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RWJ AND THE GRASSROOTS:

RACE AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION

OF INNER CITY COMMUNITIES

by

Matthew Lindholm

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Sociology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York.

2001

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Sociology in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Abstract

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by

Matthew Lindholm

Advisor: Professor Charles Kadushin

This study compared implementations of a social program in ten U.S. cities. The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation funded Fighting Back from 1989 to 1997, a community organizing project to address alcohol and other drug problems. Investigated were political and social organizational processes and consequences of a local administration in which inner city grassroots were to play a central role. Comparative case studies were developed based on in-depth interviews, field observations, and documents. First, the process of local program development was conceptualized as cooptation. At a leadership level of analysis, implementation was a mutual process of adaptation which incorporated minority grassroots into decision-making and resource distribution. Where found, this result depended on the following conditions: the relative cohesiveness and strength, respectively, of local grassroots *and* elite participants; compatibility between elite and grassroots framing of local drug problems; the relative disorganization and weakness of local service providing sectors. At an institutional level

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of analysis, grassroots inclusion in decision-making and resource distribution granted local elites some legitimacy but created dependencies between grassroots and resource providers and imposed on grassroots burdens of administration. This resulted in segmented incorporation of minority grassroots into racially ordered local and regional administration. Second, the study conceptualized administration as a community organizing and disorganizing process. Where program sites were multi-racial, program implementation organized minority grassroots as adversaries of administration. The following local institutional entry points for programming had differing civic and social organizational effects on grassroots. At the level of community organization, local grantees which were service providers disorganized grassroots as individual clients and subcontractors. Local government grantees organized grassroots as client groups or constituencies. Philanthropic grantees became potential vehicles for local grassroots leadership to create more broadly based civic organization. The following organizational and ecological factors were conditions for more cohesive grassroots organization at the community level: a history of less formally organized grassroots (relatively unarticulated and unorganized local interests), for example, only recent histories of ward-organized politics and of participation in federal programming; historically contiguous patterns of minority settlement. A direct cause of cohesion was professional grassroots organizing affiliated with national organizing networks.

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Abbreviations

ACORN	The Association of Communities Organized for Reform Now
AAFT	African American Task Force
AOD	alcohol and other drugs
CADA	Council on Alcohol and Drug Abuse
CCCIA	Country Club Crest Improvement Association
CDBG	community development block grant
CDC	community development corporation
CLRN	Coalition of Little Rock Neighborhoods
CSAP	Center for Substance Abuse Prevention
DHHS	Department of Health and Human Services
FB	Fighting Back
FTF	Filipino Task Force
IAF	Industrial Areas Foundation
LARADAC	Lexington and Richland Alcohol and Drug Abuse Council
LTF	Latino Task Force
MHCDO	Marshall Heights Development Corporation
MSA	Metropolitan Statistical Area
NAACP	National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
NAC	National Advisory Council
NPO	National Program Office

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PAC	People Against Corruption
PTA	Parent Teacher Association
RTF	Recovery Task Force
RWJF	Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
SACADA	San Antonio Council on Alcohol and Drug Abuse
SAFB	San Antonio Fighting Back
SAISD	San Antonio Independent School District
SES	socio-economic status
SSAC	Southern Solano Alcoholism Council
SCDAA	Solano County Drug and Alcohol Agency
VFB	Vallejo Fighting Back
WFB	Worcester Fights Back
YMCA	Young Men's Christian Association

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Chapter 1

Introduction

This chapter first introduces the research problem for this study. In the second section, the core of the chapter, I describe the conceptual framework developed in the course of addressing the research problem: the processes of cooptation and conflict in urban communities triggered by social intervention. Third, I summarize my explanations of the research puzzle. Fourth, I discuss the study's contribution to literature on cooptation and inner cities. I then describe my methodology, and, finally, outline the narrative of the study.

1. Overview

This study developed as an attempt to explain an unanticipated consequence observed in the implementation of an urban social intervention. Fighting Back was a program funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF) to reduce the demand for alcohol and drugs. The original program targeted fourteen local communities from 1989 to 1997, most of which included inner cities.[1] The RWJF did not mandate a fixed program, rather it invited prevention and treatment professionals, "grassroots" citizens and their leaders,[2] and local elites[3] to "come to the table" to develop and implement a plan

---

[1]Eight of the original Fighting Back programs received additional funding after 1997. This study does not follow the implementation story beyond 1997.

[2]By "grassroots" I mean the residents of the urban neighborhoods which the Fighting Back program targeted. I also use it to include "grassroots institutions"

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for reducing the demand for alcohol and drugs in their respective local communities. Virtually every one of the local programs developed projects not only to reduce demand for alcohol and drug use but also to improve neighborhoods, thus expanding the program's purpose from its original intent.

The local actors who influenced this change were grassroots leaders and, in some cases, local elites who shared an interest in the improvement of urban neighborhoods, especially the reduction of neighborhood disorder, an immediate cause of which were illicit drug markets.[4] Grassroots in the intervention sites fared differently, however, in the extent to which they were able to influence program development.

My research problem was therefore twofold. First, how and why did neighborhood improvement work its way into the Fighting Back program agenda?

(Selznick 1949: 141), formally and informally organized elements within these populations --neighborhood based organizations, activists, and others. "Grassroots" thus refers both to a local population and that sector of formal and informal organization which has its base in this population. I do not assume that the organizations and leaders who claimed to and were perceived to represent these populations were cohesive among themselves or represented the wishes of their fellow residents. These were matters for investigation in the local communities.

[3]Briefly, by elites I mean those who make important decisions or influence decisions affecting a given local community in a given domain of decision-making, e.g. alcohol and drug problems. They might include heads of public agencies with responsibility in these areas, legislators or executives who make laws in those areas, private companies that provide medical insurance or treatments, and other influentials (individuals and organizations) who take an interest in these issues.

[4]I follow Skogan's definition of disorder as those phenomena which neighborhood residents "react" to by "fight or flight" (1990:4). They may be divided into social and physical forms. Social disorder is "episodic" and involves observed behaviors such as drug buying, selling, and public use. Physical disorder is "ongoing" and "involves visual signs of negligence and unchecked decay: abandoned or ill-kept buildings, broken streetlights, trash-filled lots," and so on (1990:4).

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Second, how and why did the grassroots of different cities fare differently in the extent to which they shaped the local Fighting Back programs? I explored these questions in Part 2 of the study through case histories of Fighting Back's implementation in San Antonio, Texas and in Vallejo, California from 1989 to 1996. In my conclusions I also drew on data from eight other case histories of Fighting Back's implementation.

In addressing the first research problem, I looked at survey, informant, and observational data on how local residents experienced what they construed as "alcohol and other drug problems." To some extent I also investigated the relationships that emerged among local actors and between those actors and administrators of the national Fighting Back program as they were revealed in the case histories and by informants. I explored why the grassroots fared differently in different cities through a comparison of the organizational features of social relations in the specific sites of intervention. These social relations emerged in light of conflicts over the course of Fighting Back's local implementation and the resolution, or management, of those conflicts.

My research on the Fighting Back program's grassroots policy generated another set of questions, which I address in Part 3 of this study. The literature on inner cities leaves the impression of uniformly disordered, disorganized neighborhoods and populations. In the Fighting Back intervention sites, however, I found a layer of civic and nonprofit organizations indigenous to central city neighborhoods which appeared long used to engaging interventions like Fighting Back. This led me to consider the manner in which the implementation of social policy in inner cities has historically elicited and produced a strata of formal and informal organization. In Part 3, I describe the manner in

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which the Fighting Back intervention enacted this process. It is thus an inquiry into how administration socially constructs inner city communities. The data on which this final section of the study is based also comes from the case histories of Fighting Back's implementation --informant interviews, observations, and documents, including some documentation from local organizations other than Fighting Back and local newspapers.

2. Conceptual Frame

Cooptation and "grassroots policy"

My framework for explaining the unanticipated change in Fighting Back's program content is suggested in the title of the study which echoes that of Selznick's classic study of federal intervention, *TVA and the Grass Roots* (1949). Like the TVA, the Fighting Back program had a "grassroots" or "democratic" policy of inviting and organizing action by the most marginalized groups in the targeted institutional domain (cf. Selznick 1949: 19-45). In the case of the TVA, the targeted domain was the Tennessee Valley's power and farming industries. In the case of Fighting Back the institutional domain was local policy related to alcohol and other drugs. The TVA program was intended (among other things) to support the least advantaged farmers in participating more fully in the region's economic development. The Fighting Back program had invited inner city leaders, groups, and organizations to participate in policy making because the program's founders believed progress in addressing alcohol and other drug problems in inner cities was only possible with the engagement of the targeted populations in decision-making and implementation.

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An unanticipated consequence of the TVA was to marginalize the poorest farmers, a population which the program set out to integrate better into the Valley's agricultural development. Selznick explained this result by describing the process by which powerful actors in the region's agricultural industry turned the tables on the grassroots policy, adapting the intervention to their interests. The "latent function" of this "unanticipated consequence" (Merton 1949: 51) was to absorb the TVA into existing institutional relations, thereby re-producing a continuous, stable social and political order around existing centers of power.

The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation would allocate $45,000,000 in funding for the local Fighting Back programs from 1989 to 1997, a modest amount compared to the federal government's investment in the TVA. Nevertheless, Fighting Back triggered a similar social process in the sites of intervention though in a very different historical and institutional context. The encounter of the Fighting Back intervention with local institutional environs transformed the program, broadly speaking, in a process not unlike the TVA's encounter with the power and agricultural industries in the Tennessee Valley altered the TVA. As the TVA altered to reflect the institutional environs in which it sought to intervene, the local Fighting Back programs came to embody the adaptation of the intervention into the local institutional environs.

Selznick specified the mechanisms by which power relations were negotiated and re-produced in the course of the TVA's development as "formal" and "informal cooptation." The former denoted the intervention's necessary adjustment to local centers of power. It included direct and indirect actions and negotiations by which powerful

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players asserted their influence in the TVA. Informal cooptation denoted the intervention's negotiation of two other problems, its legitimacy with a local public (challenges to which were often articulated by parties with a stake in the program) and the administrative problem of reaching local populations. The need for legitimacy was accomplished by formally integrating local representation into the intervening organization. This included participation in governance formalized, for example, in by-laws and board or committee memberships. It also included participation in implementation formalized in contracts, memorandums of understanding, and so on. The latter forms of participation also addressed the problem of reaching local populations with services and for other purposes. Local organizations were enlisted in these efforts. Their formal participation in the program lent it further legitimacy with some local populations and organizations.

The outcome and effect of a given historical process of cooptation is not predetermined. In the course of adapting to relations within the institutional arena in which it intervenes, an organization or policy or program may also alter or re-organize that arena. This change may or may not substantively affect power relations within that institutional environment. As Selznick noted, the formal aspects of cooptation tend to obscure real power relations. A variety of interests are represented in formal governance and staffing; however, this does not necessarily translate into influence over policy.[5] In

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[5]"In general, the use of formal cooptation by a leadership does not envision the transfer of actual power. The forms of participation are emphasized but action is channeled so as to fulfill the administrative functions while preserving the locus of significant decision in the hands of the initiating group" (1949: 14).

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the case of the TVA, this incorporation of local elements into the TVA's administration was a method by which the program melded into existing institutional relations, taking on their character and coming under their influence.

I risk misunderstanding on the reader's part in reviving Selznick's concept of cooptation. Since Selznick the term has acquired diverse meanings. In the context of the rhetoric of urban political movements in the 1960s, "cooptation" acquired a negative connotation, leadership's "selling out" the more radical goals of changing "the system" in exchange for opportunities within the system, for example, a role in running social programs or in party politics. This use of the term implies a moral failure on the part of insurgent leadership who are absorbed into a corrupt system.

Since Selznick, social scientists have continued using the concept of cooptation in a manner which appears to partially adopt the popular usage during the political movements of the 1960s. Murphree et al (1996), for example, treat cooptation as the strategy of rational powerful actors in dealing with opposition, in their case, of corporations handling citizen groups objecting to their methods of toxic waste disposal.

Cross used the term more in line with my own use (1998). He argues that cooptation is indeed the process by which powerful and less powerful actors negotiate their relations, but that it is a "double-edged sword" which can cut both ways (1998: 61-62). Depending on the structure of the situation, a cooptation process may provide means for one or both parties by which they may systematically gain advantages in the relationship. In other words, less powerful actors may in the process gain political advantage. Thus he argued street vendor leaders in Mexico City were able both to

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participate in and manipulate a local political patronage system to gain space for vendors and "protections from arbitrary policy dictates of government officials" (1998: 61-2).

Part of the conceptual confusion is that cooptation may be used at two different levels of analysis. Analyses of cooptation like that in Murphree et al (1996) operate at the level of agency and its consequences --strategy, rational inter-action, and its effects. Actors seek to "coopt" one another, or in the course of seeking advantage they have this effect on the opposition. *I foreground this agency level of analysis of cooptation in Part 2, Chapters 4 - 7.* The RWJF sought to "coopt" resource-poor local actors by offering resources if they would direct their energies towards engaging drug and alcohol problems as a problem of "demand," using the grant's resources to re-invigorate or transform local prevention and treatment policy. Local actors with priorities other than those of the RWJF sought to achieve their own goals by means of the RWJF grant's resources. For example, neighborhood associations in the targeted areas sought to use grant resources to improve their neighborhoods.[6] This cooptation process was not necessarily a cynical game of politics, as the term has come to imply. The RWJF's motives were to expand national debate and policy to include a neglected aspect of alcohol and drug problems and to help local communities address local demand for alcohol and drugs. The motivations of local actors were embedded in their local context --both the specific drug and alcohol problems (and others) they experienced as most urgent and the web of local relations which local actors had to take into account. Most obviously, local organizations,

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[6]This goal did not always contradict the RWJF's goal; however, to the extent it did not include or prioritize "demand reduction," it became a competing goal.

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officials, and others were first concerned with survival in their particular institutional context --the support of constituencies, relations to other local players on whom they were dependent, and so on. These more primary concerns oriented their motivations and actions with regard to the local Fighting Back program.

However, one can enter the study of cooptation not only at the level of the choices of group and organizational leaders but also at the institutional level where the choices and intentions of rational actors are shaped by formal and informal aspects of social organization. *Part 3 of this study foregrounds this institutional level of analysis.* Cooptation occurs at an institutional level in two senses, first as a consequence of formal and informal relational patterns of organizational and individual elite actors and, second, as a consequence of the formal and informal regulations and norms of administrative process. Selznick used the term in a particular context similar to the context of this study. For Selznick, cooptation denoted an unavoidable process at the heart of the administration of social programming in a democracy, the necessary adjustment of administration to the social power of particular actors (informal cooptation) as well as to public opinion and to the concrete organizational problems of implementing policy (formal cooptation). He stated that it was often "the realistic core of avowedly democratic procedures" (1949:13). In this sense it is a normal social process, inherent in the administration of social policy, in which social power is produced and legitimated. The process is to a greater and lesser extent both open and routinized, regulated formally, for example, by contract law and laws governing the status of different types of organizations and their spheres of action (e.g. political institutions and nonprofit

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agencies). The cooptation process is also regulated informally by local norms as players of different status and different degrees of influence negotiate or fail to negotiate the terms of implementation in the context of their past interactions and their anticipation of future interactions.

Cooptation also has the effect of absorbing oppositional or marginal political elements into "the system," the web of relationships organized around existing centers of power which constitute the status quo and tend to generate "business as usual." However, this notion in itself tells us little about how the process actually works or how the effects of a given historical process of cooptation may adjust institutional relations. Cooptation is the process by which in a democracy power struggles are managed and administrative authority becomes legitimate. In the course of public controversy, the process of cooptation is the means by which administration establishes its legitimacy. To the extent conflicting groups are able to influence public opinion against administration or represent real social power that can thwart administrators' actions, administrators seek to find concrete solutions that accommodate opposition. This may change the character of both social policy and the parties to it. It is not a forgone conclusion that the effort succeeds or, as Cross argues, to whose advantage a change in the character of relationships accrues. Without such an adjustment to public opinion and to groups with real social power, administration is often stymied. As Selznick implied, this is the unavoidable by-product of administering social programs in (1) a socio-political context where administration cannot function without public legitimacy and (2) circumstances where actors with social power are capable of thwarting the original purposes of administration. I now turn to

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specifying the distinct institutional context in which the Fighting Back program intervened and of which it became a part.

The institutional context of intervention

This section outlines the institutional landscape of which the Fighting Back program became a part and which was the context for the local cooptation processes which the intervention triggered. Describing this environment and its relational patterns is a central project of this study. This outline is a sketch filled in by the chapters that follow. The institutional environs of the local Fighting Back programs were co-constructed by the RWJF and local actors in the context of existing social relations. This study focuses primarily on the local aspects of this process and therefore on local social relations.

The following institutional aspects of the intervention and of local communities powerfully shaped the course of Fighting Back' implementation. The local institutional entry points of the initiative were crucial --the status of the targeted locales as "communities" (the institutional setting in which the RWJF sought to intervene) and the institutional role and position of the local grantees. Also crucial to the course of implementation were class relations and racial conflict.

Local "communities"?

The RWJF's "Call for Proposals" defined the institutional context for the Fighting Back intervention broadly as "local communities" --municipalities, counties, or parts of

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them with populations between 100,000 and 250,000. It is by no means clear that the populations within these targeted geographical units constituted "communities," social units with some coherent principles or spheres of activity that bound members together. The sociological sub-field of community studies has long puzzled over the relationship of locality and human community beginning with the classic work of Tonnies (1887 [1963]). In this section I suggest that the overlapping processes of politics, administration, and how individuals, groups, and organizations construct their residential lives provide some local bases for social organization and that these were important contours in the Fighting Back sites which shaped the program's implementation.

The geographical boundaries that successful applicants for the Fighting Back program grant defined reflected formal institutional boundaries as well as some informal social boundaries. All local target areas were defined by political and administrative boundaries. For example, the target areas in Newark and Washington D.C. coincided with a subset of local political wards. The Vallejo and Little Rock target area boundaries were the same as those for these respective municipalities. The target areas in San Antonio and Columbia (South Carolina) were either school districts or subdivisions of a school district.[7]

Institutional boundaries define social units to the extent that they organize a given class of activities which affect residents in important ways. These activities then generate and organize relationships among individuals, groups, and organizations. Political wards

---

[7]Chapter 3 develops thorough descriptions of the intervention sites and their target areas. On institutional boundaries see Table 3.1.

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and municipalities, for example, demarcate political and administrative units. Local governments make decisions that affect residents. The overlapping spheres of politics and administration thereby generate and organize relationships within politically or administratively defined areas. These historical relationships then provide an organizational infra-structure for any sort of new activities related to administration or politics. They also constitute an institutional context into which newcomers like the RWJF and the Fighting Back program are drawn and which they may in turn shape.

In many cases, these institutional boundaries also reflected social boundaries of race and class (though not necessarily precise ones). In general, the populations in the targeted areas were poorer than those in the rest of their respective cities and metropolitan areas. They were near the center of their respective cities and had higher concentrations of minority residents than other parts of these cities or metropolitan areas. Virtually all of the grant applicants included in their target areas highly segregated, poor, African American residential areas. Milwaukee's target area included what at the time of Fighting Back's implementation was the most highly segregated African American urban area in the U.S. (Harrison and Weinberg 1992). Washington D.C.'s target area was over 90% African American. Grant recipients from smaller cities which designated the municipality as the target area tended to include more socially diverse populations, for example, New Haven and Vallejo (California).[8]

The somewhat abstract social boundaries described in the previous paragraph may define urban communities to the extent that residents are conscious of those boundaries

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[8]See Tables 3.2 and 3.3.

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and defend them or otherwise act in ways which take them into account. Suttles resurrected the notion of a "defended neighborhood" to explain how residents, especially those with children, co-construct safe areas to counteract the anonymity and unpredictability of living among strangers in densely populated areas (i.e. urban living) (1974: 29-41; cf. Wirth 1938). The concept of the defended neighborhood is based on the very notion of a lack of a "single normative order" (Suttles 1974:30). The paradox of this fundamental urban social process is that its purpose is as much to define principles of exclusion and who does not belong as it is to define membership. The effort to defend or control a residential space is by its nature exclusive. It is a socially cohering process for groups and the territory they seek to define as their own, or at least to make safe as they define safety, but in the context of the metropolis it is often also a divisive process, defining territorial boundaries and those who belong on either side of them.

These boundaries are generated institutionally. Through housing markets, for example, consumers are sorted and sort themselves as socio-economic classes -- poor/middle class/wealthy, black/white, immigrant/native, ethnics, young/old, and so on. These somewhat privately organized processes interact with the formation of political and administrative boundaries as, for example, whites and others with the resources have exited central cities for suburban developments beyond the political and administrative boundaries of municipalities. New suburban muncipalities then may formalize the lines of "defense" as better-off urban residents seek to create residential spaces over which they feel a requisite amount of control, for example, the power to exclude poorer residents through zoning laws, prohibitively expensive property markets, and so on.

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Politics and administration also shape the maintenance of these social boundaries within municipalities as politics and administration can organize neighborhood competition for resources in their efforts at drawing boundaries. The course of local infra-structure development, for example, can marginalize some neighborhoods while shoring up the value of others. Since World War II, for example, highway construction as well as commercial and residential development have often resulted in the bulldozing or blocking off of former skid row and poor black neighborhoods from downtown business and shopping areas.

These processes interacted with Fighting Back's implementation at a more micro-area level as neighborhood groups interpreted local drug problems in defensive terms. The targeted areas were often the least well defended neighborhoods in their respective metropolises. Nevertheless, residents saw Fighting Back as an opportunity to gain resources in the effort to exclude drug dealers, problem liquor selling establishments, and public drug and alcohol users from their immediate residential areas. Residents treated this effort as one aspect of a long term, broader effort to improve their neighborhoods. The immediacy of these issues for neighborhood groups somewhat contravened the RWJF's emphasis on prevention and treatment.

With respect to the RWJF's effort to intervene in local communities, I will argue that the Fighting Back intervention was an attempt at community construction which developed in the context of a local complex of existing, competing groups, organizations, and their leaders whose interactions tended already to be organized by local politics, administration, including particularly for the grassroots (but also others) the process of

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neighborhood "defense." Those that engaged the Fighting Back program made competing claims to authority in addressing drug and alcohol problems within the targeted areas in light of their diverse allegiances and priorities. The typical outcome was not the consensus the RWJF hoped to achieve but rather a negotiation among competing parties, some of whom ended up playing a dominant role. Others ended up with a subordinate role or dropped out of this particular initiative. The parties to these negotiations were along local class, racial, and administrative divides and were mediated by political and administrative processes. I begin describing these relationships by the describing the role of the grantees, the local agencies which administrated the local Fighting Back programs.

Grantees

The key institutional and organizational entry point for the Fighting Back program in the respective intervention sites was the grantee or lead agency. The more specific institutional context of a local grantee was an important variable in the subsequent unfolding of the local cooptation process. The grantees in the fourteen intervention sites were of three classes: political-administrative agencies, philanthropies, and nonprofit service providing agencies. The type of grantee often set initial local expectations about what sort of program Fighting Back was, what institutional turf it belonged to, and therefore who would be the protagonists, antagonists, and so on.

In Chapter 9, I develop the following ideas about how the institutional character of the grantee agencies mattered for grassroots engagement. I argue political-

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administrative agencies were constrained by the constituency- and reputation-building needs of local politicians and administrators and the local norms and regulations governing these processes. In multi-racial intervention sites, minority and neighborhood-based civic groups tended to engage these essentially political processes in a highly conflictual manner. Service providers had some of these same needs but addressed them from a different institutional position, namely, as worker bees in the process of social administration. They related to political-administrative agencies as subcontractors or grantees, to other providers as competitors, and to minority and neighborhood-based groups as antagonists or subcontractors. Philanthropies had other constraints; nevertheless, they appeared to be the most able to incorporate grassroots leadership.

Classes and actors

There were three general classes of individual and organizational actors that engaged the Fighting Back program. The RWJF's "Call for Proposals" sought participation from (1) elites of different spheres (politics, administration, and business); (2) service providing professionals and their agencies who also were to be drawn from different administrative spheres (e.g. law enforcement, education, and treatment); and (3) grassroots leaders and their organizations. How the grassroots fared in a given intervention site had a great deal to do with relations between actors of different classes and relations between actors within these distinct sectors. I define membership in these classes according to the role an organization or individual played in a given interaction.

Elites provided material and other resources to providers and grassroots and set

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parameters for how those resources would be used. Among them were the following kinds of organizations and their representatives: local corporations, community foundations or the United Way, elected public officials, and public service administrations. The actions of these diverse elites were constrained both by their institutional and local context which I discuss in Chapter 9. Politicians' actions were influenced, for example, by the locally determined processes of winning and keeping office.

Providers received the funds distributed by elites and in return delivered services to other organizations and inner city populations. These included treatment providers,[9] organizations that implemented prevention programs, and so on. There was some overlap in function between the largest providers and elites. Police departments and school districts, for example, provided prevention and other kinds of programming. However, in the local settings these administrative agencies functioned as elites when they exercised influence on resource distribution.

The grassroots was that sector of actors --organizations and leaders-- which

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[9]The treatment world may be roughly divided into that treatment paid for by private individuals and insurance companies and that subsidized by public agencies. The former were hardly involved with the local Fighting Back program except when they provided services which government subsidized. The few treatment providers that participated in the local Fighting Back programs were typically those funded primarily by charities and public monies --Councils on Alcohol and Drug Abuse in San Antonio, Columbia, Santa Barbara and other sites; the Patrician Movement, a Catholic agency in San Antonio; and so on. It is the class of organizations that provided publicly subsidized treatment that I refer to in this study unless otherwise indicated.

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represented or claimed to represent the targeted populations.[10] They included informal organization and nascent and formal organizations among the targeted populations. These organizations were more or less cohesive depending on dynamics of this sector in given locales. This organizational stratum of inner cities mediated between residents and entities from outside the inner city seeking to reach residents or indigenous organizations.

A typical form of nascent grassroots organization in the Fighting Back intervention sites related to drug problems were ad hoc campaigns to drive drug dealers out of a particular park or close down a particular liquor store associated with violence or public nuisance. Examples of other indigenous inner city organizations were homeowner and tenant associations, churches, community centers, community development corporations (CDCs), and other small neighborhood based social and health service providers.

The position and role of inner city based service providers overlapped that of provider and grassroots. They were providers because they depended on external funding --grants, contracts, subsidized fees, and so on. They often had a grassroots base, however, because they were typically part of a two-tiered service delivery system. In multi-racial sites minority organizations provided services to residents in the inner city while other agencies serviced the larger metropolis. Providers based in inner city neighborhoods were sometimes, therefore, a social base for grassroots organization and leadership. These roles as provider and as base for grassroots organization came into conflict as I show in

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[10]These actors might be more precisely termed the "grasstops" rather than "grassroots," the population targeted by the intervention.

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Chapter 8.

Relations between actors from these three sectors were shaped most broadly by their inter-dependencies. Grassroots and providers depended on elites for resources. Elites relied on providers to implement policy. Elites and providers depended on grassroots for legitimacy and access to inner city populations.

The interests of providers and grassroots tended to conflict as both sought elite resources. In most Fighting Back intervention sites they competed for the program's resources. The coalitions that emerged to govern the local programs therefore tended to be either administrative and provider oriented with elite sponsorship or grassroots (neighborhood and often minority) oriented with elite sponsorship. Most local programs parsed resources between grassroots groups and providers but the relative success of the grassroots in influencing program direction, their share in resource distribution, and how much program content reflected their wishes depended on whether or not they were able to ally themselves with elites.

Racial conflict and urban communities

My empirical entry point for understanding the cooptation process which the Fighting Back program triggered was the conflicts that occurred in the course of Fighting Back's local implementation. Conflict occurred over many of the substantive and symbolic issues Selznick identified as the mechanisms by which the TVA adapted to local institutions: governance, program content, hiring, contracts, and other mechanics of implementation. These conflicts revealed local social organization --key local actors and

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their relations. The resolution or management of these conflicts indicated how these relations were produced.

The most evident dividing line in conflicts, and therefore in local social organization, was race. Local racial conflict had crossed a number of policy arenas: policing, housing, employment, education, development, and so on.[11] Intervention sites where residents were predominantly African American evidenced less open conflict. However, there were other dividing lines which racial conflict sometimes obscured: competition between organizations, inter-minority competition, competition for leadership roles, and so on. Local histories of racial conflict, and conflict along these other lines, thus also shaped the modes of conflict in Fighting Back's development and how it was resolved or managed. To better understand conflict in local communities I turned to Coleman (1957, 1971).

Coleman developed from his studies of local community conflict a theory of the relation of community action and community organization. In Coleman's scheme, community action emerged when something threatened a local community as a whole: a flood, a crime wave, a factory shutdown, and so on (1957:4). The RWJF sought to construct drug problems as a crisis within local communities. It attempted to precipitate

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[11]Inner city informants remembered conflicts with city hall, administrative bureaucracies, corporations, and others dating back into the 1950s. Examples in the social science literature include, on housing Hirsch (1983), Massey and Denton (1993), Kirp et al (1997); on policing see Sampson and Bartusch (1999), Carter (1985), and National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968); on schools see Suttles (1986), Lukas (1985), Fainstein and Fainstein (1974). Racial conflict over development has been less well documented. See Meyerson and Banfield (1955), Gans (1962), Abrams (1965) and Hirsch (1983); on local politics see Browning et al (1990).

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community action by offering grants to applicant agencies who could define drug problems as a local community problem and show promise of rallying a broad-based collective effort to confront those problems. In this sense, the RWJF framed local implementation of Fighting Back as a problem of community action.

In his studies of community action, Coleman observed three organizational outcomes of a local community's response to crisis: conflict, disorganization, and organization (1971: 658-659). Local communities that were able to coherently act to address crises evidenced community organization. Local communities that were not able to respond were disabled either by conflict or by disorganization. Conflict --cultural, social, or normative-- produced a cleavage(s) in local social structure that made the community as such unable to move forward in addressing a crisis. Disorganization was the result of social entropy, social organization or structure so atrophied that collective action could not be mustered. In the Fighting Back intervention sites, I observed another form of disorganization, namely, over-organization. A surplus of organization within a local community made collective action exceedingly complex and unlikely (cf. Ryan 1999). It also presented the Fighting Back program with the problem of finding room in an overcrowded environment.

Coleman argued that these community structures emerged through iterative enactments (1971: 678 [Table 1]; cf. Lipset et al 1959: 394). Each enactment of a given set of social relations in the course of a community controversy left a residue of organization that was likely to shape the outcome of the next crisis, re-producing similar relations. Contributing to this reproduction of social organization was the residue of

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sentiment left by the outcome of a crisis. In the case of division, relations between the losers and winners of past controversies were animated, on the losers' side, by hostility. In the case of organization the residue of sentiment was identification; in the case of disorganization, apathy. These sentiments imbued the next crisis.

The idea of the Fighting Back program was to organize diverse actors into a local collectivity that would address local alcohol and drug problems as a unified front. The intervention would encounter, however, existing local divisions endemic to the historical character of U.S. urban social structure. Conflict developed between grassroots elements and program leadership in Worcester, New Haven, San Antonio, Little Rock, Kansas City, and Vallejo.[12] In at least three of these sites grassroots actors subsequently ceased to participate. In San Antonio an alliance between the conflicting parties was brokered which resulted in community organization.[13] Disorganization and over-organization were more difficult patterns to identify, but Newark and New Haven appeared to be candidates.

3. Explaining Grassroots Influence in the Local Programs

As noted above, how the grassroots fared depended on whether they were able to forge an alliance with elites. This ability depended on local social relations, on the direct or indirect actions of supralocal actors, and on local ecological factors.

Among local factors were the following: the extent of organization or

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[12]Conflict may have erupted in other sites as well. Grassroots sentiment was hostile in at least five of these six sites.

[13]This pattern was sustained through the Fighting Back program from 1992 at least until the end of my research there in 1996.

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disorganization within elite, provider, and grassroots sectors; the relative strength of the provider and grassroots actors and their sectors; the type of elite actors which sponsored the local program, political-administrative or business; ideological and interest affinities between elite sponsors and provider or grassroots elements; the existence of individuals or organizations in a position to broker an elite-grassroots alliance.

The degree and character of diversity within a local community's social organization also mattered. For example, alcohol and other drug services for Vallejo were strongly influenced by a group of 12 Step advocates for detoxification, recovery, and "social model" treatment services.[14] The Vallejo program was also affected by how its leaders and the National Program Office defined the "grassroots." They included three minority groups and "recovering persons." Consequently, African Americans and Latinos/Hispanics[15] were in competition with more resource-rich Filipinos and 12 Step advocates for status as grassroots participants in the program. Consequently, blacks and Latinos in Vallejo had much more difficulty finding a place in the program's governance and program activities. This also tended to be the case in those few intervention sites where minority populations were a low percentage of the target area population, for example, Worcester.

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[14]No other site had a comparable group or movement.

[15]Some "Hispanics" (the census category) in Vallejo preferred the term "Hispanic." Others preferred "Latino." The proper term for "blacks" (the census category) was also controversial among program participants. I try to use the census categories when referring to general populations. I use a mix of other terms when referring to individuals and specific groups. In the latter case I try to use the term which the specific group or individual being referred to tended to use.

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4. Significance

This study interprets a case of the implementation of social policy in order to increase understanding of the social political processes of policy implementation and its effects on urban communities. The case of Fighting Back is important in its own right as it was a progenitor of a kind of social intervention first implemented in the late 1980s to address local alcohol and drug problems. These kinds of programs were also implemented in 251 communities by the Center for Substance Abuse Prevention, a federal agency. The study thus contributes to an under-developed literature on the implementation of these programs, termed "community coalitions" or "community partnerships." In the final chapter I consider some policy implications of the study relevant to the implementation of these programs.

My interpretation of Fighting Back is grounded in my interests in the social processes of policy implementation and the social construction of urban communities. To that end the study also contributes to the literature on implementation and on inner city communities.

With regard to policy implementation in local environments, the work of Selznick and others (e.g Attewell and Gerstein 1979, Pressman and Wildavsky 1973) addressed the following question: do local dynamics turn the tables on "supralocal power institutions" (Leeds 1973), foiling their efforts to re-organize local, or lower level, institutional relations? Selznick and Pressman and Wildavsky found local institutional environments adapted the actions of supralocal powers to their own dynamics. Attewell and Gerstein found otherwise, concluding that supralocal actors foiled effective local action.

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My findings are consistent with those of Selznick and Pressman and Wildavsky; however, where local social organization indicated community organization, and the Fighting Back aligned itself with the central actors, the program could contribute to the momentum of local action. This depended on the national program administration's willingness to accommodate the broader neighborhood development goals which tended to be the priority of local actors.

This study also contributes to a neglected area in the voluminous contemporary literature on inner cities, the institutional relations of inner cities to higher level institutions through indigenous organizations and leadership. The literature on inner cities leaves the impression of a homogenous world of social disorganization, isolated from the larger society --labor markets, civil society, and so on. Wilson (1987, 1996) and others (Jencks and Peterson 1991) construct this view based on individual level data. Those studies that do investigate social interaction capture more of the diversity of urban social worlds but tend to do so in narrow social settings at the level of informal interactions between individuals (Anderson 1990, Duneier 1994, Dunier & Molotch 1999).

In contrast to these other studies, I found nascent and formal organizational life in the Fighting Back intervention sites. Organizational life existed precisely around the intervening role of higher level institutions --administration of services, social intervention, municipal politics, and so on. In these interactions the relations of inner cities or ghettoes to the larger metropolis and society are constructed. This study offers insight into the interaction of administration with inner city organizations and the

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consequences for community organization. These relations between higher level institutions and neighborhood or more local institutions play a role in producing the particular character of isolation of these neighborhoods and their populations from the larger metropolis as well as their incorporation into it. The incorporating role of these processes is a means for maintaining a level of urban social and political order while the isolating, excluding aspects of this process threaten the stability of that order.

5. Method

I originally sought to understand the unanticipated appearance of neighborhood improvement in the local Fighting Back programs and why this grassroots agenda was more prominent in some intervention sites than others. To do so I looked at the organization of interaction in the Fighting Back intervention, treating implementation as an enactment of administration and the social relations it embodies, engages, and produces. I looked especially at conflict --its appearance, progress, and resolution or management-- because conflict brings into relief the contours of local social relations. My basic method for looking at these processes was the development of multiple case histories of Fighting Back's local implementation.

Case histories

Case histories were developed for Fighting Back's implementation in Worcester (MA), New Haven, Newark, Washington (D.C.), Columbia (S.C.), San Antonio, Little

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Rock, Kansas City, Milwaukee, and Vallejo (CA).[16] Most of the case histories included the following: descriptions of local drug problems related to use and to public disorder; the process of organizing Fighting Back's governance and setting policy, including staffing, distributing resources, and programmatic content; the kinds of local organizations and other actors who participated in Fighting Back and the roles that they played; changes in organizational status, e.g. the transfer of the grant to another agency or achieving of nonprofit status; conflicts occurring in the course of these events and their resolutions between local parties and between the Fighting Back National Program Office and the local programs; and so on. When drafts of the case histories were completed, they were sent to many of the same local informants we had interviewed for their response. The responses we received gave no reason to substantially alter the contents of the case

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[16]The case histories were developed as part of a larger, evaluation study of the national Fighting Back program, funded by a grant from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation to the City University of New York, Research Foundation. The Principal Investigator was Leonard Saxe of City University of New York, Graduate Center, and Heller School of Social Policy, Brandeis University. See Saxe *et al* (1997). The purpose of the case histories was to provide evidence that programs were implemented, to identify differences in the local programs, and to document the process of organizing community wide efforts to address local alcohol and drug problems.

Together with Co-Principal Investigator Delmos Jones (former Professor of Anthropology, City University of New York, Graduate Center), I supervised the development of the case histories by a group of eighteen graduate students and professors. I conducted field work in all but Columbia and Kansas City. I developed the Vallejo case history myself and co-wrote the Milwaukee and Worcester case histories. I edited all but the New Haven case history. I closely supervised the field work for the Newark and Columbia cases. I re-constructed the San Antonio case history included in chapters Four and Five based on my own analysis of the San Antonio data. I had leisure to go over the data more thoroughly than did Jones and Suazo-Garcia (1998), which enabled me to develop theses they were unable to develop and confirm theses they advanced. The case histories for Newark and Washington D.C. were not completed.

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histories.[17]

Data

Data for the case histories came from multiple sources: informant interviews, observations, local and national program documents, surveys of target area residents. Forty or more in-depth informant interviews were completed for each local Fighting Back case history. These were completed during at least three different time points. A previous evaluator of Fighting Back, Pacific Institute of Research and Evaluation, conducted over 10 to 20 informant interviews in each program site in 1989-1990 and again in 1991-1992.[18] Thirty or more informant interviews and observations during at least one time point in 1995-1998 were conducted in each program site by the second evaluator, based at the City University of New York, Graduate Center. Where possible, we re-interviewed individuals whom Pacific Institute of Research had interviewed.[19]

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[17]The Kansas City case history was an exception. We collected a range of responses in person on the case histories of Worcester, Columbia, New Haven, Vallejo, Little Rock, and Kansas City. Errors of fact were investigated and corrected. Few informants in San Antonio and Milwaukee responded to our invitation to give feedback on those draft case histories.

[18]The quality of these interviews was uneven. They were mostly useful for identifying informants and for signaling the principal controversies that occurred during the planning phase and first phase of implementation.

[19]We were partially successful. The following were reasons we were unable to re-interview some of Pacific Institute of Research's informants: (1) former staff or participants had moved to another city and we could not find them, (2) former staff or participants did not wish to be interviewed.

We were unable to interview a grassroots leader in San Antonio and two former staff persons who participated in San Antonio Fighting Back's planning phase in 1990-1991. I would have liked their viewpoints on certain events and any facts they could have

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The guide used for in-depth interviews (see Appendix A) emphasized the history of the program's development, identifying its key participants (both staff and outsiders), relationships the local Fighting Back organization had with other local organizations, conflicts and their resolutions, the history of the local prevention and treatment sectors and relations among their organizations, the history of the targeted neighborhoods (drug problems, critical events, key players, and so on), the informants' views of the local drug problem and its causes, and so on. Many of these questions echoed those of the earlier evaluator.

A more structured instrument was used for interviews with elites (see Appendix B). These interviews covered some of the same ground as the other guide but were pointed more at identifying influential individuals and organizations and understanding the local power relations relevant to drug problem construction.

We sought out interviewees whom we thought could offer the most authoritative answers to our questions: heads of alcohol and other drug service agencies, political representatives of the targeted neighborhoods, Fighting Back's board members and staff, other organizations and individuals whose names appeared frequently in the local Fighting Back organization's documents. We identified both knowledgeable "outsiders"

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added; however, the evidence for the events I re-constructed was from other, multiple sources, both documents and interviews, and therefore was strong (see chapters Four and Five). We were unable to interview some grassroots leadership in Vallejo and two administrative officials. Others were available. Again, the evidence for the events I re-constructed was from other, multiple sources, and therefore was strong (see chapters Six and Seven).

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to Fighting Back and "insiders."[20] We used the interviews as occasions to augment (i.e. snowball) and check the validity of our working sample. We also recruited inner city (targeted area) grassroots informants, both those who participated in Fighting Back and those who did not or had dropped out.[21]

The community studies field team conducted observations over a period of two to three weeks in the following sites: San Antonio, Vallejo, and Little Rock in the summer of 1995; Milwaukee and Washington D.C. in the summer of 1996.[22] In three sites resident graduate students were recruited to conduct observations and interviews over a longer period of time, from six months to three years: New Haven (1994-1997), Kansas City (1995-1996), and Columbia (1996-1997). The researchers in New Haven and Columbia qualified as informants on recent local and regional events, organizations, and politics.[23] For Newark, three researchers from the City University of New York, Graduate

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[20]One useful strategy for identifying outsiders was to find names that appeared in program documents but then ceased to appear any longer. We discovered it was typical for a number of organizations to cease participating at the close of the planning period. They gave different reasons for dropping out, for example, they did not receive a contract or sub-grant or they disagreed with those whose influence over the program prevailed.

[21]Grassroots informants were not necessarily more difficult to identify. In the case of open controversies it was not unusual for the names of organizations and leaders to appear in local documents or correspondence with the National Program Office. Local staff and the National Program Office's officers also identified grassroots participants. We sought out contacts at meetings and events in the locally targeted neighborhoods (which did not necessarily have anything to do with Fighting Back) and snowballed from there.

[22]The field team varied in size by site: three in Washington, four in Little Rock, five in Milwaukee and Vallejo, eight in San Antonio.

[23]Mary Still, a former reporter for the *Charlotte Observer*, had written on politics in Columbia and lived in Columbia at the time she developed the Columbia study. Dan

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Center conducted interviews and observations over a six month period in 1996-1997.

I also reviewed documents belonging to the local Fighting Back organizations: correspondence, meeting minutes, planning documents, progress reports, and so on. Where possible, these were used as corroboration of events referred to by interviewees. In some instances they served as official documentation of controversies, for example, in San Antonio of grassroots' complaints about Fighting Back's leadership and its changes from late 1990 through early 1991. I also used correspondence and other documents to interpret relationships between the National Program Office and the local programs or between local Fighting Back administrators and other local organizations. Lists of meetings attendees, committee member rosters, and mailing lists, for example, helped me to identify organizational and individual participants over the course of Fighting Back's development and were therefore also sources for identifying informants.

A group of researchers at the Heller School of Social Policy, Brandeis University, supervised local data collectors who were also employed by the local programs (Hallfors et al 1999). They tracked program activities over time, kept track of critical events affecting the targeted neighborhoods, for example, election results or the acquiring of a large grant by a local agency, and noted significant organizational changes, for example, staff turnover or the local program's transition to independent, nonprofit status.

The Heller School group also conducted informant interviews with local Fighting

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Ryan, who developed the New Haven study, was a resident of New Haven for over ten years, during which time he was a consultant to nonprofit organizations in New Haven and to scholars conducting research on New Haven. For his dissertation at Yale University, he conducted an ethnographic study of organizational dynamics among New Haven's administrative, nonprofit, and grassroots organizations.

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Back staff and reviewed program documents. These sources were reviewed in order to identify the types of programmatic activities in the local programs and to measure changes in the implementation strength of each of these programmatic activities at five time points in the local programs' histories (Hallfors et al 1999). I used these data as checks on my own observations about program activities and their intensity. I also used them to measure one cooptation outcome of the national Fighting Back program, the general success of grassroots efforts to develop local program content that addressed public disorder rather than individual drug use.

The 1995 and 1997 iterations of the Fighting Back survey were used for empirical evidence on local drug related problems: use rates, dependency rates, and drug related public disorder (Kadushin et al 1998). The Fighting Back survey included samples from each of the intervention sites and a national sample to enable comparison. I also used data from the 1990 U.S. Census to give profiles of the populations in the Fighting Back intervention sites.[24]

Comparison of San Antonio and Vallejo

I chose to build this study around the San Antonio and Vallejo Fighting Back programs for a number of reasons. I knew these cases better than the others. The data on Fighting Back's implementation in these two sites was also better than that for most of the other local programs. Moreover, the local Fighting Back programs in San Antonio

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[24]Census data analysis was conducted by Susan Weber and Andrew Beveridge at the Sociology Department of Queens College, City University of New York.

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and Vallejo both provoked especially strong public controversy. These conflicts illuminated the particular contours of local social divisions in these two intervention sites. These two cases also shed light on the mechanisms by which these divisions were bridged or otherwise managed. In the discussion chapters, I also drew on the other eight case histories of Fighting Back's implementation as points of contrast and comparison.

The San Antonio and Vallejo cases were also unique because they involved multi-racial target populations and local actors. However, bringing the other eight cases into the discussion enabled me to consider the effect this may have had on how cooptation played out in sites where the targeted populations and local actors were predominantly of one race.

6. Chapter Outline

Part 1 gives essential background on the Fighting Back intervention and for the case histories. Chapter Two describes the Fighting Back program design and the historical context in which it was designed. The idea for the Fighting Back program developed in the context of what many considered to be a national crisis, the "crack epidemic" of the mid-1980s. The program was intended to re-introduce prevention and treatment into the public debate on solutions to drug problems as a complement to the emphasis on interdiction and law enforcement. The program design drew on two general intervention ideas: broad-based community action and coordination of services in the areas of prevention and treatment.

Chapter Three describes the Fighting Back intervention sites. Compared to a

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national urban sample, their populations were poorer and had higher percentages of minorities, especially African Americans. These populations and their neighborhoods were more diverse than the literature on inner city populations has portrayed them. They were not only poor and the sites of street corner drug markets, they also evidenced nascent and formal organization in support of indigenous civic leaders. In the 1980s, some of this organization formed in response to the public disorder in inner city neighborhoods caused by drug commerce and public use. Many groups, organizations, and leaders which formed around this problem perceived the Fighting Back intervention as a vehicle for addressing public disorder and other aspects of neighborhood deterioration.

Part 2 develops two case histories of Fighting Back's local implementation. Chapters Four and Five are a case history of Fighting Back's implementation in San Antonio's Eastside neighborhoods. Chapter Four describes the Eastside and the history of local social organization drawn out by the Fighting Back intervention. Two central actors emerged, the United Way and People Against Corruption. The former applied for the Fighting Back program grant. The latter was an umbrella organization representing neighborhood associations and Parent Teacher Associations on the Eastside.

Chapter Five describes the conflict between People Against Corruption and the United Way over Fighting Back's leadership. The program floundered until two brokers emerged who negotiated a governance and administrative structure which satisfied the grassroots and the United Way. This granted grassroots leadership access to resources in developing their community organizing agenda for the Eastside.

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Chapters Six and Seven develop the Vallejo case history. A city council member, with the support of school, police, and alcohol and other drug agency administrators, mobilized an application for the Fighting Back grant on behalf of the City of Vallejo. In response to the National Program Office's criticism, Vallejo Fighting Back recruited grassroots. Of those defined as the grassroots, Twelve Step advocates gained leadership positions and Filipinos acquired some support for new service efforts. African American neighborhood grassroots sought to control resources for "community prevention activities." When they failed to do so, they dropped out. Fighting Back leadership made ongoing efforts to legitimate the program as including the grassroots, for example, by distributing small grants to neighborhood organizations and developing a project that addressed neighborhood problems associated with liquor stores and bars. However, minority grassroots did not appear to be integrated into leadership as they were in San Antonio.

Part 3 considers the impact of race and administration on social organization in inner cities. My general thesis is that the Fighting Back program tended to be channeled into local institutional patterns of administration. Local processes of administration have simultaneously organizing, dividing, and disorganizing effects on the urban grassroots. Chapter 8 begins by returning to the basic underlying social organizational principle of U.S. urban communities --racial division-- and its consequences for community organization. I then consider the effects of formal aspects of administration on community organization --jurisdiction and resource distribution. I then discuss the range of grassroots organizational responses to these aspects of administration and their

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consequences.

Chapter 9 begins by describing the negotiation of administrative control between the national and local administrators of the Fighting Back program. Initially, the national and local administrations were somewhat loosely coupled with regard to programming choices. However, as the implementation phase continued, the national administration increasingly imposed itself on the local programs, tightening the coupling between the two levels of administration.

I go on to distinguish three general organizational sectors within administration: service delivery and public and private sector resource administration. Which of these administrative sub-sectors the local Fighting Back grantees fell under also shaped the effects the Fighting Back program had on grassroots social organization.

Chapter 10 considers local aspects of administration and grassroots organization that affect the relationship of inner cities to administration. The following were factors: the relationship between local administrative and political institutions, local elites' views of inner city problems and their historical receptivity to federal interventions in inner cities, racial and ethnic demography and patterns of settlement, and organizational movements indigenous to inner cities which engaged administration.

I now turn to a description of the origins of the Fighting Back program.

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Part 1. The Culture and Social Organization of Alcohol and Drug Problems

Chapter 2

Contradictions in the Origins of the Fighting Back Program

That part of the philanthropic world committed to studying social problems and developing social programs to address them engages the process of constructing "public problems."[1] The ideas behind the Fighting Back program and the public statements about it during its implementation became a part of "claimsmaking"[2] about the nature of the alcohol and other drug (AOD) problem in the U.S. and its solution. This chapter is about the origins of the Fighting Back program set in the context of this process. After some

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[1]Gusfield used the term "public problem" rather than "social problem" in order to make an analytical distinction between a problem itself and studying the social process by which a given phenomenon becomes a matter of public concern and policy (1981). In the 1960s, for example, Ralph Nader played a role in constructing the public problem of auto safety. Through lawsuits, research, publicity, and so on, auto safety became a problem of national concern. Federal regulatory agencies were created and auto makers were publically held to standards of safety to an extent they had never been previously. Public problems are thus problems which come to be generally perceived as things "about which 'someone ought to do something'" or take responsibility (1981: 5). The study of social problems, on the other hand, looks at behavioral or other phenomena whether or not they are a matter of broad public concern --for example, substance abuse and crime-- attempting to understand their incidence, history, causes, and so on.

[2]"Claimsmaking" is a term used by sociologists (e.g. Best 1989) who study the social construction of public problems. Claimsmakers are important agents in the process of problem construction. Claimsmakers couple facts "with rhetorical idioms which relate the problem to significant value positions in society and are used to demand and justify action" (McMullan and Eyles 1999: 296). For example, the RWJF was a claimsmaker in attempting to re-define the alcohol and drug problem as a problem of "demand" rather than a problem of "supply," as I will show in this chapter. See McMullen and Eyles for a brief review of the literature on claimsmaking (1999:296-7).

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historical background, I interpret key concepts in the complex of ideas integral to the program: demand reduction, the continuum of care, and the role of community in the AOD problem and its solution. My purpose is to identify aspects of the program design that interacted with social contradictions in the course of Fighting Back's local implementation. In the discussion section I describe two related sources of contradiction. First, the program required an open, democratic process for planning, but the solution to the AOD problem was generally prescribed as prevention and treatment related services. Second, the program assumed that despite local social divisions, consensus could nonetheless emerge about the nature of AOD problems and how and by whom solutions would be implemented.

1. Origins

The conception for the Fighting Back program developed in the context of the public debate about drug problems in the mid-1980s. The conception for Fighting Back also followed from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation's (RWJF) orientation to medical and public health views of problems. I first give brief background on the RWJF and then describe the genesis of the program ideas from the point of view of the chief author of the Fighting Back program, Paul Jellinek.[3]

The RWJF was founded during the Great Depression by an heir to and Chief

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[3]At the time of Fighting Back's inception, Jellinek was a senior program officer at the RWJF. He would later become a vice president. Jellinek was principal designer of the Fighting Back program. Ruby Hearn was a vice president also involved with the design and responsibility for Fighting Back program (Jellinek and Hearn 1991).

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Executive Officer of the Johnson and Johnson Corporation. Robert Wood Johnson died in the early 1970s and left most of his substantial estate to the RWJF. At the time the Fighting Back "Call for Proposals" (RWJF 1989a, hereafter "Call") was released, the RWJF was the fourth largest private philanthropy in the U.S. and the nation's largest philanthropy devoted to health-related programs and research. It had assets of two billion dollars and an annual "payout" of around 100 million dollars (RWJF 1989b: 2). In the 1970s, the RWJF focused on improving access to medical care. That mission was expanded to include cost containment. Since the mid-1980s, the focus has been broadened to "front page issues like homelessness, chronic mental illness, AIDS, high-risk adolescents and so forth" (RWJF 1989b: 2).[4]

The RWJF's segue into substance abuse related programming was described retrospectively by Jellinek at the Applicant's Workshop in May of 1989. The board of the RWJF first considered taking on the AOD problem in 1986. Jellinek noted the correlation between substance abuse and medical and public health issues, "Through our work in some of these areas we kept running into the substance abuse problem. It runs through all of these issues" (RWJF 1989a: 2).

Jellinek observed that the predominant claimsmakers about drug problems in the 1980s constructed the problem as a crime. The RWJF countered this view, arguing that substance abuse was a public health issue.

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[4]In 1999, the RWJF was still the fourth largest U.S. philanthropy. It had assets of $7.8 billion and expected to give about $440 million in the year 2000 (Dundjerski 1998).

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> Historically, substance abuse has been viewed as an enforcement issue, a supply side problem, but gradually it became clear to us...that the problem in this country was also a health problem, a major (sic) public health problem with serious health consequences. (1989b: 2)

However, another problem stood in the way, a "paralyzing" sense of incapacity to address the AOD problem.

> [T]here was a growing sense of frustration at all levels, at the federal level, state level, but particularly at the community level that was almost tantamount to paralysis, a sense that no matter how many more dollars you put in on the enforcement side, no matter how many more police we put on the beat, no matter how many curricula we put into the schools, the problem wasn't going away. In fact, in many places it seemed to be getting worse.
>
> [We] finally concluded that the most important thing we could do as a private foundation...was to try to address this issue of frustration --the sense of paralysis-- head on.
>
> ...[This] is an issue that we think goes beyond the substance abuse problem. People are deeply afraid of the problem of drugs and alcohol. Afraid for their children, for their own personal safety and for what it is doing to their communities. If we aren't able to lick this problem, the result may be a crisis of confidence in the ability of our system to respond effectively to a problem of deep

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> and immediate concern to all of us. ...[The] stakes in this program are very high indeed. (RWJF 1989b: 3)

The program would address the problem at what RWJF staff believed to be a manageable level, local communities with populations of 150,000 or less. The "paralysis" or "crisis of confidence" would be addressed by mobilizing leaders and residents within local communities to discuss and collectively address local AOD problems. The AOD problem would also be addressed by means of other programming content, namely, a coordinated effort on prevention and treatment.

> We want to find out whether, given sufficient [resources, communities] have the wherewithal to pull together all of their resources around the problem into *a single community-wide system that would bring all of the most promising prevention and treatment modalities to bear on the problem in a coordinated fashion* that would complement and reinforce the efforts going on in law enforcement to find out whether by doing all this, these communities would be able to turn the corner on what so far has been seen as an almost intractable problem. ...[With] this program we are hoping to overcome the paralyzing perception that this is an insurmountable problem. (RWJF 1989b: 2-3; emphasis added)

Jellinek's speech at the Applicant's Workshop (RWJF 1989b) signaled a number

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of important themes for the program: 1) the construction of the AOD problem as a crime problem calling for law enforcement was not openly rejected but deemed not fully adequate; 2) the AOD problem was defined as a "public health problem"; 3) prevention and treatment were the key resources for helping potential and existing users and abusers; 4) coordination of prevention and treatment efforts was essential; 5) the locus of both problem and solution was local communities.

The RWJF committed more monetary resources to Fighting Back than to any other program in its history up to that time. The Foundation funded fifteen urban and one rural program site at the rate of $200,000 per site for two years planning. Fourteen of these sites each received three million dollars over a period of five years to implement their plans.[5] In 1997, the Foundation decided to extend the Fighting Back program, offering eight of the original fourteen implementation sites the opportunity to apply for three additional years of funding. The annual cost of this most recent extension of the program ranged from between $150,000 and $300,000 per site. The RWJF thus allocated more than $50 million in funding for the local programs alone.[6]

In early 1989, before publicly announcing the Fighting Back program grant, the

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[5]The funding pattern was different for different grantees. For example, the Kansas City organization did not receive its funding as early as others. Other grantees (e.g. Oakland, Newark, and Charlotte) lost their funding or had it suspended for a time.

[6]My research on the local programs ended in 1995-1998, depending on the given site. I focused on the planning phase and the original implementation phase, not the extended implementation phase which began in 1997.

The total figure of expenditure for the Fighting Back program would be higher and would include the cost of the National Program Office, cost of the national evaluation study, and time and other resources spent by RWJF staff on the program from 1989 to 2000.

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RWJF funded a National Program Office (NPO).[7] The NPO was the administrative arm of the national Fighting Back program and would be the RWJF's representative to the local programs. It would support the development of the local programs. The original NPO was located at Vanderbilt University Medical School and directed by Anderson Spickard, M.D.

2. The Social Construction of Drug Problems in the 1980s[8]

The Fighting Back program was in large part an effort of the RWJF to re-frame how policymakers defined and approached drug problems in the U.S. At the time, the Reagan and Bush administrations' "war on drugs" was the predominant approach. The RWJF sought to expand this predominantly law enforcement and interdictive approach to include prevention and treatment. I first describe how the media and politicians shaped the perspective behind the war on drugs. This background sets the stage for how the Fighting Back program came into being. I understand the origins of the Fighting Back

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[7]It is the RWJF's standard practice to subcontract the administration of large programs to independent organizations.

[8]The term "social construction" may imply for some the belief that something is "made up," for example, that in saying drug problems are socially constructed, I mean that they do not really exist, that media, politicians, and others have made up the problem. This is not at all the case. "Social construction" is a technical term within the field of social problems which denotes a set of institutional processes by which particular social phenomena come to be issues of broad concern in a society and are re-produced as issues of broad concern. For the purposes of this chapter the social constructionist approach is simply an analytical choice. I choose, for the time being, to leave in the background questions about drug problems themselves in order to understand the RWJF's effort to shape public understanding of and concern about drug problems. The nature of this analytical choice should become clearer in the paragraphs that follow.

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program within the framework of a social constructivist approach (cf. Best 1989).

Merton et al conceived the study of social problems as encompassing both objectivist and constructivist approaches (1973).[9] In their text book on social problems, Merton and his colleagues took an objectivist approach in describing objective social contradictions or conditions which produce social disorder and deviance. Some of this text's authors embedded a constructivist approach by following the influence of social policy or social values on perceptions of disorder and deviance. Merton took a constructivist approach to "public problems" through his research on "opinion leaders" -- the media, politicians, intellectuals, and others who most influence the field of ideas available to the public and to policy makers. Best distinguishes this latter field as the territory of "constructionists" (1989: xvii-xix). Best and his colleagues are primarily interested, not in the objective conditions which produce a harm causing social problem but in the process by which some social phenomena --whether harmful or not—become public problems, sources of concern for the general public, debated and acted upon by officialdom and influential private actors.

The term "construction" implies constructors, or "claimsmakers." Claimsmakers may be media, social movement leaders, corporate elites, politicians, pundits, bureaucrats, and others depending on who is interested in a given public issue. In the case of drug problems, the RWJF sought to be an influential claimsmaker alongside politicians, pundits like William Bennett, public agencies like the federal Drug

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[9]They did not use the terms "objectivist" and "constructionist." See Best's text book for definitions (1989: xvii-xix), also Spector and Kitsuse (1977) on the constructionist approach. Cf. footnote 1.

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Enforcement Agency, and others. This is a self-defined role of many philanthropies -- through research and demonstration programs to draw attention to problems they believe public institutions should be addressing and to suggest how they should be addressed. Their efforts may influence the direction of national policy by "demonstrating" problems and their solutions. Their ideas and programs become available for borrowing at a moment when policymakers are either ready or forced to initiate legislation in a given policy area. For example, ideas that were a part of the Ford Foundation's Gray Areas program are considered by at least one historian to have been borrowed by the Johnson administration for its "war on poverty" (O'Connor 1995).

A claimsmaker "typifies" a problem by dramatizing "best" or "worst" cases. Best gives the example of anti-abortionists who typify the case of a woman callously having repeated abortions while abortion defenders typify the case of a woman who has been raped (1989: xxi). The RWJF program "Call" included the following litany of "typifications" to dramatize the Foundation's view of the AOD problem (1989a: 4).

> One in eight Americans over age 11 has used an illegal drug at least once in the past month.
>
> Between 1983 and 1987...cocaine-related deaths more than tripled and cocaine-related emergency room visits increased more than five-fold.
>
> In Florida...the estimated number of cocaine-addicted babies jumped from 200 in

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> 1986 to 2,000 in 1987, and is estimated to have reached 10,000 in 1988 -- approximately one baby in every 17 born in the state.
>
> An estimated 18 million Americans --approximately one out of every 10 adults-- have either symptoms of alcohol dependency or significant problems associated with alcohol consumption.
>
> Approximately half of all motor vehicle fatalities in this country are alcohol-related; nearly a quarter-million Americans have been killed in an alcohol-related automobile crash in the past decade.
> (RWJF 1989a: 4)

The "Call" frames drug and alcohol abuse as "a major public health problem" (RWJF 1989a: 4). The Fighting Back National Program Office would later call AOD "public health enemy number one" (Spickard et al 1994). In 1992, Steven A. Schroeder, President of the RWJF, called AOD "the nation's number one health care problem" (RWJF 1992:8).

The RWJF entered the public debate on drugs in the midst of what the media termed a "crack epidemic" (Reinarman and Levine 1989, Reeves and Campbell 1994). Cocaine was the primary focus of illicit drug coverage by the media in the 1980s. In their analysis of 270 media events in the 1980s, Reeves and Campbell argued the "cocaine narrative" of the 1980s had three phases. Phase one told a story of a glamor drug used in

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Hollywood, by professional athletes, on Wall Street, by politicians, and high society. The drug was portrayed as trickling down to the middle class. Among the drug cases profiled in this period from 1981 through 1984 were the trials of John DeLorean, Stacy Keach, a half dozen Dallas Cowboys, and Marion Barry, Mayor of Washington D.C. On the policy front, in October of 1982 in a speech at the Justice Department, President Reagan declared "war" on drugs.

Two years later, the first reference to "rock" cocaine was made in a network newscast (Reeves and Campbell 1994: 273). Phase two inverts the narrative of a glamor drug affecting the middle class. Reeves and Campbell marked the transition to phase two with the first reference in the *New York Times* to "crack cocaine" in 1985. "At the start of 1986, crack was known only in a few impoverished neighborhoods in Los Angeles, New York, Miami and a small number of other large cities" (Reinarman and Levine 1989: 117). In the spring of 1986, two college athletes' deaths were related to crack. The drug became national news. By July of 1986, the major television networks had produced 74 stories on crack. Another 1,000 would appear leading up to the November 1986 election. That fall New York Senator Alfonse D'Amato would buy crack undercover. Dan Rather's show on crack cocaine would receive the highest rating of any news show from 1981 to 1986 (Reinarman and Levine 1989: 118). Crack was referred to as a "plague," an "epidemic," a "crisis." Before the 1988 election, the stories on crack picked up again. "Drug lords" and "the crack epidemic" again received a large share of news stories. The setting of the problem was poor minority, predominantly black and Hispanic neighborhoods.

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Legislators called for an "all out war on drugs." Before the 1986 election, Congress passed a two billion dollar anti-drug law which emphasized interdiction. In the 1988 session, again, shortly before national legislators went home to campaign for re-election, more anti-drug laws were passed. The 1988 laws set long mandatory prison terms for possession of crack and authorized major funding for new enforcement. In both the 1986 and 1988 sessions, these new anti-drug laws were passed by overwhelming majorities in both houses of Congress.

3. The Fighting Back Idea

The RWJF's "Call" was a response to public rhetoric and federal policy regarding AOD in the late 1980s, era of the "crack epidemic" and the "war on drugs." The "Call" did not take on the drug war hawks directly, however. Rather, it argued that existing anti-drug efforts suffered from an over reliance on "stepped-up law enforcement, focused on reducing the supply and sales of illegal drugs," arguing that "comparatively less has been done to reduce demand through preventive education and expanded treatment, and these efforts have generally been short-term, piecemeal, and disappointing" (RWJF 1989a: 4). The "Call" reasonably suggested the dominant strategy of reducing the "supply" of drugs through interdiction be balanced with an effort to "reduce demand." Stepped up law enforcement should be balanced by increased commitment to prevention and treatment. The objective of the Fighting Back program was therefore "to reduce the demand for illegal drugs and alcohol" (RWJF 1989a: 5).

The program outlined in the "Call" put forth a number of ideas about the source of

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the AOD problem and its solution: (1) the demand reduction strategy located the problem in the individual consumer which would be addressed by improving local prevention and treatment programming; (2) existing prevention and treatment programs were not as effective as they could be because they were poorly coordinated; (3) local communities needed to be educated and mobilized in order to inform and strengthen their will and capacity to act on AOD problems. In the next sections I interpret these ideas, beginning with demand reduction and its concomitant strategy, improving the local "continuum of care."

Demand reduction and the "continuum of care"

The economistic language of supply and demand for the AOD problem suggested users are a market of individual consumers. In the demand reduction strategy the locus of the problem is therefore the individual's choice to use drugs or alcohol. The goal of "demand reduction" suggested intervening so that potential users would not start being consumers and current users would either quit or reduce their use. In the words of RWJF senior program officer Jellinek,

> Treatment [e.g.] would reduce demand by reducing the number of current users.... Another strategy for reducing demand is to reduce the number of new users and that is the prevention side. (RWJF 1989b: 23-4)

The NPO's Deputy Director, Greg Dixon, echoed Jellinek's general terms for the

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sort of programming compatible with the demand reduction strategy.

> Demand reduction can be prevention, treatment, aftercare and a whole range of activities to try and get people to reduce their use of drugs or to abstain altogether.... (RWJF 1989b:23)

The NPO Executive Director, Dr. Anderson Spickard, conceived of the general strategy for reducing demand as a "continuum of care." This public health idea is of a net of services that covers the entire population --potential AOD users and users. The continuum of care net includes the following types of programming --prevention, early identification, intervention, treatment, and after-care. The non-using population is "prevented" from developing an alcohol or drug problem by information and education. "Identification" programs train key figures like doctors, school teachers, social workers, and ministers to recognize drug or alcohol problems in individuals and "intervene" by discussing the problem directly with individuals or notifying a more qualified professional to do so. Individuals could then be steered toward an appropriate treatment. "Treatment" programs help those with a problem to stop using while "after-care" programs enable them to "stay clean."

The "Call" advocated some specific program ideas, encouraging variety and innovation as well as the targeting of particular populations in their institutional settings. With respect to the continuum of care, the "Call" stated the local Fighting Back programs should include "at a minimum" the elements described below.

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> (1) a highly visible public awareness campaign designed to generate broad-based community support for efforts to reduce demand . . . (2) a multi-faceted prevention effort targeted especially at children, adolescents and adults which could include a) prevention in the schools, as well as in out-of-school settings such as youth clubs and athletic teams, b) prevention training for peers, parents, teachers, coaches, physicians, and employers, (3) well-defined program policies and procedures for the early identification, assessment, and initial referral into treatment of people with drug or alcohol problems which could be targeted at one or more age groups and might include a) inpatient hospital-case finding programs, b) employee assistance programs, and c) student assistance programs in the school and on local college and vocational school campuses; and (4) a broad range of accessible options for treatment and relapse prevention, such as individual and group outpatient treatment and follow-up day treatment, inpatient residential treatment, and transitional residential care. (RWJF 1989a:5-6)

The organizational problem

Grantees would establish a local "continuum of care" by developing services to fill gaps, eliminate redundant services, and mend fragmented services. The local Fighting Back projects were to enlist existing organizations and agencies in a coordinated effort. The goal was to improve their collective efficiency by knitting together a seamless array of services to address the needs of the local population. This effort would be instituted

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during the planning and implementation periods by an organizational body called the "community-wide consortium." It would bring together

> ...all those institutions, organizations, and public and private agencies whose participation is required to implement the proposed initiative, including news media, civic and religious organizations, schools, businesses, major health care providers, human service agencies, drug and alcohol treatment providers...local government and law enforcement... (RWJF 1989a: 6)."

The consortium's first task was to inventory local resources in terms of the "continuum of care" idea. For example, what were existing treatment options for individuals who cannot pay for their own treatment? Were their particular populations, for example, women with small children, who were poorly accommodated by existing treatments? Was there a variety of kinds of treatment? They would then assess needs and determine what of these needs they could address given their strengths and the resources of the grant.

The Fighting Back creators were aware, however, that coordinating a variety of players in the local communities would not be simple. NPO Deputy Director Dixon explained at the Applicants' Workshop:

> We are not naive. We know that in competition, serious philosophical disagreements over approaches and probably significant personality clashes may

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> have gone on in your community over years. People compete for funds, compete for staff, and compete for promoting points of view. In any case, I think that your most difficult job initially is deciding how to be inclusive and how to work together as you prepare the application. Naturally, it is our hope that this is a process that is nurturing and healthful rather than one that is divisive, but the latter is certainly a possibility (RWJF 1989b: 8).

The literature on community-based programs to address alcohol problems concurs with the NPO and RWJF program officers' assessment. Participating organizations and groups have faced considerable difficulty in agreeing on goals, making it difficult to establish and maintain coalitions (Giesbrecht et al 1989; Greenfield and Zimmerman 1993).

The RWJF summed up the Fighting Back program idea in one statement as follows:

> Fighting Back is designed to find out whether, by consolidating existing programs, activities, and other resources into a single community-wide system of prevention, early identification, treatment, and after-care services [i.e. the continuum of care], a community can achieve substantial reductions in the use of illegal drugs and alcohol (Jellinek and Hearn 1991:79; RWJF 1989a:3).

Community as problem and solution

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Fighting Back attempted to operationalize yet another complex idea. The term "community" is used in a variety of ways in the "Call" and in the course of the program's history. Two related general conceptions stand out: community as a social geographic unit and as a collective actor. I discuss assumptions behind using "community" to refer to social geographic units in the next chapter. Implying a community is or should be a social actor, the Fighting Back designers described it as a cause or contributing factor in the nation's AOD problem. Local communities were "trying to fight back" but failing (RWJF 1989a:4). They were misguided in overly relying on law enforcement. They lacked awareness of the true extent and nature of the problem. Leadership was not "forceful and sustained" in setting priorities and articulating "community norms" (1989a: 4). Local communities "lack[ed] resources" and their existing resources were disorganized or "fragmented" (1989a: 5).

> Despite the proliferation of local demand-reduction programs and activities, there has been little attempt to tie such endeavors together...There is no common understanding of the problem, no consensus regarding priorities, and, as a result, no overall strategy for deploying the community's multiple resources in a focused, unified effort. Under such circumstances, it is hardly surprising that few communities, if any, have turned the corner on the drug problem (Jellinek and Hearn 1991: 79).

Fighting Back proposed to strengthen communities by rallying the civic

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commitment of citizens, organizations, and leadership together to reduce demand for drugs and alcohol. The mobilization would occur through a public awareness campaign, including public service announcements and special events, and the recruiting work of the local Fighting Back staff and key sponsors. The mobilized citizens, leaders, and organizations would engage in a consensus-building process. This would enable them to develop as unified actors representing a broad base of local leadership. The grant would provide resources for "systems planning, development, initial implementation, and coordination" (RWJF 1989a: 5). The solution to the problem of disorganized, weak communities was therefore the mobilization of a united community, knowledgeable about AOD problems and able to develop a comprehensive plan and act on it.

This call to "community-wide" collective action was operationalized in the organizational structure of the program. The "citizens task force" was designed to serve as a "neutral forum for consensus building and conflict resolution" (Jellinek and Hearn 1991: 80) as well as "provide oversight, guidance, and support" (RWJF 1989a: 6). The RWJF senior program officers saw the "principal barriers" to community wide consensus as "essentially political" (Jellinek and Hearn 1991: 80). This view was confirmed during the grant's planning phase when it became clear that "one of the major challenges...[would] be to remain responsive to grassroots concerns without alienating the community's established political, civic, and business leadership" (Jellinek and Hearn 1991: 80). The citizens task force would therefore include "parents, clergy, tenant groups, business and community leaders, health professionals, school superintendents, principals, judges, chiefs of police, elected officials, and others" (RWJF 1989a: 6). This

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cadre representing the breadth of local constituencies and the resources of officialdom and the wealthy would hash out their differences with regard to the AOD problem, make a plan, and implement it.

Essential to the program idea was representation both from the traditional powerful actors in local communities and from "those most affected by the problem," that is, the ordinary citizens living in the targeted areas. Jellinek explained this idea at the Applicants' Workshop (1989b).

> One of the things that is clearly going to be essential in making this program work, whatever the community, is that those people most affected by the problem are involved in the establishment of the program and its priorities. And that falls very much into the area of the task force. It is very important that it not be just a top-down sort of initiative. Clout is very important. In fact it is critical for this thing to work. But it is equally important that there be bottom-up, grassroots involvement and support for this program in order for it to succeed. I think [the citizens task force] is one forum where both of those elements can be brought together (RWJF 1989b: 22).

In the course of implementation, the NPO would define "those most affected by the problem" to include especially ethnic minorities. As I show in the next chapter, seven of the fourteen sites chosen for implementation grants focused on largely African American urban neighborhoods. Many of the program sites also had large numbers of

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Hispanics. Some other minorities were targeted as well.

Discussion

This chapter has been about some of the social and conceptual origins of the Fighting Back program. The argument is, first, that the RWJF sought to influence the construction of the public problem of AOD in the context of the war on drugs of the 1980s. Second, the RWJF emphasized reducing individual demand for illegal drugs and alcohol. The RWJF hoped that demand could be reduced by improving the continuum of care. The Foundation believed this could happen (a) if the relevant providers in local communities could coordinate their efforts and (b) if players of all social strata in local communities could agree on this approach and support it. This was a complex undertaking which the RWJF and NPO themselves expected to be difficult.

The RWJF's "demand side" view of the AOD problem was not universal in the U.S. --neither at the level of national public opinion and policy making nor in local communities. A "supply side" view of the problem clearly had the support of many citizens and policymakers. Moreover, supply and demand side constructions were not the only two views of AOD problems that emerged in the local Fighting Back programs. Many inner city grassroots tended to understand AOD problems as symptoms of the hopelessness experienced in economically depressed and politically disempowered communities. Another prominent view assigned responsibility to corporations that pressed tobacco and alcohol on minorities by concentrating their ad campaigns in

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minority neighborhoods.[10] Most importantly, local residents were most immediately concerned about the neighborhood disorder caused by drug buying and selling and by alcohol retailers that catered to poor alcoholics and youth. The Fighting Back program design did not explicitly take account of the possibility that local program participants might consider approaches other than the demand side view more suitable. It was not clear how the differences between local views and the RWJF's views would be handled.

In the course of program design and implementation, no clear theory of individual demand for AOD was articulated. Moreover, it is not clear that the fields of prevention and treatment have developed such a theory.[11] Drug dependency appears to be one of the more inscrutable puzzles for behavioral scientists. This circumstance must in part explain the variety of existing prevention and treatment approaches. Some of these approaches had histories embedded in local institutions and organizations with distinct cultures and interests. Twelve Step program members in the Vallejo, California program site, for example, would hold very different views on the use of medication in detoxification and treatment than physicians. Therefore, there were underlying reasons for the "fragmented" nature of local service provision. An important one lay in these distinct traditions of

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[10]Other views are part of the policy debate on AOD problems but were less prominent in the course of the Fighting Back program's development. See Baum (1996) and Reinarman and Levine (1997) for "harm reduction" approaches. Though his work has been less a part of public debate, Gusfield's work suggests re-locating responsiblity for alcohol in the companies that manufacture, distribute, market, and sell these substances (1981: 12). In the 1990s an analogous approach became a part of the public problem of smoking as legal responsibility for the health problems of individuals and the health care costs paid by states has been put on tobacco companies.

[11]See Kadushin et al's brief review (1998).

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prevention and treatment, which would mitigate against the organizational solution the RWJF hoped to implement, coordinating a continuum of care in each of the intervention sites.

The RWJF might instead have dictated particular prevention or treatment programs which it believed to be especially effective. However, the RWJF felt that each community should and could mobilize local concern and by democratic methods forge collective action against local AOD problems.

The combination of a process that emphasized democratic method and program content that emphasized demand reduction opened the Fighting Back program to potential conflicts. The program idea assumed participants would support the demand side view of the problem and the solution of a continuum of prevention and treatment services. But in 1989, citizens and policy makers did not necessarily share this view of the problem.

Moreover, this construction of the problem advantaged prevention and treatment administrators and service providers in local negotiations over the implementation plan, over and against others with different views of the problem. Inner city grassroots leaders and target area residents tended to see drug and alcohol problem as symptoms of larger processes --their economic and political marginality and the attendant lack of civil control in their neighborhoods. As the next and subsequent chapters will suggest, these different views of the AOD problem would be shot through with what in most program sites were entrenched racial and class divisions.

The emergence of racial and class divisions through the prism of AOD problems raises questions about the nature of "community" and its existence in U.S. urban locales.

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Jellinek and Hearn posed the question well.

> In a sense, the question underlying Fighting Back is whether concern about the drug crisis is sufficiently broad and deep for diverse community groups to finally set aside their differences in favor of what is widely perceived as a greater common interest. (Jellinek and Hearn 1991: 80)

This statement raises a number of questions, however. Who were these "diverse community groups" within the Fighting Back program sites? Did they experience the "drug crisis" similarly or quite differently? What were the bases of their differences? In what sense was a demand reduction program in their "common interest"?

The next chapter begins to answer these questions by exploring assumptions behind the Fighting Back program's notion of urban communities. It describes concretely the urban settings where the program would be implemented, giving a general description of the empirical bases for the possibility of forging broadly representative collective actors in the respective program sites —the kinds of populations and neighborhoods targeted and their experiences of AOD related problems.

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Chapter 3

Drug and Alcohol Problems in Inner Cities: Whose Problem? Whose Solution?

This chapter has four parts. The first describes the intervention sites. Although they were diverse, they were predominantly inner cities with concentrations of poor minorities. Second, I present findings from a multi-site telephone survey, observations, and in-depth interviews on alcohol and other drug (AOD) problems in these urban areas. The Fighting Back (FB) survey found AOD use was relatively evenly distributed among U.S. metropolitan populations; however, illicit drug selling and public inebriation were much more frequently observed in the FB sites. I then present my own observations and some residents' views of these latter kinds of AOD problems. I suggest that in the context of race and class relations in U.S. cities, these latter AOD problems are an effect of racial segregation and the attendant political economic disadvantage.

Third, I describe grassroots and official organization related to AOD problems. Citizen organizations, especially neighborhood associations, existed to counter the public disorder associated with inebriation and drug and alcohol selling but were rarely organized around countering AOD use. The administrative and service agencies involved in the FB program, however, were primarily devoted to the problem of private, individual AOD use. The FB intervention entrusted local program leadership initially to these latter agencies. The grantees, or "lead agencies," tended either to have histories of conflict, or little interaction, with neighborhood groups. These relations between the lead agencies

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and neighborhood groups were embedded in racial and class divisions and also in distinct institutional worlds --that which addressed AOD use and that which addressed AOD markets.

Fourth, in an epilogue, I place AOD markets and public inebriation in the broader contexts of neighborhood disorder, neighborhood diversity, and neighborhood change. I suggest that the location of these activities follows a path of least resistance. In the urban ecology of social control, inner city neighborhoods are the weakest. Nevertheless, a focus on the public problem of disorder in inner city residential areas makes visible what has too often been invisible in accounts of inner cities, namely, a more or less organized class of residents and institutions attempting to defend themselves and their neighborhoods against "disorder and decline."[1]

1. The Intervention Sites

The "Call" stated that eligible applicants would target geographical areas with populations no less than 100,000 and no more than 250,000. The RWJF's senior program officers felt the program would be more likely to have an effect in "medium-sized cities," but decided agencies targeting smaller areas within large cities were also eligible. Table 3.1, column 1, shows four of the awardees were in medium sized cities (Worcester, New Haven, Little Rock, Vallejo) and one in a tri-county rural area (Northwest New Mexico). Most of the rest targeted parts of larger cities (Newark, Washington D.C., Charlotte, San

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[1]Skogan titled a book on this topic *Disorder and Decline* (1990); however, he was less interested than I in the social organization produced by and related to these processes.

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Antonio, Kansas City, Milwaukee, Oakland). The sites were distributed throughout the U.S. --three in the Northeast, one in the mid-Atlantic and two in the Southeast, three in the Midwest, four in the Southwest.[2]

The applicant agencies stated these geographic areas had the worst AOD problems. The boundaries typically coincided with administrative, jurisdictional or electoral districts and the informal boundaries of ethnic and poor central city neighborhoods (Table 3.1, column 2; Table 3.2, columns 2-5). In many of the sites both of these boundary-drawing features applied. For example, the political wards in Washington and Newark and the school district in Charlotte overlapped with segregated

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[2]Greg Dixon, the Deputy Director of the National Program Office from 1989 to 1997, said this geographical distribution was not deliberate, that these fourteen applicants and their local communities were chosen in the course of an elaborate, blind review process. The following is an excerpt from my notes after a talk with Dixon about the review process. "After receiving 331 applications, the National Program Office immediately eliminated those that identified a target area more than 250,000 or less than 100,000. Jellinek insisted on it, saying they had to draw the line somewhere. (Greg found this arbitrary.) Staff narrowed the 331 down to 60. They had a grading system with rankings on ten categories (eventually thirteen). Each category counted for so many points (some more points than others) which added up to 100. Once they got the number down to 60, I believe the National Advisory Committee first got involved. Greg said here that the arbitrariness entered because some were easy graders and some were much tougher which made the sites they graded come out looking collectively better or worse, respectively. At some point they compensated for this by asking graders to both use the point system and then to give an overall, subjective letter grade (A, B, C). This helped distinguish which applications both tougher and easier graders actually felt were better. They narrowed the 60 down to 18 and conducted site visits to these 18 in the fall of 1989. There were either two or four visitors per site, depending on whose schedules could be coordinated. They met to choose the 12 awardees in John Brademus's office at NYU overlooking Washington Square. At this point they had a five (six?) point grading scale. The bottom three had significantly lower scores than the other 15 (4.5 or more). Numbers 13, 14, 15, however, were neck and neck (3-3.5) and not far behind number 12. Ruby Hearn went into the other room to call Leighton Cluff, then President of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (Steve Schroeder's predecessor) to ask if they could grant the planning funds to all fifteen. Cluff said yes."

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black neighborhoods.

The FB site populations had much higher percentages of minorities than the national sample and their socio-economic status (SES) was lower. I understand SES to be indicative of financial and human capital, the personal resources individuals, families, or populations have to take care of their material needs and wants. In these areas the site of FB's locally targeted populations with the characteristics of a national urban sample drawn from Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) surveyed at the same time (1997: 8).

> In terms of socio-economic status as measured by income, occupation and education, the intervention communities and their controls are somewhat lower. For example, the FB set of communities has 25% with household incomes under $20,000, whereas the national urban figure is 16%. And 26% of the FB set have incomes over $50,000 as compared with 35% of the general urban sample. Occupation and labor force characteristics are not very different, though the FB set has a somewhat greater proportion of white collar workers. Education (note that we are covering only 16 through 44 year olds) is similar. The largest SES difference is in home ownership. Two thirds of the national sample live in a household which they own, but only 46% in the FB sites group are home owners. [With regard to race] only 41% of FB site groups are white as compared with 72% of the national sample; 33% are Black as compared with 11% nationally; and 21% are Hispanic as compared with 12% nationally.

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Table 3.3 describes the SES of residents in each of the target areas relative to residents of their respective suburban and other urban counterparts. While the sites are diverse in their SES and ethnic composition, a number of them are "inner cities," areas with large concentrations of poor minorities. The following sites' populations were among the poorest in the country: Milwaukee, Newark, San Antonio, Kansas City, and Washington. In every site except Santa Barbara and Vallejo, the resources of the target area populations, in terms of SES, were considerably less than their suburban counterparts. Milwaukee is the extreme case. Forty-three percent of residents in the target area fell below the poverty rate, twice the percentage of poor in Milwaukee generally and four times the percentage of poor in the larger MSA. The disproportionate percentages of female headed households and high school dropouts in the FB target areas indicated these residents faced major barriers to improving their SES. A comparison of Tables 3.2 and 3.3 shows the disparities were most striking in those sites where FB sites were predominantly black: Kansas City, Milwaukee, Newark, and Washington, D.C.[3]

It is important to note, however, that poverty did not predominate in the FB sites, even in some of the inner cities described above. A population resided in the sites with financial and human resources. While on average residents in the intervention sites had less financial and human capital than the national sample, seventy-five percent of the population had income of over $20,000, twenty-six percent over $50,000. Nearly half

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[3]San Antonio is the only one of the five poorest sites that does not have a black majority. The Hispanic population in the U.S. is generally poorer than blacks. San Antonio's target area is predominantly Hispanic. See Table 3.2, column 5.

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owned their own homes.[4] Some of them, especially the latter, provided a basis for the formal organizations dedicated to neighborhood improvement which I observed during field work.[5]

2. Alcohol and Drug Problems: Private Use or Public Disorder?

The FB program idea located the heart of the AOD problem in demand, individual use of alcohol and other drugs. In the intervention sites, however, the AOD problem manifested itself as a problem of public order. Public inebriation, drug and alcohol markets in residential neighborhoods impinged on the person and property of neighbors and passersby. The "visible" problem, or the problem of AOD-related public disorder became apparent in on-site observations, in-depth interviews, and in multiple telephone surveys of intervention site residents. Livert et al's analysis of the FB survey suggests that the visibility of illicit drug selling and buying and public inebriation had a different set of causes than the problem of individuals using and misusing drugs and alcohol (1997). They showed that rates of alcohol and drug use were evenly distributed

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[4]It is, of course, an empirical question to what extent homeowners and middle income earners live in a given central city minority neighborhood, census tract or block. I simply make the general point here and note that I interviewed homeowners in every FB site who were involved with other homeowners in efforts to improve their neighborhoods.

One cannot also assume that higher rates of income and of home ownership necessarily translate into more in/formal organization around improving a neighborhood. One of the poorest of FB sites, San Antonio, appeared to have an unusual degree of cohesive in/formal organization around neighborhood improvement (see Chapter 4). It is not clear, however, how much this enabled them to make headway in improving Eastside neighborhoods. Certainly a couple of neighborhoods became better.

[5]I discuss this finding later in the chapter. See Table 3.4, column 5.

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throughout metropolitan areas, on some variables even slightly higher among the higher income, whiter national urban sample than among the poorer more minority populations of the central city target areas. The same survey showed, however, that drug markets and public use of alcohol and drugs were more in evidence for the poorer, more black populations in the FB central cities than they were for the national sample. Interview and observational data confirmed that drug markets and public use were blatantly visible to target area residents.

AOD use and the public visibility of drug and alcohol buying and selling and public inebriation may all be construed as problems of social control. Their effects and the forms of control brought to bear on them, however, are quite different. The visible problem is more a problem for formal or civil social control --law enforcement. Use, on the other hand, tends to be a more private problem addressed by informal social control -- socialization in peer groups, families, schools, and so on.[6]

Nearby residents and other non-AOD users who use urban areas where drug and alcohol sales and public use are concentrated are negatively affected by it. Formal civil authorities are either too weak or lack the will to shut down these activities or to chase them out of the areas where they are manifest. The failure to do so presents threats to nearby residents and passers by.

Informants in FB program sites spoke of threats to their personal safety. They recounted

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[6]For addicts, especially poor ones, use may, however, also be a matter of civil social control because certain kinds of drug use are illegal and because for convicted users, the treatment alternative is available through the court or prison systems rather than personal choice.

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being afraid to go out of their homes at night because of nearby drug selling and buying and the occasional accompanying violence. An extreme example was that of a public housing project on the Eastside of San Antonio.

> H. told me that when her group first met at Gate Elementary School around 1987, thirteen had recently been killed from a 9 month old child to a 36 year old teacher. (She did not explain the nature of the deaths and if they were related but implied they were the result of gang violence and "drive-by" shootings.) She said that most people in that neighborhood were afraid to go out and send children to school. Some were so afraid that instead of sleeping in their beds, they slept in bathtubs.

Visible manifestations of AOD markets also offended residents' moral and aesthetic sensibilities. Informants in virtually every program site found it offensive and dangerous that drug selling and liquor stores were located, in some cases concentrated, close to schools, churches, and residential areas. AOD visibility also threatened the appeal of residential or commercial areas to prospective homeowners and businesses attractive to residents not participating in these activities. AOD visibility likely affected property values and the chance that the affected area could be improved in ways appealing to many residents.

Public inebriation is an AOD use phenomenon which obviously affects the public. Athletic events, fairs, fraternities, and so on may be the sites of drinking and drugging

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that affects passersby and neighbors. These problems tend to be related to specific institutions --professional and collegiate sports, colleges and universities, for example. In the FB sites the problem was more associated with areas where alcohol stores or open drug dealing were concentrated. Public alcohol use was a problem on certain streets, often not far from downtown (possibly former skid row neighborhoods razed in the course of urban renewal) and near transportation nodes such as bus depots and train stations. Other locations that also included public drug use were parks, empty lots, and abandoned buildings.

However, AOD use need not be at all visible to the public, whether or not its effect is public. The effect of the individual use or abuse problem is not necessarily obvious or immediate. Use first of all affects private individuals. Private use can occur within a person's home, an upscale restaurant, bar, or at a private social club where few or no one witnesses use or inebriation. While the behaviors of private drinkers and drug users may well affect others, they are not necessarily concentrated geographically in a way which affects a general public using that place for different purposes. Drunken drivers who cause car accidents do so on highways and these may or may not be concentrated on particular roads.[7] Drinking and drug use may affect the families of users and in some cases others who are in contact with them --work colleagues, friends, and so

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[7]Actually it would be interesting to know if accidents are concentrated on certain roads and if these are related, for example, to concentrations of bars or the presence of a country club. The former may be concentrated in certain urban areas. Alcohol related accidents are, of course, related to certain events such as prom night. But this phenomenon is also not tied to a specific urban place but to a ubiquitous institutional event.

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on. But again, these effects are not specific to particular types of urban places as are drug markets, the concentration of alcohol businesses in poor neighborhoods, and concentrations of public AOD use.

Moreover, the FB program focused on the AOD use problem less as the problem of those whom users affect and more on the users. Trying to reduce individual use calls for a quite different response than trying to eliminate or reduce the effects of drug and alcohol markets and public inebriation on individuals unrelated to the user. One would want to find potential and active users and understand their motivations for using, then, if possible, intervene in such a way that individuals would be motivated to stop or never start using.[8]

With drug markets and alcohol stores, the attempt is usually to intervene in the operation of a market in a place. The strategies must be quite different for illicit drugs than for licit alcohol. Police and residents may go after the effects of these licit markets and their function as settings for public use. A key legal and enforcement strategy in the FB sites was the use of local public nuisance ordinances, for example, against loitering, public drinking and/or drunkenness, noise, and so on. Ancillary illegal behaviors were addressed --sales to minors and other violations of regulatory laws. Law enforcement and legislative strategies must always work around the basic rights of property owners and the legality of selling and using alcohol which presented obstacles for the neighborhood improvement groups.

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[8]Whether or not this is a worthy goal in a society that highly values personal liberties is a matter for public debate. See, for example, Baum (1996).

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Drug markets, on the other hand, are illegal. The problem here is effective enforcement. For law enforcers the problem is how to establish the facts of the crimes -- illegal drug use, buying and selling-- so they can be prosecuted, but more seriously, how to stop the army of users and dealers who replace those arrested. Residents and police have experienced some success. However, it is not at all clear how erasing the presence of a street corner drug market relates to the elimination of that market. Does it move to another corner? Does it move inside to a private residence or another less visible setting? If the goal is simply to get rid of the visibility of the problem and the associated threats of neighbors and passers by, reducing the public presence of these markets is in itself a good. If the goal is to eliminate the supply of drugs, it is not at all clear what effect reducing visible markets has. The location and form or manifestation of the market may simply change. If reducing visibility does reduce the supply, obviously less drugs will be used in the short term. If the supply is not reduced, however, it is not at all clear what reducing visibility would have to do with reducing demand or use.

Reducing public inebriation also appears to be a process different from reducing individual use. Addressing this problem has to do with the effectiveness of civil authorities in preventing these users from doing so publically.[9] These efforts need have

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[9]Informal social sanction may have a role as well, however, in the face of a critical mass of buyers, sellers, and public users it would seem unlikely. In San Antonio, People Against Corruption marched on a street where drugs were being sold. However, the tactic appeared not only to send a message to dealers and buyers but also to shame the police into doing something. A neighborhood association in Vallejo also used elderly volunteers during the day time to congregate near prostitutes and dealers which scared away customers. But these tactics seemed less effective in Milwaukee where they appeared only to endanger the lives of residents attempting them.

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nothing to do with reducing use. It is one thing to establish local ordinances against public drinking or being high in public and effectively enforcing these laws. It is quite another thing, however, to make treatment or other kinds of facilities available to alcoholics and addicts. The consequence of enforcing laws against public use or inebriation may be the equivalent of a "drunk tank" where inebriates are put by police for as long as the law will allow or enforcement practice dictates. This was what I found in the FB sites in New Haven and Gallup, New Mexico. If a treatment policy were effective, it could reduce both the visibility problem and use among this population. However, the visibility problem would not necessarily be as immediately reduced. This approach would furthermore require a different sort of public problem and policy construction involving a different set of institutions, professions, and public investments. This was in fact the crux of the RWJF's endeavor --to treat AOD as a problem for health, prevention, and treatment professions rather than law enforcement. However, they underestimated the immediacy of the visible problem and the receptivity of local publics to a law enforcement construction of the problem rather than a prevention and treatment view of the problem. I now give an account of the incidence of AOD use and visibility in the intervention sites and thicker descriptions of AOD-related public or neighborhood disorder.

Drug use

The disproportionately black, Hispanic, and poor residents concentrated in the U.S.'s inner cities are often saddled with the stereotype of being more likely to have drug

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and alcohol problems than other U.S. residents. Analysis of the FB survey suggests the rates of use and dependency within this population is similar to the rates for metropolitan populations generally. Table 3.5 shows that a sample drawn from the U.S.'s metropolitan areas --including both suburbs and central cities-- actually used alcohol at higher rates. Their drug use was only slightly lower. This finding held true for both 1995 and 1997 iterations of the survey (Livert et al 1997).

Table 3.5 compares drug and alcohol use and dependency by intervention site residents with that of a national urban sample. The figures in the first three rows suggest that the national sample is more likely to use and be dependent on alcohol: 2.5% more used alcohol within the previous month, 2.1% more had five or more drinks within the previous month, and .8% more appeared to be dependent on alcohol. The FB site residents used drugs only slightly more than the national sample: 2% more used marijuana within the previous year, .7% more used cocaine, and .2% more were drug dependent. It must be noted, however, that the magnitude of these differences in drug use are very small. They are also relatively small for the differences in alcohol use.

Neighborhood disorder and AOD

In contrast to the evidence in Table 3.5 of an even distribution of drug and alcohol use between a sample from FB sites and a national urban sample, the evidence of neighborhood disorder in Table 3.6 was significantly higher in the more minority, poorer

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FB sites.[10] The first three variables in the first column may or may not be related to AOD. Clearly the sale of illegal drugs is a crime, which may then be included along with other crimes in the minds of respondents. Burglars may be addicts trying to support their habit. Individuals on certain drugs are more likely to be violent, as are drug dealers protecting their turf. However, these three indicators include crimes and violence unrelated to AOD, too. Nevertheless, they are reasonable indicators of disorder (cf. Skogan 1990). In the FB sample, 12% more of the respondents said crime was a serious problem in their neighborhoods than did respondents from the national metropolitan sample. In the FB sample, 3.6% more respondents reported their homes being broken into, and 1.3% more said they had personally been attacked compared to respondents in the national sample.

The last three variables in Table 3.6 are indicators of neighborhood disorder directly related to drugs and/or alcohol. The FB sample reported dramatically higher rates of these problems than did the national sample. In the FB sites, 15.9% more residents reported seeing illegal drug sales, 13% more reported seeing people drunk or high, and 6.7% more said drug abuse was a crisis in their neighborhood. I now turn to observational and in-depth interview data to give a fuller picture of these AOD-related activities --public inebriation and drug sales-- that impinge on other users of the same urban places where they occur.

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[10]In an unusual and effective methodological strategy, survey respondents were used as informants on these phenomena in their neighborhoods. See Kadushin et al 1998.

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Alcohol markets and public drinking

The FB survey measured public inebriation ("see people drunk or high") but not the settings in which this occurred. What do they look like and how do they affect residents? I include in these descriptions from the intervention sites a set of problems that some residents sought to address related to alcohol selling establishments.

Alcohol selling establishments --liquor stores, bars, and corner stores-- were one setting where public inebriation took place. These establishments were sometimes the "hotspots" or social settings for other activities that were criminal, violent, and otherwise threatening to neighboring properties and to passers, both to their persons and their moral sensitivities. While many nearby residents disapproved of drinking on moral principle, these related activities were often more troubling. Examples are prostitution; drug selling, buying and use; verbal harassment and fighting; physical fighting; loud music; loitering and littering. The following is excerpted from my field notes while walking through an area targeted by New Haven FB. This particular store was located near "respectable" institutions --a new housing development, a church, and a school.[11] Such institutions have a stake in controlling "disorder" around such establishments.[12]

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[11]See Hannerz for a description of "respectables" in an urban black ghetto (1969:34).

[12]This particular street scene differs from Liebow's because of the presence of these institutions (1967). It differs from the "skid rows" Spradley described for the same reason, and also because it was a residential area (1970). In the discussion section I argue that it is precisely the tension these activities cause in residential areas that are the source of neighborhood "disorder." When these activities are segregated from residential and areas with other, incompatible uses, they may not present a problem of "neighborhood" or "public" disorder except to the extent local law enforcement and other public agents of control take an interest.

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for kids. Young people stand there, wait for a specific person, give them the cash, goes and gets beer, gives it to them. There's drinking. Police actually see them drinking it. Spend an hour. Saturday you'll see them sitting outside and drinking and drinking all afternoon. That's why I'm so dead against singles, 40 ounce malt liquor. Once you live around it you don't want another store opening up with that possibility again. You really don't.

Residents also felt stores like this were an eyesore. Many did not approve of the behaviors they were exposed to, both licit and illicit. The events in these settings had also sometimes escalated into more violent crimes --assault, rape, and murder. The following is an excerpt from my field notes about a store and a bar on the Eastside of San Antonio.

We drive past an "ice house" on the East Side of San Antonio called "Jolly Time." The name "ice house" is a Texas term for a store where one can buy beer. It originated when corner stores did not have refrigerators. Jolly Time is a small one story, ramshackle place. It doesn't quite look like a house. It's on a lot with no other buildings. Three or four trees provide some shade in the back where a couple cars are parked in the yellow dirt. There is no grass in the front either. It is late morning but a couple men and a woman or two in their 40s are hanging out. In front a couple of men lean against the wall drinking out of paper bags. Our guide tells us there are a lot more cars and people hanging out on a Saturday night. One can buy drugs. There are prostitutes. Usually there are fights. Sometimes

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they are verbal, sometimes physical. There have been shootings. An elderly woman who lives alone in a house across the street has three bullet holes in the siding on the outside of her house. The ice house is a couple blocks east from a school. The houses immediately nearby look ramshackle, from a distance more like large shacks than homes, but a couple blocks east and a couple blocks west the homes are larger and nicer. Our guide tells us that people living a couple blocks east of the ice house complained to the owner and the police that their children have to walk past the drunks, dealers, and prostitutes on their way home from school and after-school activities in the afternoons.

A bar not too far away was closed down by the police after a murder in the parking lot in broad daylight. It happened in the afternoon around the time junior high kids were walking home from a nearby school. I ask the guide what the shooting was about. He said domestic quarrels and disputes over money and drugs are common.

Residents believed the problem was not simply caused by the drug and alcohol users but also by the corporate and small businesses that pandered to users. In Vallejo and Milwaukee citizen groups had evidence, gathered from their respective state alcoholic beverage control agencies, showing the excessive concentration of alcohol selling stores in their neighborhoods. An informant in Milwaukee described the concentration problem.

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> The problem with liquor licenses is that because of -- we have a store or a bar in every block on the Southside. The corner stores that sell food for the neighborhood also get licenses to sell beer... The Twelfth District (on the Northside of Milwaukee) has the highest concentration of liquor license premises in the state. The district goes from the river valley probably to the lake (Michigan) up to 16th Street and up to about Lincoln Avenue. That's where we have the highest concentration. The Northside, they have their problems more with liquor stores. They're springing up all over the place.

Many also criticized marketing practices of alcoholic beverage manufacturers and distributors which targeted youth, poor, and alcoholic drinkers. Some store window displays obviously sought to attract young men. Certain products were developed specifically for poor and alcoholic drinkers such as 40 ounce bottles and fortified beers and wines, for example, Schlitz Malt Liquor, Olde English, Boonesfarm Apple Wine, and Ripple. The following description of an ice house is an excerpt from my field notes on San Antonio.

> On my way back to the hotel later that evening, I stop in a different ice house. It looks like the sort of 7-11 store I am used to seeing in the Midwest but more rundown. The shelves don't have a lot of food stuffs, just baked beans, hotdog buns, Ritz crackers, and lots of different kinds of chips. Two of the inner walls are lined with coolers --one wall of sodas, juice, and milk; the other one has beer. I

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> make my way towards the exit and am virtually blocked by two huge barrels. The tops and necks of 32 ounce Budweiser cans and 40 ounce bottles of Olde English malt liquor stick out, half buried by ice. The price is less than a dollar.

Illicit drug markets and public use

Drug markets and public use of drugs had similar effects on residents in the FB target areas. These illicit markets, however, had more potential for violence because they were entirely outside the law. Residents described two kinds of settings for illicit drug markets and the public use of drugs. Outdoor settings were parks, empty lots, and street corners. Indoor settings were abandoned houses and private homes or apartments.

As with the alcohol settings, the problem from the neighboring residents' point of view was not the consumption itself as much as the correlative activities. The drug business sometimes turned violent, for example, when dealers fell out over turf. Prostitution, loud music, sexual assault, domestic disputes were other co-present events. To the extent youth gangs existed and were involved in the drug business, this organizational form of drug dealing could have particular negative effects, including increased violence.

In the program sites where I was given a tour of neighborhoods, I was invariably shown "the largest open air drug market in the city" and the neighborhood with "the highest homicide rate in the city." A statement in a letter from a South Vallejo neighborhood association member captures what many residents in the worst neighborhoods of the intervention sites described. "Dealers openly operated on many of

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our corners. Blatant sales and consumption of drugs were easily observed at all hours of the day and night" (WPNA 1989). Violence associated with the dealing was also typical. A resident of Country Club Crest in Vallejo told us, "The house across the street from me is a crack house. It goes from arguments to shootings. We had a shooting just last Sunday. The dispute was over money."

The following excerpt from an interview in Milwaukee tells a general story about the genesis of drug markets on the Southside. Residents often constructed the story as one of innocent, moral children, families, and elderly being exposed to drug dealing, using, and prostitution. The excerpt gives a sense of the fear and moral repulsion in residents' reaction to the location of a drug market in their neighborhood. The drug dealing took place both indoors in private houses and outdoors on a street running east to west just south and west of downtown.

> M.: We begin to see drug pushers coming into neighborhoods, renting a house, begin to have a heavy traffic to that house, five minutes, pick up your bag [i.e. bag of drugs] and go and then come back again. And then we see women coming in and out. So people [i.e. residents] begin to get a little uneasy. So then after that we begin to see confrontation between gang and gang members. Drug pushers against other drug pushers moving into the Southside. And we have gangs that run drugs. We have gangs that will fight against drugs. So we have both.
> Q [Lindholm]: So the gangs are organized both around drug dealing, but then around not necessarily . . .

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M: It's territorial. It's territorial. But then at the same time, we do have gangs that'll fight other gangs coming in because of territorialism. And then when the rest of us are beginning to take decisions is that we see young kids running drugs from one corner to another. We see prostitutes, you know, walking in the middle of the street. You know, broad daylight, trying to pick up the johns and at the same time pushing drugs. And so the residents will begin to see because in our area we have over 10,000 young kids under 19 years old. And they've been exposed to that kind of situation. And parents are beginning to say, you know, just a minute.

A similar story was told in the gentrifying Washington Park neighborhood near downtown Vallejo which gives more detail about the operation of the selling. This one involved homicide as well.

The problem started when some renters moved in about two or three months ago. I live about two blocks down and we had a stabbing, a murder. There was a lot of stuff going on up to the murder. What it was is that the kind of way the drugs work here and I am assuming elsewhere. They usually have three houses in an area. One place where the drugs are at and two other houses for some other kind of dynamics. So it was the green house, the gray house across the street and then right around the corner on Setter and Ohio. Prostitution was part of the problem of the green house. The top floor was where the prostitutes were working and the

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bottom floor was where the drugs were coming out.

The same neighborhood has a problem with drug selling and prostitution in the neighborhood park.

> It started in the late 1970s when there were carloads of people coming up from the Bay Area to deal drugs in the basketball court. Along with the dealers were prostitutes as well as their pimps. Now we just have independent entrepreneurs to deal with. It is not as organized. There are still some problems with the prostitutes, but its usually dealing with this gal instead of an organization.

Neighborhood disorder and the segregation effect

I suggest the over-concentration of visible AOD markets and public use in disproportionately black and minority urban areas is in part a segregation effect. With the exception of the Washington target area, the FB sites were not purely segregated areas. Nevertheless, many were predominantly black, and all manifested the residential segregation of blacks and whites, the most persistent fact of urban social geography in the U.S. (Taeuber and Taeuber 1965; Massey & Denton 1993). Among the intervention sites were the two most segregated cities in the U.S., Milwaukee and Newark. Table 3.2 shows that the applicants from large metropolitan areas targeted areas within their cities with black and minority concentrations. In San Antonio, for example, while only 7% of

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the city's population is black, 23% of the target area's population was black. As Table 3.2 shows, 50% or more of residents were black in the following program sites: Newark, Milwaukee, Washington D.C., Kansas City, Charlotte, and Columbia. The respective MSAs in which they were set were predominantly white, however. While the majority in Little Rock and New Haven were white, the local FB programs would devote most of their effort to blacks and their neighborhoods.[14] The visible drug markets appeared to be concentrated precisely in these neighborhoods.

Table 3.7 shows segregation rates for the MSAs in which the FB sites were located. A rate of "1" would mean that the given MSA is perfectly segregated with no blacks on blocks with white residents. It is typical for the rates to be lower for cities where the black population constitutes a low percentage. The typical pattern is for a white neighborhood to tolerate a black population of about ten to fifteen percent before whites start moving out and the neighborhood turns black in relatively short order (Massey and Denton 1993). It is therefore remarkable that cities with as proportionately low a black population as San Antonio, Kansas City, New Haven, Santa Barbara, and Vallejo would have segregation rates above .40 and as high as .70 (Table 3.7).[15]

Massey and Denton argued segregation is a cause of the residential concentration

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[14]The National Program Office's deputy director suggested the eventual grantees targeted mostly blacks because applicants perceived their local drug problems to be the worst in these areas. In retrospect it appears this perception was based on the visibility, or public nature, of drug and alcohol problems in these areas. "Crack" was believed to be the main drug related to violent crime.

[15]The relatively lower segregation rates for Columbia and Charlotte may be artifacts of historical residential proximity of whites and blacks in the Carolinas where social differences between blacks and whites were strictly maintained by other means.

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of poor blacks (1993). Segregation has negative consequences for the accumulation of financial wealth and human capital in black families because of their exclusion from the housing markets and elementary and secondary schools to which whites have access. Because blacks are segregated and disproportionately poor relative to whites, they have fewer private resources for addressing the problems of neighborhood decline and disorder, despite the fact that these problems are greater in their neighborhoods. They must fall back on public and political resources to address them. They are therefore more dependent on public agencies --police, code enforcement, public schools, housing authorities, and so on.

Four of the remaining sites were half nonwhite --San Antonio, Vallejo, Newark and New Haven-- where many of these same visible AOD problems were concentrated. The Hispanic population in the intervention sites was poorer than the black population and tended to share neighborhoods with blacks. On the Eastern seaboard the longstanding Hispanic populations were primarily Puerto Rican. Hispanics in the California sites and San Antonio, Texas pre-dated the Anglo populations and also included Mexican immigrants, though most of San Antonio's Hispanic population was native born. Vallejo was also 18% Filipino.[16] San Antonio directed programs primarily to blacks and Hispanics. Vallejo targeted some in each of its racial and ethnic populations: whites, Filipinos, blacks, and Hispanics.

Public inebriation: Individual use and the poverty effect

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[16]I explore the reasons for this at the beginning of Chapter Five.

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Public inebriation may also be a manifestation, not of greater use on the part of poor people but of the forms and effects of being poor drinkers and drug users rather than middle class or wealthy drinkers and drug users. This might also explain this apparent conundrum of an even distribution of use among urban populations but more visible manifestations in neighborhoods with more poor and minority residents.

Users with more resources may use more often in private where their use is exposed only to their companions and not to a larger public, for example in private homes or private clubs. Or the public places where they use are less exposed institutional settings than those where poor people use, for example, expensive restaurants and bars, private colleges and universities, resorts, and so on. Civil or public control of these wealthier users is unlikely to come into play if the using is in a private setting. If the use is in a public setting, the proprietors of both private and public establishments have incentives to protect their wealthy, using clients as well as their status as reputable institutions.

On the other hand, poor people, especially the abject and transient, may use more in public places where civil control comes into play --in and around inexpensive bars, liquor stores, and corner stores, in parks, abandoned lots and buildings, and so on. If they had the resources, they might well use in their own homes or in private clubs where no public, or at least a much more limited public, would be exposed to their use and behavior. If they were wealthier, those exposed to their using and its effects --proprietors, local law enforcement officers, and so on-- might have more motivation to participate in hiding the behavior.

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3. Anti-Alcohol and Drug Social Organization

The previous section described the disproportionate AOD visibility problem in the FB sites. Other indicators of neighborhood decline and disorder were also evident -- dilapidation, graffiti and other forms of vandalism, extreme litter, and so on (cf. Skogan 1990). Nevertheless, there was diversity within these areas, even in what Jargowsky called "distressed neighborhoods" (1997). Not only were there criminal, intimidating, and unsightly behaviors[17] and the social settings constructed for and by these kinds of activities. There were also "law abiding" licitly employed low and middle income residents, including homeowners, as well as the concomitant institutions for conventional civic life in urban neighborhoods --churches, community centers, parks, elementary, junior and senior high schools, and so on. These individuals and institutions had a stake in stemming neighborhood "disorder and decline" (Skogan 1990) and promoting neighborhood improvement.[18]

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[17]Obviously these latter two descriptors are value judgments. The FB site residents I spoke with clearly did not want to witness public inebriation, fighting, loud verbal arguments, and so on in their neighborhood park or outside their residence.

[18]Appendix C is a street by street account of a tour of Milwaukee's Northside where black residents are concentrated. It describes what the guide called "pockets" of both neighborhood improvement and neighborhood decline, starting near a very promising gentrifying neighborhood, continuing through mixed residential, commercial, industrial areas, including "Little Beirut," the area on the Northside most notorious for drug dealing, gangs, and homicide. The point of the tour is to show that while the North Side in general is not a place most people with a choice would choose to live, throughout these neighborhoods there are residents and institutions deeply and negatively affected by illegal, violent, and in the eyes of many residents, immoral activities. They have a stake in eliminating them but face incredible obstacles in doing so.

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Formal organizations had developed among residents in the intervention sites around addressing these very issues. The interviewees quoted in the previous section and my tour guides were often officers or leaders in these organizations. The sources for my field notes and interviews in the above section from Milwaukee, San Antonio, and Vallejo were from three different community organizers and two neighborhood association officers. Over a period of many years, two of the organizers had developed federations of neighborhood associations to address these and other neighborhood quality issues. One of my sources in Vallejo was on the board of a neighborhood community development corporation.

Column 5 in Table 3.4 lists the kinds of local, grassroots organizations which participated substantively in the respective local FB programs. The most common type were neighborhood or homeowner associations. Others included ad hoc citizen groups organized to address crime, racism, and so on. Others were more permanently established community organizing groups with goals and tactics akin to the Alinsky founded Industrial Areas Foundation affiliates and the Association of Communities Organized for Reform Now (ACORN) affiliates.[19] Little Rock had an alliance of eight neighborhood associations affiliated with ACORN.[20] The lead organizer of People Against Corruption in San Antonio had been to Industrial Areas Foundation trainings. The lead organizer of the federation of neighborhood associations on Milwaukee's Southside seemed to have similar training. Other organizations were tenant unions, community development

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[19]On the IAF see Alinsky (1971) and Horwitt (1989).

[20]ACORN was founded in Pine Bluff, Arkansas in the 1970s.

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corporations, and youth service providers.

For many of these organizations their goal appeared primarily to be improving their neighborhoods, or at least stemming decline. The attendant process goals were gaining political, financial, and other resources to achieve these ends. The visible AOD problem was viewed as symptomatic of a larger problem --neighborhood decline. Neighborhood decline was viewed primarily as a political and economic problem. Voluntary associations and incorporated nonprofits typically sought public and private investment into these urban areas --by individuals and businesses. New Haven had a relatively new industrial park subsidized by public funding. People Against Corruption in San Antonio together with FB sought public investment in an intake and detoxification center for AOD dependents. Their intent was also to improve what had formerly been a declining property and to create jobs.

Virtually every FB site had community development corporations which developed housing --single family homes, townhouses, and apartments-- subsidized by public monies. A typical strategy was to seek a mix of tenants --both those with rent or mortgage subsidies and those who could pay their own way-- in the hope that maintaining a mix of poor, low, and middle income residents would create and sustain neighborhood stability. The developments improved, or razed and re-built, declining properties. Community development corporations and community centers also implemented job training and small business support programs.

The improvement of residents health and socialization was also a goal. In Vallejo a community development corporation involved with FB had been long engaged in an

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effort to open a community health center. In the view of many neighborhood leaders, idle youth without prospects were a part of both the AOD use and visibility problems. Nonprofits and voluntary associations had developed youth programs --tutoring, mentoring, parenting, intern, and recreational programs were typical.

Many of these same organizations addressed the visibility problem. One key format for doing so was participation in local community policing programs. In Vallejo, New Haven, Little Rock, Kansas City, Columbia, and Milwaukee neighborhood groups and associations pressured local police departments or worked with them to establish policing sub-stations in their neighborhoods. Neighborhood groups and formal associations in Worcester, San Antonio, and Newark worked with local police through Crime Watch and other policing programs.

Cohesions and divisions in neighborhood organization

While neighborhood organization existed to do something about AOD-related public disorder, it was not necessarily cohesive. Chapter 5 will show neighborhood based organization in Vallejo was divided by territory as well as by ideology and competition for youth service grants and contracts. San Antonio's Eastside neighborhood associations, in contrast, cohered in a formal alliance as did neighborhood associations on Milwaukee's Southside. These alliances worked together on housing and economic development as well as visible AOD problems. The Vallejo neighborhood-based organizations competed, in some instances, bitterly, for community development block grant funding, for youth program grants, for city services, and so on.

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Little Rock neighborhood organization appeared divided by origins and philosophy. Eight neighborhood associations participating in an alliance were founded much earlier than a new generation of neighborhood associations. The older ones had higher rates of black membership. They kept elected and appointed officials at arms length both out of suspicion and the belief that they could more effectively achieve their goals as city hall outsiders than as insiders. The newer neighborhood associations were not necessarily allied with each other or the older ones. They had their origins in a city charter revision which established district based elections. The new district based city directors,[21] in what appeared to be an effort to build constituencies, provided city aid to encourage the founding of neighborhood associations. The Alert Centers, "mini-city halls" located throughout the city's neighborhoods, were a part of this same strategy. These new organizations were beholden to city officials in contrast to the older self-consciously independent alliance of neighborhood associations.

Relations between neighborhood groups and officialdom

Local official agencies also address issues related to neighborhood improvement, youth socialization, and health. Among them are police, housing authorities, code enforcement, departments of housing and economic development, schools, departments of youth services, parks and recreation, and so on. The relations between the neighborhood organizations and these public agencies were typically ambivalent.

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[21]Little Rock's city charter termed its city council the "Board of Directors" and referred to members as "directors" rather than "council members."

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In New Haven I visited a policing sub-station which residents spoke well of. The captain met regularly with residents. He and the officers seemed often available to talk with residents informally. The conference room was regularly made available to community groups. I do not know if the substation's presence and the police's relationships to residents simply helped them feel better about the police or if it also reduced crime in the area. The former benefit was probably in itself a good.

Relations between police and residents were more tense in other FB sites. While I was conducting field work in Milwaukee, police shot a young black man in a neighborhood on the Northside. In local newspapers the police claimed appropriate use of the gun, however, representatives of black community groups responded suspiciously as did residents I spoke with. I also spoke with a woman who ran a Department of Justice program called Weed and Seed which addressed neighborhood crime problems. She responded defensively to my questions about the shooting, arguing that community groups lacked credibility. Another community liaison for a program run out of the local district attorney's office said residents' distrust of police was high. The lead organizer of a neighborhood association federation complained bitterly that police made poor efforts to clean up drug dealing on the Southside.[22]

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[22]I do not know if or how the bitterness of community-police relations in Milwaukee related to crime reduction. It may have correlated with the form police tactics took, which in Milwaukee were more oriented toward elite crime fighting task forces within the department rather than towards daily regular presence in specific neighborhoods and cultivating relations with community groups. Milwaukee did have a community policing program, but, as in Little Rock, it appeared to be relatively disempowered within the department. Community policing officers in Little Rock, for example, did not have the same career opportunities as did other officers and were viewed by many officers as "social workers" rather than "real" police officers.

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In San Antonio police had cooperated with the organizers for People Against Corruption, but they expressed suspicion of community groups. People Against Corruption kept local officials at arms length, preferring to keep the option of exercising public pressure as outsiders rather than asking for favors, or bringing personal pressure to bear as insiders. This was in keeping with the Industrial Areas Foundation philosophy of relations with public officials (Alinsky 1971).

Local organization countering AOD use

The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF) sought the participation of law enforcement and criminal justice agencies in its effort to balance anti-AOD law enforcement efforts with reducing use. Some of these agencies were interested in reducing use rather than only addressing visibility problems and enforcing laws against using drugs.

Some relevant programs already existed or developed during the years of the FB program. "Drug court" programs existed by which federal and local criminal courts had the option of offering treatment as a sentencing alternative to prison. Many local police departments had for years run recreational programs for youth. With the possible exception of drug courts, however, these agencies remained primarily focused on reducing AOD visibility. When they did focus on use, they tended to run their own programs without involving the local FB program or neighborhood organizations. "D.A.R.E.," perhaps the most popular and well funded AOD prevention program for

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youth in the U.S., was run by police in many FB sites.[23]

The grantees

The RWJF's local allies in the effort to reduce the demand for AOD were the grantees. A national actor intervening in local communities must find an organizational point of entry. The RWJF sought "lead agencies" to administer the FB community organizing projects. The successful grant applicants' initial task would be to organize the governing and implementing bodies of the program, the citizen task force and the community consortium. The "Call" described the sort of organization the RWJF was seeking.

> The grants will be awarded to an organization within the applicant community that has shown it is able to coordinate multiple health and social services and to work effectively with community groups and organizations whose participation would be essential to addressing the substance abuse problem successfully. (RWJF 1989a: 1)

These qualifications were measured by a number of indicators. The applicants had to demonstrate that their local community had serious AOD problems but also that there was enough local concern and capacity to implement a substantive program. The track record of the lead agencies in administrating health and social service programs was

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[23]"D.A.R.E." stands for "Drug Abuse Resistance Education."

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important. The United Way of San Antonio was invited to apply, for example, because it had successfully taken over another RWJF initiative in San Antonio addressing homelessness that had floundered at another agency. Another indicator was the support of local political and other elites, demonstrated by their commitment of funds, in-kind support, and volunteer service given to the project. Other indicators of elite involvement were their presence at site visits during the planning phase of the National Program Office, the RWJF senior program officers, and National Advisory Committee as well as the interest in and familiarity with AOD issues they expressed during these visits.

Column 3 in Table 3.1 lists the grantees. For the most part they were administrative agencies with broad social, health, and other service agendas. They were typically funding agencies which made grants to, contracted with, or subsidized fees for service to local, smaller providing agencies. Some of these funding agencies also provided services themselves. Among the administrative agencies were both governments and nonprofits: municipal governments or their departments, county agencies, an intergovernmental council, two United Ways, and a community foundation. In a few instances the grantees were primarily service providing agencies: Councils on Alcohol and Drug Abuse, a community development corporation, and a youth service agency.

Prevention and treatment organizations

There were also local organizations devoted primarily to preventing AOD use and treating chemical dependents. However, unlike the visible problem, there was virtually

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no indigenous, lay, citizen organization around reducing AOD use. The one exception was Vallejo where Twelve Step members had been advocates for the increase in detoxification facilities and the reform of treatment. With the encouragement of the National Program Office, other local FB programs tried to involve Twelve Step members but to little avail. In Vallejo the National Program Office's encouragement was hardly necessary. Twelve Step members had been instrumental in increasing and shaping the character of detoxification services in Solano County. They insisted on having a say in establishing the Vallejo FB program content. Twelve Step members in Vallejo were different in kind from neighborhood organization around AOD visibility problems because their organizing base was not a neighborhood but a set of beliefs and practices related to alcohol, drugs, and other forms of dependency, namely, the Twelve Step program. They advocated principally for increases in detoxification services, supports for individuals coming out of treatment and individuals in "recovery" --so-called "aftercare," "relapse prevention," and Twelve Step programs, respectively.

Social organization which countered AOD use tended to be exclusively in the form of nonprofit service agencies staffed by professionals --social workers, certified AOD counselors, and so on. Examples are the Councils on Alcohol and Drug Abuse in San Antonio, Columbia, Santa Barbara, and Washington. Others were Youth and Family Services and BiBett Corporation (private) in Vallejo, the Patrician Movement in San Antonio, and so on. The latter two provided in- and out-patient treatment. Youth and Family Services provided out-patient treatment and prevention.

Relationships among these organizations appeared mostly to be organized

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according to market principles. Where there were interdependencies, relations were formalized by contracts, grants, and payments of fees for service. Otherwise these organizations appeared to tend towards autonomy and competition rather than cooperation. Sometimes this competition appeared direct, for example, when agencies put in competing bids for contracts as did research firms wanting to assess the local AOD problem for Vallejo FB during its planning phase. Sometimes this competition was between distinct service sectors, for example, when youth service advocates vied with treatment aftercare advocates in a contest over establishing the program content of Vallejo FB. Other forms of competition were indirect, for example, developing a market niche. An example of this strategy was developing a service relation to a particular population --e.g. women, minorities, elderly-- that other agencies did not serve.

In some instances prevention and treatment organizations were neighborhood- and race-based. The neighborhood-based organizations tended to be more limited in scope, focusing on local minority populations rather than the entire city or metropolitan area. In Little Rock, for example, FB funded two African American-run agencies to provide an array of treatment and prevention related services in black neighborhoods. Minority-run service providing organizations appeared larger and better established in cities where the population was predominantly black. For example, in Washington D.C., the FB lead agency was a well established, African American-run community development corporation that had focused primarily on commercial and residential development. This agency subcontracted with other African American-run service providers, for example, one agency trained former addicts to become HIV/AIDS and AOD counselors.

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Neighborhood relations with use countering agencies

Neighborhood organizations tended to distrust the lead agencies. In some instances the grantees did not appear to have previous relations with neighborhood organizations, for example, the Councils on Alcohol and Drug Abuse in Columbia and Santa Barbara and the United Way in San Antonio. In other cases the previous relations were antagonistic. This was especially the case where government agencies were the grantees. In Vallejo and Little Rock, for example, some neighborhood-based organizations had longstanding conflicts with city hall. In both of these cases African American neighborhood organizations were led by individuals who remembered a time when city hall refused to provide basic municipal services to black neighborhoods. Little Rock still had black neighborhoods lacking basic infra-structure --paved streets, adequate sewers, and so on.

Neighborhood leaders also often appeared suspicious of prevention and treatment agencies that were not based in their territory. Resentments were expressed about past neglect from these agencies. Grassroots saw them as taking an interest in their neighborhoods only because it would gain them resources from the FB grant. Neighborhood leaders and organizations also often appeared territorial and felt a sense of entitlement to funding intended for services to residents in the neighborhoods they believed they represented.

Race and class

As the Vallejo and Little Rock examples suggest, antagonism between the

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grantees and neighborhood organization was not simply a conflict over whether to prioritize AOD use or visibility problems. The FB community organization effort typically stumbled into a thicket of longstanding racial and class divisions and antagonisms. In the case of Little Rock, Vallejo, and Milwaukee, the specific histories behind these divisions lived on in relations between contemporary actors --both in minority neighborhoods and in local seats of power --city hall and county governments. Often FB staff had little awareness of these histories. I describe more fully such a case in Vallejo in Chapter Seven.

In other intervention sites, while it was not apparent individual actors involved in past racial and other controversies played a role in FB, neighborhood organizations typically mistrusted the lead agencies and other participating agencies, lacking confidence in their willingness to make neighborhood leaders full partners in decision-making about program content and the distribution of resources. Common complaints were that the grantees, at RWJF's bidding, spent two years time and resources on a planning phase, talking about problems and researching them rather than addressing problems neighborhood organizations felt were immediate and obvious. They also believed considerable resources were absorbed by the administrative practices and self sustaining needs of service agencies, monies neighborhood organizations felt they were just as entitled to or that could at least go more directly to addressing problems.

Moreover, the FB program appeared to pander to the dominance of the lead agencies and their principal organizational allies over neighborhood organizations and groups. The grantees were advantaged as decision-makers by virtue of administering the

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grant. The larger incorporated organizations that participated were typically advantaged in acquiring resources from the FB grant in the form of contracts and grants because they had a track record of service provision and accounting for finances. They also tended more to share the health and service professional culture of the lead agencies and the RWJF than did the neighborhood organizations which were more oriented towards local political culture and conflict.

Conclusion

This chapter has described the dynamics revealed when the RWJF's effort to construct local community organization to reduce demand for AOD encountered existing social organization. These structures and dynamics may be summarized as follows. An institutional gap existed between the visible AOD problem and the use problem. These two public problems had distinct effects addressed within distinct areas of social organization --(1) citizen groups and official agencies that dealt with controlling AOD markets and use that had a public impact in residential areas and (2) agencies that ran prevention and treatment programs. Racial and class fault lines further complicated relations between officialdom and citizen groups addressing these public problems. The case histories of San Antonio and Vallejo FB which I develop in the next four chapters provide more concrete empirical accounts of local social organization around addressing AOD visibility and its embeddedness in local histories of racial and class divisions.

I close this chapter with an essay that explores more in depth public disorder in inner city neighborhoods. This was the fundamental social circumstance which the FB

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program stumbled into when it invited grassroots participation. A better understanding of it is therefore useful before going on to present case histories of local FB programs.

4. Epilogue: Public Disorder and Inner City Neighborhoods

AOD-related disorder is the product of competition over what activities will predominant in given urban places at given times. These activities --drug dealing, selling of cheap and fortified alcohol, public inebriation, and so on-- are not necessarily a problem when they do not conflict with other activities where they take place. These activities may thrive without much interference, for example, in pre- and post-war skid rows in many Midwestern and western cities (e.g. Spradley 1970) and the western edge of Times Square before urban renewal hit full stride in the 1980s and 1990s. The disorder problem arose in the intervention sites in residential areas. People lived in these places. Streets, parks, areas both public and private were their front- and backyards. They used these spaces for other purposes which conflicted with drug and alcohol buying and selling --playing with children, recreating, going to and from school, coming and going from work.

The competition over what activities will prevail in these places was perceived by residents as a conflict of values. People wanted what was going on in their environs to reflect their values. This was especially strong where people resided and where certain civic activities took place, for example, religious ritual (church-going and worship) and the education of children (schools). Most people do not want their children to witness dealing, using, prostitution, and so on. Church- and mosque-goers do not want to witness

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these activities either. Drake and Cayton (1993 [1945]: 564-715) and other, earlier students of "slums" characterized the parties to this persisting value conflict "lower class" and "middle class." The distinction was not necessarily one between those with lower and higher income or between those who were unemployed and employed, but rather between aspirations and lifestyles. The "middle class," or more accurately given their low socio-economic status, "respectables" (Hannerz 1969: 35, Drake and Cayton 1993 [1945]: 658), valued education, a more staid religion, propriety expressed in how homes were kept, and other more staid behaviors and demeanor; whereas, lower class or "street" values were identified with immediate physical gratifications (drinking, sex, etc.), emotionalism in religion, loudness, crudeness, and so on. This kind of value conflict appeared to be expressed in this conflict between those engaged in AOD-related and other "disorderly" activities and church-going and other residents who valued not only safety of person and property but also a propriety which sociologists have associated with "middle class" values.[24]

Urban ecology of social control

AOD-related disorder occurs in the larger context of the urban ecology of social

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[24]Hannerz develops a good critique of this "moral taxonomy of the natives," arguing that the lives of individuals in the Washington D.C. ghetto he studied were in fact much more complex (1969: 36-38). I retain the distinction between "lower" and "middle" class, because I believe this native construction was an aspect of the forces producing the public problem of neighborhood disorder. "Middle class" informants who were typically my tour guides, insisted on presenting an image of their neighborhoods counter to the images they believed most Americans had of black urban neighborhoods, for example, those projected by Simon and Burns's *The Corner* (1997).

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control --the places where social control is the weakest, I propose, is where these illicit, deviant activities will tend to locate. The FB sites, where these activities were evident, were also places where poor minorities were more likely to live. Social control has two aspects: formal and informal. The most prominent, legally sanctioned agent of control is law enforcement. These agents deal with activities formally defined as illicit: drug dealing, drug using, prostitution, assault, burglary, and so on.

Informal social control has to do with sanctions private groups and individuals are able to impose on their fellow residents. For example, elderly neighborhood association members in Vallejo drove out dealers and prostitutes during the later afternoon hours in a local park by going there in a large group and milling around. Their presence scared away customers. Social control in some neighborhoods is more subtle. Home-owning retirees in a black San Antonio neighborhood appeared to have established strong norms about keeping clean, well maintained properties, low noise levels, and so on. Residents appeared to compete for who had the prettiest flower garden. The same appeared true for young Mexican American families living on Lamar Street. These residents were nevertheless confronted with elements who did not share their values --an "ice house" where drinkers and drug users gathered in the former case and a neglected property which became a site of dealing, using and prostitution in the latter case.

Public and private aspects of disorder and control

Why is social control weak in many central city minority neighborhoods? The assumption about inner cities in media (Reeve and Campbell 1994) but also sociology

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(Wilson 1987) is that informal agents of control are weaker because residents in these areas are more likely to engage in illicit activities or other activities considered disorderly by given publics. This line of inquiry has probably been too controversial to pursue because of the possible finding that minorities are more likely to commit illicit and other "bad" behaviors. However, this conclusion therefore tends to be assumed. I am interested, however, in more sociological lines of inquiry. First, are there qualitative differences in the nature of poor neighborhoods that make social control a different sort of problem in them? There is reason to think so. Just as poor users of AOD may be more likely to encroach on public spheres, poor residents lives may be more likely to be exposed to other citizens as well as to public institutions. They may be less able to privatize their daily lives. Living in more densely populated places brings them more into contact with neighbors, exposing them more to neighbors habits and behaviors. They may also be more reliant on public spaces in their daily lives --traversing the city on public transit, using parks for recreation rather than private lawns, using the street for a gathering place rather than drinking and eating establishments, and so on. They are probably also more dependent on public institutions --public transit, public schools, housing authorities, and so on. In short, both the lives of individuals and the spaces in which they pass their time may be more shared, less private, than in more affluent neighborhoods where individuals and families are more able to retreat into their private spaces, more easily avoid public spaces and the influence of public institutions on their lives. Problems of disorder and the related social control thus may function more in public in these communities and through public institutions than they do in residential

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areas where life takes place more in private.

A second line of inquiry is the distribution of public resources for the control of the kinds of disorder afflicting urban neighborhoods. What is the nature of both private and public resources available for social control in neighborhoods? Are these resources distributed evenly across neighborhoods? Residents in poor neighborhoods bring fewer private resources to neighborhood problems --fewer telephones, faxes, computers, copy machines, discretionary funds for block parties, etc.-- all important ingredients for neighborhood organization. Racial and other tensions with police and other authorities was another problem in the neighborhoods I studied. These tensions were embedded in local histories and cultural gaps between residents and social control agents operating in their neighborhoods. Poor minority neighborhoods typically also have less political clout to wield in influencing public control agents --police, code enforcement, housing authorities, and so on.

Both official and civic agents of social control nevertheless clearly also were active in the neighborhoods I studied. This is precisely why such disorder became a public problem. These agents sought to use the FB program, as well as other resources, to make these activities a public problem and to combat them. Public disorder is thus produced by this conflict between agents of "disorder" --dealers, users, prostitutes, and others-- and agents of "order" --groups of residents, neighborhood associations, ministers and their parishioners, school principals, and so on seeking to drive out these activities from their immediate environs.

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Neighborhood change and diversity

The larger process in which the urban ecology of social control is embedded is neighborhood change. Many of the neighborhoods in which public disorder was found had undergone serious decline beginning as early as the 1960s and 1970s. In Milwaukee, for example, working class whites had lived in the single family homes to the north and west of downtown. As the children of these families grew up and left, they did not return. Some of their parents stayed on, but as they died or moved out, they and their children became absentee landlords. An expanding black population moved into the area which could not afford to buy the homes. Homes became split into multiple rental units. Many absentee landlords did not keep up the yards or the houses. Dilapidation occurred, in some instances condemnation and demolition. Vacant lots dot this part of Milwaukee. These problems were intensified in a particular area just to the north and west of downtown where an entrance-exit ramp for the downtown highway was to be built. In the context of litigation over a public highway authority's right of eminent domain, this entire area became stuck in limbo for twenty years. Landowners therefore did not keep up properties. Condemnation and demolition followed. Developers shied away from the area because of uncertainty about the area's future. Some poor renters remained in the existing buildings. The area became a central node for street dealing, prostitution, and other illicit activities.[25]

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[25]I was able to observe some of the facts related in this account; however, I rely heavily on one informant, a resident in North Milwaukee and professional community organizer. Some of the things he said, other informants repeated. But otherwise this account requires more empirical evidence.

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A section of this area became known as "Little Beirut," so-named because of its high rate of shootings and homicides. However, as I noted above, the problem of disorder in residential poor minority neighborhoods is more usually produced by a contest between agents of order who also live in the area, not in areas where "street" activities have entirely taken control of public space (except when media or others draw public attention to what is happening). Homeowners appear to have the most motivation to do something because they have an investment to protect. (I suspect home ownership rates were higher in the midwestern and western FB sites than in the northeastern sites.) They are also positioned in a real estate market where it is unlikely they will be able to trade up for a better property and therefore are planted in these neighborhoods.

Inner city neighborhoods in central cities are diverse. First of all, while poor and minorities are more concentrated in these urban areas, working and non-poor residents predominate. That is, statistically speaking, there are hardly any urban census tracts in the U.S. where 50% or more of the population is below the poverty rate or qualifies for any of the other standard measures of being poor (cf. Jargowsky 1997). This does not mean neighborhoods with higher rates of poverty are not qualitatively different, only that there is a demographic basis for social organization of non-poor (and poor, of course) in virtually all urban areas that have a stake in neighborhood order. I observed such social organization in churches, neighborhood associations, informal social groups, and so on.

Therefore, on the one end of the spectrum of urban neighborhoods are the most afflicted by disorder or "street" activities, "Little Beirut" in Milwaukee and the Baltimore neighborhood portrayed in Simon and Burns's *The Corner*. On the other end are solidly

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gentrified areas such as Brewer's Hill in Milwaukee, where the brewer barons built their homes at the turn of the century and new developments that middle class blacks have moved into in three or four different neighborhoods in North Milwaukee. Neighborhood disorder becomes more or less a public problem depending on the extent to which a critical mass of residents develop into a civic group which seeks to get rid of it --engaging the agents of disorder indirectly and directly and engaging official agents with the formal authority to attempt to control disorder. I observed such groups in virtually all of the FB site neighborhoods I visited. This suggests that the image of inner cities as off the deep end of social organization --"Little Beirut" and "The Corner"-- represents only one kind of inner city neighborhood, the worst, around which exists much greater variety. To accept this image as predominant is to make invisible struggling neighborhoods and those inner city residents who do not engage in disorderly activities and who combat it.

The RWJF, in choosing inner cities as the sites of intervention, encountered this circumstance, the struggle between agents of neighborhood disorder and agents countering this disorder. The FB invitation to grassroots participation thus made visible a social element in inner cities that is not typically evident in the popular imagination (e.g. the Home Box Office television series, "The Corner") or in studies of inner cities which tend to emphasize the most disorderly areas and the most disorderly elements in those areas (e.g. Wilson 1987, 1996; Liebow 1967; Hannerz 1969). This had unintended consequences for the development of the local FB programs because inner city residents were not organized around the private use problem that the RWJF was seeking to address. The next four chapters give accounts of the development of two local FB programs and

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the attendant unintended consequences related to the public problem of neighborhood disorder.

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Table 3.1. Fighting Back Program Sites and Grantees.

METROPOLITAN AREA	FB SITE & POPULATION	INITIAL GRANTEE ("LEAD AGENCY")
Worcester, MA	City of Worcester 169,759	United Way
New Haven, CT	City of New Haven 130,474	The city's Human Resource Administration
Newark, NJ	Three minority central political wards 131,170	Boys & Girls Club
Washington D.C.	Two black political wards on the eastside of the District 113,831	Marshall Heights Community Development Organization
Columbia, SC	A school district spanning two counties 98,052	Lexington and Richland Alcohol and Drug Abuse Council
Charlotte, NC	A school district in predominantly black West Charlotte 102,236	The county mental health agency
Little Rock, AR	City of Little Rock 175,781	The city manager
San Antonio, TX	School districts on the "Eastside" 120,675	United Way
Kansas City, MO	Black neighborhoods in north and central city 178,587	a community foundation
Milwaukee, WI	Mostly black neighborhoods west and north of downtown 210,441	The county's Dept of Health and Human Services
Vallejo, CA	City of Vallejo 109,199	The city manager
Santa Barbara, CA	Greater Santa Barbara 145,720	Council on Alcohol and Drug Abuse
Northwest New Mexico	Three counties and parts of three tribal reservations	intergovernmental council

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Table 3.2. Racial Composition of Fighting Back Sites.

Fighting Back	Community	%BLACK	%WHITE	%OTHER	%HISP
Charlotte	Target Area	56	42	2	1
	City	32	66	2	1
	MSA	20	78	1	1
Columbia	Target Area	49	50	1	1
	City	44	54	2	2
	MSA	30	68	1	1
Kansas City	Target Area	51	43	6	6
	City	30	67	2	4
	MSA	13	84	2	3
Little Rock	Target Area	29	69	1	1
	City	*	*	*	*
	MSA	20	79	1	1
Milwaukee	Target Area	55	34	11	11
	City	31	63	3	6
	MSA	14	83	2	2
New Haven	Target Area	37	53	10	13
	City	*	*	*	*
	MSA	12	83	1	6
Newark	Target Area	51	28	21	36
	City	59	29	1	25
	MSA	23	70	3	10
San Antonio	Target Area	23	54	23	53
	City	7	72	2	55
	MSA	7	75	2	47
Santa Barbara	Target Area	2	82	16	25
	City	3	78	3	31
	MSA	3	77	6	26
Vallejo	Target Area	20	50	23	10
	City	*	*	*	*
	MSA	10	72	11	13
Washington	Target Area	97	2	0	1
	City	66	30	2	5
	MSA	27	66	5	6

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Table 3.2 (continued).

Worcester	Target Area	5	87	8	9
	City	*	*	*	*
	MSA	2	94	2	4

Notes: The data source is the Census of the Population and Housing, 1990: Summary Tape File 3B. "Other" includes Asian Pacific Islanders, American Indians, Eskimos, Aleutians, and those classified as "other" by the census. Hispanics may be of any race. The "target areas" are defined using local zip code areas which, for the most part, are congruent with the areas targeted by the local *Fighting Back* programs. "*" means the target area and the city are the same.

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Table 3.3. Socio-Economic Composition of Fighting Back Sites.

Geographic Areas		Income	%Poverty	%Female Headed Households	%Drop-out
Charlotte	Target Area	$29,000	18	12	34
	City	42,000	9	8	19
	MSA	38,000	7	6	28
Columbia	Target Area	32,000	14	9	24
	City	32,000	5	9	24
	MSA	37,000	5	8	21
Kansas City	Target Area	25,000	24	12	32
	City	34,000	12	9	21
	MSA	39,000	8	7	18
Little Rock	Target Area	38,000	10	8	16
	City	*	*	*	*
	MSA	33,000	10	7	23
Milwaukee	Target Area	21,000	43	25	41
	City	28,000	22	13	29
	MSA	39,000	11	8	20
New Haven	Target Area	33,000	20	14	29
	City	*	*	*	*
	MSA	50,000	6	7	21
Newark	Target Area	25,000	30	20	50
	City	28,000	24	17	49
	MSA	55,000	7	7	24
San Antonio	Target Area	21,000	28	12	43
	City	31,000	20	9	31
	MSA	34,000	17	8	27
Santa Barbara	Target Area	55,000	6	4	17
	City	46,000	8	5	21
	MSA	47,000	8	5	20
Vallejo	Target Area	41,000	7	8	19
	City	*	*	*	*
	MSA	44,000	6	7	18
Washington	Target Area	29,000	22	20	38
	City	44,000	14	10	7
	MSA	57,000	4	6	10

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Table 3.3 (continued).

Worcester	Target Area	35,000	13	9	27
	City	*	*	*	*
	MSA	42,000	7	6	22

Notes: For source of the data and geographical sites see notes to Table 1. "Income" is mean household income. "Poverty" is families in poverty. "Female Headed Households" are only those with children. "Drop Out" is individuals between the ages of 16 and 19 not attending school and without a high school diploma.

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Table 3.4. FB Site Organizational and Group Participants[26]

FB SITE	INITIAL LEAD AGENCY	early ELITE advocates and sponsors (~1991)[27]	service ORGANIZATIONS still participating in mid-implementation (~1995)[28]	GRASSROOTS groups and organizations[29]
San Antonio, TX	United Way of San Ant & Bexar Counties	United Way Exec Officer, former governor, wealthy local businessman, Dept of Health Dir	community centers, an army base, an air force base, middle schools, AOD service agencies	a federation of Eastside PTAs, neighborhood associations, and others
Little Rock, AK	City of Little Rock (office of city manager)	mayor, city manager	Dept of Neighborhoods & Planning, Police Dept, local TV station, 2 church-based service providers	alliance of eight neighborhood associations; new unaffiliated neighborhood associations; religious congregations, a CDC

[26]The table includes a sample of intervention sites that indicates their diversity. Columns three through five are not comprehensive but list the most active as well as a range of examples of other participants.

[27]If elites were actively involved, they tended to be so when the program needed support getting established. They did not tend to be active during implementation.

[28]From strategy report appendices (Hallfors et al 1998), board meeting minutes, and other site documents. These were agencies involved with FB during implementation. Examples of their type of engagement were serving on FB's board and subcontracting with FB.

[29]These include participants in FB and groups that conflicted with FB. The latter either did not participate or ceased participating.

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Table 3.4 (continued).

FB SITE	INITIAL LEAD AGENCY	early ELITE advocates and sponsors (~1991)[30]	service ORGANIZATIONS still participating in mid-implementation (~1995)	GRASSROOTS groups and organizations
New Haven, CT	City of New Haven Human Resources Admin.	city's substance abuse coordinator, Dir of Yale University AOD research and service agency, HRA Dir, utility company exec, hospital exec	2 university AOD research and service agencies, Police Dept, consortium of agencies serving AOD abusing women, local rehab center	community development corporations, small minority and other led health and social service providers
Milwaukee, WI	Milwaukee County Dept of Health & Human Services	county supervisors, HHS Dir, school superintendent, pro baseball team vice president, community foundation executive	a large development, youth & family service organization; smaller youth service organizations	group against alcohol advertising; small youth, ethnic, other service orgs; federation of Southside neighborhood associations; unaffiliated Northside neighborhood associations

[30]If elites were actively involved, they tended to be so when the program needed support getting established. They did not tend to be active during implementation.

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Table 3.4 (continued).

FB SITE	INITIAL LEAD AGENCY	early ELITE advocates and sponsors (~1991)[31]	service ORGANIZATIONS still participating in mid-implementation (~1995)	GRASSROOTS groups and organizations
Vallejo, CA	City of Vallejo (office of city manager)	city council members, mayor, school superintendent, county AOD agency Dir	family and youth service provider, county AOD agency, county probation dept	neighborhood associations, ethnic youth service organizations, 12 Step advocates

[31]If elites were actively involved, they tended to be so when the program needed support getting established. They did not tend to be active during implementation.

Table 3.5. Drug Use in the FB Sites Compared to a National Urban Sample[32]

DRUG USE VARIABLES	FIGHTING BACK SITES[33]	NATIONAL URBAN[34]
used alcohol within the last month	51.8%	54.3%
had 5 or more drinks within last month	20.2	22.3
alcohol dependent	4.0	4.8
used marijuana within last year	11.9	9.9
ever used marijuana	44.2	45.0
used cocaine within last year	1.7	1.0
used any drug within last year	16.7	14.8
drug dependent	3.0	2.8

[32]The Fighting Back Evaluation Survey (Kadushin et al 1997) was conducted in 1995, 1997, and 1999. The data in this table were calculated from the 1997 iteration (Livert et al 1997). A sample was drawn in each FB site. The FB sites figures in this table are an aggregation of the results for each site. The national urban sample was drawn from MSAs in the 48 contiguous states.

Caution should be used in interpreting differences between Fighting Back sites sample and the national sample. The data reflect weighting by sampling fraction, number of phones in household, and number of household residents age 16-44. However, demographic differences between the FB sample and the national sample have not been controlled for; these differences may account for some of the variation in responses between the two. See Kadushin et al (1998) for a summary description of the FB survey.

[33]N=10,568. Respondents were ages 16-44.

[34]N=1,692. Respondents were ages 16-44. MSAs=Metropolitan Statistical Areas.

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Table 3.6. Neighborhood Disorder in FB Neighborhoods Compared with a National Urban Sample[35]

NEIGHBORHOOD PROBLEMS[36]	RESIDENTS IN FB SITES[37]	RESIDENTS IN U.S. MSAs[38]
crime is serious	17.0%	5.0%
house or property broken into	11.7	8.1
personally attacked	3.1	1.8
see people selling drugs	25.0	9.1
see people drunk or high	39.2	26.2
drug abuse is a serious problem	12.0	5.3

[35]See the first footnote on Table 3.5.

[36]With the exception of "personally attacked," for each of these variables the respondent was asked if the given problem was evident in his or her neighborhood.

[37]N=10,568. Respondents were ages 16-44.

[38]N=1,692. Respondents were ages 16-44. MSAs=Metropolitan Statistical Areas.

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Table 3.7. Racial Residential Segregation in the FB Site MSAs[39]

METROPOLITAN AREA[40]	TOTAL POPULATION	BLACK POPULATION		SEGREGA-TION INDEX
Milwaukee	1,432,149	197,183	14%	.83
Newark	1,823,993	422,735	23	.82
Kansas City	1,566,280	200,508	13	.73
New Haven-Meriden	492,370	62,647	13	.70
Little Rock-North Little Rock	513,117	101,862	20	.60
San Antonio	1,302,099	88,778	7	.54
Columbia	453,331	137,906	30	.54
Charlotte-Gastonburg	1,162,093	231,654	20	.53
Vallejo-Fairfield-Napa	450,822	47,015	10	.49
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Lompoc, CA	369,581	10,401	3	.43

[39]Harrison and Weinberg (1992) calculated the standard segregation indices for the Census Bureau's Metropolitan Statistical Areas in the U.S. This table uses the most common one, the dissimilarity index. For a definition of this index see Harrison and Weinberg (1992), also Massey and Denton (1988).

[40]These were the MSAs in which the FB sites were situated. It is reasonable to suspect segregation was actually more severe in the FB sites as the percentage of blacks was higher in the FB sites. As a general rule, the dissimilarity index is higher where the percentage of blacks in a given area is higher.

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Part 2. Local Implementations of Fighting Back

Chapter 4

Administrative and Grassroots Organization on San Antonio's Eastside

San Antonio Fighting Back (SAFB) represented the pinnacle of the local Fighting Back programs' achievement in engaging the grassroots. The coalition which eventually rallied behind the program was more broadly representative of the grassroots than the coalitions behind any of the other local Fighting Back programs. This chapter introduces San Antonio's Eastside, the two key organizational actors in the San Antonio story, and some of the individuals behind these organizations. Understanding the Eastside setting and these principal actors is essential for grasping what happened in the implementation of SAFB. This material also sets the stage for the next chapter, a conflict between the lead agency and a federation of grassroots organizations which threatened to abort the San Antonio Fighting Back program before it could be implemented.

San Antonio's Eastside had features similar to the other Fighting Back sites and inner cities generally. It included especially poor neighborhoods with both black and Hispanic residents. Tensions existed between proponents of civil order and "neighborhood improvement" and those elements which undermined order and speeded neighborhood decline. People Against Corruption (PAC) was a federation of predominantly black Eastside organizations devoted to countering civil disorder and neighborhood decline. It would seek to play a key role in the Fighting Back program.

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The Fighting Back lead agency, the United Way, was a major player in funding services in San Antonio generally. It did not appear to have direct or strong ties to PAC's principal leadership. Nevertheless, the United Way would eventually need PAC's endorsement in order to secure the implementation funding.

1. The United Way

The United Way of San Antonio and Bexar County applied for the Fighting Back planning grant in 1989. Although the United Way solicited the involvement of many other organizations, including PAC, the United Way staff and the professional expertise they enlisted were the dominant influences up to the implementation phase. San Antonio Fighting Back did not initially function as the broad-based coalition the RWJF intended but as a single organization whose staff solicited the help of others in accomplishing their tasks.

During the 1980s, the United Way intentionally went about establishing a central place for itself in the arena of social service delivery in San Antonio. Its leadership mobilized the participation of the city's corporate elites and the attendant financial support. The United Way not only established a dominant role in the distribution of local charity but also expanded its role beyond that of mere raiser and distributor of charitable funds in two ways. First, its management committed staff resources to augmenting local contributions with external funding from private foundations and other sources. Second, they sought to influence the quality and kind of social programs in San Antonio. Howard Nolan, Chief Executive Officer, led the United Way in these efforts beginning in 1985.

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A United Way insider described in 1995 how the organization had successfully enlisted corporate elite volunteers.

> [We] started to turn the corner in 1977. That 1977 campaign mentality was just to raise the money, and we had to get by that. We started in 1978, 1979. In 1980, we asked the former governor of the state of Texas ... to chair the campaign. That significantly raised the profile of the United Way. We raised 21% new dollars that particular year. A lot of individuals that the governor called on gave substantial dollars. The nice thing about giving substantial dollars is their increase sort of follows their investment. We were able to start attracting folks in. Campaigns went extremely well. Timing was right, but as we started to grow, we had all this campaign success, and then we had resources available to reach out to new programs.

In 1994, the 36 members on the Executive Committee listed in the United Way's annual report included ten chairs, owners, or chief executive officers of local companies; a former governor; the county judge; and the commander of the Fifth U.S. Army. Among the heads of companies were Tom Frost, the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Cullen/Frost Bankers, a regional bank with over four billion dollars in assets; W. Lawrence Walker, Jr., the publisher and Chief Executive Officer of the San Antonio Express-News; and Red McCombs, former owner of the San Antonio Spurs and owner of a car dealership empire. The Board of Trustees included another 100 persons from

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business, military, universities, social services, and so on.

In our effort to understand the operation of influence in San Antonio, we asked a local executive, "Who runs things in this town?" He referred to the list of past United Way campaign chairs and chairs of the Executive Committee.

> Tom Frost, Red McCombs, Greg Greehey, chairman of the board of Valero Corporation, a natural gas gathering and processing firm, Charles Bott, Charlie Cheever, General McDermott, Ed Whittaker, Martel Zachary, Lewis Stenberg, Sam Bishop who founded La Quinta Motor Inns, Larry Mays from Clear Channel Communications, Bob Harres at USAA [an insurance company].

When asked, "Who counts who isn't on your list here of past campaign chairs," he replied, "Nobody."[1]

The participation of elites in the United Way was more than token. A board member described how the organization came to deepen elite involvement.

> [T]he old school was that we would get a campaign chair and at the end of December, he was glad to say goodbye and you'd never see him again. And then the campaign was everything, so there was no use in getting involved in the other side of the shop [i.e. programs]. But if the other side of the shop isn't functioning, campaigning isn't going to be anything. So we started to think that really what we

[1]He then mentioned one exception, B.K. Johnson.

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needed was quality time and adjust the way we operate, not ask the volunteers to adjust the way they operate.

The key local business elite in the Fighting Back story was Red McCombs. McCombs was a local elite *par excellence* (Merton 1949). He owned one of the largest metropolitan car dealership chains in the U.S., making his customer base almost entirely local. Until shortly before the field work for this study was conducted (1995), he had owned another high profile, local business, the San Antonio Spurs, the local professional National Basketball Association team.

McCombs's business interests made him a likely candidate for local philanthropist and booster. He was a United Way volunteer and had been for many years, having served in the following capacities: member of several of the standing committees, chair of a number of committees, including chairing the organization's two most important committees, the funding campaign and the executive board. From 1989 through 1995, McCombs served on the Executive Committee in an at-large capacity. When Fighting Back became a project of the United Way, he was asked to take oversight of the program for the board. This was no coincidence. McCombs had publically acknowledged his bout with alcoholism and his participation in Alcoholics Anonymous. This personal experience made his interest in San Antonio Fighting Back more than perfunctory.

The United Way asked some of its elite volunteers to lend more than their names and fund-raising efforts. Elite volunteers were also engaged in program functions. One volunteer said,

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> When you get involved in United Way in San Antonio and you're active, you're in it for life.... I believe (laughs). I've been involved about 25 years and I don't know if there's any way out. Governor Briscoe said it's a life term.

Agency directors, grassroots leaders, and its own board members perceived the United Way as having a major influence in social service in San Antonio. A board member recalled the growth of the agency's influence.

> [As] we started to grow, we had all this campaign success, and then we had resources available to reach out to new programs. And as we reached out to those programs, we then started to take away whatever competition might have created itself in the community so there was again a constant tying in together.

Another volunteer summed up the United Way's preeminence, "We do have most all of the business and not-for-profit social agencies and all tied to the United Way in San Antonio."

One local service professional referred resentfully to the agency's influence over local social services. "The control the United Way has is awesome, just awesome." When asked if they had too much control, he replied, "Absolutely." Recalling their conflicts with the United Way during the planning phase of Fighting Back, grassroots informants portrayed the United Way as an elite-run agency with major influence over the fate of resource distribution for local social services.

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The United Way developed its influence under two important political economic conditions. First, the state of Texas has a history of minimal involvement in social services. Texas ranks 49th among the states in social service expenditures *per capita* (Pindus et al 1997). Texas also ranks very low among the states in health expenditures (Wiener et al 1997). Whereas the legislatures of the other five largest states in the U.S. meet throughout the year, the Texas legislatures meet only every other year for a session of less than five months.[2]

Second, as local corporate executives explained in interviews, San Antonio had an underdeveloped industrial base and was the home base of no national corporations. No major corporation was there to play a role in developing local philanthropy. The largest employer in San Antonio was the federal government as the city and outlying areas were home to five military bases, the largest concentration of military installations west of the Mississippi. In order to succeed in its annual campaigns, the United Way had to solicit donations more from private individuals than the typical United Way. Referring to San Antonio's lack of a corporate presence, one United Way volunteer explained, "[O]ur skyline is not a Dallas or a Houston or a Chicago. We're unique in that about 81% of our dollars come from individuals where in most communities, about 63% comes from individuals."

The United Way achieved a high giving rate by soliciting the volunteer work of management at the largest local employers, including public bureaucracies such as the

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[2]From the constitutions of the states of California, Florida, Illinois, New York, and Texas.

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school district and military installations. Local labor union officials participated, too. A social service professional described the United Way campaign as a virtual "tax system" on local working people.

As lead agency for the Fighting Back program, the United Way brought with it the potential influence and connections of its elite board members. It would have no trouble recruiting the kind of membership the Fighting Back "Call for Proposals" required for its governing body, the Citizens Task Force: "...community leaders, health professionals, clergy, school officials, parents, law enforcement officials, and other concerned and influential citizens" (RWJF 1989a: 1). The United Way's influence appeared to grant it a powerful legitimacy as an applicant agency. This turned out to be only partly true as the Fighting Back National Program Office would challenge the initial lack of grassroots participation during the planning phase of the program.

Table 4.1 categorizes the members of the San Antonio Fighting Back's Citizens Task Force. The 59 member Citizens Task Force, formed in February of 1990, reads like a *Who's Who* of private and public sector elites in San Antonio.[3] The roster is evidence of the United Way's ability to recruit at least the nominal participation of actors for an initiative like Fighting Back: elites from the fields of health, education, business, religion, politics, and law enforcement. Corporate people predominate the list, reflecting the character of the United Way's own board. If corporate executives and Chamber of

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[3]For the purposes of this table by "elite" I simply mean a person in a position of official prominence, namely, the head of a private or public organization or association. I include those in political office. The mayor, for example, is an elite by virtue of his position. This says nothing about the personal influence of the mayor or her influence relative to that of the city council or other prominent public figures.

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Commerce officers are combined, business people accounted for more than half of the original task force's membership. No other local Fighting Back program was able to recruit the sponsorship of so many prominent local corporate people. Striking, however, is the initial absence of grassroots representation. This would later be rectified as a result of pressure from the Eastside grassroots and the National Program Office.

Although Table 4.1 shows the ability of the United Way to recruit an illustrious committee roster, it says nothing about the engagement of any of these persons in the decision-making which subsequently shaped the establishment and direction of San Antonio Fighting Back. In fact, the task force rarely convened. The program would be driven, rather, by the United Way staff and a small number of professional individuals the United Way staff relied on for technical and other support. This is neither surprising nor necessarily negative. It simply speaks to the symbolic nature of this kind of committee. The task force was meant to show to the RWJF and the San Antonio public the elite support behind the Fighting Back initiative. The Fighting Back National Program Office would later criticize the San Antonio program, however, for being overly staff-driven and for lacking elite leadership.

The United Way also had no trouble recruiting membership for the Community Consortium, the body required by the RWJF which would mobilize the expertise necessary to advise the Citizens Task Force and implement the programmatic direction it gave. The consortium was to represent

> ...all those institutions, organizations, and public and private agencies whose

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> participation is required to implement the proposed initiative, including news media, civic and religious organizations, schools, businesses, major health care providers, human service agencies, drug and alcohol treatment providers...local government and law enforcement ... (RWJF 1989a: 4)

This body was also designed as an indicator to the funder of the ability of the applicant agency to recruit broad participation, in this case, the participation of social service providers, community-based organizations and others who at the time were already working in the fields of prevention and treatment. Judging by the consortium's membership roster, again, the United Way clearly made a strong case that it was qualified to implement Fighting Back.

Table 4.2 lists the members of San Antonio Fighting Back's original Community Consortium. The 47 members included virtually every treatment and youth service agency providing services to Eastside residents. Of the twenty-five treatment, youth, and community center service organizations on the consortium roster in 1989, thirteen received funding from the United Way that year.[4] Three other agencies whose staff served on the consortium would receive grants from Fighting Back during the implementation phase of the program. The United Way was also able to recruit for the roster other small agencies it did not fund as well as city, county, and state-funded agencies, including hospitals, educational institutions and professional associations. The TV and newspaper

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[4]The list of agencies funded by the United Way is the third attachment to a letter sent from R.Alvarado to W.Butynski, December 13, 1989.

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media were also recruited from the private sector.

Like the Citizens Task Force, however, the Community Consortium rarely convened during the planning phase. A small number of consortium members would go on to play key roles, however, in writing the Fighting Back grant proposals and other decision-making. Minority and neighborhood based organizations were represented by the Eastside YMCA, the Barbara Jordan and Ella Austin Community Centers, the Boys and Girls Clubs, and so on.

2. The Eastside

The Fighting Back grant required applicants to designate a target area. The United Way drew the boundaries of the target area to coincide with the Sam Houston and Highlands High Schools' attendance districts. This area was referred to locally as the "Eastside." Ethnically, it was one of the most diverse of the Fighting Back sites. It was also the poorest. Despite the Eastside's ethnic diversity, African Americans dominated its politics.

Geographically, the target area covered the southeast quadrant of the city and lay east of downtown. Going from west to east the area began roughly with New Braunfels Avenue and continued east as far as Interstate 410. From south to north the area stretched roughly from Kelly Airforce Base to Fort Sam Houston.[5] It overlapped San Antonio City Council Districts Two and Three.

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[5]Officers and other military personnel from both Fort Sam Houston and Kelly Air Force Base became involved in programming for youth through San Antonio Fighting Back.

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According to the 1990 census, the Fighting Back target area was 23 percent non-Hispanic white, 23 percent non-Hispanic black, and 53 percent Hispanic. Ninety-two percent of the total population was native born, meaning the vast majority of Hispanics were not immigrants. Virtually all Hispanics were Mexican American.[6]

As Table 3.3 showed, San Antonio was the poorest of the Fighting Back sites in terms of mean household income. The Fighting Back sites were, in turn, poorer than average U.S. urban areas. Table 3.3 also showed the Eastside was poorer than San Antonio generally with mean household income of $21,000, 28% of families in poverty, and a staggering 43% high school dropout rate. The figures for blacks and Hispanics were more devastating. Of those black families with one or more children, 45% lived in poverty. The figure for Hispanics was 39%.

Generally, the Eastside's population was very young, 32% under 18.[7] This was especially true of minorities. However, the black population in particular was split between a high number of young people and a high number of older people, more so than in other Fighting Back sites. Homeowning, black retirees played an important role in grassroots organizations in the San Antonio Fighting Back story.[8] Many upwardly mobile

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[6]Over 90% of the Eastside's Hispanic residents chose Mexican as their ancestry in the 1990 census.

[7]Of the Fighting Back sites only Milwaukee had a younger population than San Antonio. The Fighting Back sites generally had younger populations than the average urban area.

[8]Black men ages 50 and older accounted for 29% of the black men on the Eastside. Black women ages 50 and older were 36% of the women. Both of these figures were 6% higher than those for men and women generally on the Eastside.

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blacks had moved to Council Districts Six and Ten in the northwest part of the city.[9] The Eastside's white, European American population was older, including many retirees who had served at one of the local military bases. The Mexican American population included young working class families who had moved "up" from the poorer neighborhoods on the predominantly Mexican Westside.[10] Kelly Air Force base on the southern border of the Eastside employed many Mexican Americans.[11]

Despite its diverse population, a long time African American resident and member of Fighting Back's board said the Eastside was "politically black." City Council District Two, which covered the central Eastside, had a black representative during the years of the Fighting Back program. District Two representatives on the school board, the water board, as well as representatives to the state legislature, also identified as African American.[12] There was a disproportionately high number of blacks on Fighting Back's

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[9]From an interview with a staff member in the office of District Two Councilmember Mario Salas.

[10]Despite the high poverty rate for Hispanics in the target area, local informants told us Hispanics on San Antonio's Westside were poorer yet.

[11]An agency head said that 45% of all Mexican American federal employees in the U.S. were employed at Kelly Air Force Base. Kelly's closure was announced around the time that we conducted our research in June of 1995. The agency head expected the closing of Kelly to devastate the income of many Eastside Mexican Americans.

[12]The dominance of African American political organization is evident in the practice of mixed race (black-Hispanic) officials from District Two publically identifying themselves as African American. The current council representative, Mario Sales, despite his Hispanic surname, identified himself publically as African American. Of course, his name already identified him as Mexican American. My point is simply that District Two representatives make sure their publics know at the least that they are African American.

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board as well. Mexican Americans on the Eastside seemed to have far fewer organizations. No Mexican Americans represented the Eastside on the city council during the field research for this study in 1995.[13] Council District Three covered the rest of the Fighting Back target area to the south and east of District Two. The city council representative from District Three in 1995 was white.

I expected to find conflict between African and Mexican Americans over control of a program targeting the Eastside. A Mexican American service professional interviewee perceived the Fighting Back program as an African American project but did not seem to resent that fact (June 1995). During the implementation phase, the African American Fighting Back project director would balance the community organizing and administrative staff (i.e. non-clerical) between Mexican and African Americans. Board representation would be primarily from African American residents, however, with representation from Mexican American officials and a local businessman rather than from Mexican American residents. In an article for the San Antonio Express-News, the writer noted that African and Mexican American leaders on the Eastside were puzzled by references to conflict between their groups and said they worked together well.[14] None of the interviews collected for the Fighting Back study in 1995 contradicted this, and some

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[13]City-wide the story was different. The health director and school superintendent were both Hispanic, for example. The representative of the U.S. congressional district in 1995, of which the Eastside was a part, was Hispanic. The head of the United Way believed, nevertheless, that blacks were simply much more involved than Mexican Americans in citizen action and in electoral politics.

[14]The *Sunday Express-News*, San Antonio, October 21, 1990, page 6-L.

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confirmed that African and Mexican Americans did not conflict.[15]

Blacks were largely segregated in San Antonio and concentrated in the central Eastside.[16] To the south and just north of Kelly Air Force Base were more Mexican Americans. Whites lived in the Highland Hills neighborhood and other neighborhoods further east and south in the target area. There were, of course, mixed areas as well, but the general pattern described above seemed to hold based on my tours of the Eastside.

As in many other U.S. cities, segregation of blacks in San Antonio was physically shored up by freeway construction in the 1960s for suburban commuters and their access to downtown stores. U.S. 281 paralleled the old railroad tracks built during the pre-war

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[15]I and other researchers tried to disconfirm the no-conflict hypothesis with informants. We discovered stereotyping by some individuals; however, this seemed a different phenomenon than leadership conflict or overt social conflict. It may also be that African and Mexican American leaders in San Antonio exercised strict discipline in their relations to the public (including researchers). I observed this among African American leaders. I witnessed an older African American leader, an Eastside representative on the water board, strictly reprimanding two young lawyers (20s) in front of a dozen other prominent African American citizens for publically criticizing the NAACP. He did not object to the substance of their criticism but to their making it in an interview with a journalist.

[16]Harrison and Weinberg calculated the dissimilarity index for San Antonio at .54. Two other Fighting Back cities, Milwaukee, the most segregated city in the U.S., was .83 and Newark was .82. Roderick J. Harrison and Daniel H. Weinberg, "Racial and Ethnic Residential Segregation in 1990". Paper presented at the annual meetings of the Population Association of America, Denver CO, May 1992. The tables with indices of segregation for U.S. cities may be found on the following World Wide Web site: http://www.census.gov/ftp/pub/hhes/www/housing/resseg /sumtabs.html.

The index of dissimilarity "captures the degree to which blacks and whites are evenly spread among neighborhoods in a city . . . . If a city is 10% black, then an even . . . pattern requires that every neighborhood be 10% black and 90% white . . . . The index of dissimilarity gives the percentage of blacks who would have to move to achieve an 'even' residential pattern. (Massey & Denton 1993:20)." Thus, though San Antonio's index is low relative to Milwaukee, over half of blacks would have to move to white neighborhoods for the residential pattern in San Antonio to be "even."

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era, suggesting that after World War II the "wrong side of the tracks" became the wrong side of the downtown loop.[17]

In San Antonio these physical dividers between the black neighborhoods and downtown took on the symbolic meaning of social, political, and economic barriers. A neighborhood organizer who gave us a tour of the Eastside, called U.S. 281, "the Berlin Wall" between the Eastside and downtown as well as the whiter, European American Northside. He had participated in an Eastside group's efforts to recover some access to downtown in the early 1990s, negotiating with the Alamo Dome Development Committee to ensure auto and public transit access to the new downtown sports arena.[18]

I experienced the physical isolation of the Eastside myself while conducting field work. In my first attempt to find an Eastside address from my downtown hotel, I departed a half an hour early so that I could get a sense of the transition from downtown over to the Eastside. I thought I would get a better feel for this transition if I simply headed east and did not use a map. I was late for my appointment because I kept driving down streets heading east that ended in concrete barriers or otherwise stopped at U.S. 281. I finally found my way across 281 on Commerce Street.

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[17]Since the construction of the loop, U.S. 281 coincides with Interstate 35 for a few miles.

I observed evidence of highway construction shoring up pre-war and immediate post-war black ghettoes while on tours of the Fighting Back target areas in Milwaukee, New Haven, Vallejo, Washington D.C., Worcester, and Little Rock. Urban historians and sociologists have written on this subject (Caro 1974; Hirsch 1983; Schwartz, 1993).

[18]SNAP News, March 31, 1990, page 11. SNAP is a newspaper for African American Baptists on San Antonio's Eastside.

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3. Grassroots Organization

African American activists on the Eastside and those involved with Fighting Back who did not live on the Eastside perceived the area very differently. Non-residents painted a picture of general poverty and social disorder. Residents and activists told a dynamic story in which agents of community development and maintenance vied with countervailing forces of crime, violence, and neglect.

The following descriptions based on field observations and interviews describe a continuum from order to disorder. The crucial point, however, is the co-existence of the two and the tensions this created for residents. The desire of residents to shape a residential environment that was safe and conformed to their values appeared to produce organized civic activity among inner city residents, motivating them to participate in programs like Fighting Back. The desire for better environs also formed the basis for how residents and their leaders defined the drug and alcohol problem in these neighborhoods --as a part of the physical deterioration, danger, and immorality that threatened their property values, their personal safety, and their sense of decorum and morality.

Neighborhood Order and Disorder

One corporate elite's first word for the Eastside was "dilapidated." Residents of the Eastside showed us, however, that well kept and developing properties co-existed with declining ones. A self-described "community organizer" gave us a tour of the Coliseum Willow Park neighborhood. He captured the extremes of the state of the

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neighborhood as follows.

> This particular community, as you can see, from the dilapidated duplexes we just came from, and you see how well kept these people have their yards. This is primarily an African American community. It is somewhat an older community. It is one of your highest voting precincts. The people in this area are very involved. You have some of the city's major businesses located in this area, like Coca Cola and several meat companies, several industrial companies. And it's a very quiet neighborhood, but on the fringes of it they have some real problems. You see here we have.... wherever you see those Good Neighbor programs, usually we've been in these communities.
>
> I'm going to show our alcohol problem in the area: it's going to blow your mind. You're gonna say, "Wow, you mean y'all allow this to be by this neighborhood?" You need to get a feel of the contrast. You see, one of the things you're gonna find out about a lot of these neighborhoods is it goes to an extreme. You'll see well-manicured lawns, well-kept houses, and then you'll see deterioration of structures and dilapidation.

A number of the residents in the area belonged to the Coliseum Willow Park Neighborhood Association. Bordering the north of these homes had been a run down, low rent apartment complex. The neighborhood association pressured Housing Code Enforcement and other city agencies to demolish the complex and were in negotiation

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with the city's development office and developers over the specific dimensions and style of the new homes and townhouses to be built. The association members wanted the development to attract a mix of low and middle income working people.

The rest of the Eastside was also a mix. The San Antonio Sunday Express News stated there were "89 abandoned homes along seven streets in the heart of District 2" on the Eastside in October, 21, 1990 (6L). The article went on to say abandoned houses were targeted by drug dealers for "setting up shop." I learned about the "drug house" situation from some residents on Lamar Street.

Residents on Lamar were concerned about an abandoned house on their street. I attended a meeting of a group of them near Lamar at the Ella Austin Community Center, one of the Fighting Back satellite offices. A Fighting Back community organizer was helping them with the situation. The leader of the group was a Mexican American woman who lived three doors down and across the street from the problem house. After the meeting I walked home with her and her elementary school-aged children. They lived in a small pre-war house. She and her husband obviously did a lot of work on the yard and the house, judging by how clean the garden was and the careful, elaborate trim work painted on the window frames and eaves of their home.

She told me they believed drug dealing, using, and prostitution had been operating out of the abandoned house across the street. They based this belief on the persons they had seen going in and out of the house. She and her neighbors had been calling the police about the illegal activities. They had recently learned from the Fighting Back organizer that they could also call the city's code enforcement agency because of local ordinances

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about the upkeep of property and the potential dangers that the dilapidated house presented to anyone who walked into the property. I later walked by the house with her children and a couple of their friends. The kids told me they had heard shootings and screams coming from the house at night.

People Against Corruption

In interviews conducted with SAFB participants in 1991, two agency professionals described the Eastside as "unorganized."[19] It is not clear just what they meant by this. The Eastside did not, however, lack for organized civic engagement. Two neighborhood residents and activists said the Eastside was "very organized." People Against Corruption (PAC), an umbrella organization of 55 black organizations, was a key to organized citizen action and youth service activity on the Eastside.[20] In the early 1990s they made a powerful claim to legitimately representing residents, or the "grassroots," on the Eastside on a number of issues. The Fighting Back program became one these issues.

PAC was founded in 1988. Its first president, and co-founder with Lillie Wilson,

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[19]The RWJF hired Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation as the original evaluator of the Fighting Back program. They conducted research on Fighting Back from 1989 to 1994, including two waves of in-depth interviews.

[20]It is possible PAC did not have a high public profile and was not as well organized in 1991. Or these agency professionals did not recognize PAC as what they believed was "organized" or did not believe this sort of organization was relevant to prevention and treatment. Nearly 50% of PAC's supporting organizations were in fact unincorporated neighborhood associations, Parent Teacher Association chapters, and so on. Another explanation is that the two service professionals had some motive for not legitimizing PAC and others as representative of the Eastside. PAC surely did not represent everyone, but had broad-based support as will become apparent in the following pages.

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was Donald McClure. McClure was the principal at Gates Elementary School on the Eastside. The baton of running PAC was passed to Lillie Wilson in 1990. At the time she was Vice President of the umbrella group for the Parent Teachers Associations on the Eastside.

PAC began to organize in 1987. It had its first meeting at Gates Elementary School in 1988, hosted by McClure. The meeting was prompted by a spate of recent shootings. The Gates school was a symbolic choice for the meeting place because in a short period of time, thirteen individuals had been killed nearby, from a nine month old child to a 36 year old teacher. Residents near Gates were afraid to go out of their homes and to send their children to school. A neighborhood activist said that some were so afraid that instead of sleeping in their beds "they slept in bathtubs" to protect themselves from stray bullets. Residents said the shootings were related to illicit drug markets and gang conflicts. In attendance at that original meeting were McClure; Ms. Olita, a Parent Teacher Association President; Ralph Green, President of the Wrigley Heights Neighborhood Association; T.C. Calvert, Director of the Eastside Economic Development Council; and Linda Tippins, Executive Director of the Ella Austin Community Center.

Tippins agreed to take responsibility for organizing transportation for residents to events and meetings. T.C. Calvert became lead organizer. Charles Shannon, Executive Director of the Alamo Area YMCA, offered PAC meeting space. Polly Kirven became their grant writer.

On January 11, 1989, four months before the RWJF first announced the Fighting

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Back program grant, PAC presented a four point action plan to the United Way for specific problem areas on the Eastside and proposed that the United Way fund them to address the problems. The locations were Wheatley Courts (a public housing project), Stanley's Ice House (a convenience store), Hilda's (a convenience store), and the Rusty Nail (a bar). All these places were the sites of concentrated drug trafficking, public drug and alcohol use, or were otherwise "hotspots" where residents perceived violent and other crime rates were highest. The United Way did not fund PAC at that time but was encouraging.

PAC had its first major public event in April of 1989, a "Walk and Talk" tour of problem locations on the Eastside with public officials and local residents. A flyer for a meeting on April 29, 1989, listed Eastside service providers who supported PAC: the YMCA Alamo Branch, the NAACP, San Antonio Black Efforts Against the Threat of AIDS (B.E.A.T. AIDS). Also listed were 16 elementary and middle school Parent Teacher Associations, six neighborhood resident or crime watch associations, two public employee unions, clergy associations, churches, and others.

PAC's purpose was to "combat drugs and thugs and support outstanding youth; promote the welfare of our children and enhance a higher quality of life for our people."[21] They opened their first office in Wheatley Courts, an Eastside public housing project and one of PAC's originally targeted trouble spots, on October 28, 1990. The San Antonio Housing Authority eventually rented office space to PAC in a number of public housing projects, charging an annual rent of one dollar.

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[21]According to a flyer distributed by PAC, dated October 28, 1990.

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PAC's first major anti-drug accomplishment came in 1990 during the planning phase of Fighting Back. PAC met regularly from January 1990 through June 1990 to close down a local business man and drug dealer.[22] They cooperated with a number of law enforcement agencies. A U.S. Marshall seized possession of the Sonny Mitchell Community Center on June 12, 1990. The "strip center," a group of businesses located in the 2800 block of Martin Luther King Drive, included a barber shop and a restaurant. The owner of the center, Sonny Mitchell, was convicted of selling narcotics and sentenced to ten years in prison.

In January 22, 1993, SNAP News reported the bulldozing of the Sonny Mitchell Center, carried out by the Texas National Guard engineers unit in cooperation with the Fifth U.S. Army from Fort Sam Houston.[23] The strip center was eventually replaced by the Dorie Miller Center. Lillie Wilson, PAC's president, spoke at the rally for the groundbreaking of the new center. Governor Ann Richards spoke, congratulating both Mayor Nelson Wolff and Councilwoman Ruth McClendon on forging the corporate partnerships that helped the new business development project come to fruition.

PAC went ahead, without United Way funding, with successful campaigns to close their other three targets: Hilda's, Stanley's Ice House, and the Rusty Nail. PAC also established youth programs --a basketball league for boys, girls volleyball, and other programs. The basketball program had 300 participants in 1990.

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[22]This information comes from a xerox copy of an unidentified publication given to me by Lillie Wilson.

[23]SNAP News was an Eastside newspaper.

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Many figures were key to PAC's success. I say more about one of them, T.C. Calvert, because he would be the key figure in encouraging PAC to continue working with the United Way, which would be essential to the outcome of the story of San Antonio Fighting Back. Other field researchers and I spent more time interviewing and following T.C. around than other informants because he was key to San Antonio Fighting Back's organizing work and to the history of PAC. He also knew the Eastside in and out, its streets, organizations, and leadership.

T.C. had attended trainings of the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF).[24] The IAF had considerable success organizing in Texas in the 1970s, starting on San Antonio's predominantly Mexican American Westside. Ernesto Cortez emerged as the key figure in organizing the success of the IAF in San Antonio. The name of the organization on the Westside was Communities Organized for Public Service (COPS). T.C. had not worked with COPS.

T.C. appeared to accept many of the tenets of Alinsky's theory and method of community organizing. We observed him teaching ordinary, uneducated residents on the Eastside how to identify fellow residents' concerns through face-to-face, door-to-door contact; how to plan and run meetings; how to develop a citizen action plan and build a

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[24]The IAF is the legacy of Saul Alinsky and had its beginnings on Chicago's poor, European ethnic South Side in the 1940s (Alinsky 1945, 1971; Boyte 1980; Horwitt 1989). Calvert had no formal affiliation with the IAF. The IAF celebrated its 50th anniversary in 1990. It is a training organization and consults with independent local organizations. It also functions as a national network for organizers. For example, local organizations may contact IAF for consultation. Subsequently, the IAF may put them in touch with professional organizers whom they may hire. The IAF has been organizing in Texas since the mid-1970s, in the New York metropolitan area since the late 1970s, in Los Angeles, Baltimore, and other parts of the urban U.S.

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broad base of support for an action plan; how to deal with elite actors using techniques of polarizing, supporting, negotiating, and so on to achieve concrete objectives such as investment in a specific low income housing development like the one in Coliseum Willow Park or the Dorie Miller Center, a commercial development and community center on the Eastside, both of which T.C. had helped to bring about.

T.C. sought to develop small organizations on the Eastside. His broader goal was to create an association of Eastside organizations that would become the power broker for the Eastside in local decision making in the distribution of public and private spending, for example, Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funding.[25] Another goal was influence in motivating municipal bureaucracies to respond to citizen concerns, above all neighborhood development and crime.

Conclusion

The RWJF announced the Fighting Back grant at a time when the United Way was realizing its goal of becoming a leading influence in local social programming. The Fighting Back intervention in San Antonio also had its origins in a moment when PAC was first developing its organizational momentum. PAC's momentum was in response to the drug and gang related violence occurring on the Eastside in the middle and late 1980s. It was also fed by the skills and ambitions of its leadership which were shaped in part by the Alinsky school of community organizing.

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[25]CDBG funding was key to improving streets, sewers, and other neighborhood infra-structure.

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Chapter 2 explained how the RWJF defined the institutional fields into which Fighting Back would intervene. It attempted to do so very broadly --to include local political and business "clout," the "grassroots," and professional health care and social service providers. In San Antonio, the RWJF's invitation to the United Way to apply for the Fighting Back grant went a long ways towards setting the parameters for the local institutional arena in which the program intervened. The United Way extended a community-wide open invitation to participate in the program; nevertheless, local health and service organizations appeared to assume that the applicant agency would be making the decisions. In San Antonio, Fighting Back was squarely under the aegis of the United Way. It would invite the organizations which it funded --San Antonio Council on Alcohol and Drug Abuse, Ella Austin Community Center, the Davis Scott YMCA (Eastside), and others. It also invited the other relevant local AOD agency officials -- medical faculty from the University of Texas, the head of treatment at the county jail, the head of the state alcohol rehabilitation center in San Antonio, the head of the local health district, and others.

The political and business "clout" present tended to be for symbolic purposes, to lend the program legitimacy locally and with the RWJF. San Antonio had a ready supply of clout on its board. It would recruit former Governor Dolph Brisco and Red McCombs, owner of the San Antonio Spurs at the time and of one of the largest metropolitan car dealership empires in the Southwest. The "grassroots" were treated like the others. The United Way staff contacted People Against Corruption and others, inviting them to serve on committees and attend meetings. The expectation of most participants appeared to be

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that the program belonged to the United Way. Originally, the most engaged individuals would be the United Way staff with the support of key local figures with access to the sort of data and expert knowledge the grant application required.

The United Way staff did not appear to reckon with the grassroots, which in the late 1980s and early 1990s on the Eastside was represented by PAC. The RWJF, in its insistence that grassroots be involved with the program, drew in the grassroots, creating the potential for a legitimate grassroots claim to leadership in the local Fighting Back programs. This expanded the institutional field which the intervention entered to include not only the applicant agency, the agencies it was connected to, and the rest of the health and social service AOD players in town but also lay groups who could lay special claim to representing residents of the targeted area, "those most affected by the problem."[26] This granted influence to those who could successfully claim to represent the grassroots. It also introduced racial and class dynamics because in San Antonio the agency leadership tended to be white while PAC's leadership was African American.[27] Some of the former were Hispanic but tended to be white and appeared to relate and identify more with the worlds of their professions than the worlds of inner city residents and politics.

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[26]This was an RWJF Senior Program Officer's phrase for the "grassroots" at the Applicants Workshop in Nashville, April 1989.

[27]As late as 1991 it was the express practice of community organizers of the Alinsky school to never "play the race card," that is, neither allow race to divide organizing potential nor to smack of special interest pleading rather than the rightful claims of ordinary citizens in a democracy (Lindholm 1991). Nevertheless, when the organized group is predominantly minority and their political nemeses are white, the race issue is never far below the surface as one IAF organizer admitted to me (November 1991).

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PAC would be preemptive in their response to the Fighting Back grant. They would not wait to be left out or wait to see things turn out differently from what they wanted. They told the United Way they wanted to be involved. They had their own ideas for programming. They insisted on a role in decision-making and assumed they would play one. This was in part the result of fortuitous timing. PAC had already made a proposal to the United Way to address drug problems on the Eastside. It was also the result of their leadership's background in community organizing. The following chapter gives an account of how these dynamics played out, the cooptation process that emerged as constituent of the establishment of the Fighting Back program in San Antonio.

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Table 4.1. San Antonio Fighting Back Citizens Task Force Membership, 1990

MEMBER CATEGORY	EXAMPLES OF MEMBERS	NUMBER IN CATEGORY
Corporate Executives	Heads of the largest local businesses: Frost/Cullen Bankers, USAA, McCombs Enterprises.	17
Chamber of Commerce	Executive officers and chairs of boards.	6
Medical/Health	Hospital executives, a medical school president, the San Antonio Metropolitan Health District director, president of the local medical society.	10
Religious	The Episcopal Archbishop of West Texas, the Catholic Archbishop for San Antonio.	5
Schools	SAISD[28] Superintendent, the president of Trinity University, the president of the local teachers' union.	5
Elected Officials	The county and other judges, the mayor, city council and state representatives for the Eastside.	11
Grassroots	Residents of the Eastside with no formal title.	2
Law Enforcement	The local chief of police and the district attorney.	2

[28]San Antonio Independent School District

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Table 4.2. San Antonio Fighting Back Community Consortium Membership, 1990

MEMBER CATEGORY	PROMINENT MEMBERS	NUMBER IN CATEGORY
Treatment	Heads of non-profit treatment providers.	9
Youth/Prevention	Educators, youth service agency heads (YMCA, YWCA, Boys and Girls Clubs, Boys and Girls Scouts, the city's Youth Services Division head, Executive Officer of the local Council on Alcohol and Drug Abuse).	12
Social Services	The city's social service agency head, community center directors.	4
Media (public awareness)	Newspaper and television executives.	4
Research (needs assessment and evaluation)	Medical faculty, university faculty.	3
Law Enforcement	Police captain.	1
Mental Health	Agency heads.	3
Public Housing	Local housing authority director.	2
Medical	Medical society head, pharmacist association head.	4
Affiliation Undetermined	NA	4

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Chapter Five

Cooptation in San Antonio

The previous chapter introduced the elite, administrative, and grassroots players in the San Antonio story in their local contexts. This chapter describes the cooptation process triggered by the development of the Fighting Back (FB) program in San Antonio. In this chapter I investigate cooptation primarily, not at the institutional level of analysis, but at the level of agency --the interactions of individuals, organizations, and groups in their local contexts. The story begins with a conflict between the grassroots and FB program administrators over program leadership. The conflict triggered both Selznick's formal and informal modes of cooptation. PAC's leadership publicly challenged the legitimacy of SAFB's leadership, and it did so as a local center of power with which the FB administrators had to reckon. The National Program Office (NPO) played a key role in bolstering the grassroots' claims in this conflict.

Although SAFB successfully integrated the grassroots into governance early in the program, it eventually had to deal with the contradictory programming objectives of the grassroots and the RWJF, whose interests were represented by the NPO. The grassroots wished to focus on neighborhood improvement and empowerment of Eastside groups to accomplish that end. They approached AOD-related problems from this perspective. Initially, the NPO embraced neighborhood improvement programming as part of an "environmental strategy." If neighborhoods became safer, more pleasant, more hopeful places to live and residents did not have to witness criminal behavior, including illicit

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drug sales and use, in the streets, it was believed youth and others would be less likely to use or abuse AOD. However, the heart of the RWJF programming purpose was improving efforts more directly related to reducing demand for AOD, namely, local prevention and treatment services. In the second phase of implementation, from mid-1994 on, the NPO sought to move local programming more in this direction. An ongoing cooptation process developed as SAFB sought to balance these dual programming purposes --improving neighborhoods and improving the local continuum of care.[1]

The United Way and the SAFB adjusted to this tension by committing the United Way's resources to improving both Eastside neighborhoods and the local "system" of prevention and treatment. SAFB used the FB grant to pay a large staff of "Area Coordinators." In practice the Area Coordinators were granted considerable autonomy. The African American coordinators were engaged in community organizing to strengthen neighborhood groups, improve Eastside neighborhoods, and develop structured activities for youth to the ends of youth development and control. The Hispanic Area Coordinators were engaged in the latter effort and more directly in intervention outreach with youth and families.

Paying a large, relatively independent, entrepreneurial staff gave SAFB the flexibility to respond to the relationships in which it was embedded. Grassroots leaders filled the Area Coordinator positions from which they were able to advance the agenda of neighborhood improvement. On the other hand, SAFB accommodated the RWJF's

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[1]It is not clear to me to what extent SAFB's leadership consciously adjusted to this programmatic tension. Regardless, SAFB's organizational structure and practices embodied and operationalized this tension.

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agenda by subcontracting for prevention, intervention, and treatment services with both RWJF and United Way funds. In this way it incorporated local AOD service providers into the program. SAFB also committed some staff effort to prevention and treatment related programming.

The chapter has two sections. The first describes SAFB's early leadership crisis, the grassroots' and NPO's responses to it. The resolution of this crisis then determined how SAFB would be governed and how it would embark on the implementation phase of FB. The evidence for this account is based on documents (correspondence, meeting minutes, etc.) and interviews with the actors themselves or witnesses to the events. The second section assesses the effects of the cooptation process on SAFB's governance structure and leadership, staffing, program content, and resource distribution. The evidence for this section is also based on documents and interviews.

1. Leadership Conflict[2]

Early leadership

Dick Alvarado, an employee of the United Way, was appointed Fighting Back Project Director in March of 1990.[3] In June of 1990, three Planning Associates were hired to organize the Fighting Back planning effort. Toni Van Buren would organize the planning for treatment. Mark Carmona worked on youth and adult development. Nan

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[2]Many names are mentioned in this account. Table 5.1 is a guide to many of those who played important roles.

[3]Nolan letter to Spickard, April 19, 1990.

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Littlefield was assigned to working with neighborhood organizations.[4]

During the writing of the planning grant application, United Way staff drafted the clout, officials, and other figures the FB program "Call for Proposals" (RWJF 1989a) suggested they mobilize. These individuals would compose the required governing and implementing bodies --the citizens' task force and the community consortium (cf. Tables

Former Texas governor Dolph Brisco was recruited to chair both the Citizens Task Force and the Executive Committee. The Community Consortium was divided into three areas: prevention, treatment, and control. A number of Consortium members headed organizations which the United Way funded: Sharon Shook, Director of San Antonio Council on Alcohol and Drug Abuse; Linda Tippins, Director of Ella Austin Community Center; Charles Shannon, Director of the YMCA; the Directors of the Boys and Girls Clubs, Boy Scouts; and others.

The prevention area was represented by top officials from the San Antonio Independent School District. The treatment area was represented by local providers, some of whom also were funded by the United Way, for example, Father Brosnan of the Patrician Movement; Dr. John Sparks who oversaw treatment provided by the county to jail inmates; Steven Schnee, superintendent of a local hospital; faculty at the University of Texas medical school; the city's Health Director; and others. Law enforcement,

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[4]Handwritten notes by Hamel, National Program Office, on phone conversation with Alvarado.

[5]Alvarado's calling log from 1989 file.

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neighborhood associations, schools, and others were represented in the area of "control."

Betrayal

According to a PAC member, PAC wrote the original proposal on which both the United Way's planning and implementation grant proposals were based. PAC's proposal was said to include key elements the United Way ultimately included in its proposal to the RWJF: a drug abuse treatment facility, education and prevention programs, and an AIDS hospice program (Jones and Suazo-Garcia 1998:16). Some believed the United Way had betrayed them by using these ideas in their application for the FB planning grant without including or even notifying PAC.

It was difficult to verify the events relevant to this story. Whether or not all aspects of it are true, it reflected the state of mind of PAC's leadership.

PAC was said to have met with the United Way staff once every two weeks from June of 1989 through December of 1989 to develop a proposal. PAC was preparing to formally request funding from the Unite Way. In retrospect PAC members saw the FB grant as the funding source for their proposal. Among the individuals from and supporters of PAC were T.C. Calvert (PAC's organizer), Lillie Wilson (PAC's president), John Sanders (Chair of Ella Austin Community Center's Board and a local minister), Charles Shannon (Director of the Eastside YMCA), Mr. Byrd (Vice President of one of the neighborhood organizations), Linda Tippins (Director of the Ella Austin Community Center and PAC's transportation organizer), and Polly Kirven (PAC's grant writer). Alvarado logged both phone calls and meetings with PAC in a quarterly report for the

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NPO in 1990.[6]

It did not appear that the United Way staff deemed the relationship to PAC as important as PAC did. Staff may have met with the group as one of many groups (though they did appear to meet more often with PAC). They may also have perceived the meetings with PAC as simply input into what the United Way staff believed was their own program. United Way staff may have felt entitled to this input as some of the organizational affiliates of PAC's active members and its supporters were recipients of United Way funding: the Ella Austen Community Center represented by Tippins and Sanders and the YMCA represented by Shannon. Some PAC members, however, felt used by the United Way.

According to PAC members, Governor Brisco and United Way board members also met with PAC several times. They may have been referring to meetings of the Citizens Task Force. PAC members are listed on the original Citizens Task Force and Community Consortium roster in 1989. Kirven and McClure were listed both on the Task Force and the Consortium. Shannon, who provided meeting space to PAC at the YMCA, and Tippins of Ella Austin Community Center, PAC's transportation organizer, were also on the Consortium's original roster.

Some PAC members believed the United Way's betrayal began in 1990. The details of what happened are somewhat unclear. According to one individual, when PAC

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[6]Alvarado logged conversations and meetings with others, too, but more so with PAC (First Quarterly Report, June 20, 1990). PAC was prominently mentioned as a participant in both the first and the third quarterly reports (June 20, 1990; January 1, 1991). After that time, PAC was no longer mentioned though its leaders were.

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presented their proposal to the United Way staff in January 1990, staff told PAC they would consider funding the proposal. PAC then learned in March 1990 that the United Way had been awarded the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation grant targeting the Eastside and that the application had included elements of PAC's own proposal to the United Way.[7]

> [When the proposal] came back, it came back Fighting Back. The four point plan, the detox center, that's all in our grant. Everything that [the United Way had in their proposal] is on our grant, our original one from PAC to Dick Alvarado and Toni Van Buren to assist us in getting funds.

Another PAC member recalled that a little trust in the United Way was restored when Nan Littlefield, an African American assigned to the Neighborhood Organizations Committee, was hired as an FB Planning Associate in June of 1990. Moreover, despite the mistrust, and at one member's strong urging, PAC remained involved with Fighting Back. Calvert (PAC's organizer) and Wilson (PAC's then Vice President) were listed as members of Fighting Back's Executive Committee in 1990. In May of 1990, Donald McClure, PAC's President, was listed as one of five "San Antonio Fighting Back community leaders" on the roster for a breakfast during a site visit from Paul Jellinek, an RWJF Senior Program Officer, Anderson Spickard, the National Program Office's

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[7]In retrospect, one PAC member felt this was a fortunate circumstance, implying PAC really needed the resources of the United Way to acquire the grant and play a role in its implementation.

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Executive Director, and Greg Dixon, the NPO's Deputy Director.[8]

Leadership change

In the fall of 1990, Leonard Lawrence, M.D., was appointed Vice Chairman of the Executive Committee. An April 1991 letter from Spickard to Dolph Brisco, Executive Committee Chair and former Texas governor, suggested there was a leadership vacuum that Lawrence was being counted on to fill. According to a witness to decision-making, Lawrence was brought in "to counter Myrick." Some believed James Myrick, an attorney claiming to represent the Eastside grassroots, was making a play for control of the program. For the United Way to stay at the helm, they needed a strong leader to counter him. According to the NPO's Deputy Director, former Governor Brisco was not able to take an active leadership role at the time for personal reasons.

Lawrence was a psychiatrist on the medical faculty of the University of Texas Health Sciences Center. Together with PAC leadership, Lawrence would go on to play a central leadership role in seeing the implementation grant proposal through and in establishing the program agenda and governance structure for the implementation phase. His efforts would be viewed by some grassroots representatives as "heavy-handed." This threatened to unravel the tie between Eastside grassroots representatives and the Fighting

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[8]Others at the meeting were Fernando Guerra, the Chair of the Community Consortium and the city's Health Director, an Hispanic psychiatrist, an Associate Superintendent of the school district (SAISD), and the Director of the Eastside's Boys and Girls Club Branch. This suggests San Antonio Fighting Back wanted to present both an Hispanic and African American face to the visitors and representation from health officials and officials in charge of youth service organizations.

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Back program. Lawrence would go on, however, to broker a major accommodation with grassroots representation that would define the character of leadership and program for at least the first four years of FB's implementation in San Antonio.

Lawrence lent legitimacy to the project at a moment when the National Program Office's Executive Director, Anderson Spickard, had major doubts about San Antonio Fighting Back's viability. Like Spickard, Lawrence was a member of the medical profession and on the faculty of a medical school. Besides the professional affinity, Spickard had made it a personal priority from the start of the FB national program to recruit the involvement of doctors and their affiliated hospitals and universities in the local FB programs. Lawrence also would impress Spickard with his vigorous leadership.

Lawrence appeared to be a fit for the Eastside grassroots as well. He was African American and belonged to a large Eastside church. He was not born into a professional family but had grown up in inner city Detroit in a public housing project. He was raised by a single mother who had been on welfare. He did not share some professionals' aversion to the "streetfighting" political style of Eastside grassroots' leadership. Referring to his role in the tensions emerging between the grassroots and the United Way staff, an insider told us that he "enjoyed a good fight."

Not long after Lawrence became Vice Chairman of SAFB's Steering Committee, Spickard wrote a letter to Brisco, SAFB's Executive Committee Chair. Spickard expressed his disappointment in SAFB's leadership and his doubts about SAFB's prospects for acquiring the implementation grant.

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> Some of Texas [sic] leading citizens such as Red McCombs, Henry Cisneros, and you assured us that this project would be fully backed and led by San Antonio's most prominent citizens. Furthermore, articulate community level leaders such as Lillie Wilson communicated their confidence that the average citizens most affected by these terrible problems will be heard and represented as the two year planning and development unfolded. We were persuaded that the United Way of San Antonio would be the best organization to operate your ambitious effort. [April 2, 1991]

Spickard went on to say, however, that the United Way had made a weak staff commitment to Fighting Back. Consequently, San Antonio lagged "far behind most of the other sites in what [it] had achieved" up to that point in time. He listed a number of concerns. San Antonio had not submitted required financial and program reports. Fighting Back leadership had been unresponsive to grassroots' complaints about leadership and direction of the project. SAFB had been poorly prepared for the National Program Office's recent site visit: a number of key persons were absent, including Executive Committee Chair Brisco and United Way President Nolan. A rift among the Fighting Back staff Planning Associates persisted. There was "little semblance of a draft plan nor . . . a clear sense of direction about how one [would be] developed in the time remaining [before the implementation grant application was due]."

Spickard closed with a call for leadership, "This project needs leadership, Governor. It needs it from the voluntary participants like yourself and from the paid

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executives like Howard Nolan and the staff." Spickard told Brisco he was "confident that you good people can still turn this thing around." He particularly expressed confidence in Lawrence and in Toni Van Buren, one of the three Planning Associates.

> . . . I was very impressed with Dr. Leonard Lawrence . . . . Clearly he is joining the process late in the game but seems to have the clout and the sense of direction that this project needs right now. I have been impressed with the work of Ms. Toni Van Buren on the staff . . . .

Shortly thereafter the reins of San Antonio Fighting Back were placed in the hands of Lawrence, who would rely heavily on Van Buren as the principal staff person.

Grassroots challenge

In late 1990, tensions between the grassroots and FB program leadership erupted. Grassroots elements challenged FB Director Alvarado by directly complaining to the NPO that the project was not progressing well and that Alvarado was not including "the community" in decision-making. Alvarado would be replaced but by someone not to the grassroots satisfaction. In the meantime board leadership would also transfer from Brisco to Lawrence. Lawrence would both lock horns with and cooperate with grassroots leaders.

In November 1990, James Myrick authored a letter to Alvarado expressing grave concerns about the management and progress of Fighting Back. He copied the letter to

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the president of the United Way and the Executive Committee. Myrick was a local African American attorney who presented himself as an Eastside grassroots leader. He was a member of Fighting Back's Executive Committee as well as Chair of the Neighborhood Organizations Committee, a committee of the Community Consortium. He also became Coordinator for the Executive Committee, a role created to promote communication among the various committees of the Community Consortium. These appointments suggest he had become one of the most active volunteers among project leadership.

In early February 1991, Myrick penned another letter, this time to NPO Director Spickard, stating that Alvarado was not working with the Eastside "community" in developing the Fighting Back plan and that he was concerned about the prospects for the program. Calvert, Wilson, and two others wrote similar letters to the NPO. Spickard's subsequent letter in April to Brisco (see above) suggested Spickard himself had serious doubts about Alvarado at the time. Initially, Lawrence appeared to support Alvarado. Shortly after the March Executive Committee meeting, however, Alvarado resigned to take a position as President of the El Paso United Way.

The hiring of the new Project Director became the source of a new controversy between Lawrence and Myrick. Van Buren, a United Way employee and Fighting Back's Planning Associate on treatment issues, was hired to replace Alvarado in April, 1991. Myrick penned a memo to the Executive Committee in April of 1991, calling for a "vote of no confidence" in the decision-making process which resulted in Van Buren's hiring. According to Myrick's memo, Van Buren's hiring was a "back room," "heavy-handed"

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maneuver engineered by Lawrence.

Van Buren was perceived by agency people as the only person on the United Way staff and among the volunteers from the Eastside who had the skills to write the implementation grant proposal. She recruited the help of John Sparks, M.D. and other local experts in writing the implementation proposal. She stayed at the helm of Fighting Back while the implementation grant was being written but would be replaced when implementation kicked in.

However, Van Buren's hiring threatened the continued involvement of grassroots representatives. Both Myrick and Wilson ceased to participate in Fighting Back by June.[9] However, other members of PAC remained involved, including Calvert. In the fall of 1991, Wilson re-joined the effort, participating on the Neighborhood Organizations Committee.[10]

2. Making San Antonio Fighting Back Legitimate

The United Way and the grassroots' accommodation of one another was indicated in the roles these respective parties would play in governance and staffing choices as well as in the development of program content. In the former two areas the United Way and Eastside grassroots leaders accommodated one another. It is not clear that the United

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[9]Spickard, notes on phone conversation with Van Buren, June 1991.

[10]Neighborhood Organizations Committee roster, November 6, 1991. Myrick dropped out permanently. It is not clear to what extent or for how long he and PAC leaders were aligned. PAC informants did not discuss Myrick and his role. He declined to speak with us.

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Way cared one way or the other whether the grassroots made decisions. Its concern was perhaps more in securing the grant. During the planning phase, conflict over decision-making appeared to be more between the service providing oriented staff and the grassroots rather than between the grassroots and the United Way's president and its board. Regardless, when the conflict with the grassroots over Alvarado's and Brisco's leadership came to a head, the United Way's leadership chose a new direction which strengthened the grassroots decision-making position and continued to make choices that did so.

Furthermore, there is no evidence the United Way had any objection to the grassroots' agenda for program content. On the contrary, a United Way executive and another member of its Executive Committee shared the view of PAC's leadership that the principal, inter-related problems of the Eastside and its residents were economic and human under-development, more concretely, unemployment and inadequate schools. While it was difficult for PAC's leadership to take on these huge, structural conditions, it did want to take on other, more modest conditions of human and neighborhood development which are described in the program content section below. This agenda would coopt the RWJF's original program agenda of building or improving the "continuum" of prevention and treatment services and result in ongoing tension between the NPO staff and SAFB.

SAFB nevertheless also accommodated the RWJF's continuum of care programming agenda and local service providers. The RWJF was accommodated through programming content. Local service providers, excluded from a strong presence on the

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SAFB board, were nevertheless accommodated by contracts for services. SAFB was able to do this because the United Way committed considerable resources to the program. SAFB's staff was also able to attract other funding and programming, for SAFB and for Eastside organizations that was directed at neighborhood improvement.

During the implementation of FB from 1992 to at least 1996, grassroots leadership played a substantive role in determining SAFB's programming. This was to the benefit of both the United Way and the grassroots. The program's publicity successes, both local and national, heightened the profile of both grassroots elements and the United Way.[11] The structure of governance allowed for the possibility, however, that the United Way could re-assert its role depending upon the composition and dynamics of the board and staff.[12] The cooptation process thus set up an interdependent relationship between the United Way and Eastside grassroots leadership, a relationship beneficial to both but which left future dynamics open. Moreover, as long as the FB grant remained a part of the picture, SAFB's relationship with the RWJF would also need regular attention.

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[11]U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno came for a photo opportunity in connection with SAFB's role in bulldozing over 70 drug houses. Texas Governor Ann Richards, San Antonio's mayor, and others came for a photo op in connection with PAC's role in turning the Sonny Mitchell, drug-infested mall into the Dorrie Miller Community Center. SAFB received awards from the Department of Defense for its work in conjunction with the U.S. Fifth Army at Fort Sam Houston and the Texas National Guard. Virtually all of these kudos were in connection with neighborhood improvement --rooting out drug dealing and other criminal behavior, developing properties, and providing recreational and developmental (e.g. mentoring and tutoring) programs for youth.

[12]This dynamic depended potentially, too, on interventions by the RWJF, i.e. the foundation's re-assertion of its claims on the program. At this point, however, I am discussing the local dynamics.

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Governance

The membership structure and decision making powers granted the Management Board was a major accommodation to PAC and the Eastside grassroots. The Fighting Back Management Board was first "seated" on March 3, 1992 (Van Buren to Spickard). The United Way Executive Committee "[delegated] to the [Fighting Back] Management Board the policy decision making authority necessary to implement the San Antonio Fighting Back program."[13]

> The San Antonio Fighting Back Management Board will set policy and operating procedures for the project, will hire and evaluate the Project Director, and oversee the day to day operations of the project.[14]

The United Way's accommodation of the Eastside grassroots conferred decision making power to the grassroots. According to the by-laws of the new board, eight of the fifteen board members would be residents of the Eastside.

While PAC's leadership did not entirely control the board or which Eastside residents would in the future be appointed, it had solid representation. Table 5.2 lists the original board members. Leonard Lawrence was elected the first Chair, T.C. Calvert the

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[13]Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Governance and Relationships between United Way of San Antonio & Bexar County and San Antonio Fighting Back, attached to a letter from E.A. to N.P., dated June 3, 1992.

[14]"Clarification of the Roles and Relationships Between the United Way and Fighting Back Governing Boards (June 3, 1992)".

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first Vice Chair, and Sharon Shook the first Secretary. At least three members of PAC's leadership circle served: Calvert (PAC's organizer), Kirven (PAC's grant writer), and Sanders. The board included individuals broadly representative of Eastside grassroots leadership who appeared by their positions capable of brokering Fighting Back's relationship to other grassroots leaders on the Eastside. According to the by-laws, board membership would change over time, but grassroots leaders originally associated with PAC continued to play important roles throughout the time period of my study. Kirven and Sanders were still serving as late as 1995, Sanders as the board's Secretary.

The structure of the SAFB Management Board also consolidated the relationship between Eastside grassroots leadership and the United Way. The Management Board Chair would become an *ex officio* voting member of the United Way's Executive Committee. The United Way Executive Committee would appoint a representative to FB's Management Board. (Red McCombs was appointed as the United Way Executive Committee's representative in 1992 and still served in 1995.)

The United Way would support the FB program in its formative years both through these governance linkages and by continuing "to serve as the fiduciary and fiscally responsible intermediary through which Robert Wood Johnson grant funds flow to the SAFB Management Board" (see footnote 14). The United Way also recognized the autonomy of the FB Management Board. While it was anticipated the FB and United Way governing boards would be able to resolve conflicts, if this were not the case, it was agreed the United Way would no longer serve as the "fiscal and fiduciary intermediary" between FB and the RWJF (see footnote 14).

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Service agency executives were *de facto* excluded from governance, first, because they were not residents of the Eastside and did not serve on the United Way board and second, because their acceptance of contracts disqualified them from serving on the governing board. That few treatment providers and health officials were on the original board was a dramatic change from the original players during the first year of the planning stage and during the implementation grant writing process. Sparks, who helped Van Buren write the implementation proposal, did not appear to have any subsequent role in the program. Guerra, the Director of the Metropolitan Health District and original FB Community Consortium Chair, was no longer involved. The University of Texas Health Sciences Center was represented by both Lawrence and Martinez, but their subsequent participation appeared to be perfunctory. The only professional AOD service provider on the Board was Shook, Executive Director of the San Antonio Council on Alcohol and Drug Abuse (SACADA). I did not find evidence that her influence on the Board was strong. She would resign after accepting contracts from FB. After some perfunctory participation during the planning phase, Brosnan, Director of the Patrician Movement, a provider of treatment in San Antonio, no longer participated. This suggests the accommodation worked out with the grassroots excluded local service providers from decision-making. It is not clear this was intentional at the time; however, grassroots resentment towards service providers came out in interviews, towards SACADA in particular. Informants felt SACADA had previously not deigned to come to the Eastside to serve African Americans, directing its services almost exclusively at the predominantly white suburbs.

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Staffing

Beverly Watts Davis began working with FB as early as April of 1992. She was officially hired as Project Director and a United Way Vice President on May 4, 1992. She had worked in the state capitol, Austin, for Texans' War on Drugs, a program designed to mobilize adult and youth participation in anti-drug efforts. This bought her credibility with the RWJF. She was African American, a native of San Antonio, and the daughter of a military officer. Her race and native daughter status likely gained her some initial legitimacy on the Eastside as did her connection with the local military. The Eastside was home to two large military installations --Fort Sam Houston, home to the U.S. Fifth Army, and Kelly Air Force Base. Both would become important allies in programming for youth, neighborhood cleanups, demolition, and property improvement.

Davis was a neutral candidate in that she was not drawn from the Eastside grassroots or from local social service agencies. She had one important tie, however, to Eastside grassroots. A colleague at Texans' War on Drugs, Arlene Chalkley, was a member of PAC's board. One of Davis's first moves was to hire Chalkley as Deputy Director. She also hired Linda Tippins and T.C. Calvert, both members of PAC's leadership circle, as "Area Coordinators."[15] Other hires --both clerical and senior staff-- were native to the Eastside.

The history of staffing also shows Davis sought to evenly balance the staff with African Americans and Hispanics. In December 1992, the original staff members

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[15]Calvert subsequently resigned his position as Vice Chair of the Management Board.

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included six Hispanic, six African American, and one Anglo Area Coordinator; one Hispanic and one African American Deputy Director; three Hispanic and one African American clerical staff. A 1994 organizational chart showed clerical staff evenly split between three African Americans and three Hispanics. When I conducted field work in 1995, two of the Area Coordinators were African American and two were Hispanic. The Deputy Director was Hispanic, and the clerical staff at the central office appeared predominantly African American.

SAFB's staff were housed in four "Neighborhood Resource Centers" on the Eastside. The Director, her deputy, and others would locate at a property owned by Baptist Temple, home to a large Eastside congregation. African American Area Coordinators would locate at the Barbara Jordan Community Center (2803 East Commerce) and the Ella Austin Community Center (1023 North Pine). The Hispanic Area Coordinators located at the Southeast Neighborhood Resource Center (850 East Drexel).

Program content

In Chapter 3, I suggested that neighborhood improvement activities in the local FB projects would significantly coopt prevention and treatment related programming. This was more true for San Antonio than for any other local FB project. Figure 5.1 shows that 56% of SAFB's programming was devoted to neighborhood improvement while 44%

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was devoted to continuum of care programming.[16]

Figure 5.2 gives a more detailed picture. Hallfors et al defined 18 programmatic strategies in the FB local programs and ranked each according to the strength with which it was implemented (1999). Figure 5.2 ranks the programmatic strategies of SAFB from the one implemented most strongly to the one implemented most weakly.[17] Figure 5.2 also codes the 18 specific strategies according to two general kinds of programming areas --neighborhood improvement and continuum of care.[18] The four strongest program areas were devoted to neighborhood improvement, the darkly shaded bars in Figure 5.2 and

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[16]The percentages in Figure 5.1 are based on the sum of the implementation strength ratings for all 18 strategies (see Figure 5.2, cf. Hallfors et al 1999). I included in the total program content those programming areas which did not reach the threshold for significant implementation strength, 2.7, because a measure of program content which seeks to get at the intentions of the board and staff should include all that SAFB attempted rather than only those strategies at which it succeeded (cf. Figure 5.2, cf. Hallfors et al 1999). When only those strategies which reached the 2.7 threshold for significant implementation strength are included, neighborhood improvement accounts for an even greater amount of SAFB's program content, 68%.

[17]The higher the rating on a scale of one to five, the stronger SAFB's effort in the given area of programming. The ratings were based on budget priorities, staff job descriptions, interviews with the local Project Director and other staff, other evidence of different types of programming activity and its intensity based on recordings of meetings, critical events, services provided, and so on in the MIS data. For a description of the MIS data see Hallfors et al 1997. For a description of the strategies and their ratings see Hallfors et al 1999.

[18]I divided the local FB program content into two general categories: neighborhood improvement and continuum of care. Seven of Hallfors et al's 18 "strategies" fit under my definition of neighborhood improvement, 11 under the continuum of care. Neighborhood improvement had two components: development and control. Under development fell three of Hallfors et al's 18 strategies: community organizing, resources centers, and grants. Four fell under control: community policing, neighborhood cleanups, structured activities for youth, and alcohol outlets. The other eleven strategies fit under the continuum of care, the NPO's umbrella concept for prevention and treatment programming.

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represented in the darkly shaded area of the pie chart in Figure 5.2. One of these four strategies was devoted to control: structured activities for youth. The other three were devoted to development: community organizing, community resource centers, and community grants. Only one neighborhood improvement strategy was not implemented strongly enough to be considered a significant activity by Hallfors et al, control of liquor outlets (1999).[19]

Figure 5.3 shows the average strength of implementation of each neighborhood improvement strategy compared to the average strength for each continuum of care strategy. On average the continuum strategies, at 1.3, did not reach 2.7, the level of significant activity. At 3.1, the neighborhood improvement efforts were above the threshold for significant activity.

In the five years of the FB program's implementation, the most tangible achievements were crackdowns on drug houses and physical improvements. SAFB worked with police, residents, code compliance, neighborhood associations, and the Texas National Guard to develop a process by which over 70 condemned properties, all of which SAFB claims were sites of illicit drug markets, were demolished. The immediate effect was to rid the Eastside of dangerous structures and of the then

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[19]Hallfors et al defined program activity with a rating under 2.7 as not significant because according to their scheme it meant the activity from 1993 to 1996 was only minimally implemented --had a "low budget and staffing commitment," or FB was "an active partner but did not initiate" the activity, or FB initiated the project but it was of "brief duration" (1999:7).

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contemporary sites of drug buying, selling, using, and other illicit activities.[20] A central aspect of SAFB's role was to broker relations between residents and police so that trust was restored enough for residents to cooperate in identifying problem properties.[21]

Area Coordinators Calvert and Tippins were the key organizers for the Eastside CDBG Coalition. This group of neighborhood associations and service organizations worked with District Two and Three city councilmembers to garner a larger share of federal CDBG funding for improvements to the Eastside. In 1995, 1.7 million dollars was garnered for the FB target area. The funding was used for housing, capital improvements (parks, streets, sewers, institutional buildings), services, and neighborhood revitalization. Among the recipients of these funds were the following: at least two neighborhood associations Calvert played a key role in organizing, the Eastside YMCA

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[20]It is not clear that the markets and consumption patterns themselves ceased or were reduced.

[21]Giving credit where credit is due is not a simple matter here. The NPO encouraged SAFB to take credit for these accomplishments; however, these matters were accomplished in conjunction with neighborhood associations and other organizations. I suspect the Area Coordinators played significant roles because of their role in supporting the neighborhood associations, but the coordinators made a point of standing back, putting forward leadership from the indigenous Eastside organizations, primarily the neighborhood associations. Some of this leadership was clearly independent of FB and the coordinators. It is not clear how the neighborhood associations perceived the role of SAFB. On the one hand, they spoke positively of FB to the evaluation researchers (including myself) in 1995. On the other, some of these same organizations disavowed a relationship to SAFB in an organizational survey conducted in 1997. I do not know if this was because there was a falling out between 1995 and 1997 between SAFB and the neighborhood associations or if the individuals we interviewed in 1995 were at that moment willing to help SAFB look good. In short, I find it difficult to state what SAFB's role was in these accomplishments. I do know the Area Coordinators played important roles in developing the neighborhood associations in the implementation period leading up to the fall of 1995.

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which was a longstanding supporter of PAC's community organizing efforts, and the Southwest Community Empowerment Center, a leadership training institute with which PAC and other Eastside leaders were affiliated. In 1996, the Eastside CDBG Coalition was instrumental in bringing another $1.2 million of CDBG funding to the Eastside.

SAFB's six weakest strategies were all related to the continuum of care programming area, the lightly shaded bars in Figure 5.1 and the lightly shaded area in Figure 5.2: youth access to alcohol and tobacco and youth prevention training; early identification and intervention programs directed at legal, health care, and workplace institutions; and treatment for youth. Only three of the eleven continuum of care related strategies were significantly implemented, public awareness, intervention with high risk youth, and treatment services for adults. The NPO strictly enforced the requirement that every local program devote a significant portion of its budget to public awareness. This was probably the least negotiable program item with respect to the RWJF's wishes. Treatment, however, had a somewhat different story that indicates the manner in which SAFB and Eastside organizations understood even treatment services in terms of Eastside development, an opportunity to create jobs, improve a particular neighborhood, and exercise and develop local leadership. Other local programs implemented treatment related services without also using them as development strategies for target area neighborhoods (e.g. Vallejo and Worcester).

The principle initiative under the treatment strategy was SAFB's attempt to bring a new intake and detoxification facility to the Eastside. Community organizers and neighborhood associations cooperated with this effort. The plan was for the new facility

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to create jobs for Eastsiders and re-develop a large, Eastside property as a new institution which Eastside leadership would play a role in governing. Eastside residents received training for certification as AOD counselors which would qualify them for jobs if the new facility was built.[22] The San Antonio City Council granted SAFB $250,000 in 1994 to set up a management information system as the heart of the intake and referral function of the new facility. However, the state alcohol and drug agency, a major funder of the new facility, fell under a cloud of scandal before the funds were released for the facility. The state legislature subsequently cut off the state AOD agency's funding, bringing to a halt the development of the facility. Nevertheless, SAFB's efforts to bring the new detoxification, intake, and referral facility to the Eastside is reflected in the 3.6 rating given its strategy of adult treatment services (Figure 5.2).

Contracts and grants

Another kind of accommodation in a cooptation process is the exchange of material resources. Jobs are one example implicit in the previous section on staffing. Selznick cites another example, contracts (1949:13). Material exchanges are an essential means of stabilizing relations in a given institutional environment. They may function both to solidify relations among allies and to incorporate or stabilize relations with other potentially hostile or conflicting parties in the local institutional environs. In the FB

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[22]The property was cleared and 146 individuals completed training for certificates as chemical dependency counselors (Hallfors et al 1998). Construction had not begun at the time our research ended because the state legislature had frozen funding to the state AOD agency.

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program this operated at two levels --ongoing stabilization of relations between the RWJF and the local programs, ongoing stabilization of relations among local players. SAFB not only brought the resources of the FB grant to bear on this essential project of establishing and developing SAFB in the local institutional environs and in its relationships with the RWJF. The United Way also committed considerable financial resources to the effort.

It is difficult to sort out what cooptive purpose a given contract may have accomplished. It may be better to think of the cooptive aspect of contracts and similar material exchanges as investments in social capital.[23] To the extent a given contract indicated to the National Program Office that SAFB was committed to the RWJF's prevention and treatment program agenda, it was an investment in legitimacy vis-à-vis the RWJF.[24] To the extent the contract was a boon to the recipient, it may have functioned, alternatively, as a preemptive payment for not challenging the public legitimacy of SAFB, an investment in good will, or an IOU obligating the recipient to some unspecified future cooperation. Contractors may have experienced the exchange as one or more of the above depending on its historical relationship with SAFB and the United Way. If service

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[23]The social capital investment implicit in a material exchange of services or goods for payment is hidden, dormant. The exchange may be merely contractual, payment for service. Whether or not it becomes something more depends on the future behavior of one or both of the parties --their reaction to the material exchange as a boon that creates good will, blood money for past wrongs, the incurring of an unspecified IOU. The initiator of the material exchange need not be conscious of it as an investment in social capital in order for it to have an effect as such on the recipient or in order for it to bring a return. Or the initiator may only come to think of it as such at a later date.

[24]I consider legitimacy a form of social capital. It is an important resource from which one party benefits but for which it is dependent on another party. The resource is therefore grounded in a relationship or web of relationships (cf. Burt 1992: 9).

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provider recipients were resentful about being excluded from an important role in governance, they may have been experienced as a payment. If they felt the given contract or grant was too small, the exchange may have actually furthered resentments. If a given contract or grant was especially generous, it may have repaid a debt and incurred an obligation or generated good will. If Eastside grassroots recipients were resentful of the United Way as an elitist institution, small grants they received may have been perceived as an overdue payment. If no previous relationship existed, the grants may simply have created good will towards the United Way.

Table 5.3 lists SAFB's largest subcontractors. Given the history of the contractors' relations with the United Way and SAFB, the cooptive aspect of the exchange with SACADA was potentially both a payment for it being excluded from a central role in decision-making and a boon because of the large dollar amount.[25] The exchange with Ella Austin may have been routine as Ella Austin had received funding from the United Way in the past. Or it may have been a boon. My field work suggests relations between Ella Austin and the United Way, as well as between Ella Austin and SAFB, were positive. The contract and grant from SAFB likely reenforced this. PAC may have felt entitled to the contract and small grant, though its leadership expressed positive feelings about the United Way and SAFB which the exchange likely helped create or reenforce.

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[25]I do not know, however, the history of SACADA's contracting relations with the United Way. If this amount is considerably less than it was used to seeing from the United Way in a given year, it may have had the opposite effect.

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Neighborhood improvement

The FB grant and the United Way contributed resources to both neighborhood improvement and prevention and treatment programming content, to both Eastside grassroots based organizations and to professional service oriented agencies. It was not possible to sort out precisely which resources went to which program agenda; nevertheless, I attempt to do so in order to suggest the cooptive aspects of resource allocation.[26]

The United Way contributed $200,000 for small grants of up to $5,000 to organizations on the Eastside. SAFB received 51 grant applications and the board approved 50 of them. Funds were eventually paid out in 1994 to 40 organizations. Virtually any organized group could qualify for the grants, thus eliminating competition and the sometimes concomitant mistrust between applicant organizations and between applicants and the funder. For the most part grant recipients were neighborhood associations and small service providers. Most of these organizations appeared devoted to neighborhood improvement, including youth and family socialization -- structured activities for youth, organizational development, neighborhood improvement promoting events, and so on. The service organizations above all provided services to local youth. Among the youth service organizations were the Eastside Boys and Girls Club, two community centers, People Against Corruption, churches, a boys choir, the Police Athletic League, and others. Larger contracts above and beyond the $200,000 for mini-

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[26]In fact, my inability to do so mirrors the NPO's inability to do so. I discuss the implications of this below.

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grants were provided to the Ella Austin Community Center for $13,000 and People Against Corruption for $10,000.[27]

The small grant program was further used by organizers to educate and develop Eastside applicant organizations and their staff. An incentive structure was created for organizational development. If an applicant could demonstrate rudiments of formal organization, for example, a board, by-laws, and regular meetings, it qualified for grants of a certain amount. If an applicant was in the process of applying for legal status as a nonprofit, it could qualify for larger grants. The SAFB Area Coordinators helped applicants to develop their boards, by-laws, and write the proposals. Nonprofits qualified for the maximum size grant, $5,000.

The small grant program also created the necessary good will or enlightened motivation for Eastside groups and formal organizations to work with Fighting Back and the United Way, thus dovetailing with the community organizing work of the Area Coordinators. The best example of cooperation was the Eastside CDBG Coalition which included an Eastside federation of neighborhood associations and other nonprofit service providing organizations. The Coalition composed a bloc which was instrumental in bringing nearly three million dollars to the FB target area in federal CDBG funds.[28]

Prevention and treatment

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[27]The contract for PAC was above and beyond what PAC received from the small grant program.

[28]See the previous section, "Program Content," for another account of the Coalition.

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Some of the largest small grants ($5,000) contributed to intervention services with youth and their families, including counseling and referral for AOD treatment. In some instances the recipients were tied to Eastside grassroots leadership or were simply located on the Eastside. In other instances the recipients were non-Eastside organizations, some of which had been involved with planning committees before grassroots leadership secured their central role in decision-making. Among the grantees were the Patrician Movement, the Family Service Association, the Ella Austin Community Center Youth Intervention Program,[29] and Victory Outreach. The United Way also offered fees of up to $38,000 in total to the Patrician Movement and Victory Outreach for treating Eastside residents referred to them. Between 1994 and 1997, the United Way contracted with the San Antonio Council on Alcohol and Drug Abuse (SACADA) for $195,000 to provide prevention education, counseling and referral out of one of the neighborhood resource centers, and the necessary training and education for 146 individuals, many of them Eastside residents, to become licensed AOD counselors.

Resource allocation and program legitimacy

The United Way made major contributions other than the $200,000 for SAFB's small grant program. In the second year of implementation (1993-1994), the United Way paid the salaries of the Area Coordinators. The United Way would also supplement what RWJF funds were used to pay staff, including the Area Coordinators, clerical and

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[29]This small grant was separate from the contract Ella Austin received for neighborhood improvement related programming.

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executive staff. The United Way contributed funding for ongoing services at the neighborhood resource centers at a rate of approximately $150,000 a year.[30]

The FB grant was used primarily to pay SAFB's staff. The staff was large compared to the local FB staffs in other cities. The NPO's budget officer told me this made it much more difficult for her to know whether or not SAFB was actually following the RWJF's mandate for programming content --improving the local "system" of prevention and treatment to the end of reducing the demand for AOD. She found the job descriptions for the Area Coordinators vague and was uncomfortable with her inability to know just what they were doing and to enforce accountability to the RWJF's program agenda.

For SAFB's part, however, using the FB grant to pay staff enabled it to adapt to the Eastside grassroots bloc that had gained considerable influence over SAFB and which granted FB legitimacy on the Eastside. Using the FB grant for payroll enabled SAFB to legitimize a major expenditure without having to clearly account for the extent to which staff devoted themselves to neighborhood improvement or improving prevention and treatment. Job descriptions, however well intended, are often inaccurate and therefore a poor instrument for staff accountability to a given program agenda.

Contracts, an alternative form of resource allocation, give precise, legally enforceable accounts of what will be done in exchange for funds. In contrast to SAFB, Vallejo FB distributed its funds primarily in the form of contracts. The NPO's budget

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[30]This figure is based on SAFB's budget, not their expenditures. I do not know how much of these funds were spent for each of the five years of FB's implementation.

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officer liked this because she knew exactly what the RWJF was getting for its money, as spelled out in the contracts for service. Given the local relationships to which SAFB had committed itself in order to survive, SAFB could not rely on service contracts to the extent Vallejo Fighting Back did. PAC was not experienced or large enough to administrate large contracts. It was also not clear that PAC's leadership wished it to become such an organization. Its principle agenda was to develop the Eastside organizationally. To do so, it needed community organizers, staffing, and other supports. Creating a large staff of local organizers enabled grassroots leadership to carry out this organizing agenda through SAFB. SAFB was then also able to present itself and its staff to the NPO as committed to the "demand reduction" strategy of prevention and treatment, to which it was in part also genuinely committed.[31]

Small grant programs were also a thorn in the RWJF and NPO financial officers' sides in their efforts to make sure the RWJF was getting what it wanted for its money. To some extent small grant programs were perceived as a way of purchasing grassroots' "buy-in," support of the given local FB program. SAFB avoided this touchy issue with the RWJF and NPO financial officers by using United Way funds rather than RWJF funds. Some of the other local FB programs which ran small grant projects used other sources of funds as well. Vallejo FB, for example, used its Community Partnership program grant from the Center for Substance Abuse Prevention rather than the FB grant.

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[31]As I suggested earlier, I do not know whether this conflict in the program agenda was experienced at a conscious level within the FB organization. The tension was clearly evident with the NPO's financial officer who was responsible for approving SAFB's budgets.

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The other local FB programs also tended to reserve FB grant funds for payroll and contracts for services clearly related to improving AOD services.

Conclusion

The implementation of FB in San Antonio triggered a cooptation process which fundamentally shaped the character of SAFB and its local actions: the structure of decision-making and who was able to participate in decision-making, the structure of resource allocation and who shared in resources generated by the program, the structure of and content of programming and whose wishes that content expressed. The specifics of these developments reflected FB administrators' adjustments to the necessities of establishing the program's public legitimacy on San Antonio's Eastside and adjusting to powers, both in San Antonio and in Princeton, New Jersey (the RWJF's headquarters), with a stake in the program's development.

In the course of this process the San Antonio grassroots were revealed as an organized force to be reckoned with. They were lent legitimacy by the NPO which was persuaded of their influence on the Eastside and their credibility as allies of the local program. The United Way was revealed as flexible, willing to share decision-making powers and considerable material resources in order to advance its presence on the Eastside and its connection with the Eastside's African American leadership.

These outcomes were made possible by the social organization of administration and of the grassroots on the Eastside. The implementation of FB in turn, as an enactment of administration, played a role in the construction of community organization on San

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Antonio's Eastside. These social organizational aspects of local communities will be further explored in Chapter 8. I first turn to the Vallejo story of FB's implementation, beginning with the local organization of administration and grassroots in Vallejo.

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Table 5.1. Participants in the Conflict Between PAC and the United Way, 1989-1992.

INDIVIDUAL	ORGANIZATION	NOTES ON ROLE IN FB
Howard Nolan	Executive Officer, United Way.	Not involved in day-to-day operations but when crises arose was a decision maker.
Dick Alvarado	Vice President, United Way.	Program Director, Fighting Back. Departed April, 1991. Grassroots Executive Committee members complained of his lack of leadership in 1990 and 1991.
Dolph Brisco	Brisco Enterprises; former Governor of Texas	Chairman of the Executive Committee.
T.C. Calvert	Project Officer, Eastside Economic Development Council	(Also Vice Chairman, Board of Management, YMCA of San Antonio, Alamo Branch; Organizer, People Against Corruption.) Fighting Back Executive Committee member. First Fighting Back Management Board Vice Chair. Wrote letter critical of Alvarado's leadership. Eventually hired as Neighborhood Coordinator on Fighting Back staff from 1992 on.
Greg Dixon	Deputy Director, FB National Program Office	Located at Vanderbilt University Medical School in Nashville, TN. Principal operations person at the NPO.
Fernando Guerra	Executive Director, Metropolitan Health District	Chair, Community Consortium
Paul Jellinek	Senior Program Officer, Robert Wood Johnson Fdtn.	Later became Senior Vice President at RWJF. Principal author and advocate of the FB program at the RWJF.

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Table 5.1 (continued).

INDIVIDUAL	ORGANIZATION	NOTES ON ROLE IN FB
Leonard Lawrence, MD	Dean of Students, University of Texas, Health Sciences Center.	Vice Chairman of the Executive Committee. Active counterpart to former Governor Brisco's "figurehead" role. "Brought in to counter Myrick" in late 1990. "Impressed" NPO Director Spickard. Grassroots cited him as "heavy-handed" in hiring of Van Buren as Program Director in April, 1991. First Fighting Back Management Board Chair.
Nan Littlefield	United Way.	Planning Associate, Fighting Back, Neighborhood Organizations. Sided with Myrick in the challenge to Alvarado's leadership and to Lawrence's "heavy-handed" hiring of Van Buren.
James Myrick	Attorney.	Executive Committee member and Coordinating Chair (of the sub-committees). Chair, Neighborhood Organizations Committee. Questioned Alvarado's leadership in late 1990. Proposed vote of no-confidence on hiring process Fighting Back Program Director (April 17, 1991).
Sharon Shook	Executive Director, S.A. Council on Alcohol & Drug Abuse.	Executive Committee member. Chaired Fighting Back Community Consortium. Elected the Fighting Back Management Board's first Secretary. Her agency was funded by United Way and received an Fighting Back subcontract of $75,000.
John Sparks, M.D.	Director of treatment at the county jail.	Collaborated closely with Van Buren in writing the implementation grant.
Anderson Spickard, M.D.	Executive Director, FB National Program Office	Faculty at Vanderbilt University Medical School, Nashville, TN.

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Table 5.1 (continued)

INDIVIDUAL	ORGANIZATION	NOTES ON ROLE IN FB
Toni Van Buren	United Way.	Planning Associate, Fighting Back, Treatment (1989-1991); Program Director (1991-1992), Fighting Back."Impressed" NPO Director Spickard. Replaced Alvarado as project director in April 1991. Fighting Back grant writer.
Lillie Wilson	President, People Against Corruption.	Executive Committee member. Wrote letter critical of Alvarado's leadership.

Table 5.2. Original SAFB Board Officers and Members, 1992

INDIVIDUAL	ORGANIZATION
Leonard Lawrence, MD	Chair[32] Dean, University of Texas, Health Sciences Center
T.C. Calvert	Vice Chair Eastside resident Project Officer, Eastside Economic Development Council
Sharon Shook	Secretary Exec. Dir., S.A. Council on Alcohol & Drug Abuse
Red McCombs	represented the United Way Executive Board McCombs Inc.
Martha Alsbrooks	Eastside resident
Maria Rendon Beltran	Eastside resident
Nancy Bowman	Eastside resident
Maria del Rosario Gonzalez	
Polly Kirven	Eastside resident PAC grant writer
Cervando Martinez, M.D.	University of Texas, Health Sciences Center
Warith Muhammad	Eastside resident
Al Notzon	
Victor Rodriguez, Ph.D.	Eastside resident
Diana Rumfield	Eastside resident

[32]The three officers were elected during the March 24, 1992 board meeting. No Treasurer is mentioned.

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Table 5.2 (continued)

INDIVIDUAL	ORGANIZATION
John Sanders	Eastside resident supporter of PAC Chair, Ella Austin Community Center Board (later appointed Eastside repr. on county water board)

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Table 5.3. Largest SAFB Subcontracts and Fee Recipients.[33]

CONTRACTOR	PROGRAM CONTENT	AMOUNT
San Antonio Council on Alcohol and Drug Abuse (SACADA)	Continuum of Care (prevention, identification and referral, intervention, out-patient treatment)	~$195,000
AIDS Resource Center	Neighborhood Improvement / Continuum of Care (building renovation)	~ 30,000
Patrician Movement	Continuum of Care (treatment)	~ 24,000
Benedictine Resource Center	Continuum of Care (intervention)	~ 20,000
Victory Outreach	Continuum of Care (treatment)	~ 19,000
Ella Austin Community Center	Continuum of Care (intervention) Neighborhood Improvement (in support of human development: day-care for working and school-attending parents)	~ 5,000 ~ 13,000
People Against Corruption	Neighborhood Improvement (youth development, structured activities)	~ 15,000
Springview Boys & Girls Club	Neighborhood Improvement (org development, youth development)	~ 5,000
Family Service Association	Continuum of Care	~ 5,000
Project ASSIST	Neighborhood Improvement (youth development)	~ 5,000

[33]The figures are usually from budgets, not expenditures. I was unable to determine whether the contract or fees were consummated or paid.

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Figure 5.1. San Antonio Fighting Back Program Content: Percent by General Strategy.



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Figure 5.2. San Antonio Fighting Back: Strength of Specific Strategies.



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Figure 5.3. San Antonio Fighting Back: Average Strength of Each Specific Strategy by General Strategy.



Chapter 6

Drugs Problems and Social Divisions in Vallejo

This chapter introduces the context which shaped the development of Vallejo Fighting Back (VFB) and in the process begins the story of cooptation in Vallejo that is continued in the next chapter. This chapter has two theses. First, unlike in San Antonio and other FB cities, the establishment of the FB program in Vallejo became a part of the official construction of the AOD problem as drug abuse rather than as crime in neighborhoods. Second, social divisions in Vallejo were organized in a manner that made it difficult to legitimate the local program to a broad base of local players. Some neighborhood based organizations were hostile towards city hall, the administrative agency for FB. Neighborhood organizations also conflicted with one another. Other divisions were generated by competition for funding among minority-based organizations and others. These cleavages would make it easy for FB's original administrators to control decision-making but difficult for them to achieve legitimacy with minority grassroots.

The chapter is divided into three parts. I first describe the city of Vallejo, the drug-related problems in its neighborhoods during the 1980s, and the citizen groups that organized in response to them. Second, I show how the establishment of VFB became a part of the construction of local crime and violence problems as drug abuse. Finally, I describe the local social divisions which became manifest during VFB's implementation and which threatened VFB's legitimacy. This threat in turn triggered the cooptation

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process discussed more fully in the next chapter.

Before beginning the body of the chapter, a crucial point about VFB's setting must be made. The Vallejo setting was constituted differently from the San Antonio setting in two important ways. First, VFB officially targeted the entire municipality of Vallejo --all its neighborhoods and populace-- rather than a particular population within the city and its neighborhoods as did SAFB. VFB was therefore more open, potentially and actually, to more diverse participation than was SAFB. Had SAFB targeted all of San Antonio, it may also have undergone a more complicated cooptation process.[1]

Second, and also in contrast to San Antonio, the applicant and administrative agency for FB in Vallejo was a governmental agency, the city manager's office. This politicized the program from the start in a different way from how FB was politicized in San Antonio. The location of VFB in city hall invoked certain expectations on the part of potential participants. Community groups and organizations would engaged VFB as they did other forms of local public resource distribution. CDBG fund distribution is a good example. In both San Antonio and Vallejo, CDBG distribution programs posited a pie of resources to be divided among diverse, competing constituencies rather than a project planned by consensus, the proposed method of FB's implementation. Community groups and organizations therefore tended to engage VFB as competing interest groups. As the most experienced politically of Vallejo's minorities, African American leaders and

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[1]Of course, this is not a pre-determined outcome. In fact, there appeared to be precedent for intra- and inter-ethnic coalitions in San Antonio that did not exist in Vallejo.

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organizations were perhaps most inclined to engage VFB in this manner.

The location of VFB in city hall also constrained how program leadership would treat participants. SAFB was able to favor a particular group, a set of African American organizations on the Eastside, which it focused on developing. Other potentially competing groups on the Eastside appeared to accept this as an appropriate choice by the United Way, an independent agency. VFB would in fact favor recovering and treatment organizations, which it justified by appealing to the funding source and AOD aspect of the FB program idea. However, with respect to citizen groups generally, VFB would have to appear not to play favorites. As a program within city hall, VFB was not an independent agency but represented the entire community, the center of the local polity. It was therefore faced with the inherent contradiction of having to legitimate itself as serving the entire community while also being most strongly influenced by, and therefore also serving, a particular dominant group or coalition.

These institutional factors in the development of VFB will be explored again in Chapter 8. Their influence, however, will be evident in the narratives of both this chapter and the next.

1. Vallejo, California

Geography and economy

VFB targeted all of Vallejo, a city of 28 square miles lying on the north end of San Francisco Bay. Vallejo lies on Interstate 80, 32 miles north of San Francisco and 65 miles west of Sacramento, the state capitol. Since the nineteenth century, the city had

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been a support community to naval operations at Mare Island. Vallejo's Filipino population dated back to this era when Filipinos were brought in to work the lowest paying jobs on sea-going vessels and in the shipyards. During World War II, Mare Island became one of the largest ship construction and repair facilities in the world. Navy personnel and civilian workers moved to Vallejo from all over the U.S., including African Americans from the South. Many remained after the war. During the 1980s, the shipyards employed engineers and high wage laborers primarily to repair nuclear powered submarines.

In March 1993, the Department of Defense announced that Mare Island Naval Shipyard would close. At the time, the shipyards employed over 2,500 residents, many of whom have since left the city. The closing had a ripple effect on businesses supporting both the shipyards and the workers.

Aside from the school district and Mare Island, the largest employers in Vallejo were Marine World Africa USA, and Kaiser Permanente. A tourist attraction, Marine World Africa USA employed 1,200 people during peak season in the early 1990s. At the time of FB's implementation, Kaiser Permanente was the second largest health maintenance organization in the U.S. By the 1980s, Vallejo had become an affordable bedroom community to the larger Bay Area cities and new housing developments had popped up within and on the periphery of the city limits.

Demography

In 1990, of Vallejo's 109,199 residents, 52% were white, 22% Asian, 20% black,

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and 10% Hispanic[2]. Almost 18% of the population was foreign-born, most of whom came from Spanish-speaking American countries and the Philippines. White residents described themselves as predominantly of German, Irish, or English ancestry. The Asian population was primarily Filipino (81%) and the Latino population predominantly Mexican (57%). Between 1980 and 1990, the city's population grew by 36%, with significant shifts in the ethnic and racial composition. In 1980 whites made up over 63% of the population but by 1990 composed only 52% of Vallejo's population.

Vallejo was more affluent than the other Fighting Back sites.[3] The average household income in 1990 was $40,750, approximately $40,300 for whites and $35,400 for blacks (U.S. Census 1990).[4] Asian income was higher still, though that of recent immigrants was significantly lower. Approximately 7% of families with children were below the poverty level, the lowest poverty rate for all Fighting Back sites.

Politics

From 1985 through 1987, the local Democratic Club supported a number of successful candidates for county and municipal office. Two of those elected became important to VFB's story. Councilmember Cynthia Kay would become known as the "mother" of VFB. She rallied the political and financial support for the application, and

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[2]Figures total more than 100% because Hispanics may be of any race.

[3]Except Santa Barbara. See Table 3.3.

[4]Santa Barbara, Washington, and Charlotte were the only other sites with a mean household income exceeding $40,000. See Table 3.3.

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troubleshot as parties conflicted over leadership and program content. Mayor Anthony Intintolli, a former high school history teacher, lent official legitimacy to FB, signing the planning and implementation grant applications from the City of Vallejo and enthusiastically receiving RWJF visitors. Jack Hanstein, Director of the Solano County Drug and Alcohol Agency, which distributed state monies for local services, played a crucial behind-the-scenes role, providing both his own and the expertise of others in developing the proposal and integrating FB plans with those of the county agency.

These local political elites, along with support from activist Twelve Step members, would succeed in not letting the neighborhood crime problem exclusively define the local AOD problem. They mobilized the founding of a large civic group that would legitimate the AOD problem as drug abuse at its roots, calling for the prevention and treatment solutions the RWJF was also advocating. Nevertheless, crime in neighborhoods would remain a central public problem which they would also have to address in order to legitimate their policies and the FB program.

Neighborhoods, drugs and crime

In the mid- and late 1980s, drug-related crime and violence became a major concern. Neighborhood associations became a vehicle for residents to pressure city hall to address the problem. They sought to draw VFB into their agenda for addressing crime, with some success as the next chapter will show. Initially, however, their relationship with VFB was ambivalent. Some neighborhood associations would only support the city's FB grant application after the program leadership conceded to targeting certain

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neighborhoods. Some later felt betrayed when a neighborhood focus did not emerge as VFB's priority.

Descriptions of parts of downtown and North Vallejo give a flavor of Vallejo's diverse neighborhoods and the drug and crime problems residents were experiencing. The areas I describe had a disproportionate share of the city's crime and the bulk of housing and other poverty-related problems.

Downtown

Washington Park, a neighborhood in the downtown area, was 22% black, 9% Asian, 12% Latino, and 50% white (Vallejo Fighting Back [VFB] Implementation Proposal 1991). The housing stock was a mixture of apartments, small pre-war bungalows, and large Victorians. Filipinos and Latinos attended St. Vincent Catholic Church and African Americans Good Samaritan Baptist and First Baptist. Two neighborhood associations were active, St. Vincent Hill and Washington Park. The Washington Park Neighborhood Association's (WPNA) members were a combination of long time residents and gentrifiers who started renovating Victorians and bungalows in the 1980s.

WPNA had originally organized in the late 1970s to drive dealers and prostitutes out of the neighborhood park. They re-surged in the late 1980s to drive a youth gang out of the park which had been selling crack and other drugs. When we interviewed a group of members, they were addressing a variety of AOD control issues in their neighborhood. With respect to AOD, they had persuaded a gas station and the local Seven Eleven store

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to stop selling alcoholic beverages and prevented a store on the nearby commercial strip from acquiring a liquor license.[5] One member described the problem with the liquor stores.

> The stores around here - I don't know. They sell cheap liquor. They are booze stores. They sell Firebird, Ripple, and all those.[6] Then they sell candy and junk for the kids. We don't have anything like that [where I come from]. We had liquor stores and they sold beer in some grocery stores, but I had never seen anything like this. It is just so common out here now.

Residents also described a drug dealing problem which had recently developed.

> The problem started when those renters moved in about two or three months ago. I live about two blocks down and we had a stabbing, a murder. There was a lot of stuff going on up to the murder. The way drugs work here, they usually have three houses in an area, one place where the drugs are at and two other houses for some other kind of dynamics. So it was the green house, the gray house across the street, and then right around the corner on Setter and Ohio. The top floor of the green house was where the prostitutes were working and the bottom floor was

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[5]According to California State law, beer and wine may be sold in gas stations, grocery and convenience stores, though a license is required.

[6]These were cheap wines, beers, and other products fortified with alcohol which pander to poor people, especially alcoholics and youth.

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where the drugs were coming out.

WPNA members cited other problems as well.

> We have had problems with lots of others. They have done things, annoyance things -- left their children two and five years old in the park without any adult supervision So I called child welfare. I asked them to turn down the loud obscene rap music and asked them not to throw bark at the other kids in the park.[7]

The residents attacked these problems on a number of levels. WPNA had succeeded in getting the area "down-zoned." This reduced the density of the area's population by reducing the number of residential units allowed in a given area. They closely monitored activities near their properties and in the local park. They had convinced the city council to install speed bumps.[8] They had participated in persuading the city to pass a zoning law disallowing new liquor licenses within a certain distance of

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[7]It was not simple to determine whether or not WPNA members' identified African Americans as the source of their neighborhood problems. There were African American members in WPNA, one of whom attended the group interview. White members said the problem was more "economic" than it was racial. In other words it was poor people that were the problem. I suspect they meant people who did not share their norms for behavior --people who played their music too loud, hit their children, did not keep up their yards or buildings, and so on. In the group interview, WPNA members spoke of white and Hispanic neighbors who had also caused problems.

[8]The reason for the speed bumps became apparent during the interview. As we were talking, a loud, speeding car roared past. The members discussed whether to call the police and decided to wait and see whether the car drove by again.

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each other, of churches, and of schools. They worked with the police, code enforcement, and other city offices to address the drug house problem.

North Vallejo

In contrast to downtown, housing in North Vallejo was in suburban-like subdivisions. Expensive housing developments were underway in the 1990s, catering to a Bay Area commuter clientele. The new neighborhoods evoked affluence and had fewer visible crime and drug problems. Marine World was located in North Vallejo. Nearby motels and shopping malls had recently been built.

Ironically, North Vallejo's most crime-ridden neighborhood was called "Country Club Crest." It was an older section of North Vallejo with active gangs and higher numbers of violent incidents, drug trafficking, and domestic disturbances. The Crest was "hyper-segregated," 91% black.[9] Originally developed in the 1950s, it was one of the few developments at the time that would sell to African Americans. A home in the Crest could be purchased for a small down-payment and credit was available. According to older residents, the more stable and better-off African Americans moved out in the 1970s and 1980s when other housing became available. Many of the Crest's houses were subsequently converted into rentals and a low-income population grew.

A resident of the Crest neighborhood described a street near where he lived in the 1980s as full of dealers both night and day. Another described a violent incident in a drug

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[9]See Massey and Denton for a technical description of hyper-segregation (1993: 74).

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house near his home that had happened in summer of 1995. "The house across the street from me is a crack house. It goes from arguments to shootings. We had a shooting just last Sunday. The dispute was over money." A local professional claimed the Crest provided the city with more of its dropouts and the county jail with more of its young male offenders than any other neighborhood. A police lieutenant agreed that crack dealing was concentrated in the Crest and that drug dealing gangs had been a problem.

A number of neighborhood associations were active in the Crest, including Country Club Crest Improvement Association (CCCIA) and Concerned Citizens of Country Club Crest. The Continentals of Omega Boys and Girls Club and CCCIA were the primary service providing organizations.

Unlike the WPNA, however, CCCIA was in a polarized relationship with city hall. CCCIA's leading members had a history of grievances against the city. In the 1950s, when African Americans first moved into the Crest, the city refused to incorporate the area which thrust the fledgling development on its own resources for basic services --fire, water, police, sewers, streets, and so on. This exclusion, and a subsequent history of uneven residential and commercial development, had continued into more recent times. The construction of Marine World in the 1980s angered some Crest residents. They saw the city willing to pour resources into the new development by providing tax breaks and infra-structural support to developers while doing little about the deterioration of black neighborhoods in North Vallejo. One resident had sued the mayor, charging the conflict with personal animosities.

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Dimes Against Crime

Neighborhood associations were not the only ones concerned about crime. Dimes Against Crime was founded in 1987 in reaction to the effect of public inebriates and drug users on downtown businesses. A founding member recalled, "A number of us said, 'Enough. We're not going to take it anymore.'" A downtown clothing store owner and an insurance agency owner assembled a group of concerned, prominent citizens and officials to discuss drug-related crime. Also among the founding members of the group were Councilmember Cynthia Kay, a local police sergeant, a PTA member, the school district's community liaison officer, and the museum Director and Vice President for Fund-Raising at the United Way. Most of these individuals would go on to play roles in Fighting Back.

2. Constructing Local Alcohol and Drug Problems

Protagonists

Around the time that Dimes Against Crime was founded, a campaign took shape which constructed the local AOD problem as rooted in drug abuse. The protagonists in this campaign were Councilmember Kay and Jack Hanstein, Director of the Solano County Drug and Alcohol Agency (SCDAA). Supporting players were activist members of a strong Alcoholics Anonymous chapter in Vallejo, other elected officials, and agency professionals in both city hall and the county. They were committed to treating AOD problems as individual abuse of and dependence on AOD. Adherents of the Twelve Steps were ideologically committed to some specific ideas about treatment. The

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unorganized antagonists in this campaign were those who saw the local AOD problem as primarily a crime problem, especially neighborhood association leadership and others who did not see public commitment to AOD treatment as a priority. The protagonists mobilized citizens and media in support of the idea that drug abuse causes crime and other problems, which preempted the idea that drug dealing and related crimes alone were the problem. This would legitimate VFB's policies to increase treatment and aftercare services and deflect some pressure for FB to address the neighborhood disorder related to AOD.[10]

In 1987, Jack Hanstein contacted Councilmember Kay about the future of AOD services in Vallejo. Hanstein's agency allocated state funding for AOD services in Solano County. At the time, "Solano County rank[ed] as one of the most underfunded counties in California [in terms of] federal and state funding devoted to drug prevention and treatment."[11] Hanstein knew, however, that state legislators expected to make up past funding disparities. He was planning for a windfall of state funding for AOD services in Solano County. He considered Vallejo the city in the county most afflicted by AOD problems and was looking for local political and citizen support for a plan to provide

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[10]VFB appeared to be the "favorite child" of the RWJF's NPO in part because it accomplished better than any other local program what the RWJF sought to accomplish nationally. VFB, its sponsors, and supporting citizens whom the NPO saw as legitimate "grassroots" representatives, framed the AOD problem (including local AOD policy) around the idea that individual dependence on and misuse of AOD was the root of the problem. The most obvious solution therefore appeared to be preventing and treating dependence and misuse.

[11]From Hanstein's letter of support for the City of Vallejo's FB implementation grant application, addressed to Council member Kay, August 30, 1989).

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services in Vallejo.

Vallejo citizens had mobilized in the past around the re-organization of AOD services at the county agency. Before 1982, most services for alcoholics in Solano County were provided by the county detoxification center and other programs in Fairfield, the county seat. By 1989, the Southern Solano Alcoholism Council (SSAC) was garnering 46% of the county's dollars for alcohol services (VFB Planning Proposal 1989). SSAC was created in 1981 by a group of advocates for change within the service delivery system. Core members of this group were from a strong chapter of Alcoholics Anonymous in Vallejo. Some time after SSAC was established, two Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) members from Vallejo were recruited to serve on Solano County's Citizen Advisory Board for Alcohol. The county's Alcohol and Drug Advisory Boards were charged to develop funding policies and components of the Solano County Drug and Alcohol programs and to advise the Solano County Board of Supervisors, the elected body with authority over the county health and human service agencies (VFB Planning Proposal 1989: 7). Members of the advisory boards and Solano County Drug and Alcohol Agency (SCDAA) provided leadership in mobilizing citizen action against substance abuse, in applying for the Fighting Back grant, and for the project's subsequent development.

Although the NPO would express concern in 1990 about the lack of "grassroots" participation by persons recovering from personal alcohol and drug dependency, a Steering Committee member estimated that 20% of the committee's membership was "in

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recovery." Some members of the "recovering community,"[12] especially the oldest generation of Alcoholics Anonymous members, were at times a thorn in the side of AOD professionals. On the one hand they were a valuable resource, providing legitimacy to the SCDAA, to Red Ribbon, and VFB as a "grassroots" constituency, lay citizens affected by and knowledgeable about chemical dependency.[13] Members of this Twelve Step group from Vallejo also possessed considerable political experience, having advocated many years for change in policies related to AOD and other issues at the local, county and state levels. This group also generated some of Fighting Back's early controversies. In deliberations about the Steering Committee's by-laws, recovering persons raised the issue of whether alcohol should be served at fund-raising events. It was agreed that Fighting Back would not serve alcohol. Disagreement also arose over acceptable modes of treatment. Some influential older Alcoholics Anonymous members adamantly opposed the use of medications in the treatment of chemical dependents, including methadone and the use of anti-depressants and other drugs for chemical dependents with multiple diagnoses. There was also disagreement between those advocating a social model, emphasizing Alcoholics Anonymous, and professionals who emphasized ongoing counseling and treatment. The views of Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous members were not always incompatible with the views of treatment professionals, but when they opposed a program idea they appeared to prevail.

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[12]"Recovery people" or "recovering community" were native terms for adherents to the Twelve Step program for Alcoholics Anonymous, Narcotics Anonymous, and so on.

[13]Red Ribbon is described in the next section.

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Red Ribbon

In 1987, Hanstein and Dimes Against Crime founded a Red Ribbon chapter in Vallejo. According to another founding member, Red Ribbon was based on the notion that "drug abuse causes the increases in crime and violence that a lot of communities are experiencing." This was the key idea which would frame the emerging policy agenda. It did not presume crime was not a problem but claimed the root of the crisis of crime and violence in Vallejo was the drug use of the perpetrators. The answer was therefore not only fighting crime but also treating individuals who had AOD problems.

Red Ribbon grew out of a Community Action Forum on KPIX Channel 5 organized by the City of Vallejo, Dimes Against Crime, and others. More than 450 people attended the forum where illicit drugs were identified as the principal concern. Red Ribbon subsequently undertook addressing the concerns raised in the Community Action Forum (VFB Implementation Proposal 1991). The goal of Red Ribbon was "to reduce alcohol and drug abuse through programs for education, intervention, treatment, and aftercare" (VFB Planning Proposal 1989). To achieve this, Red Ribbon committed itself to increasing public awareness of the detrimental effects of alcohol and drugs on the local economy and the city's quality of life and to "involving local residents in the struggle against drug and alcohol abuse" (VFB Planning Proposal 1989).

Red Ribbon was composed of church representatives, city officials, education and criminal justice professionals, health care providers, parents, members of youth and minority groups, neighborhood and community organizations, and labor unions. Among Red Ribbon's members were the key players engaged in efforts to combat substance

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abuse and drug-related crime: members of Dimes Against Crime, the head of the county drug agency, "recovering" citizens, other members of the Solano County Alcohol and Drug Advisory Boards, neighborhood association representatives, and city officials.

Red Ribbon held its first major event in September 1987. The objective of "Battle Plan 1988," the first "Community Conference" in Vallejo, was to determine what action to take and how best to proceed. Following the conference, more than 100 participants organized themselves into small groups. These groups would later evolve into the Fighting Back Community Consortium, the implementing body mandated by the RWJF.

In the summer of 1988, Red Ribbon, Councilmember Kay, Hanstein, and others campaigned for a county referendum that would increase the local sales tax by half a cent in order to raise revenue for Solano County's "war on drugs." Although the referendum was voted down, the group gained experience working together to affect public policy. Collaborators in the initiative included Vallejo city councilmembers and members of the Solano County Board of Supervisors.[14]

By 1989, Red Ribbon consisted of more than 60 citizens. The organization held the Community Action Conference in January 1989 to develop a community plan to address alcohol and drug problems. The goals of the resulting Community Action Plan were to promote clear and consistent community values, healthier social and family relationships for children and teens, a greater sense of community, and a system of evaluation and accountability. Strategies included involving local decision-makers in issues of policy and funding; support and expansion of prevention, public-awareness

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[14]J.H. letter to C.K., August 30, 1989; VFB Implementation Proposal, 1991.

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activities, and substance abuse services; promotion of aftercare support groups such as Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous; needs assessment; and evaluation of activities. In the plan, Red Ribbon specifically called for the city to allocate $60,000 for a grant writer and $5,000 for Red Ribbon activities.

The city's positive response to this request brought impressive results within the year. Through the efforts of Red Ribbon, Youth and Family Services, Catholic Social Services, the city's grant writer, and the county drug agency, the city secured a substance abuse-related demonstration grant from the federal government's Office of Substance Abuse Prevention. The Center for Substance Abuse Prevention (CSAP) grant, named "The Downtown High Risk Youth Project," was received before the RWJF planning grant was awarded and targeted school-age youth for prevention and intervention. The project focused on the downtown area and provided family-oriented, neighborhood-based services through the formal network of city services and also provided less formal networks of social care such as those within neighborhood church congregations. Table 6.1 lists the external grants acquired through the efforts of the city's grant writer, the Red Ribbon initiative, and cooperating agencies.

Fighting Back planning grant

The City of Vallejo applied for the FB planning grant in August of 1989. The application was a continuation of the legitimating process generated by the formation of Red Ribbon. Councilmember Kay brought the "Call for Proposals" (RWJF 1989a) to the attention of others in the spring of 1989. Shortly thereafter, Councilmember Kay, the

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city's grant writer, then-President of the Vallejo School Board Henry Elliot, and Police Sergeant Tony Pearsall traveled to the Fighting Back National Program Office (NPO) in Nashville, Tennessee, to attend the applicants' workshop. Those who appeared to most influence the proposal content were Councilmember Kay; Jack Hanstein; Billie Middleton, Director of Youth and Family Services; Helen Wardlaw, the school district's liaison to the community; Maureen Henry, the city's grant writer; Jane Callahan, a county employee who would become the Fighting Back Project Director; Sergeant Pearsall; Sally Woodard; and Ann Grant.

Governance: Officialdom with citizen support

Decision-making bodies were designated by city government. The city council approved all members of the initial FB Steering Committee, many of whom were municipal and county government officials. Two members of the original committee were members of the city council. Other committee members were selected from the leadership of Red Ribbon. Representatives from city agencies included the Chief of Police and a representative of the Vallejo City Unified School District; representatives from county government included the probation and health departments. Initially, the Steering Committee reported to the Mayor's Roundtable, an advisory body to the mayor consisting of city councilmembers, local and area business, professional, and agency elites. In 1991, the Steering Committee assumed a greater role in decision-making. Its decisions and objectives were still officially reviewed by the city manager.

The FB Executive Committee consisted of members from Red Ribbon and the

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Steering Committee and was ultimately charged with "implementing the plan and making necessary adjustments" (VFB Implementation Proposal 1991) It also developed plans and meeting agendas and was the transfer node for information among the relevant bodies. Its membership expanded from four people at the beginning of the planning phase --including Sally Woodard, Councilmember Kay, and Helen Wardlaw --to eight people when the implementation grant application was written.

As "the driving force behind efforts to unite the community against drug and alcohol abuse," Red Ribbon was designated as the "oversight entity for Fighting Back" (VFB Planning Proposal 1989: 3, 7). It would stand in as the citizen governing body mandated by the RWJF. In Fighting Back's first quarterly report, the Red Ribbon Committee was described as the "political arm" of the project. It was assigned the task of implementing the Community Action Plan established at the open community meetings in September 1988. It was also to develop Fighting Back program objectives, oversee development of the city's master plan for service delivery, and evaluate implementation progress.

The VFB Community Consortium, the collection of implementing agencies and groups also mandated by the RWJF, grew out of the focus groups created at the September 1988 Community Action Plan Conference. The seven groups organized themselves according to members' interest in schools, youth, health, neighborhood, ministry, public relations, business, and services. They were charged with (1) identifying substance abuse needs, resources, and gaps in resources, (2) assisting Red Ribbon with implementing the Community Action Plan, (3) establishing additional program activities

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and time frames to meet Fighting Back objectives, and (4) holding focus group meetings to "bring the seven interest groups together." Needs assessment guided the implementation of four studies and reports, and each focus group within the consortium contributed key products; for example, the media group developed the public awareness plan and produced a promotional video, the health group conducted needs assessment of both clients and providers, and the finance committee inventoried county resources and potential funders. At the time of the implementation grant application, these groups were newly designated subcommittees of the Steering Committee.

Conflicts

By the summer of 1991, Red Ribbon was less directly involved in Fighting Back, though many of its members were still Fighting Back participants. Its role by this time was described as "implementing selected projects, providing community input, and promoting citizen involvement" through, for example, the Youth Mural Project and clean up projects in conjunction with 15 neighborhood associations (VFB Implementation Proposal 1991). It is not clear just why Red Ribbon moved from the foreground to the background. This change marked the beginning of a transition from a loosely organized campaign with broad-based citizen support to a more narrowly instrumental, formal organization, albeit one blessed with the residue of past, broad-based support. The acquiring of funding and the investment in particular programs altered the basis for organization from an expression of broad-based concern about AOD-related problems to the development of concrete programs.

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The VFB implementation grant application suggests great efforts were made to maintain a broad, inclusive framework for programs (1991:115-119), but not every program could or did receive the same support from the RWJF grant. Red Ribbon could not continue to lead the project without resolving the differences among its members over what kinds of projects were more important than others. If a successful implementing organization was to be firmly established, a coalition had to emerge around a particular course of action that necessarily excluded other courses.

The conflict over priorities during the planning period, according to a witness, was primarily between "kid people" and "treatment and recovery people." Some participants in Fighting Back's planning process believed the mission of the project was to "make the community a better place to live for children and their families." Others insisted the project's resources should be devoted primarily to "assisting abusers, addicts, and alcoholics to stop using." Discussions regarding the different approaches and emphases of "kid people [who favored prevention] and treatment and recovery people occupied more time than any other topic."

Treatment organizations, members of Alcoholics Anonymous, and Solano County Health and Human Services were well represented on VFB's Steering Committee and the Interagency Committee, a coordinating body composed of municipal agency directors in Vallejo which advised the fledgling VFB. Many important figures at the core of the planning process worked or had worked for the Solano County Health Department and supported the focus on increasing substance abuse services. The "recovering community" advocated increased detoxification and post-treatment ("after care") services.

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Fighting Back planned to subcontract a significant amount of grant money to projects designed to address deficiencies in the treatment system. These projects included jail-based substance abuse treatment, acupuncture treatment for substance abusers, a work-based recovery center, and more space in "sober living residences" for individuals coming out of in-patient treatment (VFB Implementation Proposal 1991). These plans were combined with those of the Solano County Drug and Alcohol Agency, resulting in a public-private mix of funding from the state of California, the City of Vallejo, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, and others.

Prevention was initially ruled out as a focus of the RWJF grant. The city nevertheless addressed the concerns of "kid people" through other means. During the Fighting Back planning period, numerous other grants were written and acquired which devoted programming to this aspect of the continuum of care (see Table 6.1). These projects were implemented by the school and recreation districts, local social service agencies, churches, and a variety of other community-based organizations.

Leadership and decision-making

Differing perceptions of VFB's decision-making process emerged by 1991.[15] By the second year of the planning phase, the Mayor's Roundtable was becoming less influential than the Steering Committee. Other committees and groups inside Fighting Back, such as the Interagency Committee, the Communications and Planning Networks (a

[15]This argument is based on a reading of interviews conducted by Pacific Institute of Research and Evaluation (PIRE) in 1991. PIRE was the original evaluator of the FB program.

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group designed to integrate citizens into the project), and Red Ribbon, had the task of implementing strategies and ideas formulated by the Steering Committee. During the early implementation period, members of these committees expressed frustration at being excluded from decision-making. Interviewees in 1991 believed that important decisions about the focus of the Fighting Back project and its goals were made by Fighting Back staff and others outside of the Steering Committee. Some Steering Committee members believed that the people who originally wrote the grant possessed a greater influence over the project's direction: Councilmember Kay, Hanstein, Middleton, Henry, Callahan, Wardlaw, Sergeant Pearsall, Woodard, and Grant. Interviewees told of several key leaders making binding decisions about the project without Steering Committee approval. One member of the Steering Committee cited a frank and productive discussion with Fighting Back's Director about how decisions in Fighting Back seemed to "emerge from the thin air." Not all members of the Steering Committee shared this view. Several identified the Steering Committee as the authoritative decision-maker over the Mayor's Roundtable, the Interagency Committee, and other interested elite official bodies. The individuals most closely involved in the grant writing appeared to be key to decision-making, especially Kay.

Community policing

Local officials who supported VFB could not ignore the most manifest AOD problem, drug-related crime in residential and commercial neighborhoods. In the late 1980s, neighborhood associations throughout the city pressured the city council, the

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police, the housing department, and other city agencies to address drug related crime. Arrests of drug dealers went up, especially those involving crack cocaine.[16] In April 1987, Mayor Intintolli appointed a new Chief of Police. Chief Gavin shared the view of Red Ribbon's founders that drug abuse was the root problem behind drug-related crime and therefore was an advocate of VFB's prevention and treatment agenda. The police department's administrators publically and privately supported VFB during the planning phase.

Chief Gavin also implemented "community-based policing." Three policing substations were established in 1991 in downtown, North, and South Vallejo neighborhoods, respectively. Police had identified the neighborhoods of the substations as having the highest concentrations of drug-related and other crime. Neighborhood Watches were formed in conjunction with the police department.[17]

These measures by the police department appeared to boost the legitimacy of both elected officials and the police department in the neighborhoods. Nevertheless, an interviewee told us many rank and file officers disdained community policing as "social work" and did not enter the spirit of the community policing program. VFB would support the community policing program and initiate a strategy of its own through the Alcohol Policy Coalition, a group that sought to clamp down on bars and corner stores.

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[16]The arrests and the violence of the crack trade disproportionately affected African Americans. Between 1984 and 1988, the proportion of blacks arrested for drug sales in Vallejo increased from less than 20% to 76%. (By 1995, a police lieutenant said the biggest illicit drug problem in Vallejo had become "crank," a methamphetamine used primarily by working class whites.)

[17]Letters of support from neighborhood associations to VFB, August 30, 1991.

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This would restore VFB's legitimacy with some of the neighborhood associations as some crime "hotspots" were anchored by alcohol selling establishments.

3. Majority-Minority Politics

In VFB's first year, the NPO criticized the project for its failure to mobilize and integrate the grassroots, which the NPO defined as recovering persons and minority groups --African Americans, Latinos, and Filipinos. VFB would take a number of steps throughout the life of the program which would satisfy the NPO, the "recovering community," and Filipinos but which would not silence some local African American and Latino critics. This criticism would make the program vulnerable to challenges to its local legitimacy, which recurred between 1990 and 1995. This history is accounted for in the next chapter. For now I give a brief account of Vallejo's minority groups and politics which were the context for the conflicts arising over VFB.

Between 1980 and 1990 Vallejo's population grew by 36%, with substantial growth in the Filipino, black, and Hispanic populations. The white portion of the population declined from 63% in 1980 to 50% by 1990. Despite the growth of Vallejo's minority populations, whites remained electorally strong. The white ethnic population was significantly older than minority populations and more likely to vote. A larger proportion of the minority populations were not of voting age. In addition, almost 18% of Vallejo's total population were foreign born and, therefore, less likely to be voting citizens.

My discussion of minority politics in Vallejo necessarily focuses primarily on

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African Americans as they were native born citizens and had longer histories as citizens and political participants than other groups. Some African Americans took an integrationist tack, participating in local politics through the local Democratic Club. Neighborhood organizations took more militant approaches and were divided. Some Latinos' politics were also formed in the crucible of 1960s movement politics; however, other Hispanic leadership was Republican. Filipinos appeared to first assert a role in local politics in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Filipinos

Vallejo's Filipino population was somewhat insular given the historical formation of this group in the crucible of both its cultural distinctiveness and California's longstanding history of legal and informal racial discrimination. It was also the most educated ethnic group in Vallejo and had the highest income. However, informants spoke of important intra-group divides based in generational differences; political differences (Republican versus Democrat); immigrant cohort differences (recent immigrants versus American born); cultural differences rooted in regional, language and other differences originating in the Philippines.

Nevertheless, Filipino Americans constituted the most politically cohesive of Vallejo's ethnic minorities at the time of my research. In the early 1990s, Filipinos cooperated in the campaign to elect the first Filipino American councilmember in Vallejo. Political differences were subordinated to the goal of electing a Filipino. Leadership organized an informal Filipino "primary" for selecting which candidate would

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run. This avoided competition between Filipinos in the general, nonpartisan election, closing Filipino voter ranks solidly behind one candidate and presenting white and other voters with only one Filipino candidate. Both Democratic and Republican Filipinos publically united behind the Filipino candidate.

A Fighting Back, Filipino staff member also ran successfully for the school board in the early 1990s. In the campaigns preceding the November 1995 mayoral and city council elections, the mayoral candidates clearly perceived Filipinos as a potential swing vote in a close election and went to considerable lengths to court them. African American and Latino interviewees expressed envy at Filipino political and electoral unity in the early 1990s. Filipinos and African Americans had discussed common ground; however, they clearly had not established a shared political organization or voting bloc.

African Americans[18]

African Americans in Vallejo were divided. They included both the most politically integrated of minorities in Vallejo and the most militantly anti-establishment. Of those participating in "normal" electoral politics and government bureaucracies, inter-racial cooperation through the Democratic Club was productive in the 1980s and early 1990s. However, a group of neighborhood-based organizations were hostile towards city hall and did not quickly cool down with African American political successes in the

[18]There was some controversy about how to refer to "African Americans" or "blacks" among local members of this group. Some did not like either term. For the most part I use the term "black" when I am referring to the census category. Otherwise I use "African American," which seemed to be the most acceptable term.

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1980s. Moreover, African American neighborhood-based organizations were divided among themselves. This division was based in both social geography and formal organizations.

African American political success in Vallejo in the 1980s and 1990s was more attributable to white-black cooperation than to African American solidarity. In the mid-1980s, the Democratic Club supported an African American candidate for the Solano County Board of Supervisors and one for the Vallejo City Council. Both were eventually elected. In the late 1980s, an African American was appointed Superintendent of the Vallejo Independent School District.

Once in office, some Democrat-backed councilmembers sought to open up official appointments to minorities. An informant described how things used to work.

> It used to be if you wanted to be a commissioner, you worked on somebody's city council campaign and then you called them up and said, I want to be on the commission. Nobody filled out anybody's application. Nobody interviewed anybody. Nobody knew how these commissions came to be.

The new members changed things.

> We consciously set out to increase minority participation in every piece of city government. We opened up the commission appointment process. We increased the minority participation in civic life by, I don't know, maybe two, three hundred

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percent, very deliberately, very strategically.

Vallejo's African Americans, however, could not be described as a cohesive "community," or at least not as one organized around principles of racial, ethnic or cultural solidarity. African Americans backed by the Democratic organization succeeded at the polls despite competition from other African American candidates. In the 1989 election, in contrast with Filipinos who fielded one candidate, five African Americans ran for city council. Given that Vallejo's councilmembers were elected "at large" rather than by districts, this threatened to make it difficult for any one of them to be elected. Only the candidate with support from the Democratic organization was elected.

African Americans were further divided, both by neighborhoods and organizations. A former councilmember stated that Vallejo was more split in 1985 than in 1995 when I conducted my field work. The split was between neighborhood based organizations, some of which competed for funding and services from city hall and external sources. Youth were also divided by neighborhood-based gangs.

In 1985, the city attempted to found a teen center in an African American neighborhood but could not because the question of where to locate it provoked unresolvable conflicts.

> This town is divvied up in geographic, economic squares... [T]here wasn't a place in this town to put a teen center and not have it shot at. The community had put lines all over everything.

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FB faced the same problem.

> There was no neutral ground in the city at that time. If we had sited FB in any geographic area other than city hall, somebody in South Vallejo would have driven up to North Vallejo and shot a hole in it. Or the other way around. I'm not joking.

In 1995 the divisions were still there though informants agreed they were less violent. An African American informant organizing a voter education program said divisions among African Americans made the work difficult.

> I'm working on a project right at this moment. [T]here's no one place that you can go to make a call into all of us [African Americans]. I've got to make a call from over here and a call from over here... I have to work myself to death dividing up in all these different parts and getting these cast of characters, while it's a common issue and a common concern and common problem for the entire community.

The divided, neighborhood based organizations, in contrast to African American elected officials connected to the Democratic Club, were hostile to city hall. The hostility was in part grounded in the residual affect of city hall's past mis-dealings, neglect, and unequal treatment of neighborhoods. As I noted above, Country Club Crest Improvement Association's leadership had a list of grievances against city hall dating back to the

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1950s. When in 1991 VFB circulated drafts of the FB implementation grant proposal at a "town hall" meeting in South Vallejo, without even reading it, one local resident denounced the proposal and threw it across the room. This distrust in African American neighborhoods towards projects initiated by city hall was corroborated in numerous informant interviews.

Hispanics/Latinos[19]

Hispanics were the most politically and economically marginal of Vallejo's minorities. Interviews indicated social status differences and organizational divisions within the Latino population. For example, membership of the local Hispanic Chamber of Commerce was Republican while local labor unions with Mexican American members supported Democratic candidates. As non-citizens, fewer recent Spanish-speaking immigrants were able to play a role in local politics. A social service professional told us undocumented immigrants avoided formally organized activity entirely because they feared deportation. Recent immigrants also came from polarized politics in their nations of origin, for example El Salvador and Nicaragua. Current and former members of the Latino Task Force said that these divisions affected the ability of Latinos to work together to establish community-based prevention through Fighting Back's Center for Substance Abuse Prevention grant.

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[19]During field work, the term "Hispanic" offended some Mexican American informants, especially those with a political background in the Chicano movement. However, the term "Latino" and "Chicano" offended other Mexican Americans. I use the term "Hispanic" when referring to census categories. I otherwise try to use the terms according to the preference of the groups or individuals being referred to.

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Conclusion

On the surface the Vallejo setting had characteristics in common with San Antonio. Both had multi-ethnic, multi-cultural populations. Both had lead agencies with strong leaders who, relative to other local players, controlled significant resources. Nevertheless, the Vallejo FB program was set in much different and more complex circumstances than the San Antonio program.

The Vallejo program targeted an entire city fraught with social and political divisions rather than a historical black ghetto with latent political coherence. Previous to the announcement of the FB grant, San Antonio's Eastside had a potential grassroots community by means of the organizing work PAC had done and existing relations among African American leaders. On the other hand, Vallejo was a disorganized community,[20] openly conflicted both racially and within the minority group most politically experienced, African Americans. Vallejo's African Americans did not appear either to wish to or be able to compose a cohesive campaign to vie for control of FB in the manner People Against Corruption in San Antonio did.

Added complications in Vallejo were two other relatively affluent groups which passed as "grassroots" --Filipino Americans and Twelve Step adherents. Both of these groups would have greater potential for social and political coherence than Vallejo's African Americans and Hispanics. However, they did not tend to represent the

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[20]I use the term "disorganized community" according to Coleman's usage (1971). He found two kinds of disorganization in local communities: disorganization generated by conflict and disorganization as a result of entropy, the deterioration or under-development of social and political organization.

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economically dis-enfranchised residents faced with the visible AOD problems poor African American and Hispanic residents in San Antonio and other cities identified -- threats to personal safety and public morality from AOD sellers, buyers, and users. Moreover, Twelve Step adherents more easily incorporated themselves into VFB's leadership than did ethnic minority groups. Their success in doing so had its precedent in some members earlier participation in local politics and in the administration of AOD services in Solano County.

Finally, the elite local actors in SAFB had no ideological and political commitments to a particular construction of local AOD problems. Nolan of the United Way, McCombs, and others agreed with how African American leaders saw local AOD problems and did not contend with them over priorities. A public campaign for a particular local construction of the problem did not appear to be necessary and did not occur. In fact, the lack of such a campaign probably helped SAFB in its efforts to legitimate the program to the RWJF's NPO. Had such a campaign occurred, SAFB would have had to take a more open, less ambiguous position between AOD problems framed as an aspect of neighborhood deterioration and AOD problems constructed as drug abuse.

In Vallejo, however, elite local actors in SAFB had ideological and political commitments to a construction of local AOD problems as drug abuse which publically countered both those focused generally on neighborhood deterioration and those focused on crime. Nevertheless, as the next chapter will show, VFB addressed aspects of neighborhood deterioration that overlapped with control of alcohol sales and consumption

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and thereby built up its legitimacy with neighborhood organizations.

I now turn to an account of cooptation in Vallejo, VFB's adaptations to its political and organizational environs as it attempted to construct its legitimacy from the beginnings of the organization through 1996.

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Table 6.1. Grants Acquired or Applied for in Vallejo, Planning Period, 1990-1991.[21]

GRANTOR, GRANT NAME	IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS	AMOUNT	PURPOSE
Office of Substance Abuse Prevention (fed.) Downtown Youth Project	churches, agencies, and associations of Vallejo	$1,001,699 for 5 years	programs and activities to decrease risk factors and increase resiliency to prevent drug and alcohol abuse among youth and families (David Hawkins model)
Office of Substance Abuse Prevention Community Partnership	City of Vallejo (Fighting Back) and community organizations	$823, 028 for 4 years	community organizing activities aimed at minorities and Twelve Step participants; mini-grant program for ethnic group-based prevention programs FB role: conceived of and wrote grant
Federal Office of Education (Drug Free Schools Program) Project Community	Vallejo school district; Greater Vallejo Recreation District and community organizations	$564,987 for 2 years	comprehensive prevention education and recreation for all Chapter I elementary schools

[21]VFB Implementation Grant Application, 1991: 226-228.

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Table 6.1 (continued).

GRANTOR, GRANT NAME	IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS	AMOUNT	PURPOSE
State Dept of Social Services L.E.A.R.N. (Local Efforts at Reducing Neglect)	Vallejo school district	$415, 713 for 4 years	comprehensive services to children and families with AOD or other problems in 3 Vallejo elementary schools; effort to solve problems before Child Protective Service must intervene FB role: Project Director assisted
Solano County Drug & Alcohol Agency; Vallejo School District	Solano County Drug & Alcohol Services	$293,232 annually	intensive adolescent day treatment program with special day school for teens (and their families) with AOD problems who have been referred by juvenile court, social service agencies, or both
Solano County Drug & Alcohol Agency Shamia	BiBett Corporation	$130,000 annually	12-bed residential recovery program for pregnant and parenting, substance abusing women
Napa Solano United Way; City of Vallejo; Greenville Foundation	Youth & Family Services	$70,000 for 3 years	establish and operate the Vallejo Training Institute which recruits graduate-level interns to provide low cost individual and family counseling in community-based organizations

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Table 6.1 (continued).

GRANTOR, GRANT NAME	IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS	AMOUNT	PURPOSE
Federal Office of Education (Drug Free Schools Program) Project Support	Vallejo school district and Sacramento State University	$56,684 for 1 year	special emphasis course of study in substance abuse for Pupil Personnel Credential candidates (teachers and social workers) at Vallejo Community United School District
State Dept of Alcohol and Drug Programs (state); Solano County Drug and Alcohol Agency	Substance Abuse and Pregnancy Task Force (Southern Solano Alcohol Council & others)	$48,750 for 1 year	planning grant to develop a comprehensive perinatal substance abuse continuum for women of childbearing age FB role: Project Director assisted
Solano County Drug & Alcohol Agency S.T.R.I.V.E.		$5,000 One time allocation	seed grant to provide equipment to construct ropes course as first step toward a city-wide challenge course for at-risk youth and clients of local treatment programs

Chapter 7

Cooptation in Vallejo

Vallejo Fighting Back (VFB) struggled with legitimacy among some neighborhood organizations and African American and Latino based organizations beginning with the planning period and off and on throughout implementation. When in 1991 VFB held town hall meetings to present a draft of the FB implementation grant proposal to citizen groups, neighborhood leaders responded angrily, both because VFB did not consult them during the drafting process and because they felt excluded from programming plans. North Vallejo organizations would also prove hostile. During the first phase of implementation (1991-1993), Latinos and the Black Ministerial Alliance wrote letters complaining of VFB's failure to support a Latina employee who was in a conflict with the county human service agency. The most serious and direct challenge to VFB's legitimacy, however, came when VFB's Allocations Recommendation Committee awarded small grants. An African American and Latino coalition of organizations attempted to block the city council's ratification of the committee's decisions, challenging its decision-making authority and proposing an alternative authority, the board of the Community Partnership. The protest failed. The first section of this chapter describes the background and events of this challenge to VFB's legitimacy. Despite the protest's failure, VFB was still faced with a legitimacy problem. After the challenge to the Allocation Recommendations Committee's (ARC) authority, VFB leaders sought to re-stake a claim to legitimacy among minority grassroots.

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In the course of both these sections, I interpret the events, suggesting why the challenge failed and how potential future challenges were defended against by VFB's leadership. African American and Latino challenge to VFB's governance, in contrast to PAC's challenge in San Antonio, came after VFB's governance and policy had been legally established. While this did not make a successful challenge impossible, it made it much more difficult. VFB's leadership, in contrast to leadership in San Antonio, also consistently opposed the challenge, showing little receptivity to working with the challengers. Neither did the NPO support the challenging group as it did PAC in San Antonio. Finally, the grassroots challengers did not broadly represent those who could claim status as "grassroots." There were other grassroots who did not support their challenge and who countered it.

The second section describes the operation of cooptation in governance, the distribution of contracts, and in programming. VFB's leadership re-organized governance to include minority representation, hired minorities, distributed small grants to minorities, and directed programming at minority populations. These efforts paralleled San Antonio Fighting Back's; however, VFB devoted, proportionally, more of its resources towards professional services than did SAFB. Its re-organizations of governance and hiring of minorities did not incorporate the dissenting grassroots as did these efforts in San Antonio. Rather, in effect, they provided symbolic legitimacy for the coalition whose power the dissenters were challenging. The core leadership group that most influenced VFB's direction before the challenge did not expand or change as a result of the challenge but continued to decide the course of the program and its

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organization.

1. VFB's Legitimacy Challenged: The Community Partnership Program

In its review of Vallejo's planning grant application, the National Advisory Committee criticized VFB for not sufficiently including the grassroots. In 1990, the NPO reiterated this criticism, telling VFB to incorporate more minorities and recovering people in the planning process and programming plans. VFB's leadership interpreted this task as separate from addressing gaps in professional AOD services. They considered it community organizing and argued their program could not take on both tasks. Nevertheless, to address community organizing around prevention and other AOD related problems and services, Kay and others proposed applying for an Office of Substance Abuse Prevention[1] program grant called the "Community Partnership."[2] The application succeeded. With the FB grant VFB would improve the professional services system and with the Center for Substance Abuse Prevention (CSAP) grant "empower individual citizens, family members, and church and community organizations . . . to take responsibility for reducing the abuse of alcohol and other drugs."

VFB leadership's program idea for the Community Partnership was to

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[1]Shortly thereafter this federal agency's name was changed to Center for Substance Abuse Prevention, which I abbreviate as "CSAP."

[2]Over 200 Community Partnerships were funded in urban and rural communities in the U.S. between 1990 and 1995. They were funded for two or more years in amounts ranging from the $100,000's to as much as $3 million.

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> . . . establish a new consortium of existing community-based organizations to stimulate the development of grassroots community organizing projects. The primary strategy will be to encourage and fund the design and implementation of "mini-projects" that focus on community organization and development in relation to substance abuse. The consortium [intended] to identify and support groups that have innovative and potentially effective ideas but that typically do not have access to funds. This proposed project [would] focus on four specific target populations: Filipinos, African-Americans, Latinos, and recovering substance abusers. (VFB Community Partnership Grant Proposal)

The Community Partnership would grant funds to "community groups who already had or could find an umbrella organization to handle their money for them. The community would say what worked for them and put those services together" (VFB Community Partnership Grant Proposal). Only groups and individuals from the four targeted populations could apply: recovering persons, African Americans, Latinos, and Filipinos. In the first year, $32,250 was available to each group. Individuals, groups, organizations within each of these four target populations would compete with others within their respective groups for funding, African American organizations for the money set aside for African Americans, Latinos for the Latino funds, and so on. In each successive year, the budget for the project would be reduced by half. It was assumed that competent and innovative programs would survive by acquiring other sources of

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funding.[3]

The "empowerment" idea behind VFB's Community Partnership was qualitatively different from SAFB's ideas about "empowerment." SAFB's organizers sought to develop the Eastside and its residents holistically. They treated political development as both an immediate and long term goal which interacted with the population's economic, human, organizational, and other development. VFB's leadership, on the other hand, sought to develop the local system of service provision by incorporating into it and developing minority- and recovery-based service providers.

The Fighting Back Executive Board, which was ultimately subject to the city manager and the lead agency's governing body, the city council, had authority over the Community Partnership; however, it set up the governance of the Community Partnership to appear to be a separate board. The Steering Committee was concerned that participants might interpret the existence of a single VFB Board taking ownership away from the targeted groups. It was believed that composing an individual Community Partnership Board would empower new local participants to "take ownership" of the Partnership.

According to Selznick's terms, this was a clear instance of formal cooptation. Participants in the Community Partnership were offered positions on its board, but it was not a substantive gesture as the VFB Executive Board continued to control decision-making for the program. The idea of the Community Partnership Board was also a volatile solution because it gave a false impression. It appeared to offer control of the program to the Community Partnership Board. When push would come to shove,

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[3]C. to S. Letter, April 19, 1992.

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however, the Community Partnership Board would not have legal authority over the program.

Small grant competition

The Community Partnership grant's Project Manager, Carmen Mason-Browne, an African American, was hired in April 1992. She came from the Youth and Family Services Downtown Project at Lincoln School, a prevention effort also funded by Center for Substance Abuse Prevention (CSAP). The announcement that Community Partnership small grants were available to community groups and organizations was made the same month.

To receive a grant, applicants were required to attend a bidder's conference and submit a proposal to the Allocations Recommendations Committee (ARC), a body appointed by the VFB Executive Board, which would review the proposals and recommend to the city council which ones to fund from the CSAP grant. Independent groups and organizations within each of the four designated communities could either cooperate within their respective groups and submit single applications or compete within their groups with one another for funding. A number of proposals were submitted by independent African American organizations and individuals and by Latino organizations. Only one proposal was submitted by Filipinos and by recovering persons, respectively. Individuals within these latter two groups who were interested in the Community Partnership funding came to consensus about what they wanted to do and applied jointly, as cohesive groups with support from established agencies who could administrate their

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respective grants.

Some of the proposals from African American and Latino groups were not funded, and some of the rejected applicants appealed the ARC's decisions. In an ARC meeting in August of 1992, the committee defended its decisions and justified them by referring to a scoring system developed for their review process (Allocations Committee Meeting minutes, August 17, 1992). Some African Americans requested to re-submit their applications orally. VFB's director resisted this suggestion. She reasoned that not having the proposal spelled out fully on paper would leave the city vulnerable to legal challenge.[4]

After the ARC turned down the appeals, some applicants organized a protest. The ARC's recommendations had to be ratified by VFB's ultimate authority, the city council. The city council subsequently met to authorize the committee's recommendations for funding. A group of African Americans and Latinos protested ARC's recommendations, arguing that the Community Partnership Board, not ARC, represented "the community" for which the Community Partnership was created.[5] The Filipino group which had successfully applied for a Community Partnership small grant, fearing the protest would jeopardize their funding, counter-protested, arguing they had successfully followed a legitimate process and therefore had a right to receive their award. The city council

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[4]Allocations Committee Meeting minutes, August 17, 1992.

[5]Though the Community Partnership Board had representatives on the Allocations Committee, they did not constitute a majority. Other citizens from the groups targeted for the Community Partnership mini-grants (African Americans, Latinos, Filipinos, and recovering persons) also served on the ARC.

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ratified the recommendations of the ARC, foiling the challenge of the African American and Latino protesters and confirming the awards to both the Filipino and recovering groups. In upholding the ARC's decisions, the city council officially confirmed the legal authority of VFB's Executive Committee and its appointed ARC over the Community Partnership project. VFB nevertheless still faced a legitimacy problem.

Ethnic task forces

The Community Partnership was premised on the participation of groups within the targeted populations. This was not a problem for the Filipinos and recovering people, both of which had organized themselves into single entities, respectively, and had successfully applied to the ARC for funding. Many African Americans and Latinos, however, no longer wished to participate in the program. Among them were those who protested the ARC's funding decisions and its authority. A successful applicant for a grant for an African American-run program also withdrew because the group did not wish to take sides in the dispute between the protesters and the ARC. The Community Partnership Project Manager was faced with trying to develop interest in the program, either re-capturing the interests of African Americans and Hispanics who were disillusioned by the preceding events or developing interest among new African American and Hispanic groups.

VFB's Executive Board altered the Community Partnership funding process for the subsequent years of the program. The funding continued to be divided into four separate and equal amounts, one for each of the targeted groups. However, there would

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be no competition for small grants. A group would be formed from each targeted population, a task force, to develop a proposal for funding. The Community Partnership Manager would review the proposal and either send it back for revision or fund it. Each group could hire an organizer to help them develop a proposal. The ultimate goal was for each task force to develop into a new, nonprofit organization. The organizer would help the group toward this goal.

The new process removed what had previously been a structure that encouraged competition within the targeted groups. Because only one proposal would be accepted from participants in each of the task forces, those who participated would have to resolve their differences before a funding decision would be made.

The new process also created the possibility of recruiting or developing alternative groups within the targeted populations. The responsibility for managing this process was given to the Community Partnership Manager. She oversaw the development of the task forces and had the power to approve their programming proposals. However, the new process also took the pressure of acting as authority off of VFB's governing body and put it onto the Community Partnership Manager. Subsequent complaints and challenges to the running of the Community Partnership would be directed at the Project Manager person rather than the VFB Board and the city council. This would take the heat off of VFB. During the time of my research, VFB and its board would no longer be the subject of the sort of fundamental challenge the African American and Latino protest coalition had organized. The Community Partnership Manager became the target of criticism and challenge --both her actions and her public persona. I now turn to a brief account of how

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the four task forces fared.

Filipino and Recovering Task Forces

The new process was relatively straightforward for the Filipino Task Force (FTF) and Recovering Task Force (RTF). Each had already formed a unified group and successfully applied to VFB for funding from the Center for Substance Abuse Prevention grant. Before the end of the Community Partnership program the Filipino Task Force would incorporate as a 501(C)(3) nonprofit agency, Filipino American Social Services, or "FASS." It declared as its goal establishing a multi-service center where Filipino Americans could receive a variety of services. The Recovering Task Force would incorporate as the Ia'Tik Community Recovery Center which provided services and activities to individuals recovering from AOD dependency. Table 7.1 lists the sorts of programming undertaken by these two task forces.

Both the FTF and RTF were able to pull together in large part because they had already done so before the Community Partnership program came along. They also received competent staff support from the very beginning of the Community Partnership program for organizing their respective groups. They also already had connections to larger institutions with resources. I first discuss further the RTF's success, then the FTF's.

Members of the RTF had come together before in the early 1980s to found SSAC and its for-profit, AOD treatment providing arm, Bi-Bett, Inc. They already had connections with and further developed relations with the more resource-rich local

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agencies. They listed their organizational partners as Bi-Bett Corporation, Dillingham Construction, Freedom Outreach (another provider), Greater Vallejo Recreation District, Kaiser Permanente Medical Center, Planned Parenthood, Solano AIDS Task Force, Solano County Health and Social Services, and the Vallejo City Unified School District.

The RTF had formed a cohesive enough coalition to influence FB's direction. Their effectiveness in pulling together under the Community Partnership grant was an extension of their success influencing FB. There were ideological disagreements among recovering persons about the Twelve Step program and how it should be followed. For example, some did not share the view of older AA members that under no conditions were medications appropriate for recovering persons. However, what they appeared to hold tenaciously in common was a commitment to "sobriety" and "recovery" broadly construed. These were tenets of AA's founders --both the commitment to recovery and the idea that how recovery is sustained would be somewhat broadly construed. For example, throughout the Twelve Steps, God is referred to as a "Higher Power" to enable persons of different religions as well as non- and anti-religious to participate in this same "fellowship" of recovery (Alcoholics Anonymous World Services 1995). The organization of Twelve Step programs is such that there is no formal authority other than "the conscience of the group" and the Twelve Steps and Twelve Traditions to adjudicate controversies (Alcoholics Anonymous World Services 1995). At least from a formal standpoint, then, power struggles are disempowered by the character of the organization and its philosophy.

Some of the FTF's participants had come together previously, in their case,

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around the campaign to elect the first Filipino member of the Vallejo City Council. The original Filipino American FTF organizer had been involved with an Office of Economic Opportunity funded nutrition program for senior Filipinos. She had experience both in developing social services and in cultivating support for them within the local Filipino American leadership. She and subsequent FTF organizers carefully cultivated support within Filipino American leadership so that the new organization would not be a source of controversy.

African American Task Force

The African American Task Force (AATF) would go back and forth between being a forum for challenge to the legitimacy of the Community Partnership and FB programs to having difficulty forming a stable organization. By the time my research ended, a decision had been made to abandon the effort. This failure or inability to establish the AATF was caused by a number of factors. First, as I discussed in the previous chapter, African American neighborhood-based organizations viewed city government with suspicion and therefore were reluctant participants, quick to either challenge FB staff authority or cease participating. FB exacerbated this by making promises it did not keep and otherwise acting in ways that some African Americans experienced as betrayals. Second, as I also previously mentioned, Vallejo's African American organizations did not constitute a racially or ethnically based community, or, as such, they were divided in numerous ways --by neighborhood, by organization, by a classic difference among African Americans over whether to integrate with whites and

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other minority groups politically and culturally or to maintain a strict separatism, and so on.

Members of African American, neighborhood-based organizations in Vallejo viewed city government with suspicion. In 1995, African Americans in a group interview in one neighborhood viewed Fighting Back as just another episode in a series of city-based exclusions and betrayals. One African American, neighborhood-based, nonprofit organization believed Fighting Back made promises it had not kept. The FB implementation grant application had explicitly identified this group's area as a key target of programs. Grant application writers had also illustrated the AOD problem by emphasizing the dramatically rising number of young African American men being arrested in this neighborhood. With these factors in mind, this group had written a letter of support for the Fighting Back proposal. The group later felt that Fighting Back had used its neighborhood's problems to secure the grant without financially supporting the area's community-based efforts. The use of statistics from a black Vallejo neighborhood to secure grant money was felt to repeat previous acts by the city to obtain outside funding that was not, in turn, shared with or invested in these neighborhoods.

Meeting times and places were a bone of contention for African American neighborhood leaders and nonprofessionals. This was a point of division generally between nonprofessional volunteers and professionals, but this dividing line was often also a racial line. An African American professional committee chair person remarked that service professionals wanted to meet during the daytime hours because some commuted long distances and wanted to reserve evenings for themselves or their families.

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Non-professional residents of Vallejo, however, typically worked during the day. Evenings were the only time they could attend meetings. When meetings were scheduled during daytime hours, local residents, particularly low-income minorities, were poorly represented and felt excluded from decision-making. For a time, parallel meetings were held during both the day and evening, but this did little to integrate or include nonprofessional volunteers because professional leaders attended the daytime meetings.

To some, the conflict over scheduling meetings was a symptom of another, more fundamental issue: residents of the afflicted neighborhoods lived the problems every day and addressed them out of necessity and without remuneration. Service professionals, conversely, were paid to work on the problems without experiencing them. Residents of the most afflicted neighborhoods also questioned the allocation of resources to professionals. Some African Americans believed that, beginning in the planning period, Fighting Back and the RWJF had spent money on surveys, consultants, training, and other activities that did not have any clear benefits for the people living in neighborhoods with the greatest problems. They felt this could be addressed by sharing a larger portion of grant resources with community groups. Among them were those who would challenge Fighting Back and the city's authority to decide who would receive funds from the Center for Substance Abuse Prevention (CSAP) grant.

There would also be confusion among African American participants about the relationship between the CSAP and RWJF grants. They fell under one, though sub-divided, organizational umbrella, VFB, which made it appear that the two funding resources were pooled. Some African American leaders felt it was unjust that community

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groups could qualify for funding only from the smaller CSAP grant. FB leadership had structured the programs, however, to be divided, essentially declaring the FB grant off limits for community groups, reserved for treatment and aftercare services. Some African Americans experienced this as yet another example of the city withholding resources from poor, African American neighborhoods which provided them with the negative statistics that brought in the money in the first place.

When the CSAP mini-grants were announced in the spring of 1992, African American non-profit organizations and community groups saw potential resources for their organizations and activities. A local youth club director hoped to garner funding for much-needed physical plant improvements. Other groups wanted to expand existing programs and seed new ones. In contrast to the various segments of the Filipino community, African American organizations did not come together to submit a cooperative proposal, therefore African American youth service organizations competed against each other for mini-grants.

Unlike among Filipino Americans in Vallejo, there were a number of well-established, African American-run organizations with experience in providing youth and prevention-related programs.[6] Moreover, there was no apparent historical precedent for cooperation among the relevant African American community-based organizations as there had been among Filipino Americans during the 1980s. The mini-grant program exacerbated "turf" issues, as organizations competed for available funds. Applications

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[6]There were many Filipino organizations in Vallejo but none incorporated to deliver social services.

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from African American organizations and individuals outnumbered those from other racial and ethnic groups. Inevitably, many proposals were rejected. One nonprofit organization was awarded funding to run a mentoring program for youth, however, when an African American and Latino coalition protested the decision-making process for the award of funds, the successful African American applicant organization withdrew its proposal. They did not want to appear to choose sides in the conflict between the city and African Americans protesting the Allocation Committee's recommendations.

The Community Partnership staff attempted to re-group the African American Task Force (AATF) after the mini-grant protest; however, it soon splintered. The group originally met in the Fighting Back offices at the public library one evening a week. When the library reduced its opening hours because of a reduction in its budget, the AATF was unable to meet on several occasions. Some AATF members believed the city should have provided other meeting space. A group within the AATF felt it was more appropriate for the task force to meet "in the community" anyway. This group unilaterally decided the meetings would take place in their neighborhood and despite others no longer participating, continued to call their group the AATF. One individual who was not from the splinter group complained to the Community Partnership Manager, "You can't say this [group represents] Fighting Back. They don't meet, don't report to us, and don't perceive us as being part of them." This individual described this as "bottom of the valley" for the AATF. The interviewee agreed with much of what the splinter group had to say about race relations in Vallejo and problems with Fighting Back and the Community Partnership; however, this individual felt the neighborhood group's

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leadership sabotaged efforts to establish an effective African American Task Force by excluding other African Americans. The interviewee further believed they caused the important issues not to be taken seriously. "The messenger is so bad, it spoils the message. [This group has] such a bad reputation, even though it's a good message, no one will deal with it."

Other interviewees shared this view. The splinter group was described as promoting "a political agenda of [their] own, unrelated to Fighting Back" and of being occupied with their own interests rather than that of Vallejo's African American population generally. Another said, "several individuals used their position in a way that caused many in the community to not want to be involved." In another instance he remarked, "There are lots of turf and power issues in the community that have made it challenging to work [together]."

Members of the splintered neighborhood group questioned representation of "the community" identified in the grant and felt they were being excluded by the local officials who claimed to be addressing the problem. The group verbally attacked the manager of the Community Partnership in a variety of ways. They derisively referred to her as "light-skinned." They said she was afraid to come into their neighborhood. They said she was not a legitimate organizer for the Community Partnership because she did not live in the neighborhoods where the problems were.

There was also strong ideological or philosophical disagreements among African American service providers. Some of the African American professional staff who worked with FB were considered by other African Americans as "do-gooders" intruding

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in African American neighborhoods. They were also discredited for aspiring to a place in the "white" world. In another example, a local program which focused on college preparation for high-achieving African American students was criticized by the dissenting group for training the youths to be "white" in order to gain better prospects. They argued that the program promoted class and cultural divisions and separated African American middle-class kids from inner city kids. These programs were also viewed as separating youth from their authentic, African heritage, teaching them to aspire to and assimilate "European" values and positions in society, and focusing on minority youth who were already a step ahead of their lower-achieving peers rather than on the youth most in need of the programs.

At the end of my field research, in July 1995, the split between the neighborhood group and the Fighting Back-sponsored AATF was unresolved. The neighborhood group claimed to be the true AATF and the rightful representatives of the African American population. Other observers believed the AATF to be defunct and in a state of re-organization, a process the Community Partnership Manager believed would be difficult. Residents would not work together under the term "task force," and there was debate on how to refer to the group. The structure of the Community Partnership grant required the identification of a target group, so agreement had to be reached with regard to a defining or characterizing name. As the Project Manager stated, "How do you reach your target group if you don't identify it?" In July of 1995, the AATF did not have a paid organizer. The Community Partnership Manager took over this role with the help of an administrative assistant.

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Within a year, the effort to organize an African American group or nonprofit organization based on racial solidarity was abandoned for supporting discreet programs targeting blacks, some of them run by African American individuals or organizations. Vallejo's African Americans seemed hopelessly divided, divisions exacerbated by what most agreed was a "bad messenger," a neighborhood group whose leadership appeared to poison efforts to organize a group which they did not run. Moreover, it seemed no longer necessary to organize an African American group in order to fund African American organizations and target blacks. The FB grant had supported African American-run efforts to organize employee assistance programs among black businesses designed to identify AOD problems among employees and treat them. FB also attempted to establish Project Real Chance, a program to support young black men in trouble with the law to get their lives together. The Community Partnership grant supported youth programming that targeted some black youth as well as a neighborhood cleanup project that targeted black residential areas in South Vallejo.

Latino Task Force

Despite some Latinos joining African Americans in protest of the Allocations Recommendations Committee's decisions, Hispanic/Latino organizations received small grants for programming. Over 5,000 people attended *Festival de Familias* in July 1993 and a survey of Hispanic/Latino residents was completed. However, the task force would have trouble establishing a consistent membership and program. There was considerable infighting and accusations over the use of funds and the tenor of the festival of 1993.

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Interviewees cited numerous contributing factors: class differences among citizens between the business people oriented towards the Chamber of Commerce and those associated with the Chicano and union movements; among professional Latinos and ambitious first generation immigrants seeking to establish a leadership role; nation of origin and political differences among immigrants.

Lack of commitment and poor support from the parent organization, the Community Partnership, was also cited. In this regard, there appeared to be difficulties on both sides. The Community Partnership Manager certainly had more than enough on her plate. The organizers who were hired struggled. In 1996, five years after the program started, a core group of social service and education professionals emerged which developed some modest programming focused on youth and families and on services for immigrants. They supported a youth dance group, a bi-lingual referral for immigrant and social services, and a series of forums on issues relevant to local residents including how immigrants could apply for citizenship, gangs and neighborhood problems (in conjunction with the St. Vincent Hill Neighborhood Association), and so on. Around the time that my data collection ended, the Latino Task Force (LTF) hired a consultant to help them apply for 501(C)(3) nonprofit incorporated status.

Task force success and failure

Group resources

The Community Partnership program outcome I describe above appeared to reproduce the ability of these four groups, as groups, to gain access to resources and

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address their respective concerns. Their ability was grounded in resources of various stripes: financial, human, and social capital.

The Recovery Task Force had diverse participation, but among its leadership were successful professionals experienced in politics and services with connections to both public officials and private corporations. The group was integrated into VFB's leadership and would end up being a principal focus of the FB grant. VFB's budget for services to recovering persons, $540,361 from 1989 to 1997, would exceed that of any other kind of services. Obviously this group had the advantage of legitimacy as grassroots in the AOD realm --they were individuals with AOD problems. However, they also were able to legitimate themselves as part of the "community grassroots," thereby gaining the Community Partnership as a resource and mining it.

To a lesser extent, Filipino Task Force participants also had access to financial, human, and social capital. It had professional women with the personal resources to volunteer their time to getting the organization off the ground. They had past ties to funding agencies whom they drew upon again to develop Filipino American Social Services. They drew upon important sponsors within the Filipino American population.

Many African Americans in Vallejo were well educated, experienced in service provision, and politically connected to the Democratic Party, but as an ethnic group they were not able to mobilize these resources because of the divide between the more resource-rich individuals and organizations and neighborhood organizations as well as divisions among neighborhood organizations. Latinos were the least endowed with resources and in monetary terms would benefit least from the FB and Community

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Partnership grants.

The Community Partnership bolstered the capital of the wealthiest groups. This may be the effect of organizing programs in divided communities without the deliberate strategy of identifying and focusing on the poorest groups. I do not mean an organizing project among Vallejo's poorest residents would have succeeded, but it was also not attempted. The Community Partnership ended up simply giving ethnic groups, plus the recovering, a piece of the pie which enhanced the position of those with the largest pieces already. This is likely the effect, too, of funding local government. The politically strongest groups are sure to gain while there are few incentives for city hall to bolster politically weak groups, which in the case of Vallejo were also the groups with the least financial, human, and social capital.

Identity as an organizing principle

The initial, overall idea for the Community Partnership program was in part the source of the problem. Hispanics and blacks in Vallejo were not "communities" or cohesive groups as were the Filipinos and recovering people. Cooperation among leadership and organizations within the latter two populations was possible. A cohesive task force, and ultimately a formal organization, could take shape. Leaders and organizations within the Latino and African American populations were conflicted. By its design, the Community Partnership program reproduced rather than addressed these conditions.

I can think of two alternatives, generally stated, to how the Community

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Partnership program was designed and implemented. First, the program could have taken a slower developmental tack towards organizing the LTF and AATF. This was in effect what happened with the LTF in the long run. A group eventually pulled together that could get along and could find common ground. This group was not representative of the politics, wishes, or goals of all Hispanics/Latinos. But it was a credible group that sought to address issues of concern to many Hispanics.

It is not clear such a group could have pulled together under the rubric of the AATF. However, informants suggested the splinter group could have been either avoided or cast aside much earlier in favor of more cooperative elements within the groups who protested the Allocation Recommendation Committee's decisions. It also may not have made sense to organize

African Americans as African Americans but to seek some other principle of organization. Perhaps the funding could have simply been divided up according to indigenous divisions among African Americans by neighborhoods, for example those in South Vallejo and those in the North; or by youth service providing organizations. While this would not have organized African Americans as African Americans, it might have productively contributed resources to addressing problems in a manner that did not activate and re-enforce hostilities.

Alcohol policy coalition

VFB did in fact organize by this method through the Alcohol Policy Coalition (APC). The APC had a diverse agenda. My interest is in its success in organizing around

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a concrete, broad-based concern of Vallejo's residents, regardless of race or ethnicity -- crime "hotspots" based around alcohol selling businesses and illicit drug markets. Like the Recovery Task Force, the APC was able to bridge a "grassroots" constituency and a clear cut AOD related problem. The APC's issue was not increasing services but the control of alcoholic beverages and illicit drug sellers. Its grassroots constituency was much broader than that of the Recovery Task Force or other ethnic task forces -- neighborhood-based organizations in different parts of the city, primarily resident associations and churches.

By advocating for neighborhood organizations in different parts of the city, the APC worked with diverse ethnic populations --whites, African Americans, and Latinos/Hispanics. The Coalition's board was racially and ethnically diverse. Informants attested to underlying, ethnicity-based tensions, but the membership was stable and the board effective. Not all neighborhood associations participated and the APC did not seek to involve everyone. It started with a core, interested group, and as it became successful and proved useful to others, they climbed on the bandwagon. The APC Board represented not only neighborhood associations but also activists committed to curbing corporate power in the alcohol and tobacco industry and Twelve Step participants and religious people who disapproved of alcohol.[7]

The APC achieved considerable influence in creating and enforcing local policies that regulated the sale of alcoholic beverages in Vallejo. The APC and neighborhood

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[7]The latter tended also to be members of churches and neighborhood associations addressing problem alcohol selling stores.

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associations believed that in more closely regulating alcohol selling stores, the APC improved neighborhoods. The APC's big success was writing and successfully lobbying for a local Conditional Use Permit ordinance. The Conditional Use Permit enabled the city's Planning Commission to grant business licenses to alcohol selling businesses while also putting strict, enforceable conditions on the license. This gave the APC, neighborhood associations, and others participating in the licensing process leverage to make alcohol business owners behave in ways that did not add to crime and other neighborhood problems. Among the rules the commission could stipulate were whether "on" or "off" sale liquor could be sold (or both); that the owner had to control loitering, graffiti, litter, and general unsightliness of the store and property; whether or not beverages with more than 15% alcohol could be sold; how much and what kind of advertising could be put up outside the store and in the store windows; and so on.

As the APC proved effective, not only to grassroots groups but to politicians and local agencies, it was invited to help address other issues by the Police Department and the Planning Commission. It provided a citizen group that officials could work with while it commanded respect both from those officials and from neighborhood groups. This presented the risk of being coopted by these powerful agencies. At the time my research ended, the APC appeared to remain an effective advocate for residents concerned about alcohol selling businesses.

VFB paid a consultant from the FB grant to coordinate the APC. He played the principal role in carrying out the will of the board, which he also influenced. It is not clear what would happen to the organization if it lost this particular staff person, or the funds to

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pay him. Nevertheless, the APC demonstrates alternative principles for organizing a "grassroots" constituency and organization to address local problems --issue-based rather than identity-based.

Legitimacy problem re-located

The protest of the original distribution of the Community Partnership's small grant funds attacked the legitimacy of the VFB Board's appointed body, the ARC. The subsequent re-organization of the Community Partnership program had the effect of re-locating authority with the Community Partnership Manager and the four designated groups themselves. The Community Partnership Manager and VFB's director did not work well together. Nor did the Community Partnership Manager appear to be closely related to VFB's Board members and their relationships inside city hall. In contrast, the Filipino Task Force appeared more connected to the VFB Director and its board. The Recovery Task Force was represented on the board and had good relations with both elected and appointed officials. The Community Partnership Manager and the Latino and African American Task Forces therefore were isolated from relationships and other resources that might have made success more possible.

The Manager and the groups themselves would subsequently be the targets of blame and challenge. Members of both the LTF and AATF blamed the Community Partnership Manager for the groups' struggles. She did appear distracted or to have difficulty addressing the situation. The splinter group in the AATF seemed to be pandered to for a time before it was realized they would not work with others. The LTF organizers

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appeared to need support in learning and doing their work and did not appear to receive it. However, the LTF and AATF were also extremely difficult to work with. It is not clear anyone could have formed them into cohesive, effective groups.

The legitimacy problem, in the terms the Community Partnership program was re-designed, thus ultimately put the task forces themselves in the hot seat. If the LTF and AATF could not get it together, was it not their own fault? The floundering of these two task forces made a case for dis-crediting these groups. The heat, or responsibility, for why the FB and Community Partnership programs were not working for Hispanics/Latinos and African Americans in Vallejo was now diverted from VFB and city hall to these two problematic groups and a problematic program.

2. Formal Cooptation.

The development of VFB's governance and program fits better than SAFB's development the classic example of cooptation as Selznick described it in *TVA and the Grassroots*. At the end of the process, like poor black and white farmers in the Tennessee Valley, African Americans and Latinos/Hispanics in Vallejo did not make inroads into decision-making in the relevant policy domain. They, too, were disorganized and remained systematically excluded by the local centers of interest and power which took an interest in the FB intervention.[8] This was in contrast to SAFB where PAC's leadership

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[8]They were disorganized in different forms, however. Poor and minority farmers in the Tennessee Valley appeared to suffer from organizational entropy; whereas, Vallejo's African Americans and Latinos/Hispanics, especially its African Americans, suffered from within-group divisions. Or, to the extent members of these population groups participated in communities, these communities were organized on principles

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successfully claimed a central role in policy making vis a vis the contending interests, most prominently, AOD service providing agencies.

African American and Latino challenges to VFB's legitimacy were absorbed and deflected by the development of a governance structure that appeared to formally incorporate them while not incorporating them substantively. The body that was created with apparent policy making powers, the Community Council, had minority representation built into its by-laws. However, the fifty member Council was too unwieldy to influence policy. Moreover, while the by-laws formally required a certain number of Filipinos, African Americans, recovering, and Latinos/Hispanics in its membership, it did not necessarily include the organized groups seeking to be included.

Similar outcomes occurred with regard to VFB's programming content, staffing, grants and contracts. Programs targeting black and Hispanic populations were formally developed; however, they either floundered or did not receive the same financial commitment and lead staff attention that other programming did. With regard to staffing, minorities were hired, but they were not affiliated with the organizations who made the charge of exclusion. Moreover, the minorities that were hired did not appear to have the support from within VFB which they needed to succeed. VFB's distribution of grants and contracts reflected this same subordination of minorities' interests to other priorities.

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other than ethnicity or race. The most salient, alternative principle of organization for African Americans appeared to be neighborhood. I am not sure what alternative principles for Hispanics/Latinos were. Among the possibilities were the following: Catholic parish, nation of origin, class (labor/business, professionals).

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Governance

VFB's governance was convoluted and often in flux. It developed this way in large part because of its leadership's legitimacy needs. Leadership shifted over time, from one led by Councilmember Kay to one led by Director Callahan. Leaders from the recovering community participated continuously, providing input and support both to Kay and Callahan. Initially, the program had to legitimate itself to the RWJF by recruiting elite leadership and sponsorship. Subsequently, VFB had to legitimate itself, both to the RWJF and local groups, as a citizen- or grassroots-based organization. Locally, VFB's legitimacy was challenged by some African Americans and Latinos who claimed VFB was an organization run by "white European women" which did not substantively include them in decision-making or programming.

VFB easily solved the initial need for elite support, engaging local public and private sector elites. Councilmember Kay, as a Democratic Club member and elected official, was able to recruit top elected and appointed officials. Mayor Intintolli, a strong sponsor of VFB, held the highest local political office. Hanstein, Director of SCDAA, was the highest appointed official in the local system of AOD-related services. The Chief of Police, the Vallejo Independent School District Superintendent, other service agency heads, and the local United Way were also recruited to publically support VFB and its leaders.

Two local bodies, the Mayor's Roundtable and Red Ribbon, were presented to the RWJF in the planning grant application as VFB's policy making bodies. The Roundtable, a place for community elites to meet and talk about pressing community problems at the

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invitation of the mayor, was responsible for determining the priorities of the Fighting Back Project. It was comprised of as many as 32 high-level administrators and policy makers, including the mayor; five councilmembers; the city manager; the police chief; the fire chief; heads of county departments, including the district attorney and the sheriff; representatives from Exxon; Pacific Gas and Electric; three local, private hospitals; University of California, Berkeley; the Solano Medical Society; and the State Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs.

The planning application stated the Roundtable would develop the mission statement and goals of the program and set policies. In addition, it reviewed VFB's needs assessment so that resources could be re-directed and policies modified. The Roundtable would monitor the resources and funds of the city's "comprehensive AOD service delivery system."

I described Red Ribbon above as a 60 member organization that was the vehicle for citizen involvement in setting local AOD related policies. Red Ribbon was also charged, as the "citizens task force," the governing body required by the RWJF, with defining VFB's objectives.

The NPO expressed confusion about which of these bodies made policy for VFB. "The organization and structure of the program are somewhat murky. Several groups have either been created or put on the same chart to meet both the terms of the grant and the local realities."[9] There was considerable overlap in tasks and membership, and the chain of command was not always clear. Local participants were also confused.

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[9]National Advisory Committee, Site Visit Notes, 1989.

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According to informants, the Roundtable, with input from the other bodies, initially set policy. It is not clear that Red Ribbon ever did so. An eight member Steering Committee quickly supplanted the Roundtable as policy maker, however.

Satisfied that VFB had elite backing and engagement, the NPO then questioned whether the "grassroots" were adequately included. Solving the need for citizen- and grassroots-based support proved more complicated for VFB. Red Ribbon was the original vehicle for citizen, or grassroots, participation. The planning grant and implementation grant proposals cited Red Ribbon as VFB's "citizens task force." The NPO was not satisfied, however, that Red Ribbon represented neighborhood based organizations, Filipinos, and recovering persons.

Leaders of the recovering community were readily incorporated. In 1991, informants reported that twenty percent of the Steering Committee were recovering persons. Minorities were ostensibly incorporated into governance and programming through the Community Partnership program, launched in 1991. Actual authority over the Community Partnership would, on the one hand, be contested throughout the history of the Community Partnership program and on the other, would never formally belong to the Community Partnership Board and the Community Partnership Manager.

I gave an account above of the ultimate challenge to VFB's authority over the Community Partnership when I recounted the African American and Latino protest at city hall over the funding decisions of VFB's Allocations Recommendations Committee. The outcome of this challenge proved that VFB's had authority over the Community Partnership Board.

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I also discovered in interviews a dispute over whether the Community Partnership Program Manager or the VFB Executive Director had ultimate authority over the Community Partnership. A former VFB board member remarked on the struggle between these two managers over who had ultimate authority over the Community Partnership. The issue was never confronted or resolved openly. In practice it appeared VFB's Executive Director did not insist the Community Partnership Manager submit to her authority. However, the Community Partnership remained the black sheep program, so to speak, of VFB. With the exception of programming for recovering persons, the grant's resources appeared to be kept separate, were not used to re-enforce one another as powerfully as they might have had collaboration between the Community Partnership Manager and FB Director been the practice. The Center for Substance Abuse Prevention grant was the poorer of the two and developed as the lesser, somewhat neglected sibling. Elements of the Community Partnership program floundered and the conflict between the Community Partnership Manager and VFB's director appeared to limit the Community Partnership's resources --social ties and other-- to those of the Community Partnership Manager rather than also drawing upon those of VFB's director and its board.

VFB countered challenges to its legitimacy among African Americans and Latinos in part by implementing two major re-organizations which were to integrate Community Partnership, or "grassroots," representation into VFB's governance. The first re-organization took place after the small grant controversy in 1991. An attempt was made to merge the Community Partnership Board with VFB's governance. The Community Partnership Board became the "Community Council" which was to bring policy matters

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to the Executive Committee for consideration. The Council had strict membership requirements. Each of the populations targeted by the Community Partnership program were to be equally represented --recovering, Filipinos, African Americans, and Latinos. The Community Council was ineffective, however, for two reasons. First, VFB was never able to attract enough people to fill out the council's membership of fifty. Second, it was such a large and diverse body, it was unable to present a coherent front on policy issues to VFB's board.

In 1993, VFB began the process of incorporating as a nonprofit organization. Again, it bifurcated its governance into an unwieldy, fifty member Community Council and a smaller body, the twelve member Administrative Board. The Executive Director described the Council as a kind of legislative branch and the Executive Board as an executive branch. However, at the time my research ended, this structure seemed to simply reproduce the earlier one which shored up the decision-making power of the twelve member board.

By the time of the implementation phase, the board appeared most influenced by the Executive Director and its recovering members. Not long after the mini-grant debacle, Kay left office and withdrew from her involvement with VFB. Her role had been initially to see that the city obtained the RWJF grant and see that it was firmly established. Once established, the director appeared to take the lead. Recovering members of the board continued strongly to influence VFB's direction. The Community Partnership Manager and Community Council members never penetrated the core leadership.

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The relationship between the director and recovering leadership was not without tensions; however, it continued on basically good terms to their mutual beneficial. In the recovering group, Callahan had a legitimate "grassroots" constituency that supported her. Recovering leaders told me that Callahan was a strong advocate. They said that she brought impressive skills in articulating both to lay audiences and policy makers local needs for AOD services and the form those services should take. She remarked publically that the recovering community had taught her and other service professionals a great deal about the disease of drug dependency and how to address it.

At the time my research ended, VFB was formally incorporated as the Vallejo Community Consortium. It had successfully applied for funding other than the RWJF and CSAP grants. It subcontracted with the city to implement the FB and Community Partnership programs. This arrangement was convenient. The city manager's office administered the grants' finances, enabling Vallejo Community Consortium staff to focus on both programming and development. As an independent contractor, the Vallejo Community Consortium did not have to do more than formally report to city authorities.[10] It also did not have to submit to the city's cumbersome regulations for hiring and firing staff. In short, it appeared to have combined the best of both worlds --the independence of an autonomous organization without the encumbrances of administrative overhead.

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[10]This had not been a problem previously either. Before Callahan and the board incorporated, while the organization was formally still under the authority of the city manager, VFB never suffered from meddling or interference from above. Councilmember Kay saw that VFB was protected within city hall from interference by either bureaucratic or elected authority. Kay remarked that she had been determined to protect VFB from becoming a "political football."

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By the time my research ended, the RWJF no longer seemed to require that VFB legitimate itself as an elite-backed, grassroots-based organization. It was firmly enough established to weather the turnover of public officials who had been its principal sponsors: Councilmember Kay, Mayor Intintolli, Police Chief Gavin, Superintendent Eliot, and others. In 1997, a new mayor (and Republican Party member) raised the possibility of kicking the FB program out of city hall. The negative public reaction to her floating of the idea, from recovering and others, caused her to back off.

VFB did not solve its legitimacy problems with local minorities. They may have been unsolvable because of divisions within minority groups. However, VFB appeared to use this as an excuse rather than attempting to address the real development problems for minorities in Vallejo, in contrast to SAFB's efforts in San Antonio. Moreover, VFB's response to its legitimacy problem had the effect of re-locating the "legitimation crisis" from VFB's board and the city council to the Community Partnership Manager, who had difficulty gaining credibility with African Americans and Latinos after the small grant controversy. The black and Latino task forces did not have broad support from their respective population groups and at the time my research ended in 1996 were not effective enough to have won over support. The Manager and black and Latino task forces were faced with a perpetual legitimacy problem that made it difficult for them to develop an effective program.

Program content

In Chapter 5 I argued that African American grassroots in San Antonio were better

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represented in decision-making than AOD service and other professionals. They coopted the FB program in part by steering programming to neighborhood improvement. In contrast, professionals and Twelve Step advocates dominated leadership in Vallejo. This was in part reflected in the predominance of AOD service related programming over neighborhood improvement in Vallejo. However, neighborhood improvement efforts were also strong in Vallejo.

Figure 5.1 showed that 56% of SAFB's program content was devoted to neighborhood improvement programming while 44% was devoted to prevention and treatment. Figure 7.1 shows the reverse pattern in Vallejo. VFB devoted 58% of its programming to prevention and treatment, 42% to neighborhood improvement.

I see two significance issues in Figures 5.1 and 7.1. First, Vallejo and San Antonio both devoted a considerable share of their programming to neighborhood improvement. In Chapter 3, I argued that advocates of neighborhood improvement coopted the FB grant in most program sites. The findings in Figures 5.1 and 7.1 are consistent with this argument.

Second, Vallejo devoted more of its programming to prevention and treatment than it did to neighborhood improvement. While this suggests advocates of neighborhood improvement succeeded in co-opting a good portion of FB's programming, prevention and treatment advocates in Vallejo were more successful in realizing their programming goals than were their counterparts in San Antonio.

Comparing Figures 5.3 and 7.3 introduces an issue which I address in the discussion chapters to follow as the consequence of cooptation at a system level, the

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greater difficulty introducing initiatives in the area of prevention and treatment than in neighborhood improvement. The average strength of the eleven prevention and treatment strategies in Vallejo was 2.6, much stronger than the average for the same strategies in San Antonio, 1.4 (see Figure 5.3). However, the average strength of seven neighborhood improvement strategies in Vallejo was the same as that for the same strategies in San Antonio, 3.1. While VFB emphasized prevention and treatment more than did SAFB, it also did a lot in the area of neighborhood improvement. Figure 7.1 notwithstanding, Figure 7.2 shows that four of VFB's eight strategies implemented at 3.0 or higher were in the area of neighborhood improvement. This was not so different from SA where five of eight of the strongest strategies were in the area of neighborhood improvement (Figure 5.2). I will argue in a later chapter that it was generally easier to implement neighborhood improvement strategies than it was to implement prevention and treatment strategies. This has to do with the higher level of formal organization and other structural inflexibilities in these service delivery fields in contrast to the somewhat more open, less formally organized arena of neighborhood improvement.

Figure 7.2 gives a more detailed view of the kinds of programming VFB emphasized. VFB's programming had the following in common with SAFB. VFB also emphasized structured activities for youth and community organizing (cf. Figures 5.2 and 7.2). As I argued earlier in this chapter, however, VFB was much less successful organizing African American leadership than was SAFB and did little more to organize Hispanics than did SAFB. Like SAFB, VFB did little with the legal system, the schools,

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treatment and AOD prevention training for youth, and access to tobacco and alcohol.[11]

The local FB programs all had great difficulty intervening in legal and school systems. Within both these systems, large bureaucratic and political players generated their own reforms and controlled interventions. New players as small as the local FB programs either made no headway or were coopted.[12] The local FB programs were also generally unsuccessful in developing treatment for youth. Some had small successes with peer prevention training programs. Access to tobacco and alcohol generally meant attempts to curb corporate AOD advertising --on inner city billboards and metropolitan transit vehicles, as sponsors of local festivals, and so on. Both VFB and SAFB attempted this as did other sites but the strength of the effort was simply low.

VFB's programming differed from SAFB's in the following ways. Whereas SAFB's four strongest strategies were in the area of neighborhood improvement, VFB's two strongest were in the areas of prevention and treatment. The CSAP Community Partnership program accounted for VFB's prevention efforts. VFB's treatment emphasis was realized through subcontracts as will be clear in the following section on grants and

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[11]The qualitative data collected by the FB national evaluation community studies, both interviews and documents, suggest, however, that SAFB worked much more with the schools than is reflected in the strategies data used for the analysis in Figures 5.2 and 7.2.

[12]A good example is Worcester Fighting Back (WFB). WFB initiated an application to the federal Department of Justice to institute a Drug Court, alternative sentencing program. The local District Attorney's office thanklessly used the application and offered WFB no credit or role in its implementation. In this instance, WFB nevertheless could be said to have made a real contribution in preparing the application. However, it was unable to use this effort to sustain itself as an organization with a role in promoting local innovations.

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contracts.

VFB also emphasized control of liquor outlets; whereas, in San Antonio this strategy did not meet the threshold for implemented strategies. This strategy was realized through the Alcohol Policy Coalition.

According to the strategies data, on which the analysis in Figures 5.1 through 5.3 and 7.1 through 7.3 are based, VFB emphasized three strategies which were not strong in San Antonio: workplace/business community, faith community programs, and health care system (cf. Hallfors et al 1999). While there was some evidence that VFB made efforts in these three areas, evidence from the qualitative data is not strong. It is also not clear that VFB succeeded in implementing particular programs in these areas.

VFB's efforts with the workplace/business community were to recruit African American businesses for an employee assistance program to identify and treat employees diagnosed as AOD abusers or dependents. An employee assistance program was never established.

The evidence for VFB's faith community programs was similarly vague. The Community Partnership Manager organized conferences for clergy and churches and sought to enlist churches in prevention, identification, and intervention related efforts. She had previously succeeded in recruiting churches for the Downtown Project, an effort to support and intervene with school children and their families. My interviews and observations in Vallejo and other FB sites indicated that despite public statements of unity and cooperation among clergy and churches, it was very difficult to get them to do

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anything substantive together.[13]

Finally, the strategies data indicate VFB made substantive efforts in the health care system. Evidence for this in the strategies and community studies data was stronger than that for their faith community and workplace efforts; nevertheless, the evidence was ambiguous and incomplete. VFB provided trainings and information for medical personnel on identifying individuals with AOD problems and referring them for services. They also met with staff from Kaiser Permanente, the U.S.'s second largest health maintenance organization which had its headquarters in Vallejo, and from the Solano Health Partnership, both of whom were engaged in new, AOD service-related initiatives.

Kaiser Permanente had two initiatives. First was its experiment with funding AOD treatment for its MediCal clients. MediCal was California's conduit for the national MedicAid program. Kaiser funded some AOD services for MediCal clients without receiving any reimbursements. VFB claimed to play a role in this experiment, but I found no clear evidence that they did. The other Kaiser initiative was the opening of an AOD treatment facility in Vallejo. I do not know what role VFB played in this initiative.

VFB did not make as strong an effort to develop community resource centers as did SAFB. The United Way in San Antonio supported SAFB's effort to do so by housing FB in two community centers and in a building owned by an Eastside church. It also committed staff, equipment, and program funds to the centers, from the FB grant and from its own budget. VFB's lead agency, the city, founded policing substations in

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[13]Individual churches and clergy in other FB sites carried out substantive programing, however.

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Vallejo's neighborhoods but not social and health service centers. In the last year of my data collection, a community center opened in North Vallejo with funding from Solano County's Health and Human Service Department. Interview data suggested VFB's Executive Director supported the founding of the center and part of some meetings related to this endeavor.

Contracts and grants

As noted in Chapter Two, a central goal of the FB intervention was to change the system of AOD service provision in local communities. The meaning of "change" put forth, however, contained two potentially contradicting goals. First, the goal was to re-enforce and weave together by means of planning and existing resources a net of prevention and treatment services that could adequately serve the individuals with AOD abuse and dependency problems in the targeted local communities. Second, participation in this net of services would be broadly inclusive, roping in new, previously un-involved elites and grassroots groups. As a study of cooptation, this dissertation focused more on the latter goal than the former.

VFB's principal mode of allocating the FB grant's resources was subcontracting. VFB's distribution of subcontracts appeared to re-enforce the existing players in AOD services rather than bringing in and developing new players. This outcome was related to the fact that VFB's board membership overlapped with membership in at least two other central organizational players in AOD service provision in Vallejo. I first describe the membership overlap and then show the distribution of contracts.

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VFB's board overlapped with membership on the Solano County Alcohol and Drug Advisory Council which advised the Solano County Board of Supervisors on AOD issues. The Solano County Board of Supervisors in turn set policy for the Solano County Drug and Alcohol Abuse Agency. These same members of VFB's board had been closely involved with changes in the county's approach to AOD services in the early 1980s. Among those changes was the founding of the Southern Solano Alcohol Council which provided detoxification services for the county since the early 1980s through its private, incorporated arm, Bi-Bett, Inc. These same VFB Board members helped to found Bi-Bett, Inc. - Southern Solano Alcohol Council.

Another member of this network was the Executive Director of Youth and Family Services. Youth and Family Services was a provider of social services to families in Vallejo and would be another VFB subcontractor. The director served on the Solano County Alcohol and Drug Advisory Council and also played a key leadership role in VFB's preparation of the FB implementation grant proposal.

My argument here is not to call into question the integrity or competence of these VFB Board members or of these agencies. It is simply that the subcontracts of the VFB grant circulated through this network of agencies, enforcing their centrality in this policy domain.

This membership overlap was a potential, even likely, conduit for information sharing, mutual support and influence among four organizations --VFB, Bi-Bett - SSAC, Youth and Family Services, and SCDAA.

This may in part have been the necessary result of the size of the local AOD

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policy domain. Relatively few dollars are at stake in the public subsidy of AOD services for low income individuals. Therefore, few organizations develop to provide these services. Moreover, certification requirements limit just who can develop treatment providing organizations. The practice was for SCDAA to subcontract with Bi-Bett for detoxification and treatment as well as a few other providers. The particular players in this policy domain were also the consequence of recovering activist mobilization that brought about changes in SCDAA's practices and the founding of SSAC.

VFB did have a training program somewhat parallel to SAFB's program to certify AOD counselors. However, Master Trainer focused less on certifying counselors and more on recruiting lay volunteers. That is, it did not focus on expanding the number of AOD counselors. SAFB both sought to increase the number of certified counselors and the number of minority counselors. Master Trainer graduates in Vallejo, however, could receive credits towards certification if they so chose.

VFB did fund some smaller agencies to survey minority populations about AOD use and to provide one-time programs. Among these were FELAD, a Latino agency that surveyed local Hispanics and neighborhood associations to carry out neighborhood clean-ups. Another prominent example was VFB's support of Filipino American Social Services through the Community Partnership grant.

These contracts were evidence, however, of the RWJF's and local minorities' cooptation of VFB's leadership. The original leadership sought to devote the FB program entirely to treatment and aftercare. The NPO's criticism inspired the city's application for the CSAP grant. The Community Partnership program was also an opportunity for VFB

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to gain the approbation of minorities. It is not clear to me that VFB leadership fully committed to the Community Partnership's success.

In both Vallejo and San Antonio, subcontracting shored up existing service providers. Both local FB programs made some effort at expanding the players in delivering services by developing organizations within minority sub-groups to serve their sub-group. SAFB's effort appeared more robust than VFB's.

Table 7.2 lists VFB's largest subcontracts. By far the largest went to Bi-Bett, Inc. Bi-Bett was involved in three kinds of projects for VFB. The first was a social club for recovering persons that also offered services, for example, acupuncture treatments for recovering drug dependents, workshops and seminars, trainings, and so on. The second was "sober living residences," half-way houses for men and women coming out of treatment. The third was residential treatment for women with small children. The former two projects in particular re-affirmed Bi-Bett's relationship with the "recovery community" of Vallejo, members of which founded Bi-Bett, Inc. - Southern Solano Alcohol Council.

Youth and Family Services was the recipient of the next largest set of subcontracts. The largest was for Master Trainer, a program to train lay persons for outreach and referral to families with AOD and other problems. They were also trained to provide informational talks about AOD problems and services at community gatherings --in churches, schools, and so on.

The third largest set of subcontracts were for Geographical Information Systems (GIS) mapping. This initially supported the Alcohol Policy Coalition in their effort to

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document the relationship between problem alcohol outlets and crime. Later it supported VFB, the city, and others in applications for funding by documenting the spatial distribution of local social and health problems as well as the location of social and health services.

Table 7.3 lists subcontractors for the Community Partnership program funded by CSAP. The recipients of these funds were for the most part involved in the four task forces for each of the following: Filipinos, Latinos/Hispanics, African Americans, and recovering. A fifth target group was later added, youth.

Staff

Table 7.4 lists VFB's staff. The organization drew upon county AOD services networks and recovering networks for its staff. The director, Jane Callahan, was previously an employee of Solano County Health and Human Services. At least four other staff were recovering persons. Two staff had either worked for the county or for other AOD service providers in Solano County.

Table 7.4 indicates that the FB program and its staff were organized around the delivery of particular programs devoted to developing a kind of service, an employee assistance program, a training program, treatment, outreach and referral, and so on. The other type of programs were devoted to the regulation of either alcohol sellers or youths who drink and drive.

The FB program staff were all white with the exception of one Filipino woman, the Public Awareness Coordinator. Some African American interviewees summed up

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both VFB's leadership and staff as "white European women," which appeared to signify to them that FB was a program by and for whites. The complexion of the Community Partnership program staff was quite different, however. The Project Manager was African American, though she was criticized by one group of African Americans for being too "light-skinned." The organizers were of their respective target populations. The original recovering organizer was Filipino and a subsequent one African American.

The Community Partnership was also clearly organized, however, around the support or development of service delivery. This was most clear with respect to youth programming. VFB's idea of "organizing," unlike SAFB's idea, was also geared toward developing services. The function of the organizer positions was to found new nonprofit organizations that could apply for other funding and bid for contracts to provide services to particular populations --minorities and recovering persons. This was in contrast to SAFB's idea of organizing --a holistic, broad-based effort to develop social/organizational, political, human, and financial capital among the Eastside's black population, and to a lesser extent, its Hispanic and elderly white population. VFB was also less committed financially to its organizing staff. They were typically part time rather than full time.

Conclusion

The cooptation process in Vallejo differed from that in San Antonio. First, the outcome was different. In both Vallejo and San Antonio, the FB administrators had the legitimacy of their authority to make decisions about a program targeting minorities

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challenged by minority groups. In San Antonio this challenge led to the incorporation of organized African American grassroots into all levels of the organization: board, staff, and programming. In Vallejo, however, organized minority grassroots were unable to penetrate the leadership circle. Some minority individuals were on the staff but with the exception of the Filipino organizer, they did not represent a larger grassroots constituency. They had difficulty succeeding in developing and carrying out programs. Programming and some small contracts did go to minorities in Vallejo, but the bulk of the grant's resources went to programming by consultants and non-minority subcontractors. SAFB devoted considerably more resources than VFB to a large organizing staff devoted to developing minorities' social, human, and financial capital. VFB paid out some contracts to minority organizations to provide services targeting their own populations.

In San Antonio the United Way's legitimacy problems were confronted and resolved directly and early in the life of the program. In particular, the governance structure worked out in SAFB's by-laws substantively incorporated representation from PAC and other Eastside minority residents in decision-making. VFB, on the other hand, was confronted with legitimacy problems throughout the life of the program. The most open challenge, to the Community Partnership small grant program, was resoundingly put down by the city council's vote in support of VFB's leadership. The subsequent re-organization of the Community Partnership did not resolve the legitimacy problem but it did re-locate the stress point to the Community Partnership Manager and the ethnic task forces. This resolved the problem for VFB's leadership because it deflected attention from their role in decision-making over the Community Partnership.

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Cooptation is a relational social process, that is, its course in San Antonio and Vallejo was determined not only by the structure and action of agency elites and others but also by the structure and action of the grassroots the program was targeting and whose leading organizations FB was intended to engage. San Antonio's grassroots presented a much more organized front and thus mounted a more coherent and credible claim to the local FB program.

What became defined as Vallejo's "grassroots" included a much more diverse and divided set of organizations and leaders. San Antonio's Eastside African Americans were able to constitute a coherent leadership and organization by means of the FB intervention. Moreover, no competition for their claims to FB's leadership developed from other possible groups --Hispanics, whites, recovering persons, and so on. Vallejo on the other hand had two groups who were able to forge a coherent leadership and organization within the framework of the FB program --Filipinos and recovering. African Americans and Hispanics did not appear to have coherent structures based on the categories "black" or "African American" and "Latino" or "Hispanic." On the basis of these categories, they suffered from disorganization: entropy and division. This was a condition that made possible the relocation of the legitimacy problem to the Community Partnership program to distract those African Americans and Latinos who engaged it from the source of decision-making, VFB's board.

The next chapter considers the themes of cooptation and community organization at an institutional level of analysis: the structure and dynamics of relations between minority and majority populations in different urban settings, the structure and dynamics

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of administrating social programs in these settings, and the consequences of these processes for the construction of local urban communities in the U.S.

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Table 7.1. Programming by the Filipino and Recovering Task Forces, 1991-1995.

FILIPINO TASK FORCE	RECOVERING TASK FORCE
peer survey of youth on attitudes and behavior as regards AOD, sex, and other FAST, a tutoring program funded by a CDBG	"Fun in Recovery" events: Recovery Day Celebration which became an annual event, street fair, etc.
two "youth-to-youth" conferences to discuss the results of the survey and what to do about them	development of a Recovery Center, an AOD free social club for recovering persons (also funded by FB grant)
parenting class	activities at the Recovery Center: trainings, workshops, forums[14]
nutrition program for seniors (later funded by the Solano-Napa Agency on Aging) needs assessment of Filipino elderly funded by the Solano-Napa Agency on Aging	development of "Sober Living Residences" for individuals coming out of treatment[15] (also funded by FB grant, space provided by the city, subcontract with Bi Bett Corporation to run the residences)

[14]The large subcontracts spent on this initiative came from the RWJF grant; however, some of the CSAP grant may have been spent on this.

[15]See the previous note.

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Table 7.2. VFB Fighting Back Program Subcontractors and Grants, 1990-1997.

Bi-Bett, Inc. to renovate a "sober living residence," start up and operate a Recovery Center, provide acupuncture	$533,100
Youth and Family Services for Master Trainer, for acupuncture treatment	$179,500[16]
Clew Associates for GIS mapping	$137,800
GRAY Associates for GIS mapping	$38,000

[16]This figure includes some budgeted amounts which may not have been fully paid out.

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Table 7.3. VFB Community Partnership Subcontractors and Grantees, 1990-1996

CSAP GRANT SUBCONTRACTORS	SERVICE PROVIDED
four neighborhood associations	neighborhood cleanup program
FELAD	survey of Vallejo's Hispanics
Solano/Napa County Hispanic Chamber of Commerce	Festival de Familia/Celebration of the Family
unidentified	administer funds for FTF to hold youth conferences and conduct youth survey
unidentified	develop social club for recovering; outreach education program through a local residential treatment center for women with infants
Cooper Cougar Bus Club	volunteer training, materials for children, and recognition for volunteers and participants

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Table 7.4. Vallejo Fighting Back Staff, 1989-1991

Fighting Back grant	Executive Director (former SCHHS[17] staff) Public Awareness Coordinator Coordinator, Community Connection Project 17 Adult Peer Advocates (volunteers) 11 Youth Peer Advocates (volunteers) GIS Data/Financial Assistant Consultant,[18] Recovery Program Consultant, Elder-Link (former SCDAA[19] Dir.) Consultant, employee assistance program for African American businesses Consultant, Jail Treatment Consultant, Alcohol Policy Coalition Consultant, Zero Tolerance[20] Consultant, Responsible Beverage Service
Community Partnership grant	Director FTF organizer RTF organizer (12 Step member) LTF organizer AATF organizer Coordinator, Project Target Youth supervisor, youth advocates 6 youth advocates (interns) Coordinator, Youth Mentoring/Tutoring

[17]Solano County Health and Human Services, the umbrella agency over SCDAA.

[18]VFB subcontracted with consultants to fill staff positions so that it would not have to follow the city's rules for hiring.

[19]Solano County Drug and Alcohol Agency.

[20]Zero Tolerance was an effort to develop local legislation to revoke the driver's licenses of youths caught drinking and driving.

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Figure 7.1. Vallejo Fighting Back Program Content: Percent by General Strategy.



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Figure 7.2. Vallejo Fighting Back: Strength of Specific Strategies.



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Figure 7.3. Vallejo Fighting Back: Average Strength of Each Specific Strategy by General Strategy.



Part 3

Race, Class, and Administration in the Construction of Urban Communities

Chapter 8

Race, Class, Administration, and the Grassroots

Part 2 of this study, the case histories of San Antonio and Vallejo, described the encounters of grassroots, local administrators, and agents of the RWJF as the implementation of the local FB programs was negotiated. I interpreted these interactions as embedded in the social political process of cooptation. I measured the success of the grassroots in these negotiations as the substantiality of their role in decision-making, the extent to which they participated in resource distribution, and the extent to which program content addressed their concerns. The exposition in these chapters remained for the most part at a level of analysis which foregrounded rational action and its consequences.

In these last chapters of this study, I treat the events of the case histories at an institutional level of analysis. I consider cooptation, not as the rational negotiation of power between players but as an enactment of local institutional arrangements. Here I am interested in the organization of actors as classes, the manner in which particular institutional positions defined them and shaped their actions. I delineate formal and informal structures --statutes, legal statuses, residual historical patterns of organization, and so on. These structures were more or less in flux depending on local and regional

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conditions. These structures constrained actors' choices, patterning their interactions, and to some extent re-producing them as classes.

I set cooptation within the broader process of administration and its role in the construction of local communities, that is, the social organization of inner city grassroots.[1] I continue to draw on data from the San Antonio and Vallejo cases but now also draw on data from the other eight case histories developed from the FB study.[2] My orienting assumption in this final discussion is that in the course of the RWJF's attempt to build democratic community organization, the FB program's development was channeled into the process and organization of administration. The negotiation of the terms of administration between administrators and grassroots was an enactment of the relationship between social organization in inner cities and administration. FB's implementation both engaged and reproduced the relationships of these classes of actors --those based in the inner city and those based in local and regional politics, administration, and service delivery.

The broad purpose of these final chapters is to shed light on how administration is related to the social organization of inner city neighborhoods, both isolating them from

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[1]This orienting idea was suggested to me by a brief section in Suttles's *The Social Construction of Community* in which he discusses local communities as "objects of administration" (1974: 257). Suttles brought up this idea in his discussion of the distinction between local and national communities. I consider this issue in the concluding chapter.

[2]Case histories were completed for Worcester, New Haven, Columbia, Vallejo, San Antonio, Kansas City, Milwaukee, and Little Rock. Interview and other data was collected for Newark and Washington, D.C. and case histories were drafted but not completed.

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the broader social order and incorporating them into that order. To that end I explore how administration produces entropy, division, and cohesion in the social organization of inner cities.

There are four parts to this undertaking: (1) understanding how race relations shaped the organization of administration and of the inner city communities I studied; (2) understanding the formal features of administration which organized its relation to these urban communities; (3) interpreting the response of grassroots actors to administration which both reflected and shaped grassroots social organization; (4) identifying the local and regional conditions that might explain variance in how administration organizes and disorganizes urban communities. In Chapters 8 and 9, I address race relations and the formal features of administration. In Chapter 10, I address local features of administration and grassroots organization.

Chapter 8 begins by describing the principal dynamic driving social organization in urban U.S. communities --race relations. I then describe some basic structures and processes of the administration of social policy --jurisdiction and resource distribution. I then describe the social organizational consequences of these features of administration as the grassroots seek material, social and other benefits from the administrative economy.

1. The "Color Line"

Race relations and their historical residues are the principal force producing inner cities. They therefore color the organization of urban administration and its relation to social organization in inner cities. This section argues that while race relations operate

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through local politics and administration to divide and disorganize urban communities, administration also bonds inner city neighborhoods to the social and political orders operating in cities. In doing so administration produces particular features of social organization in inner cities which are also then a constitutive part of the organization of administration.

Coleman treated community organization as iterative, previous relations producing residues of social organization and sentiment that then tend to be reproduced in the course of new public controversies (1971: 678 [Table 1]). The predominant historical consequence of U.S. urban race relations has been racial division and inequality. Racial segregation, perhaps the most strikingly persistent feature of U.S. urban communities in the twentieth century, is the original and persisting product of this social divide. In a classic feedback effect the momentum of segregation has tended to reproduce racial division and the attendant socio-economic disparities through a variety of institutions: housing and labor markets, uneven commercial and industrial development, politics, and administration of public services (e.g. schools, medicine, policing, and housing).

The consequences of the historical concentration of African Americans in inner city neighborhoods have presented a chronic series of crises for urban social order. A latent function of social intervention and the accompanying cooptation process is to reach across the racial divide to incorporate inner city social organization into the larger metropolis. That administrators must bridge this divide has a social structural effect. Inner city leaders who represent, or at least claim to represent, inner city populations, broker relations between inner city community organization and the next higher level of

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administrative institutions. This is an opportunity for inner city actors to negotiate some degree of influence on the course administration will take. Historically, this situation has produced a class of inner city based actors who broker these terms of inner city representation in the process of administration.

The fruit of gaining a position of power or influence in administration is being able to play a role in resource distribution. This opportunity then plays a role in producing another class of inner city based actors, the organizations and professionals who receive contracts, grants, fees and other resources in order to deliver the services which administrative decision-making generates.

Administration thus organizes a social structural relationship between segregated minority neighborhoods and higher level institutions which constitutes a modicum of incorporation. However, these relationships created by administration also generate heat in the context of urban racial divisions. Coleman argued that the residue of sentiment for losers in local controversies is hostility toward the dominant group (1971: 667-674). I discovered this to varying degrees in the FB sites in interviews with older inner city residents who had been a part of past and ongoing local battles over the provision of infra-structure and basic services to black neighborhoods, beltway and other construction that displaced black residents, school desegregation, over police brutality and neglect, and so on. In brokering the distribution of power and other resources, inner city African American leadership represents constituencies that have often felt they have never received the share they deserve. The consequence in the FB case was often a hard bargain, sometimes accompanied by polarizing, hostile rhetoric.

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How the racial divide expressed itself in administrative institutions in a given metropolis appeared to depend in large part on the stage of and prospects for demographic succession. The interaction of politics and administration with demographic developments has been one key historical mode of incorporating new and marginalized groups into the larger society (e.g. Steinberg 1989 [1981], Fainstein 1993). For African Americans, however, achieving local political power has typically coincided with white flight. Cities where blacks dominate both the population and local politics are then left with higher concentrations of poverty and the social problems which correlate with poverty (cf. Massey & Denton 1993:115-147). Some whole metropolises thus become ghettoes in a somewhat new political administrative context, the relation between black or minority metropolises and state governments.[3] This appeared to be the case in two FB intervention sites, Newark and Washington. Local administrative institutions were overwhelmed. For example, in Newark local schools were in an abject state. Washington was in a fiscal crisis. In both cases, the next higher level of administrative authority had taken control of African American-run local authorities. The state of New Jersey took over the Newark school district. Congress took control of Washington's finances. The succession of African Americans in urban politics and administration appeared to re-produce the racial divide at the next higher institutional level. African American political and administrative leadership inherited, however, poverty stricken and

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[3]I use the term "ghetto" here to mean the socio-cultural world in which a segregated minority group lives which is nevertheless institutionally and culturally related to the larger society (cf. Wirth 1928: 1-6).

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overwhelmed local institutions.[4]

The two cities I focused on most in this study, San Antonio and Vallejo, had experienced racial demographic succession in neighborhoods but not at the municipal level. It appeared unlikely that in either city blacks would succeed whites as in Newark and Washington because of the growing presence of Hispanics. In these cities the racial divide persisted at the level of municipal politics and administration. This appeared also to be the case in Worcester, Little Rock, Columbia, Kansas City, and Milwaukee.[5]

African American and other minority grassroots conflicted with white FB leadership in at least the following program sites: Worcester, New Haven, San Antonio, Little Rock, Kansas City, Milwaukee, and Vallejo. Demography appeared to correlate with differences in the outcomes of these conflicts. In sites where African Americans were a majority, they dominated FB's governance and were the principal recipients of grants, contracts, and other resources. Where blacks and others were minorities, they were nevertheless typically the populations targeted by the local programs. Among these sites were New Haven, San Antonio, Little Rock, and Vallejo. With the exception of San

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[4]Representatives of New Jersey State, the congressional committee with oversight of the District of Columbia, and others might argue that endemic corruption in politics and administration explained the takeover of African American-run municipal institutions rather than racial division and uneven development. In my view these somewhat independent processes all contribute, though racial division and uneven development are the essential larger context for weak, disorganized municipal institutions.

[5]The latter three cities may eventually be candidates for demographic succession by blacks. None of these three cities had a significant immigrant population which at least opens the door for faster growing black populations to overtake white populations. (Milwaukee was more diverse than the other two cities, but Southeast Asians and Hispanics accounted for less than 10% of the city's population.) See Table 3.2.

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Antonio, in these sites minorities did not appear to be influential in FB's governance. In these sites, African American and other minority organizations were, however, recipients of the FB grant's resources in the form of contracts, grants, and other assistance. In sites where whites were the majority population and dominated governance, minority organizations and individuals garnered a small share of the grant's resources through contracts, small grants, jobs, and by other means.

Whether or not this transfer of resources was a force for cohesion or division among inner city organizations depended on local factors. In the case of Vallejo this incorporation method, and the way it was handled, appeared to exacerbate existing divisions between and among local minorities. In San Antonio incorporation appeared to have an organizing effect at the level of the minority group. African American neighborhood-based and agency-based leadership did not appear to be divided as in Vallejo. Rather, they appeared to divide the labor of administration and politics while remaining cohesive in their informal relations. Eastside agencies provided services while neighborhood-based organizations took the city and others on over administrative control and influence in decision-making.

In intervention sites where race and ethnicity were less salient organizing principles, that is, where either whites or blacks dominated both population composition and local administration, administration could be organized in a manner which drew the grassroots into cooperative relationships with administration or alienated them. In predominantly white Worcester, FB played a role in organizing a federation of neighborhood associations which appeared to exacerbate conflict between neighborhood

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groups and police as well as other municipal agents of service delivery. In Little Rock, FB played a cohering role in relations between some white neighborhoods and city hall. I discuss these organizing and dividing elements in administration after I introduce the basic structural features of administration.

2. Structures and Processes of Administration

I begin this section with some introductory remarks. I then briefly describe the social actors which administration engages and organizes. I then introduce the jurisdictional features of administration and describe their effect on grassroots organization. I then describe the processes of resource distribution and their consequences for the grassroots. Finally, I describe organizational sectors within administration and their diverse effects on grassroots organization.

Local communities are "objects of administration" (Suttles 1974: 257). The administration of public services and the implementation of policy produces local communities as units of the "supracommunity" or of higher levels of a political administrative community --metropolis, region (county and state), and nation-- and is therefore also a process which relates local communities to the supra-community. Administration has technical-formal and political-informal mechanisms that create conditions for entropy, division, and organization in local communities. The technical-formal mechanisms consist in the legal apparatus that authorizes and governs administration. This technical-formal aspect is the product of politics but in its turn has an effect on the organization of politics. These structures and processes in turn construct

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local communities. In the FB program sites, they appeared capable of simultaneously organizing, disorganizing, and dividing local communities.

Administration, the implementation of social policy, is largely undertaken by government. In FB intervention sites where the grantees were governmental bodies --for example, Vallejo, Little Rock, and Milwaukee-- FB was for the most part drawn into the local organization of governmental administration. Administration is also initiated by private, non-governmental organizations. The national FB program is an example. FB intervention sites where non-governmental agencies implemented the program engaged somewhat different institutional processes. Nevertheless, because the resources that flow through the process of administration originate so predominantly from governments, and administration is therefore largely the sphere of government, non-governmental administration tends to be drawn into the same field of relations.

Classes

Administration is a vehicle for the goals of those elites and professionals who have official roles in administration. It is also a vehicle for the goals of various urban groups. The principal classes engaging the administration of FB were political and administrative elites, service providers, and the grassroots groups who were the objects of administration and also sought to participate in or influence its processes.[6] How these

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[6]Other types of private actors are central players in some areas of administration. For example, sociologists and political scientists have written a great deal about the role of realtors, developers, construction firms, and others in the area of housing, commercial, industrial, and related infra-structure development. See, for example, Zukin (1982), Logan and Molotch (1987), Teaford (1990). This was much less the case in the

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relationships played out in the FB case produced the organization of both administration and local communities.[7]

Both political and administrative elites seek to realize their ambitions by responding to and organizing constituencies through public problem construction and distributing resources. Service providers and professionals are recipients of resource distribution as are grassroots leaders and groups. Providers derive their bargaining position with elites primarily as a function of their social and human capital. Their social capital resides in their efficacy as formal organizations, their human capital in their professional credentials and expertise. Grassroots derive their bargaining position with elites primarily from their function as constituents. Though providers are also important constituents and allies of political and administrative elites, grassroots have the moral advantage in their function as constituents because they are the citizens targeted by administration. Providers are advantaged, however, in their formal capacity to receive resources directly. Both providers and grassroots are organized by the efforts of elites to construct problems and create constituencies. They are also organized by the nature of their social base, providers by professional individuals and agencies, the grassroots by nascent and formal organizations in inner city neighborhoods.

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administration of FB as it did not tend to touch the immediate interests of private actors outside inner cities.

[7]I use the term "produce" to mean the enactment or manifestation of social structure. I leave ambiguous the extent to which this simply means a repetition of informal structures or whether it introduces incremental or even wholesale changes. The FB program's enactments of local administration tended merely to repeat structures or otherwise reflect social structural changes already underway in large part because of the relatively small scale of the intervention.

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Jurisdiction

The FB program idea as expressed in the "Call for Proposals" treats administration on the face of it as the delivery of services (RWJF 1989a). The authority to administrate and its parameters are defined most powerfully, however, by legislation. A fundamental set of statutes define the jurisdictional organization of administration. Legislation obviously involves politics and has political consequences, for example, in the U.S. the drawing of electoral districts tends to favor the political party that dominates at the time. Nevertheless, once defined, jurisdiction becomes part of the technical machinery of administration.

Jurisdiction defines both the physical and functional domains of authorities. It generates the organization of administrative responsibility and also shapes and can generate both formal and informal organization in response to it. The complex geographical and functional organization of administration can also have disorganizing and dividing effects. I discuss territorial organization of administration first, then its functional organization.

Geography

Jurisdiction denotes physical or geographical boundaries in two senses. It sets boundaries between peer authorities marking, for example, where one municipal boundary ends and another begins. It also defines boundaries between levels of authority signifying the limits of a subordinate level of authority with respect to a superordinate level of authority, for example, the authority of state departments of human services in

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California and Wisconsin over county departments. Multiple layers of administrative authority therefore typically apply to a given urban area.

The organization of administration by service districts has the potential to create competition between those districts. For example, cities with district or ward-based representation sometimes distribute administrative resources according to these same boundaries. In San Antonio, neighborhood organization on the Eastside treated the distribution of CDBG funding as if those that mustered the biggest turnout at public hearings and otherwise exercised the most influence would be best able to shape official decision-making. On the one hand this was an incentive for the development of neighborhood organization as savvy residents sought the best advantage. On the other hand, this organization of the distribution of resources brought neighborhoods into conflict over who would receive more or less funding to fix sewers, streets, sidewalks, and so on.

Treatment was an area in which the geographically nested structure of jurisdiction foiled the FB intervention. Treatment services were typically organized at the county or state level, not the municipal level. Because the FB programs typically targeted municipalities or sub-municipal areas, most local FB programs' attempts to influence treatment delivery had little effect. Moreover, developments at the state level affected the delivery of treatment services for target area residents in a manner over which the local FB programs had little, if any, control. For example, San Antonio FB mobilized considerable clout and resources to establish a detoxification, intake, and referral facility on the Eastside; however, the effort ground to a halt when their most essential ally, the

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state AOD agency, came under the cloud of a scandal.[8] In contrast, developments at the state level were a boon to Vallejo FB. During the planning phase the California state legislature allocated extra funding for treatment in Solano County to make up for historical inequities in funding to the state's counties. This contributed to the initial momentum of Vallejo FB.

Function

Administration is also organized by functional jurisdiction, the boundaries around who has authority to deliver which services or address what kinds of public problems. This aspect of jurisdiction draws lines between administrative domains. In the case of FB and the construction of local AOD problems, this functional division of administration was an organizing factor in contests over "ownership" of public problems. As I argued in Chapter 2, at the time of FB's initiation the administrative domain of law enforcement had the upper hand in both the national and local construction of AOD problems. The FB program was an effort to shift more responsibility for the public problem of AOD to the areas of prevention and treatment.

The RWJF sought to inspire entire local "communities" to take collective responsibility for local AOD problems. However, providers and administrators with distinctive arenas of authority and expertise prioritized AOD related problems differently. Educators and youth service agencies in Vallejo insisted that prevention took precedence

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[8]In the summer of 1995, the Houston and Dallas Councils on Alcohol and Drug Abuse were suspected of misappropriation of funds from the state agency. The state agency was allegedly complicit in the scandal.

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over treatment because it could intervene in the lives of youth and adults before they embarked on the destructive path of substance abuse and dependency. Twelve Step members in cooperation with other treatment advocates, however, saw detoxification and aftercare as priorities because of the points at which Twelve Step programs play a role in the course of recovery from chemical dependency. It is a tenet of the Twelve Steps that members reach out to "the alcoholic (or addict) who suffers" (Alcoholics Anonymous World Services 1995). Twelve Step members in Vallejo were frustrated that waiting lists for publically subsidized detoxification prevented drug dependents ready to quit from taking that step immediately. In Vallejo FB's planning phase these parties and others were divided over what the priorities of the program should be and therefore what administrative domain they fell under. At the same time, these players in the construction of Vallejo's AOD problems also represented or were allied with these different administrative domains.

The functional jurisdictional organization of administrative authority also draws lines between lay and professional. Certain kinds of acts are only allowed to be carried out by those with proper certifications. Moreover, in the delivery of services, individuals with educational and other formal credentials are deemed more appropriate for leadership roles and delivering specialized services.

Grassroots organized in reaction to this boundary between professional and lay in their efforts to "own" local AOD problems. Many grassroots leaders expressed open suspicion of the relevance of certain kinds of expertise, thereby challenging the legitimacy of professions. As I will show in a later section, grassroots leaders tended to

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understand AOD problems in terms which called for authority or expertise indigenous to the inner city. They claimed residents and organizations based in inner city neighborhoods understood their problems better and cared more about solving them because they lived with them. They also argued that minorities had the most authority or expertise in working with their own group members because they had cultural expertise that non-members did not have.

Legal statutes not only define the credentials of individuals who are permitted to address certain problems or engage in certain acts. They also define the formal requirements of the organizations authorized to receive public and other resources in order to deliver services or otherwise administrate. The following section discusses the implications of this feature of administration for the organization of urban social relations.

Resource distribution and uneven development

In this section I first describe how inner city grassroots organizations were disadvantaged in the competition for material resources from government and nonprofit agencies. Second, I describe the conflicts that nevertheless arose between metro-wide service providers and grassroots in the course of local AOD public problem construction as grassroots attempted to construct AOD problems in a manner that included them in resource distribution. Third, I describe the system cooptation, or goal displacement, that tends to occur when inner city, minority-based organizations themselves become provider agencies.

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Grassroots disadvantage

In the 1990s, the deliverers of AOD services appeared increasingly to be nonprofit and for profit agencies (cf. Smith and Lipsky 1993). The legal mechanisms for administrative resource distribution are contracts, grants, and fees. Contract and grant competitions are organized formally by competitive bidding and "RFP" processes, respectively.[9] The grassroots were structurally disadvantaged in the competition for these resources for a variety of reasons. The most powerful formal barrier was their organizational status. They were often informally organized rather than incorporated as non-profit corporations which status authorizes organizations to receive grants and contracts.

Those inner city organizations that were incorporated were often less well developed than providers servicing the metropolitan area. They lacked the level of material, social, and human capital that others were capable of investing in grant applications and bids for contracts.[10] To the extent they participated in the administrative

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[9]"RFP" stands for "Request for Proposals," the document issued by governmental bodies, foundations, and others that announces the existence of a grant and invites applications.

[10]An organization's material capital is its literal wealth --real estate, equipment, contracts, grants, accounts, revenue streams, and so on. An organization's human capital resides in the expertise (skills, knowledge, credentials) of its members --employees, board, and so on-- that it is able to draw upon and that it is able to purchase, for example, consultants. Its social capital resides in the professional, inter-personal and - organizational networks of its members that it is able to draw upon. The resources gleaned from these networks may be information about contracts, grants, good consultants, legislative changes, and so on. These three kinds of capital can interact synergetically. They are the kinds of investments available to those with resources by which the "rich get richer" (cf. Burt 1992: 8-10).

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economy, they tended to become subcontractors to larger providers or the recipients of small grants rather than a part of mainstream resource flows. The administrative process of resource distribution therefore tended to advantage the haves over the have nots, more fully developed, organizations, wealthier in material, human, and social capital.

Administrative agencies that distribute grants and contracts and the agencies that receive them are constrained by legalities around contract law and the procedural requirements of the bodies that give them authority to act. For example, administrative agencies need to be able to audit contractors, which requires contractors to prove a certain level of administrative competence. Larger organizations that have been in existence longer, that have experience administrating large grants and a track record of providing services, have a leg up in the competition for contracts and grants. The degree of bureaucratic capacity was thus a factor advantaging formally developed and larger organizations in the distribution of the FB grant's resources.

The following FB sites did have large, administratively competent minority-run organizations that received large subcontracts or were the FB grantee --Newark, Washington D.C., and Milwaukee. Two conditions appeared necessary for this to occur. First, blacks had succeeded whites in the control of either local politics generally or some aspect of local administration. Second, these organizations and their leaders appeared to have a history dating as far back, in some cases, as the Community Action Programs of the Johnson administration's Office of Economic Opportunity.[11]

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[11]Little Rock FB was an exception. Little Rock is a predominantly white city with predominantly white elected officials (Table 3.2). Its neighborhood development agency, however, was headed by an African American as was the FB program during the early

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An issue related to organizational development was professionalization. Professional local consultants and agencies external to the inner city who subcontracted with the local FB organization were more likely to receive larger subcontracts. A number of factors gave these individuals and agencies more legitimacy than many inner city organizations. To the extent they had more human capital, graduate degrees and fitting certifications for certain professional services --medicine, social work, treatment, education, and so on-- they had more legitimacy as contractors. In San Antonio, for example, the grassroots had more influence in setting the local FB organization's policies, but the largest subcontracts were for professional services --intake, referral, and treatment. The largest of these contracts went to the San Antonio Council on Alcohol and Drug Abuse, one of the very organizations that some grassroots leaders most resented because they believed it had avoided serving inner city blacks, preferring to service the predominantly white suburban population. FB's budget for contracts with the San Antonio Council on Alcohol and Drug Abuse was 17 times greater than its largest budgeted contract with an Eastside, inner city-based organization.[12]

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implementation phase. Little Rock Fighting Back provided large contracts to two inner city providers, one based in a mosque and the other in a church. These contracts enabled at least one of these provider organizations to expand its operation and experience in providing treatment and other services to ex-convicts coming out of prison and to single women with children. I discuss the significance of this example in the next chapter when I discuss local factors in the organization of administration.

[12]San Antonio FB's budgeted contracts with the San Antonio Council on Alcohol and Drug Abuse totaled more than $170,000. The largest contract budgeted for with an Eastside organization was with People Against Corruption for around $11,000.

San Antonio FB tried to counter grassroots disadvantage by contracting with SACADA to provide a drug counseling certification course at an Eastside community center and recruiting African American and other Eastside residents for the classes. The

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There were also minority social workers and treatment professionals in the FB sites. When they worked for agencies with white executive staff that serviced the metropolitan area and did not have a history of relating to inner city residents and organizations, inner city-based organizations tended to resent their presence. This resentment was especially vehement in Vallejo where one particular neighborhood group verbally attacked African American outsiders as helping only better-off, middle class minority kids rather than kids living in the "ghetto" whom some inner city leaders felt should have been the focus of support. Inner city leaders discredited both white and black professionals for not living in the inner city and felt this disqualified them from legitimately working with inner city residents.

Other minority professionals worked out of inner city organizations. This was the case for outpatient treatment providers in Washington and Little Rock. On average, however, minority professionals in multi-racial sites appeared to work more in the area of prevention while whites continued to dominate treatment agencies. Those minority professionals with a base of support among inner city residents did not appear to generate controversy with leadership and residents as did professionals based outside the inner city.

Inner city based organizations often appeared to be relegated to receiving small grants and contracts because of these two factors --lack of formal organizational

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long term goal appeared to be the development of potential professional staff for an independent minority-run Eastside referral agency. I discuss the convergence of ethnic competition and political administrative succession in a later section.

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development and professionalization of services.[13] Many of the local FB organizations set up grant programs to pass on resources to these organizations, but few of these grants were more than $1,000. These funds were often used to put on one time events --rallies, block parties, conferences, and so on. In some cases they were used to run one time, small programs limited in duration and scope --recreational programs for youth, after school programs, and so on. These programs typically were on a small scale, required little bureaucratic administration, and minimal input from credentialed professionals. The local FB organizations with small grant programs included at least the following: Vallejo, San Antonio, Milwaukee, Worcester, and New Haven.

Conflict between grassroots and service professionals

Conflicts between grassroots and providers over resources took place on two levels of public problem construction. Battles for direct control of resources over and against administrative and provider agencies were generally about "ownership" of the local AOD problem (Gusfield 1981: 10). Battles over specific program content were over "problem definition" and "responsibility" for solutions. Other related conflicts were over meeting times and the physical location of the FB offices. Grassroots resentments in many instances were high. Sentiment between these two classes of actors thus tended to be polarized. Challenges to the legitimacy of provider and administrative agencies to conduct programs and provide services in the inner city focused on who had the authority

[13]As I noted above, exceptions were large, black-run agencies in Milwaukee, Newark, and Washington D.C.

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to address problems in the inner city and on the intentions of outsiders seeking to work with inner city populations.

Inner city grassroots leaders with whom we spoke had problems with both the views and efforts of service providers whom they perceived to be interlopers. Many identified existing formal organizations and informal groups they believed were best qualified to address local problems. Often their claim to authority was not based on education, certifications, or other professional qualifications. Rather it was based on experience and membership. They believed that living with the problems on an everyday basis gave them special knowledge and perspective. They also believed that being a member of the afflicted group and neighborhood made them more legitimate as implementors of solutions.

Across the FB sites we consistently heard grassroots leaders make this claim. They resented others making decisions which affected inner city residents without including them. They resented playing second fiddle to professional agencies based outside the inner city. A leader on San Antonio's Eastside explained,

> There was friction [with the United Way] at first, because they wanted to control us, people who didn't know anything about this community, had no relationship with this community, never been in this community... knocked this community. So we had some problems with [the first FB project director] and a young Anglo girl. She wanted to be the director, but would never have lasted out here amongst these people. She didn't hit it off too well with them because they had done things

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> in secret, you know, back-door stuff. It was like, "We're gonna show these niggers and these Mexicans what they need for their community. And we're smarter than they are, and we're gonna go out here and tell them what's good for their community." There was a lot of resistance to that.

A neighborhood leader in Vallejo made related remarks. He noted that this was not so much a race issue as a "class" issue. The dividing line appeared to be between service professionals and non-professionals, though he conflated this issue with gradations of skin color and a distinction between "middle" and "lower" class. The latter appeared to distinguish those who lived outside what he called "the ghetto" and those who lived in the ghetto, respectively. He suggested service professionals --black or white- - were arrogant, thought they knew what was best for the ghetto, and did not appreciate the views of residents and neighborhood based organizations.

> There is a problem in the African American community people don't want to address --class. Professional people feel they're better than average in so-called "blighted areas." They work with Fighting Back but they're not getting to the root causes because they feel they're in the middle class. The worst perpetrators are African Americans. If you have light skin, you get over. If you're dark, regardless of education, you have a harder struggle. We're talking about college educated professions. [A local organization] is dealing with people out on the street, in the gutter, dealing with people on the lower level. There is a difference

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of classes here. FB is dealing with the upper class echelon of blacks, not lower class.

Many also believed that social service agencies made their livelihood off of their misery. In both San Antonio and Vallejo, grassroots activists said that local agencies used census and other data on inner cities to demonstrate severe problems which were then used to gain grants and other funding which did not benefit inner city residents.

Interviewer (Jones): But do you think that of the people who were involved in this initial [Fighting Back] effort, they didn't become involved immediately, I take it?

Interviewee: No, they didn't. There was still a lot of hesitancy because. . . here comes another program into our community to make money off of us. See, everybody also had the impression, and you need to remember this, they wanted to make money off the blood of our children and the crime statistics of our community. We've seen police departments do it, we've seen the sheriff's department do it, we've seen the D.A.'s office do it, we've seen the city of San Antonio do it. They're doing it right now. They take these statistics, and they go get grants to come in with these crime-fighting programs. So it was also viewed in that perspective, and we told them that we couldn't have that, that we weren't going to tolerate it.

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A neighborhood leader in Vallejo made a similar point.

> The mayor does not want any social programs in this part of the city....We've only been used as a target area to get money, but there are no programs here. When the Mayor uses us as statistics but puts no programs here, that's salt in the wound.

Neighborhood leaders in Vallejo also resented the money spent on surveys carried out by research firms and consultants from outside Vallejo. They felt they knew what the problems were and how to address them. They wanted funding directed immediately at problems and felt they were best qualified to define them and implement solutions.

Service professionals expressed bewilderment at the hostility grassroots participants directed at them. A VFB staff member bitterly recalled a neighborhood meeting at which a resident threw a draft implementation proposal for the FB project across the room and called it "crap" without even reading it. Other informants in Vallejo expressed dismay at the vehemence of FB's critics during meetings of the Critical Mass Committee. An FB board member viewed the committee as an unproductive forum where minority residents vented their rancor at FB staff and the board. It was described as "very stressful" for staff and volunteers involved in running the committee.[14]

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[14]Coleman identified this "asymmetrical affect" in divided communities (1971: 670). The losers in past controversies tend to feel hostility towards the winners, but the winners do not necessarily feel any. Grassroots hostility was even more mystifying to "winners" in local FB related controversies when the individuals on the winning side did not live in the local community and had no previous experience with local relations between administrative agencies and the grassroots. Some of these administrators and professionals received their first exposure to inner city organizations and leadership

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During the planning phase and early implementation another typical manifestation of conflict between grassroots volunteers and service professionals related to meeting times and places. Professional service providers preferred day time meetings. They could attend meetings as part of their paid work. For the grassroots, including leaders, the meetings were unpaid time taken away from family, work, or leisure. Nevertheless, they preferred the meetings were held in the evenings because many could not leave their jobs to attend. In San Antonio, another factor applied. Meetings during the summer were held right after work during dinner time so that elderly residents and others could get home before dark when they felt safer coming and going in their neighborhoods.

In many of the FB program sites, the location of the FB offices was an important symbolic issue. Grassroots felt the project should have a physical presence in the inner city. In most instances, the location of the project in better neighborhoods and office buildings was taken by the grassroots as a lack of commitment to inner city residents. For example, some neighborhood leaders in Vallejo insisted on holding FB's African American Task Force meetings in an inner city neighborhood and belittled FB staff whom they claimed were afraid to come to their neighborhood for meetings. Neighborhood leaders identified FB with city hall and saw the location of its offices next door to city hall in a city-owned building as evidence that the program was not truly a "community-based" program. In San Antonio, on the other hand, branch offices were established in Eastside community centers --the Barbara Jordan Community Center and the Ella Austin

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through the FB program. Inner city leaders and organizations, however, tended to have lived in the local community for many years, some for decades, and remembered well or were involved in a history of controversies over administration in their neighborhoods.

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Community Center. The main FB office was housed on the Eastside where rent was paid to a neighboring African American Baptist church. This presence of SAFB on the Eastside was the result of grassroots involvement in decision-making and boosted the local legitimacy of the program.

Small, minority-based neighborhood service organizations and activists, especially those in multi-racial settings, perceived larger, metro-wide agencies as interlopers in their domain. As such they considered them illegitimate, incompetent to deal with ghetto problems and residents. Moreover, they considered them exploiters. Many felt that social programs often merely enriched the wealthier, larger, interloping agencies. Perhaps the most bitter expression of this resentment was the use of the term "poverty pimp" for those professionals and agencies who were believed to make their living off of inner city misery, robbing inner city residents of resources that grassroots leaders believed should go directly to those with the moral authority and local knowledge to understand problems and address them, inner city organizations.

The claims of grassroots leaders had moral weight with the NPO and RWJF program officers, especially in FB sites where there was a racial difference between white providers and minority grassroots. In San Antonio the grassroots were primarily African American, the lead agency and providers predominantly white. In Vallejo the contentious grassroots were African Americans and Latinos, the lead agency and providers predominantly white.[15] The RWJF was committed to grassroots participation in decision-

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[15]While race has its own powerful dynamic described in the first section of this chapter, the divide between grassroots and service providers need not be racial. The same basis for conflict existed in mono-racial settings, whether white like Worcester or black

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making, and in most sites the NPO's predominant definition of the grassroots was ethnic or racial minorities.

Problem ownership and ethnic succession

As I have argued, the organization of problem solving by professions and by resource distribution disadvantaged the grassroots. Grassroots sought to overcome this disadvantage within the terms set by the organization of administration. There were two ways grassroots sought to do so in order to gain access to resource flows and control of administration in inner cities. One was to acquire the same professional credentials and establish new provider agencies. San Antonio and other local FB organizations adopted this strategy, sponsoring drug counselor certification classes for inner city residents and planning for new agencies and facilities. The other strategy was to re-define the problem to discredit existing professions or create new professional niches.

Mainstreaming. The first strategy, acquiring credentials and founding agencies or expanding existing ones, had limited success. Some local programs provided course work for inner city residents towards certification, though none of these were permanently established. Attempts were made to found new providers and expand existing providers. The following are examples and their outcomes.

A service providing inner city agency in Little Rock was founded on the strength of a subcontract with the local FB program; however, it fell apart under a cloud of scandal. In Newark and Milwaukee the African American-run FB programs attempted to

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like Newark and Washington.

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incorporate as nonprofits. These two local organizations did not look like they would survive when our research ended in 1998.[16] Vallejo FB sought to establish African American and Latino providers, respectively. At the time my research ended, the idea of founding an African American provider had been dropped. A group of Latino professionals looked like they might achieve incorporation, but their chances for development were unclear.

The one inner city agency which showed some promise for the future was in Little Rock. It was not a new agency but one that expanded considerably with the help of a large subcontract from the local FB program. This organization may well have had a future because the city had recently established a local tax, a percentage of which was committed to treating drug dependents. If the organization was able to maintain its credibility and relationship with city hall, it had a chance of continuing to provide services as long as the tax remained on the books and the city continued to contract with the agency.

The obvious factor contributing to the difficulty establishing new inner city-based service agencies was lack of reliable funding. FB had a relatively long tenure in many of the intervention sites, eight years, more in some intervention sites; however, the level of funding was not high enough to foster development of provider agencies.

Existing inner city agencies that provided AOD related services tended to conduct prevention rather than treatment. Many of the small, existing inner city agencies, relied

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[16]The local program in Worcester also attempted to incorporate. I excluded it here because it would not have qualified as an inner city, minority-based organization. Regardless, the organization dissolved in 1998.

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on a grab bag of prevention and other, often youth service related, grants. Prevention programing was easy to get into because it was not regulated, either by authorities or professional associations, and therefore did not require special certifications. Perhaps for this very reason, prevention did not really constitute an independent administrative domain. Funding streams for prevention programs tended to flow from federal government to large, local institutions --schools, police departments, housing authorities. Or they were generated by the policies of these large agencies. Large agencies tended to carry out their own programs rather than subcontracting with other agencies.

There were other, federal, state, and local allocations for prevention. The mayor's office in Milwaukee funded its own prevention program; the state of Wisconsin funded its own community organizing project to prevent AOD related crime; the federal government's Center for Substance Abuse Prevention, the Department of Justice, and others funded their own programs. To the extent these programs built in a policy of funding inner city based organizations, they benefitted indigenous organizations. However, the horizon of these programs were not clearly established. In the case of CSAP's Community Partnership and RWJF's Fighting Back, uncertainty about whether the program would continue to be funded produced instability for organizations, for example, problems with staff retention.

Treatment services required much more funding to start up and start-ups were unusual. Existing treatment organizations tended to be longstanding and relied in large

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part on fees or subcontracts from state or county governments.[17] This was a relatively reliable stream of support and at much higher volume than the typically piecemeal prevention grants that some city-wide and inner city agencies sought. Publically subsidized treatment was also much more centralized organizationally while prevention programs were scattered across institutional spheres and among organizations small and large. Whether or not treatment providers had a steady stream of resources, depended, however, on both federal and state commitments to subsidizing treatment. The county AOD agency in Milwaukee, for example, anticipated decreased funding for treatment from the state of Wisconsin.[18]

Problem re-construction. The second path for inner city leaders who wanted to establish "ownership" of local AOD problems was to re-define the problem in a manner which shifted resources away from the typically white dominated treatment organizations to providers in administrative areas which inner city organizations minorities dominated or in which they could better compete.[19] I observed two variations of this strategy. In the

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[17]State legislatures typically made decisions about state commitment to subsidized treatment. Either state AOD agencies or county agencies then allocated subcontracts or fees.

[18]To my knowledge Vallejo was the only FB site where funding for treatment increased --both because of a one time increase in funding from the state to make up for past inequities and because of a pilot program instituted by a local insurance company, Kaiser Permanente, to subsidize treatment for its MedicAid clients. The latter source of increased funding was experimental and not necessarily likely to continue. (The insurer wanted to see if treating drug dependency reduced the overall cost of health care for Medicare clients.)

[19]I do not know that the political aspect of these efforts was always conscious, or that when it was conscious it was necessarily the dominant motivation. Social problems and the different understandings of them are also cultural. People imagine problems and

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first, AOD problems were defined as symptomatic of "root causes" that had to be addressed first. These root problems implied solutions other than prevention and treatment. In the second variation, prevention was argued to be the priority over treatment. A multi-cultural language and administrative authority emerged in some FB sites to give status to a new area of expertise, "cultural competence," and a nascent profession, "prevention specialist."

Root causes. In the initial stages of planning the local FB programs, many grassroots insisted the root cause of AOD problems was lack of economic development. They argued that joblessness caused youth to deal drugs, that bleak prospects led to hopelessness, which led to drug use. Many felt the FB grant should take on economic development directly. This implied ownership of AOD problems by economic development agencies. In numerous sites the most established inner city provider organizations were community development corporations (CDCs). Neighborhood organization existed around CDCs in New Haven, Newark, Washington, and Vallejo. Participants in Newark were especially adamant about addressing AOD problems through development. The FB lead agency in Washington was a CDC with experience in

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solutions in ways which fit with how they experience and understand the social world and human behavior. Their experience and interpretation of the social world and human behavior are embedded in the social organizational worlds of which they are a part. The demand to solve a problem a particular way was therefore not necessarily a bald grabbing for resources or was at least also an assertion of cultural beliefs.

Moreover, urban grassroots tended to be culturally oriented toward modes of political behavior that clashed with the political modes of many local social service professionals, the RWJF, and its emissary the NPO. For example, grassroots were more likely to speak openly in terms of self interest, while professionals did not tend to speak publicly in terms of self interest.

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commercial and industrial development since 1980.

Virtually all of the implementation grant applications of the local programs described their local AOD problems as one indication of disorder and decline of "community." The narrative of this construction in some sites posited a golden age of the ghetto when families were in tact, men had jobs, and neighbors looked out for each other's children.[20] Grassroots in San Antonio called the problem a fraying of the "fabric of community." They called for a holistic approach to empowerment and development that "re-knit" the fabric of community. This development approach involved economic, political, social, and moral aspects. It was also premised on the notion of "self-help" or indigenous action and programming. Other local grassroots made similar arguments.

This idea of the solution to the malaise afflicting inner cities demoted AOD problems to a symptom, thereby opening wide the possibilities for program content. Churches could address social and moral aspects as could youth service agencies. CDCs and neighborhood associations could address economic development. Community organizers could address political empowerment. Virtually every local FB program included some or all of these kinds of programming. The local FB organizations made

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[20]Wilson (1987, 1996) and Anderson (1990) erroneously adopt this "native" construction of the development of a new underclass which they deem historically discontinuous with an earlier, socially integrated ghetto. I agree with Fainstein that this central feature of the "underclass narrative" obscures the historically continuous processes of racial segregation embedded in a number of urban institutions central to the social chances of urban residents: housing and labor markets, schools, political and administrative institutions, and so on (1993). Segregated black neighborhoods continue to be reproduced which tends to confine their residents, of whatever socio-economic class, to inferior institutions --urban schools and the lower strata of segmented labor and housing markets.

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grants to and contracted with inner city-based organizations to carry out these strategies. The National Program Office initially accepted this varied programming as legitimate forms of prevention and came to define this type of programming as an "environmental strategy" of "prevention"-- if the neighborhood under-went general improvement, residents would be less likely to use or abuse AOD. The NPO would later reject these types of programming as not direct enough efforts to "reduce demand for AOD."

Cultural in/competency. Another definition of prevention also emerged among inner city and minority providers and professionals. This definition was less broad and identified a new area for expertise which had some potential for professionalization. Prevention and treatment for ethnic minorities was said to require "cultural competency." Professionals in Worcester, Milwaukee, Vallejo, and other sites argued that ethnic minorities needed to become treatment and prevention providers for these groups because they shared cultural worlds and therefore understood the needs and motivations of their fellow ethnics better than non-minorities. Minority professionals in Worcester and Milwaukee authored "cultural competency" curricula that they presented to treatment and prevention providers. Among the cultural groups targeted by "culturally competent" fellow minority ethnics were African Americans, Puerto Ricans and other Spanish speaking groups; Filipinos in Vallejo; Native Americans, Hmong, and other Southeast Asian groups in Milwaukee. Furthermore, a professional in Milwaukee organized a group to make the case to state legislators that prevention deserved recognition as a profession. He proposed a certification process with educational requirements. While claims for the field of prevention did not go so far in other sites, the job title "prevention

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specialist" and variations were used by other local FB organizations.[21]

In Milwaukee this effort to professionalize prevention played a role in what appeared to be either an intentional or de facto succession process with African American and Hispanic providers replacing longstanding white-run and -staffed treatment organizations as providers to inner city clients. Milwaukee County's Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) administrated publically subsidized treatment services for residents who qualified by contracting with local providers. The DHHS acquired not only the RWJF grant but also a federal Center for Substance Abuse Treatment program grant called "Target Cities." The purpose of Target Cities was to rationalize treatment provision by centralizing intake and referral. In Milwaukee the new intake offices were established in black inner city neighborhoods. In the course of implementing this project, the number of individuals seeking treatment in Milwaukee declined. Leaders of the project declared victory. Critics argued that the program was simply botching the administration of the project, not adequately reaching and properly

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[21]The RWJF's Fighting Back and the CSAP's Community Partnership programs were part of an expanding programmatic and research phenomenon that also made inroads into the academy, primarily in the public health field, but also sponsored by other major institutional fields, for example, law enforcement, the military, and education. Pennsylvania State University, for example, recently founded an institute for prevention studies. Prevention is not new but what appeared to be a broad move from treatment towards prevention may have been new. This growing aspect of the construction of a field of related public problems also appeared related to reduced commitment to more capital intensive treatment solutions. Public problem constructors --politicians, administrator, and professions entrepreneurs-- are the vanguard of these kinds of changes. A politician in Milwaukee said to me that he anticipated the Wisconsin State legislature's backing out of support for expensive treatment facilities in Milwaukee and that prevention was a more palatable construction for legislators. This individual was a key person in the effort to shift resources to inner city prevention providers in Milwaukee.

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registering those needing treatment. The critics notwithstanding, in their effect, the actions of the DHHS appeared to aid the development of black and other minority inner city providers to precipitate the decline of longer standing white-run agencies, or at least a decrease of their minority clientele in Milwaukee County.

Milwaukee County's DHHS also used the intake process to refer juvenile offenders and troubled families to minority-run agencies. Meanwhile, the local AOD problem was being defined in the direction of prevention and out-patient programs, away from traditional in-patient treatment. The longstanding white-run treatment agencies had difficulty competing for inner city clients who could choose among inner city-based and non-inner city based providers. The white providers were not located in inner city neighborhoods. Moreover, intake was controlled by staff located in inner city offices. When my research in Milwaukee ended, a group of African American and other minority-run small agencies appeared to be developing their organizational and service capacity based on referrals from this program.

The efforts of minority and inner city organizations to succeed white agencies enabled some of them to establish a better position in the flow of public and private resources intended for services to inner city residents. In the case of Washington, succession appeared complete. The FB lead agency was a CDC, the Marshall Heights Community Development Organization. MHCDO's lead staff was African American. Not only did this organization contract with African American agencies to provide treatment and prevention services. It was considering negotiating with the District of Columbia to take over some of the administrative function of the beleaguered local

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DHHS in the sixth and seventh political wards. (MHCDO was located in Ward Seven.) African American agencies in New Haven, Newark, Milwaukee, and Little Rock also appeared to have made inroads into leadership in the arenas of treatment and prevention services for inner city residents. Minority agencies in Vallejo and San Antonio and minority professionals in Worcester and Columbia were engaged in similar efforts.

Gaining a foothold in the arena of service provision to inner city residents paved the way for the development of a small class of minority treatment and prevention providers in the inner city as well as a minority class of professionals. In some FB sites, this process had already taken hold in the broader fields of politics and administration -- New Haven, Newark, and Washington. It appeared to be occurring through Milwaukee County's DHHS as well though the future of developments in Milwaukee was uncertain. This process in these cities appeared to correlate with a substantial black population with some political strength. Newark and Washington were predominantly black cities. Milwaukee and New Haven were over 30% black (see Table 3.2).

Dilemmas for grassroots incorporation

The organization of resource distribution caused some grassroots leaders and organizations to develop and adapt through professionalization. The development of a class of inner city based providers and professionals, however, presented dilemmas for inner city actors. Staking a claim to administrative resource flows can entail subsequent dependency on these flows. The volume and organization of these flows are largely dependent on politics. These structural factors can have cooptive effects on inner city

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providers. Resource dependency has historically caused inner city providers to reflect the face of policy trends. The dilemma is unavoidable for inner city leadership and organizations with purposes at odds with the predominant constructions of inner city problems --either forgo administrative resources or accept them and to some extent participate in the latent social control function of administration that organizes inner city organizations and individuals into dependent relationships. Although the structure of the situation produces this social control function, the process of control is negotiated through particular administrative mechanisms. I first describe two extreme and opposite types of responses to resource dependency, then more moderate strategies.

Autonomy. Purist, "self help" organizations claimed, or attempted, to avoid dependency by rejecting or not pursuing administrative resources. These were of two kinds --political or advocacy organizations and organizations part of a broad African-American cultural movement emphasizing separatism. The former nevertheless participated in local politics around administrative policy by organizing opposition against or advocacy for particular policies. Participants in various African- American cultural movements were more likely to opt out of this kind of "normal" political participation.

Black Muslims in San Antonio argued that Eastside grassroots leadership should reject the relationship with the United Way and forgo the RWJF grant in order to remain autonomous in their decision-making about Eastside issues that concerned them. Organizations in other FB sites that sought funding from the local FB organizations would accept no conditions tied to the funding. Country Club Crest Improvement

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Association (CCCIA) in Vallejo was one such organization. Funds were never granted under these conditions.

In both of these instances the inner city organization held a separatist strategy for the development of inner cities and their African American residents. Some mosques, CCCIA, and organizations like it participated in diverse ways in a longstanding Afro-centric cultural movement. Few in the FB sites were as publically militant as CCCIA. CCCIA's leadership disavowed "multiculturalism," insisting that residents of the Crest were not part of a multicultural mosaic but were part of a "small town ghetto" predicated on racial subordination. They saw FB as part of a conspiracy by a "white, old boys network" to exploit the Crest. The neighborhood's poverty and crime statistics were used by the city to gain administrative resources that then were not used to help residents.

Both the Coalition of Little Rock Neighborhoods (CLRN) and People Against Corruption in San Antonio were examples of advocacy or "empowerment" organizations. Since I told PAC's story in Chapters 4 and 5, here I summarize the quite different story of CLRN because it brings out the distinction between an advocacy organization and those which participate in the flow of administrative resources.

Associated Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) organized CLRN in 1990.[22] In keeping with ACORN's philosophy of community organizing, the Coalition did not pursue administrative resources or those generated by formal politics. One of their leaders explained to me that the lack of entanglements with politicians and

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[22]Pine Bluff, Arkansas was the home of the original ACORN organization. The Little Rock neighborhood federation (N=8) was one of the oldest of a national network of ACORN affiliated organizations.

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administration enabled them to advocate vigorously against the contemporary local political administrative regime.

The Coalition scored a dramatic success in the early 1990s. It was initially organized around opposition to a referendum for a bond issue to develop a hotel, conference center, and park in downtown along the Little Rock River. To the astonishment of local business elites, the Coalition's campaign was successful. The referendum failed to pass. CLRN's success enabled an eventual compromise in which the bond issue eventually passed but neighborhood initiatives were built into the city's budget as line items funded by the same tax that paid the interest on the bond issue.

A referendum to revise the city charter also passed. Historically, the city council, in Little Rock termed the "Board of Directors," was elected at large. This enabled wealthy neighborhoods in the Heights and to the west to exclude representation from poorer white and black neighborhoods to the east and south. Moreover, the mayor was not elected directly but appointed by the Board. Under the charter revision, the mayor would be elected directly by the voters, seven directors would be elected by ward, and three at-large. The first election under the revised charter was held in 1993. For the first time, African Americans were elected to the Board of Directors.

Dependency. On the other end of the spectrum from advocacy and separatist organizations were those for whom accepting administrative resources to provide services and participate in its social control function did not appear to be a conflict. This was most

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obvious in sites where African Americans ran the relevant administrative agencies.[23] However, I observed such organizations in Little Rock, Vallejo, San Antonio, and New Haven. In these instances minorities appeared to have cornered the market on some aspects of local administration in inner city neighborhoods. One Little Rock provider, a Baptist church, appeared motivated predominantly by religious beliefs and an ethic that was consistent with cross-racial local norms. Others were affiliated with longstanding African American-run organizations, some of which had national affiliations --Boys and Girls Clubs, NAACP, YMCAs, and so on. Some of these had relatively independent financial bases connected to their national network. Others were significantly dependent on local administrative economies.

In Vallejo, African American minority organizations whose social base was not in segregated neighborhoods did not appear conflicted about working with those of other races and within the parameters of "normal" administrative politics. This is probably explained by the white-black Democratic Party coalition that had made inroads into county and municipal politics in the mid-1980s. One accomplishment of this regime was to formalize and make public the process for municipal administrative appointments. This opened up public commission memberships and administrative positions to blacks that had previously been inaccessible. These kinds of organizations appeared to be

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[23]I do not know that African-American-run administrative agencies were less exploitive of inner city residents, or more likely to distribute resources more justly or competently. They appeared also to punish enemies and reward allies and friends. Grassroots advocacy organizations were as needed in predominantly minority cities like Newark and Washington; however, they did not appear to have as strong a presence in these cities as in other cities where blacks were a politically significant minority.

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adequately incorporated into a local administrative niche and its concomitant culture -- beliefs about the relevant social or public problems and practices for addressing them.

Negotiating autonomy within dependency. Other organizations fell between a strong attempt to be autonomous from administration and a relatively unconflicted adaptation to local administration and its concomitant control function. These organizations self-consciously negotiated the constraints that came with participating in administrative resource flows, creating some room for autonomy. I observed two kinds -- large service providers and segmented organizations that divided themselves into aspects with an "empowerment" function and those with a service function.

The best example of an established, relatively independent large provider was Marshall Heights Community Development Organization in Washington. MHCDO's largest projects were a retail mall and housing developments in the District of Columbia's Ward Seven. MHCDO's application for the FB program grant was part of their strategy for "holistic" development. Economic development --the development of properties, businesses, and job creation-- was the heart of their strategy, but they also pursued a "social" development strategy that could support local residents and their families in participating in local economies. Strategies included AOD prevention and treatment, day-care and after school programs, job training, and so on. FB was only one of MHCDO's many projects. The organization had a relatively independent and diverse financial base and enough confidence in its ability to generate and find resources that lead staff were able to privilege the organization's self-defined purposes over those of the RWJF. When the NPO and RWJF pressed MHCDO in directions it did not want to go,

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MHCDO appeared to choose its own path.[24] They ultimately chose to let go of the FB program.

The Vallejo, Worcester, and San Antonio FB organizations all either consciously set out to or fell into combining an "empowerment" strategy with service provision. As I described in Chapter 7, Vallejo did this through the Alcohol Policy Coalition (APC) which supported neighborhood associations, churches, and other neighborhood based organizations in limiting, regulating, and closely monitoring local alcohol markets. This effort was funded in part by the FB grant but also by other grants. Worcester did community neighborhood organizing by acquiring a CSAP Community Partnership program grant to supplement the FB program. The Community Partnership staff attempted to organize a neighborhood federation to advocate for better municipal services and influence local legislation affecting neighborhoods. Although San Antonio FB did not have a Community Partnership grant, it took a similar tack using both the FB grant and United Way funding.

The "empowerment" strategy appeared initially to be accepted by the NPO as a way to incorporate grassroots into the program. The NPO legitimated it as prevention and dubbed it an "environmental strategy." They were influenced in this tack by Goldman and Sparks, Goldman's successor, who organized the Alcohol Policy Committee in Vallejo. The environmental strategy idea was a variation of the "broken windows" idea in policing (Kelling and Coles 1996). The "environmental strategy"

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[24]I am unclear about MHCDO's story at this point. They may also have simply chosen to pursue more promising funding opportunities, namely, taking over some of the District's DHHS services in Wards Six and Seven.

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argues that if neighborhoods looked better --litter and graffiti, illicit drug markets and seedy liquor retailers were cleaned up, properties improved, and so on-- people would find these and related behaviors less acceptable. The change in norms induced by environmental changes would introduce informal social controls that would then reduce AOD use and abuse.

Neighborhood associations, churches, and others in Vallejo participated with the Alcohol Policy Coalition in preventing the granting and renewal of local business licenses for liquor retailers and by monitoring their behavior. Their motives for doing so appeared to be out of concern for neighborhood improvement and the moral corruption of both youth and adults. The environmental theory of prevention appeared also to open the NPO's mind to other neighborhood improvement activities conducted by other local FB organizations.

However, this acceptance of perhaps the strongest, most persistent grassroots agenda in the FB sites did not last. I tell this story in the next section in the course of describing the mechanisms of how the NPO and the local FB organizations negotiated control of the local and national programming agendas.

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Chapter 9

Organizational Levels and Sectors of Administration

The previous chapter described general structures and processes of administration that engage and organize inner city organizations and leadership. This chapter has two parts. First, I describe relations between the national administrators of the FB program and the local administrators as the national administrators eventually sought to impose their original intent of prevention and treatment programming on the local administrators. In the process, mechanisms of administration are touched upon by which the local administrators initially gained some autonomy from national control. However, other mechanisms were subsequently used to tighten national administrators' control over the local programs.

Second, I distinguish three organizational sectors of local administration to which different local FB grantees belonged: governmental, nonprofit philanthropy or charity, and nonprofit service delivery. I then consider the different organizing effects these different types of agencies had on inner city grassroots.

1. Levels of Administrative Control

This section argues that the local FB programs were granted considerable latitude in the development of local program content during the planning and initial implementation phases. Consequently, the local programs developed initially in ways which reflected local arrangements. However, because of internal institutional pressures

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at the RWJF, the National Program Office (NPO) eventually reigned in the local programs to conform with more narrow, professionally oriented ideas about prevention and treatment. This change was the death knell of grassroots participation in the local FB programs. In the course of this narrative some dynamics and mechanisms of administrative control are described.

The NPO needed some method for holding the local organizations accountable to a program consonant with the RWJF's intent. Because the program content was initially defined very generally and each local program was expected to differ, there was not programmatic consistency across the local interventions. The array of programmatic activities were numerous and differed from site to site. Hallfors et al would classify over 40 different kinds of programmatic activity in the local projects (1999). Some local organizations implemented some activities that others did not. Those local organizations that implemented same activities did so with varying intensity.

The NPO was constrained in keeping track of fourteen local FB programs not least because it had a small staff-- an Executive Director, a Deputy Director; a public relations officer, an administrative assistant, and a secretary. For a period of one to two years in the initial implementation phase, the staff also included an Associate Director.

However, controlling program content was not the NPO and RWJF's only concern and, initially, this concern competed with others. When concern about program content re-emerged urgently in the second phase of implementation, the mechanism of control was principally the process of budgeting and authorization of funds.

During the planning stage the RWJF's control was structured into the situation.

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The local projects had to produce an implementation grant application acceptable to the RWJF. At this time the NPO was not only focused on encouraging program content that strictly emphasized treatment and prevention. An essential, immediate goal was establishing local programs with legitimacy among a variety of local constituencies -- business, political, and administrative elites as well as grassroots leadership.

During the implementation phase, in most cases another preempting goal was to inspire and support the local programs in getting programming up and running. The RWJF and most of the local organizations were united in this effort. The general policy of the NPO and RWJF in this initial phase appeared to be to praise the local programs for whatever they implemented. The local organizations were encouraged to claim credit for whatever was going on locally that they were in some way connected to.

Given its status as a new player in AOD and health related urban policy, part of the function of the FB program for the RWJF was constructing a national reputation. The reputation of the national FB program and the RWJF depended on the presence of FB in the media which in turn depended on success stories from the local programs. A number of local initiatives were praised and put forward by the local and national FB public relations staff to get the word out about FB.[1]

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[1]The following were highlights. Little Rock FB was establishing neighborhood municipal service centers for policing, prevention, and AOD related outreach. It was also instituting a program that covered AOD treatment services for every youth in Little Rock. Kansas City was lauded for establishing policing substations in neighborhoods. San Antonio received kudos for demolishing over 70 drug houses.

Some of this initial momentum did not continue. In other cases it was not clear just what role FB had played in a given local development. For example, it was never clear that the neighborhood service centers in Little Rock were effective in doing prevention or treatment. The staff I interviewed seemed to be pulled in many directions

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Control of program content did, however, become a priority for the RWJF program officers and the NPO when the initial results of the evaluation study did not show changes in AOD problems in the program sites. The RWJF's bottom-line objective was to reduce AOD problems in the program sites. The RWJF and the national evaluators decided to use as indicators of changes in AOD problems trends in use over time and trends in approval of drug use.[2] In 1995, the first wave of the survey conducted for the evaluation study yielded no positive results on these indicators. In an effort to get results, the RWJF and NPO took a renewed interest in the program content of the local organizations. They insisted on programming that showed the most promise for manipulating rates of use, dependency, and attitudes towards use of AOD.

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and competed poorly with police and code enforcement staff for status in the local branch offices and among residents. Staff in one neighborhood center reported that treatment seekers were scared off by the police presence. The funding for the insurance program in Little Rock initially fell through. It re-appeared later, ironically, by means of a political effort that FB's lead agency did not support --a demand by the ACORN affiliated neighborhood association federation that revenue from a local tax be used for social programs. Little Rock FB was not against this particular idea; however, FB was administered by city hall and many elected officials were against other measures on the referendum of which the funding of social programming was a part.

The demolition of drug houses in San Antonio was accomplished in large part by a group of neighborhood associations who had relationships with some FB staff but would later disavow a connection to FB. A few initiatives were sustained in the local FB programs, not many, however. I do not blame either the RWJF or the local FB organizations for this outcome. FB was simply a small player in the local communities and for the most part not powerful enough to make great strides, particularly in the treatment arena and in those aspects of the prevention arena dominated by large administrative bureaucracies --schools, police departments, and housing authorities. Moreover, my point here is not to argue whether FB was well implemented but to highlight the RWJF's subordination of its interest in controlling the local program content to its initial interest in building the program and the RWJF's reputation.

[2]For descriptions of the design of the evaluation study and the survey which measured these indicators see Saxe et al (1997) and Kadushin et al (1998), respectively.

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The NPO exercised control over program content by intervening at the point when the local programs submitted budgets to the RWJF's financial officer. The budget submission process for the local FB organizations was re-organized and the submissions held to a new standard. Each budget item now had to be justified according to whether or not it was reasonable to believe that the activity would change attitudes about AOD use, decrease AOD use, or reduce other indicators of demand for AOD. NPO staff worked closely with the local programs in submitting their budgets to the RWJF's financial office.

In most of the FB program sites, activities that the NPO had previously approved now came under scrutiny. Activities by grassroots neighborhood organizations came under special scrutiny as many of these were less directly related to reducing the demand for AOD than were those of treatment and other AOD service professionals. Local program content became geared more toward provider related efforts --both by treatment and prevention professionals-- and away from lay, neighborhood-based efforts. Neighborhood grassroots became less involved, except in cases where the local organizations had developed a separate stream of funding for their activities. San Antonio was one of the few local programs that for a time continued to use RWJF funding for neighborhood organizing. For a time it was able to sustain this programming because of the manner in which it budgeted its grant. The workings of this autonomy carved out by the San Antonio organization from the administrative control of the NPO can be seen through the eyes of the NPO's budget officer.

In contrast to how she felt about San Antonio FB, the NPO staffer felt she knew

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what the Vallejo organization was doing and that it was in line with FB goals because VFB had subcontracted a substantial amount of its budget. Contracts spelled out the service that would be provided and who would be served. Records could be kept of the consummation of these acts. For example, Youth and Family Services provided training to lay people to educate community groups and organizations about AOD dependency and available services. The dates of the training could be recorded and attendance taken. The subsequent number of presentations by lay trainees and the number of attendees could be counted.

San Antonio on the other hand did little subcontracting with the RWJF funding but instead paid a large organizing staff. The budget officer only had job descriptions for the organizers. She could not verify from her office in Nashville what the organizers actually did. Her visits to San Antonio, rarely longer than a couple days, were not adequate to the task either. She did not feel confident that she knew what San Antonio FB was doing as late as the fall of 1996, four years into implementation of the program.

San Antonio FB was not able to sustain this practice. The new turn in policy at the RWJF toward local programming pulled funding away from community organizing. Previously such activities appeared to be supported because they legitimated the local programs with the grassroots. However, this initial priority was then superseded by the effort to reduce demand for AOD. While community organizing could be called a method of prevention, namely, an "environmental strategy," the NPO now held in suspicion some of the less obviously AOD related activities that had previously been understood as part of an "environmental strategy."

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The RWJF eventually let go of the original NPO at the Vanderbilt University medical school and established a new NPO at Join Together in Boston, an organization that had established itself as a resource for anti-AOD "coalitions" and other organizations in the U.S. engaged in AOD prevention. The original NPO had inspired and nurtured the local programs into existence; however, the RWJF program officers appeared to be looking for a task master to re-focus the local programs on reducing demand.

The new NPO was hired in 1997. It committed to the tack that the former NPO had begun to institute --insisting that every program budget item be justified by whether or not it could be expected to reduce the demand for AOD. Although I have not been able to confirm fully the consequences of this change for participation, data suggest that this policy, thoroughly instituted by the new NPO, changed the character of local participation. Some grassroots providers may have continued to participate to the extent they could demonstrate their programming emphasized careful targeting of drug using populations to intervene in their behavior or of potentially using populations to prevent them from initiating use. However, the broad participation sustained by the local FB programs' commitment to "environmental strategies," including neighborhood improvement, declined. The RWJF appeared to have backed off its initial priority of sustaining broad-based participation.

In the end, the grassroots were not able to sustain their cooptation of the FB program, that is, the influence on local implementation that inner city groups initially achieved. In the last two years of the FB program's original implementation phase, the RWJF's NPO sought to make the local FB organizations conform their program content

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with the initial FB idea of trying to improve local prevention and treatment services. In 1997, seven of the original 14 programs qualified for some continuation of funds for "demand reduction" related programming. The new NPO's prioritizing of demand reduction over broad-based participation in decision-making and programmatic activity further reduced grassroots participation.

2. Types of Administrative Agencies

In Chapter 8, I introduced the jurisdictional features of administration and the manner in which resource distribution incorporated and excluded inner city grassroots. I now turn to a description of organizational sectors within administration. My empirical entry point for this discussion is the FB grantees --the institutional environs in which they operated and the consequences for the grassroots. This section interprets the sectors of administration from a political economic perspective, attending primarily to the power and material relations driving administration. I first give an overview of the organization of administrative process, then introduce the sectors of administration relevant to the FB program, giving an account of the effect each had on local grassroots organization in the FB intervention sites.

The sectoral position of the lead agencies in the organization of administration had consequences for how the local FB programs were implemented --the different kinds of local actors the lead agencies tended to include and exclude, how the lead agencies engaged these other local actors, the kinds of local actors that engaged the local programs, and how they did so. These different types of agencies managed grassroots participation

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differently with different effects for local grassroots organization.

The most general division of labor in the organization of administration is that between the distribution of resources and service delivery. While a given organization may carry out both of these functions, organizations may generally be classed as those which fund social policy and those which implement it. Those which fund policy belong roughly to the public or private sector, government to the former, philanthropies and charities to the latter.[3]

In the public sector the organization of resource distribution begins with the legislative and executive bodies that make social policy, or, more precisely, first set it in motion. Various bureaucracies are authorized to implement those decisions. Since the influx of funding for urban programs in the 1960s, increasingly the trend has been for government bureaucracies to contract with for- and non-profit agencies who then deliver services authorized by public decision makers (Smith and Lipsky 1993).

The RWJF sought to model a democratic method of program development. Consequently it modeled the FB program organization on civic institutions. The grantees were to organize a public decision-making body, the citizens task force (CTF). If the program leadership (which was not necessarily the same as the citizens task force, as the Vallejo case showed) then decided to include services as part of the program, the FB

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[3]Service providers could be divided between those in the public and those in the private sector; however, this did not appear to be such a meaningful feature of administration in FB's implementation.

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organization could deliver services themselves or contract with providers.[5]

The local FB programs developed differently because the grantees or "lead" agencies which administered the local programs fell within different sectors of administration. Some of the local programs were administrated by municipal or county bureaucracies which distributed resources authorized by executive and legislative political bodies, the Office of the City Manager in Vallejo and Little Rock, for example. Private sector resource providers also were lead agencies, for example, the Greater Kansas City Foundation and the San Antonio United Way. In other cases service providers implemented the program: Marshall Heights Community Development Organization in Washington, the Council on Alcohol and Drug Abuse in Columbia, and so on. These sectors constitute related but somewhat distinct institutional settings. I now describe these settings and their effects on community organization and the grassroots.

Political-administrative processes and governmental grantees

Government agencies operate within the context of both political and administrative institutions. These institutions are somewhat independent depending upon

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[5]As I stated earlier, while the RWJF did not originally intend for the FB program to provide or fund direct services, the local programs nevertheless did. In many cases these were "start-ups" with agreements sometimes in place that other bodies, for example, local public human services departments, would ultimately fund the services. Services were also indirect, that is, rather than treating clients directly, training was provided for lay or professionals or conferences or workshops were funded related to recognizing when people have AOD problems, helping them find help, or disseminating new information in treating people with AOD problems.

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their size and local organization.[6] Political regimes, the foundation of stable political administration, are built from constituencies organized as electoral coalitions and the somewhat distinct constituencies organized as governing coalitions. The former must include both organized and disorganized grassroots residents, the latter the public bureaucracies that constitute relatively independent centers of power --police departments, schools, and so on. Administrators for their part may use policy implementation as a tool for shoring up their own position --in concert with or opposition to other centers of political power such as elected officials, organized grassroots, and so on. The making of policy and its implementation is perhaps the key tool available to politicians and administrators as they seek to realize their ambitions which are often in turn determined by their institutional context --the rewards of consolidating a hold on political or administrative office.[7]

Consequently, the making of policy and its implementation, for political and administrative office holders, are tools in the development of constituencies. One of the principal mechanisms in the constituency building process is resource distribution. In cases where the FB lead agency was a governmental body, the program tended to be used and perceived as a vehicle for the distribution of resources. This process tended to draw the local FB programs into the local arena of politics as I now demonstrate.

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[6]Urban political scientists make the broad distinction between "machine" and "reform" systems of local government. Crudely put, in the former, elected political and administrative actors are more tightly linked. In reform systems administrators are said to act more independently of elected officials. See Judd and Cantor (1992: 132-240).

[7]Cf. Mollenkopf (1992: 37-43).

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Where government agencies were the FB grantees --New Haven, Little Rock, Milwaukee, Vallejo-- two outcomes appeared likely. First, the FB program reproduced the existing institutional relations around this central node in the local organization of administration. In other words, the lead agency adapted FB to its own organization and its relations with others. This typically froze grassroots out of governance and managed any opposition by appeasement through resource distribution. Second, elected representatives used the program to develop constituencies by organizing them as recipients of benefits these officials gained for them. This incorporated some grassroots elements into the circulation of municipal resources. It also could have the effect of locking others out, thereby reproducing, sometimes exacerbating, existing divisions among the grassroots.

Table 3.1 lists the local FB lead agencies. In Little Rock and Vallejo, FB came under the auspices of the city manager. In New Haven and Milwaukee, FB came under human service departments in city hall and the county, respectively.[8] These agencies were the central nodes of public administration related to AOD and other problems the grassroots faced. Providers of various stripes tended to be dependent on them for significant portions of their revenue. Grassroots leadership and residents often resented these agencies for how they had been treated historically but also depended on them for services, jobs, and other resources.

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[8]In California and Wisconsin, federal money administrated by state agencies and state funding authorizations went to county human service departments. In Connecticut, human service administrations were organized at the municipal level. In Arkansas, resource distribution was handled by the state AOD agency.

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Different actors dominated or used these agencies as vehicles for their purposes. In Little Rock a strong, entrepreneurial professional administrator, the city manager, saw the FB grant and program as one part of a broader effort to expand the scope of municipal administration, and increasing public services. Milwaukee, New Haven, and Vallejo FB appeared to be initially part of a similar strategy.[9]

However, in the Little Rock and Milwaukee cases, the FB program appeared to channel into constituency organizing processes that preempted the RWJF's agenda. The Vallejo program appeared also to be drawn into constituency organizing processes but in a manner which better coincided with the RWJF's intentions. I told the Milwaukee story in the section above on ethnic succession in AOD related services to inner city neighborhoods. The Vallejo story came out in Chapter Six in Kay *et al's* organization of Red Ribbon. The New Haven story is told in Ryan (1999).[10] Here I tell the Little Rock

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[9]The states of Wisconsin, Connecticut, and California, however, were historically far more generous in public and social services than Arkansas.

[10]The relevant aspects of the New Haven story may be summarized as follows. Election ward based CDCs acted as gatekeepers for many social programs targeting minority neighborhoods in New Haven. They demanded a role in FB's decision-making or a piece of the program pie. The FB director skillfully sidestepped them, however, by developing an alternative grassroots organization of neighborhood councils called "Community Management Teams" that held open monthly meetings in the new policing substations. Small grants from FB were distributed to groups and nascent organizations participating in the councils. According to Ryan the councils eventually played a broader role as a grassroots organizational alternative for the city and private agencies who historically had had either to kowtow to the demands of the CDCs or limit their work in minority neighborhoods (cf. Ryan 1999: 93-94). FB's director did this as a relatively autonomous administrator within city hall. She was given unusual latitude by her superiors because they had originally nearly lost the RWJF implementation grant. She came in as the grant's savior, hence the latitude. When I interviewed her in 1996, however, she worried that FB could become a vehicle for elected officials --the mayor retained the power to appoint members of FB's board.

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story.[11]

Little Rock. In Little Rock, FB became a vehicle for organizing constituencies in local city director districts. FB staff established municipal administrative branch offices in neighborhoods called "Alert Centers." They were staffed by two community policing officers, two housing code enforcement officers, and one "neighborhood facilitator" paid by FB. The best facilitators appeared mostly occupied with developing the centers organizationally, performing AOD-related and other outreach and social work to residents (especially youth and elderly), and acting as liaisons between residents and the police and code enforcement officers.

The original Alert Centers gained positive local media attention. The regular presence of two police officers a few blocks from residents' homes was appealing to residents. Code enforcement was also appealing because it was a vehicle for addressing unsightly and dangerous properties that either resident or absentee owners had neglected. The presence of both police and code enforcement therefore had potential for improving property values. Little Rock residents without Alert Centers in their neighborhoods began badgering their directors about establishing branches in their neighborhoods. As I described in Chapter 8, Little Rock had recently undergone a change in the city charter which re-organized local elections by districts. The first cohort of district representatives were elected in 1993, over a year into FB's implementation phase. The Alert Centers appeared to be a vehicle for both city agencies and newly elected directors to gain

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[11]This story is drawn from Jones and Fisher (1997) and my own observations from field research in Little Rock.

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popularity with residents.

In cooperation with city directors, FB set up criteria for the founding of Neighborhood Alert Centers. Neighborhood sponsors --typically a group of residents, businesses, and other organizations-- were to organize a neighborhood association, the leadership of which served as a community board for the center; provide an adequate facility; raise money for bicycles for the two police officers; organize volunteers for receptionist and clerical duties; and so on. The police, code enforcement, and FB provided professional staff.

The subsequent two years saw the founding of eight new Alert Centers. The city's Board of Directors also authorized a new municipal agency with responsibility for neighborhood preservation and development. Another organizational strategy of this agency was to foster the founding of neighborhood associations. In the mid-1990s over 30 new neighborhood associations were founded in Little Rock. In the summer of 1995, city hall sponsored a national conference, held in the new downtown conference center, for a national umbrella organization of neighborhood associations.

The effect of this political-administrative effort was to foster neighborhood organization connected to city directors and to city agencies. The Alert Centers and these other efforts generated by city hall appeared to have potential for a powerful community organizing effect. The consequences for the character of city wide community organization, however, were ambiguous. First, ACORN had organized a federation of eight older neighborhood associations whose philosophy was to deliberately dissociate themselves from collaborating with politicians and administrators. The neighborhood

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associations affiliated with ACORN were founded in the 1970s and 1980s before the creation of election districts when directors were elected on a city-wide basis. They were based in older, black and white working class neighborhoods near downtown in a predominantly white city. The ACORN federation was multi-racial as certain older white working class neighborhoods were also frustrated with city hall's unresponsiveness. Their founding was oppositional to city hall which had been dominated by politicians representing the interests of wealthier neighborhoods just to the north and west of downtown. The federation sought to force elected and administrative officials to address inequities by mobilizing campaigns that embarrassed officials in the local media, organizing citizens to withhold support to foil official initiatives, and making demands that officials historically had not wanted to meet. In contrast, the impetus for the neighborhood organizations founded after the charter change was directly to associate with city hall in order to join in the circulation of municipal resources. Many of the new associations were based in newer, virtually all white neighborhoods further west of downtown.

These two distinct sources of neighborhood organization had potential to divide the city's board into advocates for older neighborhoods near downtown and newer ones to the west, a re-enactment of community divisions during the campaign for charter reform. The movement for the charter change was a somewhat bi-racial movement, but the new organizations had not participated in that movement and were developing relations not with the older neighborhood federation but with city hall. The racial compositional difference between this older source of organization and the new one, in my view,

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appeared more likely to deepen the racial divide rather than bridge it as the federation had in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Moreover, the drawing of electoral districts had potential to increase competition between neighborhoods. Two of the FB interventions sites, Little Rock and San Antonio, had recently changed to district organized elections. I did not observe neighborhood based competition along district lines as a source of social division in either city; however, this may be because this jurisdictional organization of neighborhoods was relatively new. Without cooperative, insightful institutional planning at city hall, the district organization of administration that was developing --the Alert Centers, the fostering of other neighborhood organization connected to city directors-- had potential for producing conflict. Divisions embedded in class and race relations already existed between older neighborhoods near downtown. How newer neighborhoods to the west would fit into the existing order of neighborhood stratification was unclear.

Second, police and code enforcement officers did not have the same motivations for relating well to and organizing neighborhood citizens that the city directors had. Officers, especially code enforcement, appeared to emphasize issuing citations over developing relations with local residents and organizations. Some resentments developed. Code enforcement officers at one Alert Center in a relatively poor neighborhood had cited elderly, black homeowners for poor upkeep of their homes and lawns. Controversy was avoided because an adept FB-paid neighborhood facilitator acted as liaison between elderly residents and code enforcement. She also organized both a fund for a lawn mower that belong to the center and a youth volunteer corps to help

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elderly residents keep up their properties.[12] Not all of the center staff were as skillful as this neighborhood facilitator. Relations between residents and Alert Center staff were more troubled in two poor, black neighborhoods whose Alert Center FB staff were interviewed.

Third, code enforcement, police, and FB staff came from three distinct municipal agencies, each with different missions and loyalties. The executives of these agencies were not communicating according to Alert Center staff. This lack of communication at the executive level appeared to affect negatively relations between staff from these different agencies in the neighborhood centers.[13] This had the potential for dynamics that would confuse and foil residents seeking help at the centers.

Another problem was the distinctly lower status of the community policing officers within the police department. The community policing officers that spoke with me were African American. One officer said that his choice to participate in the community policing program would have been a mistake had he wished for a better career track within the department. Regular patrol officers were eligible for promotions within the department for which community policing officers were not. The lower status the

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[12]I do not know how well this strategy was implemented.

[13]In contrast, staff in the "helping" professions --educators, health and social workers-- more often appeared to work together in spite of poor relations at the level of their respective agencies' lead staff than did staff in the "citing" professions --law enforcement, code enforcement, etc. The culture of these professions appeared to differ based on a focus group with staff and interviews with individual staff. For example, the Alert Center community policing officers, who in my mind were better for seeming closer to the ideal type of the "beat cop" who knew families, proprietors, and so on in a neighborhood, were denigrated by regular cops as "social workers" rather than "real" police officers.

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police department gave to the community policing program therefore stratified career tracks in the department. If the police department did not adequately support the community policing officers, who were the most appealing feature of the Alert Centers in the minds of residents, it was unclear whether the program could be a great deal more than symbolic in its effectiveness.

In the Little Rock case, the organizing effects of the city hall generated neighborhood movement were contravened by the following. First, the movement was superimposed on longstanding racial and class divisions between residents of the east and south and those to the north and west. Second, the jurisdictional organization of elections and the subsequent parallel organization of administration through the Alert Centers divided the city into discreet territories. Whether or not these would become fiefdoms or otherwise dividing lines in local politics and administration can only be determined by future studies as these jurisdictional lines had only recently been drawn. The experiences of older cities with longstanding electoral districts or "ward" systems suggest problems will crop up.[14] Third, municipal bureaucracies --the police, code enforcement, neighborhood preservation, and others-- addressed neighborhood needs in a fragmented manner. The officers whose jobs were to respond to residents' concerns were motivated differently according to the formal and informal rules governing their home institution. The top level administrators of these bureaucracies did not appear motivated to cooperate

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[14]Examples among the FB intervention sites were New Haven, Newark, and Washington. Worcester appeared to be different in this regard as neighborhood associations made progress towards unity in their response to city hall. I do not know enough about community organization in Worcester to suggest why it appeared less divided at the neighborhood level than did these other eastern seaboard cities.

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at the time of my research to mitigate the fragmentation of Alert Center staff responses to residents. It appeared the FB staff had some potential for an organizing effect as one had functioned as liaison between residents and code enforcement. This role, however, appeared to depend on the personal skills and motivations of the individual staff person. There did not appear to be in place any structural motivations for playing this role, career incentives, for example.

Discussion. When government lead agencies implemented FB, FB appeared to adapt to constituency organizing processes. Except in Vallejo, this process diverged considerably from the original purposes of the RWJF. What follows are implications of these processes for the incorporation and exclusion of inner city grassroots in community organization. The first comments are related to the behaviors of politicians and the second to the behaviors of administrators.

Local political regimes in the midst of change, for example, as in Milwaukee and Little Rock, can motivate elected representatives to organize inner city grassroots thereby incorporating them into the polity. The consequences are ambiguous, however. Though the rules of competition and interaction of administrative, political, neighborhood, and other actors may change, I suspect formal changes are unlikely to alter dramatically the local history of race and class relations that play out through neighborhood stratification. In the case of ethnic succession (possibly the case in Milwaukee), relations between racially and otherwise divided groups is bumped up to another institutional level, from municipality or county to relations among governing units in the larger metropolitan area or the state.

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However, the organization of local political and administrative institutions may make a difference for the general level of social order. For example, the district based elections in Little Rock gave politicians incentive to organize some grassroots and incorporate them in some manner into the polity. To the extent organization at the grassroots level increases and to the extent groups and organizations become invested in some arena of "normal" politics --elections, referenda, administration-- the grassroots participate in the polity. Institutions that discourage organization would be more likely to distribute resources more up than down the socio-economic strata of neighborhoods. They also create a condition for more volatility in the social order by failing to bridge relationships between social strata.

Service delivery and provider grantees

Providers were not oriented towards FB as an opportunity to distribute resources but as an opportunity to expand, develop, or otherwise secure the existence of their organization. Consequently, provider agencies tended not to distribute the FB grant's resources but to fold them into their own organization, taking on the lion's share of programming themselves. These lead agencies tended to exhibit the least amount of "partnering" with other agencies and the grassroots. Both conservative and radical approaches were taken to organizational development. One conservative strategy was simply trying to fold the FB grant into the existing organization, for example, paying existing staff to do what they already did. Another strategy was grafting the new program onto the old as if it were a new division or department. More radical strategies were

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attempts to use the RWJF resources to re-organize the grantee organization to position it better within the local environment and with respect to new opportunities in service delivery.

Local providers other than the FB grant recipients, while some expressed resentment toward the RWJF or the local FB lead agency for being left out, seemed ultimately to treat the experience as routine, an outcome of the workings of competition and division of local turf. Once another local agency received the FB grant, the competition was decided. Agencies that had special expertise in AOD or in the direction the local FB program took during the planning period were often not contested in their effort to become the sole local applicant for the FB grant, for example, the Councils on Alcohol and Drug Abuse in Columbia and Santa Barbara and Marshall Heights Community Development Organization in Washington.[15]

Established provider lead agencies tended to relate to the grassroots only as recipients of services and programs. Both philanthropies and governments appeared more open to grassroots participation in governance and as recipients of small grants and other resources. The decision-making processes of providers were different from those of government agencies. Grassroots were more easily able to engage government, even though they were not necessarily successful in realizing their goals. Moreover, nonprofit

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[15]The RWJF only seriously considered making grants to agencies in local communities where only one agency applied for the FB grant. If the RWJF received more than one letter of intent from a local community, the NPO told the respective authors they would not apply successfully unless only one application was received and suggested the agencies cooperate. The NPO argued multiple applications were counter-productive to the FB program idea of community wide cooperation.

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providers appeared not to have to submit to the same norms of accessibility as government. Grassroots expectations for participating with providers probably were also lower. The NPO appeared also to press provider lead agencies less on the terms of grassroots participation than it did governments.

When service providers implemented FB (Worcester, Newark, Washington, Columbia), as with government agencies, FB was typically adapted as a new program or department within the agency. This tended not to re-organize relations among grassroots, providers, and elites but to simply adapt the program to the provider's effort to survive and flourish in the given local administrative economy. This occurred because providers in administrative economies tended to be organized by competition --for grants, contracts, clients, staff, and so on.

In cases where providers were well established, they tended not to collaborate with grassroots but to retain full control of FB.[16] Being less well established or a new nonprofit was a condition for cooperation with the grassroots as these lead agencies sought out local support and to increase the NPO's confidence in them. In either case,

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[16]There was collaboration with other providers, however, it was not typical and appeared limited to projects that did not threaten the competitive interests of providers where those interests diverged. The following were typical kinds of collaborative projects: (1) grant applications that would provide funding for multiple parties, (2) informal cooperation among mid-level staff who shared clients (but rarely at the level of executive administration), (3) professional workshops and trainings, (4) subcontracts with smaller agencies or consultants. The following appeared less likely and depended on local conditions: (1) response to crises or opportunities affecting an entire administrative sector or organizations in multiple sectors --e.g. legislation about funding levels and that re-organized or otherwise affected service delivery, (2) new constructions of public problems that helped a part of a given field expand --e.g. identifying "special needs" populations such as pregnant women, women with small children, and cultural minorities.

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relations with other providers tended to be minimal or contractual. Elite sponsorship was always important as was establishing relationships with major institutional providers -- hospitals, schools, and so on. However, these latter efforts were not often successful because major institutions usually preferred to conduct their own programs. When well established providers implemented FB, the program appeared to simply remain an extension of that organization. This was also the case with less well established and new agencies; however, they were more likely to flounder and dissolve.

As Table 3.1 shows, service providers were the FB lead agencies in Washington, Columbia, Newark, and Worcester. The Newark and Worcester programs attempted to establish new agencies based on the FB program. Both floundered in exceedingly difficult organizational environments. The Washington and Columbia programs were folded into well established local providers who had established agendas, which in both cases became incompatible with the NPO's view of the program. I first discuss Newark and Worcester.

In Newark the original lead agency was a philanthropy but FB leadership eventually incorporated as a 501 (C) (3) nonprofit.[17] The lead agency for Worcester was initially the United Way; however, the United Way had no ambition to adopt the program. It agreed to be the FB applicant agency from Worcester on the condition that the FB program would incorporate as its own 501 (C) (3) nonprofit if the implementation grant application was successful.

In Newark and Worcester, the FB programs had some initial elite support but lost

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[17]See Section 527 of the federal tax code.

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it. In Newark, the NPO and the Newark organization's series of program directors were frustrated with the intrusiveness of the lead agency staff who appeared intent on merging the FB program's identity into its own. Incorporating was an effort to get out from under this relationship. However, the organization did not subsequently find other elite support. The grassroots it attempted to organize never developed into a strong enough ally.[18] The Newark FB organization also found itself in a crowded organizational environment. Other than contractual relations, it did not develop allies. Strong leadership was difficult to attract and keep because of the program's poor prospects for survival. In 1997 a promising director was hired; however, he faced formidable obstacles. When the original grant for the FB program expired, Newark was not among those local programs that received another round of funding.

Worcester ran into structurally similar difficulties. Its original director conflicted early on with a crucial collaborator, leadership at city hall. A major initiative to set up employee assistance programs linked to health insurers did not pan out. Worcester FB consequently lost support from local elites. The organization was also getting flak from minority professionals and grassroots. The original director's strategy appeared to be establishing an independent agency, the focus of which was a dominant role in local prevention and treatment services rather than community organizing. This may have been possible; however, after an auspicious beginning she lost support from both elites and grassroots. Worcester Fights Back attempted to recuperate by getting rid of the original

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[18]It is by no means clear Newark FB truly committed to developing grassroots organization and support. Any commitments to local groups and organizations became difficult to sustain, however, because changes in the program director were so frequent.

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director and hiring the head of the local NAACP. The new director appeared unable to recruit enough powerful new allies. He had some success with the grassroots because the organization's Community Partnership program adopted a neighborhood organizing and development project. However, without other support the agency floundered. In 1998, it dissolved (cf. Hernandez et al 1998).

The FB program in Washington was a Marshall Heights Community Development Organization (MHCDO) program from the start. One could argue that MHCDO represented both elites and grassroots in Washington's sixth and seventh political wards, that it integrated all classes of actors in the target area. During the life of the program no conflict appeared either from the grassroots or elites. Like Worcester and other local programs, FB simply appeared to run into limits to what it could accomplish in the local environs. Treatment provision was largely influenced at a higher institutional level. It sponsored some prevention programming, but it was not clear these programs were sustainable beyond the term of the FB funding.

The Columbia lead agency, the local Council on Alcohol and Drug Abuse, also adopted FB as its own program. Like many of the local programs, during the planning phase it appeared to integrate elites and grassroots, the latter primarily African American based organizations. The Columbia program initially had some major high publicity events; however, it did not appear to sustain cooperation with two important allies, the police department and the school district. Like Washington and other local FB programs, Columbia implemented some prevention programs in poor communities, but these could not be sustained without regular funding streams. Towards the end of the FB

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implementation phase, Columbia Fighting Back did not appear to have the broad base of support among local agencies and elites that it had originally. It had some support among some African American grassroots because of its shift toward local prevention programming; however, this support was not enough to enable the program to survive.

Service providers related to the grassroots as individual service recipients. This had little or no apparent organizational effect on the grassroots. The FB providers also sometimes collaborated with minority (sometimes non-minority) grassroots in developing programming, most typically recreational, tutoring, and mentoring activities for youth. Selznick described this as a type of formal cooptation in which administrative organizations organize grassroots to take on the burdens of implementation. In sharing the responsibilities of administration, the grassroots also lend legitimacy to the level of administrative authority that granted them this responsibility (1949: 14). These kinds of efforts tended to organize grassroots as a subcontracting, lower, dependent strata of service deliverers. These groups relied on the FB programs for their funding. This created, or drew upon existing, relationships between administrator-providers and grassroots which had potential to be activated in the future. In some instances it may also have created, or drawn upon, grassroots networks and nascent organizational forms that had potential for activity as service deliverers independent of the FB lead agency and therefore as relatively low status or weak participants in the administrative economy. Their hand was strengthened in sites where prevention activities for minorities were being constructed as the exclusive domain of minority providers, for example, in Worcester.

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Nevertheless, this sort of construction of the prevention solution tended to limit grassroots participation in local administrative economies to a niche market –nonprofit services for minorities.

Local philanthropies as administrators

Non-governmental administrative agencies appeared the most capable of adapting to the grassroots. These agencies were not as constrained by the competitive institutional environs of providers or the political institutional environs of government agencies. Unlike government based programs embedded in local politics, local philanthropies could side with marginalized populations and organizations in disputes because they did not have to deal with the response of an electorate. Unlike provider based programs, their survival was not based on maintaining or expanding market share in the local delivery of services. Therefore, they had less of an urgent need to commandeer the local FB program, steering the local AOD public problem toward a professional or administrative definition. Nevertheless, philanthropies were embedded in the history of their own role in the local organization of administration --past interactions, perceptions, and so on. Their staff also tended to be oriented to the culture of social and health service professionals, an orientation which clashed with the grassroots.

Local philanthropies were the FB lead agencies in Kansas City, San Antonio, and, initially, in Worcester.[19] The Kansas City and San Antonio FB programs were the only

[19]As I mentioned above, the Worcester United Way did not wish to continue as lead agency once the implementation funding was secured. For this reason I discussed the Worcester case in the previous section.

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ones of the original thirteen FB urban intervention sites in which the grassroots came to play the predominant role in governance, filling roles as board members, lead and senior staff.

Initially, both the United Way staff in San Antonio and the Greater Kansas City Community Foundation staff easily recruited local administrative elites and providers. Local charities are designed to distribute resources to local social and health service providers. They also tend to be embedded in a history of sponsorship by civic minded elites, especially those heavily invested in local consumer and real estate markets or with an otherwise prominent local public profile. Prominent local corporate officers and business owners served on the boards of these organizations.

During the planning period both the original project directors of the Kansas City and San Antonio programs alienated the grassroots. This may have in part been a function of assumptions about the process of grant writing and programming. Elite sponsors were not interested in the details of grant proposals. Administrative, provider agencies and grassroots of various stripes were interested in the technical aspects of the grant proposal because it had implications for staffing, program content, and related aspects of resource distribution. In San Antonio there appeared to be precedent for other agencies working with the United Way. In Kansas City there appeared initially to be inter-agency cooperation. However, in both cases the lead agencies did not appear to have experience working with local grassroots.

In both San Antonio and Kansas City, organized grassroots wanted to participate substantively in the grant writing. In both cases staff at the lead agency were initially

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unresponsive to this interest. Grassroots in both Kansas City and San Antonio were organized and articulate enough to gain the ear of the NPO, which responded to their concerns. The NPO corresponded with the project directors in both sites that their applications for implementation funding would be weak if they did not substantively incorporate grassroots in planning. In these sites the grassroots came to play predominant roles in the FB program leadership. However, their stories played out very differently. I continue with the Kansas City story below.[20]

Kansas City had a precedent for civic organizing around treatment and prevention going back to 1983. The local district attorney at that time organized the Metropolitan Kansas City Task Force on Alcohol and Drug Abuse because he believed that law enforcement was not getting a handle on drug problems. He believed their efforts needed to be complemented by treatment and prevention. He eventually inspired a number of local treatment agencies to offer treatment to Kansas City residents who could not afford it. The efforts of the Task Force were ongoing when the FB grant was announced.

The Task Force agreed that the Greater Kansas City Community Foundation (GKCCF) would be the applicant agency; however, many members quickly soured on the GKCCF because the staff person responsible worked independently of them. They felt the GKCCF was taking over something that they had built. The Greater Kansas City Community Foundation subsequently had difficulty engaging providers and

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[20]Since I told the San Antonio story in Chapters 4 and 5, here I only mention San Antonio for comparative purposes. My account of the Kansas City program is drawn from Jones et al (1998).

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administrative agencies.[21]

Moreover, a grassroots organization broadly representative of African American grassroots in the proposed target area, the Ad Hoc Group Against Crime, also felt the Greater Kansas City Community Foundation was unresponsive. They told the GKCCF that in order to continue participating they would need a grant. The NPO expressed their grave concerns about the loss of support for the Kansas City application in a series of letters to the GKCCF. The Greater Kansas City Community Foundation remained the applicant agency but let the original grant writer go and hired another staff person focused on improving relations with the grassroots. Other administrative and provider elites, however, ceased to substantively engage the FB program.[22]

The grassroots subsequently dominated decision-making about the FB program. However, the program struggled for a number of reasons. It never re-gained the support and participation of AOD service related agencies. Neighborhood politics appeared to be organized by discrete arenas of interaction that competed against one another. Neighborhood actors ended up becoming FB staff and using that position to develop their own interests in their respective neighborhoods apart from those of FB. While the organization had a charismatic director who initiated creative programming, the organization was weakly managed and faced considerable obstacles given neighborhood

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[21]One individual they offended, the chair of the Task Force, came to direct the state alcohol and drug agency. This did not bode well for FB's relationship with AOD service related agencies (Jones et al 1998: 22).

[22]Jones et al note that several remained as board members but did not appear engaged, indicated by their poor attendance at board meetings (1998: 38).

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divisions and lack of participation from other agencies (cf. Jones et al 1998).

San Antonio never faced or overcame obstacles that the Kansas City organization faced. While many administrative and provider agencies in San Antonio did not like the United Way's alliance with the Eastside grassroots, the United Way secured their cooperation. It did so in part by contracting with providers. Moreover, I suspect the United Way's board integrated local elite sponsorship more powerfully than did the Greater Kansas City Community Foundation.

Conclusion

In this section I have argued that local FB programs implemented by governments and providers were drawn into the institutional dynamics in which their lead agencies were embedded. Consequently, these types of lead agencies were less susceptible to the influence of historically marginalized local grassroots. Providers tended to treat them as service recipients. They also organized them to share the burdens of program delivery. This had the effect of legitimating the FB lead agency among populations where its legitimacy may have been weak. It also developed some grassroots as allies, or partners, which boosted their legitimacy in the eyes of the NPO and perhaps with local community level administrative agencies. But providers tended to freeze out grassroots influence in governance.

Government agencies treated the grassroots as service recipients and as constituencies. In the latter case they tended to incorporate them in a similar fashion as the providers, by distributing small grants or other limited resources. Local governments

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differed in two respects from providers, however. First, they had deeper pockets and more various administrative channels. Consequently, they were able to shape grassroots organization in a more far-reaching manner. Second, they were potentially susceptible to the influence of elected officials seeking to organize constituents as voters.

Despite initial resistance to working with the grassroots, philanthropies were less constrained and therefore more able to respond to grassroots challenges. Local philanthropies were therefore the best resource for grassroots efforts to develop local organization in a manner they saw fit. However, local political institutions generated more resources and more opportunities for leadership advancement in the long run to the extent grassroots had access to them.

In all cases, the FB program was adapted to local institutional environs. Whether or not this foiled the RWJF's original intent of improving local prevention and treatment systems depended on the compatibility of this agenda with that of their administrative entry points to the local communities. It also depended on the uniquely local aspects of the organization of administration and its relation to the grassroots. I now turn to this latter question.

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Chapter 10

Local Matters

The previous chapters in Part 3 have tended to generalize the processes of race relations and administration across the different Fighting Back (FB) intervention sites. In the previous chapter I began to make some distinctions in the specific manner in which the FB program made entry into local communities. This chapter is an effort to further address how definitions of "local" and local realities mattered in the administration of FB. I then speculate some about the effects of local social and administrative contexts in the processes of race relations and administration. I first consider the different definitions of "local community" given to the local FB programs. Second, I explore the effects of how local elites have historically constructed AOD related problems and accepted or rejected federal urban programming. Finally, I consider the effects of local ecological factors and organizational movements on the civic organization of local grassroots.

1. National and Local Administrative Definitions of "Local"

Local and national administrators determined the elements of formal and informal organization the local FB programs would engage. First, the RWJF limited eligibility for the FB program grant to "medium-sized communities with populations of from 100,000 to 250,000." Prospective grantees therefore had to construct geographic boundaries for the program. Second, the prospective grantees were self selecting and were from distinct administrative organizational sectors. I discussed this latter topic in the previous chapter,

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arguing that governmental grantees, provider grantees, and philanthropic grantees tended to relate to and organize the grassroots in different manners. The grassroots also appeared to approach these different types of agencies in different modes and with different expectations. This section therefore focuses primarily on the effect of drawing particular geographic boundaries around the areas the local programs targeted.

From the standpoint of the RWJF, the boundaries of the target areas were somewhat arbitrary. The program designers at the RWJF felt that they would stand a better chance of affecting changes in "medium-sized communities"; nevertheless, from the standpoint of civic and social organization, they defined "medium-sized community" arbitrarily as a cachement area. Some of the eventual grantees were municipalities with populations that fell within the eligibility requirements. In two cases, grantees from cities smaller than 100,000 expanded the cachement area beyond municipal boundaries -- Greater Santa Barbara and three counties and tribal territories in Northwest New Mexico. In large cities, the cachement areas had to be smaller areas within municipal boundaries.

In some cases the drawing of the FB target areas coincided with the administrative authority of the grantee. Where a municipality constituted the target area, a municipal agency was typically the grantee, for example, in Little Rock, Vallejo and New Haven. (Worcester was an exception.) Service provider grantees tended to define areas that they served: for example, Wards 6 and 7 in Washington DC which was the area in which Marshall Heights Development Corporation had developed housing and a commercial district; a school district spanning two counties in and adjacent to Columbia, SC, which had been served by the Lexington and Richland County Council on Alcohol and Drug

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Abuse. Other local projects defined contiguous central city minority neighborhoods -- Newark, Milwaukee, and Kansas City.

The eligibility defined by the RWJF and the self selecting of the grantees defined the institutional context of the local programs. Whether the choices made were intentional, anticipated on the part of local grantees, or whether the consequences of the choices were anticipated by them, was not always clear. Local FB programs solved the dilemmas presented by cooptation more adequately in local environments that were more cohesively organized. San Antonio's Eastside was perhaps the only example among the FB intervention sites of a cohesive local grassroots environment.

Local programs targeting contiguous minority neighborhoods elicited grassroots organization indigenous to that territory. One might assume because a targeted area is populated by a singe racial or ethnic group, that population is cohesive in its civic and social organization. However, that is usually not the case. Residents, leadership, and organizations in these urban communities tend to be diverse. Initially, the grantees tended to draw upon connections to grassroots organization which they had had a role in establishing in the target areas. They then received approval from the National Program Office (NPO) for these efforts or pressure to expand representation of the targeted populations. The grantees initial choice of grassroots allies sometimes elicited public protest, however, on the part of grassroots groups that felt excluded.

Because the FB program targeted geographical areas, it tended to elicit territory based organizations --minority ethnic organizations based in particular neighborhoods (e.g. churches) and neighborhood associations. Because the program addressed drug and

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alcohol problems it also tended to attract both those target area organizations that worked with local youth and families and those organizations that addressed problems associated with local drug and alcohol markets.

Local programs targeting broader swaths of urban territory attracted similar kinds of organizations but tended to elicit more ethnically diverse grassroots participation, depending on local demography. This depended, too, on how diversely the national and local administrators wished to define the grassroots. The National Program Office tended to push the local administrators to define the grassroots broadly and to be inclusive, especially of minority groups. The effect was for participation, towards the end of the planning phase, to be diverse. This tended to stretch the local programs too thin as they attempted to sustain diverse constituencies and programming. Towards the middle and end of the implementation phase, the local programs tended to end up allying themselves with a more narrow set of organizations and the populations they represented.

The effect of targeting administrative or politically defined territories was most obvious in local programs that targeted a municipality. This factor appeared to correlate strongly with whether or not local government administrated the local FB program. The government agencies that implemented the local FB programs appeared to be adept at organizing clients and constituencies, both in residential and organizational populations. Local administrations in Little Rock and Vallejo appeared to do so as part of the efforts of relatively new local political regimes. However, because local grassroots were often diffuse and diverse, these administrative efforts were typically not inclusive.

Some civic organizations were also experienced in responding to the client and

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constituency organizing of local political administrations. Little Rock FB and Vallejo FB encountered opposition --the Little Rock Coalition of Neighborhoods and neighborhood associations in North and South Vallejo, respectively. In both of these cases, local FB administration worked around opposition by providing programming to and building grassroots support in other neighborhoods.

Specific urban areas also constitute administrative districts, or at least parts of them. With regard to administration, specific urban areas may be the objects of multiple, related, sometimes competing administrative jurisdictions. This was especially evident in the area of prevention programming –schools, police, other public and private agencies all conduct prevention programming. The NPO pressed the local programs to work with as many of these diverse local administrative agencies as possible. Early criticisms of the local programs were that they had not engaged the local school district, police department, local hospitals, or others.

Despite their efforts the local programs had little success engaging these large administrative bureaucracies. The bureaucracies tended to run their own, independent programs. They also appeared to prefer not to work with independent grassroots organizations. An exceptions was San Antonio, where grassroots organization on the Eastside was based in part in a federation of independent local PTA groups and where these groups had allied with at least one local principal. For the most part, however, large administrators tended to be sources of organization unto themselves; where they organized grassroots groups, they tended to organize them as client groups.

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Discussion

Civic, political, and administrative organization are all organized in some manner by geographical territory. Administration tends to cut across this social territory in multiple and fragmenting ways because of its division into distinct fields. In the case of historically large, independent bureaucracies (e.g. police and schools), they tend to organize client groups rather than civic groups. Political organization can mitigate against this fragmentation as district offices intervene on behalf of constituents and otherwise seek to become benefactors of residents within given districts.

Broadly conceived and professionally built civic organizations like People Against Corruption in San Antonio and the Little Rock Coalition of Neighborhoods can provide the same function of organizing residents' otherwise fragmented experiences of administrative agencies. They do so by becoming experts in their understanding of how local bureaucracies work, identifying who is able to make which decisions and how to motivate decision makers. But these civic organizations have an ongoing balance to negotiate between (1) opposing local political regimes which are unresponsive and (2) publicly praising local political and administrative for delivering. The former action can shut them out from benefits that flow from better relations with local politicians and administrators. The latter action puts them at risk for becoming client groups rather than independent interests.

2. Elite Views of Social Problems and Their Relations to Federal Programming

The local culture of public problems is largely shaped by local elites and their

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relation to national administrations. A key aspect of this was the history of a given city's participation in federal urban interventions. In this regard, the most important consequence was the early creation and longstanding maintenance of administrative institutions and the concomitant development of professional and provider sectors.

With regard to the AOD problems of individuals, in the Northeast, Midwest, and West public rhetoric appeared more likely to frame solutions in terms of the fields of medicine and psychology. This did not appear as strongly to be the case in the South and Southwest where these problems were also framed as about individual moral character and some solutions framed as religious.

Regional differences in the depth of local treatment sectors were striking and appeared to correlate with these different public rhetorics. In the northeastern FB sites, Milwaukee, and Vallejo, treatment was a well established administrative sector. This did not mean treatment was easily available. Waiting lists for publicly subsidized treatment tended to be long. Treatment competed with other administrative sectors for status in the priorities of local politics and government. Nevertheless, the related administration and professions appeared well established. Other social service administrations also appeared to be deeply entrenched.

In San Antonio and Little Rock, however, publicly funded treatment appeared to be an anemic administrative sector. In San Antonio, treatment appeared to be much more available for county jail inmates than for Eastside residents. The NPO consented to the San Antonio FB programs' using RWJF funding for direct services because so little

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public funding for treatment was available.[1]

The depth of the local treatment sector may have had an effect on how able grassroots were to participate substantively in the local FB programs. In Little Rock and San Antonio, where treatment sectors appeared weaker, neighborhood based grassroots would become important to the program, in Little Rock as constituents and in San Antonio as players in FB's governance. In FB sites where the AOD service sector was well established --Vallejo, Milwaukee, Newark, and Washington-- neighborhood grassroots had varying levels of involvement but did not become the predominant focus of programming as they did in Little Rock and San Antonio.

Midwestern and northeastern FB sites also tended to have longstanding social service administrations. This appeared related to a history of participation in federal urban interventions, beginning with the community action programs (CAPs) of the Johnson administration. Participation in CAPs, Model Cities, and subsequent federal programming generated local nonprofit provider sectors, some of which were based in inner city neighborhoods and populations. All of these intervention sites had longstanding minority or neighborhood based social service providers with annual budgets in the low millions: Marshall Heights Community Development Organization in Washington, Social Development Corporation in Milwaukee, Hill Health Corporation and neighborhood CDCs in New Haven, and so on. These agencies had long been recipients of federal grants, administrating programs and distributing resources in inner

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[1]San Antonio appeared richer, however, in other social service areas. Former Mayor Cisneros was credited with bringing federal monies to the city, both while he was in office and during his tenure as Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.

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city neighborhoods. Little Rock and San Antonio had community development organizations but they appeared to be a relatively new phenomenon.

The tendency of this inner city based nonprofit sector was to relate to inner city residents as individual service recipients. This sector constituted a mediating class between administrative agencies at the federal, state, and local levels and inner city residents who received services. In Selznick's terms, this is an example of formal cooptation by which local organizations develop a share in the burdens of administration. It tends to have the effect of legitimating higher level administrative institutions. In the case of urban programming it has created a class of local organizations and professionals which has become the face of administration in inner cities.

On the other hand these agencies also appeared to function as gatekeepers to inner city populations. In some cases FB administrators seeking to reach these populations could not do so except through these organizations. In others cases, inner city based organizations tried to force themselves on the local FB programs as gatekeepers to local populations. In New Haven and Vallejo, some neighborhood based organizations refused to participate in the local program unless they received particular resources --grants or contracts, staff or board positions, and so on. In these cases, they were unsuccessful in establishing a role in FB. In New Haven and Vallejo, the local program staff attempted to organize alternative grassroots groups as conduits for local programming and to lend legitimacy to the local program, with some success. New Haven organized neighborhood councils that went on to become alternatives for city hall to dealing with the neighborhood development corporations. In Vallejo, FB staff attempted to organize, on

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the one hand, ethnicity based minority organizations to share in service delivery and, on the other hand, to engage neighborhood based organizations in addressing neighborhood disorder. The former strategy was successful with Filipinos, less so with Latinos, and not with African Americans. The neighborhood strategy of the Alcohol Policy Coalition appeared successful across groups and some neighborhoods at the time my research ended.

This relationship between the depth of local administration and grassroots organization is compounded with another historical factor: whether local political representation has been organized by wards or on a city-wide, "at large" basis. District based political organization constituted another historical source of organization. It was not possible to assess the relationships between these multiple, related sources of neighborhood organization. My larger argument here is simply that the accumulation, multiplicity, and consequent complexity of organization in neighborhoods stemming from local political and administrative institutions had another sort of effect on grassroots organization. Grassroots organization, especially in the northeastern sites, appeared to be anemic, not because there was so little formal organization but because there was so much. The consequence of this over-organization was multiple, entrenched centers of interest and more complexity in the organization of grassroots.

Little Rock and San Antonio are contrasting cases. Both Little Rock and San Antonio had less lengthy histories of participation in federal urban intervention. Both cities had district organized elections for representation on local councils; however, district based elections were a recent phenomenon. They were first created in Little Rock

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in 1993. Up to that point, city directors had been elected on an "at large" basis. Until 1977, San Antonio also elected council representatives on an "at large" basis.[2] Under these electoral systems, political organization tends to become more local, based at a district level rather than at a city-wide level. The locals behind city-wide political organizations may well be concentrated residentially. In Little Rock, they had historically come from the "Heights," a wealthy area to the near north of downtown. However, in cities where local representation is organized by districts, a formal basis for political organization exists in all parts of the city.[3]

The consequences of longstanding "at large" systems of representation in San Antonio and Little Rock may have been that whatever neighborhood organization existed was more likely to arise independently of direct relationships to political representatives and their organizations. In fact, in both Little Rock and San Antonio, neighborhood based organization arose in non-patrician and minority neighborhoods independent of and in opposition to local political regimes. These oppositional organizations were federations of neighborhood based organization --Catholic church parishes on San Antonio's Westside, neighborhood associations and PTAs on the Eastside, neighborhood associations in Little Rock. The lack of historical ward structures may have created a

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[2]This advance for district based representation may have been undermined in the mid-1980s, however, by the institution of term limits on council representatives. Limited terms would seem to limit the building of political organization or at least give leaders a much shorter time horizon for building their relations with constituencies.

[3]Both Little Rock and San Antonio had histories of city-wide elite sponsoring organizations around local political elections. The effort of challengers to create districts was an effort to reduce the influence of these elite-based, highly influential organizations.

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condition for this cross-neighborhood cooperation.

Another factor in the development of these minority, neighborhood based organizations in Little Rock and San Antonio was the involvement of professional community organizers. The Industrial Areas Foundation had been influential in San Antonio since the late 1970s, playing a central role in developing Communities Organized for Public Service (COPS) on the Westside and training People Against Corruption's organizers on the Eastside. In Little Rock, ACORN had been organizing in African American neighborhoods since the 1980s.

I propose that neighborhood based grassroots organization played a more prominent role in FB sites with less history of federal and other social programming and with less history of neighborhood based formal political and administrative institutions. The greater the local history of inner city based political and administrative organization, the more likely service providing, professional agencies were to dominate local FB programming.

Table 10.1 summarizes these factors and their effect on grassroots organization. Column 1 represents a hypothetical case in which inner city grassroots are untouched by administrative and political organization. In this hypothetical case, there are no political or administrative resources flowing into these urban communities which would create stakes for organization. Column 3 represents an opposite case in which administrative and political organization have had a longstanding presence in inner cities. Here multiple centers of interest have developed which have shared in the distribution of political and administrative resources. Even if these organizations are weak, subject to the ebb and

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flow of the generosity of local and federal regimes, they nevertheless create the basis for a class of organizations and leaders that compete for the goods generated by politics and administration. The more highly developed this sector, the more complex the configuration of organizational and individual actors.[4] Such settings make independent civic action by inner city grassroots highly unlikely.

Column 2 represents a case in which administrative resources flow into inner city neighborhoods, creating the political and economic stakes for neighborhood organization to develop. However, in this case administrative resources are less likely to flow through political organization based in these neighborhoods. These are conditions for independent civic organization in inner cities that can influence the character of administration.

Independent civic organizations may, of course, differ in the role they seek to play in administration. IAF and ACORN are national networks of local civic organizations. Affiliation with these networks brings experience and expertise to the development of local organizations as they are presented with the dilemmas of how to negotiate their relations to administration, in effect, an ongoing cooptation process in which civic organizations seek to balance the need for resources and organizational development with the desire for political independence from administrative agencies.

3. Ecology and Inner City Organizational Influences

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[4]Cf. Ryan's "The Ghosts of Organizations Past," which I also draw on for my understanding of New Haven FB (1999).

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Other factors influencing grassroots organization are not necessarily attributable to local histories of political and administrative organization. They nevertheless affect what develops in a given city or neighborhood. First, I discuss ecological factors and their effects on inner city organization --demography and the contiguity of minority urban settlement. Second, I discuss indigenous organizational movements and their consequences.

Row 2 in Table 9.2 suggests that in cities with multiple minorities, inner city grassroots organization is likely to be more complex, divided along group and other lines. Vallejo was such a case. It must be said, however, that the source of ethnic group organization is not necessarily indigenous to the group. Vallejo Fighting Back organized the distribution of small grants by group categories, which then played a role in producing grassroots organization as group based. Neither is ethnic group necessarily a "natural" basis for grassroots organization. Of course, it depends on how one defines ethnic categories. I suspect administrators tend to define these categories in crude terms. In Vallejo, FB leadership generated the categories of "Latino," "African American," and "Filipino" in its organization of small grant distribution, though each of these categories embraced populations with a diversity of cultural and sometimes even national backgrounds. The category of "Latino," for example, embraced groups of multiple national and ethnic origins. The only clearly common cultural feature of these groups was the Spanish language. And that did not apply to some Hispanics whose families' tenure in Solano County dated further back than whites of Irish and German ancestry. Filipinos were somewhat organized according to the region of the Philippines they came

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from and the language they spoke. Class differences and U.S. tenure were also factors contributing to associational affinities. Vallejo's African Americans were of at least two general geographical and national origins --Anglo-Carribean and the Deep South. Political and administrative processes thus can have the effect of creating "ethnic" groups that did not previously exist or these categories may presume associational affinities around ethnic or racial lines that are mis-drawn, that do not accurately represent real social and civic organization.[5]

Nevertheless, cities where the population is predominantly black and white may create a condition for cohesion in African American grassroots organization. Although the bases of African American leadership in Milwaukee, for example, were multiple, it appeared to me to be more cohesive than in cities with significant numbers of other minorities, e.g. Newark, New Haven, and Vallejo.[6]

Neighborhood organization in Vallejo also suggested to me the potential influence of the character of black settlement on grassroots organization in a given city. In Chapter 6, I told the story of the Country Club Crest neighborhood in North Vallejo as told to me by residents. The Crest was an all black settlement originated by African Americans who built their homes there in the 1950s. Original residents developed a strong identification

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[5]See Kasinitz (1992).

[6]It is of course impossible to isolate the demographic factor from other factors. I do not know, for example, why African American neighborhood organization in Kansas City, a city not so different from Milwaukee demographically, appeared to be more divided. Perhaps I would discover other factors I have been describing --the local organization of politics and administration and organizational factors indigenous to these neighborhoods.

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with the area, forged in part by a long running series of battles with the City of Vallejo over the delivery of municipal services. Other black and minority neighborhoods in Vallejo did not share this history.

This fact appeared to be a condition for division among African American organizations in Vallejo. Homeowners in the Crest provided a basis for organization invested in that particular part of the city independent of neighborhoods where other African Americans lived. Residents of the Crest founded a neighborhood development corporation which became a center of administration in the Crest that competed fiercely with other African American based service providers for contracts and grants to provide services to African American youth and families.

The Crest thus also constituted an independent base of African American leadership. Neighborhood need not be the only independent basis for leadership. Row 3 in Table 9.2 lists sources of independent minority leadership. Religious congregations appeared to be another basis for distinct and independent sources of African American leadership. Another feature of leadership division among African Americans in Vallejo was ideology. The neighborhood development corporation in the Crest had a separatist, Afrocentric orientation. Its leadership criticized other local youth service programs for teaching youth to be "white" and succeed in "white" institutions rather than teaching them to value their African origins.

San Antonio's Eastside provides a counter example of a centralized leadership base that appeared to cut across religious congregations and other distinct bases of leadership. Two organizations existed on San Antonio's Eastside which centralized

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leadership. One was a leadership training institute. On the staff, board, and otherwise involved in the training network were representatives of many organizations on the Eastside --the YMCA, two community centers, neighborhood associations, religious congregations, and others. I was not able to witness the activities of the institute; however, its existence posited the potential for cohesion among Eastside leaders.

The other organizational form was an African American Leadership Forum. I witnessed one gathering of the Forum. A senior member of the group had called a special meeting which appeared designed to discipline two young lawyers who had stepped out of line by criticizing the local NAACP in an interview with a local journalist. The criticism was subsequently published in a local paper. The point of discipline was that other African American leadership should not be criticized in public.

There were clearly multiple sources of leadership on San Antonio's Eastside. Different leaders also played different roles. Some ran social service agencies. Some were public officials. Others headed civic organizations, primarily neighborhood associations. There were also philosophical differences and differences on particular public issues. However, I thought it striking that organizational forms existed where leaders from numerous organizations regularly interacted face-to-face. How effective these forums were in enabling Eastside African American grassroots to present a common front on administrative and other public issues I was unable to systematically assess.

Conclusion

This chapter has addressed how definitions of "local" and local realities mattered

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in the administration of FB. I first considered the different definitions of "local community" given to the different FB programs and how this engaged particular aspects of organization. Most of the local programs engaged a relative diversity of administrative and grassroots organization. However, the local programs' ability to solve the program's initial legitimacy problems depended on the type of grantee and its relations with other administrative and grassroots organization as well as on the cohesiveness of the grassroots engaging the program.

Second, I explored the effects of how local elites have historically constructed AOD related problems. In some regions of the U.S. medical and psychological understandings of substance abuse had taken stronger hold and correlated with strong treatment and other AOD service related sectors. In FB sites where this was the case, AOD related services tended to be more influential in local programming than grassroots. Where treatment and other AOD service related sectors were weaker, grassroots appeared to have more influence on FB programming.

Where local political and administrative elites had participated in federal urban programming, service sectors generally appeared to be stronger and to have organized service providing agencies at the neighborhood level. In these settings, AOD service oriented programming also appeared to have a larger role in the local program. Where elites had not participated in federal urban programming, non-service civic organizations such as neighborhood associations appeared more able to influence programming.

Generally, the less developed health and social service organizational sectors were for local inner city populations, the more possible it appeared to unite and develop civic

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organization across neighborhoods. In some of these cases the FB program became a part of local political and administrative efforts to develop client groups or constituencies. In other cases, community organizers were able to develop broad-based grassroots civic organizations to advocate for their interests in the course of the local FB programs' development.

Finally, I considered the effects of local ecological factors and organizational movements on the organization of local grassroots. The larger issue here is whether independent bases of leadership and organization develop and the extent to which they become insular or develop connections to other sources of leadership and organization. Key factors linking sources of grassroots leadership and organization appeared to be less historical entanglement with political and administrative processes and the presence of professional community organizers.

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Table 10.1. Ecological Organizational Conditions for Inner City Grassroots Organization

UNDER-ORGANIZED (disorganization)	ORGANIZED	OVER-ORGANIZED (divisions, complexity)
lack of federal or other government intervention	recent history of government intervention	history of federal intervention since 1960s
no history of ward organization	no history or short history of ward organization	long history of ward organized local politics
	history of intervention by professional community organizers (IAF, ACORN)	

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Table 10.2 Conditions for Division and Cohesion in Grassroots Organization

LOCAL CONDITIONS FOR DIVISION	LOCAL CONDITIONS FOR COHESION
ecological factors: (1) demography: multiple minorities (2) minority settlement that is historically not contiguous	ecological factors: (1) demography: white-black (2) historically contiguous minority settlement
organizational movements creating independent bases of leadership and organization: (1) strong radical movements, e.g. Afro-centrism and separatism (2) independent development of religious congregations (3) independent development of administrative and service delivering organizations (4) district based political organization	lack of organizational movements: (1) weak or no radical movements (2) historical dearth of administrative intervention (3) weak or only recent district based political organization organizational movements forging links in local leadership: professional community organizing projects (IAF, ACORN)

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Chapter 11

Conclusion

The first section of this conclusion reviews the arguments of Parts 2 and 3. Part 2 showed how the Fighting Back program's grassroots policy triggered a cooptation process and the outcomes of that process for the grassroots. Part 3 argued that Fighting Back's implementation was drawn into the processes of urban administration and that this revealed aspects of administration's role in the social construction of inner city communities. The second section considers the place of this study in the context of research on inner cities and administration. The final section reflects on the problem of intervening in AOD problems in inner cities.

1. The Argument of The Study

Cooptation and the Implementation of Fighting Back

The RWJF implemented an AOD community organizing project that got caught up in local structures and processes of administration in inner cities. The result was an unintended consequence: a program that intended to address individual use problems came also to address neighborhood disorder. I explained this unintended consequence as follows.

Cooptation is triggered by any one of three distinct problems of administration: the need for public legitimacy for the implementing agency and the program, the need to adjust to local powers that have a strong interest in the agency and its activities, and the

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need to recruit the participation of elements within the targeted populations in administration in order to reach the targeted populations.

The Fighting Back intervention was shaped by indigenous local organization that the Fighting Back program engaged and which engaged it. Indigenous organization existed around both AOD problems defined as individual use and as public disorder. However, in the former case these were typically only formal administrative agencies and service deliverers. In the latter case they included both administrative organizations and civic groups. In other words, grassroots organization existed around the neighborhood disorder related to AOD but did not exist around the problem of individual use of AOD.

Grassroots leadership challenged the legitimacy of the local grantee agencies to implement a program in inner cities. In the course of adapting to this challenge, the local Fighting Back programs incorporated the grassroots into leadership and the distribution of resources. Another method, or outcome of these other methods, was the development of programming that addressed grassroots concerns. This incorporation of grassroots leadership tended to steer local programming towards addressing neighborhood disorder.

However, this accommodation had different outcomes for the grassroots in different local communities. Depending on local factors, minority grassroots had more or less influence in decision-making, more or less of a share in resource distribution, and program content reflected more or less their wishes. These differences may be attributed to the following organizational features of the local programs and the interventions sites.

It mattered what type of agency received the Fighting Back grant. This affected the extent to which and how grassroots were incorporated into the local Fighting Back

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programs. Provider agencies tended to relate to grassroots as individual service recipients rather than as organizations. They therefore tended to incorporate grassroots the least. Decision-making tended to follow pre-existing practice in the Fighting Back program's host organization. Providers tended to run programming themselves, keeping the grant's resources in-house rather than distributing them to grassroots based organizations. This may be explained to some extent by the entrenched interests service providers tend to develop in the context of administrative resource flows.

Some accommodations were made to the grassroots by provider grantees. A key effort was to develop a grassroots organizing division within the program. Whether or not grantees who were service providers did so depended, however, on whether or not they acquired other funding to carry out such a program. The principal instrument for these programming elements were the federal Center for Substance Abuse Prevention Community Partnership grants.

Public administrative agencies were more likely to incorporate grassroots into resource distribution or target them for programming that the grassroots were interested in. They did not, however, tend to include the grassroots in governance, though they tended to have symbolic representation of the grassroots in governance. Moreover, public agencies tended to define the terms of resource distribution themselves and where they implemented services themselves, did so through bureaucracies which were not easy for grassroots organizations to influence.

Local philanthropies appeared the most likely to include the grassroots in decision-making, enabling them to play stronger roles in determining resource

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distribution and programming content. Philanthropies may also, however, have been the freest to disengage from the local grassroots. Or, at least, the RWJF appeared to disengage the grassroots as it re-asserted its control over programming content toward the end of the implementation phase, emphasizing activities that addressed the problem of individual AOD use over the problem of AOD related neighborhood disorder and neighborhood improvement.

How the grassroots were defined by the local programs and the cohesiveness of local grassroots organization under these terms also affected the extent to which target area grassroots were able influence the development of the local Fighting Back programs. In San Antonio, for example, the United Way primarily targeted black neighborhoods on the Eastside. African American grassroots eventually presented a single front in their efforts to play a role in the local Fighting Back program. This made it clear with whom the local grantee had to negotiate the grassroots role if it was going to establish a program on the Eastside.

In Vallejo, the grassroots were defined diversely and presented even more diverse fronts in the efforts of numerous groups to play a role in the local program. Filipinos and recovering groups each presented an organized front for their respective groups and thereby shared in resources flowing from the program. Recovering leadership was able to establish a central role in decision-making for the Vallejo program. Latinos and African Americans were divided in numerous ways and were unable to establish a role in program leadership or a share in resource distribution. Latinos and African Americans, respectively, did not constitute cohesive ethnic communities. The local Fighting Back

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leadership nevertheless sought to develop and incorporate Latinos and African Americans into the program by other means in order to shore up the program's tenuous legitimacy among these local populations.

Cooptation is both an integrating and excluding process. It defines the modes by which various groups do and do not participate in administrative decision-making and resource distribution. This participation may be relatively substantive or empty depending on the extent to which these various groups constitute bases of real social power. However, cooptation always has tendencies towards incorporation as groups in power are faced with solving the ongoing problems of legitimating their programs with local publics and of maintaining social and political order in communities divided by race and by class.

Fighting Back's implementation in the context of administrative process in inner cities.

Part 3 of this study placed the Fighting Back intervention in the context of the broader social processes of race relations and administration and the role these processes play in the organization of inner city communities.

Race relations

Administration is an arena in multi-racial cities in which minorities seek a share of public goods --power, autonomy, resources. For African Americans this has been an especially crucial arena because public institutions have historically been more accessible than private ones. However, African Americans engage in this competition in the context

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of segregation. Under segregation social structure is divided and segmented by race. Social organization --civic and other formal organizations, informal groups, kin, networks, neighborhoods-- is largely bifurcated with whites being organized among themselves and minorities, especially blacks, among themselves. Where social organization is not separate, it tends to be segmented. African Americans tend to be concentrated in the bottom strata of those organizations, groups, networks to which both whites and blacks belong. This is also the case with the participation of minorities in the circulation of public goods, services, and other resources generated by politics and administration.

The responses of minority grassroots groups to Fighting Back's administration reveals the dilemmas segregation produces. Participating in the circulation of public resources generated by local administration can mean surrendering autonomy in establishing organizational purpose and direction. However, not participating impoverishes an organization. The ongoing solution negotiated is to attempt to establish as much autonomy as possible while still participating in the circulation of resources. For the first years of Fighting Back's implementation, local grassroots and programs established considerable autonomy; however, eventually the national Fighting Back administrators imposed their wishes on local programming which then reduced grassroots autonomy and participation.

The form, strength, and dynamics of minority participation in administrative processes depend on demography and jurisdiction. Minorities may be a minority at the level of the municipality or in the context of regionally organized administration --

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counties in metropolitan areas and the state.[1] In other words, the contest for minorities' share or position in the circulation of public resources may take place primarily at the level of the municipality, the county, or the state, depending on demography. In a predominantly black city like Newark, for example, the contest takes place at the level of state politics and administration. In a predominantly white city like Little Rock, it takes place at the level of municipal politics and administration. It may also take place simultaneously at different levels.

Where African Americans dominate municipal politics and administration, this may have the effect of de-legitimating black regimes to local, regional, and national publics. The burdens of administration are fully on the shoulder's of black regimes while at the same time these regimes tend to be handicapped by poor tax bases and concentrations of poverty related social problems.

Another dynamic shaping administration in the local context is whether there are multiple minorities, though it may not be straightforward how this matters. First, in the Fighting Back sites, African Americans tended to be ahead of other minorities in participation in politics and administration by virtue of having longer residential tenure, being citizens and demographically dominant. Second, a given minority group (as defined by administration) may not be cohesively organized within itself. In Vallejo, for example, the Fighting Back program organized resource distribution by minority groups which handicapped groups which were not organized, or able to organize, around ethnic

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[1]This depends also on the particular field of administration in question. Law enforcement, mental health services, etc. may be organized by distinct jurisdictional schemes.

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identity. Minorities that shared the demographic characteristic of race or ethnicity but were socially organized by other principles were thus disadvantaged. Other organizing principles were neighborhood, ideology, and formal organization. In San Antonio, Mexican- and African American leadership appeared able to seek power and resources in a manner which de-emphasized ethnic competition. They nevertheless engaged in this competition and tended to do so as distinct groups.

History and forms of local administration

This section considers some historical and ecological factors shaping social structure and forms in inner cities: local participation in federal urban programming, ward organization of local politics, and minority settlement patterns.

The predominant source of administrative resources flowing into inner cities has been the federal government. Programs which had important organizing effects include the community action programs of the Johnson administration, Model Cities, the community health and community development movements, and so on. However, not all cities have participated equally or at the same time in these programs. When, how, and to what extent local elites participated in federal urban programs is an important factor in the development of inner city organizations.

I suggest that the longer the history of local participation in federal programming, the more developed will be local grassroots organization and its participation in administration. I suggest also that the more highly developed this sector of urban organization, the more likely multiple bases of formal grassroots organization are to

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develop. These may be based in distinct administrative areas, different fields of administrative activity, different organizations providing similar services, and so on. The tendency, therefore, is for entrenched and distinct interests to develop. This means grassroots tend not to be cohesively organized but are more likely to be competitively organized according to organizational membership, administrative field, neighborhood, and so on. Given their longer history of participation in federal programming, and therefore their more highly developed nonprofit and grassroots organizational sectors, cities in the northeastern, mid- and western U.S. are more likely to exhibit this condition of hyper-organization and the consequent increased likelihood of inter-organizational divisions and disorganization.

Ironically, grassroots in cities where local elites participated later or not as much in federal programming may therefore have a better chance of developing cohesive organization. They are less likely to have developed distinct entrenched administrative interests. A broadly cohesive minority (or other) grassroots sector is better able to negotiate beneficial terms for their incorporation into decision-making and the resources generated by local administration. In the FB case, this appeared to apply more to cities in the South and Southwest.

Another factor in the relative cohesiveness of inner city civic organization is likely also the jurisdictional organization of local politics and administration. The key factor is whether or not local political representation has been historically organized by districts. If so, again, ironically, the organization of the local grassroots sector and its role in local administration may be longer standing but may also be more complex and competitive.

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In these systems the remnants and existing strands of neighborhood or area-based organization may be entrenched which may mitigate against broader cohesion as grassroots negotiate their role in local administration. Again, broadly speaking, cities in the northeastern U.S. and industrial cities of the Midwest and West are more likely to have organizational remnants of ward-based organization than are cities in the South and Southwest where business leaders have been more influential in the organization of local politics in the twentieth century.

In Vallejo a key factor in the development of grassroots organization appeared to be the pattern of minority settlement. The Crest neighborhood in North Vallejo was an independent African American residential development. Organization of residents in the Crest formed independently of other black neighborhoods around the Crest's conflicts with city hall over provision of basic services. This generation of leadership continued to identify with their specific neighborhood and its history of grievances over and against other neighborhoods in the city, whatever the color of their residents. I know less about the history of black settlement on San Antonio's Eastside; however, informants gave me the impression settlement developed contiguously (though a black suburb has developed north of the city line).

It may therefore be that contiguity of settlement has an effect on the cohesiveness of grassroots organization and its relation to administration. This raises questions about the historical development of African American neighborhoods in particular cities and the relation of those developments to class distinctions among African Americans. When segregated areas of black settlement in a given city spread out, or black settlements in

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discontinguous areas develop, as more affluent African Americans attempt to distance themselves from neighborhoods where disorder is more concentrated, what are the effects on civic and political organization among African Americans across neighborhoods? These demographic and ecological factors are likely to multiply the bases for African American civic and political organization, making that organization more complex as it mediates the relations of African American residential life to urban administration.

2. Research on Inner Cities and Administration

Inner cities have tended to be studied from the perspectives of research on poverty and deviance. I believe this has resulted in a distorted picture of urban minority neighborhoods. The subjects of research have tended to be either those who fall below the poverty line (e.g. Wilson 1996; Jargowsky 1997); the dealers, addicts, and others who participate in "street" culture (e.g. Liebow 1967, Hannerz 1969, Duneier 1999); or another below-middle class element, teenage mothers on welfare (e.g. Wilson 1987, Jencks and Peterson 1991). These literatures have left the nearly exclusive impression that minority neighborhoods in central cities are disordered and their residents are poor and "socially disorganized."[2]

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[2]Whyte suggested in *Street Corner Society* that we tend to call "disorganized" social groups and settings which we have not looked at very closely (1943). In Wilson (1987) and others, social disorganization is really a term for certain behaviors that do not fit with "middle class" values but not a description of social organization, or patterns of interaction (relations) within a group in its "native" context.

I find it problematic associating certain behaviors with "middle" or "lower" class values (Hannerz rightly called these "native" terms in the ghetto he studied) and then further associating these values with socio-economic status. These may well be competing value systems but I suspect they compete as often within the hearts and minds

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I suspect, however, that there resides in inner city neighborhoods an invisible majority. My research on the Fighting Back program brought me into contact with inner city residents who were above the poverty line, most of them professionals (teachers, nurses, managers in private and public sectors), who owned homes, belonged to religious congregations and other civic organizations. They guided my colleagues and me on tours of inner city Milwaukee, New Haven, San Antonio, Vallejo, and others. They sought to convey particular messages about their neighborhoods: (1) that most residents were not dealers or drug addicts; (2) that they and their fellow residents were building positive institutions in these neighborhoods --churches, community centers, housing developments and so on; (3) that organized residents of these neighborhoods built these institutions and brought about these improvements by their own initiative; (4) that they nevertheless were frustrated with the ongoing necessity of battling decline and disorder in their neighborhoods; (5) that they were frustrated with the efforts of public agencies with

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of individuals of all socio-economic strata as they do between groups.

What is the relationship between socio-economic status and "bad" behaviors? I find this relationship not at all straightforward. I believe the consequences that follow from engaging in certain behaviors may be more devastating the poorer one is. These consequences may also become more of a burden to the public as poor people do not have the same material reserves that non-poor are able to drawn on in a personal crisis and therefore may cease to be able to support independent living.

Poor and non-poor may also express "lower class" values (e.g. failure to delay gratification, hedonism, sensuality, crudeness, etc.) in different forms with different consequences because of their differential ability to support different kinds of activities. Peer group and family dynamics may also be better predictors of "bad" behavior than socio-economic status. The rise of mass media has also produced a medium that may shape, or at least rapidly disseminate, life styles and behavior patterns. Mass media is also responsible for the "copycat" phenomenon by which a particular kind of "bad" behavior is widely disseminated and then becomes imitated --suicide, mass shootings, and so on. The relationship of these negative group and media influences to socio-economic status are also by no means straightforward or clear.

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authority to address these problems.

I found a tension between forces of decline and disorder and forces for development. The investment of poor and middle class minorities in the quality of their residential life produced civic organization that challenged decline and disorder as well as those public agencies responsible for neighborhood quality. This raises a number of questions about inner city neighborhoods, civic organization within them, and their relation to administrative agencies.

The Fighting Back survey suggested neighborhood disorder and decline was a greater problem for blacks and other minorities than for whites. What is the extent of neighborhood decline and disorder in segregated urban neighborhoods? To get a more accurate picture of the scope of these issues, one could classify neighborhoods according to the degree of disorder and decline. The most troubled neighborhoods would be like "Little Beirut" in Milwaukee, "The Corner" in Baltimore (Simon and Burns 1997), and South State Street in Chicago (Wilson 1987).[3] The least troubled neighborhoods would be like the housing developed by Marshall Heights Development Corporation in the seventh ward of Washington D.C. and a development of ranch houses towards the south of San Antonio's Eastside owned mostly by African American retirees. They would also include the black suburbs described by Dent (1992). In between these extremes would be

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[3]Just how many neighborhoods are there in the U.S. like "Little Beirut" in Milwaukee? Jargowsky found 2,886 urban high-poverty census tracts (40% or more) in the U.S.'s urban and non-urban 59,678 tracts --4.8%. However, this figure does not give a sense of what percent of urban tracts are high poverty. I do not know the relationship between neighborhood poverty and disorder, but in the next note suggest there is a strong correlation.

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a third category where disorder and decline are co-present with stable institutions and development. This latter category is probably mostly what I was observing in the Fighting Back intervention sites.

In my observations of the Fighting Back intervention sites, high poverty, high disorder neighborhoods do not account for most minority neighborhoods in urban areas. Many African Americans live in neighborhoods where disorder is a problem but where civic groups also exist to combat it and pressure administrative agencies to do so. In his poverty research, Jargowsky found the distribution of neighborhoods by poverty rate was "continuous, not bimodal" (1997: 9). In other words, there were not clearly demarcated "nice" neighborhoods and "bad" neighborhoods. My qualitative sense is that the distribution of the Fighting Back neighborhoods by disorder was also discontinuous. In these in-between neighborhoods, which I hypothesize constitute the majority of segregated urban neighborhoods, tension exists between disorder, decline and the desires of homeowners and others who wish to improve their residential conditions.

What are the characteristics of residents in these urban minority neighborhoods? Poverty researchers have focused on characteristics of poor people. Who are the other residents in medium- and high-poverty neighborhoods? What is the extent and character of civic organization among both poor and non-poor in these neighborhoods? To what extent am I correct in saying that inner city organization exists around neighborhood quality and the various fields of administration that address it? How typical is such organization in a given city? Does it vary across cities? How and why? Where in a given city is such organization more and less evident? In what sorts of neighborhoods is

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it stronger? I suspect that such organization is concentrated precisely in those "in-between" neighborhoods where the tension exists --where disorder is a problem but where homeowners and other residents who are not able or do not wish to leave are engaged in improving their immediate environs.[4]

This research would subordinate questions about poverty and deviance, their causes and effects, to questions about the diverse effects on minority urban residents of living in segregated urban areas. One broad goal would be simply to do justice to the diversity of residential life in segregated urban neighborhoods --the diversity of residents, the existence and diversity of formal and informal institutions, the relations of these populations and institutions to city-wide populations and institutions. The other would be to describe the particular adversities faced by these populations and institutions in establishing a quality of residential life that reflects their basic need for order as well as their moral and aesthetic values.[5]

There would also be an historical aspect to this research. Wilson put forth one interpretation of historical change in inner city neighborhoods --that as industry moved from center city to the suburbs and better-off African Americans followed industry, a

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[4]There are questions in my mind here about the constraints on residential choice for African Americans because of two factors: dual, or racially segmented, housing markets (cf. Kingsley and Turner 1993) and the lack of wealth among African Americans with middle class income (Conley 1999). They may not be able to exercise as much choice as whites and other minorities in getting away from neighborhoods higher in disorder.

[5]Obviously, the latter may be diverse and conflict. The manifest tension in these neighborhoods appeared largely due to this conflict in values between "street" culture and that of "respectables" (cf. Hannerz 1969: 34-58).

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poor, unemployed population became concentrated in inner cities. I am not convinced of this story, certainly not of its broad applicability. A competing explanation for what happened in some of the very neighborhoods which Wilson described would be, for example, that the concentration of poverty on South State Street in Chicago was actually more likely attributable to the unprecedented administrative concentration of poor African Americans in public housing in the 1970s. Disorder in such areas is then a question not only of residents' behavior and organization but also of the administrative authorities responsible for establishing and maintaining these housing developments.[6]

What have been changes in the historical experiences of residential life by African Americans in central cities in the post-war era? What have been the changes in institutional life? It may actually be that residential life has improved but that some degree of disorder remains an issue. In the mid-1960s, Hannerz's informants in the poor Washington D.C. neighborhood he studied said that the neighborhood had "calmed down" since the 1950s and 1940s. It is likely that participation in administrative institutions --as clients, as employees, as managers-- has increased since the 1960s and that participation in independent civic groups that address disorder and administrative agencies' responses to it have also increased, especially in those cities where African American home ownership has increased.

While the entry point for these kinds of research problems is primarily the

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[6]The re-segregation of African Americans in public housing from the 1950s to the present was also, of course, produced by the inability of local housing authorities to recruit white tenants that would live with blacks. See Hirsch (1983), Meyersohn and Banfield (1955), and Schwartz (1993).

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residential life of African Americans in U.S. urban centers, it would not treat life in these neighborhoods as merely isolated from the rest of urban society. I am interested in understanding that life, not as separate from the rest of society but as incorporated, albeit denigrated, within both public and private institutional processes. This dissertation contributed to such a research agenda in its case study of the administration of a national program in inner cities.

What have been the changes in the role of administration in inner cities? How has the development of federal intervention in urban minority neighborhoods affected both the quality of life there and the civic and other organization of residents? Political scientists have done a lot of work on the incorporation of African Americans into local politics and administration but have not studied the effects of this incorporation on black urban neighborhoods. Nor have they tended to consider the relation of this racial incorporation in local politics and administration to civic and other organization in segregated urban neighborhoods.[7]

Finally, this study touched on a topic both more narrow and more broad that is worthy of further research. How does a modern democratic society manage majority-minority relations based on a de facto "color line." How are threats to social disruption from both elements within the minority and within the majority managed? What are the stress points of this accommodation process? What actors are produced by this process? What shapes their character and motivation? How does this in turn shape the accommodation process?

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[7]See, for example, Browning et al (1984, 1990) and Sonenshein (1993).

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I showed in Part 2 and argued in Part 3 that the problems of neighborhood disorder and local politics and administration produce a class of leadership and organizations in segregated urban neighborhoods. It is this class that is on the front line of minority-majority accommodation in multi-racial urban centers. To what extent is this class based in inner city neighborhoods? To what extent does it broadly represent the concerns of residents? To what extent does it incorporate urban black populations into civic life and administration? What are the bases of cohesion and division within this class? How are these organizational patterns related to local political and administrative institutions?

3. Intervening in Minority Urban Neighborhoods

This study did not make me an expert on the mechanics of how to help drug addicts or how to close down street corner drug markets. I did learn some things about implementing programs in local communities generally and how to do so with regard to AOD problems.

"Grassroots administration" and program content

The RWJF got caught in a dilemma. It wanted to engage grassroots substantively in an intervention targeting their populations and neighborhoods. Where it succeeded in doing so, the anticipated programming content altered, away from the problem of individual use of AOD and towards neighborhood improvement. However, the RWJF also wanted to improve local prevention and treatment efforts to the end of reducing

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"demand" for AOD. When it reined in local programming to reflect this wish, grassroots engagement declined.

The lesson from this experience is that one cannot attempt a "grassroots policy" or "democratic method" of implementation and also dictate the sort of programming activities that are supposed to result from this process. If one wants to engage the grassroots substantively, it is necessary to work with their priorities and definitions of problems and be flexible on the programming content that results. If one wants to implement particular program content, it makes more sense to work directly with grassroots and other organizations that want that kind of programming. Inviting others to participate as if they have equal input will tend to produce conflict when these parties discover their views and goals are not considered equally valid.

AOD problems

Civic organization in inner cities exists around the problem of AOD related neighborhood disorder but not around the problem of individual use. If one wishes to work with this civic organization, one must deal with a set of problems quite different from those related to AOD use --civic organizations such as neighborhood associations and churches on the one hand and law enforcement and other official agents of neighborhood control on the other. This institutional setting presents a nest of issues: relations between neighborhood leadership, groups, and local police; the organization of local police's methods of addressing drug dealing, public inebriation, alcohol stores, and the related neighborhood disorder; other administrative agencies that have an effect on

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neighborhood disorder such as housing code enforcement and housing authorities; other more positive, development strategies that address order indirectly: commercial, housing, institutional development. In short, there exists an entire array of administrative agencies and strategies that can mitigate neighborhood decline or bring about neighborhood improvement. The entry points for addressing urban neighborhood disorder are therefore multiple.

There is a broad ecological factor which makes affecting neighborhood disorder politically complex. AOD-related public disorder develops and is fought against on a block by block basis. While the victory may be won on one block, disorder may re-organize itself a few blocks away. A cat and mouse game occurs between authorities and criminal elements in disorder. This has differential effects on residents. There is a benefit to residents on the block where disorder has been removed but a cost to the residents on the block or blocks where it re-appears (if it does). Authorities and residents are simply not capable of eliminating public disorder from the urban landscape. Disorder therefore tends to concentrate in certain areas. This is broadly the problem for poor minorities as disorder is more likely to concentrate where they live. However, it is also a problem for the differentiated neighborhoods within segregated urban areas. Those civic groups and individual residents able to mobilize the most private and public resources are able to push the problem out of their areas. Those less able to mobilize resources are more likely to get stuck with the problem. The urban ecology of public disorder is therefore a product of neighborhood stratification. This is one important social basis for some aspects of urban conflict that are organized by local politics and administration.

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Intervening in such a situation ultimately means taking sides in this competition. Politicians and administrators necessarily tend to choose the sides of stronger constituencies.

There are organizations in inner cities that exist to deal with problems of individual AOD use. These are not typically civic associations but service providers. Here the issue for a national administration is whom to ally with in helping local addicts and alcoholics. There is competition between providers which in many of the Fighting Back sites played out somewhat along racial and ethnic lines. Minority groups sought to establish professional and organizational niches in which they took control of service provision for their fellow minorities.[8] In at least one instance, Milwaukee, the terms under which this struggle took place involved particular definitions of the solution to individual abuse of AOD. This contest was affected by an anticipation of what state legislators were willing to fund --expensive, long term in-patient treatment or inexpensive, short-term, out-patient treatment. Again, I am not qualified to say what definition would have led to more effective treatment for inner city residents. I can only say that this process is to a degree inevitable --where administrative resources flow to services for inner city residents, minority leadership and organizations form which make a legitimate claim to these resources and to providing services. A part of the process of making a legitimate claim is countering the problem definitions of those who control

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[8]I do not know who stands a better chance of helping these individuals. It could be that people have a poorer chance of bettering their quality of life if they are treated in their old neighborhood where peer groups draw these individuals into their former behavior patterns. It could be they nevertheless do better being treated by and with fellow minority group members.

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resources. In the Milwaukee case, this appeared to have the ironic consequence of Fighting Back being on the side of an effort which probably decreased the provision of treatment in Milwaukee. Nevertheless, the best approach to take is to work with inner city based providers --supporting them in their efforts to cultivate practices which improve the quality of client's lives as the clients and those who care about and work with them come to define that.

Community organization

National administrators like the RWJF that intervene in local communities but are for the most part unconnected to local administrators, would be much advantaged by some rudimentary understanding of local community organization before intervening. It is not necessarily straightforward how to identify centers of interest and good allies when faced with numerous potential local allies. What happened in the Fighting Back case was probably inevitable. The National Program Office staff did their instinctive best before making the grants and during the planning phase at discerning local allies, their strengths and weaknesses, and supporting them in addressing the problems of establishing a legitimate program.

Local communities in which the grassroots are more cohesively or centrally organized, such as San Antonio, appear easier to intervene in with a "grassroots policy." Establishing a program's public legitimacy is more straightforward. Whatever organizational point the intervention enters, it is more likely in these cases to become quickly subject to a process of conflict and negotiation that can result in legitimacy for

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the program in the target area. How then to reach local populations with programs or services is also more straightforward as leadership is likely to be linked to or interested in building organizations that can share in this function of administration.

Where these leadership links exist but are fragile, it is crucial to identify a good entry point into them early on. I do not know just how cohesively organized grassroots on San Antonio's Eastside were, but People Against Corruption turned out to be a good ally, and within PAC's leadership, that element which was more experienced --persistent, patient, and flexible in imagining different modes of negotiation and outcomes.

All local communities have latent and manifest divisions --multiple centers of interest-- in any given field of grassroots and administrative activity. Communities where these divisions are heightened are more complicated to intervene in. In my view, it makes little sense for outsiders to attempt to bridge local social divisions except where local forces for bridging exist and have momentum. The clearest solution is to identify the sides, choose well given one's own agenda and the agendas of the local parties, and manage the fallout. The RWJF's original National Program Office did so, usually with some success. A crucial aspect of managing the fallout is to address continually the problem of the program's public legitimacy through ongoing efforts to develop grassroots support or to establish links to some existing grassroots leadership. Vallejo's local administration was able to do so, especially through its Alcohol Policy Coalition. New Haven Fighting Back also did so through its development of "neighborhood management teams."

Most complex, and perhaps most typical, are urban communities which are over-

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organized. They are typically divided in multiple ways. In these situations, attempts at "community wide" engagement are fruitless. They flounder because the many local entities do not know how to categorize and therefore respond to them or a multitude of parties conflict in their efforts to exercise influence. In such communities, it is essential to identify specific local allies with purposes compatible with the national administration.[9] If a goal of the intervention is community organizing, in an organizationally complex environment it makes more sense to enter at a specific point and build alliances from that organizational point in the local institutional field rather than extending an open invitation to participation. The latter is more likely to result in confusion and unproductive conflict.

Finding effective local allies in a given organizationally complex community is not necessarily easy to do and takes time. It is my sense that in the Fighting Back sites which fell into the category of "over-organized" communities, the National Program Office staff searched for good local allies, but they were slower to emerge and more constrained than allies in less organizationally complex communities. These local Fighting Back programs were more likely to have trouble establishing their legitimacy and implementing programs.

Community organizing at some level is necessary to accomplish anything in a local institutional field. The three problems of cooptation must be adequately solved for any intervention to establish itself: adjustment to local centers of interest, public

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[9]This is not a straightforward process as administrative organizations and service deliverers in central cities have learned to adapt themselves, or may appear to adapt themselves, to new initiatives because they need the resources to continue to exist.

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legitimacy, reaching the targeted populations. These must be adequately addressed if a project of any scale is to engage in activities that might directly address a given local public problem. The effect of these cooptation processes on local institutional environments is to order or organize them in some fashion. The adequacy of that ordering or organizing process depends on how cohesively organized the target institutional environment and its constituent grassroots are. New interventions nevertheless can have community organizing effects --shoring up existing organization or developing new organization.

Program expectations

The RWJF senior program officers expected the Fighting Back program to change the behavior and attitudes related to AOD of residents in urban areas with populations of 100,00 to 250,000. In three iterations (1995, 1997, 1999), the Fighting Back survey has shown no significant reductions in AOD use or improved attitudes about AOD use in the Fighting Back intervention sites. It is, of course, extremely difficult to know whether these survey findings have a relationship to what local Fighting Back programs did or did not do. I do not believe there is a relationship. Aggregate individual AOD use in a given community is related to many things. We know very little about why individuals develop substance abuse problems, let alone about what sort of effect being located in a particular geographical area might have to do with it.[10] Moreover, in the larger scheme of what might affect individual use, Fighting Back was a small scale intervention.

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[10] Cf. Kadushin et al's review of the relevant literature (1998).

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Efforts to reduce neighborhood disorder may also be ambiguous in their results. If the goal is to reduce the size of AOD markets, the amount of AOD bought and sold, I suspect these efforts have little effect. They may reduce disorder in specific neighborhoods. The question then arises whether these activities and the accompanying disorder simply move to adjacent areas, in which case the aggregate problem is not reduced. It may be that, in combination with other factors,[11] these efforts reduce neighborhood disorder in a given city. This may or may not reduce the size of AOD markets themselves. They may simply move inside or develop other, less visible forms.

My point is not that we should not try to do anything about either individual AOD use or about neighborhood disorder. Rather, that perhaps something can be done with great effort concentrated in a micro-area or on a very small group in a relatively limited or constrained environment. However, affecting behavioral trends in a city or even two or three neighborhoods is unrealistic. These phenomena are likely shaped by powerful factors which at this point I am not sure we know a lot about and which are likely beyond the powers of small scale efforts.

Does this mean we should only bother with narrowly targeted, precise interventions and make no attempt to intervene in "communities," however, these are defined? If an important societal goal is social and political stability, urban interventions on a small and large scale are absolutely necessary. Under certain circumstances they may have a de-stabilizing effect. Law enforcement is a regularly intervening agent in inner cities which has had especially volatile effects. In most instances it was interactions

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[11]E.g. an economic boom that spreads to central city neighborhoods.

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between law enforcement and residents, and the perceptions that immediately were passed on among residents, that triggered urban riots in the late 1960s (National Advisory Council on Civil Disorders 1968). These continue to trigger riots and create tensions. To the extent interventions exacerbate inter-ethnic tensions, they may also have a de-stabilizing effect. However, interventions that deliberately invite grassroots influence and support fall into a different category. They have an organizing effect in inner city communities. While inner city residents in the Fighting Back sites were initially suspicious of the Fighting Back program, this was often overcome among some groups and organizations to an extent that the program was able to proceed. However feeble the effects of particular interventions may be in the larger context of racial division, efforts to reach across this divide are essential. Doing so well is then a matter of gaining experience, learning how to do it, and whom to do it with in particular places.

In order for administrative interventions to be legitimated among grassroots populations in multi-racial settings, they must build and maintain bridges across the social divides of race and class. If they do so, they may also increase a sense of local efficacy. One of the original senior program officers at the RWJF was concerned that the RWJF do something about national drug policy because of the potential for a widening alienation between inner city populations and administrative agencies, particularly law enforcement. This individual also was concerned about the sense of frustration and hopelessness he encountered in his conversations with inner city and other local leaders. In those intervention sites where the local Fighting Back program was able to solve adequately the problems presented by the cooptation process, they necessarily reached

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across the social divides of race and class. Such an effect on community organization brought about in the course of a cooptation process may in turn contribute to decreased alienation of minority grassroots and increased perceptions of local efficacy among both administrative and grassroots organizations. In the case of FB there is no evidence that changes in community organization or lessened alienation and increased perceptions of local efficacy result in a reduction of problems related to AOD. However, these changes may lessen the threat of local social and political upheaval.

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Appendix A

Long Interview Form

Interview Cover Sheet

Fighting Back
Community_____

Respondent
Name_____

Title/Organization_____

Contact Address/Phone
Number_____

Interviewer_____

Place of
Interview_____

Date_____

Start Time_____ EndTime_____

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Questions

Background

History of Fighting Back

Structure

Committee

History of Each Activity

New Initiatives

Major Players and Activities in AOD Domain

Community Involvement

Funding

NPO

Changes in Target Community

Disagreements Within Fighting Back

Before interviewing someone, have a basic idea of what their expertise is, what they are most knowledgeable about. I.e. know why you're interviewing this particular person. Then this instrument should be edited beforehand --just cross off what you won't bother to ask. But be ready for surprises. They may have expertise/first hand experience of things you don't know beforehand, so be flexible.

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[BACKGROUND INFORMATION]

1. Female [ ] Male [ ]

2. Where were you born?

   In what year?

3. How long have you lived in this community?

4. Tell me about your educational background?

5. What is your main occupation?

6. Please describe your responsibilities at Fighting Back. (Have they changed?)

6.1 For how long have you served in this capacity?
Probe: Start Date; End Date.

6.2 How did you come to be involved in the Fighting Back initiative?

6.3 Who selected you for this position?

[HISTORY OF FIGHTING BACK]

7. Here we are trying to get at the time-line for the site. We ask for a history, for the myths and stories about the site. Basically, we're trying to get info that will help us to construct a picture of what happened when.

We should go into the site with a list of names from the PIRE interviews of who can give us insight into the origins --planning period, key history. Read the PIRE interview beforehand to 1) follow up on questions, see if they're answers have changed, if issues then have since been resolved or have changed... 2) target your questions --i.e. you can't ask "tell us the myths of the site." Instead, e.g. "your earlier interview mentioned a fallout between the lead agency and agency X --what was that about?"

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[STRUCTURE OF FIGHTING BACK]

I want to talk to you about the Fighting Back Organization.

8. I have here a Fighting Back organizational chart. SEE PIRE INTERVIEWS AND PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION PROPOSALS. Is this an accurate description of the Fighting Back structure? Probe for changes [FILL IN ANSWERS TO THE FOLLOWING FROM THE PIRE INTERVIEWS BEFOREHAND.]

[Probe for who is who for each position. Who reports to who. Who makes policy. What task is carried out by which individual. For each change in structure/personnel ask why change took place. The goal is to determine how do the different parts of the structure fit together -- what and who does what? The results should be an outline of the various components, lead agency, task force, etc.]

9. How and where are policies determined? Decisions made? THIS QUESTION MAY BE TOO BROAD, ASK ABOUT SPECIFIC INITIATIVES --ESPECIALLY THE PRINCIPLE ONES.

9.1 What does "democratic" and "consensus" and things like that mean in practice here --"representation," "diversity" ....?

9.6 WE SHOULD KNOW IF there HAVE been any major changes in the formal leadership positions within Fighting Back since the start of the implementation phase. SO ASK WHY THE CHANGE, HOW IT CAME ABOUT, HOW THE NEW PERSON WAS FOUND (BOARD MEMBER, STAFF PERSON...), WHEN...

10. In your opinion, who are the two or three key persons who provide direction to Fighting Back. either as formal leaders or in some other capacity? GO INTO SITE/INTERVIEW WITH LIST OF WHO IS INVOLVED. ASK ABOUT THEIR CURRENT INVOLVEMENT --IF ITS THE SAME OR DIFFERENT. ASK HOW/WHY IT CHANGED. FOR THOSE WHO ARE NO LONGER INVOLVED, WHY?

10.1 [For each individual mentioned ask] What makes this person key?

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THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS [14-15] SHOULD BE ASKED OF THE PROJECT DIRECTOR AND OF KNOWLEDGEABLE MEMBERS OF THE BOARD/TASK FORCE AND CONSORTIUM/PARTNERS. [MAJOR PLAYERS AND ACTIVITIES IN THE DRUG AND ALCOHOL DOMAIN]. THE PLANNING OR IMPLEMENTATION PROPOSAL SHOULD INCLUDE A LIST OF THE PLAYERS IN THE TX FIELD. ASK ABOUT PREVENTION, TOO --ESPECIALLY IN THE SCHOOLS (D.A.R.E. ETC.). AFTER CARE, TOO --E.G. SOBER LIVING RESIDENCES.

14. Who are the other major players in the drug and alcohol domain?

14.1 What are the major initiatives other than Fighting Back in San Antonio? [Probe for CSAP Community Partnership]

14.2 In your opinion, how well have these initiatives been coordinated with Fighting Back?

14.3 Have you done any joint or collaborative work with [name activity mentioned in 14-31?

14.4 Have there been any difficulties in your relationship with [name activity]?

15. Are there other major state, federal or privately funded investment (NOT NECESSARILY IN RELATED TO SUBSTANCE ABUSE) in [target community] such as "Weed and Seed" or the creation of an "Enterprise Zone"?

17. Does Fighting Back actively solicit community involvement or do you rely on individuals initiating contact with Fighting Back? Or both?

[Probe:

How does FB expand within the community?

How do new organizations get involved?

How do individuals get involved?

Is there a strategic plan for increasing participation?]

18. When someone from the community decides to volunteer, what happens next? In other words, who and what determines where and how this volunteer will work?

19. Would you say Fighting Back has the involvement and input of all constituencies in the community?

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19.1 Which constituencies are not represented? Why do you believe this is so?

20. In what sense is Fighting Back a grass-roots organization?

21.2 Are racial issues a major concern in target community?

22. Who would you say are currently the most influential community groups and special interest groups in [target community]?

List:

22. Are these groups currently working with Fighting Back?

Why is this so?

23. Have there been any major changes in the role of religious organizations in [target community] since the beginning of the implementation phase?

24. In your opinion, what do you understand to be the principal objectives of Fighting Back?

[Probe] [If response is too general, probe for specifics. For example, if a goal is identified as "reducing the demand for drugs", ask the respondent how Fighting Back hopes to achieve this goal.]

24.1 Do you think these goals are appropriate given [target area]?

25.2 Who is responsible for securing additional resources? ASK DIRECTOR

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[QUESTIONS ON THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL PROGRAM OFFICE (NPO)]

The following questions are about the role that the NPO has played in the implementation of Fighting Back. [We want to understand the degree to which they have controlled and influenced what happened here, the degree to which the site has felt (taken into account when making decisions) that it needed to satisfy the criticisms, requirements etc. of the NPO.]

26. Other than regularly scheduled site visits, what contacts have you had with the National Program Office in Nashville since the beginning of the implementation phase? ASK DIRECTOR AND EXECUTIVE BOARD. REVIEW PIRE I/Vs FIRST TO GET SENSE OF HOW THE RELATIONSHIP WAS EARLIER ON, PROBE: I.E. RECOUNT THE DATA IN THE EARLIER I/Vs, ASK IF ITS ACCURATE AND ASK ABOUT CHANGES.

26.1 Overall, how useful has the NPO guidance/assistance been to Fighting Back in [site]? Any suggestions or recommendations for improvement?

[CHANGES IN THE TARGET COMMUNITY SINCE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF FIGHTING BACK]

27. In what ways do you believe [target community) has changed as a result of Fighting Back?

27.1 Since the beginning of the implementation phase, have there been any other significant events in [target community]?

27.2 Have these changes affected the organization and/or operation of Fighting Back in any way?

28. Since the beginning of the implementation phase, have there been any significant changes in the availability of social services in [target community] that have been outside of the control of Fighting Back?

28.1 Have these changes affected the organization and/or operation of Fighting Back in any way?

29. Have you noted any changes in the infrastructure of [target community]. That is, have you noticed the building or improvement of residences, businesses, streets, utilities, parks, and so forth?

Has anything become worse?

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30. Since the beginning of the implementation phase, have you detected any change in the kinds of AOD problems you are responding to within [target community]? For example, have any new alcoholic beverages or illicit drugs entered the local market?

[DISAGREEMENT WITHIN FIGHTING BACK]

31. It is not uncommon for organizations to encounter disagreement concerning direction, objectives and resource allocation, particularly when addressing complex problems such as alcohol and drug abuse. Has any disagreement like this arisen since the beginning of the implementation phase?

31.1 [If yes] Could you please describe the nature of the disagreement?

- Who was involved?

- Was it resolved?

If so, how?

32. Very briefly [I know this could be a long story, but just some main points will do here], what are the main problems facing [community] today?

33. What are the main problems here in [community] with respect to Drugs and Alcohol and what is being done about them?

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Appendix B

Elite Interview

Author: Dan Ryan, Yale University

Opening

[As I mentioned on the phone] [As you know] I'm working with a team of researchers that is looking at how Robert Wood Johnson's Fighting Back Initiative has been implemented in cities around the country. One part of our study involves trying to understand the general structure of the "substance abuse domain" in each city. To do this, we're talking with influential individuals in key organizations here in [community]. Your name and your organization has been suggested to us by people knowledgeable about drugs and alcohol here in [community]. Our goal is to develop an understanding of the issues around drugs and alcohol here in [community] and the way the community has organized to meet challenges in this field.

As in any research, we're operating according to routine standards of confidentiality. The details are spelled out on this release form. Basically, I guarantee that we will not use your name or that of your organization in published or disseminated reports. I'll only tape the interview with your permission and you can stop the tape at any time or refuse to answer any question as we go along. The tape is intended only to help me with my notes.

1 First, I would like to know about you.

Do you have a vita or resume that you or an assistant can give me? [Actually, we ask for this in advance, and hopefully we can pick it up now].

Just to review:

[ ] Female [ ] Male

1.1 You were born in _____(yr). Where? _____

1.2 How long have you lived in [community]? _____

1.3 College education (if any) Where? _____

1.4 Graduate school, degrees (if any) _____

1.5 What is your current main occupation? _____

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Could you tell me a bit more about what you do?

[IF not being interviewed as a paid professional member of a SA abuse organization or government decision-making organization, but rather as a volunteer or committee member of a SA organization:

We are also talking to you in your capacity as (whatever it is -- chairman of the board of X, etc.)

1.6 Could you tell me a bit about what you do as [voluntary position]?

1.7 Are you a member of any non-profit organization's board?

[Does your assistant have an up to date list of them?]

Board	Position

1.8 What about for profit organizations? Are you a member of any boards of directors?

[Does your assistant have an up to date list of them?]

Board	Position

1.9 And various clubs, local and national. Are you a member of any? Which?

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2. Now a little bit about your organization. I have its name as [xxxx]. Is that its official name? [Must decide WHICH organization we are interviewing about]

Is there a brochure describing your organization that you or your assistant can give to me?

Is there an Annual Report or other official summary of your organization's activity that your assistant can give me?

2.1 About how big is it in terms of its annual budget?_____

2.2 About how many people does it employ? _____

2.3 [If applicable] How many members?_____

2.3.1 Do they pay dues? _____

2.4 How long has it existed?_____ [Ask even of public organizations such as a Board of Health -- this varies and there may be a story here]

2.5 How long have you been with them?

3. Very briefly [I know this could be a long story, but just some main points will do here], what are the main problems facing [community] today?

Any special economic problems?

Any recent changes in the community?

4. What are the main problems here in [community] with respect to Drugs and Alcohol?

4a. What is being done about them?

4.1 What is the main thrust of your organization with respect to these challenges?

4.2 What is your own main interest or project or initiative in the field of Drug and Alcohol use and abuse?

4.3 **[General Partners]** Who in particular [outside your own organization] have you worked with in pursuit of these interests and activities. [get names of people AND organizations -- get the names spelled out -- don't pretend you know all about it]

What is the nature of the relationship? [in general & then 3 specifics]

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Do you have clients in common?

Is there a financial or budgetary relationship?

Do you lend or share personnel?

4.4 Are there any organizations that you might consider "peers" in the sense that they provide services very similar to those that you provide?

4.5 **[Government Partners]** Is there anyone or any organization in the city government [we haven't mentioned] with whom you regularly work on matters of Drug and Alcohol policies and programs?

What is the nature of the relationship? [in general & then 3 specifics]

Do you have clients in common?

Is there a financial or budgetary relationship?

Do you lend or share personnel?

4.5.1 What about in the state government?

What is the nature of the relationship? [in general & then 3 specifics]

Do you have clients in common?

Is there a financial or budgetary relationship?

Do you lend or share personnel?

4.5.2 Anyone in the national government?

What is the nature of the relationship? [in general & then 3 specifics]

Do you have clients in common?

Is there a financial or budgetary relationship?

Do you lend or share personnel?

4.6 **[Non-Profit Partners]** Is there any one organization in the non-profit or voluntary world [whom we haven't mentioned] whom you have found especially helpful?

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What is the nature of the relationship? [in general & then 3 specifics]

Do you have clients in common?

Is there a financial or budgetary relationship?

Do you lend or share personnel?

4.7.1 [As appropriate]
[If not yet mentioned] Have you heard of [name of Fighting Back in community]?
Have you had any [or how much] contact with this organization?
So you've had a good bit to do with [name of Fighting Back in community] over the years?

IF YES: With whom and on what the occasion(s)? [Ask this anyway if not clear from previous mentions of FB].

What is the nature of the relationship? [in general & then 3 specifics, as appropriate]

Do you have clients in common?

Is there a financial or budgetary relationship?

Do you lend or share personnel?

5. **About Fighting Back** [if these matters have not come up already]

[Story line: 1. What is FB; 2. Who is FB; 5. When is FB]

5.1 Could you tell me anything about the "lead agency" for Fighting Back?

5.2 Were you involved in it [the FB organization] at all? When? How did it develop?

5.3 How do you rate their staff (e.g. PD)?

5.4 What is their public image? [7.]

[Why is FB? 4.]

5.5 In your view, what is the rationale for FB? What are they trying to do? Is it a good idea?

5.6 What are its chances of being accomplished?

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5.7 What are its chances for continuing [after RWJ funding runs out]?

5.7.1 Should it continue?

5.8 What is the relationship of Fighting Back to other agencies in town?

5.8.1 Are there conflicts?

6. That leads to my next question. We have been talking, by and large, about organizations that have been ***helpful*** with respect to working on drug and alcohol issues. What about organizations that have been less than helpful, even oppositional or obstructive?

7. **[Influentials]** Which persons in the field of Alcohol and Drug programs here in [community] have the most influence on policies and programs?

7.1 Are there any people who have been especially difficult or obstructive?

7.2 Which Organizations have been especially difficult of obstructive?

7.3 Turning to the positive, who has the most interesting things to say? [please elaborate]

7.3.1 What about at the state level? Anyone?

7.3.2 What about nationally?

8. OK, This is the alcohol and drug story in [community]. But how does this relate to the overall Power picture here in [community]? Who is in general influential and how does FB fit in with these people, these organizations?

9. Which organizations here in [community] have the most interesting and/or most effective programs in AOD (yes, interesting and effective aren't necessarily the same things)?

10. Whom else should we talk with?

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Appendix C

Transcript and Commentary: Tour of Milwaukee's Northside, June 21, 1996

Introduction

The following is an edited transcription of a tour of Milwaukee's Northside given by T.J., a Northside resident and community organizer employed by a local CDC unaffiliated with Milwaukee FB.[1] I include this tour to give the reader a sense of what a segregated black urban area is like. As the most highly segregated city in the U.S. (see Table 3.#) and the poorest of the FB sites (see Table 3.3), Milwaukee is a special case. Nevertheless, it too had considerable diversity within its population and within its neighborhoods. It also had considerable formal and informal organization devoted to stopping neighborhood decline by getting rid of AOD visibility, improving properties, attracting industry and commercial businesses, and so on.

My notes and commentary on the transcription are in italics. These were made when I first reviewed the transcript and were edited during preparation of this appendix. I identify the field researchers when they speak, otherwise the tour guide is speaking.

Tour

It seemed T.J.'s goal was to dispel the notion that the Northside is all bad, that wherever you have black people you have bad neighborhoods. He also wanted to convey the dynamics of neighborhood change: for example, on the near Northside you had fancy homes

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[1]I did not edit content in the transcription, rather the goal was simply to make the transcription more readable.

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where the brewery barons lived, then it ran down, now it's coming back. This neighborhood, where the tour began, was being gentrified, Victorian housing stock restored and other new development.

Martin Luther King Jr. Drive and Lloyd:

They took a lot of the riff raff out of this neighborhood. A lot of the drug sellers, a lot of the taverns. Now that's Brewer's Hill right there, right? Now just to show you that the argument holds steadfast, this here is King Drive. This strip here was just going all the way to hell.

The next argument is that people think it's white people that make the difference but here it was blacks who had the idea and developed the housing. It's about a neighborhood that's improving --the housing stock and who's living there is bringing it back, black professionals moving in.

Lloyd and Fourth Street:

This club right here is all about African Americans. When they seen the redevelopment coming in the area, he redeveloped his business. He's still here. He worked, he operated. People say, well all man, it was a white man. Now, okay, well, you know, let's get to racism. See these homes over here? This idea was constructed by two blacks. Now, to show you the different argument: two black developers came and looked at this. All this land was clear and vacant. They had an idea to build suburban type homes in the central city

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where most of your utilities, the downtown is located at. You're five minutes away from work. They're all professional. These homes here cost, maybe seventy-five thousand dollars when they're first built it. This is all African American. I told them their argument don't stand with me cause these folks came back out of the suburbs into the inner city and built these homes. So we brought services back. Now the SDC[2] office is one block down there on King Drive. All this is African American. Nice homes.

They've been up about twenty years now. I mean this was just clear land. Where they just cleared the houses away and it was just sitting. Because they was gonna build an extension to the expressway down here.

Most of these people are professional folks. They're either in government or businesses. Most of them own businesses here in the inner city. Most of the folks who stay there are professional folks. They're in the insurance industry, they're in law enforcement. The former black sheriff of Milwaukee County used to stay back here. Most of them are school teachers. Most of them are lawyers. But they used to live outside down the expressway in the Brown Deers of Milwaukee (Brown Deer is a near north suburb). And they said, hey, man, this is a great opportunity to get back into the city and do something positive.

The following is about a neighborhood affected by highway construction. The land was bought up, buildings razed, then never built on, now being developed. So what happens

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[2]Social Development Corporation, a large, black-run CDC providing an array of social, health, and development services.

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to areas like this that stand vacant? The houses don't get kept up (Landlords). They rent to poor. Houses have to be condemned. And the poor people that live there need services. Partly it's an area where the beautiful Victorian housing stock never got renovated --i.e. formerly fine housing but didn't get gentrified like nearby Brewer's Hill (or it's in a part of Brewer's Hill that didn't gentrify).

Tenth and North:

Lee Street School is right here. This is the hub of our neighborhoods right here. The school here. This neighborhood here was just given up. There was no community services over here. No community based organizations. We came in to see what it is we could actually do. We came over here with Neighborhood Partners, which was a CSAP organization,[3] three years ago to try to assist the residents with some kind of a service oriented project. These are the new upstart homes that were just built this year.

This was all vacant land. It was part of the expressway plan. [For the] expressway plan, they had to kill a lot of homes from the way that they had it designed. They call it the Park West Corridor. These homes were sitting in the off spaces of the main thoroughfare. The majority of them was taken down through the expressway project. They were supposed to run the spur through here. But the majority of them now are being razed for condemnation for building code violations. They are, just like this one on the corner here. Now this house here at one time was a great house.

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[3]Center for Substance Abuse Prevention, a federal agency.

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The following describes neighborhood change: older homeowners leave, rent property or leave to their children.

Right and Tenth:

This neighborhood here was one time, it's seventy-five percent home ownership in this neighborhood. Hard to believe, huh? They're still a lot of residents in here. But see the slum lord thing, we had no kind of tenants union organized over here. So what happened is the slum lords just basically rented to anybody they wanted to. Never did any fix up. And when they built the new school up here.

This is North Division. This is all the initiative area. When they built the new schools up here, we were instrumental in having workers over here. I used to live on this block here.

Twenty-five hundred block on Lloyd Street:

When I met my wife, her grandmother used to get an award for this block here during the Christmas season. It was the well keptest block in the city of Milwaukee. It's down in the archives. Milwaukee Historical Museum. And as the original homeowners got older and retired and moved and left the property to either a rental unit or some of their children. My home it was sitting right here. But it burnt down. The property went down because the services in the area was pulled by the city (Fire Dept didn't come?). This is one of the newest high schools in the city. This is called North Division. African American by ninety-eight percent.

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Clark Street and North Eleventh.

Now this school was built as a medical specialty school with what we call a neighborhood base school. Means that they wouldn't allow no busing to come in here. You had to either get here on your own if you want to come to this school, or you had to live in the neighborhood. It failed

because they didn't put the kind of dollars into recruiting the type of students that we needed to keep it flourishing. As you can see, all this is condemnation. See all these vacant lots here. This is what happens in our city. Every time you tear down a house and create these vacant lots, and pretty soon you got everything condemned all the way back. Well, do you know, from this block here all the way downtown is maybe about a five minute drive.

These lots are owned by the city. And the city have a special program to sell them to residents. You can buy them. Get you home adjacent. The homes just adjacent to it, people get the first crack at it. As you can see, we're not stuck a lot of hours over in here. These projects here is part of the initiative effort. I'd like to buy a lot on Tenth and Right. I'm a citizen of the city of Milwaukee. If the homeowners don't want it, any citizen can buy it. What you gonna do with it? I mean you have to have a plan for it. So when Stokes said their home.

One of the things that we don't have in this neighborhood, we haven't been able to attract businesses back here because of the, the image that was laid on. Like them brothers see. See, my doctor's office is right here. He's a young professional. He's about forty-three. He said, he ain't going nowhere. He bought this whole structure here. He's gonna open up a medical clinic. The hamburger joint, it just came, with our new revitalization efforts to the

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area. But in order to attract business, you've got to have people who are gonna.

Twelfth and North.

This is the Masonic Temple. The Masonics brothers, they work in here real, real good. They're supposed to tear down all of this. This used to be the old drug strip here. Tatonia, North Avenue, down to Garfield, it's like every little red light district in the city. Well this is it. After hour joints. It's still that way now.

When you change the neighborhood people are always says that you have to change the image too. In order to get business to come back or develop businesses come back on the strip, that's what we got to do. This was a vacant area here where they were trying to build a housing project. The land was contaminated, and they couldn't get the DNR[4] to release it. They really didn't want to give it to the developer anyway.

Fourteenth and North.

This is North Avenue. This used to be the business area of the black community along with Third Street. But as you can see. This here was a former ice cream plant, company. They used to call it Very Fine. They used to make ice cream. All down through here used to be businesses. Now we just have the store, the deli, JR Market, he's one of the biggest inner city clothing outlets that we have. They do clothes and linens.

Eighteenth and North.

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[4]Department of Natural Resources, a state agency.

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We're gonna be looking at the strip where Sears used to be at. Directly in front of us up here. It is the old Sears. See what's that, Milwaukee Mall? All Koreans mostly is in that mall now. I haven't been in there since it opened. All this used to be a business area. Right after the riot, all the businesses basically moved. They became, the stores became blood banks. We got about three or four blood banks up here on the street.

Jones: There's supposed to be something unique about African American blood. There's a big recruiting effort to collect it. The Red Cross is undergoing a real recruiting effort to get donors.

Fried chicken dinners they don't give away, thirty dollars, man. I said, oh man, they're really homing in on us.

Jones (reciting names of stores in the mall): UTC, Mansella, Snack Shop, Gold's, Toys, Ladies something.

This brother named Artie used to, owns all this buildings here, but he can't get finance to open up like he wants.

Gladden: So all these shops are closed down, that's why the gates are down?

This land here was the beginning of the northwest corridor. When it was supposed

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to bring the expressway in from State 41.

About Twenty-Fourth Street.

All of this land here. The citizens came out and protested before they took the houses down, they informed the group. They was advocating against bringing the houses down because they were saying that we didn't need that type of expressway system in Milwaukee. Not only that, they were gonna displace over maybe, what did they say, forty thousand families or more. It was a large number. But they recently built on this site here. This is still Tech Manufacturing. Still Tech Manufacturing have a big old contract with.

Twenty-Eighth and North.

With the U.S. Defense Department. They do [?] for the government and for the truck plant up in Oshkosh. That's a non-union shop. All of this up here was supposed to, used to be a business development area. But when they planned the expressway, they bought all the businesses out and the businesses moved.

Thirty-first and North

Yeah. They weren't going to move until the actual plan started. Wisconsin Electric just built this building here. All this land is devastated. They bought the dry cleaners out from on Thirtieth, and they moved up here. They bought and built this new building for them. But as you can see, all of the buildings here.

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Thirty-second and North.

Yeah. All these buildings here used to be businesses. But the freeway, what do they call it, the Southeastern Transportation Committee bought all of these buildings. Cause they was gonna tear em down to build the expressway.

Jones: So North Avenue used to be a real booming business district?

Real vital. Oh yeah. All of this right up in here. All of this area. It used to be booming up in here.

Gladden: When did [things deteriorate]?

Around sixty, around '68. Cause the corridor fight took about twenty years. As you can see, you can see the devastation. Now when you come here, see this is part of the corridor. You look this way and see.

Jones: Right. And this is new.

Yeah, this is new. So after the plan failed, and the citizens balked against the mayor, they said hell with it, we spent money. It was a bad idea. We lost. And so they went down here and built new homes, part of it up there.

As we go westward, this is little Beirut. More shootings and stabbings and drug

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dealings going on over here. I'm gonna you take you all in and first I'm gonna swing you by the center. The center over here.

Thirty-fifth and Right

Thirty-fifth and Right. This used to be a real vibrant neighborhood. The church here, the Catholic church, they had a big time congregation. And they developed Black Clubs United out here, which consists of maybe two to three hundred black clubs around here to try to maintain its diversity. And it worked for a while, but then, with the central city steady crumbling, jobs steady leaving. These were working class white folks, mixed with sort of middle class black folks, on the up side of Milwaukee. This neighborhood here used to be part of the Sherman Park neighborhood, which now is about six blocks to the west of it. It used to start on Thirtieth Street and ran all the way to Forty-second. But as the influx of African Americans began to move west, and as jobs left for the working class here, they moved out into the surrounding area, it mostly became African American. But this Church over here is called St. Ann. They used to have a congregation there maybe about three thousand people. And they were all in this big Black club network. They used to politically control the city.

Gladden: It's beautiful inside.

Yeah. Oh man the congregation when they left here they left in tears. I mean they moved so quickly. They just couldn't see it... They just turned around and said, damn what's

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gonna happen to us over here. The homes fell down. But they would try to come back and go to church. There was violence all over. They just said, "hey, hold it, wait a minute. It ain't working." They built em a new parish.

This block down here. It's the twenty-five hundred block. It is mostly. It's all African Americans. Drug raids daily. A lot of condemned homes. That's the influx, the reason why we came over. When we first moved here, we had all vibrant houses. We were gonna bring the services here and make sure that we could stabilize. Cause we know not just African Americans, when low income folks come here, you gotta bring services to them.

I've been over here since August of '93. The westside when we first came here was just filling the daytime programs. And I was given the task of stabilizing the station as well as making this community center. You can see our gains, and on the alleys over here. We've been trying to fight back and the gang war with the young people. We have been able to neutralize the site while we even see programs that we run in the evening times through [a federal program]. But the neighborhood is in a transition. This used to be St. Ann's Catholic Church. It's now being involved in a Capital Christian Center. They have a design to be a part of this community. This has also been one of the churches that R.W. has adopted as a part of his youth ministry. So they're gonna be doing some things in the near future. You can see the vacant lots. Recently [there was] a fire there. They tore it down to the ground. That garden there is the first of this kind in the country. That garden was particularly planted last year to support our food pantry. The people literally ate out of that garden. When the tomatoes turned green, they went over and got green fresh tomatoes. You can see that the neighborhood is changing. It's coming back. The church built some houses. Fifty-nine

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units.

St. Mary's Hospital right up here on Center Street is building a senior citizens complex about two blocks down there. You probably saw the surveyors out here. They're getting ready to repair this whole street up. Hopefully they're gonna widen it and make it angle parking on one side of the street.

Jones: That's probably the urban renewal piece they got up here?

Yeah, they've been renewing the street, but I asked them to turn the parking on this street, one way. This is sort of a weed and seed program. There is a national program that's sponsored by the U.S. Justice Department called the Weed and Seed program. The Weed and Seed program pulls up the weeds, the bad seed, and puts them someplace to themselves. Then the seeding places create safe havens. We want a Safe Haven portion. The Weeding portion is ran by the Police Department. The Safe Haven portion is ran by community organizations. We are one of four sites in the city. What we do is basically open up our center on the weekends for youth and family education and recreational activities.

Reverend M. is right over here on Fortieth and Holy Cathedral now. So he's a part of the neighborhood transition. They bought that church over there.

The Metcalf Park community is the same blocks over on Thirty-fourth Street, and we have a direct working relationship with them. Their territory is North Avenue, which is two blocks down and Center Street, which is one block. Twenty-seventh Street on the east and Thirty-Eighth Street on your west. So we fall inside of their territory. One of their primary

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objectives --we can walk down to the end of the block and you'll see two houses that's been built. There are forty units of these sort of houses in this area.

Statistically speaking, the mean age of most of the people in this area is about twenty-two years of age. We have literally whole blocks where there is not a man that's down legally as resident of the block. They're all women, head of households. We got about forty-nine percent of the population in this area is eighteen years of age or younger. Something like forty-one percent of the households in this area receive some type of government subsidy. We also have probably one of the highest unemployment rates in the city in this area. Among young people eighteen to early thirties, it's probably close to fifty-six percent. We have a very high unemployment rate, drop out rate too. Maybe one or two out of five people that live in this neighborhood own their own home. That's just a rough statistical breakdown.

Jones: How would you describe the family situation?

I would describe the family situation here as a female headed household, probably two to three children, no man in the household, living below the poverty level, struggling, just struggling.

Jones: Struggling, working.

They're struggling whether they're working or they're not working. One of the things

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that we've been able to do here along with our daytime programs, we have a department of adult education, employment and training that's scheduled, as well as a head start program that has two hundred and eighty-seven children. Our evening program, we've been able to channel almost twenty-five hundred people a month. We recruit ourselves to come in and do whatever they want to do. We recruit kids for them, we recruit people to work for them, and we provide the space to run the programs. This year we created twenty-six new teams, basketball teams, west of Twentieth Street. Ten adult teams. Adult teams bring their family members and the whole ball game. We were able to do some counseling with the sixteen teams of eighteen and under. Through the counseling, over seventy-five kids changed their lifestyles, by accepting the belief in a higher being.

Another voice: T.J. will tell you, we had a tournament, an invitation tournament. And we had a team last year, our team lost in the championship game, and they stopped the tournament. [400] This year our same team was 9 and 0. They lost in the championship game and they appealed to the authorities. They appealed to the people that ran the league. There was no answer. They appealed to the person who ran the Safe Haven coalition. There was no answer. They appealed to me. I said, "Well hey, when was the last time you saw anybody in the championship game get another fifteen minutes. [Laughter] The deal is over. You guys lost, you lost." Ten years ago, they'd have torn this neighborhood up, man. There'd be a fight out in the streets.

It's an attitude change. So as you can see, not only did the neighborhood change, but the people who live in it change. The church here now is gonna anchor it. We've always tried to get our administration to take the church into it. Because I believe that anytime you go

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somewhere, especially in the community, you got an opportunity to do a building for the school. So I'm glad to see that they're finally doing something with the churches. They closed down St. Ann's parish last November, I think. Capital Christian Center is a welcome replacement. I had tried to move Bishop Allen in here with thirty-five churches to replace the whole Catholic church. But they didn't want to come up with the deal for him and they kept procrastinating.

Jones: Sherman Park area. And this was mainly a white neighborhood or a mixed neighborhood?

Mixed neighborhood. It was middle income folks. These homes here were just recently built by New Covenant and Missionary Baptist Church. It says right there on the corner. They received the grant from HUD and through the city. They just completed these units this year. It brings back the housing. Whether it's members or nothing. It redevelops the neighborhood. It's a good thing. These homes over here, all this is New Covenant here.

Thirty-Ninth and Meineke

This partial land here was supposed to be developed. I think New Covenant is gonna put units here. This is what we call the Samson Division. After the land was not used for the expressway project, they built these homes up here. They were supposed to be the new model single family condo style homes. Well the folks who moved in them at first said, "oh man, shit, we've been sold a bill of goods. This is not what we expected." So most of the

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folks who originally bought these homes moved. This is the only home on the block here -- this home right here -- this old white guy had it. He refused to move. He said that the project and the planning was not suitable. He went to court and fought it, and his home was the only one that wasn't torn down. And all the homes that was basically torn down were homes like this here. This is Grant Boulevard.

Jones: Oh, these are nice.

All the homes on the corridor was just like this here. This is Grant Boulevard. This was the hub. This is the beginning of the new Sherman Park neighborhood right here. It runs over to about Sixtieth. This is what we call about Forty-second.

Jones: And this is again still mixed?

Yes. Professional folks. Lawyers, doctors, all, county supervisor, professional consultants. I know a lot of folk that live up here. I used to live in this neighborhood too. But I stayed rather closer to Sherman Park.

Jones: Oh this is nice.

They just recently built a Girls and Boys Club in the park.

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Gladden: These are the one hundred thousand dollar homes?

Some of them, they've been a little bit better than that. They trying to stabilize the neighborhood because, as you can see, from where we came from, down here in the Sherman Park, this is Center Street here.

Center and Grant

Now this is around Forty-first. I used to live down here on Thirty-ninth. I moved down here in the '70s. We were instrumental in bringing a lot of African Americans up in here for home ownership. But with home ownership, you also got to do business strips. There used to be a lot of business through here.

Jones: This is Center Street. That looks like it used to be something.

A little theater. Turned it into a liquor store. The Catholic church had a lot of investment. This is one of their convent homes here. They have a lot of investment here. All down there is what they call the industrial corridor. Master Lock is buying up all of that down there. This is where we have a little Beirut at. Master Lock is trying to bring this neighborhood back. They're buying up all the properties over here, refurbishing, the whole works. They're putting in the infrastructure. This is little Beirut here.

Jones: Why do they call it "Little Beirut?"

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Because the most shootings are here. More drug dealings go on over here than anywhere in the city. We come up in this neighborhood and clean one day. But we stop cleaning and the residents don't want to clean. That's Master Lock. That was Briggs and Stratton over there. So we had a lot of industry too. As you can see they're putting a park here. Master Lock just took the land where it was vacant and turned it into Southwest Development. If they want to revitalize, it's good for neighborhoods, but it's more beneficial for them because they still have their plant here. They have all of the day workers coming to work over here.

The children are out here now during the day. The dealers just have not woke up yet. They probably are just going to sleep from last night. We bought homes all through here with the initiative project money. See all these new porch furnitures here? Those are some of our homes that we're trying to stick them back in to make work. But you don't do something on this side of the street, here, it isn't going to work no way. You got to go along and when you put in new infrastructure, you have to also bring this property up. The city saw what we were harping on, like these are new porches here.

Jones: Well do you think there is, sort of a spin off, so when people see the improvement on one side of the street, they want it also?

We put a lot of pressure on the landlords, too. The Metcalf Park Neighborhood Association is around here. This is their block here now. We are workers there. But you clean it up one day, it's the same way. You got to get the residents involved in it because

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they have to be willing to help take care of their own stuff. This is the police substation here. Metcalf Park Neighborhood Association.

Jones: Are the police there all the time?

No. They mostly come over here in the evening. They usually bring vice over here. They be after the drugs. All the people over here have to buy into this project for it to work. If the people don't buy into it, regardless if they're homeowners or renters, it's not gonna happen. I mean, that's been my experience.

Jones: Why do you think they don't buy into it? Is it that they're not interested? The organizers are not active enough? Or what do you think it is?

It has something to do with the organizers. It has something to do with what you bring people. See, a lot of these homes over here, we could have got for ten thousand dollars. Well, the people who was renting the home.

Right and Thirty-fourth

We should have said to them, "Look, if you're willing to help us rehab these homes, we'll try to get you a loan to help you buy this home that you live in." That's what they got to do. They gotta turn renters into homeowners. Now this is the lower part. Down here you have a few homeowners, but you don't have as many.

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Jones: So Little Beirut is mostly renters?

It's not as bad here. We're going to cross over the area between North Avenue and Wallace. This action over here is a worse neighborhood. Right over across the street. But it's in the same Corridor. They call this the Corridor because of the railroad tracks. But keeping in mind that ain't no services. Now the West Side Center is way back on Thirty-sixth. So we have people coming all the way from down here.

We're going south on Thirty-second.

Gladden: What are the dimensions of the corridor? The railroad track on one side.

Yeah. It runs to about two miles. I used to work over here. But I found out that we didn't have no services, that most of the homeowners had left, that is was mostly renters. My windows got shot out over here. See these guys coming here. Most of these homes, we got what we call the dollar program. Once the landlord is not paying the liquid on his taxes, they come in here and take these homes and then they sell them back.

Jones: Sell them for a dollar.

This little brother here, this minister here, he and I worked two summer programs together. He is pretty outward going. He come in the neighborhood. His whole

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congregation came out of Little Beirut here. The whole congregation. He got about a hundred parishioners. This is all what we had. We used to run his camp down here out of the school on the corner. As you can see coming down in here it gets worse. At night, it's like, the police don't even come up in here at night without no backup. Man you can just look around, you say, damn man, what really happened here?

Thirty-second and Brown

The school here is the Thirty-first Street School. There's two young ladies who come out of St. Thomas Aquinas Catholic Church who run a program here in the summer called K.C., Kids in Control. And they have about maybe three hundred kids. See all this over here is just devastated. And they saying how come kids don't come? And there be as many parents out here as they do be children. And they take them roller skating and they do some other thing. Now just for a city of this size, you know, but the thing is, these are some of the worse neighborhoods that we have in Milwaukee. As you can see, it's not really spread way out. You got little pockets. But this is one of the larger pockets. This is one of the larger pockets right here. All of this used to be houses about five years ago. All of this. This is Habitat. Habitat is taking a chance and coming up in here and doing some rehab. What is this right here? What does that sign there say?

Jones: "Milwaukee Habitat for Humanity"

See they're taking a big old chance. You want to get shot on. Yeah see, Habitat is

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taking a real, real big chance. That's what it amounts to there.

Jones: This is a big building too.

Yeah. Single families. This is all like a lot of single family. But they're big.

Jones: This looks like the most run down area that we've been through.

Yes. And we ain't through yet. Now this is up on Thirty-third. Used to be a Lutheran school about two years. They turned it into a mission because of the homelessness up here.

Thirty-second and Brown

On the first of the month, the landlords come through here with their jackets. You don't pay your rent they set your stuff out on the street.

Jones: Now, that's an impressive looking place.

This is the National Cowboy Association. Real deep place. This is Brother Still's place here. They got a cowboy organization here. They got boots and guns in there. You all want to go in for a minute? It's a legitimate organization. They do, and doing all our parades and stuff. They ride their horses, bring them out to the parks here. All them horses

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and cowboys you seeing down there, they belong right here. Now see this is on the other side of the Corridor. This runs from W Street all the way back to Twenty-seven. Now this over here might be worse than that back there, at night

because the prostitution walks this right here. So you have a mix of prostitution going on, drugs going.

Jones: And abandoned buildings galore. Brown and Twenty-ninth

Yeah those are close out. They're a little fixed up. See all this fixing up. I mean homes was here last year, the year before. But you just see the lots.

Jones: Who's knocking down the buildings? Like there's a lot of abandoned lots. Are those recent knock downs?

Well see most of the buildings get tore down, when you see little pockets like this, because of code violations. And there's a lot of slum lord going on up in here.

You know, this is nice homes here.

Jones: Now what is a drug free zone sign? I've seen about a half a dozen of them. The red sign. Is that an organization that's doing that?

Yeah. Drug abatement program, but most of the folks here use them for a signal sign.

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When the sign is up, they're on. When it's down, they ain't on. In other words, they're out of drugs. They put them in front of the houses, trying to fool the police. The police was the first ones to get hip to it. They knew they were dealing drugs, but they couldn't understand the drug free zone. Years ago this was a nice neighborhood. I remember when this was all European, German and Polish. They was the blue collar workers of the brewery industry. Maybe a mile or so from here was a lot of breweries. Round Miller, Miller Park and all of that.

Jones: Brown and Twentieth. Now the breweries, where are the breweries located now? Nearby or did they move out also?

There's two of them right down there where you all as at James's office [FB's Project Director]. Miller's out here on the heel by the stadium. All the cabdrivers call this the Uptown because it sets up on the hill of the city when you go up that. This strip is devastation. This used to be vibrant. This is Walnut. Now we are basically leaving the little Beirut area as zoned by organizers and the police. And now we're going to go over to Cold Spring Park. Cold Spring Park is a development equity of middle income African Americans, White and Asians. It's like Sherman Park. They have a lot of neighborhoods that are integrated that are middle income.

Jones: So you make it sound like the integrated neighborhoods are middle income and the poor neighborhoods are basically African American?

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African American, Hispanic and European. They're located on the south side of the city though. On the south side of Milwaukee we might have three hundred black families there. It's mostly Hispanic and European. But their neighborhoods look just like these neighborhoods I just took you to. They're on the near south side of town. When you get further south, once you cross Valiet here, you come into what is known as Cold Springs Park.

Twenty-eighth and Valiet coming over to McKinley Boulevard

This is the beginning of Cold Springs Park. The city has a lot of little neighborhoods. This is strictly home ownership basis. Some rentals, not a lot. They got some beautiful homes. They just had a big housing fair, open housing.

Jones: Oh, look at that. That's a nice house. It looks like it used to be.

Friend of mine owns that. He's a police officer. Oh, I knew his wife. We was in school together. Do you know what they paid for that? Nine thousand dollars.

Jones: They must have put a lot of money into it.

Yup. They had to redo the staircases, put the fireplaces back in, the whole works.

Jones: This looks pretty good down here.

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They've just been doing all this with that conservation corps come through here. All of them live back here. All of this here is lawyers, doctors.

Jones: How does this compare to the other neighborhoods?

This neighborhood here. We had the police up here. My wife works for 911. They be over here just like they'd be anywhere else. Homewise, we kind of keep the neighborhoods up. I live in this neighborhood because of the attractiveness of it. So this is my block here.

Jones: It's nice, tree lined. And it's really very attractive.

This is all homeowners here. We have what we call an equity over here. On this block here. This is June Wall Avenue Association. That's my home there. There are some nice places along here. This runs all the way to Twenty-seventh. As property becomes available, we buy it.

Jones: So you have an CDC?

Just as an equity. Just as homeowners. The guy who owns this home here, he just bought these two properties right here. And right here. A week ago it was all concrete here. Like where the grass is. He started it, he planted it all, refurbished it. This is a neighborhood

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that's prevention. So we try to keep this in a preventional mode here. It's very, very little work has to be done up here by organizations. Cold Springs Park is just a housing upkeep organization. They have one staff member. That person just goes around, reviews property, get with the homeowner to see if they need assistance to bring these properties back up to code.

Jones: You do this for landlords who are renting as well as homeowners?

Yes. Any member that's in the block.

Jones: Do you ever get people who sort of say go mind your own business?

Yeah. And we just simply say go visit them. We put building inspection on them. See because we go in as a friend to the homeowner or to the landlord. Now if you don't want to deal with us, and we can't come to some kind of negotiation. Say we run into a person who's on a fixed income. Their property falling apart. We'll go down with them, go to the city, get the alderman to support them, get a low interest loan or grant, to bring their property back up. Because we got a lot of other dollars in here that's grant oriented. But say if we get a landlord who's, say he's real nasty, get the inspector to go see him. And sooner or later he's gonna do something else, we're gonna take his property. They take property here. If you don't bring your residence up to code in your first ninety day appearance, they move in what they call the "imminent right of domain" and the city will take your property.

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Jones: Do you have a policy of trying to destroy crack houses here?

Yeah. They call it the building inspection drug abatement program. The organizers, all organizers, in the CBO --community based organizations-- they get funded through the city. On the surveys they have to identify all possible crack houses or any calls that come in through the hot line, they have to record them and turn them into vice squad. And they move on them. First they write the landlord a letter if it's, or the homeowner. The homeowner gets the first letter. Say you need to talk to your tenants, there's a possibility of drugs being dealt out of your premises. Or we will talk to them. And they stipulate it, you do not, if this activity does not cease, we'll move. Take it to court and move on it. They're done gave a couple of the properties to community based organizations. We do the accent forfeiture thing here with ours. National Peoples Action Drug Data. This is Habitat for Humanity here. Were no homes down here four or five years ago. They started building homes here, Habitat did. Now the city is over here. This is the Triangle Community they call it.

Twentieth and Walden

All them new homes there, new homes that run sixty-eight to about seventy-two thousand. I don't know if the average person that lives around here is gonna be able to afford them, but they'll get somebody in here. Yeah, this is Triangle Community. They do pretty good organizing. All these homes here was relocated in this area. They were moved to this area. There they are. Neighbors. They were moved from the east side of town to right here.

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Jones: There's not a small amount of industry here. You have the Master Lock and the, whatever that was back there.

This here's the bus company. Well see, all the industry moved out of the north side, but they closed it down. It used to be an industrial town. But see, when we lost our steel contracts to the Japanese market, they closed us down. See this was part of the expressway where the Corridor was supposed to hook up to. You see what I'm saying. This is a new spur, was supposed to come from up at Sherman Park.

Then there was a lot of Italian. They call it the old Third Ward. Where they build because of the tannery that was in central location, over here, all of that the Great River Wall. This is a new residence development. But it coincides with the new type of housing that they built over here too. And they call this the east side of town. This is the lower east side of town in the downtown area. Mostly professional folks live over in this area here.

Jones: Liams and Austin, I think.

I'm just going back over here to go back up across the bridge. But I want you to kind of get some kind of feeling of the east side and how it's maintained. And keeping in mind is that years ago, and maybe even [not so long ago], they had a lot of housing discrimination going on in the city. So people live according to their ethnic background. And that's the truth Blacks with blacks. White with whites. And so it didn't really open up, like it's a young city on integration. Those are the new housing support units over here. So what

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happened was now people are beginning to feel more comfortable because ain't about color, it's got to be about the dollar. So racism, you know, really just goes away when you talk dollars. And that's what happened. Because like Grady Street was one of the oldest streets in the city to the east side. And it still is a real viable business district. This is Grady here. Mostly all Italian.

We're gonna head towards the capital drive area which is our preventional area that I work in now. And it's almost 85% home ownership, maybe 97% African American. See Brother Mosely down that street there. We'll be coming back from Brown this way to give you a glimpse of the Hispanic community. And the Hispanic community over here on the north side is basically Puerto Rican. And it starts right here by Bogart. This is all Hispaniola.

Bogart and Liams

Holt and [?]. Hispaniola

Jones: Now we're back to north.

Yeah. This is a great jazz club.

Jones: Malcolm X Academy?

Yeah. African American admission. School. They turned it into Afro Center.

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Education was the basis. All African American. The teachers did that, and got it passed through the school board. Put most of our little brothers over here that was having disciplinary problems, strapped a little discipline to them, got them involved in something they could relate to, all of them came out pretty good. Yeah, one of the highest middle school graduate rates there is in the city. I guess, you know, educators are educators. That's just like the German admission school here. They be producing. Both of them do. Now this here is just a neighborhood that is just really maintained itself. But the neighborhoods, they call this the Robbie Neighborhood. It goes from King Drive all the way down. Now, they got another area over here that they call Vice Lord [?].

Palmers and Chambers

Burline is the dividing line. Now a lot of people say that they have a lot of gang activity, this is Burline Street. I haven't seen it. Except in the Latino community and over here. Cause I know Vice Lords when I see them. Just affiliation in Chicago with them. But all of this beginning in Burline all the way back to [?] here is Vice Lord territory. I know that for a fact. I got relatives live over here, cousins. Now they're the real deal over here. But they got it in. It's not spread out. It's just in about two or three blocks. Where they do their business transactions and all that kind of stuff. This is just factual observation and information coming from the Milwaukee Police Department. But this is also the only place that our youth program works in too. Because most of the guys in our youth program was recruited out of the Vice Lords. Who better to know their people than them. This is all theirs over here. Again, it makes sense. And they haven't been doing no more killings over

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here either. It is still some decent people live over here. Keith Avenue. They even tried to get rid of the old graffiti. [Laughter] They say to them, why do you want to tell the police where you at? Does that make sense? So they went in and the city gave them a couple of the paid slots. See look. The city gave them a couple of the paid spots in our anti-graffiti campaign. And I mean they've been working up. You know, I mean, when you really look at it. Most of our corner stores here are also run by Asians. Either Asians or Arabs. You come up out of here you're be in Vice Lords. We're gonna swing north now going to Jackson Heights. This is a prevention area. This is where I work at now at present. We're getting some good results up in here too.

Jones: So you described your major work as being in prevention. That you're more concerned about prevention.

Right. See, because in the intervention world, all of our dollars go for activities that's family oriented. And then on the bottom line of that is treatment. So we spend, you know, we're looking at our dollars, we spend over maybe eighty thousand dollars a year maybe on one person in intervention. Treatment in the hospital, follow up, you know, basic needs in a center. When you look at all of that, you say, hey, my budget is going to somebody I didn't even cure. Then you look at the statistics. Bam! Addiction is up. What age group? More drug houses are open. That's intervention say. Is that the best way to deal with this? So I changed when I got an opportunity to change. I said, no, I want to do some prevention stuff.

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Jones: So, how, what do you, what do you define as prevention or how do you?

We do AODA,[5] education seminars. We do leadership development seminars in the neighborhoods. Black club chapters. Churches. We go into the schools. We put dollars aside for maintaining neighborhoods. We teach folks how to identify drug traffic situations. We get folks involved in their neighbors program. So we do a lot of prevention, and it don't cost it nothing. I think that's welcome. This is the area that I'm working in now. This is Capitol Drive. This is the Rufus King area. [300]

Thirteenth and Capitol

So the difference is. The difference is I got 80% home ownership. So I say, hey we had a couple burglaries two houses down from. Oh you don't know Mr. Jones that stay down there. No. You should get a chance to meet Mr. Jones because if they burglarize in only south end, that's because you got a machine, you know, man, they won't try to break into your home. You mean to tell me that this. Yeah, they burglarized right here. Why? Let's take a look. This is why. So yesterday, we came up with this whole area. We went door to door. That's what we're doing up here now, we're doing a survey. Door to door. I got about fifteen veterans in our Vets Project, and all we do is go door to door. And we talk to the residents. And we won't tell them, you know, you guys live desperate here. Let's take care of your investment. You don't have a block club here. Hey, you need a block club. I came on this block yesterday and sure enough, they'd had three burglaries. You all ought to get on with

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[5]Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse

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that self-containment stuff. [Talks to someone on the side of the road] Plus that, all my resources are here. I go into a center, I got twenty-five thousand dollars. Normally my budget is a hundred ten, you know, ninety thousand. Here with twenty-five thousand dollars I can do everything that I do in other areas because I got more resources up here. I got doctors, teachers, lawyers, dentists, carpenters, electricians. So when I need something done, I just come on down to Mr. Matthew, and I say, Mr. Matthew, we got a lady over on 19th Street that needs a fan put up in her house. And I said, now she's been participating in the black structure and America keep the neighborhood beautiful program, but she just can't pay no electrician to come in. I don't have to pay it out of my budget because Mr. Matthew, he agrees to come down and put the fan in. See what I'm saying?

So when I need somebody to help me develop a budget, I come over here to Bubba Pitts, who's an attorney, CPA. Bang. And another good thing about them, they retired. Most of them is in the retirement age. They know this van, they know me. They be saying, yeah, he looking out for us. So the preventional mode works easy. [350] Then I get a chance to talk to the children too. Where some of them still live with their parents. There ain't a lot of children up here, but they either done graduated from this high school here, moved out. This is the only school that we have neighborhood oriented. For the residents here. Cause the Rufus King area was seen as a movement for African Americans for Upward Bound. Still Europeans over here, but you can look at the housing stock, and you know what kind of dollars you're dealing with. So, you know, I don't have to, up here I don't have to run. Look, I got to a parent meeting up here, I got about almost a hundred parents. Down in Little Beirut and over there where I told you we're building a new one, I'm gonna get ten. I might

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get ten. The interest level is not as high. So I said, well, you know, I've been beat up, I've been shot at, I've been chased by drug dealers. I've been everything done happened to me. It's time for me to go do some relaxing for a change. [Laughter] You know?

Jones: I don't blame you.

Yeah. You know. So I come up in here. It's a breeze. You know. And they say, well T.J. why do you? I said, I brought all my dollars up here. Because these people up here. Now, if they don't organize now, same thing happen to this neighborhood that happened to all the rest of them. And I don't have, I don't have.

Jones: Do you to some extent feel that some neighborhoods are too far gone, require too much resources in order to turn around?

That's one reason why I moved too. Little Beirut was one of them. [Talks to someone on the street] Around here is handled by neighborhood patrol up here. Got a citizens patrol up here. [Talks to someone on the street] I'm just showing these gentlemen around the city. They're from outside the city.

Jones: How are you doing?

We have brothers do onto your neighbors, you have them do onto you. See that kind

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of stuff goes on up here. They're on citizens patrol. I don't even got to go through all those things. This is the president of the block club association. This is the Fighting Back black club association area.

Jones: Yeah.

Because the master's up here.

Jones: The master's up here.

Yeah. The nation. The nation is up here. The league of [?] which is the black police officers, and a lot of them live over here. When I'm on safety patrol done, when I want somebody to train people on how to better secure their homes from burglary, the League of Martin come out. See black club gonna do that for people. Free of charge. If I go through the city and have the city police department inspect a resident's home, it costs them forty dollars. So, you know, it's great resources we got here. And I know that the people over on this side of the street, can't survive, not unless we get the people on this side of the street. So, now we're over here telling these folks, you can't prevent deterioration of your neighborhood. And at the same time using the volunteers over here to help you work over here. It works.

Jones: So to some extent in order to prevent the deterioration of their neighborhood,

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they have to help the other neighborhoods across the street.

Yeah. What's over here can come over there too. So if you keep a basic. And see then I got more organizations up here. The YWCA, this big church here, this African American church here. This is a [?] church, St. Mark's. St. Mark's does wonderful things in the neighborhood. They got a lot of professional folks in the congregation. They come out they do Girl Scouts, Boy Scouts. They do little league. So when I got all those resources to work with, I ain't got to spent a lot.

Gladden: Do you work with MICA?[6]

The churches? Yeah. I work with their organizers. I don't work on their issues. They develop their own issues. I develop mine. We work in neighborhoods in organizing together, in sharing of information. MICA is a, to me, it's just my personal opinion. MICA is deeply rooted in identifying and addressing problems. They're not a solving problem oriented organization. I'm out here to try to do efforts to solve problems. They identify them and they address them. You know. Education was one of their big things. They identified it and they addressed it. But they ain't resolved it. I'm all over here organizing now. [450] Fourteenth and Max. I came up over here cause people down here called me and said we need an organizer. We want to start a black club. We need to keep our blocks clean. I said,

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[6]MICA was an organization of ministers and churches working on AOD visibility problems.

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are you all for real? So I came down here with fourteen of my kid students, and this was my first black here. Then I ran, what I do is basically in this neighborhood here, it's on the fringes of a deteriorating neighborhood. But as you can see, it's a pretty decent block. Plus 75% percent of it is home owned. So you can work with that kind of diversity on a block. So these people here, I came out. Man, they were all that cleaning. I like it. But then they said, we got a drug house. I can't help them do that. I say drug houses, even if you identify them today, they're not closed tomorrow. Let's be clear on that before we get started. Because it's a legal process. But over in here now, this is all, this is all [?]. This is like maybe thirty-four hundred north. Most of these were home owners and they, you know, they be trying, but most of the folks over here have left or rented their properties out. You see what I'm saying. They bought the homes, probably saved some. But it's mostly renters over here and they.

Jones: It still looks like a reasonably nice area though.

It's saveable. If people just get together. Somewhere along the line, somebody's gonna have to develop a renter's program to help renters. Or either organize renters and what their role and responsibility is to the neighborhood.

Jones: Well, you seem to suggest that the best thing for renters is have them become home owners?

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Yeah. I think so. Yeah, with all the home owners, first time home buyers projects we got here. We got over ten million dollars in it. This is Bellevue Heights, this block over here, all of this area here. See the signs up on the.

Jones: Bellevue Heights drug free. This is Ring and what?

This is Ring and, what street is this?

Jones: You know what one of you should do or both of you, get a map and before we lose our guide here, have him draw, sort of draw some boundaries on a map in terms of where all of these neighborhoods are so we get a visual picture of it.

I got a map like that.

Jones: You got a map like that? Then we can.

I swing back in there. I can always have another one done.

Jones: No we can get it copied at.

Yeah, I'll get it.

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Jones: If it's a big map we can copy it Kinko's because they have a large copier.

Okay, let me go get it.

Jones: That would be good.

I be up in here. They have a great block club. They bring out the grills, and dancing. And people come from miles around. And we've never had an incident.

Jones: Now what do you do to get the renters to become home owners?

We have to give them informational overviews of the different programs that we have in the city. See even, a lot of folks who are on AFDC, have been living in their property and have statements from their landlords for five years or better, paying over four hundred and fifty dollars a month for rent and never missed a beat. Them people would be eligible to buy a home. Within their price range. If they've been paying rent for five years at four fifty. But a lot of people, the misconception is that a lot of renters don't think that they can buy cause they only have DC or fixed income. That's not true. Because basically you can go in and get you a dollar home on a homestead program and get you a city rehab loan to rehab it. Now there are broader neighborhoods way out. But that's like section 8 housing. They just like little modern mini projects. That's what I call them. Because they group a lot of low income people in one geographical area and don't expect to have the same outcome as they do in the

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central city projects. Well, why not? What makes you think because you got all these low income folks in these nice looking apartments or houses out here that they you ain't gonna have the same existing problem that you do in the projects. These are the projects. You know. They just made for through the HUD subsidy. [550] You're not gonna operate here without a map. Because one of the things about people in this city, they territorial. I mean, you know, not in a violent sense. But you go in their neighborhood, the first thing they want to know is what you doing over here? Who are you? You live around here? So I do it in a geographical sense. I'll be right back gentlemen. You know the [?], they got the general hospital, they got the brick center over here. This used to be the hub of the black shopping area. But during the riots, it burned down. So Walgreen was the first one to come back to anchor it.

Jones: So we're back at North and King.

And we brought the gas company and the electric company down here. And our main office is right over here. We're not too far away from James. You said 11:30.

Jones: Yeah, I'm gonna miss it. I'll set up another appointment with James. That's not really.

These are our offices.

Jones: So these are your offices here?

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What's left of them. You know, we had a big time problem with the. Hey, you got my lunch? Hey fellow. Now we were supposed to buy this building. A banker owns this building. So in the process of rehabbing the building, we came in here. It was just a shell. We stuck big money in here out of all our programs to rehab the building. So during the investigation, the little bank got nervous and put a damned for sale sign on the building. And then we didn't have the money.

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Autobiographical Statement

Matthew Lindholm grew up in Blue Earth, Minnesota. He received his Bachelor of Arts in English in 1982 from Carleton College, Northfield, Minnesota. He taught middle and high school English in Faribault and Minneapolis, Minnesota. In 1991, he received the Master of Divinity degree from Union Theological Seminary in New York City. He has worked as a research associate or assistant in the following areas: race relations, institutional research (City University), immigration, Jewish American identity, drugs and alcohol, nonprofit and civic organizations, and evaluation. He has presented papers on census profiles of recent New York City immigrants, the Fighting Back National Program and Evaluation, inter-racial and inter-organizational conflict and cooperation in urban communities, and other areas. His general areas of expertise are community and urban sociology and racial and ethnic relations. He has served as Adjunct Professor at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, Queens College, and Kean University where he has taught race and ethnicity, research methods, and introduction to sociology.

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