

71-16,547

IMMERMAN, Rita Jean, 1926-
ADMINISTRATIVE ROLES: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
BUREAUCRATIC ATTITUDES TO DECISION-MAKING.

The City University of New York, Ph.D.,
1971
Political Science, public administration

University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan

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ADMINISTRATIVE ROLES: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
BUREAUCRATIC ATTITUDES TO DECISION-MAKING

by

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A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty
in Political Science in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
The City University of New York.

1970

This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indebted to a great many people for their assistance in this undertaking.

My deepest obligation is to Professor Blanche D. Blank of Hunter College, City University of New York who gave so much of her time, thought, energy and encouragement to me during the course of this research. Her graciousness and cooperation were always generously available. Professor Dennis Palumbo of Brooklyn College, too, has been extremely helpful and generous in reading and making suggestions about the project at all the stages of its development.

The Urban Research Center of Hunter College provided facilitating sponsorship which contributed immeasurably to the successful accumulation of data necessary for analysis. Similarly, the cooperation of the Honorable Solomon Hoberman of the Civil Service Commission, and his staff, and the Commissioners of the six New York City line departments involved guaranteed that there would be sufficient levels of responses from the sample population. All 182 respondents are thanked as well for taking time out from busy schedules to complete the questionnaire, thus sharing their perceptions of the administrative function with the researcher.

Financial support in the form of a dissertation year grant was kindly provided by City University of New York.

At times when office space was badly needed, Dr. Leonard Lund offered the facilities of the New York Chamber of Commerce and Dr. Karl J. Leone gave private office space to the project.

Over 1,000 tables of statistical information were prepared by the Brooklyn College Computer Research Center in connection with this study. I am especially grateful to Mr. Alan Jacowitz who programmed and arranged for the work to be done.

Mrs. Lucille Kolkin of National Opinion Research Center was kind enough to check the language and format of the instrument proposed for the field work.

Finally, I would like to thank the people who formed my panel of experts for contributing to the validation of the questionnaire. For their cooperation and comments I am grateful to Professors Jewel Bellush, Charles Ascher, Erwin Bard, Claude Hawley and Norman Powerr, to Dr. Leonard Lund and Mr. A. L. Levine.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I. INTRODUCTION AND THEORY

Chapter			
I.	INTRODUCTION		1
	The Problem		
	The Field of Study		
	Definitions of Terms Used		
	Organization of the Study		
II.	ROLE THEORY AS A MODEL		16
	Analytical Value of Role Theory		
	Heuristic Value of Role Theory		
	Previous Research Using Role Theory		
III.	THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ATTITUDE AND ACTION		29
	Definitions and Premises		
	Empirical Research Relating Thought to Action		
	Some Theoretical Argument About the Relationship		
IV.	POLICY ROLE ORIENTATIONS OF ADMINISTRATORS .		44
	Alternate Approaches to the Study of Administrative Roles		
	Typology of Policy Roles		
	"Administrative Implementer"		
	"Administrative Formulator"		
	"Administrative Mediator"		
	Political Consequences of Various Role Types		
V.	HYPOTHESES TO GUIDE THE RESEARCH		79
	Introduction		
	Hypotheses Concerned with Organizational Characteristics		
	Hypotheses Concerned with Personal Variables		
	Hypotheses Concerned with Sociological Characteristics		

PART II. METHODOLOGY

Chapter VI.	RESEARCH PROCEDURES AND STRATEGIES	110
	Background of the Research	
	Selection of the Field of Study	
	Collection of Data	
	Processing and Analyzing the Data	

PART III. FINDINGS

VII.	EMPIRICAL INADEQUACIES FOUND IN ROLE THEORY	132
	Criticism of Role Set	
	Criticism of Previous Research in Role Theory	
VIII.	ATTITUDES TO POLICY MAKING AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO ORGANIZATIONAL VARIABLES ..	149
	Profile of Attitudinal Sets	
	Profile of Organization Characteristics	
	Comparison of Organization Characteristics with Attitudinal Segments	
IX.	COMPARISON OF PERSONAL AND ATTITUDINAL VARIABLES	210
	Profile of Personal Characteristics	
	Comparison of Personal Characteristics and Attitudinal Segments	
X.	COMPARISON OF SOCIOLOGICAL AND ATTITUDINAL VARIABLES	236
	Profile of Sociological Characteristics	
	Comparison of Sociological Characteristics with Attitudinal Segments	
XI.	SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS	262
	Summary of the Study	
	General Implications	
	Implications of the Findings	

APPENDIX	280
BIBLIOGRAPHY	306

LIST OF TABLES

<u>Table</u>		<u>Page</u>
8.1	Distribution of Responses About Important Job Factors Relating to Policy Types	150
8.2	Distribution of Responses to Preferences About Setting Agency Courses of Action	152
8.3	Rank Ordering of Reasons for Obeying Superior Directives	153
8.4	Distribution of Responses to Rule Deviation Behavior . . .	154
8.5	Distribution of Attitudes to Qualifications for Promotion.	156
8.6	Correlations Between Formulator Type Reasons for Promotion with Other Formulator Type Orientations. .	157
8.7	Summary of Responses to Imaginary Situations.	159
8.8	Distribution of Self-Descriptions.	163
8.9	Perception of the Locus of Responsibility in Specific Decisional Areas	165
8.10	Distribution of Respondents by Position	167
8.11	Comparison of Position Levels with Time at Agency . . .	169
8.12	Time at Agency and in New York City Government . . .	170
8.13	Numbers of Hours Worked	171
8.14	Comparison of Position Levels with Numbers of Hours Worked	171
8.15	Distribution of Responses to Work Involvement Aspects of the Work Situation	172.
8.16	Correlations Between Importance of Job Factors and Length of Time at Agency and City	173
8.17	Distribution of Salary	175
8.18	Distribution of Means of Recruitment into Service	175
8.19	Attitudes to Union Rights	176

<u>Table</u>		<u>Page</u>
8.20	Comparison of Agency Variable with Attitudinal Ranking & Rating Variables	179
8.21	Comparison of Agency Variable with Alternatives for Setting Agency Course of Action	180
8.22	Comparison of Agency Variable with Self Description . . .	181
8.23	Analysis of Responses to Imaginary Situations by Agency	182
8.24	First Choice Preferences in Specific Decisional Areas by Agency	183
8.25	Comparison of Position Levels with Attitudinal Ranking and Rating Variables	189
8.26	Comparison of Position Level with Alternatives for Setting Agency Course of Action	190
8.27	Comparison of Position Level with Self Description	191
8.28	Analysis of Responses to Imaginary Situations by Position Levels	192
8.29	First Choice Preferences in Specific Decisional Areas by Position Levels	193
8.30	Correlations Between Salary and Quantifiable Attitudinal Variables	196
8.31	Correlations Between Time at Agency and Quantifiable Attitudinal Variables	198
8.32	Comparison of Appointed Personnel to All Personnel on Selected Attitudinal Variables	200
8.33	Correlation Between Numbers of Hours Worked and Quantifiable Attitudinal Variables	202
8.34	Correlations Between Selected Work Factors Indicating Work Involvement and Quantifiable Policy Attitude Variables	204
8.35	Correlation Between Attitudes to Union Rights and Quantifiable Policy Attitudinal Variables	207

<u>Table</u>		<u>Page</u>
9.1	Distribution of Respondents by Sex	210
9.2	Distribution of Respondents by Sex and Agency	211
9.3	Distribution of Respondents by Age	212
9.4	Distribution of Respondents by Highest Educational Level Attained	214
9.5	Distribution of Respondents by Licenses and Certifications Held	216
9.6	Correlation Between Sex and Quantifiable Attitudinal Variables	218
9.7	Analysis of Responses to Imaginary Situations by Sex	220
9.8	Comparison of Sex with Self Description	221
9.9	Correlation Between Age and Quantifiable Attitudinal Variables	223
9.10	Correlation Between Education and Quantifiable Attitudinal Variables	225
9.11	Comparison of Education with Self-Description	226
9.12	Analysis of Responses to Imaginary Situations by Education	227
9.13	Comparison of Professional Licenses with Quantifiable Attitudinal Variables	230
9.14	Comparison of Professional Licenses with Self-Identification	232
9.15	Analysis of Responses to Imaginary Situations by Licenses	233
10.1	Distribution of Educational Levels of Respondents by Fathers' Education	237
10.2	Distribution of Places of Rearing of Respondents	239
10.3	Distribution of Organization Memberships of Respondents	240
10.4	Distribution of Respondents by People They Report Knowing Well	240

<u>Table</u>		<u>Page</u>
10.5	Comparison of Social Mobility (Educational Differential) with Rule Deviation	244
10.6	Comparison of Social Mobility (Educational Differential) with Ranking and Rating Variables	245
10.7	Comparison of Social Mobility (Educational Differential) with Agency Action Alternatives	245
10.8	Comparison of Social Mobility (Educational Differential) with Self-Description	247
10.9	Place of Rearing with Quantifiable Variables	249
10.10	Comparison of Place of Rearing with Imaginary Situations	250
10.11	Comparison of Professional Organization Memberships with Quantifiable Variables	253
10.12	Comparison of Professional Organization Memberships with Imaginary Situations	254
10.13	Correlation Between People Known at Agency and Quantifiable Variables	257
10.14	Comparison of People Known at Agency with Imaginary Situation	258
10.15	Comparison of People Known at Agency with Decisional Areas	259

Part I - Introduction and Theory

I

Introduction

1. The Problem

The traditional view of public bureaucracies as the passive instrumentalities for the implementation of policy goals set elsewhere in the political system¹ has been successfully challenged. Most current theory holds that, for good or for evil, bureaucratic structures are necessarily and intrinsically involved in shaping goals as well as in carrying them out.²

¹For the traditional view see: Woodrow Wilson, "Study of Administration," Political Science Quarterly (December, 1941), pp. 481-506 (reprint of the 1887 paper); Frank Goodnow, Politics and Administration (New York: Macmillan, 1900); Luther Gulick and Lyndall Urwick, Papers in the Science of Administration (Institute of Public Administration, 1937); Leonard D. White, Introduction to the Study of Public Administration (4th ed.; New York: Macmillan, 1955).

²Innumerable works propose or assume this position. The seminal work was done by Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1938). Later works include: Paul Appleby, Big Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945); Paul Appleby, Policy and Administration (University of Alabama Press, 1949); William W. Boyer, Bureaucracy on Trial: Policy Making by Government Agencies (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1964); James Burnham, "Some Administrators Unkindly View Congress" in Robert T. Golembiewski, Frank Gibson, Geoffrey Y. Cornog (eds.), Public Administration: Readings in Institutions, Processes and Behavior (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1966), pp. 74-78; Murray Edelman, "Government Organization and Public Policy," Public Administration Review XII (Autumn, 1952), pp. 276-283; Charles E. Jacob, Policy and Bureaucracy (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1966); J. Leiper Freeman, "The Bureaucracy in Pressure Politics," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 319 (September, 1958), pp. 11-19; Norton Long, "Power and Administration," Public Administration Review (Autumn, 1949), pp. 257-264; Fritz Morstein Marx, The Administrative State (New York: Ronald Press, 1948); Wallace Sayre, "Premises of Public Administration," Public Administration Review 17 (Spring, 1958), pp. 102-105; Edwin E. Witte, "Administrative Agencies and Statute Lawmaking," in Claude E. Hawley and Ruth G. Weintraub (eds.), Administrative Questions and Political Answers (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1966), pp. 149-158; Peter Woll, American Bureaucracy (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1963). Most recently, there are the papers and discussion at a conference on public administration

The nature and the extent of this "political" role of administration has not, however, been adequately explored empirically. A careful survey of the literature reveals that there is application of this decision-making, political focus as developed in speculative theory and impressionistic works primarily in case study examinations of individual bureaucratic behavior.³ These case studies, each done by a different observer, from differing perspectives, and with differing levels of sophistication, emphasize uniqueness and particularity, and thus, cannot be fruitfully compared. The comparative studies, on the other hand (and there are many of these) are still largely concerned with efficiency and economy, production, service, and other intra-organization components of bureaucratic functioning, while ignoring the relationship of administration to the other parts of the political system.⁴

held December, 1967, and reported in James C. Charlesworth, ed., "Theory and Practice of Public Administration: Scope, Objectives, and Methods," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (Philadelphia: October, 1968); Frederick C. Mosher, Democracy and the Public Service (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968); Francis E. Rourke, Bureaucratic Politics and Public Policy (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1969).

³See, for instance, the cases in Harold Stein, ed., Public Administration and Policy Development (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1952) and the Inter-University Case Program. Also occasional single studies such as Norman C. Thomas, Rule 9: Politics, Administration and Civil Rights (New York: Random House, 1966).

⁴Most of the work in organization theory is concerned with these intra-organizational variables. Among the work specifically concerned with these variables in public agencies are the following empirical studies: Donald R. Crossey, "Contradictory Directions in Complex Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly IV (1959), pp. 1-19; Milton C. Cummings, M. Kent Jennings and Franklin P. Kilpatrick, "Federal and Non-federal Employees: A Comparative Socio-Occupational Analysis," Public Administration Review XXVII (December, 1967), pp. 393-402; Oscar Grusky, "Role Conflict in Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly III (1959), pp. 452-472; Franklin P. Kilpatrick, Milton C. Cummings and M. Kent Jennings, The Image of the Federal Service (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1964); Arthur W. MacMahon and John D. Millett, Federal Administrators (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939); Dean E. Mann, The Assistant Secretaries (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1965); David T. Stanley, The Higher Civil Service (Washington:

One reason for the lack of comparative studies of the policy-making dimension of administration is undoubtedly the difficulty involved in isolating and measuring variables which reflect discretionary behavior. None of the direct measurements which have so far been devised seem very valid or very useful. To illustrate, a study done by Guetzkow, Forehand and James,⁵ examines the effects of a training program on the decision-making behavior of a group of bureaucrats. However, to test differences, evaluations by immediate superiors were relied on. This method invites criticism because of the subjectivity involved in the observations of hardly disinterested participants. Richard Snyder has articulated the problem:

No economical set of variables has been developed for analyzing decision-making behavior. . . . Pages and pages are available on the substance of decisions and on the formal structure within which decision-making takes place, but very few pages on how to analyze decisions and decision-making.⁶

A more hopeful means for systematically examining decision-making, and the one used herein, may lie in the use of attitudinal and perceptual data. Attitudinal

Brookings Institute, 1964); David T. Stanley, Professional Personnel for the City of New York (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1964); Ralph M. Stogdill, Ellis L. Scott and William E. Jaynes, Leadership and Role Expectations (Columbus: Ohio State University, 1956); James D. Thompson, "Authority and Power in Identical Organizations," American Journal of Sociology LXII (November, 1956), pp. 290-301; W. Lloyd Warner, Paul A. Van Riper, Norman H. Martin and Orvis Collins, The American Federal Executive (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963); Deil S. Wright and Richard L. McAnaw, "The American State Executives: Their Backgrounds and Careers," State Government XXXVIII (Summer, 1965), pp. 146-153.

⁵H. A. Guetzkow, G. A. Forehand and B. J. James, "An Evaluation of Educational Influence on Administrative Judgment," Administrative Science Quarterly 6 (1962), pp. 483-500

⁶Richard C. Snyder, "Decision Making Approach, to the Study of Political Phenomena," in Roland Young, (ed.), Approaches to the Study of Politics (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1958), pp. 3-38, p. 12.

studies, while only indirectly measuring the particular factor sought⁷ nonetheless lend themselves to rigorous analysis and statistical manipulation. There are a number of recent works using this particular approach to examine bureaucratic differences. Although none of them are specifically concerned with decision-making, their techniques and methodology can readily be adapted to the present study. Thus, studies such as Berger's of the degree of bureaucratization and professionalization among Egyptian bureaucrats,⁸ Hopkins' of the ideals and self-images of Peruvian bureaucrats,⁹ Eldersveld and associates' of the extent of democratic perceptions in five agencies in Delhi, India,¹⁰ Peabody's of attitudes to authority in three United States local government agencies,¹¹ Shuart's of the orientations to various values such as efficiency, authority, group membership, government control, etc. among education administrators,¹² Marvick's of the institutional-specialist identification of members of a government research organization,¹³ and Davis' of the career identification and

⁷See Chapter III for discussion of the relationship of attitude to action.

⁸Morroe Berger, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt: A Study of the Higher Civil Service (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

⁹Jack W. Hopkins, The Government Executive of Modern Peru (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1967).

¹⁰Samuel J. Eldersveld, V. Jagannadham and A. P. Barnabas, The Citizen and the Administrator in a Developing Democracy (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman & Co., 1968).

¹¹Robert L. Peabody, Organizational Authority (New York: Atherton, 1964).

¹²James M. Shuart, Some Value Orientations of Academic Department Chairmen: A Study of Comparative Values and Administrative Effectiveness (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1966).

¹³Dwaine Marvick, Career Perspectives in a Bureaucratic Setting (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1954).

role conception of executives in five scientific bureaus of the United States federal government,¹⁴ can be combined with attitudinal studies of decision-making by other government organs such as Eulau and Wahlke's examination of the role orientations of state legislators¹⁵ to form the basis of a promising examination of the decision-making functions of public administrators.

The responses to questions indicating attitudes to various aspects of the decisional process have an intrinsic interest. However, more importantly, these attitudes are related to a theoretical body of knowledge, increasing their breadth of application and extending their significance.

Several theoretical bases support this work. First, the concept of role was adopted as the means for organizing individual attitudes into an integrated framework. In addition to offering what seemed a most effective means for approaching the problem¹⁶ it follows the precedent set by the empiricists mentioned above for handling similar questions.

To adapt role concepts to the decision-making concerns which are central here, a second body of theory was needed, namely, public administration theory. Within the literature on public administration, there are a number of alternate approaches described in connection with the proper relations of government employees to policy-making processes. Three relatively distinct and coherent roles were

¹⁴James Warren Davis, Jr., Executive Roles in Technical Bureaus (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1964).

¹⁵John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan and Leroy C. Ferguson, The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962).

¹⁶See Chapter II for a discussion of role theory.

distilled from this literature--the implementer, the formulator and the mediator roles.¹⁷ The attitudes to each of these by a group of administrators is the empirical foundation for the present explorations. Thus, a bureaucrat who defines his role in classical administrative terms as an instrumentality of the political organs will be distinguished from one who relies primarily on his own principles, conscience, expertise or professional standards for decision-making cues, and both are differentiated from the official whose foremost concern is with aggregating and accommodating conflicting public opinions and demands.

Role attitudes may also, quite logically, be assumed to be associated with variations in organizational, personal and sociological characteristics. Which of these independent variables were examined in relation to the dependent variable of policy role is based mainly on the significance with which each is viewed in prior theoretical and empirical works.

Finally, because it can be argued that a person's attitude to decision-making may not have an impact on a system except insofar as his behavior reflects his orientation, the relationship between action and attitude is another area for theoretical investigation here.¹⁸

What is the significance of policy-making role differences among administrators? Is the extent to which there is restraint or activism in attitudes of any consequence to the political system? An overriding concern in much of current thought is the effect of discretionary activities by the bureaucracy on the viability

¹⁷See Chapter IV for a discussion of public administration theory as related to policy role perceptions.

¹⁸See Chapter III for a discussion of the relationship of attitude to action.

of democracy. It is proposed that the greater the involvement by officials, the less is control by the public and its representatives possible. Thus, Frederick C. Mosher, to this effect, states:

All public organizations are presumed to have been established and to operate for public purposes--i.e. purposes of the people. They are authorized, legitimized, empowered, and usually supported by authorities outside of themselves for broad purposes initially determined outside of themselves. To what extent, then should "insiders," the officers and employees be enabled to modify their purposes, their organizational arrangements, and their means of support?¹⁹

So, too, Karl Dietrich Bracher fears for the future of democracy in the decline of legislative power, arguing that government responsibility to its citizens is lost if the nexus of policy determination lies not with elected officials or people personally chosen and responsible to them, but, with civil servants selected according to some objective standard such as training or skill and not subject to challenge or recall for unpopular policies.²⁰

¹⁹Mosher, *op. cit.*, p. 18. Mosher's work is the first in a series concerned with "Public Administration and Democracy" undertaken by the Maxwell Graduate School of Syracuse University. See, too, the second in this series: Emmette S. Redford, Democracy in the Administrative State (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969).

²⁰Karl Dietrich Bracher, "The Crisis of Modern Parliaments" in Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown (eds.), Comparative Politics (rev. ed., Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1964), pp. 360-378.

2. The Field of Study

The population used for the examination of policy role orientations of public administrators was the entire complement of executive level personnel below the position of commissioner in six line agencies of New York City government. All people holding executive titles at these agencies, from deputy commissioner to assistant division chief and including staff professionals such as chief medical officer, chief counsel, chief architect, etc. were questioned. From a total of 237 such employees, 182 returned valid questionnaires for an almost 77% response level. The six agencies involved are the Departments of Traffic, Highways, Social Service, Sanitation, Correction and the Housing Authority.

Several reasons guided the selection of who to study and where. High-level personnel have a more substantial impact on public policy than those at lower ranks, although all exercise some discretion. Diversity in the age, function and size of the agency was a further criterion. The most challenging area to investigate seemed to be within a city. There are profound problems confronting urban places and a dearth of systematic examinations into the framework within which these problems develop. New York City, as the largest city with a bureaucracy larger than any other city's (or any state for that matter) seemed a most promising place to embark on this type of study.

3. Definitions of Terms Used

Operational definitions basic to the problem examined follow. Other concepts, too, are involved in the research, however, not as fundamentally. The less intrinsic concepts will be defined operationally as they arise in context.

It is well to caution, too, as Etzioni and Lehman do, that "a perfect coincidence between a social concept and its operational definition is unlikely."²¹ Therefore, only some dimensions of complex wholes are often being covered by the definitions used.

a) Administration

Administration and bureaucracy are used here synonymously to describe that structure of government under the authority of a chief executive, organized in a hierarchy of offices. This structure is characterized, albeit somewhat imperfectly by most of the elements comprising the Weberian "ideal type" bureaucracy.²² Salaries are fixed. Recruitment is on the basis of competence. The office is the primary occupation of the holder. There is a formal system of appointments and promotions. Offices are filled through free contractual relationships and each has a specific sphere of competence. Official actions are founded on rules and are

²¹ Amitai Etzioni and Edward W. Lehman, "Some Dangers in 'Valid' Social Measurement," Social Goals and Indicators for American Society, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (Philadelphia: May, 1967), pp. 1-15, P.9.

²² Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans. by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947).

generally recorded in writing.²³

Although these characteristics are not limited to public organizations--bureaucracies can and do exist in the private sector as well--this paper is concerned only with public bureaucracies, with public administration.

As should be obvious by now, the term bureaucracy is used here in a descriptive, non-derogatory sense.²⁴

Although the term "administration" shall be used interchangeably with the term "bureaucracy," in actuality there are distinctions. Administration implies a neutral, value-free application of rules. As has become quite clear in recent years, administrators are very much a part of the goal-setting, political process. For convenience, however, both terms are employed similarly.

b) Policy

At the very beginning of the book "Administrative Behavior" Herbert Simon states that "the task of 'deciding' pervades the entire administrative organization."²⁵ Deciding implies that there are a number of alternatives to action (including

²³Ferrel Heady, "Bureaucratic Theory and Comparative Administration" in Nimrod Raphaeli (ed.), Readings in Comparative Public Administration (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1967), pp. 385-401, p. 391, comments about the large number of definitions of bureaucracy which reformulate Weber's structural characteristics as the proper point of focus.

²⁴Victor Thompson has coined the very useful term "Bureaupathology" to refer to the malfunctions of bureaucracy, as cited by Fred Riggs at conference, October, 1968, Philadelphia, Pa., and reported in Charlesworth, op. cit., p. 73.

²⁵Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision Making Processes in Administrative Organization (New York: Free Press, 1945), p. 1.

non-action)²⁶ available and that one of these alternatives is preferred over others.²⁷

In reality the alternatives may not always be clear and distinguishable in a sequence of related events. The choice made may not be well defined and unequivocal. Decision-making may, in truth, be much closer to Lindblom's "muddling-through" his "strategy of disjointed incrementalism"²⁸ than to the rational choice posited by Simon²⁹ or the comprehensive analytical model of Snyder.³⁰

Whether there are clearly delineated choices or vague comprehensions of needed actions, it is nonetheless apparent that important differences exist in kinds of situations requiring selections from among alternatives. These differences have been analyzed and classified by various scholars. Selznick,³¹ for instance, distinguishes between "routine" decisions which can be made without changing the

²⁶According to William Dill, "Administrative Decision Making" in Sidney Mailick and Edward H. Van Ness (eds.), Concepts and Issues in Administrative Behavior (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1962), p. 33, citing Barnard, "An understanding of when 'not to decide'...is an essential mark of a good manager."

²⁷See Wahlke and Eulau, op. cit., p. 379; Louis C. Gawthrop, Bureaucratic Behavior in the Executive Branch (New York: Free Press, 1969), p. 83, Herbert A. Simon, The Shape of Automation (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 53-54, conceives of a decision as "a conclusion drawn from a set of circumstances." Snyder, op. cit., p. 19, says, "Decision making results in the selection from a socially defined, limited number of problematical, alternative projects (i.e. courses of action) of one project to bring about the particular future state of affairs envisaged by the decision-makers."

²⁸Charles E. Lindblom, "The Science of Muddling Through," Public Administration Review 19 (Spring, 1959), pp. 79-88. See, too, William J. Gore, "Decision-Making Research: Some Prospects and Limitations" in Mailick and Van Ness (eds.), op. cit., pp. 49-65, p. 54.

²⁹Simon, Administrative Behavior, op. cit.

³⁰Snyder, op. cit.

³¹Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administration (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), Chapter 2.

character of the organization and "non-routine" or "critical" decisions which raise questions about the values to which the organization subscribes. Gore³² suggests a threefold classification--completely "routinized" decisions where only insignificant choices are left to be made, "adaptive" decisions which focus on a problem as distinguished from a task but which can be resolved through an accommodation of old ways, and "innovative" decisions which involve dramatic changes disturbing the status-quo.

Herbert Simon in both his article "The Decision-Maker as Innovator"³³ and his more ambitious "The Shape of Automation"³⁴ develops a dichotomy between "programmed" and "non-programmed" decisions. The former involve routine, repetitive activities which can be disposed of by "programs" already in existence. Decisions are non-programmed when they are "novel, unstructured and consequential" and there is "no cut-and-dried" method for handling them.³⁵

Those decisions variously called "non-programmed," "innovative" and "critical" are the present concern. These are the building-blocks of policy. Involved in policy decisions are changes which go to the heart of the basic operations of the organization, its goals or its purposes. The routine, programmed decisions can, in the long run, also affect the basic shape of the organization. However, the impact

³²Gore, op. cit., p. 55.

³³Herbert A. Simon, "The Decision Maker As Innovator" in Mailick and Van Ness (eds.), op. cit., pp. 66-69.

³⁴Simon, Shape of Automation, op. cit.

³⁵Ibid., p. 58. Also, Simon, "DecisionMaker," op. cit., pp. 66-67. Similar classification schemes have been developed by Dill, op. cit., p. 37, ff., and others.

of each individual choice is minimal, by definition. It has but slight significance when examined separately.

One of the difficulties with all the typologies devised is that none, to my knowledge, has been satisfactorily applied experimentally. Each of the types of decisions could be arranged along a continuum with only those at the extremes easily categorized and the middle items arbitrarily divided. I have not tried to remedy this empirical lack. Rather, I have taken only those decisions from the easily distinguishable upper-reaches of the "non-programmed" end of the continuum as those with policy-making significance and have relied on these for this analysis.

c) Politics

Politics has two meanings in common parlance with no adequate substitutes for either available. Consequently both usages are necessary with, hopefully, the specific meaning of the term each time it is used becoming clear from the context.

Politics is sometimes used herein in its structural sense to refer to those bodies especially established or evolved for encouraging choice between conflicting values. These are the traditionally designated political bodies such as political parties, legislatures, elected officials, etc. In this sense, administration is used as the contrasting form of organization to political organs.

Politics can also be defined functionally. As Easton's widely-accepted definition holds: politics is the authoritative allocation of values in a society. The relationship between this functional definition of politics and decision-making is clear. Decision-making is the heart of politics performed by all government organs including administrative agencies. Non-governmental agencies may make decisions which are politically relevant, too, but these decisions are not authoritative and

binding on the political community in the same manner and to the same extent, and so, are not encompassed by the definition. Paul Appleby, for one, stresses the differences between public and business administrations in both his "Big Democracy" and "Policy and Administration." Government activity is unique, he holds, in its wider scope and impact, in that it is accountable to many more clienteles and is more representative than any other type organization and also because the purposes served involve more concern with public interest considerations than do private groups.³⁶

³⁶Appleby, Big Democracy, op. cit., and Policy and Administration, op. cit. See, too, Snyder, op. cit., p. 16, and Roy C. Macridis, The Study of Comparative Government (New York: Random House, 1955), p. 23.

4. Organization of the Study

The preceding paragraphs have briefly described the basic problem and the approach to examining it that will be taken. The chapters that follow will explore in greater detail some of the theories relied on for this project, the specific means used to test these concepts (part II), and the results of the tests and their relation to the theory (part III). Specifically, Chapter II will discuss role theory and its relevance for this study, Chapter III reviews work done previously which synthesizes attitudes and actions, Chapter IV presents the policy-role typology developed for this analysis and that part of public administration theory upon which I relied for its development, and Chapter V hypothesizes about the relationships between attitudes to policy-making and other variables -- organizational, personal and sociological.

Section II consists of Chapter VI which sets forth the techniques for the data collection and analysis and how these techniques are being applied.

The results of the field work are presented in Chapters VII, VIII, IX and X of part III. Chapter VII analyzes the viability of role theory and the policy-role types for this particular population, and the following chapters relate attitudinal differences in the population to organizational, personal and sociological variables, respectively.

Chapter XI is the Conclusion and Summary which also includes some speculations about the implications of the work. The Questionnaire and other standard communications used for the field work, are contained in the Appendix.

II

Role Theory as a Model

1. Analytical Value of Role Theory

Role theory as a means for examining attitudes has many research possibilities. However, as will also become apparent, there are substantial limitations in the application of the theory to a specific body of data which inhibit its operational utility. The "gap between theory and data" which Heinz Eulau proposed as "never fully closed,"¹ remained too wide for use in a rigorous analysis. This research confirms Eulau's further observation that "the data, no matter how carefully chosen to accommodate one's theoretical notions, have a way of being stubborn and resistant to what one may wish to do with them along theoretical lines."² In this chapter, the "theoretical notions" that were relied on will be set forth and Chapter VII will discuss the problems involved in applying the theory to the field of study.

All studies must have a model to provide it with some basis for selecting and organizing a specific aspect for analysis from the complexity of the totality. When the model is not explicitly referred to, this does not mean it does not exist. Rather, it suggests that the model may be vague, ill-defined, contradictory or worse, subconsciously employed. Conscious, explicit and consistent use of a model is important, however, for the potential value of a study to be realized. The process of selection of specific segments from an incoherent mass of reality necessarily involves some distortion, whether or not this

¹ Heinz Eulau, "The Behavioral Movement in Political Science: A Personal Document," Social Research 35 (Spring, 1968), pp. 1-29, p. 19.

² Ibid.

selection is made knowingly.³ The advantages of a conscious selection are that the biases inherent in a particular model can be understood and the selection made to minimize the amount of distortion incurred between the reality and the analysis of it.

Role theory was consciously chosen over myriad other possible models⁴ with the belief and hope it would lead to the most incisive kind of investigations and most accurate perceptions about administrative decision-making.

The concept of role has been used extensively in all the behavioral sciences.⁵ Each field subtly distinguishes its use of the concept with each discipline, naturally, emphasizing the aspect of the concept most significant to its own work. Common to all, however, and to the broad usage adopted for this study, is that role involves (1) shared expectations (2) by a number of people (3) about the behavior of

³Nelson W. Polsky, Community Power and Political Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), p. 95, argues that "without some sort of arbitrary simplifications research is impossible. A suitable criterion by which the adequacy of a test can be judged is whether or not the simplifications introduced by the research design seem likely to prejudice the outcome of the research." See, too, Nimrod Raphaeli, Readings in Comparative Administration (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, Inc., 1967), Intro. p. 7; Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964).

⁴Other possible research strategies might have been game theory, communications model, group theory, power, elite analysis, analysis of the decisional unit, etc.

⁵For instance, in anthropology by Ralph Linton, The Cultural Background of Personality (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1945); in sociology by Parsons, op. cit.; in psychology by Stanfeld Sargent, "Concepts of Role and Ego in Contemporary Psychology" in John H. Rohrer and Muzafer Sherif (eds.), Social Psychology at the Crossroads (New York: Harper & Bros., 1951); in political science by Wahlke, et al., op. cit.

individuals (4) occupying particular positions in an organizational system.⁶

A basic unit of an organization is role. Men in organizations (and administrative agencies are highly sophisticated examples of organizations) are neither completely individual actors behaving according to idiosyncratic inclinations, nor conversely fully organization uniformities--each member acting exactly like each other member. Role can be used as an intermediate concept between these extremes. It provides a means for differentiating between parts of the whole, while at the same time encouraging examination of similarities and uniformities that may exist. As Parsons and Shils have said:

The individual actor as a concrete system of action is not usually the most important unit of a social system. For most purposes the conceptual unit of the social system is the role. The role is a sector or the individual actor's total system of action. It is the point of contact between the system of action of the individual actor and the social system.⁷ (emphasis theirs)

The above holds true as well for a sub-system within the larger system.

⁶Definition adapted from Wahlke, et al., op. cit., pp. 7-17; Neal Gross, Ward S. Mason and Alexander W. McEachern, Explorations in Role Analysis (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958), Chapters 1-5; and Daniel Katz and Robert Kahn, The Social Psychology of Organizations (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966), p. 174. See, also, for definitions: Robert A. Dahl, Modern Political Analysis (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), that "Role" is shared expectation by a number of people about how to behave in a particular situation and by Alvin W. Gouldner, "Cosmopolitans and Locals: Toward an Analysis of Latent Social Roles - I," Administrative Science Quarterly 2 (December, 1957), pp. 281-306, p. 282, that role is "a set of expectations oriented toward people who occupy a certain position in a social system or group."

⁷Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils, (eds.), Toward a General Theory of Action (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 190. This view is the one widely held by sociologists. Psychologists, on the other hand, stress the individual as the most important unit of a system.

Parsons in "The Social System" again repeats his belief that role as the "patterned interactive relationship" of an actor "with one or more partners in the complementary role" may be "for many purposes the most significant unit of the social system."⁸

Wahlke and Eulau find role equally helpful as an intermediary concept in their analysis of state legislatures. They write:

The chief utility of the role-theory model of the legislative actor is that, unlike other models, it pinpoints those aspects of legislators' behavior which make the legislature an institution. In the light of most other models, the actions of any given individual legislator appears highly individualistic, to be explained by factors operating uniquely and distinctively for each individual member....(But) the behavior of legislators is clearly "institutional behavior" not merely aggregated or symbiotic behavior of individuals.⁹

From this discussion it should be apparent that there is a normative component to the definition and idea of role. The normative element--what men should do or are expected to do under given circumstances--is an integrative force relating the individual to the system. Expectations by oneself and others pattern behavior and eliminate randomness. Without such uniformities organizations could not exist. Wahlke and Eulau as a matter of fact define institutions (sub-systems) in terms of regularities in behavior and speak of the identity between role and these regularities.¹⁰

⁸Parsons, op. cit., p. 25. See, also, pp. 38-39. To same effect is Katz and Kahn, op. cit., p. 171.

⁹Wahlke, et al., op. cit., pp. 9-10.

¹⁰Ibid. See, also, George C. Homans, The Human Group (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950), p. 123, and Gross, et al., op. cit., p. 17, and Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 168.

Role theory focuses on the inter-relatedness of various components within a system. People are linked to each other in a system through the assumption of inter-acting and complementary roles appropriate to their positions. Shared expectations by an actor and others provide boundaries and set premises within which mutual relationships are established. The others with whom the individual inter-acts may be members of the same organization or people outside it. By stressing role over formal structure, the effect of relevant non-members (i.e. interest groups, clienteles, etc.) on the organization can be assessed and the extent to which compatibility exists between groups with differing relationships to the organization can be examined.

Further, role theory enables the researcher to study the relationship between an actor and his organizational structure. According to Eckstein and Apter,¹¹ role theory can be used to bridge the gap between behavioral and structural approaches because role is a functionally defined position within a structure, which, however, is played by an individual. The structure can be viewed as a plurality of interlocking sets of roles. Each role played presupposes that some counter-role will inter-act with it with some degree of regularity so as to formalize and institutionalize a structure.¹²

Role can be used as a means of studying intra-organizational power relations, too. In a study of the power attached to individual positions within a number of

¹¹Harry Eckstein and David E. Apter, Comparative Politics (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963).

¹²See Parsons, op. cit., p. 39, and Betty H. Zisk, Heinz Eulau, and Kenneth Prewitt, "City Councilmen and the Group Struggle: A Typology of Role Orientations," Journal of Politics (August, 1965), pp. 618-646, p. 620.

local public health departments, Dennis Palumbo¹³ measured the extent to which role norms are specific as an indicant of power. Role specificity is determined in terms of the structural characteristics--centralization, formalization, specialization and span of control--all of which are more amenable to measurement than the concept of power itself. And the extent to which role specificity in these structural terms exists affects the range of personal choice (i.e. power) available to a position occupant.

Another dimension of the inter-relatedness between elements that role theory pinpoints is that between the role and the individual. A criticism of many administrative studies is that "too often the personalities are overlooked as important data in the analysis of bureaucracy, although the individuals on all administrative levels who make the mechanism function are quite obviously an integral part of such study."¹⁴ Role overcomes this. It implies that it is the individual who adopts some role in conformity with his place in a system. If there were no differences between all occupants of the same position, then role and position would be identical. Role, however, is quite different primarily because the individual brings his own perceptions and individuality to an office so that the resultant role is a composite of both the objective requirements of the position and the occupant's interpretation of these requirements. Parsons stresses this point that uniform behavior cannot be the same for all those playing the same role for psychological reasons:

¹³Dennis J. Palumbo, "Power and Role Specificity in Organization Theory," Public Administration Review 29 (May, 1969), pp. 237-248,

¹⁴Leonard Reisman, "A Study of Role Conceptions in Bureaucracy," Social Forces 27 (1949), pp. 305-310, p. 310.

Conformity with role-expectations will always to a greater or lesser degree involve motivational elements of the character referred to in psychological discussions as composing the "ego-ideal" or the superego, elements of "self-respect" adequacy or "security" in the psychological sense.¹⁵

Herbert Simon holds that role individuality arises because each sees his role according to his own cognitive structure.¹⁶ Parsons attributes this lack of uniformity partially, at least, to the fact that any one role is but one of several the individual assumes.¹⁷

2. Heuristic Value of Role Theory

If, as has been suggested, role is the most significant unit of a system, how can it be used to examine practical problems in analysis? Here, too, the theory seems flexible and adaptive.

Role involves a large number of different factors, any one or few of which can be isolated for intensive attention. Thus, both the occupant of a role (the focal person in terms of the Katz and Kahn analysis)¹⁸ and relevant others (role senders in Katz and Kahn terms) expect certain behaviors from incumbents or certain positions. An analysis can center on the role concepts of either or both. The extent to which there is shared or divergent expectations of behavior between focal people and others, or within each group, can be investigated. Differences in attitude to

¹⁵Parsons, op. cit., p. 40.

¹⁶Simon, Administrative Behavior, op. cit.

¹⁷Parsons, op. cit., p. 44.

¹⁸Katz and Kahn, op. cit., pp. 177-191, have an excellent discussion of the factors relating to organization roles.

role behaviors by others holding differentiated relationships to the focal person might also be studied fruitfully.

This paper confines its attention to the attitudes by role occupants of their own roles. Of course, because inter-relatedness is basic to role concepts, the influence of role senders necessarily affects the study. But, the emphasis is here on role occupants.

Role expectations (by either occupants or senders) are not spontaneous, idiosyncratic expressions of individuality. Rather, they arise from properties of the organization, from aspects of the salient environment--the ecology of the organization and the individual, and from the attributes of individuals making up the organization and playing focal roles therein. In heuristic terms, any of these produce a wealth of data. Organization variables that merit attention might include the age of the organization, its function, its structure. Some variables relating the individual to the organization are position, length of time in the organization, salary, perception of job satisfaction. Personal attributes that could be related to role expectations include age, sex, ethnicity, education, professional status and identification, social status and identification, social mobility, experience, and myriad others. Cognition, too, can have as profound an impact. The perception of the expectation about role as sent by other inter-actors within a system can be guided by the ability of the focal person to correctly interpret the expectation, the content of the expectation and the nature of the contacts--current and previous--with the role sender.¹⁹

¹⁹Ibid. Also Wahlke, et al., op. cit., p. 16.

Another promising research strategy is an analysis of the extent to which there is consensus or conflict about a role either by role incumbents or others, as noted above. In order for a system to exist, there must be some agreement about appropriate behavior for focal people by all those inter-acting in a role relationship. The extent of this agreement can be a significant dimension in understanding organizational problems.²⁰

It is also possible, as Andrew Gunder Frank²¹ has done, to use the extent to which a role is defined as an analytical construct. Does specificity in role requirements have consequences for other dimensions of an organization?

In the above discussion, the role itself is conceived of as a rather set function of the individual. It is viewed holistically--as identifiable, indivisible, well defined--as a unit against which other properties of the individual and the organization can be compared. This assumption, however, fails to account for the complex and multi-dimensional character of the role. (This part of the theory which analyzes role as a composite of segmented attitudes presented substantial difficulties empirically.)²² The concept of "role set" as an array of role segments which the occupants of a position perform in their inter-actions with relevant others was first proposed by Robert Merton.²³ Role set proposes that each role is

²⁰See Wahlke, et al., op. cit., p. 15, Gross, et al., op. cit., pp. 5, 43

²¹Andrew Gunder Frank, "Administrative Role Definition and Social Change," Human Organization 22 (Winter, 1963-1964), pp. 238-242.

²²These difficulties will be discussed at great length in Chapter VII.

²³Social Theory and Social Structure (New York: Free Press, 1957), p. 36.

sub-divided into sectors with each sector comprising a norm appropriate to a context. An individual's role conception is made up of all the separate role components which he holds or is capable of holding.²⁴ Wahlke and Eulau discuss the concept with reference to legislators:

We should not think of any given role orientation as a fixed attitudinal attribute of each person, which invariably leads him to act and react the same way in every situation. It is more likely that most legislators pattern their behavior in the light of one role orientation in one situation, but according to another under other circumstances. We can, therefore, conceive of a "role set" of each legislator as all those orientations in any given component of his role which he is capable of entertaining.²⁵

This aspect of the role model should make it particularly valuable for examining specific and complex relationships--the kind most often encountered in reality. Its operational usefulness for this study was, unfortunately, quite limited.

3. Previous Research Using Role Theory

The theoretical arguments for adopting role as the framework for this research are compelling. Supporting the decision, too, is the extensive reliance by other researchers on this model.

In comparative administration, role as an organizing concept has been most recently used by Haire, et al.,²⁶ for a cross-policy survey of leadership, by Berger²⁷

²⁴Gross, et al., op. cit., pp. 50-56.

²⁵Wahlke, et al., op. cit., p. 16.

²⁶Mason Haire, Edwin E. Ghiselli and Lyman W. Porter, Managerial Thinking (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966).

²⁷Morroe Berger, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt, op. cit., and Morroe Berger, "Bureaucracy East and West," Administrative Science Quarterly (March, 1957), pp. 518-529.

in his works on Egyptian bureaucracy, by Ahmad Muneer²⁸ in a study of Pakistani officials, by Jack Hopkins²⁹ in Peru, by Richard Harris³⁰ in Ghana and Nigeria, and by Eldersveld, et al.,³¹ in Delhi State, India.

Similar uses were made in studies of public administrators in the United States by Dwaine Marvick³² and James Davis³³ at the federal level, by Leonard Reisman³⁴ at the state level, by Gross, Mason and McEachern,³⁵ Seger,³⁶ Hartley³⁷ and by Gouldner³⁸ in his seminal works on cosmopolitan and local orientations of educational administrators, and by Grusky³⁹ of prison officials.

²⁸Ahmad Muneer, The Civil Servant in Pakistan (Karachi, India: Oxford University Press, 1964).

²⁹Hopkins, op. cit.

³⁰Richard L. Harris, "The Effects of Political Change on the Role Set of the Senior Bureaucrats in Ghana and Nigeria," Administrative Science Quarterly 13 (December, 1968), pp. 386-401.

³¹Eldersveld, et al., op. cit.

³²Marvick, op. cit.

³³Davis, op. cit.

³⁴Reisman, op. cit.

³⁵Gross, et. al., op. cit.

³⁶John Edward Seger, Variations in Value Orientations and Differences in Role Expectations--A Relationship in an Educational Context (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Oregon, 1965).

³⁷Harry Joseph Hartley, Bureaucracy and Local-Cosmopolitan Orientation Examined with Selected Criterion Variables (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1964).

³⁸Gouldner, op. cit., and part II in Administrative Science Quarterly 2 (March, 1958), pp. 444-480.

³⁹Grusky, op. cit.

The kinds of roles played in various other contexts have also been explored. Mark Abrahamson,⁴⁰ George Miller⁴¹ and Kahn and his associates⁴² all looked at industrial organizations, Stogdill⁴³ studies a military research center, Wilensky⁴⁴ labor unions, Hall⁴⁵ professional organizations, Porter⁴⁶ both government and private agencies and Corwin⁴⁷ nursing groups.

⁴⁰Mark Abrahamson, "The Integration of Industrial Scientists," Administrative Science Quarterly 9 (1964).

⁴¹George Alfred Miller, Professionals in Bureaucracy: Role Orientations and Alienation Among Industrial Scientists and Engineers (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1966).

⁴²Robert L. Kahn, Donald M. Wolfe, Robert P. Quinn, J. Diedrick Smoek and Robert A. Rosenthal, Organization Stress: Studies in Role Conflict and Ambiguity (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964).

⁴³Stogdill, et al., op. cit.

⁴⁴Harold L. Wilensky, Intellectuals in Labor Unions: Organizational Pressures on Professional Roles (New York: Free Press, 1956).

⁴⁵Richard H. Hall, "Some Organizational Considerations in the Professional Organizational Relationship," Administrative Science Quarterly 12 (December, 1967), pp. 461-478.

⁴⁶Lyman W. Porter and Edward E. Lawler, Managerial Attitudes and Performance (Homewood, Illinois: Irwin-Dorsey Press, 1968).

⁴⁷Ronald G. Corwin, "The Professional Employee: A Study of Conflict in Nursing Roles" American Journal of Sociology 66 (1961), pp. 604-615.

In addition to Wahlke and Eulau, there are other studies of legislative roles by Eulau and Sprague,⁴⁸ by Zisk, Eulau and Prewitt⁴⁹ and by Lewis Dexter⁵⁰ of military policy making roles by congressmen.

There is, thus, an extensive amount of research depending on role theory to examine subtle and elusive dimensions of individual and group characteristics. It may well be that more empirical work on behavior and attitudes employs this model than any other. This noticeable preference for one methodology, converging with the theoretical reasons supporting role as an analytical tool, directed its adoption. It will be shown later, however, that, too often, role is used casually and that a more ambitious attempt to relate field work to this conceptual framework meets with serious handicaps.

⁴⁸Heinz Eulau and John D. Sprague, Lawyers in Politics: A Study of Professional Convergence (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964).

⁴⁹Zisk, et al., op. cit.

⁵⁰Lewis Anthony Dexter, "Congressmen and the Making of Military Policy" in Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), New Perspectives on the House of Representatives (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1963).

III

The Relationship Between Attitude and Action

1. Definitions and Premises

Role theory can be broken down further into role behaviors (actions, performance) and role perceptions (orientations, attitudes, conceptions). The theory assumes that overt actions conform to role concepts. In this chapter, the validity of the assumption that attitude is translated into behavior will be explored.

Role performance can be defined, as the psychologist Daniel J. Levinson does, as "the characteristic ways in which the individual acts as the occupant of a social position."¹ He goes on to say that it is the overt level of a role concept.

Behaviors or performances differ in their levels of consequence to the system. The extent to which certain actions are uniformly adhered to varies considerably too--some are widely accepted and practiced by occupants of a role while others may be more individualistic and peculiar to some role incumbents only. The behaviors that are of central concern here (albeit only inferentially) are those shared by substantial proportions of the administrative population (but not all administrators) and those having significance.² Specifically, the interest is in the performance of bureaucrats in their policy-making role and the impact of this performance on the environment.

The best approach, of course, would be to study bureaucratic role

¹Daniel J. Levinson, "Role, Personality and Social Structure in the Organization Setting," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 58 (1959), p. 176.

²Some incidental behaviors such as numbers of hours worked per week were studied. These, however, were not the major variables of the research.

performances directly. In real life, however, the examination of any but the most trivial behaviors in some systematic fashion presents enormous difficulties.

Laboratory experiments can deal with actions rigorously. But, outside the laboratory, the complexity of the context in which behaviors occur makes isolation and selection rather arbitrary. Classification and interpretation are likewise dependent on the perceptions of the researcher. If more than one researcher is involved, the problem of co-ordination between different observations arises. Then, when attention is focused on behaviors usually performed unobserved, the subject's self-consciousness can distort the picture. Self-descriptions, too, may be no less distorted than descriptions by others. Here, too, self-consciousness may be a factor as is also the desire to conform to one's idealized version of a performance.³

The difficulty involved in carrying out methodologically careful studies of behavior has been noted by others. Levinson comments: "the formulation of adequate variables for the analysis of role performance is in fact a major theoretical problem and one of the great stumbling blocks in empirical research."⁴ Homans, to the same effect in his "The Human Group" has pointed out the difficulties involved in observing overt actions in non-laboratory situations.⁵ Records, when and where they exist, seldom provide information about anything but incidental activities-- attendance at meetings, for instance, or hours worked. Observations, as has been noted, are unamenable to objective analysis and, in addition, are too costly to be

³George C. Homans, The Human Group (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950), pp. 24-47, discusses some of the difficulties involved in observing overt behavior.

⁴Levinson, op. cit., p. 176.

⁵Homans, op. cit.

used by individual researchers.

A more realistic research strategy which avoids the excessive reliance on impression and insight involved in direct behavioral observations or reports is the examination of role perceptions. However, if role attitudes are determined and analyzed, it becomes very important to discover the extent to which attitude is predictive of behavior. For, if an individual's attitude to an event or a concept has no effect on his actions, then it would have no impact on the system and the determination of the nature of such attitude would be an idle exercise in political terms.⁶

Role attitude (perception) in the present context has an existence only on an ideational level. It means the individual's predisposition to evaluate some dimension of a concept in some discriminable manner.⁷ Attitudes include an affective component of favorable-unfavorable perceptions of an object plus a cognitive element which characterizes the object of the attitude and relates it to other objects.⁸ Role perception, both in its cognitive and affective dimensions, is obviously normative. Which parts of reality are selected and retained by an individual is

⁶This dimension might have relevance to psychologists with their emphasis on the individual.

⁷Definition adapted from Daniel Katz, "The Functional Approach to the Study of Attitudes" in Martin Fishbein (ed.), Readings in Attitude Theory and Measurement (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967), pp. 457-468, p. 459; Charles E. Osgood, G. J. Suci and Percy H. Tannenbaum, The Measurement of Meaning (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1957) cited by Lynn R. Anderson and Martin Fishbein, op. cit.; and Harry S. Upshaw, "Attitude Measurement" in Hubert M. and Ann B. Blalock (eds.), Methodology in Social Research (New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1968), p. 60.

⁸Katz, op. cit., p. 459.

dependent on his scale of priorities. How these parts are organized and appreciated is dependent on his value system.

There are great heuristic possibilities in the study of both dimensions of attitude. The individual's preferences can be rated on evaluative scales--good-bad, important-unimportant, satisfactory-unsatisfactory, practical-impractical, reasonable-unreasonable.⁹ The cognitive structure of an attitude can be gauged by finding the amount and kind of information about an issue that an individual has.

An attitude is an attribute of an individual as much as is his height or weight, age, education, or any number of variables. Admittedly, it is more complex and multi-faceted than other objective characteristics of a person, and the means used for measurement are more open to question. There are profound difficulties involved in devising satisfactory instruments for ascertaining attitudes correctly and assuring that the attitude being studied is indeed relevant to the behavior we are interested in. The instruments used invariably rely on the verbalized perceptions of the subject gathered through interview or questionnaire procedures, although the concept of attitude does include non-verbal as well as verbal levels.

A role orientation is one part of the larger role attitude. Role orientation involves an individual's expectations about his own performance in his place or position.

2. Empirical Research Relating Thought to Action

Psychologists and sociologists have been concerned with the association

⁹Thurstone scales and Likert scales, for instance, are appropriate for this purpose.

between attitude and action for some time. Their studies on the problem have found varying extents of relationships with most finding at least some minimal link between the two.

Probably the best known such work is Stouffer's studies of the American soldier.¹⁰ Stouffer compares the attitudes of soldiers to combat before they went into battle during World War II with subsequent behavior as exhibited by non-battle casualty rates after the invasion of Normandy. He uses this index of men who become ineffective for reasons other than wounds or injuries during battle as the best available guide to efficiency. Although all the soldiers engaged in fighting, those companies with men who had more unfavorable attitudes to combat tended to have higher non-battle casualty rates. In another part of the study, Stouffer compares subsequent promotion rates to attitudes reflecting adjustment to the army. He discovers that those who hold conformist attitudes tend to receive promotions more than those who do not.

Stogdill, Scott and Jaynes¹¹ were interested in the nature and extent of discrepancies between reported behavior and expected behavior in large organizations. They gathered information from the focal person and relevant others about time allocations, frequency of participation and degrees of responsibility and authority. After cross-correlating all the data, they found high correlations between self-descriptions and self-expectations.

¹⁰Samuel A. Stouffer, Social Research to Test Ideas (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), Chapter 10.

¹¹Stogdill, Scott and Jaynes, op. cit.

An early (1900) experiment by a psychologist¹² found that the production of a group of workers was strongly related to their attitudes about production. Clerks at the United States Census Bureau were trained to operate a new machine with the understanding that 550 cards per day would be their expected output. Those operators who tried to exceed this limit showed great emotional stress--so much so that the setting of minimum production standards was abolished. A later group of clerks similarly trained were therefore given no instructions about expected outputs. After three days the second group reached the speed the first had achieved after seven weeks and eventually started producing three times the number of cards without ill effects.

The Coleman findings¹³ in the field of education are very much in point, too. The factors most closely related to academic performance, according to it, included attitudinal characteristics (as well as socio-economic condition).

Some interesting work has been done in the field of medicine dealing with the effects of belief (attitude) on the efficacy of drugs. Gregory Pincus¹⁴ experimented with the use of oral contraceptives on three groups of women. Two groups were given the oral contraceptive pill and one a placebo. The group given the placebo and one group taking the actual pill were told to expect side effects of

¹²J. Jastrow, Fact and Fable in Psychology (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1900).

¹³James S. Coleman, Equality of Educational Opportunity, U. S. National Center for Educational Statistics, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of Education (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1966).

¹⁴Gregory Pincus, "Control of Conception by Hormonal Steroids," Science 153 (1966), pp. 493-500, cited by Robert Rosenthal and Lenore Jacobson, Pygmalion in the Classroom (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1968).

nausea and malaise. One group given the real pill had no such warning. Reactions to the real pill occurred in about 6% of the cases with women who had had no expectations of ill effects. In both other groups, the one taking the placebo as well as the one using the actual pill, side effects were about three times as frequent.¹⁵

In law, too, it was found that witnesses who had perceptions of themselves as good observers tended to be more correct and thorough than those who rated themselves poorly.¹⁶

Self-fulfilling prophecies are a form of attitudinal translation into action. In these instances we find that beliefs or expectancies about an outcome can lead to behavior sufficient to cause an event. An empirical study conducted recently was concerned with the self-fulfilling prophecies of teachers giving rise to commensurate performances by the children they taught. Harvard psychologist, Robert Rosenthal¹⁷ reports that about 20% of the children in a San Francisco elementary school were selected at random and the teachers of these children told that the youngsters had exceptional potential for intellectual gain. Four months later and again eight months later, all the children in the school were given the same intelligence tests they had been given at the start of the experiment, and the results

¹⁵See also other medical studies reported by Rosenthal and Jacobsen, *op. cit.*, specifically those done by Gunne in 1959, by Greenblatt in 1964, by Longanger, Prout and White in 1961, and by Orne in 1959.

¹⁶Morton Deutsch and Leonard Solomon, "Reactions to Evaluations by Others as Influenced by Self-evaluations," *Sociometry* 22 (1959).

¹⁷Rosenthal and Jacobsen, *op. cit.*, see, too, reports of the same study by Lane K. Conn, Carl N. Edwards, Robert Rosenthal and Douglas Crowne, "Perceptions of Emotions and Responses to Teacher's Expectancies by Elementary School Children," *Psychology Reports* 22 (1968), pp. 27-34; and Robert Rosenthal and Lenore Jacobsen, "Teachers' Expectancies: Determinants of Pupils' I. Q. Gains," *Psychology Reports* 19 (1966), pp. 115-118.

analyzed by sex, grade, minority group status and ability. Rosenthal found significantly larger gains in scores for the randomly selected "spurters" although the extent of these gains varied according to grade, race and sex. For instance, the early grades were more affected than later grades; girls responded slightly more than boys did to the greater expectancy. These findings have aroused heated controversy and the researchers have been criticized for exaggerating the importance of the results by emphasizing the statistical significance rather than the substantive gains!¹⁸ Nevertheless the determination that there were gains made by the "exceptional" children greater than the others (and in the cases of first and second grade children, these gains were substantial)¹⁹ indicates that the attitudes held by a person so affects his own behavior as to give rise to changed behavior in another.

A similar experiment in an industrial setting is also described by Rosenthal.²⁰ Several foremen were told that a group of applicants had scored variably on intelligence and dexterity tests with actual scores unrelated to what the foremen were told. Some time later when production rates were examined, it was found that those workers who the foremen believed had high test scores showed superior performance. The actual test scores of these workers showed no relationship to the objective

¹⁸For instance, the entire issue of The Urban Review 3 (September, 1968), is on the institutionalization of expectancy. The Center for Urban Education devotes this special issue to a discussion of Rosenthal's research.

¹⁹About 21% of the children in the experimental group increased I.Q. scores by 30 points while about 5% of the control group children had that large a gain. Almost half the "spurters" gained at least 20 I.Q. points with about 19% of the control children showing a similar gain. Nearly 80% of the experimental group had a gain of at least 10 points, but only half the control group showed a corresponding gain.

²⁰A Bavelas communication cited by Rosenthal and Jacobsen, op. cit., p. 6.

production record.²¹

On the other hand, there are several research projects which have uncovered little or no relationship between attitude and action. Ulf Himmelstrand²² found low correlations between attitude and behavior but noted that different kinds of behaviors are more related to attitude than are others. He also called for additional work and refinements in techniques and selection of problems which could improve the relationship.

Thurstone, in 1929²³ and Murphy and Newcomb in 1937²⁴ also report dishearteningly low associations of verbal attitude to behavior. Hopefully, however, they would find more precise measurements have been developed for gauging attitude in the intervening years. DeFleur and Westie²⁵ who ran a laboratory experiment and found a similar lack of correlation suggest that before the two can be related there is a need to analyze action opportunities and the norms and values held by the subjects' reference groups, peers and significant others.

²¹Work with animals cited by Rosenthal and Jacobsen found that worms, rats, etc. respond favorably to researchers expectations of superior performance.

²²Ulf Himmelstrand, "Verbal Attitudes and Behavior," Public Opinion Quarterly 24 (1960), pp. 224-250.

²³L. L. Thurstone and E. J. Chave, The Measurement of Attitude (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929).

²⁴L. B. Murphy and T. H. Newcomb, Experimental Social Psychology (New York: Harper, 1937), Chapter XII.

²⁵Melvin L. DeFleur and Frank R. Westie, "Verbal Attitudes and Overt Acts: An Experiment on the Salience of Attitudes," American Sociological Review 23 (1958), pp. 667-673.

Sune Carlson²⁶ in one of the first studies of what executives actually do asked some Swedish bureaucrats for an account of how they spent their time and for a separate log of their activities. Carlson found little relationship between the impressions of how time was spent and the log of actual activities. It can be argued, however, that impressions of how time is spent is a report at second hand on behavior and is subject to the kind of distortion about reported behavior previously discussed. An attitudinal study, on the other hand, should elicit the actual attitudes held by the subject--his perception of the object rather than a report of that perception. A valid instrument for the measurement of an attitude should determine the nature of that attitude and not what the respondent thinks his attitude is or should be. Further, Dennis Palumbo reports a study, comparable to Carlson's in which he found a very high association between perceptions and records of how time was spent.²⁷

3. Some Theoretical Argument About the Relationship

A basic consideration that becomes apparent from the foregoing discussion is that often the problem is not one of relating behavior to attitude but of accurately assessing the attitude. In those instances where behavior seems to deviate from an articulated attitude, we might ask, as Wahlke and Eulau do "whether that difference is attributable to divergence of role concept from role behavior or to inaccurate

²⁶Sune Carlson, Executive Behavior (Stockholm: Stromberg Aktienolag, 1951).

²⁷Dennis Palumbo, Research on Local Public Health Agencies, reported to writer personally.

representation of the role concept."²⁸ Our methodology, perhaps, is not sufficiently refined as yet for us to identify with any certainty the reasons for disparities that emerge.

The previous research does support the theory that, in general, attitudes predispose one to certain actions. Each person, however, holds many attitudes, some inconsistent, even contradictory with others. Osgood and Tannenbaum discuss attitude congruity:

Each individual has potential attitudes toward an infinity of objects. It is possible to have varying attitudes toward diverse concepts without any felt incongruity or any pressure toward attitude change, as long as no association among these objects of judgment is made. As anthropologists well know, members of a culture may entertain logically incompatible attitudes toward objects in their culture (e.g. ancestor worship and fear of the dead); without any stress as long as the incompatibles are not brought into association. The issue of congruity arises whenever a message is received which relates two or more objects of judgment via an assertion.²⁹

Other factors affect the predictive value of an attitude. The intensity with which an attitude is held can affect its behavioral influence. If an individual is certain of his position, this would undoubtedly act as a strong inducement for him to act accordingly. So, too, would an attitude to which his level of commitment is high. The saliency of a held idea is an important variable in determining the extent to which it might motivate consistent action.³⁰

²⁸Wahlke and Eulau, op. cit., p. 32.

²⁹Charles E. Osgood and Percy H. Tannenbaum, "The Principle of Congruity in the Prediction of Attitude Change" in Fishbein (ed.), op. cit., pp. 301-311, p. 302.

³⁰For a discussion of the salience dimension in politics, see Moshe M. Czudnowski, "A Salience Dimension of Politics for the Study of Political Culture," American Political Science Review LXII (1968), pp. 878-888.

It is true, too, that certain orientations have more of what psychologist Daniel Katz calls an "action component,"³¹ (or action structures as others refer to it). He comments that while many people have attitudes of approval toward one or another alternative, there are differences in their structure with respect to relevant action. The action structure of an attitude, according to Himmelstrand³² can be broken down into those which give satisfaction from belief in them without the need for any complementary action, and those that require some overt behavior to provide satisfaction to the holder.

Not every situation provides the same opportunity for an attitude to be given behavioral expression. Thus the relevancy of concept to action may depend on the amount of discretion the actor has in effectuating his own predisposition as well as on what those predispositions are.

This discussion suggests that attitudes seem to have relevance as predispositions to related behaviors--they have probability value, not predictive value. Within this limitation, attitudinal studies can make a substantial contribution to knowledge. Scholars in almost every discipline have speculated about this contribution.

In education, a truism is that the teacher should work from the child's values and norms. John Dewey gave fundamental importance to individual motives, interests and attitudes in encouraging learning behavior.³³

³¹Katz, op. cit., p. 460.

³²cited by Katz, op. cit.

³³See Andrew Effrat, Roy E. Feldman and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Introducing Poor Children to Learn," Public Interest 15 (Spring, 1969), pp. 106-115, p. 107.

Many psychologists define attitude in terms of subsequent behavior.

Ramon J. Rhine cites different definitions of attitude among which is one that considers it "a residuum of experience by which further activity is conditioned and controlled...an inner mental organization takes place which predisposes the person to a certain type of activity towards objects, persons and situations."³⁴

Gordon Alport, too, considers different definitions and concludes "most investigators basically agree that an attitude is a learned predisposition to respond to an object or class of objects in a consistently favorable or unfavorable way."³⁵

Others propose a logical relationship between idea and action. Bennett and Tumin³⁶ hold that "humans behave in conformity with their definitions of the situation--they act in terms of their conceptions of what is and what they think ought to be." Robert Peabody in a similar vein, says: "If men define situations as real, they are real in the consequences." And again: "The assumption that behavior will depend on the respondent's definition of the situation...seems to be a valid one."³⁷

Decision making theory is full of comments about the policy consequences of attitudinal sets (or value systems and norms) of policy makers. Herbert Simon in "Models of Man" and Wahlke and Eulau describe role orientations as setting

³⁴Ramon J. Rhine, "A Concept-Formation Approach to Attitude Acquisition" in Fishbein (ed.), op. cit., p. 383.

³⁵Gordon Alport, cited by Fishbein, op. cit., p. 383.

³⁶John W. Bennett and Melvin M. Tumin, Social Life: Structure and Function (New York; Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), cited by Stogdill, Scott and Jaynes, op. cit., p. 8.

³⁷Robert Peabody, op. cit., p. 44.

premises in decision making.³⁸ Richard Snyder holds that the range of alternative projects considered by an actor is limited by his past experience and values.³⁹ March and Simon agree that motivations, preferences, cognitions, reference group identification and values, etc. of individual actors have great consequences for organizations.⁴⁰ Eulau and Eyestone hold that "policy outcomes...reflect the orientations of policy-makers, regardless of whether or not a conscious decision has been made."⁴¹ Gawthrop, citing Alexis and Wilson, says that "the decision maker's behavior reflects his perceptions of people, roles, and organization, in addition to his own values and emotions."⁴² To the same effect are Katz and Kahn that "organizational decisions are affected by deep-seated orientations of personality, those attributes which individual decision makers bring with them because they are what they are."⁴³ And Dexter says that it is reasonable to suppose that the way men define situations has an effect on how they behave.⁴⁴

Sidney Verba, concerned with participation in the political system relates attitude to this dimension as follows:

³⁸Herbert A. Simon, Models of Man (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957), p. 201, and Wahlke and Eulau, op. cit., p. 246.

³⁹Snyder, op. cit., p. 20 and p. 17.

⁴⁰James G. March and Herbert Simon, Organizations (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1958).

⁴¹Heinz Eulau and Robert Eyestone, "Policy Maps of City Councils and Policy Outcomes: A Developmental Analysis," American Political Science Review LXII (March, 1968), pp. 124-143.

⁴²Gawthrop, op. cit., p. 97.

⁴³Katz and Kahn, op. cit., p. 274.

⁴⁴Dexter, op. cit., p. 305.

Just as the beliefs and values of the citizens affect the likelihood that they will participate, the beliefs and values of the decision-maker affects the likelihood that he will comply. If he believes citizens are potent and that he will suffer some loss if he is not responsive, he will be more likely to comply, Similarly, if he believes that such participation is right and proper, he will also be more likely to comply.⁴⁵

Frederick Mosher who shares Verba's concern with the conditions for an effective democracy agrees that the kind of decisions and actions administrative officials take "depend upon their capabilities, their orientations, and their values."⁴⁶

Many of these quotations refer to values and norms rather than to attitudes and orientations. However, value systems can be viewed as a composite of attitudinal sets among many dimensions. The individual's basic attitudes comprising his normative structure is formed from the single concept about the specific object. The determination of these attitudes can act as a rough approximation of the probability of congruent behavior.⁴⁷

⁴⁵Sidney Verba, "Democratic Participation," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 373 (September, 1967), p. 67.

⁴⁶Mosher, op. cit., p. 1.

⁴⁷See Wayne L. Francis, in Eulau (ed.), New Directions, op. cit., pp. 76-82.

IV

Policy Role Orientations of Administrators

1. Alternate Approaches to the Study of Administrative Roles

It is often noted that an individual plays many different roles in his life. He plays one role at home as a parent, or mate, or child. He assumes a very different role at work and yet another role perhaps in other relationships. He has a role as a citizen, a role as a neighbor, a role as a consumer, etc. The fact that different occupants of comparable roles perceive the role dissimilarly and behave variably within it has also been the subject of much study. These discussions, however, too often ignore the multi-faceted nature of the role within any one of these role positions. Thus, for instance, the role perception of parent includes attitudes toward permissive and strict child-rearing, but it might encompass as well attitudes concerning self-actualization or realization through parenthood. So, too, the administrative role can be perceived from a number of different angles. The particular perspective that the present research focuses on is the perception of the policy-making functions of administrators by role-occupants. A typology of policy-role alternatives is developed from the literature on public administration, and will be discussed at length later in the chapter.

Decision-making perception, however, is hardly the only dimensions of the administrative role that has been previously examined. There are many other ways of looking at administrative roles and some of these can be related to policy role types as possibly related variables. These other approaches to the administrative role are not role segments either. Rather they are separate role sets held by one individual with regard to the many sides of even one position in a system.

The economist, Anthony Downs,¹ for instance, focuses on motivation of role incumbents for his analysis of bureaucrats. He suggests that all officials are motivated at least in part by self-interest but he differentiates between those with no loyalties other than to self and those who are loyal as well to narrow policy ("zealots"), to the organization itself ("advocates") and to the larger society or nation ("statesmen"). Downs' role motivations are distinctive dimensions of role positions, separate from (although possibly associated with) policy role orientations within the same role position.

Another role set is proposed by Robert Presthus in his influential "The Organizational Society."² Presthus is concerned with patterns of accommodation by role incumbents to an organization. He trichotomizes people in an organization into the "upward mobiles" who are achievement oriented, the "indifferents" who participate in the organization as a means of satisfying non-organizational needs, and the "ambivalents" who can neither renounce status and power nor discipline themselves adequately to achieve them. Again, there may be an association between patterns of accommodation and policy role types but they are quite dissimilar elements within one position.³

There are a good many studies based on Alvin Gouldner's⁴ reference group

¹Anthony Downs, Bureaucratic Structure and Decision-Making (Santa Monica: Rand Corp., October, 1966. Memo No. RM - 4646).

²Robert Presthus, The Organizational Society (New York: Vintage Books, 1965).

³Melvin Seeman, "Social Mobility and Administrative Behavior," American Sociological Review 23 (December, 1958), pp. 633-642, develops a similar typology based on attitudes to mobility among educational administrators.

⁴Gouldner, op. cit.

identification of role incumbents into cosmopolitans and locals. Dwaine Marvick⁵ and James Warren Davis, Jr.⁶ explicitly related bureaucratic career types to Gouldner's categories. In both pieces of research, we find "institutionalists," comparable to "locals" who are place-bound and rule-oriented, and "specialists" comparable to "cosmopolitans," who are committed neither to skill nor place but to their own careers. In both, there is an additional type, "hybrids" who combine qualities of the others. Harry Joseph Hartley⁷ and Robert B. Brumbaugh⁸ have used local-cosmopolitan analysis to study teacher attitudes in a bureaucratic setting. Mark Abrahamson⁹ adopts the cosmopolitan-local dichotomy for his analysis of the integration of industrial scientists into an organizational setting.

Empirical work using Gouldner's scheme invariably focuses on levels of professionalization, often even equating one variable with the other. Those aspects of the cosmopolitan-local role set which refer to professionalization may be relevant to policy role sets and some aspects of this possibility will be explored later.

Leonard Reisman¹⁰ is concerned with civil servants' perceptions of their social roles. He sees officials as "functional bureaucrats" who derive recognition from their professional group identity, "specialist bureaucrats" whose recognition

⁵Marvick, op. cit.

⁶Davis, op. cit. Davis bases his typology explicitly on Marvick's.

⁷Hartley, op. cit.

⁸Robert Books Brumbaugh, A Test of the Effectiveness of Certain Concepts from Reference Group Theory in Predicting Teacher Attitude Toward School District Reorganization (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 1963).

⁹Abrahamson, op. cit.

¹⁰Reisman, op. cit.

comes from identifying with their department and their co-workers, "service bureaucrats" who get recognition from groups outside the bureaucracy based on their positions within it, and "job bureaucrats" who are completely immersed in the structure. A similar classificatory system was developed by Porter and Mitchell¹¹ who apply Maslow's¹² need satisfaction expansion to the bureaucratic setting by comparing role satisfactions of military and business administrators.

Richard L. Harris¹³ basis for analyzing administrators' roles is multi-functionality. Using Gabriel Almond's¹⁴ input-output (rule-making, rule-applying) model, for the enumeration of possible administrative functions, Harris examines administrative role types according to how many different functions they perform.

There may very well be associations between all the different kinds of role sets others have selected for examination. The policy role orientations of bureaucrats may be related to their career goals or their reference group identifications or their patterns of accommodation. Developing cohesive role sets to dimensions other than policy role was not feasible for this study, however, even in a limited way, efforts to analyze the attitudes of respondents to some of these other aspects of the administrative role according to policy role differences have been undertaken.

¹¹Lyman Porter and Vance Mitchell, "Comparative Study of Need Satisfactions in Military and Business Hierarchies," Journal of Applied Psychology (April, 1967), pp. 139-144.

¹²A. H. Maslow, Motivation and Personality (New York: Harper & Row, 1954).

¹³Richard L. Harris, "The Role of The Administrator Under Conditions of Systematic Political Change," Comparative Administration Group Occasional Paper (May, 1967).

¹⁴Almond and Verba, op. cit.

2. Typology of Policy Roles

There is a vast body of work grown up during the past eighty years around public administration as a field of study. A salient feature of this literature is the often contradictory opinions among authorities about the relationship of civil servants to policy making. The classification system of policy-role types for this study was constructed from the various descriptions of what bureaucrats do and the equally numerous prescriptions for what bureaucrats should do with reference to decision-making.

Three quite distinctive attitudes to administrative decision-making seem to prevail among administration theorists. These three form the model for the policy-role types of this study:

1. "Implementer"--Officials of this type perceive agency goals as a given. Administration is a value-free, technical process for implementing goals decided elsewhere in the political system.
2. "Formulator"--These people are social engineers. They would maximize administrative autonomy to achieve the "public interest" as it is conceived of by the agency since the agency is the repository of the best information, experience and expertise and has the most concentrated involvement in the field.
3. "Mediator"--Bureaucrats in this category view the administrative function as the bringing about of equilibrium between conflicting interests and demands. Administrative decisions are arrived at by interpreting, balancing and accommodating group, clientele and community claims.

It should be noted that these categories follow closely those that Glendon

Schubert¹⁵ proposed as prevalent in his examination of how the public interest is related to the administrative decision-making process. His "administrative rationalist," administrative platonist" and "administrative realist" are similar in most respects to administrative implementers, formulators and mediators, respectively.

Norman C. Thomas,¹⁶ too, has a typology of decision-makers which includes some of the above types. His schema has less heuristic value though because some confusion exists between the role set toward how policy goals should be arrived at and the methods preferred for achieving these goals, regardless of what they were. Thus, for instance, his "rational man" who takes into account all aspects of a problem and rationally calculates his choice, is not mutually exclusive with his "political man" who evaluates policies in terms of their utility for his agency's clientele groups and his party, or his "platonic man" who considers policy according to his own predispositions. Note, however, that his goal based categories of "political man" and "platonic man" are close to the administrative formulator and administrative implementer of this study and Schubert's realist and platonist.

Each of the above views of how the bureaucracy functions in connection with goal determination has been emphasized by different authors and at different times. In a recent article Herbert Kaufman¹⁷ uses norms of administrative behavior similar to this typology of policy making functions and develops a theory about

¹⁵Glendon Schubert, The Public Interest (Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1960).

¹⁶Thomas, op. cit.

¹⁷Herbert Kaufman, "Administrative Decentralization and Political Power," Public Administration Review XXIX (January/February, 1969), pp. 3-15.

their cyclical nature.

So, too, has Dwight Waldo commented on the time-related nature of different approaches to administrative decision-making. He holds that the belief in a dichotomy between policy and administration, the "implementer" view, still persists "a generation after it has been destroyed and abandoned"¹⁸ (presumably by scholars) because no single cogent and generally accepted theory has arisen to replace it. The argument, in effect, is that the implementer approach reflecting the traditional school of public administration has been challenged as unrealistic but the alternate values of representativeness (mediator) and expertise (formulator) have not been universally recognized and accepted. No consensus around the primacy of any of these three values has been built up so that any of them can be definitively acknowledged as the sole administrative role in shaping policy. It is, therefore, valid to assume that all three perceptions can be validly held by executives and the extent to which each of them was adhered to by administrators in an urban setting and relating each to individual attributes and attitudinal dimensions of the respondents is the central problem of this research.

Needless to say, the administrative types exemplifying the values of responsibility, expertise and representativeness--implementer, formulator and mediator--are conceived of as ideal types in the Weberian sense. An attempt was made to see the degree to which an individual identified with one or the other types, while recognizing that such identification was not complete but co-existed with competing values. The next few sections clarify these ideal types and sets forth

¹⁸Dwight Waldo, "Scope of the Theory of Public Administration" in Charlesworth, op. cit., p. 13.

their historic and theoretical foundations.

3. "Administrative Implementer"

The implementer approach to the role of the administrator has its roots in the traditional theory of public administration which assumed that politics and administration were separate and distinct spheres of activities. The administrative function consisted of translating into action statutes and directives issuing from politically responsible bodies. Policy-making discretion--the setting of goals and ends of government action--was to be exercised exclusively by political institutions such as legislatures and executives which are subject to popular direction and control. Administrative discretion extends only to decisions about means, not ends. Because administrators are instrumentalities, the ideals for office emphasize impersonality, objectivity, expertise, value-free neutrality. The primary concern of administrators is to find the most efficient and economical method of operations to effectuate others' decisions.

The politics-administration dichotomy theory of public administration has had currency since the inception of the field. Woodrow Wilson who is credited with the first important work set the direction in which public administration scholarship was to follow for at least the next fifty years. In 1887, he wrote "The broad plans of governmental action are not administrative, the detailed execution of such plans is administrative."¹⁹

¹⁹Wilson, op. cit., p. 212.

Frank Goodnow²⁰ some thirteen years later elaborated on the distinction between policy making and policy execution, the former to develop from responsible party government, the latter to be based on technically competent administration.

During the next few decades, the non-political nature of the bureaucracy was accepted as a truism. Concern in the field centered on the means and methods needed for improving techniques and cutting costs. The textbooks that appeared during this time assumed the separation of means and ends,²¹ and there arose a whole school of management theorists dedicated to defining the immutable principles of administration and applying the most advanced knowledge available for the enhancing of administrative competence.²² These latter works, done before the politics-administration division came into question after World War II, propose a universality to the laws governing administration regardless of differences in goals and ends and despite differences in personalities and social and political contexts.

Since the 1940's the orthodoxy of the implementer approach has been seriously challenged. Repeated assaults by scholars on its basic premises have not proved fatal, however. The myth of administrative neutrality still persists. The myth may now be less an assumption than an argument and the tenets more subtle and

²⁰Goodnow, op. cit.

²¹For instance, Leonard D. White, op. cit., and Trends in Public Administration (New York: McGraw Hill, 1933); and W. F. Willoughby, Principles of Public Administration (Washington: The Brookings Institute, 1927).

²²See Gulick and Urwick, op. cit.; and United States Report of the Committee on Administrative Management in the Federal Government (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1937), (Brownlow report).

sophisticated. But the concept of the role of the administrator as an implementer of goals set elsewhere is still very much alive and accepted.

The scientific management school of Taylor²³ and Fayol²⁴ in the pre-World War II era obviously divorced policy setting and policy implementing. Their search for mechanical means for dividing labor, specializing functions, rationalizing operations, for increasing organizational efficiency, presumes given ends so that the problem becomes technical only. But the latter-day human dimension and group dynamics people²⁵ share the same basic premises. Their greater sophistication adds new dimensions to the search for efficiency but their aim, too, is to maximize bureaucratic effectiveness, albeit through more satisfactory human adjustments to the organizational setting.

The Hoover Commission reports in 1949 and 1955²⁶ are direct descendents of

²³Frederick W. Taylor, Scientific Management (New York: Harper, 1911).

²⁴Henri Fayol, "General and Industrial Management" in Urwick and Gulick (eds.), op. cit.

²⁵See, for instance, Mary Parker Follett, Dynamic Administration (New York: Harper, 1942); Robert T. Golembiewski, Men, Management and Morality (New York: McGraw Hill, 1965); Harold Leavitt, Managerial Psychology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958); Rensis Likert, New Patterns of Management (New York: McGraw Hill, 1961); Merton, op. cit.; Elton Mayo, Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization (Boston: Harvard Business School, 1945); and Stouffer, op. cit.

²⁶United States Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch (First Hoover Commission), 1949, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1949), and Second Hoover Commission Report, 1955, (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1955). The second Hoover Report recommended that career administrators be relieved of "responsibility for advocacy or defense of policies and programs" and "kept out of direct participation in political controversies."

the administrative implementer view. Their recommendations stressed the de-politicalization of the administrative branch of the federal government and prescribed specific remedies for tightening procedures and processes, for establishing unity, strengthening staff and defining lines of authority to enable administrators to better carry forward legislative programs. The 1962 Municipal Manpower Commission Report²⁷ takes a similar approach to local government personnel. And the same general viewpoint is implicit in the operations research and PPBS ideas of today's neo-Taylorites who still stress efficiency and economy and assume that the goals toward which this efficiency and economy are directed are pre-set and immutable. Victor Thompson²⁸ makes the point that current econometrics and mathematical models are being used by a new group of "scientific managers" who still accept the problem solving model of classical rationality, who still accept economy and efficiency as the ends of administration.

Herbert Simon despite the break with traditional thinking along many lines in his "Administrative Behavior," at that time still endorsed efficiency as the criterion of organizational activity. His bifurcation of the universe into fact and value was quite consistent with the prior organization theorists who separated policy determination from policy administration. He maintained that values can be articulated and controlled. Value laden decisions can then be made by politically responsible agents in the society. The distinctive fact component is then the special

²⁷Municipal Manpower Commission, Government Manpower for Tomorrow's Cities (New York: McGraw Hill, 1962).

²⁸Victor A. Thompson, Bureaucracy and Innovation (paper delivered at the American Political Science Association convention, 1966).

property of administrative agencies which mechanically apply scientific principles to the given values.²⁹

Along the same lines is Golembiewski³⁰ who also would use science to improve administrative techniques. In a similar vein, James Fesler's³¹ interest in administrative organization is the streamlining of its machinery.

Current definitions of administration still reflect an instrumental perception of its role. Ferrel Heady calls public administration a concern with carrying out public policy decisions made by authoritative decision makers in the political system.³²

Earl Latham in developing a pluralist view of the political system as a whole holds: "Administrative agencies...are established to carry out the terms of the treaties that the legislators have negotiated and ratified."³³

With a slightly more normative slant, Joseph LaPalombara writes:

It is expected that administrators will consider the electorate sovereign and that those who are elected to policy or rule-making roles are legitimately endowed, for the duration of their office, with the power and the right to specify what is or is not in the public interest. This means that the administrator sees himself as

²⁹Simon, Administrative Behavior, op. cit.; Waldo, Scope of Theory, op. cit., p. 5, discusses Simon's logical positivism as an extension of the traditional public administration dichotomy. See, too, Robert A. Dahl, "The Science of Public Administration," Public Administration Review VII (1947).

³⁰Golembiewski, op. cit.

³¹James W. Fesler, Area and Administration (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1964).

³²Heady, op. cit.

³³Earl Latham, The Group Basis of Politics (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1952), cited by Eulau and Wahlke, op. cit., p. 340.

instrumental for political institutions but that he will not alone or in concert, seek to undo or pervert what the electorate may have decided.³⁴

In the 1950's Charles Hyneman recognized and feared administrative encroachments on goal determination by politically responsible bodies and, not unlike LaPalombara, argues that the legislature must be supreme for democracy to work.³⁵

A rule of the Civil Service Commission for the interchange of employees states as an objective of administrative performance political neutrality.³⁶ David Stanley's studies of federal and New York City civil servants³⁷ and Paul T. David's similar examination of "Executives for Government"³⁸ are still technique oriented works which concentrate on improving recruitment, examination procedures, salaries, evaluations, etc. As late as 1966, an empirical study of federal bureaucrats by

³⁴ Joseph LaPalombara, "An Overview of Political Development" in Joseph LaPalombara (ed.), Bureaucracy and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 53.

³⁵ Charles S. Hyneman, Bureaucracy in a Democracy (New York: Harper, 1950), writes, "If administrative officials and employees are expected to conduct themselves within the limits that are acceptable to the American people as a whole there must be authoritative ways of telling them what the American people want them to do. The authority on these matters...must lie in the political branches of government." (p. 47)

³⁶ Gilbert A. Schulkind, "Personnel Interchange Between Merit Systems," Public Personnel Review (July, 1957), cited by Stanley, Professional Personnel, op. cit., p. 135.

³⁷ Stanley, The Higher Civil Service, op. cit.; and Stanley, Professional Personnel, op. cit.

³⁸ Paul T. David and Ross Pollock, Executives for Government (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1957).

Corson and Shale³⁹ focuses on the managerial skills needed by public administrators-- performing, controlling, co-ordinating, evaluating, negotiating, staffing, supplying, directing, training--and ignores in its basic formulations any decision-making components in administrative positions. To wit:

The program manager (their most "politicized" category of administrator) in the final analysis is responsible for accomplishing the program--for producing results. And either his hierarchical superior--the secretary--or a congressional committee looks to him for that accomplishment. The supporting staff manager and the professional (their lower echelon categories) are responsible for contributing to the program.⁴⁰

4. "Administrative Formulator"

The instrumental "implementer" approach to public administration seems to be the preferred view still dominating practitioner oriented works and overviews of the system. Most academicians, however, whose commitment is to an understanding of the reality of the system more than to the improvement of any part thereof, have rejected the politics-administration dichotomy as idealistic, impractical and inoperative. They hold that discretion over substantive matters is an integral and essential component of administrative functions. At a conference on public administration held recently (October, 1968) many of the exchanges and assumptions reveal that this is the attitude to bureaucratic policy-making among scholars. The following discussion of a paper delivered by Harlan Cleveland is illustrative:

³⁹John J. Corson and Paul Shale, Men Near the Top (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966).

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 104, see, too, pp. 12, 44-51.

James C. Charlesworth: It is quite evident that the greater part of the conversation here has subsumed a high position for the administrator. We have been talking about department heads and mayors and ambassadors. We have not been talking about modest bureau heads and the like....(are we) talking about policy-making administrators and not mere implementers?

Harvey Sherman: There are no such things as mere implementers according to Harlan's paper and my own view. Certainly, every supervisor at every level makes policy of certain kinds.

Stephen Bailey: I agree with him (Jim Sherman). You take these so called specialists operating at the low levels, say GS-9's. As I observed GS-9's around Washington, if they are bright and concerned with specific aspects of public policy, they are often extraordinarily influential.⁴¹

And again, in discussing his own paper at the same conference, Stephen Bailey noted:

Inevitably, public administrators are part of the group that defines constitutionally mandated means and politically sanctioned goals... They are part of a creative partnership that continues to be at work in defining the ends and means of government.⁴²

There is an inevitability to bureaucratic accretion of influence and authority in the modern world. The scale of government makes it necessary for legislative bodies at all levels to delegate more and more discretionary power to administrative agencies. Legislators have neither the time nor sufficient knowledge about all the subjects that come before them to make intelligent judgments. Further, too detailed statutes would result in "harmful rigidity" as the Committee on Administrative Procedures has pointed out.⁴³ As a by-product of even routine administrative

⁴¹ Charlesworth (ed.), op. cit., p. 203.

⁴² Ibid., p. 152.

⁴³ United States Committee on Administrative Procedures, Final Report of the Attorney General (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1941), cited by Boyer, op. cit., p. 6.

procedures, an agency accumulates an impressive store of facts and information. This happens because the agency is at the center of pressures at the grass-roots and because it is the most continuous and cohesive government organ operating in the arena. Moreover, it has a corps of experienced and/or specially trained people. An agency then naturally becomes uniquely knowledgeable and capable of specifying the alternatives available for redress of societal ills. And, while societal ills may not have increased over the years, their recognition has and so has public responsibility for their amelioration. This, of course, has resulted in enlarging the size and scope of government, adding to its complexity and needs for greater expertise and specialization to cope with overwhelming responsibilities.⁴⁴

Now, both the administrative formulator and the administrative mediator roles recognize the policy-making functions of the bureaucracy. The mediator, however, perceives of himself as balancing diverse interests, while the formulator relies on his own training, expertise, judgment and involvement in the subject matter for decisions. The formulator approach, as a rejection of the classical theory of public administration is rarely espoused with the same directness and purity as is the implementer view. It is more often proposed as the only realistic way with which to perceive the system or else it is first argued that the administrator is a specialist or expert in the area with which the agency is involved and, as such, is best able to judge the ends to which the agency should strive. Typical of the "reality" school is the following statement by Harlan Cleveland:

⁴⁴For a discussion of the growth of bureaucratic power, see Boyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7; Mosher, *op. cit.*, p. 3; Rourke, *op. cit.*, p. 45; Fritz Morstein Marx, "The Higher Civil Service as an Action Group in Western Political Development" in LaPalombara (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 72-78.

For the first time in the story of man, the public administrator is more responsible for defining the purpose of his work than anyone else is.

From prehistoric times until the day before yesterday, leadership in public affairs was exercised by a comparatively small number of strong men....

But nowadays, for the public executive in a modern complex system, it is different. "Policy" for him, turns out to be largely the decisions which he himself negotiates with other public executives. The broader guidelines that he heeds are not available from oracle or priest or political boss, and often not even from the "higher" levels of an increasingly non-hierarchical hierarchy. If he asks where he, or his organization, or America, or the world, is and ought to be heading, he finds that his best authority on the subject is himself.⁴⁵

Brian Chapman writes of the same phenomenon of administrative policy formulation increase on a world wide basis.⁴⁶ So, too, does Wallace Sayre as follows:

The fact is that in all countries the bureaucracy is one of the important actors in the making of governmental decisions; in some systems the bureaucrats are the leading actors, and in most systems their power as decision-makers would seem to be increasing.⁴⁷

One of the earliest works which cast doubt on administrative orthodoxy was Dwight Waldo's "The Administrative State."⁴⁸ In it, the point was made that the efficiency and economy school ignored the effects of value judgments on administrative actions and that administrators were necessarily involved with shaping public

⁴⁵Harlan Cleveland, "The American Public Executive: New Functions New Styles, New Purpose" in Charlesworth (ed.), op. cit., pp. 173-174.

⁴⁶Brian Chapman, The Profession of Government (New York: Macmillan, 1959).

⁴⁷Wallace S. Sayre, "Bureaucracies: Some Contrasts in Systems" in Raphaeli (ed.), op. cit., pp. 341-353, p. 347.

⁴⁸Dwight Waldo, The Administrative State, op. cit.

policy. Previous work had almost all been concerned with how the administrative branch could be strengthened. Waldo asks whether it should be strengthened in light of the administrators independent goal-setting activities.

Most of those who report the accretion of administrative power share Waldo's fears about the consequences. A rare sanguine view about increasing bureaucratic participation in decision-making is expressed by Fritz Morstein Marx⁴⁹ who sees no threat because of internal limits on bureaucratic arbitrariness through its own rationality and complexity. More common is the view expressed by James Burnham⁵⁰ almost thirty years ago that the arrogance and independence from executive control of the bureaucracy is deplorable, which view is virtually repeated by Peter Drucker in 1969.⁵¹ In between, many others have documented the goal-setting functions of the bureaucracy and condemned its dominance over politically responsible bodies. Many of these authors have pointed out in their analyses that administrators, no less than other members of the governmental system are bound by individual value systems and dedicated to promoting their own interests and subject to those same irrationalities and limitations in perception, insight and awareness as other humans.⁵²

⁴⁹Marx, Administrative State, op. cit.

⁵⁰James Burnham, The Managerial Revolution (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1962).

⁵¹Peter F. Drucker, "The Sickness of Government," The Public Interest 14 (Winter, 1969), pp. 3-23.

⁵²See, for instance, Banfield and Wilson, op. cit.; Downs, op. cit.; Herman Finer, "Administrative Responsibility in Democratic Government," Public Administration Review (1941), pp. 335-350; Jacob, op. cit.; Freeman, op. cit.; Ralph E. Lipp, The New Priesthood; The Scientific Elite and the Uses of Power (New York: Harper & Row, 1965); Mosher, op. cit.; Presthus, op. cit.; Rourke, op. cit.; Herbert J. Storing, "Political Parties and the Bureaucracy" in Robert A. Goldwin

The concept of administrator as formulator is inextricably intertwined with the perception of him as expert. With the expanded activities and complexities of government and the growth in technical knowledge in society, it may be rationally claimed that, for good or for ill, only someone immersed in a field is adequately equipped to cope with its inherent confusions and contradictions. The determination of where the public interest lies becomes so technically involved, so complex, that only someone trained in the subject and continuously exposed to developments in it can make informed decisions. More, even when alternatives are presented for final disposition to other organs of the political body, the formulation of possible courses of action is in itself significant policy-making.

There are few scholars who share the extreme view of Frederick Beutel that public control should be replaced by government reliance on experts, empirical methods, science and technology.⁵³ But there are others who assume a compatibility between the role of administrative formulator and political responsibility. John Gaus⁵⁴ who calls for administrative personnel to work with citizens to clarify problems and guide them in their responsibilities ignores the impact of the administrator as interpreter and communicator of conditions and circumstances. So, too,

(ed.), Political Parties, U. S. A. (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1961), pp. 137-158; and York Willbern, "Professionalization in the Public Service: Too Little or Too Much," Public Administration Review XIV (1954).

⁵³ Frederick K. Beutel, Democracy or the Scientific Method in Law and Policy Making (San Juan, P. R.: Editorial Universitaria, Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1965).

⁵⁴ John M. Gaus, Reflections on Public Administration (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1947).

Emmette Redford's⁵⁵ thesis that there is a need for publicly oriented, publicly conditioned experts to find solutions to public problems in the public interest, minimizes political responsibility as an administrative norm.

We find in practice a tacit acceptance of the preference for expertise over responsibility in the growing trend for selecting professionals in a field as the appointees to head agencies.⁵⁶ Although the thinking behind this may be that he can best control the career experts within his organization, it also becomes increasingly difficult for the public directly or for those political agencies charged with effectuating the public's will to control or supervise such expert activities. They have neither the facts, training, nor sufficient involvement to have an impact.⁵⁷

A salient feature of the literature dealing with the role of the administrator as formulator of policy is its ambivalence. It is widely recognized that agency personnel control the ends to which agency activities are directed. This control is

⁵⁵Emmette Redford, Administration of National Economic Control (New York: Macmillan, 1952).

⁵⁶Banfield and Wilson, op. cit., among others, have commented about this.

⁵⁷The inability of the generalist to control or even understand the specialist has been noted by Abrahamson, op. cit., p. 6; Harvey Brooks, "Scientific Concepts and Cultural Change," Daedalus 94 (Winter, 1965), pp. 66-83, p. 68; Lapp, op. cit., p. 159; Frederick Lowi, At the Pleasure of the Mayor (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), pp. 64-75; C. B. Macpherson, "Complexity and Control" in Macridis and Brown (eds.), op. cit., pp. 436-448, p. 443; Hans J. Morgenthau, "Modern Science and Political Power," Columbia Law Review CLIV (1964) 1402, cited by Dean Morse and Aaron Warner, Technological Innovation and Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), p. 138; Mosher, op. cit., pp. 21, 215; Rourke, op. cit., p. 94; and Dexter, op. cit., examines inability of congressmen-generalists who are members of committees dealing with military policy to understand military experts presentation of alternatives.

generally accepted as inevitable in modern society and yet regretted as a diminution of the democratic processes. At the same time, however, and often by the same people, proposals are made for increasing the expertise of administrators. These proposals disregard the relationship between increased specialization and administrative independence. They are inferred from an instrumentalist perception of the administrative role while adopting a formulator view of the administrative role.

Typical here is James McCamy who argues:

Public Administration will provide the analysis, will perceive the alternative solutions, will assess the domestic and international political forces that must be reconciled, and will recommend to legislatures the policies, step by step, that will use science (knowledge) for good ends.⁵⁸

McCamy does not go into what those "good ends" are to which policies are to be directed and where primary responsibility for their selection lies. He assumes immutable "good ends" so that, despite his apparent observations about policy-making locii, he is really re-affirming an implementer view of administration.

Banfield and Wilson discuss this ambivalence extensively in connection with civic reform movements. In their interpretation of "City Politics," reformers are assumed to hold that there exists a "public interest" pertaining to the city as a whole as differentiated from partial interests held by private individuals and groups. Local government is simply a matter of managing the services performed in the pursuit of this "public interest." The discovery of what the public interest is, therefore, becomes a technical rather than political problem and the best arrangement

⁵⁸James L. McCamy, Science and Public Administration (Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1960), p. 17. For similar arguments, see Lapp, op. cit., and Lisa Peattie, "Reflections on Advocacy Planning," (Paper delivered to Conference on Radicals in the Professions, July, 1967) (Mimeographed).

for local government is to place "affairs entirely in the hands of the few who were best qualified, persons whose training, experience, natural ability and devotion to public service equipped them best to manage the public business."⁵⁹

To the same effect is Peter Drucker who very recently has noted that "there is still a good deal of resistance to the responsibility of politics and resentment of the burden of political decision,"⁶⁰ and Herbert Kaufman who said in an article published this year:

Bureau chiefs and organized bureaucracies perceive intervention by political executives as the intrusion of partisan politics into fields from which doctrine has for many years held that politics should be excluded; they see jeopardy for the competence nurtured so carefully and painfully against political distortion or extinction.⁶¹

For those who would reconcile the administrative formulator role with traditional theory, policy setting has been reduced to a technological process. Others who define the policy formulator function of administration exhibit more concern for its effects on the democratic quality of decision-making.

For the present research, efforts were made in the field work to present the formulator role (as the other two roles) in its most positive and favorable light so that identifiers with it could easily and unashamedly so indicate. Though ambiguities about its propriety in a democratic state exist, these were not reflected in the instrument used to classify respondents in order to obviate unfavorable re-action to any one type role.

⁵⁹Banfield and Wilson, op. cit., p. 139, see, also, pp. 19-20, 220.

⁶⁰Drucker, op. cit., p. 5.

⁶¹Kaufman, op. cit., p. 9. See, too, Gore, op. cit., p. 50, that "the members of the administrative profession, their friends, associates and apprentices are unalterably committed to the ideal that government can be managed. In the end,

5. "Administrative Mediator"

The mediator approach to the administrative role applies the pluralist interpretation of the political process to the bureaucracy. It differs, however, from the traditional concepts of pluralism of Bentley and Truman in that it centers the functions of balancing competing societal interests in administrative rather than elected officials. In common with other pluralists, the mediator sees policy resulting from the interaction of diverse demands being made upon the system. New equilibriums emerge from the authoritative re-allocations of resources and values to accommodate these demands. And, according to administrative mediators, this re-allocation is done by the bureaucracy.

One of the first challengers to the classical implementer concept of public administration was Paul Appleby.⁶² He argued that government agencies formulate policy--that they are inherently political bodies. His disagreement with the formulator role, however, is in his emphasis on accommodation as the basis for decision making. He feared the substitution of the expert for the generalist at the higher reaches of the civil service as a distortion of the representative role of the

not the elected representatives of the people, but the professional public servant finally bears the burden of public responsibility." Also relevant is Jacob, *op. cit.* pp. 195-196; Mosher, *op. cit.*; Lewis A. Dexter, "Check and Balance Today: What Does it Mean for Congress and Congressmen" in Alfred DeGrazia (ed.), *Congress: The First Branch* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1967); and Macpherson, *op. cit.*

⁶²Appleby, *Big Democracy*, *op. cit.*; *Policy and Administration*, *op. cit.*; *Morality and Administration in Democratic Government* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1952). See, too, generalist-specialist discussion in Victor A. Thompson, *Modern Organizations* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961).

administrator as hostile to his function as arbiter and negotiator of diverse values in society.

Another early expression of the pluralist view is found in Pendleton Herring's "Public Administration and the Public Interest,"⁶³ wherein the author examines relations between pressure groups and officials and finds that bureaucrats are largely responsible for reconciling group differences and effectuating economic and social compromises. Herring views this role sanguinely so long as bureaucrats execute policy in the public not specialized interests and do not develop their own group interests in which survival becomes their goal.

J. Leiper Freeman⁶⁴ attempts a more sophisticated inter-actional examination among a political body (Congressional sub-committee on Indian Affairs), an administrative agency (Bureau of Indian Affairs), and public interest groups (concerned with Indian affairs). He concludes that the administrative branch of government, along with the legislative, mirrors the pluralistic nature of American society and there is considerable interplay between them and also with the public for the setting of governmental policy. Because he focuses on sub-systems within larger bodies and finds access by interest groups and responsibility to them by both branches, he, too, views with equanimity present decision-making processes although they allow for extensive administrative discretion.

⁶³Pendleton Herring, Public Administration and the Public Interest (New York: McGraw Hill, 1936).

⁶⁴J. Leiper Freeman, The Political Process: Executive Bureau-Legislative Committee Relations (New York: Random House, 1955).

Carl J. Friedrich⁶⁵ also holds that administrative responsibility is primarily to dominant societal trends (rather than to politically selected bodies). However, because of the consequences of greater complexity and more sophisticated technology he qualifies administrative responsibility to these community demands by requiring also that policies do not violate "objective criteria of the prevalent level of technical knowledge." In this respect then, Friedrich combines some elements of the formulator approach as well. In a recent book, Francis Rourke⁶⁶ addresses himself to the same goals of administrative responsibility raised by Friedrich. Whereas Friedrich assumes a compatibility, Rourke conceives of these goals as often in conflict with each other and he calls for some system to be devised which would reconcile responsiveness to social trends with expertise. Although there are some constraints on bureaucratic power that Rourke sees, the ascendancy of the formulator role seems to be gaining over the mediator approach due to increasing agency expertise, informational resources and ability to mobilize support and initiate action.

In his examination of the federal budgetary process, Aaron Wildovsky weighs proposals for changing the functions and powers of the Bureau of the Budget and favors those which encourage present pluralist tendencies within the administrative organ over suggestions for tighter hierarchical control.⁶⁷

A long time ago Tocqueville viewed American democracy and commented:

⁶⁵Carl J. Friedrich, "Public Policy and the Nature of Administrative Responsibility" in Francis E. Rourke (ed.), Bureaucratic Power in National Politics (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1965), pp. 165-175.

⁶⁶Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics, op. cit.

⁶⁷Aaron Wildovsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1964).

It is no doubt of important to the welfare of nations that they should be governed by men of talents and virtue; but it is perhaps still more important for them that the interests of those men should not differ from the interests of the community at large.⁶⁸

Norton Long agrees and argues that the credentials of the bureaucracy as representative of the community at large are better than those of other branches of government. In "Bureaucracy and Constitutionalism,"⁶⁹ Long disputes Hyneman's legislative supremacy as an amoral concept because legislators in the United States fail to represent the diversity in society. He, therefore, rejects elections as the "sine qua non" of democracy arguing for the civil service as a better sample of the mass of people which makes up for legislative deficiencies in representation.

The view that the civil service should be representative of the diverse and conflicting components of society is implicit in studies of the characteristics of public employees such as the one done by Warner and his associates.⁷⁰ Herbert Storing,⁷¹ too, in deprecating the growth of the merit system as inhibiting legitimate avenues of expression of the popular will, sees greater representativeness of society's characteristics as the best guarantee of continued American democracy. He maintains that the spoils system is a better guarantee that officeholders share the political character of the community at large than the merit system.

The argument that the administrator should reflect the larger society in his

⁶⁸Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America Vol. I (New York: Vintage Book, 1945), p. 248.

⁶⁹Norton E. Long, "Bureaucracy and Constitutionalism," American Political Science Review 46 (September, 1952).

⁷⁰Warner, Van Riper, Martin and Collins, op. cit.

⁷¹Storing, op. cit.

personal characteristics indicates an awareness by these authors that policy is more than an automatic derivative of the interplay of competing interests. Since the bureaucrat, in addition to aggregating interests, interprets, shapes and adds to these interests, he should resemble the whole population as nearly as possible so that his decisions conform to societal values.⁷² Whereas the administrative formulator chooses from among alternatives according to his own judgment, expertise, training, experience and involvement, the administrative mediator either consciously makes decisions which accommodate societal pressures or else unconsciously does so because he incorporates societal norms in his being.

6. Political Consequences of Various Role Types

In real life, we do not find these pure types of formulator, mediator or implementer. The assumption is, though, that some administrators will emphasize one aspect of their role while others might stress another. And, which particular perception of the administrative role is manifest within a bureaucracy or sub-system of it may have profound consequences for the political system. In other words differing attitudes toward which point in the political system substantive problems should be resolved and the bases for that resolution has great meaning for systemic operations.

The administrative implementer role is an anachronism. It is untenable in modern highly technical, highly scientific, highly complex and vast government

⁷²See discussion at conference held October, 1968, reported by Charlesworth, op. cit., p. 161-162, between Gladieux and Bailey wherein Bailey calls public administration an "aggregating and moralizing agent."

service. However, it is suggested that belief in this traditional role for higher civil servants would tend to moderate their policy-making functions. Believers in this particular approach to administration would probably adhere most closely to statutory and executive direction, making every effort to discover what the will of the political agencies are. This will of the political bodies is, of course, interpreted by the administrators. It is filtered through the lens of their own individual visions. However, although inevitably changes occur between the articulation of a "will" and its effectuation, it is proposed that the desire to implement that "will" as nearly as possible affects the degree of change incurred. The more legitimate and binding political directives are considered to be, the more compatible with their spirit will be the policies concerned with implementing them.

The extent to which belief in an idea acts as a restraint on contrary practices is implicit in Theodore Lowi's recent work, "The End of Liberalism."⁷³ Lowi argues that when "good" theory which explains causes and effects well becomes elevated into ideology, it assumes these causes and effects to be natural and good, to be "inviolable principles" and prevents change in them. By turning necessity into virtue, defects and distortions are rationalized and accepted.

In terms of the political system, the more the implementer view prevails, the closer we are to classical concepts of democracy. Eldersveld's study of Indian civil servants even posits bureaucratic and democratic norm beliefs as contradictory role perceptions.⁷⁴ As inadequate as are the controls on elected officials, and as

⁷³Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969), p. 14, p. 155, p. 314.

⁷⁴Eldersveld, op. cit.

limited as are some of the means for selecting them, nonetheless legislators and political executives can be repudiated by party and public as administrators selected according to other criteria cannot. The activities of politically chosen agents, too, is more public and subject to closer scrutiny. The extent to which their decisions are realized, therefore, is the extent to which societal goals are set by those authorized to set them.

If the administrators view their function as primarily implemental, then the prime virtues to be sought is a willingness to accept orders and rules and to apply them to the problem effectively. And so long as goals are set without the bureaucracy these are indeed virtues. However, when, as so often happens, goals are vague and even honest efforts by bureaucrats to implement, not set, policy are frustrated by the lack of political direction, these same virtues can become dysfunctional. Efficiency and economy, intended as a means for achieving goals become the goals themselves. And the myth that efficiency and economy are not goals--that they are non-political, value-free "virtues," that they are absolute "good" qualities, removes the activities of specialists in efficiency and economy from awkward inquiry into motives and actions.

The implementer approach relies on self-restraint and belief in legitimacy of political agencies as controls on bureaucratic dominance. But when political agencies lack the time, knowledge, material resources, experience, etc. to prescribe solutions to complex problems, they are forced to delegate more and more discretion to administrative functionaries. The needed flexibility to deal with unanticipated contingencies requires loosely designed laws and orders, giving implementing agencies wide latitude even within the law. The physical and

psychological inability of executives and legislators to cope with the overwhelming, diverse, shapeless mass of information and pressures to which they are subject, forces them to rely heavily on administrative specialists to select and interpret problems for them. The administrative formulator who either sets goals himself or else develops the alternatives from which final determinations are made is, therefore, a natural development from the specialization component inherent in the efficiency and economy emphasis.

Fear of the consequences of specialist control of decision-making is widespread as above noted. The expert as well as the politician is dedicated to the realization of individual values with the significant difference that politicians must temper their values according to public acceptance while experts temper their^s according to professional standards. No doubt, competency and knowledge are admirable qualities to be maximized among government personnel. However, it must be understood that they may conflict with larger values in society such as responsiveness to public opinion, and, when they do, there is a tendency for expertise to prevail among administrative formulators. The dangers of relying on the efficiency norm with which specialist training and emphasis is formally concerned is well stated by Banfield and Wilson who hold that conflicts function to express the needs, wants and interests of the population. The efficiency criterion is anti-conflict and too great a regard for it might lead to restlessness and tension erupting into violence and weakening social bonds. Politics in contradistinction to efficiency is a way of converting hostile, restless impulses into fairly stable social products and giving these impulses significance.⁷⁵ Sidney Verba, too, contrasts efficiency and

⁷⁵ Banfield and Wilson, op. cit.

democracy in an urban setting:

Effective governmental programs may require slow and careful planning, technical control, and a willingness to defer gratification. Programs based on widespread participation are likely to represent greater compromise and less careful planning and technical control and to be aimed at relatively rapid gratification.⁷⁶

Stephen Bailey says that "the most efficient way of doing something in slide-rule terms may be the most inefficient way in terms of maximizing values other than dollar economies,"⁷⁷ and Harvey Sherman specifies some of these other legitimate goals as "responsiveness to public opinion and to pressure groups, aid to minority groups, aid to depressed areas, (and) maintenance of the privacy of the individual."⁷⁸ Peter Blau, in another context, also holds efficiency to be antithetical to freedom of dissent.⁷⁹

Woodrow Wilson, campaigning for the presidency in 1912 also expressed fear of expert rule:

What I fear is a government of experts. God forbid that in a democratic society we should resign the task and give the government over to experts. What are we for if we are to be scientifically taken care of by a small number of gentlemen who are the only men who understand the job? Because if we don't understand the job, then we are not a free people.⁸⁰

⁷⁶Verba, op. cit., p. 75.

⁷⁷Discussion of Harlan Cleveland's paper in Charlesworth, op. cit., by Stephen Bailey, p. 202.

⁷⁸Harvey Sherman, "Methodology in the Practice of Public Administration" in Charlesworth, op. cit.

⁷⁹Peter M. Blau, Bureaucracy in Modern Society (New York: Random House, 1956).

⁸⁰cited by Lapp, op. cit., p. 1.

The problem has intensified now so that there are serious questions about whether the generalist, the politically responsible government official, is able to understand government complexity sufficiently to control and limit the setting of goals by those who are continuously involved in a problem and/or specially trained and qualified to deal with it, i.e. the administrative formulator. Ralph Lapp has discussed the present difficulties:

The advent of science, together with the increase of technical specialized knowledge in every domain, has fundamentally altered the condition under which the ideal of an open society has to be pursued. The inability of the citizen to understand science and technology effectively closes off part of society and severely hinders the formulation of technological goals.⁸¹

The consequences of the administrative mediator approach would seem most consistent with both the reality of the way the system works and the maximization of democratic controls. However, here, too, the immunity from popular control of bureaucratic personnel affects the democratic quality of administrative decision-making. Although the administrator may consciously try to accommodate disparate sentiments within the community, and although he may view himself as representative of the agency clientele, there is still no formal means for the public to hold him responsible for his conduct except through elected officials. Francis Rourke has pointed this out:

An effective system of representing clientele in the development of policy differs substantially from arrangements under which executive officials themselves take public opinion into account

⁸¹Lapp, *op. cit.*, p. 226. See, also, Rourke, *op. cit.*, p. 109, Mosher, *op. cit.*, p. 211, Fred Riggs, "Bureaucrats and Political Development: A Paradoxical View" in LaPalombara, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-167, agrees ineffective controls on a bureaucracy results in bureaucrats increasingly favoring their own self and group interests.

in their policy decisions. In the case of a genuine system of representation, the public has an opportunity to speak for itself. When public opinion filters instead through the lens of bureaucratic perceptions, the image that emerges may be grossly distorted--reflecting not the actual contours of opinion but the image that it is convenient for bureaucrats to see.⁸²

Lowi, too, is critical of pluralism as applied to the administration. When interest group liberalism is extended to the bureaucracy, it discredits both the administrative function and representation. In his words:

The further down the line one delegates power, the further into the administrative process one is forced to provide representation. While much of this is unavoidable, formalizing the fusion of administration and representation is a way of discrediting both.⁸³

So long as no formal means for repudiating administrators exist, legitimate participation by some groups may be discouraged while the demands of preferred interests may be exaggerated, nay, even stimulated and organized. At the federal level the F.B.I. and Corps of Engineers are prime examples of agencies which have cultivated group support for themselves so that they are virtually immune from hierarchical control.⁸⁴ So, too, regulatory agencies show the possible consequences of domination by administrative mediator attitudes on goals. These agencies' direct and continuous relationship with that sector of the population which they are ostensibly regulating often subverts their original purposes. Their organization outside the framework of direct political control removes them from formalized checks upon their policies. Efforts to insulate agencies from political supervision does not

⁸²Rourke, op. cit., p. 152.

⁸³Lowi, End of Liberalism, op. cit., p. 233.

⁸⁴See Rourke, op. cit., p. 31, for discussion.

necessarily de-politicalize them. Such efforts may result in allowing a measure of political autonomy, even irresponsibility, that enables them to become completely identified with some limited part of the public.⁸⁵

Nor is the structuring of the civil service to reflect general societal characteristics a sufficient guarantee that administrative decision-making will unconsciously mirror the public will. For as Mosher has suggested, democracy within administration raises a dilemma with regard to political democracy:

Democracy within administration, if carried to the full, raises a logical dilemma in its relation to political democracy. All public organizations are presumed to have been established and to operate for public purposes--i.e. purposes of the people. They are authorized, legitimized, empowered, and usually supported by authorities outside of themselves for broad purposes initially determined outside of themselves. To what extent, then, should "insiders," the officers and employees, be enabled to modify their purposes, their organizational arrangements, and their means of support? It is entirely possible that internal administrative democracy might run counter to the principles and objectives of political democracy in which the organizations of government are viewed as instruments of public purposes.⁸⁶

If the representative nature of the civil service is to have any impact on policy, it is necessary for there to be an interplay of forces within the administration. Moreover, the studies which sanguinely view the similarities in characteristics between the population and the bureaucracy study the civil service as a monolith ignoring differences in attributes between personnel at different levels within the government service. Thus, although the educational attainment of government personnel or their religious affiliations, or age, or race, may be comparable to the general public's, they need not be evenly distributed within the bureaucracy so that

⁸⁵See Storing, op. cit., p. 146.

⁸⁶Mosher, op. cit., p. 18

those with more policy making prerogatives may be and probably are disproportionately reflective of one segment of society.

That neither representativeness nor expertise is sufficient protection of the democratic ideal of individual right is shown by increasing demands for instituting an ombudsman system in this country. The ombudsman, a publicly responsible agent for receiving and investigating citizen complaints about bureaucratic decisions in individual cases, would provide another political means for overseeing administrative functioning and could perhaps mitigate some of the effects of administrative formulation and mediation where they exist.⁸⁷

It seems then that each of the role types distinguished herein has both functional and dysfunctional aspects. While the implementer role may be most consistent with our democratic norms it is also the least realistic. The formulator role, while antithetical to the conflict which inheres in democratic participation, can undoubtedly achieve the most tangible results with the least expenditure of resources and efforts. The mediator approach which takes cognizance of the pluralist and conflicting nature of society, provides for the representation of diverse interests inadequately without provisions for public control. There seems to be no one role type which balances the various norms for bureaucratic performance that prevail in our society. Emphasis on each, however, has different effects on the political system.

⁸⁷For a discussion of the ombudsman see Walter Gellhorn, When America Complains: Governmental Grievance Procedure (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966), and Stanley V. Anderson (ed.), Ombudsmen for American Government? (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1968); Donald C. Rowit, "Ombudsman for North America," Public Administration Review XXIV (December, 1964), pp. 226-230.

V

Hypotheses to Guide the Research

1. Introduction

From the endless numbers and kinds of variables that could be fruitfully examined in relation to policy role types, it was necessary to select the most relevant to the decision making attitudes of administrators. The criteria for selection were two-fold:

1. General significance
2. Availability and accuracy of data.

General significance was determined in part by the frequency with which the variable was used by other researchers. Also, and more importantly, certain variables presented themselves as most likely to be related to differences in policy orientations.

The availability and accuracy of the data is dependent on the cooperation of respondents. Therefore, the questionnaire had to be relatively short and allow for ease in its completion. This, of necessity, acts as a limitation upon the numbers and kinds of variables possible.

The variables adopted have been organized into three broad categories. As with all other classificatory schemes, there is an amount of arbitrariness involved in listing items under certain headings. In general, the reasons guiding the assignment to type are:

1. **Organizational characteristics:** These include variables concerned with the nature and length of agency membership of respondents;

2. **Personal characteristics:** These are relatively concrete data regarding individual attributes of respondents such as sex, education, etc.
3. **Sociological characteristics:** These variables are concerned with the respondents' relationship to the general society and include such items as group memberships, etc. Although these data are personal, they are somewhat more abstract and are distinguished from personal characteristics in that they have been introduced and elaborated on within the field of sociology primarily.

Hypotheses to test the relationship of the independent variables in these three classes with the dependent variable of policy role orientations are developed in this chapter. Ideally, hypotheses should derive from previous research and theory. However, no research or theory was found to be sufficiently comprehensive to provide a complement of meaningful propositions. It was, therefore, necessary to speculate about variable interrelationships in those instances where previous work was lacking. Where earlier research was relevant, hypotheses were adapted from it.

Once again, it must be stressed that the decision-making responses were not sufficiently unidirectional to form policy role sets. To analyze the results of the fieldwork, therefore, the dependent variables used are the component segments of the role set not the role set itself. In other words, each specific response reflecting the partial aspects of the administrators' attitudes to decision-making loci is examined separately in connection with the organizational, personal and sociological characteristics. For convenience, the hypotheses reflect a concept of policy role as a coherent whole. In later chapters, though, which describe the findings, the detailed role components must be used.

2. Hypotheses Concerned with Organizational Characteristics

Basic to any analysis of administrative differences is differences in agency memberships. The nature and the norms of the agency with which an executive is associated and the level of socialization requisite for acceptance into that organization vary substantially. These variations undoubtedly affect members' role attitudes.

Richard Snyder notes a tendency to minimize the importance of formal factors in the emphasis on informal and personality patterns. "To ignore this context," he says, "omits a range of factors which significantly influence the behavior of decision-makers and omits not only the critical problem of how choices are made but also the conditions under which choices are made."¹ Richard Hall, too, holds that the type of activity pursued by an organization (its formal function) can be related to the degree of bureaucratization of that organization.²

The ways in which agencies differ from each other may be as manifold and various as the ways individuals do. And there are equally as many kinds of variables relating to these differences. Anthony Downs in "Inside Bureaucracy"³ discusses twenty three major types of internal, structural and personnel variables connected with organizations including such concerns as communication systems, stability,

¹Snyder, op. cit., p. 19.

²Hall, op. cit., p. 39. See, too, William M. Evan, "Role Strain and the Norm of Reciprocity," American Journal of Sociology, (1962), p. 346, cited by Davis, op. cit., p. 12.

³Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, op. cit.

mixture of officials, etc. J. Eugene Haas, Richard H. Hall, and Norman J. Johnson⁴ construct a taxonomy of organizations from differences in dimensions such as penalties for rule violation, competition with other organizations, interdependency of departments, etc. Milton M. Mandell⁵ develops an administrative judgment test (used by Guetzkow in the early 1960's) based on situational differences in organizations involving centralization, relations of line and staff personnel, criteria of efficiency, leadership, etc. More recently, Pugh, Hickson, Hinings and Turner⁶ compare fifty two English organizations on five structural components-- specialization, standardization, formalization, centralization and configuration (the organization chart), for each of which scales and measures are devised. Amitai Etzioni stresses organization goals in his analysis of organizational effectiveness.⁷ Elsewhere, Etzioni relates organization goals to mechanisms for achieving membership compliance to organization rules and norms.⁸ Degrees of

⁴J. Eugene Haas, Richard H. Hall, and Norman J. Johnson, "Toward an Empirically Derived Taxonomy of Organizations" in Raymond V. Bowers (ed.), Studies on Behavior in Organizations (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1966).

⁵Milton M. Mandell, "The Administrative Judgment Text," Journal of Applied Psychology 34 (1950), pp. 145-147.

⁶D. S. Pugh, D. J. Hickson, C. R. Hinings and C. Turner, "Dimensions of Organization Structure," Administrative Science Quarterly (June, 1968), pp. 65-105.

⁷Amitai Etzioni, Modern Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1964).

⁸Amitai Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1961).

bureaucratization,⁹ rationality,¹⁰ centralization¹¹ and organization energy and esprit¹² are other organization variables looked at by organization theorists and empiricists.

The more complex and sophisticated of these organizational differences cannot be rigorously examined within the present framework. They are mentioned primarily to show how much variety there is in organization characteristics besides the more obvious and easily identifiable ones .

Stephen Bailey has remarked that "new agencies behave differentially from old agencies,"¹³ and Francis Rourke proposes that there is a tendency for bureaucratic organizations to move from an initial period of enthusiasm and energy to a later stage of routinization when organizations lose a good deal of elan.¹⁴ Because of periodic re-organizations within urban bureaucratic structures, a more significant dimension than the age of the agency itself may be the length of time the agency function has been performed by the city. This is particularly true when, as often happens, personnel, files, physical facilities, as well as procedural customs and commitments are transferred virtually intact to the agency newly assuming the function from its predecessor agency. Agency multifunctionality can sometimes muddle the

⁹Berger, op. cit.

¹⁰Norman C. Thomas, op. cit.; and Hall, op. cit.

¹¹Simon, The Shape of Automation, op. cit.; and Haas, Hall and Johnson, op. cit.

¹²Rourke, op. cit., pp. 74-75.

¹³Stephen K. Bailey, "Objectives of the Theory of Public Administration" in Charlesworth (ed.), op. cit., p. 130.

¹⁴Rourke, op. cit., pp. 74-75; Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, op. cit.; Haas, Hall and Johnson, op. cit.; and Haire, et al., op. cit., have also stressed the importance of age as an organization variable.

determination of the age of the function but, on the whole, some degree of accuracy is possible.

From the tendency noted above by Bailey and by Rourke for agencies to become more routinized with age, it was hypothesized that, concomitantly there would be the tendency for executives to hold more traditional views of their policy making roles. It is proposed, therefore, that:

Hypothesis 1a: An implementer orientation will tend to vary directly with the length of time the agency's function has been a city responsibility.

Conversely:

Hypothesis 1b: Formulator and mediator role orientations will tend to vary inversely with the length of time the agency's function has been a city responsibility.

The size of an organization is also widely recognized as a factor affecting the role patterns of members. Haire, Gheselli, et. al.¹⁵ looked at size in relation to managers involvement and satisfactions. James Price¹⁶ compared size and organizational effectiveness. Because hierarchical tendencies accompany growth in size, Louis Gawthrop proposes:

The size of the organization directly affects the role patterns of its members. In the growth of an organization, when that point is reached where top-level organization officials, who are responsible for the formulation of policy decisions, are no longer able to participate in, or supervise directly, the actual implementation of these policy decisions, a basic role dichotomy must

¹⁵Haire, et al., op. cit.

¹⁶James Price, Organizational Effectiveness: An Inventory of Propositions (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin Press, Inc., 1968).

develop within the organization that clearly separates--physically as well as psychologically--the positions of authority from the specialized positions of function.¹⁷

From this it follows that:

Hypothesis 2a: An implementer role orientation will tend to vary directly with the larger the size of an agency:

and

Hypothesis 2b: Formulator and mediator role orientations will tend to vary inversely with the larger the size of an agency.

A constituency variable was suggested by Francis Rourke who identifies agency power with the size, expertise and influence of its clientele and relevant publics.¹⁸ In terms of the present research, it is postulated that, if the public served is the entire population, the contact with that public is more limited so that more traditional attitudinal sets will prevail. On the other hand, if the agency clientele is small and particularized, there might be a tendency to prefer public response over hierarchical direction as a basis for decisions. Therefore:

Hypothesis 3a: An implementer orientation will tend to vary directly with a larger and more generalized constituency served by the agency.

Hypothesis 3b: Formulator and mediator orientations will tend to vary directly with a smaller and more particularized constituency served by the agency.

¹⁷Gawthrop, op. cit., pp. 3-4. See, also, Presthus, op. cit., pp. 27-36 to the same effect.

¹⁸Rourke, op. cit., pp. 63-64.

As important as the nature of the agency to which an executive belongs, is the nature of his relationship to that organization. Although, again, many subtleties about this relationship are outside the scope of this project, one important dimension-- the formal position of the individual within the organizational structure-- can be quite precisely ascertained.

There are two aspects of members' formal position in an agency that warrant investigation. First, some executive classifications, such as chief counsel or chief medical officer, require professional training, which training is intrinsic to the job function. This dimension, though closely related to levels of education and professionalization (both of which will be explored as demographic variables) is nonetheless distinct from them to the extent that the administrator-professional performs a staff function in his capacity as a professional here whereas we find some professionally trained people (i.e. lawyers) who occupy positions in the bureaucracy for which their professional training and experience is not necessary.¹⁹

Consistent with conventional assumptions about the distinctive ideologies that accompany professionalization,²⁰ it is postulated that the formulator orientation is most often found among staff professionals:

Hypothesis 4a: A formulator orientation will tend to vary directly with an executive's position as a staff professional.

Hypothesis 4b: Implementer and mediator orientations will tend to vary directly with general administrative positions.

¹⁹Lowi, op. cit., p. 82, makes this distinction in his non-job oriented classification of some administrators.

²⁰See Rourke, op. cit., p. 95.

The other aspect of formal position involves place in the authority structure. According to Fred Riggs the extent to which a bureaucrat emphasizes his administrative or political functions varies between different bureaucratic positions in the same polity (as well as between different polities).²¹ Gawthrop, too, observes that "decision-making authority should be directly related to formal organizational authority. As the individual progresses upward within the organization, more formal authority is acquired, and at the same time his decision-making responsibilities are increased."²²

This leads us to speculate that rank is directly related to the formulator role and inversely to the implementer one.²³

Hypothesis 5a: A formulator orientation will tend to vary directly with the higher hierarchical position of the member in the agency.

Hypothesis 5b: An implementer orientation will tend to vary directly with the lower hierarchical position of the member in the agency.

While administrators' salaries²⁴ are related to administrative rank, there are

²¹Fred W. Riggs, Jr., "Bureaucratic Politics in Comparative Perspective," Journal of Comparative Administration 1 (May, 1969), pp. 5-46, p. 30.

²²Gawthrop, op. cit., p. 95.

²³See Davis dissertation, op. cit., p. 44; and Leonard I. Pearlin, "Alienation from Work: A Study of Nursing Personnel," American Sociological Review 27 (1962), pp. 314-326, to similar effect.

²⁴Administrative incomes have been examined by Joseph P. Pisciotte and Thomas J. Anton, Provincial Administrators: Profile and Career Patterns of Illinois State Officials, Manpower for Illinois Government: Final Report and Background Papers, Assembly on Manpower for Illinois Government, University of Illinois Bulletin

still sufficient inconsistencies between the two for each to be examined separately. The effect of a higher income though, should be to move the bureaucrat in the same direction as higher position, so that:

Hypothesis 6a: A formulator orientation will tend to vary directly with a higher salary received by an executive.

Hypothesis 6b: An implementer orientation will tend to vary directly with a lower salary received by an executive.

The length of time of membership by an individual in his agency specifically and the larger organization generally is another important consideration. This seniority dimension is as ubiquitous in studies on bureaucracies as rank, having been studied by Lionel S. Lewis²⁵ to ascertain university prestige and institutional loyalty; by Pisciotta and Anton²⁶ and by Dean Mann²⁷ to compare administrators in different systems; and by Clayton Alderfer²⁸ to relate organization variables to need satisfactions.

There is a normal socialization process that occurs with time spent in the same organizational climate. Eldersveld related length of tenure with traditional bureaucratic norms in the expectation that newer executives to government service

No. 65, July 24, 1968, (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1968); and by Wright and McAnaw, op. cit.

²⁵Lionel S. Lewis, "On Loyalty and Prestige of University Faculty," Administrative Science Quarterly 4 (March, 1967), pp. 629-642.

²⁶Pisciotta and Anton, op. cit.

²⁷Mann, op. cit.

²⁸Clayton P. Alderfer, "An Organizational Syndrome," Administrative Science Quarterly 12 (December, 1967), pp. 440-460.

would be "more amenable to and supportive of the democratic norms of . . . administration."²⁹ Following Eldersveld and translating his democratic norms into the mediator role perceptions to which it is most closely akin, we would expect:

Hypothesis 7a: A mediator orientation will tend to vary inversely with the length of time an administrator has been with an agency.

Hypothesis 7b: An implementer orientation will tend to vary directly with the length of time an administrator has been with an agency.

It would also seem to follow that:

Hypothesis 7c: A formulator orientation will tend to vary inversely with the length of time an administrator has been with an agency.

An additional feature of the length of time a civil servant has been in government employ, and one which might affect his role attitudes, is the societal conditions prevailing during the time of his recruitment. Those bureaucrats whose length of service exceeds twenty five years most probably joined the service in a "buyers' market" when employment by city government was considered an attractive opportunity.³⁰ Since then, however, the competition for competent personnel between public and private sectors has left the city at a disadvantage. Dwight Waldo

²⁹Eldersveld, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-90. Alderfer, *op. cit.*, p. 442, agrees that "if the concept of organizational climate is a valid one, then the longer a person stays with an organization, the more he experiences and becomes a part of the climate."

³⁰See Corson and Shale, *op. cit.*

expanded on this disadvantage recently, arguing that the traditional view of public administrators as the efficient implementers of government policy has had a negative recruitment effect of attracting the "least imaginative" and "more stolid" young people.³¹ Assuming that the job situation has become increasingly competitive, Waldo's proposition that less imaginative recruits now enter government service, would result in the opposite of the above hypothesis obtaining so that the newer executives could be expected to be implementers (i.e. ^{less} imaginative, more stolid) and the more senior bureaucrats mediators and/or formulators. Eldersveld was preferred as the source for the propositions about tenure because his empirical approach and classificatory system more nearly resembles this one.

Closely related to period of time during which a civil servant was recruited into service, is the manner of his recruitment. Dean Mann has examined this variable in his analysis of "The Assistant Secretaries"³² as did Macmahon and Millett in the earliest attempt at systematically examining and classifying administrative personnel.³³ Theoretical speculations, too, discuss the effect of means of entry into service on administrative perceptions. For instance, Theodore Lowi³⁴ holds that "the lateral-entry pattern" of recruitment of members to executive positions is anti-bureaucratic. The bureaucratic career follows a pre-arranged pattern which rewards seniority. Lateral-entry executives (professionals-administrators) follow

³¹See Waldo in Charlesworth (ed.), op. cit., p. 201. Also James Q. Wilson, "The Mayor vs. the Cities," Public Interest (Summer, 1969), pp. 25-37.

³²Mann, op. cit.

³³Macmahon and Millett, op. cit.

³⁴Lowi, At the Pleasure of the Mayor, op. cit., p. 66.

a chance pattern and must depend on skill and prominence, rather than seniority. In a similar vein is Fred Riggs who distinguishes between "insiders" whose experiences have been gained within the bureaucracy and "outsiders" with experiences primarily outside the bureaucracy. Riggs hypothesizes from this duality in means of recruitment that "a bureaucracy whose first-level (cabinet) offices are filled predominantly by outsiders drawn from the constitutive system will be more politically responsive to that system than will a bureaucracy whose first-level posts are filled by insiders," and "a bureaucracy whose third-level offices are filled predominantly by insiders will be more administratively capable than one in which posts are predominantly filled by outsiders."³⁵ This can be restated as:

Hypothesis 8a: An implementer orientation will tend to vary directly with recruitment through routinized bureaucratic channels.

Hypothesis 8b: Formulator and mediator orientations will tend to vary directly with lateral entry recruitment into the organization.

For the above organizational characteristics there are relatively objective measurements.³⁶ Not so for the variable organizational loyalty and commitment.

³⁵Fred W. Riggs, "Professionalism, Political Science and the Scope of Public Administration" in Charlesworth (ed.), op. cit., pp. 32-62, p. 55. See, too, Downs, Bureaucratic Structure, op. cit., p. 157.

³⁶Other objective variables exist of course. For instance, extent and nature of experience prior to government employment (see Gawthrop, op. cit., p. 127) or in-service training courses (Eldersveld, et al., op. cit.). The need to keep the numbers of variables within limits dictated omission of some.

Following Berger,³⁷ Hopkins,³⁸ Davis,³⁹ and Bowers⁴⁰ I have adapted some aspects of work involvement such as hours worked, importance of work in an executive's life style and the value placed on various aspects of the work situation as indicators of this dimension.

The effect of organizational loyalty appears often as a major concern of public administration, if we are to credit the innumerable prescriptive works suggesting means for increasing commitments to organizational norms. Levels of organizational loyalty affect members' decision-making behavior to the extent that executives exercise their discretionary judgments in accordance with the preferences of the organization as they see them. As Gawthrop states: "the organization decision-making process will be effective only insofar as each member is prepared to accept the organization's values, attitudes, and beliefs as his own."⁴¹ The sense of loyalty felt by a member to his agency influences his willingness to change in accordance with organizational patterns.⁴²

This viewpoint leads to the postulate that organizational loyalty is positively related to the implementer role, the implementer being the type most willing to conform to the hierarchical structure. But, the findings of James Davis dispute this. Davis hypothesizes that work involvement is unrelated to whether an executive is an

³⁷Berger, op. cit.

³⁸Hopkins, op. cit.

³⁹Davis, op. cit.

⁴⁰Bowers, op. cit.

⁴¹Gawthrop, op. cit., p. 97.

⁴²Ibid., chapters V and VI.

institutionalist or a specialist (similar to implementer and formulator respectively) because organizational identification and professional interests can both generate a high level of work commitment. Contrary to his expectations, Davis found that specialists (i.e. formulators) are much more highly involved in their work.⁴³ The resemblance between Davis' categories and policy role orientations used here directs that hypothetical relationships for this study be based on his:

Hypothesis 9a: A formulator orientation will tend to vary directly with organizational loyalty as determined by work involvement levels of an executive.

Hypothesis 9b: An implementer orientation will tend to vary inversely with organizational loyalty as determined by work involvement levels of an executive.

The final attitudinal variable related to organizations is suggested by the growing importance of unionism in the civil service. According to some views expressed during the 1968 public administration conference, unionism may be one of the most volatile government personnel problems today.⁴⁴ Its effect on the decisional process can be profound if employee demands expressed through collective

⁴³Davis, *op. cit.* Davis' findings accord with Abrahamson, *op. cit.*, p. 8, that "The sense of obligation to, and involvement with, one's work characterizes professionals, but it often runs counter to the type of career commitment demanded by a bureaucracy."

⁴⁴See discussion of Sherman's paper by Bernard L. Gladieux, in Charlesworth (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 299, by Harvey Sherman, *op. cit.*, pp. 276-278. See, too, article by Everett M. Kassalow, "Trade Unionism Goes Public," *Public Interest* 14 (Winter, 1969), pp. 118-130, which discusses the growth of trade unionism among public employees. Also, one of the best attended and most provocative panels at the American Society of Public Administration Convention, April 1970, dealt with "Collective Bargaining in the Public Service."

bargaining agencies inhibit government discretion. In his concern for the continued health of democracy, Frederick Mosher has sounded the alarm that:

The concept of unilateralism (government as sovereign and its decisions, when reached through proper procedures, final) is directly challenged by both collective bargaining and professionalism, each of which demands increasing influence of employees and their organizations upon governmental decisions.⁴⁵

and

The ideal of objective responsibility is increasingly threatened by both professionalization and unionization with their narrower objectives and their foci upon the welfare and advancement of their members.⁴⁶

Mosher's concern that unionism (like professionalism) infringes on the democratic operation of the overall political process would suggest that the formulator role orientation would be most compatible with favorable attitudes to civil service unionism. Thus we get:

Hypothesis 10a: A formulator orientation will tend to vary directly with favorable attitudes to civil service unionism.

Hypothesis 10b: An implementer orientation will tend to vary with unfavorable attitudes to civil service unionism.

3. Hypotheses Concerned with Personal Variables

The personal variables are distinguished by their being relatively objectively determined characteristics basic to an individual's make-up. They are sex, age, education and professional license or identification, if any. Other salient features such as race, religion, and ethnic origins are omitted because these more sensitive

⁴⁵Mosher, op. cit., p. 205.

⁴⁶ibid., pp. 200-209.

areas of inquiry could be expected to arouse a degree of defensiveness or hostility antipathetic to the purposes and needs of the research.

Prior research comparing sex to administrative factors indicates that the sex of an administrator is not associated with policy role attitudes. We, therefore, postulate:

Hypothesis 11a: Administrative policy orientations will be unrelated to his (her) sex.

Of course, because of the functional differences between agencies, we could anticipate disproportionate ratios of men to women by agency. Since differences in orientation by agency already has been proposed as a variable, it may be necessary to determine, where sex differences exist, whether these are attributable to agency membership or to sex.

The age variable, too, is closely identified with an organization variable--length of time in public service. As an independent factor, it is proposed that an executive's age will not affect his role perception.

Hypothesis 12a: Administrative policy orientations will be unrelated to the age of an executive independent of his length of time in public service.

Tens of thousands of pages have been written about the phenomenon of increased specialization--its political and social consequences and its impact on the essentials of organizational structure, function, effectiveness, procedures. Despite the wealth of material dealing with the larger issue, few attempts to explore it empirically have been undertaken. For this study, two elements related to expertise, education and professionalization have been singled out because the

larger concept has not as yet been adequately refined for operational utility.

Education as an indicator of expertise is suggested by Gouldner who uses college degrees as one measure of commitment to skills.⁴⁷ So, too, Pisciotta and Anton in their profile of Illinois State executives identify higher education with specialization.⁴⁸

There are subtleties inherent in the education variable which are beyond the scope of this examination. For instance, what effect does training in different disciplines have on one's perceptual system? In point is Anthony Downs:

Differences in modes of perceiving reality spring from the value structures implicit in the trained outlooks associated with various technical specialties. For example, engineers do not look at problems in the same way that economists do or artists do.⁴⁹

By limiting the study to levels of attainment, we assume that exposure to education in comparable types of institutions over comparable periods of time will produce some uniformities regardless of differences in courses studied during that period of exposure.

Professionalization is more closely related to expertise. Professionals are usually assumed to be competent in some field of expert endeavor. A distinction must be made between professionalization and expertise, however, because of definitional and heuristic problems involved in both concepts as applied to the field of public administration--Is public administration a profession, or not? Are degrees

⁴⁷Gouldner, op. cit., p. 304.

⁴⁸Pisciotta and Anton, op. cit., p. 58.

⁴⁹Downs, Bureaucratic Structure, op. cit., p. 38. To same effect is Mosher, op. cit., p. 169.

in public administration professional degrees? At what level?⁵⁰ If administration is a profession, how can we reconcile the commonly held view that professional norms and bureaucratic norms conflict with each other?⁵¹

The basic elements of professionalism have been enumerated by T. H.

Marshall as:

1. technical efficiency and skill;
2. self protection of the field from unqualified encroachments;
3. a code of ethics;
4. a relationship of trust between professional and client;
5. service orientation to public professional and

Interpreted broadly administrators can be conceived of as having met some of these requirements. Probably to the same degree as some well-recognized professions, they possess skill, rules of ethics, self protective ambitions. Even if we include a further qualification of Marshall's that the professional man does not work in order to be paid but is paid in order to work,⁵³ we can view the public service as idealistically as other service occupations. However, Marshall's specification that there be a unique professional-clientele relationship seems to exclude administrators from

⁵⁰The discussion at the October, 1968, public administration conference dealt extensively with this issue. See Charles worth (ed.), op. cit.

⁵¹Among others, this conflict has been identified by Hall, op. cit., p. 463; Etzioni, op. cit., p. 76; Berger, op. cit., p. 44; Rourke, op. cit., p. 90; Abrahamson, op. cit., pp. 82-83, p. 176; Barney G. Glaser, Organizational Scientist (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964), p. 16; Alan Harrington, Life in the Crystal Palace (London: Jonathan Cape, 1959), p. 82; and Victor A. Thompson, Modern Organizations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961).

⁵²T. H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship and Social Development (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1965), pp. 158-162. See, too, Presthus, op. cit., who includes self-consciousness born of knowledge and desire to control the market for skills as additional components of professionalization.

⁵³ibid.

professional status. Neil Cheek elaborates the idea that the professional is distinguished by his use of skills in behalf of members of society.⁵⁴ The professional acting as a professional within an organization provides those skills with which the organization serves the community. The administrator, on the other hand, uses his skills in order to maintain the organization.⁵⁵

A main concern of Victor Thompson's "Modern Organizations"⁵⁶ is with an inherent conflict he sees between specialization and hierarchy, between the professional qua professional and the administrator. His view, concurred in by such dissimilar observers of the administrative scene as the highly respected Frederick Mosher,⁵⁷ the rather unconventional Theodore Lowi,⁵⁸ participant-commentator Alan Harrington,⁵⁹ seminal thinker Herbert Simon,⁶⁰ scientists Harvey Brooks⁶¹ and Ralph Lapp,⁶² urbanologist Lewis Mumford,⁶³ and organization theorists generally

⁵⁴See Neil Cheek, Jr., "The Social Role of the Professional" in Abrahamson (ed.), op. cit., pp. 9-16, p. 9.

⁵⁵Rourke, op. cit., p. 90, makes a similar distinction. I have rejected as tautological definitions of professionals which include as elements independence from control by layman (Eulau and Sprague, op. cit., pp. 133-143) or self-government in deciding policies, criteria and standards of employment (Mosher, op. cit., p. 124).

⁵⁶Victor A. Thompson, Modern Organizations, op. cit.

⁵⁷Mosher, op. cit., pp. 52, 123, 215.

⁵⁸Lowi, op. cit., p. 59.

⁵⁹Alan Harrington, op. cit., p. 82.

⁶⁰Simon, op. cit., p. 113.

⁶¹Brooks, op. cit., p. 69.

⁶²Lapp, op. cit., p. 228

⁶³Lewis S. Mumford, "Authoritarian and Democratic Technics," Technology and Culture 5 (1964), p. 1.

such as Robert Golembiewski,⁶⁴ Mark Abrahamson⁶⁵ and Francis Rourke⁶⁶ holds that the specialists' needs for independence conflict with monocratic organizational needs. Sociologist Amitai Etzioni too, speaks of the conflict between the "highly individualized principle" of the expert which is "diametrically opposed" to the organization requisites of control and co-ordination by superiors.⁶⁷ In contradistinction to the ultimate justification for specialist action which is generally recognized to be the right act to the best of his knowledge, the "ultimate justification of an administrative act...is that it is in line with the organization's rules and regulations, and that it has been approved--directly or by implication--by a superior rank."⁶⁸

The specialist's ultimate reliance on his own competence and knowledge has deep implications if and when they become major forces within the public service. Scientist-philosopher Jacob Bronowki expresses his fears of increasing specialist influence in the public domain: "A world run by the specialists for the ignorant is and will be a slave world."⁶⁹

Even benign views of "a world run by the specialists" suggest the relationship between administrative formulators and specialization. Thus Donald N. Michael writes that "given the convergence of the powerful technologies and our already

⁶⁴Golembiewski, op. cit.

⁶⁵Abrahamson, op. cit., pp. 82, 126.

⁶⁶Rourke, op. cit., p. 97.

⁶⁷Etzioni, Modern Organizations, op. cit., p. 76.

⁶⁸ibid.

⁶⁹cited by Lapp, op. cit., p. 228.

enormously complex and huge society, it would seem that social manipulation will be necessary if we are to introduce appropriate changes in society at appropriate times."⁷⁰

To determine whether an administrator should be classified as a professional or not, I used one of the symbols of expertise which invariably accompanies professional status in our society--namely, a license or diploma in a recognized professional field such as law, medicine, engineering, architecture, graduate social work, teaching.⁷¹ Using this standard for professionalism and applying the policy role typology to the basic contradictions between hierarchy and specialization which is evident in the literature, we derive the following hypotheses:⁷²

Hypothesis 13a: A formulator orientation will tend to vary directly with professionalization.

Hypothesis 13b: An implementer orientation will tend to vary inversely with professionalization.

Inasmuch as serving the public has been defined as a norm of professionalism,

⁷⁰Donald N. Michael, "Some Speculations on the Social Impact of Technology" in Morse and Warner (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 118-154, p. 132. See, too, Don K. Price, *The Scientific Estate* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1965), for a sanguine view of expert policy roles.

⁷¹See Kilpatrick, et al., *op. cit.*, p. 37, and David T. Stanley, *Professional Personnel*, *op. cit.*, p. 243, for similar formal criteria for determining professional status. Warner, Meeker and Eulls also have a comparable scale for rating occupations in Delbert C. Miller, *Handbook of Research Design and Social Measurement* (New York: David McKay Co., 1964), pp. 103-104.

⁷²Peabody, *op. cit.*, p. 78, has similarly hypothesized that the more professionally oriented the workers, the greater the degree of self-determination exercised by them. See, too, for similar formulations, Marilyn Gittell, "Address to League Conference, November 14, 1967," *National Civic Review*, p. 22; and Wilensky, *op. cit.*, p. 304.

the further hypothesis with regard to the mediator role is derived:

Hypothesis 13c: A mediator orientation will tend to vary directly with professionalization.

Education as our second measurement of expertise would be similarly related to policy role types. Hypotheses concerned with this aspect are:

Hypothesis 14a: A formulator orientation will tend to vary directly with higher levels of education.

Hypothesis 14b: An implementer orientation will tend to vary inversely with higher levels of education.

Hypothesis 14c: A mediator orientation will tend to vary directly with higher levels of education.

4. Hypotheses Concerned with Sociological Characteristics

The sociological variables of interest to us here are social mobility, geographic mobility and group identity. In choosing these particular characteristics for attention, tradition is being closely followed. Geographic mobility and social origins are the factors most often explored by sociologists in connection with differences in such diverse characteristics as career patterns,⁷³ innovative capacity,⁷⁴ attitudes to public employment,⁷⁵ degrees of bureaucratization,⁷⁶ executive self-image,

⁷³Macmahon and Millett, op. cit.

⁷⁴Pisciotta and Anton, op. cit.

⁷⁵H. George Frederickson, "Understanding Attitudes Toward Public Employment," Public Administration Review XXVII (December, 1967), pp. 411-420.

⁷⁶Berger, op. cit.

motivation and satisfaction,⁷⁷ selection and recruitment means,⁷⁸ and representativeness.⁷⁹ The group identity variable relies on the well-known cosmopolitan-local analysis of Gouldner.⁸⁰

The standards used here to assess these three aspects of an individual's social make-up are only partially explanatory. Each of the concepts involves a mass of intricacies and nuances far too complex for exhaustive investigation by a single researcher. For the present purposes, one or two principle components of the larger factor were isolated and measured to suggest the relevance of sociological variables to decision-making orientations. For social mobility, differences in educational attainments between respondents and their fathers is the basis for analysis. For geographic mobility, there is the nature of the places in which respondents were reared as a guide, and for cosmopolitan-local differentiation, organization memberships and intra-organizational contacts are used.

Social mobility is usually defined as the process by which individuals or groups of individuals move from one stratum of society to another.⁸¹ To determine the rate of this process for our New York City executives, differences in educational

⁷⁷Hopkins, op. cit.

⁷⁸Dean E. Mann, "Selection of Political Executives," American Political Science Review 58 (1964), pp. 81-99.

⁷⁹Warner, Van Riper, et al., op. cit.; Cummings, Jennings, Kilpatrick, op. cit.; and Wright and McAnaw, op. cit.

⁸⁰Gouldner, op. cit.

⁸¹See, for instance, Seymour Martin Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, Social Mobility in Industrial Society (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1959), p. 6; and Pitirim A. Sorokin, Social and Cultural Mobility (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1959), p. 23.

levels between generations was examined.⁸² A single dimension is obviously a limited standard for appraisal but it is the only feasible one within this context.

On a theoretical plane, the sociologist Pitirim Sorokin links education with social selection and movement. He holds:

Up to the last few years, the school was regarded primarily as an educational institution. Its social function was seen in 'pouring' into a student a definite amount of knowledge, and, to some extent, in shaping his behavior. The testing, the selective, and the distributive functions of the school were almost completely overlooked, although these functions of the school are scarcely less important than that of "enlightenment" and "education."...At the present moment it is certain that the school, while being a "training and educational" institution, is at the same time, a piece of social machinery, which tests the abilities of the individuals, which sifts them, selects them, and decides their prospective social position.⁸³

Social mobility has been held to have its own distinguishing characteristics so that, regardless of the particular position held at one time, the mobile individual may be other-oriented than his status equals who are more socially stable.⁸⁴ David Reisman suggests that one consequence of changed social position may be an increased desire for security. Referring to "Fortune" surveys about this matter, he questions the desirability of social climbing because it leads to a preference for safe and secure jobs over risky ones. The Reisman view adapts to bureaucratic attitudes to the extent

⁸² Similar usage of educational levels are found in Berger, op. cit. and Pisciotta and Anton, op. cit.

⁸³ Sorokin, op. cit., p. 188. See, too, Marshall, op. cit., p. 121.

⁸⁴ See V. Subramaniam, "Representative Bureaucracy: A Re-Assessment," American Political Science Review LXI (December, 1967), pp. 1010-1019, p. 1014; and Lipset and Bendix, op. cit.; Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1963), pp. 209-218, refers to Studies in the United States, Germany, Sweden, Finland and Norway which show greater participation in voting by non-mobile individuals.

the implementer role represents the safer, more conservative approach to one's functions and the formulator and mediator roles represent more responsibility and therefore more risk.⁸⁵ It then follows that:

Hypothesis 15a: An implementer orientation will tend to vary directly with greater educational distance between an executive and his father (greater social mobility).

Hypothesis 15b: Formulator and mediator orientations will tend to vary inversely with the greater educational distance between an executive and his father (greater social mobility).

Few findings of previous research report attitudinal and behavioral differences attributable to geographic origin although this is an oft-examined variable.⁸⁶ Nor is there reason to believe that place of rearing, the geographic variable selected for this examination, will have more relevance to policy role perceptions. It is, therefore, proposed that:

Hypothesis 16a: Policy orientations will be unrelated to the geographic origins of executives.

The effects of group memberships on an individual is a major concern in all the behavioral sciences. In political science the preferred concept of democracy--pluralism--uses group identity, participation, conflict and access as a foundation. According to this view, decision making results from the activities of organized groups

⁸⁵David Reisman, The Lonely Crowd (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1950), p. 65.

⁸⁶See for instance, Cummings, et al., op. cit., Mann, op. cit., Warner, et al., op. cit., Eldersveld, et al., op. cit., Hopkins, op. cit., Wahlke, et al., op. cit., Berger, op. cit.

impinging on the deliberative process--"the sum total of group activities becomes translated into a decision."⁸⁷

By direct application of pluralist doctrine to public administration, the proposal might be made that spokesman for the interests affected by an agency be situated in strategic positions within it.⁸⁸ If indeed this prescription were followed, a mediator role would be the preferred orientation. However, in fact, a much more complex situation prevails than the isomorphic one between interest and administration posited by advocates of "representative bureaucracy."

There is another simplistic approach to administrative propriety which is in direct opposition to executive interest group advocacy. According to the "reformer" approach, civil servants should maximize their objectivity by refraining from membership in any special interest group.⁸⁹ Inconsistently, however, while discouraging interest group activity, reformist thinking approves of professional group memberships, implying thereby that there is no interest articulation involved in professional associations.

In the preceding sections, though, it has been maintained that professionalization can have a profound impact on individual perceptions. Memberships in professional organizations which indicate stronger ties to the profession and which re-inforce the norms and ideals of that profession is consequently as salient a factor in affecting attitudinal sets and behaviors as is membership in other, albeit less

⁸⁷Macridis, op. cit., p. 46.

⁸⁸See Kaufman, op. cit., p. 5; and Gawthrop, op. cit., p. 78.

⁸⁹See description of this view in Banfield and Wilson, op. cit.

prestigious and more controversial societies. Banfield and Wilson illustrate this point:

A city planner, engineer, doctor, accountant, or purchasing agent who is a member of and oriented toward an outside professional group which sets standards and defines "proper" conduct may value his standing in these circles sufficiently to challenge local elective officials even at the risk of his job.⁹⁰

This "objectivity maximization" approach to administration also has a tendency to discount and discredit the controls which group identity even without actual group membership exert. Psychologists Katz and Kahn have examined this process of identification in an organizational setting:

The executive not only follows the norms of his own organizational family; he is also affected by outside groups with which he identifies. Such groups tend to be at his own level of power and status, or somewhat above it. The information and values of these outside groups are given more weight than similar inputs from groups of lower status and power...The process of identification refers to his emotional ties with groups of the same or superior power to which he turns and to which he may defer.⁹¹

To the same effect is Eulau and Sprague who hold that non-organizational influences limit the effects of the socialization process within the organization.⁹²

Empirically, reference group identity has been given its most thorough application in connection with the cosmopolitan-local typology developed by Alvin

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 219. Norman Thomas, *op. cit.*, p. 7, also equates professional group influences with interest articulation. Gouldner concurs, *op. cit.*, p. 288.

⁹¹ Katz and Kahn, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-86.

⁹² Eulau and Sprague, *op. cit.*, pp. 123-124. See, too, Merton, *op. cit.* supported by George Homans, *Social Behavior* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961), Presthus, *op. cit.*, and Herbert H. Hyman and Eleanor Singer, *Readings in Reference Group Theory and Research* (New York: Free Press, 1968), and others.

Gouldner.⁹³ Studies that use this analytical framework suggest that the levels of "outer" (non-employing agency) group references may be related to attitudes to decision-making responsibilities. Gouldner, himself, hypothesized that people with an outer reference group orientation tended to be higher on skills.⁹⁴ Marvick, expressly basing his work on Gouldner's proposed an identification between specialists who tended to adopt skill-bound perspectives and cosmopolitans who have stronger "outer" group references.⁹⁵ William R. Rosengren and Mark Abrahamson⁹⁶ both suggest that organizational independence and cosmopolitanism are positively associated and Harry Joseph Hartley⁹⁷ that non-conformity may be a concomitant of high outer group references.

The qualities examined in these studies--non-conformity, independence, specialization, skill component--are all partially descriptive at least of the formulator policy role type. From this it follows that the formulator role is directly related with greater outer group references (cosmopolitanism) and the implementer role with less outer group references (localism). The mediator, too, would seem to be more "outer" reference group directed than the implementer, more cosmopolitan, so that he, too, would tend to the cosmopolitan type.

It was impossible within the confines of examining the problem of administrative

⁹³Gouldner, op. cit.

⁹⁴Ibid., p. 294.

⁹⁵Marvick, op. cit.

⁹⁶William R. Rosengren, "Sociologists in Medicine: Contexts and Careers," in Abrahamson (ed.), op. cit., pp. 143-155; and Abrahamson, op. cit.

⁹⁷Hartley, op. cit.

decision-making orientations to absorb the full richness of the work already done on cosmopolitan-local differences. For operational manageability only some dimensions of the cosmopolitan-local dichotomy that had previously been used could be included. Specifically, memberships in voluntary and professional associations were examined--cosmopolitans conceived of as those with most memberships and positions in outside organizations and locals with least .

Hypothesis 17a: The formulator role orientation will tend to vary directly with greater identification with professional organizations.

Hypothesis 17b: The mediator role orientation will tend to vary directly with greater identification with voluntary (non-professional) organizations.

Hypothesis 17c: The implementer role orientation will tend to vary inversely with greater group memberships.

Gouldner also looked into the numbers of intra-organizational people the respondents knew well as an element in perceptual differences. Assuming that intra-organization contacts mitigate role conflicts (the pulls of cosmopolitanism), we hypothesize:

Hypothesis 18a: Formulator and mediator role orientations will tend to vary inversely with the numbers of people an executive knows well within his organization.

Hypothesis 18b: An implementer role orientation will tend to vary directly with the numbers of people an executive knows well within his organization.

A final aspect of cosmopolitan-local differences was examined in terms of

self-identification. Locals would be expected to describe their occupations in terms of the organization while cosmopolitans by referring to some outside factor. It is posited that:

Hypothesis 19a: Formulator and mediator role orientations will tend to vary directly with self-identification in non-organizational terms.

Hypothesis 19b: An implementer role orientation will tend to vary directly with self-identification in organizational terms.

The analysis in the following chapters VIII, IX and X has been guided by these propositions. But, before turning to this analysis, the methodology for the field work and the utility of the theoretical models will be discussed.

Part II - Methodology

VI

Research Procedures and Strategies

1. Background of the Research

The theoretical framework of a study dictates the problems selected as relevant. The nature of the problem then guides the methodology for the research. The best methodology is that which is most effective in explaining the phenomena to be examined.¹ Under most circumstances political phenomena are most effectively explained comparatively. The single case gains meaning and significance only in relation to other comparable cases despite some sacrifice of detail and loss of the sense of uniqueness of each discrete event or characteristic. Lipset, to this effect, argues that, "Any comparison means the sacrifice of a great deal of detail, much of it important information. Yet to draw comparisons from only partly comparable data is the essence of human thought."² At a recent conference Melvin Richter called "comparison, not casual and impressionistic but sustained and disciplined... one of the distinctive qualities of our intellectual tradition."³ Reinforcing his argument he cited Montesquieu that "comparison is indispensable for the analysis of human collectivities. If we seek to know why they have the characteristics that

¹See Robert L. Peabody, "Research on Congress: A Coming of Age" in Ralph K. Huitt and Robert L. Peabody (eds.), Congress: Two Decades of Analysis (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), p. 5.

²Seymour Martin Lipset, Introduction to T. H. Marshall, op. cit.

³Melvin Richter, "Comparative Political Analysis in Montesquieu and Tocqueville," Comparative Politics 1 (January, 1969), pp. 129-160, p. 131.

they do, our search is best carried on by reference to general effects learned from comparison of many cases...;"⁴ and Tocqueville that "the mind can gain clarity only through comparison...if any general statements are to be made about social institutions, they can only be made by comparison between the same type of institution in a wide range of societies."⁵ Roy Macridis similarly asserts that "the function of comparative study is to identify uniformities and differences and to explain them."⁶

Professor Macridis then goes on to enumerate the steps necessary for comparative study as:

1. The collection and description of facts on the basis of carefully constructed and generally adhered to classificatory schemes,
2. the discovery and description of uniformities and differences,
3. the foundation of interrelationships between component elements of the political process and other social phenomena in the form of tentative hypotheses,
4. the subsequent verification of such tentative hypotheses by rigorous empirical observation for the purpose of amplifying the original hypotheses and ultimately verifying them; and finally,
5. the slow cumulative process of acceptance of certain basic propositions.⁷

The methodology here is basically an adaption of the components of the scientific approach(statement of problem, drawing up hypotheses, deductive elaboration of how to test problem and verification or restatement with modifications of the

⁴cited by ibid., p. 136.

⁵cited by ibid., p. 136.

⁶Macridis, op. cit., p. 1. See, too, Martin Landau, "The Concept of Decision Making" in Mailick and Van Ness, op. cit., p. 24, which criticizes Harold Stein's case method.

⁷Macridis, op. cit., p. 4.

problem).⁸ My explorations into bureaucratic attitudes to decision making follow these prescribed procedures as closely as possible.

The selection of a significant problem of concern in the field of administrative theory and its statement in empirically meaningful terms, the construction of a classificatory system sufficient to investigate the problem, the analysis of previous findings about uniformities and differences relating to the problem and the development of tentative hypotheses about the possible interrelationships of component parts of the problem were all derived after an intensive investigation into the body of literature on public administration. The specific formulations growing out of this investigation have been set forth at great length in Part I. In searching the literature for possibly relevant research and theoretical propositions, reference was made to unpublished dissertations, unpublished monographs (where available), newspaper reports, as well to the more commonly used journal articles and published books.

Step four in Professor Macridis' enumeration calls for the empirical verification or modification of the hypotheses through empirical work. This requires a real and specific field for observation and tools to pursue this observation systematically and rigorously. In this chapter the efforts to meet these requirements are discussed. (Professor Macridis' fifth step calling for the cumulative acceptance of propositions must await considerable further work, of course.)

⁸Discussion with Dennis Palumbo. See also, Kilpatrick, et al., op. cit., discussion of developmental research.

2. Selection of the Field of Study

To empirically explore a problem and test hypotheses one must have sources of data. Which particular universe is designated for data collection may profoundly affect the findings and conclusions of a study. Unless a random sample is drawn from a total population, statistical inference to any group other than the one being examined is not warranted. Since, therefore, deductive logic must be relied on the more significant the group under study, or the more reflective it is of similarly positioned groups elsewhere, the more meaningful does this deduction become.

Random sampling as a means for pursuing this research was considered and rejected. It was not feasible in terms of resources available to examine populations with members spread over the nation, either at a state or local level, either all bureaucracies engaged in like functions, or all in the same hierarchical position. Further, to examine all bureaucrats engaged in like functions or all in similar positions results in the loss of some important variables--differences in agency function and differences in position. This loss was not felt to be sufficiently offset by the benefits to be derived from a random sample of a still restricted population.

A study of bureaucratic decision-making seems particularly relevant at the urban level. Urban agencies are assigned a larger proportion of governmental functions than are comparable bodies at other government levels.⁹ It is at the local level, too, that more distrust and hostility exist to traditional politics and politicians,

⁹This can be deduced from the greater stress on administrative functions over legislative in the literature and in courses on local government.

that reform movements have been strongest and most successful and that, as a result, administrators who are theoretically supposed to be free of the taint of politics, are given wide latitude. The further assumption that technical, non-political problems characterize the bulk of municipal operations adds to the degree of influence over public policy that administrators can exert.¹⁰

In addition, urban problems today are of such saliency that empirical work about such a pervasive and prominent organ of city operations is needed. Phrases such as "urban crisis," "urban ills," "urban decay" indicate the growing concern with which our cities are viewed. There is hardly a thoughtful observer of the American scene who does not set revitalization of the cities as a high if not the highest priority for national attention.

And New York City, though hardly typical of other American cities, magnifies and dramatizes the conditions existing ubiquitously. The size of the New York City administrative mechanism, second only to the federal service and larger than any single state's bureaucracy gives added importance and interest to any data gathered and explored about it--its operations, its character, the nature and attitudes of its personnel.

A number of criteria guided the choice of the agencies and positions within the New York City bureaucracy that could be expected to yield the most productive data. Random sampling of all personnel was again considered and discarded in favor of examining all people holding specified executive positions within certain agencies.

¹⁰Banfield and Wilson, *op. cit.*, argue against the usual approach to city government as an exercise in technique. They make a convincing case for the position that city government is politics.

An impression in looking at recent empirical work on social and political behavior is that total population studies are preferred to random samplings. Although it is theoretically possible to project one's findings from a random sample to a larger population, the distortions arising from respondent refusals are exaggerated if the non-respondent population is not random. A researcher cannot assume that non-respondents share the same characteristics in the same proportion as respondents do. This, of course, biases the sample, the extent of which depends on the differences between respondents and non-respondents--something which cannot be ascertained for all dimensions. In a field such as public administration, where certain functions are in much more sensitive areas than others, the extent of this bias could be expected to be substantial.¹¹

The sample population decided on was all executive level personnel below the position of commissioner in six city agencies. Personnel holding titles from deputy commissioner to assistant division chief including staff professionals such as chief medical officer, chief counsel, chief architect, etc. were questioned at the departments of Corrections, Highways, Sanitation, Traffic, Social Services and the Housing Authority.

To determine which agencies to examine, a primary consideration was the length of time the city had performed the function now assigned to that agency. In some cases the same agency was still performing the function as originally assumed by the city. However, in many cases, administrative re-organizations had resulted

¹¹This assumption was supported by the results of the field work. Originally eight agencies were asked to cooperate in this study. The participation of six was satisfactory to excellent. Two, however, were indifferent about responding and the erratic returns from them have not been included.

in newly created agencies taking over functions of older origins. The age of the function rather than the agency was then the decisive factor. The concern here was to get a distribution between old, established city services and more recently undertaken ones.

The nature of that function was a second factor. Only agencies performing line functions were selected. The expectation was that their more direct contacts with the public as well as their intra-governmental place within the regular chain of command might result in greater diversity among personnel than would be true at the more specialized staff agencies.

An expectation of diversity of orientation of personnel within an agency according to agency function also guided the choice. Some agencies seem to deal with more controversial issues. The values underlying services in some are likely to be in conflict, whereas, in others, relative consensus exists around values, and conflicts tend to center on factual not normative matters. Agencies representing each of these types are part of this study. However, those agencies with exceptional levels of controversy over the nature of their services have been excluded in the belief that their extreme sensitivity to examination would result in inadequate response levels and a greater self-consciousness and distortion in the responses that did come forth.

The final factor weighed was the size of the executive force. No agency with fewer than fourteen top officials was included. This assures a sufficient number of returns from each agency to permit agency membership to be used as a variable.

Only high level personnel were questioned because of their more significant impact on public policy. Employees of all ranks make decisions, i.e. exercise

discretionary judgment. Many of these choices can incrementally affect policy formulation. However, it is the upper level administrator whose job is dominated by decision making,¹² whose choices are less likely to be routine, and who, therefore, have the profoundest influence within the political system.

Once the criteria for choice were determined, the specific agencies fulfilling the specifications had to be chosen from among all city agencies. Because of the paucity of material on the city bureaucracy, this is not a simple, mechanical task. Instead, it involves extensive inquiry into such things as annual reports, public relations and promotional brochures and publications, procedural and regulation descriptions and organizational charts, as well as discussions with knowledgeable people within the city structure.¹³ On the basis of such an inquiry and with reference to the few general works dealing with New York City government,¹⁴ the following six agencies were picked as the universe for examining administrative attitudes to policy making.

¹²Simon, Administrative Behavior, op. cit., distinguishes between "horizontal specialization" which is the traditional work of administrative operative personnel and the decision making by supervisory personnel which he calls "vertical specialization."

¹³The New York City Director of Personnel, The Honorable Solomon Hoberman, was of great help in this direction.

¹⁴Thelma E. Smith, Guide to the Municipal Government of the City of New York (New York: Record Press, Inc., 1960) 8th ed.; Theodore H. Lang, Evaluation of the Personnel Function as Administered in Operating Agencies of the Municipal Government of the City of New York (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, June, 1950); Demetrios Caraley, New York City's Deputy Mayor-City Administrator: Accomplishments, Problems and Potentialities, (New York: Citizens Budget Commission, 1966); Theodore J. Lowi, op. cit.; Wallace Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, Governing New York City (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1960).

1. Department of Correction: Established as a separate department in 1895, the Department of Corrections took over the correction function from the Department of Welfare which had had supervision since 1784. The department has jurisdiction over city custodial institutions including nine prisons, thirty six court detention pens and three hospital prison wards, caring for an average inmate population of over 10,000 daily or 300,000 annually. Wide differences of opinion exist between persons working in the field of correction over whether a rehabilitative or custodial approach should prevail.¹⁵ We can therefore, assume substantial disagreements in this field over values and norms.

There were sixteen central office executives and seventeen top administrators at the different facilities below the rank of commissioner at the time of this study.

2. Department of Highways: The Department of Highways was organized recently, taking over its functions from the "Roads" bureau of the Department of Public Works which had been established in 1849. It is responsible for street conditions and street locations within the city. Relatively little conflict over the values involved in the performance of these services is projected.¹⁶ Differences are more likely to arise over questions of fact.

The department is headed by a commissioner who had twenty three executives under him during the time of this study.

3. Department of Sanitation: In 1803 "A law was passed appointing a Superintendent of Scavengers to see to the cleaning of the public streets and

¹⁵Information based on Thelma Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 210-215; New York City Department of Correction: Annual Reports, 1967, 1966; Statistical Report, 1967.

¹⁶City of New York: Department of Highways: Annual Report, 1967; Thelma Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 102-105.

grounds,"¹⁷ In 1834 street cleaning was made a separate department and in 1930 the present Department of Sanitation was established. Only in recent years has it come to light that discretionary actions over sanitation operations can generate much controversy and even have substantial electoral effects. In 1969, the snow removal priorities set by the Department of Sanitation had profound political implications for the mayoralty election. Despite this, on the whole, the sanitation function's conflicts would seem to arise more over factual matters than normative ones.¹⁸

At the time of this study there were thirty seven top level administrators under the sanitation commissioner.

4. Housing Authority: The Authority was established in 1934 under State Law as a public corporation to provide and maintain low cost housing for low income people in New York City and to clear and rehabilitate slum areas. There is a Board of three members supervising an executive staff of ninety-one.¹⁹

Conflicts in this department probably arise over both fact and value. Different opinions about how much housing for the needy should be built, about where such housing should be located and how it should be provided (i.e. vest pocket housing or massive slum clearance and renewal programs) involve normative judgments in providing services.

¹⁷Thelma Smith, op. cit., p. 142.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 142-147; City of New York, Department of Sanitation: Annual Reports 1963, 1964; New York Times, February, 1969.

¹⁹New York City Housing and Development Administration: Handbook, 1968; Thelma Smith, op. cit., pp. 126-128.

5. Department of Traffic: In 1949 a "Traffic Commission" was established which, two years later, was organized as a separate department to formulate and establish traffic regulations, conduct surveys on the extent of pedestrian and vehicular mobility, approve traffic control devices and disseminate traffic safety information. The Department shares with the Police Department in the enforcement of many of its regulations. On the whole, it is probable that traffic concerns involve questions of fact rather than value, although some of the latter is bound to arise from time to time.²⁰

There were fourteen executives under the Traffic Commissioner in early 1969.

6. Department of Social Services: Although some city responsibility for poor people dates back to 1784, when a Commissioner to oversee almshouses was appointed, the custodial character of this responsibility (as evidenced by the fact that the corrections and "public charity" were both pursued together until 1895) distinguishes it significantly from the "welfare" concept adopted by the department during the 1920's and 1930's. It was during this time that the name was changed from "Public Charities" to the Department of Public Welfare first and then to the Department of Welfare. When the Human Resources Administration came into being in 1967 as one of the super-agencies under Mayor Lindsey's re-organization plan, the department became one of its components under the new name of the Department of Social Services. The problem of how to eliminate poverty in the midst of affluence is one about which little if any consensus exists. This would result in

²⁰City of New York Department of Traffic: Annual Reports, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967; Thelma Smith, op. cit., pp. 209-210.

substantial disagreements in value judgments about the functions of the department.²¹

The Commissioner of Social Services headed an executive staff of thirty eight members during the time this study was made.

3. Collection of Data

An instrumental device to gather data is a requisite for translating a theoretical problem into research terms. To the extent the instrument corresponds with the theory, is consistent and pertinent to it, to that extent will the field work contribute to knowledge about the larger problem. Empirical evidence relates to broader concerns only as it uses valid means for acquiring relevant information.

Data about administrative attitudes was collected for this study through a self-administered questionnaire. This was supplemented by material available elsewhere which gives some background information about New York City personnel and agency characteristics.

The decision to use a self-questionnaire was made after weighing the relative advantages and disadvantages of alternate means for conducting an attitudinal survey of public administrator-respondents. The most persuasive reasons were:

1. The personal inter-action between interviewer and interviewee may influence the nature of a response. One can expect that mood and attitude will be a less significant factor when a relatively neutral piece of paper rather than a

²¹City of New York, Annual Report of Mayor John V. Lindsey, 1967; Thelma Smith, op. cit., pp. 148-155.

human interrogator confronts the respondent.²²

2. A written questionnaire allows the respondent to visually check both the questions and his responses. Though loss of accuracy due to faulty reading is always possible, it may be less distorting than the effects of faulty hearing when the opportunity to review the material is limited. Further, verbal facility probably varies more significantly than the ability to read a fairly simple questionnaire. Thus, the degree of articulateness is a factor in oral responses.²³

3. The biases of an interviewer may influence the interpretation of results in an interview. In 1929 Stuart A Rice noted that interviewers with strong attitudes about social causation of poverty found responses among charity applicants conforming with their predispositions. Thus prohibitionists found three times as many responses blaming drink, and socialists twice as many blaming industrial factors for economic dependency.²⁴ Greater sophistication in techniques have evolved since this early study but interviewer inferences and interpretations is still a more important consideration with interviewer-administered instruments.

4. The literature favors questionnaire over interview schedules for validity because the latter involves too great flexibility and nuance possibilities. Rarely is more than one answer given to a written question so there is no overlap and no necessity to assign priorities for more than one answer.²⁵

²²See Eulau and Sprague, op. cit., pp. 148, 154-155; John Galtung, Theory and Methods of Social Research (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967); Rosenthal and Jacobson, op. cit., p. 28.

²³See Wahlke, et al., op. cit., p. 440.

²⁴Cited by Rosenthal and Jacobson, op. cit., p. 22.

²⁵Galtung, op. cit.; Wahlke, et al., op. cit., p. 440

5. Time is a less trenchant concern in answering written material. A respondent may choose his own time to complete the questionnaire so the effects of interruptions or counter-demands on his attention are minimized.

6. Depending on the nature of the respondents, some hostility or suspicion is present when the interviewer takes notes during the meeting. In direct face to face contact, a tendency to resent having one's ideas or thoughts recorded is common. If no notes are made at the time of the interview, recollections made even immediately afterwards are more likely to suffer from inaccuracies.²⁶ Written answers are under the control of the writer and, therefore, less suspect.

7. An advantage of interviewing is that open-ended questions permit a spontaneity and freedom of response suggesting saliency of items to the respondent.²⁷ On the other hand, open-ended questions resist rigorous, systematic treatment. Often answers can be coded in several categories. There is a loss of information in transmitting it from verbal to written form. Ratings by judges may be necessary to interpret the meaning of a response. Differences in candor in replying is more consequential when wider discretion is available.

Categorical or structured questions and semi-structured questions are suitable for self-administered questionnaires. A structured test minimizes the resort to "response set" answers such as "no opinion" or "yes" because the alternatives are specified. And, of course, answers can be more easily tabulated and analyzed because they are clear and unequivocal. No interpretation is necessary to assign

²⁶Berger, op. cit., for instance, took no notes during his interviews presumably for this reason.

²⁷Eulau and Sprague, op. cit., pp. 154-155; Kilpatrick, et al., op. cit., pp. 11-12.

responses to categories. More precise statistical methods can, therefore, be employed.

The validity of any questionnaire depends on the extent to which it tests the research problem. To test the validity of the present questionnaire, a panel of expert opinion was solicited besides pre-testing the instrument and discussing it with knowledgeable advisers.

The questionnaire had to apply to all top-level executives (except commissioners) in a wide range of agencies and functions. References to innumerable (even tangentially relevant) studies concerned with bureaucratic personnel or with attitudinal sets or with role theory, helped in the development of such an instrument.²⁸ The instrument, preliminarily devised, embodied a variety of approaches for eliciting information so that those techniques that were potentially most fruitful could be discovered. For the sake of validity, too, attempts were made to measure the same trait through different means.²⁹ The clarity and the format of the instrument and the extent to which it avoided directed responses was checked with a professional survey researcher.³⁰ At the same time, consultations were had with a number of

²⁸References used for the questionnaire include: Berger, op. cit.; Bowers, op. cit.; Eulau and Sprague, op. cit.; Gouldner, op. cit.; Gross, Mason and McEachern, op. cit.; Haire, Ghiselli and Porter, op. cit.; Hopkins, op. cit.; Mandell, op. cit.; Marvick, op. cit.; Martin Patchin, "Alternative Questionnaire Approaches to the Measurement of Influence in Organizations," American Journal of Sociology (July, 1963), pp. 42-45; Peabody, Organizational Authority, op. cit.; Carroll L. Shartle, Executive Performance and Leadership (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1956); Stouffer, op. cit.; Wahlke, et al., op. cit.; Warner, et al. op. cit.; Wilensky, op. cit.; Zisk, Eulau and Prewitt, op. cit.

²⁹Campbell and Fiske, in Martin Fishbein (ed.), Readings in Attitude Theory and Measurement (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967), stress the importance of this.

³⁰I sought and received the advice of field supervisor, Mrs. Lucille Kolkin, of a survey research organization.

experts in the field of public administration about the relationship of the questionnaire to the theoretical concerns and classificatory scheme of the problem.³¹ I also sought the advice of people within the New York City administrative structure about whether particular terminologies or approaches were more likely to produce relevant responses from this particular group of respondents.³²

A revised questionnaire was submitted to a twelve member panel of judges consisting of administrative practitioners and students and theoreticians of public administration,³³ together with a covering letter and explanatory note describing the aims of the research and the policy role types proposed for classifying administrators.³⁴ The judges were asked to evaluate which responses should be assigned to which role type categories. The purpose of this was to validate the usefulness of the instrument in relation to the research problem. As a result of the returns from the panel, one analytical category was eliminated as too ambiguous and those questions about which there was no consensus in classification were also dropped.

Again revisions in the questionnaire were made and a pre-test undertaken of a city agency not being considered for the final study. Efforts were made to keep the conditions of the pre-test as close as possible to those expected to be used for

³¹Professors Blanche D. Blank, Dennis Palumbo, and Norman Powell.

³²The Honorable Solomon Hoberman and Frances Goldberger of the New York City Department of Personnel.

³³The panel consisted of Professors Blanche D. Blank, Dennis Palumbo, Norman Powell, Charles Ascher, Marilyn Gittell, Jewel Bellush, Claude Hawley, Erwin Bard, and Philip Finkelstein, Leonard Lund, Arthur Levine, and Jules Cohen.

³⁴See Appendix for draft questionnaire, letter and explanatory note.

the final survey--self-administered questionnaire, distribution by the agency head with a covering letter from him and an explanation of the study from the researcher, and assurances that information received would be kept confidential. The six individuals to whom the pre-tests were submitted returned them for a 100% response and, after analyzing these returns, modifications in the questionnaire were once more made and a final instrument for use in studying the sample population was devised.³⁵

The facilitating sponsorship of the Urban Research Center of Hunter College had been previously secured to help in gaining access to city officials. The New York City Director of Personnel was approached and cooperated with this project by calling the study to the attention of the commissioners involved and asking for their co-operation. In January, 1969, a letter was sent by him, together with one from this researcher, to the heads of the selected agencies³⁶ and during the next few weeks arrangements were made with them for the distribution of the questionnaire among their top personnel. For each agency, the positions to be included as executive level had been investigated and specifications about them given to the commissioners (although some agency discretion was allowed). The executives to be given the questionnaires and the covering letter describing the study ranged from deputy commissioner to assistant division chief and included chief staff personnel such as chief engineer, chief counsel, etc. Attached to each was a self-addressed, postage prepaid envelope for return of the questionnaire directly to the researcher.³⁷

³⁵See appendix for final questionnaire.

³⁶See appendix for letter to agency heads.

³⁷See appendix for covering letter to respondents.

Each agency furnished a list of people to whom distribution had been made so that the numbers and character of responses could be ascertained. Respondents were assured of the confidential nature of their completed forms although they were asked to identify themselves in order for non-respondents to be urged to cooperate and so that supporting data could be coordinated with their responses. About 62% response resulted from the original distribution and in March, 1969, a follow-up letter to non-respondents³⁸ produced about another 14%. A total of 236 questionnaires were distributed among the six agencies and 182 useable returns received for a 77% level of response. This breaks down by agency as follows:

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Distribution</u>	<u>Return</u>	<u>Per cent Return</u>
Corrections	33	25	75.8%
Highways	23	14	60.9
Housing Authority	91	73	80.2
Sanitation	37	33	89.2
Traffic	14	11	78.6
Social Services	38	26	68.4
	<u>236</u>	<u>182</u>	<u>77.1%</u>

There is a range of responses from agencies from 60.9% for Highways to 89.2% for Sanitation. This shows some variation in agency cooperation exists but does not evidence a heavy weighting in any one direction.

This level of response compares favorably with most other empirical studies.³⁹

These 182 valid returns provide the data for the discussion that follows. For some of the respondents, background material was available to supplement the attitudinal dimensions gleaned from the questionnaire. These supplemental data were

³⁸See appendix for follow-up letter to non-respondents.

³⁹For instance, Wilensky, op. cit., had a 70.3% response; Eldersveld, op. cit., a 40.1%; Hopkins, op. cit., 58.2%.

preferred over requesting respondents to answer extensive personal questions even though the entire sample population was not covered, because too many sociological and biographical probings might arouse resentment and suspicion. Also, too lengthy and/or difficult a questionnaire might not result in a sufficient number of responses for as meaningful an analysis.

4. Processing and Analyzing the Data

The items selected for the questionnaire applied to all executives in the six city agencies studied to aid comparability. A number of different techniques were employed to try to best discover policy role preferences of administrators. Stuart W. Cook and Claire Sellitz discuss the advisability of using multiple indicator approaches to attitude measurement and, citing Paul Lazarsfeld, argue that because "some inconsistency will always be found between different measures of a hypothesized trait...that the task of the investigator is to combine them into an 'index' or 'measurement' which represents the best inference that can be made from the manifold of empirical operations to the underlying characteristic they are assumed to reflect."⁴⁰ Social science concepts are on the whole too complex and subtle to be disclosed by a single measurement.⁴¹ With the relatively concrete variables such as age, sex, education, income, there is little response error. But, once we try to deal empirically with more abstract postulates, the possibility of

⁴⁰Stuart W. Cook and Claire Sellitz, "A Multiple-Indicator Approach to Attitude Measurement" in Fishbein, *op. cit.*, p. 221.

⁴¹See Amitai Etzioni and Edward W. Lehman, "Some Dangers in 'Valid' Social Measurement" in Charlesworth (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 1-15.

response error is so great that it becomes advisable to have a number of different kinds of questions and approaches to test reliability--to assure sufficient consistency for classification.⁴² In consequence, both structured and semi-structured questions were used to get at respondent role orientations. Specifically imaginary situations involving different responses based on attitudes to policy-making were described and the respondents were asked how they thought an administrator should re-act to them. Rankings and Likert-type scaling of the relative importance of various qualities associated with decision-making attitudes were used, as were forced choice alternatives between competing values in administrative work. A total of eleven items relevant to the central concern with policy-making roles made up the dependent variable component of this study.

These eleven dependent variable items together with the demographic, organizational and sociological items constituting the independent variables were all coded to facilitate statistical elaboration. Most of the questions were closed-end type and coding was unambiguous. For the few open-ended and semi-structured items requiring more discretionary judgment, consistency in categorizing answers was achieved by having all coding done by one person. The answers were thus evaluated according to the same set of standards.⁴³ Less structured questions, however, were used more cautiously as a basis for any conclusions because they are more suggestive and less definitive of respondent perceptions.

⁴²See Blalock, *op. cit.*, p. 19, for discussion of differences in treatment of concrete and abstract variables.

⁴³Lowi, *At the Pleasure of the Mayor*, *op. cit.*, pp. 244-245, emphasizes a single coder for reliability.

The coded responses were then transferred onto IBM cards for counting, cross-tabulating and correlating variables by computer. During the spring, summer and fall of 1969, using the facilities of the Computer Center at Brooklyn College, over 800 tables were drawn up comparing the dependent variable items with the independent variables. The information contained in these tables have been compressed and combined and appear in the reports of the findings in Chapters VIII, IX and X.

The statistical relationships found between variables is being used descriptively only. Leo F. Schnore cautions against using powerful statistical techniques without adequate data,⁴⁴ and Dennis Palumbo specifies some of the limitations and formal requirements for statistical analysis. Professor Palumbo emphasizes that inferential statements about a population cannot be made unless the sample is randomly selected.⁴⁵ He also cautions that tests of significance are likewise not possible without random sampling because many of the factors relevant to the analysis may be controlled when using a total universe.⁴⁶ Thus, for instance, a bias in the direction of an extreme degree in any variable which may be inherent in the nature of a sample population consisting of a total universe prevents statistically determining the probability of chance occurrence of this variable in the general population. There must be some criterion for even the descriptive use of statistics, however, and

⁴⁴Philip M. Hauser and Leo F. Schnore, The Study of Urbanization (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966), p. 37.

⁴⁵Dennis J. Palumbo, Statistics in Political and Behavioral Science (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), pp. 19-20.

⁴⁶Ibid., see, also, Wahlke, et al., op. cit., p. 457; and Zisk, et al., op. cit., p. 622.

for this purpose, differences of over 10% were viewed as showing some significance for a sample population of this size.

For role theory to be viable the various measures of single orientations must combine into one index. The difficulties encountered in trying to form a single index from the eleven attitudinal items proved insurmountable. For an index to be reliable, the items designed to test the same thing must be unidimensional, which unidimensionality can be tested by the Spearman-Brown split half consistency co-efficient.⁴⁷ Using various combinations of items and a number of different systems for weighting them, this test of reliability failed to show the consistency necessary to form a single index of policy role types from the individual role segments. For the analysis of the findings, therefore, we must examine each item separately inasmuch as combined scoring could not be used. Although this is a less sophisticated approach to studying bureaucratic attitudes, an analysis of responses to even discrete items may hopefully still reveal much about the policy-making dimension of administration.

⁴⁷Formula given in Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. 933, Psychometrics, p. 103.

Part III - Findings

VII

Empirical Inadequacies Found in Role Theory

1. Criticism of Role Set

Chapter II set forth the theoretical support underlying role as the organizing structure for this study. On the basis of my field work applying role theory, I found it to have only limited utility. While the theory "qua" theory can not be refuted on the basis of one study, it is maintained that the tools developed to explore it empirically have remained relatively primitive so that any examination in depth is inhibited.

To examine role orientations more than superficially, the concept of role set is necessary.¹ A role occupant does not simplistically and automatically respond to any stimulus in exactly the same way regardless of the nature of that stimulus. Rather, differences in the external circumstances, differences in his perception of these circumstances and differences in which of his values and expectations about his own role-playing are activated by the circumstances, causes him to respond changeably, dependent on the context. Role set proposes that the various re-actions to different external situations will still show a consistency sufficient to identify a range differentiated from other ranges for other role types. In other words, individuals who share a particular role set will respond to the role segments comprising that set in a similar manner. To repeat what Wahlke and Eulau have said about role set in relation to legislators may help to clarify this point.

It is more likely that most legislators pattern their behavior in the

¹See Page 24-5, Chapter II.

light of one role orientation in one situation, but according to another under other circumstances. We can, therefore, conceive of a "role set" of each legislator as all those orientations in any given component of his role which he is capable of entertaining.²

Wahlke and Eulau,³ Gross, Mason and McEachern,⁴ and Merton⁵ who originally suggested the concept, all maintain that role segments can be combined into a role set. Role set, according to Merton, "designates a total compliment of role relationships in which a person becomes involved by virtue of occupying a particular social position."⁶ As will be seen shortly, in their questionnaire and field work, Wahlke and Eulau did not try to test the efficacy or reliability of this thesis, and Gross and his group of sociologists used it only tangentially in their work. The present study, tried to explore the complexities of a role by positing a number of different situations, each reflecting a different role sector or aspect of the role. The expectation was that if role set theory is correct, these segments would add up coherently into a role type. This did not happen.

The questionnaire was designed to examine separate role segments by proposing a variety of contexts involving administrative inter-relationships and inter-actions. Specifically:

²Wahlke, et al., op. cit., p. 16.

³Ibid.

⁴Gross, et al., op. cit., pp. 50-56, 62.

⁵Merton, op. cit., p. 36. See, too, Richard L. Harris, op. cit., who relies on role set for developing a theory of administrative multi-functionality.

⁶Robert L. Merton, "The Role Set: Problem in Sociological Theory," American Journal of Sociology VIII (June, 1957), p. 113.

1. Questions ten and eighteen of the instrument are designed to reveal administrators' perceptions about who does and who should set agency goals, and who is most aware of the public interest.
2. Questions eleven and thirteen seek to uncover conceptions of rule following behavior.
3. Question twelve considers qualifications for promotion as an aspect of role perception.
4. Question fourteen lists twelve decisional areas concerned with agency operations and asks the executives who they think has responsibility, who they think should have responsibility and who they think has influence over these decisions.
5. Question fifteen suggests a number of items that may be important in an occupation. Three of these (opportunity to influence policy; opportunity to come into contact with different viewpoints; and clear cut responsibilities and chain of command) are related to policy role types and comprise another role segment.
6. Questions sixteen and twenty describe imaginary situations involving administrative conflicts and ask respondents to re-act to them.
7. Four of the forced choices presented in question seventeen (A, B, D, and H) refer to still other administrative inter-actions and describe another role sector.

The relationship between the responses to these different aspects of the administrative role showed no consistency. Impressionistic, enumerative and statistical analyses all were employed, but failed to reveal coherent policy role sets

as the sum of individual responses to role segments. The role segments, did provoke, to varying degrees, dissimilar re-actions among the bureaucrats indicating that differences of opinion about the items do exist. These differences, however, could not be integrated into discrete role-type orientation categories.

There are evidences from the responses that the questionnaire was taken seriously and completed conscientiously, so that capriciousness or arbitrariness does not seem to be a factor contributing to the lack of consistency. For instance, replies to open ended questions were responsive. Unsolicited comments appearing on the backs of a few questionnaires indicate thoughtfulness on the part of respondents. Nor does bias on the questions themselves seem to be an element. There is a wide array of answers to questions which suggests that each of the alternatives proposed was acceptable to some of the respondents.

An invalid instrument may also prevent role set consistency from developing. There are always difficulties involved in checking validity and the effects of substantial discrepancies between theory and empirical inquiry could result in incongruities appearing in the data. Attempts were made to minimize this possibility by a frequent resort to expert advise and opinion (as described in Chapter VI).

If, as is maintained, the application of role set theory to a field of operations was performed as meticulously as possible according to the present state of knowledge, and distinctive role types could still not be identified, then, either the theory itself is flawed or the means for applying it are. In the discussion that follows, previous research which uses role theory empirically will be explored to try to evaluate the operational utility of role as an analytic tool.

2. Criticism of Previous Research in Role Theory

Amitai Etzioni and Edward W. Lemman have enumerated "Some Dangers in 'Valid' Social Measurement."⁷ Foremost among these, they warn against using single indicators as explanations for complex concepts. Much of the previous work using role theory empirically relies on just such single measurements to classify individuals according to complex role orientations.

One of the most widely known and highly regarded role analysis is the study by Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan and Ferguson⁸ of how state legislators in four states perceive their legislative roles along a number of dimensions--purposive role orientations, clientele role orientations, representative role orientations. Their purposive role and clientele role typologies refer to legislators' views regarding the focus of their job. To classify respondents for these typologies, the researchers used the answers to substantive questions about the content of legislation--Should legislation benefit the legislator's district or his state?; Should it be "liberal" or "conservative?"; Should it be favorable to some interests, or in performance of party obligations? The more widely discussed part of this work, however, is that dealing with style of representation--the "representational" role set. The three major types set forth by the authors--trustee, politico, and delegate--describe how a representative related himself to his decision-making functions. The trustee claims

⁷ Amitai Etzioni and Edward W. Lemman, "Some Dangers in 'Valid' Social Measurement," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science Vol. II "Social goals and Indicators for American Society," September, 1967, pp. 1-15.

⁸ Wahlke, et al., op. cit.

to rely on his own conscience, on what he thinks is right, on his own judgment of the facts at issue. The delegate claims that he seeks instructions from his constituents and clientele. The politico claims that he adopts one or the other orientations depending upon the conditions.

The determination of a legislator's representational role was made on the basis of one question in this study:

Now, a couple of questions about the job of being a legislator:

- a. First of all, how would you describe the job of being a legislator-- what are the most important things you should do here?
- b. Are there any important differences between what you think this job is and the way your constituents see it? (What are they?)⁹ (emphasis theirs)

Using such a limited basis for designating a legislator as a particular role type seems to avoid the complexities inherent in the researchers' theory. In all fairness, it should be noted that the authors do comment upon the limitation of their empirical elaboration:

While our research did not permit us to explore "role segmentalization"--the richness of role concepts or the versatility of role behavior--systematically or intensively, the theoretical importance of the problem must not be overlooked.¹⁰

The question still remains though, whether there is a sufficient foundation laid for assignment of a role conception to a legislator on the strength of so little data. Had the question been posed in another form such as an imaginary situation embodying the conflict, or had specific contexts rather than an abstract concept been

⁹Ibid., Appendix 6, Question 10, p. 494.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 10.

described could not the results have been otherwise?

Further, though responses to the question used for categorizing this role orientation may quite legitimately relate to the theory of representational role inasmuch as its open ended structure allows for a wide variety of answers, this relationship relies too heavily on the judgment of the researchers themselves. Open questions necessitate great interpretative latitude in deciding which role category best fits. As a matter of fact, thirty of the responses were found to be unclassifiable along this dimension. In addition, this same question supplied data for classifications into purposive and areal role types.

Based on the data collected about these same four state legislatures, Heinz Eulau together with John D. Sprague examined differences in role orientations between lawyer and non-lawyer representatives.¹¹ They used the purposive role set which characterizes the job of the legislator as:

1. Tribune: the representative's job is "finding out or knowing the will of the people" and representing their concerns or expressing their demands and needs. The emphasis is on public trust benefiting the people and protecting or defending their interests.
2. Inventor: the representative's job is "solving problems." The main objective is to promote the general welfare or foster "better government" or achieve specific policies.
3. Broker: the representative's job is to balance conflicting demands and interests between constituents and the state or interest groups, or between interest groups, or between interest groups and the state. A legislator should "see all sides" of an issue.¹²

Eulau and Sprague base their classification on the same one question from

¹¹Eulau and Sprague, op. cit.

¹²Ibid ., p. 150.

the original questionnaire cited above. This was coded into five different categories:

- Characterization of the job of legislator
- Objectives of the job
- Criteria used in decision-making
- Law-making functions
- Non-lawmaking functions.

From this analysis, they conclude there is little difference in role orientations as legislators (law-makers) between lawyers and non-lawyers.

Again, of course, the basis for classification is inadequately dependent on the response to one question and the interpretation of that response allows too great discretion in judgment on the part of the interpreter.

Heinz Eulau, again, this time with Betty H. Zisk and Kenneth Prewitt¹³ studied attitudes of city legislators to interest group spokesmen and activities in twenty two small political units in the San Francisco Bay area. They typologized the councilmen-respondents into pluralists, tolerants and antagonists according to the answers to seventeen open-ended questions covering attitudes to interest groups, perceptions of the numbers of influential groups and perceptions of the bases of group influences. These questions were posed at the end of a lengthy (2½ - 5) hour interview and some loss of information resulted. The various dimensions of role perception of group interests do seem to be well explored by these seventeen questions. However, the congruence of one attitudinal aspect with that of another is not tested. What they do is contrast scores on individual questions to form a class from single items.

Though role set and role segmentation theory is not developed within the article describing this research, some of the elements are present. Thus, three

¹³Zisk, Eulau and Prewitt, op. cit.

dimensions of the problem are explored--attitudes to the accessibility and propriety of interest groups, perception of how many groups are influential and perception of the reasons for group influence. Each of these can be considered a role sector. The typology was built from the various combinations into which the information derived from these sectors fell. Pluralists perceived many groups as influential and "esteemed" them as useful to the system. The basis of group influence was irrelevant for classification in this type. Tolerants perceived many groups, were "neutral" to group existence and attributed group influence to the respect it could generate. Antagonists were classified according to two patterns of responses. If respondents rejected groups and attributed their influence to the stakes they had in the issue, they were considered antagonists, regardless of their perception of how many groups were influential. Secondly, those neutral to group utility who perceived many groups and attributed group influence to objective strength were also so typed.

Obviously, from the variety of patterns among the different dimensions, consistency in perception did not exist. There is no justification for deriving a role set from such diverse role sectors. If each individual part had been checked for the validity with which it tested the role type, such combinations could not have been made.

Too, in some cases, only two of the three dimensions were used to develop a category, the third sector being ignored. Then, again, the sector dealing with the reasons for group influence is somewhat questionable. There was a great deal of overlap with 31% holding objective strength, 37% stake in society and 84% respect for their honesty, good sense, etc. as sources of groups' influence. But, if

84% of a population answer in one direction, can this highly consensual attitude be considered as the criterion for type-casting an individual? Can a respondent be typed as leaning in one direction when his answer is coded into a number of categories?

Though the study attempts to deal with some of the complexities inherent in role theory, there are as many doubts raised as there are problems explored.

Looking at a quite dissimilar population, Harold L. Wilensky¹⁴ explains differences in group identification among intellectuals employed by labor unions in terms of role theory. Eight "clues" were used to type union experts as "missionary," "professional service," "careerist" or "politico." These were:

1. job frustrations
2. job satisfactions
3. enemy targets of their work activity
4. view of hypothetical or actual company job offers.
5. how they describe their work
6. presence or absence of research product aimed at a professional audience
7. concepts of the ideal expert
8. the character of colleague groups.¹⁵

The development of why these eight items are intrinsic to the role orientation schema is quite tenuous. For instance, how do job satisfactions or job frustrations differentiate missionary oriented experts from career oriented or professional service ones? True, these variables may be correlates of role perceptions, but this is quite another matter from that of defining role types according to components that may not be basic to the distinguishing characteristics of that role.

¹⁴Wilensky, op. cit.

¹⁵ibid. , Chapter VII.

The manner in which these attributes were combined into clusters to conform to the classification was impressionistic and logical, not statistical. The assignment of individual cases into the four categories is, therefore, too loose.¹⁶

There are a number of works which utilize role theory to examine bureaucratic personnel and organizations. A very recent investigation of administrators in Delhi State, India, was undertaken by Eldersveld, Jagannadham and Barnabas.¹⁷ In an effort to distinguish between "democratic" and "bureaucratic" role norms, the researchers constructed an "index of democratic job perceptions which relied on administrators' responses to three questions about whether serving the public or following orders was more important, whether relaxing procedures was necessary or possible on the job, and whether the average citizen is able to understand government operations. Three other kinds of data were also used to form the index--reaction to and characterization of training programs, whether administrative decisions required explanations and self-descriptions of the nature of their respective positions.¹⁸ All items were weighted and a single score assigned to each administrative official. The items concerned with public relations were given greater weight than others, without further elaboration on why they were being rated more significantly. No tests of reliability were made but on the basis of his total score, an individual was classified as high, moderately high, moderately low and low on his democratic role perspective. No explanations are given for the cut-off points between highs and lows nor is there a solid foundation laid for preferring some questions over others to

¹⁶Ibid . The appendix, pp 313-317 describes procedures used to determine role orientations.

¹⁷Eldersveld, Jagannadham and Barnabas, op. cit.

¹⁸Ibid ., pp. 80-81.

develop the index.

A study of Pakistani civil servants¹⁹ using role orientations as one of several variables suffers even greater disabilities in trying to examine officials' self-images. According to the author administrators perceive public attitudes to their function very differently. They see the public as viewing the administrative role either as leader, or as servant, or as educator, etc. However, the terms used, the theoretical framework and classification boundaries are imprecise and poorly defined and there are inadequate controls and validation, with entire attitudinal sets being inferred from a reaction to a specific imaginary situation.

Although the thrust of Jack Hopkins' work with Peruvian bureaucrats²⁰ is toward constructing a profile of them on a number of concrete characteristics and comparing it to a similar profile of American bureaucrats devised by Warner,²¹ one section does deal with role expectations.²² After a cursory nod in the direction of Gross,²³ intensive role analysis work, the study describes role expectations of executives toward superiors, toward peers, toward subordinates and toward their own performance. The interview schedule is provided, but which particular items were used as sources for these role attitudes is not specified. Nor is it clear from the schedule itself which items do refer to the attitudinal differentiations made.

¹⁹Muneer Ahmad, op. cit.

²⁰Jack W. Hopkins, op. cit.

²¹Warner, et al., op. cit.

²²Hopkins, op. cit., pp. 108-113.

²³Gross, et al., op. cit.

Robert S. Friedman, Bernard W. Klein and John H. Romani²⁴ used the concept of representational role perception to examine the relationship of administrators to the publics they serve. They studied ninety-six top level officials in three Canadian and eight U. S. agencies (two federal, four state and two city), loosely adapting the concepts of focus and style role differences from legislative studies. A great deal of variation in response was found among the ninety six respondents and this undoubtedly contributed to the researchers' devising an eight-part typology which included a number of hybrid categories. With only ninety six respondents and eight categories, each could not, of course, contain too many cases. Similarly, a sample of ninety six from eight agencies fails to provide substantial numbers of cases from each for agency analysis and comparison. There is also no basis for the assignment into categories reported and the criteria used for the later re-assignment of the thirty one hybrid types into three main categories is similarly left undisclosed.

The representational role perceptions of politico, administrator and professional which are by definition oriented respectively to outside pressures, to general supervision and to the use of technical skills, are then compared to responsiveness to groups as a separate variable. This appears to be highly tautological. Attitudes to groups must be one of the bases for distinguishing between role types according to the definition and is, therefore, precluded from examination as an associative variable.

²⁴Robert S. Friedman, Bernard W. Klein and John H. Romani, "Administrative Agencies and the Publics They Serve," Public Administration Review XXVI (September, 1966), pp. 192-204.

For his doctoral dissertation at the University of Michigan, James Warren Davis examined "Executive Roles in Technical Bureaus."²⁵ In a secondary analysis of data available from the Survey Research Center about fifty-five executives in five scientific and technical bureaus of the federal government, Davis tried to relate role theory to material originally gathered for other purposes--specifically, the material was accumulated to help the members of these agencies develop an increased understanding of the organizational problems affecting their performance and also, to develop and bring to bear on these problems the individual and organizational resources necessary for the effective introduction of needed changes.²⁶

The typology for classifying these fifty-five officials has similarly been taken from work unrelated to role theory. Thus, the primary schema of career identification is explicitly modeled after the study by Dwaine Marvick²⁷ who did not introduce the concept of role into his investigations. As a result, the relationship of Davis' work to the title of the dissertation and to its opening emphasis and concluding remarks on executive role playing is elusive. The theory and the empirical inquiry are at best but casually linked.

Leonard Reisman's²⁸ and Richard H. Hall's²⁹ empirical studies of bureaucratic

²⁵Davis, op. cit.

²⁶Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, Studies Toward the Assessment and Improvement of Performance in Certain Bureaus in the Department of....., cited by Davis, p. 59.

²⁷Marvick, op. cit.

²⁸Reisman, op. cit.

²⁹Hall, op. cit.

roles show similar if not greater inconsistencies. In both, the basis for role differentiation is either poorly developed or inadequately reported although Reisman does provide an interesting four part differentiation of bureaucratic roles later relied on by Corwin (below).

This discussion of the uses of role theory in the field of public administration points up, not so much the inadequacies in the theory itself as the lack of rigor with which it has been applied. A more carefully conceived and executed study seems to be one done by Ronald G. Corwin³⁰ between professional and bureaucratic norms experienced by nurses. The researcher questioned about 300 nurses in seven hospitals and four nursing schools about their conceptions of the bureaucratic, professional and service aspects of nursing. Six items were used to identify bureaucratic orientations (i.e. rule following ideas, punctuality, etc.), and eight items each for professional role (i.e. commitment to knowledge, ability to use judgment and power to make decisions, etc.) and service role (i.e. desire to serve humanity, etc.). Likert scaling was used throughout the questionnaire and weights dependent on the extent of agreement or disagreement assigned accordingly. Internal consistency and relevancy were pre-tested and revisions made. While this research is well designed to identify the broad outlines of role perceptions in the three categories defined, the multi-dimensional nature of a role is only suggested and the research did not undertake to break down over-all role sets into component segments. Only one approach, namely Likert scaleable hypothetical situations, is represented in the questions. Also, each respondent's index for each dimension is

³⁰Corwin, op. cit.

the arithmetic sum of the weighted responses to the agree-disagree alternatives. The component items making up these indices, we are told, reflect a broad spectrum of nursing activities, which could be considered role sectors. The questions themselves, however, are not given. Nor are we told which "internal consistency" tests were made, though the term is so broad as to allow wide latitude in rigor within its definition. For instance, we do not know whether the items used for the final index were subjected to reliability testing so that the same or similar scores would result from the use of only some of the items or comparable items designed to reveal the same dimension.

Almost all research done afterwards acknowledges some debt to the intensive explorations into role theory itself and the applicability of role theory to a particular field of reality done by Gross, Mason and McEachern in 1958.³¹ This is undoubtedly still the most thorough development of role analysis as an approach to examining phenomena. After exploring the many definitions, methodologies and intricacies involved in the theory, these sociologists use role consensus and role conflict to examine perceptions of school superintendency functions as seen by role incumbents and by significant others, namely school board members. The emphasis by Gross, Mason and McEachern on intra-positional and inter-positional conflict and consensus about the specifics involved in the superintendent's job is too dissimilar to the present problem to offer a suitable model for adaptation despite the impressive rigor with which it was executed. In the few references made to role segmentation in connection with the empirical work, each role segment was used

³¹Gross, et al., op. cit.

discretely to determine the extent of consensus about it between and among the two sets of respondents. Attempts at organizing these discrete role sectors into single role sets were not undertaken.

The review of prior work adapting role set concepts to a specific array of data reveals how wide the gaps are between theory and practice. In most instances, too few, too ambiguous or too interpretive indicators are relied on to explain subtle and multi-faceted characteristics. The extent to which these works relate to the theory is, therefore, uncertain. My own research attempts to apply the theory rigorously, following the precept basic to it that role segments are congruent and add up to form a role set. The failure of the data to so add up may be a consequence of the use of a multiplicity of role segments necessary to test the theory but not embodied in previous projects. On the basis of this, it would seem that role set theory has serious limitations in its applicability. Either more refined tools are needed to increase its empirical usefulness or else, the theory itself may be flawed in that single contextual attitudes are too individualized for a role set type to be identified. It may even be, as proposed by John G. Gunnell that the conceptual framework, because it is "a non-empirically derived set of analytical categories which stand outside inquiry"³² is at the present time insufficiently developed to order and control the direction of social science inquiries.³³

³²John G. Gunnell, "The Idea of the Conceptual Framework: A Philosophical Critique," Journal of Comparative Administration I (August, 1969), pp. 140-176, p. 147.

³³Ibid., p. 140.

VIII

Attitudes to Policy Making and Their Relationship to Organizational Variables

1. Profile of Attitudinal Sets

The attitudes of the bureaucrats to the various aspects of policy making covered by the questionnaire show great diversity. In this section this diversity about the individual items used to distinguish between bureaucratic types will be explored. It becomes necessary to study individual rather than comprehensive attitudinal sets because the differences in bureaucratic perceptions about the locus of policy making is not consistent enough to form identifiable role types. Quite contradictory preferences for one or the other of the approaches to administrative decision-making were found to be held by the same respondent depending on the kind of situation described, the nature of the issue involved, the structure of the question posed, or the context in which the decision is to be made. But, for almost every item used in connection with policy orientations, there are wide divergences in responses, with each of the three policy orientations favored by some and rejected by others. This suggests that formulator, mediator and implementer approaches are all acceptable ways of viewing administrative functions despite individual inconsistencies.

The following tables and text describe and analyze the data with regard to differences in approaches revealed by the sample population:

Question fifteen of the instrument requested respondents to indicate how important or unimportant a number of occupational components were in their evaluation of a position. Three of the twelve items listed related to decisional attitudes.

The degree of importance a bureaucrat attributes to the "opportunity to influence public policy" involves a dimension of the formulator orientation. An important rating for "opportunity to come into contact with different viewpoints" reveals mediator proclivities and a high rating for "clear cut responsibilities and a well-defined chain of command" shows implementer ones. Table 8.1 shows the responses of the sample population to these three values.

Table 8.1
Distribution of Responses About Important Job Factors
Relating to Policy Types

Job Factor (Question 13)	Very Import.		Important		Some Import.		No. Import.		N.
	N.	%	N.	%	N.	%	N.	%	
Influence Policy	35	19.3%	56	30.9%	61	33.7%	29	16.0%	181
New Viewpoints	21	11.6	63	34.8	76	42.0	21	11.6	181
Chain of Command	77	42.5	60	33.1	32	17.7	12	6.6	181

We note from this table that there is significantly more importance attributed to the implementer viewpoint with 42½% of respondents considering this job element to be very important, 33.1% rating it important and only 6.6% dismissing it as not important at all. About 45% to 50% of the total considered the other two items important with the formulator approach garnering a slightly larger number of very important answers (19.3% to 11.6% for the mediator) but also showing a slightly larger number of not important evaluations (16% to 11.6% for the mediator view).

There may be a tendency for some people to view all things more importantly than do others, regardless of the value about which they are being asked. That this was not the case here is shown by the lack of any relationship developing

between perceptions. For instance, the importance of the "chain of command" variable and the "opportunity to influence policy" variable showed an insignificant correlation of $-.08$.¹ It is interesting to note, though, that there is a $.19$ level of association between "chain of command" and "opportunity to come into contact with different viewpoints" and an even more significant $.31$ between the latter and "opportunity to influence policy."

Table 8.2 analyzes the responses to Question seventeen which forced a choice between competing priorities for deciding agency courses of action. Those choosing the alternative:

"Before an agency decides on a course of action, the most important thing to consider is whether it conforms to the directives of elected officials"

preferred the implementer perception. Those choosing:

"Before an agency decides on a course of action, the most important thing to consider is whether it represents the prevailing sentiments in the community" (or whether it "accommodates conflicting demands in the community")

adopted a mediator orientation. Those choosing

"Before an agency decides on a course of action, the most important thing to consider is whether it contributes to the general welfare of the public"

were considered formulators. The logic for the formulator classification is, if elected officials and community demands do not direct what the general welfare is, the only alternative is for the administrator to determine for himself what policies are for the "general welfare."

¹All correlations are Pearson's r .

Table 8.2

Distribution of Responses to Preferences About
Setting Agency Courses of Action

<u>Question 17</u> Priority to	When Alternative Is General Welfare	When Alternative Is Community Demand	When Alternative Is Elected Officials
General Welfare	-----	165 (91.7%)	139 (76.8%)
Community Demand	15 (8.3%)	-----	93 (52.0%)
Elected Officials	42 (23.2%)	86 (48.0%)	-----

An overwhelming 91.7% of the sample opted for "general welfare" over "prevailing sentiments" and a substantial 76.8% chose it over "directives of elected officials." Between the "directives of elected officials" and the "demands of the community," there is an almost equal division of opinion.

There seems to be a basic distrust evidenced about outsiders determining agency policy. Although a well-defined chain of command is considered a very important element of the job situation, this chain evidently does not extend to the Mayor or other elected people. No relationship was found between those who rated "chain of command" high in importance and those who gave elected officials top priority in setting agency courses of action (-.05 and .00 with "community demands" and "general welfare" respectively). There are similar lacks of meaningful associations between those who view setting public policy as important in an occupation and selection of general welfare over alternative policy-making considerations in Question seventeen (.04 and .03) and between "prevailing sentiments" and "opportunity to come into contact with different viewpoints" (.04 and .00).

Table 8.3 reports the distribution of reasons bureaucrats have for obeying

the directives of superiors (Question thirteen).

Table 8.3

Rank Ordering of Reasons for Obeying Superior Directives

Question 13 Reason	1	<u>Ranks</u> 2	3	4	5	N.
Competence	107 (59.3%)	61 (33.7%)	6 (3.2%)	7 (3.8%)	-----	181
Character	1 (0.5)	23 (13.2)	74 (42.7)	17 (9.7)	59 (33.9%)	174
Form.Author.	72 (39.9)	81 (44.8)	21 (11.6)	5 (2.7)	2 (1.0)	181
Promotion Pow.	2 (1.1)	7 (4.0)	50 (29.1)	84 (48.7)	30 (17.3)	173
Impose Penalty	2 (1.1)	11 (6.2)	23 (13.0)	59 (34.2)	79 (45.4)	174

This question called for a rank ordering and we find that almost 60% of respondents consider superior's competence to be the primary reason for following orders.

Almost all the rest give first place to superior's formal authority. In terms of the typology, it would seem that the formulator view is reflected in responses emphasizing superior's competence. This value is ranked higher than the implementer perception of formal authority as the primary reason for obeying superiors, although there is still a large 39.9% who do give priority to formal authority. Respect for superior's competence does not correlate significantly with how importantly a respondent views making policy as a job factor (Question fifteen) nor with priorities assigned to "general welfare" in the forced choices of Question seventeen. A first ranking given formal authority in Question thirteen shows a slight association of .11 with the selection of elected officials over general welfare and of .15 with the selection of elected officials over community demands, both in Question seventeen, but it does not correlate with the ratings of "chain of command" job importance of

Question fifteen.

If these are the reasons for complying with superior's directives, then to what extent are such directives followed or deviated from by executives? Table 8.4 shows the responses to Question eleven:

"In carrying out the functions and responsibilities of your job, about how often do you personally find it reasonable and practical to deviate from some policy or procedure in order to do a more effective job?"

Table 8.4

Distribution of Responses to Rule Deviation Behavior

(Question 11) Frequency of Rule Deviation	Frequently	Often	Occasional	Hardly	Never	N.
	14 (7.7%)	40 (22.1)	97 (53.6%)	26 (14.4)	4 (2.2%)	181

We note that more than half the population deviate from set policy occasionally with about twice as many tending to more frequent deviation than less. We can assume greater rule following behavior to be an implementer characteristic and greater rule deviation a formulator type response. If we relate rule deviation descriptions of behavior with the implementer perceptions of the other role segments, we find inverse correlations as follows:

1. Question fifteen	("chain of command")	-.12
2. Question seventeen	(elected officials over general welfare) (elected officials over prevailing sentiments)	-.21 -.20
3. Question thirteen	(respect for formal authority)	-.15

In all these instances we find some degree of negative association between rule deviation and implementer orientations ranging from a slight -.12 to -.21, the

latter a fairly significant figure for a population of this size. There seems to be a definite tendency for those who say they deviate from rules less to show greater implementer tendencies.

Another dimension of policy setting attitudes explored concerns qualifications for promotion. Question twelve asks the administrators to rank by order of importance a number of qualities often given prominence in administrative functioning. The importance with which each was viewed could identify some part of an executive's predisposition to policy types:

1. Emphasis on "ability to handle public opinion and demands" or on "ability to handle criticism by the public" or on "ability to establish and maintain good relations with the public in general and agency clientele in particular" identified mediator types.

2. Emphasis on "specialized knowledge about the field of operations of the agency and ability to keep up with developments in it" or on "ability to secure advice from consultants about matters related to agency services" or on "ability to influence agency policy" identified formulator types inasmuch as the formulator's judgment is used as his own best guide to action.

3. Emphasis on "ability to keep up with modern administrative techniques" identifies the implementer type since the implementer by definition is technique oriented about his role.

The distribution of emphases is shown on Table 8.5.

Table 8.5

Distribution of Attitudes to Qualifications for Promotion

(Question 12) Reasons	Ranking							N.
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
Conflict P. O.	10 (5.8%)	20 (11.6%)	20 (11.6%)	24 (14.0%)	37 (21.5%)	36 (20.9%)	25 (14.5%)	172
Spec. Knowl.	112 (61.9)	31 (17.1)	12 (6.6)	6 (3.3)	6 (3.3)	8 (4.4)	6 (3.3)	181
Admin. Knowl.	17 (9.5)	49 (27.4)	29 (16.2)	33 (18.4)	14 (7.8)	25 (14.0)	12 (6.7)	179
Public Critic.	1 (.6)	3 (1.8)	11 (6.6)	24 (14.5)	29 (17.5)	55 (33.1)	43 (25.9)	166
Secure Exp. Adv.	5 (2.8)	19 (10.7)	33 (18.6)	32 (18.1)	28 (15.8)	15 (8.5)	45 (25.4)	177
Good P. R.	21 (11.8)	41 (23.0)	36 (20.2)	30 (16.9)	29 (16.3)	17 (9.6)	4 (2.2)	178
Infl. Policy	22 (12.2)	25 (13.9)	39 (21.7)	29 (16.1)	30 (16.7)	14 (7.8)	21 (11.7)	180

A large majority of 61.9% consider specialized knowledge of primary importance with another formulator perceptions "influence policy" having the second highest number of first rankings (12.2%). The one implementer type attribute "keep up with modern administrative techniques" received only 9.5% first ranking, although a considerably larger 27.4% ranked it second in importance and comparatively few placed it in the last three places (fifth, sixth and seventh).

The mediator values are ranked most important by only 18.2% of the population although three such attributes were listed. In fact, all three received a least important, seventh ranking 42.6% of the time.

The responses to Question twelve seem to heavily favor the formulator orientation. The degree of association with some of the other segments of the formulator role type are shown on Table 8.6.

Table 8.6

Correlations Between Formulator Type Reasons for Promotion
With Other Formulator Type Orientations

Qualif. for Promotion	(15) <u>Infl. Policy</u>	(17) <u>Welf. over Elected Off.</u>	(17) <u>Welf. over Community</u>	(13) <u>Competence for obeying</u>
Special Knowledge	.01	.02	.04	.22
Expert Advice	-.08	.06	.00	.25
Influence Policy	.31	-.04	-.06	-.12

The highest correlation, a quite substantial .31, is between the ranking of the importance of ability to influence policy as a qualification for promotion and the importance of the opportunity to influence policy as a value in an occupation.

The reasons people give for following orders also show a notable relationship with

the formulator type qualifications for promotion. Competence as a reason for obeying orders correlates .22 with specialized knowledge and .25 with ability to secure expert advice, as attributes for promotion. There is an anomalous negative -.12 coefficient, however, between ability to influence policy and competence as a reason for obeying superiors. The correlation between the formulator ability to seek expert advice and the implementer reason for obeying orders (respect for formal authority) though shows a substantially higher inverse relationship of -.20.

As anticipated, the less structured questions required subjectivity in interpretation to be classified according to type. The greatest difficulty was encountered in organizing and adapting the variety of responses to the imaginary situations (Questions sixteen and twenty) into a schema with a manageable number of alternatives. The full flavor and complexity of the answers are, of course, lost in the process but there does emerge some patterns of similarities among administrators about the conflicts involved.

Question sixteen projects a conflict situation between professional norms and directives from a superior and Question twenty between community demands and superior's directives. Thus, Question sixteen focuses on implementer-formulator predispositions and Question twenty on the implementer-mediator ones.

The patterns of responses to these hypothetical circumstances are presented in Table 8.7.

Table 8.7

Summary of Responses to Imaginary Situations

	Follow Orders	Follow Orders with Qualif.	Maintain Integrity	Equivocal	N.
Question sixteen	38 (22.4%)	12 (7.1%)	15 (8.9%)	105 (61.8%)	170
Question twenty	78 (43.8)	19 (10.7)	34 (19.1)	47 (26.5)	178

Because of the nature of this question, some elaboration and illustrations of the way responses were interpreted may be helpful.

For both questions, the "follow orders" answer was considered an implementer response. This category was relatively clear cut and included such comments as "Do it. It's been adopted by superior authority." etc. Also generally classified as implementers, although separately listed on Table 8.7 are those who favored following directives but who qualified this responsibility to superiors with some additional action designed to modify the effects of compliance. Typical of these answers, are the following:

Prepare the justification but also point out different points of views of majority of economists. Special circumstances may justify a course of action differing from accepted viewpoint.

Explain the situation to agency head. If latter wishes the memo written, economist should follow directive. An agency chief is entitled to a smoothly running, efficient operation...But the subordinate should be encouraged to develop his own approach.

In the category "maintain subordinate's integrity" which constitutes the formulator approach to the situation described by question sixteen and the mediator to that in question twenty, all answers calling for subordinate to refuse, resign, transfer or ask to be relieved were placed. For instance:

Attempt to reason with his chief. Failing to do so, he should ask to be relieved of the assignment. As an economist, the subordinate has professional standing and personal integrity at stake.

With regard to Question sixteen professional norms and requirements were usually the reasons given for not following directives:

Decide whether it makes sense from an economic point of view. Economists value to his chief relies on his ability to advise the chief in his own area of expertise. He needs to think to give chief benefit of his best judgment.

To Question twenty, maintaining integrity involves a different dimension:

Reject the plan. Any plan that will increase tensions and hostilities will serve no good purpose.

Refuse. It is his responsibility. Therefore, he should not condone a program that will cause trouble.

To follow department head's program without further revision might lead to a more serious situation from which one may not be able to back-track. The recent school strike is an example of what can happen.

A large number of reactions to the dilemma presented in Question sixteen and a somewhat lower number to question twenty were evasive and equivocal. These eluded interpretation according to the typology. How, for instance, does one classify:

Department head should not "instruct" on so complicated an issue.

or

Put in writing his objections and send to department head and higher officials. He should not send it to elected officials or community leaders except perhaps the Mayor. A man should express his thought within a frame of loyalty to the organization of which he is a part.

or

He should present arguments as to why it would be unwise to go

against present economic thinking. Perhaps the policy needs changing.

These answers were classified as neutral and unrevealing of any attitudinal preferences toward a policy type orientation.

Table 8.7 reveals that a much larger number of executives exhibit strong implementer views to decision-making when the alternative is the exacerbation of community tensions than if expert opinion is being contradicted. 43.8% of the administrators would follow superior orders despite countervailing community pressures and another 10.7% would follow orders with qualifications. When the value in conflict is professionalism, a much lesser 22.4% would follow orders unequivocally and another 7.1% with qualifications. The latter conflict between professional norms and superior directives evidently presents quite a difficult dilemma for many respondents, for more than half (60.6%) avoid any commitment, while less than half that many (26.5%) avoid taking sides in the community pressures-superior orders situational conflict.

The interpretative nature of these questions and the fact they are non-quantifiable precludes correlations with other attitudinal segments.

Another non-structured question asks the executives to describe their occupation in the most prestigious terms they could:

(Question nine) You are about to be introduced to a group of people and it is important that you impress them with your occupation. How would you describe your position?

This question was designed to see if self-identification could reveal basic perceptions about how an administrator views his relationship to decision-making functions. Respondents who stress supervision, direction, management, co-ordination, the "PODSORB" parts of administration were considered administrator-implementers.

Illustrative of this response are the following answers:

I direct, supervise, co-ordinate and administer all _____ operations.

General administrative responsibility for the implementation of the policies and procedures of the Department.

Supervise the management and administration of twenty four projects.

Those people who emphasize their expertise and their role in initiating and formulating plans and policies are formulator oriented. Examples are:

Formulate and make recommendations concerning major projects in the field of _____.

Establish policy, approve operating plans, approve capital and expense budgets.

Acts as counsel (or engineer, or architect).

Program planning for various services.

A third group answered that they are primarily concerned with matters involving the public and public service. For instance:

Hold conferences with [client groups] and community groups.

I do public relations for the department.

Maintain liaison with public and further the department objectives and public interest through community relations.

These people are closest to the mediator type and were so classified.

Some answers were mixed and unclassifiable according to the schema (i.e. "engineer in charge of co-ordinating..."). Also unassignable in terms of the policy trichotomy are those self-identifications which stress working for government generally or New York City specifically.

The value of Question nine for the typology is somewhat diluted too by the

number of instances in which the title of the position or its formal requirements are mentioned as the occupational description. These answers do not reveal an executives decision-making predilections except insofar as the type of job held influences his preferences for a particular attitudinal set. For this reason, there is less reliance on this particular item for the over-all analysis than on the other policy attitude questions.²

Table 8.8 reports the distribution of responses.

Table 8.8

Distribution of Self-Descriptions

<u>Primary Identification</u>	N.	%
Administrator-Implementer	111	62.0
Professional-Formulator	33	18.4
Public Servant-Mediator	9	5.0
New York City	10	5.6
Mixed	16	9.0
	<u>179</u>	<u>100.0</u>

The bulk of answers (62.0%) show administrative functions as the center of respondents' occupational descriptions (implementers) with almost one-fifth (18.4%) concerned with professional and policy matters (formulators) and only 5% considering themselves primarily involved with ^{the} public (mediators).

The last table in this group analyzes administrative perceptions about the locus of decision making in specific areas requiring action. Table 8.9 reports the distribution of responses to the following questions:

²Davis, *op. cit.*, and Marvick, *op. cit.*, who used similar questions for their analyses, found inconsistencies between the responses to this indirect means of eliciting job descriptions and a direct forced choice question about career identifications.

1. Question 10a: "What individuals, groups or institutions (in or out of government) can best appraise what the goals and aims of your agency should be?"

2. Parts of Question fourteen: "Many different kinds of decisions must be made in connection with the work of an agency. Individuals and groups both in and out of government have varying degrees of responsibility and influence, depending on the nature of these decisions. Please indicate next to each type of decision which agency...or group...or individual...you think...should have the most responsibility..."

- a) Decentralizing Operations
- b) Building or establishing new facilities where none existed previously
- c) Initiating new types of services to be offered by the agency.

3. Question eighteen: "Who do you think is most aware of where the best interests of the public lie in matters related to your agency?"

Some ambiguity about classification is inevitable in trying to adapt these kind of data to a predetermined design. Therefore, the specific bodies mentioned by respondents for each area of decision-making are given in table 8.9.³

³Examples of the classifications for questions 10, 14 and 18 are:

Expert: specific professional association such as "American Institute of Architects."

Staff: either the specification "staff" itself or specific staff people such as "Director of Operations."

Civic Groups: either the general comment "civic groups" or specific groups such as "Citizens Housing and Planning Council."

Clientele groups: i.e. "Homeowners," "A.A.A."

Other Agencies: i.e. City Planning Commission, Department of Personnel or other line agencies.

Table 8.9

Perception of the Locus of Responsibility in Specific Decisional Areas

Decision	Perception of Responsibility												
	Expert Groups	Staff	Commissioner	Mayor	City Legislature	Interest Groups	Client	General Public	Other Agencies	Civic Groups	Federal & State Agencies	Mixed Administrative Groups	Mixed Expert Groups
10a Set Goals	N 19 (11.2)	8 (4.7)	6 (3.6)	6 (3.6)	-	3 (1.8)	5 (3.0)	10 (5.9)	-	3 (1.8)	9 (5.3)	31 (18.3)	11 (6.5)
14 Decentral.	N 20 (14.3)	88 (62.9)	20 (14.3)	3 (2.1)	-	-	1 (0.7)	2 (1.4)	-	-	-	2 (1.4)	-
14 New Facilities	N 15 (10.7)	40 (28.6)	11 (7.9)	9 (6.4)	-	-	6 (4.3)	34 (24.3)	-	-	-	14 (10.0)	-
14 New Services	N 33 (23.2)	79 (55.6)	11 (7.7)	2 (1.4)	1 (0.7)	-	-	2 (1.4)	-	1 (0.7)	1 (0.7)	9 (6.3)	-
18 Awareness of Public Interest	N 9 (6.2)	41 (28.3)	52 (35.9)	7 (4.8)	2 (1.4)	-	3 (2.1)	8 (5.5)	-	1 (0.7)	-	8 (5.5)	4 (2.8)

The most noticeable pattern of responses is the extent to which the executives feel that decision-making should take place within the administrative structure itself. With regard to decentralization 62.9% feel the agency staff should decide, 14.3% the commissioner, 1.4% other administrative agencies and 1.4% a combination of these, for a total of 80% intra-administration preferences. 70.8% and 71.0% of the population also list these same bodies in connection with establishing new facilities and initiating new services, respectively. Even with regard to assessing who is most aware of what the public interest is, 69.7% respond similarly, although the distribution here shows a tendency to favor the commissioner over the other staff people whereas in the other three instances the reverse is true. It is only in connection with setting agency goals (Question ten) that intra-administration sources do not predominate (26.6% of the total) with widespread divergences in opinion appearing.

Although precise measurements of the implications of these responses are not possible, the strong tendencies to intra-agency policy-making do suggest dominance of the formulator view. The people who think the commissioner is or should be responsible may be implementer oriented, insofar as they say decisions should be made higher up in the hierarchy. But these same people do not extend the apex of the hierarchy as far as the politically responsible bodies within the system such as the mayor or legislature, nor to the public itself. Moreover, if the sizeable number of responses that maintain that various kinds of experts or advisory boards are primarily responsible for decisions are included as formulator perceptions, then there is an overwhelming proportion of the population that assigns the resolution of competing demands to those who are in some way specialists, either by reason of

training, or because of occupational involvement in the subject matter of the field. There are only a handful of executives who perceive chief executives, legislative bodies, clientele, community and other groups, or the general public as being important in setting goals, decentralizing functions, establishing new facilities, initiating new services or being aware of the public's best interests.

2. Profile of Organization Characteristics

In Section three, Chapter VI, the percentages and numbers of responses in each of the six agencies are reported. In this part, the distribution of other organizational variables will be presented.

Table 8.10 shows the positions in the hierarchy held by respondents:

Table 8.10

Distribution of Respondents by Position

Position	N.	%
Deputy Commissioner	5	2.8
Assistant Commissioner	27	14.9
Bureau Chief	30	16.6
Assistant Bureau Chief	21	11.6
Division Chief	61	33.7
Assistant Division Chief	17	9.4
Staff Professional	5	2.8
Multi-Positions	15	8.3
	<u>181</u>	<u>100.</u>

The "mixed" category includes those who are staff professionals for their agency at the same time they either head a bureau or a division or are assistants to the head. Staff professionals are so classified only when they unambiguously describe their title in professional terms. Thus, there may be a lawyer included in any of the

positions but only if he calls himself "chief" or "staff counsel" is he considered an executive-professional.⁴

As expected, the best represented category is division chief. There are many more divisions than bureaus within departments, and more chiefs than assistants since not all divisions have both. However, at all levels, sufficient numbers of responses were received for meaningful analyses of position as a variable.

The relationship of hierarchical position to all the organizational, personal and sociological variables could be fruitfully examined. Some limitation on comparisons must be imposed, however and the most interesting comparison suggesting itself seemed to be with length of time at agency. Are the top positions filled by people who have been there longest? Do professionals or generalists have more seniority? Table 8.11 compares the two dimensions:

⁴There is a "Classification and Compensation Schedule" (two volumes) which classifies jobs in New York City government. Thirty two grades are listed, but because the salary levels at grades are often unrealistic in today's market, and an occupant of a position within a grade cannot exceed that salary range, almost all executives are in the top grade and classification by grade level would be meaningless.

Table 8.11

Comparison of Position Levels with Time at Agency

<u>Position</u>	<u>-5 years</u>	<u>5-15 years</u>	<u>16-25 years</u>	<u>+25 years</u>	<u>N.</u>
Deputy Commr.	2 (40.0%)	2 (40.0%)	-----	1 (20.0%)	5
Asst. Commr.	9 (33.3)	5 (18.5)	7 (25.9%)	6 (22.2)	27
Bur. Chief	2 (6.7)	10 (33.3)	7 (23.3)	11 (36.7)	30
Asst. Bur. Chief	1 (4.8)	6 (28.6)	3 (14.3)	11 (52.4)	21
Div. Chief	1 (1.6)	18 (29.5)	19 (31.1)	23 (37.7)	61
Asst. Div. Chief	1 (5.9)	-----	3 (17.6)	13 (76.5)	17
Prof.	3 (60.0)	1 (20.0)	-----	1 (20.0)	5
Mixed	<u>2 (13.3)</u>	<u>3 (20.0)</u>	<u>6 (40.0)</u>	<u>4 (26.7)</u>	<u>15</u>
Total	21 (11.6)	45 (24.9)	45 (24.9)	70 (38.7)	181

From this we note that deputy commissioners and staff professionals are the least senior people on the staff, and assistant commissioners also tend to less than average lengths of time at their agency. Assistant division chiefs, probably the lowest executive position in this study, have longest tenure with the next two least superior positions, division chief and assistant bureau chief also showing above average lengths of service. We find then, interestingly, a generally reverse relationship between higher-level titles and length of agency membership with the few professional respondents also showing shorter service periods.

The actual lengths of time executive level personnel have been at the agency and in New York City government service is shown on Table 8.12.

Table 8.12

Time at Agency and in New York City Government

<u>No. of Years</u>	<u>In Agency</u>	<u>In N.Y.C. Govt.</u>
less than 5	22 (12.1%)	17 (9.3%)
5 to 15	45 (24.7)	30 (16.5)
16 to 25	45 (24.7)	39 (21.4)
More than 25	70 (38.5)	96 (52.7)
	<u>182</u>	<u>182</u>
Mean =	19.3	22.0

It will be noted that this table is heavily weighted toward the longer periods of service. More than half the people in government employ now have been there over twenty five years. A very small percentage of 9.3% of all top-level personnel have entered the government rolls during the last five years. The mean number of years of time spent within New York City government employ for all executives is 22.0 and within the same agency the mean is 19.3.

The implication of this for city functioning is profound. We can expect a good many of the people who have been in public employ over twenty five years to be retiring soon. Who the replacements are and where they are to come from has great consequence for the city. If the policy-making perceptions of the newer people are significantly different than those of their more senior colleagues, then we can expect meaningful changes to occur when those with lengthier service periods leave shortly.

A further organizational consideration is whether people at different hierarchical levels differ in the numbers of hours worked. Table 8.13 gives the distribution of hours worked overall, and Table 8.14 compares position to this aspect of work involvement.

Table 8.13

Numbers of Hours Worked (Work Involvement)

Hours Worked	N.	%
Less than 40	32	17.7
40 to 49	77	42.5
50 to 59	45	24.9
60+	27	14.9
	<u>181</u>	<u>100.0</u>

Mean = 48.7

Table 8.14

Comparison of Position Levels with Numbers of Hours Worked

<u>Position</u>	<u>-40 hours</u>	<u>40 to 49 hours</u>	<u>50 to 59 hours</u>	<u>60+ hours</u>	<u>N.</u>
Dep. Commr.	-----	-----	2 (40.0%)	3 (60.0%)	5
Asst. Commr.	2 (7.4%)	9 (33.3%)	11 (40.7)	5 (18.5)	27
Bur. Chief	-----	17 (56.7)	5 (16.7)	8 (26.7)	30
Asst. Bur. Chief	3 (15.0)	5 (25.0)	9 (45.0)	3 (15.0)	20
Div. Chief	15 (24.6)	30 (49.2)	12 (19.7)	4 (6.6)	61
Asst. Div. Chief	7 (41.2)	6 (35.3)	3 (17.6)	1 (5.9)	17
Prof. Staff	1 (20.0)	1 (20.0)	1 (20.0)	2 (40.0)	5
Mixed	<u>4 (26.7)</u>	<u>8 (53.3)</u>	<u>2 (13.3)</u>	<u>1 (6.7)</u>	<u>15</u>
Total	32 (17.8)	76 (42.2)	45 (25.0)	27 (15.0)	180

From table 8.13 we note that the largest number of administrators report working between forty and forty nine hours (42.5%) with only 17.7% admitting to a shorter week's work and 14.9% claiming they devote more than sixty hours to their job. The mean number of hours worked for the entire population is 48.7.

According to table 8.14, there is a very strong relationship between position and work week. Deputy commissioners and assistant commissioners show significantly greater work times than the over-all average. Bureau chiefs are somewhat above average. Assistant bureau chiefs work the numbers of hours closest to the norm. Division chiefs tend toward fewer hours and assistant division chiefs show a decided pattern of shorter working hours. Professionals and mixed professional-administrators average longer work weeks too.

Besides hours worked, other indicators of work involvement are perceptions of importance of various factors connected with the job. In table 8.15 we see how bureaucrats rate the importance of four aspects of the employment situation-- salary, advancement opportunity, public service opportunity and security of tenure:

Table 8.15

Distribution of Responses to Work Involvement Aspects of the Work Situation					
<u>(Question 15)</u> Value	Very Import.	Important	Some Import.	No. Import.	N.
Salary	82 (45.3%)	80 (49.7%)	8 (4.4%)	1 (.06%)	181
Advancement	103 (57.5)	56 (31.3)	17 (9.5)	3 (1.7)	179
Public Service	37 (20.4)	84 (46.4)	50 (27.6)	10 (5.5)	181
Tenure	49 (27.1)	68 (37.6)	49 (27.1)	15 (8.3)	181

Opportunity for advancement was rated very important by the largest number of respondents--higher even than salary by 12%, although salary is the more important factor if we consider the very important and important responses together. This seems to imply a greater intensity connected with advancement but a greater consensus about the importance of salary. Security of tenure is often cited as one

of the prime advantages of government service. However, more people rate this as a factor of no importance than any of the other three, even more than those who felt service to the public to be a non-important consideration.

One would imagine that security of tenure is of more concern to those bureaucrats who have been in service longest, particularly since many of these started at the time of widescale unemployment and economic unrest during the 1930's. Opportunity for advancement, on the other hand, might be a more salient factor with newer, younger people who could be expected to be more ambitious. With regard to public service, one could argue both ways either the traditional virtues and ~~values~~ instilled in the more senior people might increase the significance of this job aspect with them, or an idealism, more usually attributed to younger people might generate more positive attitudes to the importance of public service among newer members.

Table 8.16 shows the association between the importance ratings of these selected job aspects and length of time at the agency and in New York City government.

Table 8.16

Correlations Between Importance of Job Factors
And Length of Time in Agency and City

<u>Job Factor</u>	<u>Agency Time</u>	<u>City Time</u>
Salary	.05	.06
Advancement	.14	.17
Public Service	-.11	-.17
Security	.36	.43

We find that the speculations about security of tenure and time in service is supported by the evidence. There is a very high correlation of .43 between these two variables and only a slightly lower .36 between security and time at the agency. The importance of advancement as a job factor, however, also shows some positive correlation with length of service indicating that those who are in government longest also emphasize opportunities to realize their ambitions within the public structure most. Public service opportunities show an inverse association with tenure perhaps supporting the proposition that more idealistic attitudes to government exist among newer recruits. The importance of salary is unrelated to length of service.

The income level of executives is, of course, related to their position. However, given the often rigid and irrational salary structure that prevails in the civil service the relationship between the two is not isomorphic. For instance, in the New York Times on January 29, 1970, it is reported that two city rent officials had voluntarily demoted themselves in order to increase their salaries.⁵ Table 8.17 reports the distribution of salaries among the executive level personnel at our six agencies.⁶

⁵New York Times, January 29, 1970, 34:4 reports about the voluntary stepping down of Stanley A. Kaufman, chief protest attorney in the Office of Rent Control and his deputy, Stephen H. Deutschmeister, to realize an increase in salary.

⁶For this variable (and a few others) information is available about only a proportion of the population. The instrument used for the research did not request this data directly and other sources were relied on. Income figures refer to 1968 salaries.

Table 8.17
Distribution of Salary

Salary	N.	%
Under \$10,000.	1	1.1
10,000. - 11,999.	4	4.2
12,000. - 13,999.	23	24.2
14,000. - 15,999.	27	28.4
16,000. - 17,999.	18	18.9
18,000. - 19,999.	12	12.6
20,000. +	10	10.5
	<u>95</u>	<u>100.0</u>

The mean income is \$15,790. Over half the sample earn between \$12,000. and \$15,999. and over 70% are in the range from \$12,000. to \$17,999. There is only a slight correlation between salary and length of time at agency of .10 and no association (-.03) with length in New York City government employ.

From table 8.18, which reports the means of recruitment into New York City government service, we note that a very large majority (78.8%) have been selected through competitive exam with only 16.7% entering service through appointment.

Table 8.18
Distribution of Means of Recruitment into Service

Means of Recruitment	N.	%
Competitive Exam	143	78.8%
Non-Competitive Merit	9	4.9
Appointment	30	16.7
	<u>182</u>	<u>100.0</u>

The final organizational variable with which this research is concerned is attitudinal. Because of the burgeoning memberships in civil service unions and the

increase in collective bargaining arrangements between such groups and government as employer, there is growing awareness of the possible consequences of this phenomenon.⁷ The question that was used dealt with attitudes to unions indirectly.

One of the forced choices of Question seventeen presented the following alternatives:

Arbitration should be compulsory and binding for settling all labor disputes involving public employees.

(or) Denial of the right to strike by public employees is an abridgement of their civil rights.

These alternatives were deemed meaningful in a public administration context. In addition, they were considered more likely to elicit deeper-rooted feelings about the legitimacy of unions among the sample population than a more direct approach.

Table 8.19 shows that almost three of every four executives tend to view unions in the public arena unfavorably:

Table 8.19

Question Seventeen Attitude	Attitudes to Union Rights	
	N.	%
Arbitration should be compulsory	131	73.6
Denial of right to strike is abridgement of civil rights	48	26.4
	<u>179</u>	<u>100.0</u>

73.6% agree that arbitration should be compulsory and only 26.4% support the right by public employees to use unions' most efficacious means for achieving their

⁷The New York Times, March 20, 1970, 38:2, reports that Mayor Lindsey had requested a bill to be passed by the state legislature requiring compulsory arbitration in labor disputes involving city employees.

ends--strikes.

No patterns regarding unions were discernable between different hierarchical positions. Between different agencies, however, a slightly more favorable attitude to the right to strike was found at the Department of Corrections (34.8%), Department of Highways (35.7%) and Department of Social Services (34.6%) with preferences for compulsory arbitration at the Department of Sanitation (81.8%) and at the Department of Traffic (81.8%). Income, time at agency and numbers of hours worked showed no particular association with perceptions of unionism in public service.

3. Comparison of Organization Characteristics With Attitudinal Segments

Hypotheses concerning the relationships between certain organizational attributes and policy role types were presented in Chapter V. Although policy role types showed insufficient cohesion as an analytic tool, some of the dimensions relating to the different types can be used as separate role segments to suggest a predisposition to a particular orientation about decision-making in the specific context presented. In this section, some of the hypotheses will be explored in relation to these role segments.

Hypotheses one, two and three were concerned with the affect of agency membership on attitudinal sets. Tables 8.20 through 8.24 compare responses to those questions designed to elicit perceptions about decision making loci, according to agency membership. Table 8.20 examines the extent to which people in each of the six agencies reflect the average opinion of all respondents about:

1. **Question fifteen: The importance of specific factors in evaluating a job--opportunity to influence policy, opportunity to come into contact with different views and well defined responsibilities and chain of command (reflecting formulator, mediator and implementer tendencies respectively).**
2. **Question twelve: The relative importance (rank ordering) of qualities for promotion.**
3. **Question eleven: The extent to which directives are followed.**

Table 8.20

Comparison of Agency Variable with Attitudinal Ranking & Rating Variables

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Question 15</u>			<u>Attitudinal Variables</u>						<u>Question 11</u>	
	<u>Inf. Policy</u>	<u>Diff. Views</u>	<u>Chain of Command</u>	<u>Reasons for Promotion</u>						<u>Inf. Policy</u>	<u>Rule Deviation</u>
				<u>Conc. P. O.</u>	<u>Spec. Knowl.</u>	<u>Adm. Knowl.</u>	<u>Public Critic.</u>	<u>Expert Adv.</u>	<u>Good P. R.</u>		
Corrections	Below	Above	Above	Below	Slight Above	Slight Above	Below	Above	Aver.	Aver.	Below
Highways	Below	Very Below	Very Below	Above	Aver.	Slight Below	Above	Below	Above	Aver.	Above
Hous. Auth.	Aver.	Aver.	Very Below	Aver.	Aver.	Aver.	Aver.	Aver.	Aver.	Aver.	Slight Below
Sanitation	Aver.	Slight Above	Above	Below	Slight Above	Slight Above	Below	Aver.	Aver.	Slight Below	Slight Above
Traffic	Below	Aver.	Slight Above	Above	Below	Above	Aver.	Below	Aver.	Slight Above	Above
Social Serv.	Very Above	Very Below	Very Below	Aver.	Aver.	Aver.	Slight Below	Aver.	Below	Slight Above	Aver.

Explanation of Analysis:

Average 0-5% within average
 Slight Above 6-10% above average
 Slight Below 6-10% below average
 Above 11-20% above average
 Below 11-20% below average
 Very above More than 20% above average
 Very Below More than 20% below average

Table 8.21 reports the preference, by agency, of the answers to Question seventeen about what considerations are given primacy in setting courses of action for an agency.

Table 8.21

Comparison of Agency Variable with Alternatives
For Setting Agency Course of Action
(Question 17)

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Genl.</u> <u>Wlf.</u> v.	<u>Elect</u> <u>Offic.</u>	<u>Comm.</u> <u>N.</u> <u>Dem.</u> v.	<u>Elect</u> <u>Offic.</u>	<u>Comm.</u> <u>N.</u> <u>Dem.</u> v.	<u>Genl.</u> <u>Wlf.</u>	<u>N.</u>
Corrections	17 (70.8)	7 (29.2)	24 11 (47.8)	12 (52.2)	23 --	24 (100)	24
Highways	10 (71.4)	4 (28.6)	14 9 (64.3)	5 (35.7)	14 4 (28.6)	10 (71.4)	14
Hous. Auth.	58 (79.5)	15 (20.6)	73 38 (52.1)	35 (48.1)	73 5 (6.9)	67 (93.1)	72
Sanitation	25 (75.8)	8 (24.2)	33 19 (57.6)	14 (42.4)	33 3 (9.1)	30 (90.9)	33
Traffic	9 (81.8)	2 (18.2)	11 5 (50.0)	5 (50.0)	10 --	11 (100)	11
Social Serv.	<u>20 (76.9)</u>	<u>6 (23.1)</u>	<u>26 11 (47.8)</u>	<u>15 (52.2)</u>	<u>26 3 (11.5)</u>	<u>23 (88.5)</u>	<u>26</u>
Total	139 (76.8)	42 (23.2)	181 93 (52.0)	86 (48.0)	179 15 (8.3)	165 (91.7)	180

Table 8.22 relates agency membership to occupational self descriptions (Question nine).

Table 8.22

Comparison of Agency Variable with Self Description

<u>Agency</u>	Profess. Formul.	Admin. Implem.	Public Med.	NYC	Mixed	N.
Corrections	2 (8.0%)	20 (80.0%)	---	1 (4.0%)	2 (8.0%)	25
Highways	3 (23.1)	8 (61.5)	---	1 (7.7)	1 (7.7)	13
Hous. Auth.	17 (23.4)	35 (48.1)	4 (5.5)	6 (8.2)	10 (13.7)	72
Sanitation	3 (9.4)	24 (75.0)	2 (6.2)	2 (6.2)	1 (3.1)	32
Traffic	2 (18.2)	9 (81.8)	---	---	---	11
Social Serv.	<u>6 (23.1)</u>	<u>15 (57.7)</u>	<u>3 (11.5)</u>	<u>---</u>	<u>2 (7.7)</u>	<u>26</u>
Total	33 (18.4)	111 (62.0)	9 (5.0)	10 (5.6)	16 (9.0)	179

Table 8.23 examines the different prescriptions for subordinate responses to superior directives in the imaginary situations outlined in Questions sixteen and twenty.

Table 8.23

Analysis of Responses to Imaginary Situations by Agency

Agency	Question 16					Question 20				
	Follow Orders	Follow Orders w. Qualif.	Expert Integrity	Equivocal	N.	Follow Orders	Follow Orders w. Qualif.	Community Integrity	Equivocal	N.
Corrections	7 (31.8)	3 (13.6)	1 (4.5)	11 (50.0)	22	16 (64.0)	2 (8.0)	2 (8.0)	5 (20.0)	25
Highways	5 (38.5)	3 (23.1)	---	5 (38.5)	13	7 (53.8)	---	3 (23.1)	3 (23.1)	13
Hous. Auth.	14 (25.7)	4 (6.0)	8 (12.0)	42 (60.5)	68	25 (37.5)	11 (14.1)	13 (17.1)	22 (31.2)	71
Sanitation	3 (9.7)	---	3 (9.7)	25 (80.6)	31	13 (40.6)	1 (3.1)	10 (31.2)	8 (25.0)	32
Traffic	3 (27.3)	1 (9.1)	---	7 (63.6)	11	8 (72.7)	---	2 (18.2)	1 (9.1)	11
Social Service	6 (24.0)	1 (4.0)	3 (12.0)	15 (60.0)	<u>25</u>	9 (34.6)	5 (19.2)	4 (15.4)	8 (30.7)	<u>26</u>
					170					178

In table 8.24, the person or group most frequently selected as the decision-maker in specific discretionary situations is reported, together with the percentage making such selection in each agency.

Table 8.24

First Choice Preferences in Specific Decisional Areas by Agency

Agency	First Choice Preferences				
	Quest. 10 Set Goals	Quest. 14 Decentral.	Quest. 14 New Facil.	Quest. 14 New Serv.	Quest. 18 Best Interests
Corrections	Mixed Exp. (19.0)	Commr. (75.0)	Other Agenc. (41.2)	Commr. (70.6)	Commr. (47.4)
Highways	Mixed Adm. (25.0)	Commr. (72.7)	Commr. (50.0)	Commr. (50.0)	Staff (45.5) Commr. (45.5)
Hous. Auth.	General (20.6)	Commr. (50.4)	Commr. (23.5)	Commr. (50.0)	Commr. (36.0)
Sanitation	Mixed Adm. (40.6)	Commr. (71.4)	Other Agenc. (32.1)	Commr. (57.1)	Staff (31.0)
Traffic	No Pattern	Commr. (100.)	Commr. (37.5) Oth.Ag. (37.5)	Commr. (50.0)	Commr. (55.6)
Soc. Serv.	Experts (28.0)	Commr. (52.2)	Commr. (52.4)	Commr. (60.9)	Staff (25.0) Commr. (25.0)
All Agencies	Mixed General (18.3)	Commr. (62.9)	Commr. (28.6)	Commr. (55.6)	Commr. (35.9)

These tables show the following tendencies in each agency:

1. **The Department of Correction:** This department is above average on all the implementer measures reported on table 8.20 whereas it shows mixed re-actions to the mediator and formulator perceptions according to the context. There is no identifiable preferences shown to the choices reported on table 8.21 but table 8.22 that reveals/higher percentages of Correction Department executives identify themselves as administrator-implementers when asked to describe their occupations. The re-actions to the imaginary situations shown on table 8.23 also indicate a tendency toward more implementer-type answers. Table 8.24 is merely suggestive but the choice of "other agencies" as the bodies which should have primary responsibility for new buildings, together with the first choice of Commissioner for decentralization and adding new services decisions and as the one most aware of where the public's best interest lies, also shows intra-administrative inclinations.

The Department of Corrections is one of the oldest agencies in the city so the discernable trend within it toward the implementer orientation would seem to support the theory that the older agencies have more implementer types (Hypothesis 1). However, it is a relatively small body with a constituency that is not general, so the same implementer predilections would contradict Hypotheses two and three that the larger and more generalized organizations would be more implementer oriented.

2. **Department of Highways:** Table 8.20 shows the Department of Highways to be consistently below average in its implementer choices, with a slight preference to mediator attitudes apparent. Table 8.21 again shows an above average mediator approach. Tables 8.22 and 8.24 reveal no particular inclinations on the part of these executives other than those held by the rest of the sample. In deciding the

conflicts posed by the imaginary situations, the Highway people were less inclined to give equivocal answers, opting instead for above average implementer type responses and a slightly higher mediator approach to Question twenty.

This Department is a newer body with a generalized constituency. Its somewhat above average mediator views would, therefore, support Hypothesis one that mediator views vary inversely with age, and refute Hypothesis three that mediator views are associated with more particularized constituency. It is a medium sized agency so it is difficult to analyze whether it supports or counters Hypothesis two that mediator views vary inversely with larger sized agencies.

3. Housing Authority: According to table 8.20, the Housing Authority is average in all rating and ranking percentages reported except that it is below average in its rating of the importance of a well-defined chain of command as a job factor, and it is slightly above average in rule following. Tables 8.21, 8.23 and 8.24 show a similar lack of policy role distinctiveness although there is a very slight trend to below the norm implementer perceptions about the second imaginary situation of table 8.23. Table 8.22 also shows a less than average identification with the administrative-implementer self description.

There is a slightly discernable trend away from the implementer view in this agency. Since the functions of the Housing Authority is a fairly recent addition to the city, and it is rather top-heavy but not that large an agency with a particularized constituency, this slight trend, seems to support the three hypotheses with regard to policy types and agency membership.

4. Department of Sanitation: Tables 8.20 and 8.21 show no particular predispositions to any of the three policy orientations within this agency. There is a somewhat smaller percentage of professional-formulator identifiers and larger

per centage of administrator-implementer identifiers shown on table 8.22 but the responses to the questions examined in table 8.23 offset this tendency with fewer than average responses to the implementer re-action to what the subordinate should do in the first imaginary conflict situation, and a more than average number of mediator type responses to the second. Other agencies and commissioner are the most frequent choices for decision-makers in the selected areas reported in table 8.24.

Sanitation is an old, large agency serving the general public but its mixed perceptions about policy role segments does not provide an adequate basis for interpreting the relationships of its attitudinal sets according to the hypotheses.

5. Department of Traffic: Table 8.20 reveals a very slight tendency to below average formulator attitudes in this agency, and table 8.21 also shows a below average formulator perception to one of the three dimensions reported there. According to table 8.22, more of the executives at Traffic refer to themselves as administrator-implementers. The same implementer tendency is found in resolving the imaginary situation dilemmas with a sizeably larger number of implementer type responses being given to Question twenty and a slightly larger number to Question sixteen. The Traffic Department also shows more responses indicating that the commissioner should be responsible in specific decision-making areas.

The Traffic Department dates only from 1950 in its present structure. It is a small agency with a generalized constituency. Its tendency to favor the implementer views would seem to refute hypotheses one and two while lending credence to hypothesis three.

6. Department of Social Services: The importance of various job factor

aspects for social service personnel reported in table 8.20 reveals a marked preference for rating opportunity to influence public policy as important (formulator) while minimizing the importance of opportunity to come into contact with other viewpoints and a well-defined chain of command. This formulator tendency is found also in the rankings given qualifications for promotion though to a lesser extent. Tables 8.21 and 8.22 show no variation from the attitudes of all executives to the items analyzed there. Table 8.23, Question twenty indicates a slight antipathy to the implementer approach and table 8.24 shows that, unlike any other agency personnel, social service people choose expert groups most as those best able to appraise the goals of the agency.

A formulator views seems to predominate in this agency. Because of the age and large size of Social Services this then would seem to refute Hypotheses one and two while the particularized clientele it serves would support Hypothesis three.

To recapitulate, we find some tendency to the implementer view in Corrections and Traffic with a general hostility to this outlook in the Housing Authority. The Department of Highways is somewhat mediator oriented and Social Services formulator oriented. Sanitation is too mixed in its preferences for classification.

Hypothesis one is supported by the findings in three agencies and refuted by those in two. Hypothesis two is supported by only one agency's responses. Hypothesis three is also supported by three agencies' findings and contradicted by two. The evidence does not seem sufficient to confirm or contravert the first three suppositions relating policy orientations to agency age, size and constituency.

We turn now to Hypothesis four which holds that a formulator orientation will

vary directly with staff professional positions and to Hypothesis five that formulator orientations will vary directly with higher levels in the hierarchy. The relationships between position and policy attitudes are reported by tables 8.25 through 8.29 which examine the same attitudinal variables with respect to position as tables 8.20 through 8.24 do with respect to agency.

Table 8.25

Comparison of Position Levels with Attitudinal Ranking and Rating Variables

Position	Attitudinal Variables										
	Question 15			Reasons for Promotion							Question 11
	Inf. Policy	Diff. Views	Chain of Command	Conc. P. O.	Spec. Knowl.	Adm. Knowl.	Public Critic.	Expert Advice	Good P. R.	Inf. Policy	Rule Deviation
Dep. Commr.	Slight Above	Above	Very Below	Slight Above	Slight Above	Aver.	Below	Below	Slight Below	Above	Above
Asst. Commr.	Above	Below	Below	Slight Above	Aver.	Aver.	Aver.	Slight Below	Slight Below	Above	Slight Below
Bur. Chief	Aver.	Aver.	Aver.	Aver.	Aver.	Aver.	Aver.	Aver.	Aver.	Aver.	Above
Asst. Bur. Chief	Above	Above	Aver.	Slight Below	Above	Aver.	Above	Aver.	Aver.	Aver.	Aver.
Div. Chief	Below	Aver.	Very Above	Aver.	Slight Below	Aver.	Aver.	Aver.	Aver.	Aver.	Slight Below
Asst. Div. Chief	Below	Above	Very Above	Below	Aver.	Above	Below	Above	Aver.	Below	Aver.
Prof.	Very Above	Below	Very Below	Very Below	Very Above	Aver.	Aver.	Above	Above	Below	Very Above
Multi.	Above	Above	Slight Below	Aver.	Very Above	Aver.	Aver.	Slight Above	Slight Above	Aver.	Aver.

Explanation of analysis:

See explanation table 8.20

Table 8.26

Comparison of Position: Level with Alternatives for Setting Agency Course of Action

<u>Agency</u>	(Question 17)											
	<u>Genl.</u> <u>Welf.</u>	v.	<u>Elect.</u> <u>Offic.</u>	<u>N.</u>	<u>Comm.</u> <u>Dem.</u>	v.	<u>Elect.</u> <u>Offic.</u>	<u>N.</u>	<u>Comm.</u> <u>Dem.</u>	v.	<u>Genl.</u> <u>Welf.</u>	<u>N.</u>
Dep. Commr.	3 (60.0)		2 (40.0)	5	3 (60.0)		2 (40.0)	5	1 (20.0)		4 (80.0)	5
Asst. Commr.	17 (63.0)		10 (37.0)	27	12 (44.4)		15 (55.6)	27	4 (14.8)		23 (85.2)	27
Bur. Chief	22 (73.3)		8 (26.7)	30	17 (58.6)		12 (41.4)	29	1 (3.3)		29 (96.7)	30
Asst. Bur. Chief	16 (76.2)		5 (23.8)	21	13 (61.9)		8 (38.1)	21	2 (9.5)		19 (90.5)	21
Div. Chief	49 (80.3)		12 (19.7)	61	27 (44.3)		34 (55.7)	61	4 (6.7)		56 (93.3)	60
Asst. Div. Chief	14 (87.5)		2 (12.5)	16	11 (68.8)		5 (31.3)	16	---		16 (100.)	16
Prof.	5 (100.)		---	5	3 (75.0)		1 (25.0)	4	---		5 (100.)	5
Mixed	<u>12 (78.6)</u>		<u>3 (21.4)</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>6 (40.0)</u>		<u>9 (60.0)</u>	<u>15</u>	<u>3 (20.0)</u>		<u>12 (80.0)</u>	<u>15</u>
Total	138 (76.7)		42 (23.3)	180	92 (51.7)		86 (48.5)	178	15 (8.4)		164 (91.6)	179

Table 8.27

Comparison of Position Level with Self Description

<u>Position</u>	<u>Prof. Form.</u>	<u>Admin. Implem.</u>	<u>Public Med.</u>	<u>NYC</u>	<u>Mixed</u>	<u>N.</u>
Dep. Commr.	---	5 (100.)	---	---	---	5
Asst. Commr.	3 (11.5)	13 (50.0)	4 (15.4)	3 (11.5)	3 (11.5)	26
Bur. Chief	4 (13.8)	18 (62.1)	4 (13.8)	1 (3.4)	2 (6.8)	29
Asst. Bur. Chief	4 (19.0)	14 (66.7)	---	2 (9.5)	1 (4.8)	21
Div. Chief	11 (18.0)	41 (67.2)	1 (1.6)	4 (6.6)	4 (6.6)	61
Asst. Div. Chief	1 (5.9)	14 (82.4)	---	---	2 (11.8)	17
Prof.	2 (40.0)	3 (60.0)	---	---	---	5
Mixed	<u>8 (57.1)</u>	<u>2 (14.3)</u>	<u>---</u>	<u>---</u>	<u>4 (28.6)</u>	<u>14</u>
Total	33 (18.5)	110 (61.8)	9 (5.1)	10 (5.6)	16 (9.0)	178

Table 8.28

Analysis of Responses to Imaginary Situations by Position Levels

Position Levels	Question 16					Question 20				
	Follow Orders	Follow Orders w. Qualif.	Integrity	Equivocal	N.	Follow Orders	Follow Orders w. Qualif.	Integrity	Equivocal	N.
Dept. Commr.	1 (20.0)	---	---	4 (80.0)	5	2 (40.0)	---	1 (20.0)	2 (40.0)	5
Asst. Commr.	3 (12.0)	2 (8.0)	4 (16.0)	16 (64.0)	25	8 (30.8)	4 (15.4)	7 (26.8)	7 (26.8)	26
Bur. Chief	6 (20.0)	3 (10.0)	2 (6.6)	19 (63.3)	30	14 (46.7)	3 (10.0)	6 (20.0)	7 (23.3)	30
Asst. Bur. Chief	5 (25.0)	1 (5.0)	2 (10.0)	12 (60.0)	20	13 (61.9)	3 (14.3)	3 (14.3)	2 (9.5)	21
Div. Chief	16 (29.1)	3 (5.5)	5 (9.1)	31 (56.8)	55	29 (50.0)	5 (8.6)	6 (10.3)	18 (31.1)	58
Asst. Div. Chief	3 (18.8)	1 (6.2)	2 (12.4)	10 (62.5)	16	6 (35.3)	3 (17.6)	5 (29.4)	3 (17.6)	17
Staff Prof.	---	---	---	5 (100.)	5	2 (40.0)	---	3 (60.0)	---	5
Multi.-Position	4 (28.6)	2 (14.3)	---	8 (57.1)	14	4 (26.6)	1 (6.7)	2 (13.3)	8 (53.3)	15
All Positions	38 (22.4)	12 (7.1)	15 (8.9)	105 (61.6)	170	78 (44.1)	19 (10.7)	33 (18.7)	47 (26.5)	177

Table 8.29

First Choice Preferences in Specific Decisional Areas by Position Levels

Position Levels	First Choice Preferences				
	Question 10 Set Goals	Question 14 Decentralize	Question 14 New Facilities	Question 14 New Services	Question 18 Best Interests
Dep. Commr.	Mixed Adm. (40.0)	Commr. (50.0) Mayor (50.0)	Staff (40.0)	Commr. (80.0)	Commr. (66.7)
Asst. Commr.	General (20.0)	Commr. (59.1)	Commr. (47.4)	Commr. (65.2)	Commr. (50.0)
Bur. Chief	Mixed Adm. (25.9)	Commr. (72.0)	Commr. (30.8)	Commr. (41.7)	Staff (36.0)
Asst. Bur. Chief	General (25.0)	Commr. (76.5)	Other Ag. (41.2)	Commr. (70.6)	Staff (31.6)
Div. Chief	General (14.0)	Commr. (62.5)	Commr. (27.7)	Commr. (52.1)	Commr. (31.9)
Asst. Div. Chief	Mixed Adm. (20.0)	Commr. (54.5)	Other Ag. (38.5)	Commr. (50.0)	Staff (33.3) Commr. (33.3)
Prof.	Mixed Adm. (75.0)	Commr. (66.7)	No Pattern	Commr. (66.7)	No Pattern
Multi.-Position	Experts (28.6)	Commr. (37.5)	Commr. (37.5)	Commr. (55.6)	Commr. (54.5)
All Positions	General (17.9)	Commr. (63.3)	Commr. (28.8)	Commr. (56.0)	Commr. (35.9)

There are only five staff professionals who do not also occupy some other administrative position. Fifteen of the respondents indicate some duality or multiplicity in their titles (i.e. Bureau Chief and Chief Engineer). Because of the small number of exclusively professional people in the study, statements about differences in orientation must be accepted with caution. However, analysis does show a marked tendency to the formulator approach to decision-making among this group. Table 8.25 reveals very much above average scores on two of the four formulator items and above average scores on another one, as well as strong predispositions to rule deviation. The mediator and implementer items generally show lower than average or average responses. Table 8.26 also shows the same tendencies with all five people choosing general welfare over both elected official directives and demands of the community as primary considerations for agency action compared to 76.7% and 91.8% respectively for the whole executive population. It is interesting to note, however, on Table 8.27 that, while more than the overall average of 18.5% (namely 40%) of respondents identify their occupations in professional-formulator terms, a larger number still (60%) stress its administrator-implementer aspects. The responses to the situational conflicts reported in table 8.28 show a greater than average desire to avoid the issues asked by Question sixteen and a somewhat greater than average pro-mediator re-action to Question twenty. No pattern of preference is evident from table 8.29.

The "multi-position" people show about the same general perceptions as do the professional staff executives. With regard to the items listed on tables 8.25, 8.26 and 8.28, there is little preference for any one view although slightly fewer than average would follow superior's directives if community hostility might ensue

(Question twenty, table 8.28). A significantly larger percentage of these multi-titled administrators identify themselves as professional-formulators than do even those whose titles are exclusively professional (table 8.27), and this group is also the only one which selects experts as the means for best appraising agency goals (Question ten, table 8.29).

The predisposition to the formulator attitude found among both staff professionals and those with mixed professional and administrative titles would seem to support Hypothesis four although, again, caution is urged because of the relatively few cases on which this conclusion is based.

According to table 8.25, position in the hierarchy also seems positively associated with the formulator perception. In examining the items concerning the importance of influencing policy, we note substantially more people at higher levels rate them higher while specialized knowledge as a qualification for promotion is also slightly favored by those higher up in the hierarchy. At the same time we note consistently more importance given to the implementer perceptions by people occupying lower positions in the bureaucracy. Table 8.27 similarly suggests that higher level people are less apt to describe their occupations in implementer terms. There is an opposite trend noted on table 8.26, however, where higher level people show less preference for general welfare over other alternatives for agency courses of action. The other tables do not disclose any marked differences in outlook according to hierarchical positioning.

On the weight of evidence of these findings there seems to be somewhat more support given to the proposition in Hypothesis five that the formulator view is held more widely as the hierarchical ladder is scaled.

The next two hypotheses deal with quantifiable organizational variables so that the results can be less impressionistically analyzed.

Hypothesis six postulates that a formulator role will vary directly and an implementer one inversely with higher salary levels. Table 8.30 gives the correlation coefficients between salary and the ranking, rating and forced choice items in the questionnaire.

Table 8.30

Correlations Between Salary and Quantifiable Attitudinal Variables

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Correlation with Salary</u>
Question 15, Job Factors	
Influence Policy	.24
Conflicting View Contact	-.04
Chain of Command	-.11
Question 12, Reasons for Promotion	
Handle conflicting public opinion	.10
Special Knowledge	-.05
Administrative Knowledge	-.20
Handle public criticism	-.11
Secure Expert Advice	-.05
Good Public Relations	.08
Influence agency policy	.17
Question 11, Rule Deviation Frequency	.02
Question 13, Reasons for Obeying Rules	
Respect for ability	-.07
Personal regard	.03
Formal authority	-.02
Control over promotion	-.13
Control over penalties	.14
Question 17, Considerations for Agency Action	
General Welfare (v. Elected Officials)	-.14
Community Demand (v. Elected Officials)	-.03
Community Demand (v. General Welfare)	.16

Ten of the nineteen items show degrees of associations of .10 or more, with three of them referring to formulator perceptions. Higher salaried people show a .24 correlation with the importance of influencing policy as a job factor and a .17 with the importance of influencing policy as a qualification for promotion. However, there is a somewhat lesser inverse correlation of $-.14$ between the choice of general welfare over elected officials for setting agency courses of action and higher pay. We find generally positive associations between higher salaries and the mediator orientation and a less favorable perception of the implementer alternatives by higher-paid people as seen by a $-.20$ co-efficient with the importance of administrative know-how for promotion and a $-.11$ with the importance of chain of command in rating a job.

An impressionistic examination of the relationship between the non-quantifiable attitudinal variables and salary levels shows no significant predispositions to any one attitude except for some tendency for lower income people to approve the implementer alternative to the conflict situation posed in Question twenty involving supervisor directives and community demands.

There seems to be sufficient support in the data to suggest that hypothesis six which holds that higher salaries are associated with formulator views and lower with implementer ones has validity.

The next proposition, Hypothesis seven refers to length of time at an agency. It states that mediator and formulator approaches will vary inversely and implementer attitudes directly with longer tenure. Table 8.31 reports the correlation co-efficients.

Table 8.31

**Correlations Between Time at Agency and
Quantifiable Attitudinal Variables**

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Correlation with Agency Time</u>
Question 15, Job Factors	
Influence Policy	- .13
Contact with conflicting views	.14
Chain of command	.21
Question 12, Reasons for Promotion	
Conflicting public opinion	.07
Special knowledge	.14
Administrative knowledge	.02
Handle public criticism	.00
Secure expert advice	.07
Good public relations	.02
Influence policy	-.05
Question 11, Rule Deviation Frequency	- .17
Question 17, Considerations for Agency Action	
General welfare (v. elect. offic.)	.07
Community Demands (v. elect. offic.)	.06
Community Demands (v. general welfare)	.01

Of the five items that show more than .10 degrees of association, we note a -.13 inverse figure between the importance of influencing policy as a job factor and tenure which supports the hypothesis and a -.14 inverse figure with special knowledge as a qualification for promotion refuting it. There is a similar contradictory pattern with regard to the implementer questions. Between length of time and the importance of chain of command, an association of .21 is found upholding the hypothesis but a -.17 direct relationship between tenure and the extent to which directives are followed (Question eleven) disputes the hypothesis. The one mediator-designed question which shows some relationship with tenure (.14 between tenure and opportunity to come into contact with different views as a job factor) also throws

doubt on another part of the hypothesis. It would therefore, seem that length of time at the agency affects decisional attitudes inconsistently, depending on the nature of the context in which the decision is to be made.

These inconsistencies are apparent as well in the non-quantifiable attitudinal variables, with, for instance, the greater tendency to describe oneself in formulator terms with longer periods at the agency, being cancelled out by the disinclination of more senior people to refuse to follow superiors' directives, in the imaginary situation of Question twenty.

Hypothesis eight states that implementer orientations will be favored by those recruited into service through routinized channels while formulator and mediator attitudes will prevail among appointed personnel. Table 8.32 compares attitudes of appointees to those of all respondents on a number of dimensions.

Table 8.32

**Comparison of Appointed Personnel to All Personnel
On Selected Attitudinal Variables**

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Relationship to Total Population</u>
Job Factors (Question 15)	
Influence policy	Much above average importance*
Conflicting view contact	No pattern
Chain of Command	Below average
Rule Deviation (Question 11)	Below average
Reasons for Promotion (Question 12)	
Handle conflicting public opinion	Above average
Special knowledge	Below average
Administrative knowledge	Average
Handle public criticism	Above average
Secure expert advice	Average
Good public relations	Average
Influence policy	Average
Set Agency Goals (Question 10)	No distinctive pattern
Decentralization (Question 14)	Mayor preferred more than by rest of population
New Buildings (Question 14)	Commr. preferred more than by rest of population
New Services (Question 14)	Commr. preferred more than by rest of population
Awareness of Public Interest (Question 18)	No distinctive pattern.
Consideration for Agency Action (Question 17)	
General welfare (v. elected officials)	More preferred general welfare
Community demands (v. elected officials)	Average preferences
Community demands (v. general welfare)	Slightly more preferred welfare
Imaginary Situation No. 1 (Question 16)	No distinctive pattern
Imaginary Situation No. 2 (Question 20)	No distinctive pattern

***Explanation of analysis:** Average - up to 5% average for total population
 Slightly below or above - 6% -10% in either direction from aver.
 Below or above - 11% -20% in either direction from average
 Much below or above - 21% or more in either direction from aver.

Although it is necessary to again rely on impressions of tendencies, there does seem to be a predisposition among appointees to the formulator viewpoint and a disinclination to the implementer one in connection with the importance of job factors (Question 15) and primary consideration for agency action (Question 17) as well as more frequent rule deviation behavior reported in answer to Question eleven. While the responses to the questions posing situational conflicts and qualifications for promotion show no dominant trends, there is some support for the proposition that lateral entry people are more likely to be formulator types.

The extent of work involvement is related directly to the formulator perception and inversely to the implementer perception according to Hypothesis nine. To determine the extent of work involvement, numbers of hours worked is the primary measuring tool used although the relative importance of certain job attributes is also considered.

Table 8.33 reports the degrees of associations between the numbers of hours worked and the quantifiable attitudinal items.

Table 8.33

**Correlation Between Numbers of Hours Worked and
Quantifiable Attitudinal Variables**

Variable	Correlation
Job Factor (Question 15)	
Influence Policy	- .29
Conflicting view contact	.04
Chain of Command	- .14
Reasons for Promotion (Question 12)	
Handle conflicting public opinion	.07
Special knowledge	- .01
Administrative knowledge	.00
Handle public criticism	- .08
Secure expert advice	- .08
Good public relations	.00
Influence policy	.07
Rule Deviation (Question 11)	.19
Agency Courses of Action (Question 17)	
General welfare (v. elected officials)	- .14
Community demand (v. elected officials)	.02
Community demand (v. general welfare)	.02

There are three items that identify a formulator orientation, two of which correlate inversely and one directly with hours worked. The people who work longer hours select the general welfare alternative over elected officials for setting courses of action less frequently (- .14 co-efficient). These same people also do not consider influencing policy as a positive asset in evaluating a job by a quite substantial - .29 inverse figure. They do, however, report greater proclivities to rule deviation (.19). This same .19 degree of association can be interpreted as a predisposition to the implementer rule following norm among executives who work fewer hours. This tendency is evident as well in the - .14 correlation between numbers of hours worked and the less important rating assigned to chain of command as a work factor.

No pattern of responses is apparent in answer to the less structured questions (Questions 10, 14, 16, 18 and 20) although it is noteworthy that the longer the hours an executive works the less likely is he to describe his occupation in professional-formulator terms and the more apt to emphasize its administrator-implementer aspects.

On the basis of numbers of hours worked as an indicant of work involvement, the data suggest that hypothesis nine is correct in relation to the implementer orientation being dominant among those working fewer hours. On the other hand, the relationship between formulator views and hours worked is dependent on the context in which the formulator approach is presented.

Certain attributes of a job are also examined as tangentially related to work involvement. Greater concern with salary and security of tenure is assumed to indicate some lesser level of involvement than does emphasis on public service and advancement aspects of the work situation. Accordingly, table 8.34 is devised to show the correlation co-efficients between these four job characteristics and the ratings, rankings and forced choice questions relating to policy attitudes.

Table 8.34

**Correlations Between Selected Work Factors Indicating
Work Involvement and Quantifiable Policy Attitude Variables**

Attitudinal Variable	Involvement		Non-Involvement	
	Advancement	Public Service	Salary	Security
Job Factor (17)				
Influence Policy	.04	.33	-.02.	-.17
Conflict View	.05	.21	.00	.01
Chain of Command	.23	.08	-.02	.23
Reasons for Promotion (12)				
Handle Conflicts	-.13	-.16	.14	-.20
Special Knowledge	.21	.10	.08	.14
Administrative Knowledge	.02	.08	-.08	-.02
Public Criticism	.03	-.08	.03	.01
Expert Advice	-.06	.11	-.04	.01
Good Public Relations	.06	.01	.01	.14
Influence Policy	.08	.03	.00	-.07
Rule Deviation (11)	.02	.03	.12	-.17
Agency Action (17)				
Welf. v. Elect.	.00	.14	.17	.10
Demands v. Elect.	.16	.12	.17	.03
Demands v. Welf.	-.08	.09	-.02	-.05
Obeying Rules (13)				
Ability	.05	.25	-.07	-.04
Personal Regard	.09	.12	-.07	-.05
Formal Authority	-.06	-.19	.05	.02
Promotion Control	.07	-.05	.20	.01
Penalty	-.12	-.08.	-.06.	.00

These data also lend some little support to Hypothesis nine. But, unlike numbers of hours worked as a measure of work involvement which found implementer views related to involvement, here we find the formulator view shows greater degrees of association with these other work involvement considerations. In most instances, formulator type answers are positively correlated with involvement factors and negatively with non-involvement ones. Specifically, with the importance of public service (an

involvement variable) there are positive correlations as follows:

- a) a substantial .33 with the importance of influencing policy as an important value in assessing a position;
- b) .10 with special knowledge as a qualification for promotion;
- c) .11 with securing expert advice as a qualification for promotion;
- d) .14 with the choice of general welfare over elected officials for setting agency courses of action.

With the importance of advancement (an involvement variable), there is:

- a) .21 with special knowledge as a qualification for promotion.

And with the non-involvement variable of security of tenure there is an inverse -.17 relationship with the extent of opportunity of influencing policy as a job value and a -.17 with the extent of rule deviation.

On the other hand, positive associations of .14 and .10 were found between the importance of security, of tenure and special knowledge for promotion and general welfare over elected officials for agency action, respectively, and of .17 between the latter and the other non-involvement variable, salary importance.

With regard to the implementer items in the questionnaire, we find a positive .23 between chain of command importance and the involvement variable of advancement and a tendency for those more disposed to follow rules to rate the non-involvement factors of salary importance lower and security higher, with the only other significant correlation being a positive .23 between chain of command and the importance of salary. The implementer attitudinal set thus seems to show no consistent emphasis when compared to these selected work-involvement attributes.

Inasmuch as different dimensions of the work involvement factor support

different parts of Hypothesis nine, and others show ambivalences about its relationship to policy types, we can only suggest that perhaps this hypothesis may be true but more empirical evidence is needed.

The last hypothesis concerns the relationship of attitudes to public unions with policy types. It was proposed that formulators would be more favorably disposed to unions and this was found to be true. Table 8.35 reveals inverse correlations of $-.10$ between negative union attitudes and the job factor, opportunity to influence policy and a $-.13$ with general welfare selection over elected officials in the forced choice Question seventeen.

Table 8.35

**Correlation Between Attitudes to Union
Rights and Quantifiable Policy Attitudinal Variables**

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Correlation</u>
Job Factor (Question 15)	
Influence policy	-.10
Conflicting view contact	.04
Chain of Command	.15
Reasons for Promotion (Question 12)	
Handle conflicting public opinion	.05
Special knowledge	.08
Administrative knowledge	.11
Handle public criticism	-.01
Secure expert advice	-.03
Good public relations	-.06
Influence policy	-.08
Rule Deviation (Question 11)	-.17
Reasons for Obeying Rules (Question 13)	
Respect for ability	-.07
Personal regard	-.07
Formal authority	.12
Control over promotion	-.11
Control over penalties	.08
Agency Courses of Action (Question 17)	
General welfare (v. elected officials)	-.13
Community demands (v. elected officials)	-.18
Community demands (v. general welfare)	.09

This table also shows the implementer orientation to be more closely associated with unfavorable union perceptions, supporting the second part of Hypothesis ten that the implementer orientation will vary directly with negative attitudes to civil service unions. We note positive correlation co-efficients between the belief that there should be compulsory arbitration and:

- a) the importance of chain of command as a job factor of .15.
- b) Administrative knowledge as a qualification for promotion of .11.

c) formal authority as a reason for obeying superiors of .12.

There is also an association of $-.17$ between rule deviation behavior and antipathetic union sentiments, re-inforcing the other findings that formulators tend to pro-union and implementer anti-union attitudes.

We note, too, that the only mediator item which shows some significant correlation with union attitude is an inverse relationship between unfavorable union feelings and primacy given community demands over elected officials as a basis for agency action (Question seventeen).

No significant relationships are revealed by an examination of the responses to the unstructured questions. However, on the basis of the quantifiable data, the evidence seems to support the hypothesis about union attitudes and policy types.

To summarize, the relationships of organizational variables with policy attitudes proposed by the following hypotheses seem, on the whole, to be given some support by this study:

Hypothesis four that formulator orientations will vary directly with staff professional positions.

Hypothesis six that formulator orientations will vary directly with higher salaries and implementer with lower.

Hypothesis ten that formulator orientations will vary directly with pro-union attitudes.

The following hypotheses were supported in part:

Hypothesis five. There is a slight tendency for formulator views to be more widely held by higher-level personnel but not sufficiently so to substantiate the

hypothesis.

Hypothesis eight. The formulator role orientation does tend to vary directly with lateral entry recruitment and the implementer with recruitment through routinized channels. But the third part of the hypothesis regarding mediator orientations also varying directly with lateral recruitment is not upheld.

Hypothesis nine. The different items selected as measurements of work involvement each support another aspect of the hypothesized relationship between involvement in work and policy type while revealing no patterning for the other type. There is the suggestion that this hypothesis may be true but more evidence is needed.

Finally, the findings with regard to Hypotheses one, two and three relating agency factors to policy types are not consistent so that no interpretation is possible. The proposition that length of time at the agency relates to policy types (Hypothesis seven) is also not supported.

IX

Comparison of Personal and Attitudinal Variables

1. Profile of Personal Characteristics

In the preceding chapter, decision-making perceptions and organizational characteristics of the sample population were examined and then compared to each other. For a deeper analysis, we can delve into the personal attributes of respondents which may also be related to attitudes and opinions. In this chapter, the more concrete, more elemental aspects of a person's identity--his age, sex, education and profession--will be studied. Chapter X will deal with those more sociological aspects of the individual's make-up such as geographic and social mobility and cosmopolitan-local foci.

Table 9.1 notes that only 16 or 8.8% of all the high-level executives employed at these six New York City agencies are women.

Table 9.1

Distribution of Respondents by Sex

Sex	N.	%
Male	165	91.2
Female	16	8.8
	<u>181</u>	<u>100.</u>

In addition, the distribution of women among agencies is most uneven, as shown on table 9.2.

Table 9.2

Distribution of Respondents by Sex and Agency

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Male</u>	<u>Female</u>
Corrections	24 (96.0)	1 (4.0)
Highways	13 (92.9)	1 (7.1)
Housing Authority	67 (91.8)	6 (8.2)
Sanitation	33 (100.)	
Traffic	11 (100.)	
Social Service	17 (68.0)	8 (32.0)
	<u>165 (91.2)</u>	<u>16 (8.8)</u>

The Social Service Department has the largest number--eight of twenty five officials, or 32% of its officials are females. The Housing Authority has six women from a total of 73 or 8.8%. The other departments each have one or no distaff members in top positions. It would seem that, despite the prohibition against discrimination by sex for city government employment, there have been few in-roads made by women into the upper reaches of the bureaucracy.

Women bureaucrats tend to be at the agency between sixteen and twenty five years whereas the proportion of men who are there more than twenty five years and between six and fifteen years is substantially greater. There is also some indication that women tend to be from better educated families than men. While no differences in education by sex was found among respondents themselves, the educational level of fathers was somewhat higher for women. No distinction was apparent in the numbers of hours worked between men and women.

The ages of the executives in this study are given by table 9.3.¹

¹See footnote 6, Chapter VIII, with regard to the size of the sample.

Table 9.3

Distribution of Respondents by Age

<u>Year of Birth</u>	<u>N.</u>	<u>%</u>
After 1939	-	-
1929 - 1938	3	3.2
1919 - 1928	11	11.6
1909 - 1918	55	57.9
1899 - 1908	25	26.3
Before 1899	1	1.1
	<u>95</u>	

Mean Age = 56.0

As could be anticipated from the heavy weighting toward longer periods of government employment and agency tenure, there is an overwhelming proportion of middle-management people in their fifties and sixties. 57.9% of respondents were born between 1909 and 1918 placing them in their fifties at the time of this research. A very substantial percentage (27.4%) are even older, having been born before 1908.

The mean age for the population is a quite mature 56.0. This is a good deal older than comparable executives in other bureaucracies. The executives in the five technical bureaus of the federal government looked at by Davis had mean ages ranging from 48.3 for section chiefs to 53.7 for bureau chiefs and deputies.² The Warner, Van Riper study of federal employees at different grade levels report the following mean ages:³

²Davis, op. cit., table 3, p. 71.

³Warner, Van Riper, Martin and Collins, op. cit., table 81B, p. 399.

GS -14	49.9
15	49.2
16	50.4
17	50.4
18	52.0

At no level is the mean age as advanced as in our six agencies. The average age of executives in the Peruvian departments examined by Hopkins was 47.4.⁴

While Eldersveld and his associates do not compute a mean for their population, fewer than half the administrators in four of their five Pakistani agencies are older than forty years⁵ compared to only 14.8% of New York City executives in the present study who are under fifty.

There is no association found between age and income (.08) but a -.23 correlation between age and education is established. Thus, there is some significant tendency for the older personnel to have had less formal education though they are not at lower salary ranges than younger people.

The distribution of the executives according to education levels is reported in the next table--table 9.4.

⁴Hopkins, op. cit., table 21, p. 65.

⁵Eldersveld, et al., op. cit., table 5.1, p. 70.

Table 9.4

Distribution of Respondents by Highest Educational Level Attained

<u>Educational Level</u>	<u>N.</u>	<u>%</u>
High School or less	31	17.0
Some College	59	32.4
Bachelor Degree	27	14.8
Some Graduate Work	30	16.5
Master Degree	22	12.1
M. A. +	6	3.3
Doctorate	7	3.8
	<u>182</u>	

The largest per centage of respondents--32.4% have had some college training but have not received a degree. Another 17% have no college experience at all.

There is thus an even division among high level executives between those who have graduated college and perhaps gone on to higher levels and those who have not.

Interestingly, of the 50% who have at least a bachelor's degree, 35.7% report some graduate work with seven of these (3.8%) holding doctorates.

The education variable correlates with some personal and organizational characteristics besides age, (noted above). There is a .26 co-incident between education and income which is evidence of some recognition being given for additional schooling. If anything, it is surprising, that the association is not greater, inasmuch as formal and objective qualifications are so often stressed within the civil service. Perhaps the key lies in the lack of correspondence between income and age so that either education or seniority are monetarily recognized, and the more senior members show less educational attainments.

Education also shows a negative relationship with length of time in New York City employ and at one's agency-- -.31 and -.24 respectively. The bureaucrats

with the most education are thus those who are newer to government service.

The education factor does not affect the numbers of hours worked by an executive, a comparison showing a perfect no relationship of .00 between the two variables. However, some other work involvement characteristics do show patterns of association with amounts of schooling. There is a tendency for those with less education to rate the opportunity to serve the public as a relatively more important value on a job (.16) and a much stronger disposition for these same people to emphasize the security of tenure aspects in their evaluations (.29 co-efficient).

No differences in attitudes to strikes and collective bargaining according to educational levels is evident.

The educational levels of New York City people in this research compares unfavorably with that found at the federal level by Davis and Warner and Van Riper. Among Davis' agencies only 8% of the population had less than a bachelor's degree and 24% had Ph. D.'s.⁶ Davis studied technical bureaus, however, which could be expected to have larger proportions of specialists requiring more extensive education. However, Warner and Van Riper who did not limit themselves to technical agencies report only two out of ten high-level federal executives in their research have not finished college while one tenth have Ph. D. degrees.⁷ Deil S. Wright and Richard L. McAnaw also found higher per centages of college trained people holding executive positions in state bureaucracies.⁸ Sixty four per cent of

⁶Davis, op. cit., table 12, p. 80.

⁷Warner, et al., op. cit., p. 11.

⁸Wright and McAnaw, op. cit.

their sample of heads of major administrative units in all fifty states had college degrees and 40% also report having advanced degrees.

Table 9.5 gives the distribution of licenses and certificates, if any, held by respondents.⁹

Table 9.5

Distribution of Respondents by Licenses and Certifications Held

<u>License</u>	<u>N.</u>	<u>%</u>
Engineering	19	19.0
Law	13	13.0
M.D.	3	3.0
Accounting	9	9.0
Misc. Professional	16	16.0
Misc. Non-Professional	4	4.0
None	<u>36</u>	<u>36.0</u>
	100	

The miscellaneous professional licenses category include mainly social worker certifications in the Housing Authority and architectural symbols of recognition in a number of agencies. The miscellaneous non-professionals include technical certifications for non-college type training.

Although professional licenses held is only one indicator of professionalization, it is relatively hard data which, probably more than any other single measurement, reveals the primary focus of any advanced training an executive may have.

Unexpectedly, we find a larger per centage of respondents have engineering licenses than law degrees. There are 19 (19%) engineers to 13 (13%) lawyers in the sample. The ubiquitous lawyer as the prototype of a city administrator is hardly

⁹See footnote 6, Chapter VIII, with regard to the size of the sample.

substantiated in this study. Either there has been a decline in the extent to which lawyers are involved in the city¹⁰ or, less likely, the requirements of the particular agencies selected are so technical that differently trained people predominate.

The most significant relationship noted is, of course, between education and licenses held. Some trend is also noted, however, for those with professional licenses to work fewer hours than do the non-licensed people. And of interest, too, is the fact that the only women holding licenses are the social work-administrators in the Department of Social Services.

2. Comparison of Personal Characteristics and Attitudinal Segments

Are the personal differences between bureaucrats as to age, sex, education and professionalism related to attitudes to decisional functions? In Chapter V, it was hypothesized that sex and age were not related (Hypotheses eleven and twelve) and that higher educational levels and professionalism were associated with both formulator and mediator-type orientations and, lower educational attainments and non-professional identity with implementer ones. This section will investigate these postulates.

Table 9.6 shows the correlation between sex and the quantifiable attitudinal segments:

¹⁰Lowi, *op. cit.*, among others has described the extent to which lawyers pervade the city bureaucracy.

Table 9.6

Correlation Between Sex and Quantifiable Attitudinal Variables

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Correlation with sex</u>
Question 15 - Job Factors	
Influence policy	-.17
Conflicting view contact	-.10
Chain of command	.08
Question 12 - Reasons for Promotion	
Handle conflicting public opinion	-.03
Special knowledge	.07
Administrative knowledge	.06
Handle public criticism	.02
Secure expert advice	.08
Good public relations ability	-.05
Influence agency policy	-.05
Question 11 - Rule Deviation Frequency	.08
Question 17 - Consideration for Action	
General welfare v. elected officials	-.13
Community demand v. elected officials	-.14
Community demand v. general welfare	.02

While the sex of a respondent is, of course, not a quantifiable variable we can determine variations in responses between men and women by assigning numerical values to each and comparing these to the more meaningful numerical rankings and ratings given in answer to the questionnaire items. A certain amount of caution is also necessary in interpreting these results since the proportion of women in the sample is quite small.

Referring to this table, we note a tendency for female administrators to perceive the opportunity to come into contact with different viewpoints as a somewhat less important job factor (-.10) as well as a slightly greater tendency (-.17) to give opportunity to influence policy somewhat lower ratings than men do. These particular

mediator and formulator aspects then are less prevalent among women. On the other hand, women tend to choose prevailing sentiment (the mediator view) over elected officials by $-.14$ degree of association, and general welfare (the formulator view) over elected officials by $-.13$ degree of association, as the primary consideration for setting agency courses of action. No other even minimally significant relations between sex and quantifiable policy attitudes were uncovered. This may be a consequence of a tendency, which an impressionistic observation of the data suggests, that women tend to choose moderate positions in preference to either extreme in rating items.

The few associations shown by table 9.6 go in contradictory directions. An examination of the responses to the less structured items shows the same inconsistencies. Table 9.7 reveals that larger percentages of women are formulator-disposed when faced with the dilemma presented in the first imaginary situation between professional and administrative norms (25.0% compared to 7.2% for men). But, when presented with a problem involving community demands and hierarchical responsibility, there is a propensity for women, even more than for men, to evade definitive resolution of the problem. Women answer Question twenty equivocally 37.5% of the time compared to 25.0% for men and they would follow orders with qualifications 25% as against a male 9.3%.

Table 9.7

Analysis of Responses to Imaginary Situations by Sex

<u>Sex</u>	<u>Question 16</u>					<u>Question 20</u>				
	<u>Follow Orders</u>	<u>Follow Orders w. Qualif.</u>	<u>Integ.</u>	<u>Equiv.</u>	<u>N.</u>	<u>Follow Orders</u>	<u>Follow Orders w. Qualif.</u>	<u>Integ.</u>	<u>Equiv.</u>	<u>N.</u>
Male	35 (22.9)	13 (8.5)	11 (7.2)	94 (61.4)	153	75 (46.6)	15 (9.3)	30 (18.6)	41 (25.4)	161
Female	<u>2 (12.5)</u>	<u>1 (6.2)</u>	<u>4 (25.0)</u>	<u>9 (56.3)</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>3 (18.8)</u>	<u>4 (25.0)</u>	<u>3 (18.8)</u>	<u>6 (37.5)</u>	<u>16</u>
All	37 (21.9)	14 (8.2)	15 (8.9)	103 (60.9)	169	78 (44.1)	19 (10.7)	33 (18.6)	47 (26.5)	177

In analyzing both imaginary situations we find that women assume an implementer approach (follow orders) less frequently.

Self-identification by sex is explored by table 9.8.

Table 9.8
Comparison of Sex with Self-Description

<u>Sex</u>	<u>Self-Description</u>					<u>N.</u>
	<u>Prof. Form.</u>	<u>Admin. Implem.</u>	<u>Public Med.</u>	<u>NYC</u>	<u>Mixed</u>	
Male	101 (62.3)	32 (19.8)	6 (3.7)	10 (6.2)	13 (8.0)	162
Female	<u>9 (56.3)</u>	<u>1 (6.2)</u>	<u>3 (18.8)</u>	<u>---</u>	<u>3 (18.7)</u>	<u>16</u>
Total	110 (61.8)	33 (18.5)	9 (5.1)	10 (5.6)	16 (9.0)	178

This table reveals a predisposition to a public-service mediator emphasis in describing occupations by larger proportions of women than men. Women also tend to a somewhat more multi-functional view of their jobs. In view of the few professional licenses held by distaff executives, it is not surprising to find only one respondent whose primary identification is as a professional-formulator.

In the specific decisional areas of setting agency goals (Question 10a), responsibility for decentralization, for establishing new facilities, for introducing new services (Question fourteen) and in awareness of the best interests of the public in matters concerning the agency field of operations (Question eighteen), no differences by sex are discernable.

In view of the inconsistencies in orientation between attitudinal segments, the evidence would seem to sustain Hypothesis eleven that sex and policy attitudes are unrelated.

Hypothesis twelve relates age to policy orientations. Table 9.9 examines the correlations of this personal variable to the ranking and rating items of the instrument. The hypothesis proposes that, in exploring the age characteristic, time in service is an associated variable, and we do find a .34 co-incidence between the two. However, since the relationship is not great and because the policy attitudes of administrators showed no particular patterning by length of time in service¹¹ age was handled as a separate variable.

¹¹See Chapter VIII, pp. 198-199.

Table 9.9

Correlation Between Age and Quantifiable Attitudinal Variables

Variable	Correlation with Age
Question 15 - Job Factors	
Influence Policy	-.02
Conflicting view contact	.17
Chain of command	.14
Question 12 - Reasons for Promotion	
Handle conflicting public opinion	.11
Specialized knowledge	.06
Administrative knowledge	-.04
Handle public criticism	.10
Secure expert advice	.01
Good public relations	-.08
Influence agency policy	-.11
Question 11 - Rule Deviation Frequency	-.06
Question 13 - Reasons for Obeying Rules	
Respect for ability	.02
Personal regard	.01
Formal authority	.07
Control over promotion	.08
Control over penalties	-.14
Question 17 - Agency Courses of Action	
General welfare v. elected officials	-.08
Community demands v. elected officials	.02
Community demands v. general welfare	-.10

When we compare table 9.9 to length of time in service (table 8.31) we do find some similarities in orientations between both independent variables in relation to the dependent variables of policy perceptions. The executives who are older, like those who are employed longer, rate contact with conflicting views and a well-defined chain of command as more important job factors (.17 and .14 by age and .14 and .21 by length of time at agency). Unlike longer tenured respondents, however, who rate influencing policy less highly than newer recruits, there is no correlation found with

this job aspect by age.

Turning to reasons for promotion, a few very slight relations develop which are unlike those found by length of service. Older bureaucrats rank the two mediator-type attributes, ability to handle conflicting public opinion and ability to handle public criticism a little higher (.11 and .10 respectively). They also consider ability to influence policy of somewhat less consequence than do younger people (-.11). When forced to choose between accommodating conflicting demands and elected official directives for determining agency policy, older officials again give a slight edge to the mediator alternative in this context (-.10). No distinctive preferences are in evidence in answer to the self-identification, imaginary situation or specific decision area items. Nonetheless, the data in table 9.9 does suggest a very slight preference for mediator-type solutions to administrative dilemmas with increasing age.

Hypothesis twelve that age is unrelated to policy orientations is not supported. Instead, perhaps the proposal that age may be directly related to a mediator orientation should be introduced for further explorations.

The comparison of educational levels and attitudinal items is given on table 9.10.

Table 9.10

Correlation Between Education and Quantifiable Attitudinal Variables

Variable	Correlation with Education
Question 15 - Job Factors	
Influence policy	.13
Conflicting view contact	-.15
Chain of command	-.41
Question 12 - Reasons for Promotion	
Handle conflicting public opinion	.14
Specialized knowledge	-.07
Administrative knowledge	-.12
Handle public criticism	.17
Secure expert advice	-.02
Good public relations	-.08
Influence agency policy	.06
Question 11 - Rule Deviation Frequency	.13
Question 13 - Reasons for Obeying Rules	
Respect for ability	-.04
Personal regard	.08
Formal Authority	.05
Control over promotion	-.08
Control over penalties	.00
Question 17 - Agency Courses of Action	
General welfare v. elected officials	.07
Community demands v. elected officials	.03
Community demands v. general welfare	-.03

Here we find the most compelling evidence of the rejection of one of the points of view about decision-making. In evaluating the attributes in a work situation, there is a high inverse association of $-.41$ between the importance of a well-defined chain of command and higher schooling. Supporting this rejection of the implementer orientation, there is a negative $-.12$ co-efficient by educational attainment with the importance of administrative know-how as a consideration for promotion.

The findings of table 9.11 which analyzes the breakdown of self-identifications by amounts of education, also reveal the same anti-implementer bias among the more educated.

Table 9.11

Comparison of Education with Self-Description

<u>Education</u>	<u>Prof. Form.</u>	<u>Admin. Implem.</u>	<u>Public Med.</u>	<u>NYC</u>	<u>Mixed</u>	<u>N.</u>
High School	26 (83.9)	2 (6.5)	1 (3.2)	2 (6.5)	---	31
Some College	46 (79.4)	5 (8.6)	2 (3.4)	3 (5.2)	2 (3.4)	58
Bachelors	12 (44.4)	11 (40.7)	---	---	4 (14.8)	27
Some Grad Wk	14 (50.0)	6 (21.4)	2 (7.1)	2 (7.1)	4 (14.2)	28
Masters	8 (36.4)	6 (27.3)	2 (9.1)	2 (9.1)	4 (18.2)	22
Masters plus	1 (16.7)	1 (16.7)	2 (33.3)	1 (16.7)	1 (16.7)	6
Doctorate	<u>4 (57.1)</u>	<u>2 (28.6)</u>	---	---	<u>1 (14.3)</u>	<u>7</u>
All	111 (62.0)	33 (18.4)	9 (5.0)	10 (5.6)	16 (9.0)	179

Except for bureaucrats holding doctor's degrees, there is a decided inclination toward less administrative emphasis in describing their own positions by those with higher degrees, and even those holding doctorates show a very small below average implementer type response rate (57.1% compared to 62.0% for the entire population).

The comparison of education with re-actions to the conflict situations posed in Questions sixteen and twenty, and reported by table 9.12, does not evidence as clear a tendency as does the comparison with the quantifiable and self-description items. But, even here, some greater antipathy to following superior's orders in order to resolve conflicts is apparent among officials with master's degrees and higher.

Table 9.12

Analysis of Responses to Imaginary Situations by Education

Education	Question 16					Question 20				
	Follow Orders	Follow Orders w. Qualif.	Integ.	Equiv.	N.	Follow Orders	Follow Orders w. Qualif.	Integ.	Equiv.	N.
High School	6 (22.2)	1 (3.7)	1 (3.7)	19 (70.4)	27	11 (36.7)	2 (6.7)	5 (16.7)	12 (40.0)	30
College	14 (24.5)	1 (1.8)	5 (8.8)	37 (65.0)	57	32 (54.1)	5 (8.4)	11 (18.6)	11 (18.6)	59
Bach.	7 (26.9)	4 (15.4)	2 (7.7)	13 (49.9)	26	12 (44.4)	3 (11.1)	3 (11.1)	9 (33.3)	27
Bach. plus	8 (29.6)	4 (14.8)	2 (7.4)	13 (48.1)	27	13 (44.8)	5 (17.2)	6 (20.6)	5 (18.2)	29
Master's	3 (13.6)	1 (4.5)	4 (18.1)	14 (63.6)	22	5 (25.0)	2 (10.0)	5 (25.0)	8 (40.0)	20
Master's plus	---	1 (20.0)	1 (20.0)	3 (60.0)	5	1 (16.7)	2 (33.3)	2 (33.3)	1 (16.7)	6
Doctorate	---	---	1 (16.7)	5 (83.3)	6	4 (42.8)	---	2 (28.6)	1 (14.3)	7
Total	38 (22.4)	12 (7.1)	16 (9.4)	104 (61.1)	170	78 (43.8)	19 (10.7)	34 (18.0)	47 (26.5)	178

Some picture with reference to the formulator viewpoint as related to educational levels also emerges from an examination of these tables 9.10, 9.11 and 9.12, albeit not as emphatically. From table 9.10 we note a correlation with higher education of the importance of opportunity to influence policy as a job factor (.13) and with extent to which rules are deviated from (.13). Table 9.11 suggests a predisposition to more professional-formulator self-descriptions by college graduates and beyond and table 9.12 shows some more preferences for professional norms over following directives in responses by people with master's degrees and higher to the first imaginary situation. It might also be noted that those with more education tend to select expert groups more often than do less educated bureaucrats as the ones best able to appraise what the goals and aims of the agency should be (Question 10a) and also as those most aware of what the public's best interests are in matters related to their agency (Question eighteen).

There are also some indications that the mediator orientation is related to the education variable. Although table 9.10 shows an inverse association of $-.15$ between higher education and the importance of coming into contact with different viewpoints as a job factor, from the same table we note $.14$ and $.17$ positive co-efficients with the ability to handle public opinion and the ability to handle public criticism respectively as assets for administrative promotion. In addition, we find a somewhat greater tendency for post-graduate educated executives to describe themselves in public service-mediator terms (table 9.11). This public service predisposition is also apparent in response to the part of Question fifteen which asks respondents to evaluate the importance of serving the public as a job factor. A $.16$ co-incidence with educational attainment was calculated for this item.

With reference to the second imaginary situation which raises the conflict between community demands and official directives, table 9.12 reveals that those who have more than a bachelor's degree tend to favor community oriented alternatives more than do those with less formal training.

Hypothesis fourteen proposed that implementer orientations are inversely related and formulator and mediator orientations directly related to educational attainments. This hypothesis is supported by the evidence.

Education is one aspect of the expertise factor. We find that the more expert bureaucrats as measured by higher educational levels do tend to take less traditional non-implementer views of the administrative function. The second indicator of expertise which may be related to policy viewpoints is professionalization. The determination of this variable is based on the holding of a professional license or certification. The final personal variable that is being compared to attitudinal items is the professionalization of an executive.

Table 9.13 reports the extent to which holders of licenses in various specialization fields reflect the average perception of the population with reference to the quantifiable variables.¹²

¹²See footnote 6, Chapter VIII, with regard to the size of the sample.

This table shows some tendency for those executives who hold no licenses or certifications to favor the implementer view of administration in assessing job factors and reasons for promotions. The only other class of respondents who are similarly disposed are those holding miscellaneous professional licenses (i.e. social workers and architects) who exhibit some preferences in the same direction about job factors and who also prefer elected officials to prevailing community sentiment in setting agency courses of action somewhat more than does the entire population. The bureaucrats who hold non-professional certificates are slightly less implementer oriented tending toward more mediator responses. With regard to the other professions, mixed reactions are evident. Lawyers and physicians rate formulator alternatives quite high generally while accountants seem antipathetic to this particular policy perception and show some mediator inclinations. Engineers' pattern of responses is inconsistent and more dependent on the context in which the alternatives are presented.

Table 9.14 reports the distribution of responses to the self-description items of the questionnaire, by licenses held.

Table 9.14

Comparison of Professional Licenses with Self-Identification

<u>License</u>	<u>Admin. Implem.</u>	<u>Prof. Form.</u>	<u>Public Mediat.</u>	<u>NYC</u>	<u>Mixed</u>	<u>N.</u>
Engineer	7 (38.9)	10 (55.6)	---	---	1 (5.6)	18
Law	5 (38.5)	5 (38.5)	1 (7.7)	1 (7.7)	1 (7.7)	13
Medicine	2 (66.7)	1 (33.3)	---	---	---	3
CPA	5 (55.6)	3 (33.3)	---	1 (11.1)	---	9
Misc. Prof.	1 (6.2)	7 (43.8)	2 (12.5)	---	6 (37.5)	16
Misc. Non-Prof.	4 (100.)	---	---	---	---	4
None	<u>28 (80.0)</u>	<u>2 (5.7)</u>	<u>2 (5.7)</u>	<u>1 (2.9)</u>	<u>2 (5.7)</u>	<u>35</u>
Total	52 (53.1)	28 (28.6)	5 (5.1)	3 (3.1)	10 (10.1)	98

There is a marked trend for both non-professional certificate holders and those with no licenses to identify themselves as administrator-implementers. The responses by professional licensees do not show any special preferences although the miscellaneous professionals seem to prefer both mediator and formulator type descriptions more than the entire population. Engineers, too, identify themselves more often in formulator terms.

As can be seen from table 9.15 the re-actions to the imaginary situations posited in Questions sixteen and twenty show no consistencies sufficient to constitute a trend.

Table 9.15

Analysis of Responses to Imaginary Situations by Licenses

<u>License</u>	Question 16					Question 20				
	<u>Follow Orders</u>	<u>Follow Orders w. Qualif.</u>	<u>Integ.</u>	<u>Equiv.</u>	<u>N.</u>	<u>Follow Orders</u>	<u>Follow Orders w. Qualif.</u>	<u>Integ.</u>	<u>Equiv.</u>	<u>N.</u>
Engineer	4 (22.2)	2 (11.1)	2 (11.1)	10 (55.5)	18	8 (47.1)	2 (11.8)	3 (17.6)	4 (23.5)	17
Law	2 (15.4)	1 (7.7)	2 (15.4)	8 (61.5)	13	7 (53.8)	---	2 (15.4)	4 (30.8)	13
Medicine	---	---	---	3 (100.)	3	2 (66.7)	---	1 (33.3)	---	3
CPA	2 (25.0)	2 (25.0)	2 (25.0)	2 (25.0)	8	4 (50.0)	1 (12.5)	2 (25.0)	1 (12.5)	8
Misc. Prof.	3 (21.4)	2 (14.3)	2 (14.3)	7 (50.0)	14	4 (25.0)	4 (25.0)	1 (6.2)	7 (43.8)	16
Misc. Non-Prof.	1 (25.0)	---	---	3 (75.0)	4	3 (75.0)	---	---	1 (25.0)	4
None	<u>6 (17.6)</u>	<u>3 (8.8)</u>	<u>3 (8.8)</u>	<u>22 (64.7)</u>	<u>34</u>	<u>18 (50.0)</u>	<u>3 (8.3)</u>	<u>6 (16.7)</u>	<u>9 (25.0)</u>	<u>36</u>
Total	18 (19.1)	10 (10.6)	11 (11.7)	55 (58.5)	94	46 (47.4)	10 (10.3)	15 (15.5)	26 (26.9)	97

The same is true of the answers given to the questions about specific decisional areas where the only notable differentiation is a bias in favor of experts having responsibility for new facilities, on the part of the miscellaneous professional licensees.

The formulations of Hypothesis thirteen that implementer orientations will vary inversely with professionalization and that mediator and formulator ones will vary directly, are only partially substantiated by the findings. There does seem to be an inclination among those who are unlicensed professionally to choose implementer alternatives to some segments. The holders of professional licenses, however, respond variably to these attitudinal items with the perceptions of members of some professions being quite distinct from those of members of others. No uniformity among all professional license holders is sufficient to sustain the parts of the hypothesis which relate formulator and mediator approaches to professionalization.

Four hypotheses in section three, Chapter V associate personal variables with policy attitudes. Of these, two are supported by the evidence, one is partially supported and the findings with regard to the last suggest some other relationships might obtain.

Hypothesis eleven which proposes that sex and administrative perceptions are not associated is sustained. Indeed, no significant relations between the two are present.

Hypothesis fourteen which suggests relationships between education and attitude is well substantiated. An implementer view is apparent among those with less education and formulator and mediator outlooks characterize those with more formal education.

With regard to the other expertise dimension, professionalization, the

implementer approach is again favored by those with less expertise, the non-licensed executives. However, there is not enough coherence in perception among and between those holding the various professional licenses to either uphold or refute the assertion in Hypothesis thirteen that formulator and mediator attitudes vary directly with professionalization.

The hypothesis which the evidence seems to contravert is Hypothesis twelve that age is unrelated to policy type. Some tendency for older personnel to prefer mediator-type choices is suggested by the data, although further work is needed for this relationship to be substantiated.

Comparison of Sociological and Attitudinal Variables

1. Profile of Sociological Characteristics

The last group of variables to be compared to attitudinal characteristics have been designated sociological. Although these, too, are measurements of individual attributes, they are distinguished from personal variables for two reasons: First, they are less precise in their determination and so require more interpretation in order to be classified and analyzed. Second, the concepts which the data test have been devised and developed in the field of sociology and refer mainly to social origins as a critical factor in an individual's intellectual, cultural and philosophical make-up. The distance someone has come from his origins has distinguishing characteristics so that, regardless of class position held at the time, the mobile individual may be other-oriented than his status equals whose positions are more stably established.¹

The determination of degrees of social mobility is a complex and elusive process, far beyond the scope of this study. For this paper, educational differentials between fathers of respondents and respondents was selected to indicate social mobility. If social mobility is defined as the process by which individuals or groups of individuals move from one stratum of society to another,² then educational levels

¹For discussion of the effect of social mobility on political attitudes see Sorokin, op. cit., Lipset, op. cit., Lipset and Bendix, op. cit., Reisman, op. cit., and Subranaim, op. cit.

²Adapted from Lipset and Bendix, op. cit., and Sorokin, op. cit.

are clearly associated with such movement. Table 10.1 compares the respondents' educational levels with that of their fathers'.

Table 10.1

Distribution of Educational Levels of Respondents by Fathers' Education

Father's	Respondents' Education						N.	%
	H.S. or Less	Some College	B. A.	Some Grad. Work	M.A.	Post M.A. Work		
Elem. or Less	26	40	20	13	9	4	112 (62.2)	
High Sch.	5	13	2	14	7	6	47 (26.1)	
College	---	5	3	3	3	3	17 (9.4)	
Post Grad. Work	---	1	1	---	2	---	4 (2.2)	
Total	31 (17.2)	59 (32.8)	26 (14.4)	30 (16.7)	21 (11.7)	13 (7.2)	180	

There is a general trend in this country for each succeeding generation to receive more schooling than the previous one had, and we do note from our data that the New York City executives are on the whole much better educated than were their fathers. Thus only twenty one or 11.6% of the older generation had had any college training while 149 or 82.8% of the respondents have been to college. Only four fathers (2.2%) continued onto graduate school while sixty four (35.6%) of their offspring took post-graduate work. In only two instances are the descendants less educated than the forebears, one in which the respondent has some college and one where he has a bachelor's degree and in both cases the fathers had had some graduate school experience.

We note from table 10.1 that a large majority of the fathers (62.2%) have not gone beyond elementary school. Of the children of these 112 men, twenty six

or 23.4% have had some graduate school education with half of these holding M.A.'s or better. These latter are, of course, the most socially mobile group when we consider education as the yardstick of mobility. Somewhat less mobile are the twenty college graduates and the forty with college but less than a B.A., whose fathers had only elementary school training, and still less so are the twenty six administrators who did not go beyond high school. None of the respondents have less than high school training.

There were forty seven fathers with some high school or high school graduation. Five of their offspring achieved the same educational level, thirteen others had some college with two of these graduating. Twenty seven children of high school educated men attended graduate school, seven of whom received M.A.'s and six of whom have gone even further. The thirteen people with an M.A. degree and beyond are considered to be the most upwardly mobile with the eleven with graduate work a little less so and the fifteen with college experiences only slightly mobile.

Eight of the respondents whose fathers were college trained have the same amount of education and nine have more. Of the nine, the three with work beyond an M.A. are the most mobile, while the three with an M.A. and the three with some graduate work are only slightly so.

The mobility of the individuals with fathers that had post-graduate training is, of course, minimal.

The nature of the place of rearing of respondents as one component of geographic mobility is reported by table 10.2.

Table 10.2

Distribution of Places of Rearing of Respondents

Nature of Place of Rearing	N.	%
City	151	83.5
Suburb	13	7.1
Small Town	17	9.3
	<u>181</u>	

Other geographical considerations are possible. Place of birth may be different from that of rearing. Or the distance between one's present location and one's geographic origins, whether it was foreign or not, or in a dissimilar section of the country or not, are all relevant. Urban-suburban-rural experiences while growing up, however, was singled out as the one indicator which could be most accurately determined and which others have emphasized as a significant influence. One other consideration was the expectation that sufficient numbers of respondents would have had different early experiences if the nature of the place rather than its physical proximity was used. From table 10.2 we see that this was not the case. An overwhelming 83.5% of city executives were brought up in cities and only thirteen (7.1%) and seventeen (9.3%) were reared in suburban communities and small towns, respectively. Although we do not know how many of the 151 city people were born in New York, it still seems that New York City administrators are characterized by relatively little geographic mobility as to types of locations. Evidently, the proverbial country boy who came to the big city to seek his fortune did not seek it in government service (even during the thirties and forties). Either that, or, he did not rise to executive levels within the bureaucracy.

Another dimension often examined by sociologists is cosmopolitan-local

differences. As indicated in Chapter V, the concept is not sufficiently well established for full examination here. However, group memberships and intra-organization contacts are two aspects of the larger whole which have been previously studied. Table 10.3 reports the numbers of professional and non-professional organizations that the bureaucrats in these six New York City agencies are members of and table 10.4 shows the distribution of responses to Question seven of the instrument: "About how many people in your agency do you feel you know well."

Table 10.3

Distribution of Organization Memberships of Respondents

<u>Type of Organization</u>	<u>Numbers of Memberships</u>			<u>N.</u>
	<u>None</u>	<u>1 or 2</u>	<u>3 or more</u>	
Non-professional	48 (50.5)	32 (33.7)	15 (15.8)	95
Professional	21 (22.1)	47 (49.5)	27 (28.4)	95

Table 10.4

Distribution of Respondents by People They Report Knowing Well

<u>Numbers of People Known Well</u>	<u>N.</u>	<u>%</u>
0-10	23	12.6
11-25	25	13.9
26-50	46	25.7
51-100	18	10.0
Over 100	67	37.5
	<u>179</u>	

First, looking at the non-professional memberships in table 10.3 we note that about half the people in the sample belong to no voluntary groups. About one-third belong to one or two such groups and the rest report memberships in three or

more.³ There is great diversity in the kinds of organizations respondents report belonging to, ranging in type from religious and ethnic and fraternal, to charitable, educational and civic, to labor unions and employee associations, to veterans groups, with even some sports and recreational clubs mentioned. Considering the options available for participating in a voluntary association, the large numbers of executives who report no memberships suggest that more intra-occupational concerns, a more parochial approach might be characteristic. Supporting this interpretation, too, is the fact that "activities in voluntary organizations" is ranked as the least important personal factor by an overwhelming majority of administrators in answer to another question asked of respondents.

The predisposition to avoid joining non-professional organizations is not evenly distributed among agencies. Executives in Social Services show substantially more group memberships while the Traffic Department administrators are noticeably less inclined to such activities. Differences according to position in the hierarchy are also found. There are significantly fewer group memberships among assistant bureau chiefs and more among assistant commissioners, but no pattern of distribution emerges in ascending or descending order of hierarchical steps. Staff professionals show about average joining propensities but among the different professional licenses there are variations. Lawyers and miscellaneous professionals (primarily social workers and architects) show more group memberships while engineers and accountants are less

³Lipsett, *op. cit.*, related voluntary organization memberships to social class, arguing that higher socio-economic classes are characterized by greater participation in such groups. In his terms, low membership levels of respondents would indicate lower socio-economic class identities.

participatory in community groups.

Again referring to table 10.3, we see that many more memberships in professional organizations are reported by administrators. Only 22.1% of the group list no professional society attachments while almost half (49.5%) belong to one or two and 28.4% to three or more.

Turning now to the second indicator of local-cosmopolitan orientations, table 10.4 reveals that the largest proportion (37.5%) of respondents feel they know over 100 people in their agency well. Only about one-eighth (12.6%) say they know ten or fewer fellow employees well. The remaining half of the sample answer variously between eleven and 100 people.

The interpretation of what it is to know another person well is highly individualized. It is, therefore, quite revealing that so many respondents either interpret this concept broadly or else ignore its implications and report that large numbers of colleagues are well-known to them. These large numbers of intra-agency close contacts suggest more local than cosmopolitan focus to the extent that such extensive involvement within the organization might reduce the time and attention possible for outside groups and individuals.⁴

It was also proposed in Chapter V that locals would describe their occupations in organizational terms while cosmopolitans could be expected to refer to some outside professional or functional factor. Table 8.3 in Chapter VIII reports the

⁴See Gouldner, *op. cit.*, for a full discussion of the relationship between people an individual knows well and the cosmopolitan-local focus.

distribution of self-description of the executives, and shows that only ten respondents, or 5.5% of the total, emphasize agency or city employment in connection with their job situations. Although many others do cite agency or bureau or division identity, their primary focus is on the organization itself. Because of the small proportion of local-type responses to this question, local-cosmopolitan differences measured in terms of self-descriptions was not considered a fruitful avenue for exploration and Hypothesis nineteen, therefore, was not tested.

2. Comparison of Sociological Characteristics with Attitudinal Segments

Hypothesis fifteen through nineteen (set forth in Chapter V, Section four) propose possible relationships between sociological variables and the policy attitudes of executive level personnel. These hypotheses were tested on the sample population and the extent to which they are validated or refuted by the data is reported in this section. As noted already the tests devised for this group of variables reach only into some peripheral aspects of complex and multi-dimensional concepts which warrant deeper explorations. The most that is hoped for here is that this preliminary work can suggest the direction toward which these explorations might go.

The educational differential between respondents and their fathers was selected as the one most important indicator of social mobility for which reliable information could be obtained. A four-part classificatory system based on the extent to which the executives had attained higher scholastic levels than their progenitors was developed, as follows:

1. Little or no mobility - same level between generations
 - father - elementary; respondent - high school
 - father - high school; respondent - some college
 - father - college; respondent - some grad work

2. Some mobility: father - elementary; respondent - some college
father - high school; respondent - B.A.
father - college; respondent - M.A.
3. Mobile: father - elementary; respondent - B.A.
father - high school; respondent - grad work or M.A.
father - college; respondent - post M.A. work
4. High mobility: father - elementary; respondent - post grad work
father - high school; respondent - post M.A. work

Using this schema, the relationships of mobility with a) rule deviation perceptions is shown on table 10.5; b) with reasons for promotion and reasons for obeying orders and the relative importance of selected job factors is shown on table 10.6; and c) with the forced choices between considerations for determining agency courses of action on table 10.7.

Table 10.5

Comparison of Social Mobility (Educational Differential) with Rule Deviation

<u>Mobility</u>	<u>Rule Deviation Extent</u>				<u>Never</u>	<u>N.</u>
	<u>Frequently</u>	<u>Fairly Often</u>	<u>Occasional</u>	<u>Hardly Ever</u>		
No. mobil.	3 (5.1)	13 (22.0)	31 (52.7)	11 (18.7)	1 (1.7)	59
Slight	2 (4.8)	9 (21.6)	30 (72.0)	1 (2.4)	---	42
Mobil.	5 (11.7)	9 (21.0)	24 (55.9)	4 (9.3)	1 (2.3)	43
High	<u>4 (13.0)</u>	<u>7 (22.6)</u>	<u>12 (38.8)</u>	<u>6 (19.4)</u>	<u>2 (6.5)</u>	<u>31</u>
Total	14 (7.9)	38 (21.5)	97 (56.0)	22 (12.4)	4 (2.3)	175

Table 10.6

Comparison of Social Mobility (Educational Differential) with Ranking and Rating Variables

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Tendency with Increasing Mobility</u>
Quest. 15 - Job Factors	
Influence policy	No pattern
Contact with conflicting views	Slightly less important rating
Chain of command	Very much more important rating
Quest. 12 - Reasons for Promotion	
Handle conflicting public opinion	Very slightly less important ranking
Specialized knowledge	Very slightly less important ranking
Administrative knowledge	No pattern
Handle public criticism	Less important ranking
Secure expert advice	No pattern
Good public relations	Very slightly less important ranking
Influence policy	No pattern
Quest. 13 - Rule Obeying Reasons	
Respect for ability	Less important ranking
Personal regard	No pattern
formal authority	No pattern
Control over promotions	No pattern
Control over penalties	Very slightly more important ranking

Table 10.7

Comparison of Social Mobility (Educational Differentials) with Agency Action Alternatives

<u>Mobility</u>	<u>Genl. Welf. v. Elect. Offic.</u>		<u>Reasons for Agency Action</u>				<u>Conf. Dem. v. Genl. Welf.</u>		<u>N.</u>						
	<u>N.</u>	<u>Per. Cent.</u>	<u>Prev. Sent.</u>	<u>N.</u>	<u>Per. Cent.</u>	<u>Elect. Offic.</u>	<u>N.</u>	<u>Per. Cent.</u>							
None	49	(84.5)	9	(15.5)	58	32	(56.1)	25	(43.9)	57	5	(8.6)	53	(91.4)	58
Slight	35	(76.1)	11	(23.9)	46	23	(50.0)	23	(50.0)	46	1	(2.2)	45	(97.8)	46
Moder.	32	(74.4)	11	(25.6)	43	24	(57.1)	18	(42.9)	42	7	(16.3)	36	(83.7)	43
High	21	(65.6)	11	(34.4)	32	13	(41.9)	18	(58.1)	31	4	(12.9)	27	(87.1)	31
All	137	(76.6)	42	(23.5)	179	92	(52.3)	84	(57.7)	176	17	(9.6)	161	(90.4)	178

The relationships proposed in Hypothesis fifteen are that implementer orientations will vary directly with social mobility while mediator and fomulator ones will vary inversely with the greater distance between generations. Looking at table 10.5, we see that there is some positive relationship between the frequency of adherence to directives and mobility. But, the same direct relationship exists with frequent deviating. The tendency to choose both extremes, rather than either one, seems to be associated with mobility, and, inasmuch as the extremes cancel each other out, no consistent rule deviation pattern becomes apparent.

The weight of evidence from table 10.6 seems to support the hypothetical premises. Though a very slight direct relationship between two mediator type responses and educational differential is found (good public relations ability as a reason for promotion and contact with different viewpoints as a job value) many more relationships and more significant ones are developed showing that fomulator and mediator perceptions are held more and implementer attitudes less by the less mobile people. The most marked tendency is for those whose level of schooling is furthest from their fathers to rate a clearcut chain of command as a very important job element. Similarly, mobile people ranked as relatively less important the job factor "opportunity to come into contact with different viewpoints" and promotion qualifications "abilities to handle conflicting public opinion," "good public relations" and "ability to handle public criticism" (all mediator answers). They also responded less favorably to specialized knowledge as a promotion qualification and respect for superior's ability as a reason for obeying directives, both fomulator type answers.

The findings of table 10.7 also adds some support to the hypothesis. There is a tendency for the administrators who are more socially mobile to choose the

implementer type alternatives for setting agency actions over both general welfare (formulator) and prevailing sentiment (mediator).

Table 10.8 reports the self-identifications of the executives by educational differentials.

Table 10.8

Comparison of Social Mobility (Educational Differential) with Self-Description

<u>Mobility</u>	<u>Self-Description</u>					<u>N.</u>
	<u>Prof. Form.</u>	<u>Admin. Implem.</u>	<u>Public Med.</u>	<u>NYC</u>	<u>Mixed</u>	
None	6 (10.4)	47 (80.8)	2 (3.4)	3 (5.2)	---	58
Slight	6 (13.0)	31 (67.3)	2 (4.3)	4 (8.7)	3 (6.5)	46
Moderate	14 (33.1)	18 (43.2)	2 (4.8)	1 (2.4)	7 (16.6)	42
High	<u>6 (19.4)</u>	<u>14 (45.3)</u>	<u>3 (9.7)</u>	<u>2 (6.5)</u>	<u>6 (19.4)</u>	<u>31</u>
All	32 (18.1)	110 (62.2)	9 (5.1)	10 (5.7)	16 (9.1)	177

The data here show contrary tendencies with greater mobility relating positively with formulator-professional and mediator-public service self-descriptions and inversely with implementer-administrator ones. Also, the more highly mobile people tend to give multi-functional descriptions of their positions more frequently.

The responses to the imaginary situation questions show no marked pattern. A very slight tendency could be discerned for those with the greater social distance from their roots to favor implementer type resolutions to the conflict described by Question 16. But, these same administrators selected these type of alternatives less often than their less mobile colleagues when presented with the Question twenty dilemma.

These data, while inconclusive, tend to support the contentions of hypothesis

fifteen. The findings with relations to the qualifications for promotion, the importance of selected job characteristics and the considerations for agency action outweigh the contrary tendencies noted in the self-identifications, while the imaginary situation responses and rule deviation frequencies evoked mixed reactions.

The nature of the places in which the bureaucrats grew up shows relatively little variation with only about 16% of the total having non-urban backgrounds. Of these 9% were town-reared and 7% had suburban upbringings. The results of the comparisons between geographic mobility, as measured by types of locales, can, therefore, be only suggestive.

Table 10.9 shows the extent to which respondents with dissimilar childhood environments reflect the average perception with regard to reasons for promotion, for setting agency courses of action and the importance of specific job characteristics.

Table 10.9

Place of Rearing with Quantifiable Variables

<u>Variables</u>	<u>Place of Rearing</u>			<u>N.</u>
	<u>City</u>	<u>Suburb</u>	<u>Town</u>	
Quest. 15 - Job Factors				
Influence policy	Aver.	Aver.	Above aver.	180
Contact with conflicting views	Aver.	Slight below	Above	180
Chain of command	Aver.	Very slight above	Aver.	180
Quest. 11 - Rule Deviation	Aver.	Aver.	Aver.	180
Quest. 12 - Reasons for Promotion				
Handle conflicting public opinion	Aver.	Aver.	Above aver.	171
Specialized knowledge	Aver.	Above aver.	Above aver.	180
Administrative knowledge	Aver.	Below aver.	Aver.	178
Handle public criticism	Aver.	Aver.	Slight above	165
Secure expert advice	Aver.	Aver.	Aver.	176
Good public relations	Aver.	Aver.	Slight below	177
Influence policy	Aver.	Slight above	Slight above	179
Quest. 17 - Course of Action				
Genl. welf. v. elect. off.	Aver.	Aver.	Aver.	180
Prev. Sent. v. elect. off.	Aver.	Slight above	Aver.	178
Community Dem. v. genl. welf.	Aver.	Very slight below	Aver.	179

Because the bulk of the data comes from city-bred personnel, their views must count disproportionately in determining the norm for all types. The fact that they have average perceptions about all the attitudes reported by table 10.9 is, therefore, merely reflective of their size, and does not have significance. We do note, however, some tendency for people with suburban backgrounds to favor the formulator alternatives when considering reasons for promotion and for determining agency courses of action. People from small towns exhibit similar preferences with regard to job factors and reasons for promotion. Small town people also seem to favor mediator responses to these categories of questions more than do the executives with other backgrounds.

From table 10.10 which reports the responses to the imaginary situation

questions by geographic mobility, we find that the most notable difference is a tendency for suburban raised officials to prefer equivocal answers somewhat more frequently.

Table 10.10

Place	Comparison of Place of Rearing with Imaginary Situations									
	<u>Question 16</u>					<u>Question 20</u>				
	<u>Follow</u>	<u>Follow</u>		<u>N.</u>	<u>Follow</u>	<u>Follow</u>		<u>N.</u>		
	<u>Orders</u>	<u>Orders w.</u>	<u>Integ.</u>		<u>Orders</u>	<u>Orders w.</u>	<u>Integ.</u>		<u>Integ.</u>	<u>Equiv.</u>
		<u>Qualif.</u>	<u>Integ.</u>	<u>Equiv.</u>		<u>Qualif.</u>	<u>Integ.</u>	<u>Equiv.</u>		<u>N.</u>
City	31 (22.3)	10 (7.2)	13 (9.4)	85 (61.1)	139	68 (45.9)	15 (10.1)	28 (18.9)	37 (25.0)	148
Sub.	3 (23.1)	1 (7.2)	---	9 (69.2)	13	6 (46.2)	---	1 (7.7)	6 (46.2)	13
Town	4 (23.5)	1 (5.9)	1 (5.9)	11 (64.7)	17	4 (25.0)	4 (25.0)	4 (25.0)	4 (25.0)	16
All	<u>38 (22.5)</u>	<u>12 (7.1)</u>	<u>14 (8.3)</u>	<u>105 (59.8)</u>	<u>169</u>	<u>78 (44.1)</u>	<u>19 (10.7)</u>	<u>33 (18.6)</u>	<u>47 (26.5)</u>	<u>177</u>

They also prescribe courses of action consistent with maintaining professional integrity less than others do in answer to Question sixteen and they are less disposed to the mediator-type resolution of the second conflict raised by Question twenty. Small town origins do not seem to affect perceptions about how to resolve these dilemmas. The city people again form the center of gravity for the whole and must, therefore, reflect the average.

No significant differences by place of rearing are given in answer to the questions about responsibility in specific decisional areas.

Hypothesis sixteen postulated that geographic origins of executives are unrelated to policy orientations. Although some slight preferences for formulator alternatives^{are found} among those from small towns in response to the rating and ranking questions, the imaginary situation questions show contrary inclinations. Further, since a disproportionate number of respondents have similar backgrounds, the findings are insufficient for making any definitive statement about this hypothesis.

The extent to which executives are members of both professional and non-professional organizations has been suggested as indications of their focus as "locals" or "cosmopolitans."⁵ The numbers of memberships in all kinds of voluntary groups--religious, civic, charitable, educational, veteran, ethnic, fraternal, recreational--were compared with the importance ascribed to various job factors, reasons for promotions and primary considerations for agency actions. No patterns of preferences are found according to how many such organizations a person is attached to. Nor are

⁵See discussion, Chapter V, pp. 104-9, supra.

there any relationships uncovered between voluntary organization memberships and attitudes to alternative behaviors for resolving the conflicts posed in the hypothetical situations, and to the specific policy area responsibility question.

The extent of memberships in professional societies is associated with policy attitudes only slightly more than memberships in non-professional groups. Table 10.11 reveals some tendencies for those who belong to more professional organizations to rate two job factors--the opportunity to come into contact with different views (mediator) and opportunity to influence agency policy (formulator) as less important. Those with more memberships also perceive specialized knowledge about an agency's field (formulator) and public relations ability (mediator) as less important reasons for promotion. In evaluating alternatives to setting agency courses of action, those without professional organization attachments favor the extent to which the decision contributes to the general welfare over conformity with elected officials directives more often than do the others.

Table 10.12 reports the answers to the two imaginary situations.

Table 10.11

Comparison of Professional Organization Memberships with Quantifiable Variables

<u>Variables</u>	<u>Tendency with Increasing Memberships</u>
Quest. 15 - Job Factors	
Influence policy	No pattern
Contact with conflicting views	Very slight to less important
Chain of command	Tendency to less important
Quest. 11 - Rule Deviation	No pattern
Quest. 12 - Reasons for Promotion	
Handle conflicting public opinion	No pattern
Specialized knowledge	Tendency to less important
Administrative knowledge	No pattern
Handle public criticism	No pattern
Secure expert advice	No pattern
Good public relations	Slight tendency to less important
Influence policy	No pattern
Quest. 17 - Course of Action	
Genl. welf. v. elect. off.	Tendency to prefer elected official
Comm. dem. v. elect off.	No pattern
Comm. dem. v. genl. welf.	No pattern

Table 10.12

Comparison of Professional Organization Memberships with Imaginary Situations

<u>No. of Orgs.</u>	<u>Question 16</u>					<u>Question 20</u>				
	<u>Follow Orders</u>	<u>Follow Orders w. Qualif.</u>	<u>Integ.</u>	<u>Equiv.</u>	<u>N.</u>	<u>Follow Orders</u>	<u>Follow Orders w. Qualif.</u>	<u>Integ.</u>	<u>Equiv.</u>	<u>N.</u>
None	5 (26.3)	2 (10.5)	3 (15.8)	9 (47.3)	19	7 (36.8)	2 (10.5)	4 (21.1)	6 (31.4)	19
1 - 2	10 (22.2)	6 (13.3)	4 (8.9)	25 (55.5)	45	20 (43.5)	4 (8.7)	8 (17.4)	14 (30.4)	46
3 - 5	<u>3 (11.5)</u>	<u>2 (7.7)</u>	<u>4 (15.4)</u>	<u>17 (65.3)</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>16 (59.3)</u>	<u>4 (14.8)</u>	<u>1 (3.7)</u>	<u>6 (22.2)</u>	<u>27</u>
All	18 (20.0)	10 (11.1)	11 (12.2)	51 (56.6)	90	43 (46.7)	10 (10.9)	13 (14.2)	26 (28.3)	92

Here we find a diversity of opinion about resolutions of the dilemmas posed depending on the values in conflict. When professional integrity is at stake if superior directives are followed, those with more professional memberships would follow such directives less. These people tend to answer more evasively, suggesting actions that avoid making a decision. When the conflict involves directives which might generate community hostility, there is a decided preference by those with more organizational attachments for following such directives and little concern for accommodating local demands is manifest.

With regard to specific areas of policy making, the only trend discernable is for the administrators who belong to fewest professional societies to ascribe responsibility for establishing new buildings and initiating new services to the commissioner more frequently than do their more "joiner" colleagues.

The segment of Hypothesis seventeen which deals with voluntary organization memberships is not supported by the data. No associations of any kind were found between belonging to such groups and the mediator approach to policy making (nor to any other approach). With regard to professional group memberships, when any tendency was exhibited at all, it invariably repudiated mediator perceptions. The same personnel were somewhat less decisive about the formulator alternatives, rejecting them in evaluating the relative importance of job factors and reasons for promotion, but in the context of specific situations involving professional integrity, they were equivocal in response. There is an ambivalence, too, about the implementer role. Those with less group memberships rate chain of command as a more important job factor supporting the hypothetical premise. However, those who join fewer professional organizations also select conformity with elected officials less often than

contribution to the general welfare as the primary consideration for setting agency courses of action and they also would follow directives of superiors less when faced with the problem described in the second imaginary situation.

The evidence about group memberships and policy attitudes neither support nor refute Hypothesis seventeen. Rather it would seem that the extent of memberships in voluntary and professional organizations has little or no effect on attitudes to administrative decision-making.

Another aspect of the local-cosmopolitan dichotomy examined concerns the numbers of intra-agency people an administrator knows. Table 10.13 shows the correlation coefficients between this variable and attitudes to the ranking and rating questions of the instrument.

Table 10.13

Correlation Between People Known at Agency and Quantifiable Variables

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Co-efficient in Order of More People Known</u>
Question 15 - Job Factors	
Influence policy	.12
Contact with Conflicting views	.09
Chain of command	.07
Quest. 11 - Rule Deviation	-.03
Quest. 12 - Reasons for Promotion	
Handle conflicting public opinion	.02
Specialized knowledge	.07
Administrative knowledge	.07
Handle public criticism	-.01
Secure expert advice	.06
Good public relations	.00
Influence policy	.10
Quest. 17 - Course of Action	
Genl. welf. v. elect. offic.	.01
Comm. dem. v. elect. offic.	.02
Comm. dem. v. genl. welf.	.00

There are very few even minimally significant associations between the two characteristics. We do find a barely significant .10 between the executives who know more people well and the importance of ability to influence policy as a reason for promotion, and a slightly higher .12 with influencing policy as an important job factor. Both associations, though very slight, show formulator type preferences positively correlated with more intra-agency contacts. No similar pattern of responses shows up in answer to the imaginary situation involving conflict between the implementer and formulator roles as can be seen from table 10.14.

Table 10.14

Comparison of People Known at Agency with Imaginary Situation

<u>No. of People</u>	<u>Follow Orders</u>	<u>Question 16</u>				<u>N.</u>	<u>Follow Orders</u>	<u>Question 20</u>			
		<u>Follow Orders w. Qualif.</u>	<u>Integ.</u>	<u>Equiv.</u>	<u>N.</u>			<u>Follow Orders w. Qualif.</u>	<u>Integ.</u>	<u>Equiv.</u>	<u>N.</u>
0-10	2 (10.0)	4 (20.0)	3 (15.0)	11 (55.0)	20	7 (31.8)	2 (9.1)	8 (36.3)	5 (22.7)	22	
11-25	5 (20.8)	2 (8.3)	2 (8.3)	15 (62.5)	24	12 (48.0)	3 (12.0)	3 (12.0)	7 (28.0)	25	
26-50	7 (17.1)	3 (7.3)	3 (7.3)	28 (68.3)	41	19 (43.2)	4 (9.1)	10 (22.8)	11 (25.0)	44	
51-100	5 (31.3)	---	2 (12.4)	9 (56.3)	16	10 (55.6)	2 (11.1)	1 (5.6)	5 (27.8)	18	
Over 100	<u>16 (25.8)</u>	<u>3 (4.8)</u>	<u>5 (8.1)</u>	<u>38 (61.3)</u>	<u>62</u>	<u>28 (45.2)</u>	<u>8 (12.9)</u>	<u>10 (16.1)</u>	<u>16 (25.8)</u>	<u>62</u>	
All	35 (21.5)	12 (7.4)	15 (9.2)	101 (61.9)	163	76 (44.4)	19 (11.1)	32 (18.7)	44 (25.7)	171	

The same table also shows no predisposition to either the implementer or mediator view in evaluating the dilemma posed in the second imaginary situation.

Table 10.15 reports which individual or group is most frequently selected as primarily responsible for specific agency decisions according to differences in the numbers of people known by the administrator. Although some categories show deviations from the norm, these deviations are not consistent with increasing or decreasing numbers of contacts to form a trend.

Table 10.15

Comparison of People Known at Agency with Decisional Areas*

<u>No. of People</u>	<u>Set Goals</u>	<u>Decisional Areas</u>			
		<u>Decent.</u>	<u>New Buildings</u>	<u>New Service Staff</u>	<u>Best Interests</u>
0-10	Mixed Admin. (30.8)	Commr. (69.2)	Commr. (38.5)	(30.8) Commr. (30.8)	Commr. (33.3)
11-25	Expert (21.1) Mixed Admin. (21.1)	Commr. (52.6)	Other Agency (35.0)	Commr. (73.7)	Commr. (44.4)
26-50	Mixed (25.7)	Commr. (71.9)	Commr. (25.7)	Commr. (61.8)	Commr. (35.5)
51-100	Expert (21.4) Mixed (21.4)	Commr. (50.0)	Commr. (26.7) Other Agency (26.7)	Commr. (78.6)	Staff (42.9)
100 plus	Mixed Admin. (23.6)	Commr. (61.8)	Other Agency (26.3)	Commr. (44.6)	Commr. (30.8)
All	Mixed Admin. (22.3)	Commr. (62.5)	Commr. (25.9)	Commr. (56.1)	Commr. (34.1)

*Listed are the individual or group most frequently mentioned in each category.

The distinctions in policy-making orientations by numbers of intra-agency people known to respondent are minimal. To the extent they exist, they suggest, contrary to Hypothesis eighteen, that the formulator role will tend to vary directly with more contacts and that the implementer and mediator roles are unrelated.

As noted above, Hypothesis nineteen could not be tested because of the small proportion of bureaucrats who identify their positions in organizational rather than professional or administrative terms.

The sociological variables on the whole, constitute a less fruitful area for examination than either the organizational or personal ones. Perhaps their greater complexity requires such extensive and multiple approaches in order to obtain reliable data so that the present direct and uni-dimensional indicators do not suffice even for a peripheral examination. However, within the confines of a study in which the main concern--the policy making attitudes of bureaucrats--is a characteristic of great subtlety and complexity, comparable attention to the sociological dimensions of respondents just is not feasible. The relationships described between the sociological variables and policy-making perceptions are, therefore, highly speculative.

Hypothesis fifteen states that an implementer role will vary directly and mediator and formulator roles inversely with greater social mobility, social mobility to be determined by the educational differentials between respondents and their fathers. Using this yardstick, the weight of evidence, while inconclusive, supports these premises. There is a tendency for the more mobile people to adopt implementer alternatives and reject formulator and mediator views. Those who have risen furthest from their roots do tend to favor the safer, more traditional attitude to the administrative function that is implied by the implementer role.

Although Hypothesis sixteen postulates no differences in orientation by geographic mobility and indeed, the differences found are both minimal and ambivalent, the numbers of respondents in non-urban categories are too few to substantiate the hypothesis.

Two aspects of local-cosmopolitan differences are suggested by Hypothesis seventeen and eighteen. In the case of the first one, dealing with group memberships, the evidence is not sufficient to establish meaningful relationships. There are contradictory re-actions among respondents to different aspects of policy-making according to the numbers of professional group associations a bureaucrat has and no pattern of attitudes by voluntary organization memberships. With regard to Hypothesis eighteen, some indications of opposite tendencies to those proposed are evident. While the data is again quite inconclusive, a slight preference for the fomulator role appears to be associated with the numbers of intra-agency contacts an executive has while the mediator and implementer perceptions show no correlation.

Summary and Implications

1. Summary of the Study

Banfield and Wilson ask the question: "Where does the administration get answers to questions that are essentially policy making?"¹

Where, indeed? Do administrators look to elected officials and those who are directly responsible to them for policy determinations? Or, by-passing the electoral process, do they seek cues directly from their own constituencies to find what the general interest or the public will is? Or do administrators rely on their own judgment about policy alternatives, giving greater weight to their own professionalism and sustained interests than to uninformed and casually involved generalist opinion.

The task set for this research has been to ascertain where bureaucrats do, in fact, get solutions to policy dilemmas. Which of the three means posited above is given primacy by administrative practitioners in choosing between policy alternatives?

Are they committed to responsiveness, to specialization, to representativeness — to an implementer, formulator or mediator emphasis — in their decision-making functions.

Of course, this is a large and complex problem -- one which requires some reduction in overall dimensions for study with any degree of rigor. The research strategy employed here was to emphasize the perceptions of bureaucrats about their own role in the policy making process.

Role theory recommended itself as the conceptual model most appropriate for gathering and putting into perspective discrete perceptual items for two reasons.

¹Banfield and Wilson, op.cit., p. 220.

Firstly, there is more theoretical work done and higher levels of sophistication reached about the heuristic value of role theory than of any other model that could be used for an attitudinal study. In the second place, an overwhelming proportion of the empirical research on political and social orientations does rely on this structural framework.

The promise of role theory was unrealized, however. Its two levels--theoretical and empirical--were found inadequately connected each with the other. Instead of the richness at the ideational level being explored in depth by field researchers, there is a tendency for them to use only the most superficial aspects in actual test situations. My attempt to incorporate the multi-dimensionalism of role set (the role segmentation elements of role theory) into work with a sample population was in the direction of greater co-ordination between theory and analysis. That it failed is quite probably because the ambition of the attempt exceeds the possibilities at the present level of development. However, role theory still had utility as a construct for the organizing and presenting of data gathered about a single theme even when the data reveals some contradictory strains. A typology necessary for role analyses proves to be heuristically valuable for classifying the separate attitudes involved in bureaucratic policy setting.

Role behaviors rather than role perceptions are undoubtedly a more reliable guide to phenomena affecting the political system. Inasmuch as role behavior examination is beyond the reaches of most studies, it then becomes necessary to explore the indirect dimension of attitude. However, unless attitudes become translated into behaviors consistent with them, they have no real implications. Only if there is a congruence between an individual's attitude and his actions does an understanding of those attitudes help us to understand systemic functionings. That such a congruence exists was supported by a thorough check of previous work which

uncovered impressive evidence showing that predispositions to a certain view relate substantially to subsequent performance involving that dimension.

The policy role typology used here has been drawn from descriptions in the literature on public administration about what the bureaucratic function is and should be. Three dominant perceptions about the place of administration in the political process were isolated:

1. "Implementers" perceive agency goals as a given. The task of the bureaucrat is to efficiently and economically effectuate policies set elsewhere in the system.

2. "Formulators" are social engineers interested in maximizing administrative control over decision-making since agency personnel incorporates the best information, experience and expertise about the policies which are in the best public interest.

3. "Mediators" view the administrative function as one of balancing conflicts and demands. Policies result from the administrative staff aggregating and interpreting group, clientele and community claims.

A sample population of executive level personnel in six line agencies in New York City was tested to ascertain whether or not administrative practitioners do indeed subscribe to any of these three views. One hundred eighty two people in all responded to a self-questionnaire designed to classify executives according to their role orientations. Most respondents showed substantial inconsistencies in attitudes, preferring one type alternative in one situation and a contradictory one elsewhere. It was also found, though, that each alternative solution to administrative dilemmas had adherents, regardless of the context in which it was posed, indicating the acceptability of all three types as a way of perceiving the administrative scene.

The least favored alternative to administrative decision making in each instance

is the mediator one. In none of the conflict situations does a large proportion of the population opt for this type resolution. This is true whether the issue is the relative merit of certain job factors, qualifications for promotions to higher office, considerations for setting agency courses of action, the locus of responsibility in specific decisional areas or in evaluating policy.

Both formulator and implementer orientations are held more widely, sometimes one, sometimes the other dominating, depending on the role segment aspect of the administrative function that is involved. On the whole, more formulator preferences are exhibited. Thus an overwhelming majority of the bureaucrats believe that the more important consideration for setting ^{an} agency course of action is the extent to which it contributes to the general welfare regardless of whether the alternative is the directives of elected officials or the accommodation of conflicting community demands. In evaluating what qualifications are necessary for promotion, again we find a preponderance of responses favoring the formulator criteria with more than three of every four answers ranking either expertise or ability to influence agency policy as first. The primary reason given for obeying directives from a superior officer is his competence rather than his formal authority or any of the other accoutrements of that formal authority. Further, while most administrators will deviate from these directives only occasionally, twice as many will deviate often than will hardly ever or never deviate. In perceiving the locus of responsibility for specific decisions, there is a solid majority of intra-organizational preferences indicated. Staff people are listed as the ones primarily responsible for initiating new services, and for decentralizing agency operations by most of the respondents with a plurality of them also proposing that staff people should decide about establishing new facilities. The staff and

commissioner together are considered most aware of where the best interests of the public lie by more than three of every five respondents.

The implementer value of clear cut responsibilities and a well-defined chain of command is considered the most important attribute of a job over the opportunity to influence policy and the opportunity to come into contact with different viewpoints. In specific contexts, too, there are more implementers than formulators. Thus, to resolve the conflict raised by a hypothetical situation counterposing superiors' directives against expert information, many more bureaucrats choose to follow orders than to maintain their position in the face of a challenge. But, in this situation, most respondents find some way of avoiding a definitive solution for the dilemma. Respondent self-identifications, too, reveal dominant administrative-implementer orientations. However, this may result from a noticeable tendency for formal position to be used as the occupational description by respondents.

Banfield and Wilson inquire also whether relationships exist between the sources of administrative decision-making and other variables.² This research explores this problem empirically asking, for instance, whether different perceptions of the bureaucratic function are correlated with length of time in service, or membership in a specific agency, or with position in the hierarchy. Also, do attitudinal dissimilarities vary with age, with sex, with education? Is mobility, either social or geographic, associated with policy type?

Because role inconsistencies were substantial, no reliable assignment of individuals to role categories could be made. It was, therefore, necessary, for the

²Ibid.

determination of the correlates of bureaucratic policy attitudes, to take the individual items indicating attitudinal differences and relate each separately to variations in organizational and individual attributes. Consequently, the following findings are suggestive rather than definitive of the relationships between certain policy views and other independent characteristics.

The most significant relationship uncovered between the dependent variable of bureaucratic policy making and another variable was with educational levels of respondents. Here we find that the more schooling an administrator has had the greater is his tendency to reject the implementer orientation and prefer the formulator view primarily and the mediator one to a somewhat lesser degree. Conversely, less highly educated people tend to be implementers more often.

Of only slightly less significance are some of the organizational variables. With regard to position in the bureaucracy, there is a marked tendency for people with staff professional or mixed professional and administrative titles to prefer formulator solutions to problems. A similar inclination is found as the hierarchical ladder is ascended so that higher level people tend to be formulators while those at lower levels display more implementer proclivities.

The formulator view also seems to be preferred by administrators who enter service laterally, through appointment rather than through routinized competitive channels.

The data gathered also suggest that somewhat lesser relationships exist with other variables. Thus, the people who hold no professional licenses or certificates tend to an implementer approach. However, licensees' responses seem closely related to the nature of their profession so that holders of one kind of license perceive decision

making loci quite differently than do other license holders. For instance, lawyers and physicians seem to rate formulator alternatives highly, while accountants seem more mediator oriented and social workers and architects (taken together) more implementer inclined.

The personal variables of age and sex show no strong relationships, although, in some instances, women and older executives adopt the mediator position more than do men and younger people.

Some very tentative conclusions about the relationship of social mobility to policy orientations are also possible. While the yardstick for measuring this complex concept is admittedly an over-simplified single dimension, a positive correlation does emerge between greater differentials in educational levels between respondent and father and a tendency to choose implementer alternatives over formulator and mediator ones.

Some differences in orientation by agency memberships do exist but these are unrelated to agency characteristics of age, size and nature of constituency. Specific policy type preferences by agency are:

Corrections	-	Higher on implementer perceptions
Highways	-	Higher on mediator perceptions Lower on implementer ones
Housing Authority	-	Slightly lower on implementer perceptions
Sanitation	-	No perceptual distinctions
Traffic	-	Higher on implementer perceptions
Social Service	-	Higher on formulator perceptions.

There was one non-policy attitudinal variable examined because of its particular importance in the current period of civil service union expansionism. Favorable attitudes to the right to strike by public employees was more widely held by formulator types with considerably fewer implementers sharing these sanguine feelings about unions.

For this analysis of the predispositions to policy types, attitudes to discrete role segments were used. When the number and extent of preferences to some of these segments outweigh neutral or less intense reactions to others, the classification into type is based on the more pronounced attitudes regardless of which discrete issue evoked the response.

The possibility must also be considered that general findings may be insufficiently related to a conceptual framework so that the translation of questionnaire answers in terms of classificatory system is not justified. Extreme care was taken to mitigate this possibility by checking the opinions of knowledgeable people about which questionnaire answers relate to which policy type. It is with reasonable assurance, then, that these empirical results are presented as validly related to the typology developed theoretically.

2. General Implications

Our society is becoming increasingly concerned about the dilution of political direction over administrative action. The attitudes of public administrators to the propriety of such direction undoubtedly contributes to the extent of the dilution. If the bureaucrat is more firmly committed to the hierarchical principles of traditional theory, there is likely to be less serious limitations on political control. If, on the other hand, he believes that the greater awareness and contact of agency people with the problems involved, provide them with special capabilities for resolving conflicts, his acceptance of political control is made more difficult. As Sidney Verba argues:

Just as the beliefs and values of the citizens affect the likelihood that they will participate, the beliefs and values

of the decision-maker affect the likelihood that he will comply.³

And, for the viability of democratic government, the consequences are profound if political control over administrative activities^{is} effectively exercised or not.

A number of factors have created and perpetuated an aggrandizement by the bureaucracy of many political functions. There is an explosion in technological knowledge, an increased complexity in society, a need for speed to respond to constant crises, an involvement by the public sector in more and more kinds of activities. All of these have resulted in greater reliance on administration for the effective disposition of pressing needs and concerns. Administrative discretion is further encouraged by the tendency for legislation to be rather generally and loosely drawn. It is usually not feasible nor wise for statutes to be so explicit as to prevent adaptability to specific cases. The circumstances under which the law must be applied can most often not be anticipated and some latitude must be available to the administrator.⁴

Further, bureaucrats have more durable, more intensive and more proximate contacts with their fields of activities. This, coupled with the likelihood that they are more highly trained, puts them in the advantageous position of being able to propose the policy alternatives which are possible or viable to resolve conflicts.⁵

³Verba, op. cit., p. 67

⁴See United States: Committee on Administrative Procedure. Final Report of the Attorney General (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1941), p. 14.

⁵President's Committee on Administrative Management, op. cit., p. 361, found that 270 of a total of 429 acts of Congress during the 74th Congress, 1st session (1935), referred to the organization or functions of administrative departments. They hold that these doubtlessly originated with the departments concerned. They also maintain that the departments expressed influential opinions about other legislation dealing with other matters.

And, the power to propose which are ^{the} realistic alternatives in a situation has been held to be an intrinsic element in policy setting.⁶

The concern over the extension of administrative power centers on the belief that there is an inverse relationship between bureaucratic involvement and democracy.

To this effect is Peter Drucker who warns:

Modern government has become ungovernable. There is no government today that can still claim control of its bureaucracy and of its various agencies. Government agencies are all becoming autonomous ends in themselves, and directed by their own desire for power, their own narrow vision rather than by national policy.

This is a threat to the basic capacity of government to give direction and leadership.⁷

Democratic control implies some responsibility to the public will, howsoever determined. Now, it is true that there are limitations and abuses and distortions and deficiencies present in electoral control in a large, heterogeneous society. But, elections are still probably the best means available for providing some measure of governmental responsibility to its citizens. However, if the nexus of policy determination lies not with elected officials, nor with those personally chosen and responsible to them, but with bureaucrats who are selected according to some objective criteria such as training or skill and who are not subject to challenge or recall, this imposes

⁶For arguments setting forth the political nature of the administrative procedure see Appleby, *op. cit.*, Boyer, *op. cit.*, Burnham, *op. cit.*, Golembiewski, *op. cit.*, Hyneman, *op. cit.*, J. Leiper Freeman, *op. cit.*, Rourke, *op. cit.*, Sayre, *op. cit.*, Waldo, *op. cit.*, Herbert A. Simon, D. W. Smithburg and Victor A. Thompson, *Public Administration* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959), among others. A sanguine view of the political nature of administration is expressed by Gaus, *op. cit.*, Herring, *op. cit.*, and Woll, *op. cit.*

⁷Drucker, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

severe limitations on the public's ability to control its own government machinery.⁸

Further, the ideals of administration--efficiency and specialization--both of which justify administrative qualifications for problem solving, may be incompatible with democratic ideals. It has been long recognized and commented on that efficiency may be a benevolent despot but a despot nonetheless. DeTocqueville argued, in the 1840's that:

It profits me but little, after all, that a vigilant authority always protects the tranquility of my pleasures and constantly averts all dangers from my path, without my care or concern, if this same authority is the absolute master of my liberty and my life...

and

Democratic liberty is far from accomplishing all its projects with the skill of an adroit despotism. It frequently abandons them before they have borne their fruits, or risks them when the consequences may be dangerous... Under its sway the grandeur is not in which the public administration does, but in what is done without it or outside of it. Democracy does not give the people the most skillful government, but it produces what the ablest governments are frequently unable to create...

Further, specialized knowledge is esoteric, incomprehensible in its intricacies to the generalist. When questions of public policy are cast in technical or scientific terms, the public and its direct agencies are unable to make meaningful decisions.

As one commentator about the modern scene expresses it:

⁸ See, for instance, Bracher, *op. cit.*, p. 374, and J. H. Hofmeyr, "Civil Service in Ancient Times: The Story of its Evolution" in Raphaeli, *op. cit.*, pp. 69-91, p. 74.

⁹ Alexis DeTocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Vintage Books, 1945), p. 96.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 261-262.

Much of the history of social progress in the twentieth century can be described in terms of the transfer of wider and wider areas of public policy from politics to expertise. The increasing complexity of the management apparatus has made it difficult for ordinary voters to make judgments and develop choices relevant to its exercise.¹¹

With a democracy, political responsibility is a major value. Anti-efficiency, anti-bureaucratic elements such as conflict are necessary for this responsibility to be meaningful. When professional judgment, or "objective criteria" or esoteric knowledge, or neutrality, or efficiency, or moral commitments are substituted for political responsibility, more and better products may result, more and better services may be provided. But the basic value of democracy can be subverted. Woodrow Wilson, campaigning for the presidency in 1912 said:

What I fear is a government of experts. God forbid that in a democratic society we should resign the task and give the government over to experts. What are we for if we are to be scientifically taken care of by a small number of gentlemen who are the only men who understand the job?

Bureaucratic domination of policy making would be of concern even if the bureaucrats used objective standards for decision-making. But the "myth of the neutral bureaucrat" is just that--a myth. The executive is most often selected for office according to some merit criterion which emphasizes specialized training and/or experience. Yet, the specialist is socialized into a value structure during the course of his training and experience. This value structure may be more sophisticated, more consistent or based on more accumulated learning and knowledge than others in society. It may conform to a greater or lesser extent with other value structures in society.

¹¹Harvey Brooks, op. cit. See also, Hans J. Morgentau, "Modern Science and Political Power," Columbia Law Review CLIV (1964); LaPalombara, op. cit.; Lapp, op. cit.

But, it is still to a subjective normative system and not to any absolute truth that specialists' loyalties are owed. Facts are meaningless without interpretation and interpretation depends primarily on the particular training to which the analyst has been exposed. New techniques and developments, which in themselves are neither intrinsically evil nor good, become either depending on the values of those in control. In the words of the economist Anthony Downs:

Whenever rational officials have the power to make choices, they will use that power to achieve their own goals. However, each official's goals will inevitably diverge to some extent from the organization's formal goals, and from the goals of other officials therein.¹²

The goals and values sought by administrators may or may not be prescribed by narrow self interests. One school of thought, characterized by York Willbern, holds that professionals in government agencies constitute a built in "representation of a special type of special interest which substitutes the sanctified politics of a priesthood for the open and earthy politics of an uneducated electorate."¹³ A similar conception of the scientific establishment is presented by nuclear scientist Ralph E. Lapp.¹⁴

There is a counter-argument which holds that specialists will recommend "the policies...that will use science for good ends;"¹⁵ or "every decision he [the professional] takes in the course of his career is based on his sense of what is right;"¹⁶

¹²Downs, op. cit., p. 118.

¹³Willbern, op. cit.

¹⁴Lapp, op. cit.

¹⁵McCamy, op. cit., p. 17.

¹⁶Marshall, op. cit., p. 158.

or "the specialist's loyalty is to the work process and to his own technical skill."¹⁷

Whichever view is subscribed to--the specialist as angel or the specialist as monster--the specialist as value-laden emerges. And, the administrator, if wedded to his own particular brand of norms is little able to weigh counter-norms. He has limited his focus so that his goals are probably more narrowly defined in terms of his own field. He then is more likely to accept as societal values those most consistent with the application of his knowledge without considering other equally or more important goals.¹⁸ He may have, as Veblen succinctly put it "a trained incapacity to recognize certain kinds of facts."

3. Implications of the Findings

The distribution of formulator, mediator and implementer orientations within a bureaucracy assumes more meaning in terms of the entire political structure if, as has just been postulated, administrative discretion is closely and inversely related to democratic controls.

That few mediator types were revealed suggests that there is no widespread pre-emption by the bureaucracy of the democratic function of aggregating, interpreting and accommodating diverse interests and demands. The agency as representative is rarely accepted by its own personnel as a basis for legitimizing its activities. Although Norton Long's argument that the credentials of the bureaucracy as a decision-making

¹⁷ Presthus, op. cit., p. 54.

¹⁸ See Lewis Mumford, "Authoritarian and Democratic Technics," Technology and Culture 5 (1964), p. 1.

body is better than other organs because the bureaucracy is the most representative branch¹⁹ may be true insofar as the bureaucracy reflects the characteristics of the community, it certainly is not true of the way administrators perceive themselves. This does not mean that executives have disclaimed decision making responsibilities. Rather, they have looked elsewhere for legitimation of these responsibilities, and most specifically to their own awareness of the needs of the situation.

The preferences shown in the majority of situations for formulator type resolutions to problems emphasizes the extent to which the more politically constituted bodies have lost control over their own instrumentalities. Reliance by administrators on their own special competence and proximity to the facts conflict with more democratic norms of public control and accountability. With the predominance of formulators within government, feelings of responsibility and efficacy among a citizenry may be frustrated and atrophy. Though more material needs may be adequately satisfied by bureaucratic emphasis, the values of individuality, self expression, of mastery over one's own life, may be sacrificed.

Of course, as a practical matter, it is often essential that those most knowledgeable and capable should also be most responsible for shaping policy. Chaos, born of ineptitude, might otherwise prevail. Or stagnation and paralysis resulting from an inability to act might occur. Or there might result an inappropriateness and inadequacy of response due to a lack of information and inability to appraise and interpret needs correctly. With advanced technology making it possible for prosperity to be extended to all, the means for achieving this ideal requires technological

¹⁹Long, Bureaucracy and Constitutionalism, op. cit.

sophistication, available more through the involvement of administrative specialists than of political generalists.

What is perhaps most needed is the establishment of some balance between the formulator assumption that policy discretion resides in administrative know-how and the implementer bias of administrative neutrality. The balance is a delicate one and which side, if any, is to be more heavily weighted must depend on the objective needs of a society and the values prevalent within it.

If there is an awareness of the systemic consequences of bureaucratic perceptions and some desire shown to either maintain or to change the mixture of the norms of effectiveness and public responsibility, then it is helpful to ascertain the concomitants of the different perceptions. This can provide some guidelines for promoting or inhibiting a particular point of view within government about inter-governmental relations. While associations found between ways of perceiving the administrative function and other variables concerned with personal and organizational characteristics are based on experiences with New York City personnel only, it is hoped that these findings have relevance beyond the narrow scope of one particular group of respondents.

A preference for greater emphasis on decision-formulation by those most aware and involved in the area of operation of an agency should result in more formulators being sought for government employ. Formulators are more apt to be highly educated, to hold professional or mixed professional-administrative titles, to hold higher positions in the bureaucracy, to have higher salaries, to have entered government service laterally and to be in the Department of Social Services. Also, more lawyers and physicians are found to assume formulator views and more formulators are

favorably disposed to unions than are other types.

Implementer type administrators are more likely to have had less formal schooling, to hold administrative (non-professional) titles, to be at lower hierarchical levels, and to receive lower salaries. This predisposition is also more widespread among those recruited into service through competitive procedures and those who show the most social mobility as measured by educational differentials between executives and their fathers. Architects, social workers and administrators holding no professional licenses or certifications are also more likely to be implementers, as are the executives in the Departments of Correction and Traffic. There is more antipathy to unions among these people than among other types.

A number of concomitants of mediator orientations also were found. Thus, there is a slight tendency for accountants, women, older people and executives in the Department of Highways to favor this view of administrative policy making.

In achieving the balance between efficiency and responsiveness, the mediator approach would seem to be a compromise between the other two. It accommodates efficiency norms by giving primary decisional responsibility to administrators. It accommodates democratic norms, albeit unconventionally, by placing the agency at the center of pluralistic pulls and strains. The unconventionality of the mediator approach in accommodating democratic requirements can be of concern, though, because direct public controls on agency policy is difficult to achieve. In most instances, pressure on organs more responsible to the people is more efficacious because agency responsiveness is a self-imposed requirement while political responsiveness may be a necessity for political survival.

None of the co-efficients associating independent variables with policy types

are overwhelming. It does not follow therefore that more careful recruitment will necessarily produce an administration with a particular perception. The socialization process into the organization and the ideals and norms prevalent therein are undoubtedly equally compelling factors. Further, the possibilities for selective recruitment into government service are very limited. As James Q. Wilson writes:

For all the talk about cities being "where its at" very few able administrators seek out employment in the low-prestige, low-paying jobs that city hall has to offer.²⁰

In New York City, we find more than half the top level executives have been in government service over twenty five years. There is, as well, a sizeable percentage (27.4%) who are in their sixties and who can be expected to retire shortly. Who will their replacements be? From where will they come? There will undoubtedly soon be the opportunity to effectuate some major changes in city personnel. In the field research, differences in attitude by length of service was found to be an inconsistent factor, one preference being exhibited in one context and another elsewhere. If, then, the length of service is of lesser consequence, the other variables associated with policy orientations can be consciously sought to maximize a particular perception of the administrative function. In other bureaucracies, too, similar opportunities exist or arise from time to time. The need for competent personnel--any competent personnel--often obscures the fact that there are policy consequences to the recruiting process. Hopefully, this research has increased the awareness of the existence and consequences to the political process of the prominence of certain attitudes to decision making within the bureaucracy.

²⁰James Q. Wilson, op. cit., p. 31.

(APPENDIX)

LETTER TO PANEL OF EXPERTS

September 20, 1968

Dear Sir:

I am writing to you at the suggestion of Blanche Blank in connection with a research project I have undertaken as my doctoral dissertation.

Enclosed is a draft of a questionnaire I hope to use for this project and an explanatory note about both the study and the questionnaire.

To check on the extent to which the questions measure the dimensions I am seeking, I am asking you and a number of other experts to relate a few of the questions to the schema of administrative types described in the explanatory note. Specifically what I am asking you to do is to indicate next to questions 9, 10 and 11 which "type" you think would rate as highly important each of the items listed. For question 12, I am asking you to do the same with regard to the column headings only, i.e., indicate which "type" you think would have the most check marks in each column.

Since I am awaiting your reply before final acceptance of this instrument, I would be deeply appreciative if you could give this your consideration as soon as possible. A stamped, addressed envelope is enclosed for your convenience.

Thank you.

Cordially yours,

Rita J. Immeman
Doctoral Candidate
City University of New York

enclosure

(Appendix)

Explanatory Note to Panel of Experts

Re: Questionnaire to Determine and Analyze Administrative Types

This is an explanation of the aims of the attached draft questionnaire which was developed in connection with a study of certain high-level personnel in selected New York City agencies.

I have devised a "typology of bureaucrats" according to differences in attitudes toward decision-making influences and other considerations. These types have been abstracted from the literature--both that describing what administrators are and that prescribing what administrators should be. The bureaucratic types, classified according to the values each wishes to emphasize through the decision making process are:

1. "IMPLEMENTERS"--Goals are given. Administration is a value free technical process. Decisions are to implement the goals decided elsewhere in the political system.

(This is the traditional view found in Weber, Wilson, Goodnow, Gulick and Urwick. From a prescriptive point of view, see Hyneman, Finer and LaPalombara. Textbook definitions of public administration are usually in this vein, i.e., Ferrel Heady's that public administration is concerned with carrying out public policy decisions made by authoritative decision-makers in the political system. It is implicit in studies concerned with increasing efficiency and economy such as Paul David's and David Stanley's, etc.).

2. "PLATONISTS"--Social Engineers. This type would maximize administrative autonomy to achieve the "public interest" as they conceive it. The term is based on Plato's "philosopher-king" type role.

(This view can be distilled from Redford; McCamy: "Science and Public Policy;" to an extreme in Frederick K. Beutel: "Democracy or the Scientific Method in Law and Policy Making;" and to a lesser extent in Friedrich, Gaus, and Jacob: "Policy and Bureaucracy;" It is behind the demands by practitioners in various fields to "Keep politics out of _____" i.e., education, welfare, police work--witness the attitude to the Civilian Review Board.)

3. "BROKERS"--Administrative function is to bring about equilibrium between conflicting interests and demands.

(This is an adaptation of the Eulau-Wahlke type of legislator. For descriptions of similar administrative types see Paul Appleby and Pendleton Herring. Banfield and Wilson also give examples of this type, i.e., that a fire chief's role cannot be simply that of technician but must include finding the terms on which conflicting opinions and interests can be reconciled and compromised.)

4. "ORGANIZATION MEN"--Administrative conservers. Criteria for decisions are whether they enhance or maintain power of the agency. Primary value for preservation and growth of organization can be either from a sense of identification with and loyalty to the organization, or in order to realize personal ambitions or desires for security, stability, etc.

(This view can be found in J. Leiper-Freeman, Riggs, Norton Long, Burnham--not necessarily approvingly. See, too, Victor Thompson, Anthony Downs, Robert Presthus.)

I have tried to operationalize this classificatory scheme with the attached instrument, as follows:

Question 8 categorizes the respondent into a general type according to his primary emphasis.

Question 9 through 12 are designed to check on whether this categorization into type is reliable by testing the respondent's attitude to various aspects of the administrative function. Each of the administrative types should have characteristic perceptions toward administration which is distinctive to his type. These four questions should discover which group of perceptions are sufficiently congruent with each other so as to form a "type."

Questions 13 through 15 are also for the purpose of exploring attitudinal variations among the respondents. These differ from the previous group of questions in that the distinguishing features of the administrative types do not necessarily involve a set attitude to the dimensions covered by these questions. For instance, the

same perceptions of unions, or of technology, or of investigating committees, or of the qualities which make a position attractive may be shared by two or more administrative types or perhaps be unrelated to type. The attitudes to these particular items are not included in the definitions of the administrative types and it could prove of value to see if these perceptions follow any associated pattern with the typology. Determining the extent to which positive or negative views of these elements exist among bureaucrats should have inherent interest, in addition.

Of course, each question will not be equally valuable either for determining administrative types nor for eliciting attitudes to other phenomena of the administrative scene. More questions are included than will be analyzed to insure that sufficient differences for meaningful interpretation do emerge.

Questions 1 through 6 are obviously factual. The data gathered from these will be supplemented by information about other features of the respondents' background, training, experience and associations. These hard-type data will then be compared to variations in attitudes to determine the extent to which educational, sociological, demographic and/or bureaucratic factors are related to administrative types.

(Appendix)

Preliminary Questionnaire for Pre-Test and Validity Check

ConfidentialName:

1. Agency:

2. Length of time at agency: (check one)

- Under Five Years
 5 - 15 Years
 16 - 25 Years
 Over 25 Years

3. Length of time in New York City Government Service: (check one)

- Under Five Years
 5 - 15 Years
 16 - 25 Years
 Over 25 Years

4. Means of recruitment into government service: (check one)

- Competitive Exam
 Non-competitive Merit Procedure
 Appointment
 Other (specify) _____

5. Highest educational level of other members of your family: (check one for each member listed)

	<u>Father</u>	<u>Husband or Wife</u>
Some elementary school or elementary school graduate	_____	_____
Some high school or high school graduate	_____	_____
Some college or college graduate	_____	_____
Post-graduate college work	_____	_____

6. Where you spent most of the years in which you were growing up: (check one)

City
 Suburb
 Small Town
 Farm
 Other (specify) _____

7. What is the primary nature of your present duties? (check one)

Administrative
 Technical
 Other (specify) _____

8. What do you think is the most important consideration for setting policy in your agency? (Check one only)

Conformity with the Mayor's over-all program and goals.
 Contribution to the general welfare of agency clientele.
 Accommodating the different interests making conflicting demands on agency.
 Maintaining the integrity and usefulness of the agency so it can continue and develop its work.

9. How important do you think each of the following qualifications should be for promotion to administrative responsibilities in your agency? (check one for each qualification listed)

	<u>Absolutely Essential</u>	<u>Very Important</u>	<u>Important</u>	<u>Of minor Importance</u>	<u>Not at all Important</u>
Ability to follow orders from above despite personal disagreement	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Ability to get outside technical advice from specialists	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Ability to get along with other agency personnel	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Ability to handle public criticism	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Ability to represent agency interests in dealing with other officials	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Ability to keep up with modern administrative techniques	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Ability to keep up with new ideas in the field	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Ability to handle conflicting public opinion and demands	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Ability to use common sense and general intelligence more than special training	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Extensive experience and specialized training	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

10. How important would you rate each of the following in helping you to perceive where the greatest need for your agency's services and facilities exist? (check one in each category)

	<u>Very Important</u>	<u>Important</u>	<u>Somewhat Important</u>	<u>Not at all Important</u>
Views of colleagues within the agency	_____	_____	_____	_____
Views of concerned interest groups	_____	_____	_____	_____
Views of the general public	_____	_____	_____	_____
Reports and articles in professional journals and at conferences	_____	_____	_____	_____
Decisions of the Mayor	_____	_____	_____	_____
Decisions of the Board of Estimate or the City Council	_____	_____	_____	_____
Communications from your chief	_____	_____	_____	_____
Views of other city agencies	_____	_____	_____	_____
Views expressed by agency clientele	_____	_____	_____	_____
Views of advisory boards and panels	_____	_____	_____	_____
Your own experience, training and judgment	_____	_____	_____	_____
Other (specify) _____	_____	_____	_____	_____

11. How important do you find each of the following for your intellectual stimulation and growth? (check one in each category)

	<u>Very Important</u>	<u>Important</u>	<u>Somewhat Important</u>	<u>Not at all Important</u>
Colleagues at the office	_____	_____	_____	_____
Superiors in city government	_____	_____	_____	_____
Family and friends	_____	_____	_____	_____
Professional associates	_____	_____	_____	_____
Books, journals and lectures	_____	_____	_____	_____
Contacts with members of the community	_____	_____	_____	_____
Other (specify) _____	_____	_____	_____	_____

13. All of the following may be things people look for in jobs. Please indicate the extent to which each is of importance to you in evaluating a position. (check one in each category).

	<u>Very Important</u>	<u>Important</u>	<u>Somewhat Important</u>	<u>Not at all Important</u>
Salary	_____	_____	_____	_____
Working conditions	_____	_____	_____	_____
Opportunity for advancement	_____	_____	_____	_____
Opportunity to serve the public	_____	_____	_____	_____
Opportunity to use knowledge & skills	_____	_____	_____	_____
Opportunity to meet interesting people	_____	_____	_____	_____
Opportunity to influence public policy	_____	_____	_____	_____
Recognition & appreciation of my work	_____	_____	_____	_____
Security of tenure	_____	_____	_____	_____
Congenial atmosphere	_____	_____	_____	_____
Opportunity to come into contact with different viewpoints	_____	_____	_____	_____
Clear cut responsibilities and a well-defined chain of command	_____	_____	_____	_____
Other (specify) _____	_____	_____	_____	_____

14. In a democracy power is invariably distributed in different ways among many institutions. Please indicate how much power you think each of the following have over matters concerning your agency's functions. (Check one in each category.)

	<u>Extensive Power</u>	<u>Some Power</u>	<u>No power at all</u>
Political Parties	_____	_____	_____
Trade Unions	_____	_____	_____
Press and other mass communications media	_____	_____	_____
Professional associations	_____	_____	_____
Judiciary	_____	_____	_____
Church Groups	_____	_____	_____
Civic Improvement Organizations	_____	_____	_____
Economic or Financial or Trade Associations	_____	_____	_____
Ethnic or Sectarian Groups	_____	_____	_____

(Appendix)

Letter to Commissioners
From New York City Director of Personnel
Requesting Cooperation

January 14, 1969

Dear Commissioner _____:

Mrs. Rita Immerman of the Hunter College Urban Research Center proposes to do a study on executive personnel. A description of the study and material for it are enclosed.

I ask you to give Mrs. Immerman your support and cooperation because I feel that the results of this study may be helpful to us in the City's Executive Personnel development program. Please assure the respondents that all information reported will be treated confidentially.

Thank you for your time and cooperation.

Sincerely,

Solomon Hoberman

(Appendix)

Letter to Commissioners Requesting Cooperation

January 14, 1969

Dear Commissioner _____:

Attached please find a letter from the City Personnel Director. Mr. Hoberman has suggested that I ask for your assistance in having the executives in your department complete a questionnaire, a copy of which is herewith enclosed.

This questionnaire is being used in connection with an attitudinal study of high-level personnel in urban line agencies. Specifically, we are interested in discovering how administrators view their own role in setting agency policy, where they think the locus of policy-making functions lies with regard to different kinds of problems facing an agency, and how much influence they think different parts of the political system have in connection with agency matters. If different perceptions of the policy process emerge from the responses, we will examine further whether these differences are related to administrative, demographic and sociological characteristics such as educational background, length of time at agency, different agency affiliation, etc.

We would appreciate it if we could arrange to bring the blank questionnaires (together with the enclosed letter of explanation for respondents) to your office for distribution to executives in your department. This would include people in such titles as Bureau Chief, Assistant Bureau Chief, Deputy Bureau Chief, Division Director, Assistant or Deputy Division Director, Chief Counsel, Chief Manager, Chief Superintendents, Senior Engineer, Senior Accountant, Senior Architect, Assistant to Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner, etc.

Please let me know if this is suitable and when the most convenient time would be. We are anxious to have the results of this survey which, hopefully, should be of help and interest to you and your department as well as the City generally. For its speedy completion, we earnestly request your cooperation.

Cordially yours,

Rita J. Immerman
Research Associate
URBAN RESEARCH CENTER

rji
enc.

(Appendix)

Letter to Respondents Requesting Cooperation

January, 1969

Dear Sir:

We at the Urban Research Center of Hunter College are conducting a study of how executive-level personnel in City agencies perceive some aspects of government responsibility and policy-making. In connection with this, we are asking a number of New York City public administrators to give us their opinions about the nature of the administrative function in their agencies and the relationship of administration to the government process as a whole. We hope to use this information to test certain theories and assumptions about administrative attitudes and behaviors.

The questions to be answered are on the enclosed schedule. The information and opinions you express will be tabulated along with responses from about two hundred other executives with no names or other means of identification appearing. We can assure you that your responses will be held in the strictest confidence with access to the completed questionnaire limited to the researchers alone. You are being asked to identify yourself by name so that we can determine the number of responses in each agency and send out reminders, if necessary. Your name will be detached from the body of the questionnaire once this has been done.

We realize we are asking you to take time out from a busy schedule. We believe, however, that this study should add to an understanding of the way City government in general and administration in particular works and, in so doing, help you in your work and activities.

Please answer the questions as honestly as possible. We are asking for opinions so, of course, there are no correct or incorrect answers. If, in some instances, your exact sentiment is not one of the choices offered, please indicate the choice which approximates your feelings most nearly.

Enclosed is a stamped, addressed envelope for your convenience in returning the completed form.

With grateful appreciation for your cooperation, we are,

Cordially yours,

Rita J. Immerman
Research Associate
Urban Research Center

APPENDIX

QUESTIONNAIRE

Administrative Roles Study

January, 1969

CONFIDENTIAL
C O

NAME _____

TITLE _____

1. AGENCY _____

2. LENGTH OF TIME AT AGENCY: (check one)

- Under 5 years
 5-15 years
 16-25 years
 Over 25 years

3. LENGTH OF TIME IN NEW YORK CITY GOVERNMENT SERVICE: (check one)

- Under 5 years
 5-15 years
 16-25 years
 Over 25 years

4. MEANS OF RECRUITMENT INTO GOVERNMENT SERVICE: (check one)

- Competitive Exam
 Non-competitive Merit Procedure
 Appointment
 Other (please specify) _____

5. LEVEL OF EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF SELF AND MEMBERS OF YOUR FAMILY: (check highest level completed for each)

	Self	Father	Husband of Wife
Some elementary school or elementary school graduate	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Some high school or high school graduate	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Some college or college graduate	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Post-graduate college work	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

6. WHERE DID YOU SPEND MOST OF THE YEARS IN WHICH YOU WERE GROWING UP? (check one)
- _____ City
 _____ Suburb
 _____ Small Town
 _____ Other (please specify) _____
7. ABOUT HOW MANY PEOPLE IN YOUR AGENCY DO YOU FEEL YOU KNOW WELL?
- _____
8. ABOUT HOW MANY HOURS EACH WEEK WOULD YOU SAY YOU DEVOTE TO YOUR WORK?
- _____
9. YOU ARE ABOUT TO BE INTRODUCED TO A GROUP OF PEOPLE AND IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU IMPRESS THEM WITH YOUR OCCUPATION. HOW WOULD YOU DESCRIBE YOUR POSITION?
10. a) WHAT INDIVIDUALS, GROUPS OR INSTITUTIONS (IN OR OUT OF GOVERNMENT) CAN BEST APPRAISE WHAT THE GOALS AND AIMS OF YOUR AGENCY SHOULD BE?
- b) WHAT INDIVIDUALS, GROUPS OR INSTITUTIONS (IN OR OUT OF GOVERNMENT) CAN BEST APPRAISE HOW SUCCESSFUL YOUR AGENCY IS IN ACHIEVING THESE GOALS?
11. IN CARRYING OUT THE FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF YOUR JOB, ABOUT HOW OFTEN DO YOU PERSONALLY FIND IT REASONABLE AND PRACTICAL TO DEVIATE FROM SOME POLICY OR PROCEDURE IN ORDER TO DO A MORE EFFECTIVE JOB? (check one)
- _____ Frequently
 _____ Fairly Often
 _____ Occasionally
 _____ Hardly Ever
 _____ Never.

12. MOST AUTHORITIES SEEM TO FEEL THAT THE FOLLOWING QUALIFICATIONS ARE IMPORTANT FOR PROMOTION TO ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES. PLEASE RANK HOW IMPORTANT YOU CONSIDER EACH. (Please place "1" in front of the item you think most necessary for promotion, "2" in front of the next most necessary, etc.)

- _____ Ability to handle conflicting public opinion and demands.
- _____ Specialized knowledge about the field of operations of the agency and ability to keep up with developments in it.
- _____ Ability to keep up with modern administrative techniques.
- _____ Ability to handle criticism by the public.
- _____ Ability to secure advice from consultants about matters related to agency services.
- _____ Ability to establish and maintain good relations with the public in general and agency clientele in particular.
- _____ Ability to influence agency policy.

13. THE FOLLOWING ARE SOME REASONS USUALLY GIVEN WHY PEOPLE DO THINGS THEIR SUPERIORS EITHER SUGGEST OR DIRECT THEM TO DO. PLEASE RANK, ACCORDING TO THE ORDER OF IMPORTANCE TO YOU, EACH OF THESE ITEMS. (Please place "1" next to the reason you think most important, "2" next to the next most important reason, etc.)

- _____ Respect for superior's competence and good judgment.
- _____ Admiration for superior's personal character.
- _____ Respect for superior's formal authority which gives him the right to expect his suggestions will be carried out.
- _____ Superior's ability to recommend promotions and increases.
- _____ Superior's ability to apply pressure and penalize subordinates.

14. MANY DIFFERENT KINDS OF DECISIONS MUST BE MADE IN CONNECTION WITH THE WORK OF AN AGENCY. INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS BOTH IN AND OUT OF GOVERNMENT HAVE VARYING DEGREES OF RESPONSIBILITY AND INFLUENCE, DEPENDING ON THE NATURE OF THESE DECISIONS.

PLEASE INDICATE NEXT TO EACH TYPE OF DECISION WHICH AGENCY (i.e.: Bureau of Budget, Dept. of Personnel, etc.) OR GROUP (i.e.: community, religious or trade organization, mass media, etc.) OR INDIVIDUAL (i.e.: Mayor, Commissioner, etc.) YOU THINK ACTUALLY HAS THE MOST THE MOST RESPONSIBILITY FOR THAT PARTICULAR TYPE DECISION; WHO YOU THINK SHOULD HAVE THE MOST RESPONSIBILITY; WHO HAS SUBSTANTIAL INFLUENCE OVER THE OUTCOME.

	<u>Actually Has Responsibility</u>	<u>Should Have Responsibility</u>	<u>Has Influence</u>
Decentralizing Operations	_____	_____	_____
Setting regulations governing public use or eligibility for services	_____	_____	_____
Setting salary scales for agency personnel	_____	_____	_____
Building or establishing facilities where none existed previously	_____	_____	_____
Replacing obsolete buildings and facilities	_____	_____	_____
Initiating new types of services to be offered by the agency	_____	_____	_____
Establishing good public relations	_____	_____	_____
Selecting one from several qualified applicants for a position	_____	_____	_____
Purchasing a new piece of equipment	_____	_____	_____
Purchasing operating supplies not called for in the budget	_____	_____	_____
Introducing EDP or other techniques to make agency operations more efficient	_____	_____	_____
Filling top-level jobs	_____	_____	_____

15. THE FOLLOWING MAY BE THINGS PEOPLE LOOK FOR IN THEIR OCCUPATIONS. PLEASE INDICATE THE EXTENT TO WHICH EACH IS OF IMPORTANCE TO YOU IN EVALUATING A POSITION. (Please check one for each item listed).

	<u>Very Impor- tant</u>	<u>Impor- tant</u>	<u>Of Some Impor- tance</u>	<u>Not at All Impor- tant</u>
Salary	_____	_____	_____	_____
Working Conditions	_____	_____	_____	_____
Opportunity for Advancement	_____	_____	_____	_____
Opportunity to serve the public	_____	_____	_____	_____
Opportunity to use my knowledge and skills	_____	_____	_____	_____
Opportunity to meet interesting people	_____	_____	_____	_____
Opportunity to influence public policy	_____	_____	_____	_____
Recognition and appreciation of my work	_____	_____	_____	_____
Security of tenure	_____	_____	_____	_____
Congenial atmosphere	_____	_____	_____	_____
Opportunity to come into contact with different viewpoints	_____	_____	_____	_____
Clear out responsibilities and a well-defined chain of command	_____	_____	_____	_____

16. PLEASE IMAGINE THE FOLLOWING SITUATION:

An agency chief asks one of his staff members, an economist, to prepare a memo in support of a certain policy that has been followed for some time. In studying the matter, the economist finds that he can defend this policy only if he presents arguments that differ from the accepted thinking of most economists in and outside of government.

CAN THE AGENCY HEAD EXPECT HIS SUBORDINATE TO PREPARE SUCH A MEMO?

16. (continued)

WHAT DO YOU THINK THE SUBORDINATE SHOULD DO?

WHY DO YOU THINK SO?

17. PLEASE PUT A CHECK NEXT TO THE ONE STATEMENT IN EACH PAIR OF STATEMENTS WITH WHICH YOU AGREE MOST. IF YOU AGREE WITH BOTH, CHOOSE THE ONE YOU LIKE BETTER. IF YOU DISAGREE WITH BOTH, CHOOSE THE ONE YOU DISLIKE LESS.

A. Before an agency decides on a course of action, the most important thing to consider is whether it contributes to the general welfare of the public.

Before an agency decides on a course of action, the most important thing to consider is whether it conforms to the directives of elected officials.

- - - - -

B. It is the job of the administrator to work for what the public wants even when the public is wrong.

Criticism by the lay public about the functions of agencies which perform specialized work is necessarily uninformed.

- - - - -

C. Arbitration should be compulsory and binding for settling all labor disputes involving public employees.

Denial of the right to strike by public employees is an abridgement of their civil rights.

- - - - -

D. Before an agency decides on a course of action, the most important thing to consider is whether it represents the prevailing sentiments in the community.

Before an agency decides on a course of action, the most important thing to consider is whether it conforms to the directives of elected officials.

- E. Legislative and executive investigations of administration should be exercised with more restraint.
- A course in cost accounting does an administrator more good than one in human relations.
- - - - -
- F. The average human being prefers to be directed and wishes to avoid responsibility.
- It is the job of the administrator to work for what the public wants even when the public is wrong.
- - - - -
- G. Social and economic policy setting must be removed from partisan politics.
- Modern technology raises the danger than human values will be overlooked for the sake of efficiency.
- - - - -
- H. Before an agency decides on a course of action, the most important thing to consider is whether it accomodates conflicting demands in the community.
- Before an agency decides on a course of action, the most important thing to consider is whether it contributes to the general welfare of the public.
- - - - -
- I. Special interests have too much influence in administrative agencies.
- It is helpful for government employees to belong to voluntary organizations.
- - - - -
- J. Loyalty to the mayor is more important than competence in an appointed official.
- The only criterion for judging administrative performance should be merit standards.

18. WHO DO YOU THINK IS MOST AWARE OF WHERE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE PUBLIC LIE IN MATTERS RELATED TO YOUR AGENCY?

19. PLEASE RANK THE FOLLOWING ITEMS ACCORDING TO HOW IMPORTANT EACH IS TO YOU PERSONALLY. (Please place "1" in front of the most important item, "2" in front of the next most important, etc.)

- ___ Family
- ___ Work or occupation
- ___ Friends
- ___ Leisure time activities and hobbies
- ___ Activities in professional groups and organizations
- ___ Activities in voluntary organizations (other than professional)
- ___ Other (please specify) _____

20. PLEASE IMAGINE THE FOLLOWING SITUATION:

An administrator in the education department of a large city is responsible for devising ways to locate schools in such a manner as to achieve the greatest possible racial integration without creating excessive inconvenience and dislocation. After much study and discussion with individuals and groups in the communities which would be most affected by any proposals, he presents a plan which is a compromise between the opposing opinions he encountered. He believes this plan to be acceptable to all the parties involved although it satisfies none completely. His department head rejects this plan and adopts instead a program which the administrator is sure will increase tensions and hostilities in the areas involved. His chief instructs him to implement the program to which he objects.

WHAT DO YOU THINK THE ADMINISTRATOR SHOULD DO?

WHY?

- - - - -

Please accept our thanks for your cooperation and courtesy.

We would find any comments and additional information about the matters covered by this questionnaire most helpful. Please use the reverse side of this sheet for any further remarks you may wish to make.

We have enclosed a stamped, self-addressed envelop for your convenience in returning the completed questionnaire to us.

(Appendix)

Follow-up Letter to Respondents

March, 1969

Dear _____:

Some time ago you were given a questionnaire by your department. This questionnaire is a necessary part of a study we are making of the attitudes of high-level executives to the decision-making processes of city government. For the validity and reliability of the entire study, it is most important that each respondent cooperate by sharing with us his thoughts and ideas about city government generally and policy problems, more particularly.

May we therefore please urge you to complete and return the questionnaire as quickly as possible. We appreciate the fact that this means taking time out from a busy schedule to help in this undertaking. We believe, though, that the information obtained from an analysis of all the returns should more than compensate for the effort expended.

There has been a most encouraging response to date. We are awaiting your completed questionnaire, however, for a more dependable and comprehensive picture.

Thank you.

Cordially yours,

Rita J. Immerman
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