

INFORMATION TO USERS

The most advanced technology has been used to photograph and reproduce this manuscript from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

U·M·I

University Microfilms International
A Bell & Howell Information Company
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346 USA
313 761-4700 800 521-0600

Order Number 9108139

The practice of protest: Three case studies in urban renewal

Lee, Jong Youl, Ph.D.

City University of New York, 1990

Copyright ©1990 by Lee, Jong Youl. All rights reserved.

U·M·I

300 N. Zeeb Rd.
Ann Arbor, MI 48106

17

THE PRACTICE OF PROTEST
THREE CASE STUDIES IN URBAN RENEWAL
IN
SEOUL, KOREA

by
JONG YOUL LEE

A dissertation submitted to
the Graduate Faculty in Political Science
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
The City University of New York.

1990

c 1990

JONG YOUL LEE

All Rights Reserved

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

June 8, 1990

Date

John Mollenkopf

Chair of Examining Committee

June 8, 1990

Date

Robert Arian

Executive Officer

Marilyn Gittell

Marshall Berman

Joyce Gelb

Young Kun Kim

Supervisory Committee

The City University of New York

Abstract

THE PRACTICE OF PROTEST THREE CASE STUDIES IN URBAN RENEWAL IN SEOUL, KOREA by Jong Youl Lee

Adviser: Professor John H. Mollenkopf

In Korea, especially Seoul, squatter settlements have been one of the major policy issue of city government. This study discusses three cases of squatter clearance and protest, those of Kwangju-daedanji, Mok-dong, and Sanggye-dong. The questions raised are: whom did urban renewal serve and what factors accounted for the dynamics of the relationship - mainly between the government and the squatters?

The protests and organizations did produce limited outcomes. The major explanatory factors for the outcomes are: the power of the state alliance with capital; appointed mayors; government vulnerability due to election and some need for legitimacy; the third party (churches and students) strategy of squatters; the Korean land ethos.

The government took the initiative in shaping renewal policies and controled the development of the city. In spite of protests, the state - that is national and local governments and

public agencies - kept going on its way as a major policy maker in renewal policy. The closed political system kept squatters away from access to the policy making stage. One surprising finding is that successive Korean governments showed political vulnerability at election time, at moments of crises of succession, and in moments of turmoil.

The large networks supported the squatter protest in three principal ways: visibility, material support and encouragement, and legitimacy. They also served a communication function and a mobilizing function. Despite all their contributions, indigenous resources were more important.

The Korean land ethic played a fundamental role in determining the relationship between the state and the squatters. The norm prescribed the participants' behavior and provided the participants with guidelines as to how they should act with reference to a variety of goals. Also, the norm contributed to the protest continuity and direction, consistent with the goals.

In renewal policy, the priority ticket was a most ingenious and effective tool. The priority ticket gave the government enormous advantages: no cost, simple administration, and transfer of decision for preference. Most squatters sold their tickets to real estate agents or other speculators. Through this ticket transaction, realtors received a large amount of benefits.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In the course of this study, I have become indebted to many people whose help was crucial to its successful completion. It is impossible to thank all those who have contributed, but I would like to name just a few whose help deserves special mention.

First are the squatters who shared with me the stories of their lives and opened their homes and hearts to me as friends. I am grateful to the dozens of urban renewal officials who helped me so generously. I profited greatly from the generous intellectual support of many friends and colleagues. During my 1988-89 field trip, Mr Lee Tuk Yon and Mr. Lee Chun Sik of Yonsei University helped me to find many data sources. Professor Kim Pyong Chun of Kukmin University also helped me and provided much additional information.

In various stages of this study, I have been aided and inspired by professors John H. Mollenkopf, Marilyn Gittell, Kim Yong Kun, Joyce Gelb, and Marshall Berman. I particularly want to thank my supervisor, Dr. John H. Mollenkopf, who first drew my attention to urban development problems in the United States. He has given me valuable advice in most of my undertakings. He opened my eyes to the political implications in the policy process, especially the progrowth coalition. To him I owe the greatest debt by far, for without him I would never have completed this work.

I would like to express my sincere appreciation to my reader, Dr. Marilyn Gittell for her extremely kind help. She read the first draft of the thesis and made many valuable suggestions and corrections, for which I am profoundly grateful.

I benefited immensely from the help of my close friend, Dr. John M. Francis. He read the entire manuscript and made many wise suggestions. He checked English and the logic of the writing too. This dissertation might have taken much longer without his help. Judy Gex, my friend, showed me kindness by editing some chapters of the thesis. I want to thank Judy.

Finally, my greatest debt is to my wife, Cho Kum Sun whose patience and encouragement were indispensable. I dedicate this thesis to her and to my two daughters, Lee Kyu Chin and Lee Kyu Mi who often asked me, "Daddy, when you are going to finish your thesis?"

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract	iv
Acknowledgments	vii
List of Tables	xi
Glossary	xiii
List of Abbreviations	xv
Introduction	1

P a r t O n e - B a c k g r o u n d

Chapter One General Background	13
Chapter Two Policy Background	27
Chapter Three An Overview of Korean Research	66

P a r t T w o - C a s e S t u d i e s

Chapter Four Kwangju-daedanji	84
Chapter Five Mok-dong	125
Chapter Six Sanggye-dong	155

P a r t T h r e e - D i s c u s s i o n

Chapter Seven Discussion	179
----------------------------------	-----

Appendix	208
Bibliography	222

LIST OF TABLES

1.1	MUD HUTS AND MUD HUT RESIDENTS, 1931-1941	20
2.1	SQUATTER AREAS, UNITS, AND HOUSEHOLDS CLEARED IN SEOUL, 1955-1965	30
2.2	SQUATTERS AND HOUSEHOLDS, Seoul Relocation Program, 1966-1972	33
2.3	PLANNED LEGALIZATION AND UPGRADING, SEOUL 1971	38
2.4	LEGALIZATION AND UPGRADING, SEOUL BY 1973	39
2.5	DEMOLITION OF CITIZEN APARTMENTS, 1970-1985 (10,000 won)	46
2.6	NEW SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS, 1972-1980	48
2.7	DEMOLITION OF LOW-INCOME HOUSING AND POLICY RESPONSE IN SEOUL, 1970-1984 (no. of housing unit)	49
2.8	LARGE-SCALE RELOCATION AREAS	52
2.9	THE TREND OF COMPENSATION FOR SQUATTER REMOVAL	52
2.10	A: BUDGET PLAN FOR THE RENEWAL PROJECT, REVENUE PLAN (FROM SELLING LANDS)	53
2.10	B: BUDGET PLAN FOR THE RENEWAL PROJECT, EXPENDITURE PLAN (won in units of 10,000,000)	53
2.11	THE PERFORMANCE OF HOUSING REDEVELOPMENT, 1974-1983	54
2.12	REDEVELOPMENT PROJECTS BY IMPLEMENTATION METHOD (3/31/87)	58
2.13	COMPARISON OF RESIDENTS' ECONOMIC BURDEN UNDER HAPTONG CHAEGAEBAL AND SELF-HELP UPGRADING (WON) (for a person with 100m ² of land)	61
2.14	A: RELOCATION PATTERN OF SQUATTERS, KURO-1ST- DISTRICT	63
2.14	B: RELOCATION PATTERN OF SQUATTERS, CH'ONHO-1ST- DISTRICT	63

4.1	POPULATION OF KOREA'S MAJOR CITIES (12/31/80)	84
4.2	POPULATION GROWTH OF SONGNAM CITY, 1966-1981 (Dec.)	85
4.3	THE COMPOSITION OF POPULATION (9/30/1971)	86
4.4	ANNUAL POPULATION TRANSFORMATION, 1973-1981	87
4.5	RELOCATION PLAN, 1968-1970	93
4.6	EXPENDITURES OF KWANGJU PROJECT (unit = 1,000 won)	95
4.7	REVENUES OF KWANGJU PROJECT (unit = 1,000 won)	95
4.8	LAND USE OF KWANGJU NEW TOWN	97
4.9	RELOCATION AT THE KWANGJU LARGE-SCALE HOUSING AREA, 1968-1971	101
5.1	POPULATION TREND, Individuals and households, 1980-1986	129
5.2	AGE AND POVERTY STRUCTURE	130
5.3	A: EMPLOYMENT OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD IN MOK- 1ST-DONG	131
5.3	B: EMPLOYMENT OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD IN MOK- 1ST-DONG	131
5.4	A: HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN MOK-1ST-DONG	132
5.4	B: HOUSEHOLD INCOME IN PONGCH'ON-9TH-DONG	132
5.5	EDUCATION LEVEL OF HOUSEHOLD	133
5.6	LAND USE PLAN	135
5.7	TYPE OF HOUSING SIZE (unit: household; p'yong)	135
5.8	1983 PLANNED MOK-DONG DEVELOPMENT BUDGET (in billions of won)	137
6.1	JOB DISTRIBUTION	157
6.2	PLANNED UNITS	159

GLOSSARY

Chonse : is a type of tenure in the rental sector. Under the Chonse arrangement, a renter makes a lump-sum deposit (key money) at the beginning of occupancy which is fully refunded at the end of the contract period. The landlord usually invests this fund and interest earnings represent the imputed rent.

Daedanji : Dae means large. See *danji*

Danji : means an estate which normally refers to a housing estate in Korea. *Danji* housing in Korea implies a new form of urban public housing undertaken by the Korea National Housing Corporation and the local authorities.

Do : province

Dong : precinct

Gu : borough

Gun : county

Key money : See *chonse*.

Myon : township

P'anjajip : means a single substandard house or dwelling unit; and *p'anjach'on* indicates a substandard settlement formed by numerous *p'anjajip* in a certain area. The original meaning of *p'anjajip* is a temporary house constructed by a board framed structure. In addition, *Muhoga p'anjajip* means a squatter housing built without authorized permission.

Poktokpang : a real estate agent.

P'yong : the standard Korean unit of area. It is used both for large and small areas. Approximate equivalents are:

One *p'yong* = 3.3 square meters or 35 square feet.

One acre = 1,225 *p'yong*

One square mile = 784,350 *p'yong*

Sakwolse : is a type of tenure in the rental sector. The tenant makes a one-time deposit which is returned to the him at the end of his tenure less a monthly charge for each month of tenure. The total imputed rent approximates the interest on the total deposit plus the deductions.

Si : city

Taltongne : is a generic Korean term meaning a squatter settlement (an illegal land occupation). *Tal* means moon and *tongne* means village.

T'ong : sub-precinct

Up : town

Wolse : is a type of tenure in the rental sector. At the beginning of the contract period, the tenant makes a deposit which is refunded at the end of the term. He also pays a monthly rent. See *chonse*.

Won : is the Korean unit of currency. On June 1984, U.S. \$1 was equivalent to 798 won and in 1988, U.S. \$1 is equivalent to 730 won.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<i>DJP:</i>	Democratic Justice Party
<i>EPB:</i>	Economic Planning Board
<i>KDI:</i>	Korea Development Institute
<i>KLDI:</i>	Korea Land Development Institute
<i>MOC:</i>	Ministry of Construction
<i>MOHA:</i>	Ministry of Home Affairs
<i>OLA:</i>	Office of Labor Administration
<i>ONT:</i>	Office of National Taxation
<i>ROK:</i>	The Republic of Korea
<i>PPD:</i>	Party for Peace and Democracy
<i>PUD:</i>	Party for Unification and Democracy
<i>SCG:</i>	Seoul City Government

Introduction

This dissertation examines three cases of urban renewal in Seoul which took place in the period 1965-1988. In each of these cases the Seoul City Government, under the guidance of the national government, sought to clear squatters from urbanizing areas in central Seoul for the primary purpose of expanding the city's stock of residential housing. The dissertation seeks to describe the interaction between the government and the squatters in those three cases and to analyze the factors that shaped the outcomes of the protest movement.

Within developing societies, the state has assumed increasing importance in directing capital investment and providing for social welfare. As development gives rise to rapid urbanization, urban space performs key functions in structuring capital accumulation and determining the quality of everyday life. As a vehicle for national planning, local government has thus become a crucial force in supporting and shaping urban policies. In Seoul, the state has used urban renewal policy to mold urban form. Within the framework of urban space, the state's influence on urban development has promoted capital accumulation and directed an increasing share of that capital into urban real estate.

These policies quickly had an impact on substantial numbers of squatters. For cultural and economic reasons, Seoul has long

drawn a disproportionately large fraction of the country's people. The personal dislocations brought about by the Japanese occupation (1910-1945) and the Korean War (1950-1953) severely aggravated the housing problem in Seoul, enlarging squatter settlements. Since a shortage of residential housing lay behind the decision to remove the squatters in the first place, they had few options for housing elsewhere. The extreme scarcity and high cost of alternative housing for dislocated squatters, among other things, made them fiercely reluctant to cooperate with the government and led them to mount large scale protests.

This dissertation is the story of the relation between the government and the squatters during the former's effort to remove the latter. It seeks to determine what factors accounted for the dynamics of this relation. As such, it is part of a literature that has looked at other peoples in a variety of other contexts for similar purposes. The case of Seoul has both similarities and differences with those other studies.

Like Janice Perlman's (1976, ch. 5) *favelados*, the squatters of Seoul were mostly migrants and productive, engaged, aware participants in the economic life of the city. They were typically poor, but not wretched. In contrast to Rio de Janeiro, however, I found no evidence that the eviction of squatters led them to forge strong new links to radical dissident groups with agendas for political reform. But unlike the conditions that Eckstein and Collier (Eckstein 1977; Collier 1976) found among the squatters of

Mexico and Peru, the squatters of Seoul did show more orientation towards protest than towards political conformism. In contrast to Mexico and Peru, the squatters of Seoul did not connect closely to the state and the political system because local governments' officials in Korea are appointed by the central government, not elected. Seoul's squatter organizations were not subservient to the dominant economic and political powers.

Seoul's squatters formed linkages with students and religious groups, particularly the Catholic Church, similar to those found by Manuel Castells in Latin America. (Castells 1983, ch. 19) Unlike the government of Peru, the Korean government did not actively support the squatters' invasion of urban land, least of all for political reasons. Moreover, the accommodation it made with squatters in Seoul derived more from cultural norms than from a calculus of political alliance. Like the government in Bogota, the government in Seoul offered compensation to squatter owners, but not exclusively. Conflict between squatter owners and tenants existed in Seoul, as it did in Colombia, but it was not crippling. In fact it was largely irrelevant to the outcomes.

Squatter leaders in Mexico City were representatives of the dominant political power, a kind of administrative liaison. They were not indigenous bosses. (Castells 1983, 195) In contrast, leaders of the squatter protests in Seoul were indigenous bosses and not subordinated to the political power. Unlike the squatters in Mexico City (Castells 1983, 198), the squatters in Seoul accepted

the legalization by the government of their illegal land occupation. Unlike Chile (Castells 1983, 199), the squatter protests of Seoul were not closely linked with workers' organizations and their political expressions.

As in John Mollenkopf's (1973, 1983) analysis of urban renewal and community mobilization in the U.S., our study of squatter protests in Seoul found that the major leaders were unskilled laborers, ministers, and women. Students were represented in the movement but rarely in true leadership roles. Why this should be so is an interesting question, since Korean students did assume leadership roles in other, particularly, political protests. Like U.S. urban renewal protest, Korean mobilization was ineffective in changing the basic progrowth agenda. Unlike the situation Mollenkopf found in the U.S., the Korean protest did not affect community mobilization much beyond the immediate issue of squatter compensation or modify in any way the top-down planning that has been characteristic of the Korean government's approach to economic development in general. In the squatter movement in Seoul, what Gendrot (1982, 286) calls the "scope of contagion" was limited.

As Jeffrey Henig (1982) found in his studies, the squatter movements in Seoul were sensitive to the visibility and suddenness with which issues came to public attention, to their geographic specificity, to their complexity, and to the clarity with which responsibility is focused.

The practice of squatter protests of Seoul showed many aspects of the Alinsky (1969) tradition: they picked a sensible issue, removal and compensation and they identified a clear opponent, the city government. Unlike the Alinsky tradition, however, indigenous leaders rather than outsiders or professional organizers played the crucial role in mobilizing protest.

As Lipsky found in his study on the New York rent strikes (1970), the outcome of squatter protests in Seoul was influenced by the support squatters received from "third parties" or "reference public of protest target (including communications media)." The squatters sought to maximize their public exposure through the "communications media" and to maximize the impact of "third parties" in the protest. In all three cases examined, "the reference publics of the protest target," like the churches, students, and communications media, supported the protests and explicitly or implicitly influenced the state to respond favorably to the protests. The cohesion of squatter organizations was an important factor in increasing bargaining resources. Unlike Lipsky's findings, however, the communications media and reference publics in Seoul did not play a critical role in bargaining with the state. With their support, the squatters entered directly into the bargaining process with the government.

What was the outcome of those protests in Seoul? While urban renewal basically went forward, the state made real concessions to the protesters and made relatively limited use of

repression. This contrasts both with the Korean state's response to other protests (students, workers) and with what we might expect in comparing a military dictatorship to the state's response to similar urban renewal protests in the US or Latin America.

The key question to be addressed is: what explains this outcome? Major determinants include the strength and strategy of protests (without it, no concessions would have been granted) and the state's newly developed search for increased legitimacy (without it, protest would not have been enough to guarantee any significant concessions). The strength of leadership, especially by women, the links to church organizers and students, and the symbolism of resistance contributed to the strength of protest. Government responsiveness is in turn explained by its political vulnerability and the Korean land ethos.

Whom did urban renewal serve? To differing degrees, everyone benefitted. The city government got income from the sale of the land at high prices and increased tax revenues. Construction firms benefitted because they got new opportunities for work. While the squatters suffered the loss of their homes and communities, they did get some monetary compensation. This is an interesting issue: why did an authoritarian national state that might have gotten away with making no concessions, instead make some financial concessions to the squatters? Finally, Korea's emerging middle class benefitted from the development of new, affordable housing in beautiful surroundings.

Who were the major actors? They included: the state's leadership, the city development agencies, land developers and speculators, future middle class tenants of new housing, and the squatters. The Prime Ministry, not the Ministry of Construction, was the supervisory agency of SCG. This left much discretion to the mayors in shaping and implementing renewal policies. In addition, the mayor of Seoul had close ties with the Blue House. For example, former Seoul mayors Kim Hyon Ok and Yom Po Hyon had firm personal relationships with the former Presidents Park Chong Hee and Chun Doo Hwan respectively. As a result, in some cases they often disregarded the political hierarchy of the Ministry of Construction and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and went directly to the Blue House. The city development agencies selected renewal sites and made the renewal plan. Development agency bureaucrats were interested in beautifying the city so that it would have higher prestige and their careers would be advanced. The land developers and speculators participated in the development of renewal areas. They tried to contact the city development agencies to acquire a project contract. In the renewal projects, they provided development skills, labors and capital. The middle class tenants participated in the renewal projects by buying the priority tickets. The ticket transaction mostly occurred between the middle class tenants and real estate speculators. Finally, the squatters participated in the renewal process, not in the stage of policy-making, but in the stage of implementation. In the Joint Redevelopment, owner squatters

formed the renewal corporation and became a member of it. Tenant squatters, however, were excluded from the renewal process. Therefore, they participated in the process by adopting a non-institutional method, that is protest.

* * *

Beyond the guidance which the general literature has given, this study has drawn on both first-hand and documentary sources specific to its focus. I lived in Seoul on the edge of a squatter settlement for fifteen years beginning in the early 1970s. I came inevitably to know the people, their life styles, and their concerns and witnessed their mobilization first-hand. As a graduate student research assistant I participated in a survey conducted by the Department of Public Administration at Seoul National University, interviewing squatters in their settlements.

In the years 1987 and 1988, as part of the data-collection effort for this dissertation, I interviewed nearly forty individuals in Seoul -- displaced squatters, members of the various churches, and students -- who had been part of the squatter movements studied here. The interviews were intended to probe network phenomena and participant experience in the movement. The interviews were structured to this end, but were not strictly formatted. Other first-hand observations included participation in discussions, briefings, and agit-prop sessions at the Myong-dong Cathedral.

Documentary sources fall into two categories: 1) unpublished government documents and 2) academic studies (and published data) relating to urban renewal generally and the squatter movements in particular. Unpublished government documents were drawn largely from the archives of the Korea National Land Development Institute; the Korea National Housing Corporation; the Korea Development Institute; the Ministry of Construction; and the departments of Urban Renewal and Urban Planning of the Seoul City Government.

A few studies on the squatter movements in Seoul have been done as dissertations by graduate students in sociology at Seoul National University and Yonsei University. These studies and other works by Korean authors relevant to urban renewal and squatter mobilization are the subject of Chapter Three.

Several conventions and units of measurement require a word of explanation. The Korean unit of area is the *p'yong*; it equals roughly 35 square feet. Unfortunately, it is used as a measure of both very small and very large surfaces. It is used, for example, to report the size of an apartment (an apartment of thirty *p'yong* is a good-sized apartment by Korean standards) and to report the size of even very large tracts of land. The price of land is always reported in terms of *p'yong*. There is no unit in common use on the order of the size of an acre. Since one acre is roughly equal to 1,225 *p'yong* and a square mile to 785,000 *p'yong*, the numbers get very large.

The Korean unit of currency is the won. Its value in terms of the dollar has varied enormously; by converting at the current exchange rate of 700 won per dollar one gets a rough estimate of equivalent values. One won has obviously little value. The currency has no unit bearing the same relation to the won that the dollar bears to the cent. So ten dollars is seven thousand won, and one million dollars is roughly seven hundred million won.

Given these facts, it is perhaps a blessing the price of land is quoted in terms of p'yong rather than acres. In any case, the admittedly cumbersome units of won and p'yong have been preserved rather than converted to dollars per acre or per square foot. Apart from a certain loss of touch with the Korean facts such a translation would imply, it would also cloud the role of inflation in the Korean economy. The reader is referred to an index of inflation in the appendix for understanding the raw numbers given.

From an American perspective, the system of residential rents in Korea is also complex. The various systems are summarized in the glossary. An example of one standard rental mode will give the reader an insight into the economy as well. Under the *chonse* system, a tenant gives his landlord a sum of money at the beginning of his tenure, usually quite a large sum of money. No money is conveyed at any other time. At the end of his tenure, whenever that may be, the landlord simply returns

the original amount of money intact. The actual rent must be imputed from an assumed interest charge and the loss of value of the original deposit through inflation. The original deposit is referred to as *key money*. Other systems are even more complex.

* * *

Part One of the dissertation provides contextual information about squatter movements. Chapter One describes the Korean land ethic which helped shape the government's search for legitimacy and details the growth and consolidation of squatter settlements in Seoul. Chapter Two describes the modern policy background, the government's renewal strategies, and the regulatory and statutory tools that it has used. Chapter Three presents the results of Korean research on the squatter movements.

Part Two presents the case studies of the government's efforts to clear and renew three squatter settlements in the Seoul area: the first in Kwangju-daedangji in 1970-71 (Chapter Four); in Mok-dong in 1983-85 (Chapter Five); and in Sanggye-dong in 1986-88 (Chapter Six). The selection of these three cases was based on three principles. They were different in time, location, and extent of protest. The Kwangju-daedangji case occurred in August 1971. The Mok-dong case occurred in 1983 and ended in 1985. The Sanggye-dong case occurred in 1986. The Kwangju-daedangji is located in the southern part of Seoul. The Mok-dong is located in the western part of Seoul and the Sanggye-dong in

the northern part of it. They all engaged in protest against the renewal policy.

Part Three contains the discussion of our findings.

Appendices provide a glossary of Korean terms, maps, information about inflation in Korea, and further data about squatter populations and relocations.

In romanizing Korean, this thesis employed the McCune-Reischauer system. For the names of historical or political figures, well-known place names, and the trade names of companies, I have tried to follow the most widely used romanization. For works written in Korean, the author's name appears in McCune-Reischauer romanization, sometimes followed by the author's preferred romanization if he or she has published in English. For works by Korean authors in English, the author's name is written as it appears in the original publication, sometimes followed by the author's name in McCune-Reischauer romanization, especially if the author has published in Korean also.

In ordering the elements of persons' names, I have adopted a Korean sequence - last name first in all alphabetized lists, but first elsewhere. Korean words in the plural are not followed by the letter "s." Finally, complete information on authors' names or companies' trade names was not always available; in these cases I have simply tried to be as accurate as possible.

P A R T I

B A C K G R O U N D

Chapter One

General Background

LAND OWNERSHIP AND THE KOREAN LAND ETHIC

Korea, alongside other Asian countries, has incorporated into the nation's written law much of the spirit and substance of modern Western legal structure, not least of which is the very concept of detailed codification itself with its well-defined taxonomies of offense and sanction. In this sense Korean property law -- the law on the books -- does not differ strikingly from American property law. A property owner may invoke the law to remove trespassers or he may dismiss them himself if inclined and able. In America, at least, the protection of private property afforded by the law, and of land in particular, corresponds well with the ethical instincts of the American people, with their respect for their own property as well as that of others.

In Korea the situation is otherwise. The traditional Korean land ethic -- that sense people have shared and still share of who may use land, for what purposes, and under what circumstances -

- finds little reflection in the law. In the contest between squatters, who have made their homes on the land of others, and the Korean government as it seeks to accommodate the accelerating need for urban housing, it is the land ethic that is key to the constitution of legitimacy of the groups involved. Behind this lies some history.

By historical accident as well as imperial design, the 20th century began with much of Seoul under the ownership of the state, reflecting a pattern first set five hundred years earlier when, in 1394, three years after his coronation, King T'aejo, first of the Choson dynasty, moved his principal capital from Kaesong to Seoul. Land in the new capital belonged to the Crown. Private use was by dispensation. The Crown selected sites for palaces, shrines for imperial ancestors and the guardian deities of the state, government buildings, streets, drainages, and markets. From the remaining lands it allocated lots to nobles and commoners according to their social position. Use of the land required application to city authorities, who granted a two-year option on its use, after which time the unused portion returned to city control. (Seoul City History Compiling Committee 1963, 36)

Under a series of military governments following Japanese annexation in 1910, the Japanese appropriated massive amounts of the best arable Korean land. The Oriental Development Company (Tongyang ch'oksik-hoesa), a Japanese government-sponsored conglomerate formed in 1908 to spur Japanese investment, was the

key. (Kang Man Kil 1984, 227) At its height the company owned about 20% of the arable land in the country. The instrument of this acquisition was an extensive eight-year land survey begun in 1910. The survey forced registration of all land, enabling the Japanese effectively to expropriate the land of masses of unsophisticated Korean owners and operators. The Japanese nationalized roughly ten million acres of village land and farm land, turning over exploitation rights to their own lumber companies. By 1930, 75% of farmers were in debt and three-quarters of that debt was to Japanese financial institutions. Tenancy and partial tenancy became the norm; some 12 million people (2.3 million families) were tenants, paying exorbitant rents, a condition that contributed substantially to the exodus from the land to the cities.

In 1948, after liberation, through the Office of Central Land Administration, the government sold off much of the land under tenancy to the tenant farmers. At the same time it ratified the ownership of most of Seoul by the Korean government.

So much is history and this history is largely reflected in the law books. As Hahm Pyong Choon¹ points out, it was official doctrine that all the land in the realm and everything on it,

¹ Hahm received a legal education at Harvard and Yale, was Korean ambassador to the United States, taught law at Yonsei University, was chairman of Korea's delegation to the U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, and served President Chun as General Secretary.

including the human beings, belonged to the king. In practice, the ruling class "owned" land: they had use, benefit, and disposition of it. The situation was analogous to that of feudal England; the king claimed all the land and legitimation of subsequent ownership required a tracing it back to the Crown. Over the centuries, property ownership in England, in practice and doctrine, acquired a near-absolute protection against the state that was missing in Korea.

On the other hand, the Korean king bore heavy responsibility for the equitable distribution of land. Yi Song Kye, the founder of the Yi dynasty, set the initial pattern of reform for his rule by making a public bonfire of all land deeds and redistributing the land. This responsibility presupposed a relative concept of ownership. Hahm (1967, 78-79) describes it this way:

Accumulation of wealth [in Korea] has never been a virtue. It mattered little whether wealth was amassed lawfully and ethically or not. The ideal was a universal satisfaction of subsistence needs. Toward this end the ruler considered it his proper duty to redistribute land periodically, if possible. Equitable redistribution of land was invariably given a high priority among the measures advocated for reform. Individual subsistence needs were determined according to a man's social and political status. Any amount in excess of what was needed to satisfy these needs was considered an illicit fortune. There could be no clearer evidence of a misrule than confusion and disorder in land possession. ... It was corruption and extreme misgovernment that prevented the government from carrying out the good policy. An idea that such a redistribution might involve "a deprivation of property without due process of law" never occurred to our ancestors. Inasmuch as the redistribution of land was to protect the rights of the

poor and the weak to their subsistence, it was a way to insure and protect equitable distribution of the land.

The mentality described by Hahm is no fossil. Hahm conducted an interesting survey to explore the current-day attitudes of Koreans toward law in general. He asked a number of questions bearing directly on the squatter issue. These dealt with the relations and mutual obligations of a landowner and a squatter who has built a shanty on that landowner's property without his permission. The inquiry bears specifically on: 1) the ethical status of the one who builds the shanty; 2) the squatter's obligation to vacate upon request by the owner; 3) the ethics of forcibly evicting the squatter without paying him compensation; 4) the validity of a prohibition against squatting; and 5) the best way to prevent squatting. These questions were addressed to city officials and police charged with enforcement of city ordinances barring the erection of unauthorized structures, and to ordinary citizens, propertied and propertyless.

Overall, the answers showed Koreans to have a strong sense that need establishes a basis for unilateral use of alien property and that ownership of property bestows no unambiguous rights. Almost half the landowners queried exempted the squatter from legal offense and judged that eviction without compensation was wrong. A large fraction thought a prohibition of squatting either wrong or impractical. Only a very small fraction thought that the best prevention lies in strict punishment of violations.

Nonpropertied respondents had a still less firm sense that property ownership endows strict rights and held more strongly that the owner's authority to request the squatter to vacate is highly contingent, depending on the owner's need and plans for immediate use and on his payment of compensation to the squatter.

One might expect that officials charged with property protection and with enforcement of the law on the books would have a different view. And so they do. The majority, following the law on the books, found the construction of the shanty to be an invasion of the owner's legal rights and found his request to vacate the exercise of his legal right of ownership. Yet even within this group a sizable fraction (one-third) saw the owner's right to request the squatter to vacate as contingent on his plans for use or payment of compensation.

Hahm was troubled by what he saw as Koreans' unwillingness to assert legal rights and obligations, their tendency to disparage law in favor of ethical judgments, and their reluctance to seek legal solutions to problems.² He ascribed these tendencies not only to considerations of poverty among Koreans, but also to general mistrust of the law which Koreans have seen, he says, as an instrument of exploitation. He repudiated the traditional tolerance of squatting as an involuntary redistribution

² This is not to say that he favored the laws that were now on the books. In fact, he called for thorough reform of Korean laws and legal thinking to bring traditional thinking and legal doctrine closer together.

of wealth. It was not, however, Hahm's judgment of this syndrome which is relevant to this dissertation; what is relevant is rather the research he did to document its reality.

His research forms the basis of what will be called here the *Korean land ethic* as distinct from the law on the books. Without complication or subtlety, the Korean land ethic makes allowance in case of need for a man to occupy alien property. It makes allowance for the owner to displace him contingent on the owner's need for the land and on his payment of compensation to the squatter.

EVOLUTION OF SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS

Japanese Occupation

Japanese colonial despoliation put pressure on Korea's agricultural sector. Korean farmers rented small pieces of land from Japanese landlords. They paid about half of their products as rent and also paid several kinds of agricultural taxes. Therefore, many small rental farmers left their hometowns for urban areas and built mud huts [t'omak-chip] on empty public or private land. According to the *Kyongsong-jedae*, (1942, 96-106), two thirds of the mud hut residents in 1942 were rural migrants who worked as day workers or street vendors. The Japanese colonial government promulgated the Choson City Planning Act of 1936, which empowered the government to clear most of the mud

hut settlements in Seoul and relocate them into Hongje-dong, Tonam-dong, Ahyon-dong, and other relocation sites. (Son Chong Mok 1978, 139)

Table 1.1 shows increasing number of mud hut residents [t'omak-min] in urban areas during 1931-1941.

Table 1.1 MUD HUTS AND MUD HUT RESIDENTS
1931-1941

YEAR	UNITS	RESIDENTS
1931	1,538	5,092
1932		
1933	2,870	12,478
1934	2,902	14,179
1935	3,576	17,320
1936		
1937	3,248	14,993
1938	3,316	16,644
1939	4,292	20,911
1940		36,000
1941	7,286	37,020

Source: Kyongsong-jedae 1942, 62-64.

During Japanese colonial period, a considerable number of rural small rental farmers migrated to such foreign countries as Manchuria, Siberia, and Japan. After 1920 there was rapid increased migration to such foreign countries. According to Yu Ui Yong (1978, 94), there were 1,562,000 migrants to Manchuria alone. In 1945, total migrants to such foreign countries reached four million, one fifth of the total population.

Post Independence (Post World War II)

Returnees from Manchuria, Siberia, and Japan after World War II

The liberation from Japan generated rapid social change. About three million migrants in foreign countries returned to Korea and about 0.5 million settled in empty public land in Seoul rather than return to their rural home towns. The population of Seoul increased rapidly from 901,971 in 1945 to 1,693,224 in 1950, playing a primary role in the formation of urban squatter settlements in Korea. According to KDI's estimate (KDI 1982, 34), after liberation, between 1945 and 1949, total returnees from Manchuria, Siberia, and Japan were 2,535,000. About half of them settled down in urban areas as squatters. In 1949, among total 190,000 housing units in Seoul 15.7% (30,000) were squatter units. (KDI 1982, 34-35)

As a result of the rapid migration to Seoul, among newly caused urban problems, housing had been in short supply and housing and land costs were high. In addition, most newly arrived migrants were poor. Under political instability, after liberation, the government covertly allowed the forming of squatter settlements as a form of relief measure.

Movement of People During the Korean War

The Korean War also resulted in massive population movement. The uprooting effects of the Korean War and the influx

of refugees further accelerated the urbanization process during the 1950s, which saw the urban share of the total population rise from 18.4% in 1950 to 24.5% in 1955 and 28.0% in 1960. (SCG 1950-1960) Housing and most urban infrastructure such as water pipes and roads were destroyed by the war. Housing shortage was most extreme in 1947. In Seoul, about quarter of housing units (55,000) were destroyed by the War and the rate of housing shortage was 52.6%. (SCG 1978, 150) As a result, most refugees settled down in urban areas and formed squatter settlements. According to the population census of 1960 (KDI 1982, 36), among total 275,804 housing units in Seoul 16.4% were squatter units. The government gave tacit permission to squatters and provided designated areas for further squatter settlements.

Waves of Migration from Other Cities and Countryside, 1960s

Since 1960, rapid industrialization also drew a massive wave of rural migrants to large cities. Most migrants in the late 1950s and the early 1960s formed squatter settlements in the center of Seoul. In response, the Seoul City Government (SCG) adopted a policy of relocating squatter settlements from the center of Seoul to the outskirts. Since 1955, the government has relocated a total of 69,844 households (332,919 persons) to the outskirts of the city to areas occupying 1,050,000 p'yong of public land. (See appendix Chong Cha Hwan 1984)

Therefore, government relocation policy formed many squatter settlements in the outskirts of Seoul. This relocation policy failed, however. About half of the relocatees later returned to the center of Seoul after selling their lots and formed squatter settlements again. (Kim Yong Ho 1985, 31-32). Consequently, in the 1960s, government relocation policy ended up multiplying the number of squatter settlements, a pattern reinforced by new rural migrants to the city.

To sum up, squatter settlements in Seoul were formed sequentially by Japanese exploitation of the agricultural sector; returnees from Manchuria, Siberia, and Japan after liberation; Korean War refugees; and poor migrants from the countryside and other cities, especially following the 1960s.

LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND

The Japanese colonial governors had created a legislative framework for addressing the problems that squatter settlements posed for urban development. Until the early 1960s, however, the modern Korean state had not developed formal policy tools or defined authority and procedures to address these same issues. Since Rhee Syngman, the first president, was wary of the socialistic overtones of "planning" and favored free market solutions, he avoided developing comprehensive land regulation with the result that urban development in general, and squatter issues in particular, were addressed in piecemeal fashion.

By contrast, President Park Chung Hee favored the legislative adoption of general policy tools for revitalizing city functions. The relevant statutory and regulatory instruments were:

- * City Planning Act of 1962,
- * The Land Readjustment Act of 1962,
- * The Land Expropriation Act of 1962,
- * The Comprehensive National Land Construction Act of 1963,
- * The 1965 Revision of the City Planning Act,
- * The 1972 Revision of the City Planning Act,
- * The National Building Code of 1972,
- * The Housing Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
- * The Special Act for Housing Improvement of 1973
- * The Urban Renewal Act of 1976,
- * The National Security Committee Special Decree for Urban Planning, 1980,
- * The Seoul City Government Joint Redevelopment Guidelines of 1984.

The City Planning Act of 1962 created the legal foundation for the development of industry, transportation, sanitation, housing, satellite cities, and new urban centers. In 1965, as the importance of dealing with squatter settlements gained recognition, the Act was amended to authorize the Seoul City government (SCG), with approval of the Ministry of Construction (MOC), to

designate specific urban districts within the city as target areas for clearance and development. The amendment gave the SCG considerable authority to buy and sell land and to regulate land prices. Further amendments in 1972 gave the SCG authority to use tax policy to encourage and expedite urban renewal activities.

The Land Expropriation Act of 1962 gave the national government the power of eminent domain over property required to carry out public works designated under the Comprehensive National Land Construction Act. The latter laid the legal basis for long-term planning for utilizing, cultivating, and preserving land, water, and other natural resources. The act gave the authority over national land development policy to the Ministry of Construction, which had been created in 1961. It empowered the ministry to target particular areas for urban development and created a deliberative committee at the national level to set objectives and guidelines for national urban development and to designate renewal districts.

The Housing Rehabilitation Act of 1973 was enacted to provide comprehensive guidelines in squatter redevelopment activities. The act stipulated that local governments could provide infrastructure and community facilities and it allowed the SCG to take full control of rehabilitation projects. The act defined the urban-center redevelopment and urban-periphery redevelopment separately for the first time. In urban-center redevelopment, major conflicts occurred mostly between small landowners (home

owners) and real estate capital (construction firms) over the profits that resulted from optimizing the market value of urban space. In this process, as Burgess argued (1982), state response varied according to the relative power of the two actors. In the redevelopment of the urban periphery, the state incorporated the squatter settlements into the market mechanism by putting them in the process of housing transaction. According to the Clause 3 of the act, the state designated urban redevelopment districts, an authority whose exercise resulted in the socio-spatial segregation of the urban poor.

To sum up, the City Planning Act, through several revisions, provided city governments with a legal basis of designating urban renewal districts. The Land Expropriation Act of 1962 gave both the national and city governments the power of eminent domain over land to carry out public works. While the Housing Rehabilitation Act focused on upgrading and rehabilitation, the Urban Renewal Act provided city governments with the right of forced removal of squatter settlements.

Chapter Two

The Policy Background

INTRODUCTION

The presence of the squatters and their settlements in central Seoul constituted both an obstacle to the full exploitation of the central city's potential and a housing problem for the squatters that the government eventually decided to resolve. The relative severity of the two horns of this issue, their respective priority, and the strategies the government subsequently adopted evolved over the period following the Korean War as a result of assimilated experience, political necessity, and changing resources. There are no definitive boundaries in this evolution; there are, however, four periods that exhibit distinct strategic preferences:

- 1) Shanty [P'anja-jip] Clearance, 1951-1965,
- 2) Legalization and Self Help, 1966-1972,
- 3) Rehabilitation and Removal, 1973-1982, and
- 4) Joint Redevelopment, 1983-1988.

SHANTY CLEARANCE (1951-1965)

During the 1950s and the early 1960s, urban development activity in Seoul was principally geared to eliminating the shanties and squatter settlements in what was then the urban center and to revitalizing the city's economy following the Korean War. The

purpose of the policy was to clear squatter settlements from public land designated as parks and green zones and to relocate the residents to the outskirts of the city.

Squatter settlements in the central Ch'onggyech'on area were razed and the residents relocated to the urban periphery, to Mia-dong, Pon-dong, and Kuro-dong during 1951-1962, and to Kongnung-dong, Sanggye-dong, Sinjong-dong, Sadang-dong, Ogum-dong, Koyo-dong, and Karak-dong during 1963-1966. Table 2.1 shows the number of squatter settlements demolished and the number of households relocated in Seoul from 1955-1965. The series shows clearly how political events reduced the government's ability and zeal to resettle squatters: It dips during the presidential elections of 1956, the April 19 Student Revolution and the end of Rhee Syngman's regime in 1959, the May 16 military coup in 1962, and the presidential elections of 1963. During the transition of power, first of all, the regimes needed social and political stability. Accordingly, the regimes loosened its enforcement of removal policies and provided most requested compensation to squatters mainly because the squatter protests were potential seeds for social and political instability. In addition, since the regimes had a problem of legitimacy of power, they need to compromise with the protest groups in order to acquire the legitimacy.

Urban development policy had not yet been clearly articulated and the demolition and relocation of the squatter

settlements were carried out without benefit of any legal basis. In practice clearance and removal were essentially a police action where detection of newly-built units led to physical removal and tenant eviction. Trucks would come early in the morning to take families to their new location. The old units were then bulldozed by wrecking crews to prevent their being reoccupied. This policy relied on both formal and informal systems of reporting and surveillance, "including on-site inspections, aerial mapping, and reporting from local administrators and community dwellers themselves." (Ha Seong Kyu 1984, 129)

During this period the state demolished squatter settlements without making any provision for effective resettlement of the residents. Families in the area were removed by force and simply dumped. Newspaper accounts frequently related encounters between the evicting policemen and squatters resisting compulsory removal from their squatter housing areas.

This practice had three consequences, two immediate and one longer-term. First, it resulted in social and spatial segregation of the relocated squatters from the urban center. Day-workers who relied on the availability of work and access that residence in the central city provided were suddenly deprived of employment and income. Many returned. The case of Kuro-dong is typical. Of the 234 households relocated there from Ch'onggyech'on, roughly half (112) returned to the city. (Chang Se Hun 1987, 48) Second, it typically resulted in the creation of

new squatter settlements at the periphery. While this freed valuable space in the central city, at least temporarily, it did little to solve the human problems associated with life in the settlements. Third, as the boundaries of central center expanded, the new squatter settlements at the periphery became once again a problem for the central city.

Table 2.1 SQUATTER AREAS, UNITS, AND HOUSEHOLDS CLEARED IN SEOUL
1955-1965

YEAR	NO. OF DISTRICTS	AREA (p'yong)	SQUATTER UNITS	HOUSE- HOLDS
1955	1	16,000	800	1,600
1956	2	10,760	400	801
1957	5	12,089	1,219	1,883
1958	4	41,448	1,791	2,328
1959	3	8,201	912	1,316
1960	8	14,282	1,015	1,546
1961	9	59,621	1,863	3,957
1962	8	31,237	1,210	1,709
1963	7	4,372	414	649
1964	4	38,540	2,852	5,142
1965	6	52,180	3,069	5,448

Source: Chang Se Hun 1987, 45.

Chang Se Hun (1987, 44-50) has documented squatters' protests of the period and their return to former sites. He criticized the relocation policy by arguing that the policy was a route to exploitation of squatters by government and real estate capital. Driven in part by adverse publicity and in part by the need to stem the tide of returning squatters, beginning with the Mia-ri relocation project of 1958, the Seoul City government

adopted a policy which made small housing lots (8-10 p'yong) available to squatters relocated to the outskirts of the city.

LEGALIZATION AND THE CITIZEN APARTMENTS (1966-1972)

By the beginning of the 1960s, relocation had become a major social issue; the government needed more effective policy tools. The early sixties saw a spate of new national laws, among other things, gave the SCG considerable independent authority to deal semi-autonomously with urban development and the squatter issue. In 1966, after conducting a survey of squatter settlements, the city defined a new and more comprehensive approach. In 1967, there was a presidential election that Mr. Park Chung Hee attempted his second term. In 1971, he attempted his third term. And, in 1972, he revised the Constitution Law in order to keep his presidential position. This resulted in legitimacy crisis for his regime. Accordingly, his regime needed to create the conditions for social harmony, what O'Connor calls the state's "legitimization" function (1973, 6-7). As a part of this purpose, the regime adopted the new policy that called for: 1) relocation of squatters to designated *danji*, that is, functionally independent and integrated urban complexes; 2) legalization and rehabilitation of squatter settlements with housing conditions satisfying certain requirements and with attendant requirements for renovation by owners of the squatter units; 3) construction of small apartments

at the demolished sites with provision for resettlement there of the site's former squatters.

Large-Scale Relocation and the Danji Program

In the latter half of the sixties, the government recognized that a sites and services improvement program was an important approach to the housing problem of low-income groups, particularly urban migrants. Sites and services take two forms in developing countries: first the upgrading of housing areas that have already been settled; and second, the development of new land to facilitate construction of individual houses. (Balwant Saini 1979, 91) In Seoul, the authority tried mainly the latter approach.

During this period and continuing into the early seventies, the building of a new town or the extended development of the central city was undertaken by local governments to help divert squatter settlement from central areas. Beginning in 1962 there were many small- and large-scale relocation programs. The households in squatter and unplanned housing areas were relocated from Seoul to peripheral areas. Between 1966 and 1972, as table 2.2 shows, slightly less than 40,000 low-income households were relocated to twenty new areas that had undergone site and service improvement programs. Table 2.2 also shows the number of districts in which clearance was undertaken, the area reclaimed, number of housing units demolished, the number of people removed from the site, and the average p'yongage available for

each household at the new sites. Once again the numbers show the retarding impact on implementation of politically significant events: note the drop in relocations associated with the electoral campaigns for the presidency and the National Assembly in 1967 and of Kwangju-daedanji protest in 1970.

Table 2.2 SQUATTERS AND HOUSEHOLDS
Seoul Relocation Program
1966-1972

YEAR	DIS- TRICTS	AREA (p'yong)	HOUSING UNITS	HOUSE- HOLDS	PEOPLE	AVERAGE AREA
1966	14	220,238	11,313	14,284	65,698	13.0
1967	12	111,116	5,363	7,058	34,079	8.6
1968	17	204,962	12,214	13,238	72,057	11.3
1969	5	25,315	484	1,277	5,372	11.5
1970	3	520	65	74	331	8.0
1971	5	39,675	1,893	1,209	6,071	8.2
1972	3	12,038	397	326	3,164	12.8

Source: Chang Se Hun 1987, 45.

The principal *danji* effort was that of Kwangju, located twenty km. south-east of the center of Seoul, a case to be examined in detail in Part II. Under the program designating complex districts, the SCG planned initially to resettle 550,000 persons to Kwangju, but by 1971 only 114,455 persons (23,692 households) had actually been resettled. Moreover, of those subject to relocation, many resold their allotment and either remained in or returned to Seoul or other nearby areas with greater access to employment than the *danji* offered.¹ Violent

¹ For a more detailed explanation, see Chapter Four.

protests in 1971 associated with the Kwangju complex terminated the danji program altogether.

Legalization and the Self-Help Development Scheme

Beginning in 1967, the year of the presidential elections, the city government introduced a selective legalization and self-help development scheme with the object of improving living conditions in squatter settlements and helping low-income households. Legalization of settlements, as a part of electoral politics, conferred relief from the threat of sudden displacement and destruction of housing units. It allowed residents to upgrade their units without fear of removal or reprisals. It did not confer ownership of the land but it did give those who had built the units ownership rights concerning the structures, i.e., it allowed them to rent the units to others or to resell them. Legalization, of course, raised both the rental value and the resale value of the units.

Under the legalization program, the city government allowed squatters to upgrade and rebuild their settlements. This program reduced the social and economic burden on both the squatters and the city government. In 1972, the program was incorporated into the New Village Movement [the Saemaul-undong] and continued as the primary method of providing housing for low-income urban households.

Until 1972, the city government pursued the legalization and self-help development program on a small scale, overshadowed by the *danji* program. After 1972, the program was the sole alternative to previous clearance redevelopment program. Criteria were drawn up to decide which areas would be eligible for legalization and which would not. In order to qualify for legalization, squatter units were required to meet the following criteria: 1) they were not be included in urban development plans; 2) they were not be included in city beautification plans; 3) they were not be in violation of government construction laws or the Comprehensive Planning Law; and in addition 4) they had to contain a minimum of thirty houses, not exceed an elevation of 100 meters above sea level, have, or have under construction, access roads of a minimum specified width, have adequate storm drainage and sewer facilities, and have lots of at least 27 p'yong, where dwellings covered a surface of at least 12 p'yong, but not more than 60 percent of the total area of the housing lot. (Ha Seong Kyu 1984, 136)

The government began the program by determinating what areas were eligible for legalization. Through the mass media, the qualifications and procedures for legalization were publicized. Eligible areas were encouraged to request assistance from the government in drawing up community development plans and estimating cost. These were then submitted to the city government for approval. The construction of public facilities

prior to legalization was carried out through the joint action of the city and squatters. The government paid a portion of the costs (estimated at an average of 35%) to improve the areas. This would come in the form of construction materials, such as pipes and cement, as well as technical assistance. The squatters would be expected to finance the remainder, with those economically unable contributing labor in lieu of cash. Participating households shared the costs. The actual work was carried out by private firms, with contracts awarded through competitive bidding, under the management of the local administrative office. Once the necessary infrastructure was complete, and physical requirements were met by all households, squatters were allowed to buy their land from the government. Prices were based on prior appraisal, determined from market values before development. No credit or other material assistance was given, though the city government did expedite applications for local house registration.

The households in those areas not eligible for legalization were relocated to peripheral areas in the city, on lots served by water and sewer systems. Households relocated to those areas were able to purchase their lots at subsidized prices, with payments extended over five to ten years. The government intended to finance such areas through the sale of lots adjacent to the areas, which were expected to bring inflated prices once their locations were made public.

In 1967, the city government announced a plan to legalize 141,520 squatter units: 35,139 units after upgrading with 17,000-20,000 won subsidy per unit, 44,819 units in their current condition, and an additional 61,562 units to be upgraded in the following years. (Dong-A Ilbo, April 25, 1967) The Administration Survey Institute (1970) has argued that the government had aimed the legalization plan at the political mobilization of the urban poor in order to develop support in the forthcoming presidential and congressional elections of 1967. Only 5,000 units were actually legalized in 1967. (Administration Survey Institute 1970, 124)

The legalization policy was temporarily interrupted by the Kwangju-daedanji large-scale relocation project and citizen apartment building program. It was reborn in the early 1970s as a form of a squatter settlement upgrading program. Chang Se Hun (1987, 66) argues that the rebirth resulted from the political need "to mobilize the urban poor, who were one-third of Seoul's population, in the presidential and congressional elections of 1971." In any case, the 1971 Kwangju-daedanji protest and the collapse of the Wau citizen apartment building in the same year signaled the demise of the relocation and citizen apartment building programs.

In 1971, the year of the seventh presidential elections, the SCG formulated a plan to upgrade 24,000 squatter units in 124 districts. (Seoul-sinmun, January 18, 1971) The final plan called

for the legalization of 11,343 squatter units in 49 districts and for upgrading of 47,887 units in 220 districts. (See Table 2.3)

Table 2.3 PLANNED LEGALIZATION AND UPGRADING
SEOUL 1971

	TOTAL	LEGALIZATION	UPGRADING
no. of district	269	49	220
no. of squatter unit	59,230	11,343	47,887
areas(p'yong)	1,966,559	300,367	1,666,192
national	1,252,720	179,405	1,073,315
land municipal	307,991	56,496	251,495
owner private	405,848	64,466	341,382
no. of household	119,970	24,875	95,095
population	562,046	112,211	449,835

Source: SCG 1973.

The city government incorporated the squatter settlements located in park and basin areas into the legalized areas without giving them housing lot status. The squatter residents worked out the program by themselves while the city government provided administrative aid. Thus, the residents had to bear considerable upgrading costs. In addition, the occupied lands had low market value and the city government often changed the designation of legalization districts. Under these burdens, the effort stalled. (SCG 1972, 130-133)

The city government realized that administrative aid alone was not enough to implement renewal policy. Accordingly, in 1972, the government modified the policy and fund urban infrastructure. The squatters were responsible for upgrading only their own

dwellings. (Kim Yong Ho 1985, 40) By 1973, this partnership between government and squatters, a product of the New Village Movement, had succeeded in upgrading 400,000 p'yong, 9,976 units in 55 districts at the cost of 820 million won. The squatters bore 54% of the cost. (SCG 1972, 1973)

Table 2.4 LEGALIZATION AND UPGRADING
SEOUL BY 1973

	LEGALIZATION	UPGRADING	TOTAL
districts	49	55	104
squatter units	10,161	10,125	20,286
total area(p'yong)	304,913	409,389	714,302
national	180,662	249,382	430,044
owner city	52,233	73,264	124,497
private	71,016	86,743	157,759
achievement	9,989	9,976	19,965

Source: SCG 1976, 326.

Table 2.4 shows that the SCG legalized 9,989 units from 49 squatter districts and upgraded 9,976 units in 55 districts by 1973. By 1973, only 6% of all squatter settlements in Seoul had been legalized. Beginning in 1973, the authority turned its attention to other approaches to low-income housing, such as relocation schemes and the high-rise and high density programs. Since 1973 there has been no further official data published on the number of squatter settlements legalized.

The program had the merit of recognizing squatter settlements as a housing resource rather than as a target for demolition. Moreover, by inducing squatters to participate in the

rehabilitation of the settlements, it improved the efficiency of public investment. Finally, it reduced the squatter residents' fear of relocation and left social and employment networks intact. (KNLDI 1983, 23-24)

While the legalization program succeeded in upgrading some squatter settlements, the demanding character of the legalization criteria excluded most. Recall that one criterion required that areas to be legalized have more than thirty squatter units. A survey conducted by Yonsei University's Institute of Urban Studies and Development showed that 30 to 40 percent of squatter settlements in Seoul had fewer than thirty units. (Institute of Urban Studies and Development 1979, 72) This criterion alone prevented legalization of roughly one-third of all squatter settlements in Seoul. Actually, the smaller areas were, in general, better developed and maintained than the larger ones, and would have been easier for the city authority to upgrade initially.

In conclusion, the government implemented legalization policy as a measure of relieving squatters' problem, and the squatters welcomed it. This is a contrast to the fact of Mexico City. According to Castells (1983, 198), the squatters in the Mexico City strongly refused the legalization policy by the government of their illegal land occupation.

Citizen Apartment Building Program

By the mid-sixties, numerous high-rise and walk-up apartments were under construction. Seoul was beginning to assume its modern skyline. Under the citizen apartment program, the government allocated funds for construction of mostly low-rise apartment buildings and gave squatters priority in purchasing units in the form of a negotiable ticket (the so-called priority ticket). Intended for low-income groups, the units were small and designed to be cheap to build and cheap to buy. In addition, the government made low-interest loans available. The program was made possible by increases of city revenues in the mid-sixties. Rapid industrialization was bringing people and money to Seoul. By the mid 1960s, the government began to pursue an outward-looking industrialization strategy, promoting labor intensive light manufacturing industries. The industries were relatively highly concentrated in Seoul. This shift in policy was driven as well by strong squatter resistance to earlier policies.²

The Seoul City government introduced the citizen apartment building program in 1967 (the sixth presidential election year) as the first comprehensive program of on-site low-income housing. Initially designed as a three year program for the construction of

² There were spontaneous protests against the removal policy in Sungin-dong, Chonnong-2-dong, Samyang-dong, Yongsan-gu, Munbae-dong, Hannam-dong, and etc. *Dong-A Ilbo*, September 28, October 26 and 29, 1964; April 29 and June 18, 1965.

2,000 buildings (90,000 households),³ it was curtailed in April, 1970 - after 406 buildings had been completed - when one building (the Wau citizen apartment building) collapsed, killing 34 residents. Subsequent investigations revealed extensive subcontracting, poor construction methods, inadequate building supervision, and large-scale graft in the awarding of building contracts. (Sindong-A, May 1970) Of the 406 buildings actually completed, 159 were subsequently vacated and destroyed. Those remaining provided residence for roughly 18,000 households.

There were other problems that impaired the system of granting priority status and reduced the efficiency of the priority ticket as a tool of redistribution of income and housing benefits. Under the program, upon receipt of a priority ticket, squatters were expected to pay 50,000 to 60,000 won for the installation of water and electrical facilities. (Other construction -- columns, floor slabs, stair wells, and service conduits -- were part of the basic plant provided by the city.) Since the total amount was due before installation could begin, no facilities were available until all the squatters in a building had paid up. One newspaper (Dong-A Ilbo, June 21, 1970) reported that as a result of the financial incapacity of so many of the squatters, buildings often lacked water and electricity for as much as a year. As of 1970, the monthly average income of squatters was 14,000 won per

³ The plan was to construct 400 buildings (18,000 households) in 1969, 800 buildings (36,000 households) in 1970, and 800 buildings (36,000 households) in 1971.

household, much less than 23,000 won, a minimum standard of living required.

Squatters were faced with amortization of the 200,000 won low-interest loans (8% over 15 years) plus a small service charge. This amounted to 2,300 won per month on a monthly income of 14,000. (SCG 1970)

For any given squatter household, there were three possible outcomes. First, if it was financially able, it might meet the terms of ownership, remain as a resident, and in time pay off the loan. Otherwise, it might either sell the priority ticket to a broker at a small profit or it might remain in the apartment for the first six months (which was actually the contractual obligation), furnish it, and sell it after six months at a higher profit than if they had sold the priority ticket at once. In general, priority tickets sold for 100,000 won. Reckoning the installation costs (50,000-60,000 won) as the only out-of-pocket expense left a profit of 40,000 won. Residents could use this money as chonse payment (key money) to rent elsewhere or to build housing in another squatter area. Though in both cases some profit was seen, it was never great enough to insure home ownership in any legitimate sector.

Estimates of the fraction of ticket holders who sold their rights at one time or another range from 50%-75%. According to the SCG's figure (1980), as many as 77% of the original residents had moved out. Thus the benefits intended for low-income groups

were to some extent passed on to middle- or upper-lower income groups.

The program suffered from still other shortcomings. Since no interim housing was provided for resident squatters displaced by the construction process, there was little assurance that even those financially able would hold out until housing became available. Tenants who had made substantial key money deposits to the owners of their units were frequently unable to get their money back since the resources of the displaced squatter-owners (including the tenants' deposits) had been depleted by the program. These families were unable to purchase a priority ticket. It has been estimated that the number of families dislocated by the program in this way exceeded by 20% the number actually settled into citizen apartment building. (Dong-A Ilbo, June 5, 1971)

Finally, the citizen apartment building program led to radical confrontation between second-generation citizen apartment owners and the government. Organizational activists succeeded in mobilizing the residents to protest the government actions. It is important to note that, while squatters were blamed for the anti-government actions in the summer of 1971 - the popular assumption being that citizen apartment buildings were mostly occupied by squatters - it was in fact the middle-class second-generation citizen apartment owners who organized protests against government policy for they possessed greater socio-

economic capacity for large-scale political mobilization. (Institute of Korea Christian Social Problems 1987, 34-36)

The design and construction features of the citizen flats were also roundly criticized. Structural members were simply placed in the surface of the soil without adequate foundations. Inadequate mix and curing of concrete resulted in cracked foundations. Chang Se Hun (1987) pointed out that repeated demonstrations by citizen apartment building residents and political criticism led to the diversion of the remainder of the construction budget to the repair and reinforcement of existing buildings. These measures notwithstanding, poor construction methods and architectural faults required the demolition by 1985 of 179 citizen apartment buildings housing 5,643 households. (See Chang Se Hun 1987, 62-64 and table 2.5.)

Investigations revealed large scale graft in the award of building contracts. Ha Seong Kyu (1984, 155) has reported that many civil servants accepted bribes in connection with the construction of the citizen apartment buildings. The construction cost for one apartment building was 6,500,000 won in 1969. In 1968, the estimated cost of one building in the private sector was 11,660,000 won. The original goal was to spend 9,000,000 won for one building at a cost of 20,000 won per p'yong; (Administration Survey Institute 1970, 118-131) the cost per p'yong in the private sector was 30,000-40,000 won. (Dong-A Ilbo, April 9, 1970)

Table 2.5 DEMOLITION OF CITIZEN APARTMENTS
1970-1985
(10,000 won)

YEAR	NO. OF APT DEMOLISHED	NO. OF HOUSEHOLD CLEARED	COMPENSATION PER HOUSEHOLD	COST FOR REPAIR
1970	5	150		158,680
1971	1	40		14,385
1972	7	315		29,700
1973	23	765		
1974	34	1,172		8,000
1975	34	1,042		
1976	10	347		11,587
1977	5	200		171,960
1978	12	483	180	24,300
1979	15	347	300	
1980				
1981	5	200	400	
1982	5	197	500	
1983	18	732	550	
1984	1	45	550	
1985	4	155	560	
TOTAL	179	6,190		

Source: SCG, *Seoul-si sijong* [Seoul City's Administration], various years.

Third, the squatters were forced into the citizen apartment building program against their will, to face often impossible financial burdens. The citizen apartments were too expensive and the city government built them without a clear understanding of the needs of those it set out to benefit. This resulted from the fact that the policy was intended to provide housing stock to middle-income people and to provide investment opportunities to big construction firms. They in turn sold their rights to other families.

As for urban renewal, the KNHC and the SCG concentrated on building large-scale danji housing. Compared to the citizen apartment buildings, these buildings contained standard apartments and were generally taller. They were built in newly developed suburban areas and some traditional residential areas. The citizen apartment buildings were mainly for squatter households, but eligibility for state-developed housing was broader. All "non-homeowners" or "renters" became eligible for the purchase of state-developed housing units. On the other hand, the households eligible for the rental housing units were classified into several categories including "homeless" and "squatters." (Ha Seong Kyu 1984, 156)

REHABILITATION AND REMOVAL (1973-1982)

By the end of the 1960s, renewal policy had reshaped and refurbished the urban center of Seoul where the demand for residential land now made it urgent for the state to formulate and implement a renewal policy for the urban periphery. Thereafter, redevelopment was directed at the urban periphery, which the poor occupied, for the most part, illegally. Clearly, however, the state needed a new approach; its vigorous renewal in Kwangju had provoked intensive group protest in 1971. As a result of the protest, in the 1970s the state added rehabilitation to its inventory of policy tools. Removal still dominated, however, as rehabilitation represented only 15% of total renewal activity.

As a result of the vigorous implementation of the renewal policy, the number of new squatter units dropped from 3,715 in 1972 to 379 in 1979 while remodelling or upgrading increased. (See Table 2.6) The urban poor sought expansion in the number of rooms for rent and improvement in the quality of squatter settlements.

Table 2.6 NEW SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS
1972-1980

YEAR	NEW UNITS	REMODELLING	UPGRADING	TOTAL
1972	3,715	1,782	1,629	7,126
1973	1,160	1,928	8,290	11,378
1974	749	1,860		2,609
1975	707	1,661	4,072	6,440
1976	783	2,482	6,852	10,117
1977				
1978	438	2,183	4,146	6,767
1979	379	2,222	5,268	7,869
1980				11,593

Source: SCG, *Seoul-si sijong*, various years of 1973-81.

In order to avoid radical protests like that at Kwangju-daedanji, the state considered three new major forms of renewal policy: relocation subsidies; occupancy rights for squatters in the citizen apartments; and large-scale relocation. (See Table 2.7)

Table 2.7 DEMOLITION OF LOW-INCOME HOUSING AND POLICY
RESPONSE IN SEOUL
1970-1984
(no. of housing unit)

YEAR	NO. OF DEMOLISHED UNITS*	POLICY RESPONSE			
		RELOCATION	PRIORITY TICKET	SUBSIDY**	OTHER
1970	13,556	13,556			
1971	7,041	7,041			
1972	6,554	2,033			4,521
1973	4,936	1,486		2,087	1,363
1974	5,964	272		3,591	2,101
1975	20,039	18	8,688	7,194	4,139
1976	18,828		6,352	8,864	3,612
1977	14,919		7,410	6,694	815
1978	12,992		3,607	5,648	3,737
1979	6,157		2,539	3,095	523
1980	3,021		500	2,971	50
1981	1,790		1,790	1,790	
1982	2,280		2,280	2,280	
1983	4,059		4,059	4,059	
1984	5,839		5,839	5,839	

* Demolitions include substandard housing in addition to squatter units. ** subsidy: 1973, 100,000 won; 1974-76, 150,000 won; 1977-78, 200,000 won; 1979-84, 500,000 won.
Source: SCG, *Seoul-si sijong*, various years; SCG, 1981, 298.

Citizen Apartments

As shown earlier, many citizen apartments were built. After the collapse of the Wau apartment building in 1970 the program was curtailed and gradually disappeared. Further, as a result of their high price, the citizen apartments had all the flavor of a "cake in the picture for the poor."⁴ For example, in the case of

⁴ In 1975 a citizen apartment (13 p'yong) in Chamsil cost 3,160,000 won; in 1976 a citizen apartment in Amsa (13 p'yong) cost 3,660,000 won; and in 1977 one of 14 p'yong in Changan cost

the Songsan-dong project about 80% (160 households out of 200) resold their apartment rights to members of the middle class for 500,000-800,000 won. (Kyonghyang-sinmun, November 10, 1976) Apartment construction was initially intended to provide rental units for the poor. However, after one year, high management costs and the limited investment resources forced the city government to start selling the apartments. (Kim Won 1982, 229) With the boom in real estate speculation and the high expected demand for housing, the difference between the purchase price and the resale price rose two to five million won.

Subsidy

The city government provided 100,000-500,000 won to the squatter owners as a subsidy. In the beginning, this was confined to the squatter owners who rejected large-scale relocation and failed in their application for nomination for citizen apartments. Gradually, however, it became a dominant theme in renewal policy because it allowed the state to reduce its compensation costs and management effort. However, the amount of subsidy was far below the chonse required for other peripheral squatter settlements. This discrepancy provoked a rejection of the renewal policy and clamor for "reasonable compensation." During the political crisis of 1980, the government established "temporary urban planning guidelines" which provided

4,985,000 won. (Park Tong Un 1981, 296) In 1978, the average monthly income of the urban poor was 98,800 won. (SCG, unpublished document 1979, 43)

institutional acceptance of the demand. (SCG 1981, 284-287)

According to these guidelines, the priority of renewal policy became rehabilitation and legalization of urban squatter settlements and reasonable compensation for squatter owners. Squatter tenants (as opposed to squatter owners, those who had built or bought the structures) were excluded from the distribution of benefits. As the scope of renewal policy expanded to the peripheral areas, the tenant movement also expanded.

Large-scale Relocation Program

Beginning in 1972, in order to disperse the population in Kangbuk (north of the Han river), the state developed housing areas in Kangnam (south of the Han river) platting out land in parcels of 27 or 30 p'yong for each squatter-owner. However, this policy differed little from the large-scale relocation policies of 1960s. In 1972 in the face of inadequate urban services (principally, running water and transportation) more than 90% of those relocated to *danji* in Sinwol and Sinjong sold their rights to rental housing and returned to north of the Han River. After 1975 the lack of idle city land surrounding the center of Seoul brought this form of renewal to a halt. Table 2.8 shows the content of large-scale relocation policy during 1972-73.

Table 2.8 LARGE-SCALE RELOCATION AREAS

LOCATION	YEAR	AREAS (p'yong)	PLANNED UNITS	P'YONG PER HOUSEHOLD
Sinjong-dong	1972	41,095	1,209	27
Hwagok-1st-dong	1972	30,847	783	27
Sinsa-1st-dong	1972	23,500	410	27
Koyo-dong	1972	9,997	259	27
Sinsa-2nd-dong	1973	3,960	166	30
Sinwol-dong	1973	19,340	984	30
TOTAL		128,739	3,811	

Source: SCG 1974, 348.

Table 2.9 THE TREND OF COMPENSATION FOR SQUATTER REMOVAL

YEAR	CONTENT
1974-78	choose one from three options: subsidy for moving, the priority ticket for citizen apartments, and large-scale relocation
1979-81	subsidy for moving or the right ticket for citizen apartments (only for residents in renewal districts)
1981-84 ^a	subsidy for moving and the priority ticket for citizen apartments simultaneously
1984-89 ^b	compensation for building itself and the priority ticket for citizen apartments
1985-89 ^c	inmate first and removal second

Source: Chang Se Hun 1987, 82.

^a Kyonghyang-sinmun (4/18/81)

^b Dong-A Ilbo (9/21/84)

^c Choson Ilbo (8/17/85)

As reviewed above, varied compensation was due to the response from the poor and the economic and political situations.

The violent or a large scale protests produced higher compensation compare to non-violent or a small scale protests. The evolution is summarized in table 2.9.

Table 2.10A BUDGET PLAN FOR THE RENEWAL PROJECT
REVENUE PLAN (FROM SELLING LANDS)

	LAND(P'YONG)	AMOUNT(10,000 WON)
relocation	75,000	40,000
on-site upgrading	225,000	382,500
legalization	165,000	247,500
on-site clearance	1,430,000	2,137,500
others		22,500
TOTAL	1,895,000	2,830,000

Table 2.10B BUDGET PLAN FOR THE RENEWAL PROJECT
EXPENDITURE PLAN
(won in units of 10,000,000)

	GOAL	AMOUNT
1. upgrading(SCG's burden) total area		2,830
4,460,000(p'yong)		
housing land and public facilities		2,280
compensation for obstacles		220
subsidy housing (22,000 units)		330
2. resident burden	124,000 units	7,170
housing	68,000 units	
construction		
clearance	34,000 units	
on-site upgrading	22,000 units	
3. others (sewage, etc.)		700
TOTAL	158,000 units	10,700

Source: Lee U Yong 1975, 11.

The exploitative character of the renewal policy of the 1970s was apparent in the budget plan. (See table 2.10) As shown in table 2.10, the SCG bore 28.3 billion won, the residents 71.7 billion won, and others 7 billion won. Thus, the SCG aimed at redeveloping 158,000 squatter units by investing a total of 107 billion won. The SCG met its burden by selling 1,895,000 p'yong which were conceded mostly by squatter areas for nothing.

Table 2.11 THE PERFORMANCE OF HOUSING REDEVELOPMENT
1974-1983

	ON-SITE UPGRADING	SELF-HELP CLEARANCE	UPGRADING BY FOREIGN LOANS
no. of district	8	12	10
areas(p'yong)	45,503	128,738	230,584
status of total	1,203	4,139	6,786
housing legal	709	3,434	(plan)
(unit) illegal	494	705	
type of total	544	1,284	2,064
housing single	296	791	2,064
after- multi-	248	493	
(unit) apt			
no. of household	834	2,750	

* Consignment redevelopment: 15 districts and 2,677 households.
Source: Kim Yong Ho 1985, 95-104.

Consequently, the residents bore the whole cost of redevelopment as a form of housing construction and land acquisition. Accordingly, the success of the policy depended upon the residents' participation. However, the residents' participation was almost impossible because, lacking title, their housing mostly could not be sold on the open market. Therefore, the city

government adopted four distinct strategies to induce the resident participation: 1) on-site upgrading, 2) self-help clearance redevelopment, 3) upgrading by foreign loans, and 4) consignment redevelopment. The application of these strategies is summarized in Table 2.11.

On-site Upgrading

In 1971, 220 districts with 47,887 units were identified for on-site upgrading. By 1973 55 districts with 9,976 units among those identified had been upgraded (See tables 2.3 and 2.4.) The city government expected to coordinate this work with such city functions as road construction, provision of running water, and aesthetic upgrading. The Minister of Construction empowered the SCG to authorize loans from public housing funds to ease the financial burden on residents. During 1974-83, eight districts with 45,503 p'yong (1,203 units) had been upgraded.

Self-help Clearance Redevelopment

In contrast to the on-site upgrading strategy, self-help aimed at mobilizing the residents who were not able to participate under the SCG's administrative guidelines. The approach involved: (KNLDI 1982, 368) a) clearance of existing squatter settlements; b) temporary relocation of households during construction; c) construction of such public infrastructure as electricity and running water; d) definition of the housing lots; e) allocation of lots to households; f) housing construction. In this strategy the

residents bore all costs including housing construction, public land allotment, and relocation. Most residents were reluctant to participate. Between 1974 and 1983 twelve districts with 4,139 units were cleared and 1,284 housing units were built.

Upgrading Units with Foreign Loans

AID provided funds and technology to Third World countries to upgrade substandard housing. With the loans residents purchased land and upgraded housing, and the government built urban infrastructures. When AID discontinued the loan program in 1982, SCG dropped this approach.

Consignment Redevelopment

This approach allowed residents autonomy in organizing a redevelopment steering committee. The committee took charge of implementation while the SCG supervised the overall process. For the redevelopment, the SCG designated a construction firm which cleared the existing squatter settlements and defined 300-500 p'yong housing lots grouping 20-30 household units, and built apartments or multi-family houses. (Chang Se Hun 1987, 68) The SCG extended loans to the residents at low interest rates. Since the loans covered only 20-30% of the total redevelopment cost, many residents balked at the economic burden. In 1983, the SCG dropped this project after building units for 2,677 households.

As discussed above, in contrast to the removal policy of the 1960s, in the 1970s the city government adopted new strategies to help low-income people improve their dwellings. However, the program carried a heavy financial burden (land and building costs) for squatter residents. Most sold their priority tickets to the more affluent and moved to the new urban periphery creating new squatter settlements. (Chang Se Hun 1987, 94-95)

JOINT REDEVELOPMENT (1983-1989)

Since 1970, new squatter settlements have developed mainly at Seoul's urban periphery. As idle space at the urban center became in ever shorter supply, the state increasingly turned its attention to this periphery. In the legitimacy crisis triggered by the assassination of President Park in 1980, the relative political strength of the urban poor increased. Seeking to mollify the newly politicized poor and to pacify their protests, the state shifted its renewal policy once again.

The need for urban redevelopment remained urgent. In its search for financing, and jaded by the incomplete success - both political and financial - of the self-help program, the city government now turned to construction capital. (Kang Ch'ung Sik 1984, 332) In the early 1980s, with the collapse of the boom in Mid-East construction (where Korean construction firms had been heavily involved), idle construction capital (manpower and equipment) was looking for domestic investment opportunities.

(Song Chong Hong 1985) From this coincidence a variation of the joint redevelopment strategy [Haptong chaegaebal], already in use in the private sector, emerged. Under this approach, squatter-owners provided housing lots while construction firms covered all other project costs. The state functioned exclusively as manager and supervisor.

Table 2.12 REDEVELOPMENT PROJECTS BY IMPLEMENTATION METHOD
(3/31/87)

CATEGORIES	JOINT REDEVELOPMENT	SELF REDEVELOPMENT AND OTHER
(completed)		
districts	5	54
size (m ²)	154,301	1,712,123
squatter units to be demolished	1,382	12,996
households housed	3,256	13,054
(under construction)		
districts	37	11
size (m ²)	1,139,727	1,656,588
squatter units to be demolished	10,945	9,874
households housed	22,692	8,530
(total)		
districts	42	65
size (m ²)	1,294,028	3,368,711
squatter units to be demolished	12,327	22,870
households housed	25,948	21,584

Source: SCG 1988, 420.

In January 1984, the SCG issued the *Implementation Guidelines for Joint Redevelopment*. Under the guidelines the squatter-owners form a corporation. The corporation selects a construction firm which in turn becomes a member of the corporation. The corporation provides legal squatters with interest-free loans to cover temporary relocation costs and excavates the recent settlement. The firm then builds apartments which exceed in number the original squatter units and sells them to former squatter-owners and the general public. The former owner squatters are entitled by law to buy a unit, subject to their financial ability. The remaining units are made available to the general public by lottery.

The Haptong chaegaebal brought to completion a substantial number of large-scale redevelopment projects. Construction firms and squatter owners participated enthusiastically. What made joint participation possible was the creation of substantial redevelopment profit. Underlying this profit were three factors.

First, in the case of city and public land (most squatter lands are public or city lands), considerable transaction profits resulted from the difference between the disposal price of the city land and market price of surrounding areas. Thus, despite the fact that the initial purpose of the Haptong chaegaebal had been the development of private land, in actuality, joint redevelopment was implemented predominantly on city-owned areas.

Second, a major source of profit was the sale of the units beyond those allotted to the members of the corporation. Accordingly, the construction firms sought to build as many units as possible. They could maximize the redevelopment profit by expanding the total building area and by building compact units in lofty buildings. The SCG loosened somewhat the land and capacity requirements to improve investment perspectives for the construction firms. (Kim Yong Ho 1985, 114)

Finally, there were unrealized redevelopment profits resulting from the long fallow state of the land and the prolonged lack of development activity. In the process of Seoul's expansion many designated redevelopment areas were not developed while most private peripheral areas were developed. The development of the areas surrounding the squatter settlements had increased the value of squatter land itself.

Construction firms were able to make additional profit as a result of reductions in overhead associated with the remobilization of manpower and equipment idled by the decline of their role in overseas construction, notably in the Mid East. The concentration of population and buildings resulting in the shortage of housing land increased the development utility of the urban periphery. Furthermore, the cost of investment necessary for buying land was reduced as a result of state intervention in land transactions. The construction firms could buy at a low price because most squatter land was owned by the city. Finally, the relaxation of

the building code allowed construction firms to build tall apartments and thus increase profits. (Chu Chong Won 1984, 30)

The SCG profited from the sale of its lands and from the creation of a new tax base. In addition, as the major actors in the project were the residents and the construction firms, the government avoided the onus of direct participation in the project.

Table 2.13 COMPARISON OF RESIDENTS' ECONOMIC BURDEN UNDER HAPTONG CHAEGAEBAL AND SELF-HELP UPGRADING (WON)
(for a person with 100m² of land)

	HAPTONG CHAEGAEBAL	SELF-HELP UPGRADING
land	exchange land for apt worth 60-70% of the land	exchange land 91m ² (75+16) (decreasing rate of 25%)
building	apt (82m ²)	second floor house (91m ²)
occupying cost	5,250,000 (the cost of increased 16m ²)	18,700,000 (construction cost + increased land of 16m ²)
loan	5,000,000	5,000,000
resident's burden	250,000	13,700,000

Source: Kang Ch'ung Sik 1984, 331.

Finally, the Haptong chaegaebal reduced residents' economic burden. As shown in Table 2.13, unlike the self-help redevelopment program, the Haptong chaegaebal distributed a part of the redevelopment profit to residents. Furthermore, the construction firms gave five million won to the residents as a

subsidy for moving, an amount sufficient to defray an important fraction of the cost of new lodging. Many also made substantial profit reselling their apartment.

Of course, the residents' interests and those of the construction firms did not coincide precisely; there was competition between them for the development profit. Whereas under the relocation program, where the major line of conflict was between the state and the residents, in the Haptong chaegaebal, on the contrary, the conflict was between the residents and the construction firms, that is, between small land owners and real estate capital. However, in the joint redevelopment effort the competitors were in an "interdependent conflict relation" since the redevelopment and its profit could be created only by their joint action. The conflict was not overt, however. Construction firms would entice some residents to form a steering committee to gain a foothold in the redevelopment process and a vehicle for the pursuit of their interests once a project was launched. (So Chung Sok 1986, 395-399) While the redevelopment corporation and construction firm were thus in relatively close interest alignment, the conflict among residents and between residents and the corporation was intensified.

Participation of resident squatter owners was facilitated by at least three policy measures: 1) the priority ticket that gave rights of acquisition, 2) the allocation of small parcels of land (7-10 p'yong) that could be sold, and 3) the five million won loan.

However, the preference of the construction firms for larger, more profitable apartment units priced many residents out of the market. Typically, the resident squatters could not carry the loan nor could they afford the monthly management fees. As a result, most residents sold their apartment rights and moved to other squatter settlements.

Table 2.14A RELOCATION PATTERN OF SQUATTERS
KURO-1ST-DISTRICT

BEFORE- AFTER-	OWNERS	TENANTS	TOTAL
owner	30 (68.2%)	9 (13.2%)	39 (34.8%)
tenant	10 (22.7%)	59 (86.8%)	69 (61.6%)
temporary staying	4 (9.1%)		4 (3.6%)
TOTAL	44 (39.2%)	68 (60.8%)	112 (100%)

Table 2.14B RELOCATION PATTERN OF SQUATTERS
CH'ONHO-1ST-DISTRICT

BEFORE- AFTER-	OWNER	TENANT	TOTAL
owner	31(75.6)	6(9.0)	37(34.3)
tenant	5(12.2)	61(91.0)	66(61.1)
temporary staying	5(12.2)		5(4.6)
total	41(38.0)	67(62.0)	108 (100)

Source: Kim U Chin 1985, 55-56.

As shown in Table 2.14, while 10% of the residents remained in the development, most left. In the case of Kuro-1st-district 68% and in the case of Ch'onho-1st-district 76% left the development, usually buying a house in an illegal district. In the

Kuro-1st-district, 23% and in the Ch'onho-1st-district, 12% moved to other, mostly illegal lodging on a rental basis.

The squatter owners thus received some benefit from the disposition of their rights tickets. The tenant squatters had no analogous benefit. Indeed they suffered a number of disadvantages. First, as the number of squatter settlements shrank, so did their rental options. Moreover, unlike houses, the apartments were not suitable for expansion or remodeling. Finally, the political and social solidarity of tenants and owners retreated as that of owners and construction firms advanced, broadening with its advance the political and economic foundations of the burgeoning middle class. The joint redevelopment policy splited the interest between squatter-owners and tenants. Squatter tenants may occupy more favorable position in the negotiation with the government and construction firms if they can delay the construction work longer. Meanwhile, the value of priority ticket may depend on the speed of construction work.

In brief, in spite of advantages to the owner/members of the corporation, their limited income and resources made resale of their apartment rights the rational choice for most of them. Tenants, whose only benefit was a small moving subsidy and excluded from membership in the corporation, were forced to renew their search for housing. The greatest benefit was to the construction firms and to the city through the expansion of its tax base. The anger and resentment of the tenants grew along

with their political identity and cohesiveness, eventually erupting into protests as in 1985 and 1986 in Sanggye-dong and Mok-dong respectively. Later chapters will examine these cases in detail.

Chapter Three

An Overview of Korean Research

In Korea, especially Seoul, squatter settlements have been one of major policy issues facing city government. Between 1950 and 1970, squatter settlements formed rapidly in such major cities of Korea as Seoul, Pusan, Taegu, Kwangju (in Chonna Province) and Inch'on. As discussed in chapter two, this phenomenon was the coincidence of rapid economic growth, mainly through export-oriented economic policy which needed cheap labor, and extreme rural poverty. Since Kwangju-daedanji protest of 1971, and especially in the 1980s, urban squatter protests against renewal policies have become extensive in Korea. Among most large-scale squatter protests were Mok-dong and Sanggye-dong protests.

There have been some studies of squatter settlements in Korea, mostly in Seoul. They studied real conditions of squatters such as household income, age, education, sex, period of duration, job, and origin. They also provide considerable data on squatters' demands and their life styles such as what they ask of city governments and how they find jobs and how they communicate with each other. Their studies focused on static living conditions of poor squatters and administrative technics to solve them. We will review the Korean research squatter settlements and related topics like urbanization, urban poverty and urban protests that has been done over the last two decades.

Many scholars in Korea study squatter settlements as a part of urbanization. This line of researcher views demographic transition as a major cause of urban problems like squatter settlements. They see urban problems as natural result of rapid migration to the cities. Their research focuses on urbanization resulting from the interaction of rapid migration and population policy restraining migration. Edwin Mills and Song Byung Nak, in their book *Urbanization and Urban Problems*, argue that since rapid urbanization causes such urban problems as squatter settlements, the major task for government is to prevent it. Mills and Song insist that the rapid economic development of the sixties and seventies and the consequent concentration of urban factories led to rapid urbanization. Kim Dai Young and John E. Sloboda, in their "Migration and Korean Development," argue that migration supported to the rapid Korean economic development. Kim and Sloboda evaluate migration as having a positive impact on economic development. Kwon Tae Hwan, in his book *Han'gugui ingut'onggye* [Demography of Korea: Population Change and Its Components, 1926-60], argues that rural poverty, economic growth, and the Korean War led to rapid migration. Focusing on population change, he argues that governments should adopt strong policies which prevent rural migration to the cities.

Several studies focus on squatter settlements as a particular form of urban poverty. The Administration Survey Institute of Graduate School of Public Administration, Seoul National University

did two large-scale surveys of squatter settlements in Seoul in 1976 and 1982. The institute published a final report, edited by professor Yu Hun, *Yongsemin silt'aejosawa chongch'aek panghyange kwanhan yon'gu* [A Survey of Urban Poor's Conditions and Its Policy Direction]. These surveys focused on descriptive and demographic aspects of poor people in Seoul, asking who they are, what they are doing, and what they are asking of the city government. They took a place-centered position on urban development policy. The survey institute proposed expansion of employment opportunities and removal of squatter dwellings. They emphasized city beautification, the development of urban infrastructure, and housing construction on the substandard housing sites. This survey institution also published a casebook, *Han'guk haengjong saryejip* [The Casebook of Korean Administration], including urban redevelopment projects like the Seoul citizen apartment project. In this book, they focus on mayoral leadership style, administrative organizations, and communication in shaping urban policies.

Under the direction of professor Ro Chong Hyon, the Institute of Urban Studies and Development of Yonse University did several studies of squatter settlements in Seoul focusing on social and economic life of squatters as rural-urban migrants. They studied the form of squatter settlements historically and squatters' social and employment networks. The institute found that squatters have very active informal networks for their social

and economic life. In *Rural-urban Migrants, Squatter Settlements and Low-income Housing Policy*, they suggest construction of low-income rental apartment for urban poor people.

Brandt studied migrants' economic assimilation and the nature of their settlement in Seoul. (1969 and 1973) His study showed that independent entrepreneurship was a channel of upward mobility for urban poor in Seoul. Brandt stated that in Seoul, "for the migrant struggling to maintain his family in the slum, a store of his own is a constant dream ... Without skills or education, [small-scale commerce] is the one area where every country-man feels qualified to seek his fortune." (1969, 14) In Seoul, on average, recent migrants had a narrower network of contacts than natives. Therefore, they inclined to jobs requiring few skills. Brandt indicated that in Seoul, aside from seasonal construction work, "carrying heavy loads in the marketplace, pushing hand carts, running errands, or attaching oneself to a skilled worker or shop owner as an unpaid apprentice all require some sort of special entree." (1973, 13) He argued that rural-to-urban movement provided an escape from the parochial and relatively powerless rural status system to the system which controls economic, social and political resources. (1970/71, 36)

Brandt found that the classic "culture of poverty" in slum settlements in Seoul in the early 1970s had entirely changed in the later 1970s. Instead, the energetic pursuit of upward mobility prevailed. (1978) Most squatters tended to be upwardly mobile.

They had a dramatic improvement in terms of living standard, physical comforts, and morale during the 1970s. (1982, 22-23)

Cho Un and Cho Ok Ra (1987) took an anthropological approach in studying urban squatter settlements. They chose Sadang squatter settlement as a case and focus on the life of urban squatters. They study daily life of squatters such as social and economic networks by adopting participatory observation approach. They found that squatters are not "marginal" and their informal social and economic networks are efficient. They suggest that governments adopt site improvement methods rather than removal because squatters have ability to improve their sites if governments legalize their squatter settlements.

Ha Seong Kyu, in his Ph.D. dissertation *"State-Developed Housing in Korea: A Case Study from Seoul,"* analyzed Seoul city government's public housing development by looking at three public housing projects. He concluded that public housing project suffers from low-quality, high pricing, and limited access to housing loans for low-income people. He suggests that site improvement strategy and low-rental public housing are better than current public housing program for low-income people. He found squatters able to improve their sites and suggested that government policy should foster and support such efforts rather than seeking removal of squatters.

Kim Won, in his Ph.D. dissertation *"A Study of National New Town Development Policy in Korea,"* analyzed the planning process of the Kwangju new town project. He reviewed several alternative planning methods and suggested one that includes residents. He criticized Kwangju new town project by arguing that the project had wrong planning procedures. He argued that participatory planning would produce good results, and administrative cooperation and integration are precondition for good planning.

These studies contributed to the decision-making by city officials, providing data on the conditions of squatters. Their studies failed, however, to analyze dominant actors who shaped renewal policies and dynamic relationships between implementers and squatters. They also failed to examine who benefited from renewal policies and who was victim of the policies.

More recently, a radical approach to the analysis of urban poverty attempted to by some young scholars and advocates applying a neo-Marxist approach to the analysis of urban poverty. They argue that Korean capitalist structure and its dependency on "center" countries like the United States are the fundamental causes of urban poverty. Ho Sok Ryol, in *Tosi muhoga chongch'akchiui koyonggujoe kwanhan ilgoch'al* [A Study on the Employment Structure in Urban Squatter Settlements], examines the economic structure of squatters, focusing on the exploitation of squatters by Korea's capitalist mode of production. His main argument is that idle urban workers are a necessary condition for

dependent Korean capitalist economic structure. He argues that without the transformation of fundamental economic structure the urban poor will continue impoverished.

Some advocates such as Chong Tong Ik and Kim Yong Sok argue that an authoritarian political regime and monopoly capital are partially responsible for urban poverty. Chong Tong Ik, in his book *Tosibinmin yon'gu* [A Study on the Urban Poor], criticizes Korean monopoly capitalism and the military dictatorship for its exploitation of urban poor. Kim Yong Sok, in his book *Tosibinminnon* [A Theory on Urban Poverty], argues that the cheap labor provided by the urban poor was the primary fuel of Korean economic growth. He insists that the distribution of economic wealth is very skewed and the state maintains this income inequality.

The Catholic and Protestant Churches have engaged in education and mobilization of squatters. As part of this effort, they have surveyed many squatter settlements by participatory observation. They have chronicled squatters' social and economic condition and their struggle against renewal policies. The Kidokkyo Tosibinmin Son'gyo Hyobuihoe [The Christian Mission Committee for Urban Poor], in its databook *Tosibinmin ch'olgo t'ujaeng charyojip of 1987* [A Databook of Urban Poor People's Struggle against Renewal Policy of 1987], has recorded the events in the squatters' struggle against what the Committee sees as a brutal renewal policy. The Han'guk Kidokkyo Sahoemunje

Yon'guwon [The Institute of Korea Christian Social Problems], in its book *Minjungui him, minjungui kyohoe* [People's Power and People's Church], records all the activities of Christian dissident groups on behalf of urban poor and views urban poverty as a natural result of military dictatorship. The Institute argues that dissolution of the dictatorship is the only solution to urban poverty. The Han'guk Kyohoe Sahoe Son'gyo Hyobuihoe [The Korean Church Social Mission Committee] published *Mok-dong kongyong kaebalgwa chuminundong sagonui chonmo* [Mok-dong Public Development and Story of Squatters' Struggle] in 1985, which records the history of the public development and protest occurring in Mok-dong. Chonjugyo & Kaesin'gyo Chaegaebaljiyok Kongdongjosa Wiwonhoe [The Joint Investigation Committee of Catholic and Protestant Church on Renewal Districts] published *Tobong-gu Sanggye-5-dong 173 ponji chaegaebaljiyok chosabogoso* [A Survey Report on the Sanggye-5-dong Renewal District] of 1986, which records contents of the renewal project and protest process. They conclude that without such compensations as low-rental apartment or low-interest long-term housing loans the Seoul city government should stop removal and squatter protests should be leveled up to joint movement with labor workers.

Lately, some students have tried to explain the origin and dynamic process of squatter settlements and protests taking structural approach. Chang Se Hun, in his Master's Thesis, *Toai muhoga chongch'akchi ch'olgo chongbi chongch'aegi kwanhan*

ilyon'gu [A Study on the Squatter Settlement Clearance Policy in Seoul], argues that the policy of squatter settlement clearance stems from government's interest in land speculation. Yun Il Song, in his Master's Thesis, *Seoul-si tosimjaegae bale taehan chongch'i kyongjehakchok punsok* [Urban Renewal in Seoul: As Viewed from the Perspective of Political Economy], examined urban renewal policy, focusing on the distribution of development profits. He concluded that most development profits go to the city government and the large construction firms contracted to develop public lands.

Taking the Mok-dong squatter protest as a case, Lee Tuk Yon focused on the causes and growth of the protest in his Master's Thesis, *Tosi kaebaljiyok ch'olgomin undongui chon'gae yangsang* [A Study on the Pattern of Urban Social Movements in Seoul, Korea: The Mok-dong Case]. His argument is that local rather than outside leaders played the more important role in mobilizing protest. He concluded that the major resource of the protest movement was voluntary participation of squatters who perceived action to be in their self-interest. In a recent article (Lee Tuk Yon, 1986), Lee argues that today's urban social movements tend to be more systematic and strategic than past ones. However, urban social movements are still narrow in scope. Urban social movements should go one step further to engage in political struggle, jointly with other squatters and movements.

Some journalists reported squatter protests and criticized the government for its brutal exercise of control. Their reports strengthened the interest of the general public in the issue of squatter settlements. Park Ki Chong and Park T'ae Son vividly reported the Kwangju-daedanji protest of 1971. Mun Myong Ho and Ch'ae Kwang Sok reported the Mok-dong squatter protest of 1983 in *Sindong-A* and *Hyonsilgwa chonmang I*. Chang Song Uk reported the Sanggye-dong squatter protest of 1987 in several major newspapers. They all criticized government for its brutal control and land speculation.

Despite some studies focused on the dynamic process of protests, most studies have been descriptive rather than analytical. The Ch'onjugyo Tosibinmin Samok Hyobuihoe [The Catholic Church's Urban Mission Committee] has done research on squatter protests. Their study provided vivid descriptions of the squatter protest and its chronological events, that is, how many participate, what they request and how they resist. This study, however, only provides a description of events rather than a causal explanation.

Most studies of protests failed to connect renewal policies with squatter protests and as a result to analyze the protest phenomenon as a whole. They failed to compare squatter protests in different times and as a result disregarded such political dimensions as change of government reaction to protests and as change of squatter movement strategies over time. Finally, it

should be mentioned that previous studies on squatter protests failed to examine the impact of protests on renewal policies and housing policies as a whole.

Government agencies surveyed urban squatter settlements and reported it to the city government. Korea National Land Development Institute (KNLDI) analyzed the impact of urban renewal policy. KNLDI, in its report *Chut'aek ch'olgo chongch'aui yonghyange kwanhan yon'gu* [A Study of the Impact on the Housing Clearance and Removal Policy], employed cost-benefit analysis in the impact evaluation of renewal policy. It concluded that housing clearance and development will give large development profits to the state. Its evaluation relied heavily on direct economic factors rather than indirect social factors. Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements (KRIHS) studied renewal policy techniques and suggested public housing construction on the sites which squatter settlements were removed. In its report, *Final Report on Housing Policy Development Research*, the corporation evaluated several development techniques and found public housing the best strategy to resolve the housing shortage.

The dominant ideology of city governments on squatter settlements was that squatter settlements were illegal and as a result had no right to ask anything of city governments. City-beautification was the major slogan of urban development. In the absence of local elections for mayors local governments paid little attention to squatters' preferences. Recently, the administration

of Roh Tae Woo has, in response to squatters, considered adopting local elections for mayor and other local political officers.

Squatters represent roughly one third of the voters in Seoul.

Previously, the lack of local elections meant that opposition parties had a weak political connection to squatters. As Roh's

administration considers local elections, opposition political parties

and the ruling party have both begun to show more interest in

squatter settlements. The national government has begun a new

project to construct low cost housing in several major cities,

including Seoul.

P A R T I I

C A S E S T U D I E S

OVERVIEW OF CASES

Part II discusses three cases of squatter clearance, resettlement, and development, those of Kwangju-daedanji, Mok-dong, and Sanggye-dong. In each case the text provides relevant geographical and demographic background, describes government policy and its implementation, and analyzes the outcome in terms of the group and situational dynamics of each case. This overview of the three cases should be helpful in preparing the reader for details of the cases which follow.

Kwangju-daedanji

In 1968, the Kwangju area, known today as Songnam, was an undeveloped agricultural area of mostly hilly districts with narrow roads about 26 km. south from the center of Seoul and 3.5 km. outside its boundary. Surrounded by Mt. Namhan and Mt. Chomdan, it lies adjacent to the T'anchon (Small T'an river). To relieve the pressure on land in Seoul and to free it for development, the city government planned to relocate here 550,000 squatters from Seoul. The land was to be built up and each squatter household was to receive 20 p'yong. The total area at issue was approximately 3.5 million p'yong (about 9,900,000 m²),

small compared to other new towns; one-sixth the acreage of Columbia near Baltimore, one-third that of Dama in Tokyo, and only 2% of that of Richfield Park in Phoenix.

The Kwangju new town development was immediately problematic. First, the Seoul City government deposited squatters into Kwangju-daedanji without providing such urban services as water and transportation. Second, the relocation of squatters en masse resulted in a sharp increase in the local labor supply and corresponding demand for employment opportunities, which the city government failed to generate or induce. Third, most of the displaced squatters returned to Seoul rather than remain in Kwangju-daedanji. They sold the 20 p'yong of land provided by the SCG to speculators through real estate agents. Speculators resold the land to new migrants attracted by the expected prosperity of the new town. Finally, there was administrative conflict between the governments of Seoul and Kyonggi Province. By location, Kwangju-daedanji belonged to Kyonggi province, but the new town plan was carried out exclusively by Seoul.

As time passed, the situation worsened. For the newcomers, mostly poor, food, limited local employment opportunities and poor access to Seoul led to complaints, grievance and anger. Guided and in part mobilized by the Protestant Church, they formed a resident activist association.

On August 10, 1971 a violent protest occurred. Residents wanted the land price cut back to its previous level, provision of emergency relief programs, reduction or suspension of all taxes, and finally, creation of work opportunities. Protesters destroyed government office buildings and a local police station; many people were injured. In the end, the city government acceded to all the residents' demands.

Mok-dong

By 1980 Mok-1st-dong, in southwest Seoul, was an area of roughly two square miles consisting of largely public land with a small fraction of private holdings. The area consisted primarily of squatter settlements (on both public and private lands) housing a total population of approximately 23,000 people (or 4.7 thousand households). The squatters had been resettled by the SCG either from squatter settlements in central Seoul (It'aewon, Ich'on-dong, Sungin-dong, Taebang-dong, Taesin-dong) following squatter clearance activity initiated by the public lands law of 1964, or at later dates from less central areas (Yoido, Chungryangch'on, and Ch'onggyech'on) as Seoul had expanded.

In 1983, Mok-dong was one of the largest remaining undeveloped areas in the western part of Seoul, where development had lagged generally. As part of a strategy to balance development throughout the metropolitan area, the Seoul city government announced, in 1983, the Mok-dong redevelopment

plan. Under the plan the city government intended to increase housing stock to alleviate the housing shortage in Seoul, to raise revenues, and to engage in a program of city beautification.

The Seoul city government began removal of the squatters. With the help and under the influence of outside groups, notably the Catholic and Protestant Church, squatters began to organize and eventually to resist. Moved by their sense of inequity and cognizant of the success of earlier protests (at Kwangju-daedanji and of the citizen apartment movement), the squatters moved steadily toward firmer action.

The government offered both tenant squatters and owner squatters moving expenses; only the latter, compensation for buildings. The squatters held that they had a strong claim on the land inasmuch as the government had itself earlier resettled them in Mok-dong. Hence compensation and land rights became a focal issue. Owner squatters requested compensation for moving costs, buildings and a priority ticket for an apartment. Tenant squatters requested compensation for moving costs and a priority ticket for one room in an apartment. Their requests were rejected by the government.

The protests initiated in 1983 continued for two years. The SCG rapidly agreed to the demands of the owners. The government's failure to meet the demands of the tenants led to radical protests supported by the Catholic & Protestant Church

and student organizations. In 1985 the government acquiesced to the tenants' requests.

Sanggye-dong

In 1968 Sanggye-dong was located to the northeast of Seoul. It had been resettled when the government had cleared squatters from Hannam-dong, Ch'onggyech'on, and other squatter settlements at the center of Seoul twenty years earlier. In 1968, Sanggye-dong, at the urban periphery, had been poorly linked to downtown Seoul. With the announcement of the government's plan to construct subway line-4, the value of land in Sanggye-dong soared.

In 1985, the city government adopted a plan to redevelop Sanggye-dong. It had three main reasons. First, it expected handsome revenues from the development of the area, especially with the additional value the new subway line contributed. Second, the new dwelling units would help to reduce the housing shortage. Third, it would further the government's city-beautification schemes, of great current importance with many foreign visitors expected for the 1988 Olympic Games.

The city government adopted the Joint Redevelopment mode [Haptong chaegaebal]. This strategy differed from the Public Management Development [Kongyong kaeбал] used in the redevelopment of Mok-dong. Under this new strategy, a corporation, consisting of a construction firm and owner squatters,

took entire responsibility for the project. The city was thus able to distance itself from implementation.

According to the plan, in 1986, Han'guk konop, a large construction firm selected by owner squatters, began demolition of Sanggye-dong squatter dwellings. The owner squatters were eager for the project; they received a priority ticket for the purchase of an apartment along with compensation for moving expenses and their buildings. The tenant squatters were less eager, however. Their only compensation was for moving expenses. As the corporation took action to demolish the squatter units, tenants resisted removal, initiating requests for a priority ticket for rental or purchase of one room in an apartment or for the provision of another site to resettle near Seoul.

After intensive protests, the corporation yielded, offering Tonggyo-ri P'och'on in Kyonggi province as a resettlement site. This offer split the resistance into two warring factions: one accepting the offer, the other rejecting it. Eventually, the former moved to Tonggyo-ri. The latter continued to protest in favor of a priority ticket or a resettlement site near Seoul. The Catholic Church again supported their protest, as did student organizations. Their protest continued for two years without moving the government to meet their demands. In the end, the Catholic Church provided a site.

Chapter Four

Kwangju-daedanji

REGIONAL BACKGROUND

Population

As of 1981, Songnam City, with its population of 388,202, ranked first in Kyonggi province and ninth in all Korea. (See table 4-1.) Before the construction of the new town in 1968 the city's population was only 25,719. The town was developed not as a satellite of the central city, but predominantly as a mechanism for the resettlement of the squatter residents of Seoul. It was

Table 4.1 POPULATION OF KOREA'S MAJOR CITIES
(12/31/80)

CATEGORY CITY	AREA (km ²)	NO. OF HOUSEHOLD	NO. OF POP.	POPULATION DENSITY (km ²)
Seoul	627.06	1,847,877	8,366,756	13,343
Pusan	432.72	690,126	3,160,276	7,303
Taegu	179.79	364,268	1,607,458	8,941
Inch'on	201.13	244,610	1,084,730	5,393
Kwangju*	213.38	152,730	727,627	3,410
Taejon	87.36	127,431	651,642	7,459
Maasan	72.46	84,168	386,773	5,338
Chonju	106.26	72,857	366,924	3,454
Mokp'o	35.13	46,645	221,856	6,315
Sumon	84.25	71,154	310,757	3,688
Songnam	141.72	86,325	376,447	2,656
Ulsan	179.95	93,705	418,415	2,325

Source: Songnam-si 1982, 68.

* Kwangju City in Chonna province.

intended eventually to accommodate 100,000 households, at a rate of 20 p'yong per household; in fact, when the program came to an abrupt halt in the summer of 1971, roughly 24,000 households had been relocated to the area.

Table 4.2 POPULATION GROWTH OF SONGNAM CITY
1966-1981 (Dec.)

CATEGORY	YEAR	NO. OF HOUSEHOLD	NO. OF POP.	INCREASING RATE(%)	POP. DENSITY
before- project	1966	4,413	26,129	3.5	202.3
	1967	4,236	25,759	-1.3	200.7
	1968	4,256	25,719	-0.2	200.1
after- project	1969		35,480	37.9	284.6
	1970		96,236	168.5	748.1
	1971	33,637	159,275	65.5	1,231.8
	1972	35,176	165,557	3.9	1,288.3
after- elevated to the status of city	1973	39,980	190,580	15.1	1,482.9
	1974	47,007	227,178	19.0	1,767.8
	1975	58,000	272,329	19.0	2,119.2
	1976	59,341	284,946	4.8	2,112.9
	1977	64,443	307,668	7.9	2,208.8
	1978	68,587	324,064	5.3	2,286.6
	1979	74,535	345,314	6.6	2,436.5
	1980	86,325	376,447	9.0	2,656.2
	1981	86,533	388,202	3.1	2,744.2

Source: Songnam-si 1982, 71-72.

The growth of the population took place in four stages. (See table 4.2) In the decade before development, the population had been constant: 25,356 in 1962, 25,207 in 1965, 26,129 in 1966, and 25,719 in 1968. Following construction, the population increased sharply. In comparison with the preceding year the population increased 38% in 1969, 168.5% in 1970, and 65.5% in 1971. From 1968 to 1971, the population increased over six-fold. With the

violent community protests of August 1971 growth came to an abrupt, although temporary halt, increasing at the rate of only 3.9% from 1971 to 1972. However, with the elevation of the town to the status of city in 1973, growth resumed. Growth rates were 15%, 19% and 19% in 1973, 1974, and 1975. In response to this explosion, the government initiated the May 4th measure, tightening resettlement in Songnam. From 1976 to 1981, population growth was in the range of four to nine percent.

While the project was originally conceived as a mechanism for squatter resettlement from Seoul, most squatters did not remain, but moved back to Seoul after selling their allotted lands to realtors. This fact is shown in table 4-3. The rapid population growth of 1969 was caused mainly by the influx of squatters from

Table 4.3 THE COMPOSITION OF POPULATION
(9/30/1971)

COMPOSITION CATEGORY	TOTAL	NATIVE	RELOCATED	MOVING-IN
households	30,771	1,046	8,995	20,730
population	139,367	4,770	41,596	93,001
composition	100%	3.4%	29.8%	66.8%

Source: Songnam-si 1982, 73.

Seoul. After the decline of squatter relocation, associated with the 1971 community movement, population growth was the result mainly almost exclusively of non-squatter resettlement, driven in

part by heavy advertising by the SCG. As of 1971, the city population was composed of 3.4% natives, 30% relocated squatters, and 67% non-squatter resettlement.

The annual increases in population do not tell the whole story. For the period 1973-1981, as table 4.4 shows, the annual increase is the difference between very large in-migration and surprisingly high out-migration. The ratio of out- to in-migration in this period never falls below two-thirds and reaches near parity in 1981 when 92,842 people move into the city while 90,925 left it. In the later years of the period, 20-25% of the city's total population turned over annually.

Table 4.4 ANNUAL POPULATION TRANSFORMATION
1973-1981

CATEGORY YEAR	MOVING-IN	MOVING-OUT	NET INCREASE
1973	54,103	35,710	18,393
1974	62,823	37,317	25,506
1975	99,506	58,952	40,554
1976	93,814	69,588	24,226
1977	100,689	82,443	18,246
1978	108,155	89,243	18,912
1979	94,390	82,147	12,243
1980	102,666	94,002	8,664
1981	92,842	90,925	1,917

Source: Songnam-si 1982, 78.

Socio-economic and Political Characteristics

Before construction of the new town, 90% of the natives were farmers who marketed their produce for the most part in Seoul. About eight percent worked in the service industry.

Incomes in the area were a little higher than the national average, but otherwise the socio-political characteristics here were similar to those of other rural areas. With the new-town development, these characteristics changed dramatically.

The SCG's first step in building the new town was to exercise the right of eminent domain to buy lands owned by natives of the area.

The massive influx of relocated squatters rapidly transformed the area's social profile. In 1974, the unemployment rate was 53.9%. Of those employed, 26.2% worked in the agriculture, 7.0% in manufactures, and 66.8% in the services. This was radical transformation in the composition of industry compared to the one of before-project. (Songnam-si 1982, 345-346) The registration of allotted land shows that in the early years about 80% of the residents were new, and it should be noted, poor. Accordingly, they were not able to improve the condition of their living space. To make matters worse, the violent protests of August 10 made people fear investing in improvements.

With elevation to the status of city, planned by the city government, this situation changed rapidly. From 1973 on, most new settlement consisted of middle-income people with stable jobs in Seoul while low-income groups constituted the out-migration. This led to the economic recovery of the city, the accompanying

housing construction boom, increased savings, and rising retail trade.

Songnam city, in fact, was created in a day. Some 90% of the residents were new to the area and came from many areas of the nation. As a result, there was little regional sentiment and social networks were underdeveloped.

Urban Services

Before the creation of the new town, Songnam, like other rural areas, lacked many services like water and sewage systems. This condition was not problematic for the original natives who found the many wells and narrow roads adequate for drinking and transportation. Not so with the newcomers. The peculiar timing of the project which scheduled resettlement before the development of urban infrastructure created hardships for those resettled from other urban environments. Many were forced to live in temporary tents or makeshift shelters, without water, sewage and electrical facilities. As bus service to Seoul was both infrequent and slow, newcomers were isolated from their daily job market. As few of the proposed industries had actually begun operation in the area, local employment opportunities were scarce. A large majority of relocated families went back to squatting or doubling up with relatives in Seoul. (Park Ki Chong 1971, 171-172) The vivid description of the life (Seoul-sinmun, May 2, 1969) was as:

In rainy season, the replaced people are under pain, and show hostility to the authority due to the lack of any public facilities. They were all housed in shacks or tents. As of February 1969, about 7,000 people were replaced and housed in 277 tents and 215 shacks with 12 public walls and 12 conventional public toilets. In the rainy season, an epidemic was spread to the residents and some of them were very sick. One year after relocation, many people got colitis as a result of drinking contaminated water from a brook. As a consequence, many have sold their share of land to realtors at very low prices and returned to Seoul.

A second newspaper (Kyonghyang-sinmun, June 3, 1970)

wrote:

281 resettled persons suffer from colitis and have received no aid for five days. Some are in critical condition. Residents drink water from wells contaminated by run-off. Twenty-seven wells have been dug near a contaminated brook. Vermin are visible in the wells. According to Mr. Park Chung Sik, a local resident, many people, especially children and the elderly, are suffering from contagious diseases. But, the authorities are not providing any help, not even water to drink. According to another resident, Mr. Kim Hyon, about half of those resettled here could not tolerate such painful conditions and have left after selling their share of land (20 p'yong) to realtors at very low prices (40,000-60,000 won).

In sum, the SCG failed to provide for minimally satisfactory living conditions for resettled persons and took no account of employment needs either by furnishing adequate transportation to established employment areas or by providing new employment opportunities for the replaced people. Continued advertising of the project sustained a boom which brought substantial benefits to realtors and speculators.

REDEVELOPMENT AND THE TREATMENT OF GWANGJU SQUATTERS

Policy Formulation

The Mayor and the Master Plan

On April 4, 1966 President Park Chung Hee appointed Kim Hyon Ok, an ex-general and former mayor of Pusan, mayor of Seoul. Called the "bulldozer" mayor, the ambitious Mr. Kim had successfully sponsored land subdivision projects during his administration in Pusan. He soon appointed professor Ch'a Il Sok, who had specialized in local government at New York University, as the second deputy mayor for urban development, directly responsible to himself. Most new Seoul development plans, including the Kwangju-daedanji project, were conceived by Mr. Ch'a. (Lee Ki Su 1968, 268, 286-287)

The Twenty-Year Seoul Master Plan, 1967-1986, which they established, was designed to disperse the population of Seoul south of the city through large-scale land subdivision projects. The plan had three major components: 1) the development of satellite towns near Seoul, 2) the renewal of the downtown area, and 3) the metropolitan development of Seoul. (Lee Ki Chu 1966, 66-67) The Kwangju new town project, along with others, was regarded by city officials as an integral part of the development of the Seoul metropolitan area, and thus Seoul city officials

launched a massive publicity campaign for what they called "a western type suburb." (Seoul t'ukpyolsi 1970, 3)

Initially, the projects were subject to dual administration. Seoul, as the landowner, was responsible for land development activities: the sale of lands, construction activities, and relocation of squatters. Social services, the draft, veterans' affairs, teacher recruitment and payroll, construction permits, tax collection, and fire and police protection were considered local responsibilities and were discharged by Kwangju county which was administratively responsible to the Kyonggi provincial government. (Park T'ae Son 1971, 257)

The Master Plan was prepared by Seoul City officials alone without participation of Kwangju county and Kyonggi province. The plan was concerned only with the physical aspects of the town development, Kyonggi province being expected to provide social services as construction proceeded. This arrangement was made because, once relocated, the squatters were technically no longer residents but of Kyonggi province.

During the 1960s, a main feature for improving squatter settlements was the large-scale relocation of the poor to a satellite city. This was known as the Kwangju satellite city, later renamed the Songnam New Town Program, during 1968-71. Adopted by the SCG in 1967, the policy primarily aimed at resettling 550,000 squatters living in Seoul to the newly constructed satellite city

with the provision of housing lots and job opportunities (See table 4.5). It was assumed that the development of Kwangju would stimulate enough economic activity in the town so that it could be self-sufficient, and thus allow Seoul to redevelop its urban center along the lines of the Master Plan. It was further assumed that this development would ultimately contribute to the goal of population decentralization. (Park Ki Chong 1971, 174)

Table 4.5 RELOCATION PLAN
1968-1970

YEAR	NO. OF HOUSEHOLD	NO. OF PEOPLE
1968	17,000	93,500
1969	49,000	269,500
1970	34,000	187,000
TOTAL	100,000	550,000

Source: Songnam-si 1982, 72.

The idea of building the Kwangju new town within the Seoul metropolitan region evolved primarily from Seoul's urgent housing problem. It was hoped that the new town would rehouse most of Seoul's squatters. The SCG had been under heavy pressure of increased demand for space for office buildings, banking facilities, hotels and high-rise apartments since the mid-1960s. City officials were keenly aware that the occupation of land in highly valued area by squatters seriously inhibited further expansion of these facilities. The city also wanted to put these ugly settlements out of the sight of foreign tourists. (Kim Won 1974, 76)

This new town development idea generated wide-spread enthusiasm among planners, architects, and engineers, who were eager to experiment with the British garden city concept in Korea as a solution to urban problems. (Park Ki Chong 1971, 169-170) Through this program, the city government intended to diffuse Seoul's population to the satellite city, to build a self-help city near Seoul, and to construct a new town contributing the development of the capital area. (Lee Sang Min 1971, 25)

The reasons for the selection of Kwangju as a site were several. First, as the land was cheap, the city could afford the acquisition and realize a quick return if the land were sold soon thereafter. The SCG would be able to relocate squatters currently scattered all over the city at no cost, and the land occupied by them could be redeveloped. Furthermore, only 26 km. south of the center of Seoul, the Kwangju could readily be developed into new town. Furthermore, as a hilly area, its conversion would entail only small loss of farmland.

Financing as a Business Project

The large-scale relocation policy started as a business project with an eye to profitability rather than an investment (with national funds) in a construction project.¹ This approach to

¹ The business managerial type employed from 1967 means that the concept of limited fund depending upon city taxes and national aid turns to the concept of developmental budgeting. (Kim Myong Su 1983, 162). In other words, the Government guarantees the profitability as a policy by introducing private capital in

financing was unique. The Kwangju project, which required heavy capital investment, was conceived as a "self-financing" project (Seoul t'ukpyolsi 1970, 47-48), where all financial requirements would be met from the land sales. (See table 4.6 and 4.7)

Table 4.6 EXPENDITURES OF KWANGJU PROJECT
(unit = 1,000 won)

PROJECT	INVESTMENT	PERCENT
land acquisition	1,227,034	13
site improvement	4,214,997	45
water supply	1,186,730	13
sewage system	1,097,944	12
street pavement	500,600	6
others	1,057,947	11
TOTAL	9,285,252	100

Source: Seoul t'ukpyolsi 1970, 21-22.

Table 4.7 REVENUES OF KWANGJU PROJECT
(unit = 1,000 won)

REVENUE SOURCE	REVENUE	PERCENT
sale of residential area	2,223,630	24
sale of holding land	4,997,802	54
sale of industrial parks	657,338	7
sale of public land	654,588	7
others	751,894	8
TOTAL	9,285,252	100

Source: Seoul t'ukpyolsi 1970, 21-22.

constructing urban infrastructure, consequently reducing the city burden in funding those projects. The typical examples were the large-scale land readjustment project at Yongdungp'o area and the project of building the Seun commercial town.

This was an innovation at the time since urban projects had typically been financed in one way or another by the national government. The intent was to relieve the national government of the financial burden. (Son Song Mo 1967, 23-25)

The self-contained new town was to be provided with such facilities as 17 elementary schools, 8 junior high and 5 senior high schools, 2 public health centers, 2 large private hospitals, 72 light industries employing 45,000 workers, and 200 buses running between Seoul and the town. (Seoul t'ukpyolsi 1970, 10)

All capital expenditures were to be met from the sales of land. The sale of residential areas and the holding land was to provide two-thirds of the total capital for building expenditures of which the sale of land alone was to generate nearly half of the total capital. Rapid acceleration of land prices was clearly in the city's fiscal interest. Accordingly, the large-scale relocation policy was adopted as the best policy by the city government because the SCG could deal with such urban problems as urban poverty and squatter settlements without incurring additional financial burdens.

Business Managerial Policy and Land Use

The business managerial policy appeared with the designation of Kwangju as the site for the new town development. The SCG selected Chungbu-myon, Kwangju-gun, adjacent to Seoul, in order to gain the development profits resulting from low land

costs and the high ratio of public to private land. The Chungbu-myon was not suitable for housing construction because the adjacent area was mostly hillsides and fields. (Songnam-si 1982, 45-48) The site was not attractive to wealthy Seoul residents since transportation to and from Seoul was poor. Moreover, the sole local artery between Seoul and the town was inadequate for the heavy flow of materials required initially for the construction. To the south of the town, there were no urban centers near Kwangju with which to exchange goods and services.

Zoning regulations, building acts, and construction codes based on the City Planning Act of 1962 were put into effect to regulate the development of Kwangju land. Of the total 3.5 million p'yong, 3.2 million p'yong were developable land. Nearly half of this land was designated for residential use, and housing lots were sliced into 20 p'yong parcels for each family.

Table 4.8 LAND USE OF KWANGJU NEW TOWN

LAND USE	ALLOCATION(p'yong)	PERCENT
residential zone	1,500,000	47
commercial use	530,000	16
industrial zone	320,000	10
public facilities	270,000	8
road	600,000	19
TOTAL	3,220,000	100

Source: SCG 1968, 11.

Public facilities such as schools, health centers, parks and recreation areas were planned on about 8% of the total land. As

shown in table 4.8, 16% of the land was zoned for commercial use. Another 10% of the land was laid out as an industrial district where the national government would relocate 72 light industries. This would provide the prime employment base for the residents.

Industrial Promotion

According to the Master Plan, four criteria were adopted for the selection of industries: prospects for export, the promise of full-capacity operation, labor-intensiveness, and pollution-free production. (Seoul t'ukpyolsi 1970, 8) Strategies for industrial promotion were to speed up industrial site formation by providing infrastructure, electricity, water, and municipal loans.

To this end, a large portion of land, 320,000 p'yong or 10% of the total, was zoned for industrial use. The government planned to build two industrial parks on this land, and it was projected that 72 light industries employing a labor force of 45,000 would be located in the parks, which meant that one of every eight inhabitants was expected to be working in industry. (Seoul t'ukpyolsi 1970, 13-15) In addition, private and other public sector employers were expected to provide a significant number of jobs for residents.

Policy Implementation

The Development Phase

The Kwangju new town was unique in terms of the phasing of development. Rather than building an urban core to provide necessary town services for the early settlers or those relocated from Seoul, city officials relocated squatters in the town before the completion of the town center. The city officials assumed that once people arrived, private investors would be attracted and would build a town center to house business concerns. The land on which the town center was to be built was called a "holding area," and it was held until the price of the surrounding land went up. 530,000 p'yong of land, or 16% of the total land zoned for commercial use, were not put for public sale until the end of 1970, nearly two years after the relocation started. (Park T'ae Son 1971, 270)

Ironically, there was no construction in the center of the town. Since the SCG had neither the resources to provide capital investment for commercial promotion nor the prospect of financial support from the national government, the primary resource was to be the sale of residential land and commercial areas of the town center. The commercial land, which was held in anticipation of a jump in price, accounted for the bulk of the town investment potential.

Relocation

In the late sixties, the city government adopted a policy under which land would be freed for development by relocating

squatters to adjacent suburban areas. In 1969, the Seoul city government started to relocate squatters to the Kwangju area, which was still under construction. In particular, the government sought to fill in the Ch'onggye River in central Seoul in order to allow the construction of the Seun commercial building and apartments. At the time the area was occupied by 2,200 squatter units many of whom had originally settled there as refugees during the Japanese occupation. (Kim Myong Su 1983, 163; Park Ki Chong 1971, 174)

The relocated squatters were housed in temporary tents at the Kwangju area and depended completely on city assistance inasmuch as they were isolated from the work opportunities of the central city.

Based on the plan, the first effort at relocation was made in mid-1969. (See table 4.9) The squatters in the areas of Pongch'on-dong, Sungin-dong, Ch'angsin-dong, Yokch'on-dong, Sangwangsimni-dong, and Hawangsimni-dong were loaded into city-operated trucks and bussed to Kwangju. They arrived with a "town entry ticket" or resident ticket (allotment card), to be used to claim 20 p'yong of land in Kwangju, some cash per family and one tent for every ten families. The relocated people were entitled to receive a small lot of land, average 20 p'yong (720 sq. ft.) upon submitting their entry ticket. (Park T'ae Son 1971, 263)

The exchange of the ticket for land, however, did not take place without charge. The land was distributed by open lottery; the price of a lottery ticket was 40,000 won, repayable at 13,334 won per year over a three year period, following a three year grace period. This last feature was designed to allow residents time to build their houses before having to assume monthly payments; until such time as the resident completed payments, however, the government legally owned the land. If the land rights were sold to a second party, the transaction was considered invalid unless the new owner immediately built on the land. If he did so, the land would be renegotiated with the government later, at the current market value.

Table 4.9 RELOCATION AT THE KWANGJU LARGE-SCALE HOUSING AREA
1968-1971

YEAR	plan		accomplishment	
	HOUSEHOLD	POPULATION	HOUSEHOLD	POPULATION
1968	17,000	93,500		
1969	49,000	269,500	3,031	14,150
1970	34,000	187,000	15,030	72,150
1971			5,631	28,155
TOTAL	100,000	550,000	23,692	114,455

Source: Songnam-si 1982, 72.

As table 4.9 shows, the operation succeeded in moving only 20% of the households originally planned for relocation. This poor performance resulted from short-sighted and incomplete planning. Residents were forced to move into the development site before

construction of the project was completed. As a result, the displaced people had to reside on bare land in tents for months. Water supplies, public toilets, and even roads were scarce, a condition that was worse than it had been in the squatter settlements in Seoul. Therefore, a considerable number of those who moved to the Songnam area left after reselling their rights for new housing lots. (Whang In Chong 1986, 281)

Displaced squatters began to wonder whether the town could live up to the promises of the city officials envisioned in the Master Plan. Some, bitterly disappointed, returned to their old sites in Seoul. While they were returning to squatter settlements in Seoul, new migrants from elsewhere, especially from severely depressed regions of the country, arrived in the town replacing the old inhabitants. In some cases, displaced squatters from Seoul sold their entry tickets to the newly arrived migrants and moved to peripheral areas of Kwangju. (Park T'ae Son 1971, 259) As of 1971, it was believed that 60% of the relocatees had left their lots and either returned to the old squatter settlements in Seoul or moved to the peripheral area of the new town.

The new settlements in the peripheral areas of Kwangju were worse than the housing situation in the town itself. Newly arrived migrants outnumbered the resettled squatters. The rapid turnover of the population created many problems like the question of control over population change with which the town seemed unable to cope.

The population of the town increased at an explosive rate. Most of the new inhabitants were rural migrants from all parts of the country. Radio, TV, and newspaper publicity told of the ticket-land exchange in such a way that many people believed that status as a Seoul squatter automatically entitled one to a free lot in Kwangju. Some rural migrants were relocated to the town after brief residency in Seoul as squatters, and others came directly to the town. Within three years the population of Kwangju reached nearly 200,000.

Financing and Resource Mobilization

The Seoul city government planned to finance development through resale of land in Chungbu-myon. After designating the Chungbu-myon as a target district for the relocation of urban squatters, the SCG asserted right of eminent domain and began to buy up property in private hands. However, conflicts with the local residents as well as budget shortages resulted in land acquisition falling short of plan.²

² At that time, the inhabitants insisted that the cost of paddy field is 400-1,000 won per p'yong and the cost of forest fields was 200 won per p'yong. But, the city government decided that the cost of field is 100-500 won per p'yong. The conflict regarding the land cost created a struggle over changing inhabitants' lands from fields to housing lots. Finally, the land cost was set according to the city government's decision, but 20 percent of paddy fields, except the forest fields were distributed to the each household for exchange for land use. After that, the city government designated the most valuable land adjacent to the central artery as a reserve in order to secure future funds, and designated only hillside areas as land for use exchange. Also see Songnam-si 1982, 246.

Nonetheless, during the three years of implementation the SCG spent 3.8 billion won, just two-thirds of what it had projected for that period, but the actual recapture of revenue through land sale lagged far behind; the SCG raised only 1.2 billion won in three years. Since the 1.2 billion won raised by land sale were expended for capital development in the new town project, out-of-pocket investment in town development was 2.6 billion won. Scrutiny of the budget shows that the 2.6 billion won of initial capital were provided from Seoul City revenues. (Seoul t'ukpyolsi 1970, 5) Thus the Kwangju new town project was carried out from tax revenues levied against the residents of Seoul, rather than with the special funds allocated by the national government as an integral part of the national development plan. Financing through the private sector was extremely limited as the majority of residents in the area were poor.

Project implementation became more vigorous after 1970, particularly after the August 1971 demonstrations by residents in the new town then under construction. The funds mobilized for the period from May 1968 to September 1971 amounted to 3.8 billion won while expenditures for period from August 1971 to July 1972 came to 3.1 billion won. (Whang In Chong 1986, 278-279)

Land Speculation

Through public auctions, some of the commercial land was sold to wealthy Seoulites for 30,000 won to 50,000 won per p'yong.

This was twenty times as high as the price of the residential land sold to the squatters. Because of the lack of developmental incentives and the uncertain future of government commitment, the Seoulites who bought the land in the town center held the commercial land which waiting for another round of price increases instead of building community facilities on it to encourage town growth. (Park Ki Chong 1971, 179)

As a result of the failure of the new owners to invest in development, the population rapidly outstripped the community service facilities and employment opportunities of the area. Industrial development, relocation of industries from Seoul, and the promotion of economic activities were not within the scope of the SCG, but of the national government. After 1970, conditions began to improve. Transportation facilities to Seoul were augmented, the first industries opened, and large-scale public works and private construction began to absorb much of the excess labor. As development began to gain momentum, land values soared and speculation became widespread. However, by this time many of the original settlers had moved out. On the other hand, considerable quantities of land were sold to middle class families and speculators who were forced to build immediately. This was one of the factors responsible for the housing boom that ensued in Kwangju. Contrary to the observations of some, it was not the original settlers who were building houses, but rather middle- or upper-income families and

speculators who had purchased the land from them. (Ha Seong Kyu 1984, 145)

The major economic activity in the town was the sale of land; in fact, most expenditures on site improvement and infrastructure were financed out of the profits from land sales. The transfer of land from old to new squatters provided a great impetus for land speculation and attracted many wealthy Seoulites to invest in land. As land transactions took place, price was pushed upward, and profit was generated without additional improvements. The SCG was retreating from the action and increasingly leaving the future of the area in the hands of speculators. Land acquired for 400 won per p'yong was sold for 60,000 won per p'yong after three years of operation. This price inflation encouraged the relocated squatters to resell their lots. The sustained prospect of profits through resale maintained the climate of speculation with the result that there was little interest in building homes. The dominant attitude was one of "wait and see." In this land transaction game, the new buyers, who bought lots from Seoul squatters, usually paid a double price, one to the middleman and the other to the land owner. (Kim Won 1974, 92-93)

The city officials assumed that if squatters were given land at a cheap price, in addition to some cash and a tent for temporary shelter, they would build their own houses on the lots and settle there. They also assumed that once people started

moving to the town, everything for their "living" environment would be provided by the national government.

Land Speculation and Price Inflation

Housing construction for relocated squatters without self-help plans came to a halt. Therefore, the city government planned to induce real estate speculation capital to invest in the project in order to activate construction. In doing so, first, the government broadly advertised the project to the public and generated social acceptance of land speculation and resale. (Park Ki Chong 1971, 174) Simultaneously, the government acted as real estate speculator by selling land at the rate of 21,000 won per p'yong that it had bought at 150-400 won per p'yong. (Songnam-si 1982, 333; Institute of Urban Studies and Development 1979, 56-61) Consequently, the project was not a new-town jointly constructed by private capital and governmental development investments, but an object of speculation by real estate speculators and a government indifferent to the construction of urban infrastructure.

The Relocation of Industry

To make the relocation of industry possible is essential to provide necessary facilities. The importance of site improvement in Kwangju could be seen in the budget allocation. Of 9.3 billion won of capital expenditure, almost half, or 4.2 billion won, was budgeted for site improvements in which industrial parks had

high priority. As a result, nearly 90% of the industrial sites had been improved as of August 1971, whereas only 50% of the residential land had been improved in the same period. As to the state of employment for the lower income groups in Kwangju, the authority promised to provide various labor-intensive industries, together with a new vocational training center. But it was difficult, if not impossible, to attract such industries under a free market system. (Ha Seong Kyu 1984, 146) Industrial relocation lagged far behind.

This indicated that most industries in Seoul were reluctant to relocate their plants in the Kwangju industrial parks not only because there was no national policy to redistribute manufacturing activities, but also because the site was not attractive to industry. Since the town was located south of Seoul with no railroad or major highway to facilitate the movement of final products, the costs of transporting materials to and from the town, was in part responsible for the indifference to the new location.

It was uncertain how many new jobs would be provided. As of August 10, 1971, some 1,500 estimated members of the labor force under 18, mostly young women, were working in four factories. Meanwhile, there were at one time 2,000 real estate offices, competing with each other for prospective land investors. There were also an unknown number of related businesses such as taverns, bars, restaurants, and cheap hotels that could not

provide a viable economic base for the new town. (Kim Won 1974, 91-92)

Problems

Some basic points with regard to the new town experience should be noted. First of all, the project was hastily prepared and corruptly executed by the inexperienced planners of Mayor Kim's administration. As discussed above, infrastructural considerations were totally ignored in the development of Kwangju. More importantly, the potential contribution of the squatters' skills to the development of resettlement projects was not explored in the process of development. As Kim Won (1974, 102-103) said, the squatters were just dumped from one administrative boundary to another without provision for solving their fundamental problems of human existence.

Second, there was no national or regional development framework within which the feasibility of the town was determined. There was a lack on the part of the planners of a full understanding of the conditions and background which form the substance of new town programs in advanced countries. Since the town was planned as a part of the development of the Seoul metropolitan area, there was need for a broad policy of national development to determine the types of economic activities to be relocated in Kwangju. Missing was any determination of feasibility

based on policies of industrial location and population distribution, within a framework of a long-range economic growth plan.

Third, the dichotomy of administrative organization was one of the major obstacles to the effective implementation of the town project. Despite the fact that the project site was located in Kwangju County of Kyonggi Province, beyond the jurisdictional boundary of the city, the project was nonetheless designated as a special program of the SCG. Consequently, the City Planning Division and the Construction Division of the SCG were responsible for planning and design of specific activities. In the actual process of implementation there were two governmental agencies involved, that is, the Kyonggi Province Songnam Branch Office (KPSBO) of the Kyonggi provincial government and the Kwangju Development Project Office (KDPO) of the SCG.³ Both agencies were in conflict with respect to implementation because of the lack of coordination. Since both agencies had different tasks, they did not share a common frame of reference with regard to the

³ There were three major governmental agencies involved at the initial stage of the project. These agencies included the Songnam Branch Office (SBO), under the control of the chief of Kwangju county, which had been operating even before the program was introduced to provide residents with routine administrative services. In addition, the Songnam Construction Project Office (SCPO) was organized in 1969 under the control of the county chief, and the Kwangju Development Project Office (KDPO) of the SCG was established to participate in the project. This organizational arrangement created conflicts and inefficiency in decision-making as well as in execution processes. Thus, at the later stage, the two offices of the county, SBO and SCPO, merged into one, the Kyonggi Province Songnam Branch Office (KPSBO) in 1970. The KPSBO was placed directly under control of the Governor of the province. (See Whang In Chong 1986, 274)

program. As a result, residents did not know whom they should contact in order to get things done. The delays in action frustrated many and caused bitterness among the powerless residents. The building regulations differed for the two authorities. As soon as the relocation of squatters and land sale were completed, the SCG was no longer be involved with the town.

Fourth, the SCG adopted a top-down and centralized approach to the planning and implementation of the program. (Whang In Chong 1986, 276) Throughout the whole period of program implementation, there were no linkages established with any non-governmental organizations due to the lack of opportunities for wide participation in program planning. There was a strong desire and willingness of the poor to participate in the decision-making process, particularly because their lives were to be affected directly by the program.

Nevertheless, neither channels of participation by the poor nor opportunities for determining their opinions were established throughout the whole planning process. Furthermore, enforcement of the program through police action rather than through full understanding and support from the poor was the major instrument for the program's implementation. As a result, migrants in the town expressed their grievance and desire to participate through a series of protests.

Fifth, the crucial problem faced by the very low-income group originally relocated in Kwangju was the lack of employment, coupled with the high cost of commuting to Seoul. The location entailed a long journey to work and considerable daily travel expenses, which were obviously beyond their means. One of the basic requirements of job security for the average squatter is his familiarity with the area in which he is working. This involves his knowledge of the people, institutions, and special situations of his particular area, especially if he is a vendor, small salesman, or push-cart operator. These factors are implicit in his business and daily functioning and they affect his credibility, credit, and the small face-to-face exchanges that determine the success or failure of a day's labor. The severing of these neighborhood ties prevented him from doing his job. The Kwangju program destroyed the squatter pattern of employment, without providing any alternative. (Ha Seong Kyu 1984, 146)

Finally, living conditions for many residents were appalling. Squatters trying to build their homes faced the prospect of having to pay far higher prices for building materials than they would in Seoul. Many families lived through winters in tents, with very poor heat, suffering from malnutrition and disease, and often forced to drink water that was contaminated. On the other hand, as Ha Seong Kyu (1984, 146-147) argued, speculation had driven land prices to extreme levels and the government then charged second generation land owners renegotiation rates that were

inflated, furthermore stipulating that the entire sum was due in one payment.

In sum, the program was place-oriented, not people-oriented. It was designed to satisfy aesthetic consideration and physical planning requirements rather than to provide services for residents. The major policy concern was to reduce and relocate the increasing number of squatter units from the central area of Seoul. From the beginning of the program's formulation, improving the standards of living in squatter areas and aiding the poor were not concerned.

The new town project collapsed with a massive community protest, which took place in August 10, 1971. The violent protest caused much damage both to the community and the government, and had unprecedented consequences. Since that, the project has been under the territorial jurisdiction of Kyonggi province.

THE DYNAMICS OF PROTEST AND ITS IMPACT

Before the general election of May 25, 1971, and the presidential election of April 27, 1971, all people in Kwangju-daedanji expected a wonderful future having their own home. The city government allotted twenty p'yong to each owner squatter. This was unprecedented because at that time in other squatter settlements of Seoul the government allotted only eight p'yong to each squatter owner when removing them. Furthermore, in the

election season, all candidates issued many campaign pledges saying "if you vote for me, I'll make the Kwangju-daedanji an independent living place as an ideal city." Beside the election pledges, construction of housing and manufacturing factories was initiated. The displaced people from Seoul and elsewhere migrated to Kwangju-daedanji, and got daily jobs in construction.

These expectations, however, withered after the election. The construction boom began to lose its pace and as a result, the unemployment rate went up. What made matters worse was that the people who lost jobs could not take jobs in Seoul because of the transportation problems. At that time, it took about two hours to reach Seoul by public transportation, and required at least one transfer. The cost of a round trip was at least 150 won which was equal to the cost of living for one day for the poor. People who lost their jobs soon faced emergency conditions. Some began to skip meals. One relocated squatter resident reported (Park Song Chin interview, April 14, 1988, Kwangju-daedanji):

We often had to skip meals. My children began to cry asking food. One of my daughters, fifteen years old, asked me if she should go into prostitution in Seoul instead of starving. It made my heart break and bloody tears. We were then in desperate condition. When we were in Seoul, at least, we did not worry about food.

Drawn by the expectation of housing and employment migrants at Kwangju-daedanji met the same fate as the relocated squatters. As one rural migrant, Kim Chong Sop, reported (interview, May 23, 1988, Kwangju-daedanji):

When I was in T'an-ri (rural area), I heard that if I move out to this place I can have my own housing and job at factories. So, I sold all my property and came here. When I arrived here, the area was heated up by the election wind. I bought one priority ticket for 150,000 won at real estate office. However, after the election, the boom went down to the bottom. I lost my dream of having my own home by making money. There was no opportunity to work. In addition, it was almost impossible to sell the priority ticket again because there was no person to buy it at same price I bought.

In 1969, the poor population totaled 150,000 including 101,325 relocated squatters, 27,660 other migrants and 15,000 new squatters. They all needed new work opportunities.

In 1970, the SCG began to monitor land transactions in Kwangju-daedanji so as to boost housing construction on the one hand and to collect the difference between the realtors' price and the government price on the other. In order to expedite housing construction, the government gave notice that third-party purchasers must build on their land by June 10, 1970 or forfeit their land allotment to the SCG. The path to this end was to invalidate the land sales by relocated squatters from Seoul who had sold their "entry tickets" to realtors and then to resell the land to newly arrived rural migrants. To this end the SCG took the clause permitting relocated squatters to begin repayment of the lot price three years after initial settlement as inapplicable to the third wave of purchasers, the new migrants, who were not from Seoul.

On July 14, the SCG divided the migrants into two groups; the relocated squatters and the third-party purchasers. The SCG required the former to make an allotment contract, the latter, a purchasing contract. Third-party migrants had to pay the land price in a lump sum at the market price at time of purchase. In other words, what the SCG had in mind was to sell the land it had bought at 150-400 won per p'yong for 8,000-16,000 won per p'yong. As a result, the third party migrants became the victim of land speculation by the SCG. The land price, 8,000-16,000 won per p'yong, which the SCG set, was high compared to the land price for other, similar areas. For instance, the land price of Koyo-dong adjacent to the Songnam area was 500-2,500 won per p'yong.

Subsequently, a notification of the price change from the original level of 2,000 won per p'yong to 8,000-16,000 won per p'yong was delivered to each lot purchaser by registered mail in the early summer of 1971. The message further warned that failure to pay the new "due" amount within ten days could result imprisonment for six months for contractual violation. Particularly at risk were those who had bought housing lots from realtors as they were already victims of double payments. Adding insult to injury, Kyonggi Province sent a notice for payment of a housing acquisition tax of 10,000-16,000 won per house. This action triggered a violent community reaction and physical confrontation with the authorities. (Kim Won 1974, 99)

Lacking the funds necessary to comply with the new regulation, the only alternative open to the new purchasers was defiance. They compounded resistance with organization. The residents formed an initial association and selected leaders.⁴ They also created sub-organizations of the association down to the level of the precinct (*dong*) and ward (*t'ong*). The residents held several meetings to unify residents and organized sporadic protests. Subsequently, on July 19, they formed the Negotiation Association and chose Reverend Chon Song Ch'on and Presbyterian Park Chin Ha of the Cheil Church to head it. (Park Ki Chong 1971, 176) Both men had come from Seoul with the residents, who were their former parishioners in Seoul. Rev. Chon Song Ch'on functioned as the both activist and spiritual leader to the residents. In his words (interview, June 14, 1988, Songnam-si):

The fundamental problem was that the government brought the urban poor together in one place without providing work opportunities. The government gathered all these people here and then just trashed them. This site became a dumping ground. I shouted to the residents that we were not trash, but human beings. We had to fight to acquire the right to survival. This was only power we had. No other choice. The August 10 protest was a turning point which brought dead Kwangju-daedanji alive. If we had not taken such radical means, we all might have starved to death.

⁴ Leaders selected were Councilor: Rev. Chon Song Ch'on, Cheil Church (now, Songnam Church); Chairman: Park Chin Ha, Presbyterian of Cheil Church; First deputy chairman: Lee Tae Sop; Second deputy chairman: Lee Chong Po; General manager: Lee Sang Hi; Financial manager: Kim P'yong Chin; Organization manager: So Chin Kyong; Mobilization manager: Yu Il Kyong. (See Songnam-si 1982, 297)

The residents already knew that the residents of citizen apartments in Seoul had protested the SCG's requirement for lump-sum repayment of loans, and had carried the day. They were convinced that vigorous protest would prove successful. Two organizations played a role in supporting protest action: The Korean Student Christian Federation (KSCF) and the Institute for Urban Studies and Development (IUSD).

The KSCF was a large organization consisting of university students and activist Christians committed to radical political reform. Still active today, in 1970 the KSCF was a young group. While concerned with social relief, the group saw the situation in Kwangju as a vehicle for its political ends. In July 1970 a KSCF team from its Social Development Service Corps (SDSC), went to the Songnam area to support opposition to the SCG's relocation policy. The team, consisting of five members led by the evangelist, Kwon Ho Kyong, joined the residents in Kwangju. According to Kwon (interview, May 15, 1988, Seoul):

We thought that we had to understand the situation we faced very well. One way was to live together with the residents as members of their community. So we moved there in 1970. First of all, we tried to identify the local leaders and then to establish frequent contact with them. This way we found such local leaders as Rev. Chon Song Ch'on. With him we held frequent community meetings to residents up to date on current issues. We pointed to many cases to show that strong protest was the only and best way to satisfactory outcomes.

The IUSD was a research institute of Yonsei University in Seoul. In 1970 it also was also a young organization. Established

in September 1968, it was partially funded by a contribution of \$100,000 raised by George Todd from both Catholic and Protestant sources abroad. Todd was a missionary assigned to Korea by the United Presbyterian Church. The IUSD had two sections: a research section and an urban mission section. The urban mission section engaged in training social activists in urban mission work and community movements.

The IUSD selected and recruited trainees, predominantly from the ranks of Yonsei University students. The trainees were schooled in the Institute's Action Training Program which taught techniques for mobilizing the urban poor, for setting the urban agenda, and for gaining visibility. Some of the graduates of this program were sent to the Kwangju area where they supported residents' mobilization efforts, seeking to cultivate and groom local leaders. (Han'guk Kidokkyo Sahoemunje Yon'guwon 1987, 18)

In the early summer of 1971, the association petitioned the SCG seeking the following concessions (Kim Won 1974, 99-100):

- 1) provision of a workable living environment for the unemployed residents of the town;
- 2) suspension of various taxes for five years as promised during the election;

- 3) rollback of the price of land from 8,000 won per p'yong to the earlier level of 2,000 won (as paid by the relocated squatters from Seoul).

With this proposal, the association requested a meeting with the mayor of Seoul to discuss its grievances. The request was renewed and rejected several times.

The association submitted, without success, a written petition to the Ministry of Home Affairs and the governor of Kyonggi Province. In response, the association formed sub-organizations for each *dong* and organized occasional protests. The settlement scheme finally brought frustration to this low-income group, generated a growing suspicion of the authority, and spurred resistance in the later stages. The residents selected 217 representatives and changed the name of association from "Negotiation" to "Struggle" on August 3, 1971.

The new "Struggle Association" announced "we fight to the end," and set August 10 as D-day. In response to this movement, the SCG proposed a meeting at 10:00 A.M., on August 10 to seek discussion aimed at reaching a mutual understanding. In the early morning of the 10th, association members distributed leaflets, titled *Gather, Unite, Arise* to each house. With a picket in one hand and a stick or knife in the other, they went to the Songnam precinct office [ch'ulchangso] to meet the new mayor of Seoul, Yang T'aek Sik. They expected the mayor to appear and answer

their requests. At 10 A.M. about 50,000 residents gathered around the ch'ulchangso, including some 2,000 pickets with placards reading *Don't starve us, Give us something to eat, Stop land profiteering, Fight land speculation to the death, Don't exploit the poor, and We want*.

When the mayor did not appear, matters came to a head. At 11:45 A.M., a community revolt erupted. Angry residents went screaming, "They've cheated us again; On to the precinct." More than three hundred residents stormed the Songnam precinct office. (Han'guk Kidokkyo Sahoemunje Yon'guwon 1987, 43-44) Some 10,000 angry residents destroyed and burned the government buildings where land records and tax notices were filed. Sixty-three police officers, dramatically outnumbered, looked on. The rioters seized one bus and two trucks and drove around the central streets shouting "Destroy! Destroy! Destroy!" Some occupied the main routes into Seoul, stopping taxis, forcing the passengers to get out, while shouting "We don't have food tomorrow and you take taxis. At about 2:00 P.M. about seven hundred police officers from Seoul and Kyonggi province arrived at the scene. However, this made the rioters all the more angry. They shouted at the police: "You'll beat us, but you won't give us food" and stoned them. At 2:30 P.M. the rioters invaded and set fire to the local police station. They also destroyed several police cars and set a fire to a gas station. The angry residents headed towards Seoul, but were blocked by the police. This did

not keep a small group of rioting residents from finding time for a lunch break. During the melee they overturned a melon truck. (See appendix.)

The physical confrontation between the protest control police squad and angry residents lasted the entire day and resulted in about 100 injuries on both sides and estimated damages of about twenty million won. At dusk, the rioters finally began to withdraw when they were told by the "Struggle Association" that all demands had been met by the SCG. (Han'guk Kidokkyo Sahoemunje Yon'guwon 1987, 44-45)

Twenty-three leaders were arrested. Late in the afternoon, Mayor Yang T'aek Sik met with them in the offices of the Samyong Co. At this meeting the mayor accepted all the movement's requests without any conditions. That afternoon, Kim Chong P'il, then Prime Minister, called on the Minister of Home Affairs and the Minister of Justice with instructions to accept the residents' requests forthwith. The next day President Park Chung Hee instructed the SCG to formulate a revised plan for the rapid development of Kwangju-daedanji as a healthy city with an independent municipal administration.

The SCG adopted six emergency measures to assure the residents that their requests had been met. The following remedial measures were announced (Kim Won 1974, 100-101; Ha Seong-Kyu 1984, 147-148):

First, the city government would roll back the price of land to the previous level, that is, 2,000 won per p'yong and would recognize the legitimacy of their land ownership and would permit houses to be built on the lots.

Second, emergency relief programs including free rice distribution (2,500 tons) and work-relief would be instituted to assist the unemployed relocated squatters.

Third, incentive construction activity would be resumed to absorb the unskilled labor forces. This activity would, however, last only three months. In addition, 1.5 billion won of city loans would be allocated to attract industry to the town. Most importantly, all taxes billed by the SCG and by Kyonggi Province would be reduced, and suspended for five years.

Fourth, the government would set up several counseling centers.

Fifth, the government would complete the construction of 40 industrial plants, already started, and facilitate the rapid construction of such urban infrastructures as roads, water and sewage systems.

Sixth, the Kwangju-daedanji project would be turned over entirely to Kyonggi Province which had territorial jurisdiction over the land. Hence, the Kwangju Development Project Office of the SCG would be merged into Kyonggi Province Songnam Branch

Office (KPSBO). This move finally overcame the separation of responsibility between Seoul and Kyonggi Province which had given rise to such agony and desperation. The KPSBO finally became the implementing agency for the new town project. This integration of organizations enabled the KPSBO to make a full commitment to project implementation and resulted in a rapid increase in financing and investment, in improved work performance, and in a revised plan of action. Furthermore, the area was elevated to the status a city (to be named Songnam). In addition, the SCG provided additional capital investment of one billion won for development during year 1972.

Since 1971, the face of Kwangju-daedangji has changed continually. New factories have been constructed and new urban infrastructure built. New highways move passengers to Seoul in less than half an hour.

Chapter Five

Mok-dong

REGIONAL BACKGROUND

Geography and Administrative History

Today, Mok-dong is located about 10 km. south of the center of Seoul and is itself the center of southern Seoul. It plays the role of regional node relating Puch'on, Suwon, and other major urban centers within the extended Seoul metropolitan area to Seoul itself. In 1983, however, the development of the area lagged substantially behind that of other major areas of Seoul. It was therefore a prime target for planned urbanization and land recovery both from the point of view of regional equity and from that of efficient land utilization. Beyond the pervasive need to develop underutilized land resources to accommodate Seoul's rapidly increasing population there was an additional reason for targeting Mok-dong: surrounding urban land uses were rapidly rendering Mok-dong's rice paddies unfit for agriculture.

Mok-dong today borders Yongdungp'o-gu and Kuro-gu, as the map in the appendix shows. Before 1963, when it was incorporated into Yongdungp'o-gu, it had been administratively part of surrounding Kyonggi province (Mok-dong Yangdong-myon, Kimp'o-gun, Kyonggi-do). Twenty years later, in 1983, with the

further expansion of Seoul, Mok-dong was incorporated into Kangso-gu.

In 1963, Mok-dong was mostly farm land -- 1.3 million p'yong (82% of all land) was devoted to farming; its total population was 2,611 (451 households). By 1984, when Mok-dong was divided into 3 dongs, the population had reached 82,601 (19,405 households). Of the three dongs, Mok-1st-dong was the target of the redevelopment effort launched in 1983. Its population surge started in 1964 when the Seoul City Government (SCG) launched its five-year squatter-clearance plan clearing 74,759 households from 52,534 illegal squatter units in central Seoul in that year alone. The SCG resettled some of these in Mok-dong (then called Ttukppang-dongne), mostly those households that had been cleared from Sungin-dong, Taebang-dong, Taesin-dong, It'ewon-dong, and Ich'on-dong in Seoul. (Lee Tuk Yon 1985, 16)

Consequently, although Mok-1st-dong residents had illegal housing without property rights, the community differed from other squatter settlements in that its residents had been resettled there by the SCG itself. This gave the residents a sense if not the actuality of legitimacy.

In the years following 1964, squatters from many other areas -- Yoido, Ch'onggyech'on, and Chungryangch'on -- resettled in this area, forming a large-scale squatter settlement. (Han'guk

Kyohoe Sahoe Son'gyo Hyobuihoe 1985, 4-5) Gradually the mud-hut squatters upgraded their communities. Upgrading was hard work and doubtless raised still higher the residents' sense of legitimacy. Mr. Lee Chung Kyong, a former Mok-dong squatter, recalls (Mun Myong Ho 1985, 442):

When we came here, there was nothing on the land. The city government just relocated us here without providing anything. The government allotted each household seven or eight p'yong for shelter. It was a terribly cold winter we spent here ... All relocated squatters worked hard to make their homes as sweet as they could. We usually did the construction work at night because we had to work for food during the day. We dug the land and made soil-brick at the time when there was no electricity or any water to drink ... Despite these obstacles, we finally built our shanty houses and improved them as much as we could. Most of us traded the original mud huts for modern brick and tile housing.

Beginning with the resettlement, Kyonggi province improved the infrastructure, building power plants and constructing new roads. Despite these efforts and those of the squatters, housing remained substandard. (Lee Tuk Yon 1985, 14-15)

One year before the official announcement of the Mok-dong new-town plan of 1983, the land became the target of real estate speculation as investors began buying land from local farmers. By 1983, the price of one p'yong of land exceeded 130,000 won.

Population

Most residents of Mok-1st-dong hailed from beyond Seoul and Kyonggi province. One-third (33.6%) came from Chonna

province and a fourth (21.5%) from Ch'ungch'ong province. Residents originally from Seoul made up just 21.5% of the total. This reflects a shift in the origin of squatters from urban to rural areas. (Hong Se Kwang 1985, 46)

According to one survey about 38% of the squatters were owner squatters, i.e., they owned the structure they lived in (although not the land, of course) and about 62% were tenants. (Ch'ae Kwang Sok 1984, 301) Among the tenants, 20% were chonse tenants. The rest lived as wolse tenants who paid 20,000-40,000 won monthly having made a security deposit of 100,000-400,000 won.¹

In 1984 Mok-1st-dong had a population of 25,888 (5,832 households). (Seoul t'ukpyolsi 1984) As table 5.1 shows, although the renewal area included all households, in 1986, according to SCG official data, the population of Mok-1st-dong was still 11,765 (2,828 households).

¹ Recall that under the chonse (key money) system, the tenant pays the landlord an initial amount which the landlord repays when the tenant moves out. During the tenant's stay the landlord has use of the money. The landlord thus has the use of the money throughout the period. Thus rent equaled the implied interest charge on the chonse payment plus whatever erosion could be attributed to inflation (since the transaction was made in nominal currency). The wolse system is a hybrid of the monthly rent familiar in the West plus the chonse payment.

Table 5.1 POPULATION TREND
Individuals and households
1980-1986

YEAR	'80	'81	'82	'83	'84	'85	'86
DONG							
MOK-1st-DONG							
	23,412	23,663	24,506	25,693	25,888	24,893	11,765
	4,767	5,139	5,427	5,622	5,832	5,884	2,825
SINJONG-1st-DONG							
	34,696	13,867	14,366	14,228	14,303	14,467	13,079
	7,374	3,047	3,237	3,271	3,309	3,418	3,190
SINJONG-2nd-DONG							
	30,007	31,113	32,661	33,483	35,191	36,072	33,031
	6,363	6,679	7,010	7,309	7,810	8,448	7,831

Source: SCG, *Seoul-si t'onggye yonbo* [Seoul City Statistical Yearbook], various years.

Table 5.2 shows the breakdown by age of Mok-1st-dong in comparison with poor families in Seoul, as estimated by a survey conducted by the Korea Development Institute (KDI) in 1981, and with the nation at large. The fraction of Mok-1st-dong residents between the ages of 20-29 and 30-39 is higher than for the nation as a whole or for those below the poverty line, while lower for residents above fifty. Thus, Mok-1st-dong had a younger population. The average age of a head of household in Mok-1st-dong was 45.3 years old, six and one-half years younger than the head of a poor household in Seoul at large (who was 51.9).

Table 5.2 AGE AND POVERTY STRUCTURE

	MOK-1st- DONG(a)	POVERTY- RIDDEN(b)	NATIONAL AVERAGE(c)
below 14	32.1	30.5	34.0
15-19	11.4	17.3	11.2
20-29	23.9	11.1	18.8
30-39	14.1	8.5	12.7
40-49	10.5	12.4	10.6
50-59	4.7	9.5	6.6
60-64	1.4	4.9	2.2
above 65	1.9	5.8	4.0
total	99.9	100.0	100.0

Source: (a) SCG 1984; (b) KDI 1982; (c) EPB 1981.

From estimates based on small samples, employment and income of residents of Mok-1st-dong appear better than in other poverty areas. The survey results, shown in table 5.3A and B, suggest that roughly one-third of those employed were construction workers. KDI's survey showed a similar figure (about 35%) in poverty areas in Seoul. However, the percentage of company and public employees is much higher in Mok-1st-dong than in KDI's survey; 17.8% and 10.7% in table 5.3 A&B; 4.8% in the KDI survey. Moreover, the unemployment rate is much lower in Mok-1st-dong than in the KDI survey; 10.3% in table 5.3A, 31.35% in the KDI survey.

Table 5.3A EMPLOYMENT OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD IN MOK-1ST-DONG

EMPLOYMENT	PERCENT
construction worker	35.5
business	24.3
company employee	15.9
service business	9.3
liberal profession	2.8
public employee	1.9
unemployment	10.3
N=107	100

Source: Hong Se Kwang 1985, 44.

Table 5.3B EMPLOYMENT OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD IN MOK-1ST-DONG

EMPLOYMENT	PERCENT
A. company	technical service 8.7
employee	management service 10.7
B. business	self-business 10.0
	peddler 15.3
	repair 10.7
C. daily	construction 20.5
employee	others 10.0
D. others	8.0
N=150	

Source: Ch'ae Kwang Sok 1984, 310.

Finally, Table 5.4 (A&B) compares the monthly income of squatters in Mok-1st-dong and in Pongch'on-9th-dong. In Mok-1st-dong, the bulk (nearly one-half) have monthly incomes in the 200,000-300,000 won range. In Pongch'on-9th-dong, on the other

hand, almost 70% have monthly incomes in the 100,000-200,000 won range.

Table 5.4A HOUSEHOLD INCOME
A: MOK-1ST-DONG

INCOME (in won)	TOTAL		HEAD	
	f	%	f	%
below 100,000	11	8.0	11	10.3
100,000-200,000	38	27.7	26	24.3
200,000-300,000	61	44.5	52	48.6
300,000-400,000	9	6.6	6	5.6
400,000-500,000	11	8.0	7	6.6
above 500,000	7	5.1	5	4.6
TOTAL	N=137	100%	N=107	100.0

Source: Hong Se Kwang 1985, 49.

Table 5.4B HOUSEHOLD INCOME
B: PONGCH'ON-9TH-DONG

INCOME (in won)	TOTAL		HEAD	
	N	%	N	%
no income	8	10.0	8	10.0
below 100,000	12	13.0	8	10.0
100,000-200,000	52	63.0	59	73.7
200,000-300,000	10	10.4	4	5.0
300,000-400,000	3	3.6	1	1.3
400,000-500,000				
above 500,000				
TOTAL	N=85	100.0	N=80	100.0

Source: Chong Tong Ik 1985, 71.

Other data appear to confirm that income of Mok-1st-dong residents was considerably higher than that of the poverty areas of Seoul as a whole. KDI's 1981 survey shows the average

household monthly income of Seoul's poverty area was 153,130 won (28,570 won per person) as opposed 317,757 won (64,272 won per person) in Mok-1st-dong.²

Educational achievement in Mok-1st-dong appears to have been consistent with the higher earnings just mentioned. The percentage of all residents who had dropped out of school before finishing elementary school was 36.4%, 58.6% and 44.7%, respectively, for Mok-1st-dong, the Seoul's poverty-ridden, and the nonpoor. (See table 5.5)

Table 5.5 EDUCATION LEVEL OF HOUSEHOLD

	MOK-1ST-DONG	POVERTY-RIDDEN	NON-POVERTY-RIDDEN
below-elementary	36.4	58.6	44.7
junior	35.5	17.5	20.3
high	21.5	17.5	24.6
2-years college	6.6	6.4	10.4

Source: Hong Se Kwang 1985, 55.

REDEVELOPMENT POLICY AND PROCESS

Development Method and Housing Plan

For the redevelopment of Mok-dong the SCG adopted an approach referred to as the public management development method (PMDM). (Choson Ilbo, April 12, 1983) Under PMDM, the

² According to the Korea Labor Workers' Welfare Association the monthly income required for a minimum standard of living for a family of 5 was 611,372 won. (Chong Tong Ik 1985, 50)

city government buys up all land in the project area held in private hands and establishes a master-plan. It divides the land into lots and contracts with private construction firms to build apartments, retaining the right to sell them to the public upon completion. By adding to the housing stock, the government was seeking to contain the demand inflation of land prices. Through PMDM, the government also sought to counter growing real estate speculation by stressing the idea of public land use. (Seoul t'ukpyolsi 1984, 10-11)

On April 12, 1983 the government announced the housing plan for Mok-dong area, as the redevelopment plan of Mok-1st-dong was known. At the same time, the SCG began negotiating contracts with major construction companies, including Hanbo Construction and Samsung Construction Company, a member of the Samsung Group. Under the plan the government would convert 1,400,000 p'yong (including Mok-dong and Sinjong-dong) into housing lots and build a new town, housing 24,000-30,000 households on 608,000 p'yong. The plan set the percentage of all land devoted to housing lots at 46.7% (see table 5.6), lower than the usual allocation which exceeded 50%. This meant that a greater fraction of available space would be used for nonresidential facilities: 39.2% for public facilities -- schools, city hospital, and administrative headquarters; and 8.4% for commercial buildings.

Table 5.6 LAND USE PLAN

CATEGORY	AREA(p'yong)	%
housing lot	608,000	46.7
commercial zone	109,000	8.4
public facilities	519,000	39.2
others	68,000	5.2
TOTAL	1,304,000	100.0

Source: SCG 1983.

The housing supply plan called for the construction of apartment complexes accommodating 100,000-120,000 persons (25,000 households) on 608,000 p'yong. The mix of sizes, initially targeting low- or middle-income households, ranged from 10 to 60 p'yong. To this end, the plan anticipated provision of inexpensive apartments coupled with long-term loans and a 2 to 1 ratio of units for sale to units for rent.

Table 5.7 TYPE OF HOUSING SIZE
(unit: household; p'yong)

TYPE CATEGORY	20	25	35	45	55	TOTAL (1,000)
sale	2,750	3,250	6,000	2,250	2,750	17
rent	1,000	3,000	3,000	1,000		8
TOTAL	3,750	6,250	9,000	3,250	2,750	25

Source: SCG 1983.

On May 12, 1983 the SCG issued a revised plan. The revision eliminated the small apartment units (in the range below 20 p'yong), as shown in table 5.7, and reduced the number of

apartments available with long-term loans to 8,000 (32% of the total households to be accommodated). The revised plan also reduced the number of units available for rent, cutting the sales-to-rentals ratio to 7:3.

Financing and Compensation

The SCG published its initial development plan in April 1983. It projected outlays of 60.6 billion won for land acquisition from private landowners, 33 billion won in compensation to squatter owners for appropriated structures, and 113.5 billion for capital construction. The SCG anticipated that revenues from sales by the government at the conclusion of the project and from the key money from rental units would cover project costs, thus requiring no long-term government outlays. (Lee T'ae Il 1983, 25; Lee U Chong 1984, 90)

The budget assumed that the SCG would buy land from local landowners at the rate of 72,000 won per p'yong, the rate set by the (national) Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA). This rate structure was outside the discretion of the SCG. It was roughly half the rate set by the Office of National Taxation, which was 150,000-170,000 won per p'yong, the rate at which the landowners had been paying tax. (Chungang Ilbo, May 12, 1983) (Reluctant landowners could always be expropriated under the Compulsory Land Purchase Act.)

The budget assumed further that owner squatters would also be compensated for appropriated structures at rates set by the MOHA rather than at the rates used for tax purposes or at market rates.

As table 5.8 shows, the government expected to net 238 billion won from the project. Note that priority tickets are not a budget item, since their effect is to allow the recipient to purchase or rent an apartment. Their income value derives from their resale potential.

Table 5.8 1983 PLANNED MOK-DONG DEVELOPMENT BUDGET
(in billions of won)

PLANNED EXPENDITURES		EXPECTED REVENUE	
COMPENSATION	100.0	apartment sales	838.9
for land	60.6	rental sales	90.2
for building	33.0	reserved land sales	
moving and	6.4	facilities	28.1
other		retail	108.8
CONSTRUCTION	728.0		
readjustment	91.0		
land			
development	22.5		
sales units	419.3		
rental units	195.3		
TOTAL	828.0		1,066.0
EXPECTED NET			238.0

Source: Lee T'ae Il 1983, 25.

THE PROTEST AND ITS DYNAMICS

The Mok-dong squatter movement lasted a little less than two years, from April 1983 to March 1985. It proceeded in four phases corresponding to shifting goals, strategies, and coalitions.

Phase One: Origin of the movement, April 1983 - August 1984

When the plan of the Mok-dong new town development was first announced, the Mok-dong residents responded with ambivalence and uncertainty. Some thought that the public management development method would allow them to rent an apartment. Others feared removal without compensation as had happened in the past. The announcement of the revised plan, however, was key in moving the residents to action. The tenants understood the deep stake they had in the renewal, and while recognizing that their interests were not fully consistent with those of the owners, judged that in the absence of joint action they would be evicted.

An anti-removal association formed spontaneously, centered originally and naturally around the existing ward and sub-ward (t'ong and pan) level liaison personnel. However, the residents quickly perceived the organization as a tool of the government and turned away from it.

A new movement organization was formed drawing on the pre-existing organization. The squatter residents began to recognize that the government's plans were in conflict with their expectations. The residents saw their immediate recourse in an approach to the government through established channels. From the beginning the influence of religious groups was felt. In May 1983, residents met with Cardinal Kim Su Hwan to ask help in dealing with the compensation issue. The anti-removal association sent a written petition to the mayor of Seoul and to several related agencies. In their petition they requested guarantees of (Lee Tuk Yon 1985, 40):

- 1) priority tickets for owners for apartments in the same district,
- 2) interim shelter prior to removal,
- 3) reasonable compensation for buildings and moving costs,
- 4) priority tickets for a single room in an apartment budding for tenants.

These efforts to work through established channels were guided by official community leaders (leaders at the t'ong and pan level). The government response was vague: it would give consideration to the proposal and appealed to residents for cooperation with the government's plan. As the residents came to recognize the limits of the organization under the direction of official community leaders, they began to look to other means.

Meanwhile, women tenants, who had been holding meetings independently, sent a petition to several government agencies and political groups.

On April 17, 1984, the government announced a new plan offering owners a priority ticket for the purchase of an apartment in Mok-dong. (Kyonghyang-sinmun, April 17, 1984) In response, the women tenants visited the Gu-office president and the district assemblyman to request priority tickets for tenants enabling them to rent a room in Mok-dong and market-rate compensation for owners for appropriated structures. On June 21 they presented their requests to Seoul's deputy mayor who met them at the Gu-office. These efforts evoked no change in position from the SCG.

On August 8, the government announced that it would sell its Mok-dong apartments at the price prevailing in the private sector, a price well beyond what they could afford. Mok-dong residents concluded from this report that they would be excluded from the benefits of the project. At the same time, a movement organization guided by religious groups issued a statement reflecting the residents' situation and suggesting a new strategy. The new strategy called for residents to switch from working within and through the government's own institutions to working through the public arena. In August 1984, members of the Mok-dong Catholic Church issued a flyer with this statement:

We will never retreat even one step and we will fight the removal policy until our requests are met. All tenants will join in the struggle even at the cost of

their jobs. We intend to act without reservations; we will engage in radical street protests. The fundamental structure of renewal policy is the government's exploitation of the most powerless for the benefit of the most powerful.

Residents agreed to present an united front to defend their interests in the project. On August 15 they replaced the old organization with an action group committed to the fight against squatter removal. The new organization included community leaders and active women tenants. It excluded the heads of the t'ong and pan who had guided the earlier organization. The new organization would seek out more direct and active relationships with government agencies and other social groups.

On August 10, just before the SCG offered the first of the new Mok-dong apartments for sale, a daily newspaper reported that the SCG stood to make nine billion won in undue profits from the sale. (Chungang Ilbo, August 25, 1984) The report angered the residents. In its wake they made several unsuccessful visits to the head of Mok-dong and the president of the Kangso-gu Office aimed at winning compensation. In late August the organization distributed a leaflet -- "A Report to Mok-1st-dong Residents" -- describing the results of their interviews to the residents. The government had repeated its earlier position on the compensation issue: the SCG

- 1) would compensate owner squatters for the loss of their structures at the government (MOHA) price;

- 2) would not sell apartments for less than 1.05 million won per p'yong (the market rate);
- 3) would provide no compensation for tenant squatters; and
- 4) would provide alternative, interim shelter before clearing squatter sites.

In order to report to the residents the movement organization convened a meeting to be held the next day (August 27) at the dried out flats in the bed of the Han River. As a result of the announcement, the organization leaders were immediately arrested. (Han'guk Kyohoe Sahoe Son'gyo Hyobuihoe 1985, 17) About 300 residents staged a sit-down strike in front of the police station until 2:00 A.M. the following morning and succeeded in effecting the release of those arrested. This event was a turning point: the movement as a whole rejected negotiating strategies based on petitions and interviews with government officials. From now on the movement would shun institutional channels.

Phase Two: Mobilization for direct, non-institutional action, 8/27/84 - 11/30/84

The next morning, August 11, the meeting was held as planned, at ten o'clock in the wide, dry river-bed. The organization leaders reported to the residents that their efforts at negotiation had failed. "The negotiation has failed; protest is the only way," the leaders shouted. At about 11:00 A.M., the rally was

joined by an additional 1,000 persons. The overall mood was radicalized. Angry residents surged into the Mok-dong development office to protest the project, and then turned across the Yanghwa bridge toward City Hall. Police and movement control squads blocked the way preventing protesters from crossing the Han into the central city. About one thousand participants, some scrawling anti-renewal slogans, denounced the government, hurling firebombs and rocks as they battled the control police. During the protest some 500 participants were arrested. (Han'guk Kyohoe Sahoe Son'gyo Hyobuihoe 1985, 18)

This action brought the Mok-dong movement to public attention, attracting especially that of religious groups. The Korean Church Social Ministry (KCSM),³ in particular, was to play a key role both in Mok-dong and in Sanggye-dong, the case the next chapter addresses. The KCSM conducted a survey of the situation of the Mok-dong residents and their needs. After the group's chairman, Jei Jeong Ku, announced the results of the survey, the group held several strategy sessions with the residents. The Ministry staked out a position clearly in favor of the squatters, a position they communicated to the mayor of Seoul on August 30, 1984.

³ Han'guk Kyohoe Sahoe Son'gyo Hyobuihoe [The Korean Church Social Ministry] was established in January 1971 by leading Catholics and Protestants as a Christian social action unit to address dysfunctions of urban industrialization. See chapter six.

Three weeks later, on September 21, the SCG announced that it would provide 500,000 won for moving expenses and would compensate owners for the loss of their buildings at the higher appraised value set by the Office of National Taxation. (Dong-A Ilbo, August 21, 1984) The effect of this was to drive a wedge between the owners, who would be paid for their property, and the tenants, who were thus subject to eviction without compensation. The tenants had coincidentally formed an independent association (the Mok-1st-dong Tenant Association) on September 10 after receiving notice that the government would begin clearance of the northern area of the district October 20. The Tenant Association petitioned the Gu-office, City Hall, the National Assembly, and various political parties. In the petition, they requested (Mok-1st-dong Tenant Association, Petition Paper, 1984):

- 1) postponement of the clearance of the settlement until April 1985,
- 2) provision of appropriate compensation to tenants as well as owners,
- 3) provision of land or an apartment near Seoul for five members of a family at low rents or long-term installment payments.

However, the government denied these requests and on October 17 began eviction in some parts of the northern area of Mok-dong.

These evictions alarmed tenants of the southern area of the district. On October 19 tenants held open meetings at the Mok-dong Catholic Church and protested in front of the Kangso-gu Office for six hours. After this protest, all tenants participated in forming the Mok-dong Tenant Association. The organization goals were:

- 1) long-term, low-rent housing;
- 2) long-term, low-interest land for land acquisition;
- 3) long-term, low-interest housing loans.

The organization agreed to pursue its aims lawfully. The new association failed to articulate the felt interests of the tenants. Its leaders appeared to suppress tenant complaints and were viewed as generally cozy with SCG officials and sympathetic to construction interests. Almost immediately, a rump group of 200 tenants walked out and took independent action. At a prayer meeting held November 8 at the Mok-dong Catholic Church, they met to discuss future tactics.

On November 12 this small, independent tenant group led a demonstration of about four hundred tenants at the Kangso-gu Office. Five days later they again demonstrated at the Omok bridge where they publicly denounced and repudiated the t'ong and pan leaders (that is, the ward and sub-ward level liaison). Its following increased by these actions, the group organized a rally at the Mok-dong Catholic Church on November 22. The rally was disrupted when more than two hundred battle police detained

Jei Jeong Ku (KCSM chairman), who had joined the rally, and two principals of the movement. Simultaneously, joint protests were held at Seoul National University, Yonse University, Ihwa Women's University, Mok-dong interchange, and Yangp'yong-dong. All were demanding that tenants be given priority tickets for low-rent apartments or relocation sites near Seoul.

Compared to the initial period, this one saw tenants bypassing institutional channels to make their appeal in the public arena through radical protests. By and large the movement was confined to the Mok-dong area. Owner squatters, who received compensation naturally disappeared from the movement, which became tenant-dominated. In spite of their efforts, tenants were failing to achieve their ends and participation was flagging. The leaders began casting about for a new strategy.

Phase Three: Expansion of the movement, 12/1/1984 - 2/12/1985

The third period began with a church meeting to evaluate past activity and to discuss future directions. At the meeting, participants fixed on the strategy of taking the contest beyond the confines of Mok-dong. The tenants chose Song Chong Po as their new chairman and Park Chung Yon as new general manager. The group confirmed their commitment to solidarity. However, an event to place that was to require yet a further organizational adjustment.

On December 7 the owners were prepared to rejoin the movement. The owners had reached the conclusion that the government's compensation for the seizure of their buildings was insufficient; they wanted compensation at the going market value rather than at the rate used by the Office of National Taxation for tax levies. In order to accommodate the owners, on December 16, the tenant association reformed itself, electing new officers more congenial to the owners: one chairman, Chong Ch'ol Ho, and three deputy chairs, included one woman, Ch'oe Sun Ok.

To arouse public support, the new organization quickly planned a protest in an area outside Mok-dong. The organization chose the headquarters of Kim Dae Jung's Party for Peace and Democracy [P'yongmin-dang]. However, the movement control squad was alerted to the plan and succeeded in preventing the demonstration. In response to this suppression, the movement leaders organized another protest, appealing to major social and political groups (including, of course, the churches). Almost five hundred tenants gathered at the dry river-bed and four times blocked the Kyongin Highway. The protest resulted in the arrest of twenty-three participants. (Lee Tuk Yon 1985, 52) This action served to dissolve the remaining distrust among tenants and to solidify their ranks. Compared to previous actions, this one saw the participation of more men alongside the women. Organization within the movement was deepened and strengthened: t'ong level

leaders were designated and delegated the responsibility for coordination of small-group actions.

Tenants and owners demonstrated together. "No sale, no removal, and no evacuation!" was their slogan. A joint petition issued on December 31 called for (Lee Tuk Yon 1985, 54):

- 1) compensation for owners for structures at market value;
- 2) 7.5 million won long-term, interest-free loans for owners;
- 3) priority ticket to rent an apartment at current rent with the same security deposit tenants were currently paying.

On January 22, the leaders called for a protest at City Hall in the very heart of Seoul. Following this protest it was agreed that the deputy mayor would meet with residents at the Kangso-gu Office. In this meeting, the deputy mayor reiterated that the government had no plan to dispense priority tickets for the rental of an apartment to tenants. He did, however, propose several alternative forms of assistance for residents (SCG unpublished data 1984):

- 1) aid in moving to rural areas,
- 2) charitable assistance for those with no place,

- 3) a lottery chance for tenants on a priority ticket for the purchase of an apartment (worth about 2 million won),⁴
- 4) possibility of group relocation to another site.

Since the SCG's counter-offer provided no compensation, the owners and tenants continued their protest in several sites in the central city. In early February, elections to the National Assembly were being held. In anticipation of the election campaign, activity in the streets of Seoul was intense. Movement leaders took advantage of the opportunity to address their complaints to the resulting preformed audiences. They distributed a flyer "We will not be cheated again!" to those gathered at the stumping sites and called for the mayor to be punished. The control squad broke up all such efforts, arresting and wounding some of the participants.

*Phase Four: District defense and complex strategies
2/13/1985 -3/20/1985*

The fourth phase was one of geographic retrenchment. Beginning February 13, 1985, the movement's efforts were once again focused within Mok-dong. Although the shortest, this phase produced the highest density and intensity of protest.

⁴ The lottery ticket provides a chance to win the right to buy an apartment. The probability of winning in this case is set at about 70%-80%.

Without having made the residents a satisfactory offer, the government's implementation of the project continued with the installation of a drain pump. On February 13, the owners and tenants jointly occupied the work site, interfering with the construction and on the following day blocked deliveries of concrete. These obstructionist activities continued through February 26.

The tenants and owners agreed that the owners would block the construction efforts to install a sewage system in the south, while the tenants would block the work effort in the northern area near the Kyongin highway, blocking traffic on the highway at the same time. On February 22 the residents distributed leaflets setting forth their demands of an apartment for tenants and of long-term, low-interest loans for tenants to rent housing. In their effort to blockade the construction sites, five residents were wounded and many were arrested. The residents immediately released a flyer promising continued pressure. The flyer protested the government's action and called for the SCG to (Kim Yong Sok 1985, 156-159):

- 1) provide prompt, market-rate compensation to owners for their structures;
- 2) provide tenants priority tickets to rent long-term, low-rent apartments to be built in Mok-dong;

- 3) release immediately the residents who had been arrested and to punish the police and control squad members responsible for the violence.

Shouting these slogans, the owners and the tenants demonstrated in front of the development office and the police station.

Within the movement, there remained some internal disharmony among tenants associated with the separation of Mog-1st-dong into northern and southern sections and distrust deriving from the use of movement funds. The movement leaders addressed this through an open meeting and by publishing a detailed account of fund use. A public relations committee was formed along with a special subcommittee charged with seeking the release of the demonstrators who had been arrested. This subcommittee sent a petition to the Minister of Justice requesting the release; The subcommittee also turned for support to the Association for Peace and Justice, one of the most radical and critical of the dissident groups.

The owners meanwhile also regrouped and delivered a statement "Mok-dong residents are crying." The statement called for (Mok-dong Kaokchu Hyophoe 1984):

- 1) interim housing for owners and tenants prior to removal;

- 2) guaranteed, reasonable compensation in advance of development for owners for their demolished structures;
- 3) provision of long-term rental apartments for tenants.

The women tenants and owners had the opportunity to air their issues publicly at a forum sponsored by YWCA on March 9. This meeting provided further occasion for tenants and owners to consolidate their ranks and take joint action. On March 11, about seventy residents visited the Party for Peace and Democracy to ask its cooperation. On their return home, they staged a demonstration seeking a meeting with the head of the Mok-dong development office. In the ensuing melee the control squad launched tear gas and wounded several participants. Resentful residents protested angrily in the district, in front of the studio of the Korean Broadcasting System, at the headquarters of the opposition party, and at Myong-dong Cathedral in downtown Seoul.

On March 18, in response to these events, the SCG developed four options under which it offered tenants. (SCG unpublished data 1987)

- 1) a ticket entitling tenant households to rent a room in the new apartments to be built in Mok-dong;
- 2) a subsidy for moving;
- 3) a special subsidy for moving to rural areas;

4) group relocation to a different area.

Each tenant household could select whichever option it found most suitable. From the tenants' point of view the goals of the movement goal had been accomplished. The proposal did not alter the SCG's offer to owners. The next day, angry owners blockaded the deputy president of the Gu-office in his home. This event attracted massive media attention and brought the Mogdong area under tight police guard.

On March 20, two representatives of the residents took their appeal to a general student emergency meeting held at Seoul National University. On the same day about one thousand people, including university students, held a violent demonstration near the Mok-dong area and set fire to the development office. As a result of this protest several movement leaders were detained by the police.

Thirty-six Mok-dong tenant households choose the group relocation option and resettled in Sihung district in Kyonggi province an hour's drive by car south of Seoul.⁵ Each household contributed 500,000 won to the development of the new community. Each received twenty p'yong. The community was built on principles stressing human development. The development was led

⁵ The squatters relocated to 276 Unhaeng 5-ri Sorae-up, Sihung-gun in Kyonggi Province.

by Jei Jeong Ku and Father Daly who had long collaborated in the design and building of these so-called bird's nest communities.

Tenant households choosing the first option sold their priority tickets for 2.5 million won. Of these sixty-nine joined the bird's nest community, investing the money they had received from the sale of their tickets. In all, 105 households resettled in Sihung district, occupying three four-story apartments.

The owners had already received compensation for their structures at the beginning of the project at the tax-levy rate. In addition they sold the priority tickets entitling them to the purchase of an apartment in Mok-dong. The Mok-dong's new residents, who paid 7.5 million won for them, were, as Hong In Ok showed through her survey, part of a new middle class. (Hong In Ok 1988, 69-70)

Chapter Six

Sanggye-dong

REGIONAL BACKGROUND

Sanggye-5th-dong was publicly identified as a candidate for redevelopment on April 20, 1985 and formally designated as a redevelopment district seven months later on November 22, 1985. It is a small, densely settled area, nestled into a beautiful corner of Northeastern Seoul near Mount Pulam and Mount Surak. Squatters had been resettled there twenty years earlier from various squatter settlements of central Seoul of the 1960s, principally, Hannam-dong and Ch'onggyech'on. (Chang Song Uk 1988, 254) Each relocated squatter had been provided with living space amounting to 4 p'yong. At the time the area was not easily reached by public transportation. The announcement, shortly before the redesignation, of the plan to connect Sanggye-dong with downtown Seoul by subway, gave a sharp upward impetus to land prices. (See the appendix)

Population

As of the beginning of the redevelopment activity (early 1987) the population of the area was estimated at 1,580 households or roughly 8,000 individuals. They were housed in small houses with single rooms, many of them multiple-family dwellings.

Households could not live together with tenants because each shack had only one room. Therefore, the tenants of Sanggye-5th-dong renewal district used the entire house they rented. The 1,580 households consisted of 1,000 owner-occupied units and 580 tenant households living in units owned by nonresident owners. (Yun Sok Chin 1987, 242) There was an average of 5.3 persons per dwelling. The recent increase in population at that time resulted from natural increase alone since the crowded area had no room for additional shacks and no room within existing shacks to accommodate new arrivals.

Socio-economic and Political Characteristics

The Sanggye-5th-dong renewal district had a considerably lower incidence of unemployment than other areas in Seoul. One survey shows that about 43% worked as day laborers in domestic services or construction. About 11% worked as street vendors. (See Table 6.1) However, much of the employment was unstable; sporadic odd-jobs -- fixing a few appliances here and there or washing cars from time to time -- and high turnover rates.

Table 6.1 JOB DISTRIBUTION
(in percent)

EMPLOYMENT	PERSONS
business and vendor	15 (10.9)
cab/truck driver	9 (6.7)
company employee	5 (3.6)
factory worker	3 (2.2)
skilled worker	10 (7.3)
one-day worker	59 (43.1)
unemployed and other	36 (26.2)

Source: Tobong-guch'ong 1987.

Chonse tenants paid one million won key money while wolsse tenants paid 500,000 won key money and 30,000-50,000 won in monthly rent. These rates were low in comparison with other residential areas in Seoul. However, as the redevelopment approached, key money requirements soared ten-fold to five million won.

Although squatters in Sanggye-5th-dong occupied substandard housing, they were emerging from their marginal way of life. They had upgraded the quality of their housing; they were looking forward to improved living circumstances and saw the Sanggye renewal as the means to a way of desirable urban life. They believed the Haptong renewal project would result in a considerable benefit for them as a result of the difference between market land price and the subsidized price at which the government made the land available for redevelopment.

Urban Services

At the time of the redesignation urban amenities were in short supply. (Ch'onjugyo/Kaesin'gyo Chaegaebaljiyok Kongdongjosa Wiwonhoe 1986, 4-11) Water was available at five spigots located for collective use near the road. These spigots served about 20 percent of the residents; the rest had arranged for water-supply trucks, underground and piped-in water. However, since many of the dwellings were on the hillsides, water pressure was low, there were often long lines at the pumps and water-supply trucks.

Few had any sort of toilet facilities inside or connected to their homes. Most inhabitants used public toilets, which characteristically had long lines, especially in the morning. Even with the public toilets, there were no sewer pipes, only open channels through which waste ran through the settlement and collected in troughs beside the sidewalk near the road.

REDEVELOPMENT AND THE TREATMENT OF SANGGYE SQUATTERS

The SCG's plan, announced on April 20, 1985, called for the renewal in 173 Sanggye-5th-dong (renewal district No. 4-1) of a total area of 15,704 p'yong, of 730 p'yong of road area, for the removal of all 1,528 existing squatter units during the period November 17, 1985 to June 16, 1986.

This project was one of thirty-two renewal projects announced in late 1985. They shared a special urgency as a result of the imminent 1988 Olympics which Seoul was hosting and in view of the government's desire to present its best face to the world.

The plan called for the construction of eleven fifteen-story buildings with a total of 40,937 p'yong of floor surface, designed to house 1,547 households. Apartment units were scheduled to be constructed in four sizes: 17 (small), 25 (moderate), 31 and 35 (luxury) p'yong, in the amounts shown below.

6.2 PLANNED UNITS

UNIT SIZE (p'yong)	UNITS TO BE BUILT
17	716
25	299
31	472
35	60

Source: SCG 1987.

The redevelopment of Sanggye-5th-dong was initiated during the joint redevelopment period and followed the *Implementation Guidelines for Joint Redevelopment* which had been issued in 1984, reflecting a shift in policy generated in the early 1980s by the

search for political legitimacy following President Park's assassination.¹

Recall that the political essence of the joint development project was that it distanced the SCG from the front line of squatter removal. Recall too the main technical features of the approach which facilitated this extrication: 1) Owner squatters in the renewal district form a renewal corporation; 2) the corporation selects a construction firm which becomes a member to the corporation; 3) the construction firm provides legal owner squatters with interest-free loans to cover temporary relocation and preinvests the redevelopment fund; 4) the construction firm excavates the squatter area and undertakes the actual construction. When construction is complete, the construction firm sells the individual dwelling units preferentially to the members of the corporation (the owner squatters) and to the general public at market price.

As prescribed under the *Guidelines*, the Sanggye owner squatters, on December 19, 1985, held their first resident community meeting. At this meeting they formed the Sanggye 4-1 District Upgrading Redevelopment Corporation and a Renewal Promotion Association (RPA) chaired by Kim Sang Ho. The RPA, in turn, selected a large firm, Korea Construction Co. (KCC), to implement the project.

¹ See Part I

The *Guidelines* made no provision for benefits for tenant squatters (as opposed to owner squatters). In fact, the Guidelines prohibited construction companies acting as partners in joint development projects from providing any benefits to tenants. In order to encourage the tenants to vacate the squatter units in Sanggye, the corporation offered all tenant households a moving allowance of 100,000-700,000 won. Of the 580 tenant households, 320 accepted the offer and made plans to vacate. The remaining 260 households did not wish to vacate and took action in opposition to the owners and the construction company. Their dynamics will form part of the next section.

As in the previous cases, the owner squatters lacked the financial means or backing to exercise their right of purchase. Consequently, they sold their rights ticket.² As a result of the opening of the local subway line, the price of the rights ticket peaked at 12-13 million won between the fall of 1985 and the spring of 1986 and subsequently dropped back to below ten million won. (Kim Hyon T'ae, interview, June 24, 1988, Seoul) Compare this with the 2.5-3.5 million won at which the squatter dwellings exchanged before the renewal announcement.

² According to informal sources, all owners sold their rights, typically to realtors.

PROTEST AND ITS DYNAMICS

The general dynamic of the ensuing conflicts derives from the differential under the *Guidelines* in the representation of the interests of the Renewal Promotion Association (owner squatters and the construction company) on the one hand and of the tenant squatters on the other.

Recall that under the *Guidelines* the owner squatters were assured of several important benefits: i) interest-free loans intended to facilitate temporary residence during construction; ii) authorization to purchase an apartment in the new building at prevailing market price (the rights ticket); iii) freedom to sell the rights ticket at any negotiable price, one reflecting its discounted value at time of sale. The owner squatters were thus assured of new housing or a way of getting a piece of the development profit. The owners were further protected in as much as their association selected and contracted with a construction company for the implementation of the renewal. This role gives them additional leverage in gaining appropriate terms from the construction company as a precondition of selection.

The construction company derives its leverage from its central role as financier and manager of the project; it buys the land from the government, sells the apartments to holders of rights tickets and to the general public, and has some discretion in determining the mix of apartments in terms of size.

On the other hand, the *Guidelines* provided only limited benefits to tenants. They contained no provision sharing the development profit with tenants. The *Guidelines* did provide some residential security in that they protected the tenants from eviction until sixty days after project approval.

In brief, the resulting situation had three major lines of conflict: that between the tenants and the owner squatters (and their progeny), that between two groups of tenants; and that between the tenants and the Korea Construction Company (KCC). Common interests made allies of the owners and the KCC, and to some extent the SCG, while the tenants found supporters, moved partly by ideology and partly by compassion, within the Catholic Church, among various special-purpose religious groups, and from certain student organizations. We will examine first the dynamics of conflict among the central players and then look at the role of external groups in sustaining the conflict and in the eventual outcomes.

The Internal Dynamics

There is no evidence of conflict between the owner squatters and the construction company. This alliance was in part assured by the guaranteed provision of benefits for the owners and in part by the centrality of their role in initiating the selection of the firm. The owner squatters opted universally to sell their rights at market price. To some extent, this choice was

driven by their inability to buy into the new apartment complex. The value of the rights ticket, however, was sufficient to secure alternative housing (although we do not know the owners' preferences for alternative housing versus other forms of consumption made possible by the sale of the rights ticket).

In order to secure the tenants' timely departure, in March 1985 the owners offered them moving allowances in rough proportion to likely expenses. These allowances, while small (100-700 thousand won) in comparison with the value of the rights' tickets were sufficient to secure the peaceful and rapid departure of 55 percent of the households (320 of 580). The remaining tenants formed an organization, the Tenant Action Organization (TAO) to seek greater compensation.

In response, the RPA offered to subsidize the purchase of an alternative residential site to the extent of 100 million won and to underwrite modifications of the site. The chairman of the TAO, Lee Pyong Ryol, undertook a search for suitable sites. He located one site (belonging to the deputy chairman of the RPA) in Kyonggi Province.

One site found favor among a majority of the tenants. It contained 3,116 p'yong and was located about two hours from the center of Seoul at an one-way transportation cost of 590 won. Of the 260 households in the TAO, 147 accepted the site, including the chairman. (Lee Pyong Ryol, interview, July 20, 1988, Tonggyo-

ri) As part of the proposed deal, the RPA offered 10 million won for bricks for the construction of seven new buildings containing 163 rooms of 6-7 p'yong each.³ In addition, the SCG and the provincial government together offered each household 1.1 million won.⁴ Each household was to contribute 200-300,000 to the construction.

Some tenants found the offer a good one. Some claimed in addition to be moved by patriotic considerations. One tenant interviewed recalled (Lee Tae Pung, interview, July 3, 1988, Seoul):

The renewal policy is intended to improve the quality of city life. As citizens, we should cooperate with the government policy.

In May, the TAO agreed to the RPA's offer and a handful of tenants became small landowners. Electrical service was added immediately after construction; water was supplied from wells; and initially 15 temporary public toilets were installed.

In this way, the dynamics generated by the *Guidelines* and internal pressure resolved the real and potential conflicts generated by the redevelopment among the 1580 owner squatters, two-thirds of the tenants, and the construction company. The process was by and large peaceful, and accomplished essentially through internal bargaining (with some sweetening by the SCG

³ In Seoul this would be roughly half the size of a typical residence for a family of 4-5 at the time.

⁴ The SCG paid 0.5 million won and the Kyonggi government paid 0.6 million won.

and the provincial government). Some intimidation, however, was brought to bear on dissenting members of the TAO. (Lee Pyong Ryol, interview, July 20, 1988, Tonggyo-ri) The government shut off water service and empty squatter dwellings were destroyed by owners and cooperating tenants, resulting in some physical confrontations. Plain-clothes police circulated, making inquiries of squatters.

During consideration of the RPA offer of the Kyonggi Province site, dissenting tenants formed a separate organization, the New Tenant Action Organization, to continue their resistance. Its chairman was Hwang Kil Ku. Their resistance was driven by the difficulty of maintaining established jobs in Seoul, a judgment that the compensation offered was inadequate, and by a sense, common among Koreans, that Seoul is education and Seoul is the future. One tenant, who subsequently settled on Church-provided land near Seoul, related in her interview her reasons for continuing to hold out (Kim Chin Hong, interview, July 18, 1988, Seoul):

We couldn't live in that isolated site because there were no job opportunities. And it would have been impossible to commute to Seoul because the trip in to work would have been too long and too costly.... It would take a couple of years to get stable, new jobs, even as a vendor. It is also painful process to adjust to such a new situation. After all, to leave there [Sanggye to Tonggyo-ri] meant giving up our life ... We do not want to hand over ignorance and poverty to the next generation. If we had moved out to the new site, we would have had no chance at all to overcome our poverty.... Our hope was in staying.

The resistance of the remaining tenants became public, with outside groups playing a major role. That story is subject of the next section.

External Dynamics

The conflict within the TAO over the offer of the alternative site in Tonggyo-ri intensified rapidly as the majority became willing to resettle there. This majority exerted pressure on the holdouts through destruction of squatter buildings, even in advance of any official removal activity; harassed the minority members as they sought to attend a meeting on April 29, 1986 sponsored by the Sanggye-dong Catholic Church. The disappearance (and ultimate death) of one holdout, Nam Sang Yon, the day following the official acceptance of the offer (also the day of the first rally of the NTAO), was attributed to brutality of the willing members of the TAO; suspicion was directed at its general manager, although the death remained without official explanation. (Hong Hyon Chong, interview, July 17, 1988, Seoul)

The confrontations at the squatter settlement, the growing involvement first of the Catholic Church, then the Protestant Church, the intertwining of the squatter issue with student movements, and the reflection of the situation and events in the press were signs that the issue was shifting to a more public domain. In the course and wake of this shift, the remaining squatters, now some 50-100 households strong, lost a measure of

control of the movement they had initiated, saw their own involvement in social issues grow, ultimately gained a new settlement area near the periphery of Seoul in Kyonggi Province (through the ministry of the Catholic Church), and became themselves a repository of radicalized ideas and techniques.

The principal religious groups involved with the remaining squatters were four: 1) the Catholic Urban Poor Ministry (CUPM) [Ch'onjugyo Tosibinmin Samok Hyobuihoe]; 2) the Korean Church Social Ministry [Han'guk Kyohoe Sahoe Son'gyo Hyobuihoe]; 3) the Protestant Urban Poor Preaching Committee or Kidobin [Kidokkyo Tosibinmin Son'gyo Hyobuihoe], and the Catholic Social Action Group [Ch'onjugyo Seoul Taegyogu Chongui P'yonghwa Wiwonhoe].

First, the reader will recall that the Catholic Urban Poor Ministry (CUPM) was established in March, 1985, to oppose the implementation of public development policy at the time of the protests in Mok-dong. This organization tried to articulate the interests of the urban poor through educational activity and mobilization aimed at the development of political power. It holds regular discussion and strategy meetings open to the urban poor. Jei Jeong Ku, the group's chairman, had himself helped the Mok-dong squatters' protest. He ran, unsuccessfully, for a seat in the National Assembly as a candidate from the Chong-ro district of Seoul.

With respect to the Sanggye-dong protest, this organization provided such resources as joint action, public meetings, and leadership. After the June 26 protest, this organization published a statement, titled "Our View on the Recent Sanggye-dong Protest," which criticized the protest as merciless terrorism. (Ch'onjugyo Tosibinmin Samok Hyobuihoe 1987, 24-25)

The Korean Church Social Ministry had been established in January, 1971 by leading Catholics and Protestants as a Christian social action unit to address dysfunctions of urban industrialization. The organization sought to help low-income groups, including the urban poor, labor workers, farmers, students, and women through education and training. Its strategic aim has been to develop mutual cooperation and solidarity among groups affected by industrialization. The Ministry has assumed a public posture, publishing critical statements, distributing flyers, researching problems of the urban poor, and supporting protests. In Sanggye-dong it provided legal assistance to tenants and sought to connect squatters there with tenant protests in other areas of the city. (Han'guk Kyohoe Sahoe Son'gyo Hyobuihoe 1987)

Third, the Kidokkyo Tosibinmin Son'gyo Hyobuihoe (called Kidobin) was established in August 1984 as a broad social action group to promote human and material resources for self-reliance among the urban poor. The Kidobin has sub groups at most urban poverty areas including the Sanggye-dong squatter area.

These provide such services as medical treatment, night schools, nursery schools, training for local movement leaders, job information and join local protest activity. (Kidobin 1987)

The Catholic Social Action Group was established in January 30, 1985, to promote human dignity and social justice. The group engages unreservedly in public and radical protests. After the June 26 protest, it issued a statement that criticized the repression of the protest for its brutal violence and requested reasonable measure for the squatter tenants. Members of the group, including some nuns, were involved in the subsequent protests.⁵

Father John V. Daly and Sister Son In Suk of the Sanggye Catholic Church were spiritual father and mother for the tenants. (Dong-A Ilbo, December 26, 1986) Both provided emotional support and encouragement throughout as well as participating in public protests. Both suffered physical indignity and abuse in the course of the protests. Daly moved into the settlement and lived there almost two years. Despite threats, he regularly read Sunday mass at the Sanggye squatter settlement, even after tents had replaced the destroyed shacks there. Sister Son In Suk had been interested in helping the squatters since before the announcement of the renewal policy. As the removal work began, she helped tenants organize meetings, held nine-day prayer

⁵ These data are based on my interview with one leading member of the organization in July 20, 1988.

meetings, made door-to-door visits, and helped tenants maintain their solidarity of purpose. On one occasion, demolition workers removed her veil and beat her.

Chronology of Squatter Removal in Sanggye

On June 1, the NTAO held a rally in front of the RPA's office. The tenants were joined by church leaders and students. Mr. Jei Jeong Ku, the leader of the rally and chairman of the Catholic Urban Poor Ministry, sounded the new theme of the movement (Jei Jeong Ku, interview, May 8, 1988, Seoul):

The battle is against the renewal policy and the dictatorship. It comes down to self-determination: having a voice in what affects our community and our people. You are trying to do the right thing. You're trying to accomplish something for yourself and your family that will help improve the entire squatter areas in this country.

In the wake of this protest, Jei Jeong Ku was detained by the police.

On June 26, 1986, the city undertook the forced removal of some of the squatter units in Sanggye. The confrontation was intense and violent. A report released several months later provided the following description (Seipcha Taech'aek Wiwonhoe [NTAO] 1986):

about one thousand squatter owners, five hundred of hoodlums, five hundred riot police, and one hundred of plain clothes officers showed up at the area and started rudely to tear down empty or occupied squatter houses. In the occupied houses, they throw out the children without notice and engaged in merciless destruction ... High-ranking officials

addressed the workers through loud-speakers installed on the top of a building and encouraged them saying things like: "Tear down those ugly things and don't worry," "Bring resisting tenants to the police," "Beat them but don't harm them," "We take all responsibility for it." Present were such high officials as the Gu-president and chief of police. One person was killed and one seriously injured, and about 40 wounded ... On the scene, the tenants vigorously resisted to brutal removal with support from students and church members. Despite this, there was no contending against such odds. About sixty leading resistants were bundled into buses and driven away.

The tenants were joined by university students and supporters from Churches, who provided confidence and broader legitimacy to the tenants' protest. June 26 was a turning point for the tenants. It marked the transition from a movement of tenant claims to benefits to a movement of resistance with a broader sense of goals and solidarity with other tenant groups and with participants in other social issues. Mr. Hwang Kil Ku, the chairman of the NTAO, noted in an interview (May 15, 1988, Seoul):

After brutal destruction of June 26, the protest became a daily task of the tenants. They usually protested at the Gu-Office. It was kind of community protection protest. However, they realized that the limits of this strategy; despite their resistance, the removal work proceeded step by step. Therefore, the tenants decided to extend the boundary of their efforts: to take to the streets to participate in other anti-government movements to broaden the issue. Following this strategy, they participated in a general demonstration in the urban center on July 10; in a sexual-torture exposure movement at the Myong-dong Catholic Church; in a prayer meeting for tenant squatters at the Hongje-dong Catholic Church on August 4; and in protest against torture and charges of communist affiliation at the opposition party's (Party for Peace and Democracy) headquarters on

August 14; a protest at the Song-dong central police station (August 15) and the Myong-dong Catholic Church (August 17) to ask for the release of Mr. Jei Jeong Ku, held after earlier arrest.

On August 29, 1986 there was another large scale removal tumult. The tumult started with a removal of the tents that the Gu-Office provided as relief goods in the wake of the destruction of the original units. Angry tenants went to the Gu-office and protested violently, resulting in many injuries. The tenants sought to return the tents. The deputy president of the Gu-Office replied that he could not do so without approval of the president of the Gu-Office. After mediation by the chief of police, the Gu-Office returned the tents. (Kim Hyong Kuk, 1988, 16)

The Sanggye-dong Catholic Church held a prayer meeting for the tenants. Owner squatters tried to prevent the tenants from participating in the meeting. Despite this, about two hundred tenants attended. In the meeting, Jei Jeong Ku admonished the tenants (interview, May 8, 1988, Seoul):

You tenants are victims of urban renewal policies. Why does the government implement this policy? There are two reasons: to profit the government and the Korea Construction Company; and beautify the city for visiting foreigners. The torture, the killing, and the brutal removal all have in common their infringement upon people's right and the deprivation of their right to survival. The only way to eliminate this institutional violence is to fight it.

Students and dissident groups, mostly church members, joined and daily newspapers provided more frequent coverage and were critical of tenant violence. The reports maintained public

awareness of the situation in Sanggye. Whether in spite of, or as a result of public attention, the tension between the RPA and the tenants continued.

On November 4, 1986 many nuns visited the Sanggye-dong renewal area to comfort the tenants. During the protest, the demolition crew shouted "take off the nuns' dress." They removed the veils of several nuns and beat them. (K'at'ollik-sinmun, December 21, 1986) The demolition crew removed Sister Son In Suk's veil and on November 19 they beat her. Despite this abuse, she and other nuns continued their joint protest with the tenants and prepared food for them.

On December 24, 1986, about one hundred owner squatters, members of the renewal corporation, set a fire to some tents at the squatter area, complaining that the tenant's protest was delaying the redevelopment. Some tenants were suddenly without a place to sleep in the middle of winter. (Chungang Ilbo, December 25, 1986) That night, Cardinal Kim Su Hwan visited the site to console the tenants. In his Christmas message the Cardinal included the following words (Yun Sok Chin 1987, 282):

The tenants who were taken from their homes have no place to go while there are many new apartments left in Seoul. They are spending this winter in tears and bitterness. Where are gone the tremendous development benefits of the renewal project? The tenants are struggling with severe cold in their tents because they are not able to rent a room in Seoul ... We need urban development. But, the development must be oriented to the people who live there, not to the place. Current renewal policy, if conceived only for the good of government officers, businessmen, and

speculators, will only increase income discrimination, alienation, hate, and social disease. It is bought with the blood, tears, and sacrifice of the tenants...

Student Participation in the Protest

The government was wary of student support for the tenant wars and monitored their interaction closely. Yu Kyong Che, general manager of the NTAO, gave a speech at the Korea University general student meeting held by the Student Coalition Front on September 26, 1986. In this presentation, he described the state of emergency existing at the Sanggye-dong removal district and criticized the removal policy for its injustices. (Student Association of Seoul National University 1987, 23-26) Upon leaving the campus, Yu was arrested and sentenced to a one-year prison sentence. Yu initiated a fast which was joined by one hundred tenants who successfully sought his release. (Yu Kyong Che, interview, June 24, 1988, Seoul)

On June 13, 1986, about 50 students of the Korea University for Foreign Studies spread flyers opposing the renewal policy and threw fire-bottles into the office of the Renewal Promotion Association. In early July, about four hundred Korea University students held a meeting on campus censuring the Sanggye-dong removal policy and then marched through the streets shouting slogans. On July 14, seven students led a protest in the Sanggye subway station attended by about 200 tenants and resulting in one student arrest. On August 3, about 400 students representing

the Student Coalition Front staged a violent protest against the renewal policy in the Sanggye subway station.

Student influence on tenants was strongest in matters of ideology and goals. As the chairman of the NTAO put it in our interview (Hwang Kil Ku, interview, May 15, 1988, Seoul):

We really appreciated their support, and felt sorry when they were arrested. At first, all we sought was reasonable compensation [for the loss of our homes]. But, the students made us realize that the brutal urban renewal policy is rooted in dictatorship and monopoly capital. Now, we have clear objective to our struggle.

In line with this ideological shift went a broadened involvement with tenant protesters and with other causes.⁶ The main foundation of this solidarity was the Soch'olhyop (Seoul Tenant Action Association), established in March 1986, which now represents all squatter tenants in Seoul. The object of this association is to consolidate tenant power to resist the government's renewal policy. It participated in the June 26 protest and in subsequent protests. It also held meetings to report on the protests and to lend encouragement at tenant meetings in Sanggye-dong and at the Myong-dong Cathedral and protests such as that on February 18, 1987, which drew 300 tenants from Sanggye-dong, Yangp'yong-dong, Sadang-dong and other areas to the Myong-dong Cathedral.

⁶ Interview with U Chong Pom, president of the Soch'olhyop (Seoul Tenant Action Association, Seoul).

On April 14, 1987 the demolition crew bulldozed the remaining tents. In May, 73 tenant households moved to the Myong-dong Cathedral where they remained for three months before moving to property in Kyonggi Province provided by the Catholic Church.

SUMMARY OF CASES

We reviewed three cases of squatter protests in Seoul. It might be helpful to sum them up in one section with reference to variables which will be considered in the discussion. This summary will show the similarities and differences of the three cases examined.

Variables	Kwangju-	Mok-dong	Sanggye-dong
Policy	relocation	public-managed	joint
Policy-maker	SCG	SCG	SCG
Priority ticket	squatter-owner	squatter-owner and tenant	squatter-owner
Major "third parties"	Protestant church organizations & newspapers	Protestant & Catholic church organizations, student organizations, & newspapers	Catholic church organizations, student organizations, & newspapers
Solidarity	unity (high)	division and unity (medium)	division (low)
Leadership	local boss (indigenous)	local boss (indigenous)	local boss (indigenous)
Period of protest	very short	long	very long
Size	large	medium	small
Policy impact	rehabilitation, citizen apartment, & subsidy	joint redevelopment	long-term rental apartment

P A R T I I I

D I S C U S S I O N

Chapter Seven

Discussion

This discussion will focus on the key question raised in the introduction: what factors account for the outcomes of the three cases examined, given the range of causes that various theoretical perspectives have found to have explanatory value for other protest movements? Two determinants seem to have played major roles: first, the strength and strategy of protests, and second, the state's newly developed search for increased domestic (and possibly international) legitimacy.

Each part of the explanation needs to be expanded. The strength of protest may be explained by the role of squatter leaders, especially women who protecting their homes; protesters' ties to and support from church organizers and students; their activation of support within public opinion as a symbol of resistance to the dictatorship; and their learning over time from the strategies that worked in earlier protests. On the other side, the desire for greater legitimacy and the Korean land ethos influenced how state actors saw the situation.

THE STRENGTH AND STRATEGY OF PROTESTS — Leadership, Organization, & Solidarity

One striking feature of the squatter movements and their protests is the modest, almost anonymous stature of their leaders. There is little suggestion of inspiring, charismatic leaders moving masses with impassioned rhetoric, of pragmatic leaders carefully crafting goals and strategies, of movement members withholding or changing judgment as they await the considered wisdom of respected elders, or of socio-emotional leaders bonding alienated residents in a common cause. Officers might be a more apt term for leaders, who change or are changed frequently and with little fanfare, rancor, or apparent repercussion. Abandoned leaders did not become alienated from the movement, and leaders in the wings did not appear to campaign for the position. Leaders seemed more a convenience than a necessity.

In the early stage of protest in Mok-dong and Sanggye-dong, some local leaders were co-opted. As Piven and Cloward (1979) asserted, they tended to direct the group's efforts towards institutional politics, rather than towards violent demonstration. As soon as squatters recognized this attitude, they reformed the leadership.

Why did women play a key role in the squatter protests? In squatter areas of Seoul, there were many female-headed households, roughly half of total households. In addition, women showed more attachment to their living place than men. Women

stayed home and took care of housework while men went outside to work. In the Mok-dong movement, for example, women played leading roles. Female households were prevalent in Mok-dong and other squatter settlements. Lawson and Barton (1980) have pointed to the importance of women's roles in tenant movements. Mollenkopf (1973) indicated the role of housewives in community organizations. The Korean woman's association with the house is very strong. Women spend considerable time there. They participate in and manage credit networks and other tightly knit associations that are likely to enhance movement legitimacy. Moreover, control units had greater difficulty in dealing with female protesters than with men.

Consider now the effect of the network external to the squatter community. Some resource mobilization theorists (Oberschall 1973; McCarthy and Zald 1973 & 1977; Lipsky 1970 & 1982) contend that resources and organizations outside the protest group are crucial in determining the scope and outcomes of protest. Jenkins and Perrow argue that sponsorship by established organizations is the important variable in the movements. (1977, 251)

In general, the squatters drew direct support from university-affiliated groups and from church-affiliated groups. To a lesser extent and in a more indirect manner, they drew support from the press and television. The support groups in the network served the movement in three principal ways:

1) visibility; 2) material support and encouragement; and 3) legitimacy. In less important ways, they served an information and mobilizing function. The various groups made these contributions in different degrees, and in different ways in the three cases.

All groups enhanced the visibility of protest by increasing the mass of what were usually quite small demonstrations. They also indirectly enhanced visibility by reporting on the squatters' situation to their own constituents. Dramatic incidents such as the arrest of church figures and the physical harassment of nuns further contributed to public awareness and knowledge of the squatters' distress and of their claims.

Encouragement took both moral-spiritual and material forms. Religious groups -- Protestant, in the early Kwangju events, Catholic, in Mok-dong and Sanggye-dong -- provided the principal material supports. Religious groups were an important source of food for many squatters in Kwangju and Sanggye-dong and in Mok-dong to a lesser extent. Moreover, the Catholic Church ultimately provided land to the small, residual group of tenant squatters from Sanggye-dong, who failed to achieve their housing goals in negotiation with the SCG. Encouragement also took the form of providing a vision of alternative life styles -- the Bird's Nest, for example. There are grounds to believe, at least in the Sanggye-dong case, that by providing an expectation of ultimate support, were all else to fail, the Catholic Church emboldened some

of the tenants to be more insistent in negotiation and protest than they might otherwise have been.

The question of the networks' contribution to movement legitimacy is more difficult. The residents of Seoul saw the squatters' claims as legitimate; that is the heritage of the Korean land ethic. The students, as the ritual conscience of the nation, and the religious groups, as a source of moral authority, provided validation to the squatters.

For the purposes of this analysis, however, what the networks failed to provide is as significant as what they did provide. In each of the three cases examined, the protest movement received its initial motion from within the community of affected squatters. As Morris argues (1981 and 1984), such "indigenous" resources are paramount. Network personnel did not come to the squatters to address a quiet injustice or to provide organizing resources. They gravitated to squatter communities already aglow with the recognition of their own needs and opportunities, already aware of the necessity for their own action, and already engaged in the process of petition and protest. Groups like the Korean Christian Youth Federation, the Korean Church Social Ministry, the Catholic Urban Poor Ministry Committee, the Protestant Urban Poor Preaching Committee, and Yonsei University's Institute for Urban Studies and Development, in particular, saw themselves, among other things, as mobilizers of social protest and educators in aggressive social action. While

these organizations helped squatters maintain action and pressure, there is no evidence to suggest that they sparked to original actions or the consciousness underlying them. Unlike McCarthy and Zald's view (1973), professional movement organizations did not generate the squatter protests.

Such helping organizations did bring into play experience gained directly or indirectly in earlier encounters and other issues. This experience, which squatters lacked, gave them considerable understanding of social process and articulation of goals, abundantly good sense of strategy and tactics, and a deep feeling for the people with whom they worked. Nevertheless, the strategies employed by the squatters were largely borne of their own intuition and perception of the requirements of the situation. If these coincided with those of the external network, it is as fair to say that those of the external network coincided with theirs. Squatters learned over time what strategies had worked in earlier protests. For example, the Kwangju-daedanji protest learned from the strategy of the earlier citizen apartment protest. The Sanggye protest adopted almost the same strategies that had worked in the Mok-dong protest. The members of the external network may have contributed answers to subtle questions: when and where to act; whom to address; and when to be silent. But it is easy to overrate the subtlety of these questions. Korea is, after all, a relatively homogeneous society where the rules are broadly shared, if not always articulated.

What we see, then, is a situation which poses a clear problem: How to reclaim land from squatters that is needed for other, clearly recognized, purposes. Social wisdom, Tilly's prevailing standards of rights and justice, in this case the Korean land ethic, prescribes clearly the socially recognized, right response. This is perhaps a rare case. Most public issues are more controversial; the issue can be argued many ways by appealing to equally entrenched, but competing, values.

What is needed beyond the prescription is sufficient outreach to bring to public attention the fact of the existence of a case that fits the moral paradigm. As Lipsky argues (1970), the outreach function of the networks, opening and maintaining lines of communication from the squatter community through which information flows validating the case at hand, is thus the next greatest challenge. The religious groups and the student groups, by virtue of their special roles, resolved this challenge.

The need for leadership and organizational resources was reduced relative to other cases where more controversial questions were at issue. Moreover, certain technical factors further reduced the need for these resources in the cases at hand. In Mok-dong and Sanggye-dong, movement membership was small and the neighborhoods were compactly organized. This condition greatly reduced the need for elaborate communication networks; members could rely on natural as opposed to configured ones. Participation of other members in community action was readily

observable, reducing losses associated with the free rider problem. (Olson 1965) Leadership resources contributed more heavily in issues where movement members' interests were complex; in the cases at hand, the members understood quite well how government action affected them. Moreover, within each community they all understood it at essentially the same time. It was no accident that it was in Kwangju, precisely the case where members were most out of touch with each other and with the central Seoul community, that organization had the most visible role.

How important was solidarity to the success of the squatters' efforts? Hobsbawm (1959) argued that the lack of solidarity of the peasantry was a major reason for the episodic, spontaneous and failure of rural rebels. Oberschall differentiates communal from associational solidarity, and argues that the former is more powerful in producing protest than the latter. (1973, 122-124) Solidarity was a crucial force in mobilizing squatters in Korea. Relatively low levels of solidarity often caused difficulty to squatter mobilizations, especially in Sanggye-dong.

Solidarity varies considerably in the three cases examined. In Kwangju, all members of the protest shared a common situation and a common basis to their claims on government. Solidarity was high. Under the joint development approach as exemplified in Sanggye-dong, solidarity across the squatter community as a whole was quite low; there was overt hostility between owners and tenants as well as between warring factions of tenants among

themselves. The approach itself, in which compensation of structure owners was predicated on tenant removal, made cooperation within the community unlikely. In Mok-dong, solidarity between owners and tenants was episodic, but cooperation was not uncommon. Owners' interests were not served at the obvious expense of tenants (or vice versa). The movement split tactically from time to time depending on which side the SCG's most recent offer favored.

If solidarity within individual squatter settlements varied, solidarity across different squatter settlements was negligible. This was true even though in the 1980s the SCG was clearing from five to ten sites at any given time.

The three cases offer strong contrasts in the nature, depth, and potential of solidarity as a resource for the movements. This resulted from the different government policies. Yet no significant difference in outcomes resulted.

Thus we can account for the squatters' success with reference to four other factors: the capacity of small groups to give their cause visibility through protest, the validation of their cause provided by student and religious groups, and the land ethic. But, to prevail, one must endure for a certain period. In the context of the Korean ask-and-wait rule, the religious groups bought squatters time to wait by providing another resource -- rice.

In conjunction with certain situational parameters — compact configuration and mutual visibility of the membership, the simplicity and ready interpretability of their cause, and a modest political vulnerability of the government on this issue — these resources reduced the squatters' dependence on, and thus the need for explanatory reference to, other factors. This is substantiated by the apparently low levels of active leadership, organization, and solidarity.

This thesis receives further substantiation from the fact that squatters got exactly what the land ethic calls for: *compensation*. They achieved none of their other calls that fell outside its prescription. In 1989, however, the national government announced a plan to build very small rental apartments, from 8 p'yong to 13 p'yong for the urban poor. Though time will tell how this policy is actually implemented, it appears that squatter protests might well have influenced this aspect of housing policy.

The land ethic specifies what the outcome should be. It does not specify how great compensation should be nor how it should be negotiated. This dissertation does not address the issue of the magnitude of compensation, although many interesting issues lurk therein. The last section does however, discuss as the tools through which compensation was provided.

The government developed an ingenious policy tool, the priority ticket, that responded well to the mandates implicit in the land ethos and had useful economic and political characteristics as well.

THE PRIORITY TICKET AS A TOOL OF RENEWAL POLICY

A most ingenious and effective tool of the government's renewal policy has been the priority ticket. The meaning of the ticket varied somewhat from case to case: in Kwangju-daedanji it entitled the recipient to purchase 20 p'yong land at government subsidized price within the relocated area and targeted squatters relocated to that area; in Mok-dong and Sanggye-dong it entitled the recipient to purchase an apartment within the renewal area and it targeted squatters displaced by the renewal, owners and tenants in the former case, owners alone in the latter.

Overwhelmingly, the squatters sold their tickets to real estate agents or other speculators. In Kwangju-daedanji, the relocated squatters sold their tickets because the new site was without basic facilities and offered no employment. In the other cases the recipients could either not wait for accommodations or found them costly. Completely fungible, the ticket to date has worked as a cash benefit rather than as an in-kind benefit.

As a practical matter, the system of priority tickets has enormous advantages for the government. First, it costs the

government nothing. The cost is borne by the ultimate buyer, for whom it may be the only way to acquire desirable housing at the moment. Second, it is administratively simple. Once authorized, there is little overhead associated with its management. Third, it transfers to the household the responsibility for deciding whether to opt for cash or for housing.

From a theoretical point of view, the ticket offers three additional and related advantages, all of which increase social welfare. First, it is a device for capturing the consumer surplus. That is, it captures the difference in the value of housing to the buyer and its cost to the government (or firm). The value to the buyer can be taken, at least, as what he shows himself willing to pay (the sale price of the apartment *plus* the price of the ticket). Second, it gives each squatter receiving a ticket the possibility of selecting whichever is greater between the value in money of what he can get for the ticket and the value he places on housing. This further prevents inefficiency in the use of social resources. In essence and within limits, the squatter can negotiate the price of his own eviction. The third benefit flows from the first two. The ticket allows policy makers to bypass an issue commonly raised in the debate over in-kind versus cash benefits. It eliminates the need to choose between *higher*, in-kind benefits (higher, because they incorporate the value of the public good associated with the provision of a specific benefit which the society subsidizing the benefit approves) and a *lower* cash benefit

which gives the beneficiary the flexibility to spend the money in the way that yields his highest utility (lower because it does not or may not satisfy society's preferences for the guarantee or provision of particular benefits).

Since the tickets were originally defined as nontransferable, policy makers apparently intended them initially as an in-kind benefit, a way of providing housing to displaced squatters. Since, in practice, no actual restrictions were ever implemented, we are free to conclude that policy makers recognized the wisdom of allowing uninhibited transfers.

In practice, the theoretical benefits were not fully realized. The squatter's option to use the ticket for the actual purchase (or rental) of an apartment was restricted by his limited access to cash and loans necessary for the actual outlay and by the difficulty of maintaining shelter until the new apartments became available. Increasingly, squatters called for long-term loans and transitional housing. However, their systematic importance as instruments of public policy seems not to have been recognized. The squatters, moreover, were not the only beneficiaries of the consumer surplus. Since most tickets passed through the hands of realtors on their route from squatter to final consumer, the consumer surplus was shared with realtors. Since potential takers for tickets are not likely to be hard to find and since little risk is associated with holding tickets, speculation in tickets by realtors lacked any economic purpose.

The data gathered do not allow quantification of the extent to which actual benefits fell short of theoretical expectations. It is clear, however, that improving access to cash in the form of long-term loans and making provision for interim shelter, arguable on their own grounds, would also increase the tickets' value to the squatter in either of its two possible uses. Moreover, a clearinghouse operation in tickets by the squatters' institutional allies could eliminate speculation in tickets by realtors and improve both social welfare and the benefits to squatters.

Finally, the Korean land ethic dictates that the landowner pay compensation to the displaced squatter. But who is the landowner in our case? The government? The construction firm? The joint redevelopment corporation? The as yet unknown resident-to-be? Moreover, in our case, the ethic fails to account specifically for new values are created for parties not explicitly involved in the relationship governed by the ethic as formulated at the beginning of the dissertation. There are two such values, both of which are public goods by nature. The first is the beautification of the city -- a value all, without exclusion, may enjoy without reducing its supply. The second is the benefit to the public of the improved condition of the squatters, a benefit which the entire public may share. These values are in addition to the personal, private value of comfortable, modern housing to the new owners.

The priority ticket allows the accounts to be squared, though without demonstrated quantitative precision. Through whatever subsidies the government pays squatters from public coffers, it is also buying (a part of) two public goods -- social knowledge of the improvement in the lot of squatters and beautification of the city. At the same time, through its issuance of priority tickets to squatters, the government is forcing the future owners to pay the ethically required compensation to the squatter evicted on his behalf.

NORMS AND LEGITIMACY

Throughout the period under examination, the Korean government and Korean society were faced with a challenging problem: how to take legitimate control of land that some have at their disposition for the use and benefit of others.

The Korean land ethic lays down an unambiguous basis for the squatters' claims to the land. Moreover, it not only stipulates the squatters' claim, it also stipulates the terms of recovery: the landowner will pay the squatter compensation. It is rare for a social value to be articulated with such incontrovertibility. Many social values are articulated in ways which allow little rebuttal: clean air is good, justice is blind, children must not starve. Such dictums are articulated without reference to cost and remain uncontroverted until their application requires some sacrifice in their implementation by some party not in on the benefit, at which

point a spoil-sport points to "reality." What makes the Korean land ethic difficult to rebut is it anticipates what party will be responsible for covering the cost of the benefits.

Cultural norms in many societies make some provision for the poor. The incontrovertibility and the specificity of the Korean land ethic provide additional force that explains how a government characteristically harsh in its treatment of other forms of defiance may (or must) yield in this instance without recourse to long-term imprisonment or torture. Given the great disparity in raw power between squatters and the government, given the ruthlessness and purposefulness with which it has dealt with other protests, and given that the period treated here was one of military dictatorship (although less and less virulent), the government was, if not generous, relatively forthcoming and moderate. Tilly (1978 & 1979) has pointed to the importance of the prevailing standards of rights and justice in determining movement form. Korean squatters and possibly other participants protesting on their behalf benefitted from and were protected by norms -- a socially shared sense of entitlement -- peculiar to Korea.

What is remarkable about the Korean land ethic is the precision with which it prescribes the solution to a problem. The ethic alone is insufficient to realize the solution socially; at a minimum, the society must see the problem as one that falls under the jurisdiction of the particular ethical prescription. The act of

deciding, discovering, or demonstrating that a given condition is subject to a particular ethical regime will be called *validation*.

Validation does not result from the application of logic, although logic plays a role; it is a *social* process that confers legitimacy. It results from the interplay of a range of factors, including organization, mobilization and action, strategy, and goals.

In general, initial movement organization in the cases studied defaulted to existing street-level administrative structures like *t'ong* and *pan*. In the early stages (from the residents' perspective), plans and issues were not articulated with sufficient clarity for residents to interpret who the players were and how their interests would be treated. Therefore, the owner squatters, whose greater or more intimate vesting in the land was recognized, took early initiatives in movement action and organization. Movements got an early boost from the legitimation implicit in the government's initial offers of compensation to owners, irrespective of its adequacy. The government's divide-and-conquer strategy, pitting tenants and owners against each other, served as an early goad to differentiated interest articulation, and hence local legitimacy.

The type of government intervention of course conditioned the relationship between tenants and owners. Under the joint redevelopment strategy, the government was clearly seeking to get the owners and the companies to take responsibility (and the

heat) for the tenants. However, this strategy had only modest success. In Mok-dong, there was considerable collaboration between tenants and owners, despite their quite discrepant treatment by the government. In Sanggye-dong, while the split between tenants and owners was initially severe, the split among those tenants content to leave Seoul and those who found relocation outside of Seoul intolerable was ultimately the most enduring. However, the high degree of norm-based legitimacy, resulting from the land ethic, the movement enjoyed in the eyes of movement participants blunted the effect of the government's strategy, that is, *divide-and-conquer*.

Mobilization was consistent and sustained in all cases analyzed. The mobilization in Kwangju-daedanji was largely that of outraged middle-class buyers of priority tickets who found themselves without infrastructure supports. (Han'guk Kidokkyo Sahoemunje Yon'guwon 1987, 33-35; Administration Survey Institute 1970, 103-105) Contrary to Tilly's argument (1978, 100-101), the repression by social control agents was not an effective strategy against squatter protests. In neither Mok-dong nor Sanggye-dong did high risk appear to reduce the intensity of the movement. On the contrary, vigorous efforts at suppression provoked more intensive resistance, enhancing movement legitimacy. Movement legitimacy was further enhanced by petitions, appeals, public statements, and particularly through network extension as religious and student groups rallied to the

residents' cause. Moreover, the SCG's official communication with participants further supported validation by its implicit acknowledgement of and the visibility it gave the squatters' claims. Seoul's deputy mayor met twice with Mok-dong residents, for example. Moreover, in both these cases, the deputy mayor traveled to meet the residents in *their* neighborhood. The Kwangju-daedanji crisis, furthermore, was resolved through intervention by the Prime Minister. This unusual intervention at a national level seems to have been motivated by the disasters generated by the SCG's zealous protection of its own purse at the expense of broader regional interests and by the threats to legitimacy implied by the incompetence apparent in the government's failure to make any preparation for employing or servicing the resettled squatters. At any rate there is little to suggest that the SCG set out to undermine movement legitimacy as such in any of the cases analyzed.

The point is that all the protests (except for dissident tenants in the Sanggye-dong case) promoted validation, that is, actions related to the land ethic, because the simplicity of the squatters situation prevented peripheral skirmishes from obscuring the central issue. Squatters had simple values and goals like priority ticket as compensation. As Gamson argued (1975, 41-49), the single issue or "setting one's sights low" was an important factor in gaining success. Their location was specific and limited to one site.

SYSTEM OPENNESS, POWER, AND POLITICAL LEVERAGE

Within memory, no one has alleged that recent Korean governments have a substantial openness. Moreover, President Reagan's ambassador to Korea has been widely quoted to the effect that Koreans in politics do not know how to compromise. While not in agreement with Mr. Reagan's envoy, this writer will not break new ground by claiming that the Korean governments in power during this period have the virtue of openness.

It remains nonetheless a fact that the squatters had limited success in getting what they wanted. They did receive compensation for what they were giving up. These appeals for benefits were accompanied by open conflict in all the cases examined: conflict between government and residents, between government and the residents' supporters, between residents and the construction industry, between tenants and owners, and between tenants and tenants. Even so, the government has consistently succeeded in having its way in the design and construction of new housing raised on squatter settlements in Seoul. Despite protests, the government persisted in implementing its renewal policy. In design, the new structures have served an increasingly affluent middle class. The protests had no effect whatever in modifying the overall implementation of this design.

Has urban renewal policy resulted from the self-interest of the state apparatus? Or has it been driven by private interests,

private decisions, or target-group interests? Who controls the where, when, and how of the development of cities? Who wields power and who makes decisions have been central questions in the study of urban politics. (Hunter 1953; Dahl 1961; Banfield 1961) More specifically, what factors influence the emergence of controversy over proposals for urban renewal?

As Gittell argued in her study on participants and participation of school policy in New York City (1968), bureaucrats as an elite played an important role in the policy making process. In developing countries like Korea, the bureaucrats have a significant degree of autonomy from society and the capacity for control necessary to achieve their goals. Because the Korean bureaucracies have considerable autonomy from and control over the economy, they are often called "bureaucratic-authoritarianism." (O'Donnell 1973 and 1978; Cardoso 1979)

Unlike neo-Marxists' assertions (Boulay 1979, 605; Jaret 1983), the Korean government -- that is, political leaders, appointed officials, and bureaucrats -- has not been simply a pawn in the games of others, but a player itself with its own vision, using and controlling social resources of its own. Although the government managed urban conflicts like squatter protests, it did not primarily aim at satisfying the capitalist class. Instead, it sought to beautify the city and to provide more standard housing stock. Satisfying the capitalist class was a secondary and incidental result. As Winkler argues (Ham and Hill

1984, 36-37), the government took a more directive and interventionist stance in the policy process. In a country where the government tells rich industrial conglomerates how much to export, what they can import, and what they can produce, such an outcome is not surprising. But at the same time, government development agencies and private developers have strong mutual interests.

Korea's construction firms, such as Hyundai, Daewoo, and Samsung, are members of larger, broad-spectrum conglomerates. (The extent of industrial concentration in Korea should be kept in mind here: five conglomerates account for over one-half the country's gross national product.) They benefit from the government's liberal loan policies, its support for product-line or industrial expansion, and its international trade policies. While chaffing under and suffering from government restrictions and occasionally heavy-handed interventions, they have benefitted from its intervention in the urban environment. Through state intervention, they find new investment opportunities. Financial considerations often dictated that construction firms build profitable middle- or upper-income housing or commercial or industrial uses on renewed land, rather than low-cost private or public housing development. Construction firms expect and to some extent propel the state to mitigate urban problems like squatter sites. In response to this expectation, the Korean

government has, by and large, not impeded capital accumulation by burdensome taxes on profits.

Along with conglomerate capital, the Korean government has also played a central role in real estate development and speculation. Speculation has no doubt been inevitable in the context of rising productivity in a country with a population of over forty million in an area smaller than Virginia, more densely populated than Japan, India, or Puerto Rico. In its search to expand the country's urban housing stock, the government made squatter settlements a prime target. The government induced monopoly capital into the speculation process. Under the banner of city beautification, the government has cleared squatters from urban areas, tearing down sustaining social networks and compelling them to abandon familiar neighborhoods and established survival strategies.

Patently and significantly, the government took the initiative in this transformation. Riding (and often overriding) market forces, the government nonetheless provided the financial impetus. Despite considerable public criticism and turmoil, the government enjoyed some legitimacy deriving from its effort to satisfy the emerging middle class's great and growing demand for housing. (Administration Survey Institute 1970, 130-133) In Seoul, mayors took command of renewal policy while the central government set both the framework and certain parameters, and approved local decisions. Mayors and technocrats were the primary movers;

they formulated renewal action and recruited investors. As appointed lieutenants rather than elected officials, mayors were beyond immediate political reach.

More surprising, perhaps, is that protesters had any success at all. In all cases examined, squatters received benefits. Molotch argues that in the speculative urban renewal game, the agents of the "growth machine" always become winners and the urban poor always become losers. (1976 and 1979) Of course, in Korea, the agents of the "growth machine" received considerable benefits from renewal policies. However, despite their much less significant gains compared to that of the agents of the "growth machine," the urban poor were not always losers. Our tale provides evidence that throughout episodes of renewal and protest, the government has been sensitive to considerations of stability and legitimacy, its own and that of others. This supports and extends O'Connor's observation that when urban renewal becomes a critical political issue, the government will give priority to political stability and legitimacy. (O'Connor, 1973)

In Seoul, squatters were not aware of renewal policy initiatives in the early stages of project formulation. Their networks lacked the reach necessary to apprise them of initiatives early enough to allow any but reactive strategies. They became engaged only after new policies had been announced or implementation set in motion. (Kim Won 1982, 15-16) Open conflicts occurred only after projects had reached the hands of the

development directors or during the stage of implementation. The opposition could negotiate only such details of a project as compensation. They were never able to affect its principal shape.

By contrast with the United States, policy formulation and implementation in Korea has a decidedly regulatory rather than legislative cast. In Korea, moreover, policy or regulatory initiatives are characteristically put in place in very general language and with little preliminary airing or discussion with those affected. Modulation of new policy or regulations is practiced on a case-by-case basis as conflicts arise between regulations and those regulated. From a Korean perspective, what made renewal policy different was not so much the absence of representation of squatters' interests initially, but their subsequent impotence to affect the basic design of housing policy once articulated.

Politicians (mostly in the ruling party) and technocrats are closely linked in shaping policy. (Lee Kuk Ch'an 1988, 20; Han Song Chu 1974) In fact, the military dictatorship has adopted a technocratic mode of functioning. Korea's leaders have been technocrats to a great extent. They have been nothing if not aggressive, outreaching, and forward-thinking. They are, as Danielson and Doig (1982) have observed, proactive about urban development because it fuels the commercial life of the city, creating jobs, higher tax revenues, and in Korea's case, the prestige and international status sought by its leaders for

themselves and for the country. The fusion of politics and expertise in Korea is, if anything, more intense, even intimate, than Savitch described when he wrote of the coalescence of politicians and technocrats in major western cities. (Savitch 1988, 248)

Seoul's mayors have been the perfect lieutenants for urban renewal. As presidential appointees, they have been responsive to the dictates of the ministries of home affairs and construction, where policy has originated. In fact, most of Seoul's mayors have been military officers. Their military experience and outlook bespeak their profession as commanders of bulldozers rather than as bargainers and brokers for a variegated public. Their political fate is not directly connected to realtors, developers, and businessmen or to the public because they are not elected by the public. Therefore, their manner of operation is best described not as political entrepreneurship, which depends upon coalition building, but as executive direction. (See Mollenkopf 1983) In Seoul, executive direction begins with a set of prescriptions, followed by consensus building. What is surprising is that a government accustomed to bullying its opponents and to having its own way became selectively sensitive and responsive to squatters' appeals.

To an unexpected extent in what has been widely and rightly regarded as an authoritarian regime, the cases presented here demonstrate clearly that successive Korean governments have

been sensitive to squatters' claims at election time, at moments of crises of succession, and in moments of turmoil. It was analogous to what Piven and Cloward regarded electoral instability as the major source of political opportunity (1979) and to what Tarrow (1989) calls vulnerability as a political opportunity. In the 1930s and 1960s in the United States, the Democrats' attempted to seek new sources of support from blacks by providing welfare policies to them. (Mollenkopf 1983) In 1956 and 1963 -- years of presidential elections -- as well as in 1959 and 1960, the years of the Student Revolution and the end of the Rhee regime, squatter removal activity dropped dramatically. In 1967, the year of the sixth presidential election, the city government announced a plan to legalize 141,520 squatter units. In fact, that year saw the legalization of only 5,000 units and in subsequent years the legalization plan collapsed. It was renewed, without apparent embarrassment, in 1971, the year of the National Assembly elections and of the seventh presidential election. That year, the government called for the legalization of 11,343 squatter units in 49 districts and for the upgrading of 47,887 units in 220 districts. These plans quickly disappeared from view, blotted out by still new promises. In the constitutional crisis (and the extra-ordinary presidential election) the following year, the government promised substantial infrastructure supports to squatter communities. Again, in 1967, the SCG announced the citizen apartment building program as the first comprehensive program of on-site, low-income housing. After the election was over, the program was plagued

by inadequate funding, lack of follow-through, poor oversight, and corruption in the contracting process.

An important question remains unresolved, namely, the extent to which the government was appealing to the squatter vote and the extent to which it was appealing to the general sentiment of the Korean voters who saw the fair distribution of land resources as a responsibility of the government. It is clear, however, that the government's accountability for its election-year promises did not extend far beyond the elections.


The government's responsiveness to squatters' appeals in Mok-dong and Sanggye-dong also came at a time when it was yet again under political pressure, this time of quite a different sort. Few who had the opportunity to observe Korean life closely in the years preceding the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympic Games would deny their impact on Korea's political life. The need for political calm and legitimacy that the impending games placed on the Korean government, as the games' hosts, was considerable, a fact which added weight to the voices of political, constitutional, and social reform. The government recognized that the principal means of avoiding an intolerable national embarrassment was compromise and reform.

Squatter removal and land speculation in Korea continue to be a powerful social issue. Almost every day people can find the issue in the media in newspapers and on television. Big firms and

real estate capital continue to invest large amount of their money not in productive sectors but in speculative real estate. As long as squatter settlements exist in Seoul, removal seems to be inevitable. Consequently, it will produce squatter protests continually unless the requested compensation is given. Even today, squatters in Seoul are protesting against renewal policy by asking for the priority ticket and housing programs for the urban poor.


Despite the squatter protests, the Korean government might continue to remove the squatters mainly because of the shortage of urban space and the need for city beautification. The government, however, might consider the request from squatters in order to promote the regime legitimacy, especially these politically turbulent days. In addition, the government is considering to adopt the local self-government system. Such new housing policies like long-term low rental housing are regarded as a way of soothing squatters. The extent of policy change would depend on the extent of protest.

Appendix 1 The Change of Seoul



Source: SCG, Metropolitan Administration, Seoul, 1988.

Appendix 2 Seoul's Squatter Settlements as of 1988



**Appendix 3 LARGE SCALE RELOCATION SETTLEMENTS OF SEOUL
1918-1981**

YEAR	SITE	UNIT	P'YONG	HOUSE- HOLD	LOT(EACH (HOUSEHOLD))
1918	Ahyon 2	1,203	15,039	2,303	10-13
1955	Mia 3	800	16,000	1,000	10
1956	Ungam 3, Mia 5	400	10,760	801	26.9
1957	Namgajwa 2, Mia 9, Pukkajwa	1,219	12,089	1,883	9.5
1958	Ungam 2, Mia 3,7,9	1,791	41,448	2,328	20.4
1959	Sangam, Mia 7	912	8,201	1,316	9.4
1960	Moraene, Yonhi, Ungam 1, Hannam, Hongun 1	1,015	14,282	1,546	16.2
1961	Susaek, Namgajwa 2, Mia 6,7, Hongun 1	1,863	59,621	3,957	19.5
1962	Kuro 1, Hongun 1,3, Pukkajwa, Mia 8	1,210	31,237	1,709	10.8
1963	Moraene, Sanggye 2, Mia 9	414	4,372	649	6.5
1964	Pondong, Chongnung 4, Sanggye 2, Sinjong	2,852	38,540	5,142	11
1965	Sadang 2, Tobong, Sanggye 1, 3	3,069	52,180	5,448	9.1
1966	Hapchong, Yomch'ang, Pongch'on 3,4, Sanggye 3, Ssangmun, Chunggye, Mach'on, Sinnim 1, Sihung, Koyo	11,313	220,238	14,284	13
1967	Sanggye 1,3, Hail, Ch'angdong, Chunggye, Ogum, Mia 8	5,363	111,116	7,058	8.6
1968	Ch'ongjin, Sanggye 3, Chunggye, Sinnim 2,3, Karak, Kodok, Pongch'on 1,2	12,214	204,962	13,238	11.3
1969	Sadang 1, Karak, Kongnung	484	25,315	1,277	11.5
1970	Yonhi 1	65	520	74	8
1971	Sihung 2, Pongch'on 4, Yonhi 1	1,893	39,675	1,209	8.2
1972	Sinjong, Yonhi 1	397	12,038	326	12
1979	Chin'gwanne 215		1,713	384	
1980	Chin'gwanne, Tonam	50	8,309	246	
1981	Yokch'on	344	6,377	344	18

Source: Chong Cha Hwan 1984, 8-15.

**Appendix 4:A Squatter Settlements at Which Removal Work had been
Finished, as of 9/30/87**

Name of Settlement	P'yongage (a ²)	No. of Housing Units at Clearance	No. of House-hold (units)	New Year Cleared	New Const-ruction (type & year)	Agent	Finance
Ahyon 2	87,358	1,933	1,397	9/76	S&M(1/81)	SCG	SR
Chegi 1	25,447	252	156	7/76	M(1/81)	SCG	SR
Ch'ong-ryangri 3	19,011	186	178	9/75	S(6/78)	SCG	SR
Ch'onho 1	32,151	138	479	9/83	A(1/85)	C	JD
Chonnong 1	27,376	237	238	6/78	M(9/81)	SCG	CD
Chonnong 2	8,277	158	87	2/78	S(2/81)	SCG	SR
Ch'ung-jong1-1	10,820	146	146	12/72	S (?)	SCG	SR
Hannam 1	18,383	78	80	9/74	S(3/79)	SCG	SR
Hongje 3-1	3,681	91	91	7/80	M(12/81)	SCG	CD
Hongje 6	38,874	236	112	11/79	M(9/81)	SCG	CD
Hongun 5-1	57,120	280	280	6/74	S(12/85)	SCG	SR
Hongun 6	21,380	385	136	7/76	A(1/81)	SCG	SR
Huan 1	11,286	70	232	12/79	A(9/81)	SCG	CD
Hyonjo 3	116,482	549	653	4/79	M(1085)	SCG	CD
Koch'ok	28,965	166	143	9/75	S(1/81)	SCG	SR
Koyo 1	29,563	157	187	9/75	S(1/81)	SCG	SR
Koyo 3	36,558	140	249	6/76	S(3/77)	SCG	SR
Kumho 1-5	26,285	175	622		(87)		
Kumho 2	133,860	676	680	4/77	S(1/81)	SCG	SR
Kuro 1-1	19,725	213	493	11/83	A(12/84)	C	JD
Kuro 4	14,623	120	427		(87)		
Mach'on 1	35,322	306	342	9/77	S(12/81)	SCG	AID
Mach'on 2	57,862	645	616	9/77	S(12/81)	SCG	AID
Mach'on 3	11,776	129	127	9/77	S(12/81)	SCG	AID
Mia 3	24,795	66	48	9/77	M(12/81)	SCG	SR
Mia 5-1	12,400	91	91	4/80	A(12/81)	SCG	CD
Mukchong	5,762	156	289	3/83	A(11/83)	C	CD
Myonmok 1	23,200	243	163	9/75	S(6/78)	SCG	SR
Myonmok 2	13,579	119	58	5/74	S(3/79)	SCG	SR
Naagajwa 3	3,340	136	100	4/80	A(2/81)	SCG	CD
Ogin 1	66,261	122	99	9/75	S&M(9/81)	SCG	CD
Oksu 1	66,733	593	426	9/77	S(7/82)	SCG	AID
Oksu 2	103,637	937	198	9/77	S(7/82)	SCG	AID
Oksu 3	97,873	540	455	10/76	S(12/81)	SCG	AID
Oksu 5-1	10,240	120	120	10/76	A(1/81)	SCG	CD
Oksu 5-2	40,932	55	430		(87)		
Pon 1-2	34,989	320	720		(87)		
Pongch'on 2	10,375	111	204	9/76	A(1/81)	SCG	SR

Pugahyon 2	12,602	52	52	9/74	S(3/79)	SCG	SR
Sadang 3-1	48,480	868	868	7/81	A(7/83)	SCG	CD
Samch'ong 1	7,517	25	22	10/76	S(1/81)	SCG	SR
Sangdo 8-1	13,384	263	42	9/75	S(1/81)	SCG	SR
Sihung 1	198,930	1,980	4,700		(87)		
Sihung 2	344,020	526	2,700		(87)		
Sindang 1-1	34,678	295	295	9/79	M(12/81)	SCG	CD
Sindang 2	32,492	163	163	3/76	S(9/81)	SCG	SR
Sindang 3	104,170	1,220	2,000		(87)		
Singil 3-1	15,900	130	130	2/80	A(5/81)	SCG	CD
Sinnia 2-2	26,185	350	1,225		(87)		
Sobinggo 1	11,751	58	73	9/75	S(1/81)	SCG	SR
Ssangaun 2	11,900	79	104	12/79	A(12/80)	SCG	CD
Taebang 1	6,766	115	53	2/79	S(9/81)	SCG	SR
Tapsipri 1	13,098	139	108	6/76	S(1/81)	SCG	SR
Tapsipri 3-1	26,477	163	490		(87)		
Tapsipri 6-3	7,155	86	225		(87)		
Tonam 3-1	23,910	216	216	10/79	A(5/85)	SCG	CD
Wolgye 2	7,644	122	136	6/80	A(7/82)	SCG	CD
Yoksam 1	62,343	139	1,000		(87)		

Source: Kidokkyo Tosibinmin Son'gyo Hyobuihoe [Christian Mission Committee for Urban Poor], 1988, 43.

* financing mechanism

SR = self-reliance

AID = aid from International Bank

CD = consignment development

JD = joint development

* implementation agent

SCG = Seoul city government

C = Corporation

* construction type

S = single-family house

S & M = single- & multi-family house

M = multi-family house

A = apartment

Appendix 4:B Squatter Settlements Which were under Construction, as of 1987

Name of Settlement	P'yongage (m ²)	No. of Housing Units at clearance	No. of New Year Household (units)	Cleared	New Const- ruction (type)	Agent
Ahyon 1	138,860	1,377	631	2/20/79	S&H	SCG
Anas 2	179,100	1,194	801	11/2/79	S	SCG
Ch'ong- ryangri 2	13,821	199	241	10/9/85	A	C
Ch'ongun 1	15,250	114	205	4/23/84	A	C
Ch'onho 2	8,851	157	158	3/21/86	A	C
Ch'onho 3	7,347	35	122	9/27/86	A	Hyondae
Ch'ung- jong1-2	12,592	96	86	12/4/86	S&H	SCG
Hawang 1-1	72,428	232	430	10/30/85	A	C
Hongun 4-1	94,220	517	299	11/6/85	A	C
Hongun 4-4	1,646	4	?	7/27/85	A	C
Hongun 5-2	32,017	283	560	8/20/86	A	P'ungria
Hongun 5-3	171,380	938	1,710	7/27/85	A	C
Hongun 5-4	8,710	70	181	8/19/86	A	P'ungria
Huksok 1-1	29,982	172	660	9/10/86	A	Hyondae
Huksok 1-2	44,450	268	960	11/5/86	A	Hyondae
Huksok 2	97,179	372	160	6/6/81	S	SCG
Hyoeh'ang 2-2	37,808	190	123	3/21/86	A	Hansin
Karak 1	35,456	603	838	3/13/85	A	C
Karak 2	17,623	65	448	10/18/86	A	Saaho
Koyo 2	75,380	1,219	1,089	4/23/84	S	SCG
Kumho 1-1	18,398	134	200	3/20/86	A	Taeria
Kumho 1-3	275,837	250	855	5/16/84	A	C
Kumho	44,225	502	749	10/31/86	A	Taeria
Kuro 2	10,167	115	118	10/19/85	A	C
Kuro 3	21,612	166	494	11/13/86	A	Hyondae
Kuro 5	14,655	65	397	7/30/86	A	Hyondae
Man-ri	29,220	354	237	6/25/82	S	SCG
Mia 5-2	165,386	498	500	3/2/86	S	SCG
Oksu 4	74,566	252	900	6/2/84	A	C
Panp'o 1	25,440	61	414	9/15/86	A	Hansin
Pondong 1-1	82,906	520	297	4/14/84	S	SCG
Pongch'on 2-1	64,805	888	900	3/21/86	A	K'orong
Pongch'on 4	243,010	1,842	552	10/11/80	S&H	SCG
Pongch'on 6	15,391	216	251	3/21/86	A	Hyondae
Puggajwa 1	34,425	249	660	3/14/85	A	C
Sadang 3-2	20,779	278	290	3/21/86	A	C
Sanggye 4-1	43,620	1,528	1,547	11/17/86	A	Han'gug- gonup

Sanggye 4-2	28,377	373	705	12/31/86	A	Taeria
Sanggye 5-1	74,835	405	72	8/14/85	S	SCG
Sindang 1-2	36,946	1,081	705	6/25/84	A	C
Sin'gil 2	158,183	871	268	2/28/78	S&M	SCG
Sin'gil 4	6,125	53	108	10/29/86	A	Life
Saangsaun 1	119,438	769	104	12/13/79	S	SCG
Taehyon 1	41,492	650	900	12/3/86	A	Locky
Taeria	26,973	294	591	3/5/85	A	C
Tapsipri 6-1	67,831	130	221	1/25/85	A	C
Tohwa 3	69,841	599	1,178	12/3/86	A	Osong
Tonaa 2-1	22,781	217	714	10/29/86	A	Sambu- t'ogon
Tonaa 2-2	16,990	235	462	12/18/86	A	Hyondae
Tonaa 3-2	123,920	589	500	3/12/86	S	SCG
Tongsomun	191,080	1,605	3,801	10/2/86	A	Hansin
Ungaa 4-1	17,664	100	292	12/12/86	A	Osong
Ungaa 4-2	220,400	1,432	149	1/12/83	S	SCG
Yokch'on	36,364	19	16	2/6/82	S	SCG
Yongsan 1	382,000	1,714	565	0/24/79	S&M	SCG
Yonhi 3	159,700	269	200	10/23/79	S&M	SCG

Source: SCG January 1987.

* implementation agent

SCG = Seoul city government

C = Corporation

* construction type

S = single-family house

S & M = single- & multi-family house

M = multi-family house

A = apartment

Appendix 4:C Squatter Settlements Which are Designated as a Renewal District, as of 1987

Name of Settlement	P'yongage (a ²)	No. of Units at Clearance
Changch'ung 1	21,811	145
Ch'angsin 1	64,659	586
Ch'angsin 3	86,450	1,209
Ch'angsin 6	15,384	81
Chonnong 3	88,192	611
Ch'ungjong 1-3	44,958	342
Haengdang	90,611	787
Hawang 1-2	37,583	758
Hawang 2	74,918	1,102
Hawang 3	75,523	401
Hongje 1	50,790	99
Hongje 3	57,194	343
Hongje 4	40,000	228
Hongje 11	60,510	297
Hongje 13-2	29,052	171
Hongun 1	32,520	69
Hongun 3	181,000	936
Hongun 4-2	54,070	310
Hongun 4-3	23,174	203
Hongun 5-5	12,032	37
Hwanghak	122,453	987
Hyoch'ang 2-1	16,466	159
Kuaho 1-2	33,115	205
Kuaho 1-4	176,130	800
Kuaho 5	71,446	880
Kuro 1-2	5,042	57
Mach'on 4	3,717	50
Mia 1	233,113	1,754
Mia 7	22,678	196
Myongil	18,400	224
Myonaok 3	13,244	121
Oksu 7-1	28,796	259
Oksu 7-2	18,000	3
Oksu 7-3	13,171	61
Oksu 7-4	5,749	36
Oksu 8	30,200	82
Pangbae 1	30,000	52
Pondong 2	129,372	750
Pondong 2-1	41,376	287
Pongch'on 1	102,585	472
Pongch'on 2-2	75,080	999
Pongch'on 3	137,525	1,330
Pongch'on 7	97,708	1,990
Pugahyon 5	19,640	93
Sadang 2-1	11,651	82
Sadang 2-2	77,127	1,056

Sadang 4	185,028	2,087
Sangdo 1	60,907	268
Sangdo 4	11,646	84
Sangdo 8-2	4,336	20
Sangdo 9	14,189	13
Sanggye 1	66,080	455
Sanggye 2	102,400	1,131
Sanggye 3	138,221	2,938
Sanggye 5-2	62,256	405
Sanggye 6	239,000	2,481
Sangwang	222,439	1,190
Sindang 4	67,498	630
Sin'gil 3-2	10,618	148
Sin'gongdok	72,099	648
Sin'gye	17,780	134
Sinjong 4	77,740	320
Sinjong 5	32,090	312
Sinnim 2-1	88,744	1,177
Sinnim 3	68,981	776
Sinnim 4	40,547	735
Sungin 3	30,509	87
Susaek 2	41,900	264
Taehyon 2	6,628	93
Tapsipri 3	64,054	248
Tapsipri 6-2	22,385	136
Tapsipri 6-4	31,043	189
Tobong	56,540	1,855
Tohwa 1	56,004	640
Tohwa 2	40,849	759
Tonam 2	55,628	529
Yangp'yong 1	13,263	310
Yongsan 2	39,865	410

Source: SCG January 1987.

Appendix 5:A MAJOR ECONOMIC INDICES

YEAR	WPI*	CPI**	HLPI***
1975	100.0	100.0	100.0
1977	122.2	127.0	160.8
1979	162.1	171.9	303.3
1980	225.2	221.3	349.0
1981	275.8	272.9	377.0
1982	283.8	287.9	398.1

Source: Korea Housing Bank, Dep. of Survey, 1983.

* WPI: Wholesale Price Index

** CPI: Consumer Price Index

*** HLPI: Housing Land Price Index

Appendix 5:B SELECTED PRICE INDICES: 1965-78

Year	HPI*	HSPI**	GNP deflator
1965	100	100	100
1966	142	165	114
1967	165	200	132
1968	217	303	153
1969	365	675	176
1970	379	656	203
1971	516	993	229
1972	593	1,033	264
1973	638	1,116	299
1974	802	1,400	390
1975	1,108	2,009	482
1975	1,414	2,707	571
1977	1,759	3,472	659
1978	3,043	7,881	784

Source: Kim Kwang Suk, "Basic Alternatives of Korea's Housing Policy for the 1980s," in Papers for Housing Symposium 1979.

* HPI: Housing Price Index

** HSPI: Housing Site Price Index

Appendix 5:C PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN LAND PRICES:
1967-73; 1979-89

Year	WPI*	LPI**
1967-68	8.1	33.5
1968-69	6.8	36.0
1969-70	9.1	14.5
1970-71	8.7	25.0
1971-72	13.1	1.2
1972-73	7.0	3.1
1978-79		16.6
1979-80		11.7
1980-81		7.5
1981-82		5.4
1982-83		18.5
1983-84		13.2
1984-85		7.0
1985-86		7.3
1986-87		14.7
1987-88		27.5
1988-89		30.5

Source: MOC, Han'guk chut'aek chongch'aek kwa changgi chut'aek konsol kyehoek [Korea Housing Policy and Long-Term Housing Construction Plan]. Seoul: MOC, 1975, 65; Korea Land Development Corporation, 89 yon pudongsan sijang kyolsan [Final Report on Real Estate Market of 1989], 1990.

* WPI: Wholesale Price Index

** LPI: Land Price Index

Appendix 6 Korean Won Exchange Rate for Dollar

YEAR	RATE
1984	895
1985	890
1986	861
1987	792
1988	684
1989	680
1990	700


Source: Han'guk Unhaeng [Korea National Bank], *T'onggye pogo* [Statistical Report], 1990.

Appendix 7 Seoul's Typical Squatter Structures



Photo by Lee Jong Youl

Appendix 8 Kwangju-daedanji Protest



Source: Dong-A Ilbo, August 12, 1971.

Appendix 9 Today's Mok-dong




Photo by Lee Jong Youl

Appendix 10 Sanggye-dong Squatter Protest



Source: Dong-A Ilbo, December 15, 1987.

Appendix 11 Today's Sanggye-dong



Photo by Lee Jong Youl

BIBLIOGRAPHY (ENGLISH)

- Abrams, Charles. *Man's Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanising World*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1964.
- Achtenberg, Emily Paradise & Peter Marcuse. "Toward the Decommmodification of Housing." In *Critical Perspectives on Housing*, eds. Rachel G. Bratt et al. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986: 474-83.
- Alinsky, Saul D. *Rules for Radicals*. New York: Random House, 1969.
- Anderson, Martin. *The Federal Bulldozer*. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1964.
- Bachrach, Peter and Morton S. Baratz. "Two Faces of Power." *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 56 (December 1962): 947-52.
- Banfield, Edward C. *Political Influences*. New York: The Free Press, 1961.
- _____. *The Unheavenly City*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1970.
- Bar, H. A. C. "Notes on the Capital of Korea." In *Transaction of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, Vol. 11 (1883): 243-59.
- Blumer, H. "Collective Behavior." In *New Outline of the Principles of Sociology*, ed. A. M. Lee. New York: Barnes & Nobel, 1946: 165-220.
- Boulay, Harvey. "Social Control Theories of Urban Politics." *Social Science Quarterly*, Vol. 59, No. 4 (March 1979): 605-21.
- Brandt, Vincent S.R. "Seoul Slums and the Rural Migrant." Paper presented at the Seminar on Tradition and Change, Seoul, September 1969.
- _____. "Mass Migration and Urbanization in Contemporary Korea," *Asia*, Vol. 20 (Winter 1970/71): 31-49.
- _____. "Young Migrants to Seoul: Dimensions of Complexity." Paper presented to the Panel on Migration in Korea, Association for Asian Studies, 1973.

- _____. "Urban Squatters Eight Years Later." A paper prepared for the Thirtieth Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Chicago, Ill. March 31-April 2, 1978.
- _____. "Upward Bound: A Look at Korea's Migrant Squatters," In Korea Culture Service, *Korean Culture*, Vol. 2, No. 4, 1982: 14-37.
- Bratt, Rachel G. et al. *Critical Perspectives on Housing*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986.
- Burgess, R. "The Politics of Urban Residence in Latin America." *IJURR*, Vol. 6 (1982): 465-80.
- Cardoso, Fernando Henrique. "On the Characterization of Authoritarian Regimes in Latin America." In *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America*, ed. David Collier. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979: 33-57.
- Castells, Manuel. *The Urban Question: A Marxist Approach*. London: Edward Arnold, 1977.
- _____. *The City and the Grassroots: A Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban Social Movements*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.
- Ceccarelli, Paolo. "Politics, Parties, and Urban Movements: Western Europe." In *Urban Policy Under Capitalism*, eds. Norman I. Fainstein and Susan S. Fainstein. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1982: 261-76.
- Ch'oe J. H. and Lee Tae Il. "Attributes of Metropolitan Suburbanization in Seoul Capital Region and Their Policy Implications." A Paper Presented at Korea/United States Seminar on Urban/Regional/Transportation Development Planning and Environmental Management, Seoul, 18-24 August 1985.
- Ch'oe S. C. and Song Byung Nak. "An Evaluation of Industrial Location Policies for Urban Deconcentration in Seoul Region." *Journal of Environmental Studies*, Vol. 14 (1984): 73-116.
- Clare, Kenneth G. et al. *Area Handbook for the Republic of Korea*. Washington D.C.: The American University Press, 1969.
- Collier, David. *Squatters and Oligarchs: Authoritarian Rule and Policy Change in Peru*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976.

- Connolly, W, ed. *The Bias of Pluralism*. New York: Atherton, 1969.
- Dahl, Robert. *Who Governs?* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961.
- _____. *Pluralist Democracy in the United States: Conflict and Consensus*. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967.
- Danielson, Michael N. and Jameson W. Doig. *New York: The Politics of Urban Regional Development*. Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982.
- Davies, James C. "Toward a Theory of Revolution." *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 27 (1962): 5-19.
- _____. "The J-curve of Rising and Declining Satisfaction as a Cause of Some Great Revolutions and a Contained Rebellion." In *Violence in America*, eds. Hugh Davis Graham and Fred Robert Gurr. New York: Bantam, 1969: 671-709.
- Davis, Kingsley. "Urbanization." In *The Urban Economy*, ed. Harold M. Hochman. New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1976: 1-17.
- Doxiadis, C. A. *Urban Renewal and the Future of the American City*. Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1966.
- Drakakis-Smith, David. *Urbanization, Housing and the Development Process*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980.
- Dunleavy, P. *Urban Political Analysis*. London: Macmillan, 1980.
- Dwyer, D. J. *People and Housing in Third World Cities*. New York: Longman, 1979.
- Eckstein, Susan. *The Poverty of Revolution: The State and the Urban Poor in Mexico*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977.
- Fainstein, Susan S. & Norman I. Fainstein. "Economic Restructuring and the Rise of Urban Social Movements." *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (December 1985): 187-206.
- Freeman, Jo. "On the Origins of Social Movements." In *Social Movements of the Sixties and Seventies*, ed. Jo Freeman. New York: Longman, Inc., 1983: 8-30.
- Gamson, William A. *The Strategy of Social Protest*. Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1975.

- Gendrot, Sophie N. "Government Responses to Popular Movements: France and the United States." In *Urban Policy Under Capitalism*, eds. Norman I. Fainstein and Susan S. Fainstein. Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, Inc., 1982: 277-300.
- Gittell, Marilyn. *Participants and Participation: A Study of School Policy in New York City*. New York: Frederic A. Praeger, Publishers, 1968.
- _____. "Violence as a Political Strategy: Defending the Status Quo." Presented at meetings of the American Political Science Association, New York, N.Y., 1981.
- Goodall, Leonard E. & Donald P. Sprengel, 2nd eds. *The American Metropolis*. Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1975.
- Gordon, David M. "Capitalism and the Roots of the Urban Crisis." In *The Fiscal Crisis of American Cities*, eds. Roger Alcaly and David Mermelstein. New York: Vintage, 1977: 82-112.
- _____. "Capitalist Development and the History of American Cities." In *Marxism and the Metropolis*, 2nd eds. William K. Tabb and Larry Sawers. New York: Oxford University Press, 1984: 21-53.
- Greer, Scott. *Urban Renewal and American Cities: The Dilemma of Democratic Intervention*. New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1965.
- Groberg, Robert P. *Centralized Relocation*. Washington, D.C.: National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials, 1969.
- Gurr, Ted Robert. "A Causal Model of Civil Strife." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 62 (1968): 1104-1124.
- _____. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970.
- Ha Seong Kyu. "State-Developed Housing in Korea: A Case Study from Seoul." Ph.D. Dissertation, University of London, 1984.
- Hahm Pyong-Choon. *The Korean Political Tradition and Law*. Seoul: The Royal Asiatic Society, 1967.
- Ham, Christopher and Michael Hill. *The Policy Process in the Modern Capitalist State*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984.

- Han Song Chu. *The Failure of Democracy in Seoul*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974.
- Hardoy, J. E. and D. Satterthwaite. *Shelter Need and Response*. Chichester, John Wiley and Sons, 1981.
- Harloe, Michael. "Notes on Comparative Urban Research." In *Urbanisation & Urban Planning in Capitalist Society*, eds. Michael Dear and Allen J. Scott. New York: Methuen, 1981: 179-195.
- Harvey, David. *Social Justice and the City*. London: Edward Arnold, 1973.
- _____. "The Urban Process under Capitalism: A Framework for Analysis." In *Urbanization & Urban Planning in Capitalist Society*, eds. Michael Dear & Allen J. Scott New York: Methuen, 1981: 91-121.
- Hauser, Phillip M. "The Social, Economic, and Technological Problems of Rapid Urbanization." *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Oct. 1957): 18-24.
- Hay, Richard, Jr. "Patterns of Urbanization and Socio-Economic Development in the Third World: An Overview." In *Third World Urbanization*, eds. Janet Abu-Lughod and Richard Hay, Jr. New York: Methuen, 1977: 71-101.
- Henig, Jeffrey R. *Neighborhood Mobilization: Redevelopment and Response*. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1982.
- Hobsbawm, Eric J. *Primitive Rebels*. Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1959.
- Hunter, Floyd. *Community Power Structure: A Study of Decision Makers*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953.
- Hwang Myong Ch'an. "A Search for a Development Strategy for the Capital Region of Korea." A Paper Prepared for the International Conference on Planning for the Capital Region: Strategy and Policy for Growth Management, 1982-1991. Seoul: Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements, 1979.
- _____. *Growth and Management of Seoul Metropolitan Region*. Seoul: Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements, 1982.

- Institute of Urban Studies and Development. *Rural-urban Migrants, Squatter Settlements and Low-income Housing Policy in Seoul* (unpublished paper), Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1979.
- Jacobs, Sidney. *The Right To A Decent House*. Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976.
- Jaret, Charles. "Recent Neo-Marxist Urban Analysis." *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 9 (1983): 499-525.
- Jenkins, J. Craig and Charles Perrow. "Insurgency of the Powerless: Farm Worker Movements (1946-1972)." *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 42 (April 1977): 249-68.
- Kihl Young Whan. "Policy Output and Electoral Competition in Korean Cities." Unpublished Paper Delivered at the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, 1973.
- Killian, Lewis M. "Organization, Rationality and Spontaneity in the Civil Rights Movement." *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 49 (Dec. 1984): 770-83.
- Kim Dai Young and John E. Sloboda. "Migration and Korean Development." In *Economic Development, Population Policy, and Demographic Transition in the Republic of Korea*, ed. Robert Repetto et al. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981: 41-53.
- Kim Hee Kyung and Mo Sumi. "Nutrition Status of Pre-School Children of Low Income Families in Urban Areas." *Journal of Korea Public Health Association*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (1979): 65-63.
- Kim Won. "A Study of National New Town Development Policy in Korea." Ph.D. Dissertation, Columbia University, 1974.
- Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements. *Final Report on Housing Policy Development Research*. Seoul, August 1983.
- Kornhauser, Arthur. *The Politics of Mass Society*. Glencoe, Il.: Free Press, 1959.
- Lang, Kurt and Gladys Lang. *Collective Dynamics*. New York: Crowell, 1961.
- Lawson, Ronald and Stephen E. Barton. "Sex Roles in Social Movements: A Case Study of the Tenant Movement in New York City." *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1980): 234-248.

- Lee Chae Chin. "Urban Political Competition in a Developing Nation: The Case of Korea." *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (April 1971): 107-116.
- Lipsky, Michael. *Protest in City Politics: Rent Strikes, Housing and the Power of the Poor*. Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1970.
- _____. "Protest as a Political Resource." In *Classics of Urban Politics and Administration*, ed. William J. Murin. Oak Park, Illinois: Moore Publishing Company, Inc., 1982: 136-155.
- Long, Norton. "The Local Community as an Ecology of Games." *American Journal of Sociology*, No. 64 (1958): 251-61.
- Lowe, Stuart. *Urban Social Movements: The City After Castells*. London: Macmillan, 1986.
- Lowi, T. J. *The Politics of Disorder*. New York: Basic Books, 1971.
- Manley, John. "Neo-Pluralism: A Class Analysis of Pluralism I and Pluralism II." *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 77, No. 2 (June 1983): 368-83.
- Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. "The City, The Division of Labor, and the Emergence of Capitalism." In *Third World Urbanization*, eds. Janet Abu-Lughod and Richard Hay, Jr. New York: Methuen, 1977: 22-28.
- McCarthy, John. D. and Mayer. N. Zald. *The Trends of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization*. Morristown, N.J.: The General Learning Press, 1973.
- _____. "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory." *American Journal of Sociology*, No. 82 (1977): 1212-41.
- Mcgee, J. C. "Conservation and Dissolution in the Third World City." *Burg Wartenstien Symposium No. 23*. New York, Wennergren Foundation, 1977.
- Mills, Edwin S. "The Nature of Urban Areas." In *The Urban Economy*, ed. Harold M. Hochman. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1976: 18-31.
- Mills, Edwin S. and Song Byung Nak. *Urbanisation and Urban Problems*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979.

- Mitchell, J. Clyde. "Urbanization, Detribalization, and Stabilization in Southern Africa: A Problem of Definition and Measurement." A report of the International African Institute, London. *Social Implications of Industrialization and Urbanization in Africa South of the Sahara*. Prepared under the auspices of UNESCO. Paris: UNESCO, 1956.
- Mollenkopf, John H. *Community Organization and City Politics*. Cambridge, Mass.: Department of Government, Harvard University, unpublished thesis, 1973.
- _____. "The Post-War Politics of Urban Development." *Politics and Society*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (1975): 247-95.
- _____. *The Contested City*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983.
- Molotch, Harvey. "The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place." *American Journal of Sociology*, No. 82 (September 1976): 309-32.
- _____. "Capital and Neighborhood in the United States: Some Conceptual Links." *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, Vol. 14 (March 1979): 289-312.
- Moore, Wilbert E. *Social Change*. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963.
- Morris, Aldon D. "Black Southern Student Sit-In Movement: An Analysis of Internal Organization." *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 46 (Dec. 1981): 744-67.
- _____. *The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizing for Change*. New York: The Free Press, 1984.
- Mumford, Lewis. *The City in History*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1961.
- Nelson, Joan M. *Access to Power: Politics and the Urban Poor in Developing Nations*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979.
- Niebanck, Paul L. *Relocation in Urban Planning*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968.
- Nordlinger, E. A. *On the Autonomy of the Democratic State*. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981.
- Oberschall, Anthony. *Social Conflict and Social Movements*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973.

O'Connor, James. *The Fiscal Crisis of the State*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973.

O'Donnell, Guillermo A. *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics*. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973.

_____. "Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State." *Latin American Research Review*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Winter 1978): 3-38.

Olson, Mancur. *The Logic of Collective Action*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965.

Perlman, Janice E. *The Myth of Marginality*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976.

Piven, Frances Fox and Richard A. Cloward. *Poor People's Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail*. New York: Vintage Books, 1979.

Renaud, B. "Economic Structure, Growth and Urbanization in Korea." A Paper Prepared for Multi-Disciplinary Conference on South Korean Industrialization, Honolulu, Hawaii, 1979.

Roberts, B. *Cities of Peasants*. London: Edward Arnold, 1978.

Ross, Marc Howard. *The Political Integration of Urban Squatters*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973.

Sackrey, Charles. *The Political Economy of Urban Poverty*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1973.

Saini, Balwant. "Site Development and Sanitary Services." In *Housing in Third World Countries*, eds. H.S. Murison and J.P. Lea. London: MacMillan, 1979: 87-109.

Savitch, H. V. *Post-Industrial Cities: Politics and Planning in New York, Paris, and London*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988.

Schattschneider, E. E. *The Semi-Sovereign People*. Hinsdale, IL: Dryden, 1960.

Schulz, Ann. *Local Politics and Nation-States: Case Studies in Politics and Policy*. Santa Barbara, California: Clio Books, 1979.

Smelser, Neil J. *Theory of Collective Behavior*. New York: Free Press, 1963.

- Stone, Clarence. "Social Stratification and Community Power: Decisions, Nondecisions and Beyond." Presented at meetings of the Political Studies Association, Manchester, England, 1980.
- _____. "Social Stratification, Nondecision-making, and the Study of Community Power." *American Politics Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (July 1982): 275-302.
- _____. "Systemic Power in Community Decision Making: A Restatement of Stratification Theory." In *Readings in Urban Politics: Past, Present, & Future*, eds. Harlen Hahn and Charles H. Levine. New York: Longman, 1984: 159-80.
- Stone, Clarence N. & Heywood T. Sanders, eds. *The Politics of Urban Development*. Lawrence, Kansas: The University Press of Kansas, 1987.
- Tarrow, Sidney. *Struggle, Politics, and Reform: Collective Action, Social Movements, and Cycles of Protest*. New York: Center for International Studies Cornell University, 1989.
- Tilly, Charles. *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1978.
- _____. "Social Movements and National Politics." *CRSO Working Paper 197*, Ann Arbor, MI., 1979.
- Truman, D. "The American System in Crisis." *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 74 (1959): 481-97.
- Turner, Ralph. "Collective Behavior and Resource Mobilization as Approaches to Social Movements: Issues and Continuities." *Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change*, No. 4 (1981): 1-24.
- Turner, Ralph and Lewis Killian, 2nd ed. *Collective Behavior*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972.
- United Nations. *Population Growth and Policies in Mega-Cities: Seoul*. New York, 1986.
- Wachtel, Howard. "Looking at Poverty from a Radical Perspective." *Review of Radical Political Economics* (Summer 1971): 1-19.
- Ward, Peter M. *Self-Help Housing*. London: Mansell, 1984.
- Whang In Chong. *Social Development in Action: The Korean Experience*. Seoul: KDI, 1986.

Wiarda, Howard J. *Corporatism and Development: The Portuguese Experience*. Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1977.

Wilson, James Q. *Urban Renewal: The Record and the Controversy*. Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1966.

BIBLIOGRAPHY (KOREAN)

- Administration Survey Institute. "Seoul-si simin ap'at'u saop" [Citizen Apartment Project of Seoul], *Han'guk haengjong saryejip* [The Casebook of Korean Administration]. Graduate School of Public Administration, Seoul National University, 1970: 105-43.
- Ch'ae Kwang Sok. "Mok-dong ch'olgomin siwisagon" [Mok-dong Squatter Protest], *Hyonsilgwa chonmang I*. Seoul: Pulbit, 1984: 298-313.
- Chang Se Hun. "Tosi muhoga chongch'kchi ch'olgo chongbi chongch'aeke kwanhan ilyon'gu" [A Study on the Squatter Settlement Clearance Policy in Seoul]. Master Thesis, Department of Sociology, Graduate School of Seoul National University, 1987.
- Chang Song Uk. "Sanggye-dong ch'olgomin" [Sanggye-dong Relocatee]. In *Kajinjawa moggajinja* [The Have and Have-nots], ed. Dong-A Ilbosa. Seoul: Dong-A Ilbosa, 1988: 253-278.
- Cho Un and Cho Ok Ra. *Han'guk tosi muhoga p'anjach'on chuminui saenghwal* [The Life of Urban Squatters in Korea: The Case of Sadang-2-dong Redevelopment Area in Seoul]. Seoul: The Population and Development Studies Center of Seoul National University, 1987.
- Ch'oe Mun Song. "Tosibinminui chongch'ijok nungryoge kwanhan yon'gu" [A Study on the Political Ability of the Urban Poor]. Master Thesis, Department of Political Science, Graduate School of Seoul National University, 1984.
- Chohapwon Iltong. *Minjusimin'gge turinun gul* [A Statement Addressed to Democratic People]. 3 July 1986.
- Chon Song Ch'on. Interview by Author, 14 June 1988, Songnam-si.
- Chong Cha Hwan. "Han'gukaahoe yon'gue issosoui chesamsegyejok chopkonui kanungsong" [The Possibility of the Third World Approach in Studying Korean Society]. *Songsim Women's College Research Paper*, Vol. 16, 1984: 1-25.
- Chong Tong Ik. *Tosibinmin yon'gu* [A Study on the Urban Poor]. Seoul: Ach'im, 1985.

- Ch'onjugyo/Kaesin'gyo Chaegaebaljiyok Kongdongjosa Wiwonhoe [The Joint Investigation Committee of Catholic and Protestant Church on Renewal Districts]. *Tobong-gu Sanggye-5-dong 173 ponji chaegaebaljiyok chosabogoso* [A Survey Report on the Sanggye-5-dong Renewal District]. (1986): 4-11.
- Ch'onjugyo Tosibinmin Samok Hyobuihoe [Catholic Urban Poor Ministry]. *Che 2 ch'a chonggi ch'onghoe charyo* [The Second Regular Meeting Data]. (23 February 1987).
- Choson Ilbo, 12 April 1983; 17 August 1985.
- Chu Chong Won. "Seoul-si pulryang chut'aek chigu kaesone kwanhan yon'gu." [A Study on Improving Substandard Dwelling Settlements in Seoul] *Kukt'ogaebal* [National Land Development], Vol. 19, No. 1 (1984): 25-38.
- Chungang Ilbo, 12 May; 22 October 1983; 25 August; 27 September 1984; 25 December 1986.
- Daly, John V. Interview by Author, 20 July 1988, Seoul.
- Dong-A Ilbo, 28 September; 26, 29 October 1964; 29 April; 18 June 1965; 25 April 1967; 9 April & June 21 1970; 5 June 1971; 21 August & September 21 1984; 26 December 1986; 14 April 1987; 12 September 1988.
- Han Sang Chin, et al. *Tosi pigongsik pumun yon'gu* [A Study on Urban Informal Sector]. Seoul: The Institute of Modern Society, 1985.
- Han'guk Ilbo, 19 September 1985; 9 June 1988.
- Han'guk Kidokkyo Sahoemunje Yon'guwon [Institute of Korea Christian Social Problems]. *Minjungui him, minjungui kyohoe*. [People's Power and People's Church] Seoul: Minjungsa, 1987.
- Han'guk Kyohoe Sahoe Son'gyo Hyobuihoe [The Korean Church Social Ministry]. Pamphlet. 1987.
- Ho Sok Ryol. "Tosi muhoga chongch'akchiui koyonggujoe kwanhan ilgoch'al" [A Study on the Employment Structure in Urban Squatter Settlements]. *Han'guk sahoe yon'gu I* [A Study on Korean Society I]. Seoul, 1982: 239-261.
- Hong Hyon Chong. Interview by Author, 17 July 1988, Seoul.

Hong In Ok. "Mok-dongsik kongyong kaebali chugoji hyongseonge mich'inun uimiwa p'yongga" [The Evaluation of Mok-dong Public Development on Forming Residential Area]. Master Thesis, Seoul National University, 1988.

Hong Se Kwang. "Kongyonggaebal kwajonge issoso chuminch'amyoe kwanhan yon'gu" [A Study on the Resident Participation in the Process of Public-managed Development]. Master Thesis, Graduate School of Urban Administration, Seoul City University, 1985.

Hwang Kil Ku. Interview by Author, 15 May 1988, Seoul.

Hwang Myong Ch'an. Comments made at a meeting at KDI, 13 July 1988 and reported in *Han'guk Ilbo*, 14 July 1988.

Jei Jeong Ku. Interview by Author, 8 May 1988, Seoul.

_____. Unpublished Document, 1988.

Kang Ch'ung Sik. "Chaegaebal saop chaltwae kamnikka," *Chonggyong munhwa* (November 1984): 327-338.

Kang Man Kil. *Han'guk hyondaesa* [Korea's Modern History]. Seoul: Ch'angjakkwa pip'yong, 1984.

K'at'ollik-sinmun, 21 December 1986.

KDI. *Chajohwaltongul t'onghan tosisobiso konggup kaesonbangan yon'gu* [A Study of Improvement Strategy on Urban Service Provision Throughout Self-help Activities]. Seoul: KDI, 1982.

Kibinhyp [Christian Poverty Committee]. *Chumin-sinmun* [Resident Newspaper] No. 4 (1987).

Kidobin [Protestant Urban Poor Preaching Committee]. Pamphlet. 1987.

Kidokkyo Tosibinmin Son'gyo Hyobuihoe [Christian Mission Committee for Urban Poor]. *Tosibinmin ch'olgo t'ujaeng charyojip of 1987* [A Databook of Urban Poor People's Struggle against Renewal Policy of 1987] (April 1988).

Kim Chin Hong. Interview by Author, 18 July 1988, Seoul.

Kim Chong Sop. Interview by Author, 23 May 1988, Kwangju-daedanji.

Kim Hyon T'ae. Interview by Author, 24 June 1988, Seoul.

- Kim Hyong Kuk. *Sanggye-dong sat'aeui chonmal* [The Whole Story of Sanggye-dong Protest]. A Paper Delivered at the Conference of Squatter Renewal Policy at the Myong-dong Cathedral, 22 June 1988.
- Kim Myong Su. "Seoul konghwagugui yoktae sijangnimdul." [The former Mr. Mayors of Seoul Republic] *Chonggyong munhwa* (March 1983): 159-169.
- Kim U Chin. "Pulryangjut'aek chaegaebal chuminui chaejongch'ak t'uksonge kwanhan yon'gu." [A Study on the Relocation Pattern of Squatters], Master Thesis, Graduate School of Environment Studies, Seoul National University, 1985.
- Kim Won. *Tosi haengjongron* [An Introduction to the Urban Administration]. Seoul: Pagyongsa, 1982.
- Kim Yong Ho. "Seoul-si pulryang chut'aekchigu chaegaebal kibube kwanhan yon'gu." [A Study on the Redevelopment Techniques of Substandard Housing in Seoul]. Master Thesis, Seoul City University, 1985.
- Kim Yong Mo. *Han'gugui sahoe pyondonggwa kyech'unggujo* [Korea's Social Transformation and Stratification Structure]. Seoul, 1986.
- Kim Yong Sok. *Tosibinminron* [A Theory on Urban Poverty]. Seoul: Ach'im, 1985.
- KNHC. *Chut'aek chongch'aek yon'gu* [Housing Policy Research] (unpublished). Seoul (August 1983).
- KNLDI. *Chut'aek chongch'aek charyo* [Housing Policy Data]. Seoul, 1982.
- _____. *Chut'aek ch'olgo chongch'aegui yonghyonge kwanhan yon'gu* [A Study of the Impact on the Housing Clearance and Removal Policy]. Seoul, 1983.
- Han'guk Kyohoe Sahoe Son'gyo Hyobuihoe [Korean Church Social Ministry], Department of Urban Residents. *Mok-dong kongyong kaebalgwa chuminundong sagonui chonmo* [Mok-dong Public Development and Story of Squatters' Struggle]. Seoul, 1985.
- Kwon Ho Kyong. Interview by Author, 15 May 1988, Seoul.
- Kwon T'ae Hwan. *Han'gugui ingut'onggye* [Demography of Korea: Population Change and Its Components, 1926-60]. Seoul: Seoul National University, 1977.

Kyonghyang-sinmun, 3 June 1970; 10 November 1976; 18 April 1981; 17 April 1984.

Kyongsong-jedae ed. *T'omakminui saenghwal - wisaeng* [The Life and Health of Mud Hut Residents]. Tokyo: P'aamsojom, 1942.

Lee Ki Chu. "Seoul tosi kyehoegui hyonhwanggwawa yon'gubanghyang" [Current Seoul City Planning and Future Study Direction], *Sijong yon'gu* [A Study on City Administration], Seoul (July 1966): 61-73.

Lee Ki Su. *Sudo haengjongui paljonjok yon'gu* [Developmental Study on Capital City Administration]. Seoul: Pommunsa, 1968.

Lee Kuk Ch'an. *Chongch'ihak kaeron*. Seoul: Pummunsa, 1988.

Lee Pyong Ryul. Interview by Author, 20 July 1988, Tonggyo-ri in Kyonggi-do.

Lee Sang Min. "Pinminjiptanui sahoe chongch'aekchok songgyok" [Characteristics of Social Policy over Poverty Groups] *Wolgan choson* (Oct. 1971): 20-31.

Lee T'ae Il. "Kaebal'ik hwansuwa kongyonggaebal." [Taking-back of Development Profit and Public-managed Development]. *Tosi munje* [Urban Problems]. (December 1983): 21-34.

Lee Tae Pung. Interview by Author, 3 July 1988, Seoul.

Lee Tuk Yon. "Tosi kaebaljiyok ch'olgomin undongui chon'gae yangsang" [A Study on the Pattern of Urban Social Movements in Seoul, Korea: The Mok-dong Case]. Master Thesis, Department of Sociology, The Graduate School of Yonsei University, 1985.

_____. "1980 yondae tosi sahoeundongui chon'gae wa t'uksong." [The Trend and Characteristics of Urban Social Movements of 1980s] *Saehak yon'gu* [Sociology Studies], Vol. 4 (1986): 159-191.

Lee U Chong. "Mok-dong chigu kongyong kaebal saobui p'yongga" [The Evaluation of Mok-dong Public Managed Development Project]. Master Thesis, The Graduate School of Public Administration, Seoul National University, 1984.

Lee U Yong. "Pulryang chut'aekchigu chaegaebal saobui hyonhwanggwawa munjejom" [The Reality and Problem of Substandard Housing Redevelopment] *Tosi munje*, July, 1975: 1-18.

- Minch'ongryon [Young Federation for Democratization]. "Sadang-dong ch'olgo pandae t'ujaenggwa pinminmunje" [Sadang-dong Anti-clearance Struggle and poverty problem]. *Minjuhwaui kil* [The Road to Democratization], No. 12 (1986).
- MOHSA. 1977 *chon'guk yongyang chosa* [The 1977 National Nutrition Survey]. 1977.
- Mok-dong Kaokchu Hyophoe [Owner Squatters' Association]. *Mok-dong chuminun ulgoitta* [Mok-dong Residents Are Crying], 1984.
- Mok-1-dong Tenant Association. Petition Paper, 1984.
- Mun Myong Ho. "Mok-dong ch'olgommin odirogana" [Where Shall Mok-dong Squatters Go]. *Sindong-A* (March 1985): 440-450.
- Park Ki Chong. "Kwangju-daedanji." *Sindong-A* (October 1971): 168-79.
- Park Song Chin. Interview by Author, 14 April 1988, Kwangju-daedanji.
- Park T'ae Son. "Kwangju-danji oilgan" [Five Days of Kwangju-danji]. *Wolgan chungang* (November 1971): 256-272.
- Park Tong Un. "Pulryangjut'aek chongbi pangbobui haprijok kaeson" [A Rational Improvement in the Way of Substandard Housing Clearance]. In *Yon'gu nonmun sirijo* [Study Dissertation Series]. Seoul: Local Administration Training Institute, Ministry of Home Affairs, 1981: 291-315.
- Remedy for New Association of Tenants. *Sanggye tosibinmin ch'olgo pandae t'ujaeng pogoso* [A Report on Struggle for Renewal Opposition of the Sanggye Urban Poor], 1986.
- Sanggye-dong 173 Ponji Tosibinmin Seipcha Iltong. *Tosi pinmin'gge turinun hoemun* [A Petition Sending to the Urban Poor]. (11 March 1987).
- Seipcha Taech'aek Wiwonhoe [New Tenant Action Organization]. *Sanggye tosibinmin ch'olgo bandae t'ujaeng pogoso* [A Report on the Struggle to Resist Squatter Removal of Sanggye Urban Poor], December 1, 1986.
- Seoul City History Compiling Committee. *Seoul-si yoksa* [The History of Seoul City, The Ancient Part]. Seoul: Dong-A Publishing Co., 1963.
- Seoul-sinmun, 2 May 1969; 18 January 1971.

Sindong-A, May 1970.

So Chung Sok. "Sandongnee punun chaegaebal t'ugibaram."
[Speculation Wind of Redevelopment on Squatter Settlement]
Sindong-A (March 1986): 390-412.

Soch'olhyop [SRA], *Samui sori* [The Voice of Life], the initial
number, 1987.

Son Chong Mok. "Chut'aegui yonhyokkwa sajong" [The Housing
History and Situation]. In *Chut'aek paekao* [Housing White
Paper], SCG, 1978: 134-152.

Son Song Mo. "1967 Sijong panghyang" [The Direction of City
Administration of 1967], *Sijong yon'gu*, Seoul, Vol. 2, No. 1
(1967): 22-30.

Song Chong Hong. "Konsolopkye chagumgamryang pisang"
[Emergency Cutback of Construction Sector], *Chonggyong
munhwa* [Political Economy and Culture], (October, 1985):
345-362.

Student Association of Seoul National University, *Tosibinmin
t'ujaeng pogoso* [A Report on the Urban Poor's Struggle],
1987.

U Chong Pom. Interview by Author, 27 May, 1988, Seoul.

Yijosillok [The Official Diary of the Yi Dynasty's King] by various
authors.

Yo Hung Ku and Mun Ch'on Chae. "Chut'aek kaeryang chaegaebal
saobui saryebunsok" [Case Analysis of Substandard
Housing Improvement Projects], *Chut'aek kumyung* [Housing
Finance], Vol. 21, No. 1 (February 1988): 25-47.

Yu Hun et al. *Yongsemin silt'aejosawa chongch'aek panghyango
kwanhan yon'gu* [A Survey of Urban Poor's Conditions and
Its Policy Direction], Graduate School of Public
Administration/Seoul National University, Public
Administration Survey Institution, 1982.

Yu Kyong Che. Interview by Author, 24 June 1988, Seoul.

Yu Ui Yong. "Ingu idonggwa tosihwa" [Population Movement and
Urbanization]. In *Han'guk sahoe* [Korean Society], eds.
Lee Hae Yong & Kwon Tae Hwan, Vol. 1. Seoul: The
Population & Development Institute of Seoul National
University, 1978: 85-104.

- Yu Ui Yong and Sok Hyon, eds. *Han'guk chongbu t'onggyeui choksilsonggwa munjejom* [Adequacy and Problems of Korean Government Statistics], Vol. 1, *Inguwa kyongje t'onggye* [Population and Economic Statistics]. Seoul: Seoul National University, The Population and Development Studies Center, publication series, No. 7 (1971).
- Yun Il Song. "Seoul-si tosimjaegaebale taehan chongch'i kyongjehakchok punsok" [Urban Renewal in Seoul: As Viewed from the Perspective of Political Economy]. Master Thesis, Department of Sociology, Seoul National University, 1987.
- Yun Sok Chin. "Toisang kaldega opsumnida: Sanggye-dong 173 ponji ch'olgominui i ausonggwa hasoyon" [There Is No Place to Go], in *Yolrin sahoe: I* [Open Society I]. Yun Sok Chin et al. Seoul: Yolrin ch'aektul, 1987: 232-290.

GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS AND STATISTICS

- Economic Planning Board. *Han'guk t'onggye yonbo* [Korea Statistical Yearbook], 1965, 1976, 1981, and 1983, 1984.
- Ministry of Home Affairs. *Han'guk tosi yonbo* [City Yearbook of Korea], 1984, 1985.
- Republic of Korea, Economic Planning Board. *Han'gugui sahoe chip'yo* [Social Indicators in Korea], 1987.
- Republic of Korea. *Kyongje sahoegaebal 5 kaeyon kyehoeok, 1982-86* [The Fifth Five-Year Economic and Social Development Plan, 1982-86], 1987.
- SCG. *Seoul t'onggye yonbo* [Seoul Statistical Yearbook], 1950-1960.
- _____. *Seoul-si tosigyehoeok paekso* [Seoul Planning White Paper], 1962.
- _____. *Kwangju-daedanji kyehoeok* [The Plan of Kwangju-danji], 1968.
- _____. *Seoul t'onggye yonbo* [Seoul Statistical Yearbook], 1955, 1970.
- _____. *Kwangju-daedanji konsol kyehoeok* [Kwangju-daedanji Building Project], July 1971.
- _____. *Muhoga chongch'kchi naeyong* [The Content of Squatter Settlement], 1972, 1973.
- _____. *Seoul-si* [Seoul City], 1974.
- _____. *Seoul-siui chuyo opchok* [Seoul City's Major Performance], 1976.
- _____. *Seoul-si tosi kyehoeok paekso* [Seoul planning White Paper], 1978.
- _____. *Chut'aek paekso* [Housing White Paper], 1978.
- _____. *Seoul-si ssuryegi ch'oriwa chut'aek munjee kwanhan yon'gu* [A Study on Housing and Problems of Garbage Disposal in Seoul] (unpublished), 1979.

- _____. *Seoul-si chonghap siljok* [All Performance of Seoul City Government], 1979.
- _____. unpublished document, 1979.
- _____. unpublished document, 1980.
- _____. *Chaegaebal saop kaesonbangan sebu sihaeng chich'im* [A Detail Implementation Guideline for Improvement of Renewal Policy], 1981.
- _____. Department of Urban Planning. *Tosi chaegaebal* [Urban Renewal], 1983.
- _____. *Haptong chaegaebal sebu sihaeng chich'im* [A Detail Implementation Instruction for Joint Redevelopment], 1984.
- _____. unpublished document, 1984.
- _____. *Seoul t'onggye yonbo* [Seoul Statistical Yearbook], 1984.
- _____. unpublished document, 1987.
- _____. *Chut'aek kaeryang chaegaebal saopchigu illam* [Renewal Districts], January 1987.
- _____. *Seoul-si sijong* [Seoul City's Administration], various years.
- Seoul t'ukpyolsi. *Sinp'yonip chigu charyojosa pogoso* [A Report on New Incorporation Area], 1965.
- _____. *Kwangju-danji chosongsaop* [Kwangju Large-scale Relocation Project], 1970.
- _____. *Mok-dong chigu sinsigaji kaebal kyehoek* [Mok-dong New Town Development Plan], 1984.
- Songnam-si. *Songnam siji* [The History of Songnam City], 1982.
- Tobong-guch'ong. *Tobong-gu haengjong charyo* [Tobong-gu Administration Data], 1987.