Writing the Acoustic Self in English Modernism

By

Zoltan Varga

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Comparative Literature
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
The City University of New York
2013

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the
Graduate Faculty in Comparative Literature in satisfaction of the
dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Professor John Brenkman

Date | Chair of Examining Committee

Professor André Aciman

Date | Executive Officer

Professor John Brenkman

Professor Vincent Crapanzano

Professor Giancarlo Lombardi

Professor John Hamilton

Supervisory Committee

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

Abstract

Writing the Acoustic Self in English Modernism

by

Zoltan Varga

Adviser: Professor John Brenkman

The dissertation maps the different modes employed for the musicalization of fiction in English modernism, mainly focusing on novels by E. M. Forster, Aldous Huxley, and Virginia Woolf. While music is usually present on the level of structure and characterization in these texts, I claim that even its structural applications are related to characterization and address modernist dilemmas regarding the notions of self and identity. I delineate three modes of musicalization in English modernist fiction–the fugue, absolute music, and *Gesamtkunstwerk*–and argue that they are interrelated with an emerging modernist critique of the subject. Employing methods of narrative theory, semiotics, and musical semiotics, I aim to show how music, in its paradoxical relationship with representation and language, generates an interference within fictional texts, creating an *aporia* that allows for an analogy with the constitution of human subjectivity.

Table of Contents

Chapter One

Let's Get Lost

We hear only ourselves. – *Ernst Bloch*

Musical experiments in narrative fiction either open up the text toward music or emphasize the inwardness of the textual universe. Aldous Huxley set out to *musicalize fiction* in *Point Counter Point*, as an example for the latter, while E. M. Forster wrote about the musical *expansion* of the novel form in his influential *Aspects of the Novel*. The dissertation focuses on musicalization in the modernist English novel, and besides the works of Huxley and Forster, will explore musical narratives by Virginia Woolf and Samuel Butler. I will identify and examine three modes of musicalization employed by these writers–fugue, absolute music, and *Gesamtkunstwerk*–and map their effect on characterization. My main claim is that these modes of musicalization reveal a pattern for the modernist critique of the subject in English modernism.

Attempts at the textualization of musical semiosis are usually manifest on the level of characterization or structure, so it is either textual subjects or texts as subjectivities that are enriched and at the same time brought to risk by an *other discourse* in the process. Hence, the musicalization of fiction enacts the drama of the self. Musical semiosis becomes the engine of this turmoil. In his *Musical Meaning: Toward a Critical History,* Lawrence Kramer draws a parallel between the twofold nature of musical meaning-making and the constitution of human subjectivity: music, via its concurrent introversive and extroversive semioses, enacts both our "absolute self-presence" and our

"contingent" social constructedness (Kramer 3). Music dramatizes this division of the subject, while introducing the non-representational and the *a*rational into the textual. Through the inherent aporia of this process, an in-between space is created, from which an *atopos* subject is born that I will call the *acoustic self*. In being *atopos*, the acoustic self questions the very notions of self and identity.

Music presents a set of paradoxes in literature. Once it enters the realm of language, music can only be *spoken of*, not *heard*: the non-linguistic medium that seems to work against *logos*, i.e., verbal utterance, becomes dependent on it. But music also works against *logos* as reason in literary texts. Narratives often thematize madness via their characters' musical experience. E.T.A. Hoffmann's stories, including "Ritter Gluck," "Councillor Krespel," and "Don Juan," are a point in case. Music leads to territories outside reason in these tales. A similar idea appears in Tolstoy's "The Kreutzer Sonata," where the art form also gains a connection with the devil due to its capacity to drag one out of her or his *stasis*. Thomas De Quincey's "Dream Fugue," a story that presents the reader with a sequence of dreams organized as a fugue, points at another territory outside representability, the realm of dreams. Music, madness, and dreams–depending on whether one locates madness and dream at the same or opposing ends of the continuum–represent the pre-linguistic or the beyond of language, unveiling a side of the self that is not accessible via reason and linguistic representation.

If music works against *logos*, music brings the text itself to risk by what John T. Hamilton calls the unworking of language (Hamilton 15). But what do narratives gain through music? A possibility to tackle the unspeakable: the self. Between music and text emerges the acoustic self, the subject in its impossibility. Dream, madness, and music all

talk about the same thing: we cannot talk about the self, it cannot be grasped solely on rational grounds. Music points at this in fiction and, thus, the musical and the textual become intertwined through the subject, not as much in opposition as supplementarity. This dissertation seeks to show how the modernist English novel enriched the already existing musicalization of fiction via unearthing existential, ontological, and aesthetic dilemmas regarding the literary text and its subjectivities.

Although the last two decades have witnessed a steadily growing interest in the field of intermedialities, there are surprisingly few works in word and music studies informed by musical semiotics. One of my premises is that the double lens of semiotics and musical semiotics may prove to be a useful tool for exploring musical characterization and structure in narrative fiction. Following Kaja Silverman, I will position the semiotics of the subject as the *subject of semiotics* and contend that it is the 'subject' that connects musical and textual meaning-making (3).

While outlining my project above, heavily loaded terms popped up, which need to be put in a theoretical perspective in order to clarify their use throughout the dissertation. Through these theoretical considerations, I will position the dissertation within recent scholarship on the interrelations of musical and textual meaning-making, and develop a key concept for my analyses, the acoustic self. This introductory chapter mainly focuses on musical semiotics, but it is important to emphasize that the perspective of the dissertation is a literary one. The musical theories introduced here often rely on literary theory and general semiotics, which will be familiar to the reader. I spotlight musical meaning-making in this chapter, and will use further theories and criticism during the analyses of the novels in the following parts.

Also in this chapter, I will clarify my choice of English modernism and my main emphasis on works by Aldous Huxley, E. M. Forster, and Virginia Woolf–each of whom employed "music as a method" in their narratives (Brillenburg Wurth 15). Whilst this makes up the second part of this chapter, I will first provide a description of how I intend to explore the topic throughout the rest of the dissertation.

Chapter Two is an inquiry into the topic of fugue. While fugue is generally associated with the name of Bach, as a matter of fact, there will be as much Handel and Beethoven in the texts analyzed. The three novels studied in this chapter present two modes of constructing the acoustic self through a fugal structure. Woolf's *The Waves* introduces six voices that create an absent character, Percival, in a synchronic way, i.e., the acoustic self emerges from the concurrent narration of six voices. We may call this the vertical model. Huxley's *Point Counter Point* also belongs to this category. In Samuel Butler's *The Way of All Flesh*, the different voices of the fugue come from different generations of the Pontifex family, providing multiple versions of the same character via a diachronic, or linear fugal model. I aim to show how fugue, as a way of "mythical thinking" (Tarasti 35), flattens the vertical (synchronic) and synchronizes the linear (diachronic)–estranging the characters from themselves, as we witness their mythical construction evoked by their musical experiences.

While Chapter Three, "Does Beethoven Kill? Absolute Music and the Self," strictly focuses on narratives employing Beethoven's music, we will see that the history of listening to Beethoven is as important as his music itself in these novels. I will look at the use of Beethoven in Forster's *Room with a View* and *Howards End*. Beethoven's oeuvre and name are often connected with the idea of absolute music, a notion that is

symptomatic of how Beethoven is used in fictional texts. Absolute music carries the idealistic notion of the philosophical absolute, making it a sublime experience.[1] However, this sublime experience will turn into an internal *katabasis* for the main characters of the novels investigated in this chapter. While music leads to some kind of an essence and self-sameness in German romanticism, the sublime musical experience becomes connected with death in the novels to be discussed. Music no longer serves as a bridge between distinct aspects of the self in modernism; the signifier and the signified remain irreconcilable. It is not the shortcoming of music though; music in its in-between-ness shows that no self-sameness, no essence can be brought to the surface. The moment it appears, the self falls prey to its own constructedness.

Chapter Four tackles another awe-inspiring composer, Richard Wagner. The role of Wagner in English modernist literature has been widely explored, yet his influence has not been connected to the semiotics of the subject. The use of leitmotifs in literature not only evokes a myth or a mythical character, but due to the fact that leitmotifs always keep developing (they never turn into a rigid *forma formata*, formed form, but remain *forma formans,* forming form, and thus retain their inherent musicality) we witness the making of the mythical hero through the development of a novel's character. This reverses the logic of intertext and results in the deconstruction of the original myth. An example of this is Forster's *The Longest Journey*, which provides a queer reading of Wagner's *Parsifal*, a reading that will never allow one to hear the opera "straight" again. Wagner admittedly gets somewhat abused in this chapter, as Forster turns the composer's use of myth against its ideological framework. The opera's plot that reaches its climax in the

[1] For a thorough discussion of the notion see: Dahlhaus *The Idea of Absolute Music*.

annihilation of desire, achieved *via* the erasure of sexual and racial difference, becomes the tool for producing the exact opposite effect in Forster's work. As all the novels in the previous chapters, *The Longest Journey* also examines the relationship between music and sexuality, and the topic of music and gender gets an in-depth treatment in this chapter.

The readings in Chapter Five are not from the modernist period and they serve to expand the topic of the dissertation. The expansion is both temporal and geographical. The texts provide a counterpoint to the modernist novels, and allow a test run of the acoustic self in different contexts. My aim is not to turn the notion into a universal tool, but to see how the postmodern musicalization of fiction problematizes the modernist questions from new angles. Rafi Zabor's *The Bear Comes Home* (1997) is a contemporary New York jazz novel that displays a different tradition and musical canon form all the other novels included in the dissertation, while Vikram Seth's *An Equal Music* presents a contemporary example of musicalization in the English novel from the very end of the twentieth century (1999). This text features a classical (continental) musical repertoire.

Both novels are about musicians, which allows the texts abundant opportunities to address issues regarding musical performance and performativity in different contexts. Besides these two narratives, I will also look at postmodern musicality and the role of sampling in contemporary musical culture. I will examine the work of Paul D Miller aka DJ Spooky That Subliminal Kid to explore the topic. This chapter will show that some of the romantic ideas and ideologies attached to music are still intact today, yet the conceptualization of the subject has changed. Technical developments have played a

significant role in these changes and they also altered the relationship between humans and music-making.

The model I am proposing about the three modes of musicalization is in no way either prescriptive or exhaustive. What I intend to show is how the different ways of employing music in English modernist fiction correspond with a critique of the subject. In the Conclusion I will sum up my findings and draw connections based on the analyses presented in the dissertation, and also point at possibilities for further research.

1.1 Theoretical Considerations

Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, music has generally been considered as a non-referential sign system where meaning is generated within the composition[2]–yet music is clearly also a discourse, carrying external references, both acoustic and symbolic. As argued by Kofi Agawu, it is exactly where these two types of signification overlap that musical meaning happens (PWS 133). The terms 'absolute music' and *Gesamtkunstwerk* denote an emphasis on the introvert and extrovert aspects of musical signification respectively, the emblematic composer of the former being Beethoven, while Wagner's name evokes the latter. We will see how the novels that engage the works of these composers are informed by this tradition, providing two versions of musicalization, one with more emphasis on music as a centripetal force, and another, where music means expansion.

[2] Probably the two most famous representatives of this "purist" view are Igor Stravinsky and Eduard Hanslick. According to Hanslick's famous dictum, "sounding forms in motion constitute the sole and exclusive content and object of music" (Bonds 107). A couple of decades later, Stravinsky maintained that "music is, by its very nature, essentially powerless to express anything at all, whether a feeling, an attitude of mind, or psychological mood, a phenomenon of nature, etc. Expression has never been an inherent property of music. That is by no means the purpose of its existence" (Stravinsky 53).

Both types of musicalization belong to the range of intermediality, which, along with intertextuality, is an intersemiotic form. However, not all instances of intermediality are intertextual: they can appear as "a general involvement of more than one semiotic system in a given work . . . to another medium without further specification" (Wolf 47). A working definition of intermediality that I will use in the dissertation comes from Kiene Brillenburg Wurth:

> Instead of being just an expanded form of intertextuality, intermediality refers to the process whereby medium *x* absorbs the 'method' or semiotic system of medium *y.* In this way, medium *x* turns into something (slightly) other from its own, no longer its familiar or traditional self, but not (yet) quite the medium it mimicks either. Thus, it falls in-between *x* and *y*, between traditionally demarcated medial categories. (14)

Although Calvin S. Brown published his *Music and Literature: A Comparison of the Arts* already in 1948, thus establishing the field of musico-literary studies, the fact that a collection of essays was released under the title *Word and Music Studies: Defining the Field* more than fifty years later shows that the area that "has been in a creative flux" (Scher 11) for the last couple of decades still lacks the coherence of a discipline. However, it might not be all bad, as a lack of coherence also means a lack of rigidity. As Eric Prieto points out in his *Listening In: Music, Mind, and the Modernist Narrative*, the underlying pitfall of musico-literary studies has been its aiming at "establish[ing] a fixed set of rules governing the use of musical models" and metaphors (21). While these rules certainly offer some guidelines and intellectual rigor, they do not always recognize that music goes beyond *logos*, and those moments may be exactly the most exciting moments

in musical fiction where we lose our ground in terms of time, space, and logic. These moments may become the entry points for inspecting the modes in which musical meaning and the logic of musical semiosis create a discrepancy within the text, thus creating an impact on its semiotic functioning. Although I accept the premise that music is always metaphorical in literature, at least in the original Greek sense of the word, the closer we get to allowing music into our reading, i.e., the more literally we take music's presence in the text, the more exciting our intersemiotic experience may become. I propose that the agent of semiosis, the subject, serves as a bridge between these two media of meaning-making. To return to Silverman: "Semiotics involves the study of signification, but signification cannot be isolated from the human subject who uses it and is defined by means of it, or from the cultural system which generates it" (3). These two aspects will receive due emphasis in the following analyses: the subject and the cultural system that generates "it,"–whether the referent of "it" is the system or the subject itself remains one of the main questions for my project.

1.1.1 The Musical Text

Jean-Jacques Nattiez, whose *Music and Discourse* was the first attempt at a general theory of musical semiology, is no less aware of the importance of the subject and cultural codes in the semiotic process than Silverman. He claims that music is "whatever people choose to recognize as such," as opposed to noise, which is "whatever is recognized as disturbing, unpleasant, or both" (M&D 47-8). For Nattiez, cultural codes are responsible for what is considered music and what is not, making any statement about the universality of music questionable. Even within the same interpretive community,

"there is rarely a consensus" (48). Contemporary music clearly illustrates this. While some people would listen to certain pieces with tears of emotion in their eyes, others would try and escape from the venue. Also, cultural codes change over time, and the pieces that were used to be considered by the majority as mere noise are eventually being 'heard' as music. A recent example of this is the inclusion of Sex Pistols' "Pretty Vacant" in the opening ceremony of the London Olympics in 2012. Nattiez's definition questions the universals of music, and he claims that, if they exist at all, they "must be sought in the realm of poietic and esthesic strategies more than the level of immanent structures (67)." For him, it is not music that is necessarily musical, but rather the creative and interpretative processes around the musical experience.

The notions "poietic" and "esthesic" are essential elements of Nattiez's musical semiotic model, which is based on Jean Molino's *tripartition*, differentiating the poietic, the neutral, and the esthesic levels of interpretation. The poietic aspects of a work refer to the dimensions around the creation (*poiesis*) of the object, what we may call the creative meaning-making, while the term esthesic was originally used by Paul Valéry, emphasizing perception (*aisthesis*). Esthesic meaning-making takes place "in the course of an active perceptual process" (Nattiez 12). The third aspect is the object, the neutral level, in its "form of a trace accessible to the five senses." This level of interpretation focuses on the "immanent and recurrent properties" of the musical composition (12).

The borders of the musical work are then extended beyond its beginning and end, and the semiosis takes place "in its dispersal between three spheres, in the *interaction* between its symbolic components, as a total musical fact; as poietic strategies, a resultant trace, and esthesic strategies unleashed by that trace" (70). This understanding opens up

the musical text to contextual and intertextual horizons. Music, for Nattiez, is a "symbolic form" with a "capacity (with all other symbolic forms) to give rise to a complex and infinite web of interpretants" (37). Nattiez attempts to make some order in this highly complex and polisemic jumble by distinguishing these different levels of meaning in the musical experience without curtailing its complexity. The polisemic nature of music lies in the fact that "the meanings it takes on, the emotions that it evokes, are multiple, varied and confused" (37). Musical meaning cannot be separated from the emotions it evokes, and this subjective element of musical semiosis makes Nattiez call musical interpretation "*hazardous*," as there's no "certainty what constitutes the expressive, the natural, the conventional, the analogical, the arbitrary association" (37). Musical interpretation creates a risk, as musical meaning cannot be secured (we should note that this actually points at a similarity with language). And secure we want to be. Safe denotative meaning is what we want, as Socrates, who intends to ban most forms–and modes–of music from the ideal state, declares: "we shall not want multiplicity" (Plato *Republic* Book III). A look at the history of tonal symbolism, despite the continual effort of music theoreticians to keep it in check throughout the centuries, shows significant changes in how the same tonality was perceived throughout the centuries. Nattiez's summary shows, for instance, how E major went through an evolution between the 18th and the 20th centuries from being considered as "quarrelsome," then "gay or grand," later evoking the notions of "firmness, courage" while considered as "warm" and "joyous" by Albert Lavignac by the middle of the 1900's. It is simply impossible to secure musical meaning, as music most of the time has no concrete outside referent, and denotation easily turns into connotation, especially between the poietic and the esthesic levels.

> If the Peircian interpretant represents at once an atom of meaning and an idea that serves as a point of departure for an account of semiosis as a phenomenon … what we ordinarily call denotation designates a *constellation of interpretants that are common to the poietic and the esthesic.* As long as an interpretant is situated, in isolation, on either side, then we have entered into the sphere of connotation. (M&D 24)

This is a critical point for my further investigations, as this is one of those cases where music serves as a reminder about the working of language: "we cannot establish a priori criteria for the distinction between denotation and connotation," the dichotomy of which "cannot be resolved except empirically, on a case-by-case basis" (24). This problem does not only manifest itself between the poietic and the esthesic, but de-neutralizes the neutral level of musical semiosis, while also questioning language's capacity to represent reality. The issue may be best examined on the level of signs.

Although it is much harder to identify what a musical sign is than a linguistic one, it may be only a false sense of security that we have in the case of language. Actually, the linguistic signifier–like its musical counterpart–does not point at a segment of reality. Raymond Monelle recalls that already Saussure noted in his *Course in General Linguistics* that "there are no pre-existing ideas, and nothing is distinct before the appearance of language" (Saussure 112), i.e., there is no objective content in linguistic denotation. If this is so, argues Monelle, "[t]he signifier cannot mean a pre-existent natural thing. Music, then, is not opposed to language in being unable to represent the real world; on the contrary, it *shares this feature with language*" (12). This will be of vital import for the musical experiences in the chapters to follow.

Still, Monelle, who is mainly concerned with the "inherent signification" of music, finds it pivotal to identify the meaningful segments of a musical composition in order to carry out an analysis. For him, an "analysis engages with signifier and signified together," which point at a wider spectrum than the actual score, opening up what Monelle calls the "musical text" to its own inherent intertextuality (11). Each musical sign will be meaningful in its own musical *con*text, in the manner of Nattiez's case-by-case basis. As a result of this, the undefinability of the musical sign is indeed one of the few points where musical semioticians agree. Agawu, for instance, comes to the conclusion that "there cannot be a single definition for 'sign' in music, for each work's dimensions display a unique mode of signification … to insist on a stable definition of musical sign is, to my mind, to falsify the semiotic enterprise even before it has begun" (MAD 16).

Each work, then, becomes a specific semiotic field with its specific logic of meaning-making, while also being interconnected with other such fields, the works in the musical repertoire. The interplay of these intro- and extroversive forces creates the musical text, which is according to Monelle,

> a boundary between inside and outside, rendered problematic by the flow across the boundary and the interdependence of inside and outside. It is also an epistemic nexus, the meeting point of all its significations, indexical, iconic, and symbolic. It is not a transcendent essence, an abstract pattern, an object, an 'experience.' (155)[3]

[3] It is in this sense that I refer to musical "texts" throughout the dissertation. The musical text is a writerly text.

Monelle recognizes that an infinite network of significations is created by this model, but claims that this plurality enriches the process of interpreting music rather than making it impossible–also, it ensures that no one discourse or ideology can gain control over the musical text. Musical semiosis is created by the interplay of the centrifugal and centripetal forces in musical signification, and it follows that interpretation becomes a play as well. As Agawu pronounces regarding the introversive and extroversive semioses in music: "it is precisely where the two processes overlap, a region described as 'the region of play,' that a semiotic investigation reaps its richest harvest" (PWS 133).

To take one example, Virginia Woolf's "The String Quartet" indicates how the dilemma of musical inside and outside may appear in a literary text. The experimental short story records an unnamed narrator's experiences while attending a musical performance. Neither the place, nor the musical piece is identified, and at first glance, the story seems to be about everything but the music itself. Yet a more careful reading reveals that the story is precisely about the interplay of the levels on which music is experienced by a conscious, but probably musically untrained listener, who is "furtively seeking" (SQ 29) for meaning. However, any graspable meaning seems to come from the "outside" of music, as instead of any kind of description of the music itself, the reader only receives an account of the narrator's impressionistic, dream-like mental images, not unlike those in De Quincey's "Dream Fugue," evoked by the music.

A lot of details emerge, however, about the external circumstances, which envelop the musical experience, and thus shape the semiotic process from the addressee's part and also point at the different layers of meaning owing to the cultural embeddedness of the listener. The narrator recounts how people got there, using the Tube, trams, and

buses, as well as carriages and landaus, mapping a musical circulatory system of London as they reach the venue from all parts of the city. We hear the patrons' chitchat about the recent happenings in town, the Royal family, and of course the weather, and are also presented with the narrator's reactions to details of the clothes and accessories sported by the members of audience.

The only hint about the musical program is someone saying, "That's an early Mozart, of course–," which might well be a false lead, but as Émilie Crapoulet points out, this lead–false or not–references absolute music, as there would be no lyrics or program for an early Mozart quartet (BTBL 5). It is remarkable then that Woolf describes exclusively the external elements attached to the musical performance of a composition that supposedly carries only internal meaning. Not only that, it is precisely this that makes the narrator upset about her hermeneutic performance: making the music programmatic, telling a story.

Those parts of "The String Quartet" that refer to the actual music are sequences of a fragmented story that the narrator subconsciously projects on the music while listening to it. The only *accountable* part of the whole musical experience is thus its circumstances, societal and concert hall rituals, and habits that order one to "sit passive on a gilt chair" (SQ 29) in this sepulcher of music. Turning active, acquiring an agency in listening, against this backdrop becomes difficult, even impossible for the narrator. The ritual around music stiffens the audience, everyone turns serious hearing the first, distant sound of an instrument, even before the musicians enter the room: "Was it the sound of the second violin tuning in the ante-room" that made "that elderly face … a moment ago urban and flushed; now taciturn and sad?" (29). The funeral-like atmosphere is

strengthened with the appearance of the four musicians, when the "four black figures, carrying instruments," enter the hall and "seat themselves facing the white squares under the downpour of light" (29). Finally, the performance begins with the "simultaneous movement" of the four bows getting lifted, poised, "and looking across the player opposite, the first violin counts one, two, three–" (29).

What follows is a caricature of a musical *ekphrasis* in the form of a stream-of-consciousness-like sequence of images about fish, water, and rivers. In the interval, the narrator is dissatisfied with these images and her account of the movement. "What do I mean? That's the worst of music!" (30) she laments, but before long, someone emits a "–Hush!" (30), and with the music returning, more images follow: a river, a sinking boat, a storm. The narrator is even unhappier with the result than earlier. "That's the worst of music," she repeats, "these silly dreams" (31). As usual, conventions save one from unpleasant self-consciousness: "The second violin was late you say?" she hears, but soon enough the third movement begins after another "Hush!" What follows is a lovers' dialogue, "the words are indistinguishable, though the meaning is plain enough – love, laughter, flight, pursuit, celestial bliss" (32). Fantastically, the images are not only visual, but audial: "the sound of silver horns, at first far and distant, gradually sounds more and more distinctly," and the narrator hears "tramp and trumpeting" and "clang and clangour" (32) actually produced or evoked solely by the four stringed instruments. In the final part, an imaginary city is conjured up with amazing architecture, leaving the narrator without hope to gain the meaning she was seeking in the music. "Back then I fall, eager no more, desiring only to go," back into the world, into the everyday, to "find the street, mark the buildings, greet the applewoman," and commenting on the "starry

night" (32) to the maid awaiting at home, adding loneliness to the hopelessness resulting form the semiotic failure. It is as if the extroversive and introversive musical semioses addressed each other in the last two lines of the short story, "'You go this way?' 'Alas. I go that'" (32).

There is more to the narrator's musical experience, and it is exactly those subjective, dream-like sequences denounced by her that could allow her own unique listening self emerge in the short story. But let us address the issues of musical intertextuality and subjectivity before we return to "The String Quartet" again.

1.1.2 Musical Intertextuality

The quest for the musical sign led to the notion of the musical text and musical intertextuality. Why did I make sure to establish the differentiation between intertextuality and intermediality in the beginning if we ended up with inter*text*uality anyway? The argument has apparently come full circle, yet we did not arrive at the exact same crossroads. Musical intertextuality provides a perspective to look for ruptures created by musical texts entering literary ones without bringing music under the aegis of *logos*. These ruptures will hopefully show the inconsistencies, *aporias*, and *paradoxes* within *logos* itself as well as its incapability of fully representing the human experience. If musical semiosis can elucidate the uncertainties and shortcomings of language, as noted above, it may also very well do a better job than language in territories where words fear to tread. Via its analogy with human subjectivity–in its simultaneous self-sameness and social constructedness–musical semiosis may succeed in sounding the acoustic self in the text.

As outlined above, from the 1990s on, the reality of "music" in itself has been questioned, and the focus has turned more and more toward a text-context relationship. However, this does not mean that the proponents of musical semiotics dismiss the musical composition and existing analytical tools. Instead, this perspective is about the acknowledgment of, and even more, cherishing the multiplicity of meaning. The musical text is looked upon as discourse, in opposition to a strictly formalist view that attempts to uphold the boundaries of the composition. Another difference between the two approaches is not looking for a final meaning or understanding, but opening "paths to understanding" (Agawu, MAD 7), while also emphasizing the performative aspect of criticism (more on this in 1.1.5).

The text-context relationship raises the question of intertextuality. Leonard G. Ratner's work needs to be recalled here as a precursor of musical semiotics, an important milestone in music theory, and also as it provides a general framework for how I am to carry out my project in the following chapters. His *Classic Music: Expression Form, and Style* introduced a systematic study of what he called the musical topic, an important step towards intertextuality in music:

> From its contacts with worship, poetry, drama, entertainment, dance, ceremony, the military, the hunt, and the life of the lower classes, music in the early 18th century developed a thesaurus of characteristic figures, which formed rich legacy for classic composers. Some of these figures were associated with various feelings and affections; others had a picturesque flavor. They are designated here as topics–subjects for musical discourse. Topics appear as fully worked-out pieces, i.e., types, or as

> figures and progressions within a piece, i.e., styles. The distinction between types and styles is flexible; minuets and marches represent complete types of composition, but they also furnish styles for other pieces. (9)

Topics were recognized and understood by the listening community, and participated in the perceived meaning of a musical composition, making tropes like allusion and irony possible within music. Though this may sound like stating the obvious these days, a look at the history of musicology shows that out of several centuries it is only the last couple of decades that have dealt with those aspects of music that connect compositions on a higher level, yet which are rooted within the composition and not external factors, e.g., history.

An act of theoretical self-reflection is appropriate here. I have to admit that I am going somewhat against the grain here when evoking the works of these musicologists, as they themselves often claim that they theoretically do not offer anything new for literary scholars. While I am not proposing a new theory myself in this dissertation, I claim that juxtaposing music and narrative in a way that is informed by musical meaning-making is a fruitful method for investigating how music functions in literature. The three modes of musicalizaiton that I label as "fugue," "Beethoven," and "Wagner" in the dissertation will be explored as 'musical topics' in literature. As Monelle asserts, "[e]ach topic needs a full cultural study" (33). However, I do not claim to carry out an exhaustive cultural study of these topics, and the perspective I offer will not affix a stable function of a certain instance of musicalizaiton in a given text, but rather look at how the given topic functions in the network of signifiers in a semiotic field. We can only construe musical meaning via language (acknowledging Schenkerian analysis as an exception), and despite the

contradictory, and often troubled, relationship between music and language, language is arguably still the best analogy to music as a semiotic system. Music, in turn, provides the closest analogy to language and it acts as a mirror to its (mal)functioning.

Now, back to intertextuality: Nattiez's and Monelle's understanding of the musical "text" opens the composition toward other "texts," whether they are contexts, or other compositions. They both draw on Ratner's topics, and address the introversive and extroversive meaning-making within music. Clearly, topic theory, even if treated with some skepticism toward its actual pervasiveness and limitations, exposes new vectors in musical semiosis, which are implicative of a certain type of musical intertextuality.

Michael L. Klein provides a thorough analysis of such questions in his *Intertextuality in Western Art Music*. Bringing together the works of Roland Barthes, Umberto Eco, Mikhail Bakhtin, Julia Kristeva, and Harold Bloom (among others), Klein uses literary theory as an intertext to musical analysis.[4] His conception of musical intertextuality is based on Hatten's tropes[5], which Klein broadens to refer to "any sign in one text that is a transformation of such signs in another text" (13). The key word here is transformation, meaning that Klein maintains the metaphorical aspect of the process. Metaphorical in the sense that there is not simply borrowing that takes place, but that a trope "turns into something (slightly) other" and remains "no longer its familiar or traditional self"–to recall our working definition of intermediality by Brillenburg Wurth. The reason for my apparent mixing of intermediality and intertextuality is due to their

[4] He has been duly criticized for it by his reviewer in *Music and Letters*. See Arnold Whittal "Intertextuality in Western Art Music (review)," *Music and Letters* 87.1 (2006): 126-128.

[5] Hatten defines musical trope as "Figurative meaning in music. Troping involves a species of creative growth that goes beyond the typical articulation of established types and their hierarchy. Troping akin to metaphor occurs when two different, formally unrelated types are brought together in the same functional location so as to spark an interpretation based on their location." See *Musical Meaning in Beethoven*, 295

commingling when music enters narrative fiction. It is always an instance of musical intertextuality (in the Kleinian sense) that provides the basis for (musical) intermediality in these texts. To further complicate matters, let us recall Nattiez's poietic and esthesic levels, as it is time to introduce the notions of poietic and esthesic intertextuality. Musical intertextuality from the composer's end is poietic when using a trope in a composition, while that composition may become an esthesic intertextuality for the writer who hears it, and in turn uses it in her or his fiction, thus engaging in poietic intertextuality that results in musical intermediality in the narrative text. The fusion of horizons is indeed somewhat bewildering in its complexity.

A further important aspect of Klein's work is that, with a clear-cut separation from influence, which "implies intent or historical placement of the works in its time or origin," he describes intertextuality as a "crossing [of] texts that may involve historical reversal" (4), and suggests that the western musical repertoire can be considered as a web of intertexts. This will be important in the readings that follow. Intertextuality is bi-directional, and the original text is also transformed by the process.

1.1.3 Music and the Subject

The other bi-directional facet of musical meaning-making, as noted above, is what Agawu calls its introversive and extroversive semioses. Kramer addresses these forces in relation to autonomy and contingency. They both find the *play* between the two the "context and condition" (Kramer 2) of musical meaning, and Kramer claims that this dual character has been at the core of musical meaning-making–at least in the western canon. What Kramer takes one step further is drawing an analogy between musical semiosis and

the construction of human subjectivity. He explains that although the interplay between autonomy and contingency may be central to sensuous, cognitive, and artistic experiences, in the case of music, the boundary between the subject and the object is broken down, and music (entering the subject) provides one with a "sense of immediacy" that evokes the feeling of "bodily self-presence, the intimacy of oneself with one's own embodiment" (3), while other experiences may suspend the distance between self and other. But "in music we feel it in ourselves" and, thus, music has the capability to "articulate one of the core conditions of subjectivity," being "poised between a unique and absolute self-presence and a contingent social constructedness" (3). "Music," continues Kramer, "the art of collapsing distances, plays out this paradox as nothing else can." He argues that "the question of musical meaning, and above all posing it in and through music, in the lived experience of works, styles, and performances, has given music of many kinds a substantial share in the diverse, conflicted formation of subjectivity in the modern era" (3).

Often, music as lived experience occurs when it is not listened to for its own sake, but rather when the musical experience is attached to another–usually social–event. Kramer points out that music may be added to other things, supplementing or intensifying them, yet when it withdraws, it has not lost anything of itself, but remains unchanged. It is due to this, that

> music may act as a cultural trope for the self, the subject as self-moved agency that remains when all of its attributes and experiences have subtracted. Musical affect, expression, and association become pure forms of self-apprehension; music is known by and valued for its "transcendence"

> of any specific meanings ascribed to it; identity seeks to become substance in music, even though music, being more event than substance, continually eludes this desire in the act of granting it. (4)

Questions of identity and substance in music remain the topic the following pages, but this passage points at a more immediate issue: there is no meaning the subject can attain in itself, so it needs to identify itself against "others." Music may serve as "other," as we will see in Naomi Cumming's argument below, but the analogy works both ways. While music may and does act as a cultural trope for the self in the novels discussed in the dissertation, the workings of the self illuminated by music reflect back on music itself, showing that music itself may only become meaningful in its intertextuality, contextuality, socio-cultural embeddedness. Thus, the materiality of music becomes interconnected with the materiality of the subject via this analogy.

1.1.4 The Sonic Self

It is the materiality of music that Naomi Cumming, drawing on first-hand experience as a solo violinist before she became a semiotician, uses to dismantle some myths about the musical performance and experience. In her *Sonic Self: Musical Subjectivity and Signification*, she describes how a "well-balanced physical adjustment to the instrument" during a musical performance may create a "beautiful tone" (23), thus giving rise to a new personality that does not preexist the actual sound that has been created. This "subjectivity" emerging in the performance is what we refer to when talking about a soloist's specific style. "The 'sonic self' is thus conceived. It is not a previously existing element of personality, but a creation that comes into being with sound" (23). Cumming

highlights the difference between delivery and interpretation in the musical performance. Since the emphasis is on interpretation, "[t]he performer's individuality is thus expressed in the moment that she becomes the vehicle for giving 'character' or 'life' to the work" (27). However, it is practically impossible to provide a full account of this process due to the subjective aspects of each instance of (musical) sound production. "Character" and "life" are suggestive descriptions, but are not able to explain the specifics of an individual musical presentation. Cumming proposes that the phenomenon, if understood as an instance of musical sign production, becomes more comprehendible when understood in semiotic terms. In her example, the violinist's physical movement creates a sound, which evokes the "singing voice" in the listener, even though the sound does not actually have any physical attributes:

> In Peirce's terms, the material qualities of the sound are the sign vehicle, by which it comes to represent (to be a "representamen" or "sign"). The vocal grain it achieves is its "object," what it stands for. A third element is, however, required to account for this counter-factual relationship. Without interpretation, no material sound produced by a non-human instrument can be heard as a voice. In the third logical position there is, then, an "interpretant." It acknowledges two things: the conventions that allow violin sound to be heard as vocal in some contexts, and the act of recognition in a particular moment of listening. What transforms a dead, mechanical performance into a "live" one is the creation of sound as a sign–in this case, a sign for "singing" in an appropriate tone. (29)

This Peircean transcription of the performance rounds us back to the question of musical text and its boundaries. "Where is the work, except in the performance?" asks Cumming (41). We are back at the question of risk[6] that the performer needs to take via the spontaneity and nuance in his or her performance that is necessary to bring the work to life, i.e., to provide an interpretation of it, not mere delivery. Bringing the work thus into play it can become a semiotic field where musical signification can take off. But what are the exact risks of doing this? What does the performer have to lose? Some kind of musical essence? Only if the self is looked at as a static entity that pre-exists the performance. Cumming suggests that the answer lies in looking at musical performance as a performative act. The risks the performer faces gain a different light in this view: "Can you really be losing your 'self' if your selfhood is formed in activity?" asks Cumming. "If you are constituted in your acts, your performances, you are per-forming yourself through them. Your 'self' will appear in the act. You do not know fully who you are, but will discover yourself in the action of taking risk, as I discover–or perform–myself in taking the risk of writing this" (42).

There is no musical self that preexists the production of the actual musical sound. The self, analogously with music, is *forma formans*, not a rigid form. In the process of shattering the myth of a musical self, Cumming brings to light the sonic self, as an element of musical signification. With the emergence of the sonic self, the risks taken by the performer become more intelligible, while also being shared by the listener. Listening to the interplay between conventionality and individuality in a given performance is yet

[6] See Hamilton and Nattiez above.

another act of interpretation, and as such, it involves risk and uncertainty. Listening as interpretation is also performative, and thus it also creates a new subject position.

Cumming evokes Peirce's pragmatism, for whom: "meanings are relational structures that emerge in active behavior, as an individual responds to some aspect of the environment" (SS 48). Conventionality and individuality, along with thought and feeling, merge in these responses, and this necessitates a "recognition of continuity between these ways of understanding. … A self-reflexive negotiation of the relationship between something heard and learned criteria for critical analysis is demanded in the musical events at any level" (48).

The self-reflexivity of the musical experience, however, does not arrive via either introspection or some kind of intuition, and this is where Cumming turns listening inside out: "Even 'inner' experiences–personal and even intimate–are not unmediated by a knowledge of musical signification as something that is learned within a community, and hence shared" (60), she reminds us. One does no have to be a highly trained to share these cultural codes, as they are present on all levels.

A self-reflexive act of listening "leads not to the discovery of an inner musical self, but to the fact that selfhood even in music is a contingent formation whose qualities derive from the signs over which it operates" (61). Following Peirce's theoretical model and terminology, Cumming differentiates three types of awareness in the active listening experience: feeling, reaction, and rationalization. First, the listener without reflection is "attentive to its felt quality." Then, the "otherness" of what has been heard awakens the "self-as-perceiving," which then evokes the third type of awareness, that compares this otherness with existing knowledge, experience. The experience goes from affect to

individuation, and then to cultural embeddedness in an interpretive community. Self-consciousness enters in the middle of the process (on the second level), and it is pivotal to Cumming's argument that music as "other" brings about a sense of one's self:

> A failure to encompass some experience in familiar terms, or adequately to predict it, leads to a knowledge of the "self" as one who is over-against something (or someone) in the environment. The "self" becomes apparent as one who had a will to organize things in a way known to it, that will be drawn to attention only by being resisted. An individual musical "self" appears as having distinctive expectations, based on a particular background in style, at that moment when its expectations are violated in some way. … If this self is an induction from felt "otherness," it is not known as a pure and unmediated interiority, or as an entity having the power to impose meanings on objects that resist. (56-7)

Thus, the liveliness of the music, its "uniqueness" and "individuality," provide the specific musical "other" against which the listening self creates itself. One of the main achievements of Cumming's model is that she rejects the notion of an inner musicality, and disqualifies the "'self' as a source of meaning" (57). She proposes, instead, that "the confronting experience of the music as an 'other,' resisting classification, can only enforce a sense that I must change to accommodate the experience of listening" (57). Thus, Cumming reinstates the self as a process, that emerges exactly at the moment that it ceases to be what it was or thought it was.

The apparent self-sameness and immediacy in the listening experience is eliminated. What seems an immediate quality in an experience is in fact due to the

subject's social/cultural/historical embeddedness that created the quality in question (71). The listening self thus becomes a subject position that will not only be able to experience the three kinds of awareness during the musical experience, but may "recognize the limitations of the interpretive world within which she operates, and, opening up the way of listening available to her, allow others to respond from a position of difference. Listening, then, is not only a matter of musicality, but of hearing other selves"(71). What seemed to be the most inherently musical about music is only apparent, actually the least authentic experience.

This is clearly one of the dilemmas of "The String Quartet," and perhaps the reason behind the narrator's sense of failure in making sense of music is due to the effort she puts into "recalling something, furtively seeking something" (29). Seeking and recalling presuppose something being there already, as opposed to emerging in the process. It is also telling about the narrator setting herself within the culturally assigned ways of listening to music. Already upon her arrival to the concert hall, the narrator "begin[s] to have [her] doubts" about her semiotic project, whether she will find the meaning she is after (28). However, she is actually much closer to making sense of music than she realizes, and she operates on all three levels of awareness during her listening. *Feeling*: her reaction to the first movement evokes sensuous experiences: "I want to dance, laugh, eat pink cakes, yellow cakes, drink thin, sharp wine. Or an indecent story…" (30). Scolding herself for the "silly dreams" that the music evokes in her is the second level of awareness, *reaction*, as she distances herself from her *self-as-perceiving*, having recognized the *other*ness of the images that the music evokes. It is *rationalization* where her project fails, and it is not due to her lack of ability or competence, but more to

her inability to release the presupposed selfhood that is assigned to her from the outside. The narrator's mistake is to blame herself, not *the limitations of the interpretive world in which she operates*. Music thus does not reveal an inner self in the narrative, but the drama of the subject's autonomy versus contingency.

1.1.5 The Acoustic Self

Whether or not we accept Cumming's last point, in which she voids the musical experience of one of its strongest qualities, immediacy, her theory certainly demystifies the emotional aspects of music that have been ruling in western culture for millennia. For Cumming, the listening subject is "a process of becoming aware of, and questioning, one's own presumptions about signs," which turns listening into a hermeneutic performance. The listening subject is "so contained in the world that created it," that s/he has never considered "to question the priority given to emotionality in this world" (71). Although the issue is clear and the argument is sound, there is something that still *feels* amiss. Following Cumming's logic, one could argue that *it sounds so wrong that it must be right*, yet I do not think it fully resolves the questions of self-sameness and immediacy in music. Hence the need to incorporate Kramer's position into my own formulation of the problematics of listening.

The acoustic self, this key notion of the dissertation, takes elements of Cumming's notion of the sonic self and Kramer's analogy between musical meaning-making and human subjectivity. If this engenders inner contradictions in my concept, it will be one of the many paradoxes and *aporias* in the dissertation, and will hopefully

create an inner tension in the analyses for further questioning. Some dilemmas will be resolved by the end, but at least as many will remain unresolved.

Let us recall the set of paradoxes from the very beginning of this chapter with the help of Jean-Luc Nancy. He asks in his seminal work *Listening*, "Is listening something of which philosophy is capable?" If we ask instead, "Is listening something of which novels are capable?" further questions emerge about listening, reading, and meaning. Signification in music is non-verbal, and musical meaning cannot be fully expressed in words. What happens then when music enters the realm of narrative? Can we hear it? Does music sustain its immediacy when it gets entangled in this indirect representation?

The aim of the brief theoretical discussion above is to set up a framework in which these questions become meaningful. Musical intermediality transfers (metapherein) a way of thinking into narratives, and brings about a self-awareness of language, unveiling its own limitations. Music for language is like the pool Narcissus is gazing into. It brings the self, the text, and meaning to risk. I hope to show in the following readings how musical structure and characterization unveil a side of the self that is not accessible via linguistic representation. What emerges in this process is the *acoustic self*. Through the incompatibility of music and language, writing the acoustic self sounds the impossibility of the self.

If the musical text is, as Monelle defines it, a *boundary between inside and outside*, then the intertextuality of the musical text is an inherent intertextuality. This is in alignment with Kristeva's concept of the text as a "permutation of other texts, an intertextuality: in the space of a given text, several utterances, taken from other texts, intersect and neutralize one another" (Kristeva 36, qtd Klein 2). As Klein sums it up,

"dialogue is already inside the frontier of the text, by definition the site of several intersecting utterances" (Klein 3). Via Kramer's analogy between the self and musical meaning-making, intertextuality appears as an inherent condition of the human subject as well. It is the sense of "something more" that music and human beings have in common. It is exactly this that modernism questions, and the existentialists reject. It will clearly show in the analyzed novels that, without the help of an existing theoretical framework or vocabulary, their writers not only address musical contingency and self-sameness in these texts, but they provide answers as well: there is either no reality of an inner essence, or if there is, bringing it to the surface will disable the functioning of the subject in her or his semiotic, cultural, or social framework. In a way, each of these novels dramatize the introversive and extroversive semioses of music, the text, and the subject.

The notion of the acoustic self is derived from Cumming's sonic self, but it gets broadened in that it is transferred to literature. The acoustic self also involves the main dilemma Kramer points at, and allows for a self-sameness that Cumming eliminates. Even if there is no immediacy or self-sameness in music, the writers we are dealing with clearly rely on such aspects of the musical experience.

1.1.6 Writing the Acoustic Self in English Modernism

The contingency of the subject appears as a central dilemma in the post-romantic era. Wylie Sypher's *Loss of the Self* draws the trajectory of the human psyche from the romantic craving for freedom to its subsequent assimilation in liberal utilitarianism, and the resulting impulse for authenticity.[7] This route correlates with the loss of center–both

[7] See Sypher 19-28.

on a transcendental and a psychological plane–during the nineteenth century and reaches its climax in a radical non-identity in the twentieth. One way the resulting existential *angst* manifested in the arts during modernism and the avant-garde is that the romantic notion of the sublime, instead of being in the center of the work of art as beforehand, moved into its very texture.[8]

As I will show in Chapter Three, the modernist musicalization of fiction is deeply rooted in the romantic aesthetic and literary traditions, and what Brillenburg Wurth calls the semiotic self-reflexivity of modernism and the avant-garde may be a possible explanation of why musical experiments are so exuberant in the English novel between 1890 and 1930 (Brillenburg Wurth 16). This provides an explanation and partially justifies Lukacs when describing modernist writers as "contemporary virtuosos of form without content" (Lukacs 60, qtd Prieto 269).

In this self-reflexive semiosis, the signifier and the signified are collapsed into one another, and denotation loses its capacity of meaning-making. The phenomenon of the modernist musicalization of fiction is thus, as Prieto confirms, "a symptom of a more general interest in those kinds of communication that are resistant to denotation" (Prieto 42). Modernist writers use music as a "model for the functioning of the narrative text," and this way musical semiosis, providing a new narrative logic, transforms how these "narratives make and communicate meaning" (ix). This unique aspect becomes the distinguishing feature of modernist musicalization.

With no self at the center, characterization began to focus on cognitive and mental functioning rather than steady (or steadily changing) subjectivities. Consequently,

[8] As observed by Brillenbug Wurth, 13.

modernism became more interested in the exploration of mental reality than the representation or the physical and social realities of the outside world" (Prieto x). Music, with its inseparable denotative and connotative functioning, as well as its then generally accepted self-referentiality, presented itself as an opportune alternative for exploring "the inner space of consciousness" (x). One peculiar finding of the dissertation though is how the contingent aspects of musical meaning-making and performativity indeed provide social and cultural critique in the texts analyzed.

A romantic influence on modernist musicalization appears on two levels: (1) the intermedial practice grows out of romantic aesthetics, and (2) it also reveals a traditional, unquestioned attitude toward its musical canon. While Beethoven and Wagner were typically those composers whose large-scale tonal structures modernist musicians attempted to break away from, their works appear probably the most often in modernist narratives. The work of Wagner, who has been rightfully observed to have had "greater influence than any other single artist on the culture of our age" (Magee 100), had an especially significant impact on modernist narrative. Also, his views on Beethoven have been decisive for more than a century in the way of listening to the composer's works, in a way hijacking the Beethoven experience for several generations. This will gain special significance in Chapter Three, where I will show how Beethoven's voice has been filtered through Wagner's in Forster's *Howards End*.

The use of classic and romantic composers is also due to their being more "listenable" for *profani*, not just the few initiated listeners with an acquired taste for modern classical music. While expanding the limits of their texts, modernist writers had to adhere to some codes that were shared by the reading public, so that the writings

remained comprehensible. As Franco Moretti rightly observes about the development of the novel, "[p]rogress coexists with backwardness, indeed, depends on it. One level of the work can be bold, *because* the other is crude and superfluous. It is a constructional split that runs through almost the entire twentieth century." (119)

One more thing remains to clarify regarding the writers and the works included in the dissertation. As I noted earlier, neither the range of works nor the applicability of the acoustic self is exhaustive. The musicalization of fiction was especially prominent in England in the first three decades of the twentieth century, making English modernism an especially rich field of investigation. The novels I will look at use 'music as a method' in their entirety,[9] and whether musicalization is manifest in their structure or characterization, it brings both their text and its subjectivities to risk.

Narrowing the scope of my investigations to three recurrent musical *topoi* in the modernist English novel makes the present project more realistic in its undertaking than an overarching attempt. Other ways offer themselves to scrutinize musicality in fiction, for instance a monograph-style study, like Michelle Fillion's *Difficult Rhythm: Music and the Word in E. M. Forster* or Émilie Crapoulet's *Virginia Woolf: A Musical Life* (both works provided invaluable insights for the present study); or a comprehensive survey, like Raymond Furness' *Wagner and Literature* or Gery Smyth's *Music in Contemporary British Fiction: Listening to the Novel* (a rich harvest of the last two decades' musical novels from the United Kingdom). The difficulty in the monograph format is the lack of possibility for in-depth and balanced comparisons with works by different writers, and

[9] This is one of the reasons why Joyce's *Ulysses* is not included in the dissertation. The novel, especially, its "Sirens" chapter is an exciting experiment with the fugue structure, but on the one hand I do not consider it to organically affect the structure of the novel as a whole and on the other hand–probably this is the more honest reason–only to prove this would take a whole dissertation due to the complexity of Joyce's novel.

surveys carry the pitfall of sacrificing depth in order to maintain a wide-enough scope. It is mainly the *topoi* themselves that informed my structure and the works targeted. There is a significant amount of scholarly work available dealing with the use of music in modernist fiction, but I have not come across a study of musical *topoi* in modernist English narrative. If one were to name a role model, Emma Sutton's *Aubrey Beardsley and British Wagnerism in the 1890s: The Imperfect Wagnerites* is probably the closest to what I aim to achieve in the following pages.

The English novel provides the scope of this dissertation, as these narratives share an interesting feature: their almost exclusive focus on the German musical repertoire and their continuous investigation of Britishness. While questioning and redefining human subjectivity, the novels explore one of the most evident contingencies of subjective identity: nationality. The dilemma of Britishness and a palpable music envy is present in each work to be treated in the dissertation, as if the two were inseparable. "Finzi! Delius! It would be better to remain in a land without music than to have music like that," bursts out the English protagonist's violin teacher in *An Equal Music* (Seth 55). Music provides the grounds for a critique of the subject and also of England in these narratives. A critique, but also a certain nostalgia for both.

Chapter Two

Of Fugue and Other Demons

2.1 The Listening Subject

The British rock band Judas Priest was brought to trial in 1990 in Reno, Nevada, for their music's supposedly influencing two young men, Raymond Belknap and James Vance, to enter and carry out a suicide pact. The two teenagers were listening to Judas Priest's *Stained Class* album before rushing out of Belknap's home and shooting themselves with a sawed-off shotgun at a nearby playground. Belknap died immediately; Vance three years later due to complications related to the incident, which took place in 1985. It was their parents who initiated the case. The plaintiffs' original complaint targeted the lyrics of the songs "Heroes End" and "Saints in Hell," but when the case faced dismissal by judge Jerry Whitehead based on the protection of free speech, they changed course. The prosecution claimed that subliminal messages hidden in one of the songs of the album, "Better by You, Better than Me," triggered Belknap and Vance's actions.[10] Like so many times before, music was accused of possessing a demonic power, providing a shortcut to the devil. The allegation was that the song included a hidden message, repeating the instruction to "do it" on six occasions in the song, and that this subliminally encouraged the two listeners to put an end to their lives. Leaving the important questions of free speech, liability, and pseudoscientific testimonies aside–a lot has been written elsewhere

[10] This brief summry of the case is based on: Stan Soocher, *They Fought The Law: Rock Music Goes to Court*, New York: Schirmer Boooks, 1999, 153-64.

about those aspects of the case[11]–the incident raises interesting questions regarding the power of music and the myths that surround the notion of the voice and the listening experience in western culture.

As it turned out, the supposed subliminal message was and was not musical at the same time. In fact, the "do-it's" were not even on the same track of the recording, but the accidental product of Judas Priest singer Rob Halford's exhalation and a simultaneous guitar strum.[12] Halford's breathing and the guitarist's changing chords are both extramusical and extraphonological phenomena, which neither musical notation nor linguistics can account for: the dubious message emerged from the unmusical within music. An *other* voice appeared where the human voice faltered, resulting in an "intrusion of otherness," similar to that which Mladen Dolar discusses when revealing the conflict of logocentrism and phonocentrism, duing which the senseless quality of the voice turns it into "the other of *logos*, its radical alterity" (52).

The voice stands in a very intimate and intricate relationship with *logos. Phônê* first empowers *logos* (the voice carries articulation), but also undermines it (there is always the chance of the voice failing), and eventually overpowers it–both physically and metaphysically. This happens where *phônê* and *logos* do not pair up into a linguistic structure, resulting in a kind of phono-*a*-logy. As Dolar points out, voice operates outside of the symbolic; it is the pre- and post-linguistic, or "physiological," materialization of the exteriority that "epitomizes the signifying gesture precisely by not signifying anything in particular. … The non-structured voice miraculously starts to represent the structure as such, the signifier in general. For the signifier in general, as such, is possible

[11] For a detailed assessment of the case in Charles Patrick Ewing and Joseph T. McCann, *Minds on Trial: Great Cases in Law and Psychology*, Cary, NC: Oxford University Press, 103-13.
[12] The master tape was an eight track recording, where the vocals and the guitar were separately recorded.

only as a non-signifier" (28-9). Understood through this lens, Belknap and Vance had a transcendental experience in a linguistic sense. The one thing they did not know, however, was its source. Perhaps, they created a consciousness behind the message they heard and this imaginary consciousness eventually took control of their listening experience and, alas, their listening self. But, if this is the case, how did the message become "do it"? Why did the two young, disturbed men turn *phônê* (voice) into *phonos* (murder, massacre)–two words having curiously similar phonetic structures in ancient Greek?

Was it the subliminal do-it's? One of the plaintiffs experts, Howard Shevrin, claimed that subliminal messages are especially dangerous because while one can neglect or dismiss an overt imperative, subliminals are perceived unconsciously and the receiver of the message "attributes the directive or the imperative to himself" (Moore). Timothy E. Moore, who testified on the defendants' side, points out that the main problem with this argument is that there is no scientific evidence whatsoever that shows subliminal commands being capable of prompting someone to action, let alone to act in a specific way. The power fallaciously attributed to subliminal messages seems to be just another myth about the "mysterious and almost magical force" (Moore) that people tend to attribute to a*log*ical auditory experiences, especially music. Another important factor Moore calls attention to is that the plaintiffs learned about the do-it's from Vance's guidance councelor, who testified that Vance told her how the Judas Priest album "was giving us the message to just Do It" (Moore). How could he account for a message that they supposedly received unconsciously? Becuse it was a liability case, it actually did not matter whether the band planted the message deliberately or not, as long as it could be

proven to be there and a direct connection could be established between the message and the suicides. And Vance's (and probably Belknap's) awareness of the do-it's rule out the subliminal argument even if it were a valid one. However, Judge Whitehead did not acquit the defendants based on this fallacy, but on the impossibility of establishing a direct causality between the do-it's and the boys' actions. The ruling ultimately claimed that the boys were of an especially high risk suicide group for reasons not related to Judas Priest, and that several factors in their lives led to the tragic event (Moore).

The teenagers, like all listening subjects, had a directedness in their listening; in Wittgenstein's terms, they *listened as*.[13] The two were listening in for an answer in the music. As Vance wrote to Belknap's mother afterwards in a letter about the night of the incident, "I believe that alcohol and heavy metal music, such as Judas Priest, led us or even 'mesmerized' us into believing that the answer to 'life was death.'" (Bromwich 244). The listening subject, expecting there to be a message, first had to identify that message, then had to identify itself as the addressee of that message. Placing themselves as the *other* in the communication process, they in turn identified the origin of the voice, which in fact was not there, as the *other* of their own freshly emerged listening self. Conjuring a consciousness where there was none, they presupposed a *logos*, and thus anthropomorphized noise into *phônê*, not only as voice, but also as utterance, originated in a consciousness, which became their Other, and which was at least as imaginary as the connection between the expression "do it" and what they thought it was the answer to.

[13] Lawrence Kramer uses Wittgenstein's duck-rabbit picture to show the simultaneously autonomous and contingent meaning-making in music, and our perception of music in the light of this duality. Michael Spitzer also invokes the image in his *Metaphor and Musical Thought*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004.

The Judas Priest case thus is not as much about subliminals as about myth in and about music, the musical experience, as well as the birth of the acoustic self.

An anthropomorphization of music is pervasively present in both informal and formal musical discourse. As discussed above, Cumming draws on the example of the violin, which is generally conceived in musical discourse as an instrument that is able to "convey a quasi vocal 'innocence' or 'warmth.'" Thus, a myth "is established within a community of discourse–one which habitually links 'violin' with attributes of 'vocality'" (SS 77). Again, we are back to the Wittgensteinian "hearing *as*" where metaphorical listening results in the "emergent property of the sound-as-heard" (SS 77). The anthropomorphization of musical sound is related to the cultural embeddedness of the listener, whose mind draws an analogy between sound and "vocal emotionality" (75). It is important to see that while this anthropomorphizing takes place on all three levels of the musical semiotic process–composing, the performing, and listening–we are specifically addressing the latter two at the moment: the subjectivity we are after "inhere[s] in the text of the work itself, as it is performed, inviting the listener's engagement in a manner that transforms his or her own subjectivity" (Cumming, ED 17).

It is the imaginary subjectivity in music that has been the cause of endowing music with mythical meaning in the (western) history of listening. Plato recognized the potentially dangerous power music can have over the mind,[14] but it was Augustine, who first problematized the Janus-faced subjectivity within music that may lead the listener either to salvation or ruin. It does not come as a surprise that, as Dolar observes, sticking to the Word, *logos*, is the key to face the right side of this duplicitous persona (50).

[14] See *Republic,* Book III (398-403).

Eero Tarasti's *Myth and Music*, one of the first works in the field of musical semiotics, adds a new ingredient to the music-myth conundrum. Proceeding from the perceived connection between mythical and musical thought attributed to the listening experience since the birth of aesthetics, Tarasti scrutinizes the logic of myth in the musico-semiotic process, emphasizing structure. He evokes the Lévi-Straussian view that the interconnectedness of musical and mythical discourse lies in the similarity of the functions they serve, especially in Western civilization, where

> [t]he heritage of myth was divided between two domains: music adopted the structural principles of myth while literature exploited mythical contents as a subject matter of narration. Therefore it was in the Western culture in which music in a certain sense occupied the place reserved for mythology in other societies. For us, listening to music assumes the same function as does listening to mythical stories in primitive societies. (Tarasti 33)

This theory may prove problematic on several grounds, yet it is also very illuminating. Two of the most immediate critical questions emerging are (a), if music inherited only the structural principles of myth, how can it stand in for the mythical stories that supposedly carried the content? and (b), isn't this model just another myth being created about music–actually turning musical experience itself into a Barthesian myth, which simultaneously directs toward and becomes emptied of meaning? At any rate, the Lévi-Strauss-based proposition demonstrates that the idea that music carries an inherent *mythopoetic* function still prevails in critical thinking. The reason for this is a convincing analogy between the semiotic functioning of myth and music, and that is where the music-myth parallel may provide a good starting point for our investigations. According

to Lévi-Strauss, while myth and the mythical experience is supposed to lead the participant to some kind of a truth, an essence, a mytheme makes no sense in itself but only in relation to its variations, creating a meaningful structure (Lévi-Strauss 210). Similarly, the elements of a musical piece gain their meaning within the system, the composition. Relating to each other, they create a web, a semiotic field that comes into play without external references. Remarkably, Lévi-Strauss uses the fugal structure to illustrate the resemblances between the two means of meaning-making. But this is only half of the story, as this introversive semiosis coexists with an extroversive one. Just as mythemes exist in their ethnographic context, musical compositions are created in relation to other musical instances (e.g., the sonata form), which are embedded in the musical repertoire. Music, like myth (and also music as myth), leads to one's innermost self in the sense that, through the dramatic play of the introversive and extroversive semioses, it conveys a meaning that cannot be fully expressed, only experienced.

After closer inspection, this model carries several implications for tackling the use of music in literature, especially in narrative fiction, where these two aspects (i.e., introversive and extroversive) of musical/mythological semioses can be brought into play. First, the claim that music represents a way of thinking in literature, as for instance Eric Prieto would suggest, is extended with a possible direction of that thinking: a mythical one (Prieto 98). Second, the mythical aspect creates a certain timelessness, in which the past is evoked in the present, chronology and linearity are cast away, providing a new logic to narrative, that is, a new rhythm. The third aspect that calls for attention is the question: if music took the structural principles of myth, making musical structure

mythical, is then mythical structure also essentially musical? Meaning: is every mythical narrative in some way inherently musical and *vice versa*?

It indeed seems to be the case with the 20th century musicalization of fiction, where structure often gets intertwined with subject matter, form with content, theory with praxis. While it would be impossible to argue for an overarching model (Tarasti himself limits his investigations to what he calls mythical music, a special brand, with overt mythical content), we will look at examples of modernist fiction that are musical and mythical from a semiotic point of view: novels, in which music and myth seem to be interconnected and which display how music and musical meaning-making may provide an alternative logic for narrative syntax–all three novels find this logic in the fugue. The statement that the function of musical experience replaced those of mythical stories in the modern world is problematic in itself, but Tarasti's model provides an exciting analogy to how musical structures in modernist fiction point at the very texture of the narrative, which thus becomes the subject matter of these texts.

2.2 *The Way of All Flesh*

Butler's novel "The Way of All Flesh," written between 1873 and 1884 but published only posthumously in 1903, is a pre-echo of the modernist musicalization and a showcase for the reconceptualization of the self that took place between romanticism and the modernist period, as described by Sypher.[15] Written in the Victorian period, the novel at first glance follows the traditional novel form, only with a satirical tone. However, as for the Victorian value system, it is dissected and discarded with a surgeon's precision, and

[15] See Chapter One.

so are the institutions that Butler investigates in the novel: the family, education, the Church of England, marriage, the justice system, and the art world. The methodical scrutiny of the novel evokes an interesting comparison to Huxley's *Point Counter Point*. As Huxley named Butler's anti-utopia, *Erewhon*, as the inspiration for his *Brave New World*, the *Way of All Flesh* is in many ways the *Erewhon* of *Point counter Point*.

A romanticizing tendency is perceptible in modernist writers' views on music– both in aesthetic and in semiotic terms. Their experimental musicalization coexists with a somewhat nostalgic, backward facing, romanticizing attitude, which is also discernible in their musical references. These romantic affinities create an exciting contrast with the existential questions of their time. Romantic aesthetics, which we will explore in detail in the next chapter, treated music as the way to the essence of the self, which itself dissolves via the musical experience. By the early twentieth century, one cannot talk about such an essence. These two poles, the aesthetic and the existential, repel each other and provide a philosophical tension within modernist musical narratives. We may speak of an aesthetic-existential projection of the acoustic self in this respect. Butler's novel provides an interesting middle ground between the romantic and the modernist conceptualization of the self, while also clearly distancing itself from contemporary utilitarian attitudes (as well as from romantic music). Depicting a reality distinctly different from the other two novels analyzed in this chapter, *The Way of All Flesh* presents an earlier point of the historical trajectory of the self, and a proto-modernist instance of the musicalization of fiction.

This Victorian *Candide* is about the life of young Ernest Pontifex, raised by a despotic father, Theobald, and a mother, Christina, whose primary function in the text is

to manipulate her husband. Ernest himself does not appear until chapter XXVIII; the previous chapters provide a detailed account of the earlier generations of his family. This scrupulous description of the protagonist's genealogy is not necessary for the story line, which would make sense without this thorough prelude, but gains functional importance for the plot and, as we will see, the musicality of the novel, so a brief summary is in order here.

Old Mr. Pontifex, the well-off carpenter of Paleham is the first member of the family to be introduced by the narrator, Edward Overton. When Overton's father describes old Pontifex as "not only an able man, but ... one of the ablest men that ever I knew" he gives rise to the young boy's wonder about the old man (Butler 3). We also learn that Old Pontifex was an amateur musician who built an organ for the church and a smaller one for himself and who also tried his hand in painting. His son, George, who takes after his authoritative mother rather than his father, gets into his uncle's publishing business in London early on in his life, thus exceeding his own family's rank, and eventually inheriting the whole company. Growing up to be a man without emotions, he becomes a ruthless father, who forces his son, Theobald, to become a clergyman, partially to further secure his own public image as the publisher of religious books. Theobald's upbringing and his inability to overcome his father's influence turns him into a prig and a father who is even more severe on his children, especially his first-born, Ernest, than his own father was on him. Theobald and Christina set out to forestall any sign of "self-will" (18) in their children's character, appropriately starting to whip Ernest from the age of two.

When Overton, who is Ernest's godfather and a childhood friend of Theobald, witnesses the cruel treatment of his godson, he distances himself from the family, seeing no chance for him to improve the child's position, yet not wishing to witness it. A change comes in Ernest's life when he leaves for a boarding school in Roughborough upon turning twelve. Although the headmaster, Dr. Skinner–a wonderfully suggestive name for a pedagogue–is as peremptory as Theobald, he at least does not employ physical punishment in his school. It is at this point that Theoblad's sister, Alethea, decides to put her services into the welfare of the child and undo the influence of his parents, whom she despises. She moves to Roughborough and starts working on Ernest's a more humanistic education for Ernest. Also, in an attempt to give him a project, she makes an agreement with him to build her an organ. The organ is emblematic of their relationship, as well as of their connection with Alethea's grandfather and Ernest's Great grandfather, old Mr. Pontifex. Overton points out that it is these two members of the family who inherited the good characteristics of the old man. While Alethea's project is cut short by her illness and subsequent death, she hurriedly makes a will, leaving all her money in the hands of Overton to hand it over to Ernest upon his twenty-eighth birthday without letting him know about his fortune beforehand. This way, godfather and godson's lives are again intertwined. Overton witnesses the impressionable Ernest's long line of struggles: getting ordained, becoming a religious fanatic, getting swindled out of his money by a fellow-curate, ending up in prison for an assault on a woman whom he thinks to be a prostitute, becoming estranged from his parents, and marrying Ellen who previously worked at his parents' house and who turns out to have become a lowlife alcoholic. While Overton, an astute bachelor, often gets irritated with his godson, he abides by his promise to Ernest's

aunt and keeps up with him. Their strongest tie is their admiration of what Alethea refers to as "the best music" (113).

When it turns out that Ernest's marriage with Ellen is void, as she was already married when uniting with him, Overton springs into action to save his godson. He helps Ernest place his two children with a decent working class family, he takes him on a trip to Italy, and teaches him accounting, offering him a job of taking care of 70,000 pounds sterling without letting him know that it is actually his own inheritance. Meanwhile, Ernest becomes a prolific writer. To Overton's dismay, however, he does not write literature but essays that are not too well-received except for his first volume, *Essays and Reviews*, which is published anonymously and becomes a moderate success. Ernest's answer to his own lack of critical acclaim is that "a younger generation will listen to him more willingly than the present" and, as Overton pronounces it, it is not only his views that can be blamed for this, but also his lack of making alliances in literary circles, which he, in his Othello-esque mind-set, "hates not wisely but too well" (340). This mind-set, as Overton declares at the end of his story, could not be understood by Ernest's father or grandfather, yet "those who know him intimately do not know that they wish him greatly different from what he actually is" (340). A quite ambiguous and vague final account, which leaves the reader as much in wonder as Overton himself was left by his father when describing Ernest's great grandfather along similar lines, not for what he is, as much as what he could (have) be(en).

Both Ernest's likeness to old Pontifex and the ambivalence of the characterization of the two touch upon the key issue of the novel: how human beings can become fully developed individuals in the light of (or even in spite of) their inheritance while also

depending on their capacity for adaptation. The life story narrated by Overton suggests that the combination of these two attributes in the right ratio enables human beings to achieve their potential. As for happiness, or even contentment, while being embedded in society? Well, that is the point where Butler's novel turns into a satire. *The Way of All Flesh* is as closely connected to 19th century realism as to Victorianism, but the novel also suggests that practically all Victorian values are false or have lost original meaningfulness. It is not access to society that the protagonist gains by inheriting money at the end, but the freedom to disregard that society. The Victorian hero ceases to be Victorian in that he does not care about his contemporaneous fabric, but unknowingly lives partially in the past (emblematized by Old Pontifex) and the future (via writing for future generations).

In its escape from the fatalistic logic of Darwinism, the novel shows that realism does not mean the precise reproduction of the surface of reality, as reality is now in the inherited features, and not visible.[16] Darwinsim for Butler is a framework in which one's inherited characteristics may be as evil as the congenital original sin of Christianity. Since Butler did not publish his novel due to the autobiographical elements in it, it was possibly also a personal quest for him to find a way out of this gridlock. Butler's central tropes for characterization tackle these issues in the narrative: fugue and crossing.

The word 'fugue' originates from the latin *fuga*, meaning 'flight' or 'escape'. The *Oxford Companion to Music* points out that fugue is not a rigid form or structure, but "a style of composition" with certain characteristics. Generally in a fugue "three or more voices … enter imitatively one after the other, each 'giving chase' to the preceding

[16] See: "Darwin among the Machines" and *Erewhon*. Butler is clearly struggling against what he perceives as a fatalism inherent in the Darwinian notion of evolution.

voice" ("fugue"). A fugue's exposition begins with the first voice introducing "the principal theme, known as the 'subject'. After this theme has been presented, the second voice enters, transposing the subject to the dominant; the dominant entry is called the 'answer'. The third voice enters with the original subject (in a different octave), and so on" ("fugue"). The exposition comes to a full circle "when each voice has presented the subject or answer," after which the fugue continues with the "alternating sequence of episodes and middle entries—the latter in related keys—and conclude[s] with a final entry in the tonic" (*OCM*). The terminology of this musical description showcases the tendency of anthropomorphization of musical notions/ideas and is suggestive of the shaping/pre-determination of musical experience. The network of metaphorical terms, such as 'voice', 'subject', and 'answer' echo the creation of a musical consciousness similar to the one described above in relation to the Judas Priest case.

The Way of All Flesh is not simply permeated with fugue in general, but specifically with Handelian fugue. Handel is Ernest's favorite composer well as Samuel Butler's himself. In an unpublished manuscript he writes: "[Handel] and his music have been the central fact in my life ever since I was old enough to know the existence of either music or life. All day long, whether I am writing or painting or walking - but always - I have his music in my head" (qtd Yeasted 23) The sense of Handel's importance is reinforced by the numerous references to Handel and his works in the novel. According to Overton, Ernest "worshipped Handel" and "liked Offenbach" (Butler 271). There are several references to Handel in the novel, whom Overton claims to represent music "of the highest class" (113). Ernest admits to Miss Skinner at one point towards the end of the novel that he is fond of "some kinds of music" and adds that he

"never did like modern music" (337). As to her question where he thinks modern music commenced, his answer is "with Sebastian Bach" (338).

One of the most important figures in Ernest's life is of course his aunt Alethea. Their taste is similar. When summing up her first meeting with Ernest in Roughborough, she exclaims, "He likes the best music" (112) and it is with her that Ernest shows the similarities of a principal fugal theme. No wonder that when asked by Overton to find a musical epitaph for Alethea, it is the principal subject from the *Six Fugues* by Handel:

Handel and fugue are key to the interpretation of the novel, both thematically and structurally, and Handelian fugue characterizes the logic of the narrative. According to the *Grove*,

> Handel's treatment of fugue is freer and less rigorous than Bach's: the part-writing (at least of the keyboard fugues) is often loosely handled, the counterpoint is sometimes allowed to relax into thematic statement accompanied by chordal texture, thematic statements are less recognizably grouped, episodes less clearly defined, thematic material less economically used. These characteristics have not universally been considered signs of inferiority: writing in 1789, Burney (*History*) called Handel 'perhaps the only great Fuguist exempt from pedantry'. Marpurg in his treatise on fugue (1753–4) subdivided the genre into strict (*fuga*

obligata) and free (*fuga libera* or *soluta*) which he associated, without expressing particular preference, with Bach and Handel respectively.[17]

Butler's choice of the Handelian fugue reflects a personal musical preference, but it also works for the purposes of the novel. Although there are several references to concrete works by Handel, the novel seems to follow the 'thinking' of a Handelian fugue, not the structure of a specific work. It is this logic behind the characters and their ideas, as well as their transformations into one another that provides the narrative syntax. Reading the text against a concrete composition would be forcing a pre-fabricated matrix on it; the characters and their ideas are instead the elements of a *fuga libera*, which encompasses four generations and about a hundred years of the Pontifex family. The analogy between a musical theme and the idea or ideas a character stands for is to be found in a description of Ernest in his youth: "Nor yet did he know that ideas, no less than the living beings in whose minds they arise, must be begotten by parents not very unlike themselves, the most original still differing but slightly from the parents that have given rise to them" (168). Right after this, the narrator Overton describes the logic of a fugue that overarches a century:

> Life is like a fugue, everything must grow out of the subject and there must be nothing new. Nor, again, did he see how hard it is to say where one idea ends and another begins, nor yet how closely this is paralleled in the difficulty of saying where a life begins or ends, or an action or indeed anything, there being an unity in spite of infinite multitude, and an infinite multitude in spite of unity. (168)

[17] From the entry "fugue" in *The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians, 2nd edition*.

But this in itself would be giving in to fate, which does not seem to be acceptable to either Overton or Butler. Heredity is one aspect of the human meaning-making, which– although it may show a limited amount of variation–will not in itself be responsible for all one's actions and characteristics in the Butlerian model. Throughout life, one becomes exposed (or transposed in more musical terms) to the other tone (counterpoint), as Ernest gets exposed to Alethea and Overton (overtone). Serving as an overtone, Overton tries to unsettle the preexisting and none too satisfying harmony within Ernest's family. Overton is a constant 'dominant' in the semiotic field, trying to "cross" Ernest. Also, Alethea, an earlier variation on the same subject that Ernest derives from (old Pontifex), "crosses" him to be more like he actually is, i.e., taking away the influence of the wrong type of crossing, as if in an attempt to re-graft a scion onto its original host.

As Overton explains, "all these things cross a man; whatever a man comes in contact with in any way forms a cross with him which will leave him better or worse, and the better things he is crossed with the more likely he is to live long and happily. All things must be crossed a little or they would cease to live..." (83). Strangely, it is actually his surprise inheritance that nearly kills Ernest. When he comes into age and inherits his aunt's money, he turns very feeble. Overton takes him to one of the "most eminent doctors in London," (291) who prescribes crossing as the right cure for Ernest.

> 'Cross him,' said the doctor, at once. 'Crossing is the great medical discovery of the age. Shake him out of himself by shaking something else into him.' … He continued: 'Seeing is a mode of touching, touching is a mode of feeding, feeding is a mode of assimilation, assimilation is a mode

> of recreation and reproduction, and this is crossing—shaking yourself into something else and something else into you.' (291-2)

Crossing with the right things, as well as an inherent affinity for harmony–and preferably for the music "of the highest class"–is the key for the self to succeed, suggests the novel. Yet, one also needs to recognize the shortcomings of the wrong voices, subjects, and thematic variations in one's own fugue. The two voices Ernest has to escape are those of his parents, Christina and Theobald. Christina's voice was already false when ensnaring Theobald into marriage, but is explicitly Siren-like when she uses it to emotionally blackmail and manipulate her son on several occasions. The voice of the father is of course hardly ever harmonious in the western literary canon, yet Theobald is such a negative character in the novel that he is simply described as someone who "hated music" (34). Ernest's flight (*fuga*) from these malign voices makes up the diegesis.

Although both Alethea and Overton play an important role in Ernest's escape from his family, the boy also successfully eludes being overly transposed by these two seemingly beneficial characters. Alethea, due to her early death, and Overton, in his ineffective attempts to shape Ernes's character, fail to fully realize their influence on Ernest. It is not entirely clear what Alethea's motivation is for becoming Ernest's benefactor besides getting even with her brother and sister-in-law, and it is solely through the filter of her admirer, Overton, that we get to know her. As for Overton, his relationship with Ernest may be a variation on the theme (a displacement) of his desire for Alethea and his rejected marriage offers (eight); his engagement with Ernest may be an attempt to gain mastery over his past failure. Thus, Overton has his own fugue that

remains unexplored in the novel. Ernest's luck is that no voices become stronger than his in his flight.

The voices of Alethea and Overton stand in for two forces in Ernest's subjectivity. Alethea's is a voice attempting to direct Ernest toward their common original theme (old Pontifex), i.e., she directs him toward self-sameness. Overton goes out of his way to persuade Ernest to try his pen in more popular genres, thus standing in for the contingent self. As discussed above, it is exactly the incompatibility of these two aspects of the self that create the energy and the tension that brings about the emergence of the acoustic self. Yet, we also saw that it is due to the impossibility of the acoustic self that culminates in the subsequent destruction of the self. Alethea must have seen their incompatibility when rejecting Overton eight times.

Ernest's luck is that he never gets to the primal scene of the drama of his subjectivity. His failure to bring his real self to the surface, to realize his abilities to the full extent, may be the only way to save his life. As we will see, this is not the case in the other two novels analyzed in this chapter, where the acoustic self does emerge and bring about the demise of the subject. Musicalization is closely related to death both in Woolf's and Huxley's novels. While *The Way of All Flesh* certainly does not have a happy ending, but rather an ironic one, Ernest is still better off at the end than "musicalized" characters usually are. Butler's "hero" does not succeed in changing his society, but remains an outsider to it. Nevertheless, he achieves a life of contentment. The acoustic self, although posed as a problem in the novel, is not fully realized. The other voices do not gain full control over Ernest's character, and so the drama of his subjectivity evades resulting in tragedy.

2.3 *The Waves*

Similarly to *The Way of All Flesh*, Woolf's *The Waves* employs the logic of the fugue as its structural principle. The novel is about the lives and friendship of six characters: Jinny, Susan, Rhoda, Louis, Neville, and Bernard. Through these characters' dramatic soliloquies, as Woolf referred to them (AWD 156), the reader learns about a more or less idyllic childhood in Elvedon where their friendship begins, the subsequent school years, their later meetings, and finally their getting older, as well as Rhoda's eventual suicide. Their life stories are told in nine parts broken by ten interludes that describe the waves, the course of the sun during a day, and the sound of the birds. These interludes provide a frame to the narrative and initiate a cyclical conception of time within the text, thus ritualizing it while also veiling it with a Schillerian "living wall," functioning like a dramatic chorus. The novel starts as follows:

> The sun had not yet risen. The sea was indistinguishable from the sky, except that the sea was slightly creased as if a cloth had wrinkles in it. Gradually as the sky whitened a dark line lay on the horizon dividing the sea from the sky and the grey cloth became barred with thick strokes moving, one after another, beneath the surface, following each other, pursuing each other, perpetually. (7)

Already in the first paragraph, the reader is promised a pursuit (*fuga*) which from the very beginning appears to work beyond the surface. With the development of the characters' voices, the fugue comes to light, revealing the undercurrents of their subjectivity behind their surface narratives. This unmasking is done by a seventh character, Percival, who,

although he has a central importance in the others' lives, does not speak in the novel and who, possibly due to a Forsterian influence, dies right in the middle of the narrative.[18]

Percival's death has a pivotal impact on the six characters' interconnected lives: The unity that they had possessed in his presence is broken, and they become unable to regain or relive their lost harmony. The parts after Percival's death are darker, emphasizing the incompleteness in the characters' consciousness both in the intra- and intersubjective spheres. In the final part, Bernard, who is a writerly figure in the narrative, fully takes over the narration and sums up the novel in his long, final monologue.

The six lives revealed by the six voices in the novel do not recount much factual information or too many events. It is rather impressions, sensations, and reflections that delineate the characters, who occasionally repeat each other's expressions, sometimes altering them. If character is the form of action, there is not much action here to rely on, and also the form is quite fluid. Actually, the characters seem to exist only in each others' light. In fact, in Bernard's final monologue, all six voices merge into one, and turn out to be aspects of his own character.

But is there a character at all here? Everyone in the novel is struggling to gain a self, but they are unable to do so. As it has been successfully shown by Makiko Minow-Pinkney in her *Virginia Woolf and the Problem of the Subject*, the interludes tell the story of the development of the subject from an "amorphous pre-subjectivity" (157) to the state of separation and difference, via acquiring language. However, as the interludes lead us through the course of a day, we see how Woolf moves away from linearity, bringing the subjects' trajectory to a full circle, where difference and separation gets dissolved, the

[18] Forster has a tendency of killing off his heroes somewhat unexpectedly in the middle of his novels. More on this in the following chapter.

day turns into night, colors and features merge into one another, and the sounds die away. The subjects fail to identify their essence. An apparent skepticism towards linearity is expressed in the interludes, and it is closely related to a skepticism towards language, and consequently towards the subject (as the subject as such only becomes possible through language and temporality), expressed by the characters.

It is Bernard, a writer, who is supposed to render the narrative meaningful, according to the other characters, and who mostly takes the role of the narrator in the second half of the novel. As Neville exclaims, "Let him describe what we have all seen, so that it becomes a sequence" (37). It is thus assigned to Bernard to create a sequence, a story, a meaning. The question "who am I?" (83, 291) is repeatedly asked by the characters, whose self-identification comes in different forms. Yet each attempt is related to language and difference: Louis says at one point, "I, and again I, and again I. Clear, firm, unequivocal, there it stands, my name" (167). Bernard asserts, "I am myself, not Neville" (240). Only Rhoda fails in this quest for carving out a separate self: "I am nobody. … This great company … has robbed me of my identity" (33). And later, "I am not here" (43). It is almost as if she were the blindspot from the beginning in Bernard's story, for as the characters themselves realize from an early point, "We are all phrases in Bernard's story" (70).

Yet, Bernard himself is a character in someone else's story: he evokes a "lady [sitting] between the two long windows, writing" (17)–maybe the implied author, the consciousness behind/within the novel. As a metanarrative marker inscribed within a novel that is seeking to find itself and its meaning, this female writer is unweaving Bernard's story by pointing to its loose ends, the relativity of signification. In a way

Rhoda and this enigmatic woman are the depositories of the knowledge that neither Bernard nor the reader is willing to accept. They know what is at the bottom of things and it is that there is no bottom. Bernard has to face that he may be a phrase in someone else's story, the author of which is a phrase in someone else's.

All subjectivities in the text get relativized, are floating, and Bernard himself proves to be highly skeptical towards narrative, language and meaning. He says, "I have filled innumerable notebooks with phrases to be used when I have found the true story, the one story to which all these phrases refer. But I have never found that story. And I begin to ask, Are there stories?" (187) and somewhere else: "There is no stability in this world. Who is to say what meaning is there in anything? Who is to foretell the flight of a word? It is a balloon that sails over tree-tops," (134) and later, "speech is false" (138).

A fluidity of the selves ensue from this fluidity of meaning. Bernard notes, "To be myself … I need the illumination of other peoples' eyes, and therefore cannot be entirely sure what is my self. … I have been traversing the sunless territory of non-identity" (116). This non-identity is exposed through the multiplicity of identity: "What I call 'my life,' it is not one life that I look back upon; I am not one person; I am many people; I do not altogether know who I am - Jinny, Susan, Neville, Rhoda, or Louis: or how to distinguish my life from theirs" (276). This reaches a point where Bernard calls himself a man without a self, and has to face the question, "But how to describe the world seen without a self?" (287). There are no words.

What does the novel gain from this negativity, the dismantling of subjectivity? The seventh character, Percival, who is referred to as a "hero" by the other characters, might be of help here. He is not only the object of desire in the text, but he is *eros*

himself. As in Hesiod, Eros is the offspring of chaos. With Percival's appearance, "the reign of Chaos is over" as Neville, who is deeply in love with him, observes, "He has imposed order," (122) Neville continues. Also, "[h]e is the first to detect insincerity," (39) he is continually connected to truth, desire, lack, and poetry, that is, a highly *ero*tic presence in the philosophical sense of the word. He is the bridge among the other characters, he provides the structure of their story – and here is where we arrive at music again.

Woolf writes in her diary that it was while she was listening to a Beethoven quartet that she decided to merge all the previous voices in Bernard's final monologue (Woolf, AWD 159). Elicia Clements, among other critics, identifies Beethoven's String Quartet in B-flat Major, Opus 130 with its original last movement, *Die Grosse Fuge*, Opus 133, as the intertext of *The Waves* (Beethoven agreed to remove *Die Grosse Fuge* and write a new last movement due to the fugue's bad reception). Clements provides a fine analysis of the connection between the quartet and the novel, identifying a correspondence between each movement of the quartet and one of the characters (Clements 168). Although the analysis is intriguing, especially in its recognition of the twofold function of Woolf's musicalization being "as much about reconstituting human interaction as it is about formulating new narrative structures" (162), I feel that the treatment of the interrrelations between the quartet and the novel remain more intertextual than intermedial. The exact identification of each character with a movement of the Beethoven quartet makes the interpretation a bit less fluid than the novel allows for. Also, identifying the revised last movement of the quartet (one that is missing from the novel according to Clements) with Percival limits his central role in the novel.

Besides this, her analysis does not persuasively account for the discrepancy between the nine parts of the novel and the six (plus one) movements of the quartet.

Beethoven's late quartet, which is as experimental as *The Waves*, seems to have an important role in the writing of the novel, but I'd suggest that instead of slavishly imitating Beethoven's musical texture and weaving a fictional texture that is in one-to-one correlation with it, Woolf, similarly to Butler, aimed to employ the quartet's logic in her work. As Prieto points out, music offers an alternative logic to represent reality and the working of the human mind in modernist fiction. While the established ways of representation are recognized as no longer adequate, music "suggests ways to bring narrative form into line with a search for truth that relies on perfecting the representation of thought" (Prieto 64). This implies the rethinking of the very texture of narrative, which is one of the keys to modernist musicalization. The self-reflexivity of Woolf's novel along with the thematization of this issue through Bernard's observations about writing, illuminate how the form and the texture of the novel enact its content. On a similar note to Woolf's letter to Ethel Smyth, in which she claims to have been writing *The Waves* "to a rhythm, and not to a plot" (LVW 204), Bernard in the novel claims that "rhythm is the main thing in writing" (79). The structure of the novel, and the final fugue gets illuminated when he exclaims,

> Faces recur, faces and faces--they press their beauty to the walls of my bubble--Neville, Susan, Louis, Jinny, Rhoda and a thousand others. How impossible to order them rightly; to detach one separately, or to give the effect of the whole--again like music. What a symphony with its concord and its discord, and its tunes on top and its complicated bass beneath, then

> grew up! Each played his own tune, fiddle, flute, trumpet, drum or whatever the instrument might be. (256)

It is here that mythical semiosis comes into the picture. As the *Grosse Fuge* brings together the voices of the previous movements, Bernard's monologue brings together the voices of the narrative, which do not signify without each other. Similarly to mythemes that do not carry meaning in themselves, it is these voices' relationships to each other that create the possibility of a meaningful structure. In a final (and futile) attempt to generate meaning, the final monologue – Bernard's *Grosse Fuge* – enacts the ritual: the voices are woven together through repetition and variation. But what happens instead of nailing a meaning down is that the monologue leaves the reader exactly with the lack of such a solidified meaning.

Percival, this mythical, heroic, and *Ero*tic character is the one who holds the six characters/voices together. His pointless death breaks up their unity, but also seems to show that there is no real essence behind the veil of representation: not only him, all of them are dead. It is Bernard who creates all these characters while embarking on an internal and infernal journey, and–similar to Odysseus, who also evokes and then return the dead to a pool–he eventually lets them return to oblivion. He says about Louis, "Suddenly the sense of what people are leaves one. I return him to the pool where he will acquire luster" (244). Percival is the blood the characters need to drink to come to life. They all talk about him. A mythical layer opens up through him, whose name, as Maria DiBattista observes, "denotes in its original French, to pierce the veil (perce-voile)" (152), the veil of representation, language, consciousness, and the everyday.

A musico-mythological reading offers itself. Percival, who is necessary to bring the voices together, dies an ironically pointless death in India. His death has strong effect on the characters' lives. Neville claims, "without Percival, there is no solidity. We are silhouettes, hollow phantoms moving mistily without a background" (122). Louis a little later observes that Percival is the one "who makes us aware that these attempts to say, 'I am this, I am that,' which we make coming together, like separated parts of one body and soul, are false" (137). The fugal logic shows how the self becomes a myth, and ceases to carry meaning any longer. Bernard also realizes this: "This difference we make so much of, this identity we so feverishly cherish, was overcome. … Here on my brow is the blow I got when Percival fell" (289).

Through his death, Percival becomes a lack; through his silence, he overcomes language. However, this mythical piercer of veils also cuts through a myth–that of the self–revealing it to be an emptied-out form in the Barthesian sense.[19] His presence/absence shows that there is no self one can speak of. The self dissolves in the song of the chorus. In Bernard's words: "And I am so made, that, while I hear one or two distinct melodies, such as Louis sings, or Neville, I am also drawn irresistibly to the sound of the chorus chanting its old, chanting its almost wordless, almost senseless song that comes across courts at night…" (246). Thus, Woolf as a Barthesian mythologist deconstructs the myth of the self through music.

The structure of the self, the structure of Beethoven's *Grosse Fuge*, the structure of the novel: all juxtaposed in the text's self-reflexive search for meaning and truth. However, as the text eventually reveals a hollow center, the emphasis shifts to the

[19] See Barthes, "Myth Today" (113).

structure itself and the telling becomes its own subject matter. Bernard's effort to turn "prose into poetry" (263) successfully suspends temporality and cuts through the falseness of representation via evoking musical semiosis. Yet, the novel's negation of the self turns into a self-negation, which peaks in Rhoda's statement, "I have no face" (223). This is a symbolic suicide (heralding her actual suicide), which also points out that each utterance in the search for truth kills a part of one's self: each statement distances one from oneself and from the possibility of self-sameness. If there is meaning at all, it is fleeting–something to which one cannot give voice again (re-present). Bernard's direct address to the narratee enrolls the reader/listener in a symbolic suicide pact: his statement: "I am you" (289) turns the reading-listening experience around. Having created a consciousness in the text (and subsequently being shaped by it, as it was shown earlier in this chapter), the reading-listening subject loses itself as her/his basis for identification (the Other) is erased. The reader-listener thus joins a semiotic game that kills the self and in which each statement is a stone that is being planted in one's pocket while walking into the waves.

2.4 *Point Counter Point*

A metafictional agent, a writer figure, appears in Huxley's *Point Counter Point* as well, yet, as opposed to in *The Waves*, the function of such a character does not remain enigmatic. Philip Quarles, an experimental and somewhat muddled writer, provides the program for the novel while reflecting on the possibilities of the "musicalization of fiction" in his notebook, extracts of which make up most of Chapter XXII:

> The musicalization of fiction. Not in the symbolist way, by subordinating sense to sound. (*Pleuvent les bleus baisers des astres taciturnes*. Mere glossolalia). But on a large scale, in the construction. Meditate on Beethoven. The changes of moods, the abrupt transitions. (Majesty alternating with a joke, for example, in the first movement of the B flat major quartet. Comedy suddenly hinting at prodigious and tragic solemnities in the scherzo of the C sharp minor quartet.) (295-6)

Interestingly enough, Philip evokes Beethoven's two late string quartets, No. 13 and 14, the former being exactly the one that played such a pivotal role in constructing *The Waves*. Then, he goes on to further elaborate the experiment:

> More interesting still the modulations, not merely from one key to another, but from mood to mood. A theme is stated, then developed, pushed out of shape, imperceptibly deformed, until, though still recognizably the same, it has become quite different. In sets of variations the process is carried a step further. Those incredible Diabelli variations, for example. The whole range of thought and feeling, yet all in organic relation to a ridiculous little waltz tune. Get this into a novel. How? (296)

Huxley's novel, which is a bricolage of London's upper and upper-middle class in the 1920's, manifests clear affinities with the literary experiments of its diegetic writer figure. Phillip's own concerns with the structure of the novel he is to write are also the central issues of *Point Counter Point*: they become the warp and the weft of its self-reflexive texture. Philip, whose wife gets estranged from him exactly because of his detachment from his own life, sets out to write a novel in which the characters and

situations are variations on a theme or an idea. He is a character in a novel that exhibits a similar disposition towards its characters as its writer figure towards his own.

However, there is a price a novel has to pay to become a "novel of ideas," as the characters are being turned into a "mouthpiece" for an idea, as Philip observes (297). He opines that this approach may be artistically "feasible" as long as the "theories are rationalizations of sentiments, instincts, dispositions of soul," yet reading *Point Counter Point* makes the reader realize that it is not the characters themselves who become "slightly monstrous," (297) but also their treatment by the consciousness within or behind the novel–may it be the narrator or the implied author. This makes the narrative a bumpy read, due to the continual disassociation from the narrator's surgical treatment of the fictional (and not too persuasively human) creatures. *Point Counter Point* provides the panoramic view of a universal novel, yet it offers not one single character that the reader would want to identify with. Nevertheless, it is part of Huxley's craft that the reader has to identify with their dilemmas and existential problems. It is a satire without forgiveness. Yet, Huxley's novel works. This kaleidoscopic depiction of a "whole range of thought and feeling" (295) via its plethora of characters does reach an organicism.

The material for this "human fugue" (23) is provided by London and the decadent life of its aristocracy. From the failing relationship of Marjorie Carling and Walter Bidlake, whose dialogue opens the novel, through the disintegration of Elinor and Philip Quarles' marriage and the loss of their child, to Lucy Tantamount's zealous pursuit of pleasure and to the sensual artist John Bidlake's denial of his aging and illness, each parallel plot and character is a study on the possibility of working one's way through the matrix of the human condition that is based on the opposing drives of passion and reason.

With different degrees of egotism ascribed to each of the characters, they become possible variations of and solutions to the same puzzle. However, instead of solutions they find escape routes at best: science for Lord Edward Tantamount, who totally ignores the world around himself; perversion for Denis Burlap, the literary editor and hagiographer, who specializes in deflowering religious spinsters; subversive social action, like fascism for the politician Everard Webley, anarchism for Lord Tantamount's assistant, Illidge; and nihilism for Maurice Spandrell, whose Dorian Gray-like adventures make him one of the most wonderfully portrayed dandies in English literature. Spandrell makes an attempt toward spirituality, but ends up instead in a quite theatrical suicide instead.

The only characters that provide a coherent and livable value system are the artist Mark Rampion[20] and his wife, Mary. Rampion is ranting about intellectualism, which he thinks destroyed humanity, throughout the novel. His search for truth is an attempt to overcome the philosophical, artistic, and scientific overemphasis on reason, which he dates back to the appearance of Christianity. He pronounces the human situation as standing "on a tightrope, walking delicately, equilibrated, with mind and consciousness and spirit at one end of his balancing pole and body and instinct and all that's unconscious an earthy and mysterious at the other" (408-9). What tipped the human experience out of balance, according to Rampion, is the attempt to leave the bodily behind. The magnification of reason, along with abstraction and representation, resulted in a separation from real experience, from our self. These values appear as absolute, obscuring what he believes to be the only absolute that can be reached, which is "[t]he

[20] Several critics point out the character's similarity to D. H. Lawrence. See, e.g., Jerome Meckier, *Aldous Huxley: Modern Satirical Novelist of Ideas*, Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2006, 19.

absoluteness of perfect relativity" (409). Rampion's explanations provide a focal point to the montage of the characters and parallel plots that make up the novel. The title, *Point Counter Point*, already promises voices or melodies contrasted against one another, and the novel's epigraph by Fulke Greville defines the main issue that is at stake:

> Oh, wearisome condition of humanity!
> Born under one law, to another bound,
> Vainly begot and yet forbidden vanity:
> Created sick, commanded to be sound.
> What meaneth Nature by these diverse laws—
> Passion and reason, self-division's cause?

Ironically enough, the one who provides the only viable answer to the paradox (although his answer is a paradox in itself: the absoluteness of perfect relativity) denounces literature and linguistic representation: "Words, words, words, they shut one off from the universe. Three-quarters of the time one's never in contact with things, only with the beastly words that stand for them. And often not even with those–only with some poet's damned metaphorical rigmarole about a thing" (212).

Rampion, who is foremost a painter, uses his art as an alternative to language. While the Rampions are the only positive characters in the novel, and through them Huxley leaves a little door open for the possibility of working human relationships through them, it is important to note that Rampion, who comes from a working class family, is completely independent from the hardships of everyday life and society through his marriage to the aristocratic Mary. Similarly to Ernest Pontifex, he finds contentment (perhaps even more than Butler's protagonist), but his ideas come from a safe position located within the (financial) framework he is so outspoken against.

It is interesting to see that while in *The Waves* it is the writer character, Bernard, who pronounces that "speech is false" in conclusion of his meditations on language and the (im)possibility of stories, it is a painter who addresses the issue here, arriving at similar results. In Huxley's novel, the painter problematizes language, while the writer, as quoted above, is busy trying to musicalize fiction. Similarly to the way in which the lady writing between the two long windows relativizes Bernard's position as the writer within *The Waves*, Rampion, this card-carrying advocate of the *absoluteness of perfect relativity*, undermines Quarles' attempt at "telling a story" (296). What Quarles' musicalization may reveal, Rampion knows already: *logos* separates us from ourselves. His art, painting, reveals this as much as music does–the sister arts mirror each others' shortcomings. The interrelations of the three traditional art forms–painting, music, and poetry–will be discussed more thoroughly in the following chapters, and a survey of the aesthetic tradition in Chapter Three will put our inquiries in a wider perspective, but this chapter focuses more specifically on music, and the fugue.

The reader is immersed into a musical experience early on in *Point Counter Point*. The second through the fourth chapters take place at one of Lady Edward Tantamounts' musical parties, where the orchestra plays Bach's "Suite in B-minor." The musical sensibility of the narrative is introduced through a detailed *ekphrastic* description of Bach's work. The narrator describes the Sarabande as a "slow and lovely meditation on the beauty (in spite of all the squalor and stupidity), the profound goodness (in spite of all the evil), the oneness (in spite of such bewildering diversity) of the world" (24). The musical *ekphrasis* is practically setting forth the scope of the novel itself, in which

musical thought is employed to explore "a beauty, a goodness, a unity that no intellectual research can discover, that analysis dispels" (24).

Yet, in the beginning of chapter three, with the music still playing, we find ourselves two floors higher in the Tantamount house, where Lord Tantamount is working on his biological experiments. Music and science (analysis) are intertwined, they seem to be two sides of the same coin, or rather two languages that can lead one into thinking that we can embrace some kind of a great pattern. Similar to Philip Quarles, Lord Tantamount is also working on the issue of organicism in his experiments, by cutting off the tail-bud of a newt and trying to reattach it as a limb. The result is monstrosity, as in the case of the novel's characters: "They manufactured a monster with a tail where an arm should have been" (31).

The narrator is well aware of the subjective element within the listening experience; besides the eloquent descriptions of the music, the individual experiences of the listening subjects are accounted for. While the narrator hears a meditation on truth and beauty in the Bach piece, Fanny Logan, in tears, "abandon[s] herself wholeheartedly to it" and lets it "run smoothly but irresistibly through all the labyrinthine intricacies of her being" (25). The ecstatic experience evokes death (that of her late husband) and also consolation, creating a "sad and musical happiness" (25) in her.

Music is heard as a quest for or meditation on truth and beauty, both of which are recurring motifs in the novels dealt with in this chapter. Truth is what the quest for self-sameness is seeking, and beauty appears as the measure of a life worth living. Both truth and beauty are connected to death in this context. Total self-sameness is the implosion of the subject and beauty's worth lies to a great extent in its evanescence. What happens to

Fanny here, staying within the limits of concert-hall etiquette, anticipates the last scene of the novel, where the musical experience, as a search for truth (via beauty), culminates in the actual death of a character. Fanny's *petit mort*, however, is a clear illustration of how the musical utterance pierces through the subject in an acoustic coitus, through which "her body shook and swayed in time with the pulse and undulation of the melody" (26) that is emanated by the "swan-like undulation of the loins" (25) of Tolley, the young conductor. The listening experience not only becomes a subjective experience in this scene, but also the locus of the construction of the listening subject, or in our terminology, the acoustic self. While culturally accepted and controlled listening allows for limited portions of ecstasy, at the root of the experience is music's ability to bring forth a complete *ekstasis*, a complete elimination of the self.

This self-elimination (in both senses) takes place in the last chapter, when Maurice Spandrell invites the Rampions over to prove the existence of God to them, via playing Beethoven's "A-minor quartet" on his newly acquired gramophone. The proof, he thinks, would bring about his own salvation from his nihilism and the pointlessness of his life. Again, Huxley deploys musical ekphrasis–the device carries its own failure, as it speaks as much about its own impossibility as about the object that is being *spoken out*:

> The ineffable peace persisted; but it was no longer the peace of covalescence and passivity. It quivered, it was alive, it seemed to grow and intensify itself, it became an active calm, an almost passionate serenity. The miraculous paradox of eternal life and eternal repose was musically realized.

> They listened, almost holding their breaths. Spandrell looked exultantly at his guest. His own doubts had vanished. How could one fail to believe in something that was there, which manifestly existed?

However, Rampion is not fully convinced, and the experiment takes an unexpected turn:

> Mark Rampion nodded, 'Almost thou persuadest me,' he whispered. 'But it's *too* good.'
>
> 'How can anything be too good?'
>
> 'Not human. If it lasted, you'd cease to be a man. You'd die.' (436)

And that is exactly what happens. There is a knock on the door, Spandrell goes to answer it, and Beethoven's music becomes the soundtrack of the murder/suicide that he has orchestrated for himself. Music and death are directly juxtaposed in this strange finale: While the Rampions and the three murderers are standing over the dying Spandrell's body a couple of minutes later, the music ends, and there is only the "scratching of the needle on the revolving disc" (437) to be heard. Life and music fade away simultaneously. Interestingly enough, the rest is not silence, but noise. The scene leaves the reader with several questions, none of which can be definitively answered. What if Rampion had approved of Spandrel's proof? Was there a real chance of salvation or is it something else that is at stake here? Why is it music that Spandrel has to rely on? And more specifically, why Beethoven?

Huxley leaves these questions open, and for a good reason: the duality in musical semiosis may serve as a model for the search for truth, but it cannot provide the truth, or give definitive answers. It may actually point at the fact that there are no answers. An interesting tension comes to the surface from the novels studied in this chapter. In

modernist musicalization, a romantic view on music remains in order, but the medium is emptied of its romantic task as it cannot fulfill the aesthetic role that had been assigned to it from Novalis, through Schopenhauer, to Nietzsche: reaching the essence of life. Still, there is at least one main development since romanticism: these novels clearly show that, as opposed to the romantic view, music cannot lead to one's essence anymore, and that it is not music's fault. While characters do die and subjectivities do dissolve in romantic musical fiction–for instance that of E. T. A. Hofmann–there the *individuum* seems to dissolve into the primal flow of life, an eternal (Dionysiac) self-sameness, whereas music in modernism cannot serve as a bridge between the two aspects of the self, which thus remain irreconcilable. The possibility to reach the self as such is put into question, and consequently so is the possibility of there being a self. We witness what Sypher termed the loss of the self–De Quincey already suspected it, Butler pre-echoed it, but it only became clear with the rise of the sensibilities of modernism when the man without qualities overtook the role of the romantic hero.

This chapter started out with questions about myth, which proves to be relevant to musical fiction in two respects: due to the similarity between mythical and musical semiosis, and also insofar as it shows how music and the self are both in a way represent a Barthesian myth: Music shows how the notion of the self is a myth that is constructed by language and ideology. However, it is also important to see that this myth is also very "real," as the deaths of Belknap and Vance clearly show. The real power of music is undeniable, and it is connected to *ekstasis*, which makes the experience impossible to fully account for. This is why music is connected to sexuality, transcendence, death, and suicide in these novels. While this chapter treats texts that employ the logic of the fugue,

the question of death became more and more connected to Beethoven in the latter two novels. Beethoven's oeuvre, which is actually host for the birth of the romantic myth of music, seems to be very strongly connected with death in modernist musical fiction. The next chapter will thus explore the following issues: the romantic aesthetics of music, Beethoven, and death.

The three novels discussed in this chapter use fugal technique to explore the inner workings of human subjectivity. The Butlerian fugue, *The Way of All Flesh*, maintains a traditional novel form, and it succeeds, since Butler's idea is to show aspects of the characters' subjectivity in its linearity, through generations. The narrative pattern and temporality remain quite intact in this intermedial experiment, and it is the characterization that is most enriched by the text's musicality. Also, the novel serves as a foil to emphasize the modernist aspects of musicalization that are characteristic of the other two texts, including their treatment of temporality, narrative plot and structure, and perhaps most significantly their narrative self-reflexivity. Yet another difference is that while Butler does not question the possibility of an inherent self-sameness, there is almost no question about the lack of it by Woolf and Huxley. The emphasis on the analogy between the extroversive aspect of musical semiosis and *principium individuationis* is brought to light in the two modernist novels, exposing uncomfortable qualities and ideology within and without a self. We will also see more of this side of music in the novels studied in the following chapters.

Chapter Three

Does Beethoven Kill?

The connection between Beethoven and death in modernist musical fiction has as much to do with the history of listening to Beethoven as with the composer's works themselves. The deaths related to Beethoven in *The Waves* and *Point Counter Point* (as we saw in the previous chapter), and the two novels to be addressed in this chapter, Forster's *A Room With a View* and *Howards End*, carry important philosophical concerns that stem from this history. In the movie adaptation of *Howards End*, the main characters attend a lecture on Beethoven at the Ethical Society, not a concert as in the novel itself. The title of the lecture is "Music and Meaning." In a way, the novels addressed in this chapter undertake a similar move: they are adaptations of a Beethoven composition that do not only explore the applicability of Beethoven in fictional texts, but also tackle the question of music and meaning. The treatment of musical meaning at the beginning of the twentieth century, as well as at the beginning of the twenty-first for that matter, has been largely shaped by the aesthetic tradition that grew out of German romanticism. What is at stake–both in the romantic tradition and in these novels–is the hierarchy of the different arts, and their respective roles, especially that of music, in the quest for the Real, an unmediated experience of the world. In musical narratives, these questions become very much a question of life and death for the self. The use and abuse of Beethoven in this quest is what this chapter is after.

3.1 Absolute Music and the Self – Aesthetic Considerations

In order to understand the romantic shift in the aesthetic reception of music, one needs to consider a previous shift, concomitant with the birth of German aesthetics. Lessing's *Laocoön* is one of the key texts of the period. What made *Laocoön* especially influential was that Lessing reconsidered the notion of imitation and freed poetry and painting from their forced alliance, which grew out of Horace's *ut pictura poesis*. Lessing opened the gates to romanticism's *ut musica poesis.*[21] The *Laocoön*, however, produced its effect on the re-evaluation of music indirectly, as Lessing does not talk directly about music in the essay. Literary historians assume that he originally planned to write a second and a third part to *Laocoön*, which would have addressed the topic of music (Richter 156). Nonetheless, his analysis of the differences between poetry and painting opened up these two domains of art for separate investigations through which the relation between poetry and music could be reconsidered, based on their spatio-temporal dimensions and their semiotic characteristics.

Besides Horace's Ars Poetica, Lessing also revisits Aristotle's notion of *mimesis*. Neither Lessing, nor the Romanticists deny the presence of *mimesis* within the artistic process; it is rather a radical reconsideration of the significance of *mimesis* within that process that takes place during the period.[22] For Aristotle, the purpose of art–i.e., imitation–lies in the "delight in viewing the most accurate possible images of objects which in themselves cause distress when we see them" (6). The key for Aristotle is the pleasure in understanding, which is inherent to all humans (although to different degrees),

[21] See more on this process in M. H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition, 88.

[22] For an example, see: A. W. Schlegel, "Theory of Art," in Jochen Schulte-Sasse, *Theory as Practice: A Critical Anthology of Early German Romantic Writings* (Minneapolis-London: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 194-226, 212.

and which is “the reason why people take delight in seeing images; what happens is that as they view them they come to understand and work out what each thing is” (7). As opposed to understanding, Lessing emphasizes the importance of beauty and the free play of imagination within the aesthetic process. He arrives at these aspects via the process of signification. While painting uses “figures and colors in space,” poetry utilizes “sound in time” (Lessing 81). As signs in painting are “arranged together side by side” they are fit to “express only objects” that exist thus side by side,” while poetry, in which signs “succeed each other” are capable to “express only subjects” that “succeed each other” (81). Lessing calls the subjects of painting ‘bodies’, and those of poetry ‘actions’. Nevertheless, bodies do not exist purely in space, nor actions only in time, and both the painter and the poet have the means to reach into each others’ realm. In the case of painting, “bodies exist not in space alone, but also in time. They continue, and may appear differently at every moment and stand in different relations” (81). Each moment is in a cause-and-effect relation with the preceding and the subsequent one. “Consequently,” continues Lessing, “painting can also imitate actions, but only by way of suggestion through bodies” (81). There is a tension in the relation of bodies, which produces or rather suggests action. As for poetry, it is clear that actions do not exist only in themselves either, but they “must attain to certain things or persons” (81). If we consider these things or persons as bodies, argues Lessing, we see how bodies enter into the realm of poetry. While painting describes deeds through the suggestion of action, poetry paints bodies through the description of action.

For both painting and poetry there is an important focal point through which the above-described phenomena are achieved. In the case of painting it is what Lessing

describes as the pregnant moment: “Painting, in her coexisting compositions, can use only one single moment of the action, and must therefore choose the most pregnant, from which what precedes and follows will be most easily apprehended” (81). Poetry, in turn, needs a certain perspective to depict bodies. As its signs work through the succession of time, the medium can represent only one single quality or property of the given body at a time. Poetry has to choose the most significant characteristic or “the most living picture of the body on that side from which she is regarding it,” that is, from the perspective the poet chooses for depicting the actions (81).

The most important thing for the painter is to find a moment that is about to overflow with action, while the poet has to find the one aspect that enriches the text to become a poetic picture. In both cases “that alone is significant and fruitful which gives free play to the imagination” (37). And this is the kernel of Lessing’s view on the purpose of art. While he asserts that the ultimate goal of the sciences is truth, art functions within the domain of beauty. Beauty has an ethical value for Lessing in that it shapes the thinking and value judgments of people. Lessing stands closer to Plato than Aristotle in this respect, as his ethics are grounded on beauty, which is the “first law of art” (37), and which can be reached through freedom and imagination, or the freedom of imagination. This very idea elevates poetry above painting in Lessing’s aesthetics:

> Unquestionably; what we find beautiful in a work of art is not found beautiful by the eye, but by our imagination through the eye, the picture in question may therefore be called up in our imagination by arbitrary or natural signs. (53)

Painting works with natural signs, such as figure and color, while poetry works with words, which are arbitrary signs. The poet, explains Lessing, aims at making "the ideas awakened by him within us living tings" in a way that we fully realize "true sensuous impressions" (87) of the represented subject matter, while also losing our consciousness regarding the means through which this effect is achieved. The means are the poet's words, arbitrary signs, out of which beauty is created through the work of imagination. As opposed to the poet, the painter has an object or model directly in front of her/himself. The natural signs that the painter works with do not differ from this model insofar as they both evoke sensuous impressions; therefore the free play of imagination is not invoked to the same degree as in the case of poetry.

3.1.1 Novalis

Romanticism elaborated on the tendencies expressed in *Laocoön* and centered its attention on the freedom and imagination of the artist, whose inner feelings find external expression in the artwork. Expression became the core of the artistic process and imitation as the purpose of art was rejected. A. W. Schlegel called romantic art "the eternal mode of symbolizing: we either seek an outer covering for something spiritual, or we draw something external over the invisibly inner" (qtd Abrams 90). Novalis went even further: for him, art was more real than the perceptible world: "Poesy is the representation of the spirit, of the inner world in its totality. Even its medium, words, indicates this, for they are the outer revelation of that inner realm" (Abrams 90). This idea later becomes pivotal in Schopenhauer's and Wagner's thinking, in which the physical world is considered an illusion. The only medium that is capable of an

expression of the inner realm is the art form that is a fully self-contained system, one which had always been questioning art as *mimesis*: music. It is no surprise then that music plays a crucial role in Novalis' theory.

Novalis' aesthetics is based on his critique of Fichte. While Fichte's ego-centric philosophy claims that the subject defines its own essence through its actions, Novalis argues that the subject is not capable of accurately defining itself, as its self-definition will never be identical with the essence thus pronounced. The subject is only capable to create fictions of itself. Any real contact with its essence is possible only through *Gefühl*, or feeling, which is beyond reason. Fictions about the subject can, however, be rewritten via the work of the poet, through *Poesie*.[23]

The working of *Poesie* is based on Novalis' theory of language. He detects two forces present within language: one he names the 'scholastic', which is based on logic and wants to solidify meaning, the other is the 'poet', which promotes change and arbitrariness. Neither of the two can fully achieve its aim and this inner tension between fixity and arbitrariness provides the energy of language. The 'poet' provides the musicality in language.

Novalis compares music to mathematics, in that they are both self-referential systems which do not need to refer to the external world–an important comparison that reappears in Lévi-Strauss' *Mythologiques* and certain schools of music theory. Music, for Novalis, becomes the metaphor for the world, the universe, and, due to its self-referential absoluteness, also the model of *Poesie*. As James Hodkinson explains,

[23] This summary of Novalis' theories is based on: James Hodkinson, "The Cosmic-Symphonic: Novalis, Music, and Universal Discourse," in S. Donovan and R. Elliott (eds), *Music and Literature in German Romanticism*, (Rochester, N. Y.: Camden House, 2004), 13-26.

> Novalis conceives of music as escaping the 'reflexivity' of language, and the resultant, apparently absolute, properties bring a feeling of wholeness to the listener: such an expressive structure cannot be understood theoretically, but rather on the level of non-reflexive feeling. (15)

Thus music evokes *Gefühl*, the only possibility of self-recognition. The process works through rhythm, which provides "points of transition between differing melodic and harmonic structures" thus constituting the "speculative dimension" of music (Hodkinson 15). Novalis' *Poesie* works through the musicality of language. The rhythm of language provides similar points of transition to that of music, through which the relationship between the sign and the signified as well as the 'I' and the 'other' can be explored or challenged. Hence, music and poetry become sister arts.

As music does not have references to the external world of objects, it is the perfect medium to express the artist's inner feelings. It follows that music is the ideal form of art and that therefore all arts should strive towards music, the ultimate form of *Poesie*. Music becomes the measure of all arts because of its independence from the outside world. Both E. T. A. Hoffmann and Wagner, two significant influences on modernist literature, see Beethoven's music as the epitome of this freedom and absoluteness.

3.1.2 E. T. A. Hoffmann

E. T. A. Hoffmann, who himself wrote several short stories in which he experimented with the interrelations of music and language, wrote a review of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony in the year of its publication that became a manifesto for romantic music. Hoffmann immediately recognized the composition as one of the most significant pieces written by the composer and as the highest achievement of music as the purely romantic art. In his review, Hoffmann confirms that instrumental music gains its purity through being freed from everything that is outside itself:

> When music is spoken of as an independent art the term can properly apply only to instrumental music, which scorns all aid, all admixture of other arts, and gives pure expression to its own peculiar artistic nature. It is the most romantic of all arts – one might almost say the only one that is *purely* romantic. (236)

Another important characteristic of instrumental music, according to Hoffmann, is its ability to externalize the innermost essence:

> Music reveals to man an unknown realm, a world quite separate from the outer sensual world surrounding him, a world in which he leaves behind all feelings circumscribed by intellect in order to embrace the inexpressible. (236)

Hoffmann goes on to explain how program music failed to realize that music is the antidote of sculpture and therefore mistakenly made sculptural music, which has its object outside itself. Then, he provides a definition of romantic opera, in which music is treated as the "miracle elixir" that elevates the worldly sensations expressed by the lyrics

into “the realm of the infinite” (236). This approach to the relationship between music and libretto is in accord with Ulrich Weisstein’s explanation of the difference between the ‘Neoclassicist’ opera, which was “the modern equivalent of ancient tragedy,” in the sense that music only accentuated the text and the ‘Romantic’ view, which emphasized the importance of music over text and that “poetry must be altogether the obedient daughter of the music” (Weisstein 18-9).

Music, the pure romantic art, can help “burst the fetters of any other art,” claims Hoffmann, adding that while Haydn and Mozart, the founders of modern instrumental music, shared an “awareness of the peculiar nature of music,” Beethoven reached its very essence (237). Haydn’s music takes the listener into a prelapsarian state, where there is “no suffering, no pain; only sweet, melancholy longing for the beloved vision floating far off in the red glow of evening” (237). Man and world is one in this state: there is no separation, no pain, no fissure between the signifier and the signified. Mozart’s music, on the other hand is the “intimation of infinity”, the portrayal of a “magical quality residing in the inner self” (237). It is Beethoven whose music expresses the romantic view of the human condition: “Beethoven’s music sets in motion the machinery of awe, of fear, of terror, of pain, and awakens that infinite yearning which is the essence of romanticism” (238). All three composers share the “romantic spirit” yet Beethoven’s music reaches an ultimate negativity, the only way though which a mortal being can experience the infinite sublime, via the “pain of infinite longing” (237). Hoffmann’s sublime vision opens the path to Schopenhauer and the terror of his listening subject upon taking a glimpse

This reaction to music is not unlike the terror of Schopenhauer’s subject when it takes a glimpse at the will that underlies the world of representation. The will is a primal

misery, the terror of existence. As our survival comes at the expense of others, the world of representations is in universal war. Craving to overcome this rupture of our existence provides the ground for the romantic *infinite yearning*. Art, through the aesthetic experience, provides an escape from these horrors in Schopenhauer's view, which provides the basis for Wagner's famous essay on Beethoven.

3.1.3 Wagner's "Beethoven"

Wagner's influential essay is significant not only in its way of approaching Beethoven and his art, but also art and music in general. The essay is arguably Wagner's most important contribution to the "philosophy of musical meaning" (Rather 136). Wagner, in several ways a "culmination" of the romantic movement(s),[24] was highly indebted to Novalis, Friedrich von Schlegel, and E. T. A. Hoffmann, along with Feuerbach, and Schopenhauer.[25]

The starting point of Wagner's "Beethoven" is an analysis of the process of artistic creation and the relationship of the arts to each other. Wagner argues that the closest one can get to Beethoven the musician is at the "point where creation passes from a conscious to an unconscious act, i.e. where the poet no longer chooses the aesthetic Form, but it is imposed on him by his inner vision of the Idea itself." (Wagner, "Beethoven" 64-5).It may be useful to clarify some of the notions Wagner utilizes here,

[24] For more on this, see: André Coeuroy, "The Musical Theory of the German Romantic Writers," The Musical Quarterly, Vol. 13, No. 1. (Jan., 1927), pp. 108-129, 108.

[25] The composer's "conversion" from Feuerbach to Schopenhauer took place in 1854. The "Beethoven" essay of 1870 can be considered as the aesthetic creed of the Wagner from the mid-fifties on, however, Wagner had already developed a theoretical framework for his art in "The Artwork of the Future" in 1849, followed by "Opera and Drama" in 1852. As this chapter is dealing with Beethoven, I will address the key ideas of the "Beethoven" essay and its essentially Schopenhauerian disposition here. The subsequent chapter on Wagner will provide an analysis of "The Artwork of the Future" and Feuerbach's philosophy.

such as ‘inner vision’ and his Schopenhauerian reading of the Platonic ‘Idea’. Schopenhauer’s differentiation between the will and the phenomenal world is proposed in his *The World as Will and Representation*:

> this world in which we live and have our being is, by its whole nature, through and through *will*, and at the same time through and through *representation*. This representation as such already presupposes a form, namely object and subject; consequently it is relative; and if we ask what is left after the elimination of this form and of all the forms subordinate to it and expressed by the principle of sufficient reason, the answer is that, as something *toto genere* different from the representation, this cannot be anything but *will*, which is therefore the *thing-in-itself* proper. (Schopenhauer 162)

Wagner positions music and the plastic arts as two antidotes between which poetry takes its position. These views are based on the aesthetics of Schopenhauer, whom the composer considers to be the first one to philosophically clarify the position of music among the arts:

> [I]t is the Ideas of the world and of its essential phenomena, in the sense of Plato, that constitute the ‘object’ of the fine arts, whereas, however, the Poet interprets these Ideas to the visual consciousness through an employment of strictly rationalistic concepts in a manner quite peculiar to his art, Schopenhauer believes he must recognize in *Music itself an Idea of the world.* (Wagner, “Beethoven” 67)

Music thus takes the role of the Platonic Idea in Wagner's aesthetics, which he connects with the Schopenhauerian will. Later Wagner reaffirms this: "Music does not portray the Ideas inherent in the world's phenomena, but is itself the Idea of the World, and a comprehensive one" (106). A passage by Schopenhauer, in which he addresses the same issue also provides clarification: "music does not, like the other arts, exhibit the *Ideas* or grades of the will's objectification, but directly the *will itself*," and its strength lies in that being the will itself, music also "acts directly on the will, i.e., the feelings, passions, and emotions of the hearer, so that it quickly raises these or even alters them."[26] Music thus communicates without representation, and the listener directly experiences the inner essence of things, not through objective knowledge, but through feeling, *Gefühl*, as already shown by both Novalis and Hoffman. Schopenhauer separates two different types of consciousness through which these two types of apprehension take place. The first type of knowledge that is facing outwards conceives of the objects of the world in their interrelations though time and space. Wagner calls this type of understanding the "visual knowledge of the outside world" (67). The other type faces inwards: the "consciousness of one's own self" (68.) This type of knowledge is able to understand the character of the thing-in-itself, which is the 'will'. This inward function of the brain is achieved through what Schopenhauer names as the 'Dream-organ' and the phenomenon itself is 'Clairvoyance'. Wagner applies this idea directly to his musical theory, claiming that this "inward-facing consciousness" takes over the function of "sight where our waking daylight consciousness feels nothing but a vague impression of the midnight background of our will's emotions" (69). Music becomes the medium for this direct experience, as

[26] Schopenhauer, Vol. II, 448. The passage also suggests that Wagner blurs the differences between Platonic 'Idea' and Schopenhauerian 'will' more than Schopenhauer's text would allow it. Of course, it is too great a topic to adequately address within the limits of this dissertation.

"from out this night *Tone* bursts upon the world of waking, a direct utterance of the Will" (69).

Wagner accepts Schopenhauer's idea that while the outside world is perceptible to us visually, the other, 'inner' reality, which is perceptible through the dream-organ, is a 'sound-world', which can express itself directly through music and which is accessible through hearing.[27] This move enables Wagner to position the poet between the painter and the musician. Through the conscious side of the creative process, the poet moves towards the plastic arts, while simultaneously moving through the unconscious side toward the realm of music.[28]

Another important aspect in Wagner's theory is the move from the beautiful to the sublime. The critical tradition, maintains Wagner, has extended the criteria of imitation to music, but music does not have an outside object and musical representation is not based on semblance. Plastic arts represent a "sight around us" (70), uncovering its appearance, in the sense described above, and therefore are concerned with the surface of things, removed from the will. The result of this aesthetic tradition, Wagner continues, is "a will-freed contemplation," in which the aesthetic experience becomes "nothing but the *sho*w of things." This "sheer pleasure in the semblance" then became the model for each art form, providing the basis for all aesthetic beauty and pleasure (71). The resulting overemphasis on sight and semblance can be traced even in the linguistic conceptualization of the artistic experience, "[w]hence, too, has come our term for *Beauty*

[27] An other type of dream will also gain importance in Wagner's theory, the allegoric dream, which precedes awakening and through which the first type of "dream of deepest sleep" gets mediated to the "waking consciousness." See: Wagner, "Beethoven," 74.
[28] This duality clearly reappears in Nietzsche's Apollonian and Dionysiac in *The Birth of Tragedy*.

(*Schönheit*); the root of which word in our German language is plainly connected with *Show* (*Schein*) as object, with *Seeing* (*Schauen*) as subject" (71).

However, beauty is only the "very first effect of Music's mere appearance" which "advances the most directly to a revelation of her truest character through the agency of the Sublime" (79). Sublime is the only category by which music can be judged, observes Wagner, as music elevates its listeners to the highest possible level of human consciousness, that of the infinite. Wagner regards this as the greatest achievement of Beethoven, through whose works music extended itself from the realm of the beautiful to that of the sublime. As quoted above, tone is the mode through which the will directly gains expression in music, according to Wagner's theory. It is then through rhythm that music, still keeping its essence, reaches toward the phenomenal world, in this way bridging the world's phenomena and the will, semblance and essence, the visible and the audible, as well as the beautiful and the sublime.

While Wagner recognizes harmony as the "most inalienable element of Music," he points out how "through the rhythmic sequence of his tones in point of time the musician reaches forth a plastic hand," entering the world of time and space, i.e., the phenomenal world, "to strike a compact with the waking world of semblances; just as the allegoric dream so far makes contact with the Individual's wonted notions that the waking consciousness, albeit at once detecting the great difference of even his dream-picture from the outer incidents of actual life, yet is able to retain its image" (76-7). In this way, music gains contact with the phenomenal world through the rhythmic sequencing of its tones. This sequencing brings about melody, the surface that brings

beauty to music, while the tones remain as the essence through which music always looks inward, toward the will.

The following part of the essay turns Beethoven the composer into a metaphor of his music, creating an image that still sways the general reception of Beethoven's works. In Wagner's view, Beethoven's music reached its apex when he became totally deaf and the outside world no longer distracted him from looking towards the inside. Wagner compares Beethoven's deafness to the blindness of Teiresias that freed him from the world of appearances, allowing "the musician's eye [to grow] bright within" (93). From that moment on, all the appearances were "illuminated by his inner light," which in turn "cast a wondrous reflex back upon his inner soul" (94). This fantastic musical synesthesia affirms the totality of Beethoven's apotheosis: Wagner calls this phase of Beethoven's oeuvre the "godlike period of the master's total deafness" (94) that evokes a "divine revelation" and brings "deliverance" to the listener. Beethoven the hero, Beethoven the prophet, Beethoven the Savior: an image that separates the musical experience from the music itself for several decades to come. As we will see, the relevance of these late works to the novels discussed here lies not only in their experimental freedom, but also in their contrast to the novels' secular perspective and spiritual angst.

Wagner sees a great step made by music through Beethoven's de-hierarchizing its very elements: although tone, the utterance of the will, remains the deepest essence of music for him, it extends itself through rhythm to melody and in turn gains new light through the world of beauty. Melody, up to then a subordinate element, gets emancipated by Beethoven and gains new importance in becoming the means through which the will reaches the world as we perceive it.

In the final part of his essay, Wagner provides his readers with a manifesto of his own total artwork, music drama. In doing so, he seems to feel the need to overcome his own previous hierarchization of the art forms. Up to this point he ranks the three art forms in the following order: music, poetry, and painting. He sees the solution to the issue in opera, which could be the territory where music and drama can be reconciled. However, with the move of marrying these two art forms, Wagner de-hierarchizes only music and poetry. Painting remains a runner-up: "Drama towers above the bounds of poetry in exactly the same manner as music above those of every other art, and especially of plastic art, through its effect residing solely in the Sublime" (106).

To Wagner, drama is "the visible counter part of Music" (113). His music drama thus becomes the climax of *ut musica poesis*. However, even though music and drama intertwine in Wagner's oeuvre, music always remains more central in his theoretical works.[29] It is also important to note that while Wagner attempts to reach an inwardness with his *Gesamtkunstwerk*, in which characterization does not focus on individuals, but "lets them display their immediate selves" (106), Wagner inadvertently lays down the theory of an extroversive musical semiosis here besides an introversive one. If melody "reaches forth" towards the phenomenal world, it simultaneously points to the dependence of music on that world. Thus, Wagner's work not only aims at direct access to the drama of the self, but also unearths the drama of the acoustic self.

[29] Although Nietzsche's critique points exactly at the unmusicality of Wagner's operas.

3.2 *A Room With a View*

Forster, an ardent Beethoven fan, was also an admitted Wagnerite, and his interest in "musical methods" was clearly influenced by the latter composer (DiGaetani 91). Although this chapter deals with what we may call Forster's two "Beethoven novels," and it is in Chapter Four that I will address his most Wagnerian novel, *The Longest Journey*, one thing already manifest in the following analyses is that Forster, who was well-versed in German romanticism, listens to Beethoven through a Wagnerian filter, i.e., presents a "Wagnerian Beethoven," in these novels (Fillion 274).

Forster, especially in *A Room with a View*, attempts an expansion toward *Gesamtkunstwerk*, applying the Wagnerian contrast between visual knowledge and "inward-facing consciousness" in the narrative. Forster explores the Wagnerian model of painting and music leading the listener to beauty and truth respectively (the visual arts pierce the surface of the Edwardian order while Beethoven's music leads to the self-sameness of the focal character). Similarly to the brief aesthetic overview (from *ut pictura* to *ut musica poesis*) above, our reading of the novel will lead through the visual and arrive at the musical–following the protagonists' *katabasis*.

The writer sends his British characters to Italy in two of his novels, *Where Angels Fear to Tread* and *A Room with a View*, in order to achieve the same goal as the classical infernal voyagers, that is, to gain knowledge. While the success of an epic hero's *katabasis* has a significant effect on the fate of his people, the protagonists of these early 20th-century novels are struggling for their own self-realization. Nevertheless, there is a dimension in these novels that ties the success or failure of the characters' journey to the fate of England, creating a social critique of Britishness and its construction. This Britishness is contrasted against the horizon of an infernal Italy, where everything is real

and unreal at the same time, where the highest achievements of Western/Christian culture coexist with the primitive and the archetypal, where the body as well as its desires and passions are recognized. The British enter an uncanny environment that turns them inside out, making them visible to themselves and to each other. Italy is the *other* against which they are constructed, a discourse that opens up territories and experiences that have been deeply hidden by the individual's enculturation into British society. Italy as *other discourse* unveilss and deconstructs the binaries of Edwardian culture and its subjects.[30]

Italy as inferno provides the horizon for many layers of other discourses in *A Room with a View*, via combining myth, painting, and music. Forster employs these layers in characterization and in plotting his protagonists' self-realization. The mythical layer sets up Italy as the infernal horizon, while painting and music serve a double role: on the structural level they *expand* the text, while on the hermeneutic level they guide both the reader and the characters to the body, to passion and eventually to their innermost self, which are all infernal territories in Edwardian British eyes.

The novel starts with Lucy Honeychurch arriving at a *pensione* in Florence with Miss Bartlett, her cousin and chaperon. It turns out that, contrary to previous arrangements with the owner, their rooms have no view of the city of Florence. The *pensione* is full of English tourists, among them an old man, Mr. Emerson, whom the newcomers immediately consider to be "ill-bred" based on his clothes and manners. He overhears their discussion about the view and offers to swap rooms, as he and his son have rooms with a perfect view. Miss Bartlett immediately rejects the offer. As two women traveling alone, they cannot be under an obligation to a stranger. At this point,

[30] The word 'other' in this *other discourse* is written with a lowercase 'o' as it refers to the specular other, the image in relation to which the subject constitutes itself–as opposed to the symbolic Other.

Mr. Beebe, a clergyman whom Lucy and Miss Bartlett know from England, and who happens to be staying at the same *pensione*, enters the room and resolves the situation. Due to his mediating between the two parties, the women accept the exchange.

In the first chapter, not only do we get to know the diverse group of English people who stay at the *pensione*, but we also learn that the establishment is run specifically for English visitors and provides them with a piece of England in Italy. As comfortable as if they had never really left England, they are protected from any real or authentic experience while exploring Florence and Italy. The *signora* of the *pensione* has a Cockney accent, and there are pictures of Queen Victoria and Lord Tennyson on the wall by the dinner table. Also, all of them travel with their Baedeker, the ultimate guide-book of the time that ensures that even the sensory experiences, like visually perceiving Italy, take place through the filter of British authority. This is one of the many instances where direct experience and mediated representation are contrasted in the text, the Baedeker standing for the cultural barriers that these travelers cannot cross. The narrator, however, makes clear that Italy can become a carnivalesque place: the ticket to the carnival is c/losing one's Baedeker. That is when our story can really begin. Italy and the Italians themselves are archetypes, bearing a mythical character: the cab driver becomes Phaeton, his girl Persephone, the people sitting around the loggia "many a deity" (RWV 139).

3.2.1. Myth

The first half of E. M. Forster's *Aspects of the Novel* explores those features of the genre that are generally considered to be its necessary elements: story, characters, and plot.

However, it is the subsequent chapters where Forster introduces those optional elements that seem to make a good novel in his opinion. These elements are fantasy, prophecy, pattern, and rhythm–all of which serve as possible ways to enrich the texture of the novel. The use of the supernatural is the topic of the chapters "Fantasy" and "Prophecy." Forster explains these two notions as "[s]omething that cuts across them [novels] like a bar of light, that is intimately connected with them at one place and patiently illuminates all their problems, and at another place shoots over or through them as if they did not exist."[31]

Forster's language is highly metaphorical when describing these notions, in an attempt to defend these delicate aspects of the novel from the "claws of critical apparatus" (105). He compares prophecy to songs that "come out of different worlds." These songs may evoke any of "the faiths that have haunted humanity–Christianity, Buddhism, dualism, Satanism, or the mere raising of human love and hatred to such a power that their normal receptacles cannot contain them" (116). Forster's examples include protagonists from the works of Dostoyevsky, Melville, D. H. Lawrence, and Emily Brontë, who all gain their prophetic character via transcending themselves in their faith, emotions or passions. They all pursue a unity that cannot be "realized within the scope of human life" (117).

Due to their subject, prophetic novels have to show "humility" and suspend their "sense of humor" (117), according to Forster. This is a price, however, that he himself does not wish to pay in his own fiction, hence he combines it with the much more playful "fantasy" in his works:

[31] E. M. Forster, *Aspects of the Novel* (Harmondsworth: *Penguin*, 1962) 102.

> An invocation is again possible, therefore on behalf of fantasy let us now invoke all beings who inhabit the lower air, the shallow water and the smaller hills, all Fauns and Dryads and slips of the memory, all verbal coincidences, Pans and puns, all that is medieval this side of the grave. (104)

Forster's Italy is replete with mythical elements and figures. Each scene, each Italian character has supernatural implications. "The power of fantasy penetrates into every corner of the universe," yet the novel does not turn into a prophecy, as the protagonists do not strain "the forces that govern it" (105). The rules of the universe are not questioned, but rather re-cognized in the Italian milieu.

Through the layer of myth, the implied author communicates to the reader that the novel is not simply a boy meets girl story (which would be very strange from Forster in the first place), but rather that of a *hieros gamos*, the sacred marriage of heaven and earth, or to use Samuel Butler's term, the *crossing* of divine elements: Lucy stands for light (the word derives from the Latin lux) and Mr Emerson's son, George, for earth (*georgos* meaning "farmer, earthworker,").[32]

As for the mythical function of the setting, Mr. Beebe's half-joking explanation of the Italian character clearly hits the mark:

> I quite agree with you, Miss Alan. The Italians are a most unpleasant people. They pry everywhere, they see everything, and they know what we want before we know it ourselves. We are at their mercy. They read our thoughts, they foretell our desires. From

[32] The word itself derived from the elements *ge* "earth" and *ergon* "work." See: Adrian Room (ed.), *Cassel Dictionary of Proper Names* (London-New York: Cassel,1992).

> the cab driver down to – to Giotto, they turn us inside out, and I resent it. Yet in their heart of hearts they are – how superficial! They have no conception of the intellectual life. (Forster, RWV 134)

And turning a person inside out is highly inappropriate, as we learn from the scene where Mr. Emerson utters the 's' word, that is, says the word 'stomach,' in a lady's company. No interiority, only superficiality is allowed. But ironically, it is the British themselves who prove to be superficial. They need to be guided in this–at least for them–infernal world, "and if one god must be invoked specially let us call upon Hermes – messenger, thief, conductor of souls to a not too terrible hereafter" (Forster, AON 104-5). The Italians themselves take the role of Hermes, *psychopompos*, the guide of souls in the underworld. As the narrator explains, "Italians are born knowing the way. It would seem that the whole earth lay before them, not as a map, but as a chessboard, whereon they continually behold the changing pieces as well as the squares. Anyone can find places, but finding people is a gift of god" (Forster, RWV 158).

Lucy enters this primeval pagan world when she leaves the *pensione* without her Baedeker. Her initiation takes place at the Piazza Signoria, which is itself described as a mythic place: its statues depict immortal mythological characters, all of whom, like Perseus, Judith, and Hercules, gained their immortality through suffering and experience. As the narrator suggests about the piazza: "Here, not only in the solitude of Nature, might a hero meet a goddess, or a heroine a god" (151). And indeed, this will be the locus of the primal scene of the novel. Lucy enters this space thinking that nothing ever happens to her. At this point, the piazza transforms:

> The great square was in shadow; the sunshine had come too late to strike it. Neptune was already unsubstantial in the twilight, half god, half ghost, and his fountain plashed dreamily to the men and satyrs who idled together on its marge. The Loggia showed as the triple entrance of a cave, wherein many a deity, shadowy, but immortal, looking forth upon the arrivals and departures of mankind. It was the hour of unreality – the hour, that is, when unfamiliar things are real. (139)

Suddenly, two Italians, who appear to be arguing over money, get into a fight. One seems to hit the other on the chest, but actually is stabbing him. Lucy is standing right in front of him when he falls:

> He frowned; he bent towards Lucy with a look of interest, as if he had an important message for her. He opened his lips to deliver it, and a stream of red came out between them and trickled down his unshaven chin.
>
> That was all. A crowd rose out of the dusk. It hid this extraordinary man from her, and bore him away to the fountain. Mr. George Emerson happened to be a few paces away, looking at her across the spot where the man had been. (140)

George's face becomes the *simulacrum* of the dead man's face. Later we learn that the murderer tried to kiss his victim and that he gave himself up to the police. However, this and the true relationship of the two men remain enigmatic. Lucy and George share this scene of initiation; they are both aware that something significant happened, something

bigger than themselves. But like the message of the dead man, this experience defies verbal expression. Here is where Light and Earth meet first, but the recognition of their selves, especially for Lucy, comes much later in the novel.

3.2.2 Forster's Pictorial Turn?

Forster's portrayal of the main characters takes the form of *ekphrasis*. The process of characterization strategically employs descriptions of paintings and sculptures. The Michelangelesque George wins Lucy's love, whereas Cecil Vyse, to whom Lucy gets engaged and who is described as an ascetic and infertile gothic figure. Cecil is introduced into the story the following way: "He was medieval. Like a Gothic statue. Tall and refined, with shoulders that seemed braced square by an effort of the will, and a head that was tilted a little higher than the usual level of vision, he resembled those fastidious saints who guard the portals of a French cathedral" (174).

Lucy's scopophilia is the correlative of narrative desire. George is the object of that desire in the novel. Lucy herself is the holder of the gaze, which puts her in the position of the *erastes* (the lover in Plato's *Symposium*) and George into that of the *eromenos* (beloved). Queer interpretations[33] of the novel have successfully shown how the male body becomes the object of desire at significant points of the narrative, and how this works against heteronormative narrative strategies. The novel systematically disrupts what Laura Mulvey–about seven decades later–defined as the male gaze:

[33] See: A. A. Markey, "E. M. Forster's Reconfigured gaze and the Creation of Homoerotic Subjectivity," *Twentieth Century Literature*, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Summer, 2001), pp. 268-292; and Eric Haralson, "'Thinking about Homosex' in Forster and James," in Robert K. Martin and George Piggford (eds), *Queer Forster* (Chicago-London: The University of Chicago Press, 1997), 59-73.

> In a world ordered by sexual imbalance, pleasure in looking has been split between active/male and passive/female. The determining male gaze projects its phantasy on to the female form which is styled accordingly. In their traditional exhibitionist role women are simultaneously looked at and displayed, with their appearance coded for strong visual and erotic impact so that they can be said to connote to-be-looked-at-ness. (Mulvey 837)

Somewhat anachronistically, one might call Forster's *ekphrastic* practice of characterization his "pictorial turn." The notion itself is W. J. T. Mitchell's answer to Rorty's "linguistic turn." Mitchell's term is based on Charles Pierce's and Nelson Goodman's work, which "explore[s] the conventions and codes that underlie nonlinguistic symbol systems" and questions the hegemonic role of language in the construction of meaning (Mitchell 12) He notes that the pictorial turn is,

> not a return to naive mimesis, copy or correspondence theories of representation, or a renewed metaphysics of pictorial "presence": it is rather a postlinguistic, postsemiotic rediscovery of the picture as a complex interplay between visuality, apparatus, institutions, discourse, bodies, and figurality. (16)

Both the male gaze and the pictorial turn are, of course, later developments in visual and cultural theory, yet Forster's use of visual elements in his novel certainly shares an affinity with both Mulvey's and Mitchell's notions. Also, *A Room with a View* can be considered as what Mitchell calls an "imagetext:" a composite, "synthetic" text that calls into question the relations of verbal and visual representation.

To further consider Forster's use of painting, one may look for guidelines to *Aspects of the Novel*. Forster introduces the notion of expansion in the chapter called "Pattern and Rhythm," in which he asserts that "the more the arts develop, the more they depend on each other for definition" (134). He goes on to show how the novel tends to borrow certain techniques from painting and music. Pattern is related to the plot, which in Forster's formulation is the "narrative of events, the emphasis falling on causality" (87). Pattern refers to the aesthetic experience the reader may recognize in the unity of the novel as a whole. Forster describes this recognition as experiencing beauty. Writing about this aesthetic process, Forster's language itself turns highly poetic:

> We noted, when discussing the plot, that it added to itself the quality of beauty, beauty a little surprised at her own arrival; that upon its neat carpentry there could be seen, by those who cared to see, the figure of the Muse; that Logic, at the moment of finishing its own house, laid the foundation of a new one. (136)

Beauty does not always appear as a whole, but often functions as a musical phrase that appears at one point, disappears, then reappears again, "waxing and waning to fill us with surprise, freshness and hope" (148). Forster emphasizes how these instances should not harden painting and music into symbols, but rather work to expand the text as a whole – though not into a whole. In his words, this strategy involves "Not rounding off, but opening out" (149). The idea is based on Walter Pater's well-known passage of the *School of Giorgione*:

> [I]t is noticeable that, in its special mode of handling its given material, each art may be observed to pass into the condition of some other art, by what

> German critics term an *Anders-streben* – a partial alienation from its own limitations, through which the arts are able, not indeed to supply the place of each other, but reciprocally to lend each other new forces. (Pater 110)

Both painting and music serve as forms of expansion in *A Room with a View*. They both sound other-discourses that enrich the fabric of the text. The final effect of expanding the texture of the narrative, explains Forster, is to enable "every item" to "lead a larger existence than was possible at the time" (Forster, AON 150).

When Lucy faints during the murder scene, she drops the pictures she had just bought. One of these is a print of Botticelli's *Birth of Venus*. George goes back to pick up the pictures, but when the two of them are crossing the bridge over the Arno, he throws them into the river. The reason for this is that the pictures are covered with blood and he does not know what to do with them. This all takes place after the scene of initiation through blood, i.e., the first crossing between Lucy and George. The blood of course may stand for passion, sacrifice, initiation, fertility.[34] The painting, the image of a female body, a mediated experience, becomes symbolically fertilized with immediacy.

The narrator foreshadows, exactly while describing the murder scene, that the hero and the goddess, or the heroine and the god, will "meet in the solitude of Nature" (151). This meeting, however, is a metonymy of the primal scene. The attempted kiss of the murderer becomes a real kiss. Kissing repeatedly stands for the unspeakable, the inexpressible desires in the novel. It is as if the characters, when unable to communicate within the boundaries of reason, need to find another means of expression. Where reason fails, bodies meet and/or blood gets spilled. The description of the kissing scene is also an

[34] Ad de Vries, *Dictionary of Symbols and Imagery* (Amsterdam–London: North Holland Publishing Company, 1974), entry: "blood."

ekphrasis of the *Birth of Venus*. Lucy falls out of the wood, onto a "little open terrace, which was covered with violets from end to end." She falls "some six feet," which is telling about where we landed–again, the characters are in a primeval sphere (159). But we are six feet under only from the perspective of those who stayed in the wood. This is actually where life starts: the sea of violets, "covering the grass with spots of azure foam," is described as "the primal source whence beauty gushed out to water the earth." On the edge of this sea stands George, "like a swimmer who prepares"–or maybe it is the other way around, and he is just stepping onto the shore (159). We are witnessing the birth of Venus.[35] The focalizer is Lucy again, and the beauty is George. When Lucy refers to this moment in a later part of the novel in an attempt to defend George's actions, her slip of the tongue gives a clue to who desired whom at that moment: "It makes such a difference when you see a person with beautiful things behind *him* unexpectedly" (217-8). When the perspective changes, the reader sees Lucy from George's point of view: "for a moment, he contemplated her, as one who had fallen out of heaven" (159).

Not only does George become Venus, but Lucy's fall evokes another, namely that of Lucifer, the bringer of light (lux-fer), the angel fallen from the sky due to his/her excessive desires. And George's seemingly being fully clothed makes no difference regarding these desires, as we know that he is naked in Lucy's eyes:

> [F]or a young man his face was rugged, and–until the shadows fell upon it–hard. Enshadowed, it sprang into tenderness. She saw him once again in Rome, on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel, carrying a burden of acorns. Healthy and muscular, he yet gave her the feeling

[35] I apprehended the *ekphrastic* quality of this scene during the class discussions at Prof. Ferenc Zselyi's E. M. Forster seminar at the University of Szeged, Hungary.

of grayness, of tragedy, that might only find solution in the night. (128)

Painting is not a symbol of desire here, but shows the working of *eros*, which starts with the physical and aims towards a wider sense of love. The logic here is that of the *eros* of Plato's *Symposium*: "Everything is always in movement, in becoming. And the mediator of everything is" *eros*. "Never completed, always evolving" (Irigaray 182) and–one may also add–always desiring. But what is the ultimate goal of evoking *eros* here? Two reasons offer themselves. On the one hand, *eros* can never be hardened into a solid form, so this *ero*tic model of expansion keeps the movement of the text alive. On the other hand, *eros* leads to beauty, the final objective of all the characters who set out to Italy to find what is lost in the London fog that Lucy and George eventually have to escape in order to fulfill their narrative roles. Also, importantly, beauty and truth become closely connected in Forster's novel. As old Mr. Emerson exclaims in probably the most intimate part of the novel, "Am I justified? … Yes, for we fight for more than Love and Pleasure; there is Truth. Truth counts, Truth does count" (259). One must undergo the infernal experience to understand this. Not all the travelers can cope with it, though: As Mr. Beebe describes Mr. Emerson at the beginning of the text: "He is rather a peculiar man. … He has the merit—if it is one —of saying exactly what he means. … It is so difficult—at least, I find it difficult—to understand people who speak the truth" (117).[36]

[36] It has been pointed out by several critics that the source of George Emerson's character is not necessarily Ralph Waldo Emerson. Samuel Butler and Edward Carpenter are just as likely to be the inspirations. See: Tariq Rahman, "Edward Carpenter and E. M. Forster," in J. H. Stape (ed.), *E. M. Forster: Critical Assessments* (Mountfield near Robertsbridge, East Sussex: Helm Information, 1997) Vol. 4, 40-61, 42-5.

3.2.3 Music as Truth

As we have seen, the visual arts serve in the novel as access to the bodily, to immediate experience, while also mapping vectors of desire by defining who is looking at whom. While visual experience may be immediate, it somehow remains abstract and superficial, even though it may direct attention to the inner workings of the self (i.e., desire). In contrast, sound enters the body whether one wants it or not (one cannot close her/his ears), and the experience of listening also acquires a depth that is beyond the visible by its nature. Painting serves as an entry to the Forsterian expansion, but the real inferno lies in music. The Hoffmannian-Schopenhauerian terror gets exposed in the musical experience. Having explored one infernal sphere, that of the body, through the visual, music helps our protagonists to turn inward, to explore the abyss within. As seen earlier, music may serve to "introduce into a text the nonrepresentability of the self" (Hamilton 14). The musical text attempts to reach beyond language in order to explore the direct, the nonrepresentational, the territory where reason loses itself. The musical intertext becomes the mode of self-recognition. The reader is informed through other listeners (and thus may recognize the mistake of other listeners), and also through the narrator, whose *ekphrastic* descriptions are so exact that some compositions can be identified without their titles being revealed in the text. The musical experience becomes an uncanny one, as it cannot be represented, cannot be put into words. As we saw in the previous chapter, it is music that lets the real demons in.

The German romantics valorized music because it has no references to the external world of physical objects, and therefore is the perfect medium to express the artist's inner feelings. Also, as the ideal form of art, music has the ability to externalize

our innermost essence. It is through playing the piano that Lucy recognizes and realizes herself. Music shows how far she has to go to become real to herself. While visual art may aid her in understanding what she wants, music exposes what she is. The infernal aspects of this inexpressible part of the self lie outside the intellect, outside any norms, culture, or language. This dark aspect of music has been emblematized by Beethoven's music since the beginning of the nineteenth century, and it was Wagner who laid down the foundations of musical characterization in his "Beethoven" essay: "As a drama does not depict human characters, but lets them display their immediate selves, so a piece of music gives us its motive" (106).

It does not come as a surprise that Lucy's playing has the strongest effect on both herself and her audience when she plays Beethoven. In a flashback, Mr. Beebe recalls the first time he heard Lucy playing the piano at a rural parish:

> [H]is composure was disturbed by the opening bars of Opus 111. He was in suspense all through the introduction, for not until the pace quickens does one know what the performer intends. With the roar of the opening theme he knew that things were going extraordinarily; in the chords that herald the conclusion he heard the hammer strokes of victory.
>
> 'Who is she?' he asked the vicar afterwards.
>
> 'Cousin of one of my parishioners. I do not consider her choice of a piece happy. Beethoven is so usually simple and direct in his appeal that it is sheer perversity to choose a thing like that, which, if anything, disturbs.'

'Introduce me.'(132)[37]

However, meeting the "young lady with a quantity of dark hair and a very pretty, pale, underdeveloped face" (132) brings them both back to the everyday world. And Mr. Beebe is not interested in Lucy as representation, part of the world's phenomena. Her encultured self does not imply a hero. It is her music that makes her complex, perplexing. "If Miss Honeychurch ever takes to live as she plays, it will be very exciting – both for us and for her" (133), exclaims Mr. Beebe to the vicar, and he expresses the same sentiment to Lucy herself at a later point. And indeed, Lucy's heroic interpretation of Opus 111 becomes her masterplot, as she eventually gets out of her muddle by living as she plays: leaving the everyday behind. Mr. Beebe, her astute listener, who is perplexed "that she should play so wonderfully, and live so quietly," proposes that "one day she will be wonderful in both. The watertight compartments in her will break down, and music and life will mingle. Then we shall have her heroically good, heroically bad – too heroic, perhaps, to be good or bad" (178). As we have seen in the previously analyzed novels, the watertight compartments, i.e., self-sameness and contingent selves (characterized by their extroversive and introversive semioses), do not give up their autonomous positions easily. Also, there is no place for heroes in Edwardian period. As we saw in chapter two, when these two worlds collide and the acoustic self emerges, the inevitable result is death.

Significantly, Lucy plays Beethoven at the *pensione* just before she walks into the murder scene at the piazza. The narcissistic, self-mirroring, self-opening

[37] Mr. Beebe's role in the novel is quite ambiguous. He seems to be one of those misleading characters Forster tends to employ in his novels. Through most of the novel he

quality of the musical experience is revealed, as she becomes "intoxicated by the mere feel of the notes: they were fingers caressing her own; and by touch, not by sound alone, did she come to her desire" (132). She "enter[s] a more solid world when she open[s] the piano" (131)– the world before and beyond language. As the narrator describes,

> The kingdom of music is not the kingdom of this world; it will accept those whom breeding and intellect and culture have alike rejected. The commonplace person begins to play, and shoots into the empyrean without effort, whilst we look up, marveling how he has escaped us, and thinking how we could worship him and love him, would he but translate his visions into human words, and his experiences into human actions. Perhaps, he cannot; certainly he does not, or does so very seldom. Lucy had done so never. (131)

Not yet, at any rate. But her playing already foreshadows that she will succeed, and it is her playing Beethoven that shows her in her most complete self. Even though "some sonatas of Beethoven are written tragic," it depends on the player whether they "triumph or despair … and Lucy decided that they should triumph" (132). It is necessary to shatter the world as we know it to translate this experience into life. We have to kill the contingent self in order to reach self-sameness. Language and representation fail at this point: "'Music –' said Lucy, as if attempting some generality. She could not complete it, and looked out absently upon Italy in the wet" (133). In order to escape the "tedious conversation", she walks out into the wet afternoon without her Baedeker, leaving both language and

the Word behind. It is the murdered Italian who becomes her savior figure, who takes the blow of the drama of Lucy's inferno in his sublime death scene.

The two poles of the infernal and the sublime seem always to be interconnected in Forster. Florence is not just hell: it is the *omphalos*, the place of creation where heaven, the earthly realm and hell meet (Eliade 16). It is only here that George and Lucy recognize themselves as sublime beings. But this means that the novel's protagonists have to depart from their reality. Lucy and George cannot unite in England. One of the reasons for this is that he comes from a working class family. The other reason is that they need an infernal/sublime horizon to realize their *hieros gamos*, the sacred marriage of heaven and earth. England cannot provide this horizon. The two elope like the pair of young men at the end of Forster's *Maurice*. According to Forster's famous epigraph, "Maurice and Alec still roam the greenwood,"[38] while Lucy and George go to Italy, turning England itself into hell.

In accordance with this notion, in the second part of the novel, which takes place in England, music is muted; it becomes a mere children's game. Lucy plays Schumann for Cecil's nieces and nephews, and she is not willing to play Beethoven, contrary to Cecil's request. She is enchanted; she is hidden or, rather, hiding from herself. Schumann and Mozart display her self-negating state. Cecil, to whom she is now engaged, is unaware of the reason of her musical rigidity. When Lucy wakes from a bad dream with a cry (yet another pre-linguistic mode of expression), the by then musically aroused reader immediately thinks of Kundry from Wagner's *Parsifal*. This association is soon confirmed by the scene where Cecil asks her to play the scene of the Flower Maidens,

[38] E. M. Forster, "Terminal Note," in *Maurice* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971), 218.

having played the garden scene from *Armide* beforehand. However, Lucy fails to play the piece when she notices that George is present. Music is unable to lie. Kundry is redeemed by Parsifal, the innocent fool, and similarly to the opera, the female protagonist undertakes a much more complex journey than the supposed "hero" of the novel. Lucy's engagement with Cecil has to be broken before she can play again. Music as truth seems to reach into territories that language cannot access, yet the aesthetic choices and the fairytale-like ending show the contrast with the reality of the everyday that makes it impossible to realize one's self. And *Howards End* paints an even darker picture of this scenario.

An interesting pattern seems to emerge in the novels discussed up to now, regarding their Beethoven intertexts. In *Point Counter Point*, Maurice Spandrell orchestrates his suicide to Opus 132, specifically to the third movement, *Heiliger Dankesang*. Woolf admittedly structured *The Waves* around Beethoven's last quartet, Opus 130, and specifically *Die Grosse Fuge*, Opus 133; and Lucy plays Opus 111, Beethoven's last piano sonata, at the recital where Mr. Beebe first meets her. (We do not know what she plays exactly at the *pensione*.) These are all late period Beethoven, written by the deaf composer, who had already acquired his supposed "clairvoyance" by the time of writing these pieces, which are often regarded as "the greatest works of genius in existence to read, but reading gives more pleasure than hearing."[39]

In contrast, in *Howards End*, Forster takes us straight to the peak of Beethoven's career, the Fifth Symphony, Opus 67. This symphony was much more popular than the late, experimental pieces that appear in the other three novels. As we saw above, E. T. A.

[39] Joseph de Marliave, *Beethoven's Quartets* (New York: Dover publications, 1961), 221.

Hoffmann worked out his manifesto of romantic music based on this opus, which thus became the key composition in the birth of the notion of absolute music–and its dark undertones. *Howards End* seems to follow the German romantic tradition (and explicitly provides references to it throughout the novel, starting with the name of the Schlegels), making the Fifth Symphony an ideal choice for Forster.

3.3 Howards End

Foster wrote this novel after *A Room with a View*, and he seems to have fully worked out the role of music in his fiction by this time. If there is a sense of measuring, of weighing the role of and balance between different art forms–a somewhat indecisive contemplation of what music really is capable of–in *A Room with a View*, Forster is more definite and definitely darker in his musical treatment in *Howards End*. The latter novel is much closer in its tone to *The Waves* and *Point Counter Point* than its predecessor. Another parallel is that the musical program for the novel is developed in one chapter, and the logic of the novel as well as the fate of its characters is defined by a central musical experience.

Howards End follows the story of the orphaned, half-German Schlegel sisters, Margaret and Helen, who lead a "cosmopolitan" and highly cultured life in London. The girls' lives become entangled with the Wilcoxes, a business-oriented family, through Helen's brief affair with the younger Wilcox boy, and a subsequent friendship between Margaret and Mrs. Wilcox. After Mrs. Wilcox's untimely death, Margaret and the widower Henry Wilcox are drawn to each other and eventually get engaged. Meanwhile, the Schlegel girls get acquainted with a young clerk, Leonard Bast, at a concert, and they

take an interest in helping him improve his life. The girls' meddling results in Bast's eventual downfall and death, and also in Helen's begetting an illegitimate child. The final tableau shows Henry Wilcox, Margaret and Helen living together, along with Helen's son, at Howards End, the country house that the late Mrs. Wilcox, on a whim, wanted Margaret to inherit due to their friendship.

As opposed to *A Room with a View*, none of the characters are performers, but they are all listeners. The program is Beethoven's Fifth, and the concert takes place in Chapter Five: "It will be generally admitted that Beethoven's Fifth Symphony is the most sublime noise that has ever penetrated the ear of man," (23) the chapter begins. This sentence simply sums up the aesthetic outline provided in the beginning of this chapter and acknowledges the place of the composition in the aesthetic tradition. "All sort and conditions are satisfied by it" (23), the paragraph continues, but the narrator goes further than this and describes these different sorts of people, who become characters of varying significance in the novel: there is the polite, British, middle class listener; the romantic; the down-to-earth; the educated; the proudly German and her devoted lover. All in all, there is more German blood than British in the six listeners described, as Margaret, Helen, and their brother Tibby are half German, their German cousin and her German fiancé are in their company. One more person is needed to create a balance, a kind of harmony in this nationalized game of pursuing the sublime, and he soon arrives when Leonard, "who had for some time been preparing a sentence" (26), enters their conversation, albeit only to complain that Helen, who left right after Beethoven, took his umbrella.

Yet Leonard was already noticed by Aunt Juley before the second movement of the symphony began: "Who is that young man Margaret is talking to?" she asks, but Helen does not know. It is only later, in the beginning of the second movement of the novel,[40] when Henry starts courting Margaret, that Leonard's fate becomes such an important question for Helen. Right after Aunt Juley's question, however, the second movement of the symphony starts, and after following through the main melody once, Helen's mind starts to wander. She looks around the building, stopping for a while on the "attenuated Cupids" in their "sallow pantaloons" and thinking, "How awful to marry a man like those cupids" (24). The only person in that row who is not described is Leonard, the one who takes on the role of Cupid in Helen's life, and who makes sure to wrap his great-coat over his own–probably shabby–trousers when talking to Margaret a little later, after Helen has left. In terms of social ranking, Leonard is the odd-one-out in their row. Among the many sorts of people visiting Queen's Hall, the "dreariest music hall in London" (23), he is the sort to whom the ticket is *not* "cheap at two schillings" (23). Queen's Hall provides the carnivalesque environment[41] where there is a possibility for different classes to mingle, as Leonard and the Schlegels would probably never get to speak to one another in a different setting.

Not only the setting but also Beethoven's Fifth opens up the characters, especially Helen and Leonard, to their joint experiences to come. The second movement fills Helen with "panic and emptiness" (25), a phrase she already used when describing her feelings on the morning after having kissed Paul Wilcox at Howards End. Andrea K. Weatherfield

[40] Andrea K. Weatherfield interprets the novel as a fictional adaptation of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony and identifies the corresponding parts. Andrea K. Weatherfield, "Howards End: Beethoven's Fifth," *Twentieth Century Literature*, Vol. 31, No. 2/3, E. M. Forster Issue (Summer-Autumn, 1985), 247-64, 255.
[41] In the Bakhtinian sense of the word. See Bakhtin, 10.

considers “panic and emptiness,” which returns at strategic points in the novel, to be a musical phrase that through repetition and variations provides a musical structure to the novel, becoming the “diddity-dum” of *Howards End* (Weatherfield 251). The connection between Helen’s first passionate encounter and the conflict in the first part of the “wonderful movement” (Forster, HE 24) is brought together by this phrase, and with Leonard, who would seem “awful to marry” (24) for Helen, like those Cupids on the ceiling, yet who will eventually beget her child. The Cupids are small and ugly, uncanny creatures like the goblins Helen is daydreaming about during the first part of the third movement. Music, passion, and the uncanny entwine again.

For Helen, the movement begins “with a goblin walking quietly over the universe, from end to end” (25). Other goblins follow, and what makes them especially terrible is that they are “not aggressive creatures,” but they “merely observe that there is no such thing as splendor or heroism in the world.” Yet with the famous transitional drum passage, Beethoven takes control, “as if things were going too far,” and appearing in person to the young upper-middle class girl, scatters the goblins with “gusts of splendor” and a “magnificent victory, magnificent death” (25). The goblins return, again, causing “panic and emptiness,” but Beethoven “make[s] it all right at the end,” yet we know that “the goblins were there. They could return” (25). And they do in the third part of the novel, when Leonard arrives at Howards End, a move that almost turns the novel into domestic comedy, a genre Forster clearly plays with throughout the narrative. However, killing Leonard at Howards End helps the novel avoid a sentimental ending. He is one of the goblins. With him eliminated, there is a chance of keeping to one’s ideals. “The music

summed up to her all that had happened or could happen in her career" (26), thus providing the program for the novel.

Maybe it is Leonard who should have known better and who is suspicious about these people, as someone who "had been 'had' in the past," but "perhaps on account of music–he perceived that one must slack off occasionally, or what is the good of being alive? Wickham Place, W., though a risk, was as safe as most things, and he would risk it" (28). And so he goes with them to collect his umbrella.

Aunt Juley is also suspicious toward the young man, but Margaret dispels her fears: "You remember 'rent.' It was one of father's words –rent to the ideal, to his own faith in human nature. … he would say: 'It's better to be fooled than to be suspicious'" (32). It may be better, yet it is Leonard who pays with his life for his trust.

Margaret, who is the central figure of the novel in the sense that she is the one who accomplishes the novel's epigraph, "Only connect!" by bringing the two driving forces of her life, Henry and Helen, to some kind of a harmony, is highly skeptical of the Beethovenian program of the novel. She asks Leonard during their walk to Wickham Place, "Do you think music is so different to pictures?" Leonard of course cannot answer. Margaret continues:

> Now, my sister declares they're just the same. … Now, doesn't it seem absurd to you? What *is* the good of arts if they are interchangeable? What *is* the good of the ear if it tells you the same as the eye? Helen's one aim is to translate the tunes into the language of painting, and pictures into the language of music. It's very ingenious, and she says several pretty things in the process, but what is gained, I'd like to know? … Now this very

> symphony that we've just been having–She won't let it alone. She labels it with meanings from start to finish; turns it into literature. I wonder if the day will ever return when music will be treated as music. (29-30)

The only attitude even more irritating for Margaret is her brother's, who "treats music as music, and oh, my goodness! He makes me angrier than anyone, simply furious. With him I daren't even argue" (30). Trying to find her way out of this flux, she concludes with blaming the last contributor to the aesthetic history outlined earlier in this chapter: "But, of course, the real villain is Wagner" (30). It is worth quoting her tirade on Wagner in its whole, as it sounds an important aspect of what happens with the acoustic self:

> He has done more than any man in the nineteenth century towards the muddling of arts. I do feel that music is in a very serious state just now, though extraordinarily interesting. Every now and then in history there do come these terrible geniuses, like Wagner, who stir up all the wells of thought at once. For a moment it's splendid. Such a splash as never was. But afterwards –such a lot of mud; and the wells –as it were, they communicate with each other too easily now, and no one of them will run quite clear. That's what Wagner's done. (30)

While Helen sees "heroes and shipwrecks in the music's flood," Margaret "can only see music" (23) while listening to Beethoven. As for Leonard, "there had always been something to worry him, … always something that distracted him in the pursuit of beauty" (30). We face two kinds of issues here regarding the listening experience. While it is the inner experience of listening that triggers different types of semioses within the two girls, Leonard does not even reach the possibility of meaning-making. The question

emerges whether it is Beethoven whom we should "blame" for the death in the novel (and in the other novels discussed) or the post-romantic, post-Wagnerian way of listening to him. The next chapter of the dissertation inquires into this question.

We need to address two more immediate questions here: Is there hope for the Leonard Basts, and whose acoustic self does his fall act out? These two questions are interrelated, as the acoustic self appears in the paradoxical situation of one's trying to make meaning out of her or his life, yet as we saw in *A Room with a View*, a scapegoat may bear the brunt of the real death of a character, as a symbolic death of an aspect of the self that (re)cognizes itself. Does Leonard stand a chance to ever become a hero? Is his struggle, "pursuit of beauty," a meaningful one? I would suggest that he is not meaningful in himself. As the narrator describes him, "Leonard seemed not a man, but a cause" (246). A cause for Helen, and for Forster as well, as he addresses serious social issues in this novel as well. So, is there hope for the Leonard Basts? For the next generation–the narrative child is born–maybe. But Forster, even though a humanist, is no idealist. As in the case of Butler's *The Way of All Flesh*, there is plenty of money at the disposal of the main characters at the end, so there is a possibility of happiness, albeit away from society, away from London. Probably, most of their friends from the discussion club will not call on the Schlegel sisters in the future. Similarly to the much criticized ending of Beethoven's Fifth, the readers'/listeners' emotions are used up by the end for a successful end. The ambiguous "happy end" of the novel is reached by breaking down all the men involved to achieve the isolated reunion of the two sisters.

There are ideals and there is reality–even within fiction. There is the mysterious wych elm in the yard of Howards End that makes it a mythical place, similarly to

Florence in *A Room with a View*. There is also the ability to "connect" that the three characters achieve at the end. Yet Forster is also trying to work out the relationship between men and women in these novels. As Mr. Emerson puts it, "not until we are comrades shall we enter the garden" (Forster, *A Room* 203). But does this necessitate the killing, jailing, breaking of men? Isn't there another way to improve them? And also, what does Beethoven really have to do with all this?

An important, albeit somewhat hidden, link between *A Room with a View* and *Howards End* may be of help here. The link is between Opus 111 and the Fifth Symphony, and is also related to the listening tradition of Beethoven's works. Both works are in C minor, the key of the sublime, of heroic struggle.[42] As we saw in Chapter One, the interpretative history of musical keys has a long tradition, and the semantic role of a key may vary through time, while it also depends on personal taste–if one hears the difference at all. Forster playfully addresses the key in his essay on Beethoven, "The C-minor of that Life," where he argues with Beethoven's own comments on the different keys, judging the composer's views "rather odd" or "obviously wrong," while exactly pointing at the subjective quality of the issue. What Forster finds remarkable, though, is that about "the key he has made his own [C minor], Beethoven says nothing" (133). It is as if the key that "reveals Beethoven as a Hero"[43] could or should not be linguistically contaminated, (or profaned, to use a more Wagnerian term) by the composer. Beethoven's C minor, which according to Forster, "fused the sinister and the triumphant," escapes description, as it explodes the very measure of things: "Fate knocks at our door; but before the final tap can sound, the flimsy door flies into pieces, and we

[42] See Michael Spitzer, *Music and Philosophy*, 33.
[43] Charles Rosen, *Beethoven's Piano Sonatas: A Short Companion*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002) p. 134.

never learn the sublime rhythm of destruction" (133). The most mundane musical matter turns into sublime experience via this key, continues Forster, providing a description of Beethoven's work that may very well be used as a guideline for reading his own novels: "This knack of turning dullish stuff into great stuff is characteristic of Beethoven, and incidentally one of the reasons why one ought never to skip the repeats when hearing him–for only at the repeats does one hear what the dullish stuff means" (134). One of the dilemmas both novels grapple with is whether we can ever get to hear the great stuff by and through ourselves, or if the listening experience is preempted by our semiotic embeddedness. Leonard Bast tries to listen and is killed by the experiment.

As we saw in the previous chapter, combining fugal technique and the aesthetic tradition of listening to Beethoven, Woolf and Huxley explore the possibility of a self. Forster attempts to create harmony between and within human beings by forcing them to be honest to each other and themselves. Truth and music are connected in all four novels, but while in Huxley it is unattainable and in Woolf it reaches a peak of negativity, it seems that already in Forster it is beyond real. In a sense it is the only thing that is real, yet it cannot be reached in the world as it is. Maybe that is why music serves as truth, while being also so closely connected to myth in Forster's work. This move saves him from being utopian. He does not suggest that the world will be different and everything will be all right, but that the way we look at the world might change us and also how we look at ourselves. This is the Beethovenian lesson, which Leonard Bast fails to learn: "Death destroys a man; the idea of death saves him" (Forster, *Howards* 188).

Chapter Four

Wagner, Je T'aime … Moi Non Plus

"My head is filled with music which is certainly by me, since I have never heard it before, but which still is not my own, which I despise and abhor…"

Vernon Lee – *A Wicked Voice*

In medias res: "Will it really profit us so much if we save our souls and lose the whole world?" asks the narrator of *The Longest Journey* about three-fourths into the novel. This hesitant, yet suggestive question is at the heart of the narrative. At this point in the plot, Rickie, the main character, has just been carried out of the dining room of Dunwood House, in Sawtson School, where he teaches, having fainted after the realization that his illegitimate half-brother, Stephen, was his mother's son, not his hated father's. The plot has reached its climax, the road opens up for Rickie to be redeemed by his half-brother. To save his soul. But what does that mean in a secular, Edwardian world? The twist on the original question, which is translated in the King James Bible in economic terms, "For what shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?" (Mark 8:36) emphasizes the incompatibility of the New Testament and the world of Edwardian middle-class snobbery. Forster throws profit and soul, i.e., the issues of capitalism, social class, ethics, and desire, into his narrative cauldron and waits to see what comes out of it. It is against this backdrop that Rickie's soul goes bankrupt. The *Bildungsroman* fails. The twist on the biblical question carries the main dilemma of *The Longest Journey*, yet not only the question, but the novel as a whole is a twisted one,

Forster's "least known, most difficult, most personal novel" (Heine vii), which the writer nevertheless claimed to be "most glad to have written" (TLJ lxiv). The redeemer is saved by the redeemed-to-be, who is killed while saving his savior. So it goes in Forster's *Parsifal*.

4.1 Wagner: Let's talk about sex

The two previous chapters already touched upon the relationship between music and the gendered, desiring subject, and this chapter will further explore this aspect of the acoustic self, in the light of the Wagnerian. Wagner is an apt focus, as his oeuvre simultaneously addresses the hierarchy of the arts, desire and the subject, desire and social field. Also, his operas have proven rich semiotic fields for otherness and sexuality; music and *eros* (the drama within music), music and gender (the drama between music and text), music as sex (the drama of the action) present three levels in which to explore–or hide–desire. The Forster corpus itself had such a hidden phantom: the unpublished *Maurice*. It was the novel that was there, yet did not speak, like Percival in *The Waves*. In both novels, forms of desire appear that society did not accept at the time of their writing. Yet, it is not *Maurice* that we will mainly focus on. As we are concerned with the use of Wagner in the sexo-musicalization of fiction, it is an analysis of Forster's most Wagnerian novel, *The Longest Journey* that takes up most of this chapter.

We will have to proceed with caution, as the interrelatedness of the issues, as well as Wagner's complexity, which often becomes self-contradictory, necessitates the addressing of certain topics in separate sub-chapters before conjoining them in a reading of *The Longest Journey*, which is a parody of Wagner's *Parsifal*. The first sub-chapter

deals with gender and musicology, and is followed by a theoretical discussion of Wagner's gendered notions of music. Then, I will turn to *The Longest Journey* and show why several parts of the novel would make the Meister blush. It not only queers *Parsifal*, but also provides for it a "prophane stage" that the opera was never to be "desecrated by contact with" in Wagner's original intentions (Lucas 102-3).

4.2 Gender and Musicology

4.2.1 Not to Define Gender

The multifarious, and often conflicting, understandings of the concept of gender require a clarification of my use of this highly problematic term. As a strategic move, I will not define gender, as doing so would solidify the notion, universalizing it into a ready-made concept that can be applied to different socio-cultural settings. In fact, gender manifests itself simultaneously through, and together with, those settings themselves.

Gender thus becomes a process, interaction, relations acted out within specific contexts in different times and places. Such an approach brings about the immediate recognition of gender's embeddedness in a network of power relations and highlights other forms of oppression, including those based on race, class, ethnicity and sexual orientation; it also helps one avoid false generalizations and attempts at universalization (two underlying tendencies within gender theory initially critiqued by postmodern feminism, women of color and lesbian feminists).

One common trait within the different understandings of gender is the attempt to denaturalize the notion, that is, to disrupt the view that considers the male/female binary opposition as natural and which believes in two fixed genders, marked by external

genitalia as biological foundation. Every attempt to undermine this view (which is often reiterated in the subversive attempts themselves) includes problematizing gender in its historicity and context-specificity.

Joan Scott's insight into the possible uses of gender as an analytic tool incorporates many of the above described ideas. Scott understands gender as "a constitutive element of social relationships based on perceived differences between the sexes" (Scott 1067). As a constitutive element, gender incorporates:

- cultural symbols,
- the "normative statements" that aim at controlling the possible meanings of cultural symbols via the techniques of containment and limitation,
- "social institutions and organizations" (e.g. kinship systems, education, economy, politics) and
- "subjective identity" (the gendered enculturation of individuals).

These four factors are interrelated and create a subtle network that serves as "a primary field within which or by means of which power is articulated" (1067). This field, as stated above is closely linked with other forms and systems of oppression. Gender analyses have to keep in mind the multiplicity of experiences within each setting as well as the diversity of modes and networks of oppression in different socio-cultural environments. In our case, these include Wagner's and Forster's different situatedness.

Two more issues need to be addressed here before turning to music. One is the role of the subject within gender as a process and the other is the sex/gender distinction. I do not draw the sex/gender distinction because it resonates with a body/mind distinction and also suggests a dualistic relation, both of which I avoid reiterating.

Moira Gatens' work shows that falling back on this distinction can be avoided precisely through a recognition of the active role of both the mind and the body within the process of (en)gender(ing). She emphasizes that focusing on the subject, instead of consciousness, when analyzing gender, draws our attention to "the active processes involved in becoming a signifying subject" (Gatens 9). Gatens uses the notion of the imaginary body to frame an analytical matrix for this endeavor. The imaginary body, or body-phantom, is the physical image of our body, as we conceive it. This image is essential "in order for us to have motility in the world, without which we could not be intentional subjects" (12). The imaginary body is gradually acquired in its relation to the image of other subjects. It is characterized by its specific setting, as well as the physical and psychological history of the individual. A gendered reading of *Parsifal*, such as the Forsterian reappropriation of the opera, is technically a reinterpretation of the imaginary bodies in Wagner's opera from a different perspective.

An analysis of the imaginary body shows it to be the site of the historical and cultural specificity of masculinity and femininity. It is to the imaginary body that we must look to find the key or the code to the deciphering of the social and personal significance of male and female biologies as lived in culture, that is masculinity and femininity (12).

Besides showing the active role of the mind and the body within gendered enculturation, Gatens provides new directions for unraveling the complex network of different layers in which gender operates. Reading the imaginary body will turn it into a map through which the social, the historical, the cultural and the economic spheres can be

explored with regard to their gender implications. This approach also helps us gain a subtler understanding of the relationship between the biological and the cultural.

Based on Gatens' conceptualization of the terms, I use the notions of masculinity and femininity "as forms of sex-appropriate behaviours," which are "manifestations of a historically based culturally shared phantasy about male and female biologies," while the terms 'male' and 'female' generally designate biological difference (13). In accordance with this, the terms 'man' and 'woman' refer to animate male and female subjectivities – in their sexed bodies and above described complexities. On the grounds of these considerations, I understand gender as the body in its situatedness, or "biology-as-lived in a social and historical context" (14).

This thorough explanation is made necessary mainly by Wagner's ceaseless attempts to fathom the topic, but also as it is revealing about the relationship between sexuality and music, which is a recurring issue in all the novels discussed in the dissertation. Gender as a critical term has a lot to tell about both central notions of my investigations, music and subjectivity. Playing a pivotal role in the development of subjective identity, gender reveals several processes at work during an individual's enculturation. Power relations that are often institutionalized (and hierarchized) control these processes, and while the parameters for these interactions are not based on inherent features, those aiming to keep the *status quo* tendentiously provide essentialist arguments about supposed intrinsic values as the basis for available socio-cultural meanings. However, both gender and music are instances of intersubjective interaction, both are processes that gain meaning thorough the framework they operate in. Similarly to gender, musical meaning does not preexist its performance.

4.2.2 Gender and Music

It was Susan McClary's *Feminine Endings* that opened up the field of musicology toward questions of gender and sexuality. What is by now generally accepted as a legitimate approach in musicology came with a more or less two decades' delay compared to literary and film studies. "With musicology, art history and philosophy (traditionally conservative fields) lagging behind," postmodernism came, saw, conquered, without formal musicology noticing it (McClary, ix), and the field opened up only in the 1990s – simultaneously with the emergence of musical semiotics, as outlined in the introductory chapter. The reason, or the explanation, for musicology's unyielding rigidity was not that the practitioners of the discipline were more anti-feminist than those of other fields, but rather was due to the previously discussed purist attitudes towards music and meaning.[44] If music has only internal significance, it is 'beyond' the issues of gender and sexuality, ran the argument.

While it is probably opera where the "musical utterances of characters are inflected on the basis of gender" most visibly, McClary argues that notions of "masculinity" and "femininity" run deep in the very texture of Western music and musical thought (7), for instance the sonata form or tonality itself. The main issue at stake for her is showing how the "codes marking gender difference" in music not only reflect the current socio-cultural value judgments of their time, but also how the "musical semiotics of gender," that "composers worked painstakingly to develop" especially from the seventeenth century onwards, when opera emerged, create the gendered socio-cultural

[44] See Hanslick and Stravinsky in Chapter One.

fabric. To put it in Iserian terms, musical gendering is a performative "world-mapping" as the map does not denote, but "enables the contours of a territory to emerge, which will coincide with the map because it has no existence outside this designation" (Iser 156). Such a territory is gender in music. McClary quotes Stephen Heath's dictum to bring her argument home: "There is no such thing as sexuality" (Heath 3 qtd McClary 8).

Clearly, it is opera where gender and sexuality in/of music is most clearly manifested, yet gender and desire appear in the instrumental musical narrative as well:

> tonality itself—with its process of instilling expectations and subsequently withholding promised fulfillment until climax —is the principal musical means during the period from 1600 to 1900 for arousing and channeling desire. Even without texts or programs, tonal compositions ranging from Bach organ fugues to Brahms symphonies whip up torrents of libidinal energy that are variously thwarted or permitted to gush. (McClary 12-3)

With an astute move, McClary connects music and gender with narrativity. Invoking Teresa de Lauretis's narrative model, she shows that the tonic having been associated with masculinity in traditional music theory, and the dominant with femininity, the tonal musical composition (not only operatic, but also instrumental music) reiterates the Western narrative paradigm, in which the subject position is taken by male hero who meets a morphologically female obstacle, with whom, as McClary sums up, "the masculine protagonist makes contact with but must eventually subjugate (domesticate or purge) the designated [feminine] Other in order for identity to be consolidated, for the sake of satisfactory narrative closure" (14). McClary notes that the sonata form itself, the definitive large-scale structure in classical music form the mid-1800s to the beginning of

the twentieth century, showcases the narrative paradigm:

> In sonata, the principal key/theme clearly occupies the narrative position of masculine protagonist; and while the less dynamic second key/theme is *necessary* to the sonata or tonal plot (without this foil or obstacle, there is no story), it serves the narrative function of the feminine Other. Moreover, satisfactory resolution–the ending always generically guaranteed in advance by tonality and sonata procedure–demands the containment of whatever is semiotically or structurally marked as "feminine," whether a second theme or simply a non-tonic key area. (McClary 15)

Wagner was "encultured" into this narrative musical paradigm but he was grappling with the issue himself throughout his life, both in his theoretical writings and in his operas (within the operas, both in the librettos and the music). The question for him was closely related to the relationship of the sister arts, and it also appears in his treatment of the elements of music as well. In the Beethoven essay, discussed in the previous chapter, we met the Wagner after his conversion to Schopenhauer; nevertheless, the Meister tried to come to grips with the issue long before his turn to the philosopher. The earlier ideas are often incompatible with the later ones, and through these inconsistencies one may trace the development of Wagner's position on the topics of gender and sexuality, which occupied his mind throughout his career.

4.3 Wagner Detour No. 2: From Feuerbach to *Parsifal*

The significance of Feuerbach's philosophy is usually measured by the philosopher's impact on the development of Marx's thought. Feuerbach's writings were most influential in the 1840's and certainly were among the first ones to pronounce an antithesis of western metaphysical thought. Yet, Feuerbach also had a pivotal influence on music through Wagner, an ardent follower of the philosopher up to his already discussed Schopenhauerian turn. Wagner's *The Artwork of the Future* not only echoes Feuerbach's notion of the philosophy of the future, but also appropriates key ideas and metaphors from the anti-metaphysical manifesto Wagner's theories of music drama grows out of the Feuerbachian absolute philosophy.

Probably the most plausible way of briefly introducing Feuerbach's philosophy is through positioning it in its stance towards Hegelianism. Feuerbach was a student of Hegel and also one among the first to overturn his system. In general terms, Hegel's philosophy is "the conceptual self-articulation of reason" (Hanfi 11), the object of which is the Absolute, that manifests itself through reason. While the Absolute is always the same, reason is set in the particular historical moment. The task of philosophy for Hegel lies in the "theoretical activity of reason in terms of which the Absolute realizes its self-identity in the multiplicity of its phenomenal manifestations" (Hanfi 12). Philosophy, thus, tries to overcome the gap between the Ideal and the particular. Feuerbach's main critique of Hegel is that his philosophy does not allow for the coexistence of the Ideal and the particular. Feuerbach's move is practically the emancipation of nature, that is, the phenomenal. His "Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy" reveal how his sensualist *anthropotheism* does away with the "*dichotomy* of the *head* and the *heart*:"

> Anthropotheism is the heart raised to intellect; it speaks through the head in terms of the intellect only what the heart speaks in its own way. Religion is only emotion, feeling, heart and love; i.e., the negation and *dissolution of God* in man. The new philosophy as the *negation of theology*, which denies the truth of religious emotion, is therefore a positing of religion. Anthropotheism is a religion conscious of itself; it is religion that understands itself. (PT 166)

He elaborates on the question in his "Principles of the Philosophy of the Future:"

> The new philosophy looks upon *being* – being as given to us not only as thinking, but also as really existing being – *as the object of being*, as *its own* object – Being as the object of being – And *this* alone is truly, and deserves the name of, being – is sensuous being; that is the being involved in sense perception, feeling and love. … Only in feeling and love has the demonstrative *this* – this person, this thing, that is, the particular – Absolute value; only then is the *finite infinite:* In this and this alone does the infinite depth, divinity, and truth of love consist. (PPF 225)

Love is a central concept in Feuerbach's work and it is Feuerbachian love that is one of the initial driving forces of the plot of Wagner's *Ring*. For Feuerbach, love is absolute, as it is "not only objectively, but subjectively the criterion of being," and even more: "the criterion of truth and reality," i.e. the basis of his epistemology. "*Where there is no love, there is also no truth.* And the only one who *loves* something *is* also something – *to be nothing* and *to love nothing* is one and the same thing," he states (227). Absolute

philosophy, for Feuerbach, is the totality of living one's life through an epistemological *eros* – somewhat like Diotima's all-inclusive *eros* that starts out from the sensual and encompasses the intellectual by the time the circle of the epistemological quest closes.

Wagner dedicates "The Artwork of the Future" to Feuerbach and already the title echoes the notion of the 'philosophy of the future.' Wagner even borrows Feuerbach's "head and the heart" metaphor when writing about the function of tone:

> She [tone] is the *heart* of man; the blood, which takes this heart for starting-point, gives to the outward-facing flesh its warm and lively tint,—while it feeds the inward-coursing brain-nerves with its welling pulse. Without the heart's activity, the action of the brain would be no more than of a mere automaton; the action of the body's outer members, a mechanical and senseless motion. Through the heart the understanding feels itself allied with the whole body, and the man of mere 'five-senses' mounts upwards to the energy of Reason. (Wagner, TAF 111)

Love in the philosophy of the future is tone in the artwork of the future. It is exactly in the connecting power of tone in which Wagner finds Beethoven's Ninth Symphony a breakthrough. As L. J. Rather puts it, "where tonal expression reaches its limit, speech makes its appearance" (Rather 143). The appearance of speech is the appearance of "joy," the first word being *Freude* in the symphony.

> This was the word which Beethoven set as crown upon the forehead of his tone-creation; and this word was:—"*Freude*!" ("Rejoice!") With this word he cries to men: *"Breast to breast; ye*

> *mortal millions! This one kiss to all the world!* And *this Word* will be the language of the *Art-work of the Future*. (Wagner, TAF 128)

There is a significant shift between this interpretation of the symphony and that of twenty years afterwards. Wagner takes up his Schopenhauerian stance in the meanwhile and the word does not have a redemptive power anymore. As Rather points out, Wagner learned from Schopenhauer that "the surface world is Maya, the mere show of things… the mood of union becomes one of renunciation rather than jubilation" (144). As opposed to the 1850 interpretation, in 1870, Wagner explains how the first part of the symphony

> certainly shows us the Idea of the world in its most terrible of lights. Elsewhere, however, this very work affords us unmistakable evidence of the purposely ordaining will of its creator; we are brought face to face with it when he stops the frenzy of despair that overwhelms each fresh appeasement, and, with the anguished cry of one awaking from a nightmare, he speaks that actual Word whose ideal sense is none other than: "Man, despite all, *is* good!" (Wagner, "Beethoven" 102)

The trajectory of the Wagnerian oeuvre thus moves from the redemptive eternal feminine to a redemptive annihilation of desire, and ultimately of difference (i.e., the feminine itself). The philosophical change causes a shift within the hierarchy of the sister arts and also affects Wagner's gendered interpretation of the elements of music. There is also a third aspect influenced by the shift, that of the dramatic plot. As Nattiez points out in his *Wagner Androgyne*, the composer's "theory of the relationship between poetry and music is reflected, in his music dramas, in the relationship between man and woman" (WA xv).

Thus, we have three planes on which the sexual metaphor plays out: (1) word and music, (2) tone and melody, (3) male and female characters.

But the sexual metaphor takes up a new aspect by the time Wagner composes *Parsifal*. The question is a convoluted one, especially since Wagner's theories changed so much throughout the years. Nattiez's book follows through how sexual metaphors, especially Wagner's ever-evolving understanding of the notion of androgyny, are closely bound up with the composer's conception of the links between music and poetry. Nattiez also shows how Wagner's urge to be understood made him work on theory and operas at the same time, and also how getting new ideas in the creative process would add to his theory, resulting in a somewhat monstrous corpus of prose work. Yet, with several writings touching upon the same issues, these works also show how Wagner's thinking evolved. Although Nattiez's main focus is the *Ring*, he also addresses the notion of androgyny as it works in *Parsifal*, drawing a parallel with the theoretical treatises written while the Meister was working on his swan song. Nattiez reads these essays as "theoretical counterpart to his [Wagner's] final music drama" (161).

While in *The Artwork of the Future* (and also in *Opera and Drama* of 1851) poetry is the paramount ingredient of music drama, as we saw in the previous chapter, music takes the highest rank in the hierarchy of the arts after Wagner's 1854 conversion to Schopenhauer. This is discernible in the operas as well as the composer's writings. Nattiez recalls Jack Madison Stein's analysis to show how music gains supremacy in *Parsifal*:

> On a musical plane, Parsifal confirms this analysis. Stein has shown that this work has a shorter libretto and a longer performance time than any of

> Wagner' other operas: melodic melismatas on a single vowel are particularly frequent here, and all the motifs, save one, originate in the orchestra rather than in the vocal line. Is there an analogy between Parsifal and Kundry on the one hand and poetry and music on the other? Wagner will have recourse one last time to the topos of androgyny, albeit to other ends. (WA 166)

While the last two essays Wagner was working on before his death, "On the Masculine and the Feminine in Culture and Art" and "On the Feminine and the Human," show "Wagner's continuing interest in his sexual metaphor" (WA 167), Wagner's androgyny gains a clearly anti-semitic context here, the former title being an addendum to "Religion and Art," in which the composer elaborates on "a racist theory of regeneration" (167). Along with "Know Yourself" and "Heroism and Christianity," two additions to "Religion and Art," these writings explore the dangers menacing Aryan civilization, Jewish blood being the main threat, and provide a straightforward interpretation of *Parsifal* as an overtly anti-semitic work–as Wagner's "contemporaries realized from the outset" (167).

Nattiez's exegesis not only explains Parsifal's repugnance towards Kundry, but also elucidates the role of the Flower-maidens, and Klinsor and his "Arabian style" castle. Especially, "[i]n the character of Kundry, Wagner succeeds in combining anti-semitism with misogyny with peculiar force," and "only by refusing the Semite's kiss can Parsifal serve the pure blood of Christ" (168). Thus, by the end of his life, Wagner does not only re-rank the arts based on his gendered metaphor. The pre-Schopenhauerian, male-dominated hierarchy based on "feeling and understanding" (Wagner OD 236) is replaced by a total renunciation of desire and the elimination of difference: "Announcing

a future religion, an asexual Parsifal preaches the gospel of the renunciation of desire through the intermediary work of art in which, at the very end, every form of sexual and racial distinction is abolished" (Nattiez WA 172).

It is not likely that Forster was aware of these theoretical writings of Wagner, but he surely knew about his anti-semitism, and sensed a misogyny, which some argue he may have shared with him to some degree (Brown 40). The following reading of *The Longest Journey* shows Forster to be a far cry from the perfect Wagnerite.

4.4 *The Longest Journey*

After the novels in the previous chapter, one is not surprised by the presence of a writer figure in *The Longest Journey* who is struggling to infuse the power of music into his stories, exhibiting a serious case of music envy. After coming down from Cambridge, Rickie decides to pursue a writing career but that career never really takes off in his lifetime. After being rejected by two publishers, Agnes, by then Rickie's fiancée, is trying to persuade him to write "an out-and-out love-story," or at least express his ideas "more clearly" (141). Rickie's answer conveys the hardships of writers of musical fiction: "I can't soar; I can only indicate. That's where the musicians have the pull, for music has wings, and when she says 'Tristan' and he says 'Isolde', you are in the heights at once." Then he adds the question, "What do people mean when they call love music artificial?" (141). When pressed to express his ideas more clearly, he makes an attempt to answer, but cannot go further than saying, "You see–," (141).

Like Lucy's incomplete sentence about her musical experience in *A Room with a View*, when she can only say: "Music–," Rickie's sentence is also incomplete, its syntax

disrupted–silence says more about music than words ever could. Rickie's unfinished sentence also refers to his own inability to bring anything to fruition. He fails to become a scholar in Cambridge, fails in his marriage, in becoming a father, in becoming a brother, or for that, becoming himself. He has "certain ideas" (141), but is unable to make sense of them either to himself or to others. Somewhere inside he "knows," as/if one can know *musically*, but this knowledge never comes to the surface. And when it does, as we are getting used to in our musical narratives, he dies–acting out the acoustic self.

Cambridge plays an important part in the narrative, while also adding to its autobiographical flavor. The first scene takes place in Rickie's room in Cambridge, where a group of undergraduates are involved in philosophizing over the real existence of things. In a typically Forsterian, seemingly banal but weighty, discussion the students attempt to decide whether something exists only if there is someone to see it, or it is there even without an onlooker's acknowledgement of it. The example used in the discussion is a cow, and this bovine philosophy will bear strong significance as Rickie, who actually cannot follow the argument, is shown going astray already in this very first scene even before Wagner, and Agnes, enters the plot.

The group of students "were crouched in odd shape on the sofa and table and chairs" when one of them "crawled to the piano and was timidly trying the 'Prelude to Rheingold' with his knee upon the soft pedal" (5). The description of the group and the piano player becomes important in two ways: The dark, smoky room filled with a group whose members resemble a decadent image of Wagnerites, and the "crawling" and "timidity" pre-echoes Rickie's death, as he "wearily" (282) saves Stephen towards the

end of the novel.[45] We will return to these decadent Wagnerites later in our analysis, but there is something more that happens in this scene.

The first scenes in Forster's novels tend to reveal all the main themes of the plot, which of course only becomes clear at a re-reading of the texts. In this scene, to a soundtrack by Wagner, Agnes enters and disrupts not only the philosophical discussion, but also Rickie's life. "'Ladies!' whispered everyone in great agitation," when "a tall young woman stood framed in the light that fell from the passage" (6). This is the only description of Agnes for the first six chapters despite being one of the main characters and later Rickie's wife. What we see is a silhouette, and indeed, she will be an outline within a halo for Rickie throughout most of his relationship with her. He desperately tries to fill Agnes with qualities that he projects on her. Later, he does the same with Stephen, and indeed these two characters become the reason for Rickie's fall, his double bankruptcy.

The all-male company quickly disperses. Only Ansell, Rickie's best friend remains, but to Rickie's shock, he does not acknowledge Agnes' presence. Eventually, he leaves too, but first he casually asks Rickie if he is going to supper with him as if Agnes was not even in the room. Getting a negative answer, he departs without saying goodbye. Later, the two friends discuss the scene, but Ansell refuses to accept that Agnes was there, and calls her a "subjective product of a diseased imagination" (17). Later, when Rickie recalls the scene of Agnes' entry, Ansell does not give in:

> "Do you know–oh, of course, you despise music–but Anderson was playing Wagner, and he'd just got to the part where they sing '*Rheingold!*

[45] As pointed out by Fillion in *Difficult Rhythm* p. 51.

> *Rheingold!*' and the sun strikes into the waters, and the music, which up to then has so often been E flat–"
>
> "Goes into D sharp. I have not understood a single word, partly because you talk as if your mouth was full of plums, partly because I don't know whom you're talking about." (16-7)

Rickie goes on with his mundane reasoning, while there are at least two things he should be aware of: if Agnes were a Rhinemaiden, she would probably be Flosshilde, the one who erotically teases the distorted Alberich most cruelly out of the three. Rickie himself would, of course, have to take the role of Alberich, owing to his hereditary lameness, which should be a reminder to him to bar himself from marital bliss in the first place, as he is warned by Ansell. But Rickie learns everything the hard way. The other thing he should have noticed, is that Ansell's answer is actually very well-versed in music. Michelle Fillion points out that while the music actually turns into C major, "*[a]s the enharmonic equivalent of E flat,* Ansell's substitute tonic would create no audible change of harmony; as a modulation it is as unreal as the Rhine-Maidens offer of love, or Agnes herself" (DR 44).

Disease does not only show itself on the level of imagination. Agnes' relationship with Rickie originates in repulsion. Once alone in his room, she sees his shoes and blurts out, "Ugh!' Poor boy! It is too bad" (9). But then she recalls the perfect body of her athletic fiancé, Gerald, and gets comforted by that image. Gerald (who is to die not so long after this), Agnes, and Rickie make an awkward love triangle. On the one hand, as it turns out, Gerald and Rickie went to the same boarding school, where Gerald cruelly bullied him. On the other hand, Agnes develops a bizarre attraction to Rickie after

Gerald's death, in which Rickie serves as an antithesis and a reminder of what she used to have. As for Rickie, Agnes is mainly a mother substitute for him, but Rickie's primal scene, the musical core of the novel, reveals an even more complex Gordian knot of the vectors of desire. We will turn to this scene before further discussion of the themes of the text.

Whereas the *ekphrastic* moment in *A Room with a View* comes at the kiss scene in the field, in *The Longest Journey* it is a garden, and takes the form of musical ekphrasis. This musical core opens up in several directions within the novel, establishing connections with other points in the narrative. Rickie witnesses an embrace between Agnes and Gerald, and falls in love with their passionate, physical love. Gerald, his former bully, holds Rickie's future wife in a merciless grip, just as he did to him when they were kids. Although we never learn what exactly Gerald did to Rickie, we learn that "the elder boy had done things to him–absurd things" (38). The scene is thus loaded for Rickie in many ways, and becomes an eternal moment through which he sees the past and the future:

> Gerald and Agnes were locked in each other's arms.
>
> He [Rickie] only looked for a moment, but the sight burnt into his brain. The man's grip was the stronger. He had drawn the woman onto his knee, was pressing her, with all his strength, against him. Already, her hands slipped off him, and she whispered, "Don't–you hurt–" Her face had no expression. It stared at the intruder and never saw him. Then her lover kissed it, and immediately it shone with mysterious beauty, like some star. (39)

Rickie walks away and is accompanied to his room by his host, Ernest Pembroke, Agnes' brother, only to experience a "riot of fair images" (40) swarming in his head:

> Music flowed past him like a river. He stood at the springs of creation and heard primeval monotony. Then an obscure instrument gave out a little phrase. The river continued unheeding. The phrase was repeated, and a listener might know it was a fragment of the Tune of tunes. Other instruments accepted it, the clarionet protected, the brass encouraged, and it rose to the surface to the whisper of violins. In full unison was Love born, flame to flame, flushing the dark river beneath him and the virgin snows above. His wings were infinite, his youth eternal; the sun was a jewel on his finger as he passed it in benediction over the world. Creation, no longer monotonous, acclaimed him, in widening melody, in brighter radiances. Was Love a column of fire? Was he a torrent of song? Was he greater than either–the touch of a man on a woman?
>
> It was the merest accident that Rickie had not been disgusted. But this he could not know. (40)

Elizabeth Heine claims in her introduction to the novel that we read "the description of the full orchestration" of the Rheingold Prelude in this paragraph (Heine xiii), and Fillion also confirms that the ekphrasis accurately follows its "pattern of instrumental entries" (Fillion 47). The Wagnerian intertext makes Rickie's primal scene in a sense even more primal: it puts him in a world where gods, heroes and mortals interact, and may even transform into one another. This world is manifest also in his writing, the short stories

using abundant mythical elements and figures (similarly to Forster's early short fiction),[46] yet Rickie cannot differentiate between his "ideas" and his life, and does not see people as themselves, but rather as heroes, goddesses, or classical parallels. That is how his imagination is "diseased," as Ansell pointed out (TLJ 17). In the safe haven of Cambridge one can get away with it, but not in the "great world" (62).

Wagner enters and explodes Forster's text–Agnes enters and blows up Rickie's life. The repressed (m)other that (re)enters Rickie's life. His journey is from Cambridge to death, or rather to being unborn. A regression from *Alma mater* to his long-lost mother, the very first word of the novel being *Cambridge*[47] and the very last one, *mother*. If Rickie's plot fails as a *Bildungsroman*, it certainly succeeds as a *nostos*–to its most extreme.

But is it *Rheingold* or *Parsifal* that we are after? Neither and both, as usual. The perplexingly manifold Wagnerian (and non-Wagnerian) references in the novel show that Forster was toying with several ways of weaving the plot together. Stephen, the redeeming figure, for instance was first Siegfried, (later Harold, evoking Byron's narrative poem), before his name was finalized (Kermode 46). The characters are palimpsests of several intertextual figures, resulting in a profusion of meaning. As we will see, Rickie himself is sometimes Parsifal, yet mostly Amphortas.

But back to Rickie's vision. Fillion rightly argues that the paragraph, generally neglected by critics, evokes the "emotionalism of decadent Wagnerism" (47), which is one of the keys to queering the story. As Emma Sutton, in her study on Beardsley and Wagnerism explains,

[46] Rickie's short stories are very much like Forster's, see: "The Story of Panic"
[47] "Cambridge" is The title of Part I. The similarity between the tripartite structure of the novel and Wagner's operas has been pointed out by several critics.

> British Wagnerism took many forms, from attendance at the operas and music dramas, to political, mystical, and charitable movements inspired by Wagner's work, to literary allusions to and reworkings of Wagner's subjects; it had become a self-propelling cultural movement, at times only loosely related to the expressed theories and intentions of Wagner himself. (Sutton 3)

That is, not all Wagnerites were "perfect."[48] As a matter of fact, the image of the Wagnerite would probably have not pleased the Meister himself. Sutton shows how Beardsley's connection with Oscar Wilde, and his "representations of Wagner's protagonist as decadents and degenerates" added to the image of the "decadent Wagnerite" by the mid-1890s (Sutton 39). After Wilde's trials in 1895, this decadence became even more closely associated with homosexuality than before. Sutton claims that the connection had been established before, and as for example "the Wagnerian allusions in Wilde's work suggests, by the 1890s Wagnerism was associated, in some discourses, with homosexuality, and certain forms of Wagnerism perceived to denote homosexual or homoerotic tastes" (48).

Wagner's relationship to King Ludwig II and his works being promoted by homosexual and lesbian artists, including Verlaine and Vernon Lee, all contributed to this picture, and "[f]ollowing Wilde's trials, a number of critical and scientific texts were published in which Wagnerism and homosexuality were explicitly associated" (53). An example is Hanns Fuch's infamous essay from 1903, "Parsifal and Eroticism in Wagner's Music," in which he argues that Wagner was a "spiritual homosexual" (Fuchs 341).

[48] Although Forster probably agreed with some of Shaw's socialist views.

Forster, who was sixteen at the time of Wilde's trials, grew up in this cultural ethos, and must have been aware of that "interest in Wagner in the turn of the century was not just the evidence of an avant-garde aesthetic, it was also, for homosexuals, a lightly coded affirmation of sexual preference" (Scherer Herz 141).

Forster had just traveled to Germany before writing *The Longest Journey*, experiencing *The Ring* for the first time in his life, in Dresden (Kermode 32). He also had the chance to see *Parsifal* in concert versions in London, and probably owned the piano score of the opera (Brown 31). Another input related to the Parsifal legend was that his friend, and "most helpful critic" (Furbank 112), Trevelyan, published a play called "The Birth of Parsival," also in 1905. Trevelyan's treatment of the legend (based on Wolfram von Eschenbach's and Wagner's versions) focuses on the hero's origin, presenting Herzeloida and Frimutel's tragic love story, which has some parallels in the story of Rickie and Stephen's parents' affair.

4.4.1 Parsifal

It is not hard to detect Wagner's influence on Forster's work. What is harder, indeed, is to make sense of the novels in relation to Wagner's operas. Among those critics who have drawn connections between Forster's novels and Parsifal, there are as many who relate the opera to his other novels as to *The Longest Journey*. For Digaetani, *A Passage to India* is Forster's *Parsifal*, while in Lucas' reading shows the opera as the main intertext of *A Room with a View*, to mention only two. Comparisons are not much easier the other way around either: *The Longest Journey*, this "dazzling web of cross-reference" (Brown 50), has so many Wagnerian allusions that it is not obvious that reading it against *Parsifal*

is more fruitful than choosing *Siegfried*, for instance. We see versions of characters, split characters, and shifting of characters–with references to several Wagner operas.

One of the hardships is that, as Lucas points out in relation to *A Room with a View*, "there is no point by point correspondence–Forster is not writing a prose version of *Parsifal*" (Lucas 114). In my reading, similarly to Tony Brown and Judith Scherer Herz, *Parsifal* is the most relevant Wagnerian intertext of the novel as a whole, due to their web of "structural and thematic likeness" (Scherer Herz 141). I agree with Brown regarding the importance of the mother's role both in the opera and the novel, but I would not necessarily subscribe to his conclusions about Forster himself. Scherer Herz's analysis is alluring to my project in at least two ways. In the bigger framework, it is in alliance with this dissertation's mapping the musical in the textual: "*The Longest Journey* is explicitly about the failure of such quests, the gap between the words and music" (Scherer Herz 139) and on a smaller scale, more specifically connected to what I aim to show in this chapter, that "the music *is* the queer story" (149 emphasis mine). Meaning that not only *Parsifal* queers *The Longest Journey* but also the novel the opera.

"Unless you start with the fact that he was homosexual, nothing's any good at all," said Christopher Isherwood to John Lehmann when the two decided to publish Forster's *Maurice* after their friend's death (Moffat 20). Isherwood had received a package from Forster's attorney including the typescript of *Maurice*, and he asked Lehmann over to read the novel and help him decide whether to publish it. *Maurice* as an intertext is just as important for *The Longest Journey* as *Parsifal*. The characters and their desires in *Maurice* provide a context to those in *The Longest Journey* that help opening up what is repressed in the novel. Bryan Magee's often quoted statement that "Wagner's

music expresses, as no other art, repressed and highly charged contents of the psyche, and … this is the reason for its uniquely disturbing effect," (Magee 39) gains more specific relevance when unfolding the characters' desires in TLJ with these two intertexts.

Rickie lives the life of a Cambridge undergraduate among his fellows, "more like brothers than anything else" (TLJ 10). This homosocial idyll of Cambridge gets disrupted when Agnes enters the scene. Ansell behaves like a jealous lover from that moment on, even before any traces of intimacy appear between Rickie and the girl. Agnes is engaged to get married at that point, and it is not until Gerald's death that she gets close to Rickie. The change takes place when Rickie confronts Agnes after Gerald dies to make sure she "minds," and remembers "that the greatest thing is over" for her (54). Rickie is propelled by his vision of Agnes and Gerald, as the closest he ever gets to happiness in the "great world" (66) is witnessing their embrace in the garden–surely an androgynous moment, yet two things have to be remembered about androgyns: the male-female spherical creatures are only third in rank behind the female-female and the male-male ones in Aristophanes' story, and also, more importantly, they are only Plato's clever joke on Aristophanes' account in the first place. Too bad Aristophanes' pseudo myth *feels* so true: Rickie falls in love "through the imagination," not via his desires (TLJ 61).

Rickie falls in love with the idea of love, not with a human being. Agnes for him remains the silhouette that appeared in the door in the first pages of the novel.[49] A peculiar aspect of the relationship between the Agnes and Rickie is that it is based on abjection on both sides. Agnes' relationship with Rickie is based on repulsion form the very beginning, when she stumbles upon his shoes:

[49] Similarly, when Rickie is desperately looking for "life," he is not able to find it.

> She had known Rickie for many years, but it seemed so dreadful and so different now that he was a man. It was her first great contact with the abnormal, and unknown fibres of her being rose in revolt against it. She frowned when she heard his uneven tread upon the stairs. (12)

Right after their first kiss, the feeling returns: "She was frightened. Again she had the sense of something abnormal" (74). Also, when Rickie faints after learning that Stephen is his half brother, Agnes feels "menaced by the abnormal" yet again (132). This reaction is repeated in her feelings towards Stephen, the extramarital child of Rickie's mother: "She could not feel that Stephen had full human rights. He was illicit, abnormal, worse than a man diseased" (139). It is this last sentence, which is later repeated word for word, right after Agnes' most uncanny scene in the novel: Ten days after Rickie learns that Stephen is his mother's son, Stephen returns drunk, and causes a great commotion in Dunwood House. The following day, in her agitated state, Agnes mistakes Stephen for her late lover, and approaches him with the same words she had approached Rickie, saying, "For my sake" and calling Stephen 'Gerald' (256). She immediately tries to apologize, but the truth has come out that it was Gerald all along that she loved, not the "abnormal" Rickie.

> The poise of his shoulders that morning—it was no more—had recalled Gerald. … She had turned to him as to her lover; with a look, which a man of his type understood, she had asked for his pity; for one terrible moment she had desired to be held in his arms. (260)

It was life's cruel game that it was the only man even more "abnormal" than her husband who "had drawn out the truth" (261).

As for Rickie's disgust, on the physical plane, the reason might be very simple. When they become lovers, Rickie says, "I prayed you might not be a woman" (73), yet he answered her call and followed her into the dell. Rickie had found this circular dell in his second term, and it became a mythical place for him. "a kind of church–a church where indeed you could do anything you liked, but where anything you did would be transfigured. … he could even laugh at his holy place and leave it no less holy (18). It is here that he opens up to his friends, Ansell and Widdrington. He tells them about his parents, how cruel his father, who was lame and always laughed at him and who called him Rickie for being "rickety" (23), was to his mother all his life. After his father's death, mother and son set out to live a happier life, but the mother unexpectedly died while Rickie was out one afternoon, just after having offended her–and this part Rickie withholds from his friends. Rickie's error is to remain silent about this event. The mother remains a phantom for him, he buries her without reconciliation.

The dell becomes Klingsor's garden when Rickie/Parsifal/Amphortas shows it to Agnes. She enters first and calls his name several times before he follows her. "A bird called out of the dell: 'Rickie!' A bird flew into the dell" (73). Kundry calls Parsifal in his mother's voice to tempt him into the kiss, so Agnes also becomes a mother substitute while becoming Kundry at the same time. Kundry tells Parsifal about his childhood with his mother before kissing him, and Rickie is in a fetus position with his head on Agnes' lap when she bends down to kiss him for the first time. Kundry's kiss fills Parsifal's heart with Amphortas' pain and enlightens him. Rickie has a different kind of flashback: he is back in the garden, witnessing Agnes and Gerald's happiness. "He started, and cried passionately, 'Never forget that your greatest thing is over. … What he [Gerald] gave you

then is greater than anything you will get from me'" (74). This is when Klingsor tries to kill Parsifal with the spear, but it stops above his head, he seizes it, and drawing the sign of the cross in the air, he makes the Klingsor's castle disappear. The scene is a version of what had happened to Amphortas beforehand. On that occasion though, Klingsor wounds the knight with his own spear–in Wagner's version in the side, in the original Eschenbach version in "his private parts," making him sterile (Eschenbach 126).

Brown claims that "Rickie's lameness could in a sense be seen as a form of sterility" (38), but I agree with Heine on this point, who relates his hereditary illness to his latent homosexuality. Despite his Parsifalesque features, especially his self-accusation for his mother's death (Parsifal learns from Kundry that his mother died of grief after he had left her), Rickie emerges from the dell as Amfortas, and remains so throughout the novel. His nosebleeds, his weakness, breakdowns, and of course, his lameness all connect him to the wounded leader of the Grail knights. And he struggles to heal, for "[n]o man works for nothing, and Rickie trusted that to him also benefits might accrue; that his wound might heal as he labored, and his eyes recapture the Holy Grail (153). However, he dies without achieving his goal, and the only, albeit cynical, consolation that the narrator provides is that "death is merciful when it weeds out a failure" (287).

There are other Wagnerian warning signs along Rickie's journey that he ignores. Chapter 9 presents a symposium of letters, the first four being the correspondence between Ansell and Rickie. While Ansell is trying to prevent Rickie's marriage, Rickie brings up a Wagnerian analogy to describe Agnes, and Ansell retorts with another, a less pleasing one. Ansell foresees the catastrophe, as Rickie himself admits it towards the end of the novel. When Ansell reminds Rickie that he is "unfitted" for marriage both in body

and soul, Rickie evokes "Brünnhilde in the first scene of *Götterdämmerung*" which indicates a complete miscomprehension of his relationship with Agnes, and ironically foreshadows the exact opposite of what their marriage will be like.

Brünnhilde's lines in the opera run as follows:

> "How would I love you, if I did not let you go forth to new deeds, dear hero? One anxiety makes me hesitate–that I was too meager a reward for you. What the gods taught me, I have given you, a rich hoard of holy runes." (Act 1, Scene1)[50]

A couple of lines later, Brunhilde says, "do not despise the poor creature" while it is actually Agnes who calls Rickie a "[p]oor boy!" (9) when seeing his deformed shoes in his room in the first chapter, defining her relationship with him being based on abhorrence and pity. Agnes also uses "Poor Mr Ansell" (152) as an epithet. Which is interesting, as Ansell is a male Kundry and she is a female one. In his answer, Ansell calls Rickie's attention to "Elsa in the question scene of Lohengrin" (82). The scene is Elsa and Lohengrin's wedding night, when Lohengrin tries to calm Elsa, whose mind is troubled by Ortrud, giving more and more away about his holy origin. Breaking her promise not to ask Lohengrin where he came from and what his name was, she asks her famous questions, "Whence did you come?" and "What is your origin?" thus destroying their happiness.[51]

A parody of Rickie's story comes earlier, in Chapter 8, from Mrs. Lewin, an "always present, always hungry, and always tired" chaperone (44), who accompanies Agnes on her second visit to Cambridge. When Rickie's surprise announcement of his

[50] Translated by Andrew Porter.
[51] Translated by Chris Wood.

being engaged to Agnes clearly evokes some tension in Ansell, to ease the atmosphere Mrs. Lewin tells the story of her dove, Parsival, who was mistakenly painted green when her "knife-boy painted the dove's cage with the dove inside." (77). The bright green Parsival then was put in a cage with the bantams, until his cage dries, but the bantams, probably taking him "for a parrot or a hawk" pick out all his feathers. Mrs Lewin then says to the knife-boy, "This is the end of Parsival," to which he bursts in tears. (77) Even though Rickie eventually leaves Agnes and returns to his brothers, he cannot regain his heroic role (similarly to Amphortas).

4.4.2 Brothers[52]

Ansell and Rickie's relationship is a lot like that of Clive and Maurice in the posthumously published *Maurice*. There, it is Clive who opens up Maurice's eyes to his own sexuality as a Cambridge undergraduate, but he later marries Anne (another false redeemer), who "saves" him from his homosexuality, as he cannot bear the idea of the social stigma. However, his marriage is a dead end, and he and Anne never have children, due to his ignorance about heterosexual conduct. As the usually overlooked lines reveal, "They ignored the reproductive and the digestive functions" (Maurice 84). Ansell, half Gurnemanz-half Kundry, is the guard of the Monsalvat-like homosocial Cambridge fellowship. Ansell warns Rickie about the dangers of his engagement in the letters cited above, and tries to dissuade him. He warns Rickie of being "unfitted" both in body and

[52] Forster dedicated the novel to his Cambridge "Brothers," the Apostles. The society granted him membership in 1901 (Bradshaw xi).

soul (81). The bodily deficiency is that his hereditary lameness can be passed on to an offspring in an even worse form. As for the soul, Ansell puts it forward in Platonic terms:

> You want and you need to like many people, and a man of that sort ought not to marry. "you never were attracted to that great sect" who can like one person only, and if you try to enter it, you will find destruction. … Man wants to love mankind, woman wants to love one man. (81)

This is his Gurnemanzian argument, but this Ansell-Kundry acts jealously of Agnes-Kundry, whom he calls "not serious" and "not truthful" (82). Tilliard is perplexed about Ansell's agitation when Rickie announces his engagement. He observes, "really, you talk as if you were mixed up in the affair" (79). He is, indeed, and Rickie's involvement becomes clear from this paragraph in the previous chapter:

> He [Rickie] was thinking of the irony of friendship–so strong it is, and so fragile. We fly together, like straws in an eddy, to part in the open stream. Nature has no use for us: she has cut her stuff differently. Dutiful sons, loving husbands, responsible fathers–these are what she wants, and if we are friends it must be in our spare time. Abram and Sarai were sorrowful, yet their seed became as sand of the sea, and distracts the politics of Europe at this moment. But a few verses of poetry is all that survives of David and Jonathan. (64)

Rickie and Ansel are laying in the meadow in this scene, wearing garlands of buttercups and cow-parsley. When Rickie gets up to leave in order not to miss his lunch with Agnes, Ansell grabs his leg. "Rickie laughed, and suddenly overbalanced into the grass. Ansell, with unusual playfulness, held him prisoner. They lay there for a few minutes, talking

and ragging aimlessly" (65). Rickie then pulls himself away and takes off, leaving his friend "a little vexed, for he was a young man with a great capacity of pleasure, and it pleased him that morning to be with his friend" (65). The idyllic scene is reminiscent of Rickie's primal scene, witnessing Agnes and Gerald's embrace, and he does not realize that he has just missed his opportunity to experience what he saw, in a much more refined way. Yet he leaves, and Ansell declares war: "I fight this woman not only because she fights me, but because I foresee the most appalling catastrophe" (80).

Ansell's premonitions come true, and he cannot stop the unfolding events. Rickie gets married, and is held captive in Klingsor's castle, Dunwood House, a place of unreality, where he loses everything that he valued in life before. Herbert, the housemaster of Dunwood house, also a real Klingsor figure, sets out to "work" Rickie "in": "Rickie's program involved a change in values as well as a change of occupation" (154). Ernest and Agnes are so successful in controlling him that soon enough Rickie finds solace "neither in work for which he was unfitted nor in a woman who had ceased to respect him, and whom he had ceased to love" (183). The quest for "real existence" becomes a struggle for spiritual survival: "He did not aspire to beauty or wisdom, but he prayed to be delivered from the shadow of unreality that had begun to darken the world" (152). Yet, the real blow comes when Agnes gives birth to a deformed child who survives only for one week. Rickie's last hope is gone, and he realizes that "the lesson he had learnt so glibly at Cambridge should be heeded now; no child should ever be born to him again" (184). Although he still obediently performs his duties, his spiritual decline is inevitable.

There is another significant event that takes place during this process: Rickie learns that Stephen Wonham is his half brother, but he rejects him, following Agnes' command. The way this happens is a key to understanding Rickie's fate. Rickie and Agnes are engaged and they visit Rickie's only living relative, Mrs. Failing. She lives in Cadover, " the perilous house" (110) where "all the family breezes" start. Stephen informs them upon their arrival that their train had run over and killed a child at the local Roman crossing. The death of the child foreshadows both that of Agnes and Rikcie's daughter and Rickie's own death, which takes place at the exact same place, in a similar fashion. The irritated Stephen, being upset with his benefactor, Mrs. Failing, for not having had a bridge built there already, confronts Rickie with the facts. "Two children were kicking and screaming at the Roman crossing. Your train, being late, came down on them. One of them was pulled off the line, but the other was caught. How will *you* get out of that?" (my emphasis 95).

Cadover is "neither a pretty place nor fertile" (98), and in its vicinity are the Cadbury Rings, which the young couple visits with their hostess and Stephen. The Rings (another Wagnerian allusion) are "curious rather than impressive," (125) and are actually an ancient burial ground for soldiers. "A bank of grass enclosed a ring of turnips, which enclosed a second bank of grass, which enclosed more turnips, and in the middle of the pattern grew one small tree" (97). It is here that Mrs. Failing, slightly annoyed by her nephew, and in her desire to upset him, tells Rickie that Stephen is his brother, in a cruel, teasing way.

> But he heard her no longer. He was gazing at the past, which he had praised so recently, which gaped ever wider, like an unhallowed grave. Turn where

> he would, it encircled him. It took visible form: it was this double entrenchment of the Rings. His mouth went cold, and he knew that he was going to faint among the dead. He started running, missed the exit, stumbled on the inner barrier, fell into darkness— (130)

Stephen, who knows nothing about his origin at this point, comes to help. When Rickie comes to, he wakes with a cry, recalling Kundry's awakening, "not of horror, but of acceptance" (130). He calls his brother's name, but he immediately hears his own name called, twice, as in the dell, another circular sphere, by Agnes, who in the same motherly manner "caught him to her breast" (130). When Mrs. Failing realizes that a scandal might make things uncomfortable for herself, she decides to send Stephen away for a couple of days. The unsuspecting boy comes to say goodbye, as he feels sorry for the weakly guest, and calls his name. However, whereas Agnes' calls always use the first name, Stephen addresses him by his second name, being his social inferior. Nevertheless, this evokes the Cambridge "brothers," as they all call each other by their family names. After the first call, Rickie makes an attempt toward the window.

> He thought he had never seen her so beautiful. She was stopping his advance quite frankly, with widespread arms. "Elliot!" He moved forward—into what? He pretended to himself he would rather see his brother before he answered; that it was easier to acknowledge him thus. But at the back of his soul he knew that the woman had conquered, and that he was moving forward to acknowledge her. "If he calls me again—" he thought. "Elliot!" "Well, if he calls me once again, I will answer him, vile as he is." He did not call again. (137-8)

Thus, Rickie's trip to the dead does not provide him with knowledge. He rejects his brother's call, which is also his mother's call, as Stephen's voice is uncannily reminiscent of their mother's. When finally Rickie follows him, upon his departure from Dunwood house, it is their mother's voice that brings Rickie around:

> The words were kind; yet it was not for their sake that Rickie plunged into the impalpable cloud. In the voice he had found a surer guarantee. Habits and sex may change with the new generation, features may alter with the play of a private passion, but a voice is apart from these. It lies nearer to the racial essence and perhaps to the divine; it can, at all events, overleap one grave. (257-8)

The voice as the return of the repressed is a trope we addressed in the previous chapters. Of course, this can happen when the *logos* is gone. For Rickie, as the Schopenhauer-informed Wagner would put it, the world of "phenomenal appearance" has nothing more to offer, so he succumbs to the music of Stephen's voice. Stephen, a Dionysian figure via his numerous Pan references and his "sacred passion for alcohol" (267), offers a Schopenhauerian-Nietzschean solution here. Being saved by Stephen, Rickie gives up the world of representation in order to free himself in the primal flow of life. In this interpretation, his death is just a technicality: his writing lives on, as he is posthumously published. But Nietzsche is no Wagnerite by the time of *Parsifal*, and also Forster is up to something else here.

With Stephen, the mother's story comes out, her seventeen days of happiness. While being married to Rickie's father, she falls in love with a young farmer, and the two elope to Stockholm. However, he drowns in the sea when the two are out swimming, and

she returns to England to her husband and the young Rickie, whom she also left behind. Like Parsifal's mother, a rebel in Trevelyan's version, Rickie's mother transgresses the social norms and sacrifices everything for her true desire. Although she failed, she had those magical seventeen days. Ansell, who is certainly not a winner in this plot either, is described at one point as follows: "Failure would await him, but not disillusionment" (177). It is the latter that corrupts Rickie's soul, so that he becomes "heroic no longer" (255). Even though Rickie "wearily" redeems the redeemer (Stephen), Rickie himself is unredeemable. He fails in the same way as his short stories do, not being able to "get inside life" (144). In the end, at least he learns what his mistake was; before he dies, he proclaims, "(m)y character is to blame for our catastrophe" (277). Thus by the end, Rickie, so well acquainted with the classics, realizes the aphorism on the entrance of Apollo's Temple, *gnothi sauton*, but never gets inside it to read maxim eight on the wall, *sauton isthi*, which is the message the reader walks away with: "Be thyself."

That is what Stephen does, without learning it. From the epilogue-like last chapter the reader construes that Ansell lives in Stephen's house not far from Cadover, Agnes remarried and is now the mother of a child, and Rickie's writing, posthumously published, achieved relative success. Stephen has a daughter named after his (and Rickie's) mother, so both the mother's transgression and Rickie's imagination live on for posterity. The Jewish homosexual (Ansell) and the "accident" (Stephen) form a new brotherhood in the English countryside, not exactly erasing the Other according to Wagner's recipe. Another aspect in which Forster goes against Wagner is the "renunciation of desire," which is at the root of Rickie's fall. Although we see different failed attempts at such a renunciation in Wagner, such as Alberich's curse of love or

Klingsor's self-castration, in Rickie's case it takes the form of abandoning his Cambridge "brothers" in order to answer society's interpellation. With the allusion to David and Jonathan, the sexual identification of the Cambridge brotherhood, and of course that of the Grail knights of Monsalvat, turns both of these groups into a gay community where the members' desires (may it be spiritual or physical) become sanctified. *Parsifal* had been read in a similar vein almost immediately after it appeared on stage, but Forster's self-evident use of the opera as a gay palimpsest adopts it as one of the foundational texts of queer mythology.

I proposed two ways in which myth and music may interact in Chapter Two, but *The Longest Journey* reveals a third type of relationship. Forster's re-appropriation of the Parsifal legend capsizes its Wagnerian use in the opera, queering the pitch of *Parsifal*. Wagner employs the legend to erase any kind of *other*ness as its *dénoument*, celebrating the total elimination of sexual and racial difference. Wagner is out to save Aryan culture this way, but the renunciation of desire symbolically kills music as well. Due to the *ero*tic characteristics of music explored earlier, the anti-*ero*tic ending of the opera is necessarily anti-musical as well. Forster sets out to snatch back this pillar of Wagnerian religion and use *Parsifal* in an alternative, queer mythology.

Forster's strategy is similar to Adriana Cavarero's attempt in her influential *In Spite of Plato* to unfold the patriarchal symbolic order and start weaving an alternative representational system by re-appropriating its mythic figures. She claims that mythic characters are especially powerful, as they "express in a concentrated way the symbolic order that shapes" them, as their role is to activate "a sense of self-recognition" and to conform to the development of the symbolic order in which they appear. Thus, they serve

as forceful cultural symbols, yet may also be used to trigger a self-*un*recognition if activated within a different framework. Snatching these characters from their exclusive ideological use opens space for the emergence of different perspectives in which mythic figures still serve as beacons, but illuminate a radically different landscape. Like Cavarero's "enterprise of theft" (9), Forster's *Parsifal* is turned against its "original" symbolic network. The Wagnerian "original" is of course an appropriation itself, and *The Longest Journey* not only undermines its ideological employment of the archetypical character, but also the inner logic of the opera's plotting, thus incorporating both Parsifal and *Parsifal* into queer mythology. Postmodern Forster? *The Longest Journey* is rather a clear example of bi-directional intertextuality, in which the earlier *Parsifal* is transformed by the later text.

Chapter Five

The Dispersion of the Acoustic Self

While a considerable part of Chapter One was about narrowing the scope of the dissertation, zooming in on the topic to make it specific enough to fit the possibilities and the limitations of my project, this chapter aims at expanding the subject matter, is a conclusion of sorts before the Conclusion, which marks about as many beginnings as closures. I looked at three specific forms of musicalization in the main chapters from a perspective that is in no way prescriptive or exclusive. The novels themselves represented a particular period of a specific national literature. While deeming such limitations justifiable, my aim in this section lies in broadening the angle both geographically and chronologically, and reflecting on my findings from a somewhat readjusted point of view. Both novels to be discussed in this chapter were written in the turn of the twenty-first century, one from each side of the Atlantic. They will serve as a control group to the modernist British novels, to see whether the acoustic self makes sense in a postmodern context, or if these texts will actually highlight the specificity of the modernist efforts in musicalization.

Rafi Zabor's *The Bear Comes Home* expands not only the geographical scope, but also the musical framework of reference. Musicalization in the American novel has been more connected to jazz than classical music and, although the novel is from the post-modern era, *The Bear* grows out of the jazz novel tradition. The novel is illuminating for our renewed outlook on at least three grounds: the main characters are musicians, so the text offers an opportunity to further elaborate on the issue of musical performance–a

topic I touched upon in several instances, yet have not fully explored in the previous chapters. A second interesting aspect is that the main character, a saxophone player, is a bear, which is a unique twist on our search for musical subjectivity. The third unique feature of Zabor's novel, which may sound trivial at first, yet makes quite a contrast to the previous texts, is that the book is saturated in humor.

The musicalization of fiction, of course, continued, or rather proliferated, in the United Kingdom as well. A brief look at the table of contents in Gerry Smyth's comprehensive work, *Music in Contemporary British Fiction*, offers an impressive list of more than thirty novels written in the last two decades, in which music plays a central role–although Smyth's methodology is freer than that of the usual 'word and music' scholar, as he includes texts which are not musicalized in the intermedial sense outlined in Chapter One. His approach is, admittedly, more "concerned with the multitude of ways in which musical matters bear upon the reader's engagement with the text" (5) than with a strictly semiotic one. Vikram Seth's *An Equal Music*, a novel that is only briefly mentioned in Smyth's book is the other text I will look at in detail in this chapter. Just as Zabor grows out of the American tradition, Seth is an heir of the British one. His musical references are classical, mainly German/Austrian, while his characters are mostly English (and apparently all human).

I will start with Seth's novel, as it in many ways shows closer connections with the works discussed so far, while also offering connecting points to Zabor's text. After briefly immersing ourselves in jazz, we will take a glimpse at electronic music and hip-hop, as one cannot talk about postmodern music without considering its most forceful developments. Furthermore, electronic music will enable us to readdress issues of

originality and temporality from a different angle that will also shed new light on our previous investigations.

5.1 *An Equal Music*

The novel's first person narrator, Michael Holme, plays as a second violinist in the London-based Maggiore Quartet. The Maggiore is a relatively successful, yet financially not too profitable ensemble, so Michael also gives violin lessons. He maintains a moderately passionate relationship with one of his students, Virginie, who is in her early twenties, sixteen years Michael's junior. Early on, though, Michael unveils that there was another love: "in Vienna ten years ago. … What I lost there I have in ever come near to retrieving" (5). What it may promise, perhaps in a way is, a saccharine story of unfulfilled love (lost, found, then lost again), with enough erotic details to deserve a pink cover. However, it is also a complex musical novel, in which, with almost all of the characters being professional musicians, the dynamics of desire, music, and self-realization create a musical coordinate plane on which music has a more direct effect on the characters and the plot than in the novels studied in the previous chapters of the dissertation.

Writing about professional musicians provides plenty of opportunities to introduce musical references, allusions, rehearsals, concerts–both performed and attended–, "makers, repairers and sellers of instruments," as well as "teachers, critics, musicians' agents and managers, executives of record companies, managers of halls and festivals" (385), i.e., actors from the whole spectrum of music-making. While offering its

readers insight into this world exciting on its own merits, in its width of musicality, the novel also transposes several modernist issues into a postmodern context.

In the appended "Author's Note" Seth claims that "music is dearer to [him] even than speech" (385), and clearly shows high erudition on the subject, nevertheless, he feels that it is necessary to justify, almost defensively, this journey leaving his familiar grounds as a writer. Interestingly, he also had to explain at one point–although quite rightly he was not apologetic for that–why, as a Calcutta-born writer, he employs exclusively white, European, and mostly English characters in the novel (Bushnell 332). Even if his critics on this issue follow what may be regarded a "right" kind of ideology, trying to limit the scope of an Indian-born British writer of fiction seems bizarre. Interesting though is that these two extratextual aspects are in a way related, highlighting the connection between musical repertoire, nationhood, and identity. As the novel is about self-realization, these elements are all built into its texture.

A nostalgic aspect permeating the entire work appears on many levels, including the almost painfully conventional plot structure, its only brave move being its incompleteness. Like most of the first-person narrator Michael's favorite compositions, the plot remains incomplete. Chamber music itself represents a nostalgic form of music, an anachronism in the musical world, along with the string quartet, as both Erica, the Maggiore's agent and the music critic Nicholas Spare point out in the novel. And the distancing is not only chronological. The musical repertoire for the string quartet, along with Michael's obsession with his past mistake, takes us to Vienna: the world of Haydn, Mozart, Schubert, Beethoven, and Brahms. Being chronologically even more remote and the only non-Viennese, Bach also occurs, and his "Art of Fugue" becomes a key piece of

Michael's puzzling homecoming. Of course, the question of "Britishness" emerges, and as Bushnell rightly remarks,[53] his self-imposed exile from Vienna adds an interesting relativization of center versus off-center into the plot, so in a way, the empire does write back in the novel.[54]

Coming from Rochdale, once the heart of industrial Britain, now "a town with its heart torn out" (71), Michael is everything but a Londoner at heart. Although he lives in the very center of the city, right by Hyde Park, he misses the moors, the sound of the larks, and lives high enough above the street in his attic apartment to seclude himself even from the noise of the traffic. But he really is an exile from Vienna. In London he feels frozen, he works and exists like an automaton. When he enters Etienne's to pick up his seven croissants for his whole week's breakfast, the girl behind the counter exclaims, "You are a happy man." Seeing Michael's surprise she adds, "You're always humming." Caught off guard, Michael struggles to answer, "'It's my work,' I said, ashamed of my bitterness" (4). He lives in a fugue, both musically and psychologically. His flight from the Imperial City a decade ago put his self in hibernation, both in time and space: "London and Vienna project themselves upon each other" (232) throughout the novel.

An unexpected letter from Carl Käll, Michael's former violin teacher in Vienna, and the main reason behind his leaving that city, kick-starts the story. The sick and about-to-die Käll writes to Michael as if to ask for absolution for his dictatorial strictness. Käll's letter opens a Pandora's box in Michael's head, evoking a past around which his whole present existence revolves, a place and point in time where his life got

[53] See Bushnell's "The Art of Tuning: A Politics of Exile in Daniel Mason's *The Piano Tuner* and Vikram Seth's *An Equal Music*," 333.

[54] The musical repertoire of the Maggiore and the canon for string quartets in general is predominantly Viennese, so London becomes a cultural colony of the Habsburg Empire in terms of chamber music. For more on the question of performing the musical canon in the novel see: Benson, pp. 117-29.

stuck, both emotionally and professionally. Michael is aware of that "Vienna does things" to him he "can't explain" (250). In the upheaval of memories, he relates the story of his love with Julia, and his failure in development under the tyrannical Käll. Self-realization, love, profession, self-expression, self-restraint, and denial all come together in the memories evoked by Käll's communication. "You are very self-willed. Too much so," the teacher used to say to him (17). "But I was not learning, I was unlearning. I was unraveling" (18). We also learn about his breakdown on stage: "When I came apart at the concert, it was not because I had been ill, or because I had not prepared what I was playing. It was because he had said I would fail, and I could see him in the audience and knew he willed me to" (18). Michael breaks up with his center, Vienna, leaving both Käll and Julia behind. As a result, he never becomes a soloist, and can never overcome the mistake of abandoning his love.

"Making music and making love –it's a bit too easy an equation," (136) says Julia at one point, and indeed, the juxtaposition of music and love is more complex in the novel than making Michael's violin a substitute for Julia's body, even though he sleeps next to the instrument in Julia's absence. Actually, it is Julia who becomes the substitute of something else that Michael has lost in Vienna. Their temporary reunion, and playing together after all these years becomes for both a way to cope – for Michael with his past, for Julia with her present issues.

After they accidentally catch sight of each other on parallel buses in London, Julia comes backstage to meet Michael after a concert of the Maggiore. Significantly, the quartet plays the first contrapunctus of the "Art of Fugue" as an encore to an all-fugue concert. The notion of fugue is central to the text on three levels: Michael seems to exist

in a fugue, a constant flight form himself, even showing symptoms of a medical fugue with his occasional collapses and hallucinations. When he quits the Maggiore towards the end, he says to himself in his delirium of heartbreak, "Tell them I'm ill. … It's fugue I suffer from" (348). Also, his taste in music reveals a predilection for fugues, with special interest in unfinished ones. Schubert, "the author of perfectly unfinished masterpieces" (238), and Bach, especially "the incomplete, the unending 'Art of Fugue'" (380) provide the framework for the turning points of the novel. Connected to this, the fugue also provides the structure of Michael's plotting his own story. The voices from the past are his present and the present voices in his life are versions of those old ones. His identity is stuck in a limbo, where past traumas, unresolved situations, and unfinished relationships project themselves on each other. His reunion with Julia, the return of the first subject of the fugue, is his new opening for a possible resolution.

Julia is married now and has a son. Amidst her apprehensions, they rebound their relationship. As she changed her name form McNicholl to Hansen, the Maggiore's agent does not realize that it is the same Julia that she signs up for a quintet for their upcoming Vienna concert. All is set for Michael to face his demons. And for Julia to face hers: she is getting deaf, and this will be her last recital in an ensemble.

Julia's deafness is of course a *topos*. As discussed in Chapter Three, Wagner considered Beethoven's deafness as the musical apex of the composer's career, his godlike period, and indeed, Julia's solo recital at the end of the novel takes Michael into a metaphysical realm, offering a kind of secular salvation. Julia's deafness is not disclosed to the public at the time of the Vienna concert, and the members of the quartet are only informed about it after their first joint rehearsal. Her deafness–and it is hard not to "read

anything symbolic into it" (151), even if she warns Michael not to do so–is due to an auto-immune ear disease. Similarly to Wagner's Beethoven, Julia is losing the distractions of the outside world in her music. In order to cover up her hearing problem, she first puts up an act of eccentricity, not dissimilar from the originality of the solo artist, but ironically, and in accordance with Cumming's view, her originality is an act. At least in the beginning, because as deafness takes over, she becomes "absolutely forced to be original" (253) in the case of compositions she had not heard before her auditory problem started. While many musicians listen to a piece before they themselves play it, Julia explains that she must bring the composition to life from the score, from the neutral level of Nattiez's musical text.

The Maggiore quartet was founded by Piers, who is first violinist. His sister, Helen, plays the viola and Bill, the composer-cellist provides the bass line. A quartet is a peculiar entity and has a complex, quadruple personality. "It's the weirdest thing, a quartet. I don't know what to compare it to. A marriage? a firm? a platoon under fire? a self-regarding, self-destructive priesthood? It has so many different tensions mixed in with its pleasures," observes Piers (199). Erica approaches the same question from a more practical perspective: "That's the hardest thing about you lot: *how do you promote a quartet?* Who *is* a quartet? What is its real personality? Four faceless faces. Now, if I could split up your personalities, like the Spice Girls, there could be fantastic crossover possibilities…" (298). And there is the other four, their instruments: "Our instruments are the other quartet, each has its parallel life" (176).

The Maggiore has a ritual: they play a three-octave scale together in unison every time they are to play together, the key of the scale depending on that of the composition

they play first. “No matter how fraught our life have been over the last couple of days, no matter how abrasive our disputes about people or politics, or how visceral the differences about what we are to play and how we are to play it, it remind us that we are, when it comes to it, one” (12). A quartet gains an identity, which may remain intact even if its members are eventually replaced over time, yet which is in continual risk even if they are not. Michael replaced Piers’ partner, Alex in the Maggiore. Alex and Piers alternately played first and second violin, which Piers retrospectively regards as one of the possible reasons for their split. Michael fits in, but another disruptive influence arrives from the outside in the form of Piers’ next boyfriend, Tobias. “Under the influence of Tobias, he became obsessed with the holy writ of theory: what a piece is, what it should be, what it must be, what it couldn’t be. … Our job was to realize a reproduction of the score. Anything else–an imaginative idea, a fluctuation in pace, a whim, anything that smudged the template–was an abomination. There was no sense of ‘ah!’ to our music at all. We attained a lifeless lucidity” (15). The words, again, echo Cumming’s observations. Piers’ Tobias almost splits the quartet, but it is Piers who splits with Tobias first, and that solves the issue. The quartet is *one* again. During the all-fugue concert in the Wigmore Hall, which also marks Julia’s return in Michael’s life, he has some semiotic reflections on the multitudinous oneness of the quartet’s music:

> A strange composite being we are, not ourselves anymore, but the Maggiore, composed of so many disjunct parts: chairs, stands, music, bows, instruments, musicians–sitting, standing, shifting, sounding–all to produce these complex vibrations that jog the inner ear, and through them the grey mass that says: joy, love, sorrow, beauty. And above us here in

> the apse the strange figure of a naked man surrounded by thorns and aspiring towards a grail of light, in front of us 540 half-seen beings intent on 540 different webs of sensation and celebration and emotion, and through us the spirit of someone scribbling away in 1772 with the sharpened feather of a bird. (86)

The feather, the bird, and aspiring to the grail of light, again, emphasize a spiritual aspect in the musical experience. *Joy, love, sorrow*, and *beauty* show that the associations that music provides have not changed much throughout the centuries. For Michael, all roads lead to Vienna: "When I play Haydn or Mozart or Beethoven or Schubert I think of their city. … When I hear Bach, I think of her [Julia]" (83). At the concert he actually plays Bach, and the music summons Julia. She only decides to come backstage when hearing the encore (with a hearing aid). Bach has been a primal inspiration behind their relationship from the beginning: "When I listened to music, it was often to Bach. It was after all in her company, through her playing, that my feeling for his music had grown from admiration to love." While they played Bach together in Vienna, "it was when she had played by herself, to herself – a suite say, or an invention, or a fugue –that I had most completely yielded my being to Bach, and to her" (83).

Bach also unites Michael and Julia in deafness. Michael has to tune the E string down a tone to be able to play Contrapunctus I, which results in having to re-tune his hearing as well: "when I tuned my violin down a tone to play that Bach fugue, until I got used to reading the notes a certain way, my ears kept rebelling. I had to wear earplugs–to try to make myself deaf" (250). The ears react in self-defense, similarly to Julia's auto-immune ear disease, though Michael struggles with conventions, while Julia with her

own body. But "Why, when music is slipping away from her, has she chosen to re-involve her life with mine? Am I for her a static mark, a reversion to the days when music was for her an actual sense, not merely imagined beauty?" (156) asks Michael, and it shows that he actually has the answer. Their relationship is solely based on Julia's terms, and Michael seems to accept this, perhaps in the light of his past mistake.

The stakes could not be higher at the Vienna concert, as the Maggiore is to play an all-Schubert program in the *Musikverein*, the Mecca of classical music. Julia is to play the "Trout" with them, and Piers gives up the violin to Michael for vague reasons. Similarly to the previous concert Michael played with Julia in Vienna, this one also ends for him in a mid-performance breakdown. Significantly, the breakdown arrives in the form of deafness, in a compassionate moment of despair: "My ears cut out on me, I cannot hear, but I know these agile fingers have possession of the piece. … This silence I hear, is this what she is confined to?" (239). Then, in a vision, all the authority figures of his life appear to him "The attendant ghosts press down on me: out of my eye, to my right somewhere, is the statue of Carl Käll, who once reigned in my life; and on the balcony is Mrs. Fornby [who has generously lent her Tononi to Michael since he went to study in Vienna with Käll] sitting next to my old German teacher. Schubert is here, and Julia's mother. They attend because of the beauty of what we are re-making" (239). Michael plays, or rather hears himself play, the last movement–and thinks about it being the last movement Julia will ever play with others. "The last piece she plays in an ensemble, a few minutes more means everything; a repeat is everything; the last phrase must then be imprinted for ever; and the last note. It is a death, a passing*, for will she* ever?–she will not ever–play with anyone again. I glimpse her at the piano, a shimmering vision in

green. I am not an agent but a means, impermanent as the gold in her hair, the blue in her eyes" (239). After helping him off-stage, Julia saves the situation, and helps Michael overcome his breakdown. She herself does not need to go back on stage, as the next piece is Schubert's only string quintet.

Death is evoked in Michael's visions, and also the quintet they are to play is the last composition Schubert wrote and probably never heard performed. Julia, in a desperate attempt to revive Michael from his fugue, points at the original manuscript of Schubert's "Die Liebe" on the wall of the green room. Michael asks her to play it with him, and she obeys. The piece "is short, not sweet: urgent, unlyrical, agitated, uncertain," (242) yet it saves the day–together they overcome Michael's breakdown, and with it, also his past trauma. At least the professional one, as the real heartbreak is yet to come. The next day the Maggiore travels on to Venice, and Julia tags along with Michael. They spend a couple of days together before their final breakup: Julia travels home to her family. Michael is sick with heartbreak, and he walks out on the Maggiore in his despair.

Again, it is Julia who redeems him, or rather her playing the "Art of Fugue" at the first recital of her solo career. It is this "unfinished masterpiece" that makes Julia come backstage at the Wigmore a year earlier, and this composition also marks the end of the unfinished plot. In between, the Maggiore signs a contract for recording it as well, one of the reasons why it is impossible for Michael to continue with them. In a terrible nightmare Michael is tortured by a "terrifying music that I only gradually recognized as my single, unsupported line of the 'Art of Fugue' (367). The piece not only launches Julia's solo career, it also prepares Michael for his life to come. Despite his original

intentions, he ends up attending her Bach recital, and the experience is like going to the *Urquell*:

> Music, such music is a sufficient gift. Why ask for happiness; why hope not to grieve? It is enough, it is to be blessed enough, to live from day to day and to hear such music – not too much, or the soul could not sustain it – from time to time. (381)

An equal music–in the sense used by John Donne, a passage from whose sermon serves as the epigraph to the novel. There will be "no noise, no silence," (xi) in the life to come, but an equal music, as in Julia's playing, "a beauty beyond imagining – clear, lovely, inexorable, phrase across phrase, phrase echoing phrase, the incomplete, the unending 'Art of Fugue'" (381). Michael seems to find absolution in music, reaffirming the myth of absolute music.

5.2 *The Bear Comes Home*

Rafi Zabor's novel is about a budding alto-saxophonist, his struggles to make it in the music world, and develop his own style (inspired by Coltrane and Coleman). Fictional and real places, made-up figures and real musicians merge in this work, adding to its atmosphere characterized by a real immersion into the jazz universe. As a former jazz critic and drummer, Zabor not only provides an inside look into the New York jazz scene and the underworld of rural music club life, but also gives a knowledgeable account of the development of jazz–juxtaposed with the development of a personal musical style that the Bear works on throughout the story. Oh yes, let us not forget that the protagonist is a bear, a talking bear, to be more precise. And he meets and plays with real life musicians

like Lester Bowie, Steve McCall, Arthur Blythe, Roscoe Mitchell, and Ornette Coleman, among others.

The Bear is witty, sensitive, original, and empathic, yet somewhat eccentric, which is quite understandable considering his circumstances. He decides to give up his life as a street entertainer with his friend/owner, Jones, and enter the jazz arena. An impromptu appearance at the Tin Palace brings him recognition among some jazz musicians, who not only accept him and encourage his music, but also try to defend him from the authorities, who nevertheless take the Bear away at his second appearance (and his first real concert) at the jazz joint. The concert, however, is recorded, and an album is released while the Bear is being locked up. The success of the record enables him to sign with a major label, and earns him a contract for a studio album and a promotional tour. Once out of prison, the Bear falls in love with Iris, a medical researcher, and the reader is provided with more technical details of ursine-human sex than ever thought possible. What feels somewhat embarrassing about these scenes is that they are not even that embarrassing. The bear's-eye view works so well that neither the music nor the sex scenes prove off-key.

Music and sex are equally important to the Bear's bearness in the novel. In his existential quest, the Bear sees the two as paths to explore his spirituality, and he has immense capacities in both. While the bear factor cannot be fully nailed down (a common feature shared by a branch of animal characters in fiction, whether they are giant insects or humpback whales), three aspects seem relevant to its significance: the Bear is an existential (anti)hero, and yes, the famous first sentence about a certain *one morning* and *uneasy dreams* gets evoked in the novel, along with the Bear's allusions to his

Samsa-esque circumstances, which are not due to his being a bear, but rather being an individual embedded in this world. Also, his being a bear is actually anti-Samsa-esque: despite the overabundance of uneasy dreams in the story, the Bear was born as a bear. He has always been a talking bear. The second aspect is that, this individual is an artist, and his bearness illustrates the outsider position of the artist in society. Especially, being a jazz musician guarantees his monstrosity as an inhabitant of a nightlife-underworld governed by the seemingly ruleless rules of spontaneity, improvisation, and syncopation. This ursine saxophone player carries the traditional connotation of the jazz/blues musician's *dealing with the devil*. The bear of course does not deal with either devil or god, only with Beauty. He is strictly a Platonist–"an ideal society would be ruled by saxophone-playing bear kings," (180) he claims–and his metaphysical, spiritual quest, similarly to that of Michael in *An Equal Music*, is clearly a secular one: "Right down to it we're in love with beauty," the Bear proclaims at the end of an interview (180).

The third aspect of bearness is related to metaphysics as well. Depicting the male and the female as different species takes their polarity to the extreme. This polarization provides the ground for Zabor's dialectics, and sex and music both get probed as possible bridges between the sensuous and the spiritual throughout the text. This is where music overcomes sex: while both are sensuous, music is also spiritual. The Bear, who is by the way well-versed in eastern as well as western philosophy, has a tantric moment in his lovemaking with Iris, but he (or rather they) fail to use the experience for enriching their relationship, no matter how hard the Bear tries. As opposed to this, the Bear manages to break through the metaphysical ceiling towards the end of the novel in a tour-de-force

Coltranian solo–suggestively played at the opening of the Bridge, a jazz joint inside the body of the Brooklyn Bridge.

Early on in his life, the Bear realizes that "if you do anything the least bit unusual or interesting in this world, people will figure out a way to catch and kill you for it" (110). Yet the "portrait of the artist as a hunted animal" (68) turns out to be more of a self-hunt, due to the Bear's self-disgust related to his monstrosity. Peculiarly, his monstrosity lies not as much in being a talking bear, but in his musicality. A talking bear does break conventions, but the Bear feels that his musicality might be the breach of some universal rule:

> and as he began to find the thing in him that long ago had seized on music and learned to work it into an instrument of his secret self, it sometimes seemed that what was monstrous about him in this world or any other was not his sizable bearform and his impolitic gift of speech but his apparent talent for music, this powerful equipage that he had always prized above all his other contents: that fine instrumentality that played itself into intelligible shapes of sound and knew what lay ahead uncharted into the sea of time, and could fashion forms that lived their way into the obscurities of that future and thereby lit them: it seemed hideous to him now. Monstrous, to use the proper word. (114)

The Bear starts to turn inward in the light of this realization with self-disgust, "dropping like a stone down a well of himself in the dark: not a sound: hadn't reached water yet … all his previous solitudes had been masks that this deeper one had worn" (114). So, his real imprisonment derives from himself, or the lack of finding himself, not from the

authorities. And it is his music that catalyzes this crisis, imprisoning him into his own emptiness. “His beautiful talent was an ugly thing at heart, and if it came across authentic beauty in its march, it soiled whatever trace was resident there with its own smudge, trod the music into the mud and marched on hungry and destructive as before” (115). What actually happens to him is that as a sensitive artist, he feels that he is not ready. On the one paw (a recurring joke throughout the book), he feels he has given all of himself in his very first concert already and cannot but keep on repeating himself, to “imitate himself” (161), as he realizes that musically he is not where he wants to be; he knows what he should sound like, but there is no essence in his playing, no authenticity, he feels he is faking it.

Billy Hart, from whom he learns a lot, tells him: “The *music’s* like that, B. Whatever level you get to, there’s always something further to reach for, something you haven’t seen and didn’t know was there. Once you stop feeling that, you’re finished, basically” (50). And the Bear sets out to learn and learn, trying to establish an originality, creating his musical self. “It was only by this kind of inner substance that you could endure decades of unbelievable bullshit and still have something left to play” (355). The battle is that of form versus content. He goes through a lot of practice and experience to reconcile the two, and practically turns into a practiceoholic, but also, and perhaps more importantly, he goes on a tour with a band, learning to listen to others first to be able to hear himself.

So, are we stuck then with the old question of an inherent essence or self? Not exactly. The Bear wants to create a self *through* his music. What he wants is to establish a voice that makes him feel authentic. He wants to get away from the splitting experience

of self-expression, which makes him leave himself as re-presentation, and find self-sameness in music instead. His problem is "not the intensity, but self-division. If I can't play like a whole spirit again, I'll give up. I didn't come to music in order to find some new way of being all fucked up. I don't think you should have to cripple yourself into beauty" (194). And eventually he does find the right voice–giving himself up in music creates a new sense of wholeness. He begins to feel that "he and not the saxophone was the instrument, and that all the work he put in was no more than making sure the keys worked smoothly, the pads didn't stick and the reed wasn't thick with sober. … when the right moment came, it was time to step aside and be played upon" (358). The Bear is becoming the *forma formans* in the music the moment he becomes a vehicle for that music, to translate the experience into Cumming's terminology. His sonic self is achieved, he has become a real soloist, who brings music to "life."

The Bear loses many things–even if temporarily–along the way. As Jones points out to him once, he is bigger than what the world can take, both in body and ego. His relationship with Jones, his best and oldest friend, fades out when, having been treated very arrogantly by the Bear in the wake of his musical career, Jones realizes that it will not do for him to stay the Bear's sidekick for good, as he needs to make something out of his own life. Jones could pretend that the Bear needed him while being totally dependent on him, but with the Bear's professional success he realizes that although it may be easier to solve someone else's problems than facing his own, eventually he has to think about and act for himself. Their friendship, seemingly lost at first, transforms and after the initial break reshapes itself on more equal terms.

Similarly, the Bear is losing Iris, who quits her job and gives up her New York apartment to move in with him upstate New York. After taking back her daughters from her ex-husband, she becomes a protective mother-bear and excludes the Bear out of their life. Of course it does not help that the daughters, not as accepting as the couple's jazz musician friends, are not too happy about a bear sleeping with their mother.

It seems clear though that it is the Bear himself who wakes those around him to their situations; he acts as an agent to induce their change. Their lives are a mess even before meeting him, but through their contact with the Bear they realize that they want a change and they also begin to see what they want to change. "I want a self," (269) says Iris, and Jones claims to "need more of a self" (303). Their statements evoke those of the characters in *The Waves*, but in fact it is more of a contrast, their self-actualization is lacking on a different plane. Jones starts working for the record company that the Bear signs with, but he does not represent him any longer. Still, Jones keeps looking out for him, and even joins the band on the final destination of their tour to personally oversee their live recordings. While both Iris and Jones are well acquainted with the jazz world, the musicality of Jones' relationship with the Bear shifts increasingly to the side of music industry rather than itself being musical. This is not the case with Iris and the Bear. Although Julia points out in *An Equal Music* that the equation is a bit too easy between making music and making love, the analogy gains significance in both novels – as it also did in *Point Counter Point*, as shown earlier.

As the relationship between Iris and the Bear evolves, he feels that their sexual encounters carry an almost divine element. His attempts, however, to share the metaphysical as their joint experience fails. Instead of bringing them closer, the

improvement of sex actually distances them in their communication. "[H]ow could they be so intimate and he still feel that she was drifting away from him," wonders the Bear (262). Then, a little later, he thinks about it in more musical terms, "the moves were better, the sequences more finely worked, the transitions smoother, the view more gratifying … and yet … what bothered him?" (267). When their relationship gets overtly strained, Iris, in her desperation, also tries to communicate with him through their bodily contact, but to no avail. At certain points of their relationship they each think that carnal communication would take them further than linguistic, yet it is music that eventually opens the way for a new understanding between them by the end of the Bear's learning process.

Having opened the eyes of others the Bear has to come to terms with himself to move on with his professional and private life. His learning cycle begins in the Tin Palace, and concludes in the Bridge. The Bear's learning by doing, i.e., playing music, makes for the most enjoyable parts of the novel.

He needs to learn playing in three different settings of musical performance. As Billy Hart explains to him after their gig together,

> Look, there are three kinds of chops and they have less to do with each other than you think: the kind of chops you have when you're practicing alone, the kind when you play with other people, and then there's the kind of chops when you play with other people in front of an audience. They are three different things. The way I understand it, you've been sittin' home for a long time. Of course you're gonna have some off nights. There's no possible way you can expect yourself to know how to road. (49)

Ornette Coleman, who sees them at the Bottom Line, puts the bug in his head when commenting on his performance, asking him why he plays so much like a human person and whether he transposes from bear to human when he plays. "[W]hat I'd like is for you to play bear without transposing and I could play like me even if I don't know if that says man and then we could see what the total added up to if no one did the adding," hints Coleman at the possibility of a future gig together (41). Hearing this from his most important influence, the Bear begins "to suspect that he had a shot at being an original" (55). But taking the advice of his main source of influence (Coleman) to free himself from that very influence is not that easy. This makes the Bear realize that his music is not ripe enough for him even to play in front of an audience. It is too late for that though, as the machinery is already in full motion around him.

His time in prison and his encounter with Doctor Friedmann, an old psychiatrist from Vienna, and a Mephistophelean figure, leads him to face his diagnosis: "You suffer from unreasonable perfectionism and half began to consider yourself a monster for reasons completely normal" (119). While such diagnosis only points out the direction of a possible treatment, mixed in with Billy Hart's advice, the Bear needs to have "more chops, type three" (49), once out of prison.

After a successful studio session with his new rhythm section, the Bear goes on tour with the band. A fascinating account of their first concert, however, introduces a new hazard for a quartet playing together: failing without a reason. "Every Musician's Nightmare," (343) as the narrator labels it. Up to now we have encountered breakdowns, mishaps, but this one is due to something else. The account touches on a sensitive aspect of music, especially, live jazz:

> The Ted Beastly Quartet had full leisure in which to contemplate the mystery of four entirely competent, frequently inspired musicians passing what seemed like hour after interminable hour unable to play anything but notes. Their senses of time never meshed, not on the subtle, breathing level necessary to living music, and everything they played was reduced to mechanical gestures of tone production of no inherent meaning. The sounds went separate ways into the air or lay there on the floor like disused and misbegotten objects. None of them understood, given their known degree of talent, how this dispiriting thing could be, but evidently it was. It had not happened to any of them for a long long time. (343)

It certainly happened to the Bear for the first time, and the event marks the bottom of his professional *katabasis*. It is Garrett, the bass player, with more road experience, who tells him that this is a thing that just happens. "You'll have to use it," (346) he says, and the Bear gives himself and the band a chance to get out of the pit. Already struggling with his own musicality, he becomes maniacally obsessed with practicing, and the former melodic saxophone player, who lately sensed "form trying to overcompensate for a lack of animating essence" in his play (255), immerses himself in questions of harmony, "the intricacies, the matrix, the logic of the given forms" (348). With a scrupulous, yet determined attempt he works to find "his way out of the maze and back to beauty" (348).

Step by step, he builds himself up, even slowing himself down during the process. About half a dozen shows later, and by the time they reach the Midwest, he discovers some results: "Toward the end of the evening, he experienced the first flutters of something like the old bliss at the entrance to his heart, and visions beckoned him from

beyond the edge of things" (366). He does not feel ready yet, especially, since he "botched this stuff before," but he knows there is a hope for him (366). Also, as we saw earlier in *The Waves* and *A Room with a View*, music is often interconnected with an *ero*tic path. The lingo of Platonic, tantric, and musical gratification interlaces in the description of the Bear's ascent: "he began to experience, for the first time in ages, the music actually beginning to lift him, to invite him level upon level through higher, ampler, more satisfying worlds" (366). This musical *ekstasis*, however, as opposed to sexual gratification, does not make the Bear feel "depleted … hollowed out" (268), but opens up "visionary states, little ecstasies and flutters," states, in which "everything isn't so much forgotten as subsumed" (372).

An indication that the Bear's education has come full circle is that he feels that he has "again become such a melodist" (432). Having thus reconciled tone and melody, which Wagner regarded as the essence and the beauty of music, as described in Chapter Three, the moment comes for the Bear to break through his walls. The moment arrives in a solo that lasts more than thirty minutes, and which Zabor describes in as many as fifteen pages (!). To bring all the *ero*tic threads together, the solo is of course "the B-flat-minor-blues that formed the third part of John Coltrane's *A Love Supreme*" (445).

Zabor reconfirms his musical proficiency in this *ekphrastic* marathon, yet the musical terms give more and more space to the Bear's visions, as he does become the instrument he wanted to be: music starts flowing *through* him. The origin of his musical transubstantiation is his actual love, Iris, or rather her lack, (*Eros*), and the ladder towards beauty is music. Finally, the painstaking toils of the saxophone-playing bear king comes to fruition: the Bear dissolves in the Dionysiac:

> not just outside time and space, but blown clean out of individuation too. … Notes were nothing. Each note was itself infinite. It made perfect sense.
>
> Had the Bear still existed he would have laughed beyond being drunk on beauty and drowned in light. Had the Bear ever existed he would have plunged into these seas and tried out his stroke in them. Were he not himself these seas, and these seas him. It was so simple it was inconceivable not to have seen it all those blinkered bearshaped years. (454-5)

Even the ruleless rules are broken; something that only jazz allows for. That is how the Bear knows he has come home. The two narratives continue a tendency of modernist musical novels to employ music in search of metaphysical meaning, but Seth and Zabor seem to take a more Nietzschean attitude: music itself becomes the art that makes "life possible and worth living" (Nietzsche, The Birth 35). Art substitutes faith. The modernist skepticism toward an inherent or transcendental meaning that appears in the previous texts is replaced by the apotheosis of music in these two novels.

5.3 The Acoustic Self and Post-Modernism

In the intensely erotic context characteristic of both novels, one cannot avoid noticing that there is a high price to pay both for Michael and the Bear while they reach their musical epiphany. Although *An Equal Music* has an open ending, the musical life-to-come here on earth provides only partial solace at best for Michael: he has irredeemably lost Julia by the end of the novel. His musical redemption actually means coming to terms with this. Both novels end with a musical apotheosis, and in both cases earthly

beauty has to be left behind in return. The resolution of the failed romance comes on a higher plane, a musical one, for both protagonists. Still, in its ambiguous ending, Zabor's novel allows more for a scenario–even if fairy tale-like–in which Iris and the Bear work things out. That possibility means that the Bear does not necessarily have to leave behind all earthly beauty to reach absolute (musical) Beauty, and that the two are not mutually exclusive. Yet, the novel ends in a fairy tale parody, where the Bear comes home and the others, Iris and her daughters, find the traces of his return after they arrive home from a short trip to town. "Someone's been eating my breakfast," says one of Iris' daughters (Zabor 468). "Someone's been eating my breakfast too," adds the other one. It is Iris herself who eventually finds him: "Someone's been sleeping in my bed, *and he is still in it*" (469). It is also her who recognizes the hilarity of the situation shortly after, and her initial crossness about the Bear's unexpected return turns into laughter. But fairy tales don't come true and neither do inverted fairy tales. Still, a good laughter and an embrace is far better than what many of our modernist characters ended up with.

That music is not a question of life and death anymore, but rather that of life *worth living*, still shows the way these two novels carry plenty of romantic leftovers in their treatment of music. Perhaps, the main difference from the use of music in modernist novels is the goal reached or set via music. For Seth and Zabor music stands in for the search itself and not the goal. This clearly affects the musically created selves as well. The search becomes performance: along the lines of Cumming's sonic self, there is no risk of losing a preexisting self if the subject is being created via its performativity. The musical search becomes closely related to authenticity and originality in both novels. As in the case of the sonic self, the soloist adds her or his characteristic subjectivity to the

music bringing it to life. In Julia's case we saw an originality forced on her by her deafness. To the Bear, and the jazz musician in general, originality is also indispensible. Within the jazz tradition, the unique way of playing the standards has been essential to become an acknowledged musician. By the end of the twentieth century, however, the questions of musical originality and origin took a new turn with the advance of sampling, looping, and the mix. The aesthetics of lost and found opened new ways for authenticity.

5.3.1 Sample, Loop, and the Mix

> "The way hip-hop collapsed art, commerce and interactive technology into one mutant animal from its inception seems to have almost predicated the forms culture would have to take to prosper in the digital age." (Tate, "Nigs R Us")

Besides art and technology, hip-hop and contemporary experimental music also reshaped the relations between music and fiction, breaking up traditional genres and media, as in Bill Laswell's mix of a sample of William S. Burroughs' reading from *The Western Lands* with industrial sounds and drum loops (juxtaposing fiction, music, and sound). This is a complex enough area to provide the topic of a separate dissertation, yet looking at questions of subjectivity and temporality in contemporary sample-based music allows us an insight into some significant changes in music-making and perception that the postmodern era brought about. The hip-hop manifesto *Rhythm Science*, by sound artist and DJ Paul D. Miller, aka DJ Spooky that Subliminal Kid–the last part of the moniker coming from Burroughs' *Nova Express* (whose cut up method is kind of a literary equivalent of sampling and the hip-hop aesthetics)–provides an interesting case study for exploring these issues. Miller consciously creates his musical personas for different art

projects. The haphazard theories, interests, and inspirations presented in *Rhythm Science* stretch the boundaries of scholarship, yet this is exactly what makes the book a prime example of recent trends in the artistic conceptualization of postmodern identity, "at once completely superficial and deeply evocative of the postmodern fragmentation of unitary narrative" (Murray 134).

Sampling and the loop emerged already in the mid-60s, with Steve Reich's "It's Gonna Rain" and "Come Out" among the earliest examples, but gained real popularity and prominence from the 80s on "with the Ensoniq Mirage (the first affordable digital sampler, 1985) and the Akai S1000 (1989) present in most recording studios" (Grove), becoming the kernel of both popular and experimental dance, electronic, and hip-hop music. The emphasis on the equipment is crucial, as the connection of technology and sampling culture has always been closely connected, and it was in the digital age in which hip-hop gained its overwhelming popularity. Perhaps, it is a result of this connection that technology is not treated critically, or with modernist skepticism, but with welcoming embrace, reconnecting music and the subject in a new sphere. As Miller writes,

> Barring catastrophe, technology is not only here to stay, it now exists on an evolutionary scale. Combine everything from DNA sequencing to telepresent robotics to nano-engineering to space flight, and realize that we are embarking on the first steps toward transforming the species. Future generations won't have a 'dependence' on technology. They will have technology as a core aspect of their existence." (16)

With the digital revolution, and of course the Internet, continues Miller, the web became "the dominant metaphor for the way we think. It is a living network made up of the 'threads' of all the information moving through the world at any given moment. … Information and beats and rhythms never stay in one place. It's all about algorhythms: code is beats is rhythm is algorhythm is digital" (24). The Cold War's fear of technology gave way to a "delirium of saturation" (29), which may prove problematic in several respects, as the perceived democratization of knowledge and information carries the possibilities of unprecedented levels of control. Yet it is not my purpose here to provide a critique of the phenomenon, but rather to show how sampling culture works with the logic of internalizing outside data, employing "an endless recontextualizing as a core compositional strategy" (21). The saturation in information provides a new model for art that resonates with postmodern existence, and a new type of subjectivity: "If I internalize the environment around me, who is going to control how the information eventually resurfaces? It's an uncanny situation; the creative act becomes a dispersion of the self" (29). Identity becomes a fluid process for Miller, yet he shows an urge for old-fashioned narrative, a continuity in the flow: "Back in the day, it was called alchemy, but in the hyperfluid environment of information culture, we simply call it the mix. Sampling seen in this light? I like to call it cybernetic jazz" (29). Despite its postmodern logic, sampling culture needs a story: the self as dispersion, as diaspora. Miller highlights the importance of social and cultural-historical self-awareness, weaving an alternative mythology of the self's trajectory:

> One hundred years ago, in his searing work, *The Souls of Black Folk*, W.E.B. Du Bois contributed the concept of "double consciousness" to the

> American dialogue. … Jazz great Charles Mingus moved beyond Du Bois's dualities at the beginning of his autobiography, *Beneath the Underdog*, to a form of triple consciousness: 'In other words, I am three. One man stands forever in the middle, unconcerned, unmoved, watching, waiting to be allowed to express what he sees to the other two.' Mingus shows us a third path and, in a sense, continues the dialogue around how much people need 'franchise identity' to modulate their perceptions of themselves. Where Du Bois saw duality and Mingus imagined a trinity, I would say that the twenty-first-century self is so fully immersed in and defined by the data that surrounds it, we are entering an era of multiplex consciousness. (61)

Miller's lines, and his whole writing, display characteristics of the mix culture, sampling ideas from a wide array of sources, his argument often being based on associations and juxtapositions not unlike Burroughs' cut up method. This is true about *Rhythm Science* as a whole, a book of ambiguities, which clearly shows more breadth than depth and which probably does not present a single new idea itself (as it has been pointed out by its reviewers), yet which was ranked among the 2004 Books of the Year by Guardian Observer (Harley 96). But this is exactly what the remix is about: "Sampling is a new way of doing something that's been with us for a long time: creating with found objects."

The anxiety of influence is replaced by "The Ecstasy of Influence," as novelist Jonathan Lethem points out in his essay published in *Sound Unbound: Sampling Digital Music and Culture*, edited by Miller. Lethem argues that sampling is not only present in music, but in literary texts as well, what's more, it is the structuring principle of the

human consciousness. "Any text is woven entirely with citations, references, echoes, cultural languages, which cut across it through and through in vast stereophony" (Lethem 43). These citations cannot be traced, are anonymous, and used unacknowledged, writes Lethem. The self thus finds a new essence in this new aesthetics. "The kernel, the souls – let's go further and say the substance, the bulk, the actual and valuable material of all human utterances –is plagiarism" (43).

Sampling and the idea of the remix is not new. It is enough to think about Beethoven's 33 remixes of a waltz by Anton Diabelli or his own C minor piano Trio which he rearranged into a string quintet, Opus 104, a piece that serves as a motor in *An Equal Music* (and which also "owes a debt to Mozart").[55] As a matter of fact, it is much more complicated to use samples these days than it was in Beethoven's era, as record companies have not risen to the task of dealing with sampling, despite its prominence for more than 30 years.[56] But sampling has brought about more than copyright issues, and there is a significant difference between Beethoven's using Diabelli's original waltz and looping a sample. The question leads from the original to the origin of music, as one of the interesting issues raised by electronic music is its radical reformulation of the connection between music and the human body.

Pianist and composer Vijay Iyer addresses the problem in his essay, "On Improvisation, Temporality, and Embodied Experience," and points out that music, being an "embodied, situated activity," is essentially contingent on the structure of human body

[55] Liner Notes. The Nash Ensemble: *Beethoven: Piano Quartet & String Quintet.* Hyperion, 2009.
[56] The Sugarhill Gang's single *Rapper's Delight* single (1979) was based on a "reconstituted loop … it simultaneously introduced both rap and sampling to a worldwide audience" ("sampling"); Dj Shadow's *Endtroduction* (1996), the "first completely sample-based album, was assembled from thousands of short musical segments using an AKAI MPC60 sampler" ("Dj Shadow") German artist Johannes Kreidler used 70,200 samples in 33 seconds (Razocha 77).

in its production, physical properties, and reception, including "the environment and culture in which our musical awareness emerges" (Iyer 273). He maintains that especially rhythm, "a complex, whole body experience," works based on the participants' bodily participation in the musical experience and argues that an emphasis on the physical involvement in music, with its different cultural and individual manifestations, may not only shed light on essential characteristics of music and human musicality, but also emphasize the active role of the listener in the listening process.

Iyer uses Smithers' differentiation between processes that happen 'in time' or 'over time'. The latter is a "product oriented activity," such as solving a mathematical problem or painting a room, things that take time, yet "the fact that they take time is of no fundamental consequence to the result" (Iyer 275). In contrast, the temporal qualities of an 'in time' activity have a direct affect on "the overall structure of the process:" such as the speed of human speech "exploits the natural timescales of lingual and mandibular motion as well as respiration. Accordingly, we learn (and indeed we are hardwired) to process speech at precisely such a rate" (275). Thus, the mind simultaneously makes use of

> the constraints and the allowances of the natural timescales of the body and the brain as a total physical system. In other words, … *cognition chiefly involves in-time processes*. Furthermore, this claim is not limited simply to cognitive processes that require interpersonal interaction; it pertains to all thought, perception and action. (276)

Iyer goes on to explain how the participants of 'in time' "intersubjective activities, such as speech or music-making," have an awareness of a "mutual embodiment" (276). The

result of this awareness is a sense of a 'shared time' between them. This becomes an important element in the temporal aspect of musical embodiedness during the listening process. Listening becomes a temporally simultaneous "co-performance" with the musical performance. This is significantly different from 'over time' intersubjective activities, like reading, where the co-performance takes place on a completely separate temporal plane from the writing of the book. Musical fiction cannot recreate this aspect of the musical experience, although it would be interesting to look at such attempts. (Possibly, the Bear's 30-minute-long final solo at the end of *The Bear Comes Home* takes about that much time to read, yet it will remain an approximation at best.) Iyer cites the most common example of participating in time to music: dance. Interestingly, the Bear, to his own surprise, starts to dance at the end of his final, epiphanic solo:

> It took him longer than the audience to recognize what he was doing, took a long minute for him to realize, as one of Hatwell's choruses rose to a hint of climax in its middle but then fell back into its long smooth stride, … a shuttle of hips, a dip of shoulder, the feel of boards beneath his feet, the happiness of the wood … The rules were blown. The Bear did what he felt like doing. You know what he did. He danced. (Zabor 456)

At the climax of his spiritual path, *time and space* collapses for the Bear as he steps out of the realm of *individuation*. Up to that moment, he has never been where he wanted to be either in his music or in his own body. His self-realization, occurs through losing himself and becoming an instrument instead of a self. That moment comes when he dissolves as an *individuum*, and a Dionysiac dance at the end of his solo shows his oneness with his band, their music, and being 'in time' with himself.

What has been perceived as music by humans was until recently human-made music, with rare exceptions, points out Iyer. The human body has been the source and the measure of music until the technological developments of the twentieth century: "Music and humanity have arisen in tandem, the former out of the bodily activity of the latter, and so music necessarily bears rhythmic traces of our embodiment: pulse, phrase, gesture, ornament" (287). This musical embodiment probably represents one of the reasons for imagining a consciousness in instrumental music, as discussed in the previous chapters. Also, the bodily involvement in music is clearly a reason for music's affinity with sexuality, which remains in place even with the machines having taken over:

> More than a century after the invention of recording technology, we have become accustomed to recorded, disembodied, and electronically generated music. But still, music tends to bear these same traces of embodiment. Pulse-heavy electronic dance music often makes sonic references to the stomping of feet and to sexually suggestive slapping of skin. It is indeed rather telling that today, the most widespread uses of electronic music are in contexts meant for dance; the least humanly embodied music is ironically that which is *most* dependent on our physical engagement with it. (287)

Programmable equipment has been replacing humans, often for economic reasons, changing the bodily presence and the parameters of music-making. The formal characteristics of popular dance music have not changed much, but the physical possibilities and limitations of the musicians, which used to be the defining factors for those characteristics, do not bear any defining significance any longer. Iyer's example,

the drum loop, illustrates how digitally turning a single loop into an infinite pattern changes the temporal element of music at its core, which ceases to be a human-based temporality, yet, which is still capable of triggering the same human re/actions.

Hip-hop and DJ-ing present an even more interesting issue, as these types of music consciously play with the combination of physical and electronic presences and with 'in time' and 'on time' processes in creating music. The listener hears the manipulated samples, which may first carry the audial characteristics of human embodiment, yet which in the following moment might sound inhuman possibilities or human impossibilities, unsettling the listeners' image of a human source in the music. Such manipulations "alternately engage and confound our sense of embodied empathy" (288) and also readjust the listeners' focus on the only real time physical bodily input in the music. The DJs themselves perform an embodiment, using their turntables as an "improvisational percussion meta-instrument:"

> Using strategically chosen segments of a vinyl record, the DJ moves the record back and forth with one hand, while creating amplitude envelops with a fader on a mixer in the other hand. … there is an interesting continuum between these two general types, and that continuum is navigated improvisationally. A fragment of recorded sound can be manipulated percussively in real time, in a manner that temporarily overrides its referential content, causing it to refer instead to the physical materiality of the vinyl record medium, and more importantly to the in-time embodiment, dexterity and skill of its manipulator. (288)

Pointing out the root of the word 'manipulation' (*manus* - hand), Iyer emphasizes the listeners' focus on the act of the DJ-manipulator's ironic "counter-embodiment" and her/his metamusical activity that turns the musical experience into "*recognition of the act of breaking music with the hands*" (288).

An interesting act of musical manipulation (although not electronic) occurs in *An Equal Music*, which triggers Michael's musical existence turning from 'over time' to 'in time' through the novel. The incident has to do with the mix: Beethoven's own remix (rearrangement) of his early C minor Piano Trio Op. 1 No. 3. into a string quintet, Op. 104. towards the end of his life. It is a recording of this obscure composition that Michael goes out to obtain when seeing Julia the first time in London on a bus adjacent to his. It is this piece that reconstitutes him in his real time instead of his fixation on his past. First, playing the manipulated composition causes an interesting sense of a schizophrenic *counter-embodiment*. "My hands travel the strings of the C minor trio while my ears sing to the quintet" (54). Beethoven's manipulation takes the music from the ears to the hands, an alternative that in a way Julia has to practice due to her deafness. Music for her becomes imaginary, not physically heard, while also even more dependent on an impeccable physical execution by her hands. Moreover, Michael's already mentioned manipulations of the E string of his viola create a complex juxtaposition with deafness, playing on the embodiedness and counter-embodiedness of music. It is sharing those embodied 'in time' activities with Julia described above (music and sex) that enables Michael to get back to 'real time'.

The main purpose of this chapter has been to expand the scope of the dissertation in order to (1) identify questions not addressed and (2) to map possible areas for further research. It is usually (at least) as interesting to look at what has been left out of a project as an actual research itself. The novels analyzed in this chapter raise similar issues as the ones discussed in the previous sections, yet they do so in different ways, contexts, and perspectives. Similarly to its modernist forerunners, the postmodern musical novel also seems to tackle conflicting aspects of human existence through music, and this may make the acoustic self a relevant notion to apply to contemporary musical fiction. But in order to avoid turning it into a blanket term, a thorough circumscription of the drama of postmodern subjectivity would be necessary. Having noted these dilemmas and directions I move on to the conclusion.

Conclusion

Recalling Nattiez's description of noise as "whatever is recognized as disturbing, unpleasant, or both" (M&D 48) reminds us that music can probably be best defined in its opposition to noise. Yet the discussions of this dissertation have proven many of the oppositions cited in Chapter One to be only apparent contradictions. The readings also showed that music in fiction is a type of noise, as it always creates a disturbance in the narrative or points at uncanny moments with already present disturbances. These moments are then amplified by the musical experience or activated through the entrance of music. Perhaps the most thoroughly explored example in the dissertation is how Beethoven's music and name evokes a set of meanings that are deployed during the musicalization in the novels of Huxley, Woolf, and Forster; turning the metaphorical Beethoven into a noise in the system that alters its functioning. A vortex is created, an in-between*ness* of the metaphorical and the literal, through which music opens the text and its subjects simultaneously toward the inside and the outside, similarly to the workings of musical semiosis itself.

As emphasized throughout the dissertation, the emerging acoustic self explodes the subject in these instances. Perhaps the most vivid instance uniting all three elements is Spandrell's suicide in *Point Counter Point* that brings about the death of both music and Spandrell simultaneously, yet the noise remains, as the needle of the gramophone keeps on scratching the disc, revealing a machine-based temporality that defines both music and human subjectivity in the modern world, and also implying that silence has become a rare commodity. Even if language and music have been found to supplement

rather than oppose each other, music's analogy with human subjectivity, which has been the red thread in my inquiries, shows what cannot be bridged: the inside and the outside semioses of the subject.

To return to our example, Beethoven as noise becomes voice through the subject, *i.e*., through being assigned a subjectivity that lends it a consciousness. The characters, the writer, and the reader are all engaged in a process of taking up roles as listening and performing subjects, creating what we may define as Beethoven's voice in the novel. As we saw, Beethoven's voice is as much based on the listening tradition as on the subjective experience of the characters. All the novels highlight the historicity of cultural and social relations through which meanings become available and are also controlled. Whether a novel explores ways of listening to Beethoven's Fifth, a Bach fugue, or performing *A Love Supreme*, the characters keep constantly balancing on the edge between introvert and extrovert meaning-making, simultaneously constructing their own voice either from the inside (as a personal experience) or the outside (as an ideology). The clash of these two is the reason for their inevitable failure.

Noise, voice, and silence lead us to a related phenomenon not tackled in the dissertation: sound. Sound studies represent a rapidly developing field in cultural studies; 2012 saw the publication of Routledge's *The Sound Studies Reader*, Hillel Schwartz's colossal undertaking, *Making Noise*, a study of "unwanted sound," and a special issue of *Differences*, entitled *The Sense of Sound*. Intermediality works with the logic of metaphor, and sound carries new opportunities for audial meaning-making as Trevor Wishart suggests, since, as opposed to musical representation, sounds may be used directly, and create concrete metaphors:

> Using concrete metaphors (rather than text) we are not "telling a story" in the usual sense, but unfolding structures and relationships in time–ideally we should not think of the two aspects of the sound landscape (the sonic and the metaphorical) as different things but as complementary aspects of the unfolding structure (Wishart 166).

"Get this into a novel. How?" asks Phillip Quarles in *Point Counter Point*. But the answer is already there. Sound not only provides us with concrete metaphors, but also offers new narrative solutions. As Adorno notes on Mahler, "It is not that music wants to narrate, but that the composer wants to make music in the way that others narrate" (62). Yet the narratives available in the western musical canon remain ideologically limited by its structural framework, as McClary's has shown. Sound retains a freedom that western music does not possess in terms of narrativity–an interesting scope for further research.

The modernist novels discussed in the dissertation illustrate that along with the trajectory of the self from its romantic conceptualization to its postmodern dispersion, music also lost many of its romantic traits, though more slowly than human subjectivity. The supposedly inherent meanings attached to music by the romantics lost their validity in modernism, and the absoluteness of music turned into a myth, an emptied signifier refilled with ideology. I introduced and described three facets of the mythical use of music in modernist fiction (1) the love-hate triangle of fugue, myth, and the subject; (2) music revealed as a Barthesian myth, and (3) the Forsterian reappropriation of Wagnerian myth, reasserting Parsifal in queer mythology.

The analogy between music and human subjectivity takes new turns in the postmodern era with both identity and music being considered as fluid processes, mainly

constructed by different layers of outside relations and dynamics. Sampling and the mix is the musical epitome of this process. The two postmodern novels studied in Chapter Five unveiled some remaining traces of romantic ideas and sentiments about music, but these texts do not attempt to construct a self with an essence, but rather a subject in its performativity. What remains though is individuality, which gives the grain of the voice (Barthes 276) and brings music to life (Cumming SS 27).

The modernist British novel proves especially interesting in that it represents the middle-ground in this process, where subject, essence, culture, and nation all get questioned simultaneously. "Thank God I'm English," says Rickie in *The Longest Journey* (45), which is probably the most sarcastic joke Forster plays on his character, as there is not one single element in that sentence that was not critically questioned in the period.

Bibliography

Abrams, M. H. *The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition.* New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1953.

Adorno, Theodor W. *Mahler: A Musical Physiognomy*. Translated by Edmund Jephcott. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992.

Agawu, Kofi. *Music as Discourse: Semiotic Adventures in Romantic Music*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. (MAD)

---------. *Playing with Signs: A Semiotic Interpretation of Classic Music*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991. (PWS)

Antin, David. "Some Questions on Modernism." In *Radical Coherency: Selected Essays on Art and Literature, 1966 to 2005*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2011.

Aristotle. *Poetics*. Translated by Malcolm Heath. London: Penguin Books, 1996.

Bakhtin, M. M. *Rabelais and His World*. Translated by Hélène Iswolsky. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1984.

Barthes, Roland. "Myth Today." In *Mythologies*. Translated by Annette Lavers. New York: The Noonday Press, 1991, 109-64.

---------. *The Responsibility of Forms*. Translated by Richard Howard. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.

"blood." Vries, Ad de. *Dictionary of Symbols and Imagery*. Amsterdam–London: North Holland Publishing Company, 1974.

Bonds, Mark Evan. *Music as Thought: Listening to the Symphony in the Age of Beethoven*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.

Bradshaw, David (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to E. M. Forster*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Brillenbug Wurth, Kiene. "Sounds Like Now: Music, Avant-Gardism, and The Post-Modern Sublime." *Music and Literary Modernism: Critical Essays and Comparative Studies.* Ed. Robert McParland. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2006. 12-31.

Bromwich, David. *Skeptical Music: Essays on Modern Poetry*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 244.

Brown, Calvin. *Music and iterature: A Comparison of the Arts.* Athens, GA: The University of Georgia Press, 1948

Brown, Tony. "E. M. Forster's Parsifal: A Reading of *The Longest Journey*." *Journal of European Studies* 12 (1982): 30–54.

Bushnell, Cameron. "The Art of Tuning: A Politics of Exile in Daniel Mason's *The Piano Tuner* and Vikram Seth's *An Equal Music*." *Contemporary Literature,* Vol. 50, No. 2 (Summer, 2009): 332-62.

Butler, Samuel. *The Way of All Flesh*. Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions Ltd., 1994. (WAF)

Clements, Elicia. "Transforming Musical Sounds into Words: Narrative Method in Virginia Woolf's 'The Waves'," Narrative, Vol. 13, No. 2 (May, 2005), 160-81, 168.

Coeuroy, André. “The Musical Theory of the German Romantic Writers.” *The Musical Quarterly*, Vol. 13, No. 1. (Jan., 1927), 108-129.

Crapoulet, Émilie. “Beyond the boundaries of language: music in Virginia Woolf’s ‘The String Quartet.’” *Journal of the Short Story in English,* Special Issue: Virginia Woolf. Vol. 50 (Spring 2008) [online]

---------. *Virginia Woolf: A Musical Life.* London : Cecil Woolf, 2009

Cumming, Naomi. *The Sonic Self*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000. (SS)

---------. “The Subjectivities of ‘Erbarme Dich,’” in *Music Analysis*: Vol. 16, No. 1 (Mar., 1997), pp. 5-44,De Quincey, Thomas. “The Dream Fugue.” In *Confessions of an English Opium Eater*. Oxford–New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.

Dahlhaus, Carl. *The Idea of Absolute Music*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1991.

DiBattista, Maria. *Virginia Woolf ’s Major Novels: The Fables of Anon*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980.

DiGaetani, John. *Richard Wagner and the Modern British Novel*. Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1978.Dolar, Mladen. *A Voice and Nothing More*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006.

"DJ Shadow." Levine, Mike. *Grove Music Online*. *Oxford Music Online*. Oxford University Press. Web. 8 Jan. 2013. <http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/A2218982>.

Eliade, Mircea. *The Myth of the Eternal Return*. Translated by Willard R. Trask. New York: Pantheon Books, 1965.

Ewing, Charles Patrick and Joseph T. McCann. *Minds on Trial: Great Cases in Law and Psychology*, Cary, NC: Oxford University Press.

Feuerbach, Ludwig. *The Fiery Brook: Selected Writings of Ludwig Feuerbach.* Translated by Zawar Hanfi. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1972).

Fillion, Michélle. *Difficult Rhythm: Music and the Word in E. M. Forster*. Urbana: Universty of Illinois Press, 2010 (DR)

---------. "Edwardian Perspectives on Nineteenth-Century Music in E. M. Forster's *A Room with a View*." *19th-Century Music*, Vol. 25, No. 2/3, *The Long Century 1780-1920* (Autumn, 2001 – Spring 2002): 266-95. (EP)

Forster, E. M. *A Room with a View*. In *Three Complete Novels*. New York: Gramercy Books, 1993. (RWV)

---------. *Aspects of the Novel*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1962. (AN)

---------. *Howards End*. New York: Bantam Books, 1985. (HE)

---------. *Maurice.* London: Peguin Books, 1972. (M)

---------. *Selected Stories.* New York : Penguin Books, 2001.

---------. *The Longest Journey*. London: Penguin Books, 1989. (TLJ)

Fuchs, Hanns. "Parsifal and Eroticism in Wagner's Music." [1903] Translated by John Urang. *The Opera Quarterly*, Volume 22, Number 2, (Spring 2006): 334-344.

"fugue." Tucker, G. M. and Andrew V. Jones. *The Oxford Companion to Music*. Ed. Alison Latham. *Oxford Music Online*. Oxford University Press. Web. 8 Jan. 2013. <http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/opr/t114/e2723>.

Furbank, P. N.. *E. M. Forster: A Life.* London: Faber and Faber, 2008.

Gatens, Moira. “A Critique of the Sex/Gender Distinction.” In *Imaginary Bodies: Ethics, Power and Corporeality.* London: Routledge, 1996, 3-21.

“George.” Room, Adrian (Ed.). *Cassel Dictionary of Proper Names*. London-New York: Cassel, 1992.

Hatten, Robert S. *Musical Meaning in Beethoven: Markedness, Correlation, and Interpretation*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994.

Hamilton, John T. *Music, Madness, and the Unworking of Language*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008.

Haralson, Eric. “‘Thinking about Homosex’ in Forster and James.” In Robert K. Martin and George Piggford (eds). *Queer Forster*. Chicago-London: The University of Chicago Press, 1997, 59-73.

Harley, James. “*Rhythm Science* by Paul D. Miller aka DJ Spooky That Subliminal Kid” *Computer Music Journal*, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Autumn, 2005): 94-96.

Heath, Stephen. *The Sexual Fix*. New York: Schocken Books, 1982.

Heine, Elizabeth. ″Editor's Introduction.″ In E. M. Forster. *The Longest Journey*. London: Penguin, 1989.

Hodkinson, James. “The Cosmic-Symphonic: Novalis, Music, and Universal Discourse.” In S. Donovan and R. Elliott (eds). *Music and Literature in German Romanticism*. Rochester, N. Y.: Camden House, 2004, 13-26.

Hoffmann, E.T.A. “Review of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony.” In David Charlton (ed.). *E. T. A. Hoffmann’s Musical Writings: Kreisleriana, the Poet and the Composer, Music Criticism.* Cambridge–New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989, 234-52.

---------. *Tales of E. T. A. Hofmann*. Edited and translated by Leonard J. Kent and Elizabeth C. Knight. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969.

Huxley, Aldous. "The Young Archimedes." In *Collected Short Stories*. Chicago: Elephant Paperbacks, 1992.

---------. *Point Counter Point*. London: Harper Collins Publishers, 1994.

Irigaray, Luce. "Sorcerer Love: A Reading of Plato's Symposium, Diotima's Speech." Translated by Eleanor H. Kuykendall. In Nancy Tuana (ed.). *Re-Reading the Canon: Feminist Interpretations of Plato*. University Park, Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994, 181-195.

Iser, Wolfgang *The Range of Interpretation*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.

Iyer, Vijay. "On Improvisation, Temporality, and Embodied Experience." In Paul D. Miller (Ed.). *Sound Unbound: Sampling Digital Music and Culture*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008, 273-92.

Kermode, Frank. *Concerning E. M. Forster*. London: Orion Books, 2009

Klein, Michael. *Intertextuality in Western Art Music*. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2005.

Kramer, Lawrence. *Musical Meaning: Toward a Critical History*. Berkley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002.

Kristeva, Julia. *Desire in Language: A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art*. Translated by Thomas Gora, Alice Jardine, and Leon S. Roudiez. New York: Columbia University Press, 1980.

Lee, Vernon. “A Wicked Voice.” In *Supernatural Tales*. London: Peter Owen Publishers, 1987.

Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim. “Laocoön: An Essay on the Limits of Painting and Poetry.” In J. M. Bernstein (ed.). *Classic and Romantic German Aesthetics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 25-129.

Lethem, Jonathan. “The Ecstasy of Influence: A Plagiarism Mosaic.” In Paul D. Miller (Ed.). Sound Unbound: Sampling Digital Music and Culture. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008, 25-52.

Lévi-Strauss, Claude. *Structural Anthropology*. New York: Basic Books Inc., 1963.

Lucas, John. “Wagner and Forster: Parsifal and *A Room with a View.*” *ELH* Vol. 33, No. 1 (March, 1966), 92-117.

Lukacs, Georg. “” In *Writer and Critic and Other Essays.*Edited and translated by Arthur Kahn.

Magee, Brian. Aspects of Wagner. Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 1968.

Markey, A. A. “E. M. Forster’s Reconfigured gaze and the Creation of Homoerotic Subjectivity,” *Twentieth Century Literature*, Vol. 47, No. 2 (Summer, 2001), 268-292.

Marliave, Joseph de. *Beethoven's Quartets*. New York: Dover publications, 1961.

McClary, Susan. *Feminine Endings: Music, Gender, and Sexuality*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1991.

Meckier, Jerome. *Aldous Huxley: Modern Satirical Novelist of Ideas*, Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2006.

Miller, Paul D. *Rhythm Science*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004.

---------. (Ed.) *Sound Unbound: Sampling Digital Music and Culture*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008.

Minow-Pinkney, Makiko. *Virginia Woolf and the Problem of the Subject: Feminine Writing in the Major Novels*, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1987, 157.

Mitchell, W. J. Thomas. *Picture Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.

Moffat Wendy. *E. M. Forster: A New Life.* Bloomsbury: London, 2010.

Monelle, Raymond. *Sense of Music: Semiotic Essays*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.

Moore, Timothy E. "Scientific consensus and expert testimony: lessons from the Judas Priest trial." *Skeptical Inquirer* 20.6 (1996): 32+. *Academic OneFile*. Web. 18 Oct. 2011.

Moretti Franco. *Modern Epic: The World-System from Goethe to García Márquez*. Translated by Quintin Hoare. New York: Verso, 1996.

Mulvey, Laura. "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema" In Leo Braudy and Marshall Cohen (eds). *Film Theory and Criticism: Introductory Readings* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 833-44, 837.

Murray, Soraya. "Scratching the Surface: *Rhythm Science* by Paul Miller" *Art Journal*, Vol. 64, No. 4 (Winter, 2005): 133-135.

Nancy, Jean-Luc. *Listening*. New York: Fordham University Press, 2007.

Nattiez, Jean-Jacques. *Music and Discourse: Toward a Semiology of Music*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990. (M&D)

---------. *Wagner Androgyne*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993. (WA)

Nietzsche, Friedrich. *The Birth of Tragedy and The Case of Wagner*. Tanslated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books, 1967.

Pater, Walter. "The School of Giorgione." In *The Renaissance*. New York: Random House, 1963, 107-27.

Plato. *The Republic and Other Works*. Translated by Benjamin Jowett. New York: Anchor Books, 1973.

Porter, Andrew (Trans.) and Jacobs, Robert L. (Illus.). *The Ring of the Nibelung* (Der Ring des Nibelungen). Libretto: English and German. New York: London, 1976.

Prieto, Eric. *Listening In: Music, Mind, and the Modernist Narrative*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002.

Rahman, Tariq. "Edward Carpenter and E. M. Forster." In J. H. Stape (ed.). *E. M. Forster: Critical Assessments*. Mountfield near Robertsbridge, East Sussex: Helm Information, 1997 Vol. 4, 40-61.

Rather, L. J. *The Dream of Self-Destruction*. Baton Rouge–London: Louisiana State University Press, 1979.

Ratner, Classic Music: Expression, Form, and Style. New York : Schirmer Books, 1980.

Razocha, Florian. *Geistiges von der frühen Neuzeit bis ins Zeitalter der digitalen Information*. Norderstedt: Books on Demand GmbH, 2009.

Richter, Simon. "Intimate Relations," *Poetics Today* Vol. 20, No. 2 (Summer, 1999): 155-173.

"sampling." Fulford-Jones, Will. *Grove Music Online*. *Oxford Music Online*. Oxford University Press. Web. 8 Jan. 2013. <http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/47228>.

Saussure, Ferdinand de. *Course in General Linguistics.* Translated by Wade Baskin. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959.

Scott, Joan W. "Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis." *The American Historical Review* 91 (1986, Winter): 1053-75.

Scher, Steven Paul. "Melopoetics Revisited: Reflection on Theorizing Word and Music Studies." *Word and Music Studies: Defining The Field.* Ed. Steven Paul Scher, Werner Wolf, and Walter Bernhart. Amsterdam-Atlanta, GA: Rodopi. 1999. 9-24.

Scherer Herz, Judith. "'This is the End of Parsifal': The Orphic and the Operatic in *The Longest Journey*." In Robert K. Martin and George Piggford (Eds). *Queer Forster*. University of Chicago Press, 1997, 137-150.

Schlegel, A. W. "Theory of Art." In Jochen Schulte-Sasse, *Theory as Practice: A Critical Anthology of Early German Romantic Writings*. Minneapolis-London: University of Minnesota Press, 1997, 194-226.

Schopenhauer, Arthur. The World as Will and Representation, Translated by E. F. J. Payne. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1958).

Seth, Vikram. *An Equal Music*. New York: Broadway Books, 1999.

Shaw, George Bernard. *The Perfect Wagnerite: A commentary on the Niblung's Ring*. New York: Dover publications, 1967.

Silverman, Kaja. *The Subject of Semiotics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.

Smyth, Gery. *Music in Contemporary British Fiction: Listening to the Novel*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008

Soocher, Stan. *They Fought The Law: Rock Music Goes to Court*. New York: Schirmer Boooks, 1999.

Spitzer, Michael. *Metaphor and Musical Thought*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004.

---------. *Music as Philosophy: Adorno and Beethoven's Late Style*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006.

Stravinsky, Igor. *An Autobiography*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1998.

Sutton, Emma. *Aubrey Beardsley and British Wagnerism in the 1890s: The Imperfect Wagnerites.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Sypher, Wylie. *Loss of the Self in Modern Literature and Art*. New York: Vintage Books, 1962.

Tarasti, Eero. *Myth and Music: A Semiotic Approach to the Aesthetics of Myth in Music, Especially that of Wagner, Sibelius and Stravinsky.* Helsinki: Suomen Musiikkitieteellinen Seura, 1978.

Tate, Greg. "Nigs R Us, or How Blackfolk Became Fetish Objects." In *Everything But the Burden: What White People Are Taking from Black Culture*. New York: Broadway Books, 2003, 1-14.

Tolstoy, Leo. *The Kreutzer Sonata*. Translated by Isai Kamen. New York: The Modern Library. 2003.

Trevelyan, R. C. *The Birth of Parsival.* London: Longmans, Green, 1905.

Wagner, Richard. “Beethoven.” Translated by William Ashton Ellis. *The Wagner Library* 1.0.

---------. *Lohengrin*. Translated by Chris Wood. [CD booklet.] Decca, 1987, 66-240.

---------. *Opera and Drama*. Translated by William Ashton Ellis. *The Wagner Library* 1.0 (OD)

---------. *The Artwork of the Future*, translated by William Ashton Ellis. *The Wagner Library* 1.0. (AF)

Weatherfield, Andrea K. “Howards End: Beethoven’s Fifth.” *Twentieth Century Literature*, Vol. 31, No. 2/3, E. M. Forster Issue (Summer-Autumn, 1985), 247-64.

Weisstein, Ulrich. *The Essence of Opera*. London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964.

Whittal, Arnold. “Intertextuality in Western Art Music (review)” *Music and Letters* 87.1 (2006): 126-128.

Wolf, Werner. *The Musicalization of Fiction: A Study in the Theory and History of Intermediality*. Amsterdam-Atlanta, GA: Rodopi. 1999.

Woolf, Virginia. *A Writer’s Diary*, New York: Harcourt, Inc., 156.

---------. *The Letters of Virginia Woolf. Vol. 4: 1929-1931*. Nigel Nicolson (Ed.). New York: Harcourt Brace, 1987.

---------. *Moments of Being*. San Diego: Harcourt Inc., 1985.

---------. “The String Quartet” In *A Haunted House*. London: Granada Publishing Ltd.: 1989. 28-32.

---------. *The Waves*. Orlando: Harcourt, Inc., 1931.

Yeasted, Rita. “The Handelian Quality of Butler’s *The Way of All Flesh*,” Modern Language Studies: Vol 9, No. 2, Spring, 1979, 23-32.

Zabor, Rafi. *The Bear Comes Home*. New York: W. W. Norton, 1998.

Zawar Hanfi, “Introduction” In Ludwig Feuerbach. *The Fiery Brook: Selected Writings of Ludwig Feuerbach*. Translated by Zawar Hanfi. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1972.