

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may be from any type of computer printer.

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.

Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand corner and continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced form at the back of the book.

Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6" x 9" black and white photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to order.

UMI

A Bell & Howell Information Company
300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor MI 48106-1346 USA
313/761-4700 800/521-0600

RATIONALITY, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS, AND
COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING:
AN ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES POLICY DECISIONS
TOWARDS JAPAN, 1948-1954

by

HYUN KIM

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,

The City University of New York

1996

UMI Number: 9630473

**Copyright 1996 by
Kim, Hyun**

All rights reserved.

**UMI Microform 9630473
Copyright 1996, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.**

**This microform edition is protected against unauthorized
copying under Title 17, United States Code.**

UMI
300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, MI 48103

© 1996

HYUN KIM


All Rights Reserved

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

February 8, 1996
Date


Chair of Examining Committee

Feb. 9th 1996
Date


Executive Officer

Donald Zagoria

Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner

Stanley Renshon

Benjamin Rivlin

Supervisory Committee

THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

ABSTRACT

RATIONALITY, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS, AND
COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING:
AN ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES POLICY DECISIONS
TOWARDS JAPAN, 1948-1954

by

Hyun Kim

Adviser: Professor Howard H. Lentner

This research analyzes a series of the American decisions pertaining to the formation of the US-Japanese alliance in the early 1950s, from the perspective of the foreign policy decision-making approach. By applying the three major decision-making models (the analytic, bureaucratic politics, and cognitive models) the research explains how and why the four main decisions were actually made: (1) to postpone the peace treaty in October 1948; (2) to conclude the peace and security treaties with Japan in September 1950; (3) to proceed with Japanese rearmament in September 1950; and (4) to return the northern part of the Ryukyus and retain exclusive control over Okinawa and the Bonin Islands in June 1953. The explanations of the decisions center on answering the two research questions. (1) Why and how did the decision makers choose certain initial preferences as to the particular decision problem? (2) How did their divergent preferences aggregate to produce the final decisions?

The main findings are as follows. (1) The decision makers' preferences were determined by their organizational interests, personal beliefs and cognitive processes, weighing the multiple interests, including broad national interests, or some combination of these factors. Any single model of decision-making has not

adequately explained the whole process of individual preference choice for each decision case. Explanations provided by the three models have needed to be used in some combination to understand the whole process. (2) The collective process that led to the peace treaty decision has been best explained by the bureaucratic politics model, whereas the processes from which the other three decisions resulted have been best accounted for by the analytic model. In none of the decision cases was there evidence of concurrence-seeking to promote the solidarity of the decision-making group, as predicted by the cognitive model. (3) Why and how the decision makers selected their policy preferences did not directly affect how the divergent preferences aggregated to produce the final decisions. (4) Three factors have been identified as affecting the collective processes of the four decisions: presidential decision-making styles; the existence of effective coordinating agencies; and constraints imposed by the international environment.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First of all, I am thankful to God for his spiritual guidance and grace which enabled me to complete my doctoral studies. I wish to serve God's purposes through my academic career during the rest of my life. I am indebted to a number of persons for finishing this dissertation. I express special appreciation to Dr. Howard Lentner, my adviser, whose encouragement and guidance were essential to the completion of this dissertation. I am also grateful to Dr. Donald Zagoria for his thoughtful advice and suggestions throughout my work on the dissertation. Dr. Benjamin Rivline, Dr. Stanley Renshon, and Dr. Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner gave me valuable comments on this research. Mrs. Carol Kangas was very helpful in editing this dissertation. Special thanks should be given to my family members in the United States, especially my uncle and aunt, for their support and encouragement. I also owe thanks to my brother and sisters in Korea. Finally, I extend deep thanks to my mother, Chun K. Yim, my mother-in-law, Jung S. Yoo, my wife, In Ae Kim, and my son, Harry Kim. Without their unconditional support and sacrifice, I would never have completed my doctoral studies. To my wife and son, I am greatly indebted for their long suffering and patience. This dissertation is dedicated to them.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract.....	iv
Acknowledgments.....	vi
List of Tables.....	ix
Abbreviation.....	ix
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION	
A. Research Problem.....	1
B. Decision-Making Models and Propositions.....	2
C. Rational for the Research.....	10
CHAPTER 2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: AMERICAN OCCUPATION POLICY FOR JAPAN (1945-1947)	
A. Presurrender Planning for the Occupation of Japan.....	16
B. Implementation of Initial Occupation Policies.....	22
C. Limitations on Implementation.....	59
CHAPTER 3. DECISIONS I: TO POSTPONE A PEACE TREATY WITH JAPAN (OCT. 1948)	
A. Introduction.....	67
B. Occasion for Decision.....	68
C. Decision Makers' Policy Preferences.....	73
D. Revisions of Policy Preferences.....	88
E. Collective Decision Process.....	98
F. Implementation.....	109
G. Theoretical Perspective: Decision-Making Models Applied.....	117
CHAPTER 4. DECISIONS II: TO INITIATE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A PEACE TREATY TO SECURE UNLIMITED BASE RIGHTS THROUGH A SECURITY PACT TO PROCEED WITH JAPANESE REARMAMENT (SEPT. 1950)	
A. Introduction.....	136
B. Occasions for Decision.....	137
1. Japanese Rearmament Problem.....	137
2. Peace Treaty Problem.....	147

C. Decision Makers' Policy Preferences.....	148
D. Revisions of Policy Preferences.....	166
E. Collective Decision Processes.....	175
F. Implementation.....	216
1. Peace Treaty Decisions.....	216
2. Rearmament Decisions.....	229
G. Theoretical Perspective: Decision-Making Models Applied.....	248
1. Peace Treaty Decisions.....	248
2. Rearmament Decisions.....	275
CHAPTER 5. DECISIONS III: TO RETURN THE NORTHERN PART OF THE RYUKYU ISLANDS TO RETAIN CONTROL OVER OKINAWA AND THE BONINS (JUNE 1953)	
A. Introduction.....	289
B. Background Decisions.....	290
C. Occasion for Decision.....	299
D. Decision Makers' Policy Preferences.....	302
E. Collective Decision Process.....	317
F. Implementation.....	332
G. Theoretical Perspective: Decision-Making Models Applied.....	337
CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS.....	352
Bibliography.....	370
Chronology.....	382

LIST OF TABLES

1. Individual Processes of the Postponement Decision (October 1948).....	353
2. Individual Processes of the Peace Treaty Decision (September 1950).....	353
3. Individual Processes of the Rearmament Decision (September 1950).....	354
4. Individual Processes of the Reversion Decision (June 1953).....	354
5. Collective Processes of the Four Main Decisions.....	357
6. Validity of the Models across Individual and Collective Processes.....	359

ABBREVIATIONS

ACJ	Allied Council for Japan
CINCFE	Commander in Chief, Far East
CINPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific
CFM	Council of Foreign Ministers
FEC	Far Eastern Commission
HCLC	Holding Company Liquidation Commission
IDACFE	Interdivisional Area Committee for the Far East
JNPR	Japanese National Police Reserve
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCAC	Joint Civil Affairs Committee
JSSC	Joint Strategic Survey Committee
NSC	National Security Council
PPS	Policy Planning Staff
PWC	Postwar Programs Committee
SWNCC	State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
SCAP	Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers

Chapter 1. Introduction

A. Research Problem

The purpose of this research is to explain United States foreign policy decisions regarding Japan during the period of 1948-1954 from a perspective of the foreign policy decision-making approach. To this purpose, the research uses three major decision-making models that have dominated the field of foreign policy analysis: (1) the analytic (rational) model, (2) the bureaucratic politics model, and (3) the cognitive model. From each of the models, the research deduces testable propositions concerning the substantive and procedural features of the decision-making process, and applies them to the analysis of the US decision-making processes. The American decisions as a case chosen for this study are those that led to the formation of the US-Japan alliance and to Japanese rearmament in the early 1950's. Simultaneously with the signing of a peace treaty in September 1951, the United States concluded a security treaty with Japan, thereby making the two countries military allies for the first time in history. In the four subsequent decades, the US- Japanese security relationship has developed under the basic framework of the security pact which was revised on more equal terms in 1960. The alliance system of 1951 had three essential aspects: stationing American armed forces indefinitely in post-occupation Japan, rearming Japan as an ally for self-defense, and long-term American strategic control over Okinawa. Since the alliance between the two nations was established just six years after the end of the Pacific War in which they had been enemies, the whole process through which the United States transformed defeated Japan into a military ally and then pushed disarmed Japan into large-scale rearmament provides an interesting case which reflects changes in the postwar American policy in East Asia.

This research analyzes the following series of United States policy decisions concerning Japan in the period of 1948-1954.

Decisions I:

to postpone a peace treaty with Japan (October 1948)

- (1) to move away from a reform policy to the economic recovery of Japan
- (2) to relax occupation controls
- (3) to increase the strength of the Japanese police forces

Decisions II:

to initiate negotiations for a multilateral Japanese peace treaty,

to secure unlimited base rights in Japan through a bilateral security pact, and

to proceed with Japanese rearmament (September 1950)

- (1) to create a National Police Reserve (July 1950)
- (2) to expand the National Police Reserve into a regular army (May 1951)
- (3) to establish the nucleus of a navy (August 1951)
- (4) to create an air force (August 1952)
- (5) to conclude a military assistance agreement with Japan (October 1952)

Decisions III:

to return the northern part of the Ryukyu Islands to Japan and

to retain exclusive control over Okinawa and the Bonin Islands (June 1953)

B. Decision-making Models and Propositions

This research adopts the foreign policy decision-making approach as a method for analysis. That approach is designed to explore how and why a foreign policy decision is made through the decision-making process. Thus, the focus of the approach is placed on the decision-making process. The main reason for this is that the process, that of converting inputs into outputs, is regarded as performing the integrative function through which it combines various factors widely

acknowledged as potentially important for understanding foreign policy decisions and actions. In other words, only by entering into the level of the decision-making process can domestic and international factors be causally linked to foreign policy outputs themselves. Foreign policy analysts who have focused on theoretical elaboration of the decision-making process have recognized its synthetic role.

For instance, the decision-making framework presented by Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin provides the concept of "the definition of situation" as a focal point for combining various affecting factors in internal and external settings. According to them, various sources or explanatory factors influence foreign policy actions only if they are recognized and interpreted by decision makers. Therefore, the key to the explanation of the state behavior lies in the way its decision makers define the situation during the decision-making process.¹ Allison and Halperin's "bureaucratic politics model" can be regarded as another attempt to assign decision-making process the central role through which explanatory factors are related. Their model enables analysts to integrate divergent factors by means of a decision-making framework which indicates what factors combine to determine individual decision-makers' stands with which they subsequently engage in bargaining and compromise for a final decision.² Brecher also develops an elaborate framework which suggests in a general way the synthetic role of the decision-making process. Although Brecher's model envisages the foreign policy system as embracing the operational and psychological environments, its emphasis is clearly

¹ See Richard Snyder, H. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics (New York: Free Press, 1962).

² See Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); Graham Allison and Morton Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," in Raymond Tanter and R. Ullman (eds.), Theory and Policy in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972); and Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, 1973).

on the psychological environment which includes the attitudinal prisms and images of decision makers. According to Brecher, various factors in the operational environment influence foreign policy decisions, only as they are filtered through the images of decision makers. For Brecher's framework, decision makers' perceptions or images of the real world in the decision-making process perform the synthetic role for integrating the determinants of foreign policy.³

This research is basically motivated by those analysts' affirmations of the decision-making process as performing the integrative role, so that it chooses the foreign policy decision-making approach as a method for analysis. By exploring how explanatory factors during the process of decision-making combine to influence foreign policy decisions, the approach provides the key to understanding how and why specific decisions are made in particular situations. The foreign policy decision-making process as the focal point of analysis is conceptualized as a conversion system embedded in an environment, which is composed of both domestic and international segments. This conversion system receives opportunities and constraints for the state behavior from the environment, and produces the outputs of foreign policy decisions. As has been defined by Brecher and generally adopted by other analysts, a foreign policy decision as the dependent variable of this research refers to "the selection, among perceived alternatives, of one option leading to a course of action in the international system." A decision is made by a decision maker or a group of decision makers authorized by a national government "to act within a prescribed sphere of external behavior"⁴

³ See Michael Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Process* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972); and *Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975).

⁴ Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel*, p. 374.

Decision makers selected as the unit of analysis in the research are senior governmental officials who ultimately make a decision when an action should be taken on a problem. They comprise the major political figures and the heads of the national security organizations and agencies, including the military and intelligence. Following some conceptualizations of the bureaucratic politics model elaborated by Allison and Halperin, this research regards organizations and groups as decision makers "when (1) the official papers that emerge from an organization can be summarized as coherent calculated moves of a unitary actor; (2) the actions of the head of an organization, whose goals are determined largely by that organization, can be treated as actions of the organization; and (3) the various behaviors of different members of an organization can be regarded as coherent strategies and tactics in a single plan."⁵

The research uses three major decision-making models that have represented the decision-making approach: (1) the analytic (rational) model, (2) the bureaucratic politics model, and (3) the cognitive model. From each of the models the research deduces testable propositions concerning the features of the decision-making process, and applies them to the analysis of the US policy decisions on Japan. The reason for the use of multiple models is derived from a theoretical premise that any single model cannot adequately and accurately capture the dynamics of various aspects of the decision-making process. Each of the models will be more or less relevant to the explanation of particular aspects of the decision process. In addition, each of them will be more or less applicable to particular decision makers. In other words, the validity of the three models is expected to vary not only over the distinct aspects of the decision process, but also across decision makers. The use of alternative models is needed for a comprehensive explanation of the decision-making process.

⁵ Allison and Halperin, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

There are two central research questions which will be answered by an analysis of each case of the American decision-making processes in regard to Japan:

- (1) Why and how did the decision makers choose their initial policy preferences concerning a particular problem for decision?
- (2) How did the decision makers' divergent preferences converge or aggregate to produce the final national decisions?

The first question relates to the individual choice processes in which individual decision makers define a problem, develop and evaluate policy options, and determine their preferred options respectively. These decision processes suggest that there is commonly a divergence in policy preference among decision makers resulting from different problem definitions and option evaluations. A decision-making analysis, first of all, requires an explanation of the individual choice of policy preferences. The second question refers to a collective decision process by which divergent preferences are transformed into final national decisions. Most foreign policy decisions are the outcome of a collective choice process in which decision makers adjust, change, and aggregate their initial preferences to produce national decisions. Therefore, a basic feature of this collective decision process is that the decision makers participate in the process with pre-established policy preferences.⁶ An explanation of the collective process is also needed for a complete decision-making analysis.

Corresponding to these two phases of the decision-making process, the three decision-making models advance a relatively distinctive set of propositions respectively.

⁶ Zeev Maoz, *National Choices and International Choices* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 21.

1. Analytic (Rational) Model

Individual Process for Choice of Policy Preference:

(1) A decision maker tends to develop multiple definitions of a decision problem through a multi-faceted diagnosis of the situation.⁷

(2) A decision maker tends to engage in the outcome calculations of all major viable options in relation to multiple values involved in a decision problem.⁸

(3) A decision maker tends to choose the options which produce a balanced satisfaction of the multiple values.⁹

Collective Process for Final National Decision:

(4) Exposure to new information and/or persuasive argumentation during group discussions based on relevant information induce decision makers to revise their outcome calculations of policy options and thus to change their initial preferences. As a result, a consensus on national decisions is finally reached.

(5) Final decisions tend to be those that yield a balanced satisfaction of the multiple values at stake.¹⁰

2. Bureaucratic Politics Model

Individual Process for Choice of Policy Preference:

⁷ Ibid. pp. 57-59.

⁸ John Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), p. 34.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 28-31.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 34-40; Janice Stein and Raymond Tanter, Rational Decision-Making: Israel's Security Choice, 1967 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1980), pp 47-51; and Maoz, op. cit., pp. 78-79.

(1) A decision maker tends to define a policy problem in terms of the concerns and interests of the bureaucratic organization he represents.¹¹

(2) A decision maker tends to determine his preferred options which have the greatest likelihood of satisfying the values which represent his organizational interests.¹²

Collective Process for Final National Decision:

(3) Final national decisions result from a process of contention and bargaining in which decision makers engage in pulling, hauling, and coalition-building to promote their pre-established preferences.

(4) Final decisions tend to be compromise solutions that reflect the relative power and bargaining advantages of the decision makers.¹³

3. Cognitive Model

Individual Process for Choice of Policy Preference:

(1) A decision maker's definition of a decision problem tends to be determined by his personal beliefs.¹⁴ The decision maker's beliefs about the nature of international politics and the images of the countries involved are relevant factors in shaping his definition of the problem and considering policy options.¹⁵

¹¹ Allison, op. cit., p. 168 and p. 178; and Allison and Halperin, op. cit., p. 55.

¹² Allison, op. cit., p. 166, and p. 176; and Allison and Halperin, op. cit., p. 48.

¹³ Allison, op. cit., pp. 162-64 and pp. 168-73; and Allison and Halperin, op. cit., pp. 50-54.

¹⁴ Steinbruner, op. cit., pp. 109-24; Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 143-202; and Alexander George, Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), pp. 55-80.

¹⁵ Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflicts Among Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 297; and George, op. cit., p. 231.

(2) A decision maker tends to evaluate policy options in relation to only one or two values, which are strongly supported by his beliefs, while avoiding trade-off relationships among the values involved.

(3) A decision maker tends to choose the options which yield only the best satisfaction of the values which are strongly supported by his beliefs.¹⁶

Collective Process for Final National Decision:

The cognitive model provides no definite propositions on the collective decision process. Nevertheless, a valid cognitive explanation of the process is given by the "groupthink" model that Irving Janis has developed, as pointed out by some scholars.¹⁷

(4) According to the model, final decisions result from a process of concurrence-seeking in a decision-making group in which group members tend to adjust their initial preferences to what they perceive to be the group leader's preferred options or an emerging group consensus in order to promote group solidarity. Such decision-making behavior toward group conformity tends to constrain search for pertinent information and thus the evaluation of policy options.¹⁸

Once decisions are reached at the presidential level, they are implemented into subsequent foreign policy actions as policy outcome. However, this stage of implementation cannot be treated as something that follows automatically from decisions because it may be subject to slippage between the decisions and actual

¹⁶ Steinbruner, op. cit., pp. 103-9 and pp. 122-24; Jervis, op. cit., pp. 128-42; George, op. cit., pp. 32-34; and Stein and Tanter, op. cit., pp. 44-47.

¹⁷ Stein and Tanter, op. cit., pp. 54-57; and Maoz, op. cit., pp. 209-12.

¹⁸ Irving Janis and L. Mann, *Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment* (New York: Free Press, 1977), pp. 129-34; and I. Janis, *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes*, 2nd. ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982).

actions. In other words, in many cases governmental behavior is significantly different from that planned by decision makers as a result of difficulties emerging when implementation is undertaken. This difference may be due to such factors as the ambiguous nature of the decisions, organizational standard operating procedures, bureaucratic resistance, and different perspectives in the field.¹⁹ This research also explores whether and why each American decision was executed into policy actions as intended or unintended by the decision makers.

C. Rationale for the Research

There are several reasons why this research chooses US policy decisions concerning Japan during 1948-1954 as a case for analysis. The first is that the chosen case contains important policy issues that have consistently influenced to a great extent the existing American-Japanese security relationship. The case, first of all, deals with the issue of retaining American military forces and bases indefinitely in post-occupation Japan with the prime object of assuring Japanese defense. This issue was resolved by entering into a security treaty between the two countries in September 1951 which provided for American base rights in the Japanese main islands. In the four subsequent decades, the American-Japanese security relationship has developed under the basic framework of the security treaty which was revised on more equal terms in 1960. Second, the case relates to the origin and developments of Japanese rearmament in the early 1950's, the issue that has continuously been a significant subject in American security policy toward Japan. Finally, the case deals with the issue of American strategic control over the Ryukyu Islands, including Okinawa. This issue remained controversial in the security

¹⁹ Steve Smith and Michael Clarke (eds.), *Foreign Policy Implementation* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985), pp. 1-10.

relationship between the two nations until the early 1970's, when America decided to return Okinawa to Japan.

The second reason for the selection of the Japan case is that although the case has received great attention from scholars, particularly historians, who came to take advantage of recently declassified American government documents, there has been no study seeking to analyze the case from a theoretical perspective. All of the previous studies are broadly historical and lack a consistent analytical framework. There have been many studies of United States security policy toward Japan in the period of the occupation of Japan. However, most of them have focused on policy actions and programs taken by the occupation authorities within Japan rather than on the process of policy-making in Washington.²⁰ A few studies have tried to examine some aspects of decision-making on specific issue areas in the US government. An intensive study of the making of the peace settlement with Japan was made by Frederick Dunn.²¹ His research presents a clear-cut descriptive account of the conclusion of the Japanese peace treaty. It explores how the postwar United States policy toward Japan had been originated and developed in pursuing peace-making and security arrangements by describing in detail the entire process leading to the conclusion of the peace treaty of 1951. Despite its details and some insightful descriptions, Dunn's study is not an analytical case study of

²⁰ For example, Edwin M. Martin, *The Allied Occupation of Japan* (New York: American Book Stratford Press, 1948); Robert A. Fearey, *The Occupation of Japan- Second Phase: 1948-50* (New York: MacMillian Company, 1950); Kazuo Kawai, *Japan's American Interlude* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960); Hervert Feis, *Contest Over Japan* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1967); Jon Livingston, Joe Moor, and Felicia Oldfather (eds.), *Postwar Japan: 1945 to the Present* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973); Theodore Cohen, *Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal* (New York: The Free Press, 1987); and Robert E. Ward and Sakamoto Yoshikazu (eds.), *Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation* (Honolulu: University of Hawai Press, 1987).

²¹ Frederick S. Dunn, *Peacemaking and the Settlement with Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

American decision-making because it does not delve into the decision-making process itself to explain crucial decisions.

Michael Schaller's recent study offers a careful historian's account of the origins of the Cold War in Asia with a particular focus on the American occupation of Japan.²² Based on declassified US government documents, Schaller consistently seeks to demonstrate a close relationship between the occupation policy and Southeast Asian policy by positing a determination on the part of Washington to restore trade between Japan and Southeast Asia both as a stimulus to the revival of the Japanese economy and as an alternative to trade with Communist China. More importantly, Schaller's research places its focus on intra- and interorganizational conflicts over Japan policies within the United States government, as well as on rival relations between the decision makers in Washington and General MacArthur as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) in Tokyo. Although it examines fully American policy issues relating to the occupation of Japan, Schaller's research does not provide a complete explanation of the crucial problems, such as Japanese rearmament and the disposition of Okinawa which still remained unsettled until mid-1953, mainly because its scope is limited to the occupation period of 1945-1951.

For the US-Japanese security relationship in 1951-1954, there have been few academic works which deal with the aspect of American decision-making regarding Japan. John Dower's biographical study of Yoshida, Japan's Prime Minister at that time, describes well the US-Japanese relations in the early 1950s with its focus on Japanese responses to the implementation of American policy regarding rearmament and military aid in its last three chapters.²³ John Welfield's

²² Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan: the Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).

comprehensive study of the US-Japan alliance system up to the 1980s, largely based on Japanese materials, provides a valuable insight to the interaction of Japan's domestic politics and foreign policy in security issues including Japanese rearmament in 1945-1955, while it does not explore the American side of decision-making on them.²⁴ Above all, all the previous studies are largely based upon a historical perspective and lack a theoretically-driven analysis.²⁵ This research is the first attempt to explore the case from the perspective of the foreign policy decision-making approach.

Another reason why the research selects the case of the American decisions regarding Japan is that they present a good case for applying and testing the decision-making models. The case contains "complex decision problems" with which the foreign policy decision-making approach has been primarily concerned. A complex decision problem is characterized as involving the two principal conditions, that is, value complexity and uncertainty.²⁶ Value complexity refers to the presence of a conflict relationship between values imbedded in a decision problem. In a complex decision problem, there is a trade-off between two or more values affected by the decision in the sense that the pursuit of one value can be conducted only at the expense of the other values involved. The condition of

²³ John W. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and Japanese Experience, 1878-1954* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979).

²⁴ John Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Athlone Press, 1988).

²⁵ More recently, there came two more historical studies intensively dealing with such problems as American occupation policy and a Japanese peace settlement. See Howard Schonberger, *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan* (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1989); and Richard B. Finn, *Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

²⁶ Steinbruner, *Cybernetic Theory of Decision*, pp. 15-18; George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy*, pp. 26-28; and Stein and Tanter, *Rational Decision-Making*, pp. 22-25. Steinbruner adds the existence of multiple, disagreeing decision makers as a third condition of a complex decision problem. However, it seem clear that virtually most of national security decisions meet this criterion.

uncertainty refers to the lack of adequate information about situations pertaining to a decision problem and the consequent inadequacy of available knowledge needed to calculate the outcomes of policy options considered by decision makers. The question of how decision makers deal with value complexity and information uncertainty has been one of the prime subjects of the decision-making approach. The chosen case provides a prototype containing those conditions of complex decision problems. All the decisions under study involved multiple, conflicting values, especially competing political-diplomatic and military-strategic ones. They also meet the criterion of uncertainty. Particularly, there was uncertainty about the capabilities and intentions of Japan and the Soviet Union so that American decision makers frequently disagreed with one another about the expected consequences of the policy options under consideration. This in turn led to divergences in policy preference among the decision makers.

On the other hand, the availability of primary source data also makes the selected case a good one for applying the decision-making models. A serious research problem raised in case studies using the foreign policy decision-making approach has been the lack of reliable data resulting from inaccessibility to primary source materials. As a result, analysts must rely upon incomplete and sometimes unreliable information obtained from personal memoirs, newspaper accounts, interviews, and so on. This case study relies upon recently declassified US government documents. Those primary source data are necessary for a decision-making analysis because they provide reliable and adequate information about how and why certain decisions were made. A part of declassified documents has been published in the relevant volumes of Foreign Relations of the United States for 1948-1954. In addition to referring to these volumes, this research uses a great number of unpublished archives from the State and Defense Departments, and other national security organizations. The research also uses as secondary sources

scholarly books and articles regarding United States foreign policy toward Japan in the early cold war period.

Chapter 2. Historical Background: American Occupation Policy For Japan During the Pre-Cold War Period (1945-1947)

A. Presurrender Planning for the Occupation of Japan

American policy-making in regard to postwar Japan began with the wartime planning by the State Department for the occupation and reform of a defeated Japan. The State Department, as early as February 1941, set up the Division of Special Research, a unit for the preparation of postwar foreign policy. During the years of 1942 and 1943, the division studied many of the issues regarding the treatment of Japan following its surrender, forwarding its suggestions to the Secretary of State and the President. By October 1943, when the overall postwar planning machinery in the State Department was reorganized, the Interdivisional Area Committee for the Far East (IDACFE) was created to give more definite formulation and more extensive consideration to postwar policies for Asia and, particularly for Japan. In answer to questions from the War and the Navy Departments, in February 1944 the IDACFE undertook the drafting of a large number of policy papers concerning the occupation of Japan.¹ Some twenty papers prepared in the spring were reviewed by the Postwar Programs Committee (PWC), then the highest organ of State Department postwar planning. The revised papers, bearing PWC numbers, became State Department policy by December 1944 and were transmitted to the War and the Navy Departments for comment and guidance in January 1945. A basic document in this series of papers set forth American postwar objectives in regard to Japan. Other papers dealt principally

¹ For the questions brought forward by the military departments, see the United States Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), vol. 5, pp. 1190-94, (hereafter cited as ERUS, with appropriate year, volume, and page).

with measures and programs for achieving the objectives. One of the PWC papers recommended that American postwar objectives for Japan be disarmament during the first period of the "stern discipline of occupation," demilitarization and democratization during the second period of "close surveillance" and "progressive relaxation of restrictions," and the reintegration of Japan into the world economy and the peaceful international community in the final stage.² Among other important recommendations of these papers was that the occupation of Japan should be organized on the principle of a centralized administration so as to ensure a nearly exclusive American occupation. The division of the country into zones controlled separately by allied forces wouldn't be permitted such as was planned for Germany. The military government, the IDACFE planners advocated, would use the Japanese government for administrative purposes. Finally, if circumstances required, the emperor might be retained and, furthermore, utilized in some limited aspects.³ These positions favored by the IDACFE in 1944 were unchanged and contained with minor revision in SWNCC 150/4/A, the completed policy document for postwar Japan, approved by President Truman in August 1945.

There are two facts worthy of note because of their relationship to United States initial occupation policies. In the first place, the IDACFE recommendations that proved to develop into the significant part of the final policy positions at the end of war were provided mainly by a group of policy makers within the State Department, the so-called 'Japan hands.' They were largely composed of career foreign service officers who had served in prewar Japan. Led by Joseph C. Grew, a former ambassador to Japan and then the director of the renamed Office of Far Eastern Affairs (FE), they included Joseph Ballantine as new deputy director of the FE, George Blakeslee as chairman of the IDACFE, and other key members of the

² PWC-108 b, May 4, 1944, *Ibid.*, pp.1235-36.

³ PWC-116 d, May 9, 1944, *Ibid.*, pp. 1250-55.

IDACFE, including Eugene Dooman, Robert Fearey, and Hugh Borton.⁴ Such a lineup in the offices charged with East Asian affairs made it possible for the Japan hands to give shape to their shared ideas in State Department planning for postwar Japan. This fact in turn, as Howard Schonberger points out, indicated that the center of policy-making was transferred to the Japan specialists from the so-called 'China hands' who had once been a dominant force in the State Department and who had projected China as America's most promising ally in the postwar East Asian region.⁵ The Japan hands basically advocated the moderate nature of occupation because they had considerable optimism about Japan's capacity to reform itself. They saw Japan's existing liberal elements as potential forces that could lead the society into democratic reforms.⁶ Grew and other Japan hands accordingly objected to extensive structural reforms and a prolonged occupation imposed by the military government, while they projected the moderate nature of the occupation which was revealed in the IDAFE recommendations, such as the lenient treatment of the emperor, the indirect control by means of utilizing the Japanese government, and the encouragement of the emergence of a liberal government. In the last analysis, the ascendance of the Japan hands in State Department politics and policy planning for Japan in 1944 and early 1945 provided them with an occasion to see their plans adopted as official State Department policies in November 1944 and, furthermore, embedded particularly in the political part of the final policy statement and the JCS directive to SCAP in late 1945.

A second notable fact was that few of the policy recommendations approved by the PWC had concern with economic measures for occupied Japan because

⁴ See Howard B. Schonberger, *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952* (Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1989), pp. 25-28.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

⁶ See PWC-152 b, May 9, 1944, ERUS, 1944, vol. 5, pp. 1257-59.

during 1944 there were no agreed-upon positions on economic matters among policy makers in the State Department. However, there was a serious conflict of views between the IDACFE's Japan hands and its economists from the economic divisions of the State Department because the former favored moderate and limited economic measures, whereas the latter called for stringent and extensive economic reforms.⁷ The conflict was not resolved until April 1945 when both sides agreed to split up their responsibilities, with the Japan hands taking the political part of the final policy directive and the economic divisions taking the economic.

By early 1945, the work and politics of postwar planning for Japan were greatly affected by changes in the foreign policy-making apparatus. In December 1944, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) was established as the highest policy planning organization. The Committee set up a Subcommittee on the Far East (SFE) with responsibility for preparation of policy papers regarding Japan and Korea for the approval of the SWNCC. Henceforth, all important policy matters on postwar Japan were considered jointly by the State and the military departments and, in the first instance by the SFE. The subcommittee was composed of those officials who had been working on the same problems in their respective departments: from the State Department, the Japan hands who had prepared the Japan papers for the PWC, working together with their counterparts from the military. As a result, the same policy proposals contained in the PWC papers of 1944 were presented by State Department representatives, with minor changes, to the SWNCC for its consideration.

Upon the request of the War Department that the State Department provide a short policy statement that would serve as a guide for its drafting of a military

⁷ Marlene J. Mayo, "American Wartime Planning for Occupied Japan: the Role of the Experts," in Robert Wolfe (ed.), *Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944-1952* (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1984), pp. 29-35.

directive for the occupation of Japan, the SFE completed a draft early in June 1945 of a first overall postsurrender policy document known as SWNCC 150, which in August became, with a few changes, the final policy statement on Japan. The general and political sections of SWNCC 150 owed such a great deal to the PWC papers of 1944 as to contain the moderate measures favored by the Japan hands. Contrary to the recommendations by the Japan experts, however, its economic section called for stringent and interventionist economic reforms undertaken by the occupation authorities.⁸ By the decision on the division of labor between the Japan hands and economists of the State Department, this radical economic section was drafted by Edwin Martin, a New Deal economist from a chief economic division of the State Department. As a result, it reflected the liberal views of State Department economists.⁹

In the meantime, the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and China on July 26 made a public policy statement, the Potsdam Declaration, that defined the terms for Japan's surrender largely on the basis of SWNCC 150.¹⁰ Faced with continuous pressure from the War Department for revision toward a more concrete guideline, SWNCC 150 was modified right after the Japanese surrender on August 14 under the direction of Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, also serving as the department's chief representative on the SWNCC. The final policy paper, the "United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan," (SWNCC 150/4/A), was consequently an end product to reconcile the views of the conservative Japan hands, on one hand, and the liberal economists of the State

⁸ See SWNCC 150, "Political-Military Problems in the Far East: United States Initial Post-Defeated Policy Relating to Japan," June 11, 1945, *ERUS*, 1945, vol. 6, pp. 549-52.

⁹ Theodore Cohen, *Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal* (New York: The Free Press, 1987), pp. 34-35.

¹⁰ For the text of the Potsdam Declaration, see The SCAP Government Section, *The Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1945*, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 413, (cited later as *PRI*).

Department and the policy makers of the War Department, on the other hand.¹¹ The substance of the document was sent to General MacArthur by radio on August 29 and by messenger on September 6 after its approval by President Truman.

The Initial Policy statement set out disarmament, demilitarization, and democratization as the ultimate policy objectives of the occupation. The document provided for guidelines assuring civil liberties and democracy in the political field. Among the political measures called for, the provision needs to be noted that SCAP would exercise his authority through Japanese government machinery and agencies, including the emperor. America's decision of indirect administration would have important effects on the implementation of its occupation policies. It opened the way for the retention of the emperor, as the Japan hands had hoped, so that his position, with the backing of MacArthur, finally was preserved through the constitutional reform in 1946. As examined later, the decision of indirect control also provided an occasion for conservative Japanese government officials to resist or delay the implementation of reform programs in which they had little interest. As for the economic matters of the occupation, SWNCC 150/4/A provided for drastic economic reforms designed for the structural transformation of the entire Japanese economy, including substantial reparations, the economic purge, the deconcentration of industrial and financial combines, and the economic democratization of labor and agriculture. Nevertheless, the responsibility for the recovery of the Japanese economy was to be left to the Japanese themselves.¹²

By August there was another draft document, the JCS directive to the supreme commander, ready for high-level consideration. Prepared in the latter stage by the Joint Civil Affairs Committee (JCAC), a body composed of military planners from the Civil Affairs Division of the War Department and the JCS, the

¹¹ Mayo, "American Wartime Planning," p. 45.

¹² See SWNCC 150/4/A, PRJ, vol. 2, pp. 423-26.

draft military directive defined detailed policies which would actually guide SCAP in the occupation and control of Japan. Its political section was finished with no difficulty by late August. Its economic section was revised through the joint working of the SFE and the JCAC members. On November 3, finally, the complete document, the "Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to SCAP" (JCS 1380/15), was forwarded to General MacArthur. The directive faithfully followed SWNCC 150/4/A in terms of the objectives and means to be pursued by the occupation authorities. However, the document went into far greater details in outlining the measures that should be taken by SCAP than SWNCC 150/4/A.¹³ The two key documents from Washington served as primary guides for SCAP to handle all important policy matters during the early years of the occupation. Lenient in the political field and rigorous in the economic field, MacArthur's guides reflected the unsolved contradictions regarding the occupation in 1945 between the conservative Japan experts and liberal economists in Washington.

B. Implementation of Initial Occupation Policies

1. Implementation Machinery

During the early stage of the occupation, lasting from September 1945 through mid-1947, American policy actions with regard to Japan were for most part identical with the implementation by SCAP¹⁴ of the occupation reforms outlined in SWNCC 150/4/A and JCS 1380/15. Charged with the execution of the occupation policies, SCAP was organized into a dozen staff sections that paralleled

¹³ See JCS 1380/5, *Ibid.*, pp. 429-39.

¹⁴ The research uses the term, SCAP, which refers to both a person and an institution. Depending on context, the latter refers essentially to the General Headquarters of SCAP as established in Tokyo, with its various staff sections.

closely the Japanese cabinet structure and most of which were headed by high-ranking military officers but staffed largely by civilian experts. Among them three sections, headed by generals, stood out as most important in terms of their roles and influences over the occupation: the Government Section, under Courtney Whitney, to implement reforms in such areas as Japan's constitution and political system, civil liberties, and the purge; the Economic and Scientific Section, under William Marquat, in charge of restructuring the Japanese economy; and the Civil Intelligence Section, under Charles Willoughby, to deal with security matters regarding Japanese officials as well as SCAP personnel. Besides, there was the Office of the Political Adviser to SCAP, functioning as representative of the State Department. Since General MacArthur was instructed to adopt an indirect administration to implement the policy directives from Washington through the existing Japanese bureaucracy, he ordered the Japanese to create the Central Liaison Office through which SCAP would transmit its directives to the Japanese government and receive reports on their implementation. Thus, implementation was to be achieved through frequent meetings between the SCAP staff sections and the appropriate bureaus of the Japanese government. Gradually, as direct working practice and procedures were established between them, the role of the Central Liaison Office diminished.¹⁵

While the United States had already set the policy of an exclusively American-controlled occupation without zonal divisions, the occupation of Japan was legally an Allied venture, as stipulated in the Potsdam Declaration and the basic policy statement, so that the United States government could not help taking some action to cope with other allies' demands for at least a share of responsibilities in the occupation. The State Department, on August 21, 1945,

¹⁵ For a detailed account of the SCAP machinery, see D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur, 1945-1964*, vol. 3, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985), pp. 45-58.

proposed that it establish the Far Eastern Advisory Commission (FEAC) of the eleven nations, including the United States, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union, to make recommendations on occupation policies. The Soviets, however, discontent with their merely advisory role, refused to participate in the commission. They insisted upon the formation of an allied control council of the four major powers in Tokyo with functions similar to those of the control council already established in Berlin. Negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in regard to both allied bodies continued until late December when a compromise was finally reached at the meeting of the big four foreign ministers in Moscow. A Far Eastern Commission (FEC) of all eleven allies in place of the FEAC, according to the Moscow Agreement, would be set up in Washington to nominally formulate general policies for the occupation and to review policy directives from the American government or actions taken by SCAP. At the same time, an Allied Council for Japan (ACJ) would begin to work in Tokyo as an advisory body of the four major powers, designed to consult with and advise the supreme commander in regard to the implementation of the occupation policies.¹⁶

The powers of the FEC and the ACJ, however, were sufficiently limited to make it unlikely that they would interfere with de facto unilateral American control of the occupation. The predominant position of the United States in Japan was assured legally not only by the provisions for the FEC which gave the United States the rights to veto its decisions and to issue unilateral interim directives to SCAP, but also by the provisions for the ACJ, which gave SCAP the sole executive authority and the controlling voice in almost all matters in Japan. In practice, neither the FEC nor the ACJ proved to seriously challenge the American

¹⁶ For a study of negotiations leading to the agreement on the establishment of the FEC and the ACJ, see Herbert Feis, *Contest over Japan* (New York: Norton, 1967), pp. 81-118.

predominance, particularly General MacArthur's authority, in the administration of the occupation.

There were other reasons than legal limitations why the two allied bodies remained powerless throughout the occupation. In principle, the supreme commander was merely to implement the policies formulated by the FEC. By the time the commission began its operation in February 1946, however, the vital outline of exclusively United States occupation policies had already been transmitted to MacArthur, and their implementation was under way. Furthermore, it was not until June 1947 that the FEC, after many months of vicissitudes and delays, finally adopted its "Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan." Even then, the FEC policy statement was only to reaffirm existing United States policies. General MacArthur's disregard for these international bodies also made it difficult for them to take any substantial part in the formulation and implementation of occupation policies. MacArthur, from the very beginning, perceived them as obstructions to his actions in Japan so that he sought to bypass or outrun them in his execution of the directives from Washington. In fact, he effectively eliminated the attempts for control by the FEC by ignoring their orders and reminding them that they knew little about the Japanese situation. The general also disregarded the ACJ by sending subordinates of lower rank than the representatives of other nations to its meetings and by consulting the council at his discretion. After April 1946, MacArthur avoided consulting with it in advance of his actions by issuing informal orders, in place of formal directives, to the Japanese government for implementation.¹⁷

¹⁷ James, *Years of MacArthur*, pp. 236-37; and Richard B. Finn, *Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 152-53.

2. Military Aspects of Occupation Policies

As stated clearly in the Washington directives, the demilitarization and the democratization of Japan were the two basic policy objectives of the occupation. Demilitarization contained measures such as the disarmament and demobilization of Japanese military forces, the removal of those responsible for militarism, and the destruction of Japanese war potential. Thus, they constituted the negative aspects of the occupation tasks, which were to remove certain elements from Japanese society. Reform measures for democratization, on the other hand, represented the positive aspects, which involved the rebuilding of Japan in the political, economic, and social fields.

The implementation of the disarmament and demobilization programs was SCAP's first step for attaining demilitarization. On September 2, 1945, General Order No.1, calling for the unconditional surrender and disarmament of all Japanese forces, was issued by direction of the supreme commander. Subsequently, a policy document, SWNCC 58/9, regarding disarmament and demobilization, was sent as a detailed directive from Washington to SCAP on September 10, 1945.¹⁸ It is to be noted that MacArthur, fully aware that the Americans could not disarm an army of almost seven million men without their cooperation, vested responsibility for the task in the Japanese Army and Navy ministries, though under American direction. The demobilization program was nearly completed, with relative ease, by June 1946. Nevertheless, the repatriation of Japanese forces overseas remained unsettled until 1947 mainly because the Soviet Union refused to bring back the Japanese held in its controlling areas.¹⁹

While SCAP was proceeding to the physical demilitarization of Japan, other actions were taken by Washington policy makers to ensure the long-term

¹⁸ ERUS, 1945, vol. 6, pp. 614-18.

¹⁹ For a brief description of the repatriation progress, see ERUS, 1948, vol. 6, pp. 757-760.

demilitarization of Japan. At the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in September 1945, Secretary of State James Byrnes discussed the possibility of demilitarization treaties for Germany and Japan, an idea which later received Stalin's personal expression of support at a meeting between them on December 24.²⁰ In February 1946, the United States government sent a draft treaty on the demilitarization of Japan, almost identical with that proposed for Germany, to the Soviet Union, Britain, and China. On April 29, at the Paris meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, Byrnes announced his proposal for 25-year disarmament and demilitarization treaties for Germany and Japan. The draft treaty for Japan, recognizing that Japan had already been substantially disarmed and demilitarized, called for the continuation of the process, which entailed the "prohibition of the manufacture, production, or importation of military equipment" in Japan and the "prohibition of the establishment, utilization, or operation for military purposes of all military structures and factories." The draft treaty also provided for a "system of quadripartite inspection" to become operative upon the termination of the occupation and to be conducted through a "commission of control" to be established by the four contracting powers.²¹

The underlying motive of Byrnes' proposal derived from the intent of the American government to keep its dominant position in Japan, through the method of control provided by the proposed treaty, in the post-occupation period.²² The proposal was welcomed in principle by the Chinese and British governments but went unacknowledged by the Soviets at that time. It was later dropped temporarily by the United States in light of the Soviet disinterest and virtual rejection of a

²⁰ ERUS, 1945, vol. 2, p. 268; and ERUS, 1946, vol.2, p. 63.

²¹ "Draft Treaty on the Disarmament and Demilitarization of Japan," Feb. 28, 1946, ERUS, 1946, vol. 8, pp. 153-55.

²² Memo by the Secretary of State to President Truman, Feb. 27, 1946, Ibid., pp. 150-51.

similar treaty for Germany in April 1947. A four-power demilitarization treaty for Japan once again came under consideration within the United States government in August when it proposed a conference on the peace settlement for Japan. Yet the first comprehensive policy report on the Japanese peace treaty, submitted in October by the newly established Policy Planning Staff of the State Department, recommended that:

the idea of a four-power agreement on Japanese demilitarization should be abandoned but the peace treaty should provide for complete Japanese disarmament, with the reservation that Japanese should be permitted to maintain a civil police force, including a constabulary and coast guard, at a strength to be defined initially by SCAP.... In the coming period Japanese military security must rest primarily on the proximity (or in extreme event, the presence in Japan) of adequate U.S. forces.²³

In view of this report, it became evident by late 1947 that Washington, departing from initially envisaging a demilitarized Japan guaranteed by an international treaty to which the Soviet Union would be signatory and which would meet the allied nations' interests, began to concern itself about Japanese security against Communist penetration after the occupation, from the unilateral standpoint of United States security interests in Japan.

Meanwhile, some of the FEC members maintained by early 1947 that despite the substantial completion of the demilitarization of Japan, it would be appropriate for the commission to consider future policies for that matter, while no decision had yet been made by the four nations concerned as to the United States proposal for a demilitarization treaty for Japan. Washington, responding to the demand of the FEC members, submitted a policy paper on the control of Japanese military activities which would form the basis for a policy decision eventually

²³ PPS 10, "Results of Planning Staff Study of Questions Involved in the Japanese Peace Settlement," October 14, 1947, ERUS, 1947, vol. 6, pp. 540-41.

reached on February 12, 1948 by the FEC. The Commission's policy decision on the "Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan and Disposition of Japanese Military Equipment" was similar in substance to the provisions for demilitarization in the proposed four-power treaty, except that the former was designed to take effect for the occupation period, whereas the latter was for the post-occupation era.²⁴ As examined later in the chapter dealing with Japanese rearmament, the FEC decision of February 1948, along with its basic policy statement of June 1947, later functioned as international restrictions on United States efforts to rearm Japan during the latter phase of the occupation.

3. Political Reforms

Constitutional Revision. The making of a Japanese democratic constitution, MacArthur himself recalled later, was the most important political reform to attain the basic policy objective of the democratization of Japan.²⁵ In spite of the fact that well before the Japanese surrender, policy makers in the State Department had projected a constitutional reform as a measure necessary to the democratization of the Japanese political system.²⁶ Neither SWNCC 150/4/A nor JCS 1380/15 specifically provided for a constitutional change in Japan. However, they made clear the United States determination to establish a democratic and responsible government, which implied that it would be inevitable for the Japanese to rewrite the existing constitution.

²⁴ FRUS, 1948, vol. 6, pp. 662-63.

²⁵ Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 436.

²⁶ For the discussion of American Wartime planning for a constitutional reform, see Robert E. Ward, "Presurrender Planning: Treatment of the Emperor and Constitutional Change," in Robert E. Ward and Sakamoto Yoshakazu (eds.), *Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation* (Honolulu: University of Hawai Press, 1987), pp. 18-24.

While the general terms of the reform of the Japanese governmental system were still debated in Washington, it was General MacArthur in Tokyo who initiated the process of constitutional reform. Following his informal meetings with Japanese officials in which the reform matter was brought forward, on October 11, 1945, the general advised Prime Minister Shidehara of the necessity for "liberalization of the constitution"²⁷ As a result, the prime minister set up on October 13 a cabinet committee of experts, headed by Minister of State Matsumoto, to make recommendations to the Cabinet on possible revisions of the existing Meiji Constitution. While the Matsumoto Committee drafted a revised version of the constitution, MacArthur forbade Political Adviser George Atcheson and the SCAP Government Section to provide the Japanese committee with any guidance for the revision because he believed at that time that even without American guidance the Japanese would produce a democratic constitution acceptable to the United States government, and that any direct involvement by the State Department (then represented in Tokyo by the office of the political adviser) or by SCAP would cause Japanese unwillingness to preserve a "forced" constitution after the occupation.²⁸ In the meantime, policy makers in Washington finally decided upon general principles for Japanese governmental reform, set forth in SWNCC 228, a policy paper formally approved by the SWNCC on January 7, 1946 and sent to MacArthur for his information on January 11.²⁹ Nevertheless, MacArthur did not take any immediate action on the instructions from Washington until the beginning of February.

²⁷ In a statement to the new Shidehara Cabinet, with his suggestion of a constitutional reform, MacArthur outlined essential political and social reforms required by what "liberalization" meant. see PRJ, vol. 2, p. 741.

²⁸ James, *The Years of MacArthur*, pp. 121-22; ERUS, 1946, vol. 8, pp. 124-25.

²⁹ For the text of SWNCC 228, "Reform of the Japanese Governmental System," see Theodore McNelly (ed.), *Sources in Modern East Asian History and Politics* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crafts, 1967), pp. 177-87.

Contrary to MacArthur's anticipation, a draft constitution produced by the Japanese committee and made public on February 1 was found to fall far short of the requirements of SWNCC 228. Faced with the intent of the Japanese government not to make a substantial amendment of the Meiji Constitution, General MacArthur decided that the SCAP headquarters would take on the task of the constitutional reform directly. On February 3, MacArthur directed General Courtney Whitney, the chief of the Government Section, to have his section immediately draft a new Japanese constitution to be handed to Japanese officials for their consideration at a meeting scheduled for the following week. The supreme commander also instructed Whitney to incorporate three key points in the draft: (1) the emperor is to remain the head of state but be responsible to the people, (2) war as a sovereign right is abolished and renounced by Japan "even for preserving its own security." No armed forces are authorized, and (3) the feudal system, including the right of the peerage, is abolished.³⁰

In conjunction with the abrupt intervention of MacArthur and his staff in the process of constitutional revision, there are two interesting questions that have been raised among scholars. The first question refers to the reasons why MacArthur, initially allowing the Japanese to take the initiative, changed his attitude suddenly and ordered his staff to quickly prepare a draft constitution. The following have been pointed out as the factors that led to MacArthur's sudden action on the matter. First, the Japanese draft fell short of meeting the American criteria. Second, Whitney's memorandum for MacArthur of February 1 assured the supreme commander that he, legitimately, in the absence of any policy decision by the allied powers, had the unrestricted authority to proceed with that reform. Third, the organization of the Far Eastern Commission was imminent. Once functioning, the allied body could obstruct SCAP's independent actions for

³⁰ PRJ, vol. 1, p. 102.

constitutional reform through its legal authority. Fourth, MacArthur wanted the proposed constitution to be included among the campaign issues in the impending Japanese Diet election.³¹

The second question relates to the origins of MacArthur's three points on which the SCAP draft was based. The first point designed to preserve the emperor system was in line with the directives of 1945 from Washington. They made clear that, at least for the time being, the emperor was to be used, not eliminated. The first point also resulted from MacArthur's firm determination from the outset to protect the emperor against a trial for war crimes, on one hand, and to utilize him for securing the necessary Japanese cooperation for SCAP's administration of the occupation on the other hand. The final position adopted by Washington in April 1946 concluded that "a responsible constitutional monarchy would be consistent with American objectives in Japan."³²

The second point, the renunciation of war and armed forces, which was finally incorporated with some revision in the well-known Article 9 of the new Japanese constitution, have frequently been the object of scholarly debate due to the uncertainty of its origin. Although there has been no generally accepted answer to the question of its authorship, the idea of perpetual disarmament does not seem to have originated from policy makers in Washington. SWNCC 150/4/A and JCS 1380/15 provide for disarmament and demilitarization as one of the primary tasks of the occupation, but their provisions were originally intended not for long-term policies but for early occupation policies. Moreover, SWNCC 228 of January 1946,

³¹ Charles L. Kades, "The American Role in Revising Japan's Imperial Constitution," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 104, no. 2 (1989), p. 233; Justin Williams, *Japan's Political Revolution under MacArthur: A Participant's Account* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1979), p. 105; James, *The Years of MacArthur*, pp. 128-29; and Ward, "Presurrender Planning," p. 31; and *FRJ*, vol. 2, p. 622-23.

³² SWNCC 209/1, "Treatment of the Institution of the Emperor of Japan," April 13, 1946, *ERUS*, 1946, vol. 8, p. 200.

which would serve as one of the references for SCAP's drafting of a Japanese constitution, left open the possibility of the eventual revival of the Japanese military establishment, by containing a provision calling for the future subordination of the military services to the civil government.³³ On the other hand, MacArthur's account, that the suggestion of a provision of the renunciation of war and armed forces originated with Prime Minister Shidehara, has been doubted by some scholars.³⁴ More importantly, whoever initiated the idea of permanent disarmament, it was General MacArthur himself who consequently had the idea incorporated in a new Japanese constitution by putting it into his note of three points that he handed to General Whitney.

The staff members of the SCAP Government Section, referring heavily to MacArthur's instructions, SWNCC 228, and other countries' constitutions, promptly completed a draft Japanese constitution by February 10. During the drafting process, one of MacArthur's three points was subjected to modification so that the phrase, "even for preserving its own security" of the second point was deleted in the SCAP draft by reason that it was unrealistic to prohibit a nation from exercising its inherent right of self-preservation.³⁵ The draft therefore reads:

War as a sovereign right of the nation, and the threat or use of force is forever abolished as a means of settling disputes with other nations.³⁶

This modified version might be interpreted to mean that war and the use of force might be permissible in cases of resolving domestic conflict or defending the nation from external aggression. The provisions of the SCAP draft, which became Article

³³ McNelly (ed.), *Sources in Modern East Asian History and Politics*, p. 179.

³⁴ See Theodore McNelly, "General Douglas MacArthur and the Constitutional Dis-armament of Japan," *Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan*, 3rd Series, vol. 17 (October 1982), pp. 1-33.

³⁵ Kades, "The American Role in Revising Japan's Imperial Constitution," p. 235.

³⁶ PRJ, vol. 2, p. 625.

9 of a new Japanese draft, later underwent a further crucial amendment made by a special committee of the Japanese House of Representatives during its passage through the Diet. The committee, at the proposal of its chairman, Hitoshi Ashida, added two modifying phrases to the original version of Article 9. As a result, the final version of Article 9 (with the Ashida amendment in italics) reads:

*Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.*³⁷

The first sentence of Article 9, therefore, left room for the interpretation that war and force could be permitted to be used for self-defense. The phrase at the beginning of the second sentence was reportedly designed to set a limit to the renunciation of armed forces so that although armaments for settling international disputes would be prohibited, armaments for other purposes, including self-defense, would not be renounced. Ashida later conceded such an intention behind his amendment to Article 9. The SCAP Government Section also accepted the Ashida amendment in the full knowledge that it would pave the way for Japan to rearm for the purpose of its own defense.³⁸ In addition, the implicit intention of the Ashida amendment was reinforced by the House of Peers when it made a significant modification in the wording of the preamble of the proposed constitution during its deliberation, by inserting the clause: "we have determined to preserve our security and existence."³⁹ Those modifications attracted little

³⁷ Ibid. p. 649.

³⁸ Theodore H. McNelly, "Induced Revolution: The Policy and Process of Constitutional Reform in Occupied Japan," Ward and Sakamoto (eds.), *Democratizing Japan*, p. 93.

³⁹ Kades, "The American Role in Revising Japan's Imperial Constitution," p. 242.

attention in Japan at that time but led to considerable debate over their interpretations after mid-1950, when the United States decided to rearm Japan.

The SCAP draft, approved by MacArthur after slight changes, was given to Japanese officials as a guide in their work to prepare a draft constitution acceptable to SCAP. After long consideration, several consultations with the Government Section, and the approval of the Emperor, the Cabinet completed a new draft constitution in accordance with the terms of the SCAP draft and submitted it to the supreme commander, who announced his personal approval of it on March 16, 1946. When presented to the Diet on June 20, the Japanese government draft was substantially the same as the original SCAP draft, except for the provision for a bicameral legislature in the former, which the SCAP officials accepted. The submissive adoption of the SCAP draft by the Japanese government has been known to result from SCAP's pressure based on the following arguments. First, the acceptance of the American draft was necessary for protecting the emperor from trial as a war criminal. Second, if the Cabinet chose to reject it, MacArthur would present it directly to the people, which would certainly cause considerable damage to the existing government in the coming general election. Third, the prompt constitutional revision based on the principles of the American draft was essential to bringing an early withdrawal of the occupation forces and evading potentially harsh revision terms to be imposed by the FEC.⁴⁰ The draft constitution, after debate and some amendments, including the above-mentioned Ashida amendment to Article 9, was adopted by the Diet by October 7, 1946, promulgated on November 3, and became effective on May 3, 1947.

⁴⁰ James, *The Years of MacArthur*, pp. 131-32; and Kades, "American Role in Revising Japan's Imperial Constitution," pp. 228-30; and McNelly, "Induced Revolution," pp. 82-83.

Purge Program. The purge was initially conceived in SWNCC 150/4/A and JCS 1380/15 as a phase intended to attain the demilitarization objective, in terms of which those responsible for Japan's militarist aggressions would be removed from office. It was General MacArthur who attached a second objective to the purge program. As the supreme commander issued the first two purge directives to the Japanese government on January 4, 1946, he set forth their basic objective as striking "the shackles from the efforts of the Japanese people to rise toward freedom and democracy."⁴¹ In his mind, the removal of those tainted with war responsibility meant the expulsion of antidemocratic elements from Japan's leadership, which would in turn pave the way for establishing a new democratic leadership. MacArthur's perception of the purge policy as a phase of democratization became more evident when he directed the purge against the leadership of the Communist party of Japan in mid-1950. However, this dichotomy of purge objectives, Hans Baerwald maintains, led to confusion and a lack of consistency in applying the purge criteria to the individuals under screening because their responsibility for the aggressive war effort didn't necessarily indicate whether they were antidemocratic or not.⁴² The incompatibility of these two basic objectives were the most serious defect of the purge program and caused not only ineffectiveness in its implementation but also numerous objections to the program among American observers as well as the Japanese.

In the initial period covering 1946, in which the purge criteria were applied only at the national level, the Japanese government screened about 9,000 persons under the SCAP directives, of which 1,067 were barred or removed from public office.⁴³ By January 1947, the purge became so enlarged that its criteria

⁴¹ Press Release Concerning Purge Directives, January 4, 1946, *PRJ*, vol. 2, p. 489.

⁴² Hans H. Baerwald, *The Purge of Japanese Leaders under the Occupation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), pp. 10-11.

encompassed local government officials, business leaders, and mass media personnel. By May 1948, after the extended purge was effected, over 900,000 persons had been checked, and some 200,000 of them were actually designated as purgees. Military officers constituted the majority of purgees, accounting for about 80 percent of the total number. The purge consequently eliminated almost all of the military officers from all ranks of Japanese leadership.⁴⁴ The program in the political field, however, did not substantially change the composition and outlook of the political leadership of Japan as a whole, even though it contributed to reorganizing political alignments in the formation of the Japanese government. In other words, the political purge did not undermine the dominance of the Cabinet or Diet by the traditional conservative parties in rivalry with liberal and socialist parties throughout the occupation.⁴⁵ The economic purge removed only 639 out of a total of 6,951 business leaders screened in private enterprises so that it was not entirely effective in changing Japanese economic leadership. In addition, the program never touched on the influence which the purged business leaders, working behind the scenes, continued to exert on the policies of their successors.⁴⁶ These limited effects of the purge resulted largely from the fact that the program was implemented through Japanese government officials, whose interest were at odds with the drastic purge to which they would subject themselves.

As examined later, the overall shift in 1948 of United States occupation policy from emphasizing reform to recovery of Japan was a major factor which

⁴³ PRJ, vol. 1, p. 29.

⁴⁴ "General Summary of Purge Statistics," Ibid., vol. 2, p. 553.

⁴⁵ Howard Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, pp. 60-61; and Baerwald, *The Purge of Japanese Leaders*, pp. 83-90.

⁴⁶ PRJ, vol. 2, p. 553. For the account of effects of the economic purge, see Eleanor M. Hadley, *Antitrust in Japan*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 87-99; and Baerwald, *op. cit.*, pp. 91-93.

contributed to fundamental changes in the purge program. Faced with criticism from the Congress, the press, and the American business, SCAP undertook the task of depurging an ever increasing group of purgees through appeals and reinstatements. By 1949 and 1950, he also shifted the target of the purge away from militarists and ultrarightists to leftists and Communists.

4. Economic Reforms

Reparations. The early postwar directives from Washington provided that reparations, as part of the demilitarization effort, should be exacted from Japanese external assets and from her existing industries. As an initial step to implement reparations, a special mission, headed by Edwin W. Pauley, then Truman's representative on reparations, was sent in November 1945 to the Far East to investigate and recommend a reparations program for Japan. The preliminary report by Pauley, submitted to the president in December, suggested a harsh interim program of reparations from certain important industrial sectors in which, according to Pauley, the capacity clearly exceeded the peaceful needs of Japan. Pauley then recommended the immediate implementation of the interim program, including the removal of all tools and equipment in all primary war facilities and substantial numbers of facilities on a specific list of industries. The objectives of the reparations program envisioned in Pauley's report were ambitious. Pauley considered the program not only as a means to carry out the economic disarmament of Japan but also as an instrument to reconstruct the economies of Asian countries injured by Japanese aggression.⁴⁷

Pauley's recommendations for an interim reparations program were reviewed and approved with some modifications as SWNCC 236/10 by the United

⁴⁷ Edwin W. Pauley, Report on Japanese Reparations to the President of the United States, November 1945 to April 1946 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 1-10; and ERUS, 1946, vol. 8, pp. 498-502.

States government in May 1946, and immediately transmitted to the FEC for its policy decisions.⁴⁸ Through policy decisions on eight industries, the FEC gave its general approval to the recommendations of SWNCC 236/10. Directed by the JCS to implement the FEC decisions, in August 1946 SCAP issued a series of directives to the Japanese government to designate reparations selections in the eight industries but did not order any immediate removals.⁴⁹ Moreover, since a decision was not made by the FEC upon which allied nations the designated industrial facilities would be transferred to, further steps for implementation were delayed. From early 1946 onward, FEC members were sharply divided in their opinions upon how to allocate reparations.

In April 1947, when it became apparent that the early implementation of the interim reparations program was made impossible by the FEC's failure to agree on an allocation schedule, the United States decided to take a unilateral action for implementation. On April 4, it issued an interim directive to SCAP to authorize advance transfers of up to 30 percent of the industrial equipment which had been declared as available for interim reparations by the FEC.⁵⁰ Under the so-called "Advance Transfer Program" implemented by SCAP's Reparations Section, the four claimant nations received machine tools and other industrial equipment valued at about 43 million dollars, of which China received 20 million, the Philippines 11 million, the United Kingdom 7 million (for Malaya and Burma), and the Netherlands 5 million (for the East Indies). The total amounted to about one

⁴⁸ SWNCC 236/10, "Interim Reparations Removal Program for Japan," *FRUS*, 1946, vol. 8, pp. 493-505.

⁴⁹ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, pp. 148-49.

⁵⁰ JCS to SCAP, "Interim Directive Regarding Advance Transfers of Japanese Reparations and Reparations Allocation Procedures for Industrial Facilities in Japan," April 4, 1947, *FRUS*, 1947, vol. 6, pp. 376-80.

fifteenth of the total reparations bill then under discussion in the FEC.⁵¹ This action taken by SCAP later turned out to be the first and the last transfers to implement the reparations program during the occupation period.

Meanwhile, in order to answer the basic question of the total amount of reparations available in Japan, in April 1946 Edwin Pauley submitted to the President a final report for a comprehensive reparations program. The Pauley Report called for a punitive and drastic program based on the removal of large segments of Japanese industries for reparations.⁵² The State Department submitted the recommendations by the report to the SWNCC in May. In the course of interdepartmental deliberations over the Pauley Report toward the determination of a final United States policy for a comprehensive reparations program, opposition to Pauley's severe approach was raised not only by the War Department but also by General MacArthur. Particularly, in his comments on the Pauley Report, MacArthur maintained that because Pauley's findings were "premature or arbitrary," final decisions regarding the comprehensive program should be delayed. Fearful of the "economic vacuum" which might be caused by the large scale of industrial removals the report recommended, the general insisted that higher industrial levels be retained in Japan.⁵³ The War Department, also concerned over deleterious effects of harsh reparations removals on the Japanese economy, sent to Japan in January 1947 a special reparations mission, headed by Clifford Strike, to investigate Japan's industrial capacity for paying reparations. The Strike Mission, after its return from Japan, recommended to the War Department that in order to eliminate the threat of disaster to the Japanese economy, reparations removals be

⁵¹ James, *The Years of MacArthur*, pp. 164-65.

⁵² See Pauley, *Report on Japanese Reparations to the President of the United States*.

⁵³ Pauley to the Secretary of State, *ERUS*, 1946, vol. 8, pp. 601-604.

scaled down sharply from the levels the Pauley Report and the majority of FEC members were considering.⁵⁴

After months of negotiations among the State and War Departments, the Pauley, and the Strike reparations groups, a policy for a comprehensive reparations program was determined in April 1947 by the SWNCC and incorporated in a policy paper, SWNCC 236/43, later submitted to the FEC for its final policy decision. The document, reflecting the moderate views of the War Department and SCAP, provided for higher retention levels for Japanese industries than Pauley had recommended, which actually made a little more available for reparations in Japan than the FEC decisions on the interim removals had prescribed.⁵⁵

By late 1947, when the reparations issue remained still unsettled in the FEC due to its failure to reach consensus on the final reparations levels and their allocations, there were attempts on the part of policy makers in Washington to reshape United States economic policy in regard to occupied Japan in general and its reparations policy in particular. Especially, the Army Department, increasingly concerned over the adverse effects of the deteriorating Japanese economy on the American economy, sent several economic missions to Japan during late 1947 and early 1948 to inquire into Japanese economic problems. Subsequent reports maintained that it was necessary to adopt a more drastically reduced reparations program than SWNCC 236/43, under consideration in the FEC proposed, in order not to impede the Japanese achievement of a self-supporting economy.⁵⁶ The

⁵⁴ Clifford Strike, et al., to the Secretary of War, "Report of Special Committee on Japanese Reparations," February 24, 1947, Eichelberger Papers, annotated in James, *The Years of MacArthur*, p. 164

⁵⁵ SWNCC 236/43, "Reparations Removals of Industrial Facilities and Merchant Shipping from Japan," April 7, 1947, the enclosure, 894.60/4-847, Department of State, Record Group 59; and ERUS, 1947, vol. 6, pp. 382-83 and pp. 393-95.

⁵⁶ The reports of the Overseas Consultants, Inc. and the Draper-Johnston Mission are the cases in point.

public release of these reports led to new debate over reparations policy in Washington and further delay in the removals of the industrial equipment from Japan to FEC claimants.

Deconcentration Program. In the years before and during the war, the Japanese economy had been dominated by large industrial and financial combines, known as the zaibatsu, which were usually family-dominated. They operated through a pyramidal network of companies, at the top of which a holding company exercised its control over the entire network of subsidiaries and affiliates by means of intercorporate ownership, interlocking directorates, management ties, and a centralized system of financing. Each of the zaibatsu was in oligopolistic positions in diverse Japanese industries. By the end of war the ten major zaibatsu groups, including the four largest, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Yasuda, owned a great part of Japanese industrial, commercial, and financial sectors to the extent that they, for example, controlled 53 percent of Japan's financial business, 51 percent of the mining industry, 68 percent of the machinery industry, and 39 percent of chemical production.⁵⁷

During their wartime planning, liberal economists in the State Department, who took the lead in formulating early postwar United States economic policy for occupied Japan, took up the position that because the zaibatsu, benefiting greatly from a policy of foreign aggression, had been a powerful supporting force behind the Japanese militarist leadership, they had to be broken up during the early years of occupation.⁵⁸ As a result, SWNCC 150/4/A provided that SCAP was to give

⁵⁷ For a detailed exploration of the nature of the zaibatsu and their position in Japan's economy until the end of the war, see Hadley, *Antitrust in Japan*, pp. 20-60.

⁵⁸ For wartime planning for the dissolution of the zaibatsu, see Marlene J. Mayo, "American Economic Planning for Occupied Japan: The Issue of Zaibatsu Dissolution, 1942-1945," in Lawrence H. Redford (ed.), *The Occupation of Japan: Economic Policy and Reform*, (Norfolk: The MacArthur Memorial, 1980), pp. 205-28.

encouragement to reorganizing Japan's industry "on a democratic basis." To this end, it would be SCAP's policy to "favor a program for the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations." JCS 1380/15, besides containing similar provisions, provided for certain procedures for the program, including the establishment of a public agency responsible for dissolving and reorganizing the zaibatsu.

Partly as the result of the SCAP economic section's effort to persuade the zaibatsu families to submit their own plans for voluntary breakup, the Yasuda family, the fourth biggest zaibatsu, put forward a dissolution plan in October 1945, on the terms of which Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo later agreed to dissolve. On November 4, the Japanese government submitted for approval by MacArthur a comprehensive dissolution plan incorporating the Yasuda plan, under which the holding companies of the four biggest zaibatsu would enter into dissolution procedures and a new Holding Company Liquidation Commission would be created to implement the program. The most significant feature of the Japanese plan was its limitation of dissolution action to only one level of the zaibatsu structure, the holding companies, so that the plan made no reference to actions on large operating subsidiaries, intercorporate ownership, or management ties below the level of the holding companies. The zaibatsu might be left free to operate through their subsidiaries even after the dissolution of their holding companies.⁵⁹

Lacking adequate SCAP personnel to evaluate the suitability of the Japanese plan, MacArthur approved it in general by the directive of November 6.⁶⁰ These actions in Tokyo provoked a prompt response from policy makers in Washington, who had anticipated more fundamental dissolution steps against the zaibatsu.

⁵⁹ T. A. Bisson, *Zaibatsu Dissolution in Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1954), pp. 73-77.

⁶⁰ SCAPIN 244, "Directive Accepting Japanese Proposal Under Title of 'Dissolution of Holding Companies,'" November 6, 1945, PRJ, vol. 2, p. 565.

William Clayton, then Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, asked the Justice Department to form a special mission on the zaibatsu so as to make recommendations for an effective deconcentration policy.⁶¹ In January 1946, a resulting State-War mission, headed by Corwin D. Edwards of Northwestern University, was dispatched to Japan to explore the complex zaibatsu issue. After ten weeks of investigation, the Edwards mission submitted a comprehensive report to the both departments in March. The mission's report at first criticized the initial SCAP program adopting the Japanese dissolution plan as insufficient to eliminate the power of the Japanese combines because it did not affect corporate ties below the level of holding companies, nor did it keep zaibatsu members from controlling company policies and stocks through loyal corporate officials. In place of the Japanese dissolution plan, the Edwards Report made far more sweeping recommendations. The holding companies were to be dissolved and prevented through rigorous antitrust legislation, from re-forming. In addition, the networks of large operating subsidiaries and affiliates below the holding companies were to be broken up, and the leading zaibatsu members removed from the business field.⁶²

General MacArthur initially took issue with the Edwards Report by expressing negative comments such as "too sweeping," "unworkable," "too liberal," and "unwise" on its specific proposals.⁶³ Although he agreed to them "in principle," the supreme commander sided with his staff, who feared that any drastic steps taken against the zaibatsu would seriously hamper the revival of the Japanese economy, thus prolonging the period of social stress. Consequently, he insisted that "a way less painful to Japan's economy" could be found to deal with the

⁶¹ Clayton to the Assistant Attorney General, October 31, 1945, *FRUS*, 1945, vol. 6, pp. 811-12.

⁶² For a summary of the Edwards Report, see Hadley, *Antitrust in Japan*, pp. 127-29. The recommendations of the report were for the most part incorporated in SWNCC 302/4 of April 1947. See note 64.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 126-27.

zaibatsu issue.⁶⁴ In spite of MacArthur's criticism of the Edwards Report, its recommendations formed the basis for the preparation by the SWNCC of a policy paper on economic deconcentration. After one year of extensive review within the SWNCC and some debate with SCAP experts, the policy paper, SWNCC 302/4, was approved in April 1947 by the United States government and then submitted to the FEC for its approval in May. The policy document then designated as FEC 230, going beyond a plan for the breakup of the zaibatsu, proved to be an elaborate and far-reaching deconcentration plan which would apply to any large-scale companies or combines that tended to restrict competition.⁶⁵

While the Edwards Report was under consideration in Washington, substantial steps for the implementation of the initial occupation policy of the zaibatsu dissolution had already been undertaken by the Japanese government at the direction of or with the approval of SCAP. Based at the outset on the vague and general instructions given by JCS 1380/15, General MacArthur had approved the Japanese dissolution plan incorporating the Yashuda plan by issuing SCAPIN 244 on November 6, 1945. The SCAP directive ordered the creation of the Japanese-manned Holding Company Liquidation Commission (HCLC), called for the submission of additional dissolution plans, and pressed for the enactment of antitrust laws.⁶⁶ After a ten-month delay, the HCLC was established in August 1946 so as to carry out the dissolution program under SCAPIN 244. From September 1946 to September 1947, the HCLC designated for dissolution 83 zaibatsu holding companies whose securities were to be transferred to the commission which would later dispose of them to new owners and compensate

⁶⁴ Cited in Mark J. Gayn, *Japan Diary* (New York: William Sloane, 1948), p. 259.

⁶⁵ The full text of FEC 230, "Statement of U.S. Policy with Respect to Excessive Concentrations of Economic Power in Japan," in its SWNCC 302/4 form is reprinted in Hadley, *Antitrust in Japan*, Appendix IX, pp. 495-515.

⁶⁶ See note 60.

the former owners with ten-year non-negotiable government bonds. On an additional instruction from SCAP, in March 1947 the HCLC designated 56 persons from ten zaibatsu families for the purpose of implementing the disposal of direct family holdings.⁶⁷

In July 1947, SCAP took a most drastic action in its implementation of the deconcentration program, ordering the HCLC to dissolve two trading giants, the Mitsui and the Mitsubishi Trading companies, which before the war had handled about 70 percent of Japan's foreign trade. The two companies were so gigantic that, in the months following this SCAP order, some 200 successor companies were established out of each one.⁶⁸ The final result of the actions for dissolution taken by the HCLC under the direction of SCAP was that, of the eighty-three designated holding companies, sixteen were totally dissolved, and twenty-six, including the Mitsui and the Mitsubishi Trading companies, were dissolved and then respectively reorganized into smaller companies. The remaining forty-one were not dissolved; among them, eleven were reorganized and the others left intact.⁶⁹

The breakup of the zaibatsu holding companies was only the first stage of the deconcentration program. It was followed by the economic purge and the attempts to extend the program to the level below the holding companies and to prevent future monopolies. Although MacArthur was instructed to execute the economic purge by JCS 1380/15, it was not until January 1947 that he actually launched it in the process of extending the purge program under the SCAP directive of January 1946. The main part of the economic purge applied to persons holding key positions in 245 designated companies. Its result was that a total of

⁶⁷ Hadley, *Antitrust in Japan*, pp. 67-73.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 147-65.

⁶⁹ Bisson, *Zaibatsu Dissolution in Japan*, pp. 112-13.

about 1,500 key officers in these companies were subject to removal, among which 639 were directly removed from positions; the remaining had resigned in anticipation of removal or had earlier retired.⁷⁰ Meanwhile, the Japanese government, under heavy pressure from SCAP, took a step in December 1947 to enact legislation, the Law for Termination of Zaibatsu Family Control, providing for the elimination of zaibatsu family members and their appointees from business positions in listed companies of the ten zaibatsu networks. By the actions taken under the law, 40 zaibatsu key officers, besides those already removed by the initial economic purge, were eliminated from their companies.⁷¹ Notwithstanding those actions, the economic purge did not actually lead to a substantial change or damage to the management of the existing zaibatsu. Since the purge affected only top-level officers, the vacated positions were soon taken by many remaining officers with capacities and long careers in zaibatsu practices. Moreover, many of the purged zaibatsu leaders, working behind the scenes in traditional Japanese fashion, continued to exert influence on the management of the business by their successors. Finally, the large-scale depurge undertaken by SCAP during 1950 and 1951 enabled the zaibatsu purgees to resume their old positions.⁷²

By mid-1947, SCAP's deconcentration program was extended to the enactment of laws designed for the prevention of future monopolies or the deconcentration of large-scale operating companies below the zaibatsu holding companies. To begin with, in April the Antimonopoly Law was adopted by the Japanese under the direction of SCAP, and the Fair Trade Commission was created to enforce the provisions of the law. The measure sought to restrain the

⁷⁰ See RRJ, vol. 2, p. 553.

⁷¹ Hadley, *Antitrust in Japan*, pp. 99-102.

⁷² Bisson, *Zaibatsu Dissolution in Japan*, pp. 177-79.

development of new excessively large or powerful combines, by prohibiting trade practices that impeded competition and by placing limitations upon the devices for the concentration of corporate control.⁷³

A more rigorous step for deconcentration was taken against the existing monopolistic companies in December, when the Diet, after months of heavy SCAP pressure and Japanese resistance, passed the Deconcentration Law, formally entitled "Law for the Elimination of Excessive Concentrations of Economic Power." The measure, aiming at the dissolution of large-scale operating subsidiaries unaffected by the existing anti-zaibatsu program, gave the HCLC the authority to designate and dissolve the companies that were considered as "excessive concentrations of economic power."⁷⁴ As the first step to enforce the law, in February 1948, the HCLC designated 325 companies for possible dissolution as excessive concentrations and ordered them to submit reorganization plans. This action was so rigorous that although in numbers the designated companies amounted to only one-third of one percent of all the companies in Japan, in scales they accounted for about 80 percent of its commerce and industry.⁷⁵

There are two important facts that deserve comments in conjunction with the enactment of the Deconcentration Law and the subsequent actions. First, the provisions of the law, Japanese adoption of which was reluctantly accomplished by virtue of MacArthur and his staff's persistent pressure, were closely in line with the terms of the official American deconcentration policy which was developed in late 1946 and early 1947 by the SWNCC and embodied in FEC 230. This indicated that General MacArthur, initially skeptical of the Edwards Mission proposals in

⁷³ For the interpretation of the provisions of the Antimonopoly Law, see Hadley, *Antitrust in Japan*, pp. 120-24.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 110-12.

⁷⁵ Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, p. 370.

1946, changed his attitude by 1947 so apparently as to take a series of drastic actions for deconcentration, including the dissolution of the two huge trading companies and the instruction of the enactment of the antitrust law. Finally, the general pressed the Japanese government to enact the harsh deconcentration law whose provisions incorporated the terms of the Edwards program and its later version, FEC 230.

MacArthur's abrupt reversal in his deconcentration policy was first of all influenced by liberal officials of the SCAP Antitrust and Cartels Division. Particularly, Edward C. Welsh, appointed as a new chief of the division by the advocates of a vigorous deconcentration program in Washington in March 1947, was so zealous in implementing the program that he successfully persuaded MacArthur to approve his proposals for deconcentration which reflected the recommendations of FEC 230.⁷⁶ On the other hand, Michael Schaller, a widely known authority on the occupation of Japan, argues that as on almost every other issue, this apparent change in MacArthur's attitude toward the zaibatsu issue can be explained as almost entirely attributable to his "political opportunism." In other words, the supreme commander altered his deconcentration policy because of his political calculation, rather than any consistent political principle or ideology; that adopting a drastic antitrust program he adopted would enhance his popular image as an enlightened reformer and trust buster in America, which would be necessary if he decided to run against Truman for the presidency in 1948.⁷⁷ Since the context in which General MacArthur pushed forward the deconcentration program during 1947 was complicated, however, it is hard to assess to what extent his aspirations for the presidency conditioned his attitudes and actions in Japan.

⁷⁶ For an account of Welsh's role in implementing the deconcentration program during 1947, see *Ibid.*, pp. 360-373.

⁷⁷ Michael Schaller, "MacArthur's Japan: the View from Washington," *Diplomatic History*, vol. 10, no. 1, (Winter 1986), pp. 1-23.

Second, it was also noticeable that by the time MacArthur became enthusiastic about the implementation of a harsh deconcentration program, most policy makers in the State and military departments, increasingly afraid of the adverse effects of the program, were steadily moving away from supporting it. It is even more ironical that, by May 1947, when the United States government submitted its radical deconcentration program to the FEC for approval, its high-level officials began to consider a policy reversal in Japan toward recovery and away from reform, and particularly, from the comprehensive antimonopoly policy enunciated in FEC 230 and now implemented by SCAP. In fact, in July the State Department submitted a Japanese recovery proposal, SWNCC 381, that called for a cranking-up of the Japanese economy by means of American aid of more than 500 million dollars.⁷⁸ For the following six months, the State and the Army departments had full-dress consultations about the Japanese recovery issue.

Meanwhile, the Army Department, concerned over the harmful effects on the Japanese economy of the deconcentration bill which had been pushed through the Japanese Diet by SCAP, cabled General MacArthur in October to instruct him to delay Diet consideration of the bill.⁷⁹ The general's determination, nevertheless, led the Diet to pass the bill in December. The passage of the Deconcentration Law triggered open attacks upon SCAP's economic reforms on the part of policy makers in Washington and thus provided them with an occasion to intervene actively in the implementation of occupation policies which had been left mostly to MacArthur's discretion.

⁷⁸ As examined in the next chapter, SWNCC 381, July 22, 1947, Records of the SWNCC, RG 353.

⁷⁹ Department of Army to MacArthur, October 20 and 21, 1947, CD 3-1-9, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, RG 330.

Labor Policy. SWNCC 150/4/A contained no specific guidance on labor policy, except for the instructions to promote civil liberties, to encourage democratic organizations in labor, and to promote a wide distribution of income and ownership. JCS 1380/15 ordered SCAP to require the Japanese to remove wartime controls over labor and all legal hindrances to the formation of labor organizations. These general principles were finally specified in SWNCC 92/1, a key policy paper on Japanese labor organization, which was approved on December 28, 1945. The policy document directed the Japanese government to take legislative steps for the formation of labor unions, while it called for the elimination of all the legal and institutional obstacles which had previously blocked labor union activities. Strikes and other work stoppage would be prohibited, however, when they "interfered with military operations or prejudiced the objectives or needs of the occupation."⁸⁰

The first step to implement American labor policy was taken by SCAP on October 4, 1945, when it issued the so-called Civil Liberties Directive to the Japanese government. By this directive, the Japanese government abrogated all laws and ordinances restricting labor organizations and other forms of democratic expression, dissolved the secret police organs and the other departments involved in the surveillance or control of labor activities, and released all political prisoners, some of whom were leaders of the prewar labor movement. SCAP also instructed the Japanese to dissolve the wartime government-controlled labor organizations and to bar undesirable persons from positions in labor administrations.⁸¹ As a positive step, SCAP ordered the Japanese government to set up a new legal framework to protect workers' rights. Consequently, the basic labor laws were

⁸⁰ SWNCC 92/1, "Treatment of Japanese Workers' Organization," FRUS, 1945, vol. 6, pp. 891-93.

⁸¹ Miriam S. Farley, Aspects of Japan's Labor Problems (New York: The John Day Company, 1950), pp. 29-33.

enacted by the Japanese under the sponsorship of the SCAP Labor Division during the early period of the occupation.⁸²

Taken along with the public encouragement of labor unionization by SCAP, the enforcement of the civil liberties directive and the enactment of labor laws provided a momentum for the phenomenal development of the Japanese labor union movement. Within a few months, the number of union members passed the prewar peak of 400,000, and by the end of 1947, reached into 6.3 million so that about 48 percent of Japan's nonagricultural labor force belonged to unions.⁸³ A most compelling incentive to the rapid union growth in Japan lay in the postwar spiraling inflation, which made the wages of Japanese workers fall far short of minimum living requirements. Furthermore, the inopportune inflationary economic policies of the conservative Japanese government aggravated the workers' economic hardship, which in turn contributed to the phenomenal burst of union activity.

In the spring of 1946, when economic conditions became far worse due to food shortages, hyperinflation, and increasing unemployment, labor unions intensified their activities with disputes, mass demonstrations, and strikes. A large part of the union movement joined in food demonstrations and in political rallies demanding the resignations of first, the Shidehara and then, the Yoshida cabinets. The most alarming fact, from the viewpoint of SCAP's labor officials at that time, Howard Schonberger points out, was the "increasingly left-wing politicization of the Japanese labor movement." By the summer of 1946, a greater part of the labor unions was organized into two nationwide labor federations: the National Congress of Industrial Unions (Sanbetsu), closely associated with the Japanese

⁸² For various labor laws enacted during the early years of the occupation, see *Ibid.*, pp. 34-40 and 57-58.

⁸³ See compiled data in James, *The Years of MacArthur*, p. 176.

Communist Party, and the General Federation of Labor Unions (Sodomei), linked to the right wing of the Socialist Party. Particularly, the pro-Communist Sanbetsu represented the radical politicization of the labor movement, taking the lead in raising strikes and demonstrations against the Yoshida government all through the fall of 1946.⁸⁴ SCAP, concerned about the development of left-wing and politicizing tendencies on the part of the labor unions, determined to change its policy from nonintervention and full support of the labor movement to interventionist control of the radical elements. MacArthur's first public warning of May 1946 against radical mass demonstrations against the Japanese government was to foretell such a shift in SCAP's labor policy. A rise in the number of strikes and demonstrations from August, in spite of the first major warning, brought another stern warning from SCAP that any radical union activities which were inimical to the objectives of the occupation were prohibited.⁸⁵

SCAP's reactions to the radical orientation of union activities stiffened even more in the beginning of 1947 as Japanese labor prepared for a general strike. Faced with the deteriorating economic situation, with little prospect of improvement, and the inept resistance of the Yoshida government to labor's demands, all the unions, led by Sanbetsu, were poised to launch a general strike on February 1, the ultimate objective of which was reportedly to overthrow the Yoshida government. Confronted by the threat of the nationwide strike, MacArthur adopted one of the alternative measures under consideration. It was at first to persuade the Japanese to back down and later, to outlaw the strike if the unions persisted.⁸⁶ After the

⁸⁴ Howard Schonberger, "American Labor's Cold War in Occupied Japan," *Diplomatic History*, vol. 3, no. 3 (Summer 1979), pp. 116-17.

⁸⁵ James, *The Years of MacArthur*, pp. 177-78.

⁸⁶ Interestingly, Theodore Cohen, then chief of the SCAP Labor Division, enumerating three alternatives examined at that time, later gave an account that MacArthur's selection of that alternative was influenced by his political calculation of the forthcoming American presidential

unsuccessful efforts by SCAP officials to press union leaders to call off the planned strike, General MacArthur finally intervened and issued a public order banning the general strike on January 31.⁸⁷ The general's firm action was to reflect his deep apprehensions about the potentially mischievous effects of a nationwide strike on the Japanese economy as well as the Communist penetration into the labor movement. More importantly, his action provided a key momentum that led SCAP to alter its labor policy. Subsequently, SCAP took such an interventionist line that it sought actively to guide union policies, discourage strikes, promote the peaceful settlement of labor disputes, and eliminate Communist elements from the labor movement.⁸⁸

By the beginning of 1948, SCAP found another occasion to impose more restrictions on union activities, as there was once again an increase in strikes and labor violence by government workers unions under the influence of the left-wing groups. General MacArthur, perceiving the upsurge of labor activism by government employees as jeopardizing his occupation, pressured the Japanese government to amend the National Public Service Law of 1947 so as to restrict the labor rights of public employees.⁸⁹ Subsequent labor policy placed its focus on the removal of Communist influence from the labor unions, culminating in the purge of Communists in the labor field during 1950. SCAP's policy of intervention and restriction on certain union activities after 1947 turned out to be one of the unusual cases in which SCAP's actions were favorably seen by policy makers in

election in 1948. In MacArthur's view, it would be hard to anticipate support by American labor unions for his unannounced presidential bid if he had quickly banned the strike. See Theodore Cohen, "Labor Democratization in Japan: The First Years," in Redford (ed.), *The Occupation of Japan: Economic Policy and Reform* pp. 171-72.

⁸⁷ PRJ, vol. 2, p. 762.

⁸⁸ Farley, *Aspects of Japan's Labor Problems*, pp. 120-23.

⁸⁹ See Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, pp. 378-92.

Washington. This was attributed to the fact that MacArthur's solution to labor unrest was in tune with their new policy of the economic recovery of Japan, which would clearly entail the control of labor interests.

Land Reform. In the prewar years, a key feature in the Japanese agricultural structure had been the land tenure system under which a great part of Japan's farmland was cultivated not by its owners but by tenant farmers. By the end of the war, over 60 percent of Japanese farmers were either partially or wholly tenants. The area farmed by these tenants amounted to 46 percent of the total cultivated land.⁹⁰ Not only because of excessive rents but also because of growing farm debts caused by the depression and the government's discriminating policy against agriculture, almost all of the tenant farmers, with little hope of having their own land again, could not support themselves on their farm incomes.⁹¹

The two basic directives from Washington addressed themselves to the matter of land reform only to the extent that they favored the development of organizations in agriculture organized on a democratic basis. An initial action toward land reform was taken by SCAP in October 1945, when MacArthur circulated to the SCAP sections for information a memorandum prepared by Robert Fearey, who had just transferred from the State Department to the office of the Political Adviser to SCAP. The memorandum, based on Fearey's comprehensive appraisal of Japan's agrarian problems, provided clear and broad principles which would guide attempts at land reform.⁹² The Japanese also

⁹⁰ Laurence I. Hewes, Jr., Japan: Land and Men: An Account of the Japanese Land Reform Program, 1945-51. (Ames, Iowa: The Iowa State College Press, 1955), pp. 141-43.

⁹¹ For a brief description of the prewar agrarian situation under the land tenure system, see *Ibid.*, pp. 30-39; and Frank J. Sackton, "The Transfer of Land Ownership to the Peasants: The Priceless Economic Reform," Redford (ed.), The Occupation of Japan, pp. 124-28.

⁹² R. P. Dore, Land Reform in Japan (New York: Schocken Books, 1985), pp. 130-32.

independently started an action to launch a land reform. On its own initiative, late in November the Japanese government announced its intention to enact land reform legislation immediately. The subsequent land reform bill was drafted and then presented to the Diet on December 6. A key factor prompting the Japanese to set out to enact an independent land reform law was undoubtedly their fear that a rigorous reform program might be imposed on them by SCAP if they did not take the initiative.⁹³

While the land reform bill was under debate in the Diet, MacArthur issued a directive, SCAPIN 411, to the Japanese government on December 9, instructing it to undertake a land reform. It was a matter of course that the contents of the directive were derived from Fearey's memorandum. The directive in effect canceled the existing land tenure system of Japan and ordered the substitution of a new system based on the ownership of land by those who had cultivated it. For this purpose, the Japanese government was directed to submit by March 15, 1946, its land reform plan which should contain provisions for: (1) the transfer of land ownership from absentee land owners to land operators, (2) the purchase of farm land from nonoperating owners at equitable rates, (3) the sale of land to tenants at annual installments commensurate with tenant income, and (4) the protection of former tenants against reversion to tenancy status.⁹⁴ At the same time, SCAP informed the Japanese government that its proposed bill did not meet the requirements of the SCAP directive. Nevertheless, the Japanese bill was passed by the Diet on December 18 and promulgated ten days later. The measure intentionally reflected the views of the conservative Japanese government which sought to preserve the landlord system as the economic basis of the traditional

⁹³ Hewes, *Japan: Land and Men*, pp. 52-53.

⁹⁴ SCAPIN 411, *PRJ*, vol. 2, p. 575.

rural leadership.⁹⁵ Consequently, the law was widely criticized by the Japanese public as a reluctant attempt to forestall a real reform and finally invalidated when SCAP refused to accept it and demanded a more comprehensive plan. Further actions toward a new plan were delayed for the next several months due to the failure of SCAP and the Japanese government in reaching an agreement.

To find a way out of the stalemate, General MacArthur decided in May 1946 to refer the issue to the Allied Council for Japan for advice in one of the rare instances throughout the occupation in which he made use of that international body. The subsequent ACJ recommendations were in line with the SCAP positions. They were accordingly accepted by SCAP as the basis on which it eventually worked out with Japanese agricultural officials a new plan for the land reform.⁹⁶ On August 14, MacArthur announced publicly his approval of the new plan just after the Japanese cabinet endorsed it. After numerous revisions by SCAP and Japanese officials, followed by debates in the Diet, the program was finally enacted in October 1946 in the form of two laws: the Agricultural Land Adjustment Law and the Owner-Farmer Establishment Special Measures Law. The first law provided that the Japanese government would buy the land from landlords and then sell it to tenant cultivators by providing them with long-term loans at low interest. Landlords would be paid in long-term government bonds, which proved to be valueless as a result of soaring inflation. Agricultural land commissions in charge of implementation were to be elected at the local and prefectural levels, including representation by tenants, owner-cultivators, and landlords. At the national level the government-appointed Central Agricultural Land Commission was established to coordinate and oversee the implementation of the program. The

⁹⁵ Sackton, "The Transfer of Land Ownership to the Peasants," p. 129.

⁹⁶ Dore, *Land Reform in Japan*, p. 137.

second law stipulated that to protect future tenant farmers, rent payment in kind would be prohibited and that limits would be set on the amount of rents.⁹⁷

In spite of the opposition from landlords and the attempts by conservatives within the Japanese government to delay implementation, the land reform program was carried out under SCAP's prodding so speedily and effectively that its achievement turned out to be remarkable within the short period of three years. According to an announcement by the Japanese Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry in October 1949, about 4.5 million acres acquired by the government under the program had been sold to the former tenants, which reduced the land under tenancy from 46 percent of the total cultivated land in 1945 to 12 percent. Over 3.5 million tenant families had been helped to a position of ownership of much of the land they cultivated. A new and fairer rental system was established for the less than 1.5 million acres of land still under tenancy.⁹⁸ For many years the land reform in Japan was considered one of the most successful SCAP reforms. The reform gave a great number of tenant farmers freedom from economic dependence on landlords, incentives to produce on a large scale, and thus increasing purchasing power to contribute to the economic recovery of Japan. On the other hand, as one observer states, the reform transformed Japanese farmers into little capitalists who had a tangible stake in the existing regime, so that it did much toward the prevention of the spread of Communist influence into the rural area of Japan.⁹⁹ It is most noticeable of all that the land reform was pushed forward by SCAP with

⁹⁷ Ibid., pp. 137-41; and Edwin M. Martin, *The Allied Occupation of Japan* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1972), pp. 89-91.

⁹⁸ Robert A. Fearey, *The Allied Occupation of Japan, Second Phase: 1948-1950* (New York: Macmillan, 1950), pp. 65-67; and Hewes, *Japan-Land and Men*, pp. 142-43.

⁹⁹ Kazuo Kawai, *Japan's American Interlude* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 173-74.

consistency and firm confidence throughout the occupation, in contrast to many other SCAP reforms.

C. Limitations on Implementation

To sum up, in the early years of the occupation (1945-1947) the two main objectives of United States policy regarding Japan were the demilitarization and democratization of defeated Japan. To attain these objectives, General MacArthur and his staff in Tokyo implemented wide-ranging policies which were incorporated, either directly or by implication, in the two key documents, SWNCC 150/4/A and JCS 1380/15, basically drafted by the policy makers of the SWNCC. The ultimate thrust of the United States occupation policies was to reform the former enemy through punitive and constructive programs. The pace and scope of the implementation of the occupation policies, however, were different in various areas and conditioned by the following factors: (1) the interpretations and application of the formal reform agenda by General MacArthur as the ultimate authority in Japan, (2) the follow-up supervision by Washington policy makers in the process of implementation, (3) the Japanese economic disruption as the result of wartime destruction, and (4) different perspectives on the part of the Japanese government charged with actual implementation. More importantly, these factors were also responsible for slippage between the reform programs initially intended by policy makers in Washington and the actual measures taken by SCAP in Japan.

As far as the military matters were concerned, SCAP's measures for the demilitarization of Japan were first of all taken according to the instructions from Washington. Disarmament and demobilization were executed promptly and with determination. Persons who had led the nation to war or committed crimes in military campaigns were put on trial. With the exception of a small group of

officers kept on by SCAP, all military officers of all ranks were purged from public life. One of the rare exceptions in which General MacArthur's positions on military matters were at variance with those of Washington officials related to the decision as to whether the emperor should be tried as a war criminal. Faced with the demands from American and allied official circles for trying him, the supreme commander was successful in saving the emperor from a trial for war crimes and in preserving him as an instrument for securing Japanese cooperation necessary to the implementation of the occupation policies.

Political reforms for the democratization of Japan were implemented by the Japanese government under the strong initiatives and directions of SCAP very early in the occupation. They were represented by the legal protection of civil liberties, the constitutional revision on democratic lines, and the political purge. On one hand, the type and scope of the political reforms executed, if taken as a whole, accorded with the instructions given in the early postwar directives. On the other hand, their pace and contents were subjected, in the process of implementation, to changes because of the above-mentioned factors. As for the constitutional reform, MacArthur received no specific instructions from Washington on the issue, except for a directive to proceed along the general lines laid out in SWNCC 228. It was consequently MacArthur, with the assistance of his staff, who determined the pace and contents of the reform. The attempts by the American government and the FEC in Washington to exercise influence upon the reform also affected, even if to a small degree, its pace and contents. In the area of the political purge program, its scope was considerably more limited than Washington and even SCAP expected because the task of its implementation was left to the conservative Japanese government which had little interest in pushing forward the program.

Meanwhile, it was noticeable that despite SCAP's primary emphasis on the enforcement of democratic political reforms in the first two years of the

occupation, these reforms did not lead to fundamental changes in the nature of Japanese politics. Although the legalization of political activities and the purge of the existing political elite contributed to the reorganization of political alignments in the formation of the Japanese government, they did not undermine the dominance of the Cabinet or Diet by the traditional conservative parties in rivalry with liberal and socialist parties throughout the occupation. The government bureaucracy remained intact, virtually untouched by the purge or other political reforms. The failure of the political reforms in inducing substantial changes in Japanese politics was largely due to the fact that they were actually implemented by the officials of the existing Japanese government. The conservative Japanese officials, afraid of losing their vested interests, tried to mitigate some drastic effects of the political reforms mandated by SCAP, by delaying or distorting them during implementation.

Policy actions taken by SCAP in the economic field from the outset were to a great extent in conflict with those called for in the Washington directives. MacArthur's main instructions from Washington for economic reform were to extract reparations from Japan's industry, to break up the zaibatsu, to encourage the labor movement, and to leave it to the Japanese to revive their economy. Once going into the stage of implementation, however, these economic programs were so constrained by the above-mentioned factors that actions taken in Japan were significantly different in some areas from those anticipated by policy makers in Washington. The first of the conditioning factors was General MacArthur's predominant role in implementation. While SWNCC 150/4/A and JCS 1380/15 provided guidelines for most of the policies SCAP was directed to implement, especially during the early years of the occupation, they were expressed in general and open-ended terms, which allowed the supreme commander to enjoy a larger degree of freedom in interpreting them in the process of implementation than the

Washington authorities intended. In addition, MacArthur was ensured wide leeway in his interpretations and actions by virtue of the authority the JCS directive itself granted to him, that is, his "power to take any steps deemed advisable and proper" by him to reform Japan.

The Allied control arrangement for Japan, such as the FEC and the ACJ, never seriously restricted the supreme commander's actions for implementation, leaving his authority unhampered. MacArthur's domination over the process of implementation was further assured by his control of the SCAP machinery, mainly by means of the appointments of his close friends and staff in the military to key positions in the SCAP staff sections. The supreme commander always functioned as a final decision maker in SCAP's dealing with occupation matters. Each directive to the Japanese government was planned and drafted by the SCAP staff section that MacArthur charged with the responsibility of giving advice and recommendations on a particular matter. However, once the supreme commander reached a final decision, that ended all further discussion.

No United States occupation policies proved to be more affected by MacArthur's great leeway in implementation than its economic reform policy. The degree to which economic policy decisions incorporated in the early Washington directives were carried out depended largely on how MacArthur interpreted and applied them to his liking. In some cases, SCAP's policy actions went counter to the instructions from Washington. SCAP, for instance, actively intervened in food relief and inflation control operations performed by the Japanese government during the early months of the occupation, contrary to the policy decision to leave the tasks of economic recovery and inflation control to the Japanese themselves. To use an account by a former high-ranking SCAP official, this strong and active intervention from SCAP was provoked by MacArthur's apprehension that the

economic crisis, if mishandled, would probably wreck his occupation politically.¹⁰⁰ In other cases, SCAP's actions for economic reform fell short of, even if not in conflict with, those intended by Washington. From the outset, for example, MacArthur successfully resisted pressure from Washington to undertake harsh reparations and economic deconcentration programs. Instead, he chose to soften the directed economic reforms by partially implementing and then delaying implementation in reparations policy or by making compromise with Japanese business leaders, who opposed drastic deconcentration.

On the contrary, SCAP's actions in another cases unexpectedly surpassed the changes called for in the basic directives from Washington. One of the most successful reforms undertaken during the early years of the occupation, the sweeping land reform, illustrated how radically SCAP, without any specific guideline from Washington, pushed forward the program. SCAP's sudden enthusiasm for the implementation of a radical antimonopoly program during 1947 also went too far beyond Washington's policy at that time.

A second restriction upon the effective implementation of economic reforms derived from the fact that officials in Washington were limited in their interference in SCAP's activities during the initial years of the occupation. First of all, any formal mechanism for supervision over the implementation was nonexistent at the SWNCC or the War Department. The attempt of the State Department to exercise some influence upon SCAP's actions met with failure mainly because its representative in Japan, the Political Adviser to SCAP, was restricted in his role under the strict control of the supreme commander, who wanted to keep the State Department away from his administration of the occupation.¹⁰¹ MacArthur's

¹⁰⁰ For a detailed account of SCAP's early activities of intervention in food relief and inflation control, see Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, pp. 141-46 and 171-86.

¹⁰¹ See Memo by Acheson to Acheson, November 7, 1945, ERUS, 1945, vol. 6, pp. 837-38; and Eisenhower to MacArthur, January 7, 1946, ERUS, 1946, vol. 8, pp. 95-98.

dislike for interference by Washington officials, often manifested, made them reluctant to issue specific orders to him for the purpose of implementation control. It followed that the supreme commander, given minimal supervision until mid-1947, carried out his task of implementation according to his own perspectives and priorities, which were often different from those of the officials in Washington. Effective implementation was also restricted by indecisiveness on the part of the policy makers in Washington. Despite policy recommendations by the economic missions that the State and the War Departments jointly sent to Japan in late 1945 and early 1946, their final policies on both reparations and economic deconcentration were left undetermined until mid-1947. While such indecisiveness provided an occasion for MacArthur to recast to a greater extent those programs at his discretion, it led to confusion and delay during the process of implementation.

Third, the postwar economic dislocation in Japan made it more difficult for the economic reforms to be executed than had been originally intended. The Japanese economy, afflicted with numerous problems, such as mounting inflation, falling industrial production, shortages of food and consumer goods, unemployment, and lack of foreign raw materials, was close to collapse at the end of 1945.¹⁰² The economic crisis led SCAP to take its own way and actively intervene in food relief and counter-inflationary measures, contrary to the instructions from Washington. To MacArthur's mind, the enormous postwar economic disruption, if unsettled, would endanger his administration of the occupation. Furthermore, his political reforms would never last without a certain level of economic recovery. With these views, the general changed the priorities of the economic policy set by the early postwar directives. He rejected the full execution of both large-scale reparations and the rigorous antimonopoly schemes proposed by the economic

¹⁰² Jerome B. Cohen, *Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949), pp. 417-19.

experts from Washington in 1946, while he energetically carried out democratic reforms in the political field, the agenda acceptable to Washington. The economic crisis, left unsolved until 1948, also affected SCAP's labor policy, one of the reform policies SCAP at first implemented in accordance with the instructions from Washington. The development of a radical labor movement, triggered by the unsettled economic crisis, caused a sudden change in SCAP's labor policy in 1947 from one of encouragement and nonintervention to restriction and intervention.

A fourth limit on the effective economic reforms was already set by a critical decision in the basic directives to SCAP to govern Japan indirectly through the existing Japanese administrative and bureaucratic apparatus. The two key directives, SWNCC 150/4/A and JCS 1380/15, were the products of compromise at the end of the war between conservative political planners and liberal economic planners within the policy-making circle of the United States government. It was, therefore, inevitable for the directives to contain contradictory instructions: whereas liberal and drastic reforms were to be implemented by SCAP, they were instructed to be done through the machinery and officials of the Japanese government, whose interests were generally at odds with the directed reform agenda. In fact, such a contradiction led to the effect that the implementation of economic reforms was hampered, delayed, or greatly modified as it proceeded through the conservative Japanese bureaucracy. By making a preemptive move to offer moderate reform plans, first of all, the Japanese sought to avert more radical ones from SCAP and reach a compromise between them. For instance, both a limited zaibatsu dissolution plan and a gradual and moderate land reform plan proposed, prior to SCAP's actions, by the Japanese government were intended to deter or mitigate anticipated drastic measures by SCAP. A second tactic the Japanese adopted was to delay the implementation of the SCAP directives, typically by prolonging the process of establishing legal and administrative

procedures for their implementation or by making the implementation itself proceed slowly, as also evidenced in the cases of deconcentration and land reform programs. A third method for the resistance to the directed reforms on the part of the Japanese government was to modify them during the process of implementation so as to diminish their effects. The economic purge is a case in point. Owing to the Japanese effort to limit the scope of the economic purge, the effect of the program was considerably less pervasive than the SCAP directives called for.

Chapter 3. Decisions I:

To Postpone a Peace Treaty with Japan in October 1948

- (1) to move away from the reform policy to economic recovery
- (2) to relax occupation controls
- (3) to strengthen the Japanese police forces

A. Introduction

The present chapter will explore the decision-making process by which a national decision was reached in October 1948 to defer a peace treaty with Japan for the time being. By early 1947, it seemed to most of the State Department policy makers and General MacArthur that it was the time for the United States to proceed with a Japanese peace settlement in light of the fact that the main objectives of the occupation (the demilitarization and democratization of Japan) had been to a large extent accomplished. Hence, MacArthur publicly called for the initiation of negotiations for the settlement in March 1947. The State Department, whose Far East experts had prepared several treaty drafts since the middle of 1946, sympathized with the general and thus proposed in July to the other Far Eastern Commission (FEC) nations the convening of a preliminary peace conference. However, the proposed conference was never held owing to the disagreement over its composition and procedure among the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. In the meantime, the peace treaty problem entered on a new phase in late 1947, when the Policy Planning Staff (PPS) of the State Department, headed by a Russia expert, George Kennan, set out to examine it in connection with the postwar situation of the increasing US-Soviet confrontation. In the PPS members' views, Japan should be denied to Soviet control because of its strategic significance in maintaining a balance of power in Asia. Nevertheless, Japan was considered unstable under the radical reform programs of the occupation and thus vulnerable

to communist political penetration. Therefore, Kennan and his staff opposed an early peace settlement, preferring a prolonged occupation during which the United States would take steps to promote the economic recovery of Japan. The planning group's views were so convincing to the leaders of the State Department that Kennan was charged with formulating and coordinating a final department position on the basis of an onsite investigation and direct consultation with General MacArthur in Japan. After discussions with the general and his staff, Kennan prepared a policy paper, whose recommendations included the postponement of the peace settlement, a change in the emphasis of the occupation from reform to economic recovery, and the relaxation of the occupation controls. The policy document received such general concurrence within the State Department and from the military departments that it was adopted, with minor revisions, as a national policy in October 1948.

B. Occasion for Decision

The problem of a peace treaty with Japan was initially raised at a high-level meeting between the State and War Departments as early as August of 1946. Informed of General MacArthur's call for the discussion of a Japanese peace treaty in the FEC, Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson suggested that an informal committee be set up by the State Department in order to formulate United States views prior to the submission of the problem to the FEC.¹ In accordance with Acheson's suggestion, a special working group headed by James Penfield, Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, and composed of Japan specialists was designated in September to begin work on drafting a peace treaty. During the

¹ Memo of Conversation, Aug. 23, 1946, 740.0011(Peace)/8-2346, Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State (hereafter RG 59).

ensuing five months, the working group, under the leadership of Hugh Borton, a longtime Japan expert, drew up draft treaties for formal consideration within the United States government.

Another occasion for decision was provided by General MacArthur in March of 1947 when he called Washington's attention to the problem of a peace settlement with Japan. On March 17, MacArthur, without consulting any policy makers in Washington, maintained at a press conference in Tokyo that the time was ripe for the United States to set out for a peace treaty and further to withdraw its occupation forces since the main tasks of the occupation had been completed with Japan disarmed and democratized.² SCAP's call for a quick peace treaty provided a momentum for the State Department as a whole to take the problem of the Japanese peace settlement into serious consideration. Particularly, officials in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, certainly encouraged by MacArthur's argument, began to move toward early negotiations with concerned nations of a multilateral peace treaty. Such a move, led by Borton, then Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs, at first took the shape of a proposal for a preliminary conference to discuss procedures for the peace treaty. As early as April, Secretary of State George Marshall also recognized a need for such a preparatory conference and, by late May, committed himself to acknowledge the importance of an early treaty with Japan.³

The view of the State Department favoring the early convening of a peace conference was put into action on July 11, 1947, when the department officially

² SCAP, *Political Reorientation of Japan*, vol. 2, pp. 730-31.

³ At a meeting on May 22 with Borton and General Hilldring, Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, Marshall stated that he realized the importance of an early treaty but that the timing of a peace conference was complicated by other U.S. commitments such as the UN General Assembly in September and the meeting of the Council of Foreign Minister in November. See Memo of conversation, by Borton, May 22, 1947, Lot File 56D256, RG 59.

proposed to the eleven member countries of the FEC that a preliminary conference on a Japanese peace treaty be held on August 19, to consist initially of deputies of the FEC countries and that its decisions be made by a voting procedure of a two-thirds majority.⁴ This suggestion, however, brought objections raised largely by the Soviet Union and Nationalist China which led to the postponement of the proposed conference. The Soviets were strongly opposed to the handling of the Japanese peace treaty by a conference of the FEC nations, most of which were pro-Western and thus expected to vote against Soviet positions at the conference. Instead, Russia insisted that the problem of the Japanese peace settlement be considered by the Council of Foreign Ministers, which was composed of Britain, China, the Soviet Union, and the United States, and in which a veto was secured for the Soviets.⁵ From the American point of view, the basic Soviet approach to the peace treaty was to insist upon a veto in peace discussions and the enforcement of the treaty. Such a veto right would be aimed at preventing Japan's resurgence under American leadership.

On the other hand, the Chinese government, while consenting to the US position of a peace conference of the eleven FEC nations, urged that the conference adopt a voting procedure similar to that of the FEC whereby decisions would be made by a majority vote including the concurrence of the four big powers. China's insistence on veto rights on the part of the big powers was interpreted by decision makers in the State Department as its strategy by which to induce the Russians to participate in the proposed peace conference. The Chinese government was concerned that its participation without the Soviet Union might offer the Russians certain grounds on which they would abrogate the Sino-Soviet Treaty of

⁴ For the text of the U.S. statement on the holding of a preliminary conference, see Annex to Memo of conversation, by Borton, July 1, 1947, ERUS, 1947, vol. 6, pp. 468-69.

⁵ Memo by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Secretary of State, July 23, 1947, *Ibid.*, pp. 473-74.

Friendship of 1945 and thus openly support the Chinese Communists even possibly to the extent of recognizing them as a communist regime in Manchuria and North China.⁶

The State Department immediately rejected the Soviet formula for the Japanese problem, pointing out that the previous international agreements, including the Potsdam Declaration, contained no provisions giving the Council of Foreign Ministers any authority in the Japanese peace settlement and that in agreeing to the creation of the FEC, the four big powers had already recognized the primary interest of its member nations in the Japanese peace settlement. The State Department, at the same time, showed its negative attitude toward the Chinese formula to allow the Soviet Union to have a veto.

The American preference for an eleven-power conference with the voting procedure of a simple two-thirds majority was grounded on several underlying concerns. First, in light of the existing stalemate in the German peace settlement through the Council of Foreign Ministers, in which each of the participating great powers was given a veto, the United States was concerned about a possible prolonged deadlock in Japanese peace negotiations in case the procedure of the four-power veto were adopted. Second, it was expected by the State Department policy makers that treaty terms in line with American interests could be reached not by a conference of the countries represented on the Council of Foreign Ministers but by one of the FEC countries, most of which would be amenable enough to American terms to ensure a two-thirds vote for their adoption. Third, the eleven-power conference was to meet increasing demands from the FEC

⁶ Memo of conversation, by the Secretary of State, Sept. 14, 1947, *Ibid.*, pp. 518-19; and Memo of conversation, by Charles Bohlen, Counselor of the State Department, Sept. 17, 1947, *Ibid.*, pp. 519-20.

members for participation in the process of peace-making with Japan.⁷ As examined later, in the latter part of 1947 the State Department continuously made diplomatic efforts to induce China and the Soviet Union to accept American terms for the peace conference. However, their repeated refusal to shift their positions made necessary the indefinite postponement of the proposed conference, on the one hand, and provided an occasion for the State Department to reconsider the desirability of an early treaty, on the other hand.

In the meantime, intragovernmental consultations on the substantive matters of the peace treaty were initiated in early August. Encouraged by the official call by the State Department for a peace conference, Hugh Borton, who had led the work of drafting a peace treaty, circulated copies of the draft treaty to senior officials of the State, War, and Navy Departments in an attempt to receive concurrence within the government prior to the use of the draft for peace negotiations with other concerned governments.⁸ The distribution of the draft treaty, which had been largely prepared by the special working group in the Far Eastern Office, led to intense debate within the government on matters of substance affecting the peace treaty. More importantly, it provided the momentum that made American decision makers reshape United States policy objectives toward Japan in view of the changing international situation and thus reappraise the timing of the peace treaty.

⁷ Memo by John Vincent, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, to the Secretary of State, April 29, 1947, Lot File 56D 527, RG 59; Memo of conversation, by Bohlen, Sept. 17, 1947, *FRUS* 1947, vol. 6, p. 521; and Frederick S. Dunn, *Peace-Making and the Settlement with Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 64.

⁸ Memo by Borton to Bohlen, Aug. 6, 1947, *FRUS* 1947, vol. 6, pp. 478-79.

C. Decision Makers' Policy Preferences in 1947

1. The Office of Far Eastern Affairs

During 1947, policy positions developed within the US government concerning the timing and substance of a peace treaty with Japan were different among various decision makers concerned with the problem. First of all, the officials of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department, who were formally responsible for the Japanese problem, largely advocated an early peace settlement and concerned themselves with security against a revived Japan rather than the security of Japan itself during the post-treaty period. These positions of the Far East specialists were represented until mid-1947 by the views held by a special working group, which had been charged with the work of drafting a peace treaty with Japan since late 1946.

The group's thinking on the Japanese problem was still based upon the US policy objectives that had been formulated during the wartime for the early period of the occupation: the demilitarization and democratization of Japan. Therefore, the members of the group, though acknowledging a probable Soviet threat to Japan, still thought of the security problem in the Far East in terms of security against Japan. Their solution to post-treaty security against it was the establishment of an Allied control machinery, which would be operative in Japan for the supervision of its military potential on a long-term basis.⁹ In view of this position, the working group did not rule out the likelihood of future Soviet-American cooperation in dealing with the Japanese problem.

As to Japan's future place in the Far East, the members of the working group envisioned a post-treaty Japan as a "neutral and self-sufficient nation" which would

⁹ See "Summary of Alternative Drafts on Interim Controls, Disarmament and Demilitarization, and Draft Disarmament Treaty," in Memo by Hugh Borton, March 26, 1947, Lot File 56 D 256, RG 59.

maintain friendly relations with both the US and the USSR. While recognizing that Japan consequently might become a focus of ideological and strategic conflict in light of the increasing Soviet power in the Far East, the Japan specialists found little likelihood that the Russians would successfully penetrate into Japan in the post-occupation period. A Soviet threat through the Japanese Communist Party would be overcome by the long-standing and widespread antipathy of the Japanese against Russia and communism. On the other hand, any Soviet military move could be checked by American participation in the proposed Allied control machinery in Japan.¹⁰

These positions shared by the working group were reaffirmed in a policy paper prepared in February of 1947 by the Far Eastern Office. The document was largely confined to restating the policy objectives of the early occupation. Nevertheless, it is to be noted that it examined two policy options in connection with Japan's future role. In order to meet a highly probable Soviet challenge in Japan, the document considered that America should choose one of two courses of action: to build up Japan as a bulwark against the Soviet Union or to develop it into a neutral, peaceful, and pro-American nation. The latter option was preferred in the paper not only because building up Japan as an American ally would be unnecessary as well as contradictory to the enunciated policies, but also because the democratization and other reforms of the occupation would protect Japan from any Soviet threat.¹¹ In this respect, by early 1947, the State Department policy makers directly concerned with the Japanese problem began to take into

¹⁰ Memo by Emmerson to Vincent and Borton, Oct. 9, 1946, *FRUS* 1946, vol. 8, pp. 337-39. In a reply memo, John Vincent, Director of the Far Eastern office, and John Hilldring, Assistant Secretary of State, expressed their concurrence with Emmerson's views. See an attached note, *Ibid.*, p. 339.

¹¹ Department of State, "Policy and Information Statement on Japan," Feb. 15, 1947, Lot File 60 D 330, RG 59.

consideration the foreseeable situation of Soviet-American confrontation in the Far East in general and Japan in particular. They were, however, so optimistic about the capacities of Japan and America to check any Soviet threat to Japanese security that attention in their work for a peace settlement focused on security against a revived Japan, a problem with which the other FEC countries were primarily concerned.

A draft peace treaty of August 1947, drawn up and revised by the working group of the Far Eastern Office, insisted upon international control by the FEC nations over Japan's military and industrial potential on a long-term basis after the termination of the occupation. In order to ensure the demilitarization of Japan and the continuance of the democratic reforms of the occupation, the draft treaty provided that a council of ambassadors representing the eleven nations of the FEC would be established as a supervisory authority, simultaneously with the signing of a peace treaty. A commission of inspection would be operative for the implementation of the prescribed policy of a twenty-five-year disarmament and demilitarization of Japan. The draft treaty also provided for the use of Allied military forces in Japan in case of Japan's failure to comply with the limitations on its military potential. Except for the provision that the civil police, including a coast guard, would be permitted, it included no provisions for the security of Japan in the post-treaty period.¹²

As to the timing of a peace treaty with Japan, throughout 1947 most officials in the Far Eastern Office advocated an early treaty. As examined above, their preference for the early convening of a peace conference led the State Department in July 1947 to make a proposal calling for a preliminary conference. Their consistent position in favor of a prompt treaty arose out of the consideration of

¹² For the text of the draft treaty, see an attachment to Memo by Borton to Bohlen, the Counselor of the State Department, Aug. 6, 1947, "Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan," Aug. 5, 1947, 740.0011 PW(Peace)/8-647, RG 59.

several factors. First, many of the Far East experts thought of General MacArthur's call for an early treaty in March 1947 as a factor making necessary the initiation of treaty negotiations. Second, they were concerned that the prolongation of the essentially unilateral occupation would have serious psychological repercussions among the Japanese, which might create hostility toward the United States as well as political instability in Japan. Such a probable situation would be highly detrimental to the basic US objective of establishing a stable, pro-American Japan. Third, in view of the fact that most of the FEC nations favored an early peace settlement, any postponement or delay on the part of the United States would weaken its political position in the Far East in general, and in Japan in particular, by provoking dissatisfaction among them. Finally, it was expected that by reducing the financial burden of the occupation on the Japanese and by removing the restrictions placed upon Japanese economic activities, a peace settlement would promote the recovery of the Japanese economy, which would lead to the reduction of American costs for Japan. In addition, the peace treaty would stimulate Japanese incentives and self-reliance for the conduct of economic affairs, which were necessary to economic recovery, by transferring substantial responsibility to Japanese hands.¹³

2. General MacArthur

Throughout 1947, since his press conference of March, MacArthur recorded himself as strongly favoring an early peace treaty. The general's preference for a prompt treaty stemmed from his estimation that the military purpose of the occupation had been accomplished, and that its political phase approached such completion as was possible under the occupation. Nevertheless, the economic

¹³ See Memo by Bishop to Penfield, the Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Office, Aug. 14, 1947, ERUS 1947, vol. 6, pp. 492-94; and Memo by Martin to Borton, Sept. 26, 1947, attached to Memo by Borton to Hamilton, Sept. 29, 1947, 740.0011 PW (Peace) /9-2947, RG 59.

recovery of Japan as the final phase of the occupation, MacArthur maintained, could be achieved only after the termination of the occupation when restrictions upon Japan's economic activities were removed, and foreign trade with the other FEC nations was resumed.¹⁴ In addition, he believed that a military occupation would serve its purpose at best only for a limited period of time. Once the basic objectives of the occupation had been attained, its unnecessary continuation would show overall diminishing returns. Especially, the prolongation of the occupation in Japan would make the Japanese increasingly restive and resentful "under the deprivation of personal freedom."¹⁵ MacArthur was concerned that such psychological repercussions might undermine his accomplishments in Japan. As D. C. James points out, he desired that, unlike the previous military occupations in history, the American occupation would be remembered by the Japanese as a progressive and cooperative undertaking from which their lasting pro-American orientation developed.¹⁶ These concerns prompted the general to publicly call for an early peace settlement in March 1947.

In connection with his desire for a prompt peace treaty, MacArthur preferred that the peace conference be held in Tokyo so that he could serve as "an adviser and chief contact" with the Japanese government. Tokyo, he considered, was a neutral site for the conference, where the United States could maintain all necessary control and where, at the same time, its delegates would have more freedom of action than within the territory of the United States. This preference suggests that the general strongly wanted to display to the world a successful conclusion of the occupation, which he had administered, through his sponsorship.

¹⁴ *Political Reorientation of Japan*, vol. 2, pp. 765-66.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 763-64.

¹⁶ D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur*, Vol. 3, 1945-1964, p. 196.

MacArthur felt it imperative to have a peace treaty with Japan even though the Soviet Union or other concerned nations refused to participate in it. In addition, the treaty should not be of such a harsh nature as to arouse future Japanese resistance to the United States.¹⁷ From these points of view, the general regarded the State Department's effort to convene an early peace conference as favorable.

However, General MacArthur strongly objected to the terms of the draft treaty prepared by the working group of the Far Eastern Office. First of all, the general criticized the post-treaty Allied control machinery as "imperialistic" and "unrealistic." Instead, he favored the means of inspection and control that would depend upon both the voluntary compliance of the Japanese with the terms of a peace treaty and upon the United Nations. If there should be an Allied control machinery such as the council of ambassadors, its functions should be limited to observation and reporting. As to security measures against Japan, especially the proposed 25-year treaty for the demilitarization and disarmament of Japan was rejected by MacArthur as "unrealistic" since he estimated that Japan would be "utterly incapable of rearming herself for modern war" within 25 years. Furthermore, the general worried that the post-treaty utilization of Allied military forces in Japan for the implementation of the demilitarization treaty would provide a ground for the Soviet Union or other unfriendly nations to acquire military bases in Japan. In MacArthur's view, any future attempt by the Japanese to rearm could be better controlled by the United Nations and the "moral force of world opinion" than by the risky use of Allied forces.¹⁸

¹⁷ Memo by Borton to Director of the Far Eastern Office Vincent, May 6, 1947, Lot File 56 D 256, RG 59.

¹⁸ Memo by General MacArthur, March 21, 1947, ERUS 1947, vol. 6, pp. 454-56; and Memo by MacArthur to the Secretary of State, Sept. 1, 1947, *Ibid.*, pp. 512-15.

On the question of the post-treaty security of Japan, MacArthur had a scheme of neutralizing Japan. He preferred that, in view of Japan's constitutional renunciation of the maintenance of armed forces, the security of a neutral Japan be ensured by the machinery of the United Nations. The general, from the beginning of the occupation, had held a vision of turning Japan into a pacifist nation as a unique example to the world. This belief about Japan's role had been embodied in his successful attempt to press the Japanese to renounce war and the use of armed forces as national rights in the 1946 constitution. His scheme of Japanese neutralization based on a guarantee by the UN was derived from his belief in a pacifist Japan. Nevertheless, MacArthur was of the opinion that the Ryukyu Islands, especially Okinawa, should be retained under exclusive American control as a military base area because such strategic control was deemed essential to the security of the United States in the western Pacific.¹⁹ This stand was contrary to that of the working group of the Far Eastern Office, who favored the reversion of the islands to Japan.

3. The Army and Navy Departments

The Army Department's policy positions concerning a peace treaty for the most part conflicted with those of the Far East experts in the State Department, as well as with those of General MacArthur. The Army Department raised strong doubt about the desirability of a prompt treaty in view of an indefensible Japan following the withdrawal of American occupation forces along with a peace treaty. The military planners thought that it would be necessary for the United States to retain its predominant occupation control and armed forces in Japan for at least two more years. Their stands were grounded upon security concerns in connection with a highly probable Soviet-American conflict in the Far East in general, and in

¹⁹ Ibid.

Japan in particular. As a result, they favored the retention of US military bases and forces in Japan even after the termination of the occupation in order to deter future Soviet military aggression.

The specific views of the Army Department were set forth in its comment upon the draft treaty forwarded by the Far Eastern Office of the State Department. In particular, the Plans and Operation (P&O) Division of the Army Department contended that the Japanese peace problem should be taken into consideration in the context of overall United States security interests which called for deterrents against any major Soviet military development in Asia as long as the Soviet Union was regarded as a primary threat to the peace and security of the postwar world. According to the military planners' thinking, Japan was of great strategic importance to United States interests in East Asia because Russia would control the entire East Asian region if it succeeded in dominating Japan, whose military and industrial potential was the greatest in the region. This probable situation would impair America's national security in the Pacific. Therefore, the primary objective regarding Japan was to protect that country from Soviet military aggression. Since withdrawing American occupation forces along with a peace settlement would expose a disarmed Japan to external aggression, the military occupation should be prolonged until alternative security arrangements were available. Those measures, from the military point of view, should be the retention of American bases in Japan and its rearmament in the post-occupation period. Especially, the policy planners of the Army Department envisioned Japan as potentially an important ally to the United States. Japan should be utilized as an important American military base area in the event of war between the United States and Russia. From this point of view, the military planners estimated that Japan was not ready for a peace

settlement. Rather, a prolonged occupation for another few years was needed to gain the ground for making such use of Japan.²⁰

On the other hand, P&O Division members ignored the problem of security against Japan with which the draft treaty of the Far Eastern Office was primarily concerned, for they saw little likelihood that Japan would become a threat to the security of the neighboring countries in the foreseeable future. Because of their strategic concerns about the Soviets, the military planners were preoccupied with the post-treaty security of Japan. Unlike General MacArthur, they were skeptical of the capacity of the United Nations to enforce a peace treaty or to guarantee the security of Japan. In order to retain the predominant US military position that the military planners considered necessary for the security of Japan and the United States, the terms of a peace treaty should preclude neither the maintenance of American military bases nor the utilization of American forces for treaty enforcement in the post-occupation period. Furthermore, the rearmament of Japan was favored as another step for its defense against probable Soviet aggression.²¹

The views of the Navy Department were largely in accord with those of the Army Department. They also stemmed from security concerns over aggressive Soviet moves in East Asia. Navy Department officials were strongly insistent upon American strategic control over the former Japanese mandated islands and the Ryukyu Islands for United States security in the Pacific. Concerned about a post-treaty Japan with no means of defense against external aggression, they advocated a prolonged military occupation. The post-treaty security of Japan should depend primarily upon defense tasks performed by US forces, which would be stationed in military bases in Japan. It is to be noted, however, that the Navy Department

²⁰ Memo by the Plans and Operations Division of the Army Department to the State Department, Sept. 2, 1947, P&O 091 Japan, TS, Records of Army Plans and Operations Division, RG 319.

²¹ Ibid.; and Memo from S.F. Giffin to the Policy Planning Staff, Aug. 14, 1947, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, RG 59.

differed with the Army Department over the problem of Japanese rearmament. The former preferred the creation of a coast guard-type security force to the revival of military forces. In addition, the Navy, unlike the Army, did not rule out the likelihood that the United Nations would in the long run take the responsibility for the defense of Japan against external aggression.²²

4. The Policy Planning Staff

A major impetus for the State Department to consider the problem of a Japanese peace treaty from the perspective of overall United States foreign policy in connection with the postwar situation of Soviet-American confrontation was provided as the newly established Policy Planning Staff (PPS), headed by George Kennan, entered upon deliberations on the Japanese peace problem. When the PPS members examined the draft treaty received from the Far Eastern Office early in August 1947, they raised serious criticisms of its provisions. In a memorandum to Kennan, John P. Davies, one of the PPS members in charge of reviewing the draft treaty, argued that its provisions in no way promoted what he considered to be a primary United States objective of a "stable Japan, integrated into the Pacific economy, friendly to the US, and, in case of need, readily and dependably allied with the US" On the other hand, the draft treaty was preoccupied with drastic measures for the demilitarization of Japan under international supervision, that would provide the Soviets with opportunities to exercise a disruptive influence in Japan and eventually to attempt "sovietized totalitarianism." Davies accordingly recommended that further discussions with the Far Eastern Office would be

²² Memo by E. T. Wooldridge, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Politico-Military Affairs, Navy Department, to Borton, Aug. 18, 1947, *FRUS*, 1947, vol. 6, pp. 495-96; Memo by Admiral Forrest Sherman to Kennan, Sept. 24, 1947, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, RG 59; and Memo by Louis Denfeld, Chief of Naval Operations, to C.V.R. Schuyler, Chief of P&O Division, Army Department, Feb. 24, 1948, Lot File 60 D 330, RG 59.

needed to render the terms of the peace treaty in conformity with fundamental American objectives in Japan.²³

Kennan, concurring with Davies's views, suggested to Under Secretary of State Lovett that the State Department delay the initiation of international discussions of peace terms until it had formulated concrete United States policy objectives with respect to Japan and the Pacific and made the draft treaty conform strictly to these objectives.²⁴ With this event, Kennan's planning group led State Department policy makers to depart from the early policy objectives concerning Japan which had been set in the wartime period and to formulate realistic new objectives in view of the changing postwar world situation, characterized by an emerging relationship of confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

After receiving instructions from the Under Secretary of State that the PPS directly review problems pertaining to a Japanese peace treaty, the planning group started full consultations. In spite of the argument of the officials of the Far Eastern Office that the peace-making process should be made urgent and thus not delayed, the PPS members spent considerable time during the ensuing two months in preparing and discussing draft policy papers on Japan.²⁵ In this process of deliberation, they consulted not only with the officials of the Far Eastern Office, but also with the military departments, and with some retired Japan experts of the State Department, such as Joseph Grew, Joseph Ballantine, and Eugene Dooman.

It is not surprising that there was a conflict of views between the members of the Planning Staff and the officials of the Far Eastern bureau. An initial draft

²³ Memo by Davies to Kennan, Aug. 11, 1947, *FRUS*, 1947, vol. 6, pp. 485-86.

²⁴ Memo by Kennan to Lovett, Aug. 12, 1947, *Ibid.*, pp. 486-87.

²⁵ For arguments for a prompt treaty, see Memo by Max Bishop to Penfield, Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, and attached note from Penfield to Kennan, Aug. 14, 1947, *Ibid.*, pp. 492-94.

document prepared late in August by John Davies was criticized particularly on its military terms by Deputy Director of the Far Eastern Office Penfield and Chief of the Northeast Asian Division Borton, both of whom had led the work of drafting a peace treaty since late 1946. The draft document set forth United States military objectives in regard to Japan, along with its political and economic ones:

In military terms, (1) Dependent upon the United States, its security from external attack guaranteed by the United States but with Japan extending necessary facilities. (2) Provided with sufficient constabulary, coast guard and police forces to prevent mass violence and to be susceptible of expansion and use in accordance with American military decision.²⁶

In order to achieve these objectives, the draft document recommended that the United States, simultaneously with a peace settlement, conclude a security treaty with Japan that would provide for American base rights in Japan. Furthermore, it called for a peace treaty without the Soviets' participation in case of their opposition to the American treaty terms.²⁷

These initial views of the PPS members conflicted with those of the Far East experts. While concurring with the political and economic objectives enunciated in the draft document, namely, the "development of a Japan politically stable, oriented toward the United States, and economically revived," Penfield and Borton raised objections to its military terms. It was expected in their view that unilateral actions by the American government to obtain an alliance pact with Japan and a separate peace treaty without Soviet participation would not only provoke the Russians to hostile moves in Japan, but also arouse unfriendly attitudes toward the United States among the other FEC countries. Such a situation would lead to

²⁶ The attached paper to Minutes of meeting, Aug. 25, 1947, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, Box 32, RG 59.

²⁷ Ibid.

instability throughout Asia which in turn would make the region more susceptible to Soviet control.²⁸ It is presumed in light of subsequent revisions on the draft document that these critical views of the leading officials in the Far Eastern Office persuaded the PPS members to withhold their initial position favoring the retention of American military bases in a post-treaty Japan and a separate peace treaty. Nevertheless, extensive deliberations within the PPS, along with consultations with the representatives of the military departments and with former Japan experts, provided an occasion for Kennan and his planning group to take the initiative on the Japanese problem within the State Department away from the formerly responsible Far Eastern Office. This means that in place of the early perspective on Japan, which had been formulated in the wartime period and reflected in the draft treaty of the Far Eastern Office, a postwar perspective of the Policy Planning Staff based upon the conception of the bipolar world came to the fore in the State Department's approach to the Japanese problem.

The results of the planning staff's deliberations were set forth in a long draft paper of September 17. The document at first characterized the postwar world situation as "one of struggle between the USSR on the offensive and the US basically on the defensive." In a bipolar world in which it was inevitable for other countries to align themselves with either of the two great powers, Japan could not enjoy an independent and neutral position, particularly due to its geopolitical location. It could "function only in close association with the US or as a Soviet satellite." It was necessary, in the view of the PPS, that because of its strategic importance stemming from its great military and industrial potential, Japan stay out of communist control and further align itself with America in order to restore a postwar balance of power in Asia. In particular, Japan should be reliant upon the

²⁸ Memo from Borton to Davies, Aug. 22, 1947; and Memo by Penfield to Davies, Aug. 25, 1947, PPS Records, box 33, RG 59.

United States for its security from external aggression because it would be left indefensible without its own military forces.²⁹

The planning staff expected, however, that, with the termination of the occupation, Japan would be confronted by a serious economic crisis leaving it vulnerable to communist penetration unless certain preventive measures were taken to aid the economic recovery of Japan. The PPS members estimated that a primary and immediate threat to the security of Japan was one of political penetration and domination, which would arise out of such a economic crisis, by Russian-controlled Japanese Communists. It was unlikely, in their view, that without a successful political penetration, the Soviets would undertake direct military aggression against Japan. It was therefore recommended that, in order to attain the American objective of denying Japan to Communist control, the Japanese economy be reconstructed by a large amount of American aid over a period of four or five years, and that during the remaining period of the occupation, the priorities of the occupation policy be shifted to stability away from reform.³⁰

In the meantime, the recommendations of the PPS were tentatively summed up in a policy report (PPS/10) and submitted by Kennan to Secretary of State Marshall on October 14, 1947. As to the timing of the settlement, the planning staff took a position against an early treaty on the grounds that there was no satisfactory evidence that Japan would be politically and economically stable enough to resist communist penetration when the occupation was terminated. Given the situation that the US government could not unilaterally break off peace negotiations with the other FEC nations due to its prior commitment to them,

²⁹ "United States Policy Toward A Peace Settlement with Japan," Sept. 17, 1947, an attached draft paper to Minutes of meeting, Sept. 22, 1947, PPS Records, Box 32, RG 59.

³⁰ Ibid.

however, the PPS members advised that the United States proceed with "exploratory and non-binding" consultations, while postponing negotiations about the substance of the treaty for several months until it reached a definite stand on certain basic issues. In addition, they suggested that the US government might adopt a policy option of securing a peacetime status in Japan without a peace treaty by a "gradual modification of the occupation regime," since they were doubtful whether the American terms of the treaty could be accepted by the other governments.³¹

The Planning Staff thought of the post-treaty security of Japan as involving dual aspects: military and political defenses. It was recommended regarding military defense that while the peace treaty would provide for the demilitarization of Japan to which the American government had already committed itself, the military security of Japan be guaranteed by the United States through the maintenance of its armed forces in the vicinity of Japan, especially in the Ryukyu and the Bonin Islands. Unlike the military departments, however, the PPS members were skeptical about the advisability of seeking American bases in the Japanese main islands either for American military purposes or for Japanese military defense.

The problem of political defense was of greater importance to the planning staff's approach to Japan than that of military defense because an impending threat would be the danger of domestic communist subversion. To uphold domestic order, Japan should be allowed to strengthen its police establishment, including the creation of a constabulary and a coast guard. Moreover, a substantial effort, particularly through adequate economic aid, should be made to establish political and economic stability. SCAP's occupation policies should be reviewed in consideration of whether they contributed to the economic recovery of Japan. It

³¹ PPS/10, "Results of Planning Staff Study of Questions Involved in the Japanese Peace Settlement," Oct. 14, 1947, *FRUS*, 1947, vol. 6., pp. 537-38.

was, furthermore, advised that if State Department policy makers came to the conclusion, on the basis of further study and discussions with SCAP, that Japan would be unable to be economically self-sustaining for the near future, the policy option of entering into an early peace treaty be set aside, along with a prolongation of the occupation.³² Kennan finally recommended that, for the purpose of obtaining more information necessary to reach a final position on basic Japanese issues, a high-level official of the State Department be dispatched to Japan to have consultations with General MacArthur and his staff.³³ Secretary of State Marshall accepted those PPS recommendations favorably and decided to send Kennan, Butterworth, or Charles Bohlen to Tokyo. In addition, he ordered that all future policy formulation for Japan be coordinated with the PPS.³⁴

D. Revisions of Policy Preferences

As noted above, three divergent policy options were advocated respectively by key American decision makers concerning the timing of a peace settlement with Japan in the latter part of 1947. The first option was to move toward the early conclusion of the peace treaty. That was largely favored by the officials of the Far Eastern Office of the State Department, as well as by General MacArthur. The second was to postpone the treaty at least for the next two years in order to maintain the United States' dominant position in Japan in light of Soviet expansive tendencies. This option was supported by the military departments. Although

³²Ibid., pp. 540-42.

³³Memo by Kennan to Marshall and Lovett, Oct. 14, 1947, Ibid., pp. 536-37.

³⁴Memo by Carlisle Humelsine to Willard Thorp et al., Oct. 29, 1947; and Memo by Humelsine to General Marshall Carter, Oct. 16, 1947, PPS Records, RG 59, cited in Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan*, p. 106.

basically favoring the postponement of the treaty, Kennan and his Policy Planning Staff were disposed to a third option to delay the process of peace negotiations until the American government determined its definite positions on basic issues affecting both the timing and substance of the peace settlement. Although the last option received the tentative concurrence of Secretary of State Marshall and the military departments, the officials of the Far Eastern Office, who emphasized the advantages of the peace settlement, consistently sought the first option of proceeding with negotiations for an early treaty until the end of 1947. Accordingly, the working group on the Japanese treaty in the Far Eastern Office entered into the process of preparing a new draft treaty in line with the recommendations developed in the preliminary policy paper, PPS/10.³⁵

More importantly, despite doubts raised inside and outside the State Department as to the advisability of a prompt treaty, there was a consistent attempt by the officials of the Far Eastern Office during the last months of 1947 to break the deadlock over the convening of a peace conference. This had been caused by the fundamental differences in position among the United States, the Soviet Union, and China concerning the membership and voting procedure of the conference. To expedite the holding of a peace conference with Chinese and Soviet participation, the Far East experts thought that the US government must modify its initially suggested terms that the conference should consist of the eleven member countries of the FEC, and that its voting should be by a simple two-thirds majority without a veto. They found an occasion to accommodate this American position to those of the other dissenting nations as the Chinese suggested alternative terms.

³⁵ A new draft was submitted in January 30, 1948, by Hugh Borton to John Davies of the Policy Planning Staff. Although it was intended to be revised along the lines of the thinking of the Planning Staff, the draft treaty hardly departed from the principles on which the previous draft of August 1947 was based, and left many basic issues undetermined. See "Analysis of the Japanese Peace Treaty Draft of January 8, 1948," *FRUS*, 1948, vol. 6, pp. 656-60.

Reluctant to attend a peace conference without Soviet participation and in an attempt to reconcile the difference between American and Russian terms, the Chinese government proposed to the State Department, on October 9, that the composition of the conference be the eleven FEC nations and that the FEC voting procedure, under which each of the four great powers exercised a veto, be retained. The suggested voting method was evidently designed to meet the Soviet claim for a veto right. On November 17, the Chinese proposal was formally delivered to the other three major powers.³⁶

Walton Butterworth, director of the Far Eastern Office, insisted that the American government accept the Chinese compromise since he expected that it would induce the Russians to attend the peace conference. In addition, Max Hamilton and Robert Fearey, the senior officials of the Far Eastern bureau deeply concerned with the Japanese peace problem, recommended that, to secure Soviet participation, the United States commit itself to further compromise. They suggested convening an eleven nation conference with major powers' veto rights to preliminarily consider the peace treaty and later to report the results of the conference to the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM), consisting of the four great powers. The four CFM nations would then, if they so determined, seek to reach an agreement on the unsolved issues. It was estimated by the Far East experts that since the recommended terms would enable the major powers to retain effective control over the proceedings of the peace negotiations, they would be consistent with the Soviets' insistence upon the exclusive competence of the CFM over the Japanese peace problem.³⁷ Although not fully consenting to his staff's suggestion, Butterworth recommended that Under Secretary of State Lovett and Secretary of

³⁶ Memo of conversation, by Marshall, Oct. 9, 1947, *FRUS*, 1947, vol. 6, pp. 527-28; and Memo by the Chinese Ambassador to Marshall, Nov. 17, 1947, *Ibid.*, pp. 568-69.

³⁷ Memo by Fearey of the Division of the Northeast Asian Affairs, Oct. 29, 1947, *Ibid.*, pp. 556-64.

State Marshall manifest to the other FEC nations the American position that for the purpose of facilitating the holding of the peace conference, the US government stood ready to accept the Chinese compromise proposal if the other interested nations agreed to it. Finally, Marshall endorsed this recommendation and communicated American willingness to comply with the Chinese terms to the other major powers when he attended the CFM meeting in London late in November.³⁸

There were certain reasons why the policy makers of the Far Eastern Office made a consistent effort during the latter part of 1947 to resolve the international disagreement on the composition and procedure of a peace conference in the face of skeptical views about an early treaty raised inside and outside the State Department. First of all, they attached more importance to the beneficial effects of the peace settlement than to its postponement. In particular, Robert Fearey estimated that the advantages of having an early treaty outweighed those of postponing it for about two years. The peace settlement would bring about beneficial effects on Japanese initiative and self-reliance as considered necessary for the economic recovery of Japan, an objective that the civilian and military planners in Washington agreed upon. More importantly, the early termination of the occupation through a peace treaty would remove the possibility that the unnecessary prolongation of the occupation would cause a "letdown and feeling of disillusionment" in Japan that might create hostility toward America. Responding to the security concern of the military departments about a defenseless Japan in the post-occupation period, Fearey considered that although the exclusive American occupation afforded certain security safeguards to Japan, most of these would be

³⁸ Memo by Butterworth to the Secretary of State, Nov. 18, 1947, *Ibid.*, pp. 569-72; and Telegram from Lovett to Bohlen, Counselor of the State Department, at London, Nov. 21, 1947, *Ibid.*, pp. 578-59.

preserved by an expected American leading role in such post-treaty international control machinery as contemplated in the draft treaty of the Far Eastern Office.³⁹

On the other hand, the failure to convene an early peace conference would cause dissatisfaction among the other FEC countries, most of which advocated a prompt peace settlement, so that the US political position in the Far East in general and in Japan in particular would be damaged. It was also estimated that the likelihood of attaining the basic American objectives in regard to Japan would be greater with the convening of a peace conference (even with the major powers' veto rights) than with its postponement. The concerned nations could be induced to accept the American terms of the peace treaty because they would be given the greater share in post-treaty international control over Japan as a result of the treaty of the type prepared by the working group of the Far Eastern Office.⁴⁰ Those views in favor of an early peace settlement were shared not only by the other officials of the Far Eastern bureau, including Director Butterworth, but also by Under Secretary of State Lovett. Therefore, they sought to overcome the international deadlock over the convening of the peace conference by suggesting a modified American position on the terms of the conference.⁴¹

In the meantime, despite the Chinese compromise proposal for the peace conference and the American willingness to accept it, the Soviet Union rejected the Chinese proposal late in November and instead suggested that a special session of the Council of Foreign Ministers be held in January 1948 in China to consider the preparation of the peace settlement. The Chinese proposal was also rejected by the British government for the reason that the adoption of any voting procedure

³⁹ Memo by Fearey, Oct. 29, 1947, *Ibid.*, pp. 556-64.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Telegram from Lovett to the Secretary of State, Aug. 26, 1947, *ERUS* 1947, vol. 6, p. 505; Memo by Butterworth to the Secretary of State, Sept. 22, *Ibid.*, pp. 523-25; and Telegram from Lovett to Bohlen, Counselor of the State Department, Nov. 27, 1947, *Ibid.*, pp. 579-80.

conferring a veto right on the four major powers would retard the conclusion of a prompt treaty. On the other hand, the Chinese responded negatively to the Soviet suggestion, contending that they saw neither the reason for which the task of preparing the peace treaty should be confined to the four major powers nor the necessity for the preliminary conference to deviate from the terms governing the Far Eastern Commission. Although another response from the Soviet Union at the end of December showed a minor concession in the direction of giving some consultative authority to the FEC countries, the Soviet position insisting on the exclusive jurisdiction of the Council of Foreign Ministers over the Japanese peace problem remained unchanged.⁴² As it was obvious by the end of 1947 that there was little likelihood of holding a peace conference within the immediate future, the officials of the State Department decided to reconsider the advisability of an early peace treaty.

Their review of the matters relating to the timing of the peace treaty was submitted early in January 1948 to Secretary of State Marshall as a position paper prepared by the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. The document maintained that before making any further diplomatic moves toward peace negotiations, the US government needed to reexamine two fundamental questions: (1) "whether in light of the Chinese and Soviet attitudes regarding the procedural issue any prompt attempt to proceed with a peace treaty was in US interests," and (2) "whether it would be in US interests to conclude a peace treaty without Soviet participation." As to the question of timing, the officials of the Far Eastern Office evaluated the advantages of negotiating a treaty settlement in 1948 in contrast to those of postponing it. It was considered as an important advantage of a prompt treaty that

⁴² Note from Molotov, Soviet Foreign Minister, to Wang, Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs, Nov. 27, 1947, *Ibid.*, pp. 580-82; Note from Bevin, British Foreign Secretary, to Wang, Dec. 12, 1947, Lot file 56 D 256, RG 59; Note from Wang to Molotov, Dec. 6, 1947, *FRUS* 1947, vol. 6, pp. 584-86; and Note from Molotov to Wang, Dec. 30, 1947, *FRUS* 1948, vol. 6, pp. 647-48.

the termination of the occupation would provide the Japanese with the initiative and self-reliance essential to the establishment of a self-supporting economy upon which political stability in Japan would largely depend. More importantly, the peace settlement would enhance the continued political orientation of Japan toward the United States by eliminating the adverse effects of a prolonged occupation on Japanese attitudes.

On the other hand, to postpone the peace negotiations was not thought to produce any definite advantages, except for one of allowing the US government time to define its final position with regard to unresolved issues, especially the American security needs in the Pacific and economic policies in Japan. It was finally estimated that it would be definitely advantageous to wait for two or three months to permit first-hand consultation with General MacArthur on the whole treaty situation.⁴³ It is worthy of note that in evaluating the policy options concerning the timing of the peace treaty, the officials of the Far Eastern Office gave little consideration to the security of Japan, a problem with which the Policy Planning Staff and the military departments were primarily concerned. This was because they considered that the Japanese security problem should be resolved on a long-term basis through the peace treaty rather than through the temporary continuation of the occupation. For this reason, the security problem was of little importance to the Far East experts in determining the timing of the treaty.

As to the policy option of having a peace treaty without Soviet participation, it was calculated in the position paper that its disadvantages would outweigh the advantages. Above all, the officials of the Far Eastern Office expected that if a peace treaty were concluded without Soviet participation, along with the withdrawal of American occupation forces, the likelihood of serious clashes

⁴³ Basic Position Paper, "the United States Position on a Japanese Peace Treaty," Dec. 22, 1947, attached to Memo by Butterworth to the Secretary of State, Dec. 31, 1947, Lot File 60 D 330, RG 59.

between the United States and the Soviet Union over Japanese issues would increase. Another serious disadvantage of a separate treaty was that the Russians would be in a favorable position to exploit the differences of position between Japan and other interested countries and to manipulate trade and political arrangements with Japan in such a way as to advance the Soviet position there. Based on these calculations of expected outcomes, the Far East experts reached a tentative conclusion:

Stability and security and general interests of this country in the Far East can be best secured by concluding a treaty of peace with Japan at as early a date as practical and by including the Soviet Union in the negotiations.⁴⁴

Unlike the stands taken by the military departments or the Policy Planning Staff, the position paper of the Far Eastern Office recommended that the peace settlement not be postponed for one or two years because there were no substantial indications that the situation after two years would be more favorable to United States interests. Nevertheless, the Far East experts suggested that a final decision on the timing of the treaty be deferred until the US government established its definite position concerning the unresolved security and economic issues after an onsite investigation and direct consultation with SCAP. Another important recommendation was that if it were decided for certain reasons to postpone the peace negotiations for one or two years, the US government should proceed with taking active steps to bring about the same beneficial conditions in Japan which the treaty was expected to produce.⁴⁵ It is to be noted in connection with this recommendation that while the officials of the Far Eastern Office still

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

committed themselves to advocating an early settlement, they began seriously to consider its postponement as a policy option which could be adopted.

As a result, Hugh Borton, one of the persistent advocates for a prompt treaty, submitted to Butterworth a report prepared by the Office of Intelligence Research of the State Department. The report, first of all, pointed out the prospect of the inevitable postponement of the peace settlement caused by the international disagreement over the peace conference. Based upon the estimate of the effects of the postponement of the treaty, the report reached the tentative conclusion that postponement would not have seriously unfavorable effects upon American objectives in the Far East, and under certain circumstances, including some modification of the occupation regime, it might have favorable effects on the ability of the United States to achieve its objectives in Japan. It was newly calculated that the continuation of the occupation would contribute to Japan's economic recovery, for the achievement of economic recovery would require extensive American aid, as well as domestic economic controls that might be enforced more effectively by SCAP than by an international body in the post-treaty period. This revised calculation was contrary to the prevailing view in the Far Eastern Office that economic recovery in Japan could be better achieved after the occupation ended. In addition, the report estimated that the success of the reform program instituted by the US would require continued supervision and protection that would be more effectively provided by the unilateral occupation than by the multilateral control body. It was also calculated that any postponement or delay by the United States would not cause antagonism toward it on the part of the other FEC nations in view of the inevitable situation of postponement resulting from

their divergent stands concerning the composition and procedure of the peace conference.⁴⁶

Reflecting these revised calculations, by February 1948, the Far Eastern division within the Office of Intelligence Research developed a detailed program for modifications in the occupation policy which would be implemented in the absence of a peace treaty. The suggested program contained negative and positive measures designed to alter the character of the occupation in the direction of stimulating a greater sense of direct responsibility on the part of the Japanese government. It was recommended on the negative side that there be a relaxation of occupation controls over Japanese governmental processes, along with the restriction of SCAP's function to the remote supervision of the general course of Japanese affairs, and a substantial reduction of the occupation forces. On the positive side, measures should be adopted or further expanded to promote the economic recovery necessary to Japan's political stability. The necessity for such a modification program was underlined by the effects on the Japanese of the postponement of the peace settlement. It was argued from the consideration of political and psychological factors that the alteration of the occupation policy was required in the absence of a peace treaty in order to diminish Japanese resentments resulting from the prolongation of the occupation and to retain the "faith and friendship of the Japanese people." This argument was reinforced by the consideration of economic factors. The economic argument for modification was that the occupation policy should be altered in the direction of assisting Japan toward a self-supporting economy because the political orientation of Japan

⁴⁶ Report by the Office of Intelligence Research, "Possible Effects of Postponement of the Japanese Peace Treaty," Dec. 15, 1947, attached to Memo by Borton to Butterworth, Jan. 22, 1948, 740.0011 PW (Peace)/1-2248, RG 59.

toward the United States could not be possible without the Japanese economy recovering to a " level that would permit a tolerable standard of living,"⁴⁷

Following this line of thinking, Robert Fearey, another advocate of an early treaty in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, also revised his position and asked George Kennan, who was scheduled to have a consultation with General MacArthur in Japan, to take into account the advisability of the reorganization of the occupation in case of the postponement of the peace settlement. In connection with the specific measures for reorganization, Fearey insisted upon a sharp reduction of the occupation forces, the diminution of SCAP's organization, its subsequent civilianization, and the restriction of SCAP's function to the remote supervision of the general course of Japanese affairs.⁴⁸ Despite this consideration among some Far East experts of the prolongation of the occupation in a modified form, a final position as to the timing of the peace treaty was to be determined after the State Department conferred with General MacArthur. Accordingly, George Kennan was designated late in January to proceed to Japan to appraise directly the Japanese situation and discuss the whole treaty matter with SCAP.

E. Collective Decision Process

1. Kennan's Consultation with MacArthur

George Kennan arrived in Tokyo on March 1. His visit coincided with that of an economic mission headed by Under Secretary of the Army William Draper and charged with assessing the economic situation in Japan.⁴⁹ During his stay in

⁴⁷ Division of Research for Far East, "Estimate of Measures Required in Japan During 1948 and 1949 in the Absence of a Peace Settlement," Feb. 18, 1948, Lot File 56D 256, RG 59.

⁴⁸ Memo by Fearey to Kennan, Feb. 19, 1948, 740.0011 PW (Peace)/2-1948, RG 59.

⁴⁹ For the activities of the Draper mission, see Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*

Japan, Kennan had three meetings with General MacArthur. In an effort to orient the general to the new line of Japan policy under consideration in Washington, Kennan presented to MacArthur a statement that reflected the new policy line. The statement suggested that, in the coming period of the occupation, the focus of American policy be placed on the "achievement of maximum stability of Japanese society" based on the American security policy for the defense of Japan, an intensive program of economic recovery and the reduction of occupation controls designated to give the Japanese government greater responsibility and initiative.⁵⁰ As to the question of United States security, General MacArthur and Kennan found themselves sharing some views. MacArthur insisted, and Kennan concurred, that the defensive boundaries of the United States in the western Pacific lay along the island areas off the Asian mainland, ranging from the Aleutians through Okinawa and the former Japanese mandated islands to Clark Field in the Philippines and that Okinawa be developed as the focal point of American military bases in the Pacific defensive structure. MacArthur, like Kennan, was skeptical about the military's plan for the retention of American bases in the Japanese main islands in the post-treaty period because he expected that the other FEC nations, including the Soviet Union, would then claim a similar right to bases in Japan. In his estimation, the US security in the Pacific against any military aggression from the Asian mainland could adequately depend upon American naval and air forces based on Okinawa.⁵¹

Turning to the Japanese security problem in the post-treaty period, MacArthur was not worried about indirect Soviet aggression through the political penetration of the Japanese communists. According to his estimation, the democratic reforms instituted by him had such a beneficial effect on the Japanese

⁵⁰ Memo of conversation between MacArthur and Kennan, March 5, 1948, ERUS_1948, vol. 6, pp. 699-700.

⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 700-1.

that they became strongly averse to communism and would never willingly accept its control. In addition, the Japanese communists were powerless in Japanese politics, holding only four seats in the Diet. They were widely discredited as a result of their failure illegally to capture the labor movement. The political security of Japan did not seem to be a matter of concern to MacArthur.⁵² On the other hand, the general believed that the only acceptable permanent solution to the problem of the military security of Japan would be its complete demilitarization under an effective international guarantee. He contemplated the neutralization of a disarmed Japan as a preferred security arrangement for the post-treaty period. Thus, he considered it essential that the peace treaty provide for a demilitarization agreement guaranteeing Japan's neutrality and security among the four major powers, including the Soviet Union. The general expected that the Russians would accept and honor Japanese neutrality if they became a party to such an agreement. The treaty should also prohibit Japan from maintaining any armed forces. MacArthur's scheme of a disarmed and neutral Japan led him strongly to oppose its rearmament, a plan under consideration among the military planners in Washington.⁵³

As to the question of timing a peace treaty, MacArthur reasserted his previous stand that the United States should continue to press for a prompt peace treaty even without Soviet participation. He expected that once a treaty was agreed upon by all the other nations, the Russians would eventually go along with it. His preference for an early treaty was in part derived from his concern that the failure to obtain a peace treaty would retard the economic recovery of Japan since

⁵² MacArthur's Remarks at Lunch, Mar. 1, *Ibid.*, p. 697

⁵³ Memo of conversation between MacArthur, Draper, and Kennan, March 21, 1948, *Ibid.*, pp. 706-9; and Memo by C.V.R. Schuyler to the Secretary of Defense, April 3, 1948, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, RG 330.

many important issues, such as reparations and the rights of Japan in foreign trade, were left unresolved. In this respect, MacArthur in principle agreed with Kennan's contention that economic recovery should be made a primary objective of the Japan policy. However, the general viewed it as primarily depending upon the development of Japan's foreign trade with the other Far Eastern countries, which would be made possible by the termination of the occupation when restrictions on the Japanese economy were lifted. As to the relaxation of occupation controls, General MacArthur explained that SCAP's control over the Japanese government had not been so strict as the policy makers in Washington supposed. He also defended the reform program he had implemented, arguing that the reforms actually carried out were less drastic than those initially directed by Washington.⁵⁴

After the meetings with MacArthur, Kennan made a fact-finding tour of the main areas of the occupation. In his eyes, in no field was Japan ready to assume the responsibilities of an independent nation. In particular, the radical occupation reforms, such as the land reform, economic deconcentration through the dissolution of the zaibatsu, and a large scale of the purge, were perceived as producing great confusion and instability in Japan. On the other hand, Japan was viewed as lacking adequate means to preserve its internal security because its police forces had been highly decentralized according to the occupation reform. In addition, it had been totally disarmed. Nevertheless, the Japanese communists were allowed to engage in political activities and were extending their influence, particularly in the labor unions. Given these conditions, Kennan believed that "it was difficult to imagine a setup more favorable and inviting from the standpoint of the prospects for a Communist takeover."⁵⁵

⁵⁴ ERUS 1948, vol. 6, pp. 702-3.

⁵⁵ George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925-1950*, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), pp. 386-90.

Kennan's discussions with MacArthur and onsite investigation served to confirm his earlier skeptical views that Japan was in no way prepared for a peace settlement, and that SCAP's reform measures tended to impede the economic recovery and the internal stability of Japan. Before leaving Japan, Kennan set about the work of drafting a policy report concerning changes in the occupation policy, which would be submitted to the Secretary of State for the formulation of a State Department position. Kennan's report, designated PPS 28, began with the key recommendation that the United States government postpone the peace treaty, while placing the focus of its policy on the promotion of Japan's stability during an additional period of occupation. In Kennan's view, there was no important respect in which Japan was prepared to "bear the responsibilities of renewed independence in a manner fully satisfactory to US interests."⁵⁶

It was recommended, regarding security matters, that American occupation forces be reduced for the remainder of the occupation to minimize their cost to Japan's economy and the psychological impact of their presence on the Japanese. Although Kennan suggested deferring the determination of a final position concerning post-treaty measures for the Japanese security until the peace negotiations started, he considered three policy options, whose selection would depend on Japan's internal stability and the Russian situation. If the Soviet Union continued to seek an aggressive policy, or if Japan would still be vulnerable to Communist subversion, only two options would be adopted: to postpone the peace treaty, along with the retention of the occupation forces, and to rearm Japan to a limited extent under American supervision. If, on the other hand, Soviet military and political potential were weakened and if Japan would be considered sufficiently stabilized, the third option would be sought: to conclude a

⁵⁶ Report by Kennan, PPS 28, "Recommendations With Respect To U.S. Policy Toward Japan," March 25, 1948, *Ibid.*, p. 691; and Explanatory notes by Kennan, "Discussion on U.S. Policy Toward Japan," March 25, attached to PPS 28, 740.00119 Control (Japan)/3-2548, RG 59.

demilitarization treaty of Japan by which Japan's security would be internationally guaranteed. Kennan's report, going along with MacArthur's strategic view, suggested that Okinawa be retained as an American base area. More importantly, the report recommended that, for the purpose of domestic security, the Japanese police be strengthened by better equipment, the creation of a coast guard, and the establishment of a central police organization similar to America's FBI. In this connection, Kennan had already discussed in Japan with Under Secretary of the Army Draper the necessity of creating a centralized Japanese police force to be organized along the lines of the American constabulary then operating in occupied Germany.⁵⁷

Turning to policy changes needed for a prolonged occupation, Kennan's report proposed that SCAP's functions be reduced to those of general supervision over Japanese governmental activities. It also recommended that while relaxing existing reform measures, SCAP not press the Japanese government to adopt any further reform legislation. In particular, SCAP should be directed to relax the purge program. These provisions were in line with another key recommendation that economic recovery, rather than democratic reform, be made the prime objective of the occupation policy for the prolonged period. The economic reconstruction of Japan would be sought through a US economic aid program, measures to revive Japan's foreign trade, and a reduction in reparations. Detailed economic measures were scheduled to be worked out by the Draper mission.

As a final point, the report advised strengthening State Department representation in the conduct of the occupation affairs. It was recommended on this point that the State Department send to Tokyo a permanent political representative with an ambassadorial rank, who would be in a position to report

⁵⁷ PPS 28, *Ibid.*, pp. 692-93; and Memorandum by T. N. Depuy, March 23, 1948, P&O 091 Japan TS, Records of Army Plans and Operations Division, RG 319.

independently to the department and only in a secondary capacity under SCAP.⁵⁸ This recommendation reflected the State Department's persistent thinking favoring a change in the direction of greater civilian control over the occupation. Civilian control over nonmilitary areas had been claimed by some officials of the State Department since the latter part of 1947, when they began considering a prolonged occupation in view of the international disagreement on the procedural matters of the peace conference. Such a call for the modification of the occupation regime, however, had been rejected by high-level policy makers because of expected opposition from the other FEC countries, as well as from SCAP.⁵⁹

2. Coordination of Kennan's Policy Report

The interested divisions of the State Department considered Kennan's report for submission to the National Security Council (NSC) as a new policy paper. They were in general agreement with its new underlying approach to Japan. Some of the concerned officials, however, raised minor objections to its specific recommendations and then suggested several alterations in their wording. Especially, Charles Saltzman, Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, took a stand against Japanese rearmament as recommended as a policy option in the report though he acknowledged a need for the military defense of Japan in the post-treaty period. It was also advised, by Saltzman and others, that the US government take diplomatic efforts to secure acceptance of its new policy from the other FEC nations because any program for the economic recovery of Japan, a

⁵⁸ PPS 28, *FRUS* 1948, vol. 6, pp. 693-95.

⁵⁹ See Memo by Robert Fearey of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs, Oct. 9, 1947, *FRUS* 1947, vol. 6, p. 559.

prime objective of the new policy, would have but slight chance of success unless it obtained their cooperation.⁶⁰

After being slightly revised in light of the comments made within the State Department, Kennan's report was adopted as the department's final policy position. It is noticeable among the minor revisions that the phrase "insist on a limited remilitarization of Japan," as an option for post-treaty arrangements, was reworded as "permit the institution of adequate security arrangements by Japan." By avoiding the direct mention of Japanese rearmament, the State Department policy makers left the disputed issue undecided. As another important revision, they sought to gain the State Department's control over SCAP's actions in Japan by inserting a provision for SCAP's prior consultation with Washington into the section pertaining to occupation policy.⁶¹

In mid-April, the policy paper of the State Department was forwarded to the Army Department for consideration and comment. The military planners in the Plans and Operations Division of the Army Department concurred with its general principles. Nevertheless, important modifications were suggested with regard to some of its specific provisions. First, the military planners insisted that while the provision for the demilitarization of Japan by an international treaty be deleted as a policy option for post-treaty security arrangements, there be a provision for the limited rearmament of Japan. They put it:

During the post-treaty period, Japan should not be completely demilitarized under any conditions. Regardless of the present wording of the Japanese

⁶⁰ For comments by State Department divisions on Kennan's report, see Memo by Saltzman to Butterworth, April 9, 1948, ERUS 1948, vol. 6, pp. 727-36; Memo by Thorp to Butterworth, April 6, 1948, *Ibid.*, pp. 364-66; Memo by Allison to Butterworth, March 29, 1948, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, RG 59; and Memo by Hamilton to Butterworth, March 30, 1948, Lot File 56 D 527, RG 59.

⁶¹ See the revised PPS 28, attached to Memo by Butterworth to Lovett, April 16, 1948, Lot File 60 D 330, RG 59.

Constitution, the peace treaty stipulations should permit the Japanese to maintain armed forces (essentially ground elements) of a strictly defensive character and in limited numbers. Such forces are considered a necessity to handle internal security problems above the capabilities of the civil policy and to foster governmental prestige in the eyes of Japanese nationals.⁶²

Second, contrary to the position of the State Department favoring the continued existence of the Far Eastern Commission, the military planners proposed that a policy be developed toward the termination of the organization. Third, the officials of the Army Department, reluctant to afford the State Department an opportunity to establish its direct control over the administration of the occupation, suggested that the provision for an American ambassador in Japan acting directly under the direction of the State Department be dropped. Other minor revisions were also recommended to the State Department.⁶³

In order to reduce the interdepartmental differences of position prior to its submission to the NSC, the draft policy paper was the subject of considerable discussion between the State and the Army Departments over the next two months. In the meantime, Under Secretary of State Lovett forwarded to the NSC staff early in June the revised policy document (then designated NSC 13) embodying some of the revisions by the Army Department so as to prepare a final paper for the Council members. At the same time, in a diplomatic effort to obtain the agreement of the other FEC nations to the new policy, high-ranking State Department officials, such as Lovett, Kennan, and Butterworth, had discussions with senior British and Canadian officials to inform and explain the outline of the American position. There were reservations and claims for greater consultations on

⁶² Department of the Army Position with Respect to the State Department's Japanese Policy Paper, attached to Memo by C.V.R. Schuyler, Chief of Plans and Policy Group, the Plans and Operation Division of the Army Department, to Butterworth, April 28, 1948, 740.00119 Control (Japan)/4-2848, RG 59.

⁶³ Ibid.

the part of the other FEC nations, especially Britain. However, they proved no obstacle to the American decision to prolong and change the occupation.⁶⁴

The draft policy paper (NSC 13) was also transmitted in mid-June to General MacArthur for his comments. Although the general gave his tacit consent to the key aspects of the document, such as postponing the peace settlement and laying primary emphasis on economic recovery, he raised objections to several other provisions. First, MacArthur opposed the strengthening and expansion of the Japanese police, arguing that such actions would provoke explosive reactions from the other FEC countries. In addition, the threat of communist penetration, from his point of view, was not so serious as certain policy makers in Washington considered. Second, he insisted that the authority of the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council for Japan over occupation matters be completely eliminated so as to effectively carry out future occupation policies. Third, he defended himself against Washington's criticism of his extensive purge program, saying that his implementation of the program was "as mild as action of this sort conceivably could be." Thus, the recommended relaxation of the purge would encounter severe criticism from the other FEC nations. Finally, MacArthur made strong objections not only to the provision for SCAP's obligation to consult with Washington in case of the further implementation of reform measures, but also to the recommendation of stationing in Japan an independent representative reporting directly to the State Department. He worried that these provisions would enable the policy makers in Washington to gain control over his conduct of the occupation.⁶⁵ None of

⁶⁴ See Memo of conversation with Dening, Assistant Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the British Foreign Office, by Lovett, May 27, 1948, *FRUS* 1948, vol. 6, pp. 782-85; Memo of conversation by Green, May 28, 1948, *Ibid.*, pp. 788-95; and Memo by the Canadian Department of External Affairs, June 3, 1948, *Ibid.*, pp. 800-7.

⁶⁵ Telegram from MacArthur to Draper, Under Secretary of the Army, June 12, 1948, *Ibid.*, pp. 819-23.

MacArthur's objections was accepted in the later process of modifications of the policy paper, except that the provision for an independent State Department representative was finally deleted.

As a result of intense consultation over two months between the State and Army Departments, their divergent stands concerning certain provisions of the policy paper were for the most part reconciled by mid-July. It was agreed that a final position on the post-treaty arrangements for Japanese security should be withheld until the deferred peace negotiations actually started. This procrastination of a final decision was largely due to widely split views among the civil and military decision makers. As to the functioning of the FEC, the Army Department accepted the position of the State Department, which preferred the continued existence of the organization even with no policy-making function to its elimination. On another disputed problem of State Department representation in Japan, the State Department in turn accepted the position of the Army Department and MacArthur that the entire provision for such representation should be withdrawn.⁶⁶ After being slightly revised by the NSC staff, the draft document was finally adopted as a new policy paper (NSC 13/2) by the NSC on October 7, 1948 and approved by President Truman on October 9. As already noted, the Japan policy paper contained several key decisions: to postpone a peace settlement for Japan; to place progressively greater responsibility on the Japanese government; to strengthen and recentralize the Japanese police establishment for the purpose of ensuring internal security; and to alter the priorities of the occupation policy from reform to economic recovery.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ For detailed compromises between the two departments, see Memo for record regarding NSC 13, the P & O Division of the Army Department, July 16 and 26, 1948, P & O 091 Japan TS, RG 319.

⁶⁷ NSC 13/2, "Recommendations with Respect to United States Policy Toward Japan," Oct. 7, 1948, ERUS 1948, vol. 6, pp. 857-62.

F. Implementation

With presidential approval of NSC 13/2, the State Department, particularly the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, was designated as the coordinating agency for its implementation and required to make periodic reports on implementation. Within the Army Department, the Civil Affairs and the Plans and Operations Divisions were given the responsibility for carrying out the military aspects of NSC 13/2.⁶⁸

From the beginning, the State and Army Department officials worried that General MacArthur, who was skeptical about many aspects of the policy paper, might oppose its prompt and forceful implementation. They were also concerned about the delay in implementation which was expected to result from the interference of the other FEC nations. Thus, they adopted several tactics to press for implementation. One of them was to send a group of high-powered experts to Japan to supervise SCAP's actions for implementation. That method was used mainly in the critical economic aspects of NSC 13/2. Policy actions were taken, even before the official approval of the document, to launch the program of Japanese economic recovery. One of the initial actions was to remove what many policy makers in Washington thought were obstructions to economic recovery in Japan. It was especially to reduce or eliminate the controversial deconcentration of big business program that SCAP had been pushing forward in the face of objections from Washington.

As has been illustrated in the last chapter, after the completion of its first part, the breakup of the zaibatsu holding companies, the deconcentration program by early 1948 was extended by MacArthur's instruction to the dissolution of any large-scale companies below the holding companies. In an effort to reduce the disruptive impact of the program on the Japanese economy, Under Secretary of the

⁶⁸ Memo of conversation, by Green, Nov. 2, 1948, 740.0011 PW (Peace)/11-248, RG 59.

Army Draper dispatched to Japan in May 1948 a Deconcentration Review Board composed of selected American businessmen to oversee and moderate the implementation of the program. After fully examining 325 companies already designated by the Japanese Holding Company Liquidation Commission as excessive concentrations, the Review Board reduced the number of the companies for dissolution from the original 325 to about 30. Among them, only 11 companies were finally ordered to be reorganized. Meanwhile, the American government decided by December 1948 to withdraw its support of FEC 230, a policy proposal for the deconcentration program that was under consideration within the FEC.⁶⁹

Another attempt was made, by sending a group of experts to Japan, to urge General MacArthur to carry out an austere economic stabilization program. In consequence of accepting the recommendations in July 1948 by an economic mission on the financial situation of Japan, Washington forwarded in December to SCAP an interim directive ordering the implementation of an economic stabilization program which called for comprehensive control over the governmental budget, wages, prices, and foreign exchange. In order to press for prompt and effective implementation, the high-level officials in Washington sent to Japan early in 1949 a special mission of economic experts headed by Joseph Dodge, president of the Detroit Bank, who was appointed by President Truman as the financial adviser to SCAP. The Dodge mission proved successful, with General MacArthur's cooperation, in directing the Japanese to carry out the stabilization program during 1949 and early 1950.⁷⁰ These two aspects of the new economic

⁶⁹ Memo by Saltzman to Draper, Dec. 3, 1948, *FRUS* 1948, vol. 6, pp.1054-56; Statement by McCoy, U.S. Representative on the FEC, Dec. 9, 1948, *Ibid.*, pp.1056-59; and Memo by Sebald, Political Adviser in Japan to Acheson, Secretary of State, Aug. 25, 1949, *FRUS* 1949, vol. 7, pp. 840-44.

⁷⁰ Message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to SCAP, Dec. 10, 1948, 091.3 Japan, Draper/ Voorhee File, RG 335. For a detailed discussion of the Dodge mission, see Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, pp. 198-235; and Finn, *Winners in Peace*, pp. 210-27.

policy were effectively implemented as the policy makers in Washington intended because they could get control of SCAP through supervisory missions high-powered enough to prevent him from challenging or delaying the proposed policies.

A second tactic that the officials in Washington used for the full and prompt implementation of NSC 13/2 was to transmit instructions to General MacArthur as Commander in Chief, the Far East (CINCFE) rather than as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP). This method was primarily designed to win MacArthur's compliance with the NSC policy directives by treating him as only an American field commander responsible to the Army Department's orders in accordance with the military chain of command. On November 30 and December 1, 1948, the Army Department sent to MacArthur, as CINCFE, two telegrams directing him to carry out several policy decisions of NSC 13/2 within his field of responsibility, such as easing occupation controls, strengthening the Japanese police establishment, and tempering the purge.⁷¹ This tactic of implementation, however, met with MacArthur's opposition. He disputed the relevance of these directives, arguing that most of the measures requested of him as CINCFE could only be carried out by him as SCAP because they dealt with the non-military aspects of the occupation. He thus refused to implement the directives.⁷²

In consequence, another tactic was adopted by the policy makers in Washington to issue unilateral directives to MacArthur as SCAP without using formal interim directives as prescribed by the terms of reference of the FEC. The use of this alternative method was intended not only to avoid MacArthur's

⁷¹ For the text of the two telegrams, see attached documents to Memo by Butterworth to Marshall, Nov. 29, 1948, Lot File 56 D 225, RG 59.

⁷² SCAP message (C 65997) to the Army Department, Dec. 4, 1948, 091 Japan, Draper/ Voorhees File, RG 335.

opposition but also to do away with the interference of the other FEC nations in the execution of the new American policy, which might be occasioned by the issuance of interim directives. Since interim directives were required to be filed with the FEC, in issuing such directives, the American government recognized by implication the jurisdiction of the FEC over the matters concerned. This might consequently cause the opposition of the other FEC nations to American policy actions. The alternative method of giving SCAP unilateral instructions, known as implementing directives, however, also met with MacArthur's resistance. In an effort to evade implementation, the general used the international character of SCAP, formally responsible to the FEC, the organization he had long ignored in his administration of the occupation. He maintained that, serving as an international officer, he was "subject solely to Allied policy either formulated by the FEC or under specific limited circumstances by the United States, if transmitted as an interim directive pursuant to the former's terms of reference." He added that since the policy decisions of NSC 13/2 were not conveyed to him as SCAP by appropriate directives as prescribed by international agreement, he was not, therefore, responsible in any way for their implementation.⁷³ In spite of MacArthur's reluctance to take action, the officials of the State and Army Departments, instead of issuing interim directives, urged him to carry out promptly the NSC decisions by emphasizing his wide executive discretion as SCAP.

Although General MacArthur initially resisted and delayed the implementation of NSC 13/2, he began by mid-1949 to make some progress in carrying out several aspects within the field of his responsibility. Intensive efforts were made for economic recovery in SCAP's cooperation with Washington, such as the execution of the stabilization program, the termination of any further reparation removals from Japan, and the enforcement of various measures for the

⁷³ SCAP message (C 66402) to Draper, Dec. 18, 1948, 091 Japan, Draper/Voorhees File, RG 335.

promotion of Japan's foreign trade.⁷⁴ Actions were taken to relax occupation controls and to turn over greater responsibility to the Japanese government, even though not to the extent envisaged by the NSC policy. The number of personnel in the SCAP headquarters was reduced from 3,500 to 2,000. All existing SCAP instructions and directives to the Japanese government were reviewed for elimination or modification.⁷⁵

On the other hand, General MacArthur continued throughout 1949 to show marked reluctance to take any substantial actions, particularly in relation to the strengthening of the Japanese police and the relaxation of the purge program. As to reinforcing the police, he was instructed to take the measures set forth in a State-Army Department cable of November 1948 to him: the creation of an adequate mobile national police; the establishment of a separate national police investigation agency; and the coordination by the national police of activities of all police units.⁷⁶ By mid-1948, the Japanese police establishment had been decentralized according to SCAP's reform plan in which emphasis had been placed on local police prerogatives and on the close public supervision of police activities. The measures ordered by Washington pursuant to the NSC policy decision were primarily designed to establish and expand a centrally-directed police system for internal security against communist penetration.

By way of carrying out the NSC policy, during 1949 SCAP equipped the Japanese police at the full authorized strength of 125,000 men with such small arms as American revolvers and gave them in-service training. However,

⁷⁴ For an account of SCAP's implementing actions in the economic sphere during 1949, see D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur*, Vol. 3, pp. 248-67.

⁷⁵ Telegram from Huston, Charge in Japan, to the Secretary of State, May 24 and June 16, 1949, ERUS, 1949, vol. 7, pp. 754-58 and 781-82.

⁷⁶ State-Army message (War 92991) to MacArthur, Nov. 22, 1948, 091 Japan, Draper/ Voorhees File, RG 335.

MacArthur refused to implement any of the organizational changes. Estimating that the police forces as manned and equipped were fully capable of maintaining internal security, MacArthur was opposed to the creation of a national mobil police or the recentralization of the police system, the measures which would be contrary to his initial police reform.⁷⁷ It was not until July 1950 that SCAP took the first substantial action to implement the State-Army instructions. Following the outbreak of the Korean War, on July 8, MacArthur authorized the formation of the Japanese National Police Reserve, a constabulary force comprising 75,000 men, in order to ensure Japanese domestic security.⁷⁸

The relaxation of the purge was also never fully carried out by MacArthur. As noted in the previous chapter, by mid-1948 about 200,000 Japanese had been removed and barred from public, business, or media positions under the SCAP purge directives. In particular, former military officers accounted for over 80 percent of these purged persons. The decisions of NSC 13/2 concerning the purge basically sought to allow the return to public and business positions of many purged persons, whose services would be valuable to the Japanese government and economy. General MacArthur, however, persistently refused to alter his initial purge program on the pretext that the NSC decisions were inconsistent with the pertinent controlling policy decisions of the FEC. In his view, the execution of the NSC decisions required a new and superseding FEC decision to be made along their lines.⁷⁹ This position on the part of MacArthur indicated, in view of his longstanding disregard for the authority of the FEC, that he had a strong reluctance to implement the instructions from Washington for the relaxation of the purge.

⁷⁷ SCAP message (C-51666) to the Army Department, July 28, 1949, *Ibid.*

⁷⁸ Telegram from Sebald to the Secretary of State, July 9, 1950, 894.501/7-950, RG 59.

⁷⁹ SCAP messages to the Army Department, Dec. 4, 1948 and July 28, 1949, 091 Japan, Draper/Voorhees File, RG 335.

Although he did not formally modify the original purge directives along the lines of the NSC policy, by late 1950 MacArthur partially carried out one of them to the extent that, with his approval, the Japanese government in October freed more than 10,000 persons who had been purged and in November depurged some 3,200 former military officers. The task of depurging most of the remaining purgees was undertaken by General Matthew Ridgway, who succeeded MacArthur as SCAP in April 1951.⁸⁰

General MacArthur's reluctance and delay in the full implementation of the NSC decisions, especially those of relaxing occupation controls and easing the purge, caused the State Department officials to proceed with two important moves even from mid-1949. One was to seek a substantial change in the regime of control of the occupation. As noted above, the proposal of the State Department for the dispatch of a civilian ambassador directly reporting to the department was dropped from the NSC policy paper because of opposition from the Army Department and General MacArthur. This matter again came to the fore early in March, when Maxwell Hamilton, a senior official of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, after consulting with Max Bishop, Chief of the Northeast Asian Division, submitted to Director of the Office Butterworth a draft memorandum that suggested a program of the State Department's taking over control over the non-military aspects of the occupation. It was proposed in the program that a newly appointed American ambassador to Japan would perform the tasks of supervising political and economic matters in Japan and of reporting directly to the secretary of state.⁸¹

This scheme of civilianizing the occupation regime in Japan was encouraged by and patterned after the plan being implemented at that time for the American

⁸⁰ James, *The Years of MacArthur*, pp. 238-39.

⁸¹ Draft memo by Hamilton, "State Department Assumption of Control of Non-Garrison Aspects of Military Occupation of Japan: Full Implementation of NSC 13/2," March 2, 1949, *FRUS*, 1949, vol. 7, pp. 674-78.

zone of occupied Germany, in which the regime of control was to be transferred from the jurisdiction of the Army Department to that of the State Department, and the military governor would be succeeded by a civilian high commissioner. General MacArthur raised a strong objection to the takeover plan of the State Department on the grounds that the circumstances in Japan were entirely different from those in Germany. In addition, he maintained that if the State Department replaced the military in the conduct of the occupation, it would "give greater impetus to the communist drive to bring all of Asia under control." The plan for Japan finally received no approval from high-level policy makers, perhaps owing to MacArthur's strong objection.⁸² On September 9, 1949, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in a letter sent to MacArthur with the concurrence of Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson and the approval of President Truman, informed him that no plan was being considered in the State Department to change the regime of control in Japan.⁸³

The other important move of the State Department occasioned particularly by MacArthur's reluctance to undertake a substantial relaxation of occupation controls was to give renewed consideration to a peace settlement with Japan. By May 1949, the officials of the Far Eastern Office began to reconsider procedural and substantive matters pertaining to the peace treaty. In their estimation, SCAP's failure to shift, to a great extent, responsibility to the Japanese government, and thus to stimulate Japanese initiative, made it evident that proceeding with a prompt peace settlement was necessary if increasing Japanese restiveness were not to damage the political orientation of Japan toward the United States.⁸⁴ This

⁸² MacArthur to the Secretary of State, June 16, 1949, *Ibid.*, pp. 778-81; and Omar H. Bradley and Clay Blair, *A General's Life* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 526.

⁸³ Telegram from Acheson to MacArthur, Sept. 9, 1949, *Ibid.*, pp. 850-52.

⁸⁴ Memo by Butterworth to James Webb, the Under Secretary of State, May 19, 1949, *Ibid.*, pp. 752-54; and Memo by Sebald to MacArthur, May 25, 1949, Lot File 56 D 527, RG 59.

renewed attempt at the peace settlement on the part of the State Department is the subject of the next chapter.

G. Theoretical Perspective : Decision-Making Models Applied

To explain the United States decisions regarding Japan from a theoretical perspective of the foreign policy decision-making approach, this study adopts three major models of decision making: (1) the analytic (rational) model, (2) the bureaucratic politics model, and (3) cognitive model. In regard to the decision to postpone a peace settlement with Japan, there are two research questions answered by using the three models. (1) Why and how did the decision makers choose their initial policy preferences concerning the timing of the peace settlement? (2) How did the decision makers' divergent preferences converge to produce the national decision to postpone the peace settlement?

As identified above, the key individual and organizational decision makers were the State Department's Office of Far Eastern Affairs, George Kennan and his Policy Planning Staff (PPS), the military departments, including the Army and Navy Departments, and General MacArthur as SCAP. Although President Truman was interested in the Japanese peace problem and made a final decision approving NSC 13/2, he had no hand in the decision-making process. This was because he was preoccupied with European problems. Late in 1946, Truman expressed his view that it was desirable to conclude early peace treaties for Germany and Japan. After that, however, he left the Japanese peace problem to his civilian and military advisers until they reached an agreed-upon position that he would finally endorse. Secretary of State Marshall and Under Secretary of State Lovett were other decision makers. Initially convinced that a prompt peace settlement with Japan would contribute to the peace and stability of the Far East, they led the aborted

diplomatic effort of the State Department during the latter part of 1947 to convene a Japanese peace conference. After a skeptical view was raised about an early settlement by the PPS members in October, however, Marshall and Lovett entrusted the planning group with the work of formulating and coordinating a final State Department position, instead of directly taking part in it.

1. Individual Processes of Preference Choice

As examined above, three major policy options were considered and advocated among the key decision makers concerning the timing of the peace settlement during the latter part of 1947. A first option to move toward an early conclusion of the peace treaty was favored by the officials of the Far Eastern Office and by General MacArthur. A second one was to postpone the treaty at least for the next two years in order to maintain the United States' dominant position in Japan in light of Soviet expansive tendencies. This option was supported by the military departments. Although basically favoring the postponement of the treaty, Kennan and his Policy Planning Staff were disposed to a third option to delay the process of peace negotiations until the American government determined its definite positions on the basic issues affecting both the timing and substance of the peace settlement.

First of all, the preference of the officials of the Far Eastern Office for an early peace settlement is best explained by the bureaucratic politics model. This model postulates that a decision maker's problem definition and preference choice are determined by the concerns and interests of the bureaucratic organization he represents. In Allison's words, "where you sit influences what you see as well as where you stand on any issue."⁸⁵ The Office of Far Eastern Affairs was the regional bureau charged with State Department operations in the Far East, that is, those of

⁸⁵ Allison, *Essence of Decision*, p. 178.

managing political relations with the Far Eastern countries. In view of this, the concerns and interests of the Far Eastern Office were representative of those of the State Department as a whole in that region. The bureaucratic politics model, therefore, would predict that, in dealing with a policy problem, the officials of the Far Eastern bureau would be primarily concerned with the impact of the problem on political relations with both the country in question and the interested friendly countries. It would be further predicted that they would favor a policy option that would lead to the maintenance of good political relations with those nations, which reflects the organizational interest of the State Department.⁸⁶

In effect, the officials of the Far Eastern Office interpreted the Japanese peace problem as primarily having implications for political relations with Japan and the friendly FEC nations. In considering the timing of the peace settlement, they focused on the effects of the settlement on the political relationship between the United States and Japan. From their perspective, the early restoration of Japanese sovereignty through a peace treaty would enhance the continued political orientation of Japan toward America by preventing the repercussions of Japanese letdowns and resentment resulting from the prolongation of the occupation. The Far East experts agreed with the members of the Policy Planning Staff on the central American objective of creating a politically and economically stable Japan oriented toward the United States and, at the same time, denied to the Soviet sphere of control. Nevertheless, two groups of decision makers differed with each other in perspective on the problem of stability in Japan. The officials of the Far Eastern Office viewed it as a political problem largely affected by the duration of the American occupation. On the other hand, the PPS members considered it a security problem caused by the Soviet communist threat. Based upon these

⁸⁶ Allison and Halperin, "Bureaucratic Politics," pp. 48-49; and M. Halperin and A. Kanter, "The Bureaucratic Perspective: A Preliminary Framework," in Halperin and Kanter (eds.) *Readings in American Foreign Policy* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973), pp. 10-12.

divergent perspectives, the former favored the early termination of the occupation, while the latter opposed it. Furthermore, the former estimated that the economic recovery of Japan, without which its political orientation toward America could not be sustained, could be better achieved after the end of the occupation than during the period of the occupation. This was because the termination of the occupation would give full scope to Japanese initiative and self-reliance which they deemed necessary for economic recovery.

The officials of the Far Eastern Office were also concerned with the impact of the Japanese peace problem on political relations with the other FEC nations. From their standpoint, any unilateral postponement or delay on the part of the United States would provoke the other FEC states into dissatisfaction in light of the fact that most of them insisted upon a prompt peace treaty. This situation would consequently weaken the American political position vis-à-vis the other FEC countries in reference to Japan. On the contrary, it was calculated that the United States would not be isolated and rather become stronger in its political position in the Far East if the occupation could end on the basis of an international agreement among the interested countries, including the Soviet Union.

Although the Far East experts acknowledged the necessity of containing the penetration of Soviet influence into Japan as initially stressed by the PPS members, they favored a policy of containment in Japan as one of not unnecessarily antagonizing the Russians. They viewed the Soviet-American relationship in connection with the Japanese peace treaty as more of a diplomatic problem than a security problem of the type perceived by the PPS and the military departments. In addition, the Soviet Union was expected to be less troublesome and obstructive if it were a party to the peace treaty. Thus, the Far Eastern Office recommended that diplomatic efforts be made to bring about Soviet participation in the peace

negotiations.⁸⁷ In the last analysis, those organizational concerns and interests in regard to Japan and the friendly FEC nations led the officials of the Far Eastern Office to advocate an early peace settlement in preference to a prolonged occupation. As a result, despite doubts raised inside and outside the State Department as to the desirability of a prompt treaty, a consistent diplomatic attempt was made by the US government, on the recommendation of the Far Eastern bureau, during the last several months of 1947 to break the international deadlock over the convening of a peace conference. In this respect, the bureaucratic politics model holds in the explanation of the policy position favored by the officials of the Far Eastern Office.

The bureaucratic politics model also has validity in accounting for the policy preferences of the military departments. The model would predict that when military planners got involved in a problem for decision, they would focus on its military-strategic implications rather than on political-diplomatic ones. The primary mission of the military is to prepare for and wage war. In this connection, the organizational interest of the American military departments is supposedly to develop and retain military bases and commitments overseas so as to maintain military readiness for war.⁸⁸

The evidence suggests that the military departments were primarily concerned with the military-strategic aspects of the Japanese peace problem for the United States and Japan. As has been mentioned above, there were two overriding concerns that led the military to advocate the postponement of the peace settlement. One was the military defense of Japan. The Soviet Union was regarded

⁸⁷ See the basic position paper on the Japanese peace treaty prepared by the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Dec. 22, 1947, Lot File 60 D 330, RG 59.

⁸⁸ Snyder and Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations*, pp. 359-60; and Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*, p. 59.

as a major threat to United States security in the East Asia, as well as to that of Japan. Because of Japan's strategic importance in the Soviet-American rivalry relationship, the primary US objective regarding Japan, from the perspective of the military planners, was to defend it from probable Soviet aggression. To meet this objective, they advised that the American occupation should be prolonged until alternative means were made available for the military security of disarmed Japan. The other concern was the military role of Japan in case of a future Soviet-American conflict. The military envisioned Japan as potentially an important ally to the United States in the event of a war against the Russians. In particular, Japan should be utilized as an American base area in that war. Therefore, a prolonged occupation was needed to prepare for making such use of Japan. It was, of course, further recommended by the military planners that the American bases developed during the occupation be retained after its termination.

In short, the preference of the military departments for the postponement of the peace treaty was determined mainly by their military-strategic considerations involving the defense of Japan and the development of American bases in Japan in preparation for a possible armed conflict with the Russians. These considerations reflected their organizational concerns and interests.

While the analytic and cognitive models provide respective propositions about how decision makers deal with value complexity involved in a decision problem in determining their policy preferences, the bureaucratic politics model suggests no explicit proposition. In an effort to elaborate the bureaucratic politics model, it is useful to explore ways of dealing with value complexity on the parts of the officials of the Far Eastern Office and the military departments. As implied above, the peace treaty problem involved two conflicting value dimensions. On the one hand were political values, that is, those of assuring the continued political orientation of Japan toward America and of satisfying the demand of the friendly

FEC nations for a prompt settlement. On the other hand were security values, that is, those of containing a communist political threat in Japan and of defending it from external aggression. The pursuit of the political values dictated an early conclusion of a peace treaty. On the contrary, the promotion of the security value required prolonging the occupation. This was because economically and politically unstable Japan would be highly vulnerable to communist political penetration if the occupation were brought to an end without taking necessary measures for political security. From the standpoint of military security, a continued occupation was also needed until alternative security arrangements were provided. The reason was that disarmed Japan would be defenseless against external aggression if American occupation forces were withdrawn with the termination of the occupation.

The officials of the Far Eastern Office determined their initial preference for an early settlement because they attached primary importance to the political values. On the other hand, they gave little consideration to the security values. The treaty drafts prepared by them were designed principally to prevent a resurgence of Japanese militarism and thus to provide for long-term Allied control over Japan's military and industrial potential. However, they made no provision for the security of Japan against direct and indirect aggression. In Kennan's words, "nor could we discover that anyone in our government ... had given any thought in their planning for a peace treaty to the question of how this need (the protection of Japan against Communist pressures) was to be met in the post-treaty period."⁸⁹

As a serious concern was raised over Japanese security in the post-occupation period by the PPS and the military establishment, the officials of the Far Eastern Office at first proceeded to bolster their favored policy option by arguing that most security measures for Japan provided by the occupation could be preserved through the expected American leading position in such a post-treaty

⁸⁹ Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925-1950*, p. 376.

international control machinery as contemplated in the draft treaty. In their conception of the treaty problem, the favored option of an early treaty would satisfy not only the political values but also the security ones. No trade-off relationship was found between the values at stake. The Far East experts' argument is considered questionable, however, because the proposed Allied control machinery, in which the Russians would participate, was so designed to supervise Japan's long-term disarmament and demilitarization that it was highly doubtful whether the machinery could safeguard Japanese security against direct and indirect Soviet aggression. The Far East experts later recognized that a prolonged occupation would contribute to Japanese security. Nevertheless, the security values to them was still of little importance in determining the timing of the peace settlement, because they thought the security problem in Japan should be resolved on a long-term basis through the conclusion of the peace treaty rather than through the temporary continuation of the occupation. This body of evidence indicates that, in bolstering their preference regarding the timing of the peace treaty, the officials of the Far Eastern Office sought to avoid the value conflict involved in the problem initially by denying its existence and later by playing down its importance.

When they chose the policy option to prolong the occupation, the military departments alike tended to avoid the value conflict by considering only the value of the military security of Japan and the United States. They interpreted the treaty problem primarily in terms of its military-strategic implications. Military security took precedence over all other values. In a single-value decision problem, expected benefits to military security, from the standpoint of the military departments, dictated the postponement of the peace settlement.

General MacArthur's preference choice is also best explained by the bureaucratic politics model in that his case for an early peace treaty was primarily

determined by his parochial concerns and interests deriving from his bureaucratic position. Serving as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, he had exclusive responsibility for implementing the Allied policy objectives of the occupation set forth in the Potsdam Declaration and in the Initial Post-Surrender Policy Directive (JCS 1380/15). Thus, his perspective on the peace treaty problem narrowly focused on its implications for Japan itself. The two principal objectives of the occupation were the demilitarization and democratization of Japan. The general had implemented various reform measures to achieve these objectives. His argument for the termination of the occupation was partly based on the estimate, from SCAP's perspective, that the immediate need for the occupation no longer existed because the basic tasks of the occupation had been, for the most part, carried out. In MacArthur's view, by early 1947, Japan was fully demilitarized and a framework was laid down for democratization so that Japan was ready for a peace settlement. The general defended himself from the argument in Washington that Japan should be economically revived, asserting that economic recovery was beyond the assigned tasks of the occupation.

More plausibly, MacArthur's preference for a prompt treaty can be interpreted as stemming from his parochial interest deriving from his bureaucratic position in charge of administering the occupation: to bring the occupation to a successful conclusion during his service in Japan. This interest was demonstrated by his view that a Japanese peace conference should be held in Tokyo. As will be noted in the next chapter, MacArthur later conveyed repeatedly to Washington his desire that Tokyo be the site of the peace conference so that he could preside over it. He wanted to display to the world a successful end to the occupation, which he had administered, through his sponsorship. Such a parochial interest held by the general was connected with his concern about the possible adverse impact of a prolonged occupation when he considered the problem of timing a peace treaty.

MacArthur believed that a military occupation served its purpose at best only for a limited period of time during which its basic objectives were achieved. Hence, he worried that the unnecessary continuation of the occupation would make the Japanese people so restive and resentful toward the occupation authorities as to damage his prestige and accomplishments in Japan and militate against a successful conclusion of the occupation. This concern led the general to advocate concluding a peace settlement promptly.

Once he became in favor of a prompt treaty, MacArthur sought to defend his preference against the competing option of continuing the occupation. In doing so, he tended to avoid the conflict relationship among the values involved. The general's favored option seems to have been intended to satisfy a political value: to maintain the friendly attitude of the Japanese toward the occupation authorities and thus to finish the occupation successfully. This value was in a trade-off relationship with the value of ensuring Japan's security against communist pressures in that the latter required prolonging the occupation. When Kennan made the case for the postponement of the treaty on the grounds that the early termination of the occupation would render Japan highly vulnerable to communist subversion, MacArthur advanced the argument that the democratic reforms he instituted and anti-communist trends in Japan would make communist penetration fail. Moreover, by holding that Japan's security could rest on a neutralization agreement among the major powers which the Russians would join and observe, the general disputed the point that the occupation should be prolonged because Japan's security problem in the post-treaty period remained unresolved. In this respect, MacArthur hardly viewed the political and security values as conflicting.

However, his arguments are considered ill-founded. First, contrary to his view, Japan actually remained unstable in light of its chronic economic depression, the radical politicization of the labor movement, and the absence of effective

police forces. Thus, Japan's capacity for resistance to communism could not be taken for granted. Second, the general's sanguine view of the Soviets' observance of the neutralization agreement was also questionable in light of their increasing expansionist trends in Eastern Europe and other regions. In addition, Kennan, who had been monitoring Soviet behavior, held the view that the Russians could not be trusted to abide by such an agreement unless they became considerably weaker and more restrained than they were at that time.⁹⁰ To sum up, in considering the timing of the peace treaty, MacArthur focused on the political value of preserving the friendly orientation of the Japanese toward the occupation authorities, as dictated by his parochial interest in a successful end to the occupation. As a result, he advocated an early treaty because it would satisfy that political value. When he became aware that the security value was also embedded in the problem, the general sought to bolster his preference against the competing postponement option by resting on questionable arguments which enabled him to avoid the trade-off relationship between the political and security values.

Finally, the bureaucratic politics model hardly helps to explain why Kennan and his planning staff members basically advocated the postponement of the peace settlement. The primary mission of the PPS was to formulate long-term foreign policies in broad politico-military issues.⁹¹ This organizational role led its members to approach the Japanese problem from a broader perspective than that of the officials of the Far Eastern Office or SCAP. As noted above, the policy planners of the PPS had no real concern for the implications of the Japanese peace problem as it affected the FEC nations or Japan itself, but perceived it in the context of the overall world situation characterized by the increasingly expansive tendencies of

⁹⁰ Explanatory notes by Kennan, "Discussion on U.S. policy toward Japan," March 25, 1948, attached to PPS 28, 740.00119 Control (Japan)/3-2548, RG 59.

⁹¹ George Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925-1950* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967) p. 327.

the Soviet Union and a consequent Soviet-American confrontation. However, this organizational perspective had no direct relevance to the policy position of the PPS members concerning the timing of the peace settlement.

On the other hand, the cognitive model has some validity in accounting for the basic preference of Kennan and his staff for the postponement of the peace treaty. That model postulates that a decision maker's problem definition and preference choice tend to be determined by his personal beliefs. His beliefs about the nature of international politics and the images of the concerned nations are relevant to developing a definition of the problem and policy options. The model further assumes that the decision maker tends to evaluate and choose the policy options in relation to only one or two values, which are strongly supported by his beliefs, while avoiding conflict relationships among the values involved. As predicted by the cognitive model, Kennan and his planning group's case for the deferment of the peace settlement was primarily derived from Kennan's firmly established beliefs about the nature of international politics, the Soviet Union, and Japan, as shared among the PPS members. Before turning his attention late in August 1947 to the Japanese peace problem, Kennan held prior personal beliefs about the postwar international system, the Soviet Union, and United States strategy and tactics. These beliefs converged into a salient value or objective of containing Soviet communist expansion.

According to Kennan's beliefs about the postwar international system, there were only five centers of industrial and military power in the world which were important from the standpoint of American security. These were the United States, Great Britain, Germany and central Europe, the Soviet Union, and Japan. Only one of these power centers was under communist control. Because if any of the others should fall under such control, it would significantly alter the balance of world power so as to threaten American security, the primary task of the containment of

Soviet power should be to prevent the Russians from dominating any of the remaining centers. Kennan viewed impending Soviet threats as those of political penetration by Soviet-controlled local communists rather than as those of direct military aggression. In his thinking, therefore, the containment of communism was "not the containment by military means of a military threat, but the political containment of a political threat."⁹²

The approach of Kennan and his planning group to the Japanese peace problem was conditioned by his prior beliefs and images of Japan. As examined above, Kennan and the PPS members regarded the postwar international system as one of bipolarity characterized by the relationship of confrontation between the Soviet Union on the offensive and the United States on the defensive. In such a bipolar world in which it was inevitable for other countries to align themselves with either of the two great powers, Japan, particularly due to its geopolitical location, could function only in close association with the United State or a Soviet satellite. In addition, Japan, in Kennan's view, was the key to the balance of power in Asia because of its great industrial and military potential. In order to restore a postwar balance of power in Asia, Japan should stay out of the control of the expansionist Soviet Union.⁹³

Nevertheless, Kennan's image of Japan was gloomy in the sense that it was viewed as economically and politically unstable and, thereby, vulnerable to internal communist penetration and subversion. Kennan estimated that a primary and immediate threat to Japan was one of political penetration and domination by

⁹² Kennan, *Memoirs*, pp. 358-59. For a detailed account of Kennan's generalized beliefs, see John Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar National Security Policy*. (New York: The Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 25-53.

⁹³ See "United States Policy Toward A Peace Settlement with Japan," Sept. 17, 1947, an attached draft paper to Minutes of meeting, Sept. 22, 1947, PPS Records, Box 32, RG 59.

Soviet-controlled Japanese communists. He saw no likelihood of direct Soviet military aggression against Japan without successful political penetration. Thus, the immediate problem that concerned Kennan's planning group was not that of military security but of political security. On the other hand, assuring the political security of Japan was believed to depend largely upon restoring its economic stability through economic recovery. In this respect, primary means for containing a political threat in Japan were economic ones to achieve its economic recovery. However, Kennan was skeptical about whether Japan was capable of reviving its economy without American aid and supervision.⁹⁴ Accordingly, the PPS members basically advocated a prolonged occupation during which Japan would be made economically stabilized enough to resist communist penetration.

In short, in considering the timing of the peace settlement, Kennan and his planning group concentrated on the value of containing a communist political threat in Japan, a security value which was strongly supported by Kennan's firmly held beliefs. Consequently, the image of Japan as economically unstable and politically vulnerable to communist penetration led to their basic preference for the postponement of the peace treaty. This aspect of preference choice seems to be consistent with the logic of the cognitive model.

It should be noted, however, that although Kennan and his planning staff placed primary emphasis on the value of increasing Japanese political security, they did not avoid a trade-off relationship between the values involved in the Japanese problem. Rather, they recognized and resolved the value conflict by suggesting policy options that produced a balanced satisfaction of the competing values. As pointed out above, the problem of the peace settlement threw two major values, that is, political and security ones into a conflict relationship. While

⁹⁴ See PPS/10, "Results of Planning Staff Study of Questions Involved in the Japanese Peace Settlement," Oct. 14, 1947, *FRUS*, 1947, vol. 6., pp. 537-42.

the pursuit of the political value dictated the early conclusion of the peace treaty, the satisfaction of the security value required its postponement.

The evidence of the policy recommendations in an initial policy report (PPS 10) indicates that the PPS members attempted to resolve the value conflict rather than to avoid or deny it. To satisfy the security value of containing communist penetration, they basically favored the postponement of the peace settlement. On the other hand, to meet the political values of answering the claims of the other FEC nations for a prompt peace settlement and of assuring the continued political orientation of Japan toward America, they proposed not only proceeding with peace negotiations even on an exploratory and non-binding basis, but also modifying the occupation regime in the direction of introducing a virtual peacetime status in Japan. The latter proposal was later embodied in Kennan's final policy report (PPS 28) as measures for the relaxation of occupation controls. In this respect, Kennan and his staff followed an analytic decision process in which to produce a balanced satisfaction of the conflicting values in their final choice of policy options, while they defined the problem and determined their basic preference on the basis of Kennan's strongly held beliefs. Therefore, both the analytic and cognitive models have some relevance to the explanation of their choice process.

2. Collective Decision Process

Among the three models of decision-making, the analytic model provides the best explanation of the collective process by which the final decision to defer the peace treaty and the accompanying decisions were produced. This collective decision process refers to the research question of how decision makers' divergent policy preferences were transformed into national decisions. The analytic model advances the proposition on the collective process that exposure to new

information and/or persuasive argumentation during group discussions based on relevant information induce decision makers to revise their outcome calculations of policy options and thus to change their initial preferences. As a result, a consensus on national decisions is finally reached. The model also postulates that the final decisions tend to be those that yield a balanced satisfaction of the multiple values at stake. While there is considerable evidence in the collective process of the postponement decision to show the impacts of pertinent information and persuasive argumentation, there is no evidence to support either the bureaucratic politics explanation of bargaining and coalition-building or the cognitive explanation of group concurrence-seeking.

As illustrated above, a consensus was reached among the key decision makers on the decision to defer the peace treaty, not only because the officials of the Far Eastern Office and General MacArthur changed their initial preferences from an early treaty to its postponement, but also because Kennan came to recognize fully the necessity for the modification of the occupation regime in the direction of relaxing its controls and giving greater responsibility to the Japanese government as suggested by the Far East experts. One of the reasons for a change in policy preference on the part of the officials of the Far Eastern bureau was that they finally estimated that there was little likelihood of convening a peace conference for some time because of the persistent divergence of positions among the concerned major powers with regard to the composition and procedure of the conference. A second reason was that they were persuaded to change their preference by the revised calculations of the State Department's intelligence divisions that attaining economic recovery in Japan would require extensive American aid and economic control under a continued occupation. In addition, the postponement of the peace treaty would not have unfavorable effects on the US position in the Far East in general and in Japan in particular, if the occupation

policy and regime were properly modified, especially toward relaxing the occupation controls. Finally, the officials of the Far Eastern Office were convinced by Kennan's final policy report (PPS 28), based on his onsite analysis of the problem, that Japan needed a longer period of the occupation during which measures should be taken to promote political and economic stability.

It is not clear from the available records why General MacArthur raised no objection to Washington's final position that the peace treaty should be postponed when he was asked to comment on the draft policy paper (NSC 13). It seems from his discussion with Kennan that MacArthur's tacit consent to the postponement decision was largely attributed to his estimate that it was inevitable to defer the treaty because of the divergent views of the concerned major powers concerning the peace conference.⁹⁵ On the other hand, Kennan in turn was convinced by the officials of the Far Eastern Office of the necessity for the modification of the occupation regime in case of postponement, so he included specific measures for easing the occupation controls in his final report. In short, changes in policy preference were not the product either of bargaining among the decision makers or of concurrence-seeking behavior to promote the cohesion of the decision-making group, but rather the result of revised outcome calculations under the impact of relevant information and/or of persuasive argumentation on the basis of onsite analysis of the decision problem.

Another aspect of the analytic decision process was that while the key decision makers determined their basic preferences as to the timing of the peace treaty, they agreed to defer a final decision until a better analysis of the problem was obtained by Kennan's first-hand investigation and consultation with SCAP in

⁹⁵ In his meeting with Kennan and Draper on March 21, 1948, MacArthur argued that the final solution of the peace treaty problem await the resolution of the Soviet-American impasse over the peace conference, even though he basically favored an early treaty. See *FRUS 1948*, vol. 6, pp. 707-8.

Japan. Alexander George refers to such a postponement of a final decision as "rational procrastination."⁹⁶ When the relative benefits of policy options were undetermined among the decision makers due to uncertainty over the Japanese situation, it was rational to postpone making a final decision in order to get first-hand and more complete information and a better appraisal of the problem on the spot.

Finally, the postponement decision and its accompanying decisions set forth in the final policy document (NSC13/2) were those that satisfied, to some extent at least, each of the major values involved. This aspect of decision-making fits into the proposition of the analytic model that final decisions tend to be those which yield a balanced satisfaction of multiple values. To satisfy the security value of Japanese defense against communist penetration, decisions were made to prolong the occupation, to place emphasis on economic recovery, and to strengthen the Japanese police. The other security value of Japanese military defense was for the time being satisfied by virtue of the continued occupation. To promote the political value of preserving the political orientation of the Japanese toward America, decisions were reached in regard to the reorganization of the occupation, involving a transfer of increasing responsibility to the Japanese government, the diminution of the SCAP staff, and the reduction of the occupation forces. The other political value of meeting the demand of the other FEC nations for a prompt treaty did not need to be satisfied at that time because international disagreement over the peace conference remained unresolved.

In conclusion, it is difficult to determine which decision-making model has been best relevant to the analysis of the whole choice process by which the postponement decision was produced. Each of the three models or some combination of the models has been more or less useful in explaining particular

⁹⁶ Alexander George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy*, pp. 35-36.

aspects of decision-making across the decision makers. The bureaucratic politics model provides valid explanations of why the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, the military departments, and General MacArthur selected their respective preferences. On the other hand, the logic of the cognitive model applies when all these decision makers tended to avoid the trade-off relationships among the values in bolstering their favored options. The cognitive model also has some validity in explaining the initial preference choice of Kennan and his planning group. Nevertheless, their final choice of options is consistent with the logic of the analytic model in that the favored options reflected a balanced satisfaction of the multiple values at stake. Finally, the analytic model among the three models provides the best relevant explanation of the collective process by which the divergent preferences converged to produce the final decisions, including that of postponement.

Chapter 4. Decisions II:

To Initiate Negotiations For A Multilateral Peace Treaty, To Secure Unlimited Base Rights in Japan Through A Bilateral Security Pact, and To Proceed With Japanese Rearmament, in September 1950

A. Introduction

This chapter will analyze a set of the decisions that led to the conclusion of peace and security treaties with Japan in September 1951, and its rearmament in the early 1950s. The peace treaty issue once again came to the fore in the middle of 1949, when the State Department policy makers became concerned about the continuing instability of Japan, which was thought to result from SCAP's failure to implement the new policies of NSC 13/2, especially the relaxation of the occupation controls. The civilian planners estimated that a peace treaty was urgently needed to preserve Japan's pro-American orientation and to achieve its economic recovery in the face of growing restiveness among the Japanese and the lack of their initiative and responsibility of economic activities. Moreover, there was a possibility that the Soviet Union might get the start of peace-making with Japan. The State Department's case for a prompt peace treaty was strongly supported by General MacArthur, who had consistently wanted to have such a treaty concluded during his service in Japan. In contrast, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other Pentagon officials opposed an early end to the occupation for fear that it would cause them to be severely restricted in their use of American bases in Japan. In addition, the military planners were concerned that a peace settlement without the Soviets' participation might provoke them to take such hostile military actions against Japan as to occasion an armed conflict with the US forces remaining there. Despite the disagreement over the timing of the peace treaty, the civilian and

military policy makers agreed to the retention of American bases and forces in post-treaty Japan, at least, for the purpose of protecting it from probable Soviet aggression. However, they were once again divided over the extent and duration of base retention. Furthermore, they differed in the question of whether to proceed with Japanese rearmament. The civilian planners stood against rearming Japan during the occupation and in the immediate post-treaty period, whereas the military planners advocated moving promptly toward the rebuilding of an armed force even during the occupation. On the other hand, General MacArthur favored the neutralization and continued disarmament of Japan. It was not until the general and the State Department made concessions to the Pentagon's military terms of the peace treaty in June 1950 that the policy contention and the resultant impasse over the treaty issue became resolved in the direction of initiating the peace negotiations. The rearmament problem was also settled at that time because, as a result of the outbreak of the Korean War, all the decision makers agreed to go ahead with indirect rearmament through the equipping and expansion of the Japanese national police into para-military forces.

B. Occasions for Decision

1. The Problem of Japanese Rearmament

Within the first year of the occupation, Japan had been totally disarmed and demobilized according to SCAP directives to implement a principal occupation goal, the demilitarization of Japan. Japanese war arms and industries had been destroyed and remaining war-supporting industries made available for reparations. Subsequent Far Eastern Commission (FEC) policy decisions prohibited military armaments for Japan, including even the creation of a constabulary (a police force organized on military lines), but permitted Japan to maintain civilian police forces

for internal security.¹ In addition, the Japanese people, because of General MacArthur's initiative and under his direction, had adopted in 1946 a new constitution renouncing the maintenance of armed forces.

In this context, the issue of Japanese rearmament was initially raised by military planners in Washington early in 1948. Growing cold war tension in Europe and the Middle East made them consider the desirability of rearming former enemies such as Germany and Japan in preparation for probable military conflict with the USSR. In a memorandum to Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall dated February 24, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal ordered the Army Department to prepare a study of "limited military armament for Germany and Japan."² The Plans and Operations Division of the Army Department prepared and submitted on May 18 to the Secretary of Defense a policy report evaluating the possibility and advisability of military armament for Japan. The Army report pointed out the necessity that American military control of Japan be continued not only to contain Soviet Communist expansion in the East Asia but also to "implement our present war concepts."³

In connection with the latter objective, the military had developed war plans under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) since the end of 1945. By early 1948, the military chiefs came to several conclusions, especially about war strategy for East Asia. First, the Soviet Union was identified as the sole major enemy capable of launching aggressive war against the United States and its Western

¹ The main FEC policy decisions laying a ban on Japanese rearmament were those of June 1947, entitled "Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan," and of February 1948, entitled "Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan and Disposition of Japanese Military Equipment."

² Memo for the Secretary of the Army, Feb. 24, 1948, CD 16-1-5 (Japan), Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, RG 330.

³ P&O Division Study, "Limited Military Armament For Japan," April 19, 1948, enclosed in Memo from Royall to Forrestal, May 18, 1948, CD 16-1-5 (Japan), RG 330.

allies. Second, an armed conflict with the Russians would be global and unlimited in view of their ultimate goal of world domination. Third, the JCS expected that, owing to its lack of military readiness, the Soviet Union would not in the immediate future resort to war to achieve its goals. If a war should break out, it would result from miscalculations by one of the two great powers. Fourth, East Asia would be ranked second to Europe and the Middle East in American military efforts to counter Soviet offensive moves. The rationale was that the Soviets gave priority to military operations in the latter regions and US military strength was limited due to drastic postwar demobilization and reduced defense spending.⁴ Fifth, America would not throw its ground troops against the enemy on the Asian mainland. Instead, US military actions would be naval and air, with its armed forces operating from forward bases in Okinawa, Japan, the Philippines, and other Pacific islands. Finally, America's initial war objectives in East Asia were to defend these base areas, particularly Okinawa and Japan which, would be used to launch a counterattack against the Soviets.⁵

Among these war concepts, the Army report gave attention to primary emphasis on the European region and the need to defend Japan in evaluating the rearmament issue. Army planners believed that the primary importance the

⁴ America's conventional military manpower declined rapidly after the end of World War II. By early 1948 its total strength reduced from 12 million in 1945 to 1.4 million men, particularly with the Army declining from 8.2 to 0.6 million men. The Army deployed three divisions in the American continent, four in Japan, two in Korea, and one plus three constabulary regiments in Germany. The military budget, which amounted to \$81.6 billion in the fiscal year 1945, also dropped to only \$13.1 billion in the fiscal year 1947. See the National Military Establishment, *First Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1948* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1948).

⁵ For detailed accounts of JCS war planning for the Far East until early 1948, see Roger Dingman, "Strategic Planning and the Policy Process: American Plans for War in East Asia, 1945-50," *Naval War College Review*, vol. 32, no. 6 (Nov.-Dec., 1979), pp. 4-21; James F. Schnabel, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1945-1947*, vol. 1 (Wilmington: Michael Glazier, Inc., 1979) pp. 186-90; Kenneth W. Condit, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1948-1949*, vol. 2 (Wilmington: Michael Glazier, Inc., 1979), pp. 294-302; and Steven T. Ross, *American War Plans, 1945-1950* (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1988), chapters 3 and 4.

European theater and the limited strength of American forces made it inevitable that only a minimum number of troops would be deployed in the Far East. The establishment of a Japanese army was needed, therefore, to share the burden of protecting Japanese islands and American bases there and to "effect economies in utilization of our own limited manpower." On the other hand, rearmament should be undertaken by the creation of small military units, "equipped with light weapons and organized, trained, and strictly supervised by the US Army" so as to safeguard against a resurgence of Japanese militarism which the neighboring Pacific nations most feared.⁶

Despite the need for rearmament, however, the military planners concluded that the immediate formation of even limited Japanese forces, other than augmentation of the Japanese police, was "not practicable and advisable at this time," not only because a rearmament program would be a great burden to Japan's deficient economy, but also because it would require an amendment to the Japanese constitution and a complete revision of the existing FEC policy decisions, both of which might meet with strong objections from the Japanese and the FEC nations. Nevertheless, the Army report recommended as alternative courses of action the following: (1) the strengthening of Japanese police forces, (2) planning for the eventual rearmament of Japan, and (3) exploration of the possibility of obtaining the revision of the Japanese constitution.⁷

It is noteworthy in conjunction with these recommendations that the Army planners envisioned the reinforcement of Japanese police forces as a practicable alternative to overt and immediate rearmament through the creation of a regular army, which the FEC occupation policy and the Japanese constitution prohibited. At that time, the police force was reaching a strength of 125,000 men, as

⁶ P & O Division Study, "Limited Armament for Japan," Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

authorized by SCAP. It consisted of local units, however, including the 30,000 National Rural Police, with no central authority, in accordance with SCAP's decentralization program. In addition, the Maritime Safety Board, a coast guard-type of police force with small patrol vessels, was just created with an authorized strength of 10,000 in April 1948. In order to strengthen the police, the Army report suggested organizing "centrally-directed emergency mobile forces" totaling about 100,000 men, including the existing National Rural Police. The augmented national and coastal police forces would, in addition to their normal duties for internal security, assist American occupation forces in defensive action against external aggression in case of emergency. More significantly, such police forces were considered in the Army study as providing a nucleus for future Japanese regular defense forces.⁸

The Army report was endorsed by Secretary of the Army Royall and then forwarded to a War Council meeting in June of 1948 for discussion. Pentagon leaders, however, deferred taking further action on the report, including referring it to the JCS. This was done in the hope that the National Security Council would deal with the rearmament issue in a Japan policy paper (NSC 13) prepared by George Kennan. The Army Department's case for limited Japanese armament, on the other hand, was supported by the JCS when they insisted in a comment on the policy paper that Japan should provide military assistance to the United States, at least to the extent of its own self-defense.⁹ The final paper (NSC 13/2) only recommended, however, that the Japanese police be strengthened in order to assure internal security. The consideration of post-treaty security arrangements, including the rearming of Japan, was postponed until peace negotiations began. In

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Memo by the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, Sept. 24, 1948, 383.21 Japan (3-13-45), Sec. 19, RG 218.

addition, the document made no mention of a military role of the police forces or of the need for rearmament planning.

However, the military planners felt that, in light of Communist advances in China and Soviet expansionist tendencies, the rearmament problem should be decided even before peace negotiations started. They proceeded to take the steps necessary to consider the problem in the NSC. On October 21, 1948, Secretary of Defense Forrestal requested that the JCS make recommendations on the previous Army report and that they obtain General MacArthur's views.¹⁰

When MacArthur was asked to comment on the report, he took a strong stand against its suggestions. The supreme commander insisted upon continued neutrality and disarmament as the "ideal post-treaty status for Japan." He urged that such a security scheme should not be prejudiced by any attempt during the occupation to compel Japan into rearmament through a "fundamental revision of the Japanese Constitution renouncing the right of belligerence." Moreover, America's policy to rearm Japan would certainly give rise to objections from the other FEC nations, most of which were fearful of the revival of Japanese militarism. The expected result was that a Japanese peace treaty through negotiations with them could not be concluded at an early date, a situation unacceptable to MacArthur who consistently favored a prompt treaty.¹¹ The general notified the JCS that he still adhered to his prior arguments in opposition to the rearming of Japan which had been advanced at his meeting with George Kennan and Under Secretary of the Army William Draper in Tokyo in March 1948. MacArthur's arguments were that: (1) rearmament was contrary to the existing FEC decisions, thereby alienating the FEC nations; (2) such a reversal of SCAP's

¹⁰ Memo by Forrestal to the JCS, Oct. 21, 1948, CD 16-1-5 (Japan), RG 330.

¹¹ Memo by MacArthur, Commander in Chief in the Far East, to the JCS, Dec. 23, 1948, CD 16-1-5 (Japan), RG 330.

occupation policy "would dangerously weaken our prestige in Japan and would place us in a ridiculous light before the Japanese people"; (3) Japan, even if best rearmed, would become "no more than a fifth-rate military power" which could not defend herself; (4) Japan's deficient economy could not support a program of rearmament; and (5) such a program required a complete revision of the Japanese constitution, to which the Japanese themselves would object.¹²

In addition to these reasons, rearmament, MacArthur argued, would destroy the "character and purpose of the occupation" and further push Tokyo into a "quasi-military alliance" with Washington, which in turn would provoke Moscow. This would make it inevitable for the United States to maintain more armed forces in Japan than were available for the Far East in order to cope with probable Soviet military advances in the region. This argument conflicted with the estimation of the Army report that the formation of Japanese forces would make possible a reduction of American troops in Japan by sharing the defense burden. On the other hand, MacArthur regarded the existing neutral status of disarmed Japan under the framework of the FEC as a "powerful moral factor" which would enable the United States to maintain its forces in the Far East, particularly in Okinawa, at a minimum level. Therefore, the general preferred to leave Japan neutralized and disarmed after a peace treaty.¹³

In spite of MacArthur's objections, the JCS submitted to Secretary of Defense Forrestal, early in March 1949, their views in support of the Army report for the purpose of amending the relevant provisions of NSC 13/2. In a memorandum, later designated NSC 44, the military chiefs maintained that preparatory steps should be undertaken toward rearmament, prior even to the

¹² Memo of conversation between MacArthur, Kennan, and Draper, March 23, 1948, ERUS 1948, vol. 6, pp. 706-9.

¹³ Memo by MacArthur to the JCS, *Ibid.*

initiation of peace negotiations. They were concerned that emergency and war situations resulting from indirect or direct Soviet aggression might arise in the interim period. They then specified three recommended courses of action:

(1) Plans be made now for the eventual establishment of limited Japanese armed forces to maintain internal security and to assist in local defensive action in event of an emergency; (2) Provision of appropriate arms and equipment for limited Japanese armed forces be considered an M-Day requirement for logistic planning purposes; and (3) The strengthening and equipping of Japanese police and coastal patrols be undertaken with the secret ultimate objective in mind of the use of these forces as a basis for the establishment of limited Japanese military forces for the defense of Japan.¹⁴

The JCS added that these measures had to be secretly carried out "with great caution" because of the FEC policy of prohibiting Japanese armament. However, the service chiefs disapproved of the formation of a nucleus for an air force because it could be regarded as offensive armament. They finally suggested that the relevant decisions of NSC 13/2 had to be revised to give the Pentagon authority to take those necessary steps immediately.¹⁵ Accepting this suggestion, Forrestal, on March 11, requested the NSC staff to prepare a policy paper on amendments to NSC 13/2 in accordance with the JCS recommendations.¹⁶ His dependence on the NSC staff in drafting a policy paper was unusual since most policy papers for national decisions were prepared by the State Department in consultation with the Pentagon and later submitted to the NSC for consideration. A feasible reason for the use of the NSC staff was that the staff, then consisting of representatives from

¹⁴ Memo by the JCS to Forrestal, NSC 44, "Limited Military Armament for Japan," March 1, 1949, ERUS 1949, vol. 7, p. 672-73.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Memo by Forrestal to Souers, Executive Secretary of the NSC, March 11, 1949, CD 16-1-5 (Japan), RG 330.

the State and all three military departments, tended to reflect to a large extent the military' views of in its work.

On April 27, the NSC staff completed a draft paper on rearmament for consideration by the NSC members. The staff paper, sympathizing with such a need to undertake preparations for limited armament as the JCS emphasized, recommended that the Pentagon make plans for the establishment and use of Japanese armed forces for self-defense as well as for maintenance of internal security. The document, on the other hand, advised that any preparations for rearming Japan should be undertaken "only under extremely tight security requirements," in light of the existing US occupation policy to demilitarize Japan and probable adverse reactions from the other FEC nations and the Japanese.¹⁷

When the staff report was submitted to the State Department for concurrence, however, it received a strong, negative reaction. Fearing political difficulties which the revelation of such secret rearmament planning to the other FEC members and the Japanese would entail, the State Department planners rejected the staff paper. They further demanded that the Pentagon's request for a national decision (NSC 44) be withdrawn. Because of the American commitment to demilitarize Japan and the FEC policy decisions to prohibit the formation of any armed forces, they were concerned that a security leak about such a covert decision would cause the other FEC nations and the Japanese to seriously doubt the sincerity of America's Japanese policy. Such a situation would certainly weaken the US political position regarding Japan.¹⁸ Their apprehensions were realized when it was reported in The New York Times on May 24 that a secret plan for the formation of a Japanese

¹⁷ NSC staff paper, "Planning for Limited Japanese Armed Forces," attached to memo for NSC consultants by the Executive Secretary of the NSC, April 27, 1949, P&O 091 Japan TS, Box 162, RG 319.

¹⁸ Memo by General Alfred Gruenther, Director of the Joint Staff, to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee of the JCS, May 9, 1949, P & O 091 Japan TS, Box 162, RG 319.

defense force was under "vigorous study" in Washington. The State Department, embarrassed by such a disclosure, requested all the member agencies of the NSC to make a thorough investigation to locate the source of the security leak.¹⁹ Aside from this political concern, the diplomatic officials perceived no military need to move toward rearmament, at least during the occupation under which US forces ensured Japanese security.

Due to State Department opposition, the NSC indefinitely deferred deliberating over its staff paper on the rearmament issue while deciding on the revision of NSC 13/2 early in May. Consequently, although the Japanese policy paper was amended and approved by President Truman as NSC 13/3 on May 6, there was no modification in the initial provision that a final decision on post-treaty security arrangements would be postponed until peace negotiations began.²⁰ Nevertheless, the Pentagon, declining to withdraw NSC 44, continued seeking governmental authorization through an NSC decision to undertake preparations for the creation of a Japanese force in the ensuing months. This persistent attempt proved unsuccessful because of objections from the State Department. The rearmament problem, on the other hand, during the latter part of 1949, remained an important subject of a renewed policy debate between the civilian and military planners over the peace treaty problem.

¹⁹ Memo by Under Secretary of State James Webb to the Executive Secretary of the NSC, June 2, 1949, CD 16-1-5 (Japan), RG 330.

²⁰ The provisions of NSC 13/3 were almost the same as those of NSC 13/2, except that the former added the policy decisions to retain long-term US control over Okinawa and terminate existing transfers of reparations from Japan to the FEC nations. For the text of NSC 13/3, see *ERUS* 1949, vol. 7, pp. 730-36.

2. The Problem of a Japanese Peace Treaty

The peace treaty problem, which had remained dormant since the abortive effort by State Department officials in 1947 to convene a peace conference, again came to the fore by mid-1949, when they gave renewed consideration to the problem. That renewed consideration was the result of MacArthur's failure to implement substantially the policy decisions of NSC 13/2, especially those of relaxing occupation controls. In a memorandum to Under Secretary of State James Webb dated May 19, Director of the Far Eastern Office Butterworth indicated that an unstable political and economic situation in Japan occasioned the State Department to reconsider seriously the policy option to conclude a peace treaty at an early date. In his view, the Japanese became increasingly restive under a prolonged occupation. Their desire for a peace settlement was widespread. Butterworth interpreted an increase in Diet seats for the Japanese Communist Party, which publicly opposed the occupation, in the general elections in January, as reflecting growing Japanese resentment toward the continued occupation. In addition, there had been "the disappointingly slow revival of Japanese production and trade." Annual American aid for Japan had been increasing rather than diminishing. The heavy economic burden of the occupation to the United States would continue, at least until 1954 or 1955, when Japan was expected to attain a self-supporting status under the existing stabilization program undertaken by the Dodge Mission. This difficult economic situation was thought to be partly caused by SCAP's failure to fully carry out the decisions of NSC 13/2, designed among other things to cut down occupation controls and to stimulate Japanese initiative. Therefore, Butterworth felt that more decisive actions should be taken to deal with these political and economic problems. One of them was to end the occupation through a peace treaty, so Japanese restiveness would not get out of control.²¹

²¹ Memo from Butterworth to Webb, May 19, 1949, *Ibid.*, pp. 752-54.

In addition to the perception of the Japanese situation, an international event caused State Department policy makers to pay attention to the treaty problem. At the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) in Paris in May 1949, the Soviet Union proposed to consider the problem in a special session of the CFM. This proposal reaffirmed the previous Soviet position that the problem fell within the jurisdiction of the CFM. Dean Acheson, the American representative who had become the secretary of state in January, immediately rejected the Soviet proposal, reiterating the standing American position that the problem should be dealt with in a conference of the FEC nations. Nevertheless, the Russians' renewed interest in the treaty issue led the State Department officials to proceed to reexamine the timing and substantive matters pertaining to the treaty. They worried that the American government would be forestalled if the Russians took further steps, including presenting their terms of the peace treaty unilaterally to the Japanese. In order to reach a prompt national decision on the treaty problem, the State Department set out to consult with the Defense Department to determine US security needs in Japan in view of Soviet-American strategic confrontation in East Asia. Under Secretary of State Webb asked the Pentagon in late May to advance its position.²² This request provoked an intense dispute in Washington about the timing and terms of the peace settlement over the ensuing months.

C. Decision Makers' Policy Preferences in 1949

1. The Defense Department

Pentagon planners' stands were initially set forth in a controversial report prepared by the JCS at the request of the State Department. The JCS report, as designated NSC 49, pointed out that Japan was "of high strategic importance to

²² See Memo by Webb to Acheson at Paris, May 27, 1949, *Ibid.*, pp. 758-60.

United States security interests in the Far East" because of its geographic location and of its military and industrial potential to "wage both aggressive and defensive war." This perception of Japan was in line with JCS thinking that essential American objectives with regard to Japan were not only to deny Japan to the Soviet Union, but also, in the event of war with the Russians, to have available for American use Japanese bases as "strategic outposts" and as "staging areas from which to project our military power to the Asiatic mainland and to USSR islands adjacent thereto."²³ The JCS, speaking for the Defense Department, envisioned Japan as an active ally in a global conflict with the Soviet Union. As examined in the previous chapter, this conception of making Japan a military ally had surfaced as early as mid-1947 when the military planners had considered the treaty problem. Faced with Communist advances in China and in Southeast Asia by mid-1949, the military chiefs placed such a notion at the center of their war planning for East Asia. In an emergency war plan called "Offtackle," which was being prepared by the JCS, Japan, along with Okinawa, was regarded as a forward base for military operations on an equal level with Britain in western Europe. According to specifics of the war plan, a principal objective in East Asia was to defend Japan and Okinawa to the utmost for use as bases for mounting the strategic air offensive and for supporting the general naval mission of maintaining control of the seas. Although the Philippine islands, where American air and naval bases were retained, were to be defended because of their supporting role, first priority would be given to Japan and Okinawa.²⁴

²³ Report by the JCS, NSC 49, "Strategic Evaluation of United States Security Needs in Japan," June 9, 1949, ERUS 1949, vol. 7, p. 774.

²⁴ See Kenneth Condit, *History of the JCS, 1948-1949*, pp. 294-302; and Steven Ross, *American War Plans 1945-1950*, pp. 110-11.

To make such military use of Japan, the JCS advocated developing and retaining unlimited US bases in Okinawa, as well as in the Japanese main islands, after a peace treaty. It was therefore recommended that the treaty, if concluded, contain a bilateral security agreement with Japan providing for the retention of American forces and bases over Japan proper for an indefinite period of time. However, international situations, such as the imminent fall of China into Communist control and increasing Communist threats to other Asian areas, caused the service chiefs to oppose the early conclusion of the treaty and to favor the prolongation of American control over Japan under the existing occupation regime. They were concerned that any change in America's predominant military position in Japan might increase its security risks in East Asia.²⁵ More significantly, the view of the JCS that "a peace treaty would be premature" stemmed primarily from their skepticism concerning whether any treaty could provide arrangements adequate to US military needs in Japan, including unlimited base rights. They were also skeptical about whether Japan under a normal political relationship with America after the termination of SCAP's command relationship would behave in accordance with US military needs. A continued occupation, on the other hand, would provide the maximum opportunities for military utilization of Japan in that its entire territory could be used as a base area, if necessary.²⁶ The JCS opposition to an early treaty provoked a sharp bureaucratic dispute between the State Department and the Pentagon over the timing and terms of the treaty, which remained unresolved until September 1950.

²⁵ NSC 49, *Ibid.*, p.776.

²⁶ Position Paper by the JSSC, JCS 1380/75, "The Impact of An Early Peace Treaty With Japan On United States Strategic Requirements," Nov. 30, 1949, CCS 388.1 Japan (9-1-47), Records of the JCS, RG 218.

The JCS report also took a stand on the issue of Japanese rearmament. As noted above, the Pentagon, on the military chiefs' recommendation, had sought since March 1949 to persuade the State Department to reach a national decision through the NSC to authorize the military to take preparatory steps toward the establishment of a Japanese army. Such an effort failed because of strong opposition from the State Department. In NSC 49, the JCS reiterated their previous position that, prior to the peace settlement, there should be plans for limited Japanese armed forces for self-defense to become effective in the event of an emergency.²⁷ Pentagon planners' preference for rearmament assumed another aspect by early November when, at the request of the State Department, they began to actively consider American security needs in relation to the peace treaty problem. They insisted that any treaty, if concluded, had to contain provisions authorizing the creation of a Japanese armed force for self-defense. This position was formally submitted by the P & O Division of the Army Department to Under Secretary of the Army Tracy Voorhees who took charge of preparing the Pentagon's official position on the treaty problem.²⁸

There were several reasons why the military planners advocated rearmament and its authorization in the peace treaty. First, they approached the rearmament issue on the assumption that a war with the Russians was possible at any time. According to the Pentagon's war plans for East Asia, in the event of war, Japan should be protected by US armed forces at least to prevent it from falling under Soviet control. Defending Japan in the post-treaty period was estimated to require the retention of all the American forces in Japan, consisting of four divisions. However, the United States, with limited manpower, could not afford to have such

²⁷ NSC 49, *Ibid.*, pp. 776-77.

²⁸ Memo for the director of P & O Division, "Japanese Peace Treaty: Establishment of Japanese Armed Forces," Nov. 10, 1949, P & O 091 Japan TS, RG 319.

a large proportion of its troops stationed in the Far East. Its military priority was in Europe. Therefore, it was necessary to rebuild a Japanese army to share the defense burden and permit the withdrawal of some American forces from Japan without jeopardizing its security. The military planners further envisioned Japanese forces as a "valuable and perhaps indispensable asset" to supplement reduced American forces for military operations in East Asia in the event of all-out war. Second, in consideration of a period of time needed for training a Japanese army and the possibility of a surprise attack by the Soviet Union, the United States should not risk the loss of time that would result from postponing the rearming of Japan. Third, the military planners were concerned that the prohibition of armament in the peace treaty might set a precedent for the coming peace treaty with Germany, thereby blocking its rearmament which was deemed necessary to American security interests in Europe.²⁹ The Pentagon's insistence on the authorization of rearmament in the peace treaty led to a policy dispute with the State Department and MacArthur, who both supported a treaty providing for the continued disarmament of Japan. Such a dispute remained unsolved until September of 1950 when the civilian and military decision makers reached a final consensus on the treaty problem.

2. General MacArthur

When the policy makers in Washington began to give renewed consideration to the treaty problem in mid-1949, MacArthur's policy stands were consistent with his previous ones which had been expressed at his meetings with George Kennan early in 1948. The general continued to advocate concluding a peace treaty

²⁹ These reasons for rearmament were advanced by military planners of the Army Department and then criticized by State Department officials. See memo by John Howard, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, to Butterworth, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Nov. 10, 1949, Lot File 56 D 527, RG 59.

promptly and neutralizing Japan in the post-treaty period. In addition, he strongly objected to rearming Japan.

The general's preference for an early treaty resulted from his estimate that there no longer existed a need for the occupation. The surrender terms and the Allied objectives of the occupation (the demilitarization and democratization of Japan) had been fully implemented by the Japanese themselves under the direction of SCAP. Moreover, the supreme commander worried that continuing the occupation would give rise to restiveness and resentment among the Japanese who longed for the restoration of their sovereignty. The expected result was that their friendly attitudes toward America, in general, and the occupation authorities, in particular, would be altered. In the general's view, history proved that a prolonged occupation beyond five years met with failure. The Japanese would not tolerate the occupation if it should last longer than five years.³⁰ Therefore, an overriding concern that caused MacArthur to advocate a prompt treaty was probably that growing Japanese resentment arising from a long-term occupation might undermine his prestige and accomplishments in Japan.

On the other hand, the general had an interest in keeping the Japanese continuously committed, in the post-treaty period, to the democratic reforms that he had instituted during the occupation. That interest stemmed from his conviction that the Japanese would maintain their friendly orientation toward the United States so long as they remained democratically inclined. To attain the essential objective of continuing Japan's pro-American orientation, a peace treaty was urgently needed. Such a treaty would encourage the Japanese and give them the

³⁰ Memo by William Sebald, Acting Political Adviser to SCAP, to Butterworth, July 26, 1949, ERUS 1949, vol. 7, pp. 808-12 ; and Memo of summary of MacArthur's views by Tracy Voorhees, Under Secretary of the Army, Dec. 14, 1949, CD 6-3-33, RG 330.

will to keep carrying out the democratic reforms after the termination of the occupation.³¹

As for the post-treaty security of Japan, MacArthur held steady to the option of its permanent neutralization under a guarantee by the concerned nations, including the Soviet Union. He objected to retaining US bases and forces in Japan. From the beginning of the occupation, the general had a consistent vision of turning Japan into a pacifist nation as an example to the world. Based on this ideal, he, without specific directions from Washington, pressed the Japanese to accept the clause in their constitution of 1946 which renounced national rights to conduct war and maintain armed forces. His preference for neutrality was a logical extension of his vision of a pacifist Japan. Throughout 1949 and until shortly before the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the general consistently urged upon the policy makers in Washington and the public an image of post-treaty Japan as a "Switzerland of the Pacific."³²

MacArthur's case for a neutral Japan was reinforced by several other arguments. First, he held that an overwhelmingly large proportion of the Japanese people (95 percent) supported neutrality as a solution to their security problem, while being against a military alliance with the United States through the retention of its bases and forces. This attitude was based on their calculation that the former solution would present less risk of involvement in another major war. Therefore, America's insistence on base rights in Japan was expected to eventually cause an

³¹ Memo by John Allison, Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Aug. 31, 1949, Lot File 56 D 527, RG 59; and Memo by Voorhees, Dec. 14, 1949, Ibid.

³² MacArthur often used the analogy with Switzerland when he mentioned his favored option of Japanese neutrality. See, for instance, an interview with MacArthur in *The New York Times*, March 2, 1949; Memo of summary of MacArthur's views by Voorhees, Dec. 14, 1949, Ibid.; and an interview with MacArthur in *Reader's Digest*, May 1950, as reported in Memo by Butterworth to Acheson, May 3, 1950, 694.001/5-350, RG 59.

anti-American reaction in Japan.³³ Another reason for neutrality, MacArthur contended, was that it would be impossible to station in Japan an American force sufficient to defend it against a determined attack by the Soviets. Because of these disadvantages of base retention, the general insisted that Washington's basic objective regarding Japan should be limited to that of denying it to Soviet control through an international guarantee of its neutrality. The objective should not be extended to utilizing Japan's main islands as military bases against Moscow. It was recommended that the United States develop only the Ryukyu Islands, including Okinawa, into a major base to secure the neutral status of Japan against any attack from the Asian mainland.³⁴ As will be pointed out, however, MacArthur later changed his basic position on the issue of base retention to the extent that he consented to the continued presence of a token US force for a short period of time. His modification of position was not intended to abandon the neutrality scheme but to narrow a difference between the policy makers in Washington and him in order to produce a consensus on a prompt peace settlement.

Finally, MacArthur's preference for neutrality was supported by his perception of Soviet intention and capability. In his estimation, the Soviet Union was incapable of taking control of Japan because of undeveloped conditions in Siberia and consequent weakness in its military position in East Asia. Its weak position was evidenced by its inability to provide Communist China with adequate military aid. It was thus calculated that Russia's main objective regarding Japan was merely to keep it neutral. Hence, the Soviets would accept and observe an international agreement on Japan's military neutrality, unless America sought to

³³ Memo of conversation with MacArthur, by Sebald, Political Adviser to SCAP, April 6, 1950, ERUS.1950, vol. 6, pp. 1170-71.

³⁴ Memo of the outline of MacArthur's views, by Colonel Babcock, member of SCAP staff, to Voorhees, Oct. 26, 1949, P&O 091 Japan TS, RG 319; and Memo of summary of MacArthur's views, by Voorhees, Dec. 14, 1949, *Ibid.*

use Japan against them militarily.³⁵ In this respect, the supreme commander stood almost alone among American policy makers in trusting the Soviet Union to honor Japanese neutrality.

As to the rearmament issue, MacArthur strongly committed himself to the continued disarmament of Japan. The general objected to any action considered by the Pentagon toward establishing Japanese armed forces and, at the same time, supported a peace treaty prohibiting Japan from rearming except for the maintenance of a constabulary and a coast guard. Several arguments were advanced against rearmament. First, since Japan, as part of the occupation reforms, had renounced the right to maintain armed forces in its constitution, any moves vitiating this Japanese position would raise serious doubt among the Japanese about "sincerity and validity of the reforms" instituted during the occupation. Second, the Japanese would refuse to rebuild armed forces, for they worried that such forces could be used by the United States or the Soviet Union in case of war between them. Thus, any attempt to rearm Japan would turn the Japanese people against America. Third, rearmament would be impossible from an economic standpoint because neither Japan nor the United States could afford to establish and support an armed force capable of defending Japan. Finally, in light of limited economic capability of Japan, any authorized forces would be of little military value in defending it against large-scale, Soviet aggression.³⁶ For these reasons, the supreme commander adhered to the option of unarming and neutralizing Japan through an agreement among the concerned nations, especially between the United States and the Soviet Union. In his view, their basic interests ran parallel: neither side wanted Japan militarily utilized by the other.

³⁵ Memo by Voorhees, Dec. 14, 1949, Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.; Memo by Colonel Babcock to Voorhees, Ibid.; and Memo of conversation, by Robert Fearey, Nov. 2, 1949, ERUS.1949, vol. 7, pp. 890-94.

3. The State Department

Secretary of State Dean Acheson and his policy advisers in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs differed with the Pentagon officials about the timing and security terms of a peace treaty. Although they consented to the retention of American bases and forces in Japan, the diplomatic officials dissented from their counterparts at the Pentagon regarding the scale and duration of such retention. More notably, the civilian and military planners sharply disagreed about the timing of a peace treaty. In contrast with the JCS position that the treaty should be postponed indefinitely because of Communist expansion in Asia, the civilian planners were of the opinion that Japan's political orientation toward the United States would be maintained only by the prompt termination of the occupation through the treaty. They determined to proceed with work on the treaty by September 1949. They also dissented with the military officials in advocating a treaty providing for the continued disarmament of Japan. On the other hand, their policy stands were largely in accord with those of General MacArthur, thus finding an occasion to align themselves with him in the policy dispute against Pentagon officials.

In mid-1949, several Japanese domestic and external events caused the State Department to move toward a peace settlement. First, a progress report on NSC 13/3 completed in June revealed a lack of success in implementing the decisions which had been designed among other things to relax occupation controls and to place more responsibility on the Japanese. Accordingly, the civilian planners reached a conclusion that more decisive measures, including the termination of the occupation, were necessary if Japan's pro-American orientation was to be assured in the face of restiveness among the Japanese growing out of the continued occupation. Second, a change in the friendly FEC nations' attitudes toward Japan encouraged the State Department officials to renew their efforts to go ahead with the peace settlement. Marshall Green, a Far East expert of the State Department,

reported late in July a shift over the past two years in the friendly FEC countries' positions. In particular, "Communist successes in China and Communist threats to other parts of the Far East" occasioned most of the FEC members to change their image of Japan to the extent that they no longer regarded it as "the principal threat to their security." As a result, they largely supported the existing American policy of promoting political and economic stability in Japan for the purpose of denying it to Communist control. In Green's view, this change of attitude suggested the likelihood that the United States and the other friendly FEC countries could reach an agreement on American terms of a peace treaty in spite of Soviet opposition.³⁷

Finally, Britain's accommodating position about treaty terms also gave an impetus to the peace-making process. When the high-level officials of the State Department and the British Foreign Office met together to discuss the East Asian situation in Washington in September, M. E. Dening, British Under Secretary for the Far East, reaffirmed the preference of his government for a prompt treaty and assented to a liberal, non-punitive type of treaty that the American officials had in mind. More notably, Dening suggested on behalf of the British government that, to safeguard its security interests, the United States conclude a bilateral security pact with Japan, separate from a multilateral peace treaty. The pact would provided for the retention of America's forces and bases in Japan in the post-treaty period. In addition, the United States would continue its strategic control over Okinawa. In Dening's estimation, the Commonwealth countries, which would participate in the treaty, certainly would raise no objections to the security terms his government proposed.³⁸ Encouraged by this British position, Acheson in turn suggested to Ernest Bevin, British Foreign Minister, that America, Britain, and the Commonwealth nations had to endeavor to reach a prior agreement as to principal

³⁷ Memo by Marshall Green, July 29, 1949, *Ibid.*, pp. 819-24.

³⁸ Memo of conversation, by Marshall Green, Sept. 9, 1949, *Ibid.*, pp. 853-56.

provisions of the treaty before approaching other concerned countries. Bevin agreed to this proposal and informed Acheson that if the US government should draft a Japanese treaty for British consideration before a Commonwealth foreign minister conference at Colombo scheduled for January 1950, he would, provided the draft treaty were agreeable to his government, undertake to secure Commonwealth support for it at the conference.³⁹

This accommodating attitude of the British government offered the State Department officials the prospect that at least the United States and the friendly FEC nations could agree on procedures and terms of the treaty which would safeguard American interests in Japan and in the western Pacific. First, the State Department needed to bring Pentagon planners around to proceeding toward the treaty. On September 16, Acheson explained to President Truman his recent discussion with British officials regarding the desirability of a prompt treaty. He successfully persuaded the president to instruct the Pentagon to advise the State Department on security terms which would be incorporated into an American draft treaty.⁴⁰ In a letter to Secretary of Defense Johnson dated October 3, Under Secretary of State Webb formally asked for the Pentagon's views on the "essential security requirements" in Japan. He urged that the two departments agree upon a draft treaty by mid-November so that it could be presented to the British government early in December.⁴¹ Without regard to the fact that the military planners objected to a prompt treaty, Webb pressed for their prompt cooperation in drafting the treaty. At the same time, the State Department forwarded to the Pentagon its comments on the JCS report of June (NSC 49) and its detailed views

³⁹ Memo of conversation, by Acheson, Sept. 13, 1949, *Ibid.*, pp. 858-59.

⁴⁰ Memo of conversation, by Acheson, "Discussion with the President," Sept. 16, 1949, *Ibid.*, p. 860.

⁴¹ Memo by Webb to Johnson, Oct. 3, 1949, 711.94 / 10-349, RG 59.

on the timing and substance of the treaty in an effort to clarify its position favoring the early conclusion of the treaty.

Specific State Department policy stands were initially set forth in a document containing its comments on NSC 49, as designated NSC 49/1, and in a position paper, both of which were prepared by the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs and presented to Under Secretary of the Army Voorhees on October 7. The Far East experts concurred with the view of the JCS that the minimum US objective with respect to Japan was to deny it to the Soviet Union. However, they viewed the attainment of such an objective as depending more upon Japanese internal political conditions, while the military chiefs were more inclined to rely on American military capabilities. The civilian planners estimated that a primary and impending threat to Japan was not a direct military attack from Russia but internal subversion by Japanese Communists under Soviet influence. Therefore, in order to keep Japan away from Communist control, it was necessary to maintain the continued pro-American orientation of Japan through an early peace settlement. In light of Japan's desire for prompt restoration of sovereignty, a prolonged occupation would expectedly cause resentment among the Japanese toward the United States, the principal occupying power. Such a condition could be exploited by Japanese Communists.⁴²

The diplomatic officials also differed from their counterparts at the Pentagon by advocating securing continued Japanese commitment to democratic reforms, instead of envisaging the military utilization of Japan against the Soviet Union as another primary objective. This political objective was more likely to be attained by the early conclusion of a peace settlement than by the continuation of the occupation. On the other hand, the Far East experts were doubtful as to whether,

⁴² NSC 49/1, "Department of State Comments on NSC 49," Sept. 30, 1949, ERUS 1949, vol. 7, pp. 871-72.

in the absence of the settlement, the Japanese would show responsibility and initiative required for the economic recovery of Japan that would be necessary to attain political stability. It was also anticipated that, in the light of "mounting demands for a peace treaty from almost all other FEC countries," which had interests in the restoration of foreign trade with Japan, any delay in proceeding with peace negotiations on the part of the United States would arouse increased resistance among those countries to its policy concerning Japan. In addition, continued American inaction would provide an occasion for the Soviet Union to take the initiative and thus put the United States on the defensive. At that time, it was estimated that the USSR favored an early peace settlement in the hope of securing, thereby, the evacuation of American troops, the legalization of Soviet territorial gains, a post-treaty voice in Japan, and some economic gains. The situation that the Russians seized the initiative would considerably weaken the existing advantageous relationship with Japan and the political position of the United States in the Far East and also among its allies. Only the American government would still take a position against a treaty.⁴³

While those considerations led Acheson and his aides to argue in favor of a prompt treaty, they recognized that American security needs in Japan and the western Pacific should be assured through the treaty in view of Communist advances in China and other parts of Asia. Consequently, they sympathized with the Pentagon's recommendation for the continued stationing of American forces in Japan. They suggested that a US-Japanese base agreement be concluded, in addition to a multilateral peace treaty, which would allow the United States to retain its forces and bases in Japan for the purpose of protecting a disarmed Japan against external aggression in the post-treaty period. In contrast to the JCS position

⁴³ Memo by Butterworth to Voorhees, "Japanese Peace Treaty," Oct. 7, 1949, Lot File 56 D 527, RG 59; and Memo by Butterworth to Acheson, Nov. 30, 1949, ERUS 1949, vol. 6, p. 907.

which advocated keeping American forces dispersed over the Japanese main islands for an indefinite period of time, however, the diplomatic officials recommended that the forces be stationed in defined areas remote from population centers for a limited period of time. This recommendation was made in light of expected adverse reactions from the other FEC nations during the peace negotiations and resultant irritating influence on the Japanese. As to the problem of post-treaty control over the Ryukyu Islands, including Okinawa, the State Department experts preferred to place them under an ordinary trusteeship rather than under a strategic trusteeship that the Pentagon favored. This preference stemmed from their concern that a strategic trusteeship would cause destabilizing consequences in the islands largely populated by the Japanese, and that the American claim for a strategic trusteeship would be subject to a Soviet veto in the United Nations Security Council.⁴⁴

In connection with American security needs in the peace settlement, another important policy stand was newly adopted by the State Department. As noted in the previous chapter, one of the reasons for the 1948 decision to postpone the settlement was that the State Department officials feared that a "separate treaty" concluded without the participation of the Russians would have provoked them to take hostile action against Japan after the withdrawal of American occupation forces. By late 1949, however, the officials were determined to push forward with a separate treaty, if necessary, to obtain American security requirements through the treaty. In their estimation, probable aggressive moves by the Soviet Union against Japan, including landing its occupation troops, would be effectively checked by US forces which would be retained after the treaty. In effect, Acheson and his Far East experts expected that there was little likelihood of concluding a peace treaty which would satisfy American security needs and obtain Soviet and

⁴⁴ Memo by Butterworth to Voorhees, *Ibid.*

Communist Chinese consent. Given the prospect that any treaty assuring the retention of US forces in Japan would encounter objections from those Communist nations, their exclusion from the peace-making process was considered inevitable if a settlement were to be reached.⁴⁵

There was also some change in the State Department's position on the issue of Japanese rearmament. The diplomatic officials had favored the continued disarmament of Japan since early 1947 when they had proceeded with work on a peace treaty. Nevertheless, the State Department officials modified this initial position by mid-1949 when their consideration of the treaty was revived. They came to recognize the likelihood of eventually creating a Japanese army as one of the alternative security arrangements in conjunction with the ultimate withdrawal of American forces from Japan. They estimated that the United States could not guarantee Japanese security indefinitely. It should be noted, however, that despite this change of position, the policy makers in the State Department still strongly objected to the Pentagon officials' recommendation that any treaty provide for prompt "reactivation of Japanese armed forces." These State Department positions were advanced in a memorandum of November 15, prepared by Assistant Secretary of the State Walton Butterworth and Special Assistant to the Secretary of State John Howard, and later approved by Acheson as the department's official stand on the rearmament issue. The memorandum manifested opposition to the authorization of Japanese rearmament in a peace treaty while leaving open the possibility of eventual rearmament:

The position of the Department of State is that, for political reasons, it is not feasible in the treaty of peace to authorize the reactivation of Japanese armed forces. No decision should be made now in favor of reactivation of Japan's armed forces, either now or at a future time designated now. At the same time the United States should not foreclose by a present decision the

⁴⁵ Ibid.

possible reactivation of Japanese armed forces at some future when this course might appear to be in our best interests.⁴⁶

It was accordingly recommended that any treaty envisage the continued disarmament of Japan in the immediate post-treaty period but provide for the continuous reappraisal of its security clauses by the signatory nations. The possibility of rearmament could thus be explored as one of the alternatives to the eventual withdrawal of American forces from Japan.⁴⁷

Several definite reasons were given in opposition to immediate rearmament. First, the civilian planners saw little likelihood of direct aggression by Russia in the near future. Rather, they were primarily concerned about the impending threat of political penetration by Soviet-controlled local Communists. They calculated that Moscow would not risk a military attack without successful political penetration. Hence, the United States would be better served by placing its emphasis upon preventing the outbreak of war rather than contriving military measures against an actual Soviet attack. Such prevention would be adequately achieved in the immediate post-treaty period through the presence of American forces in Japan. What was needed first was to assure the "continued orientation of Japan toward the United States" against Communist penetration. Therefore, American aid and Japanese resources must be concentrated upon the strengthening of the Japanese police and the attainment of economic stability and social progress, rather than on the maintenance of a Japanese military establishment.⁴⁸

Second, given Japan's commitment to the renunciation of war and armed forces in its constitution and the occupation policy to democratize and demilitarize

⁴⁶ Memo by Butterworth and Howard to Acheson, "Reactivation of Japanese Armed Forces," Nov. 15, 1949, attached to Memo by Howard to Fisher, Nov. 17, 1949, 740.0011 PW(Peace) 11-1749, RG 59.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

Japan, the civilian planners were concerned that America's decision to authorize rearmament in a peace treaty would lead them into serious doubts about the validity of the occupation policy so as to weaken "American influence and the influence of democratic principles in Japan, both of which are necessary to offset Communist influence in Japan." Moreover, such a unilateral decision, without a voluntary amendment by the Japanese of their constitution, might give them the unfavorable impression that Washington sought only its own military interests, regardless of Japanese will. These adverse consequences would militate against the continued pro-American orientation of Japan. Therefore, the retention of full American forces was considered preferable to rearmament in the immediate post-treaty period. Third, the State Department officials worried that the American pursuit of approval for rearmament in a peace treaty would meet with strong objections from the other FEC nations, who feared a resurgence of Japanese militarism. The success of the peace negotiations with them could be jeopardized. Finally, the formation of Japanese armed forces would cause a political problem in American relationships with France and other European nations who would regard it as precipitating German rearmament.⁴⁹

Those State Department preferences were incorporated into the security sections of a draft peace treaty prepared by the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs during October 1949. The draft stipulated that, by means of a bilateral security pact, US forces would continue to be stationed in Japan for its security. However, those forces were to be maintained, "on a self-supporting basis, in defined base areas." Furthermore, the draft limited the retention of American troops to a ten-year period. Rebuilding Japanese armed forces and war-related industries was strictly prohibited by the draft treaty. Japan would be only authorized to maintain internal

⁴⁹ Ibid.; and Memo by Butterworth to Voorhees, Under Secretary of the Army, Oct. 7, 1949, Lot File 56 D 527, RG 59.

security forces, such as a constabulary and a coast guard, with limits on their strength and equipment. Yet, the draft did not eliminate the long-term possibility of Japanese rearmament by the addition of a provision stating that its security clauses would be reviewed after five years.⁵⁰ On November 4, Butterworth delivered to Under Secretary of the Army Voorhees the draft treaty, minus its security terms which were initially scheduled to be prepared by the Pentagon. In an attached memorandum, Butterworth demanded that the security sections be promptly prepared, as "a matter of the utmost urgency in view of the limited time remaining under the time schedule." The presentation of a complete American draft treaty to the British government was due early in December.⁵¹ This call for the Pentagon's immediate action shows that, regardless of previously expressed objections by its officials to an early treaty, the State Department once again attempted to press them to follow suit in its moves toward the treaty.

D. Revisions of Policy Preferences

As has been examined above, three divergent combinations of policy options were initially preferred by various American decision makers concerning the timing and security terms of a peace treaty in the latter part of 1949. First, Secretary of State Acheson and his aides in the Far Eastern Bureau advocated going ahead with the prompt conclusion of the treaty, stationing US forces in the confined base areas of Japan for a limited period of time, and keeping Japan disarmed, at least during the immediate post-treaty period. Second, the policy

⁵⁰ For a full text of the draft treaty, see the document attached to memo by Fearey to Allison, Oct. 14, 1949, 740.0011 PW (Peace)/10-1449, RG 59; For an outline of security clauses of the draft treaty, see Memo by Howard to Butterworth, Oct. 20, 1949, 740.0011 PW (Peace)/10-2049, RG 59.

⁵¹ Memo by Butterworth to Voorhees, Nov., 4, 1949, 740.0011 PW (Peace)/11-449, RG 59.

makers at the Pentagon, including Secretary of Defense Johnson, the JCS, and Under Secretary of the Army Voorhees, favored postponing the treaty, retaining US bases and forces all over Japanese main islands indefinitely, and rearming Japan even before the treaty. As a third combination of options, General MacArthur sided with the State Department officials in preferring an early treaty. However, the general differed from both civilian and military planners in Washington by advocating the neutrality of an unarmed Japan, which would be guaranteed by the concerned nations, including the Soviet Union, under UN sponsorship.

A revision of policy preference first came from MacArthur. Late in September, the general modified his initial position by advising that a small size of American forces would be stationed in post-treaty Japan if its security could not be fully guaranteed by an international agreement as to its neutrality. An arrangement for such retention would be made on a bilateral basis with Japan and separately from a formal peace treaty.⁵² By offering the compromise of accepting the retention of a token force, he tried to narrow down a difference of position between the decision makers in Washington and him, thus finding a common ground for a peace settlement. The general's accommodating attitude was followed by his concession to Washington's stand favoring the substantial participation and representation of the State Department in conducting the occupation. As noted in the last chapter, MacArthur emphatically had refused any change in the occupation regime of control, which would have reduced his authority as SCAP. Due to his strong opposition, the State Department unsuccessfully had sought to push forward with its plan to take over the nonmilitary fields of the occupation from SCAP headquarters in mid-1949. Despite this conflict, Secretary of State Acheson unexpectedly assured MacArthur in a letter of September 9 that there was no

⁵² Memo of conversation by William Sebald, the Acting Political Adviser to SCAP, Sept. 21, 1949, FRUS, 1949, vol. 7, pp. 862-63.

official plan in Washington for a change in the existing occupation regime of control. The Secretary of State, on the other hand, convinced the general that he would be closely consulted by the State Department regarding the pending peace treaty problem.⁵³ The unusually soothing and sympathetic tone of Acheson's letter appears to have been designed to allay MacArthur's antipathy to the attempt by the State Department to encroach on his authority, and thus to obtain his support for the department's case for a prompt treaty. In response to Acheson's conciliatory move, the supreme commander, who consistently had argued in favor of an early treaty since 1947, decided to compromise on the issue of retaining American forces in post-treaty Japan with a view to reaching a consensus on the treaty issue. Moreover, the general, despite Acheson's withdrawal from the plan of civilianizing the occupation, informed him that SCAP would proceed to expand State Department participation in the administration of the occupation.⁵⁴

In connection with MacArthur's revision of position, it is noted that, though accepting the option of maintaining US troops in Japan, the general did not change his basic preference for the neutralization of an unarmed Japan. Accordingly, he stressed that American forces, if retained, should be kept to a minimum, totaling less than 35,000, but indicating to the Soviet Union and Communist China that any military attack against Japan would lead to a war with the United States. In addition, the remaining forces should be stationed on a self-supporting basis and for a limited period of five years in order to prevent Japanese resentment. These restrictions, in MacArthur's view, were necessary to secure Soviet consent to the neutralization of Japan. If US forces in Japan were so limited and defensive in character that Washington showed no intention of using Japan as a base for offensive action against Moscow, the Russians were expected to acquiesce in the

⁵³ Letter from Acheson to MacArthur, Sept. 9, 1949, *Ibid.*, pp. 850-52.

⁵⁴ Memo of conversation by Sebald, Sept. 21, 1949, *Ibid.*, pp. 863-64.

retention of such forces and to honor Japan's neutrality.⁵⁵ In this respect, the supreme commander did not commit himself to a separate treaty without Soviet participation which, at that time, the State Department officials considered inevitable. MacArthur's preferred option of a peace treaty, that provided for the neutrality of Japan based upon an agreement among the major powers, depended upon the participation and consent of the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, MacArthur's modification of position did not depart from his basic conviction that, with Okinawa fully developed into a base area, the United States would need no bases in the Japanese main islands. The retention of a token US force, from the general's standpoint, would be symbolic, showing a determination to guarantee Japan's neutrality, rather than having the military value of defending it against full-scale, external aggression. MacArthur still estimated that the United States could control and protect Japan through its military strength at bases in Okinawa without retaining bases in the main islands.⁵⁶ In short, without changing in a significant way his basic preference for neutrality and by making a concession to the competing option of retaining American forces as the policy makers in Washington commonly favored, MacArthur sought to reduce his difference with them in the hope of reaching a governmental consensus toward a settlement. This interpretation is supported by the general's own accounts of his modification of position. In a meeting on April 5, 1950, with William Sebald, his political adviser from the State Department, the general, referring to his opposition to having bases in Japan, explained that he had "to a certain extent" agreed to retaining a small number of bases "under pressure from the Pentagon." MacArthur

⁵⁵ Memo of conversation, by Robert Fearey of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, "General MacArthur's Views on a Japanese Peace Treaty," Nov. 2, 1949, *Ibid.*, pp. 890-94.

⁵⁶ Memo of summary of MacArthur's views by Tracy Voorhees, Under Secretary of the Army, December 14, 1949, CD 6-3-33, RG 330.

later also explained that he altered his position "in the search for an acceptable solution which will make possible full accord within our own government and provide it the basis for unified treaty action..."⁵⁷

Another revision of position arose out of the Defense Department. Despite the request and subsequent pressing from the State Department to advance the military's views on the security terms of the peace treaty, no response was officially made until the end of November, a deadline the State Department had attached to the formulation of an American draft treaty. Military planners delayed submitting their definite position in order to deter the diplomatic officials from proceeding with further action toward the initiation of peace negotiations, including consultation with the British government informally scheduled for early December. As Assistant Secretary of State Butterworth complained of it, work in the Pentagon was "jumbled together with the result that to date no progress has been made."⁵⁸

In the midst of a delay in determining a national position, an attempt was made by Under Secretary of the Army Voorhees to reconcile the difference of the positions between the State and Defense Departments by the end of November. The Under Secretary basically shared with the JCS and the Secretary of Defense the view that a peace settlement should be indefinitely postponed. Communist advances in China and Southeast Asia made it imperative that the existing predominant US military position in Japan be maintained. In addition, all of these military leaders met on common ground in opposing such a separate treaty without the participation of Russia and Communist China, as the State Department officials advocated as inevitable. In Voorhees's estimation, should the

⁵⁷ Memo of conversation, by Sebald, April 6, 1950, ERUS.1950, vol. 6, pp. 1170-71; and Memo by MacArthur, June 14, 1950, Ibid., p. 1221.

⁵⁸ Letter from Butterworth to Sebald, Dec. 1, 1949, Lot File 57 D 527, RG 59.

United States and its friendly FEC nations enter into a peace treaty, to the exclusion of the two Communist powers, which would terminate SCAP control and instead permit the retention of US forces in Japan, the Soviet Union might take hostile military actions. Such actions might include landing its troops for the occupation of Japan and attacking Japanese shipping. The Russians would defend their actions on the grounds that the surrender terms and Moscow agreement of 1945 were violated by America's action not to withdraw its occupation troops after the end of the occupation or that the state of hostilities with Japan was restored because of its breach of the surrender terms. Belligerent Soviet moves against Japan would inevitably cause the US troops remaining in Japan to take counteractions, which in turn would lead to an armed conflict between the two major powers. From the Pentagon leaders' perspective, the risk of entering into war against the Soviet Union in Asia should be avoided, if possible, not only because of the perceived lack of military preparedness, but also because of the war strategy of giving priority to the European theater.⁵⁹ Therefore, Voorhees, to the agreement of other military leaders, held that if a peace treaty was to be made to grant the United States the exclusive right to maintain its bases and forces, the USSR and Communist China should participate in and consent to the treaty.⁶⁰ It was commonly accepted in Washington, however, that it was virtually impossible to simultaneously satisfy the two requirements in light of intensifying American-Soviet confrontation. Voorhees's objection to a separate treaty, after all, resulted in reinforcing the prevailing stand in the military that the peace treaty had to be indefinitely postponed.

⁵⁹ See Condit, *History of the JCS*, pp. 265-73; and Bradley, *A General's Life*, p. 504.

⁶⁰ Those views of Under Secretary of the Army Voorhees were set forth in a position paper prepared by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC) of the JCS. See The Position Paper by the JSSC, JCS 1380/75, "The Impact of An Early Peace Treaty With Japan On United States Strategic Requirements," Nov. 30, 1949, CCS 388.1 Japan (9-1-47), Records of the JCS, RG 218.

In this context, Voorhees, by the end of November, suggested a compromise option in an effort to reconcile the conflicting positions among the Pentagon, the State Department, and General MacArthur. Under his proposed alternative, the United States would maintain its existing forces in Japan and its potential authority over its government through the continuation of the SCAP organization, in a reduced and stand-by form. At the same time, the existing SCAP controls over the nonmilitary aspects of the occupation would be discontinued for the purpose of granting the Japanese the right to conduct their political and economic affairs. Accordingly, this "stand-by SCAP arrangement" would not provide the USSR with any legal ground for military moves against Japan by leaving the legal status of the occupation unchanged. On the other hand, the arrangement satisfied, to some extent, Japan's desire for the restoration of its sovereignty by drastically relaxing the occupation controls. In his meeting with Acheson and Butterworth on November 30, Voorhees outlined his solution to the treaty problem and informed them that he would seek its approval from his senior military officials, including the JCS and General MacArthur.⁶¹

Meanwhile, Voorhees's compromise option was considered and supported by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC), the planning staff of the JCS. The JSSC incorporated it in a position paper drawn up for submission to the JCS. The document reaffirmed the previous views of the Pentagon that a peace treaty was premature and that the existing occupation regime of control best met American security needs. As for security requirements pertaining to the peace treaty, it was recommended that any treaty assure the United States of its strategic control over the Ryukyu Islands, including Okinawa, and an exclusive right to retain its bases and forces with no limits as to scale or duration. In addition, even a peace treaty containing these military terms should have the consent of the USSR and

⁶¹ Letter from Butterworth to Sebald, Dec. 1, 1949, Lot File 56 D 527, RG 59.

Communist China in order to avoid legal and military conflict with them. The JSSC paper, on the other hand, rejected the option of neutralizing Japan on the grounds that it would be exposed to a direct attack or indirect penetration by the Soviets in light of their intention and capacity ultimately to dominate Japan. Finally, the document recommended a stand-by SCAP arrangement as a preferred course of action, which would mitigate adverse political effects arising from a prolonged occupation and, at the same time, would avoid military risks involved in a separate treaty.⁶²

Encouraged by support from the JSSC, Voorhees promptly visited Tokyo early in December to persuade General MacArthur to advocate his stand-by SCAP proposal prior to obtaining final approval from the JCS and the Secretary of Defense. In conferences with MacArthur over a four-day period, however, Voorhees met with the general's strong opposition to the proposal. The supreme commander rejected it as amounting to "an emasculation of SCAP powers which would involve a humiliation." As before, MacArthur was strongly against any reduction of his authority and prestige in Japan. Furthermore, he pressed upon Voorhees the necessity of entering into a prompt peace treaty and the desirability of Japan's neutrality, while arguing against making use of Japan for military purposes.⁶³

The stand-by SCAP arrangement was also rejected by State Department officials. During Voorhees's stay in Japan, his policy assistant, Goldthwaite Dorr, consulted with John Howard, Acheson's special assistant, and sought to convince him that the occupation should be continued under the arrangement for several

⁶² Report by the JSSC, JCS 1380/75, *Ibid.*

⁶³ See Voorhees' summary of MacArthur's views advanced in their meetings, enclosed in a transcript of the JSSC meeting, Dec. 14, 1949, CCS 388.1 Japan (9-1-47), RG 218.

years.⁶⁴ However, Howard and other diplomatic officials turned down the alternative. A major concern was that the adoption of such an arrangement as a temporary solution would put the government in an inflexible position. This would make it increasingly difficult to secure desired security terms in future peace negotiations because of the growing discontent of Japan and the other FEC nations with America's delay in entering into a peace settlement. In addition, the continuation of the occupation on a stand-by SCAP basis would have an adverse effect on America's position in diplomatic competition with the USSR since it would provide an occasion for the latter to take the initiative in the treaty problem.⁶⁵

To Voorhees' great disappointment, even the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave no approval to the JSSC position paper recommending the stand-by SCAP solution. The military chiefs directed the JSSC to rewrite the paper in conformity with their position that no change should be made in the existing occupation regime of control. On December 22, the JCS approved and submitted a newly prepared paper to Secretary of Defense Johnson. The next day, Johnson forwarded the document to the State Department and the NSC as an official position of the Pentagon with regard to the treaty problem. In the document, the JCS reaffirmed the prevailing stands in the Pentagon: the indefinite retention of American bases and forces in the Ryukyu Islands, as well as over the Japanese main islands, and the participation of the Soviet Union and Communist China in the peace-making process. Because those two conditions were mutually exclusive in view of continuing Soviet expansionist trends, the military chiefs persisted with their previous position that a

⁶⁴ Memo of conversation, by Howard, Dec. 8, 1949, Lot File 56 D 527, RG 59.

⁶⁵ Memo by Howard to Butterworth, Dec. 5, 1949, 740.0011 PW (Peace)/ 12-549; and Memo by Green to Allison, Dec. 12, 1949, 740.0011 PW (Peace)/ 12-1249, RG 59.

peace treaty was premature.⁶⁶ Besides this reason, an overriding concern that led the JCS to advocate continuing the occupation was the maintenance of the existing military position in Japan which permitted the United States to exercise unlimited base privileges and to dictate Japanese behavior. Any hasty move toward the termination or drastic relaxation of the occupation was expected to undermine such a predominant position, a situation that should be avoided in light of Communist advances in China and in Southeast Asia.⁶⁷

After all, Voorhees' effort to resolve the policy dispute between the State and Defense Departments was aborted. No substantial change was made in their conflicting positions until the end of 1949. The State Department was unable to present the American terms of the treaty to the British government for consultation prior to the Commonwealth meeting at Colombo in January. To induce the Pentagon to agree to the initiation of peace negotiations, the department devoted the early months of 1950 to the intensive consideration of alternative security arrangements, which would be politically feasible and militarily satisfying .

E. Collective Decision Processes

1. Consideration of Alternative Security Arrangements

As the JCS and Johnson once again advanced their opposition to an early treaty in a position paper of December 23, Acheson was obviously embarrassed by his inability to provide the British Foreign Minister Bevin with any definite American terms of the treaty in accordance with the time schedule promised

⁶⁶ Memo by the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, Dec. 22, 1949, enclosed in Memo by the Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State, Dec. 23, 1949, *FRUS* 1949, vol. 7, pp. 922-23.

⁶⁷ See an analysis of the JCS memorandum, attached to Memo by Howard to Butterworth, Jan. 10, 1949, 694.001/1-1050, RG 59.

earlier. Acheson called a meeting with General Omar Bradley, chairman of the JCS, and General Burns, representing Johnson, to express his critical view of the Pentagon's stand. He also wanted to obtain its concurrence with his plan to explain to Bevin unsolved problems with which the US government was faced. Acheson also notified the military leaders that, despite their argument against a treaty, his department would continue to work at formulating treaty terms to meet security requirements contemplated by the Pentagon.⁶⁸ The same day, Acheson informed the British government that he regretted that he would not be able to consult with Bevin about the American position before the Commonwealth conference of January. He proceeded to outline three main security problems on which American policy makers remained divided: the size and duration of US bases and forces which would be retained in post-treaty Japan, the rearming of Japan, and the problem of seeking Soviet and Chinese participation in a peace treaty.⁶⁹

In effect, the dispute between the diplomatic and military officials by the end of 1949 concentrated on those three issues. What Acheson thought primarily led the Pentagon to stand against a prompt treaty was the need to win consent from the two Communist nations to a treaty permitting the continued stationing of American forces in Japan. As noted above, the military planners were so concerned about the military risk of an armed conflict with Russia caused by a separate treaty that they objected to proceeding with the treaty. In contrast, Acheson and his policy staff had a quite different perspective on the issue. They estimated that the Soviet Union's moves would be largely conditioned by its relative political and military capabilities against the United States, rather than by legal considerations such as its commitment to prior international agreements and the American violation of them. It was, therefore, unlikely that the mere act of excluding the

⁶⁸ Memo of conversation, by Maxwell Hamilton, Dec. 24, 1949, *Ibid.*, pp. 924-26.

⁶⁹ Memo by Acheson to the British Ambassador, Dec. 24, 1949, *Ibid.*, pp. 927-29.

Soviets from a peace treaty would provoke them to belligerent actions against Japan. Furthermore, the State Department officials believed that a treaty permitting American base retention in Japan would not give Russia any legal basis for taking action, including landing its occupation troops in Japan, because authority for such retention could be derived from a bilateral base agreement between the United States and Japan. Therefore, the civilian planners, unlike their counterparts at the Pentagon, recommended going ahead with a separate treaty if the Communists refused to consent to the continued stationing of American forces.⁷⁰

This stand was supported by President Truman when he made a rare comment about the Japanese treaty problem at a NSC meeting on December 29, where his top advisers deliberated over a general policy paper for Asia. At the end of the meeting, recalling that the Russians had taken no part in the Potsdam Conference deciding the Japanese surrender terms, Truman contended that the United States and Britain could negotiate a peace treaty regardless of whether the USSR participated or not.⁷¹ Despite his endorsement of a separate treaty, however, Truman did not attempt to overrule his military advisers by directly pressing them to withdraw their opposition to such a treaty. As his decision-making style regarding Japanese issues, the President preferred to leave the problem to his advisers until they reached an agreed-upon position, rather than to directly involve himself in their policy debates.⁷²

⁷⁰ Memo by Howard to Butterworth, Dec. 5, 1949, 740.0011 PW(Peace)/12-549, RG 59; Memo by George Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, to Butterworth, Dec. 30, 1949, Lot File 56 D 225, RG 59; and Memo by Howard to Butterworth, Jan. 9, 1950, 694.001/1-1050, RG 59.

⁷¹ Memo by Deputy Under Secretary of State Rusk, Jan. 24, 1950, *FRUS* 1950, vol. 6, p. 1131.

⁷² Michael Schaller points out this decision-making style of President Truman several times in his book, *The American Occupation of Japan*, p. 169, p. 176, and p. 177.

The State Department, encouraged by Truman's support, began two substantial moves toward early peace negotiations. One was to consult with General MacArthur, thus forming a coalition with him to urge the Pentagon to acquiesce to the initiation of such negotiations. The other move was to devise security arrangements which would meet the military requirements insisted upon by the Pentagon leaders and which, at the same time, be acceptable to the other parties such as Japan and the FEC nations. First of all, an attempt was made by the State Department early in 1950 to obtain MacArthur's support for a prompt settlement by sending its senior officials to Tokyo. Early in January, Ambassador at Large Philip Jessup, one of Acheson's trusted advisers, visited the supreme commander and held three talks with him. MacArthur revealed a contemptuous attitude toward the JCS position advocating the indefinite postponement of the treaty. He denounced the military chiefs for attending only to Secretary of Defense Johnson without due consideration of specialized views in the field. The general contended that Acheson should take the matter up with Truman and request a presidential decision to proceed with negotiations for the treaty while having the JCS overruled. On the other hand, MacArthur suggested that the peace conference had to be held in Tokyo. He already had communicated to the State Department his personal desire to preside over such a conference as a "neutral chairman." Notwithstanding his siding with the State Department over the timing of the settlement, MacArthur emphasized his longstanding preference for the neutralization of Japan as a security arrangement accompanying a peace treaty. The general also suggested as a supplementary arrangement the retention of a token American force in Japan for a maximum five-year period.⁷³

⁷³ Memo of conversation, by Jessup, Jan. 9, 1950, *FRUS* 1950, vol. 6, pp. 1109-14; and Memo by Jessup to Acheson, Jan. 10, 1950, *Ibid.*, pp. 1114-16. MacArthur's suggestion of his chairmanship in a Tokyo peace conference had been put forward on September 20, 1949 in a meeting with W. J.

Johnson was displeased with the State Department's attempt to approach MacArthur without referring to the Pentagon. He criticized it as "an offside play" and called upon Acheson to stop consulting with the general directly. He should do so only through Under Secretary of the Army Voorhees, a formal channel of the Pentagon with the State Department. Johnson's demand was ignored as Acheson sent Assistant Secretary of State Butterworth to Tokyo for another conference with MacArthur.⁷⁴ The visiting senior official sought to find out the details of the general's discussions with the JCS, who just had departed from Tokyo following a three-day visit. MacArthur informed Butterworth that he had urged that the JCS consider two points. First, the service chiefs should not go beyond their expertise by expressing views on the nonmilitary aspects of the problem, including legal concerns over a separate treaty. Second, they had to retreat from the claim for unlimited base rights, which would be unacceptable to the Japanese. The occupation commander, on the other hand, reaffirmed his support for the State Department's case for an early treaty. In addition, he came to advocate going ahead with peace negotiations without Soviet participation, if necessary for a prompt treaty.⁷⁵ Although the State Department reached a common ground with MacArthur through its direct contacts with him, Japan's role in the cold war remained a point of contention. Whereas the general persisted in his preference for the neutrality of Japan, the State Department set it aside as an impractical option in view of Soviet expansionist policy and, instead, came to envision Japan as a military ally.

Sebald, SCAP's Political Adviser as the State Department representative in Japan. See Memo of conversation, by Sebald, Sept. 21, 1949, *FRUS* 1949, vol. 7, pp. 862-64.

⁷⁴ Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1969), p. 430.

⁷⁵ Memo of conversation, by Butterworth, Feb. 5, 1950, *FRUS* 1950, vol. 6, pp. 1133-35.

In the meantime, State Department experts proceeded to explore security arrangements which would satisfy the military need to retain US bases and forces in post-treaty Japan and which, at the same time, could be accepted by the other interested nations. First considered was a bilateral base agreement between America and Japan, the conclusion of which would be authorized by a multilateral peace treaty. However, it was found that this course of action would have some serious disadvantages. First of all, the outright US military posture in Japan under such a base agreement would have adverse political consequences among the peoples of the Far East and Japan. Moreover, a peace treaty providing for the continued maintenance of American bases would force some of the FEC nations such as India and Pakistan, regardless of their desire for a neutral stance, to choose sides in the Soviet-American conflict on the base issue. The base agreement, on the other hand, would subject the Japanese government to Soviet propaganda of "having sold out Japanese people to US imperialism." Finally, the overt authorization of American base rights in a peace treaty would eliminate the likelihood of the participation of Russia and Communist China in the treaty.⁷⁶

With those drawbacks in mind, John Howard, Acheson's special assistant, and Assistant Secretary of State Butterworth developed an alternative security arrangement. Under this arrangement, the FEC nations would enter into an agreement on the restoration of normal political and economic relations with Japan while leaving untouched the legal authority of SCAP in security matters. Such a limited peace settlement was expected to largely satisfy the desires of Japan and friendly FEC nations for a treaty. As a result, their pro-Western orientation would be promoted by resumed political and economic transactions among them. At the same time, by continuing unchanged SCAP's occupational controls over security matters, and thus the legal ground for stationing the occupation forces, the

⁷⁶ Memo by Butterworth to Acheson, Jan. 18, 1950, *Ibid.*, pp. 1118-19.

arrangement would meet Defense Department concerns. Those concerns related to maintaining the predominant position in Japan and minimizing military risks involved in a separate treaty without the Soviet Union and China.⁷⁷ In this respect, the limited peace treaty was a compromise designed to simultaneously satisfy the political concerns of the State Department and the strategic ones of the Pentagon .

In a meeting among Acheson and his advisers on January 18, 1950, however, the compromise arrangement was disapproved by Acheson since it would appear to involve a change in the occupation regime of control. It thus would be subjected to the charge by the Soviet Union that the surrender terms and the Moscow agreement of 1945 were violated. In addition, it would arouse a suspicion among the Japanese and other FEC nations that the United States intended to continue its military control of Japan indefinitely. Acheson directed his policy advisers to deliver an ultimate security solution for a full peace settlement instead of proceeding with a temporary arrangement.⁷⁸

A follow-up meeting was held by Deputy Under Secretary of State Dean Rusk on February 7 to discuss other satisfactory arrangements. As a result of the discussion, on February 10, Rusk submitted to Acheson a memorandum suggesting a Pacific collective security pact as a preferred arrangement. The civilian planners in the document explored two major alternatives for solving the security problem in post-treaty Japan. The first option was to conclude a peace treaty providing for the neutralization and continued disarmament of Japan. Despite some attractive features in that option, diplomatic officials rejected it as exposing an unarmed Japan to Soviet military aggression or political infiltration. Because of the strategic importance of Japan, arising from its location, great manpower, and industrial

⁷⁷ Ibid., pp. 1120-26.

⁷⁸ Memo by Deputy Under Secretary of State Dean Rusk to Acheson, Feb. 10, 1950, Lot File 56 D 527, RG 59.

potential, the Russians were not expected to passively accept Japanese neutrality. Rather, they would continue to pursue their ultimate objective of gaining control of Japan through political and military means. The State Department experts calculated that Moscow would not be ready to resort to military aggression in the immediate future, but it would concentrate on political penetration of Japan. They were skeptical of Japan's ability, as a neutral nation, to resist such political aggression, not only because of its geographic proximity to the USSR and Communist China, but also due to expected intensified political and economic pressures from them.⁷⁹

The other alternative was to enter into a Pacific collective security pact. Under this option, advanced as a preferred arrangement, a twenty-year security pact would be concluded, separate from a peace treaty, by Japan and pro-Western FEC nations such as the United States, Canada, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. The main purpose of the pact was to provide the similar sort of collective defense against Soviet aggression in the Pacific, and particularly in Japan, which was already provided by the North Atlantic Treaty of April 1949 in Western Europe. The security arrangement also would ensure the former victims of Japanese aggression protection from its possible recurrence in the future. Moreover, since its military basis would be actually American naval and air forces stationed in the offshore island bases, the security pact would permit the United States, through a base agreement, to retain its bases and forces in Japan.⁸⁰

Several considerations prompted the civilian planners to favor the option of concluding a Pacific security pact along with a peace treaty. First of all, the regional nature of the pact and its conformity with the United Nations Charter providing

⁷⁹ Memo on Japanese Security Arrangement, drafted by John Howard, Feb. 10, 1950, attached to Memo by Rusk to Acheson, *Ibid.*

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

for the right to collective self-defense, diplomatic officials thought, would make the Japanese more likely to join in a pro-Western alignment of Pacific nations. Second, the pact was expected to induce friendly FEC nations to accept a non-punitive peace treaty by providing them with collective protection against a resurgence of Japanese militarism. Third, the USSR and Communist China would find it more difficult to deal politically with such a multilateral arrangement than a bilateral base agreement under which the United States would be solely responsible for Japanese security. Finally, the Pacific pact was thought to facilitate restoration of political and economic relations between Japan and other Pacific member nations so as to promote the continued orientation of Japan toward the West and strengthen Japanese resistance to Soviet political and economic pressures.⁸¹

In another meeting on February 20, Acheson viewed the proposed Pacific pact favorably and asked his advisers to develop the matter further in order to submit to the National Security Council a memorandum setting forth an official State Department position in favor of such a regional arrangement. The same day, he explained the proposal to the president. Truman considered it "hopeful" and requested the preparation of an NSC paper through consultation with the Pentagon for his final decision.⁸² Despite his consistent support for the State Department preference for a prompt treaty, Truman made no direct attempt to press Johnson and the JCS to withdraw their opposition to the treaty. Instead he preferred that his civilian and military advisers reached an agreed position to which he would give final approval.

⁸¹ Memo drafted by John Howard, "Outline for Meeting with the Secretary of State on Japanese Security Arrangement," attached to Memo by Rusk to Acheson, Feb. 10, 1950, Lot File 56 D 527, RG 59.

⁸² Memo of conversation, by Acheson, Feb. 20, 1950, 694.001/2-2050, RG 59.

Truman's reluctance to overrule the Pentagon leaders seems to have resulted partly from his recognition of the need for their support in securing a Senate ratification of a Japanese treaty. Throughout late 1949 and early 1950, Johnson and the JCS sided with the Republicans in Congress against State Department planners in advocating a hard-line policy toward Communist China. Military planners and the Republicans alike took the position that the US government should make efforts to roll back Communist control in China and provide the Nationalists in Taiwan with military aid to protect them against aggression from the mainland. Acheson and his Far East experts, on the other hand, favored a moderate policy in which the government would maintain a conciliatory stance toward the Communists in the hope of splitting them and the Soviets, while pursuing a hands-off policy regarding Taiwan. The policy dispute was resolved for a while by the end of December 1949, when Truman approved a new Asia policy paper (NSC 48/2) adopting the State Department position.⁸³ As a result, by early 1950 the Truman administration, especially the State Department, was accused by a number of Republican senators, including Joseph MacCarthy, William Knowland, and Alexander Smith, of its failure to prevent China from falling into Communist control and its adherence to a moderate China policy. Pentagon leaders, without turning aside their insistence on military aid to the Nationalists, continued to recommend that Truman and Acheson modify their hands-off policy toward Taiwan.⁸⁴ The fact that Johnson and the JCS aligned themselves with Republican senators over the Chinese issue appears to have made Truman reluctant to overrule

⁸³ NSC 48/2, "The Position of the United States With Respect To Asia," Dec. 30, 1949, *FRUS* 1949, vol. 7, pp. 1215-20.

⁸⁴ For a detailed account of the policy debate over the Chinese issue and its consequences, see Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan*, Chapters 11 and 14.

his military advisers in the Japanese treaty issue. Their potential opposition might have thwarted a ratification of the treaty in the Senate.

Nevertheless, Acheson thought Truman's request for a NSC paper, by setting a time limit for a national decision on the treaty issue, would cause the recalcitrant JCS to accede to the initiation of peace negotiations. Moreover, the service chiefs' opposition to an early treaty, Acheson believed, was obviously untenable. Their military requirement of securing extensive US bases in Japan could be met by the proposed Pacific security arrangement. Consequently, they were expected to "cheerfully accept being overruled."⁸⁵ In any case, Acheson and his aides had to come to an agreement with the Pentagon planners on the timing and security terms of the treaty prior to obtaining a presidential decision to start peace negotiations.

Going against Acheson's expectation, however, the JCS showed no sign of receding from their position against a prompt treaty. Rather, they once again insisted upon an indefinite postponement of the treaty when they reported to the President regarding their visit to Japan late in January. In addition, an international event caused the JCS to reinforce their position. On February 14, the Soviet Union and Communist China signed a thirty-year treaty of alliance and mutual assistance in Moscow. The pact was reportedly designed in response to the expected formation of an alliance between the United States and Japan. In particular, the pact provided that the two Communist powers would undertake joint action against "aggressive action on the part of Japan or any other state which directly or indirectly would unite with Japan in acts of aggression..." The JCS perceived this provision as increasing the likelihood of hostile Soviet moves against Japan in case a peace treaty was concluded without the two Communist nations. Therefore, the

⁸⁵ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 430-31.

military chiefs had more reason for wanting the treaty postponed.⁸⁶

Disregarding repeated opposition from the JCS, the Far East experts in the State Department prepared a position paper setting forth their preference for a Pacific security pact for submission to the NSC. According to the document, a twenty-year collective security pact would be concluded, separate from a peace treaty, among friendly Pacific nations to provide the Atlantic Treaty type of collective commitment to defend any member nation against an armed attack. To carry out the security pact, a special agreement would be reached to fix American base rights in Japan. It was recommended that such a base agreement be based on a multilateral consensus, however, rather than on a bilateral agreement between America and Japan.⁸⁷ This requirement was necessary to cope with diplomatic and propaganda offensives by the Soviets against the retention of US forces in Japan.

It is worthy of note in conjunction with the proposed Pacific pact that there was a change in the State Department officials' thinking about Japan's role in the cold war era. During the latter part of 1949, the civilian planners had envisioned Japan as a passive ally whose security would rely unilaterally on American forces stationed around and in its main islands. By early 1950, however, they brought Japan into the scheme of a regional collective defense pact against Soviet threats and thus assigned it the potential role of an active ally as a member nation who would contribute to the security of the Pacific region as a whole. Such a positive role of Japan in turn might make its eventual rearmament inevitable. As a result, the State Department planners recommended in the position paper that a peace

⁸⁶ The reiteration of the JCS's opposition to a peace settlement was noted in a letter from Voorhees to MacArthur dated February 27, see FRUS 1950, vol. 6, p. 1133. The impact of the Sino-Soviet treaty on the policy position of the JCS was later mentioned in a memorandum by the JCS to Secretary of Defense Johnson, Aug. 22, 1950, *Ibid.*, p. 1280.

⁸⁷ A position paper, "Position of the Department of State on United States Policy Toward a Japanese Peace and Security Settlement," attached to Memo by Howard to Butterworth, March 9, 1950, *Ibid.*, pp. 1140-49.

treaty not contain any provision prohibiting rearmament. Other friendly FEC nations were expected to accept such a treaty because the accompanying Pacific pact would assure them of protection against any threat from a rearmed Japan. That recommendation indicated a slight modification of the previous position taken late in 1949 that a peace treaty should provide for the continued disarmament of Japan in the immediate post-treaty period. Nevertheless, the civilian planners remained opposed to immediate rearmament, even on a limited scale, after a peace settlement, insisting that any treaty should not authorize the establishment of a Japanese armed force. A main reason for their opposition was the apprehension that such authorization would jeopardize acceptance of the treaty by other FEC nations, most of which feared a revival of Japanese militarism. In addition, the State Department experts were concerned that America's move toward rearmament in the immediate post-treaty period cause such serious doubts among the Japanese about the validity of its occupation policy of disarmament as to threaten the continuance of their friendly attitude toward the United States.⁸⁸

Consequently, the State Department remained divided with the Pentagon over the timing of Japanese rearmament, even though the former modified its position to the point of recognizing the necessity for ultimate rearmament. As examined above, the Pentagon officials consistently insisted upon undertaking steps toward rearmament, even before a peace settlement. They had unsuccessfully attempted to obtain a governmental decision through the NSC to proceed with preparations for rearming Japan during 1949. When the issue was raised by the State Department in connection with the peace treaty problem, the Pentagon held firmly to the position that any treaty, if concluded, should authorize Japanese armament. Given their opposition to an early treaty, however, military planners basically sought to proceed promptly toward rearmament. The Army Department

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 1148.

once again urged by March 1950 that the JCS report of March 1949, recommending initial steps for the rebuilding of a Japanese army, had to be urgently brought before the NSC for a national decision. However, this renewed request was again rejected by the State Department, which wanted to link the issue of rearmament with that of the peace treaty.⁸⁹

2. Attempts to Resolve the State-Defense Impasse

Meanwhile, another attempt was made by Under Secretary of the Army Voorhees to break the deadlock between the State and Defense Departments. As he had done at the end of 1949, Voorhees offered another compromise solution to the State Department late in March. According to his new alternative, obviously devised to reconcile conflicting positions of the two departments, the United States and other nations would make a treaty with Japan terminating the technical state of war and granting it diplomatic rights. On the other hand, the United States would reserve the legal right to continue the occupation regime of control by SCAP and thus to maintain its occupation forces in Japan in preparation for emergencies.⁹⁰ Since this proposal for a "partial" peace settlement involved concluding some kind of treaty, it was more accommodating to the State Department position favoring a prompt treaty than the stand-by SCAP arrangement previously suggested in December 1949. Nevertheless, his new compromise was still directed more toward the Pentagon preference for the continuation of the occupation by allowing America to retain its predominant military position and potential authority over the Japanese government.

⁸⁹ Memo by Max Bishop to Rusk, Deputy Under Secretary of State, March 21, 1950, 794.5/3-2150, RG 59.

⁹⁰ Memo by Voorhees to Acheson, March 23, 1950, attached to Memo by Howard to Jessup, March 24, 1950, FRUS 1950, vol. 6, pp. 1150-53.

In consequence, the partial treaty option was rejected by State Department policy makers. In their view, to prolong indefinitely the occupation regime of control, even on a reserved basis, would lead to such suspicions and resentment among the Japanese about American intentions as to undermine seriously their pro-American orientation. The civilian planners preferred to have a permanent solution rather than adopt the temporary arrangement of a partial peace treaty which they expected would meet with difficulties as great as those of the former.⁹¹ Contrary to Voorhees's expectation, the JCS also disapproved the partial treaty option. They feared that its implementation would undermine the status and authority of American forces in Japan. Above all, in view of the formation of a Sino-Soviet alliance and increased Communist threats to Indochina and Taiwan, the military chiefs found no reason to alter the status quo of the occupation which best satisfied the military need of securing the unrestricted use of Japanese territory in preparation for contingencies and wartime situations.⁹²

With the State-Defense impasse still unsolved, there was a significant event in the State Department which had an impact on the collective decision-making process leading to an agreed position within the government. It was a change in the lineup of State Department policy makers concerned with the treaty problem. In an effort to appease mounting criticisms from the Republicans in Congress against the department's Far East policy, especially its moderate China policy, on March 27, Acheson named Deputy Under Secretary of State Dean Rusk to replace Walton Butterworth, who had become one of the targets of the congressional

⁹¹ Memo by Howard to Rusk, Jessep, and Butterworth, April 20, 1950, 694.001/4-2050, RG 59.

⁹² Memo by the JCS to Secretary of Defense Johnson, JCS 1380/88, April 20, 1950, CCS 388.1 Japan (9-1-4), Records of the JCS, RG 218.

criticism, as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs.⁹³ As a more positive move to restore bipartisanship in Far East policy, Acheson, with the Truman's approval, appointed John Foster Dulles, a prominent Republican who served as a leading foreign policy counselor for his party, as a special adviser to the Secretary of State on April 6. Dulles was assigned in mid-May to take full charge of preparations for a Japanese peace treaty. The appointment of Dulles was not only designed as a way out of the deadlock with the Pentagon, but also to obtain bipartisan support needed for treaty ratification by the Senate.⁹⁴

As the State Department determined its position about post-treaty security arrangements, Acheson decided to consult directly with Johnson and the JCS in order to find a common ground on which a national decision could be derived. Besides, Acheson found himself in a hurried situation in which he had to present an American position about the Japanese issue at forthcoming London talks with the British and French foreign ministers scheduled for early May. At Acheson's suggestion, the high-level policy makers of the two departments met on April 24. The discussion from the beginning centered around the question of whether the government should proceed with a peace treaty. Acheson criticized the JCS opposition as "a masterpiece of understatement" because the two requirements demanded by them, namely the retention of unlimited US bases in Japan and the participation of the Soviet Union and Communist China, would virtually make a treaty impossible. He then stressed the point that growing Japanese resentment and a prospect of the Russians' taking the initiative made it mandatory to proceed promptly toward a settlement. Acheson, on the other hand, sought to appease the

⁹³ For a brief account of Republicans' criticisms on the State Department's China policy, see Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp. 341-44.

⁹⁴ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 431-32; and *FRUS* 1950, vol. 6, pp. 1160-61.

military leaders, arguing that a Pacific security pact would grant America whatever base rights would be considered necessary to protect Japan from any military attack. Nevertheless, he recommended that Pentagon planners not demand such excessive base rights as to bring about serious difficulties in peace negotiations with FEC nations and adverse political consequences in the US-Japanese relationship.⁹⁵

Despite Acheson's persuasion, Johnson, supported by the JCS, argued against an early ending to the occupation. He even denounced Acheson and his staff for leaking confidential information to the press without any agreed-upon government position on the treaty issue. Moreover, Johnson contended that only the State Department advocated an early treaty. The members of the JCS bolstered his argument, claiming that even MacArthur had no real intention of pushing forward a treaty while publicly calling for a peace conference only for the purpose of propaganda against the Russians.⁹⁶

In connection with military requirements sought by Pentagon leaders, Butterworth, then adviser to Acheson for the treaty problem, inquired of the JCS how they planned to use American bases and forces in Japan. The service chiefs indicated their intention to utilize them for offensive operations against the Soviets in case of war in Europe. In their view, Europe and Asia were so linked along the Soviet borders that hostilities in one region could not be separated from those in the other. Butterworth took exception to the JCS plan because he expected that the Japanese would strongly object to granting the extensive use of bases for offensive purposes for fear that they would become involved in another major war. The discussion made it evident that there was a difference of the positions between the two departments as to the key purpose of the retention of bases and forces in

⁹⁵ Memo of conversation, by Howard, April 24, 1950, *Ibid.*, pp. 1175-82.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

Japan. The State Department planners viewed them as being stationed mainly to insure the defense of an unarmed Japan, whereas the Pentagon planners put emphasis on offensive uses in the event of war with the Soviets. The high-level meeting ended without agreement. The civilian and military planners only reached a tacit agreement that they would seek to resolve their conflicting stands after a visit to Japan by Johnson and General Bradley, chairman of the JCS, for consultation with SCAP, as scheduled for mid-June.⁹⁷

In the meantime, aware of a deadlock over the security issue within the US government, the Japanese government attempted to urge Americans to move toward a peace treaty. At the end of April, Prime Minister Yoshida sent his trusted adviser, Minister of Finance Hayato Ikeda, to Washington to convey Japanese willingness to request the continued stationing of US forces in Japan after the treaty. In a meeting with Joseph Dodge, then financial adviser to SCAP, on May 2, Ikeda expressed the view that his government desired "the earliest possible peace treaty." He added that, if the treaty required the retention of American forces and "if the US government hesitates to make these conditions, the Japanese government will try to find a way to offer them."⁹⁸ The summary of the discussion between Dodge and Ikeda was forwarded to the State and Army Departments for their information. In a memorandum to Under Secretary of State Webb, dated May 12, Butterwoth recognized the significance of Ikeda's remarks as the first official expression of the Japanese government position.⁹⁹ The Ikeda mission conveying an accommodating attitude toward base retention, however, produced no immediate impact on American action.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Summary of conversation with Ikeda, May 2, 1950, *FRUS* 1950, vol. 6, pp. 1195-96.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p. 1198, note 5.

On the other hand, to give an impetus to State Department endeavors to resolve the policy impasse with the Pentagon, on May 18, Truman assigned the task of making preparations for the peace treaty to John Foster Dulles, Republican adviser to Acheson. On the same day, Truman told his press conference that the Secretary of State was primarily responsible for the treaty matters and that he hoped a treaty was "not too far off", thus implicitly supporting the State Department in its contention with the Pentagon.¹⁰⁰ Dulles soon proceeded with preparatory work for a treaty in consultation with John Allison, director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, who was then designated as Dulles's assistant. The result of their preliminary work was submitted on June 7 to Acheson in the form of a memorandum prepared by Dulles. Outlining Dulles's views on the general terms and procedures of the peace treaty, the memorandum was largely in accord with the policy stands, which had been developed within the State Department. First, Dulles was convinced that there was an urgent need to move ahead with a treaty in consideration of the desire of the Japanese and the friendly FEC nations. Second, defining the long-range and overall US objective as making Japan a democratic, American-oriented, and self-supporting nation, he advocated having a non-punitive treaty which would not impose further reparations or other economic restrictions on Japan, and which would avoid post-treaty control machinery to supervise the execution of the treaty. Third, the Republican adviser endorsed long-standing State Department preferences, including those of strengthening the police forces for internal security and retaining American forces in the definite areas of post-treaty Japan for a limited period of time. However, Dulles purposely advanced no specific view on post-treaty security arrangements.

¹⁰⁰ The New York Times, May, 19, 1950.

He regarded them as a "technical military problem" which should be clarified through consultation with the Defense Department.¹⁰¹

Dulles had already expressed his personal view on alternative security arrangements as early as April, when he was for the first time briefed by State Department officials. Dulles took a stand against the neutralization of Japan, considering it unworkable in view of expansionist Soviet behavior. He also objected to temporary solutions, such as the stand-by SCAP arrangement and the limited political and economic treaty, because they would fall short of satisfying the desire of the Japanese and the other FEC nations. He was even skeptical of a Pacific collective security pact favored by the State Department. In Dulles's estimation, the Atlantic security treaty type of commitment to protect Japan against external aggression would be considered anomalous by other Western allies, for Japan, a former enemy, would secure America's military commitment which the other allies were eager to have. Moreover, in light of the fact that the "one-for-all and all-for-one commitment" of the Atlantic pact was regarded in the Senate as indicative of a close alliance relationship among the signatory nations, Dulles doubted that the Senate would approve the proposed Pacific pact providing for a similar commitment to the defense of Japan.¹⁰² Despite those personal views, the Republican adviser determined to refer security terms to the Pentagon because he identified his role as one of reconciling the competing positions of the two departments.

Viewing the planned visit by Johnson and General Bradley to Tokyo as an attempt to persuade MacArthur to withdraw his support for a prompt treaty, Acheson decided early in June to have Dulles and Allison make a similar visit for the State Department "to serve warning that discussion of a peace treaty was no

¹⁰¹ Memo by Dulles to Acheson, June 7, 1950, *FRUS* 1950, vol. 6., pp. 1207-12.

¹⁰² Memo of conversation, by Howard, April 7, 1950, *Ibid.*, pp. 1162-63.

longer premature."¹⁰³ Dulles also considered such a trip necessary to obtain MacArthur's position on the controversial security terms of the treaty.

Before the visit, a briefing memorandum was drawn up in the Pentagon to furnish Johnson and Bradley with a basis for forthcoming discussions with SCAP. The memorandum, prepared by General Carter Magruder, special assistant to the Secretary of Defense for occupied areas, examined the differing positions of major policy makers and then provided reasoning in support of the JCS position. In particular, the document at first refuted the State Department position that the occupation was losing its popularity to a point where a peace treaty was urgently needed to maintain Japan's pro-American orientation. MacArthur's favored option of neutralizing post-treaty Japan was rejected on the grounds that its neutrality would be ignored by the Russians, whose ultimate objective was to control Japan. A more convincing reason was advanced in opposition to that option. Japan was envisioned as playing the role of an active ally to meet American military needs in case of war with the Communist bloc. The document pointed out that:

in a hard-fought war, this would be a great disadvantage to the US in that Japan could not be utilized to assist in ending Russian domination of Manchuria and China, nor could Japanese bases be used in interdicting Russian communications so as to permit Manchuria and China to win their own freedom.¹⁰⁴

The memorandum, on the other hand, reaffirmed the military's stand that the occupation should be prolonged in order to retain the existing predominant military position in Japan in preparation for internal disturbances by the Japanese Communists or hostilities with the Soviet Union. It was finally recommended that

¹⁰³ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 432.

¹⁰⁴ Memo by Magruder to the Secretary of Defense, June 5, 1950, CJCS 092.2 Japanese Peace Treaty, RG 218.

Johnson and the JCS adhere to their previous positions in favor of a continued occupation and immediate Japanese rearmament.¹⁰⁵

The visit of Johnson and Bradley to Tokyo from June 17 to 23 overlapped that of Dulles and Allison, who stayed there from June 21 to 27. Anticipating separate high-level missions from Washington, MacArthur prepared a memorandum in which to set forth his basic stands on the treaty issue. In the document dated June 14, the supreme commander was once again insistent on a prompt treaty because of his deep concern over psychologically adverse effects upon the Japanese people which would result from a protracted occupation. The Japanese had "every moral and legal right to the restoration of peace," since they had fulfilled the obligations under the surrender terms. Further delay in moving toward a settlement, MacArthur argued, would lead to "a situation of general hostility" among the Japanese against the occupation authorities, while providing an occasion for the Russians to take the initiative for the treaty.¹⁰⁶

As to post-treaty security arrangements, the general disapproved both options of a Pacific security pact and a limited political and economic treaty under deliberation in the State Department. Both arrangements would arouse resentment and objections among the Japanese who would view them as being primarily dictated by America's selfish military interests. Moreover, he took a strong stand against any effort to rearm Japan, warning that it would certainly occasion "convulsive reactions" in Japan and the FEC nations as well. From the economic viewpoint, the rebuilding of an armed force sufficient to defend Japan against Soviet aggression was regarded as an impossible task in light of impoverished Japanese resources and the need for "billions" of dollars in American aid. The

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Memo by MacArthur on the peace treaty problem, June 14, 1950, *FRUS* 1950, vol. 6, pp. 1221-27.

general persisted in his preference for the permanent neutralization of an unarmed Japan. In his thinking, the primary means for the denial of Japan to Soviet control should be a political alignment resting upon the maintenance of Japan's pro-American orientation rather than a military alliance with the United States. With a view to providing a security solution acceptable to both the State and Defense Departments, however, MacArthur suggested the continued presence of a small number of US troops in Japan. Such forces would be retained only for the purpose of guaranteeing Japanese neutrality.¹⁰⁷ These views in the memorandum indicated that there was no change in the general's basic position about the treaty matters.

MacArthur's memorandum met with stubborn objections from Johnson and General Bradley during their stay in Tokyo. The Pentagon leaders once again urged upon MacArthur the need for a prolonged occupation because they doubted if the Japanese would behave in accordance with American military needs after the termination of the occupation. They even argued that most Japanese were more interested in their security than a prompt return of their sovereignty. Although MacArthur came to advocate retaining a token US force, his unchanged preference for the neutralization of Japan most conflicted with the Pentagon position that America should secure unlimited base rights in Japan in order to use it as a forward base for military operations in the event of war with the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁸

When Dulles discussed MacArthur's memorandum on June 22, he agreed with the general in pressing for a prompt settlement. Yet, Dulles requested that he draw up another memorandum containing his more detailed views on the controversial post-treaty security problem in the hope of finding a solution which could be accepted by the recalcitrant Pentagon planners. The general prepared a follow-up memorandum on June 23 in which he radically modified his previous

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan*, p. 276.

preferences. In sharp contrast with the stands taken in his June 14 memorandum, MacArthur now concurred with the Pentagon's claim for unlimited base rights in Japan. He suggested in the document that:

the entire area of Japan must be regarded as a potential base for defensive maneuver with unrestricted freedom reserved to the United States as the protecting power through her local commander, acting in the normal chain of command to the Department of Defense...¹⁰⁹

To diminish the adverse psychological effects of extensive base retention on the Japanese people, however, the supreme commander presented several reservations. Any changes in the disposition of American forces should be made in consultation with the Japanese government, except in an emergency. The armed forces should not have any authority to intervene in Japan's internal affairs. Finally, they had to be maintained on a fully "pay-as-you-go" basis, which would bring the annual contribution of about \$ 300 million to the Japanese economy. Furthermore, MacArthur, consistently standing against rearmament, seemed to adopt a flexible position about it, asserting that "despite Japan's constitutional renunciation of war, its right to self-defense in case of predatory attack is implicit and inalienable."¹¹⁰ However, this argument was intended less to recede from his opposition to rearmament than to rationalize the retention of extensive American bases in Japan. The general already had advanced a similar argument in his New Year's message for 1950 with a view to paving the way for base retention, even on a small scale.¹¹¹

It is not clear from available records why MacArthur abruptly abandoned his preference for Japanese neutrality and accepted the Pentagon's claim for unlimited base rights. His modification of position seems to have been designed to induce

¹⁰⁹ Memo by MacArthur, "Concept Governing Security in Post-war Japan," June 23, 1950, FRUS 1950, vol. 6, p. 1227.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 1228.

¹¹¹ The New York Times, January 1, 1950, p. 1.

the Pentagon planners to consent to starting the peace-making process by making a concession to their favored option. Perceiving an urgent need for a peace settlement, the general already manifested his intention in May and June to find a solution to the security issue acceptable to both the competing State and Defense Departments.¹¹² When MacArthur explained his altered position to Johnson and General Bradley on June 23, the Pentagon leaders viewed it favorably. However, they left for Washington on the same day without committing themselves to withdraw their opposition to the treaty.¹¹³

The occupation commander also discussed his follow-up memorandum with Dulles on June 26, the day after the Korean War suddenly broke out with the North Korean invasion of South Korea. MacArthur's compromise position was expected to provide Dulles with a basis on which he could produce a consensus within the government on the security aspects of the settlement. In effect, Dulles later followed the general's altered position in negotiating with Pentagon officials.¹¹⁴ In return for MacArthur's concession, Dulles promised him he would cast any security arrangements in the form of "overall international peace and security rather than in terms of any special advantage to the United States at the expense of Japan" in order to make them acceptable to the Japanese.¹¹⁵

¹¹² See Memo by Sebald to Butterworth, May 25, 1950, *FRUS* 1950, vol. 6, pp. 1205-7; and Memo by MacArthur, June 14, 1950, *Ibid.*, p. 1216 and p. 1221.

¹¹³ Memo by General Bradley to the JCS, June 26, 1950, CJCS 092.2 Japanese Peace Treaty, RG 218.

¹¹⁴ Late in September, when national decisions were reached on the treaty issue, Dulles expressed his personal appreciation in a personal letter to MacArthur, stating that "our present conclusions here coincide with the views which you put forward to Secretary Johnson and to me and I feel that your position created the bridge over which we can now make constructive progress." MacArthur, *Reminiscences*, p. 345.

¹¹⁵ Memo by Dulles, June 30, 1950, *FRUS* 1950, vol. 6, pp. 1229-30.

3. Effects of the Outbreak of the Korean War

The start of hostilities in Korea had several significant effects on Washington's policy toward East Asia in general and Japan in particular. First, North Korean aggression caused the United States to depart from its prior security policy of not committing its armed forces to the Asian mainland beyond the offshore islands in the western Pacific against a Communist armed attack.¹¹⁶ Within a few days after North Korea's launching a large-scale attack across the 38th parallel on June 25, the Truman administration decided to dispatch its air and naval forces to defend South Korea. Another decision was subsequently made on July 1 to commit ground forces to the battlefield. In addition, Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to protect Taiwan from a probable invasion by the Communist China and to restrain the Nationalists from taking hostile action against the mainland. At the same time, the United States increased military aid to French forces in Indochina and to the Philippines, both of which were under the growing threat of Communist insurrections. This change of policy and the subsequent courses of action resulted from the shared conviction among Truman and his policy advisers that, since North Korean aggression represented a Soviet-directed move designed to probe America's determination to resist Communist advances, they should respond to the invasion promptly and firmly. Doing so would avoid

¹¹⁶ US security policy for East Asia before the onset of the Korean conflict was set forth in the NSC policy paper, NSC 48/2, which had been approved by President Truman on December 30, 1949. The document provided that American defenses in the Far East were based on a chain of islands off the Asian mainland. For the text of NSC 48/2, see *FRUS* 1949, vol. 7, pp. 1215-19. This policy was two weeks later made public by Secretary of State Acheson's statement. In a well-known speech before the National Press Club in Washington on January 12, 1950, Acheson stated that the US defensive perimeter in the Pacific run from the Aleutians through Japan and Okinawa to the Philippines. South Korea and Taiwan were excluded from the defensive line. The State Department, *Bulletin*, vol. 22 (Jan. 23, 1950), p. 116.

undermining US prestige and credibility with other anti-Communist nations.¹¹⁷

More noteworthy, the outbreak of the Korean conflict provided an occasion for the United States to proceed with Japanese rearmament. The first move was unexpectedly taken on July 8 by General MacArthur, who had insisted upon the continued disarmament of Japan. He was faced with the situation that a large portion of American occupation forces, three of the four divisions, in charge of internal security in Japan, were being taken into the Korean battlefield. Therefore, MacArthur authorized the Japanese government to establish a Japanese National Police Reserve (JNPR) of 75,000 men and to expand the existing strength of the Maritime Safety Board by additional 8,000 men with a view to assuring internal security against possible Communist-inspired uprisings. The reasons given publicly for such authorization were to maintain internal order against "lawless minorities" and to safeguard the long Japanese coastal line against "unlawful immigration and smuggling activity." The general made no mention of the Korean War.¹¹⁸ As General Alonzo Fox, MacArthur's deputy chief of staff, reported to the Army Department, the purpose of the JNPR was "to fill the vacuum created by the movement of US forces to Korea." Hence, the eventual organization of the police reserve would consist of four divisions located in areas corresponding to the existing US division areas.¹¹⁹ While the new police reserve was intended to supplement the existing decentralized police at a total strength of 125,000 men, it would be established outside their framework and would function as a centrally-

¹¹⁷ See Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, pp. 405-6; Bradley and Blair, *A General's Life*, pp. 534-35; Max Hastings, *The Korean War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), pp. 58-59; and Callum A. MacDonald, *Korea: The War Before Vietnam* (New York: The Free Press, 1986), pp. 30-31.

¹¹⁸ Letter from MacArthur to Prime Minister Yoshida, July 8, 1950, 091 Japan TS, G-3, Records of Army Plans and Operations Division, RG 319.

¹¹⁹ Memo by General Fox to General Collins, Chief of Staff of the Army, July 12, 1950, C-3 091 Japan TS, Box 30, RG 319.

directed mobile constabulary which could developed into a para-military force, if equipped with proper arms.

MacArthur's authorization of the JNPR was made without prior consultation with Washington. He supposedly regarded it as a policy action, carrying out the State-Army directive of November 1948 which had been transmitted to him as a guideline for the implementation of the decision of strengthening the Japanese police included in NSC 13/2.¹²⁰ Although the formation of the JNPR was designed to fill a domestic security vacuum, the general's action has been widely regarded as the start of American moves toward Japanese rearmament in that the police reserve was later converted into a regular Japanese defense force. It is uncertain whether or not MacArthur had in mind from the beginning a plan to ultimately develop the police reserve into a regular army. The evidence indicates, nevertheless, that the general and his staff at least intended to expand the JNPR into a para-military force which would not only take charge of internal security but also perform certain military tasks in case of emergency, including an external armed attack. According to a study by the Far East Command staff, the police reserve would be organized along military lines into four divisions. Besides coping with domestic disorder and unrest, such a constabulary was to prepare for combat situations. It would be eventually equipped with heavy arms such as tanks and artillery.¹²¹ Based on this study, MacArthur submitted to the Pentagon a plan to organize the police reserve into four divisions and to make available to each of

¹²⁰ As mentioned in the last chapter, the State-Army directive recommended General MacArthur to carry out the following measures: (1) the expansion and improvement of the Japanese police in strength and equipment; (2) the creation of a centrally-directed mobile police; (3) the establishment of an investigative agency; and (4) the coordination by the national police of activities of all local police units. See State-Army message to SCAP, Nov. 22, 1948, 091 Japan, Draper/Voorhees File, RG 335. Despite this directive, the supreme commander took no action to implement other measures than the first one until late June 1950, when the Korean War broke out.

¹²¹ GHQ of the Far Eastern Command Staff Study, July 10, 1950, MMA, RG 6, noted in Richard Finn, *Winners in Peace*, p. 264.

these units equipment authorized for a light US division, except for heavy armament. On August 11, Johnson endorsed the plan in principle. Consequently, the JCS approved a program on November 13 to provide light arms for the JNPR in connection with defense budget planning for the fiscal year 1951. Moreover, just after the Chinese entry into the Korean War late in October, MacArthur drafted a secret plan by which to equip the police reserve with heavy arms normally assigned to standard US infantry divisions. The scheme was immediately disapproved by the Secretary of Defense and the JCS because of expected State Department opposition.¹²²

In actuality, as soon as the Japanese government formally announced the establishment of the JNPR on August 10, the mobile security force was recruited, organized, and trained by US officers along the lines of a military organization under the overall direction of SCAP's Civil Affairs Section. The police reserve was initially equipped with American rifles and light machine guns. The force units were largely deployed in the major industrial areas to cope with possible internal disorders inspired by Japanese Communists. By July 1951, about one year after its formation, the JNPR consisted of about 68,000 men equipped with light arms and stationed throughout Japan in units of regimental or battalion size. The police reserve became a quasi-military force in all but its name.¹²³

The outbreak of the Korean conflict and the subsequent transfer of American occupation troops to Korea caused military planners at the Pentagon to revitalize their efforts to obtain a national decision to undertake a program for rearming Japan even before a peace settlement. Such efforts had been aborted twice in mid-

¹²² Undated Memo by Secretary of the Army Frank Pace to Secretary of Defense Johnson, 091 Japan TS, G-3, RG 319; and JCS 1800/130, Nov. 13, 1950, CCS 370 (8-19-45) sec. 28, RG 218.

¹²³ See a JCS report on the development and status of the JNPR by July 1951, attached to Memo by the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, July 11, 1951, CD 092 (Japan), RG 330.

1949 and early 1950 because of objections from State Department planners fearing its adverse effects on peace-making efforts. Another attempt was made by the Army Department to secure a decision for immediate rearmament. Late in July, the NSC staff was preparing a policy paper for presidential approval concerning American courses of action to meet probable further Soviet moves relating to the Korean conflict. The Army recommended that a provision for rearming Japan be include in the paper. As a result, the policy document of July 29, as designated NSC 73/1, provided in reference to Japan that the United States, besides strengthening the police, should take steps to insure that "Japan's ability to defend itself and to contribute to US defensive strength in the Far East is increased."¹²⁴ When asked to comment on the document before full consideration by the NSC, the JCS requested General MacArthur's view about its provision pertaining to Japan.

The occupation commander took exception to the provision because he thought its adoption by the NSC would lead to immediate and substantial moves toward the creation of Japanese armed forces. He advanced several reasons for his opposition: (1) the expected unfavorable reaction of the FEC nations, (2) the likelihood of providing a legal pretext for the Soviet Union to land its occupation troops on Japan, and (3) a complete reversal of occupation policies, which would discredit the occupation authorities with the Japanese people.¹²⁵ This negative response indicates that the general favored pursuing rearmament gradually and indirectly through expanding the JNPR rather than through direct measures to establish a regular army. MacArthur worried that such overt rearmament would be

¹²⁴ Paragraph 40 of NSC 73/1, "The Position and Actions of the United States With Respect To Possible Future Further Soviet Moves In the Light of the Korean Situation," July 29, 1950, Records of the NSC, RG 273.

¹²⁵ Message from General Carter Magruder, special adviser to the Secretary of the Army for occupied areas, to SCAP, July 31, 1950, OASA 381 Japan, RG 335; and Cable from MacArthur to the Army Department, Aug. 2, 1950, *Ibid.*

so contradictory to the occupation policy of demilitarization as to undermine his prestige and accomplishments in Japan. Faced with MacArthur's objection, the JCS recommended that all reference to Japan be deleted from NSC 73/1. This suggestion arose from their estimate that it would be impossible for the Pentagon to carry out any program for immediate rearmament during the occupation without consent from SCAP as the authorities responsible for implementation. Accordingly, a policy paper finally adopted by the NSC on August 25 contained no provision regarding Japan.¹²⁶

In the meantime, the Army Department drafted a proposal in mid-July to gain the FEC's approval of rearmament for defensive purposes. The existing FEC decisions strictly prohibited Japan from having any armed forces and weapons other than the civilian police equipped with "small arms."¹²⁷ In order to proceed with the creation of a Japanese defense force before the termination of the occupation, therefore, the American government had to obtain the other FEC members' agreement to rescind or amend the decisions. As submitted to the State Department, the Army's draft proposal was rejected because it would certainly be blocked by a Soviet veto supported by the adverse votes of the other FEC nations.¹²⁸ The Pentagon faced not only the State Department's refusal to seek the FEC's approval but also MacArthur's opposition to a national decision. As a result, it retreated from its plan to undertake direct moves toward rearmament and

¹²⁶ Memo by General Charles Bolte, Assistant Army Chief of Staff for Plans, to General Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff, Aug. 2, 1950, OPS 091 Japan TS, RG 319. For the full text of the final policy paper, NSC 73/4, see *ERUS* 1950, vol. 1, pp. 376-90.

¹²⁷ The main FEC policy decisions laying a ban on Japanese rearmament were those of June 1947, entitled "Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan," and of February 1948, entitled "Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan and Disposition of Japanese Military Equipment."

¹²⁸ Memo by Green to Allison, July 13, 1950, enclosed in Memo by Allison to Dulles, July 14, 1950, 794.5/7-1450, RG 59; and Memo by Assistant Secretary of the Army Earl Johnson to Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Aug. 2, 1950, OASA 381 Japan, RG 335.

instead decided to pursue it through indirect measures to reinforce and equip the JNPR and the expanded Maritime Safety Board.¹²⁹ Nevertheless, this decision was still in conformity with one of the JCS recommendations in NSC 44 of March 1949 that the "strengthening and equipping of Japanese police and coastal patrols be undertaken with the secret ultimate objective in mind of the use of these forces as a basis for the establishment of limited Japanese military forces for the defense of Japan."¹³⁰

As another result of the start of hostilities in Korea, there was a change of position about rearmament on the part of the State Department. As examined above, Acheson and his policy advisers, envisioning a Pacific collective defense pact as a post-treaty security arrangement early in March, committed themselves to the principle that a peace treaty should not contain any provision prohibiting the eventual establishment of Japanese armed forces. However, they took a stand against proceeding with rearmament in the immediate post-treaty period because of its adverse consequences in American political relations with Japan and friendly FEC nations. The civilian planners' opposition to prompt rearmament was reinforced by their estimate that, in the immediate future, the Soviet Union would not resort to direct military aggression to attain its ultimate objective of controlling Japan. The outbreak of the Korean conflict, however, caused them to modify their calculation of Soviet intentions. The North Korean invasion, as perceived in Washington to be directed by Moscow, convinced the State Department planners that the Russians were willing to use armed forces to achieve their goals. In a memorandum to Dulles dated July 11, Maxwell Hamilton, who had been deeply concerned with the Japanese issues and then was the US representative on the

¹²⁹ Memo by General Bolte to General Collins, Aug. 2, 1950, *Ibid.*

¹³⁰ NSC 44, "Limited Armament for Japan," Memo from the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, March 1, 1949, *FRUS* 1949, vol. 7, pp. 671-73.

FEC, pointed out that the invasion in Korea demonstrated that Russia "does not mind a military tussle with the United States in any region or country where the tussle can be localized and where the Soviet Union and its satellites have clear superiority in military power." Therefore, any security terms of a peace treaty, he argued, had to be determined in conformity with this point.¹³¹

Dulles viewed the Communist invasion in Korea in a more serious perspective. He interpreted it as the start of Russian moves to seize Japan. In view of the revealed intentions of the Soviet Union toward Japan, Dulles stressed the need for rearming Japan. In his estimation, it would be almost impossible for the United States to defend Japan without any assistance from its own armed forces because of Soviet proximity and American remoteness. It was expected, however, that rearmament during the occupation would encounter strong objections from the other FEC nations and from the Japanese as well. Dulles suggested alternative courses of action: (1) to create a strong national police force and coastal patrol with the potential to be converted into armed forces after a peace settlement, and (2) to recruit Japanese individually as part of a United Nations force. He added that these steps should be taken "quietly and gradually" in order not to provoke the Soviets into preventive actions. Having these ideas in mind, Dulles asked Allison to determine ways to develop military strength in Japan within the framework of existing FEC policies.¹³²

The members of the Policy Planning Staff, who had been rarely involved in the Japanese matters since 1949, expressed their sympathy with Dulles's claim for limited rearmament, pointing out that "the Korean conflict and the deep uncertainties regarding the future now make it imperative... to create Japanese

¹³¹ Memo by Hamilton to Dulles, July 11, 1950, Lot File 56 D 527, RG 59.

¹³² Memo by Dulles to Paul Nitze, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, July 20, 1950, ERUS 1950, vol. 6, pp. 1246-48.

forces designated to contribute to the defense of the islands." Because of its existing commitment to the FEC policy of demilitarization, they contended, the United States should resort to "extraordinary measures," including the incorporation of the Japanese into the occupation forces.¹³³ In response to Dulles's request, Allison and his aides set out to examine various measures to increase internal security and defense, ranging from the reinforcement of the police forces to the creation of an armed force. In light of the sweeping prohibition of rearmament by the standing FEC decisions and the Japanese constitution, however, they regarded the rebuilding of a Japanese army as almost impossible and undesirable before the conclusion of a peace settlement. On the other hand, the civilian planners saw no restriction by the FEC decisions on implementing the State-Army directive to SCAP of November 1948 which set forth the principles to reinforce and recentralize the Japanese police. As a result, they favored the strengthening of the police forces as a recommended course of action.¹³⁴

To convey the State Department position to the Pentagon, Allison visited General Magruder, special assistant to the Secretary of the Defense for occupied areas, on July 24, and gave him a memorandum containing recommendations on the strengthening of the police forces. The document pointed out several factors underlining the need to increase Japanese internal security: (1) the diversion of the occupation troops from Japan to Korea, (2) the decentralized status of the Japanese police, and (3) the likelihood of a large scale of infiltration by Communist-indoctrinated Japanese prisoners of war (some 200,000 men) in Siberia. The memorandum viewed MacArthur's action to create the JNPR and augment the coastal police as highly favorable to Japanese security. It further recommended that

¹³³ Memo by the PPS, July 26, 1950, *Ibid.*, pp. 1255-57.

¹³⁴ Memo by Marshall Green, officer in charge of Japanese affairs in the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, to Allison, July 19, 1950, *Ibid.*, pp. 1244-46.

the Army Department instruct SCAP to carry out additional measures, such as the establishment of a national investigation agency similar to the FBI and the centralization of all the police units.¹³⁵

In response to the State Department recommendations, General Magruder prepared a memorandum to SCAP. While it is uncertain whether it was actually sent to MacArthur, the document outlined an agreed-upon position among the civilian and military planners in Washington to proceed toward limited rearmament by indirect means of expanding and equipping the Japanese police forces. The memorandum stated in part as follows:

In view of recent developments in Korea, the possibility of other Soviet moves in the Far East, and obvious importance of Japan to the USSR, the United States government is vitally concerned that Japan makes maximum contribution toward its own internal security and defense, and toward our objectives elsewhere in Asia. It is recognized that only a treaty of peace would release full Japanese energy and initiative to this end and remove legal restraints imposed by the regime of control. However, it is a view here that substantial additional measures toward these objectives can immediately should be taken within the framework of the present FEC policy. Such measures also should be acceptable to the present stage of Japanese public opinion...

The document suggested to MacArthur that the Japanese police be centralized and equipped with additional light arms, including tear gas bombs and machine guns, which were considered permissible under the existing FEC decisions.¹³⁶

To sum up, because of their perception of increased Communist threats to Japanese security resulting from the outbreak of the Korean conflict and the transfer of the occupation troops to Korea, the State Department officials altered their initial stand against rearmament during the occupation and in the immediate

¹³⁵ Memo by Allison to Magruder, July 21, 1950, attached to Memo of conversation, by Allison, July 24, 1950, *Ibid.*, pp. 1251-54.

¹³⁶ Undated Memo by General Magruder to SCAP, enclosed in Memo by Alexis Johnson, Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, to Hamilton, Aug. 3, 1950, 794.5/8-350, RG 59.

post-treaty period. They now recognized the urgent need to develop some Japanese military strength. Concerned over legal and political problems arising from direct rearmament, however, they decided to opt for the expansion of the police forces as an acceptable solution to the Japanese security problem in the remaining period of the occupation.

Finally, the onset of the Korean war also produced some effects on American policy makers' perceptions of the peace treaty problem. The North Korean invasion caused the State Department planners to reinforce their case for an early treaty. In particular, Dulles viewed the start of the war as hastening, rather than delaying, American action toward the conclusion of the treaty. According to his reasoning, Communist aggression in Korea aroused the Japanese into realization of the need for their acceptance of the retention of US forces in Japan. To take advantage of this Japanese mood, the United States government was required to move promptly ahead with the treaty. In addition, Dulles regarded one of the goals of the aggression as breaking up the plan to conclude a separate treaty. Therefore, the United States should show its resolution to proceed with the treaty so as not to allow the Communist move to achieve its goal.¹³⁷ Based on these considerations, Dulles asked Acheson on July 19 to discuss with the president the issue of taking steps necessary for peace-making. Agreeing to his Republican adviser's view, Acheson, in a meeting with Truman on July 24, convinced him of the need to initiate peace negotiations and, consequently, obtained presidential authorization to work out with the Pentagon concrete terms and procedures for the treaty at once.¹³⁸

¹³⁷ Memo by Dulles, July 6, 1950, 694.001/7-650, RG 59.

¹³⁸ Memo by Dulles to Acheson, July 19, 1950, *FRUS* 1950, vol. 6, pp. 1243-44; and Memo of conversation, by Acheson, July 24, 1950, *ibid.*, p. 1255.

With Truman's approval, Dulles and his assistant, John Allison, set out to the draft security provisions of a peace treaty in accordance with the terms proposed by MacArthur's memorandum of June 23 so as to render them acceptable to the Pentagon. A draft was completed on July 25 and transmitted to the Pentagon for comment on August 1. The State Department draft provided for the continued stationing of American forces in Japan with no limits in size and area. Specific terms for such retention would be determined by a bilateral security agreement. However, the draft contained no provision for Japanese rearmament in the post-treaty period.¹³⁹ In an effort to induce the Pentagon planners into the peace-making process, on the other hand, Dulles arranged meetings with them. In a telephone conversation with Johnson on August 3, he stressed the need to go ahead with the peace settlement in spite of the Korean War, but the defense chief declined to discuss the problem due to his preoccupation with the war. Since Johnson complained that the State Department draft did not reflect the views of the JCS or MacArthur, Dulles assured Johnson that its provisions would secure the military "the right to maintain in Japan as much forces as we wanted, anywhere we wanted, for as long as we wanted." This accommodating attitude led Johnson to intimate the intention for his department to consult with the State Department to determine the security terms of the treaty. Perhaps waiting for JCS comments on the State Department draft, however, the Secretary of Defense made no mention of whether to withdraw his opposition to a prompt treaty.¹⁴⁰

In contrast with its effect on civilian planners' stand on the timing of the treaty, the outbreak of the Korean War provided an occasion for the Pentagon planners to strengthen their case for the continuation of the occupation. From the military's perspective, the war underscored the importance of American military

¹³⁹ A draft of security clauses, "International Peace and Security," July 25, 1950, *Ibid.*, pp. 1260-61.

¹⁴⁰ Memo of telephone conversation, by Dulles, Aug. 3, 1950, *Ibid.*, pp. 1264-65.

control over Japan as a source of war supplies and as a forward base for military operations in Korea as well. In a conference between State and Pentagon officials on August 10, General Magruder pointed out that the Korean situation indicated a need for further postponement of a peace treaty in that it rendered the unrestricted use of the Japanese territory necessary "to back up our military operations in Korea," General Schuyler, chief of the Army Plans and Operations Division, further contended that, should the United States become committed militarily to Taiwan or Indochina, it would once more have to depend entirely upon Japan as a forward base. With the occupation terminated, it would find "considerable political difficulty in securing adequate Japanese facilities and resources for such purposes."¹⁴¹ In this respect, the civilian and military planners interpreted the Korean War so differently that it strengthened their respective positions concerning the timing of the peace treaty.

The military officials' perception of the implications of the Korean War was shared by the JCS. When they commented on the State Department draft on security provisions, the service chiefs insisted on continuing the occupation at least until the favorable resolution of the Korean conflict. Moreover, they emphasized American interim steps toward Japanese rearmament. It was also argued that, in the event of a global war with the USSR, Japan's war potential should be made available to the United States. However, the JCS made a significant concession to the State Department by consenting to the initiation of peace negotiations. In this connection, they withdrew their opposition to a treaty concluded without the participation of the Soviet Union and China, one of the main factors in the State-Pentagon stalemate. In view of the North Korean invasion inspired by the Soviets and their subsequent boycott of UN Security Council meetings, the military chiefs modified their calculation of Russian behavior. They now estimated that Soviet

¹⁴¹ Mome of conversation, by General Schuler, Aug. 10, 1950, G-3, 091 Japan TS, RG 319.

actions were "based upon political expediency and military capabilities" with little regard for prior international commitments. As a result, the JCS receded from their argument that a separate treaty would provoke the Russians into military actions against Japan by providing the ground that it violated international agreements such as the Japanese surrender terms and Moscow Agreement of 1945.¹⁴²

Turning to security terms of the treaty, the military chiefs maintained that the treaty should not contain any provision prohibiting the establishment of a Japanese armed force. In addition, it should provide for eventual phasing out of American forces from Japan, which would be effected in step with Japanese rearmament. The JCS preferred that a rearmament policy should be written into the treaty. Finally, they evaluated the State Department draft as unacceptable because the security terms favored by the military were not taken fully into account.¹⁴³

Despite persistent skepticism among the military planners about a prompt treaty, the concession by the JCS to agree to the start of peace negotiations led the State Department to accept all the security terms insisted upon by the military chiefs. The civilian planners, especially, agreed that the treaty should not become effective until after the favorable resolution of the Korean conflict. As to the issue of rearmament, however, they adhered to the initial principle that the treaty would not include any provision either prohibiting or authorizing the rebuilding of a Japanese force. While they recognized the need to take some urgent steps toward rearmament, the State Department officials remained concerned that the inclusion in the treaty of provisions indicating the rearming of Japan would provoke the other FEC nations to reject the treaty. In addition, they came to estimate that

¹⁴² Memo by the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, Aug. 22, 1950, FRUS 1950, vol. 6, pp. 1278-82.

¹⁴³ Ibid.

immediate rearmament after the termination of the occupation would not necessarily require its authorization in the treaty.¹⁴⁴

Based on the JCS recommendation and encouraged by the concessions from the State Department, Secretary of Defense Johnson withdrew his opposition to the treaty. He suggested, and Acheson agreed, that General Magruder and Allison would discuss and iron out any remaining differences between the two departments in order to reach an agreed position on the treaty problem. As a result, a joint State-Defense memorandum was prepared by the two officials and endorsed on September 7 by Acheson and Johnson for submission to the President. The document setting forth the agreed-upon procedures and security terms of the treaty was approved by the NSC and Truman the next day.

The joint memorandum, as designated NSC 60/1, included three major decisions: (1) to initiate Japanese peace negotiations; (2) to secure unlimited base rights in Japan proper; and (3) to proceed toward Japanese rearmament. In regard to the first decision, several tactical decisions were reached: (a) the treaty would be negotiated through bilateral discussions with each of the FEC countries rather than through a general peace conference; (b) these negotiations would be followed by a bilateral negotiation with Japan over security terms; (c) the treaty would not come into effective until the favorable resolution of the Korean War; and (d) any treaty should secure to the United States exclusive control over the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands. As to the decision of base retention, NSC 60/1 contained several specific terms: (a) the treaty should provide the United States with "the right to maintain armed forces in Japan, wherever, for so long, and to such extent as it deems necessary"; (b) detailed terms for retention would be stipulated in a bilateral security agreement with Japan; (c) American troops in Japan could put down

¹⁴⁴ Memo of State Department comments on the JCS memo, Aug. 23, 1950, attached to Memo by Allison to Acheson, Aug. 24, 1950, *Ibid.*, pp. 1284-88.

domestic civil disturbances; and (d) the eventual withdrawal of American forces would depend upon a final US decision.¹⁴⁵

With respect to the rearmament issue, the policy document recommended that the treaty not contain any provision prohibiting "Japan's inalienable right to self-defense in case of external attack, and to possess the means to exercise that right." It further stated that:

the Departments of State and Defense agree that provision must be made at an early date for Japan to begin to assume some of the burden of its own defense and in step with the Treaty negotiations the two Departments will consult and agree on measures to be taken to achieve the desired ends in a manner consistent with the overall political interests of the United States.¹⁴⁶

This policy statement signified that the civil and military planners agreed to proceed toward Japanese rearmament, possibly even before the termination of the occupation. At the same time, it reflected the State Department position that any steps for rearming should be taken in such a manner that they would not prejudice the peace-making process. However, it did not specify any definite timing and method of rearmament, leaving room for disputes between the two departments about its implementation during the remaining period of the occupation.

With NSC 60/1 approved by President Truman, the longstanding State-Defense impasse over the peace treaty problem was finally resolved. The civilian planners successfully induced the Pentagon leaders to consent to go ahead with peace negotiations in spite of the Korean conflict. In order to draw such an agreement, as Acheson later acknowledged, they had to accept all the security terms insisted upon by the JCS, a large part of which they considered unworkable

¹⁴⁵ Memo for the President, NSC 60/1, Sept. 7, 1950, enclosed in Memo by the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense, Sept. 7, 1950, *Ibid.*, pp. 1293-96.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p.1294.

and difficult to secure through the negotiations.¹⁴⁷

In the final analysis, the decision to proceed with the peace treaty is regarded as directly stemming not from the onset of the Korean War but from mutual compromise made by the concerned policy makers. The outbreak of the war produced the effect of deepening, rather than reducing, the disagreement between the civilian and military planners over the issue of timing the treaty. The reason was that they interpreted the event in such a manner as to reinforce their conflicting positions. Rather, the peace treaty decision was the result of the concessions to the Pentagon's military requirements, made by General MacArthur and the State Department with a view to obtaining the former's consent to the start of the peace-making process. In particular, the general's concession to the JCS's claim for unlimited base rights in post-treaty Japan served as a momentum for the policy makers in Washington to resolve the policy stalemate and reach the peace treaty decision. On the other hand, the rearmament decision can be interpreted as resulting from the outbreak of the Korean conflict in that the civilian and military planners agreed to increase Japan's security through its limited rearmament so as to cope with the situation that the occupation forces in Japan were deployed into the Korean battlefield.

F. Implementation

1. The Peace Treaty Decisions

A week after Truman authorized the initiation of peace negotiations, Dulles and his assistant, John Allison, began a series of preliminary discussions with the representatives of the FEC nations attending the UN General Assembly in New York. The State Department officials handed to them a memorandum setting forth

¹⁴⁷ Acheson, *Present At the Creation*, p. 434.

seven general principles as to the American terms of the peace treaty. Among them were the retention of US forces in Japan, America's strategic control of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands under a UN trusteeship, and the waiver of all claims to reparations. Dulles had already made public at a press conference on September 15 that the United States intended to impose no restrictions on Japanese rearmament in the treaty.¹⁴⁸ In the discussions held between mid-September and early November, several FEC members, including Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines, expressed strong objections to the absence of post-treaty economic and military controls over Japan and to the elimination of reparations. Dulles expected that adverse reactions from those friendly nations could be dealt with by further bilateral negotiations. The Russians took violent exception to all the American principles. However, they would simply be ignored because a decision had been made to proceed without them.¹⁴⁹

Meanwhile, Communist China's massive intervention in the Korean War and the consequent retreat of US troops from North Korea during November led to the temporary suspension of preliminary discussions with the FEC nations. However, Dulles interpreted these events as hastening, rather than delaying, the peace-making process. In a memorandum to the Secretary of State on November 15, he contended that, in view of the deteriorating situation in Korea, prompt steps toward the peace treaty were needed to commit Japan definitely to the Western side. He recommended as an immediate step that a mission be dispatched to Tokyo to undertake negotiations with the Japanese government about the peace and security arrangements. The mission would also discuss the feasibility of a collective security arrangement linking together such Pacific nations as Japan,

¹⁴⁸ Seven-point Memorandum, Sept. 11, 1950, ERUS 1950, vol. 6, p. 1296; and Fredrick Dunn, *Peace-Making and the Settlement with Japan*, pp. 107-8.

¹⁴⁹ See Memo by Dulles to MacArthur, Nov. 15, 1950, ERUS 1950, vol. 6, pp. 1349-52.

Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and the United States.¹⁵⁰ While accepting Dulles's proposal, Acheson needed to obtain consent from the Pentagon because of the decision in NSC 60/1 that a peace treaty should not come into effect until after a favorable resolution of the Korean conflict. Hence, he inquired of Secretary of Defense George Marshall, who had succeeded Johnson in mid-September, whether the Pentagon would object to proceeding toward the treaty in spite of the unfavorable situation in Korea. If the military agreed, Acheson would suggest to Truman that Dulles be appointed to lead a presidential mission to Japan.¹⁵¹

The Pentagon's response was negative. The JCS strongly objected to starting any negotiations with the Japanese. They feared the dispatch of the Dulles mission might incite the Soviet Union to aggressive military action against Japan, especially an invasion of Hokkaido, the northernmost main island of Japan, for the Russians would view the mission as accelerating a peace treaty leading to the indefinite retention of American forces in Japan and its rearmament. Another main reason for JCS opposition was the concern that a prompt treaty would deprive the military of the unrestricted use of Japan as a major base for operations in Korea and in a possible overt war with Communist China.¹⁵² The State Department planners expected, however, that any preliminary action such as the Dulles mission would not provoke a Soviet attack in view of the fact that the Russians already knew the American intentions toward Japan. Rather, they were concerned that further delay in the peace-making process would cause the Japanese to doubt the US determination to hold them against Communist advances. In addition, there was

¹⁵⁰ Memo by Dulles to Acheson, Dec. 8, 1950, *Ibid.*, pp. 1359-60.

¹⁵¹ Memo by Acheson to Marshall, Dec. 13, 1950, *Ibid.*, pp. 1363-64.

¹⁵² Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to the JCS, Dec. 28, 1950, *Ibid.*, pp. 1388-89; and Telegram by General Collins, Chief of Staff of the Army, to MacArthur, Jan. 3, *FRUS* 1951, vol. 6, p. 780.

evidence that the British sought to seize the initiative in the peace-making in order to adapt the settlement to their East Asian policies, which were different in many aspects from American ones. Therefore, the civilian planners advocated the prompt visit of the Dulles mission to Japan.¹⁵³ Because of those conflicting views, it was decided at a meeting between the State Department and the JCS on January 3, 1951, that they would defer to MacArthur's view. In a telegram to the JCS, the general urged the immediate initiation of negotiations with the Japanese, arguing that the Japan mission would not have any effect upon Soviet behavior.¹⁵⁴

Finally, the JCS and Marshall agreed to sent Dulles to Tokyo. To gain the Pentagon leaders' consent, the State Department made a concession that the results of the coming negotiations would not involve any final commitments, but would be subject to further consultation with the Pentagon. On January 10, Acheson and Marshall submitted a joint memorandum on the Dulles mission to Truman, who approved it the same day. The document outlined general American policies on the basis of which Dulles as a presidential emissary would negotiate with Japan and other concerned nations: (1) to move toward an early conclusion of the peace treaty regardless of the military situation in Korea; (2) to commit substantial forces to the defense of the offshore islands, including Japan; (3) to promote Japanese rearmament; and (4) to negotiate a Pacific collective security pact.¹⁵⁵

Dulles and his mission members, including Allison, General Magruder, and Assistant Secretary of the Army Earl Johnson, visited Tokyo from January 25 to February 11. The two principal objectives of the mission were to secure the acceptance by the Japanese of a bilateral security treaty providing for the unlimited

¹⁵³ Telegram by Acheson to Sebald, Jan. 3, *Ibid.*, 778-79; and Memo by Dulles to Acheson, Jan. 4, *Ibid.*, pp. 781-83.

¹⁵⁴ Telegram by MacArthur to the JCS, Jan. 4, 1951, *Ibid.*, pp. 780-81.

¹⁵⁵ Memo for the President, Jan. 9, 1951, *Ibid.*, pp. 787-89.

retention of American forces in post-treaty Japan and to obtain its commitment to rearmament. The first objective was attained without any serious difficulty during the negotiations. The Japanese gave their consent to most of the American terms of the treaty with a view to having a prompt settlement. However, they raised an objection to the initial US position that the security treaty would include detailed provisions for the rights and privileges of the American forces stationed in Japan. The Yoshida government feared the enumeration of such specifics in the treaty might create the impression that the military occupation would continue and thus arouse domestic political troubles in the process of ratification in the Diet. For this reason, the Japanese side suggested, and the Dulles mission agreed, relegating the detailed terms of force stationing to a separate administrative agreement that would not be subject to approval by the Diet or made public until after the peace and security treaties were endorsed.¹⁵⁶

The American attempt to gain a commitment to rearmament from the Japanese initially met with their resistance. When Dulles met Prime Minister Yoshida on January 29 and urged upon him the pressing need for the rebuilding of armed forces for self-defense, the latter expressed strong reservations. Yoshida advanced several reasons for his hesitancy to undertake immediate rearmament: the danger of a revival of militarism, strains on the economy and consequent domestic unrest, and adverse reactions from neighboring countries.¹⁵⁷ However, Dulles and his staff continued to press the Japanese to present a plan for developing their military strength in the ensuing talks. The negotiating tactic of the Dulles mission was at first to secure Japan's consent to the American security requirements before discussing the terms of a peace treaty. The Japanese finally

¹⁵⁶ Editorial note, *Ibid.*, p. 849; and Howard Schonberger, *Aftermath of War*, p. 259.

¹⁵⁷ Memo of conversation, by Allison, Jan. 29, 1951, *FRUS* 1951, vol. 6, p. 829; and Undated Memo by Yoshida, *Ibid.*, p. 834.

realized that they had to show a concrete scheme of rearmament so as to get an acceptable peace treaty.¹⁵⁸ At Yoshida's direction, Japanese officials prepared a memorandum in which to outline initial measures toward rearmament in the post-treaty period. In the document submitted to the American side on February 3, the Japanese government agreed to "embark upon a program of rearmament." As an initial step, it planned to create 50,000-man land and sea forces apart from the existing National Police Reserve. These forces would be placed under the newly established "Ministry of National Security."¹⁵⁹ Japan's rearmament plan seemed to satisfy the Dulles mission since it clearly displayed Japanese willingness to go ahead with the formation of an armed force.

On February 5, the American side handed to the Japanese a draft peace treaty. The draft contained brief and lenient provisions. The sovereignty of Japan would be fully restored over Japanese territory. However, the United States would retain its control of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands until the United Nations approved a trusteeship. There would be no restrictions on Japanese economic activities. Japan would not be obliged to pay any reparations. Japan's right of individual or collective self-defense would be recognized. The Japanese government accepted these liberal terms of the treaty "with profound gratification and gratitude."¹⁶⁰ At a meeting between Dulles and Yoshida on February 7, a consensus was reached on three main draft arrangements: a peace treaty which Dulles would further negotiate with the other FEC nations; a bilateral security treaty laying down general principles for the continued stationing of American

¹⁵⁸ Richard Finn, *Winners in Peace*, p. 279

¹⁵⁹ Unsigned Memo, "Initial Steps for Rearmament Program," Feb. 3, 1951, Lot File 56 D 527, RG 59.

¹⁶⁰ Memo by the Dulles mission, Feb., 1951, FRUS 1951, vol. 6, pp. 849-55. The quotation comes from an unsigned memo by the Japanese government, Feb. 6, 1951, *ibid.*, p. 860.

forces; and an administrative agreement setting forth specific terms for such retention. There was another agreed-upon document: the addendum to the security treaty to allow UN forces operating in Korea to use Japanese facilities and services after the peace and security treaties went into effect. However, those draft documents would be tentative and subject to changes by the American government if necessary.¹⁶¹

As the negotiation was completed, Dulles and his party left Japan for visits to the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. Their purpose was to gain support from these friendly FEC nations for the draft peace treaty discussed in Japan. The Dulles mission assumed another task to negotiate a Pacific collective security pact with them. As examined above, the scheme to conclude such a regional pact had been considered by the State Department planners in March 1950 as a recommended security arrangement pertaining to the peace treaty. However, it had been later rejected by Dulles because of the expected difficulty of obtaining approval in the Senate. By the end of 1950, Dulles came to recognize a Pacific pact as facilitating the peace-making process. It would assure such nations as the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand of collective security from a possible renewal of Japanese aggression so that they would accept a lenient peace treaty, which would not contain restrictions upon Japanese rearmament. In addition, the pact was expected to make the Japanese amenable to rearmament in spite of their constitution by investing their armed forces with an international status.¹⁶² Hence, Dulles's proposal for a Pacific treaty was approved by Truman, and his mission was instructed to negotiate it with the relevant countries.

¹⁶¹ Memo of conversation, by Robert Fearey, Feb. 7, 1951, *Ibid.*, pp. 866-69; and Memo signed by Allison and Sadao Iguchi, Japanese representative, Feb. 9, 1951, enclosed in Memo by Dulles to Acheson, Feb. 10, 1951, *Ibid.*, p. 875.

¹⁶² Memo by Dulles to MacArthur, Dec. 20, 1950, 694.001/12-2050, RG 59; and Memo by Dulles to Jessup, Ambassador at Large, Jan. 4, 1951, ERUS 1951, vol. 6, p. 135.

During his visits to the friendly Pacific nations, Dulles met with objections to the draft peace treaty and the proposed regional pact as well. The Philippine government took issue with the lack of any provisions for reparations and limitations on Japanese rearmament. It was reluctant to accept Japan as an ally in the framework of the Pacific pact. The Australian and New Zealand governments strongly preferred to have a tripartite security treaty with the United States rather than conclude the proposed collective treaty along with Japan. The scheme of the Pacific pact was also opposed by the British, not only because it would exclude them, but also because it would increase security threats from the Asian mainland to their protectorates, such as Malaya and Hong Kong.¹⁶³ In view of these adverse reactions, the policy makers in Washington decided to set aside the initial plan of a collective pact in favor of a series of mutual security arrangements. The final solution to security in the Pacific was to have three interlocking treaties: (1) a bilateral United States-Japanese security treaty which would provide a defense commitment to Japan through the retention of American forces; (2) a trilateral security arrangement involving the United States, Australia, and New Zealand which would provide for mutual consultation and assistance in case of an armed attack; and (3) a bilateral United States-Philippine security treaty incorporating previous base agreements on a mutual basis.¹⁶⁴

Upon his return to Washington, Dulles drafted the full texts of the peace and security treaties with Japan in mid-March on the basis of the documents agreed upon as a result of his talks with the Japanese. The text of the draft peace treaty was instantly handed to the representatives of the FEC countries in Washington for

¹⁶³ Note by the British Embassy to the State Department, Feb. 14, 1951, *Ibid.*, pp. 154-55.

¹⁶⁴ The trilateral arrangement known as the ANZUS Pact was signed in Washington on September 1, 1951. The US-Philippine security treaty was concluded at San Francisco on August 30, 1951. See editorial notes, *Ibid.*, pp. 250-51.

further consultation. It was submitted by Acheson to President Truman for his comment. On March 26, Truman gave approval to the draft treaty, stating that "I hope you will be able to implement this Treaty as quickly as possible."¹⁶⁵ It was once again the JCS, however, who stood in the way of progress toward a peace settlement. When they were asked to comment on the draft treaties, the service chiefs raised definite reservations about the timing of the settlement, arguing that the treaty should not take effect until the Korean conflict ended. In addition, they took exception to the addendum to the draft security treaty referring to the continued use of Japan by the UN forces in Korea. The JCS preferred to modify the document in the direction of permitting American forces to utilize Japan for unilateral operations in other Far Eastern areas, including China, Taiwan, the Soviet Union, and the high seas. Because of the continuing crisis in Korea, the military chiefs wanted to prepare for the possible extension of hostilities into areas other than Korea. Especially, they remained concerned that the Russians might undertake an invasion of Japan because of the conclusion of the peace treaty, which would pave the way for its rearmament.¹⁶⁶

Faced with the JCS reservations, Dulles doubted if the Pentagon still intended to force a delay in the peace-making process in defiance of the presidential decision in January to proceed toward the settlement without awaiting the resolution of the Korean conflict. He arranged a meeting with the Pentagon leaders to ascertain their real intention. At the meeting of April 25, Secretary of Defense Marshall explained that the military did not oppose the early signing of the treaty but did oppose its ratification in the Senate prior to the termination of the Korean War. The Pentagon planners' primary concern was that, as a result of

¹⁶⁵ See footnote 5, *Ibid.*, p. 950.

¹⁶⁶ Memo by the JCS to Marshall, April 17, 1951, enclosed in Memo by Marshall to Acheson, April 19, 1951, *Ibid.*, pp. 990-93.

bringing the treaty into effect, the military might be restricted in its use of Japanese bases and facilities for conducting the war.¹⁶⁷

In the meantime, the State Department continued to negotiate the specific provisions of the peace treaty with the other FEC countries, especially Great Britain. As a revised draft treaty agreed on by the American and British negotiators was given to the JCS for comment in mid-June, the military planners once again advanced reservations about the timing of the settlement. At this time, they insisted that the treaty should not come into effect until it was ratified by the United States. This requirement would give America the power to veto indefinitely the implementation of the treaty between Japan and any other signatory.¹⁶⁸ Hence it reflected the military's persistent intent to postpone ending the occupation as long as hostilities in Korea continued. Forwarding the JCS comment to Acheson, Marshall expressed a negative view about it, arguing that "it may not be practicable to give the United States such unlimited control over the actions of its sovereign allies..." Owing to the objection raised by the JCS, however, Marshall suggested that the matter be taken to the President for decision.¹⁶⁹ Acheson explained to Truman that the proposed draft treaty in effect assured the United States of a nine-month veto over the treaty's coming into force after Japanese ratification. With Marshall's support, he convinced the President that any attempt to renegotiate the draft treaty for a perpetual veto would fail because of resistance from the other concerned nations. Truman decided on June 29 to overrule the JCS objection in favor of the draft treaty as it stood.¹⁷⁰ Accordingly, the document was

¹⁶⁷ Memo of conversation, by Dulles, April 25, 1951, *Ibid.*, pp. 1019-21.

¹⁶⁸ Memo by the JCS to Marshall, June 26, 1951, *Ibid.*, p. 1157.

¹⁶⁹ Memo by Marshall to Acheson, June 28, 1951, *Ibid.*, p. 1156.

¹⁷⁰ Memo of conversation, by Acheson, June 29, 1951, *Ibid.*, pp. 1163-65.

circulated to the interested governments and published on July 12. The peace treaty would be signed early in September as initially planned and would become effective within a year, regardless of the situation in Korea.

On the other hand, the draft security treaty completed by Dulles and his staff early in July was subjected to a substantial modification when it was considered by Pentagon officials. On the memoranda of July 17 prepared to comment on the draft, the JCS and the secretaries of the three service departments both recommended strongly that a provision be included in the treaty to authorize the United States to utilize Japan as a base for military operations in the Far East, including operations against China and the Soviet Union.¹⁷¹ The military planners considered such authorization necessary to prepare for the escalation of the Korean conflict into an all-out war with the Communist powers. Their demand was accepted by Dulles and later by the Japanese government. As a result, the first clause of the draft treaty was modified as follows (with italics for the newly inserted phrase):

Japan grants, and the United States accepts the right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace and of this Treaty, to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to contribute to *the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East* and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without...¹⁷²

Agreeing to this change, however, Dulles suggested, and the Pentagon planners concurred, deferring the public release of the text of the security treaty until its signing. They were concerned about the adverse impact of such publication on the forthcoming peace conference. Certain unfriendly nations, especially the Soviet Union, were expected to "attack the peace settlement as in essence giving the

¹⁷¹ Memo by the Joint Secretaries to Marshall, July 17, 1951, *Ibid.*, p. 1258; and Memo by the JCS to Marshall, July 17, 1951, *Ibid.*, pp. 1258-59.

¹⁷² United States-Japanese Draft of a Bilateral Security Treaty, July 31, 1951, *Ibid.*, p. 1233.

United States the right to use Japan as a military base to carry an offensive threat to Russia and Communist China."¹⁷³ The text was released to the press shortly before its signing on September 8.

The peace conference began at San Francisco among the delegations of fifty-two countries on September 4. It was not held for negotiation but for the approval of a American-drafted peace treaty. After the aborted Soviet attempt to alter its terms, the representatives of forty-nine nations, except those of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Soviet Union, signed the treaty on September 8. The United States and Japanese governments later signed the bilateral security treaty on the same day. They also signed and exchanged an accompanying note in which Japan agreed to allow the UN forces in Korea to utilize Japanese bases and facilities as long as the Korean War persisted.¹⁷⁴ The document was designed to ease the JCS concern that the peace treaty would, if brought into effect before the resolution of the war, interfere with the continued use of Japan for operations in Korea.

With the security treaty signed, the two governments set out to negotiate an administrative agreement stipulating specific terms for the stationing of American forces in Japan. The major point of contention during the negotiation was the issue of a unified US command. On the recommendation of the Pentagon, the American draft contained a provision that all Japanese and US forces in Japan would be placed under the unified command of a US commander in the event of actual or imminent hostilities. The Japanese side strongly objected to the provision, mainly because its inclusion in the agreement was expected to cause domestic political difficulties, including the possible defeat of the ruling Liberal Party in the coming general election. In the end, the American side compromised with a generalized clause that the two governments would "consult together" about necessary defense

¹⁷³ Memo by Dulles to Acheson, Aug. 2, *Ibid.*, p. 1232, note 1.

¹⁷⁴ For the text of the note, see Department of State, *Bulletin*, vol. 25, Sept. 17, 1951, p. 465.

measures in case of hostilities. The administrative agreement was finally signed on February 28, 1952.¹⁷⁵ After they were ratified by the Senate, the peace and security treaties came into force on April 28, and the military occupation formally terminated. However, the US forces remained in Japan in accordance with the security treaty.

The treaty gave America unlimited rights to station and move its armed forces in the Japanese main islands. It permitted the forces to undertake operations from bases in Japan against other areas of the Far East. Moreover, it invested them with the right to intervene in large-scale internal disturbances in Japan. It called upon Japan to proceed with rearmament for self-defense. There was, however, no provision in the treaty obligating the United States to defend Japan in case of an armed attack.¹⁷⁶ Although the continued presence of its forces suggested an intention to protect Japan from external aggression, the American government avoided stipulating an explicit defense commitment in the treaty in order to secure its freedom of action in an emergency. By bringing the peace and security treaties into effect, the US policy makers completed the implementation of the decisions in NSC 60/1. The treaties incorporated the security requirements recommended in the document. One exception was that they came into force before the the Korean War ended, contrary to the original decision. In order to induce the JCS to agree to initiate peace negotiations, in September 1950, the State Department planners had yielded to their demand that the peace treaty should not become effective until after a favorable resolution of the war. By virtue of support from President Truman

¹⁷⁵ Memo of conversation, by Niles Bond, Counselor of the Mission in Japan, Feb. 18, 1952, *FRUS* 1952-1954, vol. 14, part 2, pp. 1175-79; Memo of conversation, by Bond, Feb. 23, 1952, *Ibid.*, pp. 1188-90; and Memo by the State Department, Feb., 28, 1952, *Ibid.*, p. 1204.

¹⁷⁶ For the text of the security treaty, see Raymond Dennett and Katherine Durant (eds.), *Documents in American Foreign Relations*, 1951 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), pp. 266-67.

and Secretary of Defense Marshall, however, they changed the initial decision, in the face of JCS opposition, during the process of implementation. The military chiefs, on the other hand, obtained the assurance of the continued use of Japan for operations in Korea in return for their compliance with the revised policy of implementing the peace treaty regardless of the Korean situation.

2. The Rearmament Decisions

(1) To Expand the National Police Reserve into a Regular Army

In NSC 60/1, the State Department planners agreed in principle to proceed toward Japanese rearmament. Primarily concerned about its negative effects on the peace-making process, however, they preferred to undertake a program for indirect rearmament through the expansion and equipping of the newly established JNPR during the later period of the occupation. In addition, they took the stand that any steps for reinforcing the police reserve should be taken without clearly conflicting with the existing FEC decisions permitting only "small arms" in order to avoid legal and political problems with the other FEC countries. This position remained unchanged in spite of the massive Chinese intervention in the Korean conflict and increased Communist threats to Japanese security late in 1950.¹⁷⁷ The JCS and Army Department officials, on the other hand, considered the limited strengthening of the JNPR inadequate to the defense of Japan in light of the complete withdrawal of the US occupation forces from Japan to the Korean front. During December, there were recurring Army reports of a build-up of Communist forces in Siberia and Sakhalin, including both Soviet forces and Soviet-trained

¹⁷⁷ See a State Department position paper, Dec. 3, 1950, enclosed in Memo by the JCS to Marshall, Dec. 4, 1950, CCS 388.1 Japan (9-1-47) sec. 3, RG 218; and Memo by U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Jan. 6, 1951, *FRUS* 1951, vol. 6, pp. 784-85.

Japanese POW's.¹⁷⁸ Hence, the military planners wanted to expand the police reserve into fully equipped ground forces to cope with a possible attack on Japan.

In this context, early in January 1951, General MacArthur requested the Army Department to equip the four JNPR divisions with heavy armament (tanks, artillery, etc.)¹⁷⁹ equivalent to that authorized for standard US infantry divisions. Accepting the request, the JCS asked Marshall to obtain presidential authorization to provide such equipment for the existing police reserve and to include in the Army's budget funds for the fiscal year 1952 to support a program for equipping six additional divisions so as to make an eventual total of ten divisions. The service chiefs interpreted these measures as implementing the policy statement on rearmament in NSC 60/1.¹⁸⁰ Their proposals stemmed from the concern about the imminent threat of Soviet aggression on Japan. According to an Army report to the JCS in January, by mid-April the Russians would have the capability of employing ten divisions in amphibious operations against Japan. The report estimated that the Soviet threat would become acute by early May, when the weather conditions were improved.¹⁸¹ On February 15, Marshall concurred with the JCS proposals and forwarded them to Acheson for consultation prior to presidential approval.¹⁸²

The State Department responded negatively. In a memorandum to Marshall dated March 1, Under Secretary of State James Webb advanced several reasons in

¹⁷⁸ Memo by General Maxwell Taylor, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, to General Collins, Chief of Staff of the Army, Feb. 27, 1951, G-3, 091 Japan TS, Box 30, RG 319.

¹⁷⁹ "Heavy armament" was interpreted to include tanks, artillery, recoilless rifles, mortars larger than 81 mm, rockets larger than 3.5 inch, and similar heavy weapons. See Memo by the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, Sept. 14, 1951, ERUS 1951, vol. 6, p. 1350.

¹⁸⁰ Memo by the JCS to Marshall, Feb. 9, 1951, *Ibid.*, pp. 884-85.

¹⁸¹ Memo by General Burns, Executive Secretary of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, to Marshall, Feb. 14, 1951, CD 092 Japan, RG 330.

¹⁸² Memo by Marshall to Acheson, Feb. 15, 1951, ERUS 1951, vol. 6, p. 884.

opposition to the provision of heavy equipment to the JNPR. First, such unilateral action would violate the FEC policy of disarmament and thus could lead to the breakup of the Commission. The result was that America would be isolated in its policy toward Japan. Second, it would jeopardize support for the American terms of the peace treaty both in Japan and among the friendly FEC nations. Third, it might make it difficult for the United States to obtain international support for counteraction in case the Russians launched an attack against Japan on the pretext of the violation of the FEC decisions prohibiting rearmament.¹⁸³ Moreover, Assistant Secretary of State Rusk contended that the policy statement on rearmament in NSC 60/1 was made only as one of the security requirements that should be considered in the conduct of peace negotiations.¹⁸⁴ Recognizing the need to prepare for an emergency, nevertheless, the civilian planners suggested to the Pentagon "extraordinary measures" they could justify and defend in the FEC. That is, heavy equipment for the police reserve forces should be stockpiled in the Far East Command but not delivered to them without prior agreement by the State Department. They also consented to undertake planning and budgeting for armament to supply an additional six divisions. The JCS and Marshall accepted such measures. Truman endorsed them on May 1.¹⁸⁵

As soon as the peace treaty was signed early in September, the JCS raised the issue of releasing heavy equipment to the JNPR. They insisted that the combat capability of the police reserve should be immediately developed by making stockpiled equipment available to them. This demand arose out of the perceived need to strengthen Japanese security in light of increased tensions in the Far East

¹⁸³ Memo by Webb to Marshall, March 1, 1951, *Ibid.*, pp. 898-99.

¹⁸⁴ Memo by Rusk to Webb, Feb. 22, 1951, *Ibid.*, p. 894.

¹⁸⁵ Memo by Webb to Marshall, March 1, 1951, *Ibid.* p. 900; and Memo by Marshall to Acheson, April 20, 1951, *Ibid.*, pp. 1001-2.

resulting from the signing of the treaty without the participation of the Soviet Union and Communist China.¹⁸⁶ The State Department officials once again objected by reason that such a release would make difficult the ratification of the peace treaty in many other FEC countries. As a compromise designed to satisfy to some extent the military need, however, they suggested that if no serious objections should be raised after consultation with the FEC members, personnel from the JNPR be brought in rotation to American bases in Japan to undergo training with heavy arms until the treaty became effective.¹⁸⁷ In the discussions with the friendly FEC nations during November, the State Department proposal did not meet with opposition from them. By early December, the JCS authorized General Ridgway, SCAP, who had replaced MacArthur after his abrupt dismissal in April, to carry out the training program for the Japanese security forces.¹⁸⁸

As the occupation terminated in April 1952, General Mark Clark, who succeeded Ridgway as CINCFE, no longer saw obstacles to the transfer of heavy armament to the JNPR. The Yoshida government indicated a willingness to accept it. On July 12, the general recommended to the JCS that authority be granted for the release of equipment in order to expand the police reserve into an effective armed force to supplement the US troops in Japan.¹⁸⁹ The State Department agreed on the condition that the transfer had to be made "gradually and quietly" in view of possible adverse repercussions in Japan and among other Asian countries. With Truman's approval obtained on July 31, General Clark began to deliver about 500

¹⁸⁶ Memo by the JCS to Secretary of Defense Lovett, Sept. 14, 1951, *Ibid.*, pp. 1349-50.

¹⁸⁷ Memo by Webb to Lovett, Sept. 28, 1951, 894.501/9-1951, RG 59; and Memo by Lovett to Acheson, Nov., 1951, 894.501/11-651, RG 59.

¹⁸⁸ Telegram General Jenkins, Assistant Chief of Army Staff for Operations, Dec. 6, 1951, G-3, 091 Japan TS, Box 32-A, RG 319.

¹⁸⁹ Telegram from General Clark to the JCS, July 12, 1951, 383.21 Japan (3-13-45) Sec. 30, RG 218.

artillery and 550 light tanks on a loan basis to the Japanese government for use by the JNPR.¹⁹⁰ The police reserve was about to become a regular army in all but name. Moreover, its strength had been expanding from 75,000 to 110,000 men by governmental authorization since early April. The Yoshida government took other measures toward rearmament during 1952. On April 26, it created a Coastal Safety Force as an embryonic navy with a strength of 6,038 personnel, apart from the existing Maritime Safety Board. On August 1, a National Safety Agency was established as a kind of defense ministry to exercise supervision and control over the activities of all the security forces. In mid-October, the JNPR was formally renamed the National Safety Force and placed, along with the coastal forces, under the direction of the agency.¹⁹¹

The establishment of the National Safety Agency was interpreted as implementing a part of the rearmament plan which had been handed to the Dulles mission by the Yoshida government early in 1951. An increase in the authorized strength of the JNPR resulted largely from American pressure in January 1952. As the peace and security treaties were signed, the Pentagon set out to push the Japanese into a build-up program for the police reserve. On September 26, 1951, General Ridgway, SCAP, proposed a rearmament plan to the JCS in which the JNPR would be expanded during 1952 from the existing four-division force to an eight-division force of 150,000-180,000 men and during 1953 to a balanced ten-division force of 300,000-325,000 men. This expansion program was designed to enable Japan to assume a substantial share of defense responsibilities within two

¹⁹⁰ Memo by Allison to Acheson, July 31, 1952, Lot File 56 D 527, RG 59.

¹⁹¹ Progress Report on NSC 125/2 by Walter Smith, Under Secretary of State, to the NSC, Feb. 19, 1953, Records of the NSC, RG 273 ; and James Auer, The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945-71 (New York: Praeger, 1973) p.84.

years.¹⁹² Since Truman had authorized the Army to proceed with planning and budgeting to equip a ten-division force in May, the JCS (without consultation with the State Department) approved SCAP's plan and asked him to discuss it with the Japanese government. The military chiefs considered such an expeditious buildup necessary for the following reasons: (1) to reduce the total American cost of defending Japan; (2) to permit the release of a part of US troops for employment in other areas, especially in Europe; and (3) to ease growing Japanese resentment against the retention of a large-scale American force in Japan.¹⁹³

By mid-January of 1952, Ridgway initiated informal discussions with Prime Minister Yoshida and his staff. The purpose was to secure Japan's agreement to the Pentagon's defense plan and budgetary support for it. This was the first time that the American side presented to the Japanese concrete force goals and timing for their achievement. Because of SCAP's urging, Yoshida personally agreed to increase to 150,000 men during the Japanese fiscal year 1952 (which would end on March 31, 1953) and to 300,000 men for the following year.¹⁹⁴ Early in February, however, the Prime Minister, after consultation with his ruling party members, submitted to the Diet an expansion program in which to authorize a strength of 110,000 for the coming fiscal year, a force level which represented a compromise between the American and Japanese desires. After Diet approval in April, the JNPR was expanded and disposed throughout Japan with a moderate concentration in Hokkaido, the area most likely to be hit first by any Soviet attack. Despite his

¹⁹² Message from Ridgway to the Army Department, Sept. 26, enclosed in Memo by General Collins, Chief of Staff of the Army to the JCS, Dec. 27, 1951, G-3, 091 Japan TS, Box 32-A, RG 319.

¹⁹³ Memo by the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, Dec. 27, 1951, Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Memo by General Marquat, Chief of SCAP's Economic and Scientific Section, to General Collins, Feb. 6, 1952, Ibid.

informal agreement with Ridgway, however, Yoshida did not show any intention of further developing the security forces.¹⁹⁵

The US government, on the other hand, continued to push the Yoshida government to move rapidly toward the expansion of the JNPR (renamed the National Safety Force) beyond the authorized strength of 110,000 men. The rationale was that a substantial buildup of Japanese defense forces would make it possible to undertake a phased withdrawal of America's ground forces from Japan and to reduce its financial burden for Japanese security. The first official US plan for the defense buildup had been formulated by the JCS in December 1951. It envisaged the development by Japan of a ground force of 300,000 men in ten divisions, a naval force of 68 vessels, and an air force of 2 squadrons in the initial stage.¹⁹⁶ The plan was approved by the NSC and the President in early August 1952, when they decided on a new Japanese policy paper (NSC 125/2). The document, setting forth American policies in the post-treaty period, recommended as military courses of action that:

The United States... assist Japan to develop military forces which will eventually be capable of assuming responsibility for defense of Japan against external aggression. As a first stage, assist Japan to develop a balanced ten-division ground force and appropriate air and naval arms.¹⁹⁷

Although the policy paper did not stipulate it, the JCS timetable called for the achievement of the initial force goals by mid-1954. Based on those force goals and timing, Washington urged Tokyo to accelerate the development of its defense forces. However, the Yoshida government resisted American pressure, publicly

¹⁹⁵ Memo by Alice Dunning to Robert McClukin, Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Feb. 14, 1952, 894.501/2-1452, RG 59; and The New York Times, April 3, 1952.

¹⁹⁶ Memo by the JCS to Lovett, Dec., 12, ERUS 1951, vol. 6, pp. 1334-35.

¹⁹⁷ NSC 125/2, "United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Japan," Aug. 7, 1952, ERUS 1952-1954, vol. 14, pp. 1306-7.

reiterating that it had no plan to increase the National Safety Force beyond the authorized 110,000 figure. This position of reluctance persisted until mid-1953.¹⁹⁸

For a number of reasons, the Japanese were unwilling to move rapidly on a defense buildup. First, there was a lack of appreciation of Japan's need for assuming a primary responsibility for its defense. The Yoshida government was convinced that the continuing cold war required the United States to retain its forces in Japan which assured Japanese defense. Therefore, the government's immediate objective was to promote economic recovery and political stability. The increase of defense strength was of lower priority. In addition, the Japanese tended to discount the danger of direct Soviet aggression because of the continued stationing of American forces. Second, the declining political position of the Yoshida government resulted in its reluctance to proceed with rapid rearmament. The ruling Liberal Party suffered substantial losses of its representation in the Diet in the elections of October 1952 and April 1953. The result was that Yoshida came to operate with a minority government which held 202 of the 466 seats of the dominant House of Representatives. The government's reservations toward rearmament stemmed partly from the fact that, for varying reasons, it faced opposition from all other parties on that issue. Third, the constitution prohibiting the maintenance of armed forces produced difficulties in taking measures toward such an extensive buildup as the United States desired. The Japanese government had rationalized the expansion of the National Safety Force by emphasizing internal security aspects. Rapid and large-scale rearmament was thought to require a constitutional revision. In view of neutralist and anti-rearmament sentiments among a large part of the Japanese public, however, the Yoshida cabinet had no intention of proceeding with an amendment to the constitution which would

¹⁹⁸ Memo of conversation, by Charles Sullivan, Aug. 20, 1952, *Ibid.*, pp. 1314-16; Telegram from Robert Murphy, Ambassador to Japan, to the State Department, Dec. 30, 1952, pp. 1369-73; and Telegram from Murphy to the State Department, Dec. 31, 1952, *Ibid.*, pp. 1373-74.

involve high political risks. Finally, Yoshida's personal fear of a revival of militarism contributed to his hesitation to undertake a large-scale defense buildup, particularly in light of his victimization by militaristic groups during the war. In consequence, the rearmament policy of the Yoshida government was one of slow and gradual progress.¹⁹⁹

(2) To Establish the Nucleus of a Navy

The creation of the Coastal Safety Force as the nucleus of a navy in April 1952 was to carry out a presidential decision late in August 1951 to establish a Japanese-manned coastal security force under SCAP's operational control. That decision in turn originated from General MacArthur's action on July 8, 1950 to direct the Yoshida government to augment the existing Maritime Safety Board by 8,000 personnel, thus bringing it to a total of 18,000. On July 23, 1950, the general recommended to the JCS that 40 naval patrol-type craft from the US reserve fleet be transferred to the Japanese maritime police in order to maintain coastal security in spite of the conversion of the naval occupation forces to operations in Korea.²⁰⁰ Pending a JCS decision, Admiral Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, proposed on March 14, 1951 that Secretary of Defense Marshall present the problem of arming the coastal police to the State Department with a view to formulating a national policy. Accepting the proposal, on April 26, Marshall forwarded to Acheson two alternative policies recommended by the JCS. One was to authorize SCAP to provide appropriate armament for patrol vessels of the Maritime Safety Board. The

¹⁹⁹ See Memo by Robert McClurkin, Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, to Allison, Assistant Secretary of State, March 4, 1953, Lot File 55 D 388, RG 59; Memo by Alice Dunning to Kenneth Young, Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, June 3, 1953, Lot File 57 D 149, RG 59; and Memo by the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligent to the Army Chief of Staff, July 7, 1953, G-3, 091 Japan, Box 39, RG 319.

²⁰⁰ Message from SCAP to the Army Department, July 23, 1950, enclosed in a report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the JCS, Oct. 20, 1950, CCS 383.21 Japan (3-13-45), sec. 23, RG 218.

other was to authorize SCAP to create and operate a separate coastal security force whose vessels would be armed.²⁰¹

Acheson and his policy advisers regarded neither option as defensible to the member nations of the FEC in light of its strict disarmament policy. In addition, they worried that such measures might militate against the forthcoming signing and ratification of the peace treaty. Either of the options was expected to engender strong objections from the other FEC countries, which would interpret it as a revival of a Japanese navy. Nevertheless, the civilian planners sympathized with the need to increase coastal security. Hence, they offered a compromise option which was deemed justifiable to the friendly nations concerned. The proposed solution followed the Pentagon's second option to create a Japanese-manned coastal security force under SCAP's control. However, the State Department imposed several conditions on its implementation: (1) the force would be operated under the direct control of American officers; (2) it would be organized and equipped along normal coast guard lines so as not to provide any indication of the nucleus of a navy; and (3) any steps for its creation should not be taken until after the signing of the peace treaty and consultation with the friendly FEC nations.²⁰² The JCS and the Secretary of Defense accepted the State Department solution on the understanding that it would be reviewed after the coming into effect of the treaty. On August 29, a national decision was reached with Truman's approval to establish the disguised nucleus of a Japanese navy.²⁰³ Since no objections were raised against the American decision in discussions with the friendly FEC nations

²⁰¹ Memo by Marshall to Acheson, April 26, 1951, CD 092 (Japan), RG 330.

²⁰² Memo by Rusk to Acheson, July 20, 1951, *FRUS* 1951 vol. 6, pp. 1208-15; and Memo by Acheson to Marshall, July 20, 1951, CD 091 (Japan), RG 330.

²⁰³ Memo by the JCS to Marshall, Aug. 22, 1951, CCS 383.21 Japan (3-13-45), sec. 26, RG 218; and Memo by Marshall to Acheson, Sept. 4, 1951, *FRUS* 1951, vol. 6, pp. 1330-31.

during November, joint planning began early in December between the staff members of the US naval forces in the Far East and Japanese officials on the formation of the coastal security force. By late January 1952, a training program for the nuclear personnel of the new force was started at the naval base in Yokosuka under the guidance and assistance of American officers. A Coastal Safety Force was formally created late in April.²⁰⁴

Washington set out to provide naval ships for the new force as soon as restrictions imposed by the FEC decisions were lifted with the termination of the occupation. After Public Law 467 was approved by Congress, on July 8, to authorize a loan of American vessels to Japan, a Charter Party Agreement was signed between the two governments, on November 12, to lend 18 patrol frigates and 50 landing craft for use by the naval security force. The transfer of these naval ships would be completed at the end of 1953.²⁰⁵

(3) To Create an Air Force and Conclude a Military Assistance Agreement

As early as December 1951, the JCS contemplated the creation of the nucleus of a Japanese air force, consisting of 2 squadrons by mid-1954, and its expansion to 27 squadrons in later phases.²⁰⁶ As cited above, a national decision to establish an air force was formally made in NSC 125/2 on August 7, 1952. Considerable progress had been made toward the development of ground and naval forces in the form of the National Safety Force and Coastal Safety Force. The formation of an air force, on the other hand, was delayed by a combination of factors. The most

²⁰⁴ Message from SCAP to the JCS, Dec. 7, 1951, G-3, 091 Japan, Box 32-A, RG 319; and Memo by Dan Kimball, Secretary of the Navy, to Marshall, April 23, 1952, CD 092 (Japan), RG 330.

²⁰⁵ Memo of conversation, by Young, Aug. 7, 1952, ERUS 1952-1954, vol. 14, p. 1309; and *The New York Times*, Nov. 13, 1952.

²⁰⁶ Memo by the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, Dec. 12, 1951, ERUS 1951, vol. 6, pp. 1434-35.

important was the restriction in the Japanese constitution against the maintenance of armed forces. The existence of the ground and naval forces was justified on the grounds that they were simply the forces necessary to cope with internal disorder or to protect coastal shipping. Without a constitutional revision, however, it was considered difficult to establish an air force under the pretext of increasing internal security. Another delaying factor was the concern that the formation of an air force would arouse strong adverse reactions from other friendly nations in the Pacific area, which feared a possible renewal of a Japanese aggressive threat.²⁰⁷

By October 1952, there were external events which prompted the JCS to proceed toward the creation of an air force. There were several incidents involving Soviet military planes that made illegal flights over Hokkaido. In addition, it was reported that the Soviet Union and Communist China had made strenuous efforts to develop their air forces in the Far East. The JCS inquired of General Clark, CINCFE, whether it was desirable to initiate discussions with the Japanese government on the matter of establishing an air force. After consulting with Ambassador Robert Murphy, the general suggested that American planning proceed promptly and that he be authorized to discuss the matter with Yoshida, in company with the ambassador. He reasoned that "the most immediate and the greatest single threat to the security of Japan lies in the Communist air threat."²⁰⁸ In the meantime, the Pentagon for the first time included funds for Japan, especially for the development of a Japanese air force, in its preliminary submission to the Bureau of the Budget of the Mutual Security Program for the fiscal year 1954. In submitting to the Secretary of Defense a military guidance for the military

²⁰⁷ Memo by Assistant Secretary of State Allison to Under Secretary of State David Bruce, Nov. 18, 1952, *FRUS* 1952-1954, vol. 14, p. 1361.

²⁰⁸ Message from the JCS to CINCFE, Oct. 3, 1952, enclosed in JCS 1380/150, Oct. 3, 1952, CCS 383.21 Japan (3-13-45), sec. 31, RG 218; and Message from CINCFE to the JCS, Oct. 31, 1952, *Ibid.*

assistance program on October 30, 1952, the JCS recommended Japanese force goals nearly identical with those of their previous plan of December 1951: a ten-division ground force of 300,000 men, a naval force of 75 vessels, and an air force of 27 squadrons.²⁰⁹ The State Department supported the proposed air force program, yet attached two conditions to its implementation: concentration on the types of aircraft clearly designed primarily for defensive purposes, and advance notification and explanation to other concerned countries.²¹⁰

It was not until mid-March of 1953 that Ambassador Murphy and General Clark were directed by the authorities in Washington to enter into discussions with the Japanese government. At the request of the State Department under the new Eisenhower Administration, such discussions would not be restricted to the question of creating an air force but would cover the matters pertaining to the development of all Japanese defense forces. The reason was that decisions on the proposed military aid program for Japan in the administration and Congress would be based on an overall Japanese defense program. In particular, the ambassador and CINCPAC were given authority to discuss with the Japanese the JCS plan for the defense buildup with a view to working out mutually acceptable goals and timing for their achievement. They were also empowered to start negotiations for a mutual defense assistance agreement required for the implementation of the proposed Mutual Security Program for Japan. However, the American representatives were warned not to exert strong pressure on the Yoshida government, which might jeopardize its political position and thus result in longer

²⁰⁹ Memo by the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, Oct. 30, 1952, CCS 092 Japan (8-22-46), sec. 83, RG 218.

²¹⁰ Memo by Allison to Bruce, Nov. 18, 1952, FRUS 1952-54, vol. 14, pp. 1361-62.

delays in the defense buildup.²¹¹

Military assistance to Japan since July 1950 had been provided in the form of a loan of equipment by the Army Department on the basis that the Japanese National Police Reserve furnished security to an occupied area. A total of \$ 528 million had been made available through Army appropriations for equipping the police reserve. By March 1953, about \$ 80 million worth of armament had been loaned to the Japanese and an additional \$ 170 million programmed.²¹² However, the basis of furnishing assistance no longer existed when Japan became a sovereign country. Accordingly, in October 1952, the Pentagon planned to submit to Congress legislation which would authorize the transfer to Japan of the equipment already loaned and of additional equipment. Furthermore, it proposed additional military aid for Japan under the Mutual Security Program for FY 1954. This was the first time that Japan was included in the program. Therefore, a bilateral military assistance agreement was required by the Mutual Security Act of 1951 before equipment or services could be delivered to the Japanese government. Such an agreement would incorporate Japan's certain assurances called for by the law, including those of developing its own defense capacities and joining in maintaining world peace.²¹³ In this respect, America's primary objective underlying the inclusion of Japan in the military aid program was to oblige the Japanese to proceed with more rapid and large-scale rearmament.

When asked whether it would take advantage of military aid under the mutual security program in May 1953, the Yoshida government initially exhibited reluctance. It feared that Japan's economy would be unduly burdened by an

²¹¹ Message from the JCS to CINCFE, March 10, 1953, *Ibid.*, pp. 1390-92; and Message from Secretary of State Dulles to the US embassy in Japan, March 12, 1953, *Ibid.*, pp. 1394-97.

²¹² Memo by Allison to Dulles, March 12, 1953, *Ibid.*, p. 1393

²¹³ Airgram from Dulles to the US embassy in Japan, *Ibid.*, pp. 1394-97.

extensive defense buildup. It was also concerned that Japan would be committed to send its forces abroad. Late in June, however, the Japanese government decided to accept such military assistance. The first reason was that Japanese business circles put strong pressure on the government to do so. They found in the military aid program a substitute for America's Korean War procurements in Japan which would shortly terminate as a result of the armistice.²¹⁴ Second, Japan's decision resulted partly from the American threat to suspend existing military assistance. During June, the US embassy and CINCFE informed the Japanese government that unless it agreed to accept the proposed mutual security aid, all further military assistance through Army appropriations would cease as of June 30.²¹⁵ Finally, the Yoshida government was stimulated by the assurances given by the State Department that Japan would not be required to use its forces other than in self-defense or to rearm to the prejudice of its economic stability.²¹⁶ As Congress approved the inclusion of Japan in the Mutual Security Program, negotiations for a mutual defense assistance agreement were initiated in Tokyo on July 15. The negotiations dragged on until the end of September with no substantial progress. In deciding upon the provisions of the agreement, the Japanese side emphasized economic aspects in the hope that it would obtain economic assistance under the program with few military commitments. The American negotiators, on the other hand, wanted to stipulate Japan's explicit military obligations in the agreement.²¹⁷

²¹⁴ Message from Ambassador Allison to the State Department, July 6, 1953, *Ibid.*, pp. 1456.

²¹⁵ JCS 1380/166, Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee to the JCS, June 29, 1953, CCS 383.21 Japan (3-19-45) sec. 33, RG 219.

²¹⁶ Note from the US embassy to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, June 26, 1953, *FRUS* 1952-1954, vol. 14, pp. 1446-47.

²¹⁷ John Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System* (London: the Athlone Press, 1988), pp. 97-98.

Meanwhile, the Japanese government set out to formulate its own plans for the defense buildup. In mid-September, a defense plan prepared by the National Safety Agency was secretly given to the US embassy and CINCFE. According to the plan, the National Safety Force would be expanded to a ten-division force of 200,000 men. The Coastal Safety Force would increase to a strength of 35,500 men with 188 vessels. An air safety force would be established with 9,320 personnel during 1954 and expanded to 39,560 men with 1319 aircraft. All force goals would be achieved over a five-year period from April 1954 to March 1959.²¹⁸ The planned increases in naval and air forces were comparable to those of the JCS plan. However, the force goal and timing for ground forces fell short of those of the American plan, that is, a force of 300,000 by mid-1955. In any event, the Japanese plan indicated two significant changes of position on the part of the Yoshida government: to expand the National Safety Force beyond the existing strength of 110,000 and to create an air force. The Japanese government took another positive step toward rearmament. On September 27, Yoshida and Mamoru Shigemitsu, president of the Progressive Party (the second largest conservative party) issued a joint statement that they agreed to develop a long-term program for the expansion of Japanese forces and to amend the national safety agency law so as to enlarge the mission of the forces to include the responsibility for defense against external aggression.²¹⁹ These changes in defense policy were attributed to several factors. As an immediate reason, the Yoshida government was required to formulate a long-range plan and alter the legal status of its security forces to that of regular armed forces in order to receive military aid under the Mutual Security Program.

²¹⁸ Message from CINCFE to the JCS, Sept. 30, 1953, CCS 383.21 Japan (3-13-45), sec. 36, RG 218; and Robert J. Watson, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953-1954*, vol. 5, (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division of the JCS, 1986), p. 271.

²¹⁹ Telegram from Allison to the State Department, Sept. 28, 1953, ERUS 1952-1954, vol. 14, p. 1515.

Second, there was a growing feeling held by Japanese political leaders that the further development of their defense forces would enable American troops to be reduced and eventually withdrawn from Japan. Third, by mid-1953, the Yoshida government came to estimate that external events, such as the repeated intrusions of Soviet planes over Hokkaido and the seizure of Japanese fishing vessels by the Korean navy, led the Japanese public to accept the necessity of larger defense forces and also the idea that such forces should be legally enabled to go into action in case of an external attack. Finally, at that time, certain efforts began to be made by conservative political and economic leaders in Japan toward a merger of the conservative parties, with a view toward providing administrative stability and popular strength to a new government. The first major result was the agreement between Yoshida and Shigemitsu on the defense issue.²²⁰

During October, meetings were held in Washington between American officials and Hayato Ikeda, personal envoy of the Prime Minister, to discuss Japan's defense plan. The American side intended to obtain a firm commitment from the Japanese representative to a long-range military buildup prior to signing the pending military assistance agreement. Ikeda presented an updated defense plan, which contemplated an expansion of ground forces to 180,000 by mid-1957. He explained that the target figure was the upper limit that could be reached without conscription, which would require a revision of the constitution. The plan also included a five-year program for the development of naval and air forces. United States officials urged a more rapid and large expansion and a commensurate increase in Japan's defense budget. Although the members of the Ikeda mission conceded that the 180,000-man goal might be reached by mid-1956, both sides reached no definite agreement regarding force goals or timing. These issues would

²²⁰ Memo by Young to Walter Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Sept. 9, 1953, Lot File 55D 388, RG 59; and Memo by Alice Dunning of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Nov., 13, 1953, Lot File 57 D 149, RG 59.

be handled in Tokyo during further negotiations for the military assistance agreement.²²¹

In the midst of preparing an American position, early in December, Ambassador Allison suggested to the State Department a modest approach which would be acceptable to the Japanese. He deemed it undesirable and impracticable to press them to consent to the ground force goal of at least 300,000 in the face of Japanese realities, including the "constitutional problem, unreadiness of large part of public opinion, and vulnerability of conservative forces to leftist attack if buildup too rapid..." In addition, American insistence on rapid rearmament would strengthen Yoshida's political opponents and thus obstruct the process of unifying conservative parties. Such a situation, Allison thought, would be detrimental to the development of a stable conservative government, one of the major US objectives regarding Japan. He recommended that the United States concentrate on the goal of securing the largest possible buildup in the immediate years.²²² Allison's moderate approach was approved by the State Department and the JCS. The position agreed upon by the civilian and military planners was to avoid a deadlock in the forthcoming negotiations with the Japanese and thus to get their defense buildup started as soon as possible.²²³

When the negotiations took place in Tokyo in February 1954, therefore, the American representatives focused their attention on Japan's defense program for 1954. The negotiations led to the conclusion of a Mutual Defense Assistance

²²¹ Telegram from Dulles to the US embassy in Japan, Oct. 14, 1953, ERUS 1952-54, vol. 14, pp. 1530-31; Editorial note regarding a joint statement on the Ikeda talks, *Ibid.*, p. 1549-50; and Message from the Army Department to CINCFE, Oct. 24, 1953, G-3, 091 Japan TS, Box 39, RG 319.

²²² Telegram from Allison to the State Department, Dec., 1953, ERUS 1952-1954, vol. 14, pp. 1556-59.

²²³ Memo by the JCS to Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, Dec. 21, 1953, *Ibid.*, pp. 1560-62.

Agreement on March 8. The United States promised to offer military aid, while Japan was committed to expand its defense forces to the extent permitted by its economic capacities. The former had already programmed \$ 78 million of military aid for Japan under the Mutual Security Program for the fiscal year 1954. The Yoshida government agreed to increase the strength of ground forces from 110,000 to 130,000 men, consisting of six divisions, by the end of March 1955. The naval forces would be expanded from about 10,000 to 16,000 men. An embryonic air force would be established with 6,300 personnel, and training aircraft and schools. These goals largely reflected those of the Japanese plan. Upon America's demand, a reserve force of 15,000 would be created.²²⁴ To further implement the defense assistance agreement, the Japanese government submitted to the Diet two defense bills designed to alter the legal status of its security forces: a Defense Agency Establishment Law and a Self-Defense Forces Law. After an intense debate on the rearmament issue, the Diet sanctioned the laws on June 2, 1954. The creation of an air force was authorized. All the military forces were renamed the Self-Defense Forces and given the primary mission of safeguarding the nation against external aggression. Legislation also changed the name of the National Safety Agency to the National Defense Agency and authorized the establishment of a national defense council to advise the prime minister on defense policies.²²⁵ The defense laws thus put Japan's armed forces in a secure statutory position and, more importantly, provided a legal framework for further rearmament over the following decades.

²²⁴ Memo by Allison to Japanese Foreign Minister Okazaki, April 6, 1954, *Ibid.*, pp. 1628-30; and Memo by General Eddleman, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, to the Army Chief of Staff, March 6, 1954, G-3, 091 Japan, Box 42, RG 319.

²²⁵ *The New York Times*, March 10 and June 3, 1954.

G. Theoretical Perspective: Decision-Making Models Applied

As noted above, there were three major policy decisions in NSC 60/1 of September 1950: (1) to initiate peace negotiations; (2) to secure unlimited base rights in Japan through a bilateral security pact; and (3) to proceed with Japanese rearmament. This research separates the first two decisions on a peace treaty from the last one on rearmament in explaining them in terms of the decision-making models. One reason is that the rearmament decision had been sought by a part of decision makers, especially those of the Pentagon, independent of the treaty issue. An additional reason is that the collective decision processes by which the peace treaty decisions and the rearmament decision were respectively produced are explained by different decision-making models.

1. The Decisions on the Peace Treaty

Key decision makers were Secretary of State Dean Acheson and his policy advisers in the Far Eastern Bureau of the State Department, John Foster Dulles, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, Under Secretary of the Army Tracy Voorhees, and General Douglas MacArthur. As in the case of the October 1948 decision to postpone a peace treaty, President Truman hardly involved himself directly in the decision-making process until his civilian and military advisers reached an agreed-upon position on the timing and terms of the treaty. He wanted a bureaucratic consensus that left him no options but acceptance or rejection. He was, however, kept fully informed of the conflicting positions among major decision makers, especially between the State and Defense Departments, and the consequent deadlock in the peace-making process. The evidence suggests that Truman supported the State Department planners' preference for an early treaty. In addition, he endorsed their scheme of a separate

treaty without the Soviet Union and Communist China at the end of 1949. Nevertheless, the President made no direct attempt to overrule the Secretary of Defense and the JCS, who took opposite stands. He preferred to wait for a consensus reached by the two departments. Truman's reluctance to press the military advisers to withdraw their opposition to a peace treaty possibly stemmed partly from his recognition of the need for their support in securing a required Senate ratification of the treaty. As pointed out above, the fact that Johnson and the JCS sided with Republicans in Congress over China policy made Truman hesitant in overruling the Pentagon leaders whose objections to the treaty would cause difficulty in obtaining approval of the treaty in the Senate.

In addition, Truman did not seek to use any formal coordinating device to resolve the policy impasse over the peace treaty issue. Although he brought the National Security Council into existence in 1947, the President made little use of it as major policy-making or coordinating machinery. He even rarely attended Council meetings prior to the outbreak of the Korean War. Truman's little reliance on the NSC system stemmed from the concern that his final authority and full freedom of action in decision-making might be bound by or shared with the Council.²²⁶ As a result, the foreign policy-making processes during the Truman Administration were largely department-centered, rather than White House-centered. Most policy proposals were developed and coordinated by the executive departments, especially by the State and Defense Departments. The NSC only served as a formal mechanism endorsing the policy recommendations presented by the departments before their submission to the President for final approval. Its staff was small and played a minor part in policy-making. This department-centered process was also derived from Truman's inclination to rely upon each department

²²⁶ I. M. Destler, "National Security Advice to U.S. Presidents: Some Lessons from Thirty Years," *World Politics*, vol. 29, no. 2 (Jan. 1977), p. 147.

head as a functional expert on some aspect of national security or foreign policy, rather than upon the NSC staff.²²⁷ These features of the decision-making process stemming from Truman's policy-making style were evidenced by the decision cases regarding Japan. As noted in the last chapter, NSC 13/2, the policy paper of October 1948 which contained the decision to postpone the peace treaty, was prepared and coordinated not by the NSC staff but by the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department with the military departments. The Council staff played such a limited role as to only make a minor revision of the proposed paper. The peace treaty and rearmament decisions, as has been examined in the present chapter, were also proposed and coordinated informally by the State and Defense Departments, even without filtering through the formal NSC process, though they were submitted under the label of NSC 60/1 to the President. Such department-centered processes, however, might lead to a policy stalemate if the interested agencies took conflicting positions and there were no effective coordinating devices, as has been evidenced by the case of the peace treaty decision.

There are two research questions advanced to explain the decisions on the peace settlement. (1) Why and how did decision makers choose their initial preferred options regarding the timing and security terms of a peace treaty? (2) How did decision makers' conflicting preferences converge or aggregate to produce the final decisions to start peace negotiations and to acquire unlimited base rights in Japan?

(1) Individual processes of preference choice

The research identifies various policy options considered and favored within the government. Three divergent options were initially advocated by the key

²²⁷ Alexander L. George, "The President and the Management of Foreign Policy: Styles and Models," in Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf (eds.), *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), pp. 111-12.

decision makers concerning the timing of a peace treaty. A first alternative, to conclude a treaty promptly, was preferred by Acheson and the Far East experts of the State Department, and by General MacArthur as well. A second option was to postpone the treaty and continue the military occupation indefinitely. This option was originally recommended by the JCS and then supported by Johnson and his advisers at the Pentagon. As a third policy option, there were halfway solutions designed to reconcile the first two conflicting alternatives. Under Secretary of the Army Voorhees suggested the stand-by SCAP arrangement in which the United States would continue SCAP's occupation regime of control on a reserved basis while allowing the Japanese government to exercise its authority over nonmilitary affairs through a partial treaty. In early 1950, some State Department officials, including Assistant Secretary of State Butterworth, had recommended as a similar halfway option the conclusion of a limited political and economic treaty, along with SCAP's authority over military affairs left unchanged.

On the other hand, the focus of the bureaucratic debate about the security terms of a peace treaty was placed on the issue of retaining American bases and forces in post-treaty Japan. It is worthy of note that most of the policy makers in Washington recognized the continued stationing of forces as necessary, at least to insure the security of a disarmed Japan. A basic split among them developed not over whether or not to retain such bases and forces but over the scale and method of their retention. First, the advocates of a partial or limited treaty suggested the policy option of continuing SCAP's occupation controls in the security field and thus preserving the legal basis for the maintenance of American forces in Japan. As a second alternative, Acheson and his policy aides, who favored a prompt and full settlement, preferred to station them in confined base areas for a limited period of time. In addition, they envisioned a collective security pact among Pacific nations as a preferred method by which to obtain such limited base rights. The option to

conclude the Pacific pact was later opposed by Dulles, special adviser to Acheson for the peace-making task, who favored incorporating security clauses, including base retention, into a part of the peace treaty. Despite this difference of the positions within the State Department, its policy makers agreed that a bilateral security agreement would be concluded between the United States and Japan to provide for details about base retention. Third, the Pentagon planners insisted upon unlimited base rights to station and move armed forces over Japan proper indefinitely. As a fourth option, General MacArthur preferred the military neutralization of Japan through an international arrangement included in the peace treaty. In an effort to narrow a difference of the positions between the decision makers in Washington and him, the general accepted the alternative of base retention as a supplement to his neutrality option, to the extent that he supported the stationing of a token force only for five years.

Another security requirement over which the decision makers were divided related to the question of the participation of the Soviet Union and Communist China in the peace treaty. As a first alternative, the State Department planners advocated proceeding with a separate treaty without the two Communist nations because of the possibility of their rejecting a treaty that would provide for the retention of US forces in post-treaty Japan. Second, the Pentagon planners strongly objected to a separate treaty that they expected would cause hostile Soviet military moves against Japan and the consequent risk of Soviet-American armed conflict. Third, General MacArthur took a stand against a separate treaty for a different reason. He considered Russian participation in the settlement prerequisite to his preferred option of Japanese neutrality, for it would be based on an international agreement among the concerned nations, particularly between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The process of preference choice on the part of Acheson and his State Department advisers is fully explained by a combination of the analytic (rational) and bureaucratic politics models. The analytic model provides the following propositions regarding the individual choice process. (1) A decision maker tends to develop multiple interpretations of a decision problem. (2) He tends to engage in the outcome calculations of all possible major options in relation to multiple values involved in the problem. (3) He tends to choose preferences which yield a balanced satisfaction of the values at stake. There is a body of evidence that this model holds appropriately in accounting for the State Department officials' preference for an early peace settlement.

To begin with, they interpreted the peace treaty problem from multiple points of view. First, they viewed it as a political issue. The timing of the treaty was considered associated with the US-Japanese political relationship in light of growing letdowns and discontent with the continued occupation in Japan and their likely effects on its political orientation toward the United States. Second, the civilian planners defined the problem as having diplomatic implications. The occupation of Japan had been legally an Allied undertaking, whose termination would be subject to the FEC member nations' approval. This fact led the diplomatic officials to concern themselves with the views of these nations in taking into account the question of timing a peace treaty. It was estimated that most of the friendly FEC states strongly desired a prompt settlement which would enable them to restore foreign trade with Japan. In addition, the problem was regarded as having some bearing on America's diplomatic competition with the Soviet Union, which was perceived as favoring an early treaty in the hope of reducing American influence and securing a post-treaty voice in Japan. Third, the State Department officials viewed the timing of the treaty as relating to economic aspects: the slow revival of Japan's production and trade in the absence of Japanese initiative and

responsibility under the occupation; the resulting delay in economic recovery; and the prospect of continued financial burdens to the United States. Finally, the treaty problem was defined as involving security factors. Since the occupation had demilitarized Japan, certain security arrangements should be made, together with a peace settlement, so as to protect a defenseless Japan against probable Communist aggression. This multi-faceted interpretation of the peace treaty issue indicates that the civilian planners perceived multiple values involved in the issue: (1) to preserve Japan's pro-American orientation; (2) to meet the desire of the friendly FEC nations for a settlement; (3) to take the initiative in the issue against the Soviets; (4) to diminish the economic burden of the occupation; and (5) to defend an unarmed Japan.

As the next stage of the process of preference choice, the State Department planners calculated, along the multiple values, the outcomes of the two major alternatives: the prolongation of the occupation and the early conclusion of a peace treaty. In their estimation, the treaty option would satisfy the widespread desire among the Japanese for the restoration of their sovereignty, thus promoting the continuance of their pro-American orientation. In view of the situation that a large part of the Japanese people became increasingly weary of the occupation, on the other hand, the policy of a continued occupation was expected to provoke them to resentment against the United States, the principal occupying power. The result would be an unfavorable situation susceptible of exploitation by the Japanese Communists. In addition, the State Department planners feared that the prolongation of an increasingly unwelcome occupation would thwart Japan's initiative, responsibility, and international opportunities for economic recovery necessary to its continued pro-American orientation and the reduction of the American economic burdens.

The United States' policy of the indefinite postponement of a peace treaty was also expected to cause growing resistance to its occupation policies by the friendly FEC nations, which consistently advocated the treaty as a matter of urgency. In addition, that policy would be viewed as the result of America's preoccupation with its selfish military interests. Consequently, its existing friendly relations with most of the FEC nations would be damaged to the extent that its influence in East Asia would be weakened. Furthermore, a long delay in peace-making would bring about unacceptable consequences in the United States' diplomatic rivalry with the Soviet Union. Continued inaction would provide an occasion for the Russians to take the initiative in the treaty issue, including presenting their own treaty terms. This adverse situation was expected to seriously undermine the existing American favorable political position with the FEC nations regarding Japan because all these countries, desirous of an early settlement, might play directly into Soviet initiative and propaganda. As a result of those outcome calculations, the civilian planners adopted the option of a prompt treaty as their policy preference. To satisfy the value of protecting an unarmed Japan, they additionally opted for the retention of American bases and forces in post-treaty Japan. Therefore, their preferences were those which would produce a satisfaction of the multiple values involved.

It should be noted in connection with the preference for such base retention that, by late 1949, some shared mind-sets were formed between the civilian and military policy makers in Washington regarding US security interests in Japan, in spite of their conflicting stands on the timing of the treaty. First, they all agreed to the strategic importance of Japan in the American cold war confrontation with Russia because of Japan's location off the Asian mainland and its trained manpower and industrial potential. Second, it was also agreed that Soviet control over Japan would, to a great extent, alter the balance of power in Asia to the

United States' disadvantage. A third shared mind-set was that the Soviet intention toward Japan was ultimate domination. Finally, the diplomatic and military planners alike recognized the need for the United States to provide an unarmed Japan with military protection.

Those shared mind-sets in Washington produced two consequences in the process of preference choice. One was that the State and Pentagon planners commonly accepted the policy option to retain US bases and armed forces in Japan as an essential post-treaty requirement. The other was that they rejected General MacArthur's favored alternative to neutralize Japan as impracticable. The neutralization scheme had been considered feasible by the Far East experts in the State Department in mid-1947, when they had proceeded toward a peace settlement. By late 1949, however, it was regarded as unworkable and thus abandoned. Based on the shared perception of aggressive Soviet intentions toward Japan, the civilian and military planners estimated that the Russians would not passively adhere to Japan's neutrality but continue to pursue their goal of gaining control over it through political and military means.

While Acheson and his aides advocated retaining US bases and forces, their stands on the scale of such retention and the method by which to secure it were largely determined by their organizational interests, as would be predicted by the bureaucratic politics model. One of the missions of the State Department is to conduct diplomatic negotiations of specific issues with foreign governments. A main interest of the department deriving from that mission is to bring the negotiations to a settlement. This organizational interest motivates State Department officials to keep the negotiations going, to make concessions to the other governments in hopes of counter concessions, and to make American terms acceptable to them as far as possible.²²⁸ As this bureaucratic politics perspective

²²⁸ Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*, p. 36. and p. 58.

would expect, Acheson and the Far East experts had no direct concern for military needs in considering the size and duration of base retention. Instead, they gave attention to the acceptability of such retention to the FEC nations and Japan in peace negotiations. Hence, they preferred to station armed forces in confined areas remote from population centers on a self-supporting basis to avoid Japanese reluctance and irritation. In addition, it was recommended that a time limit be set for stationing in order to obtain consent from the FEC states.

In evaluating alternative security arrangements by which the United States would secure its base rights in post-treaty Japan, the State Department officials were also conditioned by the organizational interest of bringing negotiations to a conclusion. The result was that the selection of preferred security arrangements was largely determined by their perceived acceptability to Japan and the other FEC nations as negotiating parties. The State Department experts were initially skeptical of a multilateral peace treaty which directly authorized the retention of US forces and bases, and of an accompanying bilateral base agreement. The main reason was that such a treaty was expected to be unacceptable to such nations as India and Pakistan, which did not want to choose sides in the American-Soviet conflict on the military base issue. In addition, the Japanese government would be reluctant to accept a base agreement which might subject it to all-out Communist propaganda of "having sold out the Japanese people to Western imperialism."²²⁹ As an alternative arrangement designed to compensate for those political drawbacks, the diplomatic officials advocated a Pacific collective security pact which would be concluded separately from a peace treaty. Because of its collective nature and conformity with the collective self-defense principle of the UN Charter, such a regional security pact was considered most palatable to Japan. Moreover, by providing for collective protection against future Japanese aggression, it was

²²⁹ Memo by Butterworth to Acheson, Jan. 16, 1950, ERUS.1950, vol. 6., p. 1119.

estimated that the arrangement would prompt the friendly FEC nations to accept a peace treaty which contained non-punitive terms and no prohibition on eventual Japanese rearmament, as favored by the State Department.

The alternative of a Pacific security pact, however, was later rejected by Dulles. Instead, he favored incorporating the security clauses into a part of the peace treaty. The main reason advanced by Dulles was that he doubted if the Senate would approve such a security pact providing for the Atlantic security treaty type of collective commitment to defend Japan, a former enemy. His stand against a Pacific pact can be understood by his interest deriving from his position in the State Department: to conclude a peace settlement successfully. He was brought into the agency as a Republican special adviser to resolve its stalemate with the Pentagon and to formulate a bipartisan foreign policy regarding the peace treaty issue. Hence, in view of the need to obtain a Senate ratification of the treaty, his concern was to find certain security terms of the treaty that would be agreeable to Congress. By late 1950, such a collective pact was once again considered by the State Department as a preferred option which would induce the friendly FEC nations to accept a peace settlement envisaging Japanese rearmament.

In the final analysis, the State Department planners' preference for a prompt treaty with the retention of American forces and bases resulted from their multifaceted interpretation of the treaty problem and outcome calculations of the principal options in relation to the multiple values. On the other hand, their preferences for limited base retention and a collective security pact were largely determined by their organizational interest of bringing the coming peace negotiations to a settlement. Therefore, each of the analytic and bureaucratic models partly has validity in the explanation of those favored options.

Preference choice by Secretary of Defense Johnson and his advisers at the Pentagon is best explained by the bureaucratic politics model. They adopted the

recommendations of the JCS as official Pentagon positions: the indefinite postponement of a peace treaty, the pursuit of unlimited base rights in Japan, and opposition to a separate treaty. The evidence indicates that these favored options were largely determined by the organizational concerns and interests of the JCS. The primary mission of the Pentagon is to prepare for and wage war. To fulfill this mission, one of the tasks assigned to the JCS is to formulate war plans.²³⁰ In that connection, the organizational interest of the JCS is to develop and maintain a level of readiness necessary to fulfill immediate military commitments in case of war. On the other hand, the military chiefs have an interest in avoiding an armed conflict when they perceive the lack of readiness or where their military posture should be drawn away from the primary theater of operations.²³¹

In actuality, the policy stands taken by the JCS originated from strategic concepts in their war plans. Under the war plans, the Japanese main islands, along with Okinawa, would be fully used as forward base areas for US defensive and offensive operations against the USSR. These military needs, from the defense chiefs' perspective, required retaining the existing unlimited base rights in Japan for a long period of time in preparation for possible war with the Soviet Union. The JCS were skeptical about whether a peace treaty could assure them of such rights. In addition, they doubted if the Japanese government, under its normal political relationship with the United States after the termination of the occupation, would behave in accordance with the latter's military needs. In contrast, the unrestricted military position and SCAP's command relationship with the Japanese government under the occupation were regarded as best satisfying the perceived military needs.

²³⁰ The National Security Act, as Amended in 1949, Section 211.

²³¹ Memo by the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, Nov. 2, 1948, attached to NSC 35, a report by the secretary of defense to the NSC, ERUS 1948, vol. 1, pp.656-62; Snyder and Diesing, *Conflict Among Nations*, pp. 359-60; and Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*, p. 58.

Therefore, the JCS insisted upon, in concurrence with other Pentagon policy makers, the indefinite deferment of a peace settlement.

Another main concern that caused the service chiefs to oppose a prompt treaty was that the military risk of an armed conflict with the Soviet Union might result from entering into a peace treaty without the participation of the Soviet Union and Communist China. The JCS worried that such a separate treaty would provoke the Soviets to take hostile military actions, such as landing their occupation troops in Japan and attacking Japanese shipping, on the legal ground that the Japanese surrender terms of 1945 were violated by America's action not to withdraw its forces, even after the termination of the occupation. Those Soviet moves in turn might lead to an armed conflict between the two major powers. However, a war situation in East Asia, from the military chiefs' perspective, should be avoided as far as possible because of the perceived lack of military preparedness and in light of the first priority being given to the European theater in their war plans. This concern over the military risks involved in a separate treaty led the JCS to prefer preserving the status quo in Japan rather than proceeding with the treaty. In sum, the Pentagon policy makers' preference for unrestricted base rights in Japan stemmed from the organizational interest of the JCS to develop and maintain military preparedness for possible war with the Soviet Union. Their opposition to a peace treaty resulted from military-strategic considerations that the continuation of the occupation would satisfy the need of retaining unlimited base rights and that a separate treaty would bring about the unacceptable danger of an armed conflict with the Soviets in East Asia. This process of preference choice is consistent with the logic of the bureaucratic politics model.

Turning to the question about how the civilian and military planners dealt with value complexity imbedded in the treaty problem, this research identifies two main value dimensions as conflicting with each other. There were political values

involved: (1) to maintain the political orientation of Japan toward the United States; (2) to meet the demand of pro-Western FEC nations for a prompt treaty; and (3) to prevent the Russians from taking the diplomatic initiative in the peace-making issue. On the other hand, there were military values: (1) to retain an unrestricted military position in Japan in preparation for war; and (2) to avoid the risk of an armed conflict with the Soviet Union arising from a separate treaty. The pursuit of the political values required moving toward an early conclusion of the peace treaty. In contrast, the promotion of the military values dictated the continuation of the occupation. There was another significant value at stake: to protect Japan against Soviet aggression. This value did not affect the timing of the treaty because the civilian and military planners agreed to retain American forces in post-treaty Japan at least for its defense, regardless of whether or not to proceed with the peace settlement.

Acheson and his policy aides gave primary weight to the political values in evaluating policy options as to the timing of the treaty. Perceived benefits to such values led them to favor an early treaty. In addition, they estimated that a treaty would be inevitably concluded without the participation of the Soviet Union and Communist China in view of their expected objections to American base retention in Japan. On the other hand, the civilian planners acknowledged that, as the JCS perceived, by proceeding promptly toward the treaty, there was a risk of provoking the Soviets into belligerent actions. In other words, they recognized the existence of a trade-off relationship between the political and military values. A prompt treaty designed to promote the political values would militate against the satisfaction of the military value of avoiding the risk of an armed conflict. As a result, the policy option of a limited political and economic treaty was recommended once in January 1950 by Assistant Secretary of State Butterworth and John Howard, special assistant to Acheson, in an effort to resolve the value

conflict. That alternative was initially expected to satisfy to some extent the political values by satisfying the desire of Japan and the FEC states for a peace treaty. At the same time, the continuation of SCAP's legal authority over security matters under the limited treaty would safeguard the military value by minimizing military risks in proceeding without the USSR and China. The proposed alternative was put aside, however, because its change in the occupation regime of control still involved the risk of provoking the Soviets. Moreover, it was newly estimated to damage, rather than enhance, the political values by arousing a suspicion among the Japanese and the friendly FEC members that the United States intended to continue its military control of Japan indefinitely. As a result, the State Department planners returned to the pursuit of a full peace treaty. They basically calculated that the military risks of a separate treaty were considerably smaller than the political costs of a continued occupation, for Soviet behavior was viewed as being conditioned largely by relative political and military capabilities rather than by prior legal commitments. Therefore, they made a trade-off choice to proceed with a prompt treaty.

The State Department policy makers also acknowledged the existence of a conflict relationship between the political values and the military value of retaining an unrestricted military position in Japan. As Acheson pointed out to Johnson and the JCS during their meeting in April 1950, however, a security arrangement concomitant with the peace treaty was expected to satisfy to a large degree such a military value by authorizing extensive base retention in Japan. This body of evidence suggests that the State Department planners tended to acknowledge and resolve the value conflict by providing an option to produce some satisfaction for both the political and military values or by making a trade-off choice.

On the other hand, Johnson and the JCS tended to avoid recognizing the existence of the value conflict. They calculated the cost and benefit of policy

options exclusively in terms of promoting the military values. The Pentagon planners advocated a continued occupation, not only because it would assure them of the unlimited use of Japan proper as a base area, but also because it would enable them to avoid the military risks flowing from a separate treaty. Even when Under Secretary of the Army Voorhees suggested compromise options, such as a stand-by SCAP arrangement and a partial peace treaty, to resolve the value conflict, the JCS rejected them only because they would undermine the unrestricted military position in Japan. As the civilian planners pressed for a prompt treaty in expectation of the adverse political effects of an extended occupation, Johnson and the JCS claimed that only the State Department insisted on a peace treaty. In spite of evidence to the contrary, they argued that MacArthur had no real desire for a prompt settlement, only urging it for the purpose of propagandizing against the USSR. They even asserted that most Japanese were more interested in their security than an early restoration of their sovereignty. In their estimation, therefore, a prolonged occupation would not arouse such adverse political reactions from the Japanese or the friendly FEC nations as the State Department officials feared. In this respect, they attempted to avoid the value conflict in virtue of ill-founded arguments designed to demonstrate that their favored option appropriate for satisfying the military values at least would not damage the political values.

General MacArthur's preferences are explained by a combination of the bureaucratic politics and cognitive models. His stand in favor of a prompt treaty is partly understood from his bureaucratic position as SCAP. The general had been charged with carrying out the surrender terms and the Allied objectives of the occupation: the demilitarization and democratization of Japan. This bureaucratic position led MacArthur to evaluate the timing of a peace settlement in terms of whether these goals had been achieved. In his view, Japan had discharged its surrender terms and the occupation objectives had been fulfilled in many essential

aspects under SCAP's direction. Japan's physical war potential had been destroyed, and democratic reforms in the political and economic fields were in place. The need for the continuation of the occupation, from SCAP's perspective, no longer existed.

More convincingly, MacArthur's preference for a prompt settlement is attributed to his parochial interest stemming from his position of being responsible for the administration of the occupation: to finish the occupation successfully during his service in Japan. Such an interest was demonstrated by the general's repeated demand that Tokyo had to be the site of a peace conference so that he could preside over the conference. MacArthur's stake in a successful end to the occupation led to his concern over the impact of a prolonged occupation on his achievements in Japan when he considered the timing of the treaty. The general was convinced that a long-term occupation beyond five years would meet with failure due to psychological letdowns among the occupied people. Therefore, he feared that further delay in terminating the occupation would make the Japanese public so restive and resentful toward the occupation authorities that his prestige and accomplishments in Japan would be undermined. This concern caused him to advocate a prompt settlement.

The cognitive model also has validity in explaining MacArthur's policy preferences. The model postulates that a decision maker's problem definition and policy choice tend to be determined by his personal beliefs. It is further hypothesized in the model that the decision maker tends to evaluate and choose options in relation to only one or two values, which are strongly supported within his beliefs, while avoiding conflict relationships among the values involved. The general's preference for a prompt treaty was in part derived from his personal beliefs about Japan. Throughout the occupation, MacArthur had a consistent ideal of making Japan a democratic country. With such a belief about Japan in mind, he

concentrated on the implementation of democratic reforms in the early years of the occupation. As examined in the previous chapter, his strong interest in the democratic reforms caused him to resist and delay carrying out part of new Japanese policies in NSC 13/2, which reversed the initial reform programs, including the decentralization of the Japanese police and the purge. The general's belief in a democratic Japan led to his concern for keeping Japan committed to the democratic reforms after the end of the occupation. The reason was that he believed that the Japanese would remain friendly toward the United States in the post-treaty period if they were continuously committed to democracy which the occupation had instituted. This conviction had an effect on considering the timing of a peace treaty. In MacArthur's estimation, the treaty was urgently needed because it would satisfy the desire of the Japanese for the restoration of their sovereignty and thus encourage them to continue carrying out the democratic reforms. In this respect, his stand favoring a prompt treaty is interpreted as stemming from his belief in a democratic Japan.

MacArthur, from the beginning of the occupation, also had held a vision of turning Japan into a pacifist nation as a unique example to the world. This belief about Japan's role had been embodied in the successful attempt by the general to direct the Japanese, without specific instructions from Washington, to renounce war as a national right in their new constitution of 1946. He later recalled proudly that the revision of the constitution based on democratic and pacifist principles had been "the single most important accomplishment of the occupation."²³² MacArthur's preference for the neutralization of post-treaty Japan is considered to be logically derived from his belief in a pacifist Japan. By late 1949, the neutralization option was opposed by both State and Pentagon policy makers, mainly because the Soviets were expected to violate Japan's neutrality and to

²³² MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), p. 302.

continue pursuing the perceived objective of controlling it by political or military means. Hence, MacArthur stood alone among the key decision makers in advocating a neutral Japan.

Once he favored the neutrality alternative, the general sought to bolster it against the competing option of retaining extensive bases in Japan for the purpose of its defense or for American military use. In doing so, he tended to avoid a value conflict involved. For MacArthur, the neutrality option was intended to enhance a moral value of making Japan an example of a pacifist nation. As that alternative became regarded in Washington as damaging the military value of defending Japan against direct and indirect Soviet aggression, the general set out to defend it by advancing questionable views designed to hold that Japan's neutral status would not jeopardize its security. MacArthur basically estimated that the United States could protect Japan merely by retaining its forces in bases on Okinawa. More notably, the general argued that the Soviets had no intention of seizing Japan as long as it remained militarily neutral. He estimated at the end of 1949 that they were incapable of controlling Japan because of their weak military posture in Asia. Therefore, they were expected to respect Japan's neutrality in return for US forces withdrawing from the Japanese main islands to Okinawa. In his reasoning, the moral and military values did not conflict with each other. However, MacArthur's sanguine view about the Russian intention was regarded as highly questionable by policy makers in Washington, who witnessed aggressive Soviet moves in Eastern Europe and Communist advances in China and Southeast Asia. In addition, his underrating of the Russian capability in Asia became invalid two months later, when the Soviet Union was reported to increase its military aid to the Communist China with the conclusion of an alliance pact between the two nations in mid-February 1950. In the final analysis, by resting on ill-grounded views about the

Soviet intentions and capabilities, the general tended to avoid recognizing the existence of the value conflict.

On the other hand, MacArthur sought to avoid the conflict relationship between the moral and military values by devaluating the competing option of base retention through negative logic. As John Steinbruner points out, the cognitive model expects that a decision maker who comes to favor one of the options proceeds to downgrade the competing options by using such psychological mechanisms as "inferences of impossibility" and "negative images."²³³ By arguing that a competing alternative would be impossible to implement or would lead to strongly negative consequences, the decision maker attempts to eliminate it from serious consideration. This cognitive process serves to ignore the values imbedded in the competing option and thus avoid the value conflict. There is some evidence that MacArthur drew on those mechanisms to devalue the opposing option of base retention. The general repeatedly claimed that, because of limits in America's total military strength, it would be "impossible" to retain sufficient forces in Japan to defend it against Soviet aggression. To use his other argument, the total forces available for stationing in Japan would be insufficient to protect Japan in case of a full-scale Soviet attack.²³⁴ However, this impossibility argument was simply inconsistent with his basic estimate that America could assure Japanese neutrality against Soviet aggression as long as it garrisoned its troops in Okinawa.

In addition, MacArthur attached a strongly negative image to the competing alternative. He contended that, since "95% of the Japanese people" were opposed to it, the maintenance of US bases in post-treaty Japan would "act like a lightning

²³³ Steinbruner, *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision*, pp. 116-21.

²³⁴ Memo by MacArthur to the JCS, Dec. 23, 1948, CD 16-1-5 (Japan), RG 330; and Memo of the summary of MacArthur's views, by Under Secretary of the Army Voorhees, Dec. 14, 1949, CD 6-3-33 (Japan), RG 330.

rod to attract opposition" and would "only cause an eventual anti-American reaction on the part of the Japanese people."²³⁵ In reality, the 95% figure was ill-founded and exaggerated. The Japanese at that time were divided concerning the post-treaty security issue. For instance, some political forces, including the Socialist and Communist parties, remained in favor of neutrality. As evidenced by the Ikeda mission to Washington early in May 1950, on the other hand, the Yoshida government and other conservative groups came to accept post-treaty base retention as favorable to Japan's security and a prompt treaty as well. In an effort to devalue the competing alternative, MacArthur inferred from an overstatement of Japanese opposition a strongly negative consequence of base retention. Devaluation through the inferences of impossibility and negative image led the general to ignore the military values inherent in the base retention option, such as defending Japan and making military use of Japan. The result was that he could avoid a conflict relationship between the moral and military values.

In short, MacArthur's stand in support of a prompt treaty was partly determined by his parochial interest of bringing the occupation to a successful conclusion, as expected by the bureaucratic politics model. His preference can be also attributed to his belief in a democratic Japan. The general considered that a prompt settlement led the Japanese to continue committing themselves to the democratic reforms which he had instituted. His preference for the neutralization of Japan was primarily derived from his belief in a pacifist Japan. As the political and moral values promoted by his favored options were in a conflict relationship with the military values inherent in the base retention option, MacArthur attempted to avoid the value conflict by denying its existence or devaluing the

²³⁵ Memo of conversation between MacArthur and Sebald, April 6, 1950, FRUS_1950, vol. 6, p. 1170.

competing option. Those aspects of preference choice correspond to the cognitive model's explanation.

(2) The Collective Decision Process

The second research question relates to the collective decision process by which decision makers' conflicting stands aggregated to yield the national decisions to start peace negotiations and to secure unlimited base rights in Japan. Among the three decision-making models, the bureaucratic politics model provides a satisfactory explanation of the collective decision process. The model assumes that final policy decisions result from a process of bargaining and coalition-building among decision makers to promote their pre-established preferences. It is also postulated by the model that the decisions tend to be compromise solutions.

First of all, there is a body of evidence that several attempts were made by the State Department and Pentagon decision makers respectively to form policy coalitions to support their favored options. Such attempts were concentrated on gaining support from General MacArthur. Because of his expertise in Japanese matters and his authority and control over implementation, the general's support for certain options was considered necessary to persuade the President and other decision makers to adopt them as national policies. The fact that MacArthur had strong backing among the Republicans in Congress reinforced the need to obtain his support, since a peace treaty for Japan would be subject to ratification in the Senate. Therefore, the State Department planners, faced with strong Pentagon opposition to ending the occupation, sought to get the occupation commander's support for a prompt treaty that they preferred. They did so by sending senior officials, such as Ambassador at Large Jessup and Assistant Secretary of State Butterworth, to Tokyo early in 1950, in disregard of the formal channels of communication with the Pentagon. Initially, this attempt to build a policy coalition

seemed successful in gaining the general's full support. However, it was not effective enough to induce President Truman to make a national decision to initiate the peace-making process. Truman hesitated to overrule the Pentagon leaders because of concern that their latent opposition might thwart a ratification of the peace treaty in the Senate. He preferred that his civilian and military advisers reach an agreed-upon position.

The Defense Department also dispatched its senior officials to Tokyo with a view to forming a policy alignment with MacArthur. At the end of 1949, Under Secretary of the Army Voorhees visited him and unsuccessfully attempted to draw him into support for the Pentagon's scheme of prolonging the occupation. Another attempt was made to bring the general around to concurring with the plan in mid-June 1950, when Secretary of Defense Johnson and General Bradley, chairman of the JCS, conferred with him in Tokyo. Despite their failure to win MacArthur's support, the Pentagon leaders induced him to concede to their favored option of securing unlimited base rights in post-treaty Japan.

There is also considerable evidence to indicate that the collective decision process was one of bargaining. Morton Halperin points out the following as main features of a bargaining process: (1) persuasion involving an effort, without altering a preferred option, to convince other decision makers of the benefits resulting from its adoption; (2) compromising to change the favored alternative in order to make it acceptable to others; (3) logrolling to link support on a particular issue to support on other issues; and (4) setting deadlines for a decision and delaying.²³⁶ Among these features, compromising was most characteristic of the collective decision process which led to the peace treaty decisions. Key decision makers, namely the State Department, the Pentagon, and MacArthur, respectively sought to obtain support for their preferred options by altering them into those more palatable to

²³⁶ Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*, pp. 207-18.

the others. In considering alternative security arrangements, the State Department devised a compromise option of concluding a limited peace treaty in the political and economic fields while retaining SCAP's authority over security matters. By satisfying to a large extent the Pentagon planners' interest in preserving the predominant military position in Japan, this alternative was partly designed to induce the Pentagon to agree to the initiation of peace negotiations. Mainly because it was a temporary solution, however, the limited treaty option was excluded from consideration within the State Department prior to its formal suggestion to the Pentagon.

A more steadfast effort was made by Under Secretary of the Army Voorhees to reconcile the conflicting positions among the key decision makers. He initially proposed the stand-by SCAP arrangement as a compromise solution under which SCAP would continue occupational control in a reduced and reserved form while granting the Japanese freedom of action in nonmilitary affairs. The proposed alternative was intended to fulfill to some extent the desire for a peace treaty on the part of the State Department and MacArthur. As the compromise option was rejected by other decision makers, Voorhees suggested the option of concluding a partial peace treaty, another compromise further modified to meet the need for a settlement. He once again failed to produce a consensus on it, however, because the other decision makers refused to recede from their original stands.

MacArthur also compromised in pursuit of a national decision toward a peace treaty. Departing slightly from his longstanding preference for the neutralization of Japan, the general proposed the alternative of retaining a small size of American forces in Japan for a short period of time. The modification of his position was intended to narrow a difference of the positions between the decision makers in Washington, especially those at the Pentagon, and him, thereby reaching a decision to go ahead with a peace treaty. However, the general's concession

obtained no support from other decision makers. As he became faced with stubborn opposition from Johnson and General Bradley who visited Tokyo in mid-June 1950, MacArthur committed himself to a more drastic concession in which he abandoned the option of neutralization and accepted that of securing unlimited base rights.

Besides compromising, there were several attempts by the State Department to press for a national decision by attaching a deadline to the treaty issue. Despite such attempts, the Pentagon sought to delay the decision-making process. These aspects are another feature of a bargaining process. In particular, to push the Pentagon to consent to start peace negotiations, the State Department established deadlines for formulating a United States position for submission to planned international meetings. In late 1949, the department set the end of November as a deadline by which American treaty terms had to be determined. The terms were to be presented to the British government prior to their discussion in a Commonwealth foreign ministers conference scheduled for January 1950. Despite such pressure to proceed toward a treaty, the Pentagon policy makers delayed submitting their recommended security terms to the State Department with the intention of frustrating its effort to initiate the peace-making process. As a result, the State Department was unable to present any draft treaty to the concerned nations. In April 1950, Acheson and his advisers made another failed attempt to press the military planners for an agreed-upon position which could be presented to the talks in Paris with the British and French foreign ministers scheduled for May. Finally, becoming aware that there were still some opposing elements within the Pentagon, even after an agreement was reached late in August to begin peace negotiations, Acheson urged Secretary of Defense Johnson to endorse promptly the joint State-Defense memorandum. This was done on the grounds that the document should be approved by President Truman prior to the New York

meetings among foreign ministers of the FEC nations, scheduled to start in mid-September.²³⁷

Another aspect of the collective decision process that demonstrates the validity of the bureaucratic politics model is that the final decisions were the outcome of considerable compromise among the major decision makers. As examined above, a consensus on the treaty matters was reached not only because MacArthur and the State Department planners acceded to the military terms of acquiring unlimited base rights in Japan, but also because the Pentagon leaders withdrew their reservation about a separate treaty without Soviet and Chinese participation, thus agreeing to proceed with peace negotiations. There is little documentary evidence to explain why MacArthur abruptly discarded the scheme of neutralizing Japan and accept that of unrestricted base retention. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable that the general's change of preference is interpreted as making compromise which would induce the Pentagon planners to forgo opposition to a peace treaty, rather than as resulting from his revised calculation of the military necessity for extensive bases in Japan proper. This account is supported by the fact that, in anticipation of the visits to him by high-level missions from the State and Defense Departments, MacArthur indicated his intention to provide some midway solution acceptable to both the conflicting agencies.²³⁸ That interpretation is reinforced by the fact that the general suddenly altered his position only a few days after he met with unyielding opposition to the peace treaty by the visiting Pentagon leaders.

As in MacArthur's case, what caused the State Department officials to accept the option of securing unlimited base rights was not their updated recognition of

²³⁷ Memo by Acheson to Johnson, Sept. 7, 1950, *ERUS* 1950, vol. 6, p. 1293.

²³⁸ See Memo by Sebald to Butterworth, May 25, 1950, *Ibid.*, pp.1205-7; and Memo by MacArthur, June 14, 1950, *Ibid.*, pp. 1213-21.

its military necessity, as deemed by the Pentagon planners increased as a result of the outbreak of the Korean War, but their urgent need to drag out the military's consent to the initiation of the peace-making process. To get peace negotiations started in the face of the Korean conflict, the civilian planners made another concession in acceding to the JCS demand that a treaty should not come into effect until after a favorable resolution of the Korean conflict was reached. From the perspective of the State Department, those military requirements were very difficult to secure in peace negotiations because of expected adverse reactions from the FEC nations and the Japanese. As Acheson conceded later, however, they were accepted in order to reach a national decision to proceed with the negotiations.

The withdrawal of opposition to a separate treaty on the part of the JCS stemmed from their revised outcome calculation of that option based on new information, as expected by the analytic model. In particular, Soviet-directed North Korean aggression and the subsequent Soviet boycott of UN Security Council meetings caused the JCS to modify their calculation of Soviet intentions. Unlike their initial calculation, the service chiefs came to conclude that the Russians would not take hostile actions against Japan merely on the legalistic ground of their exclusion from the peace treaty, in light of their disregard for prior international agreements. Because of such a revision of calculation, the JCS receded from their objection to a separate treaty. Their consent to the initiation of peace negotiations, however, does not appear to have resulted from their updated appreciation of political reasons for a prompt treaty. This interpretation is grounded on the fact that, with American military involvement in the Korean War, the military chiefs and other Pentagon planners became more strongly opposed to the treaty because of the perceived need to retain unrestricted control over Japan proper as a forward base supporting military operations in Korea. It is rather understood that their consent to the initiation of peace negotiations was a compromise made in return

for the State Department's concessions to their security terms, especially those of obtaining unlimited base rights and withholding the enforcement of the treaty until a settlement of the Korean situation.

In the final analysis, there was the impact of new information and a resulting revision of outcome calculations in reaching the decision to proceed toward a peace treaty, as evidenced in the acceptance of a separate treaty by the JCS. A primary reason for that decision, though, was that General MacArthur and the State Department planners made concessions to the Pentagon's military requirements, which they deemed largely impracticable, in order to obtain agreement to starting the peace negotiations from the Pentagon planners. This aspect is strongly consistent with the logic of the bureaucratic politics model.

2. The Decision to Rearm Japan

There are also two research questions raised in regard to the rearmament decision: (1) Why and how did decision makers choose their policy preferences concerning the rearmament problem? (2) How did decision makers' divergent preferences aggregate to produce the national decision to rearm Japan?

(1) Individual processes of preference choice

Relevant decision makers were Secretary of State Acheson and his policy aides in the Far Eastern Bureau of the State Department, John Foster Dulles as a special adviser to Acheson, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Army Department, and General MacArthur. The rearmament decision involved two main issues. One was the issue of whether or not the United States would change its occupation policy of disarming Japan and proceed to rearm it. The other related to the timing of such rearmament. Three different policy options were favored by those decision makers. First, the JCS and the Army Department advocated taking prompt steps

toward rearmament even during the occupation. In conjunction with the security terms of a peace treaty, the Pentagon decision makers insisted that the treaty had to authorize the establishment of a Japanese armed force. As a second option, Acheson and his State Department advisers, while recognizing the necessity for eventual rearmament, objected to proceeding with it during the occupation and in the immediate post-treaty period. They preferred that a peace treaty would neither authorize nor prohibit the formation of Japanese forces. In this respect, both civilian and military planners in Washington agreed to the principle of rearming Japan but differed with each other over its timing. Third, General MacArthur committed himself to the continued disarmament of Japan under a neutralization agreement among the concerned countries. Therefore, he recommended that a peace treaty provide for the neutralization of an unarmed Japan.

Preference choice by the JCS and the Army Department is validly explained by the bureaucratic politics model. In other words, their favored option of proceeding toward rearmament during the occupation resulted from their organizational concerns and interests. Reasoning advanced by the military planners in favor of rearming Japan was derived from strategic concepts in the war plans formulated by the JCS. Among war concepts, the necessity of protecting Japan and giving the first priority to the European region were relevant factors that led the military policy makers to insist upon rearmament. It was estimated that defending Japan would require at least the continued stationing of the existing four divisions of American occupation forces there. It was reasoned, however, that the limited strength of the total US armed forces coupled with military emphasis on the European theater would make a reduction in the forces retained in Japan inevitable. As a result, the rebuilding of Japanese defense forces was needed to permit the withdrawal of part of the US forces from Japan without jeopardizing its security. In addition, a new Japanese army was considered necessary to supplement reduced

American troops in East Asia for military operations in the event of all-out war. This consideration also stemmed from the war concept of utilizing Japan's manpower and facilities in case of war against the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, the reason for the military planners to advocate moving toward rearmament, even in the remaining period of the occupation, is explained by the organizational interest of the JCS in developing and maintaining military preparedness for any probable wartime situations. In their war plans before early 1950, the service chiefs considered it unlikely that the Soviet Union would resort to war as a means to achieve its objectives. However, they did not rule out the possibility of accidental war caused by miscalculations. As a result, they had an interest in developing military strength and readiness for contingencies.²³⁹ Reflecting this military interest, in March 1949, the JCS insisted on taking preparatory steps toward the rebuilding of Japanese armed forces on the ground that "serious emergency conditions may well arise in the interim" until a peace settlement was reached.²⁴⁰ In short, as the bureaucratic politics model would predict, the policy preference of the JCS and the Army Department for the prompt rearming of Japan was determined by military-strategic considerations deduced from the military chiefs' war plans and by their organizational interest of developing and maintaining military readiness for war as well.

The bureaucratic politics model also holds in explaining the State Department policy makers' objections to going ahead with rearmament. First of all, Acheson and his Far East experts were in agreement with the Pentagon planners over the need for the eventual creation of a Japanese defense force as a substitute

²³⁹ See Memo by the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, Nov. 2, 1948, attached to NSC 35, Report by the Secretary of Defense to the NSC, *FRUS* 1948, vol. 1, pp. 656-62.

²⁴⁰ Memo by the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, NSC 44, "Limited Military Armament for Japan," March 1, 1949, *FRUS* 1949, vol. 7, p. 672.

for a partial or full withdrawal of US forces from Japan in the future. This agreed-upon position stemmed from the shared mind-sets of the civilian and military policy makers in Washington. They agreed that Japan should be defended by armed forces because of aggressive Soviet intentions toward it, and that the United States would not guarantee Japanese security indefinitely. These shared mind-sets led them to eliminate the policy option of the continued disarmament of Japan from serious consideration.

However, Acheson and his advisers conflicted with the Pentagon planners over the timing of rearmament. An overriding concern that prompted the diplomatic officials to stand against proceeding toward reactivation of a Japanese armed force during the occupation and in the immediate post-treaty period was its expected political consequences. When the JCS pressed for a national decision to undertake a covert program for rearming Japan during 1949, the civilian planners strongly objected, mainly because they were concerned that its disclosure would raise serious difficulties in political relations with the other FEC nations. They feared that the revelation of such a secret move would not only bring about legal and diplomatic problems in light of a ban placed on Japanese rearmament by the FEC decisions, but also arouse such distrust about the sincerity of America's occupation policy as to weaken its political position on the Japanese matters.

In considering timing for rearmament in the post-occupation period, the State Department policy makers also gave primary attention to its political effects. In their estimation, a decision to rearm Japan immediately after a peace settlement, which would signify an abrupt reversal of the occupation policies, would cast serious doubts among the Japanese people about the validity of the occupation. Moreover, the one-sided decision without consent by the Japanese through a voluntary revision of their constitution would give an impression of American selfishness. These consequences would undermine the political orientation of Japan

toward the United States. Because of their prediction of adverse political results, the State Department planners took a stand against the formation of a Japanese army in the immediate post-treaty period.

Another concern that caused Acheson and his Far East experts to oppose prompt rearmament was that it might frustrate the process of Japanese peace-making that they had decided to begin. It was commonly assumed among the policy makers in Washington that if Japan were permitted to establish an armed force immediate or within a few years after the signing of a peace treaty, it would be necessary to provide for such rearmament in the treaty. From the civilian planners' perspective, however, any treaty authorizing the creation of Japanese forces would certainly be rejected by the other FEC members, most of which preferred that Japan remain disarmed. In summary, the State Department planners' opposition to rearmament during the occupation and within the immediate post-treaty years largely resulted from their organizational interests. These interests included maintaining good political relations with Japan and the friendly FEC nations and completing peace negotiations with them successfully.

To explore how those civilian and military planners respectively dealt with value complexity in their processes of preference choice, this research identifies two value dimensions involved in the rearmament problem. One dimension referred to the military value of developing military preparedness for a possible armed conflict with the Soviet Union. The other consisted of the political values of preserving Japan's pro-American orientation and of concluding a peace settlement through successful negotiations with the FEC nations. The two dimensions were in a conflict relationship. The promotion of the military value called for prompt rearmament, along with its authorization in a peace treaty. On the other hand, the pursuit of the political values dictated continued disarmament in the immediate future. It also required that a peace treaty not provide for rearmament.

The JCS and the Army Department preferred proceeding toward the rebuilding of a Japanese military force, even prior to the termination of the occupation, because they attached primary importance to the military value. At the same time, they were aware that any measures toward rearmament during the occupation would present legal and political problems in relations with the FEC countries. Hence, they recommended that such measures be carried out in secrecy. However, this recommendation is not interpreted as an attempt to genuinely resolve a conflict relationship between the military and political values because the maintenance of secrecy was considered unworkable by the State Department officials. This was immediately proven so by the disclosure of the intragovernmental deliberation over Japanese rearmament to the public through the press in May 1949. In addition, the military planners tended to avoid, rather than resolve, the value conflict when they insisted that any peace treaty should contain a provision for the creation of a Japanese armed force. They did so by giving exclusive attention to the military value and by ignoring the political values involved. In such a single-value decision problem, benefits to the value of increasing military readiness merely dictated prompt rearmament through its authorization in the peace treaty.

In contrast, the State Department planners recognized the existence of the value conflict. In evaluating the policy options, they acknowledged the benefit of rearmament to the military value in arguing that "if the peace treaty does not authorize the rearmament of Japan, the United States will be faced with an awkward security problem."²⁴¹ They did, however, give primary consideration to adverse political effects arising from rearmament, such as those of undermining Japan's friendly attitude toward America and of jeopardizing the Japanese peace-

²⁴¹ Memo by John Howard to Assistant Secretary of State Butterworth and Under Secretary of State Rusk, Nov. 10, 1949, attached to Memo by Howard and Butterworth to Secretary of State Acheson, Nov. 15, 1949, 740.0011 PW (Peace)/11-1549, RG 59.

making. In their estimation, these political costs would be certain and considerable. The perceived military costs of continued disarmament in the immediate post-treaty period, on the other hand, would be moderate and acceptable as long as US forces remained in Japan. Accordingly, the civilian planners chose to oppose prompt rearmament through its authorization in the peace treaty. In short, the Pentagon planners tended to avoid the value conflict by devaluating or ignoring the political values, whereas their counterparts in the State Department recognized and then resolved it by making a trade-off choice.

General MacArthur's stand favoring continued disarmament can be fully explained by a combination of the bureaucratic politics and cognitive models. A major argument advanced by the general in opposition to rearmament was that it would "destroy the character and purpose of the occupation."²⁴² To use his other words, a reversal of the occupation policy of demilitarization "would dangerously weaken our prestige in Japan, and would place us in a ridiculous light before the Japanese people."²⁴³ He also claimed that such a policy reversal would create serious doubt among the Japanese about the sincerity of the entire reform program he had implemented. Those arguments suggest that MacArthur worried that moves toward rearmament would discredit his staff and him as the occupation authorities in the eyes of the Japanese people so as to undermine his prestige and accomplishments in Japan. Another major reason for the general's opposition was the fear that an American policy to rearm Japan would, by arousing objections from the other FEC nations, make difficult the early peace settlement that he strongly preferred. Judging from the reasons given by MacArthur, it is interpreted that his stand against rearmament resulted partly from his parochial interest

²⁴² Memo by MacArthur to the JCS, Dec. 23, 1948, CD 16-1-5 (Japan), RG 330.

²⁴³ Memo of conversation between MacArthur, Kennan, and Draper, March 23, 1948, FRUS 1948, vol. 6, p. 708.

deriving from his bureaucratic position charged with the administration of the occupation: bringing the occupation to a successful conclusion during his service in Japan. This account corresponds to the bureaucratic politics explanation.

The cognitive model also has some validity in accounting for MacArthur's preference for continued disarmament. As already pointed out, he had a consistent ideal of making Japan a pacifist nation as a unique example to the world. The general's case for Japan's neutrality originated from such a belief about Japan's role. In this connection, a noticeable fact was that continued disarmament, for MacArthur, was an indispensable aspect of Japanese neutrality. His scheme to neutralize Japan under an international guarantee required not retaining American bases in the Japanese main islands and not rearming Japan as well. Therefore, his support for an unarmed Japan is regarded as logically stemming from his belief in a pacifist Japan. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the general, adherent to that belief, pressed the Japanese to renounce their national right to maintain armed forces in the 1946 constitution.

As he became committed to the alternative of continued disarmament on the basis of his parochial interest and personal belief, the occupation commander proceeded to bolster that option against the competing rearmament option. In the process of bolstering, he tended to avoid a conflict relationship among the values involved. The general's favored option was supposedly intended to promote the moral and political values: (1) to set an example of a pacifist nation; (2) to preserve the friendly attitude of the Japanese toward the occupation authorities; and (3) not to provoke the other FEC nations in order to conclude a peace treaty promptly. When he was faced with the Pentagon proposal for the rearming of Japan, which was designed to satisfy the military value of developing military preparedness for war with the Soviets, MacArthur denied the existence of a trade-off relationship among the values at stake by advancing two interrelated but questionable

arguments. One was that the neutral status of an unarmed Japan would enable the United States to maintain its military forces on a minimum scale in the Far East. The other was that Japanese rearmament would provoke the Soviet Union, resulting in the United States' needing to retain more forces in Japan than it could afford in order to cope with probable Soviet military advances. These contentions were contrary to the Pentagon planners' view that the creation of a Japanese armed force would permit the partial withdrawal of the US forces from Japan so as to increase overall military readiness. In MacArthur's reasoning, the disarmament option would not only enhance the moral and political values, but also safeguard the military value. A rearmament policy, on the other hand, would damage all the values involved. He viewed the values not as conflicting but as consonant. The general's arguments, however, are considered questionable. The first one was based on his ill-grounded estimate, as pointed out above, that the Russians would respect the neutrality of an unarmed Japan since they had neither the intention nor the capability of controlling Japan. The second one simply ignored newly-established Japanese forces to supplement US troops remaining in Japan. In this respect, MacArthur, drawing on doubtful arguments, sought to avoid recognizing the existence of the value conflict involved in the rearmament problem.

As the cognitive model would expect, the general also used inferences of impossibility or negative images to downgrade the rearmament alternative. An argument repeatedly given against it was that it was impossible to create and maintain a military force capable of protecting Japan from external aggression because of its deficient economy and the need for a large amount of American aid. Or MacArthur claimed that Japan's forces, even if best rebuilt, would be of little military value in defending their nation against a large-scale Soviet attack. By resting on such strongly negative logic, the general tried to set aside the competing option. The effect was that he could ignore the military value inherent in that

alternative and thus avoid the value conflict. In the final analysis, MacArthur's preference for the continued disarmament of Japan was determined by his parochial interest of ending the occupation successfully and by his personal belief in a pacifist Japan as well. In the process of bolstering the favored option, he tended to avoid the value conflict by denying its existence or by devaluating the competing rearmament option. Hence, each of the bureaucratic politics and cognitive models has validity in explaining his preference choice.

(2) The Collective Decision Process

Another research question refers to the collective decision process through which decision makers' different preferences converged to yield the final decision to rearm Japan. The rearmament decision consisted of three tactical decisions. The first one was to proceed with limited rearmament by indirect means of reinforcing and expanding the Japanese National Police Reserve (JNPR) into a para-military force during the remaining period of the occupation. Although it was not stipulated in NSC 60/1, that decision was reached by a tacit agreement among the State Department, the Pentagon, and MacArthur early in August 1950. A second decision was to take preparatory steps toward rearmament even before the termination of the occupation, but to do in such a manner that the peace-making process for Japan would not be impeded. Third, the civilian and military planners agreed that a peace treaty would not contain any provision either to authorize or to prohibit the establishment of a Japanese armed force.

The analytic model among the three decision-making models provides a valid explanation of the collective process that led to those final decisions. The model assumes that exposure to new information and/or persuasive argumentation about favored options during group discussions based on relevant information induce decision makers to revise their outcome calculations and thus to change

their initial preferences. As a result, a consensus on national decisions is finally reached. The analytic model also postulates that final decisions tend to be those which yield a balanced satisfaction of the conflicting values at stake. There is considerable evidence in the collective decision process to demonstrate the impacts of new information and persuasive argumentation in producing the rearmament decisions. There is little evidence, on the other hand, that they were the outcome of bargaining and coalition-building or of concurrence-seeking to promote group cohesion among decision makers, as expected by the bureaucratic politics or cognitive model.

First of all, the final decisions were reached when the State Department policy makers receded from their opposition to moving toward rearmament during the occupation and in the immediate post-treaty period. This change of position largely stemmed from their recalculation of Soviet intentions as a result of the outbreak of the Korean War. Before the war, the civilian planners expected that the Soviet Union would not resort to direct military aggression in the near future, while concentrating on indirect political aggression. The North Korean invasion, as commonly perceived in Washington to be directed by Russia, caused them to modify their calculation to the extent of estimating that the Soviets were willing to use military means to achieve their goal of communist expansion. Dulles, especially, viewed the invasion as the first move by Moscow toward the eventual seizure of Japan. As a result of such a revised calculation, the diplomatic planners came to recognize the need to undertake prompt measures, including the rearming of Japan, to strengthen its security. The diversion of American occupation forces from Japan to the Korean battlefield directly induced them to proceed toward rearmament. Such a move was further precipitated by new information indicating the likelihood of large-scale infiltration of communist-indoctrinated Japanese prisoners of war. Because of severe restrictions imposed by the FEC policy

decisions, however, the State Department officials decided to pursue rearmament by expanding and equipping the Japanese police forces in the remaining period of the occupation, which would be legally and politically defensible. Therefore, they acquiesced to MacArthur's action to organize and equip the JNPR along the lines of a military organization.

As for the question of providing for rearmament in a peace treaty, the civilian planners adhered to their previous position that the treaty simply should not contain any provision either prohibiting or authorizing the formation of a Japanese armed force. A major reason was that such authorization was expected to lead to the rejection of the treaty by the other FEC nations. In addition, they came to estimate that immediate rearmament after the termination of the occupation would not necessarily require its authorization in the peace treaty.

General MacArthur is credited with producing the decision to rearm Japan through the creation and expansion of the JNPR. There is little direct evidence to explain why the general altered his favored alternative away from one of continued disarmament to limited rearmament. Indirect evidence suggests that he changed his preference in response to a revised calculation of Soviet intentions under the impact of the Korean War. The general's scheme of a neutral and unarmed Japan rested on the premise that the Soviets would observe an international guarantee of Japan's security once they agreed to it. As William Sebald, political adviser to SCAP, pointed out, however, MacArthur became convinced that, in view of Communist aggression in Korea, the Russians would not respect the neutrality of an unarmed Japan. This revision of calculation led the general to abandon the option of continued disarmament.²⁴⁴

²⁴⁴ See Memo by Douglas W. Overton of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs to the Deputy Director (Johnson), Sept. 15, 1950, ERUS, 1950, vol. 6, pp. 1305-6. In this memo, Overton summarized Sebald's view on Japanese rearmament, as shared by General MacArthur.

On the other hand, it was an external event, the dispatch of the occupation troops to Korea, that directly prompted MacArthur to take steps toward limited rearmament. Though he didn't mention either the Korean War or the diversion of the American forces in the memorandum in which he ordered the creation of the JNPR, there was evidence that the general's action was certainly intended to cope with the security vacuum arising from the movement of the occupation troops to Korea. As demonstrated by his opposition to an NSC decision to rearm Japan, however, MacArthur preferred to undertake a rearmament program through the expansion of the JNPR into a quasi-military force, an indirect means not clearly inconsistent with the occupation policy. He remained concerned that direct and overt measures, including the creation of a regular armed force, would invalidate his occupation policy of demilitarization and thus undermine his prestige and accomplishments in Japan.

As the Korean conflict started, the JCS and the Army Department sought to move toward direct rearmament by securing a national decision and altering the existing FEC decisions. Faced with objections by MacArthur and the State Department, however, they decided to be satisfied with indirect rearmament through expanding the JNPR into a para-military force during the occupation. That decision was made upon their calculation that it would be almost impossible to carry out any plan to establish Japanese armed forces without obtaining support from SCAP as implementation authorities. Moreover, the military planners were convinced by the State Department that a proposal to change or rescind the FEC decisions would be frustrated by the adverse votes of the other FEC nations. Finally, given their consent to the initiation of peace negotiations, the Pentagon policy makers also were persuaded by the arguments of the State Department that the inclusion in the peace treaty of provisions authorizing rearmament would prejudice the peace-making process and that such authorization would not be

necessarily demanded for the formation of a Japanese force immediately after the termination of the occupation. Therefore, they agreed to the decision that the peace treaty would not contain any provision either authorizing or prohibiting rearmament. In summary, the above-mentioned evidence strongly indicates that the final decisions resulted from revised calculations and persuasive arguments under the impact of relevant information, as predicted by the analytic model.

Another aspect of the collective decision process which corresponds to the logic of the analytic model was that the final decisions were those that yielded some satisfaction for each of the multiple values at stake, thus resolving the value conflict. The decision to proceed with limited rearmament through the expansion of the JNPR into a para-military force satisfied to some extent the military value of developing military readiness. That decision was considered as not conflicting with the occupation policy, so it at least would not damage the political value of preserving the friendly orientation of the Japanese toward the United States in general and the occupation authorities in particular. To promote another political value of concluding an early peace treaty, the decisions were reached to include no authorization of rearmament in the treaty and to move toward rearmament in step with peace negotiations. Such a moral value of making Japan an example of a pacifist nation as held by MacArthur did not need to be satisfied because he discarded the option of continued disarmament as a result of the outbreak of the Korean War.

Chapter 5. Decisions III:

To Return the Northern Part of the Ryukyu Islands to Japan, and To Retain Exclusive Control over Okinawa and the Bonin Islands, in June 1953

A. Introduction

This chapter is devoted to analyzing the policy decisions reached in June 1953 concerning the post-treaty status of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands. These island groups, which had been part of the Japanese territory before World War II, were invaded by United States forces in the spring of 1945 and came under American military occupation. Because of the perceived military value of the islands, the United States made provision for the retention of its control over them in the Japanese peace treaty in September 1951. Article 3 of the treaty granted the United States an option to seek United Nation trusteeships administered by the United States and the right to continue its military occupation until the execution of such trusteeships.

By March 1952 when the occupation of Japan drew close to its official end, the problem of the ultimate disposition of the islands was raised by the State Department policy makers. They feared that the prolongation of the military administration of the islands might lead to serious friction in the US-Japanese political relationship in the post-treaty period. The civilian planners advocated returning them to Japan, with base rights agreements. This position was strongly contested by Pentagon policy makers, especially the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who preferred that exclusive United States control be indefinitely maintained in view of the unstable political and military situations in the Far East. In this respect, the civilian and military planners agreed to the necessity for retaining American bases

in the islands on a long-term basis but disagreed over the methods for such retention. Despite intensive discussions between the two departments, their policy conflict remained unresolved until early June 1953, when the problem was submitted to the National Security Council for final determination. The national decisions were made by President Eisenhower at an NSC meeting of June 25, to return the Amami Islands (the northern group of the Ryukyus) to Japanese administration and to retain full and exclusive American control over the rest of the island chain, including Okinawa, and the Bonin Islands indefinitely. Reflecting the modified position of the State Department, these decisions were intended to meet both political and military considerations involved.

B. Background Decisions

The Ryukyu Islands, which are also called Nansei Shoto in Japanese¹, are an archipelago extending in an arc of 650 miles southwest from Kyushu, the southernmost of Japan's four main islands, to the northern tip of Taiwan. The island chain consists of three island groups: the northern Amami Islands, the central Okinawa Islands, and the southern Sakishima Islands. Okinawa, with a population of approximately 500,000 in 1946, is the largest and most populous island in the Ryukyus and located in the East China Sea at the center of a triangle formed by Japan proper, China, and the Philippines. The island has a topography well suited to airfield construction as is evidenced by the extensive United States development in the postwar period. The Ryukyu island chain was incorporated as a part of the Japanese territory in 1879. Its central and southern groups were administered under Okinawa Prefecture, while its northern Amami group was a portion of Kagoshima Prefecture in Kyushu. After a successful invasion by United States forces in April

¹ Shoto is a Japanese word meaning "chain of islands."

1945, the entire island chain was placed under American military occupation.² Although a governing body called the Military Government of the Ryukyu Islands was established immediately after the Japanese surrender in August 1945, there was initially a short period of the division of labor between the Army and Navy in the administration of the islands. Finally, in July 1946, the Army came to assume sole responsibility, with its Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE) as the ultimate governing official.³

The Bonin Islands are located in the western Pacific Ocean, about 500 miles south of Japan proper, and they constitute the central group of the Nanpo Shoto, a chain of islands which consists of three island groups, including the northern Izu Shoto and the southern Volcano Islands. In 1876, Japan formally annexed the Bonins. In 1944, during the war, almost 7,000 Bonin Islanders were evacuated to Japan proper by the Japanese military. After the defeat of Japan in the war, the islands were brought under the control of the United States Navy.⁴

American policy planning concerning the disposition of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands began as early as 1944. In the JCS's postwar defense plans during the year, both the island groups were included in the overseas areas in which the United States should develop and retain military bases so as to assure its national security.⁵ The Potsdam Proclamation of July 1945, whose provisions were accepted by Japan as general surrender terms, stated that "Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor

² *The Encyclopedia Americana* (Danbury, Conn.: Grolier Inc., 1995), vol. 24, p. 62.

³ Arnold Fisch, Jr., *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 1945-1950* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1988), pp. 72-74.

⁴ *The Encyclopedia Americana*, vol. 4, p. 210.

⁵ James F. Schnabel, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: the Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1945-1947*, vol. 1, pp. 321-23.

islands as we determine."⁶ This provision left the ultimate status of the Ryukyus and Bonins ambiguous, thus allowing the United States, which had already taken control of them, time and latitude in deciding on how to dispose of them in view of the need to secure military bases there in the postwar period. A policy debate in Washington about the disposition problem was occasioned in January 1946 by the JCS who conveyed to the State Department through the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee their position that, in order to retain exclusive control over the island groups, they should be placed under UN strategic trusteeships solely conducted by the United States. Such trusteeship arrangements, if approved by the UN Security Council, would provide freedom of military action in the islands for the United States as if they were under its absolute sovereignty.⁷ This JCS position stemmed from their appreciation of the military value of the islands. In their proposal in October 1945 for the development of an overseas base system, the service chiefs had designated the Ryukyu Islands as one of the "primary base areas" essential to United States security and necessary for the projection of military operations in case of war. They also had included the Bonin-Volcano Islands in the list of "secondary base areas" essential for the protection of and access to the primary bases, and for the projection of military operations. As a matter of course, the JCS had envisioned the continuation of exclusive American control over the two island groups either by direct sovereignty or through UN trusteeships.⁸

⁶ For the text of the Potsdam Proclamation, see Department of State Bulletin, 1945, vol. 13, pp. 137-38.

⁷ SWNCC 249/1, Memo by the JCS for the Secretary of State, Jan. 22, 1946, CCS 360 (12-9-42), Sec. 13, RG 218.

⁸ JCS 570/40, "Overall Examination of U.S. Requirements for Military Bases and Rights," Oct. 8, 1945, CCS 360 (12-9-42), Sec. 9, RG 218.

The State Department's response to the military's case for strategic trusteeships was negative. Late in June 1946, Secretary of State James Byrnes submitted to President Truman his department's stand that the Ryukyus had to be regarded as "minor islands" which should be returned to Japan and demilitarized. This position was largely derived from political and diplomatic considerations. First, the acquisition of any part of the islands under the guise of a trusteeship would be directly contrary to the United States policy of opposing territorial expansion by any nation. The result would be to seriously undermine American prestige before the UN and throughout the world. Second, the development of bases in the islands would be regarded by the Russians as a provocative threat rather as a defensive move. Such a situation should be avoided, if possible, so as to secure diplomatic cooperation from the Soviet Union in conducting the occupation of Japan. This accommodating attitude is understandable in light of the State Department's planning at that time which envisaged long-term control by the Allies, including the Soviet Union, over the demilitarization of Japan even after the termination of the occupation. Finally, civilian planners were concerned that the continued domination of the Ryukyus, possessing a large and poverty-stricken population of about 840,000, would lay considerable economic and administrative burdens upon the United States.⁹ There was, however, little difference of position about the future of the Bonin and Volcano Islands. The JCS estimated, and the State Department agreed, that these islands were so small, their native residents so nearly nonexistent, and yet their strategic value as the outposts of Guam so great

⁹ SWNCC 59/1, "Policy Concerning Trusteeship and Other Methods of Disposition of the Mandated islands and other Outlying and Minor Islands Formerly Controlled by Japan," June 24, 1946, Lot File 56 D 527, RG 59.

that it was commonly proposed that they be placed under a strategic trusteeship singly administered by the United States.¹⁰

The disagreement between the State Department and the JCS over the disposition of the Ryukyus remained unresolved until April 1948, when the former modified its position to the extent of supporting the recommendation by George Kennan, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, for the long-term retention of American bases in the islands.¹¹ Kennan's recommendation was a part of the policy proposals given to the State Department after his discussions with General MacArthur regarding peace treaty matters in March. In their meetings, the general convinced Kennan of the necessity for indefinite control over the Ryukyus. Although he differed with the JCS over the continued presence of American bases and forces in Japan proper, MacArthur concurred with their position that the United States should retain its bases in the islands, especially Okinawa, which were deemed essential to its security interests in the Far East. In particular, the general considered American military presence in the islands necessary to protect a disarmed and neutral Japan against any external attack from the Asian mainland. Thus, he urged on Kennan the point that, regardless of the terms and timing of the peace treaty, the islands should not be returned to Japan.¹²

As the State Department sympathized with Kennan's proposal based on MacArthur's views, agreed-upon decisions were reached between the department and the Pentagon to maintain military facilities in the Ryukyus and Bonins on a

¹⁰ Memo by Robert Fearey of the Division of Northeastern Asian Affairs, Jan. 10, 1947, Lot File 56 D 527, RG 59.

¹¹ PPS 28/1, Report by Kennan, as revised and approved within the State Department, April 16, 1948, attached to Memo by Butterworth, Director of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, to Under Secretary of State Lovett, April 16, 1948, Lot File 60 D 330, RG 59.

¹² Conversations between MacArthur and Kennan, March 5 and 21, 1948, ERUS 1948, vol. 6, pp. 700-1 and p. 709.

long-term basis and to promptly develop bases on Okinawa. They were approved by President Truman on November 5, 1948, and incorporated in a revised Japan policy paper (NSC 13/3) on May 6, 1949. The issue of how such retention would be secured in the post-occupation period, however, was left undetermined because it was also decided that a Japanese peace treaty would be postponed.¹³ To implement these decisions, the Army Department immediately inaugurated a large-scale construction program to build permanent air bases, barracks, roads and other military installations on Okinawa. From mid-1949 to 1952, a considerable sum (approximately \$ 350 million) of appropriated funds was expended for such a base construction.¹⁴

When the State Department proceeded toward the conclusion of a peace treaty late in 1949, the problem of the post-treaty status of the islands again came to the fore. While objecting to the peace settlement, the JCS insisted that any treaty, if concluded, should assure the United States of its exclusive control of all the islands, possibly by means of UN trusteeship arrangements. On the other hand, State Department policy makers, who would assume the responsibility for negotiating the peace treaty, considered several alternative terms for base retention which would be more acceptable to the member countries of the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) and Japan: (1) to seek an ordinary trusteeship, rather than a strategic one, which was subject to the supervision of the UN Trusteeship Council; (2) to restore all the islands to Japanese control, with provision for American bases there; and (3) to return only the northern Amami group, which had been formerly

¹³ Memo by Under Secretary of State Lovett to Sidney Souers, Executive Secretary of the NSC, Oct. 26, 1948, *Ibid.*, pp. 876-78; and NSC 13/3, Report by the NSC on Recommendations with Respect to United States Policy Toward Japan, May 6, 1949, *FRUS* 1949, vol. 7, p. 731.

¹⁴ Annex A to the report by the NSC Planning Board, June 15, 1953, Background documents on NSC 125 series, Sect. 4, Records of the NSC, RG 273.

administered under Kagoshima Prefecture in Kyushu and thus demonstrated strong sentiment for a return to Japan.¹⁵

In determining the terms of the peace treaty, nevertheless, the State Department reluctantly agreed in August 1950 to the military chiefs' position in favor of the continued separation of all the islands from Japan and absolute control over them by the United States. As has been pointed out in the previous chapter, this agreement was a part of the concessions made to the JCS by the department in an effort to obtain their consent to the initiation of peace negotiations with the FEC nations and Japan. In consequence, the joint State-Pentagon memorandum (NSC 60/1) approved by the president on September 8, stated that the terms of any treaty "must secure to the United States exclusive strategic control of the Ryukyu Islands south of latitude 29 degrees north, Marcus Island, and the Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan."¹⁶ This policy statement, though reflecting the preference of the Pentagon, still left concrete methods for such American control unspecified. They would be decided on the basis of further consultation between the two departments and coming negotiations with the FEC nations.

With the full-dress peace negotiations starting at the beginning of 1951, divergent viewpoints were put forward within the US government, as well as by other concerned governments. First, some doubts were raised among State Department officials in charge of the peace treaty matters about the American conduct of a trusteeship. Such a strategic trusteeship as had been envisioned by the JCS would certainly be vetoed by the Soviet Union in the UN Security Council.

¹⁵ Briefing paper for John Foster Dulles on the Ryukyu Islands, June 19, 1950, Lot File 56 D 527, RG 59.

¹⁶ NSC 60/1, Memo for the president, Sept. 7, 1950, *FRUS* 1950, vol. 6, p. 1294. The Ryukyu Islands south of latitude 29 degrees north includes the Amami group which the State Department had considered returning to Japan as one of the policy options. The Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan comprises the Bonin and Volcano Islands.

Although an ordinary trusteeship required approval only by the General Assembly, it was doubtful whether the necessary two-thirds vote could be secured for a trusteeship granting exclusive base rights to the United States.¹⁷ Furthermore, the diplomatic officials, especially John Foster Dulles (who assumed the full responsibility for the peace negotiations), were skeptical of the option for the United States to acquire sovereignty over the islands for the continuation of its exclusive administration. It was deemed politically unacceptable owing to the American policy of opposing any territorial expansion and in view of the Japanese desire for the restoration of sovereignty over the islands.¹⁸

Second, the Japanese government was prepared to agree to the retention of the American control of bases in the islands through a trusteeship or other arrangements. It preferred, though, that the United States should maintain its military facilities on a lease basis. Moreover, the Japanese hoped that a trusteeship, if approved by the UN, would be conducted jointly by the United States and Japan. In any case, they strongly wanted the peace treaty not to require them to renounce sovereignty over the islands.¹⁹ Third, there were also different views on the part of the other FEC countries which would be major parties to the peace treaty. The British government initially proposed that the treaty provide for Japan's renunciation of sovereignty over the islands. This position was supported by Australia and New Zealand, both of which were concerned about a possible

¹⁷ Memo by Bacon of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, to John Allison, Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, March 7, 1951, Lot File 56 D 527; and Memo for Earl Johnson, Assistant Secretary of the Army, March 7, 1951, CD 387 (Japan), RG 330.

¹⁸ Memo by Dulles, June 27, 1951, ERUS 1951, vol. 6, pp. 1152-53.

¹⁹ These Japanese views were formally submitted to the Dulles mission for peace negotiations on January 31, 1951. See undated Memo by Prime Minister Yoshida, 1951, *Ibid.*, p. 833.

resurgence of Japanese militarism. In contrast, India insisted that the islands had to be returned to full Japanese administration.²⁰

Those divergent stands were reconciled by virtue of Dulles's efforts and incorporated in Article 3 of the peace treaty. The article provided that Japan would accept "any proposal of United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority" the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands. It further provided that the United States would "have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration" over the islands until a trusteeship was decided and executed. Although being not included in the treaty article, an interpretive statement by Dulles at the San Francisco peace conference pointed out that Japan would retain "residual sovereignty" over the islands.²¹ While there was no official clarification of the meaning of the term "residual sovereignty," it was generally understood that it implied that the islands would be eventually returned to Japan. In this respect, the treaty article was intended partly to satisfy Japan's desire not to renounce its sovereignty over the islands, as well as India's preference for their reversion. It was also to relieve State Department officials' concern about the adverse effect of America's acquisition of such sovereignty on its national prestige. Furthermore, the article was worded in such a manner as not to bind the United States to the trusteeship option in consideration of some skeptical views about it among the civilian planners. Finally, it was to assure Pentagon planners that exclusive control over American military bases on the islands would be retained under the status quo or other arrangements, including a trusteeship. In short, Article 3 of the peace treaty, which had been drafted by Dulles, granted the

²⁰ Japanese Peace Treaty: Working Draft and Commentary Prepared in the Department of State, June 1, 1951, *Ibid.*, pp. 1061-62.

²¹ The State Department, *Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan: Record of Proceedings* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 78.

United States a leeway in deciding on the future disposition of the islands, while leaving legal and nominal sovereignty over them with Japan. On the other hand, it indicated that there was still no agreement among civilian and military planners in Washington on the question of how to retain American bases in the islands for the post-treaty period.

C. Occasion for Decision

The problem of the disposition of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands in the post-treaty period was initially raised by General Ridgway, CINCFE, immediately after the Japanese peace treaty was signed in September 1951. On October 17, the general submitted to the JCS, with his endorsement, a policy study prepared by his staff, concerning the post-treaty status of the Ryukyus. After evaluating various factors involved in United States control over the islands, the study reached two conclusions. First, the maintenance of the American strategic position along the offshore island chain extending from the Aleutians through Japan and Okinawa to the Philippines would not necessarily require the continuation of American political control, by means of a UN trusteeship or other arrangements, over the Ryukyu Islands. Second, as in the case of its bases in the Japanese main islands, the United States could indefinitely retain its control of military facilities in the islands through a bilateral base agreement with Japan. General Ridgway, therefore, recommended that the government proceed to return the Ryukyus to Japan. He added that this recommendation was also applicable to the Bonin Islands.²²

Several reasons were advanced by CINCFE in opposition to the continuation of US political control over the Ryukyu Islands. First, it would deny the principle of

²² Staff Study on US long-term objectives with respect to the Ryukyu Islands, by the general headquarters of the Far East Command, attached to Memo by Myron Cowen, Consultant to the Secretary of State, to Acheson, Jan. 25, 1952, 794C.0221/1-2552, RG 59.

self-determination, to which the United States had subscribed. Second, it would continue to burden the United States with an economic liability in light of the little likelihood that the islands would attain a self-sustaining economy. It was estimated that American assistance toward reestablishing the Ryukyuan economy had amounted to a total of approximately 150 million dollars during the period from mid-1945 to mid-1951. Budget estimates expected that the annual economic aid for the coming years would amount to a high of 15 million and a low of 6 million dollars. Third, owing to the desire of a majority of the Japanese and Ryukyans for the return of the islands, prolonged US control over them would complicate the existing friendly political relationship with Japan. In view of these disadvantages, it followed logically that the United States should initiate action to return the islands to Japanese control. However, General Ridgway attached to the proposed action the condition that it should not be implemented until the ratification of the peace treaty because of its inconsistency with the provision of the treaty granting the United States an option to seek a UN trusteeship. Moreover, the return of the islands had to be conditional upon a firm agreement with Japan to retain under exclusive US control such military facilities as were deemed essential by the JCS.²³

The staff study was secretly forwarded by William Sebald, Political Adviser to General Ridgway as SCAP, to the State Department in November. In addition, in January 1952, Sebald delivered to the department a memorandum submitted by the Japanese government regarding the post-treaty disposition of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands. In the document, the Yoshida government requested that the United States clarify the legal status of the islands in the direction of recognizing Japan's sovereignty over them and the Japanese nationality of their inhabitants. Moreover, while realizing the necessity for the continued presence of American military bases in the islands, the Japanese government urged Washington to agree to restoring

²³ Ibid.

close relations in non-military fields between Japan proper and the islands, with the ultimate goal of returning them to Japanese control.²⁴

Sympathizing with Japan's desire to restore control over the Ryukyus and Bonins, Sebald recommended to the State Department that the United States impose only minimum restraints on political, economic, and cultural relations between Japan and these islands, and establish Japanese government representation in the islands in order to facilitate such relations. Like General Ridgway, Sebald preferred that the islands be returned early to Japan, with the simultaneous execution of base rights arrangements guaranteeing to the United States the full use and control of essential military areas and facilities.²⁵ In contrast with those accommodating views of American field officials in Tokyo, the JCS raised strong objections to the staff study submitted by General Ridgway, which suggested the reversion of the islands. In a letter to the general dated January 29, 1952, the military chiefs rejected the proposed policy, insisting that no change in the existing policy of retaining exclusive control of the islands should be contemplated "until a condition of stability has been firmly established throughout the Far East."²⁶ Despite such JCS opposition, the staff study and Sebald's concurring views provided an occasion for decision makers in the State Department to proceed to formulate a new policy with respect to the status of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands in the post-treaty period.

²⁴ Memo submitted by the Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sebald, Dec. 10, 1951, enclosed in Memo by Sebald to the State Department, Jan. 17, 1952, 611.94/1-1752, RG 59.

²⁵ Memo by Sebald to the State Department, *Ibid.*

²⁶ Message from the Office of the Assistant Chief of Army Staff for Operations to CINCFE, Jan. 29, 1952, enclosed in a telegram from Sebald to Robert McClurkin, Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Feb. 26, 1952, 794C. 0221/2-2652, RG 59.

D. Decision Makers' Policy Preferences in 1952

1. The State Department

The initial policy position of the State Department was expressed in a memorandum prepared by Myron Cowen, consultant to the secretary of state, and approved by Acheson on January 25, 1952. The document suggested two major changes in the existing policies regarding the future disposition of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands. One was that the United States should not exercise its option under Article 3 of the Japanese peace treaty to seek a United Nations trusteeship administered by the United States over the islands. The other was that bilateral arrangements should be made with Japan for returning the islands to Japanese political control, while retaining United States control over the military facilities deemed necessary by the JCS.²⁷ These recommendations were based largely on the staff study by the Far East Command. During the drafting of the document, the Far East experts of the State Department considered three major alternatives: (1) to conduct a trusteeship over all the islands; (2) to seek a trusteeship over only those islands where permanent military bases were desired, while returning the other islands to Japan; and (3) to return all the islands to Japan, with the United States retaining its bases under long-term base rights agreements.²⁸ It is to be noted that the civilian planners gave no consideration to maintaining the status quo of exclusive American control as a possible option.

The first two options were set aside because the exercise of a trusteeship was expected to involve a number of problems. First, objections would be raised against the execution of a trusteeship among the islanders, the majority of whom

²⁷ Memo by Myron Cowen to Acheson, Jan. 25, 1952, *FRUS* 1952-1954, vol. 14, pp. 1116-20.

²⁸ Briefing paper for Dulles on the Ryukyus and Bonins, attached to Memo by MacClurkin to John Allison, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, Dec. 4, 1951, Lot File 58 D 529, RG 59.

desired that the islands be returned to Japanese administration. According to the estimate of the State Department, during the summer of 1951, 99% of the adult population of the Amami Islands signed petitions requesting that the area be returned to Japan. Similar petitions circulated in Okinawa and the southern Ryukyus were reported to have been signed by 74% and 80% of the adult population respectively. It was expected, therefore, that the enforcement of a trusteeship would certainly meet with political and administrative difficulties with the islanders. Moreover, it was estimated that, since the signing of the peace treaty, there had been a growing sentiment for the reversion of the islands among the Japanese, who considered them to have been historically Japanese and an integral part of the main islands before the war. Accordingly, should the United States assume a trusteeship over the islands, the Japanese would resent such a regime of control because they regarded it as a step away from the eventual restoration of the islands to their administration. As a result, the political relationship between the two nations would be strained. Second, State Department planners anticipated that such a UN "strategic trusteeship" as originally contemplated would not be approved by the Security Council because of a Soviet veto. In case the United States inevitably proceeded to adopt an "ordinary trusteeship," which merely required the approval of the General Assembly, its plans and actions in the islands would be subject to the close supervision of the UN Trusteeship Council. The result was that the American military would be severely restricted in its use of the islands for military purposes. In addition, the provisions of the UN charter would obligate the United States, as the administering power, to undertake an active program of political, economic, and social improvements in the islands. These responsibilities of the trusteeship were expected to be complicated by the chronic deficit in the economy of the islands. Far East experts concluded that the conduct of a trusteeship would bring about military restrictions,

as well as political and economic burdens which had to be avoided if it were possible in any other way to assure America's control of its military facilities in the islands.

Another factor that led civilian planners to stand against a trusteeship lay in the attitudes of other concerned nations. India had already expressed opposition to Article 3 of the peace treaty, contending that the islands should be returned to Japan. It was believed that this view was shared by other Asian countries, many of which regarded a United States trusteeship as "a device to perpetuate Western imperialism." On the other hand, such allies as the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand were expected to prefer that the United States should conduct a trusteeship in order to check any possible Japanese moves to expand southward. However, they would raise no strong objection to the return of the islands to Japanese political control, not only because the existing security agreements between the United States and these countries would provide protection for them, but also because American forces would remain in the islands on a long-term basis. In light of these various considerations, the State Department policy makers decided to eliminate the trusteeship option for consideration. Instead, they chose, as a favored option, that of returning the islands to Japan with base rights agreements. This course of action would largely meet the strategic necessity of ensuring America's use of military bases in the area on a long-term basis. The Far East experts, like the staff of the Far East Command, estimated that the United States could retain its existing control over military facilities in the islands through a military arrangement with Japan to be made at the time of their reversion. The favored alternative, on the other hand, would satisfy the pronounced desire of the islanders for a return to Japanese control and the irredentist sentiment in Japan. Furthermore, it would enable the United States to avoid the financial burden resulting from the chronically depressed economic status of the islands. Finally, the

reversion option was the one that fully took into consideration the conflicting attitudes of other concerned nations. The next step to take was to consult with Pentagon planners with a view to obtaining their concurrence with that option.²⁹

While the memorandum suggesting new State Department stands was cleared throughout the department and approved by Acheson, the issue of the disposition of the Ryukyus and Bonins lay dormant until the end of March. A main reason was that policy makers in Washington were preoccupied with the pending negotiation of the administrative agreement with Japan. On April 2, State Department representatives raised the issue at a State-JCS meeting. John Allison, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, explained to the service chiefs his department's position, pointing out the disadvantages of a trusteeship and the need to return all or part of the islands to Japanese control as "a political gesture." The military chiefs, on the other hand, took strong exception to the reversion of the islands. They, above all, insisted upon the indefinite continuation of existing absolute control over Okinawa which was being used as a crucial air base for military operations in the Korean War. The other islands also had to be retained because of the necessity of fully controlling early air warning facilities on them. The service chiefs feared that they would be largely restricted in their utilization of military bases if any of the islands reverted to Japanese political control. In particular, General Hoyt Vandenberg, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, claimed that:

If we are going to wage atomic war, which might be unpopular with the Japanese, we would have to have a free hand. If we didn't have a free hand, we would lose 90 per cent of the value of the base.

The meeting demonstrated a difference of position between the civilian and military planners. Although they agreed that the United States should retain its military bases in the islands on a long-term basis, their disagreement centered on

²⁹ Ibid.

the question of whether political control had to be returned to Japan. The only decision of the meeting was to establish a joint State Department-Pentagon committee in order to further discuss the problem and reach a consensus.³⁰ No meetings of the committee were held until mid-September, however, for the Pentagon delayed designating its representatives on the ground that the JCS had not completed their study of military requirements on the islands.

In the meantime, the State Department, at President Truman's direction, was in the process of preparing a National Security Council policy paper on Japan for the post-treaty period. A draft dated May 5 contained a provision suggesting that the United States proceed early to return political control over the Ryukyus and Bonins to Japan by making arrangements for retaining American bases there. When the draft was forwarded to the Pentagon for comment, military planners demanded the deletion of the provision on the score of the absence of any agreed-upon position between the two department.³¹ As a result, the final Japan paper (NSC 125/2), which was approved by Truman on August 7, left unresolved the problem of the disposition of the islands. The policy document, though, recommended such a general policy of maintaining military bases as agreed to between civilian and military planners, stating that:

The United States security interests will require long-term retention of bases in the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands in view of the eventual possibility that future Japanese governments may severely restrict or exclude United States use of military facilities in Japan proper.³²

³⁰ Memo of discussion at the State-JCS meeting, April 2, 1952, *FRUS* 1952-1954, vol. 14, pp. 1224-27.

³¹ Memo by Robert Young, Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs to Allison, June 10, 1952, *Ibid.*, pp. 1271-72.

³² NSC 125/2, "United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Japan," Aug. 7, 1952, *Ibid.*, p. 1302.

This policy statement reflected certain mind-sets shared by State Department and Pentagon decision makers. First, they both considered the long-term maintenance of the military base system, which had already been established in and about Japan, necessary to the defense of the United States. Second, despite the peace and security treaties predicated on the conception of Japan as an ally, they had a considerable distrust of its future political orientation. This lack of confidence in Japan caused policy makers in Washington commonly to recognize the necessity for indefinitely retaining bases in the islands, especially Okinawa, as a safeguard in case the bases in Japan's main islands were relinquished as a consequence of changes in its pro-American orientation. Since no agreement was reached on the method of such base retention between the civilian and military planners, however, NSC 125/2 was limited to directing that the two departments later submit joint recommendations to the president.³³

Another policy problem which concerned the State Department officials in charge of Far Eastern affairs at that time was that of repatriating some 7,000 former inhabitants of the Bonin Islands, who had been removed to Japan by the Japanese military in 1944, and now agitated for their return through a persistent flow of petitions to the Japanese government. Washington's existing policy was to prohibit the repatriation of the former islanders for security and administrative reasons. That policy had been formulated by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee as early as November 1945. The US government had made a further decision in March 1946 to permit the return of 135 former inhabitants of American and European descent, while continuing to object to sending back the other Japanese islanders. Early in July 1952, Robert Murphy, the first American ambassador to Japan after the restoration of its sovereignty, informed the State Department that Japanese Foreign Minister Katsuo Okazaki raised with him the repatriation issue.

³³ Ibid., p. 1306.

Pointing out the social problem arising from the deplorable conditions of the former islanders living in Japan, the foreign minister conveyed to Murphy the governmental request that the United States give permission to repatriate them. According to Okazaki, his government found it difficult to understand why the former residents of the Ryukyus had been permitted to live there and those of the Bonins, which were on the same footing as the Ryukyus, were not. It was reported in connection with the repatriation issue that the Yoshida government was meeting with increasing charges by the opposition parties that it was subservient to American interests.³⁴

In response to Japan's call for the repatriation, the Far East experts in the State Department took the stand that those former residents should be allowed to return to the Bonin Islands in order to prevent potential friction between the two governments. Another and more immediate reason for such a sympathetic position was the political concern that adherence to the existing policy opposing the repatriation might militate against the friendly Yoshida government's staying in power in the coming general elections scheduled for early October. In a memorandum of July 15 to Frank Nash, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Assistant Secretary of State Allison presented his department's position in support of promptly sending back the former islanders. Since the Bonin Islands were then under the jurisdiction of the Navy Department, however, he suggested that the Pentagon and State Department further discuss the problem so as to jointly prepare an official reply to the Japanese government.³⁵ In the final analysis, the policy preferences of the State Department concerning the

³⁴ Telegram by Murphy to the State Department, July 2, 1952, *Ibid.*, pp. 1279-80.

³⁵ Memo by Allison to Nash, July 15, 1952, 794C.0221/7-252, RG 59; and Memo of conversation, by Ambassador Murphy, July 16, 1952, enclosed in Memo by Murphy to Allison, July 29, 1952, 794C.0221/7-2952, RG 59.

post-treaty disposition of the Ryukyus and Bonins are summarized as follows: (1) to abandon the option under Article 3 of the peace treaty to seek a UN trusteeship over them; (2) to promptly return the islands to Japanese political control with base rights agreements; and (3) to repatriate former inhabitants to the Bonin Islands.

2. The Defense Department

Pentagon policy makers' preferences regarding the islands problem were represented by the viewpoints of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As noted above, late in January 1952, the military chiefs disapproved the staff study by the Far East Command recommending the reversion of the islands to Japanese administration, insisting that no change should be made in existing American full control over them as long as tensions and Communist aggression in the Far East persisted. Their reasoning for this negative position was provided by a policy report by their policy planning group, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, pointing out the strategic significance of the islands and advising against their reversion to Japan. The report, which was approved by the JCS as their position on January 20, reaffirmed the longstanding military position that exclusive military control of the islands was essential to United States security and necessary for military operations in East Asia at the outbreak of hostilities. This position stemmed from the service chiefs' considering strategic control over the Pacific as a major requirement for the ultimate security of the United States. The control of that region in turn required securing and developing military bases there "for facilitating full exploitation, both defensively and offensively," by American forces in the event of war. On the other hand, the maintenance of such bases was intended to prevent the military utilization of that area by any potential enemy.³⁶

³⁶ JCS 1380/35, Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, Jan. 14, 1952, 383.21 Japan (3-13-45) Sec. 28, RG 218.

Under the JCS's war plans for the Pacific, primary considerations were given to the Ryukyus because Okinawa in that island cluster was regarded as a "key base of primary importance," located in a controlling position in the western Pacific region. The military chiefs estimated that, in a war with the USSR, Soviet troops would inevitably drive southward into Manchuria and North China. Aside from Japan proper, where American bases might not be retained indefinitely, Okinawa would provide the only base area from which United States armed forces could be projected into the Soviet-controlled Asian mainland. Okinawa was a "springboard from which to exert military pressure upon the land area around the Yellow Sea." It was foreseen, on the other hand, that control of the Ryukyus by the Soviet Union or Communist China would enable the enemy to dominate the western Pacific and to threaten the defense of other offshore islands, including the Philippines and Japan, with which American security was closely connected. Based on these strategic considerations, the JCS concluded that no change should be contemplated in the existing exclusive control over the Ryukyus. Furthermore, they contended that the retention of such a military administration was needed more than ever before in view of the prolongation of hostilities in Korea and the recent buildup of Chinese air forces supported by the Soviet Union.³⁷

Once they reiterated their consistently held position, the JCS proceeded to refute the arguments advanced in the staff study of the Far East Command in favor of the reversion of the islands to Japan with base rights agreements. First, the military chiefs considered that the unrestricted use of military facilities on the islands necessarily demanded the retention of political control over them. If the islands were restored to Japanese administration and Japan adopted a neutralist policy, the United States would encounter serious difficulties in utilizing its bases. Because of the strategic significance of the islands, especially Okinawa, in case of

³⁷ Ibid.

hostilities with an enemy on the Asian mainland, the service chiefs insisted upon exclusive American control which would not be affected by political conditions in Japan. Second, they reinforced their case for the maintenance of the state quo by arguing that the Japanese would not look upon the continued military control of the islands as a source of irritation "until long after the present critical balance of power situation in the Far East has been remedied." Third, the point that the Ryukyus were an economic liability was disputed by the contention that the economic cost of administering the islands (amounting to about ten million dollars for the fiscal year 1953) was "trivial" when balanced against the human and material costs required to capture them from Japan and their importance to United States security. Moreover, it was estimated that the cost of military administration would decrease as the islanders became self-supporting. Finally, the JCS denied the existence of considerable sentiments for reversion to Japan on the part of the islanders, claiming that because the inhabitants of the Ryukyus (except those in their northern part, the Amami Islands) regarded themselves as racially and culturally distinct from the Japanese, they didn't show any "inordinate desire" to revert to Japanese administration.³⁸

The policy preference of the JCS for the indefinite maintenance of exclusive American control over the Ryukyus and Bonins was reaffirmed in another position paper submitted to Secretary of Defense Robert Lovett in mid-August 1952 in order to provide a basis for discussion for Pentagon representatives of the proposed State-Defense committee on the disposition of the islands. In an effort to demonstrate the necessity for holding complete control, the military chiefs specified "maximum" base requirements in the islands in the event of war with either the Soviet Union or Communist China and in case bases in Japan proper were not available. For Okinawa, the military needed seven major air bases,

³⁸ Ibid.

including the existing three, one naval base, and other supporting facilities. In addition, four air control and warning stations were required in the outer Ryukyu islands such as the Amami group. For the Bonins, two naval and air bases and other supporting facilities were needed over the islands.³⁹

As a next task, the JCS evaluated five policy alternatives for the retention of American bases in the islands: (a) a strategic UN trusteeship administered by the United States; (b) the maintenance of the status quo of exclusive American control; (c) a return to Japan with base rights agreements; (d) the exercise of joint sovereignty with Japan; and (e) annexation by the United States. Like the State Department policy makers, the military chiefs took exception to the conduct of a strategic trusteeship. The application for the trusteeship would be subject to a possible Soviet veto in the Security Council. Even if it were approved, it was expected that the American military control over the islands under a strategic trusteeship would be constantly obstructed by Russia's blocking tactics in the Security Council. Furthermore, in light of the likelihood of the inclusion of Japan as a member of the UN, the strategic trusteeship over the islands, over which Japan held "residual sovereignty," would conflict with Article 78 of the UN charter prohibiting the enforcement of a trusteeship over the territories of the member states. As a result, the trusteeship would be terminated and the United States would lose its right to control the islands.⁴⁰

As to the option of maintaining the status quo, the military chiefs pointed out its advantages. First, it would provide the major advantage of affording to the United States the full and unrestricted use of the islands for military purposes.

³⁹ Memo by the JCS to Secretary of Defense Lovett, Aug. 15, 1952, *FRUS* 1952-1954, vol. 14, p. 1324.

⁴⁰ In mid-July, the JCS already had decided to abandon the trusteeship option because of Japan's possible entry into the United Nations. See Memo by Rear Admiral Lalor to the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, July 16, 1952, 383.21 Japan (3-13-45), Sec. 30, RG 218.

Second, Washington would not need to request a United Nations mandate for a trusteeship which could be blocked by the Soviets. Third, the continuation of absolute control by the United States would allow it to retain full freedom of action until such time as "concrete and important advantages" would arise out of a decision affecting the disposition of the islands. The JCS saw no clear benefits accruing from the return of the islands to Japanese political control. Despite those advantages, they became aware that continued military administration would constitute an irritant to the existing friendly US-Japanese relations because of its inconsistency with Japanese nationalistic desires. On the other hand, the service chiefs eliminated from serious consideration the options of reverting to Japan with base rights agreements and exercising joint sovereignty with Japan, briefly arguing that American bases in the islands "would be relatively useless in war if Japan were hostile, and might involve difficulties even if Japan were neutral." On the basis of evaluating those alternative courses of action, they concluded that the maintenance of the status of quo was "the only acceptable means for assuring the accomplishment of US security objectives" regarding the islands for the foreseeable future.⁴¹ The JCS stand opposing any change in the existing status of the islands was approved as an official Pentagon position by Secretary of Defense Lovett and conveyed to the State Department late in August, along with the suggestion that, in accordance with the decision of NSC 125/2, a joint State-Defense working group be promptly established to prepare a recommended national position concerning the disposition of the islands.⁴²

⁴¹ Memo by the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, Aug. 15, 1952, ERUS 1952-1954, vol. 14, pp. 1325-27.

⁴² Memo by William Foster, Deputy Secretary of Defense, to Acheson, Aug. 29, 1952, *Ibid.*, pp. 1318-19.

As to the problem of repatriating former Bonin islanders, about which Assistant Secretary of State Allison asked in mid-July in response to representations repeatedly made by the Japanese government, the Pentagon took the stand that they should not be permitted to return to the islands. This negative position, as opposed to that of the State Department advocating prompt repatriation, followed the recommendation given by the Navy Department which had been administering the Bonins with its Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC) as the military governor. The Navy's objection to the return of some 7,000 former islanders stemmed from several considerations. First, since naval facilities were established all over the main islands of Chichi Jima and Haha Jima, where over 90% of the islanders had lived before the war, their return would arouse security problems in utilizing such military facilities. A second consideration was that, in light of the absence of the remaining residences as a result of the war, their repatriation would burden the United States with considerable expenses for resettlement and rehabilitation. Furthermore, it was feared that the return of the former islanders, all of whom were Japanese nationals, would create administrative difficulties, including those of criminal jurisdiction. The Navy wanted the islands continuously placed under its full and unrestricted control. This position was forwarded to the State Department late in August 1952 by Assistant to the Secretary of Defense Nash, who also suggested that a final decision be reached after further discussions were held between Admiral Arthur Radford, CINCPAC, and Allison who was scheduled to visit Japan early in November.⁴³

The Navy's case for the holding of exclusive control was ascertained when Admiral Radford expressed his determination to maintain the status quo during an inspection tour of the Bonin Islands made with Ambassador Murphy early in

⁴³ Memo by Frank Nash, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, to Allison, Aug. 26, 1952, *Ibid.*, pp. 1316-18.

October as a substitute for his scheduled meeting with Allison. The admiral's opposition to the reversion of any of the islands was basically strategic. During the tour, he sought to impress on Murphy the necessity for complete control of Iwo Jima as an air base and Chichi Jima as a submarine base. The major reason advanced by the admiral was that the islands would function as "auxiliary bases" if American forces should be driven out of primary bases on Yokosuka in Japan proper and Okinawa, which were deemed "highly vulnerable" in the event of a full-scale Soviet attack. After investigating elaborate submarine and naval installations, Murphy was so convinced of the need to maintain the status quo that he reported to the State Department that the Navy's position was "difficult to dispute."⁴⁴

In short, by late August 1952, three policy preferences were determined as an official Defense Department position regarding the post-treaty status of the islands at issue: (1) not to proceed toward a UN strategic trusteeship administered by the United States; (2) to maintain indefinitely the status quo of exclusive American military administration ; and (3) to continue prohibiting the return of the former inhabitants of the Bonin Islands. Hence, while agreeing not to seek the exercise of the trusteeship option, the State Department and Pentagon policy makers divided over the problem of restoring the islands to Japanese political control, as well as that of repatriating the Bonin islanders.

It is to be noted that, despite such an official Pentagon position, there were divergent views on the part of senior field officials in the Far East Command, who were directly charged with the administration of the Ryukyu Islands. In particular, unlike their home agency in Washington, General Mark Clark, who had succeeded General Ridgway as CINCFE in May, and General J. M. Lewis, Civil Administrator

⁴⁴ Telegram from Murphy to the State Department, Oct. 13, 1953, *Ibid.*, pp. 1340-43; and Robert Murphy, *Diplomat Among Warriors* (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1964), p. 345.

of the Ryukyus, alike held the view that the northern group of the island chain, the Amami Islands, should be promptly returned to Japan. The latter advanced specific reasons for this view in his report to the Army Department in August. On the basis of spot surveys, General Lewis pointed out that 99% of the residents of the Amami group wished their islands to immediately revert to Japanese administration, whereas not over 50% of those of the rest of the Ryukyus favored a prompt return. He attributed the desire of the overwhelming majority of the Amamians for reversion to several facts. First of all, the Amami group had been an integral part of Kagoshima Prefecture in Kyushu before the war. Therefore, its inhabitants had been more closely related culturally, economically, and ethnologically to the Japanese mainlanders than to those in Okinawa and the other southern islands which had been administered under Okinawa Prefecture. Moreover, it was known that the Amamians, who considered themselves socially higher than the other islanders, resented the prospect that Okinawa would exert dominant control over major fields such as government, banking, trade, and education in the Ryukyus. For these reasons, they had been agitating for a return to Japan since the signing of the peace treaty, even going on an organized series of hunger strikes. Concerned about continuing administrative difficulties caused by such agitation, General Lewis recommended that the northern island group be restored to Japanese political control. However, the general attached two conditions to his proposal. The reversion of the islands should not be implemented until (1) the Korean War terminated, and (2) Japan was economically and militarily capable of administering them.⁴⁵

General Clark, CINCFE, who was headquartered in Tokyo as Governor of the Ryukyu Islands, sympathized with the stand taken by his subordinate, General

⁴⁵ Memo by the JCS to Secretary of Defense Lovett, Aug. 15, 1952, ERUS 1952-1954, vol. 14, pp. 1322-23.

Lewis. Yet, the field commander was reluctant to express his personal views because he was under a strict injunction from the JCS to adhere to their position favoring the maintenance of the status quo. On several occasions, nevertheless, Clark informally conveyed to Ambassador Murphy his preference for the return of the Amami group.⁴⁶ As a result, the State Department policy makers later referred to the views of such senior field officials as Generals Clark and Lewis in determining and bolstering their final position about the disposition of the islands.

E. Collective Decision Process.

1. The State-Defense Department Working Group

As the Pentagon determined its position in the direction of maintaining the existing absolute control of the Ryukyus and Bonins, a joint State-Defense working group was formed in mid-September 1952 to discuss the islands problem and prepare agreed-upon policy recommendations to be submitted to the president. A preliminary meeting of the group was held on September 12. The representatives of the State Department were led by Kenneth Young, Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, while those of the Pentagon were led by Charles Sullivan, Chief of the Northeast Asian Section of the Office of Foreign Military Affairs. At the meeting, the general trend of the views advanced by military representatives was to recommend the issuance of a presidential statement to clarify to the Japanese the necessity for retaining the absolute American administration of all the islands for the indefinite future. As the major reason for favoring the maintenance of the status quo, the Pentagon officials pointed out the concern of the JCS that, in the event of general hostilities in the Far East, the United States military position

⁴⁶ Telegram from Murphy to Assistant Secretary of State Allison, Aug. 11, 1952, *Ibid.*, p. 1312; and Telegram from Murphy to the State Department, Oct. 13, 1952, *Ibid.*, p. 1342.

would be made difficult if the Ryukyus were placed under Japanese administration. It was thus reaffirmed that since political control was necessary for military control, no alterations should be made on the status of the islands. This position was predicated mainly upon an assumption that Japan might conceivably adopt a neutralist policy.⁴⁷

Faced with the Pentagon officials' insistence upon holding full control, the civilian representatives sought to emphasize the political implications of the retention of the status quo. Kenneth Young, the leading official, estimated that the islands problem was not yet acute in Japan in light of the fact that the Yoshida government so far had not formally requested any changes in the administrative status of the islands. Nevertheless, he was concerned that the problem might develop into a heated issue in Japanese domestic politics, where it became a target of increasing criticism from the opposition parties. The result of such a situation was that popular demands for the reversion of the Ryukyus in Japan and in the islands would be considerably propagated. In the long run, the issue would constitute a source of friction between the US and Japan. Based on these political considerations, the diplomatic official held that certain courses of action had to be sought to prevent the status of the islands from becoming a serious political issue in Japan and from complicating the existing friendly relations between the two countries. On the other hand, Young fully recognized the need to keep the exclusive military position there, saying that the islands, particularly Okinawa, would serve as "a sort of safety valve" if Japan became resistant against the continued stationing of American forces in its main islands. Hence, the question that most concerned the State Department side at the meeting was whether the maintenance of the status quo was the only basis upon which the United States

⁴⁷ Memo for the record, "Disposition of the Ryukyus," Sept. 12, 1952, 794C. 0221/9-1252, RG 59.

could retain necessary military facilities in the islands. The response of the Pentagon side was that it was "the only satisfactory basis."⁴⁸

It is noteworthy that, despite the existence of an official State Department position preferring the reversion of all the islands with a base right agreement, the diplomatic officials did not convey it to their Pentagon counterparts during the discussions. Young even mentioned that there was no fixed position in his department. This indicated that there remained split views within the State Department. In particular, Young was of the strong opinion that Okinawa, in any case, should not be returned to Japanese political control. The rationale was that it became more important to maintain the full freedom of military operations from bases on the island in view of the rapid build-up of the air forces of the Soviet Union and Communist China in the Far East and owing to expected limitations in utilizing bases in Japan proper. This reasoning, Young thought, would remain valid at least as long as the Korean War continued and in light of the possibility of expended military hostilities in East Asia. Nevertheless, he advocated restoring the other islands of the Ryukyus to Japan in order to allay the increasing public sentiment against American control.⁴⁹

Ambassador Murphy held similar views. After his visit in late July to military facilities on Okinawa and meetings with military field officials charged with the administration of the Ryukyus, the ambassador was so convinced of the strategic significance of the island as to advocate the retention of full control there. This position was reinforced by the fact that there was no compelling pressure from the Japanese for reversion. In consideration of the intense public agitation in the

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Young's views were the result of the discussions with American and Japanese officials in Okinawa during his visit to the island in March 1952. Memo by Young to Assistant Secretary of State Allison, April 1, 1952, 794C. 0221/4-152, RG 59; and Memo by Young to Allison, Sept. 11, 1952, 794C. 0221/9-1152, RG 59.

Amami Islands, however, Murphy sympathized with the personal views of the field officials, including General Clark, CINCFE, and General Lewis, Civil Administrator of the Ryukyus, in favor of the return of the northern island group.⁵⁰ In view of the Pentagon's insistence on the maintenance of the status quo and support for the retention of Okinawa by such key diplomatic officials as Young and Ambassador Murphy, who were directly involved in the islands problem, it was anticipated that further discussions by the State-Defense working group would center around the question of whether the islands other than Okinawa could be returned to Japanese political control, in spite of the formal position of the State Department favoring the reversion of the entire island chain.

The second meeting of the joint group was held on September 22. As had been expected, the participants concentrated their discussion on the questions raised by the State Department about the possible reversion of certain parts of the Ryukyus and Bonins, especially the Amami Islands. The Pentagon officials held steady to the principle of continuing the existing control of all the island chains mainly by advancing specific reasons for the retention of the Amami group. First, the primary military value of Okinawa was for air bases from which, in the event of war, American forces could be projected by heavy bombers into any areas in Asia and even southern Russia. The effective operation of these bases required an extensive air control and warning system on outlying islands. The Amami group had one such radar station and other potential station sites. Second, there was a sheltered anchorage in the island group which was regarded as the best one in the area in the event of typhoons. The Pentagon officials were concerned that these facilities might be restricted in their use if the island group were under the control of an unfriendly Japan. In addition, they opposed the reversion for fear that the

⁵⁰ Telegram from Murphy to Allison, Aug. 11, 1952, FRUS 1952-1954, vol. 14, pp. 1311-13.

military might encounter difficulties in securing additional necessary facilities in case of emergency.⁵¹

However, the State Department representatives were hardly convinced of the necessity for the retention of the Amami Islands. They estimated that such military needs in the island group could be adequately met by a military rights agreement made with Japan at the time of reversion. Furthermore, the prompt transfer of the Amamis was thought to have many advantages. First, it would testify to the American sincerity in not seeking any territorial expansion. Second, at a time when the United States was under no intensive pressure from the Japanese for reversion, its spontaneous move toward the return of a part of the Ryukyus would produce favorable effects on its relations with Japan by demonstrating its friendly will to the Japanese. Third, such a transfer was expected to bring benefits to the United States in its diplomatic competition with the Soviet Union. It would be regarded as a positive manifestation of American good intentions as opposed to the negative and selfish Russian intentions in continuing to hold the northern Japanese islands of Habomai and Shikotan (located between Hokkaido and the Kurile Islands). Finally, the reversion of the island group would contribute to lessening the suspicions of United States actions in Asia that were held by some Asian nations, including India. On the other hand, such reversion would not arouse adverse reactions from Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines, which had favored continued American control over the entire Ryukyus, because it would involve little military value.⁵²

⁵¹ Memo of conversation, by Robert McClurkin, Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Sept. 22, 1952, *Ibid.*, pp. 1333-35.

⁵² Memo by Franklin Hawley of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs to Young, Oct. 10, 1952, 794C. 0221/10-1052, RG 59.

Once they came to consider the transfer of the Amami Islands the most desirable of the possible policy options, during the subsequent meetings of the joint working group, the State Department representatives mainly endeavored to persuade their Pentagon counterparts to recede from their insistence on the retention of the status quo. However, the military planners persisted in opposing the return of any part of the Ryukyus, reasserting that the island chain as a whole constituted the only area in the western Pacific which could be used for immediate bases for American forces without consultation with local governments. Rather, they strongly suggested a firm national policy statement to the effect that the United States would continue to exercise its complete control over all the islands. The Pentagon officials thought of the reversion issue as arising out of the prevailing uncertainty in Japan and the islands concerning American intentions with respect to the execution of the terms under Article 3 of the peace treaty. Thus, it was calculated that the issue would subside if the United States clarified to the Japanese its resolute policy of maintaining the status quo.⁵³ Despite intense discussions in the State-Defense working group, the policy dispute over the question of returning the Amami Islands was not resolved until the end of 1952. Nevertheless, such discussions led all the State Department participants to recognize the strategic significance of Okinawa to the security of the United States and to deem the retention of its absolute control over the island necessary in case Japan restricted the use of American bases in Japan proper or adopted a policy of neutrality.

2. The Revision of Policy Preferences

As there was little prospect of reaching an agreed-upon position through deliberations in the joint working group because of the Pentagon's recalcitrance, by

⁵³ For the discussions of the joint working group in late 1952, see Memos of conversation, by Hawley, Oct. 22 and Dec. 2, 1952, 794C.0221, RG 59.

January 1953, civilian planners decided not to explore the islands problem further in the group. Instead, they set out to determine a final State Department position which would be directly discussed with the JCS or submitted to the president for national decisions. In a memorandum of January 12 to Assistant Secretary of State Allison, Director of the Northeast Asian Office Young, who had led the State Department side in the working group, put forth policy recommendations to be included in the agency's policy paper: (1) to restore the Amami group and the Bonin Islands to Japanese control with base rights arrangements; (2) to permit the former Bonin islanders in Japan to return; (3) to hold exclusive American control over Okinawa on a long-term basis; and (4) to revise the civil affairs directive for the administration of the retained islands in the direction of increasing the degree of self-government. Young added that these recommendations were based on the discussions in the working group of the military factors involved and the views of the US embassy in Japan.⁵⁴

The work of preparing a policy paper in the State Department lay dormant until mid-March. In the meantime, there were several developments in Japan that caused the department to quickly proceed toward national decisions. The first development was that the Japanese began, by late 1952, officially to demonstrate their demand for reversion. The Japanese House of Representatives had already adopted a resolution as early as July, requesting the Yoshida government to work out solutions to the territorial problems in connection with the peace treaty articles. The resolution also called upon it to deal with the problem of the disposition of the Ryukyus and Bonins, with due regard to the desire of their inhabitants, and to work for the repatriation of the displaced Bonin Islanders. In addition, Prime Minister Yoshida, in his policy speech on November 24, stated that

⁵⁴ Memo by Young to Allison, Jan. 12 1953, ERUS 1952-1954, pp. 1376-78. The views of the US embassy were forwarded to the State Department in a lengthy dispatch on November 4, 1952. However, the text of the dispatch still remains classified and unavailable to the public.

it was "the fervent wish of all Japanese" to regain control over the two island chains.⁵⁵ More notably, by the end of 1952, the Japanese began to differentiate between the Amami Islands and the rest of the Ryukyus, then concentrating their demand towards the reversion of the former. For instance, the House of Representatives, on December 25, unanimously approved a resolution urging the government to intensify its efforts to bring about the early return of the Amami group. Furthermore, in meetings with Ambassador Murphy during February and early March 1953, Japanese Foreign Minister Okazaki repeatedly conveyed his government's request for the transfer of the northern island group. He was reported to mention that his government realized the strategic considerations compelling the United States to retain its absolute control over Okinawa but thought that such considerations did not apply to the Amami group. In particular, the foreign minister pointed out the failure of the military government to provide adequate educational services in the islands as a main cause of the continuing agitation for reversion.⁵⁶

These developments in Japan, especially its shift of emphasis from the former demand for the total reversion of the Ryukyus to that of an early return of the Amami group, occasioned the State Department in mid-March to move toward the determination of a national policy on the reversion issue. In a memorandum of March 18 to Secretary of State Dulles, Assistant Secretary of State Allison proposed policy guidelines along which a State Department paper would be developed for presentation either to the Pentagon or to the NSC. They were the same as those which had been submitted by Director of the Northeast Asian Office Young in

⁵⁵ Annexes to the report by NSC Planning Board on the Japanese Treaty Islands, June 15, 1953, Background documents on NSC 125 Series, Sec. 4, RG 273.

⁵⁶ Memo of conversation between Murphy and Okazaki, March 3, 1953, 794C. 0221/3-353, RG 59; and Telegram from the US Embassy to the State Department, March 13, 1953, 794C. 0221/3-1353, RG 59.

mid-January, mainly recommending the return of the Amami group and the Bonin Islands and the retention of the status quo in the rest of the Ryukyus. In particular, Allison advanced reasoning for such partial reversion. As to the Amami group, he pointed out that their status remained an acute political issue in the islands and Japan while their strategic importance was the least in the Ryukyus in view of the minor need for securing radar stations and a typhoon anchorage. The reason for the transfer of the Bonins was that the strategic necessity for their retention (the existence of a submarine base) was weaker than for Okinawa. In addition, there had been formal Japanese requests for the repatriation of the former islanders. The proposed guidelines were approved by Dulles as an official State Department position on the same day.⁵⁷ They were different from the former position of early 1952 in that they favored the indefinite retention of complete control over all of the Ryukyus except the Amami group. On March 30, the newly established Planning Board of the NSC (a staff committee of departmental assistant secretaries) requested the State and Defense Departments to submit their respective position papers on the basis of which it would prepare a report on the subject for consideration and decisions by the NSC.⁵⁸

While there was a delay in the presentation of such position papers, the State Department altered its position late in May to the extent of supporting the Pentagon's preference for the maintenance of the status quo in the Bonins. This modification of the position resulted from an inter-agency conference at Honolulu in May 11-14 regarding security matters in the Pacific. During the conference, John Allison, who had replaced Robert Murphy as the ambassador to Japan in April,

⁵⁷ Memo by Allison to Dulles, March 18, 1953, *FRUS* 1952-1954, vol. 14, pp. 1397-1400.

⁵⁸ NSC 125/4, Progress report by the NSC Planning Board on NSC 125/2, March 30, 1953, in Makoto Iokibe (ed.), *The Occupation of Japan* (Bethesda, Md.: Congressional Information Service and Maruzen Co., 1989), Part 2, 3-C-36.

discussed the islands problem with Assistant Secretary of Defense Nash and Admiral Radford, CINCPAC. As a result of the discussion, Allison agreed to recommend to the State Department that the Bonin Islands be retained under full American control and that the islanders in Japan not be allowed to return while the existing tensions in the Far East continued.⁵⁹ Since there are no available records regarding the Honolulu conference, it is unclear why Allison reversed his previous views favoring the reversion of the islands and the repatriation of the islanders. Nevertheless, indirect evidence suggests that he was convinced by the Pentagon officials that the existing exclusive control of the islands should be kept because they were strategically located between major bases in Guam and Japan, thus cutting directly across sea and air communications lines to the defense positions of the United States. Furthermore, the fact that the status of the islands was subjected to far less political agitation in Japan than that of the Ryukyus contributed to the modification of his position.⁶⁰ Allison's altered position was supported by the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs and later approved by Dulles on June 11 just before the whole islands issue was laid before the NSC.⁶¹ Therefore, the difference of position between the two departments reduced itself to the question of whether the Amami Islands should be returned to Japan.

Meanwhile, the Pentagon requested General Clark's views in the hope of obtaining active support from the field commander and thus increasing the validity of its position prior to final NSC decisions. In a telegram to the Army Department, dated May 20, the general expressed his full support of the Pentagon's position that

⁵⁹ Memo by Young to Walter Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, May 22, 1953, 794C. 0221/5-2253, RG 59.

⁶⁰ See Annexes to the report by the NSC Planning Board on the Japanese Treaty Islands, June 15, 1953, Background documents on NSC 125 Series, Sec. 4, RG 273.

⁶¹ Memo by Robertson to Dulles, June 16, 1953, FRUS 1952-1954, vol. 14, pp. 1435-36.

none of the islands should be returned. In particular, Clark's view, unlike his former personal views, took exception to the transfer of the Amamis. The major reason was that the island group would be more intensively used for radar stations and other communications facilities in case of emergency. Besides, the field commander estimated that, instead of allaying friction between America and Japan as to the status of the Ryukyus, such partial reversion would arouse further Japanese pressure for the return of the remaining islands and create additional tension between the two countries. For these reasons, he was of the opinion that no change should be made in the status of any part of the island chain. General Clark intimated, nonetheless, that he was ready to accept the return of the Amami group if it were accompanied with a clear base rights agreement with Japan.⁶²

3. Consideration and Decisions by the NSC

Early in June, the NSC Planning Board discussed the islands problem on the basis of the position papers presented by the State and Defense Departments. Since it could not iron out the difference of position between the two agencies, the planning board proceeded to prepare a policy paper for consideration by the NSC, setting forth the conflicting positions, along with other alternatives. The document, which was submitted on July 15 to the NSC, evaluated four possible policy options regarding the disposition of the Ryukyus and Bonins, laying its emphasis on contrasting those favored by the two departments. First, the option of a UN trusteeship was rejected because of its disadvantages: the likelihood of a Soviet veto on the application for a strategic trusteeship; the expected obstruction in the UN by Russia and its allies of the American administration of an ordinary trusteeship; and Japanese opposition. Second, the alternative of returning all the islands to Japan was also set aside owing to the necessity for maintaining an

⁶² Telegram by CINCFE to the Army Department, May 20, 1953, *Ibid.*, pp. 1424-26.

assured control over at least the major base areas in these islands under the unstable military conditions in East Asia.⁶³

Third, the alternative of retaining existing full control over all the islands, as advocated by the Defense Department, was considered, above all, as securing the integrity of the US strategic position in the Far East. On the other hand, the return of the Amami group was expected to "unquestionably intensify Japanese efforts to gain control over the rest of the Ryukyus."⁶⁴ In the position paper submitted to the Planning Board, Pentagon policy makers estimated that public and political pressures in Japan for reversion were directed toward the entire island chain, making no distinction between the Amami group and the remainder of the island chain. As a result, it was anticipated that the transfer of the former would be followed by increased pressure from the Japanese for further relinquishments by the United States. The military planners even felt that the reversion problem was not a major political issue in Japan. Thus, it was expected to subside if the United States government announced its intention to continue full control over all the islands for long period of time.⁶⁵ A noticeable fact was that no points were made in the Pentagon paper to demonstrate that the Amami Islands had any strategic importance requiring their retention. This indicated that the island group was of such minor military value that it could be returned along with a base rights agreement to satisfy military needs there.

Finally, as favored by the State Department, the option of returning the Amami Islands while maintaining the status quo in the other islands was

⁶³ Report by the NSC Planning Board on the Japanese Treaty Islands, June 15, 1953, enclosed with Memo by James Lay, Executive Secretary of the NSC, to the NSC, June 15, 1953, *Ibid.*, pp. 1428-30.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 1430.

⁶⁵ Annex A to the report by the NSC Planning Board, "Department of Defense Position," Background documents on NSC 125 Series, Sec. 4, RG 273.

considered to have many advantages. First, the political and military considerations involved were adequately balanced in that option. The retention of control over all the islands except the Amami group would protect US strategic interests in the western Pacific. At the same time, returning the northern group, which was not a major base area, would not lead to any serious strategic loss, but would alleviate "the most acute of the political difficulties with Japan." Second, continued full American control over major bases in the islands would enable the Japanese government to disclaim responsibility for any military actions that might be taken from the bases into the Asian mainland. Third, by satisfying Japan's desire to regain control over at least part of the Ryukyus, the United States was expected to obtain bargaining leverage in other matters on which it would negotiate with Japan. Another significant advantage to the prompt reversion of the Amami group was that such action would prevent the Soviets from taking the initiative in capturing the Japanese public opinion through their conciliatory moves.⁶⁶ This concern about the Soviet initiative had been increasing since early 1953, when the Soviet Union and Communist China had proceeded to make various trade overtures to Japan. In addition, there were rumors that the Russians would offer Japan a favorable peace treaty involving territorial concessions regarding the Kurile Islands or at least the Habomi Islands off Hokkaido.⁶⁷

The State Department planners, unlike their counterparts at the Pentagon, estimated that the islands problem was a heated political issue on the Ryukyus and in Japan in light of frequent reversion rallies, mass meetings, and formal requests for reversion from the Japanese cabinet and Diet. The political issue was perceived as particularly acute with respect to the Amami Islands. Therefore, certain steps,

⁶⁶ Report by the Planning Board, *FRUS* 1952-1954, vol. 14, pp. 1431-32.

⁶⁷ Memo by McClurkin for NSC Planning Board meeting, June 3, 1953, Lot File 55 D 388, RG 59; and *The New York Times*, Feb. 17 and July 25, 1953.

the civilian planners thought, had to be taken to allay Japanese discontent with the status of the islands at issue. They should include the return of the Amami group, the revision of the civil affairs directive for the administration of the remaining islands, and a public statement of the American intention ultimately to restore all the islands to Japanese political control. Moreover, these steps were considered beneficial to the maintenance of the US strategic position in Japan and the islands in that it depended largely upon a stable and friendly Japan.⁶⁸ After evaluating these conflicting options favored respectively by the two departments, the Planning Board report finally recommended that the NSC decide which of them would be adopted as a national policy.⁶⁹

An NSC meeting was held on June 25 to consider and decide on the disposition of the islands. As a matter of course, the discussion at the meeting centered on the question of whether the Amami Islands should be relinquished to Japan. Representing the State Department position, Secretary of State Dulles at first advanced his general thinking that necessary American bases in the Ryukyus and Bonins could be maintained without the military administration of the islands. He pointed out, however, that Okinawa, because of its large-scale and important bases, was an exception requiring the retention of exclusive American control. On the other hand, the Secretary of State argued in favor of the reversion of the Amami Islands by stating that there was no sense in retaining full control over the island group only for the purpose of holding a radar and radio station there. Furthermore, Dulles advocated linking such reversion to the Japanese rearmament

⁶⁸ Annex B to the report by the Planning Board, "Department of State Position," Background documents on NSC 125 Series, Sec. 4, RG 273.

⁶⁹ ERUS, 1952-1954, vol. 14, p. 1433.

issue, thus suggesting that the return of the islands be calculated and timed in such a way that would induce the Japanese to promptly rearm.⁷⁰

Contrary to expectation, Secretary of Defense Wilson, though showing concern about Japan's future political orientation, concurred with the position that it was not necessary to govern all the people of the islands in order to use the radar facilities. President Eisenhower also supported Dulles's views. He contended that the military's insistence on holding control over "this little group of islands, which meant a lot to Japan," would jeopardize the main political objective of maintaining "Japan's friendship and loyalty." The military, from the President's standpoint, held "a little too narrow view" if its opposition to such reversion was only to secure a radar station. When informed that the Amami Islands had a large population of 219,000, Eisenhower decisively stated that it was a "must" to restore them to Japanese administration.⁷¹

Faced with President Eisenhower's determined attitude, Wilson said that he was prepared to agree to the transfer of the islands. Although some concern was raised by Admiral Fechteler, Chief of Naval Operations, speaking for the JCS, about the likelihood of Japan's increasing pressure for the reversion of the other islands, a decision was reached, without any objections among the participants of the NSC meeting to adopt as a national policy the State Department position recommending the return of the Amami group with a military rights agreement with Japan. It was also decided, however, that the timing of the reversion would be reviewed and determined by the NSC on the joint recommendation of the Secretaries of State and Defense within 90 days. This hold on implementation suggests that the transfer of islands might be made contingent on other issues pending with Japan, especially the rearmament issue. In addition, it was decided

⁷⁰ Memo of discussion at the 151st meeting of the NSC, June 25, 1953, *Ibid.*, pp. 1440-43.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 1442.

that the Pentagon, in consultation with the State Department and other interested agencies, should revise the directive for the administration of the remaining Ryukyu Islands so as to increase the degree of self-government.⁷² The reversion decision was incorporated in a revised Japan policy paper (NSC 125/6), which was approved by the president on June 26.⁷³

F. Implementation

As soon as the decision was made to return the Amami Islands, the State Department proceeded early in July to carry out it, in spite of the 90-day review period. The first steps taken were to ask Ambassador Allison for his advice as to the opportune timing of such reversion and to request the Pentagon to provide a detailed statement of military rights which should be secured from the Japanese before relinquishing control over the islands. In response to Washington's inquiry, Allison urged prompt moves toward the return. He was concerned that any advance leak of the American decision would diminish the psychological effect of the reversion in Japan. The ambassador believed that the transfer of the islands could contribute largely to the development of better US-Japanese relations. Thus, it should be timed to produce maximum psychological gains in Japan. Furthermore, Allison interposed an objection to linking the reversion to any other issues. Such a linkage was not expected to produce favorable reactions from the Japanese by creating the impression that the islands were being returned at the price of some Japanese concession on another issue.⁷⁴ Despite Allison's call for prompt

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 1444.

⁷³ For the text of NSC 125/6, see *Ibid.*, pp. 1449-52.

⁷⁴ Telegram from Allison to Dulles, July 6, 1953, 794C. 0221/7-653, RG 59.

implementation, no progress was made in Washington until the end of July, due to the Pentagon's delay in submitting the list of military requirements for the Amami group.

On August 4, Allison once again recommended to Dulles, who was in Korea during his trip to the Far East, that the United States immediately make moves toward the islands' reversion, including a public announcement. The major reason was that there was quite a possibility that the Soviet Union would press its bid to improve relations with Japan as a Korean armistice was concluded on July 27.⁷⁵ At that time, it was expected, among Japanese officials and Western diplomats in Tokyo, that the Russians might offer to negotiate a peace treaty which would be made palatable to Japan by including territorial concessions in the Soviet-occupied northern islands and the repatriation of the Japanese war prisoners remaining in Russia. The objective of such a Soviet effort was thought to be to turn Japan away from its ties with the West, particularly the United States.⁷⁶ In Allison's estimation, if the announcement of the reversion decision were made after any Soviet moves, it would be regarded as a defensive action rather than an initiative by Washington. As a result, the psychological benefits deriving from that action would largely be lost. Thus, the ambassador suggested that Dulles make public the American decision during his brief stop in Japan, scheduled for August 8, so as to gain maximum favorable reactions.⁷⁷ This recommendation was supported by Dulles and then endorsed by Secretary of Defense Wilson and President Eisenhower at the NSC meeting on August 5, which meant that they decided to implement the reversion decision of June 25. Dulles issued a statement on August 8 that the

⁷⁵ Telegram from Allison to Dulles, Aug. 4, 1953, ERUS 1952-1954, vol. 14, p. 1468.

⁷⁶ *The New York Times* July 25, 1953.

⁷⁷ Telegram from Allison to Dulles, Aug. 4, *Ibid.*, p. 1469.

United States would relinquish its control over the Amami Islands to Japan. The statement made it clear, however, that it would maintain indefinitely the existing degree of control over the rest of the Ryukyus, especially Okinawa and the Bonins.⁷⁸ In the statement, the Secretary of State initially had wanted to urge on the Japanese the need for their speedy rearmament, thus intimating to them that the transfer of the Amami group might be contingent on their increased effort at the defense buildup. Because of Allison's strong opposition, however, no mention was made of the rearmament issue in the statement.⁷⁹

As had been expected, Dulles's announcement was widely welcomed by the Japanese government and public. Late in August, the State and Defense Departments proceeded to work out the terms of arrangements for the islands' return. This task was largely assigned to a joint working group between the Embassy and the Far East Command (FEC) in Tokyo. They initially agreed on October 15-November 1 as the target date for the actual transfer. Owing to their conflicting positions about the method of securing the necessary military rights in the island group, however, the process of implementation was so delayed that even the American terms for negotiations with Japan were not determined until the target date. The Far East Bureau of the State Department and the Embassy advocated obtaining military rights there by means of applying the provisions of the security treaty and administrative agreement. The JCS and the FEC, on the other hand, insisted upon concluding a special arrangement with Japan, outside the existing security treaty framework, granting any rights deemed necessary to the defense of

⁷⁸ For the text of Dulles's statement, see *The New York Times* Aug. 9, 1953, p. 3.

⁷⁹ Telegram from Allison to Dulles, Aug. 7, 1953, FRUS 1952-1954, vol. 14, pp. 1477-78.

Okinawa.⁸⁰ Concerned that the return of the islands would complicate the security of neighboring Okinawa in case of the outbreak of hostilities, the military officials preferred to secure such military rights as would not be affected by a future contingency rendering the security treaty untenable because of Japanese neutrality or unfriendliness.

In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense dated October 16, the JCS specified the desired rights in the Amami group, including unrestricted access to the islands and the unlimited right to construct any military installations considered essential to the defense of Okinawa. They claimed that these rights would not be provided by the terms of the existing administrative agreement but by an extra arrangement.⁸¹ From the standpoint of State Department officials, however, such a special arrangement amounted to retaining an extraterritorial status in the islands so that it would certainly be rejected by Japan. In particular, Ambassador Allison, who would conduct the transfer negotiations with the Japanese, stood firmly against the military's position, arguing that "no Japanese government could survive such an arrangement and if it was our intention to relinquish the islands on this basis, we should never have made announcement."⁸² Faced with Japan's pressing for a prompt return, by early November, the State Department suggested to the Pentagon a compromise solution. According to the solution, in place of a formal agreement, unofficial minutes, which would not be made public, would spell out certain rights desired by the JCS but considered to be acceptable to Japan. These rights would cover free access to the air space and

⁸⁰ Telegram from the Embassy to the State Department, Oct. 2, 1953, 794C. 0221/10-253, RG 59; and Memo by Assistant Secretary of State Robertson to Under Secretary of State Smith, Oct., 21, 1953, FRUS 1952-1954, vol. 14, pp. 1536-37.

⁸¹ Memo by the JCS to Wilson, Oct. 16, 1953, 092 Japan (12-12-50) Sec. 17, RG 218.

⁸² Telegram from Allison to Dulles, Oct. 14, 1953, 794C. 0221/10-1453, RG 59.

territorial waters of the islands, permission to conduct site surveys and remove devices interfering with the American radar system, and the interchange of radar positions. Moreover, such minutes would be later adopted by the Joint Committee which had been established by the two nations to implement the administrative agreement.⁸³ Since it was estimated that those specific rights would, to a large extent, meet the military requirements defined by the JCS, the Pentagon agreed to the State Department proposal on November 20.⁸⁴

The negotiations of the transfer terms with Japan were completed, without serious disputes, by late December. Though the Japanese side insisted that the military rights to be granted the United States should be limited to those clearly stated in the administrative agreement, it finally accepted the American terms in the hope of restoring the islands as soon as possible. On December 24, the representatives of the two governments signed in Tokyo a formal agreement concerning the transfer of the Amami Islands. The accord was accompanied by the unpublished minutes clarifying American rights in the island group, which would be adopted by the Joint Committee under the administrative agreement.⁸⁵ As had been expected by the State Department policy makers, with the return of the island group, public pressure in Japan for the reversion of the Ryukyus, especially Okinawa, was reported to decline, though not disappear, during 1954.⁸⁶

⁸³ Memo by Robertson to Assistant Secretary of Defense Nash, Nov. 13, 1953, 794C. 0221/11-1353, RG 59.

⁸⁴ Memo by Nash to Robertson, Nov. 20, 1953, 794C. 0221/11-2053, RG 59.

⁸⁵ Editorial note, *ERUS* 1952-1954, vol. 14, p. 1571. For the texts of the transfer agreement and accompanying documents, see enclosures to Telegram from the Embassy to the State Department, Dec., 30, 1953, 794C. 0221/12-3053, RG 59.

⁸⁶ Progress Report on NSC 125/2 and NSC 125/6, by the Operations Coordinating Board of the NSC, Oct. 27, 1954, *ERUS* 1952-1954, vol. 14, p. 1767.

G. Theoretical Perspective: Decision-Making Models Applied

This research advances two main questions in order to explain the policy decisions of June 1953 about the status of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands in terms of the three decision-making models. (1) Why and how did decision makers choose their initial policy preferences concerning the disposition of the islands? (2) How did the decision makers' divergent preferences aggregate to produce the national decisions to return the Amami Islands of the Ryukyus and to retain exclusive control over the rest of the island chain, including Okinawa and the Bonin Islands?

The decision-making process was started at the beginning of the last year of the Truman administration and completed by the end of the first year of the Eisenhower administration. Relevant decision makers were Secretaries of State Acheson and Dulles, their policy advisers in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Ambassadors Murphy and Allison, Secretaries of Defense Lovett and Wilson, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the field commanders such as General Clark, CINCFE, and Admiral Radford, CINCPAC. As in the cases of the previous decisions regarding Japan, President Truman did not involve himself directly in the decision-making process, preferring that his civilian and military advisers recommend an agreed-upon position. However, such a position was not reached until the end of his term of office. President Eisenhower, on the other hand, played an important part in the process in that the final decisions reflected the favored position of the State Department and were reached as the result of his support for it in opposition to the Pentagon's stand. The evidence indicates, nevertheless, that he was hardly involved in the pre-decisional process. One reason was that it had been decided by the NSC in August 1952 that the State and Defense Departments would submit to the President joint policy recommendations as to the disposition of the islands. The other reason was that Eisenhower, like Truman, preferred the interested agencies

to produce an agreed-upon position, if possible. However, he differed with Truman in that he was willing to face and choose among competing policy positions if they could not be coordinated by the agencies. This decision-making style was reflected in his use of the NSC system. Unlike his predecessor, who rarely relied upon the Council, Eisenhower sought to use it as a primary policy-making mechanism. To this end, a Planning Board and an Operations Coordinating Board were established as NSC staff units, which were charged, respectively, with generating policy recommendations for consideration by the NSC and with coordinating and monitoring the implementation of national decisions. Both units were chaired by the special assistant for national security affairs, the position first created by Eisenhower and later generally entitled the national security adviser. During his presidency, however, the special assistant functioned essentially as a manager for the operation of the NSC system, not as a major decision maker.⁸⁷

As has been evidenced by the decision-making process for the islands' reversion decision, the Planning Board developed a policy paper for consideration by the NSC after examining the position papers presented by the concerned departments. Before the document was forwarded to a Council meeting, the Planning Board attempted to reconcile the competing positions. Yet, Eisenhower's NSC process did not require that they be coordinated into an agreed-upon position below the President. The split positions, if not reconciled, would be brought up to the Council meeting for debate and resolution, along with background information and alternative policy courses. These procedures were to reflect the President's decision-making style of being willing to decide among conflicting policy positions.

⁸⁷ Richard A. Johnson, *The Administration of United States Foreign Policy* (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1971), pp. 110-11; James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, *Foreign Policy Making and the American Political System* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1987), pp. 35-36; and John Prados, *Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush* (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc. 1991), pp. 61-65.

1. Individual Processes of Preference Choice

Three major policy options were initially considered and advocated by key decision makers during 1952. The first one was to place the Ryukyus and Bonins under UN trusteeships solely administered by the United States. This option, as stipulated in Article 3 of the peace treaty, was regarded as the most likely course of action at the time of the peace settlement. By mid-1952, however, it was eliminated from consideration by both State and Pentagon policy makers. The second alternative was to return all the islands to Japan, while retaining American military bases there on a long-term basis by way of base rights arrangements. The officials of the Far Eastern Bureau preferred this option, and Secretary of State Acheson approved it as an official State Department position late in January. The third alternative was to maintain the status quo of full American control over all the islands. It was insisted upon by the JCS and endorsed as an official Pentagon position by Secretary of Defense Lovett late in August.

There were additional options informally favored by some decision makers. Director of the Northeast Asian Office Young and Ambassador Murphy advocated a partial reversion, that is, retaining Okinawa but returning the other Ryukyus, particularly the Amami Islands. Such Pentagon field officials as General Clark and General Lewis, Civil Administrator of the Ryukyus, personally supported the transfer of the Amami group.

First of all, the process of preference choice on the part of Acheson and his policy assistants in the Far Eastern Bureau is best explained by the analytic (rational) model among the three decision-making models. This model provides the following propositions about the individual choice process. (1) A decision maker tends to develop a multi-faceted interpretation of a decision problem. (2) He tends to engage in the outcome calculations of all possible major policy options in relation to multiple conflicting values involved in the problem. (3) He tends to

choose preferences which produce an optimally balanced satisfaction of the conflicting values.

In effect, the Far East experts interpreted the problem of the disposition of the islands from multiple points of view. First, they viewed it as a military-strategic issue. The State Department officials, like their counterparts at the Pentagon, considered America's long-term retention of military bases in the islands necessary to its security because of their appreciation of the strategic location and resulting military value of the islands to national defense in the western Pacific. Second, they defined the problem as having political implications. The status of the islands was perceived to be closely associated with the US-Japanese political relationship in light of increasing irredentist sentiments on the part of the Japanese government and public. Before late 1952, the civilian planners estimated that there was no compelling pressure from the Japanese for reversion. Concerned that the growing pressure might become so great as to jeopardize the existing friendly relations between the two countries, however, they felt that prompt measures should be taken to prevent such an unfavorable situation. In addition, the islands issue was thought to involve administrative problems resulting from the pronounced desire of the islanders for a return to Japanese control. Third, the disposition problem was perceived as involving diplomatic aspects. The concerned allies, such as Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines, were thought to prefer the United States to maintain its exclusive control of the islands. India and other Asian nations, on the other hand, were expected to oppose such American control because they regarded it as "a modern variant of former Western imperialism."⁸⁸ Finally, the State Department officials viewed the islands issue as relating to economic factors, such as the investment of large sums in the construction of bases on Okinawa since

⁸⁸ Briefing paper for Dulles on the Ryukyus and Bonins, attached to Memo by Robert McClurkin, Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, to Assistant Secretary of State Allison, Dec. 4, 1951. Lot File 58 D 529, RG 59.

mid-1949, the chronically depressed economy of the Ryukyus, and the resulting financial burdens on the United States as the administering power.

In this respect, the problem of disposing of the islands was interpreted as involving multiple values. On the one side, there was a military value of ensuring the unrestricted use of American bases in the islands. A diplomatic value of meeting the desire of some allies for the retention of American control was also implicated. On the other side, there were political values embedded: to preserve the friendly relations with Japan; to remove administrative difficulties with the islanders; and to avoid the international charge of Western imperialism. Moreover, there was an economic value of relieving financial burdens caused by the administration of the deficit-ridden islands. The first two values were in a conflict relationship with the rest. The satisfaction of the former ones called for the continuation of existing exclusive control through a trusteeship or other means. In contrast, the pursuit of the latter required returning the islands to Japan.

Next, the State Department planners developed principal policy options and calculated their outcomes in relation to these multiple values. Three major options were initially considered available: (1) to enforce a UN trusteeship by the United States over all the islands; (2) to conduct such a trusteeship only over those islands where permanent bases were desired, while returning the other islands to Japan; and (3) to return all the islands to Japan, with the United States retaining its bases under long-term base rights agreements. The civilian planners failed to give consideration to the maintenance of the existing full control as a possible alternative. This aspect is at variance with the analytic assumption of considering all major available options. When the Pentagon advanced the retention of the status quo as its favored option, however, the State Department officials came to examine it. On the other hand, they evaluated the three options along the competing values involved. The first two, envisaging a trusteeship over all or part

of the islands, were set aside because they were expected to produce a number of disadvantages: administrative difficulties with the islanders, the majority of whom desired a return to Japan; political friction with the Japanese, who regarded it as a step away from eventual reversion; the possibility of a Soviet veto of a strategic trusteeship; political and economic burdens and close UN supervision under an ordinary trusteeship; and a criticism by India and other Asian nations of Western imperialism. In contrast, it was calculated that the alternative of returning all the islands with base rights agreements would yield many advantages. It would largely meet the military necessity of securing the exclusive use of bases. At the same time, it would enable the United States to avoid administrative and economic burdens. More importantly, the reversion option would satisfy the irredentist sentiment in Japan, thus contributing to the maintenance of the friendly relations between the two countries. It was also estimated that the concerned allies would raise no strong objection to the transfer of the islands, not only because of protection by the existing security treaties with them, but also due to the continued stationing of American forces in the area. In other words, the return of the islands was the option that would produce a balanced satisfaction of the competing values involved. By selecting that option as their preference, the civilian planners sought to resolve the value conflict implicated in the islands issue. This body of evidence indicates that the process of preference choice by the State Department policy makers is consistent with the logic of the analytic model.

Pentagon policy makers' development of policy preferences is best explained by the bureaucratic politics model. This model assumes that a decision maker's problem definition and preference choice tend to be determined by the concerns and interests of the bureaucratic organization he represents. The military planners adopted as an official Pentagon position, in August 1952, the Joint Chiefs of Staff's recommendation for the retention of the status quo in all the Ryukyus and Bonins.

This position remained consistent until June 1953, when it was overruled by the NSC decisions. The evidence suggests that the preference for continued American control was largely determined by the organizational interests of the JCS. As has been pointed out, the primary mission of the Pentagon is to prepare for and wage war. To discharge this mission, a major task assigned to the military chiefs is to formulate war plans. In this connection, the organizational interest of the JCS is to develop and maintain military preparedness for wartime situations or any other military contingencies.

First, the service chiefs' case for American military control over the islands was derived from their interest in military readiness for war in the western Pacific. In their war planning, the JCS envisioned the Ryukyus and Bonins as constituting primary parts of the Pacific base system which would be used for defensive and offensive operations in case of war. In particular, since the Soviet Union, in the event of the outbreak of hostilities, was expected to advance southward into North China, it was deemed necessary for the United States to secure its bases in Okinawa, which was located in a controlling position toward the East Asian mainland. The military value of Okinawa was increased by the estimate that the island would eventually remain as the only base area from which US forces could be projected into Soviet-controlled Asian territories. On the other hand, America's military control over the Bonin Islands was also considered essential to its national defense because they were strategically located between major bases in Guam and Japan proper.

Second, the military chiefs' stand against the reversion of the islands even with base rights agreements stemmed from their interest in maintaining military preparedness against a contingency that Japan would take a neutralist position or become hostile. In their estimation, their use of American bases in the islands would be seriously restricted or prevented in the event of war in such a situation.

In addition, their opposition can be understood by the military's inherent interest in having freedom of action in conducting military operations in overseas bases without the interference of local foreign governments.⁸⁹ This interest might lead the JCS to insist upon the retention of absolute control over all the islands.

Third, the opposition of the JCS to a partial reversion, especially the return of the Amami Islands, was also occasioned by their interest in preparing against the contingency of a neutral or hostile Japan. The military value of the island group was that it held actual and potential radar stations necessary for the operation of air bases in Okinawa and the best typhoon anchorage in the area. The military planners were concerned that these facilities might be nullified in case Japan became unfriendly. Furthermore, they feared that the military would encounter difficulties in securing additional facilities in wartime if the island group were relinquished to Japan. In short, the Pentagon planners' selection of the preference for the retention of the status quo was mainly conditioned by the interest of the JCS in maintaining military readiness against war or other contingencies. This aspect corresponds to the bureaucratic politics explanation.

A divergent stand taken by the military field officials, such as Generals Clark and Lewis, can be also interpreted by their bureaucratic interest. Unlike their superiors in Washington, the generals personally advocated returning the Amami Islands to Japan. This preference is attributable to their parochial interest deriving from their bureaucratic position in charge of governing the Ryukyus: to reduce administrative difficulties with the islanders. The generals in the field regarded with apprehension the situation that strong public agitations for reversion in the Amami Islands had been creating a difficult social and political problem in their administration. On the other hand, they felt that the minor military value of the island group would not necessarily require the retention of American control. Thus,

⁸⁹ Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*, pp. 52-54.

the senior field officials informally conveyed to the Pentagon their desire for the transfer of the island group which would eliminate the most serious problem in their governing the Ryukyus. Although their preference was overruled by the JCS, it contributed to the development of a revised State Department position.

As the JCS and other Pentagon planners determined their position in favor of maintaining the status quo in all the islands, they proceeded to bolster it against the competing options of returning all or part of the islands. In the process of bolstering, they tended to avoid, rather than resolve, the value conflict involved. Their favored option was intended to satisfy the military value of ensuring the unrestricted use of bases and other military facilities in the islands. The JCS considered all principal alternatives but evaluated them largely in relation to the military value. Like the State Department planners, the service chiefs took exception to conducting a UN trusteeship. Nevertheless, a main reason for their opposition was their concern that the military control and use of bases under a strategic trusteeship would be obstructed by the Soviets' blocking tactics in the UN Security Council. The military chiefs also worried that Japan's possible entry into the UN would nullify the strategic trusteeship, thus depriving the United States of its exclusive right to make military use of the islands. Moreover, they rejected the options of returning islands or exercising joint sovereignty with Japan, advancing the sole reason that American bases would be severely restricted in their use or useless if Japan became unfriendly.

On the other hand, the JCS were fully aware that other conflicting values were also involved in the islands problem. In particular, they recognized the possibility that their favored option, which would satisfy the military value, might damage the political value of preserving the amicable relations with Japan. This is evidenced by a remark in their position paper that "a policy of maintenance of the

status quo might... constitute an irritant to friendly US-Japanese relations."⁹⁰ Nevertheless, they played down such a value conflict by underestimating the likelihood of impairing the political value. The military chiefs and other Pentagon planners estimated in the Pentagon paper that "reversion pressure in Japan, while persistent, is not at present a major issue."⁹¹ Furthermore, they expected that such pressures would subside if the United States clarified to the Japanese its resolute intention to retain full control over all the islands. However, the validity of these estimates is considered doubtful in light of frequent reversion rallies, mass meetings, a series of the resolutions adopted by the Diet, and formal requests from the Japanese government. By underrating the political intensity of the reversion issue, the military planners sought to demonstrate that their favored policy would not complicate the friendly political relationship with Japan. In this respect, they tended to discount the value conflict involved and thus to avoid it.

2. Collective Decision Process

The second research question relates to the collective decision process by which decision makers' divergent preferences converged to produce the national decisions to return the Amami Islands and to continue exclusive control over the rest of the Ryukyus and the Bonins. This collective process is best explained by the analytic model among the three decision models. It is assumed in the analytic model that exposure to new information and/or persuasive argumentation about favored options during group discussions based on relevant information induces decision makers to revise their outcome calculations and thus to change their initial

⁹⁰ Memo by the JCS to Secretary of Defense Lovett, Aug. 15, 1952, *FRUS* 1952-1954, vol. 14, p. 1327.

⁹¹ Annex A to the report by the NSC Planning Board, "Department of Defense Position," Background documents on NSC 125 Series, Sec. 4, RG 273.

preferences. As a result, a consensus on national decisions is finally reached. The model also postulates that final decisions tend to be those which yield a balanced satisfaction of the conflicting values at stake. Considerable evidence indicates that new information and persuasive arguments during the discussions between the civilian and military planners led to the alteration of their competing positions and a consensus on the disposition decisions. On the other hand, there is little evidence that the decisions were the outcome of bargaining and compromising or of concurrence-seeking to promote the cohesion of the decision-making group, as would be predicted by the bureaucratic politics or cognitive model.

As has been noted above, the final decisions were reached through the two subsequent stages of the collective process. The first stage was the one in which the State Department planners modified their initial position in favor of the return of all the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands to the extent of advocating the reversion of only the Amami group and the retention of the status quo in the other islands. The next stage was the one in which the revised position was adopted by President Eisenhower and the NSC against the Pentagon position insisting on the continuance of the existing full control over all the islands.

The modification of the State Department position, as the first phase of the collective process, was determined by three factors. First, the divergent views held by Director of the Northeast Asian Office Young and Ambassador Murphy provided an occasion for the revision of the position. Young, in spite of his department's official preference for a total reversion early in 1952, was of the opinion that absolute control should be retained over Okinawa indefinitely. This view arose out of his trip to the island and the discussion with the military field officials. The on-site inquiry and discussion convinced Young that the United States should maintain its complete freedom to use and develop bases on Okinawa in view of the prolonged Korean War and the rapid build-up of the Soviet and

Communist Chinese air forces in Far East.⁹² Nevertheless, he supported the return of the other islands so as to ease the increasing reversion sentiment in Japan. Young's case for the retention of Okinawa affected, to a large extent, his department's position change by virtue of his leading role in the State-Pentagon working group on the islands issue. Ambassador Murphy also contributed to the modification of the position in Washington. As a result of his visits to the military facilities on Okinawa and meetings with the senior military officials, including Generals Clark and Lewis, the ambassador became so persuaded of the strategic significance of the island as to advocate retaining it under full American control. In addition, Murphy sympathized with the field generals' informal stand that the Amami Islands should be relinquished to Japan because of the islanders' strong agitations for reversion and the resulting administrative difficulties. As Young pointed out, these views of the ambassador were later reflected in the revised State Department position.⁹³

The second determining factor was the intense discussions at a number of the meetings of the State-Pentagon working group. During the discussions, the two agencies' representatives actively exchanged pertinent information and arguments about the military and political implications of the status of the islands. As a result, the State Department officials became fully convinced that the bases on Okinawa were essential to American security and that the retention of complete control over the island was necessary to ensure freedom of military action there in case Japan restricted the use of the bases in Japan proper. They recognized, on the other hand, that the Amami Islands did not constitute a major base area but contained minor military facilities. In consideration of the least military value and strongest

⁹² Memo by Young to Assistant Secretary of State Allison, April, 1952, 794C. 0221/4-152, RG 59.

⁹³ Memo by Young to Allison, Jan. 12, 1953, *FRUS* 1952-1954, vol. 14, p. 1377.

reversion sentiment of the island group in the Ryukyus, they came to regard the return of the Amami group as the most desirable of possible policy options.

The third factor that led to the revision of the State Department position was a new trend in the Japanese demands for reversion. By the end of 1952, the Japanese government shifted its emphasis from the entire Ryukyu island chain to its northern Amami group. It was also reported that the Yoshida government appreciated the strategic considerations requiring continued American control over Okinawa. This new tendency in Japanese attitudes occasioned the State Department to proceed promptly toward the determination of a national policy in the direction of relinquishing the Amami Islands.

The change in the State Department's preference from the reversion of the Bonin Islands to their retention stemmed from the discussion among Ambassador Allison, Assistant Secretary of Defense Nash and Admiral Radford at the Pacific security conference in mid-May 1953. There is indirect evidence that the ambassador was persuaded by the Pentagon officials of the need to maintain full control over the islands owing to their strategic importance to the defense of the United States. The low intensity of the reversion demands for the islands in Japan, as compared with those for the Ryukyus, led Allison to agree with the Pentagon's case for the retention of the Bonins. This body of evidence strongly suggests that the modification of the State Department position in the direction of favoring a partial reversion (the return of only the Amami Islands) resulted from the revised evaluation of the competing alternatives based on new information and/or persuasive arguments during the intense discussions with the Pentagon officials. This aspect of the collective process would be predicted by the analytic model.

The next stage of the collective decision process, in which the revised State Department position was adopted as a national policy at the NSC meeting, also corresponds to the process expected by the analytic model. First, President

Eisenhower and other NSC members were given by the Planning Board paper all relevant information and principal alternatives regarding the disposition of the islands. The four major options were presented for Council review, together with their outcome calculations in relation to the multiple values at stake: (1) a strategic trusteeship, (2) the return of all the islands with base rights agreements, (3) the reversion of the Amami Islands with no change in the status of the other islands, and (4) the maintenance of the status quo in all the islands. Since the State and Defense Departments had agreed not to opt for the first two alternatives as a national policy, the NSC members were to decide between the last two respectively advocated by the two agencies. In particular, these options were brought up for Council debate, along with the detailed position papers of the two departments. Second, the discussion at the NSC meeting proceeded not by compromising or concurrence-seeking for group cohesion but by persuasive argumentation based on pertinent information. Secretary of State Dulles advanced the convincing argument that the use of a few radar facilities in the Amami Islands would not necessarily require maintaining political control over all the islanders, who had been agitating for reversion. President Eisenhower supported Dulles's case for the islands' return, contending that insistence on retaining the island group, which had minor military value but a large population, would jeopardize another main objective of preserving Japan's pro-American orientation. These persuasive arguments and Eisenhower's resolute attitude induced Secretary of Defense Wilson and other participants to consent to relinquish the Amami Islands to Japan. As a result, the NSC adopted as a national policy the State Department position recommending the islands' reversion with a military rights agreement.

The final aspect of the collective process which is consistent with the explanation based on the analytic model was that the national decisions were those that produced a balanced satisfaction of the major competing values at stake,

thus resolving the value conflict involved. The decision to return the Amami group would enhance the political value of maintaining friendly relations with Japan by gratifying, to some extent, its reversion sentiment. The decision to retain the status quo in the other islands would largely satisfy the military value of ensuring the unrestricted use of military facilities there by assuring the United States of full control over the major base areas. To promote another political value of reducing administrative difficulties with the islanders, the additional decision was made to revise the civil affairs directive toward increasing the degree of self-government.

Chapter 6. Conclusions

This research has analyzed a series of the American decisions pertaining to the formation of the US-Japanese alliance in the early 1950s, from the perspective of the foreign policy decision-making approach. By applying the three major decision-making models (the analytic, bureaucratic politics, and cognitive models), the research has explained how and why the four main decisions were actually made: (1) to postpone the peace treaty in October 1948; (2) to conclude the peace and security treaties with Japan in September 1950; (3) to proceed with Japanese rearmament in September 1950; and (4) to return the northern part of the Ryukyus and retain exclusive control over Okinawa and the Bonin Islands in June 1953. The explanations of the decisions have centered on answering the two research questions. (1) Why and how did the decision makers choose certain initial preferences as to the particular decision problem? (2) How did their divergent preferences aggregate to produce the final decisions? While the first question has related to the individual processes of preference choice, the second has referred to the collective processes by which the different preferences were transformed into the national decisions. As a result of the analyses of this research, it is a matter of course that another question is raised about the validity of the decision-making models: which model or combination of the models has best explained the individual and collective processes of the US decisions under what conditions? This concluding chapter is devoted to answering this question. Moreover, this research advances several propositions, derived inductively from its analyses of the decisions on Japan, regarding the individual and collective processes of American foreign policy decision-making.

1. Individual Processes of Preference choice

To assess the validity of the decision-making models, this study summarizes its analyses of the individual choice processes of the four main decisions as follows.

Table 1. Individual Processes of the Decision to Postpone the Peace Treaty, October 1948

<i>Decision Makers</i>	<i>Preferences</i>	<i>Determinants</i>	<i>Validity of the Models</i>
Far Eastern Office	Early peace treaty	Organizational interests: to keep Japan's pro-American orientation; to preserve friendly political relations with the other FEC nations	Bureaucratic politics
MacArthur	Early peace treaty	Parochial interest deriving from the position of SCAP: to bring the occupation to a successful conclusion Avoidance of the trade-off between the values	Bureaucratic politics + Cognitive
Army and Navy Departments	Postponement	Organizational interest: to develop security measures and military bases in Japan for its defense and military use	Bureaucratic politics
Policy Planning Staff	Postponement; continued peace talks; relaxation of the occupation	Kennan's personal beliefs: postwar bipolar world; containment of Soviet expansionism; Japan's instability vulnerable to Communist political penetration Balanced satisfaction of the multiple values	Cognitive + Analytic

Table 2. Individual Processes of the Decision to Conclude the Peace and Security Treaties, September 1950

<i>Decision Makers</i>	<i>Preferences</i>	<i>Determinants</i>	<i>Validity of the Models</i>
State Department	Early peace treaty; Limited base retention; Pacific security pact	Evaluation of the options along the multiple values; a balanced satisfaction of the multiple values Organizational interest: to bring peace negotiations to a settlement	Analytic + Bureaucratic politics
Pentagon	Postponement; Unlimited base retention	Organizational interests: to retain unrestricted use of bases in preparation for war; to avoid an armed conflict with the Soviet Union in East Asia	Bureaucratic politics
MacArthur	Early peace treaty; Neutralization of Japan	Parochial interest deriving from the position of SCAP: to finish the occupation successfully Personal beliefs: a democratic and pacifist Japan Avoidance of the value trade-offs	Bureaucratic politics + Cognitive

Table 3. Individual Processes of the Decision to Proceed with Japanese Rearmament, September 1950

<i>Decision Makers</i>	<i>Preferences</i>	<i>Determinants</i>	<i>Validity of the Models</i>
State Department	Opposition to rearmament during and shortly after the occupation	Organizational interests: to avoid legal and political problems with the FEC nations and Japan; to complete peace negotiations successfully	Bureaucratic politics
Pentagon	Prompt rearmament even during the occupation	Organizational interest: to develop military strength and readiness for war or other contingencies	Bureaucratic politics
MacArthur	Continued disarmament	Parochial interest of SCAP: not to damage his prestige and accomplishments in Japan Personal belief in a pacifist Japan Avoidance of the value trade-offs	Bureaucratic politics + Cognitive

Table 4. Individual Processes of the Decision to Return the Amami Islands and Retain Control over Okinawa and the Bonins, June 1953

<i>Decision Makers</i>	<i>Preferences</i>	<i>Determinants</i>	<i>Validity of the Models</i>
State Department	Return of all the islands with base rights agreements	Evaluation of the options along the multiple values; balanced satisfaction of the multiple values	Analytic
Pentagon	Retention of full control over all the islands	Organizational interests: to ensure the unrestricted use of bases in readiness for war and the contingency of an unfriendly Japan	Bureaucratic politics
Generals Clark and Lewis	Return of the Amami Islands	Parochial interest deriving from the governing of the Ryukyus: to reduce administrative difficulties with the islanders	Bureaucratic politics

As these tables demonstrate, in some cases, the decision makers' policy preferences were mainly determined by their organizational interests, by their personal beliefs and cognitive processes, or by weighing the options along the multiple interests or values involved. In the other cases, they were decided by some combination of these factors. Moreover, the same decision makers selected their preferences in accordance with different choice processes in different decision problems, though

the decisions were made at the same time. This is illustrated by the cases of the peace treaty and rearmament decisions. In particular, the State Department policy makers chose their preference for an early peace treaty as a result of interpreting the problem from various points of view and evaluating the options in relation to the multiple interests involved. The civilian planners, on the other hand, selected their stand against prompt rearmament by giving overriding consideration to their organizational interests. Therefore, it is difficult to determine which model or combination of the models has been most relevant to the explanations of the individual choice processes. The validity of the models has varied not only according to the decision problems, but also across the decision makers. One conclusion drawn from these findings is that any single model of decision-making cannot adequately explain the whole process of individual preference choice for any decision problem. There is a need to use multiple models in some combination so as to get a full account of the process.

Nevertheless, the preceding analyses indicate that some recurring patterns of decision-making behavior have been found in the individual choice processes for the different issues. First, in all four decision cases, the preferences of the Pentagon policy makers, especially the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were primarily determined by their organizational concerns and interests. The military planners showed a consistent tendency to interpret the decision problems exclusively from the military-strategic perspective. They also tended to evaluate the policy options only in terms of their organizational interests: to develop and maintain military preparedness for any probable war; to avoid the risk of an armed conflict in East Asia because of its lack of readiness and secondary importance; and to prepare against other military contingencies, particularly the situation that the use of American bases in and about Japan would be restricted by the Japanese government. In addition, the evidence of this research suggests that the Pentagon

officials tended to avoid, rather than resolve, the conflict relationships between the military and other values at stake in selecting and reinforcing their preferences. This pattern on the part of the military planners is thought to have resulted inevitably from their overriding concern with the military implications of the decision problems and their inclination to adopt the options that would maximize the military values or interests.

Another decision-making pattern which has been identified in this research is that in all the decision cases, except the postponement decision, the civilian and military policy makers in Washington held certain shared mind-sets about United States security interests in East Asia and Japan. These mind-sets had some impact on the respective decision-making processes. In the case of the peace treaty decision, the State and Pentagon planners shared the attitudes, such as the importance to American security of denying Japan to Soviet control, the ultimate Russian intention to dominate Japan, and the need to provide military protection for disarmed Japan in the post-treaty period. These common mind-sets produced two consequences in the decision-making process. One was that the civilian and military planners agreed to retain American bases and forces in Japan. The other was that they both rejected the option of neutralizing Japan as impracticable. In the instance of the rearmament decision, there were also certain mind-sets agreed upon by the decision makers in Washington: the need for Japan to be defended by armed forces in light of aggressive Soviet intentions; and the eventual withdrawal of the American forces from Japan. These shared images caused the decision makers to abandon the alternative of the long-term disarmament of Japan. Finally, the civilian and military planners also held some shared mind-sets pertaining to the issue of the islands' reversion: the indefinite maintenance of a military base system in and about Japan for the purpose of ensuring the defense of the United States in the event of war in East Asia; and a lack of confidence in Japan's future political

orientation. These mind-sets led the decision makers to eliminate from consideration the option of returning the islands at issue to Japan's full control. They agreed, at least, to retain American bases in the islands, even if they disagreed over the method of such retention. This body of evidence indicates that the shared mind-sets affected the decision-making process in such a way as to limit acceptable policy options, thus narrowing the disagreement among the decision makers.

2. Collective Decision Process

The analyses of the collective processes by which the final decisions were produced are summarized in the following table.

Table 5. Collective Processes of the Four Main Decisions

<i>Decisions</i>	<i>Determinants</i>	<i>Validity of the Models</i>
Postponement Decisions (Oct. 1948): Defer the peace treaty; Pursue economic recovery; Relax the occupation	Disagreement among the FEC nations over the composition and procedures of a peace conference; Revised outcome calculations by the Far Eastern Office based on relevant information; Kennan's onsite analysis of the problem; Balanced satisfaction of the values involved	Analytic
Peace Treaty Decisions (Sept. 1950): Initiate peace negotiations; Obtain unlimited base rights through a security treaty	Building policy coalitions with MacArthur; Compromising security arrangements; Concessions by the State Department and MacArthur to the Pentagon's security terms; the Pentagon's return concession to the initiation of the peace negotiations	Bureaucratic politics
Rearmament Decisions (Sept. 1950): Proceed to rearm Japan before the end of the occupation; Rearm indirectly through the expansion and equipping of the national police forces; Include no provisions for rearmament in the peace treaty	Revised calculations by the State Department resulting from the outbreak of the Korean war; MacArthur's abandonment of the neutrality scheme as a result of the Korean war; Constraints on rearmament by the existing FEC decisions; the State Department's persuasive argument against the inclusion of provisions for rearmament in the peace treaty; Balanced satisfaction of the values involved	Analytic

<i>Decisions</i>	<i>Determinants</i>	<i>Validity of the Models</i>
Reversion Decisions (June 1953): Return the Amami Islands; Retain exclusive control over Okinawa and the Bonin Islands	Onsite discussions with the military field officials; Exchange of pertinent information and arguments during the discussions of the State-Pentagon working group; New information of Japan's emphasis on the reversion of the Amami Islands; Presentation of relevant information and the detailed analyses of all the policy options to the NSC; Persuasive argumentation based on pertinent information during the discussion of the NSC meeting; Balanced satisfaction of values involved	Analytic

As the table displays, the collective process that led to the peace treaty decision has been best explained by the bureaucratic politics model, whereas the processes from which the other three decisions resulted have been best accounted for by the analytic model. In other words, the decision to conclude the peace and security treaties with Japan were the political resultant of coalition-building, bargaining, and compromising among the State Department, the Pentagon, and General MacArthur. In each of the other decision cases, the national decisions were reached through the process in which a consensus among the concerned decision makers arose out of changes in their initial preferences that resulted from exposure to new information and/or persuasive argumentation during the discussions of the problem based on pertinent information. On the other hand, in none of the decision cases was there evidence of concurrence-seeking to promote the solidarity of the decision-making group, as predicted by the cognitive model.

Another finding worthy of note concerns the relationship between the nature of the individual choice processes and that of the collective decision process. The following table displays the validity of the decision-making models in accounting for the two aspects of the decision-making process for each of the four decisions. It is to integrate the preceding tables in a simple form in order to understand the relationship between the two aspects.

Table 6. Validity of the Decision Models across the Individual and Collective Processes

	<i>Individual Choice Process</i>	<i>Collective Decision Process</i>
Postponement Decision (Oct. 1948)	Analytic Bureaucratic politics Cognitive	Analytic
Peace Treaty Decision (Sept. 1950)	Analytic Bureaucratic politics Cognitive	Bureaucratic politics
Rearmament Decision (Sept. 1950)	Bureaucratic politics Cognitive	Analytic
Reversion Decision (June 1953)	Analytic Bureaucratic politics	Analytic

This table indicates that the validity of the three models also varies according to the different aspects of the decision-making processes. This finding is best illustrated in the cases of the postponement and peace treaty decisions. Although the two cases have in common that all the three models have some relevance to the analysis of the individual choice processes, they differ in the validity of the models in the explanation of the collective decision process. This suggests that there were no direct relationships between the nature of the individual choice processes and that of the collective decision processes. In other words, why and how the decision makers selected their policy preferences did not directly affect how the divergent preferences aggregated to produce the final decisions. If that is the case, another question is raised about what factors were responsible for the differences in the nature of the collective processes of the four decisions.

First of all, a plausible explanation of why any of the decisions was not the outcome of such group conformity-seeking, as expected by the cognitive model, is provided by examining Irving Janis's groupthink model. According to the model, groupthink, as defined as premature concurrence-seeking behavior in a decision-making group, tends to take place under certain antecedent conditions: the

common feelings of stress among the decision-makers, particularly those stemming from a crisis situation; group cohesiveness; the group's insulation from the judgments of qualified outsiders; the absence of systematic procedures for gathering and appraising information; and group leaders who assertively advance their own preferences.¹ There were no such conditions for the occurrence of groupthink in any of the four decision cases this research has analyzed. First, the decisions were made in such non-crisis situations as not to subject the policy makers to the stress created by the necessity of making prompt decisions in a threatening environment. The peace treaty and rearmament decisions were influenced, to some extent, by the crisis condition caused by the outbreak of the Korean War. Nevertheless, there were no shared perceptions of threat or time pressure among the decision makers which might lead to concurrence-seeking behavior in the collective decision processes. Second, no high level of group cohesion was found in all the instances because the respective decision-making was mainly conducted by the interactions among the organizational decision-makers with divergent perspectives and interests. More notably, there were no such leaders who were directive and assertive in their presentation of preferences. In particular, President Truman did not attempt to overrule any of his policy advisers, preferring them to reach a consensus. President Eisenhower also wanted to have agreed-upon recommendations in the reversion issue, rather than to dominate the decision-making process. Even when he had to make a final decision in the NSC meeting, Eisenhower did so after attending to the divergent State and Pentagon positions. This body of evidence helps to understand why any of the decisions did not result from concurrence-seeking behavior.

The next question is why the peace treaty decision stemmed from a bureaucratic politics process, while the other three decisions were produced by

¹ I. Janis, *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes*, pp. 242-56.

analytic processes. This question relates to the problem of determining under what conditions each of the bureaucratic politics and analytic models is most likely to explain the decision-making process. Several factors have been identified through this research as being responsible for such a divergence in the nature of the collective choice processes. The first factor was presidential policy-making styles. As has been pointed out, President Truman was rarely involved directly in the decision-making processes, though he was interested in the Japanese problems. He preferred that his civilian and military advisers recommend an agreed-upon position that would leave him no options but acceptance or rejection. It can be predicted that this presidential style might prompt the policy makers below the President to engage in bargaining and compromising so as to reach a consensus.² This prediction applies to the case of the peace treaty decision. Although he supported the State Department preference for a prompt peace settlement, Truman made no direct attempt to overrule the Pentagon planners who opposed it. He wanted to wait for a unanimous position reached by the two departments, in spite of the long policy deadlock. This style led the civilian and military planners to form policy coalitions, negotiate compromise options and make concessions to each other's stand with a view to arriving at a consensus.

The presidential decision-making style also helps to explain why the reversion decision was produced by an analytic process. Like Truman, President Eisenhower preferred his civilian and military advisers to come up with agreed-upon recommendations on the islands issue, thus hardly becoming involved in the pre-decisional process. However, he differed from Truman in that he was willing to face and choose among divergent positions by himself if they could not be coordinated below him. This style was embodied in Eisenhower's use of the NSC

² See Halperin, *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*, pp. 198-99; and Jerel A. Rosati, "Developing a Systemic Decision-Making Framework: Bureaucratic Politics in Perspective," *World Politics*, vol. 33, no. 2, 1981, pp. 214-52.

as primary decision-making machinery. As has been evidenced by the collective process of the reversion decision, the Planning Board as the NSC staff prepared a policy report for consideration by the NSC on the basis of the position papers developed by the State and Defense Departments. An effort was made by the Planning Board to resolve the difference of their positions before the report was brought up to a Council meeting. Nevertheless, Eisenhower's NSC system did not necessarily require reaching a consensus below him. The disagreement, if not reconciled, would be presented in the policy report to the President, together with relevant information and alternative policy courses. These procedures, which reflected Eisenhower's style of not discouraging the presentation of split positions, affected the collective decision process in such a way as not to press the dissenting agencies to proceed with bargaining and compromising to achieve a unanimous position. On the other hand, such procedures induced the President and other NSC members to follow an analytic process in which they made final decisions following their vigorous discussion and appraisal of the real alternative policy courses, based on pertinent information.

Although the presidential policy-making style contributes to interpreting the difference in the nature of the collective processes between the peace treaty and reversion decisions, it cannot serve to account for the difference between the peace treaty decision, on one hand, and the postponement and rearmament decisions, on the other hand. The reason is that all the three decisions were made under the same Truman administration. Some other factors are considered responsible for such a divergence of the collective choice processes.

Two factors are identified to explain why the postponement decision was produced by an analytic process, while the peace treaty decision, by a bureaucratic politics one: the existence of an effective coordinating agency and constraints imposed by the external environment. First, the analytic process of the

postponement decision was in part attributed to the existence of the Policy Planning Staff (PPS) as a powerful coordinating agency. The initial policy dissension emerged in mid-1947 between the Far Eastern Office of the State Department and General MacArthur, who favored a prompt peace treaty, and the military departments, which opposed it. However, the likelihood of bureaucratic competition and maneuvering among them to promote their preferences was reduced largely as the PPS was empowered by Secretary of State Marshall in October 1947 to determine a State Department position and coordinate it with the other interested agencies. That Kennan and his staff, who advocated deferring the peace treaty, took the initiative in dealing with the Japanese issue away from the formerly responsible Far Eastern Office led to the consequence of restraining probable infighting and bargaining between the State and military departments at least over the issue of timing the peace settlement. On the other hand, the effective coordinating activities of the planning group, such as discussions with the concerned civilian and military officials, and Kennan's onsite analysis and consultation with MacArthur, enabled an analytic process to operate in reaching the postponement and other accompanying decisions. Second, there was a major constraint on the occurrence of bureaucratic politics, arising from the external environment: the disagreement among the FEC nations (especially among the United States, the Soviet Union, and China) over the composition and procedures of a peace conference proposed by Washington. This international dissension actually made it very difficult for a peace treaty to be concluded early. The result was to weaken the case for a prompt peace settlement on the part of the Far Eastern Office and MacArthur, thus diminishing the possibility of political conflict and maneuvering between them and other policy makers, who insisted on the postponement of the settlement.

In contrast, there was no effective coordinating agency in the case of the peace treaty decision. Though the NSC machinery existed, it hardly provided such central coordination and direction to restrain interagency competition and bargaining. The reason was that President Truman made little use of the NSC as a coordinating mechanism. He tended to rely on other devices for coordination outside the NSC structure. This tendency stemmed from his policy-making style in which major policies were formulated through the work of the concerned departments, rather than the NSC staff. The evidence of this research shows that the President did not seek to use any formal coordinating means to resolve the policy impasse among the State Department, the Pentagon, and General MacArthur over the peace settlement issue. He only waited for a unanimous policy position to be coordinated and reached by them. In short, the absence of an effective coordinating agency, coupled with Truman's preference for a bureaucratic consensus, subjected the dissenting civilian and military policy makers to political infighting and led them to engage in coalition-building, bargaining, and compromising so as to resolve such a policy conflict in the direction of their favored policies. In addition, no evidence was found that, as in the case of the postponement decision, there were certain external factors that served as constraints on the occurrence of bureaucratic politics by rendering any of the dissenting positions impracticable. The outbreak of the Korean War, as a major external event, only influenced the collective decision process in such a manner as to deepen, rather than reduce, the dissension between the State and Defense Departments. It was because the policy makers of the two agencies interpreted the event so differently as to strengthen their split positions about the timing of the peace treaty.

The last question that has to be answered is why the peace treaty and rearmament decisions resulted from different collective processes - the former from

a bureaucratic politics process, while the latter from an analytic one- even though they were made by the same decision makers at the same time. An explanation of this divergence can be given by exploring the factors that influenced the collective process of the rearmament decision, for the factors which affected that of the peace treaty have already been identified. First of all, there were constraints on bureaucratic competition and bargaining over the rearmament issue, imposed by the external environment. A first constraint was that the formation of any Japanese military forces other than the civil police was forbidden by the policy decisions of the Far Eastern Commission, the Allied policy-making machinery for the occupation of Japan. The ban on rearmament made it almost impossible for the United States to proceed toward rebuilding a Japanese army during the occupation, without rescinding the FEC decisions with the consent of the other FEC nations. However, there was little likelihood that Washington would succeed in revoking such decisions because most of the FEC members, including the Soviet Union, remained strongly opposed to any kind of rearmament. A second constraint was that the Japanese constitution, which had been amended as a part of the American occupation reforms, also prohibited the maintenance of armed forces. In view of the widespread pacifist sentiment in the Japanese government and public, it was highly difficult, if not impossible, for the United States to successfully compel them to make a constitutional revision toward permitting the creation of military forces. These two factors in the international environment rendered the Pentagon's favored policy of prompt rearmament unlikely, while reinforcing the State Department' case for continued disarmament at least during the occupation and in the immediate post-treaty period. The result was that little scope was afforded to the military planners for contention and negotiation with the civilian planners to promote their preference.

Another external factor, the onset of the Korean War, also restrained the occurrence of bureaucratic politics by rendering the case for rearmament incontestable. The outbreak of hostilities and the resultant diversion of the occupation forces in Japan to the Korean battlefield left no room for the State Department to dispute with the Pentagon over whether to move toward Japanese rearmament even in the remaining occupation period. On the other hand, such external events that seemed to make a certain degree of rearmament inevitable led the civilian and military policy makers to reconsider the rearmament issue in connection with other related issues, such as the coming negotiations of a peace treaty and the avoidance of conflicting with the FEC decisions and the Japanese constitution. The result was that they reached a rational decision of indirect rearmament through the equipping and expansion of the National Police Reserve so as to yield a balanced satisfaction of the multiple interests involved. In sum, three factors have been identified in this case study as affecting the collective processes of the four American decisions: presidential decision-making styles; the existence of effective coordinating agencies; and constraints imposed by the international environment.

In conclusion, this research advances several propositions concerning the individual and collective processes of United States foreign policy decision-making, as derived inductively from its preceding analyses of the four decisions on Japan.

(1) Decision makers' policy preferences are determined by the concerns and interests of the bureaucratic organizations that they represent, their personal beliefs and cognitive processes, their weighing the various interests at stake, including the organizational and national interests, or some combination of these factors. Therefore, explanations provided by multiple decision-making models

need to be used in some combination to understand the whole process of individual choice adequately and accurately.

(2) The preference choice of Pentagon policy makers, especially the Joint Chiefs of Staff, tends to be primarily determined by their organizational interests, particularly those of developing and maintaining military readiness for war or other contingencies. Moreover, they tend to avoid, rather than resolve, the trade-off relationships between military interests and other interests at stake in the preference choice process.

(3) Shared mind-sets among decision makers affect the decision-making process in such a manner as to limit acceptable policy options, thus narrowing disagreement among the decision makers.

(4) There is no direct relationship between the nature of individual choice processes and that of collective decision processes. In other words, how and why decision makers' policy preferences are determined does not directly affect how they are transformed into final national decisions.

(5) If the president prefers to have an agreed-upon position among policy makers below him and there is no effective coordinating mechanism, final policy decisions tend to be produced by a bureaucratic politics process characterized by interagency competition, coalition-building, bargaining, and compromising. On the other hand, the occurrence of bureaucratic politics tends to be restrained if there are constraints arising from the international environment which render any of competing positions difficult or inevitable to implement.

(6) If the president is willing to have and choose among competing policy positions, final decisions tend to be produced by an analytic process characterized by the intense discussion of the problem and the rigorous appraisal of the alternative policy positions, based on pertinent information.

These propositions need to be tested and refined by other case studies in order to contribute to a better understanding of the nature of the American decision-making processes.

Before concluding this study, two research issues deserve to be briefly mentioned in connection with the future directions of foreign policy analysis. The first one relates to the question of how analysts evaluate particular foreign policy decisions. This issue is important because one of the purposes of foreign policy analysis is to provide the policy-making community with knowledge and theories for effective policy actions. Bearing this purpose in mind, analysts have attempted to evaluate a state's foreign policy largely in terms of rationality in its formulation process. They have tended to use, as criteria for such evaluation, the assumptions of the analytic (rational) decision-making model that this research adopted for the explanation of the American decisions: a multi-faceted diagnosis of the situation; the consideration of multiple relevant values or objectives; the development of all viable options; outcome calculations of options in relation to the multiple values involved; the revision of such calculations on the basis of new information; and the selection of policy preferences which produce a balanced satisfaction of the values at stake. On the other hand, bureaucratic politics and cognitive processes have been often regarded as causing certain impediments to rational decision-making.³ Although rationality, in terms of how the decision-making process should work, serves as a relevant basis for evaluation, it does not provide adequate criteria. The reason is that decisions made in accordance with rational procedures will not necessarily produce "good" results as intended by policy makers. The decisions are sometimes converted into unintended policy actions through their implementation process because of such factors as the ambiguous nature of the decisions,

³ See, for example, Alexander George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy*; and Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987).

bureaucratic resistance, and different perspectives in the field. Hence, additional criteria for evaluation are needed to assess the implementation process. Furthermore, a state's foreign policy is conducted in the context of interactions with other states. Thus, passing judgment upon the quality of its foreign policy must have another set of criteria for evaluating diplomatic performance in international interactions. In this respect, there is a need to develop and use a broad framework for making an evaluation of a state's foreign policy.

The second issue refers to the question of integrating knowledge and insight across multiple levels of analysis. This research laid its focus on the decision-making processes in order to explain America's foreign policy decisions toward Japan. The main reason was a theoretical affirmation that, by entering into the level of the decision-making process, determinative factors in the external environment could be causally linked to foreign policy decisions as outputs. While decision-making analysis is necessary for understanding foreign policy behavior, it does not enable analysts to grasp the whole picture of various factors widely acknowledged as potentially affecting such behavior. This is because a state's foreign policy is formulated and implemented in the context of constraints imposed by the domestic and international environment. To explore foreign policy behavior more accurately and adequately, decision-making analysis should be enriched by other perspectives whose focus is placed on contextual factors, such as the structure of the international system, the capabilities of states, the type of regimes, and the features of political leadership. In this connection, a crucial task on the part of foreign policy analysts is to integrate different perspectives so as to understand foreign policy behavior comprehensively. Though many case studies have been conducted in respective levels of analysis, integrative studies have been few. A priority should be given to developing ways in which findings in multiple levels of analysis can be incorporated into some generalized and coherent body of theory.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

PUBLISHED OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS

- National Military Establishment, First Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1948 (1948) (Washington: Government Printing Office).
- Public Papers of the Presidents (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office).
- Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (1948), The Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945-September 1948, Report of the Governmental Section of SCAP. 2 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office).
- U.S. Department of State (1951), Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan: Record of Proceedings (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office).
- _____ (1965), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1944. vol. V (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office).
- _____ (1969), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945. vol. I, VI, VII (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office).
- _____ (1969-1971), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946. vol. I, VIII (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office).
- _____ (1972), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947. vol. I, VI, VII (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office).
- _____ (1972-1974), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948. vol. I, VI, VII, VIII (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office).
- _____ (1974-1976), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949. vol. I, VII, VIII, IX (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office).
- _____ (1976), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950. vol. I, VI, VII (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office).
- _____ (1977- 1983), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951. vol. I, VI, VII (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office).

_____ (1984-1986), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, vol. I, XII, XIV, XV (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office).

UNPUBLISHED OFFICIAL RECORDS

All Record Groups (RG) are located in the National Archives or Washington National Records Center (WNRC).

National Security Council Files, RG 273

State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, RG 353

U.S. Department of Defense, Records of the Army Staff, RG 319

_____, Records of the Army Plans and Operations Division, RG 319

_____, Records of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG 218

_____, Draper/ Voorhees Project Decimal File, RG 335 (WNRC)

_____, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff , RG 218

_____, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, RG 330

_____, Records of the Office of the Secretary of the Army and Under Secretary, RG 335 (WNRC)

_____, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, RG 331 (WNRC)

U.S. Department of State, Central Decimal Files, RG 59

_____, Lot Files for the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs and the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, RG 59

_____, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, 1947-1953, RG 59

BOOKS and ARTICLES

- Acheson, Dean (1969), Present at the Creation : My Years in the State Department (New York: Norton).
- Present at the Creation : My Years in the State Department
- Allison, Graham T.(1971), Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown).
- Allison, Graham T. and Halperin, Morton H.(1972), "Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy Implications," in Raymond Tanter and R. H. Ullman (eds.), Theory and Policy in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 40-79.
- Art, Robert J. (1973), "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique," Policy Sciences, vol. 4, pp. 467-90.
- Auer, James E. (1973), The Postwar Rearmament of Japanese Maritime Forces, 1945-71 (New York: Praeger).
- Baerwald, Hans H. (1959), The Purge of Japanese Leaders under the Occupation (Berkeley: University of California Press).
- Barnet, Richard (1983), The Alliance: America-Europe-Japan Makers of the Postwar World (New York: Simon and Schuster).
- Bisson, T. A.(1954), Zaibatsu Dissolution in Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press).
- Bordon, William S. (1984), The Pacific Alliance: United States Foreign Economic Policy and Japanese Trade Recovery, 1947-1955 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press).
- Bradly, Omar H. and Blair, Clay (1983), A General's Life (New York: Simon and Schuster).
- Brecher, Michael (1972), The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Process (New Haven: Yale University Press).
- Brecher, Michael (1975), Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press).

- Brecher, Michael, Steinberg, Blema, and Stein, Janis (1969), "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior," Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 13, pp. 75-101.
- Buckley, Roger (1982), Occupation Diplomacy: Britain, the United States, and Japan, 1945-52 (New York: Cambridge University Press).
- Buckley, Roger (1992), US-Japan Alliance Diplomacy 1945-1990 (New York: Cambridge University Press).
- Burkman, Thomas (ed.) (1984), The Occupation of Japan: The International Context (Norfolk, Va.).
- Caldwell, Dan (1977), "Bureaucratic Foreign Policy-Making," American Behavioral Scientist, vol. 21, no. 1, (September/October), pp. 87-110.
- Clarke, Michael and White, Brian (eds.) (1989), Understanding Foreign policy: The Foreign Policy Systems Approach (Brookfield: Gower Publishing Company).
- Cohen, Bernard C. (1957), The Political Process and Foreign Policy: The Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
- Cohen, Jerome B. (1949), Japan's Economy in War and Reconstruction (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press).
- Cohen, Theodore (1987), Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal (New York: The Free Press).
- Cohen, Theodore (1980), "Labor Democratization in Japan: The First Years," in Redford (ed.), The Occupation of Japan: Economic Policy and Reform (Norfolk: The MacArthur Memorial).
- Condit, Kenneth W. (1979), The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1948-1949, vol. 2 (Wilmington: Michael Glazier, Inc.).
- Destler, I. M. (1977), "National Security Advice to U.S. Presidents: Some Lessons from Thirty Years," World Politics, vol. 29, no. 2 (January).
- Dingman, Roger (1979), "Strategic Planning and the Policy Process: American Plans for War in East Asia, 1945-50," Naval War College Review, vol. 32, no. 6, pp. 4-21.

- Dingman, Roger (1976), "Reconsideration: The United States-Japan Security Treaty," Pacific Community, vol. 7, no. 4. (July), pp. 471-93.
- Donovan, Robert (1982), Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman (New York: Norton).
- Dore, R. P.(1985), Land Reform in Japan (New York: Schocken Books).
- Dower, John W. (1979), Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and Japanese Experience, 1878-1954 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press).
- Dower, John W. (1989), "Occupied Japan and the Cold War in Asia," in Michael J. Lacey (ed.), The Truman Presidency (New York: Cambridge University Press), pp. 366-409.
- Dunn, Fredrick S. (1963), Peacemaking and the Settlement with Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
- Farley, Miriam S.(1950), Aspects of Japan's Labor Problems (New York: The John Day Company).
- Fearey, Robert A.(1950), The Occupation of Japan- Second Phase: 1948-50 (New York: MacMillian Company).
- Finn, Richard B. (1992), Winners in Peace: MacArthur, Yoshida, and Postwar Japan, (Berkely: University of California Press).
- Fisch, Arnold (1988), Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 1945-1950 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army).
- Gaddis, John L. (1982), Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press).
- Gaddis, John L. (1972), The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press).
- George, Alexander L. (1980), Presidential Decision Making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press).
- George, Alexander L. (1988), "The President and the Management of Foreign Policy: Styles and Models," in Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf (eds.), The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence (New York: St. Martin's Press).

- Hadley, Eleanor M. (1970), Antitrust in Japan, (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
- Halperin, Morton H. (1974), Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute).
- Halperin, Morton H. (1975), National Security Policy-Making (Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company).
- Halperin, Morton H., and Kanter, A.(1973), " The Bureaucratic Perspective: A Preliminary Framework," in M. P. Halperin and A. Kanter (eds), Readings in American Foreign Policy (Boston: Little, Brown), pp. 1-42.
- Hastings, Max (1987), The Korean War (New York: Simon and Schuster).
- Hermann, Charles F. (1990), "Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 34, no 3, pp. 3-21.
- Hermann, Charles F. and Hermann, Margaret G. (1985), "The Synthetic Role of Decision-making Models in Theories of Foreign Policy," in M. D. Ward (ed.), Theories, Models, and Simulations in International Relations (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press), pp. 223-48.
- Hermann, Charles F., Kegley, Charles W. Jr., and Rosenau, James N.(eds)(1987), New Direction in the Study of Foreign Policy (Boston: Allen & Unwin).
- Hewes, Laurence I. (1955), Japan-Land and Men: An Account of the Japanese Land Reform Program, 1945-51 (Ames, Iowa: The Iowa State College Press).
- Hoopes, Townsend (1973), The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston: Little, Brown and Company).
- Igarashi, Takeshi (1993), "Dean Acheson and the Japanese Peace Treaty," in Douglas Brinkley, Dean Acheson and the Making of U.S. Foreign Policy, (New York: St. Martin's Press), pp. 133-58.
- Iokibe, Makoto (ed.) (1989), The Occupation of Japan (Bethesda, Md.: Congressional Information Service and Maruzen Co.) 3 vols.
- James, D. Clayton (1985), The Years of MacArthur, 1945-1964, vol. 3, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company).

- Janis, Irving (1982), Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin).
- Janis, Irving and Mann, L. (1977), Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment (New York: Free Press).
- Jervis, Robert (1976), Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
- Johnson, Richard T. (1974), Managing the White House: An Intimate Study of Presidency (New York: Harper & Row).
- Johnson, Richard A. (1971), The Administration of United States Foreign Policy (Austin: The University of Texas Press).
- Kades, Charles L. (1989), "The American Role in Revising Japan's Imperial Constitution," Political Science Quarterly, vol. 104, no. 2.
- Kataoka, Tetsuya (1991), The Price of a Constitution: the Origin of Japan's Postwar Politics (New York: Crane Russak).
- Kawai, Kazuo (1960), Japan's American Interlude (Chicago: University of Chicago Press).
- Kegley, Charles W. Jr., and Wittkopf, Eugene R. (1987), American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process, 3rd ed. (New York: St Martin Press).
- Kegley, Charles W. Jr., and Wittkopf, Eugene R. (eds) (1988), The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy (New York: St. Martin's Press).
- Kellerman, Barbara (1983), "Allison Redux: Three More Decision-Making Models," Polity, vol. 15, no. 3 (Spring), pp. 351-67.
- Kennan, George F. (1967), Memoirs, 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company).
- Leffler, Melvyn P. (1992), A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press).

- Leffler, Melvyn P.(1984), " The American Conception of National Security and the Beginning of the Cold War, 1945-48," American Historical Review, vol. 89, no. 2 , pp. 346-81.
- Lentner, Howard H. (1974), Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative and Conceptual Approach (Columbus, Ohio: Charles Merrill).
- Livingston, Jon, Moor, Joe, and Oldfather, Felicia (eds.)(1973), Postwar Japan: 1945 to the Present (New York: Pantheon Books).
- MacArthur, Douglas (1964), Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company).
- MacDonald, Callum A. (1986), Korea: The War Before Vietnam (New York: The Free Press).
- Maoz, Zeev (1990), National Choices and International Choices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Maoz, Zeev (1981), "The Decision to Raid Entebbe: Decision Analysis Applied to Crisis Behavior," Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 25, no. 4 (December), pp. 677-707.
- Mark, Edward (1978), "Reconsideration: The Question of Containment," Foreign Affairs, vol. LVI, pp. 430-40.
- Martin, Edwin M.(1948), The Allied Occupation of Japan (New York: American Bock Stratford Press).
- Mayo, Marlene J. (1980), "American Economic Planning for Occupied Japan: The Issue of Zaibatsu Dissolution, 1942-1945," in Lawrence H. Redford (ed.), The Occupation of Japan: Economic Policy and Reform,(Norfolk: The MacArthur Memorial).
- Mayo, Marlene J. (1984), "American Wartime Planning for Occupied Japan: the Role of the Experts," in Robert Wolfe (ed.), Americans as Proconsuls: United States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944-1952 (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press).
- McNelly, Theodore (1982), "General Douglas MacArthur and the Constitutional Disarmament of Japan," Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, 3rd Series, vol. 17 (October).

- McNelly, Theodore (ed.)(1967), Sources in Modern East Asian History and Politics (New York: Appleton-Century-Crafts).
- Murphy, Robert (1964), Diplomat Among Warriors (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc.).
- Nathan, James A. and Oliver, James K.(1987), Foreign Policy Making and the American Political System (Boston: Little, Brown and Company).
- Nelson, Anna (ed.)(1983), The State Department Policy Planning Staff Papers, 1947-1949, 3 vols. (New York: Garland Publishing).
- Nimmo, William F. (1986), The Occupation of Japan: The Impact of the Korean War (Norfolk, Va.: MacArthur Foundation).
- Paterson, Thomas (ed.)(1973), Containment and Cold War (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company).
- Pollard, Robert (1985), Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press).
- Pool, Water S. (1979), The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1950-1952, vol. 4 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division of Joint Secretariat, the JCS).
- Prados, John (1991), Keepers of the Keys: A History of the National Security Council from Truman to Bush (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc.).
- Pruessen, Ronald W. (1982), John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power (New York: The Free Press).
- Rinjiro, Sodei (1991), "Janus-faced MacArthur," Diplomatic History, vol. 15, no. 4 (Fall), pp. 621-29.
- Rosati, Jerel A.(1981), "Developing a Systemic Decision-Making Framework," World Politics, vol. 33, pp. 234-52.
- Ross, Steven T. (1988), American War Plans, 1945-1950 (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc.).

- Sackton, Frank J.(1980), "The Transfer of Land Ownership to the Peasants: The Priceless Economic Reform," Redford (ed.), The Occupation of Japan: Economic Policy and Reform,(Norfolk: The MacArthur Memorial).
- Sebald, William and Brines, Russell (1965), With MacArthur in Japan: A Personal History of the Occupation (New York: W.W. Norton and Company).
- Schaller, Michael (1985), The American Occupation of Japan: the Origins of the Cold War in Asia (New York: Oxford University Press).
- Schaller, Michael (1986), "MacArthur's Japan: the View from Washington," Diplomatic History, vol. 10, no. 1, (Winter).
- Schnabel, James F. (1979), The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1945-1947, vol. 1 (Wilmington: Michael Glazier, Inc.)
- Schonberger, Howard (1979), "American Labor's Cold War in Occupied Japan," Diplomatic History, vol. 3, no. 3 (Summer).
- Schonberger, Howard (1977), " The Japan Lobby in American Diplomacy, 1947-1952," Pacific Historical Review, vol. 46, no. 3, pp. 327-59.
- Schonberger, Howard(1989), Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press).
- Shiels, Frederick L. (1980), America, Okinawa, and Japan: Case Studies for Foreign Policy Theory (University Press of America).
- Smith, Steve and Clarke, Michael (eds)(1985), Foreign Policy Implementation (London: George Allen & Unwin).
- Smith, Steve (1984/5), "Policy Preferences and Bureaucratic Position: The Case of the American Hostage Rescue Mission," International Affairs, vol. 61, no. 1 (Winter), pp. 9-25.
- Sneider, Richard L. (1982), U.S.- Japanese Relations: a Historical Perspective (New York: the East Asian Institute of Columbia University).
- Snyder, Glenn and Diesing, Paul (1977), Conflicts Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises(Princeton: Princeton University Press).

- Snyder, Jack L. (1978), "Rationality at the Brink: The Role of Cognitive Processes in Failures of Deterrence," World Politics, vol. 30, no. 3 (April), pp. 345-65.
- Snyder, Richard C., Bruck, H. W., and Sapin, Burton (1962), Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics (New York: Free Press).
- Stein, Janice and Tanter, Raymond (1980), Rational Decision-Making: Israel's Security Choice, 1967 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press).
- Steinbruner, J. D. (1974), The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
- Stueck, William W. (1981), The Road to Confrontation: American Policy toward China and Korea, 1947-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press).
- Truman, Harry S. (1955), Memoirs: Year of Decisions (Garden City, NY: Doubleday).
- Truman, Harry S. (1956), Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City: Doubleday).
- Ward, Robert E. and Yoshikazu, Sakamoto (eds.) (1987), Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press).
- Ward, Robert (1968), "Reflections on the Allied Occupation and Planned Political Change in Japan," in R. Ward, Political Development of Modern Japan. (Englewood Cliffs), pp. 477-535.
- Watanabe, Akio (1970), The Okinawa Problem: A Chapter in Japan-U.S. Relations (Melbourne University Press).
- Watson, Robert J. (1986), The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953-1954, vol. 5, (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division of the JCS).
- Weinstein, Martin E. (1971), Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968 (New York: Columbia University Press).
- Welfield, John (1988), An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Athlone Press).

- Sackton, Frank J.(1980), "The Transfer of Land Ownership to the Peasants: The Priceless Economic Reform," Redford (ed.), The Occupation of Japan: Economic Policy and Reform,(Norfolk: The MacArthur Memorial).
- Sebald, William and Brines, Russell (1965), With MacArthur in Japan: A Personal History of the Occupation (New York: W.W. Norton and Company).
- Schaller, Michael (1985), The American Occupation of Japan: the Origins of the Cold War in Asia (New York: Oxford University Press).
- Schaller, Michael (1986), "MacArthur's Japan: the View from Washington," Diplomatic History, vol. 10, no. 1, (Winter).
- Schnabel, James F. (1979), The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1945-1947, vol. 1 (Wilmington: Michael Glazier, Inc.)
- Schonberger, Howard (1979), "American Labor's Cold War in Occupied Japan," Diplomatic History, vol. 3, no. 3 (Summer).
- Schonberger, Howard (1977), " The Japan Lobby in American Diplomacy, 1947-1952," Pacific Historical Review, vol. 46, no. 3, pp. 327-59.
- Schonberger, Howard(1989), Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press).
- Shiels, Frederick L. (1980), America, Okinawa, and Japan: Case Studies for Foreign Policy Theory (University Press of America).
- Smith, Steve and Clarke, Michael (eds)(1985), Foreign Policy Implementation (London: George Allen & Unwin).
- Smith, Steve (1984/5), "Policy Preferences and Bureaucratic Position: The Case of the American Hostage Rescue Mission," International Affairs, vol. 61, no. 1 (Winter), pp. 9-25.
- Sneider, Richard L. (1982), U.S.- Japanese Relations: a Historical Perspective (New York: the East Asian Institute of Columbia University).
- Snyder, Glenn and Diesing, Paul (1977), Conflicts Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making, and System Structure in International Crises(Princeton: Princeton University Press).

- Snyder, Jack L. (1978), "Rationality at the Brink: The Role of Cognitive Processes in Failures of Deterrence," World Politics, vol. 30, no. 3 (April), pp. 345-65.
- Snyder, Richard C., Bruck, H. W., and Sapin, Burton (1962), Foreign Policy Decision-Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics (New York: Free Press).
- Stein, Janice and Tanter, Raymond (1980), Rational Decision-Making: Israel's Security Choice, 1967 (Columbus: Ohio State University Press).
- Steinbruner, J. D. (1974), The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
- Stueck, William W. (1981), The Road to Confrontation: American Policy toward China and Korea, 1947-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press).
- Truman, Harry S. (1955), Memoirs: Year of Decisions (Garden City, NY: Doubleday).
- Truman, Harry S. (1956), Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City: Doubleday).
- Ward, Robert E. and Yoshikazu, Sakamoto (eds.) (1987), Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press).
- Ward, Robert (1968), "Reflections on the Allied Occupation and Planned Political Change in Japan," in R. Ward, Political Development of Modern Japan. (Englewood Cliffs), pp. 477-535.
- Watanabe, Akio (1970), The Okinawa Problem: A Chapter in Japan-U.S. Relations (Melbourne University Press).
- Watson, Robert J. (1986), The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 1953-1954, vol. 5 (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division of the JCS). Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968 (N
- Weinstein, Martin E. (1971), Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968 (New York: Columbia University Press).
- Welfield, John (1988), An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Athlone Press).

- Williams, Justin (1979), Japan's Political Revolution under MacArthur: A Participant's Account (Athens: University of George Press).
- Willoughby, Charles A. and Chamberlain, John (1955), MacArthur: 1941-1951 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.).
- Yoshida, Shigeru (1961), The Yoshida Memoirs (Cambridge: The Riverside Press).

CHRONOLOGY

Japan

World Events

1945

Atomic bombings (Aug. 6 and 9)
 Japan's surrender (Aug. 15)
 Initiation of the Allied occupation (Sept. 2)
 Announcement by MacArthur of basic
 occupation policy for Japan (Sept. 9)

Potsdam Declaration as to Japanese surrender
 terms (July 26)
 Moscow Agreement of the Council of
 Foreign Minister (Dec. 26)

1946

Establishment of the Far Eastern Commission (Feb.)
 First Lower House election (Apr. 10)
 Promulgation of the new Japanese constitution
 including the no-war provision in Article 9 (Nov. 3)

Inauguration of the United Nations (Jan. 10)
 US proposal for 25-year demilitarization
 treaties for Germany and Japan at the
 Paris meeting of the CFM (Apr. 29)

1947

MacArthur's call for a peace treaty (Mar. 17)
 US proposal to the FEC nations for a preliminary
 peace conference (July 11)
 Policy Planning Staff paper (PPS/10) recommending
 the postponement of the peace treaty (Oct. 14)

Announcement of the Truman Doctrine (Mar. 12)
 Announcement of the Marshall Plan (June 5)
 Establishment of the National Security Council
 by the National Security Act (July 26)

1948

FEC decision to prohibit Japanese rearmament (Feb.)
 Kennan's visit to Japan (Mar. 1-26)
 Japan policy paper (NSC 13/2) including the
 decisions to defer the peace treaty and move
 toward economic recovery (Oct. 7)
 Initiation of an economic stabilization program (Dec.)

Vandenberg Resolution supporting US participa-
 tion in regional security agreements (June 11)
 Beginning of Berlin Blockade (June 24)

1949

JCS report (NSC 44) on limited rearmament for
 Japan (Mar. 1)
 Revised Japan policy paper (NSC 13/3) including
 the decision to retain long-term US control over
 Okinawa (May 6)
 Soviet proposal for discussion of the peace treaty
 in the Council of Foreign Ministers (May)
 JCS report (NSC 49) on US security needs in
 Japan (June 9)
 British proposal for the retention of US forces in
 post-treaty Japan (Sept. 9)
 State Department report (NSC 49/1) recommending
 an early peace settlement (Sept. 30)
 Pentagon Memo (NSC 60) insisting on a prolonged
 occupation (Dec. 23)

Formation of the NATO (Apr. 4)
 Withdrawal of US forces from Korea (June)
 Replacement of the military occupation of
 West Germany by a civilian commission (Sept.)
 Establishment of the Communist regime in
 China (Oct.)

*Japan**World Events*1950

Ikeda Mission to Washington conveying Japan's consent to the retention of US forces (May 2)
 Assignment of the peace-making task to Dulles (May 18)
 Separate visits to Japan by the Secretary of Defense and the chairman of the JCS, and by Dulles and Allison (June 17-27)
 MacArthur's directive to establish the Japanese National Police Reserve (July 8)
 Joint State-Pentagon Memo (NSC 60/1) including the decisions to initiate peace negotiations and proceed toward Japanese rearmament (Sept. 7)
 Announcement of seven general principles for US terms of the peace treaty (Sept. 15)
 US preliminary discussions of a peace treaty with the FEC nations (Oct.-Nov.)

Senator McCarthy's charges of the State Department (Feb.)
 Signing of Chinese-Soviet alliance pact (Feb. 14)
 Outbreak of the Korean War (June 25)
 Entry of US occupation forces in Japan into the Korean War (July 1)
 Communist China's intervention in the Korean War (Nov.)
 NATO nations' agreement to German rearmament (Dec.)

1951

Dulles mission to Japan for the negotiations of peace and security treaties (Jan. 25 - Feb. 11)
 Signing of the multilateral peace treaty and bilateral security pact with Japan (Sept. 8)

Dismissal of General MacArthur (April 11)
 Signing of the US-Philippine security treaty (Aug. 30)
 Signing of the ANZUS Pact (Sept. 1)

1952

Signing of US-Japanese Administrative Agreement for the stationing of US forces (Feb. 28)
 Termination of the occupation (Apr. 28)
 Creation of Japanese Coastal Safety Force (Apr.)
 Japan Policy Paper (125/2) for the post-treaty period (Aug. 7)

Formation of the European Defense Community (May 27)
 Eisenhower elected president (Nov. 4)

1953

Revised Japan policy paper (NSC 125/6) including the decisions to return the Amami Islands and to retain Okinawa and the Bonins (June 26)
 Initiation of negotiations for a mutual defense assistance agreement (July 15)
 Signing of an agreement on the transfer of the Amami Islands (Dec. 24)

Signing of the Korean armistice (July 27)

1954

Conclusion of US-Japanese Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (Mar. 3)
 Establishment of Japanese Self-Defense Forces, with an air force, and National Defense Agency (June)

US announcement of the policy of deterrence through massive retaliation (Jan. 12)
 Geneva Conference resulting in armistice and partition of Vietnam (July)