

INFORMATION TO USERS

This material was produced from a microfilm copy of the original document. While the most advanced technological means to photograph and reproduce this document have been used, the quality is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original submitted.

The following explanation of techniques is provided to help you understand markings or patterns which may appear on this reproduction.

- 1. The sign or "target" for pages apparently lacking from the document photographed is "Missing Page(s)". If it was possible to obtain the missing page(s) or section, they are spliced into the film along with adjacent pages. This may have necessitated cutting thru an image and duplicating adjacent pages to insure you complete continuity.**
- 2. When an image on the film is obliterated with a large round black mark, it is an indication that the photographer suspected that the copy may have moved during exposure and thus cause a blurred image. You will find a good image of the page in the adjacent frame.**
- 3. When a map, drawing or chart, etc., was part of the material being photographed the photographer followed a definite method in "sectioning" the material. It is customary to begin photoing at the upper left hand corner of a large sheet and to continue photoing from left to right in equal sections with a small overlap. If necessary, sectioning is continued again — beginning below the first row and continuing on until complete.**
- 4. The majority of users indicate that the textual content is of greatest value, however, a somewhat higher quality reproduction could be made from "photographs" if essential to the understanding of the dissertation. Silver prints of "photographs" may be ordered at additional charge by writing the Order Department, giving the catalog number, title, author and specific pages you wish reproduced.**
- 5. PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have indistinct print. Filmed as received.**

University Microfilms International

300 North Zeeb Road

Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 USA

St. John's Road, Tyler's Green

High Wycombe, Bucks, England HP10 8HR

7900771

BULMASH, KATHLEEN JONES
THE MARXIAN CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY.

CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, PH.D., 1978

University
Microfilms
International 300 N. ZEEB ROAD, ANN ARBOR, MI 48106

© 1978

KATHLEEN JONES BULMASH

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

THE MARXIAN CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY

by

KATHLEEN JONES BULMASH

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York.

1978

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty
in Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

May 25 1978
date

Martin Fleisher
Chairman of Examining Committee

May 26, 1978
date

Ivo Duchachek
Executive Officer

Michael Harrington
Michael Harrington

Marshall Berman
Marshall Berman

Rolf Meyerson
Rolf Meyerson

Young Kun Kim
Supervisory Committee

The City University of New York

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am deeply grateful to Professor Martin Fleisher for years of guidance, inspiration and friendship. His unique ability to keep me focused on the central issues made this dissertation a reality. To Professor Marshall Berman I am indebted for providing me with a model of clarity, perseverance, and commitment. To Professor David Spitz, many thanks are due for critizing my work from the beginning. To the faculty of Brooklyn College and the City University of New York Graduate School goes my appreciation; with a special thanks to Professor David Abbott whose support and encouragement convinced me to pursue graduate studies in the first place, and to Professor Abraham Bargman whose assistance and friendship made my conviction a reality.

I would like to thank my students throughout the years whose questions often enabled me to clarify my own point of view. The faculty of the Department of Political Science of the University of North Carolina at Wilmington deserve particular mention for their continual support this past year. I especially want to thank Professor James Dixon, Chariman, whose trust and understanding helped make a difficult task less onerous.

The typing of the entire manuscript is the result of the communal and truly herculean efforts of Mary Binkholder,

Donna Bennett, David H. Mayo, and Hal Mayo of Serendipity Office Services in Jacksonville, North Carolina. It would be impossible for me to thank them enough.

For my family's patience with my hectic and jumbled schedules I am most grateful. I thank my son, Jed, whose endless questions about when it would be all over helped me persevere. But there is one person without whom this whole effort would have quite literally never been undertaken. His love and encouragement throughout the years were invaluable supports. His passionate commitment to philosophy and to Marxism inspired my own, when seven years ago in a dreary New York apartment he first urged me to pursue critical theory. This thesis was born then, and developed and refined over miles and miles of conversation ever since. It is with the deepest affection that I dedicate this work to my husband, Michael.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iv
INTRODUCTION	1
I. AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY	18
Primitive Notions of Community	
Judeo-Christian Concepts	
Community in Medieval Political Thought	
Community in Modern Political Thought	
II. THE CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY IN MARX'S EARLIEST WORKS	93
Early Essays and Journalistic Writings	
Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: Civil	
Society and the State	
III. THE SOCIAL CHARACTER OF HUMAN LABOR AND HUMAN	
NEEDS IN RELATION TO MARX'S CONCEPT OF COMMUNITY	139
Development of Marx's Theory as Historical	
Critique	
The Idea of Totality and Marx's Theory of	
Community as an Historical Concept	
The Individual as Social Being: <u>Gattungswesen</u>	
and Productive Activity	
Alienation and Community	
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CRITIQUE OF CAPITALISM AND MARX'S	
IDEA OF COMMUNITY	241
The "Illusory Community" and the "Real Community":	
the Development of the Division of Labor and the	
Rupturing of Communal Ties	
The Necessary Contradictions of Capital	
The Crises of Capitalism, the Theory of Surplus	
Value and the Concept of Community: the	
<u>Grundrisse</u> and <u>Das Kapital</u>	
CONCLUSION	312
BIBLIOGRAPHY	325

INTRODUCTION

The central focus of political theory is on what Cicero called the "public thing." This follows from the generally recognized definition of the political arrangement as that which is "uniquely concerned with what is 'common' to the whole community."¹ Thus political theory can be understood as a mode of inquiry into the parameters of the community. Clearly the delineation of what is political, of what is common to the community as a whole is hardly universally agreed upon. In other words, that political philosophy is a mode of reflection on the community is incontestable, but what constitutes the "community," as well as the method of discovering its essence, is subject to dispute. The perennial task of clarifying the domain of the political, and of defining the community is described in the history of political philosophy. As Robert Nisbet puts it: "the history of Western social philosophy is, basically, the history of men's ideas and ideals of community."²

¹Sheldon Wolin, Politics and Vision, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1960), p. 2.

²Robert Nisbet, The Social Philosophers, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1973), P. 1.

The boundaries of political inquiry are in a sense pre-determined: philosophy is a mediate activity. That is, philosophy does not begin in a vacuum but in the midst of a social world "illuminated with meaning from within by the human beings who continuously create and bear it as the mode and condition of their self-realization."³ Through its concepts and categories philosophy attempts to establish the intelligibility of the social world. Nevertheless, the externality and comprehensibility of the social world, which is the presumption of all philosophy, is not a fact comparable to natural phenomena. It is a social product. Every culture develops an "elaborate symbolism" which includes the essentially non-reflective and relatively undifferentiated fund of everyday knowledge (mores, customs, roles, etc.), as well as the more highly developed and abstract body of specialized theoretical knowledge (myths, science in the narrow sense of the term, etc.,). It is through this symbolic matrix that activities, experiences, and events

³Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), P.27, emphasis added.

are "institutionalized."⁴ Thus the social world, which is the field of the political theorist, presents itself as already constituted and already meaningful. Theory imparts to it an added meaning--what Wolin calls the "vision" of philosophy.

The urgency of the philosopher's task of interpretively ordering social reality is felt particularly keenly in times of crisis, when society is "cut adrift from its moorings when man forgot the transcendent ties which bound him to it [society]"⁵. The inadequacy of existing norms (transcendent ties), which establish a "common world," to contain disintegrative tendencies, and the treatment of these norms as mere matters of artifice or convention are characteristic of the condition which John O'Neill has called the "loss of a common world."⁶ It was this condition which Hegel identified as the "source of the need for philosophy . . ."; a condition

⁴For a discussion of this conception of institutionalization see Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality, (New York: Anchor Books, 1967), pp. 47-91; also Wolin, op. cit., p. 6-7.

⁵Rudolf Bultmann, Primitive Christianity, (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1956), p. 109.

⁶See John O'Neill, "Public and Private Space" in Sociology as a Skin Trade, (London: Heinemann Educ. Books, 1972), especially, pp. 33-7.

no less acutely felt in the modern epoch than in the ancient. In fact, the recognition of it is the common thread of Western social thought:

The preoccupation with the search for community and the concern with anti-community are to be seen . . . in all ages of Western social philosophy. Ages can differ in the type of community sought and in degree of fear of the social void. But there is literally no age since social philosophy began in the West in the writings of the ancient Greek philosophers . . . when concern with community has not been present in social thought.

And it is this concern which makes the philosopher's task at once descriptive-interpretive and reconstructive.

As Hegel writes, "the particular form that a philosophy bears . . . springs on the one hand from the living originality of the spirit who in it has restored through himself the rent harmony and given form to it through his own deed . . ."⁸

The form-giving character of philosophy highlights the original connection between theory and practice, or between knowledge and practical life as expressed in Plato's

⁷ Nisbet, op. cit., p. 2

⁸ George Hegel, cited in Walter Kaufmann, "Hegel: A Reinterpretation", (New York: Anchor Books, 1966), p. 49, emphasis added.

alliance of philosophy and politics in the rulership of philosopher-kings. The philosopher, who comprehends the good through the insight of dialectical reason cannot remain apart from the world, content with a purely contemplative vision. Once having discerned the ends of life, the true nature of things, the philosopher must understand that this knowledge can make men good by re-creating an order, by re-establishing a life in common. Plato expresses this task of philosophy quite clearly in the Allegory of the Cave:

It is for us then, as founders of a commonwealth, to bring compulsion to bear on the noblest natures. They must be made to climb the ascent to the vision of Goodness . . . and when they have looked upon it long enough, they must not be allowed, as they⁹ now are, to remain in the heights.

The purpose of the law "in forming men of that spirit was not that each should be left to go his own way, but that they should be instrumental in binding the community into one."¹⁰

Plato's assumption throughout is twofold: that "the perfectly real is perfectly knowable"¹¹; i.e., that it is

⁹ Plato, The Republic, trans. Francis Cornford, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1945), p. 223, emphasis added.

¹⁰ *ibid.*, p. 234

¹¹ *ibid.*, p. 184.

possible to know the essences of things; and that the political realm is a manipulable one; i.e., that it is subject to human control. The purpose of knowledge, then, is to understand in order to control. It is thus that the political philosopher's task takes on a transcendent, projective quality, in addition to its descriptive-interpretive one. In contemporary terminology, political theory has a cognitive and normative function:

For most theorists, the imaginative reordering of political life that takes place in theorizing is not confined to helping us understand politics. Contrary to what Spinoza had argued most political thinkers have believed that precisely because political philosophy was "political," it was committed to lessening the gap between the possibilities grasped through political imagination and the actualities of political existence.¹²

In modern times the task of political philosophy as critique, as indeed it was originally conceived by the Greeks, has been eclipsed by what Horkheimer described as the tendency of reason "to dissolve its own objective content," and thus to become "more pliable to prevailing interests, more adaptable to reality as it is . . ."¹³

¹² Wolin, op. cit., p. 20.

¹³ Max Horkheimer, The Eclipse of Reason, (New York: Seabury Press, 1974), p. 12-13.

Despite this leveling tendency, there exists a widespread reaction to the rootlessness and dislocations of modern life reflected in the "quest for community." Whether we turn to the "youth movement," demands for community control, religious revivalism, or the revolt against bureaucracy, we find a common thread underpinning these disparate causes: an acute sense of lost social bonds--what Husserl called the "crisis of human subjectivity." As Nisbet remarks:

Not all the manufactured symbols of togetherness, the ever-ready programs of human relations, patio festivals in suburbia, and our quadrennial crusades for presidential candidates hide the fact that for millions of persons such institutions as state, political party, business, church, labor union and even family have become remote and increasingly difficult¹⁴ to give any part of one's self to.

Certainly the existence of an "eclipse of community" is well-documented in the literature. A wealth of evidence has been offered by contemporary sociological "community studies,"¹⁵ and critical theorists have repeatedly identified the growing privatization of

¹⁴Robert Nisbet, The Quest for Community, (New York: University Press, 1969), p. ix.

¹⁵See, for example, the literature cited in Colin Bell and Howard Newby, Community Studies, (New York: Praeger, 1973).

bourgeois life (Kulturkritik) as the central crisis of advanced capitalism. Modern literature is replete with examples of vivid portraits of the aloneness, anonymity, and isolation of modern man; and both existentialism and phenomenology represent reformulations of the relationship of thought to action in an attempt to rediscover the essence of human existence either in "absolute freedom," or "intentionality" respectively. But beyond these descriptions and partial analyses, an adequate synthesis of the problem of human subjectivity is lacking. The irony is this: at precisely the time when the need to crystallize this alienation is most acute, much of contemporary theory appears to have retreated under the banner of the "end of ideology"; and the balance has mistaken the symptoms for the disease. Consequently, social resources are being dissipated as more and more individuals retreat into one inner world or another (increased diagnoses of mental "illness" and their correlative "pop" psychologies--Rolfing, Esalen, Primal Therapy, etc.,--are merely two sides of the same coin); or seek to be absorbed by one outer world or another (discotheques and the singles culture, Khrisna consciousness, Sci-Fi and the cult of Star Trek, Sun M. Moon, neo-Nazis, etc.,). The result is that the wastefulness of modern economies in terms of pollution,

consumerism, profiteering, etc., is matched by the wastefulness of modern culture.

Liberals and critical theorists alike have emphasized the disparity between the rationalization of social systems, both capitalist and communist, and the irrationality of the uses to which this mobilized and centralized power is put. Typical of these accounts¹⁶ are the following remarks:

But the disruptions and dislocations we are most closely concerned with here, those which have made the quest for community and certainty so ominous an aspect of our age, come from the kinds of social disruption that have been the consequence of a system of power which has converted the historic plurality of allegiances and meaningful memberships into, increasingly, a kind of social monolith. In the process of conversion, old values and old symbols have had their social roots made desiccate.¹⁷

Domination, or coerced control of human behavior is the result of denying cultural sovereignty and liberty to people to interpret their own needs. In short, insofar as social theory is guided by an instrumental notion of reason, we are unable to understand the meaning of cultural reality and thereby indirectly destroy or impoverish it. Technocratic strategy, and its allied

¹⁶

I have chosen these as representative of current critiques of industrial society. Although the literature in this area is vast and complex, there are common threads that unite the "liberal" approaches with those of the "critical theorists," and even pull conservatives, who mourn the loss of individuality, into their ranks.

¹⁷

Nisbet, op. cit., p. 221.

social theory, seem to be active forces for the destruction¹⁸ of culture and the domination of man.

Nisbet's critique of the predominance of centralized political power and Shroyer's analysis of the hegemony of instrumental reason both focus on socio-cultural authoritarianism as the central obstacle to the development of more spontaneous, democratic forms of decision-making. Both argue that this despotism stems from the deterministic assumption that absolutized, centralized political power ("administrative control of the means of production") is the sufficient condition for liberation from domination.

Nevertheless, there are two weaknesses of these, and similar, analyses. The first is methodological: it is asserted that either politico-economic forms (administration in the broad sense) determine culture, or the two spheres are autonomous. The nature of this either/or proposition forecloses development of a dialectical method which provides for a more accurate analysis because it considers both possibilities as partial explanations. The second weakness is interpretive: a common but inaccurate, representation of Marx's social critique as being based

¹⁸Trent Shroyer, The Critique of Domination, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), p. 22.

on the equation of social emancipation and centralized administrative structures. These accounts unwarrantedly impute to Marx an indifference towards community or the "autonomy of culture."¹⁹ On the contrary, Marx's concern with community is central to an understanding of his critique of capitalism, as this dissertation will show.

The primary intent of this dissertation, then, is to reformulate Marx's critique of capitalism in light of the crisis of community which he identified. That Marx's "crisis of community" not only reveals the internal coherence of his thought, but underscores the utility of his approach to the understanding of contemporary capitalism and state socialism are the implications of this research. Such events as the popularity of the "new philosophy" in France, which represents a renewal of the identification of Marxism with the anti-libertarianism of the Gulag Archipelago,²⁰ as well as the rise of new-Nazism in Germany,

¹⁹As Nisbet argues: "Marx's view of the socially forward nature of history led him, as the determinist, to regard with hostility the traditional affiliations of family, community, association, and religion," (Nisbet, op. cit., p. 185). Or Shroyer, who claims that Marx "so totally polarized materialistic and idealistic forms of critique that he sometimes seems to have made culture an automatic by-product of material progress." (Shroyer, op. cit., p. 31)

²⁰See, for example, reports on "New Philosophy" , New York Times, July 31, 1977, 1:5.

Latin America and the U. S.²¹ lend a sense of urgency on the ideological front to the reconsideration of Marx in this light. Nor is there any dearth of evidence from researchers across the political spectrum that in the stages of advanced industrial society the "isolation of men from the community" about which Marx spoke is even more acute.

Because the intention of this dissertation is to provide a reformulation of Marxian theory from the vantage point of Marx's concept of community, an attempt will be made to consider the genesis and development of Marx's thought insofar as this illuminates his central concerns. It will be argued that the various emphases observed in the evolution of Marx's thought are interrelated expressions of a single theoretical program rather than several discrete programs. Similarly an attempt will be made to situate Marxism in the history of ideas only to the extent that this clarifies the uniqueness of Marx's conceptualization.

The hypothesis to be explored is that one can comprehend the coherence of Marx's work by focusing on the very crisis which he identified as seminal to the understanding of all social change: the crisis of the human

²¹On Germany, see editorial in Washington Post, Oct. 16 1977; on Latin America, see New York Times, Nov 20, 1977, 13:1; and on U. S., see "America's Move to the Right," Newsweek, Nov 7, 1977, pp. 34-44.

community.²² This is the meaning of Marx's emphasis on the productive potential of human activity. The potential of human labor in its social dimensions is the criterion by which Marx assesses capitalism. Instead of an understanding of capitalism as a "natural order," Marx reveals its social character, thus revealing the social foundation of the meaning of all human activities. He re-establishes the human community as the horizon²³

²²I am not using the term "community" here in the narrow socio-anthropological sense frequently represented in "community-studies" research. There, the word community is used basically in a descriptive fashion, in the sense that "all meaningful words stand as names designating objects, however loosely [object] may be construed." (Raymond Plant, Community and Ideology: An Essay In Applied Social Philosophy, (London: Routledge Kegan and Paul, 1974, p. 2). Nevertheless, as Plant stresses there is a strongly "evaluative meaning attached to the term community in terms of a variety of dimensions"--the wholeness of man; the transcendence of a segmented social life; participation in a public realm; universalism and transcendence (a common humanity); and freedom and community in a "mass society" (pp 15-36). Plant narrows his characterization of Marx's understanding of community to the stress Marx puts on cooperation and fraternity as opposed to conflict and competition. My understanding of Marx's term goes beyond such obvious points, as this thesis will reveal.

²³The term "horizon" is a technical term employed by Husserl to refer to the concrete world of everyday experience (Lebenswelt) out of which the questions of science emerge. It is thus the real background, the real limits of scientific inquiry. To say that Marx restored the "community" as the horizon is to argue, as he did, that all crises emerge from man's alienation from this community as his immediately human reality.

of all science, all philosophy. Further, it is Marx's concept of community which explains the significance of and connection between Marx's conception of the individual, his theory of alienation and the fully sensual, full-bodied conceptualization of productive activity (labor) as individuation. Consequently, Marx's concept of community provides a framework for re-appreciating the basis for and the extent of his objections to both the bourgeois model of possessive individualism as well as the submergence of the individual in the "community" of primitive communism. It also enables us to subject contemporary reformulations, such as those of cultural Marxism, semiology, and phenomenology to critical evaluation.

The methodological approach of this dissertation does not fit within the mainstream of conceptual approaches to political analysis. I am not concerned with the Marxian "concept" of community as one among many other concepts which Marx used to arrange his thoughts, nor as a specific exemplification of the perennial treatment of the idea of community within the genre of political philosophy. Consequently, the approach of this dissertation is basically historical and is to be distinguished from the conceptual approach of, for example, Robert Nisbet's

The Social Philosophers. In that work Nisbet sets himself the task of identifying the "classes of ideas" which underline various interpretations of community in the history of western philosophy. Thus, he argues, there are "crucial social and psychological elements . . . elements of thought, feeling and behavior" which distinguish one form of community from another.²⁴ This, he argues, avoids the pitfall of attempting to fit patterns of ideas to the "Procrustion bed of unilinear narrative." This last point is a fair criticism of those intellectual historians who take a radical "ideas-beget-ideas" approach to the evolution of philosophy, whose works amount to a narrative summation of unique atoms of thought, as seemingly unconnected in history as they are in conceptual focus. However, a similar criticism could be levied against a too rigidly conceptual method--namely, that it attempts to fit history to the Procrustean bed of conceptual purity. Nisbet himself recognizes this to the extent that he claims to allow due consideration to the "vital contexts" within which ideas of community develop. Nevertheless, even these "vital contexts" tend to be subsumed under his general category of "crisis"--

²⁴Robert Nisbet, The Social Philosophers, (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1974), p. 8, 16.

conflicting values, institutions, modes of community.²⁵ The results of such overgeneralizations are particularly fatal when considering the Marxian concept of community which, as will be shown, is very much related to the crisis of capitalism which he identified and which he argued could not be understood within the confines of classical philosophy, or even the modern philosophy of his era.²⁶ Marx's concept of community is sui generis, and in order to appreciate the methodological and epistemological implications of it one must explain the crucial texts in terms of the whole corpus of Marx's work, as well as in reference to the social and political conflicts of Marx's era which first provoked him to explore the dimensions of human self-estrangement.

²⁵ Ibid., pp. 8-9.

²⁶ Some recognition of all this is expressed by Raymond Plant in his interpretive work cited above. He writes, for example, "In consequence, to examine philosophically a set of concepts relating to a particular mode of human activity is not to examine a mere epiphenomenon of that activity, but rather to examine that activity itself from a particular point of view. To give an account of the meaning of a word is to describe the mode of social intercourse into which it enters." (p. 4) For another equally lucid description of the meaning of community see René König, The Community, (London: Routledge Kegan and Paul, 1968), who describes the community as "one of the basic forms of social life" with "a totality of its own."

Because the intention is to present a systematic exposition of the development of Marx's theory of community, I will primarily focus on original material in the chapters which deal directly with this issue.

CHAPTER I

The task of defining the community, which is the essence of political theory, becomes co-extensive with an inquiry into the "good life." As Aristotle put it, the pursuit of a life in common is concerned not only with living, but living well. All conceptualizations of community reveal this dual meaning (what I called earlier the descriptive-interpretive and reconstructive functions of theory).¹ Two authors of a modern reader on the subject put the matter succinctly:

[Community] refers both to the unit of society as it is and to the aspects of the unit that are valued if they exist, desired in their absence. Community is indivisible from human actions, purposes, values.²

The history of political philosophy's clarification of the idea of community is inexorably bound to this discussion of what the community is and what it should be. In the course of describing changing historical characterizations of the idea of community it will become apparent that this tension between "is" and "ought" is universally present, even in those philosophies which are admittedly conservative or purportedly

¹I have drawn on Habermas' categorization of the relation between knowledge and practical life. See, for example, Knowledge and Human Interests, (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1972.)

²David Minar and Scott Greer, edit., The Concept of Community, (Chicago: Aldine Pub. Co., 1969), p ix.

"judgement-free." In the former, the assumption is that the past ought to be continuously projected onto the future; in the latter it is that the need for critical exposition of alternative possibilities within the present is either unfelt, or, if felt, can only be the relativistic expression of those power constellations which support it.³ Since "there is no rational agency authorized to appraise and link them [ends and means] to an objective reality...Subjective reason conforms to anything"; the "ought" collapses into the "is".⁴ With this caution in mind it is to the history of the elaboration of the concept of community which we now turn. Space limitations require that this survey be selective. We will focus on those theories which, by contrast, enable us to have insight into Marx's understanding of the community.

It is often asserted that the search for community in Western thought was precipitated by the degeneration of the ancient kinship communities of Athens and is to be identified with the denial that human history is governed by the same laws as those of the natural world. This development is hardly comprehensible apart from an appreciation of the philosophical

³"... reason has become an instrument. In the formalistic aspect of subjective reason, stressed by positivism, its unrelatedness to objective content is emphasized; in its instrumental aspect, stressed by pragmatism, its surrender to heteronomous contents is emphasized. Reason has become completely harnessed to the social process." Max Horkheimer, The Eclipse of Reason, (New York: The Seabury Press, 1974), p. 21.

⁴Ibid, pp. 23, 25.

act ab origine which is its necessary antecedent: the attitude toward the world as something objectifiable "thus becoming nature in the strict sense of the word...."⁵ The objectifying attitude⁶ appears to be the accomplishment of the early Greek cosmologies of the sixth and fifth centuries B.C., whose significance rests with the development of a methodology which ultimately would be applied to political and social phenomena. In order to appreciate the radical significance of this development it is important to examine in some detail the distinction between myth and philosophy in terms of the contrasting attitudes towards objects and towards human subjectivity. It is only in light of mythical attitudes toward nature and the community that the endeavor of philosophy to "explain" the community can be fully understood:

Thus philosophical reflection was confronted from the very beginning with a world of meaning which was, genetically and structurally, "religious"... The experience of the sacred, by disclosing being, meaning and truth in an unknown, chaotic and fearful world, prepared the way for systematic thought.

Likewise, it is only by contrasting the nature of the community as expressed in myth with the nature of the community as

⁵Rudolf Bultmann, Primitive Christianity, trans. R. H. Fuller, (Cleveland: World Pub. Co., 1970), p. 103.

⁶Cf. Stephen Strasser, Phenomenology and the Human Sciences, (Duquesne: University Press, 1963), esp. pp. 88-97 on mythical apperception as an objectifying attitude.

⁷Mircea Eliade, preface to The Quest: History and Meaning in Religion, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969) p.2.

expressed in philosophy that the significance of Marx's methodology is revealed. This, of course, involves some commentary upon the subject-object relationship. While it is not the intention of this dissertation to resolve the subject-object dichotomy, or even to explore the history of it in detail, one cannot ignore its importance if only because an adequate elucidation of Marx's methodology would require a basic exploration of his attempting to come to terms with this dilemma in the course of his development of a theory of the human community.⁸ It is, for example, impossible to understand Marx's conception of Gattungswesen and its seminal role in the development of his thought apart from the subject-object dilemma with which this concept attempts to come to terms as expressed in the following excerpt from the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts: ". . . man is not lost in this object only when the object becomes for him a human object or objective man. This is possible only when the object becomes for him a social object, he himself for himself a social being, just as society becomes a being for him in this object."⁹

⁸At a later point in this dissertation, we will explore in detail the ontological and epistemological problem of the nature of objectivity as it is relevant to Marx's analysis. For the moment, a few remarks on the different modes of perception will have to suffice.

⁹Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, edit., Dirk Struik, (New York: International Publishers, 1964), p. 140.

Marx dealt with this concept of species-being at great length in the manuscripts in his consideration of the alienation of labor under capitalism. Man, Marx said, was an objective being, which meant that he found the objects of his needs "outside" him. But to say that objects of human need existed outside man did not imply to Marx anything like the concept of the externality of nature found in the attitude of natural science. Marx made it clear that man stood in active relation to his world in the most fundamental sense -- he transformed nature to make it appropriate to his needs. Even the world which was presented in sense perception, Marx was to argue in The German Ideology, was already transformed by human labor.

But to say that man was a objective being, necessarily involved a critique of Hegel's confusion of objectification with alienation. Only modes of objectification which adequately expressed man's essence as a species-being could be considered non-alienating; i.e., those activities which expressed man's mediated unity with nature as a social natural being. In Chapter III, we will analyze this concept of Gattungswesen in more detail.

The treatment of nature as something susceptible to rational investigation separates philosophical modes of thought from mythopoeic modes:

The fundamental difference between the attitudes of modern and ancient man as regards the surrounding world is this: for modern, scientific man the phenomenal world is primarily an "It"; for¹⁰ ancient -- and also for primitive--man it is a "Thou".

¹⁰ Henri Frankfort, et al., Before Philosophy, (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1949), p. 11.

It is the immediacy of perception, which characterizes a state of awe and a lack of detachment, that best describes the affective attitude of the primitive towards the world as "Thou":

Any phenomenon may at any time face him, not as "It", but as "Thou". In this confrontation "Thou" reveals its individuality, its qualities, its will. "Thou" is not contemplated with intellectual detachment; it is experienced as life confronting life, involving every faculty of man in a reciprocal relationship. Thoughts no less than acts and feelings are subordinated to this experience.¹¹

Moreover, the uniqueness (a relation between "I" and "Thou" is absolutely sui generis) and concreteness ("life confronting life") of each confrontation further distinguishes mythopoeic thought from philosophy. Unique events are not categorizable; nor are they ruled by universal laws. Myth anchors the primitive in his world and thus makes it meaningful. But myth is revealed truth, and consequently, the form of myth preserved the irreducibility and unpredictability of the universe, while at the same time rendering it apprehensible and "real". It is true that the mysteries of the universe recounted in primitive myths, the ritualistic participation in the rhythms of the cosmos, the naming of things, etc., all involve some degree of categorization and conceptualization. But the categories, concepts and rituals through which the primitive structures the world are expressive of an apparent unity of symbol and reality:

Though [mythopoeic] thought does not know dead matter and confronts a world animated from end

¹¹Ibid, p. 14

to end, it is unable to leave the scope of the concrete and renders its own concepts as realities existing per se.¹²

The meaning of the "concreteness" of myth for the primitive is seen quite clearly in the attitude of the primitive towards the "truth" of myths--myths are verified by the degree to which experiential reality conforms to them.¹³

It would be wrong to conclude from this, however, that primitive reality is radically "subjectivistic"; i.e., that the primitive does not understand the "nature" of objective reality. To assert this would be possible only if one adhered rigidly to the view that the nature of objectivity is "pure" externality, the understanding of which is only defined by disinterested cognition. Such a view is still held by psychologists, sociologists and anthropologists alike who reduce myth to a series of projections upon some reality-in-itself, and, as a result, foreclose the possibility of either appreciating the nature of myth as an alternative mode of knowledge, or the nature of philosophy as de-mystification. But projection is relative to a cultural-historical context, and the attempt to

¹²Ibid, p. 22.

¹³"Suppose that it is a well-known mythological theme: such and such a thing happened, men become mortal, seals lost their toes, a mark appeared on the moon, or something similar. To the primitive mind this theme can be clearly 'proved' by the fact that man is mortal, seals have no toes, the moon has got marks on it." Mircea Eleade, Patterns in Comparative Religion, (New York: World Publishing Co., 1963), p. 430.

understand one context always involves a translation from the point of view of another. Neither can claim absolute validity or truth.¹⁴

The contrast between philosophy and myth extends into what must be called the scope of mythical perception. For primitive man dreams are valid as perceptions. Appearance and reality merge--better, are undifferentiated--and since all modalities of existence have equal validity, and are not yet levelled down to a single thematic consciousness achieved by absorbing the primary relatedness of man and world, into "an analytic mode of reflection,"¹⁵ reality is truly lived in a "blaze". As Radin states, "Primitive man was interested only in validating consciousness in all its manifestations, the waking state, as well as dreams, phantasies, and mental aberrations."¹⁶ And yet the primitive recognizes the dream qua dream. "When one passed from the waking to the dream state, he passed from one reality to another."¹⁷

Thus primitive reality, the universe of the myth, is not a dream from which he does not awaken; it is not a gratuitous "subjective" construction comparable to the dream, or to be

¹⁴Cf, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "The Metaphysical in Man" in Sense and Non-Sense, (Penn: Northwestern University Press, 1964).

¹⁵For a further discussion of the nature of objectivity in primitive reality see Irving A. Hallowell, Culture and Experience, (New York: Schocken Books, 1967), esp. chapter 4.

¹⁶Paul Radin, The World of Primitive Man, (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1971), p. 233.

¹⁷Ibid, p. 233.

likened superficially to the constructions of the child or madman. Primitive experience opens upon and must account for the objective world, the daily world of hunting, food gathering, law, etc. The myth integrates a world in which elements stand in meaningful relationships to one another. Of course, it is true that primitive man does not have a concept of the "object,"

[b]ut it [mythical consciousness] is not borne away by each of its pulsations, otherwise it would not be conscious of anything at all. It does not stand back from its noemata, but on the other hand, if it passed away with each one of them, and if it did not tentatively suggest objectification, it would not crystalize itself in myths.¹⁸

Stanley Diamond has described primitive society as a "system in equilibrium, spinning kaleidoscopically on its axis..." The "axis" of this world is the kinship unit which forms the "personal nexus that joins man, society, and nature in an endless round of growth."¹⁹ The primitive, thus, lives a primary unity with the world - he lives in an "ecological community" in Nisbet's words - and consequently does not have a conception of himself as a "thing" among and outside of other things.²⁰ In Marx's terms, man is not yet fully conscious

¹⁸ Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, (London: Routledge, Kegan and Paul, 1962), p. 292.

¹⁹ Diamond, Introduction to Primitive Views of the World, edit., Stanley Diamond, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p. ix. For a full discussion of the primitive myths of the endless round of growth see Mircea Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return, trans., Willard Trask, (Princeton: University Press, 1971).

²⁰ The importance of this concept to Marx's theory of alienation will be explored in the later stages of this dissertation.

of himself as a "species-being" in a world that expressed "his own essential powers" and cannot, therefore, "contemplate himself in a world that he has created." Yet he does not lose himself to his world as does the child, the dreamer, or the madman to whom he is frequently compared. There exists a fundamental tension between subject and object which is either overlooked or explained away due to the theoretical presuppositions of natural science, thereby giving rise to dubious notions, such as the denial of the existence of a positing consciousness on the part of primitive mentality, which arises out of the subject-object dichotomy; or the equally dubious contrast between "concrete" and "abstract" modes of thought which, though understandable given the methodological presuppositions of dualism, is yet incomprehensible in light of primitive man's immersion in a world of meaning, his participation in and creation of a culture with its constituent myths, roles, rituals, obligations, laws, and other usages, all of which are congealed and extended by his primary ability to symbolize, to use language, etc.²¹

²¹Paul Radin argued similarly when he wrote: "How are we ever to trace properly the development of thought and more specifically, that of our fundamental philosophical notions if we begin with false premises: If it can be shown that the thinkers among primitive peoples envisage life in philosophical terms, that human experience and the world around them have become subjects for reflection. that these ponderings and searchings have become embodied in literature and ritual, then obviously our customary treatment of cultural history, not to mention that of philosophical speculation, must be completely revised. Paul Radin, Primitive Man as Philosopher, (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1927, p. 386

It could be argued, in fact, that it is the experience of estrangement from the primary relation to the world and to others which becomes the premise of all philosophy, and which explains the need for political philosophy in the first place:

It was not till the traditional view of the world and the customary rules of life had broken down, that the Greeks began to feel the needs which philosophies of nature and of conduct seek to satisfy.²²

The rationalist enterprise was not born out of wonder, as Aristotle, following Plato, had claimed, but out of need:²³ the need to restore harmony, to reintegrate man and nature, albeit on a different level. The nature of philosophy, then, is to be distinguished from myth not in terms of the objectivity of the former and the subjectivity of the latter,

²² John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, (Cleveland: The World Publishing Co., 1967), p. 1, Emphasis added.

²³ Hannah Arendt argues quite eloquently for the motive of aboriginal, admiring wonder as the source of thinking from the point of view of the Greeks, and contends that disharmony and disunity are the sources of Roman philosophy. In terms of the former, thinking is an affirmation of the invisible order of things manifest in the invisible; in terms of the latter, thinking is a preparation for action, a techne. Arendt complains that "textbook history of philosophy" has tended to smooth out such distinctions between the two outlooks. "Thinking...III," in New Yorker, December 5, 1972, pp. 151-161; p. 170. Eric Voegelin argues equally convincingly that philosophy is to be conceived as a science of order; and that while speculation may enable men to participate in an activity which is god-like, the purpose of philosophy is reconstitutive since it has its origins "in the resistance of the soul to its destruction by society." Eric Voegelin, Plato, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1966), p. 68. These contrary interpretations cannot be dealt with at great length at this point. Suffice it to say that it is Voegelin's interpretation (which is also Hegel's and Marx's) which will be upheld here.

but in terms of the attitude towards the object.²⁴ In mythical thought, the object has a "double aspect"²⁵: as a mundane manipulandum, subject to human control, and as visible evidence of the divine plan, i.e., as a sacred thing:

The man of the societies of which myth is a living thing lives in a world that though 'in cipher' and mysterious, is 'open'. The World speaks to man, and to understand its language he needs only to know the myths and decipher the symbols...the world is no longer an opaque mass of objects arbitrarily thrown together, it is a living cosmos, articulated and meaningful.²⁶

In philosophic thought, this quality of the sacredness of objects is gradually lost, or banished to a separate sphere, as in the modern connotation of the term fantasy. The "mysterious solidarity" of man and nature gives way to a nature demystified, secularized, and subject to technical control. The scientific view of the world²⁷ is characterized by a closed, self-contained universe of mathematical entities related to one another by exact laws, such as efficient causation. Both

²⁴In many ways, Marx's methodology is to be distinguished from both mythology and philosophy alike in terms of its "attitude towards the object": "...man's feelings, passions, etc., are not merely anthropological phenomena in the narrower sense, but truly ontological affirmations of essential being (of nature), and...are really affirmed because their object exists for them as an object of sense..." Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, op.cit., p. 165. The implications of this will be explored more fully below.

²⁵William Leiss, The Domination of Nature, (New York: George Brasiler Books, 1972), p. 34.

²⁶Mircea Eliade, Myths, Symbols, Rituals: An Eliade Reader, edit., Wendell Beane and William Doty (New York: Harper and Row, Pub., 1976), I,i. Also see Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1959), for a full discussion of meaning of "sacred".

²⁷For an elaborate consideration of the development of the "scientific" Weltanschauung see J. D. Bernal, History of Science (vol I-III).

spatial and temporal configurations and specific qualities become accessible to laws of causality and quantification, with the result that the realm of the "physicist" is taken to be the expression of the "true" condition of nature, and either encompasses or is indifferent to the world of human experience, which is relegated to the status of appearance or subjective phenomena, with a pejorative emphasis placed upon subjectivity.²⁸

In contrast to the closed world of the philosopher was the open world of the primitive in which the organic wholeness of nature, man and society was the horizon of pre-philosophical thought. To the primitive, the structure of the world and the structure of human society formed a sacred unity. Man and nature were united into "one solid fabric of moirai -- one comprehensive system of custom and taboo."²⁹ The tie which held the whole system together was the social group -- the human community:³⁰ "The group then, is the only authority that has

²⁸ Cf. Aron Gurwitsch, "The Last Work of Edmund Husserl", Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology, (Northwestern: University Press, 1966).

²⁹ Francis Cornford, From Religion to Philosophy, (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1957), p. 5.

³⁰ Admittedly, there is some controversy involved in applying the term "community" to primitive culture. The relevant social group to the primitive was the kinship group (tribe, sib, etc.) The concept of community as such refers to a later historical development in the evolution of human society. As Rene König has put it: "the community is one of the most important basic social structures in the sense of a global society, but it is neither the only one nor the earliest. Before it in order of development were a number of other structures of a preponderantly kinship character..." The Community, (London: Routledge, Kegan and Paul, 1968), p. 31. Nevertheless, to the

real existence."³¹ It was a referent so profound that an individual gained not only his material existence by membership in the group, but his psychic existence--his "status" -- as well. As Paul Radin puts it, "...until you have actually been legally and symbolically inducted into the clan or into the class to which you belong, you are a cipher."³² There was no such thing as natural rights, since "only the group has continuity." Because of this, it would be more accurate to say that the individual never possessed any rights but that they "possessed him."

The a priori existence of individuals was inconceivable to the primitive. Individual existence was a derivative of the community. For primitive man, then, the community was a sacred entity in a very real, concrete sense, viz., man existed qua man through the group. Robert Nisbet described a case in point: the attitude of the ancient Greek up to the 6th century B.C. towards the kinship community:

'Over the whole structure of Athenian kinship society... , towered the obsessive belief that only authority embedded in kinship is legitimate authority The only offenses that were deemed crimes [were] offenses against the entire community... One's sole lasting, forever-ineradicable identity came from his kinship line... Religion, property, law, education, economy, all the signal aspects of society were rooted in kinship.'³³

extent that community refers to that form of social organization which "represents a totality of life" (Ibid, p. 5), the kinship group was the community of primitive man. In any case, it is in this sense of a "totality" which the term is applied to primitive forms of association.

³¹ Radin, The World of Primitive Man, op.cit., p. 226.

³² Ibid, p. 263.

³³ Robert Nisbet, The Social Philosophers, op.cit, pp 29-30 .

Nevertheless, the orientation of the primitive towards the community was an orientation towards an eternal present (hic et nunc) threatening always to dissolve into primal time (illo tempore). In this sense it was transhistorical.³⁴ The celebrations and rituals which made the present comprehensible harkened back to a sacred time. The myths of an "eternal return", or a "return to paradise", present in all primitive cultures, represented such an orientation. Philosophy, of course, broke with this orientation by treating the community historically and naturalistically. This was reflected first in the attitude of the Sophists towards the Laws as mere conventions, subject therefore to human alteration; and, later, in the architectonic philosophy of Plato who, while attacking the Sophists and reaffirming the universality of a just order, nevertheless emphasized the role of the human actor in re-ordering the polis, as against the ritualistic reincarnation of a primitive age.

However, we would be presenting an incomplete picture of the evolution of Western attitudes towards the community if we excluded the concept of community expressed in the Old Testament. It is to these documents which we must next turn for an understanding of the politicization of time and the

³⁴See the discussion in Eliade, Myths, Symbols, Rituals..., op. cit., on "sacred time."

historicization of the community. With Bultmann we must agree that "the creation story in Genesis I is not just a piece of speculation, but the first chapter in history."³⁵

There have been various estimations of the contribution of Judaism to the development of Western civilization,³⁶ but among those which have emphasized the sociological significance of Judaism is Max Weber's Ancient Judaism. For Weber, the "world-historical importance of Jewish religious development rests above all in the creation of the Old Testament..." not only as a literary achievement but more importantly as "expressive of an ethos which represented a "turning point of the whole cultural development of the West and Middle East."³⁷

³⁵ Bultmann, op. cit., p. 21.

³⁶ Amongst the more outstanding examples are the following: Rudolf Bultmann, Primitive Christianity, op. cit.; Abraham Heschel, The Prophets, 2 volumes, (New York: Harper and Row, 1969, 1971); Erich Fromm, Ye Shall Be As Gods, A Radical Interpretation of the Old Testament and Its Tradition, (New York: Fawcett World, 1975).

³⁷ Max Weber, Ancient Judaism, (New York: Free Press, 1967), p. 5. To a certain extent it could be argued that Weber's interpretation of Judaism is decidedly "Protestantized." His emphasis on the transformation of the Jewish community into a religious association with increasingly eschatological hopes is based on an emphasis on one of the main strands of the Jewish tradition, the apocalyptic idea, which was continuously in opposition to the other main strand, the prophetic concept of the fulfillment of history, which Weber tends to ignore, or at least underplay. If it is assumed that Weber's intention, conscious or otherwise, is to lead to the unwritten conclusion that Christianity is the fulfillment of the Judaic messianic hope, then the emphasis is to be understood in this light. Leo Baeck, the noted Jewish historian and scholar, offers a more balanced view of the two traditions. He writes that "it is noteworthy that in the course of time the later attitude [the eschatological, apocalyptic] did not suppress or supplant the earlier one in the soul of the Jewish people. While the

The distinctive features of this turning point were the treatment of the world as an historical product--the locus of diving creation and human activity--and the consequent emphasis upon the demystified ethics of social conduct--upon the berith (covenant) and upon solidarity:

The world was conceived as neither eternal, nor unchangeable, but rather as having been created. Its present structures were a product of man's activities, above all those of the Jew's and of God's reaction to them. Hence the world was an historical product... The whole attitude toward life of ancient Jewry was determined by this conception of a future God-guided

apocalyptic orientation always gratified that impatience which wanted not to wait but to experience, as well as the desire for the miracle, the prophetic-messianic attitude derived its perennial power from the historical consciousness of the people, from its will to find the past again through the future." Judaism and Christianity, trans., Walter Kaufmann, (Cleveland: The World Publishing Co., 1961), pp. 31-2. Baeck thus allows for the emphasis on the supernaturalist tradition without arguing, as do both Weber and Bultmann (who may be subject to the same Christian prejudices), that the communal impulses are eclipsed. When Baeck turns his attention to Christianity, which he characterizes as a "romantic religion", the charges of particularistic narrowness which historically have been leveled against Judaism are now turned towards Christianity. The Church's self-proclaimed monopoly on salvation ("outside the Church there is no salvation") the ecclesiasticization of the community in the centuries after Christ; Luther's ambivalent attitude towards the "priest-hood of believers," are aspects of the evidence Baeck amasses to support his indictments. Clearly the history of religion is a complicated field; and while I have relied heavily on the interpretation of Bultmann and Weber, they should by no means be taken as "gospel". This, however, does not altogether invalidate their insights, for clearly the tendency towards what Marx called "Jewish narrowness" is to be found in Christianity as well as Judaism; and neither religion could completely supersede this unless "material reality" were fundamentally transformed. In order for religion to be realized, the development of the human spirit which it expresses must assume a secular form, Marx wrote.

political and social revolution...There existed in addition a highly rational religious ethic of social conduct; it was free of magic and³⁸ all forms of irrational quest for salvation...

The presence of history and the absence of magical ritual underline the ancient Judaic attitude towards the community.

Weber argues that the development of all the essential traits of Judaism can be understood sociologically in terms of the Jews' status as a "pariah community," i.e., a culturally unassimilated guest people in a foreign state.³⁹ This status was reflected particularly in the peculiar relationship of the Jews with God (the covenant, or berith) and in the consequent elaboration of an "all-pervasive ethical dualism" (insider-outsider ethics),⁴⁰ which nevertheless contained within it an element of universalism.⁴¹ It was the circumscribed nature of this latter element which led Marx to speak of the "Jewish narrowness of society" as a chimerical universality which depended for its existence on the maintenance of a degree of estrangement, of separation, of opposition:

But the Jew, too, can behave toward the state only in a Jewish way, that is by treating it as something alien to him, by counterposing his imaginary nationality to the real nationality, by counterposing his illusory

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹Ibid., p. 3

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 343.

⁴¹See for example the discussion in Erich Fromm, Ye Shall Be As Gods, op. cit., pp. 82-85.

law to the real law, by deeming himself justified in separating himself from mankind, by abstaining on principle from taking part in the historical movement, by putting his trust in a future which has nothing in common with the future of mankind in general, and by seeing himself as a member of the Jewish people, and the Jewish people as the chosen people.⁴²

It would be instructive to explore in some detail the development of the Ancient Judaic community from an essentially nomadic, occasionally confederated, group of Semitic tribes, with their respective tribal deities and war-gods, through the period of the pacifistic Patriarchs and the subsequent Exile, to the ultimate development, much influenced by the Prophets, of the Israelite community as a ritualistically segregated confessional association, bound together by common observance of the law. Nevertheless, our remarks will have to remain limited in scope. We will focus specifically on the fact that this internal transformation of the Judaic community expressed the fact the the berith came to be seen as that which bound the community into not only a political-legal organization but, more importantly, a religious association with utopic eschatological hopes for a "future kingdom of peace."⁴³ The changed nature of the community--how and why it was constituted--is reflected most obviously in the evolution of a highly elaborated and unified system of ethics with increasing stress on positive moral exhortations in place of magic and sacrificial ritual.⁴⁴

⁴²Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1974), III, p. 147.

⁴³Weber, op. cit., p. 327.

⁴⁴Ibid, pp. 235-263; 297-321.

This is what differentiated the Israelite community from others in Antiquity and allowed the "continued existence of the Yahwistic community after the destruction of Jerusalem":

In Antiquity every political alliance, in fact almost every private contract, was normally confirmed by an oath, i.e., the curse of self...the peculiarity of Israelite history consists in the first place in the extensive employment of the religious berith as the actual (or construed) basis of the most varied legal and moral relations. Above all, Israel itself as a political community was conceived as an oathbound confederation.⁴⁵

One can trace in the history of ancient Israel the increasing emphasis on the covenant as the very basis for the existence of the community as such. Initially, the position of Yahweh is not unlike that of any other tribal deity; he was regarded as the God of the Israelite Confederacy, who preserved the social order and guaranteed its prosperity. The idea of a contract was not unknown in the Israel of Antiquity; rather, it had always served as the principle of internal social order and inter-cultural relationships. But with the changing political fortunes and the development of the "pure" Yahweh cult, the relationship of the community itself to its god altered fundamentally. With this the idea of the original b'rithot (covenants) was interpreted with renewed emphasis as a "confederate covenant with God Himself."⁴⁶ The responsibilities attendant upon the conclusion of such a

⁴⁵Ibid., pp.75,334.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 78, emphasis added.

covenant were of a special nature: they were communal obligations owed to God himself as one of the contracting parties. Because Yahweh was considered a contractual partner, he was viewed neither as a merely functional deity, nor a local, tribal god. "Rather, the human community of the Israelite confederate army had to be considered his people, joined to him through common covenant."⁴⁷ Yahweh became the source of the law and the social organization of the community itself: the berith established the positive law for Israel and consequently made it subject to change by God's own free resolve.

The particularly strong, positive, ethical orientation of the law was the result of the combination of the power of divine election, which made Israel "perpetually dependent on the grace of God,"⁴⁸ and the ancient norm of the "joint religious liability of confederate members for the offenses of each individual."⁴⁹ This meant a very early devaluation of magic and sacrifice and the substitution of a strict code (the Decalogues) which stipulated the communal responsibilities of the individual, the fulfillment of which was necessary to secure the continued election of the nation as a whole. We find even in the pre-Exilic Prophets strong admonitions against

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 131.

⁴⁸ Bultmann, op. cit., p. 38.

⁴⁹ Weber, op. cit., p. 137

the continued drift away from strict ethical conduct;⁵⁰ and most prophetic visions of doom are tied to "social ethical motivations of godly punishment"⁵¹ as opposed to the more primitive conception of divine wrath wrought for ritualistic impurities. When the post-Exilic leaders of the community sought an explanation for God's judgement on the Jews they found their answer in the violation of standards of belief, conduct and worship which alone marked the Jews as God's Chosen People. Consequently, the separatism and exclusiveness of a Jewish mode of life was emphasized with renewed vigor and written into the increasingly dualistic code of ethics which governed intra- and inter-cultural relations.

The imperatives of brotherliness predominated the teachings of the prophets and it is through them that the conception of Israel as a confessional association⁵²--which reached its apogee during the period of Exile--developed.⁵³ Moreover,

⁵⁰As in Micah 6,6-8: "How shall I enter the Eternal's presence and bow before the God of Heaven? Shall I come to him with sacrifices, and yearling calves to offer?...O man he has told you what is good; what does the Eternal ask from you but to be just and kind and live in quiet fellowship with your Gods."

⁵¹Weber, op. cit., p. 303.

⁵²"Confessional Association" is Weber's term for the transformation of the Israelite community into one which recognized all ritually pure adherents of Yahweh, whether Israelites or new converts, as confessionally of equal value. See Weber, op. cit., Chapter XIII for discussion.

⁵³Weber, op. cit., pp. 336-343.

the prophets fought a puritanical battle against the introduction of other deities in competition with Yahweh and asserted the cultic hegemony of Yahwism.⁵⁴ Succeeding the prophets, the Scribes and Priests carried out the tasks of defining and ritually sanctifying Jewish exclusivity. Quite ironically, these tendencies toward the universalization and centralization of the religious association increasingly separated the community from its historical and human roots. The universalization of Judaism became increasingly eschatological. The more the prophets emphasized the community's dependence--through berith solidarity--on the individual's actions, and the unlikelihood of his obedience in the course of empirical history, the more Israel was bound to her past history (the history of God's promises) and cut off from the real:

History was...brought to a standstill. The nation lived outside history...The national leaders were not men of political or social action, but teachers who expounded the scriptures...Israel (apart from Hellenistic Judaism) cut herself off from the outside world and lived in extraordinary isolation. As a result she cut herself adrift from history. The redemption she hoped for in the future was not a real historical event, but a fantastic affair in which all history had been brought to an end for good and all.⁵⁵

Likewise, with regard to centralization, the attempt to promote justice and a unified system of ethics (the Deuteronomic code) not only sharpened the segregation of the community from outsiders, but was developed at the expense of local community

⁵⁴Cf. Bultmann, op. cit., p. 42-45; Weber, op. cit., Chapter VII.

⁵⁵Bultmann, op. cit., pp. 60-61

differences, which meant the alienation of the "common people" from a religion which became increasingly unintelligible in their own terms.⁵⁶ Ultimately, it meant the collapse of moral precepts into legalistic ones:

The Law inculcated not only morality, but ritualism. Ritual became the more important of the two, with the result that men lost sight of their social and cultural responsibilities...The Law failed to claim the allegiance of the whole man.⁵⁷

Thus, the more the community became a religious association of confessional zealots, the less it was able to fulfill its universalistic (and hence, communal) impulses. Therefore, Marx would write that as soon as religion was banished from the public sphere, i.e., was politically emancipated, and became an attribute of individuals, it became secularized--yet another expression of the conflict between the general interest and private interest:

Religion is no longer the spirit of the state, in which man behaves--although in a limited way, in a particular form, and in a particular sphere--as a species-being, in a community with other men. Religion

⁵⁶"The common people, finding it hard to attain to so high and intellectual a faith, relapsed disastrously into the emotionally more satisfying rites outlawed now by the law as well as by the prophets." John B. Noss, Man's Religions, (3rd edit., New York: The MacMillan Co., 1963), p. 529. This tendency emerges again in the Hellenistic period as evidenced by the activities of the Hasidim from whose ranks sprang the powerful Pharisees to challenge the rule of the theocratically conservative aristocrats--the Sadducees. In its extreme form, the attempt to secure cultic purity is represented by the Essene movement's withdrawal to Qumram to live in strict discipline and isolation while awaiting the fulfillment of God's promise. On the Essene community see Howard Kee et al., Understanding the New Testament, (2nd edit., Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965) pp. 41-51.

⁵⁷Bultmann, op. cit., pp. 62, 68.

has become the spirit of civil society, of the sphere of egoism, of bellum omnium contra omnes. It is no longer the essence of community, but the essence of difference. It has become the expression of man's separation from his community, from himself and from other men--as it was originally. It is only the abstract avowal of specific perversity, private whimsy, and arbitrariness.⁵⁸

In another context, Stanley Diamond argues that the transmutation of customary forms of order into legal sanctions, along with the shift from status to contract and from the kinship to the territorial principle, are "symptomatic of the emergence of the state," and calls the "state," following Engels, "the alienated form of society."⁵⁹ In other words, Diamond says, this passage from the customary to the legal order is characteristic of a transitional period in the evolution from the primitive kinship-based communities to the class-structured polity.⁶⁰ The "etatist" tendencies of the post-Exilic Jewish community in terms of the development of legalism and the emphasis on individual contract with Yahweh have already been noted. Weber completes the picture with his observation that "almost at the moment when Israel lost its concrete territorial basis the ideal value of the political territory was definitely and ritually fixated . . ."⁶¹

⁵⁸Marx, op. cit., p. 155.

⁵⁹Stanley Diamond, "The Rule of Law vs The Order of Custom" in Robert Paul Wolff, edit., The Rule of Law, (New York: Simon and Shcuster, 1971), pp. 120-1, 137..

⁶⁰Ibid., p. 120.

⁶¹Weber, op. cit., p. 338, emphasis added.

When the natural ties of association have been ruptured, the individual is left alone with only the defenses of procedural rights and allegiance to ritual. Bultmann interprets the increasing privatization of Jewish ethical commands as the absence of what he calls "a sense of radical obedience"--the result of the development of "an area . . . of considerable scope within which egoistic impulses and passions could play themselves out." Although, in theory, the Law was meant to regulate daily life down to the most minute detail, in practice it could not possibly be so comprehensive:

What was required was specific actions, or specific abstentions from actions. Once these had been got through, a man was free to do what he liked . . . So long as there are occasions in life which are directly or indirectly free from God's claim, there cannot be radical obedience. For in radical obedience a man knows himself to be claimed by God in his entirety and in every conceivable contingency.⁶²

Although the Pharasaic tradition of halakoth--rules of conduct--did much to develop a sense of the unity of life of the individual in the Jewish community,⁶³ it was against the residual formalism of Jewish solidarity and the segregation of the community from the ritually impure, that Jesus protested.⁶⁴ Against the compartmentalization of life, Jesus

⁶²Bultmann, op. cit., p. 69.

⁶³Kee et al., op. cit., pp. 38-41.

⁶⁴"Woe unto you scribes and pharisees, hypocrites! for ye pay tithe of mint, anise and cummin, and have omitted the weightier matters of the law, judgment, mercy, and faith. Ye blind guides which strain at a gnat, and swallow a camel." Matthew 23, 23f., cf. Bultmann, op. cit., pp. 63-73.

asserted the demand for radical obedience: God's claim on the whole man. Against the restriction of love and ethical duties to one's neighbor, Jesus stressed the universal brotherhood of man, extending even to one's enemies. Nevertheless, Jesus' concerns were ultimately with the regulation of man's personal relation to God, as opposed to principles of social order. His "commandment of love . . . is addressed in the first place to the individual"⁶⁵ and although Jesus' stress on self-abnegation in the encounter with one's neighbor has obvious social implications, the community of which he speaks remains transcendent and ahistorical:

. . . the perfect world he proclaimed was not so much a completion of human effort in this world as an epilogue, a supernatural kingdom that required the end of the natural world.⁶⁶

The other-worldliness of Jesus ethics--typified in the Sermon on the Mount--can be accounted for by a number of possible explanations.⁶⁷ Nevertheless, the evolution of the Christian community from the early Roman beginnings through the modern era, and its stress on what Marx would call an abstract universalism is a fact of some political significance, as Muller implies:

Jesus' failure to protest against slavery is typical of his failure to draw out the social implications of his call for universal brotherhood and

⁶⁵Bultmann, op. cit., p. 75.

⁶⁶Herbert Muller, The Uses of the Past, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 152.

⁶⁷See for example Muller's discussion, Ibid., pp. 151-153.

his scorn of the wealthy . . . The historic Church tolerated slavery and serfdom, supported the divine right of kings to govern wrongly, and generally opposed the popular movements toward equality, fraternity, and liberty.⁶⁸

We will return to the development of this idea of the transcendental community after a consideration of the predominant ideas of the Greco-Roman world.

As we move from myth to speculation, we are not so much in the company of a different object but, as already indicated, a different attitude towards the object. The early Ionian scientists expressed a secular vision which carried even further the development of an alternative view of the world which had already been represented in the epic poetry of Homer. While for the primitive the gods were substantially "other," with Homer "the gods [had] become frankly human, and everything primitive [was] kept out of sight."⁶⁹ Philosophy moves, in a sense, within and against the "primitive" tradition. The concepts with which the Ionians constructed their theories were borrowed from an earlier, dying tradition which they attempted to transcend, but which nevertheless exerted a limiting influence on them. Hannah Arendt draws attention to this fact by explaining that philosophy replaced the Olympian gods, who had become increasingly discredited, with a new god-being "and this new god's newest characteristic was that he was One. That this One was indeed a god, and thus decisively

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 154.

⁶⁹Burnett, op. cit., p. 4.

different from what we understand by 'being,' becomes obvious when we see that Aristotle called his 'First Philosophy' a 'Theology,' by which he did not mean a theory about the gods but what much later . . . was called ontologia, or ontology."⁷⁰ Similarly, Cornford argues that while the acknowledged historical achievement of philosophy was the recreation of nature as an object for rational speculation, the rupture which philosophy thereby made with religion was incomplete. When philosophy turned to describe the external world it had rediscovered it approached its datum through the conceptual filters of the earlier mythic tradition, although it imbued these with new meanings:

Philosophy, when she puts aside the finished products of religion and returns to the "nature of things" really goes back to that original representation out of which mythology itself gathered shape. If we now call it "metaphysical" instead of "supernatural," the thing has not essentially changed its character. What has changed is, rather, man's attitude towards it, which, from being active and emotional, has become intellectual and speculative.⁷¹

⁷⁰Hannah Arendt, op. cit., p. 140.

⁷¹Cornford, From Religion to Philosophy, op. cit., p. ix. There is much controversy surrounding this interpretation of the social origin of philosophy. Cornford was particularly influenced by the methods of analysis of Durkheim and Levy-Bruhl as evidenced by his argument that the "key to religious representation lies in the social structure of the community which elaborates it." (p. viii.) Consequently, his emphasis on the affinity between religion and philosophy is based on a consideration of the common social structure from which they both sprang. Burnet, on the other hand, argues for a radical break between philosophy and theology. The secular character of philosophy is to be explained by reference to the traditionless origin of the rational attitude. "We have seen that there had been a complete break with the early Aegean religion, and that the Olympic polytheism never had a firm hold on the Ionian mind. It is, therefore, quite wrong to look for the origins

The unique contribution of these early cosmologies was the repositioning of man in the world upon which they were premised. Man, it was true, remained a part of nature. But the fact that this nature--physis--was comprehensible to the human intellect meant that the part that man played within the cosmos was unique. He was, in the words of the tragedians, lord over nature. (Significantly enough, as Arendt points out, the Greek word for contemplating--theorein--is etymologically derived from *theos*). Philosophy enabled "mortal men to dwell in the neighborhood of immortal things,"⁷² because the faculty it developed--nous, or mind--made it possible for men to perceive the invisible order of things manifest in

of Ionian science in mythological ideas of any kind. . . . Ionia proper was a country without a past. That explains the secular character of the earliest Ionian philosophy." (Burnet, op. cit., p. 14.) Nevertheless, to maintain that philosophy demythologized the world but continued to adhere to the view that the world had a sacred, moral character, is only an apparent contradiction. When the Milesians spoke of the divinity of essences, as with Thales who says the universe "has soul in it," they banished the gods by materializing them. To this extent, the early philosophers were not dogmatically rooted to religious expressions. Burnet and Cornford would agree that the "god" of the Ionians was non-religious. Nevertheless, there is an important sense in which these early philosophers still move within the realm of the sacred--by ascribing to the universe a moral order (Dike). To fail to grasp the significance of this "inherited scheme of conception," is to ultimately miss the significance Plato's conception of justice as the balanced order of things. The significance of philosophy was its changed attitude: the rational attitude transformed matters of faith into matters of theory, and in this sense moved within and beyond the mytho-poetic "representation."

⁷² Arendt, op. cit., p. 135.

the midst of the appearance of chaos. As Bultmann puts it:

The individual human being is no longer exposed to the mysterious and uncanny force of his natural environment or to the equally mysterious and uncanny impulses in his own breast. The world now becomes a place where he can feel at home, which he can understand, and, within limits, control.⁷³

Despite the variety of these early philosophies, we find a unity of purpose: the search for the underlying principle of nature, for the primary substance of things (only later to be called "matter"), for unity in the midst of diversity. The "justice" of this order in nature is described as the balance of opposites, but it remains, at this point, a matter of indifference to human affairs. When, however, the object of focus shifts from natural occurrences to social and political concerns, there is a corresponding shift in the perspective of the viewer. Wolin calls this the development of a "strongly anthropomorphic attitude." Whereas in the confrontation with nature man might remain "at once resigned and curious," a spectator as it were, in the confrontation with politics "man could be the architect of order."⁷⁴ With Plato, the possibility of reconstructing the polis according to discernable immutable principles becomes an imperative.

Nisbet observes, correctly I think, that, beginning with Plato and continuing down through our own age, the political

⁷³Bultmann, op. cit., p. 103

⁷⁴Wolin, op. cit., pp. 30-32.

community is very probably the "single most powerful form of Western community." He accounts for the emergence of the state in terms of the immense social and political revolution precipitated by the Cleisthenean reforms of the late 6th Century B.C. which dissolved the ancient tribal affiliations and replaced them with the purely territorial polity.⁷⁵ Stanley Diamond concurs in this in his study of the emergence of proto-states and the consequent substitution of the rule of law for the order of custom.⁷⁶ These points are significant not only in terms of providing us with the historical context within which the polity emerged, but because they provide us with an obvious standard with which to measure the distinctiveness of the political association as it was originally constructed in theory. As Diamond stresses in another paper, Plato's "luminous monolith"--The Republic--is to be understood first and foremost in terms of "the opposition to the primitive which lies at the root of Plato's Utopia . . ."⁷⁷ Nevertheless, as we shall see, Plato's vision of the political community is limited by two factors: the domination of a "corporate view" of the community, i.e.,

⁷⁵Nisbet, op. cit., p. 28-35; p. 101-103.

⁷⁶Diamond, op. cit.

⁷⁷Stanley Diamond, "Plato and the Definition of the Primitive," in Diamond, edit., Primitive Views of the World, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), p. 170.

the reduction of the community to a functionally integrated system; and an ahistorical conception of the political--what Wolin calls Plato's attempt to "rid the community of politics."⁷⁸

Plato stood firmly opposed to the view of the Sophists that the polis and its laws were matters of mere convention. Instead, he explained the origin of the state--the political community--in terms of man's nature: "a state comes into existence because no individual is self-sufficing; we all have many needs."⁷⁹ Man lives in the polis because he cannot exist otherwise. Even in periods of the most pronounced social crisis when the sense of a life in common is reduced to the commonly perceived need to restrain the drives of individuals, the resultant order of conformity--albeit "artificial"--is nonetheless a response to social standards of conduct. In such cases, Plato tells us in the myth of Gyges ring, the influence of the public is so profound that deception is transformed into a virtue: it is better to seem than to be. In fact, to resist the social definition of reality, to hold steadfastly to a truly virtuous life, instead of the "reputation" for virtue, is ultimately fatal for the individual. When "the power of society is on the side of appearance . . . the pursuit of 'reality' is unprofitable to the point of being deadly."⁸⁰

⁷⁸Wolin, op. cit., p. 42

⁷⁹Plato, The Republic, op. cit., p. 55.

⁸⁰Eric Voegelin, Plato, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1966), p. 79.

Plato's point here is ironic: man cannot exist outside the community; yet in those situations where the order that prevails is merely formal, a matter of contrivance, to exist is an essential compromise in the sense that the individual must be at odds with himself. He chooses a life of dishonesty and pretense, all of which testifies to a fundamental split in the psyche of the individual:

What reason, then, remains for preferring justice to the extreme of injustice, when common belief and the best authorities promise us the fulfillment of our desires in this life and the next, if only we conceal our ill-doing under a veneer of decent behavior?⁸¹

Conformity promises fulfillment, but at the expense of identity: the individual must pretend to be what he is not. Others see those who condemn iniquities as speaking only out of their own weakness.⁸²

Plato's Republic must be understood, then, as an attempt to transcend those social conditions under which the individual is forced to undertake, in Marx's phrase "an essential schism within himself." Justice is ultimately defined as a state of "well-tempered harmony" within which the individual, being at one with himself, is in tune with society as a whole:

. . . justice means that a man should possess and concern himself with what properly belong to him. . . when each order--tradesman, auxiliary, guardian--keeps to its own proper business in the commonwealth and does its own work, that is justice, and what makes a just society.⁸³

⁸¹Plato, op. cit., p. 51, emphasis added.

⁸²Ibid.

⁸³Ibid., pp. 128-9.

Only under such conditions, Plato argues, could an individual's existence be authentic, i.e., compatible with his social nature (essence). The question is whether or not Plato's ordered community resolved the contradictions he described; and if so, at what expense.

Given that Plato's intention is to resolve the contradictions between the individual and society, we must analyze his description of the harmonious community in order to judge the success of his venture. The systematic coordination which Plato ascribes to the State is presumed to be inherent in nature, i.e., organic. The functional division of labor which is the fundamental social principle out of which the state is constructed is presented by Plato as an autonomous principle which alone can insure that the community "grows into a well-ordered whole. . ."⁸⁴ The community grows out of the natural interdependence of each individual upon all others: ". . . no two people are born exacting alike. There are innate differences which fit them for different occupations."⁸⁵ Hence, the three-tiered structure of society--rulers, auxiliaries and producers--each performing the one function for which it is best suited, without interfering with the others.

Securing the foundations of this community appears to be a relatively simple matter. It results from setting every

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 111.

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 56.

man "free from all other occupations to do, at the right time, the one thing for which he is naturally fitted."⁸⁶ But at a later point Plato observes that this is simply the external manifestation of the ultimate source of unity: the internal harmony of the "inward self," the individual's being at one with himself. The task of constructing the community becomes the task of guaranteeing the order of the soul. The natural stratification of the community is a reflection of the natural stratification of the elements of the soul--rational, spirited and appetitive--whose proper coordination alone can ensure that the "whole of life" not be turned upside down. In Plato's phrase, "the better part rules the worse:"

And it will be the business of reason to rule with wisdom and forethought on behalf of the entire soul, while the spirited element ought to act as its subordinate and ally. The two will be brought into accord . . . by that combination of mental and bodily training which will tune up one string of the instrument and relax the other . . . when both have been nurtured and trained to know their own true functions, they must be set in command over the appetites. . .⁸⁷

Thus, for Plato, proper education and nurturing would ensure the solidarity of the community by eliminating the source of all social discord--psychic disorder. Given that all of the classes share the virtue of temperance--". . . unanimity or harmonious agreement between the naturally superior and

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 57.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 140, emphasis added.

inferior elements on the question which of the two should govern, whether in the state or in the individual "⁸⁸ --the "consonance" which this produces throughout the "whole gamut of the state" is identical with a pervasive political quiescence. As Wolin puts it, in Plato "the task of philosophy and of ruling was to rid the community of politics."⁸⁹

While Plato's goal is to forge the organic community, his Republic remains a mechanical entity in the pluperfect sense. It is a community of functionally integrated parts whose human "elements" derive no innate satisfaction from their particular activities as such, but, at best, a kind of vicarious benefit from their share in the life of the whole:

"We shall say that, though it would not be surprising if even those people were perfectly happy under such conditions, our aim in founding the commonwealth was not to make any one class specifically happy, but to secure the greatest possible happiness for the community as a whole. . . [If] our critic aims rather at producing a happiness like that of a party of peasants feasting at a fair, what he has in mind is something other than a civic community. . . As the community grows into a well-ordered whole, the several classes may be allowed such measure of happiness as their nature will compass."⁹⁰

The irony is this: while Plato struggled against those conditions which forced the individual to lead a double life and ultimately deny his "true" self, his attempt to forge unity out of this discord is successful only to the extent that the individual is annihilated altogether. The individual's

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 126.

⁸⁹ Wolin. op. cit., p. 42.

⁹⁰ Ibid., pp. 110-111, emphasis added.

interests and those of the community are identical only to the extent that the individual's identity qua individual is totally subordinated to the performance of his allotted social function. The individual becomes a cipher whose class position fully determines the parameters of his existence. He exists--and then only one-sidedly--to the extent that he is completely submerged.

While Plato claimed that the state was grounded in man's natural sociality, this sociality is not conceived, as in Marx, as expressive of the individual's capacity, but of his paucity. The definition of man's sociality in these terms corresponds to what Marx called in The German Ideology, "mere herd-consciousness," or the individual's recognition of "the necessity of associating with the individuals around him. . ."⁹¹ The necessity of associating with others which Plato makes the principle of his community, is nothing other than the pre-ordained division of labor of everyone performing the "one function in the community for which his nature best suited him."⁹² Plato implies that this division of labor emerges quite spontaneously out of the natural division of talents amongst the various individuals. In fact, the whole of the Republic is an attempt, in one way or another, to eternalize the resultant power relationships, thus collapsing distinctions

⁹¹Karl Marx, The German Ideology, editor, C. J. Arthur, (New York: International Publishers, 1973), p. 53.

⁹²Plato, op. cit., p. 127.

between duty and will. As Wolin explains:

Since no man seeks to will other than his true interests, it followed that no man's will was being compelled when it was made to conform to those interests.⁹³

The individual needed only to "know" what his proper place was--and the proper training would assure that all would have such knowledge appropriate to their position--for communal order to prevail.

The ultimate irony of Plato's Republic is that we are presented with merely the illusion, the appearance of freedom. The fulfillment of that social role for which one's "nature" is best suited appears to resolve the contradiction between individual interest and communal interest. In fact, though, the "natural" division of labor which Plato depicts in such detail is the result of a complex and intricate process of social engineering designed to mold characters and to "shape the pattern of public and private life into conformity with [the] philosopher's vision of the idea."⁹⁴ Marx's remarks about the division of labor bring these points out clearly

. . . The division of labor offers us the first example of how, as long as man remains in natural society, that is, as long as a cleavage exists between the particular and the common interest, as long, therefore, as activity is not voluntarily, but naturally, divided, man's own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him.⁹⁵

⁹³Wolin, op. cit., p. 57.

⁹⁴Plato, op. cit., p. 209.

⁹⁵Marx, op. cit., p. 53.

Marx's concept of sociality and of the community is an historical one--man's creation of himself through human labor--implying not a fixed, one-sided definition of need but, ultimately, the development of need in the individual human being for "a totality of human manifestations."⁹⁶ In contrast, Plato operates within the confines of an ahistorical understanding of sociality, rooted in a truncated definition of need derived from the a priori vision of the philosopher, whose knowledge of the good becomes the "art" which enables him to bind the community into one. As a result, the individual parts are fitted to the pre-conceived whole; and the "community" which comes into existence is an extruded mechanistic Form.

Aristotle's understanding of the political community was the counterpoint to Plato's functional unity. Where Plato severed the idea of citizenship "from the idea of meaningful participation in the making of political decisions,"⁹⁷ Aristotle made a strong case for the definition of citizenship based on participation in the deliberative and adjudicative affairs of the polis. With him the political community became the highest form of human association, one in which man's purpose (telos) was realized because concerted action--participation in sovereignty--resulted in a self-sufficient existence. But while Aristotle intensified the meaning of membership in the community beyond sharing in the benefits of life in a polis, the number of citizens who were the real members of the community

⁹⁶ Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, op. cit., pp. 144-5.

⁹⁷ Wolin, op. cit., p. 57.

was necessarily circumscribed by Aristotle's assumption of an aristocratic division of talents. As Barker explains:

To participate in deliberative and judicial office requires both ability and leisure; and these are the gifts of some, but not of all. They are gifts, Aristotle believes, denied to the mechanic and the laborer who, tied to life's bare necessities, have no leisure for counsels of perfection. Nor are these classes merely disqualified by want of leisure; they are in a sense servile. They stand to the community, which they provide with its⁹⁸ necessities, as the slave stands to his master.

It appears that Aristotle excludes whole classes of those who contribute to the life of the community from the ability to share in its citizenship, i.e. to paraphrase Marx, there are those who are in the polis but not of it. Indeed, Aristotle's conception of the State as an organic association of parts (the metaphor of the body predominates) enables him to assert both the complete dependence of each part on the whole--the individual can only realize his telos within the life of the whole--and the complete dependence of the whole on the balanced contribution of the various parts. But it is precisely this conception of organicity in its extreme form which allows Aristotle to distinguish between those functions which are essential to the moral life of the community--the political functions--and those which merely provide the pre-conditions, or means of material subsistence. Ultimately, Aristotle is faced with a separation

⁹⁸ Sir Ernest Barker, The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle, (New York: Dover Publications, 1959), p.297.

within the state between the political (concerned with the moral ends of the state) and the economic (concerned with producing the means to existence); and as Barker puts it "between means and ends there can be no community."⁹⁹

It is true that Aristotle recognized the necessity of rewarding those who contribute to the material well-being of the community with some degree of citizenship--basically, electoral rights--in order that they not remain totally aloof and ultimately destructive of the polis. But since they are not possessed of the full complement of virtue necessary for carrying out the political function in the fullest sense, their citizenship is necessarily circumscribed.

The commonality of life which Plato and Aristotle both identified with the polis was infused with a keen sense of telos or purpose: man's nature was completed in the polis. But the boundaries of the polis were shattered in the era of the Roman empire. From the 4th Century B.C. through the early Christian era, changes in the parameters of the community wrought consequent changes in the conceptualization of community. In the hellenistic and Roman world we part company with a community based on common involvement in a public life and find ourselves in the presence of one based on common loyalty and allegiance to an increasingly distant and incomprehensible public realm¹⁰⁰ where the boundaries between a private

⁹⁹Ibid., p. 279.

¹⁰⁰See Wolin's discussion, *ibid.*, Chapter 3, esp. pp 76-82.

life and public concerns become ever more sharply differentiated. In fact, the individual's existence appears to be so thoroughly compromised by the political realm, that a withdrawal from politics is imperative. The individual is no longer completed by a share in the life of the whole community, but only by an escape from that existence, as much as political circumstances will allow. The individual and community are one only to the extent that that is true in the literal sense: the individual's ability "to commune with himself"¹⁰¹ As Epicurus advised:

"When tolerable security against our fellow-men is attained, then on a basis of power sufficient to afford support and of material prosperity, arises in most general form the security of a quiet private life withdrawn from the multitude. 102

While the Epicureans' and Cynics' stress on the self-sufficiency of the individual led to a withdrawal, the Stoic attempt to redefine the community, and membership in it, in the universal terms which seemed to fit the actual boundaries of Empire amounted to the same thing--it was a definition in opposition to the strife-torn realities of Roman politics, an assertion of the idea of the transcendental community of universal brotherhood. As Wolin explains:

...Stoicism became the natural complement to Rome only when that society had become so exhausted by

¹⁰¹Epictetus, Discourses III, quoted in Wolin, op.cit., p.78

¹⁰²Epicurus "Principle Doctrines" in Jason L. Saunders edit., Greek & Roman Philosophy After Aristotle, (New York: The Free Press, 1966), p.54, emphasis added.

internal conflicts and distended by imperial conquests that it had lost the basic determinants of a political community. The tension between philosophy and society was abolished under the happy coincidence that both were apolitical. 103

The common thread of these philosophies, in addition to the Skeptic and neo-Platonic variants, was the search for a sense of unity and purpose beyond the strife-torn world of mundane experience. This led to admonitions to withdraw (Epicureans, Cynics); or to adapt to contradiction (Skepticism) or to search for pathways to the experience of essential unity (Stoicism, neo-Platonism). Regardless of the distinctiveness of any of these ontologies, all philosophy increasingly became, in the Roman era, ars vitae: the instrument with which to aid the individual in overcoming "the painful experience of dislocation and estrangement..."¹⁰⁴ The implicit transcendentalism emerges full-blown in the Christian era where the effort is no longer, as in the earlier Greek tradition, to reconstruct the community anew, but to establish the pre-eminence of the spiritual community--other-worldly unity through the mystery of Christ.

Christianity begins with the promise that man's material existence is a state of slavery in which "he is alienated from his own true nature, alienated from life, enslaved under hostile powers and in bondage to death."¹⁰⁵ Redemption through

¹⁰³ Wolin, ob. cit., p. 82

¹⁰⁴ Jason Saunders introduction to Greek & Roman Philosophy After Aristotle, op. cit., p. 5.

¹⁰⁵ Bultmann, Primitive Christianity, op.cit., p. 189.

Christ restores man to his "true nature"--"man is freed for his authentic self by being freed from himself."¹⁰⁶ Thus the Christian community (belonging to Christ) is based on the radical isolation of the individual, his extrication from all natural ties, which restores him to his true self. As St. Paul puts it, "There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female," but all are one in Christ. The universality which was thus postulated, remained, in Marx's terms, abstract and idealistic because it was based on a fundamental dualism "between individual life and species-life." Such a dualism was reflected most clearly in the Christian's paradoxical attitude toward the political world--on the one hand, the political order was represented as inferior to the spiritual community;¹⁰⁷ on the other hand, there was a profound recognition of the necessity to discharge one's civic duties, to resign one's self to the "powers that be," to those who were in Paul's words, "ordained by God." Failure to comply with the latter obligations might result in a return to a more primitive, barbaric state of anarchy. To secure the condition of order, Christians were urged to support and to defend the Empire. As the Empire was itself increasingly threatened, and proved to be incapable of the kind of resilience and strength necessary to protect its

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, p. 202.

¹⁰⁷ "Christians pass their life on earth; but they are citizens in heaven." "(Epistle to Diognetus in Henry Bettenson, ed., The Early Christian Fathers, London: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 74, cited in Wolin, op cit., p. 100.

citizens, the Church--already highly institutionalized and politicized in its own realm--extended its ordering principles into the secular arena.

Marx's critique of the eschatological community is significant insofar as it sheds light on his own attempt "to formulate the programme of a practical transcendence of alienation by means of a genuinely universalizing fusion of ideal and reality, theory and practice:"¹⁰⁸

The man that Christianity ranks as sovereign, as the highest being...is man in his uncivilized, unsocial form, man in his fortuitous existence, man just as he is, man as he has been corrupted by the whole organization of our society, who has lost himself, been alienated, and handed over to the rule of inhuman conditions and element--in short, man who is not yet a real species-being. 109

Rather than overcoming alienation in practice, Christianity merely "completed theoretically the estrangement of man from himself and from nature."¹¹⁰ To the extent that the individual's "distinct activity and distinct situation in life" are treated as "extrinsic to man" having a "merely individual significance;" to the extent that all species-ties of man are severed, the human world is dissolved "into a world of atomistic individuals who are inimically opposed to one

¹⁰⁸ Istvan Meszaros, Marx's Theory of Alienation, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1972), p. 33.

¹⁰⁹ Karl Marx, "On The Jewish Question, in Karl Marx and Fredrick Engels, Collected Works, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1975), III, 159.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 173.

another."¹¹¹ The eschatological community which is constructed out of this discord leaves the contradictions intact because it fails to subject the actual antagonisms of civil society to criticism; instead it takes them as its premise. The community is thus, an idealized one because its resolution of the problem of alienation is ahistorical: "And be ye not conformed to this world, but be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind..."¹¹² Religious emancipation, like political emancipation, aims at liberating man, but succeeds only in reducing man "to an egoistic, independent individual."¹¹³ Human emancipation is, Marx argues, the realization of the communal essence of man:

Only when the real, individual man re-absorbs in himself the abstract citizen, and as an individual human being has become a species-being in his every day life, in his particular work, and in his particular situation, only when man has recognized and organized his 'forces propres' as social forces, and consequently no longer separates social power from himself in the shape of political or religious power, only then will human emancipation have been accomplished. 114

In Augustine's thought, there is an attempt to make careful distinctions between the kind of order that can be secured by political means (civitas terrena) and the truly communal

¹¹¹Ibid., pp. 166, 173.

¹¹²Paul, Romans, 12:2

¹¹³A. J. Carlyle makes a similar point when he stresses "the new apprehension of individuality," explicit in the Christian assertion of the autonomy of the spiritual. See his A History of Medieval Political Theory in the West, (New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., n.d.), esp. II, 6-9.

¹¹⁴Marx, op.cit., p. 168.

order of the religious association (civitas dei). The latter was not characterized by the kind of interest-group conflict which corrupted the former, and was, therefore, superior to it because it represented the consummation of man's communal nature in the harmonious fellowship of believers. Nevertheless, as long as the heavenly city lived "like a captive and a stranger in the earthly city" the Christian was obligated to maintain the laws of the earthly city "whereby the things necessary for the maintenance of this mortal life are administered".¹¹⁵ Ultimately, the notion of community in Christianity finds its completion only in eternity. Man's communal essence is realized beyond history.

Naturally the perspective of the Church in the later medieval era (11th-14th Centuries) shifted more and more to "within history," as the church became the stuff out of which Empires were built. And as this happened, the communal, fraternal emphasis of Christianity was eclipsed by the development of the Church into a "rationalized, ecclesiastical polity." The final result of the attempt to sustain, simultaneously, the two images of the Church: "on the one side, the Church as the governing order of Christendom; on the other side, a society of believers who, in their mystical unity, were members of a living body following a common life inspired by the love of

¹¹⁵ St. Augustine, De Civitas Dei, trans. M. Dods, (Edinburgh: Smith and Wilson, 1872), XIX, 17.

Christ," was the transformation of the idea of community into a non-rational, mystical "sacramental society."¹¹⁶ The ultimate results of this attempt to materialize the transcendental community by identifying it with the institutional hierarchy of the Church were politically significant on two counts especially. One was the development of a notion of citizenship based on "an equality of mutual subservience," thus clearing the way for a kind of political totalitarianism which typified much of the modern era.¹¹⁷ The other was the thoroughgoing politicization of the Church as a mode adequate to the realization of man's supernatural ends, and the simultaneous revitalization of classical ideas of the political community as a natural association, not a necessary evil (St. Thomas). This meant the juxtaposition of two essentially political realms, where order rested on the maintenance of a degree of equilibrium between the two powers.

But to the extent that the Church came to regard the political as a legitimate, indeed, necessary order, and distinguished the two powers from one another only in terms of the primacy of the supernatural, the way was cleared for the

¹¹⁶ Wolin, op.cit., pp. 131, 132

¹¹⁷ Copleston suggests that "anything savouring of political totalitarianism was quite out of the question for Aquinas" or any other medieval thinker. F.C. Copleston, Medieval Philosophy, (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1961), 1970. Still Aquinas' emphasis on the preservation of the mystical union through the subordination of the multitude to the institutionalized hierarchy of diverse orders carries within it the seeds of totalitarianism in terms of its effect on the outlook of the members of the community "in a way that made them receptive objects of power." Wolin, op.cit., p. 133.

"emancipation of political theory from its servitude to theology."¹¹⁸ Copleston explains this development quite clearly:

On the one hand, the stressing of the primacy of the supernatural, which was acknowledged by all Christian thinkers, could easily, given the concrete historical conditions, lead to or be used in support of the sort of views championed by Giles of Rome [subordination of temporal monarch to the Church] . In this case the theory of the two powers, though it was accepted verbally, was whittled away in favor of the spiritual power. On the other hand, the Aristotelian elements of Aquinas' theory, could, if stressed, lead to a whittling away of the two powers theory in favour of the State; for Aristotle knew nothing of any supernatural end or institution and understood the self-sufficing autonomy of the State in a sense different from that in which St. Thomas understood it. The fact that the latter development took place was due in large part to the historic evolution of national States in the Middle Ages; but the possibility was contained within the theory itself. ¹¹⁹

Throughout the earlier medieval period, until the conflict implicit in the assertion of the two powers theory (the "two swords" theory of Pope Gelasius) reasserted itself in different forms in the conflicts of the 11th, 12th, and 13th Centuries over the proper boundaries of secular and spiritual authorities, the predominant assumptions of political theory stressed the contrast between nature and

¹¹⁸Wolin, op. cit., p. 138.

¹¹⁹Copieston, op. cit., p. 176 .

convention. As A. J. Carlyle explains:

...to the Fathers and the great majority of medieval writers, until St. Thomas Aquinas and the recovery of Aristotelian Politics, all the great institutions of society are conventional and not natural. Men are, in this view, by nature free and equal, and possess the world and the things in it in common, while coercive government and slavery and private property are conventional institutions which were devised to correct the vices of human nature when it lost its first innocence. 120

Nevertheless, despite the continuity of this tradition, there developed in the medieval period new political principles and conceptions of the nature of the community and its importance, which were decidedly distinct from earlier ideas (although in many important ways they are quite primitive).

Of particular significance was the assertion of the primacy of the community and the corresponding conception of the law "as belonging to the folk, or the people, or the tribe, almost as if it were an attribute of the group or a common possession by which the group was held together."¹²¹ The community, or rather the "great men of the community" set the limits on the authority of the ruler. We have here, implicit within the assumptions of medieval theory, the beginnings of the notion of constitutional government. The development of the idea of absolute authority, reaching its

¹²⁰ Carlyle, op. cit., III, 3.

¹²¹ George Sabine & Thomas Thorson, A History of Political Theory, (4th edition, revised, Hinsdale, Ill: Dryden Press, 1973), p. 193.

apex in the diving right theories of the 16th-18th Centuries, was decidedly un-medieval.¹²² Another key characteristic of medieval society was the all pervasiveness of its hierarchic conception of society. As Huizinga remarks, medieval society was "inbred to the marrow with the idea of a structure of society based on distinct orders."¹²³ The development of the social and economic arrangements of feudal society gave institutional expression to these political principles which obviously antedated feudalism.

The view of the community as a "corporate body" with distinctions of rank and status, and their accompanying rights and privileges, directly translated into political distinctions is the characteristic of feudal society to which Marx addressed much of his attention. It was this which allowed him to conclude, as Hegel had before him,¹²⁴ that the social order of feudalism remained political "although political in a feudal sense," i.e., in the sense that the individual's place in society, his role, completely determined the extent of his participation in public affairs. It is worthwhile to quote

¹²²See A. J. Carlyle's discussion in Medieval Political Theory in the West, op.cit., III, esp. Chap VI.

¹²³Johan Huizinga, The Waning of the Middle Ages, (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1954), p. 57.

¹²⁴"...there was not state power opposed to individuals and independent of them as there is in modern states. The state's power and the power and free will of individuals were one and the same." George Hegel, Political Writings trans., T. M. Knox, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p.139 .

Marx at length on this point:

The character of the old civil society [feudalism] was directly political, that is to say, the elements of civil life, for example, property, or the family, or the mode of labour, were raised to the level of elements of political life in the form of seignory, estates and corporations. In this form they determined the relation of the individual to the State as a whole, i.e., his political relation, that is, his relation of separation and exclusion from the other components of society. For that organization of national life did not raise property or labour to the level of social elements, on the contrary, it completed their separation from the State as a whole and constituted them as discrete societies within society. Thus, the vital functions and conditions of life of civil society, remained nevertheless political, although political in the feudal sense, that is to say, they excluded the individual from the state as a whole and they converted the particular relation of his corporation to the state as a whole into his general relation to the life of the nation, just as they converted his particular civil activity and situation into his general activity and situation. 125

Marx's point is that the corporate community, wherein every role strictly determines the extent of the individual's relation to the state, did not develop the differences between the ranks as elements of the individual's sociality, but converted them into functionally separate components ("discrete societies within society")--pars ex partes. The bourgeois political revolution--the completed separation of civil society and the state--totally ruptures "the bonds [the estates, etc.] which restrained the egoistic spirit of civil society."¹²⁶ Since public affairs are now treated as "the general affair of the individual" civil society is no longer political even in the narrow feudal sense of a corporate polity. It no longer

¹²⁵ (Marx "On the Jewish Question" in Collected Works, op.cit., III, p. 165-6)

¹²⁶ Ibid., p.166.

has "even the semblance of a universal communal content. To Marx, the declaration of the rights of man (droits de l'homme) expresses this separation of man from the community in the sense that liberty becomes the "liberty of man as an isolated monad:"

The real man is recognized only in the shape of the egoistic individual, the true man is recognized only in the shape of the abstract citizen. 127.

There were in the medieval period two conflicting views of community: one was the feudal corporate community built upon an essentially local foundation; and the other was the transcendental community of the Church with its universal parameters. Gradually, the Church began to extend its centralizing force into the temporal political realm as well, although from the beginning this was fraught with tension. The claim that there were not two self-contained orders, but one Christian community within which coexisted two legitimate authorities (sacerdotium and imperium), could remain viable only as long as both authorities recognized the same territorial boundaries. The fragility of this claim was revealed as soon as the real power constellations supporting the two authorities altered to enable one to challenge the other. For example:

The higher clergy, by virtue of their wealth and standing, were deeply concerned with every question of secular politics; they were magnates

¹²⁷ Ibid., pp 162-7; we will develop the significance of these insights further in later chapters.

whose power and influence no king could overlook... In the 11th Century...both for reasons that inhered in feudalism itself and for reasons of policy that went beyond feudalism, churchmen were deeply involved in secular politics. In the persons of the higher clergy the organizations of the church and of the state overlapped. So completely was this true that a radical separation of the two hierarchies on the basis of a surrender of political functions by the clergy, was obviously impossible.¹²⁸

The conflict moved in the other direction as well, as the claim to independence from church dominance of the emergent national kingdoms of the next few centuries revealed. It was the development in this direction (the historical reasons of which are beyond the scope of this thesis), which succeeded.¹²⁹ When the lines of community were being redrawn, in the 15th-16th Centuries, what finally emerged was the highly centralized political "community" of the nation-state. Loosed from the communal and corporate bonds of medieval society, the impersonal collectivized structures of the modern era could hardly be classed as communities at all.¹³⁰ Antedating the separation of civil society and the state was the separation of community and society. The images of community that were drawn in political theory during this period were either noticeable for their absence (Machiavelli) or reflected the assumption of the artificiality

¹²⁸ Sabine, op.cit., p. 220-1

¹²⁹ See for example, discussion in Sabine of the "three great waves" of the disintegration of empire and the assertion of the independence of the political nation; Sabine, op.cit., especially chap 15-17; also Nisbet, The 3 11, op.cit. esp pp. 193-221.

characterizes the consequences of the impact of the 11th century law and the Renaissance spirit on the modern society. The transformation of "Gemeinschaft" relationships into Gesellschaft relationships. Mid. p. 111

of community (Hobbes).

With Machiavelli we are in the company of what most commentators agree to be the first truly modern political theory. The distinctiveness of his approach is the elaboration of a "new science of statecraft"¹³¹ where politics is the pursuit of interest, the attempt to spin "the wheel of fortune" to as much advantage as possible in a world where "though all things are objects of desire, not all things are attainable."¹³² Order in such a situation is not the result of the superior position of abstract ethical restraints, nor of a shared sense of belonging to a common world. Given that the political realm is viewed as an inherently dynamic and fluctuating one of competition for scarce resources, the only order appropriate to it was one based on a balance of power: the proper application of force and measured coercion. In its first phases of development, order is the result of the creative mastery of the skillful leader--the Prince of heroic talents--whose function it is to create a climate of security based on the institutionalization of conflict resolution by whatever means the situation dictated. Rather than attempting to rid the world of conflict, the task of the political actor, informed by the methods of the new science, was to harness these private energies towards public ends: the creation of a sense of civic

¹³¹Wolin, op.cit., p.214.

¹³²Machiavelli, Discourses, trans., Leslie J. Walker, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), I, xxxvii.

virtue "which would serve to discipline and curb the desires and ambitions of the masses"¹³³ after the Prince has disappeared. This sense of civic virtue--loyalty to the political order--was the combined result of allaying the fears of the masses, "who demand no more than not to be oppressed," and inculcating a sense of disciplined self-sacrifice through proper military training. And it was the development of civic virtue in the form of self-restraint which allowed the political order to evolve into its second phase--republicanism.

The only sense of a community which emerges from all this is some common allegiance to the nation which all citizens share however divided they otherwise are. But the problem is that this community has only an emotional reality. The "feeling" of equality engendered by the evocation of a national sentiment common to all men "regardless of wealth, station and pedigrees"¹³⁴ masks the fact that all interests remain opposed to one another precisely because they share the common goal of getting the most for themselves. As Wolin put it, there is in Machiavelli "no reflection of an ordered set of relationships among men of the same social grouping, no sense of shared loyalties, no feel for the continuity of a collectivity extending over time."¹³⁵ Indeed, Hegel's description of this situation as the appearance of public order which is in reality only "universal hostility"--"the

¹³³Wolin, op.cit., p. 236.

¹³⁴Wolin, op.cit., p. 233.

¹³⁵Ibid, p. 240.

meaningless interplay of individualities seeking to establish themselves and being dissolved"¹³⁶ is the most appropriate one.

Modern political theory argued from the self-evident premise that "society was no longer a community";¹³⁷ that the individual was by definition at odds with his fellows, being "continually in competition for honour and dignity."¹³⁸ Whether the premise of man's natural anti-communality--the primacy of individual interests given in nature-- was seen as necessitating a voluntary covenant to submit to an aweful, unbounded, common power, a "Leviathan" who would "direct men's actions to the common benefit,"¹³⁹ or a tacit consent to submit to the constitutionally limited dictates of the majority and allow the self-governing qualities of civil society to come to fruition (Locke) was, in the long run, irrelevant. The common note which both theorists struck was that man's natural impulse was not towards life in an ordered polity but towards limitless personal acquisitiveness.

In Hobbes, this is expressed in terms of the quality which nature bestows on each man, individual differences aside, which enables each to claim to himself any benefit "to which another may...pretend, as well as he."¹⁴⁰ Every man, by nature,

¹³⁶ George Hegel, Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J. B. Baillie, (New York, 1967), p. 399.

¹³⁷ Wolin, op.cit., p. 241.

¹³⁸ Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, edit., Michael Oakeshott (New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 131.

¹³⁹ Ibid., p. 132.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 98.

has a right to every thing, even to another's body, Hobbes declares. Nevertheless, nature bounds these rights by law--the law that each shall "endeavor peace" and, whenever others are equally willing, shall be means of covenants which should be honored, "lay down this right to all things, and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself"¹⁴¹ because such a natural state is an insecure one. It is passion, anxiety and fear which drives men into social arrangements. It is the desire to secure things for themselves ("liberty against other men") which necessitates their founding a commonwealth which gives their several interests an artificial unity--unity through the will of the sovereign:

For by this authority, given him by every particular man in the commonwealth, the Leviathan hath the use of so much power and strength conferred on him, that by terror thereof, he is enabled to form the wills of them all...And in him consisteth the essence of the commonwealth; which to define it, is one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants with one another, have made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as he shall think expedient, for their peace and common defence. ¹⁴²

The community is not seen by Hobbes as an expression of man's essence, but an artifice necessary to secure the continued existence of the species. Indeed Hobbes stresses, "it is the unity of the representer, not the unity of the represented, that maketh the person one."¹⁴³ All of the natural divisiveness of

¹⁴¹Ibid., p. 104, emphasis added

¹⁴²Ibid., p. 132

¹⁴³Ibid., p. 127

men is continued into political society. The "community" becomes an edifice of purely external conformity, a loose aggregation of isolated individuals related only by common participation in the rules of the game.

Locke alludes to a "great and natural community" as the state within which men existed prior to the advent of civil society, which community is created by the law of nature "common to them all." Nevertheless, his careful description of this "community" as the state within which every individual is "judge for himself and executioner,"¹⁴⁴ or as the "state of perfect freedom" in which all can "order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit within the bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man,"¹⁴⁵ compromises the extent to which it can properly be called a community at all. Contrary to Wolin's assertion that Locke's "state of nature" "was pre-eminently a social condition" and that therefore the political order "could never be an invention, only a rediscovery of the natural,"¹⁴⁶ the only thing which all members shared in that natural state was the common endeavor to avoid "the invasion of others." The natural "community" which Locke sought to "re-discover" was the well-regulated contract-bound interaction of civil society--a condition in

¹⁴⁴ Locke, "The Second Treatise" in The Social Contract, edit., Ernest Barker, (London: Oxford University Press, 1947), p.51.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 4

¹⁴⁶ Wolin, op. cit., p. 306

which each was free to enjoy his separation from the others, protected from the constant onslaught of terrors, fears, uncertainties and dangers which typified the natural state. Man's nature is not enobled by his existence in a community, as in Rousseau; the individual is "driven into society" to escape the vicissitudes of a life with others not quite as equitable as he. Both Hobbes and Locke could agree that a public life was necessary to protect man's private space:

Hence it comes to pass, that we seldom find any number of men live any time together in this state [of nature] . The inconvenience that they are therein exposed to by the irregular and uncertain exercise of the power ; every man has of punishing the transgression of others, makes them take sanctuary under the established laws of government, and therein seek the preservation of their property.¹⁴⁷

The distinguishing characteristic of Locke's community is that it is quite non-descript. Once constituted by the consent of each individual, the community exists as umpire. It sets itself up between the individual members, regulating their activities which are bound to collide. All of the purposes of the community which Locke ascribes to it have a decidedly negative connotation--settles rules to govern interactions, decides disputes between parties, punishes offenders.¹⁴⁸ Since individuals remain as opposed to one another as before, the "community" merely arbitrates. The old adage, "good fences make good neighbors" seems an apt description of Locke's concept of community. It is a conception he shared with

¹⁴⁷Locke, op.cit., p. 74

¹⁴⁸Ibid., p. 50

18th Century political economists, who, as Marx explains, treat "various forms of social connectedness as mere means toward the individual's private purposes, as external necessity."¹⁴⁹

The threshold which marks the final separation of the public and private dimensions, of society and the individual--what Marx called the separation of the state and civil society--is crossed in the era of the French Revolution. But before we cross it, we ought to pause and reflect on the distinctiveness with which Rousseau (a distinctiveness given the times within which it was constructed) discusses the 'community. Rousseau's concept of the community of the people as sovereign, expressing its universality in the form of a general will, represents an attempt, albeit a contradictory one, to resolve the conflicts between the individual and society. He succeeds, but, as Meszaros has carefully demonstrated, purely "in the ideality of the moral sphere...Thus the terms of the transcendence are abstract."¹⁵⁰ They remain abstract because, as Meszaros explains, Rousseau is unable to get at the root causes of the inequities he perceives. He aims merely for altering the effects:

What Rousseau opposes is not the alienating power of money and property as such, but a particular

¹⁴⁹ Karl Marx, introduction, Grundrisse der Kritik der politische Ökonomie hereafter referred to as Grundrisse, trans., Martin Nicolaus, (New York: Vintage Books, 1973) p. 84.

¹⁵⁰ Istvan Meszaros, Marx's Theory of Alienation, op.cit., pp. 52,56, see also pp. 48-61 in general.

mode of their realization in the form of the concentration of wealth and all that goes with social mobility produced by the dynamism of expanding and concentrating capital. He rejects the effects but gives his full support, even if unknowingly, to their causes.¹⁵¹

Nevertheless, there is an ambivalence in the way in which Rousseau even "abstractly" describes the community as an aspect of man's universal nature which we need to consider in order to emphasize the degree to which Marx's theory is opposed to it.

No other author of the 18th Century recognized more deeply than Rousseau the degree to which the institutions of society, "the social confederacy," imprisoned men in an inauthentic existence, the conditions of which tended to be slanted heavily in favor of the wealthy and powerful. The images of social cooperation, of a division of labor, were myths which, according to Rousseau, masked the profound inequities of society: "are not all the advantages of society for the rich and powerful? Are not all the lucrative posts in their hands? Are not all the privileges and exemptions reserved for them alone? Is not the public authority always on their side?"¹⁵² Rousseau's claim that the society of his time was

¹⁵¹Ibid., p. 59. The kind of socio-historical standpoint which would have enabled Rousseau to criticize the "causes," namely, the system of capitalist production and exchange relations, "was... clearly unthinkable in Rousseau's time," Meszaros contends.

¹⁵²Rousseau, "A Discourse on Political Economy" in On the Social Contract, edit., Roger Masters, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 231.

a perverse, inequitable order was based on his understanding of what man's nature would be if stripped of all the "artificial faculties" acquired through the long process of "civilization" ("Man is born free and everywhere he is in chains"). In order to discover what forms of association ought to prevail among men, one had to define those elements in "natural man" which he does not owe to society. One had to "dig down to the root," and distinguish the natural from the artificial in man, in order to ascertain which forms of association follow logically from man's nature and which deform it. In Rousseau's phrase, one should consider "human beings as they are and laws as they might be."

The foundation, the "root" for Rousseau is the state of nature: the individual, pre-social existence of man. Man is conceived by Rousseau as existing in a state of harmony with nature and with himself--guided by pure instinct, he desires only what he knows and knows only what he desires. In the Discourse on Inequality, Rousseau described this natural man as "wandering through the forest, without occupation, without speech, without a home, without war and without ties, with no need of his fellow man and no wish to harm them, perhaps not even recognizing any of them individually."¹⁵³ He exists in a state of equilibrium because he is a purely physical being. Living in isolation from others, dependent on no other person, equal to all others in the common exposure of each to the impersonal whims of nature, the individual in the state of

¹⁵³Rousseau, "A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality," in G.D.H. Cole ed., The Social Contract, (London: Dutton, 1913), p. 210.

nature was truly in a state of perfect freedom and equality. Had there been a "perpetual springtime on earth" it is hard to see, Rousseau explains, how the state of nature could ever have to end.

Society, for Rousseau, does not emerge from man's nature, but because the equilibrium in nature is disturbed by the development of certain cataclysmic natural forces which pressure man to band together with others of his kind to perpetuate the species. Rousseau, unlike Marx, postulates an antithesis between human nature and society.¹⁵⁴ He explains the genesis of society in terms of forces "outside" man's nature--i.e., in the physical environment. The "cause" of society is thus imputed to factors external to man: the forces of Nature. These forces stimulate "new needs" which require "others" for satisfaction and thus develops the tendency to form groups. But the characteristic of these new needs, which Rousseau identifies with the origin of society,

¹⁵⁴In Montesquieu and Rousseau, Durkheim contends on the contrary, that Rousseau's conception of the perfectibility of man located the origin of society in man's nature and that, therefore, there is no strict antithesis between nature and society. He bases his conclusion on his analysis of the Discourse on Inequality in which Rousseau allows that perfectibility is a characteristic of the species and of the individual which, however, remains dormant until it is awakened by circumstances. To argue otherwise, Durkheim continues, is to render unintelligible Rousseau's efforts in the Social Contract to discover positive forms of social organization. Emile Durkheim, Montesquieu and Rousseau, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960), esp. pp. 88-90. Nevertheless, I would argue, Rousseau seems to make it clear that however "potential" man's perfectibility may be, his social existence would never have developed without the help of circumstances (forces) outside his nature. This ambiguity in Rousseau about the relation between nature and society, I will demonstrate shortly, is the consequence of the methodological short-comings of Rousseau's analysis.

is that they spell the end of man's naturally free existence:

From the moment one man began to stand in need of the help of another...equality disappeared, property was introduced, work became indispensable and vast forests became smiling fields, which man had to water with the sweat of his brow, and where slavery and misery were soon to germinate and grow with the crops.¹⁵⁵

Man's social dependence on others is the sign of his enslavement. But it is nevertheless a condition over which man can exercise limited control. While he cannot "return to nature"¹⁵⁶ he ought to be able to discover a form of association which gives him the same independence as he had in nature, and the added advantage of giving "his actions the morality they previously lacked."¹⁵⁷ The solution proposed by Rousseau is the Social Contract wherein "each one, uniting with all, nevertheless obeys only himself and remains as free as before" and "as each gives himself to all, he gives himself to no one." The final result of this act of association is the production of "a moral and collective body, composed of as many members as there are voices in the assembly, which receives from this same act its unity, its common self, its life, and its will."¹⁵⁸

Rousseau's earlier position, that man is driven into society against his nature, appears to be compromised

¹⁵⁵ Discourse on Inequality, op.cit., pp. 214-215

¹⁵⁶ ("...that primitive state can no longer subsist and the human race would perish if it did not change its way of life.") The Social Contract, edit., Masters, op.cit., p.52

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 55

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 53, emphasis added

by the recognition, in The Social Contract, that although existence in the civil state appears to deprive the individual "of several advantages given him by nature, he gains such great ones, his faculties are exercised and developed, his ideas broadened, his feelings ennobled, and his whole soul elevated to such a point that if the abuses of this new condition did not often degrade him beneath the condition he left, he ought ceaselessly to bless the happy moment that tore him away from it forever, and that changed him from a stupid, limited animal into an intelligent being and a man."¹⁵⁹

On the one hand we have Rousseau's admonition that society was a perversion of nature; and on the other hand, Rousseau's recognition "that some kind of society is the only moralizing force in human life!"¹⁶⁰ Rousseau does not carry his earlier inquiries to their logical conclusion, which would have forced him into the position of arguing for a return to the "primitive naturalism" he described. But he remains equally opposed to the logical necessity of existing inequities. Instead, he looks for a resolution of inherent contradictions between his two premises in terms of a principle, which would "unite...all the advantages of the natural state with those of the civil state" and would thus "remedy the evil of forms of

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 56, emphasis added

¹⁶⁰ Sabine, op.cit., p. 537

of personal dependence within the bounds of society." 161
 Thus, we have Rousseau's "qualified" praise for civil society,
 the result of what Masters calls his "pessimistic view of
 history,"¹⁶² and his search for the community--the "body
 politic"--within which each individual becomes "an indivisible
 part of the whole."¹⁶³

However, Rousseau's resolution of the contradiction he
 perceives between the individual and society remains on the
 level of what Meszaros calls "moral postulates"¹⁶⁴ not simply
 because of his "pessimistic view of history," but because he
 reads back into his methodology a presupposed opposition
 between the natural and the social, which is in fact derived

¹⁶¹ Emile trans., B. Foxby, (London: Dutton, 1911),
 p. 149. There is a striking similarity between Rousseau's
 desire to transform the dependence on men into "like that
 on things" and Engels discussion in Socialism: Utopian and
Scientific of the development of socialism as the replacement
 of the "government of persons" by the "administration of
 things." This point has led many to conclude that Marx's
 resolution of the contradictions between the individual and
 society was technocratic and positivistic (as in Habermas,
 Wellmer, et al) Later it will be argued that this depends
 on (1) the degree to which Engels' is an accurate represen-
 tation of Marx's view and (2) the assumption that Marx's
 definition of the community, although historical in the sense
 that it recognized the material base of society, was neverthe-
 less rooted in an exclusively economic approach to social
 reality.

¹⁶² Roger Masters, edit., Rousseau, On The Social Contract,
 op. cit., ff. p. 138. Masters' assessment of Rousseau's
 pessimistic view is based on Rousseau's own qualification of
 this "new condition" as threatened by "abuses" which may
 degrade the individual to a level below the animal state in
 which he existed before. Rousseau, op. cit., p. 56.

¹⁶³ Rousseau, op. cit., p. 53; cf. Rousseau, Discourse on
Political Economy in Masters, op. cit., pp. 211-2.

¹⁶⁴ Meszaros, op. cit., p. 59.

from his survey of the circumstances of contemporary society. In Marx's terms he takes the isolated individual who is in fact the result of history--"the product on the one side of the dissolution of the feudal forms of society; on the other side of the new forces of production developed since the sixteenth century,"¹⁶⁵ and makes him "history's point of departure." Thus, what Rousseau is, in fact, describing is what I called earlier the historical separation of community and society. Although he recognized that "various forms of social connectedness confront the individual as mere means towards his private purposes, as external necessity"¹⁶⁶ he fails to identify the historical determinants of this alienation and instead projects it into the past so that the bifurcation of man's nature and his sociality appears to be a logical necessity. This failure is itself the derivative of Rousseau's inability to distinguish between particular socio-historical forces, which preclude the realization of the truly communal life, and man's essentially social nature. The result is that Rousseau's conception of sociality is riddled with contradictions (society leads to inequities but man must live in society to be truly human) and his

¹⁶⁵ Marx, Grundrisse, op. cit., p. 83.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 84, emphasis added.

conception of community is riddled with paradoxes (becoming dependent on "laws" releases men from dependence on any one; forced to be free, etc.)

To Rousseau, then, man's social existence remains "external" to him¹⁶⁷ --the "cause" of social life in the first place being located by him outside human nature. Herein lies his fundamental error. As Marx clearly demonstrates throughout his entire work, the only truly human and natural existence for man is a social one.¹⁶⁸ Thus, the "cause" of social life is not outside human nature in the form of some external stimulus, but is itself pre-supposed in the human organization of the world within

¹⁶⁷ Rousseau's search for authentic existence and his perception of human behavior in contemporary society as "profoundly alien behavior" --all semblance and the expression of a veiled existence--as a "radical indictment of of that society out of which the Enlightenment had grown" is one of the themes explored in great detail in Marshall Berman's book, The Politics of Authenticity, (New York: Athenium Press, 1970), especially part II.

¹⁶⁸ "Society is the complete unity of man with nature." Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, in Collected Works, op. cit., III, p. 298. " . . . Consciousness of nature . . . Man's consciousness of the necessity of associating with the individuals around him is the beginning of the consciousness that he is living in society at all." Marx and Engels, German Ideology, op. cit., p. 51. "The human being is in the most literal sense a 'zoon politikon', not merely a gregarious animal, but an animal which can individuate itself only in the midst of society." Marx, Grundrisse, op. cit., p. 84.

which circumstances present themselves as forms against a background. The relation between nature and human social existence is a dialectical one.¹⁶⁹

Marx's dialectical analysis has the advantage of postulating neither the concept of a nature "created" by social practice or "reduced to the historical modes of its appropriation in practice."¹⁷⁰ Nature is neither pure object--self-created, nor pure product--humanly fashioned. And the same is true of "human" nature--it is neither completely self-generated, nor rigidly determined. Rather, for Marx, natural history and human history represent a differentiated (mediated) unity.¹⁷¹ "The production of life . . . now appears in a double relationship: on the one hand as a natural, on the other, as

¹⁶⁹It is true that "circumstances," "events" are necessary for the development of man's perfectibility--"the priority of external nature remains unassailed," Marx asserts in the German Ideology,--but this does not mean as Rousseau would have it, that man's potentiality is "awakened" by external causes; rather, man participates in his own awakening. One has to be looking in order to see. Or, as Marx explains, the development of language does not facilitate association, but is itself the expression (both literally and figuratively) of man's pre-eminent togetherness, his being with others. Grundrisse, (Duquesne: Universal Press, 1971), Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Metaphysical in Man" in Sense and Nonsense, op. cit., also his The Primacy of Perception, edit., James Edie, (Northwestern University Press, 1964); Hans Peter Dreitzel, edit., Childhood and Socialization, (New York: MacMillan Books, 1973), especially Section I.

¹⁷⁰Alfred Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx, (London: NLB, 1971), p. 69.

¹⁷¹Ibid., p. 45.

a social relationship."¹⁷² There is no abstract nature which can be used as a metaphysical explanation of reality, as in Rousseau, but only concrete modes of existence. Hence, matter (or "Nature") cannot be used as a presuppositionless principle for explaining the world. Concepts of nature themselves presuppose particular historical modes of the appropriation of nature by man through the mediating activity of human labor; and to abstract from this "differentiated unity" of man's specific activity within the world is to commit the metaphysical faux pas of transforming the dialectic into an ontology and thus of reducing human praxis to either a merely quantitatively differentiated moment of natural history (Engels' Dialectics of Nature) or a moral moment outside history (Rousseau).

However, such a position did not lead Marx to the contention that all social forms were equally "communal." It was Rousseau who was lead to this sort of position, although in the opposite direction, i.e., that only those forms of "Society" which were a-social (naturalistic, i.e., inflexible, like the laws of nature) were communal (the body politic, the corporate unity). Rousseau's inability to isolate the specific historical factors which separated the community from society, i.e., which transformed social forces into means for the pursuit of private interest,¹⁷³

¹⁷² Grundrisse, op.cit., p. 50

¹⁷³ It is true, as Berman has demonstrated, that Rousseau's critique of modern society was decidedly more insightful than any of his contemporaries. Thus, where the philosophes identified freedom with constitutional government, Rousseau criticized this theory of the apparent independence of the political and the social by demonstrating that "the rule of law was...a screen for the dominance of men who made the laws."

lead him to the irreconcilably contradictory position of recognizing the (moral) necessity of society, but wishing nevertheless to escape to some more natural state. Having acknowledged the impossibility of this latter course of action, his endeavors to compensate for the necessary inequities of society become a series of abstract moral postulates which culminated in the substitution of "moral and legitimate equality for whatever physical inequality nature may have placed between men," so that "men become equal through convention and by right," with a parenthetical appeal to the establishment (by undisclosed means) of a social state in which "all [men] have something and none of them has anything superfluous."¹⁷⁴ The closest Rousseau comes to practical transcendence of the inequities of civil society is his system of taxation of luxuries "which help the poor and burden the rich," the mechanics of which he elaborates in the Discourse on Political Economy.¹⁷⁵ But the effect of this is to question only the

Thus, his vision allowed him to perceive that "the real unit of power in modern society...was no longer descent, but money..." Berman, op., cit., p. 120-123. Nevertheless, however insightful Rousseau may have been, and however much he may have attempted to resolve the antithesis between "l'homme" and "le citoyen" in "a community in which men could be freely and openly themselves," (ibid p 203), his vision was necessarily limited by the degree to which he could penetrate into the causes of the inequality he found so loathsome. Hence, the remarkable breadth of his vision-- "Rousseau was the first theorist of radical liberalism" (ibid p 207)--and its necessary historical boundaries. Meszaros op.cit., p. 50, 57, 60.

¹⁷⁴ Social Contract, op.cit., p. 58.

¹⁷⁵ Op.cit., pp. 232-236

inequitable distribution of goods, not the mode of production itself. Hence Rousseau allows that "the right of property is the most sacred of all the rights of citizens, and more important in certain respects than freedom itself. . . ." ¹⁷⁶

As Marx was later to demonstrate, no amount of juridical freedom, no "droits de Citoyen," could compensate for the intrinsic inequity of the system of capitalist production: a point which forever escapes Rousseau, who cannot ¹⁷⁷ distinguish those social institutions which pervert man's nature by driving him to destroy the balance of human needs in pursuit of the superfluous (Marx's analysis in Capital), from those which contribute to the production of what Marx called the "most developed social (from this standpoint, general) relations." ¹⁷⁸ Rousseau remains "fetishized" in the sense that, to paraphrase Marx, the social character of the community

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Meszaros explains the "contradiction of Rousseau's thought as "necessary" in terms of the "socially and historically limited standpoint" from which he approached the problem of alienation, op. cit., pp. 50-57, 60.

¹⁷⁸ Grundrisse, op. cit., p. 84.

appears to Rousseau to be an objective character of the law (general will) itself.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁹" . . . the social character of labour appears . . . to an objective character of the products themselves." Marx, / Capital, trans., Moore and Aveling (New York: International Publishers, 1967), I, 74. Cf. Franz Neumann, "The Change in the function of Law in Modern Society," in The Democratic and Authoritarian State, (New York: The Free Press, 1957), pp.52-3. "The invocation of the law as the sole sovereign and the dictum that sovereignty is 'a government of laws and not of men' make it superfluous to mention that, in reality, men do rule even when they rule within the framework of the law. . . The dictum that social changes can be attained only through laws . . . is an illusion which also serves to deny the law-creating capacity of extra-parliamentary forces. This doctrine clearly reveals the ambivalent position of modern man and Rousseau --the emphatic assertion of the autonomy of man is accomplished by the equally passionate insistence on the rule of the states." (emphasis added). As Neumann explain Rousseau's system was applicable "only in societies with / equally distributed small property holding or with socialized property." In a system of vastly unequal holdings, Rousseau's principle of general law only serves to make, indeed, to prop up, the very real inequality which continues to prevail.

CHAPTER II

Though Rousseau was ultimately unable to resolve the contradictions he observed in the society of his time, he was at least poignantly aware of the necessary connections between the social and the political, between the structure of civil society and the state which was bound to reflect it. Hegel's political theory, on the other hand, increasingly came to rest on the assumption of transcending the divisions of civil society through participation in the life of the ethical whole, the state. The legacy of the French Revolution seemed to convince Hegel of the impossibility of any direct resolution of the conflicts of civil society. It was Marx's confrontation with the Hegelian system and his growing sense of its inadequacies, based on his increasing awareness of the dimensions of "material" problems, that led him to return to an analysis of the anatomy of civil society and to completely reject the Hegelian solution in favor of a revolutionary transformation of civil society itself. In so doing, Marx was able to ground his theory of the community on a much-firmer basis than Rousseau or any of the philosophers who followed him.

Despite the youthfully idealistic tone, and without overemphasizing its significance, one could easily trace the beginning of Marx's emphasis on the significance of community as the essential dimension of human existence to his earliest endeavor--"Reflections of a Young Man in the Choice of a Profession." In this 1835 essay Marx argues that the ability to choose the means to ennoble himself and all mankind is what elevates man over the rest of creation. Nevertheless, Marx continues, man's nature is not without its own limits: the personal and the social should not be thought of as two conflicting interests where the perfection of the former is the destruction of the latter. On the contrary "man's nature is so constituted that he can attain his own perfection only by working for the perfection, for the good, of his fellow man."¹ Naturally the romanticism and abstractness of these ideas is in no way comparable to the elaborate arguments of the next decades. But the importance of the remarks lies in the fact that they express an idea Marx never abandoned throughout his intellectual career. The efforts of later years critically deepen the initial insight by transforming it from a homely truth to the kernel of his dialectical method:

¹Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1975), I, p. 8.

"Universally developed individuals, whose social relations, as their own communal [gemeinschaftlich] relations, are hence also subordinated to their own communal control, are no product of nature, but of history. The degree and the universality of the development of wealth where this individuality becomes possible supposes production on the basis of exchange as a prior condition, whose universality produces not only the alienation of the individual from himself and from others, but also the universality and the comprehensiveness of his relations and capacities.²

Here we have the fully elaborated, "mature" Marxian position. The full (universal) development of the individual is linked to the appropriation of man's social relations as communal relations, with the idea of community no longer characterized as the abstraction, "Fellow men," but related to the historical dimension of human activity ("universally developed individuals . . . are no product of nature, but of history") and grounded in a specific phase of human development which "supposes production on the basis of exchange as a prior condition." In other words, the bond between individuals becomes increasingly concrete and multifaceted with the development of relations of production based on exchange. In the advanced stages of the bourgeois economy, social

²Karl Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politische Okonomie, hereafter referred to as Grundrisse, trans. Martin Nicolas, (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), p. 162.

relations become generalized and all-round, expressed in terms of a world market system. Thus, the social relations of individuals to one another are mediated by the market, but in an increasingly interdependent fashion. Marx calls this an objective connection of individuals with one another because it appears as the result of the operation of market forces; i.e., it appears as a kind of "spontaneous interconnection . . . independent of the knowing and willing of individuals."³ Individuals appear to be "thrown together" by the recurrent crises of the market, and in an effort to "control" these contacts, they attempt to develop "institutions . . . whereby each individual can acquire information about the activity of all the others and attempt to adjust his own accordingly; e.g., lists of current prices, rates of exchange, interconnections between those active in commerce through the mails, telegraph, etc." These efforts to subject the market to human control do not, of course, overcome the alienation, Marx remarks. Although he does not specify why in this same paragraph, the reason is obvious. They are simply efforts to stabilize the market, to make exchange relations more predictable, as opposed to being

³ Ibid., p. 161

efforts that challenge the whole system of production based on exchange. Instead of constructing the rules to fit the requirement of self-consciously social production, the rules (prices, exchange rates, etc.) are developed to allow individuals as much independence as possible within the circumscribed limits of the market. Thus, individual autonomy is still a form of dependence. The only difference, Marx says, between the imprisonment of feudal society and that of the developed system of exchange in which "individuals seem independent" is the difference in the form of dependence:

"The definedness of individuals, which in the former case [feudal society] appears as a personal restriction of the individual by another, appears in the latter case [bourgeois society] as developed into an objective restriction of the individual by relations independent of him and sufficient unto themselves . . . Here also individuals come into connection with one another only in determined ways . . . individuals are now ruled by abstractions, whereas earlier they depended on one another.⁴

These "institutions" (increasingly complex communication networks; e.g.) which are initially developed in response to market conditions, "simultaneously represent the possibility of suspending the old standpoint . . .

⁴Ibid., p. 164. emphasis added.

the formation of the world market already at the same time contains the conditions for going beyond it." The market form of this social bond is a necessary stage. It is certain that individuals cannot master "their own social interconnections before they have created them." To imagine the possible directions of social interaction, it is necessary first to have the conditions for such interaction. But to suggest that this is a necessary stage, and that it appears to emerge quite spontaneously from the requirements of the market system should by no means lead to the conclusion that the social system of the market is a "natural attribute inherent in individuals and inseparable from their nature (in antithesis to their conscious knowing and willing)." In other words, one should not conclude that the market is a natural (i.e., immutable) restriction on social relations. It is rather a type of social bond "natural to individuals within specific and limited relations of production." It is the historical product of a "specific phase of [human] development" in which "individuals . . . are still engaged in the creation of the conditions of their social life, and . . . have not yet begun, on the basis of these conditions, to live it."⁵

⁵ Ibid., p. 162, emphasis added.

Marx thus imagines the possibility of a truly social life, wherein the forms of association are no longer "limited" by the requirements of the market. Even in the advanced stages of capitalism, with its networks of communication, with the complicated ways in which the production of one individual in one part of the world intimately effects the activity of another individual in a more remote region, man's life, though interdependent with others, is not really social, because the ways in which he interacts with others still appear to be independent of his will, a function of "market forces."⁶

In fact, however, these "market forces" are a reflection of a whole series of social activities and social decisions (i.e., activities and decisions with "social" implications, performed by particular individuals in the context of a specific social system). The point is to subject them to the control of the community. When Marx speaks of the "community" he refers to a very particular form of social organization in which man's social relations no longer take

⁶The machinations of Wall Street traders affects the economic livelihood of each of us in ways which are truly mystifying: the incantation of numbers--what could be more impersonal!--"somehow" elicits a response from the market which is read as an indication of economic health or disease.

on a life of their own, but are subject to the self-conscious determinations of individuals themselves.

It is capital itself which raises the image of this community by socializing the individual to an appreciation of truly universal tastes, to a requirement of seemingly boundless⁷ and therefore truly human needs. The individual who would really be suited to the capitalist system, who could genuinely be "satisfied" by its industriousness is the individual cultivated in "all the qualities of the social human being . . . for in order to take gratification in a many-sided way, he must be capable of many pleasures [genussfahiq], hence cultured to a high degree . . . "⁸

He would be athlete, scholar, artist, lover, businessman, world traveler, gourmet, scientist, friend, family person because capitalism is "exploration of the earth in all directions"--the result of capitalism's drive to realize surplus value which required the quantitative and quali-

⁷"Capital drives beyond all national barriers and prejudices as much as beyond nature worship, as well as all traditional, confined, complacent, encrusted satisfactions of present needs, and reproductions of old ways of life" Ibid., p. 410.

⁸Ibid., p. 409.

tative expansion of needs⁹--and its "discovery, creation, and satisfaction of new needs arising from society itself" (the need for leisure or free time) require that each individual have the talent and the time to enjoy "many pleasures." Were this individual truly to exist, though, the foundation of production under capitalism would be destroyed, because the truly athletic individual does not limit his athletics to spectator sports, or express his prowess in terms of the style of his gear; nor does the world traveler orient his trip to the locations of Holiday Inns around the globe, limiting his tastes for the foreign to whatever can be pre-packaged and familiar, or circumscribing his travels by the rotation of the

⁹ Marx's explanation in Capital of capitalism as a system of production for exchange--the capitalist produces in order to sell--is presented as the "universal tendency" of capital to develop the forces of production, coupled with a particular restriction of these developments according to the limits of circulation (laws of supply and demand). This becomes the basis for Marx's theory of the repeated economic crises of capitalism, but the brilliance of the insight, I will argue later, is not limited to an understanding of the economic dynamics of capitalism, but of these same (economic) dynamics being limits to the ability of capitalism to satisfy the very real social (and not materially satisfiable; i.e., not capable of being satisfied in the form of commodities to be consumed) needs which it calls forth. Thus, the economic crises of capitalism, which appear to be problematic enough to the continued existence of capitalism as a "rational" productive system, are also seen by Marx as indicative of a much more seminal cultural crisis which remains endemic to capitalism and which cannot be controlled except by the positive transcendence of capitalism itself.

office holiday schedule. The foundation of production under capitalism requires that there be "necessary limits"¹⁰ to production based on capital, but the general tendency of capital is to push production and the development of needs beyond these limits. Capitalism itself drives towards the establishment of the community beyond the social form of the commodity.

The idea of community thus provides the link between Marx's emphasis on man's productive activity as the "life of the species" and the analysis of the relations of dependence based on exchange as fundamentally alienating, although essential to the development of the "universality and the comprehensiveness of man's relations and capacities." Marx had postulated in the 1844 Manuscripts that man's species being consisted not only in the adoption of the species as his object, but also in the treatment of himself as the actual, living species; i.e., "man treats himself as a universal and therefore a free being." That is, free (independent) of any limits

¹⁰See Grundrisse, p. 415-6 ". . . (1) necessary labor as limit of the exchange value of living labor capacity; (2) surplus value as the limit of surplus labor and the development of the forces of production; (3) money as the limit of production; (4) the restriction of production of use values by exchange value." We will explain later the significance of these "limits" both in terms of economics and the idea of community.

PLEASE NOTE:

Page 103 is lacking in number only. No text is missing. Filmed as received.

UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS

(market or otherwise) which he does not actively pose for himself.¹¹ Capital--the form of production of estranged labor--ultimately drives toward the realization of this universality with "the cultivation of all the qualities of a social human being, production of the same in a form as rich as possible in needs, because rich in qualities and relations."¹² It is so driven because it defines all human qualities as needs which the market can satisfy; voids which products can fill. But it is precisely this development of the multi-side, communal essence of man which "encounters its barrier in capital itself"¹³ because capital has made "individual life in its abstract form the purpose of the life of the species . . ."¹⁴ Instead of the social human being whose richness is a function of his multi-dimensional social relations, capital rests on the private, atomized individual whose predominant relation to the world--natural and human--is a possessive one; i.e., a relation of having.

¹¹Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, edit., Dirk Struik, (New York: International Pub., 1964), p. 112.

¹²Marx, Grundrisse, op. cit., p. 409.

¹³Ibid., p. 325

¹⁴Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, op. cit., p. 113

Potential social wealth is fettered in capitalism by the requirement that all needs be translated into commodity forms so that human association is still mediated by things--people coalesce around their common sets of possessions. By postulating the "definedness of individuals . . . as developed into an objective restriction of the individual by relations independent of him and sufficient unto themselves,"¹⁵ capital sets the limits to its apparently infinite development. Individuals can still only develop in limited ways--although now the limits appear as impersonal laws of the market affecting all with the same barriers. Capital "creates the material elements for the development of the rich individuality which is as all-sided in its production as in its consumption. . .,"¹⁶ but the realization of this "rich individuality" demands positive supercession of capital itself:

The universality towards which [capital] irresistibly strives encounters barriers in its own nature, which will, at a certain stage of its development, allow it to be recognized as being itself the greatest barrier to this tendency, and hence will drive toward its own suspension.¹⁷

¹⁵ Marx, Grundrisse, p. 164, emphasis added.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 325.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 410.

That is, the "rich individuality" which capitalism projects requires a richness of social relations which capitalism cannot satisfy because it defines relations in strictly material terms; i.e., wedded to the commodity form.

The revolutionary form of the supersession of capital rests equally upon the fullest possible conception of social emancipation as opposed to individual successes. In a system of exchange, Marx argues, ties of personal dependence, differences in status, rank and education, etc., appear inconsequential when compared to truly "individual" differences (anyone who tries can get ahead; equality of opportunity, etc). "Individuals seem independent . . . free to collide with one another and engage in exchange within this freedom . . ." But this freedom and independence is merely illusory and can be grasped only by abstracting from the "conditions of existence within which these individuals enter into contact"; i.e., abstracted from the very real social structure of class relations which still operates beneath the market. If the situation of freedom is examined more closely it will be understood that it is.

impossible for the individuals of a class, etc., to overcome them en masse without destroying them. A particular individ-

ual may by chance get on top of these relations, but the mass of those under their rule cannot, since their mere existence expresses subordination, the necessary subordination of the mass of individuals.¹⁸

We need to follow carefully the line of development of this insight by tracing the evolution of Marx's thoughts on community from the abstractly philosophical reference to the "welfare of mankind" through the critique of state, civil society, and its "anatomy," political economy, all ultimately united by the threads of his revolutionary program.

While it would be an exaggeration to argue that the formative period of Marx's intellectual life--his studies in philosophy and law at Bonn and Berlin, his editorship of the Rheinische Zeitung, etc., --determined his later preoccupations, the major events of this period of his life are not without significance. Nor should environmental factors be altogether ignored when discussing the development of the theory of one who could write the following: "It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social

¹⁸Ibid., p.164. Current analyses of the necessary limits to "equality of opportunity," of the boundaries of social mobility under capitalism are to be found in Edwards, Reich & Weiskopf, edit., The Capitalist System, 2nd edition, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1978), especially chapter 3.

existence that determines their consciousness."¹⁹

Consequently, the religious and cultural background of Marx's family, the geography and the largely agricultural economy of Trier, (the city of Marx's birth and early youth) as well as the socio-political climate of this part of the Rhineland which had been annexed to France during the Napoleonic wars and therefore was well-versed in the principles of the French Revolution, only later, in 1814, to be incorporated into Prussia²⁰--all these factors must have been influences which contributed to the development of Marx's critical faculties.²¹ The particular balance of forces between these biographical data and Marx's potential for synthesizing such events into his programmatic studies would be impossible to calculate. Nevertheless, as far as critical turning points are concerned, we should allow Marx himself the forum for rendering judgement:

¹⁹ Marx, Preface to Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, edit., Maurice Dobb, (New York: International Pub., 1970), p. 21.

²⁰ David McLellan, Karl Marx, His Life and Thought, (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), p. 7-8.

²¹ For an assessment of the impact of Marx's early life and upbringing on his philosophical development, see, in addition to McLellan, op. cit., Richard Hunt, The Political Ideas of Marx and Engels, Vol I: Marxism and Totalitarian Democracy, 1818-1850, (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1974).

Although I studied jurisprudence, I pursued it as a subject subordinated to philosophy and history. In the year 1842-43, as editor of the Rheinische Zeitung, I first found myself in the embarrassing position of having to discuss what is known as material interests. The deliberation of the Rhenish Landtag on forest thefts and the division of landed property; the official polemic started by Herr von Schaper, then Oberprasident of the Rhine Province, against the Rheinische Zeitung about the condition of the Moselle peasantry, and finally the debates on free trade and protective tariffs caused me in the first instance to turn my attention to economic questions.²²

Initially convinced that, as Hegel had concluded, the state should be the "realization of freedom," Marx's research into the material conditions of the Prussian state of the 1840's brought him increasingly to the recognition of the fact that the class basis of civil society was the limiting factor of any administration. In the earliest journalistic article we have from Marx's pen "Comments on the Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction," a distinction is made between the ideal of an ethical state and the reality of illiberality in a state

²² Marx, Preface to the Contribution to Critique,

. . . , op. cit., p. 20.

which allows censorship of ideas of a critical tendency. State censorship is the corruption of the presumptive universality of the state into a powerful weapon for the oppression of one faction by another.

The law against a frame of mind is not a law of the state promulgated for its citizens, but the law of one party against another party . . . The moral state assumes its members to have the frame of mind of the state, even if they act in opposition to an organ of the state, against government. But in a society in which one organ imagines itself the sole, exclusive possessor of state reason and state morality, in a government which opposes the people in principle and hence regards its anti-state frame of mind as the general, normal frame of mind, the bad conscience of a faction invents laws against tendency, laws of revenge, laws against a frame of mind which has its seat only in²³ the government members themselves.

Under these conditions, Marx explains, the government "opposes the people in principle" and consequently discloses the fact that a universal law is merely formally universal,--"the legal form contradicts the content"--if the circumstances which support it support the interests of a single part against the whole. In this case, it should be in the interests of the whole,

²³ Marx and Engels, Collected Works, op. cit., I, p. 120.

of the "ethical state" to promote the free discussion of ideas. To suppress points of view which challenge the legitimacy of a single group, to monopolize "state reason" for its own private purposes, is simply the use of state power to achieve private ends.

Marx is here, as in the later articles of the Rheinische Zeitung, using the Hegelian ideal of the state as paradigmatic. The state ought to be the embodiment of rationality, universality, but the "coercive state" violates this principle to extent that it regulates not actions but the intentions of actions. "Laws against tendency, laws giving no objective standards, are laws of terrorism. . . Laws which make their main criterion not actions as such, but the frame of mind of the doer, are nothing but positive sanctions for lawlessness."²⁴ When unmasked, the objective form of the law reveals its subjective content. Despite the fact that Marx is moving in the direction of a general critique of the formal universality of the state, his criticism at this point remains abstract. Marx still allows that the reconciliation of universal and particular interests is possible within the state. His argument still moves within the parameters of political goals achievable

²⁴ Ibid.

within the political community. Within the state,
individual interests are converted into a "sharing"
 in the common endeavor of all citizens:

The term "public" education carried out by the state lies in the rational and public existence of the state; the state itself educates its members by making them its members, by converting the aims of the individual into general aims, crude instinct into moral inclination, natural independence into spiritual freedom, by the individual finding his good life in the life of the whole, and the whole²⁵ in the frame of mind of the individual.

It is the individual's obedience to "civic duty" which gives his individual actions a universal meaning because his citizenship ennobles his cruder instincts by keeping his natural egoism in bounds. (Marx's argument here is strangely reminiscent of Rousseau!)

Yet Marx is incipiently aware of the self-contradictoriness of this 'public' education if it is carried out not with respect to rational, objective goals for the common good, but by particular interests who have bastardized the form of the state and transformed it into a means to their private ends. In his review of the "Debates on Freedom of the Press" Marx remarks

²⁵ Ibid., p. 193.

that his inquiry is instructive not only in terms of the particular question at hand--the freedom of the press--but in terms of the opportunity it affords to view the functioning of the provincial Assembly itself and the interests which guide it. The view that the debates presents is the clearest revelation of the dominance of the "specific estate spirit." As Marx puts it, "the spirit of a definite sphere in society, the individual interest of a particular estate and its natural one-sidedness of character are expressed most bluntly and recklessly and, as it were, show their teeth" in the nature of the polemic against a free press.²⁶ Here, according to Marx, rational arguments become subservient to the interests of the social estate. Dick Howard is correct in observing that Marx is not involved here in the beginnings of "a doctrine of the class determination of ideas," but is attempting to show, following Hegel's ideas of the law as the embodiment of rationality, "that censorship is irrational, and that rational [positive law; consistently liberal criteria] institutions are the only ones which can guarantee freedom."²⁷ The Hegelian argument abounds in the following excerpt:

²⁶ Ibid., p. 138.

²⁷ Dick Howard, Development of Marxian Dialectic, (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1972), p. 36.

From the standpoint of the idea, it is self evident that freedom of the press has a justification quite different from that of censorship because it is itself the embodiment of the idea, an embodiment of freedom, a positive good, whereas censorship is an embodiment of unfreedom, the polemic of a world outlook of semblance against the world outlook of essence; it has a merely negative character.

Translated into liberal terms, we have J. S. Mill's justification of tolerance and his defense of liberty of opinions as found in On Liberty.

A more telling analysis of the limited rationality of the state, one which clearly begins to undermine the Hegelian ideal of the autonomy of the state by calling Marx's "attention to economic questions" is to be found in the "Debates on the Law of Thefts of Wood." Marx's arguments deal with the rationality of proposed laws which would have made the gathering of naturally felled wood on another's property into a criminal offense. The purpose of any state's laws should be to engender freedom, Marx says, not to make freedom the privilege of the few:

The wise legislator will prevent crime in order not to have to punish it, but he will do so not by obstructing the sphere of right, but by doing away with the negative aspect of every instinct of right, giving the latter a

²⁸ Marx, op. cit., p. 154

positive sphere of action. He will not confine himself to removing the impossibility for members of one class to belong to a sphere of higher right, but will raise their class itself to the real possibility of enjoying its rights.²⁹

Marx's idea of the state here borders on notions of a "welfare state": The state can best decrease the necessity of placing limits on the ability to enjoy right, including the right of property, by positively promoting the interests of all of its members by guaranteeing a kind of minimal security. This is what is meant by the state's obligation not only to provide the same opportunities for all ("removing the impossibility . . ."), but to raise the underprivileged to the (economic) conditions within which their right to equal opportunities is a "real possibility." In the event that the state "is not humane, rich and high-minded enough" for this; i.e., if it lacks adequate resources to accomplish these positive goals, the least it must do is to make the punishment fit the crime. To the extent that the state fails in this regard, and the punishment inspires "more repugnance than the offense,"

²⁹Ibid., p. 235..

the (rational) basis of the state is undermined.

Because the proposed wood laws violate the customary "gleaning" rights of the poor which have been "permitted by owners since time immemorial," they do not even meet the minimal criterion of rationality (that the punishment fit the crime).

Not only is the objective content of the law (treating scavanging as a crime) attacked by Marx, the manner of its enactment--the principle guiding it--compromises the formal universality of the law, he argues, and degrades the state by dragging it down to the level of private interest. The state has adopted the perspective of private (partial) interests as its own:

If the state, even in a single respect, stoops so low as to act in the manner of private property instead of its own way, the immediate consequence is that it has to adapt itself in the form of its means to the narrow limits of private property.³⁰

State powers are used to serve private interests.

Because the proposed wood laws are constructed "through the eyes of . . . private interest" the universality of the state is compromised. This universality would be

³⁰Ibid., p. 241, emphasis added.

possible only in a rational state; i.e., a state which regards all its citizens as members of the community instead of seeing them as members of one class or another. The rational state does not cut off the life of any part for the sake of the property of another part:

Private interest makes the one sphere in which a person comes into conflict with this interest into this person's whole sphere of life. But the state must regard the infringer of forest regulations as something more than a wood-pilferer, more than an enemy to wood. Is not the state linked with each of its citizens by a thousand vital nerves, and has it the right to sever all these nerves because this citizen has himself arbitrarily severed one of them? Therefore, the state will regard even an infringer of forest regulations as a human being, a living member of the state, one in whom its heart's blood flows, a soldier who has to defend his Fatherland, a witness whose voice must be heard by the court, a member of the community with public duties to perform, the father of a family, whose existence is sacred,³¹ and above all, a citizen of the state.

Under the proposed laws, the authority of the state has been transformed into "a servant of the forest owner." Instead of the state mediating the particular interests of its citizens, and allowing the realization of the multiclipity of roles--"the thousand vital nerves"--of each, it has allowed one of these (property owning),

³¹Marx, *ibid.*, p. 236

to be treated as if it were universal, as if it were the determinant relation. The result violates the spirit of rational will which ought to govern lawmaking. In its place, private interest rules so that " . . . everything is degraded into an instrument of the forest owner and his interest operates as the soul governing the entire mechanism."³² And by guaranteeing the forest owner compensation for the value of the loss of wood, even the punishment of the crime serves private interests, "the fines going not to the state treasury, but to the private coffers of the forest owners."

Throughout the critique, Marx argues the Hegelian position that the state must maintain its universality against all the demands of private interests--" . . . the state cannot and must not say: a private interest . . . is guaranteed against all contingencies, is immortal." This is against the nature, the essence of the state, which is to rule not on particular issues, but on general principles. Nevertheless, there are indications of the later critique of the limitations of the state itself. Marx, for example, recognizes that the interests of the

³²Ibid., p. 245.

forest owners and their sense of right determined by their position as owners "is directly opposed to the sense of right and fairness in protecting the interests of those . . . who own nothing except themselves."³³

"The form of the state, which is based on representation on the basis of such private interests, fetishizes its principled protection of the "souless abstraction" of private property to the point where everything (rationality, morality, justice, etc.,) is subordinated to it ". . . wooden idols triumph and human beings are sacrificed."³⁴ Ultimately, this insight leads Marx in the direction of a "critical re-examination of the Hegelian philosophy of law," the net result of which is the "conclusion that neither legal relations nor political forms could be comprehended whether by themselves or on the basis of a so-called general development of the human mind, but that on the contrary they originate in the material conditions of life . . ."³⁵

³³ Ibid., p. 256.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 226.

³⁵ Marx, Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, op. cit., p. 20.

The Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right leads Marx to a rejection of the form of the state as the realization of man's universal, communal essence. Hegel's theory of the state as the sphere of perfect freedom was bound up with the presumed identity between particular interests and the state "in the fact that individuals have duties to the state in proportion as they have rights." It was a kind of juridicial definition of freedom: all citizens are accorded equal rights. The state is, to Hegel, the "substantial universal," the ethical whole, the actualization of freedom, because in it, "the individual has his substantial freedom . . . as his own essence, his end and the product of his activity."³⁶ Marx does not attack the intention of Hegel--to realize freedom--but questions whether or not it is possible to resolve the contradiction between the formal universality of the state and the substantive particularism of interests in civil society in strictly political terms. His argument is that Hegel's resolution of the conflict between particular interests and the general will remains abstract, legalistic. Only insofar as the contradictions within civil society are themselves resolved can civil society become

³⁶ Georg Hegel, "The Philosophy of Right" in Carl Friedrich, (edit.) Philosophy of Hegel, (New York: Mod. Library, 1953), p. 280.

truly political. This, however, marks the end of civil society as such; i.e., as separate sphere within the realm of the state:

But the full achievement of this abstraction is at once also the transcendence (Aufhebung) of the abstraction. In actually establishing its political existence as its true existence civil society has simultaneously established its civil existence, in distinction from its political existence, as inessential. And with the one separated, the other, its opposite, falls. Within the abstract political state the reform of voting advances the dissolution of civil society.³⁷

Marx's understanding of the term "political" in the above context is significant. The "true" existence of civil society is "political" existence. "Political" expresses the public; i.e., universal, nature of man's social existence, which for Hegel remains ideal because separate from real, material existence. In Hegel, it is not man's political-social essence which is realized. The political is rather an attribute of the state, a predicate of the Idea which has become "thoroughly subjectivized As the Idea is subjectivized, the actual subjects--civil society, family, circumstance, caprice, etc.,--become unactual, objective moments of the

³⁷ Marx, Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, trans. Jolin and O'Malley, (Cambridge: U. Press, 1970), p. 121.

Idea, meaning something else."³⁸ That is, actual subjects express the reality of the state; their citizenship determines their life, instead of the other way around. Not only is the rationality of the political order separate from civil society, it appears in Hegel as if it were, in fact, opposed to it, being a rationality which develops "behind the curtain" of the phenomenal world. Man's actual experience, an experience of togetherness with others, appears to be the result of his membership in the state; i.e., appears as the result of a separation from his material existence and the adoption of a role: man as citizen. The only thing which in Hegel's system can be universalized is man's radical isolation from others, the historical result of the development of civil society:

The state's rationality thus has nothing to do with the distribution of its content as family and civil society. The state emerges from them in an unconscious and arbitrary way. Family and civil society appear as nature's dark ground³⁹ from which the state's light is kindled.

³⁸ Marx, "Critique of Hegel's . . ." in Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, edit., Loyd Easton and Kurt Guddat, (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1967), p. 155; cf., Jolin and O'Malley, trans., op. cit., p. 8.

³⁹ Marx, in Guddat and Easton, op. cit., p. 154-5, emphasis added.

And not only is this rationality seemingly opposed to the world of "common experience"--everyday reality-- (although it is based upon it--becomes as Hegel says "actualized Spirit" in order to become "object and end for itself"), it is a rationality superimposed on reality (Wirklichkeit) and consequently appears to be autonomous:

[Hegel] does not develop his thinking from the object, but he develops the object by a sort of thinking that he manages, and manages in the abstract sphere of logic . . . The soul of objects, here that of the state, exists and is predestined prior to the body which actually exists only in appearance. The concept is the son in the 'Idea,' the father of god, and driving force, the determining and differentiating principle. 'Idea' and 'concept' are here autonomous abstractions.⁴⁰

Marx is critical of the abstract, seemingly autonomous way in which Hegel treats the development of the state as an organic entity. The totality which Hegel treats as the subject remains an "ideal determination," a kind of "state formalism" and is severely criticized by Marx because it abstracts from the dynamism of history:

. . . Hegel develops merely a state formalism. For him the only material principle is the Idea lacking any passive, any material aspect. In contrast to this abstract Idea, the def-

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 164.

initions of the actual, empirical state formation appear as content. Thus the actual content (here actual man, actual society, etc.) appears as formless, inorganic matter.⁴¹

Thus, the actual structure of society appears as the result of the activity of the state. Instead of viewing political forms as the result of socio-economic structures, Hegel makes the political form into an autonomous principle, and the atomism of civil society a reflection of it. In Hegel, the truly concrete (Wirklichkeit) is grasped as a "moment" within which the concept actualizes itself. It is true, as Marx allows, that Hegel recognized that the state has a natural basis in civil society, but the latter displays a rationality (a structure) which is not its own; it becomes a mundane manipulandum ("formless matter") conforming to the determinations of "the mystical idea." If civil society is the world of "private" affairs, Hegel has understood this as the necessary result of the development of the modern state which treats public affairs as the affairs of each individual. To Marx, it is necessary to grasp this separation of civil society and the state as the product of history and not the emanation of the Idea; i.e., as the pre-condition to the development of the modern state

⁴¹Ibid., p. 196-7.

and not the result. Otherwise, one is left with Hegel's position of imagining that political forms are truly independent, and can achieve, given the proper form, a universality which civil society itself does not directly possess. Marx's stress is on the historical determinants of the division of life into a "public" and a "private" sphere, which no amount of "state formalism" can overcome. The bifurcation (alienation) of life in modern society cannot be resolved in the political sphere alone. Such an attempt ignores precisely those determinations (class differentiation) which compromise the universality of the political realm. As Avinieri puts it, Marx's point was not that the state reflected class interests, but that its claim to "appear" as the general interest could be shown to be a cloak for class interests.⁴² Marx's entire critique of Hegel develops, in a germinating form, the essence of his method as critical exposition of the illusions of abstract idealism.

In all this, Marx is clearly indebted to Feuerbach's "invertive method," but his analysis of the self-contradictoriness of the Hegelian system goes beyond a criticism of Hegel's metaphysical axioms in its search

⁴²Shlomo Avinieri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, (Cambridge: University Press, 1971), p. 25.

For the appropriate mediation. Marx is developing in the Critique the elements of his own alternative method. Hegel established purely artificial (formal) links between civil society and the state so that only an "external identity" exists. The reason for this lies in Hegel's presupposition of the separation between actual life and political life, between civil society and the state. It is on the basis of this presumed separation that all of Hegel's dilemmas develop. Hegel's entire system is riddled with this fundamental antithesis which leads him necessarily to the "unresolved dualism" of postulating man's social existence--"common, particular interest"--as lying outside the sphere of the state--the "completely existent universal." Marx's comment is caustic: "As though the people [das Volk] were not the real state. The state is an abstraction, the people alone is the concrete."⁴³ Instead of conceiving the state as the mode of realization of the political qualities of individuals Hegel transforms this essential quality of particular individuals into an abstraction. He makes the "publicness" of decision-making inherent in the state form, and opposes particular individuality to it:

⁴³ Marx, in Jolin and O'Malley, op. cit., p. 28.

[Hegel] forgets that particular individuality is a human individual, and that the activities and agencies of the state are human activities. He forgets that the nature of the particular person is not his beard, his blood, his abstract physis, but rather his social quality, and that the activities of the state, etc., are nothing but the modes of existence and operation of the social qualities of men. ⁴⁴

Within Hegel's system, the individual can act as citizen only by denying "his own actual, empirical reality" and is thus forced to "undertake an essential schism within himself." The citizen exists only as an individual. That is, his "existence as citizen is an existence lying outside the realm of his communal existence, and is thus purely individual."⁴⁵ The state does not act as the mode of realization of man's communal being (Gemeinwesen) but as its negation. In fact, citizenship is only an illusory transcendence of the divisions of civil society which remain as determinate of political status as ever. Contrary to what Hegel wanted to achieve--the identity of civil society and the political state--he in fact hypostasizes the separation of civil society and the state by making "the Estates the expression of the

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 22, emphasis added.

⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 78, emphasis added.

separation." That is, he takes the fact of modern life--the non-political (unofficial; i.e., private) character of the classes of civil society--as the formative principle of "legislative society."

Consequently, he makes private, atomistic interests the basis of the state's power; and although he senses the separation of political life and civil society to be a contradiction, he is unable to transcend it in anything but thought. He simply posits identity where there is diversity and leaves the atomized individual untouched. Hegel has given formal expression to the "estrangement" of civil society; he has not eliminated it. His state is nothing more than a rationalization of the division of interests in civil society. Taking abstract individuality as the premise of his political system, it matters little whether Hegel's legislature exhibits principles of representative deliberation or direct participation, "the essence of the subject--individuality" remains the same, says Marx, because "allness remains merely an external plurality or totality of individuals."⁴⁶

The point is, Marx argues, to develop "allness" as the "essential, spiritual, actual quality of the individual,"

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 117.

to bring forth the "ultimate social reality of man," instead of opposing man's social existence to his individual existence as a purely external form. In place of the "private man of the present day political constitution" who regards his activity and labor as mere means to the accomplishment of the final end: individual existence, man ought to be regarded "as a communal individual, as a communal being [ein Gemeinwesen]," but to do so implies transcending the conditions which sustain the divisions between private existence and the public realm.⁴⁷

"Empirical existence"--actual, human existence--ought to be brought to its truth, instead of "bringing the truth to empirical existence. . ."⁴⁸ The "truth" of empirical existence to Marx is that man's activity is an expression of his sociality. The fact that his activity has come to be viewed as the means to life, rather than as a direct expression of his sociality, is an historical result of the development of certain institutions, the dynamics of which Marx senses the necessity to explore in order to be able to overcome alienation instead of postulating it as if it was ineradicable.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 81.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 39.

Methodologically, Marx's critique implies not only a reversal of Hegel's presentation--making "the real point of departure" not the idea, but the actual subject--but points in the direction of a dialectically developed notion of human subjectivity. Marx repudiates Hegel for the "uncritical character" of his philosophy which is based on "bad empirical grounds"--treating the data of experience as predicates of the Idea:

Thus, empirical actuality is admitted just as it is, and is also said to be rational; but not rational because of its own reason, but because the empirical fact in its empirical existence has a significance which is other than itself.⁴⁹

To Marx, Hegel has missed the essential point. Instead of understanding the historical process by which civil society and the state have come to be separated, Hegel postulated this determining activity as the product of the "Idea." He took the fact of alienation "just as it is" and consequently was forced to go outside history for the "history" of the fact. This is the essential mistake of all speculation which winds up rationalizing existing material conditions.

Hegel could have avoided this error of developing the "fact of logic" instead of the "logic of the fact" by

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 9.

simply starting "with the real subjects as the bases of the state." If analysis begins with real subjects, then the state must develop as a mode of their self-realization in accord with their nature, their "specific essence." Indeed, not only the state, but all forms of social existence (Marx calls them species-forms, Gattungsgestaltungen), "appear as qualities inhering in subjects," instead of emanations of an abstract Idea. In Marx's analysis, it is because man's essence is communal (gemeinwesen) that he becomes an individual (" . . . modes of man's social being . . . appear as his actualized universality, and hence also as something common to all men").⁵⁰ Hegel, on the contrary, makes man's individuality (the private person) the basis of the state, the basis of public affairs, and is left with the hapless position of super-imposing an identity of interests onto a system which is fundamentally self-contradictory; he is left with a "dualistic unity."⁵¹ Thus, Hegel opposes the sovereignty of the people to the sovereignty of the monarch, instead of deriving the latter from the former; he structures the legislature on the basis

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 119.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 48.

of dualistic interests and then sets the executive (bureaucracy) over against it as "superintendents." He gives "logic a political body; he does not give the logic of the political body."⁵² The logic of the political body can only be determined by a philosophy which not only demonstrates the "facts" of modern existence, but develops the historical determinants of these facts:

Thus, true philosophical criticism of the present state constitution not only shows the contradictions as existing, but explains them, grasps [Begreift] their essence and necessity. It comprehends their own proper significance. However, this comprehension [Begreifen] does not, as Hegel thinks, consist in everywhere recognizing the determination of the logical concept [das logischen Begriffe], but rather in grasping⁵³ the proper logic of the proper object.

For Marx, the "proper object" is "true social actuality," that is to say, the adequate actualization of human existence, of the truly "socialized man." And for Marx, the only proper form within which the dualism of the private man and the citizen can be overcome is democracy:

Democracy is the resolved mystery of all constitutions. Here the constitution not only in itself, according to essence, but

⁵²Ibid., p. 48.

⁵³Ibid., p. 92.

according to existence and actuality is returned to its real ground, actual man, the actual people, and established as its own work. The constitution appears ⁵⁴ as what it is, the free product of men.

The reason why this dualism is overcome, Marx argues, is because the political as a separate sphere, in opposition to civil society, disappears; form and content are identified in actuality. Hegel's mistake was to have confused the political nature of the people's existence as a whole with political formalism.⁵⁵ On the other hand, democracy is the truly political community since public affairs have become actually public; i.e., no longer the affairs of an individual but of society; social needs are investigated politically; i.e., by the whole of the state in its social sense.⁵⁶ Democracy realizes "the drive of civil society to give itself political existence, or to make political existence its actual existence."

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 29-30.

⁵⁵ Marx's description of the bureaucracy as a "circle from which no one can escape" is relevant at this juncture. Although we cannot go into the details of his criticism at this point, suffice it to say that the main point is that the universal aims of the state, which the bureaucracy is supposed to embody, become its "private property" insofar as the bureaucracy continually attempts to maintain the status quo, upon which it depends for its existence as such, at all costs. Ibid., p. 44-49, esp.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 65, p. 120.

That civil society can become political society is based on Marx's understanding of the fundamental sociality of human activity and human needs:

For example, the shoemaker is my representative insofar as he fulfills a social need, just as every definite social activity, because it is a species-activity, represents the species; that is to say, it represents a determination of my own essence the way every man is the representative of the other. Here, he is representative not by virtue of something other than himself which he represents, but by virtue of what he is and does.⁵⁷

Despite his reliance on the philosophical jargon of the idealist tradition (species-activity, etc.), Marx's point here contains the essential elements of his more "mature" works: In the Grundrisse we read, for example, of the possibility of "the cultivation of all the qualities of the social being . . . production of this being as the most total and universal possible social product, for, in order, to take gratification in a many-sided way, he must be capable of many pleasures [Genussfähig], hence cultured to a high degree . . ." ⁵⁸ It is man's uniqueness and his activity itself which establishes his connection with others. This fundamental relatedness to

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 119-120.

⁵⁸ Grundrisse, op. cit., p. 409.

others (Gemeinwesen) is the basis for civil society's becoming political: by overcoming the individualistic, privatistic tendencies of civil society which treat man as merely an individual who actualizes himself only in his political role, and as a consequence comes to view all of the other bonds--of family, community, etc.--as ties that "he can just as well throw off." Dick Howard correctly observes that Marx's use of the term Gattungswesen (species-being, generic being) focuses attention on the possibilities inherent in living the truly human life. When "understood as an historically changing concrete universal, the notion of generic being becomes a powerful tool in the analysis of the relations of the individual to the community, and the possibility of changing them."⁵⁹ Adam Schaff echoes this interest when he writes that Marx's "analysis of 'species being' sheds additional light on the evolution of the notion of the social individual in Marxian anthropology," although he is quick to point out that Marx's understanding of the human individual deepens and becomes increasingly concrete as he moves away from the Feuerbachian idea of materialism.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Howard, Development of Marxian Dialectic, op. cit., p. 179.

⁶⁰ Adam Schaff, Marxism and the Human Individual, (New York: McGraw Hill, 1969), p. 83.

But what does Marx mean by democracy as the realization of the drive of civil society to become political? What is meant by the direct sociality of human activity (that the shoemaker is my representative because he "fulfills a social need")? What is the implication of speaking of man's nature as gemeinwesen or das kommunistische Wesen des Menschen? The issue that needs resolution, as Jean Hyppolite has put it, revolves around the contention that while Marx obviously allowed for "the possibility of an authentic existence of man, compatible with his social nature. . . he never exactly defines this social nature of man, and his ambiguity on this point has dire consequences."⁶¹ Quite ironically, the question that emerges from this consideration of Marx's critique of Hegel's theory of the state is whether or not Marx's conception of community as the true social actuality of man, and his assumption that man's existence no longer needed to be opposed to his essence (i.e., the individual no longer needed to exist in opposition to society) is "possible on the historical plane and not just at the level of thought?"⁶²

⁶¹Jean Hyppolite, Studies on Marx and Hegel, (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1973), p. 116.

⁶²Ibid., p. 124-5.

It is my contention that the answer to the question depends upon the way it is posed; i.e., whether one accepts the premise of the question; viz., that Marx looked forward to an "end of history," or a "complete suppression" of tension, of conflict. In contrast to this premise, I will argue that Marx's conception of the community represented a mediated unity--precisely what he claimed Hegel failed to achieve because he established merely the illusory external unity of the political state, a "unity" which abstracted from the disunity of civil society. Further his conception of community was an historical idea; i.e., man had to come to an awareness of the fact that the wealth of capitalism⁶³ represented the objectification (Vergegenständlichung) of man's "communal relations," although in alienated form, and this wealth had to be comprehended as the objective basis for the realization of social man in the "entire wealth of his being." What is implied is that the system of exploitation of man by man comes to an end in socialism, but by no means does

⁶³The wealth of capitalism is not simply the "surplus value" which capitalism, generates although this is a significant measure. Rather it represents "the entire world which [the worker] constructs to capitalist specifications. . . ." Martin Nicolaus, "The Unknown Marx" in Ideology in Social Science, edit., Robin Blackburn, (Bungay, Suffolk: Fontana Press, 1972), p. 322. Through his own creative labor, the worker has made a world rich in the all-sidedness of relations and capacities (aesthetic, social, economic, etc.), which nevertheless impoverishes him. We will explore this further later.

this suggests that all "tension," conflict, etc., is transcended. Rather, the resolution of social conflict is a process which becomes "politicized"; i.e., subject to the control of the community itself, instead of resolved "automatically" by the forces of the market place, or "bureaucratically" in a political state which relates to the content of conflict, to the political issues of the times, merely "as organizing form, or really only as the determining, limiting intelligence which says now 'yes,' now 'no' without any content of its own."⁶⁴ In Marx's terms, social needs become "public affairs." Indeed, Marx is quite emphatic that communism does not represent the end of history--of man's mediated interaction with nature and with his fellow man--but its beginning.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ Marx, Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, trans., Jolin and O'Malley, op.cit., p. 30. There is an obvious connection implied here between Marx's early critique of bureaucracy, to which I alluded in the footnote above, and Habermas' allegations that Marx himself transformed his philosophy into a kind of "technocratic" socialism. We will consider the degree to which these allegations are well-founded or not at a later juncture.

⁶⁵ Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, op. cit., p. 246.

CHAPTER III

Thus far we have merely alluded to Marx's rather suggestive definition of the human essence as communal existence which emerged in his critique of Hegel's theory of the state. The individual in Hegel's theory is taken as the basic unit of political action. There is an element of irony in all this, Marx suggests. The idea of politics implies a kind of public decision-making. But if this public process is the result of the balance of private, individualistic forces it loses its distinctively public quality. The "public" will is bent "whither the greater force carries it," to quote Locke, rather than being oriented towards the common good.¹ The individual citizen, participating in the life of the state, denies the social qualities of his own life because he must abstract from them in order to perform his civic duties. His citizenship represents his distance from, his separation, from others. In fact, his particular qualities--his status, class, activity, etc.,--are

¹ Marx's critique here anticipates current criticisms of the limitation of modern pluralist approaches to decision-making. See Robert P. Wolff, The Poverty of Liberalism, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968).

completely unimportant from the view of the state. He is one among many who are theoretically as anonymous as he.

In reality, Marx suggests, this equality before the law masks the very real differences which prevail in civil society. These differences are in fact contradictions which are glossed over in Hegel's legalistic community, but which emerge in the form of conflicts of interest, the resolution of which requires that the state side with one interest against another.² The only way out of this dilemma is to overcome the atomism of civil society; i.e., to overcome the dichotomous existence into which the individual is driven by the historical separation of civil society and the

²See Marx's analysis of the place of property in Hegel's system. Marx remarks, for example, that Hegel has made the "political constitution" into "the constitution of private property" because of his emphasis on the institution of primogeniture as a guarantee that the landed nobility will be a class suited for political positions. Hegel's support of primogeniture, says Marx, severs the social nerves of private property, thus securing its isolation from civil society. As a consequence, the state comes to serve the interests of private property even though it pretends to be independent. This political independence, Marx argues, is not the result of the constitution of the state, but rather is a function of private property: "At its highest levels, the state appears as private property, whereas private property should appear as property of the civil quality, Hegel makes political citizenship, existence and sentiment into a quality of private property." Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, trans., Jolin and O'Malley, (Cambridge: University Press, 1970), p. 111; see entire discussion pp. 44-115.

state, of the private and public realms. This separation means that in order to participate in the public realm, "to behave as an actual citizen of the state," a man must "retire . . . into his individuality."³ The point is, Marx argues, to discover the historical conditions which have separated man's social activity from his public life, which have separated "the commonwealth (das Gemeinwesen), the communal being (das kommunistische Wesen), within which the individual exists"⁴ from political activity. Only when these conditions have been overcome (aufgehoben), will it be possible to speak of "public affairs become actually public . . . when they are no longer the affair of an individual but of society. This changes not only the form but also the content."⁵

It is important to emphasize that Marx recognized the necessity of not only changing the form of the state (e.g., from monarchy to republic), but the "contents" as

³ Marx, op cit., p. 78.

⁴ Ibid., p. 79.

⁵ Ibid., p. 65, emphasis added.

well.⁶ It is the structure of civil society, wherein "individual existence is the final end, while activity, labor, content, etc., are merely means"⁷ which must itself be transformed. Marx calls the social form which expresses man's communal essence "democracy," which he describes as a condition within which "the political state disappears [der politische Staat untergehe]":

. . . democracy is the essence of every political constitution, socialized man under the form of a particular constitution of the state. It stands related to other constitutions as the genus to its species, only here the genus itself appears as existent, and therefore opposed as a particular species to those existents which do not conform to the essence.

⁶ Dick Howard makes a similar point in his analysis of Marx's idea of democracy. Later, however, in his discussion of Marx's elaborate analysis of the contradictions of civil society in "On the Jewish Question" he argues that "Marx's defense of democracy was based on an argument which looked only at the political forms and examined them in too abstract or 'idealistic' a manner. . . ." Dick Howard, Development of the Marxian Dialectic, (Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press, 1972), p. 69, p. 109. While the conclusion that Marx was "too abstract" is warranted, the reason is not that Marx viewed the problem from a strictly political perspective--Marx clearly talks of a change of form and content--but that Marx was developing a methodology in his critique; was pointing out a direction for analysis, and followed it through in his later works. Clearly, the definitions become more concrete as the method is applied.

⁷ Marx, op. cit., p. 81.

Democracy relates to all other forms of the state as their Old Testament. Man does not exist because of the law but rather the law exists for the good of man. Democracy is human existence, while in the other⁸ political forms man has only legal existence.

It should be apparent from the foregoing that Marx is not identifying democracy with any narrow procedural definition.⁹ He clearly distinguishes his idea of democracy from any juridical conception of freedom or equality. These remain hollow forms if they mask the real, social inequities which still prevail. The point is to give expression to man's socialized essence; i.e., to begin to treat social bonds of "activity, labor, content, etc.," as something more than "merely means." This cannot be accomplished within the realm of the state, as Hegel would have it, but requires the positive supersession of the separation of civil society and the state. Marx's goal is not political emancipation of any one class, but the transcendence of class relations altogether. This is why he is critical of the accomplishments of the French Revolution which, although progressive from the point of

⁸Ibid., p. 31, 30.

⁹At a later juncture he does discuss the importance of voting reform, but even this is not confined within procedural limits. Rather, Marx describes it as "the drive of civil society to give itself political existence," thus making the state, as a separate sphere, superfluous. (Ibid., pp121-2).

view of the medieval era, "completed the transformation of the political classes into social classes, in other words, made the class distinctions of civil society into merely social distinctions pertaining to private life -but meaningless in political life."¹⁰ The French Revolution thus marked the culmination of the separation of political life and civil society, of the "citoyen" and the "bourgeois."

The question which needs to be considered is whether Marx's conception of democracy as the realized communal essence of man, as the resolution of the conflict between the individual and society, is defined in sufficiently concrete terms to allow us to absolve Marx of the same idealistic tendencies of which he accused Hegel. True, there are ample allusions to "man's socialized essence"; to the desire to overcome the separation of civil society and the state; to recognize man's social existence as an end in itself; and to resolve the contradiction between man's communal existence and his purely individual citizenship; but beyond these references, does Marx offer us any systematic analysis of the resolution of these antinomies? In Hyppolite's phrase, "can the political and

¹⁰Ibid., p. 80.

social dualism which Hegel failed to resolve, be resolved once for all, as Marx believed?"¹¹ Hyppolite's contention is that Marx himself should be accused of abstract speculation because he failed to recognize the necessity of conflict in an "existantial drama of history" and instead opted for a complete suppression ("positive synthesis") of all conflict between the private man and the citizen; i.e., "an end of [the] historical drama." The irony is, Hyppolite claims, that Hegel postulated "an endless dialectical development whereas Marx looked forward to an end of history."¹² The answer to this question of whether or not Marx resolved political and social dualism rests with our assessment of the intention of Marx's analysis of Hegel's theory of the state.

Within the confines of the Kritik, it is apparent that Hyppolite is correct when he asserts that Marx "does not include any definite solution to the problem" he raises.¹³ Nevertheless, a number of observations are appropriate.

¹¹Jean Hyppolite, "Marx's Critique of the Hegelian Concept of the State" in Studies on Marx and Hegel, trans., John O'Neill, (N.Y. Harper, 1973), p. 120.

¹²Ibid., p. 116-117.

¹³Ibid., p. 119.

First, Marx's critique remained incomplete. It is possible to infer, on the basis of several "clues" given by Marx himself that he intended to develop some of his insights in more detail later on in the work.¹⁴ One could even argue that the 1844 Manuscripts, in addition to the intervening commentaries such as On the Jewish Question, as well as several journalistic articles written about the same time, represent an obvious continuance of the analysis of civil society, and the attempt to define the concept of community more concretely. Second, the significance of Marx's critique of Hegel, as Marx himself remarked retrospectively in the introduction to the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, written in 1857, was the initial elaboration of an alternative method to Hegel's understanding of politics as independent of "the material conditions of life." Marx argued that his inquiry led him to the conclusion that legal relations and political forms could not be understood apart from the material conditions within which they originated. Marx's confrontation with Hegel enabled him to discover that only by grounding his

¹⁴For example, the indication that he intended to develop his analysis of "civil society" further. Marx, op. cit., p. 82.

dialectical analysis on materialistic premises - by standing the dialectic 'right side up again' - would it be possible to "discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell."¹⁵ Marx's entire project then is capsulated in his critique of Hegel - he begins with some remarks about Hegel's method, arguing, following Feuerbach, that Hegel had made the categories of abstract logic into subjects, and contends that if he had started instead with "real subjects as the basis of the state", he would have avoided all the subsequent mystifications which Marx analyzes. In particular, Hegel would have avoided the error of imagining he could develop a form (the political state) appropriate to man's universal essence, without developing the modes of man's social (material) existence as "actualization and objectification of man's essence." Instead of beginning with a "mystical point of departure (the Idea), Hegel should have begun with "the real subject and [examined] its objectification [Vergegenständlichung]." ¹⁶ The "objectification" of the individual, to Marx, is the commonwealth (das Gemeinwesen), the communal being (das kommunistische Wesen). ¹⁷

¹⁵ Karl Marx, Afterword to the second German edition of Capital (1873), trans. Moore and Aveling, (N.Y.: International, 1967), I, p. 20.

¹⁶ Critique of Hegel's. . . op. cit., p. 40, 24.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 79.

Marx is led to this hypothesis of the necessity of transforming social reality itself to conform with man's essentially social nature, instead of the purely political transformation which Hegel affects, on the basis of his methodological critique alone. As Avinieri puts it:

Marx turned to economic and historical studies only after his exegesis of Hegel had proved to him that the economic sphere ultimately determines politics and makes the Hegelian postulate of the universality of political life into a mere dream. Marx arrived at this conclusion not through an economic or historical study, but by applying Feuerbach's method to Hegel. He must thus be considered a materialistic at this period, and the dichotomy between a young, "humanistic", "idealist" Marx vis-a-vis an older "determinist", "materialist" Marx has no foundation whatsoever in the Marxian texts themselves.¹⁸

From now on, Marx's concern will be with an examination of the means of actualizing the community which he describes in these early works as democracy. At this point he has elaborated a method for describing man's essence as communal; in the subsequent writings he will attempt to apply this to the analysis of the relations of "civil society" which must be transformed in order for this community to be realized. In other words, he will attempt to define the community more and more concretely.

In a letter to Ruge, Marx highlights themes which he believes ought to become the central focus of the political

¹⁸ Shlomo Avinieri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx, (Cambridge: University Press, 1967), p. 38-9.

journal he and Ruge are preparing - the Deutsche-Französische Jahrbücher. Marx, for example, remarks that only the feeling of freedom "can again transform society into a community of human beings united for their highest aims, into a democratic state."¹⁹ The present, Marx argues, bears within its womb the conditions for constructing "a new type of humanity" which cannot be contained within the "philistine state." The task of philosophy should be to "expose the old world to the full light of day and shape the new one in a positive way."²⁰ Marx is here obviously continuing themes he had developed in his earlier critique of Hegel - namely, that the purpose of philosophy should be to clarify, not observe, the developing momentum for social change. In his last letter to Ruge, in which he expresses the necessity for making the Deutsche-Französische Jahrbücher into a journal of critical philosophy whose main focus should be the "ruthless criticism of all that exists," regardless of whether this puts it into opposition "with the powers that be," (perhaps ever because of such opposition), Marx is intent on emphasizing that he is opposed to "raising any dogmatic banner."²¹ This would only substitute abstract

¹⁹ Marx to Ruge, May, 1843, in Marx/Engels, Collected Works, (London; Lawrence and Wishart, 1975), III, p. 137.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 141.

²¹ Marx to Ruge, May, 1843, Ibid, p. 142.

sloganeering for the critical project of self-clarification which Marx feels is essential. The tendency to lapse into dogmatic abstraction is what Marx identifies with "existing communism as taught by Cabet, Dezamy, Weitling, etc." He calls it a "special, one-sided realization of the socialist principle" because of its tendency to identify communism with the abolition of private property--a point which, Marx adds, demonstrates that this version of the "humanistic principle . . . is still infected by its antithesis--the private system."²²

What broader understanding of the "humanistic principle" Marx has in mind is not at all apparent from this letter. But his intention in raising the issue was not to identify socialism with any ready-made set of principles; rather, it was to outline the broad parameters of critique:

The critic can therefore start out from any form of theoretical and practical consciousness and from the forms peculiar to existing reality develop the true reality as its obligation and its final goal. As far as real life is concerned, it is precisely the political state--in all its modern forms--which, even where it is not yet consciously imbued with socialist demands, contains the demands of reason. And the political state does not stop there. Everywhere it assumes that reason has been realized. But precisely because of that it everywhere becomes involved in the contradiction between its ideal function and the real prerequisites.²³

²²Ibid., p. 143.

²³Ibid., p. 143.

The critic, Marx explains, has to deal with the real issues of the times, both of a theoretical and practical nature. He cannot eschew real conflict or real political struggles because these are supposedly beneath the level of the principles to which he subscribes. On the contrary, Marx exclaims, one must make the issues of everyday reality ("the subjects which form the main interest of Germany today"²⁴) the starting point and demonstrate the contradictions contained within the present by exposing the discrepancy between "existing reality" and "true reality."

Nevertheless, though Marx is attempting to apply the methodology he developed in his critique of Hegel once again to the conditions which he claimed Hegel idealized -- the contradictions of modern political state -- his own efforts seem to be circumscribed by an idealist enterprise. Marx seems to argue that critique itself is sufficient to realize the "demands of reason." By explaining to the world the meaning of its own action, a "reform of consciousness" is accomplished." It will then be evident to the world, Marx continues, that what it has long dreamed of possessing is "something of which it has only to be conscious in order to possess it in reality."²⁵

²⁴Ibid.

²⁵Ibid, p. 144, emphasis added.

There appears to be no clear sense of the later carefully outlined idea of the dialectical unity of theory and practice. Very much influenced by Feuerbach's accomplishments in the field of religion, to which he refers in this letter, Marx seems to believe that there will be an automatic response in practice to the insights of critical theory. His abstract references to "socialism", "humanism" and the "demands of reason" seem to complete the idealistic picture.

However, despite the idealistic overtones, the main thrust of the correspondence reveals a Marx attempting to develop the implications of his redefinition of Hegel's method. He strongly opposed Ruge's desire to reduce the journal to a forum for the exchange of philosophical ideas. Marx wanted to give it a decidedly ideological function, without, however, adhering dogmatically to an ideological position. His assertion that nothing should prevent them from "participation in politics," if the situation demanded it, was accompanied by a refusal to identify the task of the journal with the striking of doctrinaire poses.

We do not say to the world: Cease your struggles, they are foolish, we will give you the true slogan of struggle. We merely show the world what it is really fighting for, and consciousness is something that it has to acquire, even if it does not want to.²⁶

²⁶ Ibid, p. 144.

Thus, although Marx acknowledged the role of consciousness-raising, he emphasized the necessity to link this to the ongoing struggles for practical change. As Marx himself turned to the analysis of the issues of the times, his revolutionary emphasis became more apparent.

In a series of articles initially published in the "Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher" -- "On the Jewish Question," "Introduction to the Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law" and "Critical Marginal Notes on the Article by a Prussian" -- Marx pursues several themes; (a) a continuation of the critique of the consequences of the separation of civil society and the state; (b) a critique of the limits of political emancipation, as opposed to the realization of man's communal essence (human emancipation); (c) the development of the importance of analyzing materialist preconditions for "human emancipation and (d) the importance of revolutionary transformation, as opposed to idealist transformation, of the status quo. We will endeavor to explore all these themes insofar as they contribute to a clarification of Marx's focus on the problem of community as the attempt to realize the universal in man; i.e. to overcome the separation between man's social existence and his political life.

The main point emphasized in On the Jewish Question is a continuation of Marx's earlier analysis of the atomism of civil society. The immediate impetus behind the analysis was the publication of Bruno Bauer's "Commentaries" on the issue of Jewish emancipation in Ruge's Deutsch Jahrbücher. In Marx's opinion, Bauer skirted the essential point. Instead of dealing with the issue of emancipation and human freedom in a direct manner, Bauer circumscribed the analysis by asking the wrong question. He deals only with civic emancipation, with political abolition of religion or with political freedom instead of investigating "the relation of political emancipation to human emancipation."²⁷ But it is precisely this which demands clarification, viz., criticism must become criticism of the state. When the state itself is examined it will be apparent that the perfection of the state (the completely secular state) in no way contradicts the existence of religion, in fact, in those states which are the most emancipated, politically, religion displays "a fresh and vigorous vitality." The reason is to be found not in the durability of religion per se, but in the fact that by abolishing religion as a qualification for public office, or participation in political activity, the state in fact legitimates it as a force in the private sphere (civil society):

²⁷Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question" in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engel, Collected Works, op. cit., III, p. 149.

Since in the existence of religion is the existence of a defect, the source of this defect can only be sought in the nature of the state itself. We no longer regard religion as the cause, but only as the manifestation of secular narrowness. Therefore we explain the religious limitations of the free citizens by their secular limitations. We do not assert that they must overcome their religious narrowness, we assert that they will overcome their religious narrowness once they get rid of their secular narrowness.²⁸

The point is not for people to renounce religion or for the state to be asked to grant religious freedom. In either case the result would simply be a formal change (as Hegel had achieved merely formal universality in his state.) The point is to overcome the secular narrowness and isolation of civil society itself. To understand what Marx means by "secular narrowness" we should follow his critique of civil society completely.

Religion, in the "perfect state" becomes a matter of private concern, just as all other individual "distinctions of birth, social rank, education, occupation" are declared to be "non-political distinctions." But abolishing religion (or property, etc.) to the private realm allows these distinctions "to act in their way, i.e. as private property, as education, as occupations and to exert the influence of their special nature."²⁹

²⁸Ibid, p. 151.

²⁹Ibid, p. 153.

Religion thus becomes yet another expression of the egoism of civil society, of the isolation of individuals from one another. In civil society, Marx writes, the realm in which man acts as a private individual, man "regards other men as a means, degrades himself into a means, and becomes the plaything of alien powers."³⁰ Freedom, of a religious nature or otherwise, thus becomes illusory -- the possession of the freedom to exist in a fundamentally unequal and alienated social order -- and the state's universality is not real, but based on the very real particular differences which it presupposes and in fact sustains:

Far from abolishing these real distinctions, the state only exists on the presupposition of their existence; it feels itself to be a political state and asserts its universality only in opposition to these elements of its being.³¹

Religion thus becomes the "expression of man's separation from his community, from himself and from other men," precisely because it becomes a purely individual affair.³²

Marx once again makes use of the metaphor of the individual's leading a "two-fold life" in the modern state, that is, his individual existence is seen as separate from his communal existence, the private and the public are sundered. More over, the community is a fiction, because the sphere of abstract freedom within the state is one in which the individual is nothing more than the imaginary member

³⁰ Ibid., p. 154, emphasis added.

³¹ Ibid., p. 153.

³² Ibid., p. 155.

of an illusory sovereignty." "Imaginary," because the real difference and conflicts which prevail in civil society infect the realm of the state, and citizenship cannot compensate for the divisiveness; and "illusory" because the sovereignty of the state is in fact a derivative of the divisions of civil society upon which it is based. The conflict within which the individual finds himself within his citizenship, and with other members of the community, is a reflection of the separation of the political state and civil society.³³ The question of Jewish emancipation, Marx contends, has to be understood within this context. And once it is so understood, it becomes apparent that political emancipation does not realize the community, but, rather sustains man's isolation from the community because it makes the individual sovereign; it makes the affairs of the public into the affairs of each private individual:

Political democracy is Christian since in it man, not merely one man but every man, ranks as sovereign, as the highest being, but it is man in his uncivilized, unsocial form, man in his fortuitous existence, man just as he is, man as he has been corrupted by the whole organization of our society, who has lost himself, been alienated, and handed over to the rule of inhuman conditions and elements; in short, man who is not yet a real species being.³⁴

Political emancipation is not human emancipation because man does not become a "real species being." Man does not realize the "essence of community, but the essence of difference" with the establishment of political freedom.

³³ Ibid, p. 154.

³⁴ Ibid, p. 159.

In his analysis of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1791 and 1793, Marx takes great pains to demonstrate how the chief accomplishment of this political revolution was the celebration of the rights of the bourgeois -- the member of civil society -- i.e. "the rights of the egoistic man, of man separated from other men and from the community."³⁵ Again the emphasis is on the narrowness of political emancipation because it abstracts from the community; i.e., it does not overcome the contradictions, within civil society, but, in its regard for "the liberty of man as an isolated monad, withdrawn into himself . . . regarded as a self-sufficient monad" sustains the "separation of man from man."³⁶ It is worthwhile to quote Marx at length on this point, not only because he clearly emphasizes his fundamental concern is with liberty identified with community, as opposed to liberty identified with self-interest, but because his critique of political democracy is based on the degree to which political change (the status of citizenship) abstracts from the attempt to secure real changes in civil society, and instead solidifies the inequities that prevail there:

None of the so-called rights of man, therefore, go beyond egoistic man, beyond man as a member of civil society, that is, an individual withdrawn to himself, into the confines of his private interests and private caprice, and separated from the community. In the

³⁵ Ibid, p. 162, emphasis added.

³⁶ Ibid, p. 162-3.

rights of man, he is far from being conceived as a species-being, on the contrary species life itself, society, appears as a framework external to the individuals, as a restriction of their original independence. The sole bond holding them together is natural necessity, need and private interest, the preservation of their property and their egoistic selves.³⁷

In civil society, Marx says, the "sole bond . . . is need and private interest." Egoistic man is taken to be a natural object the unsubstantiated premise of the entire system. All forms of his association with others are viewed as "extrinsic" to the individual, means to the furtherance of his personal goals. In fact, "other men" are viewed ultimately as "barriers" to the enjoyment of one's individual liberty, so that all bonds with others -- "all the species-ties of man" -- are finally severed. The only connection which remains is a purely legal one (and ultimately a monetary one) -- the common recognition of the desire to avoid the other, of equal protection from the others under the law. The political revolution dissolves feudal relations, which depended on privilege, and substitutes a society of independent individuals whose relations depend upon the law. This revolution attempts to establish a mode of universality - the natural equality of man and the freedom of all based on the freedom of each - but the only

³⁷ Ibid, p. 164.

thing which it universalizes is unrestrained egoism. Once society is fully emancipated from politics, it no longer has "even the semblance of a universal content."³⁸ The only "community" which is established is one based on contractual relations which are themselves designed to protect everyone from everyone else. "Security," Marx writes, "is the highest social concept of civil society, the concept of police, expressing the fact that the whole of society exists only in order to guarantee to each of its members the preservation of his person, his rights, and his property."³⁹

Marx ascribes the failure of the political revolution -- the narrowness of its accomplishments -- to the fact that it simply resolved "civil life into its component parts, without revolutionizing these components themselves or subjecting them to criticism."⁴⁰ By treating all relations and objects as "alienable, vendible objects," the value of things, and relations is no longer an intrinsic attribute of those things or relations, but becomes a function of exchange. While this appears to be an advance over the narrowness of feudal society -- in which the individual's development and his general relation to the life of the nation is a determination of the narrow, functional relation of his "estate" to the state as a whole, and thus independent of his will -- because

³⁸ Ibid, p. 166.

³⁹ Ibid, p. 163.

⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 167.

it makes a person's position (his status, his property, his freedom) solely dependent on his individual abilities, on his "practical need and egoism," Marx explains that this is nothing more than the complete estrangement of man from the human world:

Money degrades all the gods of men - and turns them into commodities. Money is the universal self-established [fur sich selbst konstituierte] value of all things. It has therefore robbed the whole world --both the world of men and nature --of its specific value. Money is the estranged essence of man's work and man's existence, and this alien existence dominates him, and he worships it.⁴¹

It is true, Marx argues, that man's relations to the world appear to be no longer immediately determined by his social position. They nevertheless remain determined --i.e., only develop within the boundaries of self-interest --because they are not valued in themselves, but only insofar as they can be translated into exchange relations.⁴² Marx closes his commentary with the note that civil society itself must be revolutionized so that man's association with others becomes the basis for the establishment of the real community as opposed to the illusory community of the modern state. This will be accomplished when practical need is humanized and the conflict between "man's individual sensuous-existence and his species-existence has been abolished."⁴³

⁴¹ Ibid, p. 172.

⁴² Ibid, p. 174.

⁴³ Ibid, p. 174.

Several things should be apparent from the foregoing. Mark's critique began with a question about the possibility of what he called "human emancipation." He argued that it was impossible to achieve this through strictly political methods such as voting reforms, or the extension of citizenship, because the existence of the state as a separated sphere, and the idea that citizenship is one among a number of particular activities, presupposes the existence of civil society which is nothing more than the sphere within which the individual is isolated from and opposed to other individuals. What Marx is saying is that within the narrow political perspective it becomes possible to engage in politics, in public decision-making, even though the idea of a public, of a community is a fiction. For Marx, the question of freedom is coterminous with the question of the foundation of the real community in everyday life:

Only when the real, individual man re-absorbs in himself the abstract citizen, and as individual human being has become a species-being in its everyday life, in his particular work, and in his particular situation, only when man has recognized and organized his 'forces propres' as social forces, and consequently no longer separates social power from himself in the shape of political power, only then will human emancipation have been accomplished.⁴⁴

Marx appears to be engaged in an ontological argument: Man's essence is species-being, existence in community, etc. To the extent that civil society abstracts from this essence, and the individual comes to view the other man not as the realization of his freedom but as a barrier to it, man's

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 168.

specifically social powers become transformed into means for his own private ends. Though this is obviously a great advance beyond the narrow confines of feudal society, in which the individual could hardly be said to exist at all, to Marx this is not human emancipation, because human existence is social existence, self-consciously social existence. The particular form appropriate to it is the community, not the haphazard interaction of isolated monads in civil society.

What allows Marx to characterize man as a species-being is not at all clear. Nor is it clear how the atomism of civil society is to be overcome, however desirable a goal this may be. Marx's arguments remain abstract to a certain degree-- once the tension between the individual and society is overcome, etc.-- because he has not yet pierced through the order of civil society itself to the structural foundation on which it rests. His analysis of capitalism is yet to be developed. Nevertheless, certain references point in a more concrete direction. First, the idea of generic being (species-being), although not fully explored, is used by Marx to refer to the very real changes which must take place in everyday life; it is not an abstract idea, fixed and unchangeable throughout history. Rather Marx's particular use of it reveals that he is beginning to develop the historical dimensions of his analysis. Second, the idea that the monetary relation mediates all social relations in civil society and transforms everything into a commodity is suggestive not only of the analysis of alienation in the 1844 Manuscripts,

but of the demystification of the commodity-form in Das Kapital. These two points alone should allow us to conclude that what appears to be an ontological argument, is in fact a further development of an historical critique.

All of this had begun with a criticism of Hegel's abstract universality. Marx's critique of Hegel had led him to the development of an alternative method and the postulation that only when the contradictions within civil society themselves are transcended would it be possible to overcome the tension between the public and the private. This insight had led him to attempt to develop further the idea of the contradictory nature of civil society which, in turn, had allowed him to suggest that within this realm (burgerliche Gesellschaft) the individual's powers were not his own, but belonged to an alien power which he allowed to rule him -- money. Apparently, once the rule of money was overthrown, man's social powers would be freed to develop in the completely human sense. Exactly what this meant, or how it was to be accomplished was not yet specified, although Marx turned his attention to this problem when he suggested, in his Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Law', that only the complete "radical revolution" of society itself, the transcendence of all partial relations, the abolition of all class relations through "universal self-emancipation," would satisfy the "whole of man" in reality and not just in imagination.⁴⁵

⁴⁵Marx "Introduction to Critique. . ." in Marx/Engels Collected Works, op. cit., III, p. 184, 186, 181.

In this introductory essay, originally published in 1844 in the Jahrbucher and intended as the preface to his longer critique of Hegel, Marx develops several aspects of his methodology. Of particular relevance to our discussion is (1) the renewed emphasis on the necessity of focusing critique on the self-estranged conditions of material reality, instead of the limited criticism of religion. "The struggle against religion," Marx writes, "is . . . indirectly a fight against the world of which religion is the spiritual aroma;"⁴⁶ (2) The growing awareness of a dialectical relation between theory and practice. When philosophy exposes the shortcomings of particular theoretical perspectives, it is bound to move from these theoretical insights to the real, material conditions within which "illusions" develop. In other words, as Marx puts it, the "demand to give up illusions about the existing state of affairs is the demand to give up a state of affairs which needs illusions."⁴⁷ To fail to make the connection with the real world is the mistake of idealism, which imagines "it could make philosophy a reality without superceding it."⁴⁸ But it is equally dangerous to err in the opposite direction, i.e. to dispense with philosophy altogether. This is the mistake of what Marx called the "practical political party" whose goals, consequently, became

⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 175.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 176

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 181.

demands for immediate reform. The criticism of philosophy itself is essential if one is to move beyond immediate change and attempt to make philosophy itself a reality.⁴⁹ To fail in this regard is to tie one's demands for change to the ideological parameters of the status quo. Marx had already demonstrated how Bauer's failure to criticize the ideology of the modern state had led him to the mistaken identification of emancipation with juristic freedom. He now makes the general point that criticism "disillusions man to make him think and act and shape his reality like a man who has been disillusioned."⁵⁰ (3) The initial elaboration of the answer to the questions which were implicit in the essay on Bauer: What constitutes human emancipation? How is it to be accomplished?" The answers are carefully interwoven because the issues raised are not discrete problems. We must focus on this third point in some detail because it provides an essential link between the idea of the community to which Marx had already alluded and the demonstration of this as a real, material, human need, and not simple an ontological premise.

Theory, Marx says, becomes a "material force" when it leaves behind the world of abstractions and addresses itself to "truly human problems." This means that theory must become radical. "To be radical," Marx continues, "is to grasp

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 181.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 176.

things by the root. But for man the root is man himself."⁵¹
 In a way, this is nothing more than a reiteration, in an aphoristic form, of a point Marx had made earlier in his critique of Hegel-- viz., that the starting point of all analysis must be the "real subjects which form the bases of the state." Nevertheless, Marx is attempting to give more clarity to the notion of "real subjects" by calling attention to the focus on "all relations in which man is a debased, enslaved, forsaken, despicable being . . ."⁵² And he becomes even more concrete when he defines the proletariat as the "class in civil society whose conditions of existence typify this total estrangement because it is "a class with radical chains."⁵³ Human emancipation (general emancipation) is represented by the interests of the proletariat because the proletariat is:

a sphere which has a universal character by its universal suffering and claims no particular right because no particular wrong but wrong generally is perpetrated against it; which no longer can invoke a historical but only a human title . . . a sphere finally, which cannot emancipate itself without emancipating itself from all other spheres of society and, thereby, emancipating all other spheres of society, which in a word, is the complete loss of man and hence can win itself only through the complete rewinning of man.⁵⁴

⁵¹Ibid., p. 182.

⁵²Ibid., p. 182.

⁵³Ibid., p. 186.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 186.

Human emancipation is the emancipation of the proletariat, because the abolition of this class is the abolition of society based on class, i.e. based on the opposition of partial interests to one another, and the establishment, in its place, of a society which has organized "all conditions of human existence on the presupposition of social freedom."⁵⁵ While Marx was arguing in On the Jewish Question that civil society itself had to be superseded, he now contends that the existence of the proletariat demonstrates the historical possibility of this radical transformation. In order for "revolution to exist as a real possibility, it must have a "material basis." "Theory can be realized in a people only insofar as it is the realization of the needs of that people."⁵⁶ The "needs" of the proletariat provide this basis, in Marx's view, because they represent the demand to overcome the "complete loss of man." In other words, the demands of the proletariat become identical with the demand to realize what is essential, what is human in man. Such demands extend beyond the bounds of civil society because civil society is based on the principle of the inimical opposition of everyone to everyone else, whereas the demands of the proletariat are coincident with the abolition of all opposition, all particularism, and are identified with the "general emancipation of society." Consequently, it is

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 186.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 183, emphasis added.

not a matter of the substitution of a new ruling class for the old one, though this has clearly been the pattern of all revolutions in the past, as Marx acknowledges.⁵⁷ It is the specific nature of the needs of the proletariat that require that its demands put an end to all estrangement of man from man and consequently the abolition of the proletariat is equated with the abolition of class in general and with the realization of the universality of philosophy.⁵⁸

The need for community, which in Marx's theory represents the demand of the proletariat to realize what is essentially human, is not something which can be satisfied within the confines of civil society. Although Marx does not state it explicitly, there is an obvious connection between the discussion of the articulation of "needs" which require a "radical revolution" in order to be fulfilled, and Marx's earlier emphasis on the necessity of the individual becoming a species-being (Gattungswesen) in his everyday life, which we saw was Marx's idea of society as community, as opposed to society as an aggregation of isolated monads ("burgerliche Gesellschaft"). Marx returns to this connection in the Paris Manuscripts. In addition, he continues to develop,

⁵⁷As Marx explains historical conditions have heretofore made it the rule that "every class once it begins the struggles against the class above it, is involved in the struggle against the class below it." Ibid., p. 185.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 187.

in increasingly concrete terms, the rationale for his judgment of the proletariat as the universal class.

It is important to stress, as Avinieri does,⁵⁹ that Marx's economic analysis emerges as a necessary corollary to his theoretical insights. Marx turned his attention to economic issues as a result of the recognition that the goals of philosophy could not be realized within the parameters of philosophy. The issues of philosophy emerged out of real life and one had to examine the historical evolution of material reality in order to discover the meaning, in terms of human needs, of these issues. This does not mean, however, that Marx becomes, as many contends⁶⁰ an economic

⁵⁹"Marx does not postulate the abolition of class antagonisms because any economic mechanism points in that direction. No economic analysis precedes his dictum about the abolition of classes; they will be abolished because historical development has brought the tension between the general and the particular to a point of no return." Avinieri, op. cit., p. 59.

⁶⁰The contemporary criticisms of a "positivistic strain" in Marx's thought found in Allbrecht Wellmer's Critical Theory of Society (New York: Seabury Press, 1974); Jurgen Habermas' Knowledge and Human Interests (London: H.E.B. Press, 1972); and Jean Baudrillard's The Mirror of Production (St. Louis: Telos Press, 1975) all stem from a common assertion that Marx's concept of labor as the measure of value, uncritically adopted from bourgeois political economy, opened the door to the consequent confusion of the "liberation of productive forces. . . with the liberation of man." (Baudrillard, op. cit., p. 21). We will return to these criticisms later as we develop the view that the concept of work as productive activity is not reduced by Marx to an industrial-commodity form. In contradistinction to the above authors, the importance of productive activity as a social form will be emphasized.

determinist. His category of work, of productive activity is not to be understood in narrowly economic terms, any more than his concept of community is to be understood in purely idealistic terms. Rather, they embellish one another. Marx's use of the Hegelian category of totality means, as Swingewood has argued, that while analysis requires isolating and separating the constituent elements of society from one another (the individual, work, relations of production, political systems, etc.) so that they appear to be independent, to the degree that one of them could even be said to be related causally to all the rest,⁶¹ Marx's method remains one of an essentially "constant movement from the part to the whole and from the whole to the part. . . The isolated fact has meaning only within the context of the whole of which it forms an inseparable part."⁶² Thus while Marx can speak of the alienating conditions of work under capitalism, the only reason this makes sense as a revolutionary insight is in terms of his discussion of the social

⁶¹ Marx himself appeared to argue so in the 1859 Preface to the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy when he claimed that relations of production determined the formation of specific forms of social consciousness. Nevertheless, there is a great deal more complexity to even this terse summary of method than a superficial reading of it discloses, as Raymond Williams has so ably demonstrated in his analysis of the paragraph in which it appears, in his Marxism and Literature, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), especially pp. 75-82.

⁶² Alan Swingewood, Marx and Modern Social Theory, (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975), p. 34, 42.

structure of capitalism as a whole as an irrational order since production of wealth takes place on the basis of the dehumanization of the producer. The category of alienation is never related simply to the separation of the worker from the ownership of the object, but to the separation of the worker from a truly social world. And the idea of alienation itself makes sense not only in terms of a negated human essence but, simultaneously, in terms of the possibility of transcending this state. Thus the more concrete categories (work etc.) refer continuously beyond themselves to the more abstract categories (community etc.) and the more abstract categories are constantly related to the material basis upon which they can be considered not as ideals but as real needs.

The entire process of theoretical reflection always presupposes the whole even though the meaning of this whole is only grasped "synthetically." Thus, although to "consciousness" it appears as if the world which it comprehends through theoretical reasoning is a product of thinking this is only .

true insofar as the concrete totality regarded as a conceptual totality, as a mental fact, is indeed a product of thinking, of comprehension, but it is by no means a product of the idea which evolves spontaneously and whose thinking proceeds outside and above perception and imagination. . . The

subject, society, must always be envisaged therefore as the pre-condition of comprehension even when the theoretical method is employed. 63

Consequently, the "facts" which emerge as a result of theoretical reflection are neither produced by thinking, nor are they self-created. They are, therefore, neither the starting point for analysis, nor the finishing point, since they have no independent significance. They are merely reference points by means of which the meaning of the whole can be grasped (begreifen). The essence of Marx's method, as Swingewood characterizes it, paraphrasing Marx himself, is a "constant shuttling between the parts and the whole," not simply in one direction but in both so that the "abstract is made concrete."⁶⁴ What Marx's analysis of capitalism reveals, beginning with the philosophical essays of 1844, is a fundamentally contradictory whole--the "parts" are in opposition to one another. There exists a system of social production, based on principles of cooperation and association, side by side with a system of private appropriation. It is at this point that the image of the community, of the Hegelian notion of universality, becomes most concrete. We will return to these ideas in a later chapter as we explore Marx's deciphering of the "social hieroglyphics" of commodity-production.

⁶³ Karl Marx "Introduction" to the Grundrisse der politische Okonomie, appendix to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, edit., Maurice Dobb, (New York: International Publications, 1970), p. 207, emphasis added.

⁶⁴ Swingewood, op.cit., p. 44, 48.

It was necessary to interject these comments on methodology at this point because they enable us to focus with a certain clarity on the patterns of development of Marx's thought. In particular, the concept of totality needed to be explored because it provides the key to understanding the full significance of all of the elements of Marx's analysis. Marx's critique is a critique of capitalism, not of isolated parts of the system, but of the system as a whole. Keeping in mind that the essence of Marx's theory is a theory of the whole, of man's existence in community as an historical concept, we are able to perceive more accurately the political implications of the theory. Most would acknowledge that Marx's arguments are not for modest reforms, but for revolutionary transformation of the social system. Yet many contend that in the working out of the details Marx got bogged down in "economistic" arguments so that all that was needed to fulfill the requisites of his "predictions" was improvement of the economic conditions of the working class; i.e., economic solutions for economic problems. The "revolution" would be complete, then, when the workers, or at least their "representatives," controlled production for their gain (economics would be used as the means to automatically resolve political problems --as in Soviet Union, China and other "socialist" nations). Or, the revolution would be precluded if capitalism proved to be able to "deliver the goods" (class consciousness --presumably rooted in material deprivation --is undercut with the increasing

"embourgeoisement" of the worker, thanks to welfare state capitalism, income redistribution, etc). Marxism winds up being rejected as a social theory to the extent that it is identified with the first alternative because its ability to live up to its economic goals appears to be wanting--not to mention the rather large dose of repression that appears to accompany the attempt. According to the second alternative, Marxism as a social theory is an idea whose time has never come--and likely never will--because capitalism has proved to be significantly more resilient and satisfactory than Marx could have ever imagined. We will consider in detail these arguments and their rebuttals at a later point. Suffice it to say that neither image captures the political goals Marx had in mind which can only be understood against the background of community--freedom within and beyond the realm of necessity--to which they constantly refer. The idea of a total reconstruction of the social whole, not a reshuffling of parts, is the idea which necessarily follows from Marx's theory of the community as its revolutionary, "totalized" import.

Marx himself dealt, to a limited degree, with the second of the above alternatives in his analysis of the Silesian weaver's revolt in Germany in 1844. The article was a response to Ruge's consideration of the uprising as an essentially futile and limited outcry of the "poor." Marx, however, considered it to be an event of much more significance.

It allowed him, once again, to demonstrate the necessarily limited scope of the modern state's ability to deal with social problems. Marx professed to analyze "the general relation of politics to social ills." In so doing he developed the thesis that it is impossible for the state to eradicate social problems without abolishing itself because it is based on the contradiction between the general welfare, towards which the state appears to strive, and the limited means and possibilities for realizing the common good, depending as it does on the available support from the private interests of civil society without which the state can do nothing.⁶⁵

The state is based on the contradiction between public and private life, on the contradiction, between general interests and private interests. Hence the administration has to confine itself to a formal and negative activity, for where civil life and its labour begin, there the power of administration ends.⁶⁶

The sources of "social maladies" lie within the "system of society," "the present structure of society," of which the state is nothing more than the "active, conscious and official expression."⁶⁷ It is therefore, impossible for the state to recommend anything more than modest "administrative" remedies for acknowledged problems. And when these fail--as Marx

⁶⁵Karl Marx, "Critical Marginal Notes on the Article by a Prussian," Collected Works, op. cit., p. 198.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 198

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 199.

seems to imply they are bound to, being nothing more than stopgap measures--the state retreats "to less than administrative action and charity," i.e. it begins to take a punitive approach. In modern terminology, the state "blames the victim."⁶⁸

Marx uses the example of England, which, he says is the "only country where large-scale political action against pauperism has taken place."⁶⁹ The first remedy which the English state proposed for pauperism was the 17th Century poor laws, which Marx characterizes as "legal charity." The extent of the State's obligation to the poor rested on the acknowledgement of the necessity of limiting the effects of poverty. But by the middle of the 19th Century--when the industrial revolution was already in full swing--the changed attitude of Parliament's Amendments to the Poor Laws reflected the assumption that the rapid increase in poverty was due to two factors: improper administration of the Poor Laws, which Parliament proposed to resolve through centralization and the commitment to the Malthusian laws of nature; as a result of which the Poor Laws came to be viewed not as a remedy but as the very obstacle to any remedy at all. "What was previously ascribed to a lack of charity, now begins to be attributed to an excess of charity, finally,

⁶⁸ cf. William Ryan, Blaming the Victim, (New York: Vintage, 1971).

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 194.

poverty came to be regarded as the fault of the poor themselves, and consequently they were punished for it."⁷⁰ In neither case, of course, was the state able to perceive the real cause of poverty which Marx describes as the "inevitable consequence of modern industry."⁷¹ The result was that the

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 195.

⁷¹ Ibid. There is a remarkable similarity to Marx's analysis of the necessary constriction of the state's powers to measures which essentially sustain the divisions of civil society in contemporary Marxist analyses of the role of the state in capitalist society. Some examples of the growing literature on this subject are Ralph Milliband, The State in Capitalist Society, (New York: Basic Books, 1969), Marxism and Politics, (Oxford: University Press, 1977); Edwards, Reich, and Weiskopf, edit., The Capitalist System, (2nd edition, New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1978), especially Chapter 5; and James O'Connor, Fiscal Crisis of the State, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973). Marx's theory of the state is not that the state is a simple reflection of class interests, but that its administrative powers are structurally bound by the nature of civil society upon which it is based. However, Marx does not explore the implications of his thesis on the state in any great detail, and although we know, from explicit statements in the 1844 preface to the Paris Notebooks and the 1959 preface to the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, the precursor of Capital, that he intended to continue his analysis of politics and the state at a later point, the fact that his work remained incomplete has left to contemporary Marxian theory the task of filling in the gaps. Lenin, of course was one of the first to take up this task in his The State and Revolution, but the exceedingly mechanistic relationship which he appeared to have established between "economics" and "politics," as well as the historical legacy of the Russian Revolution, has forced current theorists to develop more "flexible" notions about the relationship between state power and class power. In this regard, Miliband's discussion in Marxism and Politics is most illuminating because of his attempt to explicate a "strategy" for socialist transformation which coincides with the impulses of Marx, while avoiding the apparent determinism of Lenin. He writes, for example, that the "struggle for reforms in a bourgeois democratic regime was never taken by classical Marxism to be incompatible with the advancement of revolutionary aims and purposes" (p. 160). On this, see also, Michael Harrington, Socialism, (New York: Bantam Books, 1970), especially Chapters III, IV.

state wound up perpetuating the very problems it sought to eradicate. Similarly, Marx's analysis of the French Revolution is based on the idea that the revolution was of an essentially political nature. It attacked the form of the state and sought to replace it by a different state form:

Far from seeing the source of social shortcomings in the principle of the state, the heroes of the French Revolution instead saw in social defects the source of political evils.⁷²

Marx's point is neither that all attempts at reform are counterproductive, nor that all forms of the state are equally repressive. He obviously finds the punitive tactics of social reform more odious than the charitable measures, and his earlier, as well as later, analyses of the Terror and the subsequent Bonapartist state make it clear that he was able to distinguish between different forms of the bourgeois state, even if his disciples were not.⁷³ The issue that Marx raises is that all attempts at political change reach necessary limits because they leave the existing social system intact. Only those movements which are capable of identifying the real cause of social problems--"The society of private property"--deserve to be applauded. It is on this basis that Marx takes the opposite position to Ruge. The German workers

⁷²Ibid., p. 199.

⁷³Cf. Hobsbawm's analysis of the narrow perspective of the International during the interwar years in his Revolutionaries, (New York: Meridian Books, 1973), especially Section I.

uprisings are "superior" to the French activity of the 1830's because the former recognize the structural roots of their problems:

The Silesian uprising begins precisely with what the French and English worker's uprisings end, with the consciousness of the nature of the proletariat. The action itself bears the stamp of this superior character. Nor only machines, these rivals of the workers, are destroyed, but also ledgers, the titles to property. And while all other movements are aimed primarily only against the owner of the industrial enterprise, the visible enemy, this movement is at the same time directed against the banker, the hidden enemy.⁷⁴

Once again, Marx identifies man's isolation from the community with "man's protest against a dehumanized life," and defines the "true" community as the mode of specifically human nature. This community can never be a "political" community, because the state is an abstract whole, which exists only through separation from real life."⁷⁵ The community which Marx has in mind has a material reality, i.e. man's everyday life in all of its dimensions has to become the immediate expression of his communal "nature.":

But do not all uprisings, without exception, break, out in a disastrous isolation of man from the community? . . . But the community from which the worker is isolated is a community, the real character and scope of which is quite different from that of the political community. The community from which the worker is isolated by his own labour is life itself, physical and mental life, human morality, human activity, human enjoyment, human nature. Human nature is the true community of men.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 201

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 205

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 204.

The image of community is the need which man has to experience himself as a whole person and to develop all of his social powers as expressions of his wholeness which is a quality he shares in common with others. In fact, it is a quality which can only develop completely insofar as it is shared with others. Existence in community is man's nature because his specifically human activities ("human morality . . . human enjoyment") are those which are social in nature. To constrict those activities to purely private expressions is to reduce man to a sub-human existence, to make him a "slave to "a ruling stratum in society at the expense of society itself."⁷⁷ Thus, man's own social powers--his ability to construct a world in which others participate, even if it is only participation in common enslavement--are the forces which oppress him. Even an alienated existence reveals the social potentiality of human existence:

The nature which develops in human history--the genesis of human society--is man's real nature; hence nature as it develops through industry, even though in an estranged form, is true anthropological nature.⁷⁸

The brilliance of Marx's argument consists in this--that he develops a theory of human existence which is thoroughly historical. In other words, he begins with the historical present and as a result of the dialectical disclosure

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 205.

⁷⁸Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, edit., Dirk Struik, (New York: International Publishers, 1964), p. 143.

of the meaning of human activity hidden within the present he arrives at an ontological premise without ever reducing his theory to an ahistorical ontology. As Meszaros puts it:

For Marx realizes that the non-alienated foundation of that which is reflected in an alienated form in political economy as a particular sphere is the fundamental ontological sphere of human existence and therefore it is the ultimate foundation of all kinds and forms of activity . . . Marx makes the distinction between an adequate mediation of man with man on the one hand and alienated mediation of human activity through the intermediary of things on the other hand.⁷⁹

For all of this to make sense, it is important for Marx to develop his insights about man's fundamental powers, about what is specifically human, in more detail. This is precisely what he sets out to do in the Paris Manuscripts of 1844.

We have already indicated how Marx's idea of community was initially formulated in his critique of Hegel's theory of the state as a theory of abstract universality--abstract because Hegel failed to critically evaluate the historical conditions which had given rise to the atomism of civil society and, instead, treated the separation of individuals from one another as a necessary fact of everyday, material reality. Marx had contended that human existence was necessarily communal, that the isolated, egoistic individual was the product of history and not the premise, and that only when the private and the public were no longer viewed as

⁷⁹ Istvan Meszaros, Marx's Theory of Alienation, (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 88, 91.

mutually exclusive spheres would it be possible to speak of the realization of a concretely universal and therefore human, existence. In the Paris Notebooks of 1843-1845, in which Marx excerpted the works of the 18th century political economists, adding his own commentary in some instances, and in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in which he began to develop in skeletal form his critique of political economy, Marx turned his attention more directly to defining the conditions of the alienation between these two spheres (the public and the private).

For man to become truly human he argued, it was necessary that he overcome the egoism of civil society and, by reappropriating his own powers as social powers, become a real individual. This could happen only if those forces in civil society which alienated people from one another were superseded. Man's everyday reality had to be structured to express his existence as a "species-being," his particular activity had to be viewed no longer as the fortuitous, but as the direct expression of his essential connection with others. In the most basic sense man's activity distinguished him from the animals. If the specific "humanness" of this activity was realized then

In the individual expression of my life I would have directly created the expression of your life and therefore in my individual activity I would

have directly confirmed and realised my true nature, my human nature, my communal nature.⁸⁰

No longer mediated by objects and forces which were products of human activity, albeit in an estranged form, the individual's activity would be perceived as a sufficient mediation between himself and others and, consequently, as a direct confirmation of his "communal nature."

Just as before, Marx's dialectical critique of Hegel had led him to conclude that Hegel had abstracted from the real foundation of the state and had overcome the prevailing tensions of modern life only in thought, now Marx's analysis of the presuppositions of political economy led him to the same conclusion. Political economy purported to analyze "the relation of man to man," but it confused "the estranged form of social intercourse" with "the essential and original form corresponding to man's nature."⁸¹ For the human community--the manifestation of the nature of men--political economy substituted the community in the form of exchange and trade. Instead of human relations understood as communal relations, political economy understood these as necessarily mediated by exchange, as commercial relations. Instead of understanding human activity as essentially social, political economy treated what was social as incidental. The social value of

⁸⁰ Karl Marx, "Comment on James Mill's, 'Elements D'Economie Politique,'" in Collected Works, op.cit., II, 225.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 211.

men's activities was measured in terms of exchange value. Men's social activities were not seen as immediately useful, immediately identical with themselves, but were themselves viewed as the result, the product of the movement of private property. Hence, Marx says, within the system of private property, "social nature only comes into existence as its opposite, in the form of estrangement," i.e. exchange of private property merely confirmed the estrangement of the owners from one another. Their "social" connection was in reality nothing more than "reciprocity in alienation":

Exchange or barter is therefore the social act, the species-act, the community, the social intercourse and integration of men within private ownership, and therefore the external, alienated species-act. It is just for this reason that it appears as barter. For this reason, likewise, it is the opposite of the social relationship.⁸²

Marx's entire analysis is based on the demystification of exchange relations as alienated social relations. He begins with a critique of money, the medium of exchange. The apparent neutrality of money obscures the real relationships--"the inner, implicit, hidden social relationship or class relationship between commodities"⁸³--which are the presupposition of exchange. The existence of money presupposes that man's social relations are circumscribed by property relations, which means, in turn, that man's social

⁸²Ibid., p. 221, 218, 219.

⁸³Ibid., p. 211.

relations, his social activities are estranged from him, being a function of the exchange of products which appears as the purpose of man's activity:

The essence of money is not, in the first place that property is alienated in, but that the mediating activity or movement, the human, social act by which men's products mutually complement one another, is estranged from man and becomes the attribute of money, a material thing outside men.⁸⁴

Marx is here defining productive activity (mediating activity) as an implicitly human and therefore social activity. Political economy fails to grasp this fact and instead treats social relations as arising from the relations between things. It ascribes human qualities to objects, and reduces all social relations to the single relation of possession. Relations of possession, although they require social recognition in order to become real (" . . . the power which I attribute to my object over yours requires your recognition in order to become a real power"⁸⁵), can hardly be called social relations, since they are nothing more than relations of "mutual plundering." Social relations, thus, appear in the form of "mutually exclusive possession of our respective products."⁸⁶ Social relations within the social system of private property appear as the "abstract relationship of private property to private property"; i.e., as relations between objects. Man is thus

⁸⁴Ibid., p. 212

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 226

⁸⁶Ibid.

estranged from himself as a human being because he no longer understands himself as subject but, rather, views his own products as the subjects. As a consequence Marx writes, "the society of this estranged man is a caricature of his real community . . ."⁸⁷

Marx's distinction between society and community⁸⁸ in this context is significant. "Since human nature" Marx

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 217.

⁸⁸ The inability to distinguish between social relations which contribute to alienation and social relations which realize man's communal essence, between, in other words, alienated and non-alienated species-activities, lurks behind Sidney Hook's analysis in his revised introduction to From Hegel to Marx. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962). Hook claims that "in the end the view that man makes himself or creates his own nature even in part renders untenable most notions of human self-alienation." This would imply that all social systems, because they are the result of man's productive activity, are equally non-alienating. But to assert, as Marx does, that it is essential for man to produce in order to live, that man's activity mediates between him and nature (inorganic and human), does not imply that all socio-historical forms of mediation are equally satisfactory. The entire thrust of Marx's analysis is to distinguish between those forms of society which enable man's activity to express his essential communality and to realize his nature, and those which estrange man from nature. Istvan Meszaros calls this Marx's distinction between "first order" and "second order" mediations, where the "first order" mediation is the "ontologically fundamental self-mediation of man with nature," and the second is the historically specific form this mediation takes in a particular social structure. It is true, of course, that the historically specific forms arise on the basis of the first order mediations; i.e., that all social systems are a product of man's active interaction with nature. It is only the failure to maintain a distinction between the ontologically necessary fact and the specific historical form which causes one to lapse, as Hook and others do, into the position of the inability to transcend alienation. "If . . . productive activity is not differentiated into its radically different aspects, if the ontologically absolute factor is not distinguished from the historically specific form, if, that

writes, "is the true community of men,"

by manifesting their nature men create, produce, the human community, the social entity, which is no abstract universal power opposed to the single individual, but is the essential nature of each individual, his own activity, his own life, his own spirit, his own wealth. Hence this true community does not come into being through reflection . . . it is produced directly by their [individuals] life activity itself. It does not depend on man whether this community exists or not, but as long as man does not recognize himself as man, and therefore has not organized the world in a human way, this community appears in the form of estrangement. . . ⁸⁹

Man's activity necessarily expresses his communal nature, the community is a direct product of the life activity of individuals. Existence in community is natural to man, it is not the result of reflection. But if man's activity appears not as an "essential bond linking him with other men" but only as a means, an instrument for the expression of "immediate selfish need;" if it becomes, in other words "labour to earn a living," then the relation in terms of which man stands to the other appears as purely accidental and fortuitous. The relation is not seen as essential to his existence, it is only a necessary diversion to be endured in order that one might acquire those products which alone are viewed as essential to life. Under these circumstances--

is, activity is conceived--because of the absolutization of a particular form of activity--as a homogeneous entity, the question of an actual (practical) transcendence of alienation cannot possibly arise." Meszaros, op. cit., p. 79.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 214.

where human production is "not man's production for man as man; i.e., it is not social production" because it is "only the objectification of [the individual's] own selfish need"--⁹⁰ society appears as a caricature of human existence precisely because social existence is viewed as unnatural, that is, the social and the human are separated. Consequently, Marx distinguishes between those social relations which sustain the separation of man from man--the exchange relations of the "society" of capitalism--and those social relations which express the organization of the world in a human way, i.e., the self-conscious recognition of social relations as the only form adequate to human existence and the organization of production in a correspondingly "human" form. In the latter sense, man's recognition of the other is not mediated by objects but is the direct result of his own particular activity. If we carried out production as human beings, Marx argues, then the specific character of my activity would have been objectified; instead of being viewed as a matter of indifference, a mere means to subsistence, my activity would be a direct manifestation of my life itself. Because my activity would be immediately useful--instead of being valued only insofar as it can be exchanged for equivalent objects which appear as "true values"--then my work could be said to have satisfied a human need, since the objects I produce correspond to essential human needs. And because

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 225.

my activity fulfills a human need, being understood as necessarily social, I would become the "mediator between you and the species, and therefore would be recognized and felt by you yourself as a completion of your own essential nature and as a necessary part of yourself, and consequently would know myself to be confirmed in your thoughts and your love."⁹¹ Thus the individual would directly confirm his communal nature.

According to Marx, political economy fails to understand the development of relations of exchange as the historical

⁹¹Ibid., p. 228. To Marx, "love" is the way of representing specifically human, communal connections between individuals. The human need for the other, which is expressed not out of a sense of emptiness, or dependence, but is based on the full realization (objectification) of man's human capacities, is the extent to which "the other person as a person has become for him a need . . ." (Manuscripts op. cit. , p. 34). The concept is radically distinct from the romantic idea of love which is a relation of crude need, a relation of mutual dependence, a relation of submission of one to the other and, finally, of annihilation of self. To Marx, the loving relationship is a productive, creative one because through it the unique individuality of both partners is confirmed. In the romantic idea of love, the other is ultimately regarded as an extension of the self, the ego; consequently, the relation is in reality a non-relation, a form of narcissism. Marx's idea of love is linked to the idea of community, wherein each individual, recognizing the uniqueness and individuality of the others, confirms himself. It would be interesting to develop Marx's ideas in this regard as they bear on a truly human psychology and compare them with the works of Freud, Jung, Reich, Fromm, and others who have also addressed themselves to the nature of the loving relationship and human subjectivity. Russell Jacoby's survey of contemporary conformist psychology is a good beginning point. (Russell Jacoby, Social Amnesia, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), especially Chapter IV).

outcome of the development of private property, which itself presupposes the separation of work from itself, the separation of labor and capital. Instead, it is "only able to grasp this whole development as a fact, as the outcome of fortuitous necessity."⁹² Consequently, it does not treat production on the basis of private property as an historically specific form of production, but absolutizes it. It treats alienation as a natural condition so that man's separation from others is seen as a necessary condition of human productive activity. The result is that man comes to view his activity increasingly as a matter of indifference:

Since man alienates this mediating activity itself, he is active here only as a man who has lost himself and is dehumanized; the relation itself between things, man's operation with them, becomes the operation of an entity outside man and above man. . . man regards his will, his activity and his relation to other men as a power independent of him and them. His slavery, therefore, reaches a peak.⁹³

The last point is ironic. Political economy had viewed the universal alienability of all objects, including labor itself, as the transcendence of all relations of dependence. The individual was "freed" from all personal obligations (feudal relations of lord-serf) to enter into relations of exchange. This is true, Marx says, but slavery has not been eliminated. "What was the domination of person over person is now the general domination of the thing over the person,

⁹²Ibid., p. 221.

⁹³Ibid., p. 212.

of the product over the producer".⁹⁴ To the extent that the individual's activity "appears to him as a torment, his own creation as an alien power, his wealth as poverty, the essential bond linking him with other men as an unessential bond, and separation from his fellow men, on the other hand, as his true mode of existence . . ." the individual remains the "servant of his creation."⁹⁵ Insofar as he views his own life as the sacrifice of his life, the activity through which he manifests his existence as a "compulsion to which he submits out of egoistic need and necessity,"⁹⁶ then it is impossible for man to lead a truly human existence. Thus, while Marx acknowledges the socio-historical necessity of labor's self-alienation as a precondition for the development of the human powers (productive activity) necessary for the creation of social wealth, his argument is that the full recognition of human activity as an essentially human power is given alienated expression within capitalism, and that capitalism therefore needs to be superseded. Capitalism is thus a system in contradiction; it recognized the essence of labor as creative of social wealth, but confines it within the limits of private, particularistic interests:

Division of labor and exchange are the two phenomena which lead the political economist to boast of the social character of his science,

⁹⁴Ibid., p. 221.

⁹⁵Ibid., p. 217.

⁹⁶Ibid., p. 220.

while in the same breath he gives expression to the contradiction in his science--the establishment of society through unsocial, particularistic interests.⁹⁷

That the system of private property was a necessary stage in the development of human life is acknowledged by Marx. That it is an historically limited expression of the truly human life is the import of his criticism of political economy.

Precisely in the fact that the division of labor and exchange are embodiments of private property lies the twofold proof [that labor is the essence of private property], on the one hand that human life required private property for its realization, and on the other hand that it now requires the supersession of private property.⁹⁸

We need to explore the development of this insight, its relation to Marx's concept of labor and the importance of the latter to the elaboration of the community as the realization of man's nature. Only when the concept of labor is re-inserted into the context of the community--the universality of man's nature, his existence as a species-being--will it be understood as a concept which has many more referents than

⁹⁷ Manuscripts, op. cit., p. 163.

⁹⁸ Ibid., Meszaros calls this Marx's acknowledgement of the "positive" and "negative" aspects of labor's self-alienation and contends, quite correctly, that Marx's ability to understand the necessary contradiction between private property and labor was what enabled him to argue for the transcendence of alienation as an "ontological necessity" in contrast to the political economists who only understood labor "in its partiality," and in equal contrast to all other moral or speculative philosophers who could depict "transcendence" only in terms of a moral imperative or as an abstract logical requirement. Meszaros, op. cit., p. 108-113.

the narrowly economic category of work under capitalism. Because the idea of labor is reduced, under capitalism, to service to "crude need," sheer survival, Marx argues that the essential sociality of man's productive activity is presented as its opposite. In contrast to this, Marx's understanding of labor as activity which is specifically human obviously moves beyond the confines of an economic category.⁹⁹ Meszaros recognizes this when he describes Marx's concept of "labor in its sensuous form" as a concept of "universal significance in Marx's philosophy" and explains that Marx identified man's historical development as an increasingly objectified social being with what was

⁹⁹ This is a point which forever eludes the likes of Baudrillard who argues that Marx's concept of labor was an "ideological" concept to the extent that it was inextricably wedded to the idea of value (use value) derived from the framework of political economy. This concept of value, and the corollary idea of need, is rooted to an instrumental concept of wealth as material wealth and totally ignores, according to Baudrillard, the notion of "symbolic wealth" and "symbolic exchange." "If there was one thing Marx did not think about, it was discharge, waste, sacrifice, prodigality, play, and symbolism," complains Baudrillard. Baudrillard, op. cit., p. 42. But this misses the whole point of Marx's critique of capitalism as an unnecessarily ascetic society, a society which takes pleasure only "as a side-issue." Once the struggle for material wealth is superseded, Marx writes in the Manuscripts and in the Grundrisse, then real human wealth--the "rich human being"--can be constituted. And the terms with which Marx describes this "rich human being" are not at all rooted to instrumental conceptions of activity, but are, rather, the idea of activity as the completely gratuitous expression of human passion: the human being experiences "the need of the greatest wealth--the other human being . . . [P]assion . . . thus becomes here the activity of my being." Manuscripts, op. cit., p. 144. We will explore these points in more detail following the elaboration of Marx's position.

specifically human in man.¹⁰⁰ Hence, there is a link between Marx's concept of labor as productivity and the idea of community.

The central focus of the Paris Manuscripts is on the alienation of labor. It is by critical confrontation with the categories of political economy that Marx is led to formulate the proposition that the estranged form of productive activity under capitalism is an historically specific form and is thus distinguished from the specifically human form of productive activity. "Political economy," Marx writes, "starts from labor as the real soul of production; yet to labor it gives nothing, and to private property everything."¹⁰¹ By identifying labor with the particular form which labor assumes under the system of private property ("one-sided, abstract labor," "labor . . . only in the form of wage earning activity,"¹⁰²) political economy only considers the proletarian as a worker and is necessarily involved in the contradiction between labor and property. But this contradiction is nothing more than "the contradiction of estranged labor with itself," and what political economy takes for the laws of production are merely the "laws of estranged labor."¹⁰³ To the extent that labor is

¹⁰⁰ Meszaros, op. cit., p. 88, 113.

¹⁰¹ Manuscripts, op. cit., p. 117.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 71-2.

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 117.

is identified with wage-labor, then the very thing which distinguishes man's life activity from animal life-activity, that "man makes his life activity the object of his will and of his consciousness,"¹⁰⁴ appears as its opposite: appropriation of man's nature appears as estrangement; man's life activity is not viewed as man's essential being but "a mere means to his existence."¹⁰⁵ Consequently man's universal activity is reduced to one-sided activity. It becomes, in Marx's phrase, "forced labor" and is itself not the satisfaction of a need, but "merely a means to satisfy needs external to it."¹⁰⁶ Not only is man's activity separated from him--"an alien activity not belonging to him"--but the "needs" which even this forced activity is supposed to satisfy remain external to the worker. Need itself comes to be defined not in relation to anything intrinsically human, but as a function of effective demand or possession of money. In fact, need comes to be coextensive with demand: "If I have no money for travel, I have no need . . . to travel."¹⁰⁷

Thus Marx's analysis of political economy enables him to distinguish between labor as "life-activity"

¹⁰⁴Ibid., p. 113

¹⁰⁵Ibid.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 111.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., p. 168.

(Lebensausserung), "productive life itself", "the life of the species;" and wage-labor, as "alienated labor" (Lebensentausserung), "estranged labor", "a mere means to . . . existence."¹⁰⁸ This leads Marx into a discussion of man's essence as a species-being (Gattungswesen) and the related discussion of real human sensuous needs versus need as "demand." All of this emerges in the context of the developing idea of sociality--the idea of the community--as the specifically human reference point, as opposed to the "social bond" of money which transforms "essential powers of man and nature . . . into tormenting chimeras."¹⁰⁹ Hence, the concept of alienation is meaningless apart from the idea of community against the background of which it is articulated. The reason why labor is alienated under capitalism is because man's specifically human activity--his species--activity, which is, of course, a capacity of specific individuals (and not an abstract entity opposed to them)--is treated as a means to individual existence. Thus the life of the species and individual life are estranged and "individual life in its abstract form [is made] the purpose of the life of the species, likewise in its abstract and estranged form."¹¹⁰ That is, the individual, abstracted from the

¹⁰⁸Ibid., p. 112-113; Cf. Meszaros, op. cit., p. 91-2.

¹⁰⁹Ibid., p. 168-9.

¹¹⁰Ibid., p. 112-113.

situation within which he develops, and society, as an entity emptied of any content, opposed to real individuals, are related to one another in an inherently antagonistic fashion.

"Political economy," Marx tells us, "starts with the fact of private property, but it does not explain it to us . . . it takes for granted what it is supposed to prove."¹¹¹ As a consequence, the standpoint of political economy is an inverted world. Instead of recognizing the product of labor as the necessary objectification of labor, the necessary appropriation of the world by human labor--as objectification is necessary to all objectifying creatures (" . . . his objective product only confirms his objective activity, establishing his activity as the activity of an objective, natural being"¹¹²)--political economy regards "this realization of labor as loss of realization for the workers; objectification as loss of the object and bondage to it, appropriation as estrangement [Entfremdung], as alienation [Entausserung]."¹¹³ All of these consequences flow from the fact that the worker's product does not belong to him; it has become an "alien object." But the workers alienation from the product of his labor, while it is the starting point of Marx's analysis

¹¹¹Ibid., p. 106.

¹¹²Ibid., p. 191.

¹¹³Ibid., p. 108.

of alienation, is by no means the essential alienation.¹¹⁴

Estrangement from the object is merely the "summary of the activity" which is itself estranged.¹¹⁵ As a consequence

labor, productive activity does not express the worker's essential being. It appears as something totally separate from life itself so that through working, the worker

does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind. The worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his work feels outside himself. . . His labor is therefore not voluntary but coerced; it is forced labor. ¹¹⁶

It is only when the worker is freed from labor that he "feels himself freely active." All those activities in which he participates away from work become identified with the "truly human" because they appear to be spontaneous. Thus it is only "in his animal functions--eating, drinking, procreating, or at most in his dwelling and in dressing up, etc.," that the worker feels himself to be human because "in his human functions he no longer feels himself to be

¹¹⁴ Naturally, Marx's "four aspects" of alienation--from the product, from his own activity, from species-being and from other men--are hardly analytically independent. They are rather different dimensions of the process of alienation under capitalist relations of production. The point that I am trying to stress, however, is that whereas Marx begins with the object because it is the "summary of activity," his point is not to simply return the object to man, but to focus on the specifically human process of objectification; i.e., the necessary sociality of human activity, and the essentially communal form of this activity, in contrast to the estranged form of activity under capitalism. Alienation--from process or from results (products)--always refers back to the community as the reconstruction of a specifically human world.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p. 110.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p. 110-111.

anything but an animal."¹¹⁷ While these functions are "genuinely human functions," when they become "separated from the sphere of all other human activity and turned into sole and ultimate ends, they are animal functions." The reason they become animal functions is because they are rooted to the satisfaction of immediate, individual need. And even if social tools, social forms and artifacts are employed in the satisfaction of these essentially bodily needs, even if some aesthetic sense is displayed (the artistry of haute cuisine, a well-decorated home, fashionable clothes), the specific sociality of these objects is lost since they are treated as private possessions, used to enhance the individuality of their owner. Moreover, the extent to which the worker is debased, in his work limits the ability to develop even this "free time" as a realm of truly spontaneous activity. As Marx writes:

The sense caught up in crude practical need has only a restricted sense. For the starving man, it is not the human form of food that exists, but only its abstract being as food . . . The care-burdened man in need has no sense for finest play; the dealer in minerals sees only the commercial value but not the beauty and the unique nature of the mineral. . . ¹¹⁸

¹¹⁷Ibid., p. 111.

¹¹⁸Ibid., p. 141. Moreover, this insight is not invalidated no matter how "affluent" and seemingly above "crude practical need" any member of society becomes. Leisure time has become in Aronowitz' phrase, "colonized" in the "one way communication" systems of mass art. As Aronowitz puts it: "The creative element of play, imagination, is restricted by the powerful images of social roles and social values presented by mass culture. The dramatic visual forces in which these values are communicated tend to command adaptation because their symbolic and ideological content is masked as

But since the worker confronts his object as an alien power, and his own activity as the negation of his self, then it follows that he treats himself not as a species-being, as a generic being, but sees his life activity only as a means to individual life. But, Marx says, man's productive activity is his ability to objectify his species-life (Gattungswesen), to experience himself "in a world that he has created."¹¹⁹ If this activity is viewed as the mere means to existence, then the specifically human world appears to be lost to him. The particular way in which human beings actively create their own reality--i.e. the expression of their existence as necessarily social, where man is the object for man and all of nature is his "inorganic body"--becomes obscured.

To a certain extent, Marx's use of the phrase "species-being" is itself an obscuring metaphor. The term was one he borrowed from Feuerbach and later, especially in The German Ideology, rejected in favor of the more concretely materialistic idea of "real, historical man" in his "actual social relations." By no means, however, does this mean that he rejected the theoretical insight behind the concept

objective reality in which the condition of communication is the absorption of the spectator in the play as vicarious participant. As in spectator sports, television--or movie-watching is not social activity in which the participant is able to see himself in the outcome of the activity, or the activity as a product of his own effort." Stanley Aronowitz, False Promises, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), p. 99, emphasis added.

¹¹⁹ Marx, op. cit., p. 114.

species-being in favor of some more abstractly "empirical" and, therefore, more "scientific" idea of man. What the concept of "species-being" was meant to convey, more than anything else, was an awareness of man's nature as essentially historical and essentially social, and this awareness is by no means lost by the definition of man, in the critical Theses on Feuerbach, as the "ensemble of social relations." If anything, it is brought into relief more vividly as this concept allows Marx to examine more concretely the connections between the relations of commodity production and alienation under capitalism; between capitalist laws of exchange and the production of surplus value. That there is in fact a connection in Marx's theory between the extraction of surplus value and man's species-activity as indicative of his essential communality is a point we will want to return to later.¹²⁰

What makes man a species-being? Marx offers a number of dimensions to his answer: (1) that man is a "human natural being" who treats himself as a "universal and therefore a free being"; (2) that he adopts the species as his object (man is the object for man) in a free, conscious way; (3) that his relationship to nature--subjective and objective--is universal and not one-sided; (4) that he produces not only to satisfy an immediate need, but only "truly produces in

¹²⁰Cf. Swingewood's discussion of the "development" of Marx's theory of alienation. Alan Swingewood, op. cit., pp. 93-97.

freedom therefrom"; (5) that productivity is a need itself for him, being the manifestation of his human life and therefore the confirmation that nature-- subjective and objective-- is his work and his reality. Let us consider these several dimensions, their interrelationship and the way they relate to Marx's idea of human need as the need for community.

(1) Man is a natural being, a part of nature but a unique part because of the specific way in which he interacts with his "world." Nature is for man the direct means of his life and the object of his activity. In other words, nature enables man to sustain his existence (means to life), but in a specifically human way--all of nature becomes "his inorganic body." Man's productive activity is universal in the double sense that first, his approach to nature is as a "whole man" with all the organs of his individual being (his physical-sensual powers) as well as those which are "directly social in their form";¹²¹ (e.g. language, labor, play); thus the nature of his activity is its multisidedness; and second, the object of his activity appears as equally multisided (e.g. water as physical substance, cleansing agent, recreation, symbolic image, energy source, decorative natural object, etc. Thus, Marx says "human objects are not natural objects as they immediately present themselves and neither is human sense as it immediately is . . . human sensibility, human objectivity."¹²² Man is an historical

¹²¹Ibid., p. 139.

¹²²Ibid., p. 182.

creature in the sense that nature becomes an object for him suited to his needs--all needs and not simply the physical ones--and he becomes a subject. Man's activity develops the inherent powers of nature as much as it expresses the development of his own powers. His activity mediates his unity with nature. For Marx, man comes to exist as subject-for-nature and nature as object-for-man only insofar as and to the extent that he appropriates pre-existent nature and makes his home within it. To the extent that man appropriates nature he thus affirms his separation from nature as its subject and, simultaneously, nature is independence from him as his object. But because his appropriation of nature is not specifically predetermined--man must live on nature "if he is not to die," he must produce in order to live, but the particular way in which he does so is not instinctually fixed--he is a universal and free being. As Marx puts it, man is created through his labor, his nature is not fixed and unchangeable. "Industry is . . . the exoteric revelation of man's essential powers."¹²³

(2) Man becomes the object for man in a free and conscious way in the sense that man increasingly comes to be aware of himself, through his activity, insofar as it is spontaneous, as a human being. He comes to comprehend his own activity as the purpose of his existence, as the development of his life, or the expression of his life. Man comes

¹²³ Ibid., p. 143.

to understand himself as a human, social being to the extent that his activity is recognized as free, i.e. not limited by fixed, prescribed "laws of nature." Of course man is a "limited" creature in the above-mentioned sense (he must produce in order to live) but his activity is an expression of his species-character to the extent that he continues to produce, even when he is freed from the exigencies of survival¹²⁴--he has human needs--and he only truly becomes

¹²⁴Marx's use of the term "activity" is certainly complex, if not downright confusing. To an extent, work is never completely free; i.e. spontaneous. As Marx indicates in the Grundrisse "labor obtains its measure from the outside through the aim to be attained and the obstacles to overcome in attaining it" Grundrisse, op. cit., p. 611. But to the degree that man's activity, his labour in the narrower sense, is posited in its "social character," i.e., that its goals and the form it takes are a determination of the associated producers themselves, its alien character will be diminished. In any case, Marx adds, work as the overcoming of obstacles, is self-liberating; and in this sense its specific humanness shows through: that man's powers expand with the humanization of nature. (Ibid.) The fullest sense of activity, as specifically human activity, is defined by Marx as a realm of activity free from necessity. This is an idea developed in the Manuscripts and returned to in the Grundrisse and Capital. Ollmann attempts to clarify some of these points by his distinctions between "activity," "work" and "creativity" in his Alienation: The Conception of Man in Capitalist Society (Cambridge: University Press, 1971), pp. 99-105 especially. But in many ways the distinctions he makes obscures the real issue which can only be understood by focusing on Marx's use of the term "necessity" in the triple sense that, (1) man needs to work in order to produce the means for life (capitalism reduces work to this sense alone); that (2) productive activity is a need in itself since it is the objectification of man's life; it is his life-activity (Marx makes this distinction in opposition to Hegel who argued that all objectification was estrangement); and that, (3) in the specifically human way in which the human species works upon the world, man proves himself to be a species-being. This means that man must be active because through his particular activity he comes to contemplate himself "in a world he has created!" "In tearing away from man the object of his production, therefore, estranged labor

human to this extent. To the degree that man is conscious of this "free" quality of his activity, man will be able to develop his specifically human qualities and confirm his real social life.¹²⁵ This means that man must treat his life as more than a mere means to his life, that he must not reduce his own life to mere survival. Man must become the "rich human being . . . in need of a totality of human manifestations of life . . . the man in whom his own realization exists as an inner necessity, as need."¹²⁶

tears from him his species-life, his real objectivity as a member of the species and transforms his advantage over animals into the disadvantage that his inorganic body, nature, is taken away from him." Manuscripts, op. cit., p. 114. In the last two senses, work remains a necessity in all social forms; the degree to which it can become "attractive work" in the first, the material, sense depends upon the social and scientific organization of production (Grundrisse, op. cit., p. 610-614). We will return to these issues later.

¹²⁵Manuscripts, op. cit., p. 138.

¹²⁶Ibid., p. 144. There is a world of difference between Marx's idea of the need for a totality of human manifestations experienced as "inner need," as essential drive, and the nature of the development of "instinctual," "biological" needs under capitalism, which Marcuse has attempted to document: "The need for possessing, consuming, handling and constantly renewing the gadgets, devices, instruments, engines offered to and imposed upon the people, for using these wares even at the danger of one's own destruction has become a 'biological' need. . ." Herbert Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), p. 11. In Marx's sense, the category of needs implies the development of specifically human capacities, relations, modes of appropriation. The only needs which capitalism is capable of satisfying are those which are translated into specifically possessive, asocial and therefore non-human forms. They become needs not reflectively, but reflexively. The problem with Marcuse's argument--that capitalism is manipulating man's instincts--is threefold. (1) by implication, he postulates an a priori fixed set of human instincts which are distorted under capitalism; (2) he sustains an opposition, foreign to Marx, between society and the

(3) That his relationship to nature--subjective and objective--is universal and not one-sided is the dimension of Marx's understanding of species-being which allows him to characterize the division of labor as the estranged expression of the social character of labor.¹²⁷

Marx contends that the political economists were "very unclear and self-contradictory" about the division of labor. Some like Smith, saw it as the result of man's natural propensity to exchange. The division of labor was viewed as a "useful" means because it bestowed on labor an infinite productive capacity, and was alleged to be the cause of the development of the diversity of human talents. Mill, on the other hand, saw trade and exchange as the consequence of the division of labor. Marx emphasized the significance of analyzing the division of labor and exchange in the following manner:

The examination of division of labor and exchange is of extreme interest, because these

individual: people are adapted to society, which leads him to the difficulty of;(3) how to rupture society's "organic" hold on the individual. If it is true that we are in the era of total control which effects all members of society (Ibid., p. 37.), then only those who are "outside," who have managed to escape manipulation, can liberate our senses on our behalf. These "outsiders" are specifically identified by Marcuse: middle class disaffected youth and ghetto rebels (Ibid., p. 51). Marx's focus on self-alienation avoids these problems. The very needs which emerge as reflections of capitalism cannot be satisfied within the narrow commodity-form. As images they point beyond this order.

¹²⁷ Marx, op. cit., p. 159.

are perceptibly alienated expressions of human activity and of essential human power as a species activity and power.¹²⁸

What Marx was beginning to recognize is that the analysis of the interconnections between division of labor and exchange--what in Capital becomes the analysis of the social relations of production--would reveal the inner contradictoriness of private property. This contradiction between labor and capital was a fact which forever eluded the perspective of political economy. Since that discipline postulated the "unity of capital and labor in a variety of ways" it was bound to explain the way "in which these two aspects leap at each other's throats" as an "accidental event, and hence only to be explained by reference to external factors."¹²⁹ Marx, however understood the opposition between labor and capital as a necessary contradiction which he said was "of necessity the limit, the culmination, and the downfall of the whole private property-relationship."¹³⁰ The contradiction to which Marx was referring was the outcome of "the production of human activity as labor" and "of the object of human activity as capital." What political economy took as the given facts of production in general were really abstractions: activity separated from its

¹²⁸Ibid., p. 163.

¹²⁹Ibid., p. 153.

¹³⁰Ibid., p. 122.

specifically social character and transformed into the "abstract existence of man as a mere workman . . . " and the product severed from "its natural and social quality," thus remaining "the same in the most diverse social and natural manifestations, totally indifferent to its real content."¹³¹

It is not too difficult to recognize in this somewhat abstract formulation the analysis of the dual aspects of labor, its use value and its exchange-value; and the dual aspects of the product as use-value and exchange-value which will be developed more completely in Capital. Although he had not yet developed the terminology with which to explore the inner contradictions of capital, Marx already sketched for himself the outlines of his more mature analysis of capitalism as a system in contradiction with itself. Towards the end of second manuscript within which these insights were developed, Marx postulated the stages of the development of private property through which he asserted it would have to pass:

First Unmediated unity of the two Capital and labor first still united. . .

Second The two in oppositon, mutually excluding each other. The worker knows the capitalist as his own non-existence, and vice versa: each tries to rob the other of his existence.

Third Opposition of each to itself. Capital = stored-up labor = labor. Capital as such--splitting into capital itself and into its interest, and this labor again into interest, and profit. The

¹³¹Ibid., p. 122.

capitalist completely sacrificed. He falls into the working class, whilst the laborer (but only exceptionally) becomes a capitalist. Labor as a moment of capital--its costs. Thus the wages of labor--a sacrifice of capital.

Splitting of labor into labor itself and the wages of labor. The worker himself a capital,¹³² a commodity. Clash of mutual contradictions.

The point to be noted is not that Marx's ideas about the necessary contradictions of capitalism were already fully developed in 1844. The analysis of the specific process of the transformation of labor into a commodity and the idea of labor-power as the source of surplus value is obviously more concrete and full-blown in Capital. The point is rather that Marx's very early recognition of the essential contradiction between labor as a social activity and labor treated as an abstraction from man's sociality in the division of labor, (which was nevertheless regarded by the economists as the source of the increased production of social wealth), enabled him to understand this contradiction as the ultimate limits of production based on capital.

Within the division of labor the diversity of human talents and powers were exploited in order to facilitate exchange on the basis of private property. The reduction of the ability of each person to a few narrow tasks was the accomplishment of the division of labor. Hence, Marx was arguing, human capacities as universal relations to nature were perverted into narrow and one-sided relations of

¹³² Ibid., pp. 126-7.

individuals isolated from one another. The natural sociality of man's productive activity was limited, subjectively and objectively; men's relations to one another were circumscribed by the mechanical interconnectedness of their activity, and men's relations to nature were circumscribed by the limits of the market.¹³³ In both instances, the universality of man's relations--to nature, and to himself and others--were artificially delimited. The social character of human labor was reduced to a means to egoistic ends. Egoism was the arbitrary premise of the whole system.

(4) That man only truly produces in freedom from immediate need is a direct outcome of the above analysis and is particularly related to Marx's understanding of what needs are specifically human. The only need which political economy understood was the "need for money." "Private property," Marx wrote, "does not know how to change crude need into human need."¹³⁴ The only needs which it can satisfy are (1) artificial, in the sense that they are illusory needs stimulated to secure the dependence of the individual on the market, and also in the sense that they are estranged from and exploit "communal human nature" since they are selfish needs; and (2) crude, abstract needs, in the sense that the

¹³³In contrast, "Marx argues that the human essence of nature first exists only for social men; for only here does nature exist for him as a bond with man--as this existence for the other and the other's existence for him--as the life-element of human reality." Ibid., p. 137.

¹³⁴Ibid., p. 147.

means to life become ends in themselves. To all of this Marx opposes the idea of "rich human need" which depends upon the development of all of the senses of the social man.¹³⁵ In contrast to the way in which man appropriates the world in a "total manner" by developing all of his perceptual and social relations to the world, private property reduces all these relations to the one-sided way of appropriating the world in the "sense of immediate, one-sided gratification--merely in the sense of possessing, of having."¹³⁶ Consequently, all of the human "physical and mental senses" are reduced to the single "sense of having." An object only becomes "ours when we have it--when it exists for us as capital, or when it is directly possessed, eaten, drunk, worn, inhabited, etc.--in short when it is used by us."¹³⁷ Egotistical appropriation obtains not only for man's relations to inanimate objects, but for his relations to himself and to others. In terms of himself, an individual's powers are measured not in terms of any intrinsic qualities or human abilities, but in terms of the quality of his wealth.

Money's properties are my properties and essential powers . . . Thus, what I am and am capable of is by no means determined by my individuality. I am ugly, but I can buy for myself the most beautiful

¹³⁵Ibid., pp. 144, 141.

¹³⁶Ibid., p. 138

¹³⁷Ibid., p. 139.

of women. Therefore I am not ugly, for the effect of ugliness--its deterrant power--is nullified by money. 138

In terms of others, the individual relates to them as the means to the realization of his own selfish needs:

Every product is a bait with which to seduce away the other's very being, his money; every real and possible need is a weakness which will lead the fly to the gluepot.

And not only relations between producer and consumer are so characterized, but the most intimate of relations--the relation between man and woman--become transformed into relations of crude dependence. The man has need of the services of the woman, and the woman's material poverty puts her in need of the man. In neither case has "the other person as a person. . . become for him or her a need." Rather the social relations of marriage are necessary means to the continued individual existence of the partners.¹⁴⁰

¹³⁸Ibid., p. 167.

¹³⁹Ibid., p. 148.

¹⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 133-4. Male-female relations, which Marx indicated were the most direct expression of man's relation to his human existence, were never completely analyzed by Marx himself. There are fragmentary remarks scattered throughout his works, as in The German Ideology and The Communist Manifesto, but there is no systemic analysis of the distortion of personal relationships under capitalism. Engels offered some analysis in his Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State (New York: International Publishers, 1948). With the interest in women's emancipation there has grown up a whole literature on the subject and some of the more interesting are the following books: Simone deBeauvoir, The Second Sex (New York: Bantam Books, 1961); Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex (New York: Bantam Books, 1970); Sheila Rowbotham, Woman's Consciousness, Man's World, (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1973); Eli Zaretsky, Capitalism, The Family and Personal Life, (New York: Colophon Books, 1976).

Since money is the medium through which all of these possessive needs are expressed, it becomes "the bond binding me to human life, binding society to me, binding me and nature and man" ¹⁴¹ Money is the "bond of all bonds," rupturing and establishing all realtions. Money is thus the "truly, creative power" of society; or, to put it more dramatically, society is the product of money. Marx's analysis of the distorting effects of money--that all of man's essential powers are transformed into abstractions, into "dreams " ("If I have the vocation for study but no money for it, I have no vocation for study. . . ." ¹⁴²)--allows him to conclude that money is the alienated "species nature" of man, the alienated "ability of mankind." ¹⁴³ In a word, money is the artificial community. The real community of man is based on the direct satisfaction of truly human needs, the development of truly human senses. As Marx puts it:

Assume man to be man, and his relationship to the world to be a human one: Then you can exchange love only for love, trust for trust, etc. . . . Every one of your relations to man and to nature must be a specific expression, corresponding to the object of your will, of your real individual life. ¹⁴⁴

To the extent that his realtions to the world are no longer limited to private possessive relations then the

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p. 167.

¹⁴² Ibid., p. 168.

¹⁴³ Ibid., p. 168.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 169.

expression of his "real individual life" no longer cuts the individual off from the experience of himself as a truly, human being, a communal being. Rather, his social relations become expressions of his individuality. Not only in those activities which are "directly communal . . . manifested in real association with other men" but also in those "which I can seldom perform in direct community with others," (Marx mentions scientific activity) does the individual express his essential sociality because he is active "as a man."

Now only is the material of my activity given to me as a social product (as in even the language in which the thinker is active): my own existence is social activity, and therefore that which I make of myself, I make of myself for society and with the consciousness of myself as a social being.¹⁴⁵

Marx is not contending that the individual is active "for society" in the sense that he fits his activities to externally determined ends, or that his actions are made to suit the dictates of "Society." He warns against postulating "Society again as an abstraction vis-a-vis the individual. The individual is the social being."¹⁴⁶ What he is saying--and the fact that the concept is so difficult to grasp is, in a way, the strongest proof of how foreign to our contemporary existence a truly human idea of the community is, how threatening to our "individualism" the "other" has become--is that

¹⁴⁵Ibid., p. 137.

¹⁴⁶Ibid., pp. 137-138.

a truly individual, human life is meaningless if it is divorced, torn away from, its implicit intersubjectivity:

Man, much as he may therefore be a particular individual (and it is precisely his particularity which makes him an individual and a real individual social being), is just as much the totality--the ideal totality--the subjective existence of thought and experienced society for itself; just as he exists in the real world as the awareness of the real mind of social existence, and as a totality of human manifestation of life.¹⁴⁷

The individual is human existence in microcosm. All of the individual's powers express his intrinsic connections with the world. It is the individual's capacities themselves which give the lie to a solipsistic view of "man." All forms of human objectification are oriented specifically towards the outside world and the recognition of others. For example, art is not just a "private" view of the world, but an aspect of human perception. If it is not communicated, it is literally meaningless.

Objects--natural and human--in order to fulfill the human need for objectification, must be recognized as truly human objects. Objects must be "made by man for man" as opposed to objects which fill distorted, lopsided, needs. But this means that their particularly social qualities must come to be appreciated. This in turn means that needs and enjoyment lose their "egotistical nature," as do the human senses. In community with others, the activity of the other becomes "my own appropriation" of the world because the

¹⁴⁷Ibid., p. 138.

world, of nature and man, is developed in a human way; i.e., in a social way, and my activity becomes a form of appropriation for the others because the motivating force behind it is its human usefulness.¹⁴⁸ The individual becomes a whole person because all of his senses are brought into being as species-connections "by virtue of humanized nature."¹⁴⁹ "Humanized nature" implies the transcendence of the absolute distinction between public and private, between means and ends. It refers not only to the external world becoming developed in a way to further the expression of man's specifically human powers, which in turn implies that material production becomes self-consciously social; but also to the individual's nature becoming socialized and social existence personalized. Nature can be developed by man in such a fashion that man and nature are both destroyed--as in the current ecologically unbalanced exploitation of nature by "technology." But the reasons for this are not to be found in technology itself; i.e., in the instrumental manipulation of external reality (other objects and other people), but in the narrow range of the application of these tools. This does not imply, however, that science is a mere means, since the particular form in which any tool is given itself reflects prior decisions and social contexts. Means and ends are never radically distinct even if they appear

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 140.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 141.

to be. For example--a computer appears to be a neutral "device"--but its own development represents the choice to investigate and manipulate areas of reality--human and physical--which are apparently mathematizable. As a technique, it limits the range of activities which can be investigated, at the same time it explodes traditional conceptions of time and space. It expands some boundaries, and contracts others. To the extent that the range of available activities is allowed to develop in accordance with available techniques, human activity remains alienated because it remains tied to ends external to man. In a word, nature becomes humanized to the extent that it is divested of its automatistic qualities. As Marx stresses, it is imperative that the human, communal essence be objectified, both in its theoretical and practical aspects, if man's sense is to become human, all-rounded. That is, in his daily life, and not just in his thinking, man's sensuous, social needs must be expressed.¹⁵⁰

Thus, Marx is arguing that human freedom is only realized in community. Political economy treated man's sociality as

¹⁵⁰ One particularly revealing current example of capitalism's ability to focus on artificially "sensual" needs is the development of Muzak--the eternal, omnipresent background noise. Not only in muzak, not music--in the sense that one can hardly distinguish one song from another, and also in the sense that it is intended not to be heard--but its usefulness is not its positive creative sense: rather it is intended to create a soothing, tension-free environment, within which the individual can feel comfortable in the pursuit of his private pleasures, or even his private toils.

nothing more than an expression of egoistic powers in a "social" milieu; as the abject need for products of the other. That man is fundamentally oriented towards others in a totality of ways came to mean, within the vocabulary of private property, that the individual was susceptible to a virtually unlimited array of enslaving "imaginary" appetites:

. . . every need is an opportunity to approach one's neighbor under the guise of the utmost amiability and to say to him: Dear friend. I give you what you need, but you know the conditio sine qua non; you know the ink in which you have to sign yourself over to me; in providing for your pleasure, I fleece you.¹⁵¹

Because political-economic needs are the reduction of human needs to crude dependence on others, the translation of human needs into privatized, possessive needs, they are abstract needs, alienated needs. They become needs engendering a permanent state of needfulness: man's "neediness grows as the power of money increases."¹⁵² The irony of all this--an irony which Marx more implies than makes explicit--is that the individual (capitalist and worker) truly becomes incapable of existing outside of the network of mutual dependence which has been constructed. The image of the "rich human being" is contained potentially within the existing society:

Just as through the movement of private property, of its wealth as well as its poverty--or of its

¹⁵¹Ibid., p. 148.

¹⁵²Ibid., p. 147.

material and spiritual wealth and poverty--the budding society finds at hand all the material for this development [of truly human sense], so established society produces man in this entire richness of his being--produces the rich man profoundly endowed with all the senses--as its enduring reality.¹⁵³

In the Grundrisse and Capital the intrinsic limitation of this development within the structure of capitalism is explored in great detail.¹⁵⁴ At this point the image of the community as the necessary horizon of capitalism is merely a germinating ideal.

In contrast to the political-economic category of possessive need, Marx offers the definition of the need for a truly human appropriation of the world in terms of sensuous activity:

Each of his human relations to the world--seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, feeling, thinking, observing, experiencing, wanting, acting, loving--in short, all the organs which are directly social in their form, are in their objective orientation or in their orientation to the object, the appropriation of that object.¹⁵⁵

It should be obvious that the satisfaction of these senses is implicit social not only because the objects they require for satisfaction are not immediately given, being the products of human activity, but also because the

¹⁵³ Ibid., p. 141.

¹⁵⁴ In particular the theory of surplus value as the concretization of the community within capitalism, as the "production" of truly social beings, is the missing link between the idea of community as man's human essence in the 1844 writings, and the economic preconditions outlined in Capital.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 139.

development of the senses themselves is the result of "a labor of the entire history of the world down to the present." Thus the particular way in which these senses develop and are expressed depends upon the activity of man himself.

(5) For man, productive activity is a need in and of itself. For it to take on specifically human qualities it is necessary that productive activity be understood as the essentially active confirmation that nature--subjective and objective--is man's work and his reality. In the active appropriation of the world, man confirms (1) nature's suitability for human existence (potential of nature); (2) man's ability to sustain his life (human potential) and in the process to give it human meaning, meaning not just for the abstract individual, but for the real, social individual. Thus, he defines nature in human terms and defines his human existence through nature. But because, beyond the requisites of physical existence, the needs we come to identify as specifically human are not immediately given either in form or content, (since man himself historically defines the obstacles necessary to be overcome, devises the ways of overcoming them, and the powers with which to do so), man is a specifically historical creature. His nature cannot be defined in abstraction from his activity.¹⁵⁶ As a

¹⁵⁶As we shall see, this is a point to which Marx returned in The German Ideology in his critique of the "true Socialists" who, Marx said, arrived at communism by way of metaphysics. Marx and Engels, Collected Works, op. cit., V, p. 468 .

consequence, the necessity of his productive activity reveals itself as a dimension of his freedom--the spontaneous development of his senses, his needs, his capacities. If this activity becomes coercive in the sense of alienated labor, then man's productivity appears rooted in crude necessity--the struggle for existence--and takes on an ahistorical quality. The senses, needs and capacities of man confront him as external means to his own immediate, individual life. He thus becomes cut off from that which defines him as a real human individual--the human context, the context of community. To the extent that man, as the isolated individual, is separated from his humanness in the general sense, it follows that he views his particular "social" relations as nothing more than projections of his fragmented existence. Alienation from humanness implies, as Marx argues, alienation from other men in particular. Or, "that man's species nature is estranged from him means that one man is estranged from the other, as each of them is from man's essential nature."¹⁵⁷ But whether we think of alienation from species-being in the general sense or in the specific (personal) sense, the emphasis on alienation as the estrangement of man from a completely human existence is apparent:

Activity and mind, both in their content and in their mode of existence, are social: social activity and social mind. The human essence of nature first exists only for social man, for only here does nature exist for him as a bond with

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 114.

man--as his existence for the other and the other's existence for him--as the life-element of human reality. Only here does nature exist as the foundation of his own human existence. Only here does what is to him his natural existence become his human existence.¹⁵⁸

In this sense, Marx's definition of "social man," "social activity," and the "bond with man," etc. as real human reality is Marx's idea of community. The community of men is not an abstract ideal term in Marx's theory, but a concept which emerges as the practical transcendence of alienated existence. It is the positive annulment of private property as the arbitrarily determinate boundary to the full development of man's sociality. For man to be man he must have a mode adequate to his existence, and the only mode appropriate to human existence is the community. Although at certain times Marx uses the term "society" interchangeably with the term "community," it is the latter term which best captures the flavor, the quality of Marx's definition of humanness as communal existence. He defines man's consciousness of himself as a human being as the "theoretical shape of that which the living shape is the real community, the social fabric . . ."¹⁵⁹

The importance of the idea of community in Marx's writings--the early and the mature--cannot be overemphasized. Because the central emphasis in the writing on alienation was on man's estrangement from his species being, it is

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 137.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 137.

impossible to understand the transcendence of man's self-alienation apart from the notion of community, where community is an historical possibility. Marx's emphasis was on overcoming the unnecessary dichotomies of modern existence, and he defined communism as "the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the individual and the species."¹⁶⁰ Any transcendence which only succeeded in emphasizing one of the sides of these dichotomies to the exclusion of the other was only an introduction of new, equally arbitrary limits. Thus, an emphasis on a personalistic overcoming of alienation--that the individual will be free to be his own man, "to do his own thing,"--to the exclusion of the dimension of sociality, is nothing more than the re-emphasis of the kind of egoism Marx was struggling against. It is a kind of escape from society, but on a higher level, which is derived from an interpretation of alienation as the alienation of the self from "real autonomy." As in the philosophy of Bertrand Russell, freedom from alienation becomes the return of the individual from an excessively conforming state back to himself; an extension of the scope of his individual actions.¹⁶¹ Or in the mood of the French existential Marxists, since the immediate experience of alienation is of the

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 195.

¹⁶¹ See, for example Russell's Authority and the Individual, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960).

"interiority of men in an alienated world" alienation would be superseded with the recognition of the Absolute Freedom of the individual. This is the way it is specifically portrayed in the philosophy of the early Sartre.¹⁶²

But the opposite emphasis is equally fatal. Marx's stress on the necessity of realizing the social essence of man should not be taken to mean that the individual can only develop himself to the extent that he is merged with "society." This complete abnegation of the individual, the attempt to "do away by force with talent, etc. . . negating the personality of man in every sphere" was what Marx called "crude communism,"¹⁶³ and he consistently emphasized that such communism was not the annulment of property relations, but the continuance of the same kind of possessive relations on a universal scale. Because individuals still do not control their existence, but have it foisted on them like some external form, and because they do not develop themselves as full human beings, but only develop those aspects of social existence which can be "possessed by all as private property" so that "the entire world of wealth (that is, of man's objective substance) passes from the relationship of exclusive marriage with the owner of private property to a state of universal prostitution with the community,"¹⁶⁴

¹⁶²Mark Poster, Existential Marxism in Postwar France, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 71, 73.

¹⁶³Ibid., p. 133, 134.

¹⁶⁴Ibid., p. 133.

this excessively collectivistic emphasis obscures the central idea in Marx:

Man's individual and species life are not different however much--and this is inevitable--the mode of existence of the individual is a more particular or more general mode of the life of the species, or the life of the species, is a more particular or more general individual life.¹⁶⁵

Treating the individual as some abstract manipulable form who can be made suited for society is precisely the thrust of Marx's critique of capitalism--that it turned man's need for sociality, as a real need of his individual life, against the individual.¹⁶⁶ To imagine that the individual could only be tolerated insofar as he fitted prescribed patterns of behavior is to define human existence in the a priori, ahistorical, asocial sense which Marx had so painstakingly criticized as the reduction of human life to animal existence. As Meszaros puts it so clearly:

In place of the isolated individual is now put an abstract universal ("abstract Allgemeine," --e.g. "members of the Socialist State," "Positive Hero" etc.) and not the truly social individual who has become a "concrete universal" by self-mediation within a real community.¹⁶⁷

Thus, Marx does not define the community as some supra-individual collectivity to which individuals must belong

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 138.

¹⁶⁶ "Under private property . . . every person speculates on creating a new need in another, so as to drive him to a fresh sacrifice, to place him in a new dependence, and to seduce him into a mode of gratification and therefore economic ruin." Ibid., p 147.

¹⁶⁷ Meszaros, op. cit., p. 270.

in order to exist as humans, nor does he define the community as a completely voluntaristic association of absolutely free individuals. Either case would sustain the opposition between society and the individual which Marx wanted to overcome. Marx's idea of community built upon the very basic insight that the individual's life was thoroughly permeated by his need for the other, but that this very needfulness was the basis for realizing freedom in the human sense. Within the context of community the individual, by developing his fundamental sociality--of his own senses, his own needs, his own powers, etc.--would enable himself to overcome those conditions which reduced real needs to the means for securing his dependence on others. Because needs lose their ego-tistical nature

the senses and minds of other men have become my own appropriation. Besides these direct organs, therefore, social organs develop in the form of society; thus, for instance, activity, in direct association with other, etc., has become an organ for expressing my own life, and a mode of appropriating human life.¹⁶⁸

In many ways the more problematic of the two above rejected alternatives for overcoming alienation, personalism and collectivism, is the latter; if only because there is a spectre haunting Communism--the spectre of Stalin.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁸ Ibid., pp. 139-40.

¹⁶⁹ I am using Stalin as a metaphor for all anti-democratic socialist regimes, where the exigencies of socialist development have presumably necessitated the sacrifice of real freedom--the infinite lengthening of the so-called first stage.

This is by no means a simple matter to dismiss, and our above discussion of Marx's rejection of any communism which negated the real, social individual because it so revealed itself to be a contradiction in terms will certainly not be considered sufficient to decide the matter once for all. But in many ways the arguments about totalitarian impulses in Marx's thought are linked to the related allegations that Marx's image of socialism became reduced, especially in his later writings, to an economistic model, or that he assumed an automatic linkage between social emancipation and the administrative control of the means of production. Wellmer writes, for example, that:

If it is basically true that productive work ,
for Marx, became paradigmatic for the generation
of all categories, that is, if he tacitly conceives
the revolutionary production of the realm of
freedom according to the pattern of instrumental
or strategic action, then at least we would have
found an intellectual-historic origin for the
technocratic corruption of socialism. 170

Consequently, these "totalitarian-tendency" allegations are best considered against the background of the problem of whether or not Marx's idea of the community was conceived in essentially economic terms. Or, to put it another way, whether Marx's central focus on the problematics of transcending alienated species-being was confined within an essentially economistic framework: the framework of material production. Within the confines of this chapter we will

¹⁷⁰Albrecht Wellmer, The Critical Theory of Society, (New York: Seabury Press, 1974), p. 64.

consider these issues as related to the early writings. In a later chapter we will return to them in terms of the charge that Marx became an economic or techocratic determinist and that this paved the way, so to speak, for the cult of bureaucratic socialism.

On the basis of the 1844 Manuscripts at least three counterpoints can be offered to the claim that Marx's community as essentially on economic ideal. These are (1) Marx's critique of "crude communism," (2) Marx's definition of human needs as sensuous needs and (3) the idea of the community offered as a metaphor for the later definition of human freedom within and beyond the realm of necessity.

The image drawn by Marx of "crude communism" in the Manuscripts is significant insofar as Marx radically distinguished his own theory from it.¹⁷¹ He defines crude

¹⁷¹Of related interest to the present discussion is the debate in which Shlomo Avineri and David Resnick recently were engaged in the APSR of December, 1976. David Resnick, "Crude Communism and Revolution;" Shlomo Avineri, "Comment on Resnick's 'Crude Communism and Revolution.'"; D. Resnick "Rejoinder," in American Political Science Review; December, 1976, LXX, No. 4, pp. 1136-1155. Briefly, that debate focused on (1) the general question of "how to read Marx"; i.e., what advantages, disadvantages, resulted from reading the later writings in terms of the early; which method Resnick sees as basically distorting and Avineri as essential; and (2) the significance of Marx's notion of "crude communism" in terms of his theory in general, and in relation to the "stages of socialism" developed in the Critique of the Gotha Program of 1875. There are merits on both sides--specifically, Resnick's implied admonition to be aware of the development of Marx's ideas and Avineri's emphasis on the theoretical and practical significance of Marx's concept. For our purposes, we will limit our commentary on Marx's theory of communism to the non-economistic model he develops in this early work, leaving the discussion of whether in his later works he shifted his emphasis to essentially economic problems until a later chapter.

communism in terms of the community conceived in a limitedly economic sense as the "community of labor," which he described as an "imagined universality."¹⁷² Instead of transcending the state of partiality in which the worker exists under capitalism, it presumes to overcome this partiality by extending it to all. "The task of laborer is not done away with but extended to all men . . . labor [is] a state in which every person is placed."¹⁷³ Similarly, it imagines it can eliminate private property by the claim that it is held in trust by the community. But the claim that there is now only one class position, one category into which every person is fit (everyone is a worker); and the simultaneous claim that there is now only one owner ("the community as universal capitalist") in no way transcends the relations of private property, but allows them to persist on a broader scale. To the extent that alienation is understood simply as the opposition of individual ownership to individual non-ownership, and that it therefore can be overcome by depersonalizing ownership and non-ownership, is to totally misunderstand the analysis of alienation explored in Marx's analysis of "the direct relationship between the worker (labor) and production";¹⁷⁴ i.e., the narrow role that productive activity assumes under capitalism

¹⁷² Manuscripts, op. cit., p. 134.

¹⁷³ Ibid., p. 133-4.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 109-110.

as a determination of the relationship in which individuals stand to one another and not the other way round. The problem of capitalism is not that certain particular individuals own and that other particular individuals work; therefore, the solution to this problem is not the elimination of particular privileges by the reduction of everyone to the same status. Rather, the problem develops out of the relationship to the productive process itself, and one cannot modify this by attempting to modify the mode of distribution. To do so is to remain subject to the same "dominion of material property" and narrow definition of need which prevails in the existing system.¹⁷⁵ The focus on measures of equality abstracted from the conditions of alienated labor is nothing more than the yardstick by which political economy measures value. Hence, the arbitrary raising or lowering of wages, or, in general terms, the superimposition of some "preconceived minimum" as a device by which everybody's wealth is reduced to a common level, is the confusion of the necessary effects of alienation--inequality--with the causative factor which is identified by Marx as the "external relation of the worker to nature and to himself."¹⁷⁶

In fact, Marx continues, not only is this a confusion of cause with effect, it is also a narrowing down of effects to the observable differences in wealth, which is an abstraction

¹⁷⁵Ibid., p. 133.

¹⁷⁶Ibid., p. 117.

from the total idea of alienation as the loss of a human world. Alienation is, Marx argues, not simply the maldistribution of commodities. The net result of the attempt to annul private property by direct economic means is only to extend alienation, albeit in a different form:

General envy constituting itself as a power is the disguise in which greed reestablishes itself and satisfies itself, only in another way. The thought of every piece of private property--inherent in each piece as such--is at least turned against all wealthier private property in the form of envy and the urge to reduce things to a common level, so that this envy and urge even constitute the essence of competition. The crude communism is only the culmination of this envy and of this leveling-down proceeding from the preconceived minimum. It has a definite, limited standard. How little this annulment of private property is really an appropriation is in fact proved by the abstract negation of the entire world of culture and civilizations, the regression to the unnatural simplicity of the poor and undemanding man who has not only failed to go beyond private property, but has not yet even reached it.¹⁷⁷

All that this "crude and thoughtless communism" can attack is the excessive accumulation of wealth by the few. In so doing it reveals nothing more than its jealousy of the possessions of the rich. It is totally trapped in the realm of crude practical need and cannot represent the appropriation of the humanly rich world of man, but reduces the "positive community" to a crudely egalitarian (everyone reduced to the same poverty), and culturally barren community of labor. Even real individual differences (of talents, etc.) are perceived within its narrow world as potential threats--any

¹⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 133-4.

quality which cannot be translated into a quantity of property to be possessed by all is to be eradicated, by force if necessary.

The connection between these arguments and Marx's own multisided definition of human need should be apparent.

The senses that Marx defines as human, and the needs and capacities he defines as essential, are obviously much too broad to be circumscribed by an economic standard. The entire impetus behind his discussion of the perversion of sensuous needs under capitalism is the poverty-stricken image of man with which they are imbued. Private property is, literally, stupefying because it is based on the illusion that an object is only mine if I possess it exclusively. It represents the inversion of means and ends. Ultimately the idea of a purpose to human life disappears altogether:

private property . . . conceives all these direct realizations of possession only as means of life, and the life which they serve as means is the life of private property--labor and conversion into capital.¹⁷⁸

The individual no longer relates "to the thing for the sake of the thing,"¹⁷⁹ but needs to have the thing, because in possessing the thing he possesses all of the properties, all of the powers of it--powers which are totally lacking in his own life. Not only does he live his life through

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 139.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 139.

objects, but these objects, live (manifest) his life for him:

That which I am unable to do as a man, and of which therefore all my essential powers are incapable, I am able to do by means of money.¹⁸⁰

In fact possession ultimately becomes unrelated to any activity, any expression of life, and enjoyment; setting itself up as its own end. Marx characterizes political economy as the "science of asceticism" because of its principle of self-renunciation:

Its moral ideal is the worker who takes part of his wages to the savings bank. . . . The less you are, the less you express your own life, the greater is your alienated life. The more you have, the greater is the store of your estranged being.¹⁸¹

Having has totally replaced being; possessing as totally circumscribed living a life.¹⁸²

And not only are the individual's capacities defined in terms of wealth, his social relations are only means to acquiring this wealth. His attitude towards the other is totally utilitarian. The other has no intrinsic meaning for him. Money (man's estranged species nature) is the

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 168.

¹⁸¹ Ibid., p. 150.

¹⁸² Marx remarks how the cries of opposed schools of political economy reveal the hidden contradiction in this moral philosophy of ascetism: "that there would be no production without consumption. . . . that extravagance and thrift, luxury and privation, wealth and poverty are equal." (Ibid., p. 151) He returns to this issue in the Grundrisse where he demonstrated the inexorable tie between production and consumption (Grundrisse, op. cit., p. 287.

universal artifice; it creates the illusion of individual prowess and the illusion of society, artificial man and the artificial community. That the same kinds of relations prevail under crude communism is apparent from Marx's description of this community as "general prostitution."

Finally, the idea of need which Marx develops is offered as a corollary to his definition of freedom. Capitalism appears to be a system which allows for a great expansion of human powers. And, indeed, Marx allows that with the rupturing of all the feudal bonds within which the development of industry had been contained, the political economy of capital postulated itself "as the sole politics, the sole universality, the sole limit and sole bond,"¹⁸³ so that capital could develop on an unencumbered basis. But the nature of the "social wealth" which capitalism produces reveals the contradictory nature of the freedom which is achieved. Capital, at one and the same time "produces the sophistication of needs and of their means . . . and a bestial barbarization, a complete, unrefined, abstract simplicity of need" ¹⁸⁴ Thus the particular form of social wealth developed under capitalism is a form totally divorced from human need; it is a form determined by the needs of the system: the need to appropriate capital. It

¹⁸³Ibid., p. 129.

¹⁸⁴Ibid., p. 148.

is hardly deserving of the term social wealth at all since it is based on nothing more than artificial (i.e. determined by the "laws" of the market and not human requirements; they only exist as real needs insofar as they can be satisfied by the market) definitions of need:

The worker's crude need is a far greater source of gain than the refined need of the rich. The cellar dwellings in London bring more to those who let them than do the palaces; that is to say with reference to the landlord they constitute greater wealth, and thus (to speak the language of political economy) greater social wealth.¹⁸⁵

Hence, what appears to be freedom--the freedom to acquire unlimited capital, and to satisfy every need imaginable is in fact its opposite:

The increase in the quantity of objects is accompanied by an extension of the realm of the alien powers to which man is subjected, and every new product represents a new possibility of mutual swindling and mutual plundering. Man becomes ever poorer as man. . .¹⁸⁶

Real freedom, in the specifically human sense, is freedom beyond the realm of necessity. As Marx puts it, man only truly produces when his activity is not forced, when it is activity freed from the requisities of production for immediate need or, in a phrase, when it is spontaneous activity. This is impossible to achieve within the structure of capitalism; nevertheless, it is only through the initial development of industry in the form of private property that

¹⁸⁵Ibid., p. 153.

¹⁸⁶Ibid., p. 147.

the ontological essence of human passion [comes] into being in its totality as in its humanity."¹⁸⁷ The category of "spontaneous activity" is coextensive with the idea of the production of the whole man which emerges, as we just saw, as an historical possibility first within the context of capitalism. Marx defines the positive annulment of private property as the "return of man . . . to his human, i.e. social existence"; as the "positive community"; "the real community."¹⁸⁸ He emphasizes that it is essential that this annulment "not be conceived merely in the sense of immediate, one-sided gratification--merely in the sense of possessing, of having."¹⁸⁹ Hence, the idea of community for Marx as the transcendence of private property (which, by the way, is not identical with communism which Marx defines as "the actual phase necessary for the next stage of historical development in the process of human emancipation and rehabilitation," although it is "not the goal of human development--which goal is the structure of human society"¹⁹⁰) is the realization that "the objective world becomes everywhere for man in society the world of man's essential powers."¹⁹¹ That Marx in no way identified this with purely material goals should be apparent from the foregoing.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 165.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 136, 135, 137.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 138.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 146.

¹⁹¹ Ibid., p. 140.

We have seen how Marx had identified the realization of man's communal essence with human emancipation in the essay on Bauer. This could only be achieved by overcoming the contradictions in civil society which precluded the establishment of real community, and although Marx had not specified the nature of those contradictions, he identified the universal need for community (overcoming the atomization of civil society) as the "complete rewinning of man" with the interests of the proletariat. When in the 1844 Manuscripts he begins to explore the dimensions of alienation and to associate man's self-estrangement with the historical contradictions within the system of private property, the link with the idea of community becomes even more striking-- man's essential powers, needs, senses, etc. can only develop in community with others. Only when man experiences the other as a direct realization of his own life, only when he objectifies himself in a truly, human way will the contradictions in civil society between the individual and society, between the private sphere and the public sphere be resolved. Only when the individual experiences himself as a whole man instead of merely an abstract appendage to a productive process, increasingly divorced from his real needs, will he confront his activity as a need in itself. Only when the social bond of money is ruptured and in its place is established the bond of man with man, only when the real community

replaces the artificial community, will the abstract wealth and poverty of political economy be replaced by "the rich human being and the rich human need."¹⁹²

Nevertheless, although Marx implies that this community is a real historical possibility and not just an ideal--his critique of Hegel had been that Hegel's understanding of estrangement was forever locked in the realm of pure thought, that his standpoint was that of "modern political economy"¹⁹³ because he took the alienation of labor as the essence of activity and not as an historical result--his arguments in the Manuscripts are only the beginning of his analysis of capital as a system in contradiction whose historical transcendence is contained as a real possibility within it. What Marx needed to do was to explore the antithesis between labor and capital in detail, to explain the necessary contradictions of capitalism and to pose communism as its necessary transcendence.¹⁹⁴ Or, to put it another way, Marx's concept

¹⁹²Ibid., p. 144.

¹⁹³Ibid., p. 177.

¹⁹⁴The term "necessary" here does not refer to anything like historical inevitability. It refers rather to the real historical possibility of transcending capitalism although not in any pre-determined way. Marx's theory remained dialectical; i.e., the relation between theory and practice was not automatic. The radical transformation of reality depended upon an adequate understanding (theory) of the potentialities of the present. At the same time this theory was not an ideal contemplation of the world, but an active understanding, a philosophy become wordly. As Marx explained the relationship between theory and practice in the Manuscripts, "In order to abolish the idea of private property, the idea of communism is completely sufficient. It takes actual communist action to abolish actual private property. History

of community had to be given a more materialistic and historical basis without factoring out the cultural critique of capitalism to which it also refers.

will come to it, and this movement will constitute in actual fact a very severe and protracted process." Ibid., p. 154. Cf. Meszaros' discussion of transcendence as "ontological necessity which remains historically open-ended because of Marx's definition of the "goal" of human history as man's self-mediation: "Thus the Marxian system remains open because in this account the very 'goal' of history is defined in inherently historical terms, and not as a fixed target. In Marx's account history remains open in accordance with the specific ontological necessity of which self-mediating human teleology is an integral part: for there can be no way of predetermining the forms and modalities of human 'self-mediation'. . . except by arbitrarily reducing the complexity of human actions to the crude simplicity of mechanical determination." Meszaros, op. cit., p. 118-9. Compare with Hyppolite, who contends Marx's transcendence was based on postulating the end of history, Hyppolite, op. cit., p. 117; and Habermas' who argues that by reducing historical change to economic transformation Marx factored out the subject of history by reducing his activity to the dimension of instrumental action, of "labor in the sense of material activity." Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1972), p. 53.

Chapter IV

The purpose of all of Marx's work was to penetrate beneath the natural appearances of modern society and explore its hidden dimensions. Instead of taking the categories of political economy or of idealist philosophy for granted, Marx's dialectical analysis aimed at explaining existing reality as a distortion, an alienated social form. By penetrating the categories of political economy, in particular the category of private property, Marx was able to demonstrate that private property was not an immutable given, but was in fact based upon the alienation of labor. As Marx made it clear in the Manuscripts:

"True, it is as a result of the movement of private property that we have obtained the concept of alienated labor (of alienated life) from political economy. But on analysis of this concept it becomes clear that though private property appears to be the source, the cause of alienated labor, it is rather its consequence, just as the Gods are originally not the cause but the effect of man's intellectual confusion. Later this relationship becomes reciprocal.

He went on to mention that an analysis of any other category of political economy (trade, competition, capital, money) would reveal the same basic point--that alienation itself

¹Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, ed., Dirk Struik (N. Y. International Publishers, 1964), p. 117).

is the result of human activity, albeit in estranged form. Thus, while the conditions of man's material existence produce a situation in which man's activity stands over against him, confronting him like an alien power, Marx continually emphasized the fact that these conditions are themselves the result of man's own activity. That the existing conditions of material reality create the conditions for overcoming alienation, in other words, that social change is not a product of external forces but of the immanent development of the existing system, of the experienced need to change the system is apparent in Marx's analyses of the proletariat in The Holy Family:

"In its economic movement, private property is driven towards its own dissolution, but only through a development which does not depend on it . . . which is brought about by the very nature of things--thereby creating the proletariat as proletariat . . . that dehumanization conscious of its dehumanization."²

Marx goes on to point out that the reason why the proletariat has this historic role is "because man is lost in the proletariat but at the same time has won a theoretical awareness of that loss and is driven to revolt against this inhumanity by

² Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, "The Holy Family" in Writings of the Young Marx of Philosophy and Society, ed., Loyd Easton and Kurt Guddat, (N. Y.: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1967), P. 368 .

urgent, patent and absolutely compelling need (the practical expression of necessity)--therefore the proletariat can and must emancipate itself".³ Without the latter emphasis on the consciousness of dehumanization, it would have been impossible to envision any real transcendence of alienation. Such a naturalistic attitude towards alienation is, in fact, the standpoint equally of political economy and the "German ideologists". It is the analysis of the false and arbitrary premises of these systems of thought to which Marx turned in The German Ideology in an effort to clearly distinguish his methodology and its implications from that of his predecessors.

It is a common misinterpretation of Marx's argument that, given his emphasis on the significance of materialist premises, he reduced men's consciousness of reality to a reflexive function of the mode of production. Having earlier argued that man's own activity enslaved him, he later, so the theory goes, abandoned this position in favor of the contention that history was itself not the record of man's changing ideas (consciousness) about reality, but the record of the development of different material conditions which determined the structure of human existence. While it is certainly true that considerable evidence can be collected

³Ibid.

from these transitional writings to validate such an interpretation, the evidence abstracts from the context and tenor of the main thesis. Marx's main point was still that while man was certainly affected by the structure of the circumstances within which he found himself, what appeared to him to be natural, was in fact nothing more than the network of social relations, which was historically created by man's own activity. Any description of man's essence which ignored the "real, active men" and their "real life process" had to remain hopelessly abstract. But at the same time, any description of material reality which treated the existing system (or any other historical period for that matter) as a function of natural laws, which, in other words, denied the peculiarity of human history, was equally abstract. As Marx had expressed clearly in the third thesis on Feuerbach:

The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of other circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that the educator must himself be educated . . . the coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionizing practice.⁴

⁴ Karl Marx and Fredrich Engels, Collected Works, (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1976), V, p. 7.

That he steadfastly held on to this position is seen most clearly in the following remarks from Capital, III.:

"But all science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of things directly coincided . . . like all its predecessors, the capitalist process of production proceeds under definite material conditions, which are, however, simultaneously the bearers of definite social relations entered into by individuals in the process of reproducing their life. Those conditions, like these relations, are on the one hand prerequisites, on the other hand results and creations of the capitalist process of production; they are produced and reproduced by it.⁵

The analysis of Capital is based on the methodology elaborated in The German Ideology--only a truly historical analysis could provide insight into the contradictory nature of any social system and thus reveal not only the inner logic of the system but the potentialities for transformation hidden within it. By grasping the structure of material reality as the result of the specific social relations into which individuals enter as they reproduce themselves, Marx could argue that any given society was necessarily limited by the degree to which these social relations contributed to or inhibited human development.

⁵Karl Marx, Capital, (N. Y.: International Publishers, 1967), III, p. 818-819).

He could thus call attention to the fact that real liberation was "an historical and not a mental act".⁶ The focus on the significance of material conditions of life was not meant to obscure the fact that men changed the circumstances of their existence as much as they were changed by them. It was intended to counter the arguments of the Young Hegelians which were rooted in one form or another of idealism. Thus, if the emphasis on material conditions in their determinate sense seems overdrawn it has to be understood in terms of this intention and not as a rigidly mechanistic argument. The latter position would render Marx's continual struggle against the implicit determinism of political economy and of Hegelianism entirely unintelligible. We shall elaborate on this later. What we need to explore now is the way Marx deepened his historical analysis of the development of capitalism and how this related to his elaboration of the idea of community.

The bulk of The German Ideology is a critique of the abstractness of the philosophical systems of the Young Hegelians. The failure of these systems of thought "to relate criticism to their own material surroundings" meant that the categories of critique remained hopelessly abstract.

⁶Marx and Engels, Collected Works, op. cit., V, p. 38 .

To the degree to which the Young Hegelians treated ideology, thought, as if it had an independent existence instead of understanding how consciousness was "directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse" of real individuals,⁷ what appeared to be a radical posture instead revealed itself to be a staunchly conservative position. According to this view, reality itself did not need to be directly transformed. All that was needed was a different interpretation of the world, a consciousness of the correct categories, and everything else would follow automatically. Marx emphasized that what was forgotten by these philosophers was:

that they themselves are opposing nothing but phrases to phrases, and that they are in no way combatting the real existing world when they are combatting solely the phrases of this world.⁸

It was not simply a matter of a shift in philosophical perspective, but a matter of the radical transformation of everyday reality out of which men's understanding of themselves and their world developed. Ideas, concepts, etc., did not emerge out of thin air, but were themselves produced by men in the course of their activity in the world:

⁷Ibid, p.30.

⁸Ibid.

Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc., that is, real, active man, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these up to its furthest forms.⁹

While it is true that Marx drew attention to the fact that the development of productive forces and corresponding social relations was a prime conditioning factor in the development of consciousness, this by no means implies a reduction of thought to a simple reflection of "economic factors," as many critics of Marx¹⁰ have rather simplistically concluded. A few pages before the above remarks, Marx emphasized that the mode of production¹¹ must not be considered simply

⁹ Ibid., p. 36.

¹⁰ Even a thinker as sophisticated as Habermas will make the claim that Marx tended to reduce "productive activity" to the realm of instrumental action, and that although in some of his writings there is a second "version" to Marx's understanding of the self constitution of the species in which he distinguished "the self-conscious control of the social life process by the combined producers from an automatic regulation of the process of production," Marx "tried in vain" to capture the interdependence between these two dimensions "in the dialectic of forces of production and relations of production. In vain--for the meaning of this 'dialectic' must remain unclarified as long as the materialist concept of the synthesis of man and nature is restricted to the categorical framework of production (labor is the sense of material activity)." Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1972), pp. 5, 55. The argument obviously hinges on whether Marx ever really restricted "the dialectic" to the categorical framework of production. I contend he did not. But more on this later.

¹¹ Mode of production is a Marxian term which encompasses both the forces of production and social relations of production and views these as a systemic whole, a totality, by calling attention to the particular way (manner, "mode") in which men organize their productive activity.

as being the reproduction of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part."¹² Admittedly, man must produce the means necessary for his survival. But in so doing he simultaneously produces new needs and also social relations. Marx called these three elements the three aspects of social activity and emphasized that they were "not to be taken as three different stages" but were to be understood as having "existed simultaneously since the dawn of history."¹³ Man's productive activity, or social activity as Marx calls it here, is never simply the relation between man and external nature, but it is simultaneously the way in which man develops his specific capacities (new needs) and interacts with others (social relations). This is why Marx described it as the "mode of life" of individuals at a particular point in history.

It is this mode of life to which Marx refers when he argues that it "is not consciousness that determines life, but life that determines consciousness." Here the term "consciousness" refers to "conscious being," that is, man is a being who exists in the world in a particular way, and therefore thinks. His consciousness is not an isolating activity, however much it may be possible for him to "forget"

¹²Marx and Engels, Collected Works, op. cit., p. 31.

¹³Ibid., p. 43.

the world, to doubt it--as Descartes did. Rather, it is an activity fundamentally oriented towards and environed by the world. Marx's point--of the absurdity of the notion of pure consciousness--is expressed well by the phenomenologist

Merleau-Ponty:

Now as before, philosophy begins with a "What is thinking?" and is absorbed in the question to begin with. He whom all things appear before cannot be hidden from himself. He appears to himself first of all. He is this appearance of self to self. He springs forth from nothing; no thing and no one can stop him from being himself, or help him. He always was, he is everywhere, he is king on his desert island.

But the first truth can only be a half truth. It opens upon something different. There would be nothing if there were not that abyss of self. But an abyss is nothing; it has environs and edges. One always thinks of something; about, according to, in light of something; with regard to, in contact with something. Even the action of thinking is caught up in the push and shove of being.¹⁴

To abstract from this real world and its particularity and to argue that consciousness can change and the world stay the same is to describe a philosophy cut off from its historical roots.

On the other hand:

Where speculation ends, where real life starts, there consequently begins real, positive science, the expounding of the practical activity, of the practical process of development of men. Empty phrases about consciousness end, and real knowledge has to take their place. When the reality is described, a self-sufficient philosophy [die selbständige Philosophie] loses its medium of exchange.¹⁵

¹⁴Marcel Merleau-Ponty, introduction to Signs, trans. Richard C. McCleary, (Northwestern: University Press, 1964), p. 14.

¹⁵Marx and Engels, Collected Works, op. cit., p. 37.

Marx's argument that philosophy become "real, positive science" should not be construed to mean that Marx was a positivist. When he makes the demand that philosophy expound upon the "practical process of the development of men" he is not arguing that the science of man be reduced to a natural science. When in fact this latter point does appear in the course of the arguments in the 1844 Manuscripts with Marx's contention that "natural science will in time incorporate into itself the science of man, just as the science of man will incorporate into itself natural science: there will be one science"¹⁶ the claim is not as Habermas would have it¹⁷

¹⁶Manuscripts, op. cit., p. 43.

¹⁷Habermas calls this demand of Marx's for a natural science of man "astonishing." Is it really possible for Habermas to have ignored the many dimensions of the word "natural" in Marx's writing? Habermas seems to only understand nature as a positivistic term, circumscribed by the conception of matter as something quantifiable, and hence subject to the investigations of "science in the rigorous sense," which understanding he imputes to Marx. But this altogether abstracts from Marx's understanding of nature as mediated for man through society. The only thing it was not, he argued, was a fixed and unchangeable entity. Alfred Schmidt devotes an entire book to the exploration of the multifaceted concept of nature in Marx (Alfred Schmidt, The Concept of Nature in Marx, (London: NLB, 1971); and Istvan Meszaros feels called upon to carefully distinguish the various senses of Marx's use of the term natural (Istvan Meszaros, Marx's Theory of Alienation, (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), esp. pp. 175-180). Habermas, however, collapses the term "natural" with the highly rarefied comprehension of nature by a particular school of philosophy--namely, positivism. Ironically, it is Habermas who is guilty of the "astonishing" acceptance of the immediate denotation of the word nature as defined in the "scientistic" tradition. Following this line of thought

that the human sciences will partake of the same instrumentalist meaning as the natural sciences, but that the human sciences will become natural to the extent that they grasp what is specifically human in man's nature. Since the object of the human sciences is man himself, and since man must objectify his human essential powers through nature, which nature is most immediately "the other man sensuously present for him" the human sciences become "human natural science"

we might just as well reduce the notion of objectification to the process of creating objects in the sense in which the natural scientist understands objects--as three-dimensional forms independent of individuals, constrained by cause-effect relations. Habermas is thus involved in a process of etymological contraction of which Marx was exempt. Marx never cast about with sublime indifference to the meaning of words. Instead of accepting the truncated definitions of words offered by his contemporaries, he was keenly aware of the way in which words, and in which language and human communication in general, took on the meaning of the contexts in which they were expressed. "For the bourgeois," he wrote, "it is all the easier to prove on the basis of his language the identity of commercial and individual, or even universal, human relations, as this language itself is a product of the bourgeoisie, and therefore both in actuality and in language the relations of buying and selling have been made the basis of all others. For example, propriété--property [Eigentum] and characteristic feature [Eigenschaft]; property--possession [Eigentum] and peculiarity [Eigentumlichkeit] . . . " Marx, op. cit., p. 231. Marx developed the etymological trajectory of words by exploring the real social relations hidden behind the immediate denotation--he did not collapse words into their alienated understanding, namely, their mere appearance. This is a point which forever eludes Habermas who remains mystified by the subject-object dichotomy to the point where he can only understand "product" and "productive" in the bourgeois sense. He could never do as Marx did--pierce through the veil of products to perceive them as the alienated expression of man's own powers.

to the extent that they are built on an epistemology which recognizes "the social reality of nature" for man.. This science of the humanly natural can lead to self-understanding--what Habermans calls "reflective knowledge"--because it implicitly acknowledges the subjectivity and historicity of human existence. By understanding the natural world as the product of human activity man is able to reflect upon himself in a world in which he feels at home. His social life process becomes subject to his control--but not in a mechanistic, scientistic sense--to the extent to which it is freed from the bonds of mere material production and becomes the appropriation of all of his powers, (seeing, hearing, tasting, willing, loving, etc.) not simply his powers to transform nature into means for sustaining his life, i.e. not simply into powers of technical control.

Habermas does not understand Marx's interpretation of Hegel's philosophy of labor. He complains that Marx conceived of reflection "according to the model of material production" and therefore reduced reflective knowledge to productive knowledge:

So far as production establishes the only framework in which the genesis and function of knowledge can be interpreted, the science of man also appears under the categories of knowledge for control [Verfugungswissen] . . . In the

end this knowledge [productive knowledge] is transformed into the steering of social processes in a manner not unlike that in which natural science becomes the power of technical control.¹⁸

But Marx's category of productive activity is not coextensive with material production.¹⁹ Rather, it is the concept by means of which Marx describes man as an objective being, i.e. as a being who must express or manifest his essential powers by means of objects which exist outside him:

¹⁸ Habermas, op. cit., p. 47,

¹⁹ This is not even true at what Habermas called the "categorical level" of Marx's analysis: The self constitution of the species through social labor. For example, Marx's analysis of the transformation of products into commodities under capital involved a consideration of the way in which the specificity of objects as expressions of specifically human goals, projects--and objectification of specific powers--is extinguished. Objects become under capital nothing more than repositories of value, different forms of objectified labor. Labor, too, becomes such an object. From the point of view of the worker labor has no use value, only exchange value. Its specific characteristic as a "power productive of wealth" is a matter of indifference to the worker, although not to the capitalist. Nevertheless, to the capitalist, the specificity of labor--apart from its appropriateness to the specific enterprise--is irrelevant. As Marx puts it, labor "as the use value which confronts money posited as capital, . . . is not this or another labor, but labor pure and simple, abstract labor . . ."

Marx, Grundrisse, op. cit., p. 296 . Thus products, which are really the developed essential powers of the subject and the object, as well as objects, activity, etc., become mere economic relations, totally devoid of specifically human characteristics. "This economic relation," Marx wrote, ". . . therefore develops more purely and adequately in proportion as labor loses all the characteristics" of art; as its particular skill becomes something more and more abstract and irrelevant, and as it becomes more and more a purely

To say that man is a corporeal, living, real, sensuous objective being full of natural vigor is to say that he has real sensuous, objects as the objects of his being or of his life, or that he can only express his life in real, sensuous, objects. To be objective, natural and sensuous, and at the same time to have objects, nature and sense outside oneself, or oneself to be object, nature and sense for a third part, is one and the same thing.²⁰

Marx is here criticizing Hegel who, on the one hand understands the essence of labor as the process of the self-creation of man, but on the other hand treats objectification itself as an alienated state of self-consciousness, which he views as the real subject, instead of understanding this estranged self-consciousness "as an expression of the real estrangement of the human being . . . in the realm of knowledge and thought". In other words, Marx contends that because man's activity is alienated he reflects on himself as a being lost in the world; thus he is conscious of

mechanical activity, hence indifferent to its particular form; a merely formal activity, or what is the same, as merely material [stofflich] activity, activity pure and simple, regardless of its form." Ibid, p. 297 . That Marx focused on the analysis of products, objects and productive activity in order to disclose the hidden meaning; i.e., the human significance, of these words should be apparent. Marx's intention was to explode the understanding of labor as mere instrumentality; to return to productive activity its characteristic as "art".

²⁰ Manuscripts, op. cit., p. 181.

being alienated. If man is to understand himself as a human being, then he must appropriate the world in a manner which expresses all the powers he has in himself instead of treating these powers as nothing more than the means to earning a living. The possibility of transcending this alienation is presupposed in the reflection on self-estrangement. This is what Marx called the "positive" aspect of the Hegelian dialectic; which is, however, expressed by Hegel "within the realm of estrangement". It should be obvious from these remarks, and the discussion of the preceding chapter, that Marx's understanding of productive activity is not circumscribed by the realm of material production but includes the activity of man as an aesthetic, social, and sensuous creature, as well as a biological being. If "production" is then, for Marx, the only framework within which the function of knowledge can be interpreted, as Habermas argues, this is because Marx argues that human self-understanding is socially and historically objective; i.e., an understanding which grows out of activity, praxis. Habermas fails to understand this.

Having grounded philosophy in a consideration of the active life-process of individuals within a specific historical period, Marx proceeds to an analysis of the historical account of capitalism and focuses in particular

on the development of the productive forces and the corresponding division of labor. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider in any great detail Marx's theory of the historical emergence of capitalism. We will focus our attention on the discussion of the general theory of social change ("the materialist conception of history") and the division of labor as this relates to Marx's earlier discussion of the evolution of human needs and his contrast between the "illusory community" and the "real community".

In the course of reading The German Ideology it becomes apparent that Marx's investigation of the division of labor and its historical evolution is a continuation of the critique of the categories of political economy which had been initiated in the 1844 Manuscripts. The division of labor and private property are in fact identical expressions Marx writes; the only difference is that one refers to the relation to the product of activity and the other to the activity itself. The key difference between the development of the division of labor within the system of private property and the development of the division of labor in all prior forms of property--tribal, ancient and feudal--hinges, in Marx's analysis, on the relationship between property relations

and the community. Only in the bourgeois system are property relations completely independent of the community. In all other societal forms "individuals are united by some bond: family, tribe, the land itself, etc.," whereas in the bourgeois system individuals are "independent of one another and are only held together by exchange." Personal relations are now completely transformed into "money relations." Social relations take on a completely independent existence because "individuals . . . exist split up and in opposition - to one another"; they become "separate individuals" or "abstract individuals."²¹ In fact, the relation of the individual to his conditions of life--his position in the division of labor--appears increasingly accidental; i.e., having little to do with the individual himself, so that his own "position in life" and his "personal development" become "predetermined" by his class.²² Because individuals are separated from one another, their inevitable association, which is determined by the division of labor, appears as an alien bond--not voluntary but coerced. Thus, the development of productive forces to the unprecedented degree

²¹ Marx and Engels, Collected Works, V, 86-7.

²² Ibid. p. 77.

achieved under capitalism presupposes the rupturing of all communal ties, so that social activity appears in an alien form:

The social power; i.e., the multiplied productive force, which arises through the cooperation of different individuals as it is caused by the division of labor, appears to these individuals, since their cooperation is not voluntary but has come about naturally, not as their own united power, but as an alien force existing outside them, of the origins and goal of which they are ignorant, which they thus are no longer able to control, which on the contrary passes through a peculiar series of phases and stages independent of the will and action of man, nay even being the prime governor of these.²³

Thus, Marx says, the development of the "division of labor" implies the contradiction between particular interests (individual interests) and the general or common interest (interests developed in community with others); and under these conditions the "common interest assumes an independent form as the state . . . and at the same time as an illusory community".²⁴

The only community which can exist under the conditions of a highly developed division of labor is an illusory one precisely because it is not the free cooperation of individuals with one another but is an enforced association

²³ Ibid., p. 48.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 46.

of individuals based upon the artificial restriction and "fixation of social activity". Consequently, men's social relations take on an independent existence opposed to the individuals themselves.

The illusory community in which individuals have up till now combined always took on an independent existence in relation to them, and since it was the combination of one class over against another, it was at the same time for the oppressed class not only a completely illusory community, but a new fetter as well. In the real community the individuals obtain their freedom in and through their association.²⁵

As a consequence of the division of labor, the community appears as an alien mode of the individual's life. His individual life is circumscribed by the "particular, exclusive sphere of activity" within the division of labor which appears to be his "natural" lot in life.

Once again Marx points to the cleavage in the life of the individual, the contradiction which exists within the system of private property between individuality and the conditions of life. Under these circumstances, the conditions of the individual's life appears increasingly accidental; i.e., they are something over which individuals have no control. Thus, "man's own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him."²⁶ The individual comes to view the

²⁵ Ibid, p. 78.

²⁶ Ibid, p. 47.

conditions of his life--his necessary association and interaction with others--as the mere means to his existence.

But the contradiction goes further than this. Not only does association, sociality, appear as an alien bond, not only is the "common interest" nothing more than common dependence on material forces (the illusory community), but the individual, too, is a fiction. His life is not circumscribed by the extent of his own personal talents or attributes, but by the artificial boundaries of self-development imposed by the division of labor:

. . . as soon as the division of labor comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd, or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want ²⁷to lose his means of livelihood. . .

On the one hand, it appears as if the development of productive forces which accompanied the division of labor had freed individuals from all restraint so that individuals "seem freer under the dominance of the bourgeoisie than before." The development of industry and the development of wealth, and consequently, the development of the freedom to enjoy the "freaks of fortune" appeared to be unlimited. Marx acknowledged

²⁷Ibid., p. 147.

the achievements of capitalism: free trade; extended communication systems and a world market system; concentration of capital; encouragement, through competition, of individuals to "strain their energy to the utmost;" development of worldwide interdependence, etc. However, the fact that all are equally dependent on the market, that all have an equal chance to become successful, are not indications of progress in freedom, but in servitude. Individuals have not taken control of their own lives, rather their lives are now being controlled by the whims of the market, the winds of chance and the wheel of fortune. Moreover, the nature of the development of the productive forces is itself limited. To the extent that individuals do not determine the content of their intercourse with one another, but allow this content to be determined by the market, the development of industry is lopsided:

These productive forces receive under the system of private property a one-sided development only, and for the majority they become destructive forces, moreover, a great many of these forces can find no application at all within the system of private property.

Thus, while on the one hand it appears as if individuals come into their own with the advent of bourgeois society, in fact their particular existence is circumscribed by their class position:

²⁸Ibid., p. 73.

The difference between the private individual and the class individual, and the accidental nature of the conditions of life for the individual, appears only with the emergence of the class, which is itself a product of the bourgeoisie. This accidental character as such is only engendered and developed by competition and the struggle of individuals among themselves. Thus, in imagination, individuals seem freer under the dominance of the bourgeoisie than before, because their conditions of life seem accidental; in reality, of course, they are less free, because they are to a greater extent governed by material forces.²⁹

Thus, the community is illusory because it is seen as an alien bond and not as the self-conscious control of the condition of social existence. And the individual is a fiction because he does not control the conditions of his life, but is controlled by them.

Until the productive system of capitalism became more developed, Marx says, personal freedom had been defined as the "undisturbed enjoyment. . . of fortuity and chance". Real freedom, though, can only exist within the community which appropriates the totality of productive forces upon which has developed a universal intercourse, and makes this universal intercourse an end in itself. The development of productive forces has thus made it possible for

²⁹Ibid., p. 73.

individuals "to enter into relation with one another as individuals"; i.e., as individuals who have developed a totality of capacities within themselves. Thus, the establishment of this community "corresponds to the development of individuals into complete individuals and the casting off of all natural limitations":

With the community of revolutionary proletarians . . . who take their conditions of existence and those of all members of society under their control . . . it is as individuals that the individuals participate in the community. For it is the association of individuals (assuming the advanced stage of modern production forces, of course) which puts the conditions of the free development and movement of individuals under their control--conditions which were previously left to chance and had acquired an independent existence over against the separate individuals precisely because of their separation as individuals and because their inevitable association, which was determined by the division of labor, had, as a result of their separation, become for them an alien bond.³⁰

It should be clear from the foregoing that Marx did not argue for the community as a form within which individuals would once again be submerged, and in which, therefore, they would find their lives circumscribed by new "natural" boundaries. This would correspond to the development of crude communism which Marx had criticized so vigorously

³⁰Ibid., p. 80, emphasis added.

in his earlier work. Indeed, in later sections of The German Ideology, Marx clearly differentiates his understanding of the communist community from Stirner's characterization of it as the "universal community of workers" based upon an equality of wages. The establishment of this community would do nothing more than re-introduce "into communism private property in its dual form--as distribution and wage labor."³¹ The community is not based on the reduction of every individual to the same crude status, Marx contends, but on the free development of all abilities. The community is not opposed to the individual, but is the only realm within which the individual can live a many-sided life:

The transformation through the division of labor, of personal powers (relations) into material powers, cannot be dispelled by dismissing the general idea of it from one's mind, but can only be abolished by the individuals again subjecting those material powers to themselves and abolishing the division of labor. This is not possible without the community. Only within the community has each individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all directions; hence personal freedom becomes possible only within the community.³²

This focus on the community as the real development of personal freedom contains an implicit reference to Marx's earlier arguments about specifically human needs, senses,

³¹Ibid., p. 216-7.

³²Ibid., p. 78, emphasis added.

powers, etc. Although here he repudiates the use of such terms as "self-generation of the species" or "species-being" to the extent that they tend to obscure the fact that it is material reality itself which must be transformed, he by no means abandons his earlier insights into the communal essence of man. In fact, as we have seen, he specifically refers to the community. His theory of the community was given a more concrete focus as Marx deepened his historical analysis of capitalism and focused attention on the necessary contradictions arising between the productive forces and the social relations of production. Man's sociality develops under capitalism. The necessity of his association with others becomes more pronounced. But capitalism contains this within the framework of a lop-sided development of the productive forces. It thus creates the conditions for its own supercession: it creates needs--the need for community, for the all-round development of the individual--which it cannot fulfill.

What we need to consider is whether or not Marx's analysis of the necessary contradictions of capital is sufficiently concrete to allow him to conclude that the transcendence of capitalism is a real possibility. In addition, as Marx begins to focus more and more on the structure of material reality, on the necessity of

"the practical overthrow of the actual social relations" the question arises as to whether or not the alienation he identifies will be automatically superseded with the abolition of private property, i.e. with a change in the mode of production. In other words, what does Marx mean when he asserts that the organization of communism is "essentially economic"?³³

The German Ideology was definitely an advance over the rudimentary analysis of the contradiction between labor and capital which had been begun in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts. In that work, Marx had set down the outlines of his theory and it is apparent that The German Ideology began to fill in the details of this theory, particularly in terms of the dynamics of history. Nevertheless, in many ways the analysis remained abstract. While it is true that Marx had developed his general theory of history--the contradiction between production forces and the form of intercourse (social relations) as the motor of history--his analysis of the specific contradictions of the capitalist mode of production remained incomplete. Having focused on the division of labor and its transformation in history, Marx could offer the general hypothesis that the division of labor under capitalism would itself ultimately

³³Ibid., p. 81.

become a fetter on the productive forces, but until he identified the specific nature of capitalist exploitation; i.e., until he developed his own theory of surplus value, and the nature of exchange relations under capitalism, his theory remained abstract. At several junctures in the analysis Marx gave some indication of the future development of his theory--the universality of production under capitalism contained within the limits of property (exchange) relations; the transformation of the "natural form of the world historical cooperation of individuals" into conscious mastery of productive forces are examples of ideas which anyone familiar with the Grundrisse will recognize as key aspects of Marx's more "mature" theories. Within the context of The German Ideology they exist only as rather suggestive hypotheses. It would be a mistake to argue from hindsight that Marx had already developed his more elaborate theory.

As far as Marx's focus on the economic dimensions of the problem of alienation is concerned, a careful reading of the text will allow us to avoid the equally erroneous conclusion that Marx had already reduced his theory of communism to an essentially economic conception. The continual emphasis on the necessity of exploring the real foundation of history--the mode of production and the form

of intercourse corresponding to it--was intended as a counterpoint to the idealist conception of history and not as a simplistic reduction of all history to abstract "economic factors". When Marx wrote that life determined consciousness, and that the mode of production conditioned the social and political structure of any historical epoch, he was not implying anything like a simple causative relation between economics and social structures, or economics and culture. The mode of production was of fundamental importance in Marx's analysis because analysis of it revealed the way in which individuals organized their productive activity. If Marx tended to treat this realm in a way which implied an hypostatization of economic reality, this was only in order to provide a stark contrast to the idealist conception of history which had treated consciousness as a completely autonomous and independent realm. Consciousness is no more devoid of material premises than the mode of production is independent of consciousness. The world in which man contemplates himself is after all

a historical product, the result of the activity of a whole succession of generations, each standing on the shoulders of the previous one, developing its industry and its intercourse, and modifying its social system according to the changed needs.³⁴

³⁴ Ibid., p. 39.

Marx's conception of history thus attempted to account, as he had argued in the Theses On Feuerbach, for the way in which the conditions of life determine consciousness and are themselves changed by human activity:

The conception of history thus relies on expounding the real process of production--starting from the material production of life itself--and comprehending the form of intercourse connected with and created by this mode of production; i.e., civil society in its various stages, as the basis of all history, describing it in its action as the state, and also explaining how all the different theoretical products and forms of consciousness, religion, philosophy, morality, etc., arise from it, and tracing the process of their formation from that basis; thus the whole thing can, of course be depicted in its totality (and therefore, too, the reciprocal action of these various sides on one another.)³⁵

It was German idealism which wanted to abstract from this totality. Marx's conception of history maintained continual contact with the subjectivity of human history; i.e., with history as the documentation of man's self-transformation and his transformation of nature. It treated neither consciousness nor productive activity as realms abstracted from man as the subject of history.

Naturally, Marx drew attention to economic considerations. He argued, for example, that the mere 'idea' of communism was meaningless if the material elements of

³⁵ Ibid., p. 53.

revolution were missing. These material elements he identified as "on the one hand, the existing productive forces, and on the other the formation of a revolutionary mass."³⁶ Although he emphasized the necessity of the development of productive forces to a high degree, and the creation of a world-market, he by no means implied that any revolution would follow automatically from such developments. These developments were rather its practical premises. Again and again, Marx argued for recognition of the pre-conditions to revolution. The idea that communism was an historical movement which would abolish the existing state of affairs meant that Marx had to consider the full development of productive forces as a necessary prerequisite.³⁷ But, given his conception of the community as the realm within which the individual could cultivate his gifts in all directions; given his criticism of the division of labor as an alien mode of existence because man's activity was circumscribed within narrow limits; and given his critique of other communist theories of the time for remaining

³⁶ Ibid., p. 54.

³⁷ Marx wrote, for example, that "in general, people cannot be liberated as long as they are unable to obtain food and drink, housing and clothing in adequate quality and quantity." Ibid., p. 38. That he distinguished liberation from both qualitative and quantitative improvement of material conditions is apparent.

trapped within the confines of the system of private property since they envisioned the communist community as a community of workers based on nothing more than a radically equal distribution system; that Marx reduced the community to an economic form, to the simple abolition of the economic immiseration of the worker is easily dismissed.

The overriding significance of The German Ideology is the emphasis on the fact that it is capitalist relations of production which preclude the "free development of individuals" and that, therefore, only a community which is based on the abolition of these restrictive relations of production can completely emancipate individuals. The abolition of the division of labor can only take place if social relations and productive forces have developed "to such a degree of universality that private property and division of labour become fetters on them."³⁸ These are the economic preconditions. But Marx stresses the equal importance of the "all round development of individuals, precisely because the existing form of intercourse and the existing form of intercourse and the existing productive forces are all-embracing and only individuals that are developing in an all-round fashion can appropriate them; i.e., can turn them into free manifestations of their lives."³⁹

³⁸ Ibid., p. 438-9.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 439, emphasis added.

This is what we will refer to as the cultural pre-requisites of change. Not only is it imperative that a world market exists, but it is equally imperative that the need for community, for the all-round development of individuals, emerge alongside the system of production as the conscious demand to realize freedom beyond the realm of necessity. That Marx did not envision this historically rooted need for community as something which was satisfied by purely economic measures is evident:

Within communist society, the only society in which the genuine and free development of individuals ceases to be a mere phrase, this development is determined precisely by the connection of individuals, a connection which consists partly in the economic prerequisite and partly in the necessary solidarity of the free development of all, and finally, in the universal character of the activity of individuals on the basis of the existing productive forces.⁴⁰

Marx's analysis of the possibility of individuals appropriating the existing productive forces in an all-sided manner was based neither on moral imperatives, nor arguments about human nature in the abstract. In fact, Marx was critical of the Young Hegelians for the fact that they justified socialism by either appealing to moral

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 139, emphasis added.

principles (the "selfless egoism" of Max Stirner) or drawing their images of human society from images of a cooperative "Nature" and arguing for some ideal human society (the True socialists). In both cases the arguments remained abstract because they failed to consider the historical factors which had separated the individual from society. They arrived at communism by way of metaphysics instead of demonstrating the emergence of communism as an historical possibility. In contrast to all of this, Marx continually stressed that the idea of community was an historical need. The community was the concept Marx used to describe the transcendence of the alienated social relations of capitalism.

We have seen how Marx began to develop the method by which he could analyze the necessary contradictions of capitalism. We have also seen how Marx's critique of the division of labor and his demand for its abolition were not tied to limited economic projects, but to the demand to free social relations from the constriction of the market, and to thus establish the wealth of the individual in terms of wealth of all of his real connections as opposed to purely "accidental" relations to the market. Only in community, Marx had argued, could the wealth of the individual become a function of his individuality as opposed to his class position. While the establishment of this community

was dependent upon the development of productive forces to a very high degree, Marx did not imply that the community was identified with material affluence, nor that it was the automatic result of the autonomous development of productive forces. Rather, he defined the community as the world historical cooperation of individuals which had a material foundation. But we have also indicated how Marx's theory, as introduced in The German Ideology, that capitalist relations of production would ultimately fetter the capitalist forces of production remained incomplete. Marx's later work, particularly the economic writings, represents an attempt to clarify the exact origin and nature of the contradictions of capitalism and, therefore, to disclose the necessary limits to production based on capital and to establish the historical possibility of the transcendence of alienation. Could it be that as Marx focused more intensely on the inner dynamics of capitalist economics he lost sight of the earlier emphasis on community and reduced the wealth of social relations to crudely economic or technocratic activities? In other words, what concept of community, if any, did Marx utilize in his analysis of the process of capitalist production? Since earlier we related Marx's idea of community to his conception of productive activity, of fundamental importance to the

answering of both of these questions in Marx's conceptualization of productive activity in the "economic" writings. Does Marx reduce work to a technocratic strategy?

Except by implication, the intention here is not to enter into the thick of what Meszaros has called "the controversy about Marx"; viz., whether there are "two Marxes" or one. In other works, the outlines of this controversy have been carefully drawn and the arguments forwarded in support of the alleged dualism of Marx's work have been adequately dismissed.⁴¹ Basically, a careful reading of the later texts and an understanding of Marx's methodology, as he himself explained it in the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy of 1859, ought to enable one to avoid the pitfalls of abstracting from the coherence of Marx's analysis as he developed and refined his earlier insights into the contradictions of capitalism. More recently, these charges about the bifurcation in Marx's thought have been eclipsed by current claims concerning the origin of what has been called the "regression of Marxism behind Marx."⁴²

⁴¹ See for example, Ernest Mandel, The Formation of the Economic Thought of Karl Marx, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), especially, Chap. 10; in addition to the works by Avineri, Meszaros, and Schaff cited in earlier chapters.

⁴² Trent Shroyer, Critique of Domination, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973, p. 31.

That the accompanying demand, emerging from these critiques, for overcoming the deficiency in Marx's theory by postulating a "broader framework for critical theory" or a "new model of emancipation" by relating the politico-economic and the cultural forms of critical theory⁴³ can be met by a more adequate conceptualization of the impetus for critical theory inherent in Marx's ontology of productive activity is one of the chief ways in which this dissertation contributes to the growing body of literature in critical theory. It is my contention that much of the work of the Frankfurt School and related theorists obfuscates the main thrust of Marx's later works which were never purely "economic" discourses.

Earlier I argued that contemporary criticisms of the latent positivism in Marx's thought found in the works of Wellmer, Baudrillard and others all stemmed from the common assertion that Marx's adoption of the labor theory of value imprisoned him in a kind of technocratic logic which assumed an equation between techne and praxis and reduced the revolutionary impulses of his critique of capitalism to a kind of etatist form of socialism. Consequently, according to these critics, it is necessary to supplement Marx's theory with an additional dynamic in order to salvage the "rational kernel" of Marxism from the deterministic straightjacket with

⁴³Ibid., p. 36, 33.

which Marx purportedly fit it, and also to provide a more systematically unified framework for the analysis of advanced capitalism in particular. Shroyer, for example, appends a reformulation of the work of the "cultural Marxists" to his analysis of Marx's crisis theory in order to fulfill his intention to develop a "broader and more scientifically relevant form of critique."⁴⁴ Habermas claims to "understand Marx better than he understood himself" and argues that a theory of non-repressive communication is a necessary precondition to a fully developed critique of domination. Baudrillard argues for the consideration of the autonomy of cultural forms and symbol systems, and proposes a critique of the "signs" of political economy, or a semiological analysis which would liberate alternative paradigms (play, etc.), which he claims Marx's preoccupation with labor and productive activity necessarily precluded. I will consider these arguments only in order to evaluate the common claim that Marx reduced consciousness (culture) to a mere by-product of productive forms, and consequently failed to escape the confines of an economistic interpretation of human needs and human activity. They will serve as counterpoints to the further elaboration of Marx's concept of community. The intention is to resolve the alleged self-contradictoriness of Marx, not to explore all of the dimensions of these critics.

⁴⁴ Shroyer, op. cit., p. 173

We know that the prime significance of Marx's analysis in Capital, I, was the discovery that the exploitation of the worker was not the result of the circulation of commodities, of some inequitable distribution of wealth, but was rooted in the very process of capitalist production itself. While it is true, Marx contended, that the production of surplus value is only realized through the exchange, or the circulation, of commodities, it was the peculiar usefulness of the commodity which the capitalist purchased in order to initiate production of other commodities that was the source of all surplus-value. "The consumption of labor-power is at one and the same time the production of commodities and of surplus-value."⁴⁵ Thus the transformation of productive activity into the commodity labor-power, exchanged on the market like any other commodity, was viewed by Marx as the basis of exploitation under capitalism. But in order to appreciate the significance of this insight we must turn to the notebooks of 1857-8, the Grundrisse, where the ideas were first worked out in detail.

Martin Nicolaus aptly described the Grundrisse as a work "of epochal significance."⁴⁶ In this work, the elaboration on the lines of reasoning which are to be found in distillate form in Capital enables one to appreciate more fully the interconnection between Marx's "economics" and his cultural critique

⁴⁵ Karl Marx, Capital, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, (New York: International Publications, 1967), I, p. 175.

⁴⁶ Martin Nicolaus, "The Unknown Marx" in Robin Blackburn (edit.), Ideology in Social Science, (Suffolk, England: Fontana Press, 1972), p. 309.

of capitalism. The main focus of the Grundrisse is on the critique of society based on exchange relations: Marx's multifaceted analysis of the social implication of the predominance of exchange relations and the division of labor make it clear that the significance of the economic categories--commodity, universal equivalent, labor-power, surplus value, exploitation--by means of which Marx provided an analysis of the process of capitalist production is not limited to the economic dimension. Rather, the analysis of the transformation of all social connections (and each of these concepts represents the "alien and objective" form of specific social relations under capitalism) between individuals into connections determined by exchange, into "relations which subsist independently of them and which arise out of collisions between mutually indifferent individuals,"⁴⁷ is a more concrete account of the alienation of man's "species-essence" and "species-ties" begun in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts. This is by no means to suggest that the Grundrisse represents nothing more than a more detailed account of the 1844 ideas. We have already demonstrated how much more historically concrete Marx's methodology had become in the intervening years. But there is an inner coherence to Marx's work, a development of his thought which is underscored in the Grundrisse, the analysis of which will allow us to avoid such mistaken notions as that Marx

⁴⁷ Karl Marx, Grundrisse, der Kritik der politischen
trans. Martin Nicolaus, (New York: Vintage Books,
1973), p. 157; hereafter referred to as Grundrisse.

posited a purely economic solution to the problems of capitalism.

Marx began his analysis with the observation that in bourgeois society the individual appears as a naturally independent being, "detached from the natural bonds, etc., which in earlier historical periods make him the accessory of a definite and limited human conglomerate."⁴⁸ In reality though, Marx continued, the bourgeois epoch marks the period of "the hitherto most developed social (from this standpoint, general) relations."⁴⁹ The individual can only exist "in the midst of society." One could argue that the whole of the Grundrisse is an exploration of this contradiction between the individual and the social as the fundamental contradiction of bourgeois society; i.e., of society based on exchange. How bourgeois relations, by completing the rupture between the individual and the community (natural bonds) and substituting the social bond of money, represent simultaneously the conditions for the real individualization of human existence, and the alienated expression of this individualization is the central thrust of Marx's analysis:

In fact, however, when the limited bourgeois form is stripped away, what is wealth other than the universality of individual needs, capacities, pleasures, productive forces, etc., created through universal exchange?

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 83

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 84

The full development of human mastery over the forces of nature, those of so-called nature as well as of humanity's own nature? The absolute working-out of his creative potentialities, with no presupposition other than the previous historic development, which makes this totality of development; i.e., the development of all human powers as such an end in itself, not as measured on a predetermined yardstick? . . . In bourgeois economics--and in the epoch of production to which it corresponds--this complete working-out of the human content appears as a complete emptying-out, this universal objectification as total alienation, and the tearing down of all limited, one-sided aims as sacrifice of the human end-in-itself to an entirely external end. 50

Contained within capitalism are "relations of circulation as well as of production which are so many mines to explode it."⁵¹

It is important to emphasize that the stress here is on the term "relations," on social connections within the spheres of circulation and production which however cannot be satisfied within the narrow bourgeois form. Capitalism universalizes relations, needs and capacities which are the real conditions for the transcendence of capitalism itself. The community emerges as an historical need within the structure of capitalism, although it appears at first in alien form. As Marx puts it, within capitalism, money is the community, but only as a "mere abstraction, a mere external accidental thing for the individual,

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 488

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 159

and at the same time merely a means for his satisfaction as an isolated individual".⁵² The system of production based on exchange contains inherent contradictions within it. Exchange relations represent the development of a kind of "general industriousness." The real sources of wealth are opened up so that production would no longer be limited to production of a "particular product standing in a particular relation to the particular needs of the individual." Individual industriousness appears to know no bounds. In fact, as Marx will attempt to demonstrate, exchange relations themselves ultimately fetter the universal development of wealth.

Capitalism is based on the implicit recognition of the universality of human productive activity; but this universality is not expressed in any direct form. It is rather something which "has first to be mediated"; i.e., expressed in terms of exchange value, so that the intrinsic sociality (Marx calls it the "communal character of production") of man's activity appears as a relation between things, between the products of man's activity.

The general exchange of activities and products, which has become a vital condition for each individual--their mutual interconnection--here appears as something alien to them, autonomous, as a thing. In exchange value, the social connection between persons is transformed into a social relation between things; personal capacity into objective wealth.⁵³

⁵² Ibid., p. 226

⁵³ Ibid., p. 157

Capitalism renders the "reciprocal and all-sided dependence" of individuals on one another indispensable to the existence of each--"individuals now produce only for society and in society"⁵⁴ --but this reciprocal dependence expressed as the "constant necessity for exchange" means that

[i]ndividuals are subsumed under social production; social production exists outside them as their fate; but social production is not subsumed under individuals, manageable by them as their common wealth.⁵⁵

Under capitalism, the social character of activity appears as fate; i.e., as something which controls the individuals instead of being subject to communal control. Nevertheless, the possibility of the latter emerges as an antithetical form within capitalism. Marx distinguishes between three stages in the development of social forms which correspond to stages in the development of the universality of productive activity and the process of individuation:

Relations of personal dependence (entirely spontaneous at the onset) are the first social forms, in which productive capacity develops only to a slight extent and at isolated points. Personal independence founded on objective [sachlicher] dependence is the second form, in which a system of general social metabolism, of universal relations, of all-round needs and universal capacities is formed for the first time. Free individuality, based on the universal development of individuals and on their subordination of their communal, social productivity as their social wealth, is the third stage. The second state creates the conditions for the third.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 158

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 158

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 158

It is important to notice the connection drawn here between "free individuality" and communal productivity. What Marx is arguing is that it is only in community that the individual can realize his potentialities to the fullest because relations are no longer determined by exchange. Insofar as the value of activity is determined by exchange (the amount of labor time embodied in the activity), the peculiarity and individuality of activity is "negated and extinguished." Only on the basis of communal production will the qualitative distinctions between activities determine their value. Individuality circumscribed only by its own limits is possible only when "communal production, communality, is presupposed as the basis of production."⁵⁷ But the converse is also true. In order for production to take on a communal character, the individual's activity must be "posited from the outset as social labor."⁵⁸ It is worthwhile to excerpt Marx's contrast between bourgeois production and communal production at length because it provides a number of insights into the community which Marx described as the transcendence of alienated activity:

But on this presupposition it would not be exchange which gave labor its general character; but rather its presupposed

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 172

⁵⁸Ibid.

communal character would determine the distribution of products. The communal character of production would make the product into a communal, general product from the outset. The exchange which originally takes place in production--which would not be an exchange of exchange values but of activities, determined by communal needs and communal purposes--would from the outset include the participation of the individual in the communal world of products. On the basis of exchange values, labor is posited as general only through exchange. But on this foundation it would be posited as such before exchange; i.e.; the exchange of products would in no way be the medium by which the participation of the individual in general production is mediated. Mediation must, of course, take place. In the first case which proceeds from the independent production of individuals--no matter how much these independent productions determine and modify each other post festum through their interrelations--mediation takes place through the exchange of commodities. . . . In the second case, the presupposition is itself mediated; i.e., a communal production, communality, is presupposed as the basis of production. 59

Communal production thus implies the simultaneous transformation of the mode of distribution, the product itself, the nature of activity, the relation of the individual to his activity and to the world of products, and the mediation of individuals' relations to one another. These are all interrelated moments of the transformation of productive activity.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 171-2

But what did Marx mean by "communal production?" Did he mean merely the control of the means of production by the associated producers? Or was the term production a descriptive concept which pointed beyond the definition of production circumscribed by exchange? And to what factors emerging within capitalism did Marx attribute the historical possibility of the establishment of the community? Of what significance is the theory of surplus value to Marx's idea of community? The answers to these questions provide an implicit critique of the criticisms of Marx cited earlier. At the same time, consideration of the community in these terms allows us to judge the validity of identifying Marx's community with contemporary incarnations of communism, and also to consider whether or not the conditions of advanced capitalism negate the dialectics of change which Marx analyzed.

Habermas' interpretation of Marx is based on the assertion that Marx's crisis theory was essentially economic. He argues that for Marx, "the basis of the world as a crisis complex is exclusively the economy, that is, it is inextricably involved in these economic crises and is resolvable together with them."⁶⁰ Consequently, Habermas understands Marx's analysis of the crises of capitalism within a narrow economic framework. To him, the validity of Marx's theories rests on the accuracy of Marx's prediction about the falling rate of profit and the absolute (economic) immiseration

60

Jurgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), p. 222.

of the worker. Given the relative resistance of monopoly capital to passively accept declining rates of profit and given the rising level of wages, Marx's theories obviously need to be revised. Moreover, Habermas continues, Marx failed to take into account the ways in which political instrumentalities (interest group action, etc.,) might be developed in such a way as to disrupt "the classical dependency relationship of politics to the economy" which Marx allegedly hypothesized. Finally, according to Habermas, Marx's tendency was to allow dialectics to be treated almost "exclusively as a positive science" which meant that "the ideological character of consciousness had to take on a metaphysical quality"⁶¹ In other words, Marx's philosophy of history became teleological in the sense in which it presupposed history's end. On each of these points, Habermas seems to have misconstrued Marx and misunderstood his critique.

Marx focuses on economic relations because under capitalism the dominant form of relations appears to be economic. The hallmark of capitalist society is the sundering of all social bonds and the substitution of the monetary bond-- of exchange relations-- in place of all natural ties. The capitalist system is a system of apparent equality and freedom. Every one stands in exactly the same relation to every one else. At least this is the way it

⁶¹

Ibid., p. 238

appears within "the pure form, the economic side of this relation" since "it is in the character of the money relation... that all inherent contradictions of bourgeois society appear extinguished in money relations as conceived in a simple form. . ."⁶² Marx here presents the case for political economy-- no inequality, no contradiction can be traced to the market relation because individuals enter into that relation freely, of their own will, and they exchange equivalent for equivalent:

As subjects of exchange, their relation is therefore that of equality. It is impossible to find any trace of distinction, not to speak of contradiction, between them; not even a difference. Furthermore, the commodities which they exchange are, as exchange values, equivalent or at least count as such.⁶³

Whereas in fact, the need of each for the other is the pre-supposition of exchange and is a fact recognized by both sides, this "common interest" or reciprocal need is irrelevant to each of the two subjects in exchange. It is the individual's interest alone which is the motive, and through this dominance of "self-reflected particular interests," the freedom of the individual is postulated:

Out of the act of exchange itself, the individual, each one of them, is reflected in himself as its exclusive and dominant (determinant) subject. With that, then, the complete freedom of the individual is posited: voluntary transaction; no force on either side; positing of the self as means, or as serving, only as means, in order to posit the self as end in itself, as dominant and primary [ubergreifend] . . .⁶⁴

⁶² Marx, op.cit., p. 240

⁶³ Ibid., p. 241

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 244

Since individual freedom and equality are the result of exchange relations, any inequalities which result ("[i]f one grows impoverished and the other grows wealthier") are purely a function of differences in individual initiative and capacities and do not "in any way arise from the economic relation, the economic connection as such..."⁶⁵

But Marx has taken great pains to detail the perspective of political economy in order to show how erroneous that perspective is. Beneath the surface of these simple relations, "entirely different processes go on in which this apparent equality and liberty disappear."⁶⁶ In other words, Marx begins on the surface of economic relations in order to penetrate these superficial appearances and to disclose the real social relations which prevail underneath. It is precisely the narrow economic framework of political economy which Marx attacks; the contradiction which he explores is not merely economic, as Habermas would have it. Marx criticized such a view for its abstractness:

What is overlooked. . . is that the simple forms of exchange value and of money latently contain the opposition between labor and capital, etc. Thus what all this wisdom comes down to is the attempt to stick fast at the simplest economic relations, which, conceived by themselves, are pure abstractions; but these relations are, in reality, mediated by the deepest antithesis, and represent only one side, in which the full expression of the antithesis is obscured. ⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 247

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 247

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 248

Underneath the surface equality and freedom lurks the inequality of exchange and the compulsion brought to bear on the individual.⁶⁸

The origin of this inequality Marx traced to the production process itself to the creation of surplus-value as unpaid labor. But his consideration of the production of surplus-value did not stay within a narrow economic focus. It was rather the concrete basis on which he reconsidered the alienation of labor as he had described it in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts--productive activity had been reduced to exchange value-creating labor. Man's specifically social powers had been transformed into powers of capital. From the worker's perspective the only value that his labor-power had for him was its exchange-value, i.e. its market value. The particular qualities of labor were matters of indifference to the worker. Indeed, they confronted the worker as alien powers:

The worker therefore sells his labor as a simple predetermined exchange value, determined by a previous process he sells his labor itself as objectified labor. . . capital buys it as living

⁶⁸ "It is forgotten, on one side, that the presupposition of exchange value, as the objective basis of the whole of the system of production, already in itself implies compulsion over the individual, since his immediate product is not a product for him, but only becomes such in the social process, and since it must take on this general but nevertheless external form, and that the individual has an existence only as a producer of exchange value, hence that the whole negation of his natural existence is already implied; that he is therefore entirely determined by society. . ." Ibid., p. 248.

labor, as the general productive force of wealth; activity which increases wealth. It is clear therefore that the worker cannot become rich in this exchange, since, in exchange for his labor capacity as a fixed available magnitude, he surrenders its creative power, like Esau his birthright for a mess of pottage. Rather, he necessarily impoverishes himself. . . because the creative power of his labor establishes itself as the power of capital, as an alien power confronting him. He diverts himself [entäussert sich] of labor as the productive force of wealth, capital appropriates it, as such.⁶⁹

As long as capitalist relations of production prevail, which presuppose the separation of labor and capital "as independent forms relative to each other," purely economic relations appear to predominate. The worker offers his commodity, his labor-power, as "pure use-value" in exchange for the value of objectified labor embodied in him. But from the worker's perspective, the specificity of his labor

has no interest for him as such, but only in as much as it is in fact labor and, as such, a use value for capital. It is therefore his economic character that he is the carrier of labor as such—i.e., of labor as use value for capital; he is a worker, in opposition to the capitalist.⁷⁰

And from the capitalist's perspective its specificity is irrelevant, so long as it is appropriate to his enterprise. But what does matter to the capitalist is that labor is that activity which not only preserves existing value (the labor time objectified in the raw material and in the instruments of labor) but creates more value: surplus-value.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 307

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 297

Thus what appeared to be a merely economic relation of simple exchange -- the transfer of a quantity of labor-time for an equivalent quantity of exchange value (money, wages)-- is in fact a qualitatively disproportionate relation:

- If we consider the exchange between capital and labor, then we find it splits into two processes which are not only formally but also qualitatively different, and even contradictory:

(1) The worker sells his commodity, labor, which has a use value, and, as a commodity, also a price, like all other commodities, for a specific sum of exchange values, specific sum of money, which capital concedes to him.

(2) The capitalist obtains labor itself, labor as value-positing activity, as productive labor; i.e., he obtains the productive force which maintains and multiplies capital, and which thereby becomes the productive force, the reproductive force of capital, a force belonging to capital itself. ⁷¹

The basis of the production of surplus-value within capitalism rests on the fact that the particular use-value which capital acquires in the exchange of equivalents is a commodity with peculiar qualities: it is wealth-producing activity itself, living labor. The capitalist pays the worker the exact equivalent of the labor objectified in his laboring capacity. But as a result of this exchange he obtains that activity which will objectify the whole day's labor in the product, i.e., will generate more value than that needed to sustain the workers for a whole day. Were this not the case, were the value at the end of the production process the same as embodied in each of the factors of

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 274.

production at the start, the capitalist "would not have acted as capital" since the purpose of capital is the generation of surplus-value.

But the emphasis that Marx places on the theory of surplus value as a measure of the exploitation of the worker by the capitalist is not intended as a narrow economic criterion of alienation--the economic deprivation of the worker. It is true that Marx formulated the so-called law of the increasing immiseration of the working class in Das Kapital, but it was a more sophisticated elaboration of the primitive theory of wages which had been introduced in the 1847 lectures on Wage-Labor and Capital. The theory of surplus-value, which Marx had begun to refine when he returned to his economic studies in the 1850's, allowed him to postulate the relative economic deprivation of the working class as measured against the accumulated wealth of capital.⁷² As he puts it in Capital, I,

⁷²Habermas' arguments in his essay on "Marxism as Critique" do not adequately take the relativity of this theory into account. He contends that Marx's theory of surplus-value was still conceived, as late as the Grundrisse, "according to the crude model of such physical exploitation." Jurgen Habermas, Theory and Practice, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), p. 277. Consequently, the adequacy of the theory to the conditions of an affluent society is questioned. However, a more accurate comprehension of the theory of surplus-value would understand it not as a simple measure of the difference between the income of capital and the income of labor but, as Marx indicated, as a measure of "all the progress of civilization, or in other words every increase in the powers of social production . . . such as results from science, inventions, division and combination of labor, improved means of communication, creation of the world market, machinery, etc.--enriches not the worker but rather capital . . ." Grundrisse, op. cit., p. 308. As Martin Nicolaus emphasized, not only the economic value, "but also the political power and social influence of these

"in proportion as capital accumulates, the lot of the laborer, be his payment high or low, must grow worse."⁷³ Moreover, it was intended as a measurement not only of the economic gap between capitalist and worker, but of the sacrifice of all the developed social powers of labor to capital. Finally, the theory of surplus-value demonstrates how capital itself acts as a barrier to the further development of the forces of production.⁷⁴ It should be clear that a detailed consideration of these three aspects would vindicate the interpretation of Marx's surplus value theory as having more than an economic significance. We will have to confine our commentary, however, to the relation between surplus-value and the concept of community.

established assets would have to be included in the equation. Only a statistic of this kind would be adequate to test whether or not Marx's prediction of increasing exploitation and increasing impoverishment had been validated by the course of capitalist development." Nicolaus, op. cit., p. 308.

⁷³Marx, Capital, I, op. cit., p. 645, emphasis added.

⁷⁴Marx, Grundrisse, p. 415; ". . . capital forces the workers beyond necessary labor to surplus labor. Only in this way does it realize itself, and create surplus value. But on the other hand, it posits necessary labor only to the extent and insofar as it is surplus labor and the latter is realizable as surplus-value. It posits surplus labor, then, as the condition of the necessary, and surplus value as the limit of objectified labor, of value as such. As soon as it cannot posit value, it does not posit necessary labor; and given its foundation, it cannot be otherwise. It therefore restricts labor and the creation of value . . . and it does so on the same extent that it posits surplus labor and surplus value. By its nature, therefore, it posits a barrier to labor and value-creation, in contradiction to its tendency to expand them boundlessly." Ibid., p. 321.

Having defined capital as the system of commodity production whose purpose is the generation of surplus-value--the exchange in order to increase value--Marx turned to a consideration of the consequences which he considered contradictory. The presupposition of capitalist production is the indifference towards the specific particularity of all use-values, and the positing of exchange-value as the purpose of production. Capital, Marx argues, is not a thing (mere means for production) nor a simple relation (exchange for profit) but is best understood as a "process," as a "constantly self-renewing circular course of exchanges."⁷⁵ The boundlessness which is the presumption of this process ultimately comes into contradiction with the specific relation of production upon which it is based. Marx elaborates on the intrinsic contradictions of capital--"barriers" to the realization of the surplus produced by capital which constantly have to be suspended in order to continue production on the basis of capital. Again, the arguments appear to be largely economic, but they contain within themselves elements which relate directly to the transcendence of narrow economic relations.

The contradictions between capitalist production and realization of surplus value are expressed by Marx very simply in terms of (1) the fact that "the commodity is an

75

Ibid., pp. 258-261.

exchange value only insofar as it is at the same time a use value; i.e., as object of consumption." The "first barrier, then, is consumption itself -- the need for it"⁷⁶ Related to the first is (2) the fact that for demand (the "need" for specific use values) to be effective there must exist a "surplus equivalent" with which to purchase the "surplus-value". This means that capital "seems to encounter a barrier in the magnitude of available equivalents."⁷⁷

Marx elaborates upon the first barrier in terms of the fact that capital's seeming indifference toward use values is in fact a "false position." In reality the specific use values which capital produces satisfy only certain specific needs. Thus, the quantity of these specific products which are required reaches a limit at a certain level. Consequently, capital is driven, in order to sustain itself, to constantly widen the sphere of circulation, "whether the sphere itself is directly expanded or whether more points within it are created as points of production."⁷⁸ This means that "[e]very limit appears as a barrier to be overcome." Specifically, capital is bound to (1) quantitatively expand existing consumption; (2) create new needs by propogating existing ones in a wider

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 404.

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 405.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 407.

circle and; (3) produce entirely (qualitatively) new needs through the discovery and creation of new use values.⁷⁹

But by constantly enriching the system of needs capital calls into existence forces which it will ultimately not be able to contain, because the needs it conjures up ultimately cannot be contained within the commodity-form. Luxury itself, Marx contents, becomes defined as a need, as a condition of production founded on capital. For example, capital brings into its realm "the exploration of all of nature in order to discover new, useful qualities in things;" exotic products from alien lands and climates are introduced; synthetically produced materials are developed; the earth is explored "in all directions" in order to expand the usefulness of old objects and discover new objects, which of course implies "the development of the natural sciences to their highest point;" new needs "arising from society itself" enter into the process; and finally, the transformation of the consumer himself by the "cultivation of all the qualities of the social human being. . . in a form as rich as possible in needs, because rich in qualities and relations," who is therefore "cultured to a high degree."⁸⁰ The degree to which capital creates the conditions for a truly universal or all-sided development of production--production of not simply the commodities, but of an aesthetic, cultured, consumer viz.,

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 408.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 409. emphasis added

the rich social human being--ultimately becomes the basis on which capital will be recognized "as being itself the greatest barrier to this tendency to universalize production."⁸¹

Related to this contradiction between the needs which capital generates and its ability to satisfy them is the second barrier intrinsic to capital mentioned above--the existence of a "surplus-equivalent" with which to purchase surplus-value. To the extent that the capitalist relates to all other workers, with the exception of his own, as consumers of his products, it is to his advantage that their number and their total purchasing power increase. "The greater their number. . . and the mass of money at their disposal, the greater the sphere of exchange for capital."⁸² However, since each capitalist relates to his own workers not as consumers but as the creators of surplus-value and wishes to restrict their consumption; i.e., their wages, as much as possible in order to increase the rate of surplus-value; since, in other words, surplus-labor is limited by necessary labor, the realization of surplus-value encounters a barrier in the production process itself. The drive to expand purchasing

⁸¹Ibid., p. 411.

⁸²Ibid., p. 419.

power comes into contradiction with the drive to increase surplus-value.⁸³

The connection between the theory of surplus-value and the concept of community to which Marx again and again alludes is that the theory of surplus-value allows Marx to conclude that "the material elements" for the positive supercession of capital are created by capital itself. These material elements for the production of what Marx had earlier alluded to as a

⁸³ Habermas argues that Marx failed to take into consideration the ways in which an expansion of production might "under certain conditions, be sufficient to assure an appropriate rate of profit and, at the same time, a rising level of wages." Habermas, *op.cit.*, p. 232. Marx, however, did consider the fact that the actual extent of the decline in real wages relative to an increase in productivity would depend upon "the relative weight, which the pressure of capital on the one side, and the resistance of the labour on the other, throws into the scale." Marx, Capital, I., *op.cit.*, p. 523. The argument that the organized power of labor can have no effect on the level of real wages dates back to Marx's earlier theory of wages in Wages Labor and Capital, but not to the more mature theories of the Grundrisse and Capital. cf. Ernest Mandel's discussion of the development of Marx's theory of wages in The Formation of the Economic Thought of Karl Marx, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971). In addition, Habermas fails to recognize the fact that the mechanization of production might allow for an increase in real wages precisely because the actual number of workers employed has declined. That this has in fact been the fate of industrial employees (the kind of structural unemployment to which Marx alluded in his theory of the industrial reserve army in Capital, I, pp. 628-648) is evidenced by the comparison of increases in productivity with increases of employment in manufacturing firms: "With technical improvements related primarily to mechanization and automation, fewer industrial workers are needed to produce increasing quantities of output. For example, in manufacturing total output increased 70 percent between 1950 and 1965, with only a 7 percent increase in production workers; in mining output increased 38 percent in the same period, while blue-collar production employment declined nearly 40 percent. U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin 1599, p. 15 cited in Michael Reich, "The Evolution of the United States Labor Force," Edwards, Reich and Weiskopf (edit.); The Capitalist System (1st edit., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, inc., 1972), p.178.

rich individuality on the basis of communal [gemeinschaftlich] relations are identified as (1) the development of needs to such an extent that "surplus labor above and beyond necessity has itself become a general need arising out of individual needs themselves;" (2) the development of "general industriousness" as the general property of the new species [Geschlecht] and (3) the development of the productive powers of labor to such an extent that (A) a lesser labor time of society as a whole is required, (B) the 'laboring society relates scientifically to the process of its progressive reproduction" and (C) there is wealth in a "greater abundance"⁸⁴ As Marx concludes, the destiny of capital is to create surplus-labor and therefore to develop the socially productive powers of labor to such an extent that labor itself is ultimately transformed, in the sense that it "appears no longer as labor, but as the full development of activity itself." Its destiny is fulfilled when the continued "development of these productive forces themselves encounters its barrier in capital itself."⁸⁶ Since activity itself has become an historically created need and since this need cannot be fulfilled except by transforming the mode of production, the capitalist production process itself must be transcended--the community must be established as the only mode adequate to the appropriate of the essential needs, powers, qualities and relations which capital has called into existence.

⁸⁴ Marx, Grundrisse, op.cit., p. 325

⁸⁵ Ibid., emphasis added

⁸⁶ Ibid.

But did Marx reduce this transformation process to a simple matter of technical control of the means of production? Was it simply a question of the development of technology to an appropriate level which would automatically ensure the establishment of the community? Would the realm of necessity itself be adequate to the establishment of the community Marx described? Based on everything which has been indicated thus far, the answers should be obvious but we can point to several additional indications of the fact that the crises of capitalism which Marx identified were never merely economic crises, but were treated by him as indications that capitalism was moving in a direction which contradicted its own essential premises, but which movement required the active participation of individuals themselves in order to be completed. In other words, capital generated the "material conditions" for its supercession, but men remained the subjects of history, i.e. historical processes were not eradicated by the development of the forces of production.

As we have already argued, Marx's critique of the predominance of economic relations under capitalism was intended to disclose the real social relations-- relations between man and nature, and between man and man -- which went undisclosed by the superficial analysis of political economy. Thus, when he points to the economic crises of capitalism, he refers to the fact that hidden behind these crises is the fundamental contradiction between social needs,

human essential powers and the form of appropriation specific to capital--individual possessions:

Because money is the general equivalent, the general power of purchasing, everything may be transformed into money. But it can be transformed into money only by being alienated alienert , by its owner divesting himself of it. . . . Furthermore, since money itself exists only in circulation, and exchanges in turn for articles of consumption, etc.--for values which may all ultimately be reduced to purely individual pleasures, it follows that everything is valuable only in so far as it exists for the individual. . . . Everything sacrificed to egoistic pleasure. . . 87

The connection between these comments--only that is valued which can be possessed as an individual object of consumption--and the arguments on money in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts; the discussion of the illusory community in The German Ideology; the critique of money as the sole social bond in the Grundrisse; and the discussion of the fetishism of commodities in Capital should be apparant. The form within which needs are satisfiable under capitalism is itself alienating--it separates man from the social structure within which those needs develop and within which alone he can develop his powers to the fullest, and can therefore really individuate himself. But the needs which capitalism has called into existence, needs experssed in terms of the cultivation of a "rich individuality"--rich in needs, qualities and relations--and in terms of the qualities of the "social human being," are needs whose content demands a communal form.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 839

All that technology - the development of one of the forces of production - contributes to the process is the development of the material conditions on the basis of which the system of production can be transformed and subsumed under the control of "universally developed individuals, whose social relations, as their own communal relations, are also subordinated to their own communal control."⁸⁸

Specifically, it begins to transform the production process itself so that "the creation of real wealth comes to depend less on labor time and on the amount of labor employed than on the power of the agencies set in motion during labor time. . . on the general state of science and on the progress of technology. . ."⁸⁹ Consequently, the "human being comes to relate more as watchman and regulator to the production process itself. . . He steps to the side of the production process instead of being its chief actor."⁹⁰ Marx interprets this development as "the development of the social individual which appears as the great foundation-stone of production and of wealth."⁹¹ Technology thus reduces the amount of necessary labor time to a minimum and in the time thus set free it is possible to imagine the

free development of individualities, and hence not the reduction of necessary labor time so as to posit surplus labor, but rather the general reduction of the necessary labor of society to a minimum, which then corresponds to the artistic, scientific,

⁸⁸Ibid., p. 162

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 704-5

⁹⁰Ibid., p. 705

⁹¹Ibid., p. 705

etc., development of the individuals in the time set free, and with the means created, for all of them.⁹²

Leisure time, freedom beyond the realm of necessity, as a sphere capable of being appropriated by all individuals, becomes a possibility within capital. And to the extent that the time is used both as "idle time and time for higher activity," free time would "naturally transform its possessor into a different subject, and he then enters the direct production process as this different subject."⁹³ The transformation of the subject, which becomes possible with the development of the forces of production, is essential to the transformation of the production process itself beyond its limited foundation on capital.

But by no means does Marx make this transformation an automatic guarantee of the development of the productive forces themselves. Capital itself creates the material condition for superseding capitalist production -- "it calls to life all the powers of science and of nature, as of social combination and of social intercourse"-- but strives always to contain these and to "confine them within the limits required to maintain the already created value as value."⁹⁴ Thus, Marx says, on the one side, capital is "instrumental in creating the means of social disposable time. . . But its

⁹² Ibid., p. 706

⁹³ Ibid., p. 712

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 706

tendency always, on the one side, to create disposable time, on the other, to convert it into surplus-labor."⁹⁵

While Marx probably never envisioned the extent to which leisure time itself would become an extension of the production process, the resilience of capital, as long as it can posit needs which can be appropriated as commodities, was something of which he was keenly aware.

And so the stress was placed on the subjective side of the history of capital. Capital creates objective conditions for its positive supercession in the development of the forces of production and social relations, which were nothing more than "two different sides of the development of the social individual"⁹⁶ In order for these objective conditions to become the basis for living a social life, the contradictions of capital must develop acutely (economic crises, overproduction, unemployment, etc. are indicative of systemic problems) so that it becomes

evident that the growth of the forces of production can no longer be bound up with the appropriation of alien labor, but that the mass of workers must themselves appropriate their own surplus-labor. Once they have done so-- and disposable time thereby ceases to have an antithetical existence -- then, on one side, necessary labor time will be measured by the needs of the social individual and, on the other, the development of the power of social

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 708

⁹⁶ Ibid., p. 706, emphasis added

production will grow so rapidly that, even though production is now calculated for the wealth of all, disposable time will grow for all. 97

Thus communal appropriation of surplus labor implies a re-definition of needs according to the requirements of the social individual (everything Marx had expounded upon in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, the senses of the social individual", etc.), and the development of material wealth for all as the basis on which "disposable time will grow for all." It is evident that control of the means of production implies that a "different subject" has entered into the production process, a subject whose wealth is measured by his capacity for many pleasures --freedom beyond the realm of necessity.

Those who have argued that Marx reduced the community to technical control of the means of production fail to adequately take account of the fact that Marx developed this only as the objective basis upon which the community-- the realm of freedom--would develop. They tend to argue from the polemics of the Communist Manifesto, instead of the complex theories of the Grundrisse and Capital. Habermas argues, for example, that Marx's revision of the labor theory of value to incorporate "the scientific development of the forces of production as a possible source of value"⁹⁸ as indicated in passages in the Grundrisse, was dropped in the

97

Ibid., p. 708

98

Habermas, op.cit., p. 226

final formulation of the value theory in Capital. But this ignores the extent to which Marx developed the labor theory of value to disclose the limits of production under capital, i.e., that Marx's elaboration of the theory contained an implicit (and explicit) critique of measuring value by labor time instead of according to "the needs of the social individual." Control of the means of production by the associated producers was the extent to which the realm of material production itself could be freed; i.e., freed from rule by so-called natural laws and subjected to the direction of individuals themselves. But this realm itself could never become a realm of real freedom. "Work," Marx wrote, "cannot become play," although it can become "attractive work" to the extent that (1) its social character is posited, and (2) it becomes increasingly of a "scientific and at the same time general character," meaning that it is more completely automated⁹⁹ and reflects decisions made by the individuals themselves. As far as real freedom is concerned, this

actually begins only where labor which is determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases; thus in the very nature of things, it has beyond the sphere of actual material production. Just as the savage must wrestle with Nature to satisfy his wants, to maintain and reproduce life, so must civilized man,

⁹⁹ Grundrisse, op.cit., p. 611-2.

and he must do so in all social formations, and under all possible modes of production . . . Freedom in this field can only consist in socialized man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with Nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as the blind forces of Nature; and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favorable to, and worthy of, their human nature. But it nonetheless still remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, which, however can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as its basis. The shortening of the working-day is its basic prerequisite.¹⁰⁰

To the extent that contemporary incarnations of communism restrict the realm of freedom to mere state ownership of the means of production, it is apparent that they are at least two dimensions removed from the idea of the community as Marx conceived it. First, the workers themselves do not directly control the direction of production, but have their position in the "socialist" hierarchy determined for them through the promulgation of impressive "Five Year Plans." This appears to be particularly the case in the Soviet Union and in China, where the struggle to solidify the development of the forces of production -- which Marx had identified as essential pre-conditions to the development of a socialized economic--takes place behind the backs of the workers themselves, and at the expense of all but the most rudimentary attempt to end the struggle for existence for the majority of

100

Marx, Capital, III, op.cit., p. 820, emphasis added.

of citizens.¹⁰¹ In East European countries who have attempted to move away from the model of Soviet-styled centralization, notably in Yugoslavia, the extent to which those experiments increasingly come to resemble the system based on private property is soon apparent. As Gar Alperovitz explains:

The Yugoslav model of decentralization raises a series of difficult problems: Through Yugoslavs proclaim themselves socialists and urge that the overall industrial system must benefit the entire society, the various workers' groups which actually have direct control of industrial resources are each inevitably only one part of society. And as many now see, there is no obvious reason why such (partial) groups will not develop special interests ("workers' capitalism") which run counter to the interests of the broader community. . . It is difficult to see how a political-economy based primarily on the organization of groups by function could ever achieve a just society, since such a structural alternative seems inherently to tend towards the self - aggrandizement of each functional group--as against the rest of the community" 102

Second, in neither of these cases is the freedom which Marx envisioned beyond the realm of necessity yet established as an historical possibility. In the so-called authoritarian-socialist regimes, the societies are so strapped by economic

¹⁰¹See for a discussion, Herbert Marcuse, Soviet Marxism, (Boston: Beacon, 1958); Milovan Djilas, The New Class (New York: Praeger, 1957), on China, David S. Broder, "4,000 Miles of Chinese Puzzles" in The Washington Post, October, 23, 1977, p. C1.

¹⁰²Gar Alperovitz "Socialism as a Pluralist Commonwealth" in Edwards, Reich and Weiskopf, edit., The Capitalist System, (1st edit., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1972), p. 526.

requisites that social freedom -- that rich individuality -- is merely a utopian image. Nevertheless, the vision stays alive.¹⁰³ In the liberal-socialist regimes or democratic-socialist states (which would include Yugoslavia as well as some "labor-party" dominated Western democracies - e.g. Great Britain and Sweden prior to the recent elections) socialism has come to be defined increasingly in strictly economic terms, or even according to commodity measures -- rising standards of living, quantitatively defined in terms of consumer goods per capita; minimal provision of state - subsidized health care systems, income-security programs etc. The degree to which freedom beyond the realm of necessity -- the free development of individuality -- nearly disappears as even a palpable "image", or desirable goal has been testified to by such varied sources as sociological studies of the problems of a leisured-class, and left oriented critics of mass culture.¹⁰⁴

Nevertheless, there remain contradictions within the advanced states of both capitalist and socialist industrial societies which point to the fact that Marx's concept of community has to be appreciated as an image which pointed beyond the economic categories and economic definitions of need, to the critique of which categories and definition Marx devoted his entire life's work.

¹⁰³ cf. Discussions of humanist socialism by various East European philosophers in Erich Fromm, edit., Socialist Humanism, (New York: Anchor Books, 1966).

¹⁰⁴ See, for example, Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969); David Reisman, The Lonely Crowd, Erich Fromm, The Sane Society.

Conclusion

We have traced the development of Marx's concept of community from the idealistic notion of his earliest essay to the historically concrete understanding of community revealed in the later works. There the idea of community is explored as the only dimension appropriate to the development of man's essential powers to the fullest. It is based on a mode of production in which the complete sociality of man's activity is realized; where production is related not to the narrow economic framework of bourgeois economy, but to the idea of the objectification, in a form appropriate to man's essential sociality, of all of the qualities, characteristics, and relations of the rich, social individual. Both the organization and the purpose of "the sphere of material production" is determined by the associated producers themselves who would be guided by their understanding of the liberating possibilities of technology to both reduce the amount of socially necessary labor time to a minimum, and allow the organization of material production "under conditons most favorable to, and worthy of, their human nature." This would mean, minimally, that the rhythm of human activity would not be adjusted to the machine, that the individual would no longer be transformed into "part of a detail-machine" or made the "mere living appendage" of the machine.

In his analysis of the effects of machinery on the structure of work within modern industry Marx dealt extensively with the debilitating effects of the mechanization of work on the worker:

Machinery is put to a wrong use, with the object of transforming the workman, from his very childhood, into a part of a detail machine...In handicrafts and manufacture, the workman makes use of a tool, in the factory, the machine makes use of him...here it is the movements of the machine he must follow...At the same time that factory work exhausts the nervous system to the uttermost, it does away with the many-sided play of the muscles, and confiscates every atom of freedom, both in bodily and intellectual activity. The lightening of the labor, even, becomes a sort of torture, since the machine does not free the laborer from work, but deprives the work of all interest...Every organ of sense is injured in an equal degree by artificial elevation of the temperature, by the dust-laden atmosphere, by the deafening noise, not to mention danger to life and limb among the thickly crowded machinery, which, with the regularity of the seasons, issues its list of the killed and wounded in the industrial battle.¹

While he himself allowed that, as a result of the introduction of the Factory Acts, "many of the older abuses have vanished,"² the human structure of modern industry has by no means been perfected, no matter how enlightened the modern industrial world has become about the horrors of the sweat shops, or the gross physical exploitation of the worker.³ It is important to emphasize that Marx raises the question of the humanization

¹ Capital, I, op.cit., pp. 422-7

² Ibid., p. 427.

³ Recently research into this question of the dehumanization of the work process has been renewed with vigor. Not only are reports of the threat to life and limb of the more subtle variety appearing in the press--industrially-related incidence of cancer in certain chemical industries, and manufacturers of synthetic materials--but there is a growing literature that analyzes the effects of the structure of modern work on the individual. Some examples are: Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969); Studs Terkl, Working (New York: Avon Books, 1975), Richard Sennett and Jonathon Cobb, The Hidden Injuries of Class, (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), Tibor

of work not as a solution to the ills of capitalism, but as part of the entire restructuring of the mode of production which means implicitly, a fundamental re-definition of the needs which set the whole process in motion. The difference between Marx's emphasis on the need for a total transformation, and modern industry's willingness to "diversify" the tasks of labor and modify the division of labor should be apparent. The former approaches the problem of the meaning of work in terms of human goals, and treats the alteration of the sphere of material production as related to the overriding goal of the expansion of the "realm of freedom" as an end in itself. The latter approaches the question of the modification of the structure of the work process in order to forestall any more long-range transformation of productive activity. As Braverman puts it, alleged improvements of the division of labor from the top down (or even based on the workers own "suggestions") prove that

workers, so long as they remain servants of capital instead of freely associated producers who control their own labor and their own destinies, work every day to build for themselves more 'modern', more 'scientific,' more dehumanized prisons of labor.⁴

Beyond the sphere of material production, which nevertheless can be transformed to conform to human standards, lies the sphere

Scitovsky, The Joyless Economy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976); Harry Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital, (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974); and Robert Blauner, Alienation and Freedom: The Factory Worker and His Industry, (University of Chicago, 1964). Braverman has an extensive bibliography on the subject.

⁴Braverman, op.cit.; p. 233, cf., Newsweek, March 27, 1973, which gave ample evidence to support his contention that a "humanization" of work within the context of capitalism coopts

of real freedom. Marx's critique of political economy was oriented towards revealing the historical possibilities for the development of this sphere and his consideration of the irrationality of capitalism must always be understood against this background--the background of community (Gattungsgetaltungen)-which was never conceptualized by Marx as coextensive with economic forms precisely because human needs, capacities, powers, relations, values, etc., all pointed beyond the commodity-form. As Marx put it, capitalism is a mystery which needs to be solved: the products of men's activity, and ultimately their activity itself, takes on an "enigmatical character" which needs to be deciphered. Once this is done, it will be seen that the objective characteristics which men attribute to products and to relations between things are, in fact, the result of the social character of men's labor and definite social relations between men. Theory aids in the process of demystification by enabling man to comprehend the world not as an automatic result of the operation of the laws of Nature, but as the product of history; i.e., as "a given historic state of the mode of social production. . . hence, a historic relation."⁵ But theory, no more than technology, does not lead automatically to the completed alteration of reality.

the efforts to transform capitalism more fundamentally. By no means does our analysis exclude the so-called socialist countries from indictment. They, too, subordinate their workers to external, anti-democratically developed norms.

⁵Grundrisse, p. 252.

The life process of society, which is based on the process of material production, does not strip off its mystical veil until it is treated as production by freely associated men, and is consciously regulated by them in accordance with a settled plan. This, however, demands for society a certain material ground-work or set of conditions of existence which in their turn are the spontaneous product of a long and painful process of development.⁶

There is no rigid determinism postulated here; no automatic relation between the so-called "base" and "super-structure." Rather, the dialectical relation between theory and practice, and between material conditions and consciousness is preserved. The theoretical analysis of the commodity-form is essential because it points to the social dimension of human activity, but men must act on their insights. But their actions must have a material foundation; i.e. the community which they seek to establish must be understood as an historical possibility. As our analysis of the Grundrisse revealed, a very advanced stage of industrial society is presupposed without, however, reducing the political significance of the community to merely instrumental action. Insofar as the community becomes an urgent need, this presupposes the development of an individual who is rich in needs "because rich in qualities and relations." It would be contradictory to assume that Marx envisioned these qualities and relations subsumed under the narrow framework of instrumental activity. His whole point was

⁶ Capital, I, op.cit., p. 80.

that capital itself raised the image of "the full development of activity itself." That he would restrict this image of activity to work as instrumental action is altogether absurd.

Under capital, he argued, work was only viewed as production if it generated capital. That he was criticizing the arbitrary contraction of the meaning of productive labor to the multiplication of exchange-values is apparent. That he recognized the necessity to free up the spontaneous dimensions of human activity is also apparent in his consideration of the degree to which work in the instrumental sense could take on the aesthetic qualities of work in the human sense. Despite the fact that instrumental activity could never fully become "play" or "mere amusement," Marx argued that even though labor obtained its measure from the outside

through the aim to be attained and the obstacles to be overcome in attaining it...this overcoming of obstacles is in itself a liberating activity-and that, further, the external aims become stripped of merely external natural urgencies, and become posited as aims which the individual himself posits-hence a self-realization, objectification of the subject, hence real freedom, whose action is, precisely, labor.⁷

Hence, Marx recognized that the sphere of material production could become a dimension of freedom to a certain degree. But he never reduced work to this instrumental activity. Real freedom consisted in the extent to which "disposable time" could itself become a productive force to the extent to which it lost its abstract antithesis to direct labor time. ⁸

⁷ Grundrisse, op.cit., p. 611

⁸ Grundrisse, op.cit., pp. 711-712.

It becomes a "force of production" to the extent that the social individual explores his potentialities, capabilities in the "free time" and thus re-enters the production process (the realm of instrumental activity) as a changed person ("a different subject") who understands his needs and subjects material production to the satisfaction of these needs. But, equally, it becomes a force of production to the extent that spontaneous activity is no longer subordinated to material production, but the relations of production have developed to such a degree that the "many-sided way" in which the individual appropriates the world finds its expression in the "mode of production"-- a mode which has quite obviously exploded through a merely economic or instrumental conception of activity:

This creation of new branches of production, i.e. of qualitatively new surplus time, is not merely the division of labor, but is rather the creation separate from a given production, of labor with a new use value; the development of a constantly expanding and more comprehensive system of different kinds of labor, different kinds of production, to which a constantly expanding and constantly enriched system of needs corresponds. 9

That it would be equally absurd to suppose Marx envisioned some "end to history" should be clear --a "constantly expanding and constantly enriched system of needs" presupposes that man continues to redefine himself according to his historically developed capabilities.

⁹Ibid., p. 409.

It is capital that imposes the "artificial check" on the development of the forces of production. Marx's idea of the community allows of no such arbitrary limits.

By way of conclusion we need to consider the status of Marx's concept of community. The nature of the status is controversial. The roots of other controversies, such as the "early" vs. the "late" Marx, I believe, can be traced back to the fundamental controversy surrounding the status of Marx's concepts; viz their historicity versus their alleged idealism. Earlier we related Marx's ideas of community to his understanding of man as a species-being, and, consequently, to his analysis of alienation. While the impetus behind Marx's theory even at that early date was the critique of the contradictions between labor and capital, in many ways the categories of the critique seemed to partake of the very idealism and abstract ontology of human existence Marx himself was later to criticize. In reality, though, it was the language that was more obfuscating than the ideas, the concepts, behind the arguments. The notions of productive activity and even species-being contained an implicit historical dimension: they pointed in the direction of the consideration of man's mediated relation with nature as these evolved historically. While Marx came to focus more and more concretely on the specific objective conditions of man's alienation, he never lost sight of the more transcendent impulse behind the earlier concepts. As the conditions which eclipsed the community, but at the same time created the conditions for its positive realization, were

clarified, the community itself was never collapsed with any final caricature; any specific historical concretion.

As Marx defined capitalism as a process, so it is best to define the community as a process; as a kind of quasi-transcendental concept. As a quasi-transcendental concept, the idea of community preserves the tension between "idea" and reality; the dialectical relation between theory and practice. The concept of community is an element of both theory and practice. It is not an ahistorical ideal--like Hegel's world spirit--because it emerges out of history, out of the human context of activity, and points in the direction of history, as a goal which has yet to be realized. It is the expression in theory of a real dimension of human activity, without, however, being a simple reflection of existing reality. This is why Marx could use the concept of community to explore the nature of social bonds under capitalism and at the same time to describe this community as "illusory." The concept pointed backwards and forwards simultaneously. Like all of Marx's fundamental categories, the community is a critical idea, an element of critique, which describes existing reality with the view in mind of disclosing what is hidden to immediate perception. It is, thus, a mental tool, very much akin to Marx's understanding of the machine.

To Marx, the machine was the embodiment of dead labor, the concretization of previous human activity. As a tool, it was the extension of man's essential powers. It appeared both

as an abstract thing, and as the active expression of man's productive capacities. So also with the concept. It was the embodiment of dead intellectual labor, the product of past activity. As a mental tool, it represented the extension of man's powers through language. It was thus both abstract and concrete; a part of praxis. In fact, in Marx's theory there was no such radical separation between physical objects and ideas, between reality and thought. He argued that the world had to become philosophical and philosophy, worldly: the mediated unity of subject and object.¹⁰ So ideas were never merely ideas, but living things, real possibilities. And reality was never a rigid structuring of history, completely thing-like, but a specific, historical mode of social activity, praxis.

To say that Marx's concept of community is quasi-transcendental retains the dialectical flavor of the idea which Marx intended it to have. This means it is offered as an ongoing critique of existing reality, as well as being exposed

¹⁰ Marcuse fails to maintain this necessary tension between subject and object, particularly in One-Dimensional Man, where a critique of technocratic rationality leads him into a kind of "No-Exit" situation. Having argued that consciousness is totally obliterated by the predominance of reflexive modes of thought (Techno-Logos), he loses sight altogether of the dimension of history, the possibility of change by those who are dominated. Consequently, he is forced to go "outside the system" to discover those who have miraculously escaped the rule of one-dimensionality - the "outsiders and outcasts" - and will redeem us all. One Dimensional Man, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964).

to its own changeability, refinement in history.¹¹ This susceptibility to change does not mean that the concept is only an ideal, but that the structure of community cannot be predetermined. It is "open" to further revision precisely because it is an historical idea--it depends on the action of real, "universally developed" individuals to become incarnate, without, however, becoming collapsed with any particular incarnation.

Marx's idea of community is, of course, his theory of communism, but not as represented by present-day communism. In those systems, the dimension of history to which Marx's idea continuously pointed is completely lost. History is treated by present-communisms as an abstract series of stages which require for their realization nothing more than the development of levels of production according to predetermined programs which are completely abstracted from the needs of the subjects of this system, who are not subjects of history at all, but are subjected to it. The irony of these "communisms" consists in the fact that the community is lost precisely because the individual is sacrificed to an eternalized idea of community.

¹¹Ollman fails to recognize this when he analyzes certain central concepts in Marx such as "power", "needs", "species-being", etc. He contends that Marx had a conception of man "outside of history" and argues that Marx's treatment of man's essence proves that this was an attempt to develop a view of "human nature in general." Ollman, op.cit., p. 76. We have dealt with Marx's concept of species-being as an historically specific notion which never lapses into the kind of pure ontology Ollman seems to be implying. Suffice it to say

Similarly, the idea of community cannot be collapsed with the consuming communities of latter day capitalism, because relations there are still determined by the market. No degree of affluence--and the affluence of bourgeois society is still distributed inequitably--can on its own establish the community Marx envisioned. The charges of the critics of Marx are here turned against the proponents of welfare state capitalism--they reduce the community to a commodity-form.

Marx's idea of community emerged out of the issues of his times, but pointed to a society yet to be realized. To this extent, it is a conceptual impetus to practice, providing a link between the early and late Marx, and allowing us to appreciate the crises of capitalism as Marx understood them--as indications of the broadening crises of the social whole in the midst of social wealth as the central paradox of the development of capitalism. Marx himself best captured this image of community as the unity of theory and practice in his description of the french socialists with whom he had been in contact during his Paris years:

all of Marx's central concepts retain the quasi-transcendental status we have described, which means that they emerge from and refer back to the dimension of human history which they seek to illumine.

When communist artisans associate with one another, theory, propaganda, etc., is their first end. But at the same time, as a result of their association, they acquire a new need - the need for society - and what appears as a means becomes an end. In this practical process, the most splendid results are to be observed whenever French socialist workers are seen together. Such things as smoking, drinking, eating, etc., are no longer means of contact or means that bring together. Company association, and conversation, which again has society as its end, are enough for them; the brotherhood of man is no mere phrase with them, but a fact of life, and the nobility of man shines upon us from their work-hardened bodies. 12

¹²Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, op.cit., p. 155.

Works by Marx and Engels

Engels, Friedrich. The Dialectics of Nature. New York: International, 1939.

Marx, Karl. Capital. trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling. 3 vols. New York: International, 1967.

_____. The Civil War in France. New York: International, 1940.

_____. A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. edit. Maurice Dobb. New York: International, 1970.

_____. Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. edit. Joseph O'Malley. Cambridge: University Press, 1970.

_____. The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. edit. Drik Struik. New York: International, 1964.

_____. The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. New York: International, 1963.

_____. Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Okonomie. trans. Martin Nicolaus. New York: Vintage, 1973.

_____. Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations. edit. E. Hobsbawm. New York: International, 1964.

_____. Surveys from Exile: Political Writings, Vol. II. edit. David Fernbach. New York: Vintage, 1974.

_____. Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society. edit. Loyd Easton and Kurt Guddat. New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1967.

Marx, Karl and Engels, Friedrich. Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy. edit. Lewis S. Feuer. New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1959.

_____. Collected Works, 7 vols. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1973.

_____. The German Ideology. edit. C. J. Arthur. New York: International, 1970.

_____. Selected Correspondence. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1965.

_____. Werke (MEW). Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1956.

The Marx-Engels Reader. edited by Robert Tucker. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1972.

Other Works

Althusser, Louis. For Marx. trans. Ben Brewster. New York: Pantheon, 1969.

Arendt, Hannah. "Thinking . . . III" New Yorker. December 5, 1972.

Aristotle. The Politics. edit. Ernest Barker. Oxford: University Press.

Aronowitz, Stanley. False Promises. New York: McGraw Hill, 1973.

Augustine, St. De Civitas Dei. trans. M. Dods. Edinburgh: Smith and Wilson, 1872.

_____. The Political Writings of St. Augustine. edit. Henry Paolucci. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1962.

Avinieri, Shlomo. Hegel's Theory of the Modern State. Cambridge: University Press, 1972.

_____. "How to Save Marx from the Alchemists of Political Revolution." Political Theory. vol. 4. February, 1976.

_____. The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx. Cambridge: University Press, 1971.

Axelos, Kostas. Alienation, Praxis and Techne in the Thought of Karl Marx. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1977.

Barker, Ernest. The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle. New York: Dover, 1959.

_____. edit. The Social Contract. Oxford: University Press, 1947.

Baudrillard, Jean. The Mirror of Production. St. Louis: Telos Press, 1975.

Bell, Colin, and Newby, Howard. Community Studies. New York: Praeger, 1973.

- Berger, Peter, and Luckmann, Thomas. The Social Construction of Reality. New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1967.
- Bookchin, Murray. Post Scarcity Anarchism. San Francisco: Ramparts, 1971.
- Braverman, Harry. Labor and Monopoly Capital. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1974.
- Buber, Martin. Paths in Utopia. Boston: Beacon, 1958.
- Bultmann, Rudolf. Primitive Christianity. trans. R. H. Fuller. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1970.
- Burnet, John. Early Greek Philosophy. Chicago: Meridian, 1957.
- Carlyle, A. J. A History of Medieval Political Theory in the West. 3 vols. New York: Barnes and Noble, n.d.
- Cole, G. D. H. edit. The Social Contract. London: Dutton, 1913.
- Connerton, Paul. Critical Sociology. Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1976.
- Copleston, F. C. Medieval Philosophy. New York: Harper, 1961.
- Cornford, F. M. From Religion to Philosophy. New York: Harper Torchbook, 1957.
- Diamond, Stanley. edit. Primitive Views of the World. New York: Columbia University Press, 1960.
- Djilas, Milovan. The New Class. New York: Praeger, 1957.
- Duncan, Graeme. Marx and Mill: Two Views of Social Conflict and Social Harmony. Cambridge: University Press, 1973.
- Dunayevskaya, Raya. Philosophy and Revolution. New York: Dell, 1973.
- Dupré, A. "Recent Literature on Marx and Marxism." Journal of the History of Ideas. vol. 35, October-December, 1974.
- Durkheim, Emile. Montesquieu and Rousseau. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1960.
- Edwards, Richard; Reich, Michael; and Weisskopf, Thomas. The Capitalist System. 1st and 2nd edit. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1972, 1978.

- Eliade, Mircea. The Myth of the Eternal Return. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.
- _____. Myths, Rites, Symbols: A Mircea Eliade Reader. 2 vols. edit. Wendell Beane and William Doty. New York: Harper Colophon, 1975.
- _____. Patterns in Comparative Religion. New York: World Publishing Co., 1963.
- _____. The Quest: History and Meaning in Religion. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1969.
- _____. The Sacred and The Profane. trans. W. Trask. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1959.
- Frankfort, Henri, et. al. Before Philosophy. Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1949.
- Fromm, Erich. Marx's Concept of Man. New York: 1963.
- _____. The Sane Society. New York: Fawcett World, 1955.
- _____. You Shall Be As Gods. New York: Fawcett World, 1975.
- _____. edit. Socialist Humanism. New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1965.
- Gendron, Bernard. "Marx and the Technological Theory of History." Philosophical Forum. vol. 6, Summer, 1975.
- Giddens, Anthony. Capitalism and Modern Social Theory. Cambridge: University Press, 1971.
- Gombin, Richard. The Origins of Modern Leftism. Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1975.
- Gorz, André. A Strategy for Labor. Boston: Beacon, 1967.
- Green, Philip and Levinson, Sanford. Power and Community: Dissenting Essays in Political Science. New York: Vintage, 1970.
- Habermas, Jurgen. Knowledge and Human Interests. London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1970.
- _____. Theory and Practice. Boston: Beacon Press, 1973.
- _____. Toward a Rational Society. Boston: Beacon Press, 1970.

- Harrington, Michael. Socialism. New York: Bantam, 1970.
- Hartmann, Klaus. "Praxis: A Ground for Social Theory?"
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology.
Vol. I, no. 2, 1970.
- Hegel, Georg. The Phenomenology of Mind. trans. J. B.
Battlie, 2nd ed. London: Allen and Unwin, 1931.
- _____. The Philosophy of Hegel. edit. Carl J. Friedrich.
New York: Modern Library, 1954.
- _____. The Philosophy of Right. trans. T. M. Knox.
Oxford: University Press, 1942.
- _____. Political Writings. trans. T. M. Knox. Oxford:
University Press, 1964.
- Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. edit. Michael Oakeshott. New York:
Collier Books, 1962.
- Hobsbawm, E. J. The Age of Revolution (1789-1848). New York:
Mentor, 1962.
- Hook, Sidney. From Hegel to Marx. Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press, 1962.
- Horkheimer, Max. The Eclipse of Reason. New York: Seabury,
1974.
- Horkheimer, Max and Adorno, Theodor. Dialectic of the
Enlightenment. New York: Seabury, 1972.
- Howard, Dick. The Development of the Marxian Dialectic.
Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1972.
- Howard, Dick and Klare, Karl. The Unknown Dimension:
European Marxism Since Lenin. New York: Basic Books,
1972.
- Huizinga, Johan. The Waning of the Middle Ages. New York:
Doubleday Anchor, 1954.
- Hunt, Richard. The Political Ideas of Marx and Engels,
Vol. I: Marxism and Totalitarian Democracy. Pitt:
University Press, 1974.
- Jay, Martin. Dialectical Imagination. New York: Little,
Brown and Co., 1973.
- Kaufmann, Walter. Hegel: A Reinterpretation. New York:
Doubleday Anchor, 1965.

- Kelly, Georg Armstrong. Idealism, Politics and History. Cambridge: University Press, 1969.
- Knowles, David. The Evolution of Medieval Thought. New York: Vintage, 1962.
- Kolakowski, Leszek. Marxism and Beyond. London: Palladin, 1971.
- Korsh, Karl. Karl Marx. New York: Russell and Russell, 1963.
- Lefebvre, Henri. Dialectical Materialism. London: Jonathan Cape, 1968.
- _____. The Sociology of Marx. New York: Vintage, 1969.
- _____. "Sur L'Alienation." Social Praxis. vol. 3, 1975.
- Leiss, William. The Domination of Nature. New York: George Braziller, 1972.
- Lemos, Ramon. Rousseau's Political Philosophy. University of Georgia Press, 1977.
- Lewis, Stuart. Medieval Political Ideas. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974.
- Lichtheim, George. From Marx to Hegel. New York: Seabury, 1974.
- Lobkowicz, Nicholas. Theory and Practice: The History of the Concept from Aristotle to Marx. Notre Dame: University Press, 1967.
- Lowith, Karl. From Hegel to Nietzsche. New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1967.
- Lukacs, George. Marxism and Human Liberation. New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1973.
- Machiavelli, Nicolo. Discourses. trans. Leslie J. Walker. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950.
- Mandel, Ernest. The Formation of the Economic Thought of Karl Marx. New York: Monthly Review, 1971.
- Mandelbaum, Maurice. History, Man and Reason: A Study in Nineteenth Century Thought. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1971.

Marcuse, Herbert. Counter-Revolution and Revolt. Boston: Beacon, 1972.

_____. Negations. Boston: Beacon, 1969.

_____. One Dimensional Man. Boston: Beacon Press, 1964.

_____. Reason and Revolution. Boston: Beacon Press, 1960.

_____. Soviet Marxism. Boston: Beacon, 1958.

Marcuse, Herbert; Moore, Barrington; and Wolff, Robert. Critique of Pure Tolerance. Boston: Beacon, 1965.

McClellan, David. Karl Marx: His Life and Thought. New York: Harper and Row, 1973.

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenology of Perception. London: Routledge Kegan, and Paul.

_____. The Primacy of Perception. Northwestern: University Press, 1964.

_____. Sense and Nonsense. Northwestern: University Press, 1964.

_____. Signs. trans. Richard McCleary. Northwestern: University Press, 1964.

Meszaros, Istvan. Marx's Theory of Alienation. New York: Harper, 1972.

Miliband, Ralph. Marxism and Politics. Oxford: University Press, 1977.

_____. The State in Capitalist Society. New York: Basic Books, 1968.

Minar, David and Greer, Scott. edit. The Concept of Community. Chicago: Aldine, 1969.

Muller, Herbert. The Uses of the Past. Oxford: University Press, 1957.

Neumann, Franz. The Democratic and Authoritarian State. New York: Free Press, 1957.

Nicolaus, Martin. "The Unknown Marx" in Ideology in Social Science. Robin Blackburn. edit. Bungay, Suffolk, England: Fontana, 1972.

- Nisbet, Robert. The Social Philosophers. New York: Thomas V. Crowell, 1973.
- O'Neill, John. "Alienation, Class Struggle and Marxian Anti-politics." Review of Metaphysics. vol. 7., March, 1964.
- _____. Sociology as a Skin Trade. London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1972.
- Ollman, Bertell. Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist Society. Cambridge: University Press, 1971.
- Paci, Enzo. The Function of the Sciences and the Meaning of Man. Penn: Northwestern University Press, 1972.
- Pelczynski, Z. A. edit. Hegel's Political Philosophy: Problems and Perspectives. Cambridge: University Press, 1971.
- Petrovic, Gajo. Marx in the Mid-Twentieth Century. New York: Doubleday, 1967.
- Plant, Raymond. Hegel. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973.
- _____. Community and Ideology. London: Routledge Kegan, and Paul, 1974.
- Plato. The Republic. trans. F. Cornford. London: Oxford University Press, 1941.
- Popper, Karl. The Open Society and Its Enemies. Princeton: University Press, 1950.
- Poster, Mark. Existential Marxism in Postwar France: From Sartre to Althusser. Princeton: University Press, 1975.
- Radin, Paul. The World of Primitive Man. New York: Dutton, 1971.
- Rasmussen, David. "The Marxist Critique of Phenomenology." Dialectics and Humanism. vol. 2, Autumn, 1975.
- Rotenstreich, Nathan. Basic Problems of Marxist Philosophy. New York: Bibbs-Merrill, 1965.
- _____. "Human Emancipation and Revolution." Interpretation. vol. 3, Winter, 1973.
- Rousseau, J. J. On the Social Contract. edit. R. Masters. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978.

- Russell, Bertrand. Authority and the Individual. Boston: Beacon, 1960.
- Ryan, William. Blaming the Victim. New York: Vintage, 1971.
- Sabine, George and Thorson, Thomas. A History of Political Thought. 4th edit. revised. New York: Holt Rinehart, 1973.
- Saunders, Jason. edit. Greek and Roman Philosophy after Aristotle. New York: The Free Press, 1966.
- Schacht, Richard. Alienation. New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1970.
- Schaff, Adam. Marxism and the Human Individual. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970.
- Schmidt, Alfred. The Concept of Nature in Marx. London: NLB, 1971.
- Schrag, Calvin. "Praxis and Structure: Conflicting Models in the Science of Man." Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology. Vol. 6, No. 1, January, 1975.
- Scitovsky, Tibor. The Joyless Economy. Oxford: University Press, 1976.
- Sennett, Richard and Cobb, Jonathan. The Hidden Injuries of Class. New York: Vintage, 1973.
- Shmueli, E. "Pragmatic, Existentialist and Phenomological Interpretation of Marxism." Journal of the British for Phenomenology. Vol. 4, May, 1973.
- Shroyer, Trent. Critique of Domination. Boston: Beacon Press, 1973.
- Svitak, Ivan. Man and His World: A Marxian View. New York: Dell, 1970.
- Thevaney, Pierre. What Is Phenomenology? edit. James M. Edie. Chicago: Quadrangle, 1972.
- Tucker, Robert. Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx. Cambridge: University Press, 1965.
- Venable, Vernon. Human Nature: The Marxian View. Cleveland: Meridian, 1966.
- Voegelin, Eric. The New Science of Politics.

- Walton and Hall, edit. Situating Marx. London: Human Context Books, n.d.
- Weber, Max. Ancient Judaism. New York: Free Press, 1967.
- Wellmer, Albrecht. The Critical Theory of Society. New York: Seabury Press, 1974.
- Williams, Raymond. Culture and Society (1780-1950). Middlesex, England: Penguin, 1961.
- Wolff, Robert P. The Poverty of Liberalism. Boston: Beacon, 1968.
- _____. edit. The Rule of Law. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971.
- Wolin, Sheldon. Politics and Vision. Boston: Little, Brown, 1960.