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WOMEN'S EXPERIENCE OF INJUSTICE IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERPERSONAL INEQUALITY

City University of New York PH.D. 1982

WOMEN'S EXPERIENCE OF INJUSTICE IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERPERSONAL INEQUALITY

by

JOYCE BLOCK

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Psychology in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York.

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Abstract

WOMEN'S EXPERIENCE OF INJUSTICE IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERPERSONAL INEQUALITY

by

Joyce Block

Adviser: Professor Florence Denmark

The present research was designed to test propositions derived from social comparison, reference group, relative deprivation, and equity theories, concerning factors which mediate the experience of inequity in the context of interpersonal inequality. If the differentiation of roles on the basis of sex is one such mediating factor, then it would be expected that women would respond differently to inequality in relation to a man than in relation to another woman. Specifically, it was predicted that on the average, women would experience less anger, resentment, or indignation when treated unequally by a man than when treated unequally by another woman. Individual differences in sex role orientation, self-perceived competency, and a generalized tendency to inhibit anger were also expected to influence women's responses.

One hundred and eighty-one women were presented either on videotape or in a written transcript with an unequal interaction between coworkers in a work setting. Subjects were asked to identify themselves with the target of an

overbearing partner, and to indicate how they would feel and behave if they were in her position.

For the most part, the sex of the overbearing partner did not have a significant effect on women's responses. There was some evidence that women's responses did tend to vary as a function of sex role orientation and self-perceived competency, with Feminine women responding somewhat less aggressively than Androgynous or Masculine women, regardless of the sex of the partner. Sex role orientation was significantly related to self-perceived competency, with low masculine women rating themselves less competent than high masculine women. Subject variables were also related to women's responses to the target of inequality, with high feminine women responding more sympathetically than low feminine women. An effect of age was also observed, with older women feeling less hurt or intimidated by the overbearing partner than younger women.

Relative deprivation theory is reexamined in light of the findings, which are discussed in terms of changing reference group boundaries, sex role stereotypes, and causal attributions for same-sex and opposite-sex inequality.

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INTRODUCTION

> "Justice depends on expectations and expectations in the long run on actualities . . . an inequitable distribution may be no more than one that no longer reflects the actual distribution of power." (Homans, 1976)

Common sense might lead one to expect that those people who have achieved the least, and have been subject to the greatest hardships, would feel the most dissatisfied with themselves and their lot in life. It might also lead one to anticipate that those who have been treated the most unjustly would experience the most anger and would express the greatest amount of unhappiness. However, these simple cause and effect relations do not hold up under empirical investigation. Our feelings of pride, shame, success, or failure cannot be predicted purely on the basis of our actual abilities or our measured achievements. In evaluating our present situation (our accomplishments or our outcomes), we compare what we have attained with what we expected to attain, and in this way the "actual" takes on meaning only in the context of what we feel <u>should</u> exist. The expectancies we hold for ourselves, and the level of our aspirations are influenced by our past experiences, and the experiences of others whom we observe, and whom

we regard as similar and thus comparable to us (Atkinson, 1964; Chapman & Volkman, 1939; Crandall, 1969; Dreyer, 1954; Festinger, 1942; Fishbein et al., 1963; Patchen, 1961; Rosenberg, 1979; Scase, 1974; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; Webster & Sobieszek, 1974). These standards, which vary according to different individuals and social groupings, fluctuate over time and across situations; they form the basis for our self-evaluations.

Similarly, dissatisfaction, feelings of resentment, and the experience of injustice are the consequences of complex psychological evaluations which do not necessarily correspond in a linear fashion to objective criteria of deprivation (Crosby, 1976; Davis, 1959; Patchen, 1958; Patchen, 1961; Pettigrew, 1967; Scase, 1974; Searles & Williams, 1962; Sears & McConahay, 1970; Stouffer et al., 1949). That which is perceived as satisfactory and equitable by one individual or group of individuals, may elicit feelings of resentment and injustice in another. "Evils which are patiently endured when they seem inevitable, become intolerable when once the idea of escape from them is suggested" (De Tocqueville, as quoted in Crosby, 1976).

The failure to obtain identity between our subjective experiences and objective phenomena has been recognized, discussed, and researched by psychophysicists (e.g. Weber's Law of Just Noticeable Difference), as well as psychoanalysts, developmental and social psychologists (Freud, 1915;

Lewin, 1951; Piaget & Inhelder, 1969; Webster & Sobieszek, 1974). In Kurt Lewin's field theoretical formulation behavior is understood to be a function of all the forces existing at a particular moment in an individual's "life-space." The forces Lewin refers to are only those which are psychologically real to the person. The perception of physical and social reality, and our subjective estimation of the costs and benefits of our movement in a particular direction, are the determining factors of our behavior. That which exists objectively, but which remains outside of the individual's conscious or unconscious experience cannot influence his or her behavior. Likewise, misperceptions of oneself or of the environment are relevant despite their fictitious basis. The symbolic or imagined, rather than exclusively the actual, thus becomes the object of study. Field theory does not discount the influence of the past on current actions and goals; however, the past exerts an influence on present-day functioning only insofar as it contributes to an individual's perception, at the present moment, of the self, and of the physical and social world he or she inhabits. Personality and social psychological variables are subsumed in this model of human behavior.

It is the purpose of the present investigation to examine certain personality and social psychological factors which may mediate women's reactions to interpersonal inequality. The study is designed to assess (through self-report measures) overt behavioral responses, as well as

covert, cognitive-affective processes which are not generally observable. Relevant literature in the areas of expectancies and self-evaluation, social comparison processes, reference groups, relative deprivation, equity, and sex roles, will be discussed.

Expectancies, Self-Evaluation, and the Evaluation of Outcomes

Internal as well as external criteria and standards determine our self-evaluations and consequently our behavior, and it is difficult to disentangle the one from the other, i.e. the influence of the past from the influence of the present (Parsons et al., 1976; Sherman, 1976; Webster & Sobieszek, 1974). Motivational analyses of behavior discuss the role of internalized expectancies in the evaluative process. For example, when an individual expects to succeed at a given task, he or she will experience a greater amount of shame upon failure than if, from the outset, success is perceived to be only a slim possibility (Atkinson, 1964). While the expectations and standards are ones we set for ourselves, it is generally acknowledged that to a large extent we derive them through our social interactions, so that originally their basis is in the external world. Sociological theories of the Self, formulated by Mead and Cooley, and discussed by Webster and Sobieszek (1974), propose that our conceptions of ourselves, and therefore our expectancies for our performances, are the product of the perceptions others have of us. Thus, once

again, the distinction between the internal and the external sources of evaluation becomes blurred.

The emphasis placed on expectancies in the field of motivation, and particularly in research investigating sex differences and achievement, has its foundation in the relationships which are posited between expectancy, cognitive-affective responses to success or failure, and future behavior (Crandall, 1969; Feather & Simon, 1973; Frieze et al., 1978; McMahon, 1973; Parsons et al., 1976). Persons who expect to achieve little are likely to aspire lower, hence they may be satisfied when they achieve less, and may fail to take credit for achieving more than what was initially expected (Festinger, 1942; Lewin, 1944; McMahon, 1973; Simon & Feather, 1973). In this manner, expectancies are confirmed, and they translate into actual functioning.

Thibaut and Kelley (1959) proposed that the expectancies an individual brings to an interpersonal interaction determine the level of satisfaction he or she experiences in the actual social exchange. These expectancies define for the individual what constitutes a favorable and fair outcome. The level of outcomes previously obtained in similar situations, and in other salient and equivalent relationships, is the social basis for the development of these expectancies. The internal standard, against which specific encounters are evaluated, is designated by Thibaut and Kelley as a person's "comparison level." Outcomes

which fall above an individual's comparison level will be experienced as favorable and satisfactory, whereas those which fall below this level will be dissatisfying. Thibaut and Kelley introduce another construct relevant to the prediction of behavioral rather than exclusively cognitive-affective responses to an interpersonal interaction: "comparison level of alternatives." They suggest that satisfaction or dissatisfaction with a relationship is not a sufficient condition for an individual to even attempt to extricate himself or herself from it. One can be dissatisfied, yet dependent. Disengagement will occur when the "mean" favorability of outcomes available to the person in alternative relationships, or in the state of aloneness, is perceived to be higher than those obtainable in the present circumstances. In the Thibaut and Kelley model of social interaction, a person's "comparison level" is largely a conglomerate product of past experiences. However, the construct is a dynamic one, and an individual's comparison level is subject to continual modification as a function of present-day interactions. The average level of past outcomes experienced fluctuates over time with each additional interaction, and each new observation. Consequently, the internal standard of evaluation will vary accordingly. The dynamic nature of this formulation leaves room for individual and social change.

The relationship between expectations and cognitive-affective responses to outcomes was investigated experi-

mentally by Spector (1956). Soldiers' feelings of frustration upon failure to obtain a promotion were found to be related to their initial expectancies for such an outcome. Those soldiers who were led to believe that they would be promoted, and who subsequently were not, experienced greater frustration than those who did not anticipate such a favorable change in status. Since expectation and subsequent outcomes were experimentally manipulated on a random basis, the findings suggest a direct, causal relationship between expectations and the experience of frustration.

Nonexperimental studies of morale in the American soldier during World War II, which were conducted by Stouffer et al. (1949), and analyzed extensively by Merton and Kitt (1950), lend support for such a relationship. Soldiers' feelings of satisfaction or discontent with army life appeared to vary as a function of their expectations for themselves, and could not be accounted for on the basis of their absolute levels of deprivation. Literature on worker satisfaction/dissatisfaction (Patchen, 1961; Scase, 1974; Wedderburn & Craig, 1974), and research investigating discontent and protest among black Americans during the 1960's (Crawford & Naditch, 1974; Orum & Orum, 1968; Pettigrew, 1967; Searles & Williams, 1962; Sears & McConahay, 1970) also make reference to expectation level as a critical mediating variable. These naturalistic, field studies will be discussed at length below under the

heading: Reference Groups, Relative Deprivation, and Equity.

It is evident from this discussion that it is of critical importance to address the question of how these expectancies develop, as well as whether they are subject to change with situational variation. For the purposes of the present study the emphasis will be placed on the social derivation of the standards we hold for ourselves as individuals and members of social groups.

Social Comparison Processes

In 1954 Festinger formulated a theory of social comparison processes. It was hypothesized that "There exists in the human organism, a drive to evaluate his opinions and abilities" (Hypothesis 1). And, "To the extent that non-social means are not available, people evaluate their opinions or abilities, by comparison respectively with the opinions or abilities of others" (Hypothesis 2). Festinger's theory is elaborated so as to include nine hypotheses and numerous corollaries and derivations. Hypothesis 3 addresses itself to the question of whom persons choose to compare themselves with. Given the wide range of diverse "Others" which exists within the population, and the proposed significance of social comparisons in the construction of a person's self-evaluation, it is critical to understand and to be able to predict the selection process.

Festinger hypothesizes that the "tendency to compare oneself with some other specific person decreases as the difference between his opinion or ability and one's own increases." This is referred to as the "Similarity Hypothesis," and it has generated an abundance of research and criticism. Corollaries to the hypothesis further clarify its implications: Corollary 3A states that "Given the range of possible persons for comparison, someone close to one's own ability or opinion will be chosen for comparison." And, Corollary 3B adds that "If the only comparison available is a very divergent one, the person will not be able to make a subjectively precise evaluation of his opinion or ability." Hypthesis 8 of the theory addresses itself to another aspect of comparison choice: "If persons who are very divergent from one's own opinion or ability are perceived as different from oneself on attributes consistent with the divergence, the tendency to narrow the range of comparability becomes stronger."

To summarize thus far, Festinger is proposing that we have a drive to evaluate ourselves, i.e. our opinions and abilities, and if there does not exist a nonsocial basis to make such an evaluation, we do so by comparing ourselves to others on these dimensions. The people with whom we choose to compare ourselves tend to be similar to us because it is these comparisons which provide us with the most precise, and hence the most valuable information.

When we perceive the difference between ourselves and another as encompassing a wide range of characteristics we are less likely to consider a comparison as evaluatively significant.

While there is some empirical evidence that social comparisons do have an effect on a person's self-evaluation as well as his or her expectancies, and this is observed particularly when objective evaluative criteria are unavailable and comparison others are "similar" (Chapman & Volkman, 1939; Dreyer, 1954; Fishbein et al., 1963; Hoffman et al., 1954; Rasmussen & Zander, 1954), it is not clearly established how, and for what reasons, people make their comparisons under naturalistic conditions.

Of particular relevance to the similarity hypothesis and Hypothesis 8 of Festinger's theory are the findings of an experiment conducted by Hoffman et al. (1954). In the context of a three-person game, subjects were observed to behave more competitively towards a confederate who was designated as a peer than to one designated as a "superior." Hoffman et al. interpret this behavior as confirmation of Festinger's similarity hypothesis. The subjects perceived the "superior" confederate as "dissimilar," and a comparison between their own and this confederate's performance had little evaluative significance. Therefore, the subject was not motivated to compete.

Experiments conducted by Mettee and Riskund (1974) and Mettee and Wilkins (1972) further corroborate the greater

evaluative impact of comparisons with similar as contrasted with dissimilar Others. Subjects expressed preference for an overwhelming and decisive defeat by a "superior" Other, to a marginal defeat by an equal. This suggests that while the latter defeat is smaller on an absolute scale, it has greater evaluative significance since it was accomplished by a comparable Other (Mettee & Riskund, 1974). Mettee and Wilkins (1972) attribute subjects' differential reactions to a "similar" and "dissimilar" ability Other who commits a "pratfall" to the comparability and noncomparability of this Other's performance to their own. "Similar" Others were derogated more for their blunders than "dissimilar" Others. The investigators suggest that subjects' self-evaluations (their self-esteem) are threatened when they are confronted with the deficiencies of those similar to themselves; therefore they judge them more harshly.

The significance that the behavior of "similar" Others has for our own self-evaluations may help to explain the "pressures to uniformity," and the rejection of deviants which are patterns that have been observed in the context of small group interactions (Festinger et al., 1952). Such group processes become more apparent when groups are "cohesive" and members perceive themselves as similar.

The evaluative implications of comparisons with similar Others may explain, at least in part, why members of minority groups are often particularly harsh in their

evaluations of deviants within their own group (Allport, 1952; Denmark, 1979; Fogarty et al., 1971; Hacker, 1951; Walster & Pate, 1976). To illustrate: It is more threatening for a Jew to observe another Jew, than to observe a non-Jew, engage in criminal behavior because it reflects on his or her own integrity as a member of the same social group. It is also more threatening for a woman to perceive another woman perform incompetently than for her to perceive similar ineptitude in a man. Consequently, she might be more critical, and less tolerant of the woman than the man. Denmark (1979) reports findings which suggest that women but not men judge "outspoken," abrasive women more harshly than identically "outspoken" abrasive men. Perhaps female judges are more critical than male judges of women who deviate from sex role norms, and norms of socially appropriate behavior, because their deviation represents a threat to their own self-evaluations and positions. It would be interesting to investigate whether males respond more critically than females when men deviate from the masculine sex role. This might be expected to follow from the theoretical framework enunciated above.

The theory of social comparisons, as it was formulated by Festinger (1954), has generated a substantial amount of research and discussion. Two aspects of the theory which required further elaboration and clarification are: (1) the motive for seeking social comparisons, and (2) the

parameters of "similarity." Festinger originally posited that the drive to evaluate ourselves in comparison to others has as its basis the need to understand reality in the face of ambiguity. We are hungry for information about ourselves, and we seek to establish veridical perceptions.

More recently, it has been argued that people compare themselves to others not only to arrive at an accurate assessment of the level of their abilities or the veracity of their opinions, but also to preserve their self-esteem, to find consensual validation for their perceptions, and to maintain mutually supportive relationships with others (Allen & Wilder, 1977; Brickman & Bulman, 1977; Goethals & Darley, 1977; Latane, 1966). Brickman and Bulman (1977) contend that while Festinger's hypotheses are true under certain conditions, the converse of these hypotheses is more accurate under other conditions. These investigators agree that people have a need to compare themselves with others; however, they suggest that people also have a desire to avoid such comparisons when they are apt to yield unflattering information. Social comparisons involve "costs" when they provide us with information regarding our relative standing on a particular dimension, and ego-defensive considerations may supercede motives for accurate self-evaluation. Therefore, although Brickman and Bulman concur with Festinger's hypothesis that similar Others provide the individual with the most pertinent data for making a precise evaluation of the self, they suggest that for this

very reason, people sometimes prefer to compare themselves with dissimilar Others.

Comparisons with an unambiguously "superior," "inferior," or "different" Other, who can be classified as non-comparable, have little evaluative potency, and do not pose a threat to self-esteem. Empirical evidence lends support to this formulation. Adolescent subjects are less likely to be threatened by the relative success and achievement of a middle-aged person than the relative success and achievement of a peer; and subjects report feeling better about the relative success of a peer whose background is somewhat different from their own (Brickman & Bulman, 1977). While the data are consistent with the assumptions underlying the similarity hypothesis, it also serves to illustrate the "hedonic" gains which comparisons with "dissimilar" Others afford.

That an individual's experience of inequality is a function of the total configuration in which it occurs can be derived from the preceding argument. Inequality on one dimension--e.g. performance on a test, position in a hierarchy--is apparently more acceptable when it can be attributed to differences on other relevant dimensions (Goethals & Darley, 1977). For example, if O's superior skills in math can be attributed to the intensive tutoring he or she has received, P need not conclude definitively that O's ability is greater than his or her own; ability and training are confounded, and the dissimilar comparison yields only

ambiguous information. Likewise, if O's success in getting admitted to medical school can be attributed to the fact that he is a man, if P is a woman, she need not conclude that she is less capable than O. She might feel angry that this criterion was used, but she has managed to preserve her self-esteem.

In summary, research designed to test Festinger's theory of social comparison processes largely confirms Festinger's hypothesis that a comparison with a "similar" Other provides us with the most relevant information by which to accurately evaluate ourselves. However, whether similarity determines whom we choose to compare ourselves with has not been established. Hypothesis 8 is a logical extension of the theory <u>if</u> the sole motive for making social comparisons is an informational one. Since Festinger's original formulation it has been argued that "hedonic" interests compete with evaluative needs, and influence comparison choices, when that which is being compared lies on a continuum of increasing (and decreasing) positive value. Since the choice of comparison Others is not determined exclusively by a desire to obtain evaluative precision or clarity, the process of selection remains a problem in prediction. Differences do not necessarily deter comparisons, they may in fact enhance their attractiveness (Brickman & Bulman, 1977; Goethals & Darley, 1977).

One of the problems which confronts the scientific psychologist, whose goal is to <u>predict</u> behavior as well as

to explain it once it has occurred, is the subjective nature of the perception of similarity between one individual and another. If the evaluative significance of a comparison hinges upon an individual's perception of the Other in question as essentially "similar" and hence comparable, cognitive-perceptual interpretations and/or distortions can serve to mitigate the impact of an observed discrepancy between oneself and another. An example will illustrate. P wishes to evaluate her ability as a graduate student, but she feels insecure in this regard, and she is reluctant to assimilate any information which might further damage her self-esteem. If she compares herself (e.g. on the basis of the number of her papers accepted for publication) to a similar Other (e.g. another graduate student in her program), she will obtain the most pertinent information by which to make an evaluation. Any discrepancies observed between her own and this Other's performance will have significance. In contrast, a comparison with an undergraduate student, or a comparison with a professor may reveal differences in the number of publications, but these differences will be uninterpretable. Let us posit that P is cognizant of the irrelevance of comparisons with grossly different Others, and that comparisons with other graduate students in her program are unavoidable. Unable to ignore objectively unfavorable information, P can search out differences between herself and her "better off" peers so that

she can attribute their higher level of performance to these nonability factors. For example, one comparison Other might be working in a different subspecialty where publication might be perceived as more easily come by. Another might be classified as a "workaholic," or a "grind," and her greater productivity may be attributed to the amount of effort made, rather than her superior ability. It becomes evident that the number of possible distinctions P can observe or invent between herself and a comparison Other are infinite. This is significant insofar as P can choose to redefine and construct "similarity" and "dissimilarity," comparability and noncomparability in such a way as to protect her self-esteem, and avoid recognizing the negative implications of certain comparisons. If "similarity hurts" (Mettee & Wilkins, 1972), it can be reconceptualized as difference.

Reference Groups, Relative Deprivation, and Equity

Sherif and Sherif (1964) define a reference group as "the group with which an individual identifies or aspires to belong." Reference groups may serve comparative and/or normative functions. A normative reference group provides an individual with an organized world view or perspective (Shibutani, 1955). Through processes of identification, an individual assumes and internalizes the attitudes and behaviors of the group, and consequently, adheres to group norms independently of direct contact with the group itself. A reference group which serves a comparative

function provides an individual with standards against which to evaluate his or her status. Abilities, rights, privileges, opportunities, or benefits are compared with those of other group members, and feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction reflect the relative gratification or relative deprivation that is observed. Reference group identification is not necessarily synonymous with actual group membership, and the possibility of orientation to non-membership groups, as well as multiple group identifications, makes the prediction of reference group selection by a particular individual, at a particular moment in time, extremely difficult.

A group of which an individual is not a member, but to which he aspires may function as a comparison group against whose standards this individual, or a group of individuals evaluate opportunities and outcomes (Merton & Kitt, 1950; Pettigrew, 1967; Rosenberg, 1979). A girl from a working-class background may identify with middle-class school mates; a black adolescent boy may compare his job opportunities to those of white adolescent boys. In either case, the standards this girl and boy set for their achievement will be determined by those others whom they perceive as appropriate referents. Their expectations for themselves may diverge from those held by their membership groups, but ultimately it will be these standards which will influence the evaluations they make of their actual outcomes.

Reference group theorists have been concerned with two fundamental questions: (1) How are reference groups selected? And (2) What are the consequences of this selection? These two questions are interrelated, and they parallel to a large extent the questions discussed earlier in the context of social comparison processes. "How do individuals choose their referents?" poses a problem similar to the one raised by the question: "With whom do persons choose to compare themselves?" And, related to this: "Whom do persons perceive as similar, relevant, comparison Others?" In the social comparison literature the response to these queries was complicated by the presence of two, sometimes conflicting motives: evaluative versus hedonic needs. So that in addition to the problem of what constitutes a similar Other, there remains a question as to whether P compares himself to this similar Other, and risks obtaining damaging evaluative information. Or, does P narrow the range of perceived similarity and <u>define</u> only those persons who are nonthreatening as similar and comparable? The desire to obtain pertinent but unpleasant information must be weighed against the desire to avoid experiencing shame, anger, or a sense of failure.

The differential significance of comparisons with Others defined as either similar or dissimilar can be reformulated in the language of reference group theory. Discrepancies along a given dimension between members of

the same reference group have different evaluative implications from those obtained between referents and nonreferents. A manual worker who perceives another manual worker earning more than he will have a different experience of inequality than a worker who perceives a discrepancy between his own wages and the wages of the factory manager (Patchen, 1961; Scase, 1974). Comparisons with nonreferents, who are defined as somehow dissimilar and hence noncomparable, will have less potency, and their ability to arouse feelings of satisfaction or dissatisfaction will be limited. If, however, in the example given above, the "worker" perceived himself and the factory manager as members of the same reference group, e.g. married, male, salaried employees, his reactions would be expected to vary accordingly, and differences between his own and his manager's wages would take on new meaning.

Since the standards to which individuals aspire are related to the reference group with whom they identify, the choice of such a group, and the psychological boundaries which are erected separating referents from nonreferents will play a critical role in their self-evaluations. The distinction between referents and nonreferents is frequently based on socially constructed categories; however, there is room for individual variation since these categories are perceptual rather than actual. Since therefore the distinction is ultimately a psychological one,

personality variables are likely to contribute, at least to some extent, to an individual's social mapping.

While comparisons with socially designated referents may influence the evaluations individuals make of themselves, it is also likely that people's self-concepts, i.e. their images of themselves, will influence the choice of Others whom they consider to be appropriate referents. Individuals who perceive themselves as superior in ability and/or different from persons in their membership group, may identify with, and compare themselves to members of an "out-group."

As discussed earlier, in the context of social comparison processes, "hedonic" needs may mediate one's choice of comparison Others, and/or the relevance ascribed to observable self-other discrepancies. An individual who expects, and at the same time fears, failure may be motivated to narrow the range of his or her comparisons, and to identify with a nonthreatening reference group. By taking "objectively" dissimilar others as referents these individuals depress the standards they set for themselves, but at the same time they protect their self-esteem.

When addressing the question of how an individual divides up the world into referents and nonreferents, into units of Us and Them, physical characteristics, and most importantly social categorizations which are salient within a particular society must be considered in addition to individual personality characteristics and motives. Age,

sex, nationality, religion, marital status, occupation, wealth, family background, measured intelligence, are variables commonly used to differentiate between groups of people. We become members of certain groups--e.g. those related to occupation, acquired wealth, marital status, academic achievement--at least in part through our own actions and choices. In sociological literature each of these is referred to as an "achieved status" (Unger, 1975). Other membership groups--e.g. those related to age, sex, nationality, family background, religion, and parents' socioeconomic status--are assigned to us independently of our behavior, our personality, or our volition. Thus, at birth, we automatically become members of certain social groups. We do not achieve or acquire these characteristics, they are thrust upon us. If, as we develop, we come to identify ourselves as members of particular groups, that is if we internalize the categorizations which were originally imposed upon us, our identities as individuals become linked with our identities as members of certain groups, and the expectations, standards, and world views of these groups shape and delimit our own.

Research findings in the area of achievement motivation and expectancies for success and failure can be interpreted within the framework of reference group theory. Wylie (1963) asked black and white high school boys and girls to estimate their ability, relative to that of their classmates.

She found that girls' self-estimates were on the average lower than boys', that blacks' self-estimates were lower than whites', and that children from families with lower socioeconomic status estimated themselves as lower in ability than their peers who came from families of higher socioeconomic status. What is of particular interest for reference group and social comparison theories is that when students were asked to name a similar-ability Other, all of the students' choices were made within sex and within racial categories. This self-imposed restriction of comparison choices reflects reference group identification which is founded upon sex-status and ethnicity.

Reference group theory provides a useful framework by which to explain a variety of research findings which document sex differences in achievement and/or expectancies. Crandall (1969) reports a series of studies designed to measure females' and males' expectancies for performance on novel and familiar tasks. Consistent sex differences in expectancies were obtained (with females expecting to achieve less than males) even when actual ability or past performance levels were held constant. These sex differences appear as early as kindergarten, and are observed among college students as well. There are several possible explanations for these differences. Parsons et al. (1976) discuss one which is relevant to the theory of reference groups. The interaction between individual and group identity is articulated. As girls and boys develop

cognitively, they learn to classify themselves according to their appropriate gender categories. Cognitive-developmental theorists suggest that this classification is the foundation for the acquisition of sex role identity (Frieze et al., 1978). Once gender is perceived as a fixed and permanent attribute, girls and boys are motivated to become proficient in their respective gender roles. This motive is one manifestation of what is posited to be a general drive for competency. According to this theory, therefore, girls strive to approximate to the best of their ability those attributes which are socially defined as characteristic of women. If, in a given society, competence and achievement within certain domains are perceived to be inconsistent with the female gender identity, little girls might conclude that since they are female, they cannot, by definition, be very competent (Sherman, 1976). A further extrapolation of this theory of gender role acquisition would be that since little girls are motivated to be "good" females, they would not even wish to be competent in male-designated arenas if this would mean that they were not successfully feminine. In this manner, the little girl's identification with a female reference group in the process of identify formation translates into lower expectations for performance and lower aspirations.

While cognitive-developmental and motivational psychologists focus their attention primarily upon the processes

within the individual that affect behavior--e.g. expectancies, motives, attributions, classificatory schemes--reference group theory looks at the individual in the context of his social environment, and addresses the systemic determinants of these internal processes. The social context, rather than the individual's personality, is taken as the given, and the former is believed to be primary in shaping the latter rather than vice versa (Webster & Sobieszek, 1974). The two approaches are not necessarily in conflict, but may complement each other. Groups of individuals may share similar psychological characteristics--e.g. motives, expectancies, attributions, etc.--as a function of their shared status within the larger social system.

Since reference groups do not always correspond to membership groups, and since people invariably have multiple and overlapping identifications, it is extremely difficult to predict which group an individual will use as a referent, and under what circumstances. Does the female, Jewish, lawyer pattern her interpersonal behavior to conform to the standards of women? Jews? Lawyers? The salience of her status as a female, a Jew, and a lawyer will surely vary across situations, though salience in and of itself may not be an adaptive or sufficient criterion for reference group identification. The sex status of the woman executive, or the minority group status of the black doctor, may be attended to by others despite the irrelevance

of this dimension of classification to the occupational activity (Darley, 1976; Epstein, 1970; Fogarty et al., 1971). Against which group's standards do these "status incongruent" persons compare themselves when considering their wages, their rights, privileges, and so on? Does the woman executive expect to receive similar treatment to that accorded her male colleagues, and therefore feel dissatisfied when and if she does not? Or, do her expectations correspond to her status as a female employee, inducing her to feel comparatively "better off" than her female subordinates? Which women do what, when? These are questions that require empirical investigation, and as of yet there are no simple answers.

The application of reference group theory in the conduct of empirical research has been largely limited to interpretations of observed behavior. Researchers have not, for the most part, asked subjects directly which groups of people they take as their referents. Rather, reference group identification has been inferred from self-report measures of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, complacency or anger, acceptance of the status quo or protest, all of which vary systematically between groups of individuals within a given situation and over time. In 1949 Stouffer et al. introduced the concept of relative deprivation to account for the relationships obtained between certain status characteristics and the attitudes, satisfaction, and morale of American soldiers during World War II. Reference group

identification and the concomitant social comparisons are the bases of this construct. According to Stouffer, "Becoming a soldier meant to many men a very real deprivation, the felt sacrifice was greater for some than for others depending upon their standards of comparison." It was proposed that a soldier's choice of comparison others determined the frame of reference by which he evaluated his situation, and consequently, his responses to it. This forms the link between the theory of relative deprivation and reference group theory.

It was inferred that relative deprivation mediated between independent variables of status such as age, marriage, or education, and dependent variables measuring attitudes towards induction, or appraisals of rates of promotion. In their discussion of the findings reported in The American Soldier (Stouffer et al., 1949), Merton and Kitt (1950) differentiate three bases for a shared frame of reference: (1) Actual association, (2) same social category, (3) different social category. Since both in-groups (membership groups) and out-groups (nonmembership groups) can be taken as a frame of reference, the prediction of relative deprivation is exceedingly complex. Its counterpart within the social comparison model is the problem predicting the choice of comparison Other.

Stouffer invoked the concept of relative deprivation to account for why men in different social categories

responded differently when their absolute level of deprivation was the same. For example, why better educated men were typically less optimistic over their chances for promotion than less educated men; or why married men showed greater resentment over induction than unmarried men. By way of empirical illustration: The actual chances for promotion for the men in the Military Police were among the lowest in the army: 24% of the MPs were noncommissioned officers as compared with 47% of the Air Corps men. Yet, the Air Corps men as a group were less satisfied with the promotion rate within their unit than were the Military Police. Stouffer et al. suggest that these unexpected findings can be attributed to the social comparisons the men made and the subsequent expectations they formulated for their outcomes. It was inferred that the rapid rate of promotion within the Air Corps raised the aspirations of the men in that division substantially so that the actual frequency of promotion was perceived as unsatisfactory. Apparently, Air Corps men were evaluating their rate of promotion only in relation to other Air Corps men, and not to men in other units where promotion was objectively slower. The within-unit comparisons stimulated the men to set unrealistically high standards by which to evaluate their own status, and generated feelings of relative dissatisfaction with their actual outcomes. The Military Police, who were rarely promoted, appeared to have maintained a low

level of expectation, and thus felt relatively satisfied when comparing themselves to other Military Policemen who were, as a rule, in the same predicament. It is unlikely that the Military Police were unaware of the higher rates of promotion existing within other units; however, if the Military Police did compare themselves to the Air Corps men, or to men in other units of the army, these out-group comparisons with "dissimilar" Others did not appear to affect their own positive evaluations of the promotion system within their own unit. This is consistent with the hypotheses formulated by Festinger (1954) in the theory of social comparison processes.

Davis (1959) defined relative deprivation as the consequence of comparisons between deprived and non-deprived members of some subcategory. An individual will feel relatively deprived when his deprivation is unequal to that of his peers. In contrast, deprivation relative to a member of an out-group is evaluated as "relative subordination," and does not elicit the same feelings of dissatisfaction and resentment. Davis posits that when a given social category--e.g. sex status or ethnicity--is correlated with objective deprivation, feelings of relative deprivation will be more prevalent among those deprived when they belong to the more favored category. This is consistent with the findings of The American Soldier discussed above. Thus, for example, if blacks in America are more likely to

be among the economically deprived than are whites, and if deprived blacks restrict the range of their comparisons to other blacks, they are less likely to experience relative deprivation than their white counterparts who are equally deprived. (It is important to note, however, that this formulation is no longer tenable when the racially-determined boundaries between referents and nonreferents break down, and blacks no longer perceive whites as non-comparable.)

There is some data available in support of this formulation. Rosenberg and Simmons (1971) found that among white children self-esteem is related to the socioeconomic status of their parents; i.e. white children from lower socio-economic groups expressed lower self-esteem than white children from higher socioeconomic groups. This relationship was not obtained among samples of black children, whose levels of self-esteem were not consistently lower than those of white children. One interpretation for these findings is that lower-class white and black children identify with different referent groups. White children from poorer families identify themselves as white, and are most likely to evaluate themselves in comparison to other whites, who are economically "better off" on the average than they. In contrast, black children identify themselves as black and <u>not</u> white, and may therefore tend to compare themselves with other blacks who are, for the most part, <u>not</u> likely

to be economically "better off" than they themselves are. This explanation parallels that which was provided by Stouffer et al. to account for the differences in morale between the Air Corps and Military Policemen.

The importance of locating an individual within a particular subgroup of the population in order to obtain an accurate analysis of his or her behavior has been recognized with regard to delinquent and nondelinquent adolescents and adults (Sherif & Sherif, 1964; Whyte, 1943). An individual who places minimal value on academic achievement is unlikely to have his or her feelings of self-worth jeopardized by relative failure in this area. Insofar as individual differences in values are mediated by reference group identification, it can be expected that the criteria of worth will also vary along these lines. When deviance, conformity, achievement, and failure are understood to be relative and not fixed entities, the failure to obtain consistent relationships between socioeconomic, sex, or other status indicators and global self-esteem is comprehensible (Rosenberg, 1979; Wylie, 1979).

Reference groups, comparison levels, and the expectations they generate have been identified as factors contributing to the level of black self-esteem, patterns of black militancy, and discontent among black Americans during the 1960's. Rosenberg and Simmons (1971) and Rosenberg (1979) suggest that the segregation of blacks in the ghetto

created a separate and distinct community within the larger society, a community in which blacks were able to avoid daily interpersonal contact with whites. The insularity of the ghetto bred a rigid system of categorization along "color" lines, and this may account for the high level of self-esteem which blacks appear to have maintained despite their lower status within the society as a whole. Since whites were defined as dissimilar, separate, and noncomparable, their values, opportunities and outcomes were also perceived as irrelevant for black self-evaluation, so these authors contend. (This ghettoization effect, which may function for other minority groups as well, does not, of course, apply to women, who interact with the dominant group continuously, and on an intimate basis.)

Rosenberg and Simmons argue that the homogeneous lower-class black community provided black children with few comparison Others who were of higher status than they. In this context, black children compared themselves, their status, their material possessions to the other black children who were similar to themselves, and they felt relatively undeprived. The narrow range of referents protected the black ghetto child from dissonant evaluations. The <u>actual</u> segregation between whites and blacks within our society was reproduced in the psychological boundaries dividing blacks from whites. These boundaries which defined whites as nonreferents, had the effect of reinforcing the

status quo, at the same time that they mitigated feelings of relative deprivation. In recognizing their deprived status, blacks may have responded with resignation rather than with anger and resentment.

Evidence consistent with this theoretical formulation is provided by Carpenter (1969) and Rosenberg and Simmons (1971) who report no significant overall differences in the levels of self-esteem among black and white children. In addition, Rosenberg and Simmons found that the black children in their study did not evaluate the social status or the achievements of their families less favorably than whites, despite their lower status on conventional social and economic scales. Apparently, black evaluations were made on the basis of the standards which existed within their reference groups, not through comparisons with the standards of white, middle-class America.

Pettigrew (1967) attributed the rise of black militancy in America during the 1960's to changes in reference group boundaries. During the preceding decades, blacks in America witnessed the most rapid legal and social advances in their history in this country. However, while the absolute level of deprivation was reduced somewhat, the discrepancy between black aspirations and the opportunities actually afford them increased. Blacks, who previously perceived white Americans as noncomparable Others, began to include them in their reference group,

and consequently they started to expect to receive equal rights, privileges, and opportunities. As long as whites were considered to be nonreferents, their more favorable position in society did not elicit feelings of relative deprivation. Searles and Williams (1962) suggest that when the rigidity of the stratification within a society begins to loosen, members of one social stratum begin to compare themselves to members of another. Today, as blacks compare themselves and their living standards to those of middle class whites, the discrepancies revealed by this comparison result in a higher level of dissatisfaction than previously experienced under objectively worse conditions.

Researchers investigating the demographic characteristics associated with black discontent, protest, and riot participation during this era, provide evidence which lends support to this interpretative model. Black college students' participation in sit-ins protesting discriminatory practices was found to be positively related to socio-economic status (Orum & Orum, 1968; Searles & Williams, 1962). Other studies have found that militancy, in both attitude and behavior, is associated with higher socio-economic and educational status, higher aspirations, youth, urban and northern socialization, and social mobility (upwards and downwards) (Caplan, 1970; Marx, 1967; Tomlinson, 1970). The data would be difficult to explain as a function of differences between subjects' absolute

levels of deprivation. Relative deprivation, as a consequence of a reconceptualization of comparability, offers a meaningful analysis.

Workers' dissatisfaction with their wages, benefits and work opportunities is apparently related to the comparisons workers make and to the people they perceive as appropriate referents. Patchen (1961) conducted research with oil refinery workers who are stratified according to occupational groups and wage differentials. The men were asked to mention someone whose wages were different than their own, and then to indicate how satisfied they were with their own position. Men who chose to compare themselves with individuals at the same occupational level who earned more than they did (an in-group discrepancy) were more dissatisfied than men who chose "upward comparisons" with individuals at a higher occupational level (an out-group discrepancy). It is unclear whether men's dissatisfaction preceded their choice of comparison; however, the relationship is consistent with relative deprivation theory.

Scase (1974) conducted a comparative study of Swedish and English manual workers to assess their awareness of white collar/manual worker inequalities, and their feelings of relative deprivation. While in absolute terms the discrepancy between workers' and mangement's wages and benefits is smaller in Sweden than in England, Swedish workers expressed <u>more</u> feelings of relative deprivation than English

workers; they expressed less satisfaction with their relative salaries than English workers; and they were more likely to compare themselves to nonmanual workers. Swedish workers were more likely to view their chances of promotion, relative to white collar workers, as worse than the English, and this, according to the investigator, represented a more realistic assessment of their actual career prospects. The Swedish workers expressed more resentment over their status than their English counterparts, and Scase explains these findings as a function of the restricted reference groups of English workers. Wedderburn and Craig (1974) suggest that English manual workers do not compare themselves to nonmanual workers, but order their expectations according to their occupational status. Scase proposes that the radical ideology of the Swedish workers defines any inequality between people as illegitimate, and hence it is experienced as inequitable.

Deprivation relative to one's referents does not necessarily evoke feelings of injustice and dissatisfaction with the system of reward distribution, however, and there are experimental studies to corroborate this. Crosby (1976) formulated an "egoistical model of relative deprivation" which includes five conditions necessary for the arousal of feelings of relative deprivation. In the Crosby formulation, relative deprivation is defined as the "feeling that one has been unjustly deprived of some deserved thing."

Phenomenologically, this is experienced as resentment and a "sense of grievance." The five conditions proposed are the following: (1) P sees a similar Other possessing X (which P does not possess). (2) P wants X. (3) P feels he or she deserves X. (4) P feels it is feasible to obtain X. (5) P lacks a sense of personal responsibility for failure to possess X. Crosby does not suggest that these conditions exist independently of one another, rather they are likely to be interrelated. For example, wanting X may covary with feeling entitled to it, or believing that it is obtainable; and perceiving others having X may covary with the assessed feasibility of possessing it oneself. Personality, personal past experience, immediate environment, and societal and group norms are all factors which contribute to the fulfillment of the preconditions. As the percentage of P's friends possessing X increases, P's awareness of X, his or her desire for it, as well as the perceived feasibility of attaining it may also increase. Once these five conditions are met, it is necessary to consider the opportunities available for change, the individual's sense of personal control, and intropunitive versus extrapunitive response dispositions in order to predict <u>behavioral</u> manifestations of the experience of relative deprivation. It could lead to random violence, or to instrumental activity aimed at its amelioration (Crawford & Naditch, 1970).

Relative deprivation theory, as it is expounded here, differs from a simple frustration-aggression model insofar as it recognizes that social comparisons, feelings of entitlement, and attribution of responsibility are critical determinants of a person's response to unsatisfied desires. The theory also distinguishes itself from equity theory, which will be discussed below, by its inclusion of the "feasibility" factor--i.e. P must think it feasible to obtain X in order for its absence to precipitate feelings of relative deprivation. The role of this factor in eliciting responses which are associated with relative deprivation has not as of yet been established empirically (Cooke et al., 1977).

Equity theory (which is closely related to the theory of relative deprivation, and thus indirectly to reference group theory and the theory of social comparisons) suggests that inequity is experienced when the perceived ratio of inputs to outcomes varies between individuals. Only when there are equal inputs are individual or groups of individuals expected to obtain equal outcomes--i.e. one's lot should be commensurate with one's "worth" (Adams, 1963; Adams & Freedman, 1976; Austin, 1977; Wicker & Bushweiler, 1970). Within this framework, relative deprivation can be evaluated as justified and equitable if it can be attributed to input differences. That is, outcome discrepancies between members of a particular reference group are

perceived as fair when they are believed to correspond to differences in members' contributions or "worth." (Translated into the terminology of social comparison theory, discrepancies between oneself and dissimilar others have little evaluative significance or potency.)

This formulation is inevitably complicated by the subjective element which enters into the perception and measurement of one's own and others' "inputs" and "outcomes." Equity theorists offer only general guidelines for defining the units of exchange. Inputs are dimensions which are generally recognized as relevant contributions to an interaction, for which an individual anticipates a fair return. Outcomes are rights, privileges, rewards, status, status symbols, or other desired commodities, and they may be tangible or intangible. Similar problems in measurement arise in the theory of relative deprivation, social comparison theory, as well as in the context of social exchange theory, and in the analysis of the bases of social power (Blau, 1961; Center et al., 1971; Emerson, 1962; Homans, 1961; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). If power differentials are a function of an unequal distribution of valued "resources," what constitutes a resource? And how are resources, i.e. contributions to an interaction "manufactured" (Gray & Churchill, 1977)? If the relevance of one's own or another's contribution, as well as the evaluation of its worth, is subject to interpretation, then the experience of inequity

or equity is, by definition, a function of one's values and needs. Inequality of outcomes can be justified by cognitive distortion or cultural mythology, and feelings of inequity can thus be mitigated. (If blacks are stereotyped as lazy, then they don't deserve equal employment outcomes; if women are stereotyped as overly emotional, then they aren't capable of leadership. Exclusionary practices are therefore not considered by some to be inequitable.)

Lerner and Simmons (1966), Lerner (1970) and Schopler and Matthews (1965) have suggested that people are motivated to maintain a belief in a "just world," a world in which people get what they deserve, and outcomes accurately reflect inputs. This vision of the world satisfies a need for order, and provides a sense of control over one's destiny. Findings from experimental studies suggest that when people are confronted with inequitable situations, and when there is no means available for restoring equity through action, they attempt to restore "psychological equity" through cognitive manipulation. Denigrating the victim of an injustice is one means by which "exploiters" or non-victims preserve the belief that we get what we deserve, and all is as it should be. When an unfavorable outcome is perceived to be a function of an individual's personal characteristics or behavior, the order, predictability and fairness of the universe is not called into question, and the illusion of justice remains intact. Walster and Pate

(1976) suggest that women's denigration of other women may be attributable to a similar process. It represents an attempt to restore "psychological equity" by finding cause for existing sexual inequality. Black self-hatred, Jewish antisemitism, and women's contempt for other women have been discussed under the rubric of "identification with the aggressor" (Allport, 1952; Hacker, 1951; Sarnoff, 1961). The motive to restore psychological equity may be an alternate way to conceptualize what in psychoanalytic literature is described as a defensive need to turn a passive experience into an active one (Freud, A., 1936), a need to feel in control of one's fate.

There has been some attempt in the literature to explain and predict the experience of inequity and/or relative deprivation in the face of inequality. Empirical evidence suggests that factors such as sex, expectations, the characteristic submissiveness of the individuals deprived, the freedom of choice they experience, and the attribution of causality they make for the existing inequality of outcomes, modify the affective and behavioral consequences of the perceptions of deprivation (Austin & Walster, 1974; Block, 1979; Cooper & Brehm, 1971; Crawford & Naditch, 1970; Patchen, 1958; Scase, 1974; Stephenson & White, 1970; Wicker & Bushweiler, 1970). Persons who expect to be treated inequitably are less distressed when they are than those not expecting such treatment (Austin &

Walster, 1974). Persons who voluntarily submit themselves to deprivation relative to their peers do not express more dissatisfaction under conditions of greater inequity (Cooper & Brehm, 1970). This suggests perhaps that when persons willingly (for whatever reason, be it under the auspices of an experiment or as a function of social norms) permit themselves and expect to be treated unequally, they do not experience such inequality as inequitable or unjust. This will be an important consideration for the present research investigation.

When the rules of reward distribution are accepted as legitimate and fair, unequal outcomes between peers are <u>not</u> related to dissatisfaction. It has been shown that children who are rated by their teachers as characteristically submissive to authority are less likely to express dissatisfaction over less favorable assignments, and that being female is associated with rule-satisfaction (Patchen, 1958). (It is unclear, however, whether the more submissive children are merely less willing to <u>express</u> dissatisfaction with the assignments, or whether they actually do not experience the same magnitude of inequity.) Stephenson and White (1970) experimentally manipulated children's play privileges, and ascribed subjects' privileged or deprived status to "just" or "unjust" (random and arbitrary) criteria. Deprivation alone did not predict subsequent cheating behavior. The unjustly deprived cheated more than the

unjustly privileged, but the justly deprived cheated less than the justly privileged! These findings suggest that people act to obtain outcomes which they feel they rightfully deserve, regardless of the level of their deprivation relative to others.

Since the experience of inequity in the face of inequality is mediated by an individual's evaluation of his or her worth in a given interaction--i.e. the value of his or her inputs--it might be expected that there would be a relationship between self-assessed competency and feelings of dissatisfaction with unequal rewards, opportunities and treatment. Ross, Thibaut and Evenbeck (1971) experimentally manipulated subjects' self-perceived competency on a task by providing them with false feedback concerning their past performance. The experiment was designed to test the Thibaut and Kelley (1979) formulation referred to above, regarding the relationship between past outcomes, an individual's comparison level, and present expectations for reward distribution. Dependent measures of aggression towards superior status Others were taken after the unequal allocation of rewards. The data indicate that the "competent" subjects experienced the unequal distribution of rewards as more unfair, and were more likely to respond aggressively than the "incompetent" subjects. A significant, positive correlation was obtained between perceived unfairness and the expression of anger.

In summary, equity theory, social comparison theory, and the theory of relative deprivation provide models by which to predict an individual's satisfaction or dissatisfaction with his or her outcomes, whether they are within the realm of work, marriage, friendship, material possessions, or any other aspect of life. The conditions which are posited as determining this experience are, however, in themselves a product of evaluative processes which are subject to individual and socially reinforced cognitive-perceptual distortions. An individual's worth within a particular domain is often impossible to evaluate in an objective manner. What is more, in the analysis of social events, the locus of responsibility for an existing inequality is generally ambiguous.

Within the context of social comparison theory and reference group theory the psychological boundaries which reflect an individual's self-concept and group identification may be derived from actual differences in interests or abilities, or they may serve defensive purposes, protecting an individual from threats to self-esteem. However, personality characteristics may be superceded by <u>socially</u> imposed role differentiation, which is blind to individual differences. Referential boundaries are constructed within the context of a larger social system, and within this system segregation and/or differentiation between categories of people is more or less rigidly maintained.

Social norms, and the social sanctions consequent to the violation of these norms, are external pressures which function to preserve status differences which accompany different role enactments. Insofar as members of a social system internalize these norms, and nonconsciously accept the stereotypes which justify them, what was once an external structure is regenerated from within (Bem & Bem, 1971; O'Leary, 1974; Parsons et al., 1976; Sherman, 1976). This dialectic forms the conceptual basis for the study at hand.

Women's Feelings of Injustice: Hypotheses

The purpose of the present study is to investigate the relationship between certain personality and social-psychological variables and women's responses (cognitive-affective and alleged behavioral) to unequal interpersonal interactions. Women's reference group identification, their sex role orientation, their self-evaluations on relevant personality dimensions, and their tendency to inhibit anger are characteristics which are expected to affect their responses to inequality.

It is posited that women, on the average, are more likely to perceive other women than men as "similar" to themselves, and therefore as members of the same reference group. They are therefore more likely to evaluate their own and other women's inputs in an interaction as equivalent than to equate their own inputs to those of men.

Hence, it would follow that women would be more likely as a group to expect and feel entitled to an equal and a balanced interpersonal interaction with another woman than with a man. They would be more likely to expect to share equally in the decision making, the talking, the listening, and the responsibilities when working with another woman. Finally, they would be more likely to expect that the valued and less valued roles and tasks would be evenly distributed when the interactant was a woman. (Equality on one dimension--i.e. sex--should lead to equality on another.) If, as it is being suggested here, it is assumed that men are more likely to be perceived by women as members of an out-group, then men's privileges, rights and conduct would be subject to different restrictions and regulations from their own.[1] Therefore:

Hypothesis 1: Women, as a group, will experience less injustice and feel less resentment or indignation when they engage or imagine themselves engaging in an unequal inter-

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[1]Similarly, men, on the average, would be more likely to perceive women as members of an out-group, whose behavior within an interaction would be governed by different rules, restrictions, regulations than their own. While these divisions along sex lines would be expected to influence men's responses to inequality involving another man or a woman, the outcome might be different since women's "dissimilarity" is also generally associated with inferiority along certain dimensions. Therefore, for a man, a negative discrepancy observed between his own and a woman's outcomes might be experienced more inequitably than one involving another man, despite the fact that the former would be an out-group discrepancy and the latter would be an in-group discrepancy. Equity theory is relevant here.

action that involves a man than one that involves another woman.

Corollary 1A: Women, as a group, will be less likely to express feelings of injustice, resentment or indignation, and will also be less likely to say that they would engage in behavior to restore equality, when the context of an unequal interpersonal interaction involves a man than when it involves a woman. Similarly, women, as a group, will be less likely to terminate an unequal relationship or interaction when the inequality involves a man than when it involves a woman.

Hypothesis 1 and Corollary 1A predict an overall effect of sex of the interactant on women's response to interpersonal inequality. Subject variables differentiating women according to sex role orientation, self-evaluations along specific task-relevant dimensions, and tendencies to "inhibit" anger will also be investigated.

The relationship between sex role orientation and responses to interpersonal inequality vis-a-vis a man or a woman will be examined, along with variables which may mediate this relationship. There is an abundance of evidence indicating that people within our culture hold certain stereotypes which differentiate the characteristics of the "typical" woman from that of the "typical" man, as well as the "ideal" woman from the "ideal" man (Broverman et al., 1975; Der Karabatian & Smith, 1977; Ellis & Bentler, 1973;

Garland & Price, 1977; Miller & McReynolds, 1973; Rosen & Jerdee, 1974a, 1974b, 1978; Spence et al., 1975). The female stereotype is comprised of an "expressiveness-warmth" cluster; e.g. females are perceived to be more timid, more socially sensitive, more easily hurt, more nurturant, and more affiliative than males (Wylie, 1979). Attributes stereotypically associated with the male gender form a competency and instrumentality cluster which includes such traits as rationality, independence, competitiveness and aggressivity. Female- and male-associated characteristics have been traditionally conceptualized as lying along a bipolar continuum, where one pole represents "femininity" and the other pole represents "masculinity." Thus, the more "feminine" a person is, the less "masculine" the person is, by definition, and vice versa. Stereotypically, women and men are not only characterized as different types of people, but this difference makes for inequality, insofar as the characteristics typically associated with males are more likely to be rated as socially desirable than female-associated attributes (Broverman et al., 1975; Lipman-Blumen & Tickamyer, 1975; O'Leary, 1974). The higher value attached to those characteristics designated as "masculine," and the implications this has for women as well as men, has been discussed and analyzed by personality and social psychologists, as well as by social scientists in related disciplines (Adler, 1927; Chodorow, 1974; McKenna & Denmark,

1978; Frieze et al., 1978; Hacker, 1951; Horney, 1939; Lockheed & Hall, 1976; Mead, 1936; Thompson, 1964; Unger, 1975). Women may internalize the value system of the larger society, and think less of themselves than men (particularly if they perceive themselves as stereotypically feminine), and the female gender may function as a status cue, which influences women's perceptions of their own and other women's authority and competence (Fennel et al., 1978; Lockheed & Hall, 1976; Unger, 1975). Women are not, however, a homogeneous group, and in the present study, it is expected that conformity to or deviation from traditional sex role stereotypes of femininity will be related to women's responses to inequality.

Sex role-related differences between men and women may reflect actual, consistent personality differences between the sexes as a function of early childhood socialization practices (Crandall, 1969; Horner, 1972; Hoffman, 1975; Komarovsky, 1950; Parsons et al., 1976; Veroff, 1969), or they may be a response to presently existing external pressures to conform to social norms, as well as the desire to avoid the sanctions imposed on deviates (Coser & Ryckoff, 1971; Epstein, 1970; Lockheed, 1975; Monahan et al., 1974). From a strict personality perspective, women who have been "successfully" socialized to conform to the feminine role will consistently exhibit appropriate "feminine" characteristics--e.g. they will be, on the average, less competitive, less assertive, less independent, less forceful,

more nurturant, and more timid than men (or sex role deviant women) cross-situationally. In contrast, a social psychological or sociological approach to sex role differentiation would anticipate greater variation in a woman's responses as a function of the social context in which she is operating at a particular time. Greater importance would be attached to the role of social norms, and the externally-located expectations of Others, as they govern specific interpersonal transactions.

In the context of the present study, these two perspectives (the personality and the social-psychological), while not mutually exclusive, have different implications for the prediction of women's cognitive-affective and behavioral responses to inequality as related to sex role orientation. From the perspective of reference group theory, women who define themselves in stereotypically feminine terms do so as a function of their identification with a particular reference group in which such behavior is normatively prescribed. Men are excluded from this reference group. Within this framework, it would be expected that these stereotypically feminine women would be more likely to perceive men as "dissimilar" Others than those women who identify themselves as psychologically androgynous or masculine. Such a relationship between women's sex role orientation and their perceptions of male/female similarity has been observed, as reported in a study conducted by

Ellis and Bentler (1973). Women who perceived males and females as basically similar, and who perceived themselves as similar to men, were less likely to subscribe to traditional sex role standards and stereotypes. While the direction of causality is not determinable, these findings lend support to the formulation outlined above.

As a result, it would be logical to infer that stereotypically feminine women would be more likely to consider men as noncomparable Others, and hence would be less likely to expect or feel entitled to similar or equal interpersonal outcomes. Insofar as men are perceived as "different," they are not expected to conduct themselves as women do in interpersonal interactions. They are perceived as entitled to engage in higher status behaviors, since these are stereotypically associated with men.[2] For a woman in this category, inequality vis-a-vis a man would be experienced differently than inequality vis-a-vis a woman, the latter being a member of the same reference group. The sex of the interactant in an unequal interaction is therefore expected to have a greater effect on the responses of the feminine

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[2]Insofar as men perceive women as "different" they would not expect women to conduct themselves as men do in interpersonal interactions. However, in this context, the expectation would be for lower status behaviors since these are stereotypically associated with women. Therefore, the processes would be expected to be the same for men as they are for women, but the affective consequences of "in-group" and "out-group" discrepancies might be different, since for a man, inequality vis-a-vis a woman is inconsistent with status differences between the sexes.

women than on those of the adrogynous or masculine women. If we assume that gender similarity constitutes a fundamental point of reference, then it would follow that the differing responses of women to inequality would be more salient when the inequality involved a man than when it involved a woman. From this perspective, feminine, androgynous, and masculine women would be expected to respond similarly to interpersonal inequality in relation to other women, since the latter would be perceived as referents for all three sex role orientation groups.

If, however, sex role orientation is measured along dimensions that reflect consistent personality configurations, then it would follow that the sex of the interactant would not be salient in the differing responses of women from all three groups to inequality. It would appear that the social-psychological and personality paradigms are in contradiction with each other, however, it is also possible that the responses of women from all three sex role orientation groups will show evidence of an interaction between the social-psychological and personality variables. In other words, the effect of sex role might be observed under both conditions of inequality, but may be more pronounced when the inequality involves a man.

A pilot study conducted by Block (179) used a hypothetical story to measure women's self-reported feelings of indignation over potentially unfair decisions involving

competition between men and women for jobs. Feminine women (as measured on the Bem Sex Role Inventory) were more likely than androgynous and masculine women to attribute responsibility to the woman in the story for her failure to attain the job in question. Moreover, there was a tendency for feminine subjects to feel less indignant over the decision than androgynous or masculine subjects. The findings suggest that the feminine subjects were more likely to interpret the ambiguous situation in a manner which justified the fact that the man received the more favorable outcome. Consequently, they felt less anger about it. (The woman's inputs were perceived as different and less worthy than the man's along sex role stereotypic dimensions; therefore, she deserved less by way of outcomes.)

The differences obtained between feminine subjects, on the one hand, and the androgynous and masculine subjects, on the other, could be attributed to varying reference group boundaries; however, an alternative explanation of the data was also offered. It has been suggested that the expression of anger or indignation as well as competitiveness is inconsistent with stereotypic definitions of femininity (Horner, 1972; Lerman, 1976; Mundy, 1975). "Females are supposed to inhibit aggression and open display of sexual urges, to be passive with men, to be nurturant to others, to cultivate attractiveness, and to maintain an affective, socially poised, and friendly posture with others" (Kagan, 1964, as quoted in Wylie, 1979). If this is the case, it would

follow that the woman who identifies herself as stereotypically feminine would be less willing to experience or express anger and ascendancy than her androgynous or masculine counterparts, since they are inconsistent with her sex role identity. She may even interpret her environment defensively, and, in finding cognitive justification for an existing inequality, avoid feeling these unacceptable emotions. Alternatively, if she does not rationalize inequitable treatment, she may nevertheless inhibit its expression.

Hypothesis 2: Women who identify themselves as stereotypically feminine will, on the average, experience less injustice, less resentment, and less indignation in the context of interpersonal inequality than women who identify themselves as androgynous or masculine.

Two alternative corollaries to this hypothesis are formulated regarding the relationship between women's sex role orientation and their responses to interpersonal inequality.

Corollary 2A: The relationship between women's sex role orientation and their responses to inequality will be observed only when the inequality occurs in relation to a man. No differences between sex role orientation groups is predicted when the interactant is a woman.

Corollary 2B: The relationship between women's sex role orientation and their responses to inequality will be observed in both experimental conditions. Feminine women

are expected to differ from other women in their responses both when the interactant is a man and when the interactant is a woman. The feminine women are expected to hold different expectations about their participation in an interaction, regardless of the sex of the interactant, and therefore they are expected to respond with less indignation when they are allocated a subordinate role.

Corollary 2A is derivative of reference group/relative deprivation theories. Corollary 2B represents a personality approach to the problem of sex role differentiation. As previously mentioned, the two are not mutually exclusive, and the effect which is predicted on the basis of personality differences may be found to interact with situational variation--i.e. the sex of the interactant.

Insofar as anger and competitiveness are deemed inconsistent with the feminine stereotype, it might be expected that the sex role orientation of women in general would be related to a propensity to inhibit the expression of these feelings. Crain and Weisman (1972) discuss "inhibition of aggression" in blacks, and suggest that it is a consequence of the expectation that any expression of anger will result in severe repercussions. They report portions of a study conducted by Bradburn and Noll (1969), in addition to data they themselves collected in their sample of northern and southern blacks. Subjects were asked to recall whether anything in the last month made them angry. In the Crain

study, if a subject failed to remember an incident of this kind, he was asked if he could recall and describe the last time something happened to elicit feelings of anger. The findings of the Bradburn and Noll study are particularly interesting. Ghetto blacks from Detroit were less likely to report having felt angry within the past month than white residents of Prince George's County, Maryland, an upper-middle class suburb of Washington, D.C. Crain and Weisman report that in their survey of American blacks, northern blacks were more likely to recall anger than southern blacks. The interpretation proposed for both these sets of data is that the question functions as a measure of the "inhibition of anger," such that those persons who cannot recall, or at least do not report recollection of anger, are classified as "inhibitors." It is argued that since it is unlikely that Detroit blacks or southerners were actually exposed to less frustration than middle class whites or northerners, their lower response rates must reflect an adjustment to perceived sanctions, rather than objective circumstances. This measure will be used in the present study to assess women's willingness to admit to feelings of anger as a personality characteristic.

Hypothesis 3: Women who tend to inhibit anger, as assessed by the measure used in the Bradburn and Noll (1969) study, are expected to express less anger and indignation, and to experience less injustice in the context of

interpersonal inequality than those women who do not tend to be inhibitors.

Corollary 3A: Women who identify themselves as stereotypically feminine will be more likely to demonstrate a tendency to inhibit anger than women with androgynous or masculine sex role orientations. This is a function of sex role norms.

Empirical research investigating sex differences in self-concept and self-esteem reveals that the relationship between sex and global feelings of worthiness is a complex one, and self-esteem must be distinguished from men's and women's self-evaluations on specific, sex-linked characteristics. Global self-esteem does not appear to be systematically related to status variables such as sex or race (Rosenberg, 1979; Wylie, 1979), so that while there is evidence that women and blacks evaluate themselves lower than men and whites on numerous attributes which are considered generally to be socially desirable--e.g. intelligence, willingness to work hard, trustworthiness (Crain & Weisman, 1972)--these less favorable self-evaluations do not apparently have a measurable impact on what many personality psychologists have defined as self-esteem.

Global self-esteem has been conceived as reflective of a person's generalized satisfaction or dissatisfaction with himself or herself. It has been suggested that feelings of worth, pride and adequacy are the consequence of internal

comparisons between that which is perceived to be the actual self, and the ideal self-image (Rosenberg, 1979; Webster & Sobieszek, 1974; Wylie, 1979). Within this framework, it follows that global self-esteem can be modified by effecting a change either in an individual's perception of the characteristics which comprise his actual self, or in the idealized self-image. Since both of these constructs are subjective in nature, the "ordinary" person may be self-satisfied whereas the "exceptional" person may be self-denigrating.

The quantitative measurement of global self-esteem has generally involved assessing the existing discrepancy between people's "real" and "ideal" self. This may be accomplished by directly asking them to compare their perceived self to their ideal self on a variety of characteristics or dispositions. Alternatively, the favorability of certain attributes may be assumed, and people's "actual" self-ratings may be taken as sufficient indicators of their level of self-esteem. While the latter procedure may reveal how people describe themselves, the former may elucidate how they feel about this description.

The computation of a composite self-esteem score from either of these procedures has its limitations since the descriptive items are weighted equally regardless of the fact that the importance attached to each varies among individuals. The absolute size of the discrepancy between the

"real" and "ideal" self-rating does not reveal its affective significance to the person. Thus, findings with respect to sex differences, summarized by Wylie (1979), must be interpreted with caution.

Questions have been raised concerning the consistency of self-evaluations across situations, and some psychologists are moving in the direction of a more contextual analysis (Lockheed & Hall, 1976; Rosenberg, 1979; Webster & Sobieszek, 1974). Although no reliable differences have been observed in the levels of male and female self-esteem, this does not suggest that male and female self-evaluations on specific dimensions are similar, nor does it suggest that sex role identification is unrelated to feelings of adequacy within specific, sex-linked domains. Women's and men's self-evaluations do tend to conform to sex role stereotypes, and these may interfere with a woman's performance in activities which require "masculine" skills (O'Leary, 1974; Spence et al., 1975; Wylie, 1979). Recent research indicates that sex role orientation is also related to self-ratings of abilities, and that the androgynous or masculine woman evaluates herself more favorably than the feminine woman on a wide range of attributes relating to social and intellectual competency (Colker & Widom, 1980; Orlofsky, 1977; Spence et al., 1975). It may be more useful to investigate women's or men's self-evaluations on specific dimensions, and within particular settings, in the prediction of

behavior, and to resist assuming consistency beyond that which is demonstrated.

In the present study, women's self-evaluations on specific, work-related characteristics are expected to be related to their perceptions of injustice, and their responses to inequality in a specific interaction. Theoretical and empirical literature in the areas of equity, relative deprivation, the "just world" hypothesis and expectation states are the bases for this prediction. As discussed above, equity theory posits that inequality is experienced as inequitable only when the ratio of another's inputs to outcomes is perceived as unequal to one's own, and the system of reward distribution is perceived as unjust. A relationship between self-ratings of competency and the experience of inequity in the context of inequality is a logical derivation of this theory. The research conducted by Stephenson and White (1970) and Ross et al. (1970) detailed earlier provide empirical documentation for such a relationship.

Differential expectations for male and female competence may account for observable sex differences in leadership behaviors in the context of small group interactions (Fennel et al., 1978; Lockheed & Hall, 1976; Webster & Sobieszek, 1974). It has been suggested that both females and males expect women to be less competent, to have less to contribute, and to have less authority than men. These

shared expectations regarding the value of female-initiated behavior systematically limits women's assertion within these interpersonal interactions. Lockheed and Hall (1976) report that women who are trained to consider themselves competent in a particular activity will change their behavior accordingly, regardless of sex role stereotypes. If dominance is in part a function of the individual's assessments of his or her own competence in relation to the competence of others, then this assessment should also be related to the individual's reactions to inequality.

Crosby's model of relative deprivation proposes that one of the preconditions necessary for the arousal of feelings of relative deprivation is that the individual should feel entitled to something which he or she does not have and which someone else does. Another condition is that the person should not take personal responsibility for his or her failure to possess the desired thing. The research studies conducted by Patchen (1961), Scase (1974) and Block (1979) lend support to this formulation. Subjects who did not take personal responsibility for their less advantageous position experienced more anger and resentment than those who did. Indignation in the face of inequality was apparently related to subjects' belief that outcome differences were <u>not</u> attributable to input differences--i.e. that the deprived were no less "worthy" than the privileged.

Research investigating the applicability of the "just world" hypothesis is also relevant to the present hypothesis. The devaluation of those less fortunate and/or victimized functions to justify the status quo and to mitigate feelings of anger directed towards the system (Walster & Pate, 1976). Therefore it is expected that persons who evaluate themselves poorly on specific task-relevant dimensions would also feel that there is justification for their less desirable outcomes in these domains. Consequently, they would be less likely to experience anger or resentment towards those more favored. That people expect and accept interpersonal interactions which confirm and reinforce their self-image (be it negative or positive) has also been a tenet of self-consistency theory (Lecky, 1945).

Hypothesis 4: There will be a relationship between women's self-evaluations on task-related characteristics and their responses to interpersonal inequality occurring in a situation related to this task. It is predicted that women with low self-evaluations will experience less injustice, resentment and indignation when confronted with unequal interpersonal interactions than women with high estimations of their ability along these dimensions.

Corollary 4A: Women who perceive themselves as stereotypically feminine are expected, on the average, to evalute themselves lower in ability on the task-related

dimensions that women who perceive themselves as androgynous or masculine.

While there is no reliable evidence that a feminine sex role orientation is related to low self-esteem in the global, subjective sense of the term, feminine women, as compared with androgynous or masculine women, by definition rate themselves lower on stereotypically masculine attributes or dispositions. These characteristics may not be judged important to the feminine woman's ideal self-image, and thus her self-perceived inadequacy along these dimensions may cause her little distress; however, whether or not this is the case, they are evaluations which will influence her expectations about her ability to perform. Spence et al. (1975), Orlofsky (1977), Baucom (1980) and Colker and Widom (1980) report a relationship between sex role orientation and positive self-ratings on objective measures of self-esteem. Apparently, androgynous and masculine subjects (males and females) rate themselves more positively than feminine and undifferentiated subjects (who rate themselves low on both masculine and feminine items), suggesting, at the very least, that the androgynous or masculine person is more self-confident about his or her abilities on a wider range of human characteristics. An exclusively feminine orientation seems to be more restrictive than an exclusively masculine one. Since, in the present study, women will be asked to evaluate themselves along dimensions

stereotypically associated with males more than females--creativity, business skills, ability to convince others of one's ideas--it is expected that feminine women will evaluate themselves less favorably.

The analyses conducted examine the relationship between independent variables--sex of the interactant, sex role orientation of the subject, a tendency to inhibit anger, and subjects' self-rated competence--and dependent measures of women's responses to an unequal interaction. The interrelationship between these independent variables will also be explored, along with the relationships between various dependent response measures.

CHAPTER 2

METHOD

Subjects

One-hundred and eighty-one college women in the greater New York area served as subjects for the research reported. With the exception of one undergraduate class in English, all of the women participating in the research were enrolled in undergraduate classes in psychology. These classes were made available with the permission of the instructors. The population included students from diverse ethnic backgrounds--white, black, Hispanic, and Oriental--and subjects ranged in age from 16 to 56, with a mean age of 22.6. Eighty-eight percent of the women were single, six percent were currently married, and six percent were either divorced or separated. Forty-five percent of the sample of women designated themselves as the primary source of their income; only two percent were primarily supported by a husband; and the remainder of women shared jointly in providing their support (seven percent), or received financial support from family, friends, or lovers (49 percent).

The experiment was conducted during class time, but participation was voluntary. All subjects filled out an informed consent form explaining the nature of their involvement in the research. Both male and female students

participated in the procedure since the study was conducted during regular class time; however, for the purposes of this research, and the questions being addressed therein, only the responses of the female subjects are analyzed and reported.[3] All students' questionnaires were anonymous, and confidentiality was assured.

Experimental Design

Women's responses to an unequal interpersonal interaction were assessed using videotapes and written transcripts portraying inequality between two people in a work setting. Ninety-six women viewed one of two videotaped interactions, and eighty-five women viewed one of two versions of the written transcript. The decision to introduce a written transcript as a separate and additional condition in the research design, and the modification this represents, will

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[3]While it would certainly be interesting and worthwhile to investigate men's responses to inequality as a function of the sex of the interactant and their own sex role orientation, the present research is concerned with the experience of inequity and injustice by persons who occupy a lower status position in society at large. Since unequal treatment is normative for these individuals, it is particularly interesting and important to understand the psychological processes involved in the breakdown of these norms. These processes would be likely to mediate movements toward social change. Thus, the present study attempts to apply a model of explanation which has been utilized in reference to black protest in America, soldiers' morale during World War II, and workers' levels of satisfaction. In each case, the question raised is "What determines an attitude of acceptance or protest? Satisfaction or dissatisfaction? Equity or inequity? in the face of absolute levels of inequality. At what point, and for what reasons, do members of a less favored group being to feel angry and to foment change?"

be discussed below, after describing in detail the general experimental procedures.

The basis for the inequality is behavioral since the interactants are described as coworkers, with identical occupational titles. Two videotapes and two written transcripts involving an "overbearing" interactant and a female target were employed. The two versions of the videotape and the transcript varied as a function of the sex of the overbearing person. Each subject served in only one experimental condition, i.e. viewed only one version of the videotape, or read only one version of the written transcript. Ninety women responded to the unequal interaction involving a man and a woman, and ninety-one women responded to an unequal interaction involving two women. Subject relevant variables--sex role orientation, self-ratings of competency, and the tendency to inhibit anger--were assessed prior to the experimental intervention.

Procedures and Instruments

The research was introduced to subjects in the following manner:[4]

> "We are interested in finding out whether people are able to place themselves in the position of characters they see on a television screen or on film. Whether they can imagine just how they themselves

[4]These instructions were given to subjects viewing the videotaped interactions. For subjects receiving the written transcript, the instructions were altered slightly. (See Appendix B.)

> would feel if they were confronted with the same situation as that being portrayed on camera. Some psychologists believe that this imaginative capacity is related to a person's ability for empathy. Before we show you the videotape, we are going to ask you to describe yourself on a number of personality traits. This is so we can get a better idea of how different people respond to the situation we are about to show you."

The purpose of the cover story was twofold: (1) to deflect subjects' attention away from sex role-related issues, and (2) to encourage subjects' identification with the character in the situation portrayed.

After subjects were read the instructions, subject relevant data were collected: Subject's age, sex, source of income, along with the personality ratings to be described in detail below.

Subjects were asked to rate themselves on a number of different characteristics which are considered relevant to the interaction they will view or read, and which they are asked to imagine themselves in. The four (seven point) rating scales they are asked to describe themselves on are: (1) creative thinking, (2) business skills, (3) interpersonal communication skills, and (4) the ability to promote and convince others of one's ideas. (See Appendix A.) These characteristics were selected because at face value they appear to measure women's self-assessed ability to perform as an <u>equal</u> partner in the imaginary interaction portrayed.

After completing the self-evaluation rating scales, subjects were asked whether they could recall and describe

experiencing within the past month a variety of emotions, e.g. joy, sadness, anger, guilt, and curiosity. (See Appendix C.) Asking subjects whether they can recollect an experience of anger within the past month is used as a measure of a tendency to inhibit or express anger. This measure is embedded in questions concerning other emotional experiences so that subjects are not alerted to its significance. The use of this technique represents an effort to eliminate subjects who "inhibit" primarily because they are suspicious of the question itself, in the context of a psychological research study. Subjects are classified as "inhibitors" if they cannot recall an experience of anger within the past month; all other subjects are classified as "non-inhibitors," although the intensity of their experience is also recorded and will be analyzed.

Following these questions, subjects were asked to fill out the Bem Sex Role Inventory (Bem, 1974). The Bem Sex Role Inventory was chosen as the measure of women's sex role orientation for two reasons: (1) The inventory's Masculinity and Femininity scales include both positively and negatively valued sex-related characteristics (in contrast to the Personal Attributes Questionnaire (PAQ) constructed by Spence et al., 1974). Thus, the Bem Sex Role Inventory affords a more inclusive measure of women's sex role orientation. (2) The BSRI requires women to rate themselves on personality characteristics rather than attitudes towards sex-linked behaviors. The present study attempts

to discover whether these self-perceptions are related to reference group boundaries, and as a consequence, mediate feelings of relative deprivation. In this way, the relationship between internal and external processes can be assessed. (See Appendix D for the instrument used and the coding procedure.)

Women's sex role orientation was assessed on the basis of women's self-ratings on stereotypically masculine and stereotypically feminine attributes. Women were classified into four sex role orientation groups: Feminine, Masculine, Androgynous, and Undifferentiated. Those subjects who score above the median for this population on the female associated items, and below the median on the male-associated items are to be designated Feminine. Those subjects who score above the median for this population on the male-associated items and below the median on the female-associated items are to be designated as Masculine. Those subjects who score above the median on both sets of items are to be designated Androgynous, and those who score below the median on both sets of items are to be designated Undifferentiated. This follows the procedure outlined by Spence et al. (1975).

After these self-report measures are completed, the instructions regarding the experimental task continue:

> "We are going to show you videotapes of actual interactions between people. Some of the situations we are showing people in this study are extremely dramatic, and some are rather ordinary. What we hope you will do today is to try to the

best of your ability to imagine yourself as the person we indicate to you on the screen, and use your imagination to experience what you might feel if you were placed in the situation that you will observe. Let me repeat, some of the situations we are studying might elicit rather strong emotions, whereas others may be very neutral or mild. Some might be pleasant or stimulating, while others may be unpleasant or dull. We are trying out a lot of different tapes right now. We hope to gain from this study an understanding of the influence of television and other visual arts on our empathic capacities. If you have any further questions about our study, I will be happy to answer them after you have completed the viewing, and responded to the post-viewing questions.

"What we would like you to do now is to watch carefully the videotaped interaction we are about to show you. After the videotape is over, I will ask you to answer some questions about it. As you watch, remember to try to the best of your ability to place yourself in the shoes of the woman on the right of the screen. Imagine how you would feel if you were her, imagine what you would be thinking, feeling, how you would be reacting to the other person on the screen. If you like, you can jot down thoughts or feelings you have while watching, but this is not necessary. At this point, all I can tell you is that the two persons in the videotape are coworkers. They are both Public Health officials, hired at about the same time, working in the area of consumer education. Up until now they have been working separately, developing educational programs for consumers. They have just been given a joint project to develop a city-wide campaign to encourage better nutritional eating habits. The videotape will last about five minutes, and it records their first meeting together after having been given the assignment. They are discussing plans for future action."

The instructions vary slightly for subjects receiving the written transcript rather than the videotape. (See Appendix E.)

The choice of the designated profession was made so as to avoid, as much as possible, a sex-typed occupation, and the assumptions concerning female and male competency

therein. Prior to selecting this occupation, four judges were asked to rate the ability of females and males to function as a "public health official," and there were no significant sex differences obtained in judges' ratings. Stereotypic sex role definitions may lead subjects, on the average, to expect that males will be more competent than females in all work-related endeavors. If such is the case however, this is not inconsistent with, or contradictory of the hypotheses formulated in this study. This may in fact contribute to the predicted effect of sex on subjects' responses to inequality. (Subjects were asked to rate the competency of the male and female interactants after viewing the videotape or reading the written transcript.)

After having been given the instructions, subjects were presented with either a five minute videotape of an interaction between two people, or a written transcript of such an interaction. A description of the videotape condition will be provided first, followed by a description of any modifications made in the transcript condition.

One half of the videotape subjects were selected (by college class)[5] to view an interaction between two women, and the remainder of the subjects were shown an identical interaction between a man and a woman. Some attempt was

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[5]Random assignment of individual subjects to treatments would have been preferable, but was not practicable, given the classroom arrangements and the use of videotape equipment.

made to equate the two samples on the basis of college affiliation, so that if two classes were available at one university or college, one class received the male version of the videotape, while the other class received the female version. In both female and male versions of the videotape subjects were asked to identify with the woman in the interaction who takes a more passive role, and who is the target of the "overbearing" person. Both videotaped interactions were designed to portray an unequal, unbalanced, interpersonal interaction, in which the woman with whom the subjects are instructed to identify is treated as a subordinate by her partner. The "interactant" dominates the conversation so that during the five minute, taped segment he or she talks approximately 88% of the time, interrupts the target woman when she begins to speak six times, fails to pick up on her suggestions so that they are disregarded and dropped, and makes unilateral decisions concerning the future course of their project. Finally, the interactant chooses what are clearly the more desirable and creative aspects of the work for him or herself, allocating the less interesting, and less creative work to the target woman. Although the interaction is designed to be an unequal one, it is devoid of any overt hostility or derogation. (See Appendix F for videotape script.)

In order to insure the objective equivalence of the male and female versions of the videotaped interactions, actors were instructed to follow carefully the scripts

assigned them, and to avoid, as much as possible, any non-verbal behavior which is not indicated as part of their role. For each version of the videotape a male and female judge, naive to the experimental hypotheses, were asked to rate the relative frequency of particular behaviors--those behaviors which were designed to differentiate the interactant (male or female) from the target woman, with whom subjects were asked to identify. (See Appendix G for judges' questionnaire.) This prerating of the videotapes confirmed that the intended inequality in behavior was actually conveyed in both videotapes. It should be noted, however, that the equivalence of the male and female tapes could not be objectively measured, since judges' responses to the two tapes would inevitably be confounded with the fact that one involves a man and the other involves a woman. The sex of the interactant may color any evaluation of stylistic differences between the two actors that might be obtained.

The original research design included only the videotape modality. However, as the data from the videotape were being collected, two problems, to be elaborated below, became apparent, and the written script was introduced as an adjunctive method by which to study the questions at hand. One problem concerned the objective equivalence of the male and female actors' portrayal of the "overbearing" partner. (The target woman was played by the same actor in each version of the videotape.) While every attempt was

made to equate the male and female versions of the videotapes, differences remained in certain nonverbal behavior, voice quality, diction, and physical stature, which make it difficult to assess the effect of sex alone on subjects' responses. Men tend, on the average, to have deeper voices, and to be bigger than women on the average, and this in itself might contribute to women's differential responses to men and women. However, for the purposes of this research, it seemed important to be able to evaluate subjects' responses to men and women in general, without providing them with specific visual cues about certain male/female differences which are by no means universal. The written script functions as an interesting contrast, which eliminates the possibility of actor differences which may enhance or camouflage the effect of gender category itself.

Another problem, which became evident during the videotape data collection was that the inequality conveyed on the screen was extreme, and therefore differences between subjects and between experimental conditions which might emerge in response to a more subtly inequitable situation might not surface here. Therefore, in the written transcript the interaction portrayed is somewhat less skewed, and the inequality is less obvious. (See Appendix H for written transcript.) Since the written transcript varies somewhat from the videotape script it cannot be considered as a "control" either for actor differences or for the extremity

of the inequality. Rather it represents a modification of the original design, which, if it yields different results would warrant further investigation and control.

At the conclusion of the videotape, or after the subjects had finished reading the written transcript, they were asked to respond to a number of questions, imagining themselves as the "passive woman" in the interaction portrayed. Included are questions about subjects' emotional responses to the interactant, e.g. her feelings during the interaction, self-ratings of anger, hurt, confidence. Subjects were also asked to rate the competence of the interactant, and to indicate their expectations about the nature of the "working relationship" between themselves and the "overbearing" person. Questions were designed to assess (1) women's emotional responses to an overbearing Other, and (2) women's cognitive evaluations of this overbearing Other, and (3) women's expectations about their behavior in the unequal interaction described. (See Appendix I for post-viewing questionnaire.)

Midway through the data collection an additional sequence of questions were included. Subjects were asked to respond to the "passive woman" with whom they had been asked to identify. It was reasoned that subjects' responses to the overbearing interactant may be influenced by their reaction to the target woman. If subjects evaluate the target woman differently when the interactant is a man than when the interactant is a woman, this would be likely to

affect their responses to the inequality. (See Appendix J for "passive woman" questionnaire.)

After completion of the paper and pencil measures, subjects were debriefed as to the true purpose of the experiment. In the context of the debriefing subjects were asked whether they could guess exactly what the experimenter was really interested in studying. While some subjects suspected that the research had something to do with "assertiveness," or "male chauvinism," there was no indication that subjects suspected that the experimenter would be comparing women's responses to an overbearing man with women's responses to an overbearing woman. Nor was there any indication that subjects realized that the BSRI was a measure of sex role orientation.

CHAPTER 3

RESULTS

Subject Characteristics by Condition

Chi Square tests of frequency and *t* tests were conducted to determine whether subjects in the videotape and transcript conditions, and subjects receiving the male and female versions of the interaction were similar on the subject variables relevant to the experimental predictions: sex role orientation, self-rated competency, and the intensity of a recollected anger experience. No significant differences were obtained on any of these variables. However, subjects in the videotape condition were significantly older than subjects in the transcript condition (t (175) = 6.99, p = .0001), with a mean age of 25.90, SD = 8.75 for videotape subjects, and a mean age of 18.98, SD = 2.74 for transcript subjects. Videotape subjects were also more likely to be self-supporting than transcript subjects (χ^2 (3) = 15.67, p = .001), and less likely to have never been married (χ^2 (3) = 14.46, p = .002). No statistically significant differences were obtained in comparisons of subjects receiving the male and female version of the interactions. For a descriptive breakdown of subjects' characteristics within each college population see Appendix K.

Organization of the Results

The analyses conducted were designed to test hypotheses formulated earlier. Results relevant to each hypothesis will be presented together, and in the following order: (1) The effect of the sex of the interactant on subjects' responses. (2) The effect of sex role orientation on subjects' responses. (3) The interaction between sex of the interactant and sex role orientation as it affects subjects' responses. (4) The effect of subjects' self-rated competency along task-related dimensions on subjects' responses and the relationship between sex role orientation and subjects' self-rated competency. (5) The effect of a tendency to inhibit anger on subjects' responses, and the relationship between this tendency and sex role orientation.

Hypothesis 1: The Effect of Sex of the Interactant

It was hypothesized that on the average women would respond differently to an overbearing man than to an overbearing woman. Specifically, it was expected that they would feel more anger, more indignation, and anticipate more conflict in relation to a woman who behaved in this manner than to a man who behaved similarly.

A 2 x 4 multivariate analysis of covariance was conducted for the videotape and transcript conditions separately, to assess the effects of the sex of the interactant and sex role orientation of the subject on subjects' responses on the dependent rating scales. In the multi-

variate analysis of covariance the effects of three covariates--age, self-rated competency, and the intensity of recollected anger--were controlled for. The multivariate effect of these covariates on the dependent measures will be discussed at a later point.

The multivariate approach is a conservative one, which takes into account the fact that there are numerous dependent measures, and therefore, significant results which are obtained on a few may be a chance occurrence.

For the videotape condition, a main effect of sex of the interactant does not reach the standard level of significance, $p < .10$. This, and all other multivariate F tests are computed in accordance with the Wilks' procedure. Since there is a trend observed in the multivariate analysis, univariate F tests will be examined but with caution. A main effect is obtained when subjects are asked how hurt they would feel being the target woman in the interaction, $p = .045$, with subjects indicating that they would feel more hurt with the overbearing male than with the overbearing female. A main effect was also obtained when subjects were asked to rate the interactant's competency, $p = .047$, with subjects rating the female interactant as more competent than the male. In light of the failure to obtain a significant multivariate F these univariate effects can only suggest trends, and cannot be considered statistically significant.

For the transcript condition, a main effect of sex of the interactant was not obtained; multivariate *F* did not nearly reach significance, $p < .20$. In view of these results, univariate *F* tests cannot be considered significant, and will not be reported in this context.

Thus, the predicted effect of sex of the interactant on subjects' responses was not confirmed by the multivariate analyses of covariance that were conducted.

Subjects were asked whom they would be more likely to have as a friend, the interactant or the target women. Chi Square analyses were conducted comparing the friendship preferences of subjects in the male and female versions of the interactions. For the total sample combined, no significant difference is found as a function of the sex of the interactant. Seventy-nine percent of subjects say they would be more likely to have the target woman as a friend than the interactant, while 21% indicate a preference for the interactant. While a greater proportion of subjects in the videotape condition express a preference for the target woman over the interactant compared with the transcript condition (which further confirms the fact that in the videotape condition the interactant's behavior is perceived as more offensive), no significant effect of sex of the interactant on friendship preference was obtained in either condition when analyzed separately.

Subjects were asked whether they thought they would, for the most part, behave similarly to the target woman

if they were placed in the same position as she. Since the target woman does not take active steps to prevent the interactant from dominating the interaction, responses to this question reflect whether or not subjects anticipate responding in a relatively passive manner to this kind of inequality. (This measure is of course only a measure of how they would respond at the moment, and does not uncover how subjects might respond after the interaction is over, or at the next meeting.) The sex of the interactant does not have a significant effect on subjects' perceived similarity to the target woman in either the videotape or the transcript conditions considered separately, or when the total sample is analyzed together. This suggests that on the average subjects do not expect to behave differently in relation to an overbearing male than in relation to an overbearing female.

Subjects were asked to evaluate the target woman in the interaction. Questions pertaining to subjects' responses to the target woman were analyzed separately since these questions are conceptually different from the other dependent measures, and were given to only a portion of the sample population.

Subjects were asked to evaluate the <u>target woman's ability</u> on a seven point scale. In a 2 x 4 analysis of variance conducted with the total sample--videotape and transcript conditions combined--a tendency emerges for

subjects to perceive the target woman as more capable when she is interacting with the overbearing male than when she is interacting with the overbearing female (F (1,98) = 2.81, p = .097). The effect of sex of the interactant on the perceived ability of the target woman does not reach significance when the videotape and transcript conditions are considered separately. The target woman is rated significantly lower in ability in the videotape condition than in the transcript condition (t (98) = 2.40, p = .018), when male and female versions of the interactions are combined. This can be attributed to the fact that in the videotape condition the interaction is even more skewed in favor of the interactant, and subjects attribute submission or passivity on the part of the target woman to low ability.

Subjects were asked how indignant they would feel if the interactant were promoted and the target woman in the interaction were not. (This must be distinguished from the question posed earlier to subjects concerning how they would feel if the interactant were promoted and they themselves were not.) In a 2 x 4 analysis of variance conducted for the total sample a main effect of sex of the interactant on subjects' indignation was not obtained, F (1,91) = 2.59, p = .11. There is a tendency for subjects to respond with more indignation to the male's promotion than to the female's promotion, and the effect of sex of the interactant on women's indignation over such an outcome is nearly

significant when the transcript condition is analyzed separately (F (1,60) = 3.78, p = .057). No significance was obtained in the videotape condition (see Table 1 for mean indignation ratings of subjects by experimental condition and sex of the interactant). This effect is opposite to that which was predicted on the basis of reference group theory.

Chi Square analyses were conducted to determine whether the sex of the interactant was related to subjects' willingness to accept a future joint assignment with the interactant. No significant results were obtained for the total sample, or when the transcript or videotape conditions were analyzed separately. Subjects' responses to the question fell into three categories: "Yes," "No," and "Maybe." Since a definitive yes or no response was of particular interest, a comparison of frequencies between these two categories of response for the male and female interactants was computed. Again, no statistically significant results were obtained.

Hypothesis 2: The Effect of Sex Role Orientation and the Interaction Between Sex Role Orientation and Sex of the Interactant

It was predicted that women's responses to inequality would vary as a function of sex role orientation. Specifically, it was expected that stereotypically feminine women would respond with less anger, indignation, and aggressivity than psychologically androgynous or masculine women. The

Table 1

Subjects' Mean Ratings of Indignation Over the Interactant's Promotion in Relation to the Target Woman by Sex of the Interactant

Experimental Condition	Sex of the Interactant					
	Male			Female		
	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
Videotape[a]	5.00	1.26	(6)	4.91	1.44	(23)
Transcript[b]	5.22	1.60	(37)	4.58	1.36	(31)
Total[c]	5.19	1.55	(43)	4.72	1.39	(54)

Note. 1 = Not at all Indignant, 7 = Extremely Indignant.

[a] p ns.

[b] $p = .057$.

[c] $p = .111$.

effect of sex role orientation was also expected to interact with the sex of the interactant so that the predicted differences between feminine and androgynous or masculine women would be greater when the interactant was male than when the interactant was female.

Subjects were divided into sex role orientation groups on the basis of their scores on the Masculinity and Femininity scales of the Bem Sex Role Inventory. The median Masculinity score for the total population was 4.75, and the median Femininity score was 5.25. Following the median split procedure, 20.4% of the women were classified as Masculine, 21.5% were classified as Feminine, 28.7% were classified as Androgynous, and 29.3% were classified as Undifferentiated.

The main effect of sex role. In the context of the 2 x 4 multivariate analysis of covariance the multivariate main effect of sex role orientation was assessed for the videotape and transcript conditions separately. For the videotape condition the multivariate main effect of sex role on subjects' responses to the 17 dependent measures was not significant, $p > .10$. For the transcript condition, the multivariate main effect was also not significant, $p > .10$. As in all the multivariate analyses the multivariate F was computed according to the Wilks procedure.

Since, prior to the conduct of the research, it was predicted that differences in sex role orientation would be

associated with the experience of relative deprivation, separate multivariate analyses were conducted with variables which have been associated with relative deprivation in the past--anger, indignation, and conflict. Multivariate analyses of variance and covariance were conducted within each condition.

In the videotape condition, no significant multivariate main effects of sex role orientation were obtained, $p > .20$. In the transcript condition, the multivariate main effect of sex role orientation on these three dimensions was significant, $p < .05$, however, no significant effects were obtained on the univariate F tests considered individually. Table 2 reports the univariate tests of the main effect of sex role orientation by experimental condition. No interaction effects were obtained in either condition. Although the three covariates--age, self-rated competency, and intensity of recollected anger--were not significantly related to the dependent measures, when these variables are controlled for in a 2 x 4 MANCOVA the significant effect of sex role, observed within the transcript condition, is not obtained.

Subjects' mean ratings of anger in the transcript condition, broken down by sex role orientation are reported in Table 3. Subjects' mean ratings of how much conflict they would anticipate if they were working with the overbearing interactant in the transcript condition are reported

Table 2

The Effect of Sex Role Orientation on Subjects' Feelings of Relative Deprivation: Univariate F Tests by Experimental Condition

Dependent Measure	Experimental Condition: Videotape[a]		Experimental Condition: Transcript[b]	
	F (3,88)	p	F (3,77)	p
Anger	.528	.664	1.898	.137
Conflict Anticipated	.862	.464	2.027	.117
Indignation	2.247	.088	2.004	.120

[a] 2 x 4 MANOVA, Multivariate F (9,209) = 1.01, p > .20.

[b] 2 x 4 MANOVA, Multivariate F (9,182) = 2.35, p < .05.

Table 3

Subjects' Mean Ratings of Anger Broken Down by Sex Role Orientation: Transcript Condition

	Rating of Anger		
Sex Role Orientation	Mean	SD	N
Masculine	3.16	1.77	19
Feminine	3.84	2.19	19
Androgynous	3.05	1.80	21
Undifferentiated	4.24	2.13	26
Total	3.61	2.02	85

Note. On the scale of anger 1 = extremely angry and 7 = not at all angry.

in Table 4. Subjects' mean ratings of indignation over the interactant's promotion in the transcript condition are reported in Table 5.

A separate 2 x 4 multivariate analysis of covariance was conducted including three scales: hurt, intimidated, and confident, for which an effect of self-perceived competency was expected (see below). In the context of this analysis, an effect of sex role orientation nearly reached significance in the videotape condition, $p < .07$, for the multivariate F computed. Upon examination of the univariate F tests, the effect of sex role was found to be significant on subjects' ratings of how confident they would feel during the unequal interaction, $p = .013$. See Table 6 for a breakdown of the mean confidence ratings of subjects in the videotape condition by sex role orientation. Feminine subjects rated themselves less confident during the interaction, and Masculine women rated themselves most confident. No significant effect of sex role was obtained in the transcript condition, and no significant interaction effects were observed in either the videotape or the transcript conditions.

The interaction between sex role orientation and sex of the interactant. For the videotape condition, the multivariate interaction effect of sex of the interactant and sex role orientation of the subject nearly reaches the standard level of significance, $.05 < p < .10$. For the

Table 4

Subjects' Mean Ratings of How Much Conflict They Would Anticipate Working with the Overbearing Interactant, Broken Down by Sex Role Orientation: Transcript Condition

	Rating of Conflict		
Sex Role Orientation	Mean	SD	N
Masculine	2.79	1.47	19
Feminine	4.00	2.00	19
Androgynous	3.05	1.47	21
Undifferentiated	3.42	1.42	26
Total	3.32	1.62	85

Note. On the scale of conflict, 1 = extremely conflictual and 7 = minimal conflicts.

Table 5

Subjects' Mean Ratings of Indignation Over the Interactant's Promotion in Relation to Themselves, Broken Down by Sex Role Orientation: Transcript Condition

	Rating of Indignation		
Sex Role Orientation	Mean	SD	N
Masculine	1.82	1.67	17
Feminine	1.79	1.27	19
Androgynous	2.62	1.86	21
Undifferentiated	1.77	1.14	26
Total	2.00	1.51	84*

Note. On the scale of indignation 1 = extremely indignant and 7 = not at all indignant.

*There was 1 missing case.

Table 6

Subjects' Mean Ratings of How Confident They Would Feel During the Unequal Interaction, Broken Down by Sex Role Orientation: Videotape Condition

	Ratings of Confidence		
Sex Role Orientation	Mean	SD	N
Masculine	4.94*	1.64	17
Feminine	3.00*	1.70	19
Androgynous	3.93	2.02	30
Undifferentiated	3.41	1.55	27
Total	3.77	1.85	93

Note. There were 3 missing cases.

2 x 4 MANOVA, F (3,87) = 3.96, p = .011.

*Scheffé post hoc comparisons of means, $p < .05$.

transcript condition, the multivariate interaction effect is significant, $p < .05$.

In examining the univariate F tests in the videotape condition there is a tendency for the effect of sex role orientation to interact with the effect of sex of the interactant on subjects' ratings of how impressed they would be with the interactant, F (3,85) = 2.64, $p = .054$, and how intimidated they would feel during the unequal interaction, F (3,85) = 2.34, $p = .08$. See Table 7 for a breakdown of videotape subjects' ratings by sex role orientation and sex of the interactant.

A posteriori comparisons were conducted according to the Scheffé procedure. Whether the interactant was male or female there were no significant differences observed between sex role orientation groups, $p > .10$. However, Androgynous women tend to be less impressed with the male than with the female, F (1,28) = 2.96, $p = .096$, and Undifferentiated women are significantly more impressed with the overbearing man than with the overbearing woman, F (1,25) = 5.89, $p = .022$. Neither the Masculine nor the Feminine women differ significantly in their respones to the overbearing man or woman.

A posteriori comparisons conducted according to the Scheffé procedure indicate that on subjects' ratings of intimidation, Masculine and Undifferentiated women tended to rate themselves more intimidated in relation to the

Table 7

Subjects' Mean Ratings of How Impressed They Are With the Overbearing Interactant as a Function of Sex of the Interactant and Sex Role Orientation of the Subject: Videotape Condition

Sex Role Orientation	Sex of the Interactant					
	Male			Female		
	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
Masculine	2.30	1.49	(10)	1.57	1.13	(7)
Feminine	2.45	1.51	(11)	2.44	1.24	(9)
Androgynous	1.47	1.13	(15)	2.20	1.21	(15)
Undifferentiated	2.80	1.14	(10)	1.76	1.03	(17)

Note. Lower values mean less impressed.

2 x 4 MANCOVA Interaction Effect, F (3,85) = 2.64, p = .054.

overbearing woman than in relation to the overbearing man, F (1,15) = 3.23, p = .09, and F (1,25) = 2.72, p = .11, respectively. Androgynous and Feminine women did not differ significantly in their responses to the overbearing man and overbearing woman, $p > .10$; however, a comparison of women's responses to the overbearing male suggests that the Feminine and Androgynous women (both of whom rate themselves high on the BSRI Femininity scale) are more intimidated by the male than Masculine and Undifferentiated subjects (both of whom rate themselves low on the BSRI Femininity scale). The difference in intimidation in relation to the male interactant approaches significance only in a comparison of Masculine and Androgynous women, $p < .10$, with Masculine women tending to be less intimidated than Androgynous women. No significant or near significant difference, as a function of sex role, is evidenced in the female condition. See Table 8 for a breakdown of subjects' mean ratings of intimidation by sex role orientation and sex of the interactant for the videotape condition.

When the univariate interaction effects are examined in the transcript condition there is evidence of a tendency for an interaction effect on subjects' ratings of how <u>indignant</u> they would feel if the interactant were promoted and they were not, F (3,74) = 2.58, p = .06. Table 9 reports the mean ratings of indignation broken down by sex role orientation and sex of the interactant for subjects in the

Table 8

Subjects' Mean Ratings of How Intimidated They Would Feel as a Function of the Sex of the Interactant and Sex Role Orientation of the Subject: Videotape Condition

Sex Role Orientation	Sex of the Interactant					
	Male			Female		
	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
Masculine	5.80	1.55	(10)	4.14	2.27	(7)
Feminine	3.73	2.24	(11)	3.67	1.12	(9)
Androgynous	3.31	2.68	(16)	4.53	2.20	(15)
Undifferentiated	4.90	2.13	(10)	3.65	1.77	(17)

Note. Lower values mean more intimidation.

2 x 4 MANCOVA Interaction Effect, F (3,85) = 2.34, p = .08.

Table 9

Subjects' Mean Ratings of Indignation Over the Interactant's Promotion in Relation to Themselves as a Function of Sex Role Orientation and Sex of the Interactant: Transcript Condition

Sex Role Orientation	Sex of the Interactant					
	Male			Female		
	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
Masculine	1.45	.93	(11)	2.38	2.13	(8)
Feminine	1.13	.35	(8)	2.27	1.49	(11)
Androgynous	3.00	2.17	(12)	2.11	1.27	(9)
Undifferentiated	1.27	.91	(11)	2.13	1.19	(15)

Note. Lower values mean more indignation.

2 x 4 MANCOVA Interaction Effect, F (3,74) = 2.58, p = .06.

transcript condition. Androgynous women rate themselves less indignant than women classified into other sex role orientation groups when the interactant being promoted is a man. This difference, as a function of sex role orientation, is not evident when the interactant is a woman. In fact, it is only the Androgynous women who rate themselves less indignant over the man's promotion than over the woman's promotion. This is directly contrary to the predictions formulated on the basis of reference group theory.

There is also evidence within the transcript condition of a trend for sex role orientation and sex of the interactant to interact on subjects' ratings on how competent they would feel after the unequal interaction, F (3,74) = 2.52, p = .065. Table 10 reports the mean ratings of subjects in the transcript condition broken down by sex role orientation and sex of the interactant on this dimension. Androgynous women tend to rate themselves as feeling more competent after an interaction with an overbearing man than after an interaction with an overbearing woman, F (1,19) = 2.73, p = .12. Women in other sex role orientation groups do not vary significantly in their responses to the male and female interactants. No significant differences, as a function of sex role orientation are observed in a post hoc comparison of means conducted within each condition (Scheffé multiple range test, $p > .10$).

Table 10

Subjects' Mean Ratings of How Competent They Would Feel after the Unequal Interaction as a Function of Sex Role Orientation and the Sex of the Interactant: Transcript Condition

Sex Role Orientation	Sex of the Interactant: Male Mean	SD	N	Female Mean	SD	N
Masculine	2.36	1.29	(11)	2.88	1.96	(8)
Feminine	2.75	1.28	(8)	3.09	1.58	(11)
Androgynous	3.50	2.02	(12)	2.22	1.30	(9)
Undifferentiated	3.18	1.66	(11)	3.20	1.32	(15)

Note. Lower values mean feeling less competent.

2 x 4 MANCOVA Interaction Effect, F (3,74) = 2.52, p = .065.

Additional analyses testing the effect of sex role independently and in interaction with sex of the interactant. Chi Square analyses were conducted to determine whether sex role orientation was related to whether a subject expressed willingness to accept a future joint assignment with the overbearing interactant whom she either observed on the videotape screen, or read of in the written transcript. Only a small minority of subjects indicated that they would definitely accept such an assignment (11.6% of the total sample), and subjects' responses were particularly negative in the videotape condition, where only 3.1% of the sample, i.e. 3 subjects out of 96, responded in such a manner. This is in contrast to 21.1% of the subjects in the transcript condition. Analyses were conducted comparing the responses (yes, no and maybe) of subjects within each sex role orientation group for the total sample population, and for each subsample. No significant effects of sex role orientation were obtained. Analyses were also conducted separately for the male condition and the female condition. Again no significant effects of sex role orientation were observed.

The relationship between sex role orientation and subjects' perceived similarity to the target woman was assessed by Chi Square analyses conducted for the total sample, as well as for the transcript condition alone. There were too few subjects in the videotape condition responding to this question for statistical analysis. For the total sample, and for the transcript and videotape conditions considered

separately, the overwhelming majority of subjects indicate that they would have behaved dissimilarly to the target woman in the interaction. This breakdown is most evident in the videotape condition where only 6.7% of the subjects indicated that they would have responded similarly in the situation portrayed. The relationship between sex role orientation and perceived similarity to the target woman approaches the standard level of significance in a Chi Square analysis conducted with the total sample, χ^2 (3) = 6.87, p = .076. A trend also emerges in an analysis conducted with subjects in the transcript condition separately, χ^2 (3) = 6.32, p = .097. Feminine and Undifferentiated women are more likely to expect to behave similarly to the target woman than Masculine or Androgynous women. Of all four sex role orientation groups, the Feminine women were most likely to expect to behave similarly to her. In the transcript condition, only the Feminine women were more likely to expect to behave similarly to her than dissimilarly. See Table 11. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis formulated at the outset of the research that Feminine women would be less likely to take action to restore equality than Androgynous or Masculine women.

Chi Square analyses were conducted to determine whether sex role orientation was related to subjects' friendship selection. No significant relationship was observed between

Table 11

The Relationship between Sex Role Orientation and Subjects' Perceived Similarity to the Target Woman by Experimental Condition

		Perception of Similarity			
		Similar		Dissimilar	
Condition	Sex Role Orientation	%	N	%	N
Videotape					
	Masculine	0.0	(0)	100.0	(3)
	Feminine	0.0	(0)	100.0	(4)
	Androgynous	0.0	(0)	100.0	(12)
	Undifferentiated	18.2	(2)	81.8	(9)
Transcript[a]					
	Masculine	12.5	(2)	87.5	(14)
	Feminine	53.3	(8)	46.7	(7)
	Androgynous	27.8	(5)	72.2	(13)
	Undifferentiated	38.1	(8)	61.9	(13)
Total[b]					
	Masculine	10.5	(2)	89.5	(17)
	Feminine	42.1	(8)	57.9	(11)
	Androgynous	16.7	(5)	83.3	(25)
	Undifferentiated	31.3	(10)	68.8	(22)

[a]Chi Square, df 3 = 6.32, p = .097.

[b]Chi Square, df 3 = 6.87, p = .076.

sex role orientation and friendship preference for the total sample or for the videotape and transcript conditions analyzed separately. The majority of subjects, regardless of condition or sex role orientation indicated that they would be more likely to have the target woman as a friend than the interactant.

The effect of sex role orientation on subjects' ratings of the target woman's ability was assessed in a 2 x 4 analysis of variance with sex role orientation and sex of the interactant as independent variables. For the total sample combined, a significant main effect of sex role orientation was obtained, F (3,91) = 4.74, p = .004, with Feminine and Androgynous women rating the target woman higher in ability than Masculine or Undifferentiated women. The significant main effect of sex role orientation was also obtained when the transcript condition was analyzed separately, F (3,61) = 3.80, p = .015. However, the effect does not reach significance in the videotape condition, F (3,24) = 2.12, p = .12. This may be attributed to the fact that only 30 subjects in the videotape condition received and responded to this question which was introduced midway through the data collection. It should be noted that in this analysis covariates are not controlled for. No interaction effects were obtained.

It might be noted at this point that while the Feminine and the Undifferentiated women are more likely to say that

they would behave similarly to the target woman than the Androgynous and Masculine women, the inferences that the Feminine and Undifferentiated women make concerning the ability of the woman who behaves in this manner diverge as evidenced by their significantly different ratings of her ability.

Correlates of the BSRI Femininity and Masculinity scales. Pearson correlation coefficients were computed to assess the relationship between subjects' scores on the BSRI Masculinity scale, the BSRI Femininity scale, and each of the dependent rating scales. For the total sample, Masculinity was found to be significantly and negatively related to feeling satisfied with the unequal interaction (r = -.14, p = .03); enjoying working with the interactant (r = -.13, p = .05); and anticipating conflicts in the work relationship (r = -.21, p = .002). There was also a tendency for Masculinity to be associated with feeling more angry at the interactant (r = -.10, p = .085). Masculinity was positively related to subjects' ratings of how confident they would feel during the interaction (r = .18, p = .009), and how fair they thought it would be if the interactant were to be promoted over the target woman (r = .16, p = .061). Masculinity was negatively related to how indignant subjects would feel over this promotion (r = -.18, p = .04). That is, a higher score on the Masculinity scale is related to perceiving such a promotion as fairer, and responding with less indignation at such an outcome.

When the videotape condition is considered separately, Masculinity was also found to be negatively related to how impressed subjects felt with the interactant (r = -.18, p = .041), and positively related to how intimidated they felt, when higher values represent less intimidation (r = .18, p = .042). The relationship between Masculinity and confidence is particularly apparent in the videotape condition (r = .37, p = .0001). Masculinity is also positively related to subjects' ratings of how friendly they would feel towards the interactant after the assignment is completed (r = .23, p = .012). This suggests that time is an important factor to consider in evaluating subjects' responses to inequality.

When the transcript condition is considered separately, Masculinity is negatively related to feeling angry (r = -.18, p = .052); hurt (r = -.19, p = .042); and friendly during the interaction (r = -.15, p = .09); when lower values on these scales represent less positive feelings, i.e. more anger, more hurt, less friendly. The negative relationship obtained between Masculinity and enjoying working with the interactant reaches -.20, p = .03, when the transcript condition is analyzed separately, and the relationship between Masculinity and the anticipation of conflict is -.25, p = .012. Masculinity also tends to be negatively associated with how satisfied subjects would feel working with the interactant (r = -.17, p = .063), and there is a tendency

for Masculinity to be negatively related to subjects' estimation of the percentage of time the target woman spoke (r = -.15, p = .082). In contrast to a nonsignificant, but positive relationship obtained in the videotape condition between Masculinity and subjects' feelings of competence after the unequal interaction (r = .12, p = .124), Masculinity is significantly, but negatively related to feelings of competence after the interaction in the transcript condition (r = -.22; p = .016). Consistent with this difference between modalities is the failure to obtain a relationship between Masculinity and subjects' feelings of confidence in the transcript condition. Apparently, the relationship between Masculinity and responses to inequality varies as a function of the characteristics of the situation.

Subjects' ratings on the BSRI Femininity scale are not significantly related to any of the dependent rating scales designed to measure dissatisfaction with, or protest over inequality. There is a very weak relationship between Femininity and ratings of the interactant's competency (r = .0976, p = .097), but this does not even reach the standard level of significance. When the transcript condition is considered separately there is a nonsignificant tendency for Femininity to be related to the amount of conflict anticipated working with the interactant (r = .1452, p = .092) where lower values represent more conflict. Femininity is positively related to subjects' ratings of

the target woman's competence (r = .27, p = .014); and the target woman's ability (r = .36, p = .001), and how well the target woman handled herself (r = .28, p = .010). When the videotape condition is considered separately, Femininity is positively related to feeling interested (r = .15, p = .074), and negatively related to feeling intimidated (r = -.23, p = .012), where lower values on the intimidation scale reflect more intimidation. On the whole these relationships are consistent with the prediction that stereotypic femininity would be associated with a more accommodating response to inequality--less conflict, more intimidation, more interest--though not necessarily with a more pleasant experience. The relationships are very weak, however, and suggest that women's self-ratings of femininity account for little variance in responses along these dimensions.

For the total population, significant and positive correlations were obtained between subjects' scores on the Femininity scale and their ratings of the target woman's competency (r = .22, p = .016); the target woman's ability (r = .35, p = .0001); and subjects' assessment of how well the target woman handled herself during the interaction (r = .19, p = .028). In contrast to the positive relationship between subjects' Masculinity scores and their ratings of how fair the interactant's promotion in relation to the target woman would be, Femininity tended to be negatively

related to perceived fairness (r = -.15, p = .067). In other words, higher Femininity scores were associated with lower fairness ratings in this regard. No relationship was observed between Femininity and subjects' indignation over such a promotion.

Hypothesis 3: The Effect of Self-Perceived Competency

It was predicted that women's self-perceived competency would have an effect on their responses to the unequal interaction, with higher competency being associated with more angry and more aggressive responses to the overbearing interactant. A mean self-perceived competency score was computed on the basis of subjects' self-ratings on four work-related dimensions. The mean competency rating for the total population was 4.95, where 1 means well below average, and 7 means well above average. All subsequent analyses were made on the basis of this composite score.

The relationship between subjects' self-perceived competency and their responses to the unequal interaction was assessed in the context of a multivariate analysis of covariance. The independent effects of the three covariates--age, self-perceived competency, and anger intensity rating--on the dependent variables did not reach or nearly reach significance in either the videotape ($p < .90$) or the transcript conditions ($p < .30$) when all the dependent measures were included in the analysis. Therefore univariate effects will not be considered.

A separate multivariate analysis of covariance was conducted including three variables for which an effect of self-perceived competency was expected: hurt, intimidated, and confident. Self-rating of competency was not significantly related to subjects' responses along these dimensions in either the videotape or the transcript conditions.

Pearson correlation coefficients which were computed between self-rated competency scores and the dependent variables across cells are reported in Table 12. The relationship between self-rated competency and subjects' perceptions of the target woman are reported in Table 13. This method of analysis differs from the multivariate approach which involves a within-cell regression analysis in that the relationship between self-rated competency and the dependent measures may be confounded with other subject variables which are not controlled for in computing the correlations.

Self-perceived competency was associated with a more negative response to the unequal interaction in most instances as was predicted on the basis of equity theory. It is also related to a less positive response to the relatively passive target woman.

Although the videotape and transcript conditions did not always yield the same relationships on specific dimensions, and self-perceived competency was more consistently related to subjects' responses in the transcript condition than in the videotape condition, the overall direction of

Table 12

The Relationship between Subjects' Self-Perceived Competency and Their Responses to the Interaction

Dependent Measure	r Total	r Videotape	r Transcript
Anger	-.1335**	-.0134	-.22**
Hurt	-.0418	.1004	-.21**
Enjoy Working with Interactant	-.1751**	-.0766	-.249**
Interactant's Competence	-.1175*	-.1758**	-.0291
Anticipated Conflicts	-.2107	-.2071**	-.2182**
Reluctance to Work with Interactant	-.2245**	-.2759**	-.2078**
Satisfaction with Work	-.331**	-.1169	-.1361
Friendliness After Assignment	-.0462	.0796	-.1478*
Feelings of Competency After Interaction	-.0114	.0835	-.145*
Indignation Over Interactant's Promotion	-.0459	-.1448*	-.063
Fairness of this Promotion	-.1315**	-.1380*	-.1276

Note. For all of these rating scales values were coded so that lower values represent more negative responses.

*$p < .10$.

**$p < .05$.

Table 13

The Relationship between Subjects' Self-Perceived Competency and Their Responses to the Target Woman

Dependent Measure	r Total	r Videotape	r Transcript
Target Woman's Handling of the Interaction	-.1763**	-.1245	-.1622*
The Fairness of the Interactant's Promotion vis-a-vis the Target Woman	.2364**	.0935	.3125**
Indignation Over the Interactant's Promotion vis-a-vis the Target Woman	-.1723**	-.0206	-.2558**

Note. On the scale of Indignation, 1 means Not at All Indignant, and 7 means Extremely Indignant. For the other two rating scales lower values represent more negative responses.

*$p < .10$.

**$p < .05$.

the correlations is the same. In the transcript condition, where the interaction is less extremely unequal, self-perceived competency may be a more important factor determining women's responses.

The relationship between subjects' self-ratings of competency and their friendship preference was assessed for the total sample, and for the videotape and transcript conditions separately. The mean competency scores of subjects choosing the interactant as a friend were compared with the mean competency scores of subjects who chose the target woman as a friend by way of t tests. For the total sample combined women who chose the interactant as a friend rated themselves significantly more competent than women who chose the target woman (t (93) = 3.04, p = .003). A significant difference was also observed in the transcript condition (t (67) = 4.19, p = .0001). No significant difference was obtained in the videotape condition. In all conditions only a small minority of subjects expressed a preference for the interactant. The results suggest that those who do choose the overbearing interactant are highly confident about their own ability. This was not predicted at the outset of the research, since competency was expected to be associated with rejection of the overbearing interactant.

The relationship between subjects' self-ratings of competency and their perceived similarity to the target woman was also assessed for the entire sample, and for the

videotape and transcript conditions separately. The mean competency scores of subjects who indicated that they would behave similarly to the target woman were compared with the mean competency scores of subjects who indicated that they would behave dissimilarly by means of t tests. Those subjects who reported that they would behave similarly rated themselves significantly less competent than subjects who reported that they would behave dissimilarly. This relationship was obtained for the total sample (t (98) = 3.37, p = .001), and for subjects in the transcript condition (t (68) = 2.88, p = .005). A nonsignificant tendency in the same direction emerges in the videotape condition (t (28) = 1.57, p = .127). See Table 14 for mean competency ratings by perceived similarity to the target woman and experimental condition. These findings indirectly support the hypothesis that self-perceived competency would be associated with behavior designed to restore equality in an unequal interaction. Apparently, people who believe that they are less competent along relevant dimensions are less likely to actively prevent another person from dominating an interaction.

The relationship between self-perceived competency and sex role orientation. A one-way analysis of variance was conducted for each condition, and for the population as a whole, to determine whether there is a relationship between sex role orientation and subjects' mean self-ratings of

Table 14

The Relationship between Subjects' Mean Self-Ratings of Competency and Their Perceived Similarity to the Target Woman

		Self-Rating of Competency		
Condition	Perceived Similarity	Mean	SD	N
Transcript[a]				
	Similar	4.60	.76	(23)
	Dissimilar	5.10	.65	(47)
Videotape[b]				
	Similar	4.25	.00	(2)
	Dissimilar	5.18	.82	(28)
Total[c]				
	Similar	4.57	.74	(25)
	Dissimilar	5.13	.71	(75)

[a] $\underline{t}$ (68) = 2.88, $\underline{p}$ = .005.

[b] $\underline{t}$ (28) = 1.57, $\underline{p}$ = .127.

[c] $\underline{t}$ (98) = 3.37, $\underline{p}$ = .001.

competency along work-related dimensions. A significant relationship between sex role orientation and self-perceived competency was obtained in the videotape condition, F (3,80) = 12.16, p = .0001, in the transcript condition, F (3,73) = 9.614, p = .0001, and when the total sample is combined, F (3,157) = 20.269, p = .0001. See Table 15 for subjects' mean competency ratings by sex role orientation and by experimental condition. Feminine and Undifferentiated women tended, on the average, to rate themselves less competent than Masculine and Androgynous subjects. The relationship between sex role orientation and self-perceived competency which was observed is consistent with the relationships obtained, and reported above, between sex role orientation and perceived similarity to the target woman, as well as the relationship observed between self-perceived competency and perceived similarity. Subjects who perceived themselves as behaving similarly to the target woman had lower competency ratings than subjects who reported that they would behave dissimilarly, and Feminine and Undifferentiated subjects were more likely to expect to behave similarly than women in other sex role groups. Low self-ratings on the Masculinity scale items appear thus, to be associated with a low estimation of competency, as well as to a tendency to behave similarly to the target woman in the interaction.

The relationship between subjects' mean self-ratings of competency and their scores on the Masculinity and

Table 15

Subjects' Self-Perceived Competency Ratings Broken Down by Sex Role Orientation and by Experimental Condition

		Self-Ratings of Competency		
Condition	Sex Role Orientation	Mean	SD	N
Videotape[a]				
	Masculine	5.35	.57	(18)
	Feminine	4.74	.77	(20)
	Androgynous	5.44	.63	(31)
	Undifferentiated	4.38	.57	(27)
Transcript[b]				
	Masculine	5.38	.78	(19)
	Feminine	4.53	.51	(19)
	Androgynous	5.26	.47	(21)
	Undifferentiated	4.56	.70	(26)
Total[c]				
	Masculine	5.36	.68	(37)
	Feminine	4.63	.66	(39)
	Androgynous	5.37	.57	(52)
	Undifferentiated	4.46	.64	(53)

[a] F (3,80) = 12.16, $p < .0001$.

[b] F (3,73) = 9.61, $p < .0001$.

[c] F (3,157) = 20.27, $p < .0001$.

Femininity scales of the BSRI was assessed. For the total sample population Masculinity and self-perceived competency were significantly correlated (r = .5789, p = .0001). Self-perceived competency was also positively related to subjects' scores on the Femininity scale, but the relationship was not as strong (r = .1593, p = .016). In the videotape condition, self-rated competency was highly correlated with Masculinity (r = .5530, p = .0001), and no relationship between self-perceived competency and Femininity was obtained (r = .0678, p = .269). In the transcript condition, the correlation between Masculinity and competency was also significant (r = .6035, p = .0001), but the correlation between Femininity and self-rated competency was also significant (r = .2483, p = .007). The videotape and transcript subjects are significantly different in age--videotape subjects being on the average older than transcript subjects. Perhaps this can account for the failure to obtain a correlation between Femininity and self-perceived competency in the videotape condition. With age and experience in the work world feelings of competency and self-ratings on the Femininity scale may be dissociated from each other.

The contrasting relationship between self-perceived competency and women's responses to their own and another woman's unequal treatment will be discussed below.

Hypothesis 4: The Inhibition of Anger

It was predicted that some women may characteristically modulate or inhibit the experience and/or the expression of anger. This tendency was expected to be associated with a more modulated response to the inequality portrayed in the experimental interaction. It was also predicted that stereotypically feminine women would be more likely to inhibit anger than women in other sex role orientation groups.

If, when asked if she could recall an experience of anger within the past month a subject was unable or unwilling to do so she was classified as an "inhibitor" of anger. Only 20 women (11.1% of the total population) were so classified. Since the inclusion of this variable in the multivariate analysis of covariance would result in many empty cells, inhibition of anger as a categorical variable could not be analyzed in this context. Individual t tests were computed comparing inhibitors with non-inhibitors on the 17 dependent rating scales, but no consistent differences were obtained, and in light of the number of t tests conducted isolated effects cannot be considered statistically reliable.

A Chi Square analysis was conducted to assess whether there was a relationship between sex role orientation and the inhibition of anger as measured in this manner. When Feminine and Androgynous women are compared with Masculine and Undifferentiated women a significance difference is obtained (χ^2 (1) = 5.762, p > .025). The high feminine

women--the Androgynous and Feminine--were less likely to be classified as inhibitors than the low feminine women--the Masculine and Undifferentiated (see Table 16).

The mean Femininity and Masculinity scores of inhibitors and non-inhibitors were compared by means of t tests. A significant difference was found in Femininity ratings only, with inhibitors having a lower mean Femininity rating than non-inhibitors (t (179) = 2.11, p = .036). These results are directly opposite to the prediction that Femininity would be associated with a tendency to inhibit anger.

Intensity of recollected anger. Subjects who did recall an anger experience within the past month were asked to rate its intensity on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means extremely mild, and 7 means extremely intense. The mean intensity rating for the entire population was 5.16.

As indicated above, the within-cells regression analysis for the three covariates considered in the context of the multivariate analysis of covariance did not yield a significant or near-significant effect on the dependent variables as a group. Therefore, the univariate effects of anger intensity rating on subjects' responses to the experimental interaction cannot be considered significant, and will not be reported.

Pearson correlation coefficients assessing the relationship between subjects' anger intensity rating and the dependent measures will, however, be reported. As in the

Table 16

The Relationship between Sex Role Orientation and the Inhibition of Anger

Inhibition of Anger	Sex Role Orientation: Masculine and Undifferentiated		Sex Role Orientation: Feminine and Androgynous		Total	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
Inhibitors	16.7	(15)	5.5	(5)	11.0	(20)
Non-inhibitors	83.3	(75)	94.5	(86)	89.0	(161)
Total	100.0	(90)	100.0	(91)	100.0	(181)

Chi Square df 1 = 5.76, p < .025.

case of self-perceived competency, the effects of anger intensity which are measured in the context of the multivariate analyses are independent of any relationships between intensity scores and sex role orientation or other subject variables. Since analyses which will be reported in detail below suggest that there may be a relationship between intensity scores and sex role orientation, the correlations between anger intensity and the dependent measures which do not control for sex role orientation cannot be attributed to the effect of this variable in itself.

In the videotape condition the relationship between intensity of anger rating and subjects' feelings of competence after the interaction reached the standard level of significance (r = .1857, p = .045), and in the transcript condition the relationship between intensity of anger and subjects' feelings of confidence was significant (r = .1880, p = .05).

In the videotape condition there is a tendency for anger intensity to be negatively related to subjects' ratings of how much they enjoyed the unequal interaction (r = -.1585, p = .075), and in the transcript condition intensity tended to be positively related to subjects' ratings of how interested they would be during the interaction (r = .1642, p = .078). That is, subjects who rated their anger experience as very intense were more interested

in the interaction than subjects who rated their anger less intense.

Subjects' anger intensity rating was not found to be significantly related to any other dependent measures for subjects in the transcript condition. However, in the videotape condition there was a negative relationship obtained between anger intensity rating and subjects' rating of the target woman's ability (r = -.3148, p = .059), that is, subjects who rated their anger experience as very intense tended to rate the target woman's ability as lower than subjects who rated their anger experience as relatively mild.

When the total sample is combined, there tends to be a negative relationship between anger intensity rating and the perceived fairness of the interactant's promotion in relation to the target woman (r = -.1390, p = .098). The more intense subjects rated their anger experience, the fairer they perceived the decision to promote the overbearing interactant over the target woman.

One-way analyses of variance were conducted to determine whether there was a relationship between subjects' anger intensity rating and sex role orientation. Sex role orientation was significantly related to mean anger intensity rating when the total sample was combined (F (3,157) = 2.957, p = .034), and is nearly significant when the videotape condition is analyzed separately (F (3,80) = 2.385,

p = .075). The effect does not reach significance in the transcript condition (F (3,73) = 1.333, p = .27). Subjects' mean anger intensity ratings broken down by sex role orientation and experimental modality are reported in Table 17. Feminine subjects, in the videotape condition, rated the intensity of their recollected anger experience lower than subjects in the other sex role orientation groups, and Androgynous and Undifferentiated women rated their recollected anger as most intense. Post hoc comparisons of means were conducted for the videotape condition. No two groups are significantly different at the .10 level according to the Scheffé multiple range procedure.

Subjects' anger intensity rating was found to be positively related to their scores on the Masculinity scale of the BSRI (r = .1414, p = .037) when the total sample is combined. In the transcript condition the relationship between Masculinity and anger intensity is nearly significant (r = .1856, p = .053). No significant relationship was obtained between Masculinity and anger intensity in the videotape condition, and no relationships were obtained between anger intensity and subjects' Femininity ratings in either experimental group.

It should be noted that the two measures of the tendency to inhibit anger are related quite differently to subjects' sex role orientation. The failure to recall any

Table 17

The Mean Intensity of a Recollected Anger Experience Broken Down by Sex Role Orientation and Experimental Condition

		Anger Intensity Rating		
Condition	Sex Role Orientation	Mean	SD	N
Videotape[a]				
	Masculine	5.27	1.33	(15)
	Feminine	4.53	1.74	(19)
	Androgynous	5.61	1.62	(28)
	Undifferentiated	5.59	1.14	(22)
Transcript[b]				
	Masculine	5.13	1.50	(16)
	Feminine	4.72	1.74	(18)
	Androgynous	5.62	1.60	(21)
	Undifferentiated	4.82	1.47	(22)
Total[c]				
	Masculine	5.19	1.40	(31)
	Feminine	4.62	1.72	(37)
	Androgynous	5.61	1.59	(49)
	Undifferentiated	5.20	1.36	(44)

Note. On this scale 1 = Extremely mild and 7 = Extremely intense.

[a]One-way analysis of variance, F (3,80) = 2.385, p = .075.

[b]One-way analysis of variance, F (3,73) = 1.333, p = .27.

[c]One-way analysis of variance, F (3,157) = 2.957, p = .034.

anger experience within the last month was associated with a lower score on the BSRI Femininity scale, and Feminine and Androgynous women were less likely to be classified as inhibitors than Masculine and Undifferentiated women according to this measure. However, when subjects were able to recollect an anger experience, the intensity of this experience is unrelated to subjects' Femininity score, and tended to be positively related to their Masculinity score.

The Effect of Age

As indicated above, the multivariate analysis of covariance did not yield a significant effect of the three covariates on the 17 dependent measures which were included. However, a separate multivariate analysis was conducted for which an effect of self-perceived competency was expected. This analysis included three dependent scales: how hurt, how intimidated, and how confident subjects would feel during the unequal interaction if they were in the position of the target woman. Although no significant effect of self-perceived competency was obtained, in the transcript condition only, age was found to have a significant and independent effect on these dependent variables, the multivariate F is significant, $p < .01$, and each subsequent univariate F test conducted was also found to be significant. Within this condition older subjects rated themselves less hurt ($p = .011$), less intimidated ($p = .001$), and more confident

(p = .019). These relationships between age and the dependent measures were computed within each cell of the multivariate analysis, and thus, other subject variables were controlled for.

The relationship between sex role orientation and age was evaluated by means of a one-way analysis of variance conducted within each condition. A significant relationship was observed in the videotape condition, F (3,88) = 3.10, p = .03, with Feminine and Undifferentiated women being on the average younger than Androgynous or Masculine women. A similar trend emerges in the transcript condition, F (3,81) = 1.99, p = .12. In this condition, it is only the Feminine women who tend to be younger than women in the other sex role orientation groups. For a breakdown of subjects' mean age by sex role orientation and experimental condition see Table 18.

Table 18

Age Broken Down by Sex Role Orientation and Sex of the Interactant by Experimental Condition

Condition[a]	Sex Orientation[b]	Sex of the Interactant[c]					
		Male			Female		
		Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
Videotape							
	Masculine	32.3	10.4	(11)	25.7	7.3	(7)
	Feminine	21.2	4.8	(10)	22.1	4.7	(8)
	Androgynous	29.5	11.3	(15)	24.7	8.0	(15)
	Undifferentiated	25.3	9.8	(9)	24.8	7.0	(17)
Transcript							
	Masculine	19.0	2.2	(11)	18.8	1.2	(8)
	Feminine	17.9	.8	(8)	17.7	.8	(11)
	Androgynous	18.9	1.7	(12)	21.0	6.2	(9)
	Undifferentiated	19.5	3.6	(11)	19.0	1.3	(15)

[a]Effect of condition, t (175) = 6.99, p = .0001.

[b]Effect of sex role orientation (see text).

[c]Effect of sex of the Interactant, t (175) = 1.36, p = .18.

CHAPTER 4

DISCUSSION

It was hypothesized that the sex of the perpetrator of an instance of inequality would mediate women's experience of injustice in such a way that women would be less likely to experience feelings associated with relative deprivation in relation to an overbearing man than in relation to an overbearing woman. The findings of this study do not lend support to this hypothesis. The sex of the overbearing person does not in itself appear to have a significant effect on feelings of relative deprivation. On the average, women did not report more negative feelings in response to the overbearing female than in response to the overbearing male, and in fact, in the more extreme, videotape condition, women tended to rate themselves as feeling more hurt in relation to the overbearing man than in relation to the overbearing woman.

It had been specifically predicted that the sex of the interactant would have an effect on women's feelings of indignation over the interactant's more favorable outcomes, i.e. a promotion. This effect was not obtained, and when the overbearing person is promoted in relation to the target woman in the experimental situation subjects respond

more negatively when it is a male being promoted than when it is a female.

The tendency to respond with greater indignation vis-a-vis a man may reflect differences in the causal attributions subjects make, as a function of the sex of the favored person, coupled with changing reference group boundaries. Subjects may be attributing the promotion of the man to his sex status, while they may attribute the promotion of the female to her individual characteristics or abilities. A relationship between causal attributions for an instance of inequality and subjects' responses of indignation to the inequality was obtained in an earlier study conducted by Block (1979). Subjects in this study expressed greater indignation when inequality in outcomes was attributed to external, systemic factors such as sex status of the individuals involved, than when inequality was attributed to internal factors such as the personality characteristics of the participants. If, in fact, subjects in the present investigation are making different attributions for the male's and the female's promotion, this could explain the counterexpectational findings--assuming, of course, that traditional reference group boundaries no longer apply.

Some evidence for this line of reasoning can be found within the context of the present study. Subjects in the videotape condition rated the female as more competent than the male interactant, and a trend emerged for subjects to

rate the woman who is the target of the unequal treatment lower in ability when she is dominated by another woman than when she is dominated by a man. One possible explanation for these findings would be that subjects are more likely to explain a case of same-sex inequality as a function of the individual characteristics of the participants, but to explain inequality between members of the opposite sex as a function of group membership. If sex status is no longer perceived as a justification for differential treatment, then following this line of reasoning, inequality in relation to a man would be perceived as more inequitable than inequality in relation to a woman. Future research designed to assess the differences in attributions for inequality as a function of the sex of the participants is needed to corroborate these speculations.

The sex of the overbearing person was also expected to have an effect on women's behavioral responses within the context of an unequal interaction. Women were expected to be less likely to act to restore equality when the inequality occurred in relation to a man than when it occurred in relation to another woman. There was no evidence to lend support to this hypothesis. Thus, not only did the <u>experience</u> of inequality <u>not</u> vary as a function of the sex of the overbearing person, but also women's behavioral intentions in response to the unequal treatment did not vary either.

A variety of interpretations of the data will be considered in the attempt to explain the failure to obtain the predicted effect. The women in the research sample may not, in fact, perceive sex status as a legitimate basis by which to differentiate between referents and nonreferents in a work-related setting. The expectations and beliefs of the women in this population concerning the rights and privileges of men may not differ significantly from their expectations and beliefs concerning the rights and privileges of women in the context of a professional relationship. As it has been suggested in the literature relating to black protest activities during the 1960's, when the stratification system in a society begins to break down, boundaries which previously separated referents from nonreferents no longer obtain, and inequality in relation to a member of an out-group--which in the past was accepted without much protest--is experienced dissonantly (Pettigrew, 1967; Searles & Williams, 1962). This kind of radical shift in perspective may cut across all subgroups within the previously disadvantaged population, and there may even be a heightened sensitivity to any remnants of inequality which continue to exist. This would explain the tendency for women to feel more hurt and more indignant in response to the man's promotion rather than less.

From the perspective of equity theory, inequality is experienced as inequitable on the basis of a subjective

calculation of the ratio between one's own and another's "inputs" and "outcomes." If, as it was predicted, different values are attached to the male and female genders, it would follow that sex status would mediate subjects' responses to unequal treatment. It may be inferred, on the basis of the results obtained, that as a group, the women in this sample population do not believe that professional merit or worth is sex-linked (at least within the professional arena described in the experimental interaction), and consequently, domination of a work-related interaction by a man is not more justifiable than similar domination by a woman. Whether this would be replicated in response to more traditionally "masculine" occupational arenas remains to be seen. Differences between the targets of the dominating individual, rather than differences as a function of the dominating individual's sex, would seem to play a more critical role in determining whether a given instance of inequality is perceived as equitable or inequitable.

Methodological factors must also be considered in the interpretation of the results. Subjects were presented with a rather extreme and obvious instance of interpersonal inequality, and this might have contributed to the failure to obtain significant differences in their responses to the male and female versions of the interaction. When inequality is blatant, differences, as a function of the sex of the overbearing person, may be occluded. The transcript

condition was introduced in an attempt to control, not only for the differences between the male and female actors in appearance, and in nonverbal behavior, which may have counteracted the effect of sex, but also to weaken the pull of the stimulus. By reducing the magnitude of the inequality it was expected that the effect of the sex of the partner on subjects' responses would be more likely to manifest itself. Although, as would be expected, subjects in the videotape condition did respond less favorably to the overbearing interactant (male or female) than subjects in the transcript condition, the effect of sex on the interactant did not differ substantially between one condition and the other. Since the results obtained from the videotape presentation are, for the most part, not different from those obtained in the transcript presentation (as they relate to the effect of the sex of the interactant), it seems likely that confounds in the videotape versions of the interactions are not a significant factor in explaining the nonsignificant results.

When after having been asked to participate in a psychological research project subjects are presented with an isolated example of interpersonal inequality, their responses to the interaction portrayed may represent how they think they <u>should</u> respond, rather than how they actually would respond if confronted with a similar situation in their own lives. In this regard, the methodological

problems are twofold: On the one hand, the demand characteristics of the experimental situation may have an influence on subjects' responses to the stimulus. On the other hand, although subjects were instructed to "place yourself in the shoes" of the target woman in the interaction, in actuality, they remain observers of inequality rather than becoming the targets of the unequal treatment themselves. Both of these factors--the artificiality of the experimental situation, and the position of the subject as onlooker--allow subjects to distance themselves from the interaction in a manner not ordinarily afforded an individual in real life. This distancing is likely to alter subjects' responses to inequality so that they conform to their conscious, rather than to their "non-conscious" values and ideology.

In recent years, perhaps under the influence of the Women's Movement, a positive value has been attached to women's assertiveness, and specifically, women's assertiveness in relation to men. Witness the proliferation of assertiveness training courses and workshops. If we can assume that for this sample population of college women these values are prevalent, it would follow that when these women are alerted or sensitized to an issue related to assertion or sexual inequality their responses will reflect these attitudes. Unfortunately, there is no assurance that such attitudes correspond to their actual behavior or experience. Although in the debriefing procedure there was

no evidence that subjects suspected the precise nature of the research, many subjects did guess that the research had something to do with assertiveness, and in the male version, there were explicit allusions made to "male chauvinism." If the attitudes and values that were measured in the context of this investigation are, in reality, integrated with these women's experience and behavior, then what is being measured is an accurate representation of existing reference group boundaries, and the methodology is not a confound. This cannot be determined without future research conducted in a more naturalistic setting. A systematic, observational study of interactions in the work arena is in order, with follow-up questions designed to assess the experiential level as well.

It was hypothesized that sex role orientation would be related to subjects' responses, experiential and behavioral, to interpersonal inequality in a work setting. Specifically, stereotypically feminine women were expected to respond with less anger, indignation, or conflict to unequal treatment than women who were psychologically androgynous or masculine. Feminine women were also expected to be less likely to act to restore interpersonal equality. Two corollaries to this hypothesis were formulated, the one proposing that differences, as a function of sex role orientation, reflect different reference group boundaries; and the other, suggesting that these differences, if obtained, are a function

of consistent personality configurations. If the effect of sex role orientation on women's responses to inequality is similar for both the male and the female versions of the interaction, then it can be inferred that this difference represents a personality difference between subjects--i.e. a difference which is not situation-specific, or predicated on the sex of the overbearing interactant. On the other hand, if differences as a function of sex role orientation are only observed under certain conditions, i.e. when the overbearing person is one gender or the other, or vary between conditions, then these differences between women of different sex role orientations cannot be attributed exclusively to different personality characteristics. Reference group boundaries, which may vary as a function of a woman's identification with a particular sex role, should then be considered as a source of variance.

On the basis of the results obtained in this investigation, sex role orientation as measured by the BSRI does <u>not</u> appear to have a significant and independent effect on women's feelings of relative deprivation in the context of inequality. When age, self-perceived competency, and a tendency to modulate anger are controlled for, Feminine women do <u>not</u> respond with less anger, indignation or conflict than Androgynous or Masculine women, nor do they respond consistently more favorably to an overbearing man than to an overbearing woman. The only dimension for which

a significant main effect of sex role was found when covariates are controlled for was in women's ratings of how confident they would feel during the unequal interaction: Feminine women rated themselves less confident than Androgynous and particularly Masculine women. There is no evidence that stereotypically feminine women exclude men from their reference groups and experience inequality vis-a-vis a male colleague as more equitable than inequality vis-a-vis a female colleague.

Significant interaction effects which were obtained between sex role orientation and sex of the overbearing interactant do suggest, however, that at least on some dimensions, which are not directly associated with feelings of relative deprivation, women of different sex role orientations respond differently to an overbearing partner as a function of the partner's sex. These interactions do not fit neatly into the reference group/relative deprivation model which has been articulated, and they are difficult to interpret.

In the transcript condition, it is the Androgynous women who respond with significantly less indignation to the promotion of the overbearing man than the Masculine, Feminine or Undifferentiated women. It is also the Androgynous women who feel more competent after having been treated unequally by a man than after having been treated unequally by another woman. From the perspective of reference group

theory these results would suggest that it is the Androgynous women who are excluding men from their pool of "comparable" others, and as a consequence of this exclusion, it is they whose self-esteem is less threatened by an overbearing man, and it is they who feel less indignant when a man obtains a more favorable outcome. Such a conclusion would however, be premature in light of the absence of corroborating evidence on related dimensions, e.g. confidence, anger, hurt. Since there were no significant interactions obtained on these dimensions, and the interactions reported were not observed in the videotape condition, the interpretation suggested must be considered highly tentative.

In the videotape condition, sex role orientation tends to make a difference on women's feelings of intimidation, but only when the overbearing partner is a man. Both the Feminine and the Androgynous women rate themselves as feeling more intimidated by the overbearing man than Masculine women, and it is particularly the Androgynous and Masculine women who differ under this condition. Since both the Androgynous and the Feminine women rate themselves relatively high on stereotypically feminine characteristics, it may be argued that possessing these characteristics is related to feeling intimidated in relation to an overbearing man. However, the data suggest that it is the specific combination of being high in <u>both</u> feminine and masculine characteristics that intensifies the feelings of

intimidation in response to an overbearing man. Although sex role orientation does not significantly differentiate women's responses to the overbearing woman, the two low feminine groups--the Masculine and the Undifferentiated women--tend to be more intimidated by an overbearing woman than they are by an overbearing man. No such effect of sex of the interactant is apparent for the high feminine women.

A significant interaction between sex role orientation and sex of the interactant was also observed in the videotape condition when subjects were asked how impressed they would be with the overbearing partner if they were in the position of the target woman. Androgynous women rated themselves less impressed with the overbearing man than with the overbearing woman, and Undifferentiated women rated themselves more impressed with the overbearing man than with the overbearing woman. The sex of the interactant did not have a significant effect on Masculine or Feminine women's responses, but, as on the measure of intimidation, it is the low feminine women, i.e. the Masculine and Undifferentiated women, who respond most negatively to the overbearing woman.

These interactions, as a function of sex role orientation and sex of the interactant are significant even when covariates related to sex role orientation are controlled for, and suggest that sex role orientation mediates women's responses to men and women independently of other variables,

at least on some dimensions. One possible explanation for this may be that women of different sex role orientations vary in the degree to which they identify with the overbearing man or overbearing woman.

The Androgynous women's negative response to the overbearing man, and their relatively more favorable response to the overbearing woman, may reflect their rejection of, and at the same time vulnerability to, stereotypic masculine behavior in men. They also may be sympathizing (perhaps even identifying with) the overbearing woman who is violating stereotypic sex role norms of femininity, as they themselves may do on occasion.

On the other hand, the Masculine women, who do not endorse stereotypic feminine characteristics in themselves, and who perceive themselves in stereotypic masculine terms, do not feel as intimidated by the man as their more feminine counterparts (after all they too have "masculine" characteristics and are <u>not</u> about to be placed in a stereotypic feminine role). However, these Masculine women apparently fail to make a positive identification with the overbearing female in the videotape. They are <u>not</u> more impressed with the female than with the male, as are the Androgynous women. It is unclear why these Masculine women should tend to be more intimidated by an overbearing woman than by an overbearing man, except that they may feel threatened by her femaleness, and by the possibility that

she has feminine characteristics which they do not have themselves, and against which they cannot compete.

The Undifferentiated women also tended to respond more favorably along these dimensions to the male interactant than to the female interactant. They too were less intimidated by the man than by the woman, and they were significantly more impressed with the overbearing man than with the overbearing woman. Lacking in masculine attributes, the Undifferentiated women are not significantly less intimidated by the overbearing man than Androgynous women; however, they are more impressed with the male than with the female, and this suggests that in contrast to the high feminine women, they attach a more positive value to male-associated characteristics than to female-associated characteristics, even if they themselves do not possess them. Further research is needed to confirm such a hypothesis.

Finally, the Feminine women do not seem to be influenced one way or the other by the sex of the overbearing partner in their responses along these dimensions. The Feminine women seem to be identifying exclusively with the role of the target woman, and from this vantage point, the male and the female overbearing partner are perceived as equally dissimilar to themselves. There is evidence within the context of this study that the Feminine women do make a positive identification with the target woman, who in fact conducts herself in a manner which conforms to the

stereotypic feminine sex role. The Feminine women rate the target woman relatively high in ability, and at the same time, they are more likely to indicate that they would behave similarly to the way she did if they were in her position. It might be argued that unlike their Androgynous, Masculine or Undifferentiated cohorts they do not aspire to be in the position of the overbearing man or the overbearing woman, and do not identify more with one than the other.

A significant relationship was obtained between sex role orientation and self-perceived competency, and in the videotape condition a significant relationship was also found between sex role orientation and the intensity of anger subjects can recall experiencing within the past month. Feminine and Undifferentiated women tended to perceive themselves as less competent along work-related dimensions than Androgynous or Masculine women, and Feminine women in the videotape condition rated their recollected anger as less intense. When these variables are not controlled for, differences, as a function of sex role orientation do emerge. This suggests that sex role orientation is one part of a total personality configuration which, taken as a whole, has some relationship to women's responses to inequality. In the transcript condition, Feminine and Undifferentiated women--both of whom rate themselves low on stereotypically masculine characteristics--tended to rate themselves less angry than Androgynous or Masculine women,

and to anticipate less conflict if they were placed in a work situation with an overbearing partner. Since the effect is not significant, and since Androgynous women tend to express less indignation than women in other sex role orientation groups, the finding cannot be considered confirmation of the relative deprivation model. The failure to obtain a parallel finding in the videotape condition may be a function of the extremity of the inequality portrayed under this condition, with a resulting "ceiling effect," or a function of the visual medium itself.

There is some indication that while sex role orientation does not consistently differentiate women's experience of inequality, it may be an important factor in determining women's behavior in the context of such a situation. A greater proportion of Feminine women said that they would have behaved similarly to the target woman in the interaction than Androgynous women or Masculine women. Since the target woman does not assert her position as an equal partner in the interaction, this difference, as a function of sex role orientation, can be considered to reflect differences in women's expectations about restoring equality in relation to a domineering person. As predicted, Feminine women are less likely to expect to act to restore equality, at least overtly, during the course of the encounter. The sex of the overbearing person was not a factor in subjects' responses along this dimension.

A significant effect of sex role orientation was observed in a univariate analysis of subjects' ratings of the target woman's ability. Feminine and Androgynous women rated the target woman higher in ability than Masculine or Undifferentiated women. This suggests that women who are themselves highly "feminine" do not interpret the target's relatively passive behavior as reflective of low ability. Low feminine women, and particularly Masculine women tend to do just that. Perhaps Masculine and Undifferentiated women are more likely to have internalized the cultural biases which define stereotypically feminine behavior as reflective of lower ability, and this is why they have not developed these characteristics themselves.

The interplay between masculinity and femininity in the determination of women's responses is evidenced by the fact that while the two high feminine groups agree in their relatively high estimation of the target woman's ability, the women whose self-concept is exclusively feminine are more likely to expect to behave similarly to this woman. In addition, although both low feminine women evaluate the target woman poorly, women who do not perceive themselves in stereotypically masculine terms are less likely to anticipate behaving differently under similar circumstances. Thus, low masculinity may be a good predictor of behavior, and low femininity may be a good predictor of values or attributional processes.

Although few significant effects were observed as a function of women's sex role orientation, several low, but significant correlations are obtained between women's self-ratings on the BSRI Masculinity scale and their responses to the unequal interaction. Masculinity tends to be related to feelings which would be associated with relative deprivation and protest, e.g. anger, anticipation of conflict, dissatisfaction. In the videotape condition, where inequality is more extreme, Masculinity is related to feeling more confident and less intimidated in relation to the overbearing partner, but it is also related to feeling more friendly towards this person in the future. This suggests that although women with masculine characteristics tend to be less tolerant of the overbearing partner's behavior, they also tend to be less threatened by this behavior. The failure to obtain a relationship between masculinity and confidence on the transcript condition, coupled with the fact that the more masculine women in this condition tend to rate themselves more hurt and less competent after the interaction than the less masculine women suggests that the influence of masculinity on women's responses varies across situations. Perhaps, when inequality is less blatant, as in the transcript condition, masculinity functions to sensitize women to existing injustice; under more extreme circumstances, however, the possession of masculine characteristics may protect women from assaults to their self-esteem.

In contrast to the observed relationships between masculinity and responses to inequality, on most dimensions women's self-ratings of femininity are not significantly related to their responses to the unequal interaction. Apparently, the possession of masculine characteristics is a more critical determinant of responses to inequality than the possession of feminine characteristics, or the balance between the two.

Femininity was, however, significantly related to women's responses to the target woman in the unequal interaction, and this relationship is in the opposite direction to the relationship observed between masculinity and women's responses to this woman. High feminine women tended to evaluate the target more favorably than low feminine women, and they tended to perceive her failure to be promoted as less fair. Masculinity, on the other hand, was associated with more acceptance of the interactant's promotion in relation to the target woman, a promotion which they also tend to perceive as relatively fair, and to which they respond with relatively less indignation. In light of these correlations it seems likely that the androgynous women who rate themselves high on both feminine and masculine characteristics would experience conflict when making an evaluation of a target of inequality such as the woman portrayed in the experimental interaction. The androgynous woman does not "blame the victim" for her less favorable position by

attributing it to low ability, however since she indicates that she would not conduct herself similarly under such circumstances she has probably realized that stereotypically feminine behavior is "inappropriate," or at least ineffective, within the work world. Can this account for why the androgynous women in the transcript condition are less indignant than other women when the male interactant is promoted? Does the androgynous woman believe that her femininity is in fact a liability in the work arena? These questions are provocative and require further investigation.

There are a number of possible explanations which should be considered for the failure to confirm the predictions derived from reference group and relative deprivation theories. Women's sex role orientation may <u>not</u> in fact mediate reference group identification, i.e. whether or not men are included or excluded from women's reference group may be unrelated to self-ratings of femininity or masculinity. A woman may perceive a man as dissimilar to herself on a number of dimensions and still regard him as a referent to whom she can compare her outcomes. In fact, dissimilarity may act as a warning signal, sensitizing a woman to the possibility of unequal treatment. Reference group and relative deprivation theories remain (perhaps inevitably) vague about what constitutes the basis for perceiving another individual as a referent or a nonreferent, as similar or dissimilar. Similar in what way? It is clear, however,

that the concept of reference group is distinguished from the concept of membership group, and therefore objectively determined similarity or dissimilarity fails to reliably predict an individual's behavior. While it is self-evident that women are biologically more similar to each other than they are to men, this dimension, as well as the characteristics measured by the BSRI may be irrelevant when a man and a woman are assigned identical job descriptions, implying similarity in work roles. At least in the sphere of work which is not stereotypically associated with one sex or the other, women may perceive all coworkers are referents unless the job titles indicate otherwise. Whether this is the case outside the work arena, or when job titles are left ambiguous can be tested empirically.

Other explanations for the results must also be considered. Since, for the purposes of the research sex role orientation is a relative rather than an absolute category (based upon a comparison between a woman's self-ratings on stereotypically feminine and masculine characteristics and the self-ratings of other women in the sample population), it may be that the differences between sex role orientation groups within this sample of women are not sufficiently great for the predicted effects to emerge. The woman who is classified as Feminine in this sample is only relatively less masculine than her Androgynous counterpart. Perhaps, when she is compared with women in the general population she would be considered androgynous or even masculine. All

of the women in this study were attending college in the Northeastern section of the United States. The range of sex role diversity is consequently restricted.

Apart from the methodological limitations of the sex role classification which are specific to the present study, the predictive validity of the four sex role categories, derived from subjects' scores on the BSRI, must also be called into question. It may be that under certain conditions the possession of feminine characteristics may be irrelevant in predicting subjects' responses, and under other circumstances, the possession of masculine characteristics are of little consequence. Or perhaps, the relative importance of masculinity or femininity varies depending on the response measured. The correlational findings obtained in the context of the present study suggest that in fact women's femininity scores are of little value in predicting their responses to the inequality, though they are relatively more salient when considering their response to the target of the inequality. In such cases, collapsing the two high feminine groups and comparing them with the two low feminine groups may be informative. In other cases, combining the two high masculine groups and comparing them with the two low masculine groups would be more useful. This kind of exploratory reclassification by individual dependent measure must be limited to a few response dimensions if statistical analysis is to be considered significant.

Finally, the model of relative deprivation itself must be reevaluated in light of the present results. Deprivation relative to one's referents may not always be experienced as more unjust than deprivation relative to a nonreferent. Subjects who are treated unequally by a similar other may seek out explanations justifying the unequal treatment, such as differences in ability or differences in personality or motivation, thereby creating dissimilarity from similarity. In contrast, inequality vis-a-vis a nonreferent provides subjects with a ready-made explanation for the differential treatment, and when this criterion is no longer considered to be a legitimate one it is likely to elicit feelings of anger and resentment.

Time and the duration of the deprivation may also play a role in subjects' responses to deprivation in relation to referents and nonreferents. Deprivation in relation to a referent may generate less resentment or anger if it informs the deprived party of the possibility of attaining a better outcome for him or herself in the future. Women of different sex role orientations may be more or less capable of identifying with the overbearing interactant. It would seem likely that those women who do make such an identification with the aggressive party would do so precisely because they see him or her as a referent. If, as a result of such an identification feelings of deprivation are mixed with feelings of admiration this might mitigate anger and resentment which has been asscoiated with relative

deprivation. Consequently, these women may not experience the inequality more negatively than the women who perceive the overbearing interactant as a nonreferent. Assuming that Androgynous and Masculine women are more likely to see themselves as similar to the overbearing man or woman than Feminine women, and hence are more likely to identify with him or her, this process may counteract the effect predicted on the basis of relative deprivation theory.

On the basis of equity theory it was predicted that women's self-perceived competency on dimensions relevant to a particular interaction would be related to their responses to inequality within that interaction. Specifically, it was expected that women who perceived themselves as highly competent would react with more indignation and anger, and would be less tolerant of unequal treatment than women who perceived themselves as less competent. There is some support for this hypothesis, although the relationship between competency and women's responses to inequality is more complicated than initially anticipated, and it is mediated through sex role orientation.

When self-perceived competency is considered in isolation, it does not have a significant effect on women's responses to inequality. This may be attributed to the fact that there is little variability in the competency ratings of subjects <u>within</u> each sex role group. Thus, the within-cell analysis, conducted within the context of the

multivariate analysis of covariance, which controls for sex role orientation, yields a nonsignificant multivariate effect of this variable. In addition, the significant relationship between sex role orientation and self-perceived competency suggests that there is considerable overlap between the two measures, and partialling out one may leave us with little information.

It may be argued that the relationship between sex role orientation and self-ratings of competency is tautological, insofar as women who rate themselves low on the BSRI Masculinity scale would, by definition, also rate themselves low on dimensions which comprise the competency score (creative thinking, business skills, interpersonal communication skills, and the ability to promote and convince others of one's own ideas). Whether or not the relationship between masculinity and competency is merely definitional, i.e. the Masculinity scale is measuring the same characteristics and dimensions as the competency rating scales, the data have important implications. If characteristics which comprise the femininity scale tend not to be associated with characteristics related to competency within the work world, then conformity to a restricted feminine sex role precludes the development of work-related capacities. It is important to note, however, that a high score on the BSRI Femininity scale is not, in itself, negatively related to self-ratings of competency, so that the

one does not exclude the other. Androgynous women rate themselves as competent as Masculine women, and Feminine women rate themselves no less competent than Undifferentiated women.

When women's sex role orientation is not controlled for, self-perceived competency is associated with a more negative response to the unequal interaction, and this is particularly evident in the transcript condition where the inequality is less blatant. Women who perceive themselves as highly competent tend to feel more angry, more hurt, less satisfied, less friendly, and more reluctant to work with the interactant in the future. They also tend to feel less competent after the interaction, to anticipate more conflicts with the interactant, and to enjoy working with him or her less. The highly competent women tend to indicate that they would feel more indignant if the interactant was promoted over themselves, if they were the target woman, and they tend to consider such a promotion as less fair. While certain differences emerge between the transcript and the videotape conditions, the low, but significant relationships obtained in one tend not to be contradicted in the other.

Women who perceive themselves as dissimilar to the target woman in the interaction rate themselves, on the average, more competent than women who indicate that they would behave similarly to her. This suggests that in order

to respond dissimilarly--which on the basis of subjects' answers to open-ended questions can be assumed to mean less passively--women need to feel that they are themselves very competent. Competency is not, however, necessarily related to a rejection of the overbearing interactant outside of the work situation. Subjects who chose the interactant rather than the target woman as a friend also rate themselves significantly more competent than women who state a preference for the target woman. This may, however, reflect a rejection of the passive woman rather than an acceptance of the overbearing person.

Although competency is related to a more negative and more aggressive response to the overbearing interactant, women who perceive themselves as highly competent also respond more critically to the target woman those women who rate themselves less competent. It could be argued that highly competent women are less likely to identify with the target woman, and are more likely to feel an affinity with the overbearing partner instead. As observers of an unequal interaction they are more likely to perceive the relatively passive woman as, at least partially, to blame for her position. This tendency to evaluate the target woman negatively is most likely mediated by the relationship between masculinity and self-perceived competency which was not controlled for in the correlation conducted along this dimension.

Neither measure of inhibition of anger was found to be consistently related to subjects' responses to inequality, and when these measures are considered independently of other variables, no significant effects are obtained.

The failure to recall any anger experience within the past month was the original measure of inhibition of anger which was adopted from the Bradburn and Noll (1969) study of psychological well-being reported in Crain and Weisman (1972). In the present investigation, subjects classified according to this procedure did not vary significantly in their responses to the experimental interaction; however, this measure was related to sex role orientation, with highly feminine women being less likely to be classified as inhibitors than low feminine women. This is contrary to the hypothesis formulated at the outset of the research which predicted that femininity would be associated with the inhibition of anger.

Given the small number of women in this population who were classified as inhibitors, the failure to obtain significant differences between inhitibors and non-inhibitors may be due to the size of the sample. Alternately, the failure to recall past anger experiences may be unrelated to an individual's responses to an instance of inequality. Finally, in the present study, as compared with the Crain and Weisman (1972) study in which this measure was employed, subjects were asked if they could recollect a number of

different emotional experiences in order to counteract any suspiciousness they might otherwise feel if their experience of anger was assessed in isolation. Perhaps, this methodological variation was successful in eliminating from the group of inhibitors subjects who intentially suppress the expression of anger, with the consequence that the classification ceases to be a reliable predictor of responses.

There were few significant correlations obtained between women's ratings of the intensity of a recollected anger experience and the dependent rating scales, and these were unrelated to feelings of relative deprivation. There was no relationship observed between subjects' ratings of the intensity of a recollected anger experience and their feelings of anger, indignation, or conflict in response to the unequal interaction.

There is some evidence of a relationship between women's intensity ratings and sex role orientation, but this relationship is different from that which was observed for the other measure of inhibition of anger, and thus calls into question what exactly is being measured. Masculinity tended to be associated with more intense ratings of anger, and in the videotape condition women classified as Feminine rated their recollected anger experience less intense than women in the other sex role orientation groups. However, this relationship does not reach significance in the transcript

condition, and femininity alone is not negatively related to the intensity of anger women report.

Although both measures of inhibition of anger appear to have some relationship to women's sex role orientation, the inconsistency between the two measures, and between findings obtained in the videotape and transcript conditions, precludes any conclusions at this point. It is unclear whether the tendency to inhibit or modulate anger is associated with femininity and the absence of masculinity, or the absence of femininity itself. It may be speculated on the basis of the findings that high feminine women are less likely to inhibit, in its entirety, a memory of anger (expressivity and femininity are in fact stereotypically related), but when they do recall such an experience, their recollection of its intensity is modulated if they also lack masculine characteristics.

The failure of either measure to predict women's responses of anger in the face of inequality raises the issue of whether these measures are reliable or valid.

No predictions had been offered regarding the relationship between age and women's responses to inequality within the work setting. Yet, age, independent of any other subject variables--sex role orientation, self-perceived competency--was found to be significantly associated with a particular pattern of responses within the transcript condition. For this sample of women age seemed to function as

a protective shield against potential threats to self-esteem, enabling the relatively older women to withstand the impact of the dominating interactant. These women reported feeling less hurt, less intimidated, and more confident than those who were younger. This pattern of responses may be an adaptive one that women develop with more experience in the world.

The failure to obtain an independent effect of age in the videotape condition may be a function of the kind of interaction portrayed on camera, or to the difference in the average age of subjects in this subsample. Age may only influence women's responses to inequality among a relatively young group of women. Once a certain level of maturity is attained, this effect may no longer manifest itself. Alternately, the magnitude of the inequality portrayed in the videotape condition may wash out any individual differences which might otherwise emerge as a function of subjects' age.

Since, at least under certain circumstances, being older is associated with feeling less hurt, less intimidated, and more confident during an unequal interaction, some of the differences observed between the videotape and the transcript conditions may be even greater if the two samples were equated for age. Other differences might have been reversed. As it was, subjects in the videotape condition were, on the average, more hurt than subjects in

the transcript condition, even though they were also older. If age functions to reduce such feelings, actual differences between the two conditions may be of a greater magnitude. On the other hand, videotape subjects were, on the average, somewhat less intimidated by the interactant than transcript subjects, and subjects did not vary between conditions in their ratings of how confident they would feel under these circumstances. Again, if age were held constant between conditions, as well as within conditions, different patterns, consistent with the effects of age might emerge.

The results with regard to the effect of age on subjects' responses point to an area of research that may be of interest. If older women feel less hurt, less intimidated, and more confident when treated as an inferior is this because they tend to make external attributions for this kind of treatment? Does this then result in more or less adaptive behavior?

A relationship between age and sex role orientation was observed, with Feminine women tending to be younger than Androgynous or Masculine women. Perhaps with more experience in the world women begin to deviate from the feminine sex role stereotype, while at the same time they become less vulnerable to unequal treatment.

Conclusion. The research here reported was designed to investigate certain factors which were expected to mediate women's experience and responses to interpersonal

inequality. Although the sample was limited to women, the intention was to test some of the propositions of reference group theory, relative deprivation theory, and equity theory, and to arrive at some general, if tentative, conclusions about the psychological correlatives of social change. It was with caution that we can infer, on the basis of the results obtained, that for women in this population, gender identity alone is not perceived to be a justification for inequality, and that for the most part, women respond to inequality with anger and indignation. The magnitude of the inequality, and individual differences such as sex role orientation, self-perceived competency, and age seem to be more important factors in the determination of women's responses. Differences which were observed between women's responses to inequality in relation to themselves, and inequality in relation to another woman are provocative, and may have profound implications. Factors which interfere with, or facilitate an identification with the victim of injustice, in contrast to an identification with its perpetrator, should be explored in future research efforts. Finally, if the findings of the present study are to be considered reliable, a more diverse subject population is required, and the conduct of the research should include more naturalistic settings.

Appendix A

Pre-Viewing Questionnaire

Please rate yourself on the four abilities listed below. Use the rating scales to describe how you see yourself. So for example, if you think of yourself as "Well above average" on a particular attribute, circle the number 7. If you think of yourself as "Average" on a particular attribute circle the number 4; and if you see yourself as "Well below average" on a particular attribute circle the number 1. You may of course use any of the numbers on the scale to describe yourself. Your self-ratings on each of the 4 scales may be similar to or different from one another. This will reflect how you see yourself on each of these characteristics. Clearly, there are no right or wrong answers, so please be as truthful as possible in your self-descriptions.

Creative Thinking

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Well Below Average			Average			Well Above Average

Business Skills

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Well Below Average			Average			Well Above Average

Appendix A, continued

Interpersonal Communication Skills

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Well Below Average			Average			Well Above Average

The Ability to Promote and Convince Others of Your Ideas

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Well Below Average			Average			Well Above Average

Appendix B

Introduction to Transcript Condition

We are interested in finding out whether people are able to place themselves in the position of characters they read about in the newspapers or books, or whom they see on film or television. Whether they can imagine just how they themselves would feel if they were confronted with the same situation as that described on paper or portrayed on the screen. Some psychologists believe that this imaginative capacity is related to a person's ability for empathy. We are comparing the effectiveness of the written word with the effectiveness of film and television as means of communication.

You are going to be given a transcript of an interaction between two people. But, before we ask you to respond to this transcript, we are going to ask you to describe yourself on a number of personality traits. This is so we can get a better idea of how different types of people respond to the written material.

Appendix C

Pre-Viewing Questionnaire

You may or may not be able to remember experiencing within the last month all the different emotions listed below. Please answer as fully as you can the questions below. If you cannot remember a particular emotional experience occurring within the past month just indicate "I don't remember."

1) Can you recall experiencing within the last month Joy?

How intense an experience was this? (Circle the number which best describes the intensity of your experience.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Mild			Moderately Intense			Extremely Intense

Describe briefly the circumstances:

2) Can you recall experiencing within the last month Sadness?

How intense experience was this?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Mild			Moderately Intense			Extremely Intense

Describe briefly the circumstances:

Appendix C, continued

3) Can you recall experiencing within the last month Anger?

How intense an experience was this?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Mild			Moderately Intense			Extremely Intense

Describe briefly the circumstances:

4) Can you recall experiencing within the last month Guilt?

How intense an experience as this?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Mild			Moderately Intense			Extremely Intense

Describe briefly the circumstances:

5) Can you recall experiencing within the last month Curiosity?

How intense an experience was this?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Very Mild			Moderately Intense			Extremely Intense

Describe briefly the circumstances:

Appendix D

Please indicate on the following scale how well each item describes yourself: Rate yourself (1) if it is never or almost never true; (2) if it is usually not true; (3) if it is sometimes but infrequently true; (4) if it is occasionally true; (5) if it is often true; (6) if it is usually true; (7) if it is always true or almost always true.

Self-Reliant		Reliable		Warm	
Yielding		Analytical		Solemn	
Helpful		Sympathetic		Willing to Take a Stand	
Defends Own Beliefs		Jealous		Tender	
Cheerful		Has Leadership Abilities		Friendly	
Moody		Sensitive to the Needs of Others		Aggressive	
Independent		Truthful		Gullible	
Shy		Willing to Take Risks		Inefficient	
Conscientious		Understanding		Acts as a Leader	
Athletic		Secretive		Childlike	
Affectionate		Makes Decisions Easily		Adaptable	
Theatrical		Compassionate		Individualistic	
Assertive		Sincere		Does Not Use Harsh Language	
Flatterable		Self-Sufficient		Unsystematic	
Happy		Eager to Soothe Hurt Feelings		Competitive	
Strong Personality		Conceited		Loves Children	
Loyal		Dominant		Tactful	
Unpredictable		Soft Spoken		Ambitious	
Forceful		Likable		Gentle	
Feminine		Masculine		Conventional	

Appendix D, continued

	Usually Not True		Occasionally True		Usually True	
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Never or Almost Never True		Sometimes but Infrequently True		Often True		Always True Or Almost Always True

Appendix D, continued

The Masculine, Feminine, and Neutral Items on the BSRI

Masculine items	Feminine items	Neutral items
49. Acts as a leader	11. Affectionate	51. Adaptable
46. Aggressive	5. Cheerful	36. Conceited
58. Ambitious	50. Childlike	9. Conscientious
22. Analytical	32. Compassionate	60. Conventional
13. Assertive	53. Does not use harsh language	45. Friendly
10. Athletic	35. Eager to sooth hurt feelings	15. Happy
55. Competitive	20. Feminine	3. Helpful
4. Defends own beliefs	14. Flatterable	48. Inefficient
37. Dominant	59. Gentle	24. Jealous
19. Forceful	47. Gullible	39. Likable
25. Has leadership abilities	56. Loves children	6. Moody
7. Independent	17. Loyal	21. Reliable
52. Individualistic	26. Sensitive to the needs of others	30. Secretive
31. Makes decisions easily	8. Shy	33. Sincere
40. Masculine	38. Soft spoken	42. Solemn
1. Self-reliant	23. Sympathetic	57. Tactful
34. Self-sufficient	44. Tender	12. Theatrical
16. Strong personality	29. Understanding	27. Truthful
43. Willing to take a stand	41. Warm	18. Unpredictable
28. Willing to take risks	2. Yielding	54. Unsystematic

Note. The number preceding each item reflects the position of each adjective as it actually appears on the Inventory. A subject indicates how well each item describes himself or herself on the following scale: (1) Never or almost never true; (2) Usually not true; (3) Sometimes but infrequently true; (4) Ocassionally true; (5) Often true; (6) Usually true; (7) Always true or almost always true.

Appendix E

Instructions

We are going to give you a transcript of an actual interaction between two people. Some of the interactions we are giving participants in the study are extremely dramatic, and others are rather ordinary. What we hope you will do today is to try to the best of your ability to imagine yourself as the person we indicate to you, and use your imaginative capacity to experience what you might feel if you were placed in the situation you will read about. Let me repeat, some of the situations we are studying might elicit rather strong emotions, whereas others may be very neutral or mild. Some might be pleasant and stimulating, while others may be unpleasant or dull. We are trying out several different transcripts, and we hope to gain from this study a better understanding of the differences between film and the written word, as well as differences between people and their responses.

If you have any further questions about the study I will be happy to answer them after you had completed all the questions.

Now, read carefully the dialogue transcribed here for you on the following pages. After you have finished, there will be some questions about it. As you read remember to try to the best of your ability to place yourself in the

Appendix E, continued

shoes of Jane. Imagine how you would feel if you here her, imagine what you would be thinking and feeling, how you would be reacting to the meeting. All I can tell you is that the two persons in the transcript are coworkers, hired at about the same time last year, working in the area of consumer education. Up until the time of this meeting they have been working separately, developing educational programs for consumers. This transcript records their first meeting after having been given a joint assignment. They are discussing plans for future action.

Appendix F

Videotape Script

W = Woman with whom subjects were asked to identify

I = Interactant, male or female

W and I are both in their mid-thirties. They are wearing attire appropriate to professional work settings. Each has a briefcase which is placed in front of him or her on the table. They are seated together at a table, and the surroundings are suggestive of an office. I occupies more space than W, in that he or she spreads out his or her papers on a larger portion of the table. As the scene opens, I begins to talk.

I: This is an exciting project we've been handed. There's an enormous amount of work entailed, some of which will be a real challenge. It's rare to get an assignment which leaves so much room for one's own ingenuity. I'd better start getting it off the ground. I think that the success of this campaign will also be important career-wise.

W: I think that we should go . . .

I: I've made some notes here and I've got a lot of ideas I want to throw out to you about how best to proceed. The way I think we should approach it at this point is to contact all of the local school administrators and community health directors, and start talking to them about our ideas for the project. We've got to enlist their aid if we can, and the best way to do it is to establish rapport through early contact, so that they feel that we are launching a collaborative effort.

W: From past experience in these projects I know that we must be able to present at least a rough sketch of what we . . .

I: Yes. We'll have to outline the critical issues of the campaign, and how it will differ from previous educational programs. This is why it is critical to think of creative approaches to the kinds of promotional material we will want to use. If we just regale them with the same old ideas, the message we wish to convey will fall on deaf ears. I think the best way to tackle the problem is to spend at least some time investigating,

researching the successes and failures of previous efforts in this area of preventive health care, and then to come up with some innovative ideas which will convince the public that this is an area of concern and that they can do something about it.

W: Well health concerns and self-health movements have gotten a lot of media attention lately, and we can utilize this and what . . .

I: True. But what we must do first is look into strategies other health organizations have taken in this regard, as well as the general media exposure. The American Cancer Society . . . how have their advertisements developed and changed over the years?

W: They began with a rather straightforward message and then they . . .

I: I recall, I recall. Or for example, the campaign to get Americans to start using seat belts. I could look into how successful that actually was. I'll try to get some data on pre- and post-campaign use of seat belts. I'll see if there has been any significant decline in the severity of accidents. We could do a mini-survey to measure how people respond to direct versus indirect scare tactics.

W: There's some literature concerning the effectiveness of scare tactics in attitude change. I was reading this in the context of another project, and the findings seem to indicate that . . .

I: I'll also want to look into the Family Planning literature. These are models we can explore as a beginning.

W: I know one of the officials at Planned Parenthood. I'll contact her and then we can . . .

I: Terrific, terrific. Now at this point, today we've got to narrow down our course of action, determine what our priorities are, and later on we can branch out, explore other possible terrains. First, one of us must wade through all of those file cabinets in the office down the hall, get all the names down on paper, get appropriate addresses of all the individuals with whom we might want to establish at least written contact. Tedious as this might be, it is clearly essential work. Also, we need to draft a form-type letter which we can send out. One which will involve minimal explanation

Appendix F, continued

of what we will actually be doing, but will function as a superficial first-contact, and introduction to us. . . . Do you have a pad and pen on hand? Maybe you could keep track of the points made and decisions we come to today, so that next time we meet, we don't have to start from base one.

W: (She has a pad and pen in front of her throughout, as does I, and at this point she slowly takes it up and starts writing.)

I: At the same time we've got to begin the research, start making informal contacts we spoke of earlier. We should formulate some rough ideas and start testing them out, talking to others, people who have worked in the field. I'd like to start working on this aspect of the project immediately. I think I've got some good ideas on a slant to take, and I'm eager to start some of the library work tomorrow. If you could get those lists of names from the files compiled, and match them to addresses, while I'm beginning to work at this end, I'd really appreciate it. We should have made substantial headway by next Monday. We can meet the same time, same place and decide then in what direction to proceed further. Okay?

(I starts putting his or her papers back into his or her briefcase, closes the case and stands up ready to leave. W has been looking at I, her face expressionless.)

On the basis of the number of words spoken during the interaction, W has spoken approximately 12% of the time, compared to I's 88%. I interrupts W six times, whereas W does not interrupt I at any point. Each time I interrupts W, I fails to acknowledge, in other than a very superficial manner, the idea W has proposed. I decides what are the important steps to be taken, as well as choosing to do what is the more creative, interesting aspect of the work. I also decides when they will next meet, and where. In total, I's behavior towards W is one of a superior to a subordinate, despite the fact that they are coworkers, who have been given a joint assignment.

Appendix G

Judges' Videotape Questionnaire

Now that you have seen the taped interaction, we would like you to respond to the following questions. In your responses, refer to the woman on the left of the screen as "W" and the other Interactant as "I."

1. Who interrupted the other more frequently, W or I? _____
2. Who was interrupted more frequently, W or I? _____
3. Who spoke more, W or I? _____
4. Who made more of the decisions about how to proceed? _____
5. At the conclusion of the interaction, who was going to begin to write out ideas, and meet with members of other departments to "Brainstorm"? _____
6. At the conclusion of the interaction, who was going to go through the files and type out and address envelopes to schools and hospitals? _____
7. Which of these two tasks would you consider to be the more desirable? 5 or 6? _____
8. Which requires the most creative ability? 5 or 6? _____
9. Which job is it more likely for a subordinate to be asked to do? 5 or 6? _____

Appendix H

Written Transcript

*John: This is an exciting project we've been handed. There's an enormous amount of work entailed, some of which will be a real challenge. It's rare to get an assignment which leaves so much room for one's own ingenuity. We'd better start getting it off the ground. I think the success of this campaign will also be important career-wise.

Jane: I agree, and I think that we can have a substantial impact on the field of consumer education if we plan carefully our promotional material, and tailor it to a wide variety of audiences.

John: I've made some notes here, and I've got a lot of ideas I want to throw out to you about how best to proceed. The way I think we should approach it at this point is to contact all of the local school administrators and community health directors, and start talking to them about our ideas for the project. We've got to enlist their aid if we can, and the best was to do it is to establish rapport through early contact, so that they feel that we are launching a collaborative effort.

Jane: From past experience in these projects I know that we must be able to present at least a rough sketch of what approach we intend to take.

John: Yes, we'll have to outline the critical issues of the campaign, and how it will differ from previous educational programs. This is why it is critical to think of creative approaches to the kinds of promotional material we will want to use. If we just regale them with the same old ideas, the message we wish to convey will fall on deaf ears. I think the best way to tackle the problem is to spend at least some time investigating, researching the successes and failures of previous efforts in this area of preventive health care, and then come up with some innovative ideas which will convince the public that this is an area of concern, and that they can do something about it.

*In the female condition, the name Alice is substituted for John.

Appendix H, continued

Jane: Well health concerns and self-help movements have gotten a lot of media attention lately, and we can utilize this in addition to the more traditional channels. In this manner we can reach out to a diverse population, and our educational efforts will be more effective.

John: True. But what we must do first is look into strategies other health organizations have taken in this regard, as well as the general media exposure. The American Cancer Society, how have their advertisements developed and changed over the years?

Jane: They began with a rather straightforward message and then they changed to a less direct approach. Their reasoning was essentially that providing the public with factual information is insufficient for changing people's habits.

John: I recall, I recall. Or, for example, the campaign to get Americans to start using seat belts. I could look into how successful that actually was. I'll try to get some data on pre- and post-campaign use of seat belts. I'll see if there has been any significant decline in the severity of accidents. We could conduct a mini-survey to measure how people respond to direct versus indirect scare tactics.

Jane: There is literature concerning the effectiveness of scare tactics in attitude change. I was reading this in the context of another project, and the findings seem to indicate that . . .

John: I'll also want to look into the family planning literature. These are models we can explore as a beginning.

Jane: I know one of the officials at Planned Parenthood. I'll contact her, look over their material, and see if we can utilize it in any way.

John: Terrific. Now at this point today we've got to narrow down our course of action, determine what our priorities are, and later on we can branch out, explore other possible terrains. First, one of us must wade through all of those file cabinets in the office down the hall, get all the names down on paper, get appropriate addresses of all the individuals with whom we might want to establish at least written contact. Tedious as this might be, it is

Appendix H, continued

clearly essential work. Also we will need to draft a form-type letter which we can send out. One which involves minimal explanation of what we will actually be doing, but will serve as an introduction to us. At the same time we've got to begin the research, start making informal contacts we spoke of earlier. We should formulate some rough ideas, and start testing them out, talking to others, people who have worked in the field. I'd like to start working on this aspect of the project immediately. I think I've got some good ideas on a slant to take, and I'm willing to start some of the library work tomorrow. Is that O.K.? And, if you could meanwhile get those lists of names from the files compiled, and match them to addresses, while I'm beginning to work at this end, I'd really appreciate it. We should have made substantial headway by next Monday. We can meet the same time, same place, and decide then in what direction we wish to proceed further.

(This first meeting ends as John looks at his watch and begins putting his papers back into his briefcase. Jane is arranging her papers as well.)

In this interaction, Jane speaks 23% of the time, she is interrupted once by John, who does not pick up on her ideas or suggestions. John chooses for himself what are the more creative and interesting aspects of the work. For these reasons it is considered to be an unequal interaction.

Appendix I

Post-Transcript Questionnaire*

IMAGINE THAT YOU ARE JANE

1) What do you imagine you would be feeling throughout most of the meeting?

(On each of the scales below circle the number that best describes what you would be feeling.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not at All Interested			Moderately Interested			Extremely Interested
Not at All Impressed			Moderately Impressed			Extremely Impressed
Not at All Angry			Moderately Angry			Extremely Angry
Not at All Hurt			Moderately Hurt			Extremely Hurt
Not at All Friendly			Moderately Friendly			Extremely Friendly
Not at All Intimidated			Moderately Intimidated			Extremely Intimidated
Not at All Confident			Moderately Confident			Extremely Confident

Explain briefly why you would react this way?

*In the videotape condition, the Woman on the Right is substituted for the name Jane throughout these questions.

Appendix I, continued

2) If you were Jane, what do you think your thoughts and feelings would be about the person with whom you would be working?

How competent do you think your partner is?

(Circle the number on the scale below that best describes your impression.)

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not at All Competent			Moderately Competent			Extremely Competent

How much do you think you would Enjoy Working With this person?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not at All			Somwhat			Very Much

Circle the number on the scale below that you think would best describe your Working Relationship:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Minimal Conflicts			Some Friction			Extremely Conflictual

If you were assigned to work on another project with this person, how do you think you would feel?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not at All Reluctant			Somewhat Reluctant			Extremely Reluctant

Would you accept the assignment?

Yes _____ No _____ Maybe _____

Appendix I, continued

3) If you were in Jane's shoes, is there any way you might have acted differently than she did under the circumstances? Or, do you think she handled herself as you would have? Explain.

4) After the meeting you observed, how do you think you would feel about your work for the coming week, if you were Jane?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not at All Satisfied			Moderately Satisfied			Extremely Satisfied

5) Still imagining yourself to be Jane, what do you think would be your relationship with your partner after the project?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not at All Friendly			Somewhat Friendly			Extremely Friendly

6) How do you think you would feel if your partner was promoted after the project's completion and you were not?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not at All Indignant			Somewhat Indignant			Extremely Indignant

7) How Fair do you think this difference in promotion would be?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not at All Fair			Somewhat Fair			Extremely Fair

Appendix I, continued

8) Can you estimate the percentage of time Jane spoke?

1%___ 5%___ 15%___ 25%___ 35%___ 45%___ 55%___ 65%___

9) On the scale below, rate how competent you would feel if you were Jane at the conclusion of the meeting.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not at All Competent			Moderately Competent			Extremely Competent

10) Describe any other thoughts or impressions you think you would have if you were in Jane's place.

Appendix J

On the preceding pages we asked you to imagine yourself as Jane--to tell us how you would respond if you were placed in her shoes. Now we would like you to return to a position of on-looker, and give us some of your impressions of Jane on the basis of her responses during the meeting.

How Competent do you think she is?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not at All Competent			Moderately Competent			Extremely Competent

Rate her ability to function effectively on her job:

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Low			Medium			High

How well do you think Jane handled herself during this initial meeting?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Poorly			Adequately			Excellently

Comparing yourself with Jane, do you think for the most part you would respond similarly or dissimilarly?

Similarly _____ Dissimilarly _____

Whom do you think you would be more likely to have as a friend, Jane or her partner?

Jane _____ Partner _____

If Jane is not promoted and her partner is, how Fair do you think this would be?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not at All Fair			Somewhat Fair			Extremely Fair

How Indignant would you feel?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Not at All Indignant			Somewhat Indignant			Extremely Indignant

Appendix K

Subjects were affiliated with a variety of different educational institutions. See Table K.1. Such diversity was intentional since a heterogeneous sample was considered desirable. Relevant characteristics of subjects within each of the different college samples are reported in Table K.2, K.3, K.4, K.5. The significance of these differences between college groups should be considered in light of the relationships obtained between subject variables, and women's responses on the dependent measures which are reported in the text.

Appendix K, continued

Table K.1

Subjects' Educational Affiliations

College Class	% of Sample	N
Queen's College*	6.6	12
Fordham University (Downtown Campus)	12.2	22
Queen's College	5.5	10
Fordham University (Downtown Campus)	3.3	6
St. Peter's College New Jersey	4.4	8
Fordham University (Uptown Campus)	7.2	13
Pratt University	14.4	27
Sacred Heart University (Connecticut)	32.0	58
Pace University	10.5	19
Marymount College	3.9	6
	100.0	181

*This class was an undergraduate English class. All of the other classes were undergraduate classes in psychology.

Appendix K, continued

Table K.2

Age Broken Down by College Group

	Age		
College Group	Mean	SD	N
Queen's College English Class	19.92	1.62	2
Fordham University (Downtown Campus)	32.68	8.69	19
Queen's College Psychology Class	22.33	5.72	9
Fordham University (Downtown Campus)	30.67	11.29	6
St. Peter's College New Jersey	19.38	2.00	8
Fordham University (Uptown Campus)	20.46	.66	13
Pratt University	21.15	4.00	27
Sacred Heart University (Connecticut)	17.97	.70	58
Pace University	26.05	6.37	19
Marymount College	37.00	13.39	6
Total	22.58	7.43	177*

*There were 4 missing cases.

Appendix K, continued

Table K.3

Subjects' Self-Ratings of Competency by College Group

College Group	Self-Rated Competency		
	Mean	SD	N
Queen's College English Class	4.42	.82	12
Fordham University (Downtown Campus)	5.11	.76	22
Queen's College (Psychology Class)	4.73	.58	10
Fordham University (Downtown Campus)	5.08	.85	6
St. Peter's College New Jersey	5.34	.48	8
Fordham University (Uptown Campus)	4.77	.74	13
Pratt University	5.06	.71	27
Sacred Heart University (Connecticut)	4.84	.74	58
Pace University	5.08	.75	19
Marymount College	5.58	.85	6
Total	4.95	.75	181

Appendix K, continued

Table K.4

Subjects' Ratings of the Intensity of a Recollected Anger Experienced by College Group

College Group	Anger Intensity Rating		
	Mean	SD	N
Queen's College English Class	4.70	1.49	10
Fordham University (Downtown Campus)	5.83	1.34	18
Queen's College Psychology Class	4.70	1.42	10
Fordham University (Downtown Campus)	6.60	.89	5
St. Peter's College New Jersey	5.38	2.07	8
Fordham University (Uptown Campus)	5.09	1.37	11
Pratt University	5.29	1.62	24
Sacred Heart University (Connecticut)	4.98	1.57	53
Pace University	5.31	1.25	16
Marymount College	4.83	2.32	6
Total	5.19	1.56	161*

*20 subjects did not recall any anger experience.

Appendix K, continued

Table K.5

Sex Role Orientation by College Group

	Sex Role Orientation							
	Masculine		Feminine		Androgynous		Undifferentiated	
College Group	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N
Queen's College English Class	8.3	(1)	41.7	(5)	16.7	(2)	33.3	(4)
Fordham U. (Downtown Campus)	36.4	(8)	18.2	(4)	31.8	(7)	13.6	(3)
Queen's College Psychology Class	10.0	(1)	30.0	(3)	20.0	(2)	40.0	(4)
Fordham U. (Downtown Campus)	16.7	(1)	16.7	(1)	33.3	(2)	33.3	(2)
St. Peter's College, N.J.	25.0	(2)	25.0	(2)	37.5	(3)	12.5	(1)
Fordham U. (Uptown Campus)	0.0	(0)	23.1	(3)	38.5	(5)	38.5	(5)
Pratt University	18.5	(5)	7.4	(2)	37.0	(10)	37.0	(10)
Sacred Heart U. (Connecticut)	24.1	(14)	29.3	(17)	19.0	(11)	27.6	(16)
Pace University	26.3	(5)	10.5	(2)	31.6	(6)	31.6	(6)
Marymount College	0.0	(0)	0.0	(0)	67.7	(4)	33.3	(2)

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