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BERNARD BOSANQUET: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT

City University of New York

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BERNARD BOSANQUET: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT

by

ELLEN JACOBS

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in
History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University
of New York.

1986

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INTRODUCTION

Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923), has been described as "the central figure in British philosophy for a whole generation,"¹ and together with F. H. Bradley, as the "last two great representatives of the nineteenth century school of British Hegelianism."² Bosanquet's book, The Philosophical Theory of the State, has been regarded as the classic English expression of the Hegelian metaphysic of the state. In The Philosophical Theory of the State, Bosanquet argued that "the Nation-State . . . is recognized as absolute in power over the individual," and that the state was the instrument and vehicle for the realization of human personality and a "better self." His book was partly an attempt to present the Hegelian theory of the state as "the actualization of freedom in the world" as it was understood in the English context at the end of the nineteenth century. This point of view was heavily criticized during the First World War for its association with what was viewed as the authoritarian tendencies of a German metaphysics of state. In the standard textbooks of political theory, Leonard Hobhouse's book, The Metaphysical Theory of the State (1918) is credited with scoring the most devastating critique in English of neo-Idealist

political theory and its leading spokesman, Bernard Bosanquet.³

But Bosanquet's book was more than a restatement of Hegelian metaphysics. Bosanquet gave to the state a particular moral significance as the matrix of individual personality and community. Embedded in his theory of the state was a concept of the individual as a moral, social and political being. Bosanquet offered not only a theory of the state, but a theory of citizenship, as well, in a period when political democracy and social welfare were hotly debated.

Himself a beneficiary of a classical education, Bosanquet pursued a lifelong attempt to apply the fundamentals of classical political philosophy to contemporary circumstance. Bosanquet, following Plato and Aristotle, identified the social with the political, an opinion which led him to criticize, among other reasons, the tendency of contemporary social scientists, particularly sociologists, to transform the political into a species of the social. He emphasized the ethical nature of polity, an emphasis which led him to argue that the state, as an ethical institution, would provide the matrix of individual well-being. Far from denying the importance of the individual, he presumed that the purpose of the state was to promote the good life of its citizens and to provide the conditions

in which the best life, as rational, moral and social beings, could be achieved. He saw the role of the state as an institution in which a good common to all could be articulated. His Philosophical Theory of the State, which was published in 1899, was originally conceived as a series of lectures in social and political philosophy, precisely because he insisted upon the identification of polity with society, the social with political, and individuality with community.

The association of Bosanquet with an authoritarian or absolutist theory of the state conceals a paradox which is all the more striking when Bosanquet's life and work is viewed in its historical context. After resigning his post at Oxford in 1881, Bosanquet went to London in order to write and to address what contemporaries called the "social problem," or poverty. For the next forty-five years of his life, he attempted to bring his philosophy to bear upon issues of social policy. He was known among contemporaries for his defense of individual effort and enterprise and for his opposition to nearly all state welfare proposals.

He was identified with the individualistic social philosophy of the Charity Organisation Society--an association secured by ties of friendship and family. His eldest brother, Charles Bosanquet, was the first Secretary of the

organization, and his Oxford friend and classmate, Charles Loch was recruited from the India Office by Bosanquet to succeed his brother in that post. Bosanquet's wife, Helen Dendy, whom he married in 1895 at the age of 47, was prominent in administrative and district work of the COS. But beyond these personal ties, Bosanquet became involved in the work of the COS because he considered it to be the practical expression of his social and political philosophy. He served on the District and Administrative Committees of the COS, frequently spoke at its public meetings and conferences and gave courses of lectures in which he emphasized the COS principles of moral development of the individual. The COS emphasis upon "character" was essential to its individualistic approach to casework. In the course of his lengthy association with the COS Bosanquet elaborated a theory of individuality which was marked by its emphasis upon the sanctity of the individual and upon individual development. His defense of the individualistic social philosophy, identified in the public mind with the COS, was evident in his defense of the Majority Report of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws in 1909.

Bosanquet was also an early member of the London Ethical Society and gave many public lectures on its behalf in the 1880s and 1890s. In the course of those lectures he elaborated a theory of individuality and society which

was neo-Kantian in its emphasis upon treating individuals as ends not means and in his insistence upon the difficulty of promoting morality directly. The ethical life of the individual was a product of inner growth rather than the result of external arrangements.

As a member of the London Ethical Society, Bosanquet joined men otherwise as diverse as J. A. Hobson, Graham Wallas, Henry Sidgwick, Leslie Stephen, Sir John Seeley, C. S. Loch and John H. Muirhead. Bosanquet was responsible for the transformation of that Society into the London School of Ethics and Social Philosophy in 1897. His experience as a university extension lecturer and then as President of the School of Ethics and Social Philosophy placed him in the forefront of the movement for the extension of university teaching to working men and women. This attempt to increase the accessibility of university-level education coincided with the democratization of politics in the period following the Second Reform Bill (1867). Education, including higher education, became party to the moral and social improvement of the citizenry.

In addressing the "social problem," Bosanquet opposed certain state legislation and instead argued that the "value and destiny" of the individual lay in self-development. The latter was the principle element of his criterion of social reform. He opposed public provision

of old age pensions, school meals for children of the poor, and publicly-financed work for the unemployed. His view of the relationship between the individual and social welfare policies was evident in his analysis of the Majority and Minority Reports of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress in 1909.

This study aims at resolving the apparent paradox between Bosanquet's reputation among political theorists as the author of The Philosophical Theory of the State, which assigns absolute value to the state, and his individualistic social philosophy. This study will examine the nature and development of Bosanquet's social and political thought particularly as it pertains to his social reform activities and to the social question. It does not deal extensively with the more technical aspects of his philosophy, except as it informs the structure of his thought. Instead, it attempts to reconstruct the relationship between his social and political theory by restoring his work to its original context, and to this end it draws upon his abundant essays and addresses, occasional writings, lectures and major works.

The examination of Bosanquet's experiences as a philosopher of applied social thought should offer insight into the ideological foundations of the late nineteenth

and twentieth century discussions of the aims and limits of social policy. Bosanquet's various reform activities brought him into contact with a diverse assortment of late Victorians concerned with the contemporary world. These included the philosopher Henry Sidgwick, the economist Alfred Marshall, the social investigator Charles Booth, and social reformers, Beatrice and Sidney Webb. Bosanquet engaged in an exchange with the latter upon several occasions, the most memorable being that which followed the issuance of the Reports of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws in 1909. Their exchange of polemics upon that occasion was characterized by differences not only with regard to social policy but also with regard to the nature of society and polity.

This study offers an opportunity to reconsider the contribution of philosophical idealism to the language of political discourse in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Britain. Philosophical idealism was a genre of metaphysical philosophy which flourished at Oxford in the last third of the nineteenth century. Most often associated with the Oxford professor of philosophy T. H. Green and his students, philosophical idealism offered a method of criticism and an implicit injunction to engage in social reform. The "school of Green" sent down scores of educators, politicians, journalists, settlement-house workers

and philosophers in the latter part of the nineteenth century who believed it was their duty to serve in the work of reform. Philosophical idealists included Bosanquet, Edward Caird, Henry Jones, David Ritchie, John H. Muirhead, R. B. Haldane, who, while not a student of Green, was closely associated with the genre of philosophical criticism associated with him and F. H. Bradley.

In terms of social and political theory, philosophical idealism is traditionally characterized by its 'organicism,' or emphasis upon society as a unity rather than an aggregate, upon the social context of individual morality, and upon the supreme role of the state as the expression of the general will of the community. Traditional textbook accounts see the Idealists' moral collectivism as a bridge between the moral individualism of Utilitarianism and the collectivist policies associated with a "new liberalism."⁴ These accounts of the new liberalism, as it became known at the time, credit the Idealists with providing a theory of the state which made the transition to collectivist policies possible. Idealism did bring a new vocabulary and a new set of concepts to English social and political argument. It provided the tools for criticism and a new vocabulary for political and social action. But it would be misleading to argue that all new Liberals were Idealists, even though elements

of Idealist philosophy are discernible in the writings of several political theorists, including some of the new Liberals.

Idealist philosophy could be, and was, used to justify a variety of political preferences. Idealism did not lead to one set of reform proposals any more than did empiricism, pragmatism or any other metaphysical or epistemological doctrine. Idealists were not homogeneous in their social and political opinion. Bosanquet was sympathetic to labor but individualistic in his social philosophy and more at home in the COS than the Fabian Society. David Ritchie and Haldane were more sympathetic to the collectivistic programs enunciated in the Fabian Society. Idealism provided the tools for criticism of many of the assumptions associated with both individualistic and collectivistic policies.

While the correlation between Idealist philosophy and political affiliation was ambiguous, it is certain that the language of philosophical idealism provided a tool for those engaged in social and political action. It provided a concept of citizenship and the state, of individuality and community, of politics and ethics. The idealist presentation of a theory of individuality and community may be said to have been essential to the development of social and political thinking in Britain

in the period from 1880-1914. In 1914 the theory suffered a decline brought about by a readiness to identify German metaphysics with the enemy. In that sense, this study aims at reconstructing a dialogue within Britain concerning the individual and the state, citizen and society which was carried on in an idiom or grammar of politics which was essentially eclipsed after the First World War.

There has been no full length critical study of Bernard Bosanquet's social and political thought as it relates to his experience as a social reformer. There is a short account of Bosanquet's life, written by his wife, Helen Dendy Bosanquet (London, 1924), and a select collection of his philosophical letters, Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends: Letters Illustrating the Sources and Development of His Philosophical Opinions (London, 1935) edited by J. H. Muirhead. Andrew Vincent and Raymond Plant have collaborated on a study of the British Idealists and their relation to social and political movements in the period 1880-1914. Philosophy, Politics and Citizenship: The Life and Thought of the British Idealists (Oxford, 1984) is a valuable contribution to our understanding of Idealism as a political philosophy. Bosanquet's contribution to social and political theory tends to be amalgamated with that of others in the attempt to

synthesize Idealist political thought, and his philosophy is analyzed almost wholly in terms of his work on behalf of the COS. Apart from these studies, Bosanquet has been left by historians of the Victorian age to be treated by philosophers. These philosophers have given little attention to the particular context of personal experience, politics, education, and social work which informs Bosanquet's thought.

Darrell Dexter Iacock's 1967 Ph.D. dissertation (Yale, unpublished), The Political Philosophy of Bernard Bosanquet, examines his political thought in light of Bosanquet's supposed Hegelianism, seeking to redress a shift toward analytic philosophy in recent British philosophy. Marvin Schnaidman's 1975 Ph.D. dissertation (Columbia University, unpublished), The Individual and Society in Bernard Bosanquet's Social Philosophy, treats the philosophical dimension of Bosanquet's theory of individuality and society but neglects an account of the historical dimension of Bosanquet's theory and its development in relation to Bosanquet's reform activities.

Bertil Pfannenstill's study, Bernard Bosanquet's Philosophy of the State (Lund, 1936), is a history of the philosophy of the state beginning with Plato, and culminating in an analysis of Bosanquet's Idealist view of the state. Kia Tchong Houang's two studies, De l'Humanisme

à l'Absolutisme (Paris, 1954) and Le néo-Hegelianism en Angleterre (Paris, 1954), are structuralist analyses of Bosanquet's Hegelian phenomenology. The most recent full length, published study of Bosanquet which has appeared is Charles LeChevalier's La Pensée Morale de Bernard Bosanquet (Paris, 1963). However, it amounts to an imprecise defense of idealism as a moral philosophy. Frederick Philip Harris' study, The Neo-Idealists Political Theory: Its Continuity with the British Tradition (New York, 1944), seeks to place Bosanquet, among others treated in the study, within a British Liberal tradition of thought.

There are brief accounts in the general histories of philosophy of Bosanquet's philosophy of state. The most extensive work of this genre is A. J. M. Milne's The Social Philosophy of English Idealism (London, 1962) which is a study of the ethics and political theory of four Idealist philosophers, F. H. Bradley, T. H. Green, Bernard Bosanquet and Josiah Royce. Milne's study is intended as a contribution to the history of philosophy and is not historical in the broader sense. Nor is it concerned with personal biography, nor the effect of the philosophers' work on contemporaries or on the general life of their time, nor with the historical context.

The research facilities of the New York Public

Library and the Columbia University Butler Library contain extensive holdings in the history of social work, philosophy and sociology. The majority of Bosanquet's published works have been consulted in those two institutions. Bosanquet's unpublished manuscripts and notes are held in the Archive Collection of the University Library, the University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne. I am indebted to Bosanquet's great-nephew, Mr. Charles Ion Carr Bosanquet for his general assistance in making available access to those papers and to Mr. Alistair Elliot, for his excellence as Librarian of Special Collections in the University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne Library. Papers relating to Beatrice and Sidney Webb, Graham Wallas, and other members of the Fabian Society engaged in reform were consulted with the permission of the Librarian of Special Collections, of the British Library of Political and Economic Science at the London School of Economics. The librarians in the Goldsmith's Library and the Special Collections division of the University of London Library (Charles Booth papers) were most helpful in making available items in their care.

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1. J. H. Muirhead, "Bernard Bosanquet," Mind 32 (oct. 1923): 393.
2. Dictionary of National Biography 1922-1930, s.v. "Bosanquet, Bernard" by A. D. Lindsay, p. 93.
3. Stefan Collini provides a thorough summary of the standard textbook accounts of Bosanquet's book and Hobhouse's critique. See Stefan Collini, "Hobhouse, Bosanquet and the State: Philosophical Idealism and Political Argument in England 1880-1918," Past & Present no. 72 (Aug. 1976): 86ff.
4. Those textbooks which see idealism as a theory which makes possible the collectivistic policies of the New Liberalism include R. C. K. Ensor, England 1870-1914 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936) and R. K. Webb, Modern England: From the Eighteenth Century to the Present (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1968).

CHAPTER I

THE SOCIOLOGY OF A FAMILY

"Ideas are the most portable of baggage," remarked Bernard Bosanquet in a 1901 essay on "The English People." "It is ideas," he explained, "which form the connection between a geographically insulated nation and the rest of the world."¹ International commerce, in deed as well as in ideas, was the very essence of his own family heritage.

The Bosanquets were an old and distinguished family of Huguenot descent.² In the sixteenth century, the Bosanquets were prominent citizens of Lunel, in the Cevennes Mountains, in the southeast corner of the ancient French province of Languedoc. The first Bosanquets to settle in England arrived in London at the close of the seventeenth century, seeking refuge from the religious persecution which followed the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. The Bosanquet brothers, David and Jean, had refused their father's legacy which was conditional upon their return to France and their conversion to Roman Catholicism. They presently became English subjects and embarked upon careers as "merchants of London" in the period which Bolingbroke labelled "an age of commercial revolution."

From the mid-seventeenth century on, there had

been a dramatic growth in British overseas trade, with the port of London handling increasingly large quantities of trans-oceanic goods for Continental markets. The migration of people and capital to London at the close of the century marked the entrance of Huguenots into the center of British finance and politics. In compulsory exile, the Huguenot community flourished, strengthened by prudent marriages and a thriving Anglo-Dutch commerce. The Bosanquet name quickly appeared among those Dutch and Huguenot migrants responsible for the rise of London to fiscal pre-eminence. The Bosanquet brothers, and David's children, acting in close correspondence with the Amsterdam trading houses, prospered in the re-export trade of East Indian silks, cotton and produce.³

Subsequent generations of Bosanquets followed an almost classical pattern of the merchant family of the eighteenth century so aptly described by later historians Lucy Sutherland and Charles Wilson.⁴ The Bosanquet family moved horizontally, from the merchant trade into commercial, banking and financial speculation, securing the family interest with prudent marriages into English landed society and a Whig parliamentary connection.⁵ By the nineteenth century the family name distinguished the rosters of landed gentry as well as City finance. Bosanquet's great-grandfather, Samuel Bosanquet II, served as Governor

of the Bank of England as well as Justice of the Peace and High Sheriff of Essex, the seat of the family estate. Bosanquet's grandfather, Charles Bosanquet, was associated with a merchant-planter interest in the West Indies and the defense of a monetarist trade policy advocated by the Bank of England.⁶ He carried the family name to Alnwick, situated forty miles below the Scottish border in the northeast corner of Northumberland County, establishing a cadet branch of the family on the estate of Rock, where Bernard was born.

The ancient estate of Rock originally consisted of a manor, mine and colliery forming part of the Barony of Alnwick, and had been held in the reign of Henry IV by William de Rok. It passed through several families in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries until it was sold to Lord Jersey. Peter Holford, Charles Bosanquet's father-in-law and Master-in-Chancery, purchased the estate in 1794, and in 1804, Charles received the estate as a gift from his brother-in-law. Bosanquet restored the main hall, which had been destroyed by fire, and the village church, rebuilt the village which was coterminous with the estate and completed the division of the estate into five farms. In his later years he retired to the estate, fulfilling the duties of a country gentleman by serving as High Sheriff, Deputy Lieutenant and Justice of the Peace

for the county.

Of six sons born to Charles Bosanquet and his wife, Charlotte Ann Holford, three died young and the others entered the "gentlemen's professions": two entered the clergy and one became a barrister. Bosanquet's father was the eldest son, Robert William, born in 1800 and educated at Harrow School and Balliol College, Oxford. He entered the clergy, serving as Rector of Bolingbroke in Lincolnshire until inheriting the family estate of Rock. There he served as resident proprietor, improving the estate and participating in the spiritual and secular affairs of the township of Rock and the neighboring parish of Rennington, lecturing frequently on foreign mission work.⁷

Robert William Bosanquet's first wife died in 1835 after giving birth to a son and heir, Charles Bertie Pulleine Bosanquet. The Reverend Bosanquet then married Caroline Day Hort MacDowall three years later and within the next ten years, four more sons were born. The youngest son, born at Rock Hall on 14 June 1848, was named Bernard in honor of the Reverend Bosanquet's uncle, Sir John Bernard Bosanquet, a distinguished Judge of the Common Pleas who had died six months earlier.

Early experiences on the Northumbrian estate of Rock and the strength of family tradition were to remain lasting influences on Bernard Bosanquet's life and thought.

When he was born, the estate was still farmed by the family with the aid of stewards. The spirit of cooperation on the land which he observed as a boy was later the starting point of his social theory, the "art of living together."⁸ Recalling the early influences on his philosophical development Bosanquet would frequently refer to the image of his family home as a site that was at once efficient in doing the world's work, cordial in its inner spirit of cooperation, and amicable to all other immediate families. The family estate of Rock provided him with a model of social harmony as well as with a concept of family life which remained alive and vivid throughout his life. "The home," he later wrote, "at its best, is a nursery of courage and of public spirit. . . ."⁹

In his career as philosopher and social reformer, Bosanquet stressed the primacy of home and family to the formation of individual character. His social theory rested upon the vision of individuals working together toward a shared moral and social purpose, a common good. Social institutions like home, family, and community were essential to the formation of the individual as a citizen, as well. These social institutions tended to strengthen one's sense of duty and also, of cooperation.

He also believed that social institutions linked members of one generation to another. In his own family,

successive generations inherited a legacy not only of the family estate, but also a sense of the obligation to family and community. Bosanquet's nephew, Robert Carr Bosanquet, an archaeologist, referred to the strength of family tradition when he advised his own son, Charles Ion Carr Bosanquet, of the sacrifices inherent in one's legacy.

That the attraction of this place and its tradition is strong, is proved by the curious way in which, for three generations, we have given up very different occupations in order to settle here; but I think Robert William Bosanquet the parson, Charles Bertie Pulleine Bosanquet the social reformer, and Robert Carr Bosanquet the archaeologist, would have done better work here if they had spent more of their lives in the North, and had a business training into the bargain. . . . I don't want you to regard the possible claims of this place as an Old Man of the Sea on your shoulders. You are quite free to decide that such a career involves sacrificing your natural ambition, and I shall not blame you at all.¹⁰

Bosanquet's fond memories of home and family were shared by his brother George, three years his elder, and an army career man who recalled his "bonny North country home" where the five brothers were raised up under their mothers' "gentle rule."¹¹

Bosanquet's mother was the youngest of six children born to Day Hort MacDowall and Wilhelmina Graham of Renfrewshire and Walkinshaw, Scotland. The MacDowalls and Grahams were of ancient Scottish lineage and linked by several generations of intermarriage. The MacDowalls traced their possession of the barony of Garthland in

Renfrewshire back to the grant of a charter by John Baliol in 1295. The Graham family ancestry included the award of the title of Airth for the service of one relation as Judge Admiral of Scotland. Both the MacDowall and Graham families engaged in the merchant trade of the eighteenth century; the Grahams in East Indian wine and goods, the MacDowalls in West Indian enterprise. Merchant wealth and extensive Scottish estates guaranteed both families' electoral interest and sent a steady stream of MacDowalls and Grahams to the unreformed House of Commons in the late eighteenth-century.¹²

Large families and frequent marriages among Scottish relations provided a plethora of Stirling, Dundas, Ingilby and McCallum cousins. One cousin, Mary MacDullum, with whom Bosanquet was to continue a lifelong association in social work activities in London, warmly recalled her visits with his mother at Rock as respite from her pious but interfering Scottish aunts.¹³ There is no record of Caroline Bosanquet's religious affiliation, although one might assume the effects of her upbringing in a Calvinist country as leading toward the Protestant practice of self-scrutiny and piety. A school friend of Bosanquet described her as "a delightful woman; clever and sympathetic."¹⁴ A letter from his mother to a friend when Bosanquet was sixteen reveals a vivacious yet rigorous character. After

describing the spring foliage in the garden she reported on her "mental work."

I have been reading Lord Derby's Iliad with the greatest pleasure; it is like a new thing to me though I know Pope's well; and happening to be reading 1st Samuel at the same time, I cannot tell you the startling effect on my mind of the description of Hector's armour in the one and Goliath's in the other, as if they might well have been made by the same Phoenician armourer. Then, the actual mention of Sidon and Phoenicians at one place! It is so interesting too in itself. I am now taking to a 'hard crust,' in the shape of Polybius history; a good translation from the original into French in some six great quarto vols., so whether I shall get through it remains to be seen. I always liked what little I knew of Polybius and felt I needed a little close mental work; one is so apt to get idle and discursive.¹⁵

Caroline Bosanquet's "close mental work" fostered Bosanquet's love of poetry and Shakespeare as a young boy. At the age of seven Bosanquet left home to begin his formal schooling at the preparatory school at Sherburn. Four years later he entered another preparatory school, at Elstree, staying there a year and a half until his promotion to the Harrow school in January 1862.

Harrow was one of the ancient public schools governed by Masters who were classically educated clergymen whose aims were to produce Christian gentlemen according to a curriculum which stressed religious and moral education. One former Harrovian, alluding to the social composition of the student body in the nineteenth century, referred to it as "a great Boarding-School for the upper classes," "a nursery of politicians," which produced three

Prime Ministers during Victoria's reign.¹⁶ Bosanquet's father had attended the school when it was under the Head-Mastership of Dr. George Butler; Bosanquet entered the school when it was headed by his son, Henry Montagu Butler.

The school was headed by the Master, but in the details of daily life it was mainly governed by the Sixth Form. Promotion to the Sixth Form was regarded as a measure of success; students might stay there for several years or never arrive at all. Bosanquet was in the Upper Sixth for three years, two and three-quarter years under Butler. Butler ruled over the classical education of his students, emphasizing Greek and Latin grammar, composition and translation. And like many other Victorian public school masters, it was his personality which left a lasting impression on his pupils. Bosanquet recalled his years under Butler.

It was part of Butler's character to radiate a sort of spiritual energy and high seriousness, and most boys dimly felt it to be wrong to be lax in work for him, and also, no doubt, rather terrible to be caught out by him. Not that he did anything very awful, but there was a sort of grave surprise in his manner at your not appreciating your chances of contact with high values.¹⁷

Butler may have also imparted to his charges a certain passion for Christian service to those less well off. As a Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, Butler had attempted to follow the example of the Christian Socialist, F. D. Maurice, by establishing a working men's

college in Cambridge in 1855. An early forerunner of the University Extension movement, the college provided classes on the Bible, drawing, French and mathematics. Butler's pioneering efforts in education may have had some echoes twenty years later when Bosanquet agreed to lecture to working men and women in University Extension courses in London.

Bosanquet graduated from Harrow in June 1866, winning awards for his facility with Greek and Latin prose in a graduating class which Butler later celebrated as the "annus mirabilis" of his Head-Mastership.¹⁸

Bosanquet's course of study was somewhat in doubt for the next six months. While he studied in Derbyshire with Robinson Ellis, a private tutor, his father corresponded with Dr. Butler about the possibility of his entrance into Cambridge University. Bosanquet's father and two eldest brothers, Charles Bertie Pulleine Bosanquet and Robert Holford MacDowall had been educated at Balliol College, Oxford. His eldest brother Charles trained as a barrister, served as the first general Secretary of the Charity Organisation Society of London from 1870 to 1875 and was for many years a leading figure in London philanthropic activities before returning north to manage the family estate. Robert Holford was a mathematician and Fellow of the Royal Society and a Fellow of St. John's

College, Oxford. Following a familiar pattern among the Victorian gentry, Bosanquet's remaining brothers, Day Hort (1843-1923) and George William (1845-1869) also entered the professions. Day entered the Royal Navy in 1857, rose to the position of Admiral and was later Governor of South Australia. George William entered the Army.

Bosanquet's parents planned a career for him in the church. While he was still at Harrow his mother had written of her hope, "God grant he (my Boy) may be a tool fitted for 'the Master's use,'" and his father started a capital-fund for his "presentation" into the clergy.¹⁹ His parents' choice of a clerical career for him followed the conventional pattern for sons of the Victorian gentry--from law, university, army, navy, to clerical career. No one planned a career in business; a telling social comment on the Victorian gentry and the social perception of class and respectability.

In November 1866, Bosanquet was successful in winning one of three scholarships offered by Balliol College. Balliol in the late 1860s was "supposed to be a hotbed of Free Thought,"²⁰ and it may have been with this reputation in mind that Bosanquet later recalled in a letter to his nephew, his eldest brother's role in the choice of a college: "Your father could I have no doubt, have prevented us [Bernard and Holford] from going to Balliol

if he had thought it desirable--it was his wonderful tolerance and judgement that made him permit it."²¹ The move from the orthodox teachings of home and school to Balliol, turned out to be a decisive event in Bosanquet's life.

The economic success of his family allowed Bernard Bosanquet to enjoy a financial security and assured social status which he later took for granted as the basis of a good society. His experience of home and family in the north of England provided him with a model of social harmony and cooperation. His family legacy was marked not only by commercial success and economic resourcefulness but also by a tradition of Christian charity and concern for those less fortunate which ranged from the founding of the Huguenot hospital for poor French refugees in late-eighteenth century London to the philanthropic efforts of successive generations of Bosanquets in the nineteenth century. When Bosanquet went up to Balliol in the late 1860s it may have been assumed within the family that he would serve both God and community; the form of social service which he ultimately chose, as a philosopher and as a social reformer, was uniquely his own.

1. Bernard Bosanquet, "The English People: Notes on National Characteristics," International Monthly 3 (Jan., 1901): 83.

2. The French spelling of the family name was variously recorded as Bozanquet, Bousanquet, Bouzanquet, Boussanquet. See Grace Lawless Lee, The Story of the Bosanquets (Canterbury: Phillimore & Co., 1966), p. 8. A later Bosanquet descendant returned to the ancient Languedoc province in 1896 and reported to his sister that "I didn't know why this climate and the Attic climate which is nearly identical--have always contented me so well;--today I found out . . . ours is a 'nom meridional.'" Robert Carr Bosanquet, Letters and Light Verse, ed. Ellen S. Bosanquet (Gloucester: J. Bellows, 1938), p. 48.

The name may have been "meridional," the pronunciation was soon Anglicized to rhyme: "Attend at sound of Bugle Horn / And with the approaching solemn Morn / Give, as you're bound, all you can get / Of votes to much lov'd Bosanquet." This was a poem written by an Essex acquaintance of an early English Bosanquet to celebrate his election as Verderer of Epping Forest. Quoted by Lee, The Story of the Bosanquets, p. 70.

The basic sources for the biographical material concerning the family Bosanquet are Lee and Helen Bosanquet, Bernard Bosanquet, A Short Account of His Life (London: Macmillan & Co., 1924).

3. Charles Wilson, Anglo-Dutch Commerce and Finance in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), p. 203.

4. Information regarding London finance in the eighteenth century is drawn from Lucy Sutherland, "The City of London in Eighteenth-Century Politics," in Essays Presented to Sir Lewis Namier, eds. Richard Pares and A. J. P. Taylor (London: Macmillan & Co., 1956), and Lucy Sutherland, A London Merchant 1695-1774 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962).

5. For the connection between a merchant "interest" and Parliament, see Lewis B. Namier, The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III (London: Macmillan & Co., 1961), pp. 49-56.

6. In a series of pamphlets on colonial trade Bosanquet argued that the augmentation of domestic duties on West Indian products and the restrictive monopoly of colonial trade by Britain added to the hazards of the British planter class in the West Indies. This was essentially a free-trade argument on behalf of the merchant and agricultural interests at the start of the great nineteenth century debate of free-trade policies. See Charles Bosanquet, Letter on the Proposition Submitted to Government for Taking the Duty on Muscavado Sugar ad valorem (London: S. & C. McDowall, 1806); Thoughts on the Value of Great Britain of Commerce in General and on the Value and Importance of the Colonial Trade in Particular (London: J. M. Richardson, 1807); and Letter to W. Manning, Esq. M. P. on the Cause of the Rapid and Progressive Depreciation of West Indian Property, 2d ed. (London: S. & C. McDowall, 1808).

Charles Bosanquet also defended the monetarist policies of the Bank of England in a debate with David Ricardo over the causes of the devaluation of the currency during the Napoleonic Wars. See Charles Bosanquet, Practical Observations on the Report of the Bullion Committee, 2d ed. (London: J. M. Richardson, 1810) and David Ricardo, Reply to Mr. Charles Bosanquet's Practical Observations on the Report of the Bullion Committee (London: John Murray, 1811).

7. Helen Bosanquet, Bernard Bosanquet, p. 9. The Rev. R. W. Bosanquet was reported by a great-nephew to have been a "devout Evangelical." See Melvin Richter, The Politics of Conscience: T. H. Green and His Age (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 380, n. 10.

8. Bernard Bosanquet, "Life and Philosophy," in Contemporary British Philosophy: Personal Statements. Ed. J. H. Muirhead, First Series (London: Allen & Unwin, 1924), pp. 52, 53.

9. Bosanquet, "English People," p. 81.

10. Robert Carr Bosanquet to Charles Ion Carr Bosanquet, 18 October 1927, Letters and Light Verse, p. 218. In the end, the attraction of Rock and family tradition won out--Dr. Charles Ion Carr Bosanquet took up residence on the family estate.

11. Helen Bosanquet, Bernard Bosanquet, pp. 12-13.

12. This summary is drawn from Burke's Genealogical and Heraldic History of the Landed Gentry, 17th ed. entries for MacDowall of Garthland, Stirling of Kippendavie and Dundas of Ochtertyre. See also materials concerning family matters in the Bosanquet papers, University of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne Library, Trunk I.A4 and A12. One of James Graham's (1755-1836) more illustrious moments came in the Commons on 17 June 1782 when he "successfully initiated legislation to repeal the Act prohibiting the wearing of Highland dress." Lewis B. Namier and John Brooke, History of Parliament: the House of Commons 1754-90, 3 vols. vol. 2: Members A-J (London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1964), p. 527.

13. Mary C. McCallum, Notes & Memories (London: By the author, Women's Printing Society, 1893), p. 16.

14. R. G. Tatton in conversation (transcribed) with Helen Bosanquet, Bosanquet papers, University of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne Library, Trunk I,E.

15. Caroline Bosanquet to Mrs. Jebb, 17 April 1865, quoted in Helen Bosanquet, Bernard Bosanquet, p. 12.

16. G. W. E. Russell, Sketches & Snapshots (New York: Duffield & Co., 1910), pp. 224, 225; Helen Bosanquet, Bernard Bosanquet, p. 22.

17. Edward Graham, The Harrow Life of Henry Montagu Butler, D.D. (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1920), p. 301.

18. Ibid., p. 150.

19. Caroline Bosanquet to Mrs. Jebb, 17 April 1865, quoted in Helen Bosanquet, Bernard Bosanquet, p. 12; Helen Bosanquet, Bernard Bosanquet, p. 24.

20. Arthur Lionel Smith, Master of Balliol (1916-1924): A Biography and Some Reminiscences by his Wife (London: John Murray, 1928), p. 75.

21. Bernard Bosanquet to Robert Carr Bosanquet, 13 August 1912, Bosanquet papers, University of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne, Trunk I.E.

CHAPTER II

BALLIOL MASTERS

When Bosanquet went up to Balliol in 1867 he was joined by three Harrow classmates, all members of the Sixth Form in Dr. Butler's "annus mirabilis." All four intended to take orders in the Anglican church; none left Balliol as clerics. One of the "Harrow four," R. G. Tatton, later engaged in the settlement house movement in London, attributed the transformation to a "wave of critical scepticism" which swept Oxford, "due more probably to Jowett than to Green, which turned them away from Orthodox Christianity."¹ The College was in a period of transition, moving from a phase of disputation about faith, as fundamentals of orthodox Christianity into a more secular, humanist and evangelical phase which emphasized service to God, state and country.

Benjamin Jowett and Thomas Hill Green dominated the intellectual life of Balliol in those years. Celebrated as "the great Tutor"² and "the irrepressible Mentor,"³ Jowett was reportedly only partly jesting when he expressed the desire upon becoming Master of the College in 1870 "to inoculate the world with Balliol."⁴ By the

last quarter of the nineteenth century, at the high point of the empire, Jowett's wish appeared to have been fulfilled. "Wherever in the world a Balliol man was settled, there was a pupil of Jowett."⁵ One of Jowett's pupils who remained to assist in the work of the College was T. H. Green. Elected a tutor and lay-fellow of the College in 1860, Green lectured on subjects in the Literae Humaniores school until becoming Whyte's Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University in 1878. His influence in promoting the systematic study of philosophy and the effect of his teaching on under-graduates was substantial. "To other real or imagined great people in Oxford," testified one pupil, "I took off my hat, but before Green I felt as if I could take off not the hat only but also the head."⁶

Together Jowett and Green helped to shape the character of the College and the men who studied there. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, students of Jowett and Green formed a steady stream into Parliament, Law Courts, Civil Service and Church. The generation which preceded Bosanquet's at Oxford included the churchman Scott Holland, who later joined Westcott, Bosanquet's Harrow teacher, and Charles Gore, another Balliol man, in founding the Christian Social Union, an Anglican group which mixed the tenets of Christianity with that of ser-

vice to the laboring classes. The philosopher, Richard Lewis Nettleship, another of the generation preceding Bosanquet's, stayed on at the College, joining Green in the task of preparing students, including Bosanquet, in the Classical School of "Greats." Nettleship had a quiet but lasting effect upon Bosanquet's appreciation of Plato, aesthetics and speculative thought. Elected a Fellow and tutor in the College in 1869, he was said to have represented the "equilibrium" between the quaero of Jowett and the credo of Green.

Bosanquet's encounter with the Balliol of Jowett and Green had a decisive effect upon his life and work. Jowett helped to transform Balliol into a little "Republic," he revived the study of Plato and imbued students with the classical notion that education, ethics and citizenship were one and the same and that public service was a very practical concern. Bosanquet's debt to Green was even greater in that Green provided the outlines of the idealistic philosophy with which Bosanquet was able to translate his communitarian experiences of home and family into a theory of polity and society and a career as a philosopher and social reformer. The aim of this chapter is to elucidate those aspects of Jowett and Green's teaching which had an effect upon Bosanquet.

* * *

Jowett was a querulous spirit and even before he became the venerable Master of his later years, he turned his critical eye toward the reform of the undergraduate curriculum and the strengthening of the College in its mission. A. D. Lindsay, who went up to Balliol in 1869 and was himself later Master of the College, recalled the "Jowett tradition" as he first encountered it. Referring to Jowett's insistence that the College existed for the sake of undergraduates, Lindsay reflected upon the difference between Jowett's view and that of his colleague, Mark Pattison.

Mark Pattison thought that all institutions of learning, including Colleges, existed for research; Jowett thought the College existed, in the words of the Bidding Prayer, to train up men to serve God in Church and State."⁷

Jowett thought his own role as mentor was to teach men "how they may learn to grow independently and for themselves."⁸ To this end, he pursued the reform of the curriculum at Oxford, introducing changes which loosened the hold of traditional authorities. Writing in 1865, Jowett noted the change in the curriculum.

When I was an undergraduate we were fed upon Bishop Butler and Aristotle's Ethics, and almost all teaching leaned to the support of doctrines of authority. Now there are new subjects, Modern History and Physical Science, and more important than these, perhaps, is the real study of Metaphysics in the Literae Humaniores school--every man for the last ten years who goes in for honours has read Bacon, and probably Locke, Mill's Logic, Plato, Aristotle, and the history of ancient philosophy. See how impossible this makes a return to the old authority."⁹

For thirty years, Jowett labored upon Plato's works, translating and introducing the Dialogues and The Republic, stimulating the study of early Greek philosophy, and reviving the spirit of Plato at Oxford. When Bosanquet went up to Balliol, one friend recalled, "there was none of Jowett's pupils who drank more deeply of the spirit of Plato," as did Bosanquet.¹⁰ Jowett revived the study of Plato, but he was critical, however, of what he considered Plato's doctrinaire tone in The Republic. Jowett criticized Plato's theory of education, which began with the aim of training the "reasoning faculties" and ended with the "vacancy of actual knowledge."¹¹

Although Jowett celebrated the introduction of "the real study of Metaphysics" into the Oxford curriculum, he was remarkably hostile in his later years to metaphysics and abstract thought. His youthful enthusiasm for reading Kant and Hegel had long since vanished as he reportedly dissuaded a pupil from studying Kant, "because it takes so long to see what these fellows would be at."¹² In 1870, the year he became Master of Balliol, he was far more accommodating to received opinion, cautioning his former pupil, Edward Caird, then Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Glasgow, and collaborator on a project for a new edition of Essays and Reviews, a volume of biblical criticism which had provoked

controversy when it first appeared in 1859, that "the more we can avoid Hegelianism, Germanism, or direct assaults upon received opinions, the better."¹³ One of Caird's pupils who went up to Balliol as a Snell Exhibitioner in 1875 remarked upon the change in Jowett's position.

It remains true that in his later years he had a rooted distrust of Metaphysics, and regarded the men who were giving new life to it under German influences with something of the alarm of the proverbial barnfowl when the ducklings she has hatched and cherished take to the water she had intended them merely to sip.¹⁴

One of the most prominent of Jowett's pupils who had taken to the waters of speculative philosophy was T. H. Green. In method and philosophy, Green differed markedly from Jowett and the clash of the two was apparent to the Oxford contemporaries. Unencumbered by a doctrine or metaphysical truth, Jowett fixed his eyes upon the matter at hand--his college and the fortunes of the pupils who passed through it. Jowett distrusted metaphysical speculation in general, and the variety he observed flourishing under Green, in particular. Jowett offered questions, Green offered a creed; the meeting of the two shaped the intellectual atmosphere of Balliol in the years of Bosanquet's apprenticeship. The historian of Balliol College offered a note upon their differences.

Their speculative differences never chilled the warmth of their intimacy. These differences were, however, great; for Green was, above all things, a system-builder, and, for that reason, the magnetic influence

which he exercised both over his own pupils and over those with whom his contact was but casual, caused Jowett some hours of uneasiness. But Green gave ideas to men who were scantily provided with them, and what was more important, set an example of high purpose, of connected and laborious thought, of confidence in the powers of human reason, which was invaluable even to those who could not go far with him in his own peculiar speculations. . . . There are many who still think that no better place of education can be imagined than one in which the 'Credo' of Green should be constantly opposed to the 'Quaero' of Jowett.¹⁵

Green's creed, philosophical idealism, offered a theory of politics and ethics and a rationale for involvement in the work of social and political reform. Green developed a theory of the state which gave it a particular moral significance as the ultimate expression of individuality and community. The purpose of the state, according to Green, was to promote the good life of its citizens and to develop the moral nature of the individual. Bosanquet followed Green in his identification of polity with ethical rationalism. Green's theory of the state was a logical construct based upon his original assumption that a life lived according to reason and morality was the best life for man. The state, for Green and Bosanquet functioned as the proper setting of individual life, the matrix for the maintenance and development of free personality. It was this view of the state which engendered Green's claim, which Bosanquet later emended in his book, The Philosophical Theory of the State, "Will, not force,

is the basis of the state."¹⁶

Green's emphasis upon the ethical and rational dimensions of state and citizenship provoked Bosanquet and others, including the philosophers Sir Henry Jones, D. G. Ritchie, Edward Caird, William Wallace, and Lord Haldane to elaborate theories in which the state and the individual were viewed differently than in the traditional manner of liberal political thought. Bosanquet was foremost among those who would be identified with the idealistic theory of the state some twenty years later. The effect of Green's lessons was evident in Bosanquet's undergraduate years and it remained influential throughout his career.

Green's creed, philosophical idealism, was among other things, a critical response to Utilitarianism, still the dominant tradition in English political thought. Starting from his critique of Hume's ethical theory, which appeared in his 1874 introduction to A Treatise of Human Nature, and proceeding in his lectures on ethics and political obligation, published posthumously as the Prolegomena to Ethics and his Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation, Green sought to restore a "metaphysic of ethics" to contemporary philosophic discourse.

Utilitarian ethical theory, Green held, vitiated moral philosophy because it was based solely upon the

hedonist principle that humans are motivated solely by the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain, and the corollary principle that the rightness of an action was determined by its impact on the happiness of those it effected. According to the Benthamite theory of morality, all that was needed was an ethic of calculation; in order to determine the "greatest happiness of the greatest number," one need only calculate the sum of individual assessments of that which was conducive to pleasure. There was no consideration of moral conflict, or ethical dilemma, in the utilitarian universe; utility itself was the sole absolute.

Unlike Jowett, Green was prepared to offer his students a via media between the demands of faith and reason, science and philosophy. His message was teleological as well as social and political. Against the image of divine perfection, Green posed his concept of man--actually two selves; an "actual self," or, man as he is as sentient being, and a "possible self," man as he might be, as spirit, approaching divine perfection. In his lectures on moral philosophy, Green recurred again and again to the image of a harmonious and rational universe of "true objectivity" in which man struggled to realize his possible, better self. The two-self doctrine, which was at the heart of Green's ethical system, was to have

a lasting effect upon Bosanquet's ethical thought. Bosanquet followed Green in the belief that reason commended the moral ideal of "the best life for man," a "higher life" and the goal of moral effort.¹⁷ He also followed Green in the Kantian idea of freedom wherein obedience to a self-made law, or self-mastery, was the very condition of moral freedom.

Green went beyond Kant, however, in socializing the "possible self." The "possible self" was something wider than the individual; it was "society" of which the individual was a part.

It is in fact only so far as we are members of a society, of which we can conceive the common good as our own, that the idea has any practical hold on us at all, and this very membership implies confinement in our individual realisation of the idea. Each has primarily to fulfill the duties of his station. His capacity for action beyond the range of those duties is definitely bounded, and with it is definitely bounded also his sphere of personal interests, his character, his realised possibility. No one so confined, it would seem, can exhibit all that the Spirit, working through and in him, properly and potentially is.¹⁸

Green's reference to the "duties of his station," was an attempt to provide a sociological context for what might otherwise have been thought to be an individualist theory of morality. The sociological context of Green's theory of individuality and morality was made clear in his lectures on political obligation, where he took as his subject, a consideration of "the moral function or object

served by positive law, or by the system of rights and obligations which the state enforces."¹⁹

Green expanded the perimeters of his theory of the rational, moral, "possible" self in his lectures on political obligation so as to include society in general, and the laws and institutions of the state, in particular. The system of political rights and obligations, Green argued, rested upon a moral foundation, the "fulfillment of man's vocation as a moral being."²⁰ If the latter was the criterion of political obligation, then the means to achieve that end were guaranteed by the complex of institutions associated with the state.

Bosanquet followed Green in the identification of individuality with society, and society with the state. In The Philosophical Theory of the State, Bosanquet argued that the development of the individual occurred within a series of interlocking social institutions, starting with the family and culminating in the state. The full achievement of individuality occurred with the fulfillment of one's potential as a citizen of an ethical polity. The association of the state and the citizen with moral purpose was evident in Green's writings and it emerged in Bosanquet's social and political essays.

Green's conception of the state was dominated by the idea of a common good recognized by all members of

society. In an argument in which he appeared to borrow from Rousseau's idea of a "general will," exercised for the good of all, Green associated the sovereign power of the state with the promotion of a common good.

It is not, however, supreme coercive power, simply as such, but supreme coercive power exercised in a certain way and for certain ends, that makes a state; viz. exercised according to law, written or customary, and for the maintenance of rights.

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The state, or the sovereign as a characteristic institution of the state, does not create rights, but gives fuller reality to rights already existing. It secures and extends the exercise of powers, which men, influenced in dealing with each other by an idea of common good, had recognised in each other as being capable of direction to that common good, and had already in a certain measure secured to each other in consequence of that recognition. It is not a state unless it does so.²¹

Green argued that the state not only sustained and harmonized social relations, it was responsible for removing obstacles which hindered the fullest development of its citizens. Because he regarded self-realization and not self-protection as the telos of political life, Green was able to extend the boundaries set by traditional liberal theorists to circumscribe state infringement of individual liberty. He proposed instead a consideration of "freedom in the positive sense,"²² as the criterion of state action to "maintain the conditions without which a free exercise of the human faculties is impossible."²³ His theory of positive freedom allowed for the presumption of state action when it could be demonstrated, as in the

case of housing, health, education, drink, primogeniture and entail (property) that the power of the individual to realize his or her potential better self was limited.²⁴ What made Green's argument unique among his English contemporaries was his formal rationale of law not only as the guarantor of right and freedom but also as the fulfillment of individual personality.

Green's philosophy suited the needs of his age. His philosophy was, in part, an adaptive response to changes in the climate of intellectual opinion. In an age which bore witness to a growing conflict between established religion and the new "positive" sciences, ethical idealism offered a via media between the demands of faith and reason. And by the same token, his political philosophy, with its emphasis on community as a shared moral world and the state as an instrument of that world, provided a rationale of citizenship in a period in which the effect of enfranchising the "demos" was still being hotly debated.

Green's biographer, Melvin Richter, has argued that Green's vision of a moral community derived in part from the opportunity presented for a "reconstruction of national life on the basis of spiritual equality" in the period following the extension of the franchise in the Second Reform Bill.²⁵ Seen in this light, Green's emenda-

tion to the liberal vision of a polity and society offered a new concept of citizenship in a period of political reform.

To those pupils raised under the rigors of Evangelical Christianity, but estranged from its intellectual content, Green's philosophy became a surrogate creed. His ethical philosophy, with its vision of a rational, moral self, triumphant over a passionate, empirical self provided, at once, a doctrine of individuality and morality which preserved the humanitarian ethos of Evangelicalism while jettisoning the intellectual baggage of established religion. "It allowed men raised under the powerful discipline of Evangelicalism to transfer their fervor, their impulse to asceticism and self-sacrifice to secular causes."²⁶

Green's rationalization of the Evangelical creed was a potential fuel for social and political activism. The system of rights and obligations outlined by Green was not merely a set of individual prescriptions, but social and political as well. His political philosophy provided a rationale for a life devoted to social and political action. It made men seek reform because reform was not only "right" but obligatory. In any sphere where the existing social and political order failed to approximate the ideal of community which Green had described,

there fell the task of the reformer.

It was no accident that the "Harrow Four" who went up to Oxford in 1867 abandoned their original plans for careers in the Church. Bosanquet and his classmates may be said to have adopted a surrogate creed, philosophical idealism, and with it the ideal of social service. R. G. Tatton took up settlement house work in London, serving as a member of the Council of Toynbee Hall and First Warden of the Passmore Edwards Settlement. C. B. Heberden became a Fellow and later Principal of Brasenose College, Oxford. T. G. Rooper, son of a liberal Anglican cleric, was later Inspector of Schools in the Education Department. Bosanquet, also the son of an Anglican cleric, taught philosophy in Oxford, London and Scotland and engaged in the charity organization movement, the university extension movement and other practical efforts for social reform.

R. G. Collingwood, one of the last of those Oxford men influenced by the philosophical idealism which flourished in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, aptly remarked upon the activist ethos implicit in the creed,

The school of Green sent out into public life, a stream of ex-pupils who carried with them the conviction that philosophy, and in particular the philosophy they had learnt at Oxford, was an important thing, and that their vocation was to put it into practice.²⁷

"Ex-pupils" of T. H. Green included men otherwise as diverse as the politicians Herbert Asquith and Alfred Milner, the theologians (Bishop) Charles Gore and Scott Holland, the philosophers Edward Caird, William Wallace, David G. Ritchie, John H. Muirhead and Bernard Bosanquet, the literary scholar Arthur C. Bradley and social reformers C. S. Loch and Arnold Toynbee.

1. R. G. Tatton, quoted in Helen Bosanquet, Bernard Bosanquet, p. 24.
2. Sir Robert Inglis, quoted in The Life and Letters of Benjamin Jowett, Eds. Evelyn Abbott and Lewis Campbell, 3d ed., 2 vols. (London: John Murray, 1897) 1:201.
3. Leslie Stephen, "Jowett's Life," in Studies of a Biographer, 2 vols. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1899) 2:148.
4. H. W. Carless Davis, A History of Balliol College, rev. ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1963), p. 177.
5. J. H. Muirhead, The Service of the State: Four Lectures on the Political Teaching of T. H. Green (London: John Murray, 1908), p. 1.
6. Ibid., p. 2.
7. Davis, Balliol, p. 249.
8. Jowett to F. T. Palgrave, 26 September 1865, in Abbott and Campbell, Jowett, 1:414.
9. Ibid., p. 412.
10. J. H. Muirhead, "Bernard Bosanquet as I Knew Him," Journal of Philosophy 20 (Dec. 1923):673.
11. Ibid.
12. Abbott and Campbell, Jowett, 1:130.
13. Benjamin Jowett to Edward Caird, 28 January 1870, Ibid., 445.
14. J. H. Muirhead, Reflections by a Journeyman in Philosophy, ed. John W. Harvey (London: Allen & Unwin, 1942), p. 40.
15. Davis, Balliol, pp. 196-97.
16. T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation, with Preface by Bernard Bosanquet and Introduction by A. D. Lindsay (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1941), p. 121.

17. T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, ed. A. C. Bradley (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1883; reprint ed., New York: Kraus Reprints Co., 1969), pp. 203 and 205.

18. Ibid., pp. 209-10.

19. T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation, p. 29.

20. Ibid., pp. 41 and 42-43.

21. Ibid., pp. 136 and 138.

22. T. H. Green, "Liberal Legislation and Freedom of Contract," in The Political Theory of T. H. Green: Selected Writings, ed. John R. Rodman (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964), p. 53.

23. Ibid., p. 56. The distinction between positive and negative liberty is made clear in Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969). For a perceptive analysis of the application of these terms in nineteenth century political discussions see also, Stefan Collini, Liberalism & Sociology: L. T. Hobhouse and Political Argument in England 1880-1914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

24. T. H. Green, "Liberal Legislation," pp. 56-70.

25. Melvin Richter, The Politics of Conscience: T. H. Green and his Age (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 266.

26. Melvin Richter, "Intellectual and Class Alienation: Oxford Idealist Diagnoses and Prescriptions," Archives européennes de sociologie 7 (1966):16.

27. R. G. Collingwood, An Autobiography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 17.

CHAPTER III

OXFORD APPRENTICESHIP

Among the ranks of those who left Oxford to take up the cause of reform, none was more devoted to the tasks set by Green for the philosopher than Bosanquet. Green reportedly marked him as "the best equipped man of his generation"¹ and the influence of the tutor who "preached Hegel, with the accent of a Puritan,"² was already evident in Bosanquet's undergraduate days.

The effect of the Balliol masters upon his thought is evident in two notebooks on weekly subjects set by his tutors in the Winter and Autumn terms, 1869. In them, the conjunction of classical scholarship and a lively attention to contemporary political and social issues is striking.

In the essays on modern subjects set by T. H. Green, Bosanquet analyzed issues which gripped the mid-Victorian liberal conscience: commerce, civilization, education and citizenship. Throughout the essays one finds variations on a theme linking progress with commercial prosperity, the nation-state with commerce, citizenship with the nation-state and education with citizenship.

In his essay, "The Proper Function of Universities," Bosanquet argued that a university ought to be a teaching institution. This was an opinion held by Jowett against Mark Pattison's view that the university should be an institution devoted to research. Arguing that the primary and special function of the university was to train minds, Bosanquet offered a spirited defense of a classical education against those who would question its usefulness. He conceded, however, that the required mastery of the classical languages Greek and Latin might hinder the successful pursuit of studies in the natural sciences and mathematics. Arguing from an implicit view of the study of language as a formative experience in logic as well, Bosanquet offered a rather optimistic suggestion that the mastery of the grammar of Indo-Germanic languages might in the future be another choice in a classical training.

In addition to this expanded notion of a classical education, Bosanquet also urged that access to a university education be made available to the sons of the laboring classes. Noting the contemporary social function of a university education for the sons of country gentlemen, the "pass men," Bosanquet offered an equally functional reason for educating "our poor but intellectual countrymen." A general education would be a precondition for

the exercise of the suffrage.

It is ours to see that these men are well cultivated; for if a little knowledge is ever dangerous surely it is when masses of intelligent men are crying for manhood suffrage, merely for want of the training which would make them fit to exercise the suffrage, and eager to withhold (sic) it from all whom they would then see to be unfit to possess it.³

Implicit in Bosanquet's argument was the then common view which held that a reform in education was required before the suffrage could be extended. Green dissented. Some fifty years later Bosanquet repeated Green's response to his undergraduate essay. "If you imply that no one is fit to have a vote who has not had a university education, I don't agree with you."⁴ In those intervening fifty years, Bosanquet became a dedicated leader in the movement for the extension of university education to laborers as well as to women. While he no longer linked the issue of education with suffrage, he retained a fixed belief in the importance of education, in its widest sense, to citizenship.

The identification of citizenship with a public sphere and a public duty was evident in several of Bosanquet's undergraduate essays. In his essay, "The Greek Idea of Citizenship," he contrasted the concept of government in ancient Greek polities to that of modern communities. In the former, he reasoned, the conception of the "public" was such that each citizen identified in thought

and deed with the actions taken by the state on behalf of the community. In Periclean Athens, public discussion and civic participation guaranteed the identification of the citizen of the state. The state, therefore, "had a right to consider itself as qualified and bound to provide for the highest wants as well as the merest conventional necessities of the people."⁵ Modern states, by contrast, lacked an analogous "public." Government was "dissociated" from the members of the state and "a most mutilated and imperfect representative of them."⁶ In such a community, the maximum role that could safely be assigned to government was that of protection.

"The ideal State," he continued in an essay on the relation between church and state, "represents the people whom it governs."⁷ The implication of this essay was that modern polities were in need of a practical reform of the system of representation, a more perfect conception of the state, or both. The evolution of a more perfect form of the state was the subject of another essay. Assigned the question, "What constitutes civilization," Bosanquet suggested that the "notion of a state or public duty" was a fundamental characteristic of a civilized nation. The Chinese Empire, he claimed, appeared to be civilized, but it was not. It was a "burlesque" of civilization because it merely provided for

the means of existence without imparting to its masses any notion of a state or public duty.

For the true progress of nations is, we think, towards a more perfect form of the state, which must indeed mould itself according to the idiosyncracies of particular races; but whatever its final shape is, must have for its chief characteristic the utilisation of the masses. By utilisation we mean, not providing for their good merely, according to the shortsighted plans of a so-called paternal government; but a system which by imparting responsibility and authority as far as possible to all classes and individuals, puts them in the way of helping themselves, and of being advantageous to others by reason of the life such a process instils, instead of a dead weight upon the nations.⁸

While he was prepared to deny to the empire of China, with its long history, the approbation of being termed a "civilization," he did not deny that material progress was an essential ingredient of a civilized nation. To emphasize this point, he portrayed the effect of material progress on an enlightened polity.

It would seem then that the action of civilisation is twofold and complementary; first, its action on the nation and on public relations is to simplify and reduce to nearer conformity with first principles; representation of the people, free trade, finally we hope, the abolition of pauperism and systems of poor relief, are some of its chief results in this field; the second and complementary action, which works into depending on and being depended on by this, is the more refined artificiality of individual life; for example, improved education, increased comfort, speed in locomotion; to spread these benefits from the few to the many is the highest work of civilization; and it is obvious that the more every individual partakes of them the fitter he will be for a share in the simplified public government.⁹

By linking the issues of suffrage, free trade, and the abolition of pauperism to material progress, Bosanquet

appeared to embrace the variety of mid-Victorian liberalism championed by the radical leaders, John Bright and Richard Cobden. They had assumed that the advance of industry and commerce, unimpeded by legislative interference, guaranteed a greater share of wealth and a greater share in government to every individual. To this end they had campaigned for the abolition of the protectionist Corn Laws and successfully incorporated the principle of free trade in the Liberal program of mid-century.

Bosanquet appears to have supported their position. This was made even clearer in his essay, "The Advantages and Disadvantages of Commercial Prosperity," when he applauded free trade and the cosmopolitan spirit of "true commercial enterprise." Referring to Matthew Arnold's negative characterization of the commercial middle class, Bosanquet countered with the Cobdenite sentiment that commerce was better than war, a characteristic activity of an aristocratic nation.

Commerce is to civilized times what war is to earlier times; it rubs nation against nation, and it is better than war, the commerce of aristocratic nations, because it does not, or where it is wise it does not, foster the narrow and exclusive patriotism which Dr. Arnold considered so great a bane to any country.¹⁰

While he appeared to embrace the economic tenets of Cobden and Bright's laissez-faire liberalism, Bosanquet was not prepared to accept the individualistic formula of liberty and legislation associated with the

classical liberal theory of the state. Instead, he suggested a view of the state as an instrument of morality.

In the essay, "Legislation and Morality," Bosanquet posed Aristotle's view of the end of government, that the individual lead the good life, against the utilitarian view represented by Herbert Spencer and John Stuart Mill, that he be "protected from aggression." Bosanquet argued that although the two views had the same effect in matters of practical legislation, the "higher ideal" associated with Aristotle's view allowed a more expansive role to government in promoting the morality of its citizens. Bosanquet's argument began with a logical construct: he first amended the utilitarian principle which exempted self-regarding actions from the sphere of legislation by claiming that "no virtue can be purely self regarding."¹¹ He then argued that the principle of protection from aggression when applied to practical matters, like that of education, might be carried so far as to sanction interventionist legislation. There was, however, one direction where the two views of the end of government were not reconcilable. No state nominally directed on the principle of protection would deliberately intervene in the lives of its citizens for the express purpose of promoting morality. It was here that Bosanquet abandoned the amended utilitarian position which he had just out-

lined and suggested an altogether different role for the state.

If the course of time should lead to destruction of the formulae on which Churches now exist, it may be worth considering whether functions analogous to those of Churches may not come to be lodged in the State. That every member of a community should, by his connection with the State, ipso facto be understood to belong to an organisation embodying as far as practicable the highest known morality, so far from being a violation of personal liberty, might without paradox be held almost necessary to it. Only the State would do what no Church ever could; for it would not merely, perhaps not at all, express the need of external and united worship; but it would provide a discipline for its citizens in accordance with the best ideal of life, and in its principles of action and legislation it would only differ by the least practicable amount from the best known morality.¹²

In the next sentence he abandoned his conjectural outline of legislation in the state of the future by remarking that in a community based on the principle of protection, e.g. contemporary England, the state was limited to removing "all material obstacles" and "false ideals" and to providing "good education." That education, he added, might include "such materials of an artistic training as may be developed into something analogous to religious worship by any who have the power and feel the necessity."¹³

Although the idea of the state as an instrument of morality was not always made explicit in the corpus of his undergraduate essays, the nature and form of the state was obviously a central theme, as was the corollary

idea of the moral nature of citizenship. Later on in his career, both subjects were explicitly treated in his various lectures on political philosophy. Thirty years after his undergraduate musings, the idea of the ethical state emerged as the leitmotif of his major work in political philosophy, The Philosophical Theory of the State. Bosanquet's undergraduate views of the relationship between the individual, society and the state appeared close to his mature views. In The Philosophical Theory he argued that the state functioned as the matrix for individual development in accordance with an ideal--the pursuit of the good life as a citizen of a state with good laws and institutions.

Bosanquet's view of the relationship of the citizen to the state appears to have been derived from his study of classical Greek thought. The cornerstone of classical thought was the identification of polity with moral agency. Deliberations in the polity were directed to a rational and moral end--to promote the public good and the good life. Bosanquet's later discussions of the nation-state and public welfare were based upon his identification of polity with the public good and public interest. Bosanquet followed Aristotle and Plato in their emphasis upon politics and the political as the requisite means of dealing with social problems. He fol-

lowed them in the identification of the state with an educative and ethical purpose. For Plato, the education of citizens for specific public functions was essential to the well-being of the polity. For Aristotle, the education of diverse elements for diverse functions in the polity was a source of stability and a means by which to transmit values from one generation to another. Bosanquet believed that citizenship, education and ethics were one and the same. The practical effects of this belief were evident in his later work in the university extension movement.

Bosanquet was not only willing to assign a positive moral function to the state, he was also persuaded that art and aesthetic training were the vehicles for a new secular morality. If his political prescriptions as an undergraduate were based upon an idealized view of the state, his ethical prescriptions were based upon an idealized aesthetic in which the appreciation of beauty became the complement, if not the surrogate, for religious worship.

"A sense of beauty," he claimed, is "an element in morals."¹⁴ Aesthetic sensibility was, therefore, a moral sensibility which confirmed the unity and rationality of the universe. In an argument similar in tone to those philosophers who argue for a universe created by design,

Bosanquet speculated upon the relationship between art and morality.

If what is meant by Morals be the effort to bring life under the dominion of Reason, or in other words, to express or manifest Reason in the actions of practical life, it is impossible but that whatever is commonly known as an elevating influence in life should be in some way connected with this Reason and its expression. Beauty may be considered as the expression of Reason, Law, Unity, or whatever we like to call it, in the Universe, and the Sense of Beauty therefore as the recognition of this Reason or Law by the similar principle in the individual. . . .¹⁵

This speculative, aesthetic side of Bosanquet's thought owed more to the influence of the Balliol tutor, Richard Lewis Nettleship, than to Jowett or T. H. Green. Elected a Fellow and Tutor in the College in 1869, he was said to have represented the perfect "equilibrium" between the quaero of Jowett and the credo of Green. More effective as a teacher than as a publicist, he was reknown among undergraduates for making the lessons of Plato come to life. Bosanquet recalled years later the vitality of Nettleship's approach to problems raised by Plato. Bosanquet referred to Nettleship's use of art as an example of the way in which the pleasure of "feeling" was "maximised and spiritualized" by aesthetic experience. By his sympathetic interpretation of the pleasurable effect of art upon the viewer, Nettleship removed the category of "feeling," a passion, from its traditional place in the Platonist's categorical opposition to reason or the intellect.¹⁶

Bosanquet respected Nettleship's interpretation of Plato as well as his ability to find harmony in supposedly dissonant elements of a theory. The ability to find a meeting-point of extremes, in philosophical thought as well as in practical social reform activities, was to become a characteristic Bosanquet trait. The speculative-aesthetic side of his thought continued to develop in the years following his graduation from Balliol.

Bosanquet graduated with honors in Literae Humaniores in 1870 and was elected a Fellow of University College, Oxford, the same year, winning out over another candidate, Francis Herbert Bradley. Bradley was reported to have already gained a reputation for being an "unruly man," although Bosanquet was credited for having won the Fellowship on his own merits.¹⁷ While Bosanquet and Bradley do not appear to have engaged in any sort of exchange during Bosanquet's Oxford years, the publication of Bradley's Principles of Logic in 1883 marked the start of a correspondence between the two concerning the nature of mind and the nature of knowledge.¹⁸

From 1870 to 1880 Bosanquet lectured at Oxford on Greek history, logic, and the history of moral philosophy, leaving little time for publishing any work other than a translation of Schömann's Constitutional History of

Athens. Bosanquet's best work with undergraduates was reported to have been in tutorials; in lecture-hall his bearing seemed to have left a more memorable impression upon students than did the subject matter.

Ever since my college days [Bosanquet] has not only represented to myself the nearest approach among my own friends and indeed beyond among contemporaries to the ideal philosopher of the Platonic vision, but along with it the citizen, the gentleman sans peur et reproche.

I still stick to it that at Oxford at any rate he was not an ideal lecturer. But I heard him mainly on Greek history or political organisation at least that is what I most remember.¹⁹

Although later in life Bosanquet was a distinguished lecturer in the university extension movement as well as a Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of St. Andrews and a Gifford lecturer, he remained a bit shy of speaking before large audiences. A colleague testified to the "power, originality, and sincerity of his thought," but noted that Bosanquet's reserved manner may have deflected some of his listeners from the "white heat of his thought."²⁰

Bosanquet was less than enthusiastic for the club-like atmosphere of college life, and while he devoted himself to his teaching responsibilities he appeared to have held in reserve the full expression of the metaphysical or speculative side of his thought. This was, perhaps, the result of a certain reluctance to proselytize his

youthful audience to his growing concern for the movement of absolute thought. Bosanquet was concerned with the metaphysical problem concerning the possibility of ever knowing the truth. His solution was that the ultimate truth lay in a condition known as the Absolute, in which thought and reality were fused. Reality, according to his view, lay in a multiplicity of worlds. In addition to the world of fact, there was the world of duty, truth, science--all mixing in and also transcending, the sensible world.

While at Oxford, Bosanquet moved from the orthodox certainties of organized religion towards a philosophical notion of truth and reality. As an undergraduate at Balliol, Bosanquet and T. H. Green had belonged to a small society which met for prayer on Sunday. Green referred to their discussions as a Hegelian "process of philosophising," best reserved for "the Sundays of 'speculation.'"²¹ Bosanquet had this dialectic of faith in mind when he remarked on the state of undergraduate opinion in a letter to a friend who shared responsibility for the Logic course at University College.

Steel wrote me a long letter about the undergraduates intellectual life, which he thinks very badly of. He declares there is neither religion nor good infidelity among them, and thinks we ought to do something to give them healthy occupation on Sunday! I was staggered, as I look back with the greatest possible delight on my own undergraduate Sundays, and I am sure we had dialectic enough. . . . I wonder if we

shall ever have any intercourse with the men which is at once social and 'intellectual'? Their opinions stand fearfully in the way just now. Don't you sometimes wish you were Professor Beesley with a lot of disciples; I always feel Mephistopheles' taunt to Faust, that after all he daren't teach the best he knows.²²

Bosanquet's thoughts at the time were occupied with questions of science and philosophy, faith and reason. No longer able to take communion from his father's hand²³ nor to accept on faith the orthodox Christian account of "the other world,"²⁴ Bosanquet nevertheless remained convinced of the reality of religious experience. This aspect of his thought developed along two lines of speculation: the first, drawn from Plato and Hegel, the second, from his consideration of aesthetics.

In his reading of Plato and Hegel, Bosanquet found an answer to the doubts which beset him in chapel: the unity of "this" world of human experience and an "other" world of spiritual value.

Plato, in particular, came as a revelation; not as confirming the dualism of 'this' world and 'the other,' but because, against one's hazy expectation, and in opposition to the current and more or less popular legends of his meaning, it was so plain and obvious that his true passion was for the unity of things. . . . The law of value, as he laid it down for all time, "that which is filled with the more real, is more really filled," together with his doctrine of the increasing concreteness and vital stability of the higher experiences, made an end of dualism in principle, though fragments of dualistic formulae might float in the ocean of his thought undissolved for the moment.²⁵

A new experience, for him, which reinforced this vision of the unity of being and experience, appearance and reality, was aesthetic experience. His circle of friends and colleagues at University College included Frank Peters, the translator of Aristotle's Ethics, Arthur Dendy, a frequent companion during summer holidays, and C. J. Faulkner, partner in a decorating firm with the artist and later Socialist aesthetician, William Morris. Bosanquet's interest in what he termed the "profound speculative interest" of aesthetic experience grew with his meetings with Morris in Faulkner's rooms and with the election of the art critic, John Ruskin, to the newly-endowed Chair of Slade Professor of Fine Arts at Oxford.

Ruskin was a vehement critic of the destruction of the natural landscape by the aesthetically impoverished architects of modern industrialism. In his lectures at Oxford, he argued for the recognition of nature and natural beauty as a principle of value. On one occasion he demonstrated the destruction of the English landscape for his audience by splashing paint upon a (protected) landscape painting by his favorite artist, J. M. W. Turner.²⁶ Morris joined Ruskin in the view that nature was the criterion of beauty and value. His conviction that everything made by human hands, including those of the artisan, potter, weaver and glassmaker, which was in

accord with nature, was a work of art and beauty gave powerful stimulus to the arts and crafts movement of the 1880s.

Morris' and Ruskin's effect on Bosanquet was evident in his support for associations like the Home Arts and Industries Association and other such craft groups. Bosanquet thought that through craft work a certain change could be produced in the workman's mind; "a new perception is awakened, a new interest is acquired; he sees things to which he was blind before, and enjoys things to which he was insensible before."²⁷

For Bosanquet, art training intensified the value of life and encouraged self-help and self-esteem. Craft work and artistic creation were elements of social equality in that all members of society would be raised up by the enjoyment and appreciation of higher values. A sense of aesthetics, cultivated in the individual, would have a revitalizing effect on the entire community from local to national level.

The new view of aesthetic experience and value emphasized by Ruskin and Morris confirmed for Bosanquet that which he had previously understood only in theory. "The simple love of beauty in unpretending minds" expressed in poetry or the decorative arts, affirmed for him the existence of "accessible values" which were concrete yet

spiritual.²⁸ It taught him to view as a unity the products both of nature and of the human spirit. This insight into the sublime effect of aesthetic experience, he later claimed, was as instrumental in shaping his philosophical thought as was his discovery of Plato and Hegel's theoretical reconciliation of the dualism between "this" world of experience and "the other" world of religious and philosophical speculation.

His reflections on aesthetic judgment soon led him to a review of the literature of idealist thought as it had developed in Germany in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries. Touched by the aesthetic sensibilities of Ruskin, Morris and other colleagues at Oxford in the 1870s and by his reading of Schiller, Schelling and Hegel, Bosanquet lay the cornerstone of his own secular creed. What others had described as the essence of religious faith, "rising into another world while remaining here," became the leitmotif of his philosophical thought.²⁹

Here [in philosophy of Schiller, Schelling, and Hegel] the whole apparatus of traditional dualism became in principle once and forever obsolete. This world and the other, the a posteriori and the a priori, the natural and the supernatural, with all their family, taken as signifying antithetical realms of being and experience, were for the future idle tales.³⁰

With the death of his father in 1880, Bosanquet came into possession of an independent income which enabled

him to conclude his apprenticeship at Oxford. A career in philosophy and the opportunity to experience at first hand the reality of his social theory, the "art of living together," drew him to London in 1881.

1. Helen Bosanquet, Bernard Bosanquet, p. 28.
2. Knight, Nichol, p. 150.
3. Bernard Bosanquet, Notebook of Balliol undergraduate essays, 1 February 1869, Bosanquet papers, University of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne Library, Trunk I. "I."
4. Bernard Bosanquet, Some Suggestions in Ethics (London: Macmillan & Co., 1919), p. 70.
5. Bernard Bosanquet, "The Greek Idea of Citizenship," Notebook of essays, 1 February 1869, Bosanquet papers, University of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne Library, Trunk I. "I."
6. Ibid.
7. Bernard Bosanquet, "The Chief Points of View in Which the Relation between Church and State May be Regarded," Notebook of essays, 1 February 1869, Bosanquet papers, University of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne Library, Trunk I. "I."
8. Bernard Bosanquet, "What Constitutes Civilization," Notebook of essays, 1 February 1869, Bosanquet papers, University of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne Library, Trunk I. "I."
9. Ibid.
10. Bernard Bosanquet, "The Advantages and Disadvantages of Commercial Prosperity," Notebook of essays, 1 February 1869, Bosanquet papers, University of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne Library, Trunk I. "I."
11. Bernard Bosanquet, "Legislation and Morality," Notebook of essays, 1 February 1869, Bosanquet papers, University of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne Library, Trunk I. "I."
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Bernard Bosanquet, "A Sense of Beauty as an Element in Morals," Notebook of essays, 1 February 1869, Bosanquet papers, University of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne Library, Trunk I. "I."

15. Ibid.

16. Bernard Bosanquet, review of Philosophical Lectures and Remains of Richard Lewis Nettleship, eds. A. C. Bradley and G. R. Benson, in Mind n.s. 7 (Apr. 1898):261.

17. J. H. Muirhead, Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends: Letters Illustrating the Sources and the Development of his Philosophical Opinions, ed. J. H. Muirhead (London: Allen & Unwin, 1935), p. 20n.

18. Once freed from his teaching responsibilities at Oxford, in 1880, Bosanquet planned to write on logic and ethics. Bradley anticipated Bosanquet in both cases, publishing his Ethical Studies in 1876 and Principles of Logic in 1883. While Bosanquet acknowledged his debt to Bradley it would seem that each philosopher was stimulated by the others' argument. Their correspondence began in the 1880s and continued through the war years. Logic and metaphysics formed the major part of their correspondence; they closed their dialogue in 1915 with an extensive discussion of the nature of play. See J. H. Muirhead, Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends, pp. 49-65 and pp. 171-88.

19. F. Osmaston to Helen Bosanquet, 6 November 1924, Bosanquet papers, University of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne Library, Trunk II.E.

20. A. C. Bradley, "Bernard Bosanquet 1843-1923," British Academy, Proceedings 10 (1921-23):564.

21. Melvin Richter, The Politics of Conscience: T. H. Green and His Age (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), p. 37.

22. Bernard Bosanquet to Frank Peters, 16 September 1877, in Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends, p. 41.

23. Bernard Bosanquet, "Life and Philosophy," in Contemporary British Philosophy, pp. 53-54; Rev. R. W. Bosanquet, Diary extracts transcribed by Helen Bosanquet, Bosanquet papers, University of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne Library, Trunk I.

24. Bernard Bosanquet, "Life and Philosophy," pp. 54-55.

25. Ibid., p. 56.

26. J. H. Muirhead, Reflections of a Journeyman,
p. 52.
27. Bernard Bosanquet, "The Home Arts and Industries Association," Charity Organisation Review no. 40 (1888), p. 135.
28. Bernard Bosanquet, "Life and Philosophy,"
p. 56.
29. Ibid., p. 57.
30. Ibid.

CHAPTER IV

A JOURNEYMAN IN PHILOSOPHY

London in the 1880s was "a time of singular social awakening,"¹ and pupils of T. H. Green who settled there shared in their common fervor for social and political reform. As the decade wore on, a series of dramatic events, sensationalized in the press, heightened the sense of awakening. In politics, debate over the Irish question, land and municipal reform, culminated in a split in the Liberal Party. In the social sphere, winter distress, industrial trade depression and developments within the trade union movement heightened the public perception of the problem of poverty. The century-old discussion of poverty was revived in new form under the rubric of "the social problem," particularly as it concerned the urban poor.

In the laboratory of social experiments which characterized late nineteenth century London reform movements, Bosanquet embarked on a career in applied ethics and social philosophy. "The plan of the great masters is being handed over to be carried out piecemeal by the journeymen,"² he often remarked. He claimed Kant, Fichte,

and Hegel as his masters. He thought he was bringing the best of their philosophies to bear upon contemporary ethical, social and political questions. To these he would have added Aristotle and most certainly, Plato, whom he regarded as the first and perhaps greatest master of all.³ These philosophers were his guides to the interpretation of the world which his own experiences demanded. His vision of polity and society was suffused with a "humanised Hellenism" and a rationalism drawn from the masters of philosophy and applied to the contemporary experience.⁴ The surrogate creed which he had found at Oxford, philosophical idealism, implicitly prescribed social and political engagement.

In the decade of the "social awakening," Bosanquet began his journey as an "applied philosopher," appearing in print and in lecture-hall before a London audience so diverse as to include philanthropists, social workers, working men and women, educators, civil servants, clergymen and philosophers. He joined the company of philosophers active in the recently-formed Aristotelian Society for the Systematic Study of Philosophy, of ethical reformers in the London Ethical Society, and of social workers associated with the Charity Organisation Society of London. His work on behalf of the London Ethical Society was one of his primary activities in those years. Within that

organization he began to carry out the "plan" of the "great masters." But before he became involved in the activities of the Society, he was busy completing several studies in the field of logic.

Bosanquet's first years in London were devoted to the study of logic. He had been responsible for the teaching of logic at Oxford and it remained a primary concern of his well into the mid-1880s. His first publication in the field, an essay on "Logic as the Science of Knowledge," appeared in 1883 as a contribution to a virtual manifesto of Idealist thought. Brought out a year after T. H. Green's death and dedicated to his memory. Essays in Philosophical Criticism, edited by Andrew Seth (later Pringle-Pattison) and R. B. Haldane, made clear the range and scope of the idealist approach to questions of logic, science, ethics, religion, history, social philosophy and metaphysics. A number of those engaged in the project had been associated with Green at Oxford. They included the philosophers Andrew Seth (Pringle-Pattison), David G. Ritchie, Henry Jones and Bosanquet, as well as the philosopher-scientist J. S. Haldane and the historian James Bonar. Another sympathetic to the cause was the statesman-philosopher, R. B. Haldane, trained at the University of Göttingen.

Bosanquet's contribution to the volume was an essay

which made the case for a "quasi-dialectical" method of logical reasoning.⁵ His choice of subject coincided with his preoccupation with logic as the key to understanding philosophy. In 1884 Bosanquet completed a project begun by Green for bringing out an English edition of Logic and Metaphysic by the German philosopher Hermann Lotze. While Bosanquet was committed to bringing Lotze's work before a wider audience, he thought Lotze had erred in his analysis of thought and reality. Bosanquet regarded Lotze as a leading representative of "the German reaction" to the earlier idealism of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel.⁶ Lotze had amended Hegel so as to suggest a dualism between the world of thought and experience. Bosanquet's own adherence to Hegelian logic and his opposition to the epistemological dualism of "reactionary logic" was evident in the small volume of logical studies he published in 1885 under the title, Knowledge and Reality. Provoked by passages in fellow idealist F. H. Bradley's Principles of Logic, published in 1883, which referred to thought as "a spectral woof of impalpable abstractions,"⁷ Bosanquet attempted to reaffirm the unity of thought and reality.

Bradley, in his Logic, seemed divided between two conceptions of human thought; one which was more traditional, the other more idealist. According to the more traditional, the subject matter of logic consisted of abstract

entities which, when taken up and employed by human beings, formed the essential constituents of assertion and will. Bosanquet criticized this view in Knowledge and Reality. Bosanquet described logic as an attribute of mind which makes humans unable to rest in the face of a contradiction. Facts were for him expressions of a partial view of reality. Investigations would show them full of contradictions. Reality, by contrast, rested in a multiplicity of worlds. One of the implications of idealistic logic was the demand for a total comprehension of a social or political problem. To look at a problem, especially a social problem, was to see a many-sided phenomenon. The real problem was not grasped by a partial view, expressed as facts or statistics. Idealism in social work brought with it a faith in reality as a whole. The logic of social work, Bosanquet argued, was not to be tolerant of one-sidedness and partial facts, but to investigate the structure of the whole situation.⁸

In the early phase of Bosanquet's career, in the 1880s, he viewed logic as an all-encompassing, systematic science. The subject matter of philosophy was seen as being identical with that of logic. Although he continued to value logic as a methodological and ontological approach, some thirty years later he suggested that logic was "but one case among others of the main principle of

reality."⁹ In the intervening years, logic served Bosanquet as both an instrument of analysis, and more importantly, as a principle of existence. In the 1890s, for example, when he turned his attention to the relationship between philosophy and the new social sciences, psychology and sociology, the analogy drawn between biological and social organisms was reflected in his "extraordinary fascination" with the study of logic, or thought, and organic life. The evolution of life and the evolution of thought were one.

To stand at the growing point of the intellectual organisms, as you may watch the growing-point of a plant, and to observe the cell-nucleus of thought as it enlarges and subdivides and differentiates itself, and acquires a positive structure, in the process by which fragmentary perception completes itself like a living thing, and rounds off into a science--this is a spectacle which seems to put before us in its purest and clearest form the evolution of which all existence is a type.¹⁰

Some sixteen years later, at the apogee of his career as a philosopher, the appeal to logic was to be the keynote of his Gifford lectures on the principles of individuality and of value. "Logic, or the spirit of totality, is the clue to reality, value and freedom. . . ."¹¹ In the Gifford lectures which he delivered in 1911 and 1912, logic was synonymous with a metaphysic of Absolute spirit.

By Logic we understand, with Plato and Hegel, the supreme law or nature of experience, the impulse toward unity and coherence (the positive spirit of

non-contradiction) by which every fragment yearns towards the whole to which it belongs, and every self to its completion in the Absolute, and of which the Absolute itself is at once an incarnation and a satisfaction.¹²

The influence of the master-builders, Plato and Hegel, obviously still at work later in his career, was equally strong in his first years in London. Soon after the publication of Knowledge and Reality, Bosanquet continued to respond to the charge of "impalpable abstractions" which F. H. Bradley had levelled against earlier German idealists. Claiming that "a philosophy which is to have any claim to deal with the universe is bound prima facie to undertake a theoretical consideration at least of beauty and of goodness," Bosanquet turned to the study of aesthetics, the "philosophy of the beautiful."¹³ He claimed that the study of aesthetics affirmed the connection between intellect and the sensuous, between mind and experience.

His first publication in the field was a translation with notes and a prefatory essay of the Introduction to Hegel's Aesthetic. Bosanquet's translation, entitled Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of Fine Art, was an exegesis of Hegelian phenomenology.¹⁴ Hegel had depicted the history of aesthetic consciousness as a revelation of mind, or spirit, liberating itself from the limitations of a material and finite world. To Bosanquet, Hegel's

depiction of beauty as an attribute of absolute mind offered "The True Conception of Another World," the title and subject of his prefatory essay. Bosanquet believed he had found in aesthetics a method of transcending theology and religion, which was yet a "new contact with spiritual life."¹⁵ For him, the idea of mind, or spirit, as an attribute of human consciousness replaced the theologian's notion of an immanent Deity.

It is impossible to omit all reference to the notion of an immanent Deity, which forms the very centre of Hegel's thought. . . . He means what he says; that God is spirit or mind, and exists in the medium of mind, which is actual as intelligence, for us at any rate, only in the human self-consciousness.¹⁶

In good Hegelian fashion, Bosanquet believed that every aspect of reality subsumed another. He thought logic was central to understanding philosophy, then aesthetics, followed by religion and ethics. Bosanquet's reflections on aesthetics (an extensive volume on the history of aesthetics followed in 1892) soon led to a discourse on the nature of spirit and "another world." From Hegel, he drew the lesson of a Christianity purged of dogma, free of the theist's god--a veritable "revelation of reason."¹⁷ The articles of faith which he often cited were those which the young Hegel had proposed to Schelling: "Our watchword shall be Reason and Freedom, and our rallying-point the invisible Church."¹⁸

Bosanquet was to inhabit the "invisible Church" of idealist thought throughout his career. A fellow journeyman in philosophy, J. H. Muirhead, recalled Bosanquet's attempt to reconcile the postulates of critical philosophy with religion.

No man was ever more reticent in his own religious life. No man was ever more convinced of the reality of religious experience, as that which is revealed to a man at his best.¹⁹

The ideal of realizing "man at his best" pervaded Bosanquet's social thought. Although removed from the orthodoxies of church and chapel, he retained an abiding faith in what he termed "the Gospel of Humanity" preached by Jesus and Paul.²⁰ To this gospel, Bosanquet grafted the ethical and social creed which he had absorbed at Oxford. The new gospel that he proposed as the "ideal of modern life" was summed up in his phrase, "humanised" or "Christian Hellenism."²¹ The attempt to synthesize Christendom and Hellenism reflected his Pauline belief in a religion of the Spirit as well as the Hellenistic ideal of the "good life" available to man as a citizen of the polis.

Bosanquet's attempt to reconcile Pauline, Hellenistic and Hegelian thought was marked on the one hand, by an eclecticism which at times threatened to undermine his supposed Hegelianism, and on the other hand, by his

strong affection for Hegel. Bosanquet saw no incompatibility in his position. In urging a Christianity purged of dogma and superstition he remarked, "If we keep the substance of Christianity, we may let the shadow, the name, take care of itself."²² Although he was equivocal in the choice of a name, he had no doubt that a "New Reformation" was underway.²³

No one can feel more acutely the extreme difficulty of reading the New Testament aright than one who has enjoyed what is ironically called a good religious education. And I have often wished, in the bitterness of my heart, that the New Testament could be buried for a hundred years, and discovered afresh in a wiser age. But man must untie, with patience and labour the knots which man has tied; and it is our task, and the task of a future moral education, to regain, for ourselves and for our children, some clue to the religion of Jesus and of Paul.²⁴

Bosanquet viewed Hegel as the initiator of the "New Reformation" in morality. He often cited Hegel's proposal for the establishment of an "invisible Church" of "Reason" and "Freedom." The "modern spirit" which Bosanquet described was Hegel's legacy.

The modern spirit may be described as the spirit of rational freedom,--"freedom" because it fears nothing and acknowledges no superior; "rational" because it is not Stoic or negative, but positive and constructive.²⁵

In the same period in which he offered this Hegelian argument, he also elaborated a theory of ethics which included a strong element of Kantianism as well. In the course of his involvement with the London Ethical

Society in the 1880s and 1890s Bosanquet elaborated a theory of ethics marked by its eclecticism--a diffuse idealism amalgamating T. H. Green's neo-Kantian ethics with his own attraction for Hegel. In his lectures for the Ethical Society of London Bosanquet advanced a theory of individuality which was Kantian in its insistence upon the moral nature and the moral end of the individual.

Kant had argued in his Critique of Pure Reason that there were at least two modes of knowledge in the universe: phenomena, or object available to humans as sense experience, and noumena, a "special category of the intellect" in which the a priori knowledge of a "thing-in-itself" spelled out phenomena so that they might be "read" as experience. Noumena, or nature in its "formal" sense, provided rules by which phenomena, or sense-objects, were referred to human consciousness. Kant had argued that experience itself presupposed the existence of a priori knowledge, of time, space and causal relationships. Experience was derived from mind--"the understanding makes nature," Kant insisted.

Reason was indissolubly linked with morality. If humans were rational they were also moral. Reason, Kant argued, enabled humans to aim at the "supreme condition," the "good will." And the good will was a capacity as well as an obligation to choose that which was morally correct.

Moral prescriptions of conscience, of what one ought to do, were the foundation of a self-legislated morality and the condition for human liberty. The paradox of Kantian morality was that humans were only free when obeying a self-prescribed law.

T. H. Green attempted to reassert Kant's metaphysic of morals in his own Prolegomena to Ethics, and he applied that metaphysic to the sphere of politics in his Lectures on Political Obligation. Green followed Kant in his double-vision of a noumenal, higher self operating in a phenomenal world of sense-objects.

Bosanquet, like Green, subscribed to a theory of individuality which presumed a struggle of two selves: a lower, empirical self and a "possible" or "best" self that was moral and rational. This "best" self was Kantian insofar as it was moral, Hegelian insofar as it was rational. According to the theory first elaborated by Green and subscribed to by Bosanquet, the conquest of the selfish inclinations of an everyday self by a "possible" self marked the achievement of true individuality and autonomy.

The "possible" self was preeminently rational. Reason, according to Bosanquet, was instrumental to the liberation of the individual from the confines of dogma and superstition. Organized religions, with their rituals

and coercive laws which were external to the individual, actually hindered the development of a "best" self. Lecturing to an audience of London workmen on the subject, "How to Read the New Testament," he went so far as to recommend a reading of Robert Owen's utopian tract, The New Moral World, as an antidote to the coercive morality of organized religion.

Robert Owen's clear views illustrate the opposition to religion as external law. Owen saw that the first condition of reform was to put an end to all religions as diverting attention from the real conditions which determine character; he thought this the only chance for religion. His view of human nature was shallow; but practically, as against the prejudices of his time, his suggestions were almost entirely right.²⁶

In his reference to the "real conditions which determine character," Bosanquet was not suggesting, as Owen had, that environment and circumstance were the prime determinants of character. If there was a determinist edge to Bosanquet's argument, it favored the reverse conclusion--that spirit, "the operative reality of ethical forces," determined character.²⁷ The "modern spirit," as he remarked elsewhere, was one of "rational freedom." True individuality, he claimed, marked the identification of the particular individual will with the "good will" of all members of society. The development of a "best self," therefore was contingent upon the pursuit of a good common to all individuals. And only

those activities which contributed to a good which could be shared by all was accorded moral status:

Although it would be obviously a blunder to say that every human individual aims at the common good--for if so, every one would be moral--yet it is true that the existence which any human being regards as tolerable is made what it is by ideas which depend on a social conception--in short, by a standard of life.²⁸

In offering the construct of a "best self" as the criterion of individuality, Bosanquet, like Green, tied the question of individual development to a social criterion. Green had argued, against the current of utilitarian thought, that man was social by nature and that any definition of the individual must also account for that aspect of his identity. The "best self," the "self as a whole," therefore, was a social self. Green had described the sociological context of individuality and morality in terms of fulfilling the "duties of one's station." Bosanquet invoked the same phrase in describing the ethical self.

Our station and its duties are the greatest part and the simplest part of the right will or the good will, which is also our own will. . . . Our station and its duties is the heart and spirit of our own little life. . . . It is through our station and its duties that we take hold of our humanity and bring it home to our particular selves. On the one hand, the good will is ourself; and on the other hand, it is the common aim and spirit of society and of mankind.²⁹

Reference to the "duties of one's station" was a canon of idealist ethical theory. T. H. Green had

referred to the duties of one's station in his lectures on ethics and political obligation. F. H. Bradley dedicated a chapter in his Ethical Studies to a discussion of the symbiotic relationship between individual and social consciousness. Using the same idiom in his Ethical Society lectures, Bosanquet depicted a form of social life in which individuals lived out the substance of their lives in terms of roles and functions.

The concept of the self "as a whole" was a metaphysical construct, invoked to suggest that a life according to reason, the best life, was the goal of moral endeavor. Bosanquet's theory of individuality, and the terms by which he suggested to a popular audience that the development of character was both individual and social in nature, was the product of a diffuse idealism, sometimes Kantian, more often Hegelian in tone. It was Kantian in the insistence upon a higher, best life and Hegelian in the suggestion that a particular form of social life would provide the context of a rational freedom.

In its neo-Hegelian fashion, Bosanquet's theory of individuality, which presumed a conception of a "common good" as well, provided a rationale for reform. It described actual social organization as it was, and an ideal of social life as it might become. According to

the terms of Bosanquet's neo-Hegelian idealism, actual and ideal were dialectically related and inseparable. Green's description of a "common good" had been ambiguous enough to suggest to his followers that the actual was implicit in the ideal. The presentation by his students, including Bosanquet, as well as those sympathetic to his position, of idealism as an ideology of social reform emerged in the 1880s and 1890s. It was in the course of his activities on behalf of the London Ethical Society and the Charity Organisation Society of London that Bosanquet applied the tenets of his neo-Hegelian philosophy.

The generation of Oxford men who came down to London in the 1880s shared in the conviction that the one supreme rule for "social guidance" was the Kantian ethical principle of treating humanity "'in thy own person and the person of others always as an end and never as a means only.'"³⁰

A generation earlier, Arnold Toynbee had seized upon the bearing of T. H. Green's philosophy of ethics and politics upon issues of practical reform. Toynbee was one of a contingent of Balliol men who had, from the mid-1870s onward, found a conduit for their energies and consciences in the East End of London where they joined local curates in ministering to the poor. To this per-

sonal mission, Toynbee added a public message, carrying his ethical interpretation of the economics of industry to workers and employers in the industrial centers of England. His last series of lectures, "Progress and Poverty," delivered in Oxford and London shortly before his death in 1883, contained a passionate plea for the recognition of collective responsibility for the impoverished condition of those members of the working class who sowed but did not reap the fruits of industrial progress. The effect of his example of a life devoted to the pursuit of an ethical imperative was legendary. "Had Arnold Toynbee lived in the 13th century," an Oxford colleague remarked, "he would probably have entered or found a religious order, unless he had been first burnt for a heretic."³¹

Those Oxford men who took up the cause of reform were inspired, no doubt, by the spirit of the age and the quest for "improvement," but the particular form and direction of their efforts was inspired by the philosophy of T. H. Green and the example of Toynbee. Another Oxford graduate, Canon Samuel Barnett, Vicar of St. Jude's, Whitechapel, sealed the link between Oxford social conscience and London activism by virtually recruiting the "thinking men" during his frequent visits to the university.³² Barnett lamented the social and geographic gulf

between rich and poor which deprived the latter of any contact with "a higher standard of man's life."³³ A solution to the problem was found in 1884 with the opening of Toynbee Hall as a settlement house for university men.

Set in the teeming center of the East End and named in memory of Arnold Toynbee, the Hall itself was a physical replica, reduced in scale, of an Oxford college. Consonant with Barnett's view that "the social problem is at the root an educational problem," Toynbee Hall served as a residence hall for college men, an education center offering weekday classes for neighborhood residents, recreational clubs, as well as public room for a host of London societies and University Extension classes.³⁴

The Hall also served as a temporary residence for a contingent of American visitors active in social reform. John Graham Brooks of Harvard lived in the Hall for several months in 1885 while preaching in the South Place Chapel, distributing pamphlets describing the work of the Ethical Society of Chicago. Dr. Stanton Coit, a leading member of the New York Society for Ethical Culture followed up his philosophical studies in Berlin with a stay of several months in 1886. Coit found an audience receptive to his descriptions of the American movement for ethical reform.

A Scottish contingent of Balliol graduates active

in the work of Toynbee Hall was not altogether satisfied with the direction of settlement activities. J. M. Muirhead recalled their discontent.

We were not altogether satisfied with its apparent absorption in practical activities to the neglect of the philosophical view of the nature and ends of human life which Arnold Toynbee himself had learned from Green. Neither Samuel Barnett nor his gifted and energetic wife were specially interested in this side of its work.³⁵

Drawing upon Coit's description of the New York Society for Ethical Culture, Muirhead, James Bonar and John Murray MacDonald approached Barnett with their plan for a non-denominational society for ethical discussion. Despite Barnett's equivocal response, "Did you ever hear of three Scotsmen getting together without forming a society?"³⁶ by July 1886, Bonar and Muirhead had circulated a draft statement of aims and principles of the "Ethical Society."

The Members of this Society agree in believing that the moral and religious life of Man is capable of a rational justification and explanation, apart from Authority and Tradition. They believe that there is at present great need for the teaching of a reasoned out doctrine on this subject, especially where old sanctions and principles have lost their hold. . . . It is suggested, *inter alia*, that the Society should endeavour to organise systematic Ethical Instruction in connection with such educational agencies as the Society for the Extension of University Teaching, Working Men's Colleges, Clubs, Co-operative Societies, and with the education of the Young.

It will further be the duty of the Society to use every endeavour to arouse the community at large to the importance of testing every Social, Political, and Educational question by moral and religious principles.³⁷

With their proposal to provide for "systematic Ethical instruction," the founders of the Ethical Society were attempting to institutionalize a rationalist grammar of ethics. If Toynbee Hall suffered from a "neglect of the philosophical view," their enterprise promised a syllabus of practice and theory. Those who subscribed to the draft statement of aims and principles were not all Hegelians--some were idealists in the tradition of T. H. Green and his neo-Kantian programme of ethics. In this view, a program of educational reform was to be based upon a criterion of non-coercive morality.

Bosanquet had not been associated with the Toynbee Hall movement nor was he particularly receptive to the settlement movement in general, but he did respond to the call for an Ethical Society in London. Bosanquet thought that the "artificial conditions" of a residence hall, in its "collegiate, if not monastic aspect," tended to elicit a new type of "self-consecration" and "self-devotion" rather than any real experience in the actual lives of those whom settlement houses were thought to serve.³⁸ He was wary of diffuse and unsystematic approaches to social work and he counselled settlement workers to avail themselves of a method of training and study under skilled direction. The only real purpose he approved of in Toynbee Hall was as a facility in which

to hold university extension classes--"a poor man's university."³⁹

Although hostile to the settlement house idea of reform he was attracted to the Ethical Society's call for ethical instruction. "Spreading moral ideas and strengthening moral influences on a non-dogmatic basis," Bosanquet remarked in his more Kantian tone, offered an excellent opportunity to contribute "by precept and in practice" to the movement for reform.⁴⁰

Bosanquet joined the Ethical Society in 1887 and for the next ten years served as a member of its executive committee and lecturer until its transformation into the London School of Ethics and Social Philosophy which he led. The Ethical Society incorporated members of various social and political interests. The movement for systematic ethical instruction found support primarily among two contingents. The first included students of classics and philosophy associated with London, Cambridge and Oxford Universities. This early contingent included the philosophers, Henry Sidgwick of Cambridge, R. B. Haldane, trained by Lotze at Göttingen University and recently elected to Parliament, C. B. Upton of Manchester New College, Henry Jones and J. S. Mackenzie, as well as Toynbee's biographer, the Oxford scholar, F. C. Montague, and Bosanquet's Harrow and Balliol classmate, T. G.

Rooper.

The second contingent of early members was drawn from "a small but ardent group" who had banded themselves into a Fellowship of the New Life. The New Lifers were Evangelicals-turned-Freethinkers who had followed Thomas Davidson, "the 'wandering scholar' from Aberdeenshire," and his utopian plan for communal-based "fellowships" in which one might achieve self-perfection.⁴¹ Several of the New Lifers seceded from the Fellowship in 1884 to form the Fabian Society, while others, including Percival Chubb and William Clarke, maintained connections with both Fabians and New Lifers. Clarke, a journalist, was the conduit between the New Lifers and the budding Ethical Society while Chubb, the more visible recruit, joined Bonar and Muirhead in serving as a provisional committee to prepare a constitution.⁴²

Although inspired by the example of the American ethical movement, the founders of the society were conscious of a difference in spirit and in doctrine between the two movements. "Whereas the American leaders were ethical and religious teachers first, philosophers afterwards, the reverse was the case with those who took the leading part in England."⁴³ Muirhead and company deliberately sought a membership of diverse philosophical opinion so as to avoid the characterization of the

society as a species of "Oxford metaphysics."⁴⁴ They succeeded in enlisting the most prominent philosophers to their cause. Idealist philosophers, Edward Caird, William Wallace, R. B. Haldane and utilitarians, Henry Sidgwick and Leslie Stephen, served as presidents of the society as did the historian, John Seeley and the American ethical culturist-philosopher, Felix Adler.

The nuances of diverse philosophical opinion were reflected in the frequent emendation to the statement of aims and principles prepared by the Executive Committee for inclusion in the annual reports of the society. Idealist keywords, "rational" and "true," appeared and disappeared while its Kantian tone remained. According to the reports for the years 1886-87 and 1887-88, the Ethical Society aimed at setting a "rational conception of human good" before those who had the "education and well-being of the people at heart." By 1888-89, their aim was to "co-operate" by means of lectures and publications, with "social and political reformers" in the formation of "a true conception of human good."⁴⁵ While a "rational" conception became, in Hegelian fashion, a "true" conception, and the category of reformers had elicited further emendation, the original statement of belief in the primacy of character remained constant.

Believing as it [the Ethical Society] does in the supreme importance of character as the determining

element in a nation's well-being, it claims that all education and social reform should be tested by this question: Does it or does it not further the development of good character among the citizens?⁴⁶

The fundamental point of agreement among the mix of Fabians and Charity organizers, economists and businessmen, school teachers, government officials and philosophers who joined the London Ethical Society was the belief that the development of individual character was the benchmark of social reform. The importance of strengthening character as a fundament of social improvement was a widely shared view in the nineteenth century. Bosanquet shared in that belief. He believed that the development of character was the primary requisite for individual and social progress. His concept of individual character, however, differed from the utilitarian notion of an autonomous self in pursuit of private ends as well as from the popular portrait of the individual depicted by Samuel Smiles in his manuals of "self help." Bosanquet's view of character was based upon his eclectic moral theory of a moral, rational and social self. The neo-Hegelian terms of Bosanquet's discussion emerged in his lectures. The diversity of opinion within the contingent of idealist philosophers in the society emerged in the course of the Ethical Society's history.

In spite of the ambiguity of idealist moral

theory the idealist contingent which had founded the society was clearly committed to the idea of reform. Muirhead and company had hoped to compensate for Toynbee Hall's "absorption" in practical activities by establishing a society which retained as its central focus "the philosophical view of the nature and ends of human life."⁴⁷ The aim of spreading "moral influences" on a "non-dogmatic" basis was ambiguous enough to attract a membership of diverse philosophical opinion while it also left unclear the methodological and ideological direction of the society. If dogmatic theology was the enemy, then what doctrine or idea could they be said to champion? The response from the members, one recalled, was indeed, diverse.

It was impossible to expel the religious element from the Ethical Society, either the negative element or the positive, either the implied rejection of Christianity or the needed affirmation of an alternative.⁴⁸

In his Presidential Address to the society in 1893, the utilitarian philosopher, Henry Sidwick, alluded to the vitiating effect of a Society that pursued an ambiguous end.

So long as they are not agreed on the ultimate end of action,--so long as one holds it to be Moral Perfection, another "general happiness," another "efficiency of the social organism,"--how can any counsels they may combine to give, as to the right way of living so as best to realize the end, be other than discordant and bewildering to those who seek their counsels?⁴⁹

A "provisional solution," Sidwick suggested, lay in the broad substantial agreement among "thoughtful persons" as to "what a good life is" even if they differed as to why. Despite the elegance of Sidwick's argument, the problem of determining the precise role of the ethical reformer in promoting the "good life" remained. "No purely practical organization can effectively maintain so extended an aim as that of promoting good life," Bosanquet claimed.⁵⁰ He recommended that their aim be narrowed to that of awakening moral ideas to "consciousness" in all "in whom humanity is still alive."⁵¹

While the members of the London Ethical Society equivocated over tactics and purpose, other societies acknowledging the same general purpose were being established with discernibly definite methods and sympathies. The American ethical culturist, Dr. Stanton Coit, continued to proselytize for a "vast Society for Ethical Culture." England seemed to be ripe for ethical culture and Coit was prepared to lead the way.

Already they are co-operating in practical philanthropy; let them now all join hands on the fundamental principle of ethics, and, behold! While still in their separate churches clinging to their old beliefs although no longer as essential, they have become one vast Society for Ethical Culture, and well worthy, if any might be, of the State protection and support.⁵²

Moving from New York to London in 1888, Coit established himself as the apostle of a new secular mora-

lity which would succeed where others had failed. It would become, he claimed, the "rallying-point of a new moral life for the nation."⁵³ By 1889, he succeeded in converting the South Place Chapel in Finsbury, for two generations a center of Unitarian and free thought, into the South Place Ethical Society. A year later, he was attracting large working class audiences to the East London Ethical Society. In 1892 he left the South Place Society in order to lead the West London Ethical Society into a union with the London Ethical Society. The merger was short lived. Eleven months after the two societies merged, Bosanquet led a motion for the separation of the two.

The failure to unite the two centers of ethical thought was illustrative of the ideological and methodological divisions within the ethical movement in Britain. Coit was sympathetic to the Comtist notion of a "religion of Humanity," with a hierarchic leadership and the support of the state. Under Coit's leadership, the ethical movement leaned further and further toward ethical ritual, ethical churches and the reinterpretation of orthodox rituals on humanistic lines. Coit also appeared to be leading the movement in the direction of collectivist politics. In 1896 he was responsible for the formation of an "Ethical Union" of several of the nine existing

societies in London. Soon thereafter, he introduced and edited a weekly paper for ethicists, which attracted radical collectivists of various hues. They included the German Social Democrat Eduard Bernstein, the mystic-aesthete Edward Carpenter, the journalist H. W. Massingham the future politician, Keir Hardie, the labor socialist J. Bruce Glasier and others whom Coit hoped to include in a new political party preaching ethical democracy.⁵⁴

Bosanquet objected to all these developments. He was sympathetic neither to the creation of a positivist science of ethics nor to the transformation of the ethical movement into a religion without its being able to supply a transcendent object of belief as in the conventional religions. He also objected to the tendency to form "a sort of Ethical 'church,' with one man sold off as preacher and priest."⁵⁵ He objected to the "preaching" of morality, urging a non-coercive, educative influence instead. "Teach moral philosophy (among other things) by all means," he counselled, "but for heaven's sake do not mix up your teaching with your preaching."⁵⁶

Bosanquet distinguished between the communication of "ideas about morality" as object, and the inward growth of "moral ideas" as subjective experience. "Morality is life, and you cannot plant a strange life in a man by

force, and all in a moment. As Plato tells us, you must make it grow from within."⁵⁷ For Bosanquet, the difference between the two phrases contained an essential distinction between engaging in morally coercive acts and those which actually contributed to the development of a moral individual. He insisted that liberty was the issue, and individual choice, whether conscious or not, its determining characteristic. It was for this reason that he claimed that the most useful ethical teacher was not a man of theory but "a man of reasonable experience" --a teacher by example rather than by precept. "Contagion, I said, is always communicating moral ideas; and contagion, perhaps, after all is said and done, remains the only certain way."⁵⁸

Bosanquet had qualified the activity of ethical lecturer to the point where one might conclude that the function of mind, thought or consciousness was irrelevant to the development of morality. In attempting to keep the London Ethical Society from breaking away from his sympathy and toward Coit, he came close to denying the Society any viable function. His remarks were not received well either in Britain or America. Muirhead recalled that Bosanquet's advice had not been taken seriously because it made the entire enterprise seemed so futile.

Take away "ideas about morality" from moral philosophy and you take away its whole stock-in-trade. If water chokes what have you got to drink? The ethical lecturer would be reduced to the condition Mark Rutherford somewhere conceives of as his own, if he again found himself in a pulpit, of having nothing better to say than 'Dear friends I know nothing more about the matter than you do. We had all better go home.'⁵⁹

The American philosopher-educator John Dewey, then at the start of an illustrious career, accused Bosanquet of perpetrating "a radically false notion of moral theory."⁶⁰ He denied the "rigid line" drawn by Bosanquet to distinguish "ideas about morality" from "moral ideas." "The former are the latter in the making," Dewey insisted.⁶¹ Bosanquet and Dewey's differences derived from two radically distinct views of moral theory and moral practice. Dewey claimed that "moral science" was not a collection of abstract, immutable laws. It was an existential reality.

Moral theory . . . is the analytic perception of the conditions and relations in hand in a given act,-- it is the action in idea. It is the construction of the act in thought against its outward construction. It is, therefore, the doing,--the act itself in its emerging. So far are we from any divorce of moral theory and practice that theory is the ideal act; and conduct is the executed insight. This is our thesis.⁶²

Dewey's defense of the unity of moral theory and moral practice was Hegelian--more Hegelian than Bosanquet's at that time. Dewey's insistence upon "action in idea" was closer to Hegel's dialectic of reason than was Bosanquet's

in his insistence upon a more Kantian view of the sanctity of the individual as a moral entity.

The eclecticism of Bosanquet's moral theory emerged in the course of his lectures for the Ethical Society. If in practice, his thoughts about the formation of character, or individuality, seemed less strongly Hegelian, he retained an affection for Hegel which emerged in the course of his work in the 1890s.

By the winter term, 1889-90, it became clear to the leadership of the Ethical Society that it needed to move beyond the eclectic system of weekly lectures to a formal series of courses of instruction in specialized subjects. This aim was realized in conjunction with the London Society for the Extension of University Teaching at the newly-opened Essex Hall in the Strand. This adventure culminated in the formation in 1897 of the London School of Ethics and Social Philosophy, with Bosanquet serving as the first President and principle lecturer. (See Chapter VI.)

Even though the Society had identified itself with a specific educational mission, its ideological direction fell under attack. John A. Hobson, hitherto excluded from lecturing on economic subjects in London for having expressed "heretical" opinions (his own assessment), found a platform at Essex Hall in 1893-94 for a course on

"Problems of Poverty." While appreciative of the London Ethical Society's spirit of toleration, he criticized what he regarded as an inordinate sympathy for individualistic solutions.

My experience of this Ethical Society led me to regard it as excellent in its assertion of free discussion, but as committed so strongly to the stress on individual moral character, as the basis of social progress, as to make it the enemy of that political-economic democracy which I was coming to regard as the chief instrument of social progress and justice.⁶³

Hobson's dissatisfaction with the inordinate attention given to individual moral character by the Ethical Society was part of a broader discussion which was carried on in print and in lecture-hall in the decade of the 1890s between partisans of "individualist" and "collectivist" politics. Behind the dichotomy of terms were radically distinct views of the nature and ends of life. Bosanquet's attempt to preserve the London Ethical Society by transforming it into an institution of higher education was one response to the division of ideological opinion among reformers in the 1890s. His attempt to reconcile individualist with collectivist solutions to social problems emerged in the course of his activities on behalf of another reform organization, the Charity Organisation Society of London. His activities on behalf of the Charity Organisation Society in the last two

decades of the nineteenth century also reflected his intellectual commitment to a neo-Hegelian metaphysic of harmony and identity-in-difference. He thought his own social reform activities and his social thought were one; his sojourn as an applied philosopher was actually more problematic than he had assumed.

1. J. H. Muirhead, "Bernard Bosanquet as I Knew Him," Journal of Philosophy 20 (Dec. 1923):675.

2. Bernard Bosanquet, The Distinction between Mind and Its Objects: the Adamson Lecture for 1913, with an Appendix (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1913), p. 55.

3. The influence of the "masters," Plato, Kant and Hegel on Bosanquet's thought is discussed briefly by J. H. Muirhead in his introduction to the collection of Bosanquet letters which he edited. See Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends, ed. J. H. Muirhead (London: Allen & Unwin, 1935), pp. 15 and 21.

4. Bernard Bosanquet, "Some Socialistic Features of Ancient Societies," in Essays and Addresses (London: S. Sonnenschein, 1889), p. 48.

5. Bernard Bosanquet, "Logic as the Science of Knowledge," in Essays in Philosophical Criticism, eds. Andrew-Seth [Pringle-Pattison] and R. B. Haldane (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1883), p. 78.

6. Bosanquet in Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends, p. 49.

7. F. H. Bradley in Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends, p. 50.

8. Bernard Bosanquet, "Philosophy and Casework," in Social and International Ideals: Being Studies in Patriotism (London: Macmillan & Co., 1917), p. 177. See also, Bernard Bosanquet, "Idealism in Social Work," Charity Organisation Review 3 (Mar. 1898), pp. 122-34 and Bernard Bosanquet, "The Meaning of Social Work," International Journal of Ethics 11 (Apr. 1901), p. 296.

9. Bernard Bosanquet, Science and Philosophy and Other Essays, eds. J. H. Muirhead and Robert Carr Bosanquet (New York: Macmillan Co., 1927), p. 21.

10. Quoted in Helen Dendy [Bosanquet], review of Essentials of Logic, by Bernard Bosanquet, in Mind n.s. 4 4 (Oct. 1895):542.

11. Bernard Bosanquet, The Principle of Individuality and Value: the Gifford Lecture for 1911 Delivered in Edinburgh University (London: Macmillan & Co., 1912), p. 23.

12. Ibid., p. 340.

13. Bosanquet, Science and Philosophy, p. 20.

14. The Introduction to Hegel's Philosophy of Fine Art, trans. and preface by Bernard Bosanquet (London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1886).

15. Bernard Bosanquet, "On the True Conception of Another World," in Essays and Addresses, p. 93. This essay was a reprint of Bosanquet's prefatory essay to Hegel's Introduction (see preceding note).

16. Ibid., pp. 104-05.

17. Bernard Bosanquet, "Edward Caird, 1835-1908," British Academy, Proceedings 3 (1907-1908):381.

18. Hegel, quoted in Bosanquet, Essays and Addresses, p. vii.

19. J. H. Muirhead, "Bernard Bosanquet as I Knew Him," p. 677.

20. Bernard Bosanquet, "How to Read the New Testament," in Essays and Addresses, p. 150.

21. Bernard Bosanquet, "Some Socialistic Features of Ancient Societies," in Essays and Addresses, p. 48.

22. Bernard Bosanquet, "The Kingdom of God on Earth," in Essays and Addresses, p. 123.

23. Bernard Bosanquet, The Civilization of Christendom and Other Studies (London: S. Sonnenschein, 1893), p. 77.

24. Bosanquet, "How to Read the New Testament," p. 161.

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27. Bernard Bosanquet, "Character in its Bearing on Social Causation," in Aspects of the Social Problem, ed. Bernard Bosanquet (London: Macmillan & Co., 1895), p. 107.

28. Bernard Bosanquet, "Socialism and Natural Selection," in Aspects, p. 295.

29. Bosanquet, "The Kingdom of God on Earth," pp. 116, 117 and 121.

30. J. H. Muirhead, quoted in Gustav Spiller, The Ethical Movement in Great Britain: A Documentary History (London: Farleigh Press, 1934), p. 1.

31. F. C. Montague, Arnold Toynbee, Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical & Political Science, 7th series (Baltimore, At the University Press, 1889), 1:31.

32. Oxford visitors to Whitechapel in the 1870s included Arnold Toynbee, Sidney Ball (later of the Fabian Society), Leonard Montefiore, Alfred Milner, Philip Gell, and Richard Lewis Nettleship. See Henrietta Barnett, Canon Barnett: His Life, Work, & Friends, 2 vols. (London: John Murray, 1918), 1:302.

33. Barnett quoted in J. A. R. Pimlott, Toynbee Hall: Fifty Years of Social Progress 1884-1934 (London: Dent & Son, 1935), p. 270.

34. Rev. Barnett in Henrietta Barnett, Canon Barnett, 1:340.

35. J. H. Muirhead, Reflections of a Journeyman, p. 74.

36. Ibid.

37. Spiller, Ethical Movement, p. 2.

38. Bernard Bosanquet, "The Duties of Citizenship," in Aspects, pp. 24 & 25.

39. Ibid., p. 25.

40. Bosanquet, Essays and Addresses, iii.

41. Willard Wolfe, From Radicalism to Socialism: Men and Ideas in the Formation of Fabian Socialist Doctrines, 1881-1889 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), p. 153.

42. Chubb had an insatiable zeal for "associating." He was a member of the Fellowship of the New Life, the Fabian Society, the Ethical Society of London, and he attended meetings of the Aristotelian Society, the Social Democratic Federation, and after 1885, the Socialist League. In 1890 he departed for America to serve as a leader in the ethical culture movement. See Wolfe, op. cit., pp. 156-62, passim.

43. Muirhead, Reflections of a Journeyman, p. 75.

44. Ibid., p. 76.

45. Spiller, Ethical Movement, p. 7.

46. London Ethical Society, Annual Report 1886-1887, quoted in Spiller, Ethical Movement, p. 7.

47. Muirhead, Reflections of a Journeyman, p. 74.

48. H. J. Blackham, "The Ethical Movement During Seventy Years," The Plain View, no. 6 (Jan. 1946):146.

49. Henry Sidgwick, "My Station and its Duties," International Review of Ethics, 4 (Oct. 1893):12. Sidgwick's comments were delivered as part of his Presidential Address to the Ethical Society in April, 1893 which was originally entitled, "The Aims and Methods of an Ethical Society." See Muirhead, Reflections of a Journeyman, p. 82.

50. Bernard Bosanquet, "The Communication of Moral Ideas as a Function of an Ethical Society," in Civilization of Christendom, p. 162.

51. Ibid., p. 204.

52. Stanton Coit, "Ethical Culture in Britain," Ethical Record 1 (May 1888):57.

53. Ibid., p. 59.

54. Bernard Porter, Critics of Empire: British Radical Attitudes to Colonialism in Africa 1895-1914. (London: Macmillan & Co., 1968), chap. 6 and passim.

55. Helen Bosanquet, Bernard Bosanquet, p. 44.

56. Bernard Bosanquet, quoted in J. H. Muirhead, Reflections of a Journeyman, p. 77.

57. Bosanquet, "Communication of Moral Ideas,"
p. 195.
58. Ibid., pp. 191 & 187.
59. Muirhead, Reflections of a Journeyman, p. 77.
60. John Dewey, "Moral Theory and Practice,"
International Journal of Ethics 1 (Jan. 1891):191.
61. Ibid., p. 196.
62. Ibid., p. 188.
63. J[ohn] A. Hobson, Confessions of a Heretic
in Economics (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1938), p. 56.

CHAPTER V

THE PHILOSOPHER AS CHARITY ORGANIZER

At the same time that Bosanquet engaged in the work of the London Ethical Society, he was rising to prominence in another London organization which was committed to the cause of reform. The Society for Organizing Charitable Relief and Repressing Mendicity, invariably referred to by its short title, the Charity Organisation Society (hereafter COS), had been founded in 1869 for the purpose of organizing and centralizing the host of philanthropic and charitable relief efforts in the London metropolis. When Bosanquet joined the COS in the mid-1880s it was already a "family affair."

His eldest brother, Charles Bertie Pulleine Bosanquet, served as the first paid Secretary of the Society from 1870 to 1875 and he had virtually saved the organization from financial and administrative collapse in its first year. Charles Bosanquet, the author of London: Its Growth, Charitable Agencies, and Wants, had been instrumental in securing the Society's reputation as a center of expertise and experience in matters affecting the lives of the London poor. In 1875 he presented the recommendations of the Council of the COS and the special Committee

on Dwellings of the Poor in London to the Home Secretary, Richard Cross. With the aid of several members of Parliament, including Kay-Shuttleworth, Shaftesbury, Napier, and Ettrick the government moved a bill "for Facilitating the Improvement of the Dwellings of the Working Classes in Large Towns," thereafter known as the Artisans' Dwellings Act of 1875 or the Cross Act.¹ The term of the Act empowered the Metropolitan Board of Works to take over large areas of unsanitary housing, upon the recommendation of the local medical officer, and then after paying compensation to the owners, to abolish slum property and sell the land to developers willing to provide working-class housing.

Bernard Bosanquet's link to the COS was secured by both family and friends. When his brother resigned the Secretaryship in 1875 in order to take over the management of the family's Northumbrian estate, Charles Stewart Loch, Bosanquet's Balliol friend, was recruited from a clerkship in the India Office to take his place. Loch married Emma Sophia Peters, daughter of a COS stalwart and sister of Bosanquet's closest Oxford colleague, Frank Peters. Bosanquet himself was joined in the COS by a contingent of Scottish cousins led by Mary McCallum. In 1895, Bosanquet married Helen Dendy, a District Secretary in the COS and holder of a "First" in economic studies from Newnham

College, Cambridge.

Beyond the ties of family and friends, Bosanquet found the COS approach to reform congenial to his own social philosophy. His philosophical idealism was based upon a view of the individual in the context of community. The development of character, or individuality, according to his view, occurred within the varying contexts of social relations and communities occasioned during a lifetime. Family, neighborhood, friends, labor or civic associations were typical communities in which the individual fulfilled obligations and functions. The relationship of individual to community and communities to one another, Bosanquet said, was like "a nest of boxes inside one another."² To express the dynamic relationship between individual and social purpose he also invoked an organic analogy, the image of society as organism. This view of the individual within a many-sided context of social relations was congenial to the COS method of assistance.

Throughout the 1870s, COS workers had taken to the field, investigating individual applicants for relief and inaugurating a technique of casework which became the hallmark of the society. The development of "character" was the criterion of assistance, a category which Bosanquet described to a later generation of COS workers as

"a necessary condition for help to be of any use."³ To the first generation of COS volunteers, a recent critic has noted, "pauperism was not merely poverty; it was moral degradation."⁴ Their aim had been not only the relief of the poor, but spiritual regeneration as well. The COS aimed at saving the "deserving" poor--those for whom charitable assistance might nurture qualities of thrift, respectability and responsibility--from descent into the nether world of the "unhelpable" residuum.

By the decade of the 1880s, the COS perception of poverty as moral failure faced a series of challenges in the press, pulpit, and lecture-hall. The COS goal of ameliorating the plight of the poor by voluntary philanthropic effort began to be criticized by some as inadequate. This change in attitude was the result of real and perceived changes in public opinion with regard to the economy and polity. Trade depressions, industrial strikes, winter distress and challenges to Britain's place on the world market undermined the gospel of progress which had inspired earlier generations. In place of the classical economists' optimistic assumption that the increased productive power of the nation would ensure the increased wealth of the nation and all of its inhabitants, contemporaries bore witness to the increasing number of poor, threatened by degrading and debilitating conditions.

Published accounts of an "outcast" population, unwashed and uncivilized and living in the centers of the great cities, seized the popular imagination. The Pall Mall Gazette sensationalized the response to "The Bitter Cry of Outcast London," the Pictorial World elaborated upon "How the Poor Live," while testimonials to the poverty of the poor abounded. The Poor of the Period, or Leaves from a Loiterer's Diary, In the Slums, Help for the Helpless, and Our Lapsed Masses typified the genre. The climate of opinion was warmed not only by reports in a sensationalist press but by the ardor of the educated classes as well.

A dialogue on the nature of social and economic justice followed in the wake of the publication in 1881 of Progress and Poverty by the American reformer, Henry George. A controversial thesis guaranteed its feisty author a series of well-attended, boisterous lecture tours of the British Isles and the sale of 100,000 copies within three years.⁵ In marked dissent from theories of the classical economists, George contended that poverty was a partner to progress so long as wealth, which he defined as a return of profit from capital in land, remained in the possession of an exclusive landowning class. His solution was a single tax on valuated land so as to guarantee a just distribution of wealth.

George's land reform scheme was not unique; schemes for the redistribution of wealth in land had been proposed for at least a decade. Alfred Russel Wallace's plan for the state appropriation of land inspired the formation of the Land Nationalization Society in the same year that George's volume appeared in Britain. But it was George who unleashed the passions of his audience.

The Oxford economist, Arnold Toynbee, responded to George's essay with an apologia to the working classes of Britain for the abuses of early industry.

We--the middle classes, I mean, not merely the very rich--we have neglected you; instead of justice we have offered you charity, and instead of sympathy, we have offered you hard and unreal advice; but I think we are changing. If you would only believe it and trust us, I think that many of us would spend our lives in your service. . . . We will do this and only ask you to remember one thing in return . . . if you get a better life, you will really lead a better life.⁶

While Toynbee had been provoked to a public display of conscience, others disputed the indices of "progress" and "poverty." The economist, Alfred Marshall, suggested that the report of a progressive pauperization of the working class was erroneous and he cited statistical evidence to support his claim.⁷ His own solution to the problem of poverty was essentially moral rather than economic. He advocated the education of the working classes to habits of thrift, duty and respectability. These characteristics, he thought, would rescue the next

generation from the grip of poverty.

The shipowner-philanthropist, Charles Booth, was equally provoked by George's statistics. He demanded evidence to support the claim that the proceeds of a single tax would eliminate competition within the working class.⁸ Booth subsequently embarked upon his own statistical study of the laboring population of London. The "hardness" of statistical evidence in Booth's survey of the life and labor of the inhabitants of East London was weakened by his classification of the poor according to income level and moral rectitude. Booth's informed study provoked Bosanquet to remark in a review that it reminded him of "the best in social literature," exposing the "two lives" of London, "the gilded" and "the squalid."⁹

As the decade wore on, the analysis of the problem shifted from questions of individual character to questions affecting the principles and limits of state action. "Socialism was in the air," Muirhead recalled, and the impulse toward legislative intervention on behalf of the laboring poor gained strength with the polemical onslaught of socialists. "In its more active form [socialism] it was represented by the Social Democratic Federation under Hyndman and his associates," Muirhead continued. In its "intellectual side" it was represented by the Fabian Society with its program for "permeation."¹⁰ Lying some-

where between the Social Democratic Federation and the Fabian Society was the Socialist League founded by William Morris and Belfort Bax and committed to the eradication of poverty.

The 1880s closed with an exchange of polemics between "individualist" and "socialist" reformers. In spite of its emphasis upon individual character, the COS was neither individualist, in the sense of being against government intervention, nor socialist or collectivist. The COS was characterized by the same evangelical spirit that had inspired the social legislation of the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century. The Society maintained a pragmatic approach to social legislation, supporting state intervention when it was deemed necessary for removing obstacles to self-government and individual initiative. But because the COS held the issue of individual character as its central doctrine, it was easily caricatured by its opponents as a laissez-fairist, obstructionist organization. Similarly, socialist and collectivist opinion from the enemy camp met with derision in the pages of the COS journal, the Charity Organisation Review.

Bosanquet's refforts in this period were devoted to creating a dialogue between partisans in both camps. His aim was to turn political argument in Britain away

from polemic and toward moral discourse. It was no accident that in writing of the formation of public opinion in ancient Athens he paused to remark upon the state of contemporary political thinking.

The general truth of Plato's view might still be illustrated by pointing out that any two opposite factions, 'Individualist,' 'Collectivist,' or the like, are as a rule, very much more on the same ground than they think, so that their distrust of the other's ideas is really a distrust of their own, and the solution is on neither side, but somewhere beyond both.¹¹

In the many essays and addresses which he delivered in the late 1880s and 1890s under the auspices of the London Ethical Society and the Charity Organization Society, Bosanquet urged those concerned with strengthening individual character neither to fear nor to oppose "collectivism" but to regard it as an ally in the cause of reform. It was with the hope of expanding the terms of political understanding that he introduced a model of German socialism into the British debate. His translation of The Quintessence of Socialism by Albert Schäffle appeared in Britain in February 1889 and went through four editions in a little over a year. A translation of Schäffle's subsequent volume, The Impossibility of Social Democracy, appeared in 1892.¹² Bosanquet introduced the former Commerce Minister of Austria to his British audience as "one of the most eminent of German economists"

whose work offered, "the clearest account of Socialism that can be attained in anything like the same compass."¹³

Bosanquet was attracted to Schäffle's scheme of socialism because it expressed views similar to his own concerning the relationship of the individual to the community and to the state. Schäffle's scheme was based upon a vision of organic community where each individual fulfilled his or her responsibilities as part of a general cooperative effort. This was similar to the view shared by Bosanquet, F. H. Bradley and T. H. Green concerning the "duties of one's station," wherein individual responsibilities once fulfilled led to the achievement of a common, public good. Schäffle implicitly identified the public good with a state founded upon the principle of collective labor.

Schäffle offered a critical analysis of German social democratic theory and practice in the period immediately preceding Bismarck's anti-socialist campaign of 1878. Schäffle was sympathetic to a specifically anti-Marxian program of state socialism. He criticized the anarchical, disunited features of the competitive, liberal system and urged the creation of an organized system of production and distribution of commodities in a state based upon the collectivist principle. Schäffle's vision of the state was not the liberal's night-watchman

but a management corporation responsible for regulating the organization of labor and the collection, storage, distribution and valuation of commodities. The structure of society which he prescribed was neither individualistic nor class-oriented, but a "universalized" version of the "organic-corporative" social relations which characterized society in the middle ages.¹⁴

Schäffle's attitude to socialism was ambivalent. He repeated the traditional socialist rhetoric calling for the socialization of the means of production, but hedged on the details of the coming transformation while assuring his audience that individuals would still enjoy private property. And while praising the collective organization of the means of production and exchange in a modern industrial economy, Schäffle invoked, with more than a hint of nostalgia, the deferential social relations of the middle ages.

Schäffle's ambivalent approach may have appealed to Bosanquet because it allowed Bosanquet to emphasize the moral efficacy of a polity based upon the principle of cooperation, while he downplayed Schäffle's specific economic recommendation, the collective ownership of the means of production. Bosanquet was less attracted to the economic aspects of socialist schemes, Schäffle's included, than to the ethical and communitarian senti-

ments they seemed to express.

Until well into the 1890s, Bosanquet attempted to teach his audience the distinction between moral and economic socialism. He identified moral socialism with a communitarian or collectivistic ethos, which in one form or another, aimed at a public, common good. This was apparent in his defense of Schäffle, and it underlay several other positions which he took in defense of "true socialism."

Schäffle's British audience responded according to their likes. Individualists, like the COS reviewer, H. G. Willink, thought Schäffle's plan "an adverse criticism" of socialism.¹⁵ Bosanquet and others, including the Fabian socialist Sydney Olivier, regarded it as a positive statement of the ethical side of the socialist movement. When Willink represented Schäffle's volume to his COS audience as the testimony of a recanted socialist, Bosanquet was quick to respond. He insisted that although Schäffle was an adversary of Marxian economic theory, his analysis of the ethical dimension of collectivism was the true representative of contemporary socialism.¹⁶

Bosanquet returned to the pages of the Charity Organization Review, in September 1889, with a defense of collectivism. The problem, he claimed, was the refusal of some and perhaps quite a few individuals in the COS,

to regard "voluntary" and "public" action as anything but antithetical. He refused to acknowledge a distinction between public officials and their voluntarist counterparts in a private sector. The ethos guiding officials acting as agents of a social or collective body was identical to that which inspired the private individual. As he elaborated his position, it became clear that the collectivism he advocated was one defined in terms of social function and public interest. Public officials and public commissions were comprised of individuals carrying out delegated authority on behalf of the public. "Complete Collectivism is consistent with every form of delegation of powers, except the one form of permission to make private profit ad libitum."¹⁷

Bosanquet's remarks were based upon his philosophical assumption that the individual exists in a social context. He identified the individual with society and private purpose with public, or social, purpose. Theoretically, at least, he had no problem with actions undertaken by servants of the state on behalf of individuals. And he challenged those theorists who opposed governmental legislation on the grounds that it was a threat to individual liberty. The real threat to the individual came from those who would isolate the individual from a natural, social context. Auberon Herbert, Herbert Spen-

cer, and John Stuart Mill he considered to be guilty of this line of logic.

I hold that the view of the anti-governmental theorist is not merely an imperfect view, but is a misapprehension of an imperfect view. . . . Theorists of this type do not know what the individual is, and in trying to free him from tyranny they are dismembering him. . . . Liberty in the plainest and simplest sense of the word does not depend on the absence of legislation, but on the comprehensiveness and reasonableness of life.¹⁸

The sole check upon legislation was that it should not break the "springs" of individual character. Neither individualist nor socialist camps necessarily guaranteed the triumph of a moral ideal. Reviewing a study of the English poor by COS stalwart and ardent individualist, Thomas Mackay, he urged that a "rational view of society" should replace the dichotomy of individualism and socialism.¹⁹ A rational view of society condemned both economic individualism and economic socialism in theory while remaining flexible enough to employ either according to circumstances. To those partisans, like Mackay, who responded to the demands of socialists with an ever-tightening grip in defense of individual liberty and property, Bosanquet urged a wider conception of the ends of life. If Mackay insisted on holding to an argument for individualism then he was also compelled to argue for a moral qua social ideal.

We miss the true bearing of the dispute unless we see that modern Socialism is deeply individualistic--

i.e., akin to a mechanical arrangement for satisfying individual desires, although it may amalgamate with other ideas. That Individualism which is to overthrow it must not be its mere opposite, but its superior. That is to say, it must include in its foundation the true--moral or ideal--unity of man in society, and must shape its resistance to social tyranny on the lines of defense which protect social duty.²⁰

Bosanquet warned his COS colleagues that the refusal to acknowledge the legitimacy of state action in certain circumstances would bring "grist" to the socialist mill. "All that individuals do is, in some way, social action, and the only question is in what shape you will have your collectivist interference, not whether you will have it."²¹

He carried his campaign for a moral and rational view of society to the Fabian Society in February, 1890. Responding to Sydney Olivier's essay on the moral aspects of socialism which had appeared in the first volume of Fabian Essays on Socialism, Bosanquet suggested that his Fabian audience consider a distinction between the economic and moral aspects of both socialism and individualism. "Economic Socialism" designated the collective organization of the productive and distributive forces of society. "Economic Individualism" designated a competitive system based on private property. The focus of his attention, however, rested on the identification of the terms "socialism" and "individualism" with distinct moral views of the "value of life as a whole."²² "Moral individual-

ism" offered an atomistic view of society while "Moral Socialism" championed the opposite view, making society the moral essence of the individual.

Economic socialism rested on assumptions synonymous with moral individualism. The economic socialist was eager to employ the compulsory power of the state to provide the material necessities of individuals. This arrangement was an artifice of morality and social purpose because it attempted to substitute economic machinery for natural, i.e., organic, social relations.

Economic Socialism need not presuppose the social organism. It is, in appearance a substitute for the life of that organism, intended to operate on the egoistic motives of individuals for the good of the whole, which cannot, it is assumed, be attained by the moral power of social purpose.²³

The real problem, he suggested to his Fabian audience, was to discover those economic arrangements best suited to "assist morality." In his examination of the economic systems capable of assisting morality, Bosanquet leaned toward economic individualism. He defended private property in terms of its effect in strengthening moral character. The "duties" of property, although a frequent target of socialist abuse, served a moral function in forcing the individual to recognize a social responsibility. He anticipated the socialist charge that unearned income derived from a gift of property might have the

same pernicious effect as out-relief or assistance from the state: "The identification of property with out-relief, if established, might be a good argument for abolishing property, but could not possibly be a plea in favour of out-relief."²⁴

Bosanquet voiced a sympathy for what he termed "practical Socialism"--the "workman's ownership of the means of production"--which allowed for the self-sufficiency of the individual workman functioning in a context of organic social relations.²⁵ He criticized the Fabian Society's willingness to substitute large-scale machinery of state for a discriminating investigation of each individual case. He objected to the intrusion of potentially large economic machinery of the state into what he termed "delicate" issues in the lives of the poor. By the term "delicate" he meant those existential relations responsible for the formation of character and will.

Bosanquet's attempt to reconcile a moral socialism which invoked a communitarian ethos with an economic individualism which sanctioned the potentially competitive struggle of the marketplace was based upon his philosophy of individuality and community. His theory of individuality led him to argue for the primacy of character as an element of social reform. He regarded the development of the individual as a struggle in the development of

mind and will. But because he believed that to be human was to be social, he also argued that the growth of the individual occurred in a social context, within a host of interlocking social institutions, like home, neighborhood and trade union. When applied to practical issues, Bosanquet's theory of individuality left him in the company of those who were identified with an individualistic approach to social reform, while his theory of a society which aimed at a common good, led him to support those socialist schemes, like Schäffle's which he thought were conducive to a collectivistic ethos.

Bosanquet's attraction to those proposals which appeared to strengthen individual character, i.e., mind and will, while also allowing for a communitarian spirit of cooperation explains his admiration for the individualistic approach of the early nineteenth century Scottish minister, Thomas Chalmers. Chalmers had reportedly turned one of the poorest parishes in Glasgow away from dependence on the Poor Law in 1819 by making the "sufficiency" of the parish community a collective responsibility of the parishioners. Chalmers' faith in the "sufficiency of the people," Bosanquet claimed, was "the very core of true democracy" and the key to his success.²⁶ The economic truth of a self-sufficient people was a lesson which Chalmers had taught and which contemporaries stood

in danger of forgetting. The reason Bosanquet found Chalmers so attractive was that he had demonstrated the survival of the individual as a member of a self-sufficient community without need of external, state-interference. The inhabitants of the parish could collectively care for the needy.

Preferring Chalmers to contemporary economic argument, and opposed to the automatic assumption of state responsibility for the lives of the poor, Bosanquet found himself aligned with the individualist camp on almost every issue of social reform under discussion in the decade of the 1890s. In the same decade, he developed those aspects of his philosophy which culminated in his lectures on the philosophical theory of the state. With slight emendation, to allow for further elaboration on the nature of modern politics, Bosanquet's philosophy of social reform remained essentially the same for the remainder of his career. The social philosophy which informed his response to practical proposals for reform in the 1890s was essentially the same one which he brought to bear in response to the Reports of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress in 1909 (see Chapter VIII).

He joined the COS in condemning proposals for the state provision of school meals for children of poor

families on the ground that it would be tantamount to providing a bounty to those who failed to discharge parental and social responsibilities. He extended his argument beyond the COS position, however, with a democratic reminder that if the machinery of the state were set in motion, it ought to serve all school children without discrimination.²⁷

Taking a larger perspective, he suggested that the problem of needy children indicated a larger problem of needy parents and families. He advocated a complete method of investigation which would inquire into the condition of the entire family.

If you want to do any real good, you must go to the parents and find out what is wrong, whether they can't or won't feed their child properly; you must consider the family life from their point of view, and see if it cannot be put upon a better footing. Then you take the strong, central point of view, affecting all the child's meals and health and prospects, and not merely the bit by bit point of view affecting one or two meals a week.²⁸

The central point of view was that offered by the COS with its casework method of assistance. The casework approach allowed for a thorough investigation of the family treated as a unit, rather than as a piecemeal response to the needs of each individual member of the family. In this case, Bosanquet was advocating a method of assistance which was ameliorative as well as preventive. He offered a similar perspective in response to proposals for the

state provision of pensions for the aged poor. He thought that the aged poor would have been better served earlier in life, by improvements in wages, thrift organizations and strong unions, rather than by receipt of philanthropy from the state or private employers late in life.²⁹ He felt assured that the condition of the "wage-earning classes" if organized on a "business footing" could be made sufficient without supplementation from an external source. He was sympathetic to those institutions, such as thrift organizations and trade unions, founded by labor and for labor, because they were organic to the individual and collective struggle of labor to survive the vicissitudes of the economic marketplace. And from struggle, character would be strengthened. Bosanquet voiced these opinions in 1892, when the question of pensions for the aged poor was first beginning to be widely discussed and they remained essentially the same when he considered them some fifteen years later in the context of a discussion concerning the reform of the Poor Law (see Chapter VIII).

Bosanquet opposed piecemeal interference and indiscriminate assistance from either public or private sources. He joined his friend, COS secretary, C. S. Loch, in criticizing General William Booth's 1890 campaign to redeem the poor of "darkest England." Inspired

by the journalist, H. M. Stanley's report, "In Darkest Africa," General Booth, the founder of the Salvation Army, had advanced an elaborate scheme for saving the poor in his 1890 study, "In Darkest England and the Way Out." General Booth's scheme proposed the establishment of food depots, shelters, workshops, labor bureaus, farm colonies in the country, overseas colonies, and farm settlements as means by which to alleviate immediate cases of distress. He also proposed a variety of service-related institutions, including a poor man's bank, a poor man's lawyer, a model lodging house for the married couple, a matrimonial bureau, a training home for housewifery, and a model suburban village. He based his proposals on statistics which he claimed revealed the existence of a "submerged tenth" of the population living in very great need and distress.

Bosanquet criticized the theoretical and factual basis of Booth's plan. In Bosanquet's view, General Booth's proposal to create a "great machine" to save the depraved and destitute of all classes would exacerbate the very problem it was intended to solve. A "machine," with its indiscriminate approach to charity, would have the effect of weakening all the purposes of charity--including that of strengthening individual character, home and family.³⁰

Instead, Bosanquet commended the analysis offered by an unrelated Booth, Charles Booth, the shipowner-philanthropist, whose social survey of London revealed the variety of life and labor among the poor of the metropolis. Bosanquet, citing Booth's study of East London, pointed to the need to discriminate among the various category of the poor. He emphasized the distinction between the category of a "true industrial class" of genuine labor and General Booth's category of a "submerged tenth" of casual labor with its own subdivision of hopeless and helpable cases. Bosanquet was concerned for the welfare of the "true industrial class," but it was the class of casual labor which he found most troublesome. Casual labor, limited, irregular and temporary, always partially unemployed, formed the "leisure class among the poor," and threatened to drag down members of the class above.³¹ It was this class of casual labor which Bosanquet found problematic.

So long as the class of casual labor existed, Bosanquet thought, the progress of "genuine labor" would be thwarted. In Malthusian tones, Bosanquet concluded by warning his audience that General Booth's indiscriminate philanthropy would perpetuate a class which ought not to exist at all. The class of casual labor needed assistance in rising up to join the ranks of the "true industrial

class." In so doing, "the whole class could be forced out of existence by preventive agencies, and especially by education."³² Preventive agencies were those working to forestall failures of self-sufficiency.

Bosanquet did not usually refer to labor as an issue of "class" and it was, perhaps, the persuasiveness of Charles Booth's social analysis which prompted him to do so in his critique of General Booth's social scheme. But the Malthusian cum Darwinian vision of an individual struggle for existence gained prominence in Bosanquet's social thought in the decade of the 1890s. His philosophy of individuality, although set in a context of social relations, did suggest a life and death struggle for existence. Character was shaped by individual struggle and competition; anything which promised to eliminate these factors would be false to human experience.

The abolition of the struggle for existence, in the sense in which alone that term applies to human societies, means, so far as I can see, the divorce of existence from human qualities; and to favour the existence of human beings without human qualities is the ultimate inferno to which any society can descend.³³

Having accepted a struggle for life as a human quality, he criticized those proposals for reform which would interfere with the operation of the principle of natural selection by guaranteeing the means of existence to all.

Bosanquet did not see a contradiction between

his doctrine of individuality which presumed an individual struggle for survival as well as for improvement, and his idea of community which presumed harmonious social relations. This was, perhaps, because he sometimes appeared to believe that survival in the struggle for achieving individuality was a qualification for membership in the community. This aspect of Bosanquet's thought emerged more clearly in his response to proposals for the reform of the Poor Laws around 1910. At that time he suggested that those individuals who failed to maintain themselves, failed in their obligations to society and polity, and were, therefore, failures in citizenship (see Chapter VIII).

In the mid-1890s, Bosanquet joined the author of Social Evolution, Benjamin Kidd, in identifying one aspect of socialism which was an obstacle to social progress. Bosanquet followed Kidd in distinguishing between a "true socialism" which aimed at eliminating competition and guaranteed the means of survival to all, and that of "State Socialism," which would regulate, but not eliminate the struggle for existence. Bosanquet was disposed to the evolution of a form of state socialism which would allow for the development of individual character, presumably one which would preserve the individual struggle for survival, while also fostering a moral and social

ethos. Although he did not elaborate upon the terms of state socialism in this particular article, it was to emerge in his lectures on the philosophical theory of the state several years later.

Bosanquet's reflections on the regressive effects of socialist proposals for reform provoked a series of discussions with socialists and collectivists in the latter half of the decade. Sidney Ball, a member of the Fabian Society and Greats tutor at St. John's College, Oxford, accused Bosanquet of misrepresenting the "truths" of contemporary English Socialism. Bosanquet replied by differentiating between the socialism enunaciated by academicians like Ball, and the socialism espoused in the literature distributed to the working classes by organizations like the Fabian Society and the Social Democratic Federation. He felt more of an affinity for the former, but thought it uninfluential in comparison to the latter in the force which it exercised over the laboring classes.

By the middle of the 1890s Bosanquet abandoned his attempt to teach his public the distinction between economic and moral socialism. The appropriation and politicization of the term "socialist" by Fabians, SDF'ers, Hammersmith Socialist Leaguers and other signers

of the Socialist Manifesto of May 1893 appeared to Bosanquet as a fait accompli; "party shibboleth" was the order of the day. The term "socialism" had been appropriated as a polemic in place of an ethical concept of community. Economic socialism had triumphed over moral socialism.

As if to substantiate Bosanquet's view of the politicization of terms as well as of the movement, the leading spokesman for the Fabian position, Sidney Webb, joined the discussion by raising the issue of what he termed the "ethics of controversy."³⁴ The controversy between individualist and socialist exponents, Webb claimed, was fueled by the inability of each side to believe in the "intellectual sincerity" of the other. The real difference between the two sides, he implied, lay in their differing perceptions of class and power.

Perhaps I do Mr. Bosanquet an injustice. But I have more than once thought that I detected in his indignation against certain Socialists a 'righteous anger' that men who must know better should lend their support to a movement which is, in his view, so demonstrably pernicious in its effects upon the very basis of the social order. There is certainly a feeling of this kind at the bottom of the exasperation against the more educated Socialists which is manifested in some quarters.³⁵

Bosanquet countered by directing the attention of his audience to the origin of the debate with Webb: Sidney Ball's critical review of a volume edited and partly authored by Bosanquet which had appeared in 1895 under the title, Aspects of the Social Problem. The remarks which

had provoked Ball, he noted, had occurred in his discussion of different senses of the term "socialism," at least one of which Bosanquet thought indicated a drift of contemporary socialism toward atomistic, individualistic and materialistic solutions. Bosanquet admitted to Webb a dread--not of class conflict, or the like, but of "a process of intellectual drifting."³⁶ He closed the discussion by denying that his position was individualist--which he associated with the tradition of Herbert Spencer and John Stuart Mill "in some of his moods." Instead, he claimed affiliation with the main stream of social theory derived from the great thinkers of the world, presumably including Plato and Hegel.

Webb was correct in sensing Bosanquet's antagonism to the literature distributed by the Fabian Society. The polemical and propagandist nature of Fabian statistics had been deftly criticized by Bosanquet's wife, Helen Dendy Bosanquet.³⁷ Holder of a First in Moral Sciences Tripos from Newnham College, Cambridge, and instructed in economics by Alfred Marshall, among others, Helen Dendy Bosanquet was also versed in contemporary German social literature. Herself the translator of Sigwart's Logic, Helen Bosanquet restored the question of "class" and "class struggle" to its Marxist roots by raising the question of "Klassenkampf" in the pages of the Charity

Organisation Review in 1897. "Rapprochement" rather than "Klassenkampf," she noted, was the more appropriate description of industrial relations in Britain.³⁸

Aspects of the Social Problem, the volume which Bosanquet edited and partly authored, with contributions from COS secretary, C.S. Loch and his wife and his cousin Mary McCallum, was received by some as a parti-pris for the individualist position. John Hobson followed Sidney Webb in alluding to the class-bias of the contributors in particular, and the COS in general. The book represented the interests of the propertied classes, Hobson charged, in their opposition to proposals for old-age pensions, meals for school children, public provision of work for the unemployed and other forms of public assistance for the poor and needy.³⁹ Hobson identified Bosanquet with all that was anathema to him: the defense of the principle of private property and the defense of an atomistic social philosophy which he identified with the COS. Casting aside Bosanquet's meticulous philosophical distinctions and social philosophy of individuality and community, Hobson branded him an apologist for the individualist side.

The eloquent exponent of the 'general will' and the spiritual solidarity of society, when he comes to practical applications, ignores the need of corporate institutions of social support, through which 'the general will' may find expression and achieve its ends, and relies for social progress upon the unsup-

ported initiative of the individual will considered as a primus mobile. The application of this social philosophy by Mr. Bosanquet and his friends makes it perfectly plain that the 'character' which is the 'condition of conditions' is individual character. Whatever some of them may say in more enlightened moments, this doctrine underlies their practice and is sheer monadism, it looks upon society as embodied in the separate action of individual wills, without allowance for any organic relation among those wills, constituting spiritual solidarity.⁴⁰

Bosanquet had been caught in the crossfire of individualist, socialist and collectivist polemic in late nineteenth century Britain. His argument for the recognition of the moral aspect of socialism was substantively repeated by Leonard T. Hobhouse, then an Oxford tutor, who took to the pages of the International Journal of Ethics in 1898 in support of his friend, Sidney Ball and the "socialist creed." On substantive points Hobhouse sounded like Bosanquet, distinguishing the ideal of socialism from its manifestation in some socialist organizations in Britain and criticizing those who, by their actions, would reduce socialist theory to "economic mechanisms."⁴¹ "The true end of Socialism," Hobson said, "is ethical."⁴² It was a sentiment Bosanquet must have welcomed. Although both Hobhouse and Bosanquet shared a similar view of the ethical nature of socialism at this point in their careers, it was Hobhouse who was called the ethical socialist while Bosanquet was denied the same title.

Bosanquet had attempted to open up a dialogue between partisans of diverse methods of social study and social reform. He tacitly conceded defeat, in one sense, in the mid-90s when he abandoned the term "socialism" as a description of his social philosophy. He was characterized in the press by those opposed to the COS policy and practice as an "individualist" philosopher. It was ironic that at the same time Hobson characterized Bosanquet as an "individualistic" philosopher, Bosanquet was preparing the lectures in political philosophy which were to result in his being branded an advocate of an absolutist state. And it was this contradiction in public reception which provoked a rare note of self-explication at the twilight of his career.

I suffer, in public discussion, I think, from what I really, in my own mind, hold to be a strength of my position, viz., that I have two quite different publics and specialisms--one, the philosophers; the other the social experts.⁴³

Were his two "specialisms," philosophy and social work, mutually supportive, as Bosanquet would have had it? Or was Hobson correct in his charge that Bosanquet suffered a lapse between social theory and social practice? The opportunity to observe Bosanquet in his guise as an applied philosopher of social thought did present itself, however, in the late 1890s with the formation of the London School of Ethics and Social Philosophy.

1. Helen Bosanquet, Social Work in London 1869-1912: A History of the Charity Organisation Society (London: John Murray, 1914; 2nd ed. with an introduction by C. S. Yeo, Brighton: Harvester Press, 1973), p. 167.
2. Bernard Bosanquet, "The Reality of the General Will," in Aspects, p. 330.
3. Bernard Bosanquet, "The Meaning of 'Ideal' and 'Charity,'" in Social and International Ideals. Being Studies in Patriotism (London: Macmillan & Co., 1917): repr.; Freeport: Books for Libraries Press, 1967), p. 111.
4. Una Cormack, "Developments in Case-Work," in Voluntary Social Services: Their Place in the Modern State, ed. A. F. C. Bourdillon (London: Methuen, 1945), p. 89.
5. George J. Stigler, "Alfred Marshall's Lectures on Progress and Poverty," Journal of Law & Economics 12 (Apr. 1969):181.
6. Arnold Toynbee, quoted in Richter, Politics of Conscience, p. 322.
7. Marshall found Alfred Russel Wallace's land reform schemes equally false, but was gentler in his criticism, remarking upon Wallace's laudable motive: he was "intent upon doing good." Alfred Marshall, quoted in Stigler, "Alfred Marshall's Lectures," p. 207.
8. Charles Booth, "Progress and Poverty," Charles Booth papers, University of London Library, MS 797/II/27/13 (i).
9. Bernard Bosanquet, review of Labour and Life of the People, by Charles Booth, in International Journal of Ethics, 2 (Oct. 1891):125.
10. Muirhead, "Bernard Bosanquet as I Knew Him," p. 675.
11. Bernard Bosanquet, A Companion to Plato's "Republic" for English Readers: Being a Commentary Adapted to Davies and Vaughan's Translation (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895), p. 225.

12. The Quintessence of Socialism by Albert Schäffle first appeared in Germany in 1874 as newspaper analyses of the Socialist victories in the Reichstag elections and were later assembled into book form. Bosanquet's translation was from the 8th German edition which appeared with slight revision after the passage of Bismarck's anti-socialist legislation of 1878. See Albert Schäffle, The Quintessence of Socialism, trans. and ed. by Bernard Bosanquet (London: S. Sonnenschein, 1889; 3d ed. 1891; New York: Humboldt Publishing Co., 18[8]0.) The date of publication of the American edition contained a printer's error and should read 1890.

13. Bosanquet in Schäffle, Quintessence (New York: Humboldt Publishing Co., 18(9)0, iii.

14. Ibid., p. 26.

15. H. G. Willink, "Socialism," Charity Organisation Review 5 (May 1889):203.

16. Bernard Bosanquet, "Socialism," Charity Organization Review 5 (June 1889):229.

17. Bernard Bosanquet, "The Antithesis Between Individualism and Socialism Philosophically Considered," Charity Organisation Review 6 (Sept. 1890):358. This essay was later reprinted in Bosanquet's book, The Civilization of Christendom (1893).

18. Bernard Bosanquet, "Liberty and Legislation," in Civilization of Christendom, pp. 361, 365 and 379.

19. Bernard Bosanquet, review of The English Poor, by Thomas Mackay, in Charity Organisation Review 5 (Dec. 1889):463.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid., 464.

22. Bosanquet, "Antithesis between Individualism and Socialism," p. 357.

23. Ibid., 360

24. Ibid., 366.

25. Bosanquet, "Individual and Social Reform," in Essays and Addresses, p. 46.

26. Bernard Bosanquet, "The Meaning of Social Work," International Journal of Ethics 2 (Apr. 1901):301.

27. Bosanquet, "Antithesis between Individualism and Socialism," p. 366.

28. Bosanquet, "Meaning of Social Work," p. 302.

29. Bernard Bosanquet, "The Principle and Chief Dangers of the Administration of Charity," in Philanthropy and Social Progress, ed., H. C. Adams (Boston: Crowell & Co., 1893), p. 267. Bosanquet's argument for strengthening the position of labor was the source of his negative criticism of one of the entrepreneurs memorialized by Samuel Smiles in Smiles' portrait of a profit-sharing employer. See Bosanquet, "Two Modern Philanthropists," in Essays and Addresses.

30. Bernard Bosanquet, "'In Darkest England,' in 'In Darkest England' On the Wrong Track: Criticisms on 'General Booth's (Social) Scheme from Three Different Points of View, by C. S. Loch, Bernard Bosanquet, and Rev. Canon Philip Dwyer (London: S. Sonnenschein, 1891), p. 14.

31. Ibid., pp. 64, 72 and 70.

32. Ibid., p. 71.

33. Bernard Bosanquet, "Socialism and Natural Selection," in Aspects, p. 291. The combination of social Darwinism and neo-Hegelian argument in Idealist thought has been more readily acknowledged in the work of David G. Ritchie--see his Darwinism and Politics, for example. Bosanquet's remarks reveal a debt to the Hegelian concept of bildung--a concept which glorified the educative effects of a struggle for individual growth and development.

34. Sidney Webb, "The Moral Aspects of Socialism," International Journal of Ethics 7 (Oct. 1896):82.

35. Ibid., 83.

36. Bernard Bosanquet, "Aspects of the Social Problem: A Reply," International Journal of Ethics 7 (Jan. 1897):227.

37. See Helen Dendy [Bosanquet], "Industrial Residuum," Economic Journal (1893) reprinted in Aspects of the Social Problem, ed. Bernard Bosanquet; "Socialist Propaganda," National Review 26 (Aug. 1895); "The Farce of the Fabians," Charity Organisation Review 10 (June 1894): as well as an abstract of a paper read to the COS Council, "Socialist Propaganda," Charity Organisation Review 11 (May 1895).

38. Helen Bosanquet, "Klassenkampf," Charity Organisation Review, 11 (Aug. 1897).

39. J[ohn] A. Hobson, "The Social Philosophy of Charity Organisation," Contemporary Review 70 (Nov. 1896): 712.

40. Ibid., 720.

41. L. T. Hobhouse, "The Ethical Basis of Collectivism," International Journal of Ethics 8 (Apr. 1898): 142.

42. Ibid., 143.

43. Bernard Bosanquet to R. F. A. Hoernlé, 17 March 1918, in Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends, p. 193.

CHAPTER VI

THE OTHER 'LSE': THE LONDON SCHOOL OF
ETHICS AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY

Contrasting ideas about the nature and boundaries of politics, economics and society were at the root of Bosanquet's polemic with Sidney Webb and other members of the Fabian Society regarding the correct uses of the terms "individualism" and "socialism." Another polemic, of sorts, continued in the decade of the 1890s, with the founding of the London School of Economics by the Webbs and other members of the Fabian Society, and the transformation of the London Ethical Society into the London School of Ethics and Social Philosophy under Bosanquet's direction.

The two institutions represented conflicting ideological and methodological approaches to the changing social and political circumstances in Britain at the close of the nineteenth century. The culture of politics was permeated by a heightened sensitivity to the "social problem," poverty, as well as to the political inclinations of a newly enfranchised "demos." The politicization of social and economic issues at home, including the increase of militant labor protest and a nascent labor

party, as well as a series of economic and political challenges to Britain's imperial interests abroad, heightened the sense of a society in transition, if not transformation. At the London School of Ethics and Social Philosophy, the idiom of idealist social and political argument prevailed, challenging, in effect, the positivistic orientation of the "new" social sciences--economics, sociology, and psychology, at the Fabian institution.

Both institutions had been created with the aim of extending university level education in London. The School of Ethics and Social Philosophy was an outgrowth of the Ethical Society's decade of experience in university extension teaching. Ultimately, the institutional venture of the "other LSE," the London School of Ethics and Social Philosophy, failed in its administrative goal--adoption within the newly reconstituted University of London--while the well-endowed London School of Economics did gain entry. But the substantive effect of the former lingered on, permeating and shaping the grammar of contemporary social and political argument.

Against this background, Bosanquet entered the most prolific phase of his career, propagating in lecture-hall and the press his conception of polity and society. His earlier doubts regarding the purpose and function of

the London Ethical Society were allayed in 1891 when the Society defined its purpose as educational and accepted responsibility for running a university extension center in central London. For the next ten years, Bosanquet was the principal lecturer in philosophy to working adults in London. He published eight books and numerous articles in the course of the decade, including five books drawn largely from his extension lectures, culminating in what eventually proved to be his most controversial book, The Philosophical Theory of the State (1899).¹

Since 1889 the London Ethical Society had been providing lecturers for university-level courses of instruction offered by the London Society for the Extension of University Teaching at the newly opened Unitarian building, Essex Hall, in the Strand. Essex Hall, with its "well-lighted offices" offering "excellent accommodation for public meetings," was already host to the Ethical Society's Sunday evening lecture series.² When extension lecturers and Ethical Society members, J. H. Muirhead and the Reverend Philip Wicksteed introduced courses in Philosophy and economics for London students at Essex Hall in the 1888-89 season, the Ethical Society supplemented the effort by embarking on a weekday evening lecture series on "social subjects, philosophy and economics," the following term.

Until then, the staple subjects of university extension courses had been history, literature and science. Occasionally George A. Smith offered a few courses in economic history at the Birkbeck Institute. But it was only with the success of Muirhead and Wicksteed's respective courses on "English Political Writers" and "Social Problems" and subsequent offerings in philosophy and economics in 1890, that it was understood that a new resource had opened up for London students at Essex Hall. By 1891 the Ethical Society formalized the arrangement, agreeing to accept responsibility from the London Society for the Extension for University Teaching (hereafter referred to as LSEUT) for running a center at Essex Hall.

The precedents of the university extension movement extended back to the 1840s when several Oxford men had pressed for the admission of "poorer" men to the university. Although they failed in their attempt, by 1854, a workingman's institution was founded in Manchester by F. D. Maurice and J. M. Ludlow. The movement revived in the north of England in the 1860s with the demand by women in the industrial towns for university-level courses of instruction. In 1873, the Syndicate of the University of Cambridge agreed to honor the request for lecturers which had been received from representatives of those groups hitherto excluded from formal university training:

women and workers.³ The principle of the extension movement was the provision of systematic university-level instruction to working adults. The goal was to extend the university, geographically and sociologically, to "whole classes of persons" who were outside the ranks from which most resident university students were drawn.⁴

In London, courses were offered under the auspices of the London Society for the Extension of University Teaching, founded in 1876 at the urging of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lord Goschen. Modelled on the Cambridge extension system, the LSEUT was a voluntary organization independent of any particular university affiliation, although representatives of Oxford, Cambridge and London Universities comprised a Joint Universities Board which advised the Council of the LSEUT on all educational matters. While some of the first lecturers for the extension society expressed, with almost missionary zeal, the desire to "permeate" the masses with a desire for intellectual improvement, in practice, the university extension courses tended to attract members of the middle classes and the "labor aristocracy," confirming Samuel Barnett's observation of his experience at Toynbee Hall, "You aim at one class and hit another."⁵ Civil servants, clerks of the mercantile and business trades, teachers, journalists, artisans, leisured men and women interested in a particular

subject or engaged in public work, and some unskilled workers in the poorer districts attended the London courses.

The LSEUT operated as a "floating college," offering courses at centers throughout London and the suburbs in a day and evening wherever accommodation might be found. The public was initially invited to attend three free introductory "people's lectures" on set subjects. The audience was then invited to participate in the course of ten lectures which varied according to locality for a minimal fee intended to cover the lecturer's fee with additional costs underwritten by private subscription. Each course was organized around a series of weekly one-hour lectures delivered by a specialist setting forth the broad principles of the subject. Class discussions led by the lecturer followed, at which time written assignments for the following week were set. A detailed syllabus of the course was prepared by the lecturer and published in pamphlet form for use by students, forming the basis upon which those with satisfactory written work were allowed to sit for a final examination set by an outside examiner which might result in a certificate of pass or distinction.

This arrangement allowed a freedom of entry hitherto unknown to students even in traditional universities.

It allowed the general lay person the opportunity to attend lectures offered by a specialist and to participate in the conversational class which followed. Serious students were able to pursue the subject at greater length by submitting written work for review by the lecturer.

Since its foundation in 1876 the LSEUT had grown from five centers offering seven courses to 139 students to 32 centers offering 48 courses to 4,733 students in 1889. In that year, extension courses were offered for the first time at the Unitarian center, Essex Hall. Collaboration between the LSEUT and a Unitarian committee which included J. H. Muirhead and Joseph Estlin Carpenter, Professor of Hebrew and the Old Testament at Manchester New College, led to the subsequent involvement of the London Ethical Society in university extension work. Most of the personnel involved in the Unitarian-LSEUT arrangement were also active in the London Ethical Society and the affiliation was formally acknowledged in 1891.

A variety of specialists on contemporary subjects found a platform at Essex Hall (see Appendix A). Graham Wallas, a friend of Muirhead's (and brother-in-law after Muirhead's marriage in 1892 to Wallas' sister Mary Talbot) as well as a member of the Fabian Society, prepared the outlines of his behaviorist science of politics while lecturing to extension audiences on the "English Citizen,"

and "The History of the Working Classes." John Rae, author of a popular text on socialism and the principal biographer of Adam Smith, attempted to delineate a common ground between individualist and collectivist strategies of reform when he lectured on the "Progress and Present Position of Socialism" in the 1892-93 term. John A. Hobson had been prevented by Cambridge extension authorities from lecturing on economic subjects for his "heretical" opinions regarding the nature of capitalist accumulation. He found a platform at Essex Hall in 1894 with a course on "Problems of Poverty." Helen Dendy, Bosanquet's future wife and a Charity Organization stalwart, trained by Sidgwick and Marshall at Newnham College, Cambridge, offered another perspective on economic and social subjects when she lectured on "The Principles of Social Development," and "Economic History" in the spring and summer terms, 1895.

Unlike the economic curricula, with its varied personnel, philosophy courses at Essex Hall were delivered in a systematically idealist idiom, with Bosanquet the mainstay of the program. The curriculum included courses on the classical Greek philosophers, read in translation, as well as those modern authors whose analyses of ethics, politics, mind and will were of particular significance to the idealist credo. The philosophers, J. H. Muirhead

and J. S. Mackenzie and the educator-social activist Mrs. Sophie Bryant, joined Bosanquet in introducing the principal tenets of idealist thought to a general London audience. Muirhead, trained by Caird at the University of Glasgow and T. H. Green at Oxford, lectured on Aristotle's Ethics and on the theme of "Mind and Will," underscoring the connection between classical moral philosophy and modern psychology and ethics. J. S. Mackenzie, another of Caird's pupils and the author of Introduction to Social Philosophy, which was highly respected among idealists, offered an introductory course in moral philosophy. Mrs. Bryant, a proponent of higher education for women, headmistress of the Women's North London Collegiate School and a member of both the Aristotelian Society and the London Ethical Society, offered additional staples of idealist argument with her courses on "Moral Education" and "Life and Mind."

From 1891 to 1897 Bosanquet lectured regularly at Essex Hall and elsewhere in London, and when the London Ethical Society transformed itself into the London School of Ethics and Social Philosophy in 1897, Bosanquet led the way, serving as President and principal lecturer until its closing in 1900. In the course of the decade he offered a virtual survey of the principal elements of idealist philosophy from ancient to modern times. In suc-

cessive terms, including summers, he taught courses on "The Nature of Knowledge," "Plato," "Plato's Republic," "The Psychology of the Moral Self," "Rousseau's Contrat Social," "The Philosophy of Aesthetics," "Some Conceptions of Aristotle's Ethics," "The Philosophical Theory of the State," "Institutions Considered as Ethical Ideas," and "Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Arts."

Although much of his written work was difficult to follow, Bosanquet carried his audiences along with him in his lectures. He has been described as a "singularly striking figure," above medium height, with clear-cut features, a "certain fine poise" and air of intellectual distinction which compelled the attention of his listeners. "A stranger might have guessed him to be a diplomatist, perhaps, or a judge, certainly no one could have been less of a 'don.'"⁶

Apprehensive, at first, of lecturing on philosophical subjects to a general London audience, he insisted that sponsors obtain a small meeting room for his first course; an overflow crowd forced them to relocate to larger quarters. He did not "scatter" the crowd, as he had feared on that first occasion. For the next ten years he was a leader in the movement to extend higher education to working adults. He found this audience, "with their living to make" and eager "to get something out of you,"

the most appealing of all his experiences as an educator.⁷ He adapted his courses on Plato and Aristotle for students reading the classical texts in translation, but made few compromises in the depth and range of the material discussed. His task, he informed readers of his companion volume to Plato's Republic, was "to bring home to English readers or to novices in Greek the sort of interpretation which a tutor at Oxford or Cambridge would probably lay before his pupils."⁸

In his lectures on Plato's Republic, delivered in 1892-93, he outlined a metaphysic of ethics and society which formed the basis of his later lectures on the philosophical theory of the state. He attempted to identify classical political theory with contemporary circumstances. He introduced Plato's text as a work of moral philosophy, emphasizing the sense of moral purpose shared by citizens of the polis, and by implication, the primacy of a moral criterion in judging of any polity, ancient or modern. He sought to demonstrate to his contemporary audience the truth of the classical view that the good life lay in the development of human personality, or individuality, as a rational, moral and social being.

The ancients understood that men sufficiently qualified to be citizens were political beings. While remaining loyal to the classical idea of the polis and

citizenship, Bosanquet tended to emphasize the social aspects of individuality, rather than the political aspects of citizenship in his lectures on Plato. His identification of society with the state, or polity, emerged more distinctly, five years later in his lectures on the philosophical theory of the state. Bosanquet began with the classical assumption that humans by nature are political and that the development of personality, the right cultivation of the soul, occurred only in a political context. The problem for the modern reader of The Republic, he suggested, was how to determine the moral character appropriate to a particular community and the appropriate social bond conducive to the development of individuality in a modern polity.

Where Plato had suggested in The Republic that the character of the polis was determined by the philosopher-statesman,⁹ Bosanquet suggested that in modern polities, the character of the community was neither determined nor represented by any one individual but permeated by a spirit, which he characterized as an "indwelling unity" greater than any one individual.

We rely much less on the complete intellectual conception and much more on the spirit of a community than Plato did, just because the notion of an indwelling unity, greater than the individual, which he suggested has become so real to us in Christianity. In the largest sense it is religion which is the root of society, not mere science.¹⁰

Although Bosanquet did not frequently raise the image of Christ of Christianity in his work, he was here replacing Plato's ontological principle of the God with that neo-Kantian blend of Christian morality which had characterized his Ethical Society lectures. The spiritual dimension of his commentary on Plato's Republic suggested to one student "a kind of blend of Plato and Jesus Christ."¹¹ This impression was not far from the mark, as Bosanquet in those years held that the ideal of modern life was a "Christian," "humanised Hellenism."¹² In his Sunday evening lectures for the London Ethical Society he had attempted to synthesize the spiritual element of Christianity and Christianity's notion of God as Spirit with the Hellenistic notion of an absolute Good. On those occasions, he had suggested that a "new Reformation" in morality, whose watchwords were (following Hegel) "reason" and "freedom," was under way. The form of the reformation in morality which he had in mind became clearer in the 1890s as he elaborated upon the theme of ethics and politics in his lecture.

Another student of Bosanquet's, sister of the philosopher F. H. Bradley, testified to a joyous discovery made while reading Plato under Bosanquet's tutelage. "It is so splendid the way Plato seems to help one live one's own life well, and be one's own best self."¹³

Bradley might not have approved his sister's mention of a "best" self, because he was attempting to construct a philosophy which denied any duality of self, actual or ideal, material or spiritual. Although Bosanquet often declared that he was following the lines of thought opened up by Bradley in his treatises on logic and ethics, he was far less systematic in his treatment of ethics, often offering an amalgam of Hellenic, Christian, Kantian and Hegelian thought (see previous discussion in Chapter IV). He often spoke of the "selves" of personality, individual and social, actual and real. The theme of individuality and society was a central theme of the extension courses he delivered in the decade of the 1890s.

In his 1895 lectures on Rousseau's Social Contract, Bosanquet invoked the language and metaphorical imagery of Rousseau. Bosanquet's presentation of his theory of individuality and community was implicitly a philosophical critique of the utilitarian theory of society and the state.¹⁴ In place of the utilitarian notion of society as the sum of competing interests, he introduced Rousseau's notion of society as an expression of a common, moral, collective self. And in place of the utilitarian model of the state as night-watchman or traffic policeman, he depicted the state as an organism--

a great cooperative effort of individuals seeking to fulfill a common end.

In The Social Contract, Rousseau had intimated the possibility of reconstituting and everyday, empirical self into a "moi commun"--a morally perfectible, social self. This higher, common self, when active, represented the general or moral will of the community. In depicting the operation of the general will, Rousseau assumed not only that there was a self to be understood, that is, a nature generic to humans, but also that there was a dual self, a "moi commun," which included both "self" and "others."

Bosanquet seized upon Rousseau's metaphor of the self in order to elaborate upon his own theory of individuality and society. His aim, he told students in his extension course on Rousseau, was "to observe the idea of society as individuals plus a supreme power, at the point of its metamorphosis into the idea of a social self or will, and to elucidate the latter."¹⁵ He then elaborated upon the political and ethical implications of Rousseau's doctrine of the self. Bosanquet, following Rousseau, emphasized the potential for developing a moral, collective self. Bosanquet did not introduce the possible manifestation of an other "self"--an amour propre, representative of an amoral self-interest, in the pejorative sense. Rousseau had insisted that the conquest of a

higher, rational self over a lower, passionate self was an act of liberation. This mastery of self, or self-government, was the foundation of morality and liberty. By defining liberty as an act of self-mastery, Rousseau appeared to have resolved the traditional utilitarian problem of politics, the separation of ruler from the ruled and individual from social interest, into an act of sovereignty over oneself. In contrast to the utilitarian's concept of liberty as the absence of constraint or legislation, Rousseau introduced the notion of positive liberty--a positive act of self-determination according to the laws of one's own being, a higher, social self.¹⁶

Rousseau assumed that the general will, the expression of the moral self, was an inalienable, indivisible, and unerring act of sovereignty. But inherent in his notion of liberty was a paradox. Freedom was linked to will as an act of self-coercion, a power to do that which we ought to will. This ethical principle, when applied to politics, gave rise to an ambiguous notion of sovereignty, whereby absolute morality was identified with community.

The paradox of liberty, or the notion that one is free when engaged in an act of self-coercion, was first raised by Rousseau, refined by Kant, extended by Hegel,

reconstructed by T. H. Green in his lectures on political obligation and his work on ethics; and further amended by Bosanquet in his subsequent discussions of Rousseau and his presentation of the philosophical theory of the state. In each case he was concerned to illustrate the psychological correspondence between individual and social mind, and its application to a theory of sovereignty and political obligation.

Bosanquet's analysis of the relationship between individuality and society, and of the psychological and ethical dimensions of individual and social behavior, in his extension lectures of the 1890s, also accounted for the wary reception he accorded to contemporary trends in the "new" social sciences, sociology and psychology. The attempt to discover the laws of social development and to create a science of society by applying the methods of natural science to society gained currency in the second half of the nineteenth century with the dissemination of the ideas of the French social philosopher, Auguste Comte, inventor of the word "sociology," and with the work of Herbert Spencer. Comte had envisioned a perfected social science as the basis for the scientific reorganization of society. Spencer had elaborated a theory of social evolution and progress based upon the assumption that the laws governing the development of non-human species were

identical and continuous with those governing the human species. The work of the sociologist, he suggested, was to pursue the parallels raised by the organic analogy and in that way to discover the mutual dependence and function of the individual in social life. By the close of the century, the term and idea of sociology suggested to contemporaries a positivistic science, a method of social analysis and research and a potential instrument by which to cure or ameliorate contemporary social problems.

Bosanquet was reluctant to accept the claims being made for sociology. Representing Comte and Spencer as the primary formulators of sociological theory, he objected to the reductivist attempt to apply the methodology of the natural sciences to an analysis of human activity.

Sociology, as contrasted with those branches of Philosophy proper which deal in any way with the facts of society, pretends to the width and impartiality of a natural science. . . . It has no primary reason for taking a greater interest in the Greek city or the nation of modern Europe than in the varied and unfamiliar phases of savage or barbarian life. It does not confine its investigations to the State or the civic society, but wherever two or three are gathered together there is a problem such as may be proposed to sociological analysis. The employment of comparison between human society and relations found to exist in groups of the lower animals is, as we might expect, vigorously defended by Comte, and in the hands of Mr. Herbert Spencer has formed the bulk of sociological inquiry. . . . On can hardly get over Mr. Herbert Spencer's characterization of a human society as a local variety of the species, a

description which appears to disregard all the elements by which it is made social and human.¹⁷

Characterizing much of contemporary sociology, as well as psychology which he found in an analogous position, as positivistic, he challenged the large claims being made for the "new" social sciences as instruments of social analysis. Citing the recent attempt of French social psychologists, Marcel Bernes and Gabriel Tarde to explain crowd behavior in terms of imitation theory, he reminded his audience of the function of mind and rationality as the distinguishing characteristic of particular social groups. "The psychology of a crowd is not even the psychology of a committee, much less of a representative assembly or of a great State."¹⁸ By contrast, he suggested the approach of the classical philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, in their depiction of society and polity as a world of conscious deliberation and shared function and moral value.

In 1896-97, Bosanquet returned to a discussion of the relationship between "Sociology and Social Philosophy," in a series of three short courses of eight lectures each, delivered at Manchester College, Oxford. In preparation for the lectures he reported reading Kant, Fichte, and "the post-Rousseau 18th century people, to get the line of transition to 19th century ideas."¹⁹ In

addition, he appears to have read the latest work by continental writers on social philosophy, psychology and sociology. The fruits of his labor were evident the following term, when he returned to the London School of Ethics and Social Philosophy to offer a course of ten lectures on "The Philosophical Theory of the State." It was in these lectures that he synthesized the major themes in social and political philosophy which he had introduced in university extension courses throughout the decade. And it was these lectures, recast slightly, which formed the basis of his book, The Philosophical Theory of the State, which has provoked successive generations of critics from Bosanquet's day to our own.

The founding of the London School of Ethics and Social Philosophy was a visible sign of the growing dislike of Ethical Society leaders, including Bosanquet, Muirhead and James Bonar, to identify themselves with a movement drifting in the direction of positivism, relativist ethics and collectivist politics (see previous discussion in Chapter IV). The transformation of the London Ethical Society into a school of ethics and social philosophy also allowed a freer hand in the organization of courses than had been possible under the university extension scheme. The experience of ten years had proved

that there was a considerable demand in London for philosophical lectures. Early in 1897, Muirhead and Bosanquet consulted Henry Sidgwick and Edward Caird on the subject of establishing a school of philosophy in London. Although encouraging, they expressed doubts about studying philosophy without knowledge of Greek classical texts. William Wallace, Green's successor as Whyte's Professor of Moral Philosophy at Oxford, thought, however, that teaching should begin with classics in translation, which had already been carried on successfully at Essex Hall. Bosanquet and Muirhead pointed to the maturity of the students for whom the school was to be run:

Teachers and educationalists who are interested in seeing the bearing of recent psychological and ethical thought on their subjects; lecturers and journalists who want a closer study of human society, and students working for London University degrees who cannot have the advantage of the philosophical training of a London college.²⁰

Bosanquet and Muirhead tried to persuade others that a school of ethics and social philosophy was a viable and necessary venture. Muirhead recalled,

When it was proposed to found a School of Ethics and Social Philosophy in London, the most common objection that the promoters had to meet was this--that a School of Philosophy had no definite relation to life. Ethical Societies, it was said, meet a practical demand. The School of Economics, the analogy of which suggested a School of Ethical Philosophy, also appealed to certain definite classes--to bank clerks, Government officials, and to the great business world generally; above all, it appealed to social and political reformers. But it did not seem so obvious that the subjects we proposed to deal with here had any similar clientele to draw upon.²¹

The specific aim of the founders of the school was "to apply philosophic methods of analysis to the social and political problems of the day, so far as these come within the scope of philosophical criticism."²² The predominant philosophy at the London School of Ethics was idealist. While the direction and scope of the curriculum tended toward those subjects which idealist philosophers found particularly relevant to contemporary issues, the school included among its roster of associates representatives of other schools of philosophical opinion. The utilitarian philosophers, Henry Sidgwick and Leslie Stephen, joined the idealist Master of Balliol, Edward Caird and the barrister Sir Frederick Pollock in serving as vice-presidents of the school.

During the three years that the school was in operation, courses were offered in logic, ethics, psychology, aesthetics, Greek literature and social and political philosophy by specialists in the field. Among those finding a place at the School of Ethics was the prominent Oxford philosopher of mind, G. F. Stout, whose book on psychology was frequently cited by Bosanquet, as well as the less well-known Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, G. E. Moore, who was later responsible for a serious critique of idealist ethical theory. Helen (Dendy) Bosanquet introduced subjects of contemporary concern from

an idealist perspective, offering courses on "The Psychology of Social Progress" and "Self and Others," in successive years. (See Appendix B for a roster of lecturers and courses offered by the school.)

Plans for the creation of the London School of Ethics and Social Philosophy had been made with the knowledge of plans to create a teaching university in London. Until then, the University of London, comprised of University and King's Colleges, operated primarily as an external examination board, awarding degrees without classroom instruction. The history of the current phase of negotiations dated back to a Royal Commission report of 1889 which recommended that there be only one teaching university in London, a finding repeated by a second Royal Commission, the Gresham Commission, in 1894. The tactical problem was to devise a constitution which would permit existing external examination functions of the university to continue but which would also empower teachers in London institutions to draw up syllabi and conduct examinations for their students. The Gresham Commissioners recommended a bill in 1895 which was defeated and withdrawn from Parliament three times before being made law, with revisions, as the University of London Commission Act of 1898.

When plans for the School of Ethics were raised

in 1897, the bill seemed close to success, especially with the efforts of the philosopher-statesman, Richard Burden Haldane. Haldane, trained in philosophy by Lotze at Göttingen University, and a key figure in the liberal-imperialist coalition of Asquith and Edward Grey, was emphatic about the necessity of a teaching university in the metropolis of the Empire. "Educate your people," he said, and "you have reduced to comparatively insignificant dimensions the problems of temperance, of housing, and of raising the condition of your masses."²³

Haldane was also working in partnership with Sidney Webb and his plans for a school of economics and political science in London. Haldane had advised Webb on the legality of using funds bequeathed by a Derby solicitor, Henry Hutchinson, for "propaganda and other purposes" of the Fabian Society. Webb wanted to use the funds to create a center of social science research and teaching, but feared antagonizing those Fabian Society members who assumed that the legacy would be applied to more immediate Fabian Society projects. Webb was promoting two projects at once: the creation of a research center for the social sciences, characterized by non-partisan techniques of social investigation, as well as a teaching institution of practical value for commercial students. He managed to secure additional funding for the school from the

London County Council, where he served as President of the Technical Education Board, by his insistence that the school would not be involved with political or propagandist issues.

Webb's academic approach provoked another Fabian Society leader, George Bernard Shaw, to seek an alliance with Beatrice Webb, warning her that Sidney's pursuit of "pure" or "abstract" research at the School of Economics would leave the school in the same ideological posture as Bosanquet and his wife.²⁴ Shaw envisioned the School of Economics as an instrument of collectivist politics and Fabian propaganda. His strategy was not only to politicize the institution but to have it publicly perceived as a collectivist stronghold as well. Envisioning Bosanquet and company as the "enemy," he launched a campaign to have the first Director of the London School of Economics, W. A. S. Hewins, an Oxford don, fly the collectivist flag.

First, Hewins must be told flatly that he must, in talking to the Guild of St. Matthew and the other Oxford Socialists, speak as a Collectivist, and make it clear the School of Economics will have a Collectivist bias. Any pretence about having no bias at all, about 'pure' or 'abstract research,' or the like evasions and unrealities must be kept for the enemy. . . . All that is necessary is to avoid shocking the common sense of the public and the ILP or Fabian critic by talking about academic abstractions and impartiality.²⁵

The potential for a clash of the two institutions seems to have occurred to at least several of the principal leaders. While plans for the founding of the school of ethics were under way, Hewins, the Director of the London School of Economics, wrote to James Bonar of the Ethical Society assuring him that plans for a school of philosophy would not in any way compete with the school of economics. Although both sides may have denied any conflict of interest, or at least that which concerned clientele, the two institutions did represent diverse ideological and methodological approaches to social questions.

The London School of Ethics and Social Philosophy provided an institutional setting, and central meeting place for those who shared an idealist perspective on social and political issues. The school served not only as counterpoint to the collectivist orientation of the London School of Economics, but also as the major center of academic criticism of the "new" social sciences, sociology and psychology, at precisely the moment in which debate regarding the efficacy of sociology's contribution to an analysis of polity and society was most heated. In the "classical" period of the development of British sociological thought, Idealist social theory provided the counterpoint to the prevailing positivistic methods of

social analysis.

In May 1899, the School of Ethics applied to the University of London Commissioners for recognition of its faculty as teachers in the newly reconstituted university. The application was refused on grounds of financial instability. Unlike the London School of Economics, the London School of Ethics and Social Philosophy had no endowments and relied upon voluntary private subscriptions and a sliding scale of fees from students to underwrite its costs. Entry into the university appeared to have been based largely upon the promise of secure funding and the sympathy of influential persons. Bosanquet was rather sanguine about the commercialization of higher education.

It won't be done, because we haven't enough money to assure continuance etc; but I shall get in a memo embodying our experience of London Philosophical teaching, which may be a help to the Commissioners. It is awfully funny and English. They will recognise any decent "school" which can support itself but they have no money to give anyone; so if one can't find one's millionaire--a beastly business too--one simply drops through. There is beer money, but that must go for "technical" education.²⁶

Muirhead and Caird suggested that they gather funds to endow a chair of philosophy in the new university, but Bosanquet demurred on the grounds that it would not meet the situation adequately. He thought that the proposed plan for collecting £5,000 would provide for an

annual lecturer, but not for the endowment of a chair which would be a working part of London University. Not particularly keen on devoting years to fund-raising in order to assure that funds adequate to assuring philosophy an essential role in the new university, Bosanquet suggested they abandon their plans for going into the university.²⁷

The School of Economics and Political Science fared better at the hands of the University of London Commissioners, gaining entry as the Faculty of Economics in the university. Beatrice Webb referred to their success as "a chapter of fortunate accidents."²⁸ R. B. Haldane, somewhat more forthright, spoke of the "personal factor in politics,"²⁹ which enabled the tenacious supporters of the London School of Economics to secure not only adequate funding, but the aid and sympathy of the Chairman of the University of London Commission, Mandell Creighton, Bishop of London, later a director of the LSE.

With the passing of the School of Ethics and Social Philosophy, the institutional setting for the British dialogue concerning sociology and philosophy, society and social policy disappeared.³⁰ Bosanquet's contribution to the dialogue between philosophers and sociologists emerged in the course of his lectures at the School of Ethics and Social Philosophy. His reflections

on polity and society formed the basis of his most controversial work in political and social philosophy, The Philosophical Theory of the State.

1. Other publications based on his university extension lectures in this period include: A Companion to Plato's Republic (1895), Essentials of Logic (1895), The Psychology of the Moral Self (1897), and The Education of the Young in Plato's Republic (1900).

2. See the previous discussion of the London Ethical Society in Chapter IV.

3. Those groups which had requested university lecturers included the North of England Council for Promoting the Higher Education of Women, the Crewes Mechanics Institute, the Rochdale Equitable Pioneers Society and the Mayor and inhabitants of Leeds.

4. Rev. Canon Browne, "The future of university extension in London," in Aspects of Modern Study, ed. Robert Davies Roberts (London: Macmillan & Co., 1894), p. 21.

5. Quoted in Muirhead, Reflections of a Journeyman, p. 164.

6. R. F. A. Hoernlé, "In Memoriam: Bernard Bosanquet," Journal of Philosophy, 20 (September 1923): 507.

7. Bernard Bosanquet to Robert Carr Bosanquet, 26 March 1906, University of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne, Bosanquet papers, Trunk I. "E."

8. Bernard Bosanquet, A Companion to Plato's Republic for English Readers. Being a Commentary adapted to Davies and Vaughan's Translation (New York: Macmillan & Co., 1895), pp. vii-viii.

9. Bosanquet substituted the term "statesman" for the traditional rendering of the term "philosopher-king" most likely in order to emphasize the relevance of Plato to contemporary politics.

10. Bosanquet, Companion, p. 203.

11. Mary Gilliland Husband to Robert Carr Bosanquet, 24 August 1925, University of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne, Bosanquet papers, Trunk I.A.6.

12. Bernard Bosanquet, "Some Socialistic Features of Ancient Societies," in Essays and Addresses, p. 48. See the previous discussion in Chapter IV.

13. Mrs. Marian de Glehn to Helen Bosanquet, University of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne, Bosanquet papers, Trunk II,E.

14. For a cogent analysis of the sociological aspects of Bosanquet's critique of utilitarian theory see Stefan Collini, "Sociology and Idealism in Britain 1880-1920," Archives européennes de sociologie 19 (1978) and Liberalism and Sociology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

15. Bernard Bosanquet, "Syllabus of Lectures. University Extension. Five lectures on the General Will with Rousseau's 'Contrat Social' and Green's 'Principles of Political Obligation.'" (1895). University of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne, Bosanquet papers, Trunk I.K.6.

16. For a cogent interpretation of the traditions of political thought and the idea of positive and negative liberty see Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty," in Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (London: Oxford University Press, 1969).

17. Bernard Bosanquet, "The Relation of Sociology to Philosophy," in Bosanquet, Science and Philosophy, pp. 238-39.

18. Ibid., p. 243.

19. Bernard Bosanquet to Frank Peters, 1 January 1897, in Muirhead, ed., Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends, p. 86.

20. Bernard Bosanquet and Mary G. Husband, "Memorandum on the Work of the London School of Ethics and Social Philosophy," June 1899, University of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne Library, Bosanquet papers, Trunk I.N.

21. J. H. Muirhead, Philosophy and Life (London: (London: S. Sonnenschein, 1902), p. 1.

22. London School of Ethics and Social Philosophy, "First Annual Report 1897 to 1898," Pamphlet, University of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne Library, Trunk I.K.6.

23. R. B. Haldane, quoted in Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison, "Richard Burdon Haldane (Viscount Haldane of Cloan) 1856-1928, : British Academy, Proceedings, 14 (reprint, London: H. Milford, n.d.), p. 13.

24. Sir Sydney Caine, The History of the Foundation of the London School of Economics and Political Science (London: London School of Economics and G. Bell & Sons, 1963), p. 47.

25. George Bernard Shaw, quoted in Caine, The History of the Foundation, pp. 46-47.

26. Bernard Bosanquet to Frank Peters, 11 June 1899, in Muirhead, ed., Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends, pp. 92-93.

27. Bernard Bosanquet to Mary Gilliland Husband, 26 May 1900, University of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne Library, Bosanquet papers, Trunk I.A.6.

28. Beatrice Webb, Our Partnership, ed. Barbara Drake and Margaret Cole (London: London School of Economics and Political Science and Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 195-96.

29. R. B. Haldane, quoted in Webb, Our Partnership, p. 212.

30. While the institutional setting for a philosophically idealist approach to social issues passed from the London scene, a number of participants including Bosanquet, James Bonar, and Muirhead were associated with the School of Sociology and Social Economics which was founded by the COS in 1902 and continued as the training center for those engaged in social work and Poor Law administration until its absorption into the London School of Economics in 1912. See also Chapter VIII.

The Passmore Edwards Settlement, in Tavistock Place, served as home to the School of Ethics and Social Philosophy. The Passmore Edwards Settlement was intended to serve as permanent home to the University Settlement which had been created under the inspiration of Mrs. Humphrey Ward. See the letter from Mrs. Humphrey Ward to Bosanquet, 13 March 1895, University of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne Library, Bosanquet papers, Trunk I, in which she describes her conception of a university settlement.

The University Hall settlement in Gordon Square (as it was later known) served as a residence hall for students in philosophy in University College, London.

Philosophy finally found a home when the latter became the British (now Royal) Institute of Philosophy, in Gordon Square. Bosanquet left a legacy of his books to the British Institute of Philosophy; a gracious memorial to the early connection between the university settlement movement, its evangelical residents and social reformers, and the institutionalization of philosophy in London.

CHAPTER VII

THE PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY OF THE
STATE AND ITS RECEPTION

Bosanquet's lectures on the state were delivered in the autumn semester 1897, as a course of ten lectures in the London School of Ethics and Social Philosophy, at the Passmore Edwards Settlement. They contained various themes which Bosanquet had already presented to students in his courses on Rousseau's Social Contract, and T. H. Green's theory of political obligation, as well as on the classical texts of Aristotle and Plato in the School of Ethics and Social Philosophy. His lectures were an extension of his remarks to students in the three short courses of eight lectures which he had delivered at Manchester College, Oxford in 1896-97. His lectures were delivered in a climate of political uncertainty. Although Britain was then at the height of empire, the political culture at the close of the century, as expressed in newspapers, lecture-hall, drawing-room and Parliament testified to an increased insecurity and defensiveness of mind with regard to Britain's dominance in international affairs. Since the 1870s, the advance of industry in Western Europe, accompanied by the democratization of political

life and the disruptive effects of an increasingly militant nationalism, threw into doubt the ability of exponents of a liberal polity to respond to ideological forces unleashed by the changing economic and social circumstances of the European polities.

In addition, within Britain, the sense of social crisis so widely commented upon in the 1880s was responsible for the revival of debate regarding the causes of and remedies for poverty and the nature and conditions of progress. Thus, at the height of rhetoric about Britain's "imperial mission," questions regarding the state of the nation, its health, productivity, even its spirit, were the subject of intense scrutiny, heightened all the more after 1899 with the revelation of military incompetence in the Boer War, an incompetence partly attributed to the deterioration of health among the laboring classes.¹

Bosanquet entered the debate about the national condition as a proponent of the idealist view of the relation of the individual to the state. He also intended a defense of idealism against the relativism he associated with contemporary sociology and the irrationalist implications of contemporary psychology. His lectures on the state, published under the title The Philosophical Theory of the State, began with prefatory remarks announcing his goal of expressing "some fundamental ideas of a true

social philosophy."² The first two chapters were intended to make clear the distinction between the classical philosophical view of polity and society and the reductivist and relativist tendencies of modern social science. Bosanquet was almost obliged to begin his discussion with Plato and Aristotle since he accepted their identification of the social with the political. This also explains the fact that he variously described his lectures on the state as a contribution to social philosophy as well as political philosophy. In his 1896 lectures at Oxford he referred to his subject as social philosophy,³ and then subsequently described the lectures on the state which he delivered at the London School of Ethics and Social Philosophy the following term, and upon which the book was based, as political philosophy.⁴ The latter was a "recast" version of the former. In the preface of his book he returned to the description, "true social philosophy." The identification of the social with the political was one of the strengths and weaknesses of idealist philosophical argument. It allowed a comprehensive analysis of the social and political while on other occasions it ambiguously subsumed the terms of political analysis into a species of the social and vice versa. From the very start of the book Bosanquet invoked an idiom of idealist political argument in which polity and society

appeared as an indivisible, organic whole.

After introducing the Greek identification of the social with the political, he repeated the theme of his previous extension courses on Plato, the primacy of a moral criterion, the common good, as the end of political life. But whereas in his previous lectures the emphasis was upon the ethical dimension of polity, in The Philosophical Theory of the State, he emphasized the psychological dimension of mind and the formation of mind in a social context.

The fundamental idea of Greek political philosophy, as we find it in Plato and Aristotle, is that the human mind can only attain its full and proper life in a community of minds, or more strictly in a community pervaded by a single mind uttering itself consistently though differently in the life and action of every member of the community.⁵

Having established mind as the essence of political community he then began to introduce his solution to the central problem of modern polities: why and to what extent ought individuals to obey other individuals or associations of individuals, their rules, or their laws?

Bosanquet's mentor, T. H. Green, had posed a similar question to an earlier generation in his lectures on the principles of political obligation. Green had suggested that the system of political rights and obligations rested upon a moral criterion, the "fulfilment of man's vocation as a moral being."⁶ This theory of the state

was a logical construct based upon the assumption that a life according to reason and morality was the best life for humans.

While Bosanquet subscribed to Green's analysis of the principles of political obligation, he redefined the rational and ethical foundations of the modern nation-state. Faced with a later generation's waning faith in the moral and rational dimensions of polity and society, Bosanquet reminded his audiences of the classical idea that society was a political structure founded upon shared values and perceptions. He stressed the extent to which the individual was constituted by social relations, existed and was realized in a web of social circumstances. He extended Green's discussion of individuality in order to make clear the interdependence of the individual upon social experience and relations identified with the state. Bosanquet's theory of the state was also a theory of the self. He attempted to answer the contemporary social question regarding the nature and extent of responsibility on the part of the state to the citizen and vice versa.

The answers, for Bosanquet, lay in the correct understanding of the concept of self-government. "Self-government," was, for both ancient and modern thinkers, "the true ground and nature of political obligation."⁷ He insisted that the idealist use of the phrase "self

government" contained a richer texture for both "self" and "government" than did utilitarian theories. In order to distinguish his concept of individuality from the prevailing utilitarian concept he embarked upon a lengthy analysis of individuality.

He repeated Green's "two self" notion of individuality in which individuals were viewed as possessing both a common, everyday self and a higher, rational and potential self. The latter was the "real" self, that is, all that one might be if allowed to develop in a rational and moral universe. Green had been rather sanguine, however, about the ability of the state to alleviate the plight of London's poorest resident. Bosanquet, in the closing chapters of the book was far more optimistic in his insistence that the complex of institutions associated with the state was the guarantor of individuality and liberty. His notion of the self was an amalgam of the Aristotelian principle of nature as potentia, Rousseau's notion of perfectibilité and the Kantian principle of a noumenal, moral self. Each of these elements was evident in his discussion of the concept of will.

The idea of self-government as self-mastery was dependent upon the concept of will. Bosanquet referred to Rousseau's argument in The Social Contract whereby the individual was viewed as having been transformed into a

social personality, with a common self (moi commun) and a common will aimed at a common end, the good of the community. Although critical of the fictitious notion of an original contract, he accepted the notion of tacit consent as the basis of community, because it legitimized the argument for the sovereignty of a common, general will. Like Rousseau, he transformed the notion of the individual in such a way as to eliminate any possible conflict between individual and social interests. Each individual was presumed to have tacitly consented to abide by the dictates of the general will of the community.⁸ The expression of self in community, a social persona, was the expression of "self and other." This social persona was the author of the general will, the indestructible and unerring source of legitimate authority. To Bosanquet, the unity of "self and other," in individual or community, was an ideal of perfection. It was the principle of politics and morality, freedom and legislation. Where a churchman might have spoken of God, Bosanquet spoke of the Good.

This indestructible impulse towards the Good, which is necessarily a common good, the substantial unity and filling of life by the interests through which man is human, is what Rousseau plainly has before him in his account of the General Will.⁹

The idea of a general will aimed at a common good was the rationale and source of political right and obli-

gation. Bosanquet, following Green, agreed that a right was a power which ought to be secured to the people, i.e., that the political rested upon a moral criterion. Bosanquet did not rest his argument with the identification of the ethical and the political; he also argued for the identification of mind qua rational will with the polity.

Arguing against the current of contemporary social psychologists like Gabriel Tarde or Gustave LeBon, who argued for an imitative theory of crowd behavior, he suggested that "Wherever two or three are gathered there is the operation of the general will."¹⁰ The psychology of a mob was not the psychology of groups of even two or three persons who shared in a common history, tradition or purpose. What was necessary was not similarity but commonality of purpose.¹¹

His point was to emphasize the plurality of "capacities" at work in a shared moral community. His was essentially an organicist view of social organization. Every social group was the "external aspect" of corresponding individual minds. Different social groups within society were like "a nest of boxes," with the state the "widest grouping whose members are effectively united by a common experience."¹² The state was the highest in a complex of institutions responsible for the development of the individual from cradle to grave. These institu-

tions, which included the home, family, trade union and neighborhood, were the matrices of individuality. Each institution served in a functional relationship to the state. The home, for example, was a "nursery" of citizenship.¹³

Bosanquet identified the end of the state with moral purpose, the realization of the best life for the individual. But he insisted that this positive end could not be achieved by a coercive mean.

The end of the State is moral purpose, imperative on its members. But its distinctive action is restricted to removing hindrances to the end, that is, to lending its force to overcome--both in mind and in externals essential to mind--obstacles which otherwise would obstruct the realisation of the end.¹⁴

In his earlier lectures before the London Ethical Society (see Chapter IV) he had invoked a Kantian moral imperative in support of his argument against that group's efforts to promote morality directly. In The Philosophical Theory, he insisted that although the end was moral, the state was limited in its capacity to promote directly the "best" life of its citizens.¹⁵ The criterion of state action which he recommended was Hegelian in language but Kantian in sentiment.

Forty years earlier John Stuart Mill had offered in his Essay on Liberty a single principle which legitimized state interference with the liberty of individuals.

Mill's critics pointed to the practical difficulties of distinguishing between "self-regarding" and "other regarding" actions. Bosanquet's principle of "hindering a hindrance" was equally difficult to apply. There was simply no fixed standard by which to determine what constituted a "hindrance" or "impediment" sufficient to impede the desired end, "capacities to be set free."¹⁶ Bosanquet offered as examples, illiteracy and intemperance as contemporary problems warranting state intervention, while he denied that problems of insufficient housing, sanitation, and poverty warranted similar action.¹⁷ If his criterion of state action was so arbitrary and amorphous as to be inapplicable, why should he have maintained it so vigorously?

One answer is that he was less concerned with providing a principle of legislation than a principle of political morality. Implicit in his principle of state action was the ideal of positive liberty--the mastery of a higher, "real" and best self over a lower, empirical self. Bosanquet's aim was less that of limiting the state in its daily operation than in emphasizing the positive aspect of the state as the matrix of its citizens' best selves. While the function of the state was to maintain the "external conditions" of the good life, its essence was the foundation of individual liberty.

What was problematic, as later critics vigorously noted, was his ambiguous use of the term "state."¹⁸

Bosanquet slipped back and forth between two modes of analysis, sometimes suggesting the state in its everyday, empirical operation and at other times suggesting an idealized "other," a theoretical construct and an ideal polity for modernity. He variously invoked two idioms of political discourse, one suggestive of a traditional view of economy and polity, and the other a more speculative and metaphorical notion of the state. The former was a rather traditional British liberal view of the state. The state acted in a negative capacity, as "compulsory power,"¹⁹ and "ultimate arbiter and regulator"²⁰ of claims between individual citizens. In this traditional view, the emphasis was upon the rights and liberties of the individual and the restrictions and limits of government.

The alternative presentation of the state was more speculative. Bosanquet invoked another idiom of political discourse when he referred to the state as "operative criticism."²¹ According to the more speculative view, the state was the expression of the general or social will. It was with this more speculative or idealist view in mind that he invoked Green's credo, "Will, not force is the basis of the state."²²

While will was the defining characteristic of the state, force was an essential resource. Bosanquet insisted, however, that the state, in its use of force, could not be judged by the same moral code as that which applied to individuals.

The State, then, exists to promote good life, and what it does cannot be morally indifferent; but its actions cannot be identified with the deeds of its agents, or morally judged as private volitions are judged. Its acts proper are always public acts, and it cannot, as a State, act within the relations of private life in which organised morality exists.²³

Bosanquet distinguished between private actions and public will and then insisted that the state was not accountable for the misdeeds of its agents in either private or public actions, because as "the organ of the public good," the state had "simply been defrauded by those who spoke in its name."²⁴ Nor was the code of private morality applicable to states at war. "Moral relations presuppose an organised life; but such a life is only within the State, not in relations between the State and other communities."²⁵ Because he assumed that sovereignty derived from the will and mind of a specific national community, he identified moral sovereignty with the nation-state and not with humanity or the world at large.

The morality of the state in its international relations was the least developed argument in The Philosophical Theory, appearing almost as an afterthought in

the final pages of the book. Although critics who reviewed the book upon its publication in 1899 were not vociferous in their objections to this aspect of the theory, it became the central point of criticism in the years preceding the First World War. From 1914 on, Bosanquet was read as an apologia for the all-powerful state and as an attack upon the notion of individual right and liberty.²⁶ And it was that reading which was repeated and continues to be repeated in the textbooks of the history of political thought. The changed context of social and political discourse was evident in the varying reception of the book by successive generations of critics.

When the book first appeared in 1899 it met with relatively mild criticism in Britain and America. In the majority of cases, reference was made to the Hegelian elements of his thought, either in the identification of the actual with the ideal state,²⁷ or with the identification of will and morality with the state.²⁸ Reference to either the Hegelian or idealist element of the book did not appear to signify negative criticism per se. With rare exceptions, it was intended to signal to the audience a departure from the more traditional utilitarian view of polity and society.

Two British weeklies, The Spectator and The Satur-

day Review, appreciated the application of ethical criterion to the conduct of politics, but dissented from the particular applications which Bosanquet offered. The anonymous reviewer in The Spectator dissented from the "sacrosanct" character attributed to the state.²⁹ Less optimistic than Bosanquet with regard to the ethical and rational qualities attributed to the state, The Spectator called for a lengthier analysis of the ethics of revolution. The critic in The Saturday Review anticipated the central concern of a later generation by noting that the state might do wrong, particularly to other states, as in the case of the partition of Poland.³⁰ The reviewer was evidently uncomfortable with Bosanquet's concluding discussion in the book where he had attempted to differentiate between the moral sanctions applicable to individuals and the state. "There are dangers in this idealising of the actual and our philosopher perhaps goes a little too far in his discussion of the question whether the State can do no wrong."³¹

The reception among American reviewers indicated a reluctance to accept any blurring of the traditional political concepts and categories of individual, state and government. The reviewer in The Nation (N.Y.) criticized the elevation of the state to a suprahuman category, and implicitly, the identification of the leaders of government with suprahuman qualities.³² William Dunning, the editor of the academic Political Science Quarterly, referred to the various and "contradictory"

uses of the term "state."³³ Further from the terms of social and political discourse in Britain and the continent at the close of the century, the American reviewers were respectful of Bosanquet and his reputation as a philosopher, but wary of his idealist analysis of state.

The early reviews were not all critical or reluctant to praise. Some appeared to recommend the book because it appeared to legitimize state intervention in social issues. In "Sociology, Politics, and Jurisprudence," the anonymous review which appeared in the traditionally liberal Westminster Review, the criterion of "hindering hindrances" was cited as an argument for greater state action.³⁴ The International Journal of Ethics, a friendly quarter for idealist philosophers, appreciated Bosanquet's defense of the state as a realization of freedom. The reviewer, James Gibson, applauded the apparent argument for greater state intervention, but thought the criterion of state action was too cautious and needed to be made specific. "Capacities to be realized" were not readily "manifest," requiring a further specification of state responsibility.³⁵

What was most interesting about the initial reception of the book was that in spite of its appearance at the height of empire and in the midst of the Boer War, so few critics reacted either to the paucity of analysis

regarding the morality of the nation-state in relation to other states, or in terms of imperial relations between home and colonies. The book was faulted by its early critics for presenting too "optimistic" a view of the state but was accepted largely on its own terms. Evidently it received a rather commonplace reception precisely because the terms of idealist social and political argument were so familiar to the audience.

The book did receive more severe and lengthy criticism from successive generations, however, and Bosanquet revised, elaborated and defended his argument in subsequent introductions which appeared in the second and third editions of 1910 and 1920. It was the latter or third generation of critics who underscored the ambiguities of idealist political thought and held the "metaphysical" theory of the state and its "prusso-phil philosopher" responsible for the sentiments that exploded in war in 1914.³⁶

Bosanquet's extensive introductory remarks to the second edition were occasioned neither by war or a critique of metaphysics. A second generation of critics dissented from the social implications of the Philosophical Theory with regard to issues of social policy and social reform. The major point of criticism was Bosanquet's conceptual identification of society, or community, with the state.

Among the most thoughtful and serious of his critics was Robert M. MacIver, the distinguished sociologist and political scientist, then at the start of a career as a lecturer in philosophy in the Scottish university system to which he had returned after taking degrees at Edinburgh and Oxford Universities. Raised on Bosanquet's book at Oxford, MacIver began his prolific publishing career with a series of articles critical of the idealist philosophy of polity and society. His article, "Society and the State" (1911), offered a particularly thorough critique of Bosanquet's theory of the state as an ethical polity. MacIver's article inadvertently precipitated his departure from the Scottish university system and his eventual resettlement in Canada. His superior in the University of Aberdeen, Professor Baillie translator of Hegel's Phenomenology of Mind, took personal offense at the criticism which MacIver had levelled at Bosanquet's theory. Rather typically, Bosanquet was not offended; he and MacIver conducted a congenial correspondence of over fifteen months duration on points of similarity and differences between the two.³⁷

MacIver objected to the identification by the idealists of political principles with moral principles. He argued that Rousseau's identification of sovereignty with the general will was an abstraction and the least

supportable justification for democracy or another principle of politics. Nor would he accept either Rousseau's or Bosanquet's definition of freedom as the corollary of the operation of the general will because he thought it neglected to account for the rights and liberty of the minority who might disagree. "To identify freedom with enforced subjection to reason or good and to call such subjection self-government is indeed a 'paradox.'"³⁸

MacIver's principle criticism was of the idealist identification of society with the state. He insisted that society was "indeterminate" and infinite in nature, different in scope and character from the state. The state was a finite, "closed organization" while the boundaries and sphere of relations in community were indeterminate.³⁹ Society, or social life, was greater than, rather than equal with or identical to, polity or political arrangements associated with the state. Social activity, or society, was generic to humans while politics and polities were artifices or constructs. This basic disagreement over the very nature of society and polity and their origin was also at the root of MacIver's charge that Bosanquet and other modern political theorists misunderstood the nature of Hellenistic social and political arrangements and transferred those misconceptions to their concepts of modern polities.⁴⁰ MacIver found

Bosanquet's self described ideal, "Christian Hellenism," a flawed attempt to secularize a Christian ethos by amalgamating it with an incorrect interpretation of classical Hellenism.

MacIver was the proponent of a pluralist sociology. He insisted that the idealist identification of the individual as a citizen was less than the whole of one's individual identity.

The state stands for an area of common good, not for the whole of common good. The life of the individual citizen cannot therefore be lived wholly in the light of the ideal for which the state stands. In modern conditions the ordinary citizen simply cannot live all the time for the state, though he can still die for it on occasion. . . . Social life can no longer in practice and should no longer in theory be centralized into state life. The individual should not be summed up in his citizenship, otherwise the claim of citizenship will itself become a tyranny and its essential moral value be lost.⁴¹

Implicit in MacIver's insistence upon the separation of the social from the political was a very contemporary concern for differentiating the political machinations of the nation-states of Europe from the potentially harmonious social relations of their citizenry. This concern was evident in MacIver's subsequent choice of subject, "War and Civilization," which he sent to Bosanquet and which was the subject of at least half of the correspondence between the two for a period of over fifteen months in the years 1911 and 1912. The question of war, peace and the morality of the modern nation-state had been the

least analyzed in Bosanquet's book. In his correspondence with MacIver, he revealed a realistic view of the state of international relations. Postulating a hypothetical conflict between Germany and Britain, Bosanquet was skeptical of the possibility of finding a third-party nation to arbitrate the dispute.

You may reconcile a difference like that by reason and discussion; but you can't arbitrate on it; it is too deep in men's hearts. You can't arbitrate on your religion and these convictions are men's religions.⁴²

While Bosanquet appeared to consider only the possibility of nations in conflict and nations as mediators, MacIver attempted to separate the conflict of nations from the potentially conciliatory and mediating role of individual citizens. Employing an essentially individualistic perspective, MacIver argued the case for jurists assembled in an international court of arbitration as well as for the potentially conciliatory effect of increased horizontal bonds of community and communication between classes and commercial interests of various nations. Basing his argument on the distinction between society and the state, MacIver differentiated between the growing political alienation of the European nation-states and the growing "intercommunity of peoples."⁴³

Unlike MacIver, Bosanquet was skeptical of the efficacy of either individual or institutional interven-

tion in international disputes. He thought that a league of nations or an international federation would provide the occasion of cabal, antagonism and intrigue rather than harmony and cooperation.

Leagues, alliances. united states, which have not the spirit of true communities, carry the germs of disruption within them, and the probability as Hegel explained, of antagonism without. External antagonism, and not a deep-seated general will, is, as a rule, their binding force.⁴⁴

Because he believed that the mind and will of community were coterminous with the geographic boundaries of the nation-state, he insisted that there could be no "common will" of humanity or of an international community, because there was "no organism of humanity."⁴⁵ Disbelieving in the idea of "humanity," he could not accept the principle of a will common to that humanity, and predicted that the decisions of an international league would merely be an agreement of "separate wills" which could not forestall intrigue or conflict.

Hinting at an implicit difference between a public doctrine optimistic in its assumption of the ethical conduct of the state and his private reservation regarding the possibility of forestalling war, he advised MacIver to face the "facts" of the European situation.

As to what you say about peace, of course I wish it might be so, and would do anything to promote it; and would not in public insist very much on the difficulties. But it worries me that you do not seem, to me, to appreciate the facts, and therefore do not

really prepare yourself to deal with the problems which must arise.⁴⁶

Two years later Europe was enveloped in war. From 1914 on, Bosanquet's theory of the state was vilified not only for its Hegelianism but also for its alleged departure from the classical British liberal defense of individual right and liberty.⁴⁷ Politicians, like Lord Bryce, attempted to distinguish Britain and British traditions of thought from their Prussian counterparts by caricaturing the essence of both traditions of political thought. One young critic, G. D. H. Cole, had appeared sensitive to the nuances of Bosanquet's argument in 1915 when he pointed to the paradox of Bosanquet's association with the individualist Charity Organisation Society coupled with his promotion of a theory "that amounts to State Sovereignty."⁴⁸ A year later, Cole did not hesitate to refer to Bosanquet in public discussions as a "prusso-phil philosopher."⁴⁹ Bertrand Russell, at the start of a distinguished career in philosophy, was critical of the idealist theory of the state. The state, he often repeated, was not an institution of morality but the incarnation of those aggressive and acquisitive impulses responsible for war.

The most celebrated attack on Bosanquet's book in the war years was L. T. Hobhouse's The Metaphysical

Theory of the State. From its dramatic opening, addressed to a son in the Royal Air Force, to its conclusion, the book was a vitriolic attack upon the ideas and ideals of metaphysical philosophy. He associated Bosanquet with Hegel and held both responsible for the carnage of the war. He charged idealist theorists with a faulty methodology which failed to distinguish between the real and the ideal, between fact and reality, between experience and abstraction. While these charges might have been made by any partisan of positivist or empirical research techniques, it was his criticism of the idealist theory of the state which was the most scathing.⁵⁰

Hobhouse criticized the ambiguity of Bosanquet's use of the term "state." As an "ideal" he thought the theory of the state useless; as a description of reality, he thought it dangerous. With a sweeping stroke of the pen, Hobhouse caricatured Bosanquet's argument, associating it, for posterity, with the violence inherent in state-worship.

It sets the state above moral criticism, constitutes war a necessary incident in its existence, condemns humanity, and repudiates a federation or league of Nations.⁵¹

Although Bosanquet did not publish a direct response to Hobhouse's charges, he was engaged throughout the war with the defense of the theory against those who suggested that it was responsible for the war. Underly-

ing these attacks he sensed the view that the state, in essence, represented force employed on behalf of sinister and exploitative interests. Against those critics, like Bertrand Russell or G. D. H. Cole, who viewed the state as an agency for war and exploitation, he insisted that "the healthy State, however strong, is non-militant in temper."⁵² While he did not think that war could be eradicated from the human condition, he was optimistic in the assumption that the end of the state was to secure the best life for its citizens. Despite the argument of R. M. MacIver, G. D. H. Cole and others against the identification of society with the state, he continued to defend his identification of the social with the political and to defend the concept of the general will as the expression of rational mind and will in community.

He repeated Plato's view that war indicated the "internal disease" of a polity and carried the analogy one step further with the suggestion that a state might suffer such degeneration as to be disqualified from being accorded the appellation "state."

People who are satisfied do not want to make war; and in a well-organized community people are satisfied. War must arise from dissatisfied elements in a community; people who have not got what they want within (or have it but are afraid of losing it) and so look for profit or for security in adventures without. War belongs to a state, then, ultimately, not in so far as it is a state, but in so far as it is not a state.⁵³

Bosanquet thought that hostile tariffs had been the main cause of war in 1914. Arguing what was essentially a classical liberal's free-trade position, he claimed that regulations in restraint of trade were "regulations in restraint of human intercourse."⁵⁴ These barriers to cooperation and communication between nations or individuals he found "irrational" and "loathsome."⁵⁵

If war was the characteristic of a diseased state, then peace was the characteristic of a healthy polity, where harmony and cooperation prevailed. "The royal road to peace is to do right at home, and banish sinister interests and class privilege from the commonwealth."⁵⁶ He urged his audiences to put aside the narrow interests of class or "national selfishness abroad" and seek the true spirit of patriotism.⁵⁷ Addressing an audience gathered in 1915 at the Bedford College for Women of London University for a round-table discussion of the "international crisis in its ethical and psychological aspects," he suggested that "patriotism in the perfect state," the title and focus of his lecture, was characterized by shared values of beauty, truth and love. He was quite consistent in his view of patriotism, having presented a similar view to an audience of the Charity Organisation Society several years prior to the war. The "teaching of patriotism," the subject of his lecture,

seemed to warrant a more practical standard, he admitted, but the aesthetic-ethical standard which he urged--kindness, beauty, and truth--was really "the most practical of all."⁵⁸

In his insistence upon the nation-state as the essence of modern politics, he was also forced to concede the divisive effect of nationalism in the international arena. In this view of divisive nationalism he found himself in agreement with Bertrand Russell, one of the most ardent critics of the theory of the state and of war.⁵⁹ In private, Bosanquet was much troubled by the war and sympathetic to Russell's critique of the war. When the pacifist Union of Democratic Control first started, Bosanquet wrote, "I all but gave my name," but feared that the organization would develop "into things one could not approve."⁶⁰

In public, he defended his theory of the state and urged audiences to put aside the spirit of rancor for a spirit of international harmony. Himself responsible, as President, for the convocation of the International Congress of Philosophy planned for 1916 in London, he drafted a circular announcing its cancellation, but which promised "cordiality to all philosophers after peace."⁶¹ Even this small gesture met with rancor and the statement was diluted so as to not seem overly conciliatory toward

the German enemy. Elsewhere, in a memorial to the American philosopher, Josiah Royce, Bosanquet celebrated the international bond of community among philosophers which "put a girdle round about the earth," and "set itself beyond any dangers" of international conflict.⁶²

In alluding to the international bonds of community he appeared to have conceded the point which MacIver and Cole had previously urged. Partisans of a pluralist sociology, they had argued that society or community need not be synonymous with the nation-state but might be international in character. Although Bosanquet recognized those associations which were international in scope, he continued to argue that the nation-state as presently constituted was the only real measure of individual identity.

It is quite plain that if our mind and will are to be at one with themselves, our loyalty and co-operation with, say, an international labour movement or an association in a foreign country, must be reconciled with that system of our mind which is our national consciousness and conscience.⁶³

In his third set of introductory remarks to The Philosophical Theory which he wrote in 1919, he acknowledged the sea-change which had occurred with the war. "Then all the old things were true";⁶⁴ by 1919, he acknowledged the possibilities inherent in a League of Nations, adding an additional proviso calling for continued individual responsibility. "I believe in the League

of Nations as the hope and refuge of mankind; but I do not believe that any moral being can divest itself of moral responsibility, or limit that responsibility's ultima ratio."⁶⁵ Repudiating earlier charges that he had denied the moral responsibility of the state, he explained that he had pleaded for the recognition of the "responsibility of every moral being."⁶⁶ He suggested that if the state were considered as any moral being it might avail itself of the right of conscientious objection, as might any individual. One example of the application of the nation-state as conscientious objector was in the conjectured situation of a league of nations acting to promote a slave trade, in which case it was the right of every being and "agency" to refuse.

Referring to the rancorous climate of opinion within Britain during the war, which had impeached his own efforts on behalf of a spirit of peace, he made a rare reference to the personal toll of the war. His "business" as a student of philosophy, was to "see connections"--in spite of the charges that he had championed the cause of war and rejected that of peace.⁶⁷

In The Philosophical Theory of the State, Bosanquet elaborated his theory of individuality, polity and society. He responded to particular criticisms of his

theory in the emendations and elaborations which he offered in the 1910 and 1920 editions of the book. The experience of the First World War forced him to acknowledge the possibility of a "world-will" extending beyond the boundaries of the individual nation-states which might foster an international spirit of cooperation and understanding.⁶⁸

Changes in British social and political circumstance in the first two decades of the twentieth century were also responsible for adaptations which he made to his theory of society and polity. An analysis of Bosanquet's response to issues of social policy, particularly those related to the 1909 Reports of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws, may serve to illustrate the ways in which he attempted to bring his philosophy to bear upon social issues.

1. For the climate of political opinion at the close of the nineteenth century, see: G. R. Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency: A Study in British Politics and Political Thought 1899-1914 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1971), Bernard Semmel, Imperialism and Social Reform: English Social-Imperial Thought 1895-1914 (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1960), Adam Ulam, The Philosophical Foundation of English Socialism (New York: Octagon Books, 1964), Stefan Collini, Liberalism & Sociology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), and Bernard Porter, Critics of Empire: British Radical Attitudes to Colonialism in Africa 1895-1914 (London: Macmillan & Co., 1968).

2. Bernard Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of the State (London: Macmillan & Co., 1899; 4th ed. repr. London: Macmillan & Co., 1965), p. vii.

3. Bernard Bosanquet to Frank Peters, 1 January 1897, in Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends, p. 86.

4. Bernard Bosanquet to Frank Peters, 22 February 1898, in Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends, p. 90.

5. Bosanquet, Philosophical Theory, p. 6.

6. T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation, p. 122.

7. Bosanquet, Philosophical Theory, p. 51.

8. For an analysis of social contract theory and the issue of consent, see J. P. Plamenatz, Consent, Freedom and Political Obligation, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968).

9. Bosanquet, Philosophical Theory, p. 103.

10. Bosanquet, Philosophical Theory, Preface, p. xxix.

11. Bernard Bosanquet, "Social Automatism and The Imitation Theory," Mind n.s. 8 (Apr. 1899): 167-75, reprinted in Science and Philosophy, pp. 245-55.

12. Bosanquet, Philosophical Theory, pp. 157, 159 & 157-58.

13. Bernard Bosanquet, "Duties of Citizenship," in Aspects, p. 10; also discussed in Philosophical Theory, pp. 278ff.

14. Bosanquet, Philosophical Theory, p. 188.

15. Ibid., pp. 191ff.

16. Ibid., pp. 178 and 179.

17. Bosanquet adapted his examples to the existential reality. After observing the pressure for housing stock in the post-war period he approved government intervention.

18. The most rigorous analysis of Bosanquet's use of the term "state" was offered by Robert M. MacIver in his 1909 essay, "Ethics and Politics," and in his 1911 essay, "Society and the State," which appeared in the Philosophical Review. Both essays are reprinted in Robert M. MacIver, Politics and Society, ed. David Spitz (New York: Atherton Press, 1969). G. D. H. Cole, Harold Laski, L. T. Hobhouse were prominent in their criticism of Bosanquet in the 1914-1918 period. See discussion below.

19. Bosanquet, Philosophical Theory, p. 172.

20. Ibid., pp. 174-75.

21. Ibid., p. 140.

22. Ibid., Preface, p. lv.

23. Ibid., p. 302.

24. Ibid., pp. 304-05.

25. Ibid., p. 302.

26. Criticism of this genre appears in Elie Halévy, A History of the English People in the Nineteenth Century, vol. 5: Imperialism and the Rise of Labour (1895-1905) (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1961), George Sabine, A History of Political Theory, 3d ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), H. J. Laski, "Bosanquet's Theory of the General Will," Symposium, Aristotelian Society, Proceedings, Supplement 8 (1928).

27. "A Theory of the State," Saturday Review, 26 August 1899, p. 270.

28. See W. G. Pogson Smith, review of The Philosophical Theory in English Historical Review 15 (Jan. 1900): 533-36; "Sociology, Politics, and Jurisprudence," Westminster Review 152 (Sept. 1899):347-78; James Gibson, review of The Philosophical Theory in International Journal of Ethics 10 (Apr. 1900):399-401; "Mr. Bosanquet on the State," Spectator, 8 July 1899, pp. 55-56; "Recent Political Theory and Practice," Quarterly Review 192 (1900):359-80.

29. "Mr. Bosanquet and the State," Spectator, 8 July 1899, p. 55.

30. "A Theory of the State," Saturday Review, 26 August 1899, p. 270.

31. Ibid.

32. Nation (N.Y.), 26 July 1900, p. 75.

33. William A. Dunning, review of The Philosophical Theory of the State, in Political Science Quarterly 14 (Sept. 1899):532-33.

34. "Sociology, Politics and Jurisprudence," Westminster Review 152 (Sept. 1899):347-48.

35. James Gibson, review of Philosophical Theory of the State in International Journal of Ethics 10 (Apr. 1900):401.

36. L. T. Hobhouse, The Metaphysical Theory of the State: A Criticism (London: Allen & Unwin, 1918), G. D. H. Cole, "The Nature of the State in View of its External Relations," Symposium, Aristotelian Society, Proceedings, n.s. 16 (1915-16):313.

37. MacIver's account of the hazardous effect of his criticism of the Idealist theory of the state appears in his autobiography, As a Tale That is Told (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968). Implicit in this tale is the strength of idealism in particular quarters at the turn of the century.

38. Robert M. MacIver, "Society and the State," in Essays on Politics, p. 231.

39. Ibid., p. 233.

40. MacIver singled out for mention L. T. Hobhouse as another of those writing "as if they were still living in the Aristotelian state four thousand citizens strong." MacIver, "Society and the State," in Essays on Politics, p. 234. Hobhouse was later responsible for one of the most rabid criticisms of the theory of the state in the war years.

41. MacIver, "Society and the State," in Essays on Politics, p. 234.

42. Bernard Bosanquet to Robert M. MacIver, 23 March 1912, in Essays on Politics, p. 244.

43. MacIver to Bosanquet, 25 April 1912, in Essays on Politics, p. 246.

44. Bernard Bosanquet, "The Function of the State in Promoting the Unity of Mankind," Aristotelian Society, Proceedings n.s. 17 (1916-17), reprinted in Bosanquet, Social and International Ideals: Being Studies in Patriotism (London: Macmillan & Co., 1917; repr. New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1967), p. 293.

45. Ibid., p. 291.

46. Bernard Bosanquet to Robert M. MacIver, 23 March 1912, in Essays on Politics, p. 244.

47. Participants in the Symposium held under the auspices of the Aristotelian Society took this line of criticism. See C. Deslisle Burns, Bertrand Russell, G. D. H. Cole, "The Nature of the State in View of its External Relations," Symposium, Aristotelian Society, Proceedings n.s. 16 (1915-16). Stefan Collini has noted the debt of many political theorists to idealism for providing the argument and structure of thought against which they could develop their own pluralist theories. Stefan Collini, "Hobhouse, Bosanquet and the State: Philosophical Idealism and Political Argument in England 1880-1918," Past & Present, no. 72 (Aug. 1976): 86-113.

48. G. D. H. Cole, "Conflicting Social Obligations," Aristotelian Society, Proceedings n.s. 15 (1914-15):148.

49. G. D. H. Cole, "The Nature of the State in View of its External Relations," Symposium, Aristotelian Society, Proceedings n.s. 16 (1915-16):313.

50. Stefan Collini argues that Hobhouse's Metaphysical Theory is unlike any other book that he wrote. This may be true in terms of the passion invoked by Hobhouse, but it is consistent with his other books in its defense of a positivistic method of social research. See Liberalism & Sociology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

51. Hobhouse, Metaphysical Theory, p. 25.

52. Bosanquet, Social and International Ideals, preface, v.

53. Bernard Bosanquet, "Patriotism in the Perfect State," in The International Crisis in its Ethical and Psychological Aspects (London: Oxford University Press, 1915), p. 145.

54. Bernard Bosanquet, "The Wisdom of Naaman's Servants," in Social and International Ideals, p. 317.

55. Ibid and Bernard Bosanquet to Robert Carr Bosanquet, July 1919, in Bernard Bosanquet and his Friends, p. 311.

56. Bosanquet, "Naaman's Servants," p. 309.

57. Bernard Bosanquet, "The Teaching of Patriotism," in Social and International Ideals, p. 12.

58. Ibid.

59. Bosanquet, "The Function of the State in Promoting the Unity of Mankind," in Social and International Ideals, p. 293.

60. Bernard Bosanquet to R. F. A. Hoernlé, 11 June 1916, in Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends, p. 90. G. D. H. Cole castigated Bosanquet in public as the "prusso-phil philosopher" but also reported privately of Bosanquet's pacifist convictions and efforts. Communication from Cole to Isaiah Berlin to author.

61. Bosanquet, quoted in R. F. A. Hoernlé, "In Memoriam: Bernard Bosanquet," Journal of Philosophy 20 (Sept. 1923):515.

62. Bernard Bosanquet, letter in memoriam, 7 December (1916), in Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends, p. 189.

63. Bosanquet, "Function of the State in Promoting Unity," in Social and International Ideals, p. 296.

64. Bernard Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of the State, 3d ed. (London: Macmillan & Co., 1920), preface, p. xlv.

65. Ibid., preface, L.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid., preface lix-lx. Bosanquet reprints a letter which he sent to the editor of the Westminster Gazette, 20 August 1918.

68. Bosanquet, Philosophical Theory, preface, p. lix.

CHAPTER VIII

PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL POLICY: BOSANQUET AND
THE POOR LAW REPORTS OF 1909

The benchmark of late Victorian social analysis was reached with the issuance of the Majority and Minority Reports of the Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and the Relief of Distress in 1909. The Royal Commission which was appointed in the closing days of Arthur J. Balfour's Conservative ministry in 1905 was one of the strongest in terms of depth and expertise. It included two economists, Rev. L.R. Phelps of Oxford and Prof. William Smart of the University of Glasgow, four senior officials of the Local Government Boards, ministers of the Church of England and the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland, two representatives of labor (Francis Chandler and George Lansbury), social reformers associated with the work of the Charity Organisation Society (including Bosanquet's wife, Helen), his close friend from Balliol days and the Secretary of the COS, Charles Stewart Loch, the housing reformer Octavia Hill, former Toynbee Hall residents Hancock Nunn and T.G. Gardiner, as well as the Fabian socialist Beatrice Webb and the social investigator Charles Booth. Chairing

this illustrious group of social experts and administrators was the experienced Tory diplomat, Lord George Hamilton.

After sitting three full years and compiling massive volumes of testimony and statistics concerning the range and extent of poverty in the United Kingdom, the Commission issued two reports, a Majority Report with fourteen signers and a dissenting Minority Report of four commissioners. The question why two reports were necessary and the significance of the reports has been variously interpreted since they were first issued.

The Report of the Majority, which included Helen Bosanquet, C.S. Loch and the COS contingent among its signers, is traditionally identified with an individualistic position characteristic of the Charity Organisation Society or of a particular brand of laissez-faire liberalism.¹ The Minority Report, written by Beatrice Webb and her unseen partner in the work of the Commission, husband Sidney Webb, is traditionally seen as forward looking in its call for the "breakup of the Poor Law" and the division of administrative function amongst specialist departments of government.

These accounts begin from the premise that the Majority Report was swamped by the propagandist campaign of the Minority, which, while failing to gain adoption

for its own proposals, managed to gain a foundation for the piecemeal adoption of parts of its program.² Una Cormack argues that the formative years of the welfare state in Britain were coincident in time with the deliberation of the Royal Commission and the controversy provoked by the two reports, both of which profoundly influenced public opinion in the ensuing decades. She argues that the welfare state developed unsystematically, almost haphazardly, because of the confusion and cleavage of opinion concerning the two essential principles of the reports, the basic provision of a minimum for those members of the community who could not do so for themselves and a basic optimum for all citizens without distinction.³

A recent interpretation of the Reports by A.W. Vincent offers a variation on this theme. Vincent argues that the Reports represented two contrasting philosophical approaches to the problem of poverty.⁴ The Majority Report embodied an individualistic social philosophy characteristic not only of the COS but also of philosophical idealism as represented on the Commission by Helen Bosanquet, C.S. Loch and the "nonsignatory" member, Bernard Bosanquet. Bernard Bosanquet is presented as the COS' "preeminent apologist and theoretician" and formulator of the Majority position along

with Loch and Helen Bosanquet. The Minority Report which embodied the social theory of the Webbs is contrasted with the Majority view and found lacking in sympathy for the texture of individual and social existence.

Vincent's approach, while correct in underlining the philosophical differences of the two Reports, is flawed in the failure to account for the diversity of opinion within the COS, which was responsible, for example, for the refusal of the COS Council to officially support the Majority Report despite the presence of Loch and Bosanquet on the Council.⁵ Vincent's interpretation errs in the identification of the COS with three prominent members tout court, as well as in the failure to distinguish the differences in Loch's and Bosanquet's idealism or between Bosanquet's life of work and that of Helen Bosanquet. By selecting only those materials directly concerned with social issues, Vincent neglects those differences between Loch and Bosanquet which significantly affected their philosophies of society and the state, particularly with regard to Loch's imperialist position on the Boer War and Bosanquet's pro-Boer stance.

The object of this chapter is to analyze Bosanquet's response to the Reports, to consider the degree

to which he may or may not have been responsible for the writing of the Majority Report or the ideas expressed therein, and to assess the degree to which he adapted the theory of society and polity which he enunciated in The Philosophical Theory of the State to changes in Britain in the first two decades of the twentieth century. The intention here is not to enter into a detailed examination of the Reports, but rather to investigate those aspects of the Reports which provoked a response from Bosanquet.

A summary of the main proposals of the Reports suggests numerous points of convergence. Both the Minority and Majority Commissioners moved for the abolition of the existing administrative unit of the Poor Law, the Boards of Guardians, and for a move away from the principles of the 1834 Poor Law and its hostility to outdoor relief. Both stated categorically that the general mixed workhouse ought to be abolished and that all institutions should be classified to allow for special treatment of clients. They were in agreement regarding the insufficiency of the system of relief works provided for in the Unemployed Workmen's Act of 1905 to deal with the problem.

Despite these points of convergence there were essential differences in the two Reports and these

differences were representative of two conflicting philosophies of society and polity. The Minority Report, written by the Webbs, called for the breakup of the 1834 Poor Law and its model of relief which distinguished between categories of "deserving" and "undeserving" poor. The Webb scheme aimed at a guarantee of a basic minimum of social services available to all citizens through the operation of specialized government departments under the direction of a Registrar of public assistance. The Webbs offered a method and a cure to the problem of poverty: a system of classification based upon the delivery of social service by specialized departments, and the guarantee of a minimum provision for public welfare on the part of the state. The Webb vision of polity and society was based upon an assessment of individual need and a responsive state bureaucracy. The implicit view of government contained in the Minority Report was of government as an administrative necessity.

The Majority Report argued for the abandonment of the 1834 model of assistance to the poor and the replacement of the elected Boards of Guardians by a statutory Public Assistance Authority appointed by the elective County Council or County Borough Council

working in conjunction with social workers associated with Public Assistance Committees and Voluntary Aid Committees. This provision joined the dual organs of public assistance and voluntary aid and formally recognized the growing numbers of trained experts in social work by requiring that certain specialists in Public Assistance be certified.⁶ The Majority also acknowledged the growing number of women engaged in social work by the provision that a certain proportion of women be appointed, including at least one-third the members of the Public Assistance committee for London.⁷

The Majority offered a method and a cure: they proposed to individualize each case of Public Assistance and to provide trained specialists to treat cases of distress and to administer each provision for assistance according to a carefully designed method. The Majority scheme rested upon the presumption of a carefully trained staff of workers engaged in various forms of casework agencies, probation and almoner's departments, homes for the aged, hostels, industrial institutions, labor colonies and detention colonies. The "casework" approach was a COS hallmark and its appearance in the recommendation of the Majority was a triumph of COS practice and

individualistic social theory. It represented that part of the continuum of liberal thought concerned with the improvement of character and the development of the individual as a citizen of the polity. While the underlying tone of the Majority Report recalls the "governess" tradition of British liberalism more readily identified with Gladstone or John Stuart Mill and their concern for the improvement of character, it was a distinctively idealistic notion of character and citizenship which informed the Report. And it was precisely in defense of the Majority's notion of individuality and character that Bosanquet entered the discussion.

The issuance of the two Reports provoked debate and propagandist campaigns for two years. The administrative and legislative proposals of the Minority were carried under the banner of the National Committee for the Promotion of the Break-Up of the Poor Law which was established in the Spring, 1909 and which became the National Committee for the Prevention of Destitution in 1910. While the Webbs led the campaign for the Minority Report proposals, the Bosanquets, Loch and Lord George Hamilton were among those defending the Majority Report who engaged in the campaign of the National Poor Law Reform Association.⁸

While there is a temptation to view the debate

of the Majority vs. Minority Reports as a case of Bosanquets vs. Webbs, the analogy between the two couples and their defense of the individual reports goes only so far. Unlike the Webbs, Bernard and Helen Bosanquet did not undertake a partnership in the production of the Majority Report. Bosanquet neither wrote the Report nor was he present for a large measure of the years that the Royal Commission sat. From 1903 to 1908 Bosanquet was engaged as Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of St. Andrews where he lectured on aspects of classical and modern thought.⁹ While there is no evidence to suggest that Bosanquet was responsible for the Majority Report, there is internal evidence which affirms the unique and substantial contribution which Helen Bosanquet made to the work of the Commission and the writing of the Report.¹⁰

Helen Bosanquet was as prolific as Beatrice Webb in the writing of memoranda to the Commission, but differed from her in that her career as a social investigator was independent of her husband's.¹¹ Well deserving of a study in her own right, Helen Bosanquet's analytic abilities were sharpened at Newnham College, Cambridge, where she earned a First in the Moral Sciences Tripos after training with Marshall and Sidgwick. Her experience of thirteen years as District

Secretary of the COS in the East End of London widened her understanding of the social dynamics of neighborhood life.¹²

While the analogy between the Webb partnership and the Bosanquets errs in slighting the distinctiveness of Helen Bosanquet's and Bernard Bosanquet's respective life and work, there is a point of comparison in that Bernard Bosanquet and Sidney Webb did campaign on behalf of the respective Reports and upon one occasion, recorded in the pages of the Sociological Review, provided point and counter-point to each other's argument.¹³

Bosanquet's analysis of the Reports, his defense of the Majority position, and his subsequent response to proposed social reforms illustrates the way in which his social thought was brought to bear upon social issues. Responding to what he regarded as divergent interpretations of the actual situation as well as in social objectives of the two Reports, he elaborated upon his theory of individuality, society and the state.

In his exchange with Sidney Webb, Bosanquet argued that the Majority recognized the failure of earlier reforms to adjust to new demands and conditions. In contrast to the Minority, which felt that the evils were present within the system, the Majority proposed to

respond to "necessitousness" and destitution with a policy which was "preventive, curative, restorative."¹⁴ The Majority called for the creation of a "disinterested authority" practiced in looking at all sides of a question, and able to call in skilled assistance.

Bosanquet thought the proposal for the creation of a Public Assistance Authority both rational and efficient. It was rational in that it comprehended the importance of individual character to "civilised group-life" and also because it presumed the cooperation of public and voluntary social services.¹⁵ The scheme was efficient in that it unified the administration of services and recognized the value of workers trained in social work. The notion of experts, expertise and efficiency played a much larger role in his thoughts concerning the administration of social policy in 1910 than in his lectures on the state ten years previous.

Bosanquet's remarks concerning the importance of experts emerged in his exchange with Webb over the place of experts in a democracy. Responding to Webb's charge that the Majority's proposal for non-elected Public Assistance officers was undemocratic and impracticable as well, Bosanquet countered that his difference with Webb was in point of fact as well as social theory. The fact was that the Majority

proposed the appointment of officials by an elected body, the County Council, hence allowing for electoral procedure in the process of selection. Their difference in social theory was more serious in that it reflected two views of democracy and democratic institutions. Bosanquet argued that the democratic nature of a polity was not dependent upon the direct election of all officials but on the efficient execution of policy. "Democracies know now that what represents them is not direct election but efficiency."¹⁶ The true nature of democracy, Bosanquet insisted, was one which gave expression to the "general will."

It is an error, I submit, in social theory, to take direct dependence either on a constituency or an elective body as a test of the democratic character of an institution. The more powerful and secure the democracy, the better it can afford to give comparative independence to its authorities, with a view to the skilful and fearless execution of the policy which on the whole it approves. The distinction between the "general will," and the "will of all" is hard, no doubt, to apply in practice; but it is the one fundamental problem of democracy, which stands or falls by success in solving it.¹⁷

The place of experts, or authorities, in a democracy, was the subject of a symposium discussion in which Bosanquet participated in the same period of time. There he argued that modern political democracies were based upon a representative system which implied the actual administration of government by the few.¹⁸

The few included those "specialist experts" fit to advise the statesman and the individual citizen. He suggested that there were actually two senses of "expert" in Plato's theory of democracy. There was the statesman, "the trained expert in life," who understood the unified operation of society and polity. And there was the specialist expert trained for a particular function. Bosanquet asked what place should be assigned to the specialist expert in the determination and execution of social policy and answered that the specialist expert had an incomplete view of the whole of social life. The more complete task of government was left to the statesman and the citizen groomed to the responsibilities and duties of civic life.

Every citizen is a microcosm of society, and so to speak a statesman in miniature; less leisured and less gifted, but with a duty and outlook on life essentially correlative. He is, in his degree, an expert in the art of life. Every householder knows more or less how to use a technical expert for the purposes of complete and healthy living; and the statesman is the household for the community; and has in him its needs and purpose, just as the householder has those of his household.¹⁹

What is interesting in Bosanquet's discussion of the use of experts in the administration of policy is that it is traditionally the Webbs who are identified with the argument for efficiency and the use of

experts in government. The essential difference between the Webbs and Bosanquet is that the former would have made the use of experts the whole of government, that is, government as the administration of experts, while for Bosanquet, experts were a resource to be used to facilitate those conditions which fostered the development of the individual within society. It was the statesman and the citizen practiced in "the art of life" who inhabited Bosanquet's ideal polity.

It was for these reasons that he insisted that the democratic nature of a polity was not determined by the presence or absence of administrative agencies, but rather by the spirit of the community as expressed in the operation of the "general will." His theory of the general will had been essential to his theory of individuality and polity. In his lectures on The Philosophical Theory of the State he had proposed that the individual should control and direct his or her own behavior and inclination through an awareness of common purpose embodied in social institutions like the family, neighborhood and trade union. The individual who determined his or her own actions within social parameters was essentially the rational citizen, who, when operating

in the most comprehensive community, the state, manifested the general will.

Whereas in his lectures on The Philosophical Theory of the State he had emphasized the essentially limited power of the state to foster the development of the individual, in his remarks concerning the Poor Law Commission Reports and proposed social legislation he emphasized the bonds of citizenship and social responsibility. Speaking in defense of the social theory of charity organization and the Report of the Majority he said,

We start from the idea of democratic citizenship. In the modern state all are citizens....In the widest sense all depend on each other and on the whole; but there is no presumption of special dependence between class and class or person and person, except with the family.²⁰

The citizen Bosanquet had in mind was one operating with full capacity or "completeness of will and ideas."²¹ His notion of will as fundamentally the dominant ideas which guide the attention and action of the individual was responsible for his insistence that "character and capacity" were the central and determining forces of human welfare.²² He regarded the capacity to participate and fulfill the responsibilities of one's station in the range of social

institutions as evidence of a willed capacity to maintain oneself physically and spiritually. Pauperism, by contrast, was evidence of a weakness of mind and will. It was a "weakness of the citizen mind," indicating a "defective participation in the social mind," and a failure to maintain oneself and dependents up to a social standard.²³

The failure of the self-maintaining character was a moral as well as social failure because it was bound to the failure of the will of the individual to take account of the common, social good. The pauper spirit was in the mind of the individual, rich and poor alike. Character was exhibited by the exercise of mind in overcoming the challenges of external circumstance.

The spirit of pauperism may be found in all social classes, and means a weakness of the citizen mind which prevents it from being equal to the situation. In other words, it is a defective participation in the social mind, on which the adjustment of life to social standards depends. The external fact of pauperism means a failure to control circumstances in the degree which the social standard demands. Wealth and dependence on the wealthy may disguise this inability. But when you have it, you have a potential pauper.²⁴

The emphasis upon the priority of mind and will, or a certain mental attitude on the part of the individual in shaping the conditions of existence, followed from his philosophy of logic and underlay his defense of charity work as a "social therapeutic" for society's failures

in self-maintenance. When he called for an "army of social healers" trained and united for a common purpose, the cure and prevention of social failure, he was calling for the rescue of mind and will.²⁵

Bosanquet viewed the recovery and transformation of will as a central function of charity work. It followed from his philosophy and found expression in the practical experience of the charity or social worker. "Charity work has always seemed to me an almost ideal training in the higher logic -- the logic of idealism."²⁶ Idealism, to Bosanquet, was a faith in a "real reality" which united appearance and reality. It was a doctrine of harmony and non-contradiction. "Logic is that attitude of mind which makes us unable to rest in the face of a contradiction; and all imperfect knowledge, all facts partially understood, are contradictory."²⁷ From the vantage point of idealistic logic, the social worker was in touch with social facts as well as the "living tissue" of home, family and neighborhood.²⁸

The "true" meaning of social work was to bring the "social mind" into harmony with itself. The social worker as "social healer" would help to guide, shape and mold failed characters back to social health. And while a change in circumstance or external conditions

might appear to effect some change in the individual's condition, the ultimate goal was a transformation of mind and consciousness. "Every social fact, when you pursue it with a view to complete explanation, leads you up to a mind, because this is the only central point of view."²⁹

The social worker, by investigating each application for public assistance, was able to gain the complete view of the situation. Bosanquet hailed the advocacy of the casework method of assistance by the Majority of the Poor Law Commissioners as the triumph of a well-practiced COS method.

If the reforming movement of the Charity Organizationists could have had its way, every family in contact with the Poor Law, in the institutions and out, would have been under constant careful and friendly scrutiny with a view to its restoration to independent citizenship. In the Majority Report they have had their way.³⁰

The casework method of social assistance "individualised" each case, but took as the real subject of enquiry the family. In most cases of need, whether of the laborer out of work or the widow with dependent children, the subject of investigation was the family and the capacity of those responsible for family dependents to maintain them according to the social standard. The presumption that the family was both

subject and object of the social question was not all that unusual in that for Bosanquet the family operated as a social institution which helped to shape and mold the individual.

In his lectures on the philosophical theory of the state he had suggested that home and family were the "nurseries" of citizenship. And it was from the perspective of the family as a social institution that he maintained that those who had recourse to public assistance had failed not only in the task of citizenship but in familial responsibility and hence necessitated the intervention of the state acting in loco parentis. "The recipient of state assistance has accepted a different status from that of ordinary citizens. He no longer controls his own household and family."³¹ If, as he insisted, pauperism was ultimately a failure of mind and will, it followed that the cure lay in the restoration to social health. Intervention by the state and its agent, the social worker, was really pauper management as a family affair.

This attitude toward the state acting in loco parentis explains his acceptance of the potentially intrusive activities of public assistance workers. He was extremely reluctant to allow for the intervention of the state in the lives of citizens unless absolutely

necessary. And it became necessary, according to his view of the problem, when individuals failed to maintain themselves or dependents, i.e., when they failed to maintain themselves as citizens. "Public Assistance is for the weak or unsuccessful, to restore or develop their mental, bodily, or industrial capacity, and to prevent a recurrence of failure in the future."³²

While Bosanquet also argued that "prevention is better than cure," meaning that there were services provided by the state to all citizens, including those of education and sanitation, which were enforcements of the general conditions of "good life," he tended to emphasize the failures in citizenship in his discussion of the state and social welfare policy. Thus, while he spoke of the state in its preventive capacity, as the matrix of individual and social development, the weight of his argument tended to lean toward those interventionist practices necessary for the rescue of the needy and destitute.

Bosanquet acknowledged that the distinction he drew between the "necessitous" and the normal citizen was similar to the distinction drawn in the 1834 Poor Law between the "less eligible" recipient of relief and other members of society. "The principle of 'less

eligibility'," he maintained, "is really continuous with the principle of modern public assistance, and does not involve any harshness of treatment such as to interfere with the restorative purposes of the relief."³³

His reluctance to allow for the intervention of the state in the lives of its citizens save in the case of physical or spiritual impoverishment was consistent with his philosophy of ethics and individuality. Although the metaphysical aspect of his philosophy had led him to advocate a strong state in The Philosophical Theory, in practice, he resisted the intrusion of the state because he feared it would break the springs of character and self-reliance which he thought so essential to individuality. He approved or disapproved of proposed social reforms according to a criterion of individuality and social responsibility. He did not necessarily demand the abstention or restriction of the state altogether, only the recognition that the method employed would shape or break the individual and the surrounding social institutions.

It was on these grounds that he opposed the proposals of the Minority Report which he associated with "popular Collectivism" because they would remove

the individual from interaction with those social institutions which helped to shape and mold individual identity.

The mark of popular Collectivism is not the intention of achieving them, -- of that it has no monopoly, -- but the method by which it proposes to achieve them. It is a method which in every case involves the destruction of some shape of mind and purpose -- the Family, the Friendly Society, the Provident Medical Institution -- which men have with pains and labour and with lofty faith created to realise, through their joint foresight and energy, their common good.³⁴

Bosanquet was here maintaining his view of social institutions as representations of mind and will. This argument had been essential to his lectures of the 1890s when he argued that institutions embodied ethical ideas. It was also consistent with the ethical philosophy which informed his lectures on the state. His hostility to proposed measures of social legislation which presumed the active role of the state in the lives of all citizens was consistent with the position which he elaborated in the 1880s and which he maintained for the next forty years.

As early as his undergraduate years at Balliol, Bosanquet had questioned the efficacy of legislation upon individual morality. In his lectures of the 1880s and 1890s he lectured to audiences of the London Ethical Society and insisted that one could not legislate or

dictate a change in morality or character. He had even appeared to vitiate the purpose of the London Ethical Society when he insisted that one could not educate individuals to be moral. One could only provide the example of one's life, lived, perhaps, to ethical purpose. This argument followed from his neo-Kantian view that one must treat individuals as ends, not means, and that morality was a "growth from within," an inward grace which could neither be coerced nor coddled.

Because he viewed morality as basically an issue of self-legislation, he tended to oppose proposed measures of legislation on the grounds that they would weaken the structure of individual and social will.

I do not say that all drastic legislative reforms are bad...I do say that legislation is bad if and so far as it makes us forget that society is a structure of wills, and that if we do not look to the soundness of individual character -- if we allow it to be perplexed and demoralized by a system of half-earnings, half-pauperism -- the whole fabric must fall to pieces.³⁵

Fifteen years later, in responding to the recommendations of the Poor Law Commissioners, he continued to maintain that the proposed reforms be judged by the degree to which they promoted "an inward and social grace" by an outward and visible action.³⁶

This emphasis upon the ethical dimension of individuality, society, and polity explains some of the positions which he took on proposed legislation. He consistently opposed the state provision of pensions to the aged, for example, In 1892, when the issue of old age pensions was being widely discussed, he argued against the provision of pensions for all persons over the age of sixty-five on the grounds that it would be better to strengthen the position of labor with improved wages, trade union organisation and thrift institutions than to provide a supplement to wages at the end of a life.

All these evasions of fact and the half-hearted ideals of those who look away from reality, demand heroic measures. Proposals for these latter -- such as weekly pensions for all old people over sixty-five, to be paid by the State -- all rest on the persuasion that the life of the wage-earning classes cannot be organized on a business footing (taking the whole life from infancy to death as the unit to be provided for), but must in some way be supplemented from without.³⁷

Trade unions and thrift organizations were preferable to the state provision of a pension because they were institutions which were organic to the life experience of the laborer. They were created and shaped by the laborer and they shaped and influenced the life of the laborer in return. They also represented the struggle of the individual laborer to organize

and survive the vicissitudes of the marketplace. It was for this reason that he insisted that the provision of a pension, which he equated with a supplement or rate in aid-of-wages, would drive workers from the struggle to organize.

It was a counsel of despair. It invited working men to abandon the hopes founded on their best achievements and to turn aside from their efforts to organise labour, to speculate on the chances of legislation.³⁸

Bosanquet continued to maintain the same opposition to proposals for state provision of pensions to the aged in 1907. He argued that the pensions would be inadequate and merely a "patched" solution to a problem best remedied by improving the position of the working class so that labourers would have their own resources for self-maintenance in old age. He equated the question of pensions for the aged with the problem of the laborer's poverty in old age which was at issue. In his various comments upon the condition of the aged poor, which in his case he equated with the aged laboring poor, it is clear that Bosanquet was sympathetic to the cause of labor and to those institutions founded by and for laborers which would improve their position. It should come as no surprise that later in his life he spoke favorably of the British labor movement and called for a Labor government.

"I should like a labour government with one or two good liberals in it."³⁹ Bosanquet offered the latter opinion in the post-War period when a Labour policy of social and economic organization seemed to promise a revitalized level of production.

Bosanquet was sympathetic to the cause of labor throughout his career; it was the notion of a guaranteed system of state-provided social security which made him uneasy because it seemed to undermine those efforts which would encourage individual qua civic responsibility. In an argument similar to the one which he promoted on behalf of improving the general position of labor he suggested that an improvement in the economic position of laboring women might best be served by a means not readily associated with an economic end: the granting of the right to vote to women. By gaining the right to vote, he reasoned, women would be able to exercise their rights and obligations as self-sufficient citizens in the polity.⁴⁰ His remarks in support of women's suffrage were made in 1907 in the midst of a discussion concerning social reform and the relative efficacy of legislative and administrative action. In the case of women and labor, he tended to regard both as groups best served by improving conditions

which would allow for self-sufficiency and independent action.

It was this same notion of self-sufficiency which led to his strong support for those "provident" institutions which were organized around the principle of self-help. These institutions presumed the participation and the involvement of the clients themselves -- that is, in the creation and control of services. In the 1890s, when policy discussion turned toward issues concerning the condition of the working classes and the aged poor, Bosanquet offered unconditional praise for those "great provident institutions," presumably thrift organizations, which were created by the British working-class as being "unmatched in the world as proofs of character and administrative ability among the wage-earners."⁴¹ His preference for providentiary systems of social services also emerged in his reaction to the Poor Law Reports. The Majority Report recommended that a Provident Medical system be established which would enable members to pay a fee and choose a family doctor. Those unable to maintain themselves in this system would see the Public Assistance doctor. Bosanquet concurred with this recommendation because it maintained the distinction between the capacity or

willingness to maintain oneself and one's dependents and the failure to do so. For these same reasons he opposed the Minority's proposed Public Health Service for all who needed it because it failed to discriminate between the self-maintaining citizen and the necessitous public welfare client.

For actual doctoring, you get much better results if the man chooses and pays his own doctor, who advises and supervises at the home; and this is widely done, through the energy and providence of the working men. Why destroy such a system, one of the very finest outgrowths of industrial democracy?⁴²

Bosanquet frequently linked his discussion of the health of the working classes to that of housing conditions. Inadequate and insufficient housing for labor was a recurrent concern during the last twenty-five years of his life. He regarded the problem of housing as being more than one of over-crowding or poor sanitation per se. He thought that there were too many people confined to too small spaces. This applied not only to the number of persons per room which was the traditional measure of overcrowding, but to the number of persons per neighborhood and street.⁴³ Bosanquet was a supporter of the suburban garden movement. This did not mean that he was hostile to the urban environment, but more the evidence of his conviction that the aesthetic effects of environment,

in this case, open space and verdant scenery, were essential to individual well-being. The connection which he drew between the aesthetic effects of environment and moral improvement was a continuation of his enthusiasm of the 1880s for the arts and crafts movement.

Bosanquet appeared to be less troubled by the possibility of harmful effects of unemployment on the condition of labor than by issues of health and housing. He criticized the Minority Report's proposal for a national authority to deal with the problem of unemployment, preferring the Majority's scheme for a general public assistance authority which would investigate each case and call upon the appropriate specialists concerned. If, for example, the case was investigated and it was found to involve only the unemployed laborer, the Labour Bureaus would be consulted. If it were found to involve the family, particularly the children, then other specialists would be involved.

It was on these same grounds that Bosanquet opposed the provision of school meals for needy children. He thought that what was really needed was a thorough investigation of the family situation and a determination of the best form of assistance to the

family, treated as a unit, rather than the attempt to provide piece-meal assistance to each member of the family as the problem arose.⁴⁴ In this case, Bosanquet was advocating a method of assistance which not only alleviated the particular case of distress but investigated the condition of the entire family as a preventive as well as ameliorative measure. In his opposition to school meals for needy children, Bosanquet joined the COS and the Majority in arguing that the family was to be taken as the unit of investigation and that the goal was to diminish rather than to multiply the services provided by state and voluntary agencies to the needy and destitute.⁴⁵

In responding to the Poor Law Reports of 1909, Bosanquet drew upon the various dimensions of his idealistic philosophy, including logic, ethics, aesthetics and polity. That the principle of individuality was foremost in his thought at this time is evident in his choice of subject for his 1911 and 1912 Gifford lectures in philosophy which were delivered in the University of Edinburgh.⁴⁶

Bosanquet's principle of individuality when applied to practical issues was neither "individualistic" in the sense of being against government

interference nor collectivistic. It was "liberal" in the sense of desiring continuous but gradual reforms based upon the principle of self-government and individual initiative. It was this notion of individuality which led him to oppose those measures which appeared to discourage or diminish individual responsibility and struggle with the promise that the state would act as surrogate-provider. This philosophy of individuality was implicit in the Majority Report. And while Bosanquet did not write the Report he did share in the practical and philosophical positions which it expressed.

To argue, as A.W. Vincent does, that the policy prescriptions of the Majority represented a triumph of the idealist social philosophy of the COS and its representatives, Bosanquet, Loch and Helen Bosanquet, may serve to dilute our understanding both of the diversity of political and social opinion among those who were considered philosophically idealistic as well as of our understanding of the way in which the COS shaped and was shaped by the changing social and economic circumstances in the first two decades of the twentieth century.

The COS in 1909 was not the same organization

that it had been in 1869. There were more women prominent in the administrative and district committees. Some, like Helen Bosanquet, had been drawn from the ranks of the women's colleges; others were associated with the Women's University Settlement which had been founded in 1887, as well as with other social service organizations which had taken root at the end of the nineteenth century.⁴⁷ These women were part of the "army of social healers" whom Bosanquet envisioned in his defense of the Majority Report. The Majority proposal for the use of specialists with certified expertise was an implicit recognition of the existential reality: the professionalization and feminization of social work in London. Hence the provision that at least one-third the members appointed to the Public Assistance Authority be female. Bosanquet supported the Majority in its acknowledgement of both gender and expertise as factors in public assistance work. Bosanquet was defending not only that which was already COS policy, i.e., the training of volunteers in district work, but also, the operation since 1903 of a School of Sociology and Social Economics.

The Majority Report's proposed requirement of a minimum number of female public assistance workers reflected two basic features of COS practice

in 1909: an increasing number of women engaged in social service work and the training of those women in the COS-dominated School of Sociology and Social Economics. From 1903 to 1912, the School of Sociology provided the institutional setting for training social workers to the COS' individualistic social philosophy and method of social investigation. The casework approach was essential to COS practice and it was essential to the implementation of the social policies recommended in the Majority Report. In requiring the participation of a minimum number of women with expertise or certification in social service work, the Majority affirmed their support for the philosophy and method of social work being taught at the School of Sociology. Implicit in the Majority Report was the assumption that the School of Sociology would provide trained social workers to implement the policy which was proposed. Bosanquet supported the Majority's policy recommendation and the work of the School of Sociology and Social Economics.

Bosanquet's association with the School of Sociology and Social Economics began shortly after the absorption of the London School of Ethics and Social Philosophy by the LSE in 1900. Both the School of

Ethics and Social Philosophy and the School of Sociology and Social Economics represent the practical ways in which an idealistic philosophy of society was brought to bear upon social movements of the day.

The School of Sociology and Social Economics had its origin in 1896 with the foundation of a Joint Lectures Committee composed of members of the COS, the Women's University Settlement, and the National Union of Women Workers. The Committee arranged for a series of lectures in London offered by those experienced in various aspects of social service. In the 1896-97 season, the Warden of the Women's University Settlement, Miss Sewell, lectured on the scope of charitable work, while Miranda Hill, sister of Octavia Hill, lectured on character and family. Lectures in subsequent years touched upon issues of charity and the family, medical relief, health and recreation, the history of the Poor Law, the care of women and children under the Poor Law and the standard of life. The latter series of lectures was delivered by Helen Bosanquet and subsequently published in a book of the same title.⁴⁸

The Joint Lectures Committee was dissolved in 1901 when the Women's University Settlement withdrew because the work of the committee had expanded beyond London to the provinces. The work of the committee

was then transferred to a Special Committee on Social Education of the COS. Various Social Education committees started in the provinces and Cambridge. Professor Alfred Marshall appeared before a conference of the COS Committee on Social Education. Marshall argued for an appreciation of an "organic" view of the influences of economic factors upon social life.⁴⁹ Marshall's argument for a holistic approach to understanding society and economy led him to join with others who shared a view of the whole, including Bosanquet, Muirhead and James Bonar, as participants in the General Committee of the School of Sociology and Social Economics after its transformation from the COS Special Committee on Social Education in 1903.

Bonar, Muirhead and Bosanquet had been primary figures in the work of the London Ethical Society and the London School of Ethics and Social Philosophy. The School of Sociology appears to have attracted those who had been associated with the idealistic outlook of the latter, while adding a dimension concerning social economics and administration. The purpose of the School was to combine the study of economics, ethics, social administration and social history with the practical work being undertaken by educators, settlement house workers and charity organizationists.

When the School of Sociology was created, Loch insisted that the attempt to provide theoretical training for those engaged in practical work would not interfere with the work of any other school. He may have made this claim with an eye to the London School of Economics, which offered an alternative method of social investigation and economics. The School of Sociology appears to have remained associated with the COS and its affiliates in the settlement house movement even after the COS officially severed the connection. E.J. Urwick was employed as a lecturer and tutor in the school. Other lecturers included the social evolutionist, Patrick Geddes, who lectured on "Observation and Method in Social Studies," Margaret Sewell held classes on "Some Practical Questions in Relief Work" and Miss E.A. Pearson of Lady Margaret Hall Settlement House lectured on "Successes and Failures in Industrial Reform."⁵⁰

The School of Sociology continued in existence until 1912-13 when it was incorporated into the University of London as the Department of Social Science and Administration with Urwick in charge of the new department. Clement Attlee was among the first lecturers. The new department was helped by

financial aid from Mr. Ratan Tata, an Indian millionaire who promoted the Ratan Tata foundation, whose main function under the direction of R.H. Tawney, was to inquire into the nature and causes of poverty. Although under the direct control of the University of London, the foundation was linked to the new department, which was then known as the Ratan Tata Department of Social Science. The department was kept separate from that of Sociology which was offered in the LSE. In 1919, the LSE assumed complete responsibility for both departments.⁵¹

What is interesting in all this is that the School of Sociology and Social Economics appears to have picked up where the London School of Ethics and Social Philosophy left off. Both were attempts to institutionalize a particular social vision. The School of Sociology added a practical dimension in that many of its students, as well as members of the Executive Committee were women actively engaged in settlement house and social work activities. The School of Ethics had provided a platform for the expression of a social philosophy of English idealism. The School of Sociology and Social Economics continued that effort, training social workers to an organic view of society and social organization.

Paradoxically, both schools were absorbed by the LSE, which at the time represented an opposing view of social theory and social action.

The same differences which had inspired the separate foundation of the School of Economics and Social Economics, the School of Ethics and Social Philosophy and the London School of Economics were responsible for the two Poor Law Reports in 1909.

The proposals of the Majority were consistent with Bosanquet's philosophy of society and polity. According to Bosanquet's view, the body politic was an organic whole, while to the Webb's the body politic was an administrative machine. The practical effect of these two visions of polity and society informed the Poor Law Reports. The Majority urged a smaller and local scale of services, tailored to particular cases of need, while the Minority envisioned the provision of services on a national scale. The Minority proposed to solve the problem of poverty with improved administration and a guarantee of services by the state. The Majority proposed to ameliorate and to prevent individual cases of destitution. Bosanquet agreed with the latter position because it implicitly presumed the obligation of the citizen to

the state, or, stated in another form, of the individual to society, and vice versa. He consistently argued for notions of individuality as the criterion of all measures of social reform.

If there was a flaw in Bosanquet's argument it was that he was quite myopic in the view that a failure to maintain oneself and one's dependents indicated a failure in citizenship and a failure to uphold one's social duty. He did not at all consider the possibility that a failure of will in the polity-at-large might ever occur. Presumably, if the will of the individual citizen could fail, why not that of an entire community? If one can fall from grace, why not the many? In practical terms, Bosanquet refused to consider the possibility that pauperism might result not from a failure of individual will or mind but from a collective failure on the part of the nation-state to sufficiently concern itself with the welfare of its people.

Most likely, Bosanquet would have replied with an argument similar to that which Rousseau had offered: the general will of the community might be deceived, but it was never wrong, precisely because it was the expression of the community. Bosanquet

did not revise his theory of society and the state, or of the general will in its relation to the nation-state, in his remarks in 1909. His insistence upon the identification of society with the state was evident in his correspondence with Robert MacIver (see Chapter VII).

He did appear to have reconsidered his theory of the general will in the years following the First World War. In the post-war years he allowed for a wider conception of community than he had in his Philosophical Theory of the State. He accepted the notion of a League of Nations and the viability of a will expressed in an international framework. But then, in the years which followed the war, Bosanquet focused less upon the social dimension of individuality and the theory of pauperism as he began a dialogue with Italian philosophers on the metaphysics of nature and mind.⁵²

1. See Charles Loch Mowat, The Charity Organisation Society 1869-1913: Its Ideas and Work (London: Methuen, 1961); David Owen, English Philanthropy 1660-1960 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1964); Kathleen Woodroffe, From Charity to Social Work in England and the United States (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968); T.H. Marshall, Social Policy in the Twentieth Century (London: Hutchinson, 1967); Derek Fraser, The Evolution of the British Welfare State (London: Macmillan & Co., 1973); Michael Rose, The English Poor Law 1780-1830 (Newton Abbot, 1971); Asa Briggs, Social Thought and Social Action: A Study of the Work of Seebohm Rowntree 1871-1954 (London: Longmans, 1961).

2. The Webbs were the foremost promoters of this view. See Sidney Webb and Beatrice Webb, English Local Government. English Poor Law History: Part 2. The Last Hundred Years. (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1929), p. 531 ff and Beatrice Webb, Our Partnership (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1948), p. 426.

3. Una Cormack, "The Welfare State: the Formative Years 1905-9," in A Reader in Social Administration, ed. A.V.S. Lochhead (London: Constable & Co., 1968), p. 92.

4. A.W. Vincent, "The Poor Law Reports of 1909 and the Social Theory of the Charity Organisation Society," Victorian Studies 27(Spring 1984):343-65. See also Andrew Vincent and Raymond Plant, Philosophy, Politics and Citizenship: The Life and Thought of the British Idealists (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984).

5. Correspondence: "The Fabian Society and the COS," Charity Organisation Review n.s.31(January 1912):49.

6. Great Britain, Parliament. Poor Laws and Relief of Distress, Command papers, Cd. 4499, 1909, Vol. 29, p. 653 (B.47) (B.51), p. 654 (B.61).

7. Ibid., p. 652 (B.42 and B.44).

8. The National Poor-Law Reform Association was responsible for reprinting Bernard Bosanquet, The Majority Report of the Poor Law Commission (London:

National Poor Law Reform Association, n.d.) as well as a number of essays by Helen Bosanquet. See Helen Bosanquet, Prevention and Cure (London: National Poor Law Reform Association, n.d.); Reform of the Poor Law (London: National Poor Law Reform Association, n.d.); Outdoor Medical Relief and the Recommendations of the Majority Report (London: National Poor Law Reform Association, n.d.); Why Not a "National" Authority for Dealing with Unemployment? (London: National Poor Law Reform Association, n.d.).

9. Bosanquet was reported to have been quite pleased to hold the same Chair in the University which Chalmers once held. See Helen Bosanquet, Bernard Bosanquet, A Short Account of His Life (London: Macmillan & Col, 1924), p. 115.

10. The extent of Helen Bosanquet's involvement in the work of the Commission is clearly evident in her Diary account and in the extensive correspondence with the Chairman of the Commission, Lord George Hamilton, fellow Commissioners Bentham, Smart, Webb, Phelps, Loch, the Bishop of Ross, and J. Patten MacDougall as well as with the Secretaries to the Commission, John Jeffrey and Robert Duff. See University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne Library, Bosanquet Papers, Trunk III.

11. Deborah Epstein Nord offers an interesting interpretation of Beatrice Webb's life and career as that of a struggle for identity. She emphasizes the oft-overlooked point that My Apprenticeship, published in 1926, was Beatrice Webb's first major work undertaken on her own since her marriage to Sidney Webb in 1892. See Deborah Epstein Nord, The Apprenticeship of Beatrice Webb (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1985).

12. Helen Bosanquet's prolific career as a writer on social issues tends to get short shrift from historians. Kathleen Woodroffe makes a rather revealing error in her study, From Charity to Social Work in England and the United States (London: Routledge, Kegan Paul, 1969), pp. 58-60. Woodroffe first cites Helen Bosanquet as a representative of the individualistic trend within the COS (p. 58) and two pages later cites Helen Dendy as a representative of an alternative, communitarian trend within the COS, apparently unaware that they are one and the same person.

13. Bernard Bosanquet, "The Reports of the Poor Law Commission. I. The Majority Report," Sociological Review 2(April 1909):109-27 and Sidney Webb, "The End of the Poor Law," Sociological Review 2(April 1909):127-39.
14. Bosanquet, "Majority Report," p. 111.
15. Ibid., p. 112.
16. Bernard Bosanquet, "The Art of Public Assistance," in Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress (Sheffield: Sheffield Weekly News Reprint, 1910), p. 52.
17. Bosanquet, "Majority Report," p. 114.
18. Bernard Bosanquet, "The Place of Experts in Democracy: Plato's Criticism of Democracy," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society n.s. 9(1908-09): 63.
19. Ibid., pp. 67-8.
20. Bernard Bosanquet, "Charity Organization and the Majority Report," International Journal of Ethics 20(July 1910):397.
21. Ibid.
22. Bernard Bosanquet, "The Reality of the General Will," in Aspects of the Social Problem, ed. B. Bosanquet (London: Macmillan & Co., 1895), p. 322.
23. Bosanquet, "Charity Organization and the Majority Report," p. 398.
24. Ibid.
25. Bosanquet, "Majority Report," p. 116.
26. Bernard Bosanquet, "Idealism in Social Work," Charity Organisation Review 3(March 1898):123.
27. Ibid., p. 127.
28. Bernard Bosanquet, "The Meaning of Social Work," International Journal of Ethics 11(April 1901): 300.
29. Ibid., p. 296.

30. Bosanquet, "Charity Organization and the Majority Report," p. 405.
31. Bosanquet, "Art of Public Assistance," p. 56.
32. Ibid.
33. Bosanquet, "Majority Report," p. 118.
34. Bernard Bosanquet, The Social Criterion: or How to Judge of Proposed Social Reforms (Edinburgh: W. Blackwood & Sons, 1907), pp. 14-15.
35. Bernard Bosanquet, "The Principle and Chief Dangers of the Administration of Charity," in Philanthropy and Social Progress, ed. H.C. Adams (Boston: Crowell & Co., 1893), p. 268.
36. Bosanquet, Social Criterion, p. 10.
37. Bosanquet, "Principle and Chief Dangers," p. 267.
38. Bosanquet cited in Helen Bosanquet, Social Work in London, pp. 297-98.
39. Bernard Bosanquet to R.F.A. Hoernlé, 14 September 1919, in Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends, ed. J.H. Muirhead, p. 218.
40. Bosanquet, Social Criterion, pp. 12-13.
41. Bosanquet, "Principle and Chief Dangers," p. 255.
42. Bosanquet, "Art of Public Assistance," p. 551.
43. Bernard Bosanquet, "Housing and Health," Charity Organisation Review n.s. 7(April 1900):193-95.
44. Bosanquet, Social Criterion, pp. 20-22.
45. C.S. Loch, A Great Ideal and its Champion: Papers and Addresses (London: Allen & Unwin, 1923), p. 216.

46. Bernard Bosanquet, The Principle of Individuality and Value: the Gifford Lectures for 1911 Delivered in Edinburgh University (London: Macmillan & Co., 1912) and The Value and Destiny of the Individual: The Gifford Lectures for 1912 Delivered in Edinburgh University (London: Macmillan & Co., 1913).

47. For a general survey of the contribution of women to public service work in this period, see Martha Vicinus, Independent Women: Work and Community for Single Women 1850-1920 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).

48. Information concerning the Joint Lectures Committee is available in Helen Bosanquet, Social Work in London, pp. 403-4; Una Cormack, "Developments in Casework," in Voluntary Social Services: Their Place in the Modern State, ed. A.F.C. Bourdillon (London: Methuen, 1945), p. 113; C.L. Mowat, The Charity Organisation Society (London: Methuen, 1961), p. 101ff and C.S. Loch, "School of Sociology and Social Economics," Pilot 7 (November 1903).

49. Alfred Marshall, "Economic Teaching at the Universities in Relation to Public Well-Being," Appendix 2 in Marjorie Smith, Professional Education for Social Work (New York: Council on Social Work Education, 1965), p. 100.

50. C.S. Loch, "School of Sociology and Social Economics," p. 4.

51. Descriptions of the absorption of the School of Sociology and Social Economics into the University of London and the LSE are available in F.A. Hayek, "The London School of Economics 1895-1945," Economica n.s. 13 (February 1946): 1-31; Richard Titmuss, Essays in the Welfare State (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969); Helen Bosanquet, Social Work in London and C.L. Mowat, The Charity Organisation Society.

52. Bosanquet produced several essays on Benedetto Croce's philosophy and engaged in a correspondence with several Italian philosophers, particularly with Lello Vivante. See Bernard Bosanquet, Croce's Aesthetic (London: British Academy, 1919) and H. Milford, "The Philosophy of Benedetto Croce," Quarterly Review 231 (April 1919): 359-77 and Bosanquet's exchange with Vivante and Armando Carlini in Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends, ed. J.H. Muirhead (London: Macmillan, 1935), pp. 255-303.

EPILOGUE

Bosanquet was vilified in the war years by Hobhouse and others for his association with a theory of the state identified with German metaphysics, and hence the enemy. The existential reality of nation-states at war forced Bosanquet to amend his theory of the general will to allow for a system of international understanding and cooperation as expressed in a League of Nations. This emendation to his theory of the general will, which he had earlier insisted was defined by the parameters of the nation-state, was an indication of his ardent hope that a League of Nations, pursuing an international common good, might overcome the limitations exhibited by the individual nation-states in the First World War.¹

Characteristically, at the moment in which he suffered indictment at home as the proponent of a false and foreign doctrine, he turned his efforts toward building bridges to another generation of scholars in another nation. He began to take a special interest in Italian philosophical writers, opening up new channels of communication with a younger generation of Italian philosophers with the publication of his critical essay on the philosophy of Benedetto Croce. Provoked by what he thought was

the false distinction between "Nature and Life" being drawn by Croce, among others, he worked to make clear the distinctions made by the "speculative" philosophers in Britain. His studies in this direction resulted in the publication in 1921 of The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy, his final complete work.

While the reality of the international situation had forced Bosanquet to acknowledge the possibility of a "world-will" expressed in an international League of Nations, domestic politics within Britain in the postwar years led him to support the Labour party. "I should like a labour government with one or two good liberals in it."² While he did not elaborate further upon his choice of political party, his move toward Labour may have been the result of a dissatisfaction with Liberal policy in the conduct of the war, its diplomatic policy, or a dissatisfaction with a party divided between the leadership of the Liberal imperialist Asquith and David Lloyd George. Bosanquet's move toward a party of Labour, in spite of its appearance of class-based politics, was really not all that surprising in that he maintained a lifelong sympathy to working class ideals and to the trade union movement. He was even willing, however reluctantly, to follow his friend R. B. Haldane's argument that the government organization of the coal industry might serve

as a means of getting the nation in motion again.³

The sea change effected by the war appears to have moved Bosanquet to acknowledge the seeming inconsistency of appearing to support both more and less of the state, a charge which he levelled against his wartime critics as well. "It is impossible to unite a demonstration of growing demands on the state for organising activity, with a demonstration that its rank and authority already demand diminution."⁴

In defending his own case, he suggested that there was no real problem or paradox, save in the mind of polemicists. In a rare note of self-explanation, he wrote to R. F. A. Hoernlé, his former assistant in the University of St. Andrews, who had published an unusually perceptive and sympathetic review of his 1917 volume, Social and International Ideals, Being Studies in Patriotism.

I suffer, in public discussion, I think, from what I really, in my own mind, hold to be a strength of my position, viz., that I have two quite different publics and specialism--one, the philosophers; the other, the social experts. I am quite happy with either apart; either at a meeting of the Aristotelian Society, or in the chair with 50 to 200 experienced social workers before me. But I cannot unite these supports. They, as a rule (I do not speak of unusually instructed persons), know nothing of each other and of each others' experiences.⁵

Were his two specialisms, philosophy and social work, mutually supportive, as he would have had it? Or was there a contradiction between his social theory and

practice, as critics like Cole and Hobson had charged? He thought his work on behalf of the COS provided him with the experience which was both the source and confirmation of his social theory. He was "like a microscopist," observing in COS committee and classroom the existential realities which proved his theory of individuality and community.

Bosanquet's experience as an applied philosopher of social thought included his work with the Charity Organisation Society, the London Ethical Society, and with the London School of Ethics and Social Philosophy. From the time of his arrival in London in 1881 to his death in 1923 he addressed public audiences, philosophers and social workers alike, in the idiom of idealism. The social philosophy of charity organization which he espoused was more complex than the simplistic individualistic-laissez-fairist formulation caricatured by critics of COS social policy. In his essays and addresses on behalf of the COS, Bosanquet elaborated upon his theory of individuality and society. His social philosophy of individuality led to his remarks on the importance of character--a traditional COS argument--which in his presentation was the essence of individuality. The development of character was essential to his argument for the development of a potential self--a higher, moral,

social self attainable only within the context of community. The shared emphasis upon community formed the basis of his remarks in the late 1880s and 1890s on behalf of a socialism which served both individual and social purpose. The ethical dimension of his thought was also evident in his work on behalf of the London Ethical Society.

In the course of his association with the Ethical Society Bosanquet gave a series of lectures marked by their neo-Kantianism. He insisted upon the sanctity of the individual as an end and he insisted upon the difficulty of promoting morality directly. His prescriptive advice to his Ethical Society colleagues was neither interventionist nor laissez-fairist in scope. He spoke of the "delicacy" of intruding into the lives of individuals, even if the intention was to assist or to raise up to a higher standard of life. Again, his theory of individuality demanded that the individual be regarded as potentia--as a potential subject capable of growth if left unimpeded yet surrounded by a matrix of social relations. In The Philosophical Theory he referred to the principle which justified interventionist action as "hindering hindrances." In his ethical lectures he cited the example of Thomas Chalmers' work among the poor in a Glasgow parish in support of his view of the self-

sufficiency of the individual within a context of positive social relations, i.e., home and community.

In his response to the Poor Law Reports of 1909 Bosanquet emphasized the moral and social obligations inherent in citizenship. Pauperism, he insisted, indicated a failure to uphold one's obligation to society. He rejected the idea of a guaranteed program of social assistance on the grounds that it would break the springs of character. Those who failed to live up to the social standard, that is, the standard of the community as mind and will, would be subject to the intervention of the state acting "in loco parentis."

The notion of will was basic to his philosophy of the state. He argued that it was the development of will which was the precondition for the realization of individuality, or personality, as a social, moral and political being. Citizenship in a state with laws and institutions shaped by the operation of a general will was essential to his social and political theory. His theory of individuality emphasized the realization of self as mind and will, striving to become what it wants to be and ought to be. The realization of this occurred in organized social life with social rules and institutional practices. And because he identified society with the state, the role of the state, in his argument, was

to provide and maintain the conditions for the development of a real self qua social self, dedicated to the common good of the community.

Bosanquet's ambiguous use of the term "state," however, weakened his attempt to integrate his communitarian social philosophy with his political philosophy. This was evident in his response to the Reports. In arguing against a guaranteed program of state assistance, Bosanquet appeared to refer to the state in its everyday, empirical operation. But the more speculative and metaphysical presentation of the state suggested that society and the state were one. In the idealist grammar of politics, the state was the expression of the general will of the community. The state in that sense was the highest in a complex of social institutions responsible for the development of the individual. In his remarks on the Poor Law Reports he appeared to move between the terms of his political philosophy which held that the state was the matrix of individuality, and the more empirical sense of the state, as arbiter and regulator of daily existence. When he invoked the idiom of the state in its empirical sense, he denied full measure to the communitarian aspect of his social philosophy. If society and the state were one, why should a national program which aimed at the self-sufficiency of the people be any

less desirable than a community-based, local program which aimed at the self-sufficiency of its inhabitants?

Bosanquet failed to realize that the community-based politics of self-help which he preferred and which he opposed to any suggestion of a national program of social welfare, tended to vitiate his argument that society and the state were one and that the state was the largest community of all. In practice, Bosanquet did distinguish between polity and society, society and the state. At times he argued that society was synonymous with the state (viewed in its speculative sense), and at other times society appeared to be the more apt expression of a collective or social will than did the state (viewed in its empirical sense). Bosanquet's varying presentations of state and community, weakened his attempt to integrate the terms of his social and political philosophy. This failure owed as much, perhaps, to the ambiguity of the terms of idealist political argument as it did to the contradictions in Bosanquet's social theory and practice.

Bosanquet's own experience of home and community on the family Northumbrian estate of Rock provided him with the example of neighborly kindness and cooperation which was the starting-point of his social theory. "The

art of living together," characterized daily life on the family estate; it also served as a shorthand description of the organic model of society which he elevated to the status of theory.⁶ Bosanquet found comfort and a theory in his organicist view of social relations. "Our station and its duties" provided the individual with a moral as well as social prescription for action. This particular view of social relations, drawn in Bosanquet's case from the example of the family's Northumbrian farm, tacitly approved the implicit pattern of social and political relations described by at least one historian of Victorian Britain as the "politics of deference."⁷ Because he believed that the social and political were one, he assumed that the harmony and cooperation which characterized the social relations in the operation of the family estate would characterize the relation of social classes in the realm of politics.

Bosanquet carried his notion of home and community up to Oxford where he found a theoretical structure for his ideal: philosophical idealism. His parents had intended him for the clergy; he found a surrogate creed in the Balliol of Jowett and Green. Green's doctrine of ethics and of political obligation contained an implicit prescription for social service. "The school of Green," as R. G. Collingwood recalled, sent down streams of young

men from Oxford eager to serve their fellow citizens and the state.⁸ Bosanquet's three Harrow classmates who had also intended to enter the clergy pursued careers as educators; R. G. Tatton was the first warden of the Passmore Edwards settlement, which served as home to residents of University College and to the London School of Ethics and Social Philosophy, T. G. Rooper served in the Education department and C. B. Heberden became Principal of Brasenose College, Oxford.

From his years of apprenticeship under T. H. Green at Oxford, Bosanquet took with him the conviction that philosophy was a vocation to be put into practice. As an applied philosopher engaged in London social reform he attempted to carry the idealist social and political message to a wider audience. T. H. Green's vision of a moral community consciously directed towards "a self-realization compatible with a common good" had been shaped by the character of mid-Victorian politics in the period following the reform of the franchise in 1867.⁹ Bosanquet adapted Green's vision of polity and society to the political and social circumstances of fin de siècle Britain. Hence his extensive remarks regarding the relationship of the individual to the state, the relationship between a healthy polity and its citizenry, the nature of patriotism and the ethical nature of the state.

These themes were all aspects of the social and political philosophy which he served and which he brought to bear upon the contemporary issues which concerned British audiences at the turn of the century. He lectured popular and scholarly audiences in the idiom of philosophical idealism. Before both audiences he invoked the commonplace to elicit a sense of the metaphysical, using metaphor to transport his audience from the real to the ideal. This was evident in a lecture before a wartime audience on "patriotism in the perfect state." The title suggested an idealist grammar or rhetoric, while the subject as discussed was far more temporal and specific. Referring to the existential nature of the modern state he impressed upon his audience the possibilities of the present.

A state is sailing a sea but slightly charted, and what marks the charts do furnish are mostly recent and depend on a revocable consent. As a supreme power, it has a responsibility for every choice, of which no precedents nor external recommendations can divest it. At every step it is making a new world.¹⁰

The metaphor which he invoked, though not at all new, was used to distinguish the limitless possibilities as well as responsibilities of the state, as a species of polity, from the ordered and familiar life of the individual functioning within community, since time immemorial. Bosanquet's philosophical theory of the state was received as a *parti-pris* for the Hegelian advocates of state power. During and after the First World War,

Bosanquet became the lightning rod for the critique of idealist social and political thought as well as its metaphysic. His theory of the state was received in terms of the heated polemic of the war years. His subsequent reputation among political philosophers reflected that reception.

Where the second edition of the Philosophical Theory had been received primarily as a work of social philosophy, and the social aspect of the theory as applied to questions of social welfare most concerned the critics, it was only with the war that the theory of the state with regard to the conduct and morality of a state in its international relations was called into question. Only rarely did commentators after 1914 refer to the individualistic as well as social aspects of Bosanquet's argument.¹¹ With the passing of the idealist grammar of polity and society from public forum after the war, and its replacement by the last and most impassioned sort of criticism which had developed under the aegis of nation states at war, the opportunity to understand the very terms of the idealists' speculative philosophy waned. Contemporaries and then later generations of political scientists, obsessed by the horror of war and divisive nationalism, misread the substance of the social and political argument as it emerged from the entirety of

Bosanquet's work. The idealist idiom of political and social argument, once accepted on its own terms, was rejected by successive generations.

In three posthumous chapters on the nature of mind, Bosanquet quoted with approval the idea that "the man is the sphere which his activity doth fill."¹² He thought that the fullness of a person's life was in his or her work and that what the person succeeded in grasping "and rescuing from chaos" was the measure of a life. Reticent in speaking of the personal or biographical aspects of his life, he was also reluctant to allow that he served as a spokesman for a generation of philosophers, trained in the idiom of idealism to serve fellow citizens and the state.

By his many-sided activities, as a lecturer and writer, Bosanquet influenced the terms of social and political discourse of his contemporaries. He offered a theory of the ethics of citizenship and community in a period when the nature and welfare of the polity was under scrutiny. He saw no contradiction between his political and social philosophy, or between his social theory and practice. In his own mind, he was carrying out the plan of the master-builders of philosophy.

One's whole being goes in tides. To some extent with me they are mitigated because my faiths are apt

to be centered outside my own work; I feel a sort of hold on tradition and its great incarnations, and feel more or less warranted as their interpreter. Probably that is a confession of some want of originality.¹³

The concluding sentence was characteristic of Bosanquet's humility. His remark had been meant to support the idea and function of reason as a means of experiencing and interpreting the world. Bosanquet's philosophizing came at first hand. His practical experience of social work in London allowed him "the experimental feel" and "concrete experience" of social organization and social life.¹⁴ And it was that concrete experience of community, family, and charity work which led him to support local self-help organizations rather than a national system of social assistance. By the terms of his political philosophy, society and the state were one and the same. But in his social theory and practice, he appeared to argue for a myriad of local communities which were distinct and separate from the public, common good. It was here that Bosanquet failed to integrate his social and political thought. In practice, to be sure, Bosanquet was much more at ease with the idea of community than that of the state. This was clear in his opposition to proposals for a state policy of social welfare.

This weakness in Bosanquet's argument, between his preference for community and his sometime-

identification of society, or community, with the state was a flaw in the logic of philosophical idealism. It should not vitiate, however, Bosanquet's contribution to the grammar of ethics, community and citizenship in late nineteenth and early twentieth century political discourse.

1. Helen Bosanquet, Bernard Bosanquet, p. 136.
2. Bernard Bosanquet to R. F. A. Hoernlé, 14 Sept. 1919, in Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends, pp. 217-18.
3. Ibid.
4. Bosanquet, "The Function of the State in Promoting the Unity of Mankind," in Social and International Ideals, p. 301.
5. Bernard Bosanquet to R. F. A. Hoernlé, 17 March 1918, in Bernard Bosanquet and His Friends, p. 193.
6. Bosanquet, "Life and Philosophy," in Contemporary British Philosophy, ed. J. H. Muirhead (1st series; London: Allen & Unwin, 1924), p. 52. Bosanquet's rare autobiographical note was occasioned by Muirhead's request that contributors to the volume (subtitled "Personal Statements") add biographical references if they were relevant to the development of one's thought. See Muirhead, "Editor's Preface," in Contemporary British Philosophy, p. 8.
7. David Cresap Moore, The Politics of Deference: A Study of the Mid-Nineteenth Century English Political System (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1976).
8. R. G. Collingwood, An Autobiography, p. 17.
9. Melvin Richter, Politics of Conscience, p. 26.
10. Bosanquet, "Patriotism in the Perfect State," in International Crisis, p. 138.
11. See Michael Oakeshott, review of Bertil Pfanenstill, Bernard Bosanquet's Philosophy of the State (Lund, 1936), in Philosophy 11 (1936), pp. 482-83. Oakeshott steered readers toward the idealist philosophy of the self. F. Philip Harris, a student of MacIver's at Columbia, prepared a fine Master's thesis which treated the individualistic as well as social aspects of Bosanquet's thought. See Frederick Philip Harris, The Neo-Idealist Political Theory. Its Continuity with the British Tradition (New York: King's Crown Press, 1944).

12. Bosanquet, quoted in Muirhead, "Bernard Bosanquet," Mind 32 (Oct. 1923), p. 396.

13. Bosanquet, quoted in R. F. A. Hoernlé, "In Memoriam: Bernard Bosanquet," in Journal of Philosophy, 20 (Sept. 1923): 510.

14. Ibid., p. 512.

APPENDIX A

ESSEX HALL EXTENSION CLASSES*

<u>1888-89</u>	London Society for the Extension of University Teaching (LSEUT)
Muirhead	English Political Writers
P. Wicksteed	Social Problems
<u>1889-90</u>	LSEUT
Malden	Shakespeare's History Plays
Morton	Astronomy
Muirhead	Elements of Ethics; Plato's <u>Republic</u>
Wicksteed	Making and Sharing
<u>1890-91</u>	LSEUT
Muirhead	Aristotle's Ethics; Ethics
G. Wallas	History of the Working Classes
G. Armitage-Smith	Political Economy
<u>1891-92</u>	London Ethical Society (LES)
S. Bryant	Life & Mind
F. W. Flux	First Principles of Political Economy
B. Bosanquet	Nature of Knowledge
Muirhead	J. S. Mackenzie's <u>Introduction to Social Philosophy</u>

*Sources drawn from syllabi and other papers in the Bosanquet collection in the Library of the University of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne.

<u>1892-93</u>	LES
B. Bosanquet	Plato's <u>Republic</u> ; Plato (spring and summer terms)
John Rae	Progress and Present Position of Socialism
S. Bryant	Moral Education
<u>1893-94</u>	LES
Muirhead	Greek Ethics; Aristotle's Ethics
B. Bosanquet	Psychology of the Moral Self
P. Wicksteed	Theory of Sharing
J. A. Hobson	Problems of Poverty
<u>1894-95</u>	LES
G. Wallas	English Citizen
J. S. Mackenzie	Introduction to Moral Philosophy
H. Dendy	Principles of Social Development; Economic History
B. Bosanquet	Rousseau's <u>Social Contract</u>
<u>1895-96</u>	LES
B. Bosanquet	The Philosophy of Aesthetics
Muirhead	Mind and Will (autumn term); Mind and Will (spring term)
Childs	English Citizen
<u>1896-97</u>	LES
Muirhead	Will in Relation to Conduct
B. Bosanquet	Some Conceptions of Aristotle's <u>Ethics</u> Some Conceptions of Aristotle's Ethics (summer term)

APPENDIX B

LONDON SCHOOL OF ETHICS AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY*

(October 1897-November 1900)

1897-98

Bosanquet	The Philosophical Theory of the State Institutions as Ethical Ideas
George Dawes	Introduction to Moral Philosophy
W. H. Fairbrother	Elementary Ethics The Moral and Political Philosophy of J. S. Mill
Arthur Sidgwick	Greek Literature
Alexander Shand	Prof. W. James "Principles of Psychology"

1898-99

G. Benson	Some General Principles of Politics
Helen Bosanquet	The Psychology of Social Progress
G. E. Moore	Elements of Ethics. Introduction Kant's Moral Philosophy
E. J. Urwick	Nature of Right and Wrong
B. Bosanquet	Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art

*Source: Memorandum of the London School of Ethics & Social Philosophy, Bosanquet papers, University of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne Library.

1898-99 (continued)

Mackail	Dramatic Art of the Greeks
	English Utilitarians

1899-1900

G. F. Stout	Fundamentals of Psychology
Drewitt	Logic
Gilbert Murray	Euripedes (3 lecture course)

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C. S. Loch. Selected papers. University of London.
Goldsmith's Library. London.

Passfield papers. British Library of Political and Economic Science, London School of Economics and Political Science. London.

Robert M. MacIver papers. Columbia University. Rare Books and Manuscript Library. New York.

Works by Bernard Bosanquet

Bosanquet's output of books, essays, lectures, reviews and published communications during his writing life of forty-five years was enormous. The list which follows is complete with regard to his books and major articles, but does not include his total published output. It is arranged in chronological order, by date of publication.

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