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U.S. NEGOTIATING STRATEGY TOWARDS THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT,  
1967-1979

*City University of New York*

PH.D.

1985

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U.S. NEGOTIATING STRATEGY TOWARDS THE ARAB-  
ISRAELI CONFLICT, 1967-1979

by

Thomas Robbins Parker

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty  
in Political Science in partial fulfillment of the  
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1985

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1985

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Abstract

U.S. NEGOTIATING STRATEGY TOWARDS THE ARAB-  
ISRAELI CONFLICT, 1967-1979

by

Thomas Parker

Adviser: Professor Dankwart Rustow

This dissertation is an examination of United States negotiating strategies towards the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1967 to 1979. Drawing on theoretical studies of negotiating strategy as well as accounts of the negotiations by participants and commentators, we examine the use at various times during this period of different diplomatic approaches undertaken or supported by the United States in order to determine their relative effectiveness.

Throughout our study, we analyze negotiating procedures both at the strategic level -- the level of general policy orientation -- and the tactical level, where the day-to-day details of implementing policy goals are worked out. On both these levels, we compare the use of the partial approach, in which issues are segmented and dealt

with over an extended period of time, with the comprehensive approach, in which all issues are dealt with at the same time. Similarly, we compare the use of the separate approach towards parties, in which they are dealt with bilaterally, with the joint approach, in which they are dealt with multilaterally.

Our hypothesis that the combination of the partial approach towards issues and the separate approach towards parties is the most effective strategy for reaching significant agreements is largely borne out by the negotiations of the period. Our study leads us to qualify this hypothesis, however, in that it shows that a modified form of the comprehensive approach is more effective on the tactical level.

The 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty that resulted from the combined partial and separate approaches, though controversial, has important positive aspects. The goal of our study, however, is not to evaluate the treaty, but to elucidate the process by which it was arrived at in order to provide a model that can be applied to other negotiations. Based on a detailed analysis of twelve years of negotiations concerning a major area of international tension, this study proposes a set of broad guidelines for optimal ways of reaching agreements in multiparty international negotiations.

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## INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is an examination of United States negotiating strategies towards the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1967 to 1979. Drawing on theoretical studies of negotiating strategy as well as accounts of the negotiations by participants and commentators, we shall examine the use at various times during this period of different diplomatic approaches undertaken or supported by the United States in order to determine their relative effectiveness.

The 1967-79 period was one of intense negotiations. It opened a new chapter in Middle East history -- the Israeli conquest of a large amount of Arab territory -- and brought part of the same chapter to a close -- the return of the territory captured from Egypt. During these twelve years, as we shall see, periods of diplomatic progress, characterized chiefly by Israeli withdrawals in return for Arab agreements on demilitarization and political conditions, alternated with periods of diplomatic stagnation and failure. A series of agreements was reached from late 1973 to late 1975 and from late 1977 to early 1979, when Israel evacuated the Sinai and part of the Golan Heights, and Egypt reopened the Suez Canal and established diplomatic relations with Israel. In contrast, efforts by United

Nations mediator Gunnar Jarring and United States Secretary of State William Rogers between 1968 and 1971 went nowhere, and Rogers' initiative was denounced by both the Israelis and the Arabs. Similarly, President Carter's efforts to organize a Geneva peace conference in 1977 floundered and were finally abandoned in the wake of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's trip to Jerusalem.

Significantly, the periods of diplomatic progress do not seem to be adequately explained by shifts in the military, political and economic situations of the respective parties. Although these shifts sometimes improved the likelihood of agreements, they did not guarantee them. The overall military situation, for example, remained stalemated. Israel enjoyed military superiority because it had better trained and motivated manpower and mass conscription that allowed it to field almost as many soldiers as the Arab armies. These advantages had allowed it to fight five Arab armies to a standstill in 1948, defeat Egypt in 1956, vanquish three Arab countries in 1967, and defeat two armies in 1973.

Nevertheless, Israel could not inflict a final defeat on the Arabs, who had a much larger population and territory. In 1967 and 1973, Israeli planes dominated the skies of Damascus and Cairo and the Israeli Army probably could have surrounded both cities with armor and artillery. But Israel could not enter those cities without paying an enormous

price in precious manpower. Nor could it occupy and administer them indefinitely, as the Soviets could in Berlin, again because of manpower constraints. Moreover, millions of other Arabs from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean lived beyond these nearby capitals. In short, three million Israelis could not enforce their will on 100 million Arabs.

The 1973 war improved the chances for diplomatic agreements somewhat. The Arabs could negotiate from a position of greater dignity and had valuable bargaining chips in their Israeli prisoners of war. Israel also had a greater incentive to reach agreements with the Arabs, who represented a greater military threat. But these military changes were not sufficient to force Israel to reach a series of agreements, especially after Israel obtained the release of its prisoners of war and rearmed itself.

Politically, the 1967-79 period was also characterized by changes that did not fundamentally alter the various parties' policies. Jordan's King Hussein was in power the entire time and Egypt's Anwar Sadat and Syria's Hafiz Assad took power in 1970. Although Sadat was more willing to make compromises than his predecessor, Gamal Abdel Nasser, he still insisted upon the full restitution of the Sinai and progress on the West Bank and Gaza. Israel had four prime ministers from 1967 to 1979, Levi Eshkol, Golda Meir, Yitzhak Rabin, and Menachem Begin. All four

leaders shared similar views about the Sinai and the Golan, although Begin was toughest about the West Bank. Thus, during our period changes in leadership made the Sinai issues somewhat easier to deal with and the West Bank issues somewhat more difficult to resolve. But, like the new conditions created by the 1973 war, these changes were not great enough to explain the periods of diplomatic progress.

Economically, the rise in oil prices in 1973 and 1974 also probably increased the chances for diplomatic progress somewhat. The heightened power of the Persian Gulf oil producers increased pressure on Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories by the oil importing countries of Europe, Israel's major trade partner, and by the United States. Nonetheless, the oil price hikes did not diminish the strength of Israel's American supporters and may even have made them more vigilant about perceived threats to Israel. Thus, the rise in oil prices did not force Israel into reaching the series of agreements that it did at various times after the 1973 war.

It seems reasonable, therefore, to look beyond the objective military, political and economic conditions to the negotiation process itself in order to determine the reasons for the series of agreements arrived at after the 1973 war. This process had to deal with both the many issues separating the two sides and the numerous parties of the Arab coalition. In fashioning a strategy, negotiators could

approach the issues in two basic ways and, likewise, the parties in two basic ways. With respect to the issues, they could take what can be categorized as a comprehensive or partial approach. These approaches, which will be studied in greater detail further on, may be defined as follows: the comprehensive approach is an attempt to resolve all major issues of contention from the outset of negotiations, whereas the partial approach involves breaking up the issues into many components and usually dealing with them in ascending order of difficulty over an extended period of time. Similarly, with respect to parties, negotiators could take a joint or separate approach. The joint approach brings all or most of the parties together to negotiate, whereas in the separate approach, the parties negotiate bilaterally.

The Arabs, as we shall see, tended to favor the comprehensive approach towards the issues and the joint approach towards the parties. They wanted all their occupied territory back as quickly as possible, and no single Arab party wanted to break ranks with the common Arab front. The Israelis, on the other hand, usually preferred a partial approach towards the issues and a separate approach towards the parties. They did not want to return all of the occupied territories and wanted to deal on a bilateral basis with the Arab parties.

It appears, as previously mentioned, that the most fruitful negotiations, from 1973 to 1975 and in 1978 and 1979, were those in which the United States used the partial approach towards the issues and the separate approach towards the parties. During this period, Israel evacuated the Sinai and reached an agreement with Syria that stabilized the military situation on the Golan Heights. Conversely, the negotiations appeared to have stagnated when the comprehensive and joint approaches were undertaken by Secretary of State Rogers in 1969, President Carter in 1977 and United Nations mediator Gunnar Jarring, who was acting with United States support, in 1968 and 1971. During these initiatives, Israel either only made token concessions or rejected compromises outright.

In this study, we shall try to determine whether in fact, this pattern of successes and failures that coincided with different approaches was consistent throughout the entire period. We shall also examine the reasons for the successes and failures of the various diplomatic approaches and point out their respective strengths and weaknesses. In doing so, we shall test the hypothesis that the more modest strategy based on the partial approach towards issues and the separate approach towards parties -- referred to sometimes as the step-by-step approach -- was more effective than the more ambitious strategy based on the comprehensive

approach towards issues and the joint approach towards parties.

### Reasons for Studying the 1967-79 Period

The 1967-79 period lends itself to the kind of study that we have undertaken for several reasons. First, it is amply documented by participants and observers. On the Israeli side, the memoirs of Yitzhak Rabin, who was Israeli ambassador to Washington from 1968 to 1973, and Prime Minister from 1974 to 1977, describe the diplomacy of the period with considerable detail and frankness. Abba Eban, who was Foreign Minister from 1966 to 1974, provides a useful account of Israel's different reactions to the various approaches. Ezer Weizman and Moshe Dayan, who were Defense and Foreign Ministers, respectively, from 1977 to 1979, describe the diplomacy of the Begin and Carter period in great detail. The memoirs of Golda Meir, who was Prime Minister from 1969 to 1974, also deal with the diplomacy of this period, albeit in a cursory manner.

Several Israel journalists have contributed to the diplomatic record as well. Matti Golan, the foreign policy journalist of Haaretz, the country's best newspaper, provides an extremely useful, if polemical, account of Henry Kissinger's talks with the Israelis from 1973 to 1975. The distinguished Israeli journalists, Eitan Harber, Zeev Schiff, and Ehud Yaari, have contributed The Year of the Dove, an unpolemical account of the Carter-Begin period.

On the Egyptian side, President Sadat's In Search of Identity traces the background of his decision to go to Jerusalem. Egyptian journalist Mohamed Heikal, a confidant of Nasser and Sadat until 1974, analyzes the Egyptian shift towards the U.S. in The Sphinx and the Commissar: The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Middle East. Both shed light on Egypt's foreign policy.

The greatest amount of documentation is about United States policy making. The memoirs of President Carter, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski describe the period in great detail and can be cross-checked with each other and with the Israeli accounts. President Ford's A Time to Heal is an unusually frank account of Washington's attempts to induce the Israelis to make their second withdrawal in the Sinai in 1975. Presidents Johnson and Nixon also discuss in their memoirs United States policy from 1967 to 1974, although only in general terms.

William Quandt, the Middle East authority who served on the National Security Council from 1972 to 1974 and 1977 to 1979, provides a balanced, non-polemical account of much of the period in Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967-1976. The American journalist Edward Sheehan, travelled with the Kissinger party during 1974 and 1975, and talked with Kissinger's aides frequently. Although Quandt has a firmer grasp of the

conceptual problems involved in the negotiations, Sheehan, in The Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger, provides a detailed account of Kissinger's talks with both sides.

The most voluminous account of much of this period is provided by presidential advisor and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in White House Years and Years of Upheaval. Kissinger's account, though contested, is useful in defining the differences between the various diplomatic approaches. His conversations with Presidents Sadat and Assad, however, present special problems in that they often occurred without any of his aides, who could have provided accounts other than his own. Moreover, the eventual de-classified State Department cables of his conversations will also be his own summary of his conversations.

Nonetheless, Kissinger's memoirs can be of great help if handled with care. They can be checked against the accounts of those of his aides who are known for their objectivity and who have not hesitated to criticize him about certain of his actions. The memoirs can also be compared with the Israeli accounts, many of which are intensely critical of him. Moreover, as we shall see, Kissinger had little incentive to distort certain questions about negotiating strategy that are most germane to this study; he had a greater incentive to distort aspects of this historical record that concern us less.<sup>1</sup>

The historical record has also been supplemented in other important ways. The Jerusalem Post, Washington Post, New York Times and translations of the Israeli and Arab press provide useful day-to-day accounts of the negotiations. Our interviews with key participants and observers, including Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban, William Quandt, National Security Council member Harold Saunders and United States Ambassador to Egypt Herman Eilts also provide useful information.

A second reason for applying our perspective to these Middle East negotiations is the relative lack of theoretical analysis devoted to the period. The bibliography sections of Foreign Affairs and The Journal of Conflict Resolution, for example, include a number of studies of Middle East elites and decision-making, but only a small number of books on the negotiations' theoretical aspects. Moreover, the few books dealing with such theoretical dimensions do so in a limited manner. Roger Fisher's Dear Israelis, Dear Arabs, which we will discuss later, set forth the advantages of the partial approach towards issues in 1972, at a time when only the comprehensive approach had been tried. Berman and Zartman's recent book, The Practical Negotiator (1982), perhaps the best book on negotiating strategy since Fred Charles Iklé's pathbreaking study, How Nations Negotiate (1964), deals with the 1967-79 negotiations only episodically.

Given this period's lack of theoretical study, the negotiations can be examined from the wide variety of perspectives that the burgeoning literature on negotiations has set forth. The psychological aspects of negotiations have been dealt with, for example, by Daniel Druckman in Negotiations: Social Psychological Perspectives and by Robert Jervis in Perception and Misperception in International Politics and John Steinbruner in The Cybernetic Theory of Decision. Thomas Schelling's Arms and Influence examines the use of military power on negotiations. Various studies such as Michael Blaker's Japanese International Negotiation Style have dealt with questions of national character. But because of the alternative diplomatic strategies pursued during the 1967-79 period and their varied outcomes, a study of the comprehensive and joint approach and the partial and separate approach used in these negotiations appears to be particularly relevant.

A third reason for applying this perspective to the 1967-79 period is that most of the limited number of studies done on the partial, comprehensive, separate and joint approaches have analyzed them in contexts other than international relations. Samuel Huntington's Political Order in Changing Societies, for example, deals with the optimal way of pursuing domestic reforms. Citing as a prime example Kemal Ataturk's strategy of first promoting political, then social, and finally economic reforms in

Turkey, Huntington observes that by dealing with issues of contention sequentially, Ataturk "won acquiescence and even support for one reform from groups which would have opposed him on other reforms."<sup>2</sup> His conclusion that what we refer to as the partial approach is superior to the comprehensive one because it avoids mobilizing certain groups that are opposed to some, but not all of the reformer's goals, appears to be sound. It is, moreover, supported by the counter-example of the 18th century Austrian monarch Joseph II's unsuccessful efforts to enact a large number of reforms simultaneously in the face of opposition by nearly all the social and political groups that felt threatened.<sup>3</sup> Yet it is not clear that the same logic applies to the rather different domain of multi-issue, multilateral international negotiations.

A similar caveat applies to Albert Hirschman's Journey's Towards Progress, which likewise argues in favor of what we refer to as the partial approach when dealing with domestic reforms. He believes that the partial approach is superior to the comprehensive one because of its greater flexibility. In Colombia during the 1950s, for example, politicians attempted several approaches to land reform before hitting upon the right one. By not committing themselves absolutely to one plan, they were more easily able to switch to another. They were also able to "learn from their mistakes and from the resistances they

encountered."<sup>4</sup> Here again, it remains to be seen to what degree this conclusion applies to the type of negotiations we are studying.

In Dear Arabs, Dear Israelis (1972) Roger Fisher does apply the problems surrounding the partial versus the comprehensive approaches towards issues to international relations and, specifically, to the Arab-Israeli conflict. He expands on Huntington's thesis by arguing that negotiators should not only segment issues, but also deal with the easier issues first. He reasons that the easier issues should be tackled first because initial successes create an atmosphere of trust and momentum. Once enough trust and momentum have been generated, the harder issues can be addressed with greater confidence. If they are addressed too soon, however, they risk blocking progress. More specifically, Fisher suggests that instead of attempting a comprehensive solution to all the problems separating Israel and Egypt -- as the Johnson and Nixon Administrations had attempted through United Nations mediator Gunnar Jarring in 1968 and 1971 and the Nixon Administration had tried through the Rogers Plan in 1969 -- Egypt should begin a diplomatic offensive with a goodwill gesture such as inviting Israelis who had been critical of their own government's policies to Cairo. Egypt or the United States might then encourage Israel to return all of the Sinai to an Egyptian civil administration, while

acquiescing in the continued Israeli monopoly over troop deployments. Egypt might also offer security guarantees in the Sinai in exchange for a partial Israeli withdrawal from the Suez Canal. The main thrust of Fisher's ideas is to segment the issues so that their easier component parts can be addressed first. The more difficult issues, such as final boundaries and diplomatic recognition, should be avoided until a certain trust and momentum have been created. As we have pointed out, however, Fisher's theory remains purely speculative since nothing close to his approach had been tried at the time. Because of historical hindsight, we can see how similar approaches were implemented and with what results.

Unlike Huntington, Hirschman, and Fisher, Fred Charles Iklé anticipates a possible problem associated with the partial approach towards issues in How Nations Negotiate. Iklé warns that postponing the most difficult issues, as Fisher advises, may cause a temporary situation to congeal: "What negotiators often fail to realize is that they may settle an issue inadvertently, even though they formally exempt it from an agreement or explicitly reserve it for future negotiations."<sup>5</sup> Churchill, Iklé points out, realized at the Potsdam Conference that the postponement of the issue of the make-up of post-war governments in eastern Europe would mean that the temporary governments in place would become permanent. Iklé implies, therefore, that the harder

issues should be dealt with relatively quickly before the forces of the status quo congeal. He is setting forth, in effect, one of the main arguments in favor of the comprehensive approach. His book, however, which was published in 1964, does not deal at all with Middle East diplomacy.

The above analyses have all been made by political scientists. In the domain of purely theoretical social science, H.H. Kelly has argued for the comprehensive approach towards issues in more positive terms. He asserts in his article, "A Classroom Study of the Dilemmas in Interpersonnel Negotiations," that the more issues involved in a negotiation, the larger the number of the possible deals. Citing an experiment involving pairs of university students whose goals were to reach agreements involving as many of the issues that confronted them as possible. Kelley found that the students initially reached agreements on one item, but eventually gravitated towards package deals after realizing that premature agreements limited the possibility of future trade-offs.<sup>6</sup>

The comparative advantages of the joint and separate approaches as applied to parties have been even less analyzed than the comprehensive and partial approaches towards issues because most of the theoretical literature on

negotiations deals with bilateral bargaining. The few studies that have been done on multilateral negotiations, however, have tended to conclude that the more parties involved in negotiations, the more difficult they become. This finding is exemplified by the work of Knut Midgaard and Arild Underdal, who conclude that:

"One of the most fundamental consequences of increasing the number of actors is that the negotiating situation tends to become less lucid, more complex, and therefore, in some respects, more demanding. First, as conference size increases, there will be more values, interests, and perceptions to be integrated or accommodated. This means that an actor will have to consider more interests when deciding upon his move, as well as that there are more moves and systems of interaction to be coordinated. Second, since there are more interests to consider, there will probably also be more uncertainty as to the interests and motives of some of the others and as to their perceptions of one's own utilities."<sup>7</sup>

Another pair of social scientists believes that multilateral negotiations are more difficult because they tend to be more competitive. In a study of 48 university students, Fox and Guyer found that the subjects in a 3-person group were much more responsive to cooperative behavior by other groups than subjects in 12-person groups. They noted that a single competitive individual tended to influence the behavior of others, thereby decreasing the chances of settlement.<sup>8</sup>

#### Overview of the Arab-Israeli Conflict

In the absence of analytical models dealing with complex, multilateral negotiations, we shall draw up our own

schematic model of the situation under consideration. In this model, we shall abstract the parties and issues from their historical context in order to isolate the relevant factors and assess their relative importance before replacing them in their concrete situation for further study.

The basic components of our model are a single country and the coalition of neighboring countries with which it is repeatedly at war. Long-standing, deeply ingrained historic, religious and ethnic antagonism have made the conflict one of the bitterest in the twentieth century. The single country enjoys military superiority for several reasons. Although greatly outnumbered by its opponents, it has better trained and motivated manpower than the coalition and can field almost as many soldiers as they can, thanks to mass conscription. It is also suspected of having nuclear weapons, though it has said nothing about them. The coalition's major advantages are large territories and populations. The single country can defeat the combined forces of the coalition, but cannot occupy its large cities or large amounts of its territories.

The coalition is not closely united. Even its four core countries, which border on the single country, have independent military commands. Moreover, these four countries have only fought together once -- in the first war against the single country that precedes our period. In the

second war, which also precedes our period, only the largest country fought. In the third war that opens our period, three countries have fought. Two of the four core countries fight in the fourth war that takes place in the middle of our period.

The core countries also have varying degrees of independence from one another and from the other coalition countries in the region. The largest one is militarily the strongest and the most independent because most of its commerce is outside the region. The second largest country is less powerful militarily and less independent economically from the rest of the region, but can influence the policies of the two smaller members more easily because they border on it.

The leaders of the coalition's core countries also differ. The leader of the largest country at the outset of our period is opposed to the existence of the single country and refuses to negotiate directly with it. But he is replaced with a more moderate leader early in the period. The leaders of the second largest country remain opposed to the existence of the single country and to direct negotiations with it throughout the period. The leaders of the two smaller countries accept the existence of the single country and have even engaged in clandestine, but not public, contacts with it.

Outside parties and events also influence the situation. The single country enjoys a high level of military, economic, and political support from one of the two superpowers, thanks largely to an extremely well organized group of supporters who are citizens of the super power. Similarly, the coalition's core countries enjoy strong support from the other superpower and from the other coalition members. The coalition members' support is mainly economic and political since it only sends small numbers of troops to fight in the wars against the single country. During this period, however, their economic support increases because their primary export commodity becomes much more valuable. Their growing economic influence extends to much of the rest of the world, which increasingly tends to support the coalition. Some of the members of the coalition also support a guerrilla organization that is a rival of one of the core coalition members.

A number of issues separate the single country and the coalition. The single country is intent on keeping some of the territories captured during the war at the beginning of our period for security and nationalistic reasons. It also wants to end its isolation in the region, and particularly the economic and diplomatic boycott by the coalition. To this end, it is willing to return some of the territory that it has captured. It also demands that whatever territory it returns must be demilitarized. The

coalition wants to regain all of the territories that it has lost. Most of its members are unwilling to end their economic and political boycott.

The superpower supporting the single country wants to reduce the likelihood of war between the two sides. To do so, it can pursue a number of possible negotiating strategies. A purely joint approach towards the parties would involve all of the coalition states, the rival guerrilla organization, and perhaps the other superpower bargaining with the single country. A purely comprehensive approach towards the issues would deal with all of them, including the demands for a return of all of the territories and diplomatic recognition. In contrast, a purely separate approach towards the parties would involve negotiations between the single country and only one member of the coalition. A purely partial approach towards the issues would deal with only one or a small number of issues and would probably address the easiest issues first. These two antipodes could be broken down and recombined into numerous other negotiation strategies. One could try, for example, to promote negotiations that dealt with all of the issues separating only one set of parties. Alternatively, one could try to promote negotiations that involved all of the parties, but that initially dealt with only some of the issues. In doing so, one could begin with the easiest or

hardest issues, or those in between. The permutations of possible approaches, then, are numerous.

Having laid out the most basic factors of the Arab-Israeli conflict, we can now replace them in context. History offered United States policymakers of the 1967-79 period only one previous set of negotiations in the conflict as a guideline for the best way to proceed. In 1949 armistice agreements had been signed ending the 1948 war. These agreements -- which were not considered peace treaties -- had taken place under United Nations auspices on Rhodes. United Nations officials had acted as mediators between the Israelis and Arab officials from various countries. Although the negotiations took place in the same building, the Arab and Israeli officials did not meet with each other, except when the armistice agreements were signed. Significantly, the Arab officials chose not to negotiate as a group. Egypt, which was the last Arab country to stop fighting, was the first to enter negotiations and sign an armistice in February 1949; Lebanon followed suit in March, Jordan in April, and Syria in May. Iraq, which had also fought in the war, never did sign an agreement. Although Jordan was only the third country to sign an agreement, its officials had actually met clandestinely with Israeli leaders to work out an accord. These contacts continued until 1951, when an Arab radical assassinated King Abdallah because of his participation in such meetings.<sup>9</sup>

No negotiations took place between Israel and Egypt after the Israelis captured the largely undefended Sinai in 1956. At the urging of the United Nations, Israel quickly agreed to evacuate the entire Sinai except for the Gaza Strip and Sharm el-Sheikh at the tip of the peninsula, from which the Egyptians had blocked the entrance of the Gulf of Aqaba. The U.S. finally succeeded in inducing Israel to return all of the territory in February 1957 after making a commitment to stand by Israel's right of "innocent passage" through the Gulf of Aqaba and its right to strike back at guerrilla attacks from the Gaza Strip.<sup>10</sup>

Starting with the Lebanese crisis in 1958, some Lebanese Christian Maronites established contacts with the Israeli government. These Christians considered Israel to be a potential ally in the struggle to keep Lebanon a Christian state. The contacts, however, were only sporadic and did not go beyond exchanges of intelligence.<sup>11</sup>

The 1967 war again re-opened the questions of negotiations, although the Israeli rout of the Arab armies was so total that there was no need to bargain about new armistice lines. The Suez Canal became the de facto border with Egypt, the Jordan River became the de facto border with Jordan, and Israel captured the entire Golan Heights. The only question was whether Israel would return any of the conquered territories.

The potential for agreements between Israel and the Arab countries varied widely in the wake of the 1967 war. Perhaps the easiest possible agreements were with the more moderate Arab countries that were not members of the core confrontation parties. Some Lebanese Christians, as mentioned previously, were in contact with the Israeli government and Beirut had scrupulously avoided fighting in 1967. Some elements of the Lebanese government favored closer cooperation with Israel and perhaps even an open alliance. King Hassan of Morocco and President Bourguiba of Tunisia, who were close allies with the West, had often called for direct negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors, and they were perhaps even willing to reach limited agreements with Israel involving low-level talks between non-government officials.<sup>12</sup>

Among Israel's neighbors, an agreement with Egypt appeared to be difficult, but not absolutely impossible, in the wake of the 1967 war. Egypt, in theory at least, had the most room for maneuver of any Arab country because it had enough stature and economic independence to withstand criticism and boycotts from the rest of the Arab world. On the other hand, since coming to power in the 1950's, Nasser had staked out a radical position towards Israel that tended to reduce his room for compromise. After the 1967 war, he restricted himself to private assurances to U.S. officials that he would consider "a declaration of nonbelligerency"

and would allow Israeli cargoes to transit the Suez Canal as part of "a general settlement."<sup>13</sup> But he never indicated that he was willing to cede the slightest amount of territory.

Sadat's coming to power in 1970 helped the prospects for diplomatic progress in so far as he was less tied to the militant policies of Nasser. Still, no Egyptian leader could afford to acquiesce to an Israeli occupation of parts of the Sinai, and Sadat at no time indicated that he would consider doing so.

Israel, for its part, did not attach any major historical or religious importance to the Sinai, but recognized its military and economic value. Nearly all political factions wanted to retain Sharm el-Sheikh, and a thin strip of land running to it in order to prevent Egypt from blocking the Straits of Aqaba, as it had done in 1967. A smaller majority also wanted to retain large parts of the rest of the Sinai in order to provide Israel with early warning of an Egyptian air attack and to allow Jerusalem to exploit the Sinai oil fields, which were providing the Israelis with half their petroleum needs by the mid-1970's.<sup>14</sup>

As mentioned previously, the 1973 war changed the military and political situation in such a way as to make agreements between Israel and Egypt more likely. Politically, Egypt could negotiate from a position of

greater dignity because it had mounted the largest armored attack since World War II and shaken the Israeli Army. Egypt could also offer to return a number of Israeli prisoners of war. Militarily, both sides wanted to disentangle their two armies, and Israel was probably more interested in reaching some kind of accommodation with the Arabs, who had shown that they could extract a heavy price from their enemy in warfare.

Negotiations between Israel and Jordan also appeared to be difficult, but not impossible in the wake of the 1967 war. Israel looked relatively favorably on Jordan's King Hussein, who had never expressed the deep, ingrained hostility towards the Jewish state that Nasser and Syria's leaders had. In this spirit of moderation, some members of the Israeli ruling coalition supported the so-called Allon Plan (named after the Israeli Labor Minister).

The plan proposed that Israel would retain control of a narrow strip of most of the land along the Jordan River and all of Jerusalem; about two-thirds of the West Bank and three-quarters of the population would revert to Jordan. The Allon Plan, however, was opposed by the National Religious Party, which wanted to retain all of the West Bank for religious reasons, and hard-liners, led by Moshe Dayan, who also favored complete retention for nationalistic and security reasons. Because of these differences, the Allon

Plan was never brought to a vote in the Cabinet for fear of splitting the ruling coalition.<sup>15</sup>

Yet the Allon Plan would not have satisfied Hussein even if the Cabinet had adopted it. Foreign Minister Abba Eban met clandestinely with Hussein and sketched the outline of the plan in late 1967. According to Eban, Hussein reacted favorably to its "concept," but did not consider losing a third of the West Bank's population and Jerusalem to be "a territorial adjustment."<sup>16</sup> Given Hussein's weak power base -- a desert kingdom of 3 million people -- he could not sever his ties with the rest of the Arab world by appearing to abandon Jerusalem. Syria and Iraq could threaten to invade Jordan; Saudi Arabia could reduce its economic aid; and a number of Arab countries could expel Jordanian workers whose remittances made an important contribution to the economy.

Hussein's position, moreover, was not improved by the 1973 war. He had sent several military units to the Golan Heights to help Syria, but had scrupulously avoided attacking Israel from Jordanian territory. Thus, Jordan, unlike Egypt and Syria, had no Israeli prisoners of war to offer. There was also no need to disengage two entangled armies on the Jordanian front as was the case on the Golan and in the Sinai.

The prospects of Israel's reaching an agreement with Syria appeared remote in the wake of the 1967 war. Israeli

control of the Golan Heights prevented Syria from dominating the plains of northern Israel, and Israeli public opinion showed little willingness to compromise. Syria was ruled by a generally anti-western military Baath Party that was closely allied with the USSR and that rejected any "political solution." It voted against the November 1967 UN Resolution 242 because it called for the "termination of all claims of belligerency and respect for . . . the political independence of every state"<sup>17</sup> in the area (which implied Israel).

As previously mentioned, the replacement of the radical Baathist leader Saleh Jedid in 1970 by Hafiz Assad may have helped improve the prospects for negotiations marginally because Assad was thought to be somewhat more pragmatic and less ideological. The 1973 war improved negotiating prospects more decisively, however, in that Syria, like Egypt, could offer Israeli prisoners of war and the entangled armies on the Golan Heights called for some kind of disengagement agreement.

The prospects for negotiations between Israel and the PLO were even less promising. Israel did not want an independent Palestinian state controlled by an organization that had pledged "to liquidate the Zionist presence in Palestine."<sup>18</sup> If Israel were to return any of the West Bank, it would be to the more moderate King Hussein. The bitterness on both sides was kept fresh by Israel's

strong-arm tactics on the West Bank and the PLO's periodic raids into Israel against civilians.

The prospects of peace between Israel and the more radical Arab states on the periphery of the Arab-Israeli conflict were probably the most limited. Libya, Iraq, Algeria, and even the more moderate Persian Gulf monarchies had little to gain from signing peace treaties with Israel. At no time did they express any interest in negotiating with the Jewish state.

Thus, ranking the parties in order of likelihood of reaching agreements, we find that in the wake of the 1967 war, an agreement between Israel and Lebanon appeared to be perhaps the most likely. Agreements with Egypt and Jordan appeared to be difficult, but not impossible. Agreements between Israel and Syria, the PLO and the more radical states on the periphery of the conflict appeared to be much more remote. The 1973 war improved the prospects for negotiations between Israel and Egypt and Syria, but did not substantially affect them for Israel and Jordan.

As we have mentioned, the main goal of the Arab coalition was to regain all of its lost territories and Israel's final objective was to enter direct negotiations that would lead to diplomatic recognition and an end to the economic boycott. There were, however, intermediate steps that could be taken that satisfied some of each side's demands while falling short of their ultimate goals.

Israel, for example, could return some but not all the territories on one or more fronts. It could also return all of the territories on one front, but not the other fronts. Bargaining over territory was also not just a question of quantity. Some of the territories occupied by Israel had particular military, economic or emotional value for both sides.

There were also concessions that the Arabs could make that fell short of Israel's ultimate goals. After the 1973 war, Israel demanded the return of its prisoners of war and expressed interest in peace gestures. These included a reduction in the level of anti-Israeli propaganda, declarations of non-belligerency, and a promise from Egypt that it would rebuild the cities along the West Bank of the Canal -- a move that Israel felt would be unlikely if Sadat were contemplating another war. Israel also sought Arab concessions over the demilitarization of any of the occupied territories that it returned. Thus, there were many issues that the two sides could bargain over that fell short of their ultimate goals.

As we shall see, various approaches toward these issues were tried during the 1967-79 period. In chronological order we shall describe these approaches and the kinds of agreements they produced or failed to achieve.

Concentrating on the six main negotiations of the period, we shall try to evaluate the relative effectiveness of these approaches. Chapter 1 covers the negotiations that took place in 1967 and 1968 when the U.S. supported United Nations mediator Gunnar Jarring's efforts to promote a comprehensive solution to the issues separating Israel and its neighbors and when the U.S. tried a more modest approach involving just Israel and Jordan. It also discusses United States Secretary of State William Rogers' attempt in 1969 to promote comprehensive agreements between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Jordan. We shall compare the relative successes of these various approaches.

Chapter 2 compares the search by the United States for a partial agreement between Israel and Egypt that began after the August 1970 cease-fire along the Suez Canal with United Nations mediator Gunnar Jarring's continued attempt to promote a comprehensive solution to all the issues separating Israel and its neighbors.

The following four chapters examine in detail the four bilateral agreements that took place after the October 1973 war: the November 1973 agreement between Israel and Egypt, the January 1974 Sinai I agreement between the same parties, the May 1974 Golan Heights agreement between Israel and Syria, and the September 1975 Sinai II agreement between Israel and Egypt. We shall concentrate on the order in which issues were tackled.

The final period of important negotiations took place during the Carter Administration. We shall examine, in Chapter 7, Carter's attempt in 1977 to organize a Geneva Conference whose aim was to bring together Egypt, Syria, Jordan and the PLO and the USSR. In particular, we shall examine the impact of Syria and the PLO on the negotiations.

Chapters 8 and 9 will deal with President Carter's less ambitious attempts to promote a separate bilateral agreement between Israel and Egypt following President Sadat's November 1977 trip to Jerusalem. Special emphasis will be placed on the September 1978 Camp David Summit, when the most crucial negotiations took place.

Throughout our study of this period, we shall attempt to establish recurrent patterns in the negotiations. We shall also try to relate the theoretical arguments about the various strategies to the historical events of the period. The respective successes and failures of the various approaches attempted will be examined in detail. Our main goal is to test the hypothesis that the use of the more modest partial approach towards issues and the separate approach towards parties was the key to diplomatic progress in the Arab-Israeli conflict from 1967 to 1979.

## NOTES

## INTRODUCTION

<sup>1</sup>For further discussion of Kissinger's credibility see Chapter 4.

<sup>2</sup>Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 346.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., pp. 348-57.

<sup>4</sup>Albert Hirschman, Journeys Toward Progress (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1963), p. 271.

<sup>5</sup>Fred Charles Iklé, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 19.

<sup>6</sup>Kelley bases his conclusion on the results of an expanded Bilateral Monopoly-type bargaining task consisting of five unlabeled numerical issues in which opposing interests were created by providing subjects with inverted outcome distributions on each issue. Thus, settlement at a higher level for one party resulted in a smaller outcome for the other, and vice-versa. Each issue could be settled at any one of 20 predetermined points, with the result that 20<sup>5</sup> different combinations were possible. Agreement had to be reached over the entire set of five items within a given time period that was unknown to the subjects in order for the contract to be consummated. Subject pairs confronted the same type of bargaining problem (though it consisted of different issues) on six repeated occasions during a 10-week period. H.H. Kelley, "A Classroom Study of the Dilemmas in Interpersonal Negotiations," in Strategic Interaction and Conflict: Original Papers and Discussion, ed. K. Archibald. Berkeley, Calif: Institute of International Studies, 1966.

<sup>7</sup>Knut Midgaard and Avild Underdal, "Multiparty Conferences in Negotiations," in Negotiations: Social Psychological Perspectives, ed. Daniel Druckman (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977, p. 330).

<sup>8</sup>John Fox and Melvin Guyer, "Group Size and Others' Strategy in an N-Person Game," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 21, No. 2 (June 1977): pp. 323-38.

<sup>9</sup>Nadav Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1978) p. 60.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid., p. 357.

<sup>11</sup>Interview with Israeli journalist Matti Golan, 1 October 1977.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>New York Times, 6, 7 November 1967; 10 December 1968.

<sup>14</sup>Interview with Moshe Ma'oz, Director of the Truman Institute, The Hebrew University, 25 October 1977.

<sup>15</sup>Interview with Abba Eban. 2 November 1977. See also Yigal Allon, "Israel: The Case for Defensible Borders," Foreign Affairs, 55 No. 1 (Oct. 1976): pp. 38-53.

<sup>16</sup>Interview with Eban.

<sup>17</sup>See Appendix for complete text of UN Resolution 242.

<sup>18</sup>"Palestine National Covenant," article 15, cited by Dankwart Rustow, Oil and Turmoil (New York: W. W. Norton, 1982), p. 296.

## CHAPTER 1

### MIDDLE EAST DIPLOMACY DURING THE JOHNSON AND EARLY NIXON ADMINISTRATIONS: THE SEARCH FOR COMPREHENSIVE AND JOINT SOLUTIONS

#### The Johnson Administration

In the wake of the 1967 war, the Johnson and the early Nixon Administrations stressed the need for a comprehensive solution to the issues separating all the parties in the Arab-Israeli conflict. President Johnson and his advisors sought an international consensus embodied in UN Resolution 242 that would appeal to all the parties and would be implemented by a United Nations mediator from Sweden, Gunnar Jarring. President Johnson first spelled out his ambitious goals in a major foreign policy statement on June 19, 1967, before meeting with Soviet Premier Kosygin in Glasboro, New Jersey. He blamed the war largely on Egypt, calling the blockade of the Strait of Tiran an "act of folly," and stated that the U.S. would not press Israel to withdraw in the absence of a peace which would have to be made by the parties themselves: "Clearly the parties to the conflict must be the parties to the peace. Sooner or later it is they who must make a settlement in the area."<sup>1</sup> He

ended by setting forth his conception of a genuine peace settlement based on five key points: political independence and territorial integrity for all states; the recognized right to national life for all states; justice for the refugees; limits on the arms race; and free maritime passage. Thus, a comprehensive settlement of all the issues was contemplated.

Johnson and his advisors did not want to repeat President Eisenhower's post-1956 Sinai War strategy of forcing Israel to withdraw from conquered territories in return for a minor Arab concession, a token UN military presence in the Sinai that withdrew at Nasser's behest in 1967. This did not mean that the U.S. endorsed a permanent Israeli occupation, but rather that the territories should be exchanged for a genuine peace agreement.<sup>2</sup>

Johnson also probably wanted to apply less pressure on Israel than Eisenhower had because of his less strong political position. Johnson was in the middle of the unpopular Vietnam war that was consuming his time and political capital. Moreover, he had never enjoyed the prestige of Eisenhower or the promise and glamour of President Kennedy. The American Jewish supporters of Israel had also become much better organized by the end of the 1960s. They voted in large numbers in the key industrial states and were willing to contribute large sums of money to

all politicians -- no longer just Democrats -- who supported Israel.

Throughout the second half of 1967, Johnson and his advisors sought a UN Security Council resolution that would incorporate Johnson's five points. The more moderate Arab states, led by Egypt and Jordan, insisted on a full Israeli withdrawal from the newly occupied territories before an end to the state of belligerency; the more radical Arab states, led by Syria, did not want to agree to anything even as nebulous as ending the state of belligerency. Israel, for its part, insisted that any withdrawals would have to follow a peace agreement and wanted direct negotiations with the Arabs.<sup>3</sup>

The U.S. agreed with Israel that withdrawal should follow a peace settlement, but was less insistent on direct negotiations. The USSR backed the Arab moderates publicly and reportedly urged a forthcoming attitude privately. According to Nasser's confidant, Mohamed Heikal, for example, in July 1967, Brezhnev told the Presidents of Algeria and Iraq, who were designated representatives of the frontline states, that:

it was the imperialists who wanted the status quo to continue, without any resolution in the UN condemning Israel or ordering its troops to withdraw, because without such a resolution the Israelis would stay in the territories they had occupied indefinitely. The people who would suffer as a result would be the Arabs, and friendly countries like India which were harmed by the closure of the Suez Canal. Brezhnev made it clear that he wanted Arab support for the resolutions they

were preparing to put forward at the UN, either in the Security Council or in the regular session of the General Assembly, even if this involved some form of recognition of Israel. He said he understood the enmity which existed between the Arabs and Israel, but this need not necessarily lead to the liquidation of Israel.<sup>4</sup>

Given this relatively forthcoming Soviet attitude, the U.S. was willing to work out a joint resolution with Moscow at the UN.<sup>5</sup>

Radical Arab states, however, made the search for a comprehensive resolution more difficult. They managed to side-track two draft resolutions in June and July calling for a complete Israeli withdrawal and an end to the state of belligerency that the U.S., USSR, and Israel were prepared to accept. As previously mentioned, the radical states, led by Syria, Algeria and Iraq, objected to the reference to ending the state of belligerency.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, the Persian Gulf oil producing states limited opportunities for compromise still further. In late August at the Khartoum conference, they persuaded Nasser and Hussein to agree to guidelines for a political settlement with Israel based on no recognition, no negotiations, no peace agreement, and no abandonment of Palestinian rights. In coming out against compromise, the Persian Gulf states were responding to the wishes of their own large Palestinian immigrant populations who were not enthusiastic about returning the West Bank to Jordanian sovereignty and to the dictates of King Faisal, who detested Israel.<sup>7</sup>

Israel stiffened its terms in the face of this hardline Arab position. When the UN debate resumed in October, it was only willing to accept a more ambiguous formulation calling for "withdrawal of armed forces from occupied territories." Israel could now claim that withdrawal did not necessarily mean evacuating all the territories. Egypt and Jordan accepted the UN text worked out by U.S. Ambassador to the UN Arthur Goldberg, Soviet first deputy foreign minister Kuznetsov and British representative Lord Caradon only because the French version referred to the occupied territories, thereby implying all of them.<sup>8</sup>

The final English text, which came to be known as Resolution 242, included a delicately balanced call for "withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" and "termination of all claims of belligerency and respect for an acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized borders." The Resolution also spoke of the necessity of demilitarized zones, a just settlement of the refugee problem and a Special Representative, designated by the Secretary-General, to go to the Middle East and promote a settlement "in accordance with the provisions and principles in this Resolution." Much of the Middle East diplomacy of the

following years consisted of attempts to make more precise the deliberately vague language of Resolution 242.<sup>9</sup>

The first attempt to implement the Resolution in concrete terms was made by Gunnar Jarring, a Swedish diplomat who was appointed the UN representative because of his background in the Middle East. In March 1968 he submitted a series of questions to the Israelis, Egyptians, Jordanians and Lebanese about the provisions of the Resolution. Each side retreated into vague generalities and used the ambiguities of the document to evade the issues that it found most difficult. When Jarring, for example, asked the Israeli government whether it would withdraw from the occupied territories, it replied that it would withdraw to "secure and recognized borders." When he asked the Arabs if they would respect Israel's territorial integrity, they said that they would, provided that Palestinian "rights" were taken into consideration. Jarring sought without success to pin down the belligerents throughout the rest of 1968.<sup>10</sup>

Jarring's mission failed to make any progress for several reasons. According to Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban, the Israeli government was not willing to say it would withdraw to the old borders in such a sweeping manner: "Whatever withdrawals we were willing to make would have to take place gradually in order to test Arab reactions." Eban also believed that "the glare of publicity hurt Jarring's

mission by mobilizing those Israelis who opposed any compromise."<sup>11</sup>

During this same period, the State Department had been urging Israel to put forth compromise proposals, even if they fell short of Resolution 242. Israel reiterated to the U.S. what Eban had already told Hussein in a clandestine meeting in 1967: that it was willing to return most of the West Bank but not Jerusalem or the Jordan River Valley. George Ball, the new U.S. Ambassador to the UN, again conveyed this position to King Hussein during a trip to the Middle East in July 1968. Hussein again reportedly expressed interest in some kind of compromise, but one less favorable to Israel.<sup>12</sup> This was the last significant initiative of the Johnson Administration, whose decision-making capacity became inhibited by the upcoming election in November 1968.

The Johnson Administration's diplomacy went into retreat just as Egypt began what became known as the war of attrition -- a punishing exchange of artillery fire and Israeli air attacks along the Suez Canal that lasted until a cease-fire in August 1970. Egypt had begun the artillery attacks in early 1968 and bombarded Israeli positions along the entire length of the Canal for the first time in September.<sup>13</sup> .

Three developments explained its greater activism. Egypt could move men and equipment fairly easily up to its

new line of defense along the Canal from its nearby population and industrial centers. Egypt also benefited from the advice of several thousand recently arrived Soviet advisors and the deterrent value of Soviet ships and bombers which were stationed at several ports and airfields to deter Israeli air attacks. Egypt, along with Syria, had also benefited from a military aid program from the Persian Gulf states and Libya that had enabled Cairo and Damascus to improve upon their prewar arsenal by the end of the year.<sup>14</sup>

#### The Nixon Administration

Because of the daily artillery exchanges across the Canal, the Nixon Administration felt the U.S. should pursue a more vigorous diplomatic policy. President Nixon, for example, said at his first presidential news conference: "I consider [the Middle East] a powder keg, very explosive, it needs to be defused. I am open to suggestions that may cool it off and reduce the possibility of another explosion, because the next explosion in the Mideast, I think, could involve very well a confrontation between the nuclear powers, which we want to avoid."<sup>15</sup> The State Department, according to Richard Parker, the Egyptian desk officer at the time, shared this anxiety. U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers and Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East, Joseph Sisco, decided to concentrate their efforts on Egypt instead of Jordan because the war of

attrition along the Suez Canal threatened to get out of hand.<sup>16</sup>

Rogers and Sisco had to decide whether they wanted to pursue a partial or comprehensive approach towards the issues. Most of the State Department felt that "something close to the maximum demands of each side would have to be met. We believed that Nasser was too proud to settle for half measures and doubted that Israel would ever return the occupied territories unless the Arabs signed some contractual agreement ending the state of hostilities."<sup>17</sup>

President Nixon was reportedly ambivalent about an ambitious initiative. On the one hand, he later claimed in his memoirs, even an abortive attempt would at least let the Arab world know that the U.S. did not automatically dismiss its case regarding the occupied territories or rule out a compromise settlement of the conflicting claims. "With the Rogers Plan on the record, I thought it would be easier for the Arab leaders to propose reopening relations with the U.S. without coming under attack from the hawks and pro-Soviet elements in their own countries."<sup>18</sup>

On the other hand, according to Henry Kissinger, Nixon was skeptical "about what could come of [the initiative and was] unprepared to face the consequences of a show-down with Israel."<sup>19</sup> This skepticism had probably been reinforced by the events surrounding the mission carried out by William Scranton, the former governor of

Pennsylvania. Nixon had sent him to visit six Middle East countries in December 1968 to sound out the parties' positions as the President's special envoy. After crossing the Allenby Bridge from Jordan into the West Bank, Scranton said: "It is important that U.S. policy become more even-handed ... [The U.S. should deal] with all countries in the area and not necessarily espouse one."<sup>20</sup> Arriving in Rome on December 11, he announced that the Nixon Administration would draw up a new "peace plan" for the Middle East. Whether he had consulted Nixon about this remains unclear. What is clear is that the resulting uproar in Israel prompted Nixon's press spokesman to state that "the remarks about even-handedness and a new peace plan were not necessarily those of the President-elect."<sup>21</sup>

An important debate took place within the Nixon Administration about the role for the Soviet Union to play in the upcoming initiative. Some members doubted the Soviets would be willing to sacrifice regional interests for the sake of improved relations with the U.S. They felt that the Soviets had been able to enter the Middle East in the mid-1950s because of the Arab-Israeli arms competition; that their position still depended mainly on arms sales to key clients; and that, if peace were established, its role as an arms supplier would become much less important. The Soviets, therefore, had an interest in preventing a genuine peace agreement, "preferring instead a state of controlled

tension."<sup>22</sup> According to this view, if the Soviets were to participate in any negotiations, their main purpose would be to get the United States to pressure Israel to withdraw from Arab territory in return for minor concessions.<sup>23</sup>

But the State Department, pointing to the cooperative Soviet behavior in the UN 242 Resolution of 1967, believed the Soviets would be willing to urge the Arabs to compromise in order to reduce the chances of another war and a possible nuclear confrontation between the superpowers. As the frontline states' principal arms supplier, the Soviets, it was thought, would have a good deal of influence. And as an additional bonus, Rogers and Sisco hoped that the USSR might weaken its standing in the Arab world by trying to force Nasser to accept any US-USSR proposals.<sup>24</sup>

A similar difference of opinion took place over whether the Europeans should play an important role. Kissinger, in particular, feared that the Europeans would line up with the Soviets against the U.S. But Rogers and Sisco felt that the Europeans, who were the main trading partners of the Arabs and the Israelis, and an important arms supplier, could use their economic and political influence to induce compromise.<sup>25</sup>

Rogers and Sisco, who had been given primary responsibility for Middle East policy by Nixon, won the debate. They decided to emphasize developing a joint position with the Soviet Union that could be approved by

Britain and France. UN mediator Gunnar Jarring would then present the consensus to the regional parties. They presented the outline of what they hoped would become the joint position at the first National Security Council meeting in February 1969. The Arabs should agree to some form of binding agreement, though not necessarily a peace treaty. Israel should withdraw from all of the Sinai and most of the West Bank. Certain critical areas like Sharm el-Sheikh should be demilitarized. Jordan should have a civilian and religious role within a united city of Jerusalem. The refugee problem should be settled. The outline was as ambitious as President Johnson's five points, but was weighted more towards the Arab side.<sup>26</sup>

Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban came to Washington in March for talks with Rogers and Kissinger. When Rogers showed him the general principles paper, Eban rejected it out of hand and asked that it not be submitted. He also expressed his dislike of a Soviet and European role, stressing rather, according to Kissinger, "the one Israeli demand that he calculated was least likely to be met by the Arabs: the insistence on direct negotiations and Arab signatures on a joint peace treaty."<sup>27</sup> Ultimately, Eban saw nothing intolerable in the status quo.<sup>28</sup>

Jordan's King Hussein was the next representative from the frontline states. In a meeting with Nixon and Kissinger on April 8, Hussein stressed that both he and

Nasser were committed to UN Resolution 242 and were prepared to sign any document with Israel as part of a general settlement as long as it wasn't "an official peace treaty." The King also recognized the need for some border rectifications on the West Bank and said that if Israel ceded Gaza to Jordan, "the rectifications could be fairly substantial."<sup>29</sup> Then in a public address, Hussein declared that he was authorized by Nasser to state that the Suez Canal would be open to the ships of all nations following a general settlement. Although Nasser had previously mentioned such a possibility in private conversations with U.S. officials, it was the first time that the promise of free transit was stated publicly. Several days later, an Egyptian envoy to President Eisenhower's funeral, Mahmoud Fawzi, confirmed the offer, but still ruled out direct talks and a peace treaty.<sup>30</sup>

Throughout the rest of the year, the State Department spent most of its time negotiating with the Soviets rather than the Arabs and the Israelis. The two sides remained far apart. Sisco insisted upon direct Arab-Israeli negotiations; Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. Anatoly Dobrynin downplayed their importance. Sisco stuck to the formulation that the pre-war line would not necessarily be excluded; Dobrynin insisted upon total withdrawal. Sisco wanted the entire Sinai demilitarized; Dobrynin did not. Interestingly, Sisco insisted upon Israeli navigation

through the Canal -- something that Hussein and Fawzi had already indicated was acceptable -- while Dobrynin hedged his position with erudite references to the Constantinople Convention of 1888, whose definition of free navigation was ambiguous.<sup>31</sup>

Overall, the Soviets only modified their position in two minor ways. They agreed that the Arabs should recognize Israel diplomatically and accepted the idea of a package deal in which Arab concessions would accompany Israeli withdrawals instead of taking place only after their completion.<sup>32</sup>

The Soviets failed to change the Arabs' policies in any significant way. In June Foreign Minister Gromyko went to discuss the negotiations with Nasser in Cairo. Their joint communique following the talks rejected any idea of a separate Egyptian-Israeli agreement and insisted upon a settlement that included all the Arab parties (despite the fact that Fawzi and Hussein had indicated in April that they were willing to negotiate without Syria). The note rejected the notion of a contractual agreement; instead a declaration of the "end of belligerency" would be given upon the completion of the Israeli withdrawal.<sup>33</sup>

Nor did the Europeans have much of an impact on the positions of the Arabs and Israelis. Talks between the UN representatives of the U.S., USSR, Britain and France began in April, but were put on an intermittent basis after

several months. They had consisted primarily of the USSR, France and Britain urging the U.S. to force Israel to be more forthcoming about the territories and the U.S. representative, Charles Yost, asking Nixon for "permission to present the American endorsement of the 1967 frontiers."<sup>34</sup> Yet neither Britain nor France, nor the Common Market in general, was willing to use forcefully its economic muscle on Israel and Egypt, both of which exported most of their products to the area. The Common Market's most assertive member, France, did try to impede the lowering of tariff and quota barriers for Israeli goods, but it never called for outright sanctions. Even this policy was abandoned in 1971.<sup>35</sup>

Nor was Nixon willing to apply much pressure on the Israelis to be more conciliatory. By Kissinger's account, when Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir visited Washington in September, Nixon assured her that "he would be responsive to Israeli requests for armaments if Israel gave us some latitude in negotiations, which he strongly implied he would ensure would not amount to much."<sup>36</sup> Nixon was probably wary of taking on the powerful Israeli lobby when major progress seemed so problematical. Meir, for her part, appeared happy that the negotiations were stagnating.<sup>37</sup>

In October, however, Nixon agreed to Rogers' persistent requests that the U.S. openly support an Israeli return to the 1967 borders. Rogers and Sisco immediately

passed on their major concession to Dobrynin; and the two sides soon agreed to a joint document which came to be known as the Rogers Plan. The plan consisted of a short preamble calling for a comprehensive peace accord between Egypt and Israel to be negotiated under the auspices of UN Ambassador Gunnar Jarring. Israel would return to the prewar Sinai border. Egypt would agree to end the state of war and allow Israeli ships to use the Suez Canal. The two sides would agree on demilitarized zones through Rhodes-type indirect talks. The U.S. also indicated that it was preparing a similar outline for a Jordanian-Israeli settlement.<sup>38</sup>

The proposal was conveyed to the Egyptians and the Israelis. Egypt made no official response, although a combative speech by Nasser on November 6 declaring that he would reclaim the occupied territories by "fire and blood" instead of political "half-solutions," may have been his way of rejecting it.<sup>39</sup> Israel brushed aside the concessions on the definition of peace and protested the very concept of another country putting forward specific formulations about its borders.<sup>40</sup> It also reportedly leaked the outline of the plan to the press.<sup>41</sup>

Undeterred, Rogers outlined the basic elements of the plan in a speech in early December. It was his formulation of the territorial issue that made the headlines: "We believe that while recognized political boundaries must be established and agreed upon by the parties, any changes in

the pre-existing lines should not reflect the weight of conquest and should be confined to insubstantial alterations required for mutual security."<sup>42</sup> Applying these principles to an Egyptian-Israeli agreement, Rogers went on to propose the withdrawal of Israeli forces to the 1967 border.

The speech drew criticism from all sides. Much of the Arab press treated it as a trick that tried to create the impression that the U.S. was "impartial" and to "undermine" Soviet-Egyptian relations. The Soviets first issued a fairly conciliatory statement to the effect that the speech was long "overdue"; later they joined the Egyptians and denounced the very plan that they had co-sponsored. Israeli Prime Minister Meir said that Rogers was "moralizing" and that the major powers could not make peace on behalf of others.<sup>43</sup>

On December 18, the U.S. presented a parallel plan for a Jordanian-Israeli settlement in the four-power talks. The plan contained many of the same elements as the position paper on Egypt, but had several new points to fit the special circumstances on the Jordanian front. The permanent border, for example, would "approximate" the armistice demarcation line existing before the 1967 war, but would allow for modifications based on "administrative or economic convenience." The document called for a settlement of the refugee problem that would allow for repatriation or resettlement with compensation. The problem of Jerusalem

was skirted: it would remain unified, with both countries sharing the civic and economic responsibilities of city government. While Jordan was reportedly pleased with the proposal, Israel labeled it "appeasement." Rogers defended both plans, but the silence from the White House indicated that he did not enjoy its full support.<sup>44</sup>

The Rogers Plan and the Jordanian position paper also caused a sharp reaction among Israel's supporters in the U.S. The Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations expressed concern; Senator Humphrey called it unwise; Senator Javits found the speech one-sided; and AFL-CIO President George Meany criticized the Plan for going too far.<sup>45</sup> The protests forced the Administration to try to mollify Israel's supporters by sending further aid; even Sisco climbed on board, recommending accelerated arms deliveries. Yet the additional aid did not improve relations as normally would have been the case; it merely muffled the uproar, while creating the impression that public criticism of U.S. policy could be a rewarding tactic.

### Overview

The Egyptian, Israeli and Soviet rejection of the Rogers Plan put an end to the first Middle East initiative of the Nixon Administration. According to Quandt's account in Decade of Decisions, most of the Administration members agreed in retrospect that it had been naive to assume that the U.S. would be able to separate the USSR from Egypt.

Throughout the negotiations, Moscow had stuck close to the Egyptian positions. The only time that it appeared to differ was when it agreed with the U.S. that Arab concessions should accompany Israeli withdrawals instead of follow them and that the Arabs should grant diplomatic recognition to Israel. But even these two concessions did not amount to much in so far as Moscow could not induce Egypt to accept them.

In theory, Moscow did have a significant amount of leverage over Egypt. Its military advisors helped to train the Egyptian military and their presence deterred Israeli air attacks, to some degree. Moscow was also Egypt's main supplier of arms. Yet it was unwilling to stop arms sales and training programs in hopes of forcing Egypt to sign a peace treaty or recognize Israel. The USSR could not be sure that Egypt would adopt such policies even if Moscow did threaten to cut its ties with Cairo. Moreover, it was not certain that Israel would withdraw to the 1967 borders even if Cairo offered such major concessions. Ultimately, it made little sense for Moscow to jeopardize its relations with Cairo, its most important Arab ally, by embarking on such a risky course. Moscow could urge compromises on the Arabs, but was hardly willing or able to extract them.

There were, in fact, several indications that Egypt, as previously mentioned, tended to be less forthcoming when talking through their Soviet interlocutors than when dealing

directly with the U.S. In Washington, Fawzi indicated that Egypt would allow Israel to use the Canal as part of a settlement and that it would be willing to enter into an agreement even if Syria were not. In private communications with Western diplomats there were also hints of willingness to sign a declaration of non-belligerency. These indications of flexibility never surfaced in the U.S.-USSR talks. Perhaps this reflected a tendency for Nasser to regard the superpower talks as an exploratory forum where maximum positions were set forth, while the real bargaining would take place with the one party that could influence Israel -- the United States. Whatever Nasser's thinking, most Administration officials, including Rogers and Sisco, felt that after the presentation of the Rogers Plan the U.S. should talk directly with the Egyptian leader rather than communicate indirectly through Moscow.

The rest of the Arab world had also failed to help much in the search for a diplomatic solution, and probably even had a negative impact. At the Khartoum Conference in August 1967 the Persian Gulf states persuaded Nasser and Hussein to subscribe to hard-line positions in return for oil subsidies. Syria, Iraq and Algeria had also tried to dissuade Egypt and Jordan from adopting moderate resolutions at the U.N.

The main obstacle preventing more diplomatic progress, however, was Israel's increased ability to

withstand U.S. pressure. Since 1957, when Israel had acquiesced to withdrawing from the Sinai, Israel's military capacity had grown immensely and had increased Israeli confidence and capabilities. In the 1956 Sinai campaign, Israel had to use mainly armored personnel carriers to conquer the Sinai. But by 1967, Israel had a large array of tanks and fighters and could mobilize several hundred thousand well-trained troops within 48 hours and 500,000 men within five days -- a force that constituted one of the ten largest armies in the world.

More important, the strength of Israel's U.S. supporters had increased markedly during this same period. As previously mentioned, Israel's U.S. supporters had become extremely well-organized and financed and no longer voted automatically Democratic. This meant that both parties were constantly trying to outbid each other for their support. Moreover, neither Johnson nor Nixon enjoyed the widespread prestige of President Eisenhower. Thus, when Israel's supporters openly attacked statements by presidential envoy William Scranton or the 1969 Rogers Plan, the White House remained silent. It would not be the last time that protests about an American "peace plan" would scuttle an ambitious U.S. diplomatic initiative.

Taking the 1967-69 period as a whole, we see that the comprehensive approaches towards the issues separating Israel and Egypt and Jordan made little progress under U.N.

mediator Gunnar Jarring and Secretary of State William Rogers. Faced with the ambitious goals of U.N. Resolution 242 and the Rogers Plan, both sides set forth their maximum demands. When these demands were not met, the negotiators did not have any more modest proposals to offer in order to try to generate some diplomatic momentum.

In contrast, the more discreet diplomatic soundings that occurred between Israel and Jordan in 1967 and 1968 did indicate certain diplomatic possibilities. Israel did suggest concrete territorial compromises, even if they were not enough to draw Hussein into sustained negotiations. Jordan's ability to reach a separate agreement with Israel, however, was severely limited by its commercial dependence on the rest of the Arab world and its vulnerability to Syrian support of terrorist actions or actual Syrian military threats.

Most members of the State Department were aware of the implications of the diplomacy of the 1967-69 period. As William Quandt relates: "Any future United States initiative would be less legalistic in tone, less public, and perhaps less ambitious. The package-settlement approach, though appealing in theory, was simply too complicated. Failure on one issue would prevent progress anywhere. More modest approaches would henceforth be considered."<sup>46</sup> Given Jordan's limited room for maneuver, and the escalating war of attrition between Israel and

Egypt, efforts would probably focus almost exclusively on Tel Aviv and Cairo.

## NOTES

## CHAPTER 1

<sup>1</sup>Lyndon Johnson, The Vantage Point. (New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 301.

<sup>2</sup>Interview with U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg, 3 March 1981. See also William Quandt, Decade of Decisions. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 63-64.

<sup>3</sup>Interview with Goldberg.

<sup>4</sup>Mohamed Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar. (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), p. 186.

<sup>5</sup>Interview with Goldberg.

<sup>6</sup>Seymour Finger, Your Man at the UN. (New York: New York University Press, 1980), p. 184.

<sup>7</sup>New York Times, 27 August 1967.

<sup>8</sup>Abba Eban, Abba Eban: an Autobiography. (New York: Random House, 1977), p. 443. Finger, pp. 185-86.

<sup>9</sup>UN Resolution 242.

<sup>10</sup>Committee on Foreign Affairs U.S. House of Representatives, The Search for Peace in the Middle East, (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), pp. 123-139.

<sup>11</sup>Interview with Abba Eban, 2 November 1977.

<sup>12</sup>Quandt, p. 65. Eban, p. 446.

<sup>13</sup>New York Times, 15 September 1968.

<sup>14</sup>Heikal, p. 192.

<sup>15</sup>New York Times, 28 January 1969.

<sup>16</sup>Interview with Richard Parker, 15 March 1981.

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>18</sup>Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon. (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), p. 479.

- <sup>19</sup>Henry Kissinger, White House Years. (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), pp. 357, 376.
- <sup>20</sup>New York Times, 10 December 1968.
- <sup>21</sup>New York Times, 12 December 1968,
- <sup>22</sup>Quandt, p. 87.
- <sup>23</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>24</sup>Ibid., p. 86.
- <sup>25</sup>Kissinger, White House Years, p. 351.
- <sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 350. New York Times, 21 April and 26 April 1969.
- <sup>27</sup>Kissinger, White House Years, p. 359.
- <sup>28</sup>Eban's attitude is discussed in New York Times, 11, 13, 15 March 1969.
- <sup>29</sup>Kissinger, White House Years, p. 362.
- <sup>30</sup>Ibid., pp. 360-363.
- <sup>31</sup>Ibid., p. 365. Washington Post, 7 May 1969.
- <sup>32</sup>New York Times, 6 June 1969.
- <sup>33</sup>New York Times, 15 June 1969.
- <sup>34</sup>Kissinger, White House Years, p. 368.
- <sup>35</sup>Eban, p. 481.
- <sup>36</sup>Kissinger, White House Years, p. 371.
- <sup>37</sup>Jerusalem Post, 24 September 1969, p. 20, p. 28; September 1969, p. 8.
- <sup>38</sup>Quandt, pp. 89-90. New York Times, 6, 10 September 1969.
- <sup>39</sup>Quandt, p. 90. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 373.
- <sup>40</sup>Kissinger, White House Years, p. 373.
- <sup>41</sup>Nadav Safran, Israel: The Embattled Ally. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1978), p. 435.
- <sup>42</sup>New York Times, 11 December 1969.

<sup>43</sup>Reactions to speech are in New York Times, 11, 12, December 1969. New York Times, 14 December 1969, sec. 4, p. 6. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 375.

<sup>44</sup>Quandt, pp. 91-92.

<sup>45</sup>Adverse reactions are cited in New York Times, 11, 12, 13, 16, 31 December 1969.

<sup>46</sup>Quandt, p. 93.

## CHAPTER 2

### MIDDLE EAST DIPLOMACY SHIFTS TOWARDS A PARTIAL APPROACH, JANUARY 1970 - OCTOBER 1973

#### Negotiating a Cease-fire

Changing circumstances influenced the U.S. diplomatic approach towards the Arab-Israeli conflict in early 1970. In January 1970, Israel began bombing the Egyptian interior along the Nile River for the first time in an attempt to force Nasser to stop the Egyptian artillery attacks against Israeli lines that had begun in 1968. A grim Nasser flew to Moscow and explained to Brezhnev and his colleagues that, as Heikal put it, "Egypt was naked in the face of Israel's deep penetration raids."<sup>1</sup> The Soviets reluctantly agreed to construct and man an extensive missile defense system and to provide planes and pilots for the defense of the Egyptian heartland, but not the Canal area.<sup>2</sup>

The increased fighting and Soviet presence galvanized the State Department into action. In April, Assistant Secretary Sisco went to Cairo to see Nasser. Even though they had only "a long if not particularly productive talk,"<sup>3</sup> it was the first trip to Egypt by a high level American official since the 1967 war. State Department officials felt the situation was too serious to embark on prolonged

negotiations. Thus, Rogers broke with the joint U.S.-USSR approach and offered a new U.S. plan in June 1970 calling on Israel and the Arabs to agree to a cease-fire lasting at least ninety days. At the same time he linked the initiative to a reaffirmation of Resolution 242 and the Jarring Mission in order not to alienate the Soviets and Egyptians.<sup>4</sup>

Interestingly the Soviets appeared to be uncomfortable about the proposal, not because they opposed the cease-fire, but because it was an American plan. When Nasser explained to them in July why he was going to agree to the cease-fire, "Brezhnev was not a little surprised; how could Nasser accept something which, as Brezhnev put it, 'had an American flag on it'?" Nasser explained that it was just because of the American flag on it that he thought it could be useful."<sup>5</sup> If the U.S. could induce the Israelis to stop their air attacks, he could finish his missile defense system and prepare for a major invasion of the Sinai.

Significantly, the Israelis agreed to the plan only after Rogers and other State Department officials promised that the 1969 Rogers Plan would not be the basis of any future negotiations.<sup>6</sup> Subsequent events were to show that the Canal agreement was an important first step towards negotiations. By establishing a cease-fire, the parties were able to shift their attention from military combat to diplomatic strategy. As long as the fighting had been

taking place, it was difficult for the heads of state to spend much time on the intricacies of diplomacy. The agreement indicated that progress could be made if modest rather than overly ambitious goals were set.

#### First Use of the Partial Approach

Two major events in the final months of 1970 appeared to improve the prospects for diplomatic progress still further. In September Nasser died and was succeeded by Anwar Sadat. Although Sadat was a largely unknown figure, it was hoped that he would be more moderate than Nasser. In November, Syrian General Hafiz Assad, who had refused to commit the Syrian air force in the September 1970 invasion of northern Jordan by the Syrian army, ousted Syria's radical President Saleh Jedid. Although Assad was also an unknown quantity, it was also hoped that he would prove to be more moderate or at least more cautious than Saleh Jedid.

Both men probably did have increased room for maneuver. If they regained some of the occupied territories, they could claim that they had undone some of the damage caused by their predecessors. In contrast, if those predecessors had regained some of the lost territory, they would still be haunted by the specter of their original losses.

Israel's Defense Minister Moshe Dayan was the first person to test the new political conditions created by the cease-fire and the new Arab leaders. Significantly, Dayan

did not propose any ambitious, comprehensive plan. Instead he floated the idea -- which Meir had neither approved nor rejected -- of "a mutual withdrawal" from the Canal zone in order to consolidate the cease-fire. Dayan's proposal, which was made at a Labor Party convention in November, had the modest goal of removing Israeli soldiers from Egyptian artillery range. He also believed that Sadat would be less inclined towards renewing hostilities if the Canal cities were rebuilt and if Egypt were earning revenues from Canal traffic. The reopening of the Canal would also be welcomed by Western Europe, Israel's main trading partner. Dayan did not, however, envision a partial withdrawal as the beginning of a total evacuation of the Sinai; he maintained that it was better "to have Sharm el-Sheikh without peace than peace without Sharm el-Sheikh."<sup>7</sup>

Nonetheless, Sadat was intrigued by Dayan's proposal and had an Egyptian official relate his interest to the U.S. mission in Cairo in January, 1971.<sup>8</sup> In retrospect, this move, modest as it was, marked the first important step that Sadat would take in his opening towards America. Significantly, he chose not to go through the Soviets or through Jarring. Then, he announced his own initiative in a public speech on February 4:

We demand that during the period when we refrain from opening fire a partial withdrawal of the Israeli forces on the east bank of the Suez Canal be achieved as the first stage of a timetable which will be prepared later to implement the other provisions of the Security Council resolution. If this is achieved

within this period, we shall be prepared to begin immediately to clear the Suez Canal and reopen it to international navigation to serve the world economy. We believe that by this initiative, we shall be turning envoy Jarring's efforts from ambiguous words into definite measures.<sup>9</sup>

Several weeks later, he elaborated upon his views in the first of many interviews in Newsweek. On the withdrawal issue, he was unbending; the first Israeli pull-back would have to be to the Ras Muhammad-El Arish line, two-thirds of the way across the Sinai, and, as stated in the February 4th speech, the return to the 1967 border would have to be agreed upon as well. Sadat also threatened "renewed hostilities" if Israel were not forthcoming. This would be the first of many such threats before he actually launched a war in 1973. In a more conciliatory vein, he agreed to the stationing of troops from the major powers at Sharm el-Sheikh, an idea that Nasser had always rejected; spoke of the "psychological problems" on both sides that impeded the search for peace; and referred to UN Resolution 242 as "an embryonic peace treaty."<sup>10</sup>

Israel was somewhat disconcerted by Sadat's offer, according to Eban.<sup>11</sup> As long as diplomacy had focused on ambitious schemes such as the 1969 Rogers Plan, Israel could hold fast, confident that its own population and its supporters in the U.S. would back its stance without reservations. In the face of Sadat's conciliatory words and more limited position, it appeared to confront a genuine

bargaining situation for the first time. Eban reports the Cabinet was split between two proposals:

Dayan's idea was that Israeli forces be withdrawn some thirty kilometers from the Canal up to the western edge of the Gidi and Mitla passes . . . Dayan believed that no Egyptian government would open the Canal under the very eyes of an Israeli army and within range of Israeli tactical artillery. On the other hand, there was a cautious approach to the Canal withdrawal not only on the part of Allon, but more surprisingly from the moderate Sapir [the Finance Minister], who now supported the view of General Bar-Lev that the Israeli withdrawal should not be more than ten kilometers from the Canal. This limited withdrawal would enable us to ensure that Egypt would not be able to cross the Canal in military strength and create a jumping-off ground for assault. It would also enable Israel 'to shoot its way back' to the Canal area if Egypt violated the agreement.<sup>12</sup>

Considering that government policy since the 1967 war had been to link any withdrawal from the occupied territories and even the re-opening of the Canal to the achievement of a "full peace," arrived at by direct negotiations, the ten kilometer position represented progress of sorts.

Ironically, it was just at the moment that the partial approach negotiations were beginning that UN ambassador Gunnar Jarring weighed in with his suggestions for a comprehensive solution. Jarring, it will be recalled, had engaged in a futile round of diplomacy during 1967-68 that had resulted in both sides putting forth their maximum demands and avoiding any hint of compromise. In early February 1971, he began a second round of talks in the Middle East and asked both parties pointed questions that could not be evaded by generalities. Israel was asked if it

would agree in principle to withdraw to the 1967 borders on the Egyptian front, subject to security arrangements and freedom of navigation if Egypt signed a peace agreement. Egypt was asked if it would sign a binding peace agreement ending the state of belligerency if Israel would return to the 1967 borders. Sadat answered in the affirmative, marking the first time that Egypt formally agreed to the idea of a contractual peace. Israel, which was angry at Jarring for having asked such pointed questions, replied in the negative, marking the first time that it made official its demands for border rectifications even in the context of a peace settlement. Towards the end of February, Jarring suspended his mission in the face of Israel's refusal to agree to the implicit trade-off on which UN Resolution 242 was based: territories for a peace agreement.<sup>13</sup> It was never resumed.

After the end of Jarring's mission, the diplomatic focus shifted back to Sadat's interim proposal. Rogers and Sisco urged compromises on both sides and some movement did take place in April and May. Israel no longer insisted on a mutual withdrawal from the Canal zone; it would carry out a limited one itself. It also indicated that it would allow Egyptian civilian personnel into the vacated areas, although not police or as Sadat insisted, military personnel.<sup>14</sup>

Rogers and Sisco, however, came under pressure for a more ambitious approach from Sadat, who wanted an Israeli

"promise" to provide a timetable for an eventual withdrawal back to the 1967 borders and who vowed that 1971 would be the "year of decision" during which he would decide on whether war or peace was the right path.<sup>15</sup> Thus, Rogers publicly stated that any partial withdrawal would be merely a step toward complete and full implementation of Resolution 242 within a reasonable period of time.<sup>16</sup> Prime Minister Meir reacted angrily and said Rogers had "greatly erred."<sup>17</sup> The Cabinet vowed that it would not pursue an interim approach if the U.S. insisted on tabling such ambitious proposals.<sup>18</sup> Sadat's understandable desire to steer the negotiations toward a timetable for a comprehensive withdrawal, at least on the Sinai front, thus had the effect of alienating the Israelis and slowing progress for even a partial step.<sup>19</sup>

The primary responsibility for the formulation of U.S. Middle East policy shifted from Rogers to Kissinger in late 1971, mainly because, as Kissinger put it, "Nixon did not believe he could risk recurrent crises in the Middle East in an election year. He therefore asked me to step in, if only to keep things quiet."<sup>20</sup>

Kissinger had never liked ambitious initiatives like the Rogers Plan. He felt that Israel could not be expected to agree to withdraw from all the occupied territories on any of the fronts at one time when all the Arabs could offer in return were promises about peace. Instead the

negotiations should be divided into segments that Israel could assimilate:

"My approach was to use an initial step to get the process of withdrawal and mutual acceptance under way even without a commitment to ultimate goals." The real issue was not the detail of whether the Israelis withdrew forty kilometers or twenty kilometers from the Canal, but the fact that an Israeli withdrawal would be of tremendous symbolic significance.<sup>21</sup>

Kissinger also wanted to continue to keep the USSR on the periphery of the negotiations "so long as it one-sidedly supported all the positions of its clients."<sup>22</sup> After meeting with Gromyko in Washington in September 1971 he believed there was still little give in the Soviet position which insisted that any interim agreement be linked "in detail" to a final settlement that would involve all the fronts.<sup>23</sup> The Soviets did not want Syria, their closest frontline ally, to be ignored.

In December 1971 Kissinger made progress on several major issues in talks with Prime Minister Meir and Israel's Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin in Washington. Meir agreed for the first time, as part of a partial settlement, that Israel would withdraw 30 kilometers to the western extremity of the passes and that Egyptian "police" would cross into the vacated areas. It would also accept a cease-fire for several years instead of an end to the state of belligerency. In return, it was agreed that the "linkage between the partial and [any] overall agreements would not bind Israel to the Rogers Plan in any way whatsoever." The two sides

also agreed that future contacts be conducted through Kissinger and the White House rather than the State Department.<sup>24</sup>

Kissinger having obtained what he thought were the maximum Israeli concessions for the moment shifted diplomatic focus to Egypt. In April a high level Egyptian officer told a U.S. official in Cairo that future communications between the two governments should take place on the presidential level instead of through the foreign ministries, and suggested that presidential envoys should contact one another. Kissinger agreed to the communications proposal and said he would see an Egyptian representative after the upcoming Nixon-Breznev summit in May. The agreement to place communications at the presidential level was an important step in the evolution of U.S.-Egyptian relations. It ensured greater confidentiality and indicated that both countries were entering a more serious period of diplomacy in which the energy and prestige of their presidents would be engaged.<sup>25</sup>

At the May summit in Moscow, Kissinger formulated with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko an innocuous statement of principles about the Middle East. Sadat considered the communique a "violent shock" that indicated that the Soviets had relegated Arab interests to a low priority in order not to disturb their relations with the U.S.<sup>26</sup> In July, the Egyptian leader expelled nearly all

Soviet military advisors. He later claimed that the Soviets had been unwilling to sell a wide range of weapons and had placed restrictions on the use of much of their equipment in Egypt: "the [Soviet] staff of the jamming center, the crews of the four aircraft and of all the other Soviet-manned equipment had consistently refused to carry out any orders until permission was granted by Moscow."<sup>27</sup>

Kissinger and Nixon, who did not respond immediately to Sadat's move because of the upcoming presidential election and the intensive negotiations leading to the January 1973 Vietnam peace agreement, met with Sadat's security advisor, Hafiz Ismail, in February 1973. Ismail restated Egypt's position that any interim withdrawal had to be linked to the 1967 border. Cairo was willing to discuss mutual demilitarization arrangements and an end to belligerency if Israel did agree to withdraw entirely, but "normalization" between the two countries would have to await "a comprehensive settlement, including the Palestinians and Syria. Egypt would accept any agreement about the West Bank that was acceptable to either King Hussein or the area's leaders "even along the lines of the so-called Allon Plan." But it insisted upon the return of East Jerusalem to Arab sovereignty and reserved the right to express its views about who should ultimately govern the West Bank even if Jordan negotiated a settlement -- an

indication of the growing influence of the Palestine Liberation Organization.<sup>28</sup>

Kissinger, for his part, argued for the necessity of accepting the idea of a settlement being implemented over a prolonged period of time. He implied that Egyptian sovereignty over the Sinai might be acknowledged by Israel, but that security arrangements would be required for a long time. (Israel, in fact, had agreed to this verbal formula in December 1971.)<sup>29</sup>

Kissinger and Ismail met one more time for clandestine talks in May. The Egyptian advisor insisted upon Cairo's maximum demands and remained "cool" to the sovereignty and security formula.<sup>30</sup> Overall, "the promising tone of the February talks was missing,"<sup>31</sup> according to Quandt. Ismail promised to contact Kissinger again, but never did, for Sadat was convinced that "Israel evidently had them [the Americans] completely in her grip."<sup>32</sup> He was set on war.

### Overview

Several important patterns emerge from the diplomacy of the 1970-73 period. One pattern was the incremental pace of the negotiations in which progress consisted of a number of modest steps: Sisco visited Nasser in April 1970, the first high level trip by a U.S. official since the 1967 war; a cease-fire was reached in August 1970; in November 1970, Dayan first mentioned the possibility of a partial

agreement; in February 1971 Sadat made public his own ideas about an interim solution. After Sadat's speech the Israeli Cabinet began to discuss the idea of a partial pullback more seriously. In May 1971 the Cabinet told Rogers it would allow Egyptian civilian personnel across the Canal and in December 1971 Meir told Kissinger that Israel would pull back to the western extremity of the Sinai passes and allow Egyptian police across the Canal.

Egypt's opening to the U.S. followed a similar pattern. In January 1971, Sadat contacted American officials for the first time when he told the U.S. mission in Cairo that he was interested in Dayan's ideas about an interim settlement. In February 1971, Sadat was interviewed by Newsweek in what was the first of many bids to influence U.S. public opinion. In April 1972, Sadat asked that communications be placed on the presidential level instead of going through the State Department. In July 1972 Sadat expelled most of the Soviet advisors. In February 1973 Kissinger and Ismail met for the first of their two clandestine talks. Thus, progress was generally made in incremental steps over a period of time.

A second pattern consisted of Israel making key concessions on the condition that they not be tied to further steps. Israel agreed to the cease-fire in August 1970, a withdrawal in the Sinai, and the presence of an Egyptian police force on the East Bank in December 1971 only

on the condition that they not be part of some overall plan involving additional compromises. When partial steps were tied to final goals, Israel balked. When, for example, Sadat convinced Rogers in late 1971 of the need to revert to a comprehensive plan, Israel retreated to a sullen negativism.

The diplomacy of the 1970-73 period affords an interesting contrast with the diplomacy of the 1967-69 period. Although the attempts to head off the October 1973 war failed, Egypt and Israel did indicate some flexibility when the partial approach was used. When Rogers temporarily put aside his more ambitious goals, he helped to mediate a ninety-day cease-fire between the two sides in August 1970 that ended up lasting for more than three years. The cease-fire agreement was followed by the Dayan and Sadat proposals about reopening the Canal. Sadat accepted the idea of signing a contractual peace of some sort and allowing troops from the major powers to be stationed at Sharm el-Sheikh. In December 1971 Israel, as previously mentioned, agreed in talks with Kissinger to withdraw to the western extremity of the Sinai passes and allow Egyptian police into the vacated area.

No doubt this progress was in part attributable to Sadat's greater flexibility than Nasser's. Nonetheless, neither Jarring's comprehensive approach in early 1971 nor Rogers' return to the comprehensive approach late in the

same year made any progress. Both men, in fact, faded out of the diplomatic picture.

Overall, the partial approach towards the issues appeared to be a more effective strategy. Israel was not willing to make major withdrawals all at once. Many Israeli hawks were against the notion of major withdrawals under any circumstances. But even Israeli moderates like Foreign Minister Eban wanted any withdrawals to be made over an extended period of time: "Whatever withdrawals we were willing to make would have to take place gradually in order to test Arab reactions."<sup>33</sup> The partial approach -- which would soon be put to a true test after the 1973 war -- appeared to be the only way that withdrawals could be made palatable to the Israelis.

## NOTES

## CHAPTER 2

<sup>1</sup>Heikal, The Sphinx, p. 198.

<sup>2</sup>See following for discussion of growing Soviet involvement: Mohamed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan. (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1975), p. 83. Lawrence Whetton, The Canal War: Four Power Conflict in the Middle East. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1974), pp. 107-110.

<sup>3</sup>Heikal, The Sphinx, p. 198.

<sup>4</sup>New York Times, 15 June 1970.

<sup>5</sup>Heikal, The Sphinx, p. 201.

<sup>6</sup>State Department Bulletin, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July - December 1970) Vol. 63, pp. 25-33. See also Eban statement on Israeli radio as reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 18, 1970).

<sup>7</sup>Jerusalem Post, 25 November 1970.

<sup>8</sup>Interview with the head of the U.S. mission in Cairo Don Bergus, 15 April 1981. Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1280.

<sup>9</sup>New York Times, 5 February 1970.

<sup>10</sup>Newsweek, February 22, 1971, pp. 40-41.

<sup>11</sup>Interview with Abba Eban.

<sup>12</sup>Eban, pp. 474-475.

<sup>13</sup>New York Times, 27 February 1971.

<sup>14</sup>Jerusalem Post, 29 March 1971. New York Times, 2 April 1971; 2, 10, 21 May 1971.

<sup>15</sup>Newsweek, December 13, 1971, p. 46.

<sup>16</sup>For full Israeli text, see Arab Record. (Bath, England: Mendip Press, Nov. 1-14. 1971, no. 24), p. 3616.

<sup>17</sup>For full Israeli text, see Ibid, pp. 3621-22.

<sup>18</sup>For additional Israeli criticism, see New York Times, 7 October 1971.

<sup>19</sup>Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1285.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., pp. 1281-82, 1287-88.

<sup>21</sup>Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, (Boston: Little Brown, 1982), p. 200.

<sup>22</sup>Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1288.

<sup>23</sup>Yitzhak Rabin, The Rabin Memoirs. (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), pp. 207, 209. See also Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 1289-90.

<sup>24</sup>Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1293.

<sup>25</sup>Anwar Sadat, In Search of Identity. (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 229.

<sup>26</sup>Ibid., p. 231.

<sup>27</sup>Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 213-16. Quandt, p. 155. Quandt's account is based on discussion with then Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East, Harold Saunders, who attended the Kissinger-Ismaïl talks.

<sup>28</sup>Quandt, p. 155.

<sup>29</sup>Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 227.

<sup>30</sup>Quandt, p. 159. Quandt bases his account of the May meeting on the account by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Roy Atherton.

<sup>31</sup>Sadat, p. 288.

<sup>32</sup>Eban interview.

## CHAPTER 3

### THE NOVEMBER 1973 ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN AGREEMENT FOLLOWING THE OCTOBER WAR

#### New Opportunities Created by the War

The October 1973 war was the catalyst for a series of diplomatic advances, as Sadat had intended. Within a month of the war's end, Israel and Egypt reached their first diplomatic accord since the August 1970 cease-fire. The accord consolidated the shaky cease-fire that had halted the October war and saved about half of the Egyptian troops in the Sinai from being crushed by Israel. In January 1974, Israel agreed to withdraw from the West Bank of the Suez Canal and Egypt agreed to reduce its forces on the east bank of the Canal. In May 1974, Israel agreed to withdraw from some of the territory it had captured in the 1967 and 1973 wars from Syria in return for its prisoners of war. In August 1975, Israel agreed to another withdrawal in the Sinai.

The war had improved the prospects for negotiations for several reasons. On a tactical level, each side had new bargaining chips. The Arabs had captured some Israeli prisoners of war and on the east bank of the Canal had thousands of troops whose numbers Israel wanted reduced.

Israel, for its part, had captured additional territory from Egypt and Syria that it could offer.

On a more strategic level, Egypt and Syria had shown they could inflict major damage on Israel thanks to improved military performance. Israel, therefore, had a greater incentive to reach some form of accommodation in order to prevent future wars. Egypt and Syria, for their part, were buoyed enough by their initial success and the end of the myth of Israeli invincibility to allow them to deal with the Israelis on a basis of greater self-respect.<sup>1</sup> This made compromise and even the very idea of negotiations less difficult. On the other hand, Israel had bested the two Arab armies and Sadat and Assad probably realized that Arab military prowess was not likely to improve greatly in the near future.<sup>2</sup>

#### Seeking a First Agreement

Throughout this period, Nixon, Ford and Kissinger stuck with the partial approach. They broke up the issues into clusters in order to defer the hardest ones and not deal with all of the issues at once. According to National Security Council advisor William Quandt, Kissinger, at least, did not have in mind the location of a specific series of withdrawals -- these would emerge during the negotiations -- but he did plan on tackling progressively difficult issues as the negotiations evolved.<sup>3</sup> They also pursued a separate approach towards the parties. They

encouraged Israel to deal with the Arabs one at a time instead of all together and kept the Soviets and the PLO on the periphery of the negotiations.

The prospects for diplomatic progress were threatened initially by the precarious situation on the Sinai front. The Israelis had broken the first cease-fire on October 22 and surrounded the Egyptian Third Army; food and water for thousands of Egyptians had to pass through Israeli lines. Kissinger felt that, "If the U.S. held still while the Egyptian army was being destroyed . . . not even the most moderate Arab could cooperate with us."<sup>4</sup>

Tactically, he believed he was faced with two traps. On the one hand, he did not want to get caught up in endless squabbles over the original ceasefire lines of October 22. He reasoned that they would be difficult to re-locate and that inducing the Israelis to withdraw to them might be as difficult as getting the Israelis off the Canal's West Bank entirely. Moreover, while a withdrawal to the October 22 lines would eliminate the embarrassing stranglehold that the Israelis had on the Third Army, occasional artillery barrages by both sides and an Egyptian attempt to surround the Israeli forces on the West Bank could still take place.<sup>5</sup>

On the other hand, Kissinger did not want to aim immediately for a comprehensive settlement:

We knew that Israel adamantly rejected a return to the 1967 borders including a relinquishment of the Old City of Jerusalem. No Arab state, even the most moderate, would ask for less in the context of a

comprehensive peace. Israel, recovering from the stunning shock of the Arab attack, was as if paralyzed. It faced an election; it sought to regain its bearings; pressures for comprehensive negotiations were more likely to lead to desperate measures, such as ending the cease-fire, or to psychological collapse, than to a settlement. As for the Arabs, in a comprehensive approach all concerned parties would have to agree, and radical elements in the Arab world would have a veto. Egypt would lose control over its own decisions. And the Soviet Union would inject itself as the lawyer of the Arab side, putting forth a maximum program that years of experience had taught us was unfulfillable. Our allies, both Europe and Japan, would support the Arab position, leaving us completely isolated.<sup>6</sup>

Thus, Kissinger would try to save the Third Army and seek an accord more ambitious than a simple return to the October 22 lines. But he would not try to achieve anything near a comprehensive settlement: "It was the contemplation of these alternative risks -- of bogging down in niggling detail and of consuming our energies in the pursuit of comprehensive goals -- that induced us to decide instead on a 'step-by-step' approach."<sup>7</sup>

Egypt's Foreign Minister, Ismail Fahmy, called for a comprehensive settlement when he presented his country's opening position in Washington in late October. Fahmy insisted upon an Israeli withdrawal to the first cease-fire lines of October 22. Once that was done, Egypt would turn over the Israeli prisoners of war. Israel should then withdraw east of the passes, while Egypt's forces would remain in place, with UN personnel being stationed between them. Egypt would clear the Suez Canal once the Israeli withdrawal had been completed. Within an agreed time

period, Israel would withdraw in one step to the 1967 border, at which point the state of belligerency would end. Similar steps would be planned for the Syrian front, though little was said about the West Bank and the Palestinians.<sup>8</sup>

Kissinger told Fahmy that the plan had constructive elements, particularly the idea of a prisoner exchange, but that the deep withdrawals into the Sinai seemed too ambitious, at least over the short term. He also downplayed the importance of the October 22 lines:

If I spend my capital on every point of the cease-fire, there will not be any capital left to spend on the peace negotiations. If peace negotiations do not succeed, we can take the present line or the October 22 line -- it does not mean anything for there will be another war. The question is how we get cease-fire arrangements that are good enough to get us through peace negotiations over the next three to six months.<sup>9</sup>

When Prime Minister Meir presented her opening position in Washington on November 1, it was apparent that any comprehensive settlement was out of the question; saving the Third Army would be difficult enough. According to the Israeli journalist, Matti Golan, "She opened the meeting on the attack. Before she would let the Third Army go, she wanted to see all the Israeli prisoners back home."<sup>10</sup> After several days of tough bargaining, she relented somewhat. She would allow a corridor to the Third Army, but it "had to be completely controlled by Israel. A UN inspection post could be set up at its starting point."<sup>11</sup> The talks ended with Meir refusing Kissinger's pleas for a larger UN role.

The tone of the talks was conveyed, according to the Jerusalem Post, by Kissinger's "glum and even grim" appearance.<sup>12</sup>

Meanwhile, Kissinger briefly took up the issue of the PLO, whose influence had slowly been growing in the Arab world. Palestinian emigres were located throughout the Arab world, especially in the Persian Gulf countries, and had become increasingly active as lobbyists for the PLO ever since the loss of the West Bank in 1967.

Ever since mid-1973 the insurgent organization had been asking privately for a secret meeting with the U.S. Kissinger had initially turned down these feelers, but right after the war he agreed to a meeting in order to encourage the guerrilla organization to be quiescent during the delicate early stages of the Sinai negotiations. Thus, on November 3, the Deputy Director of the CIA, Vernon Walters, met secretly with a senior PLO official in Morocco. The senior official intimated that the PLO would like to take power in Jordan and to incorporate Israel into a "secular state."<sup>13</sup> Walters restated U.S. support for Israel and Jordan, while expressing the hope for eventual reconciliation: "We would expect, nevertheless, that in the context of a comprehensive settlement, the relationship between the Palestinian movement and the Hashemite Kingdom could develop in the direction of reconciliation."<sup>14</sup>

The dialogue with the PLO was not taken up again until March 1974, when Kissinger again wanted to keep the organization quiet during the Israeli-Syrian negotiations. Deferring the PLO issue in such a manner fit into Kissinger's strategy of putting off the most difficult issues in favor of the easier ones such as the Sinai negotiations.

Kissinger met with Sadat in Egypt on November 7 for the most crucial negotiating session to date.<sup>15</sup> The Egyptian leader wanted a quick Israeli withdrawal to the October 22 lines followed soon by a withdrawal two-thirds of the way across the Sinai to the El Arish-Ras Mohammad line. As he had done with Foreign Minister Fahmy, Kissinger suggested that they try for something less ambitious than a deep withdrawal, but more ambitious than the October 22 lines:

The United States would do its utmost to arrange a genuine disengagement of forces, moving the Israelis back across the Canal -- although not as far as in his scheme, probably not even beyond the passes. Still, it would be the first Israeli withdrawal from Arab territory occupied for any length of time; it would create the confidence for further steps. The diplomacy to induce Israel to return to the October 22 lines was about the same as the persuasion needed to produce a disengagement scheme . . . Sadat should choose. I would do my best either way.<sup>16</sup>

Although he hesitated for a time, Sadat agreed with Kissinger's proposal. They would forego a return to the October 22 lines, even though this meant the Third Army would remain surrounded in the desert by Israeli troops.<sup>17</sup>

The two negotiators then took up the question of the control over the Cairo-Suez road which led to the Third Army. While Prime Minister Meir had been forced by her Cabinet to reject UN control over the road, Kissinger believed that there could be a UN presence if Sadat agreed to a prisoner of war exchange. Sadat agreed; he undoubtedly wanted to ease pressure on the Third Army and to generate an atmosphere of confidence with both the U.S. and Israel. Checkpoints would be placed under United Nations control; at the same time Israeli officers would be permitted to participate in the supervision of the non-military nature of the cargo. In this way, the Israelis could claim that the UN posts were being allowed to operate on their road; Egypt could insist that the UN presence effectively removed the road from Israeli control. The Israelis could point to the fact that their officers participated in the inspection; the Egyptians could argue that this was only part of the UN procedure.<sup>18</sup>

Before ending their negotiating session, Sadat and Kissinger disposed of a relatively inconsequential issue. Egypt would "ease" the blockade of the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb if the Israelis promised to make only "moderate" use of it. Sadat defined "ease" as meaning that Egypt would not interfere with the normal flow of traffic through the Strait. The whole question was somewhat academic since Egypt had never actually stopped any Israeli ships from

using the Strait during the war. (Bab el-Mandeb was at the southern entrance to the Red Sea and could be blockaded by Egyptian ships.)<sup>19</sup>

The prospective agreement met the key concerns of the two parties. Egypt obtained a guaranteed supply line for the Third Army and an international presence on the Cairo-Suez road, while Israel secured the release of its prisoners of war.

Kissinger then sent two of his aides, Joseph Sisco and Harold Saunders, to Israel to obtain the Cabinet's agreement. The Cabinet raised questions about where the checkpoints would be on the Cairo-Suez road, who would actually control the road between the checkpoints, and the exact meaning of the "moderate" use of the Bab el-Mandeb. Kissinger and his aides convinced the Israelis that these kinds of issues should be worked out later. As Matti Golan observes, "Mrs. Meir and the other ministers accepted Kissinger's explanation that it was the very lack of specificity that allowed the coming together of Egypt and Israel. Every attempt to discuss details at this stage might run the delicate agreement aground. It was preferable that the details be worked out after the signing."<sup>20</sup>

Disagreement about interpretation and detail immediately followed the signing of the agreement on November 11. The Israeli representative General Ahbaron Yariv insisted that Israel use the Cairo-Suez road for its

military vehicles; the Egyptian representative General Abdel Ghany el-Gamassy and the UN representative, Finnish General Ensio Siilasuvo thought this violated the spirit of the accord. Siilasuvo and Gamassy wanted the two delegations to hold discussions in different tents, with Siilasuvo acting as a mediator; Yariv insisted upon talking directly with Gamassy and got his way. The three parties also continued to raise questions about the numbers, locations and nature of the control of the UN checkpoints. But the core of the agreement -- the return of the Israeli prisoners of war in exchange for the free passage of food and water to the Third Army -- was something both sides wanted badly enough to provide an incentive to work out the secondary problems.<sup>21</sup>

#### Overview

The November 1973 agreement was a major achievement. It saved the Third Army and stabilized the precarious cease-fire, thus enabling the parties to turn to the intricacies of negotiating the first Israeli withdrawal. In this sense, the agreement resembled the August 1970 cease-fire which enabled the parties to turn to negotiations. In both cases, the parties realized that not everything could be settled immediately. A cease-fire would first have to be reached and only then could the parties turn to more difficult negotiations.

The ensuing negotiations illustrate a number of interesting points about Kissinger's partial approach

towards the issues separating Israel and Egypt. Kissinger first convinced Sadat that the partial approach was indeed the only feasible one since an Israeli withdrawal deep into the Sinai was out of the question -- for the time being. On the other hand, he also persuaded the Egyptian leader to seek an Israeli withdrawal across the Canal and not just to the first cease-fire lines of October 22, even though this was more ambitious. Thus, the two negotiators decided to concentrate on an easier set of goals but not the absolute easiest. The more ambitious Israeli withdrawal across the Canal fitted in better with their longer term strategy of additional withdrawals.

Once Kissinger and Sadat had decided to defer the difficult issues of a deep Israeli withdrawal into the Sinai in favor of less ambitious pullbacks, they tended to concentrate on the most difficult issues within this cluster of easier issues. They first tackled the key question of whether to seek an Israeli withdrawal to the first ceasefire lines or across the Canal. After this, they solved the less crucial but still important question of the prisoner exchange and the modalities of the resupply to the Third Army. Finally, they disposed of the blockade question. After the agreement was signed, Gamassy, Yariv, and Siillasuvo worked out the secondary issues about the numbers, locations and nature of control of the UN checkpoints.

Thus, the negotiators dealt with the most difficult issues first within an easier cluster of issues.

The agreement held together because both sides gained something important; Egypt was guaranteed a supply route and Israel achieved the release of its prisoners-of-war. Both sides wanted these issues enough to provide the incentive to work out the less important issues such as the nature of the UN checkpoints. If they had begun by negotiating the secondary issues, they might have gotten bogged down in endless squabbles. Because an important agreement had been secured, however, these disagreements were contained within acceptable limits.

The November accord and its implementation also helped to increase trust between Israel and Egypt. Most Israelis thought fighting would resume at any moment until Sadat surprised the Israeli public by agreeing to a prisoner exchange.<sup>22</sup> His decision to do so indicated that Israel was dealing with a leader who preferred not to use prisoners-of-war as bargaining chips.

Egypt's trust in Israel was likewise increased by several developments. Israeli military officials did not hinder supplies of food and water going to the Third Army after the POWs were exchanged, as they could have done. Moreover, Israeli officials handled the prisoner exchange with tact. According to Golan, Israeli General Israel Tal had originally suggested that the Israeli wounded be

transferred all in one group because of their small numbers while the Egyptians be transferred in several groups because of their large numbers. Egyptian General Gamassy explained "that President Sadat could not allow it to appear to the Egyptian public that all the Israeli wounded had been released while all the Egyptian wounded were not yet back."<sup>23</sup> Tal understood the problem and suggested that the Israeli wounded be divided into two groups. The first group would leave Cairo when the first Egyptian group left Israel, and the second group would leave Cairo when the last Egyptian group left Israel.<sup>24</sup>

The November agreement also seemed to mark the acceptance of Kissinger's partial approach. While both sides continued to adhere publicly to their maximum demands, the first partial agreement created a precedent pointing towards further such accords. Setting precedents, as in any negotiations, was important. If an agreement could be reached between Israel and Egypt perhaps further such agreements could be reached between the two parties or even between Israel and Syria.

Overall, the November 1973 agreement was an important first step. It made possible negotiations in the first place by stabilizing the precarious cease-fire. It also facilitated further agreements by establishing a useful precedent and setting up procedures, such as the resupply of the Third Army, that would allow the Egyptians to begin to

test the reliability of the Israelis in carrying out their promises. The agreement appears to have succeeded because it struck a balance between the harder and easier issues. Dealing with an easier cluster of issues improved the chances of reaching an agreement. But solving the hardest of these earlier issues gave the parties an incentive to work out the remaining problems. Thus tackling the hardest issue in an easier cluster of issues served two key purposes. It would not be the last time that this approach would be used.

## NOTES

## CHAPTER 3

<sup>1</sup>Interview with William Quandt, 10 December 1984.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid.

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 573.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid, pp. 614-15.

<sup>6</sup>Ibid., p. 615.

<sup>7</sup>Ibid.

<sup>8</sup>Jerusalem Post, 30 October 1973, New York Times, 30 October 1973, Quandt, p. 214.

<sup>9</sup>Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 618-19.

<sup>10</sup>Matti Golan, The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger. (New York, Quadrangle Books, 1976), p. 107. Also, in our interview with Mr. Golan, 1 October 1977, he elaborated on this point.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p. 109.

<sup>12</sup>Jerusalem Post, 2 November 1973. See also Jerusalem Post 3, 4 November 1973. Golan, pp. 106-111. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 623-24.

<sup>13</sup>Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 628.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid.

<sup>15</sup>As previously mentioned in the Introduction, the Sadat-Kissinger conversations present certain problems in that they often took place without any other U.S. advisors who could offer an account in addition to Kissinger's memoirs. Nonetheless, even if Kissinger distorts the record in a self-serving manner (although in the Sadat negotiations he tends to praise Sadat rather than himself), he had no reason to distort the question that will increasingly interest us: the order in which the issues were dealt with. That is to say, Kissinger or any other negotiator might depict himself in a brilliant light; but there is nothing to be gained in saying that he began with the easier or harder issues.

<sup>16</sup>Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 639.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid., p. 640

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 642.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid.

<sup>20</sup>Golan, p. 114.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., pp. 116-19.

<sup>22</sup>Jerusalem Post, 5, 6 November 1973.

<sup>23</sup>Golan, p. 107.

<sup>24</sup>Ibid.

## CHAPTER 4

### THE DECEMBER 1973 GENEVA CONFERENCE AND THE JANUARY 1974 SINAI AGREEMENT

#### Organizing The Geneva Conference

Although Kissinger's next goal following the November 1973 agreement was the negotiation of the Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank of the Canal, he could not enter into a period of intense negotiations until the December 31 Israeli parliamentary elections were over. The intervening month offered both a danger and an opportunity. On the one hand, it was important that the momentum created by the November agreement not be allowed to dissipate. On the other hand, he could use the time to explain his step-by-step strategy to the rest of the Arab world, whereby he would use a partial approach towards the issues and a separate approach toward the parties.

Kissinger believed that organizing a symbolic opening session of a peace conference at Geneva would make a modest contribution to the step-by-step process. The idea for such a conference involving all the Arab active belligerents, plus the U.S. and the USSR, had emerged late in the diplomacy that led to the October cease-fire. The Soviets had probably used the prospect of the conference to induce

the Arabs to accept a cease-fire. But they also probably had seen it as the best means to receive joint credit with the U.S. for any progress that took place. Kissinger, for his part, wanted the conference to serve "as a symbol of our commitment to overall peace, as a means of keeping in touch with the Soviet Union during the delicate phase while the ceasefire hung in the balance, and as a fallback position if alternative routes failed."<sup>1</sup> But, unlike the Soviets, Kissinger did not envisage joint negotiations taking place at Geneva.

He could also use the preparations for the Geneva Conference as a means of explaining his diplomatic approach to the rest of the Arab world and ending the Saudi oil embargo that had gone into effect on October 20. The U.S. Secretary of State had gone to Saudi Arabia, in fact, immediately after negotiating the November agreement to explain his approach. Although King Faisal stated the standard Saudi comprehensive position calling for a return to the 1967 borders and the repatriation of the Palestinian refugees, he did not criticize Kissinger's more modest approach. According to Kissinger, moreover, Crown Prince Fahd went one step further: "We appreciate the fact that things cannot be done overnight and have to be done step-by-step, but expeditiously."<sup>2</sup>

Faisal's tacit support was important. His financial support of Egypt and Syria had helped make the war possible

and continued to give him influence over the postwar diplomacy. His prestige throughout the Arab world was high because of his decision to embargo the U.S. Thus, Kissinger would keep Faisal carefully appraised of the progress of future negotiations and call on him at crucial times for support.

Kissinger, however, was unable to persuade Faisal to lift the oil embargo, although Saudi diplomats had indicated in Washington in early December that the embargo would end if Sadat, Assad and Algerian President Boumedienne agreed. Sadat was favorable, but Assad and Boumedienne persuaded the Saudis to discuss the matter at the meeting of Arab oil ministers in Kuwait on December 8. As was usually the case in multilateral Arab summits, the hardest line position predominated and the ministers linked an end to the embargo to Israeli acceptance of a schedule for total withdrawal including Jerusalem.<sup>3</sup>

Kissinger visited the Arab frontline states and Israel in mid-December during the same trip. Sadat and King Hussein agreed to come to Geneva, but Assad said he would only go after the disengagement agreement had been reached.<sup>4</sup> Israel was somewhat wary of a conference, most of whose participants would be allied against the Jewish state.<sup>5</sup> Kissinger first dealt with the problem that bothered them the most, the question of Palestinian participation, by assuring them that Sadat and Hussein had agreed that the

issue would only be discussed, not acted upon. The U.S. Secretary of State then persuaded the Israelis that the United Nations would have the authority to convene the conference, but not supervise it.<sup>6</sup>

The Geneva Conference finally convened on December 21 with the foreign ministers of Israel, Egypt, Jordan, the U.S. and the USSR, and UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim in attendance. Kissinger explained his step-by-step strategy, saying that the goal of the conference was an authentic peace settlement, but that the urgent need was to strengthen the cease-fire by reaching agreements on military disengagements as the "essential first step" on the road to the implementation of Resolution 242. The other parties stated their standard positions. The Arabs demanded an Israeli return to the 1967 borders and Palestinian self-determination; the USSR called for a return to the 1967 borders, but stated that Israel had a right to national existence; Israel rejected the concept of a Palestinian state and asked for patience in what would be a prolonged effort.<sup>7</sup>

The conference recessed indefinitely after the first day of speeches. While it was soon to be superseded by Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy, it had benefited most of the parties. In Egypt it created the impression that there was diplomatic movement and deflected attention from the embarrassing Israeli presence on the West Bank of the Suez

Canal. In Israel it gave a lift to the Labor Party during the last ten days of the campaign; voters were reluctant to disrupt the beginnings of the fragile peace process despite their anger about the October war. It strengthened Hussein's hopes of playing an important role in any West Bank negotiations. It placated the USSR during the period of incipient negotiations. It reinforced the growing impression that the U.S. was a fair-minded intermediary, open to the arguments of both sides. The effort needed in organizing the conference, therefore, did not seem entirely wasted.

The results of the December 31 balloting changed the Israeli political picture moderately, but not decisively. The governing Labor Party lost 5 percent of its strength, which translated into a loss of seven seats in the 120-member Parliament (to 49 seats, down from 56). It could still muster a majority with its traditional coalition partner, the National Religious Party, but the influence of that party, dedicated to annexing the West Bank, increased.

Any negotiations, therefore, about the West Bank would be even more difficult. Moreover, neither Egypt nor Syria wanted to defer Israeli withdrawals while the Palestinian issue was being sorted out. Sadat was preoccupied with the fate of the Third Army and Assad faced Israeli troops twenty miles from Damascus. Thus, the only

parties that were pressing for a comprehensive peace settlement at this point were the Soviet Union and Jordan.

#### Negotiating the Sinai I Agreement

Defense Minister Moshe Dayan came to Washington on January 4, 1974, to present in detail Israel's opening position for the Sinai negotiations. The major issue was the location of the forward lines of the two armies: "all agreed [this] would be the key to success or failure."<sup>8</sup> The next most important question was the nature of the limited force zones that Israel wanted in return for a withdrawal, and the third issue was the political guarantees that Israel wanted from Egypt, such as a promise to rebuild the Canal cities.

Dayan did not dispute the territory won by Egypt, which could, in fact, have a line roughly six to ten kilometers wide along the entire east bank of the Canal. Israel, for its part, would withdraw to the west side of the Sinai passes -- a concession that it had originally made to Kissinger back in December 1971. A UN buffer force would be located between the two armies.

The Jewish state would be tougher, however, about the need for force limitation zones that would reduce significantly Egyptian forces. Dayan wanted all Egyptian tanks and artillery pieces and most Egyptian soldiers to leave the east bank of the Canal. He also wanted Egyptian anti-aircraft defenses to pull back from their positions

along the Canal's West Bank in order to be out of range of the Israeli front lines. The overall disengagement should involve five separate zones of arms restrictions. The two sides would be separated by a UN buffer zone of a width of six to ten kilometers. Light security zones of six to ten kilometers would flank the UN buffer force. No Egyptian tanks and only about two battalions or 1,800 men could remain in the light zone; this meant that the two Egyptian field armies, numbering 70,000 men, 720 tanks, and 994 artillery pieces, would have to leave the east bank. Two heavier force limitations zones would flank the light zones, extending to the west side of the Sinai passes and thirty kilometers west of the Canal. No anti-aircraft defenses would be allowed in these areas.<sup>9</sup>

Dayan also demanded a number of political conditions. Israel wanted a pledge that the Canal would be reopened and the Canal cities rebuilt, that Israeli cargoes and ships could use the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb and the Canal and that the state of belligerency would be ended.<sup>10</sup>

Kissinger told Dayan that the proposal was a step forward but that it could not be a final position if there was to be an agreement. The two men decided that it would be best that Kissinger himself convey the proposal to Sadat.<sup>11</sup>

Kissinger had opening talks with Sadat on January 12, 1974. He did not mention the Israeli demands for an end to

the state of belligerency and rebuilding the Canal cities. He reasoned that if the negotiations proved difficult with regard to disengagement, these political demands would make matters worse; if there was a breakthrough, however, the political demands could be handled more easily. The point was to concentrate on the most important issues.<sup>12</sup>

Sadat had abandoned his initial call for a deep Israeli withdrawal to the El-Arish-Ras Mohammad line, but still wanted Israel to vacate the Mitla and Gidi passes in the Sinai. He seemed receptive to the idea of placing artillery and SAM missiles out of the range of each other's lines and reducing troop numbers, but rejected the near total Egyptian withdrawal from the Sinai that Israel wanted. He agreed that Israeli cargoes could transit the Canal, but not on Israeli ships, and that the "blockade" of the Bab el-Mandeb would be lifted once an initial disengagement had been reached.

According to Kissinger, Sadat urged the U.S. Secretary to stay in the Middle East until an agreement had been reached instead of moving the negotiations to Geneva. The Egyptian leader also wanted to keep the Soviets and Syrians out of the initial negotiations; the Soviets would support Assad who "would always find some pretext for delay or put forward impossible demands."<sup>13</sup>

Kissinger spent January 12 and 13 in Jerusalem. Israel now wanted Sadat to turn over some of the land Egypt

had captured to the United Nations, and still refused to withdraw beyond the western edge of the passes. When he returned to Egypt, Sadat asked Kissinger about his views on the Israelis' positions. Kissinger replied that he thought that they would not change their forward line because it was two hundred yards from the only north-south road on the west side of the strategic passes. If they withdrew beyond it, he reasoned, there would be no logical stopping point except inside the passes and it was extremely unlikely that they would withdraw that far as a part of a first disengagement. As for the arms limitations issues, there might be "some flexibility though [he] had not heard anything to that effect in Jerusalem."<sup>14</sup> Kissinger also mentioned the rest of the Israeli political demands since he felt enough progress had been made to deal with them.

Sadat, according to Kissinger, "brooded" for several minutes.<sup>15</sup> Clearly, he would have liked a larger Israeli withdrawal, but realized that he would have to settle for a more modest one for the time being. Finally, he agreed that the Israelis could withdraw to their proposed line at the west end of the passes; but he would not give up the three kilometers in the southern sector to the United Nations. As for the force limitation zones, he proposed that the light and heavier security zones be considered one zone; limits on deployments could be expressed in kilometers behind each side's forward line. Sadat accepted the

principle that neither artillery nor surface-to-air missiles would be placed where they could reach the other side's forward line; he tentatively decided that the appropriate distance for surface-to-air missiles was thirty kilometers behind Egypt's forward line (or ten kilometers less than Israel was proposing, since Israel was measuring distances from the Canal). But Gamassy's views would have to be taken into consideration; Kissinger should try to improve these distances. Sadat wanted ten battalions across the Canal, not the two or three that Israel proposed; he would accept any number that approached that figure. Egypt must also have some tanks and artillery on the east bank of the Canal; he would settle for any number as long as the principle was assured that Egyptian forces were not barred from Egyptian territory. This was a question of national self-respect.<sup>16</sup>

As for the political demands, Sadat could not accept a formal obligation to clear and reopen the Suez Canal; but Israel could be told that he planned to do so as soon as both armies reached the disengagement lines. Similarly, he would make no guarantee about rebuilding the Canal cities; but he was willing to seek Israeli assurances via the U.S. that they would not attack the population centers in the area -- a pledge that made sense only in the context of a decision to return the Canal area to normal life. He could not, however, agree to an end to the state of belligerency; it would lead to an explosion in the Arab world. Yet, he

could make a solemn pledge to respect the cease-fire. Sadat was willing to express these intentions in letters to President Nixon. The U.S. could communicate their contents to whomever it wanted.<sup>17</sup>

Neither Gamassy nor Fahmy hid their disappointment over Sadat's decisions. The Egyptian chief-of-staff was especially bitter about the backward movement of the surface-to-air missiles on the West Bank; he did not want to explain to his army why its missile defenses had to be "withdrawn" after a successful war. He would go no further than to draw a plan for a withdrawal of twenty-five kilometers, or fifteen kilometers less than Israel demanded; if Israel remained adamant, he said, Sadat would have to arbitrate.<sup>18</sup>

Kissinger returned to Israel and began negotiations with the Israeli Cabinet on January 15. Israel accepted Sadat's concept of fewer limited force zones and gave up its demand that the Third Army turn over some of its territory to the United Nations. It also accepted Sadat's refusal to declare an end to the state of belligerency; it would settle for the proscription of "hostile" acts. (That demand was diluted further as the negotiations progressed.) It would permit Egypt to have thirty tanks across the Canal on the condition that Cairo accept a limit of thirty kilometers from the forward line for the surface-to-air missiles (which

meant that Israel was conceding ten kilometers of its original proposal).<sup>19</sup>

The US Secretary returned to Egypt the same day. In his discussions about the limited force zones, he focused on the distance that Egypt would have to pull back its surface-to-air missiles, the most difficult issue. He told Sadat that he felt that Israel would go no lower than a thirty kilometer limit (down from forty). Sadat confided that he would accept the limit, but that Kissinger should make one more try for Gamassy's sake.

When Kissinger spoke with Gamassy, the Egyptian general still insisted upon the twenty-five kilometer limit and the right to deploy several batteries of howitzers and mortars on the east bank. Kissinger knew that Israel would accept the demand about the artillery, but did not say so; he planned to trade it as an Israeli concession in return for agreement about the thirty kilometer limit.<sup>20</sup>

Negotiations over the Egyptian political assurances proceeded along a parallel track with the force limitation talks. According to Kissinger, they were more time-consuming than difficult. Kissinger and Sadat agreed that Nixon would send a letter to the Egyptian leader saying he "understood" that Egypt intended to clear the Canal and that he looked forward to "the resumption of normal economic activities" in the area. Sadat also agreed that the U.S. could fly reconnaissance flights over the UN zone randomly,

instead of every two weeks as he had first proposed in order to make evasions more difficult. Sadat also promised not to interfere with Israeli civilian flights down the Red Sea, which was the country's only civil air route to Africa.<sup>21</sup>

Before leaving for Israel, Kissinger again spoke with Sadat in private. The Egyptian president said that, as a sign of good will, he would not exercise his right to keep thirty tanks across the Canal. He also asked the U.S. Secretary to take a personal message to Golda Meir about the sincerity of his intentions: "You must take my word seriously. When I made my initiative in 1971, I meant it. When I threatened war, I meant it. When I talk of peace now, I mean it."<sup>22</sup> It was the first direct message ever from an Egyptian head of government to his counterpart in Israel.

Kissinger met with the Israelis on January 17 to wrap up the negotiations. They agreed to allow some Egyptian artillery on the east bank in return for the thirty kilometer limit for surface-to-air missiles. The following day the agreement was signed by the chiefs-of-staff of Israel and Egypt.<sup>23</sup>

### Overview

The January 1974 accord, like the November 1973 one, also helped to reduce the level of distrust on both sides. Sadat's promise to rebuild the Canal cities and not to deploy any tanks in the Sinai -- even though 30 were

permitted -- were gestures of pacific intentions. Sadat's personal message to Prime Minister Meir -- the first direct communication ever between an Israeli and Egyptian leader -- was also an important gesture. Moreover, if the accord's provisions were honored -- as the November 1973 agreement had been -- trust would be increased further.

The January 1974 accord also helped teach the parties about the possibilities and limitations of future diplomacy. Each side came to understand better the other side's major concerns. It also demonstrated that U.S. support for Israel was not unconditional and that it could take into consideration the Arab point of view. At the same time, the accord again underlined the difficulties that the U.S. had in influencing Israel and further disabused the Arabs of the notion that Jerusalem was a puppet of Washington.

The importance of correctly pacing the negotiations also emerged as an important aspect of the January 1974 agreement. Kissinger tried to keep progress going at a steady rate by not making the negotiations too difficult or too easy. At the beginning, he did not convey all of Israel's demands about political conditions to Sadat for fear of overloading the negotiation circuit. On the other hand, he did not always convey all of Israel's concessions to Gamassy in order to be able to dole out concessions in subsequent sessions. This helped to maintain a steady rate of progress and avoided having the negotiations bog down

because of excessive difficulty or raising unwarranted expectations because of too many concessions.

Educating the parties about the limits of diplomacy and correctly pacing the negotiations was, of course, not only possible under Kissinger's partial approach towards the issues and separate approach towards the parties. They could, in theory, have been done if the more ambitious comprehensive and joint approach had been used. Yet both were probably easier in a situation where not too much was trying to be accomplished. Kissinger's partial and separate approach created a situation in which the parties could comprehend the dimensions of the negotiations more quickly and in which the pacing of the negotiations was more manageable.

Equally important, the January 1974 accord set major precedents. Israel had made its first withdrawal towards the 1967 border. Egypt had agreed to major force limitations in the evacuated areas and to certain political conditions. These precedents pointed the way towards further such agreements.

Kissinger's only major failure during the Sinai I negotiations was not achieving an end to the oil embargo. The Saudis appeared to want to lift it because the price of oil was going higher than even they wanted. They were not ready, however, to separate themselves from the common Arab front whose more militant members wanted the embargo to be

maintained until the Israelis had withdrawn on all the fronts.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the negotiations was the tendency of the parties to combine elements of the comprehensive and partial approaches. As was the case in the November 1973 negotiations, once the parties had agreed not to seek a comprehensive solution to all the issues in favor of solving some of the easier issues, they concentrated on the most difficult of these easier issues. When Kissinger, for example, persuaded the Israelis to attend the Geneva Conference, he first addressed their greatest concern, the issue of Palestinian representation, and then their lesser concern, the role of the United Nations. Similarly, once Sadat had agreed to seek a modest Israeli withdrawal, the parties concentrated on the most difficult issues. They first negotiated the location of the new Israeli forward line, then the make-up of the limited force zones, and particularly the location of the Egyptian surface-to-air missiles, and finally the Israeli political demands. Thus, the parties were pursuing a partial approach on the strategic level by deferring the most difficult issues. But, on the more tactical level, they confronted the most difficult issues head-on.

## NOTES

## CHAPTER 4

<sup>1</sup>Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 749.

<sup>2</sup>Ibid., p. 665. See also Edward Sheehan, The Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger. (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1976), pp. 76-77. Sheehan travelled as a journalist with the Kissinger party during most of the negotiations and spoke extensively with Kissinger's aides.

<sup>3</sup>New York Times, 9 December 1973.

<sup>4</sup>New York Times, 16 December 1973.

<sup>5</sup>Jerusalem Post, 17 December 1973.

<sup>6</sup>Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 790-91.

<sup>7</sup>New York Times, 22 December 1973.

<sup>8</sup>Golan, p. 159.

<sup>9</sup>Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 802.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>Jerusalem Post, 3, 10, 13 January 1974. Quandt, pp. 225-26.

<sup>12</sup>Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 813.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p. 815.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p. 823.

<sup>15</sup>Ibid., p. 824.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid., pp. 824-25.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid., p. 828.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid., p. 832.

<sup>20</sup>Ibid., pp. 833-34.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., pp. 834-35.

<sup>22</sup>Ibid., p. 836.

<sup>23</sup>For additional information on these negotiations, see Jerusalem Post 14, 20, 22 January 1974, New York Times, 22 January 1974, Quandt, pp. 225-29.

## CHAPTER 5

### THE NEGOTIATION OF THE MAY 1974 ACCORD BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA

#### Importance and Difficulties of a Syrian-Israeli Agreement

The successful conclusion of the Sinai I negotiations apparently strengthened the position of the advocates of the partial approach. After the signing of the accord, none of the parties was calling for comprehensive solutions at a Geneva Conference except the Soviets and the PLO, who were both afraid of being shut out of bilateral negotiations.<sup>1</sup> The key Arab states were pushing for bilateral negotiations between Israel and Syria. Sadat made it clear to U.S. officials that he could not pursue further negotiations until some kind of agreement had been reached with Damascus.<sup>2</sup> Sadat did not want to make a separate peace with Israel, at least at this point, because it would alienate most of the Arab world. Moreover, Israel might be more apt to make concessions if it thought another Egyptian-Syrian attack were possible. Saudi Arabia, for its part, insisted that the oil embargo would not be lifted until an Israeli-Syrian agreement had been reached.<sup>3</sup>

The Syrian-Israeli negotiations, however, would have to deal with more difficult issues. Whereas the cease-fire line along the Suez Canal was over two hundred kilometers from Israel's 1967 pre-war border and one hundred kilometers from Cairo, the Israeli salient captured in the 1973 war was only 50 kilometers from the Israeli border and 20 kilometers from Damascus. Moreover, the location of the Israeli settlements reduced the margin for compromise still further. The few Israeli settlements that existed in the Sinai were near the 1967 pre-war border; in the Golan many of the twenty-some settlements were within a few kilometers of the 1967 post-war armistice line. Israel had never in its history abandoned a settlement and was unlikely to do so for a mere disengagement accord.

The enmity between Israel and Syria also complicated the negotiations. Syria had always treated its Jewish citizens worse than Egypt had, and rumors about the torture of its Israeli prisoners-of-war were circulating in Israel. Fear of the Syrians, who were considered to be better fighters than the Egyptians, increased this resentment. Syria, for its part, considered Israel to be an even less legitimate state than Egypt did. Damascus had ruled over what was now Israel during various periods of its history. In contrast, Cairo did not have strong territorial ambitions beyond the Sinai and had not even annexed Gaza between 1948 and 1967 when it could have done so.

Syria's collective leadership also made the negotiations more difficult. Whereas Sadat's centralized control allowed him to override the harder-line elements in his government, Assad had to have the backing of the key members of his leadership.<sup>4</sup>

Nonetheless, the two sides did want something of value from each other. Syria wanted to push back the Israelis, who were only about 20 miles from Damascus, and possibly obtain the return of some of the territory captured in 1967. Israel wanted to establish wide force limitation zones in order to reduce the amount of Syrian men and armaments near the Golan and obtain the release of its prisoners-of-war.

#### The Negotiations Begin

In early February, Kissinger, now working out of Washington, concocted a deal whereby Syria would hand over a prisoner of war list and permit Red Cross visits in exchange for an initial Israeli disengagement proposal, to be followed by further discussions.<sup>5</sup> So deep was Israel's bitterness about the use of the prisoners of war as bargaining chips, however, that Prime Minister Meir reportedly discussed the proposal with her ministers over the telephone instead of at a Cabinet meeting for fear that it might be turned down.<sup>6</sup>

Kissinger, who was given the prisoner of war list in Washington, left for the Middle East in late February to carry out the agreement. In Damascus, Assad said that he

would break off the talks if Israel offered only to return to the 1973 pre-war line.<sup>7</sup> In Jerusalem, Kissinger transmitted the list and received the first Israeli proposal. It divided the 1973 salient into three parts. The easternmost section -- practically the environs of Damascus -- would be returned to Syria; the central portion would become a UN zone; the western part would remain under Israeli occupation. Israel's arms limitation proposals would also push Syria's artillery into the outskirts of the capital and its air defense behind Damascus.<sup>8</sup>

The proposal was outlandish, even as an opening position, and Kissinger told the Israelis that they would have to pull back several kilometers west of the 1967 armistice line and return the town of Quneitra, the Golan's main town, that had been captured in 1967: "Normally, I went at least one round before putting forth my own ideas. But the Israeli plan was so impossible of achievement that I thought it best to bring my Israeli friends down to earth."<sup>9</sup>

According to the Israeli journalist, Matti Golan, the Israeli cabinet accepted Kissinger's argument about Quneitra, but decided "to surrender it street by street."<sup>10</sup> The tactic was designed to win reciprocal concessions from Assad and demonstrate to the Israeli public that the Cabinet was fighting tenaciously over every kilometer.

In Damascus, on March 1, Kissinger was equally blunt. He told Assad that Israel would not move any of its

settlements as part of a disengagement agreement; at most it might withdraw a bit beyond the 1967 armistice line, but short of the settlements. It was agreed that negotiations would resume in earnest when Dayan visited Washington in late March.<sup>12</sup>

In clearly defining what he considered to be the parameters of the negotiations for both sides, Kissinger had violated his guiding principle for the overall Middle East negotiations: to enter into a process "without a commitment to ultimate goals."<sup>13</sup> When seeking a partial agreement, however, Kissinger took a different approach. After getting a good idea of an outline of an accord by sounding out the parties, he was usually relatively straightforward about the issues. He pointed out to each side what he thought the other would accept and focused relentlessly on the most important issues. Thus, strategic ambiguity was supplemented by tactical precision.

Before entering an intense period of negotiations, Kissinger had to decide how to deal with the USSR and the PLO, which were both importuning him. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko was demanding that any negotiations should proceed under joint U.S.-USSR "auspices," as agreed during Kissinger's October trip to Moscow to arrange a cease-fire. Gromyko, moreover, wanted a comprehensive peace, guaranteed by the superpowers, and warned that Moscow would be obstructive if it were not included in the negotiations.

The Soviet media, for their part, warned Assad not to settle for half-measures.<sup>14</sup>

Kissinger was still unenthusiastic about a major Soviet role, claiming in his memoirs that he had agreed to joint auspices in Moscow "in order to make it more palatable for the Arabs to negotiate directly with Israel."<sup>15</sup> He did check with Israel and Syria, however, to see if they wanted the Soviets to participate in the upcoming negotiations. Israel predictably said no, but Syria, more interestingly, also seemed uneasy about the idea. It would not oppose Soviet participation if both superpowers wanted it, but implied U.S.-sponsored negotiations were just as suitable.<sup>16</sup>

Syria probably reasoned the Soviets could not extract concessions from either the U.S. or Israel and that the Soviet presence might rekindle the ever present U.S.-USSR rivalry in such a way as to divert Washington from applying pressure on Jerusalem. Moreover, the Syrians may also have found embarrassing Moscow's warnings about settling for "half-measures" when they knew they would have to engage in major compromises in order to push the Israelis away from the Damascus area. Whatever their exact motivations, the Syrians appeared not to want their major ally to be involved in the substance of the negotiations at this point.

The PLO, for its part, still wanted to join the negotiations if the subject of the West Bank was raised. Kissinger's thinking about the guerrilla organization had

not changed; if any progress was to be made on the West Bank, it would be through the more moderate King Hussein. But, as in November 1973, the U.S. Secretary approved a secret meeting between the Deputy Director of the CIA, Vernon Walters, and a senior PLO official in Morocco in order to keep the organization quiet during the upcoming negotiations. Nothing new transpired at the March 7 meeting. The PLO official stressed that the organization could always turn to Moscow for help if the U.S. was uncooperative; Walters warned, as in the first meeting, against acts of terrorism directed against American interests in the Middle East. Aside from some low-level contact during the evacuation of U.S. embassy personnel during the 1976 Lebanon crisis, the U.S. engaged in no further contacts with the PLO until the Carter Administration.<sup>17</sup>

Serious negotiations resumed on March 29 when Dayan arrived in Washington with a new Israeli position. It provided for the return of Syrian forces to the easternmost part of the 1973 salient and of Syrian civilians to the central salient, still designated as the UN buffer zone. Israel would still keep the westernmost salient.<sup>18</sup>

On April 13, Syrian Brigadier General Hikmat al-Shihabi, presented a new Syrian position. Syria still wanted about half of the 1967 territory, plus the 1973 salient, but accepted, for the first time, the concept of force limitation and UN buffer zones.<sup>19</sup> Two weeks later,

however, Assad claimed that there had been a misunderstanding; since a UN buffer zone had been approved, the limited force zones would not be necessary.<sup>20</sup>

Kissinger left for the Middle East in late April, believing that there was a reasonable chance of reaching an accord. En route to Jerusalem, he stopped in Algeria and Egypt to seek their support, and in Geneva, where he tried to mollify Gromyko. The U.S. Secretary arrived in Jerusalem on May 2 and found a tense atmosphere. The Israelis were worried about U.S. aims in the region. What would be the effect of the U.S.'s rapidly improving ties with the Arab world? Would there be any change, for example, in financial and military assistance? Kissinger assured them of the U.S.'s continuing support and warned them of the dangers of not reaching an accord: Syria might re-escalate the war and Egypt would then feel obligated to back its ally. Thus Kissinger, like the Arabs, was using the threat of Syrian-Egyptian coordination in order to extract Israeli concessions.<sup>21</sup>

Dayan put forth his "personal" view that Israel might be willing to return the eastern part of Quneitra to Syria, while keeping the central and western parts, in a private talk with Kissinger on May 2.<sup>22</sup> This was a key concession since it was the first time Israel was talking about returning territory captured in 1967. (The 1967 armistice line was several kilometers east of Quneitra, towards

Damascus.) Nor were Dayan's reservations as important as they appeared at first glance. Putting forth his proposal as a "personal view" was a standard negotiating technique. It allowed the Israeli Cabinet to gauge Kissinger's reaction to a proposal that they could always quash. Similarly, Dayan's offer to return the eastern part of Quneitra, was much more important than his wanting to keep the western part. Keeping part of a divided Quneitra made no military sense, though returning territory to Syria was never popular with Israeli public opinion.

In Damascus the following day, Kissinger decided not to discuss the demarcation line since the two sides were still so far apart. Instead he dealt with secondary issues hoping that Syrian flexibility on them would make it easier for Israel to pull back the line. Assad agreed to reduce artillery fire against the Israeli salient and to stop probing raids while the U.S. Secretary conducted his mission. He confirmed that a prisoner of war exchange would take place at some point. He hedged about force limitation zones, but did not reject them outright.<sup>23</sup>

On May 4 and 5, Kissinger met with the Israeli Cabinet in Jerusalem. Meir was adamant about not recommending withdrawal from Quneitra; the Syrians had no right to gain territory after losing a war. The Cabinet would go no further than to make Dayan's May 2 proposal official; Syria could have the eastern third of the city, while Israel

would keep the other two-thirds. On May 6, however, Israel modified its position. It would turn over the central third to a mixed UN-Israeli administrative body, but Israeli settlers would still be permitted in the western third (where they had never been between 1967 and 1973). Israel would also move its military defense line just west of the city. On May 7, the Israeli Chief-of-Staff, Mordechai Gur, offered more concessions, although not on Quneitra. Israel was willing to pull back further on Mount Hermon in the northern Golan and to withdraw from Rafid, a small town in the southern Golan. It was also ready to extend the proposed buffer zone around some Syrian villages so that more civilians could return.<sup>24</sup>

Kissinger decided to present only the concessions on Quneitra to Assad. He knew that Assad would reject them and did not want Gur's concessions to fall by the wayside. He would use them on later trips to keep the momentum going. Assad, on May 8, was no longer talking about deep Israeli withdrawals into the Golan. But he did not want any administrative division of Quneitra or any Israelis on the town's surrounding western hills, which were about four kilometers away. The meaning of regaining Quneitra would be lost, he explained, if its people could not be resettled there; current Israeli proposals still made that impossible.<sup>25</sup>

After three sessions on May 13, Israel finally agreed that Syria could have civilian control of all Quneitra. But it still insisted that the land surrounding the town on three sides remain Israeli, including the hills, and that Israeli forces remain in control of the edge of the city to protect Israeli settlers cultivating their fields. (While the nearest Israeli settlement was on a far slope of a hill four kilometers from the city, Israeli farmlands were only a few hundred meters from the edge of the town.)<sup>26</sup>

Assad made a counterproposal the following day: Israel could have the western slope of the hills; Syria the eastern slope; and the UN would control the ridges. Yet Israel still insisted upon control of all the hills. At this point, Kissinger decided to bring matters to a head by presenting an American plan. After consulting with the Israelis, Kissinger proposed to Assad that the Israeli line be moved about 200 meters further west, with the area between this line and the western hills (about one and a half kilometers) demilitarized under UN supervision. The hills themselves would be under Israeli control but the armaments on them would be strictly limited; the United States would guarantee this to Syria.<sup>27</sup>

When presented with the U.S. plan on May 16, Assad still insisted that Israel move off the crests of the hills. UN or even American forces could be on the crests, and even the eastern slopes, where he no longer was demanding a

Syrian presence. When the U.S. Secretary of State threatened to end his mediation efforts, the Syrian president implored him to try one more time. In Jerusalem the Israeli Cabinet still refused to turn over the top of the hills to any third party, but agreed not to station any weapons on them that could fire into Quneitra. The U.S. could guarantee this pledge. Assad agreed to this scheme without further haggling on May 18.<sup>28</sup>

With the exhausting negotiations on the Israeli line concluded, Kissinger and Assad assumed that the buffer zone and force limitations issues would be much easier; both men spoke of reaching an agreement by May 23. Yet the negotiations proved to be much more difficult than anticipated. In the Sinai, the UN zone was entirely located on territory previously occupied by the Israelis. It therefore reduced the Israeli area of control. On the Golan, Israeli forces withdrew behind the prewar line in only two places, covering only a few kilometers. Thus, a UN buffer would require Syria to withdraw militarily towards Damascus, even as a civilian Syrian administration moved westward into the UN zone. Israel wanted to push the new Syrian military line six to eight kilometers east of the prewar line, and Assad resisted vigorously.<sup>29</sup>

An equally difficult issue was Israel's insistence that Assad promise to prevent Palestinian guerrilla raids across the line of separation. While Assad had never

permitted such raids in the past for fear of Israeli retaliation, he did not want to give any official assurances. No Syrian leader could afford publicly to disavow the Palestinian cause even though he sought to restrict its impact on Syrian politics and to influence PLO policy through Saiqa, the Palestinian element controlled by Damascus. (The May 15, 1974, Ma'alot attack, in which guerrillas killed 16 Israeli school children held as hostages, had intensified Israel's feelings about this issue.)

From May 20 to 25, the parties made slow progress on all the issues. Although Kissinger focused on the location of the Syrian forward line, the size of the limited force zones and the numbers of troops deployed in them were solved first because of the difficulty of the forward line issue. Israel initially proposed a limited force zone of twenty-five kilometers; Syria countered with five kilometers. Israel wanted as few troops as possible in the zones; Syria wanted as many as possible. Israel got most of its way on the size of the zones while Syria won the right to keep a large number of troops in them.<sup>30</sup>

Kissinger again decided to bring matters to a head on the Syrian forward line issue by preparing his return to Washington on May 27 in Damascus. Assad, his back to the wall, proposed they work out an "American Plan" based on what Kissinger thought would be the maximum position

acceptable to Israel. The two negotiators then addressed all the remaining issues for a final time. They first dealt with the most important issue. Kissinger proposed that the Syrian line be moved one kilometer forward and loop around all the Syrian villages that had been under Syrian protection before 1973. But the Syrians would have no weapons that could shoot into the Israeli area, the same restriction that applied to the Israelis on the hills west of Quneitra. The two negotiators then solved the PLO question. Assad accepted a proposed US statement asserting that the cease-fire covered guerrilla attacks; if any took place, the U.S. would support Israel politically. The force limitation issues were the last to be solved. Assad won his point that he could not formally limit his tanks and personnel beyond the ten-kilometer heavy force limitation zone since it came too near Damascus; but he promised not to deploy any more than nine brigades, of which no more than three would be armored, in the lighter area. He also agreed that artillery and surface-to-air missiles would not be placed so that they could reach into the other side's territory. The two negotiators compromised on the number of UN personnel in the buffer zone (Israel had wanted as large a UN presence as possible in order to deter a Syrian attack and guerrilla activities; Syria felt that the larger the UN presence, the greater the sense of permanence the agreement would have).

Israel agreed with the compromise proposals and the accord, which included a prisoner of war exchange, was announced publicly on May 29.<sup>31</sup>

#### Overview

The Golan negotiations followed the pattern of the November 1973 and January 1974 accords in that the parties dealt with the most important issues first. They first negotiated the location of the Israeli forward line, then the Syrian one, and finally resolved the problems of the limited force zones and terrorist raids.

Unlike the previous two negotiations, however, Kissinger set aside the most difficult issues in favor of easier ones on several occasions. On May 3, he decided not to discuss the Israeli demarcation line since the two sides were still so far apart, and dealt with the issues of sporadic artillery fire, an eventual prisoner exchange, and force limitation zones. Similarly, he sometimes set aside the issue of the Syrian forward defense line when the parties had temporarily bogged down in favor of solving some -- but not all -- of the force limitation problems.

Setting aside the main issues in favor of less central ones served several purposes. It allowed both sides to negotiate internally and created the impression of diplomatic momentum, however minor. But the tactic was used only after the negotiations on the central issues had ground to a temporary halt. As was the case with the first two

Israeli-Egyptian agreements, Kissinger usually concentrated on the most difficult issues and tried to establish a steady pace in the negotiations -- even if this meant sometimes withholding Israeli concessions in order to dole them out in later sessions.

The Golan accord helped to reduce the likelihood of war between Israel and Syria considerably. Neither side was now able to launch a surprise ground attack because of the large numbers of UN observers and the limited force zones. Moreover, the limited force zones ruled out the possibility of an artillery war of attrition. This greater military stability helped to reduce the possibility of war during times of tension. Even during the fighting between Israel and Syria in Lebanon in 1982, the Golan remained quiet.

The negotiation of the Israeli-Syrian accord did not, however, improve trust as much as the first two Israeli-Egyptian accords. Both sides granted their concessions in a grudging fashion that exacerbated their feelings of mutual dislike and suspicion. Nonetheless, the terms of the accord were respected. Both armies were deployed in the limited force zones as the agreement mandated and Assad carried out his tacit pledge not to allow guerrillas to operate from his territory. In the ensuing years, there were no serious complaints about violations, even during the fighting between the two countries in Lebanon in 1982.

Kissinger's partial approach meant keeping the Soviets and the PLO on the periphery of the negotiations in order to prevent them from raising overly-difficult demands.

Interestingly, Assad did not object to this strategy. For all his professed allegiance to Moscow and growing support for the PLO, Assad wanted to deal just with the Israelis and the U.S. once he sensed that an agreement could actually be worked out. The Soviets, it would appear, were crucial for military support, but irrelevant to the postwar diplomacy.

On the diplomatic level, the Israeli-Syrian accord, like the two Israeli-Egyptian ones, underlined the difficulty that the U.S. had in influencing Israel; this helped to place limits on Arab expectations. More important, the accord made possible further negotiations between Israel and either Egypt or Jordan, as both Arab countries had indicated that they could not proceed without it.

The accord also tended to discourage the Arab OPEC countries from reimposing an oil embargo, which had been lifted on March 18, or making further production cuts. U.S. policymakers wanted the embargo lifted for several reasons. Although its adverse effects appear to have been exaggerated in retrospect, economists and the Western public were unsure at the time how much havoc OPEC could wreak on the world economy.<sup>32</sup> Kissinger also wanted the embargo lifted because he did not want U.S. diplomacy to appear to be motivated

primarily by it. Nixon, for his part, was anxious for a policy success in order to divert attention from the Watergate morass.<sup>33</sup>

Nonetheless, U.S. policy was not driven primarily by the desire to have the embargo lifted. Significantly, U.S. policy did not change dramatically upon the lifting of the embargo or during the following months as it became apparent that the embargo was not going to be reimposed. Kissinger pursued the tortuous Golan agreement and a further Sinai agreement in 1975 as tenaciously as he had worked for the first Sinai agreements when the embargo was still in effect. Rather, U.S. policymakers were primarily concerned with negotiated settlements in the Middle East because any major Arab-Israeli war threatened to involve the U.S. and the Soviets -- the main point that Nixon made in his first presidential press conference in January 1969. Nixon had permitted initiatives intended to break the Middle East stalemate -- the December 1968 Scranton trip, the 1969 Rogers Plan and Kissinger's more modest diplomatic sounding before the October 1973 war -- although he reportedly was not optimistic about their success. Once the October war created new diplomatic possibilities, the U.S. moved decisively towards what Scranton and Rogers had supported publicly and Kissinger privately -- a more "even-handed" U.S. approach and Israeli concessions. Thus, the October war, for the U.S. policymakers "provided a convenient

setting -- perhaps a welcome pretext -- for doing what they had long wished to do in any case."<sup>34</sup> But Kissinger still refused to make clear his goal of inducing Israel to withdraw from as much of the conquered territories as possible. He feared that if he did, he would alienate the Israeli leadership and Israel's U.S. supporters and bring all diplomatic progress to a halt.<sup>35</sup>

## NOTES

## CHAPTER 5

<sup>1</sup>See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 20 May 1974, p. 10.

<sup>2</sup>Jerusalem Post, 31 March 1974.

<sup>3</sup>New York Times, 2 February 1974.

<sup>4</sup>Interview with Yacov Bar Simon Tov, 1 November 1977. Professor of Political Science, The Hebrew University.

<sup>5</sup>New York Times, 3 March 1974. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 939. Quandt, p. 231.

<sup>6</sup>Golan, p. 183.

<sup>7</sup>Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 962. Quandt, p. 232.

<sup>8</sup>Jerusalem Post, 1 March 1974. Kissinger's account coincides with the Jerusalem Post. See Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 964.

<sup>9</sup>Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 965. See also Jerusalem Post, 17 March 1974.

<sup>10</sup>Golan, p. 211.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid.

<sup>12</sup>Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 972-73. Quandt, p. 233.

<sup>13</sup>Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 1281.

<sup>14</sup>See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 20 May 1974, p. 10.

<sup>15</sup>Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 940.

<sup>16</sup>New York Times, 25, 29 March 1974. Quandt, p. 237. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 944, 953, 1035.

<sup>17</sup>Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 1037.

<sup>18</sup>Jerusalem Post, 26 April 1974. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 1042-43.

<sup>19</sup>Jerusalem Post, 26 April 1974. Quandt, p. 238. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 1044-45.

<sup>20</sup>Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 1047.

<sup>21</sup>Jerusalem Post, 3 May 1974. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 1056-57.

<sup>22</sup>Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 1057.

<sup>23</sup>Jerusalem Post, 9 May 1974. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 1058, 1060.

<sup>24</sup>Golan, p. 194. Golan's account of the negotiations coincides with Kissinger's. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 194. Jerusalem Post, 5, 6, 7 May 1974.

<sup>25</sup>Golan, p. 196. Quandt, p. 241. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 1068, 1074. New York Times, 9 May 1974.

<sup>26</sup>Jerusalem Post, 14 May 1974. Quandt, p. 241. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 1075.

<sup>27</sup>Jerusalem Post, 5 May 1974. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 1075, 1081.

<sup>28</sup>Jerusalem Post, 19, 31 May 1974. Quandt, pp. 242-43. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 1081, 1084, 1088.

<sup>29</sup>Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 1090. New York Times, 25, 27 May 1974.

<sup>30</sup>Jerusalem Post, 25 May 1974. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 1093.

<sup>31</sup>For details of final negotiations, see Jerusalem Post, 23, 28, 29, 30 May 1974. Quandt, p. 243. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 1099, 1106. See Washington Post, 30, 31 May 1974, for long account, but most information in this account comes from Kissinger.

<sup>32</sup>For a discussion of the actual impact of the embargo and production cuts, see Dankwart Rustow, Oil and Turmoil. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1982), p. 162.

<sup>33</sup>Quandt, p. 230.

<sup>34</sup>Rustow, p. 162.

<sup>35</sup>Kissinger's views were described in interview with William Quandt, 10 December 1984.

## CHAPTER 6

### THE JORDANIAN OPTION AND THE NEGOTIATION OF THE AUGUST 1975 SINAI II ACCORD BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT

#### Considering the Jordanian Option

The U.S. had three policy options following the May 1974 Israeli-Syrian agreement: it could return to Geneva for a meeting with all the Arab states and the Soviets, push for another step in the Sinai, or try to promote an initial agreement about the West Bank. Kissinger believed that the comprehensive approach at Geneva would "raise a whole host of issues where no solution was even vaguely perceived." He also believed it was important to "make moderate Jordan the negotiator for the Palestinian phase of the peace process," and that another withdrawal in the Sinai should, therefore, wait.<sup>1</sup>

Jordanian leaders, as mentioned in the introductory chapter, had a long history of periodic contacts with Israeli leaders. King Abdallah had met secretly on a number of occasions with Israeli leaders until his assassination in 1951. After the 1967 war, King Hussein, his grandson, had met several times clandestinely with Israeli leaders in

order to sound them out about the possibility of a negotiated settlement.<sup>2</sup>

Although these diplomatic feelers did not lead to any sustained negotiations, a fairly extensive set of contacts developed between Israel and the West Bank, and even Jordan. Soon after the 1967 war, Israel began to permit the free movement of goods and people between Jordan and the West Bank. Then it granted the right of West Bank Arabs to move freely inside Israel proper, and to work there. Within several years, about 60,000 to 70,000 of them, representing about half the wage earners of the territories and, together with their families, about one-third of the area's population, had jobs in Israel. Their employment in Israel raised living standards dramatically and undercut resistance to the Israeli occupation somewhat.<sup>3</sup>

Even some Jordanians took advantage of the open border to visit Jerusalem and seek treatment in Israeli hospitals. Israel also allowed Jordanian military personnel to guard the Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem.<sup>4</sup>

Despite these signs of cooperation between the two peoples, and even between their governments, negotiations between Israel and Jordan, which had sent a small contingent of soldiers to join the Syrians on the Golan, but which had not attacked Israel directly, would prove to be difficult. After the 1973 war, Hussein had put forth several ideas about possible partial steps. In December 1973, Hussein had

proposed that he be given control of the town of Jericho, whose population was exclusively Arab. In January 1974, following the Sinai I agreement, Hussein proposed that Jordan and Israel each pull back eight kilometers from the Jordan River and that Jordanian civil servants administer the area vacated by Israel.

Significantly, both these proposals were more modest than the proposals that Hussein had made after the 1967 war when he had insisted that he would have to recover nearly all the land lost if he were to break ranks with the rest of the Arab world by signing an agreement with Israel. Clearly the partial agreements between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Syria were making the idea of a partial agreement between Israel and Jordan more acceptable to Hussein.<sup>5</sup>

Yet Israel was extremely reluctant to make concessions on the West Bank while it was withdrawing from part of the Sinai and the Golan. Moreover, the Labor Party needed the support of the National Religious Party, which was opposed to returning any of the West Bank at any time. In June 1974, Yitzhak Rabin replaced Prime Minister Golda Meir, but renewed her pledge to hold elections before returning any of the West Bank. This was the last thing that the Labor Party wanted, given its recent setback in the December 1973 elections. Hussein, for his part, could not offer Israel any prisoners of war or carry on a low level war of attrition as could Syria and Egypt.

In his talks with Kissinger, Rabin only offered the old Israeli proposal of a Jordanian civil administration in large areas of the West Bank without any Israeli withdrawal -- an idea that Hussein had rejected in the past. Rabin also turned down Kissinger's proposal that UN troops instead of Jordanian troops be stationed in Jericho. He also insisted that any more substantial negotiation involve a peace agreement, "since he knew there was no chance of anything so grandiose getting off the ground."<sup>6</sup> The Israeli government, as it had perhaps done with Jarring and Secretary of State Rogers, called for a comprehensive approach in order to prevent unwelcome diplomatic progress on a more modest scale.

Nor were the other Arab parties particularly eager for Jordan to enter the negotiations. Both Egypt and Syria were more interested in further Israeli withdrawals on their own fronts.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, all the Arab heads-of-state unanimously endorsed the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people in October 1974. Now Hussein had no more right in the eyes of the Arab world to negotiate about the West Bank than any other Arab leader. Arafat's triumphant appearance in November 1974 before the United Nations further undermined Hussein's role, and his call for a secular Palestinian state reinforced Israel's determination not to compromise on the West Bank.

### The Negotiation of the Second Sinai Agreement

With the U.S. acceptance of Israel's refusal to negotiate about the West Bank, at least in the near future, diplomatic interest again shifted back towards another Israeli-Egyptian agreement. As was the case with the previous accords, the issues broke down into three categories: new lines of demarcation, the nature of limited force zones and political conditions. Sadat wanted Israel to withdraw behind the Mitla and Gidi passes and wanted the Abu Rudeis oil fields which were about 80 kilometers south of the Sinai I limited force zones. Israel would, therefore, either have to vacate a thin strip of land running along the Gulf of Suez to the oil fields (which was Sadat's position) or return them in the form of an Egyptian enclave. Israel was naturally reluctant to return either the oil fields, which supplied about half its oil needs, or the passes unless it could get something substantial in exchange.

Furthermore, as in the past, Israel insisted upon favorable terms regarding force limitation zones. It wanted wide zones, strict armament restrictions, its own monitoring stations inside the passes in the event they were vacated, and a U.S. presence of some kind in order to deter an Egyptian attack. Sadat was reluctant to accede to any of these demands, which impinged upon Egyptian sovereignty.

Israel also put forth several political conditions. It wanted an end to economic and propaganda warfare as gestures of good will. More important, it wanted a declaration of non-belligerency in order to exacerbate the growing split between Egypt and Syria. Sadat was not ready to cut his links with Syria and said that a declaration of non-belligerency could only be part of a final settlement.<sup>8</sup>

During November and December 1974, Kissinger was able to clarify each side's position. He was convinced that Sadat would settle for nothing less than the passes and oil fields and that he would not formally renounce the state of belligerency. He advised the Israelis to concentrate on the "functional equivalents" of nonbelligerency, such as the end of the economic boycott. To encourage Israeli flexibility, Kissinger met with the Shah of Iran in Zurich, who said he would provide the Jewish state with oil if it gave up Abu Rudeis and Ras Sudr.<sup>9</sup>

In March 1975, Kissinger left for the Middle East, believing that a second Israeli-Egyptian accord was in reach. In Cairo, Sadat agreed to consider a formula based on the "non-use of force" but not a pledge of nonbelligerency. He also agreed that the economic boycott and hostile propaganda would be reduced. But he still insisted that each army either control one of the entrances of the passes or be stationed at an equal distance from the entrances. Any agreement would only last two years.<sup>10</sup>

After Kissinger spent ten days shuttling between Egypt and Israel, with side trips to Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, Israel agreed to cede the oil fields, but not a road connecting them to the Egyptian zone. It still insisted on not vacating the passes in the absence of a nonbelligerency pledge; and even with such a pledge, it would keep an electronic intelligence station at Umm Khisheiba at the western edge of the Gidi pass. Although the Israelis implied that they might consider pulling back to a line halfway through the passes, at no point did they provide Kissinger with a map showing a line that they might accept.<sup>11</sup>

Significantly, Sadat decided against an agreement that turned the oil fields into an Egyptian enclave, but offered nothing more. Presumably, he felt that a second bilateral agreement with Israel -- which might well alienate much of the Arab world, and particularly Syria -- should involve major concessions or not be made at all. Thus, Kissinger's shuttle trip ended without success.

Ford and Kissinger blamed Israel for this failure and elaborated a strategy designed to encourage a more flexible approach. First, they criticized the Jewish state in the press for its rigidity.<sup>12</sup> Second, arms pressure was applied. Although contracted deliveries, including hundreds of tanks, continued to arrive on time, no new commitments were signed. Pentagon experts took advantage of the occasion to repeat

complaints of excessive inventory drawdowns, and to review Israel's access to sensitive guidance technology.<sup>13</sup>

Kissinger also met with a number of prominent members of the foreign policy establishment including Dean Rusk, McGeorge Bundy, George Ball, Cyrus Vance, George Shultz, and Robert McNamara. Most of the people he consulted favored a more ambitious U.S. strategy in which the U.S. and the USSR would work out the guidelines for an overall settlement, which would then be discussed by all the parties at a Geneva Conference.<sup>14</sup>

The Israeli lobby in Washington was also active, however; and on May 21, 76 Senators sent a letter to President Ford, urging him to be "responsive" to Israel's request for \$2.59 billion in military and economic aid. Ford was angered by the letter:

Although I said publicly that I welcomed the letter as an expression of Senate sentiment, in truth it really bugged me. The Senators claimed the letter was "spontaneous"; but there was no doubt in my mind that it was inspired by Israel. We had given vast amounts of military and economic assistance to Israel over the years, and we had never asked for anything in return.<sup>15</sup>

But the political power of the Israeli lobby convinced Ford and Kissinger that another Sinai agreement was the only viable strategy.<sup>16</sup>

Ford met with Sadat for the first time on June 1 in Austria. Sadat appealed for a public statement from the American President, saying that Israel should withdraw to the 1967 borders. Ford demurred, but reportedly said that

he would work privately toward that goal.<sup>17</sup> Sadat, in any case, was still interested in another interim agreement and suggested an American presence in the Sinai: "Why couldn't there be a buffer zone around the Gidi and Mitla passes, in which the U.S. could keep a limited number of nonmilitary personnel? These individuals ... would be responsible for surveillance. They would monitor troop movements and warn either side of an impending attack ... He thought a force of about two hundred civilians should suffice."<sup>18</sup>

The U.S. pursued its partial approach when Prime Minister Rabin came to Washington in mid-June. Although Kissinger, according to Rabin, used Geneva as "a threat", it was clear that another partial agreement in the Sinai was the real goal:

Since there had been so much talk of Geneva during the visit, in one of our less heated, private conversations I asked Kissinger to satisfy my curiosity on one point. "We've known one another for years and have held hundreds of conversations on every subject under the sun. Yet I have never heard you express your view about what Israel's borders ought to be. Now that we're here alone, just the two of us..." Smiling back at me, Kissinger said: "You've never heard it, and you won't hear it now. I hope that when the time comes to decide on Israel's borders, I shall no longer be serving as Secretary of State."<sup>19</sup>

According to Ford, Rabin was intrigued by Sadat's idea about a U.S. presence. Here was perhaps a key to another agreement.

Sometime in late June, the Israelis apparently decided it would be impossible to obtain the desired political concessions from Sadat and unwise to resist the U.S.

indefinitely. They would agree to withdraw to the eastern slope of the passes, if Egypt did not advance much beyond its present position and if the U.S. met certain political and economic conditions. Israel still insisted on keeping the facility at Umm Kasheibab in the UN buffer zone, but Egypt could also have a post in the same zone. Although Israel would prefer to have a U.S. military presence in the Sinai, it would settle for American technicians manning several other early-warning stations.<sup>21</sup>

Israeli Ambassador Dinitz conveyed the package to Kissinger, who left for the Middle East in late August with an agreement in sight.<sup>22</sup> Kissinger concentrated on the most difficult issue, the exact location of the two forward lines. During a week of shuttle diplomacy by Kissinger, the Israelis agreed to Egypt's inching up to the western edge of the passes; only at the last minute, however, did they agree to withdraw entirely from the Gidi pass. This was followed by tough bargaining over the force limitation zones. Sadat won his point that the limits should be slightly higher than the limits in the Sinai I agreement.

Finally, in a nonstop session in Jerusalem on the night of August 31, the U.S. and Israel worked out a number of points about military aid, assurances on Israel's oil supply and political coordination between the two countries. In particular, the U.S. promised not to deal with the PLO until it changed its charter provision calling for "a

secular democratic state" in the territory covering Israel, Jordan and the West Bank and accepted UN Resolution 242.<sup>23</sup>

No major U.S. initiative was taken after the Sinai II agreement because of the upcoming presidential election. During this period, several important trends continued in the Arab-Israeli area. Sadat accelerated his move towards the U.S. and away from the USSR. In October 1975 he became the first Egyptian President to visit the U.S. and in March 1976 he abrogated Egypt's fifteen-year friendship treaty with the USSR. Saudi Arabia continued its rise in international politics through its domination of the oil market. In October 1976, it summoned Presidents Sadat and Assad and PLO leader Yasir Arafat to Riyadh in order to heal their divisions. At the Saudis' behest, Assad agreed not to crush Arafat's forces in Lebanon and to stop his criticism of the Sinai II agreement. Sadat, for his part, agreed to recognize Syria's position in Lebanon, which it had entered in June 1976. The Arab coalition, which had fallen apart over Sinai II, seemed to be resurrecting itself.

Thanks in part to the Saudis' financial and political backing, the PLO, which had been appointed sole spokesman for the West Bank Arabs by the Rabat summit in October 1974, continued its rise. In April 1976, PLO supporters defeated Jordanian ones in West Bank municipal elections and in the summer of the same year, PLO soldiers helped U.S. diplomatic personnel to evacuate Beirut.

Syria shifted its focus from the Golan Heights to Lebanon, where civil war had broken out in March 1975. Its entry had been facilitated by an understanding worked out by Kissinger in Washington whereby Israel agreed to the Syrian entry into Lebanon in return for a Syrian promise to stay out of southern Lebanon and not to bring with it anti-aircraft missiles, an agreement which lasted until 1981.<sup>24</sup> Syria was now the predominant power in Lebanon.

#### Overview and Criticism of the Partial Approach

The second Sinai agreement resembled previous agreements in that the parties first grappled with the most difficult issue among a cluster of easier issues. In March, Kissinger concentrated on the location of the two forward lines. In August, he first worked out their location, then the nature of the limited force zones, and finally certain political and economic conditions. Significantly, neither Kissinger nor Sadat sought a more modest agreement involving just the oil fields. Step-by-step diplomacy did not mean seeking the easiest possible step, but rather the toughest feasible step. The challenge was not to over-reach or under-reach goals.

Kissinger's partial approach towards the issues failed to make any headway on the Jordanian front, however. Israel turned down a series of proposals -- Jordanian troops in Jericho, a mutual pull-back along the Jordan River and UN troops in Jericho. Although the proposals were rejected,

they probably had a better chance of being accepted than more ambitious proposals. Significantly, Israel called for a comprehensive settlement with Jordan in order to prevent any diplomatic progress. Moreover, Hussein could not have put forth such modest proposals, which did not include the return of Jerusalem, if Egypt and Syria had not entered their own partial agreements. Partial steps in the Sinai and the Golan at least led to partial proposals about the West Bank from Jordan. These proposals, however -- which Israel might have accepted in 1967 and 1968 -- were unacceptable in 1974.

Kissinger's attempt to pressure Israel after the failure of the March 1975 shuttle also yielded less than he had hoped. In May 1975, 76 Senators criticized the Administration for freezing discussions about future arms sales, thereby again showing the strength of Israel's domestic supporters. In order not to provoke these supporters still further, Kissinger continued to refuse to reveal his ultimate goal -- inducing the Israelis to withdraw from as much Arab territory as possible.

Despite the successful conclusion of the Sinai II negotiations there was a widespread feeling in the U.S. that step-by-step diplomacy had outlived its usefulness. Israel was still smarting from Ford's and Kissinger's reassessment exercise following the collapse of the March 1975 shuttle. Syria was becoming increasingly critical of U.S. diplomacy

as it saw the beginnings of a separate peace between Israel and Egypt, and Egypt was still a long way from the restoration of the entire Sinai.

The disenchantment with Kissinger's approach, as previously mentioned, had begun in early 1975. Kissinger's critics objected to the partial approach for different reasons. Former Under Secretary of State George Ball lambasted Kissinger for fostering an "unlimited arms race."<sup>25</sup> Ball reasoned that each Israeli withdrawal would require major U.S. arms shipments. The Arabs would react by making huge arms purchases, made possible by their new oil wealth. This would give Israel an additional argument about the need for more arms. Ball felt this cycle would increase tensions culminating in an Israeli pre-emptive strike.

Ball's warning proved to be incorrect, as Egypt was no longer intent on war as long as it thought it could recover the Sinai through diplomacy, and Syria could not fight without Egypt. Yet Ball had touched upon one of the pitfalls of the partial approach. Each time Israel made a withdrawal, it had to receive something of value. In several cases, the Arabs had valued assets such as prisoners-of-war or a peace treaty. But in the case of the Sinai II agreement, the U.S. had to offer the primary incentives in the form of financial aid and a promise not to deal with the PLO until it changed its charter.

Both of these promises created certain problems. Greater financial aid tended to decrease U.S. influence over Israel, at least in peace time, rather than increase it. The strength of the Israeli lobby would not permit a crude power play by threatening to withhold future aid for any extended period of time, as the reassessment exercise had shown. So strong was the Israeli lobby, in fact, that Israel tended to take for granted U.S. aid. And while increased arms aid did not lead to war, as Ball had predicted, he was right in pointing out that a higher level of armaments tended to give Israel more options, including the war option. In addition, pledging not to deal with the PLO until it changed its charter restricted U.S. diplomatic options somewhat.

Ball also criticized Kissinger's partial approach for allegedly having driven a wedge between Egypt and much of the Arab world. This, he believed, would eliminate the moderating influence of Sadat and lead to the "radicalization" of the Middle East.<sup>26</sup>

Ball was right in that much of the Arab world began to take its distance from Sadat as it increasingly appeared that he was ready to make a separate peace with Israel. This estrangement, however, did not lead to the radicalization of the area. The only major realignment that took place was in Iran after the fall of the Shah, a development unrelated to Sadat's dealings with Israel. The

most dramatic shift within the Arab world was Sadat's trip to Jerusalem. Thus, the partial approach, which aimed at dealing with the easier issues and parties first, appeared to have moderated Egypt's policy more than it had radicalized the policies of the harder-line countries.

Harvard Professor Stanley Hoffmann was another major critic of Kissinger's partial approach. Hoffmann feared that a long drawn-out process of negotiations would allow the parties in favor of the status quo to consolidate their grip; specifically Israel could increase the number of its settlements in the occupied territories. Moreover, stringing out the negotiations would play into the hands of the Likud bloc whose supporters were becoming increasingly well organized. Thus, Hoffmann argued that the U.S. should push for a comprehensive settlement before the settlements spread and the Likud took power. Although this is exactly what took place, Israel, as it had shown Rogers and Jarring, and would show Carter, could withstand the call for a comprehensive settlement.<sup>27</sup>

Princeton University Professor Bernard Lewis was still another critic of Kissinger's use of the partial approach. In Congressional testimony after the failure of the March 1975 shuttle, Lewis implied that Kissinger's steps were not part of a larger design:

I think step-by-step diplomacy is a good thing provided that the steps lead in a certain direction and that each step contains within itself the preparation and even some measure of acceptance of the

next step. But I do not think there is much gained by a step-by-step negotiation in which each step is self-contained, complete in itself, with no commitment of any kind beyond that embodied in the interim agreement. That seems to be dangerous in that it postpones any real general settlement: it removes any incentive to make sacrifices in order to achieve a more general settlement, and could easily degenerate into a political war of attrition. Arab governments and, in particular, the Egyptian government may be willing, I think probably would be willing, to commit themselves to the existence of Israel and ultimately to direct negotiation if they are quite sure that there is no other way in which they can achieve their purposes step-by-step, without sacrificing any options or entering into such commitments.<sup>28</sup>

Although Lewis had pointed out one of the potential pitfalls of the partial approach, the Sinai II agreement did point the way towards a future agreement in one important respect. Possessing the Sinai passes made a convenient defensive position for the Israeli Army and a good jumping off point for an offensive aimed at reaching the Canal again. Once the passes were given up, the flat desert area behind them became less valuable for the Army, although it still provided additional warning time in the case of an Egyptian air attack. The next "natural" stopping point for another Israel withdrawal was either the rather arbitrary line between El Arish, the main town in the Sinai, and Ras Mohammad, at the southern tip of the peninsula, or the 1967 border itself. If there was to be another negotiation, the issue of the 1967 border could no longer be ignored. All of Kissinger's critics agreed that it was time to try a more comprehensive approach. Israel, the Arab frontline states, and possibly the PLO and the USSR, should be

included in negotiations that would address all the outstanding issues.

## NOTES

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- <sup>1</sup>Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, p. 1138.
- <sup>2</sup>Eitan Haber, Zeev Schiff, Ehud Yaari, The Year of the Dove (U.S.: Zmora, Bitan, Modan, 1979), pp. 81-82.
- <sup>3</sup>Safran, pp. 268-69.
- <sup>4</sup>Interview with Yehuda Litani, 15 October 1977. Litani is the Arab affairs correspondent for Haaretz.
- <sup>5</sup>Quandt, p. 230. New York Times, 10, 15 February 1974. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 787, 848.
- <sup>6</sup>Golan, p. 226. See also Jerusalem Post, 7, 25 July 1974.
- <sup>7</sup>Interview with William Quandt.
- <sup>8</sup>Jerusalem Post, 4 December 1974, 2 February 1975.
- <sup>9</sup>Quandt, p. 261.
- <sup>10</sup>Rabin, p. 254. Jerusalem Post, 13 May 1975. New York Times, 11, 12, 24 March 1975.
- <sup>11</sup>Rabin, pp. 254-55. Quandt, pp. 265-66. Golan, pp. 236-38. Sheehan, p. 156.
- <sup>12</sup>New York Times, 24, 28 March 1975.
- <sup>13</sup>Rabin, p. 261. Aviation Week, 21 April, 4 August 1975.
- <sup>14</sup>Quandt, p. 269.
- <sup>15</sup>Gerald Ford, A Time to Heal. (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), p. 287.
- <sup>16</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>17</sup>Sheehan, pp. 176-77.
- <sup>18</sup>Ford, pp. 290-91.
- <sup>19</sup>Rabin, pp. 264-65.
- <sup>20</sup>Ford, p. 291.

<sup>21</sup>Golan, p. 247. Ford, p. 291. Quandt, p. 272. New York Times, 4 July 1975.

<sup>22</sup>Quandt, p. 273.

<sup>23</sup>For details on final negotiations of the agreement, see Rabin, p. 272.

<sup>24</sup>Interview with Abba Eban.

<sup>25</sup>George Ball, "The Looming War in the Middle East and How to Avert it," Atlantic Monthly, January 1975, pp. 6-11.

<sup>26</sup>Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Peace in the Middle East (Washington: Government Printing Office, 94th Congress, vol. 11-14), pp. 22-27.

<sup>27</sup>Stanley Hoffmann, "A New Policy for Israel," Foreign Affairs, April 1975.

<sup>28</sup>Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Priorities for Peace in the Middle East (Washington: Government Printing Office, 94th Congress, Vol. 21-32).

## CHAPTER 7

### THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S SEARCH FOR

#### A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION:

JANUARY 1977-NOVEMBER 1977

#### The Carter Strategy

The beginning of the Carter Administration marked an attempt to address issues comprehensively and to deal with parties jointly. During the 1976 campaign, Carter had called for a more ambitious strategy that would lead to diplomatic relations between the Arabs and the Israelis. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance shared these views:

"[President Carter and I] concluded that the step-by-step approach had exhausted its potential and that it was time to renew the pursuit of a comprehensive peace."<sup>1</sup> Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's National Security Advisor, also felt that "a process pointing towards a settlement should be launched on a broad front."<sup>2</sup>

The new Administration based its strategy on the recommendations of study group convened at the Brookings Institution in late 1975. The study group was made up of a number of Middle East experts and former government officials whose most prominent members were Zbigniew

Brzezinski, William Quandt, Nadav Safran, and former U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Charles Yost. They all had become impatient with Kissinger's step-by-step approach and wanted something more ambitious.

The study group issued recommendations that resembled the 1969 Rogers Plan, in many respects. The recommendations, known as the Brookings Report, called for an Israeli return to the 1967 borders, except for "mutually accepted" changes, and "a full normalization of relations." All of the frontline states should meet with Israel to negotiate a settlement, possibly at a reconvened Geneva Conference. The Brookings Report was more ambitious than the Rogers Plan in that Syria would be included in the negotiations and the Palestinians should be granted the right of "self-determination."<sup>3</sup>

On the other hand, the Brookings Report tried to incorporate one important element from step-by-step diplomacy. Although the parties should agree on their comprehensive goals, an agreement should be implemented in stages. Thus, critics of the Report in the Middle East could be told by their governments that the avowed goals could always be rescinded if the other party or parties did not seem to be fulfilling their side of the bargain.<sup>4</sup>

The Carter Administration made two important additions to the Brookings Report recommendations. The USSR would be brought into the negotiations in order to give it a stake in

their success: "The Soviet Union, with political interests in the region and as a patron of several Arab states, should be accorded a role in the negotiations that would help to dissuade it from undermining our efforts."<sup>5</sup> The Administration would also try to induce the PLO, and not just Palestinians, to participate and to persuade the Israelis to allow them to do so: "in some fashion the Palestinians, notably the PLO, would have to participate."<sup>6</sup>

#### Trying to Organize the Geneva Conference

Secretary of State Vance left for the Middle East in February 1977 to sound out the various parties about negotiating a settlement along the lines of the Brookings Report. Israeli Prime Minister Rabin told him that Israel would compromise on borders, but would not return to the 1967 lines on all three fronts. He refused to be more specific. The Israelis would never agree to an independent Palestinian state, but would negotiate with Jordan about the West Bank's future, and they expected significant steps by the Arab states towards the normalization of relations in return for territorial concessions.<sup>7</sup>

Rabin was "unenthusiastic" about a Geneva Conference, preferring a continuation of step-by-step diplomacy.<sup>8</sup> If there had to be a conference, Israel wanted to deal with each Arab nation separately and not with a united Arab delegation. Israel also wanted the USSR to be given a token role at best. Israel would refuse outright to attend a

Geneva Conference with a separate PLO delegation, but "would not seek to inspect the credentials of the Jordanian delegation," thereby allowing some room for compromise.<sup>9</sup>

The Arab leaders set forth their standard negotiating positions. Sadat indicated that normal state relations would "develop over time" as the basic issues were resolved. Assad insisted that peaceful coexistence would be the best that could be hoped for "for a long time to come," and Hussein would go no further than Assad.<sup>10</sup> All three leaders still insisted on a total Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines, although Sadat and Hussein were willing to consider minor changes on the West Bank (but not Jerusalem). Sadat and Hussein seemed willing to accept a Palestinian state with close links to Jordan, and Assad said he would agree to whatever the Palestinians accepted.<sup>11</sup>

All three Arab leaders supported the idea of a Geneva Conference, but differed on how to organize it. Sadat, like Rabin, wanted to negotiate on a bilateral basis. He believed that Syria would block progress by raising objections if the Arabs negotiated as a single delegation. As for Palestinian representation, Sadat suggested they be part of a UN, Arab League or Egyptian delegation. But he was uncomfortable with the idea that they be part of a joint Egyptian-Syrian-Jordanian delegation because of the leverage this would give Syria.<sup>12</sup>

Assad and Hussein, in contrast, insisted that a single Arab delegation deal with issues on a functional basis, stressing such matters as security measures and borders. They presumably felt that they needed Egypt's support in order to extract concessions from Israel. The issue of Palestinian representation also separated the two leaders from Sadat. Hussein said Palestinians should be part of the single Arab delegation, his main priority. He insisted they could not be part of a national Jordanian delegation because of the October 1974 Rabat decision that granted the PLO the right to represent the West Bank inhabitants. Assad, for his part, insisted that only the PLO could represent the Palestinians. He presumably believed that non-PLO Palestinians would be too much under the influence of Jordan. The PLO itself demanded a separate delegation, although it was not clear if it would even attend "without a prior Israeli commitment to a Palestinian state."<sup>13</sup>

Carter met with all the principal Middle East leaders in March and April. The Carter-Rabin talks went badly, with Carter finding Rabin "stubborn" ... and adamantly opposed to any meeting if the PLO or other representatives of the PLO were there."<sup>14</sup> Carter suggested "a kind of federation between Jordan and the Palestinian state, along the lines of the states of the USA. Foreign affairs and defense would be under the supervision of the central government; the West Bank would be demilitarized and enjoy a quasi-autonomous

status."<sup>15</sup> Rabin, however, was only willing to transfer administrative responsibilities to Jordan for the West Bank population; Israel would have to remain in charge of security matters.<sup>16</sup> Rabin also rejected the idea of dealing with a unified Arab delegation at Geneva, believing that it would give a veto to the least conciliatory elements.<sup>17</sup> Overall, Rabin feared that Carter was set upon the Brookings Report and "intended to sell it to me piecemeal."<sup>18</sup>

Disappointed by Rabin's rigidity, Carter outlined some of the main points of the Brookings Report in a press conference on March 9 in which he called for "minor adjustments in the 1967 borders," full diplomatic relations, and a "transition period" during which Israel might be allowed to maintain military positions beyond its recognized borders.<sup>19</sup> Several days later in a town meeting, he also said "there had to be homeland for the Palestinian refugees."<sup>20</sup>

Carter's statements set off a storm of protests from Israel and its U.S. supporters. The President and his advisors were forced to hold numerous meetings with Jewish-American leaders aimed at alleviating fears of an "American Plan" that would be forced on Israel.<sup>21</sup>

Significantly, the Carter initiative had little immediate impact on the PLO, whose policies it was designed to moderate. The Palestinian National Council, the PLO's main political body, was meeting in Cairo at the time, for

the first time since 1974. Although the less militant faction led by Yasir Arafat defeated the more radical faction led by George Habash for the Parliament's post of Speaker in a 172-69 vote, the Council refused to change its covenant calling for a democratic and secular Palestine. In an uneasy compromise, the Council agreed to participate in a Middle East conference, but not under the aegis of UN Resolution 242, whose only reference to the Palestinians was a statement calling for "a just settlement of the refugee problem."<sup>22</sup> Arafat ended the conference by denouncing the U.S. for its support for the "Zionist entity" and accused Washington of having engineered the assassination of King Faisal because of his support for Arab control over East Jerusalem.<sup>23</sup>

Despite this initial negative reaction by the Israelis and the PLO, Carter and his top advisors decided in mid-April to aim for a PLO "public commitment to UN Resolution 242" with its implicit recognition of Israel. In return they would offer the prospect of PLO participation in the upcoming negotiations.<sup>24</sup>

Carter's meetings with the Arab leaders produced mixed results. His talks with Sadat in Washington in early April went smoothly. Sadat said diplomatic relations might be established five years after a settlement "if things go well," whereas he had spoken previously of needing a generation.<sup>25</sup> Carter's talks with Hussein and Assad (the

latter he met in Switzerland) broke no new ground, however, and the Arab leaders still differed on how to organize Geneva. Sadat still wanted to deal with the Israelis bilaterally at Geneva while Hussein and Assad maintained their pressure for a single Arab delegation. Sadat and Hussein still wanted Palestinians to be represented in a larger Arab delegation, whereas Assad insisted a separate PLO delegation represent the Palestinians.<sup>26</sup>

Israeli politics underwent a dramatic change with the election of Menachem Begin in May, an event that took the U.S. entirely by surprise. Not only had thirty years of Labor Party rule come to an end, but the more nationalistic of the two major Israeli political parties had come to power.

Begin was most militant about the West Bank. Throughout the electoral campaign, he had criticized the Labor Party for considering negotiating about its status and had supported attempts to establish settlements in all areas of the West Bank often in the face of government opposition.

Begin's only gesture towards moderation after his election was to offer the post of foreign minister to Moshe Dayan. The move was designed primarily to reassure Jewish Americans, who were worried about the new government's militancy. Dayan accepted the post on the condition that there be no formal annexation of the West Bank. Dayan preferred that Israel annex the area on a de facto basis.

Settlements should be established throughout the West Bank (not just along the Jordan River, as the Allon Plan had suggested), but not in areas near significant Arab population centers. Jordan would be given administrative authority over the Arab residents, but only minor police powers.<sup>27</sup>

Several days after his election, Begin announced the establishment of several more West Bank settlements. Carter responded with a forceful public statement, calling for a Palestinian homeland and major Israeli withdrawals. But Carter's new offensive appeared to play into the Israeli leader's hands. His frontal attacks, combined with his circumspect ambiguity about the West Bank's future legal status, tended to "rally many Jewish-American leaders around the new Israeli premier."<sup>28</sup>

Carter did not persuade Begin to moderate his positions in any significant way when the two leaders met for the first time in Washington in July. The Israeli Prime Minister was unwilling to consider transferring any part of the West Bank "to any foreign sovereign authority."<sup>29</sup> Nor did he promise to exercise greater restraint about West Bank settlements as Carter asked. Like Rabin, Begin was willing to go to Geneva as long as Israel could deal with the Arabs on a bilateral basis and with the Palestinians as part of a Jordanian delegation.<sup>30</sup> Similarly, Begin was willing "to make a significant withdrawal in the Sinai and a partial

withdrawal from the Golan."<sup>31</sup> Thus, the door was not closed to all negotiations.

Vance visited the Middle East in August in hopes of convening the Geneva Conference by the end of the year. He told the Saudis, who were in close contact with Arafat, the kind of statement the U.S. wanted to hear from the PLO before making contact with it:

The PLO accepts United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, with the reservation that it considers that the resolution does not make adequate reference to the question of the Palestinians since it fails to make any reference to a homeland for the Palestinian people. It is recognized that the language of Resolution 242 relates to the right of all states in the Middle East to live in peace.<sup>32</sup>

The Saudis conveyed the statement to the PLO's Executive Committee only to have it turned down by "extreme elements."<sup>33</sup> While Arafat was reportedly willing to accept the statement if an explicit provision concerning Palestinian statehood was added, the hard-liners were still opposed to the idea of leaving Israel intact.<sup>34</sup>

Vance's second major proposal introduced during the trip was a transitional arrangement for the West Bank and Gaza. Carter and he now believed that "solving the [problem] in a single negotiation was not feasible."<sup>35</sup> Instead they suggested the area be governed by an Israeli-Jordanian administration for several years until a plebiscite took place. The Arab leaders were favorable towards the idea, but Begin turned it down. The idea was significant, however, in that it represented the first step

in deferring the West Bank-Gaza problem, the issue on which the Israelis were the least forthcoming.

Faced with Israel's continuing intransigence, Carter again chose to try to isolate the Begin government. In an interview in Time magazine, the President warned Israel that

if a particular leader of one of the countries (at Geneva) should find that his position is in direct contravention to the position of all the other parties involved, including ourselves and the USSR... there would be a great impetus on the leader to conform with the overwhelming opinion .... I would try to marshall the support of Israel's leader first of all. Secondly, the opinion of his people back home, the constituencies around the world, opinion that exists in the European community and in the Arab nation as well.<sup>36</sup>

Similar warnings were accompanied by more concrete forms of pressure. The Defense Department turned down a proposal by Sylvania Electronics and an Israeli company, Tadiran Israel Electronics, to co-produce an elaborate military communications system.<sup>37</sup> Israeli officials also reported being allowed to buy fewer F-16s than expected.<sup>38</sup>

But U.S. pressure could not induce major changes in Israel's position. In September, Foreign Minister Dayan came to Washington to present only some minor Israeli compromises. Whereas Israel had been only willing to make a "significant" withdrawal in the Sinai during the Carter-Begin talks in July, Dayan now proposed the El-Arish-Ras Mohammad line as "the final border."<sup>39</sup> He still insisted that any Palestinian representatives must

live in the West Bank and Gaza and that no "known" members of the PLO could participate in the Geneva negotiations. Israel was also now willing to deal with Palestinians in a separate working group on West Bank-Gaza matters that would include the other Arab states.<sup>40</sup> Dayan also agreed for the first time to deal with a united Arab delegation -- but only at the opening session and when dealing with the West Bank-Gaza (whose future it would now "discuss" but not "negotiate"). But Israel still insisted -- as did Egypt -- on dealing bilaterally about territorial issues.<sup>41</sup>

Vance failed to bridge the gap between Israel, on the one hand, and Syria and Jordan, which still wanted a united Arab delegation. He first suggested that a united delegation take up some of the substantive issues in the initial stages in a trial run.<sup>42</sup> When Israel turned down the idea, he proposed that the negotiations take place on a bilateral basis with the "final decision" to be made by the united Arab delegation. Dayan also rejected this "unwelcome" idea.<sup>43</sup>

Vance, in contrast, did make some minor progress on the issue of Palestinian representation. Israel reportedly accepted his plan whereby the U.S. would first consult with Israel and then put forth a list of possible Palestinian representatives for approval by the Arab countries. They would then seek the tacit approval of the proposed representatives by the PLO but not its open endorsement.

The U.S. made tentative plans to submit the name of Harvard University Professor Walid Khalidi to the Arabs and Israelis as a Palestinian representative. Halaby had been a prominent Palestinian activist who sympathized with the goals of the PLO, but who was not closely associated with the PLO leadership. The issue of Palestinian representation, however, faded into the background in the wake of Sadat's trip to Jerusalem.<sup>44</sup>

During this period, Vance had been discussing with Gromyko, with whom he met in September at the opening of the UN General Assembly, a joint communique about the Middle East negotiations. According to then National Security Council advisor William Quandt, the Administration did not consider the communique, which called for "the establishment of normal peaceful relations" between Middle East states and the fulfillment of "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people", to be a major step and did not anticipate a major reaction. It was designed to keep the Soviets happy, at a time when SALT and other negotiations were in process.<sup>45</sup> According to the U.S. Ambassador to Egypt, Herman Eilts, Sadat supported the communique because he hoped that limited Soviet involvement might moderate Syrian policy towards the Geneva negotiations.<sup>46</sup>

The communique, however, proved to be counter-productive. So vociferous was the criticism by Israeli leaders and their U.S. supporters that the U.S. felt

obligated temporarily to reduce its attempts to induce Israeli concessions, particularly regarding Palestinian participation at Geneva. Thus, the communique had the opposite effect of its intention.<sup>47</sup> The Israeli protests convinced the Administration that it would be better to leave the Soviets on the periphery of future negotiations.<sup>48</sup>

Negotiations brokered by the U.S. continued during October but made little progress. Carter feared "the whole process was breaking down...and finally decided to play [his] only whole card -- a direct appeal to President Sadat."<sup>49</sup> In a handwritten note, Carter appealed to the Egyptian President to make "a bold, statesmanlike move to help overcome the hurdles on the path to Geneva."<sup>50</sup>

Sadat, in fact, had already begun to sound out the Israelis on his own without telling the U.S. According to Sadat himself, he had been encouraged to do so by Rumanian President Ceausescu in talks during the summer: "Ceausescu's emphasis on Begin's desire for peace, on Begin being a strong man, confirmed my conclusion that a change was urgently needed -- a change in the position of both sides."<sup>51</sup> Then, Ceausescu and King Hassan arranged a secret meeting in Morocco between Foreign Minister Dayan and Sadat's national security advisor Hassan Tuhami. According to Dayan, Tuhami indicated that Sadat was no longer interested in a Geneva Conference. Instead he was ready to meet with Begin, but only if he agreed to the principle of

total withdrawal from all the occupied territories. The two advisors made tentative plans to meet again.<sup>52</sup>

Carter's appeal for a bold move of some sort struck a responsive chord with Sadat who, according to Vance, had become increasingly impatient with the endless "consultations, draft working papers, and alternative formulations of positions" in which the Geneva negotiations were mired.<sup>53</sup>

Sadat's first impulse was to invite "the Big Five (the veto-holding Security Council members) to meet with all the Arab parties concerned, that is, the frontline states -- Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinians, and Egypt -- in Jerusalem" with Begin.<sup>54</sup> But Carter, who was apparently having doubts about the efficacy of the comprehensive approach, gently turned down the proposal in a telephone conversation on November 2 while encouraging Sadat to pursue other ideas: "On top of all our other problems, there was no way we could take on the additional responsibility of adding the Chinese, British, and French to the group. The potential negotiating table was already crowded with the United States, the Soviets, the Arabs, the Israelis and the Palestinians."<sup>55</sup>

Sadat then turned to the idea of going to Jerusalem either alone or with other Arab parties. In one of the most important speeches in Middle East history, Sadat announced to the Egyptian parliament: "There is no time to lose. I

am ready to go the ends of the earth .... I am ready to go to the Knesset, to discuss peace with the Israeli leaders."<sup>56</sup> The Israelis were inclined to regard the statement as rhetoric: their newscast that night mentioned the proposal only in passing, and Begin's Bureau Chief, Yehiel Kadishai, decided not to inform him of the speech after hearing it.<sup>57</sup> Sadat, however, reiterated his willingness to go to Jerusalem to a group of U.S. Congressmen who had visited Israel the day before. Israel decided to issue an invitation and received a favorable response immediately.

Sadat's three-day trip to Jerusalem stunned the world. The leader of the Arab world's most powerful nation was seen joking with Israeli leaders and declared in his speech to the Israeli Knesset that: "We welcome you [to the Middle East] in peace and friendship."<sup>58</sup> The visit breathed life into the faltering negotiations which had reached a point where most Israelis, at least, felt that another war was inevitable.<sup>59</sup> It also refocused the negotiations on just Egypt and Israel, thereby bringing Carter's comprehensive and joint approach to an end.

### Overview

Carter's ambitious joint approach towards the parties in 1977 suffered from the same defects as the Rogers and Jarring comprehensive approaches towards the issues in the 1967-69 period. Just as the comprehensive approach risked

creating a situation in which the most difficult issues would block progress on the easier issues, the joint approach risked blocking progress between Israel and Egypt because it gave a veto power to the more difficult parties, Jordan, Syria, the PLO, and perhaps even the Soviets. Both Syria and Jordan felt that they could only extract concessions from Israel if Israel faced the threat of another attack from a united Arab coalition that included Egypt. Both countries also knew that much of the Jewish state's military power would be shifted to the northern front if Egypt reached a separate accord with Israel. Syria even opposed separate Israeli-Jordanian negotiations about the West Bank. It probably feared that if substantial progress were made there, international and Arab pressure for an overall settlement that included the Golan would decline.

The joint approach also risked blocking progress by giving a veto to the PLO. The U.S. was ready to begin to work with Arafat's organization if it accepted a statement saying that UN Resolution 242 did not make adequate reference to the Palestinians but that all states had the right to live in peace in the Middle East. Although Arafat was reportedly willing to accept such a statement, the hardline PLO members were still opposed to making any reference to accepting Israel's existence. Thus, the most extreme faction of the PLO risked blocking progress for all

the other Arab parties if the PLO became a member of a joint Arab delegation, as the Carter Administration sought.

Carter's joint approach, like the previous comprehensive approaches, also overestimated the compromises that a U.S. Administration could extract from Israel. Israel above all wanted to negotiate a separate peace with Egypt because it knew that a major Arab attack could not occur without Egypt and because it considered the Sinai to have less military and historical value than the Golan and the West Bank. Even the more moderate Israeli leaders like Rabin, who were not averse to eventual compromises about the West Bank, wanted first to separate Egypt from the rest of the Arab world. Thus, Israel insisted during the 1977 Geneva preparations that, if a conference took place, it would negotiate only bilaterally with the parties.

Israel also rejected Carter's attempts to deal with the issue of PLO representation. Although Begin agreed that the U.S. could come up with a list of Palestinian representatives acceptable to all parties, and that a separate West Bank-Gaza working group could be established, it refused to budge on the issue of PLO representation. Thus, Palestinian representation remained a difficult issue, and PLO representation remained an impossible one.

Carter's attempts to pressure Israel by appealing to U.S. public opinion also failed. Although much of the U.S. public appeared to be generally supportive of Carter's

efforts in a rather diffuse way, most Americans did not feel strongly about the matter. In contrast, Israel's supporters in the U.S. felt intensely committed to Israel. A well organized minority was clearly more effective than a poorly organized majority. Carter's attacks, moreover, tended to rally the more moderate of Israel's U.S. supporters around Begin. In addition, his attempt to bring the Soviet Union into the negotiations also alienated Israel's American supporters.

In short, Carter's joint approach appears to have tried to do too much with too many parties. It gave a veto power to the harder line elements among the Arabs and diverted Israel from confronting the difficult issues that still separated it from Egypt. The joint negotiations bogged down in procedural detail about the organization of a conference whose goal -- a comprehensive settlement of all the issues separating the two sides -- Israel had no intention of reaching in one intensive set of negotiations.

## NOTES

## CHAPTER 7

<sup>1</sup>Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 163.

<sup>2</sup>Zbigniew, Brzezinski, Power and Principle. (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), p. 85.

<sup>3</sup>Brookings Report, Toward Peace in the Middle East, Report of a Study Group. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975).

<sup>4</sup>Quandt, p. 295.

<sup>5</sup>Vance, p. 164.

<sup>6</sup>Brzezinski, p. 94.

<sup>7</sup>Vance, p. 171.

<sup>8</sup>New York Times, 14, 16 February 1977.

<sup>9</sup>Vance, p. 171.

<sup>10</sup>Vance, p. 169.

<sup>11</sup>Vance, pp. 169-71. Jerusalem Post, 18-22 February 1977. Washington Post, 18-22 February 1977.

<sup>12</sup>Interview with Quandt.

<sup>13</sup>Vance, p. 171.

<sup>14</sup>Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith. (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1982), p. 280.

<sup>15</sup>Rabin, p. 294.

<sup>16</sup>Ibid.

<sup>17</sup>Rabin, pp. 294-95.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid. See also Vance, p. 173 and Brzezinski, pp. 90-91 for discussion of Rabin-Carter talks.

<sup>19</sup>Jerusalem Post, 10 March 1977.

<sup>20</sup>New York Times, 17 March 1977.

<sup>21</sup>Washington Post, 15-18 May 1977. New York Times, 15-18 May 1977.

<sup>22</sup>House Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Search for Peace in the Middle East. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1979), p. 93.

<sup>23</sup>Jerusalem Post, 14, 16, 18, 21 March 1977. New York Times, 19, 21 March 1977.

<sup>24</sup>Brzezinski, p. 94.

<sup>25</sup>Carter, p. 284. For other accounts of the Sadat-Carter talks, see Vance, p. 174 and Brzezinski.

<sup>26</sup>Carter, pp. 285-86. Vance, pp. 176-77. Brzezinski, p. 95. New York Times, 27 April 1977.

<sup>27</sup>Interview with Yehuda Litani, Vance, p. 180. Jerusalem Post, 20 May 1977.

<sup>28</sup>Interview with Alexander Schindler, 15 June 1983. For further criticism, see Jerusalem Post, 15, 18 July 1977.

<sup>29</sup>Moshe Dayan, Breakthrough. (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1981), p. 20.

<sup>30</sup>Carter, pp. 290-91. Vance, pp. 180-84. Brzezinski, pp. 99-101. Dayan, pp. 18-21.

<sup>31</sup>Dayan, p. 20.

<sup>32</sup>Vance, p. 188.

<sup>33</sup>Vance, p. 189.

<sup>34</sup>Jerusalem Post, 27 August 1977.

<sup>35</sup>Vance, p. 187.

<sup>36</sup>Time, 8 August 1977, p. 10.

<sup>37</sup>New York Times, 23 June 1977.

<sup>38</sup>Jerusalem Post, 14 August 1977.

<sup>39</sup>Dayan, p. 57.

<sup>40</sup>Carter, pp. 292-93. Dayan, pp. 62, 66. Jerusalem Post, 21 September 1977.

<sup>41</sup>Carter, pp. 292-93. Dayan, pp. 65-66. New York Times, 14 October 1977, p. 9.

<sup>42</sup>Jerusalem Post, 29 September 1977.

<sup>43</sup>Dayan, p. 65.

<sup>44</sup>Jerusalem Post, 17 October, 13 November 1977. New York Times, 14 October 1977, p. 9.

<sup>45</sup>Interview with Quandt.

<sup>46</sup>Interview with Ambassador Eilts, 15 October 1983.

<sup>47</sup>Interview with Quandt.

<sup>48</sup>Carter, pp. 293-93. Brzezinski, pp. 108-110. Dayan, pp. 67-68.

<sup>49</sup>Carter, p. 295.

<sup>50</sup>Brzezinski, p. 110.

<sup>51</sup>Sadat, p. 306.

<sup>52</sup>Dayan, pp. 46-54.

<sup>53</sup>Vance, p. 194.

<sup>54</sup>Sadat, pp. 306-07.

<sup>55</sup>Carter, p. 296.

<sup>56</sup>New York Times, 10 November 1977.

<sup>57</sup>Haber, pp. 2, 23, 27.

<sup>58</sup>Sadat's Knesset speech is reprinted in his book In Search of Identity; the quote is from p. 335.

<sup>59</sup>Based on the author's observations while living in Israel from May 1977 to December 1977.

## CHAPTER 8

### THE NEGOTIATION OF A TREATY FRAMEWORK BETWEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT, NOVEMBER 1977-SEPTEMBER 1978.

#### Sadat's Goals and U.S. Reactions

Sadat had hoped that the trip to Israel would break down "the tremendous psychological barrier that separated the two sides" and lead to a general settlement including all the Arab parties.<sup>1</sup> Instead, Syria, Iraq, Libya and Algeria broke diplomatic relations with Egypt and the PLO condemned the initiative vigorously. Jordan and Saudi Arabia remained neutral, waiting to see how the negotiations would evolve.<sup>2</sup> Despite the adverse or neutral Arab reaction, Sadat believed that the Arab parties would eventually join the negotiations. If Syria did not join the negotiations immediately, Sadat still hoped that he could induce it to join them later by setting a precedent with an Israeli-Egyptian agreement, just as the January 1974 Sinai accord had influenced the May 1974 Golan accord. Similarly, Sadat wanted eventually to draw Jordan into the negotiations if he made progress with Israel on the West Bank.<sup>3</sup>

Throughout the negotiations about the West Bank, however, Sadat would be handicapped by several factors. Although Sadat and Egypt were probably willing to fight again for the Sinai, they were unwilling to fight for the West Bank. Israel, in contrast, was probably willing to fight for the West Bank, although not for the Sinai. This comparative willingness to fight would drive much of the negotiations. Sadat was also an impractical politician in some respects. According to Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders, he could think best in large strategic terms, but had difficulty in finding the right tactics to reach his goals. Once it became apparent that all the barriers were not going to collapse, he was at something of a loss, and continually had to rely on the U.S. for tactical advice.<sup>4</sup> His impatience with detail also allowed Begin, a meticulous legalist, to introduce ambiguous language which the Israelis would later argue supported their position. Sadat was also handicapped by not being the authorized spokesman of the West Bank inhabitants, and had even been repudiated as such a spokesman by the West Bank leaders, who boycotted Sadat's trip and the subsequent Israeli-Egyptian negotiations. It was difficult for Sadat to demand concessions for a party that spurned his authority.

The U.S. shared these concerns about a separate Israeli-Egyptian peace and initially was upset about the

Sadat trip. Carter admitted that the Administration reacted with "confusion" and Vance said he feared that Sadat's trip "could leave him isolated and exposed and jeopardized the prospects for a Geneva Conference."<sup>5</sup> They also worried that if the initiative fell flat, the situation would be worse than ever. Finally, there may even have been a touch of envy in seeing the Egyptian leader monopolizing the international spotlight to such a degree.<sup>6</sup>

But the public euphoria surrounding the trip had its impact and the U.S. Administration began to swing around in support of Sadat. On November 30, Carter conceded, on second thought, that "it's much more important to have direct negotiations between Egypt and Israel than to have us acting as a constant dominant intermediary."<sup>7</sup> He added that he would favor a separate Israeli-Egyptian agreement if the other Arab countries did not join the current negotiations. Similarly, when asked on December 6 about the date of the Geneva Conference, Secretary Vance replied: "I don't think it's that important. The important thing is what progress can be made at Cairo [the site of the first Israeli-Egyptian meeting]."<sup>8</sup> After a quick trip to the Middle East that was meant to tone down Syrian and Jordanian criticism of Sadat, Vance said that progress could be made towards peace in the Middle East even without unanimity in the Arab world.<sup>9</sup> Thus, the Administration, which had invested so much time and energy into a Geneva Conference, swung around behind

Sadat several weeks after his trip even if this increased the chances of a separate Israeli-Egyptian peace.<sup>10</sup>

### The Negotiations Begin

Yet progress between just Israel and Egypt was turning out to be much more difficult than anticipated. During their brief, private talks in Jerusalem, the Israelis told Sadat they would not withdraw to the 1967 borders on all fronts or grant Palestinian self-determination, as Sadat had called for in his speech to the Knesset. Dayan found the Egyptian leader "glum".<sup>11</sup> Weizman believed he was "nervous."<sup>12</sup> Sadat was undoubtedly disappointed that his trip had not broken all the "barriers."

Dayan presented the details of Israel's hard-line position for the first time in early December in talks with national security advisor Tuhami again in Morocco. Dayan wanted Israel's settlements in the Sinai to remain in place and their inhabitants to be allowed to possess defensive weapons and a police force. The weapons might include armored cars, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns and minefields, but not planes, tanks or field artillery. The settlers would pay taxes to Egypt; their children would be citizens of both countries; and any legal disputes with the local Egyptians would be adjudicated before a mixed tribunal.

Dayan also wanted the port and airfield at Sharm el-Sheikh to be turned into civilian installations under

U.S. supervision, but administered by Israeli civilians; Sharm should be open to the ships and aircraft of all nations. The two other airfields in the Sinai, Etzion and Eitam, should continue to remain Israeli military bases.<sup>13</sup>

Dayan's positions were not intended to be high opening proposals which would undergo significant modifications. Since the early 1970s, Israel had established 17 Sinai settlements with a population of 5,000 Israeli nationalists who were regarded as the first line of defense against the Egyptian army and Palestinian guerrillas infiltrating into Gaza. Israel was also afraid that their removal would set a precedent for their West Bank settlements. Moreover, Dayan's personal prestige was involved in so far as he had been the driving force behind the first Sinai settlements while he was Israeli Defense Minister.

The Israelis were also serious about keeping the military facilities that they had built since 1967. They had constructed two entirely new air bases and improved the airfield at Sharm el-Sheikh. Overall, successive Israeli governments had poured \$17 billion into an enormous complex of roads, military bases, water, electrical and telephone lines, and even off-shore oil fields in the Gulf of Suez.<sup>14</sup>

On December 25, Begin and Sadat met at the Ismailiya summit for the first time since Sadat's trip. Begin reiterated that Israel would keep its Sinai settlements and

could not leave them "without a means of self-defense."<sup>15</sup> In defending his position, he emphasized the importance of Israel's decision no longer to demand the strip of land from Eilat to Sharm el-Sheikh: "I want you to know that in deciding this, my government has abrogated the policies of every Israeli government since 1967."<sup>16</sup> Begin also elaborated on his concept of "autonomy" for the West Bank and Gaza residents. The residents would be free to serve in the Jordanian Parliament or form an administrative council that could meet in Bethlehem or Ramallah, but not in Jerusalem. They could raise taxes and be in charge of administrative and cultural affairs, but not defense. The proposal, in fact, resembled regimes that had existed for many minority groups in Eastern Europe, including Jews, and the various peoples of the Ottoman Empire.

Sadat, who was clearly disappointed with the entire meeting, suggested that the summit should conclude with a declaration of Israeli intent to withdraw to the 1967 borders and to allow Palestinian self-determination. Israel demurred.<sup>17</sup>

Overall, the month of negotiations following Sadat's trip to Jerusalem had led to only one major change in the Israeli negotiating position -- the willingness to return the thin strip of land from Eilat to Sharm el-Sheikh. It was a key concession, however. Ever since the 1967 war, there had been an Israeli consensus that Sharm would have to

be kept. If Egypt blocked ships heading towards Israel further south at the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb, Israel could block ships heading towards Egypt from Sharm. Thus, Sharm had been considered a key military position.

The two sides also agreed at Ismailya on a useful tactic based on the partial approach towards issues. Subsequent negotiations would be segmented into two parts. A military committee would deal with the Sinai issues in Cairo; a political committee would deal with the more difficult West Bank issues in Jerusalem. This arrangement was to facilitate progress on some of the Sinai issues, when talks on the West Bank issues stagnated. In early January, for example, when relations were already on the decline, the military committee agreed on the principle of dividing the Sinai into three zones, although their size and the armaments within them had to be worked out.<sup>18</sup>

The Israeli-Egyptian meetings were also breaking down some psychological barriers -- although not as many as Sadat would have liked. Both peoples were becoming accustomed to their representatives meeting with each other over the bargaining table instead of the battlefield. Television showed Israelis walking through the streets of Cairo and Egyptians doing the same in Jerusalem. Some journalists and government officials were forming professional and even personal friendships. The meetings between the two sides were soon acquiring the stamp of normalcy.

Finally, the two sides had at least begun to grapple with the issues that separated them -- the Sinai settlements, the Sinai airfields and the West Bank. Before Sadat's trip, most of the Middle East negotiations had focused on how to organize a forum where these issues would be discussed.

In January 1978, Israel made several decisions that greatly complicated the negotiations. The Israeli Cabinet decided to expand the number of settlements in the occupied territories for the first time since Sadat's trip to Jerusalem. Work was begun on twenty West Bank collectivities that had been authorized before November 1977. More explosively, the Cabinet decided to create some new settlements in the Sinai that were little more than hastily assembled military outposts; here the reasoning was that the new settlements could be eventually dismantled in return for the right to retain the existing ones.<sup>19</sup> When Sadat voiced his vehement opposition to the expansion plans, Begin threatened to rescind his offer of a near-total military withdrawal from the Sinai.<sup>20</sup>

President Carter travelled to the Middle East in hopes of helping the Egyptian President, whose initiative was threatening to go nowhere. This time, however, Carter was aiming for something less than a final, inclusive settlement involving all the parties: "We were now resigned to the fact that a comprehensive settlement was years away

at best."<sup>21</sup> Carter met with King Hussein, for example, in Tehran, but did not press him to join the talks.<sup>22</sup>

In Egypt, Carter tried to formulate acceptable language on the West Bank and Gaza with Sadat. The two leaders stated publicly that all parties had to recognize the "legitimate rights of the Palestinian people" -- the same phrase used in the October U.S.-USSR communique. They also declared that means must be found to "enable the Palestinians to participate in the determination of their own future." This phrase had been worked out by Carter and his advisors and "was meant to come close to support for Palestinian self-determination without using the phrase itself, which had become, in Israeli minds, a code word for an independent Palestinian state."<sup>23</sup> Israel accepted the phrase about Palestinian participation, but still objected to the legitimate rights reference.<sup>24</sup>

Carter invited Sadat to Washington in February for what appears to have been an important meeting. According to William Quandt, who often spoke with Carter and Sadat's aides during these talks, the two leaders appear to have reached an understanding that negotiations about the West Bank should not be allowed to prevent an Israeli-Egyptian accord. Thereafter, Carter in particular, tended to de-emphasize a link between the two.<sup>25</sup> At the same time, Sadat still insisted that Egypt regain complete sovereignty in the Sinai and he rejected a U.S. proposal that the UN be

put in charge of the protection of the Israeli settlers in the Sinai. Carter notes that Sadat was flexible on all points, but "adamantly opposed" to this one.<sup>26</sup>

Carter invited Begin to Washington for talks in March 1978. Carter focused on the key issue, the removal of the Sinai airfields and settlements. Begin, however, was still "not willing to withdraw the Israeli settlers from the Sinai or even leave them under UN or Egyptian protection."<sup>27</sup> Begin did indicate, however, that the Israeli Cabinet was prepared to freeze the number of existing settlements in the Sinai.<sup>28</sup> This was an important step. If the Israelis could be persuaded to make one compromise about the Sinai settlements, perhaps more important ones could follow.

Carter continued to push for a freeze on West Bank settlements and a limited-choice referendum that would allow the West Bank and Gaza residents to vote for an association with Jordan after a five-year interim period in which Israel would maintain its presence. The five-year interim period was designed to defer the adjudication of the Palestinian issue. Begin rejected the idea of a West Bank settlement freeze and an eventual association with Jordan, but indicated interest in the five-year interim period.<sup>29</sup>

Negotiations continued in a desultory fashion for several months. Then, in August, Sadat expelled the Israeli military committee from Cairo, the last formal link with Jerusalem, after Begin publicly rejected Sadat's private

suggestion that El Arish and Mount Sinai be returned as good-will gestures.<sup>30</sup> Faced with an apparent impasse, Begin and Dayan floated the idea of an Israeli withdrawal to the El Arish-Ras Muhammad line in return for an open-ended agreement on trade, tourism, open borders and other "components of peaceful relations."<sup>31</sup> Begin noted publicly that no formal peace treaties between West Germany and many of its neighbors had been signed after the war but that a "permanent partial agreement" had evolved and served as the basis for normal relations.<sup>32</sup>

The two leaders reportedly believed that a formal peace treaty with Egypt might have to await the resolution of the West Bank negotiations and that these could drag on indefinitely.<sup>33</sup> Sadat, however, rejected the idea of another interim agreement, believing that a full peace treaty was still possible. Having opted for bilateral negotiations at the expense of incurring the wrath of much of the Arab world, Sadat needed a major success to vindicate his strategy.

This was not the first time in the Middle East negotiations that an easier agreement had been rejected in favor of a more difficult one. Kissinger, as we saw in Chapter 4, persuaded Sadat to seek an Israeli withdrawal from the entire east bank and not just to the October 22 cease-fire lines after the 1973 war. Similarly, Kissinger and Sadat rejected in 1975 the Israeli offer to return only

the Abu Rudeis oil fields and pushed for a withdrawal to the Mitla and Gidi passes. Thus, a partial approach, in these cases at least, did not mean seeking the easiest agreement.

#### The September 1978 Camp David Accords

The Camp David summit was a response to the continuing deadlock and growing pessimism surrounding the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations. Although Israel had made several important concessions since Sadat's trip to Jerusalem -- dropping its plans to annex the strip of land leading to Sharm el-Sheikh and agreeing to a freeze on its Sinai settlements -- it still insisted on keeping its existing settlements and at least one airfield in the Sinai. Nor was there much flexibility in its position on the West Bank.

During the Camp David talks, Sadat concentrated on the most important issue, the Sinai airfields and settlements. Carter recounts a particularly heated moment, for example; consisting of the following exchange:

[Sadat] was fervent in condemning [the Israeli settlements on his land]. All restraint was now gone. Their faces were flushed, and the niceties of diplomatic language and protocol were stripped away. Begin repeated that no Israeli leader could possibly advocate the dismantling of the Sinai settlements ... Begin had touched a raw nerve, and I thought Sadat would explode. He pounded the table, shouting that land was not negotiable, especially land in the Sinai and Golan Heights.<sup>34</sup>

The three leaders covered all of the issues but kept coming back to the Sinai settlements -- "the most serious

problem of all."<sup>35</sup> Although Sadat attacked the Sinai settlements issue frontally, Carter suggested a more indirect approach aimed at the same goal. Perhaps the Israeli Parliament could decide the issue. While Begin initially rejected the idea, it proved to be one of the key proposals of the talks.<sup>36</sup>

The delegations were able to make progress in part because they broke up the issues into segments. Defense Ministers Weizman and Gamassy focused on the limited force zones. According to Carter, they "made a lot of progress on the delineation of military zones and on agreed limitations on armaments on those zones."<sup>37</sup> At other times, the three delegations concentrated on the West Bank and Gaza issues. Both the U.S. and Egypt continued to push for a settlement freeze on the West Bank. Although Begin continued to reject a settlement freeze and plebiscite, he agreed to "redeploy" Israeli troops to "specified locations;" make a troop withdrawal back to Israel; and "decide" and not just "discuss" the West Bank's future after a five-year interim period.<sup>38</sup> Thus, progress was made on the West Bank and Gaza issues and the Sinai military issues, even though the Israelis refused to compromise initially about either the Sinai or West Bank settlements.

Dayan spoke with Sadat alone for the first time at the urging of Weizman on September 14. Sadat restated forcefully the necessity of removing the Sinai settlements:

My people will not agree to any foreign regime on our soil, neither to American forces in the Sinai airfields, nor to your settlements, not even one, not even for a brief period. If you want peace with us, the table must be cleared. We fought to get rid of the British, and later we fought so that the Suez Canal should remain in our exclusive control. I am now ready to make peace with you, a full and true peace, and ignore the opposition of the Arab states, but you must take all your people out of the Sinai, the troops and the civilians, dismantle the military camps and remove the settlements.<sup>39</sup>

Dayan believed that "there was no question that he was adamant about the Sinai."<sup>40</sup> According to Weizman, Dayan spoke for the first time after the meeting about the possibility of accepting the U.S. proposal that the Knesset decide the Sinai settlement issue.<sup>41</sup>

Sadat brought matters to a head on September 15. When Vance met the Egyptian delegation, he found them packing and was told that Sadat was preparing to leave. Carter immediately tried to dissuade the Egyptian leader from doing so: "I explained to him the extremely serious consequences of his unilaterally breaking off the negotiations: that his action would harm the relationship between Egypt and the United States, he would be violating his personal promise to me, and the onus for failure would be on him ... I told Sadat he simply had to stick with me another day or two."<sup>42</sup> Carter then told both delegations

that he would end the conference on Sunday, September 17, regardless of whether an accord had been reached or not.<sup>43</sup>

With the deadline approaching, the Israelis decided to make their final compromise. On the same day, September 15, Weizman offered to return all the Sinai airfields to Egypt if the U.S. built new ones in Israel. According to Brzezinski however, Carter "indicated that he would not go along with such a bargain unless the Israelis accepted our total package, including withdrawals from the settlements in the Sinai."<sup>44</sup>

On September 6, Begin finally agreed to bring the question of the Sinai settlements to the Knesset, declaring: "If what is holding up peace are the Sinai settlements, I shall submit the matter to the decision of the Knesset and honor whatever the Knesset decides. I shall even recommend that on this important and sensitive issue, party discipline shall not be enforced in the voting. That is all I can do. Nothing more."<sup>45</sup> Whether Begin had intended to give in on the Sinai settlements all along is impossible to know. It is quite possible that he used the issue as a means of deflecting pressure for compromises on the West Bank.

Begin's second key decision was to agree to freeze the number of Israeli West Bank settlements. Begin later argued that he had promised that the settlement freeze would last only for the three-month period during which a formal peace treaty was to be worked out and signed. The U.S. and

Egypt later asserted that the freeze should be in effect for the entire five-year interim period during which the West Bank's final status would be decided upon. The dispute would erupt soon after the signing of the Camp David Accords and would prove to be the key stumbling block in drawing Jordan into the negotiations.

Begin also accepted a key phrase from the January 1978 Aswan formula that the U.S. had been urging on him for months: "The negotiations must recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people."<sup>46</sup> Although the Israeli "concession" may not seem important in retrospect, the two sides had struggled over such questions about phrasing for months.

With the agreement all but clinched, a last minute hitch occurred. Carter had apparently promised Sadat a letter in which the U.S. would declare that it considered east Jerusalem to be occupied territory. Begin refused to have such a statement included in the peace treaty. The problem was resolved by a letter stating that the U.S. position on Jerusalem remained that of the American UN delegation of June 1967. (The delegation had called for international supervision of the holy places while refusing to recognize Israel's annexation of east Jerusalem.)<sup>47</sup> Thus, the three sides agreed to defer any final resolution of the Jerusalem problem.

The three leaders signed the accords in Washington on September 17. Israel promised to withdraw east of the El Arish-Ras Mohammad line within three to nine months of the treaty's signing and to evacuate the Sinai completely, pending the Knesset's approval, within three years of the signing. Egypt promised to end its economic boycott of Israel and establish diplomatic relations within three years of the treaty's signing.

Autonomy talks involving Israeli and Egyptian officials would define the powers of a self-governing West Bank-Gaza authority whose members would be elected by the area's inhabitants. A five-year transition period would begin after the elections; during this time, negotiations would take place to determine the area's final status as soon as possible. Representatives from Jordan and the West Bank and Gaza would be invited to participate in all negotiations pertaining to the area. The three leaders pledged to finish work on the treaty within three months.

Despite the broad smiles that abounded during the signing of the Accords on September 19 in Washington, Sadat was apparently "deeply troubled" at the outcome.<sup>48</sup> Both Saunders and Quandt report that he was morose and tense rather than self-confident and relaxed. Sadat apparently had hoped for a better deal for the West Bank and Gaza instead of some token compromises about phrasing and a tenuous promise to freeze the number of West Bank

settlements. He was soon to learn how ephemeral the freeze would actually be.<sup>49</sup>

### Overview

Diplomatic progress after Sadat's trip took place in a series of key steps, and not all at once. Sadat's trip changed the political atmosphere and put the Israeli hawks on the defensive. It led Israel to reconsider its plans to annex the important military stronghold, Sharm el-Sheikh. Then, in March 1978, Israel agreed not to build any more settlements in the Sinai, for the duration of the negotiations. Finally, Israel agreed to allow the Knesset to vote on the future of the Sinai settlements at Camp David in September 1978. Thus, the issues separating Israel and Egypt concerning the Sinai and their bilateral relations were not solved in one grand negotiating session, but consisted of the usual maneuverings characteristic of prolonged and complicated negotiations. There was not one breakthrough -- as Sadat had hoped there would only have to be -- but a series of advances.

A key negotiating pattern that occurred in the four Kissinger partial agreements was repeated in the ten months of negotiations following Sadat's trip. The parties deferred dealing with the most difficult issues such as the future of Jerusalem and the status of the rest of the West Bank. On the other hand, they concentrated on the hardest of the easier cluster of issues the Sinai settlements.

Sadat hammered away at the necessity of removing them and rejected all compromise proposals allowing for some limited form of Israeli control.

Significantly, Sadat and even Carter several times rejected Israeli proposals that would have led to less ambitious agreements. Sadat turned down the Israeli proposal for another interim withdrawal to the Ras Mohammad-El Arish line that was made in August 1978. Similarly, Carter rejected Weizman's offer, made towards the end of the Camp David talks, of returning the airfields -- but not the settlements -- if the U.S. would pay for a new airfield in the Negev desert. The U.S. President insisted that the U.S. would pay for the new airfield only if the settlements were evacuated. Once again, the partial approach did not mean seeking the easiest possible agreement, but the hardest feasible agreement. Sadat and the US pushed Israel as hard as possible and got as much as they could.

Unlike the Kissinger negotiations, however, the easier issues at Camp David -- the nature of the demilitarized zones and the status of the air bases -- were solved before the hardest issue, the Sinai settlements, even though the negotiators concentrated on the settlement question. It would appear, then, that the order in which the issues within a given cluster of issues are solved is not the key to success as long as the negotiators

concentrate on the issue that will make or break that particular negotiation. Thus, successful negotiations should concentrate on the hardest of the easier issues; if the easier issues are solved in the meantime, so much the better.

The easier Sinai issues were solved before the settlement question because the 1977-78 negotiations were more segmented than the 1973-75 accords. Kissinger dealt with the nature of the demilitarized zones and the Israeli political conditions -- the easier issues -- at the same time that he dealt with the locations of the new withdrawal lines -- the hardest issue. In contrast, Weizman and Gamassy were in charge of the demilitarization negotiations, which were generally treated separately from the settlements question. This enabled the two negotiators to make progress even when there was no movement on the settlements issue. Similarly, the Egyptians and Israelis were able to make moderate progress about language concerning the West Bank at Camp David because West Bank issues were dealt with separately from the Sinai issues. Thus, segmenting issues proved to be a key to negotiating success.

The Camp David Agreement suffered, however, from the different conceptions that Sadat and Begin had of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Although Sadat was willing to cut many of his ties with the Arab world, he still hoped that an Israeli-Egyptian agreement would be a first step

towards a comprehensive peace including all the Arab parties. Begin, in contrast, wanted to reach a separate peace with Egypt and then be left alone to preside over the future of the West Bank and the Golan Heights. The U.S., at some point, probably deliberately glossed over the differences separating the two sides about the West Bank in order to cement the Israeli-Egyptian peace and have something to show for the enormous amount of time and effort invested in the negotiations. These differences, however, would continue to bedevil the negotiations in the coming months.

## NOTES

## CHAPTER 8

- <sup>1</sup>Sadat, p. 302.
- <sup>2</sup>Jerusalem Post, 11, 27 November 1977.
- <sup>3</sup>Interviews with Eilts and Quandt.
- <sup>4</sup>Interview with Harold Saunders, 15 December 1984.
- <sup>5</sup>Carter, p. 298. Vance, p. 194.
- <sup>6</sup>Interview with Quandt.
- <sup>7</sup>Jerusalem Post, 1 December 1977. New York Times, 1 December 1977.
- <sup>8</sup>Jerusalem Post, 7 December 1977.
- <sup>9</sup>Jerusalem Post, 6, 7, 12 December 1977.
- <sup>10</sup>Interview with Quandt.
- <sup>11</sup>Dayan, p. 83.
- <sup>12</sup>Weizman, p. 65.
- <sup>13</sup>Dayan, pp. 93-94.
- <sup>14</sup>Washington Post, 25 April, 1982.
- <sup>15</sup>Weizman, p. 129.
- <sup>16</sup>Weizman, p. 130.
- <sup>17</sup>Dayan, pp. 103-106. Weizman, pp. 128-32.
- <sup>18</sup>For a discussion of these negotiations, see Weizman, pp. 174-87.
- <sup>19</sup>Weizman, p. 142. New York Times, 7 January 1978.
- <sup>20</sup>Jerusalem Post, 9 January 1978.
- <sup>21</sup>Brzezinski, p. 235.
- <sup>22</sup>Carter, p. 300.

- <sup>23</sup>Vance, p. 201.
- <sup>24</sup>Jerusalem Post, 19 January 1978.
- <sup>25</sup>Interview with Quandt.
- <sup>26</sup>Carter p. 308. Interview with Quandt.
- <sup>27</sup>Carter, p. 312.
- <sup>28</sup>Dayan, p. 126. For the evolution of the Cabinet's position, see Washington Post, 11, 14, 21, 27 February, 1 March, 20 April 1978.
- <sup>29</sup>Carter, pp. 311-313. Vance, pp. 207-11.
- <sup>30</sup>Weizman, p. 322. Jerusalem Post, 27 July 1978.
- <sup>31</sup>Jerusalem Post, 30, 31 July, 7, 21 August 1978.
- <sup>32</sup>Jerusalem Post, 17 August 1978, p. 2.
- <sup>33</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>34</sup>Carter, p. 351. See also Weizman, pp. 356-57.
- <sup>35</sup>Carter, p. 347.
- <sup>36</sup>Carter, pp. 365-66. Dayan, p. 164. Weizman, p. 357.
- <sup>37</sup>Carter, p. 381.
- <sup>38</sup>Dayan, p. 165. Weizman, p. 356. Haber, p. 257. Jerusalem Post, 18 September 1978. Washington Post, 20 September 1978.
- <sup>39</sup>Dayan, p. 172.
- <sup>40</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>41</sup>Weizman, p. 371.
- <sup>42</sup>Carter, p. 392.
- <sup>43</sup>Ibid.
- <sup>44</sup>Brzezinski, p. 267.
- <sup>45</sup>Weizman, p. 372.
- <sup>46</sup>Weizman, p. 373. Jerusalem Post, 22 September 1978.

<sup>47</sup>Weizman, p. 373.

<sup>48</sup>Interview with Saunders.

<sup>49</sup>Interviews with Saunders and Quandt.

## CHAPTER 9

### THE NEGOTIATION OF THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI PEACE

TREATY, SEPTEMBER 1978 - MARCH 1979

#### The Failure to Bring in Jordan

The first goals of the Carter Administration after the signing of the Camp David Accords were to persuade Jordan to participate in the upcoming treaty negotiations and to induce Saudi Arabia to support them. In Amman, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Harold Saunders found King Hussein to be "genuinely interested in joining them." Hussein, however, kept returning to the point that he could not participate "unless there was an indefinite, or at least lengthly, freeze on the construction of new West Bank settlements." Similarly, King Fahd implied that he could not support them without such a freeze.<sup>1</sup>

Begin was unwilling to grant a prolonged freeze, however. Several days after the signing of the Accords, he declared on U.S. television that Israel had the right to stay on the West Bank indefinitely. Privately, Begin wrote to Carter saying he had "agreed to a moratorium on new settlements during the peace treaty negotiations, which were

to take three months, not the autonomy negotiations," which could take as long as five years.<sup>2</sup>

The Administration was "furious" with Begin, but did not consider suspending the upcoming talks in order to try to force a settlement freeze on the Israelis so that Hussein would join the negotiations. According to Quandt, Carter and Vance had become intent on achieving a separate agreement even if it meant precluding wider negotiations for the time being. Brzezinski still appeared to be skeptical that a separate Israeli-Egyptian peace would be durable if it led to Egypt's isolation from the rest of the Arab world, but he did not voice his reservations forcefully. In any case, the desire to establish peace between Israel and Egypt and to show something for the enormous effort spent on the negotiations discouraged the Administration from making the West Bank settlements a make-or-break issue.<sup>3</sup>

#### New Demands

Egypt was also unwilling to suspend the negotiations about the West Bank settlements, but quickly raised a number of demands, some of which had not been addressed in detail or even foreseen during the Camp David negotiations. Egypt wanted specific dates for the beginning of the talks about the powers that the self-governing authority composed of the West Bank and Gaza inhabitants would have, the election of the self-governing council members, and the redeployment of the Israeli troops to enclaves within the West Bank. It

also demanded a clear statement saying that the treaty was linked to a larger comprehensive peace involving the other Arab states and a timetable for the entire Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai. Finally, it continued to demand an indefinite freeze on the construction of new West Bank settlements.

Israel, for its part, wanted an Egyptian promise that it could buy the oil in the Sinai at market prices and a "priority of obligations" clause specifically stating that the peace treaty had precedence over Egypt's other treaties with the Arab states, some of which obligated Cairo to join an attack on Israel under certain broadly defined circumstances. Although each side bargained tenaciously over its demands, there was room for compromise on most of these issues.

Egyptian Foreign Minister Ghali and Defense Minister Kamal met with Foreign Minister Dayan and Defense Minister Weizman on October 12 in Washington with the intention of drawing up and signing the peace treaty by December 17. Under the prodding of Carter, the Egyptians agreed that resident, but not full, ambassadors would be exchanged upon completion of the Israeli withdrawal to the El Arish-Ras Muhammad line and that Israeli ships would be allowed to use the Suez Canal upon ratification of the peace treaty.

The Israelis, for their part, agreed to the insertion of a sentence in the treaty's preamble stating that the

treaty would serve "as a basis" for a comprehensive settlement, though they disavowed any legal connection between the Israeli-Egyptian treaty and any future treaties. They also agreed to push for the idea of a precise timetable for all of the Sinai withdrawals with the Cabinet. Both the Egyptians and the Israelis returned home believing that a final agreement was perhaps within reach.<sup>4</sup>

The tenuous compromises reached in Washington began to unravel under the scrutiny of the two home governments. The Israeli cabinet voted to instruct Dayan and Weizman to obtain a concrete U.S. aid commitment; a precise date for the exchange of ambassadors; an advantageous phrasing of the "priority of obligation" clauses; and the omission of the preamble sentence which stated that the treaty would serve "as a basis" for other treaties. The Israeli Cabinet likewise rejected any notion of a timetable for the Sinai withdrawals beyond the El Arish-Ras Muhammad one; it was afraid that unforeseen events could occur which might cause Israel to miss its withdrawal deadlines, thereby jeopardizing the whole peace process. While the Cabinet was willing to begin autonomy talks within a month of the treaty's signing, it would not commit itself to do so in writing; at most it might agree to state the agenda of the autonomy talks.<sup>5</sup>

The Egyptian delegation also returned to Washington with additional demands. Its members now wanted a more

detailed timetable for the implementation of four precise autonomy stages: the two parties should begin the autonomy negotiations within one month of the signing of the treaty; elections for the Palestinian autonomy government should be held within five months of the signing; the redeployment and withdrawal of Israel's West Bank-Gaza troops should take place within six months; and the self-governing authority should be functioning within nine months. Foreign Minister Ghali again explained that Egypt wanted to show the Arab states that the Palestinians had achieved self-rule before diplomatic relations had been established with Israel.<sup>6</sup>

Ghali and Kamal also wanted special concessions for Gaza, whose inhabitants, they believed, would be more willing to enter into the autonomy negotiations than the more independent West Bank residents. To encourage them, the autonomy stages should be implemented more quickly in Gaza and Egypt should be allowed an administrative presence in the area.<sup>7</sup>

Egypt also wanted an accelerated Israeli withdrawal from El Arish, presumably to show progress as quickly as possible; a review of the force limitation clauses five years after the treaty's signing; Israeli good-will gestures toward the West Bank-Gaza residents; and only indirect sales via the U.S. or the spot market of Egyptian oil to Israel.<sup>8</sup>

Vance suggested that the two sides commit themselves to holding elections within a year of the treaty's approval

instead of six months, as Sadat wished. Sadat approved the idea, but wanted elections to take place in Gaza within six months. Israel refused any timetable.<sup>9</sup> Vance also suggested that Israel accept Egypt's timetable proposals as target dates rather than fixed deadlines. Begin, who had joined the talks in Washington, rejected the idea. The two delegations decided, therefore, to end quietly the meetings in Washington and return to their countries for further consultations.<sup>10</sup>

Dayan and Weizman urged flexibility in their talks with the Cabinet in Jerusalem. The Israeli Foreign Minister argued that the preamble linkage sentence (the treaty would serve "as a basis" for any subsequent ones) was a necessary compromise and noted that the delegation's legal advisors, Aharon Barak and Meir Rosenne, had submitted opinions to the effect that the sentence did not imply a legal tie between the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and the implementation of autonomy in West Bank-Gaza.<sup>11</sup> Begin advised the Cabinet, therefore, to propose that both sides revert to the positions adopted during the first ten days of the Washington negotiations. Israel would withdraw its reservations about the preamble sentence if Egypt would drop its demands about special considerations for Gaza and the omission of a "priority of obligations" clauses.<sup>12</sup> Israel was still, however, to reject any timetables for the West Bank and Gaza.<sup>13</sup> The Cabinet voted fifteen to two to accept

Begin's proposal but only after he had again reassured the Ministers that Israel would never withdraw from the West Bank in any significant fashion.<sup>14</sup>

Vance, who feared that missing the December 17 deadline would set a bad precedent for other target dates, made a last-ditch effort in mid-December to bridge the gaps in Cairo and Jerusalem. Sadat dropped his demand for a fixed date for the elections, agreeing that the target date should not be later than the end of 1979. But according to Vance, he "would not yield on the exchange of resident ambassadors, which he now said would take place one month after inauguration of the self-governing authority."<sup>15</sup> And Begin promised only to implement autonomy at "an early date," but not necessarily by the end of 1979.<sup>16</sup> The December 17th deadline passed without the two sides appearing to be even close to a final agreement.

The talks stagnated during the next two months. Vance met with Egyptian Prime Minister Khalil and Israeli Foreign Minister Dayan in Brussels just before Christmas and Assistant Secretary Atherton went to Cairo and Jerusalem in January, but neither effort produced any real change.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, the fall of the Shah had led to what Vance calls "a dramatic stiffening of Israeli terms for giving up the Sinai oil fields."<sup>18</sup> Israel wanted the opportunity to buy the oil before any other country and wanted written, not just oral, Egyptian assurances that it had purchase rights.

In February, Carter invited Dayan and Khalil back to Camp David. Dayan, who was not authorized to make decisions on his own, did not budge. But Khalil said Egypt was willing to substitute the word "goal" for the more precise "target date" in the letter on West Bank-Gaza autonomy negotiations in order to ease Israeli fears about missing deadlines.<sup>19</sup>

Carter's next move was to invite Begin and Sadat to what he hoped would be a climactic meeting in Washington. Sadat declined, explaining that Khalil had full authority to make decisions. Begin reluctantly agreed, but insisted on meeting only with Carter.<sup>20</sup> The talks were, as Vance notes, "among the most difficult the two leaders ever had,"<sup>21</sup> but Begin made some concessions. He agreed that the priority of obligations clause (Article VI) did not "prevail" over Egypt's other peace treaties and accepted a U.S. interpretive note to that effect. Begin also accepted Carter's proposal that a 12-month "goal" -- not "target date" -- be set for finishing the autonomy negotiations but not, as Sadat still wanted, for the functioning of the self-government. Begin also agreed that the two sides would start the autonomy negotiations within a month of the treaty's signing and that the self-governing authority would be established and inaugurated within one month of its election. Begin accepted these "goals," pending Cabinet

approval; the vote was nine in favor, three against and four abstentions.<sup>22</sup>

Carter then decided to visit Cairo and Jerusalem to try to reach a final accord. In Cairo, Sadat agreed to the various U.S. proposals about autonomy goals, but still wanted to station Egyptian liaison officers in Gaza and implement autonomy there first.<sup>23</sup>

Carter met with the Israeli Cabinet on March 10 for the first of several extremely difficult sessions. The Israelis agreed only to consider the idea of implementing autonomy first in Gaza during the autonomy negotiations and rejected categorically the idea of stationing Egyptian liaison officers in Gaza. On March 12, though, the Cabinet dropped its demand for preferential oil treatment and accepted a fifteen year U.S. guarantee that it would sell Israel oil at prevailing world prices in case Egypt refused to do so.<sup>24</sup>

Carter returned to Cairo and obtained Sadat's agreement to drop the Gaza issue. Begin and Sadat flew to Washington on March 24 for the treaty's signing, but still had to dispense with the oil issue.

Sadat promised Begin at the Egyptian embassy that Egypt would sell Israel oil at the market price on a permanent basis, but asked the Israeli prime minister "to rely on his word and not to seek a written agreement on the matter."<sup>25</sup> The Israelis, however, insisted upon and

received a letter from the U.S. president confirming the arrangement. They accepted Vance's suggestion that the signing of the memorandum of understanding and the President's letter about oil be left until after the signing of the peace treaty in order not to embarrass the Egyptians.<sup>26</sup>

### The Treaty's Aftermath

The period following the treaty's signing demonstrated the apparent durability of peace between Israel and Egypt and the intractability of the West Bank and Gaza dispute. Initially the normalization of relations between Israel and Egypt proceeded relatively smoothly. In May 1979, the two countries exchanged ambassadors and the first Israeli ship passed through the Suez Canal.<sup>27</sup> In June 1981, the two parties agreed upon the functioning of the international peacekeeping force; 2,000 lightly armed troops from nine countries, including the U.S., eventually participated. In March 1982, the Israelis evacuated the Sinai completely.

Israeli policies in the Middle East placed major strains on the treaty, but did not provoke Egypt to renew combat. In July 1980, Israel formally annexed Arab Jerusalem; Sadat reacted only by breaking off the moribund autonomy talks.<sup>28</sup> In June 1981, Israeli planes destroyed the Iraqi atomic reactor; Sadat sharply criticized the raid,

but ordered only a temporary freeze on several minor economic and cultural programs.<sup>29</sup>

Mubarak continued these moderate policies after Sadat's assassination in October 1981. When Israel annexed the Golan Heights in December 1981 and invaded Lebanon in June 1982, he only issued verbal condemnations. In September 1982, Mubarak did recall Egypt's ambassador, but did not break diplomatic relations, following the massacre of Palestinian refugees in West Beirut. On the fifth anniversary of the treaty's signing, Israeli officials stated their disappointment over the withdrawal of the ambassador and the low levels of tourism and trade, but emphasized "that the treaty appears strong and has given Israel an unprecedented span of peace."<sup>30</sup>

The autonomy talks, however, went nowhere. King Hussein and West Bank and Gaza officials refused to participate in the negotiations from the start. Egyptian officials proceeded alone, but failed to extract any significant concessions; as previously mentioned, Sadat broke the talks off in July 1980.

Meanwhile, the Begin government pursued an aggressive settlement policy on the West Bank.<sup>31</sup> For the first time, Israelis were allowed to settle in Arab cities such as Hebron and buy land anywhere.<sup>32</sup> In the spring of 1982, the Begin government expelled most of the West Bank's elected mayors and replaced them with Israeli officials.<sup>33</sup> About 20

new settlements a year were begun and about 120,000 Israelis were living in the West Bank by 1982.<sup>34</sup>

The other Arab states and the USSR continued to oppose the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, but did not interfere in its implementation. Although the Arab states cut most of their economic trade with Egypt and the Persian Gulf states stopped their economic aid of about \$500 million a year, they did not expel the hundreds of thousands of Egyptian workers whose remittances added up to several billion dollars a year. The U.S. aid program of somewhat more than \$2 billion dollars a year for Egypt helped to cushion the withdrawal of Arab trade and aid.

#### Overview

Several key patterns that had occurred in the negotiations of the 1973-75 agreements re-emerged after the Camp David Accords. Sadat, using one of the principal techniques of the partial approach, suggested that the parties not attempt to solve the entire West Bank and Gaza problem all at once, but rather implement autonomy in Gaza as a first step towards a more comprehensive agreement. This suggestion resembled his proposal in February 1971 about a partial Israeli withdrawal from the Canal area and Kissinger's proposal in early 1974 that the UN instead of Jordanian troops be stationed in Jericho as first steps towards later Israeli withdrawals. Only one of these three proposals was accepted by the Israelis -- the partial

withdrawal from the Canal -- but they probably all had a better chance of being accepted than the more comprehensive proposals calling for Israeli compromises. The goal in each case was to strike a deal that involved the maximum compromises that Israel was willing to make at a given time in the hope that this would start a process that would lead to further agreements. During the 1967-1979 period, this strategy worked for the Sinai, but not for the West Bank.

Another key pattern that reappeared was the parties' tendency to deal with the somewhat easier issues after they had solved the hardest problem within a cluster of issues. As we saw in the previous chapter, the parties concentrated on the hardest issue of the bilateral issues separating Egypt and Israel at Camp David, the Sinai settlements. Once this issue was solved, the parties turned to the remaining issues, such as timetables for the West Bank and Gaza, the priority of obligations clause, the timing of the ambassadorial exchange, and oil sales. Although these issues were extremely difficult, they were somewhat less crucial than the Sinai settlements. Sadat probably would not have compromised about the removal of the Sinai settlements, whereas he gave in on many of the thorny questions discussed between October 1978 and March 1979 about the West Bank and Gaza.

This pattern of solving a cluster of issues in descending order of difficulty -- after deferring the most

difficult ones -- was the same pattern that occurred in the agreements negotiated between 1973 and 1975. In most of those cases, the parties first concentrated on the location of the new forward lines -- after deciding not to seek a comprehensive settlement -- and then negotiated the nature of the limited force zones and the Israeli political conditions. Thus, the negotiations between November 1978 and March 1979 resembled the negotiation of the limited force zones and Israeli political conditions. Both of these sets of issues were important, but less important than the key make-or-break issue.

The relative success of concentrating on the key question among a large number of issues seems attributable to several factors. It allowed the heads-of-state to use their limited time most efficiently. Carter, Sadat and Begin could not absent themselves for long periods of time from their own capitals. Since they could only spend a short amount of time together, it made sense to concentrate on the key issues that only they could solve.

Moreover, once the two sides had agreed on the key issues of the Sinai settlements and diplomatic recognition, they were less likely to break up the negotiations over less crucial problems like timetables for the West Bank and even the establishment of additional Israeli West Bank settlements. If the two sides had tackled these issues before solving the questions of the Sinai settlements and

diplomatic recognition, they would have had less incentive to solve them. One can easily imagine such negotiations dragging on indefinitely. As it was, however, Sadat knew that he might miss a chance for a total Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai if he did not compromise on the West Bank, and Begin knew that he would jeopardize the chances of diplomatic recognition if he did not compromise also.

On the other hand, it is possible that an important opportunity was lost because the parties had too much of an incentive to reach an agreement. Because Sadat wanted so much to obtain the evacuation of the Sinai, he was unwilling to suspend the negotiations as long as Israel refused a freeze on the West Bank settlements. And because Carter was so intent on securing an Egyptian-Israeli peace, he was unwilling to risk a major break with Jerusalem over the West Bank settlements. Once Begin realized that neither the U.S. nor Egypt would make a complete break with Israel over the West Bank settlements, he could and did accelerate their expansion. Perhaps in their eagerness to secure a partial peace and prove to their domestic audiences that the enormous effort invested in the negotiations had not been in vain, Sadat and Carter had missed an opportunity to establish a more comprehensive one.

Yet Carter and Sadat did appear to have gained as much as they could from Israel. Any Israeli government was opposed to making compromises about the West Bank at the

same time that it was making compromises on other fronts. In 1974, for example, Prime Minister Rabin, who did not rule out an eventual compromise about the West Bank, refused categorically to deal with the subject until peace with Egypt had been achieved. Under Prime Minister Begin, Israel was opposed to any compromise in principle: Begin was ready to pass up a peace treaty with Egypt in order to maintain dominion over the West Bank. Thus, one of the theoretical dangers of the partial approach -- the acceptance of a limited success when greater ones could have been possible -- does not seem to apply to the negotiations conducted by the Carter Administration. Although the peace treaty was not an unqualified success, it seems to have been the maximum feasible achievement.

## CHAPTER 9

<sup>1</sup>Interview with Harold Saunders.

<sup>2</sup>Vance, p. 228. See also Carter, p. 408 and Brzezinski, p. 273.

<sup>3</sup>Interview with Quandt.

<sup>4</sup>Carter, p. 409. Vance, p. 235. Dayan, p. 219. Jerusalem Post, 24, 27 October; 20, 23 November 1978. Washington Post, 23 October 1978.

<sup>5</sup>Dayan, pp. 228, 236-37. Jerusalem Post, 10, 13 November 1978.

<sup>6</sup>Vance, p. 236. Dayan, p. 235-36. Jerusalem Post, 13, 17 November 1978.

<sup>7</sup>Vance, p. 236. Jerusalem Post, 12, 14 November 1978. Washington Post, 15, 16, 17 November 1978.

<sup>8</sup>Dayan, pp. 236-37. Jerusalem Post, 13 November 1978.

<sup>9</sup>Vance, p. 239. Dayan, p. 239. Jerusalem Post, 15 November 1978. Washington Post, 18 November 1978.

<sup>10</sup>Vance, p. 239. Dayan, pp. 239, 246.

<sup>11</sup>Jerusalem Post, 21 November 1978.

<sup>12</sup>Jerusalem Post, 20, 21 November 1978.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid.

<sup>14</sup>Dayan, p. 248-49. Jerusalem Post, 22 November 1978.

<sup>15</sup>Vance, p. 241.

<sup>16</sup>Dayan, pp. 249-50. Jerusalem Post, 21 December 1978.

<sup>17</sup>Vance, p. 242.

<sup>18</sup>Ibid.

<sup>19</sup>Dayan, pp. 259-65. Jerusalem Post, 21 February 1978.

<sup>20</sup>Carter, p. 414. Vance, p. 243. Dayan, pp. 266-67.

<sup>21</sup>Vance, p. 243.

<sup>22</sup>Dayan, p. 268. Vance, p. 244. Carter, pp. 414-17.  
Jerusalem Post, 6, 11 March 1978.

<sup>23</sup>Carter, p. 419. Vance, p. 246.

<sup>24</sup>Carter, pp. 420-25. Vance, pp. 246-50. Dayan, pp.  
271-73.

<sup>25</sup>Dayan, p. 280.

<sup>26</sup>Carter, p. 425. Vance, p. 252. Dayan, pp. 280-81.

<sup>27</sup>New York Times, 1, 27 May 1979.

<sup>28</sup>New York Times, 31 July 1980.

<sup>29</sup>Washington Post, 26 June 1981.

<sup>30</sup>Washington Post, 27 March 1984.

<sup>31</sup>New York Times, 17 September 1979. New York Times,  
11 February, 1980. Jerusalem Post, 11 November 1982.

## CONCLUSION

During the 1967-79 period, various diplomatic initiatives were undertaken in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Although they all aimed at the same goal -- an Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories and peace treaties between Israel and its neighboring countries -- they met with varying degrees of success. Those that made the least progress were the American initiative by Secretary of State William Rogers in 1969 and the U.S.-backed efforts of UN mediator Gunnar Jarring in 1968 and 1971 as described in Chapters 1 and 2. The Carter Administration, as we saw in Chapter 7, induced Israel to make only some minor compromises about Palestinian representation in a larger Arab delegation in preparation for a Geneva conference that never occurred. In contrast, the Nixon and Ford Administrations from 1973 to 1975 and the Carter Administration in 1978 and 1979, whose efforts were analyzed in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6, 8, and 9, reached a series of agreements between Israel and Egypt that culminated in an Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai and a peace treaty.

As we pointed out in the Introduction, the periods of diplomatic progress do not seem to be adequately explained by changes in the military, political and economic situation of the parties. The military situation remained stalemated.

Although the Arabs demonstrated that they had improved their military performance, Israel still enjoyed a clear military superiority without being able to inflict a final defeat on the Arabs, who had a much larger population and territory. Politically, Sadat's coming to power made negotiations less difficult, but did not prevent the failure of the 1971 Jarring mission and Carter's 1977 initiative. Economically, the rise in oil prices added to the international influence of the Arab coalition, but did not reduce significantly the strength of the Israeli lobby in the U.S. The changes in the military, political and economic conditions of the parties, therefore, do not seem to have affected the outcome of the negotiations in a crucial way. In contrast, the change that seems most decisive is the shift in the diplomatic approach used, from the ambitious comprehensive and joint approaches to the more modest partial and separate ones.

In our Introduction, we set forth the hypothesis that the partial approach towards issues and the separate approach towards parties are better negotiating strategies than the comprehensive approach towards issues and the joint approach towards parties. Although this hypothesis appears basically to be borne out by our study, some important qualifications should now be added. With regard to issues, it appears that our initial hypothesis pertains mainly to the strategic level of negotiations, the level concerning

the overall approach to a given problem. Implementing this strategy on the tactical level of negotiations, however, calls for a more comprehensive approach in which the hardest of the easier issues is tackled first. With regard to parties, our analysis confirms that they should be approached separately in order to avoid mobilizing opposition among their least conciliatory elements and to defer dealing with the hardest parties. But this does not mean that agreements should be sought between parties whose differences are minor or which are peripheral to the conflict. Just as the hardest of the easier issues should be confronted first, parties of moderate difficulty should be tackled before either the easiest or hardest ones.

#### Achievements of the Partial Approach on the Strategic Level

On a broad strategic level, the U.S. tried or supported a comprehensive approach towards the issues separating Israel and Egypt several times, only to overreach itself. In 1969 Secretary Rogers attempted to persuade the Israelis to withdraw to the 1967 borders in return for some kind of contractual agreement with Egypt. The Israelis denounced the plan for going too far; Egypt criticized it for not going far enough; and the U.S. ended up by mollifying Israel with additional aid. UN mediator Gunnar Jarring also failed in two similar mediation attempts. When he asked Egypt and Israel if they were ready to implement

the terms of UN Resolution 242 in 1968, both sides retreated into vague generalities and used the ambiguities of the Resolution to evade the issues they found difficult. In 1971, Jarring pressed the parties with more pointed questions about their willingness to implement the Resolution. Sadat said that he would sign a peace treaty with Israel if it returned to the 1967 borders, but Israel made official for the first time its demand for border rectifications even within the context of a peace settlement. Jarring suspended his mission and never resumed it.

Similarly, Sadat's withdrawal proposal along the Suez Canal appeared to be making some headway in 1971 until he insisted that any interim step be tied to a total Israeli withdrawal. When Secretary of State Rogers agreed with Sadat that any first step had to be linked with further steps, Israel angrily denounced the proposal. Thereafter, Rogers played little role in the negotiations.

In contrast, the partial approach towards the issues separating just Israel and Egypt achieved in stages what the comprehensive approach failed to achieve all at once -- a total Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai and the establishment of diplomatic relations. The beginning was the November 1973 agreement that stabilized the cease-fire, saved the Egyptian Third Army and established a prisoner exchange. The January 1974 accord next led to an Israeli withdrawal from along the Suez Canal. In August 1975,

Israel agreed to return several of the Sinai oil fields and withdraw behind the strategic Mitla and Gidi passes. Then at Camp David in September 1977, Israel agreed to permit the Knesset to vote on the future of the Sinai settlements and Egypt agreed to grant diplomatic recognition to Israel. Finally, the March 1979 peace treaty dealt with a host of remaining issues regarding the West Bank and oil sales.

The benefits of the treaty were substantial. Making peace between Egypt and Israel was crucial because it virtually eliminated the possibility of a full-scale war between Israel and the rest of the Arab world, which in turn could have led to another U.S.-USSR confrontation. Without Egyptian participation in the Arab coalition, the Arab-Israeli conflict was reduced to the dimensions of many of the conflicts that pervade the Middle East -- dangerous but not a threat to world peace.

Moreover, this historic achievement was reached without significantly increasing anti-American feeling in the Middle East. Morocco and Tunisia remained good friends of the United States, and Algeria drew closer to the U.S. after the treaty was signed. Ties with the Persian Gulf states and Iraq actually improved as the Iranian threat increased. Like Egypt, these states believed that it was not worth jeopardizing their interests over the fate of a small number of Arabs -- one and a half million -- living in an area that, despite the importance of Jerusalem,

represented a fraction of the vast Arab territories in the Middle East.

Finally, the most convincing proof of the treaty's solidity is its durability in the face of a number of serious challenges. The entire Arab world, except for Oman, broke diplomatic relations with Egypt either after Camp David or the treaty's signing. The accord also survived the annexation of Jerusalem by Israel, the Israeli bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor, and, most important, the assassination of Sadat.

#### Reasons for the Effectiveness of the Partial Approach

There are several reasons for the effectiveness of the partial approach on the strategic level. Perhaps its strongest point was that, as Samuel Huntington had argued about domestic reform strategy, it avoided mobilizing opposition -- mainly from Israeli hawks and their American supporters -- to its final goal of an Israeli withdrawal from as much of the occupied territory as possible. Although some Israelis and their American backers refused any concessions, no matter how minor, a large number supported the various partial withdrawals, but would have opposed a withdrawal to the 1967 border in one major step.

Avoiding alienating this large group of people was crucial since the United States could not force Israel to make a single withdrawal, as it had done in the 1950's. By the late 1960's, the strength of Israel's U.S. supporters

and Israel's military power had increased markedly while the power of the United States Presidents had declined. Thus, the Israeli government and its American supporters were a constant constraint on U.S. policy. They could sometimes help torpedo a U.S. initiative completely, as in the 1969 Rogers Plan and Carter's attempt to organize a Geneva Conference in 1977. At the very least, they could help inhibit initiatives. When, for example, Ford and Kissinger tried to pressure Israel after the failure of Kissinger's March 1975 shuttle, Israel's supporters in the U.S. rallied Senate support against the move. Because of these constraints, the U.S. had to mask its final goals and proceed in stages instead.

A second reason for the partial approach's success was that, just as Roger Fisher had argued, reaching initial agreements by tackling the easier issues first helped create a sense of diplomatic momentum and a modicum of trust, or at least the perception of reliability. Most of the agreements helped generate momentum by creating a sense of accomplishment and by setting useful precedents such as demilitarized zones. Moreover, agreements allowed the parties to test their adversary's adherence to each accord. Israel, for example, carried through on its promise to permit Egyptian convoys to supply the Third Army after prisoners of war were exchanged in November 1973. Egypt reopened the Suez Canal and began to rebuild the Canal

cities in 1975, as promised in the January 1974 accord. Both Egypt and Syria carried out their promises not to engage in a low-level war of attrition or allow guerrillas to infiltrate across the cease-fire lines. Fulfilling such promises made further agreements more likely in so far as they provided tangible bases of trust.

A third advantage of the partial approach was the opportunity it provided for the parties to get to know each other over an extended period of time. The importance of human contacts is often overrated in diplomacy, where objective interests shape the agenda, but in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict the Arabs' isolation of Israel was part of that agenda. Israel demanded direct diplomatic contacts and recognition in return for at least some of the conquered territories. Egypt's willingness to engage in direct contacts and eventual diplomatic recognition was increased by the protracted negotiations that occurred after the 1973 war. It is difficult to imagine Sadat's trip taking place if four years of negotiations had not preceded it. After his trip, Egyptians and Israelis became even more accustomed to their representatives meeting over the bargaining table instead of the battlefield. If the comprehensive approach towards the issues had been pursued, more intensive negotiations would have taken place over a shorter period of time, and the gradual

reduction of Israel's isolation probably would have been more difficult under those circumstances.

The Implementation of the Partial Approach  
on the Tactical Level

We have analyzed the success of the partial approach on the strategic level. A more comprehensive approach appears to have been more effective, however, on the tactical level, where the details of the various agreements were worked out. Negotiators using this approach addressed the hardest issues first within a cluster of relatively easy ones throughout the negotiations; once a cluster of the easier issues had been isolated, the negotiators tended to focus on the most difficult issue. In the November 1973 agreement between Israel and Egypt, for example, Kissinger and Sadat first tackled the stickiest problem: whether to aim for an Israeli withdrawal to the October 22 cease-fire lines, or to the western side of the passes. Once this was solved, they dealt with the less difficult questions surrounding the nature of the United Nations presence on the Cairo-Suez road and the prisoner exchange. Finally, they disposed of the Bab el-Mandeb blockade question. After the agreement was signed, Gamassy, Yariv and Siilasvuo worked out the secondary issues of the numbers and locations of the UN checkpoints.

The preparations of the Geneva conference followed a similar pattern. With Sadat, Kissinger first solved the

issue of Palestinian representation and then tackled the less crucial question of a bilateral versus a multilateral format. With the Israelis, the U.S. Secretary of State first solved the key Palestinian issue and then the much less important issue of the UN role.

Similarly, in the two accords between Israel and Egypt in 1974 and 1975 and the agreement between Israel and Syria in 1974 the negotiators first solved the most difficult issue, the location of the new forward lines, then turned to the next most difficult one, the nature of the limited force zones, and then dealt with the Israeli political conditions, the least difficult issue.

After Sadat's trip to Jerusalem, the parties also concentrated on the Israeli settlements in the Sinai, the key issue. After they had solved this question at Camp David in September 1978, they dealt with a host of important but less crucial issues, such as timetables for the never-to-be self-governing West Bank and Gaza authority, oil, and a "priority of obligations" clause.

Variations on this pattern did occur. During the May 1974 Golan negotiations, Kissinger sometimes shifted from the key question of the location of the forward lines to the less important force limitation issues in order to give the parties time to muster an internal consensus about their negotiating positions. Similarly, officials of the Carter Administration frequently took up questions about the West

Bank and the limited force zones in the Sinai when they were not concentrating on the Sinai settlements.

Generally speaking, however, the negotiators addressed and solved the issues in descending order of difficulty, once an issue cluster had emerged from preliminary soundings. Thus, on the strategic level, issues were broken down into segments that could be assimilated by both sides. But on the tactical level, within these segments, the harder issues were addressed and solved first.

Another way in which the implementation of the partial approach on the tactical level used a technique of the comprehensive approach was that the parties tended to make known all their goals from the outset. When Kissinger began discussing a first possible withdrawal with the Israelis in 1971, for example, he told them they would have to withdraw to the western edge of the Sinai passes and allow an Egyptian police force in the vacated area. In the November 1973 talks, he told Sadat that it would be best to give up his attempt to return to the October 22 cease-fire lines in favor of a larger Israeli withdrawal. He also let Sadat know in January 1974 how far he thought the Israelis were willing to withdraw. In May 1974, the U.S. Secretary of State told each side early in the talks what areas they would have to compromise on if they wanted an agreement. During the 1975 negotiations, he outlined the prospective agreement to both sides quite early. Thus, even though

Kissinger, the advocate of the partial approach, believed, as seen earlier, that the strategic goals should remain somewhat vague in order to avoid mobilizing opponents, his approach on the more tactical level was the reverse. When an agreement was in sight, there was little to be gained by circumspect ambiguity.

In these cases, concentrating on the hardest issue in an easier cluster had several advantages. It gave the negotiations a certain dynamism and seriousness of purpose. It also allowed the heads of state to budget their time more effectively. At the Camp David negotiations, for example, Carter, Sadat and Begin could not remain away from their capitals for more than a limited amount of time. Trying to solve the key issues made the most sense given their limited amount of time.

Even more important, once the key issue was solved, the parties were less likely to wreck the negotiations over less important issues. Once Israel decided to evacuate the Sinai completely, for example, Egypt was less likely to reject an agreement because of the important but less crucial issues that were dealt with during the treaty negotiations from September 1978 to March 1979. Conversely, if these somewhat less difficult issues had been dealt with before the toughest ones had been solved, there would have been less incentive for the parties to solve them.

The Separate Versus the Joint Approach  
Towards the Parties

The separate approach towards the parties appears to have had many of the advantages that the partial approach towards the issues had. The separate approach helped to avoid alienating the political factions that were opposed to the major compromises that the joint approach would have involved. Moreover, dealing separately with the parties permitted negotiators to defer confronting the hardest parties who would have blocked progress between the easier parties.

The separate approaches of the Nixon and Ford Administrations between 1973 and 1975 and of the Carter Administration in 1978 and 1979, which dealt with Israel and Egypt and in one case, with Israel and Syria, on a bilateral basis, succeeded because they did not require Israel to make compromises on more than one front at a time. These initiatives also permitted U.S. negotiators to defer dealing with the harder parties such as Jordan, the PLO and, in most cases, Syria.

In contrast, President Carter's comprehensive approach in 1977 -- the most ambitious initiative of our period -- asked too much of Israel and granted a veto power to the more difficult Arab parties. During the 1977 negotiations, Jordan and Syria insisted that Israel deal with a united Arab delegation so that territorial compromises could be made on all three fronts at the same

time. Their positions were entirely rational in so far as these Arab leaders knew that most of Jerusalem's military power would be shifted to the northern front if Egypt reached a separate accord with Israel; they may also have felt that they could better extract concessions from Israel if it faced the threat of another attack from a united Arab coalition. But the insistence of Syria and Jordan on a joint approach meant that Israel and Egypt were unlikely to make much progress on their own.

Uniting the coalition parties also risked blocking progress between Israel and Egypt by giving a veto to the PLO. Although Arafat was reportedly willing to make some statement along the lines of UN Resolution 242, the hard line PLO elements were still opposed to any reference implying acceptance of Israel's existence. Thus, the most extreme faction of the PLO might have blocked progress for all the other Arab parties if the PLO had been a member of a joint Arab delegation, as the Carter Administration had originally sought.

Similarly, Rogers' initiative in 1969 involving Egypt and Jordan and Jarring's efforts in 1968 and 1971 involving Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon were handicapped because they required Israel to compromise on too many fronts. The slim chances of diplomatic progress between Israel and Egypt before the 1973 war were reduced still further by trying to bring other parties into the negotiations.

Pursuing the separate approach in order to avoid asking too much of Israel and to defer dealing with the most difficult Arab parties did not mean, however, that relatively easy -- but ultimately trivial -- agreements were sought with parties that were peripheral to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Just as the hardest of the easier issues were confronted first, a party of moderate difficulty, Egypt, was dealt with instead of the easiest or hardest conceivable parties. At no other time during the 1967-79 negotiations was it suggested that agreements be promoted between Israel and Morocco or Tunisia, the most moderate Arab states. Likewise, no agreement was sought between Israel and Lebanon, whose government had been in contact with Israel since the 1975 civil war had broken out. Even if any of these countries had been willing to sign a peace treaty with Israel, it would have contributed little to the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Instead, United States policy concentrated on Egypt, whose differences with Israel were important but not totally intractable. Solving these differences made a real contribution to reducing the likelihood of war between Israel and the entire Arab coalition.

#### Problems Associated with the Partial and Separate Approaches

Despite their achievements and strong points, the partial and separate approaches may increase the likelihood

of certain adverse developments. As Fred Iklé warned in How Nations Negotiate, conducting negotiations over an extended period of time can allow the status quo to congeal or negative political trends to develop. Indeed, between 1967 and 1979, more than 100,000 Israelis moved into the West Bank and established more than 100 settlements. The more settlements that were established, the more difficult their removal became. In addition, a whole generation of Israelis coming of age during this period tended to take for granted Israel's possession of the conquered territories.

A second drawback of these approaches is the temptation to make short-term gains at the expense of longer term ones. After Sadat's trip to Jerusalem, for example, President Carter probably glossed over the differences between the two parties in order to conclude the peace treaty and have something to show for the enormous time and effort that had been expended in the negotiations. It could be argued that Carter, and even Sadat, were so intent on securing an Israeli evacuation of the Sinai that they did not try hard enough to extract Israeli concessions about the West Bank and the Golan.

A third drawback of the partial and separate approaches is that the absence of clearly enunciated goals can lead to misunderstandings. It is conceivable that the somewhat ambiguous nature of these two approaches may have contributed to such misunderstandings between Sadat and

Begin. Although Sadat was willing to cut temporarily many of his ties with the Arab world, he still hoped that an Israeli-Egyptian agreement would be a first step towards a comprehensive peace including all the Arab parties. Begin, in contrast, wanted to reach a separate peace with Egypt and then be left alone to preside over the West Bank and the Golan. Their different goals might have emerged more clearly under the comprehensive and joint approaches in which all issues and parties are dealt with in a less equivocal fashion.

A fourth drawback of the partial and separate approaches is that they may force mediators to provide too many incentives to one or more of the parties. Mediators may have to provide inducements for each agreement, and a series of agreements may require a large number of them. It can be argued that the United States provided too much financial largesse to Israel and, in the case of the 1975 accord, an unwise pledge not to deal with the PLO except under narrowly defined circumstances. Moreover, these outlays became institutionalized in so far as succeeding United States administrations hesitated to cut back on aid to Israel for fear of alienating its American supporters.

A fifth drawback is that dealing with the parties separately over an extended period of time may lead to the isolation of those parties that are not included in the initial negotiations, but which are nonetheless important.

In this process, the parties that are more difficult may be neglected for too long or never dealt with at all. Indeed, this kind of neglect is the strongest objection to the 1979 peace treaty. Although the peace between Israel and Egypt was important, according to this line of reasoning, it ignored the one and a half million Arabs living in the West Bank and Gaza and did nothing to secure the future of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. The continued occupation of Jerusalem and the West Bank and Gaza was particularly deleterious since it so angered the entire Arab world. Allowing these problems to fester, it could be argued, would eventually lead to another Arab-Israeli war.

Moreover, it is also conceivable that isolating Egypt from the rest of the Arab coalition encouraged Israel to adopt more aggressive policies. Perhaps, it could be argued, Israel wouldn't have expanded its West Bank settlements so much, bombed the Iraqi nuclear reactor, or invaded Lebanon if it had still feared that Egypt might again attack it. Similarly, perhaps Israel would have made more compromises about the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan if it had feared that a united Arab coalition would have again launched an attack in the face of its intransigence.

In summary, it is indisputable that the 1979 peace treaty did have shortcomings, some of which may have stemmed from the use of the partial approach. By involving only Israel and Egypt, it did not deal fully with the problems of

the West Bank, Gaza, Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. Indeed, the situation on the West Bank and Jerusalem became worse in so far as Israel expanded its settlements and annexed the Arab portion of Jerusalem. Thus, the partial and separate approaches had solved some but not all of the aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

On the other hand, the benefits of the treaty appear to outweigh its limitations. Israel probably would have continued to establish settlements on the West Bank and pursue an assertive policy towards the rest of the Arab world even if it had not reached a separate agreement with Egypt. Israel's military advantage was still so decisive that it could afford to defy even a united Arab coalition. Economic constraints or casualties caused by guerrilla attacks might slow the movement of Israelis into the West Bank, but the threat of another Arab attack would not.<sup>1</sup>

It is also probable that the United States and Egypt obtained as much as they could from the Begin government. Although the partial approach addressed the easier issues first, Washington did not always settle for the easiest possible agreements. In November 1973, for example, Kissinger persuaded Sadat not to settle for a return to the first cease-fire lines of October 22. The United States Secretary of State felt that getting the Israelis off the West Bank of the canal should be their goal, even though it would be a more difficult step. Similarly, President Carter

rejected Defense Minister Weizman's offer of the return of the Sinai air fields at Camp David unless the Sinai settlements were also removed.

Both Washington and Cairo bargained tenaciously in negotiating the 1979 treaty and probably could not have extracted any more compromises than they did. Israel was ready to return the Sinai, but not any of the West Bank -- at least not until a separate peace had been reached with Egypt. As previously mentioned in Chapter 5, even the relatively moderate Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin insisted in 1974 first on establishing peace with Egypt before considering serious negotiations about the West Bank. Thus, the partial approach, when used judiciously, aimed for the most difficult feasible accord at any given time.

It should also be noted that the door to future progress is not entirely closed. The 1979 peace treaty may still serve as a useful precedent for future agreements. Hussein and Arafat continue to show interest in a negotiated settlement, and a strong Labor government in Jerusalem might at some point make the kinds of compromises about the West Bank that eluded the United States at Camp David and in subsequent negotiations. An Israeli desire to gain access to the increasingly important markets of the Arab world would encourage such moderate tendencies. In short, the 1979 treaty may still prove to be a first rather than last step.

### Overview

Our examination of the U.S. role in the Arab-Israeli negotiations from 1967 to 1979 thus appears to confirm our initial hypothesis that the use of the partial approach on the strategic level and the separate approach towards the parties is a more workable way of reaching agreements than the comparative and joint approaches. The relative success of the partial and separate approaches may be attributed to the following factors: they tend to avoid mobilizing groups opposed to final goals, build trust and momentum by a series of agreements whose implementation can be tested over time, and encourage human contacts between the parties.

Our study, however, leads us to qualify our original hypothesis in that it indicates that on the tactical level a modified form of the comprehensive approach is more effective than the partial one. Once a cluster of issues has been isolated, a negotiator should deal with the hardest issues first and be frank about the kind of partial agreements envisioned. This tactic makes the parties less likely to abandon the negotiations over less important issues, imparts a certain dynamism to the negotiations, and allows any participating heads of state to budget their time more effectively.

Negotiators should be aware of the following drawbacks associated with the combined partial and separate approaches, however: the forces of the status quo may

congeal, short-term gains may be sought at the expense of longer term ones, misunderstandings may develop because final goals are not spelled out, mediators may have to pay excessive compensation, and those parties not dealt with initially may be permanently neglected.

Although the Arab-Israeli peace treaty of 1979 may have some of these flaws, we feel that its benefits outweigh its limitations. The goal of our study, however, has not been to evaluate the treaty, but to elucidate the process by which it was arrived at. For despite the particularities of the issues involved here and the unusual situation of a single country opposed by a coalition, the problems raised by the Arab-Israeli conflict pertain to other multilateral, multi-issue bargaining encounters. In such negotiations, negotiators must decide whether to segment issues or deal with them all together, whether to address the harder or easier issues first, and whether to make known final goals or not. They must also resolve similar questions with respect to parties. With this detailed examination of twelve years of negotiations concerning a major area of international tension, we have, therefore, analyzed some of the basic mechanisms of negotiating strategy, concentrating on the kinds of decisions that are most likely to produce significant agreements. A further testing of this hypothesis applied to other negotiating situations around the world would be useful for corroboration.

**APPENDIX I**  
**UN RESOLUTION 242**

Resolution No. 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967

STATING THE PRINCIPLES OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The Security Council,

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;


3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.

Adopted unanimously at the 1382nd meeting.


APPENDIX II

MAPS






*Israel and Its Neighbors before the October 1973 War*

Henry Kissinger, White House Years, p. 452, Boston: Little Brown, 1982




*The Sinai Front: Cease-Fire Line after the October War*







*Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement, January 18, 1974  
(see text of the Agreement, pages 1250-1251)*




*The Golan Front: Cease-Fire Line after the October War*



*Quneitra and Environs*



Syrian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement, May 31, 1974  
 (see text of the Agreement, pages 1253-1254)



Egyptian-Israeli Sinai Agreement, September 1975.

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