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ALBERT C. RITCHIE, A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY

BY

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## Abstract

### ALBERT C. RITCHIE, A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY by

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Ritchie was born in 1876 of upper class Episcopalian parents. His childhood, adolescence, college and law school careers were unexceptional. After an unsuccessful marriage, Ritchie moved into public life in 1910 as People's Counsel for the Public Service Commission and successfully prosecuted a well publicized case against the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company which resulted in the lowering of consumer rates. In 1915 he was elected Attorney General of Maryland in which capacity he organized the State Law Department. In 1918 he took a six month leave of absence to serve as General Counsel of the War Industries Board under Bernard Baruch. In 1919 he was elected Governor of Maryland, and during his first term he directed several administrative reforms including a State Merit System and a Central Purchasing Bureau while lowering the State tax rate. He became the first Governor of Maryland to be reelected by the people in 1923. During his second term he pushed through a comprehensive plan of administrative reorganization. He then moved into a more conservative posture, but was reelected a third time in 1926 and a fourth time in 1930.

Much of his fame, however, came from his outspoken opposition to prohibition to which he had objected as early as the 1920 Democratic National Convention. During his terms as Governor, he managed to successfully oppose legislative passage of a State enforcement act to the national Volstead Act. His opposition to prohibition and to the Ku Klux Klan helped him to form an urban voting bloc of Blacks and immigrants on which his election margins were based. His success as Governor gave him national stature in the Democratic Party and with an unsystematically developed States' rights philosophy he became a contender for the Democratic nomination for the Presidency in 1924 and 1932. After his 1932 attempt at the Presidential nomination was crushed, his failure to deal actively with the problems caused by the depression in Maryland became subject to more open criticism. In 1934 he was defeated in his attempt to win a fifth term as Governor. He died of a stroke a little over a year after his retirement from the Governorship.



## INTRODUCTION

Who was Albert Calvert Ritchie?

The question is not a surprising one. Despite numerous memorials to his name such as Ritchie Coliseum, Ritchie Highway, Ritchie Theatre, and so on, only the most historically interested or politically involved people within the State of Maryland remember the illustrious Governor who was first elected exactly half a century ago. Few of these remember anything of his specific achievements, and among older Maryland citizens, Ritchie's name brings the response, "He certainly was a handsome man." This leads one to the second question: Why should anyone bother to write his biography in 1969?

The answer is that Ritchie was no ordinary Governor. His fifteen years as Maryland's chief executive still represents the longest consecutive term that any man has ever served in any State in the United States. In his first two terms as Governor, Ritchie's leadership was constructive and produced a large number of solid reforms. During the last ten years of his Governorship, Ritchie became a figure of importance in the national Democratic Party. He believed that he would be the Party's nominee for President in 1932, and although it might seem implausible today, there was solid ground for this belief.

Ritchie's prominence becomes more intriguing when one considers his ideology. He is usually labeled a Jeffersonian, but as Jefferson's ideas have meant many things to many men, the label needs clarification. Ritchie feared Federal aggrandizement was destroying the nation. Although it is

difficult to conceive, he thought that the Coolidge and Hoover administrations were hopelessly overcentralized. In many of his speeches, long before the New Deal, he pleaded for a return of powers to the States. Yet if Ritchie was far to the right on this issue, he held ideas that caused him to be labeled a "liberal" by some writers.<sup>1</sup> The nature of his ideology and the results in Maryland, therefore, seem worth study.

This biography concentrates on the political and ideological aspects of Ritchie's life; personal incidents or human interest aspects are seldom to be found, especially after his entry in politics. There is a dual reason for this. Politics was Ritchie's life. Only occasional attendance at an athletic event or a quiet dinner at the State House could allure him from his work. Even these often became semi-political functions. But even if Ritchie's private life had been filled with some moments that would be of interest to the reader, the evidence about them is either non-existent or very shaky. Ritchie did keep a diary, but it is the diary of a carefully fastidious and often stiff man who realized that the public eye was on him. If he was going to violate his own exceptionally high personal standard of ethics, or perhaps some aspect of traditional public morality, he was careful to make sure he was not detected.

The biography also emphasizes some periods of Ritchie's life more heavily than others. These are the result of available materials and my personal judgment as to what was both interesting and important. Sometimes the focus may seem to be out of proper perspective. (For

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<sup>1</sup>. Karl Schriftgeisser, This Was Normalcy (Boston: Little Brown & Company, 1948), pp. 253-4; Dwight L. Dumond, Roosevelt to Roosevelt (New York: Henry Holt, 1937), p. 382.

instance, Ritchie's adolescence is treated very skimpily.) The battle over gas rates in Baltimore City which first lifted Ritchie into public prominence is treated summarily because the available information is that which deals with the technical aspects of the case. Even lawyers would not be too likely to find the matter interesting. Ritchie's term as general counsel for the War Industries Board is also given scantier treatment than it might seem to merit. Once again the technical matters seemed beyond the scope of this work, and they did little to illuminate Ritchie's personality or ideology.

On the other hand, there is considerable emphasis given to the Democratic National Conventions of 1924 and 1932. This is not only because these are likely to absorb the reader's interest, but because they do the most to demonstrate how prominent a national figure Ritchie was.

My original interest in Ritchie was whetted by my father, Albert A. Levin, whose life is a living tie between Ritchie's and mine. In 1924, my father was first appointed to public office by Ritchie as a justice of the peace for Baltimore City. In 1932, he attended the Democratic National Convention in Chicago when Ritchie hoped to be nominated for the presidency. In 1934, the year of Ritchie's defeat for Governor, Herbert O'Connor was elected as Attorney General; he later chose my father as an assistant in the State law department. (He has served since under Attorneys General Walsh, Curran, Hammond, Finan, and Burch.) Several of the men mentioned in this manuscript I met in my home as a boy. Attorney General William Walsh, Senator Millard Tydings, Attorney General (later Governor and Senator) Herbert O'Connor, William Curran, William Broening, "Curly" Byrd, and Daniel Joseph are among the important people I remember meeting.

Both of my parents have helped by their understanding during the long process of carrying on the research and the writing of this biography, and my father had graciously taken from his time as a member of the State law department to read the manuscript and correct factual errors. Flaws in interpretation or evaluation, however, are my own.

I thank also Dr. Dorothy Ganfield Fowler of Hunter College of the City University of New York, who devoted many, many hours to showing me how to make an unreadable manuscript into something tolerable.

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CHAPTER ONE  
AN HEIR OF TRADITION

He was not christened Albert Cabell Ritchie. The "Cabell" was an addition that he made as a young man in college when he became more aware of the prominence of his mother's family tradition. A study of the family background of Albert C. Ritchie is more than barren genealogy because his life was molded by family traditions. His mother's family, the Virginia Cabells, was the more famous of the two. After his father's death in 1904, Ritchie dropped the Junior which had followed his name and used Albert Cabell Ritchie.<sup>1</sup>

Both lines of Ritchie's ancestors were Americans for at least three generations, but the Cabells of Virginia were probably older and were certainly more distinguished. Ritchie's great grandfather, William H. Cabell, was a Virginia statesman. He was born in 1772 in Virginia, attended Hampden Sidney College and William and Mary, and then studied law in Richmond. Then he was admitted to the practice of law in 1794 and was elected to the Virginia Assembly two years later. His service in the Assembly lasted eight years. In March, 1805, he married his second wife, Agnes S. B. Gamble (the sister of the wife of William Wirt), and a month later the new bride became the First Lady of Virginia after her husband had been elected Governor. William Cabell served as Governor until he was elected Judge of the General Court of Virginia in December, 1808. He was elevated to the Virginia Court of Appeals in 1811, and he

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<sup>1</sup>. Ritchie Papers, Maryland Historical Society.

served on that court until his death in 1842. He had been elected President of the court in 1842.<sup>2</sup>

Robert Gamble Cabell, one of several children of the marriage was born on December 11, 1809. He was educated at William and Mary College and the University of Virginia, where he received his M.S. degree in 1833. Robert then studied medicine in both Philadelphia and in Baltimore before returning to Richmond to practice. He established himself as one of the most distinguished physicians in the city and remained actively engaged in practice until his death in 1889. But his career as a doctor did not prevent him from following in the family tradition of public service through politics. Robert Cabell was a member of the Richmond Board of Aldermen and served as chairman of its committee on health. He had married Margaret Sophie Caskie, the daughter of James Caskie, the president of the Bank of Virginia, in January of 1843.<sup>3</sup>

Among their nine children was Elizabeth who was born in 1851.<sup>4</sup> She was considered to be one of the most famous beauties of her day. The biographer of the Cabell family insisted that it would "be a long time before the young people forget her reign...she was the loveliest of the lovely."<sup>5</sup> This was the description of the mother of Albert C. Ritchie.

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2. Alexander Brown, The Cabells & Their Kin (Boston: Houghton Mifflin & Company, 1895), p. 275. William Cabell's first wife was a cousin, Elizabeth Cabell, who died in 1801. They had been married in 1795.

3. Ibid., p. 389.

4. Ibid., p. 394.

5. Ibid., p. 574.

A summary of the Cabell family history shows a desire to serve for the public interest. They had been active in politics when such activity was the pattern for gentlemen. When politics began to seem too vulgar a profession for the socially elite, they had retired into the professions, but kept near to public affairs. Like many "old" families, they placed their emphasis on propriety and not money.

On his father's side, Ritchie's family was comfortable, but not so distinguished. Ritchie's grandfather was an engineer, but he seems to have served in some semi-public capacities in his home town of Frederick, Maryland. His son noted that he was serving as trustee for Barbara Fritchie's estate at the time of his death. His oldest son, John, had become a lawyer in Frederick County and so he tried to persuade his younger son, Albert, to follow him into engineering.<sup>6</sup>

Albert, who had been born in 1834, was possessed by a strong sense of duty, and upon his graduation from Dickinson College in 1853, he followed paternal advice and began a career as an engineer. His jobs involved surveying, but within a year, Albert found engineering intolerable, and he began to read law in the office of Colonel Benjamin Wilson, who was then the prosecuting attorney for Harrison County, Virginia. In 1855, he entered the University of Virginia's Law Department.<sup>7</sup> To confirm this decision, Ritchie visited a phrenologist who described him as having "a very large ambition but not quite full animal developments and to that end as being in danger of overworking himself."<sup>8</sup>

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6. Albert Ritchie, Private Journal, Ritchie Papers.

7. Ibid.

8. Phrenologist's Report, 1856, Ritchie Papers.



The study of law at the University of Virginia before the Civil War was considerably less rigorous than in law schools today. Ritchie, who had already read Blackstone, Kent, and some other legal writers while he was with Colonel Wilson, found the work easy. Moreover, Virginia was a gentleman's school where many students relaxed rather than worked. Of ninety students who were in the department, only a dozen took examinations in June of 1856. Only seven passed; among these was Albert Ritchie.<sup>9</sup>

After his graduation, Ritchie decided to settle in St. Louis, which he expected to become the new metropolis of the central United States. Some of his mother's relatives, the Lacklands, were already living there. In January, 1857, he moved to St. Louis, and within a week, he had opened a law office. Clients came from the day he opened his doors, and within a month he had a prosperous legal practice. However, in September, he received notice that his father was severely ill. He closed his office and returned to Frederick.<sup>10</sup>

Still a most dutiful son, he kept a diary of his father's illness which reads as one of the sentimental novels of the period. John Ritchie, Sr. had been married a second time, and he was concerned about the care of his two young children by his second marriage. He appointed his sons, John and Albert, as their guardians. When his father died on January 16th, 1858, Albert had intended to return to St. Louis. However, he did not see how he could leave and still properly fulfill his function as guardian. He decided to remain temporarily, and then as the guardianship dragged on, he chose permanent residence in Maryland. He moved to Baltimore in 1858 and opened another law office. His practice was soon successful. He

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<sup>9</sup>. Albert Ritchie, Journal, Ritchie Papers.

<sup>10</sup>. Albert Ritchie, Journal, "My Father's Last Illness," Ritchie Papers.

continued his legal work during the entire Civil War but somehow acquired the title, Colonel, by which he was occasionally referred to for the rest of his life.<sup>11</sup>

Albert Ritchie's Journal records only professional matters from 1858 onwards because hard work was the most important aim of his life. No record exists of his first meeting Elizabeth Cabell, who was almost seventeen years younger than he, nor is there evidence of the courtship. They were married in St. Paul's Church in Richmond, Virginia, on October 27, 1875, by which time Albert Ritchie was a leading lawyer in Baltimore.<sup>12</sup>

Politics was not considered a proper career for a gentleman in the 1870's, and Albert Ritchie served one term as City Solicitor from 1872 to 1876 and then devoted himself to private legal practice for over a decade. A highlight of his career came when he was admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of the United States on October 12, 1874, on the motion of Reverdy Johnson.<sup>13</sup> However, service was still an ideal to Ritchie as to other men of his generation; they solved the dilemma by serving on boards of museums, churches, schools and libraries. Ritchie became a member of the Maryland Historical Society in 1882. Later, he gave lectures at the University of Maryland on the Law of Principal and Agent, Co-Partnership and Mercantile Law.<sup>14</sup>

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11. Albert Ritchie, Journal, "My Father's Last Illness," Ritchie Papers.

12. Brown, Cabells & Their Kin, p. 574.

13. Parchment memoranda of admission to Supreme Court practice, Ritchie Papers.

14. Memorial Proceedings for Albert Ritchie (Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, 1905).

In 1887, he served as a delegate to the State Constitutional Convention; in 1888 he was elected a delegate to the Democratic National Convention. He was later elected president of the Baltimore Bar Association. In the same year, Governor Jackson offered him the position of Chief Justice of the Baltimore Supreme Court, but he turned down the offer saying that he could not afford the decline in his income. He became City Counsellor of Baltimore in 1890, and the following year he was selected as Vice-President of the Maryland Historical Society. When Governor Brown offered to appoint him to the Supreme Court of Baltimore in 1892, he reconsidered his previous refusal and finally accepted the offer. He remained on the bench until his death in 1904. He also served as President of the Maryland Historical Society from 1896 until he died.<sup>15</sup>

The main goals of his life remained constant, diligent work and concern for public service. In his industriousness, he differed somewhat from the ordinary gentleman of his times, but in his social life, he retained the aristocratic aloofness of the upper class.

Albert C. Ritchie's career shows the influence of both sides of his family tree. Both families had stressed public service. From his mother's family tradition, Ritchie learned the importance of social propriety while from his father's he learned the value of industriousness.

The very pattern of the life within his home seems to have been a major factor in the mental development of the future statesman. Elizabeth Ritchie imparted an aristocratic tone to the household. She saw her role as one of quiet submission to her husband's whims and scheme of life in addition to making their home dignified and tasteful. Because she was

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<sup>15</sup>. Baltimore Herald, 15 August 1892, clipping in Ritchie Papers.

constantly at home while her husband was busy at work, it is not surprising that young Albert felt a closer attachment to his mother. In many ways she was a great influence on him throughout his life.<sup>16</sup>

Ritchie's home life influenced his career. No word portrait of him was ever without the words, "bourbon," "aristocratic," or some similar adjective. However, the silver spoon of opportunity to which Ritchie was born was one of social exclusiveness and not of wealth. From his father, Ritchie learned the virtue of industry, and that this virtue was its own reward. Wealth, the older Ritchie stressed, should not be the goal of hard work, but its ends should be merely to support a family comfortably. His father also laid emphasis on dedication to social service, although Ritchie traveled further into the political arena than his father ever would have considered doing.

The Ritchies were Episcopalians, as were many of the members of their class. Their religious interest and expression was bland and unemotional. They adhered to strict ethics although they avoided both the extreme repression of vice associated with Puritanism and the solicitous help of the poor associated with the Social Gospel movement. Ritchie remained dedicated to this creed in his insistence on scrupulous personal honesty and financial frugality. Also, he intensely disliked puritanical reformers and had only vague sympathy for equalitarian social reform or welfare projects.

Ritchie learned his aristocratic manners in the home, mainly from his mother. What money the Ritchie's did have was decidedly not conspicuously consumed. The brownstone house into which Albert Ritchie moved his

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16. Louis Azrael, editor of Baltimore News-Post, personal interview with author, Baltimore, Maryland, June 1967.

family after his son was born was plain even by the standards of the day. One can see it today at 1224 St. Paul Street still solid and unadorned. The Ritchies entertained seldom; only once did they take an extended vacation.<sup>17</sup> This is not to say that the Ritchies cloistered themselves from society, but that their entertaining was on a simple, dignified scale. Ritchie learned that a gentleman wears proper clothes, but that these need not be new or expensive and should never be flashy. He learned to listen politely to all and never to be less than calm in any social situation. He discerned that to be refined he should respect good music, art and literature; but like many aristocratic men, his appreciation of the arts remained one of facile propriety. His reading as a young man shows a taste for genteel, sentimental fiction; he never seems to have read any of the literary Naturalists. His own views of the realities of the lives of the poor never developed beyond the fiction he read. On the other hand, Ritchie acquired the upper class sense of noblesse oblige toward the less fortunate.

Ritchie's home stressed the security of the familiar and thus created a distrust if not a fear of that which was too new. It was only a short step from this social conservatism to politically conservative ideas on most issues.

Finally, his home life placed a great emphasis on hospitality and charm. Ritchie learned both of these well, and they served him often as host as the State House in Annapolis.

Young men born in Ritchie's strata were expected to follow a set pattern--private schools, college, a career in law or finance and marriage

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<sup>17</sup>. Albert C. Ritchie, Diary, Ritchie Papers.

to a girl of their class. In this society, manners were more important than independent thinking; any education or experience which led to questioning established pattern of existence was to be avoided. Ritchie did, of course, modify many of the ideas that he learned in his childhood, but he never abandoned any of them completely. What he did change, he altered very slowly. By the end of his career, his almost Edwardian clothes and elegant manners were strangely out of place. His political ideas were equally out of place for the beginnings of the welfare state.

Our specific knowledge of Ritchie's childhood is hazy. The mementos of his youth that his mother saved were some early bits of poetry (verse) and some drawings with colored pencils. One poem, "Sweet Auburn," was made into a rather pretty booklet with illustrations on every page. The poem was merely nonsense verse. It seems that Ritchie was only concerned with his end rhymes and with having something suitable to draw.<sup>18</sup> He wrote a more meaningful poem to commemorate the death of his uncle, Judge John Ritchie. The last two stanzas illustrate the basic sentimentality of the poem.

He looked as though he was asleep  
 But he had gone forever  
 His wife and children mourn and weep  
 As they think on him forever.

Sleep, our noble hero, take thy rest  
 We all will follow soon  
 God knew that it was best  
 To take thee from us so soon.<sup>19</sup>

The same sentimentality shows in the story, "Willie McLeod," which Ritchie wrote sometime in his early adolescence. Willie is a presumed orphan

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18. Albert C. Ritchie, Diary, Ritchie Papers.

19. Ibid.

boy dying of tuberculosis in a New York hospital. The nurse who is treating him is his long-lost mother for whom he has been searching since early childhood. The discovery of consanguinity comes just as poor Willie expires. These bits and pieces of work can hardly create a whole boyhood, but the nature of the content as well as the fact that he chose to express himself in poetry and drawing seem to indicate that Ritchie was a sensitive child.<sup>20</sup>

Ritchie did not, however, think of himself in this way, at least in the public statements which he made about his childhood. He preferred to remember that he liked baseball and had hoped to play professionally some day. Unfortunately, his fielding, outshone his batting abilities which were not up to par. He also remembered the "hard work" he did as a messenger boy in his father's office for which his remuneration was twenty-five cents a week.<sup>21</sup>

When he was sixteen, Ritchie made a reading list of approximately 150 novels. There is no way of telling how many or which of the books he actually read, but the list is indicative of Ritchie's taste. He enjoyed the genteel novels of the time. The names of Wells and Bennett do appear on the list, but most of the other novelists have been forgotten.<sup>22</sup>

At the age of fifteen, Ritchie felt that his allowance of 50¢ a week was insufficient and he decided to publish a newspaper in order to earn

20. Albert C. Ritchie, "Willie McLeod," Ritchie Papers.

21. Baltimore Evening Sun, 12 March 1921.

22. Diary, Ritchie Papers, Booth Tarkington, Ellen Glasgow and perhaps James Lane Allen are still familiar names. The titles are indicative of the type of book: The Weaker Vessel (Elsie Lindtner), Heroine in Orange (James L. Allen) and Heart of the Hills (John Fox).

more money. He had a printing press which his father had previously given him as a gift, and he gathered news, wrote the articles and set the type himself. One of his most successful articles was a story about the turbulent domestic relations of a Ritchie cook and her husband.<sup>23</sup>

Another of Ritchie's entrepreneurial exploits was not nearly so successful. At the age of seventeen, Ritchie decided to increase his allowance by selling luggage. He bought a full line of luggage which he intended to sell at a profit to the midshipmen at the Naval Academy. However, the midshipmen preferred using duffle bags to any form of luggage, and Ritchie returned to Baltimore without having made a single sale. He claimed that this experience taught him to consider demand before he began to sell.<sup>24</sup>

Ritchie's academic record was undistinguished. He was tutored privately in his home and then attended Mrs. Parkhurst's School on Eager Street. This was followed by years at Dr. Deichman's School on Eutaw Street and then the exclusive Marston School.<sup>25</sup> After graduation he attended Johns Hopkins University. In college, Ritchie showed a penchant for classical history and little affinity or achievement in the physical sciences. He studied Heroditus, Thuycidides, Livy, and Tacitus. His foreign language was German.<sup>26</sup>

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23. Baltimore News, undated clipping, Ritchie Papers.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Albert C. Ritchie, miscellaneous college papers and "grade book," Ritchie Papers.



Ritchie kept two of his papers from Hopkins on which he had done his best work. The papers were for an ancient history course, one entitled "Characteristics of Chaldean Civilization" and the other, a slightly longer work, called "Patriarchial Customs According to Genesis." On both papers, Ritchie was complimented for everything except his spelling, but the papers show neither original thinking nor good research skills. He had taken most of his material from his textbook in addition to the encyclopedia for his first paper and the Bible for his second. The work indicates keen ability in organizing information. It also shows that Ritchie did not possess the probing type of intellect that was likely to discover new information or diverse ways to use old materials.<sup>27</sup>

Hopkins at this time was famous for its advanced work in History and Political Science, but Ritchie's Hopkins does not seem to be the same University that less than a decade previous was famous for Herbert B. Adams' seminar in institutional history, in which Woodrow Wilson, Richard T. Ely and John Dewey had studied.<sup>28</sup> Ritchie's college days were those of a not-too-serious undergraduate for whom college was a required part of the pattern of life largely important for the contacts one made with other similarly-situated young men.

The fact ~~that~~ Ritchie attended college in the years of severe economic depression in the United States does not seem to have affected him or his life style. He seems isolated from what Richard Hofstadter

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<sup>27</sup>. Albert C. Ritchie, miscellaneous college papers and "grade book," Ritchie Papers.

<sup>28</sup>. Arthur Link, Woodrow Wilson (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1947), I: 11-12.

has labeled "the psychic crisis of the nineties."<sup>29</sup> The social problems which influenced the writings of Ward, Veblen, Henry Adams, Ely and Ross or caused men and women like Jane Addams and Washington Gladden to go into the work of Social Reform seem not to have touched Ritchie's life.<sup>30</sup> It is fascinating to speculate what he would have felt if he had read Jacob Riis' How The Other Half Lives when it was published in 1890.

Not too much is known about Ritchie's leisure time activities during his later adolescence. He sang in the college Glee Club. In his last years at Hopkins, he followed the fashion of his days and joined a Fire Engine Company.<sup>31</sup> Young men in Baltimore joined in support of fire engine companies and ran with their companies to fires. They also battled rival engine companies in fist fights and stone-throwing. Ritchie joined the #6 Engine Company and participated in battles against #7 Company throwing pieces of gravel across the streets.<sup>32</sup>

Ritchie was at Johns Hopkins from 1893 to 1896. The Year Book, Hullabaloo, for 1896 had a humorous prophecy for each graduate. Obviously, Ritchie was already recognized as having some interest in politics because the nonsensical story about him tells of his defeating a man named Sumwalt for the presidency by one vote in a hotly-contested election after which he was reelected for life.<sup>33</sup>

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29. Richard Hofstadter, Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1966), pp. 145-187, especially pp. 183-187.

30. Harold U. Faulkner, Politics, Reform and Expansion (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), Chapter 7.

31. H. L. Mencken, Happy Days 1880-1892 (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1950), p. 19; Baltimore News, 26 February 1936, p. 1.

32. Baltimore News, 26 February 1936, p. 1.

33. Baltimore Evening Sun, 29 February 1932, p. 28.

Following college, the future Governor attended the University of Maryland Law School, where he received his degree in two years. Despite an undistinguished record, he soon established a reputation as an excellent lawyer and returned to teach at the Law School.

After finishing his formal education, Ritchie performed the last action in the education pattern for a young man of his time. He spent two months of the summer of 1899 on a European tour. Leaving Baltimore on July 21st, he remained overnight in New York and sailed for the continent the next day. On August 2nd, he arrived in England where he pronounced the Customs House examination "a complete farce."<sup>34</sup>

Ritchie passed a large part of his touring time in England and most of this was spent in trite, ordinary sightseeing. He went to London for a day and then began a bicycle trip during which he saw Windsor Castle, Oxford University and Shakespeare's house. He seemed most impressed by the scenery. He took a train to Scotland and, there, in one of his few original ventures, he visited Wordsworth's grave. Next he went to Northern Ireland for a day, returned to Scotland and then bicycled for eight more days through England while dutifully sightseeing each day.

After three and one-half weeks in the British Isles, Ritchie went to Paris where he remained for one week. Again, he filled his days with sightseeing. He saw Napoleon's tomb, Versailles and several other standard sights. He went to a different nightclub just about every night, the Moulin Rouge on August 28th.<sup>35</sup>

On September 1st, he met another Baltimore family vacationing in Paris, Mrs. and Bernard Baker and their two daughters. He had lunch

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34. Albert C. Ritchie, Trip Diary, Ritchie Papers.

35. Ibid.

and dinner with the Bakers that day and the next, went to the theatre with them on the second night and lunched with them on the following day before he took the train to Geneva. What his feelings were, Ritchie does not say. He refers to the Bakers' daughters only as "the two girls" although one of the Misses Baker became his wife a few years later.<sup>36</sup>

After Paris, Ritchie went quickly through Geneva, Interlaken, Lucerne, Basel, Mainz and Heidelberg. All this was accomplished in four days during which Ritchie again dutifully noted "the scenery is magnificent." He was so impressed by the size of the famous wine vat in the Heidelberg castle that he recorded its exact capacity in his diary. Next, Ritchie traveled on the Rhine by boat to Coblenz and then went to Brussels, the only city that prompted even slightly enthusiastic descriptions in his written record. From Brussels he went to Antwerp and then back to London where he remained for three days before he sailed to New York.<sup>37</sup>

Ritchie's trip is as significant for what he omitted as for what he saw. He did not visit a single museum, hear a concert nor attend an opera; he went to the theatre only once and then as guest of the Bakers. He seemed to derive little or no pleasure from aesthetic experiences. He did not seem to care about meeting the nationals of the countries which he visited, nor about the effects of different economic and social systems on the people who lived under them. He had, in short, no more "social consciousness" than the average wealthy young man of his times. Both his aesthetic sensitivity and social consciousness remained unchanged during his life

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36. Albert C. Ritchie, Trip Diary, Ritchie Papers.

37. Ibid.

Ritchie's life before his first job had followed exactly the pattern for upper class young men of his day. It is remarkable how little he seems to have deviated from this pattern in thought or action. He gave no indication of any future distinction. His portrait at this point in his life was that of an elegantly attired and poised, moderately wealthy young man who had dutifully gone through the proper schools, University and professional education. He was, however, not an intellectual and had never probed any intellectual questions very deeply. He had an introduction to aesthetic events but was not really involved by them. He had learned best the truly refined manners of the period and he probably expected that these more than his intellectual abilities would aid him successfully through the rest of his life. He seems almost a manifestation of the "Gibson man."<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>38</sup>. Charles Dana Gibson's cartoons were the most popular in the United States in the 1890's and early 1900's. Young men and women attempted to look like his drawings of exquisite high society.

## CHAPTER TWO

## A BLOSSOMING CAREER AND A WITHERED MARRIAGE

When Ritchie entered his profession, his life continued to proceed in the same pattern. He joined the law firm of Steele, Semmes, Carey and Bond in 1900. As if to further emphasize the narrowness of the social and professional world in which he travelled, Ritchie tried his first case before his father. He remembered being "terribly nervous . . . . I guess my father was even more nervous, fearing I might make a show of the Ritchie family." <sup>1</sup> Ritchie spoke forty-five minutes on behalf of his client which was unnecessary since the case had been settled by his associates out of court while he was delivering his opening address. They did not reveal this to him because they desired to unburden him of the strain of presenting his first case. Ritchie's work proved quite satisfactory, and he became a partner of the firm in 1902. Then after he felt that he had gained enough experience and a measure of confidence, he decided to strike out on his own. In 1903, he formed a partnership with his college classmate and friend, Stuart Janney, and opened an office for the general practice of law. In the same year that he and Janney opened the office, he was appointed Assistant City Solicitor for Baltimore. He held the job concurrently with his own practice. <sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>. Undated newspaper clipping, Enoch Pratt Free Library, Baltimore, Maryland.

<sup>2</sup>. Ibid.

His reputation for competency and honesty was growing, and he was more successful than he had ever been previously. There was, however, still no evidence of distinction nor of a likelihood that he would deviate from the general upper class pattern. But, the next few years were crucial ones in Ritchie's life because he found a part of the pattern into which he did not seem to fit.

Ritchie was married to Elizabeth Catherine Baker, the daughter of the wealthy banker, Bernard N. Baker, on May 18, 1907, in a ceremony at the bride's home in Ingleside in Baltimore County by the Reverend J. Houston Eccleston. To all outward appearances the marriage was just another step in the perfectly patterned existence which Ritchie had followed to this point. He was now thirty years old and had established a successful professional career. His wife came from a most proper family, and she was wealthy. However, the marriage was unsuccessful. Ritchie lived with his wife for less than three years. As soon as the lease expired on the property known as the Beverly which he had rented, he abandoned his wife and returned to live with his mother at 1224 St. Paul Street in Baltimore.<sup>3</sup>

Why the marriage failed is unclear.<sup>3</sup> The specific area of disagreement was whether Albert's mother should be included in the couple's housekeeping arrangements. After the Ritchies had separated,

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<sup>3</sup>. B Docket 152 File Number 15968B, 1916 records of Circuit Court of Baltimore City.

Ritchie continued to insist that he would not rejoin his wife unless his mother could live with them. Young Mrs. Ritchie made every effort to reclaim her husband. On four different occasions she tried to get Ritchie to build them a home, but refused to concede the point about her husband's mother. She first suggested that they move to a site in Baltimore City and later proposed three places in Baltimore County. She even offered to purchase the lots entirely with her own money and assist in the erection of improvements. One time her father and mother wanted to deed Ritchie a lot, but he refused in every instance. Actually Ritchie seemed to have little or no desire to be reunited with his wife.

Ritchie told his wife's father that he would make no arrangements in which his (Ritchie's) mother was not included. The younger Mrs. Elizabeth Ritchie also sent Dr. Thomas Brown to Ritchie to discuss the matter with him. Brown was physician to both the young attorney and his wife, but Ritchie absolutely refused to discuss the matter with his doctor. In the divorce proceedings, Ritchie did not deny any of these allegations. He almost seemed anxious to sever the marriage. His only concern was that he did not have to pay alimony.<sup>4</sup> Beyond this concrete evidence, one can only speculate on the Ritchie's marital

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<sup>4</sup>. B Docket 152 File Number 15968E, 1916 records of Circuit Court of Baltimore City.



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 difficulties. Afterwards, he gave up any idea of remarriage and family life. He never seems to have been seriously interested in women again despite rumors among his contemporaries that he was very much of a womanizer. Ritchie then devoted all his energy to law and politics. Having renounced women, he took a new symbolic bride in the form of work and service.

In the fall of 1907, he accepted a professorship at the University of Maryland, in addition to his private practice and his job as city solicitor. Continuing to teach at the Law School through his term as Attorney General of the State, he terminated the position only

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5. It is, of course, difficult to overlook the fact that Ritchie did return to his mother and that the overt quarrels which had led to the divorce concerned separation from his mother. He continued to live with his mother until her death in 1931. When he became Governor, she even accompanied him to the State House where she served as his hostess. His attachment to his mother was treated by newspaper and magazine articles as an example of Ritchie's chivalry and few people ever cared to look behind the facade of proper manners. Louis Azrael, Editor of the Baltimore News-Post related that he once picked up an extension phone in Governor Ritchie's office and heard Ritchie's mother telling him not to forget his rubber overshoes because the weather looked as if it might rain. (Interview with author). This single incident without much more evidence can be regarded as an example of a typically concerned mother, but in light of Ritchie's general attachment to his mother it is hard to refrain from speculation about it. Ritchie's wife's first name and middle initial were the same as those of his mother. Psychoanalysts could certainly have a field day with speculations about an oedipal relationship.

when he was elected Governor. Ritchie taught a course in the history of law, a general introductory course. According to one source, he was reported to be an easy grader.<sup>6</sup> Ritchie kept his notes for his lectures in mimeographed outlines in loose leaf holders. His personal notations in the margins lack humor and contain much legal precision. For example, one note reads as follows, "An act of God is an inevitable accident, but all inevitable accidents are not acts of God: e. g. lightning is both, but injuries from hidden obstructions, collisions and perils of the sea are inevitable accidents but not acts of God and do not excuse the carrier at common law."<sup>7</sup>

While he was married, Ritchie became concerned about politics. At first, his interest was expressed through the most timid involvement with local reform. In 1909, Ritchie corresponded with the Walbrook Improvement Association, a neighborhood civic group, on the matter of City Parks.<sup>8</sup> Another letter shows some participation in the Maryland Civil Service Reform Association.<sup>9</sup> During

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6. Harry W. Kirwin, The Inevitable Success, a biography of Herbert O'Connor (Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Press, 1962), p. 46.

7. Ritchie Papers.

8. Ritchie to Walbrook Improvement Association, November 8, 1909, Ritchie Correspondence, University of Maryland.

9. Ritchie to Maryland Civil Service Reform Association, March 31, 1911, ibid.

this decade reform movements were successful all around the United States, especially on the local level; but the waves of reform scarcely eroded the power of the bosses in Baltimore. No young man in Maryland could hope for success in a political career through reform associations alone. As his marital situation worsened, Ritchie moved toward greater involvement in politics. He was realistic enough to realize that there was little hope of advancement in State politics through the reform groups. He decided to move through more traditional political channels.

First, he accepted a new job in 1910. He resigned his position as assistant city solicitor to work as assistant general counsel to the Public Service Commission of Maryland, a job known today as people's counsel. At the time the post was advisory. The counsel could be used for guidance by the commission, but he could not be delegated to represent the public on any question.<sup>10</sup>

Next, when his marriage was clearly shattered, Ritchie visited the chief boss of Baltimore City, Sonny Mahon. Ritchie announced that he wanted to run for the position of Attorney General of Maryland. Boss Mahon was a rotund, poker faced man who was accustomed to all sorts of political requests, but no doubt he must have been startled by Ritchie's announcement. The Attorney Generalship was

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<sup>10</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 24 February 1936, p. 1.

the second or third highest office in Maryland.<sup>11</sup> Ritchie was only thirty-three years old; he had held only the most minor appointed positions; his record was undistinguished. The Attorney General's office had never been occupied by a man under forty-five years of age, and only the rarest political necessities had caused the bosses to choose a man who had not proved his popularity with the electorate and demonstrated his ability in far more difficult jobs than those which Ritchie had held.

Boss Mahon politely told Ritchie that he had no record of party loyalty and that he would have to establish this before he could be considered for elective office. Ritchie did have one asset that Mahon could use, his patrician name and respectability. These could be useful at political meetings in the more affluent areas of the city where Mahon's political machine was relatively weaker than in the areas of the city occupied mainly by the poorer Irish, Jewish, Italian and Polish immigrants. Perhaps Ritchie might be used for City Council or State Legislature if a clean man was needed to counter the appeals of the reformers, but it is doubtful if Mahon saw much more of a future for the handsome young lawyer who stood

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11. Three men within the century have used the Attorney Generalship as a stepping stone to the Governorship, and several others have at least gotten to the nomination for the State's Chief Executive from the legal office. The other high office is State Comptroller from which two men have become Governor.

before him. However, Mahon knew that retention of his power was based on judicious use of any possible resources which he could command. He did not discourage the grandiose hopes of young Ritchie. Time and experience would do that. Meanwhile, he utilized his new asset.

Ritchie did some political speaking for the Democratic candidates in 1911 and 1913 to prove his political regularity, but it was another achievement totally unrelated to his working for the political machine that quickly pummelled him into the spotlight of political success. Ritchie came into public notice when he prosecuted a case against the Gas and Electric Company in Baltimore.<sup>12</sup> The case arose in 1912 when the Legislature had just passed a new law which allowed the public service commission to appoint one lawyer to serve as people's counsel. Previously the public service commission could only ask for legal advice. A lengthy battle to give Baltimore cheaper gas and electricity had been begun two years previously and was still continuing. Declaring that gas and electricity rates were excessive, a committee of one hundred Baltimoreans petitioned the commissioners and specifically requested that Ritchie be named to direct the fight to

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Ritchie's action fits in with a major theme of the progressive era and regulation of public utilities. It is interesting that Ritchie did not capitalize politically on the anti-utility theme in his first major election campaign in 1915. By 1919 he was already well-attuned to the ideas of the post war decade with its theme of government and business partnership. Even during the case itself, Ritchie seems to have developed no anti-utility bias, one wonders if anything other than political opportunism was motivating Ritchie in his big case against the Gas Company.

lower the rates. The chairman of the Citizen's Committee, Phillip D. Laird, said: "We are going to put Ritchie on the job. He is clean as a hound's tooth, smart, bright, a hard worker, and absolutely beyond the reach of any improper influence." <sup>13</sup>

Ritchie abandoned all other projects for the next eight months. As the lone champion of the consumers, he worked day and night, depending only on his own resourcefulness, since he had virtually no funds at his disposal for expert advice. He studied the law, figures, rates, manufacturing costs and every item involved in the production and distribution of gas and electricity. His opponents, the public utilities group, fortified themselves with a battery of the ablest lawyers they could find, in addition to expert engineers and technicians. Facts never previously divulged in inquiries concerning gas and electric utilities were brought before the public. <sup>14</sup>

The public service commission began hearings in July 1912, after three months for preparation had been allowed to each side. The full day sessions were held almost every day until October. A month was then given to the counsel to prepare their briefs. In November, summation of the case in final arguments took three days. Then, as a result of Ritchie's single handed fight, the price of gas was reduced from ninety to eighty cents per 1000 cubic feet of gas and the consumer

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<sup>13</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 24 February 1936, p. 1.

<sup>14</sup>. Ibid.

of electricity granted a reduction from 10 to 8-1/2 cents a kilowatt hour. It was estimated that this saved the consumers \$500,000 annually in gas and electricity bills. This was a great personal victory for Ritchie. On the basis of the general reaction to the outcome of the case and the favorable press comment, the public had found a new hero.<sup>15</sup>

Upon the successful completion of the rate fight, Ritchie resigned as counsel to the commission. However, two years later he studied a complaint that the utility company had so reduced the quality of gas that his victory had been nullified. Although he was engaged in private practice, he filed a brief with the public service commission, in which he demanded that a further reduction in the rate be granted or that the company be forced to restore the quality of gas it sold. Consequently the utility company was ordered to restore gas to its former quality or to drop the rate from 80 to 75 cents per 1000 cubic feet. It chose the rate-cut alternative, and this decision saved the consumers an additional \$200,000 each year.<sup>16</sup>

Ritchie never forgot the difficulties of the case nor the glory in his victory. He kept the records of the Gas and Electric Company case in his private files until his death. The records are most complex, and involve a considerable knowledge of accounting. These problems are intertwined with very difficult questions in a specialized area of

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15. Baltimore Evening Sun, 24 February 1936, p. 1.

16. Ibid.

the law.<sup>17</sup> While one could overestimate the effort and ability that went into the successful preparation and prosecution of the case, it is not hard to see a difference between the Ritchie who handled this case and the Dana man who had never been more than a mediocre student in school.

The technical matters of the case need not be considered further. In no way did the issue of utilities and their control become a theme of Ritchie's career. The case was forgotten by all but Ritchie's closest admirers by the time he was a national figure. The case is important because it put Ritchie before the public eye, in a way calculated to make him a public hero. The theme of control of utilities was a popular one at the time. Many reformers saw the utilities as dreaded enemies whose effective monopoly endangered the American system of free enterprise. Ritchie was a member of the upper class, but he came into public view as the champion of the little man. He did not, of course, make this appeal himself. That would have been completely out of character. He handled the case with technical exactness and left the rhetoric to the newspapers, but he obviously had no objection to the publicity, and he was soon to capitalize on it.

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17. Ritchie Papers, Maryland Historical Society.



## CHAPTER THREE

## FIRST ELECTORAL TEST - 1915 ELECTIONS

When Ritchie returned to see Boss Mahon at the beginning of 1915, the situation had changed considerably. He had established a record of party loyalty, but this was relatively unimportant. What mattered was that he now had a local reputation as a staunchly honest reformer, a capable lawyer and a defender of the people's rights; he was good material for elective office.

However, one cannot separate Ritchie's ambitions for office from the status of the Maryland Democratic Party in 1915. Conflicting ambitions of important men were bringing the Democrats into a bitter primary in which Ritchie might have to risk his future.

It is necessary to have an introduction to Maryland politics to understand Ritchie's situation. A glance at the population figures for the State in the 1910-1930 period reveals that about 40% of the State residents lived in Baltimore City and that the city was growing faster than the entire rural area of the State. County residents feared future political hegemony by Baltimore. They used every possible means to keep the city emasculated. Some of the restrictions will be noted later, but the most obvious method of control was to keep Baltimore City underrepresented in the State Legislature.

Moreover, the State's primary elections were decided on a unit vote system, an electoral system similar to that which is used to elect the President of the United States. Each county had a unit vote equal

to the total number of its representatives in both Houses of the State Legislature. The unit vote system in the primary had the effect of reducing the influence of Baltimore City still further. This extreme curb on Baltimore's power was considered necessary in case the city legislators should form a block in the Legislature by wooing a group of county legislators by promises of catering to some special interests of their constituency. Baltimore was kept so underrepresented that this result was most improbable. In 1915 only 4 of 24 Senators and 16 of 90 delegates in the Legislature came from Baltimore City. This meant the city commanded only 20 of 114 unit votes in the primary elections.<sup>1</sup>

The rivalry between the city and the counties was partially a desire to control patronage, but it also had an ideological basis. The Democratic Party in Baltimore City was controlled mainly by business interests. Sometime during the late 1920's and early 1930's power transferred to liberals and labor. (This fact was very important for an understanding of the 1930, 1932 and 1934 elections). The Democrats in the counties were descendants of the slave owning Whigs and were a conservative group mainly concerned with maintaining white supremacy.<sup>2</sup> All State politicians, including Ritchie, had to keep these ideological divisions in mind. Treading somewhere between

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<sup>1</sup>. George P. Bagby, Annotated Code of The Public General Laws of Maryland (Baltimore: Lord Baltimore Press, 1925), sec. 190, pp. 1319-1325, especially p. 1322.

<sup>2</sup>. John H. Fenton, Politics in The Border States (New Orleans: Hauser Press, 1957), p. 171.

the extremes was one key to success.

However, the counties need not have feared the dominance of city politicians if they had been completely organized. But this was not the case, all sorts of specific local issues tended to sunder the unity of the counties. In general one can see three specific groupings. These are usually referred to as: the Eastern Shore, Southern Maryland and Western Maryland, despite inexact boundaries. Harford and Baltimore Counties do not really fit into any area, and it is hard to decide if Howard and Montgomery Counties belong in Western or Southern Maryland. The divisions are important, however, because similar economic interests caused these areas to vote as a group on many issues and politicians regarded them very seriously as areas for patronage division. The Eastern Shore relied on seafood industries and small truck farming. Seafood industries also helped to support Southern Maryland, but tobacco was the most important crop in that area. Western Maryland was a coal mining district. Such a description is far too simplified to be accurate, but it is a necessary introduction. Politicians in each area (in each party) scrupulously guarded the interests of their region. They expected to have a man from their area among the party's nominees for statewide office at least every other statewide election. The idea was that local patronage would then be better protected for the area with one of the statewide officials coming from the area. This form of "ticket balancing" had to be considered in every election.

To complicate the picture still further there were a type of politician labeled "bosses" who did not run for office but helped support those who were desirous of office in return for control of patronage. The job of chief boss of Baltimore City was a specially sought after position. At the turn of the century the "boss" of Baltimore had been Isaac Freeman Rasin.<sup>3</sup>

When Rasin died, Sonny Mahon consolidated enough power to become "the Boss" of Baltimore City. He ran a vast "organization" controlled by various lieutenants who had control over areas or districts and who in turn had control over precinct workers. Mahon was an extremely rotund man of Irish descent. His large family was now grown and his first wife was dead. Mahon had since remarried and made his residence in the Rennert Hotel, probably considered the finest hotel in Baltimore at the time. Because of his residence there the Rennert became the center of political activity in the city. Mahon was a licensed attorney so it was possible for him to legally accept fees of important business and wealthy men for what was described as counselling. In practice it was a form of purchasing of political influence as Mahon could certainly influence if not actually control the actions of most of Baltimore's elected officials most of the time. Often Republican office-holders owed him "favours." Few Democrats were ever free from such obligations. Mahon became wealthy from

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<sup>3</sup>. James B. Crooks, Politics and Progress, the Rise of Urban Progressivism in Baltimore (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968) p. 38.

the process, and increased his hold over the organization. He evidently satisfied most of the politicians in the city because he was honest in his dealings. He did not renege on his promises and he was capable of delivering what he promised. Even the reforming Sunpapers accepted his rule. "Mahon was a Democrat who recognized the organization's duty to respond to public opinion. On these terms he supported good government (with limitations), city planning, increased democracy and social reform", wrote Crooks.<sup>4</sup>

Mahon did his business in the lobby of the Rennert. His plump body made him look like a politician from the Grant era. The cigars he smoked added to the picture. As he sat in one of the heavily upholstered chairs of the lobby he may have looked tired and lethargic, but his eyes were vital and active. He was not a loquacious man by nature, and when he did business he weighed his words very carefully. He had a policy of not delivering orders or requests by messenger. Less was apt to go wrong when he delivered all his instructions himself. He was always a gentleman with reporters, but he seldom gave them any helpful information. His policy seems to have been that the less he said, the less the possibility that he would have to eat his words later if a plan of action was changed. Few political decisions in Maryland were taken without consultation of this strangely taciturn man.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>. James B. Crooks, Politics and Progress, the Rise of Urban Progressivism in Baltimore (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968) p. 212.

<sup>5</sup>. Harry Kirwan, The Inevitable Success (Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Press, 1962), pp. 67-71.

Perhaps the most powerful of Mahon's lieutenants, Frank Kelly, had a very different personality. Kelly was jolly, vivacious and lively. He was equally as calculating and careful as his boss, but outwardly he did not seem so. Next to Mahon, Kelly was the most powerful politician in the city in the early teens. Just how powerful he had become was not quite obvious early in 1915.

Nineteen fifteen was the year of a gubernatorial election. In 1911, a Republican, Phillips Lee Goldsborough, had been elected. Although he was only the second Republican Governor of the State since the Civil War, the Democratic registration majority was misleading. A bitter Democratic primary fight always gave the Republicans a good chance of winning an election. The Democrats always did their best to avoid such a primary; in 1915 they were unsuccessful. The primary was provoked largely by the obstinacy of two United States Senators. Senator Blair Lee wanted to be Governor. While this may seem contrary to the normal pattern in American politics, Maryland politicians often preferred the Governorship to service in the Senate. Lee, who was from Montgomery County, had cherished a lifelong ambition to become Governor of the State and he had the support of "Boss" Mahon. However, the State organization was largely under the control of the State's Senior Senator, John Walter Smith. Smith was backed by Maryland's statewide boss, an Anne Arundel County contractor, Frank Furst. Furst and Smith had previously decided that one of Smith's Eastern Shore proteges, Emerson C. Harrington, should

be elevated from his present position of State Comptroller to Governor.<sup>6</sup>

Harrington was an unusual figure for a successful politician. He was a quiet man who had once been elected Professor of Latin and Math at St. John's College in Annapolis and had served as Principal of a Cambridge Public High School for ten years before he turned to law and politics. Harrington had served as State's Attorney on his native Eastern Shore and then risen gradually within the State's administrative system; in 1913 he was elected State Comptroller.<sup>7</sup>

Both Lee and Harrington felt that he had the right to be the Party's candidate for the Governorship in 1915. Each knew he was popular at the polls; each had the support of influential bosses. But neither had enough power to be certain of election, and so neither man could force his opponent out of the race. The contest had begun.

Each gubernatorial candidate had to choose running mates for the statewide ticket for the office of Attorney General and Comptroller (and for the minor office of Clerk of the Court of Appeals). For a newcomer like Ritchie the primary contest was filled with special possibilities; it was also filled with danger. If Ritchie sided with the city machine of Mahon, he might not have been chosen to run for statewide office, but barring a major upheaval, he could have been sure of a major city job sometime in the foreseeable future.

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<sup>6</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 21 April 1915, p. 5, 6 May 1915, p. 16, 22 May 1915, p. 12.

<sup>7</sup>. Maryland Secretary of State, Maryland Manual 1919 (Annapolis: Republican Advertiser, 1919), p. 17.

However, it was possible if not certain that he would anger the State machine headed by Smith and Furst. To side with Mahon would make the possibility of statewide office at a later date slightly more difficult but not impossible.

On the other hand if he sided with the State machine, there would be little possibility of a future office for him within the city, and it was not too often that a man jumped into a statewide office without holding at least one local elected position. As a city man, the logical choice for Ritchie was to side with the city machine. Furthermore one of his closest friends was E. Brooke Lee, the son of Senator Blair Lee. A close personal contact with the Governor would have also been a convenient asset.

However, Ritchie was ambitious; he chose impetuously. He wanted to be Attorney General at that time, and he was not thinking of what would happen to him if he lost. He chose the side that was willing to offer him the position of Attorney General on the primary ticket.

One factor benefited Ritchie greatly in this election. Frank Kelly decided it was time to declare his independence from Boss Mahon. Other politicians had gambled this way in the past and lost, but Kelly was ready to try. He sided with Senator Smith and Frank Furst and backed the Emerson C. Harrington ticket for Governor in the primary. Many local leaders followed his leadership in the revolt against Mahon.



In return for support of the Harrington candidacy, Kelly wanted a city man on the ticket. Of course, he also would expect patronage in the future. Kelly's man was Ritchie. Exactly why he chose Ritchie or even if Ritchie was his first choice is unclear. However, it was the beginning of a political alliance (although not a personal friendship) that was to last until Kelly's death. Ritchie's later political victories were enough to insure the successful independence of Frank Kelly from Sonny Mahon. (Later Kelly and Mahon patched up their differences and agreed to rule the city as joint bosses).

Ritchie announced his candidacy for Attorney General on March 24, 1915. At that date it was still possible that there would be a compromise between Harrington and Lee. Another patrician lawyer, William Milnes Maloy, considered running against Ritchie on the Lee ticket. On May 28, 1915 Maloy, a State Senator from Baltimore, announced his candidacy.<sup>8</sup>

Harrington's ticket was completed with the choice of Hugh A. McMullen, a Western Marylander, for Comptroller, and Lee's ticket was filled by William B. Cooper of Kent County on the Eastern Shore, an aspirant for the same office.

At the end of May, Frank Furst once again tried desperately to prevent the battle by suggesting that both men retire from the contest for a compromise candidate. He refused, however, to accept

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<sup>8</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 28 May 1915.

the candidacy himself; he simply did not want the job. On June 6th he announced his official support of Harrington.<sup>9</sup>

The Republicans were having some problems of their own. State Roads Commissioner Weller had announced his intention to seek the Republican nomination for Governor in the early winter. However, Governor Phillips Lee Goldsborough desired renomination. Goldsborough was especially angry because Weller had announced his official candidacy while the Governor was in San Francisco. Goldsborough felt this was a discourtesy and was determined to make Weller pay for it.<sup>10</sup> Not until July 26 did Goldsborough decide that he would retire from the race.<sup>11</sup> The Republicans had managed to avoid a primary, but they had not completely avoided bitterness.

The Democrats avoided neither. Most of the major figures in the Party had lined up behind either Harrington or Lee by the middle of June. All through the summer eyes were focused on Kelly. The earliest rumors that Kelly might buck the Mahon organization and support Harrington came at the end of June.<sup>12</sup> Kelly's intent became clearer in July, and in August the organization suddenly put a new name on the ballot for State Central Committee: John S. Kelly was selected to run against John F(rank) Kelly. Kelly was reported to

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9. Baltimore Sun, 21, 24, 25, 26 May, 6 June 1915, clippings in Ritchie Papers.

10. Baltimore Evening Sun, 11 June 1915, p. 16.

11. Baltimore Evening Sun, 26 July 1915, p. 12.

12. Baltimore Evening Sun, 28 June 1915, p. 12.

be raving mad.<sup>13</sup> However, Kelly did not officially come out for Harrington until the day before the election, and that endorsement lasted only eight hours before he was corralled again into the organization by Mahon and Mayor Preston. On election day the political cognoscenti were aware that Kelly was supporting Harrington although he was officially backing Lee.<sup>14</sup>

This was Ritchie's first election and he learned much from it. The bitterness and hatred caused by the primary was not only a threat to all the Democratic candidates in the general election, it left a residue of hostility that damaged the Party in the future. Ritchie saw this quite clearly and as Party leader he tried to avoid primary elections for the rest of his career.

The results of the primary were close, Harrington's ticket had a 10,000 vote margin of victory in the popular vote. About ten thousand votes separated each of the candidates in the popular vote. Ritchie ran best of the three top men on the ticket. The election was, however, decided by the unit vote totals where much of the Baltimore City popular vote was nullified. Harrington could have won without winning one Baltimore district but Kelly had managed to carry two of the four city districts for Harrington, and this established his independence of Mahon. Kelly had also managed to carry one district for McMullen for

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<sup>13</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 26 August 1915, p. 16.

<sup>14</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 14 September 1915, p. 12.

Comptroller, but Ritchie's vote was the biggest surprise; he carried all the districts of the city.<sup>15</sup> Ritchie's gamble had succeeded. Not only had he managed to pick the winning side in the primary, but he had run ahead of his ticket mates in both the popular and the unit vote. In his first test before the electorate, Ritchie proved his vote-getting abilities.

However, his problems were still unsolved. Because of the bitter primary, there remained a possibility that all the Democratic candidates would be defeated in the general election. Four days after the election, Kelly flexed his new muscles. He insisted another Mahon lieutenant, Danny Loden, be dropped from the organization if it ever expected Kelly's support again. He also asked for more special patronage from Mayor Preston whose new appointments were to be made in a few days.<sup>16</sup> Mahon was, therefore, forced to choose between Preston and Loden on the one hand and Kelly on the other. As Kelly had proved unfaithful and because Preston was still in office for almost

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<sup>15</sup>. Baltimore Sun, 15 September 1915, pp. 1-3.

Ritchie was, of course, a city man and best known in the city because he had fought to lower its gas rates. The State unit vote totals were:

|            |     |        |    |
|------------|-----|--------|----|
| Harrington | 81  | Lee    | 48 |
| Ritchie    | 106 | Maloy  | 23 |
| McMullen   | 76  | Cooper | 53 |

<sup>16</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 18 September 1915, p. 12.

four years with jobs and favors to give out, Mahon decided to break with Kelly completely.<sup>17</sup> Mahon could then expect to receive little patronage from Harrington should the latter win the contest for Governor. Naturally Mahon's support was likely to be minimal, and there was a possibility that he would strike a deal with the Republicans. Not until mid-October did Mahon announce his support of the Democratic ticket. Before Mahon called on Frank Furst on October 11th to make this announcement, there must have been many anxious moments for Ritchie and the other Democratic candidates.

In the meantime, the Democrats had drawn up their platform at the end of September. Ritchie's part was suggesting ideas and putting the document into technical language. The work was done in his office on September 22nd before the Democrats met for their State Convention.<sup>18</sup> The platform was hardly exciting. The proposal that excited the most attention was the endorsement of Baltimore City's plans to incorporate several suburbs through annexation. The convention was delayed for one hour and forty-five minutes in the fight over this plank. Otherwise it rubber stamped the work of the leaders.<sup>19</sup> It is traditional that the candidate for

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17. Baltimore Evening Sun, 20 September 1915, p. 14.

18. Baltimore Evening Sun, 22 September 1915, p. 16.

19. Baltimore Evening Sun, 23 September 1915, p. 1.

Governor decides the platform on which he will run. Harrington's platform is interesting only in comparison with the platform that Ritchie would construct when his opportunity came. Harrington's work then seems lackluster and unoriginal.

The Democrats staged an active campaign. Harrington, Ritchie and McMullen travelled over the entire State giving speeches. Ovington Weller hardly spoke at all during the campaign, and he certainly was not as active as the Democrats in his attendance at meetings. Further, the influential Baltimore Sunpapers gave tacit if not open support to Harrington, and Sunpaper support was always a big factor in a Maryland election.<sup>20</sup> Active campaigning and help from the city's most influential newspaper helped the Democrats to a very narrow victory. Again Ritchie ran at the head of the ticket.

The results were:

|            |         |               |         |
|------------|---------|---------------|---------|
| Harrington | 119,317 | Weller        | 116,136 |
| Ritchie    | 122,836 | Alb. A. Doub  | 98,154  |
| McMullen   | 114,951 | Robt. F. Duer | 108,353 |

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Naturally Ritchie was elated at the results. The nature of his victory implied that there was a future beyond the Attorney Generalship.

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20. (I could not find an editorial endorsement of Harrington, but the articles about him are considerably more favorable. Weller's name is seldom mentioned in the paper. Finally there are many more private endorsements for Harrington published in the papers).

21. Maryland Secretary of State, Maryland Manual 1915, p. 208.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE ATTORNEY GENERALSHIP

The Attorney Generalship of Maryland was an office of considerable importance and had been held by some of the State's most illustrious political figures. Luther Martin, famous for his role at the Constitutional Convention, had held the office from 1778 to 1780 and then from 1818 to 1819. William Pinckney, later a federal judge, had served in 1806-1808. Roger B. Taney, later Attorney General of the United States and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, held the job from 1827 to 1831. More recently, Isador Rayner, later a United States Senator, held the office from 1900 to 1904. Ritchie was aware that success might take him higher on the political ladder.

Ritchie accepted his first elected office with dedication and seriousness. He felt duty bound to do the best possible job. To this end he labored long hours with undivided attention. While other men might look for time to spend with their families or to devote on hobbies, the new Attorney General applied himself entirely to his work.

On November 11th, Ritchie had to make a speech before the Board of Regents of the University of Maryland. He wanted to make a favorable impression but was aware that he was not a scholar. He had read little enough while he was in college, and had read almost nothing, other than the law, since that time. Yet he desired to make a speech in which he appeared aware of contemporary trends in education. He,

therefore, wrote to the head of each department at Maryland Agricultural College (later the University of Maryland) and requested some information about recent advances in knowledge within the particular discipline.<sup>1</sup>

He received many answers and used them in the preparation of his speech. He tried to show a concern for the adding of the arts to the curriculum, but he lacked personal aesthetic feelings. He spoke only vaguely about the physical sciences because he understood less about these than the humanities.<sup>2</sup> It is not possible to gauge the impression he created before the regents, but the method of preparation shows Ritchie's awareness of his limitations and his willingness to use specialists to help him solve problems.

Ritchie became Attorney General in January 1916. His job had several facets. One task was to present the State's cases in all appeals courts including those in the Court of Appeals, the highest court in the State. He was also responsible to take cases before the Supreme Court of the United States if necessary. But the litigative function took up only a small percentage of the Attorney General's time. He also was required to give legal opinions to all the State commissions and departments (with the exception of the public service commission) and to the Governor and all other State and local officials. The Attorney General was occasionally asked to

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1. Ritchie Correspondence, University of Maryland.

2. Speech of Albert C. Ritchie to Maryland Board of Regents, November 11, 1915, Ritchie correspondence.



supervise the drafting of new legislation.<sup>3</sup> Ritchie assumed every aspect of the job.

Ritchie's term as Attorney General is noteworthy for its achievements in organization and efficiency. Most of his legal work was routine, competent but unoriginal. In his first year in office, Ritchie planned and instituted a major administrative overhaul of the Attorney General's office. He organized what he called the State Law Department with the Attorney General as its head and three assistant Attorneys General. Until this time each major State board, department, or commission had its own special counsel. These counsel were abolished and their job of advising and drafting was taken over by the State Law Department. Ritchie's organization was needed; it was more efficient, and in the future it saved the State considerable money.<sup>4</sup>

One of Ritchie's first tasks was to choose his subordinates for his department. As his three assistant Attorneys General he selected John M. Requardt, William Pinkney Whyte, Jr., and Ogle Marbury. Philip B. Perlman was chosen as an assistant. The men were not all of equal calibre as attorneys and most of the work load eventually fell to Marbury and Perlman.<sup>5</sup> In 1916 the fourth office of Assistant Attorney General was created and Perlman was elevated to this position.<sup>6</sup>

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3. Attorney General of Maryland, Report 1916 (Baltimore: King Brothers, 1916), pp. 1-5.

4. Ibid., Report 1917, p. 1.

5. Ibid., Report 1916.

6. Ibid., Report 1917.

Ritchie immediately became involved with the various aspects of his office. He attended the legislative session of 1916 and remained in Annapolis near constantly while he drafted several important bills for the lawmakers. These included measures to establish a state bureau of labor statistics, to reduce membership in the State roads commission, to abolish continuing appropriations, to provide registration days in the counties before the date of elections, to create uniform systems of accounting and a uniform fiscal year, and to establish a state board of prison control. At the same time Ritchie and his assistants provided opinions to all state and local officials.<sup>7</sup>

The cases and opinions of Ritchie's law department were unremarkable. Sometimes they seemed to be written in a narrow legalistic void without awareness of basic constitutional issues. In an answer to an inquiry about an oath of office for teachers, Ritchie wrote that neither the Constitution nor State law required such an oath but that the Board of Education might do so. "It seems to me," he wrote, "that this is a very proper requirement for the Board by rule to make and I think that as long as the rule continues it should be enforced and all teachers be required to take the oath prescribed by the board."<sup>8</sup> Ritchie seemed unaware that a possible constitutional issue was involved. His opinions in other cases are similar.

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Most of the opinions, however, border on the trivial. A temper-

7. Ibid., Report 1916, p. 48.

8. Ibid., p. 4.

ance group asked him if they could give away sandwiches and coffee at the polls and maintain a temperance banner over the booth. Ritchie answered that this would not be permissible and cited several statutes including one which specified the purposes for which expenses might be incurred for elections. Sandwiches and coffee were not included.<sup>9</sup> Ritchie also decided that the Act of 1916, Chapter 222, section 8 which prohibited children under sixteen from performing in a theatre or concert hall did not apply to Chautauqua Choir Boys in a Chautauqua program.<sup>10</sup> On another occasion he answered that the closed hunting season in Allegany County from April 1st to September 1st applied to possums and racoons.<sup>11</sup> Many of the opinions are on a similar level of importance.

The cases handled by the law department were similar to the opinions in their general competency and in their narrow legalistic perspective. Ritchie evidently took a very broad view of the State's police powers even on matters he did not greatly favor. Moritz Benesch v. State involved the validity of a 1916 law prohibiting a person from taking part in a picnic or any entertainment on Sunday at which liquor was drunk. Ritchie argued that the law should be upheld under the power of the police to suppress crime and disorder. He did not see any possible conflict with the First Amendment

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9. Ibid., p. 84.

10. Ibid., p. 278.

11. Ibid., p. 41.

restriction against the establishment of religion in restrictive Sunday legislation even though the State had gone so far as to prohibit secular entertainment on the Christian sabbath.<sup>12</sup> Nor did he question the broad application of the police power although he spent much of his later career protesting government interference with personal freedoms.

Ritchie's next three years in office were very similar to his first. The total work load of the State Law Department was still comparatively light. The entire litigation in which the office was involved in the entire year of 1917 was thirty-seven cases. Eighteen of these were in the lower courts, and there were ten criminal and nine civil cases in the Court of Appeals. The criminal cases included six licensing cases, three bastardy cases and one case involving the inception of prohibition in Prince George's County.<sup>13</sup>

It was then possible to prove that reorganization of the State's legal services had saved money for the State. Ritchie proudly stated at the opening of his annual published report that the State Law Department had saved the State one-third of its previous expenses. The cost was \$21,573.77 as opposed to \$33,000. the year before.<sup>14</sup>

Ritchie was given a special job early in the year 1917. In February, Governor Harrington appointed him to the Maryland

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12. Ibid., p. 142.

13. Ibid., p. 2.

14. Ibid., 1917, p. 1.

Preparedness and Survey Commission. Ritchie did the work for this commission until it was superseded by the Maryland Council of Defense, a body created by the legislature in June 1917. His work consisted of an examination of laws dealing with storage, sale and use of explosives; preparation of rules and instructions for enrollment boards, and the preparation of twenty-one bills for the legislative session of June 1917. This was a very large task and one which would have weighty consequences for error or inefficiency, but Ritchie managed to complete it successfully while still participating in every other aspect of the duties of his office. <sup>15</sup>

The legislature was not scheduled to meet in 1917, but Governor Harrington called a special session in June mainly to draft legislation made necessary by American entrance into World War I. Ritchie and Perlman were in Annapolis for the entire session between June 12th and 17th. <sup>16</sup> Some of the legislation for which Ritchie was responsible at this session had far reaching consequences. He drafted a million dollar war loan act, an extraordinarily large amount of money in terms of 1917 budgets. <sup>17</sup> They also drafted legislation allowing the use of prison labor for building public roads, an idea previously unaccepted in the State. <sup>18</sup> Military personnel were exempted from the juris-

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15. Ibid., 1917 Report, p. 17.

16. Ibid., p. 21.

17. Laws of The State of Maryland, 1917 (Baltimore: King Brothers, 1917), Chapter 3, pp. 8-15.

18. Ibid., Ch. 4, pp. 15-19.

diction of the civil courts of the State.<sup>19</sup> Acts were passed for the organization of the Maryland State Guard and for a Maryland Council of Defense.<sup>20</sup> A proposed constitutional amendment to provide for absentee voting for military personnel, drafted by Ritchie, was rejected.<sup>21</sup>

In two bills that Ritchie drafted his limitations are clearest. One bill was rejected by the lawmakers. It proposed that the Governor be given extraordinary powers to organize the resources of the State for use in the war. The bill literally ran rough-shod over many personal and political rights usually considered basic to a Democratic form of government.<sup>22</sup> Only slightly less frightening in its disrespect of civil liberties was the Compulsory Work Law Act of 1917. Ritchie drafted a bill which provided that all able bodied males between eighteen and fifty years of age who were not regularly employed were to be assigned to public or private occupations as are proclaimed by the Governor to be necessary for the protection and welfare of the State or nation during the present war. The necessary occupations were later elaborated by Governor Harrington, and they included a fairly wide choice.<sup>23</sup> This act, later the basis of a proposed federal statute, allowed for no exceptions. Ritchie's later interpretations

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19. Ibid., Ch. 22-23, pp. 55-59.

20. Ibid., Ch. 2-6, 24, pp. 6-21, 59-61.

21. Attorney General of Maryland, 1917 Report, pp. 20-1.

22. Ibid., 1917 Report, pp. 20-1.

23. Ibid., p. 21.

of it required a strict application of penalties to those who failed to comply with its provisions.<sup>24</sup>

Of course, the Attorney General, like many other people was stirred by the great propaganda campaign which pictured the United States' entrance into the war as a gallant act necessary to save civilization from the Huns. He was anxious to give the war effort maximum support and efficiency, but he lacked awareness that a government which fails to preserve civil liberties even during a war is somewhat less worth saving. Ritchie lacked this broader perspective of the statutes he was drafting.

After the legislative session, Ritchie drew up recommendations for legislation for consideration by the 1918 session of the General Assembly. He again recommended enactment of a constitutional amendment which would give soldiers and sailors the right to vote by absentee ballot.<sup>25</sup> In addition to several pieces of minor legislation, Ritchie proposed that a legislative council be established. The council was to serve the function of giving legislators information about all proposed bills. He would aid in the drafting of statutes, and Ritchie hoped, he would do something to prevent the congestion in the closing days of the legislative session.<sup>26</sup> The Attorney General was not trying to pass off work of his department to others. He was the first Attorney General to expend quite so much time advising the State

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<sup>24</sup>. Ibid., 1918 Report, p. 263-4.

<sup>25</sup>. Ibid., p. 33-4.

<sup>26</sup>. Ibid., pp. 28-38.

legislature. He had become aware of the difficulties involved in drafting statutes carefully so that the results were unambiguous. The legislative counsel would protect against useless litigation. Ritchie was also aware that the General Assembly considered various kinds of specialized legislation, some of which required expertise. Often only a few of the lawmakers had such specialized knowledge; sometimes none did. The counsel could provide this information which would prevent unwise legislation from being adopted, or at least give the legislators better information on which to make their decisions. This legislation is another example of Ritchie's concern with organization and efficiency in administration.

In 1918, Ritchie began the year in Annapolis as adviser to the regular session of the legislature. As before he attended hearings, drafted legislation and gave advice.<sup>27</sup> Among the important legislation on which he worked was the constitutional amendment which gave military personnel the right to vote by absentee ballot. Ritchie also drafted the Road Loan Act of 1918, an act accepting Federal Aid, an act for increase of teachers' salaries, and the War Emergency Loan Act of 1918.<sup>28</sup> Ritchie and his staff personally examined all 497 laws adopted by the legislature. It is possible that the legislators found the work of

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27. Ibid., pp. 2-4.

28. Ibid., pp. 3-6; Maryland Statutes 1918, Chapters 74, 81, 105, 106, 252, 284, 295. For questions of Federal aid to the states on the question of highways see also Henry J. Bittermann, State and Federal Grants-in Aid (New York: Mentzer, Bush, 1938), Chapters 4, 9, 10.



the State Law Department so efficient that they saw no reason to adopt Ritchie's proposed legislative counsel. They did reject the concept.

The cases tried by the State Law Department in the last three years were similar to those in the first year. In one civil case the State Roads Commission sued the State Comptroller. The problem arose because the Commission had ended the year with an unexpended balance of \$200,797.39 on its yearly appropriation, but it also had unpaid bills for work contracted during the year. Comptroller McMullen said the money reverted to the state treasury, and that he would not give the money to the state roads commission unless ordered to do so by the court. Ritchie argued and the court held that whether or not appropriations automatically revert to the state treasury at the end of the year depended on legislative intent. In this case the intent was to apply the money to obligations incurred although not paid during the fiscal year.<sup>29</sup> Ritchie was often a competent attorney who used the law to reach efficient, practical administrative ends.

Another case showed that Ritchie could if necessary create a clever logical appeal argument in a criminal case. In Agricultural Society of Montgomery County v. State, the society had been convicted for permitting betting on horse races without being licensed. The appeal questioned the statute authorizing the circuit court to

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<sup>29</sup>. Hugh A. McMullen v. State Roads Commission, 130 Maryland 541; Report of the Attorney General of Maryland, 1917, pp. 5-6.

grant licenses. Ritchie argued that it was unnecessary for the court to answer the question. If the statute was valid then the traverser was guilty and if the statute was invalid then the society was also guilty because in this event the betting itself would be illegal. The court upheld the previous conviction on Ritchie's reasoning.<sup>30</sup>

Of the nine cases which were holdovers from 1917, the State won six and lost two. The Attorney General concurred in one judgment against the State. One case was argued before the Supreme Court of the United States, but Marbury and not Ritchie appeared for Maryland in the case, although Ritchie had participated in the case when it was in the Maryland Court of Appeals. D. E. Foote and Company and other plaintiffs had sued for a mandamus order to compel the Governor, Comptroller and State Treasurer to recommend to the legislature the refunding of certain taxes paid under a statute which had been declared unconstitutional after the payment. The state court held that mandamus would not issue; the Supreme Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.<sup>31</sup>

Of seven criminal cases before the Court of Appeals, Ritchie participated in only one case, Thomas S. Jackson v. State. That case involved the validity of a segregation ordinance in Baltimore which prohibited colored people from living in blocks where all or a majority of the residents were white. Ritchie and his office avoided

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<sup>30</sup>. Agricultural Society of Montgomery County v. State, 130 Md. 474; Report of the Attorney General of Maryland, 1918, p. 2.

<sup>31</sup>. Report of the Attorney General of Maryland, 1916, p. 8; 1918, p. 7.

having to take a stand in the case because a similar statute was being challenged before the United States Supreme Court at the time. When the high court held such laws to be invalid in Buchanan v. Warley, it was easy to argue that the Baltimore ordinance was invalid on the basis of the decision of the highest authority.<sup>32</sup> Of seven civil cases before the Maryland Court of Appeals, Ritchie worked on only one. He did not participate in any of the 28 cases which were decided by lower appeals courts. The heaviest load of the work was done by Marbury and Perlman.<sup>33</sup> Ritchie was not shirking; he spent part of the year 1918 in Washington on leave from office to serve on the Federal War Industries Board.

Ritchie's opinions lack perception of far reaching consequences. In one which he gave to the State Motion Picture Censorship Board, he stated that the Board had the power to censor a motion picture which discouraged recruiting. Ritchie argued that the Board had the power to censor "indecent, obscene, or sacrilegious films or those which in the judgment of the Board tend to debase or corrupt morals." The word "morals" could be given several definitions, and, Ritchie stated, that a film which tended to discourage recruiting could certainly be found to be immoral within the judgment of the Board.<sup>34</sup> The extent of the

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32. Ibid., 1918, p. 9; Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60; Roger L. Rice, "Residential Segregation By Law, 1910-1917", Journal of Southern History, XXXIV (May 1968), pp. 179-199.

33. Report of The Attorney General of Maryland, 1918, pp. 10-15.

34. Ibid., p. 148.

word "immoral" in the State implied that the legislators had a very different idea of the meaning of the word, and Ritchie failed to cite specific or general legislative intent to show that the statute should be given the meaning which he chose. His object was obviously to aid the war effort, but he could not see that censoring of films for reasons which were mainly political in intent was a bad precedent towards a healthy interpretation of the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution.

Before he left for his work in Washington, Ritchie wrote two other decisions which demonstrated his desire for efficiency and his failure to note possible violations of the Bill of Rights. The school board of Washington County had passed a resolution waiving the need for vaccination in the case of children who conscientiously opposed it on religious grounds. Local authorities approved the resolution even though the State superintendent required that all children be vaccinated. Ritchie not only held that the members of the county school board had no right to pass such a regulation, but he recommended that its members would be prosecuted for wilful neglect of duty.<sup>35</sup> The Attorney General overlooked the possible First Amendment protection against infringements on religious beliefs for children whom came from Christian Scientist or other similarly religiously inclined families.

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<sup>35</sup>. Ibid., p. 3.

before reaching a conclusion).

When Ritchie was called upon to elaborate on his own compulsory work law, he held that the statute applied to aliens because it used the word "resides." His conclusion was simply stated: "All able bodied men must work or leave the State or be subject to the penalties provided by the law." <sup>36</sup>

Ritchie officially returned to the law department for full time work in 1919, but he did even less work than he had done in the previous year. By this time he was actively involved in the campaign for Governor. Since he found that his assistants could do the work while he was in Washington, he had no hesitation in leaving the work to them while he campaigned for office. He made no appearance in twenty lower court cases nor in five civil cases before the Court of Appeals. He appeared in only one criminal case, Issah Fountain v. State. In that case a conviction of rape was reversed because the conditions of the trial prevented it from being fair in the judgment of the appeals court. <sup>37</sup>

The State also filed an amicus curiae brief in the United States Supreme Court in Dakota Central Telephone Company v. State of Dakota. The case involved the authority of the President to set new wartime telephone rates without permission from the public service commission of the State. The court held in opposition to Ritchie's

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36. Ibid., pp. 263-4.

37. Ibid., 1919 Report, p. 7.

argument~~s~~ that the public service commission was suspended during government control of the telephone wires. <sup>38</sup>

Ritchie did write some of the official opinions which issued from the State law office. None of these have any special interest. He did not write any recommendations for the legislative session of 1920. He felt that he could do so in his capacity as Governor if he was elected to that job.

Ritchie's strength as Attorney General had been in his organizational talents and his efficiency. He was always competent on routine legal matters. His greatest weakness was in his failure to see beyond the narrow legal issues to possible broader constitutional problems, especially those involving civil liberties.

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38. Ibid., p. 12.

## CHAPTER FIVE

## SIX MONTHS IN WASHINGTON - THE WAR INDUSTRIES BOARD

The War Industries Board in final form was an executive agency responsible directly to the President. To head this board which was eventually given great responsibility, Woodrow Wilson chose the very successful financier, Bernard Baruch. Baruch began to look for a counsel as soon as he accepted the job. He offered the job to Judge J. Harry Covington. The judge refused but suggested that the young Attorney General of Maryland, Albert C. Ritchie, would be a good choice. Baruch said that he never regretted selecting Ritchie.<sup>1</sup>

But Ritchie was hesitant when Baruch's offer came. He was undoubtedly anxious to serve the United States during the war, but he wanted a job that he considered an advance in status. In November 1917, Wilson had offered him the job of counsel for the Alien Property Custodian. Ritchie had refused the position perfunctorily. Such a job was, he felt, for a minor functionary; he had larger ambitions. Baruch's offer was decidedly more attractive, and Ritchie considered it carefully for a few days. Then he wrote a rather unusual letter to President Wilson on June 1st, in which he noted that when the President had offered him the job as counsel for the Alien Property Custodian he felt constrained to decline the offer because he did not

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<sup>1</sup>. Bernard Baruch, The Public Years (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), p. 79.

feel justified in leaving a job to which the people had elected him. However, he was considering accepting the job Baruch had offered him. He wrote:

I have felt constrained to do this, not only because of the great importance of the work and the high duty to perform it which Mr. Baruch's offer involves, but also because I recall with so much pleasure your own generous expressions upon the former occasion, and, therefore, feel an added pride in what, in any event, would be a high privilege, - the association with you and your administration at this time. I hesitated much about giving up an office to which the people of Maryland elected me. Mr. Baruch felt decidedly that his offer involved a higher duty. If you also feel that it does, I would be most grateful for a line from you to this effect.<sup>2</sup>

Ritchie was fearful that his leaving for Washington would appear to be the act of an ambitious individual rather than that of a dedicated public servant. He did not want the charge thrown at him in future elections that he had once deserted the people of the State for more glamorous territory. He hoped the President would repeat the phrase about his being called to a higher duty so he could use it to rebut future attacks. In this he was disappointed. Wilson's reply was courteous but neutral. The President wrote:

I am sincerely glad to learn through your kind letter of June first that you have consented to serve as counsel for the War Industries Board. I know how important the duties of that board are and how much they are in need of able counsel, and it gratifies me very much that we are to have the benefit of your valuable services.<sup>3</sup>

At the time that he accepted the position Ritchie intended to resign

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<sup>2</sup>. Albert C. Ritchie to Woodrow Wilson, 1 May 1918, Ritchie Papers.

<sup>3</sup>. Woodrow Wilson to Albert C. Ritchie, 4 June 1918, Ritchie Papers.



as Attorney General.<sup>4</sup> His appointment had come as a surprise to most people. The Attorney General had been on a speaking tour for the war savings stamp campaign, and the offer was tendered at such a time that he had to be recalled from his trip. Ritchie was expected to resign very soon from his position, and the State was buzzing with speculation as to who would be his successor.<sup>5</sup>

But Ritchie did not resign. Less than three weeks after he reached Washington, he announced his decision to hold both jobs.<sup>6</sup> Some people speculated that Governor Harrington had persuaded Ritchie to remain on the job as Attorney General so he could avoid appointing Carlyle Benson to the post.<sup>7</sup> But this was doubtful speculation. Harrington did not seem to have been under any obligation to appoint Benson, and it was Baruch who was influential in Ritchie's decision. Baruch told Ritchie what the latter wanted to hear, that Ritchie was not derelict in his duties in taking a leave of absence. The war effort was of great importance, and he was needed in Washington. His well trained staff in Maryland could do the job adequately while he was on leave.<sup>8</sup>

Ritchie was looking forward to the 1919 State elections, and he did not wish to be stranded without a position from which to operate. He

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4. Baltimore Sun, 3 June 1918; Baltimore News, 4 June 1918.

5. Baltimore News, 3, 4 June 1918.

6. Baltimore American, 24 June 1918.

7. Baltimore Sun, 24 June 1918.

8. Bernard Baruch to Albert C. Ritchie, 20 June 1918, Ritchie Papers.

wanted to retain the office of Attorney General, but he did not wish to be criticized for doing his job improperly. Baruch's encouragement was enough to convince Ritchie to keep both positions. He hoped to silence some of the possible future criticism by refusing to accept his salary from the Attorney Generalship.

The board which Ritchie joined was an executive agency with uncertain legal status. No legislation had made precise provision for it, but in 1918 when specific legislation was considered, it was dismissed because it was felt the Board was doing a reasonable job and that there was no sense fettering it with a specific definition of powers. It had originally been a subordinate body to the Council of National Defense created in 1916, but it also had power under the Naval Appropriations Act of 1916. Later it received still further powers from the Lever Act of 1917. All of these laws gave powers to the President which he then delegated to the War Industries Board.<sup>9</sup>

The board had four basic tasks. It coordinated the demand for goods, set up a priority schedule for the production of goods, organized the supply of finished products, and fixed the prices for contracts for products which were supplied to the government. Of these functions, the setting of priorities was considered its most important function, but

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<sup>9</sup>. Randall B. Kestler, "The War Industries Board, 1917-1918, a Study in Industrial Mobilization." American Political Science Review, XXIV (1940), p. 661; Carl B. Swisher, American Constitutional Development (New York: Houghton, Mifflin, 1943), pp. 653-655.

price fixing was also of substantial consequence.<sup>10</sup>

In practice the chairman of the board of the price fixing committee worked in cooperation with the industry to determine the prices which the government was to pay for a commodity. These prices were high, but less so than they would have been without controls.<sup>11</sup>

The work of the War Industries Board had been described at length by Baruch himself and several historians. The purpose of this short introduction is to show that the broad legal actions required great care because of the tenuous legal status of the entire department. A mobile, tactful, and resourceful legal department was a necessity. Perhaps the two main problems were what should be done with damages resulting from priority regulations, especially for orders which were cancelled by the government; and how to justify pooling resources in light of anti-trust laws. There was a legal department in the priorities headed by Thomas N. Perkins of Boston. Ritchie, as general counsel, answered the legal questions for the major board which controlled all the boards for individual industries.<sup>13</sup>

Ritchie created an immediately favorable impression on Chairman Baruch when he arrived in Washington. Baruch later wrote that he

10. Ibid.

11. Carl B. Swisher, "The Control of War Preparations in The United States" American Political Science Review, XXIV (1940), p. 1099; Grosvenor B. Clarkson Industrial America in the World War (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Riverside Press, 1923), p. 63.

12. William F. Willoughby, Government Organization in Wartime (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1919), p. 207.

13. Ibid.

would never forget the first legal opinion that Ritchie wrote for him. The general counsel told Baruch that all of his previous decisions had been beyond his legal authority. Without blinking Ritchie told him that he could be sued personally for a loss involved to anyone who had followed the chairman's instructions. Baruch said at first he found this a paralyzing opinion, but since he had already issued orders involving amounts far beyond the extent of his personal fortune, he decided to keep on with his work. Later he admitted that he thought about Ritchie's warning occasionally.<sup>14</sup>

Ritchie was later called before a Congressional committee to testify about the activities of the War Industries Board. He was asked if he realized that the board had no power to spend money for some of its actions. Ritchie must have endeared himself to Baruch when he answered that he had advised the Chairman of the Board's lack of power in the situation but that Baruch had decided that the expense was necessary for the war effort. He replied, "Under the circumstances, there was nothing for Mr. Baruch to do but to pay the bills himself. The mission had to go."<sup>15</sup>

No doubt Baruch must have been impressed by Ritchie's usual diligence and precision in his work. He later described him as "intelligent and highly geared." He also took a personal liking to the Marylander. "Ritchie was a handsome man and a delightful

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14. Baruch, The Public Years, p. 79.

15. Willoughby, Government Organization in Wartime, p. 378.

companion ", he wrote. "We became the closest of friends." <sup>16</sup>

It is true that despite the difficult legal problems which faced the board because of its tenuous legal foundation, that a surprisingly small amount of litigation about its work ever reached the courts. This was because the board was doing excellent work on an important job in the stress of a national emergency. <sup>17</sup> Ritchie's cautious overseeing as general counsel helped to create the excellent record of lack of legal challenge.

While Ritchie did his regular work for the War Industries Board speculation continued about his future position in State politics. By the end of August 1918, Ritchie's name was being mentioned as a possible candidate for Mayor of Baltimore in the spring of 1919. Two diverse groups were considering Ritchie; those who wanted to end the career of Mayor Preston and those who wanted to eliminate Ritchie from the race for Governor in the fall of 1919. <sup>18</sup> Ritchie was already looking towards the Governorship and was uninterested in being Mayor of Baltimore.

Early in September, it was reported again that Ritchie would resign

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16. Baruch, The Public Years, p. 79.

17. Kester, "The War Industries Board", p. 633; Swisher, "Control of War Preparations in the United States", p. 1099.

18. Baltimore News, 27 August 1918; Baltimore American, 1 September 1918.

as Attorney General.<sup>19</sup> One Baltimore newspaper even went so far as to say that his successor would be William Cabell Bruce.<sup>20</sup> What caused this new rumor about his resigning is unclear. Ritchie announced on the next day that he would not resign.<sup>21</sup>

Then at the beginning of October there was a new wave of speculation that Ritchie was to be named Solicitor General of the United States to succeed John W. Davis who had just been selected as Ambassador to Great Britain. According to the Baltimore newspapers, Ritchie had been considered for the job when Davis was originally appointed.<sup>22</sup>

Ritchie was probably interested in any position that would advance his career, but he was concentrating on the Governorship. It was still too soon to make an official announcement of his candidacy, but he did manage to do some informal campaigning. Throughout the fall and winter, Ritchie spent very many evenings at public and private dinners.<sup>23</sup> Until this time he had not seen fit to make the rounds of

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19. Washington Star, 9 September 1918, clipping Ritchie Papers.

20. Baltimore American, 10 September 1918.

21. Baltimore Evening Sun, 10 September 1918, Baltimore American, 11 September 1918.

22. Baltimore Sun, 3 October 1918, Baltimore News, 3 October 1918, Baltimore American, 3 October 1918.

23. Ritchie Diary, October-December 1918, Ritchie Papers.

political clubs, but now he was working to build support.<sup>24</sup> While he was in Washington then, Ritchie still seemed more concerned with local politics.

The War Industries Board experience was but a short interlude in his life, and even while he was concerned with technical legal problems concerning the Board's right of action, his mind was still mainly occupied with Maryland politics and his career within the State. The experience with the Board did not alter his ideas in any significant way nor did it create any new lines of thought. The most important and lasting result of his service in Washington was his friendship with Bernard Baruch.

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24. Ritchie seldom made any personal comments in his diaries, but in 1918 he twice wrote interesting elliptical remarks that excite speculation. On August 8th, there is inscribed in handwriting that looks unlike Ritchie's normal script, "please don't leave us, I'm so used to you now." If the writing was not Ritchie's, it is hard to guess who could have access to the diary which he usually guarded so closely. On October 25th, he had dinner at the home of a Mr. and Mrs. Leiter in Washington, after which he scrawled in his diary, "terrible company, a perfect souvenir of nothing." Again the reason for so much agitation is unclear.

## CHAPTER SIX

### THE ELECTION OF 1919

It was to Ritchie's advantage that Republicans had been victorious in the statewide elections of 1916. In that year the Governor and Mayor of Baltimore and both United States Senators had been Democrats. Too much success made the party careless. A three way primary fight developed, and little effort was expended to keep it from becoming very bitter. For various reasons, none of the candidates was likely to please any segment of the state or city machine, and none could come close to satisfying all of them. Most organization leaders simply withdrew to the sidelines and waited for the results. The Congressman from Western Maryland, David J. Lewis, was the victor in the Democratic Senatorial primary. Lewis was the son of a coal miner whose life seemed to be one constant success over poor odds. He had been forced to work in the mines at the age of nine, yet he managed to educate himself by reading law books at night. When he decided to go into politics, he picked the Democratic Party although it seemed to be the minority party in Western Maryland. Lewis campaigned diligently for almost a decade; in 1910 he had become the Congressman from the Maryland sixth congressional district.<sup>1</sup> He won reelection in 1912 and 1914. Such victories might have seemed likely

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<sup>1</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 16 August 1922, p. 1.



to attract the notice and admiration of the statewide Democratic machine. But Lewis' ability to win in a district with a heavy Republican registration was outweighed by other factors in the eyes of Democratic politicians. Lewis was fiercely independent and held views which many considered Socialistic.<sup>2</sup>

Lewis' opponent in 1918 was the Republican maverick, Dr. Joseph L. France, who was not a much happier choice in the eyes of the Republican machine than Lewis was for the Democrats. France's biggest asset was the wealthy widow he had married; he could at least pay for his own campaign. Perhaps the only difference between the two men was that France had held only minor offices, and the extent of his independence was less clear.<sup>3</sup>

On election day the Democrats deserted Lewis because of what they felt were his Socialistic leanings.<sup>4</sup> Even without much support from his

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<sup>2</sup>. Lewis' liberalism was hardly more to the left side of the political spectrum than that of Woodrow Wilson who cordially endorsed him for election and later appointed him to the Federal Tariff Commission when he was defeated. Lewis later lost for Senate in 1924, and for House of Representatives in 1926 and 1928. He was returned to his old Congressional seat in 1930. He held that office until 1938 when he ran against Senator Tydings in the 1938 Democratic primary. In that election Roosevelt came to Maryland and campaigned for Lewis in his famous "purge", but Lewis was unsuccessful. Lewis' career is one of many examples of political longevity in Maryland politics despite defeat at the polls.

<sup>3</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 20 September 1918.

<sup>4</sup>. Baltimore Sun, 12 November 1918.

party's machine, France won the election 113,662 to 109,740.<sup>5</sup> The Democratic machine was undisturbed by the results; it had expected little patronage from Lewis. But the victory encouraged Republican hopes of winning the Governorship.

A second and more surprising Democratic loss came in the spring of 1919. Mayor Preston of Baltimore wanted a third term. He was opposed in the Democratic primary by a gentleman reformer, George Weems Williams, who was supported by some of the "best" people in the city and by such well known lawyers as William Marbury and Edgar A. Poe, former Attorney General of Maryland. Preston had the support of Mahon's machine and was expected to win the election easily. Boss Kelly was probably supporting Williams under cover. Ritchie made what seemed an error to many people when he announced his support of Williams.<sup>6</sup>

On election day the so called independent voter came to the polls in great numbers. On April 2nd, the results showed that Williams had beaten the machine and carried with him his running mates for City Council President and City Comptroller.<sup>7</sup> Because so few had expected Williams to win, the primary lacked bitterness. That made it easier

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5. Maryland Secretary of State, Maryland Manual, 1918, p. 273.

6. Baltimore Evening Sun, 23 March 1919, p. 10.

7. Baltimore Sun, 4 April 1919, The vote was Williams 25,052 to Preston 20,857; City Council President, Howard Bryant, 24,707 to J. Barry Mahool 18,821; Comptroller Joseph Smith 26,231 to James F. Thrift 17,348.

for the Democrats to unite around Williams. Mayor Preston and Boss Mahon announced the day after the election that the winner had their fullest support.<sup>8</sup>

As Williams' opponent the Republicans had nominated William F. Broening who had the dubious distinction for 1919 of being of German descent. Broening had been born in Baltimore in 1879 of such poor parents that he had been forced to leave public school to earn a living. Through great struggles he managed to become a member of the bar in 1897 and was elected to the City Council in the same year. He worked as secretary to Congressman Frank C. Wachter from 1897 to 1907; later he served one term in the Maryland House of Delegates. He had been elected State's Attorney of Baltimore City in 1911 and 1915.<sup>9</sup> Many people attributed Broening's success not so much to his abilities but rather that he belonged to so many organizations. Broening was a Supreme Dictator of the Loyal Order of Moose, and a member of the Knights of Pythias, the Masons, the Elks, the Odd Fellows and various humanitarian organizations.<sup>10</sup> He was an excellent handshaker.

With the Democratic machine solidly behind its able reformer, Broening hardly seemed to be a man to be feared. As the Baltimore Sun constantly ran testimonials for Williams, the Broening managers

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<sup>8</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 5 April 1919.

<sup>9</sup>. Wilbur F. Coyle, Mayors of Baltimore (Baltimore: Baltimore Municipal Journal, 1919), p. 208.

<sup>10</sup>. Ibid., p. 209.

grew more and more desperate because their handshaking candidate seemed unable to develop any issues and would not answer any of the specific charges leveled against him. Even so the Democrats took no chances and the most prominent party men spoke at large rallies. Ritchie spoke for Williams at Voigt's Hall where he cautioned the voters that the new Mayor would be the first to make appointments under the new merit system. He would have special power because some of his appointments would be practically for life.<sup>11</sup> Ritchie insisted that the person to be given such power was the honest, capable Williams and not a smiling party puppet. Election day found the Democrats at their most confident. Broening had failed to talk about what the Sun had labeled the important city issues of schools and health and, therefore, predicted a Williams landslide.<sup>12</sup>

Then the bomb fell. Baltimore awoke the day after the elections to find Broening had defeated Williams 60,306 to 51,093. The Republicans had also won the City Comptrollership. James Bryant had managed to win the City Council Presidency by 518 votes to give the Democrats their only victory for citywide office.<sup>13</sup> The Democratic leaders were badly frightened by the experience; many wondered what if anything could be done to prevent the Governorship from falling to the Republicans in the election that was six months away. Ritchie

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<sup>11</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 30 April 1919, p. 28.

<sup>12</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 2 May 1919, p. 32, 3 May 1919, p. 16, 6 May 1919, p. 28.

<sup>13</sup>. Official Tabulation of election results of Board of Election Supervisors, microfilm in Enoch Pratt Library, Baltimore, Maryland.

benefited from his party's lack of certainty.

Several men had already been mentioned as possible Democratic gubernatorial nominees. Among these were State Senators Harrison, Coblentz, and Gambrill, State Treasurer, John M. Dennis, Congressman Linthicum, and Senator Smith's protege, Samuel K. Dennis. The two men most often mentioned were Attorney General Ritchie and Comptroller McMullen. Ritchie announced his official entry into the race as soon as he could do so after the mayoralty election.<sup>14</sup> His announcement was expected.

Only Boss Mahon strenuously objected to Ritchie's candidacy. Both men remembered the 1915 elections. Mahon knew that if Ritchie won he was likely to give most of the gubernatorial patronage to Frank Kelly. Furthermore Mahon and his followers were angry that Ritchie had supported Williams in the mayoralty primary when it would have been possible for him to remain neutral. They continued to look for another candidate; McMullen was the most often mentioned possibility.<sup>15</sup>

Senator John Walter Smith was also unenthusiastic about Ritchie's candidacy. Unlike Mahon, Senator Smith did not hold any particular grudge against Ritchie; he simply had close friends who were interested in succeeding Harrington. John M. Dennis and Samuel K. Dennis were his most intimate friends among those mentioned for office, but he had

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<sup>14</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 19 May 1919, p. 18.

<sup>15</sup>. Ibid., 19 May 1919, p. 18.

closer ties with Mc Mullen than with Ritchie. Smith was looking for a subordinate, not a rival,. Ritchie was not the right man.

Ritchie's chances were further threatened by a "boom" at the end of May for General Milton A. Reckord by the Maryland veterans. The idea was reported to have originated among the men of the 29th infantry division while they were still in Europe. The Democratic leaders were aware of the advantage of running the States's most popular was "hero"; they were prepared to use this time tested method of turning defeat into victory if they felt it would work.<sup>16</sup> Reckord announced on June 9th that he was uninterested. Although he was even unsure of his party affiliation, many Democratic politicians still held on to the hope that he could be persuaded to run.<sup>17</sup>

It would have been difficult if not impossible for Ritchie to overcome all these obstacles if the Democratic leaders had not been quite so frightened of losing the elections. Fear of defeat discouraged some possible candidates; they decided to wait. Fear caused the bosses to try to avoid a primary battle at all costs. One factor that had seemed to help Broening in his mayorality campaign was his getting the nomination without a primary election. The Republicans had avoided a primary once again. The statewide party was divided between those who followed the leadership of former State Roads Commissioner

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16. Baltimore Evening Sun, 28 May 1919, p. 28; 29 May 1919, p. 28.

17. Ibid., 9 June 1919, p. 18.

Weller and those who followed former Governor Lowndes. Lowndes had considered running for Governor himself.<sup>18</sup> James A. Gary, with the backing of the Weller faction, had announced his candidacy for Governor early in May. The next month he had insisted that he would remain in the race at all cost.<sup>19</sup> However, by the end of June the Republican leaders had solved their disagreements; they all agreed to support a relative unknown, Harry C. Nice. It was a reward for Nice's hard work in Broening's campaign fight. His first reward had been appointment to Broening's old job as State's Attorney, the chief city legal office, when Broening left the job to become Mayor. A month later the Republicans decided to back this relatively new face for Governor because Nice had some of the same assets that had helped the Mayor. He was a jovial joiner and handshaker.<sup>20</sup> The ticket was balanced by the selection of an Eastern Shore man for Comptroller and Alexander Armstrong, a Western Maryland man for Attorney General.<sup>21</sup> Republican harmony without a primary battle was a reality.

It was then even more obvious that the Democrats could not afford a primary battle, but it was also true that they needed to choose better than a run of the mill party man if they expected to win in November. McMullen had served faithfully and well but his

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18. Baltimore Evening Sun, 19 May 1919, p. 18.

19. Ibid., 5 June 1919, p. 32.

20. Ibid., 19 May, p. 18; 24 June 1919, p. 24.

21. Ibid., 24 June 1919, p. 24.

record was less distinguished than Ritchie's, and he was less likely to attract admiration. It then became Ritchie's task to reconcile those who opposed him. Ritchie also wanted to see if he could find money to finance his campaign other than that which he could get from the regular organization.

In July, Bernard Baruch returned to the United States from Paris where he had been at the peace conference with President Wilson. Ritchie saw Baruch in Washington on the ninth of July.<sup>22</sup> It was probably at this meeting that Baruch assured Ritchie that he would contribute \$5,000 to his campaign. In 1919, that sum was enough to finance a statewide primary.

With the necessary financial resources for a primary battle, Ritchie started wooing his opponents. One way for the bosses to have forced Ritchie out of the race was to have pleaded neutrality and refused to finance his campaign. But Ritchie no longer needed financial help. He could even force the organization to finance a primary against him. In short, Ritchie was going to bargain with his opponents from a position of strength.

On July 13th, Ritchie saw ex-Mayor Preston, a Mahon man. Preston was reported to have said after the conference that he had chosen no candidate for Governor. He and other politicians were still waiting.<sup>23</sup> A few days later some Democrats asked State Central Committee Chair-

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22. Baltimore Evening Sun, 10 July 1919, p. 32.

23. Ibid., 14 July 1919, p. 14.



man, Hubert J. Wade, to call a general Democratic conference. The idea of the conference was that all the State political leaders would get together and pick a candidate so that a primary could be avoided. Ritchie said he would remain in the race no matter what such a conference would decide.<sup>24</sup> The Attorney General was aware that in such conferences a compromise candidate was chosen because the front runners were unacceptable to some or all of the leading bosses. He did not intend to be eliminated from the contest in this way.

That same week Ritchie called on Boss Mahon at the latter's summer home in Pikesville. The meeting had been brought about by mutual friends. Ritchie wished to state his case plainly and clear the air for party harmony. He told Mahon that he could not afford to leave the race at this point without too great a personal loss. Mahon refused to commit himself after the conference; he said he had not yet chosen a candidate for Governor.<sup>25</sup>

Two weeks later Democrats observed Harry Nice's tour of Western Maryland. Crowds in Allegany County were reported to be the largest in many years.<sup>26</sup> The Democrats again were reminded of the need for harmony.

On August 4th, McMullen withdrew from the race for Governor. He had seen the city bosses and said that his conferences had led him to

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24. Baltimore Evening Sun, 16 July 1919, p. 24.

25. Ibid., 18 July 1919, p. 22.

26. Ibid., 26 July 1919, p. 1.

believe that it was not a good year for the party. More likely he had found that the bosses were veering toward Ritchie.<sup>27</sup> Only three days then remained before the deadline date for filing for statewide offices, and Ritchie was the only candidate in sight.

On August 6th, Kelly and Mahon met for the first time in four years. Eugene O'Dunne, the candidate for State's attorney, had brought about the meeting. After a private meeting the two leaders announced their intention to work together for Ritchie.<sup>28</sup>

Then the ticket to run with Ritchie was completed. The Democrats selected Thomas J. Keating, an Eastern Shore man for Attorney General. For Comptroller they chose Major E. Brooke Lee of Montgomery County in Southern Maryland. Major Lee was the son of former United States Senator, Blair Lee, and the possessor of a distinguished war record. Family name and military laurels combined to make him a very attractive potential candidate and the Democrats had worked hard to cajole him into running. Lee was not at all anxious to make the race, but eventually he agreed to do so for the sake of his party.<sup>30</sup> The ticket was completed by the choice of Caleb C. Magruder as the candidate for clerk of the Court of Appeals.

The Kelly and Mahon factions in Baltimore City were unable to agree on candidates for local offices. Both Ritchie and Lee had met

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27. Baltimore Evening Sun, 5 August 1919, p. 32.

28. Ibid., 6 August 1919, p. 22.

29. Ibid., p. 22.

30. Ibid., 7 August 1919, p. 32.

with both sides and tried to convince them to compromise.<sup>31</sup> But when the deadline passed for withdrawal of names, each faction had a full ticket in the field.<sup>32</sup> Ritchie had been unable to eliminate a Democratic primary, but he had managed to limit it to Baltimore elections. His party was then more united than it had been in five or six years.

With the primary election out of the way the Democrats looked forward to the general election. Their first task was the construction of a platform. In 1915, Ritchie had worded the planks on the basis of Governor Harrington's ideas. This time he intended to write the whole document; he also expected to have a freer hand in deciding what ideas it should contain. He spent the week of September 10th through September 17th at work on it.<sup>33</sup>

How much of the platform was Ritchie's own work and how much belonged to other men is uncertain. Ritchie was forced to temper some of his ideas; the resulting platform planks are vaguer than those he wrote later when he had complete control of his party. There was a plank defending the National Democratic administration and lauded the achievements of the Harrington government within the State. A section on the "high cost of living" claimed that the problem was mainly a national one, and that the Federal government was already in the process of solving it, but that the State could protect people by laws against

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31. Baltimore Evening Sun, 15 August 1919, p. 20; 16 August 1919, p. 14; 19 August 1919, p. 22.

32. Ibid., 23 August 1919, p. 16; 16 August 1919, p. 24.

33. Ibid., 10 September, p. 22; 17 September 1919, p. 24.

profiteering to which the Democrats pledged themselves. Next there was a plank labeled "economy and efficiency" in which they pledged to establish a central purchasing department and a merit system for Maryland. This was followed by a section which endorsed home rule for Baltimore City. It specifically requested a referendum as to whether the police board of Baltimore City should be appointed by the Mayor rather than the Governor. There followed general statements in support of good roads, public schools, agriculture, and oyster conservation. The last section contained a specific statement against the adoption of the proposed Federal amendment for woman suffrage.<sup>34</sup>

One can see the work of several men in the document. The most important task for Ritchie was to keep all sections of the party satisfied. The Baltimore City bosses were pacified by the planks to give the city more control over local offices. The whole city and State organizations approved the vagueness about schools, roads, and agriculture where specific promises may have been hard to redeem, and which might indirectly limit their power. The plank opposing the suffrage amendment was Ritchie's concession to United States Senator John W. Smith and his wing of the party. Ritchie was uncertain whether women should vote, so the concession to Smith was easy to make. Ritchie's personal desires were limited to one section of proposed reforms for the State dealing with the central purchasing agency and the merit system.

These were organizational reforms, the ones Ritchie always worked on

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<sup>34</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 18 September 1919, p. 32.

<sup>35</sup>. Ibid., 10 September 1919, p. 22.

first. Even so the platform was carefully worded so that the one sentence about the merit system did not begin to tell how broad a system the Democrats would support when it came time to make the actual legislation. The bosses were unlikely to have sanctioned such a statement even if Ritchie was willing to limit the appointing power of the Governor so severely.

The platform was submitted to the members of the Democratic State Central Committee at the State convention in Baltimore on September 18th. Ritchie, who missed no chance to further party harmony, had suggested that his former opponent, Hugh McMullen, be chosen as the chairman of the convention. At the meeting, Ritchie was officially nominated and the unamended platform was accepted by acclamation.<sup>36</sup> In an editorial the Sun praised the platform for its clarity and stands on the merit system, the national administration, and woman's suffrage.<sup>37</sup>

The Republican platform was written the following week; the results were similar to the Democratic document. The Republicans naturally attacked the national and State Democratic administrations, but there were similar planks on schools, roads, agriculture, oyster conservation, and the Baltimore police. The Republicans claimed the Democratic plank about a merit system was too vague and stated, "We pledge our party to the establishment of a civil service system in this State

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<sup>36</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 18 September 1919, p. 32.

<sup>37</sup>. Baltimore Sun, 19 September 1919, p. 18. The Democratic bias of the Sun should be weighed when in the comment on the platform.

based on merit alone." But the Republicans did not specify the extent of the merit system any more than the Democrats had. Republican bosses had no desire to limit themselves either. The Republicans did differ with the Democrats on woman suffrage. Rather than make a clear declaration for or against the proposed amendment, the Republicans hedged the issue by saying that the people of the State should be given a vote by referendum on the issue before the State legislature acted on the matter.<sup>38</sup>

The similarity between the two platforms made it clear even before the campaigning had begun that the election was unlikely to be fought on broad issues.

Once the platforms had been written both candidates started on hectic speaking tours all around the State. Actually both men had been campaigning since June. Ritchie's diary shows a heavy speaking schedule for the entire summer. The only change after September was that he began to make at least one speech a day and sometimes more.<sup>39</sup>

No one agreed on the effects of the first incident of the campaign. William Broening, the new Republican Mayor of Baltimore, had submitted his list of appointments to the largely Democratic City Council for approval and had received a long list of rejections. The Baltimore American commented that the partisanship of the Democrats hurt their chances of attracting independent votes in the State campaign.<sup>40</sup> The

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38. Baltimore Evening Sun, 25 September 1919, p. 32.

39. Diary, Ritchie Papers.

40. Baltimore American, 1 October 1919.

Sun commented that Broening's political ineptitude would lose votes for his party.<sup>41</sup>

As the campaign progressed, the areas of disagreement took clearer form. Nice had basically decided to campaign on personality rather than on the issues, but there were several places where he vigorously attacked the Democrats. He was particularly hard on the national Democratic administration. At various times he blamed the Democratic Party for the shortage of sugar, for the high cost of army cantonments, and even lambasted Woodrow Wilson's administration for carelessly leaving army trucks to stand in the rain.<sup>42</sup> He also searched for an issue on which to attack the State administration of Governor Harrington but was less successful. He did complain that the Democrats had failed to abolish the office of State auditor, but he could find no major scandals or lapses of duty.<sup>43</sup> Ritchie defended the national administration, but the newspapers tried to convince the public that national issues were irrelevant to the local elections. They ran several editorials on the need of selecting a candidate on the choice of local issues and personal qualifications.<sup>44</sup>

The one time when Harry Nice tried to attack the Democrats on a

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41. Baltimore Sun, 1 October 1919.

42. Baltimore Evening Sun, 16 October 1919, p. 10.

43. Ibid., p. 10.

44. Ibid., 16 October, p. 10; 18 October, p. 8; 20 October, p. 10; 27 October, p. 12; 3 November 1919, p. 12.

local matter, the intended shot turned out to be a boomerang that exploded in his own camp. Nice attacked the Democratic Party for being boss ridden; he claimed that Ritchie was a pawn of Boss Kelly, an infamous character.<sup>45</sup> One of Kelly's close associates, Harry Laib, answered for the Democrats. Laib pointed out that Nice had requested Kelly's help when he wanted to become a member of the board of election supervisors in 1908 and again when he wanted to become assistant State's attorney to Broening in 1912. Laib made his answer in a large public advertisement in the newspapers.<sup>46</sup> Nice was caught short and tried to dodge the fire. He said that Laib's own salary was too low for him to afford to be able to put an advertisement of such size in the papers. Therefore, Nice concluded Ritchie was the true author but he was too cowardly to use his own name.<sup>47</sup> Incidentally Nice noted that he was appointed by the Governor in 1908 and by the Mayor in 1912. He did not, however, deny Kelly's influence.<sup>48</sup> Later Nice changed his story slightly. He claimed the only way for him to receive a minority appointment was to cooperate with the Boss ridden system. Kelly's power was so pervasive that even he could not avoid it.<sup>49</sup> However, Kelly had a written letter to show that Nice had tried to enlist his help

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45. Baltimore Evening Sun, 18 October 1919, p. 18.

46. Baltimore Sun, 18 October 1919, p. 30. The advertisement included a reprint of Nice's letters of thanks to Kelly.

47. Baltimore Evening Sun, 18 October 1919, p. 18.

48. Ibid., p. 18.

49. Ibid., 20 October 1919.



in Broening's campaign for Mayor that very spring, and the Boss released it to the newspapers.<sup>50</sup> Ritchie's party had certainly won a draw on this issue, but Ritchie could not afford to press the matter home. He could not afford to alienate the bosses by a too obvious repudiation of their influence. He was fighting an uphill battle in the election and he needed their help. Besides the case of Woodrow Wilson as Governor of New Jersey was less than ten years old and the bosses of Maryland were on guard against gentleman Governors who had no use for political machines.

Actually Ritchie had no more desire than Nice to make the election one of issues. He was willing to run on his record as city solicitor and Attorney General and the achievements of the Harrington administration. Compared to his speeches in his later elections, Ritchie's talks in 1919 were overly cautious, neutral, and dull. Ritchie's strategy was to continue his efforts to have the official party machinery turn as smoothly and efficiently as he possibly could. He had visited every county in the State by October 17th to insure this.<sup>51</sup> Then he concentrated his efforts on Baltimore City. He had planned meetings for every ward and hoped to meet each ward leader personally while working for harmony between the Kelly and Mahon men.<sup>52</sup> It was reported that the organizations of the two bosses were working better together than they

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50. Baltimore Evening Sun, 21 October 1919, p. 28.

51. Ibid., 17 October 1919, p. 32.

52. Ibid., p. 32.

had ever done in the past. <sup>53</sup>

But Ritchie wanted to be certain that the two factions of the Baltimore organization kept the peace through election day. Only one person was <sup>might be</sup> able to possibly keep Mahon and Kelly in line. That was State boss Frank Furst so Ritchie persuaded him to become the head of the Baltimore campaign officially over both of the city bosses. <sup>54</sup> The plan seemed to be successful, and no family squabbles of any size were heard in the Democratic headquarters.

At the end of October the campaign continued without incident. Both Nice and Ritchie kept on with their hectic pace of handshaking and speaking; both made tours of the major factories and businesses of Baltimore City. <sup>55</sup> On October 26th, Nice made another blunder when he accused Bernard Baruch of taking a \$15,000. salary in order to go to Paris with Woodrow Wilson and accused Ritchie of collecting an unwarranted \$15,000. a year as general counsel for the War Industries Board. Even before Ritchie had a chance to answer for himself, the newspapers quickly exposed the statements as untrue. Baruch had paid for his trip to Europe with his own money, and although Congress had set Ritchie's salary at \$15,000 <sup>has</sup> he had it lowered to \$10,000 <sup>on</sup> on his own motion. Furthermore, he had refused his salary from the State of Maryland for the time he was away. These mistakes gave Ritchie the opportunity to label Nice as an irresponsible speaker. <sup>56</sup>

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53. Baltimore Evening Sun, 21 October 1919, p. 28.

54. Ibid., 22 October 1919, p. 28.

55. Ibid., 22 October 1919, p. 28.

56. Ibid., 27 October 1919, p. 12.

The final week of the campaign had the most fanfare, but underneath the noise it was the dullest of all. The Republicans imported Governor Allen of Kansas to speak for Nice. Allen limited his remarks to national issues.<sup>57</sup> Nice himself spoke mainly on national issues in the last week before the election.<sup>58</sup> Meanwhile, Ritchie was still as cautious as he could be. In his big speech at the Lyric Theatre on October 28th, he carefully lauded all the factions of the State Democratic Party and spent most of his time praising President Wilson.<sup>59</sup> A little more than a week before the election Wilson had vetoed a prohibition bill. The action was a popular one because prohibitionists disliked the form of the legislation and anti-prohibitionists disliked the legislation itself. Ritchie may have profited from the President's action.<sup>60</sup> Other than this there was no incident of importance in the last week of the campaign.

The results of the election were close. The margin of victory for the Governorship was the narrowest in the history of the State and has remained so until the present day. The election was held on November 4th, but the vote was so close that the next Governor was not known until three days later. Ritchie had wrested victory by a mere 165 votes. The final tally read Ritchie 112,240 to Nice 112,075.<sup>61</sup>

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57. Baltimore Evening Sun, 27 October 1919, p. 24.

58. Ibid., 29 October 1919, p. 28.

59. Ibid., 28 October 1919, p. 24; 29 October 1919, p. 4.

60. Ibid., 28 October 1919, p. 24.

61. Ibid., 5, 6, 7 November 1919, pp. 1-3.

Ritchie had carried Baltimore City by slightly less than two thousand votes. Nice had carried the counties by little over one thousand. Still Ritchie had done better outside of Baltimore than had been expected. Nice won in Republican Western Maryland, and had managed to get a small majority on the Eastern Shore. In Southern Maryland the vote was almost even thanks to the fact that E. Brooke Lee's Montgomery County had given Ritchie a 600 vote margin. Ritchie had won in the counties which bordered on Baltimore City and in Harford County. In short the election was remarkably close all around the State. No division between city and counties was evident, nor were any of the sections especially different.<sup>62</sup> This pattern was to be radically changed within the next decade largely due to Ritchie's policies.

The election for the other three statewide offices was almost as close. In the election for Attorney General, the Republican, Alexander Armstrong, managed to win by 608 votes over the Democrat, Thomas J. Keating. The Democrats won the remaining two offices by slightly larger majorities. Caleb C. Magruder won the office of clerk of the Court of Appeals by 3573 votes and E. Brooke Lee had the largest majority with his 5562 vote victory. The Democrats had majorities in both houses of the state legislature, but neither was very comfortable. The Democrats had 15 members in the State Senate to twelve for the Republicans and a twelve vote

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<sup>62</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 7 November 1919, pp. 1-3.

majority in the House of Delegates.<sup>63</sup> In order to work with such narrow majorities Ritchie could not afford to offend any segment within his party.

With such a narrow margin of victory questions have arisen whether there was any fraud. Frank R. Kent, political editor of the Sunpapers said, four years later that no one had ever even mentioned fraud.<sup>64</sup> This was untrue. The Republicans were aware that there had been a possibility of election irregularities in 1919. In Southern Maryland they knew that Democrats had prepared trick ballots, but these were discovered before the election.<sup>65</sup> The Republicans never protested the elections in the courts, but they were curious about the late returns from certain precincts in Baltimore and Anne Arundel Counties.<sup>66</sup> The method of reversing election results in Maryland was traditionally to hold the ballots until late in the evening, and then call into headquarters to find out just how many, if any, votes were going to be needed for victory. Then ballots for the other party would be marked by any number of devious illegal means and thus be eliminated from the total count. If a situation prevailed where a large majority was expected for opponents in any one area, ballot boxes could be conveniently lost. This was possible because local officials were sometimes all Democrats.

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<sup>63</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 7 November 1919, pp. 1-3.

<sup>64</sup>. Baltimore Sun, 2 October 1923.

<sup>65</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 6 November 1919, p. 1.

<sup>66</sup>. Ibid., p. 1.

Such frauds were impossible to prove. Several politicians interviewed by the author felt that Nice was counted out in this way in 1919, but none of them would allow their names to be used, nor is there any way for the author to test their reliability. It is unlikely that any of the men who were directly involved are likely to admit their culpability. The possibility of fraud in the 1919 elections must remain unproved. It did not become a major question for the public in 1919, and Harry Nice accepted defeat graciously.

The closeness of the election did not bother Ritchie. He was anxious to prove himself in his new job and began to plan with customary vigor. He was now forty-three years old. Although it was less than ten years since he entered politics, he was Governor of the State.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

## THE FIRST THREE MONTHS AS GOVERNOR

Ritchie was inaugurated on January 13, 1920. He left his house in Baltimore at 9;25 in the morning and traveled by car to Annapolis. With him in the car were his mother, his law partner, Stuart Janney, Phillip Perlman, and his private secretary, Oscar Anderson. On his arrival in the State capital, Annapolis, Ritchie met Governor Harrington, and the two men went together to the capitol. In front of a joint session of the legislature which met in the chamber of the House of Delegates, Ritchie spoke. This was Ritchie's inaugural address, which in Maryland was ironically given before the Governor was sworn into office. After the speech, the group moved to the Senate chamber where Judge A. Hunter Boyd of the Maryland Court of Appeals delivered the oath of office as Ritchie was officially sworn into power.<sup>1</sup>

Ritchie then went to the Governor's office on the second floor of the State House and took formal possession. He had no use for pomp and ceremony so he had insisted that the inauguration ceremonies be kept simple. The spotlight of the day had been on his address rather than on spectacle.

The speech covered matters that interested Ritchie throughout his entire career. His main point was the need for economy in the State. But the biggest applause of the day came when he said, "there is

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<sup>1</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 13 January 1920, p. 1.

already too much regulatory legislation." Ritchie objected to such laws because they impaired business efficiency and initiative and restricted the individual's liberty of conduct.<sup>2</sup> A balanced budget and as little government action as possible were the key themes of Ritchie's administrative theory.

He also discussed some specific matters. He urged increases in salaries of teachers and police; he objected to an extensive construction program for State institutions. He urged adoption of the platform promise of a merit system for State employees. Ritchie also mentioned two rather explosive topics; he advocated increased representation for Baltimore City; he stated his opposition to the National Prohibition Amendment. It took some courage for him to comment on these issues for the political liability of comment on either one was likely to be large.<sup>3</sup>

But Ritchie had begun his work much earlier. Between his election and his inauguration, he had helped with the organization of the State legislature, prepared his budget, and drawn legislation relating to Democratic campaign promises for submission to the legislature.

The legislature of the State of Maryland did not keep standing committees or general officers from session to session. Therefore, battling for position before the legislature met was standard procedure.

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<sup>2</sup>. Inaugural Address of the Governor of Maryland (Annapolis: King Brothers, State Printers, 1920), p. 5.

<sup>3</sup>. Ibid., pp. 17, 20-1; Baltimore Sun, 15 January 1920.



The Governor and State bosses of all ranks joined members of the legislature in the intriguing for offices, especially the president of the Senate and the speaker of the House of Delegates. In 1919 several men wanted these jobs. Ritchie may have had preferences in each case, but the closeness of his election victory left him indebted to all factions of the Democratic Party, and he could not afford to alienate any of them.

The most likely choice for president of the senate was Senator Campbell who had been Democratic floor leader in 1912 and 1914 and senate president in 1916 and 1918. Although several other men were anxious to have the office, Campbell's selection seemed fairly well assured by mid-December.<sup>4</sup> The scramble began again when Campbell died on December 20th.<sup>5</sup> Three candidates then came to the fore: Senators Norris and Frick of Baltimore and Senator Orlando Harrison of Worcester County. Harrison was a Smith man and because a Smith man, John W. Dennis, had already been agreed upon as the State treasurer, one of the Baltimore men was the more likely choice. Both Norris and Frick were Mahon men, and the boss preferred not to alienate one or the other by choosing between them.<sup>6</sup> He gave the job to Ritchie who directed the selection of Norris whom he believed would follow administration plans.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 10 December 1919, p. 28.

<sup>5</sup>. Ibid., 20 December 1919, p. 18.

<sup>6</sup>. Ibid., 5 January 1920, p. 22.

<sup>7</sup>. Ibid., p. 22; 6 January 1920, p. 24.

The speaker of the House of Delegates was chosen more easily even though there were more aspiring candidates.<sup>8</sup> As a reward for his favor to the party in running for State Comptroller, E. Brooke Lee, was allowed to name the candidate for speaker. Lee's choice was Millard Tydings, a young lawyer from Harford County. With the firm backing of Ritchie and Lee there was no serious opposition to his nomination.<sup>9</sup>

There seemed nothing remarkable in the choice of Norris and Tydings, but Ritchie, without doing anything dramatic in the way of leadership, had managed to limit the influence of Senator Smith, the titular party leader, more than many expected. Only one of the three major offices went to a Smith man. No faction received more than one important position. While no segment of the party could claim to have been left out, no group had the power to challenge Ritchie. Furthermore, both legislative leaders were very young men, far younger than previous legislative leaders. Neither had a large personal following of his own so that both were likely to be dependent on Ritchie for guidance and advice. In a rather subtle way, Ritchie had set the stage to give himself maximum influence with the incoming legislature.

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<sup>8</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 10 November 1919, p. 24.

<sup>9</sup>. Ibid., 5 January 1920, p. 22; 26 January 1920, p. 24; Maryland Senate, Journal of Proceedings of The Senate of Maryland 1920 (Annapolis: George T. Melvin, 1920), pp. 7-8.

However, Ritchie did not spend the majority of his time helping to select the legislative leaders. He felt his major task was to draft the State budget. The powers of the Governor of Maryland over the budget were unusual. The Governor presented a complete budget to the General Assembly. The lawmakers could then reduce expenditures if they pleased, but they had no power to increase regular appropriations. The original purpose of the Constitutional limitation was to prevent logrolling even though this procedure was the reverse of general American theory which posited a strong executive being limited in his actions by legislative power of the purse. In Maryland the Governor could not be blocked by the legislature in this way; he could also hamper the lawmakers by failing to appropriate money for programs they desired.<sup>10</sup> It also placed the responsibility on the Governor to plan more carefully than in other states.

Ritchie applied to governmental finance his ideas of home economy. The government should be as frugal as possible; the budget should be balanced. If taxes could be lowered by economies in the government, Ritchie nearly always favored such economies.

Ritchie developed his routine for preparation of the budget in 1919. He asked all of the State department heads for estimates of their expenses for the following two years. Sometimes he called them into private conference to explain their requests for specific appropriations.

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<sup>10</sup>. Harry Joseph Green, A Study of the Legislature of the State of Maryland with Special Reference to the Session of 1927 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1928), pp. 1-8.

Then he perused each line of print and cut out any expense which he felt unnecessary. Often the department heads were discouraged or annoyed at Ritchie's economizing, but there was no way to avoid the Governor's power or to change his ideas on economy. Ritchie took a vacation in French Lick, Indiana from December 2nd to December 16th so that he could work on the budget away from other cares of the state.<sup>11</sup>

Before he left for vacation, Ritchie made one major appointment. The position of secretary of State of Maryland had previously been considered one of the most lucrative plums of all of the Governor's appointments because of the high salary it commanded. The salary had then been reduced and the job was far less attractive. Almost from the moment of his election, it had been expected that Ritchie would choose one of his four assistant Attorneys General for his new secretary of State.<sup>12</sup> Most of the political gossips were betting that Marbury would be the choice.<sup>13</sup> However, Ritchie had already offered the job to Phillip Perlman. Perlman considered the offer for a few days; on December 3rd, he accepted.<sup>14</sup>

At twenty nine Perlman already had an unusual career. After he completed public high school, he had taken some special courses at Johns Hopkins University and then he entered the University of Maryland Law School at the age of nineteen. He had been admitted

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11. Ritchie Diary, December 2-15, 1919, Ritchie Papers.

12. Baltimore Evening Sun, 10 November 1919, p. 24.

13. Ibid., 2 December 1919, p. 28.

14. Ibid., 3 December 1919, p. 28.

to the bar two years later although he had already become a reporter for the Baltimore Sun. In 1913, at the age of 23, he had become the newspaper's city editor, but four years later Ritchie drew him away as an assistant for the State Law Department. One can see from the amount of work that he assigned to the young man that Ritchie's confidence in Perlman grew steadily in the four year period. He rewarded Perlman with the job of Secretary of State although he was not yet thirty years old.<sup>15</sup>

Ritchie had put Perlman to work even before he appointed him Secretary of State. The Governor-elect regarded the Democratic platform as a contract with the people; he had every intention of redeeming all of its promises. He considered three platform planks to be the most important. Unfortunately the platform had been intentionally vague about the nature and extent of the merit system or the central purchasing bureau and something less than exact about the changes to give Baltimore City control of its own police force. Each of these three proposals now had to be put into form of legislation. The task was difficult because of the small Democratic majorities in both houses of the legislature. The proposals would have to be drawn so as to satisfy nearly everyone in the party or so as to attract some Republican support. Ritchie handed the job to Perlman and expected him to complete it by the time he returned from vacation.

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<sup>15</sup>. Maryland Secretary of State, Maryland Manual, 1920, p. 78.

The legislature opened officially on January 7th. The session immediately chose its officers. There was no difficulty obtaining approval for the men whom Ritchie had helped to select.<sup>16</sup> After Ritchie's inauguration, the legislature met again on January 19th, organized itself into the committees which its officers had chosen, and settled down to business. Perlman had drafts of legislation to fulfill Democratic campaign promises ready for submission to the lawmakers in their first week of work. Perlman's work revealed that Ritchie did not intend to stop with the platform proposals. Ritchie wanted to make the administration of the State highway system more efficient. On January 20th, he called together Chairman Zouck of the state roads commission and several legislative leaders. At the conference in his office, Ritchie told the men that he was eager to establish a firm, definite policy with regard to the cost and maintenance of the state roads system. However, he felt he lacked the expert knowledge to write the particulars for such a system himself. Therefore, he suggested that a special legislative committee be established which would cooperate with Chairman Zouck to do so.<sup>17</sup> The men also decided at the meeting that the State should match equally the Federal appropriation of \$850,000. per year for the next ten years for the purpose of building trunk lines and post roads.<sup>18</sup>

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16. Baltimore Evening Sun, 7 January 1920, p. 1.

17. Ibid., 20 January 1920, p. 1.

18. Baltimore Sun, 10 March 1920, p. 6; See Henry J. Bittermann, State and Federal Grants-in-Aid (New York: ~~Mentzer~~, Bush and Company, 1938), Chapter 10.

In addition to this a fund of \$750,000 per year was to be provided from which lateral roads could be constructed, but this was to be contingent on the counties matching the sum on a fifty-fifty basis.<sup>19</sup>

Probably the most important measure before the legislature in 1920 was the bill for a State merit system. Ritchie held the bill until February 4th and then sent it to the House of Delegates.<sup>20</sup> As soon as its contents were made public there was an immediate cry of disappointment from civil service reform advocates and reformers in general. They were outraged by the limited coverage of the proposed system. The bill proposed the exclusion of eight categories of employees. Some of these exemptions were expected. They included State elective officers and all heads of departments appointed directly by the Governor or the board of public works; officers and employees of the General Assembly; officers of the various courts which included sheriffs and clerks who were classified as State officials but who functioned as local officials, the State legal officers, and the Baltimore City police who already had their own merit system. But three classes of exemptions were especially disturbing to reformers. These were all secretaries, chief clerks, and chief administrative officers, all State positions as determined by the State commissioner with the approval of the Governor that required medical, engineering, scientific, educational, or expert training and qualifications; and all positions which commanded

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<sup>19</sup>. Baltimore Sun, 22 January 1920, p. 20; Bittermann, State and Federal Grants-in-Aid, Chapter 9.

<sup>20</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 4 February 1920, p. 1.

an annual salary of under \$650.

How did Ritchie justify these exemptions was what his critics wanted to know. They claimed the Governor had sold out to the political bosses and was proposing the form of a merit system from which most of the important jobs were excluded and thus left to political control. "Untrue," Ritchie replied. He had expected that the last three classes of exemptions would cause controversy, but the new system was a radical change that should be launched slowly. Security was needed for State employees, but not at the loss of incentive to work. It was possible that the establishment of a merit system might cause employees to be less efficient at their jobs because they had little fear of replacement. Therefore, he felt that the best way to achieve both efficiency and security for employees was to add positions slowly on the basis of administrative experience rather than by general legislative fiat.<sup>22</sup> Ritchie's bill also provided that the system was to be administered by a State employment commissioner who was to receive an annual salary of \$5,000. The State commissioner would constantly survey the operation of the system and make additions or corrections.<sup>23</sup>

The system was to become partially effective on October 1, 1920 and completely effective on January 1st of the following year. Salary classifications were to be made on the second date. All of these provisions,

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<sup>21</sup> Baltimore Evening Sun, 4 February 1920, p. 1; Maryland House of Delegates, Journal of Proceedings of The House of Delegates of Maryland, 1920 (Annapolis: King Brothers, 1920), p. 160.

<sup>22</sup> Baltimore Evening Sun, 4 February 1920, p. 1.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p. 1.



Ritchie argued, showed his integrity in setting up the system. He did not wish it to be an emasculated system any more than the reformers, but he felt that a good administrator should see that the system was applied gradually.

Ritchie's plan went through the legislature comparatively smoothly. Republicans of reformist bent had announced that they would introduce a rival plan with greater coverage, but their suggestions never got off the ground.<sup>24</sup> The Senate passed the bill by a vote of 26-1.<sup>25</sup> The only dispute had been whether ex-servicemen should be given "special preference" as Senator Metzertott suggested. The legislators refused to accept this and finally substituted the clause that servicemen should be given "due credit."<sup>26</sup> The House of Delegates passed the amended bill even more quickly, and Ritchie signed the bill into law on March 1st.<sup>27</sup>

On the same day, the Governor also reconstrued the law to include secretaries and chief clerks into the merit system instead of exempting them. He gave no reason why he changed his position. Perhaps he had been convinced by the reasoning of his opponents. Perhaps he feared the adverse criticism of the Republicans in a future election, or possibly he had made a deal about other legislation with

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24. Baltimore Evening Sun, 13 February 1920, p. 1.

25. Ibid., 26 February 1920, p. 1.

26. Ibid., p. 1.

27. Ibid., 2 March 1920, p. 1. Maryland House of Delegates, House of Delegates Proceedings, 1920, p. 408; Maryland Senate, Journal of Proceedings of the Maryland Senate, 1920, p. 770.

the bosses in agreement for allowing the system to be made more comprehensive. Ritchie did not comment, and the political world was strangely quiet about his surprising reversal of position. <sup>28</sup>

Because of his method of delivery and the content of the budget, Ritchie increased the attention given to fiscal matters. The Governor had decided to dramatize the importance of the budget by imitating Presidents Washington and Wilson; he delivered his message in person to the legislature even though there was no precedent for this in Maryland history. <sup>29</sup> By reading it aloud in its entirety, he intended to be certain that all the legislators were aware of his budget proposals and the reasons for them. In the past the budget had often been inserted into the records, and some men never read it at all. <sup>30</sup> Ritchie requested pay raises for police, teachers, the State commissioner of motor vehicles, the State bank commissioner and several departments in the State department of agriculture. The Governor also presented a rather comprehensive set of appropriations for roads, hospitals, schools and other institutions. But Ritchie asserted that despite these increases, the State tax rate could be lowered two cents on each one hundred dollars, from 36 $\frac{31}{72}$  to 34 $\frac{31}{72}$  cents. <sup>31</sup>

The reduction was possible because of economies in Harrington's

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<sup>28</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 2 March 1920, p. 1.

<sup>29</sup>. Baltimore Sun, 4 February 1920, p. 23.

<sup>30</sup>. Baltimore Star, 6 February 1920, p. 23, clipping in Ritchie Papers.

<sup>31</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 11 February 1920, p. 1.

administration and a resulting surplus in the State treasury and because of Ritchie's ability to economize through administrative efficiency.<sup>32</sup>

The Governor made his usual obeisance to economy; he obviously regretted having to raise any salaries. But he noted that higher wages in private enterprise and higher living costs required him to increase the pay for certain positions.<sup>33</sup>

It was unusual if not completely unprecedented for a Governor to lower the State tax rate, and Ritchie's action received favorable comments around the State. There was little for the lawmakers to prune from the budget unless they wished to deny salary raises or perhaps to cut the \$5,000 a year which Ritchie had added to the budget for maintenance of the Executive Mansion. However, the legislators were aware just how painfully necessary the increased salaries were. Something was also necessary to improve the State House which was in bad disrepair. Ritchie's mother had come to the State House to be the official hostess for the State. She had been appalled by the conditions of the historic building. Immediately she compiled a list of necessary repairs if the building was to be saved. She noted that some of these might be done at lower cost if they waited until the cost of living again declined, but that the problems were so bad that it would be dangerous to leave them uncorrected.<sup>34</sup> Ritchie's budget passed easily.<sup>35</sup>

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32. Baltimore American, 12 February 1920, p. 31.

33. Baltimore Evening Sun, 11 February 1920, p. 1.

34. Memorandum of Mrs. Albert Ritchie, Ritchie Papers. Mrs. Ritchie's comments on the linen and the china indicate that previous Governors had pretty well ransacked the Executive Mansion.

35. Baltimore Evening Sun, 4 April 1920, p. 3.

Ritchie had only qualified success in fulfilling the platform pledge to give greater representation to Baltimore City. Both the Democrats and Republicans had favored increased representation in their platforms, but neither had stated just what the extent of the increase should be.

On March 16th, the Governor sent a message to the legislature which proposed a constitutional amendment by which Baltimore would be given two new legislative districts making a total of six. Each district was to have one senator and six delegates. Such an increase, Ritchie told the lawmakers, was only fair. He reminded them that the city boundaries had recently been extended to include a large area of county land without any increased representation.<sup>36</sup> The amendment finally received the necessary three-fifths majority for approval but only after the proposed representation in the house of delegates had been lowered from six to four for each district. Baltimore's representation was increased; it was, however, still far from a proportional share of the total based on population.<sup>37</sup>

Several other important laws were passed. The Workmen's Compensation Law was amended and extended. The State central purchasing bureau was established. A bill which united the State Agricultural School at College Park with the University dental, medical, and law schools in Baltimore City passed almost unnoticed. Ritchie had

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<sup>36</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 16 March 1920, p. 2; Maryland Senate, Journal of Proceedings of the Maryland Senate, 1920, p. 538.

<sup>37</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 4 April 1920, p. 3.

personal qualms about what this would do to future budget requests but he allowed the merger to go through.<sup>38</sup>

The legislature also dealt with several issues concerning public morality. On such sumptuary issues Ritchie was a definite libertarian in the sense that he did not countenance State interference to any greater extent than he did on economic and political matters. His reputation as a liberal or progressive is based on these issues.<sup>39</sup> The issues involved in the 1920 Maryland legislature were prohibition of alcoholic beverages, race track gambling, and what activities were proper on the Christian sabbath.

Perhaps the most important of these issues was prohibition. Much of Ritchie's fame is based on his early outspoken objections to liquor control. Ritchie could see the problems connected with consumption of alcohol but felt that temperance and not prohibition was the answer. In addition he felt that enforcement would be both expensive and an intrusion into the fundamental rights of citizens. As in other areas, he was always afraid of too great expansion of the powers of the federal government, but he also felt that effective enforcement would be so expensive as to destroy the possibility of economy. Several factors, therefore, contributed to Ritchie's opposition to prohibition.

Whether these were reinforced by a personal consideration, a love of drinking, is hard to determine. Many people who knew Ritchie

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<sup>38</sup>. Baltimore Sun, 6 April 1920, p. 72.

<sup>39</sup>. Dwight L. Dummond, Roosevelt To Roosevelt (New York: Henry Hold and Company, 1938, p. 382; Karl Schriftgeisser, This Was Normalcy (Boston: Little Brown, 1948), pp. 353-4.

remember him as fond of a good drink of bourbon and some indicated that he drank to excess. However, Ritchie was certainly not an alcoholic or even a heavy drinker. That he was a moderate and occasional social drinker even while the Prohibition Amendment was in effect is possible and perhaps probable. Too many memories have been colored by the passage of time and the fact that prohibition was a failure. To have flouted a law which in retrospect proved unworkable is now often seen as an act of courage or realism; at the time it was seen as the violation of a law which it was unpleasant to follow. Ritchie was always a careful and cautious politician. It is unlikely that he would have left himself open to the charge of having violated a law even if to have done so was only to do what a majority of the people in the State were themselves doing. He followed a rigorous code of ethics so as to be an example in his role as public official. There seems to be no reason to believe that he made an exception for drinking unless he was in private or with his closest friends. Ritchie's opposition to prohibition was based mainly on principle.

Although Ritchie was much more of a politician than an idealogue, there were a few principles that he defended rigorously despite the practical political consequences; opposition to prohibition was one of these. When the Volstead Act was passed, Ritchie was one of the first to announce that he interpreted the law as meaning that enforcement was entirely in the hands of federal officials. Most states countered this interpretation by passing state enforcement acts which

were known as "Baby Volstead" Acts. Ritchie spoke vigorously against a baby Volstead act for Maryland in his first weeks in office. His reasoning was that effective enforcement would be an impossibly heavy burden on the taxpayer.<sup>40</sup>

The spokesman for Marylanders who favored prohibition was the head of the Maryland league for enforcement of prohibition, George W. Crabbe. Crabbe might well have been a character from a Dickens novel; his name was perfectly appropriate. He ranted and raved publicly at a moment's notice about any supposed or actual infringement of the Volstead Act. No invective was ever too severe when he was using it in the service of defeating "demon rum." Throughout the decade Ritchie remained one of Crabbe's chief targets. If the Governor was not the devil incarnate, in Crabbe's evaluation, he was certainly a chief assistant. The dry leader was determined to expose Ritchie's cloven feet at every possible opportunity.

As soon as Ritchie announced his opposition to a State enforcement act, Crabbe unleashed an attack. Ritchie, he claimed, was using his office for support of all the liquor interests in the country, and he warned all faithful citizens to beware of the danger. He requested all the ministers in the State to write letters of protest to the Governor.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>40</sup>. Andrew Sinclair, Era of Excess, A Social History of Prohibition (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 196; for the Volstead Act see United States Statutes, XLI (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1921), pp. 305-322.

<sup>41</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 29 January 1920, p. 1.

The newspapers insisted that Crabbe owed Ritchie an apology for his overstatement. The Governor was no more lined up with the liquor interests than were a majority of the people in the State.<sup>42</sup> Neither man had any intention of retreating from his original stand in the slightest. Crabbe continued to rail against the Governor who remained firm in his opposition to a state enforcement act. On March 18th, the House of Delegates voted down the McBride bill, a baby Volstead act by a margin of 62-39.<sup>43</sup>

In a backward perspective if prohibition turned out to be the most important issue, race track gambling was the controversy which received most attention in the legislature of 1920. To the moralistic reformers, gambling was a sin; race tracks which encouraged this must be shut down. But the politicians who served in the state legislature saw the race tracks in a different light entirely. Some Marylanders considered thoroughbred racing an aristocratic sport that was aesthetically justifiable, but these were only a small snobbish element not heavily represented in politics. A few realistic politicians advanced sophisticated sociological theories that gambling was a human need which would never be eliminated and it would be better to have it regulated by the State than to have it controlled by racketeers. The main concern of most of the men, however, was revenue for the State.

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<sup>42</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 30 January 1920, p. 18.

<sup>43</sup>. Ibid., 18 March 1920, p. 26; Maryland Senate, Senate Journal, 1920, p. 289.



Race track betting provided the State with a great percentage of income and allowed a lower tax rate. The politicians understood well enough that the average man, especially the man who gambled, was taxed just as heavily by the levy on race tracks, but they also understood that wisely or not, he preferred taxation in this manner. If race track gambling was removed, the State tax rate would have to be raised.

Neither Ritchie or the legislators wanted to have anything to do with a raise in the tax rate. But the appeal of the moral reformers was strong in 1920. Legal drinking had just been eliminated; there seemed to reason why other sins should not be obliterated if proper effort were made. Most citizens were enticed by the idea of a world where temptation was supposed to have been removed. It was, therefore, easy for the reformers to brand as supporters of sin the legislators who failed to vote against race track gambling.

A bill to end all race track betting was introduced into the House of Delegates early in the legislative session, but it was held in committee for various reasons until the middle of March. On March 9th, the Nettle anti-gambling bill was reported unfavorably to the house, but a minority report was also presented.<sup>44</sup> The following day anti-gambling men managed to force the Nettle bill to the floor for a vote by a special parliamentary order.<sup>45</sup> Then in a series of complicated parliamentary moves, the bill was amended so that it would be subject to a public refer-

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<sup>44</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 9 March 1920, p. 2.

<sup>45</sup>. Ibid., 10 March 1920, p. 2.

endum. The purpose of the change was that several members would approve of the bill only if the public also had a chance to register its opinion. Some legislators objected to the referendum as an evasion of legislative duties, but Delegate Roberts of Prince Georges County called for an immediate vote on the measure. The delegates voted 49 to 49 on the issue of an immediate vote which by rules of procedure meant that no vote could then be taken. Delegate Daniel Joseph then came into the hall and asked that his vote be recorded as "aye" but speaker Tydings ruled that the vote was final and Joseph's could not be recorded. Then Delegate Gambrill moved for a recess, but Tydings changed sides on this vote so that the final tally was once again tied at 50 to 50. Debate on the anti-gambling measure continued and a final vote against adding the referendum lost 51-49 when Tydings voted<sup>46</sup> against the measure.

However, in the senate the anti-betting legislation was further amended so that it almost lost its original purpose. The final legislation did subject the race tracks to far stricter regulation and control than before, but gambling was still allowed.<sup>47</sup> The revenue from gambling under the new regulations was expected to be about \$700,000 per year.<sup>48</sup> The legislation also established a new State racing commission to oversee all the race tracks and shortly after the legislative

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46. Baltimore Evening Sun, 16 March 1920, p. 1.

47. Ibid., 15 March, p. 20, 22 March, p. 22, 7 April 1920.

48. Ibid., 15 March 1920, p. 20.

session, Ritchie began to search for men for the three positions.

Drinking and gambling were not the only sins the moralistic reformers in the State sought to discourage; failure to keep the sabbath was another. Proper respect for the Lord's day these men felt, required abstinence from all amusement, and their definition of amusement was rather broad. On this matter the law was already on the side of the reformers and their fight was to keep it from being changed. Senator Iverson introduced a bill to allow barber shops, bootblacks and movie theatres to be opened on Sundays. The bill also would have permitted the legal sale of gasoline, soda water, and tobacco. A large number of ministers paraded to Annapolis to testify against the bill, and eventually the legislation was defeated.<sup>49</sup> Ritchie probably would have favored the bill, but he did nothing to help it pass. It was less important to him than prohibition and anti-gambling legislation, and he could only oppose so much sumptuary legislation without losing the votes of many respectable churchmen.

Ritchie and the legislators had to face one final issue in 1920, the question of woman's suffrage. During 1920 the proponents of the Nineteenth amendment were working strenuously to get thirty-six States to vote for ratification. During the legislative session it seemed as if much depended on whether Maryland would add its name to the list of States which favored it. Ritchie's career could have been crucially

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<sup>49</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 4 February 1920, p. 1.

affected by his stand and the eventual result. The Maryland Democratic Party in the 1919 platform had opposed ratification of the amendment. The politicians felt that politics was a man's game. They simply could not see women making deals in rooms filled with cigar smoke, and they feared that a feminine influence in politics might limit some of the dubious practices then overlooked on election days. Ritchie seemed to share these sentiments, but he was too wise to voice them openly for to do so would have alienated the women if they eventually won the ballot.

On the other hand Ritchie could not openly support woman suffrage because of his party's stand and the feelings of the bosses. He found the solution by speaking on the issue in procedural rather than substantive terms. As early as 1916 he had developed this formula by stating that woman suffrage was not a national problem but a State one. Thus he could side against the Suffrage Amendment because it was an infringement on State's rights and not because he objected to women voting. He did not say what he expected Maryland to do, but he wrote to Miss Mary Jenkins, then secretary of the Just Government League, "I do not regard the opinion I have as a 'humiliating proclamation' or as classifying women politically with minors, lunatics, idiots, criminals not pardoned nor as the political inferior of Negroes."<sup>50</sup> But Ritchie did not commit himself to favoring any action to get women the vote in Maryland.

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<sup>50</sup>. Ritchie to Mary Jenkins, Ritchie Correspondence.

During the 1920 legislative session he continued to hold this position. He avowed that the anti-ratification plank in the Democratic platform prohibited him from influencing legislators to ratify the amendment.<sup>51</sup> When the Senate defeated the amendment by a vote of 18-9 and the House of Delegates followed 64 to 36, the suffragette lobbyists descended upon Annapolis to seek the Governor's aid. Ritchie avoided them maintaining that he could do nothing since the matter was a legislative concern.<sup>52</sup> Some of the feminists were reported to be pledged to campaign against Ritchie and the Democratic Party as soon as they could. They promised revenge if they ever could vote.<sup>53</sup> However, even though Ritchie had done nothing to help the women, he kept his opposition on a procedural level, and he had carefully avoided making any derogatory references about their abilities as voters. This cautious strategy helped him later.

When the legislative session ended three months after he had been inaugurated, Ritchie's performance was evaluated. He was an adequate Governor, but there were only a few hints of qualities that might have been called outstanding. The legislative session had redeemed the platform pledges and considered some other mildly important laws; Ritchie's leadership had been effective though less than forceful. Reforms which improved the State government had been adopted, but

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51. Baltimore Sun, 11 February 1920, p. 30.

52. Ibid., 17 February 1920.

53. Baltimore News, 19 February 1920.

they were few and uncomprehensive. The most important reform, the merit system, was likely to have passed no matter who was Governor, and the particular form of merit system that Ritchie recommended disappointed reformers because of the large number of exemptions from coverage. Two pieces of major legislation, the budget and the establishment of a central purchasing bureau showed Ritchie's prime concerns, efficiency and economy. The budget was reduced; the administration was pruned of some overlapping functionaries. The other legislation mainly demonstrated Ritchie's devotion to the status quo and objections to sumptuary laws. His methods of dealing with the legislature were honest and industrious. As a politician he had been effective. Only a few laws had passed without his approval or had failed when he favored them. No particular leader had arisen from the legislative session to challenge his authority. Yet only the very perceptive could have seen the seeds of future power at this point in his career. Other Governors had certainly compiled equally effective records at this point in their term of office.

## CHAPTER EIGHT

REFORM AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF POWER  
TO THE END OF THE FIRST YEAR

Governor Ritchie was unable to rest at the end of the legislative session of 1920. He had to deal with numerous perplexing problems both on the national and State level. Ritchie's actions during this time show that he had a desire to reform the State government and that he was also a capable politician who knew how to consolidate his own power.

The first evidence was in Ritchie's appointments. Until this point in his career, Ritchie had worked carefully with the bosses and other political leaders in the State. Now he demonstrated a tendency toward independence. The tendency remained just that for Ritchie was never the type of reformer who intended to destroy the political machine. He was aware of its ability to deliver votes to him, and his recent narrow victory reinforced this feeling. But Ritchie was also dedicated to the idea of effective and efficient administration of state functions, and he did not want to appoint incapable political hacks to important administrative jobs merely because they were in the service of a political boss. He had no objections to appointing men who were friendly to the machine politicians if they were qualified, but Ritchie's idea of qualifications and the bosses' lists of perspective applicants did not always match. In these situations Ritchie showed his independence.

Ritchie first appointed two boards which he considered very important, the State roads commission and the new State racing commission. Both dealt with large sums of money and could, therefore, provide great temptation for graft to an unscrupulous office holder. He reached his decision about the State roads commission first.<sup>1</sup>

On May 25th, Ritchie announced that he would not reappoint Chairman Zouck as head of the State roads commission. The Governor did not deny Zouck's qualifications but merely stated that their differences were "temperamental."<sup>2</sup> Besides specific aptitude for the job, Ritchie looked for a type of administrator who was willing to accept the close supervision over policy decisions by the Governor and for a man who was not personally ambitious. Zouck was qualified, but he was unwilling to accept a subordinate role to the Governor and so he was replaced.

But if Zouck's removal was surprising, Ritchie's choice of a new chairman was even more so. As the new chairman of the State roads commission, Ritchie chose the chief engineer of the commission, John Mackall. Most people felt that the appointment of Mackall was temporary since he did not resign his job as chief engineer, but Mackall held both offices simultaneously for nearly a decade. In Mackall Ritchie had found the combination he liked, a man with expertise and adminis-

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1. Baltimore Evening Sun, 8 April 1920, p. 32.

2. Ibid., 26 May 1920, p. 32.



trative ability without political ambition. Next, Ritchie appointed State Senator Crothers to the commission, another surprise. Crothers was well qualified for the position, but he had been expected to receive a larger, more prestigious post.<sup>3</sup> In choosing Crothers Ritchie obtained an eminently capable member and reduced the power of a possible political rival.

Another place in the government where graft remained a constant possibility was the new racing commission. Ritchie attempted to find men whose wealth and integrity would secure them against such threats, but he was unable to persuade his first choices, Howard Bruce and John K. Shaw, to accept positions.<sup>4</sup> Not until the end of July did Ritchie announce his selections. The new board consisted of Robert Oliver, a newspaper manager, E. Clay Timanus, former Mayor of Baltimore, and Joseph P. Kennedy, a lawyer who had helped Ritchie in his last campaign.<sup>5</sup> There were complaints that the men whom Ritchie had appointed lacked any special knowledge of racing, but Ritchie had passed over the men who were tied to the political machine.<sup>6</sup> He had consolidated his own power even if he had not found administrators who were as outstanding as he would have liked.

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3. Baltimore Evening Sun, 26 May 1920, p. 32.

4. Ibid., 4 June 1920, p. 36.

5. Ibid., 22 July 1920, p. 34.

6. Ibid., 24 July 1920, p. 30.

In his appointments to the school board, Ritchie showed his most determined assertiveness and his most vigorous efforts for reform. The Maryland schools were in poor condition in 1920; a national survey rated them among the least effectual in the country. Ritchie intended to remedy this situation, and he believed the first step was to select a new superintendent of schools. In April, he appointed three new members to the state board of education, but on April 28th, the old board met without consulting the Governor or the new members and reelected incumbent superintendent, Dr. M. Bates Stephens, to a new four year term.<sup>7</sup> The election was an obvious attempt to circumvent Ritchie's plan to retire Stephens, but the Governor had no intention of being outmaneuvered. The following day he called a closed meeting of the state board of education in Annapolis on May 4th at which he was to be present.<sup>8</sup>

As soon as the board convened, Ritchie attacked. He immediately asked for the board to rescind Stephens' election. He said that the vote had been only three to one and when the three new members of the board were admitted, the Stephens' electors would be in the minority. One member agreed but two others including the chairman refused to heed Ritchie's request.<sup>9</sup>

Again the Governor shocked the group with his directness. He

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7. Baltimore Evening Sun, 29 April 1920, p. 30.

8. Ibid., 30 April 1920, p. 32.

9. Ibid., 4 May 1920, p. 32.

demanded the resignations of Wharburton and Purnell. A school board in harmony with his administration was a necessity, he stated. Both men refused a second time, and Ritchie then left the room to give the story to newspapermen who were waiting just outside. While Ritchie was talking to reporters, the two members hastily conferred within the room. Only a few minutes later they reappeared to tell the Governor that they had changed their minds and would follow his leadership. The conference then resumed in a peaceful if cowed atmosphere. Ritchie asked the board to find a new superintendent of schools by the first of June or as soon after that date as possible.<sup>10</sup> On June 4th, the board announced that A. S. Cook, head of the Baltimore County school system, had been chosen the new superintendent of schools for the State.<sup>11</sup> Cook was known as a dedicated reformer and tireless worker; he was willing to subordinate himself to the Governor; he had no political ambitions or ties to the bosses. It was Ritchie's idea of an ideal appointment. It advanced reform and consolidated his power in one stroke.

In addition to these major appointments, others followed which achieved the same ends to a lesser degree. The conservation commission had expected to be reappointed as a body but instead Ritchie

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<sup>10</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 4 May 1920, p. 32.

<sup>11</sup>. Ibid., 4 June 1920, p. 36; James P. Rouleau, "Governors of Maryland and Education" (unpublished M. A. thesis, University of Maryland, 1951), p. 44. Ritchie was more interested in improving the quality of teachers than in curriculum reform.

appointed an entirely new board.<sup>12</sup> The Governor also surprised many people by the appointment of Robert Yellot to head the State merit system.<sup>13</sup> Some people saw this as Ritchie's way of getting rid of the man whom the suffragists wanted for United States Senator, but Yellot turned out to be another administrator of the type the Governor liked, dedicated, hard working, subordinate, and without political ambitions or dangerous political ties.<sup>14</sup>

Only on the prestigious public service commission did Ritchie's appointments deviate from his general policy. To head the commission, Ritchie appointed his old rival for the Attorney Generalship, William Milnes Maloy. Maloy was highly qualified, and the newspapers lauded Ritchie's choice.<sup>15</sup> But Maloy was also politically ambitious and connected with the Mahon wing of the city organization. Perhaps once having beaten Maloy, Ritchie felt that he need not fear his old competitor in the future.

While he was selecting personnel, Ritchie was also considering how the state administration could be made more efficient. On April 28th, he inaugurated two major surveys to check into duplicate boards

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12. Baltimore Evening Sun, 28 April 1920, p. 36, 29 April 1920, p. 16.

13. Bernard C. Steiger, Men of Mark in Maryland (Washington, D. C. : Johnson-Wynne Company, 1907), p. 148 has a short biographical sketch of Yellot.

14. Baltimore Sun, 3 September 1920, Baltimore News, 3 September 1920.

15. Baltimore Evening Sun, 27 April 1920, p. 30.

and the general needs of the educational system.<sup>16</sup>

As early as February 1, 1920, State's attorney, Leach, while speaking at a banquet of politicians in Baltimore had suggested that Ritchie should be a candidate for United States Senate to succeed Senator France in 1922.<sup>17</sup> Ritchie was probably not interested, but up to that time no Governor of Maryland had ever been reelected and he had to consider his political future. The first situation where he played a part in national politics was in the preparations for the 1920 National Democratic convention. The meeting of the State central committee on April 8th and a primary on May 3rd to choose delegates to the State Democratic convention were dull, inconsequential affairs.<sup>18</sup> The actual battling was done in the State convention on May 19th.

Two pressing questions before the convention were who should be chosen to go to the national convention in San Francisco, and what should be done about the prohibition issue. Ritchie agreed with the idea that a double delegation should be chosen with each delegate having a half vote. In this way more men could be gratified and he would make fewer enemies.<sup>19</sup> Nothing was resolved about the prohibition plank. Some people felt that Ritchie preferred a plain statement about modification, but he kept his own counsel. Senator Smith, who had to run for reelection in November, was an ardent prohibitionist and opposed a wet plank no

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16. Baltimore Evening Sun, 28 April 1920, p. 32.

17. Ibid., 2 February 1920, p. 20.

18. Ibid., 8 April, p. 32; 3 May, p. 16; 4 May 1920, p. 16.

19. Ibid., 19 May 1920, p. 30.

matter how moderate. Smith was still the titular head of the party, and the Governor had no desire to challenge him at that time.

Congressman Benson, an important man in party circles wanted to run on a wet platform and tried to win the convention to his side. Benson received help from Mahon and some of the Baltimore leaders and eventually won some concessions from Senator Smith even without Ritchie's help. Ritchie's plan of action had been to be unassertive and not to make enemies. Prohibition was a subject about which he held definite ideas; yet he said nothing about them. At the same time that he was adding to his power through his appointments, Ritchie avoided any direct confrontation with other party leaders over issues of procedures at the State convention.

The Democratic National Convention met in San Francisco in the last week in June. It was almost as if the choice of the west coast port was a symbolic effort to get as far as possible from the influence of Woodrow Wilson without repudiating him. Under the President, Democratic leadership was in disarray. One of the stronger men, Secretary of the Treasury William G. McAdoo, would have liked the nomination but was unable to campaign openly because Wilson was his father-in-law, and the President expected to be nominated for a third term. There had been a boom for Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer and numerous other candidates were mentioned, but no one was even slightly sure of where the eventual hand of fate would point. What was clear was that the issues of ratification of the League of Nations and

post war inflation were likely to dampen the chances of any Democrat, and optimism was not high.<sup>20</sup>

Ritchie attended the San Francisco convention as a delegate; he was the leader of the party there because Senator Smith preferred to remain in Maryland. Once the group was in San Francisco, Ritchie expressed his opinions more freely. He suggested that the State recommend to the platform committee a strong plank asking for the repeal of prohibition. With the help of the Baltimore City bosses, Mahon and Kelly, Ritchie had his way. This had nothing to do with his power; the bosses simply disliked prohibition as much as the Governor.<sup>21</sup>

When the time came to decide for whom to cast the vote as party nominee, Ritchie urged that the State ballots be cast as a unit at least on the early ballots. The Maryland delegation was not legally bound to vote by unit rule, and Mahon objected to voting as a unit and had his way. Some delegates wanted to nominate Ritchie as the favorite son on the early ballots, but Mahon objected to giving Ritchie that honor. He won his point to have the individual delegates express their personal choices. There were rumors that Mahon was displeased with Ritchie's appointments in Maryland.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>20</sup>. James M. Cox, Journey Through My Years (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1946), pp. 225-6; William Gibbs McAdoo, Crowded Years (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1931), the last chapter deals indirectly with the pre-1920 campaign; Eugene H. Roseboom, History of Presidential Elections (New York: Macmillan, 1964), pp. 397-408; Robert K. Murray, Red Scare (New York: McGraw Hill, 1955), p. 260, has a discussion of the Palmer campaign.

<sup>21</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 28 June 1920, p. 1.

<sup>22</sup>. Ibid., 29 June 1920, p. 1.

Ritchie probably would have been flattered by the complimentary vote, but he was more concerned with actual power. On the next day in the State caucus, delegate William Miller of Garrett County moved that Ritchie be nominated on the floor of the convention. The Governor rose and said that he had previously asked that this not be done. He requested again that his wishes be followed.<sup>23</sup>

Ritchie had no preference for the presidential nominee. His goal was to have the Maryland delegation on the side of the winning man so that the State would be remembered with patronage should the Democrats capture the Presidency. Ritchie's plan was for a majority of the State delegation to vote for McAdoo whom he considered the likely winner. At least four votes would be given to John W. Davis of West Virginia who Ritchie felt had the second best chance. Cox, whom Ritchie felt was only an outside possibility, would be allowed to get what he could.<sup>24</sup>

The following day Ritchie fought in the resolutions committee. He attempted unsuccessfully to place a plank in the national platform advocating the repeal of the Prohibition Amendment. The only bright note of the day for him was that William Jennings Bryan's dry plank was also rejected. Ritchie then decided to carry his battle against prohibition to the convention floor. He remained awake late at night revising his proposed platform plank so he could present it on the convention floor the next day.<sup>25</sup>

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23. Baltimore Evening Sun, 30 June 1920, p. 1.

24. Ibid., 1 July 1920, p. 1.

25. Ibid., 2 July 1920, p. 1.



Ritchie's defense of his own anti-prohibition plank against that drawn by a majority of the resolutions committee was the Governor's one appearance as a speaker at the 1920 convention. Ritchie's motivation in this near hopeless move is unclear. If he felt so strong about the evils of prohibition, it seems likely that he would have fought for an anti-prohibition plank in the Maryland State platform where he had a chance of winning. He had not done so. Perhaps his move at the national convention was merely an effort at publicity, an attempt to introduce himself to the national party, but if so he would have been wiser to have chosen a less controversial topic on which to speak. His speech drew little notice, and the majority platform plank was accepted.<sup>26</sup>

When the vote for the Presidential nominee was held, the Maryland delegation vaguely followed Ritchie's plan. Cox received more and McAdoo less than Ritchie suggested.<sup>27</sup> Ritchie voted for McAdoo despite the efforts of his close friend William Marburg, to get him to vote for John W. Davis.<sup>28</sup> When Cox was nominated on the forty-fourth ballot, Ritchie tried to get the Maryland delegation to cast its vote unanimously for Cox but six men still held out for John W. Davis.<sup>29</sup> The convention

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26. Democratic National Committee, Report of the Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention, 1920, p. 313.

27. Baltimore Evening Sun, 3 July 1920, p. 1.

28. Ibid., 3 July 1920, p. 2.

29. Ibid., 6 July 1920, p. 1.

finished its business the next day and the delegates headed for home. Ritchie's leadership had been unspectacular.

The Governor did not return directly to Maryland. He took the opportunity to see parts of the United States that he had not seen before. He stopped at Los Angeles and visited Hollywood. One of the few unusual photographs of him shows him on the set for "Ruth of the Rockies" with the female star of the film.<sup>30</sup> On his way eastward he stopped to view the Grand Canyon, but touring did not hold his interest long, and he did not pause again until he reached Baltimore on July 16th.<sup>31</sup> Arriving in Baltimore shortly before eight o'clock in the morning, he had breakfast with Philip Perlman who appraised him of recent occurrences in affairs of State. At the time of his return, it seemed as if Ritchie would be able to make all his appointments and finish his plans for reform before the time of the fall elections, but there was an unexpected interruption.

By August it seemed likely that the Woman Suffrage Amendment would receive ratification by thirty-six States before the fall election date. The issue of State versus Federal right which Ritchie had raised would then be moot. Extra registration days for registering new voters were required. These days could only be provided by State law which in effect meant that the State legislature would have to be called into session. On August 20th, Tennessee had apparently become the 36th State to ratify

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<sup>30</sup>. Photograph, Ritchie Papers.

<sup>31</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 16 July 1920, p. 28.

the Nineteenth Amendment, and Ritchie welcomed women voters in Maryland. He congratulated them on their energetic and capable leadership during their long struggle. "I am confident, he said, "they will bring those qualities of clear seeing, of straight and clean-thinking, and of loyalty and right which have made the American home second to none on earth." <sup>32</sup> The wise politician knew how to capitulate gracefully in a losing battle. Ritchie even held an informal reception of the suffragists in his office. <sup>33</sup> But rhetoric did not answer the problem of how to provide extra registration days, and the Governor called a meeting with Senator Smith, E. Brooke Lee, and J. Enos Ray to discuss the problem. <sup>34</sup> The Democratic leaders were frightened of the Black woman voter and were, <sup>35</sup> therefore, figuring how to get the maximum white registration. But the larger problem in the minds of Democrats was that an extra session of the legislature could open up difficult and explosive measures just before an election. <sup>36</sup>

Ritchie would have liked to avoid the extra session. <sup>37</sup> On August 31st, he, Smith, and other Democratic leaders conferred with the leading women in the State. <sup>38</sup> As a result of the meeting Ritchie saw that the

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32. Baltimore News, 19 August 1920.

33. Baltimore American, 20 August 1920.

34. Baltimore American, 25 August 1920; Swisher, Constitutional Development, p. 698.

35. Baltimore News, 25 August 1920.

36. Ibid., 26 August 1920.

37. Baltimore Sun, 26 August, Baltimore American, 26 August 1920.

38. Baltimore Evening Sun, 31 August 1920, p. 26.

women would not be satisfied with less than a request for a special session of the legislature to provide the extra registration days, and on September 2nd, he announced that he would call the General Assembly into session on September 20th.<sup>39</sup>

Then complications arose which made the situation even more difficult for the Governor. A legal fight had arisen over Tennessee's approval of the amendment, and this might force the Maryland General Assembly to consider ratification once again.<sup>40</sup> Ritchie did not want to have to repeat his objections to the amendment even if they were on procedural grounds. Senator Smith who was running for reelection in November, and who objected to women voting under any circumstances was in an even more unpleasant situation. However, the Connecticut legislature met and ratified the amendment before the Maryland lawmakers convened; Ritchie and the Democrats were spared their dilemma.<sup>41</sup>

Then Ritchie's problem centered on whether he could get the legislature to limit itself to providing only the extra registration days. The Republican News gleefully predicted that the special session would cause "a barrel of trouble before it is over."<sup>42</sup> Ritchie seemed worried about the prospects and kept repeating that the lawmakers should properly consider only the one matter. Still he seemed to be preparing for the eventuality that other legislation would be introduced. On September 13th,

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<sup>39</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 1 September 1920, p. 1; 2 September 1920, p. 1.

<sup>40</sup>. Swisher, Constitutional Development, p. 700.

<sup>41</sup>. Baltimore Sun, 10 September 1920, p. 28.

<sup>42</sup>. Baltimore News, 5 September 1920.

he invited the various heads of all the State departments to have dinner and an evening of discussion with him at the State House.<sup>43</sup>

The results of the meeting were highly surprising. Two days before the legislature commenced, Ritchie made a public address in which he advocated a comprehensive plan of State reorganization. Ritchie suggested that the schools, prisons, police system, State roads and the controls of the State oyster industry all needed overhauling.<sup>44</sup> But surveys were necessary before the exact changes could be recommended. The Governor had stolen the thunder of the Republican legislators if they had intended to work on any of these matters.

But there were many other matters which the legislature could consider, and it remained to be seen if Ritchie would have his way. The State Senate opened its session by agreeing to a strict limit on legislation.<sup>45</sup> Gambrill made a game fight in the house to get his prohibition enforcement bill to the floor, but a vote to bring it from committee lost by a vote of 48 to 40. Once this attempt had failed no one else attempted to introduce any other legislation, and the house followed the Senate and adjourned.<sup>46</sup> No one said what Ritchie threatened or promised in the caucus, but he had made his leadership effective. The legislature closed on its second day. As the Governor had insisted, only one matter had been considered on the floor of either house.

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<sup>43</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 13 September 1920, p. 22.

<sup>44</sup>. Baltimore Sun, 18 September 1920.

<sup>45</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 22 September 1920, p. 1.

<sup>46</sup>. Ibid., 23 September 1920, p. 25.

On October 8th, Ritchie continued his work towards administrative efficiency when he announced that the State purchasing bureau had been organized. The department was to be headed by a State purchasing agent who would receive a salary of \$5,000. Six other employees would staff the agency. The new department was expected to save the State several hundred thousands of dollars a year.<sup>47</sup>

Then for the next month, Ritchie let affairs of the State drift and concentrated his attention on the elections for President and United States Senator. The Senatorial election was bizarre. Ovington E. Weller, the Republican nominee, disliked making public appearances, so he conducted his entire campaign by mail. The cost was \$10,000, a very large sum to spend on an election in Maryland in 1920. Senator Smith enjoyed speaking, but disliked spending money. He made a moderate amount of addresses, but he spent only \$113 on his whole campaign.<sup>48</sup> Smith was expected to run ahead of Cox, but no one knew how the new women voters would cast their ballots.

For Ritchie the key moment of the State campaign was when Governor Cox spoke in Baltimore on October 21st. Ritchie and Senator Smith met him at the train station and travelled with him by car to the Rennert Hotel.<sup>49</sup> That evening Ritchie introduced Cox to the large gathering in Baltimore's Fifth Regiment Armory.<sup>50</sup> Cox spoke on the need for the

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47. Baltimore Evening Sun, 8 October 1920, p. 2.

48. Ibid., 25 October 1920, p. 20.

49. Ibid., 21 October 1920, p. 38.

50. Ibid., 22 October 1920, p. 1.

United States to join the League of Nations, a sentiment that Ritchie fully shared at that time.<sup>51</sup> The following week the vice presidential candidate spoke in Baltimore, but Ritchie did not attend the meeting to hear Franklin D. Roosevelt.<sup>52</sup>

Ritchie's efforts did little to help the Democrats in the election. Harding swept to victory in Maryland by 52,000 and Senator Smith was beaten by Ovington Weller by 13,000 votes. The Democrats managed to elect only two men to Congress, and one of these, the popular Charles Linthicum, won by merely 574 votes despite the fact that the Republican Party was split by an independent Republican candidate who got over 8,000 votes. Two very popular Democratic Congressmen, Charles Coady and Carlyle Benson, were defeated.<sup>53</sup> With both Senators, the Attorney General, the Mayor of Baltimore and a majority of the Maryland delegation in the House of Representatives in Republican hands, Ritchie's position as the lone Democrat in high office appeared to be weak.

However, the Democratic defeat was once again Ritchie's gain. By the next election, the Democrats were again organized for their best fighting effort. More important to Ritchie, losses by key Democrats in 1920 left him in stronger control of the party. Senator Smith was still a man to be watched, but he had less power than previously. Other

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51. Baltimore Sun, 24 October, Baltimore American, 22 October 1920.

52. Baltimore Evening Sun, 28 October 1920, p. 20.

53. Ibid., 3 November 1920, p. 1.

leaders like Benson and Coady were less likely to offer challenges to Ritchie's leadership.

Ritchie's year moved quietly to a close after the election. He spoke on Armistice Day with Mayor Broening and General Robert G. Nivelle, the hero of Verdun, but Ritchie's comments were perfunctory.<sup>54</sup> He was busy with his plan for State reorganization. Finally in addition to general reforms, Ritchie did look for ways to improve the State police force.<sup>55</sup> The increased number of automobiles and roads had led to much lawlessness on highways. Commissioner Gaither of the Baltimore Police told Ritchie that there would need to be more highway police in Baltimore City if lawlessness was going to be controlled. This led Ritchie to the idea of creating a State police force since it was obvious that the counties also needed increased protection.<sup>56</sup> Ritchie called in State highway commissioner Baughman and presented him with the idea of a State police force. The tentative idea was to authorize the State officers to make arrests for any highway violations by deputizing them as sheriffs of the various counties.<sup>57</sup> The plan was settled as the year drew to a close.

Ritchie's power had grown considerably during the year. His appointees were capable and subordinate but not tied to bosses. His plans for administrative reforms had been lauded. By the time of the special session of the State legislature in the fall, he had managed to force

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<sup>54</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 11 November 1920, p. 40.

<sup>55</sup>. Ibid., 14 December 1920, p. 30.

<sup>56</sup>. Ibid., 16 December 1920, p. 38.

<sup>57</sup>. Ibid., 22 December 1920, p. 30.



dissident Democrats into following his plans; and the elections of 1920 eliminated some of his rivals within the party. The extent of his powers was still far from clear, but by the end of 1920 he appeared to be a far more distinctive Governor than he had nine months earlier.

## CHAPTER NINE

## MIDTERM ELECTIONS AND STATE REORGANIZATION

Governor Ritchie's attention in his second year in office was centered on midterm elections and plans for reorganization of the State government. He also worked on the organization of the State police force and the State purchasing bureau, development of licensing regulations by the new State racing commission, and matters concerning the public service commission. All the affairs of State show that Ritchie was continuing the patterns which he had established in his first year of office, the interrelated trend towards concentration of personal power while effecting administrative reforms that were mainly concerned with efficiency and economy.

Two administrative boards that Ritchie had appointed the previous year were not operating as he wanted, and he was not the type of chief administrator to appoint a board and then leave it alone. The question arose whether Maryland should license the jockeys who rode horses at the State's race tracks. Until that time Maryland had allowed jockeys who had licenses from other states to race. Ritchie felt that the State should now do its own licensing and that this should be the function of the racing commission. Two men on the board disagreed with the Governor because they felt that the licensing would create too great a pressure on the board. On April 9th, Joseph P. Kennedy resigned because of his disagreement with Ritchie, and James A. Latane, a Baltimore attorney, who approved of licensing, was chosen

as his replacement. The commission then voted to license jockeys within the state.<sup>1</sup> Chairman Oliver, who had dissented on the issue, resigned the following week.<sup>2</sup> Ritchie had shown again that he had no intention of working with administrators who would not submit to his point of view.

Ritchie also insisted on having his way with the state purchasing bureau that he had organized the previous autumn. The Governor had organized the bureau to save money; he meant for it to do so. However, various department heads were complaining about the administrative problems caused by central purchasing. On April 26th, Ritchie announced that he would visit the purchasing bureau to familiarize himself with its functioning. He was displeased with what he saw.<sup>3</sup> Three days later he had a meeting with all department heads and state purchasing agent Wehr to thrash out some of the problems after which he concluded that it was wiser to have some of the purchases of various departments made separately although he clung to the basic idea of central purchasing.<sup>4</sup> In addition, Ritchie was dissatisfied with Wehr's work; two weeks later he asked for and secured his resignation. He chose William P. Ryan, the present collector of ports to succeed Wehr.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 18 April, p. 24; 20 April, p. 26; 19 May 1921, p. 34.

<sup>2</sup>. Ibid., 24 May 1921, p. 28.

<sup>3</sup>. Ibid., 26 April 1921, p. 26.

<sup>4</sup>. Ibid., 29 April 1921, p. 34.

<sup>5</sup>. Ibid., 11 May 1921, p. 26.

But Ritchie became displeased with his second choice even more quickly than he had with his first. On July 14th, the Governor announced that Walter N. Kirkman would succeed Ryan as the state purchasing agent. Ritchie had wanted the expenses of the bureau limited to \$19,000 per year and Ryan had said that it was impossible. Ritchie asked for Ryan's resignation and secured the services of Kirkman who agreed to the limit.<sup>6</sup>

Ritchie was also careful about the administration of justice within Maryland. Two magistrates of the Baltimore police court were arrested on charges of misconduct in July. Although the charges involved only rowdiness at a picnic, Ritchie severely reprimanded the men in private conferences and then demanded their resignations because they had deviated from the behavior befitting a magistrate.<sup>7</sup>

Ritchie was also exceptionally selective in his choice of judges to Maryland's highest court. Politics played little or no part in these matters. In September 1921, Chief Justice Soper of the Maryland Court of Appeals resigned, and Ritchie elevated Associate Judge Gorter of the same court to fill the position. Charles F. Stein, a well known and respected lawyer who was an expert in real estate was chosen to take Gorter's place. The bar and the press seemed highly pleased by the choices.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 14 July 1921.

<sup>7</sup>. Ibid., 20 July 1921, p. 22; Baltimore Sun, 2 August 1921.

<sup>8</sup>. Baltimore American, 15 September 1921; Baltimore Sun, 14 September 1921; Baltimore Evening Sun, 16 September 1921, p. 36.

These and many other minor administrative matters occupied the Governor's time, but his pet project was the general reorganization of the State's administrative machinery. The 1920 legislature had appropriated money for the Governor to make a survey of the State administrative agencies.<sup>9</sup> Ritchie felt that any Governor was hampered in his duties by the lack of coordination, by inadequate supervision, and by duplication of work in the more than eighty departments.<sup>10</sup> In a public address, September 1920, just before the meeting of the State legislature in special session he announced he was considering a general plan of State reorganization. In November, with the money the legislature had appropriated, he engaged the firm of Griffenhagen and Associates of Chicago to survey, evaluate, and recommend changes in the governmental structure that might lead to greater efficiency and economy.<sup>11</sup> The firm submitted its report in April 1921, and reached two important conclusions. The first was that the general administrative structure of State departments badly needed comprehensive revision to establish a limited number of departments and ensure executive control, coordination of State activities, and the elimination of conflict and duplication. Second, the report stated that the organization of financial work and the division of fiscal and accounting responsibility and authority were unscientifically laid out because of constitutional

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<sup>9</sup>. Charles J. Rohr, The Governor of Maryland, a Constitutional Study (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1932), p. 127.

<sup>10</sup>. Baltimore Sun, 6 April 1921.

<sup>11</sup>. Ibid., 9 November 1922.

provisions that were confused or illogical. The State's policy of employing large numbers of part time officials rather than fewer full-time employees who were properly paid was also criticized.<sup>12</sup>

Aspects of the report displeased Ritchie. He objected primarily to the vast increase in government expenses which the plan would entail. He also felt that the centralization of a large amount of power in the Governor's hands made him a potential dictator. The Griffenhagen report urged that the Governor should not be required to send many of his appointments to the State senate for confirmation. According to the firm, the Governor alone would then be responsible for the administration of State government. Governor Ritchie did not believe this approach was very wise.<sup>13</sup> He objected to centralization of power; he wanted boards rather than single officials for administrative work and semi-judicial duties, and consolidation if it was practical, cheaper, and more efficient.<sup>14</sup>

However, Ritchie was not ready to admit that the retention of Griffenhagen and Associates had been wasted money. He announced that it would be the basis for future work; he planned a board to aid the State survey, and proposed a committee to study the report and

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<sup>12</sup>. Griffenhagen and Associates, Ltd., "Report on the organization and administration of state government," April 15, 1921, Ritchie Papers.

<sup>13</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 21 August 1921, p. 28.

<sup>14</sup>. Ritchie's own itemized plan of reorganization, undated, Ritchie Correspondence.

make recommendations.<sup>15</sup> A month later he appointed a commission of seventy-one people to study the reorganization of state government. He included every faction of the Democratic Party but very few Republicans and no women.<sup>16</sup> In reply to criticism, the Governor said that he had not put women on the board because he wanted people with previous experience in state government, but that naturally he would do it if the women were insistent.<sup>17</sup> After the appointment of women to the commission the number of members totalled 108. Although all the commission was doing was ostensibly revising the Griffenhagen report, Ritchie told the members that he hoped to reorganize the eighty-five branches into eleven departments, each headed by an administrative official responsible to the Governor. At the time there was also much Republican criticism of reorganization, and Ritchie angrily challenged Republican leaders to present a better plan of reorganization than he had submitted.<sup>18</sup> Whether the plan was reform or just a form of Democratic Party entrenchment was debated by the Baltimore newspapers for the next month.

In the meantime the commission was divided into an executive committee of twenty-four members for efficiency. Judge Burke of Baltimore County who had been named chairman of the commission was also chairman of the executive committee. Former Congressman Benson was

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15. Baltimore Sun, 26 April 1921.

16. Ibid., 28 May; Baltimore American, 29 May 1921.

17. Baltimore Sun, 30 May; Baltimore American, 30 May 1921.

18. Baltimore Sun, 31 May; 6 June 1921.

named head of a smaller committee on fewer elections. The actual work of the commission was done by a sub-committee of eight led by Judge Burke. The Governor told his appointees to rip the Griffenhagen report to shreds and to draft a plan which would harmonize with Maryland traditions and institutions.<sup>19</sup>

The real work of the commission was done by eight men; even this group was closely watched by the Governor. Ritchie entertained E. Brooke Lee, Frank Furst, Frank Kent, and W. M. Maloy at dinner at the executive mansion fairly often during this time to get their ideas on reorganization.<sup>20</sup> On July 13th, Ritchie, Furst, and Burke met for a whole afternoon in Baltimore for discussion of the plan.<sup>21</sup> On July 27th, when various sub-committees of the executive committee made their progress reports to Judge Burke, Ritchie was present to listen to the results.

The commission's final plan was finished in August; it was called the Ritchie plan. It differed from the Griffenhagen report in that it would be less expensive to implement and centralized less power in the Governor. The general line of administrative regroupings had been followed, but the number of important offices was considerably reduced. On September 14th, the whole commission unanimously adopted the plan of the sub-committee and sent it to the Governor.

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19. Baltimore Sun, 9 November 1922.

20. Ritchie Diary, 17 June , 20 July 1921, Ritchie Papers.

21. Baltimore Evening Sun, 13 July 1921, p. 22.



Five days later the state Democratic convention met and adopted the reorganization plan formally as the major plank in the party's platform.<sup>22</sup> The reorganization plan became a major factor in the election campaign, and Ritchie spoke about it often.

While the Governor was involved in planning for state reorganization, other men were struggling with the difficulties of a minor recession. Some unemployed sailors in Baltimore were suffering from several days without eating and were unable to find any kind of employment. They decided to auction themselves for work to the highest bidder. First they planned to march from the docks to the City Hall. There the men were going to strip to the waist and mount a block in the City Hall Plaza from which their labor would be auctioned. Police Commissioner Gaither had given his approval and one hundred and fifty men were ready to march, but Ritchie called the newspapers and issued the following public statement,

The idea of men in this country selling themselves, or being sold on the auction block cannot be tolerated. Our every sympathy is for everyone who is so unfortunate as to be without employment, and I am ready to endorse any and all proper means which will tend to relieve unemployment. I hope the plight of these men which is now known may secure positions for them, but this cannot be the result of an auction sale. No man's services should be offered or accepted in this state which would violate the self-respect of the American workingman.<sup>23</sup>

After Ritchie's statement, Robert Johnson, who had organized the auction pleaded with the Governor to help the men for many were at the point of

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22. Baltimore Evening Sun, 14 September; 19 September 1921.

23. Baltimore Evening Sun, 12 September 1921, p. 20.

despair. The Governor did not answer. His attention was distracted only momentarily by unemployment; he was more concerned with the upcoming mid-term elections.

In the November elections, the entire General Assembly and the State Comptroller would be chosen. The Democrats had won slight majorities in the legislature in 1919 and could not afford to lose many seats to the Republicans if they expected to enact any new legislation in 1922. If the elections of 1920 were any standard by which to measure, it would take a difficult fight to maintain their position. In January, Ritchie hedged on the prohibition question in a speech before the Anti-Saloon League because he was so worried about the election.<sup>24</sup> He was afraid that tying his party too closely to the anti-prohibition issue would cost him his legislative majority.<sup>25</sup> Prohibitionists were strong in the counties which were proportionally over represented in the state legislature.

Ritchie felt that the strongest man for the major office on the ticket, the State Comptroller, would be E. Brooke Lee, the incumbent. Lee, however, could not be cajoled into running again. He told Ritchie who had by this time become an intimate personal friend, that he had been the candidate out of party loyalty in 1919. It was time for the party to find another man. Everyone thought it would be a bad year for the Democrats so no established politician wanted to run. Even the city

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<sup>24</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 24 January 1921, p. 20.

<sup>25</sup>. Ibid., 7 February 1921, p. 20.

Democratic leaders seemed unconcerned whether they got one of their men the place on the ballot.

In the middle of May, William S. Gordy, a banker in Salisbury, Maryland, made a public announcement that he was interested in the job. No one objected. The leaders seemed happy that anyone was willing to run.<sup>26</sup> The nomination for the Comptrollership went to a man who held no previous office and had no record of Democratic Party activity up to that time. Gordy had worked on liberty loan drives during the war and had served as president of the Maryland Bankers Association in 1918.<sup>27</sup>

On May 23rd, Ritchie made an unannounced trip to Salisbury to meet the banker. He was sufficiently impressed not to offer any public objection to Gordy's candidacy.<sup>28</sup> The only other person to suggest that he might run for Comptroller was former State Roads Commissioner Zouck, who suggested that in this way he would show Ritchie what the people felt about the Governor's failure to reappoint him. But Zouck received no support for his challenge and he backed down. Gordy was left alone in the field.<sup>29</sup>

During the summer Ritchie's task was to eliminate all minor squabbles within the Democratic ranks. The Kelly and Mahon factions were again at odds in Baltimore. The Governor watched the situation

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26. Baltimore Evening Sun, 21 May 1921, p. 18.

27. Maryland Secretary of State, Maryland Manual, 1922, pp. 261-2.

28. Ritchie Diary, 23 May 1921, Ritchie Papers.

29. Baltimore Evening Sun, 1 June 1921, p. 26.

in July hoping that the leaders would reach an agreement on their own, perhaps because they were afraid of the power of the new women members of the State central committee.<sup>30</sup> However, the battle continued and on August 6th, both the Kelly and Mahon factions announced they would place full tickets on the primary ballot. Ritchie decided to take a more active role to end the quarreling. He asked Kelly to come to Annapolis on August 7th.<sup>31</sup> When their meeting ended, Kelly announced that he would acquiesce in any plan that Ritchie presented. The next day the Governor called Mahon to Annapolis. Mahon insisted that Howard Jackson be given the nomination for register of wills, and he would follow Ritchie's harmony plan on candidates for the legislature. Jackson's candidacy had been a particular annoyance to the Kelly men; but Mahon would under no circumstances agree to his elimination from the ticket. Ritchie eventually gave in.<sup>32</sup> Then the Governor prepared an exact list of candidates for the General Assembly from Baltimore City. Mahon got two men for each Kelly man, but the deal was not uneven because half the Mahon men were in traditionally Republican areas.<sup>33</sup> The very fact that the bosses were willing to let Ritchie do this type of arbitrating showed an enormous gain in the Governor's power.

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<sup>30</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 22 July 1921, p. 2.

<sup>31</sup>. Ibid., 6 August 1921, p. 12; 7 August 1921.

<sup>32</sup>. Ibid., 8 August 1921.

<sup>33</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 9 August 1921, p. 22; Ritchie Diary, 11, 12, 14, 15 August 1921, Ritchie Papers.

In the end, only one man, Sam Pattison, who was running for clerk of the Criminal Court, refused to step down for the compromise plan.<sup>34</sup> Although the Democrats were forced to hold a primary the contest had been limited to the one office and there would be a minimum of bitterness carried over into the general election.<sup>35</sup>

After the primary the next task was to write the platform. State reorganization was to be the key plank, but the Democrats had to take stands on prohibition and increased representation for Baltimore City. The completed platform reminded the people that the Democrats had redeemed their 1919 promises and then pledged to bring administrative reform to Maryland. Baltimore was promised a fifty percent increase in the General Assembly, an additional two senators and twelve delegates. The Democrats also asked for a reduction in the number of State elections which came as a total surprise to many people. They recommended a change in the elections for Governor and State legislature so that they fell in an even year. In addition they pledged to have State legislators and the State Comptroller terms of office extended from two to four years. There were the usual promises to improve roads, agriculture, and schools, a section blaming unemployment on the Federal Republican administration, a section reiterating the Democratic Party's confidence in primary elections (a response to the criticism that

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34. Baltimore Evening Sun, 18 August 1921, p. 28.

35. Ibid., 9 September 1921, p. 32.

Democrats tried to circumvent the people and avoid them), a plank endorsing conservation, one for women's rights, and finally a section on prison reform. The platform did not mention prohibition or other moralistic issues of concern in the State at the time.<sup>36</sup> The proposed increased representation for Baltimore City caused the most controversy. Senator Colgan of Baltimore told some disappointed city people that they would have been given a much larger number by the county men, but Ritchie himself cut the number for fear of alienating county voters.<sup>37</sup>

The Republican platform was adopted on September 22nd at the Republican State convention in Baltimore. It promised forty-eight additional delegates and eight additional senators for Baltimore which would make the city representation proportional to its population. Senator Metzgerott of Prince Georges County was nominated for State Comptroller.<sup>38</sup> Republican strength was in rural Maryland. It was difficult to estimate the effect of the promise of such increased representation for Baltimore on traditional Republican voters in the counties. The Republicans did not worry because they were confident of victory. Their only problem was an interparty struggle because many leading Republicans were angry at Senator Weller's use of his patronage power. They suspected he was trying to consolidate power into his own hands.<sup>39</sup>

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36. Baltimore Evening Sun, 20 September 1921, p. 28.

37. Ibid., 21 September 1921, p. 26.

38. Ibid., 23 September 1921, p. 36.

39. Ibid., 25 September 1921, p. 20; 30 September 1921, p. 38.

Once the platforms were drawn, the state campaign began in earnest. Ritchie spoke mainly on state reorganization. He told an audience in Westminster, Maryland, on October 24th that the general reforms and not just increased representation for Baltimore should be their concern.<sup>40</sup> The Republican Baltimore American commented that Ritchie was "harping" on reorganization all through his tour of Montgomery County on the following day.<sup>41</sup> The campaign lacked excitement until just before the election. Up to that point it had consisted of Ritchie's speeches on reorganization and the Republicans claiming that he was a boss ridden man parading as a reformer. One of Ritchie's most outspoken critics was Dr. Howard Kelly, a Baltimore surgeon who championed clean government, prohibition and strict Sunday blue laws. Kelly was running for legislature as an independent, and his main theme was that professional politicians were corrupt and money grabbing. Ritchie was his favorite example.<sup>42</sup> Then, on November 2nd, the daughter of the late Congressman George Konig surprised everyone by an impassioned speech in which she attacked Dr. Kelly. Boss Frank Kelly was an honest man, said the emotional young woman. He taught her father to be honest which is why he had died so poor. That was why she worked as a stenographer for a living while the surgeon's son was able to fly around the state in a private airplane. The Democratic Party suddenly began to see the

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<sup>40</sup>. Baltimore Sun - 25 October 1921.

<sup>41</sup>. Baltimore American, 26 October 1921.

<sup>42</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 3 November 1921, p. 40.

value of women. Miss Konig challenged Dr. Kelly to a debate. He declined the offer, but in the last week before the election, the Democrats made sure that Miss Konig was heard as often as was possible.<sup>43</sup>

The elections were held on November 8th; the Democrats were elated by the results. William S. Gordy won the office of State Comptroller by 18,000 votes of which about 15,000 came from Baltimore City. The Democrats had a substantial majority in the House of Delegates, 71 seats to the Republicans' 35. An increase of six senate seats gave them a comfortable majority of 21-6 in the upper house. For the first time, the Democrats had carried every seat of the Baltimore City delegation which had been traditionally one-fourth Republican. In Harford County the Democrats elected the first woman to the legislature.<sup>44</sup>

The results were especially satisfying to Ritchie who felt largely responsible for the stunning reversal from the defeat of the previous year. "The Democratic Party offered the people a real advance in governmental efficiency and a real saving in the cost of public burdens. The people have accepted the offer and given us the means to carry it out," said the Governor. "It is now the party's task to do this and no one need fear that the party will fail. A great opportunity is before the legislature of 1922. The legislature will meet it fully and squarely, and fine results may be expected for the welfare of the state and its people."<sup>45</sup> The very

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43. Baltimore Evening Sun, 3 November 1921, p. 40.

44. Ibid., 9 November 1921, pp. 1, 6, 10.

45. Ibid., 9 November 1921, p. 30.



tone of the statement showed that Ritchie felt that he was in control as leader of his party; he began work on drafting the bills for the General Assembly.

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CHAPTER TEN  
THE LEGISLATIVE SESSION OF 1922

After the midterm elections, Ritchie settled into a period of relative quiet while he prepared for the coming meeting of the General Assembly.<sup>1</sup> As early as November 10th, there was talk about the choice of new leaders for the State legislature.<sup>2</sup> The Governor was also holding hearings with department heads on the State budget from November 18th, and he was preparing the formal legislation for his State reorganization plan for the legislature.<sup>3</sup>

On New Year's Day Ritchie gave his annual public and private receptions in the State House. The next day the Democrats caucused in order to choose their legislative leaders. Because of the Governor's support, Senator Norris of Baltimore City was easily reelected as the leader of the Senate. Ritchie had to use more pressure for his choice for House of Delegates speaker, John G. Lee of Harford County. Ritchie told the Democrats that he expected them to introduce bills for administrative reorganization and for the budget into consideration early in the session. The session promised to be very contested. The men who wanted a prohibition enforcement

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1. Ritchie Diary, 10 November, 21 December 1921, Ritchie Papers.

2. Baltimore Evening Sun, 10 November 1921, p. 34.

3. Ibid., 18 November 1921, p. 40.

act and those who favored anti-gambling legislation seemed to have more support than two years previously. Bitter fights were expected on both issues.<sup>4</sup>

The legislative session opened at noon on January 4th. After the formalities of organization and a luncheon recess, the General Assembly met in joint session to hear Ritchie's address. The Governor recommended administrative reorganization. He also asked for legislation to reduce the number of State elections, to increase the size of the State police force, for additional care for the insane, for increased appropriations for schools, for installation of a State use system in State prisons, for removal of the political disabilities of women, for a gasoline tax to provide road maintenance, for reorganization of the Baltimore police force and several other minor laws. He submitted a complete budget to the legislature on the same day.<sup>5</sup>

Preparation of so much legislation was difficult and Ritchie was lauded by the newspapers for his energetic efforts. But all the work had taken its toll, and the Governor fell ill with influenza on January 6th. At first Ritchie's physician, Dr. J. O. Purvis, feared that he might also develop pneumonia and called in other doctors for consultation. The Governor's illness resulted from his working fourteen to

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<sup>4</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 2 January 1922, p. 34.

<sup>5</sup>. Maryland Senate, Journal of Proceedings of the Senate of Maryland, 1922 (Annapolis: King Brothers, State Printers, 1922), pp. 26-27.

sixteen hours a day on the budget and other legislation despite the warnings of his mother and friends that it was too much for him. Ritchie was forced to refrain from activity for five days and was not allowed to have visitors for a full week. The legislative leaders decided to postpone some of the important legislative business until he was well enough to communicate with them. Friends reported that Mrs. Ritchie was so alarmed by the illness that they thought she would have a nervous breakdown. She insisted on spending every hour she was awake in her son's room and nursing him herself.<sup>6</sup>

During the time Ritchie was ill the legislature organized and selected John M. Dennis as the State treasurer. Then it halted work until Ritchie was well enough to give it guidance. It was an indirect tribute to the amount of power and respect that he had gained in two years.<sup>7</sup>

Ritchie was well enough to start seeing the legislators within a week, although he did not accept a single engagement that took him out of the Executive Mansion until March 17th. He directed the legislative leaders throughout the session. In the first two weeks legislation was introduced that was of special interest to women. A bill was presented to give women equal civic rights, to allow them to serve on juries.<sup>8</sup>

Another bill for which the women were fighting was a child hygiene bill

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<sup>6</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 9 January, p. 24, 11 January 1922, p. 26; Ritchie Diary, 1-10 January 1922, Ritchie Papers.

<sup>7</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 9 November 1921, p. 30.

<sup>8</sup>. Baltimore Sun, 19 January 1922; Journal of Proceedings of The House of Delegates of Maryland 1922 (Annapolis: King Brothers, State printers, 1922), p. 57.

that several civic groups opposed as an invasion of liberty. On January 18th, the women descended in large numbers on Annapolis to lobby for their legislation and harassed legislators spent much of the day trying to dodge the women.<sup>9</sup> Meanwhile the first woman to be elected to the legislature announced that "she had done a man's job on the farm and she intended to do one in the legislature". But at the moment Miss Risteau said she felt more comfortable running her tractor than she did holding the legislative honor.<sup>10</sup>

On January 25th, the first piece of major legislation was introduced. Ritchie had not mentioned increased representation for Baltimore City in his opening address, and on January 25th, a delegation of Baltimore legislators, Baker, Joseph, Hall, Hiller, and Dimarco had visited him about the issue. Baker was the chairman of the group but the astute Daniel Joseph did most of the talking and delivered what amounted to an ultimatum to Ritchie demanding support. They threatened to block other administration measures unless the Governor supported increased representation for Baltimore. Ritchie told them not to worry that they would get his full support on the matter.<sup>11</sup>

On the same day the legislation which Ritchie feared most had also been introduced. The proposed State enforcement act for prohibition

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<sup>9</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 18 January 1922, p. 1.

<sup>10</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 10 January, p. 2; 11 January 1922, p. 1.

<sup>11</sup>. Ibid., 25 January 1922, p. 1.

was sent to hostile committees by both Senate President Norris and House Speaker Lee, but the drys were prepared with an extraordinarily well organized lobby led by Crabbe and kept the pressure on all the hesitant legislators for the entire session.<sup>12</sup> Then a proliferation of major and minor legislation was introduced almost at once.

On January 26th, the first important bill was reported on from committee. The bill to enlarge Baltimore's representation had been given a favorable report by the committee on constitutional amendments despite a fight against it by the influential senator David Robb. The bill would have created six districts in Baltimore and given the city six senators and twenty-four representatives. On February 1st, the senate approved the bill by 19-7. Senator Brady, a Democrat, had been the most vigorous opponent of the bill. First he tried to delay the vote. Then he attempted to amend the bill to give Baltimore twelve senators instead of six because this would surely stop any county men from voting for it. President Norris ruled him out of order since the bill could not be amended after its third reading. Brady took the floor and shouted loudly: "I will continue to work against measures which work against the future happiness of my State. I will oppose them with all the honor of my soul. Not one-third of the members supporting the legislation have given it the proper consideration. I believe a number of them who will vote for the bill are voting against their own judgment

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<sup>12</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 25 January 1922, p. 1.

due to an influence and force now concealed. My State comes first; my party second; and my personal ambitions last." <sup>13</sup> It was a moving statement; it may have been true. It was also a useless gesture. On February 9th, the House of Delegates considered the same bill and passed it by a much larger majority than was expected. <sup>14</sup> In general the city had been granted a much larger delegation with much less difficulty than its most optimistic supporters had predicted. <sup>15</sup> This was due to pressure from the Governor. On January 30th, he had called in several Democratic delegates and ordered them to support all of the party legislation. He told the county men they would have to support the city representation bill or be penalized; he told city opponents of the bill to reduce the number of elections that the same thing would happen to them if they crossed him. It was a rather sharp lecture but it got results. <sup>16</sup>

On February 2nd, Ritchie called still another meeting of the Democratic legislators and party leaders from all over the State. Again Ritchie stressed the importance of the party's redemption of platform pledges to reduce the number of State elections. "I have no doubt that every Democrat in the legislature will carry out his pledges," Ritchie

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<sup>13</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 12 February 1922, p. 1.

<sup>14</sup>. Maryland House of Delegates, House of Delegates Proceedings, 1922, pp. 31, 320, 365; Maryland Senate, Journal of Proceedings of The Maryland Senate 1922, pp. 25, 64, 82-3.

<sup>15</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 9 February 1922, p. 1.

<sup>16</sup>. Baltimore Sun, 31 January; Baltimore Evening Sun, 31 January 1922, p. 2.

told his audience. "Men may have differences of opinion as it is only right and proper that they should have, but when the time comes to vote, I am sure they will do the right thing."<sup>17</sup> This was quite a change from the man who two years before had so carefully courted all segments of his party. Ritchie had now made his own leadership evident and he forced party members into line on the fewer elections bill.

The fewer elections bill did not reach the floor of the House of Delegates until the last days of the session. Many complained about the arrangement of the elections calendar. When the vote was taken ten Democrats bolted the administration and voted with the Republicans. The bill was defeated by 61-41.<sup>18</sup> Ritchie was unwilling to let the matter drop at that point. He began calling in delegates to the State House and talking to them about reconsideration.<sup>19</sup> The following day the House of Delegates voted to reconsider the measure. Minor changes were made in the bill, and another vote was taken on the substance of the matter. This time the bill passed by a vote of 71-41. Ritchie's power was obvious.<sup>20</sup>

The passage of the fewer elections bill marked a major change in Maryland political history. All members of the State legislature and the State Comptroller were now to be elected every four years instead

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17. Baltimore Evening Sun, 2 February 1922, p. 1.

18. Baltimore American, 30 March 1922.

19. Baltimore Sun, 30 March 1922.

20. Baltimore American, 31 March 1922; Maryland House of Delegates, Journal of Proceedings of The Maryland House of Delegates, 1922, p. 803.



of every two years. The offices became proportionally more important. In general the offices for State election which happened only half as often were more significant.

It had also looked as if Ritchie might face a major revolt on the question of State reorganization.<sup>21</sup> John M. Dennis, the leader of the Smith faction in the legislature, declared on February 14th, that he did not approve of Ritchie's reorganization plan.<sup>22</sup> But Stephen Gambrill, who was steering the bill through the House for the Governor, said he had the votes despite State treasurer Dennis' objections.<sup>23</sup> Gambrill was correct. The senate paid little heed to Dennis' suggested amendments. On February 18th, Dennis said that he had never opposed the bill. All he had wanted was that the state roads commission consist of paid members. But as some people noted Dennis had served on the State reorganization committee and he had made no such suggestion at the time the plan was being drawn up.<sup>24</sup> The bill easily won acceptance, and a few days later the House of Delegates passed the unamended bill by 78 to 21.<sup>25</sup>

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21. Baltimore Evening Sun, 3 February 1922, p. 2.

22. Baltimore American, 15 February, Baltimore News, 15 February 1922.

23. Baltimore Evening Sun, 15 February 1922, p. 2.

24. Ibid., 18 February 1922, p. 14.

25. Ibid., 21 February 1922, p. 1; Maryland House of Delegates, Journal of Proceedings of The Maryland House of Delegates, 1922, pp. 31, 320, 365.

Politicians considered this fight an important one. They expected John M. Dennis to confront Ritchie again. Dennis was considered an ambitious man and unlikely to give up easily. Politicians felt Ritchie was testing his strength. Did he intend to run for United States Senator or even possibly for the unprecedented second term for Governor? At any rate Dennis was courting Boss Mahon, and he was already the heir of the John W. Smith organization. He could make trouble for Ritchie in future elections or in the remainder of the legislative session. Ritchie had Dennis to lunch at the Executive Mansion on February 21st. There is no record of what was said, but Dennis did not threaten any of Ritchie's measures for the rest of the session.<sup>26</sup>

However, major legislative battles were not limited to the legislation which Ritchie proposed. As in the previous session there was great emphasis on sumptuary legislation. On the week of February 13th, the legislature began its work on a possible law for State enforcement of the national prohibition amendment. The entire day of February 14th, was spent with dry leaders testifying before the House of Delegates legislative committees. The next day was devoted to hearing testimony of anti-prohibitionists. On February 16th, the committee reported unfavorably on the legislation on the floor of the House of Delegates. An angry debate ensued. Stephen Gambrill charged that J. Bibb Mills, the attorney for the Anti-Saloon League, had tried to make a deal with

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<sup>26</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 20 February 1922, p. 20; Ritchie Diary 21 February 1922, Ritchie Papers.

him. Gambrill said he was told that if he would vote for a favorable report from the ways and means committee, the League would give him its support to make the bill special business on February 23rd.<sup>27</sup>

Gambrill's explanation was not particularly shocking to men used to every day business in the State capitol, but it hurt the public image of the Anti-Saloon League. Gambrill won a vote to make the bill special business for February 23rd without a deal.<sup>28</sup>

On the actual vote one week later Gambrill was not nearly so successful. The House of Delegates voted 64 to 14 to substitute the favorable minority report.<sup>29</sup> State prohibition enforcement legislation then seemed to be likely. Gambrill announced that he would center his fight on securing a referendum to the bill.<sup>30</sup> The next day a dry bill with a referendum was brought to the floor, and the wets claimed that they were confident of the fifty-three votes necessary to get it passed. Speaker Lee forced the dry delegates into a difficult position when he pleaded with them to give the people of the State a voice on such controversial legislation. But the dry men also disliked the fact that the legislation had been drawn with a clause stating that if the referendum

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27. Baltimore Evening Sun, 16 February 1922; Maryland House of Delegates, Journal of Proceedings of The Maryland House of Delegates, 1922, pp. 392, 407, 523.

28. Baltimore Evening Sun, 16 February 1922, p. 1.

29. Maryland House of Delegates, Journal of Proceedings of Maryland House of Delegates, 1922, p. 528.

30. Baltimore Evening Sun, 23 February 1922, p. 1.

was unconstitutional, then the entire legislation was voided.<sup>31</sup>

Fighting became fiercer. Miss Risteau, a fierce anti-prohibitionist, told the house that the Anti-Saloon League had tried to bribe or pressure her to vote for prohibition enforcement legislation. A few days later, delegate Dimarco of Baltimore, perhaps one of the most colorful figures in Maryland politics at the time, and certainly one of the least likely to suppress his sentiments, took the floor in a state of passionate anger. Dimarco, a wet, announced that dry delegate Edward McCormack of Allegany County made, drank and sold whiskey, and that he almost hit Dimarco in the hall of the capitol when Dimarco called him a hypocrite. McCormack answered by calling Dimarco a liar and stated that he had never sold whiskey. The Sunpapers noted wryly that he did not deny drinking it.<sup>32</sup>

While more recrimination continued in the house attention had shifted focus to the Senate on whom passage of the bill in any form then depended. An unofficial analysis of the Evening Sun found twelve votes for and eleven against with four men undecided, and that the Senate was equally divided on the question of a referendum.<sup>33</sup>

The Senate proceeded to study the bill for two weeks during which the prohibition leaders became more confident. On March 14th, Crabbe

31. Baltimore Evening Sun, 24 February 1922, p. 1.

32. Baltimore Evening Sun, 3 March, p. 1; Baltimore American 4 March 1922.

33. Ibid.

announced that "our people will not accept any kind of amendment." <sup>34</sup>

But the next day the senate passed the enforcement bill with the refer-

endum attached by a vote of 14-12. <sup>35</sup> Ritchie had used some pressure

to insure this result. Senator Legge of Queen Annes County dug his political grave by voting for the amendment; the results were only a

little less severe for Senator Goodel of Frederick County. Exactly

how much Ritchie had to do with the specific vote is impossible to

determine. Crabbe accused Goodel of accepting the bribe of a Federal

job in return for his vote, but Goodel denied it and never received such

a job. <sup>36</sup>

Attention then returned to the House of Delegates where the drys could accept the referendum if they so desired. Evidently the prohibition leaders were very uncertain about the results of a referendum, and they decided to try to get the bill without a referendum or wait two more years. They chose the latter course. Time seemed to be on their side. Their strength was growing. In two years they expected clear majorities in both houses of the legislature. On March 22nd, when the bill came to the floor of the House of Delegates with the referendum attached, prohibition votes helped to defeat it by 63 to 40. <sup>37</sup> Both

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34. Baltimore Evening Sun, 14 March 1922, p. 1.

35. Ibid., 15 March 1922, p. 1; Maryland Senate, Journal of the Proceedings of the Maryland Senate, 1922, pp. 384, 493, 500, 512.

36. Baltimore News, 15 March 1922, Baltimore Sun, 18 March 1922.

37. Maryland House of Delegates, Journal of Proceedings of the Maryland House of Delegates, 1922, p. 830.

Mahon and Kelly made a special trip to Annapolis on the day of the vote, and four Baltimore dry delegates were noticeably absent from the voting.<sup>38</sup> Maryland was without a State enforcement act for at least two more years. Ritchie probably breathed more easily. He could not be so obvious in the pressures he used to block prohibition as he could when he tried to affect administrative reform.

The other major sumptuary bill considered by the session was to prohibit gambling. The pattern of action was somewhat similar to that on the prohibition enforcement bill. The House of Delegates considered and passed strict anti-betting laws late in February. Then attention shifted to the Senate but the matter did not reach the floor until the end of March.<sup>39</sup> Senator Norris of Baltimore led the fight against the anti-betting legislation in the upper house. First he added an amendment to the anti-betting bill which completely changed its meaning. The prohibition against gambling was replaced by provision for a seventy-two day racing season with a \$10,000 license fee for each day of racing allowed to a particular race track. After some subtle pressuring from the Governor's office, the Norris substitute bill passed the Senate by a vote of 15-12.<sup>40</sup> The new bill was then returned to the House of Delegates which turned down the Norris amendments to the original bill by a vote of 51 to 49. A vote for reconsideration was defeated by 53 to 47.<sup>41</sup> This

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<sup>38</sup>. Baltimore Sun, 22 March; Baltimore American, 22 March 1922.

<sup>39</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 28 February 1922, p. 1.

<sup>40</sup>. Baltimore American, 29 March 1922.

<sup>41</sup>. Baltimore American, 31 March 1922; Baltimore Sun, 31 March 1922.

removed any possibility of passage of anti-gambling legislation in the 1922 session. On both prohibition enforcement and anti-gambling legislation, those who favored sumptuary laws had been beaten more by clever strategy than by actual numbers. But they felt that their numbers were growing and there was no need to accept halfway measures. They evidently expected clear majorities in both houses at the next session, and perhaps a new Governor who if not sympathetic would at least be less hostile.

Of the two bills which concerned women, only one passed. Democrats and Republicans both broke party lines with impunity to kill the bill to give women equal rights to serve on juries. The Sun reported that most of the legislators voted against the measure with "delight." <sup>42</sup> However, the legislature did vote to remove some of the political disabilities of women and it did pass a child hygiene bill. <sup>43</sup> On the women's rights questions Ritchie seems to have left the lawmakers completely on their own.

Finally there were difficulties with Ritchie's budget. The Governor had spent several months before the General Assembly met paring away every extraneous expense that he could find in the budget. As early as November 18th, he had begun his usual meetings with department heads. He perused the budget again and again with a fine tooth comb looking for places to extract even a few dollars from expenditure. Since the legis-

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<sup>42</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 21 February 1922, p. 2.

<sup>43</sup>. Ibid., 4 April 1922, p. 1.

lature was forbidden by State law to raise the budget after the Governor submitted it to them, it might have been expected that Ritchie's fiscal recommendations would have passed through the legislature with ease. The Governor, however, met with difficulty from several members of his own party who were determined to cut the budget even further. Stephen Gambrill was the most avid fighter for economy.<sup>44</sup> He wished to refuse all requests for salary raises in the budget, and he felt that \$175,000 could be slashed from the already meagre amount estimated for health, conservation, and schools.<sup>45</sup> Severe fights occurred before the final bill left the House of Delegates somewhat amended from the Governor's original bill. Two days before the end of the session, the Senate agreed to the bill in the form it was passed by the lower house. Ritchie then signed into law a budget bill that had lower expenditures than he had recommended.<sup>46</sup>

Everyone concerned probably breathed a sigh of relief when the General Assembly adjourned for the final time in the session. Scarcely a day had passed without a battle of some importance, and the amount of major legislation that had passed seemed to surprise even the law makers themselves. The Baltimore Sun described the General Assembly as having "a record unequalled by any previous legislature."<sup>47</sup> Even the

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<sup>44</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 9 March 1922, p. 1.

<sup>45</sup>. Baltimore News, 7 March 1922; Baltimore American, 9 March 1922.

<sup>46</sup>. Maryland Senate, Journal of Proceedings of The Maryland Senate, 1922, pp. 28, 585, 658-60, 670, 698, 824, 982.

<sup>47</sup>. Baltimore Sun, 4 April 1922.



Republican newspapers were complimentary. The News called the session "notable" and the American editorial claimed "Ritchie can point to a record of legislative accomplishment with great pride."<sup>48</sup> The session was one of personal achievement for Ritchie. Most of the major legislation that passed, he had sponsored and provided the necessary pressure to see it through. He had squelched party members who had worked against him. He had helped to defeat the sumptuary legislation he detested. It was an enviable record for a man who was still a relative newcomer in politics.

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<sup>48</sup>. Baltimore News, 3 April; Baltimore American, 2 April 1922.

## CHAPTER ELEVEN

## SOME CONFRONTATIONS - STATE AND NATIONAL

When the legislature ended politicians began to speculate whether Ritchie would run for United States Senator in November. No man had ever been reelected Governor of Maryland, and Ritchie's term expired in another year. It had been rumored that he would like to run for a second term, but it seemed more likely that he would follow tradition and run instead for the Senate in the fall. The situation must have been difficult for Ritchie to evaluate. Republican prospects were poor. The incumbent, Senator France, had alienated many important men in his party by his extreme independence and seemed likely to have a difficult fight if not for renomination certainly for election.

But even if the prospects of election were good, Ritchie was uninterested in the Senate seat. He had come to love the power that was wielded by the executive, and he did not relish the thought of being one of a body of ninety-six men no matter how august. He also correctly evaluated his talents as better suited to the administrative than the legislative functions of government.

On April 19th, Kelly and Mahon visited Annapolis to discuss the matter with Ritchie. Other ambitious men were anxious to start campaigns for office but they were waiting to know what the Governor would do.<sup>1</sup> The next day it seemed fairly certain that Ritchie had

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<sup>1</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 19 April 1922, p. 3.

decided to run for reelection, but he made no definite statement to that effect.<sup>2</sup> Ritchie's name was still mentioned as a Senate possibility all through the early part of the summer because party leaders would have liked to have him out of the way. Many men wanted the governorship; fewer men wanted to be United States Senator.<sup>3</sup> Although Ritchie was not likely to be the candidate this did not end his concerns about the Senatorial election. In his new position of power in the Democratic Party, he would have to be responsible for the Democratic choice.

However, before the Senate contest became an immediate problem, Ritchie was faced with several other matters. The first was appointments, but these hardly caused a stir in the political world because Ritchie named the incumbents to all of the major jobs.<sup>4</sup>

For the next two months, while other matters were somewhat calm, Ritchie's ethics were the subject of attack. When Ritchie was on his first vacation in two years, Delegate William Purnell Hall spoke at the city club where he announced that Ritchie had traded four votes against the anti-prohibition enforcement bill and the anti-gambling bill in return for his support of a one million dollar Southern Maryland road bill. The allegation may have been true but Hall gave reason to doubt his veracity when he said that Ritchie had also made a deal by

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<sup>2</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 20 April 1922, p. 40.

<sup>3</sup>. Ibid., 19 June 1922, p. 28.

<sup>4</sup>. Ibid., 27 April 1922, p. 2.

which he would get Norris<sup>4</sup> support in return for later supporting Norris for Governor when Ritchie moved to United States Senator. (Norris had already announced his own candidacy for United States Senate on May 1st).<sup>5</sup> Ritchie answered Hall that he was enjoying his vacation and that the passage of the road bill had been due to the successful lobbying of Robert Crane. "I stayed completely out of the picture," the Governor said.<sup>6</sup>

A far more important battle arose one week later. At a University of Maryland alumni association banquet, Harry Clifton "Curly" Byrd, a football coach and assistant to University President Woods, angrily criticized Ritchie's educational policies. "I don't know what report Ritchie's education commission will make to the Governor," Byrd said, "but there will be nothing in it relative to higher education."<sup>7</sup> This time Ritchie was angry. He announced, "If the remarks are true, they won't be tolerated. Byrd is a mere subordinate state employee who has the right to discuss and promote what he thinks is necessary for the University but he should not criticize the excellent commission or the Governor in a groundless, offensive way ... I expect a statement of regret from him."<sup>8</sup> Byrd's apologies to Ritchie were so

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<sup>5</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 1 May 1922, p. 28; 10 May 1922, p. 30.

<sup>6</sup>. Ibid., 10 May 1922, p. 30.

<sup>7</sup>. Ibid., 1 June 1922, p. 40.

<sup>8</sup>. Ibid.

artful that he managed to end the confrontation with a first name basis friendship with the Governor and a seat in Ritchie's box at the Kentucky Derby.<sup>9</sup>

The episode between Byrd and Ritchie was only part of a larger battle between Ritchie and President Woods of the University of Maryland. The University had been formed in 1920 by a union of the professional schools in Baltimore with the State Agricultural College at College Park outside of Washington. Byrd had been the guiding light for the new legislation, and Millard Tydings had introduced the bill into the legislature. Ritchie had been doubtful about the wisdom of creating such a large university, for he feared the expenses it might entail.<sup>10</sup>

Woods wished to make the university an outstanding school for study of the humanities as well as an agricultural and cultural school. In order to obtain the high level staff he felt necessary, he was constantly asking for more funds. Ritchie, however, was always trying to economize. In addition the men were personally cool to each other because they both were able and certain of their convictions.<sup>11</sup> In 1922, Woods

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<sup>9</sup>. Ritchie to Byrd, 3 June 1922, Ritchie Correspondence; George Calcott, A History of the University of Maryland (Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, 1966), p. 322.

<sup>10</sup>. Calcott, A History of the University of Maryland, pp. 277-9.

<sup>11</sup>. Ibid., pp. 282-3.

requested an increase in the University budget from \$540,000 to \$1,930,000. He had the support of some of the Governor's specially appointed education commission. However, he did not consult Ritchie and sent the request directly to the legislature. The Governor then announced his opposition and the lawmakers gave the University only \$793,000. In addition Ritchie let Woods know that he should be thankful for such generosity. Woods, however, had not padded the budget and, therefore, was forced to retreat from the principle of low tuition in order to obtain essential funds to maintain University standards.<sup>12</sup> Woods remained angry but kept quiet, probably assuming that there would be a new Governor in 1923 who would look on the University with greater favor.

Nor was the fight with President Woods Ritchie's last local confrontation in 1922. The State's attorney of Baltimore, Eugene O'Dunne, charged that there was bribery in the board of prison control. Dr. Hubert J. Wade was the treasurer of the board of prison control which had the authority to supervise the purchase of supplies for the state's penal and correctional institutions. Dr. Wade was also the chairman of the Democratic State Central Committee. According to O'Dunne, Wade was guilty of accepting a bribe of a Cadillac automobile worth \$4,400. from Samuel Liebowitz, the president of General Wholesale Groceries. Liebowitz had been president of the firm since 1919, in which year the

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<sup>12</sup>. Calcott, History of University of Maryland, p. 284.

board had purchased \$810 worth of groceries out of a total bill of \$38,259. By 1921 the purchases from Liebowitz' firm were \$1851. The bribe of a \$4,400 Cadillac hardly looked as if it would be worth the extra \$1,000 worth of business, but Ritchie announced on June 9th that he would investigate the case anyway.<sup>13</sup>

Ritchie considered the report of the investigatory commission and decided that Wade should be brought to public trial. A trial was likely to cause the Democratic Party even more embarrassment than it had already suffered, but Ritchie was very angry. He told the newspapers that Liebowitz had offered him financial and moral aid in the coming campaign if the charges would be dropped. But if the charges were pressed, he, Liebowitz, would expose the fact that Ritchie had accepted a case of liquor from him in the last campaign.<sup>14</sup> All the newspapers praised Ritchie for exposing the attempted blackmail.<sup>15</sup> No one seemed to notice that the second largest single gift to Ritchie's campaign in 1919 was a \$4,000 contribution from Liebowitz.<sup>16</sup> Liebowitz told the newspapers that Ritchie had been very happy to get the whiskey, but neither he nor Wade received much public sympathy or support.<sup>17</sup>

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13. Baltimore News, 6 June; Baltimore Evening Sun, 9 June 1922, p. 40.

14. Baltimore Sun, 20 June 1922.

15. Baltimore News, 20 June 1922; Baltimore American, 20 June 1922.

16. List of contributors to 1919 campaign, Ritchie Papers.

17. Baltimore News, 21, 23 June 1922.

Ritchie decided to conduct the trial himself, and strangely no one seemed to object to this very questionable legal procedure except Liebowitz and Wade. Both men were represented by one of the state's leading attorneys, Samuel K. Dennis. Dennis was also often considered to be the heir-apparent of ex-Senator John W. Smith. The trial was set for June 23rd, but both Wade and Liebowitz refused to appear to testify. Ritchie and O'Dunne put Bliven, Standard Motors President, and Frank Ehlen, a salesman, on the witness stand. These men told of Liebowitz's payments for the car and that the Cadillac was delivered to Wade who received the driving lessons for the car which were given automatically with purchase in 1922.<sup>18</sup> The testimony was damning although some people still felt the case against Wade was unproved. Four days later Ritchie removed Wade from the board of prison control for misconduct. Dennis predicted that the removal would leave Wade with more friends than the Governor, but newspapers seemed to mirror public opinion all over the state when they lauded Ritchie's actions.<sup>19</sup>

The battle was important because Wade was a power in the Democratic Party and Ritchie had attacked him without losing friends or public support. Again the measure of Ritchie's power was how tamely the

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18. Baltimore Evening Sun, 23 June 1922, the paper contained a complete transcript of the testimony.

19. Baltimore American, 27 June 1922; Kent News, 24 June 1922; Centreville Record, 24 June 1922; Sykesville Herald, 27 June 1922; Cumberland Times, 27 June 1922 - Clippings in Ritchie Papers.



members of the Smith wing of the party took this severe slap in the face. Ritchie's power had frightened them, and although they might have been very angry, they dared not express themselves for fear of jeopardizing their own political careers.

Fortunately for Ritchie the sores of discontent did not fester long for another confrontation arose only a few days later which drew Maryland citizens together. A coal strike had paralyzed the entire eastern section of the United States.<sup>20</sup> President Harding called Ritchie, Governor Sproul of Pennsylvania, and Governor Twinkle of Virginia together at a meeting in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, on July 1st to discuss the strike. At the meeting Harding asked the Governors to open the mines under the protection of State troopers. Much to everyone's surprise Ritchie refused the request. The next day he stated that he would not change his mind even if no more coal would be mined. "Free men have the right to work, but I will not call in troops until there is actual trouble," the Governor said. "Disorders are spasmodic and the strikes in Maryland are being conducted with a quite remarkable degree of order and compliance with the law. The mine owners may try to resume full mining and then conflicts may occur which require troops until then my duty is to keep in close touch with the situation which I am doing and try my best to avert trouble which I am also doing."<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>20</sup>. John D. Hicks, Republican Ascendancy (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), pp. 69-71.; Francis Russell, The Shadow of Blooming Grove (New York: Mc Graw Hill, 1968), pp. 537, 541, 544-5.

<sup>21</sup>. Baltimore Sun, 1, 2 July 1922.

On July 19th, Harding once again requested the Governor's aid. He asked Ritchie to send state troopers if the mines were reopened. Ritchie's self righteous tone crept into his answer to Harding. "The traditions of this state are those of a people who have settled matters such as these without the use of bayonets and rifles. It has been thirty years since our militia has been used for a purpose of this kind." The Governor went still further, "I don't feel that even in the case of Federal failure that I should send troops without more consideration even though I am aware of Maryland's duty to the nation to produce coal."<sup>22</sup> On July 27th, Ritchie journeyed to New York to confer with the major mine operators and John L. Lewis of the United Mine Workers of America. Again he insisted that he had no intention of calling out the troops, but he did agree to follow Harding's plan to ration coal and named a commission to administer the distribution of coal within Maryland.<sup>23</sup> On August 15th, an agreement to end the coal strike was signed by the United Mine Workers and the operators but for complex legal reasons the Maryland operators were not included and the Maryland miners remained on strike.<sup>24</sup> On August 25th, Ritchie went to Cumberland and engaged both sides in conferences which led to the end of the strike in Maryland on September 3rd.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>22</sup>. Baltimore Sun, 20 July 1922.

<sup>23</sup>. Baltimore American, 27, 28 July 1922; Baltimore Sun, 28 July 1922.

<sup>24</sup>. Baltimore News, 15 August 1922.

<sup>25</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 25 August 1922; Baltimore Sun, 3 September 1922.

The strike had ended without Ritchie's having to call out the troops and with minimal violence. The people of Maryland thrilled with a kind of patriotism as their Governor had successfully defied the President and had proved correct in so doing. One should not, however, assume that Ritchie had defied Harding with the same pro-labor sympathy that had influenced Governor Altgeld of Illinois when he had defied President Cleveland in a labor strike thirty years earlier. Ritchie was unsympathetic to the strikers or their union. Rather he was reluctant to take orders from the President because he interpreted this as an interference with the concept of States' rights which was so sacred to him. In addition, Ritchie was watchful as ever of the State's finances. In order to call out the national guard, he would have to spend more money, and this he was unlikely to do unless he thought the damage caused by his not calling out the troops was more expensive than the cost of sending troops as a preventive measure. Economy and defense of States' rights were Ritchie's motivations in his defiance of President Harding, but many workers especially union men, did not probe into his motivation and discovered for themselves a new champion of unions. Ritchie did not disillusion them in their belief.

Ritchie quarreled with President Harding again before the year was over. While the annual conference of Governors was in progress in White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, in the middle of December, President Harding requested the Governors to come to Washington on the day of the conference in order to discuss prohibition enforcement.

Only fifteen of the Governors accepted the invitation to a luncheon meeting on December 18th. Ritchie was among those who attended, and he certainly did not help to make Harding's meal a pleasant one. "The people of Maryland," said the State's chief executive, "regard the Volstead Act as an unnecessary and drastic infringement of their State and federal rights." In his most intense self-righteous manner, Ritchie went on to explain that the Volstead Act bred lack of respect for law and the only remedy was to turn the problem of temperance back to the states where diverse solutions could be reached.<sup>26</sup> The people of the State thrilled that the Governor had stood up to the President again. The little State of Maryland was flexing her muscles importantly in a way that she seldom had the opportunity to do.

One might ask why the Governor was so outspoken about the prohibition question when he was in the national spotlight, when he had been so terribly cautious on the same issue earlier in the year when he was speaking to a small Maryland organization. Several factors probably contributed to Ritchie's change, but one was the publication of a Literary Digest poll on the prohibition issues. Subscribers to the journal had been asked to vote whether they favored enforcement of the present Volstead Act, modification of the Act, or repeal of all prohibition legislation. The final results of the poll were found in the September 5th issue and revealed that Maryland was the "wettest" state

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<sup>26</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 18 December 1922, p. 2.

in the union. While the national vote was 306,255 for enforcement, 325,549 for modification, and 164,453 for repeal; Maryland had voted 3,101 for enforcement, 4,085 for modification, and 4,132 for repeal.<sup>27</sup>

It is easy today to demonstrate the lack of a proper random sample in the poll which may have distorted these results in favor of the anti-prohibition voters, but Ritchie did not know this. The poll, which had a reputation for accuracy, fortified his views. He felt that he could afford to speak out against prohibition enforcement without jeopardizing his status at the polls with the voters of the State.

Ritchie faced another confrontation in 1922. A committee to investigate the Spring Grove Mental Hospital sent Ritchie a report that insane war veterans were being badly treated. The report accused Dr. Percy J. Wade (no relation to the State central chairman) of mismanagement of the hospital unit.<sup>28</sup> Ritchie then asked Wade for a report of his own, but when he received it, he announced that it had been made too hurriedly, and that he would have another report made by men of his own choosing.<sup>29</sup> Not until December did Ritchie announce that he had decided to retain Wade as the superintendent of the hospital and then only after he demanded better supervision in the future.<sup>30</sup> In the meantime, the Governor decided that the whole state hospital system needed overhauling, and he offered the position of head of the board of welfare to

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<sup>27</sup>. Literary Digest, 5 September 1922; Baltimore Evening Sun, 1 September 1922, p. 38.

<sup>28</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 27 November 1922, p. 34.

<sup>29</sup>. Ibid., 6 December 1922, p. 32.

<sup>30</sup>. Ibid., 22 December 1922, p. 38.

Emory Coblentz, a very well known Maryland physician who accepted the job with reluctance. Coblentz agreed to serve only for so long as it was necessary to affect reform of the system.<sup>31</sup>

Despite these varied confrontations, the main consideration on Ritchie's mind throughout the year was the Senatorial election campaign. On May 1st, William Norris, the peppery State Senator for Baltimore, announced that he was going to run. The slender, dapper forty-two year old Norris was the son of a sea captain. He had started in politics at the age of sixteen when he spoke on street corners for William Jennings Bryan. He had studied law while working in a shirt factory, and when he took the bar examination in 1901 he ranked second in the state. (Ritchie's law partner, Stuart Janney, had ranked first). Norris announced that he was in the race to stay. However, the party leaders did not take his candidacy seriously.<sup>32</sup>

The Democratic Party was looking for a man who would agree to wipe out the party's debt and add money to the treasury. They wanted a contribution of \$75,000 from any candidate who expected the backing of the organization. At first most of the attention seemed to center on ex-Congressman Charles Coady of Baltimore City. Ritchie even made a tentative endorsement of Coady on April 22nd.<sup>33</sup> Coady would have

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31. Baltimore Evening Sun, 9 December 1922, p. 18.

32. Ibid., 1 May 1922, p. 22; 9 August 1922, p. 1.

33. Ibid., 22 April 1922, p. 18.

liked the job, but he felt the \$75,000 was more than he could afford to pay. However, the city organization headed by Mahon kept the pressure on Coady to run and it was not until August that he officially declined.<sup>34</sup> In the meantime Gambrill and McMullen had tentatively been mentioned as possible candidates.<sup>35</sup>

While the organization was searching for its man, one other candidate entered the race. Former Congressman David Lewis filed officially for the nomination on May 13th.<sup>36</sup> Lewis had won the nomination without the support of the organization in 1916, and he was anxious to try his mettle again. He was still only in his fifties, very much a Wilsonian in his concern with international organization, and a proponent of prohibition. In 1916, he had lost by a small margin to Senator France and he was anxious to even the score. However, the city and State machines were as little interested in Lewis as they were in Norris. Neither was likely to have the \$75,000, and the organization would not have been pleased with either of these independent men even with the contribution. Both men continued to campaign through June and July while the bosses searched for their own candidate.

Late in June it looked for a moment as if Hugh McMullen, the former State Comptroller, would be the organization choice. McMullen

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34. Baltimore Evening Sun, 4 August 1922, p. 28.

35. Ibid., 3 June 1922, p. 18; 7 July 1922, p. 3.

36. Baltimore American, 13 May 1922.

had the money and the support of the John W. Smith organization. Smith had lost considerable prestige as a result of the Wade case because Dr. Wade, the State central committee chairman, was associated with the Smith wing of the party. Former Senator Smith was anxious to recoup some of his power behind a man from his faction. However, McMullen would not run while fellow Western Marylander, David Lewis, was still in the race, and no one could persuade Lewis to quit.<sup>37</sup>

Then it looked as if all the bosses would have to choose between Lewis and Norris. When Coady declined to run, it was reported that E. Brooke Lee and other "liberal" Democrats were drifting to Norris.<sup>38</sup>

But one month before the election the organization announced its candidate: Mahon and Kelly told reporters in the Rennert Hotel that William Cabell Bruce was their man. Those who understood state politics knew that money had been the overriding factor in the choice. Bruce, who was a distant cousin of Ritchie, had been born on a Virginia plantation in 1860. He had spent one year at the University of Virginia Law School where he defeated Woodrow Wilson in a debate and in a prize essay competition. He was a successful lawyer and had served in several offices including city solicitor. He was sometimes described as a mellow, scholarly man. He had written two books, a biography of Benjamin Franklin and a book about Virginia, South of the James.<sup>39</sup> However, despite his ability Bruce was greatly disliked

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37. Baltimore Evening Sun, 27 June 1922, p. 34.

38. Ibid., 4 August 1922, p. 28.

39. Ibid., 21 August 1922, p. 1.



within the party. He had served a single term in the Maryland senate in 1896. In that legislature, the Democrats had a majority of only one vote, and Bruce announced that although it was his first term in the legislature, he would vote with the Republicans unless the party chose him as president of the senate. Unable to find an alternative course, the party leaders capitulated and Bruce was chosen. His performance in the job was unspectacular. After his term, party leaders made sure that Bruce did not have organization support to run for reelection.<sup>40</sup> He tried for the nomination for United States Senate in 1916 but lost to David Lewis although his opponent also lacked organization support. One could easily see that money had been uppermost in the minds of Mahon and Kelly when they decided that Bruce was the man they wanted for the job.

Within the following ten days, party leaders including Ritchie began to announce their support of Bruce. On August 23rd, Ritchie, Furst, and some other Democratic leaders met with Norris in Furst's offices in Baltimore and asked him to retire from the contest.<sup>41</sup> Norris considered, but the support of labor leaders and a few good friends persuaded him to persevere.<sup>42</sup> He suffered the rest of his political career for his challenge to the organization.

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<sup>40</sup>. Paul Winchester, Men Of Maryland Since The Civil War (Baltimore: Maryland County Press Syndicate, 1923), p. 141.

<sup>41</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 23 August 1922, p. 28.

<sup>42</sup>. Ibid., 24 August 1922, p. 34.

Ritchie and the bosses were very pleased with the primary election results. Bruce had 41,368 votes to Norris' 26,261, and Lewis' 18,283. The unit vote was even more of a landslide; Bruce had carried the whole State with the exception of the five most Western counties and one city district. In the Republican primary, Senator France had beaten his Republican opponent, John W. Garrett, by a comfortable if not overwhelming margin despite the opposition of Senator Weller and other Republican leaders.<sup>43</sup>

What Ritchie felt personally about Bruce is unclear. There is no indication that they were ever more than properly formal in their relations. However, once Bruce had won the primary, Ritchie campaigned for him with great energy. He spoke for Bruce almost daily, and often more than once a day from the end of September through October until the November 7th election day.<sup>44</sup> Ritchie may not have liked Bruce as a person, but he was lucky once again in that Bruce's election helped no other party leader. By campaigning so diligently he increased the obligation of the party without any cost if Bruce won or lost. Actually Lewis or Norris would have posed a much greater threat to the Governor's leadership in the State.

The Democrats won an overwhelming victory in the general election. Bruce managed to unseat Senator France by a comfortable majority, 160,947 to 139,581. Millard Tydings' victory for House of Repre-

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<sup>43</sup>. Maryland Secretary of State, Maryland Manual, 1922, p. 185.

<sup>44</sup>. Ritchie Diary, 27 September 1922, 7 November 1922, Ritchie Papers.

sentatives in the second congressional district regained one seat for the Democrats in Congress and gave them an even break in the total State delegation as the two incumbent Democrats won easy victories.<sup>45</sup>

For Ritchie the elections meant that the party had managed to keep itself together well enough to win a general election even though it had not been able to avoid a primary. He had done his part to create this harmony by agreeing to support the candidate of the bosses in the primary and by giving fully of his time to campaign for the nominee in the general election. Party leaders would feel more obligated to support him should he try to break tradition and run for reelection the following year. Ritchie was already looking forward and weighing the possibility, but for the moment he relaxed with some ceremonial functions as the year drew to a close. It had been a year filled with activity and conflict, but in almost every case the Governor had resolved the difficulties triumphantly.

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<sup>45</sup>. Maryland Secretary of State, Maryland Manual, 1922 (Baltimore: 20th Century Printing Corporation, 1922), pp. 188-190.

## CHAPTER TWELVE

### AN UNPRECEDENTED REELECTION

During 1923 Ritchie concentrated his energy on his attempt to become the first Governor of Maryland to be elected by the voters for more than one term. Only a few administrative matters diverted his attention and most of these arose at the beginning of the year. After July, Ritchie devoted himself entirely to politics.

Ritchie's most important act which was not connected directly with his reelection campaign was the extension of the coverage of the merit system. By executive order on January 15th, Ritchie extended the merit system to include 2,243 State employees who had previously held jobs that were subject to the spoils system. With this extension all but 859 job holders were covered. Only officials of the Baltimore City courts, sheriff's office, the register of wills, and the State's attorney's office remained omitted. All State officials except school teachers, road repair men, and heads of departments were now included under the system.<sup>1</sup> Ritchie may have been satisfied that the merit system did not destroy the incentive to work based on observation of the system for the last two years. But more likely there were political reasons for his extension of the system. When the law had been passed adopting the system, the Republicans had

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<sup>1</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 16 January 1923.

accused the Democrats of leaving too many loopholes in the law. By extending the system, Ritchie removed one possible election issue from the Republicans. He did so to the possible annoyance of some of the Democratic machine bosses, but these men were now rather clearly under obligation to support him for reelection.

In a talk to the newspaper editors of the State on February 10th, Ritchie also proposed that a 2-1/2-3 cent tax be placed on the purchase of each gallon of gasoline. The tax could be used to relieve the car owners of the fee for purchase of a car license, and it would be applied to road building and repairs. The Governor felt the tax was equitable because it fell on those who most used the roads. He also estimated that there would be enough of an excess from the tax to build a free bridge over the Susquehanna River and to develop a cooperative marketing system for farmers.<sup>2</sup> The matter remained in the form of a proposal and nothing was done to effect it within a year. Otherwise Ritchie was at work on matters related more directly to his reelection.

Until May the Baltimore bosses were involved with the mayoralty election. The bosses were determined to avoid a primary fight similar to that which had helped the Republicans capture the mayoralty in 1919. Howard Jackson, a Mahon man, received the nomination for Mayor despite the displeasure of the Kelly forces. He had been an excellent vote getter in three elections for register of wills.

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<sup>2</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 10 February 1923, p. 1.

Howard Bryant was chosen to run for city council president, and a new-comer, R. Walter Graham, was selected for comptroller.<sup>3</sup> The candidates were picked on January 10th and remained unopposed although the election was not until May. The Republican party renominated Mayor Broening and comptroller Tome and chose Frank Jacobi as its candidate for city council president.<sup>4</sup>

Democratic harmony plans were upset by the announcement of former Mayor Preston, a Democrat, that he would run as an independent in the general election. This way he would avoid the Democratic primary where the bosses more often were the strongest, and yet he might well take enough votes in the general election to help Broening win again.<sup>5</sup>

Preston charged Ritchie, through Boss Kelly, with providing protection to the "criminal colored" element in Baltimore in return for votes for Howard Jackson. Ritchie refused to answer the charges because he claimed they were simply political and without concrete support.<sup>6</sup> But this election does begin a change in the voting patterns of the Black citizens in Maryland. Formerly most Blacks voted Republican. In the election of 1923 the Afro-American endorsed Howard Jackson; it was the first time a Democrat had received the support of the Black newspaper.<sup>7</sup> After the election, Carl Murphy, the editor of the

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3. Baltimore Evening Sun, 10 January 1923, p. 1.

4. Ibid., 10 January, p. 1. 26 January 1923, p. 38.

5. Ibid., 5 February 1923, p. 26.

6. Ibid., 4 May 1923, p. 48.

7. Baltimore Afro-American, 9 May 1923, clipping in Ritchie Papers.

Afro-American stated that approximately one-third of the registered Black voters had voted for Jackson, and the Democratic Party could expect support from Black voters in the future if it treated them fairly.<sup>8</sup>

The election returns of May 1923 were highly satisfactory to the Democrats. Jackson won by a vote of 74,124 to Broening's 49,919 and Preston's 39,042. Furthermore the Democrats had captured all but one seat in the city council as well as the council presidency and the city comptrollership.<sup>9</sup> The city organization appeared fit for the fall elections.

Politicians then focused their uninterrupted attention on the fall elections. Ritchie had ended one threat to his renomination while most eyes were still on the mayoralty fight. A movement to make Hugh McMullen the nominee had begun in late January. McMullen had felt that he deserved the nomination in 1919 and had remained cool to Ritchie through his term as Governor. McMullen would have liked

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8. Baltimore Evening Sun, 9 May 1923, p. 1; Baltimore Afro-American, 9 May 1923, clipping in Ritchie Papers. All through the 1920's one can see a shift of support of the Black voter into the Democratic columns, and this began fully five years before the 1928 presidential election in which Al Smith is generally seen as being the first Democrat to win these votes, although the total shift of the Black voter does not come until 1936. On this see: Jerome M. Clubb and Howard W. Allen "The Cities and the Election of 1928: Partisan Realignment", American Historical Review, LVIV (April 1969), pp. 1215-1221; Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics (New York: Doubleday, 1955), pp. 42-43; V. O. Key, Jr. Southern Politics (New York: Random House, 1949), pp. 317-329.

9. Official election returns of Board of Election Supervisors May 1923 in Enoch Pratt Free Library.

nothing better than to receive the nomination in 1923.<sup>10</sup>

McMullen questioned Ritchie's expenditures as Governor to open his campaign. He claimed the State budget had risen from 1.25 million in 1919 to 1.7 million in 1921, and that Ritchie had disguised this by a clever presentation. Ritchie then invited McMullen to debate the issue with him before the editors of the Annapolis newspapers on the next day, but McMullen declined and said that he needed more time for study.<sup>11</sup> By way of reply Ritchie pointed to the reduction in the tax rate as a complete defense against McMullen's imputation of extravagance. The biggest increase Ritchie said was in expenditures for education. Did McMullen want them reduced?<sup>12</sup> By then McMullen had opened a headquarters in Baltimore City, but he had started his campaign with a poor choice of issues and his candidacy fizzled out without ever becoming a severe threat to Ritchie.<sup>13</sup>

A greater threat to the Governor was an inevitable tug of war between Ritchie and ex-Senator Smith for control of the Maryland Democratic Party. Just what form it would take remained to be seen, but the test of strength was regarded as certain.<sup>14</sup> The prophecy was soon verified.

Both Ritchie and Smith were in Atlantic City at the Maryland State

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10. Baltimore Evening Sun, 27 January 1923, p. 16.

11. Baltimore Evening Sun, 8 February 1923, p. 38; Baltimore American, 7 February 1923.

12. Baltimore Evening Sun, 10 February 1923, p. 1; Baltimore American, 11 February 1923.

13. Baltimore American, 21 February 1923, 11 May 1923.

14. Baltimore Evening Sun, 16 May 1923, p. 36.



bankers convention along with Gordy, McMullen, Jackson and John M. Dennis. On May 17th, Smith announced that he was supporting State Comptroller Dennis for the Governorship. Smith was angry at being assigned to the political graveyard. Although he was almost eighty years old, he had no intention of releasing control of the State organization which he had headed with little opposition for so long. Furthermore, he announced, he would back Dennis no matter what his old friend Frank Furst would do.<sup>15</sup> Comptroller Gordy, another Smith man, waited on the sidelines hoping that he might be the compromise candidate if a Ritchie-Dennis battle became heated. Hugh McMullen who was also associated with the Smith group shared a similar hope.

The problem was not solved until all the men returned to Maryland. State jobholders who belonged to the Smith organization were frightened by Smith's move. They owed their security to Ritchie whose power was growing. They felt that Smith was unwise to challenge the Governor at that time.<sup>16</sup> Smith requested Frank Furst to choose the candidate, but Furst was wary of being placed between the ex-Senator and the Governor, both of whom were now friends.<sup>17</sup>

Actually no one in the State, including Frank Furst, was ready to help Smith to challenge Ritchie at this time, and so the ex-Senator was forced to step down. The resulting compromise seemed more

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15. Baltimore Evening Sun, 17 May 1923, p. 1.

16. Ibid., p. 2.

17. Ibid., 18 May 1923, p. 48.

favorable to Smith than it was. Ritchie was to be the candidate for Governor and Smith men were to be chosen for Comptroller and Attorney General while John M. Dennis was to continue in his position as State treasurer. However, Ritchie made sure that the Smith men who were chosen were no threat to him. None were overly ambitious or charismatic.<sup>18</sup> Gordy was again the candidate for Comptroller; he was the kind of administrator Ritchie liked best, efficient, subordinate and unoriginal in his ideas. Ritchie expected the candidate for Attorney General to be similar. Thomas Robinson was born in Harford County in 1860 and had a moderately distinguished legal career near his home. He had also served as the president of the second national bank of Bel Air. Nothing about his career had been spectacular, and the fact that he was a Catholic made it more unlikely that he would be able to challenge Ritchie for political control in the State.<sup>19</sup>

The compromise signaled the passing of the old order in the Democratic Party; it was tangible evidence of the power that Ritchie had been able to amass in a single term.<sup>20</sup> From then on he had smooth sailing until after the date of the primary elections. The Democrats managed to avoid a primary fight and this was always a great help for the general election.

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18. Baltimore Evening Sun, 23 May 1923, p. 38.

19. Maryland Secretary of State, Maryland Manual, 1926, pp. 264-5.

20. Baltimore American, 24 June 1923.

As Ritchie's political position became more secure, he became less concerned with the politics of power and more concerned with broader constitutional issues. During the summer of 1922, Ritchie made two major addresses which explained his interpretation of the Constitution. At the bankers convention in Atlantic City, Ritchie spoke on the danger of the amending process to the Federal Constitution. Ritchie felt that small groups tried to amend the constitution whenever it hindered their objectives and pointed out that seventy-one proposed amendments had been introduced into the Federal Congress between March 4, 1921 and January 15, 1923. Some of the measures were either dangerous or trivial. Furthermore, Ritchie said it was possible under the present system of ratification for 32% of the population of the United States to effect the passage of an amendment. Therefore he proposed a three point safeguard: "First, future amendments must be essential and must not transgress the present powers of the states. Second, amendments must be ratified by legislatures elected after they had been proposed and the ratification of each legislature should be subject to popular referendum. Third, amendments should not be allowed to attack the powers of the Supreme Court." In this manner the United States would be protected against the "weapon of minorities," said the Governor.<sup>21</sup>

The other major address was made before the Maryland Bar Association Convention of which Ritchie had served as president for the

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<sup>21</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 16 May 1923, pp. 1-2.

previous year. The Governor developed his ideas about the amending process still further. Some amendments, he said, changed what he called the organic law. Two examples Ritchie gave were the proposed LaFollette amendment to increase the power of Congress or the proposed Borah amendment requiring decision made by the Supreme Court to have a six to three vote. He failed to define organic, but he seemed to be talking about the basic form of the Federal government relating to the division of powers. Ritchie was not certain that these matters should be subject to the amending process at all, but that if so they should surely be subject to public referendum.<sup>22</sup>

But Ritchie was not always occupied with larger constitutional problems during the summer. Practical political problems were still to be solved. The Democrats, it is true, had managed to avoid a statewide primary, but there was still a danger that local primary elections might be necessary especially in Baltimore. Eventually city problems were ironed out under Ritchie's direction.<sup>23</sup>

Ritchie also attempted to get as many of the women's votes as possible for the Democrats. Ideologically, this might have been difficult due to his previous ambiguous stand on woman's suffrage, but personally Ritchie knew how to charm women. One evidence of this was a beauty contest between Ritchie and his Republican opponent

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<sup>22</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 28 June 1923, p. 1.

<sup>23</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 13 April 1923, p. 48; 12 June 1923.

for Governor, Alexander Armstrong. Ritchie already had a full head of white hair which contrasted with his deep set blue eyes. By present styles of masculine handsomeness, he was probably a bit stout, but he fitted the masculine image of the day and badly defeated Armstrong in the contest.<sup>24</sup> Opera singer Mary Garden once described him as "the cutest boy in America."<sup>25</sup> However, Ritchie did more than depend on his looks and personal charm to get the female vote. He spoke at many meetings of women's clubs during the spring and summer, and on June 11th, he sponsored an enormous reception at the Executive Mansion for the Democratic women's clubs of the State. The women were given tours of the State House and the Naval Academy and Ritchie went about shaking hands "to show appreciation for work for the Democratic Party."<sup>26</sup>

In the meantime the Republicans had also settled on a ticket for the general election without a primary campaign. Attorney General Armstrong was the only Republican to win a statewide election in 1919, and after compiling an excellent record as Attorney General, he seemed the obvious Republican candidate in 1923. Armstrong, however, refused to run unless he could have the support of all the factions and leaders of the party before the primary date. Not until he had achieved the personal

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<sup>24</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 30 June 1923, p. 20, 10 July 1923, p. 32.

<sup>25</sup>. Ray Tucker, The Mirrors of 1932 (New York: Brewer, Warren, and Putnam, 1931), p. 165.

<sup>26</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 11 June 1923, p. 3.

assurances of Jackson, Weller, Tait, France, Broening and others did he announce that he would be the candidate.<sup>27</sup> With such a united party, Armstrong was a formidable match for Ritchie. He also was probably the most capable candidate the Republicans ever chose to run against Ritchie.

Three days after the primary election date, the Democrats were hard at work for the final test in November. Ritchie had arranged a meeting of almost every faction of the Democratic Party at the home of John M. Dennis in Riderwood, Maryland.<sup>28</sup> By the following week, Ritchie was already touring the State and making political addresses even though the Democratic platform was unwritten. He spoke in Cumberland and promised reductions in the State tax rate.<sup>29</sup> In Bel Air, he spoke against a State prohibition enforcement act.<sup>30</sup>

The Democratic State convention met on September 20th in Baltimore for the purpose of drawing up the platform, but the scene had changed greatly from 1919. At that time Ritchie carefully approached every segment of the party before committing himself on a platform. However, in 1923, Ritchie was already the head of the party and not really responsible to anyone. He had written the platform almost entirely on the basis of his own views.

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27. Baltimore News, 28 June 1923; Baltimore Sun, 28 June 1923.

28. Baltimore American, 13 September 1923.

29. Baltimore Sun, 14 September 1923; Baltimore News, 14 September 1923.

30. Baltimore American, 18 September 1923; Baltimore Sun, 18 September 1923.

There were twenty-three pledges in the Democratic platform, most of which were vague promises about continuing the functions of government to provide better schools, roads, conservation, agricultural aids and so on. On a slightly more important level, the Democrats also promised to legislate to "better the conditions of women in industry and to improve the State system of child care." They pledged to remove one-way bridges, to remove all grade crossings, and to make the toll bridge over the Susquehanna River at Havre de Grace into a free bridge. Perhaps the most important plank, and here Ritchie's influence was particularly evident, was a statement that "the responsibility for enforcement of the Volstead Act should rest on the Federal government alone."<sup>31</sup> Ritchie was beginning to feel that the work of reforming the government for greater efficiency was completed or nearly so. No promises of major changes comparable to those in the 1919 or 1921 platforms was included.

If the Democratic platform was somewhat noncommittal, the Republican platform, issued one week later, was absolutely vague. Three problems had occupied the attention of the Republican delegates to the State convention, but none of them were mentioned in the platform. There was no statement about prohibition, gambling nor even the Ku Klux Klan. An anti-Ku Klux Klan plank had been expected so that the Republicans could hold the Black vote, but it was not included. The pledges

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<sup>31</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 20 September 1923, p. 40.

were remarkably similar to those of the Democrats except that the Republicans asked for an increase in workmen's compensation and proposed a "blue sky" law to protect investors while not hampering legitimate business.<sup>32</sup>

Both Ritchie and Armstrong were "wets"; both had been subject to abusive comments by the dry leaders even before their nominations. However, when the Republican platform hedged on the prohibition issue, Armstrong became the preferred candidate of the drys.<sup>33</sup> Ritchie was far from the wettest man in the State. He officially favored only light wines and beer in 1923, and he continued to emphasize the need for individual states to decide the issue for themselves. However, he won the support of the Maryland Association Against The Prohibition Amendment because the Democratic platform was clearer than the Republican document.<sup>34</sup>

Also the prohibition issue embarrassed Armstrong at moments during the campaign. Two days before the election, Republican State central committee chairman Tait placed an advertisement in the Baltimore newspapers which accused Ritchie of being the only Governor who had not upheld his oath to support the Constitution because he would not enforce the Volstead Act.<sup>35</sup> However, a Republican candidate for Congress, John Philip Hill, who was even wetter than Ritchie, had no

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<sup>32</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 27 September 1923, p. 42.

<sup>33</sup>. Ibid., 25 October 1923, p. 48.

<sup>34</sup>. Ibid., 25 October 1923, p. 48.

<sup>35</sup>. Ibid., 4 November 1923, p. 18.



intention of allowing a dry advertisement to slip past his notice. He publicly asked Armstrong to deny that he had approved of the advertisement or to announce his change of feelings on the prohibition issue. The day before the election, Armstrong said he had not approved the advertisement.<sup>36</sup> Armstrong did not state his exact stand on prohibition and such fence-sitting projected a weak image to the voters and added to their list of reasons for choosing Ritchie.

During the campaign, the Republicans tried a variety of issues, none of which seemed to create the desired kind of public excitement. Quite naturally Armstrong started to use the second term issue early in the contest, but on October 2nd a Republican newspaper reported that the issue was unimpressive to voters who wanted some specific reasons why Ritchie was not qualified for a second term. Armstrong then dropped the general issue and moved to more specific ones.<sup>37</sup>

The challenger accused the Governor of partisanship in appointing only Democrats to school boards around the State. Because Armstrong was considered to be a man of great integrity, many people who were instinctively doubtful about the charges waited for proof. Ritchie kept insisting that Armstrong show specific examples of partisan appointments. Again Armstrong failed to supply proof.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>36</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 5 November 1923, p. 32.

<sup>37</sup>. Baltimore Sun, 29, 30 September 1923, Baltimore News, 3 October 1923, Baltimore American, 3 October 1923.

<sup>38</sup>. Baltimore News, 2 October 1923.

Armstrong next raised the issue of waste in the construction of roads, and then "too much politics in government, and finally "bad economics". On all of these matters he was eventually forced to retreat. The school system had been improved, road building had progressed at reasonable cost, and the last two issues were almost ridiculous because it was Ritchie's administration that had replaced the system of political appointments with the merit system, and Ritchie's budgets were nearly models of economy so much so that he had managed to lower the tax rate. Even the Republican editorials began to admit that Armstrong had failed to bring up an issue against Ritchie that gave voters any reason for not giving the Governor another term.<sup>39</sup>

Other issues influenced the election, one of which was the Ku Klux Klan. The Democratic platform had not mentioned the Klan which was at the peak of its twentieth century revival in 1923. Ritchie, however, denounced the group in his speeches. This was very unusual for a Democratic candidate in Maryland. Meanwhile Armstrong kept silent on the issue, and on October 20th, Dr. J. H. Hawkins, the imperial wizard of Maryland, announced that the Klan was officially endorsing Armstrong. Like the Anti-Saloon League the Klansmen were attempting to defeat Ritchie for what they felt was his immoral attitude.<sup>40</sup> It is not at all clear just how much the Klan's support helped Armstrong in the rural areas of the State, but it clearly added to Ritchie's appeal

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<sup>39</sup>. Baltimore American, 24 October 1923.

<sup>40</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 20 October 1923, p. 18.

among Black urban voters who had traditionally been solidly Republican. It does not seem to have changed the Black voters Republican habits in rural areas if the single available study is any guide.<sup>41</sup>

Although not an enthusiastic supporter of the unions, Ritchie received their support in this election especially in the mining areas in the Western part of the State. The Western end of the State had traditionally given Republicans large majorities in general election. Ritchie's refusal to send troops when President Harding had requested them won him enough support to nullify the traditional Republican advantage in this area.

The vote was moderately heavy; the results were a Democratic sweep. Ritchie received the highest total vote and smallest plurality of the four statewide contestants. The official returns for Governor, Attorney General, comptroller and clerk of the Court of Appeals read:

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<sup>41</sup>. George R. Kent, "The Negro in Politics in Dorchester County, 1920-60" (unpublished M. A. thesis, University of Maryland, 1961), Kent concluded that the Black votes in the county were able enough to respond to changing political issues; but he did not check into the issues in each particular election and decided a priori that until 1932 or 1934 the Republican candidates were always the best choice for the Black voter. I would certainly doubt this conclusion for 1923. But whatever the judgment about which party the Black should have voted for, in Dorchester County he chose the Republicans in 1923.

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|----------|---------|-----------|---------|
| Ritchie  | 177,871 | Armstrong | 137,471 |
| Gordy    | 173,147 | Holland   | 119,256 |
| Robinson | 167,335 | Coleman   | 120,987 |
| Young    | 171,087 | Brewer    | 113,060 |

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Ritchie's plurality was the largest ever compiled by a candidate for Governor up to that time. It might be considered a vote of confidence in his first administration. It received attention outside of the State. His popularity had carried the entire Democratic ticket as the party won large majorities in both houses of the legislature. Ritchie would have a State Senate controlled 22-7 by the Democrats and a House of Delegates with a 93-25 majority for his party.<sup>43</sup>

The 1923 elections added evidence that the Democrats were creating a regular urban majority which was to provide their margin of victory in statewide election. In 1919 Ritchie and Nice had nearly split the city and the county vote. In 1923 Ritchie actually lost the total county vote to Armstrong but won nearly 2/3 of the city vote. 90,002 to 48,760. Republican support of the Ku Klux Klan had helped the Democrats make considerable inroads in Baltimore's Black and Jewish voters. The Republican stand on prohibition and other moral issues had alienated many of the Italian and Polish voters in the city.<sup>44</sup> Gordy, Robinson and Young who were less outspoken than Ritchie on these issues ran behind him in the city while compiling substantial margins over their opponents in the counties. From this point on, Ritchie's main foundation of support was from this urban coalition of ethnic voters.

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<sup>42</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 20 November 1923, p. 1.

<sup>43</sup>. Ibid., 7 November 1923, p. 1.

<sup>44</sup>. Ibid.

## CHAPTER THIRTEEN

### THE LEGISLATURE OF 1924 - A DIFFERENT LEADER

Ritchie's leadership of the first two legislative sessions led some observers to believe that the increase in his power created by the uncontested nomination and large election victory would allow Ritchie to lead the third legislature during his Governorship to some stunning achievements. They were badly disappointed.

In the first term as Governor, Ritchie had brought about all the structural changes in the State government that he felt were necessary. Although he did recommend some minor changes in the remainder of his term as Maryland's chief executive, 1924 marks the beginning of a change in Ritchie's attitude to new legislation. He began to be the defender of the status quo, proposing only a few alterations each year to meet special problems. Actually, if the optimistic observers of 1924, had inspected Ritchie's previous career more carefully, they would have found little to justify their hopes that Ritchie would continue to remain a reform leader. Nothing in Ritchie's background nor anything he had ever said in a political speech would have created the belief that he favored any large social or economic reforms. The innovations which he had made as Attorney General and those which he had sponsored in his first term as Governor dealt almost solely with structural changes aimed at creating a more efficient bureaucratic structure. The only area where Ritchie had sounded "liberal"

was in his steadfast objection to legislation which dealt with questions of personal morality, and even there he had stated his objections in terms of States' rights as often as he had protested against interference with personal liberties. Nor had the Democratic platform of the previous fall promised any startling new changes. After the election of 1923, Ritchie looked out over his domain with a self-satisfied view. He now saw his main task as one of keeping the affairs of State as honest, efficient, and economical as possible.

After the election various people suggested that the ballot in Maryland was too long. It was difficult if not impossible for the average citizen to vote intelligently for all the minor offices, and it induced many voters to vote a straight party ticket. On November 10th, Ritchie announced that he was in favor of a simplified ballot, but he did not recommend any action.<sup>1</sup> Four days later, Senator McIntosh requested of Ritchie that a commission be appointed to prepare a shortened ballot for legislative consideration.<sup>2</sup> Later in the week Ritchie named a commission of nine, including former Governors Harrington and Lowndes and Judges Burke, Gorter and Walsh.<sup>3</sup> It was undoubtedly a prestigious committee, but despite Ritchie's statements in favor of the shorter ballot no suggested legislation concerning it reached the 1924 session of the General Assembly.

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1. Baltimore Evening Sun, 10 November 1923, p. 20.

2. Ibid., 14 November 1923, p. 42.

3. Ibid., 19 November 1923, p. 30.

Ritchie seems to have spent most of his time between the election and the meeting of the legislature in working on his budget. Only one action of the Governor's excited much attention during that time. Ritchie refused the Ku Klux Klan the right to use the Fifth Regiment Armory in Baltimore for a circus. Tentative permission had been granted and tickets and posters had already been printed by the Maryland Klan, but Ritchie felt that the organization was a bigoted blight on the American nation, and he righteously refused to allow them to use State property for any purpose.<sup>4</sup> Of course, Ritchie could also read the election returns, and it was obvious that his previous anti-Klan views had attracted many new voters into the Democratic Party and especially into the Ritchie column.<sup>5</sup>

Ritchie spent two weeks in early December vacationing in French Lick Springs, Indiana. He returned home in time to swear in Thomas Robinson as the new Attorney General, to celebrate a quiet Christmas with his mother, and to announce that he would not appoint a ceremonial military staff for his second inauguration.<sup>6</sup> The New Year opened with the Governor presiding at his annual reception in the State House during the day and then quickly retiring to a Democratic caucus in the evening in order to decide who the new officers of the legislature should be when

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<sup>4</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 29 November 1923, p. 1.

<sup>5</sup>. David M. Chalmers, Hooded Americanism, The History of the Ku Klux Klan (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1965), pp. 159-161.

<sup>6</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 20 December 1923, 27 December 1923, p. 12.

it convened the following day.<sup>7</sup>

In the choice for a new president of the Senate, Ritchie, with the help of E. Brooke Lee, successfully overcame the combined opposition of Kelly, Mahon, Furst, Samuel K. Dennis, and other leaders of the old Smith organization. Ritchie wanted David McIntosh as president of the Senate while the others wanted the new senator, William Curran, of Baltimore City, for the job. When Ritchie had his way, the city leaders were very angry because they felt that they had provided him with the margin of victory in his election. Ritchie pacified them by throwing his support behind Francis P. Curtis, of Baltimore, for speaker of the House of Delegates. J. Allan Coad, of St. Mary's County, had been expected to get the speakership.<sup>8</sup> In the end, the city organization was pleased with the speakership because it offered more patronage than the Senate presidency.<sup>9</sup> Legislative organization was completed on the first day of the session.

On the same day Ritchie delivered his message to the General Assembly. In contrast with the rather comprehensive messages which he had delivered to the two previous legislative sessions, Ritchie's 1924 speech was devoted entirely to the budget. There were faint hints of progressive concern in the appropriations for schools, for the care of the deaf, insane and tubercular, but these were nulli-

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7. Baltimore Evening Sun, 1 January 1924, p. 32.

8. Baltimore American, 2 January 1924.

9. Baltimore Sun, 3 January 1924.



fied by the small amounts of money Ritchie designated for these purposes. Maryland, Ritchie told his audience, had progressed as no other State had because it always found sound measures to meet new conditions after they arose. He said: "Our State has never been one to experiment with new fields of legislation. We have not risked the stability of our government, the enduring quality of our fine tradition or untried and unknown paths. We have not fallen before the lure of panaceas or theories or isms which do not square with the institutions and philosophy of the American government." <sup>10</sup>

In Ritchie's eyes the main job had been accomplished, and if new measures were to be initiated, the impetus would not come from him.

For at least one member of the legislature, more changes were still needed. Daniel C. Joseph was an extraordinarily capable lawyer whose sharp mind was accompanied by a disdain for any tactical problems he caused himself in fighting for what he felt was right. Joseph was a constant thorn in Ritchie's side in the remaining legislative sessions in the decade, and the newspapers referred to him as the leader of the "radicals" probably to his own sense of wry amusement. Joseph was hardly a radical. The mild reforms he sponsored seemed extreme or radical only by comparison with Ritchie's standpat attitude. In 1924, for example, Joseph introduced a measure to limit the granting of automobile licenses to those motorists who could provide accident

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<sup>10</sup>. Inaugural Address, 1920-1935, Ritchie Papers, Baltimore Evening Sun, 2 January 1924, p. 1.

protection, either through insurance or private bond. The purpose of the insurance, Joseph stated, was to protect persons and property injured by the car no matter who was driving.<sup>11</sup> Even this mild reform did not receive Ritchie's support.

Joseph also insisted that the Maryland Code of Laws had "thirty-nine and one-half feet of useless laws", and he proposed repeal of ninety sections. These dealt with apprenticeship, ferryboat rental and delay (now controlled by the public service commission), Mexican War pensions, insolvency (which was controlled by Federal laws), dower rights of heirs, pleading in Orphans' Court, and other similar obsolete sections of the State laws.<sup>12</sup> This sort of reform might have been expected to please Ritchie, but he offered no statement of support; Ritchie was also silent about Joseph's bill to expand the Traffic Court to three regular magistrates.<sup>13</sup>

Ritchie had, in fact, been very quiet for the entire first month of the legislative session. When he did speak out publicly on the fourth of February, he was in a petulant mood. All State administrators must note that the budget will not be raised, said the Governor. Every day he had received plans for more money, but his main goal was to reduce the tax rate, and he was tired of saying so every day. The supplemental budget would contain additions to the tax rate only where a clear mistake

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11. Baltimore Evening Sun, 23 January 1924, p. 2.

12. Ibid., 25 January 1924, p. 44; 29 January 1924, p. 2.

13. Ibid., 27 January 1924, p. 1.

had been made before, but it would not contain additional appropriations.<sup>14</sup>

The most dramatic moments of the 1924 legislature concerned appropriations for schools and a loan for the University of Maryland. On both of these issues Ritchie fought against greater expenditures for the taxpayers of the State. President Woods of the University of Maryland was still unhappy about Ritchie's treatment of his proposed budget in 1922 which had been cut so badly that it had forced him to retreat from low tuition for students at the university. In 1924 Woods submitted a request for \$2,763,000 in a "magnificently reasoned" budget. But this time he did not rely on reason alone, and attempted some questionable methods for getting the budget through the legislature. He mobilized all the anti-Ritchie men in the legislature, and managed to get the appropriations bill passed. The measure was in the form of a loan rather than as part of the regular budget, and it had been sponsored mainly by Senator Curran of Baltimore. The loan had not been expected to pass, and when it did Ritchie sprang angrily into the fight.<sup>15</sup>

He appeared before the legislature once again and announced in a public speech that he would veto the loan. Furthermore, he asked that the university be dissolved because it proved disruptive to economical government. Then he offered a deal. The professional schools,

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<sup>14</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 2 February 1924, p. 30.

<sup>15</sup>. Ibid., 19 February 1924; Calcott, A History of The University of Maryland, pp. 284-5.

which seemed to be Curran's main concern, would get their appropriation if they agreed to dissolution of the 1920 merger of the agricultural college and the professional schools. Neither Woods nor Curran was prepared to surrender without a public combat. Woods made eloquent speeches in support of higher education, and Curran manipulated behind the scenes in the legislature to the best of his ability. Finally on April 1st at 2:00 A. M., the Senate voted 16-13 to uphold the merger. The House of Delegates concurred and appropriated \$937,000 for the following year, and in order to discourage a veto they adjourned immediately.<sup>16</sup>

This meant that Ritchie had won the immediate appropriations battle for a second time, but he had not been able to defeat the right of the university to exist as a State supported institution. Later Ritchie acknowledged the victory and "soon included the university in his list of great accomplishments." He often appeared at campus gatherings and commencements and gave the university friendly advice.<sup>17</sup> But in 1924 Ritchie had not been in such a flexible mood, and he certainly did nothing to prevent the legislature from lowering Dr. Woods' annual salary from \$10,000 to \$7,000.<sup>18</sup>

Another educator who had his salary lowered by the legislature was Dr. Albert S. Cook, Superintendent of the Public School System. At the beginning of the legislative session Cook had angered the Governor

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16. Calcott, The History of The University of Maryland, p. 285; House of Delegates Proceedings, 1924, pp. 828-30.

17. Calcott, The History of The University of Maryland, p. 285.

18. Baltimore Evening Sun, 12 March 1924, p. 1.

by comparing the school budget with the budget for road construction. Cook showed that during a three year period over four times as much money had been spent on roads as had been spent on schools, and then he insisted that the road spending be limited to the amount collected from highway and gas taxes. It was a question of what was more important to society, he said, "concrete or children."<sup>19</sup> But Cook's speech did not anger Ritchie nearly as much as the fact that school teachers around the State were dictating letters for their classes to write, and then having the students send the letters to the Governor's office. Some classes were sending as many as two to four letters a day. Ritchie denied that the schools were being cheated or that the budget would slow down their progress. All the propaganda campaign achieved for Cook was to get his salary lowered; the budget for the schools was not raised.<sup>20</sup>

As usual the 1924 legislature had its fights over prohibition and other legislation which attempted to regulate the public morals. However, in these matters legislative sentiment had definitely changed. In 1922 the men who favored a State law to enforce the prohibition amendment had been defeated in their efforts only by clever strategy. At that point they had expected to have sufficient strength to pass their law in 1924 without any difficulty. However, in 1924, those in opposition to the prohibition amendment clearly had the upper hand. On the

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19. Baltimore Evening Sun, 24 January 1924, p. 26.

20. Ibid., 2 February 1924, p. 1; 3 February 1924, p. 1.

very first day of the legislative session, delegates DiMarco and Callan introduced "wet" bills into the legislature. The Callan bill was a resolution lauding Ritchie's speech against prohibition which Ritchie made at President Coolidge's White House luncheon; the DiMarco bill was intended to give the counties local option to legalize beer and light wines if they desired.<sup>21</sup> Later in the month, David K. E. Bruce introduced a resolution asking Congress to repeal the Volstead Act.<sup>22</sup> It is true that dry legislation was also introduced in both Houses during the session, but unlike the previous term, it fell far short of passage. The dry bill in the Senate did not reach a vote on its merits on the floor because it was returned to committee by a vote of 18-10, and in the House of Delegates an unfavorable committee report on prohibition was adopted by a vote of 72 to 39.<sup>23</sup>

The opponents to sumptuary legislation also took the offensive against restrictive Sunday legislation. A bill to allow movies to be shown on Sunday afternoons was introduced by Tony DiMarco. It was eventually defeated at the end of the session by a voice vote which greatly angered DiMarco and Daniel Joseph who claimed that it would have been passed by a roll call.<sup>24</sup> In the end, none of the legislation advocated by the men who felt the State had no right to interfere in matters of morality was passed, but the tide had obviously turned. No longer were they

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21. Baltimore Evening Sun, 2 January 1924, p. 1.

22. Ibid., 29 January 1924, p. 2, House of Delegates Proceedings, 1924, pp. 90, 292.

23. Ibid., 13 February 1924, p. 1; 14 February 1924, p. 1.

24. Ibid., 27 March 1924, p. 32.

constantly on the defensive against such legislation. In fact, they now were almost strong enough to repeal some of the laws they least liked.

When the legislative session closed on April first the results looked meagre when compared with the two previous sessions of the State's lawmakers. The most important bills which had been passed included the equalization of pay for women teachers, a slight reorganization of the Baltimore Traffic Court, a pay increase for the Baltimore City police force, a pension plan for Baltimore City employees, and a bill giving the University of Maryland Hospital \$75,000 to repair fire hazards. Many progressive bills fell by the wayside. Among these were a bill to improve the State ferry service across the Chesapeake Bay, a bill regulating building and loan associations, a bill limiting highway advertising, a bill revising the highly inequitable tax situation in Baltimore City which had been caused by the annexation of new land by the city early in the century, a bill to limit the working day for women to eight hours, a bill to make sure that the weight of bread was labeled, a bill to make some form of automobile insurance compulsory, a bill to improve the Allendale Institute for the Negro Insane, and several bills to better several educational institutions within the State.<sup>25</sup> Somewhat later in the month Ritchie vetoed over 10% of the legislation which had been passed.<sup>26</sup> In his new conservative posture he had little complaint with the fact that the legislature had done so

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<sup>25</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 1 April 1924, p. 40.

<sup>26</sup>. Ibid., 9 April 1924, p. 1.

little that was innovative. He had striven mainly for economy and was satisfied with the results that he had achieved.

In July, Ritchie appointed two magistrates to the Baltimore Traffic Court.<sup>27</sup> Later in the summer, the Governor inaugurated an investigation of certain justices of the peace in Baltimore and Anne Arundel Counties who had been reported to be guilty of irregularities in trials of motorists. Ritchie promised to dismiss the justices if any bribery was involved, but the probe failed to uncover any violations.<sup>28</sup> These two very minor matters were Ritchie's most important acts as chief executive of the State until the end of the summer.

Late in the year Ritchie mastered a crisis which disturbed the seafood industry. The problem started when Chicago health authorities announced that there were twenty five cases of typhoid fever in Chicago, five of which were definitely caused by Maryland oysters. The Chicago Health Department placed a ban on sales of oysters in the city, and the Health Commissioner of Chicago caused a further fright among oyster eaters everywhere when he said that he heard of similar reports of diseased oysters in New York, Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Cleveland and Detroit.

Baltimore health officials insisted that there was no increase of typhoid in the city and oyster operators protested that their product was pure; but cautious shoppers everywhere had already begun to avoid the purchase of oysters. The industry reported an 80% slump in sales, and

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27. Baltimore Evening Sun, 16 July 1924, p. 32.

28. Ibid., 29 August 1924, p. 36.



because the industry was centered in Maryland, Ritchie took the initiative to solve the problem. On December 11th, the week in which the Chicago officials made their announcement, Ritchie instigated a thorough probe by Maryland State health officials of the entire State industry.<sup>29</sup>

The Governor kept a close watch over the investigation and when it was announced that Maryland oysters were free from typhoid, he made sure that the report received wide publicity. On January 24th, Ritchie traveled to Salisbury, on Maryland's Eastern Shore, where he spoke to the Mardelvis Press Association and announced that in the future Maryland oysters would bear a special mark demonstrating that they had been inspected for purity. He publicly invited health officials from Chicago to visit the State for the purpose of examining the oysters themselves.<sup>30</sup>

One week later Maryland and Illionis Health Department officials met in Maryland and jointly established standards of inspection. If these regulations were observed, the Illionis officials agreed to admit shipments of oysters into their State.<sup>31</sup> Ritchie made sure that the newspapers reported this. He also arranged for a series of radio talks by Maryland's conservation commissioner, Swepson Earle, to assure the public that Maryland oysters were pure. Through speedy and effective public action, he prevented the crisis in the oyster industry from becoming a calamity.<sup>32</sup>

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29. Baltimore Sun, 12 December 1925.

30. Baltimore Evening Sun, 24 January 1925, p. 18.

31. Ibid., 19 January 1925, p. 28.

32. Ibid., 31 January 1925, p. 18.

## CHAPTER FOURTEEN

### EYES TOWARD WASHINGTON - I

No Marylander had ever served as President or Vice-President. Not since the early history of the Republic when the small State of Maryland was proportionally more important in a smaller United States had any man from the State been in serious consideration for the two highest offices in the country. It was natural that Ritchie's first longings for the Democratic presidential nomination were expressed very tentatively, and it was equally natural that when his desires assumed the remotest probability of fulfillment that citizens from the State wished for success in the way a famished man hopes for water. That Ritchie's hopes fell far short of materialization in 1924 mattered little to the people of the State. He became a local hero. He could do almost no wrong in the State because nearly everyone was thinking of Ritchie's national ambitions. The whole State looked toward Washington.

The first and most tentative notes of a "Ritchie-for-President" movement were sounded early in January. The Democratic National Committee had decided not to have an annual Jackson day dinner because they feared intra-party strife. When he heard this, Ritchie planned his own dinner to celebrate the day. Three hundred and thirty-one guests were invited to Annapolis for a dinner in the State House, and the list included some prestigious names. The National

Democratic Chariman, Cordell Hull, had accepted his invitation; later he declined because he became ill. But Senator Oscar Underwood of Alabama was present as were Bernard Barcu, Herbert B. Swope of the New York World, and several other nationally prominent figures. Guests from within Maryland included not only the usual list of Democratic politicians but representatives of the medical profession, several newspaper editors, educators and some wealthy businessmen and bankers.<sup>1</sup> Ritchie announced that any idea that the purpose of the dinner was to launch his campaign for the presidential nomination was "absurd", but he was doing nothing to discourage the possibility.<sup>2</sup> While the legislature was in session, the talk about the presidency was somewhat subdued, but Ritchie was dining very often with Judge Walsh, Ritchie's cousin David Winebrenner and E. Brooke Lee in order to plan a political strategy that had little to do with the activities of the legislature.<sup>3</sup>

Ten days before the legislature adjourned, Delegate Yewell Dillehunt of Baltimore City introduced a resolution in the House of Delegates requesting that Ritchie announce his candidacy for the presidency. The motion was quickly passed, and it was possible that the move had been planned by Ritchie or his close friends. Publicly

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<sup>1</sup>. Diary, 1924, in Ritchie Papers; Baltimore Evening Sun, 5 January 1924, p. 16.

<sup>2</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 5 January 1924, p. 16.

<sup>3</sup>.. Diary, 1924, in Ritchie Papers.

Ritchie answered by saying that he was gratified by the honor but that he was much too busy with Maryland legislation to give the matter real consideration.<sup>4</sup> It is doubtful that the Governor's modest pose deceived anyone. Actually the Governor had already begun to form an organization for the purpose of capturing the Democratic nomination for President.

Late in April Ritchie embarked on a set of speeches in several large eastern cities. On April 25th through April 27th, he attended meetings of the League of Women Voters in Buffalo. Next he went to New York City where he remained until the end of the month to canvass political support.<sup>5</sup> After a single day in Annapolis, Ritchie went to Pittsburgh where he spoke to a meeting of the leading Democrats of Pennsylvania. The content of Ritchie's speech there was unsurprising. Centralization would soon destroy American institutions, the Governor told his audience; we had already gone much too far down the path of increasing Federal powers. Federal aid, Ritchie said, was simply a misnomer for Federal interference. It was the duty of the Democratic Party to stop centralization immediately. Ritchie also recommended an amendment to tighten the process of amending the Federal Constitution.<sup>6</sup>

Then, at the end of the month Ritchie shared the spotlight with

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4. Baltimore Evening Sun, 21 March 1924, p. 1.

5. Diary, 1924, in Ritchie Papers.

6. Baltimore Evening Sun, 3 May 1924, p. 1.

Al Smith at a meeting in Baltimore of Negro Democratic delegates from eleven states.<sup>7</sup> These ventures outside of the State could hardly be considered a full scale campaign, but there can be no doubt that Ritchie intended to make himself "available" should the Democratic national convention look for a "new face."

Within the State Ritchie attempted to create a united Democratic block to take with him to the convention. The primary held on May 5th was extraordinarily quiet. Even the Kelly and Mahon factions in Baltimore City had settled their differences before the balloting. The Democrats did have two primary contests for Congressional seats in Southern and Western Maryland, but these were largely personal battles independent of the leading politicians. In Western Maryland, Ritchie's cousin and close friend, David Winebrenner, won the nomination from three other Democrats, but Ritchie had refrained from active participation in the campaign.<sup>8</sup>

What tests of power there were came at the Democratic State Convention on May 15th. The Sunpapers estimated that Ritchie controlled 112 delegates in the State Convention while former Senator Smith controlled only 35. On May 14th, Ritchie met with Mahon and Kelly. The three men decided that they would name the State delegation to the national convention.<sup>9</sup> John W. Smith was not included in these deliber-

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7. Baltimore Evening Sun, 27 May 1924, p. 18.

8. Ibid., 5 May 1924, p. 34, 6 May 1924, p. 1.

9. Baltimore Sun, 15 May 1924.

ations because the three men knew that they could control the State convention despite his opposition. During that week Ritchie made another visit to New York to confer with Baruch and national leaders, and when he returned he looked at a tentative list drawn by the two bosses.<sup>10</sup> The choices of the bosses vexed him. He announced that he would not approve them.<sup>11</sup> After much wrangling the bosses gave in to the Governor. Delegates were to be chosen by the State convention as representatives of the entire State rather than by local districts. Furthermore all State delegates would vote as a unit at the national convention.<sup>12</sup> This meant in effect that all the delegates would be chosen by Ritchie rather than by any local leaders and that all the men would, therefore, owe him their loyalty at the convention. However, general loyalty was not enough for Ritchie. He insisted on the unit vote system in order to be able to control any man who would try to vote independently on any particular issue. Mayor Jackson and Senator Curran were angry at both of the plans. They wished to attend the convention as more than decorative robots of the Ritchie bandwagon. When Ritchie had his way at the State convention both Curran and Jackson announced that they would not attend the national convention although they were on Ritchie's list of delegates.<sup>13</sup>

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10. Baltimore American, 17 May 1924.

11. Baltimore News, 19 May 1924.

12. Baltimore Sun, 21 May 1924; Baltimore Evening Sun, 22 May 1924.

13. Baltimore Sun, 22 May 1924.

The State Democratic convention became a mere rubber stamp for the actions that Ritchie and the bosses had already worked out. The list was passed exactly as Ritchie had drawn it, and the delegation was instructed to vote by unit rule on all measures. The delegation included five delegates at large, and it was here that Ritchie made sure that he included some special close friends; J. Enos Ray, Robert Crane and Howard Bruce. Mrs. Mortimer West was selected to give women representation.<sup>14</sup> A little over a week later, Mayor Jackson relented and announced that he would go to the National Convention; Senator Curran said he might go if he was needed.<sup>15</sup> As the probability of Ritchie's chances to become the nominee of the National Democratic Party grew greater internal State quarrels were dwarfed by comparison. Local politicians tended to forget State matters. Differences were hidden under a unified effort to boost Ritchie as the nominee by the time the delegation left for the national convention three weeks later.

There was a rousing farewell for Ritchie when the Maryland delegation departed from Baltimore's Camden Station on June 22nd.

Ritchie, who wore a high Edwardian collar and a blue polka dot tie while he smoked a cigar, was cheered for fifty minutes by a crowd of well wishers at the station before the train arrived.<sup>16</sup> Presidential fever was beginning to sweep over the citizens of the State, a naive

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<sup>14</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 22 May 1924, p. 46.

<sup>15</sup>. Baltimore Sun, 30 May 1924.

<sup>16</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 22 June 1924, p. 1.

optimistic concern for its favorite son. The issues which disturbed the national party were unimportant to Marylanders who regarded the Ritchie candidacy with a single-mindedness that bordered on obsession.

The 1924 Democratic National Convention demonstrated the lack of cohesion within the party. Democrats were divided into two distinct factions whose views were nearly polarized on several important issues. One group, mainly from the South and West represented an older, rural America. These men were Bryanite liberals on economic issues; they desired greater government regulation of business and finance and more aid to agriculture. On social issues they vehemently supported prohibition and were in sympathy with many of the ideas of the Ku Klux Klan. The other segment of the party was mainly from the East and represented a developing urban America. These men were conservative on economic matters. They opposed government regulation of business and aid to farmers. Their heaviest voting support came from the Irish, Italian, Jewish and Eastern European immigrants in the large cities. These immigrants objected to prohibition because it interfered with their traditional customs, and so urban Democratic leaders led the fight against prohibition. Because the Ku Klux Klan directed its attack against the Catholics, Jews and foreigners, who were the strength of the urban political machines, the urban leaders opposed the Klan.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>17</sup>. William E. Leuchtenberg, The Perils of Prosperity (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 133-4; John D. Hicks, Republican Ascendancy (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), pp. 92-3.



The difficulties caused by the Democratic division were increased by the intensity with which the variant views were held. H. L. Mencken's articles in the Baltimore Sun demonstrate the urban view of the rural wing of the party. Mencken dismissed rural Democrats as little more than superstitious, uneducated hillbillies. On the other hand, the rural men who were often epitomized by William Jennings Bryan, saw the city as a breeding ground of sinful decadence which would subvert the moral strength of American democracy. In a few years the radio would help to narrow this cultural gap, but in 1924 the radio only magnified the split. When the American people listened on the radio to the first convention which was ever broadcast, many people were shocked by the strong language with which the delegates expressed their differences.

Each of the two leading candidates represented one of the groups. Al Smith, the Governor of New York, stood for urban America; William G. McAdoo, Wilson's son-in-law and former Secretary of the Treasury, was the candidate of the South and West.

Perhaps the problem of ideological split might have been overcome if the Democrats had possessed a powerful, charismatic leader who stood above factional differences. Nine months before the convention, William Gibbs McAdoo had clearly appeared to be just such a man. No longer encumbered by the presence of a father-in-law in the White House, McAdoo had made an open bid for the Presidency a year before the convention. He had gathered delegate support at a pace that made it seem as if he would be a runaway winner at the

convention. But in the winter, the McAdoo bandwagon skidded on oil. Perhaps the most notorious scandal that was discovered in the Harding administration was that which involved the leasing of government owned oil lands by Interior Secretary Fall. McAdoo was in no way directly involved in the illegal dealings, but he had served as counsel for some of the firms who were implicated. Many Democrats felt that McAdoo's chances of election would be marred by his relationship to the scandals of the Harding era.<sup>18</sup>

Men from the urban faction of the party then launched the candidacy of New York's popular Governor, Al Smith. Smith's strengths were his solid administrative abilities and his record as a progressive. However, Smith was also Catholic, the son of immigrant parents, and an outspoken wet. All of these factors made him abhorrent to the rural delegates.<sup>19</sup>

As the convention approached, the contest assumed the aura of a symbolic debate between the sections. Smith and McAdoo both became symbols of their sections, both idealized by their own followers and distrusted or feared by their opponents. Naturally attention was focused on Smith and McAdoo as the convention opened, but neither man really had much of a chance to get the necessary 2/3 vote required to win the nomination.

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<sup>18</sup>. Frederick Lewis Allen, Only Yesterday (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1931), pp. 85-87, 107-111.

<sup>19</sup>. Charles Judah and George W. Smith, The Unchosen (New York: Coward McCann, Incorporated, 1962), Chapter I.

Local Maryland Democrats were aware of the differences on the major issues within the party, but they did not seem to understand the emotional intensity with which the issues were held nor their larger symbolic significance. The strategy of the Maryland leaders reflected this superficial understanding of party factionalism. They planned mainly around Ritchie's attributes rather than the issues. They assumed that Ritchie's Protestantism would make him acceptable to the rural delegates, and his anti-prohibition stand would make him popular with the city men, but these ideas needed to be stated because of the intensity of the ideological difference in 1924. The Maryland men failed to do this.

The Ritchie people were familiar with the history of recent Democratic national conventions. Twice before there had been a leading candidate who had had close to a majority of the delegates and yet had failed to win the nomination. Frequently the two leading candidates in the earlier balloting had destroyed themselves and a leader of a minority had risen to second place. Then after several days balloting, he won the nomination with the necessary 2/3 vote. Woodrow Wilson in Baltimore in 1912 and Cox in San Francisco in 1920 had followed this pattern. In 1924 it seemed that the stage was set for the same pattern. If the Democratic convention followed its regular course both McAdoo and Smith would be eliminated. On this basis the Marylanders devised a plan by which they felt that Ritchie could be nominated.

What the Maryland delegats did not seem to notice was the strength of John W. Davis, of West Virginis. Davis had served as a Congress - an man, as Solicitor General of the United States, and then as Ambassador to Great Britain. Then he had resumed his career as an attorney in New York. He was a highly capable man and a progressive in politics, but he has often been described since as a conservative Wall Street lawyer who worked as the servant of big business and as a man of no outstanding merit in his profession.<sup>20</sup> However, the Maryland delegation should not have been fooled by any stereotyped picture of Davis. One of Ritchie's closest advisors during his whole political career and at the convention was the Baltimore Sun editor, Frank Kent. A few days before the convention commenced, Kent had written a front page article in which he explained why the convention would nominate Davis after a Smith-Mc Adoo deadlock. Davis, Kent wrote, had only one political mark against him, and all tje other candidates had more. In addition Davis' personal record was wtihout blemish.<sup>21</sup> A year earlier newspaperman, David Lawrence, had written another front page article in the Sun explaining that Davis

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20. Theodore A. Huntley, The Life Of John W. Davis (New York: Duffield and Company, 1924), p. 290; see William E. Leuchtenberg, The Perils of Prosperity, p. 133 for the comment of a political writer, "the type that street-railway conductors like to have for a superintendent--- that is a 'mighty fine man.' "

21. Baltimore Sun, 24 June 1924, p. 1.

was the ablest Democrat running for President. Lawrence had depicted Davis as superior to Smith, McAdoo and others in intellectual attainment, legal achievement and international background.<sup>22</sup> The Maryland delegation failed to discuss how they could make Ritchie more attractive to the convention than Davis if a Smith-McAdoo deadlock occurred.

Ritchie's organization had actually been formed early in the year. Howard Bruce, President of the Baltimore Trust Company, and Democratic National Committeeman from Maryland, was the leader of the inner circle of Ritchie strategy makers. He was the driving force in mobilizing support for Ritchie before the convention. Robert B. Ennis, chairman of the board of elections in Baltimore City and a Frank Furst protege, was included in the inner circle principally because of his ability in dealing with newspapermen and in issuing press releases.<sup>23</sup>

One of the more boisterous Ritchie men was Dr. Hugh Hampton Young, an internationally known Johns Hopkins surgeon. Young was one of the physicians who had attended President Woodrow Wilson after his stroke in his second administration, but he was also famous for his research in urology.<sup>24</sup>

Two very important members of Ritchie's inner circle were William C. Walsh of Cumberland and E. Brooke Lee. Walsh was a very able lawyer who later became Attorney General of Maryland and

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22. Baltimore Evening Sun, 10 July 1923, p. 1.

23. Interview of Colonel E. Brooke Lee with N. Thigpen, November 2, 1964 cited in Neal Thigpen, "The Presidential Aspirations of Albert C. Ritchie", unpublished M. A. thesis, University of Maryland, 1966.

24. Gene Smith, When The Cheering Stopped (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1964), p. 108.

then served on the Maryland Court of Appeals. The other three men in the inner circle were Ritchie's former law partner, Stuart Janney, and two Baltimore Sunpapers men, Frank Kent, and H. L. Mencken. Other political and business leaders in the State joined the campaign effort at convention time, but these eight men formed the hard core of the Ritchie for President organization.<sup>25</sup>

At informal meetings and discussion with Ritchie these men formulated a general strategy. They decided that Ritchie should not enter any presidential primaries and should limit his pre-convention speaking tours. At the convention, Maryland delegates would be instructed to keep their ears open and their mouths closed. Issues were to be avoided while Ritchie's achievements in Maryland were to be stressed. The basic idea was to avoid offending supporters of any other candidate. Delegate support outside of the State was not to be solicited unless it came totally without conditions. Once the convention opened, the Ritchie men could have made a deal with either of the front runners to give him support at the beginning. Then if the front runner failed to win, he would give his support to Ritchie when he withdrew. However, the Ritchie men decided against using this path. They hoped to be able to draw support from both Smith and McAdoo men if a deadlock did result.

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<sup>25</sup>. Hugh H. Young, A Surgeon's Autobiography (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1940, p. 553; Diary, March-July 1924, in Ritchie Papers.

The betting odds on Ritchie were 8-1 when the convention opened on June 25, 1924. The Maryland delegates seemed pleased and announced that they would continue to follow the preordained strategy although some of the more fervent Ritchie men, including Bruce, Janney and Mackall admitted that they had difficulty observing the vow of silence with respect to canvassing out-of-State delegates.<sup>26</sup>

The meetings of the convention were held in Madison Square Garden in New York. In light of party division the choice of location was unfortunate for New York was definitely partisan territory. New Yorkers demonstrated their biases not only in the galleries of Madison Square Garden, but throughout the entire city. Delegates were accosted by taxi drivers and elevator operators who boosted the urban hero, Al Smith. To make matters worse, New York was scorched by a severe heat wave, and the combination of heated issues and overheated bodies often bordered on disaster. At times the New York police force had to detail as many as one thousand men to convention duty to keep the delegates and the spectators from assaulting each other.<sup>27</sup>

The first days of the convention were consumed by the speeches placing the candidates into nomination. Many names were presented since many men besides Ritchie were hoping to be the dark horse choice of a deadlocked convention. They included Senators Glass of Virginia,

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26. Baltimore Evening Sun, 24 June 1924, p. 1.

27. Leuchtenberg, Prosperity, pp. 133-4; Hicks, Republican Ascendancy, pp. 92-97; New York Times, 27, 29 June, 1, 2, 3, 6 July 1924.

Underwood of Alabama and Governor Silzer of New Jersey.

Ritchie's name was placed in nomination by Howard Bruce on the afternoon of July 26th. Bruce's speech was a brief account of Ritchie's achievements as Governor and stressed his acceptability to farmers, labor and business. Only one issue was highlighted and that was States' rights. Bruce ended his speech with the words:

What the party needs and what this nation needs is a man - the man Maryland offers as its nominee for President of the United States; the man who is the foremost champion of the doctrine of less paternalistic, less bureaucratic government in Washington and more freedom to the several states to regulate their own affairs - Albert C. Ritchie.<sup>28</sup>

At the end of the speech, the convention broke suddenly into spontaneous applause. The Maryland delegation had planned only a small parade, and when the speech ended they filed out into the aisles as agreed, but much to their surprise other States and delegates followed along with them. Only the Delaware and Minnesota banners were found in the parade, but delegates from nearly every State ran out into the aisles and joined the growing line. Nearly everyone in the hall was standing to see the demonstration and there was liberal applause from the galleries.<sup>29</sup>

While General Reckord led the parade, Dr. Hugh Young ran up on

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28. Democratic National Committee, Official Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention, 1924 (Indianapolis: Bookwater-Ball Greathouse Printing Corp., 1924), p. 151.

29. The Baltimore Sun, The Baltimore Evening Sun, The Baltimore American, The New York Times, 27 June 1924.



the rostrum beside the convention chairman, Senator Walsh of Montana, with the Maryland banner. However, that was still too low to satisfy the famous surgeon. He climbed on to the lecturn on which the speakers rested their notes and waved the huge Maryland flag despite his perilous balance. E. Brooke Lee and Mrs. Jesse Nicholson followed to the speakers platform with other Maryland banners, and the band which had definitely caught the enthusiasm of the entire hall played the State song "Maryland My Maryland" over and over again and finally changed to "Dixie" as the demonstration continued to grow. It was over one-half hour before the convention calmed down sufficiently for the chairman to call the next speaker. Will Rogers noted, "Only Maryland and Delaware were in on this demonstration, but if they had as many votes as they had noise, Ritchie would be our next vetoer." <sup>30</sup>

Other spectators were even more impressed. The Washington Post commented that Ritchie's demonstration was much more impressive than Al Smith's because of its spontaneity. The Kansas City Star which had angrily described Ritchie as a symbol of the anti-prohibition issue admitted that his demonstration was the surprise of the day. <sup>31</sup> However, most pleasing to the Maryland strategists was the fact that odds on Wall Street on Ritchie dropped to 2-1/2 to 1. These were reported as the shortest odds to be found in New York on any candidate. <sup>32</sup> The Governor's inner circle used these odds to confirm their opinions that

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<sup>30</sup>. New York Times, 27 June 1924.

<sup>31</sup>. Clippings in Ritchie Papers, June 1924.

<sup>32</sup>. Baltimore Sun, 27 June 1924.

many delegates were just waiting for the front running candidates to fade before they switched to Ritchie. They considered their strategy to be successful and decided not to alter it in the slightest.

Ritchie's nomination was seconded in a speech given the following day by Mrs. Clarence (Madee) Renshaw of Pennsylvania notable mainly for its flowery rhetoric. "Are we breaking the Tenth Commandment if we covet our neighbor's Governor." ? she asked.<sup>33</sup> Ritchie was only one of several candidates who was seconded by a woman in 1924. The speech created no special stir, but enthusiasm continued to remain very high in the Maryland delegation at the convention.

At this point the inner circle at the convention decided that Ritchie demonstrations in Maryland might help the Governor's chances at the convention. A mass meeting was planned for Baltimore's City Hall Plaza for Saturday night, July 29th. Ritchie's backers hoped that the politicians in New York would read about the demonstrations in their Sunday newspapers at which time it was expected that the two leading men would have eliminated each other. George Iverson, one of the convention delegates from Baltimore City was chosen to take a report of the plans from the steering committee in New York to city council President Bryant who would lead the rally in Baltimore.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>33</sup>. Democratic National Committee, Official Report of The Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention, 1924, p. 193.

<sup>34</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 27 June 1924, p. 52.

The idea of Ritchie-for-President rallies spread quickly through the entire State, and on the night of the 29th Ritchie demonstrations were held not only in Baltimore but in every town of 2500 or more people in Maryland. Over 5,000 people were reported to have gathered in Cumberland, Hagerstown, Annapolis, Salisbury and Cambridge in a rather amazing show of solidarity for their favorite son. The largest rally, however, was held in Baltimore. Fifteen thousand people crowded into Baltimore's War Memorial Plaza. Because politics was still a new field for women, almost all the demonstrators were men, and because fashion's dictates were still exacting almost all of the men wore the same type of cream colored straw hats with dark cloth bands. Some photographs of the demonstration appear to have City Council President Bryant addressing a sea of hats.<sup>35</sup>

The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company set up special loudspeakers so that everyone could hear the speeches lauding Ritchie. In order to demonstrate the Governor's ability to attract bi-partisan support, both Democrats and Republicans had been chosen as speakers. The Republicans were all prominent businessmen, but none was identified officially with the party organization. The people at the rallies worked themselves into a state of great enthusiasm.<sup>36</sup> The thought of having a presidential nominee from the State was definitely the most exciting event of the humid summer.

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35. Baltimore Sun, 30 June 1924.

36. Baltimore Sun, 29 June 1924; Baltimore American, 29 June 1924.

The demonstrations impressed the inner circle of Ritchie supporters at the convention, but it is doubtful that they caused much of a stir among the delegates from other states who were still debating the controversial plank involving the Ku Klux Klan that day. Ritchie, however, was personally gratified by the display of support given to him in Maryland. Later in the evening he gave a radio talk to thank loyal Marylanders at home.<sup>37</sup>

At that time the delegates were concerned about the framing of the platform which had shown the rifts in the party all too clearly. Several issues such as the stand on the League of Nations and Prohibition caused battles, but it was a decision about the Ku Klux Klan that ended all hopes of harmony. The platform committee had tried to effect a compromise on the issue by stating that the Democratic Party was in favor of religious freedom and civil liberties without mentioning the Ku Klux Klan. A minority on the platform committee wrote a plank which asked for outright condemnation of the Ku Klux Klan by name. Both planks were submitted to the floor of the convention. The bitter contest was decided by a vote of 542-3/20 to 541-3/20 in favor of the majority plank.<sup>38</sup> The split in the party was all too clear. Many people realized that this meant that no Democratic nominee would have much of a chance to win in November. However, it also confirmed once again the idea of the Maryland delegation that waiting

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<sup>37</sup>. Baltimore Sun, 29 June 1924.

<sup>38</sup>. Democratic National Committee, Official Report of The Proceedings of The Democratic National Convention, 1924, p. 217, The Maryland delegation voted 16-0 for the minority report.

for a deadlock was the proper strategy.

The following day the voting for the Presidential nominee began, and Ritchie's support was considerably less in evidence than when his name had been placed in nomination. On the initial ballot, Ritchie received 22-1/2 votes. In addition to 16 votes from Maryland, he won 3 votes from Illinois, 2 from Minnesota and 1-1/2 from Pennsylvania.<sup>39</sup> On the next ballots Ritchie's total rose or fell by a few votes. At one time he received 1 vote from Hawaii; on another occasion, he got 1-4/10 votes from Connecticut. Only once did the Ritchie total go over 25 votes. On the eighth ballot, Louisiana cast her 20 votes in Ritchie's column, but this was merely a complimentary gesture. Louisiana was giving each of the candidates from a Southern state her vote on one ballot or another.<sup>40</sup>

But the Maryland men were hardly worried about the lack of a big vote on the early ballots. The deadlock between McAdoo and Smith was clearly a reality just as they had hoped. Their task was now to make Ritchie the most acceptable compromise candidate after delegates began to desert the front runners. They decided to copy the method that Woodrow Wilson's campaign staff had used in 1912 and concentrated their attention on individual delegates rather than look to support from entire delegations. The pro-Ritchie spirit spread to everyone in the Maryland

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39. Ibid., p. 325.

40. Ibid., p. 383.

delegation. William Curran who had announced after the State convention that he would not be a delegate to the National convention because he objected to being tied to Ritchie, now became a fervent Ritchie backer. On the night of June 30th after the first day of balloting, he remained up late at night planning strategy with Ritchie after the convention sessions had ended.<sup>41</sup>

The next day the convention remained deadlocked between Smith and McAdoo, and the Ritchie men issued more optimistic statements. When the convention remained stalemated on the third day of continuous ballot, many people began to feel that something special was occurring. By ordinary standards, the leaders should be beginning to lose votes, but this was not happening. Still the Ritchie men held to their preordained strategy and announced that the vote would swing to Ritchie on the following day. Underwood and Ralston were reported to have too limited followings. Cox had been beaten too badly in 1920 to be chosen a second time. John W. Davis was counted out because he was considered unacceptable to William Jennings Bryan. The conclusion then was that Ritchie would be the choice of the convention. But the fourth day passed without any visible movement in the standstill and the Ritchie vote total remaining near twenty votes on each ballot.<sup>42</sup>

On Thursday, July third, the Ritchie headquarters was moved from

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<sup>41</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 30 June 1924.

<sup>42</sup>. Democratic National Committee, Official Report of The Proceedings of The Democratic National Convention, 1924, p. 478.

the Waldorf-Astoria to the Madison Square Hotel which was directly across from the convention, but the Maryland men did not change their plans. They still spoke of Ritchie's abilities, and they avoided talking about the issues that were by then obviously of great importance to the delegates. From the new headquarters, the Ritchie campaign staff continued to issue similar optimistic statements.<sup>43</sup> The convention remained deadlocked for a fourth day and a fifth as the record for the most ballots ever taken was reached, passed and then left far behind. When the convention voting had continued for an entire week, Will Rogers wrote, "This has got to come to an end. New York invited you people here as guests, not to live." <sup>44</sup>

On Sunday, July 6th, some of the Democratic leaders met in a private conference to see if there was some way to reach an agreement on a nominee. Howard Bruce and E. Brooke Lee attended the conference and offered Ritchie's name as a compromise. Their suggestion received very little attention.<sup>45</sup> Many other candidates were trying to profit from the stalemate in the same way. In the actual voting John W. Davis remained solidly in third place throughout the voting.<sup>46</sup>

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43. Baltimore Evening Sun, 30 June 1924.

44. Leuchtenburg, Perils of Prosperity, p. 133.

45. Baltimore Evening Sun, 30 June 1924.

46. Democratic National Committee, Official Report of The Proceedings of The Democratic National Convention, 1924, pp. 400-758.

On Monday Ritchie appeared at the convention where he presented a plan to end the stalemate. He asked that each state release its delegates from their specific instructions. Ostensibly this was suggested to allow individuals the freedom to desert the two leading candidates despite the fact that Smith or McAdoo still had the support of a majority of the delegation. This would erode the vote of the leaders, and then wholesale desertions would occur which would allow the choice of another candidate.<sup>47</sup> Ritchie privately hoped that the strategy of his followers would finally be effected and individual delegates from all over the country would now vote for him, and there would be a bandwagon to his candidacy. Also the Marylanders hoped that his presence at the speakers' rostrum might stampede the convention which by then was truly desperate for a candidate. But the results fell far short of these lofty expectations. On the 86th ballot Ritchie captured 6 votes from Nevada and 1 from Hawaii to give him a total of 23-1/2 votes. The only other sign of movement towards Ritchie was on the 96th ballot when Illinois gave Ritchie 5 votes.<sup>48</sup> Some observers saw this as a test move by powerful Boss Brennan of Chicago, but once again the Ritchie attempt faltered without further support.

On the 100th ballot, Smith and McAdoo both agreed to release all

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47. Baltimore Evening Sun, 30 June 1924.

48. Democratic National Committee, Official Report of The Proceedings of The Democratic National Convention, 1924, p. 803.



their delegates from pledges of support, but by this time even the Ritchie supporters were finally coming to the end of their ability to find something optimistic about each ballot. Ritchie took the rostrum on the 101st ballot and announced that he was withdrawing in favor of John W. Davis. Davis was nominated 2 ballots later as the longest balloting ever for a presidential nominee sputtered to an anti-climatic end. Ritchie spoke again and requested that a committee be appointed to escort the candidate to the rostrum as he came into the hall. Senator Barkley, who was running the convention at the time, accepted Ritchie's motion and then appointed Ritchie, Charles W. Bryan of Nebraska and Senator Owen of Oklahoma as the committee to welcome Davis.<sup>49</sup>

At that moment some people felt that Ritchie might be selected as the candidate for Vice-President. It is possible that John W. Davis actually would have preferred Ritchie, but tactical considerations forced Davis to pacify the Bryanite men of the party who feared Davis' Wall Street connections. William Jennings Bryan's brother, Charles Bryan, the Governor of Nebraska, was therefore chosen as the Vice-Presidential nominee.<sup>50</sup>

Ritchie's plans had failed according to Mark Sullivan because the Eastern leaders would have rather had John W. Davis or Oscar Underwood as their compromise choice. By failing to discuss the issues,

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<sup>49</sup>. Ibid., p. 988.

<sup>50</sup>. Ibid., p. 1017; Baltimore Evening Sun, 1 July 1924.

the Maryland delegation had failed to show many people why Ritchie would have been a better choice than either of these other men. It was not a year to hedge on issues. By failing to recruit out of State delegate strength or to bargain with other candidates, Ritchie did not create a picture of mass appeal as a compromise nominee as did Davis. Too many rural men thought of Ritchie as a wet; few men thought of him as having a genuine national appeal. The campaign strategy which the Maryland delegation followed with such loyalty did nothing to dispel these images. However, Ritchie was a comparatively young man and he had shown shrewdness in suggesting the committee to escort John W. Davis into Madison Square Garden. He left an image of statesmanship in the minds of many delegates, and thus, he kept open the doors for 1928.

Within Maryland Ritchie's candidacy greatly enhanced his popularity. Citizens of the State were so pleased by the unusual circumstance of having their Governor in the race for a national presidential nomination, that they read all the optimistic accounts of the Ritchie backers in the local newspapers without noticing just how far from nomination Ritchie had actually been. To Marylanders, Ritchie had made the nation notice their State and they were pleased and excited. Ritchie was met at the station on his return to Baltimore by a large crowd of approving citizens.

Later in the summer Ritchie organized the campaign for John W.

Davis in Maryland. On September 3rd, in a speech to the State central committee, Ritchie lauded Davis' abilities and integrity and noted that the Democratic candidate had already denounced the Ku Klux Klan by name. Ritchie was ready to give Davis his complete support.<sup>51</sup> Ritchie was not acting merely as a loyal party man in repeating the obligatory favorable remarks about the party's nominee for President. The Democratic campaign for Davis in Maryland was an enthusiastic and guardedly optimistic drive. At the worst they expected that the election would be close. Their hopes to place Maryland's eight electoral votes into the Democratic column centered around the presidential candidates' visit to Maryland.

Davis arrived at Camden Station in Baltimore on October 1st. He was met by Ritchie, Mayor Jackson of Baltimore, and other Democratic notables. Ritchie then accompanied Davis to a reception at the home of Mrs. Henry Dulaney, a wealthy, socially elite Baltimorean. Afterwards Davis went by train to Frederick, Maryland, where he spoke to 20,000 people at an open air meeting in the afternoon.<sup>52</sup>

Then Ritchie and Davis returned to Baltimore. At 6:15, they attended a dinner given in honor of Davis at the Rennert Hotel, and at 8:30 Davis addressed the major rally in Maryland at the Fifth Regiment Armory. This time Ritchie spoke but he limited his remarks to a short

51. Baltimore Evening Sun, 3 September 1924, p. 32.

52. Ibid., 1 October 1924, p. 1, 40.; Baltimore Sun, 2 October 1924, p. 1. Maryland Manual, 1927, p. 178.

introduction lauding the presidential nominee. The visit was definitely the highlight of the campaign in Maryland.<sup>53</sup> Ritchie was also responsible for convincing Charles Chance to retire from the race for House of Representatives in the fifth congressional district. The Governor chose Stephen Gambrill to run in Chance's place when the death of popular Republican Congressman, Sidney Mudd, made it possible for the Democrats to win.<sup>54</sup>

Ritchie's work from that point on to the election was routine. He spoke regularly for Davis, often striking at Coolidge with unusual viciousness. On election eve the Democrats were still confident so they were startled by the size of the Republican victory. Coolidge had run even better in Baltimore than he had in rural areas which implied that Ritchie's large urban majority in 1923 had been a personal victory rather than a permanent change in party affiliation of city voters. The Democrats did manage to pick up one Congressional seat in Southern Maryland as Gambrill narrowly defeated Thomas Mudd, while Congressmen Tydings, Linthicum and Goldsborough retained their seats. But Ritchie's cousin, David Winebrenner was badly beaten in Western Maryland, and the Republican incumbent John Phillip Hill won a landslide victory in Baltimore because of his opposition to prohibition.<sup>55</sup> The results of the election may have disappointed Ritchie but had little effect on his career. Maryland citizens remembered that he had been a contender for the presidential nomination.

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<sup>53</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 1 October 1924, p. 1.; Baltimore Sun, 2 October 1924, p. 1.

<sup>54</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 15 October 1924, p. 38.

<sup>55</sup>. Ibid., 5 November 1924, pp. 1, 3.

## CHAPTER FIFTEEN

## LOCAL AFFAIRS OF 1925 AND THE 1926 ELECTIONS

Ritchie opened 1925 with his annual New Year's day reception in the State House; then he spent part of January and February inspecting many of the State administrative bureaus. However, a far more important problem received most of Ritchie's attention at this time. On January 15th, he announced that he would seek the advice of the public service commission on the wisdom and legality of an agreement between Maryland and Pennsylvania by which it would be possible for both States to regulate jointly the rates charged by electric power companies which were doing interstate business. Any such agreement would have needed the ratification by the legislatures of both States, but Ritchie was contemplating broader agreements than rate regulation at this point.<sup>1</sup>

What the Governor had in mind was revealed in the public service commission report presented to him on February 9th. The commission proposed the construction of a fifty-two million dollar electric power project at Conowingo, a small town on the Susquehanna River about ten miles south of the Pennsylvania border. The dam was to be operated for the benefit of both Maryland and Pennsylvania. This required not only an extraordinarily complex set of legal agreements, but also created doubt among some citizens as to the wisdom of sharing power with Pennsylvania in any form. They feared that in the future Maryland might not be able to meet her own future needs for electric

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1. Baltimore Evening Sun, 1 January 1925, p. 40.

power. The chairman of the public service commission, Harold E. West, and Attorney General Robinson announced that it was their considered judgment that the proposals reserved adequate powers of regulation for Maryland; but Clarence Miles, the new people's counsel to the commission was unsatisfied and presented his objections to the Governor in a written report on the same day.<sup>2</sup>

Public debate on the matter continued steadily for almost two months. Although matters concerning regulation of electric power did not usually attract much public attention, the Conowingo project did so because the proposed cost of fifty-two million dollars was astronomical in terms of public budgets of 1924. By the end of March the power promoters were sufficiently aware of public doubts and agreed to Ritchie's reservations which would allow Maryland to recall any power which was needed within the state.<sup>3</sup> One protest in particular had caused Ritchie to include these reservations. V. Bernard Siems, the water engineer of Baltimore City, had pleaded with Ritchie to be sure that water power from the Susquehanna River was reserved for the future needs of the State's largest city.<sup>4</sup>

For a moment it looked as if the Conowingo plans were firmly set, but on March 31st, the public service commission announced that it would ask Ritchie to appoint a special commission to study interstate

<sup>2</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 9 February 1925, p. 28.

<sup>3</sup>. Ibid., 28 March 1925, p. 32.

<sup>4</sup>. Ibid., 17 February 1925, p. 32.

power control.<sup>5</sup> The following day Ritchie agreed that a special commission should be established to study laws with respect to the regulation of interstate utilities. Second, the commission was to study whether such agreements were efficacious and desirable. With the establishment of the commission, the Conowingo project dropped from the news until it became a major issue in the 1926 gubernatorial elections.<sup>6</sup> The public service commission of Maryland gave its final sanction to the project on January 11, 1926 almost without public notice.<sup>7</sup>

On April 8th Ritchie announced that all one way bridges in Maryland would be eliminated. Those in Western Maryland, the Governor promised to replace in six months. This seemed to surprise everyone, but Ritchie was not the kind of politician who made promises that he could not perform and so careful planning had probably preceded the announcement.<sup>8</sup>

Then for a period of over six months, Ritchie's activities were trivial. After the breathtaking pace of his first term as Governor, it was a considerable change, but Ritchie clearly felt that all the necessary reforms for effective and efficient operation of the State had been achieved and that his job was now to oversee honest operation of the system as it existed. Ritchie gave only prefatory attention to

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5. Baltimore Evening Sun, 31 March 1925, p. 40.

6. Ibid., 1 April 1925, p. 38.

7. Ibid., 12 January 1926, p. 34.

8. Ibid., 8 April 1925, p. 40.

late year complaints involving expense in the Bureau of Motor Vehicles and State institutions for the criminally insane. Early in 1926 matters involving removal of grade crossings in Baltimore City and the mistreatment of prisoners of the national guard received the same kind of speedy attention.<sup>9</sup>

The spring of 1926 was very quiet, but Ritchie was planning ahead for the legislative session of 1927 despite the fact that he still had to win reelection in November 1926. On May 7th Ritchie spoke before the Civitan Club in Baltimore, and in his speech he listed seven problems on which the next state legislature should act. In order of descending importance these were: first, the method of raising funds to eliminate grade crossings on all important State roads; second, oyster conservation laws; third, what the State would do for undergraduate education if the proposed Johns Hopkins University plan to eliminate all undergraduate courses was effected; fourth, building additional facilities for the insane; fifth, legislation to strengthen the public service commission; sixth, enactment or rejection of a State prohibition enforcement law; seventh, ratification or rejection of the proposed 20th Amendment dealing with child labor. All five of the matters that dealt solely with the State were in response to specific problems that had arisen during the last two years, and all except the matter of State response to the Hopkins University plan had already been publicly discussed.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 14 November, p. 20, 17 November 1925, p. 50. 30 January 1926, p. 29. 18 February 1926, p. 44.

<sup>10</sup>. Ibid., 7 May 1926, p. 46.



For the remainder of the year, Ritchie was even less active than he had been previously because most of his time was devoted to winning reelection. He recognized the need of an official to keep himself before the public to maintain the popularity needed for reelection. He refused to sponsor new reforms nor sountenance commission or investigations which he felt had no purpose. Therefore, in order to keep himself before the body politic, he accepted many more ceremonial invitations than he had during his first term in office.

On August 14th Ritchie journey to Camp Twinkle in Virginia Beach, Virginia, in order to see Maryland's National Guard in summer training.<sup>11</sup> On September 4th, he spent the day at the Maryland State Fair at Timonium. The ambassadors from Argentina, Chile, and Brazil were Ritchie's guests at the fair. Crowds were reported to be larger than usual as people pushed to meet the Governor and the Latin American dignitaries.<sup>12</sup>

Two days later, Ritchie sat on the platfrom next to President Coolidge at the unveiling of an equestrian statue of General Lafayette in Baltimore. On May 12, 1926, there was a southern exposition held in New York City. For two weeks thirteen Southern States put on a display of industrial products that they manufactured. One special day was set aside for each State. May 12th was Maryland Day, and Ritchie went to New York and spent most of the day at the show.<sup>13</sup>

On June 20th, Ritchie visited Cambridge to see the 5th annual Chesapeake

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11. Baltimore Evening Sun, 14 August 1924, p. 36.

12. Ibid., 24 September 1924, p. 36.

13. Ibid., 12 May 1925, p. 38.

Bay Workboat Races Championship along with Governor Twinkle of Virginia.<sup>14</sup> Two days later he welcomed the 7th annual convention of the Order of Moose at Ford's Theatre in Baltimore. Similar activities filled his summer schedule and during the autumn he visited the State Fair, appeared at several football games and made other miscellaneous appearances.<sup>15</sup> None of these public appearances was of any concern to the functioning of the State government, but it was through such appearances that Ritchie kept himself in the public view. The schedule of public appearances was slightly lighter during the winter months of the year though Ritchie and his mother welcomed the New Year by giving their annual open house reception in the State House. Anyone who wished could attend.<sup>16</sup> On March 4th, Ritchie visited Virginia's new Governor, Harry Byrd, in Richmond. The next day Byrd introduced Ritchie in the most laudatory terms when Ritchie spoke to the Virginia legislature.<sup>17</sup> Then on April 15th, Ritchie was the host at a large State reception for Governor Byrd to reciprocate for the one that he had during his visit to Virginia in the previous month.<sup>18</sup> Ritchie's summer agenda had a variety of similar ceremonial appearances. The nature of the events in themselves is quite unimportant, but they usually retained a dignified and stately character. The

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<sup>14</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 20 June 1925, p. 20.

<sup>15</sup>. Ibid., 1, 10 September 1925, 17 October 1925.

<sup>16</sup>. Ritchie Diary, 1 January 1926.

<sup>17</sup>. Baltimore Sun, 5 March 1926.

<sup>18</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 15 April 1926, p. 56.

closest that Ritchie came to casualness was a short speech which he gave at a program at Baltimore's Patterson Park which also included a Baby Show and a Charleston contest.<sup>19</sup> What these appearances do show is a definite change in Ritchie's position on the administration of Government functions in Maryland. The reforms that Ritchie had decided were necessary had been effected. Now the function of the Government was to make sure that all ran efficiently and economically. Possible new reforms were viewed critically and in actuality during the last year and one half of his second term only the very most minor Government actions were innovative. But Ritchie included in his duties as chief executive assuring the people that the Government was being properly run as it maintained the status quo. This he accomplished in the fashion of a benevolent paternalistic leader appearing every so often before the public with pomp and circumstance to display that he was carefully protecting the public interest.

Because of changes made by the Fewer Elections Law, Ritchie's second term lasted for only three years, from January 1924 to January 1927. A new election for Governor was held in November 1926. The election for Governor coincided with the election of a United States Senator, other Statewide officers and the entire State legislature. Ritchie's election for a second term as Governor had broken a well established precedent of one term governorships in Maryland, and few people felt that he would attempt to extend his fortune by asking the voters for a

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<sup>19</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 2 August 1926, p. 26.

third term. Because the election for a United States Senator came at the same time as the election for Governor, it would have been very convenient for Ritchie to move into the national legislature without a hiatus in public office. Furthermore, Ritchie's increasing number of out of State speaking engagements at which he discussed national affairs indicated that he was interested in moving into national politics.

For these reasons maneuvering for the Democratic nomination for Governor began earlier than usual. Ritchie had been in office for less than a year of his second term when William S. Gordy's name began to be mentioned for Governor. It was reported that a new alignment of politicians in Baltimore City were grooming State Comptroller Gordy for the Governorship in 1926. The group for Gordy included Mayor Howard Jackson, Bosses Mahon, Loden, and Padgett. The old John W. Smith forces in the State would also have been happy with Gordy as an alternative to Ritchie. Only Boss Kelly remained firmly in Ritchie's camp, and a bitter fight was expected if Ritchie and Kelly opposed Gordy with a man more to their liking.<sup>20</sup>

Once Gordy's name was in the open as a possibility to succeed Ritchie as Governor twenty other Democrats were reported as interested in running for Governor at one time or another during the year. Among these were John M. Dennis, David Mc Intosh, E.B. Lee, William M. Maloy, Milliard Tydings, Hugh Mc Mullen, Stephen Gambrill, Howard Bruce, Thomas A. Goldsborough, and Thomas Robinson.<sup>21</sup> Because the

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<sup>20</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 18 December 1924, p. 50.

<sup>21</sup>. Ibid., 19 January, 25 January 1925, p. 28.

election was still over a year and one-half away, few if any men made definite commitments to any of the possible candidates.

As the year progressed Ritchie made some speeches that looked decidedly political because of the groups that he addressed. On September 9th, Ritchie gave an address of welcome at the opening meeting of the National Colored Baptist Convention in Baltimore at the Fifth Regiment Armory. The Governor was aware that he had greatly profited from the Black vote in 1923 and that the loss of it had hurt Davis in 1924. He hoped to win that vote again in 1926 and so he addressed the 3000 Blacks who were present with a graciousness that was unusual for a Southern Governor in 1925. "I welcome you to the State of Maryland as collaborators for the common good of the United States", Ritchie said, "I would like to see every possible advantage given to colored people. I would like to see them given every possible advantage for education... so the two races may march together to their common goal for a greater America."<sup>22</sup>

Another group from which Ritchie had received proportionally large support were women who were charmed by the Governor's courtly manners and physical handsomeness. Both in Maryland and nationally Ritchie made many speeches to women's groups in his appeals for support. On September 30th, Ritchie addressed the Maryland Women's Democratic Association Convention at the Rennert Hotel. The Governor was forced to wait before he spoke while the women battled over the question of whether a verbal vote for chairman was valid. At one

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<sup>22</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 9 September 1925, p. 36.

point Mrs. William Maloy who was running the meeting announced, "I hope that no one who had not signed a membership card will dare to vote or she will be accused of stuffing the ballot boxes." Mrs Hatter arose from the audience and answered, "No one in the Democratic Party would be guilty of stuffing a ballot box." Mrs Maloy replied, "I'm not accusing anyone of cheating...." The arguments continued for over an hour even though there was only one candidate for chairwoman. But Ritchie waited patiently and then cajoled the women voters much in the way he had previously flattered the Blacks at their convention.<sup>23</sup>

But Ritchie had still not announced whether he would run for a third term as Governor or for United States Senator.

On October 21st, William M. Maloy became the first announced candidate for Governor. Maloy had left his job as chairman of the Maryland public service commission in December of 1924. He seems to have considered opposing Ritchie for Governor at that time, to do so as a member of the Ritchie administration would have left him little leway for criticism.<sup>24</sup> Maloy had visited Mahon and Kelly before he declared his intent to run, but he had received no promised of support. Still he had decided to contest the nomination and said that the chief issue would be the strengthening of the laws for regulation of public utilities.<sup>25</sup>

Ritchie responded to Maloy's candidacy congenially. "The more the merrier," said the Governor. "I have great respect for Maloy." As for

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<sup>23</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 30 September 1925, p. 36.

<sup>24</sup>. Ibid., 22 December 1924, p. 38.

<sup>25</sup>. Ibid., 21 October 1925, p. 40.

his own plans, Ritchie said that he would not make them definite until the following year.<sup>26</sup> The anti-Ritchie men were still considering Comptroller Gordy as an alternative to both Ritchie and Maloy.

On December 9th, Gordy officially filled for candidacy for Governor, announcing that he approved the principles of the 1923 platform because in his opinion they could not be improved. But Gordy did not receive immediate support from the other former members of the John W. Smith wing of the party. Smith had died in April 1925, and his followers who had been unready to challenge Ritchie in 1923 were even less willing to do so now. John M. Dennis said that he would soon decide whether to support Gordy; Samuel K. Dennis refused to make any comment at all about the Comptroller's candidacy.<sup>27</sup>

Some men who favored Ritchie were afraid that if the Governor did not announce soon that the other two candidates would gather enough support to overcome him if he chose to run for reelection. But Ritchie did not seem worried and whatever doubts he may have had were partially countered by the endorsement of two State politicians who had never previously been friendly to him. Senator Curran of Baltimore and Senator Dudley Roe of Queen Anne's County on the Eastern Shore each reversed his previous views when he announced his support of Ritchie if the Governor would run.<sup>28</sup>

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During December, E. Brooke Lee resigned from his office as

26. Baltimore Sun, 22, 25, October 1925, 8 November 1925.

27. Baltimore Evening Sun, 10 December 1925, p. 46.

28. Baltimore American 4 December 1925.

Secretary of State. This aroused speculation as to whether this close friend of Ritchie's intended to run either for Senator or Governor on a Ritchie ticket. To replace Lee, Ritchie chose his cousin and friend, David Winebrenner, and the new Secretary of State was sworn into office on December 11th.<sup>29</sup>

On February 3rd, Ritchie formally announced that he would seek reelection as Governor and forego the United States Senatorship. The next day Comptroller Gordy announced that he would withdraw his candidacy. Gordy had been assessing his chances for the last three months and evidently had decided that he could not defeat Ritchie and that it was better for him to keep in Ritchie's favor by running again for Comptroller and to hope that he would become Ritchie's heir in 1930. Gordy's withdrawal signaled the end of the Smith wing of the Democratic Party as a viable political force within the State. The group of men who had formerly been untied by their allegiance to Smith did not look for another candidate from their own ranks; they quickly jumped on the Ritchie bandwagon. State Treasurer, John M. Dennis, announced, "I am completely delighted by the turn of events. No one is more ready to support the Governor than I."<sup>30</sup>

However, Ritchie was still officially opposed by his old rival, William M. Maloy, who said that he had no intention of retiring from the primary contest. Maloy was a capable and efficient attorney with a long record of service to the State, but he could best be described as a gentleman reformer who was handicapped by lack of strong support from any part

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<sup>29</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 11 December 1925, p. 50.

<sup>30</sup>. Ibid., 4 February 1926, p. 44.



of the Democratic organization and by lack of a strong issue with which to unite the independent voters against the machine. Maloy had served as a State senator from Baltimore until 1915. In that year he had run against Ritchie in the Democratic primary for the Attorney Generalship of Maryland. Since 1915 his star had been on the wane, and he had not been chosen to run for elective office by the party leaders nor had his name been heard in influential terms within Democratic circles. Even so Maloy insisted that Ritchie had a poor performance of party duty and that "he would stay in the fight to give the voters a choice."<sup>31</sup>

Maloy's campaign began unfortunately. On February 15th the Eleventh Ward Club in Baltimore City endorsed Ritchie's candidacy for renomination. This was a special slap in Maloy's face since he had been one of the organizers of the club and was presently one of its directors. Furthermore, the club had a previous record of unbroken neutrality in primary elections. Ritchie had not been given his endorsement spontaneously; he had made a careful effort to obtain it. It was hardly a coincidence that the Governor had been present at a meeting of the 11th Ward Club the night before he announced his candidacy.<sup>32</sup> Maloy angrily protested the club's action, and he publicly called the Governor "tricky", but the damage had been done.<sup>33</sup>

But if Ritchie had expected the initial blow to cause Maloy to give up

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31. Baltimore News, 5 February 1926.

32. Baltimore Evening Sun, 16 February 1926, p. 3.

33. Baltimore News, Baltimore American 16 February 1926.

hope, he was incorrect. The rebuff only made Maloy angrier and more obstinate. While Maloy took his cause to the people, most of the interest in the Democratic Party was diverted to the choice of a nominee for United States Senator. Maloy kept trying to attract attention and support for his campaign by making more and more severe criticisms of Ritchie's administration.

On March 18th, Maloy announced that the state had lost \$3,000,000 by Ritchie's actions on the Conowingo Dam project.<sup>34</sup> The next day Ritchie's answered that Maloy's charges were reckless and untrue, and that Maryland would receive its full revenue from the power companies.<sup>35</sup> As a newspaper editorial stated the issue was now joined, but the public would hardly know who was correct until one side or the other disclosed some factual evidence.<sup>36</sup> Maloy asked Ritchie to debate; the Governor declined, but did produce a written letter from November 1924 showing that Maloy had given his approval to the Conowingo project before it had received its final acceptance.<sup>37</sup> Maloy insisted that his approval of the project was no answer to the fact that the State was now losing \$3,000,000 in revenue in gross receipts from taxes on the project; but Ritchie refused to debate the matter further.<sup>38</sup>

Ritchie was concentratinf on the choice of a United States Senate candidate for the Democrats. Various Democrats were mentioned for the

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34. Baltimore Sun, Washington Post, 19 March 1926.

35. Baltimore American 20 March 1926.

36. Ibid., 20 March 1926.

37. Baltimore News, Baltimore Sun, 20, 22 March 1926.

38. Baltimore Sun, Baltimore American, 23 March 1926.

job, but it seemed tacitly understood that the Governor was now uncontested as chief of the party and would make the final choice. It also became clear that Ritchie had no intention of picking one of the old John W. Smith men now that this group no longer needed to be pacified. He was searching for a capable man but one who would not be too strong a rival.

On the first of the month, Stuart Janney, Ritchie's former law partner, announced that he had filed for nomination for United States Senator. Janney took this step without consultation with any of the Democratic Party leaders and only went to Ritchie's office to tell the Governor of his action after it was accomplished. Janney announced cavalierly that he was only requesting Ritchie's support and that failure to give it would not damage their personal relations. Actually Janney was not even a Democrat. He had supported Theodore Roosevelt in 1912, Hughes in 1916, Harding in 1920 and Coolidge in 1924, but he put Ritchie in a very difficult situation because of their personal and professional relationship.<sup>39</sup>

Janney's action did force Ritchie and other Democratic leaders to make a quick decision as to whom they would support for the nomination for Senator. Several leading Democrats met for a conference at the Maryland Club on June 3rd. The following day Janney announced that he would drop out of the Senatorial contest. He did not state his reasons publicly, but evidently the bosses had informed him that they would not give him their

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<sup>39</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 1 June 1926, Baltimore Sun, 2 June 1926; Frank Kent, "Ritchie of Maryland" Scribners, October 1927, clipping in Ritchie Papers.

support. They had narrowed thier choice to Representative Millard Tydings and Omar Hersey, a distinguished lawyer, a close friend of Ritchie and the first choice of Woodrow Wilson for membership on the Federal Reserve Board in 1914.<sup>40</sup> On June 8th, Ritchie announced that Tydings would be the candidate although Boss Mahon had objected to the choice. Once more Ritchie's power was evident. After the choice of Tydings was announced, Jackson and Mahon's city organization said that they would not endorse the Harford County lawyer.<sup>41</sup> Ritchie held conferences with the city Democratic leaders on June 8th and the opposition to Tydings was quieted. Tydings filed officially for the nomination on June 11th. In a speech to the Democratic State Central meeting, Ritchie lavishly extolled Tyding's virtues.<sup>42</sup> At the same meeting of the State Central Committee, Howard Bruce was chosen as Democratic National Committeeman. Ritchie had dictated the choice.<sup>43</sup>

The illness during the summer of the two bosses, Mahon and Kelly, decisively influenced the election. Kelly had become ill early in May; medical treatment and limited activities did not improve his health. On May 26th, Kelly's doctors moved him to Johns Hopkins Hospital for expert care. The exact nature of his illness was unspecified, but Kelly was then sixty-six years old and his doctors were being circumspect.

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40. Baltimore Sun, 6 June 1926, Baltimore Evening Sun, 17 November 1925, p. 44.

41. Baltimore American 8 June 1926.

42. Baltimore Evening Sun, 16 June 1926.

43. Baltimore Sun, 17 June 1926.

Kelly was allowed to leave the hospital late in June, but he did not resume his activities in the city at that time. He was moved to Thurmon, Maryland, where he remained to recuperate until early in September. Kelly left John Tormollan to direct his affairs in Baltimore, but several other men, especially in the First District in East Baltimore, saw an opportunity to grab power for themselves during the boss' illness. The anti-Ritchie group of Mahon, Jackson and Norris saw a chance to increase their power in Baltimore City by capturing the First District State senate seat.<sup>44</sup>

For a short time these men also considered once more running a candidate more to their liking against Millard Tydings in the United States Senatorial primary. With Kelly disabled, they expected to have a free hand in Baltimore City. On July 6th, the city comptroller of Baltimore, R. Walter Graham, announced that business were urging him to run for United States Senate. Graham was a member of the new Mahon, Jackson, Norris alignment, but he had always been personally very friendly with Kelly, and the alliance hoped that his would woo Kelly to their side or at least cause him to remain neutral. On the same day Ritchie announced that he had heard rumors of Graham's interest in the Senate seat but did not believe that he would run.<sup>45</sup> The Governor immediately applied pressure on Graham to persuade him to drop out of the race, and the next day Graham announced that he had

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44. Baltimore Evening Sun, 26 May, 18 June, 3 July 1926.

45. Ibid., 6 July 1926, p. 34.

46. Ibid., 7 July 1926, p. 38.

"never seriously considered the post."<sup>46</sup> He claimed that he supported Ritchie 100% and was very impressed with Tydings. Ritchie might have let the new Mahon-Jackson-Norris alliance attack Kelly, but he had no intention of allowing them the slightest leeway where his own power was concerned.

If the Democrats in the city were disorganized by Kelly's illness, they fell into complete disarray when Boss Mahon fell ill on July 12th. On that day Mahon returned to the city from his country home suffering from an attack of acute bronchitis. Four days later, he suddenly became seriously ill with what was thought to be a cerebral hemorrhage. Mahon's relatives were called to his bedside because he was expected to die. This left the way open for an extraordinary degree of political maneuvering within Baltimore City, although Mahon remained alive. The political feuds within Baltimore City became extremely complex, but they were only tangentially relevant to Ritchie's fortunes. In previous years Ritchie had been worried that he would lose a general election if the Democrats were too divided in the primary, but as Ritchie assessed the Maloy campaign and his future Republican opponent, he did not feel threatened. He saw little reason to interfere in the complex and often heated struggles within Baltimore City.<sup>47</sup>

Moreover, Ritchie did not campaign heavily. His longest tour was a four day journey to Western Maryland during which he and Tydings spoke

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46. Baltimore Evening Sun, 7 July 1926, p. 38.

47. Ibid., 21, 23, 31 July, 2, 3, 4, 4, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18, 23 August 1926.

in Cumberland and Frostburg and made a motor tour through Garrett County.<sup>48</sup> Although Ritchie did make a few other speeches, they attracted little attention because the more exciting battles were in the Republican primary. Ritchie's casual confidence in election victory is also demonstrated in that he left the State several times in the last weeks before the election. On August 27th, while Maloy was angrily complaining that the Maryland public service law was a sham because it was too expensive for the people to present adequately their case against rate raises, Ritchie was speaking at the Philadelphia Sesquicentennial praising the achievements of United States history.<sup>49</sup>

What was probably Ritchie's major statement of the primary campaign was made in a speech before the Rotary Club at the Rennert Hotel on August 31st. Here Ritchie listed his accomplishments. He noted that the percentage of properly trained teachers in the State had risen from 40 % in 1920 to 75 % in 1926. Public health gains were also outstanding; the death rate had declined in the four major diseases. State roads had been increased and improved. The seafood industry had been better organized. He had established State purchasing and a merit system.<sup>50</sup> But along with the idea of maintaining the status quo, Ritchie did not promise any changes in State government in his next term in office.

The campaign ended with Maloy attacking indiscriminately, desperately attempting to rally the voters against Ritchie. He claimed that the

48. Baltimore Evening Sun, 6 August 1926, p. 4.

49. Ibid., 27 August 1926, p. 34.

50. Ibid., 31 August 1926, p. 34.

Republicans were backing Ritchie, that elections machines were being stacked and other similar criticisms, none of which was supported.<sup>51</sup> Ritchie did not bother to answer. On September 3rd, Kelly returned to Baltimore and on the 6th he met Mahon for dinner. The bosses made a surprising show of harmony claiming that they both supported Ritchie. They said that as the other politicians in the city had created their own problems that they would have to extricate themselves.<sup>52</sup> If Maloy expected help as a result of factional divisions in the city, he did certainly not receive them from the top of the organizational heirarchy.

Ritchie was as successful as he had hoped in the primary. Maloy did not carry a single city district or county, and Ritchie won over 75% of the popular vote. The official returns in the popular vote gave Ritchie 108, 853 to Maloy's 25, 277.<sup>53</sup> The local contests in Baltimore had resulted in fist fights among rival Democrats at the polls on election day, but they did not hurt Ritchie who captured over 85% of the city vote when he defeated Maloy 40, 529 to 4, 384.<sup>54</sup> As a small grace not to the victory, John Bouse who was backed by Ritchie's friends in the First District defeated the better known William Norris for State senator. Everything had worked perfectly for the Governor who later announced that his primary campaign had cost him a total of \$594.10 including

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<sup>51</sup>. Baltimore Post 2 September 1926, Baltimore Sun 2 September 1926.

<sup>52</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 6 September 1926, p. 24.

<sup>53</sup>. Ibid., 14 September 1926, p. 42. 15 September 1926, p. 1.; Maryland Secretary of State, Maryland Manual, 1926, p. 244.

<sup>54</sup>. Maryland Secretary of State, Maryland Manual, 1926, p. 244.



\$270.00 for the registration fee.<sup>55</sup>

Ritchie then looked forward to a general election that appeared as if it would be equally as easy to win as the primary because the Republicans were highly disorganized after bitter fights for the nomination for both Governor and United States Senator. In the Senatorial primary the incumbent, Senator Weller, had been challenged by Congressman John Phillip Hill. Hill had won impressively large victories in a normally Democratic area of Baltimore City mainly because of his outspoken opposition to prohibition which made Ritchie look careful and mild by comparison. First, Hill had rededicated his house at Three West Franklin Street in the heart of Baltimore City; the new name was "Franklin Farms." Then, he announced that he was making his own cider at 2.75 alcohol which was legal for farmers. He defied government officials to stop him. When the cider was ready, Hill invited the entire city to a cider and doughnut party.<sup>56</sup> Later Hill decided to brew 200 gallons of his own wine and sealed his cellar with red, white and blue wax stamped with pictures of Abraham Lincoln. Once again he defied officials to arrest him. Moreover Hill was constantly arguing in Congress that prohibition discriminated against city dwellers.<sup>57</sup> However, Senator won a narrow victory on his vote outside of Baltimore City, but the battle left the Republicans more divided than they

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<sup>55</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 15 October 1926, p. 46.

<sup>56</sup>. Ibid., 8, 20 September 1924.

<sup>57</sup>. Ibid., 21 August 1926, p. 18; Baltimore Sun, 6 October 1926..

been for two decades.<sup>58</sup> The contest for Governor was between two considerably less prominent men running on the coattails of Hill and Weller. The little known Addison E. Mullikin was chosen to be Ritchie's opponent.

Mullikin, who defeated his primary opponent, Marion E. Humphries, by only 25,899 to 20,329 was the scion of an old Eastern Shore family and had grown up on a farm about four or five miles from Easton in Talbot County on the Eastern Shore. After graduation from St. John's College he taught public school and served on the State liquor license commission to which he had been appointed by Governor Goldsborough and on the school board to which he had been appointed by Mayor Broening. Mullikin, who was a Presbyterian and a bachelor, had won the primary without giving a single speech simply because he was associated with Senator Weller. After his victory, he announced that he would discuss the issues somewhat later. Not even the Republicans thought that Mullikin had much of a chance to defeat Ritchie.<sup>59</sup>

Even if the Governor was assured that the road to victory would be an easy one, he took no chances of falling victim to overconfidence. His first task was to frame the Democratic platform. As in 1923, Ritchie saw this as a personal job and began to work on it immediately after the primary.<sup>60</sup>

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The platform clearly demonstrated that Ritchie desired to preserve

58. Maryland Secretary of State, Maryland Manual, 1926, p. 244.

59. Baltimore Evening Sun, 17 September 1926, p. 3.

60. Ibid., 22 September, p. 38, 23 September 1926, p. 54.

the status quo. Approximately 80% of the document discussed the achievements of the past seven years in about twenty categories. Only the last 20% of the platform concerned pledges for the future, and these were either quite minor or very vague. For example, the Democrats pledged "continued and adequate support of every needed kind to the public schools"... "maintenance and reconstruction of the State road system" ... "the continuance and proper extension of the State's agricultural facilities"... "the maintenance and proper development of the University of Maryland," and similar general promises on conservation, public health, zoning and the State militia. An example of a specific promise was "enlargement of the warehouse facilities in the central purchasing bureau." On only two important points was the platform at all definite. The Democrats opposed ratification of the child labor amendment and they made a plea for the principle of States' rights.<sup>61</sup>

However, if there was any benefit to be gained by a reform platform, the Republicans certainly did not take it. The Republican platform, framed at the Republican State convention on September 30th, was mainly an attack on Ritchie and it did not contain many constructive proposals.<sup>62</sup>

Ritchie began his active speaking tour in Frederick, Maryland, on September 25th. Two days later the Governor began a heavy campaign schedule that took him through the election with only a few days on which he did not speak publicly.<sup>63</sup>

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61. Baltimore Evening Sun, 23 September 1926, p. 54.

62. Ibid., 30 September 1926.

63. Ritchie Diary September 1926; Baltimore Sun, 28 September 1926.

The tone and content of Ritchie's opposition was established in Mullikin's speech to the Civitan Club at the Emerson Hotel in Baltimore on October 1st. The Republican contender accused the Governor of "ruthlessly selling out" citizens of the State to the power companies. Mullikin insisted that the State could have built the Conowingo Dam at a lower price and then sold ~~power~~ at cheaper rates to State residents. Mullikin's choice of the Conowingo issue was unwise; it was the same point upon which the voters had just given Ritchie such an enormous vote of confidence in the primary. The Governor answered Mullikin's criticisms with even more certainty than he had answered Maloy. On the evening of October 1st, he offered to have a commission investigate whether the power project could have been developed by the State with less expense to Maryland power users. Ritchie even went so far as to offer to put the State facilities at Mullikin's disposal to operate the investigation.<sup>64</sup>

The next day Mullikin answered that if Ritchie really wanted the facts he could have Attorney General Robinson start proceedings to determine the legality of the transaction. The Governor answered that if Mullikin wanted an injunction to determine legality, he had the right as a private citizen to file one himself. On both grounds, legality and economy, Ritchie said that he was satisfied that adequate investigation had been made before the project had been started.<sup>65</sup> Ritchie pointed to special commission reports as well

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<sup>64.</sup> Baltimore Evening Sun, 1 October, p. 46, 2 October 1926, p. 24.

<sup>65.</sup> Baltimore Evening Sun, 2 October, p. 24, 3 October 1926, p. 2.

as numerous hearings by the public service commission.

The following week the Republicans dropped their biggest bomb that was supposed to explode Ritchie's chances of reelection. Mullikin declared that Attorney General Robinson and the Harford County Bank, which he represented, had illegally purchased stock in the Conowingo Power Company while the project was still being planned. However, the bomb failed to detonate. Robinson answered Mullikin claiming that he had never bought a single share of stock and he asked Mullikin to supply proof of ownership. Mullikin answered that he had already proved it which Robinson insisted that he had not. The accusation remained unproven, the public unconvinced of Robinson's guilt.<sup>66</sup>

Eventually Ritchie turned Conowingo into an offensive issue of his own. He attempted to demonstrate that Mullikin was an irresponsible politician who made impossible promises. On October 8th, in a speech at Elkton, Maryland, Ritchie charged that Mullikin's idea of the government building the Conowingo Dam itself was foolish. The State could not afford to construct the dam without enormous taxes. That was why the site had lain idle for fifty years.<sup>67</sup> On October 16th, in an address at Salisbury, Ritchie pointed out that Mullikin's idea of State construction of the dam was inconsistent with the Republican contneder's espousal of tax reductions unless, the Governor suggested, Mullikin intended to make drastic cuts in other State expenses such as education.<sup>68</sup>

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66. Baltimore Sun, 11, 12, 15 October 1926.

67. Baltimore Evening Sun, 8 October 1926, p. 46.

68. Ibid., 16 October 1926, p. 3.

Although the Conowingo Dam project was clearly the major issue, Mullikin also attacked Ritchie for holding executive power for too long. On October 5th, Mullikin announced in a speech at Leonardtown in Southern Maryland that State reorganization was merely a concentration of administrative power for Ritchie's own benefit, without advantage for the general public. He also accused Ritchie's administration of inefficiency because the Governor appointed men for political reasons rather than on the basis of capability.<sup>69</sup> The next day in a speech at Mount Ranier in Western Maryland Mullikin referred to Ritchie as a "feudal monarch."<sup>70</sup> Ritchie did not bother to answer these attacks; he considered them personally offensive. Ritchie did ask on October 8th that Mullikin meet him for an intelligent discussion of the issues rather than just continuing irresponsible attacks.<sup>71</sup> Mullikin refused. Later in the campaign when the two men met in the lobby of a hotel in Cumberland, Maryland, neither made a move to speak, and Ritchie quickly left the building.<sup>72</sup> It was a rare moment when Ritchie was angry enough to breach accepted etiquette in public. Mullikin continued to attack Ritchie on the third term issue. The Governor countered by calling Mullikin irresponsible.<sup>73</sup>

A few other issues also influenced the campaign. Ritchie was again the candidate of the anti-prohibitionist forces. Because the Republican platform was more ambiguous on the prohibition issue than was more

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69. Baltimore Evening Sun, 5 October 1926, p. 40.

70. Baltimore Sun, 7 October 1926.

71. Baltimore Evening Sun, 7 October 1926, p. 46.

72. Baltimore American, 18 October 1926.

73. Baltimore Evening Sun, 20, 29, 30 October 1926, 1 November 1926.

ambiguous on the prohibition issue than was the Democratic platform, the Association to support the Prohibition Amendment gave its official backing to Mullikin on October 4th while the Anti-Prohibition Association gave its official endorsement to Ritchie on October 13th.<sup>74</sup> Because the Ku Klux Klan was no longer an important concern in 1926, Ritchie lost an issue which would help him win Black votes. The Afro-American opposed Ritchie because of the intrinsic danger to Southern Blacks in his States' rights theories. However, the Afro-American was unexcited in its support of Mullikin.<sup>7</sup>

The Ritchie campaign reached its climax on October 30th with a parade of cars past the Baltimore City Hall. Ritchie and Tydings stood on a reviewing stand and waved as an estimated 5,000 cars passed by to show their support of the Governor.<sup>76</sup> In contrast the Republican campaign ended in disarray as many Republican candidates angrily attacked Senator Weller for his failure to make public appearances and to give them adequate support.<sup>77</sup> Nothing about the campaign gave Ritchie any reason to doubt that he had lost his original advantages.

The election results showed the expected sweeping victory for Ritchie and the entire statewide Democratic ticket. The Governor broke his own record by nearly doubling his 1923 plurality when he defeated Mullikin by over 59,000 votes. Although Ritchie's plurality was exceeded by Comptroller

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<sup>74</sup>. Baltimore Sun, 4 October 1926, Baltimore Evening Sun, 13 October 1926, p. 44.

<sup>75</sup>. Baltimore Afro-American, 23 October 1926.

<sup>76</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 30 October 1926, p. 24.

<sup>77</sup>. Ibid., 1 November 1926, p. 38.

Gordy and Clerk of the Court of Appeals, James A. Young, he received 10, 10, 000 more votes than did either of these men. Representative Milliard Tydings unseated Senator Weller with a victory of over 44, 000 votes and even Attorney General Robinson won by 36, 000 despite public questions about his part in the Conowingo stock sales and the best known Republican opponent, former Mayor of Baltimore, William E. Broening.<sup>78</sup> The Democrats also gained another Congressional seat as the Republicans had no one to replace the popular John Phillip Hill in the Third Congressional District in Baltimore City. In the State legislature the Democrats maintained their enormous majority in both houses. Although four Democratic State senators were unseated, four new Democrats managed to take seats from the Republicans. One of the Democratic losses, that of Hubert J. Wade in Washington County accomodated Ritchie.<sup>79</sup>

Again the analysis of voting patterns shows that Ritchie's strength was centered in urban areas. Ritchie's plurality outside of Baltimore City was the smallest of all the statewide contestants. Ritchie lost the five westernmost counties, three counties in Southern Maryland and one on the Eastern Shore even though he did better in the counties than he had done previously when he compiled an over 12, 000 plurality in them as a total. Still Ritchie support was clearly centered in Baltimore where his 65% of the vote gave him a majority of 47, 000. Two years before John W. Davis had lost Baltimore to Calvin Coolidge. Even the lack of official Afro-American support did not

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78. Maryland Secretary of State, Maryland Manual 1926, pp. 251-255.

79. Baltimore Evening Sun, 3 November 1926, p. 1, 3, 5.



completely harm Ritchie's support among Black voters. Ritchie's new city voting bloc came because of his vigorous opposition to the Ku Klux Klan and his help, however, condescending and paternalistic, to Eastern and Southern European immigrants and Blacks. When the National Democratic Party followed Ritchie in these politics, the urban majorities were solidified in all States in State and national elections. Ritchie was therefore, an innovator in national politics in the 1920's because he set a new trend in the organization of voting blocs that became standard in many States and in national elections in the following decade. But the Democratic urban blocs formed for very different reasons in the 1930's than those Ritchie amassed in the 1920's.

## CHAPTER SIXTEEN

## LOCAL AFFAIRS 1926 - 1928

In 1924 Ritchie had had to fight to get his men elected as officers of the legislature, but by 1926 his power over the Maryland Democratic Party was so complete that there was virtually no opposition. On December 4th, he announced his choice of David Mc Intosh for Senate President and E. Brooke Lee for Speaker of the House of Delegates. The only complaints that were heard for Ritchie's choice for head of the senate finance committee, and these were quickly silenced.<sup>1</sup>

Meanwhile Ritchie had been working on the state budget. The Governor began hearings a week after his reelection. One of his first concerns was the University of Maryland. Since the battles of 1924, President Woods had resigned. The new President, Dr. Ray A. Pearson, was an administrator much more to Ritchie's liking. Pearson was willing to submit to decisions of the Governor on all matters of the budget or major policy. Even before seeing Pearson on November 17th, Ritchie felt free to announce that the University of Maryland budget would involve no great extension.<sup>2</sup> In addition to Pearson, Ritchie interviewed all of his major department heads to evaluate their budget requests in person. Most of these meetings were held from November 17th to 19th.<sup>3</sup> Basically Ritchie saw his task as he had in 1924. He

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<sup>1</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 4 December 1926, p.22.

<sup>2</sup>. Ibid., 16 November 1926, p. 40; Diary, November 1926, in Ritchie Papers

<sup>3</sup>. Diary, November 1926, in Ritchie Papers.

wished to pare the budget as much as possible and reduce the State tax rate once more if he could.<sup>4</sup> Ritchie claimed to be so busy with the budget on the last days of the year that he was unable to attend a celebration in honor of the memory of Woodrow Wilson in Baltimore on December 28th.<sup>5</sup>

The legislature opened on January 4, 1926. Ritchie had conferred with legislative leaders for an entire afternoon on the previous day. He attempted to plan in advance for a short, quiet session in which few new laws were proposed. On its first day the legislature quickly elected its officers and then met in joint session to hear Ritchie's message on legislative needs.<sup>6</sup>

The Governor's message, like the Democratic Party platform of 1926, dealt mainly with minor matters except for fiscal recommendations. Ritchie announced that his budget included a provision to lower the tax rate to 25-1/2¢/\$100. He also urged that the legislature pass a 4-1/2¢ tax on each gallon of gasoline which was purchased in the State. Then he spent a significant part of his time discussing the depletion of crabs and oysters from the Chesapeake Bay and the need for seafood conservation. In addition Ritchie asked for the removal of the Motor Vehicles Department to the site previously occupied by the Home for

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<sup>4</sup>. Baltimore Sun, 29 December 1926; Maryland House of Delegates, Journal of Proceedings of the Maryland House of Delegates, 1927, pp. 34-36.

<sup>5</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 28 December 1926, p. 32.

<sup>6</sup>. Ibid., 4 January 1927, p. 36; Maryland House of Delegates, Journal of Proceedings of the Maryland House of Delegates, 1927, p. 3-5; Maryland Senate, Journal of Proceedings of Maryland Senate, 1927, p. 3-18.

Incurables, an enlargement of the State Penitentiary, an increase of 585 beds in the State Hospitals for the Insane, and a reorganization of practices employed at the State Tobacco Warehouse.<sup>7</sup> Perhaps the most important statement was, "We have all the agencies for good government that we need.... The governmental problem has now become one of sound administration."<sup>8</sup> Ritchie stated clearly that he desired only minor innovations.<sup>9</sup>

On January 11th, the Governor sent his exact legislative proposals to the General Assembly.<sup>10</sup> He presented seven bills for action by the lawmakers, five of which dealt with fiscal matters. These included two construction bills, a bridge loan, the gas tax proposal and the lowering of the State tax rate. His two other recommendations were in four bills requiring oyster conservation and seven bills granting new powers to the public service commission.<sup>11</sup>

The following day was Ritchie's official inauguration. The Governor had eschewed pretension in his first two inaugurals, but this time he allowed a ceremony complete with pomp to be broadcast to the entire nation. A large crowd stood out of doors in Annapolis as Ritchie walked

<sup>7</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 5 January 1927, pp. 10, 11, 12.

<sup>8</sup>. Ibid., 5 January 1927, p. 11, Maryland House of Delegates, Journal of The Proceedings of The Maryland House of Delegates, 1927, pp. 34-6.

<sup>9</sup>. See for example the San Francisco Evening Bulletin, Chicago American, Pittsburgh Press, and Miami Herald, 6 January 1927, clippings in Ritchie Papers. All contain comments on his speech.

<sup>10</sup>. Baltimore Sun, 10, 11 January 1927.

<sup>11</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 12 January 1927, p. 1.

from the Executive Mansion to the State House Senate Chamber with his mother, Frank Furst, Secretary of State Winebrenner, General Reckord and Bishop Murray. Artillery boomed a salute of seventeen guns, and the Maryland National Guard stood at attention as Ritchie was sworn in at noon by the new Chief Justice of the Maryland Court of Appeals, Carroll T. Bond. Bands played both inside and outside of the State House before and after the ceremony.<sup>12</sup>

Ritchie's speech was clearly meant for national purview. In it the Governor reaffirmed his pledge to continue to act as a champion of liberty and defender of the Bill of Rights. Maryland, he claimed, had a civilization all of its own where personal liberties were guarded from Federal encroachment. Government services had been expanded in essential areas while the lack of unnecessary bureaucracy and prying legislation had allowed the lowering of the State tax rate by over 30% in the last seven years. But Ritchie feared that the Federal government was moving dangerously far in the opposite direction, and he reviewed American history in a lucidly developed thesis to prove his point. The history of the United States, the Governor stated, fell into three basic periods of Constitutional development. In the first period which lasted until the Civil War, the nation leaned too far in the direction of States' rights. The second period, from the Civil war to World War I, was a period of balanced State and Federal powers. Ritchie saw the period since the World War as one of overweening Federal powers which would

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<sup>12</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 17 January 1927, p. 1.

eventually destroy the genius of American federalism. To preserve the Federal system and the individual rights which it protected was the Governor's basic goal for his third term as Maryland's chief executive. It was also the theory on which he hoped to attract national support.<sup>13</sup>

But once the inaugural had passed, the legislature had routine business to accomplish, and theories of government took a secondary position to very practical matters. Ritchie tried to keep a tight personal control over the Democratic legislators. Approximately one-sixth of the evenings of the ninety day session found the Governor entertaining a half-dozen or so Democratic lawmakers for dinner at the State House so he could apply persuasion and pressure as he felt was necessary.<sup>14</sup>

Despite the Governor's intentions, the General Assembly did not work so quickly and efficiently as he had planned. Even some of the most minor matters provoked conflict as maverick Democrats and Republicans had their own ideas about what kind of bills should be introduced. Almost as soon as the session began, Delegate Dan Joseph of Baltimore introduced a series of bills to repeal over 400 laws. These laws dealt with apprenticeship, dueling, the sale of liquor, blasphemy, insolvency and several minor matters including a 1904 statute penalizing the wearing of Grand Army of the Republic insignia.<sup>15</sup> The contention in the Democratic ranks which he started continued until the end of the

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<sup>13</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 17 January 1927, pp. 1, 4.

<sup>14</sup>. Diary, 18, 29, 30 January 1926, 14, 15, 16 February, 14, 15, 16, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 March 1927, in Ritchie Papers.

<sup>15</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 19 January 1927, p. 2.

session.

The General Assembly battled about three matters that the Governor had not anticipated. The Republican members of both Houses introduced a resolution for a special investigation of the Conowingo Dam project. Delegate Paul Berman of Baltimore's bill called for a legislative committee of five to investigate.<sup>16</sup> But the Democrats, after some wavering, remained united on the issue, and the Republican bill was killed in committee.<sup>17</sup> Ritchie suffered more embaradment when members of his own party, led by Dan Joseph, introduced a bill to prohibit local sheriffs and the commissioner of motor vehicles from appointing special deputies. Later the legislature tried to extend the judicial terms of Judges Stumpp, Dawkins and Duncan beyond the legal retirement age even though the Governor had stated his vigorous opposition.<sup>18</sup>

The two major matters which Ritchie presented for legislative action, the gasoline tax and seafood conservation, did not find smooth sailing. It was not until he was willing to modify these proposals considerably that the party fell in line and supported conservation legislation.<sup>19</sup>

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Only in the last week of the session did the gasoline tax win legis-

<sup>16</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 2 February 1927, p. 2. Baltimore Sun, 3 February 1927.

<sup>17</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 13 February 1927, p. 1. 15 February 1927, p. 1.

<sup>18</sup>. Ibid., 4 February 1927, p. 52.

<sup>19</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 31 January 1927, p. 38, 15 February 1927, p. 1. Baltimore Sun 16 February 1927.

lative approval.<sup>20</sup> It had taken much pressure from the Governor's office to insure the passage of these two relatively uncontroversial measures.

The achievements of the legislature were hardly impressive. What legislation had been passed was unremarkable. The distinguishing features of the session were the passage of the gasoline tax bill, equalization of the city annex tax, some loans and salary increases, and a move in the direction of oyster conservation. Compulsory automobile insurance and efforts to relax the Sunday Blue Laws had both failed. Ritchie was pleased by the lack of any major new legislation, but others were not so self-satisfied by conditions within the State and were not pleased by the results of the law making session.<sup>21</sup> Towards the end of the General Assembly session, Ritchie had filled his appointments for his third term, he retained almost the identical administrators who had served him previously.<sup>22</sup>

As soon as the legislative session ended, the campaign for Mayor of Baltimore accelerated. Actually the campaigning for the March primary had begun in December, it often completely eclipsed public attention of the petty matters under consideration by the State legislature. The election was important to Ritchie, and yet it placed him in

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<sup>20</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 3 February, p. 1, 11 March, p. 3, 16 March, p. 1, 29 March 1927, p. 1, Maryland Senate, Journal of The Proceedings of The Maryland Senate, 1927, p. 838, 871, 1173.

<sup>21</sup>. Baltimore Sun, 5 April 1927.

<sup>22</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 22 February 1927, p. 28.



a most difficult situation. Incumbent Mayor Jackson was a Democrat, but his relations with Ritchie were always less than cordial, and Jackson's power as Mayor remained a possible threat to the Governor. The matter was complicated by the fact that Jackson, who had always been a heavy drinker, had become clearly alcoholic, and the Democratic leaders recognized the necessity of replacing him.<sup>23</sup> At first the leaders all seemed to agree that Comptroller Graham would be the next candidate, but Jackson would not withdraw for Graham and insisted that he would enter a primary contest.<sup>24</sup> Kelly visited Ritchie in Annapolis in February to get the Governor's help, but Ritchie would not act publicly. After Graham dropped out of the race in early March, Ritchie held a conference in his offices with Howard Bruce, Frank Furst and Mayor Jackson with the intent of convincing Jackson that he could not win an election in his present physical condition.<sup>25</sup>

The following day former State Senator Curran visited Ritchie in Annapolis in the morning. In the afternoon the Governor announced that Curran would oppose Jackson in a primary with the support of Ritchie and the State and city Democratic organizations.<sup>26</sup> Eventually Jackson agreed to drop out of the race and the Democrats avoided a primary.

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<sup>23</sup>. Interview of author with Morris Baker, Head of the Jackson-for-Mayor League of 1931, on July 25, 1969.

<sup>24</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 28 January, 4, 8, 14, 15, 16, 17 February, 3, 8, 9, 10, 15 March 1927.

<sup>25</sup>. Ibid., 9 March 1927, p. 36.

<sup>26</sup>. Ibid., 10 March 1927, p. 48.

Ritchie opened the general election campaign for Curran with a series of addresses in the Western and Southern sections of the city on April 6th.<sup>27</sup> Then he left Maryland for a ten day vacation in Hot Springs with E. O. Weant and John M. Dennis.<sup>28</sup> When he returned to Baltimore Ritchie continued to speak for the Democratic ticket headed by Curran until the May 3rd election.<sup>29</sup> The voters' decision shocked the news analysts as ex-Mayor Broening defeated Curran by over 27,000 votes. The Democrats did manage to win the presidency of the city council and the city comptrollership and a large majority in the city council. Ritchie claimed that he could not understand the results, but Boss Kelly ventured that private grudges had been responsible for Curran's defeat.<sup>30</sup> Once again Ritchie was faced with a Mayor of Baltimore from the opposing party, but because of the growth of his personal power this was not so much of a problem for him as it had been during his first term.

For the remainder of the year, Ritchie's activities within the State consisted of making some minor appointments and overseeing the State administration so that it ran efficiently and without corruption. He appeared in public at occasional ceremonial functions, but if anything the pattern of inactivity which he commenced in the latter part of his second administration was even more firmly established.

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27. Diary, 7 April 1927, in Ritchie Papers.

28. Diary, 18 April - 2 May 1927, in Ritchie Papers.

29. Baltimore Evening Sun, 3 May 1927, p. 1.

30. Ibid., 3 May 1927, p. 36.

Death, illness and embezzlement made State politics considerably livelier at the beginning of 1928. Ritchie's position as State party head was strengthened by the complete incapacitation of Boss Mahon in June of 1927. At that point city politicians were ready to accept Boss Kelly as their solitary leader.<sup>31</sup> However, Kelly became ill on November 13th and was confined to his home. Neither man's health improved.<sup>32</sup> Kelly who was thought to be less seriously ill passed away first on February 19th, 1928. Boss Mahon never recovered sufficiently to even be told of Kelly's death before he died on June 19th.<sup>33</sup> The deaths of Baltimore City's two strongest leaders, and the fact that State Boss, Frank Furst, was eighty-two years old and no longer spry, left a vacuum at the top of the State's Democratic hierarchy. In some ways this was advantageous to Ritchie who no longer had to confer with the other leaders before taking action. He might have had to compromise with them if his ideas conflicted with theirs. However, the death of these leaders who had kept the lower ranks of politicians in line and helped Ritchie with his task of rewarding service to the party through appointments, left all the work directly on the shoulders of the Governor. All the local manipulating for elections in Baltimore that Kelly and Mahon had achieved would be Ritchie's burden. He had gained much new power, but with it came heavy responsibilities.

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<sup>31</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 17 June 1927, p. 52.

<sup>32</sup>. Ibid., 16 November 1927, p. 40.

<sup>33</sup>. Ibid., 10 February 1928, p. 54, 20 June 1928, p. 38.

But political matters caused considerably less sensation than the scandal which was discovered in the State roads commission. At first deputy auditor, Daniel Carroll, found a shortage of \$8,200. Two weeks later after a more careful examination of the books had been made, Chairman Mackall announced that the loss to the State from money stolen by various employees at the commission was likely to exceed \$40,000. Before the entire scandal was unravelled fourteen State employees were imprisoned for systematic embezzlement of State funds during most of the preceding seven or eight years.<sup>34</sup> Ritchie was harmed by statements which both he and Mackall had issued at the beginning of the investigation trying to minimize the extent of the scandal. As the newspapers gave a daily account of the proceedings of the investigation, in which increasing theft was exposed, the Governor remarked, "I don't know what to say. Of course, Mr. Mackall and myself are very cut up about the matter... I told him that there was just one thing to do, to lay it all before State's attorney O'Connor and to make it public."<sup>35</sup> Then Ritchie ordered State auditor, Lewis M. Milbourne, to make an exhaustive investigation of the books. But after the first set of prosecutions in which the men involved seemed to take their jail sentences all too lightly, it was revealed that the matter was not yet solved. At the end of April, it was suggested that

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<sup>34</sup>. Sixth Annual Report of the State's Attorney of Baltimore City, p. 11; Harry W. Kirwin, The Inevitable Success, a Biography of Herbert R. O'Connor (Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Press, 1962), p. 135.

<sup>35</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 23 February 1928.

the shortage might well be above \$60,000.<sup>36</sup> Continued investigation revealed that the shortage was \$127,000 from money stolen by employees, but that the additional sum of \$952,480 had been "illegally spent" in the assigning of contracts for road equipment and material, making a final staggering total loss of \$1,078,480 of the taxpayers money at the hands of the State roads commission.<sup>37</sup> Ritchie undertook to clean house after the final revelations. He appointed a special committee to investigate the affairs of the State roads commission from 1920-1928, and although Ritchie and Mackall were personally innocent of even the slightest complicity in the scandal, it tarnished the Governor's reputation for running a completely honest State government.<sup>38</sup>

Other than his reactions to the death of Mahon and Kelly and the State roads scandal, Ritchie's actions of a purely State or local nature in the first half of 1928 are too insignificant to merit discussion. During the second half of Ritchie's third term, due to an interaction between the Governor's philosophy of little government and the prosperous economic and social conditions within the State, his activities even in local affairs slowed down to almost a standstill.

Ritchie made one important appointment during the summer months. After twenty-one years of service, Chief Judge Gorter of the Supreme Bench of Baltimore City retired, and the Governor had to find a new

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36. Baltimore News, 24 March 1928.

37. Baltimore News, 17 May 1928; Baltimore Evening Sun, 17 May 1928.

38. A very complete account of the State Road's scandal is found in Kirwan, The Inevitable Success, pp. 135-139.

man to fill the post. Without too much difficulty he selected Samuel K. Dennis who accepted the post. Dennis had been an opponent of Ritchie's since the beginning of the Governor's prominence in State politics, but he had the reputation of being a capable lawyer who combined scholarship and practicality, and the Governor was delighted to get him for the post.<sup>39</sup>

Ritchie made infrequent public appearances that summer. Perhaps the highlight of his ceremonial appearances came when the Royal Australian Navy vessel, Australia, sailed up the Chesapeake Bay and docked in the Naval Academy in Annapolis. On September 4th Governor Ritchie and the military staff of the Naval Academy boarded the ship to call on Admiral C. F. Hyde. Lavish celebration followed during the day and again a few days later when the ship docked in Baltimore.<sup>40</sup> From Labor Day through election day, Ritchie concentrated completely on the presidential campaign. In his role as speaker for Al Smith, he was before the public nearly every day and had no need for other ceremonial appearances.

Then Ritchie began to work on the budget and other matters which concerned the 1929 legislature. The Governor said that he felt free to follow any policy which was necessary within the State roads commission but that he was waiting for the final audit and the report of the

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<sup>39</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 25 August 1928, p. 1.

<sup>40</sup>. Ibid., 5 September 1928, p. 3.

specially appointed Nelligan investigation commission before he made any recommendations.<sup>41</sup> Ritchie did hold a special meeting with the Attorney General and other State officers concerning the further prosecution of incriminated State employees and to find out what if any liability could be shifted to the banks, but he was still waiting for more information before he acted.<sup>42</sup> As usual most of Ritchie's time was spent in working on the budget. He held conferences with department heads, but these seemed ever briefer than ordinary.<sup>43</sup> Ritchie announced no recommendations for new legislation.

Almost unnoticed at this time was the remarriage of the Governor's former wife, Mrs. Elizabeth Baker (Ritchie). She was wed to Dr. L. F. Proctor of Santa Fe, New Mexico. The Governor had remained friendly with her family, but did not comment.<sup>44</sup> Ritchie had escorted many different women since his divorce, but none retained his attention for more than a month or so. He had become married to politics and seemed to regard women as pleasant company or socially necessary accoutrements for certain purposes but nothing more. Because of his personal charm, his handsomeness and his courtly manners, Ritchie was attractive to women and retained a reputation as a womanizer, a reputation that seems nearly totally unfounded.

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41. Baltimore Evening Sun, 21 November 1928, p. 46.

42. Ibid., 27 November 1928, p. 44, 1 December 1928, p. 20, 3 December 1928, p. 36.

43. Ibid., 21 November 1928, p. 46; Diary, 21 November 1928 in Ritchie Papers.

44. Baltimore Evening Sun, 28 November 1928, p. 28.

A group of anti-Ritchie Democrats led by Daniel C. Joseph opposed Ritchie's plans for the organization of the legislature, but the Democratic caucus reindorsed Senate President McIntosh and House speaker Lee on New Year's Day.<sup>45</sup>

The General Assembly opened the next day, January 2nd, in the most contentious mood since Ritchie ascended to the Governorship. The chief executive was scheduled to deliver his opening message to the joint session as soon as the two houses completed their formal organization and election of officers. But the speech was delayed two hours by a bitter battle over the House of Delegates speakership. Three men were nominated: E. Brooke Lee by the regular Democrats, Joseph Vilmer by the Republicans, and Daniel Joseph by the insurgent Democrats. The temporary speaker, who was a Lee man, announced that the vote would be by voice. Joseph sprang to his feet in a rage and shouted that since 1804 the custom had been to elect the speaker by secret ballot. He cited an opinion by Attorney General Ritchie in 1916 (interpreted by Joseph) which said that secret ballot was imperative. Lee then answered angrily that a vote would be held to decide if a secret ballot was necessary but if it was he would "ask for permission to tell what I know about Baltimore City and the reasons for a Republican Mayor there and about who is betraying the party there." "None is more willing to hear Mr. Lee's exposures than I," said the unruffled Joseph. Lee did not rise again. The last

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<sup>45.</sup> Baltimore Evening Sun, 31 December 1928, 2 January 1929, p. 1.



word may have been Joseph's, but the control was still in the hands of the administration. The House of Delegates voted 68-48 to vote by voice.<sup>46</sup> This ruined the chance of the dissenters to capture the votes of those who opposed Ritchie or Lee but were afraid to do so openly for fear of loss of committee positions and local patronage.

The nominating speeches which followed were heated and insulting. Joseph's man accused Lee of supporting the Republicans in Montgomery County and claimed Ritchie lacked courage in dealing with the State roads commission scandal. The Lee man accused Joseph of party disloyalty. In the balloting Lee received 67 votes to 35 for Vilmer to 14 for Joseph.<sup>47</sup> The Governor was in control, but he was going to have to bear the insults of an angry minority within his own party.

Ritchie's message to the legislature was in the same pattern as his last two messages. The emphasis was on economy and little new legislation. He did, however, recommend that a centralized fiscal division be set up in the Comptroller's office. It might have been expected that the Democratic factionalism arose in reaction to Ritchie's stand pat attitude, but ideological objections of dissident Democrats definitely were less important than conflicts over patronage. As in 1927, the Ritchie men intended to take all the important committee positions and control of patronage which the legislature commanded. The insurgents

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<sup>46</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 2 January 1929, p. 1.

<sup>47</sup>. Ibid., p. 1, Maryland House of Delegates, Journal of Proceedings of the Maryland House of Delegates, 1929, pp. 31-36.

only hope was to control a majority of the Baltimore City delegation in the House of Delegates and use that for bargaining purposes. Despite the rather potent threat in Baltimore, the Ritchie men managed to control the city delegation by a small margin, and the insurgents were deprived of any patronage.<sup>48</sup>

The next time that the legislature met, Joseph and the insurgents decided to attack the administration in the place where it seemed to be most vulnerable. Joseph proposed that a special commission be set up consisting of members of the legislature and three former Attorneys General of Maryland as counsel; it would be given sweeping powers to check every angle of the State roads commission. But Joseph also asked for suspension of the rules to keep the bill from being sent to committee where he knew that it would be delayed if not buried. The House of Delegates defeated the motion for suspension of the rules by an overwhelming vote of 98 to 7.<sup>49</sup>

Only two days later Ritchie announced that he was appointing a new State roads commission. The Governor had searched a long time to find the most prestigious body possible so that the public's faith in the commission would be restored. G. Clinton Uhl, who had served previously on the commission from 1916 to 1920, before there was even a hint of scandal, became the new chairman. A well known banker and politician, Howard Bruce, was one of the associate members and the

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<sup>48</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 3 January, p. 40, 7 January, p. 36, 9 January 1929, p. 1.

<sup>49</sup>. Ibid., p. 1.

other was a prominent Republican, John K. Shaw.<sup>50</sup> Three days later John Mackall resigned as chief engineer and was replaced by his assistant, Harry D. Wilman.<sup>51</sup> The new appointments were cleverly timed to silence adverse legislative action on the State roads commission. They achieved the desired effect. The Senate voted its approval of the legislative investigation committee report on March 30th; the House followed on April 1st despite the opposition of Republican leader, Joseph Wilmer, and some insurgents.<sup>52</sup>

During the session bills were presented which would have legalized civil marriages, a measure for the codification of State tax laws, a measure setting a minimum and maximum payment scale for workmen's compensation, a bill to allow Baltimore the right to have home rule on the question of showing motion pictures on Sundays, and numerous very specific pieces of minor legislation including even a bill requiring uniform acidity of vinegar. Administration supporters were responsible for the majority of the minor legislation which was introduced.<sup>53</sup>

Some of the suggested legislation was most clearly a personal attack on Ritchie and his administration. On February 5th, Senator Colgan introduced twelve bills requiring consent of the Senate for the Governor appointees of various boards and heads of departments.<sup>54</sup> At another

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50. Baltimore Evening Sun, 11 January 1929, p. 1.

51. Ibid., 14 January 1929, p. 36.

52. Ibid., 30 March 1929, p. 3, 1 April 1929, p. 32.

53. Ibid., 29 January, p. 1, 12 February, p. 1, 28 February, p. 3, 7 March, p. 3, 8 March 1929, p. 3.

54. Ibid., 5 February 1929, p. 3.

point senator Coad offered a bill to limit the Governor of Maryland to a single term in office which would, in his opinion, reduce the possibility of scandals such as the one in the State roads commission.<sup>55</sup> On all of these measures the administration Democrats kept a firm hold on their majority, but the constant jabbing of the insurgents was very annoying. Fortunately for the Ritchie administration, there was so little major legislation that they wished to initiate that the insurgents tactics could do little to delay them.

The lawmakers did find the time to frame laws on seven hundred minute and specialized subjects, but the general opinion was that this legislative session was a very unsuccessful one. Not a single important new law had been passed, and a large amount of time had been wasted on mere quibbling among Democrats.<sup>56</sup> But the Governor had gotten the fiscal legislation for which he had asked and was further pleased by the lack of innovation which he still regarded as unnecessary.

After the General Assembly ended its session, Ritchie spent some time in April trying to heal some of the wounds in the Democratic Party in Baltimore. Dan Joseph had already outlined a plan for the insurgents by which they would organize their own machinery on a precinct by precinct basis. Ritchie tried to prevent this when he spoke to a group of Democratic politicians assuring them that all would be

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<sup>55</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 7 February 1929, p. 1.

<sup>56</sup>. Ibid., 2 April 1929; Baltimore Sun, 2 April 1929; St. Mary's Beacon, 5 April 1929.

treated equally and that the administration would uncover every aspect of the roads commission scandal.<sup>57</sup> But no election was forthcoming for eighteen months, and the Governor decided to let time heal as many wounds as it would until the proximity of an election made the problem acute and action necessary.

In the matter of appointments, Ritchie once again chose the same administrative heads and magistrates that he had in the past with the exception of the changes in the State roads commission.<sup>58</sup> The business of government slowed to an extraordinarily quiet pace.

The Nelligan report on the State roads commission was finally completed and presented to Ritchie on August 2nd; it was much heralded and long awaited but revealed almost nothing new. It gave the final figures of the loss to the State, but these had been known for almost a year. It did reaffirm Ritchie's belief that only subordinate employees were at fault and exonerated chairman Mackall. The Governor explained that he personally had never lost his faith in Mackall but had replaced him mainly to restore public confidence.<sup>59</sup>

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57. Baltimore Evening Sun, 12 April 1929, 18 April 1929, p. 42.

58. Ibid., 17 January, p. 1, 2 May 1929, p. 56.

59. Ibid., 2 August 1929, p. 40.

## CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

## THE NATIONAL CRITIC - 1924 - 1928

Ritchie returned to Maryland after the Democratic National Convention of 1924 as a politician with an established nationwide reputation. While the administration of the State government took most of his time, both before and after his reelection in 1926, the Governor remained in the national political arena mainly through a series of public addresses. Ritchie had a dual purpose in these speeches. He wished to keep himself available for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1928, and he wished to direct the government in channels corresponding to his States' rights philosophy.

Any categorization of Ritchie's political creed is somewhat vague and problematical. His philosophy was centered around the idea of States' rights, but this catch-all phrase leaves much unexplained beyond Ritchie's two fundamental conceptions. The Governor felt that the individual States could manage their own affairs more economically than could the Federal government, and that diverse ideas could be more easily affected by the States. But while he was outwardly defending diversity and economy, Ritchie also seemed to be pleading for specific government directions in certain areas. He objected to government interference in the private lives of citizens especially in matters concerning morals. He also espoused rigorous laissez-faire ideas about government regulation of business. A strict States' rights

interpretation of the Federal constitution would have allowed Ritchie more freedom to apply these theories in Maryland without Federal intervention or overseeing.

Furthermore, although Ritchie was usually a highly organized man, he made no attempt to systematize his States' rights philosophy. His speeches shift from one topic to another without comprehensive organization. Certain topics, especially the interference caused by the enforcement of the Volstead Act, reappear regularly, but the ideas change only slightly. Rather than developing and refining his ideas, Ritchie had a tendency to restate them in slightly variant forms. It might be possible to organize Ritchie's speeches for purposes of analysis. To do so would make the Governor into a theorist; he was not. He was a practical politician; his speeches were made to attract followers.

Not long after the end of the 1924 Democratic convention, Ritchie spoke on national affairs. On July 15th, the American Institute of Banking met in Baltimore for its national convention, and Ritchie was invited to address the opening session at the Century Roof. The Governor told the bankers that he hoped that there would soon be a change in the attitude of the American public towards banks. If citizens controlled their unnecessary fears of bankers, the government could cease its continual probes, audits and investigations most of which Ritchie felt were totally wasteful. He denounced those who would regulate banking as "self appointed guardians of which we already have enough." His high regard for the banking profession was obvious in his closing remarks, "You are

the group that keeps institutions of the United States stable...by protecting the sacredness of liberty and the sanctity of contracts." <sup>1</sup>

From August to November, Ritchie was occupied with the election of John W. Davis, and he did not again speak publicly outside of Maryland until the beginning of December. The Governor next addressed a Chamber of Commerce convention in Rochester, New York, on December 3rd. Ritchie's basic theme was one of his favorites, the maintenance of the status quo. He discussed a specific problem, the process of amending the Federal constitution. The Governor told his audience that he favored limiting amendments to the constitution to those ratified by a general popular referendum because he felt it was too easy for a highly organized pressure group which represented only a minority of the electorate to change fundamental law by the process as it existed. <sup>2</sup>

Ritchie selected similar themes when he spoke to the New York Southern Society dinner in New York City on December 10th. This time Ritchie elaborated on the need for ideological differences between the major parties. He also insisted that it was important that the Federal government refrain from invading individual liberties. "Never before," he said, "has the tendency to control the individual, his actions and his liberty been as strong as it is now." <sup>3</sup>

In several speeches which he gave at the beginning of 1925, Ritchie

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1. Baltimore Evening Sun, 15 July 1924, p. 32.

2. Rochester Democratic Chronicle, 4 December 1924, clipping in Ritchie Papers.

3. New York Times, 11 December 1924, New York World, 11 December 1924.



continued to present similar issues. Before the New York Hotel Men's Association Dinner on January 15th, he attacked Federal aid to States as an interference with States' rights.<sup>4</sup> When he spoke to the Princeton Law Club on January 27th, he attacked Federal controls because they limited individual freedom of initiative.<sup>5</sup> The same subject was the topic of his address to the Maryland Society of New York on February 18th.<sup>6</sup> These speeches were all related to the theme of limited government which was pervasive in the mid-twenties, and to that extent the Governor's ideas were received with approval if not excitement.

Ritchie was sufficiently encouraged by the reception of his speeches to continue on similar themes. When he next spoke at the annual banquet of the Delta Phi fraternity, Ritchie told his audience that States' rights were vanishing in the United States. He tried to demonstrate that centralization destroyed justifiable regional distinctions.<sup>7</sup> In an address to the American Bar Association Convention in New York City on June 16th, Ritchie's main idea was that too much Federal power was creating a despotism in the United States.<sup>8</sup>

At the 17th annual conference of Governors in Poland Springs, Maine, Ritchie had an opportunity to elaborate his ideas with greater precision. The Governor denounced the unfairness of United States tax policies.

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4. New York World, 16 January 1925, clipping in Ritchie Papers.

5. New York Evening Bulletin, 28 January 1925, clipping in Ritchie Papers.

6. New York World, 19 February 1925, clipping in Ritchie Papers.

7. Ibid., 2 May 1925, clipping in Ritchie Papers.

8. New York World, New York Times, 17 June 1925, clippings in Ritchie Papers.

According to his calculations, eighteen States paid 81% of the national total tax. Not one of these eighteen States received in return even 10% of what it contributed. Maryland was one of eleven States which was returned less than 4% of tax revenues collected by the Federal government from citizens within the State.<sup>9</sup> Ritchie insisted that the name Federal "aid" was a misnomer for the Federal government was not giving a gift but only returning what it collected from the people of the States, and in addition the States were forced to match Federal grants and submit to Federal supervision. The revenues from the Federal government were used for agriculture, roads, education, rehabilitation, health, maternity and infant hygiene all of which the Maryland Governor felt should be classified as local matters reserved to the separate States by the Constitution. The Federal government controlled these things indirectly because the Constitution prohibited direct action.<sup>10</sup>

Ritchie then cited a list of complex tables which he said showed how several States, mainly in the South and West, benefited at the expense of Eastern States like Maryland and New York. Ritchie felt that nothing in American philosophy or law could justify that some States received more than they had contributed while others got less than 4% of their contribution. He said that the people of these States which received so much money from the Federal government would never learn self gov-

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<sup>9</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 30 June 1925, p. 1.

<sup>10</sup>. Ibid., 30 June 1925, p. 1.

ernment and in all States the essential principles of American government would be undermined.<sup>11</sup>

But Ritchie did not attempt to answer whether the taxing policy was inadequate when viewed from population base, geographical size, or special needs of development. He seemed to regard the State as a "given" entity, and federalism as justifiable for no other reason than it was the system established by the authors of the Federal Constitution. Nor did he ever seem to consider that a taxing policy in which each State was returned most of its contribution might greatly hinder development in the newer or economically less fortunate States, and thus limit the rights of the people in those States. But Ritchie's idea that the Federal government regulated matters reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment deserved more consideration than it received from his critics.

Ritchie continued on the same theme he had used at the Governors' conference when he spoke in Harrisburg at the annual convention of the Pennsylvania State Chamber of Commerce. He struck at the inequity in the distribution of tax proceeds and how the fifty-fifty matching plan gave the Federal government regulatory powers that the Constitution reserved to the States. This time Ritchie supported his basic theme by a solid analysis of the Highway Construction Act of July 11, 1916, the Smith-Lever Act of May 8, 1914 which dealt with Federal aid to agriculture, and the Smith-Hughes Act of February 23, 1917 giving

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11. Baltimore Evening Sun, 30 June 1925, p. 1.

aid for vocational education. Ritchie explained that it was impossible for the States not to take part in the programs set up by the Federal government.<sup>12</sup>

These and a few other speeches made in 1925 established the fact that Ritchie was likely to remain a contender for the presidential nomination in 1928. When Ritchie went to Chicago at the beginning of 1926 his goal was to obtain the support of powerful Boss Brennan. Maryland newspapers which were always trying to glamorize the Governor's career announced that all eyes in Washington were looking towards Chicago on January 9th when Ritchie was scheduled to speak at a dinner given by Brennan.<sup>13</sup> Two newspapers said that the "Ritchie for President" boom would begin there.<sup>14</sup> There is no record of his dealings with Boss Brennan, nor is it exactly clear what Ritchie expected from the Illinois boss. It was far too early to expect an official endorsement especially since in Ritchie's case he would have to win an election in Maryland in 1926 if he were to remain in the presidential contest. If Ritchie's goal was a friendship with Brennan which could result in possible political benefits in the future, he achieved his purpose. Brennan and he remained congenial until both retired from politics.

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12. Baltimore Evening Sun; New York World; Washington Times; Harrisburg Telegraph, 16 October 1925, clippings in Ritchie Papers.

13. Baltimore Sun, 7 January 1926.

14. Baltimore News, 7 January 1926; Baltimore American, 8 January 1926.

Ritchie spoke twice while he was in Chicago. Whatever type of bargaining he was doing in private, in public he attempted to create an image of himself as a man of principle. His first speech was delivered at the Iroquois Club dinner for Jackson Day on January 8th, but it was his second speech, which he made at the dinner given by Brennan on the following evening that attracted most of the attention. Ritchie insisted that centralization was increasing at a great pace in the United States. Many people thought centralization increased efficiency, Ritchie did not. Rather, he felt, it aggrandized bureaucracy and intensified indifference to government. Furthermore, the Governor felt that bureaucracy only bred greater bureaucracy, and that States were less susceptible than the Federal government to the demands of "Leagues, pressure groups and militant minorities." The Governor went on to oppose specifically Federal subsidies, the Federal Child Labor Amendment, the Federal Inheritance Tax and the Federal Bureau of Education. But he saved his harshest words for the Prohibition Amendment. He declared that, "prohibition enforcement has broken down, and the experiment is responsible for a disrespect for law and a degree of actual lawlessness and corruption which is appalling."<sup>15</sup> Certainly no one could claim that Ritchie had talked in vague terms and avoided the issues. The Chicago Herald Examiner stressed Ritchie forthrightness and praised his political courage.<sup>16</sup>

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15. Baltimore Sun, 9 January 1926.

16. Chicago Herald Examiner, 9 January 1926, clipping in Ritchie Papers.

In March Ritchie was invited to Virginia by Governor Byrd, and he gave several speeches during his visit to Maryland's Southern neighbor. The Maryland Governor said that he felt that the South could well be the leader in vitalizing the old traditions of the United States which recognized regional differences.<sup>17</sup>

One month later the Democrats held their annual Jefferson Day dinner in the nation's capital. The choice of Ritchie along with Al Smith and John W. Davis as the three main speakers for the evening was indicative of the Marylander's prominence. Ritchie's address was comparatively brief. In it he invoked Jefferson to attack invasions of States' rights especially in the matter of the Prohibition Amendment. He also discussed the need for a free press in a democratic society.<sup>18</sup>

Ritchie spoke on April 20th, at the Columbia Law School in New York. Here his main point was that Prohibition was the outstanding example of an interference with the rights of States and their citizens in the United States. Ritchie stated that laws without social sanction must fail, but he never developed the idea.<sup>19</sup> The following day Ritchie went to Boston where he spoke several times on May 22nd.<sup>20</sup>

An important address of Ritchie's was given to the United States

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17. Richmond Times Dispatch, 5 March 1926, clipping in Ritchie Papers.

18. New York Tribune, Pittsburgh Press, 29 March 1926, clippings in Ritchie Papers.

19. New York Times, 21 April 1926.

20. Diary, May 1926 in Ritchie Papers.

Chamber of Commerce on May 12th, the topic was self-rule for big business. The Governor's proposal was that society and business should not look to legislation to solve social and economic problems. Government's broad purpose with respect to business is to keep the door of opportunity open. "Anything that chills free enterprise of business is destructive of both social and economic progress," Ritchie felt.<sup>21</sup>

One week later, Ritchie spoke twice in Detroit. He addressed the Bankers' Club Dinner on May 18th; the following night he spoke to a Democratic Club luncheon before returning to Maryland. In both speeches, the central idea was the need for a return to States' rights as seen before World War I.<sup>22</sup>

From the time of the State primary election in September until the general election in November, Ritchie concentrated completely on his gubernatorial contest. He did not speak outside of Maryland again until November 26th when he was the guest of Boss George Brennan and Chicago leaders.<sup>23</sup>

However, the highlight of Ritchie's visit was a speech which he delivered to the Iroquois Democratic Club. This time Ritchie advocated States' rights in general. The American political ideal was best served, he felt, when the largest measure of local self-government and individual liberty was made possible. Then he attacked the Prohibition Amendment

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<sup>21</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 12 May 1926, pp. 44, 27.

<sup>22</sup>. Diary, 18, 19 May 1926, in Ritchie Papers.

<sup>23</sup>. Diary, 25-29 November 1926, in Ritchie Papers.

and the proposed Child Labor Amendment with unrestrained wrath. Child labor, he insisted, was none of the State's business; it was up to parents to decide if they wanted their children to work.<sup>24</sup>

The dinner given for the Governor to celebrate his third inauguration on January 10th was an indication of Ritchie's continuing national prestige. The banquet was attended by men from all over the United States including United States Senators Bayard of Delaware, Broussard of Louisiana, Edwards of New Jersey, Harrison of Mississippi, Pittman of Nevada, Walsh of Massachusetts, Robinson of Arkansas, King of Utah, George of Georgia, and Hawes of Missouri, and members of the House of Representatives including Garner and Rayburn. Admiral Cary Grayson and Ross Hall, the President of the Iroquois Democratic Club of Chicago were also among the more distinguished guests.<sup>25</sup> This time the idea that it was the beginning of a "Ritchie for President" movement was mentioned outside of Maryland.<sup>26</sup> But Ritchie devoted his attention for the next five months to local affairs. Then he began to accelerate the number of his national speeches, but his presidential campaign was attracting little interest.

On May 15, 1925, Ritchie spoke before the Academy of Political and Social Sciences of Philadelphia. Because his audience consisted of specially trained or interested people, Ritchie selected a new and more precise topic, the recognition of the Soviet Union. This is one of the

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<sup>24</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 26 November 1926, pp. 1, 10.

<sup>25</sup>. Baltimore Sun, 10 January 1927.

<sup>26</sup>. New York Sun, 10 January 1927.



very few times that he even mentioned a foreign policy. The Governor recommended that the United States extend immediate recognition to the government of the Soviet Union for several reasons. He felt that protection of American citizens who did large scale business in the Soviet Union was extremely important. Ritchie also argued that while the government was a dictatorship of the minority, it was the only government which could hold the nation together. Finally Ritchie explained that it did little or no harm to our principles of government to recognize a nation which operated in opposition to them, especially after we had withheld recognition for so long.<sup>27</sup>

Next the Governor gave speeches in Omaha, Lincoln and in Kansas City on three different days. His subject was farm problems, and he urged that a conference be called to discuss them. But he hedged on whether or not he supported government aid to farmers, and he seems to have struck no enthusiasm among politicians in the area.

On May 20th, Ritchie returned to Chicago where he was once again the guest of the Iroquois Club. The President of the Club publicly endorsed the Marylander for President. On May 21st, the Governor's address was broadcast to the entire State of Illinois.<sup>28</sup> It was obvious that Ritchie's speaking schedule was accelerated during 1927 because he was looking forward to the Democratic National Convention of 1928 and

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<sup>27</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 15 May 1927; Philadelphia Public Ledger, 16 May 1927, clipping in Ritchie Papers.

<sup>28</sup>. Baltimore Sun, 16, 18, 20, 21, 23 May 1927.

seeking support for the presidential nomination. Although the Governor seldom gave speeches during the summer months in other years, he campaigned unflaggingly in 1927. On June 10th, Ritchie spoke to the representatives of the National Electric Light Association at their convention in Atlantic City. Here Ritchie stressed that it was a necessity for modern business leaders to remain politically knowledgeable if the United States was to advance in the future. Ritchie's idea of advance, however, was for business leaders to help the country avoid "the present tendency to write untried political theories into statutes." <sup>29</sup>

In the following month, Ritchie made one of his most outspoken speeches to the Indiana State Bar Association at French Lick Springs, Indiana. On July 7th when he addressed the Indiana lawyers, Ritchie intended to agitate his audience. He expounded his idea that a government of men was being substituted for a government of laws which involved a departure from the Constitution. "We also are inclining to transform the moral obligations of the few into the legal obligations of all which is an exploitation of American liberty by the uplifters," he said. He added, "In any event our government has become the most regulatory in the Western world outside of Russia and Italy. Inspectors and spies follow the 100% American from the day he draws his first nourishment from his inspected mother's breast." Ritchie made fun of government pamphlets explaining everything from how to raise children to how to

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<sup>29</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 10 June 1927.

hang curtains, and what meats to buy for Christmas dinner. Two months ago, he noted, the Department of Agriculture had even issued a pamphlet "A Pocket Essay on Kissing." It was, he said, impossible for an American to do anything anymore in which the government did not interfere. People in the United States had come to think of the government as a means for social control rather than as a protector of freedom, and this Ritchie felt was an abuse of the American ideal, one that needed to be reversed if the country was to be preserved.<sup>30</sup>

July was also the month of the annual Governors' conference which held its 1927 meeting in Mackinac, Michigan. About twenty Governors, including Maryland's, met for five days to discuss some of the problems which were shared by the State executives. On the second day of the conference, Ritchie proposed a major constitutional change for the purpose of upholding States' rights. He suggested that a permanent House of Governors be established and that all matters which affected States' rights would have to be passed by this body. This innovation would, he felt, curb the drift to centralization that he so greatly deplored. However, it did not receive serious attention from the other Governors or even from the newspapers.

At the conference Ritchie seemed to be trying to demonstrate to the Governors that he was not a man with a single issue, but that he was aware of diverse national problems as a presidential contender should

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<sup>30</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 7 July 1927.

be. On the fourth day of the conference Ritchie proposed that a special meeting be called to discuss the problems of farm relief. He suggested that agriculture, industry, finance, labor and government officials all attend this meeting because the problems of all of these groups were interrelated and could not be solved by one group alone. The McNary-Haugen farm relief bill providing for the Federal Farm Board to purchase farm surpluses and keep them off the market to keep prices up was really at the center of the controversy and like most of the Eastern Governors, Ritchie hedged on the issue of saying whether or not he would support it.<sup>31</sup>

A few weeks later Ritchie spoke in Charlottesville, Virginia, to the Institute of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia. This time Ritchie expressed an even more extreme view of local autonomy. He suggested that cities become separate political entities for he did not think that the present system allowed the cities true political democracy. He said further that urban-rural tensions had caused the kind of extremism of the Ku Klux Klan, Volsteadism and fundamentalism which could be alleviated by giving the cities true democracy.<sup>32</sup>

Towards the end of the summer, Ritchie was less active.

When he spoke to the International Association of Casualty and Surety

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<sup>31</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 25 July 1927. Baltimore Sun, 27 July 1927, 28 July 1927, 3 August 1927, Manchester, New Hampshire Union, 28 July 1927, clipping in Ritchie Papers.

<sup>32</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 12 August 1927, p. 34.

Underwriters and the National Association of Casualty Agents in White Sulphur Springs, Virginia, Ritchie pleaded for a return to local self government. Local government would do more to solve the problems of sectionalism, farm relief and Prohibition than any possible action of the Federal government. The last twenty-five years of United States history according to Ritchie had produced little more than excessive bureaucracy and unworkable laws.<sup>33</sup>

One might have expected that Ritchie's emphasis on freedom from government interference in his spring and summer speeches would have attracted the support of liberal thinkers, but in November, Robert M. Lovett, a University of Chicago Professor and President of the American Civil Liberties Union, announced that Ritchie's States' rights doctrines could not be expected to attract the liberal voter in a presidential election because the issue was a minor one.<sup>34</sup> Lovett and Ritchie probably would have agreed on many specific matters, but Ritchie felt that States' rights was the means by which those specific ends would have been secured; he distrusted actions of the Federal government. In the States' rights views he espoused a method of reaching "liberal" goals that liberals considered highly conservative if not reactionary.

The Governor's presidential campaign seemed to languish during the fall of 1927. Ritchie made less speeches on national issues and no

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33. Baltimore Evening Sun, 4 October 1927, p. 40.

34. Ibid., 21 November 1926, p. 36.

important Democrats announced their support. Still he continued his candidacy. On January 12, 1928, Ritchie left a strategic meeting of Baltimore Democrats to go to Washington for a meeting of the Democratic National Committee.<sup>35</sup> The Governor then made a few more major addresses, but his activity had clearly waned. On January 27th, the Governor and Senator Reed of Missouri spoke at a meeting of the National Sentinels of the Republic, an organization that was opposed to Federal encroachment of States' rights.<sup>36</sup> On Washington's birthday, Ritchie gave a radio talk, and on February 25th he talked to the New York Harmonie Club meeting which Bernard M. Baruch and Herbert Swope both attended.<sup>37</sup> On March 6th he spoke in Philadelphia and even remained in the city for three days to confer with political leaders.<sup>38</sup> But Ritchie was not encouraged by these ventures and his campaign relapsed into inactivity.

The United States Senate decided to investigate the expenditures of all the possible presidential candidates in 1928. When five Senators of an investigation committee headed by Senator Dale of Vermont came to interview Ritchie in Baltimore on May 8, 1928, the Governor told them that he doubted that he was in the race. "I have made no announcement of candidacy for United States President although I would be delighted

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35. Diary, 12 January 1928, in Ritchie Papers.

36. Baltimore Evening Sun, 26 January 1928, p. 3.

37. Diary, February 1928, in Ritchie Papers.

38. Diary, March 1928, in Ritchie Papers.

if it came my way." Ritchie told the committee that he had spent no money nor engaged in any other activity than speech making. The entire investigation took twenty-five minutes including ten minutes for making photographs.<sup>39</sup> Although Ritchie did not announce his official withdrawal until a few days before the Democratic convention began, he made no more major addresses or other efforts at attracting out of State support.

Therefore, in the four years since 1924, the Governor had managed to remain in the national arena to the extent that he had become a recognized presidential contender, but he never came closer than the outer circle of the national spotlight. He was often invited to give speeches, but he attracted only a little prominent support outside of Maryland. His States' rights doctrine never achieved significant popularity. While Ritchie's objections to centralization and his laissez-faire attitude towards business were probably suitable to the general mood of the nation in the late 1920's, he placed both issues under the heading of States' rights and thus sacrificed much of their popular appeal. Ritchie's place in national politics in May 1928 was little different from what he had been in July 1924; his ideas had been elaborated but they had not changed. He remained an important but never a central influence on national politics and the symbolic representation of the States' rights issue which was of little direct concern to voters or politicians.

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<sup>39</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 4 May 1928, p. 3; 8 May 1928, p. 1.

## CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

THE 1928 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION  
AND PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN

From 1926-1928, Ritchie tried to broaden his national appeal by making speeches around the country. Bernard Baruch, who had remained a close friend of Ritchie's ever since the Governor's service on the War Industries Board, advised him in a letter that "a man who wants the presidency must go out and get it; he can't wait for it to come to him." Baruch went on to advise Ritchie to make more national appearances.<sup>1</sup> But the Governor disregarded the advice.

On the same day that he received Baruch's letter, Ritchie also got one from Arthur Krock, a New York newspaperman, suggesting Ritchie not attend a banquet to which Baruch would invite him. Ritchie telephoned Krock in New York on March 11th to check Krock's source of information, and then wrote to Baruch that duties with the legislature, which was then in session, prevented him from coming to New York.<sup>2</sup> The exchange of notes, while not intrinsically important, is demonstrative of Ritchie's over-cautious attitude in a campaign that often needed more color and bravado and less integrity to be successful. Ritchie was not willing to trust even an old friend like Baruch in a matter of a speaking engagement that he thought might reflect badly on his reputation.

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1. Bernard Baruch to Ritchie, 7 March 1927, in Ritchie Correspondence, University of Maryland.

2. Arthur Krock to Ritchie, 7 March 1927, Ritchie Correspondence, with a note by Ritchie on the letter.



Ritchie did, however, continue to speak frequently in the spring, summer and fall of 1927. By that time, it was evident that no snowballing national boom for him had been created. His States' rights philosophy did not create much of a stir, and only isolated figures outside of Maryland seemed interested in Ritchie's candidacy. Although he did not drop out of the campaign for the Democratic nomination, Ritchie slowed down his activities and limited the number of speeches that he gave. He seemed to be waiting for some signs of weakness in the efforts of Al Smith. Since Ritchie's and Smith's ideology and records as Governors of Maryland and New York were quite similar, Ritchie hoped to be the beneficiary of Smith's votes if the campaign of the New York Governor should collapse. However, Smith's support increased through the winter and by early spring it was evident that if Ritchie were to have even a faint hope of capturing the nomination, he would have to make an aggressive effort of his own. But his ardor for active campaigning was dulled by the revelations of embezzlement in the Maryland State roads commission. The tortuously gradual way in which the scandal was revealed over more than two months until the total loss of over \$1,000,000 was discovered was quite discouraging to a Governor who had prided himself so greatly on the honesty of his first two administrations.

Ritchie's drive for the national nomination was hesitant, but he intended to keep complete control over Maryland politics and the Maryland delegation to the convention. One week before the Maryland State Convention met to choose delegates to the national meeting, Ritchie announced a tentative slate of names.<sup>3</sup> When the Democrats met the next week, Ritchie's choices were followed exactly, and the only changes were made

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<sup>3</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 15 May 1928, p. 3.

when a few of the men on the original list, including John M. Dennis and William C. Bruce, declined to serve. The convention voted to give Ritchie the State's sixteen votes on the opening presidential ballot.<sup>4</sup>

Ritchie was personally dubious about his chances to win the Democratic nomination for President; the national press was ~~more~~ optimistic. Possibly it was only because the newspapers wished to create a struggle for the nomination in a convention where it seemed that the outcome was already too certain for exciting news coverage. In the first six months of 1928, newspapers across the nation contained thousands of articles and editorials about Maryland's Governor. The Forum of Fargo, North Dakota, predicted that Ritchie would be an even more important figure at the 1928 convention than he had been in 1924.<sup>5</sup> The Independent of Helena, Montana, lauded his morality and attacked Ritchie's Methodist critics.<sup>6</sup> Several papers insisted that Ritchie was the only Democrat who could beat President Coolidge because he could win both the conservative South and eastern industrial states as Smith could not.<sup>7</sup> A few times Ritchie was compared to Woodrow Wilson because of his self-righteousness.<sup>8</sup> But the largely encouraging press did no more for the Maryland Governor than had his own speeches. No discernable "bandwagon" was visible on the horizon by the second week in June with the convention only two weeks away.

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4. Baltimore Evening Sun, 22 May 1928; Washington Post, 23 May 1928; New York Times, 23 May 1928.

5. Fargo, North Dakota Forum, 5 February 1928, Clipping in Ritchie Papers.

6. Helena, Montana Independent, 17 November 1927, Clipping in Ritchie Papers.

7. Aurora, Illinois Mid-Week Review, 21 February 1928; Chicago Journal of Commerce, 22 March 1928, Clippings in Ritchie Papers.

8. Asheville, North Carolina Citizen, 14 January 1928, Clipping in Ritchie Papers.

Four days before the opening of the convention, Ritchie announced his withdrawal in favor of New York's Governor, Al Smith. Ritchie explained that he did not wish to let personal advantage stand in the way of party success. Of course, the fact that his chances were so minimal was the main factor in his motivation, but that was left unsaid. Ritchie did say that he was uninterested in the vice-presidency. Some-time later, it was rumored ~~that~~ Smith had made a deal for Ritchie's support. The Marylander was supposed to have agreed to support Smith for the nomination in 1928, in return for the New Yorker's help in 1932 if Ritchie was running then. Neither man ever admitted making such a deal.

Ritchie played an important part in the convention which was itself a rather dull affair. The Maryland Governor opened the proceedings of the second day of the convention by giving the first of several seconding speeches for Smith. New York's Governor, said Ritchie, was "living proof that American democracy could produce leaders that were simple and yet great." Ritchie dwelt on the fact that Smith's humble beginnings gave him special humanitarian qualities lacking in Herbert Hoover, whom he described as the embodiment of standardization and specialization. Smith had demonstrated his abilities in his "fearless, honest, efficient" administration, but it was his "living, pulsating, understanding heart" that made Smith the outstanding candidate, according to Ritchie.<sup>9</sup>

Much of the action on the convention floor was perfunctory because most of the delegates were resigned to supporting Smith, although as H.L. Mencken noted, many of them would have preferred not to if they had

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<sup>9</sup>. Democratic National Committee, Official Report of the Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention, 1928 (Chicago: Bona Fide Reporting Company, 1928), pp. 125-7.

another choice.<sup>10</sup> The maneuvering within the platform committee where Ritchie represented the Maryland delegation was much more important. In the committee Ritchie engineered acceptance of the prohibition plank that Smith wanted.<sup>11</sup>

On the convention floor on July 29th, Ritchie defended the party platform in a long address. The Governor called for all delegates to give their full support to the document which he claimed was the result of compromises made in a democratic manner. Then he noted that the prohibition plank in the platform was the object of most displeasure, but in a call for unity that drew cheers from the delegates, Ritchie noted that it, too, was the result of compromise. He had personally favored a plank calling for the repeal of the 18th Amendment rather than the prohibition plank in the majority report which left the question to be resolved by individual states; but he now pleaded for all to join him in support of the committee's work.<sup>12</sup> Ritchie's speech had been expected to be the preview to a floor fight over the platform, but Senator Carter Glass of Virginia had worked behind the scenes convincing southern dry leaders to accept the platform. Glass' success stole the drama from Ritchie's speech on the floor.<sup>13</sup>

Still Ritchie was personally very pleased with the results of the convention. He had been taken into the private Smith councils which gave him great satisfaction.

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10. Baltimore Evening Sun, 28 June 1928, p. 1.

11. Ibid., 28 June, 1928, p. 1, 29 June 1928, p. 1.

12. Ibid., 29 June 1928, pp. 1, 2; Democratic National Committee, Official Report of the Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention, 1928, pp. 183-5.

13. Baltimore Sun, 30 June 1928.

One of Ritchie's greatest admirers saw even larger benefits for the Maryland Governor. H. L. Mencken reported that despite outward displays of unity, Al Smith was a bitter pill for many Democrats to swallow. Mencken perceived that beneath the boredom about which many delegates complained was a great uneasiness about having to support a Catholic candidate. The cynical Baltimore journalist predicted that Ritchie would be the beneficiary in 1932 after frightened Protestants defeated Smith.<sup>14</sup>

Ritchie was obviously not commenting about 1932 at that moment. He returned to Maryland with plans to organize a winning campaign for Smith. On July 10th, the Governor spoke at the Concord Democratic Club where he declared himself the leader of the Democratic Party in Maryland for the tenure of the campaign. In Baltimore, there was much opposition to Ritchie's leadership, but no man or group of men was effectively able to challenge the Governor's control.<sup>15</sup>

On July 7th, Smith had come to Centreville, Maryland, to attend the funeral of the son of his close friend, Jacob Raskob, the Chairman of the Finance Division of the General Motors Corporation.<sup>16</sup> Four days later, the New York Governor announced that Raskob would head his campaign.<sup>17</sup> Although Raskob resided in Maryland, he had taken no part in Maryland politics and had no personal contact with Governor Ritchie. Smith's appointment of a Marylander was definitely not a favor to Ritchie or any

14. Baltimore Sun, 26, 28 June 1928.

15. Baltimore Evening Sun, 11 July 1928, p. 36.

16. Ibid., 7 July 1928, p. 1.

17. Ibid., 11 July 1928, p. 1.

other politicians in the State. But only two days after he appointed Raskob, Smith sent a letter to Ritchie thanking him for his help at the convention. Smith wrote, "I shall always remember your part in it." Furthermore, Smith asked Ritchie to continue to help him with the national campaign beyond his work in Maryland. The presidential nominee suggested that Ritchie visit him in Albany in two weeks to confer about campaign plans.<sup>18</sup>

Ritchie and Smith met in the New York capital on July 26th, and then the Maryland Governor returned home for a quiet summer.<sup>19</sup>

On August 23rd, when Governor Smith made his speech formally accepting the nomination for the presidency before the New York State legislature in Albany, Ritchie stood on his left. Ritchie had been in Albany with Senator Tydings and E. Brooke Lee for two days before the speech to confer with Smith about the campaign.<sup>20</sup> Smith regarded Ritchie as one of his most sincere backers; Ritchie enjoyed the prestige and was determined to merit Smith's confidence.

When he returned to Maryland, Ritchie began to make public speeches for the Democratic nominee. His first major address was to a luncheon meeting of the Young People's Democratic Club of Maryland. Ritchie said that he was taking greater part in this campaign than any previous one because Smith was dedicated to the great principles of liberty and tolerance and was personally courageous and direct.<sup>21</sup> Ritchie continued

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18. Baltimore Evening Sun, 13 July 1928, p. 44.

19. Diary, July - August 1928, in Ritchie Papers.

20. Baltimore Evening Sun, 23 August 1928, p. 1.

21. Ibid., 10 August 1928, p. 28.

to put his full effort behind Smith's candidacy. He spoke at least once a day nearly every day from September 25th until election eve. The large majority of these speeches were made within the State. Ritchie did, however, go to Chicago on October 9th to make a speech for Smith in the mid-western metropolis.

Ritchie's hold on the Democratic Party in the State also depended on the success of the Democratic congressional candidates. Most important was the reelection of Senator William C. Bruce. Even during his six years in the United States Senate, Bruce had not exercised much influence on Democratic party politics or made many friends in political circles in the State. He remained an aloof, wealthy, country squire who was uncomfortable with politicians. But on the floor of the Congress, Bruce spoke often and candidly. Sometimes he angered Democratic politicians because he insisted in voting on each issue according to his conscience and not by party line. But he retained a philosophy similar to Ritchie's on states' rights and on prohibition which kept him in the Governor's favor. Ritchie seemed pleased that Bruce was capable but not too popular, so that he could never be a rival. With the Governor's support, Senator Bruce was given the renomination without a primary.

His Republican opponent was Phillips Lee Goldsborough who had first run for United States Senate in 1896 when such elections were still decided by the State legislature. Goldsborough had lost that election by one vote, but he had remained an important figure within his party, and in 1911 he had become the second Republican since the Civil War to win election as Governor of Maryland. Goldsborough had retired from politics after his party failed to give him renomination in 1915, and

despite constant efforts by leading Republicans to get him to run during the next thirteen years, he had insisted that he needed to devote his time to business. In 1928, however, he sensed that the time was right for him to run again, and after insuring himself of a united party, he agreed to become the Republican candidate to challenge Senator Bruce.<sup>22</sup>

In addition to the Bruce-Goldsborough campaign for United States Senate, Ritchie had several vigorously-contested battles for House of Representatives to oversee. In the First District on Maryland's Eastern Shore, T.A. Goldsborough, the Democratic incumbent, (a relation to Phillips Lee), was usually an easy victor, but a recent divorce suit by his wife hurt the Congressman's chances in this conservative rural district. In the Third District in Baltimore City, Republican John Phillip Hill was trying to regain the seat that he had vacated when he ran for United States Senate in 1926. The incumbent Democrat, Vincent Palmisano, had a difficult fight against Hill, a popular anti-Prohibitionist. Democratic incumbents Cole, Linthicum and Gambrill in the Second, Fourth ~~and~~ Fifth Districts were expected to win without difficulty but a great amount of attention was focused on Western Maryland where Democrat David J. Lewis tried to regain the seat he held from 1910 to 1916 from Republican Frederick Zihlman who had held the seat since Lewis vacated it to run for Senate in 1918. Ritchie campaigned at one time or another during the fall for each of these men.<sup>23</sup>

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22. Baltimore Evening Sun, 17 June 1928.

23. Ibid., 7 August 1928, p. 36, 15 September 1928, 5 November 1928, pp. 1, 3.



Despite Ritchie's attempt to control matters, the contest between Senator Bruce and ex-Governor Goldsborough deteriorated to a level of nasty accusations centering mainly around the prohibition issue and the State roads commission scandal. Bruce at various points in the campaign insisted the Republicans were hypocrites about prohibition. He said both Hoover and Curtis drank alcoholic beverages and refused to retract the statements.<sup>24</sup> Goldsborough began to make occasional snide remarks about how he had managed to build many roads while he was Governor without any kind of scandal.<sup>25</sup> In the end the campaign seemed to center around Bruce's wetness and Goldsborough's dryness. H. L. Mencken, in one of his sarcastic moods, described the campaign as follows:

Reports from agents in the counties leave them bewildered. They figure that whenever Senator Bruce delivers a speech in a country town the first canto converts an average of 164 rustics, but the second, third...9th and subsequent cantos tend to deliver them into the arms of Hoover. How far this goes can only be estimated. Nothing exactly parallel to it can be found in the records of the Smith statisticians dating back to the second Jackson campaign. The operations of Dr. Goldsborough also baffle them. They figure when he unlimbers his wind machine in a country town and begins sobbing for home, mother, service, and the Federal Reserve System, more playgrounds for the kiddies, more wooden legs for one-legged orphans, and the ideals of the Elks, the Maryland Club, the American Legion, and the Anti-Saloon League he breaks an average of 115 hearts and so gets the skids under Al. But they also figure he makes an average of 117 enemies in every town by refusing to guzzle with dry leaders...<sup>26</sup>

Still Ritchie's main concern was the presidential battle. Although Maryland Democrats remained very confident, Rodney Crother of the Asheville,

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24. New York Times, 25 August 1928; Baltimore Evening Sun, 22, 24 August 1928.

25. Baltimore Evening Sun, 13 October 1928.

26. Ibid., 18 October 1928, p. 1.

North Carolina Citizen wrote a very perceptive summary of the Maryland situation on October 12th. Smith might muddle through, Crother reported, but that was highly doubtful. The problem was not what one might expect; religion, prohibition and Tammany were not particularly bothersome to Maryland voters. But the Democrats were very disorganized. Anti-Ritchie men in the counties were determined to keep the Governor's power from growing by defeating Smith, and in the city there was bitterness of volcanic proportions with ex-Mayor Jackson and ex-Senator Curran both angry about the 1927 mayoralty election and both angry at each other. Furthermore, Crother noted Senator Bruce had been too honest about the prohibition issue even for Maryland and was losing votes in the counties for the entire Democratic ticket.<sup>27</sup> Either Ritchie did not see the political divisions within the State or it was not possible for him to heal them. He kept speaking regularly for Smith and making enthusiastic comments about the election. Smith's campaign also seemed to receive a large boost when he became the first Democratic candidate ever to receive official Afro-American endorsement.<sup>28</sup>

Ritchie had made sure that Smith's personal visit to the State came somewhat later in the campaign than those of Cox and Davis so that any enthusiasm it created would not be vitiated by election day. From the moment Smith arrived on October 29th, Ritchie and the New Yorker's time was filled with activity. First, there was an automobile parade through the city; then the Governors visited downtown Baltimore. A crowd of 100,000 was present in the Fifth Regiment Armory to hear the New York Governor speak at 9:00 p.m. At the large rally, Ritchie introduced the

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27. Asheville, Citizen, 16 October 1928, Clipping in Ritchie Papers.

28. Baltimore Afro-American, 19 October 1928, Clipping in Ritchie Papers.

candidate to rousing applause; the audience was definitely more enthusiastic about Smith than they had been about the two previous Democratic candidates.<sup>29</sup> On November 5th, both the Governor and Senator Bruce made optimistic statements about the Maryland campaign.<sup>30</sup> Ritchie intended to strengthen his prestige within Maryland when Smith carried the State, and should the Democrat become President, the Governor could hope for some influence and possibly a high position within the administration.<sup>31</sup>

But Ritchie seemed not to notice that Smith created as much dislike among his detractors as he did ardor among his admirers, and the noise of the Smith boosters had only served to cover the fact that he was not really a popular man in the State. Instead of the victory that Ritchie predicted, Smith was the victim of a sweeping Republican triumph; Ritchie suffered a blow to his personal authority. Hoover's vote of over 300,000 in Maryland was nearly double the 1924 total of Calvin Coolidge, and the Republican's 77,000 vote plurality was the largest any man had ever received in Maryland. Senator Bruce had done little better against Goldsborough, whose plurality was over 40,000. The Democrats had managed to hold on to four of six Congressional seats when T. A. Goldsborough and Vincent Palmisano both won by margins of less than 1,000 votes. The margins of two other Democratic incumbent winners, Gambrill and Linthicum, had not been much more comfortable. One Democratic incumbent, Representative Cole, was upset by a solid 10,000-vote margin. Frederick Zihlman easily beat back David Lewis' attempt to regain his seat. There was

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29. Baltimore Evening Sun, 29 October 1928, p. 1.

30. Ibid., 5 November 1928, p. 38.

31. Ibid.

little at all to which the Democrats could look for satisfaction.<sup>32</sup>

Ritchie was especially upset by the returns from Baltimore City, which he had taken on as his personal responsibility. While Governor Smith was compiling majorities in most of the northern cities, he lost to Hoover in Baltimore by over 8,000 votes even though Ritchie had seemed to be converting Baltimore into a Democratic stronghold by 1926. Senator Bruce had managed to win only the tiniest majority in Baltimore.<sup>33</sup> Religion or prohibition could hardly have caused Smith's loss, since Baltimore voters were perhaps 40 percent Catholic. (Another 30 percent were black or Jewish and in sympathy with Smith's fight against intolerance.) Finally, Baltimore was also a center of opposition to prohibition in the United States. The blame seemed to fall clearly on the failure of the Democratic organization which Ritchie had taken on his own shoulders. (Some Republican leaders regarded the victory as one for dry sympathizers since Hoover, Golsborough and Congressmen Clark and Frederick Zihlman were all clearly and candidly dry.)

The seven months between April and November 1928 had seen decisive inroads made on Ritchie's prestige both locally and nationally. He had dropped out of the race for the Democratic nomination before the convention began despite four years of campaigning. Then his position in the Smith campaign seemed likely to give him more national influence if Smith won, but the crushing defeat of the New York Governor hurt even Ritchie's own chances since he stood for many of the same issues as did Smith. It was also the first State campaign in which Ritchie had run

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32. Baltimore Evening Sun, 6, 7, November 1928, p. 1.

33. Ibid.

without the aid of Mahon and Kelly. The size of Hoover's victory provoked many questions as to whether Ritchie was a good party leader and whether he would be so invincible in 1930 as it had seemed after his own sweeping victories in 1926.

CHAPTER NINETEEN  
THE 1930 ELECTIONS

In the last fifteen months of Ritchie's third term as Governor, his greatest attention was focused on re-election. Even problems caused by the depression were lower on a list of Ritchie's priorities than his attempt to win another term as Maryland's chief executive. Of course, a fourth term was unprecedented, but then Marylanders were becoming used to Ritchie breaking precedents since no other Governor of the State had ever been reelected. But Ritchie's first and second administrations had a record of faultless honesty and progressive governmental reform that gave impetus to the previous drives for reelection. These were lacking in the record of his third term. The Governor had insisted that governmental innovations were not necessary; probably many citizens shared this view. But there was nothing that could easily explain away the scandal in the State roads Commission.

The State Roads Commission scandal was the obvious issue on which to attack Ritchie's attempt to win a fourth term in office, but there was no obvious candidate to challenge the Governor. For eleven years, Ritchie had carefully suppressed the ambitions of rival Democrats who wished to succeed him in the executive chair. He had chosen as important administrative officials and candidates for Comptroller and Attorney General men who were willing to remain in positions subordinate to him without ambition to climb higher in the government. John M. Dennis,

who had been State treasurer for thirteen years, and William F. Gordy, who had been State Comptroller for nine years, were the only two of his rivals in prestigious places; but even these men had learned to subordinate their ambitions to Ritchie's. So while there were many politicians who were tired of the Governor, they were uncertain as to whom to choose to replace him. They needed a man who had a chance to capture the voters' affections in case the still-popular Governor should force a primary battle.

As early as the summer of 1929, the search for a replacement had begun. In early June, rumors spread that Senator Tydings would run for Governor, but Ritchie, who was largely responsible for Tydings' elevation to the United States Senate seat in 1926, had chosen his man well. Tydings was uninterested in executive office and clearly preferred his Senate seat to the Governorship. On June 18th, Tydings squelched the growing rumors of his gubernatorial candidacy by announcing that he was flattered by the boom but that he had no intentions of running.<sup>1</sup>

By mid-August, six names had been discussed: Samuel K. Kennis, John M. Dennis, William F. Gordy, Emory Coblentz, J. Enos Ray and Stephen Gambrill; all had equal or greater prestige before Ritchie became Governor over a decade before.<sup>2</sup> Then on August 24th, the Baltimore County executive committee met at the home of Harrison Rider and agreed that Senate President, David McIntosh, would be their favorite son choice for the Democratic gubernatorial nomination.<sup>3</sup>

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1. Baltimore Evening Sun, 18 June 1929, p. 36.

2. Ibid., 26 June 1929, p. 28.

3. Ibid., 24 August 1929, p. 10; Baltimore Post, 24 August 1929.

The McIntosh candidacy slowly accumulated backers in the last four months of the year. On November 1st, Howard Bruce announced his support of McIntosh, and ex-Mayor Jackson's opposition to Ritchie was already a well-known fact.<sup>4</sup> The next day Comptroller Graham jumped on the bandwagon, and there were rumors that William Curran had deserted Ritchie for the Baltimore County State senator. On November 10th, State treasurer, John M. Dennis, announced for McIntosh.<sup>5</sup> With such strong support behind him, McIntosh then stated that he would run even if Ritchie decided to force a primary contest.<sup>6</sup>

In the meantime, Ritchie was ostensibly trying to decide if he would run again. Actually it seems as if he had already made his decision and was trying to decide when it would be best for him to announce his fourth-term candidacy. He could not, however, allow the McIntosh boom to grow totally unchallenged. Several ward clubs in Baltimore passed resolutions requesting that Ritchie run again for Governor, but the endorsements hardly seemed spontaneous.<sup>7</sup> Meanwhile E. Brooke Lee was busily visiting Democratic politicians on the Eastern Shore in order to win support for the Governor.<sup>8</sup> Other Ritchie friends were at work in various parts of the State almost certainly with his consent.

4. Baltimore Evening Sun, 1 November 1929, p. 54.

5. Baltimore Sun, 23 November 1929.

6. Ibid., 6 November 1929.

7. Baltimore Evening Sun, 7 November 1929, p. 46, 8 November 1929, p. 1, 11 November 1929, p. 36.

8. Centreville Record, 14, 15, 16 November 1929; Salisbury News, 16 November 1929, clippings in Ritchie Papers.



Then on November 21st, Ritchie spoke at a political jamboree in Frederick, Maryland. Before the 750 spectators, Ritchie dared the Republicans to make the State roads scandal an issue in 1930. Almost everyone interpreted the speech as the beginning of an open campaign for a fourth term.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, Gordy, Robinson and Young all spoke on the same program as the Governor and let it be known that they were willing to run on Ritchie's ticket for reelection. However, the most direct comment was that of E. Brooke Lee, who in a speech that the Governor had seen and approved, said that Ritchie was unafraid of a primary and would prove himself to be the best Democratic vote getter in 1930.<sup>10</sup> Ritchie and his backers still refused to give a direct answer to the comments of Bruce, Norris, Curran, Jackson and others that the voters would reject his bid for a fourth term despite his personal abilities.<sup>11</sup>

By the end of the year, it seemed that all the Democrats who were opposed to Ritchie had united solidly behind McIntosh.<sup>12</sup> At an annual dinner of the Potomac Democratic Club on December 31st in Hagerstown, Maryland, the McIntosh supporters met to hear their candidate speak. From the list of names alone, his candidacy must have seemed to be quite a formidable challenge to Ritchie, but a closer inspection would have shown all sorts of weaknesses. Ideologically the McIntosh men

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9. Baltimore Evening Sun, 21 November 1929, p. 48; Baltimore News,

10. Frederick Post, 21 November 1929, clipping in Ritchie Papers.

11. Baltimore Evening Sun, 26 November 1929, p. 46.

12. Ibid., 31 December 1929, p. 20.

seemed to come mainly from the far right and far left wings of the Democratic Party, from Dan Joseph, who was considered to be a radical, to Dr. Charles Conley of Frederick, who was known as the State's leading conservative. These men had nothing in common except their distrust of the Governor. Nor was McIntosh the first choice of most of the men at the dinner. Joseph admitted that he felt a man with more emotional appeal for public audiences would have been a better choice.<sup>13</sup> McIntosh's own speech was notable for its lack of criticism of the Governor, the one area where he could unify his followers.<sup>14</sup> The strongest speech of the evening was made by ex-Mayor Jackson who was unafraid to express his dislike for Ritchie whom he said acted as if "it was his God-given right to hold office."<sup>15</sup> However, at the time of the dinner, the differences among the McIntosh supporters was much less noted than their numbers or their importance as individuals.

Ritchie still had not announced his candidacy when the new decade opened, but his campaign was becoming more active. On January 9th, Ritchie spoke at a Jackson Day dinner at the Lord Baltimore Hotel to over 900 guests, and the speech was a modestly veiled request for support for a fourth term candidacy.<sup>16</sup> Ritchie was also systematically entertaining many Democratic leaders from all around the State at dinners of about eight people each during January and February at which it seems

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13. Baltimore Evening Sun, 31 December 1929, p. 20.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Baltimore Sun, 9 January 1930.

likely that political assistance was indirectly requested.<sup>17</sup> In addition Ritchie made some speeches at Baltimore ward clubs which were clear attempts to win support from McIntosh allies.<sup>18</sup>

A primary election between Ritchie and McIntosh now seemed certain, and McIntosh supporters began to look for men to fill out their ticket. A most attractive young Democrat was the State's Attorney of Baltimore, Herbert R. O'Connor, and McIntosh wanted O'Connor as his candidate for Attorney General. But O'Connor was as cautious as he was ambitious and did not wish to jeopardize his future. He tried to steer a neutral course between Ritchie and McIntosh backers until the outcome was clearer.<sup>19</sup>

Then on February 21st, the first McIntosh supporter defected to the Governor's camp. Senator Dudley Roe of Queen Anne's County said that the surprising Democratic congressional victories in Massachusetts had convinced him that Ritchie could win a fourth term and so he was switching his support to the Governor. Ex-Governor Harrington's support of McIntosh at this point would have neutralized Roe's announcement, but Harrington was still hoping to be a compromise candidate and refused to make any endorsement.<sup>20</sup> The McIntosh men took the reversal calmly, but they were aware of the psychological advantage for the Ritchie drive.

For the next few weeks, the contest remained a stalemate as both sides quietly worked for support.<sup>21</sup>

17. Diary, 20 January 1930, 28 February 1930, in Ritchie Papers (Maryland Historical Society).

18. Baltimore Evening Sun, 6 February 1930, p. 3.

19. Ibid., 20 February 1930, p. 42.

20. Ibid., 21 February 1930, p. 48.

21. Ibid., 27 February 1930, p. 40, 1 March 1930, p. 3, 5 March 1930, p. 4.

Then the tide began to turn slowly in Ritchie's favor. Hugh McMullen, an old Ritchie enemy and still a powerful figure in Allegany County, announced that he was going to remain neutral in the primary battle.<sup>22</sup> On March 17th, Ritchie gained an endorsement from party workers in South Baltimore.<sup>23</sup> When McIntosh spoke on April 3rd, he sounded decidedly defensive as he complained that Lee and Ennis were trying to force him out of the race by directing a campaign of ridicule against him.<sup>24</sup> On April 3rd, Henry R. Turner of Talbot County declined to run for Comptroller on McIntosh's ticket and ex-Governor Harrington once again publicly refused to give his support.<sup>25</sup> Despite Ritchie's gains a bitter primary was still foreseen.<sup>26</sup>

But McIntosh, who had the most information with which to assess his own chances, surprised everyone by withdrawing from the race altogether on April 5th.<sup>27</sup> McIntosh said that he had followed bad advice when he announced his candidacy quite so early for it had allowed Ritchie time to develop an organization against him. "Looking the situation squarely in the face, I realize that I cannot hope single-handed to make even a semblance of a fight against the all-powerful organization that has been built up against me," he said.<sup>28</sup> Everyone, even the most fervent

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22. Baltimore Evening Sun, 11 March 1930, p. 38.

23. Ibid., 17 March 1930, p. 36.

24. Ibid., 31 March 1930, p. 40.

25. Ibid., 13 April 1930, p. 40.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid., 5 April 1930, p. 1.

28. Union News (Towson, Maryland), 11 April 1930, a clipping in Ritchie Papers.

anti-Ritchie men seemed to acquiesce in McIntosh's statement and no one called openly for another candidate to challenge the Governor although five months remained before the date of the primary.<sup>29</sup>

When Ritchie announced his formal candidacy on April 8th, he also stated that his running mates would once again be Robinson for Attorney General, Gordy for Comptroller, and Young for Clerk of the Court of Appeals. E. Brooke Lee had asked Ritchie to drop Gordy in favor of J. Enos Ray, But Frank Furst had felt this was unwise.<sup>30</sup> Therefore, the Democratic ticket remained exactly the same as it had in 1923 and 1926.<sup>31</sup>

Then Ritchie set out to unify the party. He was fortunate that he had nearly six months in which to patch up any discord left by the McIntosh candidacy instead of the usual two months between the primary and general elections. In a few cases, Ritchie tried to destroy the power of those who had opposed him. He suggested that the rival of Dr. Hubert Wade in Washington County, William P. Lane, be chosen as the congressional candidate from Western Maryland as David J. Lewis had still not decided to run.<sup>32</sup> But in most cases Ritchie tried to find suitable consolations for his former rivals. When Howard Bruce suggested that McIntosh run for Congress in the Second District, the Governor was in complete accord.<sup>33</sup>

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29. Baltimore Evening Sun, 5 April 1930, p. 1.

30. Baltimore Sun, 8 April 1930.

31. Baltimore Evening Sun, 8 April 1930, p. 40, 9 April 1930, p. 42.

32. Baltimore Evening Sun, 17 April 1930, p. 50.

33. Ibid.

Later in April there were rumors that Stephen Gambrill was considering entering the gubernatorial primary; but Gambrill decided that it was better to join the Governor and run for reelection to Congress.<sup>34</sup> Rumors of opposition fizzled away quickly as all the Democrats began to realize that opposing the Governor was futile and could lead to loss of favor in the party.<sup>35</sup> Meanwhile, Ritchie helped Congressman Linthicum avoid a threatened primary in the Fourth District, and gave his support to incumbents Palmisano and T. A. Goldsborough. For several weeks in May, he helped to engineer all sorts of minor deals by which local candidates were withdrawn and local primary contests were avoided.<sup>36</sup>

On June 18th, the State central committee met at the Rennert Hotel in Baltimore. Ritchie's effort to achieve party harmony seemed to be working as politicians from all over the State attended. Many arrived early and met the Governor who spent two hours before luncheon in the lobby of the hotel conversing and shaking hands. Reporters found that the anti-Ritchie comments were no longer heard. Even Jackson and Bichy were boosting Ritchie, and when the ex-Mayor was asked why he was doing so, he replied with honesty unusual for a practiced politician, "There's no one opposing him, is there?"<sup>37</sup> The results of the meeting increased the party's unity. On the following day, David McIntosh publicly endorsed Ritchie with a great deal of praise.<sup>38</sup> Even a threatened

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34. Baltimore Evening Sun, 30 April 1930, p. 40.

35. Ibid., 23 May 1930, p. 48.

36. Ibid., 7 June 1930, p. 20.

37. Ibid., 18 June 1930, p. 38; Diary, 18 June 1930, in Ritchie Papers.

38. Baltimore Sun, 19 June 1930.

continuation of the perennial battle between Norris and Curran in the First District in Baltimore was settled peaceably a few weeks before the primary.<sup>39</sup> By the time of the primary elections, Ritchie had moved the party from considerable discord to a great degree of unity especially so far as his own candidacy was concerned. Even so the general election seemed likely to be a difficult contest for the Democrats.

It was probably once again in Ritchie's favor that the Republicans had been so successful in the presidential election that fell between his own gubernatorial contests. Success caused the Republicans to be over confident and exaggerated the factional struggles within their party. These factions, as those in the Democratic Party, were based on patronage and not ideology. Senator Goldsborough's victory in 1930 had given power to the Tait-Weller wing of the party; but Mayor Broening's victory in 1927 was a victory for Broening, France and Hill. Both groups sensed Republican victory in 1930 and, therefore, became more anxious than usual to make sure the Republican candidate for Governor was one who would send most of the patronage in their direction were he victorious.

The Republicans agreed that a primary should be avoided, but they did not have an easy time deciding just which man would satisfy everyone. At various times, Armstrong, Towers, Weller and J. Phillip Ronan were discussed as candidates. But Mayor Broening upset Republican plans by his determination to run for Governor whether or not he forced his party into a primary. Broening was vigorously opposed by ex-Senator Weller and Boss Tait, and neither Senator Goldsborough or the national Committeeman, ex-Senator Jackson, was very pleased by his candidacy.

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<sup>39</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 7 August 1930, p. 44, 21 August 1930, p. 38.

Still Broening would not retire, and he formally announced his candidacy on June 5th. For a few days Republican leaders hesitated to support the Mayor, but after Senator Robb of Alleghany County decided to run for Attorney General on a Broening ticket on June 7th, the rest of the Republican leaders acquiesced in two months. A primary was avoided when J. Phillip Ronan withdrew his candidacy on August 8th. Thus, Mayor Broening became Ritchie's opponent for Governor. But beneath the surface harmony, the Republican party was less unified behind its candidate than ~~were~~<sup>40</sup> the Democrats.

September 8th was the primary election date, but the voters showed little interest since in most places only minor offices were at stake. Where there were primaries for congressional seats, the results were easily predictable. The Democrats nominated ex-Congressman Cole as the challenger in the Second Congressional District and David J. Lewis in the Sixth District. In every county where the Democratic machine received a confrontation, it soundly vanquished the opposition. In Baltimore City, Ritchie's friends, Curran and Emmis, emerged strongest.<sup>41</sup>

On September 18th, the Democratic State Convention met at the Maryland Theatre. One hundred and forty-eight delegates heard Senator Tydings give the keynote address in which he lauded the Ritchie administration in Maryland and contrasted it with the Republican administration

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40. Baltimore Evening Sun, 14 November 1929, p. 28, 16 November 1929, p. 18, 4 December 1929, p. 38, 13 January 1929, p. 32, 27 January 1929, p. 30, 30 April 1929, p. 40, 28 May 1929, p. 43, 5 June 1929, p. 46, 7 June 1929, p. 20, 14 June 1929, p. 20, 8 August 1930, p. 38.

41. Ibid., 8 September 1930, p. 1, 9 September 1930, p. 1.



in Washington. Then the platform which Ritchie had written himself was introduced and ratified without debate.<sup>42</sup>

Despite the economic and social problems, caused by nearly a year of depression, the platform which Ritchie wrote promised almost no changes. The longest part of the platform criticized the Republican Party for over-centralization and blamed them for economic conditions in the country. But only one small section of the platform proposed any kind of a solution to these conditions. The Democrats promised to extend the opportunities for State employment to the limit and to extend the State construction program. But they offered no help of any sort to private individuals or businesses suffering from depressed economic conditions. Otherwise the platform was an unexciting recitation of achievements and a most expected set of promises--to support conservation, to improve the University of Maryland, to investigate fully the need for a Chesapeake Bay bridge, and to continue to develop roads and schools.<sup>43</sup> It was a dull, unprovocative platform.

But when the Republicans met on September 22nd to frame their platform, they failed to take advantage of Democratic mediocrity. Conflicts so impeded the Republicans that they ended with a platform that was just as standpat as that of the Democrats on economic conditions and even more vague on certain important issues. The greatest problems were caused by the fact that the Republicans were unable to agree on a stand on Prohibition which would satisfy the very wet candidate for Congress, John Phillip Hill, the mildly wet Broening, and mildly dry

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42. Baltimore Evening Sun, 18 September 1930, p. 1.

43. Ibid., p. 3.

Congressman Clark and the ardent dry candidate for Attorney General, David Robb. In the end they created an equivocal plank which satisfied no one completely and created a sense of duplicity which the Democrats were quick to attack. Naturally, the Republicans criticized the Ritchie administration for the roads commission scandals and for Ritchie's asking for still another term as Governor.<sup>44</sup>

Despite the Republican failure to capitalize their chances on the platform, Ritchie faced what seemed to be his most formidable opponent in 1930. Perhaps Alexander Armstrong had been a more able man than Broening, but certainly no candidate to oppose Ritchie had ever been so popular with the voters. It was said that while no grave personal weakness marred Broening's record, he had no outstanding talents to be lauded.<sup>45</sup> However, Broening had three times proved popular enough to win city-wide elections in Baltimore against the Democratic machine merely on the basis of the congenial, old-world gentlemanly competence he projected. Unless Ritchie managed to completely reverse the Baltimore voters' feelings towards Broening, he stood little chance of winning.

Ritchie gained the support of ex-Mayor Jackson in Baltimore by agreeing to support Jackson for Mayor in 1931. The secret agreement was put into writing because neither man was certain of the other, although each recognized the need of the support of his rival if he was to win.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>44</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 19 September 1930, p. 54, 22 September 1930, p. 1.

<sup>45</sup>. Baltimore Sun, 11 October 1930.

<sup>46</sup>. Interview: Author with Morris Baker, head of the Jackson for Mayor League, Baltimore Evening Sun, 1 October 1930, p. 32.

From the last week in September until election day, Ritchie and Broening spoke almost daily exchanging a variety of attacks without ever centering on any particular issue. The level of the battle was probably the highest of any Ritchie ever fought. About the strongest word either Mayor or Governor used to vituperate the other was "hypocrite." Both Ritchie and Broening attacked the other for putting politics ahead of public welfare concerns. The Republican claimed Ritchie built roads for political expediency, while the Democrat accused Broening of improperly administering the city merit system.<sup>47</sup> Broening attacked the Democratic administration for spending more to operate State government, and Ritchie retorted by showing that the Mayor's budget to run Baltimore had also risen.<sup>48</sup> Broening also attacked Ritchie for neglect of penal reform and old age security. To correct the latter, he promised to abolish county almshouses.<sup>49</sup> He accused the Governor of delaying the building of the Chesapeake Bay bridge and of taking his states' rights ideas to such an extreme that Maryland suffered in its relationships with the Federal Government.<sup>50</sup> Ritchie countered by claiming that Broening was too subject to the control of the Republican machine, and that the Republican platform was inconsistent when it promised to lower taxes and still perform as many government functions as it pledged.<sup>51</sup> Broening also claimed that Ritchie was partially

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47. Baltimore Evening Sun, 10 October 1930, p. 4; Baltimore Sun, 3 October 1930.

48. Baltimore Sun, 3, 4 October 1930.

49. Baltimore Evening Sun, 19, 22 October 1930.

50. Ibid., 22, 28, 31 October 1930.

51. Kent News, 4 October 1930; Baltimore Sun, 26 September 1930, 2 November, 1930, clippings in Ritchie Papers.

responsible for the State roads scandal because the Governor had given Mackall too large a job and, therefore, created the opportunity for the thefts.<sup>52</sup>

By the end of the campaign, two issues seemed to be most important to the candidates: prohibition enforcement and the principle of rotation in office. Broening never personally attacked Ritchie's ability or integrity, but he made several speeches which concentrated on how the accumulation of executive power was a danger to the effective functioning of State government.<sup>53</sup> No doubt the issue was considered by many people who were aware of the American principle of short terms in office, but because Broening failed to connect the Governor's lengthy term with any specific shortcomings, the issue did not have the appeal that might have been expected. Broening's personal stand on prohibition was on record since 1926. He was a wet, although hardly so vehement a one as was the Governor. But Broening's vacillation on the question of prohibition in the campaign was a definite mistake. In trying to capture all the dry votes and still hold some wet ones, Broening laid himself open to charges of hypocrisy.<sup>54</sup> One local candidate remembered that the "dry" stand taken by the Republican candidates for the State legislature was done in order to please Broening who felt that it was the way to draw the most votes.<sup>55</sup> But it seems that this was Broening's own concession to Tait and Weller, whose support he needed. Those leaders truly felt that the Hoover and Goldsborough victories in 1928 were due to the Republicans' dry position.

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<sup>52</sup>. Baltimore Sun, 11 October 1930, 29 October 1930.

<sup>53</sup>. Ibid., 2, 3, 11, 16, 22 October 1930.

<sup>54</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 8 October 1930, 1 November 1930.

<sup>55</sup>. Interview: Author with Judge Joseph Carter, July, 1969.

In the middle of the campaign, the Democratic candidate for Attorney General, Thomas Robinson, died suddenly of a heart attack.<sup>56</sup> For a few days, Ritchie cancelled his speeches and met with Democratic leaders in order to discuss the choice of a new candidate. Ritchie guided the State central committee to the choice of thirty-eight-year-old William Preston Lane who had never yet held public office.<sup>57</sup> The new candidate supplied youth and at least one new face to the Democratic ticket.<sup>58</sup>

The final weeks of the campaign were little different than the earlier ones. Broening and Ritchie moved from issue to issue with prohibition and tenure of office still the main themes. Ritchie's speech to the Nonpartisan League on November 1st is a short summary of the Democratic view of the campaign. Ritchie said:

The so-called issues are raised in great confusion by Republican spokesmen. As soon as one is procreated, it disappears as soon as its frothiness is exposed and then another rises to take its place. All have been shams and subterfuges to conceal the lack of a stand on the subject of national Prohibition as it concerns the State and to avoid talking of the meaningless words of the Republican platform and of Republican candidates on that subject. They have talked in succession of the sales tax, of Maryland coal, of the proposed Bay Bridge and the supposed influence of Philadelphia groups regarding it, of old age pensions, of almshouses, and of rotation in office.<sup>59</sup> All of their sham issues have been shown to be frauds.

When election day arrived, the Democrats claimed to be confident, but most people expected the election to be very close.<sup>60</sup>

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56. Baltimore Evening Sun, 13, 15 October 1930, p. 38.

57. Ibid., 16 October 1930, p. 1.

58. Ibid., 18 October 1930, p. 3.

59. Ibid., 1 November 1930, p. 18.

60. Ibid., 4 November 1930, p. 1.

Then, when the results were counted, Ritchie had every reason to be pleased as he won his greatest victory, defeating Broening by 66,000 votes and carrying the entire Democratic ticket to a sweeping victory. William P. Lane defeated David Robb for Attorney General by 85,000 votes and Comptroller Gordy won reelection over W. Newton Jackson by 80,000 votes. In addition the Democrats won large majorities in both houses of the State legislature. Perhaps the greatest achievement for the Democrats was their triumph in all six congressional districts in the State. The four Democratic incumbents defeated their rivals with ease. The Democrats picked up the two additional seats when William P. Cole recovered his old position from Linwood Clark by 25,000 votes, and David J. Lewis was finally able to defeat his perpetual rival, Frederick Zihlman, which returned him to Congress after a twelve-year absence.<sup>61</sup>

Once again, an analysis of the election shows that Ritchie's strength was concentrated mainly in urban areas. Although the Governor's plurality was the largest ever achieved for his office in the history of the State, his plurality outside of Baltimore City was only 914 votes. In Baltimore City, he received an overwhelming 70 percent of the votes although he was opposed by a popular two-term Mayor of the city. By this time, Ritchie had solidified all the ethnic minority groups in the urban area into his personal following, although his philosophy was hardly helpful to them in time of economic stress. He probably received 50 percent of the black vote. It would be from two to six years before this Democratic majority would be solidified into an expected result, and it is important to note that in Maryland, the Democratic urban

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<sup>61</sup>. Maryland Manual, 1930, pp. 240-251.

majorities were first accomplished on the local level, and then for elections for statewide office, especially the Governorship, and only then for national presidential campaigns within the State. Local politics rather than the national position of Al Smith or Franklin Roosevelt seem to have done most to accomplish this result.<sup>62</sup>

For Ritchie himself, the election was a great personal triumph. If he served through his fourth term, his term as Governor would be longer than that of any man any place in the United States at any time, and that in a State which had never previously reelected a Governor. It certainly seemed to increase his chances for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1932, especially since he had managed to increase his margin of victory while running against a popular opponent.

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62. See: Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1951) Ch. 3; Jerome M. Clubb and Howard W. Allen, "The Cities & The Election of 1928," American Historical Review, LXXIV, April 1969, pp. 1205-21.

## CHAPTER TWENTY

## LOCAL AFFAIRS - 1930 TO 1932

The results of the 1930 gubernatorial elections strengthened Ritchie's personal conviction that the path he had been following was not only the correct one but also the one which the voters preferred. With this certainty that the depression was merely a temporary aberration thus fortified, he held that any major new legislation, even that directed specifically at problems caused by economic hardships, was unnecessary.

After a week of rest following his reelection, Ritchie began to plan for the legislative session which would start the new year. He was mainly concerned with budgetary matters and secondarily with legislative organization and related questions of patronage. However, Ritchie's planning even for the budget was less thorough than usual because illness limited his ability to work from November 20th to December 12th.<sup>1</sup>

At the opening of the General Assembly, excitement centered around who would receive Ritchie's support for speaker of the House of Delegates. The Governor's problem was that his backers in the last election were divided between two men: Francis A. Michael and George Hofferbert. On January 5th, Michael's backers, especially Lee, tried to force Ritchie into a statement of support for their man. When the

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<sup>1</sup>. Diary, 1 November-31 December 1930, in Ritchie Papers.



legislative caucus met the next day in Annapolis, Ritchie attended the meeting and insured the choice of Michael without exactly endorsing him. The Governor did this by announcing that he felt Michael was the favorite of the city delegation despite Curran's efforts in favor of Hofferbert.<sup>2</sup> Other than in the choice of the speaker of the House of Delegates, legislative organization was accomplished without challenge. Senator Walter Mitchell of Charles County was a popular choice for president of the Senate.<sup>3</sup>

On January 7th, as soon as the lawmakers had finished their official organization, sworn in their officers, and heard Speaker Michael warn them against passing too many laws, "especially those laws which attempt to regulate our lives or morals," Ritchie gave his biennial message to the General Assembly.<sup>4</sup> The Governor's message was lengthy; it filled seventy pages of a printed pamphlet. But despite the length, it recommended little that was new. As usual, Ritchie's main concerns were budgetary. He asked that the State tax rate be maintained at 25¢/\$100, but that State projects be limited to those of "urgent necessity" while the financial crisis existed.<sup>5</sup> The Governor devoted less than two pages of his message to the Maryland drought of 1930 and only one page to the problems caused by unemployment. He recommended no legislation in either case although he admitted that both problems were severe. He felt that

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2. Baltimore Evening Sun, 3 January 1931, p. 18, 5 January 1931, p. 32, 6 January 1931, p. 32; Diary, 6 January 1931, in Ritchie Papers.

3. Baltimore Evening Sun, 7 January 1931, p. 1.

4. Ibid.

5. Message of Albert C. Ritchie to the General Assembly of Maryland, 1931 (Baltimore: King Brothers Incorporated, 1931), pp. 5, 69-74.

the organization of a private drought-loan commission to help farmers would be sufficient.<sup>6</sup> He appointed a commission to study the unemployment problem even though two months earlier he had denied this was necessary. He also promised to broaden the State construction program to give employment to more people. Relief, he stated, should be limited to matters that were "economically and governmentally sound." Ritchie maintained his belief that the severest aspects of the depression had passed and that economic conditions would naturally correct themselves.<sup>7</sup>

The legislature dealt with only minor matters until after Ritchie's January 14th inauguration. According to the Baltimore newspapers, when the Governor spoke from the State House, it was the focus of the greatest national interest on the old Senate Chamber since 1783 when George Washington resigned his revolutionary generalship in the same room. Undoubtedly, the newspapers were once again promoting their local hero, but there was no doubt that Ritchie's inauguration was of some national concern. The address was broadcast, and the subject matter of the Governor's speech was directed more to citizens of the United States than to citizens of Maryland.<sup>8</sup>

Each of his successive inauguration ceremonies was more elaborate. This time the pathway between the Governor's Mansion and the State House was lined by a regiment of the Maryland National Guard, and military bands played "Maryland, My Maryland" as the Governor walked between the two buildings. Preceding Ritchie were the eight judges of

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6. Message of Albert C. Ritchie to the General Assembly of Maryland, 1931 (Baltimore: King Brothers Incorporated, 1931), pp. 59-60.

7. Ibid., pp. 61-2.

8. Baltimore Evening Sun, 14 January 1931, p. 1.

the Maryland Court of Appeals who were robed in black silk gowns. The Governor wore a formal black morning suit. At the ceremony he was sworn in by Chief Judge Carroll T. Bond on a "historic Bible," and when he finished repeating the oath of office, a nineteen-gun salute was fired from nearby St. John's College. The State militia had difficulty restraining crowds which were mainly women and politicians, and there was difficulty obtaining quiet for Ritchie's address.<sup>9</sup>

Ritchie's speech was a call to the voters of the nation to return to the principles which, in his opinion, were those of the founders of the nation: "wide toleration, local self-government, and ordered liberty for the individual." A sympathetic audience waited for each catch phrase to demonstrate its belief in the Governor, and when, early in his speech, Ritchie called for "tolerance in all things to the people," the audience responded with a standing ovation. Ritchie claimed that Maryland had remained true to the original ideas of the founders of the nation, but that since the Civil War these ideas had been violated by the Federal Government. National centralization combined with business interference in government had largely contributed to causing the depression, according to Ritchie. He blamed the national administration for not doing more to alleviate farm problems and claimed that an excess of "noble experiments" such as Prohibition had destroyed public confidence in the Federal Government. But the Governor's message was not all critical; he presented a theory for ending the depression. Business, Ritchie insisted, must take more positive actions of social responsibility and rely less on the government. Also, he said, the nation must realize that its economy

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<sup>9</sup>Baltimore Evening Sun, 14 January 1931, p. 1.

is intertwined with Europe's, and that we cannot prosper while Europe is prostrate. Thus we must not press European nations to pay war debts for in doing so we only hurt our own economy. But the Governor also warned that "economic values are not the whole of life" and that other yardsticks should be used to consider the American experience. Here Ritchie returned to his original idea that Maryland set the example for the rest of the country. "We take pride in our love of freedom," he said.

Here, we believe that government should mind its own business. We believe that the people who are least governed are the best governed. We think that you cannot make people temperate by passing a prohibition law and that you cannot make industry prosperous by putting up a tariff wall which drives manufacturers to other countries so that they employ foreign labor there, instead of domestic labor here. We do not believe that any makeshift economic measure which attempts to lift up any part of the population by its bootstraps constitutes proper governmental action. Such things will always fail.

Ritchie ended his speech with a rhetorical call for unity: "The real effort to which mankind should address itself is harmony and unity and cooperation among all the people of the state and nation--between capital and labor, between city and country, between industrialist and farmer. Let us work and pray for the dawn of that day."<sup>10</sup>

But after his appeal for support in his inaugural address and the glamour of the victory dinner which followed three days later, Ritchie had to settle down to the more mundane task of guiding the legislative session, a task made more difficult by worsening economic conditions. In sharp contrast to the glitter of the dinner to celebrate Ritchie's fourth inaugural was the march of 150 Black and white unemployed men and women to Baltimore's City Hall on January 19th to protest the

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<sup>10</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 14 January 1931, p. 2.

inactivity of both the State and city administration to their economic plight.<sup>11</sup> There was a surfeit of bills introduced in the State legislature on the following day, but unemployment was not mentioned. Bills providing for compulsory automobile insurance and permitting motion picture performances in Baltimore on Sundays were the most important matters the lawmakers worked on.<sup>12</sup>

Ritchie's own involvement in legislative matters was interrupted by the death of his mother on January 24th. The death was not sudden, for Mrs. Ritchie had survived her husband by a quarter of a century and was then 78 years old. She had been an invalid for over a year and had been unable to attend Ritchie's fourth inaugural even though she was still the official hostess at the Governor's Mansion. Ritchie recorded her death in his diary with equanimity. "Mother died at 11:10 a.m.," he wrote, but actually her death removed his closest confidante.<sup>13</sup>

Two days later, quiet funeral services were held for Mrs. Ritchie at the executive mansion with the Reverend Edward E. Johnson of the Annapolis Protestant Episcopal Church officiating. The Governor insisted that the services be strictly limited to immediate family, of whom very few could attend. But to give due honor to his mother, public services were held simultaneously in Christ's Church in Baltimore by Bishop Edward G. Helfenstein. The pallbearers included Robert Ennis, Dr. Hugh Young, Stuart Janney, E. Brooke Lee and Frank Kent. The double service

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11. Baltimore Evening Sun, 19 January 1931, p. 1.

12. Ibid., 20 January 1931, p. 36.

13. Baltimore Evening Sun, 24 January 1931, p. 1. Diary, 24 January 1931, in Ritchie Papers.

allowed Ritchie to give his mother the magnificent burial which he thought she deserved while he could express his own grief in private without onlookers. Throughout his life Ritchie restrained his deep affection for his mother behind a facade of rigidly proper manners, and he did not wish to break his control in public.<sup>14</sup>

During the period when Ritchie's leadership was diminished because of his private grief, the legislature moved in several directions at once. Over 950 bills were introduced. The amount of activity, however, was no indication of the significance of the legislative action. While the General Assembly probably discussed more serious matters than had been discussed by the three previous sessions, many crucial problems related to the depression were left untouched.

Ritchie was also pleased by several other developments in the Legislature. His budget, which had been the subject of considerable controversy in several previous legislative sessions, was introduced on February 3rd and passed through both houses with the slightest difficulty.<sup>15</sup> Bills for repealing the Blue Laws in Baltimore had been introduced in nearly every General Assembly since Ritchie first became Governor. Although he never openly worked for their passage, he certainly favored them. In the past, however, county legislators, regardless of party affiliations, had banded together to defeat them. This time Speaker Michael introduced a bill for comprehensive Blue Law reforms on February 10th and a duplicate bill was presented in the Senate.<sup>16</sup> The Governor applied influence to county legislators

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14. Baltimore Evening Sun, 26 January 1931, p. 30.

15. Ibid., 3 February 1931, p. 34.

16. Ibid., 1 February 1931, p. 1.

and helped steer the bill to success despite considerable opposition.<sup>17</sup> The bills for oyster conservation, which Ritchie had promoted, also received approval as did the bill for compulsory automobile insurance, even though Ritchie's support of the latter had been half-hearted. Finally, the lawmakers proposed a constitutional amendment to limit legislative sessions to sixty days.<sup>18</sup> On the other hand, a bill of which the Governor did not approve, that which would have permitted women to serve on juries, was quickly defeated.<sup>19</sup>

One of the most controversial proposals was a matter on which Ritchie took no stand at all. A bill had been proposed to end segregation of white and black passengers on railway cars. The bill received a favorable vote in both houses, but on the last day of the session it was supposedly lost in the great shuffle of bills and, therefore, it could not receive the final reading which was necessary for it to become a law.<sup>20</sup> Several other new bills had been considered by the legislature, and although they failed to pass, the general atmosphere in the legislature was more innovative than it had been in the preceding two sessions. The Baltimore Sun summarized its evaluation of the General Assembly by criticizing the delay and confusion at the end of the session but praising the new laws for conservation, compulsory automobile insurance and the repeal of Blue Laws in Baltimore.<sup>21</sup>

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17. Diary, 4 March 1931, in Ritchie Papers; Baltimore Evening Sun, 5 March 1931, p. 1, 13 March 1931, p. 1, 25 March 1931, p. 1, 7 April 1931, p. 3.

18. Baltimore Evening Sun, 7 April 1931, p. 3.

19. Ibid., 10 March 1931, p. 30, 26 March 1931, p. 50, 27 March 1931, p. 54.

20. Ibid., 20 February 1931, p. 1, 4 April 1931, p. 1, 7 April 1931, p. 3.

21. Baltimore Sun, 9 April 1931.

This picture of the legislative session might leave one with the impression that the social and economic conditions within the State were functioning as usual. Ritchie had asked that the lawmakers leave the problems of the depression to correct themselves by the natural functioning of economic laws. No members of the legislature saw fit to challenge this idea, and no legislation was introduced to alleviate the distress of farmers who had suffered from the drought of the previous year nor the growing number of unemployed workers all over the State. But not all of the State's citizens were in agreement with Ritchie's assessment of the social situation.

On March 31st, a group of seventy-five unemployed men and women who were disappointed by the failure of the legislature to even consider their plight began a march to Annapolis where they intended to ask for immediate relief to be provided by the State government for the next two months.<sup>22</sup> On April 1st, the jobless workers arrived in Annapolis and entered the House of Delegates chamber of the State House where the delegates were in session. Speaker Michael did not evict the protesters, but he said that they must not speak nor interrupt the lawmakers. He said, however, he would direct the clerk to read aloud any petition which they wished to present. But the hungry marchers were too desperate to be appeased by legal formality and shouted that they wanted laws for relief. The sergeant at arms, Frederick B. Kemperer, had neither the patience nor the tact of Speaker Michael, and when he decided that tolerance had progressed too far he arose from his seat and advanced toward the marchers with the intention of evicting them forcibly. The drama was heightened because Kemperer was crippled in

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22. Baltimore Evening Sun, 31 March 1931, p. 38.



one leg, and healthy men felt guilty about sitting while a lame man attempted to battle alone. Detectives who had been specially provided to prevent violence charged the protesters to protect Kemperer, and the demonstrators then entered into the fray to protect themselves. Eventually most of the legislators also joined in the fight. By sheer force of numbers the detectives and lawmakers eventually pushed the demonstrators out of the chamber but the scuffle continued in the corridor. The Annapolis police and fire departments, in response to a call, arrived on the scene when the fight was still going on in the halls of the State House. The police ended the battle quickly with their night sticks. Eleven of the protesters, two of whom were women, were severely injured, and it was reported that, despite heavy rain, pools of blood remained on the steps of the State Capitol for one-half hour after the battle ended. Several of the marchers were arrested.<sup>23</sup>

Ritchie attempted to calm the situation by agreeing to go to the State House and receive a petition from the remaining demonstrators. The Governor was heavily guarded when he met the unemployed men and women. But his magnanimity extended only to formalities. Whether or not he was moved by the burdens of the demonstrators, he steadfastly retained his beliefs that the government should not initiate any kind of action to alleviate unemployment. He still felt that direct relief provided by the government was so incorrect a remedy as to be unworthy of serious consideration. Ritchie was highly satisfied that the violent incident had not provoked any of the lawmakers into capitulation to fears about general social upheaval which would result in their

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<sup>23</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 1 April 1931, p. 1.

espousing active efforts to solve economic problems.<sup>24</sup> His own appraisal of the legislative session was, therefore, probably more favorable than that of the newspapers.

Problems caused by the depression not only took second place in Ritchie's concern to more ordinary legislative matters, but they had to compete with his interest in the election for the Mayor of Baltimore. Ritchie had made a deal to support ex-Mayor Jackson in 1931 in return for Jackson's support in the gubernatorial campaign of 1930. Some of Ritchie's friends, especially Robert Ennis, continued to search for an alternative to Jackson but could not persuade anyone to run.<sup>25</sup> Ritchie was officially committed to support Jackson, but his efforts to that end were negligible. The day of the primary coincided with the final day of the legislative session, and foul weather added to the picture contributed to keeping most voters home. The organization ticket headed by Jackson swept to a landslide victory.<sup>26</sup>

In May, Jackson won the general election over Republican Councilman Albrect in an even greater victory to begin another twelve years as Mayor. The Democrats also won all other city-wide offices and all but one seat in the City Council.<sup>27</sup> It was a healthy victory for the party, but because of Ritchie's relations with Jackson, the results were less useful to the Governor than they might have been.

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24. Baltimore Evening Sun, 1 April 1931, p. 1.

25. Ibid., 18 February 1931, p. 1, 20 February 1931, p. 1, 21 February 1931, p. 1, 27 February 1931, p. 44.

26. Ibid., 7 April 1931, p. 1, 8 April 1931, p. 1.

27. Baltimore Sun, 6 May 1931, p. 1.

During Jackson's first term, Ritchie relied on Boss Kelly to look after his interests in Baltimore City, but now he had to attend to his own concerns there. It was obvious by the end of the summer of 1931 that Jackson would have liked to succeed Ritchie as Governor. Many Democrats around the State were ready to help the Mayor, but Jackson was cautiously biding his time.<sup>28</sup>

The Governor's appointments to the State roads commission were Robert Lacey, a retired Baltimore businessman and engineer, and E. Brooke Lee, his personal friend. Lee's appointment worried the retiring Democratic member of the commission, Howard Bruce. For ten days, Bruce who was also the Democratic National Committeeman for the State, debated with his conscience whether he should publicly disclose the fact that Lee's home county, Montgomery County, had borrowed money from the commission which had not been returned.<sup>29</sup> Bruce asked Ritchie to make a public investigation of the time he had served on the roads commission. The Governor seemed convinced by Lee's statement that the matter was merely a technical detail, but eventually he acceded to Bruce's desire. The matter then dropped from public notice, and if Lee had been guilty of some impropriety, it was corrected before the commission started its task.<sup>30</sup> The incident weakened relations between Ritchie and Bruce, and although Bruce helped Ritchie in his work for the national nomination in 1932, he did less than in 1924. In 1934, he advised against the Governor's reelection.

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28. Baltimore Evening Sun, 9 September 1931, p. 36, 10 September 1931, p. 42, 11 September 1931, p. 48, 23 September 1931, p. 34.

29. Ibid., 14 May 1931, p. 42.

30. Ibid., 21 May 1931, p. 44, 25 May 1931, p. 32.

Other than these problems, Ritchie's activities as Governor fell into the same pattern of little activity that he had established in recent years. He held tenaciously to his ideas that governmental action could not solve the problems of the depression. His confidence that these matters would correct themselves was genuine.

The year 1931 ended with a sensational Eastern Shore trial of a black man for murder. Yuel Lee was defended by the young Baltimore communist, Bernard Ades, and, from the earliest moments of the trial, a mob lynching was a definite threat.<sup>31</sup> Ades wrote to the Governor and requested that State troopers be sent to keep peace, but Ritchie declined saying that these matters were up to the judiciary. But by November 17th, violence was so great that Ritchie ordered the State troopers to guard the black defendant and his lawyer, and promised that a whole regiment would be sent if it was necessary.<sup>32</sup> Ritchie had tried to avoid acting because he realized how unpopular his acts would be with local residents, but he did not shirk the responsibility when the crisis arose. The defendant was moved from Cambridge to Salisbury, and when a mob in that town attempted to seize Lee from the local jail, Ritchie cancelled his speech in New York to remain in the State to see that nothing further went wrong.<sup>33</sup> The Governor's actions won plaudits in the Baltimore newspapers, but they were even more unpopular with many local residents than had been expected. The Governor was criticized severely by the Eastern Shore residents.

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31. Baltimore Evening Sun, 5 November 1931, p. 1-2.

32. Ibid., 17 November 1931, p. 1.

33. Ibid., 11 December 1931, p. 52.

Two weeks before the year ended, Ritchie was forced into action by the depression. Because of the decline in the economy, tax revenues in the State fell two to three million dollars short of what Ritchie had estimated in 1931. He then urged all his department heads to use measures of rigid economy in order to "avoid curtailing services or construction."<sup>34</sup>

The year had witnessed steadily worsening economic conditions, but the Governor's optimism had scarcely been scratched. He always expected the depression would correct itself, and he held tenaciously to the idea that all efforts by the government to alleviate suffering due to the malfunctioning of the economy would only prolong true relief.

The last three years of Ritchie's fourth and last administration were busier than any time since his first years in office because of the problems caused by the depression and the rumblings of discontented Democrats. For the first half of 1932, Ritchie had devoted most of his time to the campaign for the Democratic nomination for the presidency. To a great extent the State watched Ritchie's efforts with eager interest, and there were few complaints about local affairs despite trying economic conditions. But even the hope of having their Governor elevated to the presidency could not totally suppress the problems arising from the depression.

Newspapers were filled with stories of individuals suffering. One bizarre story attracted Ritchie's attention. On January 16th, Ritchie paid the \$10 fine of Miss Guynella Poage of Washington county. The young woman had been convicted for using 1931 license plates, and neither she nor her family could afford to pay the \$10 fine, so

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34. Baltimore Evening Sun, 17 December 1931, p. 1.

Magistrate Fite sentenced her to eleven days in jail as the law required, Ritchie paid the fine and had her released after one day announcing, "I could not permit a girl to be sent to jail for such an offense."<sup>35</sup>

But for all his humanitarianism on an individual level, Ritchie could not seem to see how individual misery extended generally over the social order in a way that might necessitate changes in his basic presuppositions. On March 18th, a group of charity workers met with the Governor in his Baltimore offices and requested that he commit the state to finding two million dollars which the workers said was the minimum necessary to provide adequate relief for the people in the State. Ritchie's answer was that he doubted that so large a figure was needed, but that whatever sum was necessary it could be provided by private sources. He announced cavalierly that none would go hungry in Maryland even without government action.<sup>36</sup> During the next month, several counties on the Eastern Shore requested that Ritchie call a special session of the legislature for the purpose of reducing the cost of government and for providing funds for relief, but Ritchie was adamant in his refusal. He stated that no such funds were necessary.<sup>37</sup>

Affairs of state remained quiet until the Governor returned from the Democratic National Convention in July. Ritchie who had left with such bright hopes of being the presidential nominee returned as just another Governor. Over the next year, citizens who had placed him above criticism, began to question and even challenge some of his actions.

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<sup>35</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 16 January 1932, p. 16.

<sup>36</sup>. Ibid., 18 March 1932, p. 48.

<sup>37</sup>. Ibid., 19 March 1932, p. 16, 19 April 1932, p. 36.

What, if anything, would the government spend to alleviate economic problems became an increasingly topical question. Ritchie finally acceded to the extent of naming a commission to study the need for unemployment relief in the counties. Howard Bruce was chosen as the head of the commission which included Paul T. Beisse, president of the State conference of social workers, and other business and religious leaders.<sup>38</sup> But it almost seemed as if Ritchie appointed the commission as a way of keeping the protestors silent for a longer period of time without committing himself to any action.

Ritchie was also agitated by the presence of the bonus army which was then camping in Anne Arundel County, Maryland. In May, Ritchie had welcomed the veterans to the State and provided them with food and free transportation to Washington in order to embarrass the President. But now Ritchie had little personal political need to show the deficiencies of Hoover's policies and so he wanted to be freed of the bonus army. He denied Commander Walters the right to establish a permanent camp in Maryland because such a colony would violate the State's health and sanitary laws. Fortunately for the Governor, Commander Walters agreed to disband peaceably and relinquished his hopes for a colony within the State.<sup>39</sup> But by this point, Ritchie's attention was centered on the Democratic National Convention.

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<sup>38</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 25 July 1932, p. 24, 4 August 1932, p. 30.

<sup>39</sup>. Baltimore Sun, 29 May 1932; Baltimore Evening Sun, 2 August 1932, p. 30.

## CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

## NATIONAL POLITICS 1928-1932: THE PRECONVENTION CAMPAIGN

Ritchie's efforts to win the Democratic national nomination in 1928 had attracted so little support that the Maryland Governor had withdrawn from the battle before the convention convened. However, Ritchie's national reputation had not suffered because so many commentators viewed the Governor's withdrawal as a self-sacrificial move for party unity. Not only had Ritchie backed the eventual winner in the convention, but he had worked vigorously for Smith during the entire campaign. Even though Smith had been badly beaten, Ritchie's record of party loyalty was clear, and there was a possibility that he would be the recipient of Smith's support in 1932. His length of time as a party leader of stature gave him the chance which had eluded him in 1924 of being the beneficiary of a deadlock between other leaders. With these general ideas in mind, Ritchie's campaign for the 1932 nomination began as soon as the 1928 elections results were known.

Quite naturally, Ritchie did not begin campaigning openly in 1929 or 1930, but he did make certain that he remained in the national picture. In the summer of 1929, Ritchie attended the twenty-first annual Governor's conference where he was now one of the senior members. One of the main subjects the Governors had agreed to discuss was the Prohibition Amendment and its enforcement. On July 17th, the first day of the conference, Ritchie was the presiding officer, and he had been scheduled to make a comprehensive comment on George Wickersham's letter on prohibition enforcement. However, the session started so late that Ritchie's



message was postponed until the following day.<sup>1</sup> At that time, Ritchie delivered one of his most outspoken objections to the 18th Amendment. He said, "It is time for the country to realize that the 18th Amendment imposes no obligation on the country to enforce it, and if they choose not to they have violated no moral or legal obligation, . . . . The country's real problem is not prohibition enforcement but eradication of crime caused by the Amendment."<sup>2</sup>

Ritchie hoped to persuade the group to disapprove openly the measure, but in the end the Governors hedged and refused to vote on the measure one way or the other.<sup>3</sup> At the end of the conference, Ritchie refused to speculate on his chance of winning the Presidency or how far from the norm his wet views were, but he did pointedly draw attention to the fact that at least he had been candid on his views on prohibition enforcement while those of the Governor of New York (Franklin Delano Roosevelt) remained as cloudy as before.<sup>4</sup>

At the end of the year, Ritchie made another highly publicized visit outside of Maryland. The Governor had been invited to speak in Boston by the Liberal Civic League of that city. However, officials denied the League the use of Tremont Temple for Ritchie's address, and also refused to let the League use the customary system of advertising. A number of signs appeared around the city which warned the people against hearing the Maryland Governor who was described as a "criminal

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1. Baltimore Evening Sun, 17 July 1929, p. 1.

2. Ibid., 18 July 1929, p. 1.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., 19 July 1929, p. 40.

anarchist." These restrictions and propaganda naturally aroused the interest of many citizens, and by the time of Ritchie's arrival, the head of the Liberal Civic League Reception Committee announced that the demand for tickets was so great that he could have filled the 25,000 seats of the Boston Garden. However, the League had scheduled Ritchie to speak in Symphony Hall, which had a 3,000-seat capacity.<sup>5</sup>

When Ritchie spoke that evening, the auditorium was crowded with 1,000 people beyond its capacity. But if the audience expected to hear the Governor present some new controversial proposal, it was clearly disappointed. Ritchie chose his favorite topic, prohibition, and even his wording was somewhat more temperate than it had been at the Governor's conference. He claimed that the 18th Amendment had usurped the powers of the states, and that the solution to the problem was to turn the entire question of prohibition back to the individual states. As usual, Ritchie also blamed various problems of law enforcement and general disrespect for the law on the 18th Amendment. The speech seems to have created less excitement than had the fact of his invitation a few months earlier.<sup>6</sup> After the speech, Ritchie eliminated all appearances outside of Maryland until after his election in November 1930.<sup>7</sup>

Had Ritchie been defeated, any hope of a Presidential nomination would have been impossible, so serious soliciting of support had to wait until after November, 1930. When Ritchie defeated the strongest

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5. Baltimore Evening Sun, 10 December 1929, p. 10.

6. Ibid., 10 December 1929, p. 1, 11 December 1929, p. 1.

7. Diary, 21 March 1930, in Ritchie Papers.

opponent of his career by a majority that even exceeded his own previous records, he was assured of being one of the leading contenders for the Democratic presidential nomination even if he made no further personal effort of his own. Naturally, the local newspapers were the first to propose ~~the~~ Governor's name. In two editorials printed in December, H. L. Mencken advised the Democrats to choose Ritchie as their nominee. Mencken felt that Democratic strategy should be to hold the South and capture the large northern states of Pennsylvania, Indiana, Illinois, California, Missouri and New York. He felt that Maryland's Governor would be better able to do this than any other Democrat because he could enthrall large urban populations on the issues and still appeal to the rural voters due to his background and appearance.<sup>8</sup>

Ritchie's first major effort to step into the national spotlight came with his inauguration address. There were reports that Ritchie received congratulatory telegrams from all over the United States.<sup>9</sup> One week after the Governor's inauguration, a Ritchie for President League was formed in seven states. A Philadelphia realtor, Edward Gables was elected President of the group; William Powell of New York was chosen as Vice-President. In addition, the League formed several regions and appointed regional directors. The founding of the group seems to have been spontaneous on the part of its organizers, for not even the Maryland members were friends of the Governor.<sup>10</sup>

At this time, a number of newspapers around the country were discussing Ritchie's strengths and weaknesses as a possible nominee.

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8. Baltimore Evening Sun, "Looking Ahead," 8 December 1930, "Address to Ritchie Men," 13 December 1930.

9. Ibid., 14 January 1931, p. 1, 4, 15 January 1931, p. 38. New York Times, 15 January 1931; Washington Star, 15 January 1931.

10. Baltimore Evening Sun, 20 January 1931, p. 52.

Some of the articles were critical of Ritchie's ideology. Others like the Philadelphia Record said that while Ritchie was a capable executive he could not tolerate opposition to his views.<sup>11</sup> However, most of the evaluations ranged from slightly favorable to those like the Boston Review which described Ritchie as "the strongest candidate the Democrats could nominate for President."<sup>12</sup> At the same time, Ritchie was busy entertaining possible supporters in Annapolis, the most important of whom was probably Bernard Baruch.<sup>13</sup>

During March, a national news service polled all the delegates and alternates to the 1928 Convention to find their preferences for 1932. The poll was strikingly prophetic. Franklin Roosevelt was far in the lead followed by Al Smith and then by Owen Young. Ritchie was fourth; Senator Joseph Robinson of Arkansas was fifth, and Newton Baker was sixth. Numerous other candidates received a few votes each. The poll established that Ritchie was an important contender, but it also showed that he needed to do a great deal of work if he was to overtake Roosevelt.<sup>14</sup>

On April 10th, Howard Bruce entertained Jacob Raskob, national Democratic campaign chairman in 1928, at his home in Howard County, Maryland. Ritchie and about fifty local and a few out-of-state politicians attended the dinner, and there were speculations as to whether Raskob was about to be drawn into the Ritchie-for-President camp.<sup>15</sup>

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11. Philadelphia Record, 25 January 1931, clipping in Ritchie Papers.

12. Boston Review, 7 February 1931, clipping in Ritchie Papers.

13. Diary, 5 February 1931-April 1931, in Ritchie Papers.

14. Baltimore Evening Sun, 30 March 1931, p. 2. The news service was the United Press.

15. Ibid., 10 April 1931, p. 54.

During May and June, Ritchie made several speeches in and out of Maryland by which he hoped to increase his chances for the nomination. On May 27th, he addressed the National Association of Real Estate Boards Convention at the Lord Baltimore Hotel.<sup>16</sup> Two days later, he went to the Governor's conference, but his contribution to that meeting was insignificant. He spoke in Indianapolis on May 30th.<sup>17</sup> On June 16th, the Governor went to New York with several local politicians to address the Associated Advertising Clubs of the World at their convention.<sup>18</sup> Then his activities were sharply curtailed until after Labor Day.

Ritchie's speaking schedule was accelerated in the fall. His first major address was to a meeting of the National Bar Association Convention in Atlantic City on September 15th. Ritchie's vitriol was directed at the debilitating effects of centralization, and he went so far as to state that if Federal supervision continued to accelerate at its present rate, the people would effectively be slaves in a few years.<sup>19</sup> On October 15th, at the 35th annual Founders' Day celebration of the Carnegie Institute in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Ritchie spoke on foreign policy. He suggested to the audience that relationship between international and domestic economics had been insufficiently probed, and recommended that World War I debts be viewed in practical as well as purely legalistic contractual terms. Ritchie had hinted at this position in his inaugural address in January, but now he went on to say that war

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16. Baltimore Evening Sun, 27 April 1931, p. 44.

17. Diary, May 29-June 3, 1931 in Ritchie Papers.

18. Baltimore Evening Sun, 16 June 1931, p. 3.

19. Ibid., 15 September 1931, p. 38.

debts should be cancelled, and the moratorium on German reparations payments should be extended. The statements were made in guarded terms, but he did say that we would have to assume the war debts because in fact American money was necessary to achieve a victory in the war in the same way that American manpower had been.<sup>20</sup> Later in the month the Governor spoke in Yorktown, Virginia, and then at a meeting of the Maryland Division of the Daughters of the Confederacy in Annapolis.<sup>21</sup>

On the evening of October 30th, Ritchie left with Ennis, Reckord and Winebrenner on a tour that included New York, Boston and Providence, Rhode Island. On the evening of the 30th, Ritchie was the principal speaker at the Southern Society banquet at the Waldorf Astoria. On October 31st, he spoke in Boston. In his speech, Ritchie attacked Republican economic policies and blamed them for the country's failure to return to prosperity. The next day before he left, he found time for a private luncheon with Governor Ely of Massachusetts.<sup>22</sup> On November 1st, he stopped in Providence as a guest of Mr. and Mrs. John Nicholas Brown and spent the day soliciting support in the nation's smallest state.<sup>23</sup>

When he returned to Maryland, Ritchie received the good news that the personal preference of nearly the entire Illinois delegation was reported to be for him.<sup>24</sup> But there were also some important criticisms.

20. Baltimore Evening Sun, 15 October 1931, p. 42.

21. Diary, 16, 19 October 1931, in Ritchie Papers; Baltimore Evening Sun, 28 October 1931, p. 4.

22. Baltimore Evening Sun, 31 October 1931, p. 18.

23. Baltimore Sun, 2 November 1931.

24. Ibid., 3 November 1931.

H. L. Mencken, who was still one of the Governor's most vigorous supporters, warned Ritchie that his campaign was amateurish and that he could not expect to win the nomination unless he quickly made it much more professional.<sup>25</sup> These words did not seem to have any effect, and the Governor continued the same kind of campaign which was based mainly on speaking tours. Later in November, Ritchie visited Smith and Raskob in New York, and rumors of a possible alliance rose once again, especially in Washington gossip. However, Senator Burton Wheeler of Montana said that he felt any such alliance would be merely a move to block Roosevelt, and besides he said that Roosevelt's strength in the South and West was too strong for Ritchie or Smith to overcome it alone or in combination. Other Senators doubted that Roosevelt was quite so powerful, and the alliance rumors were carefully pondered.<sup>26</sup>

On November 16th, Ritchie addressed the opening of the Third International Coal Conference at the Carnegie Institution. In speaking of the crisis in the coal industry to those who were the most directly affected, the Governor did not hedge on his principles of self-help. He insisted that the Federal Government should not be expected to play "Santa Claus" to any distressed industry, particularly the coal industry. It was up to the industry itself to find better methods of self-regulation and self help, he said. Finally he objected to the idea of government ownership because he felt that would destroy competition and incentive and thus result in higher prices and slower progress.<sup>27</sup> Ritchie also

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25. Baltimore Sun, 9 November 1931.

26. Baltimore Evening Sun, 13 November 1931, p. 3.

27. Ibid., 16 November 1931, p. 32.

spoke in Chicago where he jokingly welcomed Columbia University President and former Republican Vice-Presidential candidate, Nicholas Murray Butler, into the Democratic Party because of Butler's views on prohibition and the tariff.<sup>28</sup>

Just how well Ritchie's campaign efforts were going at this point is difficult to measure. Late in November, Time predicted that Ritchie would receive the support of Smith, Raskob and Baruch because those men trusted him and doubted Roosevelt's views on power and financial issues. Time stressed that Ritchie was a strong candidate who should not be dismissed.<sup>29</sup> About the same time other sources claimed to observe a powerful growing momentum toward Ritchie. On December 11th, Ritchie received an important endorsement from Governor Hemphill of Pennsylvania who said that he would attempt to put the entire Pennsylvania delegation into the Ritchie column.<sup>30</sup>

The Hemphill endorsement was a definite boom to the Ritchie campaign but it would be foolish to assume that Ritchie had gained very much on Roosevelt. Most of Ritchie's support was centered in the Northeast and in Illinois; and his total committed delegate strength was minute. Even though he was a Southerner himself, Ritchie could claim little or no support in the South, and no leaders west of the Mississippi River had endorsed him. Early in 1932, the Baltimore Sun noted that the hopes of Ritchie or Smith depended on the tenacity with

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28. Baltimore Evening Sun, 8 December 1931, p. 46; See also Nicholas M. Butler, Across Busy Years (New York: Scribners, 1940) Ch. VII.

29. Time, 23 November 1931, clipping in Ritchie Papers.

30. For a most optimistic statement, see The Boston Transcript, 18 November 1931, clipping in Ritchie Papers.



which the Southern states held to their favorite son candidates, Harry Byrd of Virginia, Cordell Hull of Tennessee, Huey Long of Louisiana, Alben Barkley of Kentucky, and William Robinson of Arkansas, for Roosevelt could not win without the South. If this was true, then the hopes of the anti-Roosevelt forces were already quite tenuous.<sup>31</sup>

But Ritchie was not deterred or even pessimistic. He made official announcement of his candidacy in a speech at the Concord Democratic Club in Baltimore at a Jackson Day dinner celebration on January 7th. The Governor spoke for one-half hour, and then was lauded by Senator Walsh of Massachusetts and ex-Governor Hemphill of Pennsylvania. On the following day, Ritchie attended the national Jackson Day dinner in Washington which was addressed by Cox, Davis and Smith. Ritchie did not speak, but some perceptive reporters noticed that he was seated on the platform between Raskob and Smith.<sup>32</sup> Roosevelt was not invited to this dinner because Raskob was trying to block his nomination by encouraging the candidacy of favorite sons and dark horse candidates such as Ritchie.<sup>33</sup>

From then on, Ritchie's campaign moved into full gear. On January 23rd, he addressed the New York State Bar Association in New York. To an audience filled with famous lawyers including Supreme Court Justice Cardozo, the Governor's plea was that members of the bar use their positions to correct the dangerous usurpation of individual

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31. Baltimore Sun, 11 January 1932.

32. Baltimore Evening Sun, 8 January 1932, p. 1.

33. Arthur Schlesinger, The Crisis of the Old Order (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Company, 1957), p. 282. Svend Petersen, "Arkansas Favorite Son," Arkansas Historical Quarterly, XXXVII (June, 1954), p. 213; Ida M. Tarbell, Owen Young, A New Type of Industrial Leader (New York: Macmillan Company, 1932); Ray A. Tucker, The Mirrors of 1932 (New York: Warren & Putnam, 1931), Chapter 5.

rights by the government.<sup>34</sup> On June 24th, Ritchie had dinner with Bernard Baruch.<sup>35</sup>

On January 28th, he went with Robert Ennis and Clarence Miles to Cincinnati where he addressed the Ohio Bar Association the following evening.<sup>36</sup> Then, he travelled through Kentucky soliciting support; and on February 1st, he had lunch with Kentucky's Governor before addressing the legislature of that State on the need for a new type of national leadership.<sup>37</sup>

On February 8th, Ritchie's campaign received an unexpected jolt when Al Smith announced his official candidacy for the Presidency. Not only had many of the Ritchie men been relying on Smith's 1931 statements that he could not afford to run again, but some of them had hoped for support or even the endorsement of Ritchie by the former nominee and his followers. Obviously shaken, the Ritchie men refused to comment on Smith's announcement and stated that they would wait to see the reaction in other states.<sup>38</sup> Some, however, thought that in the long run, Smith's candidacy might help Ritchie. A Washington Post cartoonist pictured Roosevelt and Smith as two rivals who had just knocked each other out

34. Baltimore Evening Sun, 23 January 1932, p. 16.

35. Diary, 24 January 1932, in Ritchie Papers; several authors comment on Ritchie's friendship with Baruch, see Raymond Noley, After Seven Years (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1939), p. 31; Alfred B. Rollins, Jr., Roosevelt & Howe (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1962), p. 352.

36. Diary, 28-30 January 1932, in Ritchie Papers.

37. Diary, 31 January 1932-1 February 1932, in Ritchie Papers; Baltimore Evening Sun, 1 February 1932; Lexington Herald, 31 January 1932; Louisville Courier Journal, 1 February 1932, clippings in Ritchie Papers.

38. Baltimore Evening Sun, 8 February 1932, p. 3; Emily S. Warner, Happy Warrior (New York: Doubleday, 1956).

while Ritchie emerged from the background to walk away with the girl who represented the nomination.<sup>39</sup>

Ritchie continued to campaign vigorously. On the afternoon of February 20th, he left for Detroit with Robert Ennis, Dr. Hugh Young and Stuart Janney. There he saw some leading politicians and industrialists including Detroit's Mayor Frank Murphy.<sup>40</sup> In his main address in Detroit, Ritchie affirmed his personal belief that prosperity would soon return to the United States, and he criticized the Federal government for not returning the problem of prohibition to the states.<sup>41</sup>

The South Carolina Legislature on February 1st had passed a joint resolution inviting Ritchie to open South Carolina's Washington bicentennial. Ritchie had accepted, and on March 3rd he left to travel South. Young and Ennis were with him as were several other Baltimore politicians.<sup>42</sup> The Governor stated that self-reliance would solve the problems of the Depression when he addressed the legislature. He reminded the South Carolinians that it was self-reliance that had lifted the South from the ashes of Reconstruction. Ritchie also fiercely attacked the Federal bureaucracy and national prohibition as violating the ideals of America, but he noted that he was not preaching a gospel of despair. The depression would end because the United States was still rich in natural resources, and the Democrats would defeat the Republican conception of a Federal bureaucracy just as the Jeffersonian Democrats previously defeated Hamilton's plan for a centralized autocracy

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<sup>39</sup>. Washington Post, 10 February 1932, cartoon clipping in Ritchie Papers.

<sup>40</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 20 February 1932, p. 3, 23 February 1932, p. 1; Diary, 20-23 February 1932, in Ritchie Papers.

<sup>41</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 23 February 1932, p. 1; Detroit Evening News, 23 February 1932, clipping in Ritchie papers.

<sup>42</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 26 February 1932, p. 3. Diary, 3 March 1932, in Ritchie Papers.

A return to Jefferson's principles, Ritchie predicted, would solve all the present problems in the United States.<sup>43</sup>

When Ritchie finished speaking, James Shepard, the Lieutenant Governor, pointed to a portrait of Woodrow Wilson and compared Ritchie to the ex-President. "Have you ever seen anyone who looks more like that man or thinks like he did?" That evening, Ritchie made an outdoor speech to open the public celebration. The speech was entitled "George Washington, his principles would lead us out of the wilderness."<sup>44</sup>

Ritchie left the State only shortly after he returned. This time he solicited support and made several speeches in Rhode Island and in New York on a trip that took four days.<sup>45</sup> He did not leave the State again until March 29th, when he went to Portland, ~~Maine~~, because the Democrats there had asked him to come to their state convention. Ritchie insisted that he was going to help the State organization and not to campaign, but that hardly seems likely.<sup>46</sup>

During March, Ritchie's hopes were damaged by the collapse of the ~~favorite~~ son movement that Raskob had promoted. Hull, Barkley and Robinson all withdrew as candidates during the month and Huey Long was clearly moving into the Roosevelt camp. In none of these states did Ritchie seem to be the likely beneficiary of the delegates that were released. Also during March, Ritchie had written a long article in Worlds Work which was probably too candid to help his chances. In the

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43. Baltimore Evening Sun, 4 March 1932, p. 38.

44. Columbia, South Carolina Record, 4 March 1932, clipping in Ritchie Papers.

45. Diary, 6-10 March 1932, in Ritchie papers.

46. Baltimore Evening Sun, 19 March 1932, 30 March 1932.

article, Ritchie stated that taxation was still too much a matter of political maneuvering and that a more scientific system should be developed. But in almost every other aspect he felt that the responsibility for ending the depression was not a proper matter for government action. He stated that he even preferred private ownership of utilities and self-regulation of business to anti-trust laws.<sup>47</sup>

On April 13th, Ritchie and Smith were together at a meeting in Washington of all the State Democratic victory campaign chairmen, and the next day both men addressed a Jefferson Day dinner. Ritchie's speech was completely eclipsed by Smith's "forgotten man" speech which was seen as an indirect attack on Roosevelt.<sup>48</sup> Although he was obviously not one of the front runners, Ritchie continued to campaign actively. On April 22nd, he spoke over national radio for five minutes and presented a plan for dealing with the Depression which was mainly a proposal for non-activity by the Federal Government. Ritchie did recommend that business adopt a thirty-hour work week, but he said that he did not have time in five minutes to explain how this would help solve problems.<sup>49</sup>

On April 24th through 28th, the Governor attended the Governors' conference in Richmond, Virginia. At the conference, Ritchie attacked President Hoover for his failure to balance the budget. Noting that Maryland's budget was balanced despite the depression, Ritchie suggested that Hoover would best turn matters back to the States. At the same time, Ritchie also tried to deflate the Roosevelt campaign by criticizing

47. Worlds Work, 1932, clipping in Ritchie Papers.

48. Baltimore Evening Sun, 13 April 1932, p. 1; Oscar Handin, Al Smith and His America (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1958) pp. 158-9.

49. Ibid., 22 April 1932, p. 54.

Roosevelt's proposed solution of government ownership of utilities.<sup>50</sup> However, by this time Ritchie's views were very well known on these subjects by anyone who cared to consider them, and it is doubtful if his forthright statements won him any new support.<sup>51</sup>

On one matter, however, the nation's views seemed to be in line with Ritchie's. The Literary Digest poll released in April reported that the nation was 73.51 percent "wet" and only in Kansas and North Carolina did a majority of the people still favor prohibition.<sup>52</sup> If this was true, Ritchie might have expected less opposition in the South and West, but politicians in those areas still held different ideas about the nature of their constituents feelings towards the 18th Amendment, and Roosevelt's ambiguous stand was more appealing or acceptable to most of these men than Ritchie's all-too-candid anti-prohibition stand.

May 2nd was the date of the Maryland Democratic primary, but Ritchie scarcely concerned himself with the election. Little was at stake for the Democrats and although Ritchie would have preferred not to see Baltimore's Mayor Jackson aggrandize power at the expense of his own allies, it was too minor a matter for him to devote much time. Fortunately for Ritchie, the results were a stalemate between Jackson and the Governor's friends.<sup>53</sup> Ritchie left Maryland the day after the

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50. Richmond Times Dispatch, 27 April 1932, clipping in Ritchie Papers; Baltimore Sun, 27 April 1932.

51. Baltimore Sun, 24 April 1932, 28 April 1932; Butte Montana Standard, 14 May 1932, clipping in Ritchie Papers.

52. Baltimore Evening Sun, 28 April 1932, p. 1.

53. Baltimore Evening Sun, 2 May 1932, p. 1, 3 May 1932, p. 1.

election and spent three days campaigning in New York.<sup>54</sup> On May 9th, he was back in Maryland and went to Howard Bruce's home for dinner where the guests included two old Wilsonians, Joseph Tumulty and Dr. Cary Grayson.<sup>55</sup>

On May 12th, the Maryland State Democratic Convention met, and the son of Grover Cleveland, Richard F. Cleveland, presented Ritchie's name for the presidential nomination. There was naturally no competition as State leaders agreed unanimously that Ritchie would be the Maryland delegation's choice for President at the national convention.<sup>56</sup> What was more important to Ritchie was the choice of a State delegation for he would need every man and woman working for him at the National convention. It was agreed to choose thirty-two men and four women with one-half vote each. The delegation included the State's highest-ranking political officers, some of Ritchie's close political friends like E. Brook Lee, William C. Walsh and Dr. Young, as well as several businessmen and bankers such as B. Howell Griswold, Jr., and R. Howard Bland, the president of the U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty Company.<sup>57</sup> Ritchie had obviously worked on the list with great care. When the convention closed, Ritchie continued to campaign in the eastern part of the United States.<sup>58</sup>

In May, Ritchie took advantage of an opportunity to embarrass the national administration. The Bonus Expeditionary Force, better known

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54. Diary, 3-5 May 1932, in Ritchie Papers.

55. Ibid., 9 May 1932, in Ritchie Papers.

56. Baltimore Evening Sun, 12 May 1932, p. 1.

57. Ibid., 19 May 1932.

58. Diary, 25-26 May 1932, in Ritchie Papers; Baltimore Evening Sun, 29 May 1932; Baltimore American, 29 May-31 May 1932.

as the Bonus Army was a group of protesting war veterans marching to Washington to demand relief from President Hoover. When the veterans entered Western Maryland, Ritchie gave them trucks and a police guard to help them travel through the State. With the aid of Mayor Henderson of Cumberland, Ritchie made certain that the men were provided with meals. Officials in Washington objected, but Ritchie said that they had assumed so many economic problems that there was no reason that they should suddenly decide to pass this particular matter back to the States. Ritchie's action was a crass attempt to find some mass political appeal, but actually it received little notice. It is doubtful that his objections to the use of federal troops against the Bonus Army won him any support.<sup>59</sup>

On the evening of May 31st, Ritchie left for Asheville, North Carolina with Eugene Beer and Robert Sindall. He made two speeches in North Carolina on June 1st and saw several local politicians.<sup>60</sup> On June 7th General Matthew Tiney, the Commander of the 168th Infantry Division in World War I, announced from Iowa that he wished to run for Vice-President on a Ritchie ticket. The Ritchie men then invited him to Baltimore for conferences later in the week.<sup>61</sup> The Governor made no more out-of-State speeches before the national convention.

Ritchie's preconvention campaign consisted of more than speaking tours and private campaigning. His private correspondence contains

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59. Baltimore Sun, 29 May 1932, Baltimore American, 29 May-31 May 1932.

60. Baltimore Evening Sun, 1 June 1932, p. 32; Diary, 31 May-2 June 1932, in Ritchie Papers.

61. Baltimore Evening Sun, 7 June 1932, p. 36.



letters to politicians in ~~every~~ state in the nation. Ritchie believed in answering all of his private mail personally even though he occasionally received more than fifty letters a day. The Governor's contacts in most of the states were minor politicians, but they show the general plan of the Ritchie campaign. He hoped to be the benefactor of the collapse of Roosevelt's drive, and several letters led him to believe that this result was likely. Edward D. Roberts canvassed the entire Iowa delegation and reported that Ritchie was the first or second choice of a majority of the delegates, and so he would not be thought to be writing in generalities, Roberts listed all of the delegates by name and their choices.<sup>62</sup> William J. Pearson of California wrote that Ritchie was probably McAdoo's choice when his own favorite son candidacy was dropped.<sup>63</sup> Other similar reports came from all over the country. Not only did Ritchie keep his own correspondence, but his campaign organization headed by Ennis had enormous lists of past and ~~present~~ delegates in each of the forty-eight states whom they canvassed by letter.<sup>64</sup>

In the end, however, H. L. Mencken's comment that Ritchie's campaign was amateurish was clearly accurate. Although Robert Ennis performed with dedication in organizing a national campaign for Ritchie, he did not have the talents and foresight of Louis Howe nor a trusted man like Jim Farley to send around the country on errands. Because of Howe and Farley, when men went into the convention they felt like they

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62. Edward D. Roberts to Ritchie, 20 May 1932, in Ritchie Correspondence.

63. William J. Pearson to Ritchie, 21 May 1932, in <sup>hij</sup> Ritchie Correspondence.

64. The volumes of names are in the Ritchie Papers.

had some personal ties with Roosevelt; Ritchie remained an abstraction to most of the delegates.<sup>65</sup>

Perhaps dedicated followers with ability cannot be bought, but national publicity can, and part of the failure of Ritchie's campaign was his own personal parsimony. Ritchie often complained that he did not have the money to run a large-scale campaign of the type that competed with those of Smith and Roosevelt. None of Ritchie's friends ever disputed these statements, but Ritchie was not totally honest with his friends. His own private income is difficult to determine, but he received from his mother's will property evaluated at over \$220,000. This was hardly a negligible sum of money during the Depression.<sup>66</sup> In his failure to gamble at least some of the money on national publicity, Ritchie may have missed a good opportunity. While Roosevelt was clearly the front runner, many important people were unimpressed with his abilities and thought of him as merely a mediocre or indecisive man. They also felt that Smith had no chance to win a general election. But Ritchie was unwilling to pay for an aggressive campaign to present himself as the alternative. Perhaps he lacked the courage to take such a move, and so he preferred to wait and hope people would look his way at the

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65. Ralph G. Martin, Ballots and Bandwagons (New York: New American Library, 1964, pp. 120-121.

66. Last Will and Testament of Mrs. Albert C. Ritchie, Ritchie correspondence in the University of Maryland. Mrs. Ritchie's will had been written in 1905, and in it she left everything to her son. A codicil filed in 1929 left several thousand dollars to various servants. Mrs. Ritchie seems to have had good business advice. She received \$50,374 from her husband's will in 1903 and managed to live off the interest of this and increase the principal over four times in value by the time of her own death. She sold a few of the stocks which her husband had left her, but held her shares in Standard Oil, U.S. Steel, Liggett and Meyers Tobacco, Reynolds Tobacco, Procter and Gamble, and the Northern Central Railroad among others.

convention on the basis of his speeches, a hope that such diverse advisers as Bernard Baruch and H. L. Mencken had warned him was foolish.

## CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

## THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION OF 1932

Despite a rather lackluster campaign, Ritchie did come into the convention with a chance to be nominated.<sup>1</sup> The hope was that Roosevelt would be eliminated because he would never get two-thirds of the total vote which was necessary for the nomination, since Smith and a host of minor candidates held over one-third of the votes. Nor was this idea entirely unjustified. It was true that Roosevelt did control more than a majority of the delegate's votes when the convention opened, and that only Martin Van Buren, Champ Clark and Stephen Douglas had ever failed to win the nomination after having one-half the votes. However, Farley and Howe, Roosevelt's chief managers, based their hopes on coming into the convention with as many votes as possible. By the end of April, Roosevelt had collected 300 delegates of the 768 he needed to win, and

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<sup>1</sup>. Unlike the three national conventions which Ritchie attended in the 1920's, 1932 has often been clearly described because of the later career of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Since most of the accounts of the convention have been written in biographies of Roosevelt, the picture centers around him. Biographies of Smith and Garner tend to balance the picture somewhat, but it is often hard to estimate the chances of the other candidates in the convention, especially when one looks backward from the results. An attempt to describe Ritchie's role in the convention brings these problems into clear focus. The optimism of the Governor himself and his followers at the convention could leave one with the impression that Ritchie just missed becoming the nominee. On the other hand, the actual number of votes he received in the balloting is so small as to create the idea that he was no more than a favorite son with minute out-of-State support. The truth lies somewhere between these extremes.

Smith had 225.<sup>2</sup> From then on the Roosevelt forces worked tirelessly to secure every possible vote. They were successful everywhere except in the Massachusetts primary against Al Smith, and the rather surprising California primary where Roosevelt ran second to Speaker of the House, John Nance Garner. At that point, Garner had been regarded as no more than a Texas favorite son whose campaign was being largely manufactured by the Hearst press because Hearst was looking for a candidate who opposed United States entrance into the League of Nations.<sup>3</sup> Despite the loss of Massachusetts and California by the time of the convention, Farley claimed 690 votes which was probably 20 votes too generous. But the problem for the Roosevelt camp was that hardly a single vote then remained that showed any inclination to move into the Roosevelt column, at least none that would do so without a deal because all of the favorite sons whose delegations leaned towards Roosevelt had since dropped out. The others seemed likely to battle until the finish or at least until something came along which made it worth their while to leave the race.<sup>4</sup>

Ritchie, Smith and other hopefuls were aware that this situation confronted Roosevelt; and Ritchie and Smith clearly felt that Roosevelt had nowhere at all to go for delegates. Farley could hold back a few votes so that Roosevelt's total would increase on the second and possibly even the third ballot, but after that they were sure that his drive would collapse.

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<sup>2</sup>. Martin, Ballots and Bandwagons, p. 143; Frank Friedel, Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Triumph (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1956), p. 276.

<sup>3</sup>. Martin, Ballots and Bandwagons, pp. 136, 138, 149. Hearst was afraid that Roosevelt would attempt to bring the United States into the League despite a public statement which he had managed to export from Roosevelt to the contrary.

<sup>4</sup>. Martin, Ballots and Bandwagons, pp. 151-2.

Ritchie also felt that when the delegates settled down to business, his forthrightness on all important issues would win him votes as Roosevelt's ambiguity was exposed. The national press had constantly praised Ritchie's integrity and administrative ability. Even the fiercely prohibitionist journal, The Christian Herald, had lauded Ritchie's dedication and pragmatic administration.<sup>5</sup> At the other end of the political spectrum, Oswald G. Willard wrote in the Nation that Ritchie was "a man of excellent brains with his emotions completely under control...sincere, candid and without malice."<sup>6</sup> The Outlook and Independent described Ritchie as intelligent enough to adapt his views to the situation and as being always open-minded and honest.<sup>7</sup>

But Ritchie had been warned that sometimes men are more interested in the personality of their leader than in his ideas. Omar Hersey, a Baltimore attorney, wrote him in 1931: "The editorials certainly do you proud...but I still think, as I said the last time I saw you, that you can't trust too much to Ritchie luck and manifest destiny....No one cares much about your ideas, but a lot about the sort of cuss they think you are. The idea is pretty well abroad that you are a 'profound statesman'; how can you make yourself a colorful leader? Damn, if I know."<sup>8</sup> Robert

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5. Harold E. West, "Maryland's Choice for President" Christian Herald, LI, 11 February 1928, p. 143.

6. Oswald G. Villiard, "Governor Albert C. Ritchie," Nation, CXXVI, 1 February 1928, p. 120-3.

7. Fred Barkeley, "Albert IV of Maryland, a Portrait of the Perennial Governor", Outlook and Independent, CLVII, 4 March 1931, pp. 337-9. See also Frank Kent, "Presidential Sweepstakes," Scribners, June, 1932, pp. 617-23; Mark Watson, "Albert C. Ritchie," Forum, August, 1931, pp. 107-113, clippings in Ritchie Papers.

8. Omar F. Hersey to Ritchie 13 November 1931, in Ritchie Correspondence.

Barry of the New York Evening World warned Ritchie that he "had pitched it his campaign a key above the range of the voice of the people to whom he must inevitably turn."<sup>9</sup> The American Mercury cautioned Ritchie that he could win if he were less of a statesman.<sup>10</sup>

Perhaps Ritchie tried to follow the advice which he was given, but he never projected the warmth which men felt about Roosevelt nor could he develop a "folksy" manner calculated to appeal to delegates from the South and West. Reporter Thomas Stokes described Ritchie as looking like a wax figure in a shop window. His dress was always elegant. "He was pleasantly reserved, seeming to hold himself in for fear that he might disturb that bland equanimity which was his public self. His face was constantly alight with a beneficent smile that never became openly joyous. His chuckle often was restrained and artificial. He just wouldn't let himself go. He wouldn't emerge from the campaign photograph," he wrote.<sup>11</sup> There seemed nothing for Ritchie to do but rely on uprightness and integrity on the issues.

Ritchie did have some reasons to expect influential support if Roosevelt was stopped. His unusual combination of conservatism with some progressive aims and his anti-prohibitionism made him available to many party men.<sup>12</sup> A secret poll of the Democratic members of

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9. New York Evening World, June, 1932, clipping in Ritchie Papers.

10. American Mercury, April, 1931, clipping in Ritchie Papers.

11. Martin, Ballots and Bandwagons, p. 180.

12. Friedel, The Ordeal, p. 174, 202-3; Karl Schriftgeiser, This Was Normalcy (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1948), pp. 253-4; Dwight L. Dummond, Roosevelt to Roosevelt (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1937), p. 382; Alfred B. Rollins, Roosevelt and Howe (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1962), pp. 339, 342, 345-6, 352.

Congress taken by Cosmopolitan magazine in the spring of 1932 to find the preferences for their party's 1932 nominee gave Roosevelt 59 votes, Ritchie 37, and Owen Young 27. Other leaders including Smith and Baker each received less than 20 votes.<sup>13</sup> Some other expectations were more concrete. Ritchie felt that Bernard Baruch was supporting him and was annoyed that Baruch would not make a public announcement of his preference. Baruch had written to Frank Kent in 1929 that Ritchie was the logical nominee, but he refused to break the resolve that he had made in 1924 never to enter another nominating fight.<sup>14</sup> Perhaps most important to the Ritchie camp was that they might have the support of the Raskob-Smith-Shouse group and the city organizations.

From Ritchie's point of view, these promises were more than vague ones. The Governor felt that he had stepped aside for Smith in 1928 and expected the favor to be returned. It does seem doubtful that the bargain of which Truman Thomas Semans, son of a cousin of Ritchie's, wrote in 1947 is true, but Ritchie did expect that Smith meant to drop out of the race after Roosevelt was stopped and announce himself as supporting Ritchie.<sup>15</sup> None of the Maryland leaders can remember any exact deals on

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13. Cosmopolitan, April , 1932, clipping in Ritchie Papers.

14. Bernard M. Baruch, The Public Years, pp. 237-8; Margret L. Coit, Mr. Baruch (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), p. 426.

15. Semans wrote in "Maryland's Albert C. Ritchie," a B.A. thesis written at Princeton University under the sponsorship of Eric Goldman in 1949, "Two strong men sat face to face on opposite sides of a table in a downstairs Manhattan office in the spring of 1928. Each strong man had a single trusted friend beside him. For some time they had been in animated, rapid, yet friendly conversation in the room. The voices of the four swelled, and rose, and fell as twilight darkened into evening. The four remained alone and silent. It was not an oppressive silence, but it was tense. Finally the taller, handsomer man got up and stretched out his hand to the smaller more nervous man. 'All right, Al, I'll wait,' Albert C. Ritchie said to Al Smith. With those very simple words, Ritchie took himself out of the race and practically ensured the nomination of Smith."



this point. Jouett Shouse attended two Ritchie dinners in Maryland but he says that he gave no promise of support to Ritchie nor to his knowledge did Governor Smith. Shouse admitted liking Ritchie and that he was ill-disposed to Roosevelt, but he remembered no solid basis for Ritchie's optimism about Smith's eventual support.<sup>16</sup>

But even if Ritchie had overestimated his support his personal friendship with Raskob and Smith made him more likely of the eventual support of these men than Newton Baker. Hearst would not have Baker under any circumstances, and so Ritchie had a possibility of being the eventual beneficiary of the Garner votes as well.<sup>17</sup> Obviously, Ritchie was still planning that Roosevelt would be stopped.

And at this point, despite his stiffness and high-pitched campaign, Ritchie had evidence of his personal popularity which bolstered his confidence. Maryland residents were very excited about the candidacy of their Governor and many people crowded into Mount Royal station to see Ritchie leave for Chicago on June 22nd. The Governor's well-wishers were estimated variously from 50,000-80,000 people. The crowd was so frenzied that it was almost impossible to quiet them for a speech by Mayor Jackson praising the Governor. Fortunately, the station had been equipped with special amplifiers so that the audience could hear the speech as well as the band which had been provided to add to the holiday atmosphere.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>16</sup>. Interview Thigpen with Shouse 18 November 1964, Neal D. Thigpen, "The Presidential Aspirations of Albert C. Ritchie" (M.A. Thesis, University of Maryland, 1966), pp. 105-6.

<sup>17</sup>. Tugwell Recollections, Columbia Oral History Collection, p. 28, p. 50-1, Samuel K. Bledsoe Recollections.

<sup>18</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 21 June 1932, p. 32.

However, the crowds that greeted Ritchie in Chicago were unplanned and were larger than those at his departure from Baltimore. When the Governor's long special train pulled into the Baltimore and Ohio station in Chicago shortly before noon there were thousands of cheering people massed inside and on the street. They wore big red and white armlets marked with "Win with Ritchie." Three bands were playing and hundreds of banners were displayed.<sup>19</sup>

Hundreds of cheering people fought their way down the tracks while photographers, hanging dangerously from the rafters, tried to get pictures. Ritchie was on the rear car, and the jam about it was so great that policemen were unable to keep the crowds under control. Jackson and O'Connor stood beside the Governor as many people tried to shake his hand. It was a long distance to the front of the station and every foot was a struggle. Women's clothes were torn and men were lifted off their feet. Even the ever-perfectly-dressed Ritchie lost one of his low-cut shoes and could not seem to get it back on because of the jostling of the crowd until he gamely jumped on a baggage truck and fixed it. The huge fife and drum corps of the Chicago Board of Trade struck up a marching tune as Ritchie was half carried through the cheering jam into a waiting automobile. None of the official welcoming committee from the city had even gotten near enough to shake the Governor's hand.<sup>20</sup>

A parade which followed the Governor's car was more than one-half mile long as it swung across the Loop on Jackson Boulevard. As it was

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19. Baltimore Evening Sun, 24 June 1932, p. 1.

20. Ibid., p. 1, 3.

noon hour crowds lined the streets all the way to the Congress Hotel where Ritchie was staying. Still another large group of citizens yelling "our next President" greeted Ritchie at the hotel and more than 1,000 people swarmed into the big public reception room on the second floor and pressed forward to shake the Governor's hand.<sup>21</sup>

The reception which greeted Ritchie impressed reporters covering the convention as it no doubt impressed other politicians. The New York Times estimated that 100,000 people had come out to greet Ritchie.<sup>22</sup> These demonstrations also seem to be part of the reason why Farley decided to offer the vice-presidential nomination to Ritchie before going to any other candidate.

When the Roosevelt men came to the convention, they were aware ~~that~~ they had gained the ultimate number of votes that they could on the strength of Roosevelt's own appeal. What now seemed to be the best strategy was to arrange a deal by which one of the other contenders surrendered his votes to Roosevelt for President in return for the vice-presidential nomination. Farley offered Ritchie the first opportunity to take the vice-presidential nomination, but exactly how the offer was sent to Ritchie is unclear. Baruch remembers himself as the intermediary.<sup>23</sup> Farley wrote that he had sent the offer to Ritchie through Mayor Jackson.<sup>24</sup> In the most detailed account, a Baltimore advertising man, Louis E. Schecter, wrote thirty-four years later that he came to Ritchie's suite in the Congress

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21. Baltimore Evening Sun, 24 June 1932, pp. 1, 3.

22. New York Times, 24 June 1932, p. 1.

23. Baruch, The Public Years, p. 240.

24. Martin, Ballots and Bandwagons, p. 163; Farley, Behind the Ballots (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1938), p. 114.

Hotel at 2:30 a.m. on the 25th to relay an interview which he had just had with Jim Farley. The interview had concerned the deal about the vice-presidency. Schecter had promised Farley an answer by nine the next morning, and he tried to persuade Ritchie to accept the offer, but Ritchie said politely that such a deal was impossible. Smith's men, Ritchie said, would stop Roosevelt and then back him, and besides he would rather be Governor of Maryland than Vice-President. Schecter had breakfast with Mayor Jackson at 7:30, and Jackson said that he felt Ritchie was being mislead by the Smith men, and he tried unsuccessfully to persuade Ritchie of this. When Schecter reported back to Farley at 9:00 a.m., he was forced to admit that Ritchie would not accept.<sup>25</sup>

After Ritchie refused, Farley went on to offer the vice-presidential nomination to Harry Byrd, to the Illinois Nash-Cermak machine which was holding its votes under the name of "favorite son" Melvin V. Traylor, and to House Speaker John Nance Garner. Only the Garner men seemed at all interested, and even then Sam Rayburn told Farley that he would have to wait three, four or even five ballots for an answer.<sup>26</sup>

Everything that happened on the first days of the convention was subject to such varying interpretations that Ritchie was able to justify that he had planned correctly and so could the Roosevelt forces. The latter managed to win the permanent chairmanship for their ally, Senator Walsh of Montana, but with less than two-thirds of the vote, and they were badly defeated on their abortive attempt to eliminate the rule that

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25. Louis E. Schecter, "I Remember Albert C. Ritchie" 1966, a five-page typed manuscript filed in the Maryland Historical Society.

26. Martin, Ballots and Bandwagons, pp. 148, 163.

two-thirds of the vote was necessary to win the nomination.<sup>27</sup> The very fact that the Roosevelt forces attempted a floor battle over the century-old "two-thirds" rule helped to convince Ritchie that Roosevelt knew that he could not get the two-thirds necessary for the nomination. The election of Walsh by less than two-thirds of the vote led Ritchie to the same conclusion. Newspapers reported that Ritchie's chances were growing better, especially if the rules fight meant that Roosevelt had been stopped.<sup>28</sup>

The next task of the convention, and one about which Ritchie was more concerned than Roosevelt, was the framing of a platform. On June 29th, the platform committee, on which E. Brooke Lee was the Maryland representative, reported its work to the entire convention. The prohibition issue had been resolved by a plank calling for the repeal of the prohibition against beer and wine. A more moderate plank which would have submitted the issue to individual states for separate action was defeated in committee and became the minority suggestion.<sup>29</sup> The minority plank reached the floor in a speech by Cordell Hull, but it was poorly received.<sup>30</sup> Ritchie was among the speakers for the majority position. He reminded the delegates that he had made the same arguments from the convention platform twelve years ago when they were considerably less popular than they were in 1932.<sup>31</sup>

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27. Baltimore Evening Sun, 27 June 1932, p. 1.

28. New York Times, United Press, Associated Press, 27 June 1932.

29. Baltimore Evening Sun, 29 June 1932, p. 1; Martin, Ballots and Bandwagons, p. 179.

30. Martin, Ballots and Bandwagons, p. 173.

31. Democratic National Committee, Official Report of the Democratic National Convention of 1932, p. 177; James Farley, Jim Farley's Story (New York: McGraw Hill Co., 1948), p. 18.

When the matter came to a vote, the convention voted to accept the majority plank by an overwhelming vote of 932-3/4 to 213-3/4. Ritchie saw the vote as an indicator of his support, and Smith's forces felt that they had put Roosevelt in an embarrassing position since much of his support was from the dry southern and western delegates who were backing Roosevelt as a dry, and he would now have to endorse a "wet" plank. On the other hand, Farley felt that in passing the prohibition repeal plank, the convention had removed the most important reason for nominating either Ritchie or Smith.<sup>32</sup>

The newspapers of that day, however, continued to report that Ritchie's chances were rising. William A. White noted that if Roosevelt were stopped, Smith could not win the nomination and that then either Ritchie or Baker would be the nominee with Roosevelt's cooperation. Canvasses of the second choice votes in other delegations revealed great Ritchie strength.<sup>33</sup> The New York Herald Tribune reported that Ritchie and not Baker stood at the top of the list of those to whom the convention would turn in case of a Roosevelt-Smith deadlock. Mark Sullivan wrote that Ritchie was the only candidate among the non-Roosevelt forces "who has a good faith, serious, hope to win."<sup>34</sup> The United Press also reported that Ritchie and not Baker was the likely choice in case of the need of a compromise candidate. There also arose at this stage of the convention a popular slogan which was being chanted by many delegates: "Roosevelt, Ritchie and Repeal."<sup>35</sup>

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32. New York Times, 30 June 1932; Baltimore Evening Sun, 30 June 1932; Friedel, The Triumph, p. 303.

33. Baltimore Evening Sun, 30 June 1932; New York Times, 28, 29, 30 June 1932; but also see C. H. Cramer, Newton D. Baker (New York: World Publishing Company, 1961), p. 252.

34. New York Herald Tribune, 28 June 1932.

35. Baltimore Evening Sun, 30 June 1932.

On June 1st, the candidates were placed into nomination. Roosevelt's name was the first presented, and it was followed by a comparatively short demonstration of which H. L. Mencken wrote, "I can recall no candidate of importance who ever had so few fanatics whooping it up for him. His followers were as silent as if they were up to something unpalatable to the police."<sup>36</sup> Following the nominations of Garner, Smith and Byrd, Ritchie was nominated by Senator Millard Tydings. The Senator presented Ritchie as a "man steeped in the great and lasting principles upon which our Democracy was founded, and it is those principles alone which can take us out of the gloom." "Ritchie," he said further, "is a man who will appeal alike to the sections and inspire enthusiasm everywhere.... a stalwart, magnetic figure with a courageous heart and a sound, inspiring personality." Then Tydings reviewed Ritchie's record in Maryland, his increasingly large majorities in each of his four elections for Governor, and placed stress on "his liberal principles and humanitarian heart." Tydings made great claims about Maryland's reduced taxes and balanced budget; he stressed the State's reduction of bureaucracy, its excellent health and educational programs, and finally ended by describing Ritchie as the "symbol of vigor and honesty" whose appeal was beyond sectional boundaries.<sup>37</sup>

The speech was followed as usual by a demonstration. It was probably the noisiest of the convention, and it lasted forty minutes. Delegates with banners of Texas, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Iowa, New Jersey, and other states were in the parade headed by James A. Forkin of Baltimore, but as

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36. Baltimore Evening Sun, 30 June 1932.

37. Democratic National Committee, Official Report of the Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention of 1932, pp. 143-6.

Farley remarked to Ritchie during the parade, it was votes and not noise that counted.<sup>38</sup>

After several more nominating and seconding speeches, the last speech of the evening was made by George P. Marshall of the District of Columbia who said:

Perspiring delegates, I'm closing the show. This is the finish. There is one thing I would like to say to you. We haven't got a vote in the District of Columbia, but there are certain people in the District who have ideas. We have to do one thing that no one else in this convention had to do--we have to live with the next President. We have to live with the nominee, and we have lived next door to a man that we know is worthwhile living with. I second the nomination of Albert C. Ritchie.<sup>39</sup>

At this point, Chairman Walso called in "Alfalfa Bill" Murray's band of girls dressed in kilts to wake the delegates, and then at 4:28 a.m., he banged the gavel and roared "The clerk will call the roll for the first ballot for the nomination for the President of the United States."<sup>40</sup> The ballot took two full hours as delegates demanded polls of each member of nearly every delegation to discover specific delegate strength of each of the candidates. The vote ended: Roosevelt 664- $\frac{1}{2}$ , Smith 201- $\frac{1}{2}$ , Garner 94- $\frac{1}{2}$ , Byrd 25, Traylor, 42- $\frac{1}{2}$ , Ritchie 21, Reed 24, White 52, Murray 23, Baker 8- $\frac{1}{2}$ .<sup>41</sup>

There is no doubt that tension was the main theme of the evening. The Roosevelt drive gained 12- $\frac{1}{2}$  votes on the second ballot of the 103

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38. Baltimore Evening Sun, 1 July 1932, p. 3; Farley, Behind the Ballots, p. 139.

39. Democratic National Committee, Official Report of the Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention of 1932, p. 287.

40. Ibid., p. 288.

41. Ibid., p. 291.



and a fraction which they needed. Several of these Farley had carefully hoarded on the opening ballot, but even then the result was not impressive. Ritchie was still certain that his waiting policy was the correct one. On the third ballot, Roosevelt gained still less, only 4-½ votes, and a worried Farley had Walsh adjourn the session as fast as possible. Wilted delegates struggled out on the street around 9:00 a.m. in the morning.<sup>42</sup>

Quite naturally frantic work was being done all evening by the backers of nearly every candidate. Basically the Roosevelt forces were trying to collect by any possible deal the votes which were necessary to get their candidate the required two-thirds of the vote. Ritchie, Smith and the other hopefuls were working to prevent any such deals from being made, but they were probably a little over-confident that they had Roosevelt stopped.<sup>43</sup> Most of the accounts of the evening were stories of tragic near-errors or knick-of-time successes, but the frantic canvassing produced occasional humorous results. The future Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, was one of the most fervent Ritchie backers. Sometime during the morning after the third ballot he cornered Mr. and Mrs. Lewis Douglas and took them into Ritchie headquarters for a drink. Two women in the room asked Acheson what was going to happen, and he replied, "I think we got that so-and-so stopped." The ladies then introduced themselves as Mrs. James Roosevelt and Roosevelt's married daughter, Mrs. Dahl. Acheson with complete aplomb said, "Suppose we start again."<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>42</sup>. Martin, Ballots and Bandwagons, p. 188.

<sup>43</sup>. Henry L. Mencken, The Making of a President (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1932), p. 126.

<sup>44</sup>. Arthur Krock, "Recollections," (Columbia Oral History Collection, 1955), pp. 7-9.

Delegate Marion Dickerman reported that in the Roosevelt headquarters Howe and Farley were in a state of complete exhaustion, and simply lying on the floor. Electric fans were turned on Howe who was so weak with asthma that he could not make himself heard when he spoke. Farley was so fatigued that when he remembered to send out for food, all he could think of was ice cream.<sup>45</sup>

However, there was really no time for anyone to rest, and in all headquarters, men revived themselves in a few minutes as the fierce bargaining of the previous day continued. Farley concentrated his efforts on the Garner block of votes and through a complex set of talks he had arranged a deal by the time the session began in the afternoon. Roosevelt's law partner later commented that at least 62,000 of the 55,000 Democrats in Chicago claim to have negotiated the agreement.<sup>46</sup> Garner had agreed to release his delegates more from a sense of party loyalty than anything else for he did not want the party involved in a struggle as that of 1924.<sup>47</sup> But Garner was still obligated to Hearst who remained doubtful about Roosevelt's foreign policy ideas. Before Garner agreed to the deal, he checked if it would be acceptable to Hearst. Hearst then tried to check whom the convention would nominate if Roosevelt was stopped. If Ritchie would have been the candidate,

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<sup>45</sup>. Martin, Behind the Ballots, pp. 189-190, 281.

<sup>46</sup>. Friedel, The Triumph, p. 304; William Leuchtenberg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 8.

<sup>47</sup>. Leuchtenberg, p. 8; Garner interview in New York Times, 2 July 1932; Bascon Timmons, Garner of Texas (New York, 1948), pp. 159-168. Burton K. Wheeler and Paul F. Healy, Yankee From the West (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1962), p. 287; S. S. McKay, "John N. Garner," West Texas Historical Association, XXXVII (October, 1961), p. 26.

then he would have advised Garner not to withdraw. But Joseph Kennedy informed Hearst that Baker and not Ritchie would be the compromise choice and so great were Hearst's fears that Kennedy would be correct, that he reluctantly decided not to gamble and told Garner to withdraw in favor of Roosevelt.<sup>48</sup>

But even at this point Roosevelt was still not assured of the nomination. Garner released his delegates, but he could not insure that Texas or California would go for Roosevelt. Ironically, the Texas delegation had been filled with anti-Roosevelt men when it was formed, and now these men did not approve of the deal, and Garner was in Washington and unable to persuade them personally of its wisdom. The California delegation was dependent on McAdoo's instructions, and McAdoo still had vague hopes that he might be a compromise choice of the convention.<sup>49</sup> Hugh Young was frantically canvassing the Texas delegation at this point, and Young was persuasive because of the number of successful serious operations he had already performed on various delegates.<sup>50</sup> Young related in his own autobiography that he was heartbroken that the Texas delegation caucused when sixteen Ritchie men were out of the room. Their votes, he said, would have given the delegation to Ritchie, and that would have been the final blow to the Roosevelt drive.<sup>51</sup> McAdoo also eventually

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48. Krock, "Recollections," pp. 7-9; Richard J. Whalen, The Founding Father (New York: New American Library, 1964), p. 124.

49. James M. Burns, F.D.R., The Lion and the Fox (New York: Harcourt Brace and World, 1956), p. 137.

50. "I think Garner would make a great president, said delegate T. M. Washington, but I might have to go back to Johns Hopkins, and if I did, Doc Young might not admit me. He's that strong for Ritchie." Quotation in Martin, Ballots & Bandwagons, p. 195.

51. Hugh H. Young, The Autobiography of a Surgeon (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1940), p. 528.

agreed to the deal, probably to end Smith's hopes and to even the score for 1924, but he waited so long to decide that he had to hitch a ride on a motorcycle in order to arrive at the convention hall after his car ran out of gas. He ran on to the floor barely in time to cast the California votes.<sup>52</sup>

When McAdoo finished speaking on the floor, Ritchie's hopes were ended. Unlike Smith, who marched angrily out of the hall, Ritchie remained impassive, but behind the mask he was suffering great disappointment.<sup>53</sup> He later admitted how unwise he had been to refuse Roosevelt's original offer of the vice-presidency which he had rejected so cavalierly a few days before.<sup>54</sup>

The next morning Bernard Baruch went to Roosevelt headquarters and asked Farley if it was still possible to consider Ritchie for the vice-presidential nomination. Farley replied that Garner was their choice, and there were no other considerations to be made.<sup>55</sup> On June 2nd, H. L. Mencken optimistically wrote that Ritchie was the least hurt of all the candidates, and would be offered an important place in the cabinet if he should want it.<sup>56</sup> This was simply wishful thinking. Roosevelt was not happy with Ritchie's rejection of the vice-presidency and was still suspicious of Ritchie's friendship with Smith as well as of Ritchie's attempt to block Roosevelt's nomination. According to Farley, Ritchie

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52. Burns, The Lion and the Fox, p. 147; Schlesinger, The Crisis of the Old Order, pp. 309-11.

53. Schlesinger, The Crisis of the Old Order, p. 310.

54. Schechter, "I Remember Ritchie," p. 4.

55. Friedel, The Ordeal, p. 313; Martin, Ballots and Bandwagons, p. 201.

56. Baltimore Evening Sun, 2 July 1932, p. 1.

was never even considered for a place in the cabinet.<sup>57</sup>

Ritchie left the convention a sad, disappointed man. He had gambled on a set of circumstances to win the presidential nomination which never materialized. But he might well have had the vice-presidential nomination, and here only an error of political judgment unattached to any uncontrollable circumstances was at fault. He was fifty-five years old, and it was doubtful that any such opportunity would come to him again. His Maryland fiefdom yielded small consolation after the whole kingdom had seemed so nearly his.

Still Ritchie spent his time working for a Democratic victory in November. On August 25th, Roosevelt announced that his old friend, George Radcliffe, the first vice-president of Fidelity Deposit Company, would head the Maryland campaign. This was a definite, unintentional slap at the Ritchie organization in Maryland, since Radcliffe was completely unknown in State politics.<sup>58</sup> Ritchie did not take offence, as he still had hopes of a larger national job for himself. On August 25th, he visited the national campaign headquarters in New York and then went to Albany where he stayed overnight with Roosevelt.<sup>59</sup> Ritchie did not comment on what he and the Democratic nominee had discussed, but he seemed assured by the results of the meeting.<sup>60</sup> Roosevelt had decided to use Ritchie as a speaker for the ticket in the large eastern and mid-western cities where the Marylander's anti-prohibition stand had made him a

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57. Farley, Jim Farley's Story, p. 33.

58. Baltimore Evening Sun, 25 August 1932, p. 30.

59. Ibid., 30 August 1932, p. 28.

60. Ibid., 31 August 1931, p. 26.

popular figure. Between October 16th and 27th, Ritchie went on an extended tour, speaking to large audiences in Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Buffalo and Indianapolis.<sup>61</sup>

Ritchie returned to Maryland once in the middle of his speaking engagements to appear with Roosevelt when the candidate spoke in Baltimore on October 25th. Ritchie seemed less enthused about the task than when he had introduced Smith from the same platform four years earlier.<sup>62</sup> Neither Ritchie nor Roosevelt remained in Baltimore after the speech. Ritchie went to Indianapolis to give the last of his major addresses for Roosevelt, and then returned to Maryland where he continued to work for the last two weeks of the campaign.<sup>63</sup>

The results of the election in Maryland were a reflection of the national mood. Roosevelt defeated Hoover with just short of a 130,000 vote majority in Maryland while Senator Tydings was elected by a 150,000 plurality and nearly 70 percent of the total vote. All six Democratic Congressmen were reelected by large majorities. But however gratifying these results must have been to Roosevelt, there was nothing unusual about them when they were placed in the national perspective.<sup>64</sup> Nor did the results of the vote in Maryland or Ritchie's personal efforts for the campaign win him any special favor. No place in the national administration was ever offered to Ritchie, nor did he ever play an important part in national affairs again.

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61. Ibid., 24 October 1932, p. 30; Ritchie Diary, 16-27 October 1932, in Ritchie Papers.

62. Baltimore Evening Sun, 27 October 1932, p. 38.

63. Ritchie Diary, 27 October-8 November 1932.

64. Baltimore Evening Sun, 9 November 1932, p. 1.

## CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

## LOCAL AFFAIRS OF 1933 AND THE 1934 ELECTION

When Ritchie returned home without winning the Democratic presidential nomination in 1932, his popularity suffered a severe decline. In the next two years, he often faced challenges to his leadership by Democrats who felt it was long since time for him to relinquish the governorship and by those who differed with his handling of depression problems. On October 13th, Mayor Jackson requested that a special session of the legislature be called so he could estimate his revenues for the coming years.<sup>1</sup> Jackson insisted that relief expenses made ordinary procedures obsolete, and he needed to know how much the State was going to contribute to the city with some degree of definiteness, but Ritchie said that he would call the General Assembly only if it were "absolutely necessary." When Jackson refused to accept this cue and stated that such a necessity did exist, Ritchie insisted that the Mayor would have to wait until the regular session anyway.<sup>2</sup> Naturally, such matters did not increase the friendship between the Mayor and the Governor.

Ritchie was still concerned about the next legislative session even though he had objected to the special session. At the end of October, he was already hard at work planning the budget for the next two years. In December, Ritchie announced that the present State tax rate would not be raised, and that the budget would be balanced by cutting expenses

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1. Baltimore Evening Sun, 13 October 1932, p. 38.

2. Ibid., 17 October 1932, p. 28.

within every department in the State.<sup>3</sup> Then he worked every day to reduce the budget still further to which end he had dinner almost every night with State purchasing agent Walter Kirkman.<sup>4</sup>

Before the end of the year, Governor Ritchie had another disagreement with Mayor Jackson. The Mayor was still worried about how to plan for his city budget for the coming year. On December 14th, Jackson went to Annapolis to try to obtain from Ritchie an assurance that there would be a State bond issue to allow the city to fund for the excess of six and one-quarter million dollars spent on relief in 1932 and expected to be spent in 1933.<sup>5</sup> The next day, Jackson angrily went to see private bankers, and stated that the Governor's actions had made it necessary for him to do so because Ritchie had refused to give him the proper assurances of funding for the city.<sup>6</sup> Ritchie answered haughtily that Baltimore's needs would be properly seen to, but that he did not have the power to agree to an exact plan since that would be usurpation of a legislative function. The Governor stated that he only intended to avoid borrowing from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. The answer did not satisfy the Mayor, and the two men remained at odds.<sup>7</sup>

The legislature opened on January 4th; it convened only to hear Ritchie's message, and postponed its decisions about organization. The Governor's message was a surprise. As usual, it dealt mainly with the

3. Baltimore Evening Sun, 12 December 1932, p. 30.

4. Ritchie Diary, 12-30 December 1932, in Ritchie Papers.

5. Baltimore Evening Sun, 14 December 1932, p. 1.

6. Ibid., 15 December 1932, p. 38.

7. Ibid., 16 December 1932, p. 1.



budget, but Ritchie recommended that the State tax rate be cut three cents from 25¢ to 22¢ on each \$100. In doing so, he assured the citizens that the budget would still be balanced. The reduction, however, was mainly illusory; further on in his message, Ritchie recommended another new tax, a commodity tax, for the purpose of collecting additional revenue:

The Governor admitted that the purpose of the new tax was to shift some of the tax burdens from real estate.

Much of his message was highly technical; matters concerning new arrangements for the allotment of revenues were given thorough explanation. He did not mention any new legislation. Finally, Ritchie announced that he would contribute 10 percent of his \$4,500 salary and 10 percent of the State funds allotted for running the executive mansion to the State treasury. He recommended that all State officials follow him by contributing this tithe from their wages. In his only statement that did not concern fiscal matters, Ritchie asked the legislature to be prepared for the possible liberalization of the Volstead Act.<sup>8</sup>

When the legislature reconvened on January 11th, it organized swiftly and without difficulty; as expected, T. Barton Harrington replaced Michael Lindsay as speaker of the House of Delegates. For the following month, the legislature worked mainly on the budget. The whole budget debate became very intricate, and on February 15th, the legislature even resorted to secret budget hearings despite objections.<sup>9</sup> Very little had been accomplished when Ritchie appeared before a joint session of the

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8. Baltimore Evening Sun, 4 January 1933, p. 1; Maryland House of Delegates, Journal of the Proceedings of the Maryland House of Delegates, 1933, pp. 14-53.

9. Baltimore Evening Sun, 15 February 1933, p. 30.

finance committees of both houses with a revision of his original budget. The main import of the Governor's changes was that the budget would be slashed even further than previously. The new reductions would then eliminate the need for the commodity taxes, the very suggestion of which had proved to be very unpopular. The cuts were made at the expense of schools and other State-supported institutions.<sup>10</sup>

But the legislature had no time to consider the Governor's revised budget before it faced the greatest fiscal crisis of the depression. In February, 1933, banks all over the United States began to close their doors. Sound banks suffered from "runs" by nervous depositors which threatened to collapse the entire banking system in the nation. On February 29th, Ritchie felt that it was necessary to declare a bank holiday in Maryland to save the rickety banking structure in the State. He called administrative leaders to his offices and together they began to work on emergency banking legislation. The bill they wrote was approved by representatives of the banking and business communities, the depositors, and the public generally before Ritchie appeared in person before the General Assembly on the night of February 28th to present the new measure. The legislation was very complex; its basic purpose was to set up preferred creditors for existing deposits. It also created a State banking commissioner to regulate banks within the State for maximum safety of all depositors.

On February 25th, Ritchie had gone on the radio to assure the citizens of the State that the system was truly sound, and that the new

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10. Baltimore Evening Sun, 15 February 1933, p. 30.

11. Ibid., 23 February 1933, p. 1, 3, 27 February 1933, p. 1, 28 February 1933, p. 1, 3; Maryland Senate, Journal of Proceedings of the Senate of Maryland, 1933, p. 465.

measures would be merely protective. The legislature received copies of the administration-prepared bill on the morning of March 1st, but despite the Governor's wishes, passage was not quite automatic. The lawmakers considered the bill for three days, and then approved it much as it had been presented to them. But Ritchie still extended the bank holiday because he was uncertain about the stability of the State banking structure against a panic.<sup>12</sup> On March 8th, Ritchie and E. Brooke Lee went to the White House to speak to Roosevelt about the new federal banking legislation, and Ritchie seemed displeased with the results of the talk. A few days later, he unleashed his first attack on the new administration, claiming that the new legislation was unfair to banks which were not members of the Federal Reserve System.<sup>13</sup> Not until March 14th did Ritchie allow the banks in the State to open and resume normal functioning.<sup>14</sup> The Governor was almost universally commended for his actions in the banking crisis. Most people seemed to feel that it was his strong, certain leadership that had preserved the State banking system from imminent collapse. On March 17th, the members of the House of Delegates adopted a resolution endorsing his leadership.<sup>15</sup>

By the time the banking crisis was ended, only three weeks remained for the legislature to finish its work which still included the budget. On March 16th, Ritchie waived the need for an itemized reduction of the

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12. Baltimore Evening Sun, 1 March 1933, p. 1, 4 March 1933, p. 1; Frederick Lewis Allen, Since Yesterday (Harper and Brothers, 1939), p. 79; Maryland House of Delegates, Journal of the Proceedings of the Maryland House of Delegates, 1933, p. 372.

13. Baltimore Post, 8 March 1933; Baltimore Sun, 12 March 1933.

14. Baltimore Sun, 14 March 1933.

15. Baltimore Evening Sun, 17 March 1933, p. 44.

budget. He said that he would approve a blanket cut of five million dollars and allow his aides to make it specific in the future, so that the legislature could be free to do other work. In effect, the Governor had agreed to even greater reductions in his budget than those he had suggested after three months of paring it himself.<sup>16</sup>

Even with the additional time, the General Assembly did not accomplish much of importance. Much of the time was spent in passing the necessary legislation for calling a State convention to act on the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment. Congress had repealed the Volstead Act, and the Governor anticipated that there would now be action on repeal of the amendment. He intended for Maryland to be prepared in advance for the possibility. Ritchie insisted that the State law department draft the legislation because he wanted to be certain that there were no technical challenges to Maryland's action for repeal.<sup>17</sup>

A perennial matter that faced the General Assembly was oyster conservation because the Governor usually placed this high on his list of concerns. The 1933 session was distinguished by an all-night filibuster by Senator Coad who spoke more than twelve hours until 8:10 in the morning on March 25th. Coad objected to Ritchie's proposal that conservation legislation be relaxed. Coad pointed out, probably correctly, that Ritchie's suggestion that some oyster beds then closed to dredging be opened for two months a year was not a sudden change in the Governor's ideas about the need for seafood conservation. It was, rather, he said, a transparent

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16. Baltimore Evening Sun, 16 March 1933, p. 1; Maryland Senate, Journal of Proceedings of the Senate of Maryland, 1933, pp. 542, 589, 728, 733, 950.

17. Baltimore Evening Sun, 18 February 1933, p. 1; Maryland House of Delegates, Journal of the Proceedings of the Maryland House of Delegates, 1933, p. 1000.

maneuver on Ritchie's part to try to polish his political image in areas of the State where it had been tarnished by his actions against lynching and prohibition.<sup>18</sup>

The General Assembly finished its business on April 4th with the usual rush of last-minute legislation. After it adjourned, the Governor spent the next fourteen days reviewing the bills which had passed in order to decide which of them to sign into law and which to veto. This was just a routine gesture, for many bills had passed which Ritchie had not proposed nor previously considered, and on a few controversial measures he felt it wise to listen to the testimony of proponents and opponents of the bills. On the night of April 20th, the last day before he could legally veto bills, Ritchie remained at his desk all night evaluating the legislation, but all of the thirty-four measures which he vetoed the next day were inconsequential.<sup>19</sup>

After the legislative matters were finished, Ritchie relaxed. During the session, he had entertained at the executive mansion almost six nights every week. Most of his guests were legislators whose support he was soliciting.<sup>20</sup> He was anticipating the 1934 elections although they were still eighteen months in the future. During May and June there were an increasing number of rumors that Mayor Jackson would run for Governor, and Jackson had stated frankly that he wanted the job.<sup>21</sup>

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18. Baltimore Evening Sun, 25 March 1933, p. 25; Maryland House of Delegates, Journal of the Proceedings of the Maryland House of Delegates, 1933, pp. 791, 1010; Maryland Senate, Journal of Proceedings of the Maryland Senate, 1933, p. 171, 702, 843, 1131.

19. Baltimore Evening Sun, 13 April 1933, p. 30.

20. Ritchie Diary, 12 January - 3 April 1933, in Ritchie Papers.

21. Baltimore Evening Sun, 17 May 1933, p. 1, 7 July 1933, p. 40.

Ritchie did not answer the challenge directly. He was, however, becoming increasingly aware that his support was waning. Part of his problem was that the national administration had decided to cut his power by disregarding his suggestions on the distribution of Federal patronage. Although Farl was not particularly fond of Senator Tydings, he choose to create Tydings as a rival to Ritchie for the head of the Democratic Party in Maryland. He did this by giving jobs to friends of the Senator whom he hoped would be a more pliable ally than the Governor. At this time the friendship between Tydings and Jackson was growing. All these matters were ominous signs to Ritchie who did his best to combat them by keeping silent about his objections to Roosevelt.<sup>22</sup>

Ritchie's tactful silence did not seem to help. One very important appointment was the director of the Federal Works Program in Maryland. On July 4th, Ritchie visited Roosevelt in Washington to recommend friends for the job, but on the next day Roosevelt announced his appointment of George Radcliffe as Maryland's administrator. Results were similar with the selection of collector of United States customs, United States marshall and other jobs. None of the men whom Ritchie recommended were appointed.<sup>23</sup> Naturally, this had the effect of causing politicians to turn from the Governor to men who would better insure them of rewards for their loyalty.

But the depression was still severe and Ritchie's regular administrative work load was heavier than usual so that he could not spend all his time on politics. Much of his work was devoted to deciding how to

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22. Baltimore Evening Sun, 31 August 1933, contains an analysis of the specific appoints and Farley's motivation in making them.

23. Ibid., 4 July 1933, p. 1, 31 August 1933, p. 32.

apply the revenues which the Federal Government assigned to the States for relief.<sup>24</sup> In between his administrative work, Ritchie tried to do some preliminary campaigning in the areas of the State where he feared he was badly losing popularity.<sup>25</sup> The extra burdens of his schedule were affecting his health. On July 29th, while he was in Ocean City, Maryland, as a guest of Comptroller Gordy, the blood vessels in his nose hemorrhaged, but the bleeding was stopped without great damage, and Ritchie promised to "take it easy for a while."<sup>26</sup> The Governor did lighten his schedule considerably during August, but at the end of the month, he was still weak and his doctors advised him to leave business for two weeks to relax completely. Ritchie agreed that this was necessary, but he had difficulty deciding which two weeks he could best afford to leave the State.<sup>27</sup> He felt that he needed to be in Baltimore City to head the N.R.A. parade on August 25th, and in Atlantic City for the Maryland State Bar Association meeting during the following week.<sup>28</sup>

Not for anything would Ritchie have been out of the State on September 12th when the vote for the delegates to the Maryland convention on repeal of the 18th Amendment took place. When he went to vote in Annapolis, Ritchie said, "This is something which I have been waiting to

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<sup>24</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 5 July 1933, p. 28.

<sup>25</sup>. Ibid., 1 June 1933, p. 36, 17 June 1933, p. 14; Ritchie Diary, 16, 17 June 1933, in Ritchie Papers.

<sup>26</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 29 July 1933, p. 12.

<sup>27</sup>. Ritchie to Robert Sindall, 12 September 1933, in Ritchie Correspondence.

<sup>28</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 12 December 1933, pp. 1, 34.

do for years."<sup>29</sup> Ritchie was pleased by the results--202,453 voters had chosen delegates pledged to vote for repeal. Only 43,136 had voted for delegates opposing repeal and 3,527 votes had gone to a slate of unpledged delegates. The Governor, who had called only two special sessions of the legislature in the past thirteen years, and then with extreme reluctance because emergency matters that required immediate legislation forced him to, announced that he was likely to call a special session before the end of the year to enact laws for control of liquor after repeal took place. He had also directed Attorney General Lane to study all types of plans for regulation of alcoholic beverages.<sup>30</sup>

In October, Ritchie finally managed to find time to leave the State for the vacation which the doctors had recommended. Ritchie remained in Hot Springs, Virginia, from October 4th through October 15th, but he was unable to follow directions to get away from business.

He was joined by Frank Furst, and most people were speculating that the purpose of Furst's visit was to try to dissuade Ritchie from seeking another term as Governor.<sup>31</sup>

When Ritchie returned to the State, he faced two major problems. He had to plan for the special session of the State legislature, and he was required to take action to punish those involved in the lynching of a Black man who was to have been tried for murder in Princess Anne, Somerset County, on Maryland's Eastern Shore.

George Armwood, a twenty-eight-year-old Black had been accused of attacking a seventy-one-year-old woman, and local residents were too

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29. Baltimore Evening Sun, 13 September 1933, p. 3.

30. Ibid., p. 1.

31. Ibid., 3 October 1933, p. 46.



impatient to wait for a proper trial, even though Federal Judge Duer had gone out in the street personally to try to dissuade them. In a scene of terrifying brutality, the mob broke through the small contingent of State police guarding the prisoner, dragged him by rope tied around his neck for a mile from the prison, and there covered his body with gasoline, ignited it, and burned him to death.<sup>32</sup> The mob included women and children. It outraged responsible citizens in other parts of the State, but seemed completely justified to Eastern Shore residents. The governor was caught between two opposing views and tried to find a middle-of-the-road answer which at least seemed to protect the process of law while still not offending Somerset County residents. Ritchie sent Attorney General Lane to investigate the matter, but he noted that punitive action still remained in the hands of the local grand jury. He also announced that he was considering anti-lynching legislation, but he refused to elaborate on the kind of laws he preferred.<sup>33</sup> Lane was thorough in his investigation of the lynchings, and on November 17th, he asked the local prosecutor, Robbins, to arrest several members of the lynching mob, but the prosecutor refused.<sup>34</sup> Somerset County residents and newspapers made Robbins into a local hero for his refusal to arrest the men. Despite the political consequences, Ritchie was unwilling to have the law flouted. He directed Attorney General Lane to arrest the men, and, when local townsmen threatened to prevent the men from being brought into court, Ritchie sent the National Guard to the Eastern Shore to ensure that the law be properly enforced. This resulted in a pitched

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32. Baltimore Evening Sun, 19 October 1933, p. 1.

33. Baltimore Sun, 19 October 1933, 20 October 1933.

34. Ibid., 17 November 1933.

battle between two hundred local residents and three hundred members of the National Guard. Among other things the angry Eastern Shore men and women stoned the car of the Attorney General. In order to disperse the mob, tear gas had to be used.<sup>35</sup>

Due to the persistence of Ritchie and Lane, the members of the lynching mob were eventually brought into court, but a local grand jury refused to indict them. Because of his actions, Ritchie became the object of fierce hatred on the Eastern Shore. Members of all the Eastern Shore counties introduced a resolution in the special session of the legislature which was then in session condemning the Governor for sending troops. The N.R.A. signs in store windows on the Eastern Shore were changed to read "Never Ritchie Again, I'll do my part."<sup>36</sup> The matter created an intense hatred of Ritchie which did not expire quickly and was an obvious factor in the 1934 election.

At the same time, Ritchie was also occupied with preparations for the special session of the State legislature. He announced in late October that he would convene the General Assembly by mid-November.<sup>37</sup> Three days before the opening meeting, Ritchie presented four points which he wanted the lawmakers to consider. First he explained a twelve-point liquor control plan for the State, the most important points of which were that there would be a separate license for light wines and beer, the allowance of purchase of liquor in bars where no food was sold, and an excise tax of \$1.10 per gallon on the sale of all liquors in addition to special licensing fees. The Governor also presented bills which would allow local subdivisions

35. Baltimore Sun, 28 November 1933.

36. Ibid., 28 November 1933, 1 December 1933; Baltimore Evening Sun, 28 November 1933.

37. Ibid., 30 October 1933, p. 39, 20 November 1933, p. 30.

in the State to take greater advantage of public works and unemployment relief.

Finally, he suggested laws to expedite criminal procedures in the State courts and banking legislation to keep the State in line with new Federal laws. Ritchie said he hoped that the legislature would agree to limit itself to these matters.<sup>38</sup>

The legislature opened on November 23rd. It did not move nearly so efficiently as Ritchie hoped. Anti-lynching laws were introduced by Republican legislators on the first day, and by the end of the session on December 12th, 193 bills were presented, of which 112 passed.<sup>39</sup> Severe challenge was mounted against Ritchie's liquor legislation, especially against the excise tax provision.<sup>40</sup> However, despite strong opposition, all the measures that Ritchie requested were passed. The Governor had also given his support to the anti-lynching bills, but there he was unable to muster enough support to carry them to victory.<sup>41</sup>

But even though Ritchie got most of the laws he wanted and all that he specifically requested, the legislative session was not a popular success. His proposals for liquor control were considered too lenient by many. His support of anti-lynching legislation, combined with his sending troops to Somerset County, created great hostility in rural areas. At the end of the year there was more outspoken criticism of the Governor than there had been at any time in his fourteen years in the State House.

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38. Baltimore Evening Sun, 21 November 1933, p. 30; Maryland Senate, Journal of the Proceedings of the Maryland Senate, 1933, pp. 3-12.

39. Baltimore Evening Sun, 23 November 1933, p. 38, 12 December 1933, p. 38.

40. Ibid., 24 November 1933, p. 52.

41. Ibid.

Also, the heavy work schedule was still affecting the Governor's health. In late November he again was ill, probably with the grippe or influenza. From November 28th until December 6th, he was confined to his bed.<sup>42</sup> He insisted that he was well enough to get up and conduct hearings on bills passed by the special General Assembly, and he worked long hours to get all the new legislation signed on time. But when he saw his doctors in mid-January, they told him that he was still not fully recovered and that he should make every effort to rest.<sup>43</sup>

At the end of February, Ritchie took a vacation with Bernard Baruch at the financier's South Carolina home. During this time, there were rumors that Ritchie would be chosen for a Federal post. However, when he returned and visited Washington, it was merely to discuss relief problems with Harry Hopkins.<sup>44</sup>

At the end of May, Ritchie felt the problems of relief in the State needed review. He seemed to have felt that the State required more money, so he went to Washington with State relief administrator Harry Greenstein and Mayor Jackson to see Harry Hopkins to discuss the relief situation.<sup>45</sup> The results of this conference were not to his liking. Hopkins insisted that Maryland could afford to carry much more of the relief burden than she was doing, and after the conference he announced that Federal funds to Maryland would be cut by one-third.<sup>46</sup> This forced Ritchie to call a

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<sup>42</sup>. Ritchie Diary, 28 November 1933-6 December 1933, in Ritchie Papers.

<sup>43</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 13 January 1933, p. 52.

<sup>44</sup>. Ibid., 20 March 1934, p. 42, 21 March 1934, p. 32.

<sup>45</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 28 May 1934, p. 30.

<sup>46</sup>. Ibid., 1 June 1934, p. 52, 2 June 1934, p. 1, 7.

conference of State employees and members of the Baltimore Association of Commerce and several charity representatives together to decide how new funds should be raised.<sup>47</sup> Some of the members of the conference felt that a bond issue should be passed for raising the money for relief, but the Governor state his unequivocal objection to this although he said he would agree to any other method of raising the money.<sup>48</sup> Not until September 19th did Ritchie decide anything about the relief problem, and all he did then was to put planks in the Democratic platform promising unemployment relief and old-age pensions.<sup>49</sup>

Even more than the relief issue, the problems concerning the November election were foremost in Ritchie's mind during the spring and summer of 1934. To this end, he went to as many ceremonial appearances as possible during the spring and summer of the year, but poor health kept these very limited in number compared with previous years.

Talk about the election had begun in the spring of 1933 when there was speculation that Mayor Jackson would run for Governor and Jackson did nothing to quiet the rumors.<sup>50</sup> His disagreements with Ritchie on relief and how to finance it in Baltimore City continued through the summer and fall; this convinced many people that he was seriously considering challenging the Governor even if it meant a primary contest.

There was one definite contender in the primary for Governor by the end of the summer of 1933, but his opposition to Ritchie was considered

47. Baltimore Evening Sun, 4 June 1934, p. 32, 6 June 1934, p. 32.

48. Ibid., 8 June 1934, p. 56.

49. Ibid., 19 September 1934, p. 32.

50. Baltimore Evening Sun, 7 May 1933, 21 July 1933.

unimportant. Dr. Charles H. Conley of Frederick, Maryland, had announced his candidacy on August 30th and filed his formal papers on the following day. Dr. Conley, a physician and banker, had long been an extremely anti-Ritchie Democrat, and the Governor had done his best to destroy Conley's power in Frederick County. In 1930, Conley had been one of the first and most ardent supporters of State senator McIntosh when a primary against Ritchie had been expected. In 1934, Conley announced that he, himself, was running so that he could be certain that the Governor faced a primary.<sup>51</sup> Conley was probably even more conservative than Ritchie, but his opposition was much more personal than ideological.

By the end of 1933, Ritchie had not announced his plans, but some observers felt that his new appointments meant that he was considering running again for Governor despite the advice of his friends. One of Ritchie's major supporters, Frank Furst, objected to his asking for a fifth term, but Furst died at age eight-eight on January 23, 1934.<sup>52</sup> However, other Democrats also felt that Ritchie could not win and were searching for another man who might unite the party. There was much speculation that Senator Tydings would resign his Senate seat and run for Governor, and that Ritchie would then be appointed senior Senator in Tydings' place. Tydings announced that he did not want to be Governor, but he would run if it helped the party.<sup>53</sup> Other men felt that Roosevelt's friend, George Radcliffe, would make the best choice. But the main attention was still focused on Jackson and Ritchie, and Ritchie had sent his trusted friends, Lee and Winebrenner, to canvas the State

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51. Baltimore Evening Sun, 30 August 1933, p. 26.

52. Ibid., 23 January 1934, p. 1.

53. Ibid., 31 January 1934, p. 26.

for support.<sup>54</sup> On February 2nd, Tydings changed his mind saying that he would not run for Governor under any circumstances, but his statement did not end the pressures on him to do so.<sup>55</sup> During this time, the most astute members of the Democratic Party attempted unsuccessfully to force Ritchie to run for the Senate, but Ritchie had used his private mail to confirm his decision not to. Letters to him during March ran about three to one in favor of his running for Governor rather than for Senator.<sup>56</sup>

Ritchie's own hesitation whether to run for Senator or Governor forced several other ambitious men to wait to declare their intentions so the pressure mounted for the Governor to announce his plans. So many different men and variables were beginning to be mentioned that the number of speculations is impossible to even list, but the names of William C. Bruce, David Lewis, State senator Dudley Roe, Judge Samuel K. Dennis, Herbert O'Connor, and Judge T. Scott Offit were all mentioned along with Tydings, Radcliffe, Gordy, Ritchie, and Jackson for the two top offices.<sup>57</sup>

On April 25th, Mayor Jackson said he was tired of waiting and called on Ritchie to announce his intentions immediately; to which Ritchie angrily replied that Jackson did not have to wait. He could file for whatever office he wanted.<sup>58</sup> The Mayor announced his candidacy for

54. Baltimore Evening Sun, 30 August 1933, p. 26.

55. Ibid., 2 February 1934, p. 42.

56. Various citizens of Maryland to Ritchie, 1-31 March, 1934, letters in Ritchie Correspondence.

57. Baltimore Evening Sun, 16 April 1934, p. 30, 18 April 1934, p. 34, 20 April 1934, p. 54.

58. Ibid., 25 April 1934, p. 32, Baltimore Sun, 26 April 1934.

Governor. Supporters of the Mayor and the Governor both claimed that they could win a primary, but Senator Tydings warned them that such a primary would be suicidal for both.<sup>59</sup> On May 13th, Ritchie made formal announcement of his candidacy for Governor, but he did not say who was going to run with him. Attorney General Lane and secretary of State Winebrenner had planned to retire.<sup>60</sup> Lane's name was then added to the list of those who might run for Senator, but he was probably uninterested because he was aware that his part in the lynching cases had badly damaged his popularity in the State.<sup>61</sup>

For the next three months, Ritchie was concerned mainly with the approaching primary battle against Jackson and the choice of a man for United States Senator on his ticket. Many of the leaders took sides with either the Governor or Mayor; some men followed Senator Tydings in trying to persuade both men to avoid the battle. George Radcliffe was often mentioned as a compromise candidate.<sup>62</sup> The Radcliffe boom frightened Ritchie, and so he met with Howard Bruce, Ennis, Curran, Lee, Winebrenner, Walsh, and the new president of the University of Maryland, Harry C. Byrd, for three hours on May 30th to try to select a senate candidate to strengthen his position.<sup>63</sup> The political jockeying of various men was front-page news every day. Just as soon as it seemed clear that any one man was certain to be on one ticket, the next day new contingencies arose. Suspicion grew everywhere. At one point even Ritchie exploded

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59. Baltimore Evening Sun, 1 May 1934, p. 34.

60. Ibid., 5 May 1934, p. 16, 7 May 1934, p. 28, 9 May 1934, p. 54.

61. Ibid., 14 May 1934, p. 30.

62. Ibid., 26 May 1934, p. 16; Baltimore Sun, 27 May 1934, 29 May 1934; Baltimore News, 30 May 1934.

63. Baltimore Evening Sun, 30 May 1934, p. 1.



quite uncharacteristically and accused Senator Tydings of aspiring to take control of the Democratic Party in the State.<sup>64</sup> Numerous conferences were held between the supporters of Jackson, Radcliffe, Tydings, and Ritchie. Several meetings promised to result in some sort of compromise between all of the involved men, but none achieved this purpose.<sup>65</sup>

The first breakthrough came on July 6th when George Radcliffe announced that he was retiring from the Governorship race. He agreed to run for Senator on Ritchie's ticket. The rest of Ritchie's ticket was then easily chosen. Gordy was again the candidate for comptroller after Ritchie had rejected the idea of substituting State Senator Dudley Roe.<sup>66</sup> Herbert O'Connor, who had been most ambiguous about whose ticket he would choose to honor, decided to run for Attorney General with Ritchie.<sup>67</sup>

The Governor still faced the prospect of a primary battle with Mayor Jackson, but his forces were better equipped than they had been in the spring. Unfortunately, the constant pressure and bickering about the election and solving problems of relief further aggravated Ritchie's weakened health. Despite the expected difficult primary contest, he was forced to take a long vacation.<sup>68</sup>

Probably few people knew just how ill Ritchie was at that point. The newspapers merely stated that he would take a four-week vacation in

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64. Baltimore Evening Sun, 4,5,6,9,11,13,14,15,19 June 1934.

65. Ibid., 22 June 1934, 23 June 1934, p. 16.

66. Ibid., 9 July 1934, p. 28, 5 August 1934, p. 44.

67. Ibid.

68. Ibid., 20 July 1934.

Europe to rest for the fall campaign. But Ritchie chose Europe so that he would be out of the reach of probing reporters, for he was actually very sick. He spent the entire vacation on the Normandy coast of France. When he arrived, he was not well enough to leave his hotel room for over a week. What his illness was is uncertain, since Ritchie made sure that there were no public accounts, but in his diary he wrote about symptoms in his stomach and eyes. He was worried enough to keep scrupulous notes in his diary about the progress of his illness. For several nights, he was unable to sleep at all, and he noted that he felt very weak even when he had no other symptoms of illness.<sup>69</sup>

Ritchie left five aides to carry on his business while he was away. These were Curran, Ennis, Winebrenner, Kirkman, and William Codd, the chief auditor of the State roads commission. Missing from the list were Walsh and Lee, probably because the Governor was angry with them for making the deal with Radcliffe without checking with him.<sup>70</sup>

While Ritchie was in Europe, his friends worked hard to prepare things for his return. Their first task was to eliminate any possible competition for Radcliffe in the Senate race, and this was effectively accomplished by a series of deals completed when Reckord and Bruce announced their retirement from the contest and support of Radcliffe.<sup>71</sup> The major objective, however, was to force Mayor Jackson from the running by isolating his support. The men were more successful in their work than they had hoped. Jackson, who was very much of a political

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69. Ritchie Diary, 5-30 August 1934, in Ritchie Papers.

70. Baltimore Evening Sun, 13 July 1934, p. 32.

71. Ibid., 21 July 1934, p. 16.

realist, assessed his chances in mid-August and decided that the primary was a bad gamble. He announced his withdrawal on August 14th, and so the last major opposition to Ritchie was removed before the primary.<sup>72</sup>

Ritchie still faced a primary because Dr. Charles Conley had remained in the fight to the finish as he promised. However, no one regarded Conley's opposition as serious, and the same was true about the challenge of the often-defeated William M. Maloy's duel against Radcliffe for Senator. One might get the feeling that neither of these contests actually existed if he read the newspapers from the month before the election. Ritchie returned to Baltimore on August 30th. He campaigned lightly in the primary, making a few speeches to show his general health.<sup>73</sup>

The results of the September 13th primary were a distinctly ominous message for the Governor. Dr. Conley, who was largely unknown outside of his home county, who had no organization backing, and who had done little campaigning, had carried twelve of the State's twenty-three counties and received 90,000 votes. Ritchie's margin in the popular vote was over 50,000, but this was very weak when it was compared to George Radcliffe who ran 80,000 votes ahead of Maloy who was a far better known politician than Conley. Radcliffe had also managed to win every county in the State.<sup>74</sup> So little about Dr. Conley could have been attractive to the voters that even Ritchie's supporters concluded that the result was clearly an anti-Ritchie protest vote that was likely to go to the Republican candidate in November.

72. Baltimore Evening Sun, 15 August 1934, p. 1.

73. Ibid., 31 August 1934, p. 46.

74. Ibid., 13 September 1934, pp. 1, 2.

One factor which was in Ritchie's favor was that the Republicans had staged bitter primary fights for both the gubernatorial and Senate nominations. Senator Goldsborough decided not to seek reelection. He had served as Governor from 1911-1915 and chose to run for the seat in the State house once again. He was opposed by Harry Nice who had been in the background of Republican politics since his loss to Ritchie for the governorship in 1919. The race for Senate had been a three-way battle between former Senator France, who had served from 1916 to 1922; Congressman Hill, who had last served in 1924; and C. Wilbur Miller. Both of these contests had provoked severe conflicts involving just about every leader in the Republican Party. Also, none of these men was exactly a new face to the voters, and when Nice and France managed to win by narrow victories, it was clear that Ritchie's Republican challenger would also face difficulties of a divided party and the burden of a political image quite as timeworn as Ritchie's.<sup>75</sup>

The State Democratic convention met on September 19th in Baltimore. Ritchie had probably written most of the platform before the primary, but the election returns frightened him into adding some planks he would not have otherwise endorsed. At a four-hour meeting on the morning of the convention, Ritchie worked out two new planks with a group of advisors. These were promises for consideration of laws for unemployment insurance and for old-age pensions. Ritchie promised "careful study" to see if they could be put into effect to lessen the amount of emergency relief. The

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<sup>75</sup>. Baltimore Evening Sun, 24 June 1933, 13 July 1933, 12 August 1933, 11 November 1933, 30 March 1934, 2 May 1934, 3 July 1934, 17 July 1934, 9 August 1934, 13 September 1934. France's victory over his two opponents was so close that Maryland's special second-place votes had to be counted to reach the result.

total platform ran to sixty-three pages in length and included thirty-one planks. It lauded the national Democratic administration, but other than the two planks which had been added at the last minute, it differed from previous platforms that Ritchie had written only in that it dealt with specific problems caused by the depression in figuring the tax rate and expenditures. No new legislation was proposed even for solutions to social and economic stress although Ritchie avoided doctrinaire statements about the depression ending itself through self help. If the protest against the Ritchie administration had been caused by his failure to deal with the problems of the depression in a dynamic way, the platform went only the slightest step in the direction of alleviating this discontent.<sup>76</sup>

The Republicans framed a considerably bolder platform one week later. They promised to improve banking legislation to protect small investors, to increase the amount of relief, to allow payment of taxes on an installment system, to create a mandatory pension for all indigent persons more than sixty-five years old, and to create a "reasonable law" for unemployment insurance. The Republicans stated that they objected to the philosophy of the New Deal although they approved of some of the specific legislation. The Republicans had failed to make their platform sufficiently definite on a number of important issues, but it was the first time since Ritchie had been running for office that the tone of the Republican platform was noticeably more amenable to experiment than that of the Democrats.<sup>77</sup>

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76. Baltimore Sun, 20 September 1934.

77. Baltimore Evening Sun, 27 September 1934, p. 1.

Once the platforms were written, both Nice and Ritchie tried to unify their parties. Nice courted Boss Tain whom he had offended during the primary campaign, and Ritchie tried to get Conley to tour with him during the general election campaign.<sup>78</sup> Eventually both men were partially successful in healing party wounds. Ritchie also insured himself of the support of Mayor Jackson by promising not only his own support but that of Ennis and Curran when Jackson ran for reelection in the spring of 1935.<sup>79</sup>

The issues in the campaign were unclear in many ways. Both Ritchie and Nice tried to claim that he was the true representative of the spirit of the New Deal and progressive social legislation and to expose his opponent as a pretender on this point. The claims and counterclaims were hopelessly tangled mainly because neither man had really ever endorsed the New Deal or progressive social legislation until the pressures of the election forced him to do so.<sup>80</sup>

Another issue on which Ritchie and Nice clashed was whether Ritchie's actions in the banking crisis had been the best for the State. Nice claimed that Ritchie should not have allowed unsound banks to remain open for so long nor to have closed the sound banks when he did. The Governor claimed that his actions had prevented a greater catastrophe. Both attacks and defenses remained insusceptible to proof and so the issue boiled down mainly to invective. Nice also attacked Ritchie on

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78. Baltimore American, 23 September 1934; Baltimore Evening Sun, 9 September 1934; Baltimore Sun, 10, 11, 17 September 1934.

79. Baltimore Evening Sun, 23 September 1934, p. 34. Baltimore American, 7 October 1934.

80. Baltimore American, 23 September 1934; Baltimore Evening Sun, 9 September 1934, p. 34; Baltimore Sun, 10, 11, 17 September 1934.

several taxing matters, and on this point there were also claims and counterclaims whether the taxing structure was as sound as it should have been. These matters were probably too technical to have been of more than passing interest to the voters.<sup>81</sup>

Each candidate accused the other of unethical acts. Nice accused Ritchie of appointing a known criminal as head of the State athletic commission, and he produced the criminal record of James H. (Jack) Pollack and a letter of May, 1933, from police commissioner Gaither to Ritchie telling him of this record before Ritchie made the appointment. Ritchie made no explanation of why he chose Pollack; he had done so because Pollack had become the acknowledged political leader in the fourth legislative district in Baltimore, and Ritchie needed his support.<sup>82</sup>

In order to counterattack, Ritchie exhumed the Boulevard Theatre scandal of 1921 when Nice had been brought before a grand jury for possible indictment in a bribery case. Ritchie admitted that the grand jury had decided not to indict Nice in the case, but he said that as Nice was running for Governor, the people deserved a fuller explanation of his relationship with Harry Wolf who had been convicted in the same matter.<sup>83</sup>

By the last days before the election, the blows had reached such a low level that Jewish voters were receiving sample Nazi ballots endorsing

81. Baltimore Sun, 2 November 1934, Baltimore Evening Sun, 24, 25, 29, 31 October 1934.

82. Baltimore Evening Sun, 26 October 1934, p. 1.

83. Ibid., 31 October 1934, p. 28.

Nice, probably sent out by the Democratic organizations to frighten Jewish voters into the Ritchie camp. Nice tried to expose this fraud on the last days of the campaign while Ritchie attacked him for his inexperience and noted acidly that Nice's only fame was as a criminal lawyer who helped the guilty escape punishment.<sup>84</sup> A few days before the election, the odds makers predicted that Ritchie would win by a close vote and set the odds at 7-5 on the Governor's reelection.

The odds makers were correct in that the election was very close, and on election night the results were still in doubt; but the experts were fairly sure that Ritchie had lost. The Governor had managed to win in Baltimore City by over 21,000 votes, but the votes from the counties were counted last, and when these were added, the politicians felt that Ritchie's urban majority would not be enough to offset a Nice victory. The issue was not clearly decided until two days after the election; Nice had defeated the Governor by 4,679 votes. The Nice men had sent workers into the rural areas to make sure that the votes there were properly counted as they did not want a repeat of the 1919 election when they felt that their man had been counted out by inaccurate returns from the counties.<sup>85</sup>

The election was a personal rejection of the Governor. The remainder of the Democratic ticket won by enormous majorities ranging up to O'Connor's plurality of nearly 100,000 votes in the election for Attorney General. George Radcliffe won an easy victory in the race for the Senate seat and all six Democratic congressmen won reelection. In addition, the

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84. Baltimore Evening Sun, 31 October 1934, 3, 5, 6 November 1934.

85. Ibid., 7 November 1934, p. 1, 8 November 1934, p. 1.



Democrats won enormous majorities in both houses of the State legislature. Ritchie's defeat was in fact one of the very few Democratic losses in a nationwide Democratic sweep.<sup>86</sup>

Naturally, there was great speculation as to why Ritchie had lost this election, but most of it boiled down to Frank Kent's statement that Ritchie "had gone to the well once too often."<sup>87</sup> Actually, Ritchie had lost for several distinct reasons and not just that he was asking for a fifth term. He had broken precedents with his second, third, and fourth terms, so it might well be assumed that the voters felt that breaking precedents was the precedent when Ritchie ran. The fifth term issue had not often been mentioned in the campaign.

Seven distinct reasons can be pointed out for Ritchie's loss in 1934. First, the Governor could no longer capitalize on the prohibition issue that had contributed to his big urban majority in past elections. Voters still admired him for his stand, but the matter was settled, and they had no fear that their liquor might be taken away if they voted for Nice. Second, Ritchie lost votes by his failure to take positive action to soothe the social and economic distress of the depression. Third, he bore the brunt of being in office when the depression began. Voters all over the country were turning out leaders not so much because of party affiliation, but because they wanted to see if new men could end the crisis. Ritchie might have eliminated some of the burden of dissatisfaction if he had identified himself more closely with the experimental legislation of the national administration, but he was known to disapprove

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86. Baltimore Evening Sun, 7 November 1934.

87. Baltimore Sun, 7 November 1934.

of many of the new laws. Fourth, Ritchie was no longer a presidential possibility because of Roosevelt's success as President. Citizens of the State could not feel they were helping their Governor into the highest office in the land by their support. The fifth reason is interrelated with the fourth. Local Democratic rivalries in Maryland had greatly increased since 1930 largely because potential rivals of Ritchie's felt he was no longer invincible and they knew that they could not remove him from their path by pushing him into a higher office. Sixth, Ritchie had badly damaged his popularity on the Eastern Shore by insisting on the arrest of the men who participated in a lynching mob in 1933 and by sending out the Maryland National Guard to make sure that this was accomplished. Finally, men in the State realized that Ritchie was not being given much Federal patronage by Postmaster General Farley. There was no hope of getting a Federal job as a reward for helping the Governor. All these factors combined convinced enough voters to cast their ballots for Harry Nice, whose greatest qualification for office seemed to be that he was a "nice guy." It was an ignominious ending for a man once described as the "perpetual Governor."

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR  
THE END OF THE STORY

Ritchie's defeat shocked him, but as always he retained outward composure. On November 14th, he conferred with the incoming Governor along with Comptroller Gordy and State Treasurer Dennis on finance.<sup>1</sup> When Ritchie turned over the Governor's office to Nice, he had served in office fifteen consecutive years, the longest term any man had ever served as Governor of any state in the nation in the century, a record which has continued through 1970.

But because Ritchie had devoted himself entirely to his public life, he had no private life into which to retire. He had no family, and only the most limited other interests besides politics. Therefore, it was natural to assume that he would continue political activity and look for opportunity to return to public service. Throughout the winter and spring, Ritchie attended many political meetings, especially in the small Democratic clubs in Baltimore.<sup>2</sup> In August, he sailed to Europe. On the trip he went to London on a visit that took little more than a month.<sup>3</sup>

Despite his freedom from the responsibilities of public office, Ritchie's health had not improved during the year. When he arrived in Baltimore from Europe on September 12th, he had planned to leave two days later to give a speech in Boston. But he found that his eyes were

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1. Baltimore Evening Sun, 14 November 1934, p. 1.

2. Ritchie Diary, 3 January 1935-30 June 1935, in Ritchie Papers.

3. Ibid., September, 1935.

so weak that he could not read the draft of his speech. He had to call in his secretary, Miss Elizabeth Smith, to do it for him.<sup>4</sup> Then he was forced to cancel his trip to Boston altogether because he was feverish on the next day. For one month, he did not leave his home. Not until the afternoon of October 9th did he visit his law offices, but even then he did not return to work until a few days later. During November, he appeared to improve and accelerated his schedule of political dinners and went to several football games.<sup>5</sup>

When Ritchie did speak during this period, he was increasingly critical of the New Deal legislation, and he flirted with the Liberty League.<sup>6</sup> The Liberty League had been founded in 1934 by a group of wealthy industrialists who felt that Roosevelt's policies were leading the nation into socialism. Its purpose was to educate the people in the value of personal initiative and private enterprise; its members included not only business men but prominent disaffected Democrats such as Al Smith, Jouett Shouse, John W. Davis, and Bainbridge Colby.<sup>7</sup> Some men have even suggested that Ritchie hoped to be the League's candidate for President in 1936, but Ritchie had spoken out against a third party in August, 1935.<sup>8</sup> He was more interested in returning to local politics than he was in trying to reform the national government by the creation of a new party. His interest in the Liberty League was largely because

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4. Elizabeth Smith, personal interview with author, June, 1967.

5. Ritchie Diary, October-December, 1935, in Ritchie Papers.

6. Baltimore Evening Sun, 20 October 1935, 12 January 1936.

7. George Wolfskill, Revolt of the Conservatives (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962); Burns, Roosevelt, p. 206.

8. Baltimore Sun, 20 August 1935.

it advocated theories of government similar to his own and because many of the men were his old associates.

One of Ritchie's speeches attacking the national administration was delivered at the Mount Vernon Methodist Episcopal Church on February 23, 1936. Some people expected Ritchie's attack to be more outspoken, but he said that he was trying to be dispassionate. His main point was that the New Deal was unconstitutional because it destroyed the proper balance of powers between the states and the national government.<sup>9</sup> After the speech, Ritchie returned to his rooms, and then went to the home of Mr. and Mrs. Joseph Carter for dinner, returning about 10:30 in the evening.<sup>10</sup>

After midnight Ritchie suddenly felt very ill and with great difficulty struggled to his telephone to call Miss Smith who lived a block away. Miss Smith got the night manager to let her into the apartment, and when they arrived they found Ritchie slumped over his desk and unable to speak. She got an ambulance. When it arrived, Ritchie was placed in an oxygen tent which prolonged his life for one hour. He died at 1:55 a.m. The official cause of death was cerebral hemorrhage or stroke. Although Ritchie's health had been generally poor, nothing specific had recently been known to be wrong with him, and his death shocked everyone. Among the condolence notes was one from President Roosevelt which noted that Ritchie's death was "not only a great loss to the State of Maryland, which honored him so conspicuously, but to the nation."<sup>11</sup> Perhaps

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9. Baltimore Sun, 24 February 1936, p. 1.

10. Judge Joseph Carter, personal interview with author, June, 1968.

11. Franklin D. Roosevelt to Ritchie heirs, 25 February 1936, in Ritchie Papers.

Ritchie's death saved him from the bitterness of men like Al Smith, who in the next decade saw fundamental changes in American life to which they fiercely objected.

Ritchie left the world with the same values he held as an adolescent. The philosophy he had learned in the home and in school served his entire life. Because he was never faced with adversity, he never felt the need to change. He always remained a Gibson man, correct, proper, and charming. No doubt his greatest assets as a leader were his honesty, his constant hard work, and his candor in most matters. But his ideas were more subject to question. Some of them seemed clearly outdated. When he died, Ritchie still had in his possession a speech which his father had delivered at the University of Virginia Law School in 1856, an eloquent defense of States' rights. Ritchie had underlined passages in the speech so he would not forget them. They were keys to his life. He seemed incapable of seeing when technological changes made his advocacy of States' rights seem almost cranky. Nor could the problems of the depression make him consider that self-reliance had limits in a complex industrial society. To the end of his life, he retained the same ideas about economics that he had always held. He believed in balanced budgets, and in frugality as a way to solve economic problems. He never modified the Social Darwinistic ideas that he had learned in college; he still believed that an economic system least interfered with was the best and that if left to operate alone, competition would solve all problems. He believed that the healthiest members of society were the ones who succeeded. Nor had he modified his Jeffersonian ideas of government which paralleled his economic ideas. A government was best which governed least, he felt. He saw neither the changes that technology had created since Jefferson's

time nor the possible distinction between interference through sumptuary laws and the kinds of social welfare legislation that freed men from overwhelming social and economic burdens.

His career as Governor reflected the strengths and weaknesses of his ideas. The government was always honest, efficient, and economical. In his first term, Ritchie directed an excellent governmental reorganization which increased the efficiency of the State. The school system was greatly improved while he was Governor; to a lesser extent, the State University. State hospitals and public health administration, and State highways made important gains, although in each of these areas Ritchie limited construction to balance the budget. When Maryland's population began to rise rapidly in the next decade, great expense was necessary to expand the already-overtaxed facilities. Ritchie also led the fight to eliminate sumptuary laws which interfered with private liberties; he did so more candidly than most Governors would have dared until after World War II. However, the State lagged behind in other social and economic matters such as unemployment insurance, workmen's compensation laws, and old-age pensions. Nor did the government help to promote industry in the State. Ritchie often balanced the budget at the expense of future needs.

In the final analysis, Ritchie stands as a towering figure of competency, honesty, and administrative capability compared to most men who have held the office of Governor of Maryland before or since.

## APPENDIX I

## A TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF RITCHIE'S STATES' RIGHTS CONCEPT

Ritchie gave nearly one thousand public addresses during his governorship. The theme of a large percentage of these was States' rights and problems which he considered related sub-topics, such as women's suffrage or prohibition. Approximately 85 percent of his national addresses are on this subject.

It is, therefore, surprising to find that Ritchie's grasp of the States' rights issue was both muddled and superficial. Ritchie sometimes spoke of States' rights as an end in itself; sometimes as a means to an end, usually connected to personal liberty. Yet he seldom delineated the relationship between the idea of States' rights and personal liberty.

Ritchie defended his idea that States' rights were an end in themselves with arguments that they allowed greater local and regional divergence, and that they provided more efficient administration. The first idea was well documented; the second was certainly open to questions Ritchie never posed nor answered.

Ritchie was most convincing about the value of the States' rights theory when he described the wide expanse of the United States with different regions; State and even local areas having widely divergent customs. He felt that the people in each of these areas should have the choice of dealing with as many aspects of their lives as possible in the way they felt was best. (He never used, however, De Tocqueville's idea that there was a danger in the tyranny of the majority which States'



rights could vitiate nor an idea like Calhoun's concurrent majorities to formally protect local interests.) Within Maryland, Ritchie signed local prohibition bills for several counties even when he felt prohibition was a hindrance rather than an aid to temperance.

Even in questions of regional diversity, however, Ritchie did not go as far as he could. He never confronted questions about discrimination against the black man in the southern states. He was outraged by the Ku Klux Klan but he never faced the problem of what should be done in a State where a majority of citizens favored its practices. Exactly what powers should be given to the Federal government to correct injustices caused by violation of provisions in the Bill of Rights or later amendments? What if two States or local areas used "rights" in a way that conflicted with each other? Ritchie never dealt with these questions.

Some of Ritchie's speeches claimed that the Federal administration was more expensive for the individual citizen than was local administration. However, his proofs were irrelevant to the statement. Ritchie's administration in Maryland balanced its budget more often than did the Federal government at the same time, but Ritchie did not show that any particular aspect of the Federal government could have been more cheaply performed if its functions had been delegated to the individual States. No true comparison was possible between Maryland and the United States because of the much broader responsibilities of the latter, if nothing else. Ritchie also produced many figures showing that Maryland and several other Eastern States received only a small proportion of the money which they paid to the Federal government while other States, mainly in the South and West, received much more than they contributed. While this showed a disadvantage for those who lived in Maryland and

similar states, it did not at all prove that the Federal administration was more expensive on a national scale. Ritchie claimed that Federal bureaucracy was frighteningly large, but he never tried to prove that what might be gained by more manageable State administrations might also be lost by duplication or lack of coordination. He never really considered whether a smaller department was necessarily more efficient. Since he never developed his economic ideas beyond balanced budgets and cheap government, no "Keynesian" questions ever entered his mind about the possible benefits of government activity or corresponding detriment in government fugality. For Ritchie, efficiency and thrift were synonymous.

However, sometime Ritchie also seemed to be saying that States' rights were not just an end in themselves but a way of protecting individual liberties. There, Ritchie was even more vague than in his general theory. The liberties of which he spoke are not delineated, but his examples often were taken from areas dealing with freedom of choice in matters of vice.

But Ritchie did not explain why a local government necessarily interfered less than a Federal government when it enforced such laws or why a local government was any less likely to pass them other than regional diversity. The idea did not fit with his idea that local governments were more efficient in economic matters. Why should they be less efficient in economic matters. Why should they be less efficient in law enforcement. Local governments might act with greater regional diversity but what Ritchie seemed to be concerned about was that the government was acting at all in such matters rather than how properly it was acting.

Perhaps he felt states would abdicate more powers than would the Federal government, but if so, he did not consider the possible harmful effects of too little government. Long after Bentham, Marx, and Mill had suggested possible flaws in the philosophy of Jefferson and the physiocrats, Ritchie still regarded the minimum of government as the best government. He assumed that almost all men would always use their freedom in the same frugal, gentlemanly, reticent way that he did. He never doubted that a strong government could prevent abuse of liberties as well as violate them. Even the Armwood lynching which was condoned by local authorities and citizens did not make him question. He did not even have the usual lawyers questions about conflicting rights and how these were balanced. Finally, he never seemed to consider the relation of effective liberty to social and economic security and whether a government which increased the latter did not also protect the former. Ritchie regarded almost all government action in social and economic areas as pure interference.

For all the flaws in his arguments, Ritchie had little benefit of concrete criticism. The editors of the Sunpapers only pushed him further in his views. Critics were usually superficial, and most of their work appeared in editorial columns too brief to be adequately analytical. No national politicians ever felt the need to debate the issue with him. None of the books he read were likely to modify his ideas. His states' rights ideas remained in substantially the same facile, unclear form until his death.

IPPER CASE LETTERS - COUNTY NAME

lower case letters = country seats v the places in text

 first congressional district (1915-35)


second congressional district " (Feb. 20, 1862)


5th congressional district

6th Congressional District

(310 & 47 cl. b. c. s. are for title in Baltimore city 1115-35)

( ) number of unit votes in primary elections in May  
total numbers of members of the General Assembly





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\_\_\_\_\_. , Maryland Hall of Records, including public letters and papers.

The manuscript collections are somewhat disappointing. Ritchie's diaries are a record of his engagements, but not of his personal feelings or ideas. The number of private papers which add anything to public documents is small especially considering the number of boxes of materials. Ritchie evidently destroyed everything he thought might be compromising. The University of Maryland collection has literally thousands of letters, but less than one in five hundred of these is more than a formality of some sort, and useless to the researcher.

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Ritchie, Albert C., Messages of the Governor of Maryland, 1920-1935. Annapolis, State Printer, 1920-1935.

Maryland House of Delegates, Journal of the Proceedings of the Maryland House of Delegates, 1920-1934. Annapolis, State Printer, 1920-1934.

Maryland Senate, Journal of the Proceedings of the Maryland Senate, 1920-1934. Annapolis, State Printer, 1920-1934.

Maryland Secretary of State, Maryland Manual. Annapolis, State Printer, 1915-1935.

Ritchie, Albert C., Reports of the Attorney General of Maryland, 1916-1919. Annapolis, State Printers, 1915-1919.

Democratic National Committee, Report of the Proceedings of the Democratic National Convention, 1920, 1924, 1928, 1932. San Francisco, New York, Houston, and Chicago, official printers, 1920, 1924, 1928, 1932.

The public documents are more helpful, and Ritchie's public life is well documented. The legislative journals and the Attorney General's reports are technical but fact filled, a history in themselves.

### III. Oral Interviews

Louis Azrael, personal interview, Baltimore, Maryland, June 1967, with the author.

Judge Joseph Carter, personal interview, Baltimore, Maryland, June, 1969, with the author.

Daniel Joseph, personal interview, Baltimore, Maryland, June 1967, with the author.

Elizabeth Smith, personal interview, Baltimore, Maryland, June, 1967, with the author.

Thigpen, Neal D., personal interviews with Jouett Shouse and E. B. Lee, 22 November 1964.

Columbia University Oral History Collection Interviews which have reference to Albert C. Ritchie include: Samuel K. Bledsoe, Florence J. Harriman, Arthur Krock, Hamilton Owens, Rexford Tugwell.

Oral interviews provided a few small anecdotes and could be a source of much more information for someone with a better interviewing technique than mine.

### IV. Unpublished Studies

Clapp, Roger A. "Albert C. Ritchie, a Biography," unpublished Senior thesis, Princeton University, 1934.

Chepaitis, Joseph B. "The First Two Administrations of Albert C. Ritchie, Governor of Maryland," unpublished M.A. thesis, Georgetown University, 1965.

Green, Harry J., "A Study of the Legislature of Maryland," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Johns Hopkins University, 1927.

Helldorfer, Rita Marie, "The Gubernatorial Career of Albert C. Ritchie, 1920-1935," unpublished M.A. thesis, Catholic University, 1955.

Kent, George R. "The Negro in Politics in Dorchester County, Maryland, 1920-1960," unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Maryland, 1961.

Loevy, Robert D., "Political Behavior in the Baltimore Metropolitan Area," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Johns Hopkins University, 1963.

Mester, Edward C., "The Constitutional Position of the Legislature of Maryland," unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Maryland, 1949.

Rohr, Charles J., "The Governor of Maryland," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Johns Hopkins University, 1931.

Roleau, James P., "The Governors of Maryland and Education," unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Maryland, 1951.

Seamans, Truman T., "Albert C. Ritchie," unpublished senior thesis, Princeton University, 1947

Schecter, Louis E., "I Remember Albert C. Ritchie," unpublished five-page paper, Maryland Historical Society, 1966.

Thigpen, Neal D., "The Presidential Aspirations of Albert C. Ritchie," unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Maryland, 1966.

White, Frank R., Jr., "The 1928 Presidential Election in Maryland," unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Maryland, 1947.

Of the unpublished studies, Chepaitis and Thigpen offer the most information, but all the works are overly complimentary to the Governor. The studies done at John Hopkins University are helpful for the factual institutional background but no more.

## V. Newspapers

Baltimore American, Baltimore, Maryland, 1920-1936.

Baltimore News, Baltimore, Maryland, 1920-1936.

Baltimore Sun, Baltimore, Maryland, 1911-1936.

Baltimore Evening Sun, Baltimore, Maryland, 1911-1936.

New York Times, New York, New York, 1915-1936.

The newspapers were obviously the main source of information for this work. Both the Sun and the Evening Sun have a pro-Democratic, pro-Ritchie bias but they also provided very factual news reporting with complete drafts of all public documents such as platforms and major speeches not to mention the spicy editorializing of Frank Kent and H. L. Mencken. The News and the American are Republican in bias and often inaccurate or speculative in their reporting, but do sometimes balance the Democratic bias of the Sunpapers. The New York Times was helpful when Ritchie was in the national news.

## VI. Articles

### A. Popular Magazines

Barkley, Fred, "Albert IV of Maryland." Outlook and Independent, March 4, 1931.

Bruce, William C., "Governor Albert C. Ritchie." North American Review, July, 1929.



Carter, Henry, "The Gentleman From Maryland." North American Review, July, August, 1931.

"Is Governor Ritchie's Hat In the Ring." Literary Digest, February 6, 1926.

Johnson, Gerald W., "White House Hopes in Maryland." North American Review, Vol. CCXXIX, June, 1930.

Kent, Frank, "Ritchie of Maryland." Scribners, LXXXII, October, 1927, 386, 404-10.

\_\_\_\_\_. , "Maryland, A Perfect State." World's Work, May, 1928.

\_\_\_\_\_. , "The 1932 Presidential Sweepstakes." Scribners, June, 1932.

"Mrs. Albert Ritchie in the White House." Woman's Home Companion, May, 1928.

Owens, Hamilton, "Ritchie of the Free State." American Mercury, March, 1926.

Ritchie, Albert C. "Too Much Government." Plain Talk, February, 1927.

\_\_\_\_\_. , "The 18th Amendment, An Invasion of States' Rights." Current History, April, 1928.

\_\_\_\_\_. , "Shall We Govern Ourselves." Scribners, April, 1928.

\_\_\_\_\_. , "Imperialism of the Dollar." Atlantic Monthly, May, 1928.

\_\_\_\_\_. , "The Progressive Zeal for Regulation." The Progressive, June 1, 1928.

\_\_\_\_\_. , "This Prohibition Wilderness." Outlook and Independent, October 23, 1929.

\_\_\_\_\_. , "Give Us Democracy." North American Review, October, 1930.

\_\_\_\_\_. , "Fifteen Years a Governor." American Mercury, CXX, August, 1935.

\_\_\_\_\_. ; Kaiser Wilhelm II; Mussolini, Benito; and Shotwell, James T., "Is Democracy a Failure, A Symposium." Current History, May, 1928.

"Ritchie, The Man with an Issue." American Review of Reviews, December, 1927.

"Ritchie." Christian Science Monitor, December 17, 1927.

Sullivan, Mark, "Who'll Get the Big Job." Colliers, LXXIX, January 1, 1927.

Villiard, Oswald G., "Governor Albert C. Ritchie." Nation, February, 1928.

Watson, Mark, "Presidential Possibilities--Albert C. Ritchie." The Forum, August, 1931.

West, Harold C., "Maryland's Choice For President." Christian Herald, February 11, 1928.

An enormous number of articles were written about Ritchie in popular magazines and the list above is only a sampling. I have selected the works of the men who knew Ritchie the best, such as Sunpapers' editors Kent, Owens and Johnson or generally perceptive reports like Villiard and Sullivan or articles that dealt with Ritchie at length. I eliminated the many superficial short sketches found in all the news magazines of the period. I have also included most of Ritchie's own articles. One measure of Ritchie's stature is the article which he was asked to write with Wilhelm II, Mussolini and Professor Shotwell. The Woman's Home Companion article is one of the few articles about Ritchie outside of the public image. It tells, of all things, that one of Ritchie's favorite foods was pigs' feet.

#### B. Scholarly Journals

Allen, Lee N., "The Underwood Presidential Movement of 1924." Alabama Review, XV (April, 1962), 83-99.

\_\_\_\_\_, "The McAdoo Campaign for the Presidential Nomination in 1924." Journal of Southern History, XXIX (May, 1963), 211-228.

Burner, David M., "The Democratic Party in the Election of 1924." Mid America, XLVI (April, 1964), 92-113.

Clubb, Jerome M. and Allen, Howard W., "The Cities and the Election of 1928; Partisan Realignment." American Historical Review, LXXIV (April, 1969), 1205-1220.

Gordon, Ruth W., "The Change in Alignment of Chicago's Negroes During the New Deal." Journal of American History, XLI (December, 1969), 584-603.

Hofstadter, Richard, "Cuba, the Philippines and Manifest Destiny," in The Paranoid Style in American Politics (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1966), pp. 145-187.

Kester, Randall B., "The War Industries Board, 1917-1918, a Study in Industrial Mobilization." American Political Science Review, XXXIV (1940), 655-684.

- Link, Arthur S., "What Happened to the Progressive Movement in the 1920's?" American Historical Review, LXIV (July, 1959), 833-51.
- McKay, S. S., "John N. Garner." The West Texas Historical Association Yearbook, XXXVII (October, 1961), 26-41.
- May, Henry F., "Shifting Perspectives on the 1920's." Mississippi Valley Historical Review, LXIII (December, 1956), 405-427.
- Noogle, Burl, "The Twenties: A New Historiographical Frontier." Journal of American History, LIII (September, 1966), 299-314.
- Petersen, Svend, "Arkansas Favorite Son." Arkansas Historical Quarterly, XXIII (May, 1947), 171.
- Rice, Roger L., "Residential Segregation by Law, 1910-1917," Journal of Southern History, XXXIV (May, 1968), 179-199.
- Swisher, Carl B., "The Control of War Preparations in the United States," American Political Science Review, XXXIV (1940), 1085-1103.
- Tindall, George B., "Business Progressivism, Southern Politics in the Twenties," South Atlantic Quarterly, LXII (Winter, 1963), 92-106.

No articles in scholarly journals dealt directly with Ritchie, but many are useful for interpreting parts of his career. I have listed only those I found most helpful, and those which give a general historiographical interpretation of the 1920's. The Hofstadter article is cited because it seems to me that it hits upon a key psychological difference between Ritchie and men who matured in the nineties and became progressives in later life. The several articles that discuss shifts in voting patterns in large cities in the 1920's always seem to eliminate Baltimore; is this because it does not fit their theories?

## VII. Books

### A. Topics in Maryland History

- Andrews, Matthew Rage, History of Maryland. New York: Doubleday Doran and Co., 1929.
- Bard, Harry, Maryland and Its State Government. New York: Oxford, 1943.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Maryland Today. New York: Oxford, 1955.
- Bucholz, Heinrich E., Governors of Maryland, Revolution to 1908. Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins, 1908.

- Burdette, Franklin, Election Practices in Maryland. College Park: Bureau of Public Administration, 1950.
- Calcott, George, A History of the University of Maryland. Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, 1966.
- Coyle, Wilbur F., The Mayors of Baltimore. Baltimore: Baltimore Municipal Journal, 1919.
- Crooks, James P., Politics and Progress, Rise of Urban Progressivism in Baltimore. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969.
- Essary, Frederick, Maryland in National Politics. Baltimore: John Murphy Company, 1932.
- Fenton, John H., Politics in the Border States. New Orleans: Hauser Press, 1957.
- Kent, Frank R., The Story of Maryland Politics. Baltimore: Thomas Evans Company, 1911.
- Kirwin, Harry W., The Inevitable Success. Westminster, Maryland: Newman Press, 1962.
- Mencken, Henry L., Happy Days 1880-1892. New York: Knopf, 1950.
- Morgan College Institute for Political Education, Maryland, A Political Profile. Baltimore: Morgan College, 1966.
- Steiner, Bernard C., Men of Mark in Maryland. Washington, D.C.: Johnson-Wynne Company, 1907.
- Wentworth, Evelyn L., Election Statistics in Maryland. College Park, Maryland: Bureau of Government Research, 1959.
- Winchester, Paul, Men Of Maryland Since the Civil War. Baltimore: Maryland Counc Press Syndicate, 1923.
- Young, Hugh H., A Surgeon's Autobiography. New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1940.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Distinguished Men of Baltimore, Maryland. Baltimore: Baltimore American, 1914.
- \_\_\_\_\_, The Book of Maryland. Baltimore: Maryland Biographical Association, 1920.

No good general history of the State of Maryland exists. Maryland historians seem to act as if State history ended with the Revolution or at best the Civil War. Andrews' is barely an adequate summary of the political history of the State, and Bard's book is a high school civics text type introduction to the government. Several books give short

summaries of the distinguished men in the State at the turn of the century, but these are bare factual introductions. Recently, two good monographs have appeared on specialized subjects; the works of Calcott and Crooks are informative and readable. Fenton's book on border state politics is very useful. Harry Kirwan's biography of Governor O'Connor is exhaustive, but far too favorable to his subject. On the whole, the field is badly underwritten.

B. Topics in United States History related to Ritchie's Life Through 1920.

Baruch, Bernard, The Public Years. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1960.

Brown, Alexander, The Cabells and Their Kin. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1895.

Clarkson, Grosvenor B., Industrial America In the World War. Cambridge, Mass.: Riverside Press, 1923.

Coit, Margaret L., Mr. Baruch. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1957.

Faulkner, Harold U., Politics, Reform and Expansion, 1890-1900. New York: Harper and Row, 1959.

Fine, Sidney, Laissez-Faire and The General Welfare State. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan, 1956.

Hofstadter, Richard, Social Darwinism in America. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1944.

Link, Arthur, Woodrow Wilson. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1947. Vol. I.

Smith, Gene, When the Cheering Stopped. New York: William Morrow and Company, 1964.

Swisher, Carl B. American Constitutional Development. New York: Houghton Mifflin and Company, 1943.

Willoughby, William F., Government Organization In Wartime. New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1919.

Faulkner, Hofstadter and Fine discuss the ideational atmosphere of Ritchie's formative period which should be a good theoretical basis for understanding his ideas. Link's book on Wilson will show how the atmosphere at Hopkins affected another politically minded student. Clarkson, Baruch and Brown help clarify Ritchie's War Industries Board experience. Swisher is excellent for background on the 18th and 19th Amendments.

C. Topics in United States History Related to Ritchie's Life, 1921-1927.

Adams, Samuel Hopkins, The Incredible Era. New York: Capricorn Books, 1939.

Allen, Frederick Lewis, Only Yesterday. New York: Harper Brothers, 1931.

Barkley, Alben W., That Reminds Me. New York: Doubleday and Company, 1954.

Bitterman, Henry, State and Federal Grants-in-Aid. New York: Mentzer Bush and Company, 1938.

Chambers, William N., The Democrats. Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand and Company, 1964.

Chalmers, David M., Hooded Americanism, The History of the Ku Klux Klan. New York: Doubleday and Company, 1965.

Collins, Frederick L., Our American Kings. New York: Century Company, 1924.

Coolidge, Calvin, Autobiography. New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corporation, 1929.

Cox, James M., Journey Through My Years. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1946.

Dumond, Dwight L., Roosevelt to Roosevelt. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1937.

Goldman, Eric. Rendezvous With Destiny. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952.

Hicks, John D., Republican Ascendancy. New York: Harper and Row, 1960.

\_\_\_\_\_, Normalcy and Reaction. Washington, D.C.: Service Center for Teachers of History, 1960.

Hoffman, Frederick J., The Twenties. New York: Collier Books, 1962.

Huntley, Charles, The Life of John W. Davis. New York: Duffield and Company, 1924.

Judah, Charles and George W. Smith, The Unchosen. New York: Coward-McCann Inc., 1962.

Lathem, Edward C., Meet Calvin Coolidge, the Man Behind the Myth. Brattleboro, Vermont: Stephen Greene Press, 1960.

- Leighton, Isabel, editor, The Aspirin Age. New York: Simon and Shuster, 1949.
- Link, Arthur, American Epoch. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958.
- Leuchtenburg, William E., The Perils of Prosperity. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958.
- McAdoo, William G., Crowded Years. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1931.
- McCoy, Donald R., Calvin Coolidge. New York: Macmillan Company, 1967.
- Morris, George R., Progressive Democracy of James M. Cox. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1920.
- Odegard, Peter H., Pressure Politics, The Story of the Anti-Saloon League. New York: Columbia University Press, 1928.
- O'Keane, Josephine, Thomas J. Walsh. Francetown, N. H.: Marshall Jones and Company, 1955.
- Palmer, James E., Carter Glass, Unreconstructed Rebel. Roanoke, Va.: Institute of American Biography, 1938.
- Raybeck, Joseph G. A History of American Labor. New York: Macmillan Company, 1959.
- Roseboom, Eugene H., A History of Presidential Elections. New York: Macmillan Company, 1964.
- Russel, Francis, The Shadow of Blooming Grove. New York: McGraw Hill, 1968.
- Schriftgiesser, Karl, This Was Normalcy. Boston: Little Browne and Company, 1948.
- Seigfried, Andre, America Comes of Age. New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1927.
- Shannon, David A., Between the Wars. Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Company, 1965.
- Sinclair, Andrew, The Available Man the Life Behind the Masks of Warren G. Harding. New York: Macmillan Company, 1965.
- \_\_\_\_\_, Era of Excess, A Social History of Prohibition. New York: Harper and Row, 1962.
- Smith, Rixley, and Beasley, Norman, Carter Glass. New York: Longmans Green and Company, 1939.

Underwood, Oscar W., Drifting Sands of Party Politics. New York: Century Company, 1928.

Wheeler, Burton J. and Paul F. Healy, Yankee From the West. New York: Doubleday and Company, 1962.

White, William A., A Puritan in Babylon. New York: Macmillan and Company, 1938.

Allen, Hicks, and Leuchtenburg provide fine general descriptions of the period. Chalmers is the most helpful book on the Ku Klux Klan as Sinclair's is on prohibition. Several biographies and autobiographies of important men in the period deal with events in which Ritchie took part, but only a few mention him by name, and none of these are very helpful. O'Keane's book on Walsh is one of the best biographies and provides an informative view on the 1924 convention. Seigfried was reported to be Ritchie's favorite book.

D. Topics in United States History Related to Ritchie's Life, 1928-1931.

Butler, Nicholas Murray, Across Busy Years. New York: Scribners, 1940.

Burns, James M., Roosevelt: The Lion and The Fox. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1956.

Donnelly, Thomas C., and Peel, Roy V., The 1928 Campaign An Analysis. New York: Richard R. Smith, 1931.

Friedel, Frank, Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Ordeal. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1954.

Handlin, Oscar, Al Smith and His America. Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1958.

Hinshaw, David, Herbert Hoover, American Quaker. New York: Farrar Strauss and Company, 1950.

Hoover, Herbert, Memoirs. New York: Macmillan and Company, 1952.

Key, V. O., Jr., Southern Politics. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949.

Lubell, Samuel, The Future of American Politics. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952.

McGee, Dorothy, Herbert Hoover. New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1959.

Schlesinger, Arthur, The Crisis of the Old Order. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957.



Smith, Alfred, Up to Now. New York: Viking Press, 1929.

Soule, George, Prosperity Decade. New York: Harper and Row, 1947.

Warren, Harris G., Herbert Hoover and the Great Depression.  
New York: Oxford University Press, 1959.

The books in this section deal mainly with Hoover and Smith and analyses of the election of 1928. They are suggested here not so much because of how they mention Ritchie, but because the interpretations of the 1928 election are somewhat at variance with Maryland results, especially in reference to urban majorities.

E. Topics in United States History Related to Ritchie's Life,  
1932-1936

Allen, Frederick Lewis, Since Yesterday. New York: Harper Brothers,  
1939.

Cramer, C. H., Newton D. Baker. New York: World Publishing  
Company, 1961.

Farley, James A., Behind the Ballots. New York: Harcourt Brace,  
1938.

\_\_\_\_\_, Jim Farley's Story. New York: McGraw Hill Company, 1948.

Friedel, Frank, Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Triumph. Boston: Little  
Brown, 1956.

Krock, Arthur, In the Nation, 1932-66. New York: McGraw Hill  
Company, 1966.

Leuchtenburg, William E., Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal.  
New York: Harper and Row, 1963.

Martin, Ralph G., Ballots and Bandwagons. New York: Rand McNally,  
1964.

Mencken, Henry L. Making a President, 1932. New York: Alfred A.  
Knopf, 1932.

Moley, Raymond, The First New Deal. New York: Harcourt Brace and  
World, 1966.

\_\_\_\_\_, After Seven Years. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1939.

Perkins, Dexter, The New Age of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Chicago:  
University of Chicago Press, 1957.

Perkins, Frances, The Roosevelt I Know. New York: Viking Press,  
1946.

Rausch, Basil, The History of the New Deal. New York: Capricorn  
Books, 1944.

Rollins, Alfred B., Roosevelt and Howe. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962.

Roosevelt, Eleanor, This I Remember. New York: Harper and Row, 1947.

Rosenman, Samuel I., Working With Roosevelt. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952.

Schlesinger, Arthur M., The Coming of the New Deal. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965.

Sherwood, Robert E., Roosevelt and Hopkins. New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1948.

Tarbell, Ida M., Owen Young, A New Type of Industrial Leader. New York: Macmillan Company, 1932.

Timmons, Bascom. Garner of Texas. New York: 1948.

Tucker, Ray T., The Mirrors of 1932. New York: Brewer, Warren and Putnam, 1931

Tugwell, Rexford, The Democratic Roosevelt. New York: Doubleday, 1957.

Whalen, Richard J., The Founding Father. New York: New American Library, 1964.

Wolfskill, George, The History of the American Liberty League. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1962.

Ritchie's name appears often in the memoirs of those involved in the 1932 convention. Farley mentions him several times in his early book; less often in his later one. Mencken's view of the convention is that of a longtime fervent Ritchie supporter, a variation from the usual view. But most of the books suffer from hindsight and an adoration of Franklin Roosevelt whose nomination often reads as a triumph of the right. This was not the view of many Democratic leaders or perceptive news analysts in July, 1932, and so I have based my manuscript mainly on newspapers and first-hand reports of the convention. The books on the other candidates, especially Baker and Young, are campaign hagiography, and Timmons' book on Garner is somewhat superficial. The most revealing book on all the candidates is Ray Tucker's anonymously-published The Mirrors of 1932, which contains devastating and perceptive analyses of Coolidge, Hoover, Smith, Ritchie, Roosevelt, Baker, and Young.