Conserving Nature, Transforming Authority:

Eviction and Development at the Margins of the State

The Niokolo-Koba National Park, Senegal

by

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A Dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Anthropology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York

2012

This manuscript has been read and accepted for
the Graduate Faculty in Anthropology in satisfaction of the
dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Abstract

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This dissertation examines two distinct but interrelated processes of displacement experienced by the evictees of the Niokolo-Koba National Park, based on fieldwork (2004-2005) in the Tambacounda region of South-Eastern Senegal. While the first process concerns centralized mass evictions of the residents of the National Park during the first decade of Independence; the second process concerns multiple decentralized displacements in resettlement areas at the buffer zone, since the implementation of decentralization reforms. Taking as a starting point that eviction is not a punctual event, but a complex process that reflects and transforms relations that lead to loss of property and authority, this project examines how the inhabitants of the National Park have been related and continue to relate to the "state" in its different manifestations since the colonial rule.

Evictions from national parks in Africa, are often understood as results of international pressures in the name of conservation of global commons. This study illustrates the equally important role of the emergence of a centralized and developmentalist postcolonial state in forced evictions. I illustrate the transformation of the national park into an "untouchable territory" where the evictions were justified by "public utility." This transformation mirrored and contributed to authoritarian and technocratic tendencies and the radical stand against "customary authorities" in this region, constructed as a backward and rebellious area.

In contrast, for many, decentralization through the transfer of centralized state powers to elected local authorities would improve democratization in Senegal. I also examine these claims by looking at the practices of the rural council of Dialakoto in resettlement areas at the northern borders of the National Park. I examine how the resettlement process, increased commodification of land and neoliberal development projects created the conditions for decentralized evictions. While centralized evictions strengthened the local image of the “state” as a coercive foreign authority, decentralized evictions extended this view to local rural councils acting as brokers of neoliberal development. Through the analysis of centralized and decentralized evictions, this dissertation unravels the contradictory effects of development, conservation and decentralization in Senegal and, complexities of claiming authority and property at the margins.

Acknowledgements

This project has been a long journey during which many individuals, too many to mention, have contributed their generous help. I would like to first thank my committee members: Professors Talal Asad, David Harvey, Jesse Ribot and Gary Wilder for their guidance and support.

The institutions that supported my efforts from the conception of my project to the writing of this dissertation include the Foreign Language and Area Studies Scholarship (FLAS) from Michigan State University and the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the CUNY New York-Paris Exchange Program, the Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), the Fulbright Hays Dissertation Fellowship, the CUNY Mario Capelloni Dissertation Writing Fellowship, the CUNY Institute for Research on the African Diaspora in the Americas and the Caribbean (IRADAC) and the New York Public Library.

I was also fortunate to have the support of many outside mentors and interlocutors who have helped me to shape this project. In New York, I would like to thank Professors Mahmood Mamdani and Gregory Mann, who have read, commented and provided invaluable feedback on this project at its different stages. In Paris, I am grateful to Professors Jean Boutrais, Dominique Juhé-Beaulaton and Jean Schmitz for their help in shaping the beginnings of this project. I would also like to thank friends and colleagues who encouraged and supported me by reading and discussing my writing: Caroline Plançon, Robert Gibb, Tarik Dahou, Deborah Gambs, Brandon County, Etienne Smith, Yunus Doğan Telliel, Saygun Gökariksel, Sophie Saint-Juste, Sinan Ünür, Karen Pittleman and Carla Baranauckas.

In Dakar, I have been fortunate to have rich intellectual exchanges with Professors Bienvenu Sembou, Paul Ndiaye, Charles Becker, Abderahman Ngaide, as well as, with Dr. Cheikh Mbow, Malamine Tamba and the researchers at the Institut des Sciences de L'Environnement and WRI/CIRAD/CODESRIA Forest Resources Decentralization Program. In Tambacounda, I would like to thank the National Parks Service and Niokolo-Badiar Project, the Regional Tribunal of Tambacounda, the staff of Wula Nafaa, Director of PROMER Masamba Diop, for their open minded and enriching discussions on issues and problems that are at the center of this dissertation.

I am grateful for the kind assistance of Saliou Core Diallo, Denis Traore and Mamadou Diallo, who always opened new windows for me to look at the issues that I am interested in and facilitated my research in translating and transcribing the interviews. I cannot repay the generosity of my hosts in Dakar, Ragip Saritabak, Assane Diarra and his family, in Tambacounda, Denis Traore, Djiby Cisse and their families, and in Wassadou Depot Niatou, Djemme and Lamine Keita. I am particularly grateful to the inhabitants of Madina Bloc, Dienna Kouta, Boulakounda, Wassadou-Depot, Damantan and Badi, who shared their experiences and perspectives that allowed me to deepen my understanding of displacement and, whose patience in the face of the most daunting difficulties became a true source of inspiration for me.

My work could not have been possible without the support, love and memory of my family in Turkey: my late father, Mehmet Muharrem Ece, whose brilliant and inquisitive mind inspired me to engage in academic research, my mother, Sevim Ece, whose endless support accompanied me throughout my life, my grandmother and my late grandfather, whose presence enlightened my childhood and whose memories taught me a great deal about displacement. Finally, I am grateful to my uncle, aunt, brilliant cousins and to the late Jean and Hermine Bruat, who shaped my childhood memories of nature at the shores of the Mediterranean.

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List of Abbreviations

APROVAG: Association des Producteurs de la Vallée du Fleuve de Gambie

CER: Centre d'Expansion Rural

CERP: Centre d'Expansion Rural Polyvalent

CRAD: Centre Régional d'Assistance au Développement

DPN: Direction des Parcs Nationaux

GEF: Global Environmental Facility

GIE: Groupement d'Intérêt Economique

NDL: National Domain Law

OCA: Office de Commercialisation Agricole

ONCAD: Office de Commercialisation Agricole et Aide au Développement

OFADEC: Office Africain pour le Développement et la Coopération.

PROMER: Projet d'Appui aux Micro Entreprises Rurales

PROGEDE: Programme de Gestion Durable et Participative des Energies Traditionnelles et de Substitution

PS: Parti Socialiste

SAED: Societe Nationale d'Aménagement et d'Exploitation des Terres du Delta du Fleuve Senegal

SODEFITEX: Société de Développement des Fibres Textiles

SODEVA: Societe de Developpement et de mise en valeur Agricole

UNDP: United Nations Development Program

UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

USAID: United States Agency for International Development

WB: World Bank

Introduction

> What they did was same as pulling fish out of water. That is what the Senegalese State did to our village. (An evicted village chief, March 2004).

> If you see a fire from afar, you will get up and shout: “There is fire. ... Come quick!” You will not stay here sitting in your chair. If you don’t see it, I will. But if you saw the fire and refused to help me put it out, when the foresters from the Classified Forest come, I will tell them that you refused to help me. If I go to put out a fire, everyone should come. This is what a “*Responsible*” [authority] of Forest is. (Philly, August 2004).

The village chief of one of the villages evicted from the Niokolo-Koba National Park in Senegal described the effects of the drastic change that the villagers experienced by the metaphor of fish out of water. Like the fish pulled out of the water, eviction had not only changed the relationship of the village inhabitants to their natural environment, forests and wildlife, but also their relations with one another, with other villages that surrounded them and what they understood as the state. The village chief was one of some 12,000 people evicted from the National Park at the beginning of the 1970s. Since their eviction in 1970, some of the evictees have been living at the northern edges of the National Park in an area that came to be known as “Madina Bloc.” Today, instead of forest and orchards, what surrounds the villages in Madina are increasingly infertile fields, planted each year with peanuts and cotton without interruption. Frequent land conflicts erupt over the land periodically withdrawn, distributed and re-distributed by the rural council. People in Madina have a deep sense of sarcasm, precaution and suspicion about “*les authorités,*” the authority that represents the state, about what it gives to them and what it asks in return.

This suspicion, however, grows in the midst of claims of decentralization and democratization of land and forests management in areas surrounding the Niokolo-Koba National Park. The “community-based” and “participatory” conservation projects, “animated” by familiar faces, promise to include evictees into nature conservation, which has cost them dearly in the past. The projects promise to bring development to evictees in new forms: as vegetable gardens surrounded by bamboo fences and as commodities produced under the watchful eyes of the foresters. For evictees like Philly, being a local forest authority is not only about claiming a piece

from the benefits of the forest, but also about re-claiming authority, through the very language of the power that displaced him from his land in the first place. These contradictions, double-binds and struggles that characterize the present of the evictees of the Niokolo-Koba National Park, are part of their relations with the state, or rather, the multiple hats that it wears. Displacement is not a thing of the past for the inhabitants of the group of villages situated at the northern edges of the National Park called the Madina Bloc. On the contrary, the possibility of future eviction looms large and the threat of displacement hangs over those who cannot afford to escape elsewhere or to pay their way out.



Map 1: Protected Areas of Senegal and the Niokolo-Koba National Park (Source, ISE).

In legal texts, state and international policy documents, and in French academic literature, the displacement of the villages from the Niokolo-Koba National Park is called *déguerpissement*. I had come across the word several times in official documents of the National Park Service as well as in my discussions with Senegalese and French researchers. The first sense that *déguerpissement* evoked in me was eviction. I understood evictions of the residents of the Niokolo-Koba National Park primarily as a property relationship, as the forced abandonment of a place. The old usage of the term *déguerpissement* in French pointed also to property relations as the term meant the abandonment of "the possession of a building."[1] Property is also one of the central issues that define the evictions from the Niokolo-Koba National Park. In the language of law adopted in Senegal, evictions are described as a property relationship as they were "expropriations for public utility," the result of the exercise of the state's eminent domain powers. This notion of property[2], deriving from French legal and administrative tradition[3] describes the loss of property as loss of "local" rights over land and forests as property objects.

In contradiction to this view, the evictees that I met during my field research, understood their displacement not only as loss of property in the sense promoted by the language of law adopted by the Senegalese state, but also as the loss of a place they called home, a land from which they derived their livelihoods, a forest and a bush which enclosed endless mystical secrets and resources. The metaphor of fish out of water that the evicted village chief used in the above mentioned quote, expressed very well that this understanding of loss went beyond the loss of "rights" over the use of land, forests or wildlife, as well as beyond the loss of "natural environment" as it is understood in Western environmental discourses.

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[1] Abandonner la possession d'un immeuble (Dictionnaire de l'Académie française, 1694, p. 300).

[2] The debates on property in anthropology have a long history, which had shown that ideas about property, as well as forms of property are not universally identical. For a summary of these debates and new approaches to property see (Verdery, 2003). Verdery defines property as a process, and as a symbol, but also as a powerful western "native category" encapsulating different implicit theories that stress on rights over property objects rather than claims over them.

[3] The Western ideas and categories of property were exported to places where Europeans sought to colonize. The French native category of property and theories of it produced an ideal type of private property that was based on the concentration of rights (rights to use, sell and enjoy the fruits) in the hands of an individual (Caverivière & Debene, 1988; Le Roy, 1980; Plancon, 2006). This ideal type shaped not only institutional and legal framework adopted in West Africa, but also influenced the interpretive universe of colonial administrators and jurists.

The close relationship between property, authority and value is also evident, when one looks at the other meanings of the term *déguerpissement.* During the initial stages of my research, I was invited to present my research project at a meeting of IRD's working unit on protected areas in 2003. Whenever I used the term *déguerpissement*, a sarcastic smile appeared on the faces of my French interlocutors. Initially, I thought this might be because of the ways in which numerous French terms were being incorporated and used in colloquial French spoken in Senegal.[4] The speakers of "standard" French often found the French spoken in Senegal amusing or strange. The view of French spoken in Senegal as a distortion of the "classical" French, thus, a deviation from the norm reflected a longstanding colonial attitude toward the French language as a sign of civilization.[5] At the same time this attitude prompted me to look further into the word *déguerpissement* in French. I then discovered how much it reflected the processes that I was interested in. In its everyday use in modern French today, the term has the sense of "clearing off": like telling children to clear off from the road. It also applies to non-human beings, in the sense of "getting rid of" something: like getting rid of the bees. Bees are quite useful for a gardener or beekeeper but, for a host of a fancy garden party they are more like pests that need to be cleared off, moved away, displaced, evicted from the garden for the enjoyment of the guests. In both cases, *déguerpissement* refers to clearing off something or someone unwanted and/or unvalued. How and why did the evictees of the Niokolo-Koba National Park become unwanted and their presence devalued? What was the nature of this power that constructed them as a nuisance or even as a threat?

These questions point to different possible views and different ways of looking at eviction from national parks. On the one hand, there is the view of national parks as the state's untouchable property, and a valuable piece of nature or landscape that needs to be appropriated and preserved for the good of the "public." Governments and international organizations moved

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[4] As Fiona McLauglin have shown in her study of Dakar Wolof, the "massive" lexical borrowing from French in new hybrid urban languages is closely linked to identity formation and politics in urban contexts in Senegal. These hybrid forms which also emerged in other parts of Africa previously under the French colonial rule (McLaughlin, 2001).

5 The hybrid forms of French had been received by French speakers from France as marginal, incorrect and "uneducated" uses of the "classical" French by Africans (Bissiri, 2001). These attitudes are part of the colonial ideas about French language as the language of Civilization, whose rules cannot be bent by colonized uncivilized populations.

by the “will to improve” and claiming to be trustees of the nation’s resources and humanities heritage find evictions necessary and justifiable, not for the sake of conservation but also for development. On the other hand, human rights activists (including anthropologists sympathetic to “indigenous causes”) insist that eviction from national parks is an issue of social justice; but also a power relationship that is imposed by international organizations upon nation states and people who are targets of conservation. From the perspective of evictees of Niokolo-Koba National Park, eviction is more an imposition of force by a foreign authority, that they call the state, which forces people to leave a place that belongs to them and to which they belong. As the village chief put it, eviction was what “the Senegalese State did” to their village.

The articulations and clashes between different perspectives on eviction, and multilayered and historically sedimented relations between different actors (government officials, NGO’s, local authorities and evictees) who voice them are central to dissertation. In this dissertation, I look at two different processes of displacement experienced and remembered by the former residents of the Niokolo-Koba National Park in South-Eastern Senegal. These processes displacement took different forms and happened in different periods of time. The first displacement took the form of the eviction of tens of thousands of people from the Niokolo-Koba National Park, and was carried out by the army between 1972 and 1976. My approach differs from the representations of eviction, as a punctual, one-time event, limited to the physical displacement of people from one place to another. This view plays an important rhetorical role to demarcate differences between outdated “fortress” conservation and new “participatory” conservation as well as between centralized and decentralized governance of people and natural resources. Instead, I will look at eviction from National Parks, as part of a dynamic and complex process of displacement, reflecting and transforming relations between differently situated actors, at different scales (Hammar, 2001; Moore, 2005).

The second process of displacement took the form of evictions from land that occurred and continues to occur, after the resettlement of the evictees at the outskirts of the National Park and the implementation of decentralization reforms in the 1980s. These evictions did not take the same form of coercive intervention in the name of development of a Third World nation and the conservation of its heritage. Instead, it took the form of multiple evictions from land, following the

implementation of decentralization reforms in South-Eastern Senegal. After the 1980s, evictees established at the northern borders of the National Park started to get evicted from the land they had acquired during their resettlement. In the last three chapters, I will focus on processes that contributed to these smaller size and localized evictions. In these chapters I will address three issues. In Chapter 4, I will look at the resettlement process and the new relations of authority and property that revolved around cash crop production. In Chapter 5, focusing on Madina, an important resettlement area at the North of the National Park, I look at the role of local rural councils in perpetuating the large-scale centralized evictions in the form of individualized and decentralized evictions, which continued to target the evictees of the National Park resettled at its Northern periphery. Finally, though not a displacement, I will consider a third intervention through which "community-based" nature conservation projects are inserted into Madina as new development interventions. Such conservation projects fit in environmental turn in decentralization in Senegal and play an important role in privatization of state, by relegating different responsibilities of centralized public institutions to rural councils, private entrepreneurs and small size rural associations. In Madina, where land withdrawals have led to increasing impoverishment and landlessness, these projects claim to offer new opportunities and avenues to reclaim authority for evictees. At the same time, however, they contribute to the ongoing fragmentation of evicted villages and re-inscription of power through coercive relations at the local level.

Centralized Evictions: Perspectives on Displacement from National Parks

The large-scale evictions from areas designated as national parks open up questions about the definition of national parks. What is a national park? What does it mean to be evicted from a national park? On many occasions, when I attempted to give a summary of my research to friendly audiences who did not have specific interests in national parks or in anthropology, I was often asked the following question: What do you mean by eviction from national parks? Do people live in national parks? Aren't national parks already wilderness areas? The idea that people were evicted from their land for the making of a national park appeared puzzling for most, who were

maybe too used to the image of national parks in safari ads. The decision to focus on the issues of national parks and displacement stems first from my interest in the political dimensions of the type of environmentalism that was promoted by international conservation organizations. This was directly related to my work experience in an environmental project financed by the United Nations Development Program and Global Environmental Facility focusing on "saving" the Black Sea. This experience working in the field had made me realize that much of the talk about saving the environment was intermingled with the politics behind closed doors, where international donors and governments "negotiated" the terms of international agreements. These agreements were hard to reach, especially in the case of the Black Sea, where much of the pollution is the result of oil tankers. Instead of addressing this touchy issue of politics -- after all no one could stop the Russian tankers from crossing the Black Sea and the Bosphorus -- the solution was found in educating the public in environmental awareness. Besides the de-politicization of crucial environmental problems, the politics of environmentalism of international organizations led me also to question the reasons and origins of a particular kind of paternalism, which treated the Third World countries as well as the local staff as subordinates that needed expert guidance. My training in anthropology provided some answers and avenues for me to pursue these interests.

For my dissertation research project, I decided to focus on national parks, as I came to realize that the goals of "protection" and "saving" of the environment that many environmental projects proudly support, were closely related to the ideal of national parks, which represent the merger of nature conservation, development and commodification of nature. The images of national parks produced for tourists and by National Geographic merged at the point of wilderness, untamed and untamable nature. Yet this did not mean that humans did not exist within national parks and the interactions between "indigenous" people and the conservationists seemed to be a fruitful angle from which to approach the political struggles around environment. Under the influence of profuse literature on indigenous movements in national parks in Latin America, when I decided to focus on Senegal and the Niokolo-Koba National Park, I first assumed that the park was inhabited. My short first reconnaissance trip to Senegal would teach me that this was far from being the case. It was after this first visit that I became interested in

evictions resulting from the creation and imposition of the conservation regime of national parks, especially the large-scale evictions that took place in many parts of the world.

One of the most striking aspects of official discourses on evictions from the Niokolo-Koba National Park was the way they treated displacement as a one-time event. The eviction "had happened" and the evictees of the National Park had been resettled around the National Park between 1972 and 1976. The new "participatory" management plan of the National Park portrayed this period of time as a natural result of the smooth incorporation of the surrounding areas within the National Park (DPN, 2000). Eviction played an important rhetorical function in this discourse, by conveying the message that the current conservation approach is not coercive or has distanced itself from coercive methods. Assuming the punctuality of eviction as an exceptional event, allowed conservation discourse to demarcate the old and new conservation, the coercive classical, fortress conservation and the new presumably persuasive conservation. People are not evicted from National Parks, as they were before. On the contrary, they are being "included" in conservation efforts through persuasion and "participatory" and "community-based" conservation policies. The assumption of the punctuality of the eviction on the straight line of historical development of the national park seemed also to enforce, rather than explain, the official silence that surrounded the issue of eviction. As I will show in this dissertation, the questions of how and why of the eviction do not have simple answers. However, it is important to look at the silences of the past to understand why today, in the era of "democratic decentralization" and "participatory" conservation evictions continue, this time on a smaller scale at the outskirts of the National Park where the evictees were resettled.

In what follows, to unpack the questions of why and how large-scale evictions from national parks became imaginable and feasible, I review some recent approaches in anthropology that cuts across a number of disciplines and fields of study, including geography, political science, political ecology, development studies and African studies. I will focus on the current anthropological debates about national parks and displacement that are inspired by the multidisciplinary field of political ecology, whose focus of attention is on exclusion, access and control over resources and territory. I will pay special attention to how these works understand the role of the state -- its absence or incapacity vs. its overwhelming presence -- and argue that the

bracketing out of the question of state obscures important aspects of mass evictions that occurred in the context of national parks in the aftermath of independence and decolonization movements. In the following section, I will consider some approaches that help illuminate aspects of postcolonial dilemmas of the developmentalist technocratic state in Senegal.

Eviction for Conservation: National Parks as Virtualism

Although anthropologists had long been preoccupied with the meanings and uses of nature as part of human cultural and material production,[6] the interest in protected areas, particularly in national parks, and their obscure (and obscured) history is relatively recent in the field. Anthropologists, who have focused on nature conservation, treated the protected area classification as one of the strategies of global nature conservation organizations (Orlove & Brush, 1996). Recently, it has been suggested that it be more accurate to define national park as a "virtual reality," part modernist "visions" of international conservation institutions imposed upon landscapes and peoples in various parts of the world (West, Igoe, & Brockington, 2006). The argument of virtualism is a continuation of the efforts of environmental anthropologists who seek to bring together critical debates about the modern view of nature that underlies current dominant environmental discourses and the multiple ways in which nature is objectified and commodified. The commodification of nature through capitalist production and exchange relations, with the help of the economic rational that assigns market value to nature based on calculations of costs and benefits had been important problems for anthropologists interested in different forms of conservation, which include national parks as well as bioprospecting (Orlove & Brush, 1996).

The argument of virtualism is an extension of the anthropological critiques of environmentalism using the notions initially put forth by Carrier and Miller for "economy in the West" (Carrier & West, 2009; West, et al., 2006). Carrier and Miller had noted that since the World War II, an "abstract economic world view" and tendency toward "dis-embedded" economic

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[6] In an article published in 1980, at a time when environmental issues started to gain increasing visibility on international forums, Orlove summarized different schools of thought that incorporated ecology and questions related to nature in early American and British anthropology (Orlove, 1980).

relationships were on the rise in the West (Carrier & Miller, 1998).[7] The main target of criticism in the virtualism argument is the economic world view adopted by neo-classical economists and experts who populate the ranks of international institutions like the World Bank (ibid, p. 7). However, international experts trained in economics do not only conceptualize, but also act and attempt to change the world according to this partial view or a "synthetic picture" of reality, which is assumed to be out there. Virtualism refers to these attempts to impose economic visions upon the rest of the world:

> Perceiving a virtual reality becomes virtualism when people take this virtual reality not just a parsimonious description of what is really happening, but prescriptive of what the world ought to be; when, that is they seek to make the world conform to their virtual vision (Carrier & Miller, 1998, p. 22).

The virtualism argument stresses that economists, like scientists, formulate their questions within the limitations of paradigms within which they work. Their "reality" is partial, because it is the product of the "conceptual apparatus that help to generate it." Yet, despite its limitations, this world view is propagating in the West and beyond and manifests itself in multiple forms, including development thinking. For Carrier and Miller the "development thinking," which emerged after the World War II is the most "visible" example of virtualism, as it aims at ordering countries' polities and economies to bring them in line with the "virtual reality of economics" (ibid, p. 12).

This emphasis on an all-encompassing world view and visibility, which may be criticized on different grounds,[8] underpins the applications of virtualism to environmentalism. Similar to economic virtualism, the environmental virtualism represents a particular "world view." This world view create "virtual realities"[9] based on a limited ways of seeing the "surroundings" and is based

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[7] Inspired by Polanyi's distinction between formal and substantive economy, Carrier and Miller described two types of "economic abstractions": practical and conceptual. These "concepts and models of economic abstraction are increasingly "taken to be fundamental reality that underlies and shapes the world" and result in the abstraction of economic activities from social and other relationships in which they were embedded (Carrier & Miller, 1998, p. 22).

[8] The first objection may be based on the simplified definitions of "reality" and "abstraction" that underpins the definition of virtualism. The authors seem to equate "reality" to what is "visible" or "what is really happening." Thus, virtualism appears to be almost a result of a failure of perception of a certain "reality" which can only be comprehended by its visibility.

[9] Virtual realities are the created by a "set of partial analytical and theoretical arguments that define the world, rather like a computer program defines the world that one sees when one puts on the goggles of a virtual reality game" (Carrier & West, 2009, p. 77).

on categories and abstractions that are created and dominated by a particular modern Western view of nature. Thus, it is also inspired by the critiques of modern view of nature, which have pointed out that nature is increasingly disassociated from society and culture.[10]

National parks (and protected areas) are the most important manifestation of this particular Western view of nature and a "form of virtualism" because "they are a way of seeing and understanding" but also a way of "reproducing the world" (West, et al., 2006, p. 252).[11] Virtualism applied to environmentalism focuses on global conservation organizations (e.g. IUCN), which not only produce protected area categories, but also hold responsible the peoples in other parts of the world from "discursive standards that they can never live up to in practice" (West, et al., 2006, p. 256). By setting up these discursive standards, international conservation institutions "prescribe and proscribe" their vision (West, et al., 2006, p. 255). In this context, evictions from national parks could be considered as ultimate examples of the "visible" effects of powerful Western environmental organizations and their "virtualism" imposed upon the world (Carrier & West, 2009).

The virtualism argument is helpful in highlighting the importance of free-market rationality, which attributes a monetary value to all aspects of the environment, and the role of international development and conservation organizations in recreating such rationality through different projects. However, virtualism does not address some of the most important issues of evictions from national parks. Where do the power of national parks, as a category of conservation thinking come from? How are "virtual realities" able to forcefully remove people from their land? If we consider protected areas only as abstract categories produced by Western economists,

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[10] The history of the transformation of the ideas about nature had been a subject of debate in philosophy as well as in anthropology. For the emergence of western thinking about nature identified to physical world, and object that could be managed and manipulated by humans see (Collingwood, 1945). However, as Raymond Williams has also remarked what is at stake in arguments about nature is the "ideas of different kinds of societies", and worlds like nature and environment contain an "extraordinary amount of human history" (Williams, 1980, pp. 67,71). Anthropologists, starting from the premise that views of nature are embedded in social relations, have been particularly interested in questioning nature-culture dualism. For an overview of anthropological literature on this persistent dualism see (Descola & Palsson, 1996).

[11] Much like this earlier definition of virtualism, in its application to environmentalism, West and Carrier argue that "virtual reality becomes virtualism when people forget that virtual reality is a creature of the partial analytical and theoretical perspectives and arguments that generate it, and instead take it for the principles that underlie the world that exists and then try to make the world conform to that virtual reality."

international organizations, or governments -- even though the virtualizing vision of Western environmentalism is not “in the heads” of conservationists -- how can we talk about “social impact of protected areas”? It becomes difficult to discover the effect of the power of environmental narratives and visions without discussing how they are inserted in specific institutional and legal contexts.

This issue is also an important drawback of the virtualism argument when it comes to comparing different parts of the world according to the prevalence of displacement. There is an agreement that there are more reported instances of eviction in Africa than in Latin America. This “plethora” of African material on displacement is explained in the following terms:

> ...larger size of African protected areas, the continent’s predominantly rural population, and the combination of weak states and colonial imposition, which makes planning for displacement so difficult (West, et al., 2006, p. 258).

It is hard to understand what makes “planning for displacement” a function of these presumable “characteristics” of the continent. Instead of offering an explanation for the prevalence of evictions, this statement make reference to why African states were unable to plan effectively for the evictions that had already been carried out. This inability to plan is understood as a combination of different factors, which all point to incapacity of African states and the marginal position of Africa in the world economy. This brief reference to Africa also points out the large gap concerning the conception and the role of the state within the framework of the virtualism argument. What makes colonial imposition and a “weak” state a “combination” that leads to displacement? Why do African states, which played a leading role in massive evictions, remain weak in the “planning” of displacement? Africa’s representation as a continent characterized by colonial imposition and “weak” states not only eschews unfruitful debates about why African states are incapable of building “strong” states that conform to the Weberian model of rational-legal state (Roitman, 2004), but also takes for granted that Western environmental “visions” are accepted as given by African governments. Why and how did nature conservation categories and eviction become acceptable to African (or other) governments? These questions remain unexplored, as it is assumed that what represents the state is only national conservation institutions, which are themselves mere tools of international interests and organizations.

Another important question that virtualism poses is why Western environmental visions, much like development visions, fail to accomplish their goal. The “cracks in the edifice of virtualism” appear because “virtualizing tendencies are hard to turn into virtualizing practices.” Similar to High Modernist agricultural and urban projects described by James Scott (Carrier & West, 2009, pp. 10,12), environmental visions like national parks are doomed because they fail at the level of organization or execution, but also because they do not take into consideration the “forces and factors” that constrain the “virtualizing pressures” (ibid, p. 13). Although the existence of these forces and factors are acknowledged, the virtualism argument runs the risk of reducing one of the most important “actors” in the implementation of international environmental visions, the nation-states, to a simplified categorization of strong and weak governments. As opposed to “strong” states (i.e. Asian governments), “weak” states (i.e. Caribbean or African governments) have to accept international visions whether they are willing or not (ibid, p. 14)[12]. Their ability to “impose” the vision of Western environmentalism, however, is assumed to be limited. The case of the Niokolo-Koba National Park, however, shows that the power field within which international visions of conservation are inserted are far more complex than virtualism admits. Not only are there a multiplicity of discourses that go into the making of a national park, but also these are negotiated, re-appropriated, and re-channeled through different institutions and actors, over which international actors do not have total control. Furthermore, the seemingly universalist and humanist tone of conservation discourses presenting the Niokolo-Koba National Park as “Senegalese gift to humanity” are part of the legal, administrative and political arsenal, which had been put in place during colonial rule and made available to the National Park Service, making possible the subsequent evictions of the resident villages.

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[12]The authors accept that even those governments that are presumably “weak” (using the case of Jamaica) to modify or even reject the Western conservation programs, making sure that they fit to local needs and practices (Carrier & West, 2009, p. 14). However, they attribute this choice not to the “local needs” or the self-serving purposes, but to their weakness, unwillingness of these states or to the possibility that they may “contain powerful factions that see the neoliberal vision as self-evident even natural.”

Fortress Conservation: Exclusion, Coercion and State-Building

The virtualism argument also acknowledges the contributions of other research on national parks and eviction within the field of political ecology. Political ecology-centered approaches focus on environmental narratives as well as on mechanisms of exclusion and access that accompany them. The term "fortress conservation" expresses very well this concern about the exclusion of local, "indigenous" inhabitants and the mechanisms, institutions and actors that control access to land, forests and natural resources enclosed as national parks. Like "fortress Europe" that keeps immigrants at bay, fortress conservation is keeping people away from national parks. This suggestive term had been first used in Brockington's work to refer to creation of Mkomazi Game Reserve in Tanzania, questions conservationist arguments about ecological fragility and pastoralists to the negative impact of cattle grazing (Brockington, 2002). As Fairhead and Leach have done for West Africa, Brockington questions the interpretations of scientific research on human impact and environmental change -- particularly based on disciplines of conservation biology and ecology.[13] The critical re-evaluation of conservation discourses about environmental degradation (e.g. desertification and deforestation) points out that what has been represented as a fragile environment and singled out as "wilderness" had already been altered, as a result of a longer history of human use and local practices.[14] What is more important, these and other studies of national parks in environmental history and political ecology show how conservation discourses targeted particular local practices (e.g. cattle grazing, slash-and-burn agriculture, or hunting) and particular groups or "peoples" associated with these

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[13] As Fairhead and Leach argued for the case of West Africa, and as Sivaramakrishnan pointed out for Bengal, unlike what conservationists argue changes in forest cover cannot be explained through a unidimensional degradation narrative that blames the local farmers and forest dwellers (Fairhead & Leach, 2000a, 2000b; Sivaramakrishnan, 1999). Brockington argues, for the case of Tanzania, that the measurements of pastoralists impact on land and forests are also bound to remain inconclusive. This debate about different criteria used to evaluate degradation extends to the question of how well national parks "work" to protect the wildlife (Brockington, et al., 2008). In some circumstances the enforcement of national park regime do conserve vegetation. However, this is not always the case for wildlife, which as the case of the Niokolo-Koba indicates continue to decrease despite the establishment of the National Park. Thus, the criteria according to which the "performance" of national parks can be measured continues to be a contentious issue.

[14] This particular argument follows from the path of the work of environmental historians. For how areas considered as wilderness had been shaped by human labor over long duree in North America and see (Cronon, 1983).

practices (pastoralists, cultivators, hunter-gatherers) for harming the environment. Exclusionary discourses, justifying the creation of national parks and the removal of their inhabitants were more than reflections of overarching Western "visions" of the environment. They produced both particular images of nature (as untouched wilderness, or as tropical Edens) and run parallel to and incorporated particular images of European settlers and "native" peoples (Beinart, 1987; Cronon, 1983; Grove, 1995; Jacoby, 2001; MacKenzie, 1988). This indicates that the power that excludes from national parks is not only limited to the field of environment.

The power of Western environmental visions does not lie in their inherent persuasiveness. However, what makes such discourses so powerful, particularly in the context of national parks? Although there are a multiplicity of responses to this question, I would focus on two positions that reflect some of the issues that I encountered during my research. At one end of the spectrum, anthropologists of development argue that national parks should be considered as examples of "mega" development projects, similar to hydraulic dams that create large-scale disruptions in the lives of local or "indigenous" peoples through displacement (Cernea, 2003; Oliver-Smith, 2009, 2010). What emanates through national parks is the power of development discourses and practices. This position is best exemplified by Escobar, who considers environmental discourses as part of the "institutional apparatus of biodiversity network," which produces not only specific forms of knowledge but also types of power and conservation as a form of development is inherently a displacement creating process (Escobar, 1998, p. 56).[15] Looking from the perspective of indigenous social movements, the tendency in these works is to focus on the power of Western scientific institutions, development agencies and non-governmental organizations, while they bracket out the question of the "state" in the process of

[15] Unlike the virtualism argument, however, Escobar influenced by Foucault, argues that these "power-knowledge" constellations are "resisted, subverted or recreated to serve other ends" (ibid, p.56).

eviction.[16] However, an important contribution of these works is to draw attention to an important dimension of displacement from national parks that is rarely discussed elsewhere: the process of resettlement and its importance in reinforcing the expansion of the state and the evictees integration in regional and national market economies (Oliver-Smith, 2010, p. 170).

At one end of the spectrum of political ecological debates are those perspectives that attribute a relatively more important role to "the state" in implementing the international environmental groups' "interests" by organizing and carrying out evictions from national parks. For Peluso there is a mutual entente between the international environmental community and the Third World states. While those states that are willing to comply with international agreements and Western conservation ideologies do so to "justify their own resource management practices," their capacities to control valuable resources are also augmented by conservation groups (Peluso, 1993, pp. 46, 49).[17] "Contemporary developing states" have adopted coercive "colonial policies for land and resource control, making them even more coercive" (ibid, p.50). Similar to virtualism arguments, Peluso adopts also a Weberian rational bureaucratic state model, but instead of relying on weak vs. strong states distinction, she stresses that all states share the "will" to establish a monopoly over "administrative, legal, extractive and coercive" means (ibid, p. 48). According to Peluso, states can coerce conservation under three circumstances: "when the resource is extremely valuable, when the state's legitimate control of the resource is questioned or challenged by other resource users, and when coercion is last resort or easiest means of establishing control over people and territory" (ibid, p. 50). Yet, as states are not unitary and they

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[16] This focus on resettlement also shapes how the role of the state is understood. Resettlement is viewed as a large-scale infrastructure building project that most states cannot undertake with their limited means and have to rely on multinational or national corporations. It is thus also assumed that international capital or private corporations have to carry out displacement from national parks (Oliver-Smith, 2010, p. 206). It is the case in certain parts of the world (notably in Equatorial Africa) that international conservation institutions are directly involved in evictions from national parks, however, this is not the case everywhere, and in other parts of Africa like Senegal (or Tanzania) it is mainly the institutions integrated within the state administration that carry out evictions. Short-circuiting this process is an obstacle to understand postcolonial dynamics within such national institutions.

[17] Despite the important place that Peluso attributes to the state in her framework, she nevertheless still attributes the international conservation and development the primary agency in implementing exclusionary coercive measures in the name of nature conservation. She claims that sovereignty of Third World nation states are also compromised because the "conservation agenda" of securing "global commons" had become a way of justifying "external intervention in what were previously the sole affairs of the states" (ibid, p. 51).

have “factions” within them composed of elites, these could seek to monopolize valuable resources not for the “public good” as they claim they do, but entirely for their own interests.

The last two conditions, however, are important suggestions, which complicate this picture. They support the idea that when nation states use sovereignty rights and militaristic strategies to remove people from the parks, they do so not only to access valuable resources but also to control “recalcitrant” groups that challenge state authority. In summary:

> “Legitimate” violence in the name of resource control helps states control people, especially recalcitrant regional groups, or minority groups who challenge the state’s authority (Peluso, 1993, p. 47).

This point highlights that the competition over access and control over natural resources and the national park as a territory is closely related to the question of competing authorities. It is not a coincidence that conservation discourses, which represent the inhabitants of national parks as poachers and trespassers co-exist with other discourses that represent certain groups as a threat to the authority of the state. One corollary of the above argument is that coercion exercised by the state is not only for control of natural resources but also for the deposition[18] of specific local authorities that are deemed to be “recalcitrant.” Political ecological perspectives focused on mechanisms of access show how valuable natural resources can become objects of different authority claims, however, they neglect to consider that the construction of these “recalcitrant groups” is a historical process and an important part of state-building itself. This process cannot be reduced to resource control strategies and competition over access to resources, although this aspect certainly plays an important part in it.[19] The case of the Oriental Provinces in South-Eastern Senegal, where the Niokolo-Koba National Park had been first established during the French colonial rule, shows that the representations of this border region as a troubled area and its inhabitants as rebels is not only connected to resource control strategies and these strategies

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[18] This aspect of eviction is perfectly expressed in the meaning of displacement in English. Displacement in its earliest use in English, refers to the deposition or removal from an office, such as the deposition of a King.

[19] More recent approaches, however, explore this complex imbrication between the governance of nature and the governance of people. For the role of colonial forestry in state-making in India and the representation of forest dwellers as ungovernable rebels and unproductive peasants, see (Sivaramakrishnan, 1999).

were themselves connected to coercive native policies, linked to the colonial project of development.

Coercion is another important question that occupies a central place in political ecological perspectives on national parks. What makes the coercion and violence a focal point about discussions on national parks in Africa, is due partly to the fact that most national parks are managed by militarized institutions (Duffy, 2010; Lindsay, 1987; Neumann, 1998). National Park or Wildlife Services use armed park rangers, who are also authorized to use “shoot-to-kill” policies (Duffy, 2010). The presence of a military institution to guard the territory of a national park renders the discursive constructions of “fortress conservation” concrete. However, although militarization of conservation institutions may be an important indicator of the existence of coercion, this does not in itself explain what form coercion has taken, when and why it was possible to exercise it. After all, the repressive character of Forestry Services, is not new in West Africa. The colonial Forestry Service had emerged as an administrative institution part of colonial bureaucracy and merged two important roles, expertise in rational management and use of forests and the enforcement of repressions foreseen in colonial Forestry and Hunting laws (Chevalier & Normand, 1946; Foury, 1953; Meniaud, 1931). Colonial institutional and legal frameworks were favorable toward authorizing the repression and gave foresters the legal authority of repression within national parks. Yet, not only the willingness of French colonial administration but also its capacity to implement repressive measures in national parks depended on a multiplicity of factors, including the type of resistance they encountered from the resident people. The case of the Niokolo-Koba national park shows that, although prior to Independence there existed colonial precedents for attempts to evict “recalcitrant” native authorities from the protected area, these attempts were either unsuccessful or their scale did not match the mass postcolonial evictions of the 1970s.

The insights of political ecology continue to be a very valuable source to understand what national parks are and how and why large-scale displacements from national parks occur in many parts of the world. Undeniably, national parks are shaped within and by the market rationality, which considers nature as a commodity. This point is particularly important to grasp the recent environmental development projects that claim to be decentralized, community based or

"participatory." I will return to this point at the end of this introduction, where I consider their contradictory and unstable effects today, among the evicted villages of the Niokolo-Koba National Park. I do not wish to minimize the importance of capitalist production relations in agrarian environments, particularly through cash crop production (either for agricultural or forest commodities), which has important transformative effects on people living within or at the proximity of national parks. However, there is a need to look further into African states not only from the perspective of their relationship with international organizations. Viewing them as peons of international interests does not allow us to understand how situated histories of state building and forms of coercion that this entails, which play an important part in environmental politics and vice versa.

One of the important questions that concerns historical investigation on evictions is why at certain periods certain types of conservation policies and practices are applied. Why "despite the contempt for the colonial regimes that preceded them, many contemporary developing states have adopted colonial policies for land and resource control, sometimes making them even more coercive"? (Peluso, 1993, p. 50) It has been reported that during the first decade of the independence movements in Africa, in most former African colonies, the amount of land put under the strict protection of categories of like national park, wildlife sanctuary or nature reserve doubled (Neumann, 1998, p. 4). Most evictions from protected areas reported in Africa occurred before 1980, mostly during the 1960s and 1970s (Brockington, Duffy, & Igoe, 2008). Can we simply assume that the occurrence of evictions in the 1960s and 1970s -- precisely at a time of independence movements and transition from colonial to a postcolonial rule in most African countries -- is coincidental? Why fortress conservation was deemed preferable and possible for postcolonial African states? Answers to these questions are far from being straightforward, as I will discuss in the next sections.

Colonial Histories and Postcolonial Dilemmas

To understand why evictions became an option and how it was possible to implement them, it is necessary to examine the complex trajectories of postcolonial states and their

transition from colonial to postcolonial rule, as they also illuminate why strategies of militarization and intimidation within and around the national parks gained importance during the period following Independence. To look more closely at the histories of centralized evictions that have marked so deeply the history of national parks in Africa, and at postcolonial dilemmas that help perpetuate them, in what follows I will review the alternative views that provide fruitful avenues, despite some of their drawbacks.

The first one focuses on development as one of the legacies of colonial rule and central dilemmas of postcolonial states. Development was the dominant discourse framing the large-scale evictions and the resettlement plans for the evictees of the Niokolo-Koba National Park, which were shaped and implemented during the late 1960s and mid-1970s. The last two perspectives from African Studies focus on the institutional legacies of colonial rule in Africa and are important for understanding the novel and decentralized forms of eviction, perpetuated by locally elected authorities after independence.

Development: A Postcolonial State Dilemma

Part of the response to the question of why national parks became sites of massive displacements lies in the emergence of a developmentalist and technocratic state during the first decade following the Independence of Senegal. Development, as Gupta argued, would become one the most important “reason of state” of the postcolonial regimes in the Third World (Gupta, 1998). This importance of development for postcolonial, independent African states, particularly those which claimed to follow African Socialism was also reflected in discourses on National Parks. As I discuss in Chapter 3, at the time of the evictions from Niokolo-Koba during the 1970s, a multiplicity of discourses that tied development to nation states shaped postcolonial representations of the national park. While the international conservation discourse merged the ideas about wilderness, desiccation and parks as common heritage (*patrimoine*) of humanity, postcolonial nationalist discourse stressed the trusteeship role of a socialist nation state over land and natural resources, as necessary tools for national development. National Parks fit into a larger goal of development of a Third World nation that needed to catch up with the West.

Recent studies in anthropology and history have pointed out that the same notions that underpinned colonial development discourses continued through decolonization, and adopted by postcolonial states (Li, 2007; Sivaramakrishnan, 1999; van Beusekom, 2002). Calling for a genealogy of development in general, these studies approach the colonial and postcolonial development paradigms, discourses and practices in different ways. Part of development debates in anthropology -- not only but particularly those that take Marxist political economy as their main guiding framework -- assumed that although the ideas and practices of development had been changing over time, modern development as an idea that emerged after the post-World War II (Cowen & Shenton, 1996; Edelman & Haugerud, 2005).[20] Similarly for the case of West Africa, it has been argued that the "genuine" development paradigm had emerged after the Second World War (Cooper & Packard, 1997).[21] However, recent research on colonial development highlighted that such assumptions may be too hastily made.[22] As the memories of the evictees show, the application of interwar development projects in South-Eastern Senegal left deep traces and shaped the ways in which the inhabitants of the Oriental Provinces and the colonial Niokolo-Koba National Park came to understand the state in its colonial form. Colonial development project was a catalyzer and crucial site of application of coercion of French native policy. By focusing on the role of the Province Chief (the native authority recognized and implanted by the French administration) I show also how he played a central role in organizing

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[20] Cowen and Shenton argued that the "development thought" in Europe were a result of the attempt to understand the rise of capitalism in Europe and to construct an "order out of the social disorders" created by capitalism. As capitalism expanded and acquired a "global aspiration" to impose its "social and economic order upon the word" after the World War II, development doctrine has also changed giving way to the modern development doctrine today (Cowen & Shenton, 1996, p. 55). This perspective takes American Imperialism of the post World War II and the creation of international aid organizations and development agencies as the starting point of the present development thinking and practices that help the globalization of capitalism through the incorporation of the Third World.

[21] The development discourse and practice during colonial rule had been subject to debates among historians of Africa, who attempted to understand when and how the modern development doctrine had emerged and applied in the colonies. For the case of French West Africa, Cooper and Packard stressed that even though a grand development plan was drafted during the interwar period by Sarraut, this plan was not implemented due to financial constraints, compared to postwar development plan financed by French government.

[22] The work of Van Beusekom on cotton schemes in French Sudan, for example, illustrates that development was since interwar period and important framing device for French colonial administration (van Beusekom, 2002).

the forced labor for development projects. This neglected question of “local labor” is not only an important aspect of colonial agrarian development but also an important part of the construction and functioning of national parks, relied on local guides during the heyday of colonial predatory hunting, continue to rely on the local labor for tourism industry that replaced it in post-independence period.

The multiple continuities between colonial and postcolonial forms of government supported also the anthropological research that underlines the close relationship between development and governance. An example is the work of Tania Murray Li, who, inspired by Foucault’s definition of government, argued that the idea of development bears many similarities with Foucault’s definition of government as the “conduct of conduct.” Like modern governmental rationality, development aims at “shaping human conduct by calculated means” and claims at working for the “well being” of population at large (Li, 2007, p. 55). Development thus intervenes in all relations that fall under the realm of government through the claims of improvement, well being of local “populations.” Li’s important insights about how development is part of the reason of state, of governance, however, are also compromised by her integration of ideas of trusteeship to her analysis. In her merger of Cowen and Shenton’s ideas about trusteeship with Foucault’s government, she draws the conclusion that the “trustees” of development, moved by a “will to improve,” are the ones who design “calculated means” and tactics to devise improvement schemes in an attempt to conduct people’s conduct from a distance. This does not necessarily require persuasion, as they do not get directly involved with the implementation. Thus, national parks, as postcolonial conservation projects, Li argues, are also governed and animated by the “will” for conservation, which looks like a derivative of overarching and generalized “will to improve” (Li, 2007, pp. 131-134). This was hardly the case for the making of Niokolo-Koba National Park, as besides the “trustees” that applied developmental and technocratic governance techniques through resettlement plans in Dakar, almost all centrally appointed government representatives in the regions covered by the National Park were involved in the “operation” of eviction (e.g. local agricultural and forestry services as well as the governors and the prefects).

Another crucial question that undermines this important argument about the connection between economic development and governance is the undifferentiated category of trustees.

Who are the trustees? Are they colonial officials, missionaries or post-colonial politicians and bureaucrats? Are they international aid donors or smaller NGOs? Are they specialists in agriculture and conservation? Are they local authorities, customary authorities or the state bureaucrats? For Li, all of the actors mentioned are trustees, as they share the "will to improve."[23] But what about the power differences and conflict laden complex ways in which these different actors negotiate their jurisdictions and authority at different scales at different colonial and postcolonial times? The second view that I will summarize in the next section addresses these issues and shows that trusteeship may mean different things in different contexts. In the context of rural areas in postcolonial Senegal until the 1980s, trusteeship meant more the state oversight, than the disinterested guidance of developers.

What made the government ambition of development particularly important during the time of evictions in Senegal, was partly the urgency to overturn the economic and institutional legacies of the French colonial rule. There were several different aspects of these institutional legacies that postcolonial Senegalese state -- at least in its official discourses -- stood against. However, at the same time, there were also aspects of this legacy that remained unchanged and continued to provide the general framework. The postcolonial state was in some ways followed from the trails of colonial power and it worked within the power field inherited from the French colonial rule. Tensions played out particularly in debates about development, which involved a reinterpretation and reworking of socialist centralized planning, through the adoption of land and agrarian reforms that claimed to "liberate" peasants from the jug of "feudal" native authorities strengthened by the French colonial rule. At the same time, however, development discourse and practice adopted the paternalistic and technocratic outlook similar to colonial development. Efforts to educate the peasants in auto-centered development techniques and, guiding rural Africans to

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[23] Li argues that as development (or improvement) cannot be a purposeful project with a hidden agenda of dominance (of First World over Third World), the trustees either do not have the objective aim of dominating the people they want to develop. Their "intentions" may be "sincerely benevolent and even utopian" (ibid, p. 5). Ultimately whatever the interests of the trustees, they are part of the "machine" of development, even though at the end, the machine does "serve to enrich a ruling group or secure their control over people and territory" (ibid, p. 9).

attain self development, not under the "trusteeship," but under the reformed oversight (*tutelle*)[24] reflected these autocratic tendencies of centralized postcolonial state, shaped under Senghor and Dia's leadership. These tendencies marked the early postcolonial agrarian and land reforms, as well as conservation policies.

To understand the construction of the fortress of Niokolo-Koba National Park and what held it together until the end of the 1980s, it is important to look at how evictions gained acceptance and how the Niokolo-Koba National Park became a space of non-accountability. This in turn requires looking more closely at the construction of state in Senegal during the 1960s and 1970s. The creation of the national park, as an inviolable state territory and object of postcolonial state sovereignty claims, the extension of the state of emergency (Peluso, 1993, p. 57) to territories of the Niokolo-Koba National Park and its inhabitants through state-backed and authorized shoot-to-kill policies, showed that the Niokolo-Koba National Park was not only a valuable natural resource but also a juridico-political territory,[25] where the target of power was both the government of nature and populations. At the same time however, as I will show in Chapter 3, the militarization of the National Park Service and the tightening of policing measures in Niokolo-Koba reflected the autocratic tendencies of the postcolonial state during this period, as it coincided to the period when a presidential regime was put in place in Senegal after the deposition of Mamadou Dia. Despite conflicts within different institutions of the Senegalese state, after the appointment of a French legionnaire as the director of the National Park, it was possible to establish for the first time a militarized National Park Service in Senegal. However, there was also another important aspect of evictions, which showed the significance of the Niokolo-Koba National Park as a state territory. The increasing tensions between the president of Senegal Senghor and the President of Guinée Sekou Toure made the inhabitants of the National Park who had close ties with that country facilitated the justification of the "protection" of the National Park

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[24] It is significant that the first two senses of the world *tutelle* in French refers to the domains of law and administration. While in Civil Law *tutelle* defines the person who has the power of representing and caring for the person and property of a minor, in administrative law, *tutelle* refers to the means of control that the central power has over local authorities (Source: the site of Centre National de Ressources Textuelles et Lexicales, http://www.cnrtl.fr/definition/tutelle, 2011).

[25] This definition is inspired by Moore who, based on Foucault, described protected areas such as national parks as "juridico-political" territories, an effect or a product of a certain type of power (Moore, 2005).

territories as a matter of national security. The idea of the national park as an untouchable territory acquired a new meaning in this context, where the National Park became a strategic and symbolic place where the application of power through the use of force was presented as legitimate. As it has been argued for national parks elsewhere in Africa, what made possible the eviction was not simply the imposition of the conservationist ideal from beyond, but the acceptance of an authoritarian regime which "opened up a space for violent mass displacements, with seemingly no accountability" (Milgroom & Spierenburg, 2008).

Institutional Legacies of Colonial Rule and Decentralized Despotism

Another important question that needs attention is how institutional legacies of the colonial rule were reworked but perpetuated in multiple forms, even though postcolonial Senegalese governmental discourse clearly stood against them. The institutional legacies of colonial rule in Africa were the main focus of the work of Mahmood Mamdani, whose much-debated authoritative account may shed some light on this question.

Mamdani's work focuses on two aspects of this institutional legacy -- customary law and native authority -- and their implications in the shaping of postcolonial dilemmas of African states (Mamdani, 1996, 2001). In *Citizen and Subject*, he argues that one of the most important characteristics of the colonial rule in Africa was the bifurcated institutional and legal distinction between citizens and subjects that was created and reinforced by colonial laws. The colonial rule in Africa had created an institutional and legal segregation, or "apartheid," which created two categories of targets of governance: citizens (e.g. white colonial setters or Africans with European citizenship) governed by civil law and subjects (Africans) governed by customary law. While citizens had civic rights (including the right to acquire private property) defined by Civil Law of settlers or colonizers, subjects had customary rights, defined and enforced by native authorities. The colonial notion of customary law in Africa was "invented" in the sense that it included different

types of distortions of the conditions and traditions that previously existed in Africa.[26] These distorted notions were inscribed in colonial laws and they also became the legacies against which the postcolonial African states stood against and formulated their answers. Thus, although, after Independence, when all Africans became citizens, the distinction between ethnicity (which was used to box "natives" in different categories of belonging) and race (used to distinguish colonizers from the colonized) still survived, this time as a basis of indigeneity (or nativity) claims (Mamdani, 2001). According to Mamdani's framework, colonial rule worked toward creating "decentralized despots" by politically recognizing and strengthening particular "customary authorities," in the hands of which, the previously diffused forms of authority had been centralized (Mamdani, 1996, p. 8). Therefore, customary authorities, to whom the burden of colonial repressive native rule was "decentralized," emerged as locally centralized despots.

Although Mamdani would like to insert the decentralized despotism as the general rule for the institutional legacies of Africa in general, he nevertheless accepts that there were differences even between early and late colonial governance strategies. He acknowledges that while early colonial ideology "defended custom to the point of its consolidation"; during the "postwar reform phase," development became the desired goal and the custom was presented as an obstacle to development (Mamdani, 1996, p. 170).[27] However, this acknowledgement enters into the picture

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[26] An example of this was the colonial ideas about African land tenure (Mamdani, 1996, pp. 139-141). The dominant colonial administrative-juridical assumptions about property in Africa assumed that Africans (subjects) had communal rights over land (as opposed to Europeans as citizens who knew and understood private property and the Civil Law). Second, the "customary" or native authorities, appointed politically by the colonial administration, were assumed to exercise close to absolute rights over communal land. Finally, colonial administrations assumed that access to community land depended on the criteria of nativity (defined in relation to ideas of tribe and lineage) and excluded strangers. Similar distortions also existed in the way in which colonial administrators understood the distribution of authority within African societies, as they also assumed that in all cases, African political authorities (chiefs) held absolute and undivided powers in their hands.

[27] An important example of these shifts in colonial policies in Senegal, and in French West Africa in general, is the category of vacant and ownerless land. This legal category functioned as an important strategy and discourse justifying land appropriation during the colonial rule and was used in different ways at different periods of time. During the early consolidation of colonial rule in West Africa, declaring land as vacant and ownerless meant the imposition of colonial state's eminent domain and rule over customary authorities (Berry, 2002; Caverivière & Debene, 1988). However, when development gained more importance (during the interwar period, earlier than the post-World War II) the vacant and ownerless land became a playing field for the allocation of land that was considered to be "unproductive" or unoccupied (e.g. the fallow land) to customary authorities engaged in agricultural production, particularly the marabouts in peanut basin of Senegal (Copans, 1988).

only to show the differences among postcolonial African state in their reform of the bifurcated (colonial) state. Each postcolonial African state sought to overturn this institutionalized colonial differences, but reproduced a part of that legacy "thereby creating its own variety of despotism" (Mamdani, 1996, p. 8).

Comparing the post-Independence African governmental discourses on custom, Mamdani argued that African governments reflected these two tendencies of colonial strategy (consolidation of custom vs. its subsumption under development). In its "radical" versions, such as Tanzania under Nyerere (or to a degree in Senegal under Senghor-Dia government), the strategy was to "reform the (colonial state) apparatus so as to remove backwardness and fight tribalism in the name of development" (Mamdani, 1996, p. 170). However, in other places in Africa, like Swaziland the postcolonial state strategy was too conservative as it sought to "conserve an already gelled apparatus of force -- the Native Authorities --" (ibid, p.170). For Mamdani, therefore, the postcolonial regimes that took the radical road tended toward centralism, whereas the ones that took the conservative road tended to reproduce decentralized despotism. Mamdani's insights allow us to understand how colonial legacies were perpetuated in particular forms of postcolonial states that emerged in Africa. Postcolonial evictions from the Niokolo-Koba National Park in the aftermath of Independence, can be seen in this light as one continuation of colonial legacy in new forms, reproducing a centralized development-oriented socialist African state aiming at controlling native authorities, which were considered as one of the vestiges of the French colonial rule. As the process of centralized evictions from the Niokolo-Koba National Park will illustrate, this autocratic postcolonial Senegalese state, which projected an image of well organized bureaucratic and rational administration, had not been very smoothly received in forested areas of South-Eastern Senegal. Although the decentralized despotism is a useful lens through which some important dynamics of postcolonial evictions become clearer, it does not open enough space to look at the terrain of conflicts, struggles and politics within the monoliths of "centralized" state and "decentralized" local authorities.

Another important question that the decentralized despotism thesis does allow us to explore further is the question of administrative guardianship or supervision, which constitute another dimension of the coercion of the "centralized" state model of postcolonial socialist African

states. Viewed from the perspective of colonial native policy and law in Africa, native authorities[28] may look like decentralized despots, yet the way the French colonial state sought to present itself was more like a rational bureaucratic state, with French colonial administrators (e.g. the Commandant de Cercle) integrated into a model of "centralized" bureaucracy (Gellar, 1990, 2005). One of the main criticisms that emerged during the last decentralization reforms was precisely this representation of the state as a centralized bureaucratic state model that was associated with French state. Consequently, some Senegalese scholars criticized the initial administrative reforms (that created rural councils replacing the canton chiefs) not for their radical reaction against colonial decentralized despots (the native authorities) but for attempting to recreate the colonial *tuttelle* (Sy, 1998). The focus of colonial *tutelle* is not new, but its reformulation is interesting and complex as I will discuss in the next section. This is so because it involves a reinterpretation of the recent postcolonial past to demand for changes in its centralizing institutional legacies in the context of an increasing push toward neoliberal governance and privatization. Yet the call for more power to postcolonial rural councils, may lead to creation of new decentralized despots. This revival of interest and support for local authorities, through "new" decentralization reforms undertaken at the time of "sustainable development" and "participatory" conservation projects, led also critiques of decentralization to suggest that new "local authorities" that decentralization aims to strengthen in Senegal, are similar to the despotic chiefs created by the colonial rule (J. C. Ribot, 1999). This issue speaks directly to the case of the evictees of the Niokolo-Koba National Park, which have been routinely evicted from their resettlement areas at the outskirts of the park, which is also one of the central issues of this dissertation.

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[28] The category of native authority needs to be unpacked as it is a very loose one. For example, though this category itself needs to be examined more closely. While Mamdani often equates chiefs to native authority strengthened by the colonial state. (Hence he argues that customary law consolidated the noncustomary power of the chiefs.) Yet as the case of Oriental Provinces show, the authorities chosen by the French colonial rule were not necessarily "native" chiefs. In areas where they faced too much resistance or when the French could not draw important families (lineages) into their networks, they resorted to the means of bringing in a "nonnative" native authority, like the Province Chief.

Decentralized Evictions: Neo-Liberal Development, Conservation and Local Governance

The second form of eviction that I will examine in this dissertation is the decentralized evictions from land that started to occur after the resettlement of evictees at the outskirts of the National Park. In the last three chapters I explore the dimensions of this issue more in detail. Starting from the 1980s, decentralization reforms have been implemented in the northern outskirts of the Niokolo-Koba National Park, where the evictees were grouped in a resettlement area called Madina. After the election of a local rural council, evictions and threats of evictions from the land became an important problem in resettlement areas. This time, the residents of Madina were not evicted by the army but by the rural council. How do we explain and understand the cycle of evictions that seem to follow wherever the evictees of the Niokolo-Koba National Park wherever they go? Are these effects of a neo-liberal mode of governance of rural areas or the increasing trend toward the privatization of the state under the banner of decentralization? How do we understand the local dynamics of these evictions? To unpack these questions about continuous processes of eviction, I will look at how the above-mentioned initial postcolonial dilemmas had been reformulated in the context of the recent neoliberal politics of governance (decentralization) and environment ("participatory, community-based" conservation).

I will look at different aspects of decentralized evictions, which are helpful to capture some of the complexities of the everyday life of evictees, including resettlement, their re-integration into cash crop agriculture and the new administrative order of things and, the uncertain openings that they are willing to seize in order to reclaim lost authority (and property).

Postcolonial State in the Margins: Creating Legibility and Illegibility

The first perspective that shed some light on the process of multiple evictions, similar to those experienced by the evictees of the Niokolo-Koba National Park is illustrated in Hammar's study of displacements from the buffer zone of the Chizarira National Park in Zimbabwe

(Hammar, 2001). [29] Focusing on a rural district in northwest Zimbabwe, neighboring a national park, she examines how this marginal area, which had received subsequent waves of evictees became a site of violent evictions by the local council. She argues that the "newcomers" -- including those displaced from a large hydroelectric project, and those who were forced to migrate due to land expropriation and drought -- who were settled at the buffer zone of the National Park, were initially accepted as they were allowed as settled on land that was "in the margins of the margins." However, as this land became more "valuable" as a potential site for wildlife tourism in connection with CAMPFIRE projects, the Rural District Council labeled the evictees as "squatters" and with the help of the police succeeded to evict them.

In this study, Hammar argues that these evictions from the buffer zone of the National Park were forced displacements that are no exception but a "routine" practice of state-making in Zimbabwe. Yet, in this process of self-making, postcolonial states in Africa engage in contradictory strategies. At one level, evictions are part of the legibility practices, aimed at creating conditions favorable to intervene on the population, but on another level, they are deliberate illegibility tactics that displace their own citizens. Hammar argues that Foucauldian approach to "administration of life" through populations, did not render the question of sovereignty of nation-states irrelevant, as nation-states continue, in the name of sovereignty, to use "laws, decrees, and regulations" as instruments to back up coercive sanctions. At the same time, illegibility practices of forceful displacements create a "chaos" at the margins and work to strengthen the state.

This study is a creative example of how different frameworks of analysis could be brought together to analyze forced evictions. However, because of this, it also makes some contradictory claims that are useful to explore. As her study is situated at the intersection of African studies, anthropology and refugee studies, Hammar's argument about eviction encompasses a large number of arguments. She stresses the importance of considering eviction as a process rather than an event. A perspective that is important to keep in mind, not only because this view leads to victimization of evictees as helpless (and problematic environmental) refugees, but also because

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[29] The purpose of this brief summary, which does not make justice to Hammar's detailed study, is to compare the two perspectives on decentralized evictions.

the representations of evictions as past, punctual events by neoliberal conservation and decentralization is a political rhetoric that does not allow opening up of the issue of coercion.

Hammar's arguments also suggest that displacement may become a means and a strategy for postcolonial elected "local authorities" to assert their authority, in the context of decentralization reforms in Zimbabwe, just like the "centralized" state could do in other large-scale evictions. An important question is how is it that the authorities that are supposedly the elected representatives of local people, turn against their own communities and evict them? One may answer the question by the argument that they can do this because some of this "community" is not autochthonous but they are "strangers." This is the portrayal of the evictees in the Zimbabwe case, where even though the district council members are themselves migrants, they label those migrants that came after them as "strangers." In Hammar's case, even though those who were given the status of "strangers" lived among their hosts for about ten years, were labeled squatters for two different reasons: the strengthening of District Councils from the "center" through connections to the ruling party and the increasing value of land in the resettlement area (the buffer zone). In the case of the buffer zone of the National Park within which the evictees had been resettled, one of the most important ways in which land was commodified was through banana production. As I will show in Chapter 4, this was also the case on the outskirts of the Niokolo-Koba National Park, where the designation of land as a buffer zone "open" to new conservation projects, and the expansion of cotton production, increased the competition over land and intensified its commodification as well.

One important point that needs to be more carefully examined in such instances is the process of resettlement of evictees. What were the relations between hosts (e.g. rural councils) and their guests (evictees) before eviction became imaginable and feasible? In the case of the evictees of the Niokolo-Koba, the hosts (the notables of Dialakoto) and their guests (evictees from Tabadian, Damantan, Badi and Niemeneke) were not complete "strangers." They already had multiple ties with one another, the position of Dialakoto as the colonial center of administration and the alliances that its elite families forged with the Province Chief contributed to strengthen its claims over land as original "native authorities." What then was the reason for the rural community council of Dialakoto to evict its guests? While the relationships that existed prior

to eviction, can be an important aspect of the evictees relationship with their hosts in resettlement areas, equally important are the relationships that they established with them after their eviction. In the analysis of the resettlement process in Chapter 4, I will draw attention to the seasonal labor agreements that evictees established with their hosts and the kinds of conflicts that erupted during the resettlement process. I will argue that the increasing spread of cotton production in addition to peanuts, was an important part of the establishment of these labor arrangements in which the evictees did not have an upper hand.

Valuable insights arising from a comparison of specific points, however, gets more difficult to draw, when it comes to different frameworks of analysis that can be used for the study of decentralized evictions. Hammar's framework that aims at presenting displacement as an all level state-building strategy comes close to equating rural councils to "local states" or decentralized despots (only with dubious authority and limited resources). This shows on the one hand, how the talk around local authorities revolves around the question of the definition and the form of the state. Hammar's inspiration for this definition comes from the growing anthropological critiques of the analysis of the question of the "state" as a unified and coherent object. These new approaches work through and describe different and situated "state-making practices," which rely on illegibility as a governance strategy, to establish authority in marginal places and at the margins of the state (Asad, 2004; Das & Poole, 2004)[30].

This definition of illegibility inspires Hammar and Graeme's argument about "Illegibility" as an important aspect of the making, particularly of authoritarian, postcolonial African states, which creates "excludable others" to assert their sovereignty (Hammar & Rodgers, 2008). At the same time, however, Hammar also points out to what seems to be equally important process of "legibility," which as Scott defined it, creates simplifications, domesticates and makes countable the targets of the state for its own High Modern projects. This contradiction is also important in the case of the Niokolo-Koba National Park, as I will show. The technocratic imagination of the postcolonial Senegalese administration, particularly the ministry of planning, shows how legibility,

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[30] Refusing to define a "universal" transparent and rational bureaucratic state form, which could than take different regional or cultural appearances, they argue for a focus on the illegibility, disorder and partial belonging at the margins of the state and everyday "state practices" that goes into its making. The notion of exclusion is also important in this perspective, as following Agamben, it argues that exclusion is a political activity.

not in its sense of “visibility” but in the sense of “fixing” peasants to the land and rural communities, was an important project of the postcolonial state. As I will discuss the resettlement process of evictees, I will also show how the planning for eviction and resettlement was discussed simultaneously, and that they did not only fit into the conservation project but also were understood as part of a larger agrarian reform project, where technocratic rational management of agricultural areas was the key issue.

As to the illegibility argument, this suggestive direction can open also new ways of looking at evictions. However, instead of stressing on the intentionality of the local state in creating illegibility or wilderness zones at the margins, it may be more useful to think further along the lines suggested by Roitman about productivity in the margins and about how activities defined as illicit and sanctioned by Forestry, hunting laws or by national park regulations can be a source of power and authority for Forestry or National Park Services, which can also use them to extract revenues through fines (Roitman, 2004). This contradiction is also important to understand why the state is understood as an alien authority from the perspective of the residents of the Madina. As Asad remarked the “unwritten” and “unspoken” laws of the state, and the decisions that are made to choose among supposedly equal citizens, continues to create suspicion and contributes to the illegibility of judicial and policing systems of the modern state (Asad, 2004). Eviction is about the creation of margins, in all these different senses. Excluding some citizens from national parks and allowing others, extracting revenues from poachers or trespassers, and withdrawing land from evictees, in the name of decentralization, are only some examples of such everyday state practices at the margins.

Decentralization and Local Authorities: New Brokers of Development?

Decentralization is a key debate around which much of the debates on local governance is shaped today in Senegal. The enduring importance of debates on decentralization is illustrated by the intensive debates that emerged in the 1990s about the reform of regionalization[31] among

[31] A conference was organized by the University of Cheikh Anta Diop (Dakar), the University of Bordeaux IV and the University of Gaston-Berger (Saint-Louis) in 1998, two years after the 1996 Regionalization Reform to debate this issue at length.

Senegalese and French jurists, academics and statesmen. The Regionalization Reform announced the beginnings of a neoliberal reform in Senegal. At the time when the Law on Regionalization passed, the time of the developmentalist Third World state seemed to be far away. The regional council a new elected local authority,[32] was conceived more like a new intermediary in development that acts between the state administration and line ministries, urban municipalities rural councils, NGOs and private companies.

While some argued that regionalization reform was a continuation of political decentralization that had started with the election of first municipal councils in the four urban communes of Senegal under the colonial rule (Diop & Diouf, 1990a; Diouf, 1998; Sy, 1998).[33] The development organizations, which supported regionalization reform, celebrated it as a sign of good governance, just like decentralization because elected governments were representatives of the "local people." (Ndegwa, 2002). Finally those who were more skeptical, questioned what decentralization meant in Senegal. Was the creation of regions and regional councils a step further in transferring the powers (competencies) of state institutions to local governments? Or was it the re-emergence of the specter of the colonial *tutelle*? They reminded that the postcolonial state reforms of the 1960s and 1970s were also labeled as "decentralization" but contrary to this claim, they re-established the colonial state's guardianship via governors, sub-prefects and state public institutions and technical services (Agricultural Services, Forestry and National Park Service etc.), who became once more shadow controllers of elected representative authorities (Sy, 1998). Sy summarized this view as follows:

> Senegalese authorities had been reticent toward decentralization for a long time. Between 1960 and 1972, decentralization had been further limited. First, it was only extended to urban communes, whose autonomy was considerably diminished by a heavy administrative oversight. Than, progressively, the regional capitals and Dakar had been put under a special regime closer to centralization than decentralization.

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[32] The Regional Councils (assemblies) were set up to act as "intermediary structures" between the central administration and other "local collectivities" (rural community councils) (Article 25 of the 96-06 Law).

[33] The creation of the four communes is decentralization in the sense that the inhabitants elected their own assemblies and therefore, there were able to "fully exercise" [11] their political rights through their elected representatives. Although Saint-Louis had already had an elected mayor in 1778, the four communes of "full exercise" (communes de pleins exercises) - Saint-Louis, Gorée, Rufisque and Dakar- were established between 1872 and 1887.

Even though the elected municipal councils continued to exist after independence, their ability to exercise their power of governance was reduced by the Senegalese state's administrative oversight concerning their budget as well as the legality of their decisions. As long as the *tutelle* of centralized state administration weighed over the shoulders of elected authorities, they would continue to be either just the tentacles of centralized state or act as extensions of state control and power in rural areas. Thus we are experiencing through "regionalization" the latest form of decentralization the expansion of state oversight rather than devolution of more powers to local authorities, even though regions with their elected assemblies are understood as local authorities.

In fact, much of the decentralization debates in Senegal are preoccupied with this administrative oversight, that was the characteristic of French native colonial policy, which made canton (or province chiefs) the administrative overseers of the village chiefs (Ribot, 1999). In land allocation decisions, as canton (or province) chiefs controlled the decisions of village chiefs, the postcolonial prefects and sub-prefect continue to oversee elected rural councils' decisions. Another important aspect of the oversight is the technocratic managerialism. This issue is more closely examined in debates about development and conservation. However, the "technical expertise" role that the conservation institutions like the Forestry or National Park Services may also exert a considerable amount of pressure. Similarly, the oversight of Forestry Services over the rural council's decisions about forest exploitation quotas are an important extension of this system of *tutelle*. The Forestry Service in his capacity as a "Technical Service" continue to play a central role in drafting the development plans, which determined the "productive use" of forests and natural resources.

Another important debate, of course, goes on about the definition of decentralized authorities. What are decentralized local authorities? Who is represented by them? Why is their legitimacy so weak? From the perspective of the argument of state oversight, rural councils are not legitimate representatives because, in reality, if rural councils have any "powers," these are used according to the directives of the centralized stated administration. They have to be treated as the extensions, the tentacles of the state administration emptied from all their political authority. This view of rural councils puts more weight on the state-designated administrative role of the councils. According to the second explanation, rural councils are, on the contrary,

extensions of the central state with similar kinds of powers at local level. This may lead elected authorities to function at times as an extension of state control and power into the rural areas. This view, which ignores the issue of oversight, makes rural councils the new decentralized despots.

One of the important blind points of academic literature on decentralization is how “local authorities” are left as an undifferentiated category. Compared to the customary authorities recognized by the colonial rule, today’s “local authorities” (the rural councils) operate within a radically different context. Also, the question of who is the local authority is even more confused because of the conflation of the rural communities with native authorities. Canton chief and village chief, custodians of land are all “customary authorities” and the rural councils are local authorities without the “customary” title. As the case of the rural community of Dialakoto shows the Rural Council that was elected in the 1980s did not necessarily represent the village chief or the canton chief recognized as customary authorities by the colonial administration. Instead, the new council was composed of members who had acquired political and economic wealth through peanut production and through their ties to political parties.

Are rural councils representatives of the rural people because they are democratically elected? The local election system itself poses one of the main obstacles to answer this question affirmatively. As pointed out by political scientists, jurists and anthropologists studying the political participation in Senegal, the current election system that is based on party slates constitutes an obstacle for anybody to participate in elections outside of the dominant party channels (Blundo, 1995, 2000; J. Ribot, 2004). The “party politics,” networking and pulling the strings of the party officials to get on the party slates is a major part of the election system. Another obstacle is that even though selected local elite (which could include the previous owners of peanut cooperatives as well as the village chiefs) could manage to secure a place in party slates, from the perspective of the citizens (“populations” in state administrative and development jargon), these may not necessarily be their legitimate representatives. As I will show, this is largely the case for the evictees of the National Park established within the rural community of Dialakoto. This represents one of the important aspects of the understanding of the rural community council as an alien and coercive authority, which works only for its own interests.

The donor-supported decentralization involves a transfer of state powers not only to rural councils but also to newly established regional councils and private organizations. Although the use of the term private is ambiguous, it may refer to non-governmental organizations or corporations. This means that decentralization is not only an administrative or political reform but also a move toward privatization. As the regional council meeting debates will show, most donor organizations do not mention privatization as an openly stated aim of decentralization, but creating identifiable private ownership rights is one of the central points of contention.

The final perspective among the attempts to define the current rural councils in Senegal is to describe them as "development brokers" (*courtier de development*) (Bierschenk, Chauveau, & de Sardan, 2000). According to Bierschenk et al. state and development in Africa became increasingly enmeshed following independence, as state sovereignty became increasingly dependent on development aid. They argued that in Africa, intermediaries had played an important role in kinship systems even prior to colonization (Bierschenk, et al., 2000, p. 55)[34].

In this context, "development brokers" existed in all ages, in pre-colonial African societies as well as under colonial rule. They are defined by their ability to mediate to govern. They include groups ranging from interpreters to representatives to chef de cantons to village chiefs were supposed to establish a link between colonial or postcolonial state authorities and local societies. Another important characteristic of development brokers, that is more related to development arguments is their activity of extracting rent from development aid, particularly in situations where

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[34] Their definition of courtier in Africa places the role of broker almost as a continuation of a pre-colonial "institution":

> In Africa for instance, we observe the importance of certain kinship positions and of alliances or, [we see] the building of connections (relations) between different classes of kinship systems or, designated intermediaries between the community, land and ancestors or between the marabouts and their local groups of disciples. The "function" of the intermediary is evident and explicit (in Africa) especially when there is a social or symbolic distance that is parallel to the geographical distance. For example in pre-colonial states this distance implied a double representation: political communities represented in governing aristocracies, and these governing aristocracies represented in local communities. In economy, there is an abundant literature that describes the *courtage and its variants in exchange.* During colonization, the relations between colonial powers and populations were largely based on intermediary groups. These groups ranging from interpreters to representatives to chef de cantons to village chiefs were supposed to establish a link between colonial authorities and local societies.

there are large economic and power discrepancies.[35] The argument about clientelism on which the concept of development brokers are based adopts also a Weberian view of bureaucratic rationality.[36] Although neo-patrimonialism had been part of the study of politics in Senegal, it is not the main focus in this dissertation[37]. What is however important in this approach is to highlight the continuity of local development positions as a way of accumulating not only money but also status. The "transfer" from one project to the next one is, as the ethnography of the community participation projects will show, is very common in Madina. Furthermore, development projects are not only seen as a source of economic revenue but also an opportunity to regain authority -- particularly for evictees who had experienced several evictions.

Community-Based Enforcement of Neo-Liberal Conservation

In Madina, where land withdrawals have led to increasing impoverishment and landlessness, a third intervention through which "community-based" nature conservation projects are inserted after the 1990s. Such conservation projects fit in environmental turn in decentralization in Senegal. The new Forestry Code adopted in 1998, "decentralizes" the management of the natural resources to rural, regional and municipal councils and transfers the powers of the Forestry Service, which include both the management of resources and their surveillance, to rural councils. These reforms do not eradicate the control of the Forestry Service and the line ministries of government (Larson & Ribot, 2005; J. Ribot, 2002). The Forestry Service maintains its "expert" authority in approving the "rational" management plans for forest exploitation, the distribution of quotas and permits, in addition to its coercive powers. However,

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[35] The broker can shift from intermediary role to rent-seeking when:

> In situations of extreme domination where there exist barriers between heterogeneous cultural, socio-economic and political groups and a real gap between local societies and territorial and metropolitan centers of decision making, these intermediaries do not play the simple role of transmission.

[36] As Weber distinguished between charismatic and personal forms of authority from rational and impersonal forms of bureaucratic authority, this dichotomy influences also the ideas about patrimonialism, which approaches it as a form opposite to "what should be" a state bureaucracy (Rudolfph & Rudolph, 1979).

[37] For critical debates on neopatrimonialism in Africa see (deGrassi, 2008).

the new decentralization laws allow the creation of neoliberal conservation and development projects, which claim to forgo the moral or economic responsibility tied to state administration, as they are the work of local economic associations connected to NGOs. As I will show, they all work for a market economy through production of nature-based commodities (charcoal, honey, bamboo fences). At the same time, some of these projects have very close ties with Forestry and National Park Services, while other smaller ones are often financed by private entrepreneurs and small rural associations. This means that even though they represent the environmental turn in decentralization in Senegal, they act almost like centralized state conservation institutions (Forestry and National Park Services). The community-based conservation projects promote new forms of commoditization of environment (West, 2006). But they are also an important form of privatization of the state in Senegal (Hibou, 2004) .

Political ecological studies have explored some examples of the “participatory conservation projects” in buffer zones of national parks (Brosius, Tsing, & Zerner, 1998; Neumann, 1997). As these studies have also pointed out, buffer zones are production zones, which are presented as buffers against the poor peasants or forest dwellers that look “with envy” to the rich resources of the national parks from the outside (DPN, 2000). However, these projects, as I will argue in the last chapter, compete among themselves for territory and the labor of inhabitants. However, their capacity to coerce participation differs and depends largely to the degree of their cooperation with the Forestry Service or National Park Service. Some of them, such as the community forests, created specifically for charcoal production are backed by the Forestry Service and maintains their ties with its bureaucracy, others attempt to bypass such “centralized” structures to work directly with “communities.” They are shortly hybrid forms of NGOs, which are deeply involved in commoditization both at the local and regional level, while some of them also have the capacity to pressure the rural councils and the workers of the projects.

I will look at the kinds of opportunities and avenues promised by “community-based” conservation projects. In Madina, where land withdrawals have led to increasing impoverishment and landlessness, these projects claim to offer new opportunities and avenues to reclaim authority for evictees. However, they also contribute to the ongoing fragmentation of evicted

village communities and have complex and contradictory effects on local authority relations, as they contribute to the ongoing fragmentation of evicted villages and re-inscription of power through coercive relations at local level.

Chapter Summaries

In the first two chapters of this dissertation, I lay out the background of the creation of a regime of conservation specific to national parks and the political and economic relationships that set the dynamics for and made the forced evictions from the National Park possible during the first decade of Independence. In the first chapter, I focus on the traces of French colonial rule in South-Eastern Senegal, and look at how through nature conservation, development and native policy different methods and strategies to manage the rebel "populations" and valuable land and forests were cemented under the French colonial rule. The first chapter follows the traces of the French colonial rule in the region of Tanda, the South-Eastern province of colonial Senegal situated at the crossroads of Senegal, Gambia and Guinee Conakry. I will summarize some important aspects of colonial development and discourse and practice that emerged during the inter-war period in France's West African colonies as these would be reframed and reworked after the Independence of Senegal. In this chapter, the focus is the relationships established between the peoples inhabiting the region of Tanda and the French colonial administration woven around the figure of Province Chief, who represented the colonial "authority." The Province Chief played a central role in Oriental Provinces in securing labor force -- mainly through forced labor-- for large-scale colonial development projects and public works, a major concern of the French colonial administration in Sub-Saharan West Africa in general.

In the second chapter I turn to the context of the creation of a centralized, development-centered postcolonial state administration and the institutional framework that were deployed to support the evictions during the 1970s. I will examine more closely the dominant discourses on development in Senegal after Independence and how Niokolo-Koba National Park became a spearhead for nature conservation. I focus on how development discourses that emerged in Senegal were framed by African Socialism. I will look at how property relations and local

authorities, also central concern of colonial development, were reframed through land use planning, auto-sufficient agricultural production and *terroir* approach.

Chapter 3 brings these dynamics together to explore the contradictory role played by postcolonial state authorities in allowing eviction and how the residents of the park responded to and negotiated increasing pressures exercised to force them to leave. Focus on the period between 1967 and 1974 during which the decisions to evict 12,000 people from the extended Niokolo-Koba National Park was taken and their evacuation was completed. Chapter 4 ooks at how the Niokolo-Koba National Park has been transformed to be made into a “strategic place,” a security concern, a territory that needed to be protected from “external” (Guinee Conakry and Sekou Toure) and “internal” (“native authorities”) threats. The National Park Service emerged as a paramilitary organization separate from the Forestry Service, accountable only to its director and to the president of republic. I argue that the state-led coercion that made possible the forced displacement was an example of the postcolonial state’s strategies of expropriation and appropriation. The National Park was emptied from its inhabitants; it became a no-man’s land and a state “territory” that needed to be policed for the enjoyment of tourists and development.

Chapter 4 looks at the aftermath of the eviction, between 1970 and 1980, during which the evictees were established in new resettlement areas. I analyze the resettlement plan and debates, which indicate that the postcolonial state’s agrarian and land reforms, particularly the implementation of village *terroir*s was an important justification of eviction and resettlement. This chapter also focuses on the process of resettlement of the evictees in areas that lie at the northern outskirts of the Niokolo-Koba National Park, and they were re-integrated to changing political and economic landscape of postcolonial Senegal. The new local power relations that emerged after resettlement affected greatly the ways in which multiple displacements from land have taken shape in settlement areas. Both Chapter 5 and 6 focus on the northern buffer zone of the National Park, specifically to the area called Madina, where there is a concentrated resettlement of some of the evictees of the National Park.

Chapter 5 discusses the establishment of the rural community council of Dialakoto at the northern periphery of the National Park. I look at how the new rural community council changed the existing authority relations and created conflicts through the analysis of land allocation and

withdrawal practices. I also compare the councils' representations of its own practices with the perspectives of evictees. After the establishment of the rural community, the evictees of the National Park started to be re-evicted from the land on which they had been resettled. I will also look through land debates on how discourses of state guardianship and nativity had been reformulated to serve different ends. Chapter 6 focuses on Senegalese state reform of decentralization after the 1990s, which gives powers to rural community councils about the management of natural resources. I look at these reforms from the perspective of Senegalese and international discourses and argue that instead of decentralizing the central state powers of environmental management, these reforms centralize the key decisions at the regional level. I show that decentralization is understood as commercialization of the resources, not about political power of rural communities. Community-based conservation works through certain fractures that already exist and they have contradictory effects.

Notes on Methodology and Translation

This dissertation is based on data generated by in-depth interviews with people displaced from the Niokolo-Koba National Park and resettled at different villages at the northern limits of the National Park, the staff of the national park and forestry services, NGOs and rural community council members during 12 months of field research conducted in Senegal in 2004. These interviews were complemented by archival research conducted in the National Archives and Institut Fondamental d'Afrique Noire in Dakar, where I collected archival and historical texts on colonial and postcolonial history of nature conservation, development and native policy and, regional and local political information. I also consulted different institutional archives in Dakar and Tambacounda. In Dakar, in the archives of the National Park Service, Programme Senegal Oriental, ORSTOM and IRD; I collected data and conducted interviews on nature conservation policies and laws, as well as data and literature on current participatory conservation related projects. In Tambacounda, I consulted the archives of the Governance of Tambacounda and of Regional Tribunal for historical data on evictions.

During the time I spent in Dakar and Tambacounda, throughout my field research, I met with staff of the National Park and Forestry Services and the NGOs working at the northern periphery of the Niokolo-Koba National Park and conducted interviews. Most of these interviews were in French (except for the staff of USAID project) and most meetings that I attended had French as the main language of communication.

During my stay at the northern periphery of the National Park, I visited at least one time, the “officially” recognized seven villages of Madina Bloc: Niemeneke Pulaar, Niemenke Mandinka, Madina Tounti, Missirah Damantan, Wakilare Damantan and Mamboya. I have met not only with village chiefs and their close families but also with other inhabitants of the villages, who generously took time to discuss over long hours issues ranging from memories of eviction, their problems and perspectives on cultivation and herding, their work in participatory conservation projects and land conflicts. I also visited two other villages that have political and economic ties with villages in Madina, part of whose inhabitants or all of them were from the park. These villages were Boulakounda and Dianna Kouta. While Boulakounda was also initially the first settlement area of the notables of Damantan, Dianna Kouta is the destination of evictees who choose to migrate into the Classified Forest of Diambour in the North of Dialakoto.



Map 2: Resettlement areas of Madina Bloc, Boulakounda and Dianakouta, Classified Forest of Diambour and the Niokolo-Koba National Park (based on ISE Map).

During my stay at the northern borders of the Niokolo-Koba National Park, I was lodged in Wassadou Depot, while I conducted in-debt interviews with the villagers living in Madina Bloc, in Badi and Damantan, as well as in the Boulakounda and within the classified forest of Diambour. These interviews were mostly conducted with speakers of different dialects of Pulaar and Manding. Although I had taken intensive language classes in Pulaar and Bamanan, my knowledge of these two languages was not enough to understand the linguistic nuances and rich metaphors that my interlocutors used. The most important difficulty was the specific usage of Manding in this part of Senegal which was quite different than my training in Bamanan, although both languages are related. I therefore worked with a field assistant during my research, Saliou Kore Diallo who was himself a Pulaar speaker from the region of Kedougou who was also conversant in Manding and had an invaluable knowledge of this part of Senegal as well as development issues. However, there were also built-in problems with my choice of interpreter. On the one hand, Saliou's familiarity with development -- as most researchers he was primarily hired by development projects -- sometimes affected the translation process, where he tended to use

development terminology. This had created some misunderstandings at the beginning but over time, as we worked together and he understood and developed also an interest to my topic of research, we were able to reduce considerably these slippages. Another important factor was how he, as a Pulaar speaker, was perceived by my interlocutors. Often, Pulaar speakers felt comfortable with Saliou and used familiar pejorative terms like "*sebbe*" (Madinka) to refer to Manding speakers, however, Manding speakers hesitated to use words like "pulanding" (little pulaar) to refer to Pulaar speakers in his presence. This particular understanding of the relationship between Mandinka and Pulaar speakers entered into the picture when Saliou was explaining to me certain issues and concepts that he felt I did not understand.

Although his translations were filtered through his lenses as an interpreter and a researcher, Saliou was in many ways crucial to my understanding of the local context. I thank him for his patience and energy, despite the torching heat and the frustration of many repetitions. This was not the only challenge of the field work. Surely, as Hammar observed, eviction narratives were also deployed by differently situated actors." Like everyone else, the evictees of the Niokolo-Koba National Park narrated their life histories, together with the history of their experience of "state," each from his own position, and in relation to what their interlocutors represent for them -- in this case Saliou and me. These are also some of the inescapable drawbacks of the work of translation. In order to check for inconsistencies, I also worked with a native Bamanan speaker from Tambacounda, Francis Traore. Francis, then a student of French literature, had a better grasp on Manding than Saliou. He was in many ways an important check and corrector in translations from Manding. Not surprisingly, his translations were also affected by his lenses, as he often used overly elaborate French terms to translate much more brief and succinct expressions used in the interviews. Finally, all translations from French to English are mine and as a native Turkish speaker, who first learned French, then English, I myself am certainly not immune from these criticisms. Therefore, I apologize for any misunderstandings that may be the result of this complex process of translation, hoping that I was able to be as truthful as possible to the core ideas and feelings communicated to me.

Chapter 1: Colonial Legacies: The Oriental Provinces and the Niokolo-Koba National Park

Introduction

At the beginning of my field research, when I first arrived at Wasadu Depot, I had little idea about the evictees of the Niokolo-Koba National Park. I was told that the evictees were concentrated at the northern limits of the park in the rural community of Dialakoto, near the national road that linked the city of Tambacounda to Kedougou. They formed a distinct area that the conservation and development projects called “Madina Bloc,” separate from the rest of the rural community. As my field research progressed, several important differences, but also similarities, emerged. First, Madina, appearing as a Bloc in development discourse, was constituted of villages from different parts of the National Park. Some of the residents of Madina, who were “from the park,” came from Tabadian and Damantan (west of the park). Others were from Niemeneke and Sibikiling (east of the National Park closer to the town of Kedougou). Others were close to Madina Bloc, and they were from the newly constituted villages of Badi and Niongani (north of the present National Park).[38] Also, as I traveled from one village to another, following the tracks and traces of the evictees, I realized that the evictees had migrated to a large area outside the Madina and settled in almost all villages. Evicted villagers were linked to one another in ways that predated their resettlement in the 1970s; they had complex relations with their “hosts” in Wasadu Depot, Dialakoto and Missirah well before the eviction. As an elderly man put it, their relations with their hosts and with one another “did not date from yesterday.” Dialakoto, the center of the current rural community, was also the seat of the province chief, who came to collect taxes and requested forced labor from villages. Wassadou-Depot was still full of migrant laborers, a transition zone, just like the time when the first forced laborers arrived to work in colonial sisal plantation.

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[38] The residents of the current villages of Badi and Niongani are a couple of kilometers away from Madina and Wassadou, and they migrated from old Badi and Niongani, which was at the North of the Colonial National Park.

Colonial legacies permeate the present lives of peoples evicted from the Niokolo-Koba National Park in many ways. The evictees' understanding and way of relating to the "authorities" are shaped not only by the immediate present but also by memories of what represented the "state." The Forest Service , as well as the rural council, are understood as alien "autorités" (authorities) (Asad, 2004). Many evictees share the view that the laws enforced by the Forestry Service (restrictions on hunting, wildfires, clearing the land, etc.) are imposed from outside, and that their relations with this alien authority is based on coercion. Similarly, the elected rural community council -- assumed to be representative of the inhabitants by international organizations and the state - is viewed with suspicion. These land distribution practices are perceived as arbitrary and coercive. However, for some evictees, these authorities are a source, if not of protection, of opportunity for access to different resources (land, forests, finances).

These views cannot be explained only by the evictees' present relations with the Forestry Service or the rural community council, as they are also embedded in a complex and layered relations that were partly shaped during the colonial rule. In order to grasp the complexities of this double-sided relationship of coercion and persuasion established between the evictees and the state, viewed as an alien authority, it is important to understand the institutions that constituted the colonial state, how they shaped property and authority relations linking the colonial state to inhabitants of forested rural areas and their authorities. Although one of the main aims of the independent Senegalese State was to dismantle the multiple traces of the colonial past, the tracks opened by colonial rule would not be entirely erased. As I will explain in Chapter 3, despite the emergence of a postcolonial discourse that seemed to challenge colonial legacies, in practice, the main principles and framework of colonial institutions and laws were retained and, colonial assumptions about property, development and local governance had not been entirely erased. Thus, the colonial practice of forced displacement and resettlement -- used both to provide forced labor and to create exclusive reserves-- would be replicated on a larger scale after Independence.

This chapter focuses on the period preceding the Independence of Senegal, during which the first colonial National Park was created in Oriental Provinces, part of the present region of Tambacounda. My aim is not to cover the complex history of French colonial rule in Senegal, but to contextualize the effects of colonial power in areas included within the colonial Niokolo-Koba National Park, which would also become the targets of postcolonial evictions.

Postcolonial representations of the Pre-colonial Past:

The South-Eastern part of Senegal where the current Niokolo-Koba National Park is located, was called Senegal Oriental[39] during the colonial rule. As its name suggests, the Senegal Oriental was, and continue to be, "orientalized" in many different ways. In the narratives of the general History of Senegal, Senegal Oriental is not only geographically peripheral region (as it is bordering Guinee, Gambia and Mali) but also as economically and culturally peripheral region, distant from the coastal centers of commerce dominated by the Wolof culture (Diouf, 2001, p. 161).[40] In contrast, to presumably ethnically homogeneous other regions of Senegal, like the "traditional" Sine, the land of the Serrer or more "modern" coastal regions dominated by the Wolof, Senegal Oriental is described as a "diverse" region, where several ethnicities cross cut the borders of current Senegal with Gambia, Guinee and Mali.[41] Compared to centralized, imposing and influential states (founded by Wolof, Tukuler, Serrer etc.) that existed in other regions, Senegal Oriental appears to have a past full of divisions, conflicts raged between fragmented small polities. The representations of different regions of Senegal and, the periphery-center

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[39] Senegal Oriental included todays the regions of Tambacounda, Kolda and Kedougou.

[40] The dominance of the Wolof culture had been the subject of Wolofization debates in Senegal. Diouf extended the center-periphery framework of the world systems theory into the realm of culture, where he placed Wolof - as a language, ethnicity and culture- at the center, which dominated over and rendered peripheral other l cultures, like the Manding, Soninke, Pulaar, Halpulaar, Serer or Diola. Cruise O'Brien on the other hand, argued that this dominance could not be taken for granted as it is related to the widespread use of wolof as the lingua franca of trade and commerce and, to the political influence of Wolof-speaking Muslim leaders in Senegal since the colonial rule (Cruise O'Brien, 1998).

[41] The diversity of South-Eastern Senegal is made of non-Wolof, "peripheral" ethnicities: the Manding, the Pulaar, the Haalpulaar, Soninke and the Tenda (Bassari, Koniagui, Bedik, Badiaranke).

model applied to them, recreates in different ways colonial discourses on native "homelands" and echoes the French nationalist regionalism of "*petites patries.*"[42] In areas like the Siin, to create such ethnic homelands, the French colonial representations continued to stress the fixity of ethnic-territorial boundaries, the ideal of sedentary peasants fixed to the land and autochthonous natives petrified in their unchanging local traditions, despite the history of multiple movements of migrations and multiple local interpretations of tradition (Galvan, 2004).

The current representations of the "social" history of the inhabitants of the Niokolo-Koba National Park bear also important similarities to colonial representations. These similarities are not coincidental, but perpetuate colonial representations of forests as marginal and inaccessible areas and of South-Eastern Senegal as a rebellious region inhabited by religious fanatics and primitive peoples. The current rhetoric of the National Park Service and international donor organizations on evictees are imbued with references to these enduring colonial representations. Consider how in the new participatory management plan of the Niokolo-Koba National Park, the evictees are depicted as victims, whose attachment to ancestral land continues to pose a problem:

> It was necessary to admit that the eviction operations left traces among the victim populations that the passage of time was not able to correct. A profound sentiment still attaches these populations to the territories of their ancestors. ... Evictions had an important psychological and cultural effect, related to the attachment of the populations to the land where they have been established a long time ago. In fact, displacing these people does not create only juridical and financial problems about the compensation of mobile and immobile property lost due to the displacement outside of the protected area. There are also affective problems that are difficult to forget, as the burial sites of the ancestors could not have been transported together with the living people who were evicted (DPN, 2000, pp. 15,33).

The National Park's new "participatory" management plan aims to bring to a resolution the conflicts and problems that were caused by the past evictions from the National Park. Claiming to be closer to the perspective of the evictees, the management plan seems to be more concerned with their "affective" problems, than it is with the juridical and financial problems related to indemnities -- an issue that I will explore in later chapters. While the plan acknowledges that these issues create many "problems", it continues to draw attention to enduring "psychological

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[42] The nationalist regionalism was an influential aspect of French social scientific thought after 1930s (Weber, 1995).

and cultural effects" of eviction. However, these "cultural and psychological" consequences are not really the effects of eviction, because they rather originate from evictees "attachment" to their "ancestral land," predating the eviction. It is this "attachment," represented almost as a cultural trait, that is a problem, affecting the relations of evictees with the National Park.

This attachment to ancient territories and "burial sites," which the management plan calls "sacred cult places," is an important obstacle for cooperation between the national and international conservation institutions and the evictees in the implementation of the new management plan, not only because of this "affective" problem but also because it is the basis of local property claims. Thus, the plan argues that:

> Against the decree of 1904 that declared the non-registered land as "vacant and ownerless," the bush of the Niokolo-Koba was perfectly appropriated by its neighbors. This is the uncontested vision of the populations who consider themselves as the owners of historical, cultural and customary legitimacy. ... We observed thus, that the links with the Park are very strong, founded on affectivity and claims of legitimacy, and these attitudes are also dictated by the most sensitive issue for all human community: the land tenure.

Although the management plan claims to be more open to a dialogue with evictees, its language suggests that the "historical, cultural and customary legitimacy" of land claims are only valid in the "populations." In fact, the strength of this "affectivity" towards land and local land claims are a still a "very sensitive issue", particularly seen from the perspective of the National Park Service, which still considers the territorial integrity of the national park as one of its priorities. Thus, the seeming recognition of local point of view, does not in any way mean that the National Park Service or the state would recognize such claims, particularly within the territories of the National Park.

The representations of different "ethnicities" to which evictees seem to belong, is an example of how current conservation discourses about the evictees of the Niokolo-Koba National Park take inspiration from colonial representations. The "populations" surrounding the present National Park, are not only self proclaimed owners and "its neighbours," but also in a certain way, as stuck in their unchanging traditions. To describe the fixity of evictees in a far away past, the plan uses representations of particular "ethnic groups." Among those, the Bassaris represent, as they were in colonial discourse, the authentic autochthonous populations, quintessential natives and "first comers" of the National Park. All other "ethnicities" Manding and Pulaar, the majority of

whom are Muslims join “Bassaris” --who bury their “fetishes” in their “hunting grounds”-- in their veneration of ancestors and their “burial sites.” In fact, the taken-for-granted ethnic groups that make up the “evicted populations” are fixed through references to a reconstructed standard version of the pre-colonial history of the area. An article published in 1994 in *Politique Africaine*, summarizes this standard version as follows:

> ... the Tenda (particularly the Bassari and Koniagui) are the most ancient inhabitants of the region, but they are in the minority compared to their “invaders” the Mande (or Manding) and the Pulaar. This diversity is also parallel to multiple forms of systems of production: pastoralism is the “traditional” activity of the Pulaar, agriculture is that of the Mandings and certain Tendas, whereas the Bassari and Koniagui are hunter-gatherers (Takforian, 1994).

According to this view, the differences among the evictees go back to an unspecified pre-colonial past. The differences among the populations evicted from areas inside or surrounding the National Park are categorized according to ethnicity (the Manding, the Pulaar and the Tendas further divided into Bassaris and Koniaguis), nativity (native vs. late-comer) and systems of production (agriculturalists, herders and hunter gatherers). They are also differentiated according to their first-comer/late-comer status, where the conquerors or invaders (Pulaar and Manding) arrived later to dominate the conquered peoples (Bassari, Koniagui). Finally, the ethnic groups are defined by their “traditional” systems of agrarian production: Manding agriculturalists, Pulaar Herders, and Tenda hunter gatherers. According to Takfordian’s account, despite the fundamental differences between these ethnicities, what is common among them is the lack of state formation, egalitarianism and “religious criteria”:

> The populations are characterized in majority by an absence of state formation (etatisation), originating from a real refusal of power and of strategies that aim at preventing its future emergence. The egalitarianism in the access to natural resources is one of these strategies: on the one hand it ensures access for all, and on the other hand, it prevents the emergence of a power that would distribute it. All (natural) wealth is considered as communal, collectively managed and distributed according to the role of each member of the society; this is the case for the distribution of the meat among the Bassaris as well as the distribution of land among agriculturalists. In addition, the exploitation of natural resources is profoundly linked to religious criteria, where men have to be in agreement with the spirits of the bush, the only masters of the territory and its wealth.

What Takforyan’s account shares with the representations of the National Park’s management plan is the unifying “religious criteria.” The evictees are depicted in relation to an unchanging and overarching belief system, which explains their egalitarian distribution of natural

resources. The colonial discourse on communal ownership as an essential characteristic of natives, creeps into this definition of evictees, who are moved by a religion where the spirits of the bush -- not men -- are the “masters” of the land.

As I will explore in the next chapters, these depictions are contradicted in many ways by the narrative histories of the evictees, as well as their current understandings and practices. For many evictees, particularly the inhabitants of current Damantan, for whom Islam provides the framework within which they talk about and relate to their elders and teachers, the description of the tombs of their waliws[43] as “sacred places of cult” or as “burial sites” would be -- to say the least -- a blaring misrepresentation. The terms chosen to describe these places (sacred places of cult, burial sites, etc.) are far from being politically neutral, as they both secularize (by taking Islam out of the picture) and primativize (by replacing Islam with animism) the evictees’ understandings of tradition. On the other hand, the “traditional” occupational role assigned to different ethnic groups at the periphery of the National Park is hardly tenable, as evictees, whether Pulaar, Manding or Bassari speaking, are all engaged in cash crop production (banana plantations or cotton production) and supplement their living with a mixture of commercial herding and artisanal production based on gathering supported by development projects.

The current conservation discourse and its representations of evictees of the National Park bear striking similarities with the colonial conservation discourse of the 1950s. After the creation of the initial colonial Niokolo-Koba National Park in 1950, in a publication dedicated to the history of the region and the park, the director of the Forestry and Hunting Service, Georges Roure, described the Haute-Gambie and the “populations” surrounding the National Park as follows:

> In the periphery [of the National Park], live in peace since the installation of the French peace, separated by great wooded or naked spaces, sometimes isolated in their little mountains, collectivities or ethnic groups that are very different from one another. The presence of these ethnic groups, for some, precedes or dates from the invasions of the 13th and 14th centuries, or they are simply settled during the course of the last century in search of tranquility: the Koniaguis, proud warriors of past centuries and intelligent cultivators, the Bassaris, the longtime oppressed but still independent and secret, hunting and cultivating in their mountain refuges, the Pulaar, peaceful herders who came from the Ferlo and descendants of the conquerors of Fouta Dialon; Toucouleurs who came from the North; and Malinke and Diakhanke who are far away descendants of old occupiers,

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[43] *Waliw*, which derives from Arabic Awliya, refers to a saint or a spiritual guide in Sufi traditions followed in Senegal.

> who live now far from the political and religious quarrels of their lords or the pillages of their neighbors. The oldest of these populations have a rough life but they live almost entirely closed onto themselves, and they have conserved their customs, their craftsmanship and the cult of ancestors.

In this depiction of pre-colonial history, whose main lines are also present in current documents of the National Park, we find each ethnic group classified according to its first-comer, late-comer status. The HaalPulaar (Toucouleur) and Pulaar are described as “peaceful herders” who are descendants of the “conquerors” from Futa Jallon (Fouta Diallon in Guinee) or migrants from northern Senegal (the Ferlo). The Manding and the Diakhanke are also more ancient than the Pulaar, as they are “far away” descendants of “old occupiers.” Finally the Koniaguis and Bassaris, “intelligent cultivators” and hunters, are the “oldest” of all, the genuine native peoples. In this pre-colonial history there is also a particular view of the relationship between these different “ethnicities.” The rulers of the Manding and the Diakhanke are engaged in political and religious quarrels with each other and with their warrior neighbors (presumably the Pulaar and the Koniagui), who “pillage” their land. The Bassaris on the other hand, are the “oppressed” natives who found refuge in their mountains, “almost entirely enclosed in themselves” and in their “independent and secret” customs.

Roure’s depiction of the villages neighboring the Niokolo-Koba National Park is an example of how representations of the pre-colonial past are deployed to support conservation practices under French colonial rule, as they continue to be important in support of the National Park Service’s politics of “participatory” conservation today. As I will show in the next section, Roure’s account is largely based on the selective use of the early colonial administrators’ and travelers’ accounts of the region at the end of the 19th century. His emphasis on French pacification of these different ethnicities who inhabit the areas within and around the colonial National Park is silent about increasing tensions and conflicts between the residents and chiefs of the forested areas and the increasing coercive presence of colonial Forestry service after the 1950s -- to which I will come back in the last section.

Oriental Provinces and the Tanda

The colonial Niokolo-Koba National Park was created in 1954[44] and covered an area of 260,000 hectares at the border of the Cercles (Provinces) of Tambacounda and Haute-Gambie (DPN, 2000). The park enclosed parts of the cantons of Tenda-Damantan and Gamon in Oriental Provinces -- in Tambacounda -- and parts of the cantons of Niokolo and Beledougou -- in Haute-Gambie. Until the creation of the National Park in the 1950s, the limits of Cercles, Provinces and cantons, as well as the administrative centers of southeast Senegal frequently changed (Charest, 1969; Diene, 1986; Roure, 1956)[45]. As I will show in this chapter, the delimitation of the cantons and designation of canton chiefs was more than mere "accidents of administrative divisions."[46] Creating and fixing the limits of local and administrative divisions in French colonial native policy lay at the heart of colonial native administration. These changes in the administrative map were a result of a complex and unstable political process, which was shaped by complex questions surrounding the recognition of specific "native" authorities and the territorial reach of their authority.

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[44] The Decree of 4 August 1954 about the creation of the Niokolo-Koba National Park.

[45] The Oriental Provinces were created before the creation of larger regions in Senegal Oriental. The Province of Haute-Gambie, whose capital would be Kedougou, was created in 1915, and the Province of Tambacounda, whose capital is the town of Tambacounda, in 1919. According to the first census of the region carried out by Du Laurens in 1904, the Tenda appeared as a canton of Niani-Uli under the authority of Sagnas in the village of Badi (Cuisinier-Raynal, 1997, pp. 57-58). In 1923, the Oriental Provinces counted seven cantons: Gamon, Damantan, Tenda, Niani, Oubadji, Nankare and Oundiou. In 1938, a year after the death of the canton chief, the cantons of Damantan, Gamon, Tenda remained in Oriental Provinces - in the Cercle of Tambacounda- the canton of Niokolo was detached from it and attached to the Cercle of Haute-Gambie.

[46] This was the view of the French anthropologists working on Tendas as isolated and endogamous groups during the 1960s (Charest, 1969).



Map 3: The Colonial Niokolo-Koba National Park and surrounding Reserves in Oriental Provinces and in Haute-Gambie in 1956 (adapted from Roure 1956).

The director of the Forestry and Hunting Service, Roure, explains the administrative divisions in the 1950s in the following terms:

> These tiny (miniscule) kingdoms which resulted from the conquest of the Pulaar from Fouta-Dialon, these provinces which submitted to the authority of the Almamis of Boundou, these chiefdoms fortified and reconstituted in inhabited zones after escaping from the conquest or a heavy tutelage, these isolated villages, that were brought together by the misfortunes of slavery as they escaped to the North and to the South and came together to reinforce a family who found peace in isolation, all these groups at the end of the 19th century have their “Histories.” And they conserve or acquire a well-marked regionalism, based sometimes on their mastery over land or on the ethnic and religious unity born out of the need of common defense against the intrusions of their neighbors and out of the necessities of geographical isolation. ... This regionalism and search for independence had marked the French, not only the Commander of the French Soudan, Gallieni, but also administrative authorities in Senegal and Guinee, who will treat them separately, each with its own chief, desiring more than anything to acquire the French protectorate in order to live in peace.

Roure's account shows how the pre-colonial and early colonial history of Africans and their authorities were re-written through the lenses of the French colonial administration, which was concerned with classifying the natives according to their "races," their autochthony, and with fixing them within "solid" administrative units conceived as fixed territories ("the provinces"). In this history, instead of ethnicities we find the history of old kingdoms, chiefdoms, provinces and villages before the stability brought by French pacification. The geographical knowledge and ideas about "regions" divided up into "isolated provinces" or "smaller countries," is an important part of the colonial discourse that permeates Roure's account. Also, the ethnographic knowledge of the inhabitants of these provinces are important in the depiction of the fragmented African polities that correspond to specific provinces. In this account, when the French arrived they found a well conserved "regionalism" due to geographical isolation, mastery of land and "religious and ethnic unity based on common defense." The French colonial administration and its native policy respectful of the individual "histories" of these "tiny kingdoms," treated them "separately, each with its own chief."

At the same time, permeating Roure's account of the pre-colonial history, are the enduring anxieties of the French colonial administration about this particular border region of Senegal. First, the borders of southern Senegal had been contested by existing African polities, whose influence crossed over the territories claimed by the British in Gambia, and by the French in Senegal and Guinea (Kane, 1997; Roure, 1956, p. 61).[47] As a colonial administrator pointed out, one of the main concerns of the French colonial administration was the allegiances of peoples and their authorities that cross-cut different colonial territories:

> The populations of the Gambia valley, whether they are Muslims or Kafirs -- and the last ones are dominant in the region -- do not have more reason to submit to the administrative authority of Senegal than that of Guinee. They are Gambians in their aspirations and in their interests.[48]

However, Roure's preoccupation with the "French pacification," was also closely related to the long-lasting French colonial administration of jihad movements and wars that pitted the "tiny"

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[47] The Southern frontieres of Senegal with Guinee were was first traced in 1899. However, several governmental decisions would change the frontieres until 1933.

[48] Cited in Roure (Roure, 1956, p. 60).

kingdoms against one another. Although much of Roure's account is dedicated to these uprisings, he tries to underplay not only their local importance but also the role of the French colonial administration in fueling them:

> Although the death of Mamadou Lamine is generally considered in the history of Sudan as the event that achieved the pacification of Haute-Gambie, there were still until 1909 some episodes of local revolt due to a sudden burst of little ethnic groups with prickly independent character (Koniagui, 1903) or to the fanaticism of followers of some religious chief (Roure, 1956, p. 41).

Part of the colonial anxieties illustrated in Roure's account are also present in Andre Rançon's depiction of his travels in southeastern Senegal at the end of the 19th century. Colonial officers, like Roure, cited Rançon and considered his descriptions and as an authoritative first-hand account of the region.

Claiming Authority: Protectorate Agreements and the Creation of Oriental Provinces

Andre Rançon had visited the colonial cantons that made up the National Park at the time of French "pacification."[49] His account details not only the geography, soil, vegetation and "races" of the region, but also provides a glance at the initial incorporation of these areas into French colonial administration through Protectorate Agreements. Rançon described this border region as comprising distinct *pays* or regions. Rançon defined the Tenda, Damantan and Gamon as regions distinct from one another due to their physical characteristics (geology, climate, soil composition, fauna) but also due to their way of governance . Rançon's understanding of African regions borrows from some aspects of 19th-century French literature about regions (pays) as physically and culturally unique locales (Buttimer, 1971, p. 17).[50] However, the regions that Rançon visited lacked a cohesive governance. For Rançon, the Tenda was a "country where total anarchy reigned." This anarchy was not related to French colonial commerce in slavery and

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[49] Rançon visited the area after Mungo Park, in 1891 and 1892.

[50] Rançon's use of the term *pays* is also connected to French understandings of regions and regionalism prevalent at this time, as is his description and grouping of the countries. Rançon takes into consideration the commonalities in soil composition, hydrology, geology, climate, minerals and fauna.

goods, but a result of African rulers' conflicts with one another, particularly through raids (*razzias*) carried out by Pulaars and Mandings.

We also find in Rançon's depiction of the region of Damantan, neighboring the Tenda, the importance of pressuring African rulers to sign Protectorate Agreements for the French colonial administration before the establishment of administrative divisions. During Rançon's visit -- unlike the Tenda and the Gamon -- Damantan, a large village of a thousand inhabitants governed by Alfa Niabali, was still refusing to sign the Protectorate Agreements:

> Until now, Damentan stayed entirely outside of French influence. As Muslims, these warriors all took part in the war that Lamine had led against us. Today, all they ask for is to be placed under our Protectorate. I explained earlier what we have done to attain this purpose. ... In fact, the village chief and one of the notables came with me all the way to Bady (Tenda) in my return from Coniaguie. From there they went with Sandia to Neteboulou where they met with the Commandant de Cercle of Bakel. I ignore the result of these negotiations, but I do not doubt that they will reach an end and that a convention will be signed as a consequence.

Rançon's mission and his interactions with the village chiefs and the inhabitants was closely connected to the French administration's early interest in discovering the economically valuable natural resources[51] and drawing the still resistant local authorities under the French authority through Protectorate Agreements. Rançon was not merely a random traveler, an amateur ethnographer or botanist, but also a mediator between the French metropolitan administration and commercial interest and the African authorities. Even though Umar Tall's jihad movement in northern Senegal was suppressed under Faidherbe's administration,[52] other jihad movements at the borders of Senegal, Gambia and Guinea continued. The French native policy, directed against "fanatic" marabouts, and against jihad movements had an important effect in fueling the rivalries between contending rulers of the region.

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[51] He was sent to West Africa by the metropolitan French colonial administration to study the vegetation of Sudan, in order to find plants that could be useful for extraction and candidates to replace the caoutchouc extinct in Sonde islands.

[52] From the end of the 17th century until the end of the 19th century, *jihads*, or holy wars marked West Africa, particularly the Senegambian region. These conflicts between French and the Muslim African leaders heading the jihad movements were analyzed in detail by Barry, Curtin, Klein, Robinson and Thriaud (Barry, 1998; Curtin, 1971; Klein, 1968; Robinson, 1985; Robinson & Thriaud, 1997). Al Hajj Umar Tall led the most important holy wars against the French colonial army in Senegal from 1852 to 1864. An influential Muslim marabout born in Futa Toro (Northern Senegal), Umar Tall's influence extended from the current Northern Senegal to Western Mali.

Multiple Native Authorities: Native Chiefs and Foreign Chiefs

The dealings of the French colonial administration with existing authorities in Occidental Provinces (Uli, Niani and Sandougou) and the neighbouring the Oriental Provinces (Tenda, Damantan, Gamon) illuminates the different strategies followed by the French colonial administration. In Uli, the French re-invented decentralized despots, whereas in Tenda, a foreign canton chief was brought in to "bring order." Both of these strategies, however, were shaped to a large extent by French efforts in co-opting local authorities against jihad movements.

In Uli, the French colonial administration inserted itself in local authority relations by selecting a particular representative "family"[13] -- the Walis -- first as their allies against jihad movements and uprisings at the northern borders of the Gambia River. The French strategy in Uli was to support and secure the cooperation of the chiefly families in defeating the jihad of Mamadou Lamine Drame[53] and suppress the uprisings of Musa Molo Baldeh in Fuladu[54] (Bathily, 1970; Clark, 1994; Van Hoven, 1995). The history of the "crushing" of Mamadou Lamine Drame in 1887 by Governor Gallieni is an example of how deeply the French were involved in playing off and pitting each other against different authorities that were parts of the same polity and by fueling rivalries[55] (Bathily, 1970). The recognition of the canton chiefs of Uli was justified by their previous help in putting down the revolts of "fanatic" marabouts. The year of the defeat of Mamadu Lamine, the French administration, claiming to be the savior of the ancient kingdom of Uli and his authentic rulers, presented them with the Protectorate agreement as a token in exchange for their help in putting down Mamadou Lamine's revolt (Van Hoven, 1995, p. 36).

In the south of Uli lay forested areas that marked the limit of Senegal with Guinee. There, the French followed a different path in implementing the early native policy. The jihad movements

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[53] Al Hajj Mamadou Lamine, a Sarakhole-speaking Muslim teacher and a follower of the Tijaniya Sufi brotherhood, had fled to Southern Senegal near the shores of the Gambia River from Bakel under the threat of the French armies.

[54] Fuladu covered the Southern shores of Gambia River next to Casamance (as opposed to Uli, which was at the northern shores of the River) and was initially part of Gabu (extending down to Guinee Bissau).

[55] Mamadu Lamine was defeated after Galieni enlisted the help of the mansa (king) of Uli and the ruler of Fuladu Musa Moloh.

of Mamadou Lamine Drame had an important following in the countries that Rançon had described as Tenda and Damantan (Roure, 1956, p. 51). Even after the defeat of Mamadou Lamine, the Muslim marabouts in Tabadian and Damantan had refused to sign Protectorate treaties. After Rançon's visit to the area, another important uprising, this time from the village of Tabadian, became a concern of the French colonial administration. According to Roure, Fode Suleiman Bayaga was a "fanatic" Muslim, who not only declared himself "Messiah" but also constructed a mosque in stone against the interdiction of the Commandant de Cercle in Makacoulibantang (Roure, 1956, p. 41). The French army sent by Gallieni, with support from the rulers of Uli, was able to capture the marabout in Damantan[56] in 1908. It is after the defeat of Bayaga that a canton chief was appointed as the head of the Oriental Provinces. The appointed Chief of Oriental Provinces, Amadou Ndiaye, was not from any of the recognized "native ruling families" of Tenda, Damantan or Gamon.

Through the protectorate agreements the colonial administration was able to insert itself in local authority relations. In areas like Uli, these agreements were the beginning of the process of assigning power and granting recognition to already established elites as canton chiefs. The ruling families selected as canton chiefs in Occidental Provinces (both in Uli and Niani)[57] were supported by the colonial administration for their important services. In 1911, a French administrator praised and justified the authority of Uli's canton chief in these terms:

> The canton chief of Wuli originates from a direct lineage from the old kings of this country, and, as such, has the authority over the population that he governs.... His devotion to the French, to whom he owes the favor for saving him from being dispossessed of his old Kingdom by the Muslims, is sincere.[58]

The family of Walis would be only representative of Mandings of the region of Tambacounda, whose customs would be represented in the collection of customs published in 1937 (Holderer,

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[56] According to Roure, the Commandant of Makcoulibantang who first marched to Tabadian was forced to find refuge in Damantan. The second army was sent to Damantan to apprehend the marabout and after his defeat, his *tata* (fortress) was destroyed by the colonial army.

[57] The account of Van Hoven, shows also shows how the politics of recognition played out in the process of fragmentation of Uli. He argues that the cession of Niani from Uli was directly related to the granting of the position of canton chief to Signates for their "services" to French colonial administrators.

[58] Cited by Van Hoven with reference to ANS, 2G11/66.

1939). In other words, the inscription of the customs of the Walis as the representative of the customs of Mandings in Tambacounda made a specific "family" and their customs a model of authoritative customary law. This, in addition to the recognition of the canton chief among this specific family as the sole authority, reinforced the coercive power of the canton chiefs as decentralized despots.

In Oriental Provinces, the appointment of Province Chief was not justified by native custom, as was the case for Uli. Amadou Ndiaye, whose father was also "recognized" for his invaluable services to the French administration, was educated in *Ecole des Fils des Chefs* (Roure, 1956). *Ecole des Fils des Chef*, the successor of the *Ecole des Otages*, was created to produce native administrators, who were appointed later as canton chiefs. Instead of linking members of a particular family into the colonial administration and strengthening their power, in Oriental Provinces, the French colonial administration opted for parachuting in an "authority" which had already been trained in French language and administration.

The authority of the Chief of the Oriental Provinces was not based on its relationship to an authentic custom, but to a great extent on forced labor.[59] In the next section, I will look at how forced labor, recruited for colonial agricultural concession and public works, defined the relations between the villages in forested areas and the Province Chief. The appointment of the Province Chief in this village, as opposed to other contending centers of authority (such as Badi or Gamon), which also claimed authority over the land of Tanda, led to the concentration of political-administrative and economic activities in Dialakoto. As I will discuss in Chapter 5 and 6, Dialakoto would be selected as the center of the rural community once again after Independence because it already possessed the "infrastructure" necessary for postcolonial development. Furthermore, the elected rural community council of Dialakoto, composed of Dialakoto's old chiefly elite and new peanut-cooperative elite, would continue to reinterpret this colonial past to justify their claims of authority and land distribution at the Northern Periphery of the Niokolo-Koba National Park after the 1980s.

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[59] This does not mean that the Province Chief did not play a role in adjudicating the land cases based on "custom" and he did not impose his authority through in other ways. However, the forced labor is remembered among the evictees as the primary way in which they experienced the customary penal code (indigenat).



Map 4: The Administrative Divisions of South-Eastern Senegal in 1956 (Roure, 1956).

Colonial Development and the Rooting of a Foreign Authority: Forced Labor

The Province Chief, Amadou Ndiaye (Dionevar)[60] governed over several cantons that made up the Oriental Provinces (Tenda, Damantan and Gamon) until 1937. This period also corresponded to the implementation of the first colonial development plan proposed by Albert Sarrault. The relationship between the canton chief and cantons located in Southern forests was based on coercion, and this coercion was primarily exercised in obtaining labor for the colonial agrarian production and public works - the building blocks of the colonial development (*la mise en valeur*). During the interwar period, public works (particularly the construction of railroads and

[60] Some evictees from Damantan and Tabadian describe Ndiaye as a Serrer but colonial documents in 1940s claim that he was a Wolof from Tivawouane.

roads), which Sarraut called the “tool set” of development, took precedence in South-Eastern Senegal. The construction of the railroad linking Dakar to Bamako, traversed the northern section of South-Eastern Senegal and linked the Senegalese port cities, centers of commerce and colonial settlement, to the hinterlands of West Africa. Public works also extended for the first time the network of roads into the forested areas of South-Eastern Senegal and into the Oriental Provinces. For these public works large numbers of Africans were recruited in the form of forced labor from all over the federation, but also from the Oriental Provinces (Conklin, 1997; Fall, 1993; Touré, 1984).

Those few who remember the colonial times, knew Ndiaye as the first French appointed authority. Ndiaye lives in memories of elders as the first foreign authority, whose use of force coerced the inhabitants of the villages into constructing roads, buildings, planting trees and in sisal production. Camara, from the Pulaar-speaking villages of the region of Tabadian, was a child at the time of Mody Ndiaye. He described him as the first state authority imposed upon them, when the first signs of modernity manifested themselves:

> At that time, we were small children. There were no cars, only bicycles. I know because two people had bicycles in Tabadian. Us kids, when we saw a bicycle, we would point at it and would run away. The guy who brought the bicycle to Tabadian was called “Sory Machine” (Machine Sory). His father had brought the Machine (the bicycle). The bicycles were mostly at Depot (Wasadu) where sisal was cultivated. Those who were taken to work at Depot under Mamadou Ndiaye had told us. Mamadou Ndiaye was the first *autorité*[61] (state authority) sent here. You see all these trees [caicedrats] planted next to the road at Depot? It is our fathers who planted them there. It was the time of Mamadou Ndiaye. You see the house of Ndiaye in Dialakoto, all made in stone. It is our parents who carved those stones. They carried them on their heads. There were no cars at that time. It was the forced labor. If the work was too difficult for men, they would call women to carry the stones. To eat you had to come back home. They would not give you anything to eat. In addition, there was also the whip. The smallest thing, they would whip you. But all of this has ended, thank God. It has been progressively abolished.

For Camara, Ndiaye was an authority of the foreign colonial state. He arrived with the machines, after the bicycle but before the cars. People in Tabadian, where Camara is from, worked for Ndiaye to plant trees along the Tambacounda-Kedougou road, to make his house in Dialakoto and to work in sisal plantations in Wassadou, where they saw the bicycles the most.

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[61] Camara used the French word “autorité” to define the role of Mamadou Ndiaye, marking a difference between him and the village chiefs. Pulaar, as well as Manding speakers, use different terms to refer to different authorities. While the French term authorite is often used for the authorities associated with the state (such as the Forestry Services, the Prefect, the Chief of Agricultural Services), . Tthe village chiefs however are never called a “autorité.”

When people worked for Ndiaye, they were not given food. If men could not work, women had to work for them under the threat of the whip. This was the truth of forced labor.

The construction of Tambacounda-Kedougou road is also one of the memories that survives until today. Dari Niabali, the oldest man in the village of Damantan and the uncle of the present village chief, was one of the only living witnesses of this time. He was over hundred years old when I met him. In one of the rare conversations that I could have with him, I asked him whether his village had to provide forced labor. Dari said:[62]

> D: I remember very well the time of forced labor. I remember it was at the time of Blaise Diagne. He was our president at that time. He had sent Amadou Ndiaye here. Ndiaye was a soldier.. He was an important chief (kuntigi)... Blaise Diagne had sent him for the "Service". He was sent because people did not have a head (kun). When he came here, the road between Kedougou and Tambacounda was not good. The moment he came here, the first thing that Ndiaye has done was to clear the road from here to Tambacounda with the help of young people. These works lasted for six to eight months.
>
> M: How did he recruit these young people?
>
> D: He brought them to Dialakoto. As Amadou Ndiaye was in command in Dialakoto, everyone was called at Dialakoto. There were a lot of villages then, all gathered under his authority. Tabadian, Damantan, Bodiri, Kobosi, Toumpata, Badi, Dialakoto, Dienoundiala, Gamon. All of them. We all worked together to get the road from Tamba all the way here. We worked. It was forced labor. They were paying us 20 F by head. It was all young men, 14, 15, 16 years old. They would come to pick them up from each household. They would ask four young men from each household. Every household had to give someone to them. They could not refuse. The soldiers had a whip on their shoulders. If you did not work, they would use it. This is how the road of Tamba had been constructed.

As it was for Camara, for Dari, Ndiaye was an authority sent from the outside. He was sent by Blaise Diagne, an African deputy working with the French colonial government.[63] Dari had remarked sarcastically that he was sent to them "because people did not have a head," a head who could govern them. Dari continued with a more serious tone when he explained how Ndiaye governed them through the forced labor. Forced laborers, who were paid a small amount, were recruited from the villages, from every household to work on the construction of the road from Tambacounda to Kedougou. The canton chief did not only demand forced labor for the construction of the roads, but also for the sisal plantation implanted near Dialakoto.

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[62] Interview August 2004.

[63] Blaise Diagne served in the French Assembly from 1914 until 1934. Born in Goree, Diagne was among the French educated urban elite of the Four Communes, who also established the first African political parties.

The Province Chief, Amadou Ndiaye was established in Dialakoto. Dialakoto's notables had close relations with the people of the Tanda.[64] Ndiaye was not welcome in the land of Tanda. Camara recounted how the Province Chief had been received by the notables of Dialakoto and other villages in the forest:

> Our relations with Ndiaye was based on force. There was just that, force. If he ordered something from a village chief and he failed to execute it, he was arrested and punished. At that time, he really had a great power. At that time, the Manding of Tanda used to inhabit Dialakoto. These Mandings were rich and imposing. When Ndiaye came, he imposed himself upon them and he has forced them to declare him as the authority. If the Mandings of Dialakoto decided to resist him, he would use force against them. And him, he was all powerful because he was with the whites. Whites were helping him. At that time, we just had sticks. A stick and a pistol are two different things (A stick cannot do what a pistol can do). They [Mandings] accepted his [Ndiaye's] authority on the land of Tandan. Imagine that you, you are my host, and you try to impose your power on me and to take my house from me. And, I submit to your authority and obey your wishes. It was just like that.[65]

The imposition of the Province Chief was a breech of guest-host relations with guests taking over the hosts' home. The Mandings of Dialakoto had to submit to the authority of Ndiaye because he had the force and the backing of the French armed forces (which was previously used to put down "fanatic" marabouts). However, a mutually beneficial relationship emerged between the canton chief and Dialakoto's elite families, for both of whom forced labor provided a bridge.

The land next to Dialakoto was granted to the *Cultures Tropicales en Afrique* (CCTA)[66] in 1920 as a temporary concession for the production of sisal, after the company's initial failure of cotton scheme (Touré, 1984). The concession at Wassadou was not Office du Niger; but it operated on similar ways, mainly through forced labor and resettlement. Recourse to forced labor was also a generalized practice in agricultural development schemes like Office du Niger, and in colonial concessions (Fall, 1993; van Beusekom, 2002). The CCTA's main problem from the start was to find labor to work in the concession. Le Maitre, the Director of CCTA in Wassadou, appealed to the Commandant, asking for his help in securing labor necessary for the

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[64] According to Rançon, Dialakoto's inhabitants had more dealings with the Tanda governed by the family of Sania (the lineage of today's village chief of Badi) than with Uli, although politically they were under the authority of the Manding speakers of Uli (Rançon, 1894).

[65] Camara, Jenna Kouta, Oct.12, 2004

[66] The CCTA was run as a French company in the form of a Consortium (Le Maitre, Mortemart, Legrand), which was initially set to study the potentials of Casamance and Senegal Oriental for intensive cotton production (Touré, 1984).

concession[67]. Under the orders of the Commandant, every village within the Cercle was asked to provide labor through the intermediary of the Province Chief.[68] Amadou Ndiaye on his turn, turned to the notables of Dialakoto and the important villages of Tanda.

The present village chief of Dialakoto, Sunkaru Diambang, is called “Le Petit.” As his nickname indicates, he is a small man, whose eyes are full of playful irony piercing through his young-looking face. When I met him, he did not spare me from his sarcasm directed to foreigners, who came there to teach them the “right way.” He struck me as a man who was conscious of his diminishing authority. The village chief remembered Ndiaye, as “an intellectual,” someone who spoke perfect French and who wanted to finish the road between Tamba and Kedougou. He described Ndiaye as the authority representing the French colonial administration in Dialakoto, who imposed himself on Dialakoto’s notables. Ndiaye imposed himself by requiring people to work for the Tambacounda-Kedougou road. Diambang remembered how much Dialakoto’s notables were displeased to give their slaves to Ndiaye, not only to build the road but also to carry him “on their heads.” However, over time, Ndiaye established links with the important families in Dialakoto as well as to the villages like Damantan, enjoying a great legitimacy for their marabouts.[69] He married with the daughters of the important village chiefs and he negotiated the forced labor between the village chiefs and the colonial administration. As the Province Chief, Ndiaye was not simply the iron hand of the colonial administration and a helping hand for concession owners, but he aspired to root himself in the province to keep his post. He refused to comply to the labor demands of the concession owner, Le Maitre, and he complained to the Commandant that the concession owner was maltreating the men that he put in his disposition.[70]

The colonial sisal plantation and the Province Chief’s coercive rule left important traces. When Amadou Ndiaye died in 1937, Oriental Provinces was divided, and the son of the Province

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[67] Letter of Lemaitre, the Director of the Concession of Nieriko to the Governor General of AOF (February,1922).

[68] The Basari cantons only provided one thousand s workers to the plantation (Touré, 1984, p. 27).

[69] Interview Damantan August 19, 2004.

[70] Letter of the Commandant de Cercle of Tambacounda to the Governor General of Senegal (February 1922).

Chief Mody Ndiaye contended for his father's post.[71] When Ndiaye's son claimed his father's office at the age of sixteen, the French colonial administration, wary of his age and against the idea of hereditary succession of the canton chief position, initially refused his demand. However, at the end, to test his "abilities" Tenda and Damantan were left under his control.
When CCTA would go bankrupt and the plantation would be sold to a Lebanese merchant. The lands alienated for sisal plantation would be planted with peanuts after the Second World War. The sisal plantation was the beginning of the transformation of Wassadou into a "Depot" (warehouse), not only of cash crops but also of migrant laborers and their families, a source of a labor pool for the lands under development.

Expansion of Cash Crops and the Colonial Niokolo-Koba National Park after World War II

The first time I had heard that Depot was "sold" to a Lebanese merchant was in Niemeneke, one of the evicted villages in Madina. Koumba Sajakho, the wife of the village chief Sajakho explained to me how the village of Niemeneke was resettled next to Wasadu, and how they have been warned about their precariousness situation in Madina, next to Wassadou-Depot:

> When they resettled us here in Depot, the village chief of Wasadu told us: "Where you are settling is the property of a white man. That is him who bought this land." He warned us about this.

Her concern about the threat of eviction was not unfounded, as she belongs to one of the families of the region of Niememeke, which had experienced evictions since the 1950s. Before its last eviction from the Niokolo-Koba National Park in 1974, the village of Niemeneke was in the region of Sibikiling, the canton of Niokolo, separated from Oriental Provinces and attached to Kedougou after the death of Ndiaye in 1937 (Charest, 1969). The Sajakhos were one of the oldest families in Niemeneke and had moved from Bangar, near the picturesque and isolated Mountain of Assirik, near the Guinean Border. They had moved to Sibikiling from Bangar in the 1950s, as a result of the establishment of the colonial Niokolo-Koba National Park. As many evictees, who had already seen many waves of evictions, Sajakho was aware and

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[71] Letter of the Governor of Senegal to the Governor General of AOF (April 1938) (ANS-AOF FM 13 G 27(17) GS).

concerned about owners of lands surrounding Wasadu-Depot, hanging over them as the sword of Damocles. The rumors of eviction would be heightened when in 2000 the grandsons of Khayat came to visit the village chief of Wassadou-Depot, expressing to him their intensions of taking back the land that belonged to them.

The property claims of the Lebanese merchant are important and constitute one of the multiple layers of claims over land in Wassadou. As I will show in Chapter 5, another layer would be added when some workers settled for the peanut production to re-appropriate the land, after the Lebanese merchant would abandon the fields. To understand these multiple layers of land claims in the resettlement areas around Wassadou, it is important to look back to the colonial history of expansion of peanut production and the sisal concession into a peanut plantation after the Second World War.

Opening New Lands for Colonization: Peanuts and Navetanes

Although peanuts were introduced to the Sine and Saloum regions of Senegal over the course of the 19th century, the expansion of peanuts to South-Eastern Senegal had started with the construction of the railroad during the interwar period (Bonneuil, 1991, 1999; Brooks, 1975; David, 1980). In the beginning, the French colonial administration had difficulties in pushing the production of peanuts as cash crops in Senegal, as most rural producers continued to cultivate and exchange local crops, and African farmers preferred to cultivate millet, the main staple crop in most rural areas (Brooks, 1975). One of the initial strategies of French colonial administration to this shortage of labor for cash crop agriculture had been the recruitment and resettlement of laborers by force. This strategy was applied in colonial development projects like Office du Niger in Sudan (today's Mali).

After the Second World War, drawing "native authorities" particularly Muslim marabouts into the cash crop production became an important strategy. Marabout's involvement in peanut production, initially encouraged by French administration, became a major concern later, with de

facto control of the production of peanuts by marabouts.[72] Cash crop production in new agricultural frontiers, called “terres neuves” (new lands).

During the interwar period, in South-Eastern Senegal the most important example of the use of forced labor was the private concession of Wassadou, which produced sisal. However, after the rail road had reached Tambacounda[73], the town became also an important center for production and the sale of peanuts, and after the 1940s the transit point for migrant laborers, called “navetanes”[74] (Charest, 1969; David, 1980).

The peanut boom would hit the Oriental Provinces in large scale after the 1950s, through the conversion of sisal plantation into peanut fields. CCTA, the private concessionary company who owned the sisal fields of Wasadu-Depot, was unable to pay the land registration fees for a permanent private title[75]. It went bankrupt, and the concession was sold to a Lebanese merchant, Khayat in 1958.[76]

Although the evictees have heard about Khayat only recently, the “old” inhabitants of Wasadu, remember “Khayati” (Khayat) well. One of them is the village chief of Madina Sokho, a village a couple of kilometres from Wasadu. The village chief of Madina Sokho, Al Haji, a short

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[72] As Copans and Cruise O’Brien, among others, have stressed, the production of peanuts as cash crops in Senegal, was closely related to the engagement of Sufi Brotherhoods (Copans, 1988; Cruise O'Brien, 1971). These debates concern primarily the Peanut Basin of Senegal and question the system of production based on communal work organized by Muslim marabouts. Framing the issue from the political economic perspective, these debates partly question the basis of authority of Wolof speaking marabouts (i.e. whether the system of production based on daaras was exploitative or not).

[73] Starting from the interwar period, the French colonial administration encouraged peanut production along the railroads as well (Rodet, 2009, pp. 119-120).

[74] According to David, Navetane comes from the wolof word *nawet*, translated in French as “spending the rainy season” (passer l’hivernage). It refered to migrants who came during the rainy season to cultivate (David, 1980, p. 166).

[75] In 1932, Governor General Brevie had signed the Arrete approving the conversion of the initial temporary concession of Wasadou in the Cercle of Niani-Ouli into a permanent land title (concession definitive). The Directors of CCTA, the company, had tried to negotiate with the French administration to reduce the registration fees (*droits d’immatriculation*) (Letter of Hombret to the Lieutenant Governor of Senegal, 23 Septembre 1933). As CCTA was unable to pay the fees and accumulated considerable debt over time, the land was re-appropriated as vacant and ownerless but later sold to a Lebanese merchant, Khayat.

[76] According to the Information Note of the Conservateur in Kaolack, Brahima Khayat had acquired the property title after the Tribunal of Tambacounda decided to sell Wasadu the concession through auction.

and very determined looking man in his mid fifties, was a Pulaar speaker whose father was from Tabadian. Although Al Haji did not live in old Tabadian, he had heard about Tabadian from his father, who had also offered land to settle to villagers from Tabadian after their eviction in 1970s. Al Haji's father was a merchant, and for this reason preferred to move to Wasadu, near the road to continue the commerce of peanuts and kola nuts:

> My father was from Tabadian. The old Tabadian was like Depot now, surrounded by many villages and they were all praying together. He had left Tabadian to come to Depot….At that time Depot was not really crowded and all this area was forested. If there was a death, we had to put a lamp next to the tomb so that the wild animals would not approach to eat it. It was really a wild forest... My father had come to Depot because he was doing commerce. He was buying kola nuts and peanuts in Tambacounda and selling them in Tabadian. But it was very difficult to reach Tabadian. You had to cross the river. It was very difficult during the rainy season. So my father decided to settle near Depot. When he settled in Depot, not many people cultivated peanuts. But then, Khayat came and constructed buildings. Khayat was a Lebanese man who was working with the French. He recruited workers from everywhere but mainly from Kedougou. If you wanted to cultivate peanuts you had to pay Khayat. First, they would come and measure a piece of land for you. Than, you had to pay them to cultivate. It was more like a rent. So many people came!

Al Haji depicted Wassadou-Depot and surrounding areas. He remarked that not many people cultivated peanuts in this forested area, where cash crop agriculture was neither a main source of revenue nor a means of subsistence. Having difficulties in recruiting agricultural workers from nearby areas, Khayat recruited migrant workers from Kedougou, Unlike the sisal plantation, the new peanut fields were not cultivated by forced labor recruited from the forested areas, but by *navetane*s from neighboring regions. Navetanes were "strangers" whose relationship with the land owner was based entirely on commodity relations. Unlike *surga*[77] arrangements, navetanes' lands were precisely measured and rented. They were paid as wage labor on the fields and could only keep a small portion of their harvest. This working agreement was not only based on wage labor but also on commoditization of land. The conversion of the sisal fields of Wasadu into peanuts fields was among the first signs of commoditization of land and labor on a large scale in this region.

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[77] According to David, the term *surga* comes from wolof (suur-ga) and could be translated as "people who are fed to oblige them to work"(David, 1980, p. 168). Although the term navetane and *surga* are used interchangeably in parts of Senegal, according to David, *surga* is different from *navetane* as its relationship with the host is not entirely commodified. Although *surgas* are migrant workers like *navetanes*, unlike *navetanes*, they are fed at home and considered as part of the household.

The process of commoditization based on the expansion of peanuts had already started to transform agrarian relations in other parts of Senegal.[78] However, as I will discuss in the next section, in Oriental Provinces, most of which was covered with forests and was abundant in wildlife at that time, the most important commercial activity - more so than agriculture - was hunting. Although most villagers' primary preoccupation was agriculture and herding, the production of peanuts for commerce always accompanied the cultivation of food crops and gathering. The production of peanuts in Southern forested areas, had also transformed the relationships between the villagers and the new Province Chief, Mody Ndiaye, who had replaced his father in 1937. Peanuts were weighed in the villages[79], to be transported to Dialakoto, and from there to Tambacounda.

The expansion of peanut production in Southern forested areas, as I will discuss in the last section, was also one of the justifications of the first colonial evictions from the Niokolo-Koba National Park at the beginning of the 1950s. Colonial administrators, complaining about the insufficiency of agricultural revenues, supported the creation of the Niokolo-Koba National Park and the eviction of some of its resident villages. The decision of establishing a National Park was closely related to the shifting developmental calling of the Oriental Provinces for the French colonial administration, which saw in this area a great potential for colonial hunting and tourism.

Colonial Hunting Reserves in Oriental Provinces:

The first large scale colonial hunting reserves were established in the forested areas in the South of Dialakoto after the London Conference in 1933. As I will show, these hunting reserves intensified commercialization of wildlife through hunting, which emerged as an important revenue generating activity rivaling the peanuts in Oriental Provinces. At the same time, the creation of hunting reserves redefined the relations between the inhabitants and the authorities of the Oriental Provinces and the French colonial administration.

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[78] Galvan analyzes the transformation of the rural economy of the Siin region in the face of the peanut boom, where Serrer farmers have adopted a synchretic land tenure system based on land pawning agreements (Galvan, 2004).

[79] Villagers from Diakhanke- speaking village of Tabadian-Soukouto and Damantan, remember that their peanuts were also weighed within the village.

Early colonial administrators who supported the creation of hunting reserves were not against European hunting but against its excesses. Before it became a sport for the public (*le sport cynegetique*), hunting, more specifically the European hunting in French West Africa -as was the case in East and South Africa, a prestige sport - was a sport for the metropolitan elite, aristocrats and for colonial administrators (Jeannin, 1945; MacKenzie, 1988). The first colonial hunting reserves in West Africa were not aimed at forbidding hunting all together but to stop excesses of colonial hunting. Lavauden, the Forestry Service Director during the 1920s and a hunter himself, expressed the early colonial conservationist concerns about the excesses of European hunters as follows:

> When I had just started my career in colonial administration, in 1927, I wanted to protest against the fact that a European had hunted within a single morning forty-five hippopotami. But my attitude led to numerous debates and was received with a sad surprise at that time… I also heard that a European, out of satisfaction, had killed twenty-four wild boars on a Sunday morning. This was in Senegal, in a region under the Muslim influence, where the natives did not consume pork or boar meat.[80]

European hunting for "trophies" - the heads and horns that served as decorative items back in Europe - was a real concern for the French colonial administration. Nevertheless, they were more interested in sustaining hunting revenues than in implementing strict conservation laws that forbid hunting. The French colonial hunting of big game had initially focused on parts of Equatorial Africa (e.g. Ivory Coast). However, the French colonial administration also promoted hunting in other parts of French African territories outside the humid zones. Among the Sahelian zones, the "country of Tambacounda" became "susceptible to satisfy to many sportsmen" during the interwar period (Jeannin, 1945, p. 203).

During the interwar period, the colonial forestry and hunting legislation became increasingly specialized according to different regimes of conservation and protected zones. The colonial protected areas were divided into classified forests, which were marked for colonial state-controlled forest exploitation (particularly for charcoal production). Separate from classified forests, game reserves focused specifically on the exploitation of wildlife in the form of hunting. There were important common points that defined the conservation regimes in these different areas. In all colonial protected areas, in classified forests as well as hunting reserves, local uses

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[80] Lavauden quoted in Jeannin (Jeannin, 1945, p. 4).

of wildlife and forests were confined into the category of customary use. The customary use was defined as strictly non-commercial and for “subsistence only” (Jeannin, 1945; Roure, 1952). At the same time, the commercial uses of forests and wildlife was subject to the colonial administration’s control and granted to European citizens through restrictions and permits.[81] This unequal distribution of commercial hunting and lodging rights, as Ribot argued, followed the colonial institutional and legal distinction between subjects and citizens (Ribot, 1999). However, the targets of the colonial state’s coercion and commercial interests were different in these different zones: in Hunting Reserves, specific wildlife species were the primary focus, and in the classified forest specific trees were protected and/or exploited. This distinction is important if one aims to understand how the colonial state related to the people in specific forested areas. It was hunting rather than forest exploitation that led to the creation of colonial National Parks in Oriental Provinces. And it was through hunting that the inhabitants of Oriental Provinces experienced the coercion of the French colonial state, besides the Province Chief.

Hunting Reserves and Commercialization of Hunting:

The first Wildlife Refuge near Tambacounda was created in 1926 at the border between Senegal, Guinee and Portuguese Guinea (today’s Guinee Bissau).[82] During that time, the sisal plantation in Wasadou was already established near Dialakoto, and the Oriental Provinces were under the authority of Amadou Ndiaye. Close to the death of the Province Chief, an important part of Oriental Provinces was gazetted in 1936[83] as Partial Hunting Reserve.[84] In 1956, the Forestry Service Director Roure hinted at the involvement of the Province Chief Ndiaye in commercial hunting in Oriental Provinces when he wrote:

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[81] In forest reserves (classified forests) exploitation permits were distributed to European companies and in game reserves, frequented by colonial administrators as well as white hunters, hunting permits were granted uniquely to Europeans, in exchange for large sums of money.

[82] This reserve was among seventeen reserves created in French territories in Africa between 1926 and 1929 (Roure, 1952, p. 38).

[83] The Partial Hunting Reserve was created by the Decree of 13 October 1936 of the Government of French West Africa.

[84] This new Partial Hunting Reserve replaced the 1926 Wildlife Refuge.

> In fact, the North-West of this reserve [established in 1936] had been the hunting fief of Chief Amadou Ndiaye, the pacificator of the Tanda, since his appointment in 1908. The South-East of the reserve were the traditional hunting grounds of Bassaris (Roure, 1956, p. 93).

Roure presents the inclusion of part of the Oriental Provinces, used as the "hunting fief" of the canton chief, as the right step towards implementing the colonial vision of conservation, at the time when the London Convention establishing National Parks in 1933, and the new colonial Forestry Code of French West Africa were adopted in 1935. From the perspective of the colonial Forestry Service, the new Partial Hunting Reserve was not a step towards stricter conservation of the wildlife, but about the claiming of land and hunting revenues under the control of the Province Chief and Bassaris.



Map 5: The National Wildlife Refuge Park (Le Parc National de Refuge) of Casamance in 1926, adapted from Roure (Roure, 1956).



Map 6: The Partial Hunting Reserve (Reserve Partielle de Chasse) of Niokolo-Koba in 1936, adapted from Roure (Roure, 1956).

Hunting was an important part of the daily activities in all the villages of the Oriental Provinces. However, not everyone was a hunter. Mamady Sane, belonged to one the important families in Damantan. His family (Sanes) prides itself in being among the first warriors who followed the marabouts (Niabeles) since their migration from Gabu. He explained the role of hunting in old Damantan:

> My grand father used to hunt. Hunters had a very important role in Damantan because they were also warriors. Hunting was to feed the warriors... Hunting is a profession. It is a knowledge and a science that is acquired. You need to recite prayers when you see an animal, when you aim at it and when you kill it. Long time ago, there was a hunter who, when he put his eye on an animal and whistled "Siiiiffft" the animal would stop on its track. Hunting is indeed a knowledge that is acquired[85].

When he stressed that hunting was a "knowledge" Sane referred to a particular type of knowledge, which was not only about the knowledge of the place, and knowledge about the use of the tools. These were necessary but not sufficient to hunt. Hunting as a profession had its secrets. It required the knowledge of certain prayers and how to use them in certain times, and this needed to be mastered and learned. From Sane's account hunting emerges as a respected activity, not only due to the commercial value it generated, but also, due to its value as part of local knowledge and its role in defining social relations among the villagers.[86]

Hunting of small game complemented the diet of village households, who lived on a variety of food crops (rice and fonio cultivated by women and millet, maize cultivated by men); roots (manioc and potatoes); vegetables from the gardens (eggplants, peas, peppers) and fish from the lakes and rivers.[87] Nevertheless, hunting became increasingly commercialized with the European trade of slaves and ivory very early on. According to Sane, the commerce of meat started after the wars that ravaged the Tanda ended:

> When wars had ended, hunters started also to divide the killed animals. One part was for themselves to eat and the other part was for sale. Let's say a hunter goes to the forest and kills an animal. He divides the animal in two parts, as I said. Than, he would go out and let other people in the village know that he has meat to sell. Once he had sold the meat, he would use this money to buy gun powder.

Sane's wife also recounted how hunting became increasingly commercialized:

> Sanes were hunters. They used to hunt elephants to sell the teeth in Guinee Bissau. White people bought the teeth. At that time Tamba was a small village. There were hunters who killed only elephants. Others killed other animals like kobas or antelopes. But at that time, you did not see anyone selling the meat. Today, we buy meat and dry fish. It was not like that at the time.....When an elephant was brought to the village and put down on the ground, it is like a granary. The elephant has so much grease. We would

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[85] Mamady Sane, Damantan, 23 August 2004.

[86] For an account of the importance of hunters as a distinct group and, hunting as part of valued local knowledge embedded in social relations and beyond in Mande society in Mali see Aknin (Aknin, 2000).

[87] Interviews in Boulakounda, Dianakouta, Madina.

> also collect the grease by lighting a fire underneath. First, everyone in the village would bring a knife and get their share. Than the rest of it was sold to neighboring villages.

Among the villages of Southern forested areas of the Oriental Provinces, colonial predatory hunting contributed greatly to commercialization of wildlife, in multiple ways. While ivory trade was directly fueled by European demand, the commercialization of the bush meat was related to this surplus left over from the predatory colonial hunting. The commercialization of wildlife, was related first to European demand for the skins, horns and heads (trophies) of hunted wild animals. Colonial hunters were not interested in bush meat but in the "trophies," parts of animals that had a prestige value and used as decorative items. While European hunters were solely interested in trophies (horns, skins, heads), the meat was left to the villagers.

When I asked Jue Camara, the village chief of Tounti, whether he remembered the whites in the old Tabadian, he described whites as hunters:

> *Toubabs*[88] (whites) came here a long long time ago. It was well before our eviction. They came because they wanted to hunt. When they would come they would take two or three young men to go in the forest with them. In the forest, they would hunt and then come back to the village with the game in their cars. In order to better preserve the horns, they apply a white powder. The meat was left to us to distribute within the village. The young people (who went with them hunting) were well paid ... Whites used to take hunters from all the villages in Tabadian as well as in Damantan. They would camp around the villages. We could even see their lights in the areas where they camped.[89]

Camara was from a Pulaar speaking village from Tabadian, but other evictees from Damantan, Badi and Niemeneke remembered the "first" whites in their villages as hunters. They came to recruit young men as guides. Working as guides (*pisteur*) for white hunters was a well paid job especially for young men and some hunters, although most of the villagers' primary preoccupation was agriculture. This situation was in striking contrast with how French colonial administration and colonial conservationists depicted local hunter-guides as "poachers." In some villages, like Badi, this type of commodified relationship between the local and white hunters, was also desirable for and found the support of the village chiefs.

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[88] The term *toubab*, is the generic name used to designate whites in Senegal. It originates from the Arabic word tabib, meaning doctor, indicating the important role that missionary doctors may have played in the initial encounters of Europeans with Africans in rural areas.

[89] Jue Camara, Tounti, March 2004.

Compared to Tabadian, the village of Badi was closer to Dialakoto and hunters visited Badi often. The village chief of Badi, compared to other village chiefs, was much keener to discuss the history of the Park, particularly to stress to me the importance of his village. Sania talked about the presence of white hunters in and nearby the village as a positive sign of the recognition and importance of Badi:

> *Toubab*s arrived to Badi because they wanted to hunt. At that time, there was no *campement*. They stayed in the villages. We would send the young girls to fetch them water next to the rice fields so that they could wash themselves. They constructed the *campement* later on. They constructed one in our village. In all this land, they gave that *campement* to my grand father who was the village chief. Everybody in the village worked in constructing that *campement*, old, young, nobles, slaves, everyone.[90]

The "campement" [91], the lodge, offered to Badi by whites, made the village unique in the land of Tanda. Sania's account cannot be detached from the present context of neoliberal conservation where the National Park and forests provide "richness" that should benefit the villagers. The old lodge in Badi is owned by the village chief because it was built through everybody's labor. However, it was also as a sign of recognition of Badi (particularly its elite) in the land of Tanda by colonial (and later by postcolonial) state authorities.

During my conversations with Sania, when we talked about the Park, he often mentioned whites not in a generic way, as was the case for other village chiefs, but by their names. He remembered a certain "Monsieur Samaniak," a French engineer who came to construct the roads. He also mentioned Roussane,[92] as a great hunter, who came to camp around the village. The village chief of Badi remembered different directors of the National Park as well as changing rules that they attempted to impose. The privileged role of Badi in hunting tourism kept its inhabitants at bay from evictions, until their displacement in 1974.

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[90] Mamadou Sania, Badi, April 2004.

[91] *Campement* is used both for Campement Touristique, lodges constructed for tourists and for the Forestry Service buildings in the villages. In this case, Sania referst to lodges for tourists.

[92] It is possible that Roussane was a French merchant in Tambacounda, in the 1920s or 1930s. Although I could not verify this, I am led to this conclusion because there are other references to Roussane in the 1950s (as "patrons a la Roussane," Roussane-like bosses) as an exploitative boss in the 1950s debates of the BDS.

Post-War Shift in Nature Conservation and Push for Evictions

Although the National Parks were established at the 1933 London Conference, the colonial governments agreed on a model of nature conservation with stricter rules that prohibited hunting and the carrying of fire arms in National Parks. As we have seen, the French administration did not implement these measures in South-Eastern Senegal. During the interwar period, commercial hunting continued in full swing in the Oriental Provinces. It is after the Second World War that a significant shift occurred in colonial nature conservation throughout West Africa, which had repercussions for the Oriental Provinces. With the initiative of the French metropolitan administration and the tourism transportation companies in France (such as Air France and Wagon-Lits Cook), in addition to hunting tourism, eco-tourism have also started to gain increasing importance (Roure, 1956, p. 93). Different Councils and Committees, which specialized in matters related to nature conservation and tourism, were established between 1945 and 1950.[93] Hunting became an important focus, as high-level Hunting Committees were established both in the metropole and in the colonies.[94]

As the Forestry Service Director Roure noted in 1956:

> Determining the limits and ensuring the effective protection of a great Fauna Reserve would start only after the re-establishment of an economy of peace and a sufficient forestry personnel (Roure, 1956, p. 93).

Unlike the violent "pacification" of the region through the suppression of jihad movements and political dissidents, the post-war "economy of peace" was brought to the region by nature conservation. For colonial administrators like Roure, what unified the Oriental Provinces in this postwar period was the development of a tourism industry. The shift in the development

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[93] The High Council for the Protection of Nature (*Le Conseil Superieur de la Protection de la Nature*) were created in 1945 (Roure, 1952, 1956). A Federal Committee of Tourism (*Le Comite Federal du Tourisme en AOF*) was established in 1949 and started to work on a "great touristic circuit" that would link Dakar to Abidjan.

[94] The High Council for Hunting in the Colonies (*Le Conseil Superieur de la Chasse aux Colonies*) was established in 1945 as well. The Committee included different representatives of hunting tourism (tourism cynegetique), colonial administrators and researchers (from Museum of National History) in France and studied the potential overseas sites for hunting tourism. In At the international level, an International Council for Hunting was also put in place in France and it was presided over by M. Hettier de Boislambert, which, as we will see in Chapter 4, would also suggest President Senghor as a new director for the Niokolo-Koba National Park after independence.

pendulum manifested itself in forested areas in the South of Dialakoto before the establishment of the Niokolo-Koba National Park in 1954.

Gazetting of a Total Wildlife Reserve, where hunting would be entirely forbidden, was first proposed in 1946 by the Commandant of the Cercle of Kedougou. The Commandant, drawing the attention of the colonial administration to low population densities due to out-migration, advised the gazetting of the hunting grounds of the Bassari's in the West of Kedougou (Roure, 1952, p. 93). The area proposed to be included as a Total Wildlife Reserve *(Reserve Total de Faune*) included the Mountain Assirik (Hassirik), reknown for its dense elephant population and its picturesque and wild landscape. In this area, unlike the Partial Hunting Reserve in the Oriental Provinces, hunting would be altogether forbidden. For the Commandant, the scarcity of inhabitants, which justified the gazetting of a Total Wildlife Reserve, made it only easier to impose the hunting restrictions and to put these areas into productive use for the French colonial administration. This proposal, which also fit into a larger shift in nature conservation policies, was accepted and in July of 1950, 175.000 hectares were gazetted as a Total Hunting Reserve.[95]

The colonial Forestry Service Director, Roure, does not mention the evictions that followed the creation of the Total Hunting Reserve of Niokolo-Koba in 1950. Some of the Manding speaking inhabitants of the current village of Niemeneke, established in Madina Bloc as other evictees of the National Park, remember the initial displacement of their village in the 1950s. French anthropologist, Charest, who conducted research in Niemeneke-Sibikiling area, also mentions that several villages, including the village of Niemeneke, had been displaced from Bangare (or Banhare) after the establishment of the Total Hunting Reserve (Charest, 1969, p. 109). Niemeneke's displacement from Bangare in 1950 was, however, not related uniquely to the creation of the Hunting Reserve, but also motivated by and speeded up the process of peanut production.[96]

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95 Arrete No. 4032 SE/F du 18 Juillet 1950 portant classement de la reserve totale de chasse du Niokolo-Koba (DPN, 2000).

[96] Before their eviction in 1974, the inhabitants of Niemeneke were established next to the main road linking Tambacounda to Kedougou, near Sibikiling. This area, outside of the Oriental Provinces, depended on the canton of Niokholo attached to the town of Kedougou (Charest, 1969, pp. 120-121).

According to Uvel Sajakho, the initial displacement of Niemeneke from Bangare was not forced but was a decision motivated by increasing the production of peanuts. When I asked whether Niemeneke had been displaced before their eviction from the postcolonial National Park, the village chief and other members of his family explained that they had made the choice to move next to the main road linking Tambacounda to Kedougou as this facilitated the sale of peanuts. Uvel Sajakho had married into one of the notable families of Niemeneke in 1950 and explained to me how Niemeneke moved next to the road in 1950s:

> I left Sibikiling to join Niemeneke which was next to the main road. People of Niemeneke were first at Bangar but they had come next to the road because of peanuts. We followed them later. At that time, not a lot of people lived here. There was Fode Ba the founder of Kedougou.. .We used to go to him to leave our harvest and our millet. During the dry season, we would go back there to take back some food to feed ourselves. Fode Bah was really powerful Sarakhole.

The inhabitants of Niemeneke, as Sajakho pointed out, were tied to Kedougou's "native authorities" through prestations, and gave part of their harvest to them and sought their help in times of need. Niemeneke's village chief and peanut producers welcomed this displacement suggested by the Commandant of the Cercle of Kedougou, as it represented an opportunity to produce more and sell the peanuts more easily. Furthermore, like the present village chief of Badi, the present village chief of Niemeneke - who was one of the main peanut producers and the head of the peanut cooperative during the 1960s - was keen to claim the share of his village in the creation of the Niokolo-Koba National Park. Uvel's sister Koumba Sajaxhou pointed to the importance of the ties that linked Niemeneke's notables and chiefs to the Park and local administration in Kedougou:

> One of my older parents Keikouta Cissokho was also one of the founders of the Park. He was a guide for the toubabs. He was also a great hunter. He spent all his time with toubabs. He was the one who made the toubabs discover the Park. He knew the forest as the palm of his hand. When toubabs arrived he showed them everything in the Park. To thank him, toubabs asked him to come to settle in Niokolo-Koba and they nominated him as the prefect. He was the prefect until his death and his son took over after that.

Thanks to Uvel's parent, a hunter, whites had "discovered the Park." Uvel thought that her parent had obtained his post in the administration in exchange for his valuable services in showing the "Park" to the whites. As I will show in Chapter 4, the political connections of Niemeneke's elite to the family of Cissokho, particularly to Mady Cissokho, the Deputy from Kedougou who became the Ministry of Public Works in Senghor's government, will also play an important role during the

eviction of Niemeneke after the Independence. The particular road that the elite of Niemeneke chose to take, took them to increasingly intensive peanut production and political alliances with local authorities, which could not prevent their postcolonial eviction, but which nevertheless attenuated its devastating impact -- at least for the peanut cultivating elite.

The 1950s evictions from the Total Hunting Reserve of Niokolo-Koba illustrate the complexities of colonial evictions. While from the perspective of the local colonial administrators (Commandant of the Cercle or Forestry Service) evictions were desirable for the development of tourism (creation of the Total Hunting Reserve), and from the perspective of some inhabitants they were an opportunity to move into cash crop agriculture. The 1950‘s Total Hunting Reserve was also the first step towards the creation of the colonial Niokolo-Koba National Park. Immediately following the creation of the Reserve, first colonial forest guards were established in neighboring villages in 1950 and 1951 (Roure, 1956, p. 93). Nevertheless, the increasing coercive presence of the Forestry Service in policing the forest and hunting would create important tensions, particularly in Tabadian and Damantan, in the West of the Hunting Reserve. After the extension of the Reserve in 1953 and the creation of a National Park in 1954, the proposal to evict the inhabitants of Damantan and Tabadian would not be easily accepted by the inhabitants of these areas.



Map 7: Tabadian-Damantan, Badi-Niongani and Niemeneke-Sibikiling areas (indicated in grey), the Total and Partial Widlife Reserves in Niokolo-Koba in 1951 (adapted from Roure, 1951).

The Creation of the Colonial National Park and Eviction Proposal of Damantan-Tabadian

The category of the National Park existed since the London Conference of 1933. However, the restrictions on hunting that defined National Parks as “intangible domain” were not implemented in the protected areas in Oriental Provinces, whereas in the Partial Hunting Reserves hunting had become increasingly commercialized. After the Second World War, the increasing importance of hunting and eco-tourism as a development priority allowed more funds to be allocated to these reserves and made it possible to implement the London Convention in West Africa. By 1954, all the elements for the emergence of the colonial Niokolo-Koba National Park as an object of development - through conservation of its aesthetic and scientific value for

tourism - was already in place. The public works, including the construction of one hundred and fifty kilometers of roads within the Total Wildlife Reserve and in surrounding hunting areas was completed between 1949 and 1953 (Roure, 1956, p. 94). The first touristic lodges were already constructed in Niokolo-Koba and Badi. Evictions from Bangare and around mountain Assirik emptied the most picturesque areas of the Total Wildlife Reserve, and forestry control posts were established in key villages surrounding the Reserve, including Damantan, Badi and Niemeneke. Furthermore, starting in 1951, the surveillance of wildlife reserves was entrusted to a specialized corps of military, called “Lieutenants de Chasse” (Hunting Lieutenants), responsible for the surveillance of wildlife in hunting reserves (Roure, 1952, p. 25).

In 1953, a decision of the Government General of French West Africa extended the Total Game Reserve to the East, towards the regions of Tabadian and Damantan, and changed its status to a Total Wildlife Reserve (*Reserve Totale de Faune*).



Map 8: The Niokolo-Koba National Park in 1950 and its extensions in 1953 (adapted from G. Roure, 1956).

In August of 1954, a Decree of the Ministry of French Overseas Territories declared this Total Wildlife Reserve among one of the three National Parks in West Africa.[97] In the same month, the Commandant of the Cercle of Tambacounda addressed a letter to the Governor General of

[97] This decree concerned the Niokolo-Koba in Senegal, the “Boucle of Baoule” in Sudan, and “W” in Niger (DPN, 2000, p. 150).

Senegal to ask for further extensions of the Wildlife Reserve to the east of the Koulountou River and for eviction of 32 villages (approximately 1,654 inhabitants) from the Damantan and Tabadian areas. The Commandant justified his proposal as follows:

> Since my arrival in the Cercle of Tambacounda, I observed that the Game Reserve was indeed very narrow in its actual limits. According to the opinion of competent persons, in order for a Wildlife Reserve to play its role, it has to incorporate all the roads of passage of wildlife, which is not the case for the Niokolo-Koba. The reserve is limited at the West by the Gambia River, which is not an obstacle but rather a point of gathering for the wildlife, which crosses the river. Therefore, I think it is necessary to plan for the attachment of the region located between the Gambia River and its affluent Koulountou to the Game Reserve, as soon as possible.[98]

Following the expert opinion of nature conservationists, the Commandant was convinced that the existing reserve was “too narrow” for the wildlife and that a larger conservation area was necessary to include the migratory paths. However, the Commandant added another justification to his demand of eviction, which was not related to wildlife per se. He added:

> In fact, the inhabitants of this region, which is limited in the South by the border with Guinee, in the North and East by Gambia, escapes nine months out of twelve from our authority: [the populations] do not pay taxes and the contributions to the *Societe de Prevoyence* and, of course, do not repay the grains lent by the government because they do not cultivate.

For the Commandant, eviction had a double purpose: conservation of the great fauna and the political reorganization of the region. The political purpose of the eviction, to remove the unruly populations, who did not paid taxes, escaped the authority of the local administration and who defaulted on returning the money and peanut grains lent by the colonial cooperatives. Clearly, unlike the approach of the Commandant of Kedougou to the region of Sibikiling and Niemeneke, the Commandant of the Cercle of Tambacounda viewed the region of Tabadian and Damantan as a problem for the local administration. The eviction also provided a solution for increasing the cash crop productivity, as the evicted inhabitants could be moved to areas where there were “lands favorable to the cultivation” and closer to the road - it was proposed to remove them between Dienoundiala and Gamon. This proposal was re-iterated in 1955 by the Commandant of the Cercle of Tambacounda to the Governor of Senegal and to Senghor and Mamadou Dia when

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[98] The letter of Commandant de Cercle of Tambacounda to the Governor of Senegal dated 5 August 1954 (ANS CS 11 D 1/1061).

they visited the region as deputies. However, this time, the Commandant suggested that “the opinion of the elected representatives of the populations” should be consulted before the displacement.[99] This cautionary note indicated that the proposal for extension of the Niokolo-Koba National Park to Tabadian and Damantan and the eviction of the residents of these areas had met with resistance. But also, it pointed out to the increasing importance of conservation in cantonal politics of elections.

In fact, an important, but unspoken aspect of this eviction proposal was the fragility of the support for Senghor’s party in the Tabadian and Damantan regions of Oriental Provinces. During the 1951 territorial assembly elections,[100] according to Keita, a Diakhanke speaking evictee from Tabadian, when Senghor was presented as the candidate for the 1951 elections, the village chiefs of Damantan and Tabadian opposed him:

> At that time, Senghor and Lamine Koura (Gueye) were competing for power. Lamine Koura came to see Diakhankes... He had come to Tabadian... Koura was from Mali, his village was also called Madina... I have once been in his village in Mali...When the time for voting came, Senghor beat Koura. Koura lost... At that time, if I say there was a vote [an election], I mean there was a campaign for vote. During the elections the two political parties were competing. The leader of each party was calling their supporters in each neighborhood [quartier] and they were asking them to vote in mass. They were also making fun of their adversaries. But unfortunately, every time there was an election Senghor was winning. That was what Lamine Koura was protesting. He used to say high and loud that there was fraud and he was the one who had most of the votes. To tell the truth, the Lamine Gueye had the victory in every neighborhood. But there was fraud.[101]

The notables and chiefs of Damantan and Tabadian enjoyed great legitimacy as Muslim teachers and healers in the land of Tanda and beyond, and their opposition to Senghor’s party was an important concern, particularly in the context of the electoral politics in the aftermath of the Lamine Gueye Law, which extended citizenship to the inhabitants of rural areas in 1947.

According to Keita, who was from Tabadian, the establishment of the Forestry Service agents within the villages, during that period of time, was also due to political reasons.

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[99] Lettter No. 490/APA of the representative of Political and Administrative Affairs of Tambacounda to the Governor, dated 2 June 1955.

[100] The municipal and territorial assembly elections were held in the 1950, following the Lamine Gueye Law granting citizenship to all rural Africans in 7 May 1946. The voting rights were extended to literates, chiefs, veterans and agents of colonial administration.

[101] Keita, Boulakounda, October 2004.

During our conversation about the Park, I asked Keita why he thought the Forestry Service posts (also called *campement*) were established in the proximity of their villages:

> M: Why were les Forets (forestry agents) in Tabadian and Damantan?
>
> K: Les Forets were primarily in Damantan. And, if you would like to know why Forets had a *campement* in Damantan, you also have to understand that this region was very troubled. There were a lot of fights, particularly internal conflicts within the villages. When there are problems among the people living in the forest.. it is dangerous for the State. The State came to Damantan to prevent them from killing each other. This is why there was a Forestry Service post there, in Damantan.... But this *campement* contributed also to the power of the marabouts of Damantan. These two powers got together to increase the power of Damantan. And Damantan became the most known village among others.

Keita's account shows how the presence of the Forestry Service and the establishment of forestry posts after the 1950s, were interpreted by the inhabitants of Diakhanke speakers of Tabadian. This cannot be dismissed as an empty suspicion, particularly in the context of the dominant nature conservation discourse adopted by the Forestry Service at the time. The Director of the Forestry Service, Roure, had also depicted the region of Damantan as a bed of "fanatic muslims," based on his re-reading (and re-writing) of their pre-colonial history (Roure, 1956). Particular villages, like Damantan, were chosen to implant posts, not only to control hunting but also to control local authorities, which posed "trouble" for the State. Yet, as Keita hinted, the presence of the forestry agents also played an important role in transforming authority relations in these villages, a topic that I will explore in the next section.

There were multiple reasons that led to the extensions of the protected area and evictions in 1954 and 1955. The colonial state was unable to establish political and economic control in this area. The inhabitants were not as keen to adopt commercial peanut production, and they were opposed to the rising influence of Senghor. These chiefs were particularly troublesome for security in the forest. The colonial administrators did not succeed in evicting Damantan and Tabadian. However, these tensions would outlive the Independence and become heightened after the election of Senghor as President. As I will show in the next chapter, similar political concerns about the "native authorities" of this region - expressed through an increasingly paranoiac standoff between Senghor and Sekou Toure in Guinee - would play a leading (yet silenced) role in postcolonial evictions.



Map 9: The Colonial Niokolo-Koba National Park in 1956 (adapted from Roure, 1956).

Policing of the Forest by Coercing through Custom

Initially, the presence of a coercive alien authority in the villages of the forested areas of Senegal Oriental was felt through the Province Chief who recruited forced labor for public works and colonial concessions. However, after World War II, as cash crop agriculture expanded to the South and tourism took precedence, the canton chief gradually lost his power over peanut producers, partly to the new Forestry Service, which extended its influence in newly protected areas established in the forests south of Dialakoto. It is after the establishment of the colonial National Park that the Forestry Service became more and more present in the villages surrounding the colonial National Park.

I have already mentioned that the colonial hunting and forestry laws restricted local uses of wildlife and forests by limiting them to “customary” uses, which was equated to subsistence use. The imposition of these restrictions through the agents living in the midst of the villagers did

not consist simply of catching the “poachers” and “tresspassers.” The coercion of the forestry agents changed in important ways the authority of the village chiefs in areas that surrounded the Niokolo-Koba National Park. A different type of coercion, which required the intervention of the village chiefs and the “custom,” existed.

Philly, who had many times welcomed me in his household and acted as host in the present village of Niemeneke in Madina Bloc, was a beekeeper. Although his parents were all from Niemeneke, he had spent his childhood in Damantan. He had studied Koran in Damantan and he also lived, like many kids of his age group, in the forest, learning how to gather honey, accompany guides and hunters , and learning about the secrets of the forests, plants and animals. From his childhood, Philly had vivid memories of the Forestry Service, as he had grown up with them. He knew what they wanted, what was forbidden and what was allowed. He recalled the presence of “*les Forets*” (forestry service agents) and their surveillance methods:

> *Les Forets* would tour around the forest on their bicycles. They even used an airplane to look at us from above. They also had binoculars. We learnt about binoculars from them. They could see the poacher from far away. They would gather together and go after him.... The foresters could hear the gunfire at a great distance.[102]

For Philly, the knowledge and power of forestry service agents derived partly from their modern tools (bicycle, binocular, air plane) of surveillance. But it was not their only source of power:

> The agents were in the middle of the villages and they were always in alert.... If they took you (the poacher) on the job, they would lock you up in a hut and wait until a car came to take you to Tambacounda. If someone opened a bush fire, they would also catch him, beat him and release him. If the person was caught a second time, they would beat him again. The third time, they would send him to Tamba (counda).

The forestry agents, as their name indicates, “Les Forets,”[103] were a repressive force sent from the outside state. They had the power to use force against the villagers. This use of force was authorized by the law (sending culprits to Tambacounda to tribunal and than to jail). However, later in my discussion with Philly, he also revealed another way in which Forestry Service agents inserted themselves into the village. I learned about the use of the “fatiha”[104] when I asked Philly:

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[102] Philly, Niemeneke, October 2004.

[103] Les Forets is short for Le Service des Eaux et Forets (Forests and Water Services).

[104] *Al Fatiha*, is the first *surat* of the Qur’an and a central prayer of Islam.

M: What happens if the person is innocent or if a culprit cannot be found in the village?

P: They (forestry agents) don't care about that. In fact, it was up to us to find the culprits, through the *fatiha*.

M: What do you mean? How would you use the *fatiha* to catch the culprits?

P: *Les Forets* arrived in our villages gradually. The village chief had called us to explain and to decide how we were going to deal with interdictions. We had to agree among ourselves about what would be forbidden so that there would not be any misunderstandings... At that time, this is how we would protect ourselves from dangers and risks...It is necessary for people who live together to have solidarity when we take common decisions... I have witnessed the use of fatiha one time. One time, we were getting ready for the evening prayer (*fitiri*). At that time someone from the village left the village to go hunting. But les Forets heard the gunfire. They told us: "We have heard the gun fire. If this is someone from the village and you don't let us know who, you can be sure that we will not let him go and we will send him to Tamba." So our village chief said: "Do not worry. God willing, we will catch him." After that everyone went to the prayer. The village chief called us to tell us that: "I told you but you don't listen to me. Now we will all recite the fatiha and we will soon know who could fire like this in the forest." A day went by, two days went by. The third day, the hunter went again in the bush and killed another animal. This time his hands swell. Swollen hands, that cannot be hidden. When he came back to the village with swollen hands, we knew that it was him. It was like that in Damantan. If you lie, you will be denounced. So you should tell, if you see something.

What Philly told me startled me at first. It indicated that coercion by the forestry service was not only based on an external use of force but that it worked in much more complex ways through the transformation of authority relations within the village. On the one hand, this showed how coercion trickled down and penetrated the web of relations within the village through the village chief. On the other hand, to protect the village community from risks and dangers, the village chief and the villagers adapted to this coercion by finding scapegoats (or real culprits). Furthermore, the use of prayers to find these scapegoats also had an effect on how Islam and tradition were practiced. The use of "fatiha" to find culprits in the village of Damantan is an example of the complexity of how colonial rule worked through the forestry service agents, and how it affected the relations of authority among the villagers themselves.

Conclusion

South-Eastern Senegal is understood as a "periphery" in economic sense and figures among the least economically "developed" regions of Senegal. Senegal Oriental was the quintessential "*arrière-pays*," a hinterland, which came to be represented as an "enclave," with no

appropriate access to public roads and folded unto itself by its recalcitrant customs. The idea of "enclavement" is partly related to the question of circulation of goods and people, a central economic concern of development. Goods cannot reach these presumably hard to reach isolated places, and cash crops cannot be transported easily without the existence of roads or railroads. This region of Senegal could be called in Sivaramakrishnan's terms an internal frontier and a zone of anomaly (Sivaramakrishnan, 1999).[105] However, these zones of anomaly are not only created through eco-centered discourses about forested areas - self-contained enclaves cut off from the center, supposedly hard to reach areas due to lack of roads- but also governance related discourses that depict the inhabitants - not only as poachers- but also as natives fixed in their homelands and rebels attached to their outdated traditions.

To understand the construction of the South East Senegal as a zone of anomaly is not recent and dates back from the French colonial rule. The land of Tanda, a region considered as a rebellious zone by the French administrators, was pacified after a violent period of wars against jihadist movements. The French colonial native policy followed also a specific trajectory in this region. Instead of choosing and reinforcing a chief considered "native" to the region, a Province Chief from a different region of Senegal was appointed. The Province Chief of Oriental Provinces under which the authorities and people of Tanda were subsumed became rooted in the region through the recruitment of forced labor. The "foreign" Province Chief help set a pattern of coercive relations that tied the French colonial state to village authorities influential in Southern forested areas of Oriental Provinces. These coercive relations developed also in the context of an increasing commercialization of wildlife and production of cash crops, cementing the basis of the close relationship between development and the expansion of colonial rule in forested rural areas.

The creation of first hunting reserves in Oriental Provinces coincide with the interwar development project, the building of road and railroad networks carried out by forced labor under the Province Chief. Together with the enclaves capitalist export oriented agricultural production (like the sisal produced in colonial concession in Wassadou-Depot) expanded, the commercial

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[105] Sivaramakrishnan, who studied environmental change and the state-making in forested zones of Bengal in India, suggested that zones of anomaly were created to mark internal frontiers.

hunting in game reserves expanded as well. After the World War II, part of the already existing hunting reserves and classified forests were converted into a national park, with a much more strict regime of conservation. Although the colonial Niokolo-Koba National Park became a much more restricted area reserved for tourism and science; hunting was still permitted in areas surrounding it. The expansion of peanut production both in Wassadou-Depot and in the forests surrounding the colonial park dates are both important transformations that shaped the post-war development in the region. While public works and the colonial sisal concession which relied on forced labor were the markers of the interwar development, the post-war development manifested itself with the creation of the Niokolo-Koba National Park and the peanut boom, which relied on seasonal paid agricultural migrants.

In this chapter, I have also looked out at the pattern of relations established between the colonial Forestry Service and native authorities during the French colonial rule. These relations were based on attempts of co-optation and coercion. As colonial commercial hunting went on, some villages like Badi, more than others, become integrated in hunting tourism, especially after the first tourist lodges were established next to their villages. Villagers provided a source of cheap local labor for hunting tourism and for the maintenance of the tourism infrastructure (the hotel, lodges and roads). Their relationship with the colonial Forestry agents was based partly on the sharing of hunting revenues. After the 1950s, with the tightening of conservation regime in and around the new national park, the first forest guards were also implanted within the villages to control hunting and exercised increasing coercion and pressure over the village chiefs. The recollection of the evictees indicate that the coercion exercised by colonial forestry guards was not an “external” affair, as foresters inserted themselves in village authority relations through the usurpation of their role of village chiefs as religious leaders.

Finally, based on colonial records, I have indicated that there has been colonial precedents to evictions from the Niokolo-Koba National Park. I argued that colonial administrators justification of evictions were based on nature conservation (e.g. the migratory patterns of the wildlife outside the reserve), development and government related arguments. At the same time, these justifications were based on discourses that reflected the villages surrounding the national park as unproductive cultivators, who escaped colonial state’s control by evading taxes. These

attitudes played an important role in colonial evictions that took place in the 1950s. However, these first evictions concerned a small number of villages which were established around the most picturesque part of the National Park. They also resulted in quicker incorporation of these villages (particularly Niemeneke) into peanut production. Another eviction was proposed in 1956 prior to Independence. This eviction targeted the Tabadian and Damantan region, where Senegal's emerging elite, particularly those gathered under Senghor's party, did not enjoy much support. The eviction of the inhabitants of Tabadian and Damantan was not carried out. While the reasons are not clear (the fear of local retaliation as well as the fear of loosing political support may have played an important role), this same area would become the primary focus of military backed evictions after Independence.

Chapter 2: Postcolonial Dilemmas

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the first ten years of Independence in Senegal, during which development became a political battle ground for economic and political independence. Debates over development reflect a more general concern with the reshaping of the colonial legacy. From the perspective of postcolonial studies this reshaping took various forms depending on the type of legacy. For example, for Mudimbe the most important colonial legacy was the "colonial library" [106] or knowledge created by colonial power and which had an affect on Africans' knowledge of themselves (Mudimbe, 1988). But for Mbembe, the most important colonial legacy was the refashioning of African subjectivity through colonial rationalities of government (Mbembe, 2001).[107] In this chapter, acknowledging the importance of these insights on postcolonial condition, I will first turn my attention to the role of development as a dominant framework within which complex postcolonial dilemmas of Senegal were played out. I will focus on three influential public figures in Senegalese politics, who were influential in shaping development debates from 1950s on: President Leopold Sedar Senghor, his prime minister and the Council President Mamadou Dia; and, the development expert Dominican Priest Louis-Joseph Lebret.[108] Their vision is important to understanding how the languages and techniques chosen to re-write Senegal's colonial past relied on knowledge and techniques of governance handed over by the colonial rule, while they struggled to overcome its legacies.

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[106] Mudimbe referred to the writings produced by Westerners during the colonial area as the "colonial library." These writings, which also "invented Africa" as an object of study, had an impact on Africans' knowledge of themselves.

[107] For a short but useful critique of Mbembe's position in postcolonial studies see (Porter, 2003). Although it is an important issue, the focus here is not on postcolonial subjectivities. However, this is not to deny that Senegalese leaders and politicians were immune from the formation of such subjectivities, which were partly shaped through the colonial process.

[108] There were also other alternative voices, such as that of Abdoulaye Ly, who influenced the debates on African Socialism. Therefore, this categorization does not do justice to the diversity of voices involved in this debate. However, as Senghor, Dia and Lebret had been determinant in defining the course of Senegalese development, I chose to focus on their views.

How was this “pluralistic” discourse of development deployed to forge postcolonial state in Senegal? This is the question that I will focus on in the first section of this chapter. The contradictions of the postcolonial developmentalist state are also illustrated in different interpretations of the state form that emerged in Senegal within the first decade of Independence. Diouf argued that development became a dominant discourse during this period because of Senegalese nation-state’s search for international recognition and that this search led to the “expectation” that the Senegalese Government should play an “active role” in country’s economy (Diouf, 1997). The right to make decisions about the economy was presented as a form of right to exercise powers of sovereignty. This view implicitly assumes that the developmentalist state in Senegal assumed an “extroverted” form.[109] It was the search for international recognition of its sovereignty that motivated the practices and policies fashioned to carry out a state-centered development within Senegal. However, according to an alternative view, the predominant role played by institutions and the administration of a developmentalist state was more like an “enlightened despotism.” It was an extension of the “Presidential regime,” which was put in place in Senegal after the imprisonment of Mamadou Dia (Cisse, 2004). Contrary to the first one, this view assumes an introverted form of a postcolonial state in Senegal. It looks not to how Senegalese intellectuals and politicians presented their country outside, or sought international recognition, but how they related to their own citizens and, how the government of post-Independence Senegalese State looked to its citizens. These two perspectives put under scrutiny the janus-faced image that this state projected: one looking outside (to France, to the Third World, to the United States, UN etc), and the other one looking inside (to the rural Senegalese and their “traditional” authorities). As I will show in the next chapter, different discourses deployed to justify the expansions of the Niokolo-Koba National Park and the extension of a stricter conservation regime reflected also the janus face that postcolonial Senegalese state projected. On the one hand, the discourse that appealed to international audiences stressed the beneficial active role of the Senegalese State in protecting humanity’s natural heritage (the Niokolo-Koba National Park) against poachers and trespassers. On the other hand, those

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[109] For a more detailed argument and analysis of extroverted states in Africa see Bayart (Bayart, 2000) .

discourses that appealed to Senegalese elite and administrators, stressed on improving the African “masses” through the development of tourism, on integrating the unproductive peasants into the reformed agrarian development and tenure relations, and on tying those “native authorities” that resisted the change to the authority of the centralized administration.

In this chapter, I will look at some of these contradictions and how they played out in Senegalese postcolonial land reform and agrarian development vision. In the first part, I will give the broad outlines of the pluralist development discourses that emerged in Senegal after Independence. The Senegalese development discourses took their inspiration from different sources, which included the underdevelopment theories that emerged with Third Worldist movement, theories of African Socialism in search for alternatives to the Soviet style socialism and, the Pan-Africanist cultural movement of return to African origins, which was represented by negritude in Senegal. These different discourses converged in the politics and ideas of three important leaders that shaped postcolonial development discourses and practices in Senegal: Leopold S. Senghor, Mamadou Dia and Joseph Lebret.

In the second section of this chapter, I will concentrate on the concept of village *terroir*s *(terroirs villageois)* and rural community (*communauté rurale*) and how these two important central concepts of postcolonial Senegalese reforms were reworked to adapt to the aims of land and agrarian reforms. The geographical notion of *terroir* and the administrative notion of rural community, would become important in defining how the developmentalist state, turned towards the rural inhabitants, sought to reorganize the rural landscape of Senegal. These hybrid concepts, which contained important contradictions, were also inscribed to 1964 National Domain Law (NDL)[110] and the 1972 Law on Territorial Administration,[111] and became the bases of the new territorial reorganization of Senegal and its land tenure regime. The *terroir* approach, conceived as a production tool for peasants, became an important part of fixing African peasants on land for cash crop production, and in a way, represented the ambitious attempt of the postcolonial state to create units of legibility, geared to create the conditions favorable to manipulate and intervene on (particularly rural) population. Although Scott described the most important aspect of legibility as

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[110] Law No. 64-46 on National Domain.

[111] Law No. 72-25 on the Reform of Territorial Administration.

the creation of units “visible” to the state,[112] another important contribution of his approach is to emphasize the centrality of preoccupation with sedentarization, domestication of peasants by fixing them on land. This preoccupation with sedentarization, together with the attempts to create territorial identities through “ethnic grid,” were both important strategies of French colonial administration in West Africa (De L'Estoile, 2005; Mamdani, 1996).

Forging a Third Way for a Developmentalist State

Development discourses that emerged in Senegal during the period following the Independence were described as “pluralistic” (Diouf, 1997, p. 292). This pluralism was partly a result of new knowledge or sources that entered into the production of development discourses. First, there was the influence of African Socialism,[113] which offered different interpretations on how socialism could be applied to independent African states (Friedland & Carl G. Rosberg, 1964; Thomas, 1966). Second, the “new” post World War II development paradigm,[114] coincided with the Third World movement and Marxist theories of underdevelopment, which had emerged in the midst of Cold War politics. The ideas of Third Worldist intellectuals and scholars took hold among nationalist rulers and the transnational elite of Senegal when they framed what development should mean (Diouf, 1997; Ferguson, 1997, p. 158). Finally, another important influence over pluralistic development discourses was a Pan-African cultural revival movement. This movement, whose most prominent representatives were Cheikh Anta Diop and Senghor in

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[112] These visible units could be citizens, villages, trees, fields, houses, or people grouped according to age. These units of intervention depend on the type of intervention and served to make the object of intervention (the population) “readily identifiable” and therefore more easily “accessible to the center” (Scott, 1998, p. 183),

[113] African Socialism had numerous variants and interpretations, which were not the result of a single thinker, but shaped by intellectual exchanges and debates among different African politicians and intellectuals. For differences and similarities between different African states see, (Friedland & Carl G. Rosberg, 1964; Thomas, 1966).

[114] According to Cooper and Packard what was “new” about development after World War II was that it carried “development out of the colonial realm and made it a basic part of international politics” (Cooper & Packard, 1997, p. 8). This was due to the influence of new actors. The first one was the United States, which, through its involvement in Europe’s reconstruction after the war, became the main investor and architect of new development. But also, new international organizations like the WB, IMF, FAO and UN development agencies (UNDP, UNESCO etc.) appeared. In French West African colonies, post-war development translated into more financial and technical support from metropolitan France to colonies.

Senegal, aimed at putting the African Civilization on the same footing as the European Civilization and influenced a great deal the take of Senegalese intellectuals on African Socialism (Tine, 2005).

African Socialism was one of the main sources of inspiration for pluralistic development discourses that became predominant in Senegal. Senghor and Dia, as Sekou Toure in Guinea, did not reject the idea of development but capitalism as development. For Mamadou Dia, capitalism encapsulated a “western economic symbolism” and the Western Civilization’s conception of “utility” was based on “fetishism of money” and individualism. Dia argued that as opposed to Western capitalism with its attending values that highlighted individualism and profit, were against African and Asian civilizations, whose system of values were “unrelated to the value of money” and based on the primacy of “group interests” (Dia, 1961, pp. 90-91). Senghor also thought that capitalism led to economic, political and cultural alienation of Africans. This alienation was however not limited to the Marxist view of alienation of workers from their labor but also the alienation of Africans from “themselves” in a system where “man has become a wolf to man” (Leopold Sedar Senghor, 1964, pp. 29-30). Capitalism worked against the “proletarian nations” of Africa, whose economies were based on peasant’s production of agricultural commodities. Finally, capitalism was the basis of colonial economic exploitation, which established African countries’ dependency on foreign markets.

Similarly, Senghor and Dia rejected Soviet communism, for its end result, they argued, resembled Western capitalism, and it was not adaptable to Senegalese context. Soviet communism was similar to American capitalism, but only in producing profits for the Communist state, which was nothing but a dictatorship of proletariat[115] (Andrian, 1964; Senghor, 1964). Although both Dia and Senghor considered the Marxist concept of alienation the most humanistic trait of Marxism, they both rejected the atheism of Marxism (Senghor, 1964, p. 38).[116] However,

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[115] Their main criticism focuses on the fact that the Soviet system of development was based on heavy industry, using peasants as a labor force in Soviet farms, which worked as factories to secure profits in the name of the Soviet state.

[116] Citing Marx’s famous quote on religion as the opium of the masses, Senghor argued that for Marx, religion led to the ultimate alienation of man. However, turning the table around, he also claimed that Marx’s atheism was in “essence” a “reaction of Christian origin against the historical deviations of Christianity.” (Senghor, 1964, p. 38)

there were Socialist techniques that could be of use for Africa to attain development. Marxism could be adapted to Senegal as a “technique” or a “method” rather than as a “doctrine” (Senghor, 1964). One of the “techniques” that Marxism offered was planning. Even though planning presupposed the dictatorship of proletariat, it nevertheless allowed the organization of “socialistic production,” which could have the effect of “developing maximum production and of distributing production equitably.”[117] But as Senegal lacked private national capital and national “technicians,” this Senegal needed to be “in dialogue” with foreign capitalists (Senghor, 1964, p. 55). I will explain in the next section the importance of this foreign technical assistance in development, particularly in land use management through a team lead by Dominican Priest Father Joseph Lebret.

Senghor’s and Dia’s reading of Marxism and Soviet Socialism was also based on their attempts to re-define Socialism through African lenses. This concern was reflected in their attempt to root African Socialism in values that were different than those offered by capitalist and communist models. The communitarian model offered a way to do this. Senghor defined African socialism as European socialism grated on the “old roots of Negro African communalism.[118]” Senghor’s model of Negro-African communalism involved a philosophical aspect, shaped by the philosophy of Negritude[119] and an ethnological aspect shaped by the work of ethnologists, geographers, historians and archeologists and their “inventory” of cultural values Negro-African Civilization (Senghor, 1964, p. 49). Senghor distinguished between Negro African communalism

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[117] Senghor identified the goals of effective planning as: 1. elimination of private property and profit by nationalization and collective ownership of means of production; 2. development of scientific research 3. establishment of a true economic plan; distribution of the value of products according to the labor of each worker (Senghor, 1964, p. 129).

[118] Cited by Cook (Cook, 1964).

[119] Senghor’s ideas on Negritude were extremely rich and complex. This philosophy, which goes beyond the confines of this chapter, is broadly defined as the “totality of civilizing values of the Negro world” (cited by Cook, 1964). This philosophy was partly based on the ideas of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, a Jesuit priest and philosopher, to whom Senghor often makes reference. Here I will only consider aspects of Negritude, which entered into his writing about Socialism.

based on the union of individuals through “intuitive reason,” emotions and faith, and the Western Western collectivism based on a contract among individuals based on reason.[120]

African Socialism based on Negro African communalism was also projected onto Senghor’s view of African land tenure, as he represented as the object of “collective use rights.” This view was similar to colonial ideas of communal ownership of land in Africa as an anti-thesis of European civilized private ownership, with one important difference. While colonial understanding of African communal tenure was the product of a multiplicity of customs, the postcolonial idea of communal tenure was projected to the nation as the overarching “collectivity” which owned the land (Andrian, 1964). This aspect was also reflected in National Domain Law adopted in 1964, which nationalized most of Senegalese territories land as the National Domain. The “novel” legal concept of of National Domain was an attempt to translate these different ideas into property relations where the nation as the ultimate community owned the land, which could not be alienated, that is bought and sold by citizens as individuals. However, there are also two very important underlying corollaries of the concept of National Domain. First, as opposed to the increasing tendency within the French colonial administration to recognize “customary rights” as the basis of private property, according to the new land tenure land could not be subject to claims based on “custom.” Second, although land was not the property of the State, the State was the legitimate trustee of the land, holding it “in the name of the Senegalese Nation.” This role of trusteeship, however, would turn into autocratic control after Dia’s deposal.

Mamadou Dia supported Senghor’s idea of “authenticity” as the “sum total of values proper to Africa, to African civilizations” (Colin, 2007, p. 225). However, he underlined that Negritude should inform socialism so that it can be in contact with “African realities.” For Dia, who would be the architect of the praxis of African Socialism, these African realities were primarily rooted in the rural world, in the question of peasants and agrarian development, more than in the

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[120] Senghor’s views on Negro-African Civilization were also shaped by German ethnologist Leo Frobenius. Senghor integrated Frobenius’s ideas into his philosophy of Negritude when he offered the idea that Africans had “emotion” or “intuitive reason.” He established an distinction between African civilization, which was moved by feeling, emotion and heart, and European Civilization, moved by reason and Cartesian reason (Senghor, 2007). But when he declared that “L’Emotion est nègre comme la raison est hellène” (emotion is Negro as reason is Helenic), he put himself not only at odds with other writers of Negritude like Cesaire but also with French intellectuals, who criticized him for being essentialist (particularly by Sartre) (Tine, 2005, p. 13).

world of elites. Instead of Soviet style collectivization, Dia advocated for “self-managed peasant cooperatives”,[121] which would be put in place to replace the colonial *Société de Prévoyance* (SIP) and operate on principles of self-sufficiency and autonomous agricultural production (Colin, 2007; Galvan, 2004; Le Roy, 1980). In his approach to rural cooperatives Dia also aimed at “traditional chiefs” and marabouts, which were in control of peanut production in most of Senegal. They constituted the “feudal landlords” against which agrarian reform had to be fought (Dia, 2001; Mbodj, 1992). Rural cooperatives had to be the tools to take the peasants out of the grip of these “traditional elements.” In putting the technical tools for this agrarian socialism in practice, Mamadou Dia was also guided by development experts, particularly by Father Lebret, whose “humanistic” approach, that I will explore later, seemed to offer an alternative to Soviet communism and Western capitalism.

Both Senghor’s and Dia’s agreed that the Senegalese State should be the center of development. National Planning would be carried out by the State as the trustee of land and national productive resources, and by centralized “public institutions” (*établissements publics nationaux*) which included a gamut of different organizations tied to the Senegalese government. The Office of Agricultural Commercialization (OCA)[122]was established in 1960 to help Senegal transition from colonial economy to a “modern, rational and socialist-inspired economy, oriented towards cooperative movement” (Pehaut quoted by Mbodj) (Mbodj, 1992). The Office nationalized the commerce of peanuts previously controlled by the French and Lebanese companies and merchants and, organized the production of peanuts at the national level by providing agricultural inputs, credit and buying peanuts. In agricultural development, new structures of state support for rural cooperatives were put in place including the Regional Centers for Development Assistance (CRADs) and Centers of Rural Expansion (CERs).[123] Finally, CERs would carry out *Animation Rurale*, the heart of Dia’s agrarian education program, which consisted of educating Senegalese experts (mostly agronomists) and sending them to rural areas to

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[121] Coopératives Paysannes Auto-Gérées.

[122] Office de Commercialization Agricole.

[123] Centres d’Expansion Rurale.

educate peasants about the principles of African socialism and development in the countryside (Galvan, 2004, p. 128).

Rational and Continuous Agrarian Production on State Land under the Guidance of Experts

Both Senghor and Dia, were against the "dictatorship of proletariat" and colonial economic exploitation, but they did not view the state oversight as an immediate problem. On the contrary, it was necessary to have state control over agrarian production until peasants would be able to sustain self-managing cooperatives. Peasants needed to be guided along the path of development, which needed to follow a technocratic rationality. The technocratic approach underlying the centralized economic and land-use planning would not only reflect but also reinforce the paternalistic tendencies of Socialist inspired planning, the central role of the state public institutions and state support for rural agrarian cooperatives. Land use planning, as I will discuss below, was closely related to administrative divisions of Senegal and an important tool to help create new units of legibility, which would replace the colonial administrative divisions.

Land Use Planning and Village Terroirs

As mentioned earlier, one of the most important influences on development debates in Senegal after Independence was the Third World movement, which emerged after the Bandung Afro-Asiatic Nations Conference in 1955.[124] The theories of underdevelopment [125] were, to large extent, influenced by the Marxist political economy, as they stood against the colonial legacy of

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[124] The international political discourse of Bandung Conference was influenced by the language of the Cold War, which divided the world into three "pillars" (or blocs): the Western Capitalist Bloc characterized by Fordism, the Soviet Bloc characterized by Soviet socialism, and the Third World Bloc, characterized by "developmentalism." The "Third World" bloc adopted a policy of "non-Alignment," as an alternative to capitalist and socialist blocs. The economic discourse of Bandung, also reflected in the documents of the Conference, stressed breaking the dependency on the capitalist world.

[125] The summary of the very rich literature on the Third World movement and its relationship to Marxist oriented African intellectuals goes beyond the limits of this chapter. Samir Amin, one of the leading intellectuals who shaped the political economic discourse of the Third World movement, stressed two main common goals of the Bandung Conference: the achievement of political decolonization and of economic independence (Herrera, 2005).

economic dependency of former, or soon to be independent ,colonies on Western capitalist “First World.” Senghor and Dia, shared with the Third Worldist movement a similar ideal of economic independence based on industrialization, urban, scientific and technological modernity, and was sympathetic to the Marxist basis of underdevelopment theories. However, many aspects of the Third World movement also corresponded to the aid policies of international organizations and the United States after the Second World War. These policies focused on the issues of poverty, peasants and “raising the living standards” of the poor.[126] Furthermore, the new international aid organizations and western countries also believed, as did Senghor and Dia, on the primacy of the role of states as locomotives and the primary pole from which the idea of development should be diffused to citizens (Diouf, 1997, p. 294). Thus, the Third World movement promoted “interdependence” with the First World. This interdependence was not only based on technical equipment and industrial goods, but also on international expertise on development. Both Senghor and Mamadou Dia welcomed “technicians” from France and other developed countries to conduct surveys and research, make policy recommendations and train African cadres.

In the aftermath of Bandung, Mamadou Dia had contacted Father Louis-Joseph Lebret, in 1957 to work as an adviser and head the Study Group on Economic Problems, with the mission of establishing the first development plan for Senegal (Colin, 2007, pp. 114-118; Dia, 2001, p. 152). Lebret, a Dominican Priest who was the founder and advocate of the “Economy and Humanism” movement, promoted a Third Worldist economic approach to development[127] and was known as an international consultant on economic strategy for Latin America and Lebanon. Dia and Father Lebret shared not only personal connections but also similar ideas on many issues related to Senegal’s transition to Independence. Lebret’s Economy and Humanism, together with other Catholic aid movements, advocated models of self-sufficient development that would not follow the Western capitalist mode. The Western model l created over-consumption and alienation (Denis, 1996, p. 40). Another important commonality with Dia and Lebret were

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[126] For this important shift in the focus of post-war development and its centrality for US-centered development aid to overseas see (Edelman & Haugerud, 2005).

[127] Lebret contended that “underdeveloped countries” were at a disadvantage in their economic dealings with “more developed countries” and that the former was dependent on the latter for technical equipment and industrial goods (Lebret, 1966, p. 75).

their stances against the chiefs (*chefferie*) in Senegal. Lebret considered “traditional religious practices and the influences of witch-doctors,” as “sociological obstacles” to development of “backwards countries” (Lebret, 1966, p. 79). Lebret pointed to religious “sects” as the source of familial and tribal resistance to a “rational and coordinated development programme.”

The cooperation between Dia and Lebret which had started in 1957 would last until Mamadou Dia was thrown out of the government and lay out the foundations of the agrarian reform based on land use planning and *terroir* approach. With the help of Lebret and his team *terroir*s would be constructed as units of legibility, as defined by Scott, which were geared to create the conditions favorable to manipulate and intervene on the population. The *terroir* approach conceived as a production tool for peasants became an important part of fixing African peasants on land for cash crop production, which was also one of the most important goals of French agrarian development based on commodity production.

Applying Geographers’ Terroir and Agrarian Community to Agrarian and Administrative Reform

When Lebret and his team worked in the Ministry of Planning in Senegal, they started countrywide research aimed at drawing a new cartography of Senegal based on “homogenous development zones.” Homogenous development zones would be determined based on a detailed study of the agrarian landscape of Senegal. Land use plans were drafted according to these studies in order to put each zone into its best productive use for development.

The research on homogeneous developmental zones was based on the concept of *millieu* (Diouf 1997, 299). The concept of *milieu* was itself derived from French schools of geography, mainly of human geography and regional geography, which focused on social groups, their spatial characteristics and their relations with their geographical *milieu* (Buttimer, 1971). The homogeneous development zones adopted a similar approach as they analyzed not only the *milieu* as a physical environment (with its relief, hydrology, its soil) but also the historical impact of humans on it.

These ideas are best exemplified in research conducted during the 1960s by French geographers, particularly by Pelissier and Sautter, who, under the auspices of the French

research agency ORSTOM, engaged in a long term research program aimed at analyzing, cataloguing and typifying “agrarian structures” in South of Sahara. In these detailed studies, “village *terroir*s” were approached as “agrarian landscapes” created by historical human use and occupation of the land (Pellissier & Sautter, 1964, p. 57). Pellissier and Sautter argued that a *terroir* was shaped by human activities, particularly by agriculture, which depended on the characteristics of a particular landscape[128]. Thus, Sautter defined the *terroir* as a “space from which an agricultural community defined by residential ties derives its essential subsistence” (Pellissier & Sautter, 1964). A *terroir*’s limits were delineated[129] by human settlement and exploitation of land based on “essential subsistence.” This approach had some important blind points - also recognized by Pelissier and Sautter - which were important for the application of the concept to agrarian development, but also to local administration.

First, *terroir* was based on a “sedentary” village’s spatial use of the land, which did not reflect the agrarian practices in most rural areas in South of Sahara (Painter, Sumberg, & Price, 1994). These agrarian “spaces” did not take into the consideration the dispersed nature of habitations and agricultural fields, and of grazing areas, which are sometimes quite distant from agricultural fields. However, the most important underlying assumption of the geographical conception of agrarian *terroir*s was that a *terroir* was used for subsistence production. In the case of the agrarian *terroir* approach adopted by Lebret and Dia, the agrarian production was not based on subsistence but on state controlled production of cash crops. In this context, the land used by peasants would not be determined by their own means and needs of subsistence but by the availability of state provided inputs (fertilizers, seeds etc.) and by the amount they should sell back to state cooperatives. Thus, the utopia of a self-sufficient rural community supported by Lebret and Dia was compromised by the very means they proposed to improve agrarian economy.

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[128] African *millieu* as a landscape was different from Asian agrarian landscapes where rice cultivation was based on inundation and heavy rains. The African *terroir*s were “rooted” (*terroirs enracines*), not by tradition fixed in pre-colonial historical times, but because of the shortage of rainfall.

[129] Sautter and Pelissier defined their research agenda as a geographical analysis of humanized landscapes (paysage humanise) within a clearly delineated space.

Another important aspect of land use planning, which is often not mentioned, is its administrative aspect. This aspect was directly related to Dia's views of "traditional chiefs." Starting from 1959, Dia was determined to dismantle the "colonial administrative structure," and had been engaged in changing the territorial administration of Senegal. He had decided to divide Senegal into great "administrative regions" (Dia, 2001, p. 154). Regions were not only "socio-economic" spaces but also political territories that would allow the transfer of power "from the center to the base." The homogenous developmental zones were geared to retrace the limits of old cantons, considered by Dia as the "fiefs of old chiefs, submitted to the administrative authority" (Dia, 2001, p. 155). As the basis of a new territorial administration, the homogeneous developmental zones would be formed by "populations who shared the same rural interests." Dia assumed that these interests would be more on the side of rural development and cooperative movement than on the side of "traditional chiefs." Although he did not ignore the economic importance of these chiefs,[130] he underestimated their political importance, which, coupled with the increasing opposition and suspicion of Senghor against Dia, would lead to his deposal and imprisonment in 1962 (Colin, 2007; Dia, 2001).

Shift from Autonomous Agrarian Development to Technocratic Administrative Development:

Starting from 1963, a "presidential regime" was put in place by Senghor. Mamadou Dia was imprisoned in Tambacounda. Between 1967 and 1969, all administrative decisions had to be approved by the President of the Republic, Senghor or his closest allies (Gautron, 1971). After the imprisonment of Mamadou Dia, Senghor focused on centralization of power based on a presidential regime run by Senghor's party (Tine, 2005). Under this "presidential regime," laws and decrees were produced at an "inflationist rate," passed only by the approval of Senghor and

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[130] As mentioned, the control of marabouts over the cash crop production was a central concern for the French colonial administration after World War II. The organization and control of peanut production by marabouts was one of the leading reasons of the slipping away of control over agriculture. The response of the colonial administration was to focus on integrating marabouts into colonial agricultural cooperatives, granting them large tracts of land, material and grains (Copans, 1988; Cruise O'Brien, 1971; Diop & Diouf, 1990b). Customary authorities in rural areas of Senegal, particularly the ones deeply implicated in cash crop agriculture, were strengthened by the colonial state.

his cabinet, establishing the basis for the nationalization of land and the oversight of a technocratic and centralized administration.[131]

The National Domain, Terroirs and Rural Community Councils

The National Domain Law was drafted before the deposal of Mamadou Dia and reflected his and Lebret's ideas about autonomous agrarian development and the zoning of the National Domain.[132] Lebret's approach to land use planning (*aménagement de territoires*) and to developmental zones would greatly influence the zones defined in the National Domain Law. The law would divide Senegalese territories into four zones according to their developmental priorities ("vocation"): the urban zones, which consisted of urban communes where land had to be used for habitation and residence; the classified zones, which consisted of protected areas, where land would be used for conservation and exploitation of forests and wildlife; *terroir* zones, which consisted of rural communities where land was used for agriculture and herding; and pioneer zones where land would be used for state-led intensive agricultural development (Le Roy, 1985, p. 668). *Terroir* Zones were the areas where agriculture and herding were the primary state-defined developmental uses. Pioneer and Classified Zones, however, were defined as "reserve lands" for other developmental purposes (Caverivière & Debene, 1988, p. 80). While Pioneer Zones were areas put "temporarily" under intensive cash crop production,[133] Classified Zones, including the National Parks were permanent reserves for conservation as their developmental vocation. However, each of these zones would be determined by regional development

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[131] Until 1970, Senghor remained the only authority who could approve administrative acts (decrees and governmental decisions, *arrêtés*), which were considered as executive decisions (Gautron, 1971, p. 21)

[132] The National Domain Law and the decrees of application has continued to be the subject of rich and important debates (Caverivière & Debene, 1988; Le Roy, 1980, 1985). This brief summary, at the expense of pointing out the injustice in the arguments of this debate, is aimed at illustrating the importance of this law in its aspects that relate to the case of the Niokolo-Koba and its residents.

[133] Pioneer Zones could be expanded to incorporate village lands (*Terroir* Zones) to extend their productive use for specific developmental purposes. Once Pioneer Zones would fulfill their developmental goals, they would be returned to village agricultural zones.

committees.[134] The State could appropriate land in any zone for "public utility" with the condition of paying indemnities to expropriated inhabitants.[135] This would allow the State to divest the use of land and reallocate it, for example, as a national park. The extensions of the Niokolo-Koba National Park, which included additional areas into the National Park for conservation, was based on this condition of expropriation of public utility.

The language of the National Domain Law kept the crucial key words of Dia's programme: the *terrior* as a homogeneous *millieu*, an agrarian community "implanted" on land and sharing the same "common rural interests" assumed to be woven around the rural agricultural cooperatives. The decree for the application of the National Domain Law also defined "rural community" based on the agrarian developmental ideas of *terroi*r and agrarian producers tied by "common rural interests." [136] A *terroir*'s limits would be determined by the availability of the means of production necessary and sufficient for "optimal self-management of an agrarian cooperative.[137]" But it was also bound to the condition of "rational use and exploitation of land" according to state development plans, drafted by Technical Services. It determined how land and natural resources would be put in productive use (Le Roy 1985). The National Domain Law also created a rural community as a political and administrative territory by giving the decision over its limits to the governor and a regional committee.[138] As I will show in the case of the Rural Community of Dialakoto, where the evictees were established, this committee would not, as Dia and others had hoped, break the colonial limits and centers of administrative authority.

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[134] Article 7 of NDL.

[135] Article 29 of Decree No.64-573.

[136] The Article 1 of Decree No.64-573 stated:

> A *terroir* is a homogeneous group of lands of the national domain, necessary for the development of populations or villages, which are united by common rural interests and had been implanted on it.

[137] The decree of application of NDL (Decree No.64-573) emphasized that the limits of the *terroi*r had to be such that it would: "Permit an agricultural cooperative [to] function profitably and with optimal self-management."

[138] Article 8 of the National Domain Law announced that the limits of the *terroi*rs would be promulgated by decree "in consultation with the governor, according to the criteria of development set by a regional committee.

Rural Community Councils and Land Allocations

French jurist anthropologist have argued that the concept of National Domain was a "novelty" of Senegal because it did not fall in any of the categories of the French Civil Code and administrative law, as it was neither the property of individuals (private property) or the property of the state (public property) (Le Roy, 1980). The 1964 National Domain Law, nationalized 95% of Senegalese territories within a new category of "National Domain." This nationalization however, adopted a particular road. The state did not directly declare itself as the owner of the national domain but as the guardian or trustee of it. The law also froze all acquisition of private property. All the owners of the private land titles registered prior to the National Domain Law were given a period of grace of six months to prove that they were "occupying and personally exploiting the land" and thus was entitled to register their land. Following this grace period of six months, no private actor was allowed to take titles to land and the land would fall within the category of National Domain where all citizens had only use-rights (Caverivière & Debene, 1988; Tzeutschler, 1999, p. 48).

The National Domain Law gave also the rural councils the "competency" to allocate or divest land within the rural community territories. That is, those who occupied the national domain, the citizens would have the land for agricultural use allocated by rural community councils, not according to any local custom or customary law. The first condition for allocation of land by rural community councils was productive use under the "control of the State."[139] The National Domain Law also defined the conditions of withdrawal of land by the rural councils. The rural community council could withdraw the land within *terroir* zones, in case of "the insufficiency of productive use or development.""[140] The land could also be withdrawn if the person had ceased to "exploit the land personally." Finally, the rural community could also withdraw lands for "reasons of general interest." The reasons of general interest included the establishment of cattle roads, water works, or the re-allocation of land for habitation. In the case of this type of

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[139] The Council would ensure the "productive use of land while continuing to exploit it under the control of the State" (Article 10 of NDL).

[140] Article 15 of the National Domain Law, the decree of application of the NDL, added to these conditions the one-year usufruct rule, according to which the land could be withdrawn if it was not exploited for more than one year.

withdrawal, either the state or the rural community was responsible for providing a new terrain for the person whose land has been re-allocated, and for paying indemnities to the person or his/her heirs based on the value of the constructions and crops existing on the land at the date of re-allocation. The “general interest” clause, like the clause of expropriation for public utility, allowed the rural community councils could withdraw land rights of the land users within the rural community. As “development” defined according to priorities of the state could be a justification of eviction, the lack of productive use (*la mise en valeur*) could also be the justification of withdrawal of land use rights. In fact, as I will analyze in Chapter 5, the lack of productive was used by the rural council established at the Northern periphery of the National Park to re-evict those who would get resettled there after the 1970’s mass evictions. These withdrawal practices contributed to largely to the increasing unpopularity of the rural council as well as its association with foreign law of the state.

Furthermore, the National Domain Law authorized the sub-prefect to approve the decisions of land allocation of the rural councils. Prefects and sub-prefects were one of the “oversight authorities” (*authorités de tutelle)*, in addition to CERs. This is also because Prefects (and governors above them) had the authority to determine “conditions” of production use according to which land would be allocated or withdrawn.[141] In theory, the prefects would specify the criteria of productive use and the conditions of allocation and withdrawal of land in consultation with state technical experts (CERs and Forestry Service). The criteria would be promulgated as executive decisions, which had never been implemented (Traore, 1997, p. 91).

The Technocratic Turn and Territorial Administrative Reforms of the 1970s

Although peasant cooperatives, rural animation program and centralized public institutions (the “offices”) were proposed as alternatives to soviet style collective farms -- that nationalized all means of agricultural production -- soon after their conception and creation, the various centralized state public institutions responsible from agricultural development ended up by controlling almost all agricultural production based on cash crops, by becoming the sole

[141] These conditions were spelled out in Decree No. 72-1288 of October 1972 establishing state tutelage over the rural communities.

providers of equipment, seeds, fertilizers and pesticides, and sole buyers of these cash crops. Furthermore, starting in 1964, the rural cooperatives were drawn back under the oversight of these centralized "public institutions" and local development centers (CERs). First, the Regional Development Centers (CRAD) were given the authority to control rural cooperatives, and then, in 1966 they were absorbed by a large centralized public institution, ONCAD (which replaced the OCA) (Mbodj, 1992). This also meant a shift towards increasing centralized state control over rural producers and cooperatives through state public institutions -- particularly through ONCAD[142]-- and to a lesser extend the CERs. While ONCAD became a monopoly in the sale of peanuts and controlled the production of peanuts through the provision of seeds, fertilizers and equipment; the CER's mission of "supporting" peasants turned into a mission of "technical assistance" which consisted of implementing central plans and enforcing state regulations, instead of promoting self-governance (Gellar, 1990, p. 135)[143].

Another important development was the creation of large regional state-owned agricultural organizations like SODEVA (specializing on peanuts in Peanut Basin) or SAED (specializing on rice agriculture in Senegal River Valley) and SODEFITEX (specializing in cotton in Senegal Oriental). These organizations, which also gave land in areas that were classified as pioneer zones to intensify large scale cash crop agriculture and irrigation programs, were increasingly drawn into party politics and corruption (or "clientelistic networks"). They drew themselves, the rural cooperatives and peasants into the same networks through various means, including the distribution of food staples (Mbodj, 1992).

In the midst of these changes and related to them, a new administrative and territorial reform was passed in 1972. The Law on Territorial Administration seemed not to contradict the socialist oriented concepts of *terroir* and rural community outlined in the National Domain Law. Yet, there were important differences between the 1960 National Land Law and the 1972 Administrative Law (Le Roy, 1980, p. 125; Vengroff & Johnston, 1989). These differences also

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[142] The *Office de Commercializaton Agricole et Aide au Developpement*, ONCAD, was created in 1966, after the dissolution of OCA (*Office de Commercialization Agricole*).

[143] According to Gellar, this transformation changed the rural cooperatives from organizations created by individuals pooling resources, into extensions of the centralized state (Gellar, 1990).

indicate the important shift that occurred in the postcolonial state's vision and relations with "local authorities," represented now through "rural councils."

According to a more "nationalist" reading of Senegalese history, the creation of rural councils represents a step towards a decentralization movement in Senegal. Rural communities are presented as legitimate representatives elected by rural people, and as such, examples of the extension of democracy, the self-government rights until then reserved for the inhabitants of urban areas. By delegating the power to allocate land to rural councils, the Senegalese state expanded the movement of autonomous political governance to rural areas. But this view ignores the doors left open by the National Domain Law and its decrees of application, from which a centralized and technocratic postcolonial state administration stepped in after the 1970s. The National Domain Law had left the door open for state oversight and the decrease of the autonomy of local administrations. It is the 1972 Law on the Reform of Territorial Administration [144] that converted the rural communities into "local collectivities," that is administrative-territorial units subject to the administrative control of centralized representative of the state. While the state's administrative/legal control (*tutelle*) of the decisions of the rural community councils was strengthened, the administrative role and responsibilities of the rural community councils were extended.[145] As land allocation or withdrawal decisions became administrative decisions under the supervision of Governors, Prefects and sub-prefects, it became very difficult to obtain favorable results in the appeals process of its decisions (Le Roy 1980)[146].

According to a more "nationalist" reading of Senegalese history, the creation of rural councils represents a step towards a decentralization movement in Senegal. Rural communities are presented as legitimate representatives elected by rural people, and as such, examples of the extension of democracy, the self-government rights until then reserved for the inhabitants of urban areas. By delegating the power to allocate land to rural councils, the Senegalese state

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[144] Law No. 72-25, 19 Juin 1972 sur La Reforme de l'Administration Territorial.

[145] In addition to land allocations, the rural community council also acts as the court of first instance in the resolution of land conflicts (Galvan, 2004).

[146] This procedure consists of appealing either to centrally appointed state authorities – who are themselves approving the land allocations - or to the Court of Appeal in Dakar, requiring important financial resources and connections that the villagers often lack. A similar difficulty exists with the appeals process for land conflicts.

expanded the movement of autonomous political governance to rural areas. But this view ignores the doors left open by the National Domain Law and its decrees of application, from which a centralized and technocratic postcolonial state administration stepped in after the 1970s.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I highlighted postcolonial dilemmas that Senegal faced following the Independence, focusing on development as the main framework. First, I provided an overview of the dominant Senegalese state discourses on development as these were expressed by Senghor, Dia and Lebret. Influenced by multiple sources, including Marxism, underdevelopment theory and negritude, these influential figures of the post-Independence era, sought to find an alternative way for Senegal to catch up with the West. Senegalese postcolonial development discourses stood against feudal despots created by the colonial rule, privatization and uneven distribution of land. However, foundational institutional legacies of the French colonial rule (e.g. land, forestry and administrative laws as well as key assumptions about property and productive use) were preserved and reworked.

The concept of village terroirs *(terroirs villageois)* and rural community (*communauté rurale*) were two important central concepts of postcolonial Senegalese reforms. Mamadou Dia, whose aim was to dismantle dependency of peasants into dysfunctional agrarian development, thought village *terroir*s would be “work tools” for auto-sufficient peasants organized under rural cooperatives. Dia’s socialist ideal of self-sufficient peasant communities, however, contained multiple contradictions. First, it downplayed the importance of the peasant economy revolving around cash crop agriculture and prioritized the control of the centralized state agricultural offices over the production and the sale of cash crops. Furthermore, drawing its inspiration from French human geography, the terroir model was based on the assumption of sedentary peasants fixed on land. When this model became the basis of the land use planning approach developed and implemented by Father Joseph Lebret and his team, the terroir concept became a tool for state intervention in rural areas through development.

In this chapter, I also discussed the concept of the rural community, and the importance of the 1972 Law on Local Administration in the process of transforming the village terroirs into administrative territorial units. After the deposal of Dia and the establishment of a presidential regime by Senghor, the specter of colonial *tutelle* was raised again through the creation of centralized state bureaucracies, which relied, as the colonial state had done, on development and productive use to justify its oversight over the rural cooperatives, land use and property in rural areas. The 1972 law marked the end of the transformation of African socialist ideals into the technocratic process of legibility, as it provided a short-cut to the complex and important problem of limits of terroirs by giving each terroir a state-designated boundary and an administrative center. In this way, it re-instituted the concept of "terroir" as an administrative territory.

In summary, while the technocratic vision of the agrarian reform worked toward fixing the peasants to their plots for continuous cash crop production and increased their dependency on state agricultural cooperatives, the administrative reform contributed to it by fixing territorial limits of new administrative units (rural communities) and by re-instituting the administrative oversight over the new rural councils, which were to replace the old "customary authorities."

These dynamics are important to understand both centralized evictions from the Niokolo-Koba National Park during the 1970s and, the decentralized evictions that followed the establishment of the rural council on the outskirts of the National Park in the 1980s. As I will show in the next chapter, the technocratic terroir approach that emerged and consolidated after the deposition of Dia, served as an important framework for the postcolonial state ministries and their administrators involved in the eviction of the residents of the Niokolo-Koba National Park. The plan of resettlement of the evictees replicated a logic similar to this technocratic approach, which focused on rational division of land and the fixing of peasants to their plots for continuous cash crop agriculture. Furthermore, this background is important to understand how the new rural council elected in the 1980s at the Northern borders of the National Park worked within and against this institutional framework to evict the residents of the National Park resettled on its administrative territories.

Chapter 3: Eviction for Public Utility

> Here is the gift of Senegal to humanity by conserving, even restoring nature with its fauna: since the fauna of some great species was on a course of extinction only ten years ago. It is a question of the rebirth of *Africa portentosa* (Leopold Sedar Senghor, 1978).

Introduction:

In 2000, thirty years after the eviction of some 12,000 residents of the Niokolo-Koba National Park, the National Park Service of Senegal published a new management plan.[147] The new management plan, reflecting the international shift towards participatory conservation after 1990s, is the first governmental document that publicly admits the evictions and their detrimental effects during the first decade following Independence. Until the publication of this plan, the displacement of tens of thousands of people from the Niokolo-Koba National Park was not mentioned in any official or scientific publication for public consumption. Silence surrounded the issue of eviction until it was broken by the new "participatory" management plan, which justified the extension of the National Park and the eviction of its residents as follows:

> The establishment of the National Park by a series of extensions spreading through roughly fifteen years implied the eviction of some villages, as keeping them within the National Park was incompatible with the conservation doctrine of the time. ... The classical conception of a national park did not tolerate any human presence in its midst, except for those human activities that had to do with the protection of nature, scientific research or the development of tourism (DPN, 2000, pp. 14, 33).

The National Parks management plan argues that past conservation doctrine (adopted by the National Park Service) viewed keeping villages within the National Park as being incompatible with conservation, because the Plan was based on the "classical conception" of conservation, which did not tolerate any human presence "in the midst" of national parks. The management plan depicts evictions as consequences of a faceless and bygone "classical" conservation doctrine that presumably do not need any explanation. It directs the attention to one main "idea" underpinning the conservation doctrine: that it did not "tolerate the human presence" in national parks. Without further explaining why this conservation doctrine did not tolerate humans and how

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[147] The management plan was published through the "technical, scientific and financial support" of the Foreign Development Aid (*La Cooperation Francaise*) of the French Government.

it was implemented, the management plan invites us to believe that it was this conservation doctrine that led to the evictions. The management plan would like us to believe that the removal of thousands of people inhabiting the National Park was dictated by a faceless international conservation doctrine. This representation of eviction as an inevitable outcome of conservation doctrine resembles to the critiques of eco-centric views of national parks also voiced by anthropologists. However, the blaming of ideas and doctrines without mentioning how they came into place and who implemented them, effectively mutes the political dimension of eviction. Who was debating and supporting which conservation ideas? What kinds of policies and practices accompanied this "classifical" conservation doctrine? How were they implemented and who implemented them?

In the first part of this chapter, I will look at the postcolonial state discourses on nature conservation and national parks that accompanied the extensions of the Niokolo-Koba National Park and the eviction of its residents. However, these nationalist and developmental discourses were also accompanied by important institutional changes. The re-creation and re-appropriation of the Niokolo-Koba National Park by the postcolonial Senegalese State reflected also the struggles within the postcolonial state administration. I will look at how these struggles were translated into tensions at the top levels of administrative hierarchy. The weakening and deposition of native authorities were an integral part of state re-appropriation of land. In this context, eviction was more than just for conservation of threatened species and it was also seen as a means to displace native authorities seen as the obstacles for state reforms.

In the second part of the chapter, I turn to the struggles between the postcolonial state administration and "native authorities" and to the process of eviction from the Niokolo-Koba National Park during the period that spans between 1968 (the first decree announcing the eviction of residents from Boucle of Damantan) and 1976 (the removal of inhabitants).[148] Focusing on what has been silenced and omitted from official conservation discourse during this crucial period of time, I will show how evictions were part of the larger transformations of

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[148] This periodization do not imply that the process of eviction had started in 1968 and ended in 1976. As shown earlier, eviction was part of colonial arsenal of dealing with the people who lived in Oriental Provinces when the first colonial national park was created. Also, the migration waves from the National Park continued after 1976.

postcolonial state and how they transformed the relations of the local inhabitants with the "state" at the margins.

Postcolonial Conservation: The Untouchable Domain of the State Reserved for Public Utility

The primary target of the postcolonial Senegalese reforms was agrarian land reform and administrative reform of local governments in *terroir* zones reserved for agricultural production. Despite this general emphasis on agriculture focused development, conservation and nature reserves retained their importance in forested regions of Senegal. In fact, following Independence, National Parks acquired a new significance for postcolonial governments, which represented them as markers of development and symbols of national pride. In the preface that he wrote to the memoirs of the Director of the Niokolo-Koba National Park, Andre-Roger Dupuy, Senghor explained the importance of national parks for Senegal in the aftermath of Independence as follows:

> The voice of Senegal has been heard in the entire world and its national parks are often cited as an example. During my travels to foreign countries, I have been congratulated for it at different occasions. They [the National Park Director and his spouse] have also participated in the making of Senegal a model of *development* among the African States, by helping it bloom in all domains (Leopold Sedar Senghor, 1991).

The "voice" of Senegal was heard on the international scene through its national parks, which helped not only the prestige of Senegal's President Senghor but also improved the image of Senegal as a "model of development" among the African states. The discourse on National Parks, as I will further explore, appealed to different audiences. On the one hand, Senghor's discourse on national parks appealed to the international audience of conservationists and development agencies. On this plane, national parks "represented" Senegal as a country committed to development and protection of nature, possibly attracting more attention and funding. On the other hand, the discourse on national parks was directed to Senegalese audiences as well, where parks appeared as essential tools of one of the productive sectors of national economy, tourism, through which development would trickle down to the base, to the mass of citizens.

Behind this double-sided representation of national parks lied also series of concrete practices, for which Senghor congratulated Andre-Roger Dupuy, who was appointed by Senghor and became the leading figure in the reconstruction of postcolonial national parks during his twenty years of "service" in Senegal. Senghor congratulated Dupuy and his spouse for their exceptional accomplishment in creating a network of national parks and making the Niokolo-Koba a "modern park":

> Alexe-Marie and Andre-Roger Dupuy have realized at the appropriate time and at my request, an original and remarkable work. This work consists of a network of national parks and reserves that Senegal could be proud of. I remember that in 1967 there was an almost abandoned, tiny little park, a simple green spot on the map: the Niokolo-Koba. ... Of course, to make it a modern park, it took twenty years of engagement, enthusiasm but most of all, tenacity. ... It has been, indeed, a beautiful adventure ... Despite the difficulties, the willingness to save the African, Senegalese nature subsisted. ... Mission accomplished! I should say. As today, eleven national parks and reserves have been created in Senegal. There are three hundred and fifty militarized and well trained rangers, with their own special status. ... (Leopold Sedar Senghor, 1991).

Under Senghor's orders and protection, Dupuy would start his career in Senegal at the Niokolo-Koba National Park and go on establishing a network of National Parks and reserves. Dupuy's long "mission" that took twenty years, which Senghor calls a "beautiful adventure," required indeed a lot of tenacity and willingness. As I will show, Dupuy faced resistance from multiple sides. In his "original" approach to nature conservation in Senegal, Dupuy relied largely on Senghor's support to overcome resistance from the cabinet members and line ministries. But to break the resistance of the inhabitants of the areas surrounding the colonial national park, his methods included a range of tactics, ranging from deception to coercion exercised through the militarized national park service.

The saving of the "African, Senegalese nature" that Senghor cherished so much and the transformation of the Niokolo-Koba National Park from a "simple little green dot on the map" into a "modern" National Park came with a cost. The view of the "state" as an alien authority became firmly established in the areas surrounding the National Park. Sane, the elderly mother of one of the village chiefs evicted from the National Park summarized this best, when she said:

> We have been evicted because of the animals. God is our witness, this did not please us. It was the State who evicted us, against our will. But, you know, when the force is in the hands of the State, we cannot do anything. Otherwise, our village was really a pleasant

> place to live. We had meat, oil and all sorts of fruits. Whatever you wanted, you could find it there. If State did not come to evict us, we were really in peace over there.[149]

The mother of the village chief described the "State" as a coercive authority, who "came" to evict them. What made the state alien was the "force" that it held in its hands but also its different priorities. Eviction was a choice the state made between the people and the animals. What the state sought was not to protect the peace and abundance that sustained the villagers but to protect the animals. In short, eviction was not for the good of the people who lived in Sane's village. Sane's youngest son Dina, who often invited me in his compound to drink tea or eat the *fonio* that his wife cultivated, recalled the times when the National Park had turned into a war zone, patrolled by armed Park agents under the Direction of Dupuy. He once said to me:

> The animals in the park, they belong to no one. It is thanks to God Almighty that we have found them here. They are there so that we can use them. We human beings can agree not to kill the animals. But the State uses the force. The rangers kill people for the animals!

For Dina, animals belonged to no one but God, who had created them for the use of humans. It was up to humans to agree among themselves not to kill them. But the State had intervened by force. Dina saw the fight against poaching, the main goal of the National Park Service, as an illegitimate use of force, because it justified the killing of humans for the protection of animals. This was a world view that Dina found alien to his beliefs, as it considered the animals, not as God's gift to humans for them to use, but as creatures that were more valuable than human beings. To understand this view, perceived as immoral and illegitimate by the evictees I will first turn to discursive constructions of national parks as an "untouchable domain" during the first decade of Independence.

National Parks for Public Utility: Tourists and the Mass of Citizens

Senghor attributed great importance to the National Parks, having made Senegal a model of development among African states. However, for Senghor, National Parks did not only

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[149] Sane, October 28, 2004.

represent a developed nation but actually developed the country through tourism. In 1969, Senghor explained the importance of “tourism” in the Third National Economic Plan as follows[150]:

> .... tourism, which, among the productive sectors, is our last priority—by last, I mean in terms of time. I have already justified the importance of tourism, which has priority among our options. I will simply remind the effects that tourism induces in different areas: transportation, hotel and catering business, art and artisanal production, infrastructures and buildings. This year, with 750,000 visitors, tourism will bring to Morocco a value of 36 milliards of CFA in foreign currency. The objectives of the Third Plan are to at least double the number of tourists (Léopold Sedar Senghor, 1969).

Tourism was a potential revenue-generating “sector” and one of the priorities of the planned development. In the socialist-inspired Development Plans of Senegal, National Parks were presented as natural resources whose economic value would be put into productive use through tourism. Tourism would bring additional revenues for the state budget. Besides state revenues, the “trickling down” effect of development through national parks would also create jobs for local people, who could be employed in the building of infrastructure -- construction of roads, lodges and hotels -- and service work -- as guides, cooks, cleaners in hotels -- necessary to maintain the tourism industry. Senghor expained how the economic benefits of development of natural resources in the National Park would be distributed to the “mass of citizens” through tourism as follows:

> ....for tourism to prosper in a country a number of conditions have to be fulfilled: by the State, by professional organizations and by the mass of citizens. ... It is therefore necessary, at the state level, to have a political direction and technical institutions necessary for the organization of tourism: to prospect the sites, to create the infrastructure, to facilitate the administrative formalities and to form the hotel personnel.

For Senghor, the state, professional organizations and the “mass of citizens” would have to play each a specific role in attaining development through tourism. As in other “productive sectors” of economy, the state’s role was to give a “political direction” to development. As we will see for the case of the Niokolo-Koba National Park, this political direction rested largely on an institutional and legal framework inherited from the colonial rule and on the executive decrees adopted and implemented in a top-down manner. Senghor also underlined that the organization of the tourism industry was entrusted to “technical institutions,” whose role was to “organize” the tourism

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150 The speech given by Senghor during the seventh general congress of UPS, organized in Dakar between 27-30 December 1969.

industry by prospecting the protected sites, building tourism infrastructure and educating the labor force to be put in the service of the tourists. Under the supervision of the state, the mass of citizens would benefit from tourism, not through the sharing of the revenues obtained from entry fees or hunting permits, but through providing labor in transportation, working in hotels (as caterers, cooks, cleaners etc.), clearing the roads, constructing the buildings and producing artisanal art for their enjoyment.

The Niokolo-Koba National Park was the center of attention of Senghor as one of the "privileged" site of tourism-based development. Senghor underlined the importance of Niokolo-Koba National Park in the 1969 Development Plan:

> The statistics for touristic sites for all the regions have already been gathered. However, in order for this effort to be profitable it has to be directed to certain privileged sites. First, the island of Cap-Vert, where there is a need for several thousands of hotel rooms and then, the Niokolo-Koba National Park in Senegal Oriental, which has just been extended to approximately one million hectares, and, in a few years, will rival the most famous National Parks of Africa. ...(Senghor, 1969, pp. 457, 458).

The Niokolo-Koba National Park represented a significant commitment as close to one million hectares were put aside for the development of tourism, as opposed to other developmental uses, particularly agriculture. In maintaining the colonial national parks and expanding them, Senghor was also supported by research institutions like IFAN, which under the direction of Theodore Monod, had played an important role in the creation of first nature reserves in West Africa after the Second World War. IFAN had conducted zoological and botanical surveys in Niokolo-Koba since the 1950s. IFAN's support for Niokolo-Koba National Park was best expressed by Michel Condamin, a leading researcher at IFAN:

> At a time when Africa accelerates its development—which has the consequence of modification and sometimes the destruction of the environment (*milieu*), therefore a more and more important regression of flora and fauna—Senegal had taken wise decision to exclude a part of its territories from the agricultural and pastoral activities to make it a sanctuary of Nature reserved for tourists and scientific researchers (M. Condamin & Roy, 1969).

As explained earlier, starting from the 1950s, tourism had become an important priority of French colonial administration in South-Eastern Senegal, which had started to increase the surface allocated for protected areas around the existing National Park. Tourism remained a developmental priority in forested regions of Senegal, particularly in Senegal Oriental and

Casamance. This trend would gain momentum after Independence when Senghor assumed the Presidency.

Humanities Heritage Entrusted to the State for the Modern Man's Need for Recreation

Senghor did not challenge National Parks as part of the heritage of colonial conservation policies and practices, but rather embraced them as international heritage. The Senegalese postcolonial state administration accepted without alteration the categories of protected areas that were agreed upon by international conventions signed by the French colonial state. Without challenging the legal and institutional basis of protected areas or the conservation policy shaped by international priorities and conventions, Senghor focused on the destruction of nature during colonial rule. Authentic African nature, for Senghor, had a larger "humanitarian" value. Senegal as a nation had the duty to restore this pristine nature not only because it was part of the authentic African environment but also because it was part of the common heritage of humanity. He supported the ideas of combating extinction and the goal of restoring a lost pristine nature, both of which have been lead motifs of the international conservation discourse.

In his preface to a book edited by Dupuy and published in 1978, four years after the evictions, Senghor praised the Niokolo-Koba and the Senegalese National Parks as follows:

> Here is the gift of Senegal to the humanity by conserving, even restoring the nature with its fauna: since the fauna of some great species was in course of extinction only ten years ago. It is a question of the rebirth of *Africa portentosa* (Dupuy & Larivière, 1978).

This idealized image of African nature as *Africa portentosa* effectively merged the two idealized images: the romanticized "pristine wilderness" (nature) and the authentic African identity/essence (nature). The creation and dominance of the idea of "pristine wilderness" has a long genealogy in Western thought, which played a significant role in justifying the creation of colonial national parks as a new category of protected area. This image of untouched wilderness was also a part of the longing for a pre-colonial past in postcolonial state discourse. The theme of return to "authentic" nature fit neatly with nationalist ideas about a return to "authentic" African values. This is most

common in the representation of specific animals (i.e. the “great species” of conservation discourse, such as elephants, lions, etc.) as symbolic representations of the nation. For Western conservationist discourse the “great species” consist of the fauna that are the most visible and attractive to tourists. These were not just used as symbols of endangered species for international conservation agencies, but also as symbols of the postcolonial nation-states.

The National Park’s symbol Eland de D’Erby, which appears on the official stamp of the Park Service, encapsulates this idea of protecting the wilderness of Africa through protecting the endangered species. In Niokolo-Koba, elephants, lions and great antelopes (such as the Eland de Derby[151]) became the most important representatives of the “great fauna.” The National Park was a unique example of the “untouched” African wilderness. In this untouched wilderness of Africa protentosa, the vision of Africa emerged from antiquity and was dragged to the surface through the poetic discourse of Senghor.

Senghor did not only construct the national park as a pristine wilderness. He also justified the existence of the National Park also in terms of the needs of the industrial man. In the Third Economic Development Plan in 1969, Senghor supported the necessity of “international parks” as follows:

> As the world enters into the industrial age, man feels more and more the need to immerse himself in nature: to be among the trees and rivers, birds and flowers, but also among animals. It is the need to have a week-end and a secondary residence, to be at the beach and at the mountain. This is the need for *national parks*, or rather, *international parks* in the surface of the planet [italics in original] (Senghor, 1969, p. 430).

The function of a National Park, or the reason for its existence is justified by the needs of the “industrialized” man who is cut off from nature and needs a “week-end” and “secondary residence.” Industrialization and the need of recuperation from work are extrapolated as the condition of every man (and woman?), be it in Senegal, in France, in the United States, etc. Although Senghor’s justification of the need for National Parks seems to be independent of the cultural, political and economic conditions that shape the experience of work and relations with nature, he is addressing a limited audience: the urban elite, international tourists and researchers

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151 Eland de Derby (*Taurotragus derbianus*) is considered to be the largest antelope in the world (Dupuy & Lariviere, 1978). It would become one of the focal points of international conservation organizations and foreign aid including the Check Republic.

who have privileged access to and could afford to stay in the National Park.[152] Senghor himself, as the representative of man in Industrial Age, would keep a residence in the Niokolo-Koba National Park where he would spend time with his family.

Spearheading this international conservation discourse was Andre Roger Dupuy, the Director of the Niokolo-Koba National Park and later the National Park Service. Dupuy was appointed and supported by Senghor throughout his long career in Senegal. He summarized his vision of what a national park "should be" as follows:

> First of all, what is a national park? It is an untouchable domain [domain intangible] for the multiplication, protection and conservation of the animal life and wild vegetation for the profit, advantage and recreation of the public at large.... It [the national park] is a parcel of the natural environment within which the greatest sample of living organisms are preserved for future generations. A national park differs from an integral national reserve, as this later requires a reinforced preservation of certain examples of untouched nature against all aggressions that could perturb or destruct the natural biological balance. The public is admitted within the National Parks, therefore, a National Park can be managed (*amenager*) to be used by the public (Dupuy, 1971).

This definition of national park is telling of how conservationist and nationalist discourses could merge to produce a representation of national park as "untouchable" domain over which the state authority is extended. In his definition, Dupuy used the term "intangible" in French, which refers to something that needs to be kept intact, inviolable and sacred.[153] A National Park should be kept intact and it cannot be violated. It is also a "domain," a territory over which a certain kind of authority is extended. The representation of the national park as a territory that needs to be kept intact and cannot be violated point to a close resemblance between two different authority claims over national parks. While international conservation discourse claims authority over untouched nature to protect it against humans (the enemy "others" of nature); the postcolonial state claims sovereignty over national territories to protect it against foreign, "other" nations and nation-states. As I will show in this chapter, the Niokolo-Koba National Park and its inhabitants would become a matter of national security, in the context of increasing tensions between Senghor and the President of Guinée Sekou Toure, precisely at the time when evictions were

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152 Colonial protected areas were initially established as hunting zones and increasingly became sites of leisure and enjoyment for "masses" of middle class Europeans as well as African elites.

153 Qui doit rester intact, a quoi on ne doit pas toucher, sacre, inviolable (Le Petit Larousse, 1990).

staunchly resisted by resident villages. Evictions were only possible with the involvement of the army, sent with the pretext of thwarting the threat that Sekou Toure's Guinée posed for Senegal's national security and sovereignty. Thus, the re-making of the Niokolo-Koba National Park during the first decade of Independence was also about creating an inviolable state territory and subject to sacred sovereignty claims. The Park had to be protected against the "others" who threatened national territories and nature from the "inside" and the "outside." The image of armed poacher embodied this threat. In this context, "fight against poaching" had a double significance: Securing the natural "heritage of humanity" and securing the postcolonial state authority at the margins.

The National Park was not only defined by sovereignty-related territorial claims. The National Park Director Dupuy described the National Park also as an untouchable domain for "the profit, advantage and recreation of the public at large." Who is part of this "public at large"? For whose profit, advantage and recreation it is necessary to create a National Park? The 1960s Senegalese state discourse on the "public utility" of the National Parks appealed to different "publics." The "public at large" that Dupuy refers to is the international and national tourists and researchers, who were the only legitimate visitors allowed within the national park. However, there is also another public, that of the citizens of Senegal, to whom the national park is expected to bring development. The nationalist discourse on national parks, is another illustration of how the janus-faced discourse of the postcolonial state as articulated at the top of the administrative and political hierarchy. On the one hand, the side turned towards international audiences of development and conservation agencies speaks of the Niokolo-Koba National Park as the representative of Senegalese authentic nature and offers it as a gift to humanity "at large." On the other hand, the side turned towards Senegalese citizens talks about the importance of the National Park as the locomotive of national development under the trusteeship of the State, despite the fact that most citizens are excluded from it. To understand how this double discourse helped justify the enlargements of the existing colonial Niokolo-Koba National Park and the eviction of its residents, it is important to understand the role of development discourse in the postcolonial construction of national parks, where the notion of "pubic utility" played a central role.

Dupuy's definition of the National Park as "for the profit, advantage and recreation of the public at large" was even more restrictive than Senghor's discourse. The public that Dupuy was

referring to did not include all Senegalese citizens but only tourists and researchers, for whom the National Park was turned into a “sanctuary.” In this sanctuary there was no place for “local populations,” who were poachers, trespassers and delinquents, and the “local authorities,” who were a threat to the security of the National Park territories.

In summary, postcolonial conservation discourse, appealed to two different publics. The first one consisted of the restricted international public of tourists and researchers. It elevated the Niokolo-Koba National Park to the pedestal of humanity’s heritage but at the same time asserted the “untouchability” of national parks based on national sovereignty claims. The second public of postcolonial conservation discourse was the citizens of Senegal. The nationalist discourse turned towards the “masses” represented national parks as relics of authentic African nature and claimed that parks were necessary for the development of Senegal. Development was an important framing device for complex postcolonial conservation discourses appealing to these two different publics. National parks were presented as an indicator of development in Third World countries and their presence was justified by their “public utility” for the mass of citizens. The public utility of national parks was defined in relation to their place within the national development and their contribution to national economy through tourism.

Struggles within the Postcolonial State

Senghor had contacted Andre Roger Dupuy for the position of the Director of the Niokolo-Koba National Park in 1966. Dupuy embodied the marriage of colonial coercive power and the expertise. He was a soldier, a “legionnaire” in the Algerian War who developed an interest in scientific research on nature during his experience in the Algerian Sahara. He had been the head of CNRS’s research center on arid zones in Algeria (Dupuy & Dupuy, 1991, p. 18). He had also worked closely with the Museum of Natural History in Paris over a period of thirty years and considered himself a passionate observer of fauna and an admirer of migrant birds. During this time, Dupuy had befriended France’s most important conservationists. While working in the

Museum of Natural History in Paris, he had met Jean Dorst[154], who would later become the head of the IUCN and publish on West African National Parks. Dorst referred Dupuy to Claude Hettier de Boislambert[155], who was not only a member of the French Assembly but also the Honorary President of the International Hunting Council. It is through the mediation of de Boislambert, that Dupuy met with Senghor. De Boislambert also "facilitated" the administrative procedures necessary for his appointment as the National Park Director, negotiated his salary and influenced Senghor, who decided to eliminate other candidates for the position.

As the newly appointed Director of the National Park, Dupuy arrived in Dakar at the beginning of 1967. In his memoirs, Dupuy recounts the resistance to his parachuting in as the National Park Director in Dakar. First, the Director of the Forestry Service, who is the administrative superior of Dupuy, opposed his nomination as it went against the politic of "Senegalization" of the government (Dupuy, 1991, p. 29). Then in Niokolo-Koba, Dupuy confronted resistance from the forest rangers, whom he considered to be "unmotivated, lazy, undisciplined" and "difficult to command." (ibid. 30). According to Dupuy, the National Park that he took over was "the Siberia of Senegal" where the hard-headed soldiers and undisciplined subjects of the Senegalese army used to be sent (Ibid. 33). Rangers were not only "incompetent" but they also drank and helped organize poaching rampages in the National Park. In his memoirs, Dupuy compared the existing authorities of the National Park to "Ali Baba and his seventeen thieves," referring to an episode of 1001 Nights, called "Ali Baba and the Forty Thieves." This reflected how Dupuy viewed the National Park rangers and the management of the

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[154] Jean Dorst was the Director of the Zoology Laboratory in Museum of Histoire Naturelle in Paris when Dupuy was also working there. Between 1975 and 1985 he was the Director of the Museum. A sought after expert for UNESCO, FAO AND IUCN throughout his carreer, he became the vice president of the Commission of Protection of Threatened Species of IUCN (Polunin, 1997, p. 83).

[155] Claude Hettier de Boislambert was initially sent to Africa by de Gaulle to rally French colonies against Vichy regime. He was imprisoned in Dakar and Bamako by the Vichy Government in 1940 (http://www.ordredelaliberation.fr/fr_compagnon/471.html). After the war he acted as the Member of the French Parliament between 1951-1955. He was also the High Representative of the French Government in Mali and Ambassador of France in Senegal during the 1960s. He was decorated as the Grand Chancellor of the Order of Liberation for his efforts for the "liberation of France" in 1962. De Boislambert organized numerous safaris in Africa and was an "exemplary hunter and conceived of hunting as rational exploitation and regulation of natural resources" (Fabbri & Giorgi, 2003, p. 12). He had close ties with Museum of Natural History in Paris where he had donated 500 trophies that he had collected in the course of 50 years of hunting as a sport in 1972.

National Park. They were thieves who were stealing the wildlife as the unique richness and wealth of the National Park, ultimate examples of corruption. Dupuy declares his determination to fight the corruption of the National Park administration to Abou Diouf, the Secretary of the President, as follows:

> I did not come to let the animals of the national park end up in secret depots or on the plates of restaurants because of guilty tolerance and laxity erected as a political system. To win the battle for the nature, I need to strike high and loud and I need to obtain a carte blanche to lead this, I realize, “mission impossible.”
> (Dupuy, 1991, p. 34).

Dupuy’s fight against corruption would become an important justification for him to obtain “carte blanche” and strike “high and loud” in applying his vision of conservation in Senegal. To denounce the corruption of the Forestry Service, Dupuy prepared a report and corresponded directly with Senghor and Diouf. The appointment of Dupuy as the Director of the National Park Service and his growing influence over Senghor made the issue of nature conservation a political question that pitted the higher echelons of the postcolonial state administration against each other. Poaching debates were not only about the destruction of nature by local criminals, but also about the way in which the postcolonial state was run. It opened up questions about corruption in the administration, top-down administrative decision-making and the continuation of colonial ideas and practices against the nationalist ideals of “Senegalization.”

The Meeting of the Council of Ministers in 1967

In June 1967, an extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers was held under the presidency of Senghor to discuss the Niokolo-Koba National Park. According to Dupuy’s memoirs, this meeting was based on his report about the Forestry Service’s corrupt practices in relation to poaching. Senghor opened the meeting in the following terms:

> Mr. Dupuy has denounced the dramatic situation of poaching perpetrated by some of our compatriots. These include those who are entrusted with the duty of protecting the great representatives of our wild fauna. We all know that his vision is not exaggerated because most of the citizens of our country see the animals living in our savannah only as meat! It is a great time that this state of mind evolves toward a collective conscience of cultural, scientific and simply aesthetic interests that African nature presents. Defending the nature of our country is defending our authenticity and our cultural heritage (Dupuy, 1991, p. 69).

Senghor supported Dupuy's ideas on conservation by stressing his concern about the backwardness of the "state of mind" of Senegalese citizens about nature. Most of the citizens of Senegal saw wild animals as "bush meat." This view had to "evolve" toward a "collective conscience" about the cultural, scientific and aesthetic "interests" that nature represented for Senegal. Senghor was convinced that the Forestry Service was corrupt; but in the sense that the Forestry Service was acting contrary to its role and purpose by perpetuating poaching. The Forestry Service's role or purpose was seen as the trustee and the defender of the "great representatives" of Senegalese (and African) fauna. However, Senghor extended the idea of conservation as the "defense of nature" -- supported by Dupuy -- to the realm of culture. Taking Western ideas about wilderness as his starting point, Senghor also argued that defending this wilderness was also defending the "authenticity and cultural heritage" of Senegal and Africa. This view, as explained earlier, was appealing to the philosophy and sensibilities of the Negritude movement.

However, here, the universal African values were translated through the metaphor of the wilderness. There emerged a contradiction, while Senghor defended "authentic" African values, he also presented wilderness is an authentic African value, and constrained the "mentalities" of Senegalese to seeing wildlife as bush meat. These recalcitrant mentalities of Senegalese citizens that also reached the state institutions (particularly the Forestry Service) needed to evolve. There had been an opposition to Senghor's position, particularly his appointment of Dupuy as the new National Park Director and his support of Dupuy's views, within its cabinet. The Head of the Forestry Service, Guelar Ly, had already communicated to Dupuy that his presence in Senegal was "undesirable" and that his nomination as the Director of the Niokolo-Koba went against the "politic of Senegalization" of the decision making posts (Ibid, 29). The replacement of French functionaries within the administrative system set up during colonial rule was an important point where power struggles converged. These tensions were reflected in this meeting where the Forestry Service Director and the Minister of Public Works criticized Dupuy -- and through him Senghor -- for perpetuating the colonial status quo.

This meeting was a turning point for the implementation of a series of measures that would lead to evictions.[156] As a result of this meeting, a number of changes in the administration of the National Park and the enlargement of the Niokolo-Koba National Park were pushed through the Senghor's cabinet. Dupuy had proposed a set of concrete administrative and legal changes that would implement Senghor's grand vision of the defense of untouched nature and authentic culture. The most important of these measures was the creation of an "autonomous and militarized" administration for the Niokolo-Koba, which would only be accountable to the President of the Republic (Dupuy, 1991, p. 40). This autonomous national park administration would have its own internal regulations and its armed agents would be recruited on voluntary basis.

Dupuy's proposition about the creation of an autonomous administration for the Niokolo-Koba National Park constituted an important threat for the Forestry Service at different levels. First, the establishment of a new administrative body responsible from the Niokolo-Koba National Park was a threat to territorial and jurisdictional authority of the Forestry Service over the National Park. Second, the adoption of separate internal regulations for this new administrative institution meant that Dupuy, who would be its Director, could act independently of the chain of administrative command and legal controls exercised by the Forestry Service and be subject only to the control and command of the President of the Republic.

The proposed internal regulations reinforced the absolute authority of the Director over the park rangers and their supervisors. Dupuy also suggested a reform of the staff, through the constitution of a new corps of park rangers who would be recruited on a "voluntary" basis and would be armed "sufficiently" to fight poaching. The "new" National Park organization proposed by Dupuy was a selective and tightly controlled paramilitary organization, composed of new park rangers, with improved arms to fight poaching. The relative autonomy from the administrative chain of command and accountability and a paramilitary organization was the "carte blanche" that Dupuy needed to "strike high and strong." Dupuy also proposed the transfer of the Hotel Simenti from the Ministry of Tourism to the National Park's Directorate. This transfer was justified by

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[156] I was not able to obtain the minutes of this meeting. However, Dupuy's memoirs and the references to the meeting in the subsequent decrees about the extensions of the National Park leads to the conclusion that the extension of the National Park as well as the issue of eviction of Damantan may have been also discussed during the same meeting.

Dupuy as a means of controlling foreign tourists, who were suspected of poaching. However, as Hotel Siminti was the center of tourism in the park, the control of this single source of "public" revenue would be also passed to the Directorate of the National Park.

Senghor and Diouf supported the plan laid out by Dupuy. Senghor gave his full support for the separation of the National Park Directorate and suggested that the Forestry Service should leave poaching to the National Park Directorate and focus on other pressing tasks of nature conservation, like bush fires, deforestation and overgrazing (Dupuy, 1991, p. 41). Ministers of Senghor's cabinet opposed to different parts of Dupuy's proposition. The Minister of Tourism opposed to Dupuy's plan primarily because it involved the transfer of Hotel Simenti from the Ministry to the National Park's Directorate. Displeased by this separation, the Minister called Dupuy a "young and pretentious man who has the audacity to talk about things that he does not know." (Dupuy, 1991, p. 40). The Hotel Simenti, constructed in 1957, a few years after the establishment of the Niokolo-Koba National Park was the most important revenue generating tourism facility in the park. The opposition of the Ministry of Tourism was not only about the struggle over territorial authority, but also about the revenues.

The most vocal opposition to Dupuy's plan came from the Minister of Public Works, Mady Cissokho, the deputy from the department of Kedougou. Dupuy depicted him as a powerful man, having even his own "army" at his disposal in Niokolo (Dupuy, 1991, pp. 72-73). Mady Cissokho, as mentioned earlier knew well some of the villages to be evicted from the National Park. For his election campaign he had visited several times the village of Niemeneke, which had moved next to the main road linking Tambacounda to Kedougou. During the meeting of Council of Ministers according to Dupuy's memoirs, Cissokho took a threatening stand against Dupuy by reminding him of the limits of his power:

> You know, Mr. Dupuy, in the region of Niokolo, there are some black and hairy great primates who look like humans and against whom your military methods cannot do anything and they will end up by killing you; they will not die even if you shoot at them (Dupuy, 1991, p. 41).

Cissokho had accused Dupuy of "neocolonialism," "racism" and "fascism" many times. But this time, he clearly challenged Dupuy's militarized approach and his power. Cissokho's reference to "black and hairy great primates who look like humans" can be read in different ways. At one level

it is a cynical reference to the way in which Europeans, and their representative Dupuy, saw Africans: sort of primates, part of wild nature, who have not been able to reach the status of human. At the same time, these "creatures" have mystical powers, "they will not die even if you shoot at them." Cissokho refers to other kinds of "authentic" cultural values and practices: the ones that believe in spiritual-magical powers. Cissokho implied that the military means of Dupuy would be impotent against the magical powers of these creatures. At another level one could also make a connection between the hairy creatures and African masks[157], which are used in specific ceremonies in the region of Niokolo. Some of these masks are made of dry lichens that look like long hair, imitating the hair of some wild animals which represent the incarnations of creatures in the spiritual world. In addition, the quality of untouchability of these mystical creatures who are unharmed by the bullets refers also to the practices of African warriors and hunters who, to protect themselves against the hazards of hunting and from enemy fire, wore "protections" (mostly in the form of a necklace). This warning against Dupuy was also that of a neocolonial power. For Cissokho, Dupuy and military power cannot conquer Africans and their mystical powers. This is a strong image of opposition against militarized coercion, which extends from the higher echelons of the state administration all the way to the villages in the "bush."

Cissokho had political and family ties with some of the villages that would be evicted in 1969, particularly Niemeneke. He was a deputy from Kedougou, one of the two departments most immediately affected by the changes proposed for the Niokolo-Koba National Park. In his election, he had solicited and obtained the support of Niemeneke and other villages close to Kedougou.[158] However, Cissokho would become a controversial figure as his image as the legitimate representative of the "populations" was not shared by all the residents who would be evicted. Although he defended the "populations" in this meeting, Cissokho came to be known as one of the main actors in eviction, especially in the eviction of Boucle of Damantan announced in the Inter-ministerial meeting in 1968.

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[157] Masks have a central role in the ceremonies held to initiate (male) children to adulthood as well as to initiate the rain. They are understood as mystical, terrifying and dangerous creatures. Some masks when they are called upon, everyone within the village stays at home and villagers observe wearily the "mask" traversing the village dirt roads.

[158] Interview Niemeneke, April 2004.

Despite the opposition within his cabinet, Senghor pushed for the approval of Dupuy's proposal for the creation of a "new" paramilitary organization for the Niokolo-Koba National Park. The Niokolo-Koba National Park was separated from the Forestry Service and put under the authority of the Bureau of the Niokolo-Koba National Park in 1967.[159] The Bureau of the National Parks would remain attached to the President of the Republic until 1970, after which it would be transfered back to the Office of the Prime Minister. The National Park Service would be created in 1973, as an institution separate from but equally important as the Forestry Service.

The Niokolo-Koba National Park, separated from the Forestry Service in 1967, had its own Internal Regulations.[160] Its Director, Andre Roger Dupuy, appointed by decree, was given "all the prerogatives" of the Forestry Service Director within the limits of the National Park. These prerogatives included the legal power to arrest poachers and bring them to the court, which were previously limited to the Forestry Service Director and the Park Management under the Forestry Service.[161] The extension of the prerogatives of the Forestry Service, was very important for Dupuy's increasing power. As the new Director of the Niokolo-Koba National Park, Dupuy acquired the authority to apply the repressive measures of Forestry and Hunting Codes, to catch the "delinquents" who committed infractions, and to bring them to "repressive courts." The Secretary of the Presidency to which the National Park Directorate was attached, backed up the authority of Dupuy not only on paper but also by applying pressure on local courts. Abou Diouf, who was the Secretary of the President in 1967, addressed a letter to the Judges and the

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[159] Decree No. 67-1056 of September 1967 regarding the Reorganization of the Niokolo-Koba National Park.

[160] Governmental Decision (Arreté) No. 16-689/PM/SG/TAC of 13 November 1967 (Published in JORS in 1968).

[161] As explained earlier, at the time of its creation, the Niokolo-Koba National Park was managed by the colonial Forestry Service. The Forestry Service, since its establishment during the French colonial rule in the 1930s, embodied a double role. The Forestry agents were public servants, thus part of an administrative structure. As public servants they played the role of technical experts, in the forestry management. However, Forestry Service and its agents had also the power to enforce the law (Forestry and Hunting Codes) in all colonial territories but particularly in protected areas. When forestry Service agents "caught" people within the protected areas, they were charged of carrying out on the spot interrogation and prepare a report (Proces-Verbal) that constituted the proof of culpability in courts. The Service had thus a division of labor: those working in "technical" side and those working in surveillance on the ground. The agents on the ground responsible from surveillance embodied the police and the prosecutor (as "*agent verbalizateur*").

Prosecutor of Republic in Tambacounda asking the judiciary to help Dupuy in his efforts against poaching. Diouf stressed in his letter that the Director needed their help in catching the poachers in the villages of Bady and Niokolo, which were not yet included in the National Park but located next to it.[162] Diouf also responded to Dupuy's pressure over the increase of penalties against poaching. In his letter dated November 17, 1968 [163] addressed to Dupuy, the Prime Minister stressed that the existing legislation provided "sufficient arms" against poaching. The Hunting Code had foreseen the payment of substantial amounts for infractions and imprisonment up to five years.[164] Dupuy, as "the Representative of the Forestry Service" within the National Park, had the authority to offer transactions or to decide to pursue penal action by bringing the case directly to the Tribunal. It was also up to him to decide whether he would propose a long-term or short-term imprisonment. Nevertheless, Diouf reminded Dupuy of the authority of the Forestry Service, particularly regarding hunting outside the limits of the National Park. Nevertheless, as the Director of the National Park Service, Diouf gave Dupuy the green light to arrest poachers outside the National Park and appeal the decisions about the penalties, if he did not find them sufficient.

This top-level support for Dupuy's territorial authority escalated the tensions between him and the Forestry Service. While Dupuy accused the Forestry Service Director of taking the side of poachers, the Forestry Service accused Dupuy of acting outside the limits of his authority by interfering outside the National Park. In April of 1968, the Director of the Forestry Service accused Dupuy of arresting a suspect outside the limits of the National Park and for not following the Forestry Code, which required him to write a legal police report.[165] As there was neither an official police report describing the events nor the confiscated arms deposited to the Forestry Service, for the Forestry Service Director Dupuy acted against the law and outside the limits of his authority. Dupuy countered by accusing the Forestry Service Director of taking the side of the poachers and

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[162] Letter No: 88/TAC of the Prime Minister Diouf to the Minister of Justice, 4 November 1967.

[163] Letter No 11403-JUR of the Prime Minister Diouf to Dupuy dated 17 November 1967.

[164] Hunting within the National Park was subject to a penalty that could go up to 240.000 CFA, and to an imprisonment of 5 years (articles L21, L25 and D45 of the Hunting Code).

[165] The letter No. 244/EF/SO of April 10, 1968 of the Forestry Service Director addressed to the Director of the Niokolo-Koba National Park.

for dwelling on administrative and legal details instead of looking at the end result.[166] He argued that it did not matter whether a poacher was arrested inside or outside the National Park:

> At the time when Senegal makes great efforts to multiply its fauna, it is surprising to find people who are more interested in knowing whether the agent was in his zone of authority or not. I will never do so, if you caught someone within the National Park ... I could not have congratulated the criminal!

This correspondence between the Forestry Service Director and Dupuy indicated that Dupuy was going outside his "authority zone" by arresting people who were carrying guns outside the National Park. This was not the only incident, as a similar incident had previously happened in the village of Niemeneke, which, at the time of the correspondence, was not yet included within the National Park. Dupuy was not communicating to the Forestry Service the legal "facts" necessary for the judicial penal procedure. The main focus of this escalating conflict was not so much whether there was enough evidence to prove that the people who were caught carrying guns were poachers, but rather the territorial reach of the two Services administrative and judicial authority.

The Creation of a Militarized National Park Service

As soon as he became the National Park Director, Dupuy started the reorganization of the National Park Service with the recruitment of new rangers. In his memoirs Dupuy justified the urgency of recruiting park rangers among soldiers as follows:

> I have chosen old soldiers, all natives, because I am committed to "militarize" the management of Niokolo-Koba. First of all, local populations are sensitive to the presence of the uniform. In addition, as the Director of the National Park, I have the rank of colonel and among military, my men and I, we understand each other very well. The discipline has to overcome (Dupuy, 1991, p. 80).

Dupuy's strategy of establishing his absolute authority over the National Park Service as a military organization was first to change the corps of rangers. For Dupuy, the sentiments that the military uniform evoked among the "populations" were a good justification of the use of military means and the creation of a paramilitary organization. It was not important that this "sensitivity" to the presence of the uniform was based on fear more than respect. This sensitivity

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[166] The letter No. 981/PNNK of April 13, 1968 of the National Park Director addressed to the Director of the Forestry Service.

was important to impose the authority and coercion of the National Park Service. In areas that were planned to be included within the National Park, there were already control posts. Central forestry control posts existed in Badi and Oubadji, where tourists who came from Dakar would stop by to obtain permits to enter the National Park or to hunt in surrounding areas.[167]

In 1968, after the eviction of Damantan was announced by decree, Dupuy ordered the reinforcement of the guards in the existing areas and appointed a new Chief of Surveillance for the Damantan-Tabadian zone not only to carry out the census of the fauna but also to "help the villagers to evacuate."[168]

Although Dupuy argues that he had recruited "locally" among the old soldiers, the recollections of the evictees are different. Danfakha, a retired soldier from Badi, was one of those who was not recruited by Dupuy and remembered Dupuy's first recruitment attempts in the village of Badi:

> When the Park first arrived people were not against it in Badi. We used to cultivate there and the harvest was very good. We could cultivate a lot of peanuts and sell them. When Dupuy came, people said: "We are not entering the park for surveillance, we prefer to continue to cultivate!" ... At that time, we used to make three times more than the salary that Dupuy proposed from the sale of peanuts. But the Director did not give up and came to Badi again to reinstate his demand. ... He said to Badi that we would regret our refusal, because the advantages that we could obtain from the Park were many. He also said, given its position in the Park, Badi should be the first place to benefit from it. He also said this second time that, the young men of Badi who would want to be hired needed to make a "dossier" and put it in his office. Again it was not successful.

Danfakha's account showed that peanuts were already an important source of revenue for the villages to be evicted, although they were not the only source of revenue. The economic benefits that Dupuy promised the villagers, compared to the revenues from peanuts, were much less. For Danfakha, Dupuy attempted to persuade the villagers to become park rangers rather than continue to cultivate their land. He even played on the relative importance of Badi, where he came to recruit rangers. The villagers in Badi, who remembered Dupuy, mentioned that Badi was often promoted as the "mother of the Park" or the most important village, which should be the center of all activity related to the National Park. Despite these attempts, the villagers refused Dupuy's proposal. They already had what they needed. They could sell their peanut crops and

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[167] Interview Badi, August 24, 2000.

[168] Note de Service, NKNP 13 Feb, 1968.

work as guides for tourism hunting. This refusal of the Badi villagers to “cooperate” with Dupuy, led him to look for rangers elsewhere. He was able to draw a good number of rangers from Bassari, who were concentrated in the South-Eastern part of the National Park. But he also turned, according to Diambi, toward “Diollas” from Casamance who were already in the military. This made the park what it was, according to Diakhite (Yaya), a retired park ranger who settled down in Dialakoto after his retirement:

> Before Dupuy the Park was the Park but not very much. There were not many rangers. Dupuy recruited more than 100 rangers. Mostly Diolas from Casamance, Pulaar of Kedougou some Mandinkas from here and Bassaris[169].

This was an important change for the villagers established around the Niokolo-Koba National Park, in that the new face of the National Park Service was different from the Forestry Service, whose agents were already implanted in the villages. The National Park rangers were “strangers,” who did not have an established relationship with the villagers. Consequently, they were less accountable to local people and less open to negotiate with them.

The newly recruited rangers were inserted into a paramilitary organization. The National Park Service was created in 1969. However, the iron fist of the Director over the Park Service rangers created tensions within the Park Service itself. These tensions would surface in 1971, a year before the residents of the Damantan-Tabadian were evicted. Rangers who protested arbitrary firings because they were not at their posts[170]. Dupuy had ordered the guards not to quit their posts unless there was a “vital need” and to report monthly to the Directorate of the National Park (Dupuy, 1991, p. 80). However, the rangers thought they were required to go their posts by foot whereas as the Director was using the cars available to the National Park for these purposes. Unionized rangers, through the intermediary of the Regional Union informed Abdou Diouf about the “abuse of authority” of Dupuy and his deputy.[171] The Head of the Union complained that the rangers were frequently humiliated and treated with an “incredible” manner. They were

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[169] Interview Dialakoto, April 2004.

[170] Letter of a fired park ranger to the Minister of Public Service (13 September 1971) and the letter of the Head of the Zone of Malapa to Prime Minister (20 September 1971).

[171] Letter of the Secretary of the Regional Union of CNTS of Senegal Oriental to the Secretary General of Government (15 September 1971).

sanctioned arbitrarily and their requests to see their families more often and to have access to enough food and medicine were not properly met. Dupuy was not only creating a paramilitary organization, where rangers were selected based on their military training, but he was also using all disciplinary methods within the National Park Service and avoiding administrative and judicial accountability within the state administration. This led the rangers to take their grievances to the labor unions.

In summary, the creation of a militarized direction for Niokolo-Koba National Park went hand in hand with the top level struggle led by Dupuy to give an autonomous status to the National Park Service within the state bureaucracy. The creation of a new directorate for the Niokolo-Koba National Park, separate from the Forestry Service and directly attached to the prime minister, put his Director, relieved the park's management from any accountability towards the Forestry Service. The implementation of the Forestry and Hunting Codes within the National Park remained largely up to the National Park Service Director, who had the power to determine the severity of infractions and propose punishments in local courts. The new internal regulations and recruitment techniques allowed the Director of the National Park to impose a hierarchical military-style management, making it difficult for anyone to oppose or control his actions within the National Park Service itself. The powers of the National Park Director remained unchecked in his "fight against poaching." However, the administrative reorganization of the Directorate of the Niokolo-Koba National Park and the recruitment of park rangers were not sufficient to enable Dupuy to carry out forced evictions. As I will show in the next section, a series of tactics had been devised to put pressure on and undermine the authority of village chiefs and marabouts of the residing villages. They included the collection of fire arms from the villages prior to their eviction and attempts to disqualify the religious authority of the marabouts. The collection of fire arms allowed the National Park Service to monopolize the use of force and, as I will discuss in the next section, the crisis between Sekou Toure of Guinee and Senghor in Senegal served as a pretext to send the military to evict the region of Damantan and Tabadian.

Postcolonial Conservation and Regime of National Parks

The first significant steps toward the enlargement of the Niokolo-Koba National Park started soon after the Independence. As explained earlier, the existing colonial National Park was already surrounded by different types of protected areas, which included Classified Forests and hunting zones, all of which were established before Independence. The first step started with the extensions and conversion of Classified Forests in the South-West into game reserves.[172] In 1962, three separate National Parks were created by decree at the eastern, western and southwestern areas of the original National Park.[173] In 1965, these separate National Parks and the colonial Game Reserve of Koulountou were included within the colonial Niokolo-Koba National Park.[174]



Map 10: Extension of the National Park from 1953 to 1965, adapted from Condamin (Michel Condamin, 1974, p. 59).

These extensions of the Niokolo-Koba National Park were not simply about changes in the "physical" limits of the national park as it is presented today under the neoliberal lenses of the

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[172] The decrees adopted during May and June of 1960 (Decrees of 30 May 1960 and the Decree No.60-187 of 30 June 1960) extended the area of the Classified Forest situated at the South-West of the Niokolo-Koba National Park to 75.000 hectares. The same decree also converted the Classified Forest into a Game Reserve (Reserve de Faune) (DPN, 2000, p. 146).

[173] The decree of 25 September 1962 constituting the National Parks of Niokolo-East (55.000 ha), Niokolo West (15,000 ha) and Niokolo South-West (75,000 ha)(DPN, 2000, p. 146).

[174] Decree No.65-684 of 13th October 1965 on Extension of the Niokolo-Koba National Park (DPN, 2000, p. 150).

National Park Service and the donors supporting its new management plan. The extensions of the National Park were presented as part of a progressive movement towards the creation of a modern national park. These extensions, it is argued, led to or caused the eviction of the residents of the National Park. The conversion of existing Classified Forests and game reserves into National Parks between 1960 and 1965 was an indicator of two important trends. First it pointed out to increasing priority of wildlife conservation and tourism over other alternative uses of land and forests for development, particularly over agriculture. At the same time, changing the status of existing Classified Forests and Hunting Reserves into National Parks implied the extension of restrictions on local uses of land, forests and wildlife specific to National Park regime into new areas. Although the National Park kept on expanding until 1966, the eviction was not considered as an option that was immediately applicable.

This shows how the current representations of the past extensions of the national park help to divert attention from the political processes involved in the making of the national park. The zoning of nature reserves were an integral part of evictions rather than being an undisputed "given" procedure. Zoning is a political process where the ideas about development and developmental priorities often clashed and the fractures within the postcolonial government were laid open.

The 1964 National Domain Law had established classified zones, and colonial protected areas were included into the "classified zones" of the National Domain.[175]National Parks were put under the trusteeship of the Senegalese State and were part of the land nationalized on Senegalese territories. The National Parks were recognized as a particular category of protected area, where hunting and capture of *all* animals, the destruction of their habitats and *all* "acts susceptible of destroying or degrading the spontaneous vegetation" were forbidden.[176] Together with other protected zones and forests, they were put under the jurisdiction of the Forestry Service, which applied the Hunting and Forestry Codes for the "safeguarding" of protected areas.

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[175] The new Forestry Decrees included the National Parks within the Classified Zones of the National Domain, together with other nature reserves (integral nature reserves, classified forests and hunting reserves).

[176] Article 6 of the Forestry Code (Decree 65-078) and Article 25 of the Hunting Code (Decree No. 62-0101) spelled out these interdictions.

The new Hunting Code adopted In 1962[177] maintained the restrictive conservation regime of national parks and integral nature reserves established during the colonial rule. The Hunting Code retained the limitations of human presence in National Parks through permits, which defined who could "freely" circulate within the National Park. [178] It also brought new restrictions concerning the circulation within the National Parks.[179] Another important restriction that applied specifically to National Parks was the detention of fire arms.[180] The Hunting Codes forbid the carrying of fire arms and required fire arms to be declared to the Forestry Service before entry into the National Park.

The 1965 Forestry Code [181] reflected also the centralizing and autocratic aspects of the presidential regime that was put in place after 1963. The Forestry Code, declared forests of national domaine "free" of all use-rights, and stated that the exercise of use rights could be abolished without any compensation in case of expropriation for public utility.[182] The conditions of zoning of protected areas were also define din the code, which made zoning decisions subject to the approval of a regional Committee of Soil Conservation, presided by the Governor.[183] Regional Committees of Soil Conservation were put under the oversight of a National Commission of Soil Conservation, composed of representatives of the line-ministries and presided by the Minister of Rural Economy and their decisions were subject to the approval of the President of the Republic. The Regional Commissions of Soil Conservation of Senegal Oriental

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[177] Decree No.62-0101 of 14 March 1962 Regulating Hunting and Protection of Nature.

[178] Those who could enter the National Parks with a permit included the officers of judiciary and police, the forestry Service, medical doctors, veterinaries and tourists.

[179] The Hunting Code also forbid the circulation outside the "public" roads of the national parks and at the circulation within the Park at night.

[180] A special Law forbidding the fire arms was also adopted in 1966 (Law 66-03 of 18th of January 1966), which required every person who detained an arm to declare it to administrative authorities.

[181] The Decree No 65-23 of 9th of February 1965 and the Decree No. 65-078 of 10 February 1965.

[182] Article D22. of the Forestry Code of 1965.

[183] According to Article D11 of 1965 Forestry Code, besides the Governor the members of the regional Commission included the prefects, representatives of Forestry, Agriculture and Herding Departments, a representative of land registry and of Regional Assembly and representatives of the local collectivities (rural communities).

created in 1965 would become an important forum where eviction decisions were debated and implemented in the top-down fashion.

Although the Hunting Codes and Forestry did not mention eviction, they included important clauses that made any human habitation and use of land and forests unlawful within the National Parks. These interdictions, would become important points of struggle between the residents of the areas to be included into the National Park Service and the new management of the Niokolo-Koba National Park. The fire arms would become the primary target and focus of the strategy of eviction of Damantan-Tabadian; and the restrictions on agriculture would take precedence in the evictions of Niemeneke-Sibikiling and Badi-Niongani areas.

The Eviction of Damantan

Until 1968, hunting was permitted in Hunting Zones established around the existing National Park. This was the case for the area called “Boucle of Damantan,” near the Koulountou River, which was home for multiple villages that surrounded Damantan and Tabadian, the two important centers of Oriental Provinces. In 1966, the regional committee of development for Senegal Oriental had approved the conversion of the Boucle of Damantan into a hunting zone (*reserve cynégétique*). The hunting zone covered an area of 117,000 hectares, where big and medium-size game hunting was permitted, but regulated by the Forestry Service. The decree creating the hunting zone[184] allowed the “populations” of the hunting zone to continue to exercise their “traditional activities,” but it forbid commercial hunting and the carrying of firearms. Hunting would be allowed only by permits issued by the Forestry Service and hunters were required to check in at specified control posts established within the National Park and the hunting zone. The decree also established new hunting posts in the villages surrounding and within the new National Park. These posts were established within the villages of Damantan at Eastern borders

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[184] Decree No.66-171 of 10th of March 1966 on the creation of a hunting zone called “Boucle de Damantan.”

of the National Park, and in Badi in Northern part of the National Park.[185] The hunting posts within the villages helped tighten the grip of the Forestry Service over the villagers.

The decision to extend the Park and the eviction of the residents of Boucle of Damantan was announced by decree in May 1968.[186] The transfer of the villages established in Boucle of Damantan was called the "Operation Boucle of Damantan." The area included 21 officially recognized villages (approximately 1,678 inhabitants), among which Damantan and Tabadian were the most well known. The decree to extend the National Park to Boucle of Damantan was also the first legal decision of the postcolonial government. Article 3 of the Decree read:

> The populations established in the delimited area have to leave the premises. They will be resettled outside of the limits of the National Park with the assistance of the State. The indemnities for restoration of the tombs and for compensating for a possible loss of planted bushes and fruit trees could be allowed; this sum will be determined by a commission designated by the Governor of the Region.

The decree announced only the result of prior negotiations. Eviction decisions had already been agreed upon. Although the governmental correspondence and documentation about the justifications of the inclusion of Boucle of Damantan to Niokolo-Koba National Park and the eviction of its residents had been difficult to obtain.[187] However, it is very likely that the eviction of Boucle of Damantan was discussed during the meeting of the Council of Ministers, during which Dupuy had obtained a carte blanche from Senghor to pursue the autonomy and militarization of the Niokolo-Koba National Park. Also, from the correspondence between the Ministry of Planning and the Governors, it is clear that the Commission of Soil Conservation had approved the inclusion of the zone of Boucle of Damantan into the National Park and the eviction of its residents before the promulgation of the decree.

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[185] In addition to hunting posts, in these two villages outside the Park, other posts were also established in Simenti and Dalaba, within the new National Park.

[186] Decree No.68-551 of 14 May 1968 on the Enlargement of the Niokolo-Koba National Park by the inclusion of the area called "Boucle of Damantan" (Decret Portant agrandissement du parc national du Niokolo-Koba par l'adjonction de la zone dite la "boucle du Damantan") (DPN, 2000, p. 151). (578.000 hectares)

[187] The minutes of the meeting of the Council of Ministers and that of the Commission of Conservation of Soils were unavailable.



Map 11: The Niokolo-Koba National Park after its extension to the area called Boucle of Damantan in 1968 adapted from Condamin (Michel Condamin, 1974, p. 59).

By February of 1968, the Ministry of Planning had proposed a resettlement plan for the Damantan-Tabadian area (Boucle of Damantan), from which 21 villages and 1,678 inhabitants would be evicted. Although I could find the official documents (e.g. the Minutes of the Commission of Soil Conservation) containing the debates regarding the eviction of Badi and Niemeneke, it was not possible to obtain or find these debates for the evictions from Damantan and Tabadian.[188] While silence surrounds the debates on eviction of Damantan on the side of official records, there is nevertheless, scant correspondence about the resettlement of the evicted villages of this area, which I will discuss in the next chapter. Therefore, in this chapter, I will turn to narratives of the evictees to illuminate the evictions from Damantan and Tabadian area, which reveals the complexity of the struggles over authority and territory between village chiefs and postcolonial state administration.

[188] The reasons for this could be manifold. One of them is the disorganization of the institutional archives. The classification of archives at the Governance of Tambacounda had only started when I was carrying my research, but it did not look promising given that a lot of files were pilled up in a room, whose door was impossible to open because of the clutter. At the same time, there are other reasons related to the reticence to open up the archives to researchers. For example, obtaining permission to the access to the archives of the National Park Service is particularly difficult.

Collection of Arms

The eviction of Boucle of Damantan is important to understand for different reasons. First, it was the first wave of massive evictions from the National Park, which was intended to be and set a precedent for the following waves of eviction. Also, this process is important to understand how eviction was being made possible through a number of different tactics, which ranged from discrediting of religious authority of local marabouts to collection of fire arms, before finally the army was sent down to carry out the evictions. As I will show in the following, the coercion exercised in the case of the eviction of Tabadian and Damantan area, did not only target the local hunting or cultivation, but particularly the authorities who enjoyed popularity and legitimacy in the area. Therefore, the deposition of these authorities became the main focus of the process of eviction in this area of the National Park.

As I have explained earlier, the creation of protected areas, particularly of National Parks had involved a struggle the colonial state and native authorities. Similarly, the postcolonial extension of the limits of the Niokolo-Koba National Park implied the reimposition and extension of the postcolonial state's claims over land that was already occupied, used and governed by existing local authorities. As explained earlier, Damantan's Mandinka speaking chiefs had established a strong legitimacy among other authorities in the land of Tanda. Part of this legitimacy was based on the role of the marabouts of Damantan in teaching and spreading the Islam. Partly because of this wide-spread legitimacy that they enjoyed, notables of the region of Damantan and Tabadian had been considered as a "troubled" area by French colonial administration. Nevertheless, throughout the French colonial rule, which made itself felt through the appointed Province Chief, Damatan and Tabadian's notables had established political and economic relations with the Province Chief, Amadou Ndiaye and his son. After the establishment of the first colonial National Park in 1953, the region had become also an important hunting zone. As earlier accounts of the evictees illustrate, colonial tourists and hunters from the metropole flocked to this region, and other areas surrounding the colonial National Park, using mostly local hunters as their guides.

According to Camara, who used to live in one of the Pulaar villages near Tabadian, all of this changed quite sharply after the arrival of Dupuy:

> We have heard about the Park for the first time from Dupuy. Before that, people would come to the village because they wanted to hunt. They used to take two three young people with them and go in the forest. After they killed the animals, they would come back to the "camp" with the animals in their cars... Then they came to tell us that it was the Park. Dupuy was the first *toubab* who told us that. He said: "Now the poachers are not allowed to enter the forest. Before, if you wanted to go to Missirah (from Tabadian) you had to take the road early in the morning before the sunset. When Dupuy came, if you were caught on the road in the dark, you would be taken to the gendarmes. [189]"

The moment, he "arrived," as Camara remarked Dupuy focused on hunting. Visiting the villages, Dupuy warned them all that where they lived was a Park. He warned villagers that "poachers" were his prime target. However, for Camara, Dupuy's interdictions did not begin nor end with hunting. Traveling on the roads that tied the villages to administrative and commercial centers in the North, at night was also punished. The coercion was also extended within the villages in Tabadian. I have mentioned earlier that foresters were already present in other villages more important for hunting tourism. After Dupuy became the National Park's Director, according to Camara he also sent new foresters to all the villages that was included within the new limits of the National Park. Camara continued:

> C: When Dupuy came he also settled a *forestier* (forest guard) in each village. They were there to police villagers who were poaching. Dupuy came to our village with his car and he brought with him Mamadou Diallo. Diallo was the first forest guard in our village and he was working for him. Diallo would tell us where the forest was forbidden. He used to say: "There the forest is forbidden... here it is forbidden." Diallo was the first one to be implanted in Tabadian. After him, one by one, they sent other agents to all of the villages.
>
> M: How did you receive this change in your village? Did people resist to them?
>
> C [sarcastically]: Lets say you are an "authority." You come here to settle and work. How can we say no to you?
>
> [Collective Laughter]

Camara was talking about the "foresters," that is the park rangers, that Dupuy has sent and the coercion that they exercised in a sarcastic way. They were a foreign "authority" who had "settled" in the village to do their "work." Niambi, the old guide from Badi had also said so: Dupuy was sent there to do "his work" by Senghor. He had a "mission" to accomplish. But the laughter that

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[189] Interview Tounti, March 2004.

Camara's account indicated that Dupuy's oppressive authority which aimed at controlling all aspects of village life were not and could not be hegemonic. Sarcasm, irony and laughter accompanied the multiple ways of resisting and avoiding the oppressive presence of park rangers. This sarcasm was also extended to me and many researchers who came to visit to conduct interviews or surveys in the villages of Madina. Although researchers did not necessarily have connections with a "state authority," they were still perceived, sometimes rightly so, as having links to it. Camara was also taking this opportunity to make fun of all those who claimed to come to their village to "work" and to express this generalized suspicion that surrounded their presence. He continued:

> When foresters arrived, we could no not gather any more honey or wild manioc. We could not even go to fish... Everything was forbidden. Don't touch it! If the State tells you not to touch it, it has the power, you cannot do it. Let's say you are caught fishing from the lake, they would tell you: "come we are taking you to prison!" [Laughter] ... See this old guy that you met yesterday? He was one of the first ones to be taken to prison, he was fishing from a lake
>
> [A stronger laughter]

While memories of oppression emerged, they were continuously subverted by irony and laughter. From Camara's account, one could clearly understand that the interdictions went beyond "poaching" that Dupuy identified as a crime. Fishing from the lake was clearly not a crime, it was after all not "poaching." But, as Camara remarked, "everything was forbidden." The distance between sarcasm and anger started to fade gradually as he started to tell me in detail the story of their eviction, and what preceded it:

> If you are in the forest and if they catch you in the forest with a knife and arms, they would take you to prison. They would take your arms everything. It was as if they were taking your claws... [Laughter]... But they, the foresters, had their knives and arms... they had everything.

Through this metaphor of arms as claws, Camara was pointing particularly at unequal power relations that had been established between the villagers and the Park Service. In fact, before evictions, it was not uncommon to find arms in all of the villages. Jihadist wars, slave trade and hunting had also fueled the circulation of arms in these forested regions. Many villagers, even though their main preoccupation was agriculture, did keep fire arms (called "fusil de traite"[190]), partly for hunting but also partly for protection against the wildlife. When Dupuy took

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[190] The term that refers to arms used in slave trade (traite).

over the management of the Niokolo-Koba National Park, as one of anti-poaching measures, he had made his priority to enforce the interdiction of carrying of fire arms within the National Park.

Many evictees remember and recount how Dupuy "tricked" them to collect those arms. According to Dari, who is the eldest family member of Damantan's chiefly family, fire arms had been a concern for colonial administration since the Province Chief, Ndiaye was appointed. What Dupuy did when he came, reminded Dari of the Province Chief:

> They have tricked us. They did not tell us the truth. They have counted the people who had the arms and after that they had confiscated all the arms. It was first Ndiaye who had counted the arms. The canton chief. he was the one who had established peace here. This is why he had decided to count the arms. ...[After Dupuy became the Director] they also counted all the people who had arms. As he knew that everyone had an arm, he came to take them. Now all our arms are in Tamba, with the name of each person written on them.[191]

Dupuy had followed this strategy not only in Damantan and Tabadian, but also in Badi. For Niambi, who had worked as a guide in the Park, one of the first things Dupuy had done, besides establishing control posts was to collect the fire arms. This was, according to him, in 1969 when the Park was extended to include Badi:

> The same year that they brought a post to Badi, Dupuy tricked the villagers with his idea that if they bought their old arms to Tamba(counda), they would be given certificates. With these certificates they would be able to exchange their old arms with new ones. Many people went to Tamba to leave those arms, but since then, not a single one was able to retrieve them or buy a new one.[192]

Danfakha, who had briefly worked as a park ranger, narrated the story in more detail:

> D: When Dupuy came the first thing he did was to collect all the arms from villagers. After that, he forbid all hunting and Badi became part of the Park. At that time we used to go to Missirah to the sub-prefect to pay taxes for our arms. The agents [established in villages by Dupuy] told people to declare the arms that they hid to Missirah. In Missirah, they would be able to exchange them with new arms from Europe. They made people believe that their local arms were not good enough. They were dangerous because they were old. That they could blow at their faces. So it was better to bring them to the authorities. They also called the village chiefs and said: "These arms are done locally, they are dangerous! Very dangerous!" They should exchange them with modern arms. This is why people took their arms to the village chief, who brought them with a camion to Missirah and gave them to sub-prefect. This is how we have been duped... [laughing to their own sort]...
>
> M: When people realized what happened, what did they do?

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[191] Damantan, August 2004.

[192] Niambi, August 24th, 2004.

> D: Well there was a lot of discussion in the village but in vain. People were not happy that their arms were taken away. People thought that the authorities were now much more interested in these arms than before, so it was better to give up the issue, otherwise there would be problems. Dupuy had told them that Senghor decided that this area would become a Park. It was also the State which has decided about that[193].

These narratives are in important in illustrating Dupuy's image among the evictees. He was like the Province Chief, in his oppression. But just like him, he had to "trick" the villagers, by lying and misguiding them to collect their arms. It is also possible to see through these narratives that the collection of fire arms was not the only an issue about "poaching." It was about security (after all Ndiaye was the one who had brought "peace" and collected those arms for the sake of peace). The tactics that Dupuy used to trick the villagers, however, were slightly different. Although some arms (probably not all of them) were registered and taxed, many were undeclared. To make people declare them, according to Dari and Niambi, the rangers in the villages persuaded the inhabitants that they were "not good", "dangerous" and outdated. It would be much better to obtain modern arms. This discrediting of the old ways, tradition as much as "traditional arms" was, as I will also illustrate in the next section, an important part of the tactics of the "State." These tactics were part of what reinforced the mistrust not only toward the National Park Service and its Director, but also towards Senghor, therefore the State, who "ordered."

Another important aspect of these narratives is to show how important it was to collect the fire arms for the National Park Service. As Camara said, they did not have any "claws" to defend themselves, against the rangers who had "knives." The monopolization of coercion in the hands of the Park Service was not thus not only a result of the increased finances and better arms provided for anti-poaching -- although this was the case as well-- but also it was also possible by the confiscation of arms, which had considerably reduced the possibility of retaliation.

Deposition of Waliws

As I have mentioned above, the tactics deployed before the eviction of Damantan and Tabadian, used a combination of coercion and persuasion. Particularly those that aimed at "persuading" aimed at discrediting the tradition and the authority of marabouts, who had a great

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[193] Danfakha, April 2004.

influence in this area. This long process, of negotiation and pressure, that took place before the evictions, lasted for about seven years, according to those in Damantan,[194] nine according to Camara:

> The discussions about eviction took a long time. I think nine years. You should have seen Damantan at that time. Damantan was the *diatigui* of all villages, of Tabadian, Sintan Silli everybody. We all followed Damantan. This is why Damantan was evicted first. During the discussions with the State, all the villages especially the village chiefs said no! They said if Damantan refused to leave, nobody would counter it had been decided, they would not leave!

For Camara, who was from a Pulaar speaking village in Tabadian, Damantan and its marabouts were "the" legitimate authorities in the entire region. Damantan was the "diatigui" the host, which protected all the villages from Tabadian to Damantan. According to Camara what made Damantan the "*diatigui*" was its role in converting the Mandings to Islam:

> Mandings at that time were not all converted to Islam. Take my old brother for example, he was not Muslim. Damantan was Manding but it was the center for all Muslims. So if Damantan would leave everybody would follow suite. At that time, the elders of Damantan were *waliw*s...Cissokho played on this. He said [after Damantan was evicted]: "Now [because Damantan has left] all Muslims should leave!"

The authority of Damantan derived, thus, from its *waliw*s, who were viewed as Sufi saints. This important role of Islam as the basis of authority of Damantan, made it also a prime target for those who supported the eviction. Among those, particularly the Deputy of Kedougou, Madi Cissokho was well known to inhabitants of Tabadian and Damatan. Cissokho was the first person who had "played on" religion to undermine the authority of Damantan and its *waliw*s. To persuade the chiefs of Damantan, Cissokho came to Damantan:

> When Cissokho came to Damantan to persuade them to leave, the elders of Damantan insulted him. They told him that [if he insisted] he would have to deal with the *waliw*s. Cissokho, who was also a Manding, said: "If you say so, I will deal with them and see this affair with marabouts." To show that the elders were not real *waliw*s, Cissokho brought to Tamba the marabout of Makakoulibantang. This is what the State did to discredit them in the eyes of the people. The marabout told to Madi that if he wanted Damantan to leave, he had to buy a white ram. They would prepare a meal with the ram so that the elders would eat... Once they had eaten the meal, they would decide to leave Damantan. The next day, they killed the ram and prepared a meal for the elders of Damantan. This is how

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[194] Interviews in Damantan and Tounti 2004. The number seven here, may not necessarily correspond --- although it very well could-- the exact span of time during which the eviction negotiations were held with the villages. In other interviews about the foundational myths of the villages, particularly that of Damantan, the number seven appears in all crucial events.

> they persuaded the elders of Damantan. This is why Cissokho brought Damantan's waliws to Tambacounda. [When he brought the elders to Tambacounda], Madi said to the elders: "You are not *waliw*s." He turned to his friends and said: "to show that they are not waliws put them in prison." He imprisoned them to show that they could not do anything. Cissokho had also told to his superiors that Damantan had accepted to leave. He said: "The proof is that we came to Tambacounda with the elders of Damantan. If they did not accept why would they come to Tambacounda? This is the proof!"

Camara's version of how Cissokho discredited the elders of Damantan stressed on witchcraft, the misuse of Islam (maraboutage) against its Saintly practice by the *waliw*s. It also stresses how despite their shared "Manding" indentity, the Deputy Cissokho and the *waliw*s of Damantan were very different. This narrative also shows how Islam had been drawn in the middle of the politics of persuasion of eviction. It also illustrates how the refusal of eviction of Damantan and Tabadian constituted a threat for the authority of the Deputy, who was also the Minister of Public Works in Senghor's government. Eviction had become a show down between Damantan and the "State" represented by Senghor, Cissokho and Dupuy.

Camara continued with how the elders were forced to sign an agreement, after they have been imprisoned by Cissokho:

> The marabout of Maka had told Madi that Damantan would leave in two weeks. Within two weeks, fifteen people signed the paper. [Angry] They have signed it! The elders singed it! The day elders signed the paper, they left Tambacounda with Madi to come back to the village. When they came to Wassadou, Madi sent a message to Damantan saying that he was now arriving with his "entourage." This, the Mandings did not like it, at all. In Dialakoto, people revolted to demonstrate their disagreement.

The signing of "the papers" by the elders, an act that was still resented by evictees, was both coercion and witchcraft for Camara. It was a "warning" to all Mandings in the region that they were now under his "authority", as the *waliw*s were his "entourage." But this was not even sufficient, because as a final precaution of security the army was also sent to carry out the eviction of Damantan:

> Before arriving to Damantan, on the road Madi called the Army Captain (Capitaine) in Siminti (the National Park). The Army captain sent Senghor a message saying that the elders of Damantan had accepted to leave. When Senghor received the message he said to evict them as soon as possible, without delay. Soldiers from at the border of Guinee and Guinea Bissao were called in, under the pretext that Guinee was going to invade Senegal. But Guinee never came! Never came!

The tension between Senegal and Guinee at the time of evictions is also mentioned in Dupuy's memoirs. However, as his memoirs is silent on evictions (except in one passage where the

number of evictees is mentioned) it also mentions this tension by passing as a surprise(Dupuy & Dupuy, 1991). This tension, which was also related to Cold War politics, had led Senghor to consider Guinee as a “radical” regime which posed a threat to Senegalese security (Schraeder & Gaye, 1997). What this account shows clearly is how much eviction of Damantan and Tabadian was, particularly in the eyes of the evictees, a matter of security. As the border area where the National Park was created was also very much a point of passage between the two countries, many evictees had also either parental or commercial ties with Guinee, or Guinee Bissao. Therefore the arrival of the army, particularly from the Guinean border, was understood as an extension of the tensions between the “state” to local level. This also opens up other questions about how much the concerns about national security became also a pretext for evictions from National Parks. Furthermore, it also indicates how security is a central question in the creation of a space like National Park, a place where, as Peluso remarked, a state of emergency can be extended (Peluso, 1993).

Until the eviction of the residents of the Niokolo-Koba National Park, the National Park Service lacked the coercive power, legal backing and financial means to implement the “strict” conservation measures imposed by the zoning of National Parks. The international agreements that set up the national parks forbid strictly the carrying of arms, and restricted the local hunting to “subsistence” needs. The carrying of fire arms within the National Parks was forbidden by law, but the law was very difficult to enforce. However, once villagers have been disarmed, the balance of power between the National Park Service and the inhabitants of the National Park had also been altered. As Camara’s account shows, the coercive tactics to force people to eviction followed one another until the arrival of the army and actual evacuation of the village of Damantan. With eviction Damantan’s authority was also deeply shaken:

> When soldiers in Depot told the news that Damantan had left to gendarmes, the gendarmes were very surprised. They said: “Wasn’t it that Damantan which had refused to leave?” After Damantan was evicted, Mady Cissokho came to us [at Tabadian] and said: “You have been told to leave. What are you waiting for? I don’t care whether you would like to leave the Park or not, Damantan has left. Now all of this belongs to the State.”

The appropriation of the National Park for “public utility” was therefore seen very much like an expropriation by force, trough political maneuvers, all aiming at both displacing people and deposition of local authorities.

Once the National Park was emptied, National Park became a no-man’s land where “shoot to kill” policies took precedence. That means the rangers could shoot without impunity or trial anyone that they saw within the National Park and suspected of being a “threat.” However, it was not possible to implement the “shoot-to-kill” policies within the National Park before the eviction of all its residents in 1975. In fact it is also in 1975, that the special status of the park rangers was approved by the Council of Ministers.[195]The number of park rangers, the amount of fines for tickets and the prison terms for poaching were all increased.[196] The killing a park ranger became punishable by ten years of imprisonment. If the poacher was from another country, his penalty would be more stringent because he would be held for violation of national territories. During this meeting, where Senghor insisted on the necessity of the special status of park rangers, it was decided that although the hierarchies and promotion within the National Park Service would be similar to the Forestry Service, the park rangers would enjoy new risk indemnities and new and improved weapons against poaching. The increased militarization of rangers and the impunity that the special status would give them brought opposition from the Minister of Rural Development, who proposed the recruitment of park rangers from within the Forestry Service corps. However, his objection was muted by Dupuy as well as the Governor of the region of Tambacounda. The Governor argued that poachers were coming from outside of Senegal (especially from Guinea) and that the rangers’ military materiel should be upgraded. They needed automatic weapons, just like the ones the poachers were using. The governor also wanted to conduct military exercises in the National Park during the “poaching season.” By the 1980s, the National Park had become a “no man’s land” and the militarized National Park Service and its “right” to use coercion to “fight poaching” had gained acceptance. Following 1975, there were frequent armed clashes between the National Park rangers and “organized groups of

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[195] Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Council of Ministers on National Parks held in 6 January 1975.

[196] The killing of an elephant was now made punishable either by 20.000 CFA or one year of firm imprisonment.

poachers" that were presented as originating from the outside of Senegal. The "shoot to kill" policy against poaching turned the National Park into a no-man's land, a dangerous zone, where the army's intervention had become legitimate.

The Eviction of Badi-Niongani and Niemeneke

The second wave of evictions, which followed the extension of the National Park to North Est, show many similarities but also some important differences compared to the eviction of Damantan and Tabadian. These differences, as I will show in this section, were related to the nature of links and networks within which the village-level local authorities were tied to regional politicians or to tourism industry through the Forestry Service, before their eviction.

The first decree announcing the National Park's extensions to "zones" of Badi, Gamon and Niemeneke was promulgated in 1969, a year after the decree announcing the eviction of Damantan.[197] The minutes of the regional Commissions of Soil Conservation of Tambacounda show that eviction of Badi-Niongani and Niemeneke-Segeuko (Sibikiling) areas were decided before the promulgation of the decree of extension. This project of extension was proposed, following Damantan' s eviction decree. It is important to note here that, the debates of extension were held in the midst of resettlement debates of the villages to be evicted from Damantan and Tabadian, that I will discuss more detail in the next chapter.

The project of extension of the National Park to Badi, Niemeneke and Gamon (North-Est of the existing National Park) concerned the local administrators of two regions: Tambacounda and Kedougou. While Badi and Gamon were included within the region of Tambacounda, Niemeneke-Niongani were put under the jurisdiction of the region of Kedougou.

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[197] Decret No 69-1028 du 18 Septembre 1969 Portant agrandissement du Parc du Niokolo-Koba et creation d'une zone limitrophe sur son pourtour (DPN: 152). The 1969 Decree would serve as the basis of the "limits" of the National Park, until it was included among the World Heritage Sites and Biosphere Reserves of UNESCO in 1980.



Map 12: Extensions of the Niokolo-Koba National Park from 1968 to 1969 adapted from Condamin (Michel Condamin, 1974, p. 59).

The Regional Commission of the Conservation of Soils of both regions were invited to meet to debate the extensions of the Park during the course of the 1968. The Commissions included the Governors and the Prefects of both regions, the Forestry Service, the National Park Directorate, regional representatives of Agricultural, Forestry and Herding Departments and the Ministry of Public Works.[198] Prior to these meetings, a Report was submitted to both Regional Commissions, which included a detailed explanations about why the National Park should be extended to North East. The Report highlighted both developmental potential of the National Park and the importance of protecting its wildlife. The National Park had the necessary tourism infrastructure; and had become a pole of attraction for Senegalese tourism. The area of the National Park had become "too small" for a great national park of Africa. Besides providing much needed jobs to areas' "populations" tourism would also help "valorize" the exceptional "landscapes" that existed at the borders of the National Park. Developmental discourse of the report was also accompanied by a conservationist discourse. It stressed on the necessity to preserve the natural richness of the region of Senegal Oriental for the future. Also, wildlife migrated outside the National Park boundaries, making it more difficult to protect it. Increasing the area of the National Park would give more "vital space" for the fauna to multiply in the center of the park and it would ensure the protection and security of symbolic species (like the Elan de Derby), whose migratory path extended outside of the core protected area during the dry season.

[198] Letter of the Governor of the region of Senegal Oriental to the Minister of Rural Development dated 7 November 1968 (No.903/RSO).

The extension of the National park towards the East was justified by the abundance of the wildlife there. If the park was extended and the new limits became concrete on the terrain, the efficacy of surveillance of the fauna, unique in Africa, would be extended. The report also stressed that the new extension of the Park was for "the sake of the future and the good of the populations" as well. Through eviction, it would be possible to eliminate animal diseases, particularly the onchocercose. The villages were "boiling centers" of cattle sickness, because pastures were sometimes shared by cattle and wildlife, which carried diseases. The spread of disease to the cattle increased the threat of disease passing to humans and causing epidemics.

This report highlights the interconnectedness of development and conservation in justifying the Park's extensions. The extension of the National Park was for the "good" of the residents, but mostly for the benefit of the fauna. Although it was favorable towards eviction, the report, initially recommended doubling of the limits of the buffer zone. This would prevent "occasional poaching", particularly in areas and roads surrounding the park, which included Badi-Niongani, and Niemeneke, Segueko (Sibikiling). It was argued that the importance of agriculture in these areas justified the interdictions on hunting that would accompany the extension of the buffer zone. The Report suggested that, the promise of more favorable prospects for production through better agricultural land could be a good reason to assure the "populations" and to prepare them for an eventual eviction. Because of concerns about the possible interruption of cash crop production, due to evictions, immediate eviction was not recommended as a solution. Instead, it was advised to proceed with "progressive" resettlement of populations to more "welcoming" regions where there was a minimum of infrastructure -- such as wells and huts-- which was important to make sure that agriculture was not interrupted. This was, as I will analyze in the next chapter, an important concern of the Ministry of Planning and Public Works -- more so than the Ministry of Agriculture-- which considered eviction as an opportunity to apply the technocratic vision through a rational planning of village *terroir*s.

The Meeting of the Regional Commission of Soil Conservation of Tambacounda, for which the report was drafted as a background document, shows that there existed many fractures and differences among the local actors involved in evictions. The Meeting of the Regional Commission was convened in September of 1968 at the center of the arrondissement, Missirah,

under the auspices of the Prefect.[199] The village chiefs of the concerned villages were also invited to the meeting, as well as the Deputy who represented the region at the Parliament.[200] During this meeting, the debate over eviction focused also on the "status" of the "populations" which would be included in the buffer zone. Was it necessary to evict them? Eviction debates highlighted the differences in opinions. Not surprisingly, the National Park Service and the Ministry of Public Works supported the eviction. The Agricultural and Herding Services, also agreed on evictions, although their justifications were quite different. The only opposition to eviction came from, the Forestry Service and the a branch of Agricultural Ministry, the Génie Rural.[201] The meeting participants who represented the state administration, debated also at length how the establishment of a new Classified Forest (the Classified Forest of Diambour) at the North of the Niokolo-Koba National Park would affect the use-rights of the villages included in the extended buffer zone. [202]

The Prefect of Tambacounda proposed three options to the Commission. The first one was to shrink the limits of the National Park, so that agriculture and herding would not be affected. The second was to shrink the Classified Forest by 15 kilometers, which would allow more space for the resettled populations to cultivate and continue herding. The third option was the eviction of the villages. The Forestry Service of Tambacounda opposed to immediate eviction of the residents of the new areas. The Forestry Service Director was mainly concerned that the villages resettled in the North would be squeezed between the Classified Forest of Diambour -- created also in 1968-- and the National Park. The "populations" squeezed in between

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[199] Minutes of the Meeting of the Regional Commission of Soil Conservation held in Missirah about the project of inclusion of Badi and Gamon to Niokolo-Koba National Park (11 September 1968).

[200] Badi, Niongani, Dienoundala, BantaKounta, Mousadala and Peteli.

[201] State Ministry of Agricultural Engineering and Mechanization.

[202] The debates about the gazetting of Diambour had already started in 1967. The Regional Committee of Soil Conservation of Senegal Oriental proposed the gazetting of Diambour to protect the wildlife and African palm trees near Nieriko, a tributary of the Gambia River. The Commission supported gazetting of a forest of 121,500 hectares to regulate the ongoing exploitation of African palm trees into state control through the "submission of the palm tree forest to the Forestry Code" (Meeting Minutes of Regional Committee of Soil Conservation of Senegal Orientale, 31 October 1967).

would have “no free zones to carry “agro-pastoral activities.” This would mean, although the Director did not express this openly, more potential for the clearing of the Classified Forest. Not surprisingly, the Deputy of the Director of the National Park was the most vocal in insisting in favor of the evictions. Deputy assured the Forestry Service that until the populations are evicted, they would have the “full liberty to cultivate within the new limits of the National Park.” Once they were relocated they would still be able to keep their “use rights” except for hunting in the buffer zone, which would extend into parts of resettlement areas. However, he also insisted that if there was a need to change the limits of the protected areas, it would be best to reduce the surface of the Classified Forest than to declassify part of the National Park. In this debate, we see another dimension of the tensions that I had mentioned earlier between the Forestry Service and the National Park Director, Dupuy. The “territorial” fight between these two administrations were translated at the local level in the conflict over priority of National Park over the Classified Forest.

It is significant also that the representatives of Agricultural and Herding Services supported evictions. Their concerns, as I will further detail in the next chapter, were quite different of those of the National Park management and the Forestry Service. They drew attention to the potential difficulties that cultivators and herders, who would be severely constrained by the extension of the buffer zone and the Classified Forest, would face. However, as I will further discuss in the next chapter, this concern with local people’s use-rights, was also largely related to the urgency to manage the herds, as well as the agricultural production in this area. The only opposition to eviction would be voiced by the representative of rural animation, who would stress that the eviction would also mean a “waste” of the CERs already established in this area. The village chiefs invited to the meeting were allowed to express their opinions at the very end. All village chiefs, particularly those of Badi, Niongani and Gamon opposed the incorporation of their villages into the National Park and their eviction. The village chief of Gamon opposed to eviction on the basis that villagers were “attached to their ancestral land.” The commission accepted only Gamon’s request, recommending that National Park boundaries should pass outside of Gamon. Finally, although the reassurances of the National Park to the contrary, the commission declared its opinion that the National Park management did not present any credible guarantee about the protection of use rights within the National Park. It would be very difficult if not impossible for the

residents to exercise their use rights. This would sooner or later lead to eviction, therefore it was better to plan ahead for the eviction. To open more spaces for agriculture, after the eviction, the Commission recommended also to declassify part of the Classified Forest.

After the Meeting of the Commission of the Conservation of Soils, the Decree announcing the extensions of the Park to Badi, Gamon and Niemeneke was promulgated in 1969. After the meeting of the Commission, Dupuy had obtained a carte blanche to pressure further the village chiefs to "voluntarily" leave. Dupuy informed the Governor of Tambacounda that he had created "pre-park" zones where "populations can cultivate while they waited for their displacement within five years."[203] But he also instructed the villagers to cultivate only in a 1-kilometer belt surrounding their villages. The regions of Badi and Niongani were included within Pre-Park Zone 1 and the region of Niemeneke was in Pre-Park Zone 3. Dupuy asked the Governor to let the prefects and Chief of Arrondissement know about these decisions. After these areas were included in the extended buffer zone, in addition to interdictions that concerned hunting, the National Park Director started to pressure villagers about the limits of their fields. Niambi, who at that time was residing in Badi, explained to me that "Dupuy had forbid agriculture" because the villages were now part of the buffer zone. These new restrictions aimed at cutting off the residents from their subsistence base. The evictions of Badi-Niongani and Niemeneke-Sibilkiling were forced in a different way than those of Damantan. The pressure on the village chiefs concentrated on agriculture, increasingly curtailing the livelihoods of the residents of the new areas included within the National Park. At the same time, different from Damantan and Tabadian, the inhabitants of Badi-Niongani were offered posts as National Park rangers and as guides. These efforts are illustrated in the next section based on the accounts of evictees.

Persuasion through Benefits

As I mentioned in Chapter 1, in Badi and Niongani, hunting and tourism had become important sources of revenue since the establishment of hunting zones during the French colonial administration. Particularly the chiefly family of Badi, which claimed to be "native" authorities of

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[203] The Circular letter of the Director of the Niokolo-Koba National Park to the Governor of Tambacounda (NPK/442 dated 24 November 1969.

Tanda, had established ties with the Province Chief, who, according to Forestry Service Director of the time Roure, used the area almost as its personal hunting fiefdom. This connection would make Badi, before the construction of Hotel at Siminti a preferred choice for temporary camp area for hunters and tourists. During the extensions of the National Park, Dupuy also sought to recruit young people from the region of Badi for the massive public works devised to improve the park's existing "tourism infrastructure." Niambi, who worked as a guide before the eviction of the villages, was one of the first guides recruited by Dupuy. He remembered that this type of work was carried out by the young men from Badi:

> Before our eviction ... there was lots of work in the park. We were clearing the piste before the clients started to come. In Badi, the young people were called upon to help clear the fallen trees by the Directorate [Management of the National Park]. To clear up the trees a grader [a machine that scraps the soil] was brought. The workers, the young people from the village would come behind with their machetes to cut the branches. They would also cut the bush during the dry season and make forest fires and closely monitor them in order to open spaces to prevent wild fires.[204]

After the National Park was separated from the Forestry Service, Dupuy started to re-organize the corps of park rangers. He had started to recruit new rangers. According to Danfakha, who was a resident of Badi when Dupuy became the Director, recounted how Dupuy first visited his village to recruit new rangers:

> When the first Park was established we were all very young. At that time, my father and some other men in his age group were working in the camps set for the tourists. When Dupuy arrived he also came to us, whether the people in Badi would like to work as rangers in the park. But at that time, agriculture was much more important preoccupation for us peasants. Dupuy insisted that instead of agriculture, people join the Park Service because they would profit more from the advantages of the Park, But it was difficult to persuade people to leave agriculture. People did not want to leave agriculture and join the Park. It was in vain. As a solution, Dupuy recruited soldiers from Casamance. However, he continued to come to the village to ask people to join. He use to say, that Badi was "the heart of the Park." He wanted to recruit from Badi first.[205]

Danfakha, who was a cultivator himself did not want to join the Park. But he said it was a mistake, because when more pressure was put on the villagers to quit cultivating and hunting, it was hard to make a living. Working for the National Park had become an option only after their means of

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[204] Interview Badi, November 2004.

[205] Interview Badi, April 2004.

subsistence was taken away. Niambi, who had accepted to work as a guide in the Park, but who never became a ranger, explained this as follows:

> The attitude of foresters towards the villagers had changed after the arrival of Dupuy. They forbid us to go to the forest. But for us peasants, we used to live out of what we obtained from the forest. We used to collect wild yams and collect honey. But when Dupuy came he forbid all of that. We could not go to forest. God knows how he much he made our lives difficult.[206]

This was what forced some people in Badi to consider working for the Park. When the villages of Badi and Niongani were displaced outside of the National Park in 1972, this option became even more desirable. The presence of the workers from Badi in National Park had even drew the attention of the foreign visitors who flocked to the National Park. In 1972, the year Badi had left the Park, a cartoon was published about the Niokolo-Koba National Park. Called “the Adventures of Spirou and Fantasio”, this cartoon story was part of a popular series based on two imaginary characters (Spirou and Fantasio), who very much like Tintin, trotted around the world at the pursuit of secrets and treasures. The series, which became very popular in France, was created in the style of a detective story, where in every “adventure” Spirou and Fantasio had to solve a riddle or uncover a secret. This story, depicted in “fictional” form all the characters of the National Park, that the creators of the cartoon had met during their visit. It depicted, a French Safari Company Director from Dakar, the Director of the National Park Dupuy as well as two characters from the village of Badi: one older ranger who worked as “boy” for Dupuy and his younger nephew who had migrated to Paris to become a tour organizer for Safaris in the national park.

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[206] Interview Badi, November 2004.

Illustration 1: Les Aventures de Spirou et Fantasio (Le Gri-Gri du Niokolo-Koba) (Fournier, 1974, p. 19).

Spirou to Christian Hok (the Owner of Touring Safari Company): The disappearance of the animals would be harmful for your affairs?
Hok: Not yet, because it is a recent phenomenon. But to come back to YOU, you have to go back and quick!
Dupuy: ONE, TWO, ONE, TWO
Hok: Ah, here it is the “Koba Authority”, the Director in Chief... Things are going to get heated. They say that you have taken his car from the airport.
Dupuy: BRIGADE... STOP... ONE, TWO!
Netwa Makare (ancient poacher from Badi) [thinking]: Who is going to go back to the airport by foot again? It is the poor Netwa Makare!
Dupuy: Louis, tell Mr. Bagare to come here immediately!
The Park Ranger II: Understood, Mr. Director.
[Two minutes later]
Dupuy: Mr. Bagare, I did not appreciate the fact that you have left me without a car at the airport.
Bagare (a nephew of Makare, tour organizers living in Paris): I am sorry sir.
Dupuy: By the way, who are these two people you came with?
Bagare: They are journalists sir.
Dupuy: WHAT!

The racist overtones of this cartoon in depicting particularly the older ranger from Badi is quite striking. His name, Netwa Makare, is derived from "Nettoie Ma Carré"[207] in French, which means "Clean my room." Netwa Makare is represented as an old poacher from Badi, who is now reduced to carrying the luggage of the Director of National Park. His younger nephew, "Bagare" who had managed well by migrating to France, on the other hand works also for the Park, but as a Safari tour organizer. The cartoon, even though it pretends to be fictional, is a representation of how the authors had experienced their stay in Niokolo-Koba. The depiction of Dupuy as the "Niokolo authority" with the military style is very consistent with his depiction in other sources, including his own memoirs. This representation of the village of Badi and its inhabitants who work for the National Park is an important illustration of how tourism industry became an primary way of integration to the new administrative and military reorganization of the National Park.

Another contrasting example of integration to the new order that was imposed upon the residents of the North-Eastern borders of the National Park is the village of Niemeneke. As I had explained earlier, Niemeneke's integration into cash crop economy, through peanut production was closely related to the relations of this village with local politicians, particularly with Mady Cissokho. It was Cissokho, who had encouraged the village to migrate during the first evictions of 1950s. Sajakho, the first wife of the village chief had explained to me that unlike Badi, or Damantan, the relations between Niemeneke were oriented towards Kedougou more than Dialakoto. The new village chief of Niemeneke, who was the manager of the peanut cooperative, knew Cissokho very well:

> Mady Cissokho was first the deputy (of Kédougou). After him, Mamba (Guirassy) presented at the elections. He won against Madi. But despite that these two got along very well. They both came to see us in (old) Niemeneke. We would explain them our problems. ... When we were at old Niemeneke, we were from the Party of Cissokho (PS) which was also the Party of Senghor. It was Cissokho who initiated us to politics. When he used to come and see us, he used to tell us that he came to us to ask our help so that he becomes a deputy.... All of the village voted for Cissokho..

Although Cissokho, was initially against Dupuy and had threatened him for the dangers of the "hairy" human-like creatures in Niemeneke, he would end up by supporting the evictions. The

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[207] I would like to thank Etienne Smith for drawing my attention to this.

importance of political ties with Cissokho was certainly an important part of how the family of the village chief perceived the evictions. This was very different than how eviction was understood by the chiefs and inhabitants of Damantan and Tabadian. Bambara, the village chief, had told me during one of our rare conversations that their eviction from the National Park had been for their own good. I was at that time very surprised by his comment. But as these connections emerged through my interviews and the analysis of different documents, it also became clear that his attitude was clearly related to the prior relations of the village chief to Cissokho. The connections that Niemeneke had with Cissokho would serve them well after the eviction of the villages. supported the eviction of the village. After their settlement in Madina, Niemeneke would also negotiate the building of a school next to this village as opposed to other villages in Madina.

Conclusion:

In this chapter, I have focused on the extension of the regime of conservation of national parks to areas surrounding the colonial Niokolo-Koba National Park and the process of centralized evictions of the residents of the park. The eviction, as I have demonstrated, was not a punctual event but a process that extended roughly from the appointment of a new director at the Niokolo-Koba in 1967 to the finalization of the second wave of evictions from the northeastern borders of the National Park in 1975. In this chapter, through a closer analysis of governmental debates about the extensions of the Niokolo-Koba National Park and evictions of its residents, I examined how “fortress conservation” was constructed and held together by coercive practices of reformed Senegalese conservation institutions. I have argued that rather than being a direct result of a direct international intervention, this coercion was woven into the very fabric of the postcolonial Senegalese state, particularly in its administrative practices.

In the first part of this chapter, I look at the postcolonial state discourses, as these were formulated by the president of the Republic of Senghor and the new director of the National Park, André Roger Dupuy. First, I showed that development was an important framing device for complex postcolonial conservation discourses appealing to these two different publics: the international public of conservation organizations and tourists and the national public of

Senegalese citizens. The conservation was integrated into a nationalist discourse by elevating the National Park to the pedestal of humanity's heritage; and simultaneously by justifying the Senegalese state's sovereignty claims through the "untouchability" of national parks. At the same time, development discourse framed the extensions of the National Park as a matter of public utility. National parks were represented as part of national development. Therefore, the postcolonial state capitalized on its trusteeship role over the nation's development and resources to declare national parks for the good of all citizens, justifying the basis of expropriation.

In this chapter, I also examined the political process that went into the construction of fortress Niokolo-Koba. Through an analysis of governmental meetings and the memoirs of the director of the National Park, I have shown that the appointment of Dupuy created conflicts within the postcolonial government, as it replicated the autocratic tendencies of the presidential regime established by Senghor after Dia's imprisonment. An important aspect of this political process was the administrative restructuring of conservation institutions. I illustrated that as a result of this top-down restructuring, the Niokolo-Koba National Park was separated from the Forestry Service and became increasingly militarized. I argued that this process was crucial to understand how the National Park Service became a special administration within the postcolonial state, which was made accountable only to the president.

In addition to looking at how centralized evictions were related to the struggles within the higher echelons of the postcolonial state administration, I also focused on how evictions unfolded in the regions of Tambacounda and Kedougou through an examination of archival documents and narratives of the evictees. I showed that although the extensions of the National Park to the Damantan-Tabadian area at the West, and Badi-Niongani and Niemeneke in the East of the existing protected area followed similar patterns of top-down imposition of evictions, the local application of these evictions differed considerably. The analysis of evictees' narratives indicated that the tactics used to evict the residents ranged from persuasion (tricking villagers to submit their arms and promises of benefits from tourism and agriculture) to coercion (imprisonment and forced evacuation by the army).

The case of the centralized evictions from the Niokolo-Koba National Park shows that eviction was also an "operation," which implicated all levels of state administration both in Dakar

and in the region of Tambacounda. Eviction and resettlement “operations,” just like improvement schemes, devised by centralized “technical” services and various public institutions, were “planned” at the center at the top of the administrative chain of command. The importance and the degree of involvement of all levels of administration in such a large-scale operation, indicated that the calculated tactics fashioned by technocrats depended on local administrators for their enforcement. The use of these different tactics depended to a great extent to the nature of relations that the village authorities had established with colonial and postcolonial state prior to their evictions. After Independence, the status quo established between the customary authorities and the state had been deeply shaken. The “radical” attitude toward native authorities, represented as the relics of colonial rule, was much more evident in the eviction of Damantan and Tabadian. The residents of Tabadian and Damantan and their authorities were represented as treats not only to wildlife but particularly to state authority. Their eviction, presented as a matter of national security, is an illustration of how eviction, as appropriation of land, required a deposition of local authorities. Unlike Damantan, the negotiations between the chiefs of these areas followed a much “smoother” course. In Badi-Niongani and Niemeneke-Sibikiling, a different road was chosen to persuade evictees to leave. They were promised jobs and better agricultural land as benefits. This “benefit” argument, one of the main themes of neoliberal conservation that I will analyze in the last chapter, was deployed to persuade village authorities in these regions, which were already integrated into commercial hunting and agriculture. The next chapter will look at how this integration was accelerated for all evictees during the process of resettlement at the outskirts of the National Park.

Chapter 4: Resettlement: Integrating the Displaced to the Agrarian Margins and Local Administration

On the national road that links Missirah to Dialakoto, if you take the *car rapides,* which serve as the shuttle between the two places, you will see just outside of Missirah a group of abandoned buildings. On one of my trips, I was traveling with Djemme, one of the older sons of my host family in Wasadu to Tambacounda. When we were approaching Missirah, he pointed out the buildings to me and said: “You see those? Those are the buildings constructed for Damantan.” I was surprised to hear this. I had assumed that Damantan stayed near Wassadou, where they were left by army trucks, and during my visits to the village, no one had mentioned that that the initial plan was to settle them next to Missirah. When I mentioned this to Djemme, he explained that the notables of Damantan had decided to go to Boulakounda, a village not far from Missirah, next to Diakhanke speakers from Tabadian. The abandoned concrete buildings outside of Madina were never occupied, crumbling like the resettlement plan and the technocratic vision behind it. The ghost of these unfinished buildings in ruins, seemed to stand as relics of the postcolonial state’s failed attempts of legibility.

In this chapter, shifting the focus away from the struggles over the “untouchable domain” of the Niokolo-Koba National Park, emptied from its inhabitants, I turn to the process of resettlement of the evictees on the outskirts of the National Park. I begin by summarizing the resettlement plan proposed for Damantan and Tabadian, and the debates of eviction of Badi-Nionagani and Niemeneke in 1968, to illustrate the importance of the “rational” terroir approach and concerns over cash crop production in the resettlement process. I will also look at how the issue of compensation and the distribution of indemnities were handled by the local administration and highlight how the main concern for the administrators was to lower the “cost” of eviction. This analysis will show that resettlement was also seen by postcolonial technocrats as an opportunity to apply two main goals: the reintegration of the evictees into cash crop production and into the postcolonial state administration.

In the following section, I will contrast the “state”’s vision of rational technocratic resettlement with the evictees’ narratives. I will also examine how the process of re-integration of the evictees into the margins unfolded after the arrival of the evictees to the periphery of the

National Park. I will look at different types of conflicts that helped transform agrarian and political relations in resettlement areas in profound ways. While the conflicts in Boulakounda focused on access to wells, and indemnities, in Madina they centered on agricultural land. The narratives of evictees who had settled in Boulakounda indicate that the resource conflicts (expressed as access to the village well) had pitted the different hosts and guests against each other and the conflict over indemnities opened up further the fault lines formed within the villages by displacement. The narratives of the evictees established in Madina, on the other hand, will illustrate how land would become increasingly commodified, while cash crop agriculture became the primary means of subsistence. These new property relations shaped during the resettlement process are central to understanding the context of the evictions from agricultural land that the villages experienced outside the National Park that I will analyze in the next chapter.

Resettlement of Damantan, Badi and Niemeneke: Applying the Terroir Approach

In the previous chapter, I have looked at some important aspects of the eviction process from a perspective that centered on the Niokolo-Koba National Park as a conservation and development project, with important political significance. In this section, I will show how the resettlement of evictees was also a central aspect of eviction, based on the debates among different administrators involved in the process. I will first look at the resettlement of Damantan, through the correspondence between the governor and the Ministry of Public Works, which were responsible for both the eviction and resettlement of this region. Then I will examine and compare this with resettlement debates of Badi-Niongani and Niemeneke-Sibikiling. All of these debates have taken place during the course of the 1968, during which the decisions of evictions were finalized.

The Resettlement of Damantan and Tabadian

The resettlement of the region of Damantan and Tabadian became an important issue immediately after the promulgation of the decree announcing the eviction. In a letter addressed to

the governor of Senegal, the director of the Land Management Department (attached to the Ministry of Planning) suggested a number of criteria to be followed during the resettlement.[208] The director's letter reminded the governor that the "implantation of new villages should not be taken lightly" because they were "permanent" installations. The letter stressed that evictees should "settle wherever they wished." Stressing this "free" choice available to the evictees, the Directorate of Land Management wished to make resettlement appear voluntary. However, the list of criteria that the letter enumerated for the selection of host villages restricted this "free" choice considerably. The letter insisted that it was important to determine the precise locations of the host areas and the administrative "centers" to which the evicted villages would be attached. The evictees should be settled at the proximity of administrative centers. It was recommended that the villages evicted from Damantan and Tabadian be relocated near Missirah, the center of the arrondissement.

The letter also urged the governor to make sure that evicted villages be "regrouped" according to "ethnic affinity." This measure, although it was not clearly explained, may have been a way to express concern about the possible eruption of ethnic conflicts, resulting from the co-habitation of different groups. Ethnic conflict was an important threat, not only for the evictees, but particularly for agricultural production. The letter made it clear that the Ministry of Planning's primary concern about resettlement was agricultural production. This was indicated by several recommendations. The letter advised the governor "as a precaution" that the evacuation of the villages from the park should take place during the dry season, sufficiently early to allow the relocated people to restart cultivation. According to the director, it was better to install the evicted "populations" in their host areas during the month of March, before the rainy season, so they could take advantage of the rainfall during the second half of June.[209] Time was also needed for clearing the fields. The main concern of the ministry was not necessarily how evictees would be able to subsist but instead how they would continue to produce.

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[208] Letter of the Director of Land Management (Amenagement de Territoires) of the Ministry of Planning (Abdourahman Dia) to the Governor of Senegal Oriental (Moustafa Kane), Feb 19, 1968.

[209] The director suggested that due to early rains, it would be necessary to install the populations during the month of March at latest. The first rains useful for the agriculture in Tambacounda is estimated to fall within the second week of June.

The director also recommended that the villages be installed on land "cultivable and in good condition." Furthermore, evictees should be settled five to ten kilometers away from the existing villages and their "residential zones," at least 500 meters from the main road. The last set of recommendations focused on the distribution of the agricultural land within the newly resettled villages. It was recommended that the village "terroirs" be determined according to three hectares of arable land per person, excluding the cattle roads, which did not need to be determined. In each resettled village, the ministry deemed it sufficient to have one well for 200 people. Finally, the ministry recommended that the village be reinstalled according to a plan of installation (*lotissement*). Each village should have an ideal size -- not too big, not too small -- and the limits of households would be distinguished by planted trees. The ministry's letter ended with the minister's wish that displacements be understood as an opportunity to implement a rational division of land in village terroirs. It would be "desirable," the letter stated, "to take advantage of the displacement of the populations to allow a rational division of villages and village terroirs." The resettlement plan of the Ministry of Planning focused on two issues: fixing of the evictees to particular administrative centers, and making sure that this fixing was done according to a "rational" land management, which would make sure that agricultural production continued uninterrupted. The first condition, fixing evictees of the Damantan-Tabadian area near the administrative center of the arrondissement (Missirah), proposed by the Ministry of Public Works, headed by Mady Cissokho, was accepted in February 1968.[210] The choice of Missirah was not arbitrary. Missirah was the center of local administration, where the prefect, the representative of the coercive arm of the state resided. The proximity to such an administrative center and to the prefect was not only for the provision of "public services" but also for the administrative and fiscal control of the newly established villages (collection of taxes, mediation of conflicts, etc.). Permanent installations were vital for permanent contact with local and state authorities. As I will show in the next section, during the Commission of Soil Conservation meeting the resettlement of Badi-Niongani and Niemeneke-Sibikiling would also be based on the same criteria of proximity to administrative centers. However, the construction of the buildings that would host Damantan

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[210] Minutes of the Meeting of the Regional Commission of Soil Conservation held in Missirah about the project of inclusion of Badi and Gamon to Niokolo-Koba National Park (11 September 1968).

outside of Missirah would be delayed considerably due to financial constrains. Therefore, instead of attempting to construct special “host centers” for evictees near Missirah, this time the option of spreading them in different centers would be adopted.

Also, the letter of the Directorate of Land Management to the governor concerning the settlement of Damantan showed the importance of the “terroir approach.” The ideal location of settlement was a “terroir” with a good-quality soil, far enough from “residential zones” and close enough to the roads to ease the evacuation of the cash crops to the main cities. Furthermore, it was assumed that evictees would, in their new locations, be settled according to an individualized land tenure, where each cultivator (with his family) would cultivate three-hectare plots of land. Each plot would be divided neatly from the residential areas and other plots through trees. The planting of trees clearly indicated the borders of the area used by a cultivator, similar to fencing of private property. The planting of fruit trees was also a desired “reforestation” activity.

The image of neatly organized villages, each with their three hectares of cultivated land, divided by fruit trees, resembles in many ways the villagization efforts in eastern Africa, which had become one of the important examples of legibility defined by James Scott. The case of the settlement plan of Damantan shows that this legibility attempt based on the technocratic approach to village terroirs. As I have explained previously, the terroir approach that underlined the postcolonial land and agrarian reforms was based on the model of sedentary peasants continuously cultivating a plot of land. This approach was an important part of agrarian development, as it was envisioned by Dia and Lebret. Similarly, the resettlement plan of the Ministry of Planning relied greatly on fixity. Permanency of cultivators on land was important for the uninterrupted continuation of agricultural production. In this technocratic vision, the evictees as agricultural labor necessary to sustain the economy should begin cultivation as soon as they were resettled.

However, as I will discuss later, this plan did not work during the settlement process for a number of reasons that I will analyze further. In addition, clearly the Governor of Tambacounda, responsible from the eviction “operation” was not thrilled by the tone of the letter, which arrived from Dakar. This was best indicated by the handwritten note of the governor on the right corner of the long letter of the Ministry of Planning. The note read: “Who does the director think I am?” In

fact, later on, when resettlement would create multiple “unintended consequences” it was the governor and the prefect who would be involved in their resolution, not the Ministry of Planning in Dakar.

Resettlement of Badi-Niongani and Niemeneke

While the resettlement of Damantan was being debated, later the same year, in September the Commission of Conservation of Soils of Tambacounda met to discuss the extensions of the Niokolo-Koba National Park toward North-East to include Badi-Niongani and Niemeneke-Sibikiling areas. [211] In this meeting, that I have briefly analyzed in the previous chapter, it was decided that due to the high cost of building new “host villages” (as it was decided for Damantan), it was suggested to distribute the villages to be evicted along the axe that linked Dialakoto to Missirah: in Missirah, Boulakounda, Hamdalaye, Wasadu Depot and Dialakoto, all of which had “basic infrastructure.” These “host centers” were either next to the road or next to administrative centers. Furthermore, this “progressive” resettlement in more “welcoming” regions was also important to make sure that agriculture was not interrupted. In the same meeting, the local representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture and the regional inspector of herding, supported the eviction, first because the herders would not be able to enjoy much longer their use rights due to the interference of the National Park rangers. But also, the eviction was a good occasion to “organize” those herders who would move outside the park, and to to count and vaccinate the cattle, which were both important for sale. The inspector also warned against the possible conflicts that could burst due to new conditions and to regrouping of evictees by ethnicity (e.g. Manding vs. Pulaar). Similarly, the representative of the Ministry of Agriculture argued that given the number of people in this region, in twenty years it would be impossible to carry out agriculture within the National Park. However, the local director responsible from agricultural

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[211] Minutes of the Meeting of the Regional Commission of Soil Conservation held in Missirah about the project of inclusion of Badi and Gamon to Niokolo-Koba National Park (11 September 1968).

engineering and rural animation[212] opposed the eviction. His opposition was framed in terms of loss of agricultural investment already done in villages, which were important peanut producers.

All of this indicated that as much as eviction was important for the National Park Service, settlement was important for agricultural development and the political administration of evictees at the local level. Although some, like the inspector of herding, had warned against conflicts that would erupt between the evictees and their hosts, both the settlement debates of Damantan-Tabadian and those of Badi-Niongani, Niemeneke-Sibikiling ignored or downplayed the possible political implications of resettlement. The assumption was that eviction would create a tabula-rasa, which would allow the "state" to step in, to develop and better organize the evictees. This was partly the extension of the attempts to make evictees legible. However, this picture was complicated by differences between the interests and concerns of these different local actors, who also competed with one another for territorial administrative control of the land and people.

Furthermore, as I will now examine, unlike what was foreseen through technocratic lenses, evictees followed their own paths of resettlement. The permanency of the settlements was not given. While most evicted people would migrate to neighboring countries and to Dakar, those who remained near the National Park would have to migrate several times until they were "settled." As the evictees' narratives will show this vision was very different than what the evictees encountered in resettlement areas, where many evictees had to disperse and find a plot they could cultivate, through tenant agreements with their hosts.

Indemnities for Expropriation for Public Utility

Before looking at the resettlement process of evictees in different areas at the North of the National Park, it is also important to summarize how the problem of the payment of indemnities was resolved during the eviction. The payment of indemnities to the evictees of the Niokolo-Koba National Park was based on the procedure established by the National Domain Law and its decrees of application.[213] The National Domain Law had established a mechanism of

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[212] This was the representative of Génie Rural, the State Ministry of Agricultural Engineering and Mechanization.

[213] Decree 64-573 of 30 July 1964 (fixant les conditions d'application de la loi 64-46) JORS 29 August 1964.

appropriation of land, based on an ambiguous and highly contested notion of “public utility.” In the aftermath of Independence, guiding this notion of public utility was the overarching aim of national “development.” The payment of indemnities to the evictees was the result of their expropriation for “public utility” -- that is for development. The first step before expropriation, was to determine the “just” value of indemnities to be paid by a commission.[214]

The estimation of the value of indemnities was based on the value of what was considered to be legitimate property objects. The National Domain Law and those who implemented it considered the land inhabited by the evictees, not as (private) property of evictees but as national domain, which was not owned by anyone.[215] Therefore, evictees could not be entitled to indemnities for the land. Land was not a “property object,” but what was planted on it to improve its value (like fruit trees) were property objects, whose monetary value could be established for indemnities. These improvements included crops and trees planted on the land.[216]

In other words, the legal principles followed in the case of the expropriation for public utility and the payment of indemnities were based on the assumption that evictees would not be compensated for land loss. They would be compensated only for the improvement on land. In addition, the calculations of the cost of fruit trees, huts, wells were based on their market value (which is itself highly contested by evictees). The calculation of value ignored also the present and future value of fruits (of the fruit tree), as fruit trees give fruit every year and they take time to grow. Another important aspect of the procedure of payment of indemnities is that it required a counting of property of each person to be indemnified. This process of counting and calculating inadequately low compensation were both understood by the evictees as a continuation of the coercion of the whole process of eviction.

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[214] According to the Article 31 of the Decree 64-573, for cases of expropriation for projects of public utility, the estimates of the values of goods had to be determined by a commission. This commission was composed of the prefect, a representative of the Ministry of Public Works, a representative of the Ministry of Rural Economy, a representative of land registry, two representatives of the communities or associations affected by expropriation (which included the president of the Rural Community Council, if there was one).

[215] According to Plancon, if one followed the National Domain Law’s legal logic, expropriation of parts of the national domain was itself a contradiction, given that the national domain was defined as land that could not be appropriated by anyone (Plancon, 2006, p. 440).

[216] Article 32, of Decree 64-573 of 30 July 1964 (fixant les conditions d’application de la loi 64-46) JORS 29 August 1964.

Furthermore, the correspondence dedicated to the calculation of the cost of the "operation" of eviction indicated that this cost included not only indemnities but also the cost of public works that was necessary to help evictees to settle. From the technocratic standpoint, public works -- including the clearing of the land for agriculture and the drilling of wells -- were necessary tools to enable the evicted villagers to continue agricultural production, presumably almost immediately after their eviction. An important portion of the cost of eviction was transportation.[217] This cost was calculated according to the number of people to be evicted and it was modified several times due to its insufficiency given the "isolation" and "dispersion" of the villages. Another important part of the budget was the drilling of wells, this would become a subject of conflict, as the well drillers would ask, amounts that would be considered exorbitant for the commission authorized to estimate the value. As a result, only a few wells would be constructed in settlement areas.

Finally, the governor of Tambacounda was designated as the head of the commission authorized to estimate the value of indemnities and as the manager of the funds set to cover the cost of the eviction. This arrangement, initially set up during the eviction of Damantan-Tabadian in 1968, served also as a model for the management of the funds for the cost of eviction for Badi and Niemeneke. The central role of the governor and the prefects in distribution of indemnities, resolution of conflicts, etc., would also make evictees dependent on their mediation for access to land and resources (like wells), until the election of the rural community council in 1980. As I will show in the next section, the distribution of indemnities would also fuel conflicts within the evicted villages.

Resettlement Areas

The eviction of Damanan and Tabadian was completed in 1972, whereas the eviction of Badi, Niongani and Niemeneke, were completed in 1975 (according to some evictees in 1976). Although evictees were planned to be resettled near the administrative centers, those who did not

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[217] In 1968, the cost of eviction of Damantan, which was estimated to be 10 million francs. The transport of the populations was estimated to cost 711,000 francs (the Letter of the Head of Arrondissement of Senegal Oriental to the Minister of Industry and Planning, dated 29 July 1968) (No. 851/RSO).

migrate elsewhere, dispersed in different areas at the north of the National Park. I carried my research in several settlement areas. These included Madina, Wassadou-Depot, Boulakounda, Dienna Kouta and Medina Sokho.



Map 13: The Niokolo-Koba National Park, the Classified Forest of Diambour and Resettlement Areas visited at the north of the National Park (indicated by a Circle) (Adapted from ISE Maps).

Madina is known as a “bloc” that is formed by a concentration of evictees from the National Park and its inhabitants are from different villages who were evicted from different areas in the park. In Boulakounda, as I will discuss further, there is a concentration of evictees from

Diakhanke speaking villages of Tabadian. In Dianna Kouta, located within the Classified Forest, and in Madina Sokho, I have come across evictees from Pulaar-speaking villages of Tabadian. near Wassadou, next to Madina, two other important villages are resettled, at each side of the Depot: Badi and Damantan.

I had heard about Madina Bloc at the very beginning of my research. When I expressed my interest in villages evicted from the Niokolo-Koba National Park, the first place that development practitioners and National Park administrators advised me to visit was Madina Bloc. Madina Bloc was described to me as an area where evictees were squeezed next to one another forming a "bloc." This terminology was also adopted by development programs, confirming the recognition of Madina as one of the target areas of development. Madina is, as I will discuss in the next section, part of the rural Community of Dialakoto since 1980. The plans drafted for Dialakoto[218] represents the rural community as a perfect example of terroir notion, with "spatial and socio-economic unity" and "homogeneity in the modes of management and use of the space." This homogeneity that creates the "synergy" in development activities includes the Madina Bloc located next to the village of Dialakoto. Madina constitutes an economically and socially homogeneous area suitable to development intervention. From the perspective of development planners Madina consisted of a unified "bloc" of seven "officially" recognized villages[219]: Niemeneke Pulaar, Niemenke Mandinka, Madina Tounti, Missirah Damantan, Wakilare Damantan and Mamboya.

Yet, as other areas of settlement for evictees, Madina is far from being a homogeneous bloc. It is composed of villages that are from different parts of the National Park whose inhabitants arrived through two subsequent waves of evictions. The first wave of migrations

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[218] Since 1990s, three wide-ranging research missions funded by international development agencies had focused on the drafting development plans for the Rural Community of Dialakoto, whose limits were established in 1980. The last development plan, claiming to have used "participatory" methods, had been finalized in 1998 with the funding of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and research assistance of the Institute of Environmental Sciences (ISE) attached to the University of Cheikh Anta Diop in Dakar (ISE & UCAD, 2001).

[219] According to the latest UNDP-funded participatory development plan, these are the "official villages." Besides "official" villages, there are also temporary "agricultural settlements" (*hameaux de culture*), which are assumed to be set up only for limited time, particularly to carry out agriculture. There are many agricultural settlements, founded by evictees, that are along the road leading from Madina, well into the depths of the Classified Forest of Diambour in the north.

arrived in 1972 from the region of Damantan and Tabadian. They were from the Pulaar-speaking villages of Tabadian and Damantan. These villages were linked to each other by important exchange relations and political ties. According to the chronological order of the village chief of Tounti, the Pulaar-speaking evicted villages arrived at Madina in the following order: Tounti (Tabadian), Missirah Damantan[220] (Damantan), Mamboya Dialiko[221] (Tabadian) and Wakilare (Damantan).[222] The second wave of evictees arrived at Madina and neighboring areas between 1974 and 1976. This was a larger group compared to the previous wave of evictees from Tabadian and Damantan.[223] They were the Manding-speaking inhabitants of the regions of Niemeneke and Badi,[224] who did not have a close contact with each other before their eviction.[225] Next to Wassadou-Depot, separated from Madina by the national road, are the reconstituted villages of Badi, Niongani and Damantan.

While I had started my research initially in Madina, I was not initially aware of the spread of the area within which evictees were dispersed. It was first my hosts in Wassadou, who had mentioned to me Boulakounda, a fifteen-minute ride from Missirah. The two brothers in my host Diakhanke-speaking family in Wassadou-Depot knew well the Diakhanke in Boulakounda. They

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[220] Unlike the village of Tounti, whose inhabitants are from the same former village of Tounti in Tabadian; the village of Missirah Damantan was composed of Pulaar speakers who came from different villages of the region of Damantan (Nippikounda and Dalaba).

[221] Mamboya is also like Missirah Damantan, one of the villages that did not keep its “original” name from the Park. Mamboya was once part of Sare Sembel, a larger Pulaar village in Tabadian.

[222] Wakilare Damantan consisted of Pulaar speakers from the region of Damantan. They were previously next to the Manding speaking village of marabouts of Damantan.

[223] According to the census of 1988, the village of Tounti was 15 compounds (35 families), Wakilare was only 3 compounds (now it has 6), Mamboya Dialiko 10 compounds and Missirah Damantan 17 compounds. Compared the Badi (37 compounds) and Niemeneke (33 compounds (Mandinka 17 compounds and Pulaar 15 compounds), the Pulaar-speaking villages were smaller in numbers. Although the census information does not reflect the migrations that could have changed the demography of the villages since 1972, it nevertheless gives an idea about the difference in demographic constitution between the resettled villages.

[224] These two villages were originally quite distant from each other and did not have close economic and political ties with each other. The village of Badi, as explained earlier, was one of the villages whose notables claimed the nativity status as they were the first rulers of the Tanda, which became part of Oriental Provinces. Niemeneke, on the other hand, located closer to the town of Kedougou, had been incorporated into the canton of Niokolo, part of the Haute-Gambie.

[225] According to official records these two areas totaled 12 villages, approximately 1086 inhabitants (the Letter of the Governor of Tambacounda to the Ministry of Rural Development in April of 1974).

offered to take me to Boulakounda and I gladly agreed. On Wednesday, taking advantage of the increased traffic related to the weekly market of Wasadu, we took a “car rapides” that was going to Missirah. But to get to the village we had to get off the main road and follow the undulating smaller path that led to the village. My host family, Keitas, had their “parents” in Boulakounda. They shared the same last name and they maintained close ties despite the distance. The Keita family in Boulakounda were also Diakhanke speakers from the region of Tabadian before their eviction.

An important reason that drew me to Boulakounda was that it was the first settlement area of Damantan. During the eviction of Damantan, the army trucks transported people, their harvest and whatever they could carry with them, and dropped them at Wasadu-Depot, along the main road linking Tambacounda to Kedougou. They were “dumped” at “open air” next to the concrete buildings, which had served once as shacks for the migrant workers of colonial concession of the 1930s. An important part of the village of Damantan continued their road from where the “state left them” to other parts of Senegal, particularly to Casamance and Gambia where they had relatives. But the chiefs of Damantan and the notables close to them chose to settle to Boulakounda. This consisted of a group of families that were close to the chiefly lineage of Damantan and who had important political and economic positions within the village. As Boulakounda was one of the first migration sites of evictees from Tabadian, it is an important place to start to explore the difficulties faced by the evictees and the strategies that they adopted to adapt to the new conditions.

Boulakounda

In Boulakounda, I remember the day Keita received us in the middle of his large compound formed by a dozen huts. He was surrounded by other members of his family and other villagers who came to greet us. When I asked him where he was from in the park before the eviction, he told me that he was from the “land of Tabadian.” Their village was called Tabadian Soukouto and they could still remember how they came to settle to Boulakounda:

> State deposed us directly here. Everywhere was covered with forest, from here all the way to Depot. Some of us were deposed in Madina... It is our Pulaar who is there now.

> We were together in (Tabadian) Soukouto. In Tabadian Soukouto there were many villages. There, food was never scarce. Rice, millet, peanuts, sorgho... We could cultivate and make our living. We have never thought that we would leave that place. If state had decided so and if you don't do it, you will be the one who loses. This is what happened.

What was depicted as "voluntary" by governmental correspondence was far from being so. Keita considered his migration to Boulakounda as a decision imposed by the state. It was not their wish to leave their land in Tabadian Soukouto, where they could make a living that was sufficient for their needs. Their resettlement was coerced, as was their eviction. Keita remembered the first time they came to Boulakounda:

> It was in January that they came to take us out. Military had come with cars. They have taken all our belongings and put them in the trucks. They have carried and left us here. At that time, all this area was a big forest, there were a lot of trees. The soldiers left our things under these big trees. Then the old people told us: "You the young, you have a lot of work now!" So, we have started to work. We took the axes and started to cut down the trees to make this place habitable and we made our huts. This is how we got settled here.

The choice of Boulakounda as the settlement place was not the outcome of the state's resettlement vision of "keeping the ethnic groups together." As the Diakhanke speaking evictees from Tabadian-Soukouto were established in Boulakounda next to Pulaar-speaking villages. They accepted the Pulaar village chiefs' claims over land as a part of the custom. As Keita continued:

> We have the Pulaar as our neighbors here. We have problems with them. But we found them on their land. It was their fathers who had cleared the land first in this place. It is their land. To come on this foreign land and wanting to impose ourselves by force is not normal. Because the Pulaar are our hosts (*diatigui*).

Keita did not question the legitimacy of the Pulaar claims over land based on custom. He indicated that they respected and recognized Pulaar customary claims over land. The land belonged to whomever cleared it first. Evictees settled on their land and the Pulaar became their hosts. This host-guest relationship was, however, not based uniquely on relations of protection. Keita acknowledged the generosity or good heartedness of some of their Pulaar neighbors, who gave the evictees land to resettle and construct their huts. He described how usually land was obtained from the hosts by the evictees as follows:

> You come and you find someone on the land. You ask him first for land to settle (inhabit). If he has a good heart, he has pity for you and he would say: "Come, I have land here, I will give it to you." Then, you measure the land. If he does not have any pity for you he would tell you: "No, I will not give the land to you!" In that case, you will go somewhere else. This is how we obtained our lands here.

However, this generosity was conditional. It was fine to give evictees land for habitation, but not for agriculture. As to land for cultivation, Keita stressed that it was "lent" to them, based on an agreement that they would pay part of their harvest as rent:

> When we came here we asked for the permission of the Pulaar. I should say they did not create any problems for us. They gave us land to inhabit, but not for agriculture. Here it was a great forest. To construct huts we needed to cut down the trees. The first years that followed our settlement, the Pulaar lent us land to cultivate. But after every harvest, they would take back the land that they had lent. If you did a good harvest that year, they would re-lend the land to you next year.

This was an arrangement that was partly similar to the *surga* system. They had to find land to cultivate and because the land rightfully belonged to others, to provide a living, they were willing to become *surga*s on someone else's land. However, unlike *surga*s who come seasonally, the evictees established on "Pulaar's lands" are not temporary. Keita stressed that their ability to access land was also evaluated based on their yearly harvest. If he can obtain a good harvest and pay off his share, he would be able to renegotiate his access to the same land the next year. Keita compared their hosts with Pulaar speakers that they used to live with in the park. He referred to them as "their Pulaar" from Tabadian Soukouto. They were both Pulaar as far as Keita was concerned but, with those with whom they lived in Tabadian, their relations were based on multiple exchanges, camaraderie and affection. In Boulakounda, this was the opposite. Conflict over resources created a great deal of animosity between the two communities. One of the most important conflicts had erupted over the use of wells. The Pulaar chief refused the evictees to draw water from the existing wells. These wells were also Pulaar property. For Diakhanke of Tabadian, their Pulaar neighbors were unwilling to help them. In addition as a result of these conflicts, increasingly each side drew lines around what they considered to be their "property." The lending of land in exchange for payment was also important in the commercialization of the relations between the two communities through land. This process of expansion of market-based evaluation of land and resources had started with the distribution of indemnities.

Indemnities: The Small Deed of the State (that Disappeared)

Keita, like many other evictees that I have talked to in Madina, recalled how the evaluation of the cost of indemnities had started with a census conducted in each village before the eviction. In Tabadian, the census of the properties of the villagers started two years before their eviction. When we started to discuss indemnities Keita sighed:

> Ahh yes... That was a generous small deed (*geste*) that the state did for us. They have paid for mango trees.. They did give something. At least they knew the value of a mango tree. But compared to what these trees were really worth, this was really a small deed indeed. It does not replace the trees. The trees are much more important. They bring at least two or three times more than the money that they gave...

This also had reminded me of how Pulaar evictees from Tabadian, who had once settled in Madina, had explained to me the process of counting of the belongings. I had met with some of the evictees from Tabadian in Madina, but part of them had migrated to Dianna Kouta, a big village established within the Classified Forest. What drew these evictees from Tabadian to the Classified Forest, as I will explain in the next chapter, was increasing land conflicts in Madina as well as the better prospects of massive cotton production, which had taken off within the Classified Forest. Camara was one of these evictees, who had migrated from Madina to the Classified Forest. He had explained to me that:

> Two years before our eviction, they came to count all our belongings village by village. A convocation sent to the village chief for him to count and estimate what each one had. No one was left out. Every person in the village was paid... During the eviction, they transported everything, even the dead wood on the ground, they took that to carry with us. If you had a well, you were paid for it, if you had a mango tree, you were paid, if you had an orange tree, that as well. The huts were counted as well. Mango trees were 5000F each. Wells were 10,000 Francs... This is not even enough to dig a well ! And it is not normal that a hut costs only 5000 Francs !!! But it was the force, and we submitted. This is how they paid us for all of our belongings on our land.[226]

For Camara, the process of evaluation of indemnities, like the eviction process itself, was imposed by force. The worth of a hut, a mango tree or an orange tree was not up to the evictees. Furthermore, all this process of counting and enumerating the property objects was not enough to account for the one thing that they lost and no one dared to mention: the land. It is to this

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[226] Camara, Dianakouta, 12 October 2004.

contradiction that Camara had pointed when he said that people were paid for “their” belongings on “their” own land. He had also stressed just like Keita, the value of fruit trees:

> Our village chief had a large orchard... He had so many mango trees that when you were in the orchard, you hardly saw the sun ... It was so dense... I had papaya and cola trees and, dates as well. My dates were about to give fruit at the time of our eviction...

Trees took time to grow and every year they bore fruit that fed the household and could be sold. Both for Camara and Keita, the monetary value assigned to trees was arbitrary, and inadequate. It did not take into account the time that a tree needs to grow and become productive. Similarly, what was paid for the construction of wells was not sufficient to pay the labor that went into the digging of the well, not to mention the building of its walls. I had mentioned earlier that in the resettlement plan, the Ministry of Land Planning had estimated that a single well would be sufficient for 200 inhabitants. However, this “rational” view of optimal number of wells per person did not match how the access was regulated and negotiated at the local level. Furthermore, in the case of the Diakhanke of Tabadian who had settled in Boulakounda, from the perspective of the administrators who had devised the plan of settlement, there were already wells that served enough people. What they did not take into account, however, was the access to these wells. Keita compared their situation again to those of “their” Pulaar from Tabadian:

> There was a place in Madina that had been cleared [for resettlement of evictees]. We were going to settle in that place which was cleared for agriculture. But at the end they brought us here [at Boulakounda]. When we came here we have suffered from the lack of water. To get the water our women had to go all the way to the river. But where we had left [Tabadian Soukouto] we had our wells.

In resettlement areas like Boulakounda, the cost of clearing of land, cutting down the trees and preparing the land for cultivation was not taken into account. For the evictees of Tabadian who moved to Boulacounda, this task required considerable resources and labor. Land was not cleared by the government, and evictees were left to their own devices to clear the land. The evaluation of indemnities was based on the postcolonial state’s technocratic view of productivity, but left out two crucial factors: land and labor of the evictees. When I asked Keita whether indemnities were paid for them to build their own wells, he replied:

> Only the huts were paid for. It was 5000 F per hut. The money, they gave it to us here [at Boulakounda]. People would tell you that we have been paid by the State... by Senghor... But me personally I had been paid only for a single mango tree.

Although the state had to pay indemnities to village members, according to some villagers, these were often paid late or not at all. This surprising declaration, opened up a much more thorny issue, that of the distribution of indemnities. This was also the root of the problem that led the notables of Damanatan, who had also come to settle next to Diakhankes in Boulacoulda.

I had mentioned earlier that one of the reasons why I wanted to visit the evictees in Boulakounda was to understand why they had decided to leave this location and settled next to Wassadou-Depot. In my earlier conversations with the village chief in Damantan, he had not mentioned to me that his village was the first in Boulakounda. Instead, I had learned this from my host family in Wassadou. In Boulakounda, I had also asked Keita why Damantan had chosen to leave them and settle elsewhere. When I asked this question, Keita hesitated. He had avoided this issue carefully. Thus, until my return to Damantan, I ignored the reasons for this important decision. This time, when I visited Damantan, I decided to talk to Mane, who was one of inhabitants of Damantan, who did not consider himself from the lineage of the chiefs and marabouts of the village. Unlike the village chief, Amadou Mane was more willing to tell the story of Boulakounda:

> At that time, Boulakounda was in the middle of a forest. It was our elder Aladji Diawarake who had decided that we should settle there. Before we were at Wassadou. In Boulakounda we found the Pulaar who had Boulabo as their chief. This is why it is called Boula-kounda. Boulabo was very old, but he had refused to convert to Islam. This is why he did not want us to come next to his village. He knew that if people who studied the Koran came to his village, it would destroy his values... We also had problems about the wells. To prevent us from getting water, the Pulaar had put a bamboo panel on the well and they had closed all around. We had to go far away to fetch water[227].

Rather this choice seems to be related to relations that the chiefs of Damantan had with Diakanke speaking elite of Tabadian before their eviction. The formerly established relationships between the village chiefs and inhabitants of Mandinka-speaking Damantan and Diakhanke-speaking of Tabadian Soukouto was important for the establishment of these two villages together. Thus,

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[227] Interview, Damantan, November 2004.

Boulacounda, originally a small Pulaar-speaking village became the site of settlement for Diakhanke-speaking notables from Tabadian and Manding speaking chiefs and their families from Damantan.

The distribution of indemnities created conflicts within the reconstituted villages in Boulakounda, particularly in the village of Damantan. Mane's narrative about the conflict between the Pulaar hosts and evictees pointed out their differences in "values." Muslim evictees did not share the same religion and the same values with the Pulaar. For him, this was the beginning of their conflict over wells. Because of this conflict, people of Damantan had called the sub-prefect:

> This is why [because of the wells] the sub-prefect of Missirah and the governor came to Boulakounda... When the sub-prefect came, we all gathered. He asked us to use the money that has been paid for indemnities to dig a well. Our elders responded that they did not have any money. So the sub-prefect asked: "Where is the money that have been paid for indemnities?" We responded that we did not receive a single franc. Sub-prefect asked: "To whom this money had been given?" He questioned many people, in vain. Nobody knew where the money was. He renounced. After that one of the members of my family went to Missirah. The prefect told him: "I will not denounce those who kept this money. But I can tell you that close to one million francs had been paid." After that he showed him a paper that showed that every single tree, hut and well was paid for. When my parent came back from Missirah he went to see the village chief of Damantan. He told him that he could pay him back his 10.000 Francs, he did not need that money. But my parent said: "You paid me back. But you have to do the same for everyone in the village. It is the state who had given you this money. We have all constructed our huts our own. You have no right to eat that money!" This is how the affair came into the light. As a result part of the village decided to migrate to Casamance. Soon after we came here (next to Wassadou).

Mane's account showed how indemnities also created deep fractures within the village of Damantan. This story was not the only one that revived the memories of corruption. The Diakhanke who had settled in Boulakounda, also had many problems with the sub-prefect that they suspected of stealing tax money. These allegations were difficult to prove given the sensitivity of the issue, but they all pointed out how money corrupted not only the State but also the authorities that evictees respected so much before their displacement. As a result of this conflict, the village of Damantan (or what was left of it) had further pulverized. The remaining small group of inhabitants that surrounded the chiefly family came with them to Wassadou, next to Madina, to the South of the main road that led to Dialakoto.

Madina: Willing Migrants, Unwilling Surgas

The settlement narratives in Madina show some important similarities with those in Boulakounda. After their eviction, among the evictees the cash crop agriculture and commodified modes of land exchange emerged quickly. For evictees, reconstituting their villages and starting to cultivate was a priority, but not for the same reasons as the State Ministry of Planning. Gathered under their old village chiefs or around new chiefs that emerged after their eviction, evictees looked for cultivable land that would support their subsistence. Before the eviction, a variety of different sources of subsistence existed and these included planted food crops and mature orchards of variety of fruits. They knew the forest and their surroundings well, where to find wild fruits, nuts and roots, where to find the bees, where to take their cattle to drink. After the eviction, the inhabitants of southern forested areas had lost all familiar aspects of their surroundings, which played an important role in their subsistence. Now, cash crop agriculture had become the only viable option.

Madina Tounti: It is not the State who Gave me the Land

Obtaining land, especially for Pulaar speakers had been a major issue. Aliou who had arrived to Madina in 1974 with his family, the year Niemeneke was evicted. First he had settled with other evictees of Tabadian area in a village called Madiali, South of Missirah, the center of the Arrondissement. Aliou told me the story of his multiple migrations after their eviction[228]:

> A: When we were evicted, some of us joined Damantan in Boulakounda. Others stayed in Wasadu-Depot. We came to Madiali. When we arrived there, we found at least two Pulaar villages of Tabadian with their chiefs. But we could not stay very long in that village. We have been divided again. Some people left for Casamance, some stayed at Madiali and I came to Tounti...
>
> M: What led you to migrate to Madiali and from Madiali to Tounti?
>
> A: You know when you are looking for fertile soils you need to turn around and around... Until you find a piece of land that pleases you. We are cultivators and we need to find land enough for us to subsist with agriculture. The main problem in Madiali was the lack of cultivable land. .. We obtained land through those who were already there and who offered to share their fields with us.

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228 Mamadi Camara (Dianna Kouta), Interview, October 2004.

> M: How did you obtain land to cultivate? From the village chief?
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> A: Not at all. The village chief had nothing to do with it. It was between me and the owner of the field. I will ask him whether he could give me a plot to cultivate and if he can, he will do it. But the fields were very narrow. If you cultivated one place two or three times the soil would begin to lose its fertility. The fields that we had obtained were abandoned.
>
> M: Why were these fields abandoned?
> A: Because they were not fertile any more, and people had given up on these fields. That is why.

Aliou's narrative also told the story of many evictees, who had to negotiate their access to land with their hosts who claimed customary rights over land. While some hosts agreed to share their fields, they gave only the land that they did not find useful or land that had been abandoned. The "rational" settlement plan had "advised" that evictees should be settled on fertile land, each evictee with three hectares of land to cultivate. This rational division of land was far from the reality that evictees faced. Access to land, at least for some evictees, depended on their hosts. It was the state that had moved the evictees to where they were, but it was not the state that gave them their land.

In Madina, which is only a couple of kilometers away from Dialakoto, most had obtained their land from the people of Dialakoto, who had forged as I explained earlier close ties with the province chief over the long period of time during the French colonial rule. Before their eviction, the villages from Tabadian who are now settled in Madina had relations with Dialakoto's notables and the Province Chief. However, when they were evicted, these relations had changed considerably. It is not clear whether all land on which Madina is established was claimed by the notables of Dialakoto. Complicating matters even further was the private land title in Wassadou, which was still owned by Khayat, the Lebanese merchant.[229] Although, Khayat was not able to assert these claims, nevertheless, this situation made insecurity of tenure in Madina even worse. Furthermore, as I will discuss in the next chapter, with the introduction of cotton to the Classified Forest and its expansion to Madina after the 1980s, these areas were squeezed between the Classified Forest and the main road, and became increasingly sought after. All of these constitute important aspects of the complex question of how evictees established in Madina were evicted

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[229] Madina may or may not be within the property limits of Lebanese merchant, however as the limits of the property continue to be a matter of debate and conflict, this issue remains also unclear.

after the creation of the rural council, which interfered with pre-existing land tenancy agreements, creating numerous land conflicts in Madina (which I explore in the next chapter).

In Madina, there were several factors that led to increasing impoverishment. One of them was the dependency on fertilizers and pesticides. As the soil gets depleted through continuous cultivation without fallow, it requires fertilizers as well as pesticides. The continuous cultivation of the same plot of land -- also promoted by post-Independence agrarian policies and terroir approach -- coupled with dependency on state supplied fertilizers and pesticides led to increasing peasant's indebtedness, which would be the case for many evictees who were integrated in cash crop agriculture after their eviction. Furthermore, evicted residents of Madina, particularly the Pulaar were also impoverished through the loss of cattle. Some villagers and villages chiefs had managed to bring their cattle outside the Park. However, their herds slowly perished, as they got lost in the forest, poisoned by agricultural fertilizers or sold. None of the villagers (whether chiefs or not) were able to keep their original herd from the Park.[230]

Madina Niemeneke: It is the State who Helped Us

Niemeneke is one of the largest villages in Madina and the first village that I had visited there at the beginning of my field research. Niemeneke stands apart from the Pulaar speaking group of villages, which are from Tabadian. This is not surprising in some ways, as Niemeneke is a Manding speaking village that comes from an entirely different area that was at the South-East of the National Park, closer to the town of Kedougou. During the eviction, the village of Niemeneke was resettled in two different locations. Roughly half of the Mandinka speaking villagers of Niemeneke were transported to Wassadou (291 persons) and the other half to Mako, attached to the Department of Kedougou (388 persons). [231]There were also Pulaar speaking villages and part of them came to establish next to Mandinka speaking Niemeneke in Madina.

This division of the original village during the eviction was also a complex issue that the present village chief and other notables were not keen to discuss. However, it seems that the

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230 Interviews in Tounti and Dalaba 2004.

[231] The Letter of the Governor to the Minister of Rural Development, 2 April 1974.

present village chief, who was the manager of the peanut cooperative in old Niemeneke, became the chief after the eviction and the split of the village.

Niemeneke is different than other smaller villages in Madina because the only primary school in Madina is located just outside this village. The teachers who come to teach there are also hosted in the village of Niemeneke together with Peace Corps volunteers. Both teachers and Peace Corps volunteers are important "assets" for the village. The first time I met the village chief of Niemeneke, he was happy to see me, because he thought I was another Peace Corps volunteer. Despite their meager means, Peace Corps volunteers are important, not only because they may be an additional help for the village but also because they would use the money provided to them to fix the huts that would be allocated to them during their stay in the village. Thus, when I had explained to the village chief that I was not a Peace Corps volunteer but a researcher, he seemed to be a bit disappointed. The chief was even more displeased when I asked his permission to stay with another household, which had hosted me during my first visit to the village a year ago. The chief was displeased to such a degree that he said he would prefer that I didn't stay in his village. It is for this reason that I decided to settle in Wassadou, where everybody was a "stranger." This meant that I would spend time in different villages, rather than living in one of them. This choice had some drawbacks, as it did not allow me to observe one single village and its inhabitants for an extended period of time. On the other hand, it allowed me to be more mobile, and to visit more evicted villages.

This first encounter with the village chief of Niemeneke made me realize, a very important dynamic among the evicted villages: competition over resources that they associate with development, or outside aid. During one of the rare conversations that I had with him, the village chief told me how proud he was of his village which was more important than the other villages in Madina. The village had the school, it was "preferred" by the Peace Corps and cooperated with many projects, which I will discuss in Chapter 6. When I had opened the topic of evictions, to my surprise, he had told me that he thought their eviction was for their good:

> Yes. Our eviction was just and good. We are here because it is God's will. We are getting along with each other and we have formed a large village...In the forest we were like wild animals. Now we are regrouped as a big village and this had made us bigger. It made us legal, now it is clear that we are a village. This is why I think it was a good thing.

His views on eviction, although he also agreed that it was a difficult period of time, were very different than other evictees that I met in Niemeneke and in the Pulaar-speaking villages of Madina. It is possible that the village chief saw me as a potential link to development aid, and wanted to present a favorable view about the eviction. However, clearly this did not entirely explain why he thought eviction was for the "good" of Niemeneke. Eviction made the new Niemeneke, and him as its new village chief, legitimate. Niemeneke became a bigger village, because it received aid and development programs and attracted more people. This privileged position was also reflected in how Niemeneke was settled in Madina. Other villagers in Niemeneke had mentioned that the governor helped them during the settlement. Also, the process of negotiations between the notables and authorities of Niemeneke and the governor was very different than the process of negotiations undertaken by the authorities of Damantan-Tabadian. Between 1971 and 1973, the village chiefs of Badi and Niemeneke were able to "bargain" and increase the amount paid to them for indemnities.[232] According to Saneba, people in Niemeneke all received their money:

> We have been paid. What each one of us received was a lot of money, for the huts and for the trees. It was a lot of money. These years were very good for us. We have built new huts with this money and we have planted trees, all of it thanks to indemnities. There was a well here...and there were lots of trees. We had to cut them to settle here.

In addition to this, although the evictees from Niemeneke also had problems with water and land, they went straight to the governor. According to the village chief:

> We went to see him [the governor] to explain to him our problems of land and drinking water. He told us that for the water there was no problem and there was no problem for land either. He took care of everything he transported our baggage... You see, we knew him through Mady Cissokho, who was the deputy of Kedougou and Mamba Guirassy.... Mamba Guirassy helped our resettlement too. He was the governor (of Kedougou). He used to come to Niemeneke often.... He would come and tell us about Senegal, how they would improve our living conditions... But what he promised was not clear.

Niemeneke's connection with Mady Cissokho, as mentioned earlier, dated from the 1950s. It was Cissokho who encouraged the villagers in Niemeneke to move outside of the colonial National Park and settle next to the main road to become an important peanut producing (and selling)

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[232] According to the indemnity documents, while the initial price of big huts were 32.000 CFA in 1973. Also for smaller huts, the Governor had agreed to increase the indemnities to 20.000 CFA as opposed to 10.000 CFA paid to other evictees from Tabadian (November 1974).

village. The connection with Cissokho was also crucial to facilitate the resettlement of the village and to resolve some of the difficulties that many other evictees were not able to surmount. This privileged access to political networks, could have been also the reason why the village chief of Niemeneke and other inhabitants were much more involved with “party politics.” In fact, the village chief was one of the rare evicted village chiefs who would be “elected” to the rural council in 1980.

Conclusion

I began this chapter by summarizing the resettlement plan proposed for Damantan and Tabadian, and the debates of eviction of Badi-Nionagani and Niemeneke in 1968, to illustrate the importance of the “rational” terroir approach and concerns over cash crop production in the resettlement process. Based on governmental correspondence, I examined the resettlement from the perspective of the local representatives of the state and the central administration (the governor, the line ministries). This analysis showed that resettlement was also seen by postcolonial technocrats as an opportunity to apply two main goals: the reintegration of the evictees into cash crop production and into the postcolonial state administration. The technocratic view of resettlement imagined villages organized according to individualized land tenure -- even though this was not what was supported by postcolonial land laws -- and permeated a settlement plan similar to what Scott defined as legibility attempts of the state. The *terroir* approach that underpinned the postcolonial land and agrarian reforms, based on the model of sedentary peasants, cultivating continuously a plot of land, was also reflected in the resettlement plan of the Ministry of Planning. This plan relied greatly on fixity and permanency of evicted villages. In addition, I also examined some of the implications of the evaluation of indemnities to be paid to evictees for expropriation for “public utility.” As the National Domain Law of 1964 did not recognize any private ownership rights over land, the evictees were considered to be tenants on land which did not belong to them, but to the National Domain, managed by the postcolonial Senegalese state. This meant that they were never compensated for land loss but only for the loss of “improvements” on land.

Next, I contrasted, how the vision of rational technocratic resettlement fell apart when it came to its implementation. The case of the resettlement of the evictees of the Niokolo-Koba National Park is an example of the limits of the legibility argument, which runs the risk of assuming that the state is an all-seeing unitary "thing" with unified vision and intension. Through the narratives of evictees from two different resettlement areas, Madina and Boulakounda, I looked at the resource conflicts that erupted between the evictees and their hosts regarding access to land and wells. This analysis indicated that the resettlement plan ignored the issue of multiple claims over land and resources, therefore the issue of local politics of access. Similarly, indemnities deemed sufficient to allow evictees to jump-start the cash crop agriculture, were not only insufficient but also unevenly distributed, in some cases due to corruption, which kept everyone from receiving their shares.

The resettlement process had multiple important implications that were unaccounted for by the grand vision of settlement. One such consequence was the emergence of the governor and prefects as the mediators between the evictees and their hosts in access to land and resettlement related help (e.g. clearing of land, drilling of wells etc.). This important political and economic role of the representatives of the state with coercive powers, gave some evicted villages connected to these networks an advantage. Some, but not all, of the "old customary authorities" who were displaced were able to regain political power and capitalize on these relations and were later able to be "elected" in the Rural Council. Among the most important of the implications of the resettlement process was the increasing integration of the evictees to cash crop agriculture through insecure land tenancy agreements with their hosts who claimed ownership of the land on customary basis. The next chapter, looks at how with the implementation of decentralization reforms in Tambacounda, and the election of the rural council in Dialakoto, would affect this terrain of power shaped by resettlement and lead to multiple decentralized evictions from the land in Madina.

Chapter 5: Postcolonial Decentralization and the Politics of Access to Land

Introduction

Starting in 1980, important changes altered the terrain of power within which the evictees of the Niokolo-Koba National Park sought to negotiate authority and property relations after their eviction. Ten years after the National Domain Law announced the creation of rural communities, in 1984, a decree announced the centers of the rural communities surrounding the National Park (Vengroff & Johnston, 1989, p. 43).[233] The village of Dialakoto became the administrative center of the rural community covering the Northern borders of the National Park, and the evictees of the National Park, established next to the village of Dialakoto, became the "residents" of this new administrative-territorial division.

At the time of the constitution of the rural council, other transformations intensified the commoditization of land and labor, which had already started after the resettlement of the evictees. At the beginning of the 1980s, in the Northern parts of the National Park, banana and cotton were introduced as new cash crops. A buffer zone of one kilometer belt surrounding the Niokolo-Koba National Park was established after the National Park became one of UNESCO's World Heritage Sites (DPN, 2000). Simultaneously, two new cash crops were introduced to the Northern borders of the National Park: banana in the buffer zone[234] and cotton in the classified forest of Diambour. In this chapter, I will be examining decentralized eviction that forced many evictees settled in Madina, to migrate or become temporary workers in banana plantations in the light of these important transformations.

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233 Decree No. 84-502 of 2 May 1984 fixing the territorial jurisdiction and centers of regions and departments.

234 In the buffer zone of the Niokolo-Koba National Park, several other development projects were implemented. However, they "failed" within a short period of time. For example, during my reconnaissance visit prior to my research in 2001, I had met with the staff of one of them, which focused on the conservation of African palm. When I came back to Senegal, I found out that the project had been cancelled. I have also been told that the reason was tensions with the National Park Service. Although this needs to be further researched, the persistency of banana production in the buffer zone , is probably due to the influence of peasant groups, which took over the production.

In the first part of this chapter, I look at how postcolonial decentralization worked as a political process. The creation of the rural community of Dialakoto and the election of its rural council were part of this political process whereby different local actors sought to extend their influence and territorial authority at different scales. In the second part, I focus on how as a result of these developments, land in the rural community of Dialakoto, acquired increasing commercial value and became the focus of multiple and competing claims. How did the rural community council of Dialakoto handle the land allocations in the midst of commoditization of, and competition, over land and labor through cotton and banana production? In the third section I will analyze the land allocation and withdrawal decisions[235] of the Land Commission of the Rural Community Council of Dialakoto.[236] In the last part of this chapter, I will look at the effect of the interventions of the rural council in transforming property and authority relations in Madina, where the evicted villages had been resettled. The land conflicts that erupted between the rural council and the evictees illustrate how rural council came to loose its already shaky legitimacy in the eyes of many evictees, who came to see it as oppressive and opportunistic "authority."

The Rural Community Council of Dialakoto

The creation of the Rural Community of Dialakoto was announced by a decree in 1982, which specified the names and the center villages of rural communities in Tambacounda.[237] The creation of rural communities, as it is mentioned in Chapter 2, was part of the 1972 Reform of Territorial Administration. This reform had transformed the socialist inspired ideas of *terroir*s into administrative territories. The 1972 reform had kept the colonial administrative divisions and limits of departments and arrondissements. The problem was, therefore, primarily to define rural communities, their territories and centers of administration. Although the 1972 reform announced

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[235] The rural council land commission's debates were recorded only from 1989 to 1996.

[236] Land commission' s meetings are public records and are registered in French. Although I was not able to attend the council meetings during my stay, I was able to consult the meeting records with the authorization of the Secretary of the rural community council. In order to preserve the anonymity of the members I will not use their names in this analysis.

[237] Decree No. 82-281 of 3 May 1982 on the creation of rural communities in the region of Senegal Oriental (Tambacounda), J.O.R.S. No.4888, 24 April 1982.

the creation of the rural communities based on the criteria of economic, social and ethnic solidarity, in practice, the creation of rural communities depended largely on the criteria set by the Directorate of Land Management (Thebaud, 1995). The determine which villages belonged to the rural community and which was did not, the Directorate had requested an evaluation of each village according to its agricultural "equipment.[238]" The existence of such equipment, or infrastructure, was considered as the sign of economic sufficiency. The administrative centers of the rural communities would be determined according to this agrarian infrastructure, in line with the technocratic approach to local administration.



Map 14: The Niokolo-Koba National Park, the Neighboring Rural Communities and the Classified Forest of Diambour (ISE,2000).

Dialakoto, which was also the administrative center of colonial Oriental Provinces, was "naturally" the best choice. The village had long been a local hub for the sale of peanuts, it had been the transit point of *navetanes*, some of which had worked in Wassadou plantation. Dialakoto

[238] The equipment included the number of rural cooperatives, peanut sale points, schools, health care centers, wells and cattle vaccination centers, mosques and youth house.

was also right next to the main road, which linked Tambacounda to Kedougou. All these criteria already pointed out to Dialakoto as the “best” candidate for the center of new rural community. Not surprisingly the regional committee of development of Senegal Oriental (later Tambacounda) selected Dialakoto as the center of the new rural community at the Northern periphery of the Niokolo-Koba National Park.

Once the centers of rural communities were fixed by decree, according to the criteria provided by the Ministry of Planning, each rural community was to hold elections to determine their rural community council. However, neither my conversations with the first President of the Rural Council in Dialakoto, nor the scant documents available at the council’s premises could illuminate how the council of Dialakoto was elected. In fact, although they had been settled next to Dialakoto before the creation of the rural community, many inhabitants at Madina had never been made aware of elections. Ousmane, from Tounti, described how he thought the first election was held in Madina:

> The first president of the rural council was from PS (Partie Socialiste) of Abou Diouf. There were also two councilor from Madina, one from Tounti, one from Niemeneke. Our village had voted for the candidate from Wassadou-Depot.... But, we did not vote directly. For the first elections, the village chiefs of Madina were called to Tambacounda. So it is there, between themselves, that they elected those people.[239]

Ousmane did not deny that the council was “elected”. The election had taken place, but only among the village chiefs. There were candidates from the evictees from Madina, who had entered into the rural council, but Ousmane talked about them with disappointment. He was not sure if they were elected through the partly “lists” (slates), which according to him were all decided before hand “in Dialakoto.” The election was something that happened behind closed doors within closed circles. Ousmane also explained how people initially wanted the rural council:

> Everyone wants that his village has a councilor. If we wanted the councilors it is because we thought they would help us. But what happened was just the contrary. They have rather tortured us, they have snatched our cattle road. When this happened the councilor from Madina told us: “If you like my decision that is good. If you don’t like it here is a paper, now you go to Dialakoto!”

The first two presidents of the Rural Council were from the village of Dialakoto, so were most council members. As Ousmane pointed out, there were also representatives from the

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[239] October 2004.

evicted villages in the rural council. However, as I will discuss later, these councilors were not considered trusted and legitimate representatives for evictees, particularly for those like Ousmane, who had lost their land as a result of the rural council's land allocation practices.

The first rural council was a mixture of the peanut producers and herders, mostly from Dialakoto, who had also been integrated into the cooperative movement and party politics in the 1970s. The first President of the Rural Council was an adherent to PS (*Parti Socialiste*), and a "*gerant de secco*"[240] in Dialakoto. Most of the members of the rural council were already relatively wealthy through their involvement with commercial agricultural production. The second President of the rural council was elected from BDS (*Bloc Democratic Senegalais*) of Abdoulaye Wade in 1990. He was also an important peanut producer and seller from one of the prominent Diakhanke families cohabiting with Manding speaking chiefs in Dialakoto. Unlike previous "local authorities" that the French colonial administration sough to integrate, the "new" local actors who gained recognition through the rural community council were not necessarily chiefs or marabouts, but important peanut producers and herders, who had already been integrated into party politics and cash crops.

Banana in Dialakoto: Development-as-Conservation in the Buffer Zone

Peanut production had gained importance in Dialakoto after the completion of the Tambacounda-Dakar railroad during the first half of the twentieth century, as I explained in the first chapter. Peanuts were cultivated in Dialakoto and in resettlement areas next to it, together with food crops (e.g. maize, millet, or fonio). Banana was first introduced in areas next to Dialakoto in 1977 (Sarraut, 1923, p. 60). It was OFADEC,[241] a "Senegalese NGO," funded by a Canadian Development Agency [242] and a Canadian Missionary organization[243], which had

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[240] The head of local agricultural cooperative.

[241] OFADEC: Office Africain pour le Developpement et la Cooperation. OFADEC was established in 1977 and dissolved in 1991.

[242] ACDI: Agence Canadienne de Developpement International.

[243] OCCDP: Organization Catholique Canadienne pour le Developpement et la Paix. OCCDP was also carrying out different "rural development" programs in Senegal to support "sustainable development" and "fight against desertification in the Sahel."

introduced banana in areas South of Wassadou, crossed by the River Gambia. OFADEC's top directors were foreigners, its workers were Senegalese rural producers. The NGO defined itself and justified its mission as "improving the living conditions of populations by founding their autonomy on a sustainable and profitable economic basis through the production and sale of banana."[244] It had started to test different "sustainable development projects," including rice production and horticulture on the banks of the Gambia River. None of them were found "profitable" enough except for banana, an irrigation intensive cash crop that requires abundant water close to the fields. Land nearby Wasadou-Depot was chosen as one of the "test sites" of the NGO due to its proximity to the Gambia River. Banana production brought to Wassadou and surrounding areas a great number of migrant workers, who "colonized the land" for the production of banana. So much that, the sub-prefect of Missirah, compared OFADEC to the 1970s project of *Terres Neuves,* which encouraged the "colonization" of vast areas for cash crop agriculture (Sarr, 1999, p. 82). As I will explore in this chapter, the competition over access the banks of the Gambia River for banana production would create great tensions and conflicts within the Rural Community Council.

As was the case during the 1930s for sisal production, and during the 1950s and 60s for peanut production, once more Wassadou became a "depot," that is, a settlement place for the labor pool of migrant laborers, only this time, under share-cropping agreements in banana plantations. Migrant workers in banana plantations next to the river attained great numbers. Like many evictees from Madina and villagers from Wasadu Depot, two brothers in my host family in Wassadou had worked in banana since its first introduction to Wassadou. One of them, Lamine, told me a short version of the complicated history of OFADEC from the perspective of the workers of banana fields. When Lamine talked about OFADEC, he had an air of disapproval and a smile on his face. He said:

> The banana started here [near Wassadou] before the Rural Community. It was a Frenchman who had started it before the Rural Community. He had already contacted Senghor to get the land. The President sent him first to the governor, the governor sent him to the prefect and sub-prefect. The French had a lease of 10 years, and had created OFADEC, a banana cooperative organizing the work. At the end of the 10 years, he left the cooperative to one of the workers and left.

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[244] The Mission Magazine of United Methodist Church.

Lamine called OFADEC's director the "Frenchman." For him, it did not matter whether OFADEC's international connections were Canadian or not. He identified them with the French. As all other Frenchmen before, OFADEC's Frenchman had obtained the land all the way from the top. For Lamine, OFADEC banana fields, "given" first by Senghor, and he described the process as trickling down from the president, to the governor and from governor down to the sub-prefect. Similarly, the village chief of Wasadu had claimed that OFADEC had "negotiated with the governor" to obtain the land before "decentralization," that is the creation of the rural council (Sarr, 1999, p. 83). As I explained in the previous chapter, during the resettlement of evictees at the outskirts of the National Park, the Governor of the region, the prefect and sub-prefects, had played an important role in mediating land distribution required by the resettlement of evictees. Similarly, according to the village chief of Wassadou and Lamine, it was the Governor who had allocated the land in 1977 for banana. There was no consultation with the evicted villages established nearby with chiefs of Wasadu Depot, nor of Dialakoto. Access to land (for banana or any other large scale agricultural project) depended on access to the networks of the state, which started from the President and trickled down the line of command until the sub-prefect in the Arrondissement.

The case of land allocated for banana in Wassadou was even further complicated due to the private property title owned by the Lebanese merchant Khayat, who, as I explained earlier, had initially planted peanuts. This time, the same fields (or part of them) were occupied by banana producers under OFADEC, whose Director insisted that when the project claimed the land, they were vacant and ownerless:

> When we occupied these lands, they were virgin. The land was allocated to us because nobody was using these areas and they were not claimed by anyone.[245]

The arrival of OFADEC had only added another layer to multiple layers of land claims. Although, Khayat's private ownership claim did not disappear, as he did not put land in productive use, OFADEC had decided that this land was vacant and ownerless. On top of this, the same area would also become part of the buffer zone of the Niokolo-Koba National Park in 1981, when the Government of Senegal agreed on the inclusion of the Park on the list of World

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[245] The Director of OFADEC quoted by Sarr (Sarr, 1999, p. 84).

Heritage Sites. These multiple claims over land next to the banks of the River illustrate the complexity of property relations in and nearby the resettlement areas of the evictees. Therefore, when, the "real" owner, Khayat, would attempt to claim his land in 2000, he would face a potentially explosive situation, as his land was occupied not only by several villages but also for intensive banana and cotton production. On the other hand, banana producers, (some of whom are from Madina) were the actual occupants and users of the land. However, they did not have any security on the land they cultivated. OFADEC and smaller peasant organizations that would be created after its dissolution would give these producers a way to strengthen their claims over land through or against the rural council and the National Park Service.

From Cooperatives to Commercial Peasant Organizations

OFADEC's demise came with corruption of its president. According to Lamine:

> OFADEC's President was sacked because he was corrupt. After that, they created a new cooperative called APROVAG. They brought an agronomist engineer and a public servant as the coordinator.

When OFADEC was dissolved amidst rumors of corruption in 1991, a new umbrella organization called APROVAG[246] assumed primary importance for banana producers. In 1984, the new Commercial Code had allowed the creation of Economic Interest Groups (GIE). The creation of GIEs, which followed the liberalization of agricultural policies in Senegal had led quickly to the fragmentation and privatization of peasant cooperatives of the post-Independence era (Blundo, 2000). These economic interests groups were also called "*groupement*" in Wassadou. Unlike rural cooperatives organized around the peanut production and tied to centralized state cooperatives, *groupement*s were relatively easy to form, as they could be set up by as little as two persons, with or without common capital. In addition, they did not need not to be formed by the association of local producers. They could be created by entrepreneurs originating from outside the region, employing the residents as labor force. Although they were promoted as a new avenue for self-management for the peasants, *groupement*s do not possess the autonomy to

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[246] APROVAG: Association des Producteurs de la Vallee du Fleuve de Gambie (Gambia River Valley Producers Association)

organize and control their own production. Organized around cash crop production, their members depend on rural councils for access to land, and on rural entrepreneurs for material (equipment, fertilizers, pesticides etc.). Nevertheless, these organizations are considered by the banana producers as one of the main avenues of access land, although this access is negotiated in unequal terms. Some of the members of the banana *groupement*s are evictees of the Niokolo-Koba National Park whose land have been denied access to land, or whose land had been withdrawn by the rural council, as I will explain later in this chapter. Being part of *groupement*, controlled by urban or rural entrepreneurs who are often not from the region, is one of the ways in which dispossessed evictees could have access to land.

The local groupements started to appear after 1984, first under the "wings" of OFADEC, and they were affiliated with APROVAG, an umbrella organization for local *groupement*s. APROVAG survived until 1997, when a "crisis" due to a "gap" of 52 millions of CFA shook the organization (Sarr, 1999, p. 128). Lamine remembered this "crisis," with great disappointment, as he was one of the members of APROVAG. He explained the nature and the extent of this crisis that he linked to corruption as follows: [247]

> Few years later [after the creation of APROVAG], the members of the cooperative started to wonder where their money was going. They made a research and found out that this new coordinator was also stealing money from the cooperative. They complained and the director was arrested. But his family paid a lot of money and he has been liberated.

During and after the 1997 crisis, many *groupement*s, once part of APROVAG, sought to continue to cultivate with their own means. But they were faced with several difficulties. First, there was the problem of equipment, particularly of expensive water pumps necessary for banana production [248]. Other *groupement*s funded independently by rural entrepreneurs, among which figure marabouts from urban areas of Senegal [249] had better chances than the small producers gather

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[247] According to OFADEC's director the Economic Interest Groups owed their existence to OFADEC.

[248] It is unclear how all of the local *groupement*s obtained their equipment (particularly the water puomps), but according to Sarr some of them were given equipment by OFADEC.

[249] The banana fields next to the village of Badi, within the rural community of Dialakoto is an example of this type of commercial organization. At the entrance of the banana plantation, there is a sign where a picture depicts the first marabout leader of Mourid Brotherhood, Amadou Bamba.

around APROVAG to have access to this equipment. Also these foreign *groupement*s competed for land. According to one of the banana producers:

> At the beginning it was OFADEC which had negotiated with the Governor. After decentralization, we have asked the Rural Community [Council] to allocate the land to us, and the demand has been transmitted to the sub-prefect, from there to the Governor.[250]

While initially access to land allocated for banana was negotiated with the governor by OFADEC, once OFADEC was gone, land used for banana production became again "vacant and ownerless." The local producers had to re-negotiate their occupation of land. Whom ever wanted to obtain land in Wassadou for banana had to go through two important brokers: the National Park Service (the new authority of the buffer zone) and the Rural Council (which allocates the land). Banana producers in Wasadu-Depot, had to seek the agreement of both the rural council and the National Park Service to remain on the land (Sarr, 1999). Similarly, other rural entrepreneurs who wanted a piece of the valuable banks of the Gambia River had to obtain their tacit approval. I had met with one of these entrepreneurs, Assane, who was one of the important families in Tambacounda. Assane was looking to "invest" in banana, and he had come to Wassadou to inspect possible plots of land. After several trips, he had managed to get some land. When I asked him how he had obtained his land, he hesitated to tell me the whole story, but mentioned that he had to go and see the National Park Service in addition to the rural council. It is not clear whether the National Park granted official "permission" to cultivate banana or whether this permission was granted for a fee. However, Assane's involvement in banana production showed the steep competition that local producers faced if they wanted to have their "own" land, instead of working for the account of someone else. For Lamine and other banana producers, "decentralization" meant this process of continuous re-claiming of land, over which the rural council, the National Park Service. as well as, the Governor and the sub-prefect claimed authority. This was, as I will show later through the analysis of rural council's land allocation practices, was exactly what was going on within the rural council.

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[250] Quoted by Sarr (Sarr, 1999, p. 120).

Cotton and the Classified Forest of Diambour: Conservation-as-Development

While banana is one example of how "sustainable development" meets with conservation at the buffer zone of the National Park, another example is the Classified Forest of Diambour. As I explained earlier, in 1968, a classified forest was gazetted in the North of the village of Dialakoto. [251] The zoning of the forest corresponded to the period when the eviction and resettlement of evictees was debated. The justification of the project of classification [252] underlined three main developmental reasons for the establishment of Diambour: the increasing surface of land of protected zones to prevent deforestation and desertification; to preserve the fauna as a "capital"; and to "rationalize" the exploitation of African palm [253] and bamboo. In the classified forest, the Forestry Service would reinforce the hunting restrictions and police the forests to make sure that they were not used for commercial purposes, except for the exploitation of bamboo and African palm, for which a special permit was required. The inhabitants of the Classified Forest, had use rights around designated habitation zones[254], which were limited strictly to "subsistence" use. As explained in chapter 3, the resettlement of evictees had led to concerns about the availability of land for resettlement and cultivation, given that the Classified Forest and the National Park would surround the resettlement areas.

Shortly after the evictees had resettled at the outskirts of the National Park, the region of Tambacounda was designated as a zone of cotton production by SODEFITEX[255], which took at hand the "popularization" of cotton. Cotton was first introduced to the region of Tambacounda in

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[251] Decret 68-113 of 1 February 1968.

[252] Report No. 4580/MER, on the gazetting of Diambour and Gouloumbou in the Region of Senegal Oriental November, 1967.

[253] African Plam, or *ronier*, is a borassus palm (Lat. Borassus aethiopum) , which has many uses. The most important local uses of the palm tree is the construction of houses and the production of palm wine. The commercial uses of the palm, on the other hand, are also numerous. The leaves are used to produce loofas, fences and sieves.

[254] The creation of Classified Forest of Diambour involved the eviction of smaller villages and their concentration around three state-recognized habitation zones.

[255] SODEFITEX (Societe de Development des Fibres Textiles) was one of the state-owned societies (like the Societe des Terres Neuves) responsible from for carrying out the expansive agricultural production.

1963 and 1964 by a French private company. After the nationalization of the company in 1974 as SODEFITEX, the region became the producer of almost one third of the entire cotton in Senegal in the 1970s (Diagne & Lericollais, 1980; Fanchette, 1999).[256] The commercial cotton production in the Classified Forest of Diambour during the mid-1970s and started to spread to evicted villages settled in Dialakoto. Most members of the evicted villages did not know the extensive production of cotton before their resettlement outside the Park. The cotton was produced within the Park but this consisted mostly of local varieties and cultivated by women as well as men, for local consumption. The new cotton, however, was produced as a cash crop. In Boulakounda, Keita had told me how the production of cotton had started almost immediately after the resettlement:[257]

> K: When we came here [Boulakounda]... all this place was a forest... we cleared the land and cut off the trees. The land was distributed by cotton cords. If it was a big family, it would get two cords, a small family one cord... When we were there [Tabadian], we knew that cotton cultivation had started but we had not seen it then. It is when we came here that we started to cultivate the cotton.
>
> M: So you have started the cotton immediately after your arrival? And you measured land according to cotton fields?
>
> K: Yes..That's true. Not everyone started the cotton, but some had already started.

Measurement by cord was used to divide and allocate fields for cotton production. The use of cords[258] to measure the fields in Boulakounda was, as Keita pointed out, a practice that became common with the production of cotton. Among the evictees, who had settled in Madina near Dialakoto, cotton gradually became an important rival to peanuts. Diallo, who was also from one of the Pulaar-speaking villages of Tabadian, explained the effects of the increasing expansion of cotton in Madina:

> When we came here [Madina] these "technique" of cord did not exist. We did not measure in this way. You would have your plot for yourself only and you decide to do

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256 It was La Companie Francaise des Fibres Textiles, a French company that had first started the test production of cotton. Companie Francaise des Fibres Textiles, was nationalized in 1974 as state owned SODEFITEX.

257 Keita, Boulakounda, October 2004.

258 The name cord comes from the system of delimitation of cotton fields. The cotton fields are delimited through a staking method, which consists of marking the area with posts and measuring it with ropes of 50 m long. Each corde as a surface area is a quarter of a hectare (2500 square meters) (Milleville & Dubois, 1975).

> whatever you want to do. But today, there is measurement by cord. People know that well.

For Diallo, this “technique” of measurement was completely different from the way they cultivated before:

> Before we cultivated rice, maize and peanuts. But we did not cultivate cotton. Women would cultivate rice, and men, millet, maize and peanuts. The lands were so vast that we did not even pay attention to who cultivated how many cords!

The use of the term cord for measurement of land was an indicator of commercialization of land in Madina in general. Although it was a “technique” introduced for cotton production, when people in Madina talked about land used for peanuts, they also used the word cord to refer to the surface they had planted. The measurement of fields by cord also implied that they were cultivated for cash crops and often through commercial land borrowing agreements. Thus, measurement by cord was the sign of enclosure. The production of cotton is different from the production of peanuts, as it is more labor intensive, requiring constant attention to the plants and the use of pesticides and fertilizers. In addition, peasants cannot keep the cotton grains to eat or to sell them to other peasants, as they can do with peanuts. Furthermore, since its beginnings the production of cotton developed outside of the control of peasant cooperatives, centered around peanut production (Milleville & Dubois, 1975). It is entirely controlled by SODEFITEX and its “encadreurs,” project animators, who promote cotton among the peasants. It is through these animators that SODEFITEX had reached the evictees established in Madina, as well as cultivators around Dialakoto and the Classified Forest of Diambour.

I traveled into the Classified Forest to meet with some of the evictees from the village of Tounti. The village chief and inhabitants of Tounti were all from Tabadian. Talking about eviction and resettlement, they have told me that Tounti had now been mostly deserted, as a good part of its inhabitants moved to the Classified Forest. This is how I had decided to travel within the Classified Forest and find a large village called Dienna Kouta, where evictees from Tounti had migrated. Dienna Kouta was a large village, composed of mainly migrants. There I met with one of the most important cultivators of peanuts,and cotton in the area, Balde. Balde, was an important cultivator and herder, established in the Classified Forest of Diambour. He was an imposing and tall man, who spoke with an air of ease and with great self-confidence. He was a

self-made rural entrepreneur who had first come to Wassadou to cultivate peanuts. However, he had transitioned to cotton from peanuts, thanks to the promises of cotton "animators." He had witnessed the time of Khayat but was also one of the pioneers of the switch from peanuts to cotton. He explained how peasants were divided about which cash crops to cultivate:

> In fact, cotton created two camps [among the cultivators]. There are those who think that cotton is more profitable than peanuts and others who do not even want to talk about it.... For some of us, peanuts are more profitable because we don't have to get a credit to cultivate peanuts every year. We can use peanuts as powder, we use its leaves and stems to feed cattle and the grains are sold. But with cotton, you need to prepare your field every year. You need to plant cotton seeds on straight lines, you need to get pesticides, fertilizers that you bought with credit. Plus you have the powder (from pesticides) that burn your eyes, your ears. This is why some prefer peanuts.

Cotton would have some disastrous effects -due to the use of pesticides- on the health of people and cattle in Madina, which I will look at in the last section. It is, however, important to note that cotton production also affected the relations of cattle herders with cultivators, and also created conflicts among evicted villages. The production of cotton also changed the relationship between herders and cultivators because cattle is considered a nuisance and not desired in cotton fields.[259] Balde, who was, and still is, the owner of a large herd in the Classified Forest, remarked how cotton transformed the agricultural cycles and social relations:

> I remember, when we were young, we used to go find an owner in his peanut fields. We would take his stems to give them to our herd. We used to sit down in the field with the owner and discuss eating peanuts together. But with cotton now, if the owner of a peanut field see a herder passing by, he shouts from far away: "Hey be careful! Get hold of your herd, don't let them enter into my field!"

Despite its important disadvantages, cotton production was picked up by those who could afford it, that is those who can pay back the credit given by SODEFITEX through sufficient production. This meant expanding the cultivated area and employing more migrant laborers. This was what Balde had done, by moving to the Classified Forest. The production of cotton in the Classified Forest had started despite the Forestry Service.[260] The Classified Forest became an

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[259] This is also related to the production cycles of cotton and migration cycles of transhumans. Herders leave their cattle loose during the rainy season (and let them drink water any where they can find) and drive them to water points during the dry season. Because cotton is still not harvested and mature on the fields, during the rainy season, cultivators had to attend that their plants are not eaten by cattle.

[260] It is not clear whether the production was allowed by the Forestry Service or not. It is possible that this issue created tensions between SODEFITEX and the Forestry Service.

"unofficial" zone of agricultural colonization, which counts currently more than 37 villages,[261] most of which were established there for cotton production and commercial cattle herding (Diallo, 2003). The case of the Classified Forest of Diambour, is not unique in Senegal. A similar process of "colonization" of Classified Forests had been going on also in other areas where cash crop production (particularly for peanuts) had been encouraged by state agricultural services and taken over by rural entrepreneurs. [262] The claiming of forest reserves as new frontiers by rural entrepreneurs and migrants for commercial agriculture, as well as herding, is an ongoing process, as I will show in the next chapter.

As land gained value due to cotton production, and to succeed in cotton required labor and space, claims over land in the areas where evictees were resettled intensified. The Rural Council's re-allocation of land for cotton around Dialakoto, but particularly in Madina, would create important conflicts between the evictees and the Rural Community Council. The practices of land allocation and withdrawal of the rural council will be one of the most important reasons for the migration of some evictees from Madina to the Classified Forest to join cotton producers. This exodus toward the Classified Forest for cotton also had implications for the rural council in Dialakoto, as the rural council had been increasingly involved in land and resource conflicts in the Classified Forest. Although the Classified Forest is within the jurisdiction of the Forestry Service, the villages settled in the Classified Forest have close relations with the rural council in Dialakoto.[263] This "unofficial" involvement of the rural council with the new settlers in the Classified Forest is partly due to the administrative functions of the rural council (such as issuing identity cards etc.) but also extends to the arbitration of conflicts between herders and cultivators.[264] As I will show in the next section, the unofficial presence of the Council in the Classify Forest would lead the local Forestry Service to make an appearance in the rural council's

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[261] The statistics on the number of inhabitants of the classified forest is speculative., hHowever, it is estimated that there are of approximately 2448 inhabitants in the forest.

[262] For a study of the transformation of the Forest Reserve of Pata, see Fanchette and Ribot, (Fanchette, 1999; Ribot & Thiaw, 2005). For the case of the Classified forest of M'begue see (Freudenberger, 1991; Rocheteau, 1975).

[263] In fact, some former rural councilors, cultivate cotton in the Classified Forest.

[264] Personal communication of one of the Land Commission Members of the Rural Council.

land commission meetings to pressure and remind the council to keep away from the territories under its jurisdiction.

The Politics of Access to Rural Land in Dialakoto:

In this section, focusing on key cases[265] recorded in the minutes of the Dialakoto's Rural Community Council's Land Commission, I will look at how the Rural Community Council of Dialakoto dealt with increasing land demands. To understand the arguments deployed by the Rural Council to justify land allocation demands, it is important to provide an overview of the institutional and administrative framework created by postcolonial Senegalese land and administrative reforms, within which the rural councilors' decisions are authorized.

As I explained earlier, rural communities created by the National Domain Law in 1964 were "solidified" after the 1972 Law on Territorial and Local Administration as administrative territories of the postcolonial Senegalese state's politically and economically driven agrarian development and administrative reform project. The rural communities were given the "competency" to allocate (affecter) and divest (désaffecter) land use rights on *terroir*s zones of the National Domain. The primary criteria, according to which the land would be allocated, was productive use or development. On the one hand, the general criteria of productive use was for the zoning of the National Domain (*terroir* zones for agriculture vs. classified zones for conservation) and centralized development plans. On the other hand, the allocation of land at the local level in *terroir* zones was bound to criteria determined by the prefects and the CERP. CERP (*Centre d'Expansion Rurale Polyvalent*) were was initially called CER (*Centre d'Expansion Rurale*). The CER were consisted of local agricultural offices created to provide "technical service" and to advise peasants in matters related to land (particularly on National Domain Law), and to support other agricultural services, including the provision of seeds, credit, agricultural fertilizers etc. Initially, created as a support structure for peasants in Mamadou Dia's Rural Animation Program, the CER had become during the 1970s a local extension of the central Agricultural Service in the implementation of rural plans through agricultural "technicians."

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[265] These cases are strategic in the sense that considered next to other land allocation decisions, they were subject to longer debates, indicating their importance.

The decree of application of the 1972 Law left the criteria of productive use in *terroir* zones to the decision of the prefects, who would announce the "minimum conditions of productive use" by executive decisions.[266] While the prefects and sub-prefects were given the authority to determine the "conditions" of productive use that will be followed by the rural community councils, their executive decisions about conditions of productive use were never announced (Le Roy, 1983; Traore, 1997, p. 98). Furthermore, the sub-prefects maintained their authority to verify and approve the rural council's decisions, including land allocations and budgetary decisions until 1990[267] (Traore, 1997, p. 98). Yet, as will become clear from the meeting minutes of the Land Commission of Dialakoto's rural council, the influence of the sub-prefect would last until 1995.

Land withdrawal could be decided based on "the insufficiency of productive use or development" or if the person had ceased to "exploit the land personally."[268] Furthermore, if the occupier of the land did not exploit the land for more than one year, the Rural Council could also decide to withdraw the land.[269] Finally, the rural community could also withdraw lands for "reasons of general interest," in which case, the council or the state would pay indemnities.[270]One of the important lacunae in the Land Commission's decisions that I will analyze in the next section is land withdrawals. Yet, as will become clear in the last section, they are crucial to understand the pattern in the relationship between the rural council and the evicted villages established in Madina.

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[266] Article 10, of the Decree No. 72-1288.

[267] In 1990, the Law 90-37 of October 8th, 1990 lifted the sub-prefects oversight over the rural councils.

[268] Article 15 of National Domain Law.

[269] The decree of application of the National Domain Law added to the conditions of withdrawal the one-year usufruct rule, according to which the land could be withdrawn if it was not exploited for more than one year

[270] The reasons are very similar to public utility close of land expropriation on the National Domain. The reasons of general interest included the establishment of cattle roads, water works and the re-allocation of land for habitation. In case the rural council decided to withdraw land for general interests, either the state or the rural community was held responsible for providing a new terrain for and for paying indemnities to the person or his/her heirs, who had lost his/her land (Panaudit, 1996, p. 59).

Rural Council's Land Allocations until 1996: Productive use, Nativity and Citizenship

Nativity and Citizenship: Different Ways of Belonging to a Rural Community

The first recorded land commission meeting of the new rural community council of Dialakoto dates from 1989, seven years after the creation of the rural community council.[271] From 1989 to 1996, most land demands for agriculture surpassing 10 to 20 hectares were denied by the rural community council.[272] Among those demands the council rejected, one that concerned 200 hectares made by an evicted village chief from Tabadian and one that concerned a government official (a *gendarme*) was discussed at length.

The evicted village chief wanted 200 hectares in order to settle next to the village of Dialakoto. The president and council members, as well as the sub-prefect, voiced their opinions against the allocation of land to the village chief. However they opposed the land based on different justifications. The sub-prefect also pronounced against the land allocation by reminding the council members of specific laws that he thought applied to this situation. First, he drew attention to the right of every Senegalese citizen to demand land use rights in *terroir* zones. He underlined that the commission should not allocate land "without distinction between the people who are not always members of the rural community." Land could be allocated to all citizens, including those who were not members of the rural community. At the same time, he acknowledged the forceful removal of the evictees from the National Park in 1976:

> The village in question was evicted from the Park in 1976 and was installed within a neighboring rural community according to the terms established by a governmental decree of 1982. Therefore, the eviction of this village is neither authorized nor planned by the administration and it does not justify the land claim of 200 hectares for habitation.

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[271] This lag of time is important as it concerns the period during which the rural community council was elected. While it remains unclear whether or not and how much land was "officially" allocated by the rural council during this period of time, as I have shown earlier, the "colonization" of the Southern and Northern parts of Dialakoto for the production of new cash crops (banana and cotton) were was already underway.

[272] In 1989, close to 95 % of recorded land demands and in 1992 almost all land demands were refused.

The displacement of the village in question was due to the "inopportuneness of the eviction, which was the result of an administrative procedure." However, the sub-prefect opposed to the allocation of land to the evicted village chief, which was clearly for the resettlement of the other members of his village, by referring to the governmental decree of 1982[273], which had established the rural communities in Tambacounda. For the sub-prefect, this decree, which applies decentralization to the region by fixing the centers of rural communities and the villages that belong to the rural communities, had also fixed the evictees who demanded land in other administrative territories.

The rural community council also objected to the land demand by arguing that it was "an attempt of implantation of new villages at the doorstep of the village of Dialakoto." The President stressed the importance of residency in the rural community as a criterium of belonging to the rural community. Other members of the commission agreed with him. One councilor commented that except for the village chief in question, none of the other evictees could be considered as members of the rural community, because they were not "native" of Dialakoto and did not reside there. By defining the criteria of belonging to the rural community in terms of nativity, this council member voiced the opinion of the majority of councilors who were, as explained earlier, "elected" among the notables and important cash crop producers from the village of Dialakoto. The only opposition to the rejection of land demand came from a councilor, one of the two village chiefs elected from the evicted villages. He argued that even though 200 hectares for the establishment of a new village was too much, their chief should be granted some land because he inhabited Dialakoto and had an orchard there. Although their reasoning was distinctly different, both the rural council and sub-prefect agreed that land should not be allocated to the evicted village chief. As a result of this debate, the rural council refused to allocate 200 hectares for habitation to the inhabitants of the village but allocated one hectare of land to the village chief himself.

The question of belonging became important also during the same meeting in another decision concerning the demand of a retired government employee. This was a retired gendarme who demanded 20 hectares for agricultural use. The councilors were divided on the nativity status

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[273]The sub-prefect refers to Decree No. 82-281 of May 1982, which determined the centers of the rural communities in the region of Tambacounda.

of the retired gendarme. One councilor stressed that land demands from government employees and urban inhabitants should be rejected. Another one argued that although the gendarme did not "have ties within the rural community," he had been "personally residing" in Dialakoto, and therefore, "should have the same rights as any citizen (*ressortissant*[274]) of the rural community." The council member's comment was based on a restricted definition of citizenship, whereby a citizen of the rural community is one who is born and residing within its territories, more specifically in the village of Dialakoto. The commission accepted the demand, on condition that land was put to productive use and that the gendarme did not sell his land.

This debate brought into the light the two different definitions of citizenship. While the sub-prefect negated the citizenship notion based on nativity, most of the members of the land commission interpreted citizenship as being born in the village of Dialakoto. However, this criterium of belonging applied only to new evictees who demanded land for resettlement. In the case of the retired gendarme and his demand for land for agricultural use, even though he did not fulfill the commission's nativity requirement he was accepted as a citizen of the rural community. While new evictees were denied land as they were designated as absolute "foreigners," the gendarme was allocated land as he fulfilled partially (as a resident) this reinterpreted criteria of belonging.

Who has the Capacity to use Land Productively?

As with the criteria of belonging, the criteria of productive use became also a center of debate during the commission's meetings to support land demands for agricultural use, particularly for banana production. As explained earlier, the banana production at the Northern periphery of the National Park was carried out by OFADEC. While OFADEC had claimed that they occupied "vacant and ownerless" lands, the banana producers were convinced that the land for banana were "given" through the authorization of the prefect.

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[274] *Ressortissant* is often translated in English as a citizen or national of a country. There is an inherent dilemma in this translation, as the notions of citizenship and nationality are defined differently in each country, and there are differences in how French and English legal-administrative traditions frame these concepts.

In 1990, a year before the dissolution of OFADEC, a land demand of 620 hectares was brought in front of the land commission of Dialakoto. This land demand was brought by an influential representative of the traders of Tambacounda and it concerned a plot next to the Gambia River for the production of banana. Compared to other land demands, this was a notable exception given the size of the terrain. This time, neither the commission nor the sub-prefect questioned the nativity status of the entrepreneur. The sub-prefect and the head of CERP supported the land allocation. The sub-prefect this time reminded the councilors of another "decentralization law," the Decree of 1972,[275] which as explained earlier, instituted the oversight of the prefects and sub-prefects over land allocation decisions of the rural council, based on the criteria of productive use - which the sub-prefect would determine in consultation with the CERP. Instead of clarifying these conditions of productive use, the sub-prefect left the floor to the head of CERP, who argued that the rural council was "not competent" in making a decision on this matter and this right belonged in this case only to the central administration. As the representatives of the central administration, both he and the sub-prefect were in favor of the land allocation. To strengthen this declaration of authority, the CERP also shared his expert opinion by adding that the land in question was "available" and that according to the opinion of the commission – which he headed – had inspected the land, and that there were no use-rights on it. The members of the commission from Dialakoto strongly supported this land demand because it was in the best "interests" of the rural community. They also supported two other land demands for banana - also by urban-based entrepreneurs - because the applications were "serious" and showed that the projects had enough means to use the land productively. Again, the councilor elected from the evicted villages attempted to object. While he did not comment on the 620 hectares, he suggested the reduction of other land, including two large land demands and urged the commission to make sure to apply the rule, which gives the rural council the right to withdraw land if it is not used for more than three years. As a result the commission decided to allocate all 620 hectares to the notable from Tambacounda, and to allocate smaller sized land to the two other entrepreneurs.

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[275] The decree 72-1288 of 17 October 1972 on conditions of allocation and withdrawal of the land on the National Domain.

This uneasy compromise reached “after long debates” - which were not recorded in the meeting minutes - showed the importance of the pressure exercised by the sub-prefect and the head of CERP over the rural council. They claimed that the rural council was incompetent in determining the criteria of productive use for the 620 hectares. The reminder of the rules of the law were there to support this imposition. None of the members of the commission could object to this declaration. Yet, the councilor elected from evicted villages also used the technical language of the law (reminding the three year usufruct rule) to diminish the impact of this unequal land distribution. Instead of promoting the local groups by allocating land to banana projects funded by urban entrepreneurs and notables, the rural council also placed restrictions on how the evictees could have access to state-recognized land use rights.

A year after the dissolution of OFADEC in 1991, the rural council was summoned again to discuss a number of land demands for banana production, this time from the local banana *groupement*s, affiliated with APROVAG. There was an important difference between the local banana *groupement*s and the projects proposed by urban entrepreneurs. To obtain land from the rural councils, every *groupement* was required to prepare an application file (dossier) that would prove the applicants’ “capacity” to use land productively. This criteria of “capacity” of productive use” is often measured by financial means and/or ability to secure necessary crops (seeds or plants), fertilizers, pesticides and the equipment, which the local *groupement*s lack. The lack of capacity of productive use would become an important justification for denying land to smaller local *groupement*s - which included some evictees of the National Park in Madina as well- whose claims over the plots they used was weakened with the demise of OFADEC. In the meeting of 1992, where the sub-prefect was absent but represented by its deputy, the tone was also set from the beginning. The deputy sub-prefect reminded the authority of the decentralization law once more, this time stressing the importance of scrutinizing the land demands with the help of the “competent technicians.” The head of CERP, who assumed this role, advised the councilors not to “deviate from the method.” Referring implicitly to the private land title on Wassadou-Depot, CERP stressed that the Rural council should only be preoccupied with the property (l*es biens*) of the Rural Community. To determine whose property the land was, “technicians” were necessary to inspect the area. As explained earlier, OFADEC had already occupied these lands, yet when

the local banana *groupement*s attempted to claim it to continue production, they faced the private property title. The sub-prefect objected to the land demands for three reasons. First he found the demands to be “excessive.” Second, land had a private property title, and finally, the local *groupements*’ “capacity of productive use” was limited. Thus, the deputy sub-prefect rejected the land demands and, adopting a more authoritative tone, he added:

> The rural community council is not a weekly market, so it is necessary to respect the norms and the president of the rural council, which presides the meeting.... Everyone can assist the meetings but not everyone has right to speak, except those authorized by the rural council.

This debate on land allocation to local banana producers shows how property rules concerning the private land ownership, which were previously ignored, were placed as an obstacle, together with “capacity of productive use,” in front of the local producers, throwing them into the category of illegitimate occupiers.

Another important aspect of the 1992 commission meeting was the presence of the local Forestry Service representative. His unusual presence was due to the concerns about the land use in the Classified Forest of Diambour. The Forestry Service representative reminded the commission that there were “norms to be respected.” These norms were set by the law, according to which land within the Classified Forests could not be allocated for habitation and to cultivate within those forests that required the approval of the Forestry Service and a special commission headed by the Governor. Unless the land was allocated by a special contract (*contrats de culture*) with the Forestry Service, cultivation was forbidden in the Classified Forest. Clearly, the Forestry Service was concerned with the expanding cotton production in the forest. However, the presence of the Service in the meeting of the land commission indicated that the Forestry Service was also concerned with the connection of these illegal practices to the rural council.

In fact, the deputy sub-prefect and the head of CERP hinted to similar suspicions when they lectured the commission about the land allocation practices of the village chiefs. Rather than the rural council, it was the village chiefs who were overstepping their boundaries by allocating land without consulting the rural council. The sub-prefect insisted that if a village chief, who does not have right to give land, does so,“ he must be punished [by the rural community council].” Although it is unclear which village chief they were referring to, this debate is a complex

illustration of how Forestry Service, rural council and the village chiefs may intervene in and have an effect on different "zones," which are "technically" under the jurisdiction of different authorities.

Practices of Land Allocation after 1996: Fixing the Children of the Terroir

A clear trend until 1995 was the oversight of the sub prefect and the representatives of the "technical" services who acted as experts in decentralization law and considerably influenced the land allocation decisions of the rural council. The land commission, by refusing to allocate land to locally formed *groupement*s - either because it was on a private land or due to a lack of necessary financial aid supporting their "files" - also denied access to land for local banana producers. Starting from 1995, this trend would start to change. In 1995, several local *groupement*s made land demands. While most land demands ranged from 1 to 10 hectares, two of them were 50 hectares. One of the *groupement*s, which demanded 50 hectares, was based in Dialakoto. This land demand was supported by the members of the commission from Dialakoto, one of whom argued that these "youngsters (which were members of the *groupement*) were capable of exploiting more than 300 hectares." The sub-prefect who was present at the meeting, also adopted a very different discourse about the competency of the rural council when he declared that he "trusted the rural councillors," who should not forget about the future of their children and who were called upon to fix on their *terroir*s." While some council members from Dialakoto insisted that "the lands (of the rural community) should not be allocated to foreigners," the sub-prefect did not voice an opinion against any of the land demands, as was the case before. Instead, he just stressed the importance of "fixing" the future generations mainly as a labor force, into their t*erroir*s through *groupement*s, of any kind, local or foreign. As a result, nineteen land demands - most of which belonged to local *groupement*s were accepted, including the two projects which claimed 50 hectares for banana production.

The shift towards increasing land allocations became more evident after 1996, the year when the new decentralization law, the Law on Regionalization, was adopted. As I will discuss in more detail in the next chapter, the Law on Regionalization extended the "powers" of the rural councils to pass local development contracts with third parties, marking the beginning of increasing movement towards privatization. In the Northern periphery of the National Park, this

also corresponded with the corruption “crisis” of APROVAG, the umbrella organization that gathered the local banana producers and the colonization of land by urban entrepreneurs. After 1996, land demands for cash crop production increased considerably. Not only did the Rural Council meet more frequently to discuss land allocations,[276] but it approved larger surfaces for agricultural use[277], and the total land allocated in the entire Rural Community increased.[278] The large land demands (50 to 150 hectares) originated from those whom the rural council put into the category of foreigners.

Starting from the first meeting of the land commission in 1996, the sub-prefect started to stress how much more the new decentralization law had rendered “the land of the national domain interesting” for the rural community council. Compared to earlier land demands, demands for much larger areas (some reaching 100 hectares) were quickly approved with very short comments, which simply mentioned that the files supporting land demands showed enough financial strength. Land demands previously rejected by the council, such as the one by the urban entrepreneur and notables from Tambacounda, as well as other “foreigners” - most strikingly a demand from an influential marabout of Murid Brotherhood - were accepted without debate.

The attraction of the lands of the northern periphery was such that in 1997, the sub-prefect proposed establishing a land registry for the rural community council. As the land allocated to those funded by urban entrepreneurs had also increased together with land allocated to local *groupement*s, the local labor force became the point of contention. In fact, several comments by the rural councilors stressed the outmigration from the rural community. First, it was the rural councilor elected from the evicted villages who protested against the practices of the projects funded by foreigners. He suggested that the rural council to employ locals, rather than “foreigners.” These projects had “to valorize land together with the sons of the t*erroir*s in order to

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[276] Until 1996, the commission met four times. The commission did not meet or made any land allocations in 1991, 1993 and 1994. After 1996 until 2003 the commission met regularly each year. While n 1996, 1998 and 2001 the land commission met twice a year, in 1999 and 2000 three meetings were held within the same year.

[277] Before 1996, land allocated for agricultural production ranged between 1-3 hectares; after 1996, land allocations for 50 hectares or more became frequent.

[278] Between 1989 and 1996 the total land allocated for agricultural use was approximately 800 hectares. After 1996 the registered land allocations reached approximately 2000 hectares.

eradicate unemployment" and "to benefit the populations by providing new jobs." This pointed to a common problem – the increasing re-appropriation of land by foreign entrepreneurs who did not necessarily employ local inhabitants, but rather recruited new migrants to the area.

The sub-prefect and the head of CERP continued to "encourage" allocating "a good size of land to the project promoters," as this was an "advantage for the rural council and for the populations which could benefit from these projects as labour force." But the problem of satisfying these land demands was becoming even more acute. In 1998, the land commission decided to withdraw all land allocated and not put in use since 1989. The measure was taken to "enable all persons capable of putting these plots into productive use a complete control over their land." The language of private property that the rural council members started to adopt to justify the wholesale withdrawal of unused land was only the confirmation of the existing land withdrawal practices. As I will show in the next section, land withdrawals led to dispossession of many evictees in Madina Bloc.

Land Conflicts in Madina

The Commission's land allocation debates allow us partly to have a glimpse at the perspectives of rural council members, "technical services" and sub-prefects and their land allocation practices. The council's decisions reflect how the rural council related to different actors who demanded valuable land for cash crop agriculture and to the representatives of a coercive centralized administration. However, these debates also hide another set of relations between the rural council and the "citizens" of the rural community by making two notable omissions. They do not discuss any land conflicts, and they do not include any details about land withdrawal decisions. For many villagers inhabiting Madina, however, the main problem that pits villagers to the rural council is land withdrawals. As a result of rural council's land withdrawal many villagers had lost land that they were using since their resettlement.

The Rural Community Council's Land Withdrawals

When I met Yoro from Tabadian, "from the Park," he was sitting in the yard of his compound surrounded by bearing fields in dry season. We had a long conversation about how he had come from Tabadian to Madina, which was covered at that time with forests. Part of the forests were cleared by the state and Yoro had constructed his hut there in the village of Missirah Damantan. He had cultivated peanuts in addition to a few other staple crops on a plot of land at some distance from the village. He had converted to cotton, thinking it would be more profitable. But then his cotton fields were snatched by the rural council:

> The cotton was everywhere. Even I started to cultivate cotton nearby. I had nine cords of cotton. But Rural Council came to take it way from me. They decided that I did not have enough labor to cultivate all that, so they took it from me to give it to Fula. [279]

Yoro's anger against the rural community was shared by many other evictees. In his case, the council had withdrawn the land, because it thought he did not have enough help to cultivate the land for cotton, even though Yoro had already planted it. He was not only angry about that but also because same land was given to someone else, in this case to "Fula" - referring to Pulaar-speaking migrants from the Northern Senegal. These were for Yoro, his brothers -as they all spoke Pulaar - but nevertheless "foreigners" to whom land hand been "sold" by state authorities and the rural community council. His suspicions extended to corruption, to how they were able to "get" his land and how much they had to pay the Council for this favor.

Yoro's case was also known to other evictees like Philly, who was from neighboring Niemeneke. The first time, I opened the subject, Philly told me:

> Conflicts and misunderstandings over the fields are very common here [at Madina]. What I don't know is what do people do when they have complaints. Where do they go? There have been many cases [of conflicts over the fields].. People from outside came to establish on fields that do not belong them. For example, look at Yoro. He had planted his cotton, he had finished planting all his cotton... But the Rural Community came and took his field, all of it!

Yoro's field was given to people coming from outside the rural council, which was also supposed to resolve the land conflicts. Philly's disapproval of this injustice was two-sided, on the one hand, he did not agree with the practice of giving land to "outsiders." On the other, he was upset about

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[279] Misirah Damantan, October 2004.

the Rural Community's involvement in it. Like many evictees in Madina, Philly was initially reticent to talk about land conflicts. Initially, he presented conflicts related to agricultural fields as problems of other villages in Madina. It was only after we got to know each other a little better that Philly opened up on the issue of land conflicts in Madina. When he talked about Yoro, I asked him whether he had any similar problems. He finally said:

> Yes... I lived these problems myself. There was a field that I used to cultivate until last year. The Rural Council called to see me [by sending a convocation] about this field. All this, because of the people with bad intensions who want to break the family ties. I was in conflict with my nephew [fils].280 You know my nephew is not very smart. He could not have known people with bad faith. He let these people [the Rural Council] to bring us in front of them. I went to answer to their call and we have discussed. The Rural Council decided to take the field from me like that... They have retrieved the land from me and told me that no one will cultivate that field any more. So it has been taken away. In the mean time, my nephew started to cultivate there. He planted two cords of cotton. The Council had told him not to do it, but he did it anyway. The field is all planted now... even though the Council forbade it. [After this] I thought ... the Council must have been involved in this affair.

Philly thought that the Rural Council was acting unfairly at many levels. First, it was acting against its own principles. When the Council withdrew the land from Philly, he was told that nobody would cultivate there. Yet the Council made only a meager attempt to enforce such a rule when Philly's nephew came to cultivate the same field. This was for Philly a clear indication of the lack of consistency of the Council's decision. To support this Philly continued:

> This field was a wooded land when I came here [at Niemeneke] when I finished studying the Koran. I cut down the trees and cleared it myself! But what happens here is this: [The Council tells you that] if you leave your field unattended for couple of years, and another person sees it, he would think that it does not have an owner. He will cultivate the land....To tell you the whole story about my plot.... The plot that I used to cultivate, I had obtained from people in Wasadu-Depot, who had first settled here. When I arrived [after eviction] and started to cultivate it, they did not say anything. These people [the Rural Council] put us against each other. I was cultivating there for thirty years. Can you imagine it? I had even planted trees. My trees are there!

Philly, as Yoro, obtained his land through previous land agreements during the resettlement of evictees in Madina. In his case, he had obtained the authorization to use this land from the people in Wassadou-Depot, who had "settled there first." While Philly recognized this first-comer claim, he also stressed that he had cleared the land himself, which indicated that he had laid

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[280] Philly used the term "fils" which literally means son. However, son is also used for the male children of one's siblings. In this case he was talking about his nephew.

claims over it.[281] As people in Wassadou did not object to this, a tacit agreement emerged among them. As Philly cultivated during the thirty years on this land, he thought that this tacit agreement, based on a shared custom and practice with the people in Depot, was secure enough. But the rural council acted against all his expectations. The council's claims were very different than Philly's claims. The council was saying that if a plot was not cultivated it could be considered ownerless, and it had the right to give it to someone else. The Council used this argument against Philly. The Council has claimed that he was not "attending" his field, which was clearly a lie for Philly. Furthermore, the rural council had put a divide between him and the people in Depot and with his nephew. Philly was also angry at his nephew over this land conflict:

> My nephew is like my son. If your son comes and takes a part of your thing, you will not say anything. But what surprised me is that he went to see the rural council to make a paper saying that there was a conflict between me and him.

Beyond the intentions of his nephew, Philly was pointing out that the relations between him and his nephew had been damaged because of the intervention of the Rural Council. The Rural council's application of the decentralized "powers" of withdrawal of agricultural land had also changed Philly's relations with his old hosts and his nephew.

As I mentioned earlier, there were two councilors elected from Madina in the Rural Council. One of them was from Philly's village. I had assumed that as the representative from Madina, he could have at least tried to stand by Philly. So I asked him:

> M: There is a rural councilor from your village, did he know about this?
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> P: Yes, there is a councilor here. But he is the problem. If he was here I will tell him the same. What he has done to me is nothing compared to what he has done to Aliou. One time his cows entered into the field of Seydou. They called the councilor from Niemeneke to come, determine the damage and negotiate. When they have calculated the damage, Seydou said that there was damage but this was God's will. He said he pardoned Aliou. They agreed and reconciled. But the councilor asked 5000 F just because he came there! What kind of right is this? ... He is a dangerous guy and I will never trust him to be a judge on anything. God be my witness, I will never do that!

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[281] This is often called "*droit de hache*" (right by axe), right conferred by clearing of land. The act of clearing the land conferred him the right to use it. Sometimes the clearing may also imply authority over a territory. Most of the origin stories of the evicted villages mention the act of clearing the land as an act of establishing a village community and claiming the government over people and the land.

For Philly, the councilor was far from being a protector of the villager's interests. He was the "problem." As I will learn later, this councilor was not elected but "designated" by the Rural council president after 1996, due to his active role in party politics. For Philly this "local" representative of the evictees was in complicity with the rural council in taking away his land. Philly also pointed to extractions of money by a rural councilor for something that he did not do. The councilor was called as a mediator to the land conflict. However, even though the two litigants had resolved their differences and pardoned each other, without demanding any money, it was the rural councilor who asked for money. Philly rightly doubted the legality of this extraction for "mediation."

Philly wanted to do something about, it but to whom could he turn? Who was a fair and legitimate authority to decide on these issues? The chief of his village knew but was not able to do anything about it either:

> Ah.. our village chief... He also knows this. He is not a bad person. But we have too many problems here. None of them is resolved in satisfactory way with the agreement of all. Especially my case. If something get resolved it is thanks to the good will of people and the will of God... But even the village chief is not always fair in his judgments. He listens to whatever the councilor tells him. It is as if he is afraid of him.... Isn't it up to the village chief to tell people "be careful, don't do this... because there is this... don't go there... got his way..." ?

Philly expected the chief to have a moral authority over the village inhabitants (including the rural councilor) and show them what was dangerous, what should be avoided and what was good. But instead of that the rural councilor had drawn the village chief to his side through fear. In such a case, how could he expect the village chief to defend him against the rural council, to stand by him by testifying that he was cultivating the same plot for thirty years.

People like Philly who lived in constant insecurity and under the threat of eviction by the rural council had also attempted to draw boundaries themselves, to mark their "terrain." Philly had done so by planting trees around his plot. Although before their eviction most people in Madina had trees, particularly mango trees for household consumption, planting trees around the plots now meant that a particular land was somebody's property. As explained in the previous chapter, the use of trees as boundary markers had also been encouraged during the resettlement, by the Ministry of Planning. However, this practice had been adopted in Madina, not because it had been imposed by the technocratic application of the cartesian division of space by the Ministry but because of increasing land conflicts. Demarcation of the fields by trees became a sort of shield

for villagers, who wanted to defend their claims against the Rural Council, who allocated their land to “foreigners.” Policing the boundaries of the fields became an important preoccupation of the evictees in Madina.

The Cattle Road:

One of the most important land conflicts involving Pulaar-speaking inhabitants of the evicted villages in Madina erupted around the cattle road. According to Ousmane, the cattle road was also traced when the evictees from Pulaar-speaking villages of Tabadian arrived at Madina by the sub-prefect of Missirah. Later, when the Manding speakers from Niemeneke arrived, they got settled at the other side of the cattle road, which served as a boundary between the Pulaar-speaking evictees of Tabadian and Manding-speaking evictees of Niemeneke. Instead of using the same cattle road, the village chief and notables of Niemeneke had requested another cattle road for themselves, and the sub-prefect traced another cattle road for them. The conflict over the cattle road of Pulaar-speaking villages erupted in 1996 when the rural councilor from the Mandinka-speaking Niemeneke started to cultivate cotton on the road. Ousmane explained the beginnings of the conflict as follows:

> When Madi had first started to cultivate cotton on the cattle road, I went to him and told him with a joking tone: “You know that what you have done is not right. This road, which is the limit between us, is a cattle road and you know that very well! He said to me that it wasn’t. So I told him: “If you plant on the cattle road, when it is time to take the cattle to the North next to the River, we will let them free, and they will pass over it.” So I had warned him. Madi planted cotton again. Cotton has grown. When the time came to bring our cattle to the river, we let the cattle and the cows went to eat all his cotton.

The trespassing of the boundaries of the cattle road was also a violation of the relations that were established between the two groups of evictees, who had come to Madina from different regions and at different times. The cattle road was crucial for herders in Madina. This is partly due to the seasonal migration of the cattle and the calendar of agricultural cultivation, which follows specific patterns during the dry and rainy seasons. During the dry season, cattle needs to be carried to water sources like rivers and ponds, most of which are at the North of Dialakoto within the classified forest. During the rainy season, however, cattle can be let free to disperse, to find fresh pastures and small water sources themselves. At the same time, during the dry season, fields

remain empty, and when the rains start, the cultivators start to plant their fields. The cattle herders have to take their cattle to the forest when the first rains start. This is also when the cultivators start to plant. The Pulaar-speaking herders in Madina, who used to keep their cattle next to their village before all of this, would let the cattle fertilize the fields during part of the beginning of the rainy period:

> When the cattle road was still there, we used to keep our cattle next to our village. Before taking them to the forest, we would also cultivate our fields. When you cultivate, you bring your cattle in the fields. You tie them at a certain place when they eat. Then, you move them a little bit further and plant on the spots where they have fertilized. So our cattle was fertilizing our fields. You can take your cattle in the bush after your plants had grown a little bit.

This seasonal migration of the cattle that complemented the agricultural activities was crucial for the Pulaar-speaking villagers of Madina to sustain their living. When the rural councilor planted on the cattle road, all of this was disrupted. Ousmane recounted how the issue ended up in front of the rural council:

> When we let our cattle eat Madi's cotton plants, Madi went quickly to the gendarmes in Dialakoto. We were all called there. There they were, all the councilors from Madina and the village chiefs. Madi told that our cattle had ruined his cotton. As a response I said: "Madi cultivated on the cattle road. This is why cattle went through his fields. Here is where his fields' limits are and here is where the cattle has passed. The cattle used the cattle road." Then we debated and debated. But even our village chief did not help us. They said: "He is a councilor. If he decides that the cattle road would be cultivated, it would be." Our village chief and councilors all agreed... We kept on arguing and we could not reach an agreement. Everybody went home. The next day, we were all called to the rural council. The council told us to leave the cattle road. We said "No! Our cattle need the road." I said: "We need to keep our cattle at the beginning of the rainy season in the village. They can only go when the grass is higher." They said: "No, you have to take your cattle immediately at the beginning of the rainy season now." We went again to the gendarmes. One of them called me next to him and said: "Ousmane, everyone is against you. Give up. Let them do it because otherwise you will have problems." This is how I let it go. After that they distributed the cattle road to village chiefs and councilors. They all came afterwards to cultivate cotton in it.

According to Ousmane, everyone knew the location of the cattle road. But the councillors insisted that the cattle damaged the field and thus, now the herders had to take their cattle away, all the way to the forest to avoid further damage to the fields. They also claimed that the cattle road was causing bush fires, and thus was a danger to the villages. The councilors pressuring the village chiefs were able to seize the cattle road and distribute it for the cultivation of cotton. Knowing that they could not appeal to the sub-prefect or to any other authority that would defend them, Ousmane and others accepted this as a fait accompli.

The result of the redistribution of the cattle road had been considerable. Herders had to take their cattle far from the village. This meant that herders were no longer able to fertilize the fields that surrounded their villages. It also meant that they were now more dependent on fertilizers and the state credit. It was only a few years later that Ousmane started to work in one of the largest banana projects as a share-cropper.

The example of the conflict over the cattle road shows how the rural council's land withdrawal and allocation practices have a deep impact on the livelihoods of the ordinary evictees, as well as on their relations with one another. The rural council members, who as I explained earlier, remain under the oversight of the sub-prefect and the CERP, do not hesitate to misuse their power over the evictees. The evictees do not have the means to counter them. While the conflicts within the rural council had concentrated on the allocation of larger plots of land to urban entrepreneurs for banana, the council members who appeared to defend the inhabitants did not hesitate to confiscate smaller land plots and the cattle road in Madina. For most of the evictees in Madina, the "arrival" of decentralization meant the "arrival" of the rural council, increasing insecurity and land snatching either for foreigners or inhabitants (such as some village chiefs), who had "connections" with the rural council. Lands in Madina had indeed become a market commodity, not only through "illegal" land sales or "informal" agreements between the villagers, but also through the brokering role of the council members.

Conclusion

The focus of this chapter was the decentralized evictions, which started after the implementation of administrative decentralization in the region of Tambacounda in the 1980s. I began by looking at the process through which the Rural Community of Dialakoto was established. The new rural council was not as decentralization proponents claim a "locally elected" and therefore "representative" authority. Rather the council represented mainly the villagers from Dialakoto, who were integrated both in cash crop production (peanut cooperatives) and party politics. I also showed in this chapter, that the unclear "election" of the rural council coincided with the introduction of new cash crops to the areas of resettlement of the evictees of the National Park.

Cotton was introduced in Madina and in the Classified Forest of Diambour by the parastatal SODEFITEX and banana had started in the buffer zone of the National Park with the initiative of international NGOs, which claimed it to be a “sustainable development” that would provide income to the residents. I have looked at some of the important implications of the introduction of these two new cash crops, banana in the buffer zone and cotton in the Classified Forest. While banana production, initially introduced as “sustainable” development activity in the buffer zone, increased the value of land and created competition between local groups of producers and urban entrepreneurs and marabouts; cotton production spread from the Classified Forest to Madina accelerated the impoverishment of herders (through decimation of cattle from fertilizers) and contributed to more competition over land.

Next, through the analysis of the land commission meetings of the rural council, I examined how decentralization reforms was implemented in the rural community of Dialakoto, which became a forum for different local actors to negotiate access to increasingly commercialized land. In this forum, the local commercial peasant *groupement*s engaged in banana production struggled to obtain land against the urban entrepreneurs and marabouts. The “colonization” of lands in Dialakoto for banana production created a competition over land and labor of the inhabitants, which had intensified after 1996. The rural council’s meetings showed that the sub-prefect, the CERP chief and local Forestry Service continued to pressure the rural council about land allocations until 1996. Unlike what the decentralization discourse claims, the most important power (or “competency”) transferred to rural communities -- land allocations -- continue to be carried out under the watchful eyes of prefect and sub-prefects, who have coercive executive powers, and claim expertise on “rules” of the state law. Although the administrative oversight of the sub-prefect would be lifted after 1996, the oversight of sub-prefect would be based this time on expertise over decentralization laws.

The rural council’s land commission debates also showed how the ambiguous definitions and lacunae in the National Domain Law have been seized by different actors at the local level. The “flexible” and contradictory uses of the criteria of productive use and nativity illustrate that, these notions derived from the language of law, had become a focus of re-interpretation and have been deployed to justify the authority of claimants competing for land: local vs. foreign

*groupement*s, the notables of Dialakoto vs. evicted villages, and the Forestry Service vs. the Rural Council. Different actors pressuring local council used these discourses to assert their authority over land decisions.

Finally, I have also examined how the rural council's seizure of land was narrated by the evictees settled in Madina. I have shown through the example of land and cattle road conflict in Madina that as a result of the council's intervention, some evictees lost the land that they had obtained since their resettlement. The evictees' narratives indicated that rather than being perceived as a legitimate representative and a means to "participate" in the governance of the affairs of the rural community, the rural council was increasingly associated with shady practices -- unfair land withdrawals, land allocations to "foreigners" and corruption. Furthermore, the involvement of the councillors elected from the evicted villages into the land conflicts created important tensions among the evicted villages. In Madina, the existence of multiple governing institutions -- the rural council and the prefect -- and multiple rules governing the use of land -- the National Domain Law, local labor agreements according to "custom" -- created a context where the authorization of claims of property and authority are constantly contested.

Chapter 6: Benefits of Nature: Community-Based Conservation

> The management of the environment is a power transferred to rural communities. But, what the state gives with its left hand, it takes it back with its right hand. The management of natural resources generates benefits. How will the state transfer these benefits to local populations? Wula Nafaa program is a very good initiative for this (The President of the Association of the Rural Community Councils of Tambacounda and Koumpentoum, 2004).

Introduction:

In Chapter 5, I have looked at how postcolonial decentralization reforms worked in the Rural Community of Dialakoto from the 1980s until the present, through transforming relations of authority that focused on land as a property object. A distinct shift in land allocation patterns emerged after 1996, when the land at the Northern periphery of the National Park where the evicted villages were resettled became increasingly commodified in the midst of intensifying peanut, cotton and banana production. Land allocated for cash crop agriculture by the rural council increased greatly. However, an interesting shift started to happen in 1998 when the new "decentralized" Forestry Code was adopted. The young tourist guides from the village of Dialakoto demanded land from the rural council to construct a tourist lodge at the buffer zone of the National Park. This proposal was submitted by the President of the rural council to the sub-prefect and to the Head of CERP for approval before the land allocation meeting. The sub-prefect and the CERP strongly encouraged this project which was "in the interest of the sons of the *terroir*" by creating job opportunities for young people. The CERP also asked the young guides who formed the association to "elect" the president of the rural council as their president. With this condition, land was allocated for a new tourist lodge in Wassadou.

In 2003 the rural council's land commission was faced with the largest land demand (a total of 25,000 hectares) since 1989. This land demand, whose claimant was not mentioned in meeting minutes - but as we will see is a para-statal NGO financed by the World Bank - was for two adjacent "community nature reserves" (in Dialamakhan and in Mansadala). One of these reserves included not only the *terroir* areas of the rural community of Dialakoto but also part of

the classified forest of Diambour in the North. Following the deposition of this land demand, a "franc and loud" debate - which was not recorded in its entirety in the meeting minutes – took place, where the councilors were able to express their opposition to the land allocation. They stressed that 75% of the rural community's lands were already covered by a National Park and a Classified Forest and that the rural community was squeezed in between these two rural areas. While the population was increasing constantly, cultivable land was becoming scarce, and so were the pastures for herders. Despite these loud objections land allocations were also accepted.

This decision to include lands of village t*erroir*s and part of a classified forest as a "community forest" despite the opposition of the rural council indicates the importance of the pressure exerted over the rural community council from "above." This time pressure was exerted not for land for banana but for a community forest, which is branded as an example of "community-based" conservation by international donors and as an example of the application of decentralization to natural resource management in Senegal.

In this chapter, I will focus on how decentralization of the management of natural resources is carried out by "community-based" conservation and development projects. Through the analysis of a meeting held at the Regional Council of Tambacounda, I will show how the type of pressure exercised over the rural community council of Dialakoto is an integral aspect of decentralization reforms, which leave the doors open for privatization and increasing commoditization of natural resources. While decentralization discourse celebrates the community, the rural councils are left little choice but to sign the Local Conventions that establish "Community Forests." The last section of this chapter will look at how community based conservation works in Madina. I will look at how such projects authorized and supported by local administrators and laws, created and continue to create contradictory and complex effects and followed from cracks left by previous development projects.

The Regional Brokers of Development: The Hybrid NGOs and the Regional Council

The town of Tambacounda, since its "raise" in 1910s as a hub of trade and a passage point for peanuts, had been divided in two by the railroad. In one part there are buildings occupied by development projects, the Regional Council, Tribunal and governmental offices. The other part is where the townspeople live. The weekly market is set on the side of the development projects, where the administrative affairs are also conducted. This rapprochement of development projects, centers of commerce and government offices is particularly convenient - or may be related to - for the new hybrid NGOs that carry out the multitude of integrated conservation and development projects. At the same time, the existing "development industry"[282] of Tambacounda is now hit by these new competitors, whose focus seems to be the environment but whose goals and activities reach well beyond protected areas and reach peasants in their *terroir*s. These new projects, also compete with each in many levels, but particularly for the land and labor of local inhabitants, as I will show in the next section.

During my regular but short stays in Tambacounda, I met with the staff of several of these NGOs that implement community-based conservation and development projects in and around Madina Bloc and other areas of resettlement for the evictees of the National Park. I had heard about PROGEDE[283] early on, as it supported and financed women's gardening projects and beekeepers in Madina. I would also discover the importance of PROGEDE in the establishment of larger scale community-based conservation and development projects like Community Forests. PROGEDE is funded by the World Bank, the Government of Netherlands, Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and the Government of Senegal. PROGEDE operates under the oversight of two Ministries in Senegal: the Ministry of Environment and the Ministry of Energy (GEF, 2004). PROGEDE is not a small NGO working with limited funds. It is a colossal

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[282] Development projects in Tambacounda are funded by the development agencies of nation-states such as Denmark, Holland, France, Belgium, USA as well as by international organizations such as UNESCO, WB, FAO and EU which carry development projects that are funded both by these agencies and the nation states.

[283] PROGEDE is short for Programme de Gestion Durable et Participative des Energies Traditionnelles et de Substitution translated as "Sustainable and Participatory Energy Management Project" in the project document.

organization, whose institutional structure is divided into two main components that reflect the importance of the economic rationale underlying the overall project. The first component, which is also the most important in the Rural Community of Dialakoto, is called the "Supply Component"[284] and is put under the oversight of the Forestry Service. The Supply component takes over many of the forestry management tasks previously carried out by the Forestry Service. [285] The primary focus of PROGEDE is increasing the supply of charcoal for the urban areas - which was also one of the main areas of interest for the Forestry Service, which regulates charcoal production through a system of quotas. The project aims at achieving this goal through Community Forests, where charcoal production and extraction of other forest-based products would be done according to a "rational" exploitation plan and the "participation" of local communities. Two of these community forests are in the Eastern part of the rural Community of Dialakoto, next to the Classified Forest of Diambour. Besides Community Forests, the Supply component of PROGEDE is also involved in "revenue-generating" projects like horticulture, apiculture, poultry, herding and intensive cereal production. Finally, PROGEDE cooperates with the National Park Service at the buffer zone of the Niokolo-Koba National Park, which also concerns some of the most important surveillance functions of the National Park and Forestry Services [286](PROGEDE, 1999). PROGEDE's wide gamut of ambitious projects and large-scale operations are impossible to carry out without the approval and involvement of line ministries, as well as the Forestry and National Park Services, and without the funds of international agencies. This hybrid aspect is also evident in PROGEDE's management of its local operations. In fact, some members of the PROGEDE Senegalese local management team are recruited from the

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[284] The second component, the "Demand component" focuses on decreasing the demand for charcoal by encouraging alternative sources of energy and activities that reduce the energy consumption.

[285]The Demand component include among others, making an inventory and status of forests, monitoring forest growth, providing tree nurseries, environmental education and providing technical support to Forestry Service through training in forestry management.

[286] The proposed biodiversity related projects and activities include the inventory of wildlife, the prevention of forest fires, the "materialization" of the limits of the National Park and the Classified Forest and ensuring the coordination between the Park rangers and Forestry Service agents.

former Forestry Service administrators,[287] experts in Senegalese laws and the latest forest land and production management.

Another project that has a different approach to community-based conservation and theproduction of forest-based commodities is PROMER.[288] PROMER, under the oversight of the Ministry of Agriculture and Herding, supports and finances small scale rural entrepreneurs (rural micro-enterprises) including producers of forest-based commodities and cultivators (PROMER, 2003). PROGEDE funds 1,841 such micro-enterprises, which range from beekeeping to carpentry, baking, production of peanut oil etc. Its approach is different than PROGEDE's as it focuses uniquely on individual producers or *groupement*s, providing them with material and direct access to markets, rather than working through rural councils (or regional councils), line ministries, Forestry and National Park Services. PROMER provide employment for some of the villagers evicted from the Niokolo-Koba National Park, as I will discuss later, particularly the makers of bamboo furniture, fences and loofas.

Finally, although its activities had not yet been extended to the Rural Community of Dialakoto during my field research, Wula Nafaa was also an important newcomer in the development industry focusing on environment in Tambacounda. Wula Nafaa is a relatively "newcomer" to the development scene in Tambacounda, where PROGEDE had already been implanted since 1997. Wula Nafaa, is a USAID funded "participatory" and "community oriented" development project, which has played an important role in Tambacounda since 2003. Unlike PROGEDE and PROMER, Wula Nafaa was (initially)[289] not under the oversight of any line ministries. The project was developed by an independent US-based firm, which was contracted by USAID after bid, and was implemented as a part of USAID's mission to provide "technical assistance" for the Government of Senegal (Weidemann Associates, 2006). The project's approach flowed from a "multi-sectoral" model based on both Forestry and Agriculture. This model was based on three components: nature, wealth and power, corresponding to the

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[287] Personal communication with project staff.

[288] Projet d'Appui aux Micro Entreprises Rurales (Project of Support for Rural Micro Enterprises).

[289] This situation would change after 2007 when the "problems" with the Forestry Service had been resolved and the project had been put under the guardianship of the Forestry Service (IRG, 2007).

objectives of conservation, commercialization, and governance of natural resources (IRG, 2007; Weidemann Associates, 2006).

Wula Nafaa's projects overlap with projects supported by PROGEDE and PROMER. Wula Nafaa, like PROMER, focuses on supporting small entrepreneurs in the production and harvesting of "potentially marketable" commodities. The products selected by Wula Nafaa as commodities include (non-traditional)[290] agricultural products (e.g. honey and wax), which are or could be produced in agricultural areas, and natural-resource based products, which are to be extracted from forests (e.g. fruits, nuts, gum). Charcoal is also among the list of nature-resource based products targeted by Wula Nafaa. More importantly, the Power component of Wula Nafaa also focuses on local conventions, similar to the Community Forest conventions signed through the involvement of PROGEDE. Finally, like PROGEDE, Wula Nafaa's methods of participation are also based on supporting the existing *groupement*s or creating new ones for their own projects. As I will discuss in the last part of this chapter, this politics of recognition and reinforcement of selected actors would have important consequences for the evicted villages established in the Rural Community of Dialakoto in the North of the Niokolo-Koba National Park.

Despite their common emphasis on commodity production PROGEDE and Wula Nafaa differed on specific points about the "local communities'" involvement or "participation." While PROGEDE did not openly support the privatization of natural resources or forests by rural communities in agricultural zones, Wula Nafaa continually stressed working directly with local producers and rural communities for the purpose of gradual privatization and commercial market based production. Wula Nafaa, a newcomer to the development scene in Tambacounda, was eager to distinguish itself from PROGEDE by focusing on regional and rural councils - rather than on line ministries and the Forestry Service. The regional management office of Wula Nafaa in Tambacounda, whose staff included international experts, some of whom were once Peace Corps volunteers, expressed very well its eagerness to appear closer to "local" by adopting a project nickname in one of the "local languages." Wula Nafaa is the shortened version of the motto,

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[290] The "non-traditional" agriculturlal agricultural products include also palm oil, cashew nuts as well as fonio. These seem to be "non-traditional" for the project as they have not yet been yet entirely commercialized at the scale of peanuts or cotton, and, are not produced at a scale of food crops like millet and maize.

which is an approximate translation of the project's goals into Mandinka: "Wula Nafaa ani Faamaya." The utility, value and power of forests.[291] The naming of the project in Mandinka was aimed as a symbol, a sign of closeness between the project leaders and the people they worked with. Like the Peace Corps Volunteers[292] who adopt local nicknames, the project does not aim at translating the project goals to "populations" but to claim a "locally" based legitimacy. This local legitimacy is not only in the eyes of, for example, the women who work in the production of karite butter, which had become one of the main ingredients of alternative beauty products in the West. It is also in the eyes of the regional councils, the representatives of the most recently "decentralized" local collectivity of Senegal. As the Regional Council Meeting in the next section will illustrate, the council will make an extra effort to mediate between the USAID project and other major players in community-based conservation at the regional level.

The Rural Council of Tambacounda was elected after the 1996 Regionalization Law [293], which gave the council the most important task of coordination" of development efforts and "mediation" between different partners in development. The regional council is empowered by the Regionalization Law to carry out this important role. The council is authorized to sign local conventions with local collectivities, public, private or international organizations. The council will draft regional development plans that will establish local land use and management. The Regional Council has its own regional development agency (Agence Régional de Développement), which carries out the drafting of regional plans and is involved in the signing of all local conventions, including the Conventions establishing the Community Forests. Although the regional council is defined as a "local collectivity," just like the rural council, because of its ambitious role in framing regional-level development activities and plans, into which all local plans and development projects are supposed to fit, some scholars pointed to the capacity of regional

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[291] Based on Bambara-French Dictionary Charles Bailleul.

[292] In fact, some of the workers in such NGO programs originate from the Peace Corps, who according to the "custom" of this institution, should take a local name within the communities where they work. This cultural integration strategy used by Peace Corps is also adopted by larger development oriented projects funded by the United States based organizations or NGOs.

[293] Law No. 96-06 of 22nd of March 1996 on Local Collectivities.

councils to exercise a different type of oversight, this time mostly “technical” oversight, over the rural communities (Cisse, 2004).

In the next section, I will look at how these hybrid NGOs, state agencies and representatives of the rural communities interact within the framework provided them through new decentralization laws based on a meeting held in the Regional Council of Tambacounda. The meeting debates will show that while each of these projects and institutions seem to share the common goal of ensuring “democratic” community participation in conservation and development, there are also important conflicts and a fierce competition among them about the limits of their territorial jurisdiction, ownership of natural resources and their best productive use. In the next section, I will show that these confrontations are also about claiming authority over the use and “benefits” of natural resources at the regional level. Yet one of the most important challenges that regional actors of integrated conservation and development continue to face, as did colonial development projects, is to find a steady and “fixed” labor force for the increasingly growing number of development projects. I will come back to this point and the effects of community-based conservation for development in the last section of this chapter.

Debating Authority: State Gives with one hand and takes back with the other

In October of 2004, I was invited to a public meeting held at the Regional Council of Tambacounda to observe the debates on the application of decentralization to the management of natural resources. The meeting was initiated by Wula Nafaa, whose staff I had come to know during my regular stays in Tambacounda. The Regional Council, which had taken a close interest in the issue of environment and the management of natural resources in the region since its establishment 1997, had organized the meeting to bring together the “partners” of development and sustainable natural resource management in the region.

On the day of the meeting[294], I was in a meeting hall, a large amphitheater, which looked like a parliamentary assembly. Seats Were positioned in a semi-circle, facing the podium, where

[294] 10 October 2004.

the “main” discussants were lined up with their name tags in front of them: the Vice-President of the Regional Council of Tambacounda, and the Director and Coordinators of the USAID funded project Wula Nafaa. They looked out from the elevated podium to a large audience of mixed provenance. The participants included high-level representatives of the centralized state conservation and agricultural services[295] (the Forestry, National Park and Agricultural Services) and the staff and project managers of PROGEDE and PROMER. From the long list of participants in the meeting agenda, also figured representatives of the Chamber of Commerce, women’s organizations, as well as associations of herders and from the rural community councils of Tambacounda and Koumpentoum. The only rural community councils represented in the meeting were from Neteboulou and Kothiary,[296] which had signed the Community Forest Agreements with PROGEDE. The presence of only two councilors may be an indicator of the low level of support among other rural community councils (such as the Rural Community council of Dialakoto)But the reticence of the rural councilors to speak directly to the assembly, except through the President of the Association of Rural Community Councils (to which I will return later) sends an important message about the dominance of hybrid NGOs, the state Forestry, and the National Parks and Agricultural Services in debates held in “democratic forums” like the regional councils.

In fact, the first part of the meeting was entirely devoted to the presentations of the director and “experts” of Wula Nafaa. The second part of the meeting, much shorter than the first, was reserved for the comments of other participants. There were several issues that were discussed in the meeting.

My analysis of the arguments of the speakers is organized according to those issues. I listened to the arguments on these central issues and how the participants responded to each other. There were debates over how decentralization applied to natural resource management becomes a foil against which conflicts, arising from competition over defining access to natural resources and land, are played out.

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[295] They consisted of the directors of the Forestry Services of Tambacounda and Kolda, the Director of the Niokolo-Koba National Park and representatives from the Ministries of Tourism and Agriculture.

[296]Only the names of the Presidents of these two rural community councils figured in the list of participants of the meeting.

Nature as Capital

In his opening statement, the Vice-President of the Regional Council described the general framework of the meeting by reminding the assembly of the two important goals of the Senegalese government: administrative decentralization and privatization. He presented the Wula Naafa as a "program of the Government of Senegal supported by the United States of America." Wula Nafaa was a "legitimate" interlocutor, recognized by the government for its goal to fight poverty and advance the development of Senegal. He continued:

> Today, nature is a wealth that populations are claiming. Thieseclaims are made to enable the common functions of any human society, to carry out agricultural production and cultural reproduction. If these functions are not carried out in sustainable ways we will face environmental problems. This is why Wula Nafaa is an important development project intervening in the region of Tambacounda.

In this opening speech the vice-president of the Regional Council underlined two important goals that the council shared with the Senegalese government and the USAID project: privatization and decentralization. By underlining these two goals, the vice-president was not shy about his support for neoliberal decentralization through privatization. He also defined nature as wealth, similar to the idea expressed in Wula Nafaa's motto. For if nature was a kind of wealth, whose value is determined according to the financial revenues that it provides, the question of how to distributed this wealth was crucial for "local populations." Local populations wanted a share from this wealth, and their claims were justified by their need to continue to "function" properly. At the end, however, although the wealth should be made available for the good functioning of the rural society, it had to be obtained through sustainable production. Otherwise, the region would face environmental problems.

The Head of the Wula Nafaa program in Dakar and in Tambacounda took the floor after the vice-president to present the project's goals to the assembly. The overall mission of the project was presented as a "fight against poverty." To eradicate poverty it was necessary to promote "sustainable and participatory development." This is what the project proposed to do in Tambacounda through its three components: nature, wealth and power. These three components were also designed to address three problems of the rural areas: the degradation of the environment and desertification; poverty and a lack of access to governance. For each of these

problems, the project had specific proposals. Before going into detail about what the project proposed as measures in each of these domains, the Project Director from the Office of Dakar stressed one important issue: Wula Nafaa was focusing only on village *terroir*s. The project was entirely concerned with the "sustainable use" of natural resources within *terroir* zones by "valorizing" the natural resources in agricultural areas. By "valorization" the project meant the production of certain *terroir* "products" (while protecting the trees) and giving a "market share" to the producers.

With this explanation, Wula Nafaa's management sought to delineate its "territories" as *terroir* zones, not protected areas. Natural resources in *terroir* zones were important capital for the poverty stricken rural communities of Senegal. They needed to be "valorized," and local producers had to be supportive by providing access to markets. The field director of the project in Tambacounda, who had considerable experience in Botswana summarized his view of nature as wealth as follows:

> Botswana is an example of the success of our approach. While the population increased the wealth also increased. This is because in poor countries (like Botswana and Senegal), within the total stock of capital available to the country, the natural capital has a much larger share. This means that it is best to focus on natural capital to eradicate poverty and to distribute this natural wealth through decentralization.

For the director, an underdeveloped and poor country like Botswana should rely on its natural resources, which are convertible into marketable commodities. In fact, the "economist" of the project further explained the market-based logic:

> If population increases, there will be more demand for natural resources. If natural resources are more in demand, that means there will be more use of natural resources. If natural resources are used more this will increase their (market) value. There will be dynamism. So population increase will mean more market opportunities for populations.... Wula Nafaa's approach to nature as capital means that like any economic good, nature can bring economic benefits over the long run. We have to look at natural capital to overcome poverty.

These hasty links between population increase, increased demand for resources and their increased value, were formulated to put commoditization of the natural resources at the center as the solution to poverty. Once nature had become a commodity everywhere, its "economic benefits" would, "in the long run," trickle down to rural people. The economist of the project summed up nature as a capital approach and why it mattered for "populations" as follows:

> If the management of natural resources doesn't have an economic interest for people, they will not do it. Our purpose is to create a framework to people to make best decisions possible in line with their own interests.

For the economist, clearly the "populations'" best interest was in economic benefits they would derive from nature. In fact, they would not protect nature if they did not have an economic interest in doing so. From the project's expose it was clear that its whole approach was based on a neoliberal view of economics, which defined the value of nature in these terms. At the same time, the "populations" to which the project claimed to be so close, using impeccable economic logic, were expected to follow the rational path suggested to them,, but not imposed on them[297]. Given this economic rationale and the "framework" that the project and decentralization reforms will provide, peasants would make the right decision of engaging in intensive production of nature-based commodities and extraction of resources for the world market.

Power of Ownership of Nature

Another important theme of Wula Nafaa's presentation was the question of property. The project director justified his support for privatization by explaining the Power Component of the Project. The Project Director from Dakar explained the Power component as follows:

> The Power component of our program focuses on natural resources as means to consolidate democracy and the reform of governance. We need to clarify the rights of the local populations over resources... To whom do trees belong? Who makes decisions about their exploitation? We need to make sure that the power to manage natural resources is given to institutions, which are better placed to exercise those rights.

Wula Nafaa was thus proposing a new distribution of power through property rights within the framework proposed by decentralization. According to this reasoning, if the users and their rights could be clearly identified, they could be made the "managers" of resources and backed up with state recognized authority to exercise their rights. This proposal pushing for privatization of use-rights of natural resources through a re-distribution of rights was different than the National

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[297] The economist's discourse of the right "framework" echoed the current discourse of many major global financial institutions and development agencies including the World Bank. Criticized of for prescribing the development solutions to the governments of underdeveloped' countries, these institutions have developed a new discourse about how people themselves can make their "own" choices.

Domain Law, which declared that forests and land was under the guardianship of a centralized state. The economist of the project underlined this when he said:

> The assumption that nature belongs to the State is not valid any more... We need to make sure that the managers of the natural resources have secure access to natural resources and that they have the knowledge of this access. By this I mean, we need a new system of land tenure, other than the traditional land tenure which is not sufficient for development. It is necessary that populations have the *feeling* [my emphasis] that they are investing in natural resources and that they will derive benefit from it.

For the economist of the project, to think of natural resources as the property of the state was no longer a correct assumption. Natural resources were used by local people, and they should be the ones who manage these resources. Speaking of and on behalf of them, the economist argued that, as (rational) managers, peasants needed a more secure access to resources. This security was not provided by the state, and the traditional land tenure - which may or may not have provided security - was not "sufficient for development." The best solution for the economist was to make nature an economic "asset" - a property that could be bought and sold - so that local people "felt" secure about investing in it.

Wula Naafa's call for clarifying rights over and ownership of natural resources was supported by the Vice-president of the Regional Council of Tambacounda. However, the Regional council's discourse and justifications differed from Wula Nafaa's. The Vice President of the Regional Council stressed the importance of "cultural" understanding of nature, and peasants saw themselves excluded from access to nature:

> Nature, Wealth and Power, what kind of relationship exists between these elements? Within which context? Nature has a cultural element. Those who live at the seaside have a different view of nature than those who live in the mountains. My sensibility towards nature depends on where I come from. We are a developing country where the level of alphabetization is very low in rural areas. How does the peasant see nature? This nature does not belong to him. Nature is for everybody and for nobody. To change these attitudes, education is important.

According to the Vice-President, the peasant's sensibility and attitudes towards nature were rooted in the place, in the region, and it was part of its cultural, local identity. At the same time, peasants in Tambacounda continued to view nature as something that was "for everybody and for nobody." The vice-president stressed the "traditional" aspect of the peasant's view of nature by positing it as an inalienable property object. The idea of private property was not rooted in peasants' minds, partly due to a lack of necessary education. Education would change these

backward attitudes towards property. It was also necessary to educate peasants about matters related to administration and governance to help them understand their rights:

> The peasant does not know documents that concern him, and even if he knows them he does not know where to find them...

Supporting this view, the representative of the Regional Development Agency (ARD) added that it was necessary to make peasants know the legal texts, so that they could learn their rights - especially their rights about forests that the new decentralization law had conferred on them. Summing up the Regional Council's views on the issue of private property, the vice-president noted:

> If the peasant cannot sell his land, he cannot put it in productive use and increase its value. Similarly, if nature is not well managed, it will have no value. To help peasants generate value from land and nature, State must help peasants. At the time of "colons" the resources were their property. Today these resources have become the property of the State. When would the populations derive benefit from this?

By linking the ownership of land (a peasant cannot sell his land) to productivity and increasing economic value of land, the Vice-President seemed to be supporting Wula Nafaa's view about privatization. Yet he was doing so cautiously, by calling for the guidance of the State, which he considered to be the current owner of land, over natural resources. Natural resources were once the "property" of the colonial administration (colons), but now they were the property of the Senegalese State. The vice-president felt that the situation had not changed much compared to the colonial order of things. Peasants were still not deriving any benefits from the extraction of resources.

Competing Jurisdictions and Politics of Recognition: Classified and Community Forests

While Wula Nafaa and the Regional Council saw an important opportunity in privatization of natural resources in the "framework" proposed by decentralization reforms, not all participants looked at Wula Nafaa's high-level appearance in the region in a positive way. As explained earlier, Wula Nafaa's activities overlap considerably with projects funded and carried out by other hybrid NGOs like PROGEDE and PROMER. Wula Nafaa, just like PROGEDE, was aiming at charcoal

production, and, although the overall emphasis remained on the *terroir* areas, the project was also considering drafting local agreements for charcoal production. Wula Nafaa's aim to extend into charcoal production was not welcomed, particularly by PROGEDE and the Forestry Service. The Representative of PROGEDE questioned Wula Nafaa's authority by stressing that the project did not know or take into consideration the specificities of Senegalese juridical and political context and that it was not only working in *terroir* zones but in protected areas as well. According to PROGEDE's Director:

> Wula Nafaa experiences are based on other countries. Senegal's juridical and political context is very specific. Wula Nafaa works also with the populations living within the classified forests. Classified Forests are under the responsibility of technical services. Talking to populations without mentioning technical services is a mistake.

PROGEDE' s critique of Wula Nafaa was based on two points. First that Wula Nafaa did not know the specific context of Senegal, which was different from other parts of the world. This specific context of Senegal required that projects like Wula Nafaa, before "talking to populations," should talk with "Technical Services" - that is the Forestry Service. The PROGEDE also objected to Wula Nafaa's intervention in Classified Forests. Although the Director did not clarify the content of this cooperation with populations within the Classified Forests, it is not unreasonable to assume that he was referring to the difference between the sites of collection (classified forests) and sites of production (*terroir*s) of forest based resources. While Wula Nafaa's concern is the production and sale of forest-derived products, where these resources are extracted from is not their concern. Or they assume that the extraction takes place in *terroir* zones. However, as is the case at the northern borders of the National Park, most agricultural areas used for intensive cash crop production are depleted of natural resources. This means that those who are engaged in Wula Nafaa's forest-based commodity production projects have to venture into places where these resources still exist, that is, to protected areas. According to this reasoning, Wula Nafaa, by promoting such products in *terroir* zones, is encouraging their "illegal" extraction from protected areas, which are under the jurisdiction of Forestry or National Park Service.

However, the Director of PROGEDE is more concerned with Wula Nafaa's lack of cooperation with the Forestry Service, than his concern about illegal extraction from forests. PROGEDE is also engaged, and on a much larger scale than Wula Nafaa, in the production of

such commodities in the Classified Forest of Diambour. Part of the Classified Forest is now a Community Forest, which is set up specifically for the production of charcoal and extraction of other resources. PROGEDE, which drafts the management plans for Community Forests and forces through the local conventions, is indeed deeply involved in Classified Forests. PROGEDEs real objection was thus, not tto he extraction of resources, but their "illegal" extraction, that is their collection by the inhabitants of rural communities or migrants themselves under the management of Wula Nafaa, escaping the control of PROGEDE and the Forestry Service.

As PROGEDE, the Forestry Service of Tambacounda also stressed activities of Wula Nafaa's in the Classified Forest of Diambour and advised the programme to cooperate with PROGEDE:

> Wula Nafaa is stepping outside the *terroir* zones. Wula Nafa works with populations living within the classified forests. It should cooperate with PROGEDE. PROGEDE has to be included within the management plans, especially those concerning the classified forest. The community Reserve of Maline-Dino at the periphery of the National Park is a good example... There are other examples of co-management of forests (such as the forest of Wouli) that are underway. Local environmental codes are being developed and these local codes will organize the valorization and protection of natural resources.

The Forestry Service Director objected to Wula Nafaa's involvement in the Classified Forest because it did not work with PROGEDE. If the project was aiming to work with "populations" in Classified Forests, it had to cooperate with the Forestry Service and PROGEDE, which had already set up Community Forests. The Forestry Service Director was also making reference to Wula Nafaa's own attempts to develop its own local conventions, similar to ones proposed by PROGEDE.[298]

The Deputy Director of the Niokolo-Koba National Park agreed with Wula Nafaa's view that "populations" would not cooperate in the management of nature if they did not have an interest in it. In an era of participation the "National Park would be better managed if it offered an interest for populations." However, projects like Wula Nafaa could not bypass the Technical Services:

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[298] Wula Nafaa had already developed such a local convention in the Southern limits of the National Park. This Local Convention, also a Local Code defining specific "community," imposed restrictions and sanctions about on the use of natural resources, and sanctions, which were very similar to the restrictions foreseen by the Forestry Code and were carried out previously by the Forestry Service (USAID/SENEGAL, 2003).

> We are technicians working in institutions that are affected by the natural resource management… We have the necessary specialized knowledge but we need resources to implement it.

For the Deputy Director, the "technicians" were indispensable because of their knowledge of natural resource management. However, Wula Nafaa could be useful by helping them provide the resources to implement this knowledge. Thus, the National Park Service would show interest in the project if it could offer its resources in eco-tourism and the production of commodities in the buffer zone. He summed up the position of the National Park Service:

> Nature is like a cow producing milk on the prairie of the peasant. Development programs have to associate with state structures and local organizations, so that a capitalist does not exploit the environment without sharing profits with the populations.

The National Park Service presented itself as the "buffer" between the capitalists and peasants, by protecting populations from the snatching of their profits by "development programs." Development programs had to cooperate with technical services (that is the National Park Service and the Forestry Service). The profits obtained from nature, the "milk producing cow" would be allowed only in village *terroir*s, the "prairie of the peasant" without any attempt to the territories of the National Park.

In summary, PROGEDE, Forestry Service and the National Park Service strongly opposed Wula Nafaa's attempts to work in the region for the "participatory" management of resources unless the project integrated itself or agreed to work with them. While the National Park Service looked for Wula Nafaa's cooperation in the buffer zone and its support in ecotourism, the tensions between Wula Nafaa, the Forestry Service and PROGEDE was based on the intrusion of the USAID project into territories over which the Forestry Service and PROGEDE claimed authority and control.

In fact, PROGEDE finds itself increasingly in competition with Wula Nafaa in multiple areas of intervention. PROGEDE plays a central role in the drafting of management plans as well as the Local Codes that are included in the agreements that set up the Community Forests. The Community Forest Conventions had also recently come under the scrutiny of researchers who analyzed PROGEDE's Community Forests, the political process that led to their creation and its

impact on local communities (Bandiaky, 2008)[299]. These studies showed that for the creation of such reserves villagers had been forced to abandon the fields that they had already planted. The studies also saw a similarity between the evictions from the National Park and their displacement due to the creation of the Community Reserve. As I mentioned in the introduction, the Rural Community had approved the creation of Reserve under the pressure of sub-prefect, after heated debates and despite strong opposition. This illustrates that such reserves, created in the name of the "community" and for "community benefit" are not very different from other types of coercions exercised at the local level, especially on village chiefs, for charcoal production (J.C. Ribot, 2009).

Wula Nafaa's Local Agreements are not substantially different than the ones elaborated under PROGEDE, as these agreements are also attempts to transfer controls, more than powers, of the Forestry Service in *terroir* areas. This devolution of control mechanisms works through village communities and the surveillance and management of natural resources, and has the important effect of new local actors, challenging the existing village authority relations and competing with village chiefs and notables. I will look at this important effect in the later analysis of the involvement of evictees of Niokolo-Koba National Park in "participatory conservation." However, at the regional council's meeting this dynamic had also surfaced in the comments of the President of the Cattle Herder's Association of Koumpentoum,[300] who said:

> Taking a forest and giving it to a Rural Community is a new practice. The opinion of Inter-Village Development Councils should be taken into consideration when the Rural Community allocates forests… In order to prevent damage on forests and educate populations it is necessary to establish village surveillance teams...On the other hand, Classified Forests are increasingly exploited for karaya gum, by people originating from outside the region of Tambacounda. Karaya gum (mbep) is not only important for its gum but also for its leaves. Mbep leaves are an important food for the herds. Damages caused to Classified forest from foreign herders from Thies are substantial. We recently confiscated 300 machetes used for illegal exploitation of karaya gum.

The President of the Herder's Association was concerned both with Community Forests and Classified Forests, mainly because of karaya gum trees, whose leaves provide one of the

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[299] This study focuses on the village of Dialamakhan at the North-Eastern part of the Rural Community of Dialakoto.

[300] The presence of the President of the Association of Herders of Koumpentoum was also significant because Koumpentoum is a center for most herders who migrate from Northern regions of Senegal and descend to the Southern parts of the region of Tambacounda, where they hope to find more grazing land for their herds.

essential nutrients for herds. The extraction of karaya gum for commercial production, supported by Wula Nafaa, is viewed as a competition against the herder's use of this resource. As karaya gum is also more available in protected area forests than around village agricultural lands, access to Classified Forests and wooded areas that are candidates for Community Forests is crucial for pastoralists. Classified Forests are also important, as I have shown in the case of the herders, among the evicted villages for water sources, and they are spaces where herders can still go around without "damaging" someone's land.

According to the President, "taking" these forests and "giving" them to Rural Community Councils bypassed the herders, who are only represented in certain village "committees." The President, looking for the recognition of herders in the management of Community and Classified Forest, believed that herders should have been involved through surveillance teams. This proposal is particularly interesting given the stereotypes of herders and their destructive effects on nature that have their roots in colonial discourses but also permeate through postcolonial conservation discourse. The Cattle Herders' Association was now proposing to reverse this and give herders the power of surveillance against the herders who came from outside of the region. The President of the Association was not objecting to the use of karaya gum trees by local herders for grazing but for its exploitation for commercial purposes and by herders originating from a different region of Senegal. We see in this intervention how nativity arguments are deployed for "regional" resources and how the politics of claiming authority over forests work in tandem within the frame provided by the politics of recognition of decentralization. As the case of Madina Bloc will show, the transfer of the authority of the surveillance "function" of the Forestry Service creates important divides and competition at the village level and pits village committees against rural councils, rural council against villagers etc.

Benefits of Nature: Access to Markets and Distribution of Profits

During the meeting held in the Regional Council, none of the interlocutors had objected to Wula Nafaa's goal of turning nature into a wealth. PROGEDE, the Forestry Service and the National Park Service did not object to Wula Nafaa's "capital-intensive" method but objected to the political means through which the project proposed to implement it. These political means

were encapsulated in the “Power” Component of the project, which was directly concerned with “strengthening decentralization” in Senegal. The Project Director of Wula Nafaa had stressed at the beginning of his intervention that the “natural capital” of Senegal, and Tambacounda should be “distributed” through decentralization. Wula Nafaa saw decentralization as a means to two kinds of distribution: The distribution of private property rights through privatization (power component) and the distribution of benefits from the sale of nature-based commodities (wealth component). This was also the concern of PROMER, which focuses on the local extraction and commercialization of natural resources, but does so by directly funding and supporting the rural producers.

When he took the floor, the representative of PROMER was very vocal about his disagreement with PROGEDE, the Forestry and National Park Services regarding their necessary role in overseeing the management of resources as “Technical Services:”

> There is much stress on technical services. But we have seen the limitations of this approach. Populations don’t profit from the valorization of natural resources. Local populations don’t have access to information about markets; they lack financial resources necessary to process and transform local natural resources into products that satisfy market exigencies. It is not a question of encouraging and inciting populations but a question of terms of exchange.

Instead of drafting “community” management plans and organizing the rural councils and various village communities for the management of new Community Forests or forests in *terroir* zones, PROMER was directly dealing with peasants as producers of commodities. From this perspective, the intervention of organizations like PROGEDE or Forestry Services was not only dictating their own rules of access to resources, but they were also intervening in how much peasants obtained from the production of forest-based commodities and how these were distributed. As the representative pointed out, these organizations did not deal with “terms of exchange,” that is, they did not concern themselves with (or worse worked with) powerful merchants - particularly charcoal merchants. Peasants did not have direct access to markets and were not able to negotiate the prices. Although PROMER’s representative did not comment on Wula Nafaa’s involvement with Community Conventions, he supported the project’s approach to “non-traditional” agricultural products in *terroir* zones, which proposed to support individual or groups of producers of commodities through technical and financial means. As I will explain in the

next section, this approach led to the specialization of some of the evictees of the National Park in the production of nature-based commodities. However, this precarious production continues to be closely monitored by Forestry Service.

I had mentioned that none of the rural community council presidents present in the meeting had taken the floor to express their opinions, despite the fact that the meeting was -presumably- about decentralization and the devolution of the powers to manage natural resources to rural councils. This silence does not come as a surprise given the considerable pressure they face from the sub-prefect, the CERP, and the Forestry Service in the exercise of the "powers" of land allocation, as explained in the previous chapter. However, at the very end of the meeting the President of the Association of PCRs (Presidents of Rural Councils) of Tambacounda and Koumpentoum made the following short commentary supporting Wula Nafaa:

> The management of the environment is competency transferred to rural communities. However, what the State gives with its right hand, it also takes back with its left hand. The management of natural resources generates financial resources. How will the state allow these resources to be devolved to local populations? Wula Nafaa program is a very good initiative for this.

As the representative of the rural community council of presidents, he supported Wula Nafaa's initiative, particularly when it came to its role in pushing the state to "allow" the devolution of power and wealth of natural resources to rural communities. In the present state of affairs, although the state claimed to have given the management of the environment to rural communities, it did not loosen its grip over them. The State had given the councils the right to pass conventions involving exploitation of natural resources, but the rules of these conventions and the political process through which they were implemented had taken away the control of councils over those resources. The State had given them the power with its right hand but only in order to take it away with its left hand. Projects like Wula Nafaa were good initiatives to break this vicious circle.

This comment left me with the strong impression that the rural council had only a marginal role in forums like Regional Council. While the Forestry and National Park Services sought to protect or regain their control over forests, rural councils were quickly swallowed in the whirlwind of "community-based" commodity production, as the only benefit of decentralization appeared to be more participation in the "market," and the new hybrid NGOs were the most

important means for it. When I thought about Madina Bloc and its inhabitants, however, the rural council did not appear as marginal as it seemed in this meeting. In the next section, I will look at how the evictees of the National Park are integrated into this new “community-based” conservation and at the contradictory effects that this integration creates.

Neoliberal Community-based Conservation and Commodification of Nature in Madina

Everyman for himself: The Bamboo Fences

The production of a variety of commodities that use forests had started in resettlement areas of the evictees of the National Park through different channels during the 1990s. Philly in Niemeneke recounted the shift that occurred between the Foresters and the evictees:

> When we left the Park to come here, we found those Forestry agents who were in the Park also over here. At that time, this whole place was a classified forest. Often Foresters would find women in Niemeneke to warn and educate them about the forest and its resources. Women had started to make sponges (loofas) at that time. Foresters were giving them hard time and the women were praying to God everyday so that the Almighty gave them something else to do than these sponges. They were going in to the forest for leaves to make those sponges and they did not have a permit. That means whenever they were caught they had to pay fees to Foresters. Their prayers came true because forestry agents came to help them and direct them in their task. Before that though, if you brought a carpet from leaves to the market, Foresters used to come and confiscate it. If you thought that you would make some money to bring home to feed your children, you would come home empty handed. It is only when PROGEDE came here that things have started to change. This project is there to give us ways to protect the forest but also make something out of its resources.

For Philly, the same agents who were in the Park and who controlled hunting, bush fires and exerted pressure on the villagers and village chief, almost followed them to places they resettled after the eviction. The foresters got women started early on in the production of loofas which are made from the trees of African palm. I have seen many women in the village of Badi doing them, and whoever approached Badi could hear from far the sound of the sticks pounding on the leaves to separate them into stems, which would later be rolled up to make a loofa. In Madina, as women did not have any permits, they had to pay foresters if they were caught. However, things had changed with PROGEDE, whose approach was different. What PROGEDE represented was a different type of Forester. It gave people in Madina ways to protect the forest but also make

money out of it. It was the prayers come true, a Forester who allowed them to make a living from the forest.

The production of forest-based commodities in resettlement areas ranged from loofas to sieves made from African palm tree leaves and from furniture to fences, made from bamboo. One could see, once in a while, on the main road linking Wassadou to Tambacounda, lines of bamboo furniture, awaiting clients from Tambacounda or Dakar. While furniture and loofas were destined for urban centers, bamboo fences were in great demand around Madina. I had seen these fences everywhere, erected at the edges of some villages to mark the border, or around the vegetable gardens to mark the land as sign of property. The bamboo fences, locally called “crinting”s depend just like loofas on the extraction of a resource, bamboo, which is not found around the villages. It is hard to find bamboo fence producers in the middle of villages, as they often work at the interior of the Classified Forest or in areas that are out of the way and out of sight from Foresters.

When I had visited Boulakounda to meet the evictees from Tabadian, I met with Cissokho who was making his living by making bamboo fences. Boulakounda, although it was closer to Missirah, was a village relatively far from the main road, but close enough to the Classified Forest. Cissokho was 25 years old when he had left Tabadian Soukouto, one of the Diakhanke speaking villages of the region of Tabadianin within the National Park. When he was in Tabadian, he had cultivated mainly peanuts, millet and cotton. After the eviction, when he came to Boulakounda, one of the main struggles that Cissokho faced was to find land to cultivate. He had started to work in the field of his mother’s husband first. But when he got married and had kids, this was not enough any more:

> You know, the time we are living in now and the time when I was in Tabadian Soukouto are two different times. At that time, you could buy a bicycle for 10.000 F, now it costs 60.000 F. There, you could have a large family and still provide for it. But today, if you have a family, you would see your children scattered around because everyday life is very difficult and expensive.

To provide for his family and send his sons to school Cissokho had chosen to diversify his earnings by producing bamboo fences and furniture. Before he had started the bamboo fences, Cissokho was a praise singer (griot), and he was not entirely unfamiliar with craftsmanship:

> You know, my grand mother was a griot. So were my brothers...A griot is someone who knows the history. He is the one who will sing to remind the origins of a family, its installation (at certain places), its migrations until present. I inherited this profession from my family... So, my first profession was to be a griot. As a griot, I knew how to make drums. This skill had served me when I later started to do carpets from the millet stems. When I was a griot, I became ill and went to look for medicine. It was not an illness that western medicine could heal. I came to a village where people were producing carpets from the millet stems. I learnt how to make the carpets in that village... When I came back to the village (Boulakounda), I started to make the carpets. People came to see, they were interested. I started to sell.

Cissokho's skill in drum making also helped him to quickly master how to make carpets and later how to make bamboo fences:

> Initially we would go into the Classified Forest and pick up bamboo left by Serrers. After they had finished cutting bamboo to make sieves, they would leave parts that they did not need. We used those to make fences. At that time, PROMER from Tambacounda came to find me. They took me to Tivawouane for training. I spent two years there and came back here. The following year another project took me for training. Last season I was also at a training. Now I am the one who trains other people.

Cissokho was among those evictees who had difficulties in gaining access to his own land to use for agriculture. He had worked in the fields of his mother's husband first. It was only when he wasn't able to earn enough for his family that he had decided to start making carpets and fences. When PROMER had come to "find" him, he had already learned his craft thanks to his own efforts. In a way, projects like PROMER capitalize on the prior experience that the artisans have to turn them into mass producers specifically trained for the market. But PROMER allowed him to become a more important producer, who could now train others to work for his account. With all that labor force, he was now a bigger producer:

> When I work during the dry season, I can produce as much as hundred and seventeen chairs. People come from Tambacounda, Dakar, Kedougou to buy, but my biggest clients are from Missirah and Tambacounda... We have no intermediaries. We do not have a *groupement*. Everyone for himself.

Cissokho distinguished the bamboo producers from the *groupement*s. His was a small size "independent" capitalist enterprise. He did not work for a *groupemen*t or cooperative that helped to pull resources. Every individual worked for his own account. The small enterprise of Cissokho was part of a well-greased commodity chain, where merchants came in to the village and placed their orders. I asked Cissokho:

> M: What about the Forestry Service, do they come and bother you?

> C: For me, I have no problems with them. Because it is the State who had trained me to do this and gave me the material. The Forests and us get along well here. I cooperate with them when they ask me to point to illegal producers. I also negotiate with Forestry Service in case other producers from my village have problems with them... Besides, lets say a merchant ordered hundred bamboo fences, he should have a permit. If he doesn't he will have problems with the Forestry Service. For us, it is not our problem because we don't use the fences to sell, it is the merchant who sells them.

Cissokho's account showed clearly that the Forestry Service, which stood on the high ground of protecting Classified Forests during the Regional Council's meeting, was indeed already involved in commodity production within the Classified Forest through the permits that it distributed to urban merchants. PROMER, on the other hand, by choosing already trained craft workers to set up their own small businesses, had helped them to become small scale entrepreneurs in their own village. The training and help of PROMER was also in a way a shield for Cissokho, who reiterated to me the line of justification that he would give in case of trouble: It was PROMER – (which was the representative of the State, as it was authorized to do so) who had trained him and who had given him the material to work with. Yet, this shield was not strong enough, as Cissokho and producers like him still had to establish "good relations" with the Forestry Service. The Forestry Service, which distributed permits to merchants, was the biggest boss of them all. Therefore, PROMER in the case of Cissokho did help him to acquire a "market share," but only to become part of a a chain where Forestry Service continues to control all the strategic points.

Community at Work: Vegetable Gardens in Madina

As Philly explained me, the Forestry Service had also been involved with loofa production in Madina. According to Philly, when the Forestry Service took the cloak of PROGEDE things started to change. Madina was part of PROGEDE's "biodiversity conservation" program that was run together with the National Park Service at the buffer zone of the Niokolo-Koba National Park (PROGEDE, 1999). PROGEDE's partnership with the National Park Service fell into the category of supporting income-generating projects to ensure the "security" of the resources enclosed by the National Park.

Vegetable gardens were very visible in Madina, surrounded by bamboo or other types of fences. You could tell from the door or from some crumbling fences women carrying buckets of

water they fetched from the well at the center of the garden back and forth between neatly lined plants. Potatoes, lettuces, peppers, onions, eggplants were all produced there, although one could hardly find any of them in the daily meals of villagers. Often times, when I visited families, they were next to vegetable gardens. Even when they did not have much to offer, they offered me something to eat or drink. Sometimes we shared a meal, mostly a bowl of pounded millet with peanut sauce on top. One time, when I was at Ousmane's, I asked him:

> M: Ousmane, I know there are gardens next door. But I don't see you eating anything that is planted there. Why is that?
>
> O: These are not to eat at home, women sell them in the market. It is their business.

I was clearly on a touchy topic. But I still asked him when he had first heard about them. Ousmane told me that when the first vegetable garden project appeared in Madina, he had just lost his first wife and had heard about it through his mother's relatives. In the mean time, Ousmane's wife had also joined us on the courtyard, and the group grew as women and men who were stopping by jumped in the conversation. Ousmane's wife explained that initially three women from the Pulaar-speaking evicted villages of Madina had formed a gardening group in 1993. At that time, it was a "project" that an inhabitant of Dialakoto, Samele, had put in place through funds from a "toubab" (white man). Although he sometimes intervened in the conversation, I could clearly see that Ousmane had kept a cynical look in his eyes when he let others tell me the story of the vegetable gardens.

When this first project died down, PROGEDE's gardening project replaced it. The "new" garden of PROGEDE was run by two men, a project "animateur" of PROGEDE (Diallo) and a former "animateur" (Tijane) from the first unsuccessful gardening project. This is when Ousman intervened to clarify who Tijane was and how he was tied to other projects:

> Tijane is from Madina Gounass. He was brought up in one of the daaras (Koranic schools) there. He came to Wasadu-Depot when OFADEC was beginning. He got in OFADEC. He stayed in OFADEC for three years until Samele from Dialakoto arrived.

One of the women in the room said disapprovingly..."Hmmmm... that Samele!" indicating that they were not so happy with him.

Ousman continued:

> So, Tijane left OFADEC and started to work with Samele. Samele got him initiated and trained. Tijane went to do some training somewhere. He came back. Now he was

> knowledgeable and he created a women's *groupement*. He also had his own field, but this did not prevent him from coming to women's gardens. When Samele left, Diallo from PROGEDE came. This time, Tijane started to work for Diallo. Until today, they continue to work together. Nowadays, Tijane has his own garden.

The way Ousmane saw it, PROGEDE's gardens were the same project that was initially Samele's from Dialakoto. It had only changed hands. Samele from Dialakoto had given "it" to Tijane from OFADEC and Tijane handed it over to Diallo from PROGEDE. He described it as one garden passing to another without significant interruption or change. PROGEDE had capitalized on an already existing vegetable garden that belonged to a notable from Dialakoto. PROGEDE followed from the tracks of this previous project, which would become "community-centered" after its involvement. The difference is that PROGEDE trained Tijane, who was formerly working with OFADEC, the banana cooperative which went bankrupt amid corruption scandal. Tijan's shifts from OFADEC to gardening project, and from there to PROGEDE shows how local development networks are perpetuated from one project to another, keeping things as they were before.

It is clear that Ousmane was very critical of vegetable gardens, but as it was mostly women who worked there and it was their "business" I asked why Ousman's present wife was not working in PROGEDE's garden. He first replied:

> My wife doesn't know how to work. Her body is not strong enough. You know, women of light color don't know how to work.

His joke involving me, as a white woman who was not good at hard work like gardening, caused a spring of laughter. But it also gave the occasion to one of the women in the room, Fatou, who until that time remained silent, to speak:

> When PROGEDE took over the garden, the wife of Tijane, Binta became the President of the PROGEDE garden. The garden of Samele was there but it was dead. To revive the group, Binta came to knock on each door to ask: "Are you interested? Do you want to enter the gardening group?" At that time the garden was surrounded by a bamboo fence that was brought from Depot. I entered the group. I worked there for two months. Then, my mother got ill and I had to go to Tambacounda for four months. When I came, they did not take me back. I had to pay a lot of money to get back in. This is how I left the garden.

She continued by explaining how Binta persuaded them to join the women's group to work in the garden:

> Binta [wanted to revive the garden because], she saw an interest. She told us women: "Women should not stay beside without taking advantage of the State aid! But if you want the State to help you, you have to work with the State. We have to put in place an activity

> (a project). She collaborated with Diallo of PROGEDE. He taught us what we know about the gardening.

Fatou's story, which revealed part of the politics of women's groups formed around the vegetable gardens. The gardens promoted by PROGEDE were run not by women who formed the group but by the local project manager selected by PROGEDE. This manager, through a President - who was not chosen by the workers but was the wife of the manager- recruited women from the villages to work for the garden. She did so by persuading them that PROGEDE was the State and the project was a kind of State help that they needed to take advantage of. In fact, PROGEDE was also offering women who joined the project rice, oil and beans. This "food aid"[301] was an important incentive for Fatou, who thought that joining the gardening group would also help her make some extra money for the household. But, looking back at it now, Fatou thought that it was not for the State help but for Binta's self interest that women worked in that project. Fatou explained how work in the *groupement* was based on a coercive system of attendance that was dictated by the President:

> The day you did not come to the project you had to pay 100 F per day. 100 F for your absence, do you imagine that?! If you were sick you had to pay! For the time when I was in Tamba and attending my sick mother they asked me for lots of money. After that, other women started also to quit. Binta herself left the group because of problems with her husband. They now have another President.

Gardening projects are not as they are presented by PROGEDE, an "income-generating" activity that is conceived and run by workers. This *groupement* is like banana projects that employ migrant workers as share-croppers. Women who work long days and hours before they can receive any money from the sale of vegetables are not coerced by their boss, but by the Presidents. While Fatou had left the group because she could not afford the price of two months that she spent with her mother in Tambacounda, other women had other reasons to leave. This time Niatou explained why she left the project:

> N: When it was time to pick the vegetables, and if there were enough, we would have potatoes, salad, peppers. One woman was designated to sell this. After she had sold the produce, she would bring that money to Tijane and he would put this in the bank.

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[301] The distribution of food aid and its uses in Senegal is a very important issue that I will not develop here. However, the practice of distributing food aid is very wide spread not only in election campaigns but also in rural cooperatives and constitutes a "resourceful" way to draw electors as well as laborers.

> M: How much money you would get from the sale?
> N: We did not get even a single franc. We were working and we were unaware of what was happening. After the sale, we did not receive any money. This is why I decided to leave the group. The President (Binta) took the money and she left. And we were supposed to say: “Thank you.” We were all really happy when she left [laughter].

Community based development projects rely increasingly on the formation of local *groupement*s to carry out their activities. But examined more closely, these *groupement*s, which depend on NGOs like PROGEDE to obtain the land and the credit, are based on a coercive labor regime, which do not “generate” any significant income. Furthermore, these so-called “community-based” projects complement others like “sustainable” banana production, and they all are part of the buffer zone activities allowed and promoted by the National Park Service. Ousmane, who works in the banana fields of a *groupement* owned by a marabout from Dakar is only too familiar with these politics. I could better understand why he did not like women’s vegetable gardens.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I examined regionalization and community-based conservation as the products of the last wave of decentralization in Senegal and how they were implemented at the outskirts of the National Park. I focused on illustrating the contradictions and the conflicts created by this new type of decentralization, by looking at two instances of its application. First, through a close examination of a meeting debate on the application of regionalization to Tambacounda, I looked at how access to forests and natural resources become a focus of practice of politics of at the regional level. The hybrid NGOs are the main brokers of development in this forum, and a closer examination of these different NGOs show that they differ not only their sources of funding but also in their approach to “community-based” conservation for development projects. I have shown also that the recently elected regional council of Tambacounda that the discourses of decentralization presents as the legitimate elected representative of all the “populations” of the region, act more like a forum for hybrid NGOs and the current, supposedly more participative, central state conservation institutions (the Forestry and National Park Services).

My analysis of the debates of a meeting held at the Regional Council showed that the issue of the “management of natural resources” in the region was framed by a discourse of productive use and “utility.” It stressed nature as wealth, private ownership of nature and how the “benefits” of nature should be distributed. Therefore, the dominant discourse of regionalization as applied in the region of Tambacounda promoted neoliberal market capitalism. The power struggle within the Regional Council focused not on how to achieve economic benefits but instead on who would help “populations” in producing natural resource based commodities and where, as each participant claimed his own territorial authority over natural resources.

The politics of regionalization indicates that instead of decentralizing the powers of environmental management to rural councils, the latest decentralization reform re-centralizes key decisions at the regional level, where the multiplicity of NGOs, competing with one another for the land and labor of “participant” communities are expected to cooperate with the Forestry or National Park Services. Struggles among these different partners of development was the struggle over the complex set of relations previously dominated by a technocratic postcolonial state administration and public institutions of a centralized state. In this struggle, local authorities, had very little to say. The powers given to local authorities (regional and rural community councils) taken as instances of democratization in Senegal are limited, partly because the central state administration and international funding agencies can shape the institutional framework within which the actions of local authorities are taking place.

However, as I have shown in the previous chapter, the rural council still can exercise its power to seize land. While the rural council’s decisions about land allocations are now increasingly motivated by commercial gain, the application of the “community-based” conservation for development projects in Madina adds another layer to the complexity of power struggles at the local level. In the last section of this chapter, I have focused on these community based conservation projects implemented in Madina and surrounding evicted villages. Through examples of two different projects (the production of bamboo fences and community vegetable gardens) I have also shown how regional hybrid NGOs provide the “opportunities” to “benefit” from nature by becoming integrated into commercial production of forest products, yet also creating unforeseen consequences for the evictees. A closer look at how these projects work from

the perspective of the evictees of the Niokolo-Koba National Park shows that they insert themselves into existing patterns of unequal distribution of power and deepen the fractures within the village communities. While these projects rely on local brokers of development -- who often capitalize on their past networks and experiences in other projects -- they are also seized by evictees as an opportunity to reclaim some authority and control against the rural council.

CONCLUSION

Eviction or threats of eviction, experienced as loss of property, livelihoods, homes and a way of life, had been a part of the lives of many evictees settled at the outskirts of the Niokolo-Koba National Park. At the same time, eviction had also been operative in Senegal since the French colonial rule in multiple forms: as forced labor displacements and evictions from vacant and ownerless land during the colonial rule, as expropriations for public utility and development after Independence, or as divestments of land use rights for “lack of productive use” by local rural councils. Yet, eviction was not limited to property relations, as competing claims over agricultural land, forests or national park. It also meant clearing the playing field of power, displacement of existing authority relations, deposition of “recalcitrant” local authorities, all presumably in the name of nature conservation or development.

My study focused on two different processes of displacement that were experienced by the evictees of the Niokolo-Koba National Park, who have been resettled in the northern borders of the present National Park, within the rural community of Dialakoto. The first form of evictions took a centralized form, where tens of thousands of people were displaced from an area reaching close to one million hectares, which became enclosed as territories of the Niokolo-Koba National Park during the first decade following Independence. The second form of evictions took a decentralized form, where individuals or their families had been evicted from the resettlement areas after the decentralization reforms were implemented at the northern buffer zone of the National Park. These two processes of eviction illustrate how the inhabitants of this forested region, represented as at the margins of the law, development and order, have been related and continue to relate to the “state” in its different manifestations at different historical moments.

Centralized Evictions

In the analysis of centralized evictions, one of the central themes of this dissertation, I focused on the Niokolo-Koba National Park as a juridico-political territory, which was reconstructed during the first decade of independence as an untouchable domain to be defended

against the enemies of conservation (poachers) and enemies of the state (customary authorities). I have argued that rather than being a punctual event, or a direct “implementations” or imposition of international nature conservation, the centralized large-scale evictions from the National Park showed that in Senegal the Western conservation discourses and interests were inserted in complex and historically sedimented terrains both at national and regional levels.

At the same time, I also inquired about how fortress conservation had manifested itself in Senegal through the Niokolo-Koba National Park, with which contradictions and through what kind of coercive practices. In Chapter 1 and 2 my aim was to contextualize these centralized displacements in relation to state in its colonial and postcolonial forms in Senegal. I have argued based on archival documents that the attempts to evict certain areas (particularly Damantan and Tabadian) from the colonial National Park at the end of the French colonial rule had failed, or if they did succeed these implicated a much smaller area and number of people. At the same time, I have also indicated in Chapter 1 that rather than being punctual events, evictions were also related to different concerns and targets of the French colonial administration. Evictions were not only justified by conservation-related arguments that explained the importance of protecting the migratory roots of wildlife or the preventing the spread of diseases from wildlife to cattle. They were also justified by the argument that the backward and rebel “populations” of Oriental Provinces were unproductive peasants, who escaped the state’s purview.

My study has indicated that during the early years of post-Independence, the Niokolo-Koba National Park has acquired a new importance. It became a “model of development” for a Third World country like Senegal and had the potential of putting it back on the map of development by providing tourism revenues. At the same time, as I have shown in Chapter 3, by the 1970s, the park became a territory that was made by extending a state of emergency through shoot-to-kill policies, carried out by the National Park Service without accountability. I argued that to understand how the National Park became a symbol of a developing nation, a territory where the use of coercion was legitimate and a no-man’s land created by acceptable mass evictions, it was necessary to look at several dynamics that emerged in Senegal during the beginning of the post-independence period. The Niokolo-Koba National Park became a site of and emerged out of different, but related postcolonial dilemmas in Senegal.

First, as in other post-Independence African states, in Senegal, development also became an urgency, a reason of state, and a way to reform the legacies of the French colonial rule (Diouf, 1997; Mamdani, 1996). Senegalese postcolonial development discourses were influenced by different sources, which included, as I have shown in Chapter 2, Marxist and Third Worldist dependency theories, the pan-African movement of return to origins, as well as the ideas of progress and rational development. They stood against backward feudal despots created by colonial rule, against the privatization of land and dependency on foreign markets, all of which put Senegal at the periphery of the world economy and civilization. Development also had to follow the Third Way, which was an African one, by refusing the (Western) individualistic values of capitalism and atheism of communism. I have analyzed aspects of these different currents of thought in the development framework of three pivotal figures: Senghor, Dia, and Lebret. I have also given a general overview of how policies, laws and administration of the postcolonial state translated these ideas. Instead of declaring wholesale nationalization of the country's land and resources or privatizing them by allowing private ownership, Senegal would adopt a model of trusteeship, where the postcolonial state would represent itself as the trustee of the National Domain in the name of the nation. The Land Law of 1964 projected this representation but at the same time "nationalized" 95 percent of Senegalese territories as National Domain. This legal and administrative projection of the postcolonial state as a benevolent trustee, stressed its role in looking after the nation's heritage and property (including land, forests, national parks and people's well being) and ushering the citizens on the path to development.

At the same time, postcolonial development was also fashioned according to a centralized state model. This model was adapted partly from the Soviet-style centralized "public" institutions, which took various forms (e.g. Office of Agricultural Commercialization, which controlled peanut sale and production or, state companies like SAED, set up for specific mega-development projects). The land use planning model of Lebret and his team was applied as the rational way of applying the *terroir* approach, which was also based on the model of sedentary peasants continuously producing (cash) crops. The rural cooperatives would be organized and the peasants would be animated to carry out this vast agrarian reform. However, the socialist -- paternalist -- ideals that underpinned the land and agrarian reform had faded to the background

after Mamadou Dia's imprisonment in 1963. Under a presidential regime the 1964 Land Law was adopted. Between the beginning of the 1960s and the 1970s several important transformations turned development into a technocratic exercise of power. These included the tying of cooperatives to the centralized state agricultural office, as well as the strengthening of the state's administrative oversight and extending it to rural communities. Finally, with the Law of 1972 reforming the local territorial administration, village *terroir*s initially conceived as common work tools of peasants were transformed into administrative territories under the jurisdiction of rural councils. In this context, the trusteeship became the *tutelle* of the postcolonial state.

As I discussed in Chapter 3, the making of the Niokolo-Koba National Park reflected some of these important changes. The park became not an especially coercive space of the "national domain." The National Park Service was separated from the Forestry Service, and became a militarized institution with armed park rangers and its own internal regulations. Nature conservation discourses and attending coercive practices, particularly in the form of shoot-to-kill policies, were authorized under a government with strong autocratic tendencies. However, the construction of the fortress of Niokolo-Koba, as a mega-development project and as a restructuring of conservation administration, involved debates within the postcolonial state administration, top level bureaucrats, experts and intellectuals. The top-down way in which this reform of conservation was implemented was reflected in the appointment of Dupuy as the director of the National Park and the creation of a National Park Service under his authority and accountable only to the president (this would also change with neoliberal reforms). The conflict concentrated on the return of neocolonialism as much as on territorial fights between Forestry, National Park and Agricultural Services, as I showed in the same chapter.

The case of the centralized evictions from the Niokolo-Koba National Park shows that eviction was also an "operation," which implicated all levels of state administration both in Dakar and in the region of Tambacounda. Eviction and resettlement "operations," just like improvement schemes, devised by centralized "technical" services and various public institutions, were "planned" at the center at the top of the administrative chain of command. The importance and the degree of involvement of all levels of administration in such a large-scale operation, indicated

that the calculated tactics fashioned by technocrats depended on local administrators for their enforcement.

Although I have stressed the “centralization” aspect of the postcolonial state in Chapter 2, I did so not to deny the complex power struggles that also took place at different moments among different aspects involved in postcolonial land and agrarian reforms. My purpose was to highlight how different local power struggles that congealed around the Niokolo-Koba National Park and evictions destabilized this image of the centralized, rational and development-oriented socialist Senegalese state. Two important examples illustrate this point: the narratives of resistance and struggle during the eviction process of the Damantan and Tabadian area and the resettlement process of the evictees. The eviction of Damantan-Tabadian, that I discuss in Chapter 3 is a compelling example of how what is presented as a punctual event was a process that extended over a period (seven according to evictees), during which coercion, persuasion and threat were all used to displace this particularly troubled part of South-Eastern Senegal. In this chapter, I also look at how these silences in official records were recorded in the memories of the evictees. They indicate that the centralization and monopoly of violence in the hands of the Park Service depended not only on armed rangers, but also on the tricking of the residents and the confiscation of their arms. When resistance continued, this time a different tactic, that of discrediting the local marabouts was used. The eviction “event” itself (although it is hard to put dates around it), as recounted by some evictees, was possible only when the army was recalled under the pretext that Sekou Toure would invade Senegal. This violent aspect of the postcolonial state contrasted greatly with the rational disinterested and benevolent image that it projected.

Similarly, the process of resettlement, discussed simultaneously with evictions, shows a resettlement was devised by different administrators, who sought to apply the technocratic land use planning approach to resettlement. The aim was to fix the evictees on land and make sure that agricultural production did not go uninterrupted. At the same time, evictees would be settled next to administrative centers to “facilitate” their access to public services. Instead, evictees refused to settle in designated areas, conflicts erupted between evictees and their hosts, requiring frequent interventions of the governor and prefects. Instead of neatly lined huts with three hectares of arable land that surrounded them, the evictees spread out over a large area to

cultivate, due to different reasons, which included soil conditions, resource conflicts, and customary claims.

However, today when one looks at Madina from the outside, he or she would have the impression that these attempts to order recalcitrant authorities, fix peasants to land for cash crop agriculture, and tie them to specific centers of authority had succeeded. This view, partly accurate in depicting the devastation and transformation that accompanied the evictions, does not allow us to understand how decentralized forms of eviction are superimposed over and works through the connections and traces of centralized evictions.

Decentralized Evictions

In the analysis of decentralized evictions, my focus of attention was not the Niokolo-Koba National Park but the areas surrounding the national park, where the evictees had been resettled. In Chapter 2, I focused on some aspects of decentralization as framed by the National Domain Law of 1964 and the Law on Territorial Administration of 1972. I have shown that these two laws, considered by some as the beginning of decentralization in Senegal, had foreseen the state's administrative and technical oversight over the rural councils, this would be the case until the 1990s. Thus, although the aim was decentralization of state powers to rural communities at the beginning, this aim was dissolved after the state *tutelle* became re-inscribed. However, there were also legal and administrative openings that allowed the rural council to interpret or occupy the areas left to ambiguity. The conditions of residency within the territorial limits of rural communities, the productive use and the "general interest" of the inhabitants, were all important areas, which led to reinterpretations and justifications of the Rural Council of Dialakoto for its land allocations and withdrawals. However, the existence of various forms of state oversight do not imply that rural councils were simply the tentacles of the central state in exerting coercion and the existence of openings and ambiguities in laws do not require rural councils to become all powerful. On the one hand, although by allowing them to distribute land use rights over the national domain, the post-Independence reforms had declared the intention to give more power to rural councils. On the other hand, the same laws limited the councils' decisions by tying them to the oversight of prefects and sub-prefects. As I showed in Chapter 5, in the rural community of

Dialakoto this oversight continued until very recently and opened the door of important pressures over the council in its land allocations in favor of certain projects or people.

On the other hand, since the 1980s, the rural councils in Senegal became the point of passage of different international development agencies and NGOs, with an increase in this trend after the 1990s (Blundo, 1995; Ribot, 1995). And since the 1980s, at the outskirts of the National Park, the rural council continued to seize land that most evictees in Madina had obtained through customary or share-cropping agreements; the council has also seized the cattle road used by herders from evicted villages. This has pushed many herders, either to live a good part of the year in the Classified Forest, or to permanently settle there, and has forced many people to look for jobs on banana plantations. How can we understand these practices that further mine the dubious legitimacy of the rural council? Can we argue that rural councils have become the decentralized despots of neoliberal development (Ribot, 1999)? Today's rural councils are not the same as or a continuation of yesterday's "native" authorities. Yet, it would also be incorrect to assume that the rural council of Dialakoto represents the "old" customary authorities, chiefs, marabouts and notables, although some of them were "elected." The council of Dialakoto is also composed of other councilors who have risen to the top of the local hierarchy through the peanut economy as well as through ties to political parties. The party affiliations of rural councils are certainly an important part of rural council politics that needs to be explored (Blundo, 1995). However, while all these could be important explanations of how the rural council came to centralize power in its hands, they do not suffice to explain why councilors, most of whom are from Dialakoto, decided to evict people, with whom they had relations that "did not date from yesterday" and who came to settle as "hosts" next to them.

To understand why the rural council of Dialakoto started to evict the former evictees of the National Park, it is also important to situate these practices within the context of the disengagement of the previously centralized forms of authority from different areas of economy, starting with the dissolution of the centralized public institutions created during the first decade of independence. Neoliberal development opens up the avenues not only for development projects but also for private corporations, urban entrepreneurs, hybrid NGOs and local commercial associations. For the case of the rural community of Dialakoto and the evictees who live within its

administrative territories, this process of change corresponded to the introduction and encouragement of new cash crops, in addition to peanuts, through para-statals and NGOs. Starting from the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, cotton was introduced in the Classified Forest of Diambour at the North of the National Park, and banana to the buffer zone of the national park. Simultaneously, the first artisanal production based on trees and the production of nature based commodities also started, initially with the encouragement of the Forestry Service. All of these contributed to increasing the value of land, in this narrow strip between the Niokolo-Koba National Park and the Classified Forest of Diambour. The decentralization of the management of natural resources, as I will discuss later, added another layer to this ongoing commodification.

To understand better the decentralized evictions in the hands of rural councils, in this dissertation, I have examined both the rural council's land commission meetings and how conflicts were described by the evictees. The meetings of the rural council indicated that while land allocation were controlled by the sub-prefect, the CERP and the Forestry Service until 1996, the date of promulgation of laws that announced regionalization and the extension of decentralization to natural resource management. Furthermore, the meeting minutes highlighted the importance of land allocations to various types of associations, commercial peasant organizations, particularly those that could "prove" that they can use land productively. In fact, the emergence of nativity based arguments expressed through residency or customary rights together with productive use criteria in the council's meetings indicated that in the context of multiple claims, the rural council was seeking to reaffirm or strengthen its authority by defending its own claims. Another factor that one needs to take into account in rural council's decentralized evictions is the type of relations that had been established between the evictees and their hosts -- in the case of Madina between the evictees and the notables of Dialakoto. As I illustrate in Chapter 4 where I look at resettlement process, evictees that arrived to the outskirts of the National Park were extremely impoverished and they their means of negotiation was limited. In the process of integration into cash crop production they also became dependent on their *diatigui*s (hosts) for access to land. The acknowledgement of these relations as part of customary

arrangements by the evictees have also contributed to their loss of authority, which was already diminished by the centralized evictions.

In the rural council's debates I also emphasized how the "fixing of children to *terroir*s" became a battle cry not only for the authorities of oversight but also for the rural council. Although both sub-prefect and the rural council called for legibility, their reasoning was quite different. While the sub-prefect called for children of the *terroir* to fix on land, he encouraged also the urban entrepreneurs, or NGOs with enough financial means to "develop" the rural community. The council on the other hand, called for the children "native" of the rural community (more restrictively of Dialakoto) to stay there and seize the opportunities that were offered by new development projects.

How did the regionalization reform and the extension of decentralization to natural resource management change this situation? Some of the important insights into political ecology also help in understanding the most recent neoliberal form of nature conservation in its various manifestations. These projects that are gathered under the umbrella terms of "participatory" or "community-based" conservation are shaped within and by the market rationality, which considers nature as a commodity. The conservation for development projects, as it has been pointed out by the critiques of Western environmentalism, are based on a market rationality, which calculates the costs and benefits of conservation for "local people" (Carrier & West, 2009; West, 2006). More important, however, within the legal and administrative framework created for the decentralization of natural resources, these projects avoid the "elephant in the room," that is the national parks are still untouchable territories where shoot-to-kill is allowed. At the same time, they do not eradicate the control of Forestry or National Park Services in and outside the buffer zones, which are exercised in multiple forms including the control of the transfer of forestry products, the quotas and permits of exploitation etc. (Ribot, 2002; Ribot & Larson, 2005).

However, to understand the local effects of these projects and how they are negotiated with different actors involved at the regional and village level requires us to look at them as more than prescriptions of market rationality. Sustainable development projects and participatory conservation projects that invaded the buffer zone of the National Park and the areas of resettlement of evictees, have intensified and encouraged increasingly the commercial production

of nature based commodities. The evictees dispossessed of their land by decentralized evictions of the rural council, adopt multiple strategies to adapt to this relentless mill that turn every piece of nature into a commodity. These include switching from one project to another, becoming small rural entrepreneurs themselves or seeking a better place within the hybrid NGOs. However, by doing so they also, modify their relations with one another and ironically could also use the "power" and "benefit" of nature to re-inscribe the diffused coercion of decentralization themselves.

Dilemmas of the Present

Toward the end of my field research, I was invited to have a tea in one of the households that I regularly visited. This was the first time that my host decided to tell me a story about the violence of shoot-to-kill policies. It was a rare moment when he allowed me, a foreigner, to be part of the collective rumors about violence, which traveled long distances to reach other villages surrounding the national park. These stories of violence were reported not only about "foreign" poachers who came from Guinea or Mauritania, but also about inhabitants in the areas bordering the new National Park. This story was about a 60-year-old man who used to live in Madina Gounass, a large village located in the west of the National Park:

> During that time Madina Gounass was covered with dense forests. There were lots of trees, particularly *maad* around the village. The old men used to live underneath these trees. He had put the game that he had killed on the tree to dry. He had prepared tea and something to eat. At that time, we were working to clear the roads of the park, we were with the agents. The agents heard a "bang" someone fired. The foresters asked the workers to get in the car. One of the agents climbed on a tree to see. He saw smoke (coming from a fire). He said: "Do you see that smoke? We are going there." The agents left the workers and went there. Once they arrived they started to shoot. The old man was there with a young man. When the young man heard the shots, he wanted to escape. The old man told him not to escape but the young man did anyway. The old man stayed there to confront them. They started to exchange fire. Their bullets had been exhausted, the old man did not run away. The agents came out of their cars and started to beat the old man. Among these agents there was a certain N. (who fled and now is in Guinea) he cut the protections of the old man. He took his knife and he plunged it into his stomach. He kicked him with his boots. The old man's bicycle was next to him. The agents made him fall on the pedal of his bicycle, which cut into his back. They beat him until he was dead. Then they took his body to Tambacounda. But this cost them, b ecause the old man was one of the elders of Madina Gounass. The body was sent from Tamba to Madina Gounass. The parents of the old man swore that they would enter the park for revenge. They left Gounass and came near old Damantan. At the end of the day, they arrived to the post of the agents. The agents were eating, discussing having a good time. One of them took his arm, FK 4, and shot at the agents. All four agents fell in their meals. The others escaped some of them to Guinea. After that they put fire on the post and destroyed everything. They destroyed the radio, too, and they went back home. This has happened in 1998. After this event we started to see the agents a little less among the villages.

Keita, who told me the story, not only wanted to make clear that shoot-to-kill policies continued until 1998, but he also wanted to illustrate his opinion and that of many other inhabitants of the areas neighboring the National Park about how the “friendlier” look of park service was interpreted. The patrolling of areas surrounding the villages and inside the villages halted also because the families of those who were killed in the park decided to take the justice in their hands.

For Keita, the regime of conservation based on shoot to kill was based on suspicion. This suspicion was to a large extent an effect of impunity that was enjoyed by the park rangers within and outside the territories of the national park:

> Let’s say I see a hunter, I know he is a hunter because he is not in uniform. I can catch him and make him accept his fault. He can demand pardon and say he will not do it again, and he will not do it again. But look what happens here: If I am a hunter and I see a person in uniform, I know that if he sees me first, he will shoot at me. ... So what would I do? I will shoot at him first. ...

The escalation of violence and its effects was the most important reason why the villages neighboring the National Park refused to “cooperate” with the National Park Service when it offered to take over the surveillance tasks of the National Park in 1994. According to Keita, a meeting was held between the National Park Service and the villages surrounding the National Park:

> A big meeting for the 40th anniversary of the National Park was held in Dialakoto. During this meeting the Parks told that they were sorry and they wanted to communicate with villages evicted from the park. As these villages lived there and knew the forest well, they wanted to collaborate with them for the surveillance of the forest. The people of Dialakoto disagreed and told them that they did not know the park because they were not evicted from the park. It was those who were evicted who knew the park. ... They had killed A.S. who was an agent in Dienoundala. They have killed his brother next to Dialakoto. They had also killed other inhabitants of Dialakoto. Dialakoto refused to collaborate because the agents had killed their brothers. They said even the evicted people returned there (to the park), they would not go there. Their brothers have been killed by the rangers. Dialakoto would never collaborate with these people. Because the soul of their parents killed costs more than the entire forests agents in Senegal. Even though these agents were happy to have killed these people, even if the government is satisfied, they are not satisfied. This is why they will not cooperate. ... In fact, everyone was united to tell them that they don’t want to collaborate with the park. As we were coming from the park, we said, if you want us to keep a watch over the park we have to go there. If we are not there we cannot do the surveillance. If we went to the park, the rangers, when they would see us, they would still kill us. We will lose. ... That is what we told them. ...

The repercussions of the “shoot to kill” policy for the areas surrounding the National Park, where evicted people would be resettled, were far reaching. Both those villages whose residents were

not evicted but were neighboring the National Park (Dialakoto) and the villages evicted from the National Park refused to cooperate with the National Park Service. They refused the shoot-to-kill policy because they refused to accept and considered against their values the view of Senegal's National Parks as being more important than the village elders and their parents. The coercive policing function of the National Park Service and the impunity in using coercion within the park territories have not disappeared even after decentralization. Only the targets have changed, focusing on different areas of the National Park.

The community-based participatory conservation projects are now part of everyday life in Madina. One could see the vegetable gardens, whose fences fall out and are regularly rebuilt, with women busy pumping water from the well and carrying it over their heads to irrigate the neatly lined up peppers. Ousmane, whose land had been "confiscated" by the rural council, hopes to leave the banana project owned and managed by a marabout from the city one day, whenever he can find an alternative. Others in the village of Badi, next to the road, have found the alternative in selling bamboo furniture or loofas, but they have to rely on credit that the "projects" are willing to extend to them. Philly who is the beekeeper in Madina, works with PROGEDE now. He is responsible for the project. Philly had once told me the story of the foresters in the park, who lived in the midst of the villages. He had told me that he "grew up with them and knew them very well." He knew what was forbidden and what was allowed in the forest. He also knew that children who did not listen to them and who were caught would be punished with the stick. The same went for the villagers. At the time of colonial foresters, if you did not tell who was the culprit you would be punished. After Philly had told me these memories, I was again in Madina to have tea and chat with him and his family. This time, he gave me the example of a "new" forester, himself. Philly, who was a beekeeper, had been "trained" by PROGEDE. He took me on long walks to show me different beehives around the village. He would point to specific trees and where the hives were. But he was also very proud of the new wooden beehives that PROGEDE had given him. He had put them next to each other, not very far from the main road, and he would take the honey from there to carry it back to his hut in Niemeneke.

This time when I visited Philly in the village, we had long conversations about different kinds of bees and different kinds of honey they produced. Philly was very fond of bees and

possessed a deep knowledge of bees and honey. At all times, except at night, bees flew around Philly and the hut where he kept his honey. The hut was full of buckets of honey, toward which the bees gravitated. Once he explained the "life force" and wisdom that inhabited the bees:

> When someone mounts a horse, he can see far-away distances. In the past, kings used horses to impose their presence. Now people who have means have horses. Here, in this village, there are also people who own horses. For bees it is different. A bee holds a vital force. It is a force that is not well appreciated by everyone. But a bee's force surpasses any other animal. In Mandinka we say: "A person cannot do without a head." Human beings need their heads to do their work, without your head you cannot go anywhere. Also a person keeps his wisdom in his head. Elders keep their wisdom in their head. So we call bees "kung birio." Kung means head and, biri in Bambara means covering. If people call bees kung birio (he who covers his head) that means they have a great knowledge that they keep and their knowledge is the power that surpasses that of all other animals.

Philly's comparison between bees and horses illustrated how he understood different types of power. The horse exemplified the power of the person who was mounted on it. There was the power of kings who imposed their rule. There was the power of rich people in the village, who also imposed what they wanted. Then there were bees, and beekeepers and healers like him, who did not have an imposing power over people but had the power of knowledge, knowledge of the secrets of bees. For Philly, bees were keepers of a great knowledge and wisdom, which gave them a power that surpassed the power of those who ruled by force (kings) or those who ruled through money.

To my surprise however, Philly also added that with PROGEDE, now he had become a forester. When I later asked him when he had become a forester, he answered:

> I am not exactly a forester. When the foresters came to Niemeneke to plant trees, they had asked for people who could do that. They wanted someone to whom they could give that task. The whole village had helped to plant trees. When foresters came to the village to plant trees, the village chief nominated me as "responsible" for tree planting. This is how I became a forester. I had not asked for it. In fact, my role is limited to surveillance. If there is a bush fire, or if trees need to be planted or watered, it's me who takes care of that. All my papers are here to prove it.

Philly was one of a form of eco-guards in the Senegalese way. He had the papers to prove it. Philly, who had known foresters since the time he grew up in the park, and who had told me of their coercion over the villagers, not to mention their role in eviction, saw his nomination by the village chief as an approval of his recognition as a local forestry agent. I was very surprised by his account. I asked:

M: What do you mean by surveillance?

> P: For example, you and I are here discussing. If you see a fire from afar, you will get up and shout: “There is fire, ... Come quick!” You will not stay here sitting in your chair. If you don’t see it, I will. So when the foresters from the Classified Forest will come, I will tell them that you refused to help put down the fire. If I go to put down the fire, everyone should come. This is what a “*responsible*” of forest is. When there is a need to plant trees, I will show you how to do that. In fact people in the village have been asked to learn how to plant trees and they have been asked to choose someone as forester.

What Philly described to me was very similar to how he remembered the forestry service before the eviction, when they forced villagers and the village chief to “point” to the culprits of poaching. Philly refused to “indicate” villagers to the foresters for causing bush fires, but he was willing to indicate those who did not help put fires out. Philly was proud of his role as a local forester. For a while I thought about why Philly was willing to perpetuate in a different form what he had experienced from foresters when he grew up. He revealed one side of this complex problem when we came back to his land problems with the rural council:

> This big field that I had over there, this year I cannot even touch it. They all took it away. All. Now they will use it as they like. Everyone knows the situation. ... The rural council withdrew the land from me to give it to my nephew. There is no use to go to the rural council because they know all about it and they are the reason for it. There are times when doing something will be a loss of time. People laugh after me. But I will observe and wait. I will deal with them as equals. If I don’t complain now this is not because I am afraid or I am trying to escape. There will be a time when I will talk. And I will talk because I will be within my rights.

Philly’s land had been withdrawn by the rural council. The land was re-allocated to his nephew, and to Philly the rural council not only took away his land but also put him on bad terms with his nephew. He also knew what happened to Aliou when the council came to determine the damages caused by cattle and asked for 5,000 CFA. These experiences made him very suspicious of the rural council, and he had decided if he could avoid it, he would not appeal to it for any kind of judgment. Even though he did not have power now, he was a local forester, and when the time came, he would be talking to them as equals, that is someone who has authority and thus the right to contest. For Philly it was also important to be a local forester because it was for him an alternative form of authority. An authority, which he did not ask for, but for which he had been chosen and recognized by the state, just like the rural council.

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