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MISTAKE OR MALICE?: MORAL JUDGMENTS ABOUT INTERPERSONAL HARM BASED UPON TRANSCRIPTS OF ALLEGED CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS

by

DAVID WILLIAM CARRAHER

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in partial fulfillment of requirements for the degree of Doctor of Psychology, The City University of New York

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ABSTRACT

Two alleged pending criminal investigations involving personal injury were presented to 180 persons. These subjects were told that their responses would be used to determine whether, in the future, reasonable and impartial juridic decisions could be made outside the courtroom setting based upon similar but more detailed transcripts. Unknown to the participants, two aspects of the cases had been systematically predetermined and varied across different subjects: the amount of harm that the victim received and the attitude of the harmdoer toward the person he harmed. The stories, one involving a case of childbeating and the other a planecrash, were constructed in such a manner that the intentions of the harmdoer were not totally clear. Several judgments of the case were elicited from subjects regarding the harmdoer's guilt, responsibility, intent to harm, and so forth. Three predictions were made with regard to the effect of the experimental manipulations on the ratings. Further, three hypotheses were advanced with respect to the relationship of several personality-attitudinal characteristics to the judgments. Partial support was found for the first three hypotheses, but none of the personality attitudinal variables were linearly related to judgments.

Results showed distinct patterns of judgments for the two stories. The childbeating case displayed an independence of judgments related to the seriousness or legality of the act from those related to the psychological aspects. The planecrash case showed no such independence. For that story results suggested that the subjects relied more heavily upon common sense theories regarding the cooccurrences of traits.

In the childbeating story, it initially appeared that the amount of harm the child received influenced judgments of guilt and recklessness as well as the favorability of the impression formed of the harmdoer. However, a follow-up analysis showed that these experimental results were probably due to an unexpected variation in subjects' understandings of how hard the father struck his child. The perceived brutality of the act was more important for these judgments than the physical damage per se. An exception to this occurred for the prison sentence recommendations, which were related to the extent of injury but not to the perceived brutality. Findings were discussed in terms of the light they appear to shed on our understanding of social and moral judgments.

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BACKGROUND TO THE PRESENT RESEARCH

The present study systematically investigates how people perceive and judge acts of harm to other persons. I will begin by considering what moral judgment is and review basic notions of how responsibility and blame are dealt with in legal thought and general psychology.

Many people view their judgments about others' actions as emanating directly from their principles and beliefs. If one asks a person to explain why he judged another as acting irresponsibly, he will often receive a reply such as, "I believe that...", "I feel strongly that...", "It is my conviction that...", "...the act is wrong." Or simply, "the act is wrong." Naive realism, the view that our perceptions and judgments provide direct and errorless understandings of the world, may characterize the manner with which we view our moral judgments and thus deserves attention as a world-view, but is not a proper starting point for scientific formulation about moral judgment. Moral judgment has been and continues to be a matter of great controversy and debate among philosophers, jurists, and psychologists. This fact, along with many observations evidencing the complexity of moral judgment in form, origin, and relationship to "reality", make indisputably clear that naive realism can not explain moral judgment.

In moral philosophy a classic dispute has been waged over whether moral judgments and behavior are based upon reason or emotion. Proponents of the former, rational approach have tended to argue that moral judgments follow from moral beliefs, ethical principles, or ideals, sometimes consciously known to the agent and sometimes not. Proponents of the latter, emotion-oriented approaches, of which there are many variations, have considered moral judgments to be mainly a matter of feeling. In the extreme, moral condemnation is viewed as a direct reflection of a person's anger, disappointment, or other negative feelings concerning a particular act. Praise reflects contentment, joy, and positive feelings about the act. Moral principles and logical consistency are downplayed in importance.

Philosophical approaches to moral judgment based upon the notion that moral language describes natural or non-natural features of reality have been notoriously deficient as psychological accounts. The problem appears to lie with the Referential Theory of meaning, the view that the meaning of language--in this case, moral language—is that to which statements refer (Hudson, 1970).

Austin (1962) distinguishes three ways of conceptualizing the meaning of statements. Locution refers to what is said. Illocution refers to what we do in saying something. Included here are asking for information,

announcing a verdict or intention, pronouncing a sentence, promising, making an identification or description, making an appointment or appeal or criticism, and so forth. Perlocution refers to the effects upon the feelings thoughts, and actions of the audience, speaker, or others. Examples are acts of persuading, inciting, embarrassing, moving, disappointing others, etc. Until recently, philosophers have placed major emphasis upon locution and little upon illocution and perlocution. Welcome exceptions for psychologists are H.M. Hare's Prescriptivism (1963) and Stevenson's Emotivism (1965), both of which treat the meanings of statements in terms of the same statements' functions or uses.

Attempts to describe moral judgment subtly become prescriptive in nature as less emphasis is placed upon observation of people than the clarity or sense of the theory (cf. Hudson, 1969). Many philosophers, in their work of explication, focus on the meaning of moral terms and reject those points of view which lead to logical inconsistencies. For one who is developing an idealized ethical theory, this is legitimate, but these tendencies do not facilitate the development of theories of people's everyday working systems of morality and moral judgment, where logical consistency is an inappropriate constraint.

People often hold others responsible in ways which are psychologically understandable but logically inconsistent. This can be seen very clearly in the phenomenon of moral blaming.

What is the basis for the conclusion that an act which is viewed as careless or reckless is morally blameworthy? People normally use the terms "careless" and "reckless" with the implicit understanding that the individual could have acted otherwise. Thus, a carelessly dressed person could have made the decision to dress more carefully and neatly, but did not. Another could have made the decision to drive more slowly and to look more closely at the pedestrian traffic even though he did not. Similarly, a careless math error could have been avoided--since one knew how to add properly--but for some reason, it was not avoided. We are now faced with the question of how a man is held responsible for damage which he never intended. How can a person be found guilty if he did not intend the consequences? A person may view an act as reprehensible and worthy of reproach while sincerely admitting that he does not believe that the other was out to cause harm. He may even believe, especially in the case of damage with severe consequences, that the agent would have by all means avoided the damage if he had expected it to occur. The act is on the one hand an unfortunate accident and on the other something that could

have and, morally speaking, should have been avoided. This is a paradoxical although not uncommon way of reasoning.

There is no more need to assume a rational or justifiable basis for condemnatory judgments than there is to assume that our understandings of moral situationas are veridical.' To a victim of another's carelessness, feelings of belittlement and moral indignation portray "what happened". They are social "facts". He may believe that another's foolishness and carelessness caused him to be burnt with a spilled cup of coffee, for example. At the same time, relatively uninvolved observers may interpret the victim's story, his claim of carelessness, as a warning to the other, a demand not to behave that way in the future, a way of managing transgressions of this sort, of understanding the act, and so forth.

The problems involved in systematically explaining phenomena such as moral indignation and reproach are not resolved by decreeing that they are not in the area, namely, that they are not moral judgments. Philosophers sometimes employ this tactic when they maintain that judgments which would not be defended later while the individual is in calmer spirits are not "moral" in nature. Such a maneuver unfairly sidesteps the morass of difficulties which lie in the path of those persons trying to map out and make sense of the realm of moral judgment.

I think it is clear from the discussion that we may assume that moral judgments of others serve psychological functions and are not simply objective moral "facts". The issue of whether man is or is not responsible may not be answerable. But it is certainly legitimate to say that people are sometimes viewed as responsible for their acts. Even in ideal conditions, where people will be little motivated to distort reality, the processes by which judgments are made can not be resolved by philosophical inquiry. If moral judgments do not directly describe external realitiy and are not simply logical deductions, then the psychological basis of moral judgments would seem to merit investigation.

This study is directed towards clarifying that basis by systematically observing how certain factors are related to moral judgments. Among other things, we will be looking at how judgments of recklessness and intent are associated with those of guilt and responsibility in given situations.

Responsibility

Attribution Theory

Attribution theory is a division of the broader field of person perception which focuses on how people explain the behavior of others. Any particular act is usually thought of as due to some properties of the environment, some properties of the agent, or a combination of both. The same act of providing assistance to another may be explained according to the motives and traits of the actor ("He was trying to ingratiate himself with me", or "He is altruistic") or features of the environment ("He was forced or influenced to help".) In some way the observer weighs the various competing explanations in the process of deciding what accounts for the act.

Any given behavior is thus ambiguous in the sense that one may appeal to varying explanations to account for that behavior. So in making attributions a person must sort out different types of conflicting information about another and the environmental forces acting upon him. If an observer obtains information that another person donates three hours of his time helping poor people each week, he might be inclined to infer that the other is generous. If he finds out that the other is well paid for his work or is

satisfying a course requirement, the explanation will likely be made in terms of incentives rather than the agent's personality. The information regarding external forces acting on the individual leads to or facilitates a particular interpretation of the behavior. On the other hand, if the observer finds out that the actor is undergoing hardships, acting against friends' wishes or against cultural norms, the observer will tend to allocate explanations in terms of the characteristics of the actor. The information facilitates an explanation in terms of the individual (Jones et al, 1972).

Attribution is normally viewed as a process of induction using common sense models of what sorts of information signify about the causation of behavior. Social judgments, of which moral judgments would constitute one type, are viewed primarily as explanations for social events. But we should be careful not to reduce social judgment to "induction". The ways in which people construe others do not always reflect a detached and uninvolved manner that the term "induction" would appear to imply.

Theory and research in the area have perhaps overemphasized the rational aspects of person perception and the need to veridically represent social reality. Clearly, whatever plays an important role in judging others should be considered in attempting to account for moral judgments.

One enters an arena where many otherwise neglected variables might conceivably play important roles: sympathy, attraction processes, memory for events, motivation and set of the observer, attitudes toward the act in question and toward the actor, conformity pressures, the perceived effects of one's judgment, and so forth.

We now turn our attention to notions of responsibility, which is central to attribution processes.

Heider (1958, pp. 112-114) describes five sorts of personal responsibility. He views these as "different forms". Four of the names are taken from Shaw and Sulzer (1964).

(1) Association: An individual is held responsible for events with which he is even remotely connected.

(2) Commission: Responsibility depends upon whether one committed the act in question, regardless of whether the outcome could have been foreseen.

(3) Foreseeability: The individual is held responsible for any act which he committed if it is felt that he could have foreseen the effects.

(4) Intentionality: A person is held responsible for only those consequences which he intended to have occur. An individual may also be seen as responsible for intended acts which were, for one reason or another, prevented or thwarted.

(5) Freedom of the agent to choose: A person is held responsible only for those acts which were freely intended--"freely" in the sense that the actor is perceived as having had the potential to have chosen not to act as he did. A person who chooses to harm another might not be held responsible for example, if he is thought not to have been in control of his volitional faculties.

Heider assumes that responsibility for an outcome takes on different meanings depending upon not only the evidence available but also the point of view of the person making the judgment. In certain instances an individual is guilty by association as when a youth watches a friend's crime and by failing to act is thought to condone or support it. In other circumstances, a person blames another for having caused an event that was not foreseeable, for instance, damaging the family car by being hit from behind. Acts of carelessness may lead to judgments of the agent's responsibility even though the act was not viewed as intentional. Sometimes a person is not held accountable unless the act is intentional. And lastly, one might not hold a person accountable even for conscious intentional acts if it is felt that somehow the agent had no choice. Such reasoning might allow one to excuse a person for yelling at his wife because he was under a lot of pressure, for example.

Legal Concepts of Responsibility

Heider's five types of responsibility bear strong resemblance to certain legal terms and analyses, as we show in Table 1. Our legal system employs varying notions of what responsibility is and hence requires that different types of evidence be produced to demonstate legal liability depending upon the charges involved. For example, when the

charge is gross negligence, it must be shown that the agent: (1) failed to take reasonable precautions, and was therefore negligent; and (2) knew the risks he was running. What is "reasonable" will depend upon common sense notions of the judges about "due care" and prudence. In the case of a fire it may involve a whole spectrum of presumed knowledge about not blocking doorways, storing inflammable materials away from heat and children, ventilating rooms, and so forth.

Often "reasonableness" is interpreted by jurists according to standards of "objective liability", whereby "the law...considers what would be blameworthy in the average man, the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence, and determines liability by that" (Holmes, 1923/1881). In such cases, the task is not to determine what the actual defendant thought, attended to, felt, or intended before or during the act in question, but rather what a fictitious ordinary man could have been reasonably expected to know under the circumstances. Establishing the mens rea, whether the agent possessed proper knowledge and foresight, is applied to a particular model of an agent rather than the actual agent being tried.

Heider's last type of responsibility is in reality an "excusing condition, a qualification for three of the four types of responsibility. Simply stated, if the agent is seen as not having had the capacity to act otherwise, he is

relieved of responsibility. This appears to apply to moral and legal judgment. It does not enter into judgments of responsibility based upon association for the simple reason that the individual in question is not thought to be a cause of the harm and hence consideration of his capacity to have done otherwise is meaningless.

It should be noted that for the strict determinist responsibility does not exist in the sense of blameworthiness because according to him an individual does not possess free will to decide upon his actions. People are never viewed as capable of behaving in other ways, and so there are always excusing conditions for action. If the widespread occurrence of blaming is any indication, it can be rather confidently asserted that the great majority of people do not hold strict deterministic beliefs.

In daily usage a person is sometimes referred to as "responsible" in the sense that he is able to and likely to carry out his duties, functions, and obligations properly, as in "a very responsible man". The term is also used to indicate that a person is empowered with certain authority or duties, as in "responsible for the training of firemen." In the first case, responsibility denotes virtuous character; in the second, the charges of a role. These meanings are not of interest to the present study and should not be confused with the notion of responsibility in the

sense of liability or blame.

Now that we have drawn a parallel between certain aspects of moral and legal judgments, perhaps we should ask ourselves about their differences. Hart (1968) gives the following analysis:

> A system of criminal law may make responsibility strict, or even absolute, not even exempting young children or the grossly insane from punishment; or it may vicariously punish one man for what anothr has done, even though the former had no control of the latter; or it may punish an individual or make him compensate another for harm which he neither intended nor could have foreseen as likely to arise from his conduct. We may condemn such a legal system which extends strict or vicarious responsibility in these ways as barbarous or unjust. (p. 226)

The idea is that certain legal notions run counter to our moral assessments of right and wrong. This is true even in criminal law where vicarious and strict liability do not usually appear. As I pointed out earlier, vicarious and strict liability do have parallels in moral judgment so Hart's point does not appear to be valid. In principle, the fundamental distinction is quite simple. A legal judgment or decision is made by individuals in accordance with a set of laws or rules to which the jurist does not necessarily personally subscribe and which are external to his own standards of right, wrong, and justice. To the extent that a particular individual internalizes legal codes it may be difficult to determine whether his responses are legal or

moral in nature, but the conceptual distinction nonetheless holds.

In practice, there is an historical tendency for this distinction to blur, and legal decisions are nurtured by the moral inclinations, common sense, and judgment of individuals acting in a particular setting and social climate. As Holmes (1923/1881) eloquently states:

> The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow men, have had a good deal more to do than syllogism in determing the rules by which men should be governed. The law embodies the story of a nation's development through many centuries and it can not be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.

Legal reasoning is not purely deductive because it involves application and interpretation. This is true for judges but even more for jurors, who seem to greatly depend upon non-legal or extra-legal criteria for arriving at legal decisions. Let us look at the evidence.

Research Using Real and Simulated Juries

Garfinkel and Mendlovitz (1967) studied the decision making of actual jurors and found that jurors' decisions were based on a combination of everyday implicit rules and

the "official line" offered by the legal system. The everyday rules included common sense understandings regarding "what anyone knows about the ways in which competence, authority, responsibility, and knowledge are usually distributed among and evidenced by social types of persons" (p. 18). The official line was characterized by the authors with a list of rules, several of which are mentioned here:

(1) Between what is legal and fair, the good juror does what is legal.

(2) For a good juror, choices vary independently of sympathy.

(3) For a good juror, the "law" and "evidence" are the only legitimate grounds for a decision.

(4) The good juror does not innovate upon the judge's instructions.

(5) The good juror delays judgment until the important matters of trial have been completed.

(6) For the good juror, personal preferences, interests, social preconceptions, that is, his perspectival view, are suspended in favor of a position that is interchangeable with all portions found in the entire social structure. His point of view is interchangeable with that of "Any Man."

(7) The good juror suspends the applicability of the formulas that he habitually employs in coming to terms with the problems of his own everyday affairs.

The good juror is also conceived of as one who will not stubbornly hold on to a position "out of pride" or to maintain face.

The researchers' general conclusions were that:

(1) jurors feel called upon to modify the rules used in daily life;

(2) the modifications they make are slight and produce an ambiguous situation of choice for them; and

(3) it is the management of this ambiguity and not his "judiciousness" that commonly characterizes the activity of being a juror (p. 104).

Research suggests that in both actual and simulated legal cases, jurors operate to a great extent according to their own set of rules and understandings. Hans and Doob (Note 1) found, for example, that simulated jurors did not pay attention to judges' instructions to ignore the fact that a defendant had a previous criminal record. Forty per cent of the groups (n = 15) convicted an exconvict while none of the control groups convicted a man who had no previous record, even though the evidence was the same in each condition. This occurred despite an overwhelming tendency on the part of experimental group jurors to insist that they had not been influenced by their knowledge of the defendant's record. An analysis of the group deliberations revealed that the "record" groups stressed the weight of the evidence against the defendant and considered it to be more damaging than "non-record" groups did. Further, record groups were signficiantly more likely to make initially negative or damaging statements about the defendant's case.

In terms of the analysis I have been suggesting, the study reveals something about an extra-legal or implicit rule that operates, namely, "exconvicts are relatively likely to be guilty". The rule appropriately describes the decision making of the jurors despite their insistence to the contrary.

To the extent that jurors can not and do not simply parrot the official line, legal decisions are worthy of psychological consideration. We would in fact be foolish to attempt to reduce legal decisions to what is contained in laws.

Several studies have shown how characteristics of jurors are related to their decisions, a fact intimately tied to lawyer's careful screening during the voir dire in jury trials. Shulman and his associates (1973) obtained various types of information from jury pool members and found that they could determine the "ideal juror" for the defense in the well-publicized Berrigan brothers' conspiracy trial (also known as the case of the "Harrisburg Seven"). This hypothetical juror was a female democrat with no religious preference and a white collar or skilled blue collar job. Further, a good defense juror "would sympathize with some elements of the defendant's views regarding the Viet Nam war, at least tolerate the rights of citizens to resist government policies nonviolently, and give signs

that...he (sic) would presume the defendants to be innocent until proven guilty" (pp.40-41). Some characteristics were strongly related to presumptions of guilt, as evidenced by the fact that before the trial 37% of the women questioned from a jury pool sample thought that the defendants were guilty as compared to 57% of the men. I should mention, however, that these biases probably become less important after jurors become familiar with the evidence (cf. Saks, 1975).

Although juror characteristics do not always relate to conviction tendencies in the same way across all trials, it is often found that measures of authoritarianism are positively associated with conviction (Mitchell & Byrne, 1973; Boehm, 1968). Gerbasi and Zuckerman (Note 2) found that mock jurors who obtained high scores on the "Just World Scale" (Rubin & Peplau, 1975) tended to give more severe verdicts than those with low scores did. Sosis (1974) reports finding that relatively harsh ratings of a car accident defendant were given by "internal" as opposed to "external" simulated jurors (Rotter, 1966).

The composition of juries has been shown to be related to judgments. Snyder (1970) compared decisions reached by all-male juries with those from male-female juries. Her results showed that in real courtrooms mixed juries were significantly more partial to the plaintiff (58% of the

cases went to the plaintiff) than all-male juries were (where 50% of the cases went to the plaintiff). More interesting is the finding that all-male juries were likely to favor the litigant with the superior status (74% of the time) while male-female juries showed no such preference (50% of the time the superior status litigant won). Despite minor methodological flaws, the study appears to have important implications.

Other studies have investigated effects of manipulating the characteristics of persons or evidence to be judged. Landy and Aronson (1969), for example, experimentally varied the respectability of the defendant. Mock jurors assigned a longer prison term to a person described as a janitor, two-time divorce, and exconvict, than to a man said to be happily married, regularly employed, and sociable. These results appear to represent a specific instance of a more general labelling phenomenon. Outside of legal research Langer and Abelson (1974) had clinicians judge a videotaped interview of either a "job applicant" or a "patient". Despite the fact that each rater saw the same interview, clinicians who believed they were judging a patient were significantly more likely to describe the individual as maladjusted.

Characteristics of the defendant other than a term or label undoubtedly play important roles in how harshly he is

judged. Physical attraction may be one of the more important variables in this area. Efran's (1974) work is illustrative. The researcher found that when physically attractive students were accused of cheating, they were less likely to be found guilty than physically unattractive students. Dion (1972) found that misconduct of physically attractive children was judged as milder and less representative of the child than that of physically unattractive children.

Blame: The Psychoanalytic Contribution

Blaming closely resembles the notion of holding a person responsible but always in a moral or moralistic rather than legal sense. One can hold a person responsible in a detached sort of way but blaming implies emotional involvement and dissatisfaction on the part of the blamer. One who blames has a psychological stake in the act under consideration. Presumably he obtains some relief in finding or specifying a culprit. If the blame is unfairly placed, the innocent victim is termed a scapegoat or whipping boy. Few people would say they blame others since the term "blame" often conveys the idea that one is taking out his frustrations on the other.

In traditional psychoanalysis blaming is interpreted as the displacement of aggressive impulses onto another person. Supposedly, when one sees another acting out his impulses, the viewer's own unconscious wishes and impulses become aroused. The superego then directs aggression towards the other individual instead of towards the ego in the form of guilt. Thus blame serves the ego-defensive function of relieving or preventing guilt. A typical example of such a process is found in the extreme condemnation of homosexual conduct and lifestyle by persons with repressed homosexual conflicts and, according to the theory, hence, desires.

Offshoots of the psychoanalytic notion of blame have found fertile ground in recent social psychological literature, notably in Jones and Davis' (1965) idea of "hedonic relevance", whereby actions which are of particular consequence for a person's own attainment of pleasure and avoidance of pain are given especial importance, with the result that the perceiver is more likely to make an inference about the psychological state of the agent who caused the act. Hedonically relevant actions are taken to be the result of motives which derive from underlying personality traits and dispositions. When a doorman refuses to let a person enter a building, he is viewed as "nasty" or "uptight" by the person who was refused entry, whereas an uninvolved bystander may simply see the doorman as "doing

his job". Acts which lead to inferences about another's personality and motivation are known as "correspondent". It should be recognized, however, that since correspondence depends upon the observer's point of view, it really describes the inference rather than the act being assessed.

In attribution theory responsiblity is treated as a perceived cause of behavior. It is as if a person's being responsible or guilty resulted in the harm or injury in question. This probably distorts the way people normally think of responsiblity but it is what a number of recent researchers (cf. Jones et al, 1972) have done to accomodate judgments to an attribution framework, which focuses more upon the explanation of behavior than upon the inferences made from it.

Harshness towards another will depend upon the extent to which one sees the other and not external forces or situational factors as responsible for an undesirable outcome. A traditional example is provided by Walster's (1966) study of judgments of an automobile accident when a person allegedly parked a car on a hill without a parking brake. Harsher judgments were made when greater damage was done. In the author's analysis hedonic relevance apparently increased with greater damage. The reasoning is not made explicit but appears to assume the occurrence of identification with the victim which leads to a sort of

vicarious reactive anger (cf. Wright, 1971, p. 194).

It is possible that there may be several appropriate explanations for blame. Wright (1971) describes two sorts of moral indignation which are thought to lead to blaming.

> There is first simple <u>reactive anger</u> which is the individual's response when he himself is the victim of wrong-doing....Judging by the intensity of the anger shown by people at offenses as diverse as vandalism and relatively mild sexual assault on children, it seems plain that these sources of anger are supplemented by another factor which I shall call <u>moral anger</u>. It is as if the mere knowledge that the act has been committed incenses people so that they cannot rest until they see the offender punished.

The important distinction between vicarious reactive anger and moral anger is that in the case of the latter, concerns for the victim assume little importance.

Shaver's (1970) "defensive attribution theory" (not really a theory at all but rather a few hypotheses for special conditions) makes clear just how flexible psychoanalytic notions are for making predictions about moral judgments. I have shown how blame may be treated in terms of identification with the victim. Shaver's idea is that under certain conditions a person will show leniency towards a harmdoer. The judge identifies with the agent and thus "goes easy" on him as he would on himself. According to the reasoning, the situation in question must be relevant

in the sense that the observer might someday find himself in a similar predicament (or already has).

I will not proceed to explore psychoanalytic notions as fully as possible. It can be readily seen that other processes could be appealed to in order to account for blame. Among these are projection, ambivalence, rationalization, and denial, to mention a few.

Piaget's Contribution to Moral Judgment

Piaget's (1932) major interest in moral judgment consists in tracing the development of qualitatively different modes of evaluating others' behavior as the child increases in age and experience. He emphasizes the close correspondence between the child's general cognitive functioning and his moral judgment. According to his theory moral judgment is best approached from a consideration of how the child looks at and understands rules. Rules are broadly conceived to refer to anything from games of marbles to parental commands. Individuals are thought to pass from a more primitive stage based upon moral realism or a morality of constraint to a second, more advanced stage based upon a morality of cooperation. The transition from the first to the second stage supposedly takes place around the age of 10 or 11.

Lickona (1976) describes nine dimensions which distinguish Piaget's two stages. The nine dimensions are given below:

(1) Absolutism of moral perspective as opposed to awareness of differing viewpoints.

(2) Conception of rules as unchangeable, as opposed to a view of rules as flexible.

(3) Belief in inevitable punishment, "immanent justice" for wrongdoing, as opposed to a naturalistic conception of punishment.

(4) "Objective responsibility" in judging blame as opposed to consideration of the actor's intentions.

(5) Definitions of moral wrongness in terms of what is forbidden or punished, as opposed to what violates the spirit of cooperation.

(6) Belief in arbitrary or expiatory punishment as opposed to belief in restitution or reciprocity based punishment.

(7) Approval of authority's punishment of peer aggression, as opposed to approval of eye-for-an-eye retaliation by the victim.

(8) Approval of arbitrary, unequal distribution of goods or rewards by authority, as opposed to insistence on equal distribution.

(9) Definition of duty as obedience to authority, as opposed to allegiance to the principle of equality or concern for the welfare of others. (p. 220)

The "morally realistic" view of responsibility bears a resemblance to the legal notion of strict liability, or, in Heider's terms, to responsibility based upon commission. There are no "excusing conditions" for having violated moral rules: intentions and motives do not matter.

Personal experience may convince the reader that many young children note the occurrence of "accidents" in

everyday happenings and are quick to assert that they did not mean to do something bad. Piaget makes a distinction between practical and theoretical levels of thought which clarifies the issue. The practical level refers to moral behavior and reasoning in specific situations and the theoretical level to verbalizations about morality in more general situations. Supposedly there is a time-lag in development such that theoretical reasoning always follows and depends upon advances at the practical level. Thus Piaget's theory would allow for different levels of responding in the young adult before the theoretical level has caught up with the practical level. But according to his theory young children are not expected to take intentions into account.

Recent research (e.g. Berndt & Berndt, 1975) shows that young children are indeed aware of intentionality, contrary to Piaget's suppositions. In some cases it appears that young children are aware of intent but do not weight it in their judgments (cf. Imamoglu, 1975). Other research suggests that they do in fact take it into account and that Piaget's (1932) own results did not reveal this because of methodological flaws: confounding (Chandler, Greenspan, & Barenboim, 1975; Berg-Cross, 1975) or recency effects stemming from children's forgetting previous information (Feldman, Klosson, Parsons, Rholes, & Ruble, 1976). Part of the reason for the inconsistency in findings regarding the

role of intentionality probably arises from characteristics such as the subject's familiarity with the setting (Rest, 1970; Magowan & Lee, 1970). But we should not miss the point that research has merely qualified Piaget's original ideas regarding intentionality. The notion that intent becomes increasingly more important with development has been repeatedly corroborated (Lickona, 1976).

As adolescence approaches, the child gradually develops principles based upon mutual respect for others and upon needs for cooperation, a change made possible largely by the presence of a peer group and the need to establish workable social rules of fairness. At this time morality takes on a subjective character in that the child feels that the rules he follows are his own and may be somewhat altered if it is of larger interest or importance to others.

Kohlberg (1969; 1976) has extended Piaget's pioneering work in the cognitive developmental perspective. His model includes three, rather than two levels.

> One way of understanding three levels is to think of them as three different types of relationships between the self and society's rules and expectations. From this point of view, Level I is a preconventional person, for whom rules and expectations are something external to the self; Level II is a conventional person, in whom the self is identified with or who has internalized the rules and expectations of others, especially those of authorities; and Level III is a postconventional person, who has differentiated himself from the rules and expectations of others and defines his values in terms of self-chosen principles. (1976, p.33)

Each level consists of two stages, the second being the more advanced and organized of the two. See Table 2 for an overview of the six stages in terms of (1) what is right, (2) the reason for upholding the right, and (3) the social perspective behind each stage.

Research suggests that cognitive development is necessary but not sufficient for moral development. Although group data show that as a whole children advance morally according to Kohlberg's stages, some research (e.g. Holstein, 1976) shows that individuals may skip stages or regress.

Kohlberg measures level by reference to stories. He is aware that different issues and values are raised by different stories and his scoring procedure takes this into account. Most of Kohlberg's research has relied upon nine standardized stories which present the subject with a dilemma. His responses to interview questions are coded according to standardized procedures such that respectable interjudge reliability can be obtained. The chief advantage in using his nine stories is that they represent a standardized test for assessing moral judgment. Presumably story content differences account for some of the variation which subjects show over time when different stories are used. His theory thus pertains not only to individuals' cognitive structure but also to the role of story content in moral judgment.

Chapter 2

HYPOTHESES AND DESIGN

Transcript for the First Story

It was an underlying assumption of the present investigation that moral judgments vary as a function of the evidence available to the judges and the judges' own personality characteristics. I systematically obtained judgments made under various conditions and evaluated the impact of these conditions upon the judgments.

The meaningfulness of the results of the present study depends in large part on the powerfulness and persuasiveness of the stories I used. Insofar as the particular stories are critical to the present research I will present them here. This will also provide the reader with an immediate impression of the kind of task which faced our subjects. What follows is a transcript which participants in our study were asked to evaluate and form judgments of.

Jurisprudence Research Division: Grand Jury Section
Center For Legal Analysis
Newark, N.J.

Case docket # 09881

Background.

The reason for the grand jury investigation is to clarify the events surrounding and leading up to the injury of Joey Fromlan, age 10, of Paramus, New Jersey.

On Sept. 9 of this year Joey Fromlan was taken by his stepfather to Belcrest Hospital in Paramus. He arrived at 6:40 P.M. complaining of severe pains in the chest area. Doctors noticed that the boy had recent slight bruises at the stomach and lower chest area. X-rays revealed that 2 of his ribs had been fractured.

Hospital authorities grew suspicious about the incident from the moment they learned of the nature of the bruises. They decided to call the police officials when they were unable to obtain a clear story from the boy's parents regarding how the boy was injured.

Police investigators questioned Mr. Edward Fromlan, age 34, stepfather of the boy, about circumstances leading up to the injury of the boy. Below is some of the testimony which came out in the recorded preliminary interviews with police investigators.

Mr. Fromlan is stepfather of the boy and is presently the main suspect in the case.

Question: Mr. Fromlan, we'd like to ask you a few questions regarding what happended to your son. I know this is a difficult time but we have to ask some routine questions in cases like this. The matter that concerns us most at this point is how your son got injured. What do you think caused...

Fromlan: I know what you're thinking. Well I can tell you this: it was just an accident...

Question: What sort of accident? What do you mean?

Fromlan: Well, I didn't mean to hit him so hard. I was just trying to do my best as a father. I never thought he'd get hurt like this. It was really an accident. You know what I mean?

Question: Why don't you start from the beginning. You say you struck your son. Why did you hit him?

Fromlan: Well, he did something that he shouldn't have. It doesn't seem so important now, when you look back at it. But we were eating at the table and my wife and he, Joey, got into a fight, an argument. He wasn't treating her with very much respect and I told him to pay a little more respect to her because she's his mother. Then at one point he told her to "shut up" and that got me really upset. I told him to get into his room and when he didn't move so fast I helped him along and gave him a few

whacks. Well, he turns around sort of defiantly, telling me that it wasn't fair, that he was just going to keep on talking. That's when I hit him, twice, yes twice.

Question: Where on his body did you hit him?

Fromlan: You make it sound like I enjoyed hitting him. Well I didn't. I just hit him hard two times, in the front, like in the stomach. I didn't even close my fist. I was just going to let him know who's boss when it comes to situations like this. As soon as I hit him I thought it was just a little too hard. But I really didn't want to hurt him. The whole thing is just a terrible accident.

Question: So you say you hit him lightly a few times and then twice hard in the stomach?

Fromlan: Yes officer. No more than that.

Officer: We'll want to ask you some more questions later. For now, just tell us this: what sort of child is Joey?

Fromlan: A great kid. For as long as I can remember we were always real close. What a damn nice boy. You don't see many kids like him around.

Mrs. Wilson, age 43, a neighbor of the Fromlans, was questioned by police on the day after the incident.

Question: Mrs. Wilson, we understand that you were present when the Fromlan boy was struck by his father. What took place?

Mrs. Wilson: Well, I wasn't really there, in the same room. I was in my back yard looking at my roses. I can hear the conversation from the Fromlan's house pretty well from there actually. They were having dinner.

Question: What happened?

Mrs. Wilson: Like I say, I couldn't see them. But this is what I heard. Joey's mother, Mrs. Fromlan, told Joey that he couldn't go to a movie with his friends and he got angry, saying that all of the other kids were allowed to. His mother told him that her mind was made up and there was no use talking about it anymore. He continued asking and then then she said, "Why don't you just shut up and forget about it!" And then he said, not so loud but I could hear it, "Why don't you shut up!"

Then Mr. Fromlan got mad at him and told him to go to his bedroom. He hit him a few times--I don't know, 4 or 5. I could hear it from my yard. It's very close. Just then he must have hit him really hard a couple of times They were real sharp screams.

I got frightened because there was a lot of commotion. Joey was crying and said he felt sick. First his father didn't believe him. Joey must have been on the floor because his father told him to get up. Then Mr. Fromlan carried him to the car, and took him to the hospital. That's about all I can really attest to. Except that Joey looked awful dizzy as he was being carried to the car.

Question: What about the boy in general? How would you describe him as a child?

Mrs. Wilson: Well, I don't know the Fromlan family too well. But I've seen Joey quite a lot playing catch with his friends. They all seem like such nice boys. The father, Mr. Fromlan, played ball with the 2 sons in their back yard a few times. It didn't take much to see that the father liked Joey a lot. He would treat him very nice when they were together there. He always seemed to like his son very much.

Police: Thank you for your cooperation, Mrs. Wilson. We'll get in touch with you later for more details if necessary.

Police also met with several teachers in Joey's school. They were in general agreement that, although the boy was sometimes overactive and loud, he was essentially a good boy and an average pupil. None of the three teachers interviewed felt that he presented an unusual behavior problem.

Amount of Injury to the Victim

This brief case presented us with the opportunity to ask some intriguing questions about how people judge others. I was first of all interested in the extent to which people are blamed as a function of the amount of harm incurred upon another. What would happen if the stepfather in the above case had actually killed his own son? What would this mean for the sorts of judgments people would pass on him? Would they treat the injury as irrelevant? Would they be overcome by moral outrage and condemn the man? Would they condemn the action and not the man? Just how would they react? As in all theoretical research, I set out to examine the validity of a general statement by testing it under particular conditions.

Assuming that I could control the perceptions of how hard the stepfather was perceived as hitting his son, I decided to experimentally vary the amount of harm that the boy, Joey, would receive using three levels of harm or personal injury. In addition to the Moderate Harm condition presented above, a Low Harm condition story informed our subjects that the child received only superficial bruises and was quickly released from the hospital. In the Severe Harm condition, the stepfather's action resulted in the death of the boy (see Appendix A for other versions of the stories).

In the proposal to this study, I reasoned that people would show a general tendency to be tough-minded towards the harmdoer as a function of the amount of injury. The exact words are restated here:

Hypothesis 1: An act of injury to another will be judged more harshly if it results in relatively greater harm to the victim.

The operationalization of harshness will be presented after the second hypothesis.

Our reasoning was clarified by appeal to Piaget's notion of "moral realism". I stated that "although Piaget's usage was meant mainly to describe the moral judgment of young children, it can be taken to apply to any persons who view moral issues as though they were objective matters." Piaget's notion was put forth not as a foundation for the hypothesis (since, as I noted, Piaget holds that moral realism is a complex point of view) but rather as a rough illustration of the kind of reasoning that I expected of our subjects. Properly speaking, my reasoning was grounded in my intuitive notions about how people judge others.

I should point out that in our study the question of intent on the part of the harmdoer is largely left open to the reader. I suspect that if I were to depict the stories in such a way that the act was definitely not

Attitude Toward the Victim

If there were any questions left open regarding the extent to which the father was predisposed to being against his sons's injury, I hoped to remedy this with the introduction of a second experimental variable.

The version presented above portrayed a man who, through his own testimony and that of his neighbor, Mrs. Wilson, appears to like his son.

In the Dislike version, two passages have been edited to convey the distinct impression that Mr. Fromlan dislikes his son:

> Officer: For now just tell us this: what sort child is (was) Joey?
>
> Fromlan: Alright,I guess. If he just didn't get these ideas about acting up sometimes. Sometimes I wish he was more like his older brother, more sensible. I'm not complaining, and I'll tell you, I do my duty as a father.

I hesitated to have the father viciously display hatred towards the child in front of police investigators. A man would be a fool and a villain to strongly denounce the child he has just beaten, and, in one condition, just killed. That the neighbor's testimony corroborates the man's statements appears sufficient, I feel, to convey a negative attitude of the father toward the son.

Mrs. Wilson: Well, I don't know the Fromlan family too well. But I've seen Joey quite a lot playing catch with his friends. They all seem like such nice boys. The father, Mr. Fromlan, played ball with the two sons in their backyard a few times. It didn't take much to see that he has a preference for the older boy. He would criticize Joey a lot you know, treat him impatiently. At times I got the definite impression that he disliked Joey very much.

According to my reasoning, the less a person likes another, the more favorably disposed he is toward the harm brought to the other. I believe that most people at least implicitly work from this assumption also. Further, I believe that people will assume that a person who is favorably disposed towards another's harm is relatively likely to intend harm towards the other, and that people will judge the harmdoer accordingly. This leads me to the following conclusion.

Hypothesis 2: Given a case where the intent to harm is unclear, a person who harms an innocent person whom he dislikes will be judged more harshly than one who harms a person whom he likes.

Are there alternative hypotheses to ours? Perhaps an individual who harms another whom he likes is viewed as guiltier and judged more harshly than one who hurts a person he dislikes. It could be maintained that a person who hurts a friend, for example, is despicable and worthy of punishment because he has violated a trust that exists between friends. Hurting an enemy, on the other hand, might be viewed as more natural and less blameworthy because the

actor behaves consistently with his feelings towards the other and in a way that is more likely to be condoned by the standards of our society. I do not accept the logic of this argument on the grounds that in our stories the issue of "intent to harm" is unclear--a fact which would seem to work in favor of a suspect accused of hurting a person whom he likes. Had I constructed stories in which there was no doubt about the actor's intent to harm the victim, I would perhaps side with the argument presented above.

Dependent Variables

The dependent variables correspond to the rating scales and to other items to which subjects responded after they had read the stories. Appendix B presents the items which subjects were asked to respond to for each story and we provide brief names for some so they can be referred to more easily in the discussion.

The variables can be discussed individually or at a higher level of organization, namely, at the level of underlying dimensions. Past factor analytic research with social judgment variables has invariably yielded a highly evaluative first dimension which accounts for a large portion of the variance. In person perception studies, this dimension is characterized by a good-bad quality, such that

adjectives or traits which are positive in meaning or socially desirable fall towards one end of the dimension while negative traits tend to fall towards the other.

I expected in my research that the first nine variables (except for the variable Physical Force) would be highly correlated. In view of this I proposed to factor analyze the variables in order to simplify the analysis and discussion. The highly evaluative dimension which I expected to emerge could be described as a "guilty-innocent" dimension, with positively keyed variables expected to appear on the innocent end of the dimension. This procedure allows for a reduction of nine scores for each individual to a single factor score reflecting the extent to which the individual judges the harmdoer harshly.

The proposed factor score is a weighted composite which serves as a most representative score for the set of nine rating scale variables. Henceforth I will refer to this dependent variable as Harshness.

It was decided that if factor scores were not obtainable or if the dimension was not interpretable, judgments of guilt and responsibility would be summed and used as a measure of harshness. Also, if any of the nine variables did not fall as predicted on the first dimension, it would be given a separate analysis.

Perceptions of the Harmdoer

Clarence Darrow, one of the most distinguished defense lawyers in our nations's history, once remarked that he never knew a jury to convict a man they liked. Studies in person perception (e.g., Dion, 1972; Bersheid & Walster, 1972) have shown the importance of attraction in how a person is judged by others. Bearing this in mind, I decided to obtain ratings of how judges perceive the harmdoer. By comparing ratings under various experimental conditions I would be able to observe how certain features of the story affect the impressions subjects form of the harmdoer. Also, I would be able to assess the relationship between characteristics of the rater and the type of impression formed.

I selected a set of 48 adjectives and short descriptions (see Appendix C) many of which have appeared in impression formation research in the last 20 to 30 years. Care was taken to obtain a sample of descriptions which was highly evaluative in nature and which contained both desirable and undesirable traits. These criteria were established in order to facilitate attainment of a factor analytic dimension with a large evaluative component.

The 48 descriptors were straightforwardly classified by me into positive and negative types. Further, I

distinguished between those traits which were social in nature and those which were not particularly social in nature, which I shall refer to as asocial or nonsocial (not in the sense of antisocial). If a trait referred to how an individual functions in the presence of others or to how he relates to and presents himself to others, it was taken to be "social"; otherwise it was treated as asocial.

Only 12 adjectives were classified as "asocial": relaxed, wasteful, thrifty, practical, alert, stupid, rash, careful, overly idealistic, intelligent, indecisive, and choosy.

I reasoned that there is something distinctly antisocial in the nature of harming another that ought to lead the harmdoer to be judged more negatively on social traits than on asocial traits. This led to the following following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 3: The harmdoer will be judged as more antisocial under conditions of increasing harm to the victim.

One might argue that, since the dialogue in the various experimental conditions is essentially the same, people would not form different impressions of the harmdoer in those conditions. If this is correct, the positivity or favorability of impressions would not be related to the amount of injury the victim suffers.

Perhaps the social/asocial distinction is not made by subjects. In this case a general halo effect would be found rather than a specific effect on certain types of adjectives. The research was planned to allow us to assess this alternative hypothesis.

A Second Story

As a means of validating any significant effects on the childbeating story, I chose a second story with some characteristics similar to and other characteristics different from those of the first. The reader should refer to Appendix A, which contains the altered passages of the previously undescribed versions of the first and second stories.

A face analysis of the first story led to the following criteria for composing the second story. They were not dictated by a theoretical formula or structure but rather derived from an attempt on my part to isolate what I felt to be crucial characteristics. I arrived at the following points regarding the second story:

(1) it must involve the harming of one person by another;

(2) the harm must not be portrayed as necessarily intentional: the issue of whether the harm was intended must be left somewhat open to interpretation.

(3) the harm must be clearly related to action of the harmdoer;

(4) the effects must follow the act rather closely in time;

(5) the severity of the consequences must be varied in different versions of the story;

(6) the attitude of the harmdoer towards the victim must be varied in different versions of the story.

Some aspects which were not considered essential and were therefore varied included the following: the precise dialogue; the location of the events in the story; the precise type of harm incurred upon the victim; the nature of the act which caused harm; the length of the story in words; the relation of the actor to the victim; and the age of the victim.

Similar results across stories can be taken as support for the view that the experimental conditions overpowered all of the changes in "inessential" variables mentioned directly above. In short, the variations introduced in the second story would be shown to be inconsequential in contrast to the aspects I was interested in. The experimental effects would receive confirmation over a new set of story conditions, which is a demonstration of external validity. In this way a replication of results would be rather straightforwardly interpretable.

I eventually constructed a story in which a plane mechanic apparently leaves out a bolt in an inner chamber of the plane engine, in turn causing harm to the victim, a private pilot. In the Low Harm condition the pilot suffers from shock and minor abrasions. In the Moderate Harm condition, his thumb and index finger are severed from his right hand. In the High Harm condition, he dies. I also varied the attitude of the harmdoer towards the victim, as in the first story. Below follows the Moderate Harm, Favorable Attitude condition.

Jurisprudence Research Division: Grand Jury Section
Center For Legal Analysis
Newark, N.J.

Case docket # 44812

Background.

On the night of October 15 of this year, a small, single-engine aircraft crashed in a field shortly after take-off from Akron, Ohio's Municipal Airport. As an ambulance team reached the plane, they found it in two sections about 60 feet apart. The owner and pilot, Mr. James Lamont, was found unconscious inside the plane's front section. Attendents successfully resusitated the victim and quickly removed him from the wreckage. However the impact of the crash had totally severed Mr. Lamont's thumb and index finger from his right hand. He was given plasma to prevent the occurrence of shock and taken to a nearby hospital where he remained under supervision for a week before release.

After the incident an examination was undertaken by Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) officials. In the course of their two day investigation they found that the plane crashed due to a failure in the carburetor system which mixes fuel with oxygen. Upon dismantling the carburetor, mechanics who were part of the investigation noted that an

inner bolt was missing. They concluded that the carburetor was recently either tampered with or negligently repaired because the engine can not operate for more than a very short time without the bolt in place. Also, if the bolt had become dislodged or loosened by itself, it would have remained in the engine. However, no such bolt was found by authorities. This evidence definitely shows, they believe, that someone either intentionally or accidentally removed the bolt from the engine.

On the basis of this evidence FAA officials decided to question the planes's mechanic, Michael Scott, 47, of Akron, Ohio. The following testimony is taken from the initial questioning of Mr. Scott, who is the suspect in the present inquiry. He was called to the FAA regional office supposedly for the purpose of routine quesitioning.

Scott: Excuse me, are you Mr. Langdon, the man I'm supposed to see?

FAA Agent Langdon: Yes, take a seat. We've been expecting you. You're the mechanic of that Beechcraft that crashed Wednesday night, aren't you?

Scott: Yes sir. They told me I should see you. Awful thing that happened, wasn't it? A real shock to me. It just goes to show you, you just never know when your time is up.

Agent: Actually we didn't call you down here for no reason. My men have been carefully looking over the evidence at the site and they've found some suspicious signs in the wreckage of the plane. We thought that since you were the person who regularly serviced Mr. Lamont's plane we would let you in on it too. But first tell me something. What kind of shape was the plane in, prior to the crash?

Scott: Oh, she's always been a good little machine. No problems. That's what bothers me so much. It doesn't look good for me to have one of my planes crash like that. You know what I mean, one of the planes that I take care of. Say, have they looked over the area real careful? You know, sounds to me like one of them birds must have hit it. They're always flying around over there at the airport. They hang around the garbage dumps just nearby. I'll bet that's what happened. You know, they hit a guy's prop and they can do a lot of damage.

Agent: We've looked into that possibility but, frankly, it appears that the plane crashed because of a malfunction in the engine.

Scott: What do you mean? Gees, I mean how can you tell that? Of course, after the plane falls it's got to have some effect on the engine. You can't expect the engine to be in perfect running order after that! I mean, heck, if you go around looking like that into every plane that crashes, it's going to look like it was always because of the mechanic.

Agent: No, that's not what I'm saying. The evidence is simply that a hex bolt in the inner chamber of the carburetor was not found in place. It looks like it was removed sometime between the last completed flight and the crash.

Scott: It could have just got lost.

Agent: No, it couldn't. My men were very careful and thorough. And it couldn't have just disappeared. So what we have to do now is just determine how it was removed. Do you have any idea...

Scott: Hey, wait just a minute!

Agent: Look. You're the plane's mechanic. We've got to ask you these questions. Now, I don't like this any more than you do but we have to go through with it.

Scott: Alright.

Agent: Mr. Scott, did you work on the engine at all since the last completed flight?

Scott: Yes. I always check them out after a run. I was right by the plane until she took off Wednesday.

Agent: Well, did you notice any problems with the engine?

Scott: No. Nothing unusual.

Agent: Listen, Mr. Scott. We checked with another of the mechanics, a Mr. Clyde Hansen, at the hanger who said that he saw you working on the carburetor of Mr. Lamont's aircraft on the afternoon of the flight. He said you were dismantling it.

Scott: Alright, so I took it apart. That's standard procedure. Every so often you've got to clean it out. That's just standard. Nothing unusual. You just clean it up and put it back together.

Agent: Well, it looks to me like it didn't quite get put back together correctly last Wednesday. You realize what this means, of course, don't you? You're going to have to answer a lot more questions about this because you're the only person who could have gotten into the engine before Mr. Lamont took off on Wednesday.

Scott: Look, once in a while a guy makes a mistake. I know it looks bad for me but it's not the same thing if it's a mistake, is it? I mean just because a guy forgets to put on a bolt, you can't blame him for a crash, can you? It's still an accident, you know, nobody's fault, right?

FAA officials referred the above transcript along with additional questioning information to the Akron County district attorney. The district attorney conducted his own questioning of Mr. Hansen, along with another mechanic and a hanger security Guard. They expressed surprise that Mr. Scott was under suspicion. It was also learned that Mr. Lamont often treated Scott in a cold and rather demanding manner. According to their testimony Scott understood Mr. Lamont's ways and thought that behind it all he was a nice fellow. They stated that he felt very positively about the man and liked him very much.

The other versions of the second story are in Appendix A.

The Research Design

The present study has a repeated measures design with subjects embedded within experimental conditions. There are 12 experimental cells defined by three levels of Harm, two levels of Attitude Towards Victim, and two levels, that is, types of stories. Each subject appeared in the same condition with respect to the Harm and Attitude variables in each of the two stories. The design may be considered a 3x2x2 "repeated measures" format. Each person judged stories twice under the same experimental conditions.

This design was not the starting point from which I decided to formulate theoretical questions. I moved from an interest in certain questions about social judgment towards this design as a suitable structure for investigating the ideas.

What is the rationale for this design, as opposed to others? Why did the subjects appear in the same conditions for each story? Given the fact that there is a reason for the use of two stories, why is a repeated measures design employed? It might have been decided that different subjects would judge stories one and two, but this would complicate the analysis; for a failure to obtain similar findings for both stories would leave unsettled the question of whether this were due to story differences, group differences, or both. In the present design, it can only be due to story differences, that is, differences in the content of stories. I state this with confidence because two control procedures were established. A "group difference" effect was controlled by using the same subjects twice; and an order of presentation effect was controlled for by randomizing the order of presentation of stories to subjects.

Relations Between Judges and Their Judgments

If all we needed to know about a judge in order to predict his responses were the experimental conditions to which he was exposed, then one could pretend that all participants in the study were just the same. The anticipation that people would differ in their social judgment led me to search for subject characteristics which might account for those differences.

It is sometimes assumed that demonstrating the importance of individual differences automatically precludes the possibility of finding experimental effects. In this study, for example, demonstrating that Internals differ from Externals in the way they assess the guilt of a childbeater might lead one to argue that there is no main effect for the experimental conditions. The argument might be expressed in the statement, "You can't speak of a general tendency, because it depends upon whether one is Internal or External."

Certainly there are cases in which individual differences are important to take into account. But it is possible that individual difference effects and main experimental effects simultaneously obtain.

In our study I observed whether the dependent variables were significantly related to the following four independent assigned variables: (1) Locus of Control

(Rotter, 1966); (2) Belief in the Trustworthiness of Others (Wrightsman, 1964); (3) Intolerance; and (4) Authoritarianism in Parent-child Relationships (Levinson & Huffman, 1955). Specific hypotheses were advanced with respect to these variables.

Locus of Control

Sosis (1974) found that there were differences between Internals and Externals in the way they judged a defendant in an unintended car accident in which drinking was involved. Internals viewed the defendant as more responsible for the accident, more likely to have a general drinking problem, and more likely to have been able to foresee the consequences so as to act differently than externals. They also felt less sorry for the defendant and gave greater sentences.

It appears that Internals, seeing themselves in control of their own sources of reinforcement, act under the assumption that they are responsible for what happens to themselves, and also apply this outlook when it comes to judging others. I attempted to validate this effect under the conditions of the present study, using Rotter's Locus of Control Scale as a measure of Internality-Externality. The expected results are stated in the following hypothesis.

Hypothesis 4: Internals will tend to judge a harmdoer more harshly than Externals will.

Belief in the Trustworthiness of Others

Fourteen items were taken from Wrightsman's (1964) "Philosophy of Human Nature Inventory" (see Appendix D). They were designed determine the extent to which people are seen as moral, responsible, honest, and reliable. Several were reworded to balance the keying. According to our analysis, the intent of the defendant is not entirely clear in any of the experimental conditions. This being the case, it seemed that individuals who generally believed in the goodness of others would give others the benefit of the doubt. They were expected to be less likely to assume malevolence on the part of the harmdoer and thus give more lenient judgments.

Hypothesis 5: Belief in the Trustworthiness of Others will be associated with judgments of leniency toward a harmdoer.

Intolerance

Ten questions were selected from several variations of the F-Scale (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950) which were thought to reflect a punitive morality or special intolerance for everyday annoyances (see Appendix D). Our expectations were rather straightforward and consistent with previous research (e.g., Boehm, 1968) in the area.

Hypothesis 6: Intolerance scores will be positively associated with harsh judgments of a harmdoer.

Authoritarianism with Respect to Parent-Child Relationships

This collection of 12 items was drawn from Levinson and Huffman's (1955) Traditional Family Ideology Scale (in Appendix D). The scale can best be described as a measure of how democratic, as opposed to autocratic, one's views are with regard to how parents ought to raise children, how much freedom they should allow their children to decide matters for themselves, and so forth. Several of the items were reversed so as to balance the scale with an equal number of positively and negatively worded items.

The complete TFI has shown substantial relationships to measures of Ethnocentrism (r=.65) and Authoritarianism (r=.73), which was consistent with the researchers' predictions. The subscale was included primarily for exploratory purposes with respect to the first story. One can easily develop arguments both ways as to how it should relate to judgments of harshness or lenience in the first story. Our first reaction would have us argue that the Authoritarian measure would be associated with harsher judgments of the man who physically injured his stepson. But it must be remembered that the father punishes his son for talking back to his mother, and this element might be particularly important for authoritarians, who may regard

the stern action of the father as justified, if not necessary. For this reason I did not put forth a hypothesis with respect to the Authoritarianism variable.

I predicted no interactions between the three experimental variables, although I looked for them.

Chapter 3

METHOD

Subjects

Subjects were drawn from several college classes in psychology in the New York area. The 180 people included 97 women and 83 men from the following groups: 71 students from a small parochial college, 50 students from a large metropolitan university, 40 student nurses from a small private hospital, and 19 army veterans in a special adult education program. Subjects invariably participated in the study in regular classroom groups, although they responded privately to the questionaires. It was possible in this fashion to randomly distribute experimental conditions throughout each group, thereby eliminating the possibility that group membership characteristics might become confounded with the experimental effects.

Procedure

The personality-attitudinal data on subjects were collected several weeks prior to the experimental session. Efforts were made to disguise any relationship between the personality data and the experiment, and no mention was made during the initial collection period that there would be any

followup research.

See Appendix D for a sample questionaire. It includes the initial questionaire, consisting of the Rotter Locus of Control Scale; an inventory containing the Intolerance, Trustworthiness, and Authoritarianism Scales; as well as a few demographic items.

The study was introduced as "legal research" under the auspices of the "Center For Legal Analysis" of Newark, New Jersy. The organization is actually fictitious and was mentioned to subjects for the purpose of disguising the fact that the research is psychological in nature as well as to put the research into a credible context. Justifications for introducing the study in class time varied from group to group depending upon what seemed most appropriate, but in any event the research was not presented as part of normal course material.

The alleged rationale for the research from our point of view remained the same for each group and was described at the beginning of the experimental session as the experimenter addressed the group:

> The study you are participating in has to do with the judgments of courtroom jurors. We have been studying the possibility of using different means by which jurors might participate in making decisions. Perhaps you already know

that a lot of time and money is spent because jurors, under the present system, must appear in court for the trial whenever the trial is held. This automatically disqualifies a good many people from acting as jurors due to the fact that they cannot be released from work obligations.

What we want to know is whether jurors can make accurate and impartial judgments even if they don't attend a live trial. Can jurors make reasonable decisions from videotapes or films of the trial, for example? How about from written accounts of the trial proceedings?

You are going to receive a brief written summary of a case or two and be asked to make several judgments regarding the defendant, his guilt or innocence, responsibility, and so forth. Please consider your role here to be somewhat like that of a grand juror: you will be asked to weigh the evidence, and, among other things, individually decide whether there should be a trial against the defendant.

There are of course some real differences between the procedure that we are using here and that which would be used eventually with real courts. For example, if you were a real juror you would be asked to look at more evidence than you will be judging now. Also, you would make your judgments in groups, together. But for the purposes of this study these things are not too important. What matters is that you give the most sensible judgments that you can, based upon the available information.

Following this introduction, subjects received the written materials, which included the following items: (1) the first story (either the child-beating case or the planecrash case--order of presentation was randomly varied); (2) rating scales for the first story; (3) the second story; (4) rating scales for the second story; and (5) the demographic items.

Chapter 4

RESULTS OF THE STATISTICAL ANALYSES

Table 3 presents most of the basic descriptive statistics for the present study. With the exception of the variables Sentence (with unrestricted positive values), Social Traits, and Nonsocial Traits (7-point scale each), each of the means presented is from a 6-point scale such that a value of 3.5 represents the middle of the scale. Several general statements can be made about the central tendencies. In the childbeating story our subjects tended to view the father's action as reckless (mean = 4.97) and involving a lot of physical force (mean = 5.15). They also tended to judge him as guilty (mean = 4.89) and responsible (mean = 5.21) for his stepson's injury. The great majority of subjects endorsed the idea that the father had lost his temper in striking the child (mean = 5.62).

Experimental Effects

Several significant differences emerged across the stories. The stepfather was judged to be more upset about the harm than the mechanic (t=10.09; d.f.=179; $p<<.001$) and also guiltier (t=3.73; d.f.=179; $p<.01$). There was a highly significant tendency (t=-54.02; d.f.=179; $p<<.001$) to view the stepfather more negatively than the mechanic on

nonsocial traits but not on social traits. Finally, subjects expressed greater confidence about their judgments of the stepfather's guilt than they did about the mechanic's guilt.

Table 4 presents a summary of the experimental effects for the first story. It gives the F values and levels of significance for all judgment variables. With increasing harm or injury to the boy subjects were:

(1) more likely to recommend that a trial be held (F=8.11; d.f.= 2, 179; p<.001) with 48% (n=43), 62% (n=36), and 82% (n=19) of the subjects recommending a trial in the Low, Moderate, and High Harm conditions, respectively.

(2) more prone to describing the stepfather as reckless (F=4.13; d.f.=2, 179; p<.017);

(3) more prone to finding the stepfather guilty (F=3.25; d.f.=2, 179; p<.040);

(4) more likely to assign a larger prison sentence (F=15.48; d.f.= 2, 179; p<.001); and

(5) less likely to form a favorable or positive impression of the stepfather on social traits (F=3.52; d.f.=2, 179; p<.031) and asocial traits (F=4.03; d.f.=2, 179; p<.019).

There was a curious curvilinear relationship between the extent of harm to the child and judgments of how hard the man struck the boy: subjects thought that the stepfather used significantly greater force in the condition of moderate harm than in the low or high harm conditions (Scheffe tests, F=-21.51; d.f.=2, 177; p<.001; and F=9.64;

d.f.=2, 177; p<.01, respectively). Ratings of force in the high harm condition were also significantly greater than in the Low Harm condition (Scheffe F=9.64; d.f.=2, 177; p<.01). I consider this finding as well as its possible implications for my study in the discussion section.

With the exception of the above mentioned anomaly on the variable Physical Force (how hard subjects thought the man hit his child) all of the effects due to the manipulation of Harm are monotonic (although sometimes with a lack of differentiation between two of the three levels of Harm) and in the expected direction, that is, in the direction of harsher judgments with increasing harm. The unexpected feature is that not all variables were affected by the experimental manipulations.

Looking now at the effects due to the stepfather's attitude towards his child (Tables 4 & 5) we observe almost totally different significant trends. When the actor was portrayed as disliking rather than liking his son, he was more likely:

(1) to be viewed as having intended to harm the boy as much as the boy was harmed (F=6.31; d.f.=1, 179; p<.012);

(2) to be viewed as having intended to harm the boy at all (F=8.99; d.f.=1, 179; p<.003);

(3) to be viewed disfavorably or negatively on an array of different traits, both social (F=16.59; d.f.=1, 179; p<.001) and asocial (F=5.21; d.f.=1, 179; p<.022) in character.

The results for the second story are presented in the same manner as those for the first story. Table 6 gives an overview of the experimental findings. Table 7 provides a detailed breakdown of the effects showing cell means.

In general it will be noted that the effects are fewer in number and weaker in strength. Both of the judgment variables affected by the Harm manipulation, Responsibility (F=4.41; d.f.=2, 179; p<.013) and Social Traits (F=3.56; d.f.=2, 179; p<.030), revealed curvilinear trends. Manipulation of the harmdoer's attitude toward the victim affected only four variables. When the mechanic was described as disliking the victim, he was judged significantly:

(1) less reckless in his action (F=5.93; d.f.=1, 179; p<.015);

(2) less responsible for the harm (F=5.46; d.f.=1, 179; p<.020); and

(3) less guilty (F=5.71; d.f.=1, 179; p<.017). Also

Subjects also expressed less confidence in their judgments of guilt (F=8.36; d.f.=1, 179; p<.004).

Intercorrelations

The intercorrelations among the judgments reflect the extent to which judgments on one rating scale are related to judgments on others. Table 8 presents the intercorrelation

matrix for story one and Table 9 the intercorrelation matrix for story two. In both tables correlations were adjusted in order to key the scales in a direction which corresponds to the intuitive meanings of the variables. Several variables in the first story correlated with corresponding ones in the second. Those five variables from the first story are Upset (r=.282, p<.001), Confidence (r=.381, p<.001), Sentence (r=.207, p<.003), Social Traits (r=.209, p<.002), and Nonsocial Traits (r=.211, p<.002) showed significant relationships to the corresponding variables in the second story.

It will be necessary for us to consider why, in the midst of a great number of significant correlations in the first story, the perceived intentionality of an act was not related to the perceived guilt, responsibility, and the prison sentence assigned. The reader will recall that I had expected a high degree of interrelation among all of the judgment variables, a result which would have allowed us to combine the variables into a composite dependent variable which would be referred to as Harshness. Why this did not occur and the implications for our understanding of the psychological processes underlying the judgments will be considered shortly.

Since the same patterning of results does not appear for the second story, I must either concede that the

inconsistency in results is due to chance--an unlikely hypothesis in view of the number of significant relationships involved--or search for an answer to each of the following three questions: (1) how can one explain the patterning of results in story one?; (2) how can one explain the patterning of results in story two?; and (3) how can one credibly account for the differences between the two stories? Here "credibly" means "in the sense that one's explanation does not appear to be ad hoc and without corroborating evidence."

An intercorrelation matrix for the judgments in both the first and second stories served as the basic input data for the factor analysis of judgments. Results (Table 10) seemed to be most interpretable when submitted to oblique rotational analysis (with delta=0). The factor structure matrix shows the variance between the observed variables, in this case the judgments, and the factors. Factor I refers to a subset of variables from the first story, among which are included those which were influenced by the Attitude Towards Victim manipulation, namely Intent To Harm As Much, Intent To Harm At All, and Upset. Also on this dimension are the two Clear variables, as well as Trial, Physical Force, and Reckless. Factor III likewise refers to the first story and is characterized by Guilt and Responsibility, Reckless, Physical Force, and Trial. Factor II pertains to the second story, as does Factor IV.

Although the factors do not seem to be easily interpretable, two observations may be made. First, there is a clear empirical distinction between variable clusters which refer to the childbeating story and those which refer to the planecrash story. This finding supports our decision to analyze the stories independently. Second, the general harshness factor which I expected to emerge did not materialize; at least two dimensions were necessary to account for most of the common variance in the two stories.

The Personality-Attitudinal Variables

Table 11 presents the descriptive statistics for each of the personality attitudinal variables: Locus of Control, Intolerance, Authoritarianism, and Trustworthiness. Contrary to our expectations, none of the the variables correlated significantly with any of the judgment variables.

The average age of our subjects was 21.0 years with an s.d. of 4.0 years. They were significantly more External than Rotter's sample of college students (t=8.940, d.f.= 1358, $p<<.001$). There was also a more pronounced difference between men and women in our sample. But they were comparable in Authoritarianism to Levinson and Huffman's 1950 sample of psychology students.

When I found that none of the personality variables correlated significantly with the judgment variables, it was reasoned that the personality variables might not have related to any individual judgment variable, but still could be related to the set of judgments, the idea being that each or several judgment variables might be weakly related to the personality-attitudinal set. Therefore several composite variables were created to test this hypothesis. First, a logical composite variable was constructed by normalizing all of the judgment scores and combining the scores in such a way that the new variable would reflect Harshness as originally conceived in the proposal. One such composite was formed for each story. These composites did not significantly correlate with any of the personality-attitudinal variables.

When I considered that the factor analysis and experimental results did not support the idea that there was a general harshness factor, I pursued another line of reasoning: perhaps the judgment variables could be most meaningfully combined in terms of the ways they were affected by the Harm and Liking Variables. I thus constructed empirically based composite variables to reflect Harm and the Attitude variable effects (see Appendix E). When these new composite variables were found not to relate to the personality attitudinal variables, I terminated my search for relationships.

A low but significant correlation was found between the Locus of Control and Trustworthiness scales: the Internals tended to show more trust in others and to view them as more honest than Externals did ($r = -.272$, $p < .001$). The Authoritarianism scale correlated moderately ($r = .452$, $p << .001$) with the Intolerance scale.

Factor Analysis of the Rated Traits of the Harmdoer

The 48 trait adjectives and short descriptions were intercorrelated and submitted to a principal components analysis. Results appeared to be most easily interpretable without rotating the dimensions. The first dimension, which accounts for fully 44% of the total, not common, variance is clearly interpretable as a good-bad or positive-negative dimension, an evaluative dimension. Virtually all of the adjectives fall on this dimension as would be expected since I specifically chose highly evaluative adjectives. Two exceptions are the descriptions "too generous towards others" and "too realistic", which were perceived positively. Apparently too much of a virtue may still be desirable.

The second factor was interpreted as "social assertion" vs. "passivity and withdrawal". On one end are the traits "firm", "severe", and "rash" while the other is marked by the presence of "very submissive", "overdependent",

"passive", and "avoids getting close to others".

Factor III was interpreted as "accepting and open" vs. "rejecting and closed". One end is marked by "flexible", "tolerant", and "very submissive", and the other by "stubborn", "severe", "frank", and "uncooperative".

These three dimensions account for 76.7% of the total variance of the traits.

Table 13 shows the results of an analysis of covariance which arose from a discussion regarding certain anomalies in the experimental results. It shows that the perceived physical force, when partialled out of the relationship between Amount of Harm and Reckless, Guilt, Social Traits, and Nonsocial Traits, erases the effect of Harm. This is not the case with the variable Sentence, and only partially the case for the variable Trial.

Table 14 presents the results of a canonical correlation analysis between certain trait descriptions and the judgment variables. I will comment on this shortly.

Order effects had been kept orthogonal to the experimental manipulations through balancing. However, upon suggestion (Langer, Note 3) I looked to see whether there were systematic order effects. Of 26 possible significant effects at the .05 level of significance, four emerged. A z-test showed that four such outcomes are

significantly different from what would be expected by chance ($z=2.25$, $p<.025$). It was found that when the childbeating story was presented first as opposed to second, subjects:

(1) expressed less confidence regarding the assignments of guilt ($F=4.70$; d.f.=1, 179; $p<.029$);

(2) judged Scott, the mechanic, to be more reckless ($F=4.91$; d.f.=1, 179; $p<.026$);

(3) formed a more favorable impression of the mechanic on nonsocial traits ($F=6.32$; d.f.=1,179; $p<.012$); and

(4) formed a more favorable impression of the mechanic on social traits ($F=4.53$; d.f.=1, 179; $p<.033$).

I mention these findings here but do not have an explanation for them.

Separate factor analyses were conducted for each order of presentation. Since there were no systematic differences in the factor structures depending upon order, the results are excluded from further mention.

Subjects' open-ended responses were coded when it was suggested (Saltzstein, Note 4) after the study that the childbeating story may have involved a more irrational example of harmdoing than the planecrash story did.

Responses were coded as "irrational" if the agent was referred to as having personal, motivational, or psychological problems, or if psychological help or

counseling was recommended in lieu of or in conjuction with imprisonment. Responses which referred to the agent as unfit or incompetent were put into a separate, Unfit category. If the subject recommended that the mechanic lose his job, as opposed to having his license merely suspended, or if he recommended retraining the mechanic, the response was treated as an Unfit response.

Table 15 shows the results of this coding. The two blind judges were in agreement 91.7% of the time, a rate which climbed to 98.6% with the addition of a third judge who acted as a blind arbiter. Two major features stand out:

(1) Of the 48 responses which refer to the agent's irrationality or psychological deficiencies, 43 (90%) described the childbeater;

(2) Of the 31 responses which characterized the agent as unfit, 29 (94%) were associated with the mechanic.

These differences appear to account for the significance of the Chi-square for the same table (Chi-square=56.12, d.f.=4, $p<<.001$). When criticized, the childbeater is described as psychologically unstable, while the mechanic is described as incompetent. These differences are probably related to the omission/commission distinction which I discuss in the following chapter.

We also looked at the relationship between judgments of Guilt and Responsibility and those of Intent. It was

hypothesized by one of the members of the present author's dissertation committee (Saltzstein, Note 4) that the irrationality element, which was expected to vary positively with guilt and Responsibility in the childbeating story, would relate linearly with Guilt and Responsibility, and curvilinearly with Intent, with the result that there would be a curvilinear relationship between Guilt (or Responsibility) and Intent. The explanation offered was that as Guilt increased, so should irrationality, with the consequence that the results would be judged as less likely to have been intended by the agent. No such evidence was found when the means of Guilt and Responsibility were looked at across different levels of the Intent variables.

Chapter 5

DISCUSSION

Let us begin with the recognition that the two stories used in the study produced distinct patterns of findings. This is evident in the pattern of correlations of the variables, in the experimental effects, and also in the lack of correlation among the variables across stories. At the outset, one could only guess as to whether this finding is due to a lack of consistency in the manner with which individuals interpreted the stories, to theoretically important differences between the two stories, or to problems of operationalization which had been overlooked. We know at least that it is not due to differences in subjects since the same groups judged both stories, which were randomized for order effects. Whatever the case is, I will attempt to construct my arguments on evidence from the present study or previous studies rather than on pure speculation. Of course, the lack of correspondence between the results of the first and the second story does not constitute the only nor necessarily the most important point to be considered. It does, however, argue for a separate analysis of the stories.

Our Previously Implicit Model of Moral Judgment

is the virtual independence of the Harm and Attitude Toward Victim effects. The manipulation of the two experimental variables was perfectly orthogonal, so that one would not expect similar results due to problems of experimental control. But in my prior thinking I had conceptualized the reasoning of our jurors in such a way as to view the judgments as derived from a two step process--an analysis which led me to expect similar results for each manipulation. The model was not made explicit in the course of the study proposal, but now has become clear as I was forced to consider unexpected findings.

The model, in its first stage, involves the evaluation by judges of features of the story and the actors in it. These features were thought to serve as a basis upon which judges would form a general evaluation of the harmdoer and the act. In stage two, the general evaluation would serve as a basis for making judgments of the act and the harmdoer. This general evaluation was expected to result in the emergence of a Harshness factor analytic dimension due to a high degree of interrelation among all of the variables on which the story and actors were to be judged. For example, we expected that ratings of guilt would be highly correlated with the assignments of prison sentences. Our reasoning was based upon numerous studies in the social perception area

with the consistent finding of a highly evaluative dimension (e.g., Asch, 1946; Osgood et al, 1957). The same evaluative process was expected to show up in the experimental effects: we expected each of the experimental variables to be influenced by both the Harm and Liking variables and in particular ways. I expected the stepfather who disliked his son to be found guiltier, more responsible for the harm, more reckless, more likely to have intended the harm, and so forth, than the stepfather who liked his child. Judgment was viewed as a matter of tough-mindedness or tender-mindedness.

Neither of these fundamental expectations, regarding the relationships among the variables and the experimental effects, was given corroboration. The evidence indicates that our subjects were more differentiating in their reasoning than I had supposed.

It is of interest to note that of all the judgment variables which might have been influenced by the Attitude Towards Victim variable (whether or not the stepfather liked his child) only four actually were: the perceived intent to harm the child as much as he was harmed (Intent 1), the intent to harm him at all (Intent 2), how upset or unhappy the father was thought to be (Upset), and the likelihood that the fatherhood lost his temper (Temper). It can be seen that each of these variables is based upon judgments of

the psychological or motivational state of the stepfather--his intentions or emotions. On the other hand, the Harm manipulation (how much injury the child suffered) tied into a different set of variables: the recommendation for a trial (Trial), the sentence length (Sentence), how hard the boy was hit (Physical Force), and the recklessness of the act (Recklessness). Individually all of these findings are consistent with predictions. But why were the judgments grouped as they were?

My initial thinking regarding the childbeating story, among other things, looks at the dependent variables as a function of the experimental variable, Harm. This line of analysis is represented in th subsequent discussion. A later, follow-up analysis strongly suggested that these significant effects were in fact not due to the manipulation of Harm, but rather to the subjects' notions of how brutally the stepfather beat his boy. A section in the Discussion chapter entitled "An Unexpected Finding" details the follow-up analysis which is referred to.

Why did the experimental manipulations relate only to certain variables and not others? I will venture an ad hoc explanation here. The extent of harm incurred was related to three sorts of variables: (1) the force used in striking the child, as perceived by the subjects; (2) variables related to the perceived seriousness of the act or its

consequences (Guilt, Recklessness, Sentence, and Trial); and (3) the type of impression formed of the stepfather (Social Traits and Nonsocial Traits). The first of these, Physical Force, was already explained in terms of a control variable which got "out of control". Later we shall see that this flaw was a blessing in disguise.

It would seem that the trial recommendation judgments, ratings of recklessness and guilt and the sentence length are reflections of the perceived seriousness. The more serious the act, the greater the likelihood that a trial would be recommended and the harsher the judgments. This reflects a tendency to judge by consequences and not by the antecedents of the act.

It is surprising to us that the extent of harm to the boy did not influence judgments of motivation. Logically, of course, the consequences of an act do not directly inform us about the motivation behind the act. I am surprised nonetheless that subjects did not tend to infer greater intentionality with increasing injury. The explanation may lie in the notion that some subjects defensively reacted to protect the stepfather, thinking that it was less likely that he would have wanted to greatly harm his son, while others reacted with more hostility to him, the net effect being that the two types of responses cancelled each other out. This reasoning was tested by looking along different levels of Harm at the variability among subjects regarding

the stepfather's perceived motivation. Contrary to the thinking, there was not significantly greater variability with greater harm to the boy.

The fact that our subjects formed more negative impressions of the stepfather with increasing injury but did not carry this attitude over to judgments of the motivational state of the stepfather appears to have some interesting implications. At first glance this appears to contrdict Jones and Davis' (1965) "Acts to Dispositions" model in which it is postulated that people judge others according to the following three step fashion. First one observes the act from which one infers about temporary states or intentions of the actor. Acts which run counter to the dictates of social desirability or to norms are more likely to lead to inferences than others. The temporary inferred characteristics lead to inferences about the permanent or stable perceived features. Thus the model proceeds from act, through state, to underlying disposition. It is assumed that an intermediate inference is necessary for judgments about stable characteristics: "The assignment of intention...is a precondition for inferences concerning underlying stable characteristics toward which the perceiver passes in attaching significance to action" (Jones & Davis, 1965, p.222).

Our results showed that the motivational variables in question were not affected, but judgments of permanent features were affected when Harm was experimentally varied. This would appear to represent strong counterevidence to the claim that the stage of intermediate inference is necessary; one aspect of the theory appears to have been falsified. But the reader is asked to reach his final conclusion only after reading this report's section on "An unexpected Finding", which, if the reasoning is correct, would weaken the basis of the present argument.

The manipulations of the variable Harmdoer's Attitude Towards Victim (Like/Dislike) tied into the motivational variables and the general impression formed of the harmdoer.

Knowing that a person dislikes another apparently also provides important information about how that person will treat the other. A man who dislikes his son will be perceived as one who doesn't enjoy being with the boy, dislikes conversing with him, and who is not concerned about protecting him from harm and personal injury.

A well-liked person is viewed as an extension of oneself, and all the care and consideration given to one's own development and happiness will normally be viewed as

extending to the liked other. In contrast to this a strongly disliked person is seen as a displeasure and a problem rather than a source of joy. We usually do not wish the best for those we do not get along with and often harbor negative feelings, grudges, resentment, wishes for the other's failure, and the like. If we do not show Schadenfreude--joy at the other's problems and failures--we at least are not upset or bothered by the other's losses. Although there are exceptions to the above statements, people who typically wish harm to those they like and others who show goodwill to those they dislike are a minority. Generally speaking, the above observations are typical of how we perceive and treat others, and perhaps even more typical of how we believe people perceive and treat others.

I should not hesitate to point out the uncomfortable little detail that the motivational variables occasionally correlated moderately with variables such as the trial recommendation judgment, with which it did not show a common experimental effect. I will consider this shortly.

Subjects' Two Heads

How can we account for the results of the experimental manipulations? What processes took place? Is there support for the notion of moral realism?

It appears that we are faced with three distinct types of variables: first, the psychological motivational variables; second, the "seriousness" variables; and third, the two composite variables referring to the type of impression formed (Social Traits and Nonsocial Traits). The mere fact that the motivational and "objective" variables could be experimentally manipulated independently of each other gives support to the idea that a certain degree of moral realism lay behind the judgments. First, when the stepfather was portrayed as disliking his child, this had the effect of leading subjects to infer that he intended to harm the boy. But they did not find the man guiltier, nor did they assign sentences of greater magnitude. In short, the intentionality of the act was not an important factor in the assignment of guilt and of punishment, nor in terms of the tendency to recommend a trial. Conversely, increasing Guilt, Recklessness, and Sentence Length judgments with increased Harm did not lead to differential judgments about the intent behind the childbeating.

It might be illustratively said that subjects behaved as if they had two heads, one for reasoning about psychological aspects and the other for non-psychological, objective matters related to the seriousness or legality of

the act. These heads might be thought of as "moral" and "legal" in nature. Whatever the case, the reasoning in one head (or cognitive domain) does not affect the reasoning in the other. One is reminded of Piaget's accounts of young children who judge the accidental act of breaking a pile of dishes more harshly than the intentional breaking of one dish. Somehow, even though the intent of the acts is perceived, the damage, and not the intentionality, predominates in the judgment of guilt and the punishment.

Models to Account for Trait Interrelationships

There is another way to consider the question of moral realism: from the correlations among the judgment variables. Looking at Table 8, it is clear that the perceived intentionality did not significantly correlate with with the judgments of guilt and responsibility, nor the sentence assigned. The act did not appear to be more nor less legally wrong if it was perceived as intentional. Judgments of intent and responsibility operated independently. Further, suggested sentence lengths were not related to perceived intent.

These are quite striking findings in view of the many substantial correlations among the other combinations of judgment variables. They appear to confirm the analysis

made above that subjects displayed a degree of moral realism.

Now let us consider the impressions formed of the harmdoer. They related to both sets of judgments, moral and legal. The reader will also recall that the variables Social Traits and Nonsocial Traits were influenced by both of the experimental manipulations. What can we learn from this?

Perhaps, as many studies in the area of interpersonal attraction have demonstrated (e.g. Bersheid & Walster, 1972), people form a general impression of the individual which then leads to more specific judgments. This is essentially what I reasoned earlier. By the indirect method of proof, this possibility can be reasonably shown to be false.

First, let us assume that the correlations among the three elements in question--the impression formed of the stepfather, the motivational variables, and the "legal" variables--are explained by the idea that subjects form general impressions first and later derive from them judgments of guilt and responsibility as well as those regarding the actor's motivation. If this is true, then a favorable impression would lead to both judgments of lesser guilt and responsibility as well as of lesser likelihood

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First, let us assume that the correlations among the three elements in question--the impression formed of the stepfather, the motivational variables, and the "legal" variables--are explained by the idea that subjects form general impressions first and later derive from them judgments of guilt and responsibility as well as those regarding the actor's motivation. If this is true, then a favorable impression would lead to both judgments of lesser guilt and responsibility as well as of lesser likelihood

that the stepfather intended to hurt his son, and so forth. But since judgments of guilt and responsibility as well as those of intent derive from the same source (the general impression formed of the stepfather), all of the variables should correlate significantly, which Table 8 shows not to be the case. We thus should reject the assumption that people in our study first formed general impressions of the stepfather and then used them to assess the specific questions of guilt, responsibility, intentionality, and so forth.

A sophisticated variation on the above model can be mentioned. It holds that certain aspects of the general impression are causally related to the judgments of guilt and responsibility while other aspects are related to the judgments of intentionality and the other motivational variables. The model can be tested by relating factor analytic dimensions of the impression formed of the harmdoer to the two sets of variables in question. Since the first dimension was identified as a good-bad dimension I eliminated it from consideration and chose the extreme adjectives falling on the second and third dimensions. A canonical correlation was performed on the two sets of data, from the descriptions which received extreme loadings on Factors II and III (which were not general evaluative factors) and from the rating scales. Results showed indeed

that there is a significant relationship (R=.677, d.f.=195, p<.001) between the two sets of variables (see Table 14). But the sets are not related in the way that was suggested by the above reasoning. It appears that the major source for the relationship is the connection between the Disinterested In Others trait in the set of trait descriptions and the Upset variable in the set of Story 1 judgment variables.

Semantic and Psychological Aspects of Common Sense

The reader may wish to question along with us the assumption that a linear-temporal model is necessary for explaining the judgment processes to which we are referring. The mere fact that, say, how guilty a man is judged to be is related to the general impression formed of him does not imply that one sort of judgment is causally related to the other. It may be that the two sorts of judgments are structurally rather than functionally related; that is, that the correspondence which exists between them may be due to semantic or psychological relations between them.

A semantic relation, in our sense of the term, refers to a correspondence between judgments due to an overlap or closeness in meaning. This appears to be the case in the

relationship between judgments of guilt and responsibility. The words are, logically speaking, virtually the same. An analysis of the meanings would lead one to expect an empirical relation between them.

A psychological relation, on the other hand, is due to a person's imposition of a cognitive set of relations about what sorts of features tend to coincide. In the area of person perception, some authors have referred to such relations collectively as "implicit personality" or "lay personality theories" (e.g., Cronbach, 1954). Accordingly, an individual may make the inference that a certain fat person is likely to be jolly or sloppy or compulsive. Such psychological relationships should be broadened in meaning, however, to extend beyond personality traits, which past orientations have emphasized, and to include whatever sorts of inferences are made on the basis of logically insufficient information. This would include notions regarding how different people behave or would behave in real or imagined situations, why they would behave in such ways, (that is, their immediate motives and intents and emotions), and how they would interpret those situations. Garfinkel and Mendlovitz (1967, p.106) illustrate this in their analysis of courtroom jurors' decision-making:

> Jurors...decide the "facts", that is, among alternative claims about speeds of travel or extent of injury, jurors decide which may be correctly used as the basis

> for further inferences and action. They do this by consulting the consistency of alternative claims with common sense models. These common sense models are models jurors use to depict, for example, what culturally known types of persons drive in what culturally known types of ways at what typical speeds at what types of intersections for what typical motives.

Let us just add the comment that these common sense models vary from one cultural group to another and from individual to individual.

The distinction between semantic and psychological relations was introduced to facilitate discussion concerning the necessity of a temporal model of social judgment. The data are consistent with the idea that subjects' did not reason according to a discrete and consistent set of sequential stages such that, for example, first a general impression is formed, after which a judgment of guilt is made. Perhaps the reasoning does not proceed from point A (initial observations), through intermediate inferences, to point B (final conclusions). Perhaps inferences are made in several cognitive domains simultaneously or at least without a particular order, the resultant relations between domains being due to constraints imposed by the individual because of common sense notions, intuition, feelings, best guesses, or whatever mechanisms he uses to bring the data, his past experience, "knowledge", and his inferences into acceptable consistency.

I am not arguing against the possibility of temporal processes. It is known, for example, that if one first manipulates the general impression formed of another person, it is possible to causally influence judgments of guilt and assignments of punishment (cf. Landy & Aronson, 1969). What I am saying is that in many cases in our study we know only that some judgments have orderly relations to other judgments. This in no way justifies a causal model for all judgments.

What then are we left with—nothing but a pattern of correlations between judgments? Most of the intercorrelations must be analyzed for what they appear to indicate in terms of pyschological and semantic relations. The patterning of correlations is important, for it indicates the psychological relevance of certain types of judgments to others. More significantly, it shows the lack of psychological relevance of intentionality to judgments of guilt and responsibility, a finding of clear theoretical interest. Moreover, certain statements may be made about linear causality, as I shall show.

Overlap between two judgments or judgment domains may suggest certain things. First, it suggests that one might make predictions about judgments from knowledge regarding an individual's other judgments. Second, if one controls or experimentally manipulates judgments in one domain (or

cognitive region marked out by a set of psychologically related judgment dimensions) they are expected to influence judgments in psychologically related domains. Manipulation of information from one domain should lead to systematic changes in others.

This second point is subject to a very important qualification regarding the "symmetry" of the relationship in question. It is clear that "jolly" and "fat" are for some people psychologically related characteristics, but not in a symmetrical way. Knowledge that a person is fat will lead certain people to the conclusion that the same person is jolly, but the reverse inference is not likely. Knowing that a person is in a national honor society for engineers may well lead to a conclusion that the individual is intelligent, but the opposite is unlikely. A similar relation of asymmetry holds between the following pairs: "exconvict" and "dishonest"; "astronaut" and "pilot"; "very old person" and "weak person"; "Puerto Rican" and "poor person". The examples need not be restricted to traits and social roles. Consider the psychological relations associated with the following: "having just had a root canal treatment without a sedative" and "feeling sore in the mouth"; "being mocked in public before friends" and "feeling upset and humiliated"; "receiving a compliment from an admired writer in one's profession" and "feelings of pride";

being angry and slapping one's child; having pimples and feelings of awkwardness; jealously insulting another wrongly and attempts to maintain face. The list could go on almost indefinitely. Although it is easy to rattle off pairs of closely associated features, the field of psychology would benefit from an explicit attempt to articulate the content, structure, and functions of common sense among lay people.

Asymmetry may be described from the standpoint of the relative likelihood that a given individual will be a member of a category. The more specific the category, the fewer the members it contains. There are fewer exconvicts than dishonest people. The relation is depicted roughly in Diagram 1, which is a variation on Venn diagrams used in the analysis of logical arguments. The essential departure from traditional Venn diagrams consists in depicting the subjective probability that an individual falls within a set by varying the size of the set: the larger the set, the greater the likelihood that an individual belongs in it, as opposed to other, smaller sets. This modification allows us to portray logically necessary or deductive inferences as well as logically reasonable or probable inferences, which are usually termed "inductive". Normally, logically necessary inferences, which are represented by the nesting of one set totally within another, pertain to logical or semantic relationships. Thus there is the logically

necessary inference that a schoolboy is a human being. Philosophers would term the statement "analytic" since a simple analysis of the meaning of the terms is sufficient to verify or falsify the statement. When the reasoning behind an analytic statement is made explicit, it may properly be described as deductive.

There are cases in which psychological relations are necessary. This would include cases in which there is a simple recognition of a synthetic truth (as expressed, for example, in the statement, "All Catholic priests are men") or where there is rigidity or overgeneralization due to a simplistic cognitive structure (expressed, for example, in the statement, "You can't trust any people with slanted eyes," which is to say, "'People with slanted eyes' are not in the class of 'people you can trust'"). In the above instances, "necessary" is used to mean "necessary from the point of view of a person employing such and such a cognitive structure".

Going back to the first diagram, it can be seen that there are relatively many dishonest people compared to the number of exconvicts. The great majority of exconvicts lie within the set of dishonest people, which is consistent with the notion that an exconvict will tend to be perceived as dishonest. On the other hand, most dishonest people are not exconvicts, so dishonesty does not lead to inferences about

being an exconvict or not. Of course, as other factors enter into the picture, the situation becomes more complex.

A word of caution. The diagrams I have been using do not provide solutions to questions of psychological inference; they simply allow one to visually depict relations which are already in some sense understood. Their usefulness lies in terms of the clarity with which they allow us to illustrate the asymmetry of inferences. They allow us to consider relationships between any types of information, not just personality traits. Whatever types of information individuals use to make common sense judgments of others or of situations might be included.

Diagram 2 portrays a relationship which is semantic and asymmetric. An extremely withdrawn and isolated person is in many people's view psychologically maladjusted by defini tion. The relationship shown in the diagram is due in this case to the conceptual overlap of one notion (being extremely withdrawn and isolated) with another (psychological maladjustment). There is a certain lack of differentiation between the two features. It is not that people simply recognize that extremely isolated and withdrawn individuals tend to be have psychological problems (a point of view I do not entertain here); it is that being isolated and withdrawn <u>means</u> being maladjusted.

Now let's change the example, using "homosexuality" as the more specific feature. It is clear that some people consider homosexuality as a type of problem, in which case the relationship between "homosexuality" and "psychological adjustment" is semantic. On the other hand, some people see homosexuality as a lifestyle which happens to be associated with maladjustment, not because it is a mental disease or example of maladjustment, but because it is related to psychological problems, most likely because of our society's ways of viewing and dealing with it.

I am suggesting that we ought to pay attention to the semantical/psychological distinction in our models of common sense and also use this in interpreting research results. A correlation does not allow us to assess the basis of an emprirical relationship between two cognitive categories or classifications. If we bear this in mind, we will be less likely to make mistakes from treating semantic relationships as if they were psychological and vice-versa.

In a series of early studies in social perception, Asch (1946) made a distinction between "central" and "peripheral" traits to convey the notion that some characteristics such as "warm" or "cold", when applied to a person's personality, led to many inferences, while others, such as "polite" or "blunt", led to relatively few or weak inferences about the other. The former, salient traits were termed "central" and

the latter, less important traits "peripheral". A person familiar with the research might be tempted to conclude that Asch's findings contradict what I have been saying about asymmetrical relationships, for the following reason: Asch found that general trait words led his subjects to make inferences about more specific aspects of a stimulus person's personality; our argument was that specific characteristics or information (e.g. Charles drinks a lot, is a heavy drinker) lead to more general conclusions (Charles is neurotic).

There is really no contradiction. Asch's "central" traits refer to logical or semantic relationships and our example to psychological relationships. (It is recognized that some people may define heavy drinkers as neurotics, and thus for these people our example is semantic in nature. Although it may often be difficult in practice to distinguish between semantic and psychological relations, the distinction appears to be important.) Further, the traits which Asch used were complex concepts. I shall show how these features make a difference. Take the example of the term "warm". "Warm" actually means "tends to smile rather than frown", "tends to be friendly, sociable", and so forth. It conveys much information about another person. The inferences that Asch's subjects made were not, strictly speaking, psychological, because they did not go beyond the

information given by the word "warm". Their judgments were merely elaborations of the meaning of the term. His study could thus not properly be termed a study of social perception. It was instead a study of word meaning. It would appear that virtually all of the factor analytic work in social perception during the 1960's suffers from the same error. Starting from vague or very global information about fictitious individuals removed from particular settings will apparently lead to little beyond the trivial (cf. Hulaik, 1964).

I have admittedly oversimplified the processes involved in perceiving and understanding others. Our heads do not contain two-by-two tables or matrices, of course, and much of the time we undoubtedly do not work at the level of individual relationships between two bits of information. Social judgment and reasoning often involves, instead, arriving at inferences in the midst of different sources of and types of information--sorting out information and impressions, disregarding some parts, emphasizing others; resolving or ignoring apparent conflicts; reconstructing events; guessing, hunching, drawing "reasonable" conclusions, and so forth. Such reasoning normally takes place in a social situation where social pressures, expectations, implicit understandings about such judgments, social hierarchy structures, norms, rules, tendencies to

gossip or defame, notions of what is appropriate or fair to the individual--in short, social influence--act upon the individual. These pressures act upon him in such a way that he will not be clearly aware of the extent or particular source of many such pressures. He will also perceive and reach conclusions in conjunction with his own set of needs (to appear untainted, important, intelligent, humorous, insightful, tolerant, or pathetic, for example), his momentary concerns (expressing jealousy, obtaining recognition from a friend, getting the matter out of his head, repaying a favor, ingratiating another, etc.), and his response to the social pressures (psychological reactance, overconcern, direct incorporation of suggestions).

For these reasons the question can be legitimately raised as to how consistent the relationships are that I have been talking about. How stable are people's common sense notions about others? How useful is it to speak of the relationship, for example, between judgments of guilt and of intentionality in view of the fact that people may act defensive, excited, stubborn, conveniently forgetful, inconsiderate, or overly polite in judging others? What about the rich diversity in social reasoning among different groups in our society, men and women, young and old, conservative and liberal, and those with different social roles, personal beliefs, cognitive styles, and levels of education?

No doubt there are important systematic ways in which factors such as those mentioned above affect the structure of social judgments. I believe that these sorts of considerations, certainly important, may be usefully pursued in future studies and theorization. In the meantime we should note that the present study can only consider a few questions at a time, and under conditions which hold most of the above mentioned important factors constant. Nonetheless, if we understand what those "constants" are, perhaps we can learn something new about social judgment.

What is the relevance of the present discussion to our study? I argued that a linear temporal model for social judgment was not necessary to account for many of the intercorrelations. They could be reasonably accounted for in terms of common sense structures. The relationships in such structures are sometimes asymmetrical, with the result that providing or manipulating information regarding one element in a relationship leads to an inference which reflects the asymmetry: inferring B from A will not be as likely or certain as inferring A from B. Our analysis leads to the conclusions that, first, one needs an independent measure of asymmetry; second, that a correlation coefficient may not be the best measure to depict such relations (since it is based on the assumption of equal variances); and third, we need more theorization about the structure of

common sense reasoning. It also suggests that some of the correlations may be due to overlap in meaning between certain judgment variables rather than functional relationships. In the present study this probably accounts for the relationship between Guilt and Responsibility. Perhaps the closeness in meaning accounts for their close empirical relationship (r=.569). Despite this relation, they were significantly distinct to allow for distinct relationships to the experimental variable, Harm (Table 4).

An Unexpected Finding

In the first story a curvilinear relationship was found between the extent of harm the boy received and judgments of the force used by the stepfather in the act of beating (F=6.68; d.f.=2, 179; p<.002). The act was seen as more violent when the son ended up with two broken ribs than in the high harm condition, which in turn was significantly higher than the low harm condition. I had tried to control for variation along this dimension by providing a rather carefully worded account of the beating which was corroborated by the neighbor's testimony. The fact that these measures were not enough may be partially explained by the notion that subjects inferred that a great deal of force would be needed in order to actually break the boy's two ribs. Let us also point out here that I did not subject

the variable in question, Physical Force, to the rigorous analyses that the experimental variables received. That is because it was treated as something to be controlled rather than an essential part of our inquiry. It was thus left out of the correlational analyses and factor analyses. We only decided to explore its relation to the experimental findings when certain anomalies turned up. Those anomalies were the following four variables: Recklessness, Guilt, Social Traits, and Nonsocial Traits. Each of these was significantly affected by the Harm variable, but had approximately the same mean level under the Moderate and Severe Harm conditions.

In an early draft of my results, I reasoned that the two phenomena (the problem with Physical Force and the non-linear effects with the four dependent variables) might be related. Thus the extent of harm or injury might have affected those same four variables over all three levels had we controlled the perceived force or brutality of the act. The idea was that the perceived brutality might have counteracted the influence of the variable Harm, with the resultant non-linear effect on the four variables. The greater brutality of the act in the moderate harm condition would increase judgments of guilt and recklessness, for example. In the high harm condition even though there was greater injury, the act would be seen as less brutal.

Our reasoning led us to assert that two sorts of moral realism processes might be operative, the first based strictly upon damage and the second upon damage as well as the brutality of the act. I suggested partialling out the contribution of the variable Physical Force from the effect of the variable Harm. If my hunch was correct, I thought, we would see a cleaner, that is, linear, relationship between Harm and the four above mentioned variables, but no such change for the variables Sentence and Trial, which were linearly related to Harm.

An analysis of covariance was performed on each of the variables affected by Harm, using Physical Force as the control variable. The results are presented in Table 13.

The results show that my predictions were far too modest. The perceived brutality of the beating (how much force the father apparently used) was not simply an extraneous variable that "dirtied up" otherwise clean results. It appears to have been the very source of those results. And what was before taken as the crucial determinant of certain results now appears to be an artifact. Let me explain.

When the variable Physical Force was partialled out of the relationship of the experimental variable, Harm, to Recklessness, Guilt, Social Traits, and Nonsocial Traits,

two important facts emerged. First, it became clear that Physical Force had very substantial relationships with the four dependent variables in question. Subsequent correlational analysis revealed that Physical Force correlated much more strongly with the variables than the experimental variable Harm did (see Table 8). Second, partialling out Physical Force totally eliminated any relationship between Harm and the four variables.

The conclusion to be drawn is that people assessed the recklessness and guilt of the stepfather and formed impressions of him as a result of their perceptions of how much force he used in beating the child.

If the analysis is correct, the nature of the act rather than the consequences of it served as the basis of these judgments. The physical effects upon the child appear not to be very important, as I supposed earlier in this report. Rather, what appear to count are the subject's notions regarding the physical aggressivity of the father. This reconceptualization is fundamental because it entails shifting from an analysis in terms of "moral realism" in which people are judged by the consequences of their actions, to one based upon the nature of the father's act as envisioned by the subjects.

What then happened with respect to the other two variables, Sentence and Trial? The sentence length appears

to be determined only by the effects upon the child. People occasionally justified their sentences almost as if they were arrived at by some predetermined formula.

This sort of reasoning seems to lie behind the relationship between Harm and Sentence: "If you caused such and such injury, you deserve x." The recommendation that a trial be held seemed to be based on both factors, the brutality of the act and its consequences.

These results suggest that we can not simply speak of subjects as morally realistic, or psychologically-oriented or not. Such generalizations do not do justice to the data. It appears that the kind of processes which come into play depend to some degree on the kind of judgments one is talking about. When referring to sentence length, moral realism seems to predominate. When it comes to judgments about the nature of the act or the actor, people will attempt to base their judgments on their understandings of what took place (in our study, on their understandings of the brutality of the act). When it comes to questions of intent, subjects appear to be moved by information related to the actor's general attitude of acceptance or rejection toward the victim.

Stated in this manner, the results might appear obvious. But I must admit that I did not anticipate them.

And I know of no research which suggests that subjects, in making moral appraisals of others, will selectively attend to information depending upon the nature of the judgment being made. Perhaps my concentration upon the judging individual has led me to overlook how the nature of the task determines the information considered relevant to its solution. Perhaps, on the other hand, the present results are not typical. Maybe the legal-type setting predisposed individuals to being more rational about their task than people quickly passing judgment over others normally would be. I do not know.

The Planecrash Story and the Question of Generalizability

The second story was included to allow for an examination of the continuity of the experimental effects across conditions thought to be sufficiently different from the original ones to constitute an initial test of external validity (in this case with emphasis upon variation across the domain of evidence or stories) which at the same time would be sufficiently comparable to the original conditions in its essential features.

The significant experimental effects for story two were fewer in number and weaker in significance levels than those in the first story. Whereas thirteen experimental effects were significant in the childbeating story, only six were significant in the planecrash story. Further, seven of the

effects in the former case were significant at the .003 level or better as compared to only one beyond the .02 level in the latter (Tables 5 and 6).

Looking now at the interrelations, one sees that the structural relationships reflected in the correlations are more numerous in the second story, with 35 at the .01 level as compared to 26 in the first story.

Table 9 also shows that in the planecrash story, judgments of Intent, Guilt, and Responsibility were related, that is, not made independently. What happens to my previous assessment, in which the dimensions were independent? I was puzzled over this finding.

Table 10 shows the factor structure for the judgment variables in the two stories. In both stories the three psychological-motivational variables (Intent1, Intent2, and Upset) remained separate from the "legal" variables; that is, the former occupy different factors from those of the latter. So although the correlations between the psychological and legal variables are significant in the second story, they are small in comparison to the other relationships which exist.

Why were there fewer experimental effects and yet a greater degree of patterning in the responses?

Perhaps, I reasoned, the subjects found the planecrash story harder to evaluate and therefore relied more heavily upon their common sense notions about what sorts of features are related to what other sorts of features. This sort of analysis would be consistent with other research. Koltuv (1962) found, for example, that responses showed higher intercorrelations when people rated strangers than when they rated friends. People seem to impose a preconceived pattern of responses upon their perceptions of others when lacking a solid basis for their evaluations. Likewise, it suggests that in reality traits are not as related as they are in our idealized working models of others' personalities. "Warmth" is related to "intelligence" more in terms of the perceiver's implicit common sense structures than in reality, at least if one can take as a veridical basis judgments of people by friends.

A second source of support comes from D'Andrade (Note 5) who studied trait interrelations based on observations of t-group members' interactions. Judgments of the members on Bales-type items (Bales, 1970) were much more interrelated when given after t-group meetings than during the meetings. The observers' reconstructions of members' characteristics were much more coherent and structured than on-the-scene ratings were.

One might wish to describe this phenomenon in Gestalt terms, saying that there is a tendency toward forming a

simpler Gestalt and for closure when one must rely upon his memory. One is apt to simplify his understanding of a social situation as time passes and to use common sense structures to fill in the gaps due to poor observation or memory loss. These processes result in a more ordered reconstruction than is actually warranted.

One would expect these sorts of processes to occur if subjects had difficulty in making sense out of the planecrash story.

Subjects' uncertainty should be reflected in two other ways: (1) in the variability in responses among subjects; and (2) in ratings of their confidence in determining the mechanic's guilt. I made these two hypotheses explicit before looking at the appropriate data.

The results are consistent with this reasoning. The standard deviations of all of the judgment variables were compared across both stories. Nine of the ten variables showed greater variance in the second story than in the first, and a t-test for the difference between the standard deviations was significant ($t=-3.91$, $d.f.=9$, $p<.005$). As a group, then, subjects showed greater variability about their judgments in the planecrash story than in the childbeating story. The within groups variance was summed for each story and divided by the appropriate degrees of freedom.

Realizing that the total variance is the sum of between-groups and within-groups variances, I decided to eliminate the between-groups variance, which is not relevant to the present hypothesis. An F-ratio comparing the variances ($F=1.18$, $d.f._=1740, 1740$; $p<.01$) showed that within conditions there was greater variance in the planecrash story, roughly 18% more variance. And every variable (of ten) in the planecrash story showed more within-groups variability than the corresponding one in the childbeating story.

Next I calculated a t-test for dependent samples on the variable Confidence. A significant difference ($t=3.44$; $d.f.=179$, $p<.025$) was found. The conclusion is that our subjects found it easier to assign guilt in the childbeating than in the planecrash story.

The question to ask here is why there was less certainty about the second story. Is it easier to judge a more personal story? Was the evidence less conclusive in the planecrash condition? (The mechanic was assigned significantly less Guilt for the harm than the stepfather was ($t=3.57$, $d.f.=178$, $p<.001$).)

The evidence may have been more persuasive in the first story. For one thing, the stepfather's act was one of commission, while the mechanic's was one of omission.

People may require proof of intent when the act concerns omission. This is consistent with the relationship between Intent and Guilt. The mechanic's guilt was related to perceived intent, unlike the first story.

Second, there is an important distinction to be made in terms of types or levels of intentionality. The first story left no question about the father's intent to strike his son, striking being the immediate cause of the son's injury. The question of intent to harm the son is is not clear, however. In story two, the act (of omission) is not clearly portrayed. Did the mechanic wish to leave out the bolt or not? Then if he did, did he wish the man to be killed or just shaken up? It seems that the second question is totally contingent upon the first: if the man intended to leave out the bolt, it is very likely that he intended to kill the victim.

It is recognized that judgments of intent involve three distinct questions: (1) did the agent intend the act, whether of commission or omission; (2) if the answer to the first question is affirmative, did he wish the victim to suffer adverse consequences; and (3) if the answer to the above is affirmative, did he wish the consequences which occurred, or others? In the first story the answer to (1) is clear and affirmative. In the second the answer to (1) is unclear, and hence the issues raised by (2) and (3)

remain more difficult to infer about.

Perhaps the relationship between the two Intent variables (r = .877) is informative here. Subjects clearly did not make a distinction between the intent to harm at all and the intent to harm as much as the victim was harmed. I see a possible explanation for the lack of distinction between the variables. Perhaps subjects saw the harm as "the planecrash", regardless of the amount of injury the victim suffered. If this is true, then one would expect similar judgments of guilt, for example, regardless of whether the man was just shaken up or died; it was only fortune which led to the man's living or dying after the plane crashed. This sort of explanation may account for the weak effects of the Harm manipulation. It suggests that I should have included a control condition, in which, for example, there was no crash at all but only an emergency landing. It is also consistent with the notion that subjects may have had difficulty in dealing with this particular story.

Another possibility is that the subjects were "so incompetent with tools that they didn't feel sure whether the mechanic's act was heinous or only natural" (Schmeidler, Note 6). The idea is that subjects felt uncertain about the ease with which a hexagonal bolt could be left out of a carburetor. Was this a likely mistake for a mechanic? It

was also suggested that it may be easier to judge a case of child abuse since we have all been trained from early childhood to control our use of force when we hit someone, and that, by contrast, our sense of duty regarding the care of technical machines is not so deeply ingrained. Nagowan and Lee (1970) have shown that the familiarity that a child has with a setting influences the level of responding to Piaget-type stories: the less the familiarity with the setting, the lower the level of responding. Perhaps this sort of phenomenon occurred in the planecrash story.

A closer look at the experimental findings in story two reveals some puzzling significant effects. For example, the judgments of guilt were more severe when the defendant liked the victim than when he disliked him. Not only was the mechanic judged guiltier, but also more responsible and reckless (Table 6). Perhaps these results can be clarified with the finding that subjects were more confident of their judgments in the Like condition than in the Dislike condition. It appears that the subjects were more confused by the condition in which the mechanic was publicly known to dislike the man he caused injury to. Can it be that the subjects thought a plane crash would be too obvious a vent to his hatred, that he would have to be a fool to so openly attempt murder? If this were indeed the case, wouldn't the subjects have interpreted the act as a mistake in the

Dislike condition, in which case I would have expected lower ratings of intentionality? The fact that this interpretation is not fully supported leaves me still in doubt about what happened in the second story.

Further questions arise about the Harm variable. Why was the mechanic judged more responsible in the condition where the pilot lost his thumb and forefinger than when he died? Is this due to the general impression formed of the mechanic which shows a close parallel? (The more favorable the impression, the less responsible the man was held.) If so, why are judgments of responsibility not significantly correlated with the favorability of impression formed of the harmdoer? Did the effect arise as the result of a defensive leniency in the condition of extreme harm? I do not know the answer to these questions.

Now let us reconsider the model I set forth earlier in light of the observations made about the second story. I emphasized in the first story the importance of the independence found between the guilt and responsibility ratings on one hand, and judgments about intentionality and motivation on the other. How are we to look at this in view of the contrary results from story two, where the same sets of judgments were related? And what does this mean for what it conveys about the common sense structures which subjects employ? Do the structures simply vary from one occasion to

another? If so, what is their usefulness to us as social scientists if we can not predict when and how such structures vary? Further, are the experimental effects for the two stories contradictory, as they appear to be?

First, let us make a clarification about the relationship between perceived guilt, responsibility, and intentionality. The fact that I found them to be independent in the first story should not lead us to conlude that they are always independent. An illustration will suffice to show this point. If I had unambiguously portrayed the childbeating as malicious and willful, there is little doubt in my mind that people would have responded more harshly toward the father, finding him guiltier. In other words, had I greatly and clearly varied the intent of the father in a few different versions of the childbeating, we could expect a relationship between judgments of intent and guilt. This seems rather clear. Why did this not happen in our first story, where intent was not directly manipulated?

My response considers two factors. I believe that the range of variability along the dimension of intentionality is rather restricted since I did not directly manipulate or clearly depict the intent of the stepfather. Variability in perceived intent was due to differences among subjects in judging the same situation. This variability was not

enough, I feel, to tie into judgments of guilt and responsibility.

The natural response to this is the following: why then was there the observed relationship between guilt, responsibility, and perceived intent in story two? Should I simply cite the evidence that there was more variability of perceived intent in the second story? This would not really be fair or consistent with my former argument that the same variability was due to uncertainty regarding the story. With such uncertainty, subjects relied more upon idealized common sense structures for arriving at their judgments.

There are, I suggest, two ways in which highly structured interrelationships are expected to emerge in judgments: (1) if a high degree of uncertainty is present in the stories; and (2) if a high degree of variation is presented in different versions of the "evidence". The former case would refer to structures due to correlations across individuals, whereas the latter refers to correlations due to variation across stories. If high degree of certainty exists in the latter condition, I would not expect significant intercorrelations among judgments within the same story condition.

At issue in this discussion is the question of the generalizability of results. To what conditions may I

legitimately generalize my findings? If I alter the context of the childbeating story somewhat, what will be the results? Another way of looking at the issue of generalizability is by asking the question, "What story would be a reasonable test for extending the results of the present study?"

Unfortunately, the present data can not furnish a definite answer regarding their own generalizability. In a similar manner, researchers who study the effects of antibiotics on rats may hope to extend their findings to humans, but the ultimate answer to the question comes from empirical inquiry.

This discussion has made me aware of the importance of several factors which distinguished the two stories which I selected:

(1) the familiarity of subjects with the content of the story,

(2) the commission/omission distinction, and

(3) the personal relationship between the harmdoer and the victim.

Subjects showed a tendency to view the stepfather's action as the result of psychological problems or deficiences on his part. The mechanic, on the other hand, tended to be described as incompetent. There is the distinct possibility that individuals showed 'two heads' in

the childbeating story as a result of the inherent irrationality of the stepfather's action. Perhaps at some level they felt a certain legitimacy in evaluating his psychological functioning apart from his legal culpability. This tendency may disappear for judgments about apparently normal individuals, for whom legal and psychological criteria are rightfully more interwoven.

It was also pointed out that there are two important levels at which one may ask questions or convey information regarding intent to harm. First, one may discuss intent to commit the action which caused the harm in question. Second, one may discuss intent with respect to the consequences of the same act. It would appear wise to consider this distinction in preparing future stories of harmdoing so as to prevent oneself from attempting to study the same phenomenon under conditions which are different in an important way.

The suggestion which follows from this line of reasoning is that future reseach clarify the nature of the differences between our two stories by either:

(1) controlling variables such as those mentioned, or

(2) manipulating them through different versions of stories.

Future inquiry will probably require the use of more stories, that is, more evidence conditions, but the

investment in time and energy may well be compensated for by gains in our understanding of the structure and function of moral judgments. As I shall show in the following section, future research should also take into account the differences among subjects. For example some people make an effort to be consistent in their criteria for moral judgment while others do not.

Subjects' Open-Ended Responses

Some of the justifications for assignment of prison sentences reflect an outlook based totally upon the harm done and the agent's causal role in it:

> (1) He took a human life--regardless of wether (sic) by accident or what.
>
> (2) I didn't recommend life because it was in a fit of anger. (Subject 74; High Harm, Favorable Attitude Toward Victim Condition; sentence recommended = 10 years)
>
> A father or stepfather should be responsible enough to know not to hit a small child that severely. It might have been accidental but it really shouldn't have occurred. (Subject 164; High Harm, Disfavorable Attitude Toward Victim Condition; sentence recommended 2-5 yrs.)

Responses which stressed the harm per se were classified accordingly by two judges (see Table 16). Forty-one (20%) of the subjects evidenced this sort of

reasoning in the first story and forty-one in the second story. The percentages do not sum to 100 because the categories were not mutually exclusive.

Another content category involved the intentionality of the act. If a subject referred to the act as intentional or not intentional (a mistake, negligence, unintended, etc.) the response was considered to reflect the Intent criterion. However, if a subject mentioned intentionality but discounted it, his response was not classified as based on intent. Results showed that in the childbeating story 61 (33.9%) of the subjects' responses fell into this category, as compared to 96 (53.3%) for the second story. in the second story.

The third category of responses pertains to punishment justifications based upon presumed effects that the punishment would have on the agent. In such cases, punishment was to teach the man to control himself, to teach him to think before hitting, to teach him to realize or know better, to remind him, to let him know how crimes are dealt with in our society, and so forth.

Occasionally the word "teach" is a cover word for less desirable motivations on the part of the subject who is sentencing. We all know that the phrase, "I'll teach you not to do that!" expresses more than a person's desire to impart knowledge or skills to the ignorant. In such cases

the justification appears to be more retributivist than utilitarian in nature. In the everyday language of our subjects, sorting out the subtle connotations of their language is a difficult task. I contented myself with a recognition of the problem. Whenever a subject referred to "teaching" the agent, I took the response to indicate that the punishment was intended to change the agent. Fifty eight responses (32.2%) received this classification in the childbeating story as compared to 14 (7.8%) in the second story.

An interesting though infrequent justification for sentencing was the idea that the harmdoer should be punished for his stupidity: "15 year (sic) I think would be enough time to eat (sic) at Mr. Promlan for being so stupid" (subject 11, Low harm, Favorable Attitude Toward Victim, Sentence recommended = 15 years). Subjects such as the above seemed to be indignant at the mere thought that someone could not or did not know better. Only one subject gave such a response in the first story and only one subject in the second story.

Sometimes subjects justified their assignments of punishment by considering a larger context than the act itself or the individual agent. They may have referred to the effects of the punishment on the agent's family or expressed concern that the agent had suffered enough

already. Others raised questions about what would happen in our society if the agent (and others like him) were punished or went unpunished. The common thread to such classifications was the view that more than the act and the harmdoer had to be considered in order to render a fair judgment. Thirteen responses (7.2%) involved this justification in the first story compared to six (3.3%) in the second.

Table 16 displays the results for our coding of sentence justifications. A Chi-square for the table is not significant (Chi-square=2.25, d.f.=7, n.s.).

The first two judges agreed 68% and 56% of the time on responses for the childbeating and planecrash stories, respectively. A third judge rated the responses independently of the first two judges, that is, without seeing their judgments. Classifications for which there was total disagreement were eliminated. Ninely-two per cent of the responses in the first story and 96.7% of those in the second story entailed agreement between at least two judges. One hundred and twenty two (69.7%) of the responses were coded similarly by all three of the judges in the childbeating story. Ninety nine (56.9%) of the planecrash codings were agreed upon by the three judges.

The same coding allowed me to look at the subjects' consistency across stories in terms of the criteria they

appealed to in order to justify their sentences. I took subjects' responses to be consistent if a criterion appealed to in the first story was appealed to in the second. Of the 123 subjects who gave codable responses for the first and second stories, 51 (or 41.5%) used a similar criterion in each story. It would be interesting to know whether the large degree of inconsistency is due to differences in the stories or to an arbitrariness in the way criteria are chosen and applied. After reading subjects' responses, my hunch is that they were not able to clearly express the reasons behind their reasoning. Most people referred to one feature alone as though it, and nothing else, had determined their sentence assignments.

Many of our subjects' verbal responses were not clearly articulated. This phenomenon was sometimes seen in apparent conflicts between sentence justifications in the first and second stories for the same subjects:

> I feel he is not guilty. He was in total responsibility of the boy, but most parents have bad days and come home to hear a defiant son isn't to (sic) pleasant. I don't think he intended any real harm to the boy. (Subject 29; Low Harm, Favorable Attitude Toward Victim Condition, Sentence = 0 years)

Compare the above with the same subject's response to the planecrash story:

> I feel that Scott is guilty, whether it was accidental or intentional. If you have a job that involves the lives of other human beings, you should be

> conscientious about your job and do it right. 5 yrs. is a sufficient length to serve to show Scott the consequences of intentional endeavor or that human error can sometimes end up in punishment. (Sentence recommended = 5 years)

In the childbeating story, appeal is made to the apparent lack of intent in order to justify the sentence. In the other story, the same criterion is discounted. There are hints that there might be excusing conditions or extenuating circumstances in the childbeating story, but why such considerations would not apply to the planecrash story is left unclear. I suspect that subjects reach a decision and then attempt to justify it rather than beginning with known criteria and moving toward a solution. Garfinkel and Mendlovitz (1967) arrived at a similar idea in their study of jurors' deliberations. They questioned jurors after actual courtroom trials and concluded that "the person defines retrospectively the decisions that have been made" (p. 114). In the same study, jurors idealized their decision making, viewing it as derived from the official line and thinking that they knew from the beginning what was expected of them and used this knowledge in selecting a decision.

Concluding Remarks

This study investigated six specific hypotheses regarding the judgment of harmful acts to a victim acts

involving interpersonal injury. Let us now reconsider the original hypotheses and the hypotheses developed in the course of the research.

I should emphasize that my expectations for a general harshness or toughminded-tenderminded dimension were not met. In a loose sense subjects were harsher with increasing harm (Hypothesis 1) and as a function of the harmdoer's Attitude Toward the Victim (Hypothesis 2) in the first story. Subjects also tended to form relatively unfavorable impressions of the stepfather as a function of the harm inflicted on the boy (Hypothesis 3). Although all of these effects were in the direction of our hypotheses, not all of the variables thought to comprise the harshness dimension were implicated in the experimental manipulations.

Locus of Control, Intolerance, and Trustworthiness scales did not relate to judgments despite our efforts to relate them to theoretical or empirical composite variables made from the judgment scales.

The most striking findings of the present study are those which I was not looking for and which emerged after the data were collected. Let us summarize the major findings here:

(1) In the first story there was an independence demonstrated between variables related to the perceived

intent of the harmdoer and his perceived motivation, on the one hand, and those related to the legal aspects and seriousness of the harmful act, on the other. This suggests that our subjects' judgments were to some extent "morally realistic".

(2) In the same story, an anomaly cropped up which made it possible to separate the perceived brutality of the childbeating (the perceived amoung of physical force) from the harm per se done to the child. It appears that judgments of recklessness and guilt as well as the impression formed of the stepfather on social and nonsocial traits were determined by the perceived brutality but to a very little extent (if at all) by the harm per se. Recommendations that a trial be held were related to both the perceived brutality and the harm per se. Finally, the sentence lengths assigned were a function of the harm done irrespective of the perceived amount of physical force involved. The conclusion is that individual subjects use different criteria to evaluate acts depending upon the nature of the judgment in question. Characterizations of the individuals as "morally realistic" or "psychologically oriented" do not do justice to the manner by which they judge acts of harm. Sentence length stood out as the only variable that appeared to be "morally realistically" determined. It should be

remembered that less than one half of the subjects assigned any punishment at all when given the choice. Thus this conclusion applies only to those who gave prison sentence recommendations.

(3) Effects were fewer in number and weaker in the planecrash story, despite the fact that there was a greater number of significant interrelationships among judgment variables in that story as compared to the childbeating story. I reasoned that subjects may have found the story more difficult to assess and that they relied therefore upon implicit common sense theories regarding trait co-occurrences. The reasoning was confirmed in subjects' ratings of confidence regarding the assignment of guilt, in a greater overall variability in responding to the judgment variables in the planecrash story, and in greater within groups variability in the same story.

(4) Content coding of subjects' justifications for assigning punishments showed that there is a great diversity among individuals in what they view as legitimate reasons for punishment. Future studies perhaps ought to classify subjects into qualitatively different groups before performing statistical analyses.

Table 1

Comparison between Heider's Forms of Psychological Responsibility and Legal Notions of Liability and Responsibility

Heider	Legal	Relevant Questions
Association	vicarious liability collective liability role responsibility (Hart, 1968, p. 212)	Does the agent's role make him accountable for the damage done?
Commission	strict liability causal responsibility (Hart, 1968, p. 214)	Did the person commit the act which caused harm?
Foreseeability	negligence	Did the agent fail to take reasonable precautions against possible harm?
Intentionality	No general term. Expressed in phrases such as "intent to kill", "intent to do bodily harm", "conspiracy", etc.	Did the agent will the consequences in question? Was there a *mens rea*, that is, knowledge and foresight?
Freedom of the agent to choose[a]	capacity-responsibility (Hart, 1968, p. 227)	Was the agent sane at the time of the act? Did he understand what he was doing?

[a] This is really not a type of responsibility but rather a limiting condition or excusing condition.

Table 2
Overview of Kohlberg's Six Moral Stages (from Kohlberg, 1976)

	Content of Stage		
Level and Stage	What Is Right	Reasons for Doing Right	*Social Perspective of Stage*
LEVEL I—PRECONVENTIONAL **Stage 1—Heteronomous Morality**	To avoid breaking rules backed by punishment, obedience for its own sake, and avoiding physical damage to persons and property.	Avoidance of punishment, and the superior power of authorities.	*Egocentric point of view.* Doesn't consider the interests of others or recognize that they differ from the actor's; doesn't relate two points of view. Actions are considered physically rather than in terms of psychological interests of others. Confusion of authority's perspective with one's own.
Stage 2—Individualism, Instrumental Purpose, and Exchange	Following rules only when it is to someone's immediate interest; acting to meet one's own interests and needs and letting others do the same. Right is also what's fair, what's an equal exchange, a deal, an agreement.	To serve one's own needs or interests in a world where you have to recognize that other people have their interests, too.	*Concrete individualistic perspective.* Aware that everybody has his own interest to pursue and these conflict, so that right is relative (in the concrete individualistic sense).
LEVEL II—CONVENTIONAL **Stage 3—Mutual Interpersonal Expectations, Relationships, and Interpersonal Conformity**	Living up to what is expected by people close to you or what people generally expect of people in your role as son, brother, friend, etc. "Being good" is important and means having good motives, showing concern about others. It also means keeping mutual relationships, such as trust, loyalty, respect and gratitude.	The need to be a good person in your own eyes and those of others. Your caring for others. Belief in the Golden Rule. Desire to maintain rules and authority which support stereotypical good behavior.	*Perspective of the individual in relationships with other individuals.* Aware of shared feelings, agreements, and expectations which take primacy over individual interests. Relates points of view through the concrete Golden Rule, putting yourself in the other guy's shoes. Does not yet consider generalized system perspective.
Stage 4—Social System and Conscience	Fulfilling the actual duties to which you have agreed. Laws are to be upheld except in extreme cases where they conflict with other fixed social duties. Right is also contributing to society, the group, or institution.	To keep the institution going as a whole, to avoid the breakdown in the system "if everyone did it," or the imperative of conscience to meet one's defined obligations (Easily confused with Stage 3 belief in rules and authority; see text.)	*Differentiates societal point of view from interpersonal agreement or motives.* Takes the point of view of the system that defines roles and rules. Considers individual relations in terms of place in the system.
LEVEL III—POST-CONVENTIONAL, or PRINCIPLED **Stage 5—Social Contract or Utility and Individual Rights**	Being aware that people hold a variety of values and opinions, that most values and rules are relative to your group. These relative rules should usually be upheld, however, in the interest of impartiality and because they are the social contract. Some nonrelative values and rights like *life* and *liberty*, however, must be upheld in any society and regardless of majority opinion.	A sense of obligation to law because of one's social contract to make and abide by laws for the welfare of all and for the protection of all people's rights. A feeling of contractual commitment, freely entered upon, to family, friendship, trust, and work obligations. Concern that laws and duties be based on rational calculation of overall utility, "the greatest good for the greatest number."	*Prior-to-society perspective.* Perspective of a rational individual aware of values and rights prior to social attachments and contracts. Integrates perspectives by formal mechanisms of agreement, contract, objective impartiality, and due process. Considers moral and legal points of view; recognizes that they sometimes conflict and finds it difficult to integrate them.
Stage 6—Universal Ethical Principles	Following self-chosen ethical principles. Particular laws or social agreements are usually valid because they rest on such principles. When laws violate these principles, one acts in accordance with the principle. Principles are universal principles of justice: the equality of human rights and respect for the dignity of human beings as individual persons.	The belief as a rational person in the validity of universal moral principles, and a sense of personal commitment to them.	*Perspective of a moral point of view* from which social arrangements derive. Perspective is that of any rational individual recognizing the nature of morality or the fact that persons are ends in themselves and must be treated as such.

Table 3

Means and Standard Deviations of Main Dependent Variables in Each Story

	Childbeating Story		Planecrash Story		Diff. of Means[b]	
Variable[a]	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	t	p
Reckless	4.97	1.14	4.77	1.21	1.16	n.s.
Intent 1	4.63	1.53	4.25	1.68	2.24	n.s.
Intent 2	4.17	1.68	4.04	1.80	.71	n.s.
Responsible	5.21	1.16	4.92	1.28	2.25	n.s.
Upset	4.59	1.37	3.27	1.55	10.09	<.001
Guilt	4.89	1.42	4.39	1.46	3.73	<.01
Confidence	4.71	1.39	4.29	1.54	3.44	<.025
Social	4.07	.48	4.08	.55	- .21	n.s.
Nonsocial	3.62	.71	3.84	.71	-54.02	<.001
Sentence (log of)	.064	.54	.189	.50	- .18	n.s.
Force Used	5.15	.90				
Temper	5.62	.71				
Clear 1	3.65	1.57				
Clear 2	3.34	1.60				

Note. Each of the means is taken from a 6-point scale, with the exception of the variables Social, Nonsocial (7-point) and Sentence (continuous positive number scale). Operationalizations of most variable found in Appendix A.

[a]The last four variables apply only to the childbeating story.

[b]df = 179. T-test for correlated means used.

Table 4

Experimental Effects for the Childbeating Story due to Amount of Harm and Stepfather's Attitude Toward Boy

	Harm[a]		Attitude[b]	
Variable	F	p	F	p
Trial	3.11	<.001	3.23	n.s.
Hard	6.68	<.002	1.53	n.s.
Recklessness	4.13	<.017	.99	n.s.
Guilt	3.25	<.040	.23	n.s.
Sentence[c]	15.48	<.001	2.68	n.s.
Social	3.52	<.031	16.60	<.001
Nonsocial	4.03	<.019	5.21	<.022
Intent 1	.30	n.s.	6.31	<.012
Intent 2	1.13	n.s.	8.99	<.003
Upset	1.03	n.s.	17.31	<.001
Temper	.55	n.s.	8.29	<.005
Responsibility	1.26	n.s.	.94	n.s.
Confidence	.15	n.s.	0	n.s.
Clear 1	.22	n.s.	.10	n.s.
Clear 2	.68	n.s.	.35	n.s.

[a]Df = 2, 179.

[b]Df = 1, 179.

[c]Log of sentence lenth used due to high degree of skewness.

Table 5

Cell Mean Breakdown for Variables Significantly Affected by Harm or by Attitude Towards Victim Variables in Childbeating Story

	Amount of Harm		
Variable	Low	Moderate	High
Hard	4.87	5.45	5.13
Recklessness	4.63	5.16	5.11
Guilt	4.51	5.10	5.06
Social	4.20	3.99	4.02
Nonsocial	3.83	3.51	3.53
Sentence (yrs.)	.85	.75	2.24

	Attitude Towards Victim	
	Favorable	Unfavorable
Social	4.21	3.93
Nonsocial	3.74	3.50
Intent 1	4.91	4.35
Intent 2	4.54	3.80
Upset	5.00	4.18
Temper	5.77	5.47

Table 6

Experimental Effects in Planecrash Story due to Amount Of Harm and Mechanic's Attitude Toward Victim

Variable	Harm[a]		Attitude[b]	
	F	p	F	p
Responsibility	4.41	<.013	5.46	<.020
Social	3.56	<.030	1.18	n.s.
Nonsocial	2.80	n.s.	.07	n.s.
Recklessness	2.23	n.s.	5.93	<.015
Guilt	2.35	n.s.	5.71	<.017
Confidence	2.48	n.s.	8.36	<.004
Intent 1	1.35	n.s.	.05	n.s.
Intent 2	2.13	n.s.	.06	n.s.
Upset	.44	n.s.	.59	n.s.
Sentence	.51	n.s.	1.51	n.s.
Trial		n.s.		n.s.

[a]Df = 2, 179.

[b]Df = 1, 179.

Table 7

Cell Mean Breakdown for Variables Significantly Affected by Harm or by Attitude Toward Victim Variables in Planecrash Story

	Amount of Harm		
Variable	Low	Moderate	High
Social	4.05	3.96	4.22
Responsibility	4.79	5.30	4.67

	Attitude Toward Victim	
	Favorable	Unfavorable
Responsibility	5.14	4.70
Recklessness	4.99	4.55
Guilt	4.65	4.13
Confidence	4.61	3.97

Table 9

Intercorrelations among Judgment Variables for Planecrash Story

	Trial	Reckless	Intent 1	Intent 2	Responsible	Upset	Guilt	Confidence	Sentence	Social
Trial										
Reckless	177									
Intent 1	233	172								
Intent 2	267	177	877							
Responsibility	118	471	285	240						
Upset	-262	-119	-472	-502	-118					
Guilt	156	371	369	219	520	-115				
Confidence	269	170	130	067	223	-025	332			
Sentence	335	142	422	449	213	-348	256	198		
Social	-167	-003	-236	-234	-188	382	-176	085	-297	
Nonsocial	-202	-116	130	131	-201	248	-198	073	-182	657

Note. Correlations' signs changed where original correlations would be misleading.

For $|r| > .130$, $p < .05$; $|r| > .193$, $p < .01$; $|r| > .246$, $p < .001$.

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Note. Correlations' signs changed where original correlations would be misleading.

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Table 10

Factor Structure Matrix for Judgment Variables of both Stories

Story	Factor I	II	III	IV
Childbeating				
Trial	-476	080	429	225
Hard	510	-148	488	-043
Reckless	418	-022	555	107
Intent 1	-695	036	-082	123
Intent 2	-634	-029	-102	118
Responsible	231	-006	594	-013
Upset	-494	178	-140	268
Guilty	230	-172	696	112
Confident	130	-154	369	180
Temper	-037	039	305	112
Clear 1	622	-112	259	-018
Clear 2	529	-140	183	113
Sentence	060	-093	215	-057
Planecrash				
Trial	-003	365	-252	-234
Reckless	-009	-179	070	505
Intent 1	-068	851	055	-321
Intent 2	-127	878	034	-234
Responsible	-021	-222	-022	735
Upset	-129	615	-143	-063
Guilty	-135	-284	086	698
Confident	-041	-153	269	426
Sentence	-045	560	123	228

Note. Trial, Intent 1, and Intent 2 were originally coded in a direction contrary to their intuitive meaning

Table 11

Descriptive Statistics for Personality-attitudinal Variables

	Present Study		Prior Studies		
Variable	Mean	S.D.	Mean	S.D.	Sample
Locus of Control					
Men (n = 98)	10.41		8.15	3.88	575 men,
Women (n = 82)	12.34		8.42	4.06	605 women
					Rotter (1966)
Authoritarianism	33.64	6.51	33.3	7.8	109 students from psych. classes (Levinson & Huffman, 1955)
Trustworthiness	39.85	8.09	no norms available		
Intolerance	33.75	8.42	no norms available		

Table 12

Results of Principal Components Analysis with Varimax Rotation on Trait Words in the Childbeating Story

Trait	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3
relaxed	220	035	058
too generous	484	209	073
confident	321	051	300
stubborn	-327	117	430
wasteful	-436	265	350
trusting	600	-069	182
stingy	-421	221	106
modest	322	110	-100
firm	049	-209	380
insincere	-622	324	067
avoids others	-432	403	126
cautious	218	186	033
cultivated	594	135	027
too realistic	353	212	118
gullible	015	422	-066
thrifty	202	367	221
severe	-359	-219	504
frank	190	-089	407
detached from others	-460	291	145
practical	509	182	265
disinterested in oth.	-549	390	051
overly proud	-400	262	150
alert	431	-102	376
bold	-197	-158	542
uncooperative	-614	098	241
tolerant	410	168	-288
overdependent	105	450	-137
conformist	043	247	-062
natural	588	167	170
stupid	-622	168	-068
distrustful	-490	191	040
flexible	372	260	-217
too dominating	-403	-181	028
very uncertain	-494	101	-152
rash	-308	-301	107
generous	528	187	171
steady	474	160	303
careful	471	273	133
overly idealistic	001	291	362
unassertive	039	429	-146
noncommittal	003	230	-125
very submissive	093	450	-277
intelligent	678	-004	227
takes advantage of oth.	-596	176	137
passive	277	427	-143
helpful	555	180	157
indecisive	-122	396	018
choosy	-148	376	125
% of var. acc'ted for	44.9	17.8	14.0 Total 76.7%

Table 13

Results of Covariance Analysis where Variable Hard (or Force) was Partialled out before Assessing the Effects of Harm

Variable	Source of Variation	F	df	p
Trial				
	Hard (covariate)	24.47	3[a]	<.001
	Harm	7.94	2	<.001
Sentence				
	Hard	.88	3	n.s.
	Harm	15.40	2	<.001
Recklessness				
	Hard	71.63	3	<.001
	Harm	1.49	2	n.s.
Guilt				
	Hard	18.96	3	<.001
	Harm	1.55	2	n.s.
Social				
	Hard	30.58	3	<.001
	Harm	1.19	2	n.s.
Nonsocial				
	Hard	24.38	3	<.001
	Harm	1.96	2	n.s.

[a]Three df used for variable Hard since only four discrete values of Hard were employed by subjects.

Table 14

Canonical Correlation Results between Trait Descriptions from Two Factor Analytic Dimensions and Judgments about Childbeating Story

Trait Descriptor	Coefficients for Canonical Variables of First Set
Gullible	-.097
Rash	.293
Avoids Getting Close to Others	.246
Overly Idealistic	.004
Disinterested in Others	.555
Stubborn	.120
Overdependent on Others	-.292
Severe	.269
Unassertive	.005
Frank	-.350
Indecisive	-.074
Bold	-.149
Choosy	-.005
Firm	-.153
Passive	-.148

Variable	Coefficients for Canonical Variables of Second Set
Trial	-.066
Physical Force	.299
Reckless	-.026
Intent to Harm 1	.214
Intent to Harm 2	-.347
Responsibility	.047
Upset	-.574
Guilt	.066
Confidence	-.050
Temper	.058
Clear 1	.176
Clear 2	.029
Sentence (log of)	.211

Note. Canonical correlation = .677, d.f. = 195, $p < .001$.

Table 15

Coding of Subjects' Open-Ended Responses For "Irrationality" and "Incompetency"

Category	Childbeating Story		Planecrash Story	
	N	%[a]	N	%
Irrational/ Needs psychological help	43	23.9	5	2.8
Incompetent/ Not fit	2	1.1	29	8.6
Other Response	129	71.7	143	79.4
No Response	2	1.1	2	1.1

Note. Chi-square = 56.12, d.f. = 4, p .001

[a]Percentages do not sum to 100 because the first two categories are not mutually exclusive.

Table 16
Content Coding of Subjects' Sentence Justifications

Justification for Sentence	Childbeating Story		Planecrash Story	
	N	%[a]	N	%
Harm Per Se	41	22.8	41	22.8
Intended/Mistake	61	33.9	96	53.3
To Change Agent	58	32.2	14	7.8
Agent's Stupidity	1	0.6	1	0.6
Larger Context	13	7.2	6	3.3
Unclear Response	21	11.7	30	16.7
No Response	3	1.7	6	3.3
No agreement among Judges	5	2.8	6	3.3

[a]Percentages do not sum to 100 because some of the categories were not mutually exclusive.

Diagram 1

Asymmetrical Relationship between the Classifications "dishonest person" and "exconvict"



Note. Size of set intended to roughly convey the perceived relative number of elements in the set (or probability of being in a set).

Diagram 2

An Asymmetric Semantic Relationship between two Classifications



Note. The more specific category necessarily implies the more general category.

Appendix A

Transcript Variations Not Presented in Text

In the Method section of this report we presented the Moderate Harm version of the transcript for the childbeating story. Further, we provided the passages to show the differences between the "favorable" and "disfavorable" levels of the Attitude Toward Victim variable. What remains to be presented are those passages which defined the Low and High Harm versions. They are presented here:

Low Harm

On Sept. 9 of this year Joey Fromlan was taken by his stepfather to Belcrest Hospital in Paramus. He arrived at 6:40 P.M. complaining of severe pains in the chest area. Doctors noticed that the boy had recent slight bruises at the stomach and lower chest area. X-rays revealed that there was no damage to his ribs. Doctors concluded that he only suffered superficial bruises. Nonetheless, hospital authorities grew suspicious about the incident from the moment they learned of the nature of the bruises.

High Harm

The reason for thegrand jury investigation is to clarify the events surrounding and leading up to the death of Joey Fromlan, age 10, of Paramus, New Jersey.

On Sept. 9 of this year Joey Fromlan was taken by his stepfather to Belcrest Hospital in Paramus. He was declared "dead on arrival" at 6:40 P.M. An autopsy revealed that he had died of a cardiac arrest or heart failure.

Hospital authorities grew suspicious about the incident when it was learned that the boy had recently received slight bruises about the stomach and lower chest area. They concluded that a physical injury had resulted in damage to the vagus nerve which in turn caused the boy's heart to stop beating.

Minor but critical alterations in the introductory paragraphs to the planecrash story served to convey the idea that the harm to the pilot was low or high in degree.

Low Harm

> On the night of October 15 of this year, a small, single-engine aircraft crashed in a field shortly after take-off from Akron, Ohio's Municipal Airport. As an ambulance team reached the plane, they found it in two sections about 60 feet apart. The owner and pilot, Mr. James Lamont, was found unconscious inside the plane's front section. Attendants successfully resuscitated the victim and quickly removed him from the wreckage. He was taken to a nearby hospital and treated for shock and minor abrasions. On the following day he was released.

High Harm

> On the night of October 15 of this year, a small, single-engine aircraft crashed in a field shortly after take-off from Akron, Ohio's Municipal Airport. As an ambulance team reached the plane, they found it in two sections about 60 feet apart. The owner and pilot, Mr. James Lamont, was found unconscious inside the plane's front section. Attempts were made to resuscitate the victim but they were not successful. He was declared dead at the scene of the crash.

The Unfavorable or Dislike version of the second story contained the following closing remarks:

> It was also learned that Mr. Lamont quite often treated Scott in a cold and rather demanding manner. According to their testimony, Scott outwardly put up with Mr. Lamont's way of behaving, although he felt very negatively about the man and disliked him intensely.

Appendix B

Judgment Scales for both Stories

Following this page are the actual scales used in the present study for the childbeating and planecrash stories, respectively. Below we simply indicate which items or questions correspond to which variables

Childbeating Story

Item/Question	Variable Name
1	Trial
2	(no name)
3	Hard or Force
4	Reckless
5	Intent 1
6	Intent 2
7	Responsible
8	Upset
9	Guilty
10	Confident
11	Sentence
12	(no name)
13	Temper
14	Clear 1
15	Clear 2

Planecrash Story

Item/Question	Variable Name
1	Trial
2	(no name)
3	Reckless
4	Intent 1
5	Intent 2
6	Responsible
7	Upset
8	Guilty
9	Confident
10	Sentence
11	(no name)

Instructions.

Answer the following questions based upon the evidence you just received. Please answer all of the questions even if you don't have all of the information you might want to know.

1. Would you recommend, based on the evidence gathered so far, that Mr. Fromlan be brought to trial? (Circle one)

Yes No

2. Why did Mr. Fromlan strike his son? Explain briefly in your own words.

3. How hard would you say Mr. Fromlan struck Joey?
Circle the number which best expresses your view.
"1" means "very lightly" "6" means "very hard".
Circle any one number from "1" through "6" depending upon your view.

very lightly 1 2 3 4 5 6 extremely hard

4. How reckless was Mr. Fromlan in his action? (Circle one number)

Not at all reckless 1 2 3 4 5 6 Totally reckless

5. How likely is it that Mr. Fromlan intended that his son would be injured as much as he was?

Totally likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 Not at all likely

6. How likely is it that Mr. Fromlan intended that his son would be injured at all?

Totally likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 Not at all likely

7. How responsible is Mr. Fromlan for the fact that his son was injured?

Not at all responsible 1 2 3 4 5 6 Completely responsible

8. How upset or unhappy do you think Mr. Fromlan was about his son's injury?

Not at all upset or unhappy 1 2 3 4 5 6 extremely upset or unhappy

9. How guilty is Mr. Fromlan for the fact that his son was injured?

Not at all guilty 1 2 3 4 5 6 Completely guilty

10. How confident are you about the above rating that you just gave regarding Mr. Fromlan's guilt?

Not at all confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 Very confident

11. Based upon your present understanding of the case, what do you think would be an appropriate sentence for Mr. Fromlan? Please express the sentence length in years, months, and days. (If you feel that he does not deserve punishment his sentence should be 0 years, months, and days.)

suggested sentence length: _____years _____months _____days

12. Explain briefly why you gave the sentence you did. Answer specifically.

13. How likely is it that Mr. Fromlan lost his temper when he struck his son?

Not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 Certain

14. How clear do you think it must have been that some sort of harm would come to the boy when his father hit him as he did?

Not at all clear 1 2 3 4 5 6 totally clear

15. How clear do you think it must have been that the boy would be harmed as he was when his father struck him?

Not at all clear 1 2 3 4 5 6 totally clear

Instructions:

Answer the following questions based upon the evidence you just received. Please answer all of the questions even if you don't have all of the information you might want to know.

1. Would you recommend, based on the evidence gathered so far, that Mr. Scott be brought to trial? (Circle one)

Yes No

2. Why do you think the bolt was missing from the carburetor of the plane's engine? Explain briefly in your own words.

3. How reckless was Mr. Scott in his apparent failure to properly replace the bolt? Circle the number which best expresses your view.
"1" means "Not at all reckless" "6" means "completely reckless"
Circle any one number from "1" through "6" depending upon your view.

Not at all reckless 1 2 3 4 5 6 completely reckless

4. How likely is it that Mr. Scott intended that Mr. Lamont would be injured as much as he was?
Totally likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 Not at all likely

5. How likely is it that Mr. Scott intended that Mr. Lamont would be injured at all?

Totally likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 Not at all likely

6. How responsible is Mr. Scott for the fact that Mr. Lamont was injured?
Not at all responsible 1 2 3 4 5 6 Completely responsible

7. How upset or unhappy do you think Mr. Scott was about Mr. Lamont's injury in the plane crash?
Not at all upset or unhappy 1 2 3 4 5 6 extremely upset or unhappy

8. How guilty is Mr. Scott for the plane crash and injury to Mr. Lamont?

Not at all guilty 1 2 3 4 5 6 completely guilty

9. How confident are you about the above rating that you just gave regarding Mr. Scott's guilt?

Not at all confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 very confident

10. Based upon your present understanding of the case, what do you think would be an appropriate sentence for Mr. Scott? Please express the sentence length in years, months, and days. (If you feel that he does not deserve punishment his sentence should be 0 years, months, and days.)

suggested sentence length: _____years _____months _____days

11. Explain briefly why you gave the sentence you did. Answer specifically.

Appendix C

Trait Adjectives Used in Assessment of Impression Formed of Harmdoer

Instructions: We are interested in knowing here whether jurors can form accurate impressions of persons from testimony of the sort presented to you already. Please rate the suspect on the following descriptions. Look at the example below.

Example: _____ intelligent

The description does not fit him at all.	1	2	3	4 Don't know	5	6	7 The description probably fits him very well.

If you think the word "intelligent" describes the suspect very well, write the number 7 next to the word. If you think the word probably does not describe him at all, write the number 1 next to the word. Feel free to use any of the numbers between 1 and 7 but only use whole numbers, don't use fractions.

You will find that for many of the words, it will be difficult to know for certain just what the suspect is like. Try to form an impression of him based on what you know for certain. Then give your best judgement for each quality. Use intuition or hunches where possible. Work quickly.

_____ relaxed
_____ too generous towards other people
_____ confident
_____ stubborn
_____ wasteful
_____ trusting
_____ stingy
_____ modest
_____ firm
_____ insincere
_____ avoids getting close to others
_____ cautious
_____ cultivated
_____ too realistic
_____ gullible
_____ thrifty
_____ severe
_____ frank
_____ overly detached from others
_____ practical
_____ disinterested in others
_____ overly proud and "above others"
_____ alert
_____ bold
_____ uncooperative
_____ tolerant of others
_____ overdependent on others
_____ conformist
_____ natural
_____ stupid
_____ distrustful of others
_____ flexible
_____ too dominating
_____ very uncertain of himself
_____ rash
_____ generous
_____ steady
_____ careful
_____ overly idealistic
_____ unassertive
_____ noncommittal
_____ very submissive
_____ intelligent
_____ takes advantage of others
_____ passive
_____ helpful
_____ indecisive
_____ choosy

****

Appendix D

Personality-attitudinal Inventory Used in Research

The first 29 items of the "Diverse Attitudes Questionaire" are the Rotter Locus of Control Scale. The Likert scale inventory which follows includes the items which comprise the Authoritarianism (A), Intolerance (I), and Trustworthiness (T) scales. The letters in the left margin, which were not on subjects' questionaires, indicate the scale to which items belong.

DIVERSE ATTITUDES QUESTIONAIRE

This questionaire is designed to find out people's ideas and beliefs about different types of situations. Please answer each question as truthfully as possible.

Remember that different people have different attitudes. There are no right or wrong answers to any of the questions.

For the following part, you will notice that each item has a pair of statements labelled A and B. Please select the one statement of each pair which you more strongly believe to be true.

In some instances you may discover that you believe both statements or neither one. In such cases, select the alternative which is closer to the truth as far as you are concerned.

1. A. Many of the unhappy things in people's lives are partly due to bad luck.
   B. People's misfortunes result from the mistakes they make.

2. A. One of the major reasons why we have wars is because people don't take enough interest in politics.
   B. There will always be wars, no matter how hard people try to prevent them.

3. A. Children get into trouble because their parents punish them too much.
   B. The trouble with most children nowadays is that their parents are too easy with them.

4. A. In the long run people get the respect they deserve in the world.
   B. Unfortunately, an individual's worth often passes unrecognized no matter how hard he tries.

5. A. The idea that teachers are unfair to students is nonsense.
   B. Most students don't realize the extent to which their grades are influenced by accidental happenings.

6. A. Without the right breaks one cannot be an effective leader.
   B. Capable people who fail to become leaders have not taken advantage of their opportunities.

7. A. No matter how hard you try some people just don't like you.
   B. People who can't get others to like them don't understand how to get along with others.

8. A. Heredity plays the major role in determining one's personality.
   B. It is one's experiences in life which determine what one is like.

9. A. I have often found that what is going to happen will happen.
   B. Trusting to fate has never turned out as well for me as making a decision to take a definite course of action.

10. A. In the case of the well prepared student there is rarely if ever such a thing as an unfair test.
    B. Many times exam questions tend to be so unrelated to course work that studying is really useless.

11. A. Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck has little or nothing to do with it.
    B. Getting a good job depends mainly on being in the right place at the right time.

12. A. The average citizen can have an influence in government decisions.
    B. This world is run by a few people in power, and there is not much the little guy can do about it.

13. A. When I make plans, I am almost certain that I can make them work.
B. It is not always wise to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to be a matter of good or bad fortune anyhow.

14. A There are certain people who are just no good.
B. There is some good in everybody.

15. A. In my case getting what I want has little or nothing to do with luck.
B. Many times we might just as well decide what to do by flipping a coin.

16. A. Who gets to be the boss often depends upon who was lucky enough to be in the right place first.
B. Getting people to do the right thing depends upon ability; luck has little or nothing to do with it.

17. A. As far as world affairs are concerned, most of us are the victims of forces we can neither understand nor control.
B. By taking an active part in political and social affairs the people can control world events.

18. A. Most people don't realize the extent to which their lives are controlled by accidental happenings.
B. There really is no such thing as "luck".

19. A. One should always be willing to admit mistakes.
B. It is usually best to cover up one's mistakes.

20. A. It is hard to know whether or not a person really likes you.
B. How many friends you have depends upon how nice a person you are.

21. A. In the long run the bad things that happen to us are balanced by the good ones.
B. Most misfortunes are the result of lack of ability, ignorance, laziness, or all three.

22. A. With enough effort we can whip out political corruption.
B. It is difficult for people to have much control over the things politicians do in office.

23. A. Sometimes I can't understand how teachers arrive at the grades they give.
B. There is a direct connection between how hard I study and the grades I get.

24. A. A good leader expects people to decide for themselves what they should do.
B. A good leader makes it clear to everybody what their jobs are.

25. A. Many times I feel that I have little influence over the things that happen to me.
B. It is impossible for me to believe that chance or luck plays an important role in my life.

26. A. People are lonely because they don't try to be friendly.
B. There's not much use in trying too hard to please people; if they like you, they like you.

27. A. There is too much emphasis on athletics in high school.
B. Team sports are an excellent way to build character.

28. A. What happens to me is my own doing.
B. Sometimes I feel that I don't have enough control over the direction my life is taking.

29. A. Most of the time I can't understand why politicians behave the way they do.
B. In the long run the people are responsible for bad government on a national as well as on a local level.

Instructions for part 2:

Please read each statement carefully. Then indicate how much you agree or disagree with it by circling one number below.

The numbers and their meanings are as follows:

If you agree strongly	circle +3
If you agree somewhat	circle +2
If you agree slightly	circle +1
If you disagree slightly	circle -1
If you disagree somewhat	circle -2
If you disagree strongly	circle -3

T 1. If you give the average person a job to do and leave him to do it, he will finish it successfully.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

A 2. It is important to teach the child as early as possible the manners and morals of his society.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

A 3. Even a well-raised child often has to be told twice to do something.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

I 4. I am in favor of a very strict enforcement of all laws, even if the consequences are very severe.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

I 5. It is too bad that many people still believe in the saying, "An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth."

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

T 6. Most people would cheat on their income tax, if they had a chance.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

A 7. There is hardly anything lower than a person who does not feel a great love, gratitude, and respect for his parents.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

T 8. Most people lead clean, decent lives.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

I 9. Sex-offenders should be treated with expert care and understanding rather than punishment.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

A 10. The saying, "Mother knows best" is very often downright wrong.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

T 11. If you act in good faith with people, almost all of them will reciprocate with fairness toward you.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

A 12. There is a lot of evidence which shows we have to crack down harder on young people to save our moral standards.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

T 13. Most people are not really honest for a desirable reason; they're afraid of getting caught.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

A 14. A child who is unusual in some way should be allowed to be different from other children.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

I 15. I would disapprove of anyone's drinking to the point of intoxication at a party.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

T 16. Most students will tell the instructor when he has made a mistake in adding up their score, even if he had given them more points than they deserved.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

A 17. A child should not be allowed to talk back to his parents, or else he will lose respect for them.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

I 18. The death penalty is barbaric and should be abolished.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

I 19. The trouble with many people is that they don't take things seriously enough.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

T 20. Nowadays people commit a lot of crimes and sins that no one else ever hears about.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

T 21. People claim they have ethical standards regarding honesty and morality, but few people stick to them when the chips are down.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

A 22. It hurts the child in the long run if he is made to go along with most of his parents ideas.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

I 23. People should be willing to overlook failure in manners and unpleasant personal habits in other people.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

T 24. Most people would tell a lie if they could gain by it.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

A 25. A woman whose children are messy or rowdy has failed in her duties as a mother.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

T 26. People usually tell the truth, even when they know they would be better off by lying.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

I 27. Drunks and degenerates who end up in the gutter on skid row deserve their fate because of a lack of moral character.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

A 28. In making family decisions, parents should always take the opinions of the children into account.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

T 29. Most students do not cheat when taking an exam.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

T 30. If you want people to do a job right, you should explain things to them in great detail and supervise them closely.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

A 31. Whatever some educators may say, "Spare the rod and spoil the child" still holds, even in these modern times.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

I 32. People who set high standards for themselves should not require that others reach their standards.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

T 33. Most people are basically honest.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

I 34. There must be something wrong with a person who is lacking in religious feeling.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

T 35. If most people could get into a movie without paying and be sure they were not seen, they would do it.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

A 36. A teenager should be allowed to decide most things for himself or herself.

+3 +2 +1 -1 -2 -3

~~~~~~~~~~

Background information.

Please fill out the following items. Do not include you name.

Social security number _____

Sex: _____female _____male

Age (in years): _____

Marital status: check one only.

____ never married
____ presently I am married
____ divorced or separated but did not remarry.
____ widowed

Children: (if applicable) please list the ages and sex of your children.

Age Sex

Note: ALL information regarding this questionaire will be kept strictly confidential.
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Appendix E

Composite Variables Used to Relate Judgments to Personality Variables

Model 1

The following two composite variables were constructed in order to reduce the large number of judgment variables to two, one for each story. It was reasoned that this might allow us to combine the effect of the judgments so that they could be shown to systematically related to personality-attitudinal variables used in the present study.

The model is termed "rational" because theoretical or rational considerations determined the direction in which judgments would be added in order to form the composite. All variables were normalized before summing.

For Story 1,

Alogic = -Trial + Reckless - Intent1 - Intent2
+ Responsibility - Upset + Guilt + Confidence
+ Temper + Clear1 + Clear2 + Hard.

For Story 2,

(same as above but without last 4 terms)

Model 2

When it was found that the above composites did not significantly correlate with the personality-attitudinal variables, we formed three more composites based upon the empirical linear relationships which emerged in the study.

The Harmsum variable is a composite which weights variables affected by the Harm to Victim manipulation equally and in a like direction. Likesum concerns those variables affected by the Attitude Toward Victim manipulation.

For Story 1,

Harmsum = -Trial +Reckless +Guilt -Social -Nonsocial.

Likesum = -Intent1 -Intent2 -Upset -Temper -Social -Nonsocial.

For Story 2,

Harmsum not computable. Only one linear relationship was found.

Likesum = Guilt + Confidence + Responsibility + Recklessness.

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