GENDER AND VOTING BY NATIVITY AND ETHNICITY IN NEW YORK CITY

by

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Abstract

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This dissertation project examines the relationship between gender and voting behavior in New York City by nativity status. It is informed by the literatures on the gender gap in American politics, on immigrant political incorporation, and on racial/ethnic studies in urban politics. The main conclusion from the three empirical chapters is that differences in life experiences between foreign-born and native-born populations result in different styles of gendered electoral participation. The first empirical chapter employs logistic regression models for the foreign-born, native-born non-White, and native-born non-Hispanic White samples from the 1996-2002 CPS data. The results show that the gender gap in voting for the foreign-born sample can be attributed to immigrant women's marital status, labor-force participation, and the gender-structure of country of origin. When the same model (excluding the immigrant-specific variables) is employed for the two native-born samples, the explanatory power of marital status and labor-force participation on the effect of gender in voting appears to weaken for the native-born non-White sample and disappear for the native-born White sample. The second empirical chapter employs the Hierarchical Linear Model (HLM) to examine the relationship between context and gender in Hispanic turnout, using the New York

City Board of Election's turnout data for the 2000 general election. The findings from this analysis suggest that 1) Latino men are more influenced than Latinas by the contextual factors in racially/ethnically concentrated areas, and 2) the difference in the Hispanic female-male turnout that is evident in racially/ethnically concentrated areas disappears in White-majority and White-plurality areas, a finding suggesting possible interaction between gender and class in turnout. Finally, the third empirical chapter, which focuses on explaining the gender gap in voting preferences by analyzing the voting for Al Gore in the 2000 presidential election, suggests that the 'political autonomy' thesis developed by Susan Carroll has a strong explanatory power in analyzing why women's and men's vote differ for the city’s native-born voters, but is of limited or no use in the case of immigrant voters.

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Chapter 1 Introduction

Studying Gendered Immigrant Political Participation in New York City

Immigrant women in New York City vote at a higher rate and are more likely to vote Democrat than are their male counterparts. Systematically analyzing this phenomenon, specifically the relationship between gender and immigrant voting turnout and voting preferences, is the topic of this dissertation project. This project also seeks to determine the variation, if any, in the effect of gender on voting turnout and voting preferences across native-born and foreign-born populations and to explain why they come about.

The basic assumption employed in this study is that differences in life experience between native-born and foreign-born populations, based on gender roles within the family, the labor market, the welfare state, and the community, may motivate different styles of gendered electoral participation. The migration experience itself for immigrants is perhaps one of the most significant differences in the life experience of these two groups. For immigrants, American national and local institutions and political and social arrangements become relevant only after they enter the United States.[1] Their initial political disposition will be established by premigration socialization and other sending-country-specific factors. Only after migration does the setting in the United States shape postmigration gender ideologies which, in turn, shape the political status of immigrant

[1] Some studies (Rumbaut, 1997; Waldinger and Bozorgmehr, 1996) argue that for some immigrant groups, the process of assimilation into mainstream America may begin before the act of migrating to the United States because future immigrants are already exposed to American institutions and popular culture in their country of origin. On the other side, however, as Kasinitz argues (1992, p. 218), "new" immigrant groups whose racial backgrounds resemble those of historical American minority groups, even if they are arriving from Anglo-Saxon political settings, may lack a shared experience of struggle with their counterparts here. Due to this lack of a collective past between the two groups of the same racial background, immigrant groups' initial political disposition in the United States may be quite different from that of the established minority. I will address this in detail in Chapter 3.

men and women. The institutional, political, social, and cultural settings that shaped the premigration gender ideology in the sending country are relevant in the sense that they would predict the strength of gendered responses to political and social structures in the host country. However, the degree of impact of postmigration gender ideology on immigrant women's political status is constrained by the institutional and political arrangements within the U.S. electoral system.

From an analytical perspective, this study is limited to explaining the gender gap in political participation as measured by turnout and voting preferences, not the gender gap in political representation, one of the five political gender gaps identified in American politics (Manza and Brooks, 1999, p. 130).

This study will also explore the question of whether or not there is a "women's vote" in New York City. Earlier studies have shown that women do not vote as a block, but given their larger share both in the population and in the electorate in New York City, certain election-specific factors may give them an "unexpected" common cause, enabling them to translate their vote into significant political power.

Although the immigrant population represents a small electoral base in the United States, its size and share are growing within the total U.S. population. Immigrants already have a large presence in “gateway” cities such as New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and San Francisco, and have long been in the making as a potential political force in local politics. According to the 2000 Census figures, the number of immigrants in the U.S. has increased to 31 million from 20 million in 1990, constituting about 10 percent of the total U.S. population. About 9 percent of the entire immigrant population in the U.S. live in New York City (2.8 million in absolute numbers). While immigrants make up 36 percent

of the city's overall population, they constitute 44 percent of its total voting-age population (VAP). Finally, according to the 2000 Current Population Survey (CPS) data, immigrants presently make up about one-fourth of the New York City electorate.

Contemporary immigration to New York City is phenomenal, not only in terms of its large numbers, but also in terms of its diversity. Table 1.1 presents their demographic and electoral composition by region of birth.

Table 1.1: Comparison of Immigrant Population and Immigrant Electorate in New York City by Region of Birth

	Immigrant Population		Immigrant Electorate
	Census 2000 PUMS 5% File (N=118,614)	**CPS 2000 Nov. Supplement** (N=1,154)	**CPS 2000 Nov. Supplement** (N=259)
Region			
Western Europe	8.1%	7.5%	15.4%
Eastern Europe & former Soviet Union	12.5	12.3	14.7
South & East Asia	17.9	19.5	12.7
Caribbean	29.3	26.0	32.0
South & Central America	22.5	21.8	16.2
Muslim-majority Countries*	5.0	4.9	3.1
Other	4.3	7.0	5.8
% of Total	35.6	37.1	22.9

*This category includes respondents born in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Turkey, Egypt, and Morocco.

The figures in the first column of Table 1.1 are from the Census 2000 PUMS 5% file. Although a disproportionate share of immigrant groups continue to arrive from the Caribbean region, constituting 29.3 percent of the immigration to New York City, countries in Central and South America, such as Mexico, El Salvador, Honduras, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru, are the new sources of immigration to New York City. Immigrants from this region constitute about 22.5 percent of the immigrant population.

Another striking trend is that the numbers of immigrant groups from South Asia, Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East, and Africa have increased nearly threefold since 1990, raising their share within the immigrant population to 13 percent (results not shown). Similarly, with the end of the Cold War, the eastern European countries and former Soviet Union became another source of immigration to New York City, constituting about 12.5 percent of its immigrant population.

Column 2 of Table 1.1 presents the figures from the Current Population Survey 2000 November Supplement data for comparison. Even with a much smaller sample size, an accurate picture of the city's immigrant composition can be obtained. As for their electoral composition, the CPS data set is the only data source that contains information about New York City's electoral profile by nativity status. As mentioned earlier, immigrants make up about one-fourth of the city's electorate (22.9 percent).

Column 3 of Table 1.1 presents the city's immigrant electoral profile, based on 259 immigrant respondents who reported being registered. It appears that immigrants also make up a diverse electorate. Immigrants from Western Europe and the Caribbean constitute a larger share of the immigrant electorate ─15.4% and 32.0%, respectively─ than their share in the overall immigrant VAP because they have higher rates of eligibility status for registration than do the newly arriving immigrant groups, due to their age structure and immigration history. Combined, these two groups constitute about half the immigrant electorate in New York City. However, as more immigrants from South and Central America and Muslim-majority countries become citizenship eligible and therefore voting eligible over time, the composition of the immigrant electorate will be more diverse in the coming years.

This study focuses on New York City mainly for three reasons: first, as the figures above clearly show, New York City is one of the major immigrant-receiving "gateway" cities; therefore it provides a good context within which to compare the gender gaps across foreign-born and native-born groups. Second, immigration to the U.S. is gendered in ways that make flows to New York City more predominantly female than in, for example, the City of Los Angeles. According to 2000 Census data, females constitute 54 percent of the voting-age immigrants in New York City, compared with 50 percent in Los Angeles. The 8-percentage-points difference in the sex composition in New York City, compared with none in Los Angeles, is substantial, leading one to expect more pronounced gendered economic, social, and political outcomes. One such outcome comes from the 2000 CPS data, showing that females make up 58.5 percent of the overall immigrant electorate.[2] In this regard, New York City would be a good case study for assessing the future applicability of the findings of this research to other immigrant-receiving cities. Third, the two key data sets, New York City voter registration and turnout data and the New American Exit Poll data (NAEP), are available only for this city. Largely due to lack of available data, empirical studies have analyzed immigrant voting behavior at the state or national level. Those studies focusing on urban settings and cities are qualitative in nature, based on in-depth interviews and participant observations. By examining gendered immigrant voting behavior at the local level, using quantitative methods, this study will add a new dimension to the study of immigrant voting behavior.

[2] The term immigrant electorate refers to those respondents in the 2000 CPS November supplement who reported being registered to vote (N=259).

Political participation has a strong bearing on immigrant integration and upward mobility (Ramakrishnan, 2005; Logan and Mollenkopf, 2003). Immigrants do naturalize with increasing numbers (CIS Report, 2002; CRS Report, 1998; PPIC Report, 1999), which has important implications for political outcomes, especially at the local level. By exploring the path to formal political incorporation among immigrants by gender, as measured by voting behavior, we can better understand some of the political dynamics shaping local politics in "gateway" cities. Figure 1.1 illustrates the different paths of immigrant political incorporation.

Figure 1.1: Classifying Forms of Immigrant Political Incorporation



Due to the availability of data in recent years, there has been a growing number of quantitatively oriented studies focusing on immigrant and minority voting behavior (Bass and Casper, 2001; DeSipio, 1996b; Jones-Correa, 2001; Lien, 1998; Ramakrishnan, 2005; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001; Tam Cho, 1999). Although the growing literature on immigrant voting behavior has expanded our understanding of electoral participation in American politics by adding immigrant-specific factors, it has largely ignored the gender-specific dynamics of immigrant political participation. Unlike the theoretical work resulting from the gender gap literature on women in American politics, there has been very little attempt to theorize on gender roles in immigrant political participation. Gender is either completely missing (Cho, Gimpel, and Dyck, 2006; DeSipio and Pachon, 2002) or just one of the "control" variables, not a central topic to the researcher (Bass and Casper, 2001; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001). On the other hand, the few community-based qualitative studies that have been done hint that immigrant political participation is a gendered process (Hardy-Fanta, 1993; Jones-Correa, 1998a, 1998b).

Similarly, although it produced rich, competing theoretical frameworks, empirical studies on women in American politics have attempted to explain the evidence of the gender gap in electoral participation largely with a focus on cultural, political, social, and historical developments unique to the American experience (Burns, Schlozman, Verba, 2001; Carroll, 1988; Kaufmann and Petrocik, 1999; Piven, 1985). To a great extent, the same arguments do not apply to contemporary immigrant groups. As mentioned earlier, the impact of American national and local institutions and political and social arrangements is relevant only after immigrants enter the United States. Similarly, studies

on women of color in American politics primarily focus on the intersection of gender and race in American politics, but not on gender and immigration (Cohen, 2003; Junn, 1997; Tate, 1991). Again, largely due to a lack of available data, nativity and immigration status are missing in gender studies in American politics.

Another limitation of the current scholarship on the gender gap in American politics is that it studies this phenomenon at the national level (Burns et al., 2001; Bass and Casper, 2001; Junn, 1997), therefore ignoring the importance of local political context. As racial/ethnic studies in urban politics show, such local dynamics as the degree of political mobilization, ethnic leadership in the community, and neighborhood demographic characteristics and social-economic status (SES) can explain, to a substantial extent, such outcomes as immigrant partisanship and turnout (Cho et al, 2006; Barreto, Segura, and Woods, 2004; Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995; Logan and Mollenkopf, 2003; Mollenkopf, Olson, and Ross, 2001). By focusing on the gender gap in electoral politics in New York City as the context of this study, I will aim to bring a local perspective to the current debate.

Theoretical Perspectives on Female-Male Behavioral Differences

The underlying premises of empirical research on gender in American political life draw on the broader theoretical perspectives on female-male behavioral differences, although this link between the two fields is rarely fully explored or discussed (Crow, 1997, p. 439).

The theoretical work on female-male behavioral differences has produced two major alternative types of explanations: structural versus nonstructural. The structural explanations focus on differences (or similarities for that matter) in male-female life experiences. Basically, these theories explain the gender gap in political participation in

terms of other gender gaps, such as the gap in labor-force participation, occupational status, income, and education (Baxter and Lansing, 1983; Erie and Rein, 1988; Klein, 1984; Piven, 1985; Andersen, 1999; Kaufman and Petrocik, 1999; Cook and Wilcox, 1991). For example, women's lower level of voting participation compared to men's, known as the traditional gender gap in voting participation, is explained by the social and economic barriers facing women, such as the social isolation of full-time homemakers who are excluded from political networks based on work and occupational status (Carroll, 1988). The movement of women into the paid labor force and the disappearing gender gap in educational attainment are also thought to play a role in the disappearance of the gender gap in voting participation.

The second group of explanations, which I broadly term as "nonstructural explanations," emphasizes socio-psychological and value-oriented factors in explaining female-male differences in political life. Almost all the arguments developed from this perspective are gender-based (Carroll, 1988), and grounded in the view that women looking at the world in fundamentally different ways than men. Voting differently from men, according to one group of gender-based scholars, is one way in which women express their feminist awareness, distinct identity, and self-confidence (Abzug and Kelber, 1984; Conover, 1988; Hardy-Fanta, 1993; Tolleson-Rinehart, 1992). Another group of gender-based scholarship locates female distinctiveness in a more psychological source. These studies argue that women are "nurturers," more compassionate than men, and thus are more concerned about societal well-being, leading to different moral values and voting behavior (Chodorow, 1974; Frankovic, 1982; Gilligan, 1982), and that women's nurturing role within the family and in their immediate social surrounding gives

them a distinct perspective that stems from their role in raising and caring for their children and family (Hardy-Fanta, 1993; Tronto, 1987).

Although mostly rejected as possible explanations for female-male gender behavioral differences, a few theorists locate female distinctiveness in a biologically determinist argument (Wilson, 1975). Relegating the presumed gendered differences in social and political behavior to biological differences simply does not have any theoretical merit. This conservative position is, in essence, very different from other gender-based positions that base women's distinct political behavior on the socially constructed "gender" concept. Nevertheless, one may not be able to see a clear, firm line between them. The distinction between the social and biological dimensions of gender is often blurred. In addition, as Dietz (1985) argues, basing women's political participation on predetermined gender roles "essentializes" women and implicitly rejects the idea that those gender roles may be transformed. Similarly, an important and "uncomfortable" fact for these theories is that there is a timing puzzle: in recent decades, studies have found that traditional gender differences in voting participation diminished, or even reversed in many advanced industrialized countries (Christy, 1987; DeVaus and McAllister, 1989; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995; Conway, Steuernagel, Ahern, 1997). In the United States, for example, in every presidential election since 1980, the proportion of eligible female adults who voted has exceeded the proportion of eligible male adults who voted, and the same phenomenon is found in midterm elections since 1986 (CAWP, 2000). Another significant development in the post-1980 period is the reversal in gendered voting choice (Norris, 2003, p. 149). Until the gender gap in voting preference was closed during the 1960s and 1970s, American women were slightly more likely than men to vote

Republican. However, with the 1980 presidential election, women were found to vote Democrat at a significantly higher rate than their male counterparts.

As the trends in electoral participation over time show, the established gender gaps in participation and voting strategies may disappear over time or may open up again but in the opposite direction leading to a new gender gap, known as the "modern gender gap." To understand the change, theorists produced alternative structural explanations that would account for both the pre-1980 "traditional gender gap" and post-1980 "modern gender gap." In this sense, explanations offered for the pre-1980 and post-1980 gender differences in voting participation are interrelated.

The structural explanations for the post-1980 trends in female-male voting choices emphasize the effect of structural changes in lifestyles and long-term secular trends in social norms. For example, with the increasing "feminization of poverty," beginning in the 1980s (Piven, 1985; Goldberg and Kremen, 1990) a "gender poverty gap" developed (Casper, McLanahan, and Garfinkel, 1994; McLanahan and Kelley, 1999). As their experience with the welfare state continued to increase (Andersen, 1999), a large number of economically vulnerable women eventually became aware of a shift to the right in the 1980s and 1990s and of its consequences. Such increased salience of welfare programs mobilized women to turnout to vote and to vote Democrat at a higher rate than men (Kaufmann and Petrocik, 1999; Erie and Rein, 1988).

Some theorists, however, argue that the post-1980 gender gap may be a function of women's autonomy from men (Carroll, 1988). Although largely based on structural elements, this perspective also includes elements from socio- psychological explanations, in that the autonomy of women requires economic independence as well as psychological

independence from traditional sex-role socialization. Being younger, having more education, being part of the paid work force, and being unmarried are all factors that could make for enhanced autonomy.

This study looks into the relationship between gender and immigrant voting participation and voting preferences in comparison to the native-born by focusing on structural factors. Given my focus on the possible varying effects of life experiences on gendered political participation within and among the two groups, I argue that the appropriate methodological approach for this project is the one offered by Burns et al. (2001, p. 36):

> The gender gap in participation grows out of either or both of the following circumstances: where there is a difference between women and men in the level of a particular participatory factor or in the effect on activity of a factor, that is the process by which it is converted into activity.

This way of thinking is not only methodologically appropriate in trying to examine the underlying premises and assumptions of this study, but is also theoretically appropriate, given that the previous qualitative research on gendered immigrant political participation, as mentioned briefly earlier, suggests that some effects of life experiences may not operate for the foreign-born the same way as they do for the native-born in the participation process.

Considering the growing share of immigrants in the U.S. population, I would argue that the literature on the gender gap in American politics can no longer ignore them, just as the literature on immigrant political incorporation can no longer avoid a gendered analysis of immigrant politics. With this study, my goal is to gain an understanding of the empirical evidence in an urban setting and to make a modest

contribution to the growing literatures on women in American politics and on immigrant political participation. The ultimate goal of this study is to develop an integrative model of a gender-differentiated process of immigrant political participation.

Setting the Stage: Preliminary Findings regarding the Gender Gap in New York City

Is there a Gender Gap in Voting Turnout? Evidence from the CPS Data, 1992-2002

Individual-level data from the past three presidential and congressional elections (1992-2002) suggest that men and women have different rates of voting in New York City. Table 1.2 shows the self-reported voting rates by gender when measured as percent of registered voters. Except for the 2000 presidential election, there appears to be no gender gap in voting turnout.

Table 1.2: Reported Voting Rate among Registered Voters by Gender in New York City, 1992-2002

	1992 (Pres.)	1994 (Midterm)	1996 (Pres.)	1998 (Midterm)	2000 (Pres.)	2002 (Midterm)
Women	69.1	51.8	61.1	53.6	**68.4**	46.6
Men	68.1	52.7	60.5	51.1	**63.3**	46.9
Gap	1.0	0.9	0.6	2.5	**5.1**	-0.3

Source: Current Population Survey Voting and Registration data, 1992–2002, unweighted.
Note: Boldface indicates a statistically significant difference between women and men within each year at the $p \leq .05$ level (1-sided test).

When turnout is measured in relation to the potentially eligible population, there appears to be a gender gap, although, again, except for the 2000 presidential election, it is neither substantial nor statistically significant (Table 1.3). These results would lead one to conclude that there are a few gender differences in electoral participation in the city.

Table 1.3: Reported Voting Rate among Citizen VAP by Gender in New York City, 1992–2002

	1992 (Pres.)	1994 (Mid-term)	1996 (Pres.)	1998 (Mid-term)	2000 (Pres.)	2002 (Mid-term)
Women	NA	46.7	55.8	46.7	**58.6**	39.7
Men	NA	47.3	53.2	43.7	**52.8**	38.7
Gap	NA	-0.6	2.6	3.0	**5.8**	1.0

Source: Current Population Survey Voting and Registration data, 1992-2002, unweighted.
Note: Boldface indicates a statistically significant difference between women and men within each year at the $p \leq .05$ level (1-sided test).

The 5.8-percentage-point gender gap in the 2000 general election could be explained by the fact that Hillary Clinton ran for senator in that election. In New York State, black voters made up 11 percent of the electorate, a 9 percent increase in 2000 over the previous federal election (Nagourney, 2000). New York State has the highest black population in the U.S., with females from this population constituting a disproportionately large number of its electorate. Any increase in minority turnout — not only Blacks— automatically leads to a more pronounced female-male participation gap because minority women make up a larger share of the minority electorate. Increased turnout among the minority electorate in neighborhoods in which Hillary Clinton was supported by a ratio of 9 or 10 to 1 did not only helped her win the race by a 12-point margin (Kaplan, 2000), but also led to a wider gender gap in turnout in 2000 than in any other election under consideration in this study.[3]

[3] My point here is not to argue that there was a "women's vote" in the 2000 senatorial election in New York, but simply to provide a possible explanation for the substantial gender gap in 2000.

When we change the definition of the potential electorate to include those who could become citizens, however, the pattern changes.[4] Table 1.4 shows that only in the 1994 and 1996 elections was the gender gap among this most inclusive population not statistically significant.

Table 1.4: Reported Voting Rate among Citizen- and Citizenship-Eligible VAP by Gender in New York City, 1992–2002*

	1992 (Pres.)	1994 (Mid-term)	1996 (Pres.)	1998 (Mid-term)	2000 (Pres.)	2002 (Mid-term)
Women	**44.1**	28.6	41.8	**35.4**	**44.3**	**31.3**
Men	**40.9**	27.1	38.7	**31.9**	**38.4**	**28.9**
Gap	**3.2**	1.5	3.1	**3.5**	**5.9**	**2.4**

Source: Current Population Survey Voting and Registration data, 1992–2002, unweighted.
*Denominator is citizen voting age population (CVAP) and non-citizen VAP with 5+ years residency, except 1992, which includes all the voting age population —CPS began collecting data on nativity status in 1994.
Note: Boldface indicates a statistically significant difference between women and men within each year at the $p \leq .05$ level (1-sided test).

Once the act of registration is accomplished, the impact of many traditional predictors of turnout, including gender, diminishes (Highton, 1997; Squire, Wolfinger, and Glass, 1987), which may explain the fact that there appears to be no gender participation gap when turnout is measured as percent of those reporting themselves to be registered (Table 1.2). Measuring voting turnout as percent of all citizenry those who are voting eligible — as an alternative to measuring it as percent of electorate —those who are registered to vote— is a conventional approach in studies of electoral politics. Among

[4] Immigrants who want to apply for citizenship must reside in the U.S. for at least five years, as this is the minimum required length of residency. Those voting-age immigrants who reported being in the U.S. for at least five years and reported not being a U.S. citizen make up the citizenship-eligible voting age population (CEVAP).

the citizenry, non-voting, in practice, involves two groups: both the registered who would not vote and those who did not register to vote. As for the foreign-born, the act of non-voting involves an additional group: non-citizens. I would argue that we need to include the non-citizen immigrants who may be eligible for citizenship in the analysis of electoral participation in order to see the full picture of the difference, whether gendered or not, between voting and non-voting immigrants (see Figure 1.1). Chapter 2 will discuss the rationale for this unconventional conceptual approach in detail.

Employing the most inclusive definition of the potential electorate as the denominator, an analysis of gender and voting by race/ethnicity and nativity in the two presidential and midterm elections between 1996–2002, however, shows that the role of gender in voting varies across groups. Table 1.5 shows voting rates for men and women for the native-born Whites, native-born non-Whites and foreign-born groups separately.

Table 1.5: Reported Voting Rate among Citizen- and Citizenship-Eligible VAP by Race/Ethnicity and Nativity Status in New York City

	1996	1998	2000	2002
Native-born White[a]				
Female	64.2	58.8	74.9	53.9
Male	70.2	56.5	70.1	52
Gap	-6*	2.3	4.8	1.9
Native-born non-White				
Female	55.8	54.6	68.9	44.7
Male	50.0	43	56.6	38.3
Gap	5.8	11.6**	12.3***	6.4*
Foreign-born				
Female	32.7	22.3	33	21.5
Male	22.9	21.4	28.2	23.6
Gap	9.8***	0.9	4.8*	-2.1

Source: Current Population Survey Voting and Registration data, 1992-2002, unweighted.
***p< .01 level (1-sided test), **p< .05 level (1-sided test), *p< .1 level (1-sided test).
a. Whites of non-Hispanic origin.
Note: For the native-born samples the denominator is the citizen voting age population whereas for the foreign-born sample it is citizen and citizenship-eligible voting age population.

Among the native-born Whites, the only statistically significant gender participation gap is observed in the 1996 presidential election, with men voting at a rate 6 percentage-points higher than their female counterparts. The results for the other elections show no significant gender gap for this group. The results for the native-born non-White category point to a persistent gender gap, with women voting at higher rates than their male counterparts in all four elections (only in the 1996 presidential election the difference is statistically significant). As for the foreign-born, the gender gap follows a different pattern from that of both native-born Whites and native-born non-Whites, with statistically significant gender gap only in the two presidential elections in 1996 and 2000.

A quick look at the New American Exit Poll (NAEP) data for the 2000, 2002, and 2004 federal elections also suggests that foreign-born women were more interested in the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections than in the 2002 mid-term election. Table 1.6 shows the percent female vote by the three groups.

Table 1.6: Percent Female Vote in NAEP Sites by Race/Ethnicity and Nativity Status

	2000	**2002**	**2004**
Native-born White	52.0	53.2	52.2
Native-born Non-White	**60.3**	**57.9**	**58.9**
Foreign-born (Puerto Ricans omitted)	**56.8**	51.1	**57.7**
Total	56.2	53.5	56.4

Source: NAEP 2000–2004, unweighted.
Bold face indicates the percentage differences are statistically significant at $p < .05$. The significance testing is based on chi-square test.

Although these are exit poll data, they are consistent with the finding from the

CPS data showing varying patterns of the role of gender in voting turnout among these groups. Table 1.6 indicates that, of the foreign-born voters in the 2000 and 2004 NAEP data, 56.8 and 57.7 percent, respectively, were women, whereas 51.1 percent of the foreign-born voters were women in 2002. The figure 'total' indicates that, of all the respondents in the 2000, 2002, and 2004 samples, 56.2, 53.5, and 56.4 percent were female, respectively. As for the native-born non-White voters, women persistently make up the larger share of the native-born non-White voters, a finding, again, consistent with the CPS data. As for the native-born White, NAEP data shows there is no significant gender difference for the three election years.

Gender Gap in "Context:" Evidence from the 2000 Voter Registration and Turnout File

According to 2000 Census figures, 54 percent of the overall VAP in New York City are women — 3.3 million out of 6.1 million. They constitute 55 percent of the CVAP — 2.6 million out of 4.7 million. According to 2000 New York City's Board of Elections voter registration and turnout data, 57 percent of the registered voters are women. The finding that women account for 59 percent of the people actually casting votes in the 2000 presidential election in New York City is also striking: 497,370 more females than males cast ballots in the city's 5,782 election districts, a figure of considerable magnitude.

The task here is to establish whether there is a spatial dimension to the participation patterns of female and male voters. Considering the fact that New York City's female population is larger than its male population for almost all adult-age groups, and that there are more elderly women than men (and the elderly are more likely

to vote than the young), the 497,370 difference in female-male vote would be "as expected," with no specific spatial dimension to it. However, Map 1.1 shows that there is a clear spatial pattern to the voting distribution by gender (see Map 1.1).

The minority and immigrant-receiving election districts of the city have between 150 and 200 female voters for every 100 male voters. Quite a few election districts have more than 200 females vote for every 100 male votes. In the immigrant-receiving and minority areas, women voted at higher rates than men in the 2000 presidential election. However, any conclusion without controlling the share of the female votes to the share of the female voting-age population would be misleading given that the ratio of female to male population in minority and immigrant-receiving areas tends to be higher than it is in the rest of the neighborhoods in the city. Map 1.2 shows the distribution of voting-age population —people at age 18 or older— by gender, regardless of citizenship status (see Map 1.2).

There is a clear spatial pattern to this distribution. The areas with disproportionate shares of female voting-age population are the immigrant-receiving and minority neighborhoods. In order to "correct" for this demographic fact,[5] I developed two different voting indices: I first divided the percent share of the female vote in each election district by the percent share of the female voting-age population in the same election district. The simple formula below, resembling the Location Quotient (LQ) measure,[6] would control the share of the female vote for the share of the female voting age population within the same election district:

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[5]I would like to thank Professor Arthur Getis at UCSD for bringing the LQ approach to my attention.

[6] The location quotient (LQ) is an index for comparing an area's share of a particular activity with the area's share of some aggregate phenomenon.

$$\text{Voting Index}_1 = \frac{\text{Female Vote/Total Vote}}{\text{Female VAP/Total VAP}}$$

When the Voting Index equals to 1, the share of the female voters is the same as the share of the female voting-age population in any given election district. When it is greater than 1, it shows areas where female voters turned out to vote at higher rates than their share of the adult population within the same election district. Map 1.3 shows the results for the Voting Index 1. As expected, the pattern is less pronounced than that in Map 1.1 (see Map 1.3).

Areas in blue represent voting indices greater than 1.1, a figure chosen as an arbitrary standard for overrepresentation. Using this figure, Map 1.3 shows where the share of the female vote is at least 10 percent greater than the female share in the voting-age population in the same election district. The evidence still suggests that females are voting at higher rates in minority and immigrant-receiving areas.

The second "voting index" is based on a more conservative measure, where the share of the female voters is divided by their share in the electorate:

$$\text{Voting Index}_2 = \frac{\text{Female Vote/Total Vote}}{\text{Female Electorate/Total Electorate}}$$

This voting index would show if gendered participation would still hold among the registered voters. In the 2000 election, the female voter turnout rate was 5-percentage points higher than the male voter turnout rate (64 percent vs. 59 percent). However, considering that, according to the voter registration file, female registered voters make up

63 percent of the electorate, this would not be surprising. The findings from Map 1.1 and Map 1.3 were, perhaps, the result of the simple fact that the female share in the electorate in certain immigrant and minority election districts is disproportionately higher than in other election districts. Map 1.4 presents the result of Voting Index 2, showing that immigrant and minority areas with a heavy presence of Black and Hispanic populations is where the female electorate vote at substantially higher rates than do men (see Map 1.4). It appears that there is still a pattern, although a much less pronounced one, to female-male voting, even when employing the most conservative approach. As for the immigrant neighborhoods with large numbers of Asian immigrants such as Flushing and Chinatown, there appears to be no or little variation in turnout among the female and male electorate. A close look at Map 1.1 and Map 1.3 would also reveal that these areas are gender-neutral areas in terms of voting outcomes.

The exploratory spatial data analysis clearly shows that the women's vote is substantially overrepresented in the city's Black and Hispanic areas, where one of the groups are either the majority or both are present in more or less equal percentages.

The New York City Board of Elections voter registration file does not contain information by race/ethnicity. Since Blacks do not have distinct surnames, this dissertation project will focus on the relationship between Hispanic female/male turnout and context given that Hispanic registered voters in the official voter registration file has been identified through Hispanic surname analysis. Mapping the voting indices for the Hispanic voters may not be desirable because their distribution across election districts is nonnormal. The voter registration file indicates that two-thirds of Hispanic voters live in about one-third of the city's election districts —their numbers are less than 100 in 3,729

election districts out of 5,782, so employing the voting indices for an all-Hispanic sample may not work as well. The Hispanic sample makes up about 18 percent of the voter registration file. Hispanic females make up 57.5 percent of the all-Hispanic sample, and they constitute 60.4 percent of the Hispanic electorate who turned out to vote in the 2000 presidential election. In Chapter 4, I will systematically examine if this Hispanic gender gap varies across election districts.

Gender Gap in Voting Choices: Evidence from the NAEP Survey

Finally, the bivariate analyses of the NAEP data show that regardless of nativity status, women in New York City voted for Gore in 2000 at a higher rate than did men. Table 1.7 presents the distribution of voting for Gore by gender and nativity status. The differences of 7.4 and 4.3 percentage-points in voting for Gore between men and women for the native-born and foreign-born samples, respectively, are statistically significant at .01 level. Chapter 5 will focus on explaining this gender gap.

Table 1.7: Percent Voted for Gore in 2000 Presidential Election			
	Male	**Female**	**Difference**
Overall Sample	74.9 (N=2,056)	81.4 (N=2,817)	6.5***
Native-born subsample	72.0 (N=1,229)	79.4 (N=1,657)	7.4***
Foreign-born subsample	79.8 (N=801)	84.1 (N=1,102)	4.3***
Source: NAEP 2000-2004. *** p<.01 (1-sided t-test).			

Outline of the Study

Chapter 2 presents the data sources and methodology used in this study in detail. Chapter 3 systematically examines if gender has a significant impact on voting, employing multivariate logistic regression models for the native-born and foreign-born samples separately, using the combined CPS 1996–2002 registration and voting data. Possible explanations for the gender effect will be explored employing various interaction terms. The literature on the gender gap in American politics will guide the selection and construction of the variables and interaction terms. In addition to these variables, I will introduce immigrant-specific variables to the models, guided by the literature on the immigrant political incorporation to explain the relationship between gender and voting for the foreign-born sample.

Employing a multilevel approach, Chapter 4 systematically examines the relationship between female-male voting and neighborhood characteristics, first for the overall sample and then for the Hispanic electorate, using data from the New York City Board of Elections turnout data for the 2000 presidential election and contextual data from the 2000 Census data.

Chapter 5 focuses on the relationship between gender and voting preferences.

Using the NAEP survey data, it will test the validity of the "political autonomy" hypothesis developed by Susan Carroll (1988) for the city's foreign-born and native-born voters in the 2000 presidential election. According to this argument, the gender gap in voting choices and preferences is a function of women's political autonomy status from men. Finally, Chapter 6, the concluding chapter, will discuss the implications of the findings within the broader context of gender politics, electoral politics, and immigrant political incorporation, and offer directions for future research.

Map 1.1: The Number of Female Voters per 100 Male Voters in the 2000 Presidential Election



Map 1.2: The Number of Female Voting Age Population (VAP) over 100 Male VAP



Map 1.3: The Share of Female Voters over the Share of Female VAP, 2000 Presidential Election



Map 1.4: The Share of Female Voters over the Share of Female Electorate, 2000 Presidential Election



Chapter 2

Data and Methods

This dissertation project relies on the Current Population Survey November Voter Supplements (1992–2002), the New York City Board of Elections 2000 voter registration and turnout file, 2000 U.S. Census Summary File 3 data, and the New American Exit Poll data (2000–2004).

The Current Population Survey

The Current Population Survey Voter Supplement (CPS) is one of the primary data sets for this project. It is a national survey administered jointly by the U.S. Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics and is conducted monthly, primarily to collect information on labor-force participation. The CPS is a multistage stratified probability sample of a little over 50,000 housing units from 792 sample areas. The first stage of the sample takes place by dividing the Unites States into primary sampling units, or PSUs, comprised of a single metropolitan area, a county, or a group of small counties. A sampling of housing units is then drawn from each PSU. Individuals within each household are selected to represent the civilian noninstitutional population, 16 years of age and older. Each household is surveyed for four years in a row, cycled out, and then brought back into the survey sample eight months later to be interviewed for another four months in a row, before being discarded. Although the data were designed to be used as cross-sectional, it ideally consists of repeated cases.[1]

[1] I computed a unique ID based on the year, household ID, and person number in household, to examine the possible repeated cases in the combined CPS 1996–2002 November supplement. Based on this new ID variable, and on information from the age and sex variables, there appear to be 1,344 overlapping cases for the whole data at the national level. Of all these, only 25 are in New York City.

The survey also includes supplements in specific months in certain years. This dissertation uses the November supplement that is added to the CPS in every federal election year, entitled "Voting and Registration Supplement." The question about the respondent's voting status will be the dependent variable in multivariate logistic regression models in Chapter 3. The survey includes many important individual- and household-level characteristics, such as age, gender, race, education, income, marital status, household type, and children present in the household. However, what is unique about the CPS data compared to other nationally administered data sets is that it includes information on the nativity and citizenship status of respondents. Knowledge of immigrant respondents' country of birth and year of entry into the U.S. allows us to construct immigrant-specific variables.

As is the case with most survey data, there are limitations to using the CPS data for explaining electoral participation. For example, though the sample is carefully developed and the demographic information is excellent, the November Voting and Registration Supplement measures only voting and registration status. It does not contain information on individuals' party identification and voting preferences nor does it include other forms of political participation, such as signing petitions, or membership in political organizations in which both citizens and non-citizens can be involved. The degree of such involvement or non-involvement also informs us about the level of immigrant political incorporation. Another limitation of the CPS data is that it does not include any measures of attitudinal, associational, and contextual factors at the local level, all of which are hypothesized to have an effect on voting (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993). Despite these limitations,

the CPS data provide the best empirical basis for determining the extent to which gender-specific differences have emerged in immigrant political participation in New York City and will provide useful, if partial, explanations.[2]

Finally, the CPS data rely on self-reported measures of registration and voting status that are not validated. Although earlier studies (Presser et al. 1990) based on the CPS data suggest over-reporting of voting status, the data in general, and for the New York City sample in particular provide us with reasonable voting patterns. Electoral data from the CPS data will be compared with the actual voting results using official voter list and turnout data for the 2000 election.

The Sample

The overall New York City sample for multivariate logistic regression analysis is drawn from the 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002 CPS November Supplement data.[3] It consists of 12,737 cases, which is about 2.5 percent of the overall CPS 1996–2002 population. Of these, 9,530 make up the voting-age population. Table 2.1 presents a comparison of the sample and 2000 Census totals (see Table 2.1).

When native American Indians, Island-born Puerto Ricans,[4] respondents born abroad to American parents, immigrants residing in the U.S. for less than eight years, and respondents with missing data concerning their time of residence in the U.S., their

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2 See Karthrick Ramakrishnan's study (2005) on the use of CPS data for examining immigrant political participation in the United States.

3 I have pooled the four CPS data sets to increase overall sample size, which improves statistical reliability. Each wave of the survey contributes approximately one-quarter of the cases to the combined sample.

4 Island-born Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens at birth, and therefore are not identified as an immigrant group and are omitted from analysis.

citizenship, or their registration and voting status are omitted, the data consist of 6,891 cases.

Group I: "Foreign-Born"

To be included in this subsample, respondents can be either naturalized or not naturalized but must have been in the U.S. for 8 or more years — the length of residency usually required for completing the application process and gaining U.S. citizenship (Bernstein, 2004). The individuals also must have answered the CPS questions on citizenship, registration, and voting.

Group II: "Native-Born Non-Whites"

Group II includes respondents of Black, Asian, or Hispanic origin, born in the U.S. All the individuals in this sample must have answered the CPS questions on nativity, registration, and voting.

Group III: "Native-Born Non- Hispanic Whites"

Group III includes native-born non-Hispanic white voting age population. All the individuals in this sample must have answered the CPS questions on nativity, registration, and voting. Table 2.2 provides descriptive statistics of independent variables for each group (see Table 2.2).

Methodology

In order to estimate the differential effects of gender on the propensity to vote, I will use binomial logistic regression models. Binomial logistic regression is a form of regression used when the dependent variable is dichotomous and the independent variables are of

any type (DeMaris, 1992; Jaccard, 2001; Menard, 2002; Pampel, 2000). For the purposes of my research question, this is the most appropriate model: my dependent variable is a dichotomous variable ―voting― and the independent variables are both categorical and continuous (see the construction of CPS variables in Appendix 2.1). With this method, the equation will rank the relative importance of the independent variables and assess interaction effects. Since I will be employing a logistic regression model, I will take the logit form of the probability, which will correct for nonlinearity in the relationship between my dependent variable and the independent variables (Menard, 2002).

New York City Board of Elections 2000 Voter Registration Data and 2000 U.S. Census SF 3 File

The analysis examining the relationship between female-male turnout and contextual factors relies on two data sets: the first one is the individual-level New York City Board of Elections voter registration and turnout data file for the 2000 presidential election. Using a scanning system, the New York City Board of Elections loads the actual vote counts for the general elections into its voter registration database. There is one voting roll book for each election district, signed by the voters before they cast their votes. After these books are scanned, the vote count (turnout) is entered into the voter registration data file, which has information on party identification, absentee ballots, year of birth, and gender. The second data source is the contextual-level 2000 Census SF 3 data, containing demographic data for the 5,782 election districts.[5]

The voter registration file also has information on party identification, year of

[5] Using a population allocation procedure in SPSS, the original census demographic data that contain information for 2,217 census-tract boundaries has been allocated to the 5,782 election districts. Both the political data and census data have been collected and constructed by Professor John Mollenkopf.

birth, and gender. In addition, using the complete data, a surname analysis was conducted in order to identify those registered voters who are believed to be of Hispanic-origin. This technique involves a few caveats: first, this is not a self-identification process: for example, some Dominicans and Mexicans may identify themselves as "White" rather than "Hispanic." Second, through intermarriage or adoption, a non-Hispanic person may take a Hispanic surname, or vice versa. The second data set is aggregate-level 2000 Census Summary File 3 data containing socioeconomic and demographic information for the city's 5,782 election districts.[6]

One of the strengths of the city's official voter registration file is that the figures are not self-reports, as in the CPS data, but the actual participation records of registered voters. In addition, because the data set encompasses the entire universe, not just a sample, there is more than a sufficient number of cases to provide meaningful context-specific estimates of turnout by gender. There are also some limitations to using this voter registration data to study voting behavior. First, the records provide a limited number of individual characteristics: age, sex, party registration, and year of registration. Unfortunately such key items as income, education level, and issue attitudes are lacking.

The second limitation of the data is its level of accuracy. A close examination of the data and anecdotal evidence reveal that people who move away or die are not removed from the rolls in a timely and systematic fashion. Unfortunately, a complete validation of the official voter registration database would be highly costly, although not impossible to obtain. A validation of the database, however, can be done for randomly selected small samples from the file. Scholars who study voting behavior have addressed

[6] The data for 512 election districts were omitted because the total vote counts in these districts were less than 100.

the validity issue regarding survey and official registration databases with serious limitations in scope and context (see McDonald, 2006).

The Overall Sample and the Hispanic Sample

The voter registration and turnout file includes information on 3,526,797 registered voters in the 2000 presidential election, living in the 5,782 election districts in the city. The Hispanic sample makes up about 18 percent of the voter registration file (N=625,536). Hispanic females make up 57.5 percent of the all-Hispanic sample (N=374,051), and they constitute 60.4 percent of the Hispanic electorate who turned out to vote in the 2000 presidential election. Table 2.3 provides descriptive statistics of both the overall and Hispanic samples (see Table 2.3).

Methodology

Utilizing the Hierarchical Generalized Linear Model (HGLM), the version of the traditional Hierarchical Linear Model (HLM) for nonlinear outcomes, I investigate the contextual variation in average turnout rate for the Hispanic female and male registered voters in the 2000 presidential election. Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) is a procedure for examining data providing information at two or more levels of analysis (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). Level I variables are observed at the individual level and level-two variables are observed at the contextual level in which the individual observations are nested. In a traditional HLM, the expected outcome is modeled as a linear function of the regression coefficients. Since my dependent variable is binary with only two possible outcomes (1=voted, 0=not voted), I use a Hierarchical Generalized

Linear Model (HGLM), suitable for non-linear outcomes. I chose the Bernoulli (binary) sampling model because the dependent variable is binary.

The Level I independent variables come from the voter registration file: age, sex, and party ID. These variables and model equations will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4. The contextual-level independent variables are developed guided by previous studies of the neighborhood effects on political participation, which will be reviewed in detail again in Chapter 4. These theoretically relevant measures are: population density (logged), percent citizen voting-age population, percent people at age 65 or over, percent in poverty, Black election districts (EDs), Hispanic EDs, Asian EDs, Mixed-minority EDs, and White-majority EDs (see Table 2.5 for descriptive statistics of these variables).

The construction of five mutually exclusive racially/ethnically distinct election districts is based on Exploratory Data Analysis (ESDA) techniques, using ArcView3.2 and SpaceStat software programs. The strength of this ESDA technique over thematic mapping or over traditional exploratory statistical techniques is that it provides an objective assessment of clustering of EDs with standard geo-statistical procedures (see Anselin, 1995). Map 2.1 displays these five racially/ethnically distinct EDs (see Map 2.1; also see Appendix 2 for details of the ESDA procedures to construct these distinct locations).

Table 2.4 presents descriptive statistics of selected socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of these five racially/ethnically distinct EDs, including the Level II independent variables introduced in the hierarchical general linear models (see Table 2.4).

The New American Exit Poll Data

The final data source for this study comes from the New American Exit Poll data (NAEP) for 2000, 2002, and 2004, undertaken by Professor Lorraine Minnite of Columbia University, in cooperation with the New York Immigration Coalition.[7] Designed to mirror the standard exit polls conducted by the major news media, the NAEP collects information on immigrant voters. The respondents were drawn from voters leaving polls in a sample of 32 polling places stratified to capture the top half of the distribution in terms of the presence of immigrants in election districts in New York City. Figure 2.1 and Map 2.2 present the list and locations of these polling sites, respectively (see Figure 2.1 and Map 2.2).

The NAEP data contain information on gender, race, nativity status, marital status, education, employment status, presence of children, and length of stay in the U.S., as well as on attitudes about issue importance, partisan affiliation, source of news, contact by others about voting, and group membership, for 7,962 voters leaving the polls. Their collection method was not as rigorous as that of the CPS, and they sampled relatively concentrated immigrant areas, but they do provide otherwise unobtainable voting choice and attitudinal data on immigrant voting behavior.

Before the sample is outlined in detail in the next section, it is important to note that using a New York City sample to analyze voting behavior in a presidential election may arguably have serious limitations. These limitations are discussed in detail in Chapter 5.

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[7] I am grateful to Professor Lorraine Minnite for letting me use this data for my dissertation project.

The Sample

The combined NAEP sample constructed for analysis includes 7,138 cases that have valid answers to the survey questions on gender, nativity status, education, employment status, marital status, and voting for presidential candidate in the 2000 election. Omitted cases due to missing data make up 9 percent of the data (N=718). The foreign-born respondents make up 39.6 percent of the sample (N=2,827). The native-born respondents make up 60.4 percent of the NAEP data (N=4,311). Of these, 32.4 percent are born to parents born abroad and 55.1 percent born to parents born in the U.S.; 12.5 percent are born to one parent born in the U.S. and one parent born abroad. Table 2.5 presents the demographic and SES figures of this sample by nativity status (see Table 2.5).

Method

Using this data, I will test Susan Carroll's (1988) "autonomy" hypothesis for the native-born and foreign-born samples separately. According to Carroll's argument, the gender gap in voting choices and preferences is a function of women's political autonomy status. Following her methodology, I constructed subgroups of women with varying degrees of political autonomy, based on their employment status, educational attainment, and marital status. The details of the constructions of the 'political autonomy' measure will be discussed in Chapter 5. The hypothesis testing will be done by simply examining the percentage-point differences in voting between female and male voters for Al Gore in the 2000 presidential election. Appendix 2F lists the questions from the NAEP survey that are utilized in this study.

Table 2.1: Comparison of Selected Demographic Characteristics from the CPS 1996–2002 Sample and Total Populations for the U.S. and New York City

	The United States		New York City	
	CPS Sample	**Census Total**	**CPS Sample**	**Census Total**
Population	512,597	281,421,906	12,737	8,004,759
%				
Female	265,170	143,368,343	6,774	4,222,238
%	51.7	50.9	53.2	52.7
Male	247,427	138,053,563	5,963	3,782,521
%	48.3	49.1	46.8	47.3
Voting age pop. (VAP)	375,812	209,128,094	9,530	6,081,758
%	73.3	74.3	74.8	76
Female VAP	198,191	108,133,727	5,200	3,281,239
%	38.6	38.4	40.8	41
Male VAP	84,574	100,994,367	4,330	2,800,519
%	34.5	35.9	33.9	35
White	382,497	211,460,626	4,904	2,923,827
%	74.6	75.1	38.5	36.5
Black	52,811	34,658,190	3,109	2,047,795
%	10.3	12.3	24.4	25.6
Asian	20,033	10,242,998	1,377	853,873
%	3.9	3.6	10.8	10.6
Hispanic	50,508	35,305,818	3,312	2,150,965
%	9.9	12.5	26	26.8
Native-born	465,760	250,314,017	8,159	5,133,624
%	90.9	88.9	64.1	64.1
Foreign-born	46,837	31,107,889	4,578	2,871,135
%	9.1	11.1	35.9	35.9
Entered after 1990	20,021	13,178,276	1,849	1,295,667
%	3.9	4.7	14.5	16.2

Source: CPS Voter Supplement 1996–2002 (unweighted), Census 2000 Summary File 3 (SF 3) for the U.S. totals, Census 2000 PUMS 5 Percent File for the New York City totals.
Note: I have also run the descriptive statistics with weighted data using the "PWCMPWGT" variable, an individual person's composite final weight. Weighted and unweighted percentages are quite similar to each other.

Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables

	Group I Foreign-born (N=2,967)	Group II Native-born Non-White (N=1,764)	Group III Native-born White (N=2,484)
% Age 30–39	24.2	21.3	18.8
% Age 40–49	23.2	16.5	18.2
% Age 50–59	15.7	10.7	13.2
% Age 60–69	11.1	7.9	11
% Age 70+	12	8	19.4
% Female	55.1	58.3	53.1
% Unmarried	43.5	75.2	54.2
% Children 0–6	19.5	28.9	11.7
% Children 6–18	28.2	17	12.8
% Employed	63	57.4	62.2
% Poverty	20.8	26.8	7.9
% NH Black	20.9	NA	NA
% Hispanic	29.7	30	NA
% NH Asian	21.7	4.2	
% Less than high school	31.8	26.9	9.9
% More than high school	37.6	41.9	63.8
% Residing 5+ years	53.1	58.6	64.5
% in US between 8 & 15 years	27.9	NA	NA
% in US between 15 & 30 years	42.3	NA	NA
% Male-sending countries	7.9	NA	NA
% Female-sending countries	35.9	NA	NA
% Gender-neutral countries	56.3	NA	NA
% Distance 2000	28.3	NA	NA
Mean Labor force sex-parity Index	.659	NA	NA
Mean civil rights index	3.34	NA	NA

Source: CPS Registration and Voting data, 1996-2002, unweighted

Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics of Level I and Level II Variables Introduced in HGLM

LEVEL-1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS – OVERALL SAMPLE

VARIABLE NAME	N	MEAN	SD	MINIMUM	MAXIMUM
DEM	3526797	0.68	0.47	0.00	1.00
REP	3526797	0.13	0.33	0.00	1.00
FEM	3526797	0.57	0.50	0.00	1.00
VOTE00	3526797	0.63	0.48	0.00	1.00
AGE1829	3526797	0.16	0.36	0.00	1.00
AGE3039	3526797	0.22	0.41	0.00	1.00
AGE4049	3526797	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00
AGE5064	3526797	0.23	0.42	0.00	1.00
AGE64PL	3526797	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00

LEVEL-1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS – HISPANIC SAMPLE

VARIABLE NAME	N	MEAN	SD	MINIMUM	MAXIMUM
DEM	652536	0.74	0.44	0.00	1.00
REP	652536	0.08	0.28	0.00	1.00
FEM	652536	0.58	0.49	0.00	1.00
VOTE00	652536	0.54	0.50	0.00	1.00
AGE1829	652536	0.19	0.39	0.00	1.00
AGE3039	652536	0.24	0.43	0.00	1.00
AGE4049	652536	0.21	0.41	0.00	1.00
AGE5064	652536	0.22	0.42	0.00	1.00

LEVEL-2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

VARIABLE NAME	N	MEAN	SD	MINIMUM	MAXIMUM
PPOVERTY	5251	20.25	13.70	0.64	65.05
PELDER	5251	12.36	5.96	0.00	93.63
PCVAP	5251	62.94	11.60	28.97	96.41
LNDENSIT	5251	10.73	0.94	6.08	13.58
BLACK	5251	0.20	0.40	0.00	1.00
ASIAN	5251	0.12	0.32	0.00	1.00
HISP	5251	0.19	0.39	0.00	1.00
MIX	5251	0.19	0.39	0.00	1.00

Table 2.4: Selected Characteristics of New York City's Racial/Ethnic Neighborhoods

	Hispanic EDs (N = 1,007)					Black EDs (N=1,035)					Asian EDs (N=633)				
	Mean	S.D.	Lower Quartile	Median	Upper Quartile	Mean	S.D.	Lower Quartile	Median	Upper Quartile	Mean	S.D.	Lower Quartile	Median	Upper Quartile
Demographic characteristics															
% NH White VAP	13.6	17.3	1.8	5.8	19.3	6.3	10.9	0.7	1.7	5.9	49.3	23.5	28.6	56.3	68.1
% NH Black VAP	17.7	15.1	3.8	14.1	28.2	75	16.1	65.2	79.4	88	2.7	4.6	0.3	1	2.8
% NH Asian VAP	5.7	7.3	0.7	2.7	7.9	1.6	2.6	0.3	0.7	1.8	31.7	17.6	18.9	27.2	41.1
% Hispanic VAP	59.7	17.5	49.2	60.5	72.1	13.5	10.9	5.4	9.5	18.7	12.5	9.1	5.9	9.5	16.4
% Female	52.3	3	50.6	52.4	54	55.6	2.9	54	55.6	57.1	51.5	2.5	50.3	51.6	52.9
% 65 and over*	8.5	3.3	6.1	8.1	10.3	10.1	3.9	7.5	9.4	11.9	15.2	4.6	12.1	15.4	17.8
% Foreign-born	38.1	15.3	26.7	37.1	47.8	31.8	14.4	19.5	30.7	43.7	50.1	13.7	41.2	50.2	60.1
% CVAP*	52.8	8.1	47.2	52.3	57.6	60.6	7.3	55.7	59.9	64.9	58.7	10.3	50.8	59.4	66.2
% with 5+ residency	54.8	6.6	50.7	54.8	58.8	60.4	7.2	55.2	60.3	64.8	58.4	7.1	54.2	58.3	62.8
% Linguistically isolated	23.9	8.7	18	24.1	29.3	6.6	4.9	2.9	5.6	8.7	22.9	12.1	13.1	22.6	30.6
SES characteristics															
% Home owner	15.7	13.9	4.7	11.1	23.5	30.5	24.7	9.8	23.1	50.9	40.8	21.7	25.4	36.6	56.7
% With BA or more	11.9	8.8	19.1	9.2	15.3	14.3	8.7	8.5	13.1	18.2	27.6	12.2	6.2	25.2	34.3
% In poverty*	31.6	11.9	22.1	30.6	41	25.6	13.8	14.1	24.5	34.3	15.7	8.6	8.3	15.5	20.8
Gender-specific characteristics															
% Female employed	38.9	7.9	33.7	39	44.1	46.6	10.3	39.9	47.5	54.6	45.7	6.5	41.5	46.2	49.9
% Female-headed household	29.1	10.6	20.1	29.4	37.3	32.1	9.2	25.7	31.4	37.3	11.4	4.2	8.8	10.7	13.4
% Female-headed household with children	18.4	8.4	11.5	18.8	24.3	18.3	7.5	12.7	17	22.9	4.3	2.5	2.7	3.8	5.5

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 Summary File 1 and 3.

* Variables introduced in HGLM Models.

Table 2.4: Selected Characteristics of New York City's Racial and Ethnic Neighborhoods (cont.)

	Mixed-Minority EDs (N=1,025)					White-Majority EDs (N=1,577)					New York City (N=5,267)				
	Mean	S.D.	Lower Quartile	Median	Upper Quartile	Mean	S.D.	Lower Quartile	Median	Upper Quartile	Mean	S.D.	Lower Quartile	Median	Upper Quartile
Demographic characteristics															
% NH White VAP	31.6	21.6	10.1	34.1	51.9	82.9	8.3	76.5	83.9	89.8	40.7	34.5	3.8	37	75.3
% NH Black VAP	24.7	21.2	6.3	18.5	41.2	2.2	2.8	0.4	1.2	2.9	23.8	29.9	1.2	6.7	41.6
% NH Asian VAP	9.1	8.5	2.1	6.5	14.4	5.9	4.4	2.8	4.9	7.9	8.7	12.1	1.1	4.2	11.2
% Hispanic VAP	29.6	15.7	18.5	25.9	38.6	7	4.6	3.8	5.7	9	23.4	22.8	5.9	13.5	34.6
% Female	52.8	4.1	50.7	52.8	55.4	52.6	3.1	50.9	52.4	54.3	53	3.5	51	52.9	55.2
% 65 and over*	11.7	5.1	8.1	10.7	14.7	15.6	7.1	10.9	14.5	18.7	12.4	6	8.1	11.1	15.6
% Foreign-born	32.5	15.2	19.7	29.8	44	24.6	12.6	16.4	21.1	30	33.2	16.2	20	30.1	44.8
% CVAP*	62.4	10.1	54.8	61.8	69.9	73.1	9.3	69.1	74.9	79.7	63	11.6	54	62.1	72.4
% with 5+ residency	56.6	9.1	51.7	56.6	62.5	58	9.6	51.3	59.1	64.6	57.6	8.5	52.4	57.5	63.2
% Linguistically isolated	14.8	9.1	7.9	12.6	20.6	8.5	8.8	3.2	5	10.7	14	11.1	4.8	10.8	21.9
SES characteristics															
% Home owner	25.9	19.1	10.9	21.9	39	43.9	22.4	26.1	38.7	63.1	32.1	23.3	13.2	27	47
% With BA or more	24.5	16.9	11.1	20.4	33.3	43.3	23.5	22.6	35.4	69.6	26.1	20.6	11.1	19.7	33.3
% In poverty*	22.2	12.9	12.1	18.6	29.6	10.1	7.6	5.4	7.8	12.2	20.3	13.7	8.5	16.9	28.9
Gender-specific characteristics															
% Female employed	45.9	10.9	38.5	46.1	52.9	53.3	12.4	45.4	51.3	64.1	46.9	11.4	39.2	46.3	53.3
% Female-headed household	20.6	11.8	11.3	17.3	26.4	7.8	3.9	4.2	7.9	10.6	19.5	13	9.2	15.2	29.4
% Female-headed household with children	10.9	8.1	4.5	8.6	15.4	3.1	1.9	1.6	2.8	4	10.6	9.2	3.2	7	17

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 Summary File 1 and 3.

* Variables introduced in HGLM Models.

Table 2.5: Demographic & SES Characteristics by Nativity Status, NAEP 2000–2004				
	Foreign Born		**Native Born**	**Total Sample**
Survey Year		**Survey Year**		
Year 2000 (999)	35.3%	Year 2000 (1,475)	34.2	35.0
Year 2002 (910)	32.2	Year 2002 (1,368)	31.7	31.7
Year 2004 (918)	32.5	Year 2004 (1,468)	34.1	33.3
Female (1,593)	55.7	**Female** (2,384)	55.3	55.6
Married (1,176)	59.1	**Married** (2,726)	36.7	46.3
Race		**Race**		
White (640)	22.9	White (2,381)	55.7	42.1
Black (548)	19.7	Black (998)	23.7	22.2
Hispanic (970)	36.0	Hispanic (579)	13.9	23.0
Asian (425)	15.8	Asian (126)	3.0	8.3
Other (150)	5.6	Other (152)	3.7	4.5
Children under 18 (1,131)	41.0	**Children under 18** (1,211)	28.6	33.8
Work full-time (1,691)	58.9	**Work full-time** (2,894)	66.9	63.5
Education		**Education**		
Less than HS (342)	12.9	Less than HS (140)	3.3	7.4
HS Graduate (548)	20.1	HS Graduate (586)	13.7	16.5
Some College (604)	20.8	Some College (838)	19.9	20.2
College Graduate (987)	34.2	College Graduate (1,402)	32.1	32.9
Postgraduate (346)	12.0	Postgraduate (1,345)	31.0	23.0
Family Income		**Family Income**		
Less than $15,000 (613)	25.6	Less than $15,000 (323)	8.1	15.4
$15,000 – $29,999 (545)	21.2	$15,000 – $29,999 (578)	14.7	17.3
$30,000 – $49,999 (590)	22.7	$30,000 – $49,999 (1,002)	24.8	23.8
$50,000 – $74,999 (460)	17.2	$50,000 – $74,999 (924)	22.6	20.5
$75,000 – $99,999 (187)	6.8	$75,000 – $99,999 (469)	11.7	9.6
$100,000 or more (180)	6.6	$100,000 or more (737)	18.1	13.3
Party Identification		**Party Identification**		
Democrat (2,103)	75.7	Democrat (3,192)	74.8	75.3
Republican (304)	11.2	Republican (400)	9.2	10.0
Other Party (62)	2.1	Other Party (198)	4.5	3.5
No Party Registration (323)	11.0	No Party Registration (495)	11.5	11.2
Presidential Vote		**Presidential Vote**		
Al Gore (1,903)	82.5	Al Gore (2,886)	76.1	78.8
George Bush (362)	15.3	George Bush (574)	15.1	15.1
Someone Else (50)	2.2	Someone Else (333)	8.8	6.1
Region of Birth				
Caribbean (864)	35.2			
East Eu. & Former S.U. (316)	12.9			
East & South Asia (330)	13.5			
South & Central America (446)	18.2			
Western Europe (127)	5.2			
Muslim-majority countries (121)	4.9			
Other (51)	2.1			

Figure 2.1: List of the New American Exit Polling (NAEP) Sites

Site Number*	Borough	Address	Zipcode
1	Bronx	3710 BARNES AVENUE	10467
2	Bronx	725 BRADY AVENUE	10462
3	Bronx	1116 SHERIDAN AVENUE	10456
4	Brooklyn	7109 6 AVENUE	11209
5	Brooklyn	1031 59 STREET	11219
6	Brooklyn	202 AVENUE C	11218
7	Brooklyn	4801 AVENUE D	11203
8	Brooklyn	3300 CONEY ISLAND AVENUE	11235
9	Brooklyn	1023 NEW YORK AVENUE	11203
10	Manhattan	2580 AMSTERDAM AVENUE	10040
11	Manhattan	4600 BROADWAY	10040
12	Manhattan	166 ESSEX STREET	10002
13	Manhattan	234 WEST 109 STREET	10025
14	Queens	10412 SPRINGFIELD BOULEVARD	11429
15	Queens	8602 127 STREET	11418
16	Queens	2837 29 STREET	11102
17	Queens	8902 32 AVENUE	11369
19	Queens	17901 90 AVENUE	11432
20	Queens	5501 94 STREET	11373
21	Bronx	2049 BARTOW AVENUE	10475
22	Brooklyn	2310 GLENWOOD ROAD	11210
23	Brooklyn	6006 23 AVENUE	11204
24	Brooklyn	60th ST & 3 AV	11220
25	Bronx	3201 KINGSBRIDGE AVENUE	10463
26	Bronx	1400 NEEDHAM AVENUE	10469
27	Brooklyn	5010 6 AVENUE	11220
28	Manhattan	200 MADISON STREET	10002
29	Queens	144-80 BARCLAY AVENUE	11355
30	Queens	48-01 90 STREET	11373
31	Queens	42-00 72 STREET	11377
32	Queens	33-09 35 AVENUE	11106

Map 2.1: New York City's Racial and Ethnic Neighborhoods



Map 2.2: The New American Exit Polling (NAEP) Sites



Note: The NAEP site numbers in Figure 2.1 correspond to the site numbers in this map.

Chapter 3

Gender and Voting: An Analysis of 1996–2002 CPS Data

Studies of immigrant voting behavior based on the traditional SES models and immigrant-specific factors show that the effect of gender on voting is inconsistent in significance and direction. Although the variation in the role of gender warranted a closer examination, these studies did little to explain and theorize about immigrant gender roles in political participation. Gender is usually treated as one of the "control" variables, not as a central topic to the researcher. On the other hand, the few studies centered on gendered immigrant political participation relied on community-based, qualitative data, focusing on informal political participation. The goals of this chapter are: 1) to systematically examine the role of gender in voting by foreign-born voters in New York City; 2) to quantitatively test for the hypotheses developed by the previous qualitative research; and 3) to compare the voting outcomes of foreign-born voters with those of native-born voters and explore to what extent gender may predict propensity to vote for both groups.

Previous Research

Due to the availability of data in recent years, there have been a growing number of quantitatively oriented studies focusing on immigrant and minority voting behavior. These studies are largely undertaken to examine whether or not the traditional individual-level demographic and SES theories established for the overall population by earlier research would also account for immigrant political participation. These studies also explore politically relevant country-of-origin variables (Bass and Casper, 2001; DeSipio,

1996b; Jones-Correa, 2001; Lien, 1998; Ramakrishnan, 2005; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001; Tam Cho, 1999). Most of these studies focused on comparing the effects of such key individual-level variables as age, education, and income on immigrants' voting behavior to those of the overall population, raising questions about the explanatory power of SES variables and the consistency of their relationship to minority and immigrant voting. For example, a few studies have shown that the effect of education was weak or inconsistent in significance and direction (Arvizu and Garcia, 1996; Lien, 1994; Ramakrishnan and Espenshade, 2001). Age does not always predict the likelihood of voting (Tate, 1991) and may be negatively associated with immigrant voting (Tam Cho, 1999). Similarly, studies of Asian American and Latino groups reveal insignificant relationships between income and voting (Lien, 1994; Tam Cho, 1999).

It is clear that, compared to the studies on voting among the overall population, studies of voting participation among ethnic and immigrant groups reveal a mixed picture regarding the effects of age, education, and income. That minority and immigrant groups are subject to different socialization processes and life experiences are given as possible explanations to the findings (Ramakrishnan, 2005; Tam Cho, 1999). Another possible explanation for the differences in the findings may simply be the differences in the collection of survey data, the construction of the key variables, and inclusion of different control variables in the models. If this is the case, these studies prevent us from concluding that there are systematic differences between various minority and immigrant groups and the overall population. In addition, the role of gender is underexamined in all these studies. One possible explanation for this lack of scholarly interest in gender in immigrant voting behavior studies is that, unlike age, education, and income, the effect of

gender for the overall population has been less consistent in significance and direction across time. Earlier studies of voting behavior for the overall U.S. population established that gender, along with other individual characteristics, was one of the predictors of electoral turnout, with women participating at significantly lower rates than men (Verba and Nie, 1972; Almond and Verba, 1963; Campbell et al., 1960). Recent studies indicate that this gap has diminished in size (Leighley and Nagler, 1992; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980) but other studies point out that the gender gap is reversed, with men significantly less likely to vote than women (Casper and Bass, 1998; Jennings 1989, 1993). This chapter conducts a systematic examination of the role of gender in voting to determine whether its effect varies across nativity status. Guided by the qualitative research on gendered immigrant political participation, I explore possible explanations for the effect of gender on immigrant voting.

Age

Studies for the overall population have shown that age has a curvilinear relationship with voting (Verba and Nie, 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). As explained by the "life cycle" thesis, voting is at the lowest levels among the youngest eligible voters, but increases during the midlife years and declines with advanced age. More recent studies, on the other hand, found that a significant and positive relationship exists between age and voting in a monotonic fashion (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Verba, Scholzman, and Brady, 1995). One explanation for low voting levels among the youngest citizenry is that this group exhibits low levels of such politically-relevant skills as membership in political and civic organizations or social networks. Increased age may also translate into greater resources and a greater stake in society. On the other end of the voting spectrum,

apathy and physical immobility make voting a more difficult and less appealing process for the very elderly, causing the curvilinear relationship between age and voting.

Studies focusing on foreign-born groups have shown a weaker effect of age on voting. In her study of voting among Asian and Latino immigrants in California, Tam Cho (1999) finds that age has a negative relationship to voting, a finding she attributes to dynamics that are particular to the immigration process. Tam Cho argues that younger immigrants are more likely to be socialized into American political institutions and norms and to show more interest in American politics than are older immigrants.

Education

Educational attainment has also been shown to be a strong predictor of voting among the overall citizenry, because it tends to increase interest in the political process and to promote the acquisition of the skills necessary to participate in that process (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Conway, 1991; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Campbell et al., 1960). Although some studies have found that the same results have been true for immigrants (Jones-Correa, 2001; Portes and Curtis, 1987; Portes and Bach, 1985), other studies of ethnic and immigrant voting behavior have produced mixed results. For example, some analyses of Asian immigrant political participation have pointed to an insignificant relationship for education (Lien, 1994; Junn, 1999). One study actually finds a negative relationship between education and voting (Tam Cho, 1999), a finding explained by the fact that Asian immigrants may be more likely to have been educated in their home countries, some of which may have ideals of government and citizen participation that are not compatible with those of a democratic system (Tam Cho, 1999).

Employment

Previous studies for the overall citizenry show that being in the work force facilitates participatory type of behavior through increased institutional and social involvement (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). The workplace fosters participation by increasing access to political information, which encourages co-workers to get involved in social or political activities whether or not they are related or not related to the workplace. The unemployed as well as homemakers are less likely to be involved in political activities, including voting, because they are not part of the social networks facilitated through the workplace. Studies focusing on the foreign-born, however, have shown that the presumed relationship between employment status and voting becomes insignificant. Using the 1996 CPS data, Bass and Casper (2001) find that although employment status increases the likelihood of voting, it has no effect on the naturalized citizen's voting behavior. Similarly, an analysis of the 1996–2002 CPS data, disaggregated by race/ethnicity and immigrant-generation status, suggests that employment status is not one of the predictors of voting for the foreign-born or for second-generation immigrants across the racial/ethnic groups under study, although it was found to be a significant predictor of voting for the third immigrant generation and higher (Ramakrishnan, 2005).

Marriage

Numerous voter studies for the overall citizenry have found that marriage increases political participation (Putnam, 2000; Leighley and Vedlitz, 1999; Stoker and Jennings, 1995; Tate, 1991; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). These studies conclude that marriage generally encourages political participation through two primary mechanisms: stability and social networks. Increased social networks mean greater social

incorporation. The result of greater social incorporation is then expected to lead to greater political incorporation.

Would the same arguments shed light on immigrant political incorporation as measured by the completion of the act of voting? If marriage makes people more stable, sociable with stronger ties to the community, being married and immigrant voting should be expected to be positively associated. Using the CPS data for 1996 for the national sample, Bass and Casper (2001) find that married immigrants are about 20 percent more likely to vote than their unmarried counterparts. In his analysis of the CPS data for 1994–2000 at the national level, Ramakrishnan (2005) also finds a significant positive association between being married and voting for first-generation White, Latino, and Black immigrants. However, his regression model for the first-generation Asian immigrants shows that marital status is not significant in predicting voting outcome. Ramakrishnan's analysis also provides evidence that marital status has its strongest effects among those immigrants with low levels of education, confirming earlier studies on the differential impact marriage's on voting by educational attainment (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980).

Presence of Children

The few studies on the effect of the presence of children on voting for the overall citizenry produced mixed results. Some studies have found that the presence of children, especially school-age children, encourages parents to engage in additional social and political networks (Jones-Correa, 1998; Hardy-Fanta, 1993; Liang, 1994). In this way, children may extend an individual's network of contacts. However, children may also limit the time parents and family can devote to these networks (Hewlett, 1992),

decreasing their likelihood of voting. For example, one study suggests that the presence of children in the household depresses the likelihood of voting both for the overall citizenry and for foreign-born naturalized citizens (Bass & Casper, 2001). Another study finds that having preschool-age children leads to a substantial decrease in political participation, especially for women, and that having school-age children leads to an increase in political participation, a finding linked to greater community involvement and more social networks for those with school-age children (Burns et al, 2001, pp. 316-320).

Gender

The effect of gender on voting has been found to be inconsistent. Bass and Casper (2001) use the 1996 CPS data to describe the similarities and differences in electoral outcomes between naturalized and native-born Americans. They found that, once controlled for various individual-level factors and immigrant-specific variables, naturalized women are no more likely than are their male counterparts to register and to vote. However, when they introduced an interaction term between being Latin American and female, they found a significant relationship, but the results are not shown in their study and they do not specify whether or not this interaction term improved the fit of the model. In addition, although some studies verified the qualitative findings on the gender gap among Latin American groups (Jones-Correa, 1998a, 1998b), they did not explain why the gap exists (Bass and Casper, 2001).

Ramakrishnan (2005) uses national CPS data for 1994–2000 to examine the voting behavior across different ethnic groups and immigrant generations in different state contexts. His regression models suggest that the role of gender both across racial/ethnic groups and immigrant generations varies significantly. Being female has a

significant effect on voting for the Black and Latino groups, whereas it is not a significant predictor of voting for the Asian group (Ramakrishnan, 2005). Because he introduces gender as a control variable in his regression models, not as a key research variable, he does not attempt to explain the variation in voting with respect to gender across immigrant groups. In addition, in two studies of immigrant voting behavior (DeSipio and Pachon, 2002; Tam Cho, 1999), gender is completely missing from regression models.

In his study of voting turnout among naturalized Latin American immigrants in the United States, based on a regression model with individual, contextual, and institutional variables, Jones-Correa (2001) finds that gender was not a significant predictor of voting. This result is not expected, given that he hypothesized that Latin American females may be more likely to vote than their male counterparts, an argument he develops based on the findings from his qualitative study on Latin American immigrants in New York City (Jones-Correa, 1998b). His qualitative study is based on 112 semi-structured, open-ended interviews with first-generation, documented Latin American immigrants, and it focuses on informal political participation in local political organizations and community activities. Although Jones-Correa finds that Latin American women are more politically active than Latin American men in informal types of political activities, it may well be that when focusing on electoral participation such as voting and running for office, this gender difference can disappear or be reversed. Both citizens and noncitizens can be involved in informal types of political activities (see Figure 1.1) and this may explain why Jones-Correa does not distinguish between citizen first-generation and noncitizen first-generation Latin Americans in his sample. This quantitatively oriented study will employ the same approach, and includes noncitizen

immigrants who are citizenship-eligible-voting-age population (CEVAP) in the analysis of gendered voting behavior (see Chapter 2 Data and Method, for a detailed discussion on this).

Given that quantitative studies on immigrant voting behavior do not inform us about the relationship between gender and immigrant voting, qualitative research that specifically focuses on gender and political participation will guide this chapter. Two such qualitative studies have been undertaken by Hardy-Fanta (1993) and Jones-Correa (1998b), and they examine Latin American immigrants' informal political participation and community activities. These studies are community-based case studies with in-depth interviews and participant observation, focusing largely on the impact of family form, labor-force participation, and gender structure of the home country on Latin American female and male political participation in local politics. The goal of this chapter is to empirically test the arguments suggested by these studies. I expect that gender is a strong individual-level predictor of immigrant voting outcome, but its effect is mediated by labor-force participation, family form, and gender structure of home country, as well as by the gender structure of New York City’s labor market.

The analysis of immigrant voting behavior will be done when citizenship-eligible immigrant respondents are included in the sample. This group is comprised of those who are eligible to apply for U.S. citizenship, but did not do so. My argument for including those immigrants who did not go through the naturalization process and, therefore, who are not U.S. citizens, in the analysis is based on conceptual grounds. I conceptualize the act of voting for an immigrant not merely as a matter of electoral participation, but as the completion of a process leading to full membership in a polity, as understood by the

classic national model of citizenship. The conceptual framework of this argument is based on Thomas Faist's "threefold analytical distinction to delineate the various degrees of rights from entry into the territory and few rights (aliens) to permanent residency (denizens) and full membership status with associated rights and duties (citizens)" (Faist, 1999, p.17).[1] My analytical approach will produce an additional grouping that utilizes voting to distinguish between citizens who are practicing their citizenship rights (or obligations) by voting and who are not. The normative and theoretical studies on membership in a polity tend to overlook such an important distinction, whereas empirically oriented studies on immigrant voting behavior tend to omit the "denizens" from their analyses — when the data allow them to do so.

Studies focusing on voter turnout rate, or rather on the decrease in the turnout rate, argue that noncitizen immigrants should be omitted from the analyses, because there is a large number of them and, to a certain extent, their presence explains the decrease in turnout within the voting-age population in the U.S. (McDonald and Popkin, 2001, p. 963). My study is not a study of turnout among citizens alone. It focuses on explaining the dynamics of voting as opposed to nonvoting. For immigrants, there are varying levels of political participation: naturalization, voter registration, and voting (Lien, Collet, Wong, and Ramakrishnan, 2002, p. 625). Even when data are available, most previous studies of immigrant formal political participation have not included citizenship-eligible immigrants in their analyses. Yet this is a large and substantially important group. Of course, immigrants do not naturalize in order to become voters in the host country, but without naturalization they cannot become voters (Singer and Gilbertson, 2003). However, omitting this group just because "they are not citizens, they can't vote" would

[1] This model was originally developed by Tomas Hammar (1990).

portray only half the process that leads to immigrants completing the act of voting. This study will follow an unconventional approach and include this omitted group in the analysis.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, nonvoting among the citizenry, in practice, involves two groups: both those who are registered to vote but do not vote, and those who are not register to vote. When compared, the difference between the registered and unregistered can, to a large degree, be explained by education, among other factors (Timpone, 1998). As for the foreign-born, the act of nonvoting involves an additional group: noncitizens.

Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 illustrate how the politically relevant factors inform us about the first steps of formal political incorporation among the native-born and foreign-born. Because they are American citizens by birth, the native-born's first step toward becoming a voter is the act of registration. Table 3.1 presents the composition of the native-born sample in the CPS 1996–2002 November Supplement data by selected characteristics by their formal political incorporation status (see Table 3.1).

Among the three subgroups of the native-born sample,[2] large differences in the composition by some selected characteristics are observed between the 'not registered' and 'registered' categories. For example, non-Hispanic Whites make up 57.8 percent of the total native-born voting age population. However, when their share is broken down by formal political incorporation status, they make up 50.6 percent, 61.6 percent, and 62.6 percent of the subgroup totals — not registered; registered; and voted in the last federal election, respectively. The composition of other characteristics, such as being young (between the ages of 18 and 30), married, living in the same house for more than five years, being employed, or having educational attainment higher than a high school

[2] These native-born subgroups are "not registered," "registered," and "voted in the last federal election."

diploma, also show large differences (more than 10 percentage-points) among the "not registered" and "registered" categories for this sample (results for these characteristics are presented in boldface in Table 3.1).

As for the foreign-born, the first step toward becoming a voter is the act of naturalization (DeSipio, 2001, 1996b; Jones-Correa, 2001; Bloemraad, 2002), therefore, this group can be divided into four subgroups in terms of their formal political incorporation status: "not naturalized," "naturalized, but not registered to vote," "registered to vote," and finally "voted in the last federal election." Table 3.2 presents selected characteristics of the foreign-born by their formal political incorporation status (see Table 3.2).

The figures in Table 3.2 suggest that the act of naturalization is the decisive step in the path toward becoming a voter in the U.S. given that large differences in the subgroup compositions by some of the selected characteristics are observed between the 'not naturalized' and 'naturalized' (the results in bold faces indicate that the difference is more than 10 percentage-points).

Hypotheses

Employment and Gender and Immigrant Voting

Whether by choice or circumstances, being in the paid labor force means more than a paycheck for immigrant women (Jones-Correa, 1998b, p. 338; Grasmuck and Pessar, 1991, p. 148; Chin, 2005). The experience of working, as argued, may result in fundamental changes in long-term immigrant strategies for working women, whereas it may not be so for the working immigrant men as well as for nonworking immigrant women. The gender structure in the U.S. may translate into more opportunities for work

compared with the country of origin and this may lead an immigrant woman to decide to stay here permanently if she perceives being in the labor force as a benefit and an opportunity for personal development and independence. Previous studies on migrant experience from the gender perspective provide substantial evidence for this argument (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1994, p. 146; Grasmuck and Pessar, 1991, p. 155; Jones-Correa, 1998b, p. 338; Chin, 2005). The decision for working immigrant women to stay permanently may then translate into political activity. These arguments lead to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1*: The effect of gender on voting varies by employment status.*

Table 3.3 presents the odds-ratios of voting among men and women with the same socio-economic and demographic characteristics. The odds-ratios among the foreign-born who are in the labor force show that working women are about 40 percent more likely than are their male counterparts to complete the act of voting. In contrast, immigrant women who are not in the labor force are about 19 percent less likely than are their male counterparts to vote (see Table 3.3).

The results presented in Table 3.3 are the odds-ratios of bivariate relationships of gender and voting when controlled for only one demographic or SES factor. Although the systematic examination of the data will be done using multivariate logistic regression models, the preliminary bivariate results would give us a hint about whether and which politically-relevant factors are interacting differently — and significantly — in the voting process across the subgroups under study.

Marriage and Gender and Voting

Quantitatively oriented studies of immigrant voting behavior do not focus on the possible interaction effects between gender and marital status. This may stem from the lack of focus of the previous research for the overall citizenry, which implicitly assumes that the effect of marital status on political participation is uniform and does not significantly vary by gender regardless of nativity status.

On the other hand, qualitative studies on gendered immigrant political participation (Hardy-Fanta, 1993; Jones-Correa, 1998a, 1998b) suggest that the institution of marriage might have a varying impact on immigrant men's and women's political incorporation. Hardy-Fanta observes that for immigrant Latin American women, especially for women with lower education levels and income, "not having a husband seems associated with a higher degree of politicization; their political involvement began after separation from their husbands" (Hardy-Fanta, 1993, p.148). As for the Latin American men she interviewed, marriage seemed not a significant factor in their level of political participation. Preliminary results of the data suggest that there is a possible interaction effect between being married and female (Table 3.3). The following hypothesis will be systematically tested in regression models with an interaction term between gender and marital status:

Hypothesis 2*: The effect of gender on voting varies by marital status.*

Presence of Children and Gender and Voting

Having children in the host country is a particularly critical factor for immigrants in their decision to stay permanently in the United States or to return to the home country in the

future. Findings regarding the effect of children on immigrant political participation suggest that its effect on women's political participation is positive. Female immigrants with children are more likely to interact with such mainstream American institutions as schools, hospitals, and social service agencies (Jones-Correa, 1998a, 1998b). Such contacts, Jones-Correa argues, increase social networks, promoting greater involvement in local issues affecting their children's well-being. Hardy-Fanta (1993) also suggests that the presence of children facilitates greater political involvement for immigrant women based on her finding that Latina women are more involved than are Latino men in the process of trying to provide better opportunities for their children, as well as more inclined to demand solutions for their children's problems from the community and government (Hardy-Fanta, 1993, p. 145). These arguments lead to the following hypothesis:

> ***Hypothesis 3****: The effect of gender on voting varies by presence of children in the household. Women with school-age children are more likely to vote than are women with no children or with preschool-age children.*

The odds-ratios of female-male voting by presence of children in household in Table 3.3 suggest a lack of interaction between gender and presence of children in voting. The systematic examination of this effect will be based on the results of multivariate logistic regressions.

Home-Country Gender Structure and Gender and Voting

Educational, economic, or social opportunity structures available in immigrants' country of origin might vary greatly for women and men. Women migrating from gender-

structured societies to relatively gender-egalitarian societies have much more to lose if they return than do their male counterparts; therefore, they may tend to stay in the home country longer than their male counterparts do, or decide to stay permanently. Does the gender structure in the country of origin have an effect on the process of immigrant political incorporation? Or would it have a gender-specific effect?

Qualitative studies of Latin American immigrants found Latin American women to be more politically incorporated in the U.S. than their male counterparts (Jones-Correa 1998a; Grasmuck & Pessar, 1991), a finding attributed to the fact that opportunity structures available to immigrant women in the U.S. are more gender-equal compared with their home countries. The ratio of female to male labor-force participation is among the indicators of gendered opportunity structure in one's country of origin.[3] Guided by this qualitative research, using the World Bank's measure of labor-force sex-parity index, I will test the following hypothesis:

> ***Hypothesis 4:*** *Women from more gender-structured societies are more likely to become fully participating citizens in the host country.*

The labor-force sex-parity index is a scale, from 0.3 to 1.1, with lower values indicating lower levels of female labor-force participation compared to men. Table 3.4 shows the distribution of immigrants in the data from countries falling outside one standard deviation range on the gender-equality scale (see Table 3.4).

[3] This measure is different from the civil rights index measure, which is also included in the regression model. A close look at the data reveals that most of the repressive regimes — the former communist and socialist countries — are the most gender-equal societies in terms of female-male literacy ratio and female-male labor-force ratio. In some newly developing democracies, even in a few established democracies, there is some sex disparity in labor-force ratio.

New York City Gendered Labor Market Structure and Gender and Voting

As a result of selectivity in U.S. immigration policy, as Portes and Rumbaut (1996) argue, immigrants from some countries tend to become more economically incorporated than immigrants from other countries. An immigrant-specific measure could well be constructed guided by this study, and then used to test if greater immigrant economic incorporation would lead to greater immigrant political incorporation. However, in this study, I focus on the selectivity processes at the local level and on the gender-structured nature of immigration to New York (Sassen, 2001). Due to this structured nature, female immigrants from some countries may tend to be more economically incorporated than female and male immigrants from other countries. More female immigrants than male immigrants arrive in New York City from some countries — regardless of these countries' gender structure —, whereas the opposite is true for other countries, a fact that can be largely attributed to the structured nature of the city's labor market. Due to this structure, some females immigrate to work whereas some immigrate based on family reunification provisions in the U.S. immigration law, following their husbands or children. Unfortunately, the CPS data do not contain information on whether or not individuals migrated to work or to follow family members. Although not an ideal construction, based on the sex ratio of immigration to New York City by countries of origin, I developed a "type of immigration" variable that measures immigrants as coming from 1) female-sending countries, 2) male-sending countries, or 3) gender-neutral countries (see Donato, 1992). Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 present the list of female-immigrant-sending countries and male-immigrant-sending countries, respectively (see Table 3.5 and Table 3.6).

New York City recruits its foreign-born female labor mostly from the peripheral countries (the Caribbean), and some Central and South American countries and Philippines. It is important to note that the types of jobs immigrant women from female-sending countries are employed in is bifurcated: on one end, they do manual, informal, domestic work that requires no skills or education; on the other end, they work in professional jobs, especially in the health care and education sectors requiring specialization and college education. On the other hand, females arriving in New York from male-sending countries might be more likely to be following their husbands. Preliminary analyses of the CPS data by the newly constructed 'type of immigration' variable show that the latter group of women are less likely to be college educated, less likely to work, and more likely to be married, not only compared to their male counterparts but also compared to their female counterparts coming from female-sending countries (results not shown).

To illustrate differential demographic and socioeconomic characteristics among female immigrants from male-immigrant sending countries and those from female-immigrant sending countries, I present various figures from the 2000 Census PUMS 5% data for immigrants from seven countries. I selected seven countries, from six different regions, that are ranked in the top 20 countries sending large numbers of immigrants to New York City, between 1980 and 2000.[4] For the selection, since my ultimate goal is to

[4] In order to control, to a certain extent, for the age dimension to gender and length of stay in the U.S., I computed the sex composition for these top 20 countries for all voting-age immigrants who arrived between 1980 and 2000. One might also ask if both women and men are arriving at equal rates, but women are staying in New York City whereas men are leaving for other places in the U.S. or perhaps for their home country. Also, there is an age dimension to gender; it is true that across racial and ethnic groups, women live longer on average than men.

explore the gender gap in voting turnout among immigrants, I took the figures for percent female immigration from these 20 countries into consideration.

The countries I selected are Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Philippines (female immigrant-sending countries); Mexico and Pakistan (male immigrant-sending countries); and European Union and China (gender-neutral).[5] Immigrants from these seven countries make up 41 percent of the total immigrant population in the city. Figure 3.1 shows the sex composition of immigrants to New York City, at age 18 or older, by the seven selected countries of origin (see Figure 3.1).

Female immigrants born in Philippines and Jamaica make up about 60 percent of their group totals, while female immigrants born in Mexico and Pakistan make up less than 40 percent of their group totals. Immigration from these countries can also be identified as "female-first" type of immigration, in that females first immigrate alone, as laborers or professionals, and then send for their husbands or children (Foner, 2002, p. 39; Zhou, 2002, p. 38).

As for the naturalization rates of these immigrant groups, there is a wide variation among them, as expected, which can be attributed to the variation in the length of stay in the U.S., the level of English proficiency, and the age structure (see Figure 3.2). However, what is striking is the variation in naturalization within these groups by gender.

Except for the Pakistani group, female immigrants in all other groups have higher levels of naturalization compared to their male counterparts, especially for the Jamaican, Dominican, and Filipino groups. There is clearly a gender gap in naturalization among

[5] European Union member countries are grouped together (the new members from Eastern Europe are not included). This approach is not uncommon in comparative studies of immigration, citizenship, and naturalization. It is important to note, however, that most of the immigrants in this group are from Italy and Greece.

the immigrants from female immigrant-sending countries. What would explain this gap? Are there any other dramatic gender gaps in other demographic and socioeconomic indicators among immigrants in these groups? Figures on labor-force participation, marital status, and English language proficiency point to the existence of substantial gaps both between sexes and among females across the selected immigrant groups.

Figure 3.3 presents the female-male labor-force participation of the selected immigrant groups. As expected, the difference in the female-male labor-force participation is the smallest among the immigrants from female-immigrant sending countries, whereas it is the largest among the male immigrant-sending countries — Mexico and Pakistan (see Figure 3.3).

Similarly, data point to the existence of a gender gap in marital status. Except for immigrants from China and Philippines, there is a 10-percentage point or higher marriage gap between the female and male immigrants from other selected countries, but it is important to note that the marriage gap is in the opposite direction, between the female immigrant-sending groups and male immigrant-sending groups, with females in the latter group having higher marriage rates than their male counterparts (see Figure 3.4).

Finally, Figure 3.5 shows that, except in Jamaica and Philippines, there is a dramatic gap in English language proficiency between female and male immigrants across the groups. This time, the gender gap follows a uniform direction, with immigrant women being less proficient in English than their male counterparts (see Figure 3.5).

These findings clearly point to a need for careful and detailed investigation of the processes of immigration to the U.S. and immigrant integration. Why and how immigrants arrive in the U.S. could certainly inform us about the paths they take in

becoming full members of the American society. Considering these demographic and SES differentials within sexes and among females by country of origin, specifically by our newly constructed 'type of immigration' variable, we might expect different social and political outcomes among women coming from female-sending countries and those coming from male-sending countries. The first group might be more likely to be economically incorporated in the U.S. than the latter; therefore, they might follow a different path of political incorporation:

> ***Hypothesis 5:*** *The likelihood of immigrant female voting is influenced by the type of immigration to New York.*

Bivariate analysis of the odds-ratios of female and male voting for those who are identified as coming from female-immigrant sending countries suggests that women from these countries are more likely to vote than are their male counterparts from the same countries (see Table 3.3).

Preliminary findings suggest that all the hypotheses formulated above point to potential interaction effects that would account for the immigrant gender gap. In addition, it suggests that for the native-born group, specifically native-born Whites, exploring the potential interaction effects may not produce significant results. The next section presents the results of systematic testing of the hypotheses employing multivariate regression models.

Multivariate Data Analysis and Findings

Foreign-Born Group

Table 3.7 presents the main-effect and interaction-effect logistic regression models for the foreign-born sample (see Table 3.7).

The data suggest that immigrant-specific variables are indeed associated with the voting process for immigrants. A chi-square log-likelihood test, comparing Model 1 to Model 2, confirms the importance of immigrant-specific variables in the voting process. With a difference in the -2 log likelihood of 589.127, with 6 degrees of freedom, the improvement of model fit is significant at the 0.001 level. Immigrants from geographically distant countries are more likely to complete the voting process. This general finding is in line with the previous work on immigrant political incorporation through naturalization (Portes and Rumbaut, 1996; Liang, 1994; Jasso and Rosenzweig, 1990). Greater distance to the country of origin may mean a natural strengthening of ties to the United States due to lower levels of transnational activities and higher levels of financial and psychological costs of return migration (Jones-Correa, 1998a). In addition, length of stay in the United States is strongly correlated with the act of voting. As the previous research suggests more years spent in the U.S. result in greater familiarity and experience with the country's political system, as well as in relatively more fluency in English, through which interactions with American mainstream organizations and institutions can be developed and maintained (Tam Cho, 1999; DeSipio, 1996b, Yang, 1994; Portes and Curtis, 1987).

The two immigrant-specific variables that are of interest also show they have significant main effects on the voting process. Immigrants who come from countries with

a more gender-egalitarian society, as measured by the labor force sex-parity index — percent female in the work force over percent male in the work force — are more likely to complete the act of voting. Each 10-percentage-point increase in this index results in a 9 percent increase in the propensity to vote. In this instance, the cost of completing the voting act in the host country with greater gender-equal opportunities may be less for immigrants coming from more gender-egual countries. However, as hypothesized earlier, this variable may have varying effects on voting by gender.

Examining the main effects of the "type of immigration," it is clear that this newly constructed variable is a politically relevant variable. Immigrants from female-sending countries are about 45 percent more likely to vote than are their counterparts coming from gender-neutral countries. On the other hand, immigrants from male-sending countries have a propensity to vote at a rate equal to that of their counterparts from gender-neutral countries. I hypothesize that once an interaction term between female and female-sending country is introduced in the model, the main-effect of both gender and female-sending country variables will disappear. Likewise, the effect of male-sending country variable may vary across gender.

The findings in Model 1 strongly support the gender gap hypothesis, that is, being female has a positive effect on the process toward the completion of the act of voting, with female immigrants' propensity to vote being 18 percent higher than that of their male counterparts. Once the host of immigrant-specific factors are introduced (Model 2), the effect of gender on the voting process increases both in significance and strength. Female immigrants are 27 percent more likely to complete the act of voting than are their male counterparts, a finding significant at the .05 level.

Model 2 also shows that being employed has a significant main effect on the voting process, with employed immigrants 39 percent more likely to vote than those who are not. The other key variables — unmarried, children 0–6, and children 6–18 — show no association with voting.[6] One possible explanation for this finding may be the presence of a strong interaction between these variables and gender. As asserted by the qualitative research, women's employment status and family structure may explain this lack of main effect. It may well be that their impact varies by gender so vastly as to cause the main effect of these variables to be insignificant. Another possible explanation for the lack of association between these variables and voting may well be that these variables hypothesized to have an impact on the voting process for the overall citizenry may not be as politically relevant for the immigrant group as much as are the immigrant-specific variables.

The interacting effect of employment status and family structure on gender in voting is tested in the full (expanded) regression model. The predicted odds-ratios for the full model (Model 3) are presented in the fifth column of Table 3.7. The first important finding to note is that once the interaction terms are introduced, the main effect of gender on voting disappears. Inclusion of the interaction terms improved the fit of the model at the 0.05 significance level, by a change in the -2 log likelihoods of 15.452, with 6 degrees of freedom.[7]

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[6] When Model 1 and Model 2 are run without the children variables, the direction and significance of all the variables in these models stayed the same, suggesting that the children variables were not a bias estimator or a proxy for the other household variable, marital status. However, except for the native-born White sample, the inclusion of children variables did not improve the fit of the models in explaining the voting process. See Model 1 and Model 2 without the children variables, in Appendix 3.

[7] When the interaction terms are introduced individually, the same results are obtained.

Another striking finding from Model 3 is that the interaction between gender and employment status in voting is significant for women, but not for men. The results show that employed women are about 66 percent more likely to vote than are women who are not in the labor force, a finding significant at the .05 level, providing strong evidence for *Hypothesis 1*. Immigrant men's voting outcome does not vary significantly by their employment status. Why does employment status have such a large impact on immigrant women's propensity to vote, and no impact on immigrant men's? Although I did not systematically examine the impact of occupational status on voting, I assume that the gendered occupational status of immigrants in New York City may, to a certain degree, explain why the effect of employment status on men is not significant. Immigrant men are more likely to be self-employed in transportation and retail sales occupations, which puts them in a disadvantaged position vis-à-vis working immigrant women, in terms of being connected to mechanisms facilitating political participation that are fostered through employment. It may also be that immigrant women may value work more than immigrant men do given that employment may lead to an improvement in women's status (Jones-Correa, 1998b, Chin, 2005).

The expanded model suggests that marital status is indeed associated with political incorporation for immigrants. As discussed above, in Model 2 (the main-effects model), it appears that immigrant voting participation does not vary across marital

status.[8] The relationship between marital status and political incorporation is revealed only after the introduction of the interaction term between gender and marital status. Because the interactions are included, the results of the main-effects must be interpreted differently. The predicted odds-ratio for the "unmarried" variable in Model 3 now represents the effect of being unmarried and male on the voting process. What the results show is that unmarried men are about 30 percent less likely to vote than are married men, a difference significant at the 0.1 level. To determine the effect of being unmarried for women, I multiply the odds-ratios of "unmarried" and "female*unmarried." The respective odds-ratios are .701 and 1.499. Multiplying these two odds-ratios produces an odds-ratio of 1.0508. Females who are not married are 5 percent more likely to vote than are married women. The difference is statistically significant at the 0.1 level. Clearly, men tend to be influenced more by marital status in the voting process than their female counterparts. But what is striking is the opposite direction of the impact of the marital status on men and women.

The results clearly show that at least for immigrants living in New York City, the effect of gender on voting varies by marital status, providing support for *Hypothesis 2*.[9] One possible explanation is that the effect of marital status on social and political

[8] Quantitative studies on the effect of marital status in political participation for the overall citizenry (Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980) and qualitative studies for ethnic and immigrant populations (Hardy-Fanta, 1993; Ramakrishnan, 2005) suggest that marital status has its strongest effects among the poor and those with low levels of education. This study does not examine the interaction between marital status and education and income.

[9] The CPS data suggest that the effect of marital status on voting might vary substantially among immigrants living in "central cities," "metropolitan areas outside central city," and "suburban areas." Likewise, the data suggest that the main effect of gender diminishes for the immigrant sample living outside "'central cities." One preliminary finding from, again, the CPS data, that tentatively provides an explanation for this is that female immigrants living in central city are significantly more likely to vote than their female counterparts living outside "central cities," and that male immigrants who live in "central cities" are less likely to vote than their male counterparts living outside "central cities" (results are not shown), suggesting different paths to full membership among women and men by residential status.

outcomes might operate differently for immigrants, and none of the studies cited earlier directly examined immigrants. To explain why marital status has a lesser effect on women in New York City, we could explore gendered household arrangements among the unmarried. The combined CPS data show that, of all the immigrant women who are not married and live in multi-person households, only about 12 percent reported that they live with unrelated individuals, whereas about 31 percent of unmarried immigrant men reported living with unrelated individuals in the household. Due to their connection with family members in the household, women who are not married might be more likely than their male counterparts to engage in greater community involvement, and to have more elements of stability in their lives, facilitating greater socialization and connectivity to the community. This gendered difference, in turn, translates into gendered voting outcomes.

The data do not provide support for *Hypothesis 3*, that the role of gender on political incorporation should vary by the presence of own children in the household. Both the basic and expanded models (Model I and Model II, respectively) suggest that the presence of children is not a politically relevant factor — as measured as the act of voting. As mentioned earlier, the qualitative studies that suggested a greater political involvement of immigrant women due to their involvement with their children's education and daily problems focused on such informal political participation as community activism and being a member of a political organization. It may be possible that those who are highly active in nonformal political participation may not be as active in formal political participation. Another possible explanation is that whatever the effect of the presence of children on parents' lives is, it simply may not translate into formal political participation.

The data show that there is no difference in the political incorporation of female immigrants across gender-egalitarian societies, as measured by the female-male labor-force ratio in the country of origin, providing no support for *Hypothesis 4*, that women from more gender-structured societies should be more likely to become fully participating citizens in a host country that offers more gender-equal opportunities. One possible explanation may be that educational, economic, and social opportunities that are not available to women in the home country may again be out of women's reach in the United States, due to reproduced premigration gender status quo. The presumed change in female immigrants' inegalitarian premigration gender ideology to a more egalitarian postmigration gender ideology would be facilitated by change in such mechanisms as the educational and employment status of women, which would lead to the process of renegotiating gender roles within the family and the larger society.

Although not formulated as a hypothesis, immigrant men appear to be significantly influenced by the home-country gender opportunity structure in the political incorporation process in the host country. The predicted odds-ratio of 1.118, which is statistically significant at the 0.05 level, suggests that immigrant men from gender-egalitarian countries are more likely than are their male counterparts from less gender-egalitarian countries to complete the act of the voting process. With each 10-percentage-point increase in female-male labor force ratio, the likelihood of men voting increases by about 12 percent. This finding is in line with Jones-Correa's argument that men migrating from gender-structured societies perceive a loss of status in the United States due to its relatively more egalitarian gender structure, and that they therefore weigh the benefits of integrating here versus the cost of return migration, and thus may determine that the

political and psychological costs of return may simply be low (Jones-Correa, 1998b, p. 334). Immigrant men from greater gender-egalitarian societies, on the other hand, may view their migration as more permanent, as evidenced by their decision to vote.

The other immigrant-specific variable of interest is the female-male type of immigration to New York City. The expanded model (Model 3) shows that the effect of gender on voting process varies by type of immigration. Females from male-sending countries are 41 percent less likely to vote than are their female counterparts from gender-neutral immigrant-sending countries. When compared to their male counterparts from male-sending countries, females from these countries are about 28 percent as likely to vote, a finding that supports *Hypothesis 5*, that the likelihood of immigrant female voting is influenced by the type of immigration to New York City. As for the voting behavior of female immigrants from female-immigrant-sending countries, although the data suggest that these women are more likely to vote than their female counterparts from gender-neutral countries, the results are not statistically significant.

Native-Born Non-White Group

Table 3.8 presents the findings of the multivariate regression for the native-born non-White sample (see Table 3.8).

The evidence from the basic model (Model 1), supporting the gender gap hypothesis, is strong, with propensity to vote for native-born women of color being about 37 percent higher than that for men of color.

The expanded model (Model 2) tests for *Hypotheses 1–3*, originally formulated for the foreign-born sample.[10] Except for the interaction term between gender and marital

[10] Although the hypotheses regarding immigrant-specific factors on voting may be relevant for the native-born samples who are second-generation immigrants, they are not introduced in the models.

status, other interaction terms in Model 2 are not significant, providing support only for *Hypothesis 2*, that the role of gender in voting varies by marital status. The results from the main-effects model (Model 1) show that, controlling for a host of demographic and SES factors, there is no difference in voting between the married and the unmarried. However, when the interaction term between female and unmarried is introduced, the real effect of marital status is revealed. Voting does significantly vary among men and women across marital status. Native-born non-White women who are not married are about 16 percent more likely to vote than are their married female counterparts, a finding significant at the 0.05 level. As for men, unmarried men are about 34 percent less likely to vote than are their married male counterparts. This result is significant at the 0.10 level. As with the foreign-born sample, the difference across marital status among men is larger than that among women. Furthermore, unmarried men and unmarried women have statistically significant differences from one another in their propensities to vote, with unmarried women about 54 percent more likely to vote than unmarried men. This finding, again, raises two questions: Why do men of color tend to be substantially more influenced by marital status in the voting process and why are unmarried women much more likely to vote than both married women and unmarried men? One possible answer to the first question may be the low rates of marriage and/or remarriage among women of color, due to lack of marriageable men within the same racial/ethnic group in the society, especially within the black community (Villarosa, 2004; Laumann, 2002). Since their options for getting married are much more limited than those of their male counterparts, these women may search for social options and networks outside of marriage, resulting in lower levels of spousal dependency, which would then explain why marital status has a

lesser effect on women's voting behavior than on men's. The system of extended social networks among single black women not only eases the burden of childrearing for them (Wilson, 1989), but also replaces the social networks facilitated through the presence of a spouse. Likewise, it may be much more difficult for unmarried men of color to maintain the same degree of social networks and stability that marriage is assumed to bring about, which, in turn, is hypothesized as leading to greater likelihood of voting.

Native-Born White Sample

Table 3.9 shows the results of multivariate regression for the native-born White sample (see Table 3.9).

Model 1 shows the results for the basic model. It is striking that among the many independent variables introduced in Model 1, gender is the only variable that has no effect on voting (see the full Table 3.9 in Appendix 3). Once controlling for a host of demographic and SES variables, native-born White women and men are equally likely to vote. (As illustrated earlier in column 3 of Table 3.3, the odds-ratios of predicted probabilities of bivariate analyses of voting by gender for this group suggested no gender gap in voting for this group). Another striking finding from Model 1 is that, unlike the basic models for the first two groups, marital status and having own children in the household have a significant impact on voting.[11]

Being young, unmarried, and living with preschool-age children depresses voting, whereas living with school-age children increases it. Native-born Whites who are unmarried are about 41 percent less likely to vote than are their married counterparts, a

[11] Unlike the basic models for the foreign-born and native-born non-White groups, the "presence of children" variables significantly improve the fit of the model in voting at $p<0.01$, by a change in the -2 log likelihoods of 8.781, with 1 degrees of freedom.

finding significant at the 0.01 level. The impact of having children on voting is less powerful and significant. Compared to those who have no children in the household, native-born Whites with preschool-age children are 27 percent less likely to vote, a finding significant at the 0.10 level. Compared to the same group, those with school-age children are about 36 percent more likely to vote, a finding, again, significant at the 0.10 level. These findings lend support to the hypothesis that having preschool-age children might take so much time and attention that it leads to a substantial decrease in political participation and that having school-age children would lead to an increase in political participation generated by greater community involvement and more social networks (Burns et al, 2001, pp. 316–320).

When the interaction terms were introduced, none of them was found to be statistically significant. The effect of marital and employment status and the presence of children in the household on voting do not vary by gender.

Previous research on the impact of marital status for the overall citizenry established that marriage facilitates greater political participation through increased social networks and stability (Putnam, 2000; Leighley & Vedlitz, 1999; Stoker and Jennings, 1995). The data for native-born Whites provide strong support for this argument. Furthermore, unlike the first two groups, political-participation-enabling factors mediated through marriage do not operate differently by gender.

Discussion and Conclusion

This study shows that the role of gender in voting varies greatly across groups. Gender is one of the significant predictors of voting process for immigrants and native-born people of color whereas it has no effect among native-born Whites. Unlike the women in the first

two groups, native-born White women are no more or less likely than are their male counterparts to vote. This study also provides evidence that family structure, specifically marital status and the presence of children, has implications for political participation in a number of different ways. Among the most important findings is the varying relationship marital status and employment status have on immigrant women and men in explaining their political incorporation process as measured by the act of voting. The findings clearly show that this process is a gendered process.

Another important finding is that being unmarried operates the same way in the voting process for all the men in these three groups. Married men are significantly more likely to vote than are their unmarried counterparts. Among women, except for native-born Whites, being unmarried does not depress voting. On the contrary, it significantly increases the likelihood of voting for immigrant women and native-born women of color.

The effect of gender on voting does not vary by employment status for native-born Whites or for native-born non-Whites; however, it does significantly vary for the foreign-born sample. The results might suggest that immigrant women value, or are more conscious of their participation in, the labor force than are their male counterparts, and probably more so also than their native-born female counterparts, which results in immigrant women having a higher propensity to realize full membership in the society they live in through the act of voting. The conclusion of my research is that economic incorporation leads to political incorporation for immigrant women, but not necessarily for immigrant men.

In addition to traditional demographic and SES predictors, immigrant-specific factors are also significant predictors in explaining immigrants' propensity to vote, and

this finding provides strong evidence that sending-country context is politically relevant in immigrant incorporation in the United States.

Scholars who are skeptical about the existence of a gender gap think that the class, racial, and religious cleavages among women make them so diverse as to swamp any purely gender differences. This study verifies the argument that the life experience of immigrant women and men is so different from that of native-born women and men that it translates into a different style of full membership in the polity, and therefore, into different styles of electoral participation among groups.

Table 3.1: Selected Characteristics of Voting-Age Population by Formal Political Incorporation Status, Native-Born

		Sample Total	Not Registered	Registered	Voted
		(n=4,828)	(n=1,633)	(n=3,195)	(n=2,475)
Race					
	White	**57.8%**	**50.6%**	**61.6%**	**62.8%**
	Black	27.6%	28.4%	27.1%	28.1%
	Asian	2.1%	3.5%	1.4%	1.2%
	Hispanic	12.5%	17.5%	9.9%	7.9%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Gender					
	Male	44.9%	47.9%	43.3%	43.4%
	Female	55.1%	52.1%	56.7%	56.6%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Married					
	Currently not married	63.0%	69.7%	59.5%	57.1%
	Married	**37.0%**	**30.3%**	**40.5%**	**42.9%**
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Age 18–30					
	Age 30+	73.8%	63.9%	78.8%	82.9%
	Age 18–30	**26.2%**	**36.1%**	**21.2%**	**17.1%**
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Duration at the same house					
	Less than 5 years	36.9%	44.2%	34.2%	30.9%
	More than 5 years	**63.1%**	**55.8%**	**65.8%**	**69.1%**
		100.0%	100.0%		100.0%
Home ownership					
	Not own a house	61.9%	67.4%	59.1%	57.4%
	Own a house	38.1%	32.6%	40.9%	42.6%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Employed					
	Not employed	27.0%	38.2%	21.1%	19.0%
	Employed	**54.2%**	**47.5%**	**57.7%**	**57.6%**
	Retired	18.8%	14.3%	21.2%	23.4%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Education					
	Less than H. S. Diploma	16.9%	23.9%	13.3%	11.9%
	H.S. Diploma	29.5%	35.5%	26.5%	26.0%
	Higher than H.S. Diploma	**53.6%**	**40.6%**	**60.2%**	**62.1%**
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Poverty					
	Not in poverty	86.3%	83.5%	87.7%	89.4%
	In poverty	13.7%	16.5%	12.3%	10.6%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Source: CPS 1996–2002 November Supplements, unweighted data. Boldface entries show differences that are more than 10-percentage-points between "Not Registered" category and "Registered" category.

Table 3.2: Selected Characteristics of Voting Age Population by Formal Political Incorporation Status, Foreign-Born

		Sample Total	Not Naturalized	Naturalized	Registered	Voted
		(n=3,566)	(n=1,746)	(n=1,791)	(n=1,024)	(n=777)
Race						
	White	**28.6%**	**22.1%**	**34.5%**	**36.0%**	**38.2%**
	Black	20.6%	20.5%	20.7%	24.3%	26.0%
	Asian	21.8%	21.4%	22.4%	16.8%	13.1%
	Hispanic	**28.9%**	**36.0%**	**22.4%**	**22.9%**	**22.7%**
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Gender						
	Male	45.7%	47.7%	43.6%	41.7%	42.0%
	Female	54.3%	52.3%	56.4%	58.3%	58.0%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Married						
	Currently not married	43.8%	44.7%	42.7%	43.2%	42.5%
	Married	56.2%	55.3%	57.3%	56.8%	57.5%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Age 18–30						
	Age 30+	84.5%	79.0%	89.7%	92.9%	94.2%
	Age 18–30	**15.5%**	**21.0%**	**10.3%**	**7.1%**	**5.8%**
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Duration at the same house						
	Less than 5 years	45.7%	57.4%	34.2%	29.3%	28.6%
	More than 5 years	**54.3%**	**42.6%**	**65.8%**	**70.7%**	**71.4%**
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Home ownership						
	Not own a house	66.7%	78.0%	56.0%	53.0%	54.1%
	Own a house	**33.3%**	**22.0%**	**44.0%**	**47.0%**	**45.9%**
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Employed						
	Not employed	24.6%	29.0%	20.6%	16.2%	15.8%
	Employed	59.3%	61.4%	57.2%	59.1%	58.7%
	Retired	**16.1%**	**9.6%**	**22.2%**	**24.7%**	**25.5%**
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Education						
	Less than H. S. Diploma	31.3%	36.9%	26.2%	22.8%	23.3%
	H.S. Diploma	30.8%	31.8%	30.0%	29.1%	28.6%
	Higher than H.S. Diploma	**37.9%**	**31.3%**	**43.8%**	**48.1%**	**48.1%**
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
Poverty						
	Not in poverty	81.6%	76.9%	85.8%	86.8%	85.5%
	In poverty	18.4%	23.1%	14.2%	13.2%	14.0%
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	99.5%
Time in the US						
	Between 5 – 15	**33.7%**	**52.0%**	**16.3%**	**11.8%**	**11.0%**
	Between 15–30	38.2%	36.2%	40.7%	36.9%	35.8%
	Over 30 years	**28.1%**	**11.8%**	**43.0%**	**51.3%**	**53.2%**
Type of Immigration						
	Male	8.6%	12.5%	5.0%	3.7%	3.5%
	Female	51.5%	51.0%	52.2%	54.1%	55.0%
	Gender-neutral	39.9%	36.5%	42.8%	42.2%	41.5%

Source: CPS 1996–2002 November Supplements, unweighted data. Boldface entries show differences that are more than 10-percentage-points between "Not Registered" category and "Registered" category.

Table 3.3: Odds-Ratios of Predicted Probabilities of Voting by Selected Variables by Gender[a]					
	Foreign-born	**Native-born non-White**	**Native-born White**		
Gender Gap	1.176**	1.435***	1.013		
Gender & Marriage Gap					
Married	0.925	0.861	1.013		
Unmarried	1.754***	1.752***	1.090		
Gender & Employment Gap					
Employed	1.396***	1.510***	1.144		
Not employed	0.813	1.363**	0.878		
Gender & Children Gap					
Children present	1.034	0.903	0.805		
No children	1.258	1.585***	1.060		
Gender and Immigration Type Gap					
From female immigrant-sending country[b]	1.218*				
From male immigrant-sending country[c]	0.830				

a. Ratio is p(voting) if female divided by p(voting) if male.

b. Ratio is p(voting) if female from female-sending country divided by p(voting) if male from female-sending country.

c. Ratio is p(voting) if female from male-sending country divided by p(voting) if male from male-sending country.

*** p< .01, ** p<.05, * p<.10

Source: CPS November Supplement Data 1996–2002.

Table 3.4: Distribution of Immigrants from Countries falling outside 1 SD Range on the Gender-Equality Scale as Measured by the Labor-Force Sex-Parity Index for 1990

Countries below 1 SD Range				
	Frequency		Percent of the Total Sample	
212 Iran	4		.16	
213 Iraq	1		.04	
216 Jordan	1		.04	
222 Lebanon	1		.04	
229 Pakistan	22		.86	
311 Costa Rica	12		.47	
314 Honduras	30		1.17	
315 Mexico	108		4.22	
339 Dominican Republic	419		16.39	
375 Argentina	9		.35	
378 Chile	10		.39	
380 Ecuador	105		4.11	
385 Peru	38		1.49	
415 Egypt	14		.55	
Total	774		30.27	

Countries above 1 SD Range				
	Frequency		Percent of the Total Sample	
105 Czechoslovakia	5		.20	
136 Sweden	1		.04	
156 Slovakia/Slovak Republic	1		.04	
180 USSR	8		.31	
183 Latvia	2		.08	
184 Lithuania	1		.04	
185 Armenia	7		.27	
192 Russia	112		4.38	
195 Ukraine	36		1.41	
206 Cambodia	1		.04	
239 Thailand	9		.35	
242 Vietnam	13		.51	
343 Jamaica	190		7.43	
421 Ghana	7		.27	
Total	393		15.37	

Table 3.5 Distribution of Immigrants from Female-Immigrant Sending Countries

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
218 Korea	75	7.0	7.0	7.0
231 Philippines	50	4.7	4.7	11.7
238 Taiwan	18	1.7	1.7	13.4
317 Panama	20	1.9	1.9	15.3
334 Barbados	29	2.7	2.7	18.0
338 Dominica	5	.5	.5	18.5
339 Dominican Republic	419	39.3	39.3	57.8
342 Haiti	78	7.3	7.3	65.2
343 Jamaica	190	17.8	17.8	83.0
351 Trinidad and Tobago	98	9.2	9.2	92.2
379 Colombia	83	7.8	7.8	100.0
Total	1065	100.0	100.0	

Source: CPS November Voter Supplement, 1996–2002, unweighted.

Table 3.6 Distribution of Immigrants from Male-Immigrant Sending Countries

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
202 Bangladesh	16	6.8	6.8	6.8
212 Iran	4	1.7	1.7	8.5
213 Iraq	1	.4	.4	8.9
216 Jordan	1	.4	.4	9.4
222 Lebanon	1	.4	.4	9.8
224 Malaysia	4	1.7	1.7	11.5
229 Pakistan	22	9.4	9.4	20.9
240 Turkey	6	2.6	2.6	23.4
252 Middle East	1	.4	.4	23.8
253 Palestine	1	.4	.4	24.3
313 Guatemala	27	11.5	11.5	35.7
315 Mexico	108	46.0	46.0	81.7
387 Uruguay	2	.9	.9	82.6
389 South America	2	.9	.9	83.4
415 Egypt	14	6.0	6.0	89.4
421 Ghana	7	3.0	3.0	92.3
436 Morocco	2	.9	.9	93.2
440 Nigeria	14	6.0	6.0	99.1
449 South Africa	1	.4	.4	99.6
468 North Africa	1	.4	.4	100.0
Total	235	100.0	100.0	

Source: CPS November Voter Supplement, 1996–2002, unweighted.

Table 3.7: Odds-Ratios of Voting, Foreign-Born, CPS 1996–2002

	Model 1	**S.E.**	**Model 2**	**S.E.**	**Model 3**	**S.E.**
Female	1.183*	0.099	1.273**	0.112	0.745	0.234
Employed	1.193	0.126	1.394**	0.143	1.008	0.215
Unmarried	0.960	0.107	0.904	0.120	0.701*	0.202
Children 0–6	1.258	0.189	1.406	0.222	1.344	0.305
Children 6–18	1.049	0.130	1.059	0.148	1.009	0.230
Immigrant-Specific Variables						
Distance to home country more than 2K miles			1.425**	0.174	1.427**	0.174
Civil rights index			0.944	0.044	0.939	0.044
Labor force sex-parity index			1.091**	0.040	1.118**	0.054
Male immigrant-sending countries			1.076	0.265	1.604	0.326
Female immigrant-sending countries			1.449**	0.182	1.184	0.234
In the U.S. for less than 15 years			0.193***	0.187	0.190***	0.188
In the U.S. between 15 and 30 years			0.529***	0.135	0.520***	0.136
Interaction Terms						
Female*Employed					1.623**	0.240
Female*Unmarried					1.499*	0.248
Female*Children 0–6					1.100	0.421
Female*Children 6–18					1.056	0.281
Female*Male immigrant sending country					0.371*	0.539
Female*Female immigrant-sending country					1.354	0.239
Female*Labor force sex-parity index					0.966	0.064
Constant	0.062***	0.259	0.155***	0.352	0.227***	0.379
N	2,738		2,299		2,299	
Cox & Snell R-squared	0.133		0.176		0.182	
-2 Log Likelihood	2791.800		2202.673		2187.221	
% Predicted Correct	75.0		76.0		76.3	

***p< .001, **p< .05, *p< .10

The model includes control variables for age, level of education, race, poverty status, and year of the survey. Reference categories: No children present in household; Distance to home-country less than 2K miles; Gender-neutral immigrant-sending country; and in the U.S. for 30+ years.

See the full model in Appendix 3.

Table 3.8: Odds-Ratios of Voting, Native-Born Non-White, CPS 1996–2002

	Model 1	**S.E.**	**Model 2**	**S.E.**
Female	1.370***	0.112	0.873	0.293
Employed	1.216	0.127	1.217	0.187
Unmarried	0.931	0.139	0.655*	0.231
Children 0–6	0.980	0.203	0.655	0.365
Children 6–18	1.223	0.152	1.174	0.304
Interaction Terms				
Female*Employed			0.991	0.227
Female*Unmarried			1.763**	0.282
Female*Children 0–6			1.675	0.434
Female*Children 6–18			1.001	0.341
Constant	0.290***	0.248	0.398***	0.308
N	1,732		1,732	
Cox & Snell R-squared	0.169		0.172	
-2 Log Likelihood	2076.359		2070.902	
Chi-square	321.006		326.464	
% Predicted	69.5		69.3	

***p< .001, **p< .05, *p< .10
See the full model in Appendix 3

Table 3.9: Odds-Ratios of Voting, Native-Born White, CPS 1996–2002

	Model 1	**S.E.**	**Model 2**	**S.E.**
Female	1.074	0.095	1.071	0.206
Employed	1.310**	0.128	1.129	0.172
In Poverty	.711**	0.173	0.705**	0.174
Unmarried	0.589***	0.111	.675**	0.163
Children 0–6	0.731*	0.188	0.848	0.274
Children 6–18	1.365*	0.169	1.579*	0.252
Interaction Terms				
Female*Employed			1.325	0.202
Female*Unmarried			0.789	0.218
Female*Children 0–6			0.805	0.356
Female*Children 6–18			0.802	0.319
Constant	0.215***	0.219	0.216***	0.246
N	2,441		2,441	
Cox & Snell R-squared	0.161		0.162	
-2 Log Likelihood	2794.505		2791.718	
Chi-square	429.705		432.492	
% Predicted	69.5		69.5	

***p< .001, **p< .05, *p< .10
See the full model in Appendix 3

Figure 3.1: Sex Composition of Selected Immigrant Groups at Age 18 or Older, Arrived in the U.S. after 1980



Source: Census 2000 PUMS 5 Percent data.

Figure 3.2: Percent Naturalized for Selected Immigrant Groups, at age 18 or Older, Arrived in the U.S. after 1980



Source: Census 2000 PUMS 5 Percent data.

Figure 3.3: Percent Immigrants in Labor Force (of Working Age Population), Selected Groups, Arrived in the U.S. after 1980



Source: Census 2000 PUMS 5 Percent data.



Source: Census 2000 PUMS 5 Percent data.



Source: Census 2000 PUMS 5 Percent data.

Chapter 4

Gender and Voting Turnout in Context: An Analysis of New York City's 2000 Voter Registration and Turnout File

This chapter looks at the relationship between gender and context in political participation in New York City, using the New York City Board of Election's 2000 voter registration and turnout data at the individual level and 2000 Census data at the election district level. As established in Chapter 1, the gender gap in turnout in the 2000 general election varied substantially across racially/ethnically distinct election districts for the overall sample, with women in Black and Hispanic neighborhoods voting at higher rates than their male counterparts in these neighborhoods (see Maps 1.3 and 1.4). This chapter involves mainly exploratory data analyses utilizing the Hierarchical Generalized Linear Model (HGLM), a multilevel data analysis combining individual and contextual data, specifically designed to examine neighborhood effects on outcome variables. The chapter first reviews the literature on the impact of neighborhood context on minority and immigrant political participation. Second, it will systematically examine the gender effect in voting across election districts for the overall sample. Third, focusing on the Hispanic sample, it will examine the variation in Hispanic female-male turnout rates across racially/ethnically distinct election districts.

Previous Research

In addition to studies of traditional demographic and SES models of minority and immigrant political participation, there is a rich literature focusing on the effect of neighborhood context on minority and immigrant political participation. These studies emphasize how the neighborhood context shapes immigrant electoral participation.

Neighborhood demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, party politics, leadership in the ethnic community, and residential patterns, according to these studies, predict the incidence of political participation. These studies can be classified into two groups. One group develops a political socialization literature to explain and predict the levels of immigrant political participation in various neighborhoods, whereas the other develops a political mobilization literature by focusing on the effect of neighborhood political settings such as established ethnic leadership, party politics, and the implementation of federally mandated acts concerning minority participation and representation, to explain the variation in the levels of minority participation at the contextual level. The first group of studies primarily focuses on the link between individual resources and political participation and the ways through which such resources and skills are gained, whereas the second group focuses on the factors within a political context that have mobilizing/demobilizing effects on low-resource groups.

Studies of political participation and context from the political socialization perspective link the relationship between minority/immigrant voting and context to the process of political socialization, seen as the mechanism through which the development of "civic skills" can be acquired. The basic assumption in this model is that minority and immigrant groups cannot fully acquire such skills in racially/ethnically segregated areas since the process of immigrant socializing into mainstream society cannot be fully realized. Living in racially concentrated areas increases the cost of obtaining political information for the newcomers and their children because they are less likely to learn English, and thus less likely to interact with native-born citizens (Cho, Gimpel, and Dyck, 2006; Tam Cho, 1999). Because such racially segregated low-resource

neighborhoods lead minority and immigrant groups to detach from mainstream society due to the lack of "information flow" between them and natives with higher levels of individual resources, some degree of spatial assimilation into more ethnically-integrated areas would eventually facilitate higher levels of political engagement of minority and immigrant groups (Portes, 1987; Portes and Rumbaut, 1996; Sanders and Nee, 1987).

A recent study examining the variation in voting behavior of four groups of Asian Americans in 16 counties in and outside California — Florida, Iowa, Pennsylvania, New Mexico, Kentucky, and North Carolina — employs this approach (Cho, Gimpel, and Dyck, 2005). After a surname analysis to identify the Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Asian Indian registered voters from the official voter registration lists for the 2000 general election, Cho, Gimpel, and Dyck employ Hierarchical General Linear Modeling to look into how ethnic residential concentration and context might structure these Asian groups' voting behavior.[1] Their results suggest that, in locations outside California, an increase in the presence of coethnic populations significantly diminishes the likelihood of voting for all four Asian groups under study, a finding that, they suggest, gives evidence to political socialization theory of immigrant participatory behavior. The explanation they offer is that the availability of information flow through which individuals learn about and come to understand mainstream politics is conditioned by the resources present in the neighborhood as measured by its SES, and that the degree of presence of coethnic populations impact this process as well. Specifically, they argue that, regardless of neighborhood SES indicators, substantial coethnic populations inhibit information flow, whereas lower levels of concentration facilitate it. Their finding for the Asian voting

[1] They use two sets of data: the individual-level voter data and contextual-level demographic data at the census-tract level.

outcomes in locations in California is however ambiguous. The lack of evidence for their political socialization argument from the California locations, they argue, is due to minority political mobilization activities in this state, and they conclude that the results from outside California locations show the real effect of ethnic concentration in the absence of such political mobilization efforts.

The second group of studies focuses on the effect of the political setting of neighborhoods on the political behavior of citizens (Barreto, Segura, and Woods, 2004; Mollenkopf, Olson, and Ross, 2001; Mollenkopf and Minnite, 2001). These studies suggest that living among large numbers of minority and immigrant groups with the same racial/ethnic background may lead individuals to identify common problems and goals, and to develop a distinct group consciousness that leads to a sense of community, which in turn facilitates immigrant political mobilization. In addition, the studies emphasize that access by newcomers and their children to elected office as well as to polling booths is shaped more, or as much, by the local political establishment and by local election systems than it is by their individual-level characteristics (Mollenkopf, 1999; Mollenkopf, Olson, and Ross, 2001).

In another study, employing ecological analysis of political participation of immigrant communities in New York City, Mollenkopf and Minnite (2001) attribute Asians' lower level of political mobilization to their lower levels of residential concentration as well as to their recent arrival and to home-country-specific factors. On the other hand, they find that West Indian immigrants in New York City, who live in high levels of ethnic concentration, are politically highly mobilized and have for some time been able to elect quite a few of their members to local and national offices.

A few studies, on the other side, focus on one single minority and immigrant group, and examine the impact of majority-minority political districts on their turnout rates in comparison with that in non-majority-minority districts.[2] The basic assumption in these studies is that living among co-ethnics has a positive and empowering effect on these groups due to the relatively high levels of incentive for the minority to turnout and vote to elect a candidate of their own to office. These studies, however, have produced mixed results. One group of studies points to the positive and empowering effect of such districts on the minority vote (Bobo and Gilliam, 1990; Barreto, Segura, and Woods, 2004). Other studies suggest either no substantial increase in the turnout rates of minority voters (Brace, Hardley, Niemi, and Stanley, 1995; Gay, 2001), or find that ethnically concentrated areas are "safe seats" for candidates running for elected offices that result in non-competitive elections suppressing turnout rates of minority voters (DeSipio, 2001; Guinier, 1994).

A recent study employing this approach is Barreto, Segura, and Woods' study (2004) on the voting behavior of Latinos in California. Using actual voter registration and turnout files for the three general elections from 1996 to 2000, they examine whether majority-Latino districts increase Latino's likelihood of voting.[3] Their identification of majority-Latino districts is based on the racial/ethnic composition of the State Assembly, State Senate, and the U.S. congressional districts falling within the boundaries of the five Southern California counties -- Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, and

[2] The creation of majority-minority districts has been a legally mandated practice for securing minority representation in the U.S. under the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In practice, many minority representatives were elected to legislative offices from these districts (Barreto et al., 2004).

[3] They identify Latino voters in the turnout data using the Census Bureau's Spanish surname list for 1990. This identification was made separately three times using the political boundaries of the State Assembly, the State Senate, and the U.S. congressional districts.

Ventura. Using individual-level data, they employ logistic regression models and introduce dummy place variables for the type of district Latinos live in: a Latino registered voter could be living in a non-majority-Latino district; in only one majority-Latino district, or in multiple majority-Latino districts.[4] The identification of voters' neighborhoods SES indicators is done at the zip-code level, using census data that is also attached to each voter in the data.[5] The results of their data analysis show that majority-Latino districts have a positive effect on Latino voting once contextual SES characteristics are controlled for. In addition, the effect is more substantial when the Latinos reside in multiple majority-Latino districts.

Although there are systematic methodological differences between the two models of studies ― political socialization and political mobilization models― they both inform us about the contextual-level dynamics of immigrant political incorporation.[6] However, what these models lack in common is any attempt to focus on the relationship between gender and context in minority/immigrant voting. Utilizing the Hierarchical Generalized Linear Model (HGLM), the version of traditional Hierarchical Linear Model (HLM) for non-linear outcomes, I investigate contextual variation in female-male average turnout rate in racially/ethnically distinct locations of New York City. The exploratory spatial data analysis, summarized in Chapter 1, clearly shows that the

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4 They identify a majority-Latino district as one in which when more than 50 percent of the voting-age population is Latino.

5 The problem with working within the larger context of political and demographic boundaries, instead of precinct level or census-tract level contextual factors, is that it may not reveal the presence of any significant variation in Latino voting across these smaller units due to level of aggregation. In addition, there appears to be some inconsistency in the decision to choose two contextual boundaries that are not overlapping.

6 One such example is that the first group of studies tends to employ continuous variables to measure the presence of minority and immigrant population, whereas the latter studies employ dummy place variables to study the effect of ethnic concentration on political behavior.

women's vote is substantially overrepresented in the city's Black and Hispanic areas, where one of the groups is either the majority, or where both are present in about equal percentages. As reviewed, the focus of previous studies on neighborhood effects has solely focused on the average turnout rates of the general electorate, or of a specific minority group across these minority and immigrant neighborhoods, with no reference to the potential variation in turnout among female and male voters.

HGLM Estimation for Overall Voters and Findings

The HGLM analysis will begin using the overall sample and then the Hispanic sample from the New York City Board of Election's voter registration and turnout file for the 2000 presidential election (see Chapter 2 for details of the data). The reason for focusing on the Hispanic group is theoretical as well as methodological. Studies on Latino political participation in the U.S. suggest that there is a "Latin American exceptionalism" in that Latin American women have higher levels of political participation than their male counterparts as measured by their naturalization and voting rates (Bass and Casper, 2001; Jones-Correa, 2001) and as measured by their informal political activities such as community activism (Hardy-Fanta, 1993; Jones-Correa, 1998a, 1998b). My goal in focusing on the Hispanic sample is to contribute to this literature. The methodological ground to focus on one single ethnic group is to avoid the effects of race/ethnicity as a confounding factor on the relationship between female-male voting and neighborhood effect. Previous studies have shown that when studying contextual effects on voting behavior, focusing on one racial/ethnic group helps avoiding artificial exaggeration of contextual relationships (Huckfeldt, 1979).

The universe of this analysis is the registered voters. The dependent variable is

binary (1=voted, 0=did not vote). The Level I independent variables come from the voter registration file: age, sex, and party identification. The 'age' variable is introduced as a series of dummy variables with voters over 64 years of age as the reference category. The 'sex' variable is introduced as the 'female' variable since female voters are coded as '1'. I expect a positive coefficient; however, this coefficient is not constant, but varies across election districts. Finally, dummy variables for being registered Democrat and Republican are introduced in the models with the 'other' category as the reference category.

The Level I model specification results in an equation for each election district, consisting of logistic regression coefficients (the slopes) that estimate the effect of individual level explanatory variables on participation. The equation also estimates an intercept (the constant), which represents the average log-odds of turnout across all election districts. The regression coefficients (the slopes) may vary across election districts (EDs), depending upon theoretical expectations, and the Level II variables can be used to predict this variation in both the intercept and the regression coefficients. The gender differences across election districts will be assessed controlling for these limited individual-level variables. The equation for the Level I model is written as:

$$\text{Turnout}_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}(\text{Female})_{ij} + \beta_{2j}(\text{Age 18-29})_{ij} + \beta_{3j}(\text{Age 30-39})_{ij} + \beta_{4j}(\text{Age 40-49})_{ij} + \beta_{5j}(\text{Age 50-64})_{ij} + \beta_{6j}(\text{Democrat})_{ij} + \beta_{7j}(\text{Republican})_{ij} + r_{ij} \quad [1]$$

Where the subscript *i* is the individual and the subscript *j* is the election district and where r_{ij} represents the residual for individual *i* within election district *j*. The subscript *j* permits each election district to have a unique slope for each individual-level

independent variable's effect on turnout, contingent upon the predictors and error terms at Level II. Since the focus of this study is to examine the relationship between gender effect and context, all the Level I predictors, except gender, will be treated as fixed variables, that is, the model will not allow these variables' effect on voting to vary across election districts. The intercept term will be the second random variable of this analysis.[7]

The goal is to test if there is a significant gender effect within an election district, and if this effect varies between election districts when the effects of other individual level background variables are fixed.[8]

The development of the contextual-level independent variables is guided by previous studies of the neighborhood effects on political participation. These theoretically relevant measures are: population density (logged), percent citizen voting-age population (CVAP), percent elderly, percent in poverty, Black EDs, Hispanic EDs, and Asian EDs, Mixed-minority EDs, and White-majority EDs.[9] These EDs are identified based on Exploratory Data Analysis techniques (ESDA), and will be introduced as dummy variables, with the White-majority EDs as the reference category (for a detailed explanation of the procedures used to construct these EDs, see Appendix 2). The equation for the main effects of Level II predictors is as follows:

$$\beta_{0j}\,(\text{Neighborhood Mean})_{ij} = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11}\,(\%\text{CVAP}) + \gamma_{12}\,(\%\text{ Elderly}) + \gamma_{13}\,(\%\text{Poverty}) + \gamma_{14}\,(\text{Density}) + \qquad [2]$$

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7 The equation [1] estimates an intercept (constant), which represents the average log-odds of turnout across all election districts.

8 The assumption that the effect of age and party identification on likelihood of voting is fixed across election districts may not seem realistic given that previous research has shown that the effect of partisanship on voting may be higher in heavily Democratic election districts than moderate Democratic or Republican areas (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995, p. 258). However, employing this assumption is legitimate in systematic exploration of the relationship between context and individual-level variables of interest (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002, p. 267).

$$\gamma_{15}\,(\text{Asian ED}) + \gamma_{16}\,(\text{Black ED}) + \gamma_{17}\,(\text{Hispanic ED}) + \gamma_{18}\,(\text{Mixed-Minority ED}) + u_{1j}$$

The equation above estimates the effect of contextual characteristics on the mean value of turnout across all election districts.

The cross-level interaction terms between gender and Level II predictors will inform us about the contextual factors moderating the difference between male and female voters' turnout. The equation for the cross-level interaction terms is as follows:

$$\beta_{1j}\,(\text{Female})_{ij} = \gamma_{20} + \gamma_{21}\,(\%\text{CVAP}) + \gamma_{22}\,(\%\text{ Elderly}) + \gamma_{23}\,(\%\text{Poverty}) + \gamma_{24}\,(\text{Asian ED}) + \gamma_{24}\,(\text{Black ED}) + \gamma_{25}\,(\text{Hispanic ED}) + \gamma_{26}\,(\text{Mixed-Minority ED}) + u_j \quad [3]$$

This model assesses the extent to which the neighborhood-level variables moderate the relationship between gender and turnout. The term, β_{1j}, measures the difference in the log-odds of voting between male and female registered voters.

The most important methodological advantage of using a hierarchical model to analyze the relationship between individual-level outcomes and context is that it introduces two error terms in the statistical models: one at the individual-level, r_{ij}, and one at the contextual-level, u_{1j}. Estimates of turnout using either individual-level data or aggregate-level contextual data may produce biased estimates due to single-level estimation.[10]

All the hierarchical models were estimated using the software program

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9 Other indicators of neighborhood SES such as education and income level, or presence of non-Hispanic White population, are not introduced in the working models presented in this chapter due to multicollinearity issues.

10 The traditional models using individual-level data are based on the assumptions of independence and homogeneity of variance, that is, random errors are independent and have constant variance. This assumption is problematic for the voter registration and turnout data given that voters within certain election districts tend to have similar demographic and socioeconomic backgrounds; therefore, voters tend to be more similar to others within their locations than to those in distant locations. As far as this data set is

Hierarchical Linear Models for Windows, version 5.06.[11] The estimates were generated using quasi-likelihood estimation. The analysis is based on the unit-specific results that emphasize how the effects of neighborhood characteristics influence the Level I relationships.[12]

Table 4.1 presents the results of the Hierarchical Generalized Linear models for the overall registered voter sample. Model I is the basic model without the cross-level interaction terms and Model II is the expanded model with the cross-level interaction terms (see Table 4.1).

Model I in Table 4.1 shows that, consistent with previous work on political participation in contextual perspective, turnout rates are significantly influenced by neighborhood characteristics as measured by the presence of elderly, citizen voting-age population, poverty level, and population density (see Appendix 4 for the full model for Table 4.1). Furthermore, as expected, compared to turnout in White-majority election districts, turnout rates in Asian, Black, Hispanic, and Mixed-minority election districts are significantly lower. For example, compared to registered voters in White-majority districts, registered voters in Hispanic EDs are about 16 percent less likely to turnout to vote, a finding significant at $p<.001$.

The other finding from Model I is that being female increases the mean turnout rate (parameter estimate = 0.1948, s.e.=0.0035, $p<.001$), but its effect is not uniform across election districts. Although the variance component term for the female variable is

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concerned, employing a statistical model that assumes independence not between individuals, but between locations is most appropriate.

[11] See details of hierarchical generalized linear models in Chapter 10 in *Hierarchical Linear Models: Applications and Data Analysis Methods* (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002).

[12] The other method, the population-average method, does not provide information on the variation of outcomes across level-two units. (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002, pp. 303-304).

small (.0325), it is statistically significant at p<.001. What would explain this variation in female-male turnout across election districts? Model II with cross-level interaction terms in Table 4.1 provides some answers. The interaction term between female and poverty measure (parameter estimate = 0.0063, s.e.=.0003, p<.001) suggests that a 10 percentage-point increase in poverty level in an election district increases the difference in the female-male vote by 6 percent. Whatever the neighborhood advantages or disadvantages are in the city's low-status areas, it seems that they have a differential impact on female and male voting behavior. Using the Hispanic sample, this argument will be examined in a systematic fashion.

Model II also shows that neighborhood racial/ethnic composition mediates the effect of gender on voting. The cross-level interaction terms between gender and racially/ethnically identified EDs suggest that except in Asian EDs, the gender gap in voting significantly increases in Black, Hispanic, and minority-majority EDs. For example, the gender gap in voting in Hispanic election districts increases by 8.68-percentage points (parameter estimate = 0.1338, s.e.=0.0111, p< .001).[13] In election districts identified as Black EDs, the gender gap reaches about 16-percentage points (see column headed, "Estimated Probability," in Table 4.1). Furthermore, the results of the full model suggest that there is no significant gender effect on voting in White-majority and Asian EDs, with only 2 and 3 percentage-points difference in female-male voting,

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13 Calculating the regression coefficient for female in an election district identified as Hispanic is as follows: 0.0834 + [0.1338 + 0.1338*(1)] = 0.0834 – 0.2676 = 0.3510. Given this coefficient, I calculate the odds-ratio for 0.3510 and find it as 1.4205. Using the formula odds/1 + odds, I find a probability value of 0.5868. This is, the probability of female registered voters turning out to vote when the baseline value (that is the probability of male registered voters turning out to vote) is set to a probability value of 0.50. So I find that moving from male to female voter in a typical Hispanic neighborhood causes a change in the estimated probability of voting by about 8.68 percent.

respectively.

The result of the chi-square significance testing shows that introduction of cross-level interaction terms improved the fit of the basic HGLM model at $p<.001$. In addition, these interaction terms reduce the variation in the intercept term, B_{0j}, by 6 percent whereas they reduce the variation in the slope for gender, B_{1j}, by 67 percent.[14]

Higher levels of gender effect on turnout rates in Black and Hispanic neighborhoods may well be attributed to gender gap in voting between native-born and/or foreign-born people of color as discussed in Chapter 3. Using an all-Hispanic sample, a systematic analysis of the relationship between gender and context can be examined. If the phenomenon of the gender gap is limited to certain minority or immigrant groups, the difference in female-male voting for these groups should not vary substantially across election districts.

Hispanic Gender Gap in Voting Turnout in Context

Hispanic registered voters make up about 18 percent of the New York City Board of Election's 2000 general election data. Although this official data set does not contain information on Hispanics by group, nativity status, or immigrant-generation status, the Current Population Survey (CPS) 2000 November supplement may be utilized to estimate the Hispanic electorate by such categories in comparison with their demographic profile.

Not only has the share of the Hispanic population in New York City grown rapidly since the 1980s, reaching 2,160,608 in 2000, and comprising 27 percent of its

14 See Raudenbush and Bryk (2002, p. 74) for the formula to calculate the reduction in variance for the intercept term and slopes.

population, according to the census figures, but its composition by country of origin has also changed, becoming more diversified. Table 4.2 shows the demographic and electoral profile of Hispanics by group, nativity, and immigrant-generation status (see Table 4.2).[15]

Puerto Ricans, the first arriving Hispanic group to the city, comprise about one-third of the city's Hispanic population, according to 2000 CPS November and census figures (see footnote for Table 4.2). Although they are the single largest Hispanic group in the city, their share within the Hispanic population has declined dramatically since 1990, when they constituted half the Hispanic population. The demographic and migration trends show that their share will continue to decline, leading to a more diverse Hispanic population in the city. Puerto Ricans are the only Latino group with birthright U.S. citizenship. Due to this citizenship advantage, they comprise a disproportionately large share of the city's Hispanic electorate. As Table 4.2 shows, they constituted about 57 percent of the total Hispanic electorate in 2000. The next largest group, Dominicans, makes up about one-quarter of the total Hispanic population in the city. Despite their status as recent arrivals, compared to Puerto Ricans, and the non-voting eligibility status for those who are not U.S. citizens, Dominican electorate already makes up one-fifth of the total Hispanic electorate of the city, a figure that corresponds to their share in the Hispanic voting-age population (see column 2 of Table 4.2). One possible explanation for

[15] The estimates for the demographic profile are from the CPS 2000 November Supplement, not from the 2000 Census figures. One reason to use the CPS data is to provide data consistency for the electoral and demographic figures given that the CPS data is the only source for New York City residents' electoral profile. The other reason is that although the 2000 Census data is an excellent data source, it does not provide detailed information on Hispanics by group membership due to the way the census questionnaire is designed. For example, 16.5 percent of Hispanics did not specify their group, and therefore are classified under the "All Other Latinos" category.

their already-visible presence in the city's electoral politics is that this group, due to their high residential concentration in the Washington Heights neighborhood in northern Manhattan, was quick to establish an influential leadership within the community (Falcon, 2005; Mollenkopf and Miranda, 2002).

Mexicans, the fastest growing Latino group in the city, had become the third single largest Latino group by 2000. Although they constitute about 10 percent of the Latino population, however, they barely make up a presence in its electorate, with a share of only 2 percent. Recent Latino immigrants from countries in South and Central America other than Mexico make the city's Latino population even more diversified, constituting about a quarter of all Hispanics in New York City.[16] Table 4.2 shows that their share in the Hispanic electorate (15 percent) is much smaller than their share in the total population (26 percent). Their dispersed residential pattern, lack of established leadership within their communities, institutional barriers such as their lack of citizenship-eligibility, and language barriers may be contributing to this difference. However, as they continue to grow in numbers and gain more experience in their adopted country, their share in the electorate is expected to grow.

New York City is a highly racially/ethnically segregated cities in the United States (Alba, Logan, and Stultz, 2000). Identification of five types of racially/ethnically distinct election districts using ESDA techniques is an outcome of this fact. Table 4.3 shows the distribution of Hispanic registered voters by these election districts (see Table 4.3).

About half of all Hispanic registered voters live in Hispanic-majority election

[16] The 2000 Census figures show that immigrants from this part of the world are arriving from Ecuador, Colombia, Honduras, El Salvador, and Peru in sizable numbers.

districts, whereas one-quarter live in mixed-minority districts in which the Hispanic group constitutes the plurality of the district population, comprising altogether three-quarters of all Hispanic registered voters (see Table 2.4 for descriptive statistics of selected demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of these five types of election districts).

HGLM Estimation for Hispanic Voters and Findings

Employing the same Hierarchical General Linear Modeling used for the overall sample (see equations 1, 2, and 3) is not ideal for the Hispanic sample for several reasons. First, that model is developed to discover the effect of gender on voting within and between election districts when the effects of age and party identification (the other Level I variables) are held fixed, meaning that their effects on voting are not allowed to vary by election district. In other words, I assumed homogeneity of variance for these variables in order to test if the gender effect significantly varies within and between election districts. Focusing on the random effect of one single variable while holding others fixed is a legitimate approach in HLM in building as well as in assessing the Level 1 models.[17] However, as previous research suggests, the effect of partisanship on voting may significantly vary by context. A democrat in a heavily Democratic neighborhood may behave politically different from a Democrat in a non-Democratic neighborhood (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995, p. 258; Huckfeldt, 1986, p. 113). In addition, as shown (and as expected) in Table 4.3, the Hispanic sample is unevenly distributed across the five types of election districts, suggesting both theoretically and conceptually distinct subsets of the data. When the Level II predictors can be conceptualized into distinct

subsets, disaggregating the data into subsets and fitting a submodel for each is an alternative to an overall model (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002, p. 267). Instead of using an overall fitted model with fixed and then random effects and then interaction terms, I developed a submodel for each of the five types of election districts to analyze the relationship between gender and context for the Hispanic sample in the following form where equation [4] specifies the Level I model and equation [5] specifies the Level II model:

$$\text{Turnout}_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}(\text{Age 18-29})_{ij} + \beta_{2j}(\text{Age 40-49})_{ij} + \beta_{3j}(\text{Age 50-64})_{ij} + \beta_{4j}(\text{Age 64+})_{ij} + \beta_{5j}(\text{Democrat})_{ij} + \beta_{6j}(\text{Republican})_{ij} + r_{ij} \quad [4]$$

$$\beta_{0j}(\text{Neighborhood Mean})_{ij} = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11}(\%\text{CVAP}) + \gamma_{12}(\%\text{ Elderly}) + \gamma_{13}(\%\text{Poverty}) \quad [5]$$

The goal of analyzing the Hispanic sample is to estimate the likelihood of Hispanic female and male turnout across contextually different settings as measured by their racial/ethnic composition so the specified models above will be run for the female and male voters separately. Suggested by the preliminary findings of this study and previous qualitative work on gendered Hispanic political participation, this goal can be formulated as the following hypothesis:

> ***Hypothesis 1:*** *The difference in the average turnout between Hispanic female and male voters should be significant across racially/ethnically distinct locations. Specifically, regardless of location, the turnout rates for Hispanic females should be significantly higher than that for Hispanic males.*

As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Hispanic sample of the voter registration and

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17 See Raudenbush and Bryk (2002), Chapter 9.

turnout data shows that there is a 20.8-percentage point Hispanic gender difference in voting in the 2000 general election, with 60.4 percent of those Hispanics who voted being female. I argue that is once controlled for age, partisanship, and residential SES, this gender differential in Hispanic turnout would diminish, but the gap would remain and would not significantly vary across racially/ethnically segregated or integrated locations.

Of the five racially/ethnically distinct election districts (EDs), the Hispanic EDs and White-majority EDs represent the two areas at opposite ends of the racial/ethnic composition continuum: the first location (Hispanic EDs) represents high levels of co-ethnic concentration, whereas the second type of location (White-majority EDs) represents high levels of spatial ethnic integration of the non-white minority and immigrant groups. These two types of areas will be the focus for the remainder of the paper.

Table 4.4 presents the differences in the estimated probabilities of Hispanic female and male turnout by partisanship status in Hispanic and White-majority election districts (see Table 4.4).

The results underscore two central findings. First, regardless of party identification, Hispanic females in Hispanic EDs turnout to vote at significantly higher rates than do their male counterparts, with the greatest difference among the Democratic Hispanics -- 12 percentage points. Second, the Hispanic gender gap in turnout disappears in White-majority EDs, providing evidence against my hypothesis that, regardless of location, the turnout rates for Hispanic females should be significantly higher than that for Hispanic males. In other words, contrasting the gender gap in turnout between Hispanics living among their co-ethnics (Hispanic EDs) and Hispanics living among

Whites reveals that the phenomenon of the Hispanic gender gap is not essentialist in nature.

When the observed probabilities of voting in these two locations (see Table 4.5) are compared to the estimated probabilities, it is revealed that the observed Hispanic gender gap is slightly smaller than expected in Hispanic areas, whereas it is slightly greater than expected in White-majority areas, pointing to the absence of exaggerated over- or under-estimation of the data (Liao, 1994; Eliason, 1993).

What would explain the fact that the Hispanic female and male turnout rates in White-majority areas appear to converge? One possible explanation may be provided by looking into the magnitude of contextual factors on Hispanic female/male turnout in areas where they are concentrated the most and the least. The White-majority EDs represent New York City's high-resource areas, whereas the Hispanic EDs are the areas of low-resource neighborhoods (see Table 2.4 in Chapter 2 for selected ED characteristics). Previous research suggests that in high-resource locations, the effect of contextual factors on political participation diminishes (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995; Huckfeldt, 1986). In other words, individuals' political activity is conditioned more by their surrounding context in low-resource neighborhoods than by their own individual characteristic, compared to individuals living in high-resource neighborhoods. However, previous qualitative data on gendered immigrant political participation (Hardy-Fanta, 1993; Jones-Correa, 1998a, 1998b) point to the importance of such factors as the gendered social networks, forms of household structure and responsibilities, and migration strategies within a given immigrant community, all of which have usually been influential in socioeconomically highly disadvantaged ethnically segregated areas. If such

noncontextual factors as those mentioned above can predict Hispanic women's political participation in a given neighborhood, we then can expect a differential effect of context on Hispanic political activity by gender in a given location, which leads to the formulation of the following hypothesis:

> ***Hypothesis 2:*** *The impact of contextual factors on Hispanic voting behavior should vary differentially by gender across racially/ethnically distinct locations.*

Table 4.6 presents the results of Level II coefficients (see equation [5]) and their explanatory power on Hispanic female/male turnout in Hispanic and White-majority areas (see Table 4.6).

The model produced Level II coefficients that are small, but most have statistical significance (see Table 4.6 in full version in Appendix 4). However, it is worth mentioning that context does still matter in voting outcomes when the denominator is registered voters. This group of Hispanic voters represents without question a self-selected population of Hispanics who have overcome individual, contextual, and institutional barriers by completing the act of registration. Those who are foreign-born also went through the naturalization process (if we take the finding from the 2000 CPS November data as a fact, about 30 percent of the Hispanic registered voters are foreign-born). In other words, whatever the social and political processes in play in minority and immigrant incorporation, they have long been in play for this Hispanic sample. From this perspective, I would argue that any result that is significant, however small, would be an important finding, given that significant results are produced by most conservative

estimates.[18]

The results of the data analysis presented in Table 4.6 underscore three central findings. First, consistent with previous work, turnout rates across location are powerfully influenced by such traditional contextual predictors of political participation as neighborhood poverty level, percent of citizen voting-age population, and percent of elderly in the neighborhood. Second, the power of the conditioning influence of contextual variables on turnout varies by location, as suggested by previous research that found that the effect of contextual predictors diminishes in high-resource neighborhoods as individual-level attributes more powerfully predict the neighborhood-level turnout rates (Huckfeldt, 1986, 1979). Hispanics living in a typical White-majority ED are much less influenced by contextual factors than Hispanics living among co-ethnics. Third, the results show that Hispanic females are less influenced by contextual factors than are their male counterparts, possibly pointing to the more powerful effect of noncontextual factors on Latina voting behavior (see Appendix 4 for the full version of Table 4.6).

The regression coefficients in Table 4.6 clearly show that resources available in a neighborhood are associated with the average turnout level in that neighborhood. The significance and direction of the effect of the poverty measure on female and male turnout rates within the two types of EDs is consistent with previous work. As expected, the neighborhood poverty level and the neighborhood turnout rate are negatively associated, and the significance of this relationship is at better than 1 percent significance level. The direction of the effect of percent of elderly in the neighborhood on voting across the locations is unambiguous, with higher levels of elderly population clearly

[18] Also see Cho, Gimpel, and Dyck (2006) and Barreto, Segura, and Woods (2004) for a detailed discussion on the use of official turnout data in explaining voting outcomes.

predicting higher levels of Hispanic female and male turnout. However, this effect is not statistically significant for predicting the Hispanic female turnout in White-majority EDs. Finally, the results show that the relationship between citizen voting-age population and neighborhood turnout rate varies both in significance and in direction across locations. For example, contrary to expectations, in a typical Hispanic-majority ED, higher percentages of citizen voting-age population predicts lower levels of turnout rate. One factor that may explain this is the presence of large numbers of both mainland-born and island-born Puerto Ricans in these election districts. Puerto Ricans are U.S. citizens by birth; however they have significantly lower turnout rates compared to native-born Whites, which may explain the variation in both the direction and significance of this relationship across the locations.

In sum, except for the percent of citizen voting age population measure, the regression coefficients indicate a consistent influence of neighborhood resources on female and male turnout in Hispanic and White-majority EDs. But how much variation can these three contextual variables explain about female/male voter turnout at the neighborhood level across these locations? How much do they explain these rates? Does the variables' explanatory power vary by gender? To answer these questions, I ran unconditional HGLM estimations when no Level II predictors were included, and then compared the results to the full HGLM estimations when the three Level II variables were included. The results of the comparison show that the inclusion of these three Level II predictors reduces the variance in average Hispanic turnout in both Hispanic and White-majority EDs at better than 1 percent significance level. As expected, the variance in the neighborhood-level turnout rate explained by these contextual factors is the lowest

in White-majority election districts. These Level II variables explain 14.2 percent and 15.9 percent of the variation in Hispanic male and female turnout rates, respectively. In other words, the three contextual-level variables included in the full model explain 14.2 percent of the variation in the Hispanic male turnout rate. The inclusion of the same predictors reduces the variation in the Hispanic female turnout rate by 15.9 percent. However, the finding of no variation in the contextual effects on turnout between Hispanic female and male was not expected. Unlike these results, findings regarding Hispanic female and male turnout rates in Hispanic EDs, however, inform us about gendered processes in Hispanic political activity. First, as expected, the effect of context on Hispanic turnout is substantially higher in a typical Hispanic ED. For example, the explanatory power of the three Level II variables in explaining the variation in Hispanic male turnout is 42.8 percent — a reduction in variation that is about three times higher than that in a typical White-majority ED for the same group. Similarly, these three Level II variables explain substantially more of the variation in Hispanic female turnout in a typical Hispanic ED — a reduction that is nearly twice as high as that in a typical White-majority ED. These results are consistent with previous research suggesting higher contextual effects on turnout in socio-economically low-status locations (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995; Huckfeldt, 1986).

However, the difference in the contextual effect on Hispanic female/male turnout in a typical Hispanic ED is striking. The results of the data analysis show that although changes in the levels of neighborhood poverty, percent of citizen voting-age population, and percent od elderly in an election district identified as Hispanic can explain about half the variation in the Hispanic male turnout rates, they only explain about a quarter of the

variation in the Hispanic female turnout rates (42.8 percent and 25.9 percent, respectively). This difference is substantial. In addition, I found that Hispanic females, compared to Hispanic males, are less affected by their surrounding contexts across the four ethnically concentrated or mixed locations. The predicting power of these variables in explaining the Hispanic male turnout rate ranges from 29.2 percent to 49.8 percent. Their explanatory power for the Hispanic female turnout rate across the four types of EDs ranges from 22.7 percent to 28.8 percent (see Appendix 4 for the full version of Table 4.6). The 20.6-percentage point range among Hispanic males is substantially larger than the range of 6.1-percentage points among the Hispanic females across these four types of election districts. These results are consistent with previous qualitative work on gendered immigrant political participation in that such noncontextual factors as gendered migration and settlement strategies, the ethnic establishment's attitude toward female participation, and gendered social networks due to gendered household structure and responsibilities, might be at play predicting their political activity, providing a possible explanation to the findings of this study. However, the disappearance of this gender gap in the contextual effect on Hispanic turnout in White-majority EDs is puzzling. As formulated earlier, I hypothesized that the effect of the contextual factors on Hispanic turnout should vary differentially by gender, given that the potentially important noncontextual factors mentioned above would have more or less the same amount of effect on turnout rates across racially/ethnically distinct EDs. However, the findings regarding the White-majority EDs suggest that it might not be so. Perhaps the presumed gendered noncontextual factors disappear as Hispanics move into White neighborhoods. Or, perhaps Hispanic women's presumed relatively high levels of inclination to stay longer or

permanently in the U.S. is a strategy regardless of whether they live among co-ethnics or not, but it may well be that first- and second-immigrant generation men are more home-country oriented when living among coethnics but that this ideology is dramatically being replaced by an attitude toward settlement in the U.S. for those settled in White-majority neighborhoods.

Discussion and Conclusion

The first important point to make in regard to these results is that neither political socialization nor political mobilization literatures can adequately explain the relationship between gender and Hispanic voting. The findings clearly suggest that the political consequences of being Hispanic differ dramatically between Hispanic-majority and White-majority neighborhoods, as expected. However, what is not expected is the disappearance of the Hispanic gender gap in turnout in White-majority EDs, which is strongly evidenced in Hispanic EDs. Moreover, for Hispanic men, the context within Hispanic EDs matters substantially more than it does for Hispanic women. Disadvantaged neighborhoods pose constraints on citizens' voting rates. If such disadvantaged neighborhoods have lower levels of political socialization at the individual level and/or higher levels of political mobilization at the group level, this should effect female and male ethnics more or less equally.

If ethnic deconcentration or spatial assimilation is an indication of upward mobility, we expect higher levels of political participation, which lends support to the political socialization approach. However, I find evidence that net of some individual-level background controls, Hispanic female registered voters who are registered Democrat, and living in disadvantaged neighborhoods, may be able to overcome, to some

degree, these disadvantages, compared to their male counterparts. The results suggest that the prevalence of non-Hispanic White population has a more positive impact on the political participation of men than that of women. How may this result be interpreted? Can we assume that Hispanic men catch up with women in terms of voting behavior when they live in White-majority neighborhoods?

Since the individual-level data miss such key individual-level variables as education, income, and home ownership, from the data we cannot identify low-resource and high-resource Hispanic registered voters. What can be done with this data is to compare the voting behavior of female and male Hispanic registered voters living in the same type of election districts. If we assume that the Hispanic voters in high-resource areas have relatively higher levels of individual resources compared to Hispanic voters in low-resource areas, the variation in the gender gap in turnout in high-resource areas and in low-resource areas may be attributed to the differences in individual resources between the two groups of voters. This may point to a class dimension among Hispanics and its effect on immigrant political participation. If we assume that Hispanic voters living in White-majority EDs come more often from middle-class background compared to Hispanic voters in Hispanic EDs, and that the data analyzed for this project captures this group, the disappearance of the gender gap in turnout may reflect a possible convergence of Hispanic female and male political behavior due to their middle-class values. This is a group that is underexamined in qualitatively oriented studies. As for the quantitative studies, the traditional individual-level SES models of voting behavior for the overall citizenry show that the effect of gender — as well as of marriage — on voting is stronger among the low-income groups whereas it is weak among the individuals with high SES,

suggesting educational attainment and income as intervening variables for the other individual-level predictors of voting. Overlooking such potential relationships between gender and other individual-level variables may lead researchers of immigrant and minority political participation to come to conclusions that are possibly essentialist in nature. Similarly, the findings from previous qualitative studies that focus on only one segment of minority and immigrant groups may not be applicable to other segments of the same group. As the data presented in this chapter suggest, there clearly is a need for comprehensive qualitative and quantitative research on influence of social class in minority and immigrant political participation.

Table 4.1: Two-Level Hierarchical Analysis of Female and Male Voter Turnout in New York City in the 2000 Presidential Election, Overall Sample

	Model I			Model II			
	Logit Coefficients	Odds-Ratios	Estimated Probability	Logit Coefficients	Computed Logit Coefficients†	Odds-Ratios	Estimated Probability
Neighborhood							
White EDs (baseline category)	0.00	1.00	0.50	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.50
Asian EDs	-0.0698***	0.9326	0.4825	-0.0808***	-0.0808***	0.9224	0.4798
Black EDs	-0.0825***	0.9208	0.4794	-0.2586***	-0.2586***	0.7721	0.4357
Hispanic EDs	-0.1724***	0.8416	0.4570	-0.2530***	-0.2530***	0.7765	0.4371
Mixed-Minority EDs	-0.0993***	0.9055	0.4752	-0.1802***	-0.1802***	0.8351	0.4551
Gender							
Male (baseline category)	0.00	1.00	0.50	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.50
Female	0.1948***	1.2151	0.5486	0.0834***	0.0834***	1.0870	0.5208
Gender-Neighborhood Interactions							
Female*Asian EDs				0.0151	0.1136***	1.1203	0.5284
Female*Black EDs				0.2854***	0.6542***	1.9236	0.6579
Female*Hispanic EDs				0.1338***	0.3510***	1.4205	0.5868
Female*Mixed EDs				0.1339***	0.3512***	1.4208	0.5869
Variance Components							
Intercept	0.1199***	42,583.435[a]		0.1138***	40,565.003[a]		
Female	0.0325***	11,242.385[a]		0.0105***	7,086.676[a]		

Source: New York City Board of Election 2000 Voter Registration and Turnout file and 2000 U.S. Census SF 3 file.
Hierarchical Generalized Linear Model: Slopes and Intercepts Estimation.
† Computed logit coefficients refer to the logit coefficients when the logit coefficients for the main and interaction effects are combined. As an example, calculating the logit coefficient for female in Asian neighborhoods is as follows: 0.0834 + [0.0151 - 0.151*(1)] = 0.0834 + 0.0302 = 0.1136. Given this parameter estimate, I find that moving from male to female voter in a typical Asian election district causes a change in the estimated probability of voting only by 2.8 percent.
a. Chi-square values. **p<.05; ***p<.01.
See Appendix 4 for complete table.

Table 4.2: Hispanics in New York City by Group, Nativity, and Immigrant-Generation Status,

	Demographic Profile		Electoral Profile
	Total Population* (N=748)	**Voting-Age Population** (N=519)	**Electorate** (N=186)
Group			
Puerto Rican	34%	36%	57%
Dominican	24%	22%	20%
Mexican	11%	11%	2%
Central & South American	26%	27%	15%
Other	5%	4%	6%
Total	100%	100%	100%
Nativity Status			
Island-born Puerto Ricans	13%	20%	32%
U.S.-born Puerto Ricans	21%	17%	25%
U.S.-born Other Hispanics	23%	9%	13%
Foreign-Born Hispanics	43%	54%	30%
Total	100%	100%	100%
Immigrant-Generation Status			
Island-Born Puerto Ricans	13%	20%	32%
U.S. Born Puerto Ricans born to Puerto Rico born parents	14%	13%	21%
Second-generation Hispanics	18%	6%	11%
First-generation Hispanics	43%	54%	30%
Third or higher-generation Hispanics	12%	7%	6%
Total	100%	100%	100%

Source: CPS 2000 November Supplement

* The corresponding 2000 Census figures under the "Total Population" category for groups Puerto Rican, Dominican, Mexican, Central & South American, and Other are 36.5%, 18.8%, 8.6%, 15.3%, and 20.8%, respectively. See Footnote 15, an explanation of the discrepancy between the 2000 Census and 2000 CPS figures for the latter two categories of Hispanics.

Table 4.3: Distribution of Hispanic Electorate by Type of ED

	Number	Percent
Hispanic EDs	326,565	50.0%
Mixed-Minority EDs	158,208	24.2%
Black EDs	70,023	10.7%
Asian EDs	38,832	6.0%
White-majority EDs	58,930	9.0%
Total	652,558	100.0

Source: New York City Board of Election 2000 Voter Registration File and 2000 U.S. Census Summary File 3

Table 4.4: Estimated Probabilities of Hispanic Turnout in Hispanic and White-majority EDs							
	Hispanic ED			White-Majority ED			
	Female	**Male**	**Diff.**	**Female**	**Male**	**Diff.**	
Dem.	55.2%	43.2%	12.0***	60.5%	58.9%	1.6	
Rep.	40.3%	34.7%	5.6***	57.8%	59.3%	-1.5	
Other	36.7%	29.9%	6.8***	47.4%	47.4%	0	

Source: New York City Board of Election 2000 Voter Registration and Turnout file; U.S. 2000 Census SF3 file.

Note: These probabilities are estimated for a voter between 30 and 39 years of age. Calculations are from log-odds coefficient obtained from HGLM outputs (see Appendix 4). *** p<0.001.

Table 4.5: Observed Probabilities of Hispanic Turnout in Hispanic and White-majority EDs							
	Hispanic ED			White-Majority ED			
	Female	**Male**	**Diff.**	**Female**	**Male**	**Diff.**	
Dem.	52.4% (N=17,267)	44.1% (N=9,963)	8.3***	60.3% (N=2,785)	57.8% (N=2,184)	2.5***	
Rep.	36.7% (N=1,051)	33.8% (N=1,088)	2.9**	53.9% (N=617)	55.9% (N=757)	-2.0	
Other	36.9% (N=3,515)	32.4% (N=2,411)	4.5***	45.9% (N=891)	47.8% (N=916)	-1.9	

Source: New York City Board of Election 2000 Voter Registration and Turnout file, combined with U.S. 2000 Census SF3 file.
Note: These probabilities are observed for a voter who is ages between 30 -39. *** p<0.001; **p<0.05.

Table 4.6: Two-Level Hierarchical Analysis of Hispanic Turnout in New York City, 2000 Presidential Election

	Hispanic ED		White-Majority ED	
	Female	Male	Female	Male
Level II Means (β_0)				
Intercept	-0.5463*** (0.0178)	-0.7439*** (0.0193)	-0.1059*** (0.0334)	-0.1045*** (0.0348)
% in poverty	-0.0114*** (0.0011)	-0.0176*** (0.0011)	-0.0056** (0.0025)	-0.0105*** (0.0026)
% 65 or over	0.0358*** (0.0046)	0.0339*** (0.0044)	0.0038 (0.0024)	0.0093*** (0.0026)
% citizen VAP	-0.0085*** (0.0017)	-0.0096*** (0.0016)	0.0137*** (0.0021)	0.0106*** (0.0022)
Reduction in variance at Level I[a]	**25.9 %**	**42.8 %**	**15.9 %**	**14.2 %**
Improvement in fit of Level I model[b]	1304.479***	1617.830***	173.087***	157.481***

Source: New York City Board of Election 2000 Voter Registration and Turnout file and 2000 U.S. Census Summary File 3.
Hierarchical Generalized Linear Model: Slopes and Intercepts Estimation.
a. The reduction in variance in Level I means (β_0) is calculated by comparing the results of the complete model with those of the unconditional model where there are no Level II predictors. Thus, the results of the reduction in the variance show the predicting power of the three Level II predictors in the complete model.
b. Here the results of the significance testing for the change in the reported chi square statistics from the unconditional model and the complete model are presented.
Age group 30-39 and those who are not registered Democrat or Republican are the reference category.
**p<.05; ***p<.01. Cell entries are logistic regression coefficients, (standard errors).

Chapter 5

Gender and Voting Preferences: An Analysis of NAEP Data

The previous two chapters focused on the relationship between gender and voting turnout at the individual and contextual level. This chapter looks at the relationship between gender and voting preferences. Specifically, the goal of this chapter is to examine the applicability of the "women's political autonomy" argument developed by Susan Carroll (1988) to New York City's native-born and foreign-born voters.

Beginning in the early 1980s, studies on voting behavior in the United States (Casper and Bass, 1998; Kenksi, 1988; Miller, 1988; Sigel 1999) pointed to a growing gender gap in voting preferences and partisanship in American electoral politics. When an even more pronounced difference was confirmed with the 1996 presidential election, with about 14 percent more women than men voting for Clinton, scholars began to argue that we could be entering a new era of gender dealignment and realignment and that gender may have become a new party cleavage in the American party system (Kaufmann and Petrocik, 1999; Norris, 2003).

The recent scholarship on gendered differences in American electoral participation has produced valuable competing models for application to the case of immigrants. It is clear that scholars who are skeptical of a unified gender gap in political participation think that the class, racial, and religious cleavages among women make them so diverse as to swamp any unified explanations of the gender gap (Cohen, 2003; Junn, 1997). In the same vein, it could be argued that the life experience of immigrant women is so different from that of native women that a new approach must be taken

when studying their voting behavior. With appropriate data, we can control for nativity status to see whether gender is a dimension that crosscuts nativity status.

This chapter undertakes this task and attempts to test New York City's native-born and foreign-born populations in the 2000 presidential election for the "autonomy thesis" —one of the arguments developed to explain the relationship between gender and voting in American politics— using the New American Exit Poll (NAEP) data. The next section provides a brief overview of the existing approaches to the causes of the gender gap in voting preferences in American politics. The following section outlines the "autonomy thesis," in detail. The final two sections summarize the findings and draw several conclusions from the analysis.

Previous Research

The debate on why American men and women vote differently centers around two major approaches. The first approach sees women's economic position as the mechanism for gender differences in partisanship and voting preferences. One group of scholars employing this approach (Baxter and Lansing, 1983; Erie and Rein, 1988; Klein, 1984; Piven, 1985; Andersen, 1999; Kaufman and Petrocik, 1999; Cook and Wilcox, 1991) links the gender differences in electoral participation to differences between men and women in socioeconomic status and in experiences with the welfare state. On average, women earn less than men, are more likely to be dependent on public sector employment and welfare state (Erie & Rein, 1988; Andersen, 1999), and are more likely than men to depend on subsidies or government programs for themselves and their families (Deitch, 1988; Piven, 1985). These disparities in women's and men's socioeconomic situation make women more likely to support higher government spending, and thus more likely to

vote liberal. In addition, with the increasing “feminization of poverty” beginning in the 1980s (Goldberg and Kremen, 1990), a large number of women became economically vulnerable, constituting a distinct group. While this group may be less likely to vote because they lack individual resources, those who do vote are likely to vote Democrat as a block.

Another strand of economic position-based scholarship (Kenski, 1988; Manza and Brooks, 1999) points to the dramatic increase of female-labor force participation in post-war America to explain the gender gap in partisanship and voting choices. As opposed to the economic vulnerability version, which sees women as a disadvantaged minority group, the main argument in this version is that working women have economic interests different from men’s. To protect these interests, women began registering as Democrats and voting Democrat at a higher rate than men. This explanation supports Greenberg's (2000) and Kaufmann and Petrocik's (1999) argument that men, specifically white men, began to leave the Democratic Party for the Republican Party to protect their own self-interests.

The second major approach focuses on gender-based differences and considers how women look at the world in fundamentally different ways than men. One group of scholars (Abzug and Kelber, 1984; Conover, 1988; Tolleson-Rinehart, 1992) argues that beginning in the late 1960s, the women's movement challenged prevailing cultural, social, and political norms raising “gender consciousness” in American society and generating an “intellectual counter-socialization” among women. Voting differently from men, according to this argument, is one way in which women express their feminist awareness, distinct identity, and self-confidence.

Another group of gender-based scholarship locates female distinctiveness in a more biological and psychological source. They argue that women are “nurturers,” more compassionate than men, and thus are more concerned about societal well-being, leading to different moral values and voting behavior (Chodorow, 1974; Frankovic, 1982; Gilligan, 1982). For example, Frankovic (1982) argues that Reagan’s “hawkish” foreign policy preferences, to a large degree, explain why women favored Carter by a margin of eight percentage points in the presidential election of 1980.

Dissatisfied with this either/or approach to economic position-based versus gender-based differences between women and men, Carroll (1988) developed an "autonomy" argument that grouped women in terms of their economic and psychological independence from men based on their labor force and marital status and on their attitudes toward feminist issues. For example, according to her argument, unmarried women either in or out of the labor force would have a different voting pattern than married women who are not in the labor force which would have a powerful impact on gendered electoral participation. The next section gives a detailed overview of the "autonomy thesis."

“Political Autonomy” Hypothesis

Susan Carroll introduces the concept of women's political autonomy from men by first defining it as “the notion of self-governance, of independence in political decision making” (Carroll, 1988, p. 240). She argues that the gender gap of the 1980s can be explained by this concept, which she develops with elements that combine major sociodemographic and cultural transformations in the U.S. during the postwar era: these include women’s rising levels of education and labor force participation, as well as higher

levels of divorce rates and increasing gender self-awareness and consciousness. Thus, her concept of political autonomy involves two dimensions: economic and psychological independence. Her argument is based on two explicit assumptions: that women's and men's interests on a number of issues may differ[1] and that the Democratic and Republican parties and the candidates for president from these parties began to offer clear policy alternatives on gender-related issues since the beginning of the 1980s, with the Democratic Party being more supportive of women's issues. Figure 5.1 summarizes Carroll's autonomy thesis.[2]

Figure 5.1: Types and Degrees of Political Autonomy of Women from Men*

		Economic Dimension	
		Most Economically Independent	**Least Economically Independent**
Psychological Dimension	**Psychologically Independent**	Highest Degree of Political Autonomy from men	Moderate Degree of Political Autonomy from men
	Psychologically Not Independent	Moderate Degree of Political Autonomy from men	Lowest Degree of Political Autonomy from men

* Developed based on Carroll's autonomy hypothesis (Carroll, 1998).

Women's degree of political autonomy may stem from either their economic independence or their psychological independence from men, or from both. Figure 5.1

[1] Carroll assumes the existence of differences in interests between women and men without saying why they come about.

[2] The two categories on the economic dimension have two subcategories in Carroll's original measure of economic independence. For the purposes of simplicity, I chose to use a 2x2 table to illustrate the political autonomy concept. As for the measure of psychological independence, it is originally constructed based on a 7-point scale; however, Carroll converted this measure into a dichotomous variable and used this variable in her analysis: she identifies those who scored 1 or 2 on the scale as psychologically independent since they favor equal roles for women and those who scored between 3-7 as psychologically not independent because these respondents do not provide a feminist response to the items used to construct this psychological independence scale. It would be open to discussion if women's political autonomy from men can be best conceptualized using a two-dimensional continuum instead of a two-by-two contingency table as developed in this study.

shows that women who are both economically and psychologically independent from men, a situation most likely to occur once women gain one type of independence as evidenced by Carroll's analysis, are hypothesized to have the highest degree of political autonomy from men. This autonomy might make their partisanship and voting patterns different from those of their male counterparts, as well as from those of women who lack political autonomy from men. The other two possible situations involve moderate degrees of 'political autonomy.' It may well be that psychologically independent women may have a predisposition to become economically independent, but may not actually be so due to various situational and structural factors. But, compared to psychologically not independent women, they may still have a more developed sense of self-being; for example, they may favor egalitarian relationships between men and women, which may translate into voting and party identification patterns different from those of men. Likewise, some women with economic independence from men may lack psychological independence because their economic status might be simply due to circumstances, not to an autonomous decision. However, whether it is out of necessity or by choice that a woman gains some level of economic independence, it may be likely that she might have different policy priorities or social and individual concerns, which might translate into political preferences and choices that are different from those of men as well as from those of women who do not have any political autonomy from men. Finally, a group of women can be in a situation where they have neither economic nor psychological independence from men. This group of women has the lowest degree of 'political autonomy' from men, therefore their political choices and preferences would be expected to converge to men's.

Carroll operationalizes and tests her "autonomy" hypothesis in voting for Reagan in the 1980 presidential election and in evaluations of his performance as president in 1982. She uses national level data from the 1980 and 1982 National Election Studies (NES) surveys conducted by the Center for Political Studies at the University of Michigan. Based on a sample of 887 women and 801 men, she finds that 47.5 percent of women, compared with 54.9 percent of men, voted for Ronald Reagan in 1980, and 47.2 percent of women, compared with 55.8 percent of men, approved of Reagan's performance as president in 1982. She then attempts to test if the results vary by women's political autonomy status, looking first at the individual impact of economic independence and then at its effect when combined with the measure of psychological independence.

Carroll's construction of groups of women with varying degrees of economic independence from men is based on women's employment and occupational status, educational attainment, income level, and marital status (1988, p. 246):

- *Most economically independent from men:*

    - *Manager or professional, at least some college education, married or unmarried.*
    - *Other unmarried.*

- *Least economically independent from men:*

    - *Married, homemaker.*
    - *Married, employed outside the home in nonprofessional and nonmanagerial job, high school education or less, and less than $10,000 annual personal income.*

- *Others: women who do not belong to any of the groups above.*

The construction of the psychological independence measure is based on the scale

from 1 to 7 on which women rated their attitudes to equal roles for men and women in the 1980 and 1982 NES data.[3] Using this scale, Carroll computes a dichotomous variable by grouping those who placed themselves at 1 or 2 on the scale as psychologically independent because they favor equal roles for women, and those who placed themselves between 3 and 7 as psychologically not independent; because these respondents do not support egalitarian values. Because the NAEP did not ask a question similar to this question, we will only test the economic independence dimension of the "political autonomy" hypothesis (see Figure 5.1).

The hypotheses regarding economic independence and the gender gap in voting are as follows (Carroll, 1988, pp. 245-246):

> **H1:** *Increased economic independence from men leads to greater autonomy of women from men in political decision making which in turn leads to significant differences in voting preferences between men and women economically independent from men.*
>
> **H2:** *Women who are least economically independent resemble men in their voting behavior.*
>
> **H3:** *Due to variation in their levels of political autonomy, there would be significant differences in voting preferences among women in the categories of most and least economic independence from men.*

Finally, the results of Carroll's analysis confirm her expectations: women in the two most economically independent categories voted for Reagan in 1980 in significantly lower proportions than did comparable men. In addition, the voting pattern of women in the least economically independent categories converged with men's. Finally, women in

[3] The wording of this question from the NES survey is "Recently there has been a lot of talk about women's rights. Some people feel that women should have an equal role with men in running business, industry, and government. Others feel that a woman's place is in the home. Where would you place yourself on this scale or haven't you thought much about this?"

the least economically independent categories voted for Reagan in 1980 in substantially larger proportions than did women who were most economically independent from men (Carroll, 1988, pp. 245-247). The NES data also registered variation in voting for Reagan among the subgroups of men (see Table 11.5 in Carroll 1988, p. 253), and this seems to warrant an explanation. Carroll however does not attempt to provide it. According to my calculations, between the two subgroups of men demographically most resembling women in the two most economically independent categories, there is a 9.3 percentage-points difference, a difference significant at .05 level. The priori reasoning implicit in Caroll's argument is that there is no such thing as men's political autonomy from women. Finally, using the NAEP data, I will also test if the 'autonomy' argument has any relevance for men:

> **H4:** *The variation in voting preferences among the subgroups of men demographically resembling the groups of women in the most and least economically independent categories would not be large, since the concept of political autonomy has no or little relevance to men.*

Construction of Samples for Hypothesis Testing

The data this chapter relies on come from the New American Exit Poll data for 2000, 2002, and 2004 (See Chapter 2 for details of the NAEP data). As mentioned in Chapter 1 - Introduction, regardless of nativity status, women in New York City voted for Gore at a higher rate than men in the 2000 presidential election (see Table 1.7). The differences of 7.4 and 4.3 percentage-points in voting for Gore between men and women for the native-born and foreign-born samples, respectively, are statistically significant at .01 level. What would explain this gender gap for both native-born and foreign-born groups? Would

Carroll's autonomy thesis provide an explanation? Would this argument hold for both groups?

This analysis will add to Carroll's study in several ways. First, the "autonomy" hypothesis will be tested using a locally representative sample as opposed to a national sample in the votes cast for Al Gore in the 2000 presidential election. Second, it will focus on the native-born and foreign-born samples separately. As mentioned earlier, differences in life experiences and expectations of life between the native-born and immigrant women and the latter group's lack of familiarity with American politics may lead to differences in voting patterns. The NAEP data provides an excellent basis for testing whether differences in voting patterns exist between them. Third, in addition to looking into the differences in voting choices between men and women, this study will also carefully examine the differences, if any, in voting choices among the subgroups of men socio-economically and demographically most resembling groups of women with varying degrees of economic independence status.

The limitations of the data for testing for Carroll's autonomy hypothesis are twofold: the first relates to the sample and the second relates to the data. New York City is one of the most Democratic cities in the U.S. According to the NYC Board of Election's 2000 voter registration file, 7 out of 10 registered voters are Democrat. In the combined NAEP data, 3 out of 4 respondents reported being registered Democrat (see Table 2.8). As for the voting preferences of New York City voters, although party loyalty has a somewhat weaker effect on voting preferences in local elections, it has a relatively strong effect in voting for presidential candidates. In the combined NAEP sample, 78.8 percent of voters reported voting for Gore in the 2000 presidential election. Given the

highly skewed nature of the NYC sample in terms of voting and party identification, one could argue that the testing for the "political autonomy" argument would not produce any significant results. An exceptionally large sample of New York City voters would be a remedy for the skewness of the sample. Due to this reason, although each individual NAEP sample actually met the standards for minimum sample size warranted for inferential analysis (see Table 2.6), I decided to combine the three NAEP samples to examine the relationship between the gender gap and economic independence of women from men. The question asked both in the 2002 and 2004 NAEP data allows me to combine these data with the 2000 NAEP data:

> *"In the 2000 election for President, did you vote for: 1) Al Gore 2)George W. Bush 3) Ralph Nader 4) Did not vote in 2000."*

Considering that the election-specific factors would draw different types of electorates, the decision to combine the three NAEP data may raise legitimate conceptual questions as to whether these data represent three different "populations of elections."[4] For example, the 2002 NAEP data consist of voters who turned out in the New York gubernatorial election, whereas the 2000 and 2004 NAEP data are samples of voters in presidential elections. It is not news to students of electoral politics that the body of the electorate may differ from one election to another, both in terms of quantity and composition. Presidential elections, for example, draw a much larger electorate, compared to mid-term elections and gubernatorial elections. In addition, demographic, racial/ethnic, and partisan composition of the electorate may differ in different kinds of elections. Moreover, the composition of the electorate may also differ for the same kind of elections. For example, the 2004 presidential election, the first post-9/11 presidential

[4] I borrow the term "population of elections" from Alford and Lee's article (1968).

election, as the argument goes, drew a large number of conservative "angry white men" and "security-moms" to the polls, due to factors absent in the previous presidential election (Krauthammer, 2004; Seelye, 2004). In this sense, not only may the 2002 NAEP sample be representative of an electoral body different from that in the 2000 and 2004 NAEP samples, but the 2000 NAEP sample may also represent an electorate different from that in the 2004 election. Although these arguments are legitimate, I use the combined NAEP data in order to utilize an unusually large sample size for hypothesis testing.

The other caveat of the NAEP data is that it lacks information on respondents' occupational status and individual income. Due to this limitation, I constructed the categories of most and least economically independent women and the groups of men most resembling them in a slightly different way from Caroll's categories: the two groups of women in the most economically independent category are those 'working full-time, with at least a college degree, married or unmarried'; and 'other unmarried.' Since occupational status is not available in the data, it was impossible to make a distinction between women who work in managerial and professional jobs and those who do not (see page 132, for comparison). The least economically independent category consists of one group: 'married, not working full-time or working full-time, with high school education or less.' The reason to collapse the subgroup, 'married, not working full-time, with high school education or less,' with the subgroup 'married, working full-time, with high school education or less,' is due to the low number of the first subgroup. Both these subgroups of women have limited opportunities for upward mobility and economic

independence. Their status is mostly dependent on the men to whom they are married (Carroll, 1988, p. 245).

Table 5.1 presents the distribution of female respondents across the three groups of women by their economic independence status and male respondents who demographically most resemble them. Only 15 percent of women and 17 percent of men are not members of one of these groups (see Table 5.1).

The analysis of the data is a comparison of voting for Gore in percentages between men and women by the three categories of economic independence status. The dependent variable is a binary voting variable. Those who voted for Al Gore in the 2000 presidential election were coded as '1' and those who reported voting for other candidates were coded as '0.' The analysis is first employed for the overall sample, and then for the native-born and foreign-born samples separately.

Findings

This section first presents the findings of the relationship between women's political autonomy, as measured by their economic independence status, and their voting choices for the overall sample. Table 5.2 presents the result of this analysis, which clearly indicates that women's political autonomy status does matter in voting (see Table 5.2).

The first main finding from Table 5.2 is that data provide strong evidence for *Hypothesis 1*, that increased economic independence from men leads to greater political autonomy of women from men which in turn leads to significant differences in voting preferences between men and economically independent women. The two groups of women most economically independent from men voted for Al Gore in the 2000 presidential elections in significantly higher percentages than did men in their

comparable groups, with 8.2 and 5.5 percentage-points differences. Both results are statistically significant at .01 level. Moreover, women with the least economic independence voted for Gore at the same rate as men in the comparable group, a finding providing strong support for *Hypothesis 2*, that women who are least economically independent resemble men in their voting behavior.

The results from Table 5.2 provide weak support for *Hypothesis 3*, that due to variation in the levels of political autonomy between women who are most economically independent and women who are least economically independent from men, there would be significant differences in voting preferences among them. Although the 5 percentage-points difference in voting for Gore between women in the least economically independent category and the first group of women who are most economically independent from men is statistically significant at the .05 level, the difference between the least economically independent women and 'other unmarried' category is neither significant nor substantial.

Finally, Table 5.2 indicates that the concept of "political autonomy" has little or no relevance for men, confirming *Hypothesis 4*, that the variation in voting choices among the subgroups of men socioeconomically and demographically most resembling the groups of women by their economic independence status would not be substantial. All three figures for men in Table 5.2 are no different from 74.9 percent, the average figure for men in voting for Gore (see Table 1.7).

The findings based on the overall sample clearly indicate that the concept of "political autonomy" of women is a relevant concept in their political decision-making process. However, the ultimate goal of this chapter is to analyze the data by nativity

status and test for the four political autonomy hypotheses for the native-born and foreign-born samples separately. My tentative hypothesis is that Carroll's autonomy argument would hold regardless of respondents' nativity status: once women gain a certain level of political autonomy, their voting choices, regardless of their nativity status, would differ from men significantly.

Table 5.3 presents the results for the native-born sample. The presentation of the data in Table 5.3 as well as in Table 5.4 is different from that in Table 5.2 in that it contains the percent differences in voting between men and women by economic independence status (column differences) as well as the percent differences in voting among men and among women, again, by economic independence status (row differences). The column differences will be analyzed for testing for *Hypothesis 1* and *Hypothesis 2* whereas the row differences will be analyzed for testing for *Hypothesis 3* and *Hypothesis 4* (see Table 5.3).

The main point from the results represented in Table 5.3 is that data provide strong evidence for all four hypotheses concerning the concept of political autonomy. The two groups of native-born women in the most economically independent category voted for Gore in the 2000 election in significantly and substantially higher proportions than did men in comparable groups, supporting *Hypothesis 1*. The difference of a little over 8 percentage-points between the women in these two subgroups and men is significant at 0.01 level. Similarly, the data also give strong support for *Hypothesis 2*, that the voting preferences of women with the least economic independence from men would converge to men's. The finding that there is a 0.2 percentage-points difference between men and women with the least economic independence from men is obviously neither

significant nor substantial. Moreover, *Hypothesis 3*, that there would be significant differences in voting among women with different levels of political autonomy, is strongly confirmed by the data for the native-born sample. Comparing the least economically independent women (Group I) to the other two groups of women in the most economically independent category (Group II and Group III) reveals that women's political autonomy status has an important effect on their voting choices. The differences of 16.1 and 12.7 percentage-points between Group I and Group II and between Group I and Group III, respectively, is substantial and significant at 0.01 level. Finally, the data indicate that the variation in voting among the three subgroups of native-born men is not statistically significant, confirming *Hypothesis 4.* These differences among men also do not appear to be of substantial significance.

Table 5.4 presents the results for the foreign-born sample. The main finding is that data for this group do not provide evidence for the "political autonomy" concept in general (see Table 5.4).

Although the result of no difference between immigrant men and women in the least economically independent category (Group I) is as expected, this is not the case for Group III. As for Group II, 84.5 percent of women in this category voted for Gore, a rate 7.3 percentage-points higher than the rate at which men in the same category voted for Gore. This result is statistically significant only at 0.1 level. However, when the voting rate of women in this group is compared to men's average voting rate for Gore (79.8 percent), the percent difference declines to 4.7 and the significance of the result disappears.[5] Similarly, when immigrant women's voting rates for Gore in Group I and

[5] It is actually men's average figure that Carroll uses to compare the voting rates across the subgroups of women (see Table 11.2 (Carroll, 1998, p. 247).

Group III are compared to the average rate for men, the data show that voting patterns between men and women resemble each other, giving no support to *Hypothesis 1*.

The other important finding that stands out is that immigrant women's voting rate for Gore in all the three categories of economic independence status is strikingly the same, providing no evidence for *Hypothesis 3*. What would explain why immigrant women with the least economic independence from men are voting at the same rate as immigrant women with most economic independence from men? Would it be that economic independence would not lead to greater 'political autonomy' from men for immigrant women? Or would it be that immigrant women in Group II and Group III do have greater political autonomy than women in Group I due to their economic independence status, but this does not translate into different voting patterns between them? If so, why?

The data show that there may be differences in voting choices among the three subgroups of immigrant men, a finding that does not support *Hypothesis 4*, that the differences in voting choices among them would neither be large nor statistically significant. It appears that immigrant men in Group II are substantially less likely than men in the other two groups to vote Democrat. The 7.4 percentage-points difference in voting for Gore between immigrant men in Group II and Group III is statistically significant at .05 level. What distinguishes men in Group II from men in the other two groups is their educational attainment. It may well be that as immigrant male voters achieve higher socioeconomic status as a result of their education, the Democratic Party may lose them. The conceptualization of the "political autonomy" thesis may reveal a class dimension for the subgroups of men socioeconomically and demographically most

resembling women in the most economically independent category that is salient in their voting decision.

Finally, the data allow us to explore similarities, if any, among men and women by their nativity status. Early on this chapter stated that the life experiences and expectations of native-born and foreign-born groups may be so different that it may produce different electoral styles. In the 2000 presidential election, we find a 6.4 percentage-points difference in voting for Gore between the foreign-born and native-born respondents, with 82.5 percent of the foreign-born and 76.1 percent of the native-born voters reporting casting votes for Gore, respectively. When Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 are compared to see if this average difference varies between native-born and foreign-born female voters and between native-born and foreign-born male voters, one finding stands out. It is only for Group II that there is no substantial or statistical difference in voting for Gore between native-born and foreign-born women as well as between native-born men and foreign-born men. The voting patterns of men and women in Group I and Group III is substantially and significantly different by their nativity status, with immigrant voters, regardless of gender, voting for Gore at a much higher rate than native voters. One possible explanation for such convergence between native-born female voters and foreign-born female voters as well as native-born male voters and foreign-born male voters in Group II may be that once a certain level of socioeconomic status is achieved, the individual level forces may become more powerful in explaining partisanship and voting choices (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995; and see *Chapter 4* of this study) that tend to converge due to similarities in class status disposition that may play a more determining role than nativity or racial/ethnic status in who to vote for. However, it is

important to note that this convergence of voting patterns explains female-female behavior and male-male behavior, whereas the "political autonomy" concept explains the female-male behavior.

Discussion and Conclusion

This chapter draws several conclusions. First, the use of the 'political autonomy' thesis is limited in the case of immigrants in that immigrant women with the least economic independence from men are as likely as their female counterparts with the most economic independence to vote Democrat. Among the possible explanations is that the political interest of groups of immigrant women with the most and the least economic independence may not diverge, one of Carroll's two assumptions in constructing the 'autonomy' argument. It may well be that their interests differ but other issues, such as immigration-related issues, may be more salient to immigrant women in their voting choices, which would explain why the 'autonomy' hypothesis does not hold for them. The other key assumption ―that the Democratic and Republican parties and the candidates for president from these parties offer clear policy alternatives on gender-related issues― may also be a weak assumption for the immigrant female voters. It is true that gender has recently become a new dimension of party cleavage in the American political party system ―at least for now― in addition to traditional major social cleavages such as class, race, religion, and region. Similarly, with the high levels of politicization of immigration issues during the past two decades, immigration-related issues may have become salient issues for both native-born and foreign-born voters that may translate into voting decisions. It is certainly true that immigration today does not represent a major party cleavage as it did in the New Deal era. In today's American politics, immigration is

a multidimensional issue that cuts across political ideologies creating strange bedfellows (Zolberg, 1999). However, on average, immigrants are more likely to identify themselves as Democrat rather than Republican and more likely to vote Democrat in national elections. Party cleavages on immigration-related policies may be more central to groups of immigrant women with the most and the least economic independence in their voting decisions in presidential elections. This may explain why immigrant female voters with the least economic independence, who probably have conservative dispositions toward gender issues, would still vote for Democratic party candidates at the same rates as immigrant women with greater political autonomy, and therefore probably with feminist outlook toward gender issues.

Second, the data show there is no significant divergence of voting patterns between immigrant men and women in the most economically independent category. It may be that, due to their immigration status, men and women in this category share common policy concerns that translate into their voting choices. Their political ideologies and attitudes toward the issues that concern them most may be less divergent than alike. It may be that their immigration status rather than gender status has a determining role in their voting decisions; therefore, a theory of immigrant participation from a gender perspective should include this immigration dimension. Another possible explanation as to why the 'autonomy' hypothesis does not apply to immigrant men and women may be the fact that they are not as familiar with the dominant American political party ideology as their native counterparts are.

Third, the data strongly confirm that "political autonomy" is a relevant concept in political participation for native-born voters, even for a local sample that is highly

skewed in terms of average partisanship and voting patterns. Moreover, the power of this approach lies not only in its explanatory use, but also in its predictive use. As the share of women in the labor force continues to increase and as the education and income gaps continue to close, more women might gain greater 'political autonomy.' This may, in turn, lead to stronger party positions on gender issues; therefore, the newly established gender cleavage may well become a long-term structural phenomenon for the American political party system. On the other hand, such developments are likely to have an impact on men's behavior as to how to and where to position/re-position themselves regarding gender issues. At the same time, Democratic Party may reconsider its clear positions on gender issues if men begin to defect from the party at a higher rate than new female constituencies are acquired. So this may cause the newly established gender gap to live for a shorter period of time than predicted.

Table 5.1: Distribution of Women across Most and Least Economically Independent Categories, NAEP 2000-2004		
Most Economically Independent	Women	Men
Working full-time, with at least a college degree, married or unmarried	39% (N=1,595)	43% (N=1,381)
Other unmarried	35% (N=1,394)	28% (N=898)
Least Economically Independent		
Married, not working or working full-time, high school education or less	11% (N=433)	12% (N=380)
Other	15% (N=624)	17% (N=539)
Total	4,046	3,198
Omitted cases due to missing data	9% (N=383)	9% (N=335)

Table 5.2: Vote for Gore in Percentages by Gender, Controlling for Economic Independence among Women, NAEP 2000-2004, Overall Sample			
	Women	**Men**	**Difference**
Most Economically Independent			
Working full-time, at least a college degree, married or unmarried	82.9 (N=1,185)	74.7 (N=931)	8.2***
Other unmarried	80.7 (N=893)	74.2 (N=516)	5.5***
Least Economically Independent			
Married, not working or working full-time, high school education or less	77.9 (N=292)	77.4 (N=257)	0.5
*** $p < .01$			

Table 5.3: Vote for Gore in Percentages by Gender, Controlling for Economic Independence among Women, NAEP 2000-2004, Native-Born Sample					
	Least Economically Independent	**Most Economically Independent**		**Difference**	
	Married, not working or working full-time, high school education or less	Working full-time, at least a college degree, married or unmarried	Other unmarried		
	I	**II**	**III**	**I - II**	**I - III**
Female	65.9 (N=85)	82.0 (N=821)	78.6 (N=529)	-16.1***	-12.7***
Male	67.9 (N=74)	73.8 (N=647)	70.3 (N=353)	-5.8	-2.4
Difference (F - M)	-0.2	8.2***	8.3***		

Table 5.4: Vote for Al Gore in Percentages by Gender, Controlling for Economic Independence among Women, NAEP 2000-2004, Foreign-Born Sample					
	Least Economically Independent	**Most Economically Independent**		**Difference**	
	Married, not working or working full-time, high school education or less	Working full-time, at least a college degree, married or unmarried	Other unmarried		
	I	**II**	**III**	**I - II**	**I - III**
Female	83.6 (N=194)	84.5 (N=348)	83.8 (N=346)	-0.9	-0.2
Male	81.8 (N=175)	77.2 (N=275)	84.6 (N=159)	4.6	-2.8
Difference (F - M)	1.8	7.3*	-0.8		

Chapter 6

Conclusion and Future Research Agenda

This study has focused on the relationship between gender and voting behavior among the foreign-born and native-born populations of New York City. This concluding chapter returns to the central theoretical questions that guided this study, and then explores the implications of the findings for the literatures on electoral politics and minority and immigrant political incorporation. Finally, it provides suggestions for future research.

Summary of the Findings

The previous chapters set forth a number of findings concerning the gender gaps in voting participation and preferences by nativity and ethnicity status in the New York City context. It is my argument that these sets of findings give evidence that differences in life experiences between the native-born and foreign-born populations, based on the gender roles within the family, the labor market, the welfare state, and the community, may motivate different styles of gendered electoral participation. As the summary table (Table 6.1) of the data from the first empirical chapter (Chapter 3) shows, some effects of life experiences do not operate for the foreign-born in the same way as they do for the native-born in the political participation process. These findings support previous research on gendered immigrant political participation (see Table 6.1).

A principal finding from Table 6.1 is that employment and marital status have a strong explanatory power in accounting for the immigrant gender gap in voting outcome. This suggests that the immigrant gender gap in political participation actually reflects a difference in voting behavior between "domestic" and "nondomestic" immigrant women.

For "domestic" immigrant women (who are married and not working) a patriarchal ideology may characterize their postmigration relationships both within and outside the family. This situation may relegate them to the “private” sphere of the family, leading to the conclusion that not all immigrant women are successful in making the connection between the public and private spheres of life, as evidenced by the significant differences in voting among the different groups of women. The private/public dichotomy does appear to inform the political participation of some immigrants. The finding that some, but not all, immigrant women may speak in a “different voice” shows that it may be problematic to apply an all-encompassing feminist theory to gender politics.

Chapter 3 also shows that the size of the gender gap displays considerable variation among the subgroups under study, which may point to the existence of differences in gender-role socialization among these subgroups. This, in turn, may suggest the existence of different family politics evidenced by the varying effect of marital status on voting among these groups. In the case of immigrants, inegalitarian norms may determine their acceptance of marriage as a situation in which women are denied equal status with men. Such dominant norms in marriage create barriers for women's access to both economic and political life, and to full inclusion in the polity (Okin, 1989; Pateman, 1988). It is in such circumstances that the effect of marriage on spouses' economic, social, and political outcomes is likely to be in the opposite direction. In contrast, the effect on such outcomes of marriage understood in egalitarian terms is likely to be similar for both partners.

For the immigrant group, there also seems to be a process of adult resocialization for certain groups of immigrant women, more specifically for the immigrant women in

the labor force. The significant positive association between voting and working immigrant women may be explained by such resocialization. As for immigrant men, such resocialization due to employment status seems to be absent; or, even if it exits, it may not translate into their voting behavior. For native-born groups, being in the labor force predicts voting, but its effect does not vary by gender. This finding may suggest that labor-force participation may not result in as much politicizing effect for native-born women as for foreign-born women, or that its politicizing effect is the same for native-born women and men.

The findings from the second empirical chapter (Chapter 4) show that the effect of gender on turnout among Hispanic voters disappears when moving from ethnically segregated areas to ethnically integrated areas. This finding clearly suggests that gender and context interact. Although, due to the limitations of the data, it is impossible to identify which individual or contextual factors may have been or may become less gendered in ethnically integrated areas, especially in White-majority areas, it may well be that much of the gender differences in Hispanic voting can be accounted for by class differences. This finding also refutes essentialist explanations for the differences in Hispanic female/male voting behavior.

Finally, Chapter 5, the last empirical chapter, focuses on the variation in the gender gap in voting preferences between immigrant and native-born groups. The result of testing for the "women's political autonomy" thesis for New York City's immigrant and native-born voters suggests that while this thesis has a strong explanatory power in explaining why native-born women's and men's voting choices differ, it is of limited or

no use in the case of immigrant voters. I argue that the variation in the gender gap in voting preferences among foreign-born and native born voters can in the end be explained by differences in life experiences as well as by differing expectations from life. Beginning in the 1980s, the Democratic and Republican parties and their presidential candidates began to offer clear policy alternatives on gender-related issues, with the Democratic Party being more supportive of women's issues. However, during the same period, they also offered distinct policies regarding immigration and welfare issues. Party cleavages on immigration and welfare-related policies may be more central to the voting behavior of both domestic and nondomestic groups of immigrant women, an argument providing a powerful explanation to why Carroll's "autonomy" argument is of no use in the case of immigrant voters.

While the findings from Chapter 5 have important implications for our theoretical understanding of gender and voting behavior, they also have substantive implications for electoral politics. The results of data analysis on the voting preferences of the native-born show that Caroll's (1988) "political autonomy" argument is a relevant concept in explaining electoral outcomes. Moreover, the power of this approach lies not only in its explanatory use, but also in its predictive use. As the share of women in the labor force continues to increase, and as the education and income gaps between women and men continue to close, more women will gain exercise their "political autonomy" from men. This may, in turn, lead to stronger party positions on gender issues; therefore, the newly established gender cleavage may well become a long-term structural phenomenon in the American political party system. On the other hand, such developments are also likely to

have an impact on men's behavior as men decide how to and where to position/reposition themselves regarding gender issues. At the same time, the Democratic Party may reconsider its clear policy alternatives on gender issues if men begin to defect from the party at a higher rate than exceeding that of the registration and voting rates for the party's new female constituencies. The newly established gender gap may thus endure for a shorter period of time than predicted.

This dissertation project has explored the path to formal political participation as measured by the act of voting. As illustrated in Figure 1.1, in the introductory chapter (Chapter 1), voting is only one of the paths to political participation. However, in a representative democracy it is the most essential form of participation. Who votes and who does not vote has implications for those who want to run for office and for how resources are allocated. Immigrants who are mobilized and who vote as a block can gain significant political power (Plotke, 1999). Similarly, nonvoting may result in political implications for immigrants that are similar to those for disenfranchised populations. The importance of better understanding immigrant voting is unambiguous. This dissertation study has shown that there is no one path for an immigrant to become a voter. The varying paths toward the act of voting are illustrated in Figure 6.1. The labor market, the family, and the welfare state, as well as immigration, is gendered in New York City leading to gendered paths to voting.

From Immigrant Political Participation to Immigrant Political Incorporation

This section discusses the use of the knowledge gained from this study in the broader minority and immigrant political incorporation literature. As established in Chapter 1, before the formulation and testing for the hypotheses concerning the relationship between

gender and voting by "correcting for" or "controlling for" various demographic and socio-economic factors, I simply focused on the voting outcomes by gender with and without taking into account the nativity status. The simple bivariate results show that immigrant women as well as native-born women of color vote at much higher rates than their male counterparts (see, Tables 1.4; 1.5; and 1.6). In addition, they are significantly more likely to vote Democrat than their male counterparts (see, Table 1.7). Focusing right on these simple facts, this section discusses what it might mean for immigrant women and women of color to have relatively significantly high levels of electoral participation.

By participating in the democratic process, individuals and groups gain a political voice through which they may acquire political power; therefore, more political participation in a democracy is desirable. Ideally, a high level of participation will be one in which equal levels of participation among various racial and ethnic groups, and between men and women, is achieved and maintained. Differences in political participation are problematic because they imply unequal political outcomes. Not everyone in the United States today has an equal opportunity to express their voice and preference in the political process. Those who are excluded suffer from the consequences of being excluded or of not having equal access to the democratic process (Piven and Cloward, 1988). Indeed, it was not until the 1960s that blacks gained equal voting rights. Asians were not allowed to become U.S. citizens until 1952, and women gained their voting rights in 1920. All these institutional barriers to electoral participation of minority groups and women have had long-lasting negative consequences, leading to different paths of electoral participation, not only among various racial/ethnic groups, but also between women and men.

Despite the fact that participation rates have declined substantially in contemporary America over the past two decades, more individuals belonging to different racial and ethnic groups are eligible to participate in the electoral system than ever before. Indeed, the participation rates of certain minority and immigrant groups, if not all, have increased dramatically over the past decade. However, the question I raise here is whether this increased interest of minority and immigrant groups in electoral participation has given them political empowerment? To answer this question, we should look at their electoral participation within the broader concept of minority and immigrant political incorporation within the U.S. political system. How do we define the concept of political incorporation of various racial and ethnic groups as well as that of women?

Although there is a lack of agreement about the definition of "political incorporation" (Wong, 2002), the leading scholars of minority and immigrant political incorporation all include in its broader definition the degree of government responsiveness to the political and policy demands of minority groups (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb, 1984; Mollenkopf, 2003, 1990; Fraga and Leal, 2004). Fraga and Leal (2004), for example, argue that recent symbolic appeals to racial inclusion of Latinos by the Republican Party as part of its national party politics, and the Democratic Party's convergence with Republican ideology on many issues (including representation of racial and ethnic interests) within their party platform can prevent substantive policymaking from addressing the needs and interests of specific racial and ethnic groups. Such marginalization of specific racial and ethnic groups has also been documented in local politics in New York City (Mollenkopf, 2003, 1994; Jones-Correa, 1998a). Given these substantive issues, increased political participation of people of color

in general, and of women in particular, as Junn (1997, p. 388) argues, might not lead to empowering outcomes. Unless the specific needs and interests of women of color, which drive from differences in their life experience and expectations, are met "more participation will reinforce and legitimate, rather than eradicate, domination as it already exists" (Junn, 1997, p.388). So greater levels of political participation among women of color, as well as among men of color, may not lead to their political incorporation within the American political system.

Directions for Future Research

This dissertation project has sought to contribute to our understanding of immigrant political incorporation in the United States. It has provided greater insight into the immigrant political incorporation process by examining the gender dimension of voting participation and voting preferences. It has identified the key individual- and contextual-level factors that explain the relationship between gender and voting behavior for foreign-born and native-born groups. Further, it has uncovered the processes through which these individual and contextual factors operate differently for the groups under study. Finally, this research has examined, whether and how, immigrant-specific characteristics influence female and male political participation. In addition to hypothesizing the effect of traditional immigrant-specific factors on immigrant incorporation, I have also introduced new immigrant-specific variables, taking into account the gendered nature of migration to the U.S.

Scholars have increasingly researched the gendered nature of migration (Sassen, 2001; Foner, 1999; Hondagneu-Sotelo, 1994, Donato, 1992). Contemporary immigration from certain countries is identified as "female-first" type of immigration, in that female

immigrants as laborers or professionals come first and then send for their husbands or children (Foner, 2002; Zhou, 2002). In an effort to systematically examine the role of this gendered nature of immigration to the United States within the context of gender in immigrant political incorporation, I constructed a new "type of immigration" variable and examined whether the political incorporation of immigrant men and women from female-sending countries is any different from that of immigrant men and women from male-sending countries. The findings support the argument that the gendered nature of migration indeed does explain gendered immigrant political participation in the United States.

Following the studies on the gendered nature of migration, scholars have begun to examine how the gendered nature of country of origin can explain the gendered immigrant political incorporation process (Jones-Correa, 1998a, 1998b; Grasmuck and Pessar, 1991). These studies, which tend to focus on the experience of Hispanic men and women, have largely found that women who are politically incorporated are those who developed a postmigration ideology that is different than the gender-structured ideology dominant in the country of origin. They have also found that immigrant men who perceive their immigration to the United States as status loss due to observed or de facto realized change in their gendered norms and lives are less likely to be politically engaged in the United States. My study has empirically tested the effect of the gendered nature of the home country on the immigrant female and male participation process in the United States. Guided by these arguments, the findings show that immigrant men, rather than immigrant women, appear to be significantly influenced by their home-country's gender opportunity structure. As Jones-Correa argues (1998b, p. 334), men migrating from

gender-structured societies may perceive a loss of status in the United States due to the latter's relatively egalitarian gender structure and, therefore, in weighing the benefits of integrating here versus the cost of return migration, may determine that the political and psychological costs of return are simply low. Immigrant men from gender-egalitarian societies, on the other hand, may view their migration more permanently, as evidenced by the decision to vote.

This study has also increased our understanding of the role of contextual factors in gendered immigrant political participation. The findings suggest that neither the political socialization nor political mobilization literature adequately explains the relationship between gender and context in Hispanic voting in New York City. For example, in Hispanic-majority locations, the effect of contextual factors on turnout increases both for Hispanic female and male voters, but Hispanic male voters are significantly more influenced by them. This may, to a certain degree, explain the gender gap in Hispanic turnout. Hispanic females' voting behavior is more influenced by such unobserved noncontextual factors as the gendered forms of household structure and responsibilities, and migration strategies. The results also show that in high-resource areas, the voting behavior of Hispanic females and males appears to converge, pointing to a possible interaction between gender and class in political participation. Findings from previous qualitative studies that focus on only one segment of minority and immigrant groups may not be applicable to other segments of the same group. This clearly suggests that there is a need for comprehensive qualitative and quantitative research on minority and immigrant political participation from the class dimension.

Ideally, future research will take the next step by examining the voting participation of multiple immigrant groups in multiple areas of the country, including nontraditional locations of immigration. Future data sets should preferably include additional individual- and community-level social and associational information. They could also be improved by the inclusion of additional measurements of immigrant political participation that are missing from the current data sets. This study has only examined voting — the most formal form of political participation. By asking additional questions regarding different types of political participation, encompassing a broader definition of political involvement, we can gain a greater understanding of immigrant political incorporation in the U.S. Survey questions might ask about involvement in political campaigns, lobbying, protests, the signing of petitions, membership in political organizations, and other types of voluntary and civic engagement to name just a few activities (see Figure 1.1). It is important to focus on such informal political activities because those who are not U.S. citizens (due to legal status, or length of residency, or simply by choice) may very well influence the American political system through informal but effective means. The recent nationwide protests against the new initiatives to limit illegal immigration are a good example of the way in which disadvantaged groups can make their voices heard (Salladay, 2006; Chavez, 2006).

Finally, this study has demonstrated that the literature on the gender gap in American politics can no longer ignore the presence of immigrant women. Failing to adequately address the differences and similarities between immigrant and native-born groups of women would lead to incomplete explanations of gender politics in the contemporary American political system. Similarly, the literature on immigrant political

participation can no longer avoid a gendered analysis of immigrant politics. By incorporating gender into immigrant politics, a better understanding of immigrant experiences can be gained.

Table 6.1: Gender and Voting by Nativity and Racial Status: Summary of Findings from Chapter 3

	Foreign-born		Native-born Non-White		Native-born White	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Effect of being employed	+	NE*	NE	NE	+	+
Effect of being unmarried	+	−	+	−	−	−
Effect of children, under 6	NE	NE	NE	NE	−	−
Effect of children, ages 6-17	NE	NE	NE	NE	+	+
Effect of coming from gender-egalitarian country	NE	+	NA**	NA	NA	NA
Effect of coming from Male-immigrant sending country	−	NE	NA	NA	NA	NA

*NE: no effect; **NA: not applicable.

Figure 6.1: Paths to Full Formal Political Participation as Measured by the Act of Voting



Appendix to Chapter 2

Appendix 2.1: Definition and Construction of CPS Variables in Logistic Regression Models

Dependent Variable:

Voting: '1' if voted, '0' otherwise, computed from PES1.

Independent Variables:

Age: Series of dummy variables computed from PEAGE.

Female: '1' female, '0' otherwise (dummy coding of PESEX).

Unmarried: '1' not married, '0' otherwise (PEMARITL).

Children 0-6: '1' children ages between 0-6 are present as child member of household, '0' otherwise, computed from PERRP.

Children 6-18: '1' children ages between 6-18 are present as child member of household, '0' otherwise, computed from PERRP.

To compute the two children variables, I first constructed a subset of the overall sample by selecting those who were under age 18, then using the PERRP variable I identified those who were the child member of the household, and then created the two variables in this subset. Using the HHID variable, a unique household identification number ID, I merged this subset with the data I prepared for analysis. After this information is linked, using the PRFAMREL variable, I checked that the child member of the household was linked with the parents of the household.

Employed: '1' employed-at work, employed-absent, unemployed-on layoff, unemployed-looking, '0' otherwise, computed from PEMLR.

Poverty: '1' in poverty, '0' otherwise.

I computed this variable measuring whether an individual lives in a household above or below the poverty line, by combining information on family income (HUFAMINC) and family size (HRNUMHOU). To calculate whether an individual is above or below the poverty line, I have used the national poverty thresholds for 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002, based on the reports released by the U.S. Census Bureau for these years (U.S. Census Bureau, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003). Family income is reported as a categorical variable, so I have used the mid-point of each of these categories to calculate the poverty status of individuals in the data.

NH Black: '1' non-Hispanic Black, '0' otherwise, computed from PERACE and PRHSPNON.

NH Asian: '1' non-Hispanic Asian, '0' otherwise, computed from PERACE and PRHSPNON.

Hispanic: '1' Hispanic, '0' otherwise, computed from PRHSPNON.

Less than HS: '1' has some education, but no high school diploma or higher degree, '0' otherwise (PEEDUCA).

More than HS: '1' has education higher than high school diploma, '0' otherwise (PEEDUCA).

Duration: '1' have lived at current address for 5+ years, '0' otherwise (PES8).

In US for 8 & 15 years: '1' has been in the U.S. between eight and 15 years, '0'otherwise, computed from PRINUSYR.

In US for 16 & 30 years: '1' has been in the U.S. between 16 and 30 years, '0' otherwise, computed from PRINUSYR.

Female-Sending Countries: '1' if coming from female-sending country, '0' otherwise. This dummy variable is computed from IMMTYPE variable (coded: '1'gender-neutral immigrant sending countries, '2' female-sending countries, '3'male-sending countries) which is constructed based on the sex-ratios of foreign-born respondents by country of birth, PENATVTY. To correct, to a certain degree, for women's greater longevity, the sex-ratios were calculated for only those respondents who entered the U.S. after 1980, using the 2000 Census PUMS 5% data. Foreign-born respondents are assigned this status to determine how and to what extent the structured nature of immigration to New York City impacts individual incorporation (see Table 3.3 for the list of the countries falling in this category).

Male-Sending Countries: '1' if coming from male-sending country, '0' otherwise. See Table 3.4 for the list of countries falling in this category.

Distance 2000: '1' distance of respondent's country of birth (from PENATVTY variable) greater than 2000 miles, 0'otherwise.

Labor Force Sex-Parity Index: Scale, from 0.3 to 1.1, measuring the ratio of the percentage of women who are economically active to the percentage of men who are, based on the World Bank's Human Development Indicators for 1990. Lower values indicate lower levels of sex-parity in labor force participation. This variable is centered around its mean value (see Table 3.2 for the distribution of immigrants from countries falling outside one standard deviation range on this scale).

Civil Rights Index: Scale, ranges from 1 to 7, measuring the level of "civil liberties" in the country of birth as of 1990. Scores get higher as the level of "civil liberties" decreases. Freedom House, an independent, pro-democracy organization, has developed two indexes measuring a county's level of freedoms: one measuring the level of "civil liberties" and the other "political rights." Both variables are measured on a scale of 1 through 7. Both measures are entered in the data, but the variable introduced in the model is the civil liberties variable. A bivariate correlation analysis has revealed that the two variables are highly correlated (r=.9).This measure has been calculated since 1972 for countries around the world, but the scores have been stable for most countries for over the last three decades. This variable is centered around its mean value.

Appendix 2.2: Construction of Five Mutually Exclusive Racially/Ethnically Distinct Election Districts

I use local Moran statistics, a technique of ESDA. This method focuses on local indicators of spatial association therefore identifies significant local clusterings of contiguous areas. The Moran values for each election district is computed by:

$$I_x = \frac{\sum_i \sum_j w_{ij}(x_i - \overline{x})(x_j - \overline{x})}{\sum(x_i - \overline{x})^2}$$

where,
I_x is the observed Moran value for a given variable x for a given ED i
W is the weighted average of that variable in neighboring EDs
x_i is the observed value of the given z variable in ED i
x_j is the observed value of the given z variable in neighboring ED j
$\overline{x}$ is the theoretical mean calculated under the spatial randomness assumption.

The SpaceStat program gives both the observed Moran values and expected when spatial randomness is assumed. Moran's I is a cross-product coefficient similar to a Pearson correlation coefficient and scaled to be less than one in absolute value. Positive values for Moran's I indicate positive spatial autocorrelation (clustering), while negative values suggest spatial difference. The significance of Moran values is assessed by a standardized z-score that follows a normal distribution and is computed by subtracting the theoretical mean (calculated under the assumption that the null hypothesis of spatial randomness is true) and dividing the remainder by the standard deviation:

$$SD(I) = \sqrt{Var(I)}$$

$$z = (I - E(I)) / \sqrt{Var(I)}$$

The ArcView and SpaceStat programs were used to identify the distinctively Hispanic, Black, and Asian election districts using the % Hispanic, % NH Black VAP, and % NH Asian variables, respectively. At the end of each procedure, a new variable, the group Moran variable, is added to the original data. This variable has five values from 0 to 4, where the number '0' is assigned to areas with statistical insignificance, the number '1' is assigned to areas with a high-high spatial clustering in terms of racial/ethnic composition, the number '2' is assigned to areas with a low-low spatial clustering, the number '3' is assigned to areas with high-low spatial clustering, and finally the number '4' is assigned to areas with low-high spatial clustering. The two Moran values that indicate spatial clustering for a racial or ethnic group are the values '1' and '3'. Due to the spatial weighting matrix, an ED may be identified as a Black ED although the raw value (percent Black) is not above the average value, an example to a high-low type of autocorrelation (a high rate of Blacks in an area surrounded by low values of the weighted average rate of the neighboring areas -- most such clusters are at the edges of the larger racial and ethnic neighborhoods where the concentration rates tend to diminish).

Running the same ESDA procedure three times resulted in three new variables in the contextual-level data: Hispanic EDs, Black EDs, and Asian EDs. A close examination of these three variables reveal that some EDs were assigned to more than one racial or ethnic characteristic. To come up with mutually exclusive racially and ethnically distinct EDs, I identified the group that had the plurality in such mixed neighborhoods, and redefined the ED accordingly. When there was no clear plurality between the groups, I designated that ED as a "mixed-minority" ED.

Based on the EDs that are not identified as Hispanic, Black, or Asian, I constructed two more racially and ethnically distinct neighborhoods: those EDs that have a presence of non-Hispanic White voting age population larger than 64 % are identified as White-majority EDs and all the rest are identified as "mixed-minority" areas.

Appendix 2.3: Model New American Exit Poll (NAEP) Variables and Question Wording

Dependent Variable:

In NAEP 2002 and 2004, respondents were asked about their choice of candidate if they voted in the 2000 presidential election. This question is combined with the one asked in 2000.

NAEP 2000 Question:

[C] **In today's election for President, did you just vote for:**

1 ☐Al Gore
2 ☐George W. Bush
3 ☐Ralph Nader
4 ☐Pat Buchanan
5 ☐Someone Else
6 ☐No one

NAEP 2002 and 2004 Questions:

[JJ] **In the 2000 election for President, did you vote for:**

1 ☐Al Gore
2 ☐George W. Bush
3 ☐Ralph Nader
4 ☐Did not vote in 2000

Other Model Variables used to Construct Subgroups of Women with Varying Degrees of "Political Autonomy" and comparable Men:

[A] **Are you:**

1 ☐Male
2 ☐Female

[B] **Are you:**

1 ☐White 2 ☐Black 3 ☐Latino 4 ☐Asian
5 ☐Other

[D] **What was the last grade of school you completed?**

1 ☐Did not complete high school
2 ☐High school graduate
3 ☐Some college, but no degree
4 ☐College graduate
5 ☐Postgraduate study

[F] **Are you currently married?**

1 ☐Yes
2 ☐No

[J] **Do you work full time for pay?**

1 ☐Yes
2 ☐No

[Q] **Were you born in the U.S., Puerto Rico, or are you a naturalized citizen?**

1 ☐Born in U.S.
2 ☐Born in Puerto Rico
3 ☐Naturalized citizen:

Appendix to Chapter 3

Appendix to Table 3.5: Odds-Ratios of Voting, Foreign-born Group, CPS 1996-2002

	Model 1	S.E.	Model 2	S.E.	Model 3	S.E.
Election Year						
1996 Election	1.445***	0.134	1.036	0.156	1.026	0.157
1998 Election	0.978	0.135	0.828	0.155	0.833	0.155
2000 Election	1.760***	0.132	1.541***	0.154	1.547***	0.155
2002 Election (reference category)						
Age						
18 – 29 (reference category)						
30 - 39	1.438*	0.210	1.418	0.167	1.388	0.256
40 - 49	2.453***	0.206	2.031***	0.249	2.007***	0.251
50 -59	3.179***	0.210	2.126***	0.259	2.059***	0.261
60 - 69	5.886***	0.219	4.321***	0.269	4.120***	0.272
70 and over	6.646***	0.226	4.504***	0.281	4.091***	0.285
Education						
High School Graduate (reference category)						
Less than High School	0.671***	0.128	0.690**	0.146	0.701**	0.147
More than High School	1.953***	0.114	2.094***	0.132	2.130***	0.133
Race						
White (reference category)						
Black	1.200	0.130	0.592***	0.200	0.587***	0.201
Hispanic	0.787*	0.128	0.645**	0.185	0.658**	0.186
Asian	0.419***	0.145	0.459***	0.193	0.464***	0.194
Female	1.183*	0.099	1.273**	0.112	0.745	0.234
Employed	1.193	0.126	1.394**	0.143	1.008	0.215
In Poverty	0.866	0.129	1.018	0.144	1.001	0.145
Residing in current address 5+ years	1.833***	0.104	1.484***	0.120	1.510***	0.121
Family Structure						
Unmarried	0.960	0.107	0.904	0.120	0.701*	0.202
Children 0-6	1.258	0.189	1.406	0.222	1.344	0.305
Children 6-18	1.049	0.130	1.059	0.148	1.009	0.230

(continued on next page)

Table 3.5 (contd.): Odds-Ratios of Voting, Foreign-born Group, CPS 1996-2002

	Model 1	S.E.	Model 2	S.E.	Model 3	S.E.
Immigrant-specific Variables						
Proximity of home country			1.425**	0.174	1.427**	0.174
Civil Rights Index			0.944	0.044	0.939	0.044
Labor force sex-parity Index			1.091**	0.040	1.118**	0.054
Male immigrant-sending countries			1.076	0.265	1.604	0.326
Female immigrant-sending countries			1.449**	0.182	1.184	0.234
Length of Stay in the U.S.						
Less than 15 years			0.193***	0.187	0.190***	0.188
Between 15 and 30 years			0.529***	0.135	0.520***	0.136
Over 30 years (reference category)						
Interaction Terms						
Female*Employed					1.623**	0.240
Female*Unmarried					1.499*	0.248
Female*Children0-6					1.100	0.421
Female*Children6-18					1.056	0.281
Female*Male immigrant sending country					0.371*	0.539
Female*Female immigrant-sending country					1.354	0.239
Female*Gender-equal society					0.966	0.064
Constant	0.062***	0.259	0.155***	0.352	0.227***	0.379
N	2,738		2,299		2,299	
Cox & Snell R-squared	0.133		0.176		0.182	
-2 Log Likelihood	2791.800		2202.673		2187.221	
Chi-square	391.611		445.250		460.702	
% Predicted	75.0		76.0		76.3	

***p< .001, **p< .05, *p< .10

Appendix to Table 3.6: Odds-Ratios of Voting, Native-Born non-White Sample, CPS 1996-2002

	Model 1	S.E.	Model 2	S.E.		
Election Year						
1996 Election	1.633***	0.148	1.607***	0.149		
1998 Election	1.297*	0.150	1.290*	0.151		
2000 Election	2.493***	0.154	2.487***	0.154		
2002 Election (reference category)						
Age						
18 – 29 (reference category)						
30 - 39	1.492***	0.151	1.483***	0.151		
40 - 49	2.003***	0.164	1.982***	0.165		
50 -59	3.756***	0.208	3.652***	0.209		
60 - 69	3.726***	0.234	3.574***	0.236		
70 and over	3.608***	0.232	3.460***	0.234		
Education						
High School Graduate (reference category)						
Less than High School	0.719**	0.144	0.711**	0.145		
More than High School	1.756***	0.129	1.716***	0.129		
Race						
Black (reference category)						
Hispanic	0.521***	0.123	0.525***	0.124		
Asian	0.383***	0.267	0.384***	0.268		
Female	1.370***	0.112	0.873	0.293		
Employed	1.216	0.127	1.217	0.187		
In Poverty	0.712***	0.131	0.706***	0.132		
Residing in current address 5+ years	1.598***	0.112	1.590***	0.113		
Family Structure						
Unmarried	0.931	0.139	0.655*	0.231		
Children 0-6	0.980	0.203	0.655	0.365		
Children 6-18	1.223	0.152	1.174	0.304		

(continued on next page)

Table 3.6 (contd.): Odds-Ratios of Voting, Native-Born non-White Sample, CPS 1996-2002

	Model 1	S.E.	Model 2	S.E.		
Interaction Terms						
Female*Employed			0.991	0.227		
Female*Unmarried			1.763**	0.282		
Female*Children0-6			1.675	0.434		
Female*Children6-18			1.001	0.341		
Constant	0.290***	0.248	0.398***	0.308		
N	1,732		1,732			
Cox & Snell R-squared	0.169		0.172			
-2 Log Likelihood	2076.359		2070.902			
Chi-square	321.006		326.464			
% Predicted	69.5		69.3			

***p< .001, **p< .05, *p< .10

Appendix to Table 3.7: Odds-Ratios of Voting, Native-Born White Sample, CPS 1996-2002

	Model 1	**S.E.**	**Model 2**	**S.E.**		
Election Year						
1996 Election	2.076***	0.131	2.085***	0.131		
1998 Election	1.292**	0.128	1.293**	0.128		
2000 Election	2.896***	0.140	2.899***	0.140		
2002 Election (reference category)						
Age						
18 – 29 (reference category)						
30 - 39	1.580***	0.147	1.595***	0.147		
40 - 49	2.015***	0.156	2.014***	0.156		
50 -59	3.333***	0.177	3.354***	0.178		
60 - 69	5.384***	0.205	5.442***	0.206		
70 and over	5.350***	0.186	5.582***	0.190		
Education						
High School Graduate (reference category)						
Less than High School	0.511***	0.167	0.511***	0.167		
More than High School	3.001***	0.116	2.973***	0.117		
Female	1.074	0.095	1.071	0.206		
Employed	1.310**	0.128	1.129	0.172		
In Poverty	.711**	0.173	0.705**	0.174		
Residing in current address 5+ years	1.384***	0.107	1.378***	0.107		
Family Structure						
Unmarried	0.589***	0.111	.675**	0.163		
Children 0-6	0.731*	0.188	0.848	0.274		
Children 6-18	1.365*	0.169	1.579*	0.252		

(continued on next page)

Table 3.7 (contd.): Odds-Ratios of Voting, Native-Born White Sample, CPS 1996-2002

	Model 1	S.E.	Model 2	S.E.		
Interaction Terms						
Female*Employed			1.325	0.202		
Female*Unmarried			0.789	0.218		
Female*Children0-6			0.805	0.356		
Female*Children6-18			0.802	0.319		
Constant	0.215***	0.219	0.216***	0.246		
N	2,441		2,441			
Cox & Snell R-squared	0.161		0.162			
-2 Log Likelihood	2794.505		2791.718			
Chi-square	429.705		432.492			
% Predicted	69.5		69.5			

***p< .001, **p< .05, *p< .10

Appendix to Tables 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7: Model 1 of Voting without Children variables, CPS 1996-2002						
	Foreign-Born Sample		Native-Born non-White		Native-Born White	
	Model 1	S.E.	Model 1	S.E.	Model 1	S.E.
Election Year						
1996 Election	1.452***	0.134	1.630***	0.488	2.048***	0.131
1998 Election	0.981	0.135	1.293*	0.257	1.291**	0.128
2000 Election	1.759***	0.132	2.490***	0.154	2.893***	0.140
Age						
30 - 39	1.468*	0.205	1.576***	0.145	1.588***	0.145
40 - 49	2.442***	0.202	2.076***	0.162	2.207***	0.152
50 -59	3.110***	0.209	3.756***	0.206	3.490***	0.175
60 - 69	5.689***	0.217	3.672***	0.231	5.479***	0.200
70 and over	6.430***	0.224	3.554***	0.230	5.422***	0.181
Education						
Less than High School	0.674***	0.127	0.720**	0.144	.516***	0.167
More than High School	1.964***	0.114	1.743***	0.129	2.922***	0.115
Race						
Black	1.220	0.129	NA		NA	
Hispanic	0.796*	0.128	0.525***	0.123	NA	
Asian	0.424***	0.145	0.378***	0.266	NA	
Female	1.184*	0.098	1.410***	0.109	1.078	0.094
Employed	1.191	0.126	1.225	0.126	1.336**	0.127
In Poverty	0.873	0.128	0.727**	0.130	0.728*	0.172
Residing in current address 5+ years	1.825***	0.104	1.594***	0.112	1.421***	0.106
Family Structure						
Unmarried	0.929	0.101	0.895	0.131	0.593***	0.098
Children 0-6	NA		NA		NA	
Children 6-18	NA		NA		NA	
Constant	0.065***	0.256	0.300***	0.241	0.208***	0.209
N	2,738		1,732		2,441	
Cox & Snell R-squared	0.133		0.168		0.158	
-2 Log Likelihood	2793.255		2078.327		2803.286	
Chi-square	390.156		319.039		420.924	
% Predicted	73.2		68.7		69.5	

***p< .001, **p< .05, *p< .10

Note: Black is the reference category for Native-Born non-White sample. White is the reference category for Foreign-Born sample.

Appendix to Chapter 4

Appendix to Table 4.1: Two Level Hierarchical Analysis of Female and Male Voter Turnout in New York City in the 2000 Presidential Election
Overall Sample

	Model I			Model II		
	Logistic Regression Coefficients	**Odds-Ratios**	**Standard Error**	**Logistic Regression Coefficients**	**Odds-Ratios**	**Standard Error**
Level II Main Effects						
Neighborhood Means (β_0)						
Intercept	-0.9716***	0.3784	0.0575	-0.9235***	0.3972	0.0580
% Citizen VAP	0.0118***	1.0119	0.0006	0.0097***	1.010	0.0006
% in Poverty	-0.0181***	0.9214	0.0005	-0.0221***	0.9781	0.0005
% 65 or over	-0.0038***	0.9962	0.0009	-0.0023**	0.9977	0.0010
Population Density (Logged)	0.1122***	1.1187	0.0052	0.1139***	1.1206	0.0053
Asian EDs	-0.0698***	0.9326	0.0179	-0.0808***	0.9224	0.0170
Black EDs	-0.0825***	0.9208	0.0159	-0.2586***	0.7721	0.0191
Hispanic EDs	-0.1724***	0.8416	0.0185	-0.2530***	0.7765	0.0198
Mixed-Minority EDs	-0.0993***	0.9055	0.0152	-0.1802***	0.8351	0.0163
White EDs (reference category)						
Level I Main Effects						
Female (β_1)	0.1948***	1.2151	0.0035	0.0834***	1.0870	0.0063
Democrat (β_2)	0.6026***	1.8268	0.0030	0.6049***	1.8311	0.0030
Republican (β_3)	0.3592***	1.4322	0.0041	0.3583***	1.4309	0.0041
Other (reference category)						
Age 18 - 29 (β_4)	-0.4991***	0.6071	0.0039	-0.5003***	0.6063	0.0039
Age 30 - 39 (β_5)	-0.4359***	0.6467	0.0036	-0.4374***	1.5487	0.0036
Age 40 - 49 (β_6)	-0.0995***	0.9053	0.0037	-0.1001***	0.9047	0.0037
Age 50 - 64 (β_7)	0.2272***	1.2551	0.0037	0.2306***	1.2593	0.0037
Age 64+ (reference category)						
Cross-Level Interactions						
Female*Percent Citizen VAP				0.0036***	1.004	0.0004
Female*Percent in Poverty				0.0063***	1.006	0.0003
Female*Percent 65 or over				-0.0013**	0.9987	0.0006
Female*Asian EDs				0.0151	1.0152	0.0108
Female*Black EDs				0.2854***	1.3303	0.0094
Female*Hispanic EDs				0.1338***	1.1432	0.0111
Female*Mixed EDs				0.1339***	1.1433	0.0091
Variance Components						
Intercept	0.1199***	42,583.435 [a]		0.1138***	40,565.003[a]	
Female	0.0325***	11,242.385 [a]		0.0105***	7,086.676[a]	

Source: New York City Board of Election 2000 Voter Registration and Turnout file and 2000 U.S. Census SF 3 file.
Hierarchical Generalized Linear Model: Slopes and Intercepts Estimation.
a. Chi-square values. **p<.05; ***p<.01.
See HGLM Outputs 4.1a - 4.1b in Appendix 4.

Appendix to Tables 4.4; 4.5; and 4.6: Two Level Hierarchical Analysis of Hispanic Female and Male Voter Turnout in New York City in the 2000 Presidential Election,

	Hispanic ED		Black ED		Asian ED		Mixed-Minority ED		White-Majority ED	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
Neighborhood Means (β_0)										
Intercept	-0.5463*** (0.0178)	-0.7439*** (0.0193)	-0.5331*** (0.0327)	-0.7446*** (0.0382)	-0.2781*** (0.0416)	-0.1752*** (0.0445)	-0.4446*** (0.0236)	-0.6187*** (0.0259)	-0.1059*** (0.0334)	-0.1045*** (0.0348)
% in Poverty	-0.0114*** (0.0011)	-0.0176*** (0.0011)	-0.0112*** (0.0011)	-0.0143*** (0.0013)	-0.0222*** (0.0024)	-0.0252*** (0.0025)	-0.0111*** (0.0013)	-0.0187*** (0.0012)	-0.0056** (0.0025)	-0.0105*** (0.0026)
% 65 or over	0.0358*** (0.0046)	0.0339*** (0.0044)	0.0069 (0.0048)	0.0087* (0.0052)	0.00310 (0.0053)	0.0186*** (0.0054)	0.0184*** (0.0030)	0.0170*** (0.0033)	0.0038 (0.0024)	0.0093*** (0.0026)
% Citizen VAP	-0.0085*** (0.0017)	-0.0096*** (0.0016)	0.0068** (0.0027)	0.0039 (0.0029)	-0.0009 (0.0027)	-0.0016 (0.0027)	0.0024** (0.0010)	-0.0055*** (0.0017)	0.0137*** (0.0021)	0.0106*** (0.0022)
Individual Effects										
Democrat	0.7012*** (0.0131)	0.5776*** (0.0154)	0.7313*** (0.0277)	0.5167*** (0.0328)	0.5985*** (0.0353)	0.3882*** (0.0395)	0.7002*** (0.0189)	0.5864*** (0.0214)	0.5305*** (0.0298)	0.4628*** (0.0319)
Republican	0.1543*** (0.0233)	0.2177*** (0.0236)	0.0981* (0.0510)	0.0578 (0.0536)	0.4015*** (0.0521)	0.2683*** (0.0526)	0.2476*** (0.0321)	0.3163*** (0.0321)	0.4193*** (0.0402)	0.4827*** (0.0405)
Age 18-29	-0.0967*** (0.0142)	-0.1031*** (0.0175)	-0.1095*** (0.0210)	-0.0695* (0.0381)	0.0206 (0.0446)	-0.2019*** (0.0500)	-0.0281 (0.0216)	-0.1371*** (0.0254)	-0.0411 (0.0368)	-0.3010*** (0.0411)
Age 40-49	0.3731*** (0.0143)	0.3672*** (0.0166)	0.3812*** (0.0304)	0.4316*** (0.0361)	0.5625*** (0.0444)	0.4610*** (0.0478)	0.3724*** (0.0211)	0.3940*** (0.0238)	0.4018*** (0.0353)	0.3191*** (0.0370)
Age 50-64	0.5444*** (0.0143)	0.6402*** (0.0163)	0.6203*** (0.0307)	0.7578*** (0.0360)	0.7511*** (0.0431)	0.8021*** (0.0476)	0.6759*** (0.0210)	0.7002*** (0.0236)	0.7263*** (0.0360)	0.6045*** (0.0376)
Age 64+	0.3706*** (0.0164)	0.5174*** (0.0194)	0.4950*** (0.0358)	0.6946*** (0.0430)	0.6352*** (0.0477)	0.6496*** (0.0539)	0.5710*** (0.0231)	0.6595*** (0.0269)	0.5018*** (0.0388)	0.5179*** (0.0436)
Reduction in Variance at Level I[a]	**25.9 %**	**42.8 %**	**22.7 %**	**29.2 %**	**30.2 %**	**49.8 %**	**28.8 %**	**37.2 %**	**15.9 %**	**14.2 %**
Improvement in the Fit of Level I Model[b]	1304.479***	1617.830***	293.867***	333.337***	180.204***	270.479***	1042.640***	1174.154***	173.087***	157.481***

Source: New York City Board of Election 2000 Voter Registration and Turnout file and 2000 U.S. Census Summary File 3.
Hierarchical Generalized Linear Model: Slopes and Intercepts Estimation.
a. The reduction in variance in Level II means (β_0) is calculated by comparing the results of the complete model with those of unconditional model where there is no Level II predictors. Thus, the results of the reduction in the variance show the predicting power of the three Level II predictors in the complete model. See Outputs 4.3a - 4.3j for the results of the complete models and Outputs 4.3k – 4.3u for the results of the unconditional models in Appendix 4. (see Chapter 4 in Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) on comparing the variance estimates across models).
b. Here the results of the significance testing for the change in the reported chi square statistics from unconditional model and complete model are presented. The degrees of freedom is equal to the number of parameters to be tested. See Raudenbush and Bryk (2002, pp. 58-65) on the procedures and use of multiparameter significance testing.
**p<.05; ***p<.01. Cell entries are logistic regression coefficients, (standard errors), and odds ratios. Age group 30-39 and those who are not registered Democrat or Republican are the reference category.

HGLM OUTPUTS TO TABLE 4.1: Two Level Hierarchical Analysis of Female and Male Voter Turnout in New York City in the 2000 Presidential Election

Output 4.1a: Two Level Hierarchical Analysis of Female and Male Voter Turnout in New York City in the 2000 Presidential Election (Model II)

```
 Program:                      HLM 5 Hierarchical Linear and Nonlinear Modeling
 Authors:                      Stephen Raudenbush, Tony Bryk, & Richard Congdon
 Publisher:                    Scientific Software International, Inc. (c) 2000
                                                      techsupport@ssicentral.com
                                                              www.ssicentral.com
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Module:      HLM2.EXE (5.05.2330.2)
 Date:        5 July 2005, Tuesday
 Time:         1:26:23
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  SPECIFICATIONS FOR THIS NONLINEAR HLM2 RUN          Tue Jul 05 01:26:22 2005
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Problem Title: NO TITLE

  The data source for this run  = voterall.ssm
  The command file for this run = whlmtemp.hlm
  Output file name              = C:\HLM505_Rental6\hlm2.out
  The maximum number of level-2 units = 5251
  The maximum number of micro iterations = 100
  Method of estimation: restricted PQL
  Maximum number of macro iterations = 100

  Distribution at Level-1: Bernoulli

  The outcome variable is   VOTE00

  The model specified for the fixed effects was:
 ----------------------------------------------------

   Level-1                 Level-2
   Coefficients            Predictors
 ---------------------   ---------------
         INTRCPT1, B0      INTRCPT2, G00
$                          PPOVERTY, G01
$                            PELDER, G02
$                             PCVAP, G03
                           LNDENSIT, G04
                              BLACK, G05
                              ASIAN, G06
                               HISP, G07
                                MIX, G08
#       DEM slope, B1      INTRCPT2, G10
#       REP slope, B2      INTRCPT2, G20
        FEM slope, B3      INTRCPT2, G30
#   AGE1829 slope, B4      INTRCPT2, G40
#   AGE3039 slope, B5      INTRCPT2, G50
#   AGE4049 slope, B6      INTRCPT2, G60
#   AGE5064 slope, B7      INTRCPT2, G70

'#' - The residual parameter variance for this level-1 coefficient has been set
      to zero.
'$' - This level-2 predictor has been centered around its grand mean.

 The model specified for the covariance components was:
 -----------------------------------------------------
        Tau dimensions
              INTRCPT1
                   FEM slope

 Summary of the model specified (in equation format)
 ---------------------------------------------------
Level-1 Model
       Prob(Y=1|B) = P
(continued on next page)
```

Output 4.1a (cont.).

```
       log[P/(1-P)] = B0 + B1*(DEM) + B2*(REP) + B3*(FEM) + B4*(AGE1829) + B5*(AGE3039) +
B6*(AGE4049) + B7*(AGE5064)

Level-2 Model
       B0 = G00 + G01*(PPOVERTY) + G02*(PELDER) + G03*(PCVAP) + G04*(LNDENSIT)
         + G05*(BLACK) + G06*(ASIAN) + G07*(HISP) + G08*(MIX) + U0
       B1 = G10
       B2 = G20
       B3 = G30 + U3
       B4 = G40
       B5 = G50
       B6 = G60
       B7 = G70

RESULTS FOR NON-LINEAR MODEL WITH THE LOGIT LINK FUNCTION: Unit-Specific Model
(macro iteration 2)

 Tau
 INTRCPT1,B0      0.11993      -0.02122
      FEM,B3     -0.02122       0.03255

Tau (as correlations)
 INTRCPT1,B0  1.000 -0.340
      FEM,B3 -0.340  1.000

 ----------------------------------------------------
  Random level-1 coefficient   Reliability estimate
 ----------------------------------------------------
  INTRCPT1, B0                        0.862
       FEM, B3                        0.507
 ----------------------------------------------------

The value of the likelihood function at iteration 11 = -5.022338E+006

 The outcome variable is   VOTE00

 Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit-specific model)
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                    Standard             Approx.
    Fixed Effect         Coefficient   Error      T-ratio   d.f.     P-value
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 For       INTRCPT1, B0
    INTRCPT2, G00          -0.971619   0.057556   -16.881      5242    0.000
    PPOVERTY, G01          -0.018127   0.000464   -39.066      5242    0.000
      PELDER, G02          -0.003086   0.000940    -3.282      5242    0.001
       PCVAP, G03           0.011829   0.000580    20.403      5242    0.000
    LNDENSIT, G04           0.112233   0.005250    21.376      5242    0.000
       BLACK, G05          -0.082528   0.015940    -5.177      5242    0.000
       ASIAN, G06          -0.069836   0.017862    -3.910      5242    0.000
        HISP, G07          -0.172395   0.018468    -9.335      5242    0.000
         MIX, G08          -0.099265   0.015251    -6.509      5242    0.000
 For      DEM slope, B1
    INTRCPT2, G10           0.602649   0.002966   203.180   3526781    0.000
 For      REP slope, B2
    INTRCPT2, G20           0.359167   0.004121    87.145   3526781    0.000
 For      FEM slope, B3
    INTRCPT2, G30           0.194853   0.003500    55.679      5250    0.000
 For  AGE1829 slope, B4
    INTRCPT2, G40          -0.499061   0.003919  -127.341   3526781    0.000
 For  AGE3039 slope, B5
    INTRCPT2, G50          -0.435886   0.003631  -120.059   3526781    0.000
 For  AGE4049 slope, B6
    INTRCPT2, G60          -0.099470   0.003741   -26.592   3526781    0.000
 For  AGE5064 slope, B7
    INTRCPT2, G70           0.227196   0.003726    60.978   3526781    0.000
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

(continued on next page)

Output 4.1a (cont.).

```
 Final estimation of variance components:
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Random Effect           Standard      Variance     df    Chi-square  P-value
                         Deviation     Component
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 INTRCPT1,       U0        0.34631       0.11993  5242   42583.43506    0.000
      FEM slope, U3        0.18042       0.03255  5250   11242.38484    0.000
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

Output 4.1b: Two Level Hierarchical Analysis of Female and Male Voter Turnout in New York City in the 2000 Presidential Election (Model III)

```
 Program:                      HLM 5 Hierarchical Linear and Nonlinear Modeling
 Authors:                      Stephen Raudenbush, Tony Bryk, & Richard Congdon
 Publisher:                    Scientific Software International, Inc. (c) 2000
                                                    techsupport@ssicentral.com
                                                           www.ssicentral.com
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Module:      HLM2.EXE (5.05.2330.2)
 Date:        5 July 2005, Tuesday
 Time:         1:56:21
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  SPECIFICATIONS FOR THIS NONLINEAR HLM2 RUN          Tue Jul 05 01:56:21 2005
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Problem Title: NO TITLE
  The data source for this run  = voterall.ssm
  The command file for this run = whlmtemp.hlm
  Output file name              = C:\HLM505_Rental6\hlm2.out
  The maximum number of level-2 units = 5251
  The maximum number of micro iterations = 100
  Method of estimation: restricted PQL
  Maximum number of macro iterations = 100

  Distribution at Level-1: Bernoulli
  The outcome variable is   VOTE00

  The model specified for the fixed effects was:
 ----------------------------------------------------
   Level-1                 Level-2
   Coefficients            Predictors
 ---------------------   ---------------
         INTRCPT1, B0      INTRCPT2, G00
$                          PPOVERTY, G01
$                            PELDER, G02
$                             PCVAP, G03
                           LNDENSIT, G04
                              BLACK, G05
                              ASIAN, G06
                               HISP, G07
                                MIX, G08
#       DEM slope, B1      INTRCPT2, G10
#       REP slope, B2      INTRCPT2, G20
        FEM slope, B3      INTRCPT2, G30
$                          PPOVERTY, G31
$                            PELDER, G32
$                             PCVAP, G33
                              BLACK, G34
                              ASIAN, G35
                               HISP, G36
                                MIX, G37
#   AGE1829 slope, B4      INTRCPT2, G40
#   AGE3039 slope, B5      INTRCPT2, G50
#   AGE4049 slope, B6      INTRCPT2, G60
#   AGE5064 slope, B7      INTRCPT2, G70
```

(continued on next page)

Output 4.1b (cont.).

```
'#' - The residual parameter variance for this level-1 coefficient has been set
      to zero.

'$' - This level-2 predictor has been centered around its grand mean.

 The model specified for the covariance components was:
 ------------------------------------------------------
         Tau dimensions
               INTRCPT1
                    FEM slope

 Summary of the model specified (in equation format)
 ---------------------------------------------------

Level-1 Model

       Prob(Y=1|B) = P

       log[P/(1-P)] = B0 + B1*(DEM) + B2*(REP) + B3*(FEM) + B4*(AGE1829) + B5*(AGE3039) +
B6*(AGE4049) + B7*(AGE5064)

Level-2 Model
       B0 = G00 + G01*(PPOVERTY) + G02*(PELDER) + G03*(PCVAP) + G04*(LNDENSIT)
         + G05*(BLACK) + G06*(ASIAN) + G07*(HISP) + G08*(MIX) + U0
       B1 = G10
       B2 = G20
       B3 = G30 + G31*(PPOVERTY) + G32*(PELDER) + G33*(PCVAP) + G34*(BLACK)
         + G35*(ASIAN) + G36*(HISP) + G37*(MIX) + U3
       B4 = G40
       B5 = G50
       B6 = G60
       B7 = G70

RESULTS FOR NON-LINEAR MODEL WITH THE LOGIT LINK FUNCTION: Unit-Specific Model
(macro iteration 10)

 Tau
 INTRCPT1,B0      0.11381      -0.00834
      FEM,B3     -0.00834       0.01053

Tau (as correlations)
 INTRCPT1,B0  1.000 -0.241
      FEM,B3 -0.241  1.000

 ---------------------------------------------------
  Random level-1 coefficient   Reliability estimate
 ---------------------------------------------------
  INTRCPT1, B0                        0.855
       FEM, B3                        0.260
 ---------------------------------------------------

The value of the likelihood function at iteration 2 = -5.007341E+006
 The outcome variable is   VOTE00
```

(continued on next page)

Output 4.1b (cont.).

```
 Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit-specific model)
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                    Standard             Approx.
    Fixed Effect         Coefficient   Error      T-ratio   d.f.     P-value
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 For       INTRCPT1, B0
    INTRCPT2, G00          -0.923526   0.057978   -15.929      5242    0.000
    PPOVERTY, G01          -0.022077   0.000496   -44.496      5242    0.000
      PELDER, G02          -0.002368   0.001009    -2.347      5242    0.019
       PCVAP, G03           0.009751   0.000621    15.709      5242    0.000
    LNDENSIT, G04           0.113937   0.005281    21.575      5242    0.000
       BLACK, G05          -0.258570   0.017062   -15.155      5242    0.000
       ASIAN, G06          -0.080846   0.019120    -4.228      5242    0.000
        HISP, G07          -0.252982   0.019787   -12.785      5242    0.000
         MIX, G08          -0.180181   0.016319   -11.042      5242    0.000
 For      DEM slope, B1
    INTRCPT2, G10           0.604878   0.002975   203.305   3526774    0.000
 For      REP slope, B2
    INTRCPT2, G20           0.358260   0.004134    86.660   3526774    0.000
 For      FEM slope, B3
    INTRCPT2, G30           0.083414   0.006288    13.265      5243    0.000
    PPOVERTY, G31           0.006290   0.000265    23.725      5243    0.000
      PELDER, G32          -0.001349   0.000572    -2.360      5243    0.018
       PCVAP, G33           0.003639   0.000351    10.375      5243    0.000
       BLACK, G34           0.285449   0.009404    30.355      5243    0.000
       ASIAN, G35           0.015142   0.010838     1.397      5243    0.162
        HISP, G36           0.133859   0.011067    12.095      5243    0.000
         MIX, G37           0.133906   0.009131    14.664      5243    0.000
 For  AGE1829 slope, B4
    INTRCPT2, G40          -0.500270   0.003926  -127.435   3526774    0.000
 For  AGE3039 slope, B5
    INTRCPT2, G50          -0.437435   0.003634  -120.357   3526774    0.000
 For  AGE4049 slope, B6
    INTRCPT2, G60          -0.100077   0.003740   -26.760   3526774    0.000
 For  AGE5064 slope, B7
    INTRCPT2, G70           0.230604   0.003712    62.129   3526774    0.000
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------

 Final estimation of variance components:
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Random Effect           Standard      Variance     df    Chi-square  P-value
                         Deviation     Component
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 INTRCPT1,       U0        0.33736       0.11381  5242   40565.00326    0.000
      FEM slope, U3        0.10263       0.01053  5243    7086.67614    0.000
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

HGLM OUTPUTS TO TABLE 4.4: Estimated Probabilities of Voting for Hispanic Female and Male Voters in Racially/Ethnically Distinct Five Election Districts

Output 4.4a: Results of Hierarchical Nonlinear Modeling for Hispanic Female Voters in Hispanic Neighborhood (Unconditional Model).

```
 Program:                      HLM 5 Hierarchical Linear and Nonlinear Modeling
 Authors:                      Stephen Raudenbush, Tony Bryk, & Richard Congdon
 Publisher:                    Scientific Software International, Inc. (c) 2000
                                                      techsupport@ssicentral.com
                                                              www.ssicentral.com
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Module:      HLM2.EXE (5.05.2330.2)
 Date:        17 July 2005, Sunday
 Time:         2:34:45
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  SPECIFICATIONS FOR THIS NONLINEAR HLM2 RUN          Sun Jul 17 02:34:45 2005
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Problem Title: NO TITLE
  The data source for this run  = FEMHISP.SSM
  The command file for this run = whlmtemp.hlm
  Output file name              = C:\HLM505_RENTAL6\HLM2.OUT
  The maximum number of level-2 units = 1005
  The maximum number of micro iterations = 100
  Method of estimation: restricted PQL
  Maximum number of macro iterations = 100

  Distribution at Level-1: Bernoulli

  The outcome variable is   VOTE00

  The model specified for the fixed effects was:
 ----------------------------------------------------
   Level-1                 Level-2
   Coefficients            Predictors
 ---------------------   ---------------
         INTRCPT1, B0      INTRCPT2, G00
#       DEM slope, B1      INTRCPT2, G10
#       REP slope, B2      INTRCPT2, G20
#   AGE1829 slope, B3      INTRCPT2, G30
#   AGE4049 slope, B4      INTRCPT2, G40
#   AGE5064 slope, B5      INTRCPT2, G50
#   AGE64PL slope, B6      INTRCPT2, G60

'#' - The residual parameter variance for this level-1 coefficient has been set
      to zero.

 The model specified for the covariance components was:
 ------------------------------------------------------------
        Tau dimensions
              INTRCPT1
 Summary of the model specified (in equation format)
 ----------------------------------------------------
Level-1 Model

       Prob(Y=1|B) = P

       log[P/(1-P)] = B0 + B1*(DEM) + B2*(REP) + B3*(AGE1829) + B4*(AGE4049) + B5*(AGE5064) +
B6*(AGE64PL)

Level-2 Model
       B0 = G00 + U0
       B1 = G10
       B2 = G20
       B3 = G30
       B4 = G40
       B5 = G50
       B6 = G60
```

continued on next page)

Output 4.4a (cont.).

```
RESULTS FOR NON-LINEAR MODEL WITH THE LOGIT LINK FUNCTION: Unit-Specific Model
(macro iteration 5)

 Tau
 INTRCPT1,B0      0.14369

 Tau (as correlations)
 INTRCPT1,B0  1.000

 ----------------------------------------------------
  Random level-1 coefficient   Reliability estimate
 ----------------------------------------------------
  INTRCPT1, B0                         0.808
 ----------------------------------------------------

The value of the likelihood function at iteration 2 = -2.694969E+005

 The outcome variable is   VOTE00

 Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit-specific model)
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                    Standard             Approx.
    Fixed Effect         Coefficient   Error      T-ratio   d.f.     P-value
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 For       INTRCPT1, B0
    INTRCPT2, G00          -0.554704   0.018800   -29.505      1004    0.000
 For      DEM slope, B1
    INTRCPT2, G10           0.697620   0.013061    53.411    189643    0.000
 For      REP slope, B2
    INTRCPT2, G20           0.157679   0.023336     6.757    189643    0.000
 For  AGE1829 slope, B3
    INTRCPT2, G30          -0.097608   0.014255    -6.847    189643    0.000
 For  AGE4049 slope, B4
    INTRCPT2, G40           0.373797   0.014290    26.158    189643    0.000
 For  AGE5064 slope, B5
    INTRCPT2, G50           0.545289   0.014282    38.179    189643    0.000
 For  AGE64PL slope, B6
    INTRCPT2, G60           0.372098   0.016408    22.677    189643    0.000
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

 Final estimation of variance components:
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Random Effect           Standard      Variance     df    Chi-square  P-value
                         Deviation     Component
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 INTRCPT1,       U0        0.37906       0.14369  1004    6618.93462    0.000
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

Output 4.4b Results of Hierarchical Nonlinear Modeling for Hispanic Male Voters in Hispanic Neighborhood (Unconditional Model).

```
 Program:                     HLM 5 Hierarchical Linear and Nonlinear Modeling
 Authors:                     Stephen Raudenbush, Tony Bryk, & Richard Congdon
 Publisher:                   Scientific Software International, Inc. (c) 2000
                                                    techsupport@ssicentral.com
                                                           www.ssicentral.com
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Module:      HLM2.EXE (5.05.2330.2)
 Date:        17 July 2005, Sunday
 Time:         2:28:16
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
  SPECIFICATIONS FOR THIS NONLINEAR HLM2 RUN          Sun Jul 17 02:28:16 2005
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
  The data source for this run  = MALEHISP
  The command file for this run = whlmtemp.hlm
  Output file name              = C:\HLM505_RENTAL6\HLM2.OUT
```

(continued on next page)

```
  Output 4.4b (cont.).

  The maximum number of level-2 units = 1005
  The maximum number of micro iterations = 100
  Method of estimation: restricted PQL
  Maximum number of macro iterations = 100

  Distribution at Level-1: Bernoulli

  The outcome variable is   VOTE00

  The model specified for the fixed effects was:
 ----------------------------------------------------
   Level-1                 Level-2
   Coefficients            Predictors
 ---------------------   --------------
         INTRCPT1, B0      INTRCPT2, G00
#       DEM slope, B1      INTRCPT2, G10
#       REP slope, B2      INTRCPT2, G20
#   AGE1829 slope, B3      INTRCPT2, G30
#   AGE3039 slope, B4      INTRCPT2, G40
#   AGE4049 slope, B5      INTRCPT2, G50
#   AGE5064 slope, B6      INTRCPT2, G60

'#' - The residual parameter variance for this level-1 coefficient has been set
      to zero.

 The model specified for the covariance components was:
 ------------------------------------------------------------
        Tau dimensions
              INTRCPT1
 Summary of the model specified (in equation format)
 ----------------------------------------------------
Level-1 Model

       Prob(Y=1|B) = P

       log[P/(1-P)] = B0 + B1*(DEM) + B2*(REP) + B3*(AGE1829) + B4*(AGE3039) + B5*(AGE4049) +
B6*(AGE5064)

Level-2 Model
       B0 = G00 + U0
       B1 = G10
       B2 = G20
       B3 = G30
       B4 = G40
       B5 = G50
       B6 = G60

RESULTS FOR NON-LINEAR MODEL WITH THE LOGIT LINK FUNCTION: Unit-Specific Model
(macro iteration 5)

 Tau
 INTRCPT1,B0      0.15141

Tau (as correlations)
 INTRCPT1,B0  1.000

 ----------------------------------------------------
  Random level-1 coefficient   Reliability estimate
 ----------------------------------------------------
  INTRCPT1, B0                        0.772
 ----------------------------------------------------

The value of the likelihood function at iteration 2 = -1.946349E+005

 The outcome variable is   VOTE00

(continued on next page)
```

Output 4.4b (cont.)

```
 Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit-specific model)
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  Standard             Approx.
    Fixed Effect         Coefficient   Error      T-ratio   d.f.     P-value
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 For       INTRCPT1, B0
    INTRCPT2, G00          -0.245234   0.024441   -10.034      1004    0.000
 For      DEM slope, B1
    INTRCPT2, G10           0.573281   0.015415    37.190    136908    0.000
 For      REP slope, B2
    INTRCPT2, G20           0.222773   0.023636     9.425    136908    0.000
 For  AGE1829 slope, B3
    INTRCPT2, G30          -0.612307   0.020513   -29.849    136908    0.000
 For  AGE3039 slope, B4
    INTRCPT2, G40          -0.504518   0.019352   -26.070    136908    0.000
 For  AGE4049 slope, B5
    INTRCPT2, G50          -0.139467   0.019672    -7.090    136908    0.000
 For  AGE5064 slope, B6
    INTRCPT2, G60           0.132272   0.019304     6.852    136908    0.000
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

 Final estimation of variance components:
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Random Effect           Standard      Variance     df    Chi-square  P-value
                         Deviation     Component
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 INTRCPT1,       U0        0.38912       0.15141  1004    5268.65897    0.000
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

Output 4.4c: Results of Hierarchical Nonlinear Modeling for Hispanic Female Voters in White-Majority Neighborhood (Unconditional Model).

```
 Program:                      HLM 5 Hierarchical Linear and Nonlinear Modeling
 Authors:                      Stephen Raudenbush, Tony Bryk, & Richard Congdon
 Publisher:                    Scientific Software International, Inc. (c) 2000
                                                    techsupport@ssicentral.com
                                                           www.ssicentral.com
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Module:      HLM2.EXE (5.05.2330.2)
 Date:        17 July 2005, Sunday
 Time:         2:41:29
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
  SPECIFICATIONS FOR THIS NONLINEAR HLM2 RUN          Sun Jul 17 02:41:29 2005
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Problem Title: NO TITLE
  The data source for this run  = C:\HLM505_RENTAL6\FEMWHT.SSM

  The command file for this run = whlmtemp.hlm
  Output file name              = C:\HLM505_RENTAL6\HLM2.OUT
  The maximum number of level-2 units = 1567
  The maximum number of micro iterations = 100
  Method of estimation: restricted PQL
  Maximum number of macro iterations = 100

  Distribution at Level-1: Bernoulli

  The outcome variable is   VOTE00

  The model specified for the fixed effects was:
 ----------------------------------------------------
   Level-1                 Level-2
   Coefficients            Predictors
 ----------------------   ---------------
        INTRCPT1, B0      INTRCPT2, G00
#       DEM slope, B1      INTRCPT2, G10
#       REP slope, B2      INTRCPT2, G20
#   AGE1829 slope, B3      INTRCPT2, G30
 (
```

continued on next page)

Output 4.4c (cont.)

```
#   AGE4049 slope, B4      INTRCPT2, G40
#   AGE5064 slope, B5      INTRCPT2, G50
#   AGE64PL slope, B6      INTRCPT2, G60

'#' - The residual parameter variance for this level-1 coefficient has been set
      to zero.

 The model specified for the covariance components was:
 ------------------------------------------------------------
        Tau dimensions
              INTRCPT1
 Summary of the model specified (in equation format)
 -----------------------------------------------------
Level-1 Model

       Prob(Y=1|B) = P

       log[P/(1-P)] = B0 + B1*(DEM) + B2*(REP) + B3*(AGE1829) + B4*(AGE4049) + B5*(AGE5064) +
B6*(AGE64PL)

Level-2 Model
       B0 = G00 + U0
       B1 = G10
       B2 = G20
       B3 = G30
       B4 = G40
       B5 = G50
       B6 = G60

RESULTS FOR NON-LINEAR MODEL WITH THE LOGIT LINK FUNCTION: Unit-Specific Model
(macro iteration 12)

 Tau
 INTRCPT1,B0      0.14905

Tau (as correlations)
 INTRCPT1,B0  1.000

 ------------------------------------------------------
  Random level-1 coefficient   Reliability estimate
 ------------------------------------------------------
  INTRCPT1, B0                        0.359
 ------------------------------------------------------

The value of the likelihood function at iteration 2 = -4.554372E+004

 The outcome variable is   VOTE00

Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit-specific model)
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  Standard             Approx.
    Fixed Effect         Coefficient   Error      T-ratio   d.f.     P-value
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 For       INTRCPT1, B0
    INTRCPT2, G00          -0.107797   0.033651    -3.203      1566    0.002
 For      DEM slope, B1
    INTRCPT2, G10           0.527064   0.029801    17.686     32112    0.000
 For      REP slope, B2
    INTRCPT2, G20           0.426422   0.040207    10.606     32112    0.000
 For  AGE1829 slope, B3
    INTRCPT2, G30          -0.047949   0.036829    -1.302     32112    0.193
 For  AGE4049 slope, B4
    INTRCPT2, G40           0.397229   0.035346    11.238     32112    0.000
 For  AGE5064 slope, B5
    INTRCPT2, G50           0.725062   0.036037    20.120     32112    0.000
 For  AGE64PL slope, B6
    INTRCPT2, G60           0.511248   0.038741    13.197     32112    0.000
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
continued on next page)
```

Output 4.4c (cont.)

```
 Final estimation of variance components:
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Random Effect           Standard      Variance     df    Chi-square  P-value
                         Deviation     Component
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 INTRCPT1,       U0        0.38607       0.14905  1566    2624.67538    0.000
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

Output 4.4d: Results of Hierarchical Nonlinear Modeling for Hispanic Male Voters in White-Majority Neighborhood (Unconditional Model).

```
 Program:                      HLM 5 Hierarchical Linear and Nonlinear Modeling
 Authors:                      Stephen Raudenbush, Tony Bryk, & Richard Congdon
 Publisher:                    Scientific Software International, Inc. (c) 2000
                                                    techsupport@ssicentral.com
                                                            www.ssicentral.com
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Module:      HLM2.EXE (5.05.2330.2)
 Date:        17 July 2005, Sunday
 Time:         2:22:43
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  SPECIFICATIONS FOR THIS NONLINEAR HLM2 RUN          Sun Jul 17 02:22:43 2005
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Problem Title: NO TITLE
  The data source for this run  = C:\HLM505_RENTAL6\MALEWHT.SSM
  The command file for this run = whlmtemp.hlm
  Output file name              = C:\HLM505_RENTAL6\HLM2.OUT
  The maximum number of level-2 units = 1562
  The maximum number of micro iterations = 100
  Method of estimation: restricted PQL
  Maximum number of macro iterations = 100
  Distribution at Level-1: Bernoulli

  The outcome variable is   VOTE00

  The model specified for the fixed effects was:
 ----------------------------------------------------
   Level-1                 Level-2
   Coefficients            Predictors
 ----------------------   ---------------
         INTRCPT1, B0      INTRCPT2, G00
#       DEM slope, B1      INTRCPT2, G10
#       REP slope, B2      INTRCPT2, G20
#   AGE1829 slope, B3      INTRCPT2, G30
#   AGE4049 slope, B4      INTRCPT2, G40
#   AGE5064 slope, B5      INTRCPT2, G50
#   AGE64PL slope, B6      INTRCPT2, G60

'#' - The residual parameter variance for this level-1 coefficient has been set
      to zero.

 The model specified for the covariance components was:
 ------------------------------------------------------------
         Tau dimensions
               INTRCPT1
 Summary of the model specified (in equation format)
 ----------------------------------------------------
Level-1 Model
       Prob(Y=1|B) = P

       log[P/(1-P)] = B0 + B1*(DEM) + B2*(REP) + B3*(AGE1829) + B4*(AGE4049) + B5*(AGE5064) +
B6*(AGE64PL)

Level-2 Model
       B0 = G00 + U0
       B1 = G10
```

(continued on next page)

Output 4.4d (cont.)

```
       B2 = G20
       B3 = G30
       B4 = G40
       B5 = G50
       B6 = G60

RESULTS FOR NON-LINEAR MODEL WITH THE LOGIT LINK FUNCTION: Unit-Specific Model
(macro iteration 12)

 Tau
 INTRCPT1,B0      0.15774

Tau (as correlations)
 INTRCPT1,B0  1.000
 ----------------------------------------------------
  Random level-1 coefficient   Reliability estimate
 ----------------------------------------------------
  INTRCPT1, B0                         0.339
 ----------------------------------------------------
The value of the likelihood function at iteration 2 = -3.803916E+004

 The outcome variable is   VOTE00

 Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit-specific model)
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                    Standard             Approx.
    Fixed Effect         Coefficient   Error      T-ratio   d.f.     P-value
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 For       INTRCPT1, B0
    INTRCPT2, G00          -0.108959   0.034917    -3.121      1561    0.002
 For      DEM slope, B1
    INTRCPT2, G10           0.454513   0.031816    14.286     26804    0.000
 For      REP slope, B2
    INTRCPT2, G20           0.487681   0.040491    12.044     26804    0.000
 For  AGE1829 slope, B3
    INTRCPT2, G30          -0.319113   0.041047    -7.774     26804    0.000
 For  AGE4049 slope, B4
    INTRCPT2, G40           0.321192   0.037006     8.679     26804    0.000
 For  AGE5064 slope, B5
    INTRCPT2, G50           0.605865   0.037604    16.112     26804    0.000
 For  AGE64PL slope, B6
    INTRCPT2, G60           0.526253   0.043516    12.093     26804    0.000
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Final estimation of variance components:
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Random Effect           Standard      Variance     df    Chi-square  P-value
                         Deviation     Component
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 INTRCPT1,       U0        0.39716       0.15774  1561    2523.66920    0.000
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

Output 4.4e: Results of Hierarchical Nonlinear Modeling for Hispanic Female Voters in Hispanic Neighborhood (Complete Model).

```
                    LEVEL-1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

 VARIABLE NAME        N       MEAN         SD         MINIMUM    MAXIMUM
       DEM        189650       0.78       0.42         0.00        1.00
       REP        189650       0.06       0.23         0.00        1.00
    VOTE00        189650       0.54       0.50         0.00        1.00
   AGE1829        189650       0.20       0.40         0.00        1.00
   AGE3039        189650       0.24       0.43         0.00        1.00
   AGE4049        189650       0.20       0.40         0.00        1.00
   AGE5064        189650       0.22       0.41         0.00        1.00
   AGE64PL        189650       0.13       0.34         0.00        1.00
```

(continued on next page)

Output 4.4e (cont.)

```
               LEVEL-2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

 VARIABLE NAME       N       MEAN         SD         MINIMUM    MAXIMUM
  PPOVERTY          1005      31.62      11.95         4.08       62.55
    PELDER          1005       8.48       3.34         0.81       21.56
     PCVAP          1005      52.80       8.05        28.97       90.84


 Program:                      HLM 5 Hierarchical Linear and Nonlinear Modeling
 Authors:                      Stephen Raudenbush, Tony Bryk, & Richard Congdon
 Publisher:                    Scientific Software International, Inc. (c) 2000
                                                    techsupport@ssicentral.com
                                                           www.ssicentral.com
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Module:      HLM2.EXE (5.05.2330.2)
 Date:        16 July 2005, Saturday
 Time:        23:41:16
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  SPECIFICATIONS FOR THIS NONLINEAR HLM2 RUN          Sat Jul 16 23:41:16 2005
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Problem Title: NO TITLE

  The data source for this run  = femlat.ssm
  The command file for this run = whlmtemp.hlm
  Output file name              = C:\HLM505_Rental6\hlm2.out
  The maximum number of level-2 units = 1005
  The maximum number of micro iterations = 100
  Method of estimation: restricted PQL
  Maximum number of macro iterations = 100

  Distribution at Level-1: Bernoulli

  The outcome variable is   VOTE00

  The model specified for the fixed effects was:
 ----------------------------------------------------


   Level-1                 Level-2
   Coefficients            Predictors
 ----------------------   ---------------
        INTRCPT1, B0      INTRCPT2, G00
$                         PPOVERTY, G01
$                           PELDER, G02
$                             PCVAP, G03
#       DEM slope, B1     INTRCPT2, G10
#       REP slope, B2     INTRCPT2, G20
#   AGE1829 slope, B3     INTRCPT2, G30
#   AGE4049 slope, B4     INTRCPT2, G40
#   AGE5064 slope, B5     INTRCPT2, G50
#   AGE64PL slope, B6     INTRCPT2, G60

'#' - The residual parameter variance for this level-1 coefficient has been set
      to zero.
'$' - This level-2 predictor has been centered around its grand mean.

 The model specified for the covariance components was:
 ------------------------------------------------------
        Tau dimensions
              INTRCPT1

 Summary of the model specified (in equation format)
 ---------------------------------------------------
Level-1 Model

       Prob(Y=1|B) = P

       log[P/(1-P)] = B0 + B1*(DEM) + B2*(REP) + B3*(AGE1829) + B4*(AGE4049) + B5*(AGE5064) +
B6*(AGE64PL)
```

(continued on next page)

Output 4.4e (cont.)

```
Level-2 Model
       B0 = G00 + G01*(PPOVERTY) + G02*(PELDER) + G03*(PCVAP) + U0
       B1 = G10
       B2 = G20
       B3 = G30
       B4 = G40
       B5 = G50
       B6 = G60

RESULTS FOR NON-LINEAR MODEL WITH THE LOGIT LINK FUNCTION: Unit-Specific Model
(macro iteration 6)

 Tau
 INTRCPT1,B0      0.10637

Tau (as correlations)
 INTRCPT1,B0  1.000
 ------------------------------------------------------
  Random level-1 coefficient   Reliability estimate
 ------------------------------------------------------
  INTRCPT1, B0                        0.763
 ------------------------------------------------------
The value of the likelihood function at iteration 2 = -2.694253E+005

 The outcome variable is   VOTE00

 Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit-specific model)
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  Standard             Approx.
    Fixed Effect         Coefficient   Error      T-ratio   d.f.     P-value
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 For       INTRCPT1, B0
    INTRCPT2, G00          -0.546281   0.017782   -30.721      1001    0.000
    PPOVERTY, G01          -0.011370   0.001127   -10.084      1001    0.000
      PELDER, G02           0.035785   0.004606     7.770      1001    0.000
       PCVAP, G03          -0.008527   0.001726    -4.940      1001    0.000
 For      DEM slope, B1
    INTRCPT2, G10           0.701227   0.013069    53.656    189640    0.000
 For      REP slope, B2
    INTRCPT2, G20           0.154347   0.023344     6.612    189640    0.000
 For  AGE1829 slope, B3
    INTRCPT2, G30          -0.096697   0.014256    -6.783    189640    0.000
 For  AGE4049 slope, B4
    INTRCPT2, G40           0.373138   0.014290    26.111    189640    0.000
 For  AGE5064 slope, B5
    INTRCPT2, G50           0.544434   0.014281    38.124    189640    0.000
 For  AGE64PL slope, B6
    INTRCPT2, G60           0.370561   0.016405    22.588    189640    0.000
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------

 Final estimation of variance components:
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Random Effect           Standard      Variance     df    Chi-square  P-value
                         Deviation     Component
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 INTRCPT1,       U0        0.32615       0.10637  1001    5313.55381    0.000
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

Output 4.4f: Results of Hierarchical Nonlinear Modeling for Hispanic Male Voters in Hispanic Neighborhood (Complete Model).

```
                     LEVEL-1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

 VARIABLE NAME        N       MEAN         SD         MINIMUM      MAXIMUM
       DEM        136915       0.74       0.44         0.00         1.00
       REP        136915       0.09       0.28         0.00         1.00
    VOTE00        136915       0.48       0.50         0.00         1.00
```

(continued on next page)

Output 4.4f (cont.)

```
    AGE1829        136915       0.19       0.39         0.00         1.00
   AGE3039        136915       0.24       0.43         0.00         1.00
   AGE4049        136915       0.21       0.41         0.00         1.00
   AGE5064        136915       0.23       0.42         0.00         1.00
   AGE64PL        136915       0.13       0.34         0.00         1.00
    NONDEM        136915       0.26       0.44         0.00         1.00

                     LEVEL-2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

 VARIABLE NAME       N       MEAN         SD         MINIMUM      MAXIMUM
  PPOVERTY          1005      31.62      11.95         4.08        62.55
    PELDER          1005       8.48       3.34         0.81        21.56
     PCVAP          1005      52.80       8.05        28.97        90.84


 Program:                      HLM 5 Hierarchical Linear and Nonlinear Modeling
 Authors:                      Stephen Raudenbush, Tony Bryk, & Richard Congdon
 Publisher:                    Scientific Software International, Inc. (c) 2000
                                                        techsupport@ssicentral.com
                                                               www.ssicentral.com
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Module:      HLM2.EXE (5.05.2330.2)
 Date:        3 July 2005, Sunday
 Time:        15:52: 2
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  SPECIFICATIONS FOR THIS NONLINEAR HLM2 RUN          Sun Jul 03 15:52:02 2005
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Problem Title: NO TITLE

  The data source for this run  = malehisp
  The command file for this run = whlmtemp.hlm
  Output file name              = C:\HLM505_Rental6\hlm2.out
  The maximum number of level-2 units = 1005
  The maximum number of micro iterations = 100
  Method of estimation: restricted PQL
  Maximum number of macro iterations = 100

  Distribution at Level-1: Bernoulli

  The outcome variable is   VOTE00

  The model specified for the fixed effects was:
 ----------------------------------------------------
   Level-1                  Level-2
   Coefficients             Predictors
 ----------------------   ---------------
         INTRCPT1, B0      INTRCPT2, G00
$                          PPOVERTY, G01
$                            PELDER, G02
$                              PCVAP, G03
#       DEM slope, B1      INTRCPT2, G10
#       REP slope, B2      INTRCPT2, G20
#   AGE1829 slope, B3      INTRCPT2, G30
#   AGE4049 slope, B4      INTRCPT2, G40
#   AGE5064 slope, B5      INTRCPT2, G50
#   AGE64PL slope, B6      INTRCPT2, G60

'#' - The residual parameter variance for this level-1 coefficient has been set
      to zero.
'$' - This level-2 predictor has been centered around its grand mean.

 The model specified for the covariance components was:
 ------------------------------------------------------------
         Tau dimensions
               INTRCPT1

Summary of the model specified (in equation format)
 --------------------------------------------------
(continued on next page)
```

Output 4.4f (cont.)

Level-1 Model

Prob(Y=1|B) = P

log[P/(1-P)] = B0 + B1*(DEM) + B2*(REP) + B3*(AGE1829) + B4*(AGE4049) + B5*(AGE5064) + B6*(AGE64PL)

Level-2 Model
B0 = G00 + G01*(PPOVERTY) + G02*(PELDER) + G03*(PCVAP) + U0
B1 = G10
B2 = G20
B3 = G30
B4 = G40
B5 = G50
B6 = G60

RESULTS FOR NON-LINEAR MODEL WITH THE LOGIT LINK FUNCTION: Unit-Specific Model
(macro iteration 6)

Tau
INTRCPT1,B0 0.08664

Tau (as correlations)
INTRCPT1,B0 1.000

Random level-1 coefficient	Reliability estimate
INTRCPT1, B0	0.672

The value of the likelihood function at iteration 2 = -1.945088E+005
The outcome variable is VOTE00

Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit-specific model)

Fixed Effect	Coefficient	Standard Error	T-ratio	Approx. d.f.	P-value
For INTRCPT1, B0					
INTRCPT2, G00	-0.743937	0.019319	-38.508	1001	0.000
PPOVERTY, G01	-0.017611	0.001086	-16.211	1001	0.000
PELDER, G02	0.033916	0.004444	7.631	1001	0.000
PCVAP, G03	-0.009639	0.001659	-5.809	1001	0.000
For DEM slope, B1					
INTRCPT2, G10	0.577550	0.015431	37.428	136905	0.000
For REP slope, B2					
INTRCPT2, G20	0.217674	0.023648	9.205	136905	0.000
For AGE1829 slope, B3					
INTRCPT2, G30	-0.103137	0.017464	-5.906	136905	0.000
For AGE4049 slope, B4					
INTRCPT2, G40	0.367202	0.016634	22.075	136905	0.000
For AGE5064 slope, B5					
INTRCPT2, G50	0.640248	0.016343	39.176	136905	0.000
For AGE64PL slope, B6					
INTRCPT2, G60	0.517449	0.019381	26.698	136905	0.000

Final estimation of variance components:

Random Effect	Standard Deviation	Variance Component	df	Chi-square	P-value
INTRCPT1, U0	0.29435	0.08664	1001	3650.82834	0.000

Output 4.4g: Results of Hierarchical Nonlinear Modeling for Hispanic Female Voters in White-Majority Neighborhood (Complete Model).

LEVEL-1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

VARIABLE NAME	N	MEAN	SD	MINIMUM	MAXIMUM
DEM	32119	0.64	0.48	0.00	1.00
REP	32119	0.15	0.36	0.00	1.00
VOTE00	32119	0.63	0.48	0.00	1.00
AGE1829	32119	0.16	0.37	0.00	1.00
AGE3039	32119	0.24	0.43	0.00	1.00
AGE4049	32119	0.21	0.40	0.00	1.00
AGE5064	32119	0.22	0.41	0.00	1.00
AGE64PL	32119	0.17	0.37	0.00	1.00
NONDEM	32119	0.36	0.48	0.00	1.00

LEVEL-2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

VARIABLE NAME	N	MEAN	SD	MINIMUM	MAXIMUM
PPOVERTY	1567	10.02	7.54	0.64	65.05
PELDER	1567	15.54	7.06	0.00	93.63
PCVAP	1567	73.22	9.19	39.61	96.41

```
 Program:                     HLM 5 Hierarchical Linear and Nonlinear Modeling
 Authors:                     Stephen Raudenbush, Tony Bryk, & Richard Congdon
 Publisher:                   Scientific Software International, Inc. (c) 2000
                                                    techsupport@ssicentral.com
                                                           www.ssicentral.com
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Module:      HLM2.EXE (5.05.2330.2)
 Date:        3 July 2005, Sunday
 Time:        16:35:40
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  SPECIFICATIONS FOR THIS NONLINEAR HLM2 RUN          Sun Jul 03 16:35:40 2005
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Problem Title: NO TITLE

  The data source for this run  = C:\HLM505_Rental6\femwht.ssm
  The command file for this run = whlmtemp.hlm
  Output file name              = C:\HLM505_Rental6\hlm2.out
  The maximum number of level-2 units = 1567
  The maximum number of micro iterations = 100
  Method of estimation: restricted PQL
  Maximum number of macro iterations = 100

  Distribution at Level-1: Bernoulli

  The outcome variable is   VOTE00

The model specified for the fixed effects was:
 ----------------------------------------------------
   Level-1                 Level-2
   Coefficients            Predictors
 ----------------------   ---------------
         INTRCPT1, B0      INTRCPT2, G00
$                          PPOVERTY, G01
$                            PELDER, G02
$                             PCVAP, G03
#       DEM slope, B1      INTRCPT2, G10
#       REP slope, B2      INTRCPT2, G20
#   AGE1829 slope, B3      INTRCPT2, G30
#   AGE4049 slope, B4      INTRCPT2, G40
#   AGE5064 slope, B5      INTRCPT2, G50
#   AGE64PL slope, B6      INTRCPT2, G60

'#' - The residual parameter variance for this level-1 coefficient has been set
      to zero.
'$' - This level-2 predictor has been centered around its grand mean.
```

(continued on next page)

Output 4.4g (cont.)

```
The model specified for the covariance components was:
 ----------------------------------------------------------
         Tau dimensions
               INTRCPT1
 Summary of the model specified (in equation format)
 ----------------------------------------------------
Level-1 Model

       Prob(Y=1|B) = P

       log[P/(1-P)] = B0 + B1*(DEM) + B2*(REP) + B3*(AGE1829) + B4*(AGE4049) + B5*(AGE5064) +
B6*(AGE64PL)

Level-2 Model
       B0 = G00 + G01*(PPOVERTY) + G02*(PELDER) + G03*(PCVAP) + U0
       B1 = G10
       B2 = G20
       B3 = G30
       B4 = G40
       B5 = G50
       B6 = G60

RESULTS FOR NON-LINEAR MODEL WITH THE LOGIT LINK FUNCTION: Unit-Specific Model
(macro iteration 13)

 Tau
 INTRCPT1,B0      0.12541

Tau (as correlations)
 INTRCPT1,B0  1.000
-----------------------------------------------------
  Random level-1 coefficient   Reliability estimate
 -----------------------------------------------------
  INTRCPT1, B0                          0.323
 -----------------------------------------------------
The value of the likelihood function at iteration 2 = -4.555023E+004

 The outcome variable is   VOTE00

 Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit-specific model)
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   Standard             Approx.
    Fixed Effect         Coefficient   Error      T-ratio   d.f.     P-value
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 For       INTRCPT1, B0
    INTRCPT2, G00          -0.105948   0.033445    -3.168      1563    0.002
    PPOVERTY, G01          -0.005564   0.002460    -2.261      1563    0.024
      PELDER, G02           0.003800   0.002402     1.582      1563    0.113
       PCVAP, G03           0.013737   0.002113     6.502      1563    0.000
 For      DEM slope, B1
    INTRCPT2, G10           0.530553   0.029824    17.789     32109    0.000
 For      REP slope, B2
    INTRCPT2, G20           0.419297   0.040235    10.421     32109    0.000
 For  AGE1829 slope, B3
    INTRCPT2, G30          -0.041072   0.036840    -1.115     32109    0.265
 For  AGE4049 slope, B4
    INTRCPT2, G40           0.401798   0.035349    11.367     32109    0.000
 For  AGE5064 slope, B5
    INTRCPT2, G50           0.726257   0.036041    20.151     32109    0.000
 For  AGE64PL slope, B6
    INTRCPT2, G60           0.501806   0.038782    12.939     32109    0.000
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Final estimation of variance components:
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Random Effect           Standard      Variance     df    Chi-square  P-value
                         Deviation     Component
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
 INTRCPT1,       U0        0.35413       0.12541  1563    2451.58865    0.000
 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

Output 4.4h: Results of Hierarchical Nonlinear Modeling for Hispanic Male Voters in White-Majority Neighborhood (Complete Model).

LEVEL-1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

VARIABLE NAME	N	MEAN	SD	MINIMUM	MAXIMUM
DEM	26811	0.58	0.49	0.00	1.00
REP	26811	0.19	0.39	0.00	1.00
VOTE00	26811	0.61	0.49	0.00	1.00
AGE1829	26811	0.15	0.35	0.00	1.00
AGE3039	26811	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00
AGE4049	26811	0.22	0.41	0.00	1.00
AGE5064	26811	0.23	0.42	0.00	1.00
AGE64PL	26811	0.14	0.35	0.00	1.00
NONDEM	26811	0.42	0.49	0.00	1.00

LEVEL-2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

VARIABLE NAME	N	MEAN	SD	MINIMUM	MAXIMUM
PPOVERTY	1562	10.03	7.54	0.64	65.05
PELDER	1562	15.54	7.06	0.00	93.63
PCVAP	1562	73.23	9.18	39.61	96.41

```
 Program:                      HLM 5 Hierarchical Linear and Nonlinear Modeling
 Authors:                      Stephen Raudenbush, Tony Bryk, & Richard Congdon
 Publisher:                    Scientific Software International, Inc. (c) 2000
                                                        techsupport@ssicentral.com
                                                               www.ssicentral.com
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Module:      HLM2.EXE (5.05.2330.2)
 Date:        3 July 2005, Sunday
 Time:        16:43:57
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  SPECIFICATIONS FOR THIS NONLINEAR HLM2 RUN          Sun Jul 03 16:43:57 2005
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  Problem Title: NO TITLE

  The data source for this run  = malewht.ssm
  The command file for this run = whlmtemp.hlm
  Output file name              = C:\HLM505_Rental6\hlm2.out
  The maximum number of level-2 units = 1562
  The maximum number of micro iterations = 100
  Method of estimation: restricted PQL
  Maximum number of macro iterations = 100

  Distribution at Level-1: Bernoulli

  The outcome variable is   VOTE00

  The model specified for the fixed effects was:
 ----------------------------------------------------
    Level-1                 Level-2
    Coefficients            Predictors
 ----------------------   ---------------
         INTRCPT1, B0      INTRCPT2, G00
$                          PPOVERTY, G01
$                            PELDER, G02
$                              PCVAP, G03
#       DEM slope, B1      INTRCPT2, G10
#       REP slope, B2      INTRCPT2, G20
#    AGE1829 slope, B3     INTRCPT2, G30
#    AGE4049 slope, B4     INTRCPT2, G40
#    AGE5064 slope, B5     INTRCPT2, G50
#    AGE64PL slope, B6     INTRCPT2, G60

'#' - The residual parameter variance for this level-1 coefficient has been set
      to zero.
'$' - This level-2 predictor has been centered around its grand mean.
```

(continued on next page)

Output 4.4h (cont.)

```
The model specified for the covariance components was:
 ----------------------------------------------------------
         Tau dimensions
               INTRCPT1
 Summary of the model specified (in equation format)
 ----------------------------------------------------
Level-1 Model
       Prob(Y=1|B) = P

       log[P/(1-P)] = B0 + B1*(DEM) + B2*(REP) + B3*(AGE1829) + B4*(AGE4049) + B5*(AGE5064) +
B6*(AGE64PL)

Level-2 Model
       B0 = G00 + G01*(PPOVERTY) + G02*(PELDER) + G03*(PCVAP) + U0
       B1 = G10
       B2 = G20
       B3 = G30
       B4 = G40
       B5 = G50
       B6 = G60

RESULTS FOR NON-LINEAR MODEL WITH THE LOGIT LINK FUNCTION: Unit-Specific Model
(macro iteration 12)

 Tau
 INTRCPT1,B0      0.13532
Tau (as correlations)
 INTRCPT1,B0  1.000
 ----------------------------------------------------
  Random level-1 coefficient   Reliability estimate
 ----------------------------------------------------
  INTRCPT1, B0                        0.308
 ----------------------------------------------------
The value of the likelihood function at iteration 2 = -3.804365E+004

 The outcome variable is   VOTE00

 Final estimation of fixed effects: (Unit-specific model)
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  Standard             Approx.
    Fixed Effect         Coefficient   Error      T-ratio   d.f.     P-value
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 For       INTRCPT1, B0
    INTRCPT2, G00          -0.104480   0.034822    -3.000      1558    0.003
    PPOVERTY, G01          -0.010475   0.002607    -4.019      1558    0.000
      PELDER, G02           0.009287   0.002616     3.550      1558    0.001
       PCVAP, G03           0.010635   0.002222     4.787      1558    0.000
 For      DEM slope, B1
    INTRCPT2, G10           0.462811   0.031867    14.523     26801    0.000
 For      REP slope, B2
    INTRCPT2, G20           0.482699   0.040511    11.915     26801    0.000
 For  AGE1829 slope, B3
    INTRCPT2, G30          -0.309996   0.041066    -7.549     26801    0.000
 For  AGE4049 slope, B4
    INTRCPT2, G40           0.319098   0.037015     8.621     26801    0.000
 For  AGE5064 slope, B5
    INTRCPT2, G50           0.604456   0.037617    16.069     26801    0.000
 For  AGE64PL slope, B6
    INTRCPT2, G60           0.517968   0.043585    11.884     26801    0.000
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Final estimation of variance components:
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Random Effect           Standard      Variance     df    Chi-square  P-value
                         Deviation     Component
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 INTRCPT1,       U0        0.36786       0.13532  1558    2366.18798    0.000
 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

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