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# THE FULCRUM OF ASIA

by

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# 1

# THE ASIAN TRIANGLE

China, India, Pakistan, and the Soviet Union constitute most of the sprawling Asian landmass and embrace more than a third of the earth's total area and some 40 per cent of its population. Geographically, the real Asian triangle is formed by China, the subcontinent, and the USSR, though politically, it is a quadrangle, the subcontinent being shared by two unfriendly sovereign states struggling against the memory of their centuries-long singleness. The USSR as well as China tend to treat the subcontinent as one geopolitical entity, which enables them to exploit the contradictions between Pakistan and India. Pakistan's obsession is India, and India's obsession is India, which, in an esoteric way, means Pakistan too. Pakistan casts its shadow on India's relationships with the USSR and China; India dominates Pakistan's relations with either Communist giant.

This Asian triangle presents a unique complex of human relationships and is already one of the world's recognized tension areas. Within the triangle coexist, far from peacefully, almost all the warring ideologies including two mutually antagonistic schools of communism; a multiplicity of cultures, races, skins, nationalities, and languages; the four great reli-

gions of man; a superpower, a resurgent power-oriented Communist dictatorship and two neonationalist states each informed with its own power ambition; ancient traditions and taboos exposed to modern catalysts of science and technology; areas whose political status is either in dispute and indeterminate; and long frontiers, sometimes irrational and undemarcated, made alive by clashing national claims. It is an area of great political, economic, and military imbalance. In a large portion of this landmass, relatively feeble forces of stability and integration battle with vast amorphous divisive elements, and international relations are conducted more with elemental fear, hatred, jealousy, and ignorance than with a sophisticated awareness of the limitations of power and ideology. A study of relationships of the four countries of the Asian triangle is necessarily confined to their interlocking engagements in friendship and enmity. Translated to geography, the field of these engagements, it becomes a study of four-power relationships in South Asia, converging on the frontiers of Soviet Central Asia.

Several major factors distinguish South Asia from the other geographic regions of Asia. Here no single power lords it over a cluster of small entities. On the contrary, China meets India and the USSR meets China in increasingly grim confrontations. Devoid of any large concentration of strategic resources, like the oil of the Arab world, South Asia is of relatively little strategic interest to the West; it has only a marginal presence of the powerful business corporations that operate a high proportion of the Western capitalist economy.[1] The impact of American military power is minimal in South Asia, and that of the global system of anti-Communist military alliances residual. On the other hand, South Asia is the testing ground of the political future of Asia. Whether a large portion of the Asian population will live outside the frontiers of communism is not going to be decided in the charred paddies and hamlets of Vietnam. That decision awaits the results of confrontations building up in the landmass of South Asia.

These confrontations defy simplistic identifications because

they involve the political behavior of four very different and disparate powers, all of which are still in experimental stages of political and economic growth. Considerable confusion exists over the concept of either phenomenon; several theories of economic growth would seem to have been buried in the imponderables of traditional societies pressed to various norms of modernization. Semantic efforts to categorize these confrontations as between totalitarianism and freedom or between theocracy and secularism have proved to be frustrating; they have only expanded the gap between baffling Asian realities and their understanding in the West or in westernized Asian communities.

## INTANGIBLE DYNAMICS

It is therefore necessary at this stage to warn ourselves of certain intangible dynamics that profoundly, if at times irrationally, influence the political behavior of the four countries in relation to one another. These are the dynamics of tradition and custom, of fear and hatred, of violence, and of ignorance. They frequently intrude into the four powers' policies toward, and relations with, one another. It is well known how psychological perceptions of the past—romanticized, glorified, or resented and hated—have conditioned the behavior of Indian, Pakistani, Chinese, and Soviet leaders on issues and problems affecting their bilateral or corporate relationships. Leaders in India, Pakistan, and China have invoked their countries' past glories to beckon their countrymen to a future of high adventure. Curiously, the Indian image of Pakistan and the Pakistani image of India are etched out of the historical past of the Muslim conquest and rule of Hindustan rather than the recent memories of British domination of an undivided India. Professor T. A. Hsiah has spoken of the two contrary images of the Soviet Union in China; the much stronger one is of the Russia that has "added greatly to China's woe and shame."[2] Historical memories have undoubtedly played a part in making Sino-Soviet relations what they are today. In the mid-fifties, the

industry employed by Indians and Chinese to manufacture a two-thousand-year-old Sino-Indian friendship came to a frustrating end because it was based on a highly romanticized non-history. Asian civilization and cultures have been traditionally exclusive, except on the borderlines. China and India met each other as sovereign nations with very little previous mutual acquaintance of any value. Even between the people of the USSR and the people of the Chinese People's Republic, there was, in 1949, greater shared ignorance than knowledge.

Violence, linked with fear and hatred, creates another intangible dynamic of political behavior. And it precludes appreciation of the emotions and aspirations that are fundamental to each national psyche. Indians, for instance, have never understood the depth of Pakistan's fear complex, born out of its absurd geography, the "incompleteness" of its western wing without Kashmir, and also out of the deep-rooted fear of the Muslim mind of Hindu dominance. Since Indo-Pakistani relations have been, and will for some time continue to be, conducted by men and women who are themselves victims of the melancholy Hindu-Muslim politics of British India, they have seldom been steered along really secular lines but have often been handled with matching misperceptions of one another's aspirations, emotions, and intentions. As a result, mutual rejection of basic common interests has continued to subvert Indo-Pakistani relations. Mutual misperceptions have probably done more damage to Sino-Indian relations than any real clash of national interests. The Chinese, who have always regarded themselves as superior to Indians, their acceptance of Buddhism from India notwithstanding, have seldom appreciated independent India's political aspirations or national emotions.[3] Similarly, every time Indian leaders spoke of China as a great power, they, in fact, projected India's own claim to be regarded as one. Prejudice, hatred, and fear give an edge to violence which is more fundamental to the stratified Indian, Pakistani, and Chinese societies than is commonly acknowledged. In the dynamics of violence the South Asian landmass compares only with the Balkans of the early nineteenth century and, in our

time, with the Arab-Israeli complex in western Asia and Africa; in both regions three wars have been fought in twenty years, and fragile cease-fire lines stand between a feeble peace and renewed fighting.

## DYNAMICS OF IDEOLOGY

The trauma of ideology also adds to the complexity of the four-power relationships in the South Asian triangle. For none of these countries pragmatic geopolitical and national interests alone provide the guidelines to foreign policy. Each represents ideas and institutions whose appeal transcends national frontiers. The Soviet Union acts as the leader of an international Communist movement and the only Communist superpower in the world. China challenges the Soviet leadership and claims to have found the key to successful revolutions in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. India regards itself as the bastion of liberal democracy in the Asian continent and beyond. Pakistan believes that its Islamic ideology has a meaning for Muslims everywhere. Any conflict within the Asian triangle therefore, whether it be between Pakistan and India, or India and China, or China and the Soviet Union, is held up as an event of universal importance, a cosmic clash of values and principles. An alienated intellectual may proclaim the death of ideology in the technologically "arrived" societies in the West, but in the fields, factories, and homesteads of the far-leftover Asia, Africa, and Latin America, ideology is still a powerful weapon to move human minds and muscles. In a study of relationships between China, India, Pakistan, and the USSR, the role of ideology must therefore claim equal importance with the more measurable ingredients of external relations like frontiers, national interests, security, and economic and commercial advantages.

Several difficulties, however, arise in determining the influence of ideology on state relations. While until the early fifties there used to be a broad identity between Soviet ideological articulations on India and Pakistan and the very limited state relations, there is now a wide, and widening, gap between the two.[4] The initial optimism of the Soviet ideological (and

largely subjective) view of Indian state capitalism as a "higher" form, capable of an eventual peaceful transition to socialism, has now been abandoned, but Soviet state commitment to Indian development and defense has expanded. Although this demonstrates the high degree of sympathy with which the Soviets treat an admittedly capitalist economy friendly to the USSR, it also raises the problem of relating articulations of Soviet scholars to actual and probable projection of state policy. The number of Soviet specialists on the third world countries has increased remarkably since the mid-fifties; they now evidently enjoy a measure of freedom to express their views even if these do not conform to governmental policy.

However, the difficulty of a student of the Soviet Union's recent India policy is not resolved by the sudden mutation of unfavorable comment on India in the Soviet media on the eve of a renewal of friendly collaboration, only to be released a while later. Ideology being also a weapon of flexible response, the Soviet leaders can always justify their massive assistance to an admittedly capitalist Indian Government on the need to block American and Chinese influence on India; the very fact that an ideological justification is considered necessary betrays the basic impermanence of Soviet friendship. In the case of China the scholar's main difficulty is to discover dissenting notes in the noisy chorus of the official line; perhaps what is eloquent at crucial times is Chinese silence. To illustrate: The absence of praise of Pakistan in the Chinese press since January, 1968, is probably a clue to Peking's displeasure with Rawalpindi's new *rapport* with Moscow, much as China's nonapproval of the Vietnam peace talks in Paris is widely construed as strong disapproval.

The central theme of this study is the ideological and power conflict between China and the USSR over the India-Pakistan subcontinent and the whole South Asian complex. We hope to demonstrate that Soviet policies for India (and Pakistan) were from the early fifties strongly motivated by a more fundamental policy of containing the power and influence of Chinese com-

munism as well as the Chinese People's Republic. This is certainly not to exclude or minimize the other, equally strong, Soviet ideological and power motivation—to keep the subcontinent secure from an overdose of American influence. In pursuit of both goals the Soviets have desired to see a strong, united, forward-looking India assume a leadership role in the community of Asian-African nations; they have rendered substantial assistance to India's industrialization and defense. The dual motivation of Soviet policy made a confrontation with China over the Indian Question inevitable. India seems to have played a greater part in the Sino-Soviet conflict than is generally acknowledged.

Since foreign policy and relations are at most times projections of domestic policies, a general acquaintance with the course of developments within the four countries during the last twenty years is a prerequisite for an intelligent study of their interrelationships. To give even the briefest outline of these developments is, however, clearly outside the scope of this volume. It should, however, be noted that fifty years of organized, planned growth has placed the USSR in a position of great advantage in relation to its three Asian neighbors. Whether this has made the Sino-Soviet conflict a combat between two grossly unequals is perhaps debatable, because there are powerful constraints on Soviet might in this unusual duel. A noteworthy factor in South Asian relations is the growing disparity between economic progress in China and India, although both began their new life almost simultaneously, and India with certain clear advantages. In the political development of the two, similarities exist only on a superficial level. The old leadership in both countries is in the process of passing, although more rapidly in India than in China, and younger men and women are steadily coming to the forefront of national life through two distinctly different processes of political socialization. The great social upheaval in China which goes by the name of the proletarian cultural revolution coincides with a vast, amorphous realignment of political forces in India. Whether

and to what extent Mao has succeeded in revitalizing the revolution, whether China is poised on the threshold of new domestic and external policies, whether the cultural revolution has tightened or loosened Mao's clasp of the Chinese revolution, and whether, when Mao is no longer at the helm of affairs, a new direction will be given to Peking's policies are questions more easily asked than answered. The Soviet handling of the Sino-Soviet border clash in an uninhabited island of the Ussuri River in March, 1969, however, indicates a great paucity of optimism in Moscow about welcome changes in the direction of Chinese affairs in the near future that might be pleasing to the Russian leaders.[5] Whatever may be one's individual perspective of the Chinese proletarian cultural revolution—and there seem to be as many perspectives as there are "China-watchers"—the stability of the People's Republic and its continued economic and military growth are not held in serious doubt except by the most pessimistic or the most die-hard defender of the isolation of China from the international community.[6]

The Indian political landscape in 1969 is very different. Here too perspectives and perceptions vary from the overly optimistic to the overly pessimistic. What is undisputable is that the Congress party, which won independence and ruled India for twenty years, has lost its monopoly of political power and that Indian politics seems to have become as pluralistic as the country itself. No Indian political party can claim to be stable any more; the right is as splintered as the left. With the victory of the Communist-dominated United Front in the midterm elections in Bengal in February, 1969, communism appears to have emerged as a viable factor in Indian politics.[7] It may also have begun to be *Indian communism* for the first time, with the two major groups, one dubbed pro-Moscow, the other pro-Peking (wrongly in either case), working together in the united front governments in Kerala and Bengal, and a third group, born in 1968 with the blessing of the Chinese Communist party, that has firmly rejected the parliamentary road and adopted, even though it has hardly any following in the countryside, the

strategy of armed peasant-led revolution.[8] Whatever may be the ups and downs in the electoral fortunes of the multitude of political parties that function at the national and state levels, it seems fairly predictable that India will for some time to come lack strong national leadership and a firm direction of social and economic change.

In Pakistan the sudden disintegration of the regime of Field Marshal Ayub Khan in March, 1969, and its replacement by another variety of military rule is more than a classic example of the inability of an army regime to transform itself into truly representative government.[9] The integrity of the state of Pakistan is now regarded to be in greater danger than ever before.[10] Disintegration of Pakistan as a state, if it comes to happen, may lead to physical upheavals in the subcontinent far exceeding anything that has occurred so far. In this context a study of the two neighbors' relations with China and the USSR assumes an additional importance. For, both China and the Soviet Union, being Communist countries, claim a scientific insight into the laws of social transformation and have their own perceptions and perspectives of where India and Pakistan are going and where they should go and how. In fact, both the Soviet Union and China have been trying, in different ways, to change the course of social and political development in India and Pakistan.

## BORDER AREAS

In the border areas in the Asian landmass, there exists a cluster of traditional societies embracing a vast belt of subcultures inherited from centuries of unrecorded history. These are Sinkiang, Tibet, Sikkim, and Bhutan and the tribal areas that lace India's (and Pakistan's) northern frontiers. These traditional communities, which inhabit either side of the national frontiers, are also being pressed into varying degrees of modernization. The result has been rebellions, uprisings, political and social tensions, and demands or struggles for independence acting on, and reacting to, relationships between the four major

powers. Sinkiang is now firmly in Chinese hands, and so is Tibet. Enormous projects have been executed in Sinkiang in recent years, with the discovery of rich oil and uranium deposits. Sinkiang houses China's nuclear installations. It serves as an air link between China and Pakistan, and now road projects are under way to open up northern Kashmir to Sinkiang. Similarly, the Chinese have built a network of strategic roads and highways in Tibet, have joined Tibet with Sinkiang by two highways, both cutting through Aksai Chin in Ladakh, and have constructed another highway of great importance linking Lhasa and Kathmandu, capital of Nepal. Tibet's old feudal society is being reconstructed in accordance with the ground rules of Chinese communism; extensive land reforms, cooperatives, and the first network of industries point to the direction in which Tibet is being piloted by the Chinese leadership. To the south, Bhutan is being steadily opened up to the outside world; it already has its first airfield, electricity, and a network of roads. A slower pace of modernization is noticeable in Sikkim. Thus, large areas, for centuries stagnant and isolated, are waking up to the age of science and technology and modern political doctrines. A major problem that faces Chinese and Indian social and political engineers is how to reconcile the demands of these subcultures and their increasing economic and political resources to their existing political status. Nationalist aspirations have surfaced in all the four territories, posing for Peking and Delhi issues that cannot be settled in exclusiveness, for there is an Indian "presence" in Tibet, a Soviet "presence" in Sinkiang, and a Chinese "presence" in Bhutan and Sikkim. Although the Chinese would not permit "nationalist deviations" in Sinkiang and Tibet, they cannot ignore "legitimate" aspirations of the local inhabitants; they must satisfy the national minorities or wage genocidal warfare as did the Americans against the Red Indians. The Indian problem is how to satisfy the political aspirations of the new generation of Bhutanese and Sikkimese, and how to conciliate the Kashmiris, the Nagas, and the Mizos. In Pakistan, apart from the seemingly

growing schism between the eastern and the western wings, there is the simmering Pakhtoon irredenta along the Durand Line, the border that is not officially recognized by Afghanistan. It can erupt into a major problem if the stability of Pakistan comes to be seriously questioned.[11]

A remarkable development of the past decade or more in South Asia is that the political evolution of the Himalayan societies has become more open than in the past because of rivalries between China, India, and Pakistan. In spite of strong Soviet propaganda efforts to influence the minds of the Tibetans and the Uighurs of Sinkiang, it is not easy to define with some clarity either Moscow's intensions or its capabilities with regard to these extramural limbs of the Chinese People's Republic.[12] India recognized Chinese sovereignty in Tibet in the early fifties. However, the melancholy turn in Sino-Indian relations since the late fifties has made many Indians advocates of Tibetan independence, although the Indian impact on Tibet is very hard to measure. The Chinese impact on Bhutan and Sikkim would seem to be greater in comparison; in recent years Peking has repudiated India's special relationship with both kingdoms and has been urging them to edge out of the Indian fold. Moreover, Peking has been supporting the Kashmiri people's right to "national independence" since the India-Pakistan war of 1965 and nursing the Naga-Mizo irredenta since 1967. Within the subcontinent, India has given moral support to the political aspirations of the Pakhtoons, while Pakistan claims guardianship of the fifty million Muslims living in India and renders material assistance to the Nagas and Mizos. China and the Soviet Union accuse each other of rousing the nationalist passions of people living in the Sino-Soviet border zone. There is no evidence that either India or China has a clear perspective of the Himalayan complex of territories; the Chinese concept of a Himalayan federation heard briefly in the early sixties has since been muted. Peking's present strategy to soften up the northeastern frontier of India—from Sikkim to Nagaland—and, if possible, to nurse an Indian Maoist revolutionary

base along this border, which could be fed from a rear base in Burmese territory controlled by the White Flag Communists, is to be seen in the context of internal developments in India, of relations between China, India, and Pakistan, and of the success or failure of the post-Tashkent thrust of the Soviet Union's South Asian diplomacy.

## TERRITORIAL DISPUTES

Territorial disputes have already led to three wars in the Asian triangle. Twice have India and Pakistan fought undeclared wars over the possession of Kashmir; the problem is still unresolved. China and India have fought over the 2,500-mile-long disputed border; the war has only pushed Sino-Indian relations to the point of no easy return. Today relations between neighbors in this region are more frozen than anywhere else, with the exception of Israel and the Arabs. Trade and commerce do not flow between India and China, or between India and Pakistan. Communication and cultural exchanges remain forbidden. A multistream radio and press warfare is part of the region's daily pattern of life. There are constant charges and countercharges of border violations and of interference by one in the internal affairs of another.

Territorial disputes and unsettled borders were written into the political deal between the British, the Indian National Congress, and the All-India Muslim League which led to the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947. As soon as the imperial fortress the British had built in India, "with the vast moat of the sea on two of her faces and with mountains for her walls on the remainder,"[13] caved in, the countries and peoples at whose expense it had been constructed demanded their territories back or asked for the recognition of their sovereign rights. Significantly, the Dalai Lama Government in Lhasa was the first to ask India for the return of territory to Tibet (not to China) that was larger than the largest claim registered by Peking twelve years later.[14] Afghanistan looked

United States finally decide to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet conflict and use a newly contrived policy of conciliation with China in the seventies as a leverage against the USSR? Will the Soviet Union *in all circumstances* regard Chinese communism to be a greater enemy than American capitalism? Is Moscow working on a long-term strategy to bring South Asia under its exclusive hegemony? Is the perspective of the seventies inevitably one of still more intensified conflict between Moscow and Peking? Or will changes in the leadership of either or both countries lead to an attempt to repair the fallen structure of Sino-Soviet friendship? What would be the impact of a future Sino-Soviet *détente* on the Asian land mass?

This study raises these questions without trying to answer them. While its main focus is on the Sino-Soviet contest in South Asia, a good deal of the study is of the foreign policy and relations of India and Pakistan. The vastness of the scope of our inquiry raised a formidable spatial problem. It has been managed somewhat arbitrarily by a methodology that regards the 1950s as the decade of the Soviet arrival in South Asia and also of the steady buildup of the Chinese challenge. Following up this spatial framework, the 1960s have been viewed as the decade of confrontations between the USSR and China in South Asia. An analysis of the major confrontations and the consequences rising therefrom leads, in the final chapter, to an examination of some of the important problems that are likely to be faced in South Asian relations in the coming decades. The reader hardly needs to be reminded that the story of China-India-Pakistan-Soviet relations in South Asia is only part of the fluid substance of the history of our time; a window view may sometime yield closer observation, but the vision is necessarily of a fragment, not of the whole.

in our world, no Asian country would seem to have been able to build a strong indigenous ideology that could sustain several succeeding generations. Sukarno's *Pantjila* is almost dead. Ne Win's Burmese Way to Socialism is still on trial. Pakistan's Islamic stance is basically retrograde. In India, Nehru's Socialist Structure of Society is no more than a camouflage for a capitalist polity. Asia is overly dependent on the West not merely for technology but also for political and social development doctrines. While British-style parliamentary democracy is being gradually Indianized in India (its future remaining excitingly uncertain), Japan's successful experiment with democracy would seem to have had limited impact on the larger Asian community. Of the two competing doctrines (or strategies) of communism, the Soviet theory of National Democracy would seem to be losing ground in Asia to the Maoist theory of New-Democracy. And yet it is the Soviet Union, rather than the United States, which is in a position to combat China on Asian soil. The American weakness lies in geography, culture, priorities, and limited resources as well as in the absence of convictions in plans that are often empty of principles. And Chinese power and influence is something that cannot be contained by brute military might. Chinese communism is bellicose *politically,* not militarily.

The Soviet leaders probably believe that India and the subcontinent will eventually determine whether Chinese communism will hold sway over most of Asia. They have embarked upon the most delicate and potentially most dangerous (or promising) phase of their South Asia policy, a parity of influence in India and Pakistan, in an effort to draw both countries within the Soviet orbit. In the cautious pursuit of this policy, the Soviets have taken calculated risks, and it is too soon to pronounce judgment on their new adventure. It raises several important questions, however. Will the Soviets be able alone to contain China in Asia? Will they encourage parallel American policies to operate in South Asia? Is there a coincidence of Soviet and American interests in this region, and will both superpowers regard it profitable to act in collusion? Will the

is rooted in the ancient Chinese *fa-chia* philosophical school. . . .

In the remote past, the traditional conception of the Chinese emperor's supreme power over the neighboring peoples was implemented by the most diverse methods. Sometimes the Chinese rulers conquered neighboring countries and exterminated their population. At other times, they had to content themselves with purely outward manifestations of vassalage. As a result of long years of war, the Chinese emperors developed an original method of conquering their neighbors' lands. This was known in the Han epoch as *tsan shih* which may be translated as "to eat gradually [the neighbors' lands] as a silkworm eats a leaf." Another tradition was pitting nations against one another. Chinese diplomacy, especially in the Middle Ages, skilfully, and not so unsuccessfully, employed the method of "suppressing barbarians with the hands of barbarians."

Mao and his followers are taking practical steps to satisfy their covetous appetites, to establish China's supremacy in South-East Asia. To this end they are employing the "no-war no-peace" tactics which are designed to weaken the countries and bring them under Chinese rule. The border conflict with India has been going on for ten years now, with tension alternatively heightening and relaxing. Peking periodically presents India with ultimatums and tries to interfere in her affairs. Mao's agents are weaving a network of intrigues and plots in Bhutan and Sikkim. . . .[32]

The weird intensity of this polemic would suggest the enormity of the Chinese challenge in Soviet eyes. The Soviets know, as others also do, that China is, and will remain for a long time, an Asian power, the frontiers of its ambitions being confined to the Asian horizon. Europe is for the Chinese a remote and alien continent; Africa a field for remote action; even the Arab world is primarily an area worth cultivating because of China's current and future needs for oil. Asia is different. In Asia there is no real ideological opposition to Maoist communism except in Japan and India. The various Asian nationalities are weak, faced with a very complex period of transition from traditionalism to modernity. Except for nationalism, a universal doctrine

role of an independent leadership in Asia) as the Asian, or at least South and Southeast Asian, country capable of absorbing the trauma of Chinese power and of playing a meaningful *Asian* role in the containment of China. Furthermore, the Soviet Union would seem to consider India the first line of defense of the Russian Central Asian frontiers in a future military confrontation with China. For political purposes the Sino-Soviet frontier has merged with the Sino-Indian border; Soviet arms are being increasingly committed to the defense of the Indian border against China. The Russians would seem to have developed a stake in the continuity of the Sino-Indian frontier dispute and of a frigid stalemate in Sino-Indian relations. Not only have they done little to help in resolving the Sino-Indian differences, their policy and action have aggravated them. They have intervened at crucial points to remind the Indians (and other Asians) that the Chinese leaders are bent on dividing and weakening the new nations in order to build up their own power and influence in all of Asia. One of the most forceful and unequivocal Soviet attempts to portray the Chinese People's Republic as an expansionist power in Asia came in a leading Russian journal in July, 1968, when, for the first time in many years, the suggestion was heard in non-Communist Indian political circles that India should try to make up its differences with China in view of the conclusion of an arms deal between Pakistan and the Soviet Union.

> If you compare the foreign policy of the Chinese Empire and the foreign policy of Mao and his supporters, you will find that the latter are continuing the traditional policy of the Chinese emperors and developing their concept of hegemony. As in the past the hegemonic aspirations and the exaltation of the country are predicated upon the idea that the Han nation and Peking have a special mission to fulfil. In the old days, the concept of aggressive war, Great-Han chauvinism, and Sinocentrism were all features of a foreign policy doctrine aimed at excessively glorifying the Middle Kingdom.
>
> The ideology of militarism now widely propagated in China

## SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT

In this steady escalation of Sino-Soviet conflict, India and the Indian Question occupy a central place. The causes of the conflict are, of course, far wider and much more numerous than the clash of Sino-Soviet interests over India, in South Asia, and the general issue of the national liberation movement. As is well known, they embrace two very divergent ideological outlooks of the nature of our epoch, of the relative strength of the socialist and capitalist systems, of the strategy and tactics of the desired Communist revolution in the third world, and of general and local wars; interlocked with these doctrinal issues are internal developments in the Soviet Union and China, the success or failure of the two countries' encounters with the United States, and a progressive deterioration of Moscow-Peking state relations. However, thrice during the last eight years India has provided the ballistic for a marked escalation of the Sino-Soviet conflict. As the CCP itself has said, Sino-Soviet differences came out in the open for the first time in September, 1959, with Soviet support for India in the Sino-India border dispute. The second escalation came in 1962-63 following Soviet support for India during the Sino-Indian border war. And the third was reached after the Soviets and the Chinese Government took diametrically opposite positions during the India-Pakistan war of 1965. It is over and in South Asia—on the Sino-Indian and Sino-Soviet frontiers and in the war between Pakistan and India—that the gathering tensions and strains in Moscow-Peking relations exploded in near-physical clashes. The corrosive acid of course came from several other issues and conflicting interests, but the litmus was provided by what we may call the Indian Question.

An attempt has been made in the following pages to find out why the Indian Question occupies a pivotal position in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Our general conclusion is that the Soviets regard India (and Japan if it could be eased out of its defense alliance with the United States and persuaded to appear in the

and Taklakot, where the Tibetans had denied similar concession to the British.[29]

This tenuous arrangement broke down in the late fifties when the Soviet Union decided on the strategy of peaceful coexistence with the United States, inherent in which was also the strategy of holding the power and influence of the Chinese People's Republic. Although the Twentieth CPSU Congress strategy essentially meant peaceful coexistence *while* and *until*, the Soviet leaders knew in the mid and late fifties that it would have to be negotiated on the basis of a period of American military superiority. Mao's concurrence with the Twentieth Congress strategy had to be ruled out because what Herbert S. Dinerstein has aptly called the "shifting status quo"[30] between the US and the USSR implied, in the first instance, placing some of the vital unfulfilled Chinese ambitions, the "liberation" of Taiwan and acquisition of the Security Council seat, in cold storage; and, secondly, China's acceptance of the nuclear tutelage of the Soviet Union. Although recent research has thrown considerable light on the internal and external compulsions that led to the adoption of the CPSU Twentieth Congress strategy, not enough is known of what role the Chinese factor specifically played in it.[31] It is, however, instructive that in December, 1954, Khrushchev got a glimpse of the expansive territorial ambitions of Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues, and three or four years later, more than a glimpse of their nuclear aspirations. In the meantime, Mao Tse-tung attacked the Twentieth Congress strategy where it was most vulnerable and volatile—its perspective of the national liberation movement. Since the forties, Mao had been doubtful of the revolutionary élan of European Communists, of the Soviet Union's willingness to give combat to American "imperialism." These doubts and suspicions were only confirmed by the Twentieth and Twenty-first CPSU Congress strategy. Henceforth the positions of the Soviet Union and China on the national liberation movement became increasingly opposed to each other until, finally, the CCP declared in 1966 that even unity in action with the Soviet leadership was impermissible.

between New Delhi and Peking which proved to be a valuable line of communication between China and the United States. Nehru's diplomacy during the Korean War was more rewarding when he discovered, before any other non-Communist statesman, that the USSR and China did not really constitute an unshakable Communist monolith. He wrote in 1951 to his envoy at the UN: "I see that both the United States and the UK on the one hand and the USSR on the other, for entirely different reasons, are not anxious that India and China should be friendly towards one another. That itself is a significant fact which has to be borne in mind."[27] And he said publicly toward the end of 1950, "It is true that she [China] is controlled by Communists as Russia is. It would be interesting to know whether her type of Communism is the same type as Russia's, how she will develop and how close the association between China and Russia will be."[28]

## INDIA AND CHINA

When the confrontation over Tibet finally came in October, 1950—it had been coming since spring—Nehru was able to turn the Indian situation of weakness to one of some strength. He had made himself, and a part of the Indian bourgeoisie, ideologically acceptable to the Chinese leaders. Pressing this gain to India's advantage, Nehru first reacted to the Chinese advance into Tibet with righteous indignation—calling it an invasion—and then adopted tactics that probably made China's "peaceful" liberation of Tibet a little more peaceful than it otherwise might have been. What Nehru got from China in 1950-51 was an *unwritten* recognition of India's special relationship with Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim and an unrecorded Indian voice in the political settlement between Peking and Lhasa. Later, in 1954, Nehru exchanged the dubious inherited extraterritorial rights in Tibet for considerable commercial and cultural rights. India got a Consulate-General in Lhasa, the only such foreign mission in Tibet—the original British mission there had no clear legal basis—and trade markets at several places including Phari

of Soviet attention. The comfort, however, was tenuous because, first, the Soviet Union in the late forties remained persistently hostile to the Indian regime, which prevented India from applying the age-old formula of cultivating the neighbor of an unfriendly neighbor; and secondly, India, unlike the British, had to deal with the fact of Chinese power, not the fiction of a Chinese empire. An acute rivalry between India and China was inevitable as the extended frontiers of the People's Republic converged with the extended frontiers of India in the mountain fastness of the Himalayas. The rivalry was made sharper by the ethnic composition of the border zone, with large groups of people living on both sides of the undemarcated frontier with responsive racial, cultural, and religious relationships.[26]

Independent India's immediate problem was how to live with its Chinese neighbor. Chinese communism added a verisimilitude to the oncoming conflict between two resurgent Asian nationalisms both infused with a strong territorial imperative. Nehru's strategy was to improve the Indian position along the border, delay the Chinese advance into Tibet as long as he could, and, in the meantime, establish some *rapport* with the leaders in Peking so that in an eventual settlement of the Tibetan question, Indian interests were not completely eliminated.

The outbreak of the Korean War provided Nehru with an unexpected opportunity to seek the friendship of China. He did this by being the first world statesman to try concretely to secure for Peking the universally recognized great power symbol—a seat in the Security Council. In July, 1950, Nehru proposed, in identical letters to Stalin and Dean Acheson, and with the prior concurrence of Peking, a settlement of the Korean War through the Security Council on which the People's Republic would occupy the Chinese seat and to which the Soviet Union would return, ending a long boycott. His initiative failed, as it was expected to, but a bridge was built

border disputes. They did not see, except for brief ineffectual moments, that to make the inch-by-inch retention of a challenged frontier a matter of national honor was to make impossible a settlement without force.

## STRATEGIC FACTORS

Strategic considerations, of course, had much to do with the Indian perspective of the Himalayan complex. The Himalayas gave India a false sense of security, a "Maginot-line mentality."[21] India's historical foreign invaders, however, came across the Hindukush, which is part of the Karakoram range. As Arnold Toynbee has pointed out, the territory of Pakistan was carved out in 1947 not very differently from what a Demetrius or a Muhammad Ghaznawi or an Ahmad Shah Durrani had been required to carve out for himself.[22] Whatever else the partition of India might have achieved, it weakened the defense of both Pakistan and India against a strong external enemy. Pakistan belongs to what Sir Olaf Caroe calls the "arc of danger."[23] The leaders of Pakistan inherited the British strategic perspective of the Persian Gulf area to which their country was a gateway. Although Pakistan regarded India as its principal enemy, it was also afraid of the Soviet Union; this fear was enhanced when, in 1949, Stalin, in spite of the hostile Soviet ideological stance of the newly liberated subcontinent, invited Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan to visit the USSR. Pakistanis linked the Soviet gesture with the traditional Russian interest "in the general direction of the Persian Gulf."[24] Liaquat Ali Khan accepted the Soviet invitation only to land in Washington the same year in search of security.

The partition deprived India of its defense lines in the northwest. India's first defense line was the Hindukush, the second, the Northwest Frontier. For a country that lost control of its strategic frontier, an outlook of nervousness with regard to powerful neighbors was natural.[25] The only comfort that India could draw was that the partition exposed Pakistan to the trauma

longingly at territories that made up most of West Pakistan.[15] It was a tribute to the fiber of the leadership of India and Pakistan that stable, viable unions were formed with the merger of the six hundred-odd princely states, each of whom the British had left theoretically a paramount power. The leaders of the two countries failed only on Kashmir; the phantom of that failure still haunts Indo-Pakistan relations. The irrational frontiers between India and Pakistan were never completely peaceful. But gunshots were seldom heard beyond the border villages. An acute and explosive border crisis erupted in South Asia only after the Chinese Communists took over in Peking and determined to bring all extramural China under the effective control of the central government. The border crisis, however, brought a major aspect of the Asian nationalist ethos into sharp and clear focus. It was found that irrespective of the ideological complexion of China, India, and Pakistan, the resurgent identity of each had an imperial content, inherited from the immediate or distant past. Mao Tse-tung's perspective of a Communist China even in the thirties had included Mongolia, Sinkiang, Tibet, and Formosa;[16] he was remarkably free of imperialist guilt while asserting China's right to the vast domains beyond the Great Wall. Independent India determined to keep intact all the territories, special relationships, and extraterritorial rights it had "inherited" from the British.[17] So did Pakistan.[18] The anti-imperialist idioms that used to ring in the speeches and writings of Asian nationalist leaders when, in the early phases of national liberation movements, they referred to territorial annexations of the imperial powers, were almost invariably replaced by acquisitive phrases when their own countries emerged into independence.[19] For centuries the nibbling of small fringes of territory on India's northwestern or northeastern regions was an inconsequential event in its long history.[20] So it was, on occasions, in the case of China. Now India and Pakistan and, later, India and China not only disputed one another's claim to bits of territory along the frontiers but also became prisoners of their own articulation of

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# 1950s: THE SOVIETS ARRIVE IN SOUTH ASIA

It is sometimes intriguing to speculate on the if's of history. What would have been the pattern of international relations, one is tempted to ask, if Franklin D. Roosevelt had lived to build the peace he had conceived during the second world war? Of the several areas where Roosevelt had sought and expected Soviet collaboration, one was the postwar development of the colonies of the vanquished as well as the victors. The Russians were pleased with Roosevelt's recognition that the USSR was not an imperialist country while the United States was. To return the compliment, *Pravda* in 1945 distinguished the United States from the European colonial powers since it did not possess "significant" colonial territories.[1] The Soviets welcomed Roosevelt's ideas about international trusteeship of colonies and reacted positively to his proposal for an Allied declaration setting independence as the goal of the colonial powers. A draft of the declaration was distributed by Secretary Cordell Hull at the Moscow Conference, despite objections raised earlier by the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, at Quebec.[2]

Roosevelt and Stalin had several discussions on the future of the colonies of Japan as well as of Britain, France, and the Netherlands. At Teheran they pondered the future of Indo-

China and India; both seemed to agree that India presented a complicated problem.[3] Roosevelt expressed himself in favor of political reforms in India "from the bottom, somewhat on the Soviet line." Stalin stressed the complexity and ambiguity of Indian class relationships and warned that reforms from the bottom might mean revolution. Both the United States and the Soviet Union appeared to be in broad agreement on how to tackle the postwar colonial problem, until differences began to emerge at the San Francisco Conference of the United Nations. The differences, however, were not serious. The Soviets appeared to understand that the American retreat from "independence" to "self-government" as the explicit goal of UN trusteeship was an unavoidable concession to the British. The Soviets accepted permanent membership of the Trusteeship Council, a reversal of their decision not to have anything to do with the League of Nations mandate system in the thirties. At San Francisco the Soviet delegation fought for a more radical trusteeship charter; Soviet publicists did not fail to point out the contrast between Moscow's progressive colonial perspective and the American retreat to "self-government," but they were not overly critical of the U.S. position.[4] The Soviet Union got the reward it was aiming at. Their labors impressed the colonial countries of Asia and Africa. The Asian sentiment was voiced by Jawaharlal Nehru. "There is no doubt that during the last few years there has been some disillusionment in India with regard to American championship of freedom," he said. "At San Francisco, the Soviet Union took the lead in championing independence for subject peoples, but other powers fought shy of this and tried their utmost to choke it down."[5]

## THE SOVIETS AND THE COLONIES

In 1945–46 the Soviet Union was probably looking for an orderly transition of the colonies and semicolonies to national independence as a result of a broad agreement on principles between Moscow and Washington. In any case, the Soviets' immediate concern was stabilizing the newly established so-

cialist regimes in Eastern Europe. The wartime alliance with the Western democracies had created a somewhat ambiguous ideological situation with regard to the colonies and semi-colonies; it was neither easy nor absolutely necessary immediately after the war to revert to the old Comintern stance on the National and Colonial Question. The Potsdam Agreement had placed the Soviet Union in a position of strategic advantage in the Far East. Stalin had signed a treaty of friendship with the government of Chiang Kai-shek in China, securing considerable economic and strategic advantages in Sinkiang and Manchuria; he was advising the Chinese Communists against any revolutionary misadventure. If, during the "imperialist" phase of the war, he had been anxious to secure German recognition of the "area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf" as "the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union," the alliance with Britain (and the other Western democracies) in the "anti-fascist war" created an altogether new situation.[6] The Indian Communists, with their support for the war effort, alienated themselves from the nationalist elements led by the Indian National Congress. The Soviets had no sympathy for the Quit India movement launched by the Congress in 1942. A settlement of the Indian problem, it was agreed in the Soviet Union, must await the defeat of Germany and Japan.[7] This was also broadly the American and British position.

The colonial issue was revived in the Soviet Union as the war was about to end. Several months before the Japanese surrender, a Soviet journal published an article by E. Zhukov, already a specialist in oriental affairs, which was surprisingly mild in tone and subjective in content. Zhukov stressed the urgency of solving the colonial question once and for all, for colonialism had been a perennial cause of international conflicts and wars and also because the position of several colonial countries had changed radically during the war and these changes had now to be recognized as political facts. Zhukov invoked the "spirit of the Atlantic Charter," approvingly quoted liberal American and British opinion on the colonial

problem, and also warned against dominant "racist, overbearing and colonizing attitude" in the imperialist countries. The only specific colony that Zhukov discussed was India, on whose future, according to him, American and British views differed. The United States wanted changes that would turn the colonies "into spheres of unobstructed investment for American capital and a market for American goods"; the British, on the other hand, sought to maintain their supremacy as before the war.[8] Other Soviet writers identified a broad-based freedom struggle existing in India. D'iakov, for example, in stronger terms than Zhukov, emphasized India's desire for independence: ". . . the basic strata of Indian society are united more and more in the struggle for independence."[9] Zhukov's next article on the colonial question came in *Bol'shevik* in December, 1945. He now warned the leaders of the freedom movements in the colonies that a "recognition of formal sovereignty is no guarantee of actual independence." However, Zhukov still pursued the moderate line, relying on UN trusteeship to "accelerate the progressive development of complete independence for the colonies" and acknowledging no specific role of the Communists in the freedom struggles.[10] Charles McLane believes, perhaps correctly, that the reasons for Moscow's moderation "may be related to Soviet policies in China after the Japanese defeat."[11] Moscow was also apparently in the process of contriving a new perspective of the changing power alignments in the postwar period. The major colonies were going through varied convulsions. In Indo-China and Indonesia, the nationalists were fighting against imperialist restoration with arms; India was being torn asunder by Hindu-Muslim riots.

In 1946 the Soviet line on the colonial question somewhat hardened, apparently because the nationalist struggles in Asia had become more serious and, secondly, because the survival of the wartime Soviet-U.S. alliance came under doubt. In October, 1946, *Bol'shevik* published a third article by Zhukov, in which the Soviet revolution was projected for the first time as the surest guideline for the national liberation movements.[12]

In an article on India, D'iakov identified the National Congress as "the most influential" of the national political organizations, fighting for the attainment of "full independence." The Congress, he added, had some support among workers and peasants; it united ideologically heterogenous elements. Its main fault seemed to lie in its fear of a broad-based mass movement and in its preference for constitutional methods.[13] In another article in *New Times*, D'iakov was appreciative of Nehru's role in Indian politics. Nehru, though somewhat ambiguous and inconsistent, represented the progressive elements in the National Congress, forces that D'iakov found to be ascendant at this time. Nehru's particularly strong point was that he had "in the main, a correct appraisal of the international situation," he related the Indian freedom struggle with the "general struggle of progressive and democratic forces against reaction," and he tried to acquaint the people of India "with the truth about the Soviet Union." As against these qualities, Nehru was also too much under the influence of Gandhi, too much steeped in the British concept of democracy and opposed to the Indian Communist party. His weak points included "unfriendly" remarks on events in the Ukraine and Bylorussia and Iran, and on "some other issues."[14]

The Soviet Union came in contact with India in 1946 at the Paris Peace Conference and at the UN Conference at San Francisco. The Indian delegation to the Paris Conference consisted of officials who hardly represented the political changes that were imminent, and the Soviets were highly critical of its performance. In a report in *Pravda*, D'iakov described all members of the Indian interim Government, of which Nehru was the *de facto* head, as representatives of the right wing, with the sole exception of Nehru himself; the Indian delegation at Paris was just the "loyal vassal of British imperialism." He was even doubtful that the Indian Government would be able to translate into reality Nehru's aspiration for an independent foreign policy. And D'iakov reported Molotov as having stated in a speech at the Paris Conference:

> We might have expected more objective voting on the part of the Indian delegation, but we have been confronted once again with the impossible situation wherein the Indian delegation simply fulfilled its colonial obligation to vote in accordance with the will of another country—according to the will of Great Britain.[15]

Molotov had obtained in Paris some idea of Nehru's foreign policy aspirations from a man whom Nehru had sent there from London as his personal representative—V. K. Krishna Menon. At the San Francisco Conference, India was able to play an independent role especially on the colonial question, and the Soviet delegation often found the Indian delegation voting with it and against the Western powers. Issues on which the Soviets and India voted together included trusteeship, military bases in trust areas, and racial discrimination. At a luncheon for the Indian delegation at San Francisco, Molotov now said that his expectation that the "authentic voice of India" would be raised on behalf of "progressive causes" had been "so completely fulfilled."[16]

## ACADEMIC DEBATE

In the twilight period between the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War, an academic debate took place in the Soviet Union on whether the political reforms imminent for countries like India, Indonesia, Indo-China, and Egypt were more than a change in the mere form of relationship between the colonies and the metropolitan imperial countries. The most forceful champion of a minority school which believed that the changes coming over the colonies were of some substance was the noted Hungary-born economist, Eugene Varga. In a book published in 1946, Varga argued that economic trends in the colonies in wartime had affected colonial relationships in a fundamental way. Among the positive changes in this relationship were the almost universal lessening of the colonies' financial dependence on the metropolitan powers,

and the transformation of certain debtor countries, India and Egypt in particular, into creditor nations. These unprecedented developments in colonial relationships signified a most profound new trend. India, he added, was particularly well off; it was now in a position to use its accumulated sterling balances in London for the purpose of industrialization. The British imperial position in India had been further weakened by the large-scale buying of shares in British companies by Indian capitalists. Varga did not regard India's coming independence as entirely real: the country was still under British control, but a qualitative change had occurred in colonial relationships, which he wanted the Soviet Union to take into account.[17] Among those who agreed with Varga, though not entirely, was I. Lemin, who also identified a substantive change in economic relationship between Britain and India.

The Soviet establishment's perspective of the national and colonial question continued to be expressed with increasing clarity by Zhukov. His next important article on India came in *Pravda* on August 7, exactly a week before Indian independence and the birth of Pakistan. This article is remarkable for three reasons. First, it stressed the intensity and expansion of the national liberation movement almost all over Asia and recognized its diversity of style, content, and leadership. Secondly, it regarded most of, if not all, the impending changes in colonial relationships as formal rather than real and repeated the warning that "the grant of formal independence to the colonies by no means guarantees their actual independence." And thirdly, it linked the national liberation movement more clearly than before with the ideology and the objectives of the socialist bloc led by the Soviet Union, and projected, for the first time, the idea that the Soviet Union was the only source of genuine help for the colonial people as against the "dollar servitude" being offered by the United States.[18]

Zhukov's tone, however, was still moderate. There was no exhortation to the colonial peoples to rise in armed rebellion against the imperialist powers. Nor were they advised to reject

political reforms offered by the imperialists. Even where colonial peoples were fighting an armed struggle for freedom, as in Indonesia and Indo-China, there was no indication of concrete support forthcoming from the USSR. Nor did Zhukov make a distinction between the bourgeois and proletariat leadership of the liberation movements; indeed, he had nothing specific to say about the strategy the Communists should or should not pursue in the freedom struggles. It was evident from Zhukov's article that the USSR was deeply interested in the colonial question. What was not evident—yet—was that it was willing to enter the arena as a participant in the great human drama that was unfolding in Asia.

Thus, between 1945 and 1947, not only did Moscow not have a consistent, clear-cut strategy for the Indian (and Asian) liberation movement, but Soviet experts were also probably of divided counsel. The result of this confusion in Russian thinking was quite apparent in the rapid twists and turns in the political strategy of the Indian Communist party. This crucial phase in the CPI strategy has been elaborately discussed in several scholarly studies.[19] It is enough to note for our purpose that in 1945–46 the CPI tried the strategy of united front from above with the Congress as well as the Muslim League. It adopted a "left" strategy of a united front from below in opposition to the Mountbatten Plan in early 1946, only to return to the "right" strategy of a united front from above by the end of the year.[20] In a resolution in June, 1947, the CPI strongly criticized the plan to partition India; at the same time, it welcomed the formation of the two sovereign dominions and offered its cooperation to the new national governments formed in India and Pakistan.[21] During the first months of Indian independence, the CPI rallied to the support of the Nehru Government, making a distinction between the progressive elements in the Congress led by Nehru and the "reactionary" forces led by Sardar Ballabhai Patel.[22] It tried to convince the British Communist party, which acted as the transmission line between Moscow and the CPI, that it was wrong to regard the Muslim League as entirely reactionary.[23] It strove, with the

limited resources at its disposal, to extinguish the fires of communal riots and bring about working neighborly relations between the two newly born dominions.[24] The CPI had no reliable indication during this period that Moscow wanted it to pursue a "left" strategy of opposing the British scheme for Indian independence. All that it knew was that the Soviets regarded Nehru as a progressive man and the Congress as broadly representative of the Indian masses, and apparently it contrived its strategies keeping these factors in view. The CPI was, however, soon obliged to change its strategy from one of support of the Nehru regime to that of violent opposition as soon as Moscow shaped an India policy to suit the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States.

## SOVIET STANCE HARDENS

The Soviet stance on India and Pakistan began to harden in early 1947. A strong Soviet delegation attended the unofficial Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in February; one of its members was E. Zhukov, who also traveled extensively in India after the conference. The Soviet delegation looked at the conference with suspicion; many of the delegates were surprised when it rose to oppose a resolution to create an Asian bloc.[25] The report on the conference that Zhukov made to a Moscow meeting of Soviet experts on the colonial question revealed an astonishing hostility toward India. The New Delhi conference as a whole did play a useful role, said Zhukov, who had words of praise for Egypt, Indonesia, Indo-China, and Burma. But he attacked Nehru for his pro-British sentiments, his Pan-Asianism, his failure to organize Asia in opposition to Western imperialism. Zhukov found the Indian nationalist leaders eager to conciliate the West. Nehru had failed to give a class interpretation to Indian independence. Zhukov suspected India of harboring expansionist ambitions in Asia and was quite alarmed by the prospect of India and China, either separately or in collaboration, filling up the power vacuum in Asia created by the defeat of Japan. He found the leadership of the

Indian National Congress as "big capitalist." The British had neither departed from India in reality nor did they intend to do so. "Asia is heavily burdened with feudal remnants, and a purifying thunderstorm for her, undoubtedly, was not only useful, but necessary." In his travel accounts, Zhukov painted the picture of an India that was "weighed down by centuries of backwardness," where the proletariat was becoming a "more and more important factor in the political life," and a "considerable element" in the youth had an admirable "fighting spirit."[26]

Soon after Zhukov's return to Moscow from India in June, 1947, was held the first postwar conference of Soviet scholars on the colonial question referred to above. The keynote speech was made by Zhukov; three other principal participants were V. V. Balabushevich, D'iakov, and S. Melmen.[27] When their speeches were published, it became evident that although Soviet scholars had radically revised their earlier stance on India, they were still not entirely in agreement on the class analysis of the Indian "reactionary forces." They found an intensified class conflict in India, in which the working class was playing a major role; however, they dismissed the peasant movement as backward and definitely subordinate to the working class. The Congress, including Nehru, was reactionary and an ally of British imperialism. India was divided into two camps, just as the world was—the pro-imperialist, reactionary camp led by the Congress, and a growing popular movement for real independence and democracy led by the working class, that is, the Indian Communist party.[28] The four experts were, however, divided on those sections of the bourgeoisie that should be excluded from the CPI's strategy of a united front, and also on whether this front should be from above or below. Zhukov excluded only the "big" bourgeoisie from the united front, and John Kautsky thinks that in doing this he was echoing the strategy of Mao, or what Kautsky called the "neo-Maoist strategy." Zhukov had the support of Melmen. Balabushevich and D'iakov, on the other hand, wanted to exclude even the

middle bourgeoisie from the united front. In other words, Zhukov and Melmen appeared to be in favor of the strategy of a united front at the top, while the two others preferred the adoption of the "left" strategy of a united front from below.[29] This controversy was to rage in the Soviet Union for several more years. Indeed it was not quite resolved until the Stalinist strategy was replaced by the strategy of Nikita S. Khrushchev at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956.

The next landmark in the progressive hardening of the Soviet stance on the colonial question came in May, 1947, when Eugene Varga's heretic views were debated and discarded at a three-day meeting of the Academy of Sciences. The critics accepted nothing of his forceful self-defense. There had been no qualitative change in the relationship between the metropoles and the colonies; only the form of colonial exploitation had changed. In any case, it was un-Marxist to suggest that the colonies could attain independence merely through economic means, without a revolution.[30] The final verdict on Varga's thesis came from I. Gladkov in *Bol'shevik:* "In it that indisputable truth is forgotten that colonies cannot attain freedom and independence by the route of economic evolution; for this a national liberation struggle against imperialism is indispensable."[31]

Thus, even though the Bolshevik revolution and the Soviet experiment had a profound impact on the minds of the Indian intelligentsia during the second half of the freedom struggle, when freedom came to the subcontinent in mid-1947 and the two sovereign states of India and Pakistan were born, the Soviets not only refused them friendship but regarded them as appendages of British imperialism and their leaders as its lackeys and camp followers. There was little response from Moscow to Nehru's articulated desire for close, friendly relations. Pakistan presented the Soviets with an additional problem—the Marxist aversion for religion, and Moscow's failure to understand, until very recently, what an American scholar has termed as Islam's "instrumentality in politics."[32] Even in the

twenties the Comintern had debated the dynamics of Islam in the politics of colonial countries. Tan Malaka, the Indonesian leader, had disagreed with Lenin's thesis of the second Comintern Congress that Pan-Islamism was a reactionary force and had therefore to be unmasked. Malaka felt that both Pan-Islamism and the boycott movement against foreign merchandise constituted useful tendencies during the national-democratic phase of the Asian revolution; he particularly mentioned the case of India and Indonesia.[33] The Comintern had a department in its secretariat to deal with Islamic countries. Nevertheless, the Soviets had failed to recognize anything positive in the Muslim League movement in the Indian subcontinent;[34] they were apparently influenced in their perspective by the British Communist party, which remained more hostile to the Islamic stance on Pakistan than the Communist party of India. In 1947 a Soviet writer branded the Pakistani Government as antiworker, antipopular, tied up with the imperialists, and dominated by feudal elements and landlords; in effect, classwise a more reactionary state than India.[35] The Soviets regarded the partition of India, which gave birth to Pakistan, as the "result of a deal of the Indian bourgeoisie and landlords with British imperialism."[36] Although Zhukov tried in 1948 to draw a distinction between what Pakistan meant for the Muslim masses and what it meant for the Muslim League leadership,[37] Pakistan symbolized for most Soviet scholars the recognition of regional particularism in the subcontinent. Moreover, Communists had not been able to make any inroad into the Muslim League as they had done in the Congress. It was not before 1948 that the Indian Communist party was formally divided into the CPI and the CPP. The Soviets were thus denied the advantage of an indigenous Communist party interpreting the religious ethos of Pakistan from the Marxist-Leninist standpoint.

## THE COLD WAR LINE

The Soviets might have modified their perspective of India

and Pakistan if the Cold War had not broken out over Europe in 1947. On the Soviet side the Cold War lines were sharply drawn with Zhdanov's speech at Wiliza Gora in Poland on September 22, 1947, while inaugurating the Cominform.[38] In his analysis the world was now divided between two combatant blocs, one led by the Soviet Union and the other by the United States. The socialist bloc had become massively stronger since the war, while the imperialist bloc was beset with rivalries and contradictions. The crisis of the colonial system since 1945 had "placed the rear of the capitalist system in jeopardy." Although the Soviet Union was ready to coexist with the United States and with capitalism, the policies adopted by America left little room and less hope for coexistence. In this global confrontation Zhdanov called upon Communists everywhere to "head the resistance to the plans of imperialist expansion and aggression along every line—state, economic, and ideological." This clear call for Communist action against the "other camp"—there was no third—made Zhdanov's speech one of extraordinary importance. His direct references to the colonial question were few. Within the general mobilization call, the actual formulation of Communist strategies in specific countries was left ambiguous, perhaps deliberately. However, Zhdanov made a distinction between countries that had broken away from imperialism, such as Finland; countries that were "associated" with the anti-imperialist camp, such as Vietnam and Indonesia; countries that had sympathy for the camp, such as India, Egypt, and Syria; and all other countries that were in the imperialist camp. He did not make it clear if the countries that were in "sympathy" with the socialist camp were to be treated differently.

That they were not to be, not in any case India, was soon indicated by Zhukov in *Bol'shevik* in December.[39] In the post-war situation, Zhukov declared, the national bourgeoisie had entered into a compromise with imperialism (he no longer spoke of the "big" bourgeoisie only), while the vanguard of the national liberation movement, now much more broad-

based than before the war, was the working class, leading the other elements. "Imperialism tries to raise the noticeably fallen authority of the national bourgeoisie among the masses, and also the feudal lords, to strengthen their political position. . . . It is clear for whom the British imperialists pass over to the 'second front of defense' in India and advance the bourgeois nationalists in the capacity of a covering detachment." In this formulation Zhukov had traveled far from his 1946 articles on India; now he regarded the entire national bourgeoisie as allied with imperialism. Even more significant was his rejection of the conception of neutrality or nonalignment.[40] The "so-called theory of a third force" with which "the countries of the East are to preserve a strict 'neutrality' in the struggle between Communism and imperialism" was nothing more than "an imperialist device" designed "to slander the USSR by placing it on the same level with American imperialism." Zhukov went on to say, "It is significant that the 'theory' of the third force had specially broad circulation and success among the Indian bourgeoisie." The Indian bourgeoisie was using the theory of neutrality to justify its policy of rapproachment with British imperialism. Zhukov believed that the idea of neutrality had been conceived by the imperialists and their agents in Europe in order to undermine the internal forces of resistance in the colonies and semicolonies. "It is characteristic that the British, whose colonial affairs are bad, have quietly disseminated this theory."

The Indian Communist party had already moved to the left strategy of 1947 and was openly supporting the armed peasant uprising in Telengana and organizing labor and peasant actions in other parts of the country. It does not seem to be plausible, in view of the almost nonexistent direct links between the CPSU and the CPI, that the Indian Communists were acting under directions from Moscow. In February, 1948, Indian Communist leaders were able to exchange views with delegates from the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and certain other countries at the international youth conference in Calcutta. The Soviet

delegates, however, were very low-level persons from the party, and it is improbable that they have been asked to convey a new line to the CPI. Some students of international communism believe that a call went out from this conference for insurrectionary outbreaks in several Asian countries; it is not clear who engineered the call.[41] There seems to be little doubt, however, that the CPI's left strategy had the sanction of Moscow; it was a strategy of approving whatever Communist activity there existed in India at that time rather than of laying down a new line. The point to be considered is whether in approving the CPI left strategy, the Soviets were fostering the cause of a revolution in India or merely using the CPI, as they used other Communist parties, to further the interests of the Soviet state in its global confrontation with imperialism. The CPI was clearly not in a position in the late forties to organize armed rebellion against the newly established national government; the left strategy led to the banning of the CPI, its isolation from the mainstream of Indian life, and a marked weakening of its influence all over the country.

Moscow's direction of the world Communist movement in the late forties was influenced, in addition to the Cold War, by a new factor within the fraternity—the rising tide of Chinese communism and the revolutionary strategy of Mao Tse-tung. Rivalry between the two schools of revolutionary strategy began even before the Chinese Communists took over in Peking. Individual Soviet scholars sometimes reacted positively to certain aspects of the Maoist strategy, but none was in a mood to concede to the CCP something that the CPSU had failed to achieve. And yet this was exactly what the Chinese Communists asked for from the beginning of their spectacular success in China.

## SOVIET-CHINESE DEBATE

The Chinese Communists claimed they had discovered the key to the revolution in the colonies and semicolonies. Long before Mao seized power in Peking, he believed that the Chinese

revolution would prescribe the path the colonies and semi-colonies must traverse to reach the goal of Marxian socialism. In a way, Mao's *Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party,* written in 1939, was a declaration of equality with, if not independence from, the Communist party of the Soviet Union.[42] It was about this time that the CCP ceased to be an appendage of the Cominform, deciding its own revolutionary strategy and seeking within the framework of Chinese history and the objective conditions in China new meanings for Marxism-Leninism. The thesis laid down "once and for all" the basic outlines of the Maoist revolutionary strategy "down to the conquest of power." The revolution that Mao was trying to bring about could not be a replica of the Soviet revolution; it needed new ideas and a new strategy, for China was very different from prerevolutionary Russia. China, in Mao's analysis, was a "colonial, semicolonial and semifeudal society," in which the landlord class continued to exploit the peasantry even though its old feudal structure had been largely destroyed. In China, national capitalism was in the process of development. But it was far from being the principal socio-economic form; moreover, it was tied "in varying measures" to "both foreign imperialism and domestic feudalism." China was therefore under the "joint dictatorship of the landlord class and the big bourgeoisie," with imperialism controlling its financial and economic life as well as its political and military power. Hence arose a complex of contradictions—"between imperialism and the Chinese nation; between feudalism and the great masses of people." On these interlocking contradictions Mao based the ideological perspective and the strategy of the Chinese revolution. It was "bourgeois-democratic," not proletarian; it was a *new*-democratic revolution. It was *new* because although it was part of the "world proletariat-socialist revolution"—Mao's recognition of the leadership of the Bolshevik revolution—it would be carried out under a "dictatorship of several revolutionary classes"; it would reject a "bourgeois dictatorship," nationalize the holdings of the "imperialists,

collaborators and reactionaries" but preserve "capitalism generally," including the "rich peasant economy." The objective of the revolution, to be sure, was the building of a socialist society. This was inevitable because of the simultaneous victory of socialist forces within China and the existence of a favorable international situation. The "process" of the *new*-democratic revolution would complete China's transition from a colonial, semicolonial and semifeudal society to a socialist one. Mao's strategy therefore called for a two-stage revolution, democratic and socialist, under the leadership of the Communist party.*

Within two months of the Communist take-over in Peking, the Maoist claim to have found the path to the revolution in the colonial and semicolonial countries—the path that had eluded the Comintern for many years—was officially proclaimed at the conference of Asian trade unions held in Peking under the auspices of the World Federation of Trade Unions. The keynote address was delivered by Liu Shao-chi, who declared that the road taken by the Chinese people "to defeat imperialism and its lackeys and to establish the People's Republic of China is the path that should be taken by the peoples of various colonial and semicolonial countries in their fight for national independence and democracy." Liu made it clear that the success of the Chinese revolution rested on its rural bases, on the broad national front, the people's revolutionary army, and on

* Students of Marxism-Leninism will recognize that there is very little originality in the Maoist formulation and that its basic ingredients can be found in the works of Lenin and Stalin. The point, for our purpose, is not whether Mao actually made a new contribution to the theory of Marxism-Leninism but that he *believed* that he had and his close comrades *claimed* on his behalf that he had. Thus, Chen Po-ta asserted in 1949 that Mao had reached conclusions similar to Stalin's "on many fundamental problems through his independent thinking." (Chen Po-ta, "Stalin and the Chinese Revolution," *Sino-Soviet Friendship*, Peking, Dec. 15, 1949.) Two years later, Chen Po-ta claimed with further clarity the distinctiveness of the Chinese revolution from the Soviet revolution, especially with its rural base area and guerrilla warfare. "Mao Tse-tung's Theory of the Chinese Revolution Is the Integration of Marxism-Leninism with the Chinese Revolution," *People's Daily*, June 28, 1951.

making armed struggle (guerrilla warfare) the principal instrument of capture of power.[43]

This forceful projection of the Chinese revolutionary line as the line to be adopted by more than half the human population was made in those initial years with a mixture of confidence and caution.[44] Articles in the Chinese press acknowledged Mao's indebtedness to Lenin and Stalin.[45] At the same time it was made unmistakably clear that Mao had hit upon the right strategy of revolution making in the colonies and semicolonies where, as Otto Kuusinen had admitted during the Sixth Comintern Congress in 1928, communism, directed from Moscow, was at its weakest.

The implication of the Chinese challenge to Moscow's copyright to the science of Marxist revolution in the non-Western world had not been lost on the Soviets. In two articles published in 1947, V. A. Maslennikov had attempted an objective assessment of the Maoist strategy, noting its relevance to the colonial countries and admitting that the method of armed revolution had a major significance "for all peoples of Eastern Asia fighting for their liberation." At the same time, Maslennikov had sought to establish Moscow's ideological superiority by downgrading the originality of the Maoist line. He stressed that Stalin had correctly anticipated the Chinese strategy as far back as 1926.[46]

## SOVIET DILEMMA

The dilemma that faced the Soviets in the seminal years of 1948–50 and that, less than ten years later, was to explode as the biggest crisis in international communism was whether it should legitimate the diversity of Communist strategies. Both in Yugoslavia and China, a new phenomenon—the peasantry—played the leading role in Communist revolutions; with neither could Moscow establish smooth working relations for a long time. Stalin could be tough with Tito, who could be excommunicated because of his refusal to submit to Moscow's doc-

trines; Mao was a different matter. A long, tortuous debate was conducted in the USSR in 1948–50 covering many aspects of ideology and strategy. It was conducted in the traditional language of right and left strategy, but the real question was the confluence of revolutionary ideologies and leaderships. The Soviets were handicapped by their insistence that the East European revolutions must follow the Russian model and move in accordance with guidelines laid down in Moscow. How sensitive were the Soviets about any deviations or divergencies in the East European experiments was indicated by the arrest and deportation of Anna Louise Strong during her visit to the USSR in 1948 for no greater offense than carrying an authenticated article that claimed that Mao Tse-tung's ideas and strategies had profoundly influenced the East European development.[47]

The plurality in Soviet thinking during this period is illustrated by scholarly writings by two leading specialists in 1948. A. Kheifets, the economist, made a distinction between new-democracy and people's democracy and said that while the former was applicable to colonial and semicolonial countries where the revolution had to fight the predominant survivals of imperialism tied to imperialist interests, the latter held good for the countries with varying degrees of feudal survivals.[48] Kheifets was, in effect, conceding the point the Chinese were trying to make in the late forties. This, however, could not be permitted. Several months later, E. Zhukov came out with an article stressing that people's democracy was equally applicable to all countries of the world. "The general pattern of social development," wrote Zhukov, "is identical for both Eastern and Western countries. One can speak of differences in tempo and in concrete forms of this development. In this sense, people's democracy in the East is no different in its basic features from people's democracy in the West." People's democracy, Zhukov also pointed out, was a "special form of regime" made possible by the "victory of socialism in the USSR and the strengthening of the democratic forces throughout the world."[49]

Apparently, the CPSU at this period was even prepared to make experiments in Asia to find successful strategies other than the Chinese. The Indian Communist party, at its second congress in Calcutta in February–March, 1949, adopted a political thesis of a single-stage revolution leading directly to socialism. Completely anticapitalist and unreservedly antibourgeois, it called for a united front from below for an armed struggle which it implied was near. This virtual transplantation of the East European model on an Asian country was done without any explicit approval of Moscow, *but also without its disapproval.*[50] Whether or not the CPI was acting in ignorance of the prevailing thinking in Moscow or was influenced by the Yugoslav delegation that attended the Congress,[51] the fact remains that for several months the Soviets did not disavow its newly adopted line. This would suggest that Moscow was not averse to watch the results of the new CPI line.

Of greater interest is the political line adopted by the Indonesian Communist party in 1948. This line was introduced by Musso, who had just returned to Indonesia after spending twenty years in the Soviet Union. There is little reason to think therefore that the line did not reflect the thinking in the CPSU. Under the new line, the Indonesian revolution would be "of a new type"—a preparatory step leading to the socialist or proletarian revolution. In order to capture the Indonesian nationalist government by bringing it under pressure of a PKI-led national front, the Communists would act in collaboration with sections of the national bourgeoisie. The national front was to comprise members of other parties and organizations. It would, however, be "controlled by the workers."[52] The proletariat's closest ally was the peasantry, and a major plank of the revolution would be extensive, radical land reforms. The new PKI line was obviously a mixture of the Chinese and East European models. Moscow's stamp was evident: it was still a city-based revolution shunning the rural base areas and guerrilla warfare. Its application to Indonesia reflected the special consideration the country was receiving in the CPSU in the

late forties. If it had succeeded, Moscow could have claimed to have found an alternative to the Chinese model for the revolution in the colonies and semicolonies.

Following the WFTU Conference in Peking in 1949, Moscow apparently acknowledged for a brief period the merit of the Chinese strategy for the colonial and semicolonial countries. This was projected by Moscow as what Kautsky calls the neo-Maoist line, and, later, as the *peaceful* neo-Maoist line. The controversy over the Moscow versus Peking line, however, did not die. It surfaced at the meeting of the USSR Academy of Sciences in Moscow in November, 1951. Earlier, in June, the Cominform journal had published an article by a member of the Central Committee of the CCP, Lu Ting-yi, claiming that although the classic model of revolution, the Soviet, held good for the imperialist (capitalist) countries, the Chinese revolution was the model for the colonies and semicolonies; this, Lu added, was Mao's distinctive contribution to Marxism-Leninism.[53] At the November assembly of scholars in Moscow, the universality of the Chinese revolution for the colonies and semicolonies was firmly rejected. Zhukov, by now the most respected and authoritative academic voice on Asian affairs, recognized the "immense significance" of the Chinese revolution but ruled that it could happen only in China and that its essential component, armed struggle, was not an obligatory element of all socialist revolutions.[54] Zhukov observed that it would be "risky to regard the Chinese revolution as some kind of 'stereotype' for people's revolutions in other countries of Asia," and he particularly mentioned India and Indonesia as countries that would "require consideration of the concrete experience of the Chinese revolution or of the experience of the October revolution in Russia."[55] This conclusion was confirmed three months later in an editorial in the Cominform journal. The controversy went on till 1952 when the Chinese, evidently in pursuit of a newly contrived "soft" Asian policy, and under the strains and pressures caused by the Korean War, muted their claim to be the model of the colonial libera-

tion movement. In the meantime, the Russians made a gesture of concession to the Chinese point of view. In an article on the Chinese revolution and the national liberation movement written for a Chinese journal at Peking's request, Zhukov went so far as to concede that China had provided an "example" that could "stimulate" and "inspire" other Asian peoples in their struggle for emancipation.[56] However, as a former Soviet diplomat has disclosed, the Chinese embassy in Rangoon started quietly to guide the Burmese Communist party in 1950 and did not care to consult the Russians even when the Soviet embassy was set up in the city in 1951.[57]

The Nineteenth Congress of the CPSU, the last before Stalin's death, ended without the formulation of a cogent, comprehensive Soviet line for the national liberation movement or the newly independent countries. In Stalin's main report, the emphasis was on contradictions within the imperialist camp. All that it suggested was that these contradictions might provide the Communists with an opportunity to exploit the countries newly born in Asia.[58] These countries however still belonged to the opposite camp. It was left to Mikoyan to make more explicit the bare indication in Stalin's report that the Soviets might shortly be able to extend economic and technological assistance beyond the frontiers of the socialist bloc, and to Malenkov to pay a modest tribute to the peace-ward contributions of the newly independent countries.

Meanwhile, big events were changing the face of Asia. The Communist takeover in China brought about a major shift in the balance of power in Asia and the world. The two-year-old national government in New Delhi was prompt to realize that a China ruled by Mao Tse-tung and his party would be very different from a China presided over by Chiang Kai-shek; it would have the authority and power to do what Chiang wished to do but could not—namely, to unify China under a strong central government. That would change the traditional buffer status of Tibet; India would soon come face to face with a great, strong, ambitious Communist neighbor. An Indian spe-

cialist on China says that the Communist victory in Peking brought about a reorientation in India's world outlook although the Congress regime continued with its domestic policy of opposition to communism.[59] It will probably be more realistic to suggest that the Communist triumph in China made it obligatory for India to take a new look at power alignments exercizing an immediate impact on its internal and external environment, and persuaded Nehru to probe Peking's intentions. He was quick to sense the opportunity offered by the Korean War and to seize it. It was not without significance that the weakest of the three combatants in Korea—the Soviet Union fought the war in Korea by proxy—was the most inclined to make use of India's offered services, despite its own imminent conflict with India over Tibet.

The Soviet Union reacted to the Asian changes haltingly. Throughout 1949, Soviet commentators regarded India as a camp follower of the United States; Nehru was dubbed virtually an American stooge after his visit to Washington. When India called the New Delhi conference in January, 1949, to mobilize support for Indonesian independence, *Pravda* denounced the meeting for its mild tone and found in its resolutions an attitude favoring consultations for some kind of an anti-Communist bloc. Zhukov; who wrote the *Pravda* commentary, accused Nehru of "active participation" in talks aimed at "knocking together" a "Pacific Ocean or Eastern Asian bloc."[60]

A significant dichotomy between ideology and state relations began to be noticed in 1950 in the Soviet Union's attitude and policy toward India. The Kremlin could not but respond to positive evidence of change in Indian foreign policy. India voted against the US resolution in the United Nations General Assembly branding China as the aggressor in Korea; it refused to join in the economic blocade of the People's Republic. These actions more than balanced the token nonmilitary contribution India made to the UN side in the Korean War. Then came Nehru's diplomatic breakthrough in Peking. The Chinese For-

eign Office cleared his initiative to seek a settlement of the Korean War through the Security Council in which Peking would occupy the Chinese seat and the Soviets would return, ending a long walkout. This proposal went out from New Delhi in identical letters to Dean Acheson and Stalin. Nehru could not possibly expect Washington to react to it positively. His success lay in tacit Chinese approval of the initiative and, thereby, of India's usefulness as a conciliating link between the two Cold War blocs. Could Stalin reject a move that had been made with the prior approval of Mao Tse-tung when the Korean War was raging? Stalin's approval of the proposal was therefore not surprising, and the very act of approval meant a Homeric nod to the role India was trying to play in a bipolar world.[61]

## MOSCOW CHANGES INDIA POLICY

This was the first change in Moscow's Asia policy exacted out of the Kremlin by the men who were now ruling China; this was certainly not the last, as these pages will show. The change, however, came reluctantly, and it was not until the onset of the Khrushchevian era that the dichotomy between ideology and Soviet national interests was, for a few years, resolved insofar as South Asia was concerned. In 1950–51 one did not quite know which face of Soviet policy counted more. Moscow had already made India a modest offer of wheat, 270,000 tons, to meet a difficult food situation.[62] At the same time, a commentator in *New Times* had categorized India as a "capitalist country" where "no real economic planning is possible."[63] In July, 1950, *Pravda* described Nehru's letters to Stalin and Acheson as a "peaceful initiative"; within two months *Izvestia* castigated the Indian Government for the "open support" it had given to the Americans in the Korean War.[64] When in 1951 India refused to take part in the Japanese peace treaty conference at San Francisco, *Pravda* came out with a word of approval; it was also about this time that it told the Soviet people that India was the "second largest and most important

state of Asia."[65] But the ideologue's stance on India remained as hard and disapproving as ever. An eloquent expression of this stance came in D'iakov's analysis of the Indian situation between 1939 and 1949, published at the beginning of 1952.[66] In it D'iakov withdrew whatever he might have said earlier in appreciation of the Indian bourgeoisie including Gandhi. India's foreign policy was tuned to serve the general interests of imperialism; Nehru was opposing the peace movement within India and outside. D'iakov's judgment on the Nehru Government was stern: it had to be replaced by "a popular-democratic government" before India could be expected to be part of the worldwide peace movement led by the Soviet Union. In this assertion one could see a reiteration of the supremacy of the people's-democracy type of revolution for India as against the new-democratic. D'iakov took note of the fact that India alone in Asia could be a counterpoise to China, although he attributed this concept to the Western imperialists.

Other Soviet commentaries on India were no less unflattering. The National Congress was controlled by reactionary monopolist elements; working people in India were living in inhuman conditions.[67] If the Indian Government had been forced to act against the interests of the imperialists in specific matters, such as the Japanese peace treaty, this was because of the powerful anti-imperialist movement in the country and the world, which made it impossible for the reactionary regime to line up completely with the imperialists. This was one face of the Soviets' India policy till the death of Stalin. The other face was much less stern. If it did not exactly smile on India and on Nehru, it did soften into a cautious, calculating, probing friendliness.

State relations between the Soviet Union and India therefore began to improve. Although ambassadors had been exchanged in 1947, the first time Stalin received an Indian ambassador was in January, 1950; it was a farewell call by Madame Pandit, sister of Nehru. Cultural exchanges began in the summer of 1951 with the visit of an unofficial Indian delegation to the USSR. In July, 1950, Stalin publicly—and promptly—endorsed

Nehru's proposal for a settlement of the Korean War at the Security Council with China sitting as a permanent member. In 1951 the Soviet delegate at the ECAFE session indicated Moscow's willingness to assist, through the United Nations, in the industrial development of the newly independent nations. In the following year, a Soviet cultural delegation visited India, the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society was set up, Soviet delegates attended the first Indian international film festival, and Moscow took part in a big way in an international industries fair in Bombay. Also in 1952, Stalin received the Indian ambassador, Radhakrishnan, and told him that there was no international problem that could not be settled by peaceful negotiation. At the Security Council that year Moscow made the first perceptible move toward the Indian position on Kashmir. Diplomatic history was made in Moscow when Stalin received two Indians separately the same day in 1953—Ambassador K. P. S. Menon in the morning, and the president of the Indian Peace Council, S. Kitchlu, in the evening.[68] Kitchlu claimed to have explained India's peaceful policies to Stalin and suggested a meeting between him and Nehru.

In the slowly changing Soviet stance on India, the peace movement front served as the first outlet of change. This was not surprising, because the Communists were spearheading the peace movement front, and an approving nod toward Nehru was also a recognition of the good work done by the CPI.[69] Recognition of Nehru as a defender of peace came first in the journal of the All-India Peace Council; the article was reprinted in a Soviet paper. When Malenkov, as chairman of the Council of Ministers, was addressing the Supreme Soviet in August, 1953, after Stalin's death, his now comparatively generous reference to India was also based on its contribution to peace. "The position of so large a state as India is of great importance for strengthening peace in the East," said Malenkov, and went on to recognize that India had made "a considerable contribution to the efforts of the peace-loving countries aimed at ending the war in Korea."[70]

When Stalin's successors weighed the pluses and minuses of the dictator's foreign policy, they were evidently impressed by the paucity of achievements in Asia, particularly in comparison with the gains already made by the United States and China. In 1953–54, China was trying to build up peaceful coexistence, in collaboration with India and several like-minded Asian countries, as what was bound to be a rather feeble defense against the post-Korean thrust of American policy of a global chain of pacts and alliances; the Soviet effort was limited mostly to Europe. When the power struggle in Moscow ended with the exit of Malenkov and the capture of the Party leadership by Khrushchev, the Kremlin applied itself to forge a new Asia policy. It was necessary first to strengthen the USSR's alliance and friendship with China; Khrushchev and Bulganin journeyed to Moscow for what undoubtedly was one of the most crucial meetings between the Soviet and Chinese leaders. Our knowledge of this meeting is still limited, but enough information is available to suggest that Mao demanded complete equality with the Soviet Union in the socialist camp and a settlement of the "territorial question." The Soviet leaders made major concessions by liquidating well ahead of the stipulated time Russian interests in Manchuria and Sinkiang; however, they turned down Mao's demand that Mongolia return to China. It should be reasonable to speculate that the innovation of the Soviet Union's India policy in 1955 was at least partially influenced by the long-term implications of the Chinese demand for equality.

## MOSCOW AND PAKISTAN

In the mid fifties, the Kremlin had neither the wish nor the opportunity to begin its new South Asia policy with Pakistan; the latter was already a military ally of the United States. As we shall see presently, Khrushchev and Bulganin undertook their Asian journey in late 1955 determined to offer economic and political support to India, which no Indian government, in identical external and internal environment, could possibly

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decline. In contrast with this India-based South Asia policy of the Soviet Union in the mid fifties, was the tentative gesture of friendship Moscow had extended to Pakistan in the late forties. Soviet "neutrality" on the Kashmir issue as it came to the Security Council in 1948 was, in itself, an ambiguous move; it pleased the Indians, particularly because it was couched in language strongly condemning imperialist maneuvers to "turn Kashmir into an American base"; [71] at the same time, it enabled the Security Council to deal with the Kashmir issue on the basis of a plebiscite, which was the kingpin of the Pakistani case. The neutrality stance was carefully maintained till 1952. During the Kashmir debate in the Security Council in that year, the Soviet representative, Jacob Malik, spoke in support of the Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, of which Sheikh Abdullah, then Kashmir's chief minister, and architect of the state's accession to India, was the leader. Malik rejected the idea of a UN-supervised plebiscite. The impression he gave was that the Soviet Union was endorsing the view that the popularly elected constituent assembly of Kashmir was competent to decide the state's political future. However, when the Pakistani representative, Zafrullah Khan, saw Malik privately to seek clarification, he was told that this was *not* the Soviet position. What the Soviets wanted was a *new* constituent assembly elected for the *whole* of Jammu and Kashmir. After the meeting, Zafrullah Khan was able to tell reporters that the difference between the Security Council's recommendation of a plebiscite and what had been suggested by Malik was "one of method, not of principle." [72] The Soviet attitude to Kashmir began to move perceptively toward supporting certain aspects of the Indian stand in late 1952, about the time when policy makers in Moscow were apparently taking a new look at Asia in the light of the Korean War and its expected consequences.

In the late forties, however, Moscow had shown a readiness to woo Pakistan rather than India. True, diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Pakistan were established more than two years *after* the establishment of such relations between

the USSR and India; it was not before March, 1950, that the first Russian ambassador took up his position in Karachi.[73] However, as we have already noted, Indo-Soviet diplomatic relations had not been overly productive in the late forties. In 1949 the Soviets extended a surprise invitation to the Pakistan prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, to visit the USSR. The motivation of this move is still somewhat unclear. It was certainly meant to counter Nehru's visit to Washington. The fact, however, remains that no firm invitation had come to Nehru from Moscow. It has been suggested that Liaquat Ali Khan maneuvered the invitation "as a move on the political chessboard" without ever actually intending to go to Moscow;[74] if this was so, the invitation was the result of poor Soviet knowledge of Pakistani affairs. Yet the Soviet invitation seemed to fall into the pattern of Moscow's postwar efforts to build up a presence in the Near East. The Russians had tried unsuccessfully to set up a separatist pro-Soviet regime in Azerbaijan; they had laid claims to territory belonging to Turkey. Nearer the subcontinent, they signed a frontier treaty with Afghanistan in 1946 and resolved all disputes with that country at the Tashkent meeting in 1948. By 1950 the Soviets had established an economic and strategic presence in Afghanistan. They had also accelerated the pace of road and railway construction in the Soviet territory north of Kashmir. By 1950 they had started building airfields near the Sinkiang-Kashmir-Soviet border and begun large-scale exploration of minerals. "The historical pressure from the north on southern Asia was at it again."[75]

Liaquat Ali Khan did not make the visit to Russia, but the invitation itself made a big impact on the Pakistani people.[76] However, when he made the journey to Washington and returned with welcome assurances of economic assistance, the Soviet Government apparently had little else to try in order to win Pakistan's allegiance. After the Korean War, in which Pakistan gave greater political support to the UN than India but carefully refrained from committing military support, it became obviously impossible for Moscow to woo it openly,

even if this was considered desirable. Nevertheless, cultural exchanges with Pakistan began before those with India.

When Pakistan signed a military pact with the United States and became the first non-Arab Asian state to join the American alliance system, the Soviets were anxious and worried. Moscow had been trying since 1952 to dissuade Pakistan from taking the final plunge toward alignment. It had no means by which to influence the Pakistan government, but it found it rather hard to believe that a newly independent Asian country would enter into a military alliance with the US against the Soviet Union. Soon after the signing of the US-Pakistani military pact, Moscow accused Pakistan of committing an "unfriendly act" and demanded an assurance that no American bases would be located on its soil.[77] Pakistan denied any intention to allow American bases on its territory and charged Moscow with trying to interfere in its affairs. The Soviets, in turn, took recourse to realpolitik. They began to move closer to Afghanistan with support for the Pakhtoon irredenta in the sensitive northwest frontier of Pakistan.

At no point did the Soviets completely close their door on Pakistan, and several times in the fifties they tried to dangle the carrot of economic aid to win Pakistan's friendship. Bulganin and Khrushchev, during their historic visit to India in late 1955, underwrote the Indian stand on Kashmir, but in the communique issued at the end of the visit, Kashmir was not even mentioned. Less than a year later, Mikoyan startled both the Pakistanis and the Indians by declaring, while on an official visit to Pakistan, that the future of Kashmir should be decided by consulting the will of its people. The statement was justifiably taken by the Pakistanis as supportive of their stand on Kashmir.[78] Even Pakistan's membership in SEATO did not entirely preclude it from Soviet blandishments. Mikoyan announced at a Pakistani embassy function in Moscow in December, 1955, that "pacts or no pacts," Moscow wanted cordial relations with Karachi.[79] The Soviets were on rather vulnerable ground in the sixties when they blamed China for

developing friendly relations with Pakistan despite the latter's membership in SEATO and CENTO. The galling fact was that the Chinese had succeeded where the Russians had failed.

Between 1956 and 1958 the Soviets made several more attempts to win the confidence of Pakistan, but without much success. Shortly before the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, Bulganin, in an interview with a Pakistani news agency, offered mutually advantageous economic relations and even assistance to build an atomic reactor. *Pravda* in an article took note of the "changing political climate" in Pakistan.[80] The tempting Bulganin offer was followed by Mikoyan's visit to Karachi which we have already referred to, and his effort to minimize the importance of Soviet support for the Indian stand on Kashmir. Even the Soviet note to Pakistan protesting the country's cosponsoring of the American resolution in the United Nations General Assembly calling for internationally supervised elections in Hungary was surprisingly mild; Bulganin did not go beyond charging the Pakistan Government with taking a "distorted view" of the revolt in Hungary.[81] The Soviets did not relish Pakistan's somewhat pro-Western position during the Suez crisis, but they were not anxious to criticize Pakistan harshly. In the late fifties the increasing political turmoil in Pakistan probably armed the Soviets with some hope for a favorable change in the ruling setup in Karachi. Comment on the unrest in Pakistan, especially the autonomy movement in East Pakistan, was scarce in the Soviet press; but Soviet sympathy for the movement may be inferred from the strong and consistent support given it by the Communist party of India. Of all the prime ministers of Pakistan, the man who came in for the harshest criticism in Russia was H. S. Suhrawardy. In July, 1958, *Mirovaiia ekonomika* bluntly remarked that Suhrawardy had reduced Pakistan to a "full-fledged American colony."[82] As the autonomy movement in East Pakistan grew in intensity, the Pakistan Government appeared to be moving closer to the United States. In a note to Pakistan in April, 1958, the Soviets expressed "great disturbance" over an al-

leged Pakistani request for the stationing of American nuclear weapons and missiles on its territory and threatened retaliation in the event of an aggressive move against the USSR.[83]

Whatever hopes Moscow might have entertained of a favorable political change in Pakistan were dashed by the military coup in 1958. *New Times* described the coup as a joint move by American imperialism and Pakistani reactionaries to forestall the victory of the anti-imperialist front.[84] At the CPSU Twenty-first Congress, Khrushchev cited the Ayub Khan regime as an example of a new trend in the new countries engineered by the United States—the propping up of dictatorships to crush the democratic forces.[85] D'iakov and V. N. Mosklenko wrote articles "exposing" the reactionary character of the military regime,[86] while Andreyev told an audience in Srinagar in 1959 that Pakistan's foreign policy was hostile to its "peaceful neighbor" as well as to the Soviet Union.[87] *Izvestia* ridiculed Ayub Khan for appointing himself a field marshal.[88] When Ayub moved the capital from Karachi to Rawalpindi, *New Times* explained the action as an effort to save the military regime from the "workers" and to place Karachi more completely at the disposal of the American military.[89] Then came, in 1960, the U-2 incident; Powers had flown the spy plane from an American base in Peshawar. In an angry outburst, Khrushchev threatened Pakistan with nuclear annihilation and dismissed the explanation that the Pakistan Government had not been kept informed of the flight.[90] *Pravda* reported India's strong disapproval of the U-2 flight,[91] which however went unnoticed in the Chinese press. It is instructive to note that even during the U-2 affair the Soviets indicated their willingness to give Pakistan economic and technological aid. In August, 1960, an agreement was concluded providing for Soviet assistance to probe for minerals and petroleum in Pakistan. A team of Russian geologists made a survey. The Soviets gave Pakistan a credit of $32.4 million in March, 1961, following a visit to Moscow by Foreign Minister Bhutto, to develop its oil industry.[92]

From this rapid survey of the development of Soviet-Pakistan and Soviet-Indian relations till the end of the fifties, it is permissible to draw several conclusions. During the Korean War and afterwards, when the Soviets decided to engage actively in influence building in South Asia, they firmly rejected the Anglo-Saxon principle of parity between the two partners of the subcontinent and anchored their presence in the region on an expanding friendship with the larger and stronger of the two. The new Soviet policy was built up and applied when the Chinese had already established friendly relations with India, and its impact on Sino-Indian friendship was not salutary. Only for a brief while did most of the Asian landmass—the USSR, India, China—appear to be acting together to struggle against imperialism, for peace zones, against military pacts and external interventions to stop, slow down, or control the upsurge of the national liberation movement. The Soviet leadership was preparing the ground, both within the USSR and in the third world, for launching a new strategic line at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU. In the transitional period of 1955–57 Soviet foreign policy was not unnaturally exposed to certain contradictions. For instance, the Soviet leaders appeared to be uncertain on the crucial question of how far they could go to accommodate China and whether and at what point would peaceful coexistence with the United States clash with the vital interests of the Chinese People's Republic. Scholars differ on the precise character of Sino-Soviet relations during this period of transition; it seems to the present writer that although differences began to appear between Khrushchev and Mao over certain aspects of the Twentieth Congress line, particularly the national liberation movement and peaceful coexistence in 1957 (when Mao placed at the Moscow Conference of Communist Parties concrete criticisms of the Twentieth Congress line on peaceful transition and noninevitability of civil war in revolutions in particular countries) there was still a wide range of convergence of Soviet and Chinese interests and outlooks on major international issues. For instance, the

Chinese not only did not condemn peaceful coexistence but entered into diplomatic negotiations with the United States in search of a *quid pro quo* on the Taiwan question. Although idioms of "leap forward" began to be heard in Peking, indicating Mao's impatience with the pace of progress achieved by the revolution, the Soviets refrained from criticizing the Chinese methods of building socialism. Peking was still supporting the Soviet proposal to make most of Asia an atom-free zone. Mao's forceful projection at the 1957 Moscow Conference of the strategic concept of the East wind prevailing over the West wind was probably no more than a warning to the Soviet leaders that they must not buy peaceful coexistence with the United States without securing the vital interests of the socialist bloc, more precisely, of China.

Nevertheless, certain strains were building up on the Sino-Soviet friendship in the transitional years of 1956 and 1957. One of the areas where this was happening was India. One has only to examine Nehru's dealings with China from 1957 onward to realize that he had found in Soviet friendship a certain strength and self-confidence. It was during this time that Nehru formulated his basic policy about the border with China—that it had been determined by treaties and conventions and could be subjected only to minor adjustments. Nehru could not have missed the point that Khrushchev had launched a new India policy without consultation and agreement with China, and that the Soviets had broken unilaterally what had hitherto been a common Sino-Soviet stand on Kashmir. Nehru also knew that the new Soviet policy toward India was part of the Twentieth Congress line on peaceful transition and peaceful coexistence; hence his prompt and unequivocal support of the new line.

## SOVIET-INDIAN FRIENDSHIP

The shift in Soviet policy toward India after Stalin's death was dated September, 1953, as Alvin Z. Rubinstein has pointed out,[93] when Mikhail Menshikov, a specialist in foreign trade

relations, replaced Ivan Benedictov as Russian ambassador in New Delhi. Menshikov's first major success was in the conclusion, within four months of his arrival, of a five-year Indo-Soviet trade pact covering trade, payments, navigation, and technical assistance. Commenting on the pact, **Izvestia** remarked that it would bolster India's exports and employment opportunities and stabilize its balance of payments; the commentary was conspicuously lacking in criticism of India's economic policy.[94] Cultural relations began to develop rapidly now; in 1954 as many as 199 Indians went to the Soviet Union and 82 Russians to India in cultural delegation exchanges.[95] An Indian air force mission visited the Soviet Union in June, 1955. Then came, in February, 1955, the agreement for Russian aid to build India's first major steel plant at Bhilai. As a Soviet commentator pointed out, it was the "first important economic agreement concluded by the Soviet Union with one of the largest underdeveloped countries in Asia."[96] Earlier, on January 26, the Indian Republic Day, *Pravda* had found in India a determination to "gradually eliminate the harsh legacy of colonialism." Anti-imperialism provided an expanding area of Soviet-Indian collaboration in foreign policy. The Russians welcomed Nehru's refusal to give airport facilities for the transportation of French troops to Indo-China and supported his proposals for a settlement of the Indo-China crisis. They backed Nehru's demand, following the conclusion of the Pakistan-US military pact, for the withdrawal of American observers working for the UN in Kashmir. The Russians welcomed the decision of the Colombo powers in December, 1954, to hold a conference of Asian-African countries at Banduing in the following April. They were not invited to Bandung. But with Soviet inspiration some Indian leftists organized a "little Bandung" in Delhi immediately before the Afro-Asian meeting. With Russian participation, it was probably intended to exert some influence on the Bandung conference. The Soviets found many reasons to be pleased with the conference. There was much appreciation in the Soviet press of China's debut in an international meeting. No Soviet com-

mentator on Bandung took notice of Chou En-lai's meeting with the prime minister of Pakistan and his statement on Sino-Pakistani cooperation. Zhukov listed a number of positive achievements of Bandung. One of the most important was the close ties of personal friendship and community of national and world outlook that had grown between Nehru and Nasser.[97]

The next landmark in Indo-Soviet relations was Nehru's ten-day visit to the Soviet Union in June, 1955, and the return visit by Bulganin and Khrushchev to India five months later. We don't quite know whether or to what extent China was discussed between Khrushchev and Nehru in 1955. Still, Nehru had already been to China before his visit to Russia, and he met Chou En-lai in New Delhi within a few days of his return from Moscow. Khrushchev and Bulganin were in Peking a few weeks before their visit to India. Later, in 1959, the Chinese datelined India's deviation from progressive policies from the "latter half of 1956."[98]

Nehru's visit to the USSR was most remarkable because of the freedom his hosts gave him not only to travel in the country—he saw several major industrial and agricultural projects—but also to preach the gospel of Gandhi to a vast audience in Moscow. The welcome accorded to Nehru was unprecedented in the Soviet Union.[99] The drafting of the final joint statement on the visit was left almost entirely to the Indian delegation.[100] Although Nehru's inspection of large industrial and agricultural plants suggested Soviet willingness to participate in India's economic development, the joint statement did not mention economic assistance, indicating thereby that the Soviets were still to make firm decisions. The real significance of the joint statement—something that was hardly grasped in those days by more than a very limited number of people—was a security understanding between India and the USSR. The joint statement precluded *either country's participation in any coalition or actions directed against the other.* This was, in a sense, an improvement on the Sino-Indian agreement of 1954 incorporating the five principles of peaceful coexistence (Panchsheel).[101] This was

the beginning of nonaligned India's alignment with the Soviet Union.

There was, of course, no military compact. The immediate Indian gain was recognition in late 1955 by the Soviet Union of the integrity of the Indian frontier in Kashmir. The question of the Sino-Indian frontier had not yet been formally raised, but during the treaty negotiations in 1954 both the Indian and Chinese sides had realized that they were dealing with a largely unknown and undemarcated border. Thus both India and China were living with an uncertain three-thousand-mile-long frontier. Soviet recognition of the Indian possession of Kashmir gave India a large measure of political security in the northern flank of its frontier; it probably also encouraged India to expect Soviet support in any possible future border dispute with China. Significantly, Chou En-lai's failure in 1956 to endorse the Soviet position on Kashmir, and his effort not to offend Pakistani sentiment, did not evidently perturb Nehru. The Chinese were faced with an uprising in Tibet in 1956 and were apparently in no mood to settle the border with India before establishing firm control over the whole of Tibet.

India got more from the Bulganin-Khrushchev visit in November, 1955, than support for its stand on Kashmir. The Soviet leaders endorsed the Indian claim to Goa; they now offered substantial participation in Indian development, and they did not insist on any condition that Nehru might have found difficult to accept. In offering India large-scale developmental aid, the Soviets asked for nothing more than the construction of a public sector in the vital industries. Khrushchev appeared to have chosen India as the first country to test the competitive appeal of Soviet and American economic aid programs.

Soviet scholars began to identify India's qualifications to merit participatory relations with the USSR. In November, 1955, *International Affairs* printed an article by K. Vasilyev generally praising the recommendations of the States Reorganization Commission appointed by the Indian Government for redrawing the boundaries of some of the states on the basis of language.

Vasilyev's guarded criticism reflected the views of the CPI, but there was no complaint of subjugation of national minorities in India. This was a major Marxian concession to India, particularly significant in the context of South Asia, where both India and Pakistan have important national minorities. Rehabilitation of Gandhi in the Soviet Union had begun in 1955;[102] it was carried forward in the coming years. At the Twentieth Congress, Kuusinen's confession that the Stalin period evaluation of Gandhi had been sectarian lent a certain verisimilitude to Khrushchev's denunciation of the dictator.[103]

The rapid growth of Soviet-Indian relations in the late fifties has to be viewed against the background of a steady deterioration of Moscow's relations with China. Whether or not differences began to unfold themselves in 1957, the following year (1958) is almost unanimously regarded as the watershed in Moscow-Peking relations. A multiplicity of factors contributed to the conflict, the most important of which probably was Moscow's decision to seek a *détente* with the United States regardless of Chinese interests. The Chinese pendulum definitely swung to the left in 1958 when the cult of Mao began to appear, and the claim that China alone knew the path to revolution in the underdeveloped world once again began to be heard.

What stands out against this background is the persistent Soviet effort between 1956 and 1959 to promote India to the status of an Asian great power. At least six times the Soviets tried to obtain for India a seat in international parleys, to which only a great power could aspire; if they did not succeed, it was partly because India itself lacked the wherewithal of a great power, and partly because of American opposition. The Russian commitment to India's industrial development went on expanding. From the steel plant at Bhilai, Soviet assistance was extended to such vital fields as metallurgy, heavy electricals, oil, and pharmaceuticals. In 1957 the Soviet veto at the Security Council blocked the adoption of a resolution on Kashmir, which India had opposed. Soviet intellectual talent was employed in a

radical revision of the pre-1956 perspective of Indian history and its post-independence achievements.[104]

At the Twentieth Congress, Khrushchev did not praise India too much. What he made unmistakably clear, however, was that India was a leader of the newly liberated nations; he called upon these nations to join the Socialist states to form a "vast peace zone." Unlike Zhdanov in 1947, Khrushchev in 1956 did not make a break with the imperialist bloc or even sympathy for the Socialist bloc a condition for the newly independent countries to qualify for the peace zone. The only condition he asked for was that there must be no partnership of any alliance sponsored by the imperialist powers. Hitherto, the CPSU and the Comintern had regarded the national liberation movement as an actual or potential revolutionary rear of the international Communist movement. Khrushchev could be said to have recognized its individual identity. However, it would inevitably be merged with the world Communist movement, and he offered to it the hands of friendship of the socialist bloc. The strategy of peaceful and competitive coexistence, noninevitability of world war, and peaceful transition to Socialist bloc. The strategy of peaceful and competitive coexisber of countries that were capable of noncapitalist growth. India, Khrushchev implied, was one such country.

## BRIEF EUPHORIA

Expectedly, therefore, a major cerebral enterprise was launched in the Soviet Union to appraise the Indian situation in the light of the Twentieth Congress thesis. The first articles, printed in January and February, 1956, exalted India's foreign policy of nonalignment and independence and gave it a central place, as a "Great Power," in the peace zone along with the Soviet Union and China. Soviet writers now took up the position that "under certain conditions" nonalignment could serve as one of the "principal means of strengthening general security." Since progressive foreign policy alone might not adequately justify

the placement of India as the vanguard of the peace zone of the Twentieth Congress thesis, reappraisal of India's domestic policies was taken up in great earnest. The call for a new look at the Indian national bourgeoisie, its industrial progress, and land reforms was made in an editorial in the journal of the Institute of Oriental Studies.

The first bold attempt in this direction emanated from a man named Modeste Rubinstein, who, in two articles in *New Times* in July, found "objective possibilities" in India "for obviating the continued growth of monopoly capital" and for "taking the socialist path" by "peaceful methods."[105] In other words, Rubinstein claimed that India was capable of noncapitalist development and was fit for peaceful transition to socialism. He gave all the credit for this to the leadership of Nehru and none to the "democratic movement," that is, the Communist party. The article drew a quick rebuttal from the CPI leader, Ajoy Ghosh.[106] The new Soviet line on India was taken to Peking next September by Mikoyan at the Eighth Congress of the CCP. He drew a parallel between Chinese and Indian state capitalism. Several underdeveloped countries, said Mikoyan, were trying to "avoid the torments of capitalism," and "we must see the difference between state capitalism in India and state capitalism in the United States." Marxists could not but "regard positively" the growth of state capitalism in the newly liberated countries, which was for them a transitional form to avoid capitalism.[107]

Developments within India fortified the new Soviet stance. The land reforms during the first five-year-plan period had ended the old, decrepit, stagnant *zamindari* system, and although the benefits hardly reached the poor landless peasant, a new fabric of agrarian relationship was being woven round the middle peasant, who now dominated the Indian countryside. The Indian Parliament adopted an Industrial Policy Resolution in 1956 reserving a large section of the industrial economy, including defense industries, for the state sector and prescribing general state supervision over the private sector. Life insurance

and the Imperial Bank were nationalized. At the annual session of the Congress party at Avadi in 1957, socialism was proclaimed as India's objective, and this was later endorsed in a resolution adopted by the Lok Sabha, the lower House of Parliament. The socialist goal—or rather the goal of a socialist structure—was projected in India's second five-year plan with its emphasis on heavy industry in the state sector. Foreign policy seemed to synchronize with domestic economic policy, and there apparently was no significant opposition either to Nehru's conceptual formulation of socialism or to his style of working for it. A national consensus was forming in India on the basic postulates of domestic and foreign policies which lasted till the early sixties. The country went through a second major readjustment of internal boundaries since independence, though not entirely without violence and bloodshed. The second general election was conducted in peace and order, leading to a political miracle. The small state of Kerala, on the southwest coast, elected the Communist party to a majority in the local legislative assembly. The world's first freely elected Communist government was installed with the publicly expressed goodwill of the center.

In the Soviet Union the process of revising the Stalinist stance on India began, as we have noted, with the role of Gandhi in Indian history, and it rapidly extended to the national bourgeoisie, land reforms, and the state sector. The Academy of Sciences' Institute of Oriental Studies organized a seminar in 1956 to examine, or rather reexamine, the role of the national bourgeoisie in Asian countries. Balabushevich, an authoritative voice on Aisan affairs comparable to D'iakov and Zhukov, observed that the national bourgeoisie in India and similar countries were "still progressive"; the Indian landlord class was interested in capitalist development; and since the Congress party represented the national bourgeoisie and the landlords, it was playing a progressive role. The old school, however, was not entirely muted; at least one scholar attending the seminar maintained "stubbornly" that in India power was held by the

monopolies and landlords who also controlled the Congress party. However, the published report on the seminar said that the dissidents were given the "necessary rebuff."[108]

Rostislav Ulyanovsky, an economist, in a study of the Indian economy, found reliable evidence of a strong trend toward dominant state control of industry; state capitalism, now flourishing in India, was "an undoubtedly progressive phenomenon" when practiced in a nonaligned peace-loving country—in other words, a country collaborating with the Socialist camp. If there were contradictions in the Indian economy, these chiefly were between the state sector and foreign private capital; by implication, there was little contradiction, and even less antagonism, between the state sector and Indian "monopoly capital."[109] A study of the Indian land reforms by M. Maximov in 1957 gave them credit for undermining "to a certain degree" the economic power of the landlords and liquidating feudal institutions. Although the reforms brought land only to the "well-to-do part of the peasantry," and capitalism was taking root in the countryside, Maximov believed that the transformation of feudal and semifeudal relations to capitalist relations was progressive; what he left unsaid was how the growth of capitalism in the Indian villages could correspond with the possibility of noncapitalist development.[110]

The next academic discussion of the Indian economy was held in 1958. It was more sophisticated because, since 1956, Indian studies had received a great impetus in the Soviet Union. The discussion covered not merely the surface manifestations of the Indian economy but also its history and the relationship between the growing industry and the agrarian sector. One of the controversial issues was how to evaluate Indian state capitalism. It appears that there were now two schools of thought on the Indian economy, and the dissenters could not be easily given the "necessary rebuff." One school regarded the Indian public sector as the preserve of the "national, anti-imperialist, and, to a certain extent, anti-feudal elements," thereby giving it a progressive title. The second school was doubtful. It seemed

to believe that the Indian state sector was already under the control of monopolists. The over-all estimate of the Indian state sector that emerged from the meeting was that it still held promise of developing as a powerful instrument for transition to socialism. But Soviet scholars were aware that it could also be captured by Indian and foreign big monopoly capital and made into a powerful vehicle of capitalist construction.[111] The new Soviet stance on India was reflected in the first comprehensive history of India to be published in the Russian language.[112]

In the international field, the second half of the fifties established Indo-Soviet collaboration on vital issues affecting one another's essential national interests, exposing the amity, at the same time, and somewhat paradoxically, to strains that were to increase during the next decade. Khrushchev's search for a *détente* with the United States drew support from Nehru, who was not lagging in efforts to turn the changing relationship between the two superpowers to India's advantage. In the Middle East, the Soviets found in Nehru a dependable defender of their policy to nurse progressive Arab nationalism; Nasser emerged as a dynamic link between New Delhi and Moscow. India gave strong support to Nasser during the Suez crisis, trying, at the same time, to persuade the Egyptian leader to accommodate some of the important Western interests in the final settlement of the conflict. Suez, in a way, signaled for Nehru the end of the Cold War of the previous nine years and the beginning of Soviet-American joint efforts to preserve international peace. This gave Nehru some occasion to maneuver. He politely turned down Bulganin's suggestion in 1956, following the tripartite invasion of Suez, to convene an Afro-Asian conference to mobilize support for Egypt; he preferred to work through the United Nations, as did the United States. In 1958 he ignored Soviet objection to an expansion of the UN observer group in the Lebanon and Moscow's bitter criticism of Dag Hammarskjöld, the UN Secretary-General, for appointing a consultative committee on the Lebanese crisis. Nehru, in fact,

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sent eighty Indian observers to serve with the UN group in the Lebanon. During the Iraqi crisis, Nehru gave greater support to the Soviets presumably because, in the first instance, nothing was more welcome to India than the collapse of the Baghdad Pact, and, secondly, the Russians were being accused by Peking of adopting a soft line in deference to American interests. As if to pinpoint his reaction to Chinese extremism, Khrushchev included India, but not China, in his abortive proposal for a big power foreign ministers' conference to settle the Iraqi crisis. This was followed up by Khrushchev's suggestion to Eisenhower that India be invited to the forthcoming talks on prohibition of nuclear testing for war-like purposes. The Russians also pleaded for a place for India in the disarmament talks going on in Geneva.

The Hungarian uprising in 1956 passed off without lacerating Soviet-Indian friendship and understanding. From the beginning of the crisis, Khrushchev had taken pains to convince Nehru of the legitimacy of the Soviet action.[113] Nehru's mild disapproval of the Soviet intervention roused a section of Indian public opinion, but it was not strong enough to deflect the Prime Minister from the manner in which he had decided to react publicly. India voted against the American resolution in the UN Assembly, calling for UN-supervized elections in Hungary, for the very good reason that it had always opposed similar elections in Kashmir, and that the Soviet veto was the only instrument with which India could hope to prevent the Security Council to act in Kashmir against what it regarded its own vital interests. The logic of the Indian stand on Hungary at the UN became clear when in January, 1957, the Soviet Union stood solidly on the Indian side with its opposition to any proposal for a UN-supervised plebiscite in Kashmir and for the positioning of an international police force in the border between the parts of Kashmir occupied by India and Pakistan. The Soviet delegate backed the entire Indian political stand on Kashmir, and the Soviet veto killed a resolution that was supported by the United States.[114] The only occasion when Moscow reacted sharply to any Indian action during this period was

when in May, 1958, Nehru accused the USSR of violating the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence in applying sanctions against Yugoslavia following an acute worsening of relations between the two countries. Through the Indian ambassador in Moscow, Khrushchev firmly asked Nehru to leave the Socialist countries alone to solve their ideological disputes.[115] What Khrushchev meant was that he would not brook any interference in the affairs of the East European countries, for no such admonition came to New Delhi from Moscow when Nehru and other Indian leaders criticized China in its ideological and other disputes with the USSR.

Collaboration in the international field rested on the ever-growing foundation of Soviet-Indian economic and cultural cooperation. Mikoyan, visiting New Delhi in March, 1956, offered India Soviet expertise in economic planning (which was not accepted) and a market for certain goods India was finding it difficult to export (which was accepted). Indo-Soviet trade was now expanding rapidly. In 1957, India was the fifth biggest non-Communist trade partner of the USSR.[116] A direct shipping line was established between the two countries.[117] The most significant development in economic relations, second only to the construction of the steel plant at Bhilai, was Soviet, and afterwards Rumanian, assistance to build an indigenous Indian oil industry. Toward the end of 1957 the Soviets signed an agreement with India providing for credits for a number of vital industries in the state sector, including heavy machinery, thermal power, coal mining and processing machinery, and optical glasses. In comparison with the credits India had so far obtained from the West, the Soviet interest charge of 2.5 per cent for a $126 million loan, to be paid back in thirteen years after the receipt of the equipment, appeared to be strikingly generous. Soviet financial commitment to India's second five-year plan, with its emphasis on industrialization, reached the figure of $250 million.[118]

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## STRAINS ON INDO-SOVIET RELATIONS

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three directions. The first was India's growing economic and political relations with the United States. The Soviet strategy of peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition between socialism and capitalism gave Nehru some freedom to build economic relations with the US; his hands were strengthened by a change in American policy toward the nonaligned countries. Soviet commentators probably echoed the disturbance of the Russian leadership with growing American influence on the Indian economy. The Soviet press reacted adversely to the holding of an Indo-American conference on economic cooperation in 1959; it denounced the formation of the Swatantra party as the political platform of the conservative forces avowedly opposed even to the Nehru brand of socialism.[119] In 1959, Soviet scholars began to state with some conviction that American economic aid to India had taken on political aspects. The great mass welcome to President Eisenhower's visit to India in December, 1959, and the impact it made on the public mind added to Soviet apprehensions. A Soviet scholar came to the conclusion: "The Eisenhower trip to India was a singular attempt through confidential negotiations at the highest level to influence the course of India's foreign policy, to induce her to turn from the policy of non-alignment, and to turn to the United States for military aid."[120] The jibe this time was at people very close to Nehru in the Indian Government, if not to Nehru himself.

A second source of strain was China. Sino-Soviet relations began to cool off in 1958 with Mao's return to the forefront of Chinese domestic and foreign policy. Moscow withdrew the several thousand Soviet experts operating in China and heavily cut back on economic aid at a time when its commitment to India's development was expanding. Where the Soviets really clashed with the Chinese was on the question of Tibet and the disputed Sino-Indian border. Minor incidents on the Sino-Indian border had been happening since 1957, indicating the difficulties the Chinese were facing in Tibet and the pushing up of the Indian administration to areas long left practi-

cally ungoverned. Then, in early 1959, came the rebellion in Tibet.[121] Neither during the Tibetan uprising nor in the border dispute with India that followed did the Chinese consider the support they got from the Soviet Union commensurate with the ideological and military alliance that bound the two countries. In 1950–51 the Soviets had been more strident than the Chinese in criticizing Indian "intervention" in Tibet. In 1959 they seemed to have recognized a certain legitimacy of the Indian involvement in Tibet. This is indicated by the exclusion from the Soviet press, except for the first few days, of Chinese charges of Indian complicity in the Tibetan uprising, in the use of the Indian hill town of Kalimpong as a "command base" of the Khampa rebels, and in the escape of the Dalai Lama to India with his entourage. If the Soviets had rallied to the support of China during the rebellion and in the border dispute with India, Nehru (so the Chinese leaders seemed to think) would either have accepted the Peking position or moved clearly closer to the United States. Either Indian action in 1959 would have been a blow to the global strategy the CPSU had been pursuing. If Moscow had remained truly neutral, leaving the issues to be settled exclusively between Peking and New Delhi, and trying to bring both to a compromise, it might have been regarded by China as a tolerable position. *But Khrushchev decided not to remain neutral by declaring Soviet neutrality.* On September 9, following a major clash between Chinese and Indian soldiers, Tass came out with a statement that had a stunning effect on the world:

> One cannot fail to express regret at the fact that the incident on the Sino-Indian frontier took place. The Soviet Union is in friendly relations with the Chinese People's Republic and the Republic of India. The Chinese and the Soviet people are linked by inseparable bonds of fraternal friendship, based on the great principle of proletarian internationalism. Friendly collaboration between the USSR and India is developing successfully in accordance with the ideas of peaceful co-existence. . . . In Soviet ruling circles the assurance is

being expressed that the government of the Chinese People's Republic and the government of the Republic of India will not permit the incident to give comfort to those forces who do not want an improvement in the international situation.[122]

The decision to release the Tass statement was taken at the highest level in Moscow in spite of Chinese efforts to stop the Soviet move. What is more, the Chinese Government had sent to Moscow the copy of a letter Chou En-lai was about to write to Nehru laying claim, for the first time, to some 35,000 square miles of territory regarded by India as its own. By stopping the release of the Tass statement, Moscow might have prevented or at least postponed this dramatic escalation of the Chinese territorial claim. What happened in fact was that Chou En-lai's letter, dated September 8, reached New Delhi almost simultaneously with the issuance of the Tass statement. And later, in 1963, Peking told the CPSU that the Tass statement had for the first time brought the Sino-Soviet dispute in the open.

The third source of strain on Indo-Soviet friendship was the political and economic conditions in India itself. The Twentieth Congress euphoria about India was too brief. Politically it reached its zenith in 1957 when the Communists in Kerala were permitted to form the state government after a remarkable electoral victory. It seemed as if communism might after all work its way out in India through the peaceful parliamentary method. In 1958, however, a "liberation movement" was building up in Kerala against this government; taking a leading part in it were the Congress party and its president, Indira Gandhi. The Soviet press ignored the events in Kerala except for a short article appearing in an obscure technical journal, in which an "observer" seemed to advise the chief minister, E. M. S. Namboodiripad, not to resign.[123] As the political crisis in Kerala worsened and it appeared that the Indian president would dismiss the Communist ministry, an article was published in the December, 1958, issue of the *World Marxist Review*. Written by Pavel Yudin, Soviet ambassador to China, it was the sharpest attack on the

Nehru Government during the Khrushchev era. Yudin said that the Indian bourgeoisie and landlords were using the state machinery as an instrument of violence against the masses. Nehru and the Congress party knew nothing about real socialism and had no solution for India's poverty. The Government was incapable of preventing an increasing control of the economy by Western monopoly capital. The middle path that Nehru was following was an exercise in abstraction and inadequate for solving the problems of underdevelopment. The main point in the Yudin article concerned the strategy of the Indian Communists. Whether or not there would be peaceful transition to socialism depended on the conduct of the bourgeoisie. If the Indian Government did not allow Communists to get power by peaceful means and decided to use force to suppress them, the Communists would have no alternative to violence. Yudin was appreciative of the progressive character of India's foreign policy, but this did not deter him from suggesting that the CPI should change its policy of total support for the Nehru Government and organize mass action to force it to pursue progressive policies at home and abroad.[124]

The Yudin article did not create more than a ripple in India. It had no lasting impact because it was not followed up by anything else, and its publication in the *World Marxist Review* rather than in *Pravda* indicated that although it might have reflected the thinking of a leftist section in the Central Committee of the CPSU, it hardly represented the attitude of the Kremlin to the Indian situation. Only a year before, in 1957, the Congress party had won a most impressive victory over the Communists in the midterm poll in Andhra Pradesh effectively circulating to the voters reprints of a *Pravda* article heaping praise on the Nehru Government's accomplishments at home and abroad. And now, within weeks of the Yudin article, Khrushchev hailed the Bhilai steel plant agreement at the Twenty-first CPSU Congress as a major socialist success in the peaceful competition with imperialism, while Mukhtidinov, a leading member of the Central Committee, confirmed the continuity of the

Soviets' India policy. His remark that India was progressing in an increasingly "democratic" manner was perhaps meant to be a rebuff to Pavel Yudin. India had no doubt a great deal further to go before it could "eradicate the consequences of colonialism and assure social and economic progress." It was, however, "incontestable" that "as a result of the far-sighted policy of that outstanding statesman of the East, Jawaharlal Nehru," as well as the "activity of all progressive forces," India had achieved "certain successes" in a relatively short time in developing industry, agriculture, and the entire economy, achieving national unity, and enhancing its international prestige.[125]

The Communist ministry in Kerala was dismissed in August, 1959. A Soviet journal described the action of the Central Government as "anti-democratic," and a Moscow commentator blamed for its collapse not only local reaction but also the Congress Government in Delhi and the ruling party.[126] However, the Soviet Union's growing conflict with China and the crisis building up in Sino-Indian relations invested the Moscow-Delhi alliance with extraordinary importance. The fate of the Communist government in Kerala could not be permitted to cast a shadow on the alliance.

Yet it strengthened the doubts of the ideologues in the USSR about India. As the fifth decade of the century ended, the Soviet scholarly community was apparently changing its stand on India, for a second time in ten years. They were now giving more attention to the monopoly character of Indian big business; they were looking more critically and skeptically at the Indian state sector; they were taking public notice of the predominance of private enterprise in the Indian economy. They were talking and writing, albeit cautiously, about the slow pace of India's progress toward industrialization, the incompleteness of the land reforms, and they found in India an eagerness to "placate" the United States and to create conditions favorable for private American capital investment. For the first time India's socioeconomic evolution began to be unfavorably compared with

that of the United Arab Republic and even Indonesia.[127] Soviet scholars were nearing the stage when they were to conclude that capitalist economy had grown too far in India to enable it to traverse the noncapitalist road to socialism.

## AN ASSESSMENT

The Soviet arrival in South Asia in the brief span of five years had certainly been spectacular. Khrushchev had demolished many of the walls built during the Stalinist times. Soviet economic assistance gave strength to Nehru's egalitarian programs. It gave meaning and substance to the policy of nonalignment. Soviet support to India's territorial integrity boosted the self-confidence of the Indian people. Soviet appreciation of internal accomplishments elevated the morale of the Indian leadership. India wanted to be told that it was doing well. Even in the *bhai-bhai* years, the Chinese leaders were extremely wary of praising India's domestic achievements. The Soviets were more than generous. They appeared proud of the role they were playing in Indian industrialization. But for Soviet assistance, India's progress with industries would certainly have been much slower.

Till 1955, Afghanistan was the only country in South Asia with which the Soviets had a constructive, participatory pattern of relationship. Now, in five years, the USSR was playing a major participatory role in most of South and Southeast Asia. Even with Pakistan its relation was not entirely one of conflict.

The engineering of the Soviet arrival in India had been strikingly dynamic. The wholesale denunciation of Stalin and Stalinist legacy appeared to give Khrushchev and his colleagues a remarkably wide scope of initiative and ingenuity in building relations with countries that did not belong to the imperialist camp. There were no commitments to bind them, no alliances to hold them to the past. Nevertheless, Khrushchev and his colleagues appeared to be acting in great hurry.

At the Twentieth Congress, they proclaimed a universal

strategy of communism without prior consultation with, and concurrence of, other Communist parties, including the CCP. They saw to it that the Indian Communist party adopted the new line whatever might have been the doubts and misgivings of its leaders. In launching the friendship drive for India, they acted unilaterally, in the interest of the Soviet state rather than world communism. They changed their policy of neutrality on Kashmir (that is, in territorial disputes between India and Pakistan) to one of complete support of the Indian stand, once again, unilaterally, without consulting China, which shares the Himalayan frontiers with India. By the end of 1959 many Indians believed that the Soviet Union was somewhat committed to defend India in its border dispute with China, if not to endorse the Indian stand on this dispute.

# 3

# 1950s: THE CHALLENGE OF CHINA

THOUGH SCHOLARSHIP on Communist China has grown enormously during the past decade, particularly in the United States, it is not easy to understand and interpret the foreign policy and relations of the Chinese People's Republic. A major obstacle is the perplexing protuberance of myths, jargons, clichés, passions, and prejudices that blur our perspective of China. The bamboo curtain is, of course, there. But there is also a curtain of errors and false prophesies, of gross and costly misperceptions that have muddied and distorted the picture of China in the outside world.[1] Sometimes the Chinese regime itself has contributed to this distortion, but more often it has been the result of real or imagined conflicts between the national and power interests of the People's Republic and those of other powers. For an Indian student of China there is an additional problem—patriotism. For the last ten years India has been engaged in a multiple clash of interests with China. Politicians as well as intellectuals have contributed to the prevailing Indian perception of China as an aggressive, expansionist power determined to undermine India's internal strength and external influence. The current Indian psychological reaction to China is comparable to the American psy-

chological reaction in the fifties. It has taken American scholars some twenty years to shake off the trauma of McCarthyism and take a bold new look at the history of their country's relations with Communist China. O. Edmund Clubb, a specialist on the inner Asian border areas, and the last American consul-general in Peking before the Communist takeover, regrets in 1969 that "McCarthyism played a significant role in making America's China policy and in keeping it that way."[2] However, in 1950–51 Dr. Clubb was among the China specialists who regarded the Communist victory in China little else than a brutal and alarming expansion of Soviet power.[3]

What brings about a change in the perception of one nation by another is not always certain. Friendship makes room for indulgence. But enmities also mellow in the course of time. The facts of international politics are subject to constant change. World affairs, as Hans J. Morgenthau puts it, "have surprises in store for whoever tries to read the future from his knowledge of the past and from the signs of the present."[4] Some students of Chinese affairs try to discover in the hoary history of the Chinese people clues to the present Chinese leaders' attitude toward, and dealings with, foreign nations. The result is quite often another series of myths and make-believe: for example, the Chinese regard their own country to be still the center of the world; they are not particularly interested in building relations with other countries; and that they cannot help regarding all foreigners as inferiors. The Chinese People's Republic having been kept isolated from the world community for twenty years, it is relatively easy to confuse the results of the isolation with its causes. This is a trap that few scholars have been able to avoid completely.

Communist China's foreign policy, like that of any other country, can be studied only in the pattern of its interaction with other members of the international community. No existing balance of power smoothly makes room for new great power; the transition from the old balance of power to a new one is almost always painful and bloody. The foreign policy of a new

great power therefore has to be studied on the two extreme interaction patterns—participation and hostility. Conflict short of war is participation, leading often to readjustments of power interests among the major partners of an emerging balance of power. In the case of China the common scholarly attitude is to make the pattern of hostility interaction the focus of study of its foreign policy. This has led to errors of perception and judgment. China, like any other great power, acts on the dual level of participation and hostility. The pattern of hostility reaction appeals mostly to those who regard China to be a threat to the prevailing balance of power.

One major problem with the hostility reaction pattern approach to China's foreign policy is that it may lead to a highly inflated and unrealistic evaluation of the objectives of China's foreign policy. Is it realistic to suggest, one must ask in all seriousness, that the leaders of Communist China have set as their foreign policy goal the conquest of Asia or the spreading of the Maoist revolution throughout the underdeveloped world? Power and influence are certainly among the objectives of Chinese foreign policy, as they are with every other major power; it may also be the wish of Mao and his followers to see their revolution succeed in other countries. But the pursuit of power and influence is conditioned by China's actual economic and military strength and its mastery over its internal environment. The Chinese Communists have taken on their shoulders the incredibly gigantic task of modernizing one quarter of mankind in a relatively short span of time; this, above all, is the great constraint within which succeeding Chinese governments will have to conduct their foreign policies for decades to come.[5] The Chinese Communist stance is therefore essentially internal and will remain so for many more years.

What appears to be the Sino-centrism of Communist China is mostly its preoccupation with internal problems. Among these the two most important are international acceptance of the legitimacy of the revolution, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the geographic Chinese state. Most of China's for-

eign policy and relations during the last twenty years have been directed toward gaining these two objectives; they remain still unsecured. Whatever progress the Communist regime may have made in internal reconstruction, it is still not recognized by the majority of the international community, it is still kept out of the United Nations and the Security Council, and part of its geographic territory is still outside its control. The rival counterrevolutionary regime of Chiang Kai-shek still masquerades as the legitimate Government of China, is still a permanent member of the Security Council, and still hopes to liberate the mainland with the help of American arms. These iron facts constitute the scenario of China's relations with the rest of the world. The Communist regime finds itself encircled by the world's mightiest power and see no possibility of a breakthrough without a radical change in the world situation or in American policy. It has been trying to do all it can to bring about this change, knowing all the time that it cannot do much, not, in any case, very soon. It tries to benefit from every situation that is unfavorable to its main enemy, the United States, but it is extremely cautious in avoiding a direct collision with America.

In the pursuit of the two major objectives of their external policy the Chinese Communists behave as Chinese and as Communists. Being Chinese arms them with certain peculiar characteristics, not the least of which are almost limitless perseverance and what one may call their strategy of time.[6] Also being Chinese, they are endowed with a sense of material realism. Their strategy—or perspective—of time enables them to wait and to persist: the Chinese *Weltanschauung* enables them to "maintain an objective over an unusually long period of time without seeing frustration or impatience resulting from long delays. . . . Time to the *n*th degree multiplied by the *n*th root of effort equals results, says Mao."[7] Being Communists, they are extremely proud of their revolution and are highly conscious of its uniqueness. They fought and won against vastly superior enemies; they won because they had evolved their own strategy

and their own philosophy of revolution within the framework of Marxism-Leninism; they are convinced that the Chinese revolution is the model for successful Communist revolutions in the underdeveloped world. This does not necessarily make the Chinese Communist regime more anxious to spread their own model to the world than, say, the Government of the United States or the Soviet Union. Except during the uncontrolled (perhaps uncontrollable) extravaganza of the proletarian cultural revolution, the Chinese Communists have made little proved effort to export their model across the borders.

Within the broad perspective of Communist Chinese foreign policy, a study of Peking's actions within the Asian Triangle may prove to be somewhat rewarding. Chinese actions within the Asian landmass have been on the dual interaction pattern of participation and hostility. The major motivations in either case would seem to have been the two principal objectives of foreign policy we have already mentioned. For at least seven, perhaps nine, years the People's Republic was closely allied with the Soviet Union, which played a significant part in its industrial construction and provided it with military protection from a possible American attack. Not that the alliance was without its stresses and strains; these were inherent in the historical relationship between Russia and China, in the relations between the CPSU and the CCP since 1937 (when Mao captured its leadership), in the fundamental difference between the Bolshevik and the Chinese revolutions, their leaderships and strategies, and in the successes and failures of the two very different methods of socialist construction. As we have already seen, Mao and his comrades firmly believed even in the late forties that they alone, and not the Soviets, had found the road to revolutions in the colonies and semicolonies. In the early fifties Mao applied several techniques of the Soviet socialist construction to China and also made experiments with some of his own techniques such as the hundred flowers campaign and the various rectification drives. In the latter half of the fifties he came to the conclusion that the

Soviet model would not do in peasant-dominated China, and he steadily moved to the application of his own techniques. This might have displeased and even alarmed the Soviet leaders, but neither the great leap forward nor the communes alone would have destroyed Sino-Soviet friendship. The foundation of this friendship was rudely shaken only when the Soviet Union sought a *détente* with the United States without securing the two fundamental unfulfilled objectives of the Chinese regime—legitimacy and territorial integrity. Mao saw in the Soviet move an attempt to legitimize the bipolar balance of power at the cost of China. To him this was betrayal not only of the alliance but also of communism itself.

## INDIA AND CHINA: 1949–50

Communist China's first contact with India involved the crucial question of the integrity and sovereignty of the Chinese state. Tibet was Chinese, whether the government in Peking was Communist or Kuomintang. As long as China had remained a fiction rather than a fact, Tibet was a semi-independent buffer territory, over which China exercized suzerainty, but little control. The British had practically brought Outer Tibet within the sphere of influence of their Indian empire; only Inner (or Eastern) Tibet had been allowed to remain under somewhat loose Chinese control. Till 1949, Chiang Kai-shek had been unable to alter this situation substantially. When the Communists came to power, they lost no time in announcing their resolution to liberate Tibet, and in New Delhi it was realized that these were no empty words. Thus the national Indian Government was called upon to make a quick decision on whether it would concede Tibet to China or try to maintain the special interests it had inherited there from the British.

India's own experience in the matter of territorial integrity had not been greatly dissimilar from the People's Republic's. The Nagas on the eastern frontier were refusing to submit to Indian sovereignty. Kashmir had been claimed by Pakistan.

India had employed its armed forces to defend its frontiers both in the northwest and the east. However, the partition of the subcontinent and Pakistan's claim to Kashmir had made the Indian elite unusually sensitive about inherited influence or special interests in the Himalayas. Besides, the Indian leaders had inherited not only the strategic outlook of the British empire but also the British stance on the Himalayan complex of territories extending from Sikkim to Tibet.

Thus a confrontation between China and India became imminent in the Himalayas. Both were acting under a territorial imperative. Peking was determined to extend the frontiers of its rule to the southernmost limit of geographic China. Delhi was equally determined to protect the special interests it had inherited in the Himalayas from the British. Leaders of both countries made a careful appraisal of their respective stances. The Chinese leaders apparently drew two major conclusions from their evaluation of the Indian situation. The first—and this point was made by the Chinese delegation at the 1949 conference of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Peking—was that India lacked objective conditions for an armed peasant revolution. The other was that sections of the Indian bourgeoisie were progressive and anti-imperialist and therefore worthy of cultivation. This was a somewhat different line from the Zhdanov speech of 1948, but the Chinese apparently were able to persuade the Soviets in 1949 to accept their own perspective of the Indian bourgeoisie.[8] At least indirectly therefore Mao played a role in the Indian Communist party's decision in 1951 to call off the Telengana uprising. The Chinese Government combined its strategy of peaceful liberation of Tibet with a tactical move to woo the progressive section of the Indian bourgeoisie. It regarded Nehru to be the leader of this section.

The Indian appraisal of Communist China was more complex. Nehru had little personal knowledge of Chinese communism and no knowledge at all of the Chinese Communist leaders. The Indian ambassador to China, K. M. Panikkar, who described himself as a radical liberal and Nehru as a liberal,[9] was im-

pressed by the sweet reasonableness of Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung and was inclined to regard Chinese communism as part of the nationalist upsurge in Asia, of the great Asian awakening. Nehru had his sympathy for China, Communist or non-Communist; stronger than that sentiment was his perception of India and China as two coequals in resurgent Asia. He did not wish to get involved in a territorial conflict with China, but he was equally opposed to any demonstration of Indian weakness. In any case, Nehru yielded to none in his determination to maintain India as a south Himalayan power. He lost no time in signing new treaties with Bhutan and Sikkim legitimizing India's special relationship with both kingdoms. In treaty negotiations with Nepal, the Indian Government proposed that Delhi should continue to handle Kathmandu's external relations, as the British had done till 1947. Nepal's rejection of the proposal left India with no alternative to conceding full sovereignty. Nehru, however, promptly, and unilaterally, placed Nepal within the Indian defense orbit.[10] He pushed up the Indian administration as far north to the border with Tibet (as it was known to India) as was possible in the physical circumstances prevailing in the mountainous, mostly unpopulated, and scarcely governed border areas. And he declared in Parliament: "The MacMahon Line is our border, pact or no pact."[11]

There were differences in the Indian cabinet, in the Congress party leadership, and in the Foreign Office on how to deal with Communist China. The governor-general, C. Rajagopalachari, the deputy prime minister, Sardar Patel, and several others wanted Nehru to go slow with the recognition of the People's Government; they were supported, according to Panikkar, "by a powerful section of the Civil Service including, I suspect, some of senior officials of the Foreign Office."[12] As a result, Nehru took the compromise decision to extend recognition to the People's Government only when the Kuomintang regime moved to Formosa about the end of 1949. When the Tibet question came up in the Indian Parliament, several

prominent Congress and opposition leaders, while attacking Nehru's handling of the issue, exhibited a more bipolar world view than did the Chinese Communist leaders.[13] Nehru's own stand was not always equally firm. He used the word "suzerainty" in his speeches on Tibet in 1951, changed over to "sovereignty" during the period of 1954–58, and reverted to "suzerainty" in 1959. He was personally convinced that legally Tibet belonged to China, but it was not before 1958 that he categorically said so. On the one hand he made it clear that the Chinese had given him (or India or anyone else) no pledge to grant Tibet autonomy; on the other hand, he at times seemed to encourage Indians to believe that the Chinese had really done so. As Nehru explained in an interview with George N. Patterson, the main reason for his renunciation of Indian rights in Tibet was that the territory lay beyond the Indian defense perimeter and that in any case India had only a couple of hundred troops in Tibet in 1950.[14] With the bulk of the Indian army defending Kashmir, India was clearly not in a position in 1950–51 to take even a symbolic military stand in Tibet.

## LIBERATION OF TIBET: A RECONSTRUCTION

In his proclamation of the CPR on October 1, 1949, Mao did not mention Tibet; he only announced that the People's Republic would "wage the war of liberation to the very end" and "liberate all the territory of China." A certain kind of political ferment got hold of glacial Tibet as the Communists were about to storm Peking. There was a move in Lhasa to declare Tibet independent, but although the Kuomintang representative was expelled, the declaration did not come.[15] The Chinese Communists had, however, devised a Tibetan strategy before they took over in Peking. They brought about a complete split between the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, building up the latter with his great influence in Sinkiang, Mongolia, and considerable parts of Tibet as a counterblast to the former. Warlordism in the northwest and southwest provinces

of China was wiped out with astonishing swiftness. Tibet was thus exposed to the Chinese Communist power; the revolution was knocking at its gate. The geographical barrier that had been in Tibet's favor all through history collapsed. Some Tibetan leaders in East Tibet were planning a revolution. The Communists established contact with them and asked them to work for a larger and deeper revolution against "a feudal, reactionary regime." They were promised all kinds of support. Patterson says that this was an extremely clever move; the East Tibetans had no alternative but to accept it, for the Communist forces were about to enter Tibet. Patterson himself flew to India and to Delhi in a vain attempt to persuade the Indian Government to intervene on behalf of Lhasa.[16] By January, 1950, Peking was able to win over the East Tibetan leaders, and on January 1, it laid down the liberation of Tibet during the year as one of the basic tasks of the People's Liberation Army.

Tibet's only hope was in getting foreign assistance for independence. This was what the Chinese Communists feared in 1949–51. Their fear and suspicion was fed by the situation in Taiwan, and by newspaper reports. In October, 1949, *The New York Times* discussed the possibility of recognition of Tibet as an independent country and said that such a step would enable the United States to "make available some of its funds to help foreign countries arm themselves against Communism."[17] A brother of the Dalai Lama, the former a resident of the United States, went to Formosa in 1949 for talks with Chiang Kai-shek. It seems that Lhasa was in fact hoping to get foreign help.[18] It could come only from India, which was the only external power with a physical presence in Tibet. When Lhasa found that India was not in a mood to help, and after the East Tibet leaders had been won over by Peking, it sent a seven-man mission to India in April, 1950, to make preliminary contacts with representatives of the Peking Government with the aim of establishing better relations and settling the differences. The mission arrived in India with the permission of the Indian Government. However, having arrived in India, it adopted the

posture of a mission of an independent country. It told pressmen that it would like to hold talks with Chinese representatives on neutral territory. The mission set up its headquarters at Kalimpong, on the Bengal-Sikkim border.

## FIRST PEACEFUL WAR

In May, Peking began to publicize its conception of "peaceful liberation" of Tibet. On the twenty-second, Peking Radio addressed an appeal to the Tibetan Government and people asking them not to count on British or American aid and not to be "misled by slanders of the British and American imperialist bloc aimed at sowing discord against Chinese nationalities." The PLA would in any case liberate Tibet; Tibet's geographical remoteness would constitute no obstacle. The Chinese Government, however, was "absolutely considerate of the interests and traditions of all component nationalities of the People's Republic of China and fully respects their freedom of religion." The broadcast ended with a call to the Tibetan Government to send plenipotentiaries to Peking "to conduct peace talks" in order to save "the Tibetan people from unnecessary losses."[19] Earlier, on May 9, the vice-chairman of the Chinghai provincial people's government, Shirob Jalto, had made a broadcast from Sian to the Dalai Lama making the same request.[20] About this time, units of the PLA crossed the three rivers of Kinsha, Lantsang and Nu into Tibet. At the beginning of June, 1950, the Tibetan mission at Kalimpong, apparently frustrated in its efforts to obtain Indian support for Tibet's independence, asked the British Government for permission to fly to Hong Kong to meet representatives of Peking. The British were unwilling to endanger their relations with China, and permission was refused. The outbreak of the Korean War made the Chinese Government speed up Tibet's peaceful liberation. On August 5, New China News Agency circulated a statement by General Liu Po-chen, chairman of the Southwest China Military Affairs Commission, declaring that the PLA would soon enter Tibet to liberate it from the "aggressive influence of British and American im-

perialism." The statement promised the Tibetans that they would be allowed "regional self-government and freedom of religion," and that their institutions would be protected, but the Tibetan army would be incorporated in the "national defense forces of the Chinese People's Republic."[21] Peking's first ambassador to India arrived in New Delhi in September and had conversations with the Dalai Lama's delegates in the second week of the month. The talks ended inconclusively on October 1; the envoy was unable to commit himself on Tibet's future relationship with Peking and pressed the mission to go to the Chinese capital. Meanwhile, on September 30, the first anniversary of the CPR, Chou En-lai announced his government's determination to "liberate the people of Tibet and stand on guard at the Chinese frontiers." He hoped, however, that the liberation would be achieved peacefully through negotiations with the Tibetan Government. In October, units of the PLA began their march into East Tibet and took Chamdo without much resistance. On October 25 a brief communique issued in Peking announced that the "People's Army units have been ordered to advance into Tibet to free three million Tibetans from the imperialist oppression and to consolidate national defenses on the western borders of China." Confirmation from Lhasa reached New Delhi on October 28; Nehru was reported to have been "extremely perplexed and disappointed at the Chinese Government's action without a word of explanation in advance."[22] Two days later, Lhasa requested New Delhi for diplomatic assistance in its dispute with Peking; presumably India was asked to raise the matter at the Security Council. On October 29, Nehru made an ambivalent statement to Reuter's diplomatic correspondent. Nehru was not inclined to treat the advance of the PLA into Eastern Tibet as an aggression, because the Chinese had been given the right under the "former agreements" to station garrisons at certain places in Eastern Tibet. He spoke of the Peking regime's genuine fear of US intentions to destroy it, a fear that had been aggravated by Washington's support of Chiang Kai-shek and the outbreak of the Korean

War. Significantly, Nehru ascribed the Chinese action partly to Soviet influence. Current Chinese policy, Reuter quoted Nehru as saying, "was perhaps partly attributable to the fact that although Peking's policy might not be directed by Moscow, much of the information upon which this policy was based came through Soviet sources. For example, Moscow had repeatedly said that Anglo-US 'intrigues' in Tibet aimed at bringing the country into an anti-Communist bloc or sphere of influence. However unfounded these accusations might be, Pandit Nehru wondered whether they might not have influenced the Chinese decision to move into Tibet."[23]

In September the Chinese accused India of expansionist designs in the Himalayas. Once again Tibet was linked with Bhutan. *People's Daily* spoke of an "international plot" in Tibet in which India was playing a part:

> The Nehru Government cannot deny that it has sent men to Lhasa. *The New York Times* reported from New Delhi on August 8th that the spokesman of the Indian Foreign Ministry announced that night that Bhutan had become a protectorate of India. Since the Nehru Government has announced its sovereignty over Bhutan and declared that Tibet had never recognized Chinese suzerainty, will it not declare suzerainty over Tibet? . . . The Nehru Government has no right to declare sovereignty over Bhutan. The United Nations should examine the matter.[24]

This was purely pressure tactics. By questioning India's new treaty relationship with Bhutan, China was trying to pressure India out of any intervention in Tibetan affairs. Nehru was trying to do the same. By holding on to India's inherited rights in Tibet, he was pressuring China to maintain Tibet as much as a traditional buffer as was possible in the changed circumstances.

India did not take the Tibetan question to the Security Council, but it did use its diplomatic machinery and its newly found rapport with Peking not merely to plead the cause of Tibet but also to *appear* in the eyes of the world as a power

with a sphere of influence in Tibet. Three Indian and two Chinese notes were exchanged in October, in addition to diplomatic discussion in New Delhi and Peking. A study of these notes offers an interesting clue to the minds of Nehru and Mao in tackling the first big South Asian power contest.[25] China stepped up military pressure when it found that the Tibetan mission in India was delaying its journey to Peking under the influence of "foreign powers." It would appear from one of the two Chinese notes that the Indian Government was informed of the decision to take military action "soon in West Sikang according to set plans" and was asked to hasten the departure of the Tibetan mission to Peking. In his preliminary talks with the mission, the Chinese envoy pressed its members to arrive in Peking *before the end of September.* The failure of the mission to do so aroused Peking's suspicion that it was acting under foreign encouragement. Although neither of the Chinese notes directly accused India of being responsible for the delaying tactics of the Tibetan mission, there was an implicit complaint that the Indian Government did not put enough pressure on the mission to proceed to Peking. The Chinese Government alleged that under cover of the delaying tactics, the Tibetan regime was building up armed resistance to the PLA.

India, in its first note on October 21, tried to persuade the Chinese Government to go slow in Tibet in the larger interest of the PRC itself. China, it said, "must be aware that opinion in the United Nations has been steadily veering round the admission of China into that organization before the close of the present session." Chinese military action in Tibet might frustrate the efforts of China's friends, India one of the foremost among them, at the UN. Since it was not likely that there would be serious opposition by the Tibetans to Chinese military action, China could very well act in caution. If India was interested in this, it was "only" because it wished to "see that the admission of the People's Government to the United Nations is not again postponed due to causes which could be avoided, and

further that, if possible, a peaceful solution is followed while military action may cause unrest and disturbance on her own borders." India's second note, on October 26, was prompted by newspaper reports of the official Chinese announcement that Units of the PLA had been ordered to advance into Tibet. India called this "the invasion of Tibet" and regarded it as "deplorable," all the more so because the Tibet mission had finally decided to repair to Peking and had already left Delhi on October 25. True, there had been a delay in the delegation's proceeding to Peking; the Indian Government, however, did not "believe that any foreign influences hostile to China have been responsible for the delay." Now that the "invasion" of Tibet had been ordered, the Tibetans would be naturally afraid that the negotiations in Peking "will be under duress."

The first Chinese note was brief. It made only two points: Tibet was an integral part of China, and the Tibetan problem "an entirely domestic problem of China." Whether the Chinese Government decided to liberate it by force or through peaceful means was nobody else's business. However, it had decided to give peaceful means a try and had waited for months for the Tibetan mission to arrive in Peking; it still had not abandoned the desire to proceed with peaceful negotiations. Tibet had nothing to do with the question of Chinese representation at the UN; these were "two entirely unrelated problems." If India found the Chinese action in Tibet deplorable, it must have been acting under "foreign influences hostile to China in Tibet."

India reacted strongly. In a note to Peking on October 31, it refused to advise the Tibetan delegation any longer to go to Peking "unless the Chinese military advance was halted and a chance given for peaceful talks." It explained what was its own perspective of a changed Sino-Tibetan relationship. The task was to "adjust" the "legitimate Tibetan claim to autonomy within the framework of Chinese suzerainty." (The Indian notes stuck to the word *suzerainty* while the Chinese notes used the word *sovereignty.)* Tibet's autonomy was "a fact," which the Chinese Government was reportedly willing to "recognize and foster."

In urging a peaceful solution, India was not interfering in Chinese internal affairs but merely rendering "well-meant advice" as a government friendly to China and interested in peaceful solution of problems near its own border. India had "no political or territorial ambitions in Tibet"; it did not seek any "novel privileged position for [itself] or for [its] nationals in Tibet." However, *India wished to hold on to what it had in Tibet:*

> At the same time . . . certain rights have grown out of usage and agreements which are natural among neighbors with close cultural and commercial relations. These relations have found expression in the presence of an agent of the Indian Government in Lhasa, existence of trade agencies at Gyantse and Yatung, and maintenance of post and telegraph offices at a trade route up to Gyantse. For the protection of this trade route, a small military escort has been sanctioned at Gyantse for over 40 years. *The Indian Government are anxious that these establishments, which are to the mutual interest of India and Tibet and do not detract in any way from Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, should continue.* Personnel at Lhasa mission and agencies at Gyantse and Yatung have been instructed to stay at their post.

India, in fact, was demanding a military and strategic presence in Tibet. The note implicitly regarded Tibet as a virtually separate entity and claimed that India's presence in Tibet would not conflict with Chinese suzerainty. Peking, in its reply, carefully parried this vital issue but laid down what in Chinese eyes was the fundamental yardstick to determine its relationship with the outside world. "The entry into Tibet of the Chinese People's Liberation Army is exactly aimed at the protection of the integrity of the territory and of the sovereignty of China. *And it is on this question that all those countries who wish to respect the territory and the sovereignty of China should first of all indicate their real attitude toward China."* The note reiterated that Tibet was China's internal problem and that China was entirely free to decide how to settle this problem; it gave reasons for ordering the PLA into Tibet. The Chinese Government, "in showing its friendship" with the Indian Government, and "in an understanding of the desire of the Indian Government to see

the problem of Tibet settled peacefully," had kept it informed of "its efforts in this direction." It was the Indian Government that was trying to make an international dispute out of a domestic issue in China.

## "TWO INDIAN TRENDS"

The PLA took twelve days to reach Chamdo, and there it halted its march. The Dalai Lama's delegation arrived in Peking in November, and the agreement on the peaceful liberation of Tibet was announced on May 23, 1951. Units of the PLA entered Lhasa on October 26, two days after the Dalai Lama cabled to Peking his formal approval of the May agreement. The promises and hazards of Sino-Indian relationship were, however, sketched in the last quarter of 1950. The Chinese found two different trends in India. One, represented by Nehru, was broadly progressive, keen on developing friendly relations with China and willing to play an anti-imperialist role in world affairs. Nehru himself was torn by the contradictions of his progressive concepts and his class relationship with the big bourgeois elements. The other trend in India, which revealed itself in the press and in Parliament and was well represented in the Nehru cabinet, was averse to trade Indian interests in Tibet for Chinese friendship and was apprehensive of Chinese influence in South and Southeast Asia. The Chinese Government, which was following within China the new-democratic strategy of a Communist-dominated united front with large sections of the national bourgeoisie, decided to cultivate the progressive Indian bourgeoisie. It was to this element in India that Chinese formulations were addressed in the last months of 1950. A typical appeal to India came from *People's China* in early November. China, it said,

> appreciates the fact that because of its proximity, India naturally desires to see peace reign in Tibet, but, equally, India should appreciate the fact that the speedy liberation

of Tibet from the orbit of imperialist intrigues will, in the first place, guarantee security and peace in Tibet. China is therefore reluctant to believe that India might lend herself to the sinister Anglo-American influence now working against the legitimate interests of the Chinese people. We cherish the friendship that has been developing with the Indian people who are also struggling for complete emancipation from imperialist intrigues. If China hopes and believes that India will not become, in regard to Tibet, a cat's paw of the Anglo-American imperialist bloc against China, it is because the Chinese people have faith in the value of the costly lessons that both peoples have learnt from the oppression of the imperialists.[26]

This was essentially part of the Maoist strategy in 1950–51 to build up a broad anti-imperialist front in Asia, a strategy that had been obliquely placed by the Chinese delegation at the 1949 WFTU conference in Peking. In 1949–50, India was still a dominion of the British Commonwealth; its foreign policy and external political and economic relations were mostly with Britain and other Commonwealth countries.[27] Nehru had visited Washington. The Soviets were regarding him as a stooge of imperialism and Indian independence as devoid of real content. Nehru was still to formulate, except in the most bare outlines, his philosophy of nonalignment. There was hardly any Socialist accent in the Indian Government's economic formulations. The Communists were waging an armed rebellion in Telengana. Against this general background the Chinese recognition of a section of the Indian bourgeoisie including Nehru as progressive and anti-imperialist was an ideological concession not without substance.

It is tempting to reflect briefly on the implications of this concession. Nehru had been an ardent admirer of the Soviet Union since the thirties; in fact, he was the first Congress leader to emotionally link the Indian freedom struggle with the worldwide movement against imperialism and for socialism. Even if he did not endorse everything that had happened in the USSR, there was little doubt in his mind that the Russians regarded

him as a leader of Asian resurgence. One could imagine his sorrow and surprise when he found, upon assuming the office of India's first prime minister, that the Soviets not only refused to recognize Indian independence as real but condemned him as a camp follower of imperialism. The Soviet attitude to India and Nehru in the late forties made it somewhat difficult for the Indian leader to maintain his image at home and abroad as a leader of progressive Asia. The peaceful transfer of power from Britain to India had been some kind of political arrangement between the British and the Indian leaders. Nehru was aware of the limitations of this arrangement; he was also from the beginning of independence under an ideological attack from the Indian left.

In 1950, Nehru got from Peking what he had failed to get from Moscow since 1947—recognition of Indian independence as a positive force, and of himself and his regime as a progressive element playing a constructive role for international peace and freedom. The Chinese approval of India as a progressive force soon led to a change in the Soviet stand, as we have already noted. Korea gave flesh and blood to Nehru's nonalignment and placed India squarely on the world diplomatic map. Nehru was now able to strengthen his grip on Indian economic development. Within India, he moved toward formulating the five-year plans with some Socialist rhetoric and toward land reforms; abroad, he acted to assemble a third force between the two opposing forces of socialism and capitalism and gave it the name of "nonalignment."

## CHINA AND PAKISTAN

It should be noted that in 1950–51 the Chinese Communist regime moved toward friendly relations with India and *not* Pakistan; the contrast with the first mutations of the Soviets' South Asia policy in the late forties is instructive. It is possible that Chou En-lai had learned from Moscow's experience, but there was perhaps more to it than merely avoiding the

mistake the Russians might have made. Panikkar has described in detail the cordiality with which he had been received in Peking as India's first ambassador to the People's Republic; he found Mao and Chou En-lai not only friendly but also eager to learn about internal developments in India.[28] In an unmistakable gesture of friendliness, Mao made a surprise appearance at an Indian Embassy reception. In contrast, when the Pakistani ambassador presented his credentials to Mao in November, 1951, the president of the Chinese People's Republic greeted him with the following chilly remark: "I have great pleasure in receiving the letter of credentials of the King of Great Britain, Ireland and British Dominions beyond the seas, presented by you."[29] Pakistan had not been overly hostile to the People's Republic. Its establishment had been welcomed in that country. "As Asia gains in political importance internationally, Pakistan will also share it," was a typical editorial comment in *Dawn*.[30] Pakistan had been quick in recognizing the Communist regime; the Pakistani press had been critical of American nonrecognition. Pakistan had been one of the first champions of the People's Republic's claim to the China seat at the UN.[31] During the Korean War, it had abstained from voting on the resolution branding China the aggressor; it had refused to support the economic blockade. And yet toward the end of 1951, Mao treated the first envoy from Pakistan as an appointee of the King of Great Britain! Mao of course did not preclude the development of state relations between China and Pakistan. The first bilateral trade agreement was signed in 1951, and cultural relations were quickly established. In 1953 the Chinese Government even suggested Pakistan as a participant in the Korean political conference,[32] perhaps in a subtle move to draw the country into the orbit of nonalignment. But at mid century the Chinese Communist leaders left no doubt in anyone's mind that they regarded India, its leadership and its freedom movement, as a positive force against imperialism and for peace.

## QUID PRO QUO IN SOUTH HIMALAYA

We have to reconstruct the first Sino-Indian confrontation over Tibet because Tibet remains the crux of the relationship between Asia's two largest neighbors. The absorption of Tibet in the Chinese state brought China and India face to face along a frontier of 2,500 miles. With little or none of this border formally delimited and marked on the ground, and much of it determined by treaties and conventions that do not bear the signature of the Chinese Government, border disputes and even clashes between the two neighbors were inevitable. If these disputes could not be mutually settled and the clashes kept within the confines of the many undesirables that mark normal relations between nations and have to be lived with, it is because the power aspirations and interests of both China and India stretching beyond the frontiers of either country were also in conflict. The Chinese Communists, in their maiden perspective of South Asia, were primarily concerned with expanding the effective writ of Peking to the southernmost borders of Tibet; fearing Indian resistance, they questioned India's special relationship with Bhutan and accused India of harboring expansionist intensions with the backing of the imperialist powers. India, while trying to avoid a military conflict with China, wanted to maintain a military and economic presence in Tibet. At the same time, in anticipation of Tibet's passing under effective control of Peking, India hastily extended its hegemony over the rest of the south Himalayan region. In the years of internal consolidation, both countries were willing to come to a satisfactory arrangement, and it would seem that both sides made important concessions. India withdrew its presence from Tibet. In 1954, under the agreement covering trade between Tibet and India, the Indian military escorts hitherto stationed at Yatung and Gyantse were withdrawn; as a gesture of goodwill India returned to China all the buildings and land it once used to occupy and own, and

the postal, telegraph, and telephone installations it was operating in Tibet, some of these without compensation. India also agreed to withdraw its consulate at Kashghar, in Sinkiang, when the Chinese Government decided not to allow any country to maintain consulates in Sinkiang. Defending these concessions, Nehru told Parliament in 1954, "The British empire in the days of Lord Curzon about 50 years ago had expanded into, and made several types of arrangements in, Tibet. Now it is impossible and *improper* for us to continue any such arrangements as the British empire had established."[33] In 1950, India had demanded continuance of the same arrangements. Nehru's anti-imperialism had been sharpened by his friendly contacts with the Chinese Communists.

What concessions did Peking make? We have already mentioned the ideological approval of India. Peking gave a tacit approval also of India's special relations with Bhutan and Sikkim and did not question the unilateral placing of Nepal within the Indian defense orbit. Furthermore, Peking also conceded the *appearance* of an Indian interest in Tibet, as long as India was a friendly neighbor and regarded Chinese sovereignty over Tibet as final. In other words, the Sino-Indian accord between 1951 and 1954 led to an *unwritten agreement* on mutual interests in the Himalayas. It is possible that Peking made the concession to India because of the political difficulties it was facing in Tibet, because it knew that Tibet was not fit for Communist reconstruction and that the warlike Khampas were not to be easily tamed. It may be that their political strategy for Tibet happened to coincide happily with prevailing Indian sentiments. However, the fact remains that in the fifties, Peking was in search of friendship. At the Asian and Pacific Peace Conference in Peking in October, 1952, the Chinese leaders proclaimed a new line of peaceful coexistence; the conference called for a negotiated settlement of the fighting in Indo-China and Korea. At the Geneva Conference in 1964, Chou En-lai played a softer role than the Soviets, and it was largely through his efforts that the Hanoi delegation was persuaded to accept

the partition of Vietnam across the 17th parallel. Encouraged by Krishna Menon's reports from Geneva on Chou En-lai's diplomacy, Nehru extended an invitation to the Chinese premier to halt in New Delhi on his way back to Peking.[34] The Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet had already been concluded, incorporating the five principles of peaceful coexistence, and Chou found India and Burma (which, too, he visited) responsive to the new image of China. In New Delhi he gave a clear formulation of the policy of peaceful coexistence:

> All the nations of the world can peacefully co-exist, no matter whether they are big or small, strong or weak, and no matter what kind of social system each one of them has. The rights of the people of each nation to national independence and self-determination must be respected. The people of each nation have the right to choose their own system without interference from other nations. Revolutions cannot be exported; at the same time, outside interference with the common will expressed by the people of any nation should not be permitted. If all the nations of the world would put their mutual relations on the basis of these principles, intimidation and aggression by one nation against another would not happen and peaceful co-existence of all nations of the world would be turned from a possibility into a reality.[35]

Then in 1955 came Bandung, where Chou En-lai stole the limelight by projecting the image of a China which was ready to settle its differences with all countries by peaceful negotiations. Its neighbors had nothing to fear from it: the Chinese Government was willing to settle reasonably not only border problems but also problems arising out of the dual citizenship of the overseas Chinese. At Bandung, Chou En-lai plunged into a series of active diplomatic engagements. He signed an agreement with the Indonesian Government to settle the dual citizenship problem of Chinese nationals living in that country. His talks with Nasser led to Egyptian recognition of the People's Republic; within two years China was able to set up a major political base in Cairo. Of considerable significance

were Chou's conversations with the prime minister of Pakistan, Mohammed Ali Bogra. He listened to, and accepted, Bogra's explanation of Pakistan's membership in SEATO and the Baghdad Pact and offered Pakistan close relations with China in spite of its military alliance with the United States. Chou En-lai offered the olive branch to America: Peking, he announced, was willing to enter into negotiations with Washington to settle the Taiwan question peacefully. Next year, Chou paid his first—and to date last—extensive official visit to India. Tibet was then passing through a difficult time; the rebellion that finally broke out in 1959 actually began to fester in 1956. The Dalai Lama was visiting India; he was reluctant to return to Lhasa. Chou discussed the Tibet problem with Nehru and took advantage of Nehru's successful effort to persuade the Dalai Lama to return to his office in Tibet. Once again the Chinese Government tacitly acknowledged an Indian influence in Tibet. However, although Chou's explanation of the technique of social change Peking had devised for Tibet, in consonance with the character of Tibetan society and realities of the Tibetan situation, appeared to Nehru to be satisfactory from the Indian point of view, Nehru was not given, nor did he ask for, any understanding that the pace or style of social transformation in Tibet would follow any particular norm. In other words, the basic Chinese position seemed to be that as long as India remained a friendly neighbor, in the anti-imperialist camp, and noninterfering in Tibetan affairs, Peking would go some length to respect Indian sentiments about Tibet.

## CHINA'S BORDER POLICY

The Nehru-Chou meeting in 1956 probably brought out some of the strains inherent in Sino-Indian relations. Our insight into these talks is limited because the minutes are still secret, except for one single paragraph released by Nehru. We know that the border question *was* raised; Chou's attention was drawn to certain maps published in China; his reply was that they were old maps without much meaning and that the Chinese

Government had not had time to look into the frontier question. What was probably more nearly correct was that Peking was not prepared to take up the border issue until the situation in Tibet had been brought completely under control. Chou agreed to respect India's "proper" relations with Bhutan. However, he was not ready to endorse the Soviet support for the Indian position on Kashmir; on the contrary, while on a visit to Pakistan, he came very near to supporting the Pakistani demand that the future of Kashmir be decided in a free plebiscite. If Chou's noncommital attitude toward Kashmir meant anything, it was that the Chinese were geopolitically interested in the territory.

India, however, had already had a glimpse of the Chinese Government's general attitude to the border question, when, in 1953, a Chinese atlas had made the point that the Sino-Burmese border problem "awaits the establishment of a People's Burma and the final victory of the Asian people's revolution; then they can receive a complete and reasonable solution."[36] In 1956, serious talks on the Sino-Burmese border began between U Nu and Chou En-lai; the Chinese premier announced to the National People's Congress in Peking that except for relatively minor points involving three villages near the Hpimaw Pass, China would accept the Anglo-Burmese version of the frontier. Unfortunately Nehru drew wrong conclusions from the Chinese statement. The Chinese position on the frontier with all neighbors was basically twofold: in the first place, there must be a formal, if somewhat metaphysical, accord that the existing frontier is a "left over" of the colonial past and therefore not to be upheld; secondly, if the neighbor is a friendly country, the Chinese would go very far in settling the border mostly on the existing line, but with modifications, wherever necessary, to mutual advantage and satisfaction. The first postulate is political, and to the Chinese Communists extremely valuable and important. In it they find not merely a vindication of China's national honor, the washing out of the humiliations of the colonial era, it also conforms to the tradi-

tional Chinese concept of law which is mainly ethical and based on good conduct. The border treaties the Chinese Government has signed—with Burma, Nepal, Mongolia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan—have been mostly on the "customary frontier line," the phrase that Chou En-lai used in 1956 for the northern sector of the Sino-Burmese border. But in each case, they insisted on a formal or tacit repudiation of the frontier imposed on China by Britain (or any other imperial power). One of the main reasons why the Sino-Indian border issue could not be resolved in the fifties was that India stood firmly from the beginning by the treaties and conventions signed by the British with the Tibetan authorities in Lhasa.

The problem was not so much with the border dispute as with Tibet and with the foundations of Sino-Indian relations. The prolonged negotiations for the 1954 agreement gave India enough knowledge of the Chinese anxiety to insulate Tibet from outside influence; both negotiating teams also knew that they were dealing with a frontier only vaguely and impressionistically known to either Government. In the latter fifties the Chinese were never without trouble in Tibet, as the Indians were never without trouble in Nagaland; moreover, Peking was also trying to consolidate its rule in Sinkiang. The small border incidents that took place between 1954 and 1958—for which it is difficult to place precisely the origin of immediate provocations—were obviously the result of forward probings from both sides. There is, however, independent evidence to suggest that prior to the uprising of early 1959, the Chinese were trying to implement the go-slow, mildly radical program of reforms of which Chou had given an outline to Nehru in 1956. C. L. Sulzberger reported in *The New York Times* in February, 1955, that China had fewer than thirty-thousand troops in Tibet and that these were being used mainly to construct the first highways and roads in Tibetan history. The Chinese military headquarters had been pulled forty miles out of Lhasa. The administration had been left in the hands of the Kashag, or cabinet, and the Dalai Lama, who had made "several declara-

tions favorable to the Communist regime," was still recognized as the "supreme temporal and ecclesiastical real power." It was a "mild and polite government," Sulzberger went on to report, and the Chinese troops "have behaved in an exemplary fashion," building schools, repairing and subsidizing monasteries, and treating the rebel elements generously.[37] *The Times of* London confirmed in May that the Chinese were "handling Tibetan susceptibilities very carefully."[38] The preparatory committee to finalize an autonomous status for Tibet within the Chinese People's Republic was installed in Lhasa on April 23, 1956, with the Dalai Lama as chairman.

## THE 1959 REBELLION

Probably the very mellowness of the Tibetan reconstruction brought about the massive uprising in 1959. A section of the Indian elite had not reconciled itself to Tibet's being a part of the Chinese People's Republic. Now, with the outbreak of the rebellion, Tibet became a *cause célèbre* among liberal intellectuals in India. Influential voices in Parliament proclaimed the strangulation of Tibet by the Hans, and the Indian press raised protests of anger and indignation. Much of the history of the rebellion and its aftermath is known and has been discussed from various angles. At this remove from the passions and prejudices of the time, it is, however, possible to see the event in a somewhat cool and detached perspective. As far as the Chinese were concerned, a rebellion by reactionary elements had broken out in a part of their own territory, and they had the unquestionable right to deal with it as they deemed best. They did not view without annoyance and suspicion the escape of the Dalai Lama to India with his entourage, which included most of his cabinet members. Peking, however, did not officially object to the granting of asylum to the Dalai Lama in India. What it did object to was the *political* importance India was giving the Dalai Lama and the rebellion in Tibet, and to the championship by sections of the Indian elite

of Tibet's right to independence and self-determination. They objected to the use of Kalimpong by the Tibetan refugees and their supporters. They took serious note of the Afro-Asian conference organized by some Indians in New Delhi to mobilize support for Tibetan independence. They were alarmed by the pressure brought upon Nehru in Parliament, in the press, and by various organized pressure groups to raise the Tibet issue at the United Nations. For the Chinese, India was about to nullify the foundation of Sino-Indian friendship by interfering in China's internal affairs.

The Chinese leaders, however, still made a distinction between various sections of the Indian bourgeoisie and still regarded Nehru as a friend of China and a respected leader of progressive forces in Asia and Africa. The Chinese press printed the text of at least two of Nehru's many long statements on Tibet. They took note of Nehru's refusal to confuse India's humanistic concern over the plight of large numbers of Tibetans with challenging the question of Tibet's being an integral part of China. They took note of Nehru's refusal to raise the Tibet issue at the UN, of his categorical statement in Parliament that "it would be wrong to say that this stress on autonomy [for Tibet] was included [in the 1954 agreement] because of our pressure and our desire. . . . So, it is not correct to say that they gave us an assurance which they broke later."[39] They noted Nehru's somewhat belated (owing, most probably, to ignorance) admission of the existence of espionage activity in Kalimpong and the actions the Government took against elements that might have been helping the Tibetan rebels from the hill town. The Chinese were aware of some of the contradictions in Nehru's reaction to the Tibetan uprising and in his perception of it, contradictions that Nehru himself admitted in a parliamentary statement.[40] They resented the manner in which Nehru treated the Dalai Lama, allowing him to meet newsmen, foreign diplomats, and Indian dignitaries.[41] Nevertheless, Chou En-lai stated on April 18, 1959, "We are grateful to India and the great and friendly Premier Nehru for

issuing a statement that his country will not interfere in China's internal affairs, and that India will strengthen friendly Chinese-Indian relations though the Dalai Lama has been taken there by counter-revolutionary elements." And perhaps the most eloquent praise of Indian economic progress by any leading Chinese Communist—Peking had been very cautious so far in praising the internal policies of the Nehru Government, another sharp contrast between Chinese and Soviet perspective of the Indian regime—came at the beginning of 1959 from no less a man than Ch'en Yi:

> During the last nine years the Republic of India, under the leadership of Prime Minister Nehru, has made tremendous progress in building up the country and developing its national economy. Three years ago India completed its first Five Year Plan. The Indian Government was now adopting many positive measures to realize its second Five Year Plan. Prime Minister Nehru has recently put forward the target of doubling India's production in seven years. This is inspiring news. The Chinese Government and people have been following India's economic construction with great interest and wholeheartedly wish it success. We have always held that a politically independent and economically powerful India will make still greater contribution to the peace of Asia and the world.[42]

If the Chinese were more than anxious in 1959 to cultivate the progressive elements in the Indian bourgeoisie and particularly Nehru, they also took an alarmist view of others who wanted to reverse the Indian policy on Tibet. *People's Daily* spoke of "some people with high power in India" who "mistakenly believe that this is the time to exert pressure on China by attacking China with the Tibetan independence scheme."[43] The New China News Agency quoted a member of the People's National Congress asking the question: "If the rebellion has no connection with the Indian expansionists, why are certain Indian political figures so sympathetic to the traitorous crimes of the Tibetan reactionary clique?"[44] The Peking newspaper *Ta Kung Pao* was worried that there might be an Indian plan

to take Tibet "out of Chinese territory and make it a vassal state of India."[45] The over-all Chinese stance on India in 1959 was therefore a mixture of fear, anxiety, indignation, resentment, and friendship; beneath all this there was a firmness not to allow the Chinese grip of Tibet to be loosened in any way.

## HINT OF CONFRONTATION

Tibet and the Sino-Indian frontier put China-India relationship in 1958–59 to an acid test, and the Chinese Government took the opportunity created by the crisis to spell out, in terms more palpable than *Panchsheel*, the conditions for friendly coexistence. This was done with extraordinary forthrightness, although the long-term significance of some of the Chinese formulations of early 1959 were not grasped in India and in other countries till much later. On March 10 the Chinese ambassador, Pan Tzu-li, visited the Indian Foreign Office and read in an excited, trembling voice a statement widely off the limits of diplomatic politeness and decorum; he even thumped the table of a dazed and shaken Indian foreign secretary while addressing an appeal to the Indian people. Yet what he said was of far-reaching import. China's "main attention and policy of struggle" was riveted on the vast Pacific region and on the United States and "not to India or any other country in Southeast or South Asia." That is why China had not treated as its "principal enemy" countries like Thailand and Pakistan that had joined SEATO; "our principal enemy is US imperialism." The envoy went on: "China will not be so foolish as to antagonize the United States in the east and again to antagonize India in the west. . . . We cannot have two centres of attention, nor can we take friend for foe. This is our State policy." Afterwards, towards the end of the statement, came this significant warning: *"It seems to us that you too cannot have two fronts."*[46] India's first front was with Pakistan, which was negotiating a larger and less ambiguous military pact with the United States. Could India afford to have a second front of hostility with China?

The second significant Chinese formulation that had an ominous geopolitical rhetoric came in the first comprehensive thesis on India to be composed in China—a document entitled *The Revolution in Tibet and Nehru's Philosophy,* written by the editorial department of *People's Daily* and published on May 4, 1959. Granting India's historical kinship with Tibetan culture, the article spelled out in concrete terms how China could, if it chose, intervene in India's domestic affairs under similar reasoning:

> This kind of logic is fraught with danger, because if such logic can stand, then when Tibet has taken the road of democracy and socialism, the road of strength and prosperity, could not a "people's committee to support Assam" and a "committee for Uttar Pradesh affairs" be set up to interfere in the affairs of India's State of Assam or Uttar Pradesh under the pretext of ancient religious and cultural ties? Could not the Government of the Autonomous Region of Tibet or the Government of China as a whole declare deep sympathy with the people of Assam or Uttar Pradesh as a basic policy and in pursuance of such a policy find fault with this and that in the affairs of these States? If the Indian Government can demand certain assurances from the Chinese Government on the grounds of deep sympathy and ancient links with the Tibetan people, could it not, on the grounds of deep sympathy and ancient links with all the people of China, make the outright demand for certain assurances from the Chinese Government as regards all its internal affairs? Similarly, could not the Chinese Government, also on grounds of deep sympathy and ancient links with the Indian people, demand certain assurances from the Indian Government as regards its internal affairs?[47]

Explicit in this formulation was the polite warning of what a strong and developed Tibet could do to foment and foster trouble in the adjoining Indian states of Assam and Uttar Pradesh and how potentially enormous was China's ability to interfere in India's internal affairs.[48] The formulation also implied the importance for India to accept, once and for all,

Chinese sovereignty over Tibet and to work out with Peking a peaceful, demarcated border on the basis of clear recognition of mutual interests.

The *People's Daily* thesis was important for several other reasons too. In many ways it was a warning to Khrushchev that his India policy was bound to fail because it was anchored on a mistaken class interpretation of the Indian situation or on no class interpretation at all, which made it worse. The Indian big bourgeoisie, said the *People's Daily* article, "maintains innumerable links with imperialism and is, to a certain extent, dependent on foreign capital." With this ideological formulation, the Soviets, even in 1959, would not quarrel. But the Chinese also saw in the Indian big bourgeoisis, "a certain urge for outward expansion"; that is why it combined with opposition to imperialist intervention "certain influences of imperialist policy of intervention." Also, "for historical reasons, India's big bourgeoisie has inherited and is attempting to maintain a certain legacy from the British colonialist rulers." This description of the Indian ruling class was obviously meant for the ears of India's other, lesser, neighbors. The Chinese, of course, still believed Nehru to be different; he was a genuine friend of China; he had tried "more than once" to exert a restraining influence on the anti-China, expansionist elements within his own party and outside, although at times he himself lapsed into utterances removed from "truth and propriety." His "deplorable error" was his assertion that a majority of the Tibetan people sympathized with the uprising. Nehru was "one of the statesmen who enjoy prestige in the world." He had a somewhat progressive outlook, but he lacked scientific knowledge of history and had been "involuntarily" pushed by the imperialist alliance "into an important role" of cultivating world support for the Tibetan crisis. *People's Daily* was, in effect, warning Nehru that his progressivism was on trial. It also spelled out, almost for the last time, the precise conditions under which China and India could live as friendly neighbors.

## BORDER DISPUTE

The border dispute took on a serious aspect because the Chinese did not find in India complete and final acceptance of Tibet as an integral part of the People's Republic, in whose internal affairs no Indian Government or organized group would interfere. In 1956, Nehru had, as we have noted, raised the border question with Chou En-lai. The Chinese Premier's stand, as explained at a news conference, was not dissimilar from the position Peking had taken on the Sino-Burmese border issue. He assured Nehru that although China did not recognize the MacMahon Line, it would respect that line in deference to Sino-Indian friendship.[49] Chou saw a difference in the *political* situation in Asia in China's growing friendship with India and Burma. The two prime ministers agreed to a joint investigation and study of the border situation at Wu-je, in the middle sector; the 1958 accord on neutralization was based on this study, and the Chinese did withdraw their military post from the area. Another strategy to solve the border problem was also suggested by the Chinese: to separate the three sectors—northwest, middle and northeast—and tackle them one by one. Chou made it quite clear in 1956 that China was vitally interested in the northwestern sector, where it had built a strategic highway in the early fifties, without Indian knowledge, linking Tibet with Sinkiang through the Aksai Chin salient of Ladakh, which India claimed to be its own territory.

It is somewhat surprising that Nehru did not pursue this strategy in the period of 1956–58, when there were practically no border incidents to complicate the controversy. A major incident took place in the Ladakh portion of the frontier in the summer of 1958. Suspecting fresh Chinese road-building activity in the Aksai Chin and the adjacent area, India sent out a patrol; one of the groups was arrested by the Chinese. The protest notes that followed showed that the Chinese had taken a firm position on this part of the frontier compared to

their flexible and mellower stand on the two others. They did not return the captured Indian personnel for six weeks. In July the Chinese captured the Khurnak Fort in Ladakh. To make matters worse, *China Pictorial* published a map in late 1958 showing large portions of Indian territory as well as part of Bhutan as Chinese.

## CHINA READY TO TRADE

Nehru drew Chou En-lai's attention to this cartographical expansionism in a personal letter in December. Chou's reply, dated January 23, 1959, for the first time offered an integrated Chinese stance on the border issue. The Sino-Indian border had "never been formally delimited"; it was defined by "no treaty or agreement." If the Chinese maps had raised concern in India so had the Indian maps in China. "As a matter of fact, our people have also expressed surprise at the way the Sino-Indian boundary, *particularly its western sector,* is drawn on maps published in India. They have asked our Government to take up this matter with the Indian Government" (italics added). If Nehru was willing to make minor adjustments to the border, so was China. "We do not hold that every portion of this boundary line is drawn on sufficient ground," said Chou in referring to the Chinese maps. What was needed was a negotiated settlement between India and China. The Chinese Premier once again implicitly offered an exchange of concessions on the western and eastern sectors. China's main concern was with "an area in the southern part of China's Sinkiang-Uighur Autonomous Region, which has always been under Chinese jurisdiction. Patrol duties have continually been carried out in that area by the border guards of the Chinese Government. And the Sinkiang-Tibet highway built by our country in 1956 runs through that area." With regard to the MacMahon Line, Chou said that although it was a "product of British policy or aggression against the Tibet region of China," and "cannot [therefore] be considered legal," the Chinese Government could not but recognize "great and encouraging changes: India and Burma, which are concerned in this line, have attained

independence successively and become states friendly to China." In view of the "various complex facts," China "finds it necessary to take a more or less realistic attitude towards the MacMahon Line. . . ."[50] This was an implicit trade offer: if India took a realistic line on the western sector, China would be willing to reciprocate on the eastern sector. Pending such a business agreement, Chou proposed maintenance of the *status quo* by either side and joint consultations on specific issues like the dispute over Wu-je. Nehru accepted this suggestion in a letter in March and apparently made a confession of his embarrassing position in relation to his countrymen. "It was in the confidence that the general question of our common frontier was settled to the satisfaction of both sides that I declared publicly and in Parliament on several occasions that there is no room for doubt about our frontiers as shown in the published maps. We thought that our position was clearly understood and accepted by your Government."[51] Having stated —to the Indian people and the Indian Parliament—that there was no major border controversy and that the Indian maps were more or less sacrosanct, Nehru was obviously under compulsion to defend his position. What is not clear is on what concrete ground he had convinced himself that the Indian position had been accepted by the Chinese. However, in view of the position Nehru had already taken publicly, he needed time to school the Indian people into recognition of a viable Chinese claim to Aksai Chin. Unfortunately, time was denied the Indian Prime Minister. The uprising in Tibet shook the entire structure of the Sino-Indian relationship and seriously eroded the fragile fabric of a two-thousand-year-old friendship.

In the summer of 1959, Nehru was apparently trying to respond positively to Chou En-lai's January suggestion to isolate the western sector of the border (the Chinese had by now built a second strategic highway across Aksai Chin, considerably below the first one) and acknowledge the existence of a dispute there. Unfortunately, secret diplomacy was now made impossible by uproars in the Indian Parliament over leaked-out stories of

Chinese intrusions into Indian territory. Nehru had to disclose the fact of Chinese intrusions in Ladakh since 1956, the building of the Gartok-Yarkand road through Aksai Chin, the detention of Indian patrols by the Chinese. The reaction in Parliament and among the public was predictable. Nevertheless, Nehru tried repeatedly to impress upon his countrymen that the frontier in Ladakh was different from the MacMahon Line. "In all this area [Ladakh] there is no actual demarcation. . . . I may say that this area has nothing to do with the MacMahon Line. . . . There are other parts [of the border] regarding which it is rather difficult to say where the immediate border is. . . . If he [an Opposition member] is referring to this particular corner [Aksai Chin] . . . it is not quite clear what the position is. . . . Let us take them [the various sectors of the border] separately so that they may be separate compartments."[52] A series of relatively major incidents in the eastern sector in August, in one of which the Chinese used force, made Nehru's position very difficult. The Chinese overran a few Indian posts including Longju. To an articulate section of the Indian elite the recently disclosed incidents in Ladakh and the incidents along the MacMahon Line were parts of an integrated, total Chinese threat to India's territorial integrity; this is how it was presented in the press and in Parliament. On August 28, while facing up to a volley of questions about the latter incidents, Nehru did not separate the Ladakh border from the MacMahon Line although he offered to "sit round a conference table" and settle minor differences. However, in a memorandum to Peking on September 9, the Indian Government dealt mainly with the eastern sector of the boundary, offering mutual disengagement, and discussion of the alignment of the MacMahon Line at one of the disputed points.

The Indian position on the border dispute received rather unexpected support from the Soviet Union in September, 1959, as we have already noted. Leaving for the next chapter more details of the diplomatic efforts made by the Chinese Government to stop the Soviet leaders from releasing the Tass state-

ment, what we have to stress here is that the Soviet support persuaded Nehru that no flexibility in his basic stand on the border was called for. It was, as Nehru told newsmen, an "unusual" statement for the Soviet Government to issue.[53] Further evidence of Soviet nonsupport for China was immediately forthcoming. The Soviet press published *both* Indian and Chinese versions of the border incidents and issues. Earlier, during the Tibetan uprising, the Soviet press had generally kept out Chinese allegations of Indian complicity in the rebellion, thus giving the impression that Moscow regarded an Indian interest in Tibet to be somewhat legitimate.

It was the Soviet intervention on Indian behalf that immediately hardened the Chinese position on the border dispute. Writing to Nehru on September 8, Chou En-lai virtually withdrew the earlier offer to recognize the reality of the MacMahon Line. China now claimed the entire area of the Northeast Frontier Agency, which, as Chou pointed out, was as large as the Chekiang province of China: "How could China agree to accept under coercion such an illegal line that would have it relinquish its right and disgrace itself by selling out its territory —and such a large piece of territory at that?" (Chou was, in fact, replying to some of the Soviet arguments against the Chinese stance on the border, as we shall see later in these pages.) Nor was there any suggestion that Aksai Chin could be bartered with the MacMahon Line. Chou even questioned India's right to discuss with China the boundaries of Bhutan and Sikkim.[54]

A discussion of the merits of the Indian and Chinese claims to the border areas is outside the scope of this volume. However, it should be pointed out that scholars who have gone into the juridical aspects of the Sino-Indian border dispute have disagreed on the relative merit of the Indian and Chinese cases. In their joint study of the Ladakh sector of the border, Margaret Fisher, Leo Rose, and Robert A. Huttenbeck found that "once documents were assembled . . . it was quite clear that the Indian case was not only far stronger than the Chinese,

but also possessed a solid basis quite apart from any question of 'British imperialism'; and any tendency to be apologetic about the Indian position has completely disappeared."[55] On the other hand, Alastair Lamb, in a study undertaken on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Relations, takes a very different view of the Ladakh sector. He places Aksai Chin beyond Indian territory.[56] It is interesting that the Chinese have taken a softer stand on the MacMahon Line, where their legal position is relatively strong. The basic difference between the Indian and Chinese position is that while the Indian case rests on legal evidence, the Chinese want a political settlement; hence their rejection of Indian suggestions of arbitration and adjudication.[57] As Dick Wilson, former editor of *Far Eastern Economic Weekly* and a keen student of the Sino-Indian border dispute has put it: "You can argue about treaty rights and whether eccentric British tourists went this way or that way in 1846 or whether a tribe paid more tribute to Lhasa than to Darjeeling—but in the end you can reach agreement on your border by making a joint *decision*, possibly an arbitrary one incorporating a little horse-trading. You have to reconcile not only history, geography, strategic interests and the convenience of local inhabitants, but also public opinion in your respective capitals. The Pakistanis, Nepalese and Burmese have now done this with China, and it is greatly to be regretted that the Indians and Chinese were never able to proceed to this stage of the border agreement."[58]

An attempt at horsetrading was almost made by India during Chou En-lai's visit to New Delhi in 1960. He came to a very different New Delhi where there were no crowds to welcome him, and his conversations with the Indian leaders were chilly. A biographer of Krishna Menon has given details of the then Indian Defense Minister's effort to persuade Nehru to trade Aksai Chin with the MacMahon Line with mutual compensations to keep each other's face as well as vital interests. It is stated that

> Menon read the Chinese mind, correctly as it turned out, that China's main interest lay in the Aksai Chin salient of Ladakh,

which India never physically possessed any way. He also knew that if India adopted an unflexible attitude in Ladakh, China might mount military pressure in the North-East Frontier Agency which was valuable to India and "nibble away areas in the dark. . . ."

Menon conveyed his analysis of the situation to the Cabinet and suggested a political deal with China which would be in line with international practice—and this was more important—would help India gain time to complete her development plans. The suggestion was to lease to China the Aksai Chin salient. In return China would lease to India the narrow strip of Chinese territory projecting into India between Sikkim and Bhutan. This was a strategically important territory. Menon prepared his case thoroughly and collected a long list of instances of similar international lease arrangements in history.

Chou En-lai came to Delhi in April 1960 to discuss the border dispute and Nehru agreed to place before him the Menon formula. In order to avoid public controversy that was bound to follow if he put forth the idea as his own, Menon kept out of the talks with the Chinese Premier; another cabinet minister was nominated as the principal Indian negotiator.

Chou En-lai seemed willing to accept the plan and to give India some Chinese territory in return for the Aksai Chin area. But before the plan could be seriously discussed with the Chinese Premier, it was torpedoed by the combined efforts of two of the most senior members of the Cabinet. One of them, the late Govind Vallabh Pant, sat in his bathroom and carried on a dialogue while Nehru stood outside the door. The gist of the conversation was that Pant would revolt and resign if Nehru agreed to the lease idea. The other Cabinet minister met Chou En-lai and started riling him with talk of Chinese stupidity and India's moral grandeur. So offended was the Chinese leader that he walked out of the room and started talking in terms of "taking revenge on India."[59]

## SIGNAL TO PAKISTAN

The only small gain of the Nehru-Chou talks were the mutual agreements to demilitarize Longju and keep it as a kind of no-man's land, to avoid armed clashes along the frontier, and

to refer the border dispute to joint teams of officials for further study.[60] When these teams met in June and September, it was found that the Chinese approach was mainly political and the Indian almost strictly juridical. The work of the officials could only complete the deadlock in the absence of a willingness of the two governments to come to a compromise; here again the rigidity of the Indian position perhaps proved to be a greater obstacle to a possible settlement. However, the Chinese deliberately chose the meeting of the officials for extending the political dimension of the frontier dispute. They refused to discuss the frontier of Azad Kashmir—the one third of the state under Pakistani rule—with Sinkiang, a signal that Rawalpindi was quick to pick up. The Chinese had made a cartographical claim to part of the territory regarded by Pakistan as its own in the undemarcated border area of Gilgit and Sinkiang.[61] This had, however, been enough to alert the Ayub Khan regime of the danger that might be lying ahead. In October, 1959, the governor of West Pakistan had made a personal tour of the border area, and a decision was taken to build an all-weather road connecting Gilgit with West Pakistan.[62] The Pakistan Government had also started collecting legal evidence to prove its claim to the disputed territory. Peking, however, did not register a formal claim, and no Chinese patrols infiltrated the disputed area.[63] On October 23, President Ayub Khan disclosed his intention to approach China for a peaceful settlement of the northern border and its physical demarcation. In November, *Dawn* reported that negotiations on the border had started between Pakistan and China on the former's initiative. The newspaper said, "In case China showed encouraging response to Pakistan's desire for settling the boundary line between Sinkiang and northern reaches of Gilgit, ranking statesmen of the two countries may eventually meet to lay down principles for specific demarcation of the boundary. . . ."[64]

The Chinese refusal in 1960 to discuss with Indian officials the boundary between China and the Pakistan-occupied part of Kashmir was the first move on Peking's part to bring Pakis-

tan into the Sino-Indian border dispute. Or so it was construed in India. The Pakistan Government, however, saw it in a very different way. In 1959, Ayub Khan had proposed joint India-Pakistan defense of the subcontinent against Chinese aggression. Unlike previous Pakistani rulers, he did not make a settlement of the Kashmir issue a precondition of joint defense. What he asked for was that India and Pakistan should establish a joint machinery to settle the Kashmir question and that the recommendations of this body should be faithfully implemented. Nehru rejected the proposal, assuring the Pakistan President that India's relations with the People's Republic were quite friendly.[65] In the absence of joint defense arrangements with India, and in view of the deadlock in Sino-Indian border talks, it was not unexpected of the Pakistan Government to approach Peking for a settlement of the border between Gilgit and Sinkiang. This approach was made in 1960. What is important is that the Chinese Government did not reject the approach. It went slow on the actual settlement of the Sino-Pakistan border. In 1960, Peking apparently wanted to warn India of what would follow if the latter continued to reject a political settlement of the border.

China had of course kept its option of friendship with Pakistan open since Bandung. In other words, unlike the Soviet Union, it had not made India's enemy its own enemy. Or perhaps it would be more correct to say that while the Soviets had failed to reconcile their friendship with India with an open-door policy for Pakistan (we saw in the last chapter how they continued to woo Pakistan from time to time during the fifties, without much success), China had succeeded in keeping its relations with Pakistan fairly free of strains. Pakistan's membership in SEATO and CENTO was not condemned in the Chinese press, nor was a very condemnatory view taken of its military alliance with the United States. At Bandung, Chou En-lai invited Mohammed Ali Bogra to visit China, neither he nor the next Pakistani prime minister was, however, able to go. The visit was made in October, 1956, by

H. S. Suhrawardy and on that occasion Chou En-lai made the rather indulgent statement that "although Pakistan was a member of SEATO, since its Government and people had expressed friendliness for China, there was no reason why China could not be friendly with Pakistan." This was part of the then prevailing Chinese foreign policy of friendly coexistence with as many countries as possible. The only occasion when the Chinese were strongly critical of Pakistan was in 1958–59 when the military regime came to power, and Ayub Khan combined his bid for a more effective and pervasive military relationship with the United States with his attempt to enter into a joint defensive agreement with India.[66] Chinese criticism was muted as soon as the joint defense proposal fell through. Even the U-2 incident, which involved the Soviet Union, drew no protest to Pakistan from Peking.

On the specific question of Kashmir, China was unwilling to give much comfort to either India or Pakistan.[67] Whatever consolation Pakistan got was from China's nonsupport of the Indian stand. It is this flexible Chinese position with regard to Kashmir that enabled China in the sixties to exploit this volatile issue not merely to advance its own influence in Pakistan but also to keep Pakistan wide apart from India.

By the end of the fifties the Chinese People's Republic was able to project a formidable presence in South Asia. The friendship with India lay shattered in the debris of the uprising in Tibet; the Sino-Soviet frontier became the longest disputed frontier in the world, pregnant with tension. The brief Sino-Soviet-Indian *entente* of the fifties was replaced by two parallel axes, one between Moscow and New Delhi, the other between Peking and Rawalpindi. To both China and Pakistan, the Eisenhower visit to India in 1959 signaled the beginning of closer relations between the United States and India; each had its own reason to regard this with apprehension, all the more so because India was about to enter a phase of parallel friendly and participant relations with both the superpowers. The Chinese contrasted their own broken relations with the USSR with

the increasing Soviet commitment to India's security and development, and they began to smell a US–Soviet collusion to dominate the world. Broad outlines of their differences with the Soviet Union over the national liberation movement, and concretely over India, began to come out into the open. In April, 1960, *People's Daily* called for greater Communist support for the colonial and semicolonial people's "inevitable" struggles against imperialism.[68] The emphasis in Chinese formulations began to shift from "peace zones" to liberation struggles. The supremacy of the Chinese revolution as a model for revolutions in all colonial and semicolonial countries began to be proclaimed once again. In an ideological appraisal of the national bourgeoisie in the newly independent states, the Indian bourgeoisie represented by Nehru was now downgraded. The Indian bourgeoisie was found to be increasingly under the influence of monopoly capitalism; the Indian public sector was nothing but bureaucratic capitalism.[69] The ideological justification of Soviet economic aid to India was publicly questioned. One Chinese commentator remarked that "the increased economic assistance which the socialist countries gave India" actually helped the Indian bourgeoisie to consolidate its influence over, and control of, Indian society.[70] As Sino-Soviet economic relations were reaching the breaking point, with the Russians suddenly withdrawing several thousand technical and scientific personnel, Chinese attack on increasing Soviet assistance to India began to be shriller. Strategic and military differences between China and the USSR began in 1957–58; at the close of the decade Chinese leaders began to talk openly about an independent Chinese nuclear capability. Thus in ten years the Chinese People's Republic was able to build up a formidable challenge to the pattern of power relationships in South Asia. The country that had to bear the brunt of this challenge was India, for the Chinese were now questioning the integrity of the frontiers of the Indian Republic, its special relationship with Bhutan and Sikkim, its power and influence in the Himalayas, and the positive content of its foreign policy

of nonalignment and domestic policy of liberal socialism. However, in challenging India the Chinese were also challenging the leadership of the Soviet Union, particularly certain major aspects of the international policy of the Twentieth and Twenty-first Congresses of the CPSU.

## ANATOMY OF A FRIENDSHIP

Our study of the most crucial period in Sino-Indian relations will remain incomplete without an attempt to find out why the friendship between the two largest Asian nations could not survive the strains of Tibet. An answer to this question has to be sought in the psychology of the two nations and their leaders, in the mutual perceptions of China and India in the early and mid fifties. Both had suffered at the hands of European imperialism but in very different ways, and each had emerged into its own with different perspectives of imperialism. Apart from being Communists, the Chinese rulers had fought a protracted war against the Japanese, the Kuomintang, and, at least in their own minds, against the United States as well. They shared very little of the Indian leaders' generally friendly orientation toward Britain and the United States. India and China had remained grossly ignorant of each other for centuries; Panikkar was struck by the poverty of the Chinese leaders' knowledge of India and of the Indian elite's knowledge of China. Apart from Tagore, Nehru, and a few other Indian intellectuals, nobody had done anything during this century to build intellectual and emotional bridges between China and India. And the image of China created by Tagore and Nehru had little objective relationship with the China that emerged in 1949 from the welter of the protracted civil war. Whatever contacts the Indian nationalist leaders and intellectuals had developed with China in the thirties and forties had been with Chiang Kai-shek and Kuomintang China. Very little was known to Indians, including Communists, of Chinese communism and the architects of the Chinese revolution.

Since India's China policy was mainly made by Nehru, it

is necessary to analyze briefly his perception of India (the India self-image) as well as of Communist China. The most fruitful technique for studying the foreign policy of the new nations, with their meager experience in international politics and in the game of power, and in the absence in Asia—though not so much in Africa—of a basic accord on vital interests that characterized relations between European nations during the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth centuries, is probably what is known as the technique of perception. In other words, Sino-Indian relations, as relations between most of the new nations, may be profitably analyzed in terms of certain distinctive yet interrelated factors—each nation's self-image, its perception of the character of other nations, as well as the intentions, power, and capabilities of these nations.

A scrutiny of Nehru's writings and speeches on China from the late thirties to the late forties would show that in an Asia freed from European domination, he visualized the emergence of China and India as the two principal rival powers. He wanted the two emerging Asian great nations to be friendly to each other, but it could be only the friendship between two equals. Nehru never reacted to the Chinese revolution in the manner in which he had reacted, many years before, to the Bolshevik revolution; it is interesting that the man who had been enthusiastic about the liberation of the proletariat from capitalist exploitation was relatively untouched by the liberation of Asia's largest peasantry from the exploitation of feudalism. His perspective of the Communist victory in China was a part of his perspective of the larger and, to him much more important, phenomenon of the awakening of Asia, in which he had no doubt that India had played a comparable part. He was aware that in new Asia, China and India were destined to play vital and perhaps rival leadership roles. His concern was not with Chinese *communism* but with resurgent Chinese *nationalism,* in which, as a student of history, he had noticed an imperial imperative. Matching this was his image of India of the distant past, with its cultural, civilizational, and intellectual influence

spreading far and wide beyond the shores of geographic India. China and India being both continental nations, their leaders, regardless of ideological persuasions, inherited the empire-nation stance embedded in each country's history. There is little difference between the territorial perspectives of Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, and Mao Tse-tung; similarly, there is little difference between the perspectives of Tilak, Gandhi, Nehru, and Indian Communists of the territorial dimensions of the Indian state.

At mid century Nehru became keenly aware of the two very different roads to development India and China had elected to pursue. He knew that India had started off with some advantage over China, and he never thought that the Indian experiment would lag behind the Chinese. Moreover, he seemed to believe that if the Indian experiment was a success, the combination of individual liberty and economic advancement would make it the more attractive model for Afro-Asian countries. When he visited China in 1956, he was all the time comparing the progress made by the two countries.[71] In a once oft-quoted (in India) statement in Parliament, Nehru visualized China as the third great power in tomorrow's world but hastened to add that India was destined to be the fourth. He did not even mention Japan.[72]

What prevented Nehru from agreeing to the Chinese suggestion that both countries repudiate the treaties and conventions of the British period and settle the border de novo to mutual satisfaction and advantage? In several statements Nehru declared that he had no particular liking for the term Mac-Mahon Line. And yet he was quick to defend it. A wholesale Indian repudiation of rights and privileges inherited from the British might have led to difficulties with Bhutan, Sikkim, Nepal, and Nagaland, as well as with some of the princely states within India. This was a strong constraint, but not the only one. The newly liberated nations almost invariably inherit the territorial imperative of the departed colonial powers; Sukarno's claim to West Irian was based entirely, and quite frankly, on the fact

that it used to be part of the Dutch empire-state of Indonesia. The Indian elite similarly inherited Lord Curzon's strategic conception of India as an Asian power and were determined to preserve as much of the inherited interests in the Himalayas as could possibly be done. It is remarkable that Nehru stuck all along to his position that the border with China could not be changed except at relatively minor points. The only defeat he took from the Chinese was in the difficult terrain of the Himalayan foothills. He could not bring himself even to settling the Ladakh section of the border in order to be better equipped to defend Kashmir from Pakistan. Nor would he join hands with Pakistan to defend the subcontinent from China.

Nehru built the massive myth of two-thousand years of Sino-Indian friendship knowing very well that it was historically untrue. Not only had there not been much contact between China and India historically, except in the realm of Buddhism, which the Chinese simplified and vulgarized with an admixture of Confucianism and Taoism; there was almost always a sense of rivalry between the two great Asian civilizations. This is amply indicated in a dialogue between the Chinese monk Hsuan-tsang and the monks of Nalanda when the former announced his decision to return to China after a long sojourn in the famous Buddhist university:

> The monks of Nalanda, when they heard of it, begged him to remain, saying, "India is the land of Buddha's birth, and though he has left the world, there are still many traces of him. What greater happiness could there be than to visit them in turn, to adore him and chant his praises? Why, then, do you wish to leave, having come so far? Moreover, China is a country of the mlecchas who despise the religious and the Faith. That is why Buddha was not born there. The mind of the people is narrow, and the coarseness profound, hence neither saints nor sages go there. The climate is cold and the country rugged—you must think again."
>
> The Master of the Law replied: "Buddha established his doctrine so that it might be diffused to all lands. Who would wish to enjoy it alone, and forget those who are not yet

> enlightened? Besides, in my country the magistrates are clothed with dignity, and the laws are everywhere respected. The emperor is virtuous and the subjects loyal, humanity and justice are highly esteemed, and old men and sages are held in honour. . . . How then can you say that Buddha did not go to my country because of its insignificance?"[73]

In ancient times it was China that took Buddhism from India; India, in comparison, took very little from China. In our own times, Gandhi and Tagore had as little impact on the Chinese mind as did the Chinese revolution on the mind of Indian nationalist leaders. Yet both Nehru and the Chinese Communist leaders fabricated the myth of thousands of years of Sino-Indian friendship, not because they deliberately wanted to cheat their countrymen on history but probably because they were reacting through the psychological mechanisms that operate the minds of newly liberated nations.[74] Glorification of the past, risking a certain falsification of history, is a common attribute of the national psychologies of all new countries. Although this is understandable, what is less so is the failure to see the other side in a dispute in the light of a nation's own experience. India had gone to war with Pakistan to defend Kashmir and was trying to pacify the Naga rebellion with its security forces, and yet it refused to understand with sympathy the Chinese concern with establishing the writ of the Government in Peking all over Tibet. India had made Kashmir the test of the outside world's attitude toward it; so did the Chinese make Tibet and Taiwan the test of the nations' friendship or enmity toward it. Dennis Bloodworth says that Mao "expected understanding from a newly independent India on the Sino-Indian border issue and first bent upon Nehru his 'tender regard.' "[75] It was soon revealed that the Chinese and Indian minds had very different hang-ups from the colonial period.

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# 4

# 1960s: THE DECADE OF CONFRONTATIONS

## MOSCOW AND PEKING: TWO OPPOSITE LINES

THE BLOODY confrontations within the South Asian Triangle in the sixties have completely shattered most of the relationships that were built during the major part of the fifties. India has fought two wars, the first with China along the Himalayan borders in 1962, and the second with Pakistan in 1965. These two military conflicts have subjected India to traumatic experiences and have aggravated its domestic political and economic problems. They have seriously eroded the American role in South Asia and have all but dismantled Pakistan's military alliance with the United States. The Sino-Indian war pushed India closer to the Soviet Union and the US and Pakistan to China. The India-Pakistan war has brought for the first time in history an expanding Soviet presence in the subcontinent. Soviet arms have started to flow to *both* India and Pakistan, and Soviet assurances now replace American assurances of the fifties that neither would be allowed to use them against the other. Along India's entire land frontier, border nationalities are restively demanding independence or autonomy, with active Chinese support. The South Asia of today has little in common with the South Asia of the mid fifties. A great many

uncertainties have been introduced into one of the world's most volatile areas.

The factor that has been most responsible for this transformation of South Asian relationships is the conflict between the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic. Before the outbreak of this conflict, South Asian tensions were localized; now their impact is much wider, the issues at stake are much greater in dimension. The character of South Asian realities began to change as soon as China and the Soviet Union arrived in the region, China through its incorporation of Tibet, the Soviet Union with its offer of friendship to India. Today these two Communist powers have spread their rival influence on even *local* events in India and Pakistan.

It all began with the Sino-Soviet challenge to each other's leadership aspirations in South Asia. Relations between the two Communist giants began to be strained in the late fifties. The differences stemmed fundamentally from the divergent roads traversed by the two revolutions, the great disparity in the revolutionary ethos of their leaders, and the two countries' social and economic conditions. The crucial question was whether the Soviets would regard China as a great power even when it did not possess the attributes of one. Moscow could not, like the United States, turn Nelson's blind eye on the People's Republic; China was an ally of the USSR. The Soviets had to recognize China as a brother and an equal. Unfortunately, they had little direct experience with how to deal with the Chinese leaders, and even less in treating other Socialist countries on an equal footing. Stalin's ungrateful successors could not treat Mao as he had treated Tito; with a grim sense of irony, Stalin seemed to have left the problem of Mao's China to be tackled by Khrushchev, who had risen to the summit of power in the Soviet Union after reducing Stalin to a nonhero.

Khrushchev tried to treat China as an equal, but after all, Khrushchev was a Russian and the prime minister of the Soviet Union. He recoiled as soon as he found the enormity of the

Chinese demand—a share of the Soviet nuclear arsenal under Chinese control, leadership of the national liberation movement, recognition as the world's third great power, without whose formal and equal participation, no world order could endure.

## DÉTENTE WITHOUT CHINA

Khrushchev's dilemma in the fifties was whether he should engage the Chinese in an ideological and power contest in the Socialist camp, the international Communist movement, and the national liberation movement, and *at the same time* combat American imperialism, or he should try to come to an understanding with the United States and engage in combat with the PRC. Combat with the Chinese People's Republic was perhaps inevitable. Even if the Soviets had not adopted the policy of *détente* with the US and persisted on waging the Cold War, they would have found China claiming leadership of the national liberation movement and eventually of at least a large segment of the Communist movement, especially in the third world countries. The Chinese, of course, wanted the Soviets to *lead* the worldwide struggle against American imperialism which stood between China and the realization of its great power status. As soon as the Soviets embarked on the line of *détente* at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, they started their quarrel with the Chinese. The Twentieth Congress line of peaceful coexistence and peaceful transition to socialism was not designed to intensify and aggravate the Cold War but to bring it to an end. It was, as we have already noted, a *Soviet* line, formulated without consultation with China or any other socialist country; however, it was meant to lay down a universal Communist strategy, to be obeyed and practiced by the entire international Communist movement. The Twentieth Congress line was devised by Khrushchev and his colleagues in response to a number of major problems *the Soviet Union* had to face in its relationship with the other Socialist countries and in its confrontation with the United

States. It evoked positive response from the East European countries, because it promised the security of their frontiers and peaceful evolution of their political and social institutions. In contrast, peaceful coexistence had nothing particularly rewarding to offer to China unless the Soviet Union made recognition by the US of the irreducible minimum of China's national demands—its seat in the United Nations and settlement of Taiwan issue—the irrevocable conditions for a *détente.* The Chinese feared even in 1956–57 that the Soviets would not do this. They took the first available opportunity—at the Moscow Communist meeting in November, 1957—to register their objections to the Twentieth Congress line. Significantly, Mao, who was leading the Chinese delegation, chose Khrushchev's concept of "peaceful transition" for attack.[1] This was the crucial part of the Twentieth Congress thesis; it embraced the entire national liberation movement and offered an indefinite period of truce to capitalism. The turgid controversies over war and peace and several other issues that built the confused superstructure of the Sino-Soviet rift in later years, were to a large extent phony. For the Chinese never advocated a frontal war between the Soviet Union and the United States, nor did they entertain any cannibalistic appetite for nuclear warfare.[2] Mao was convinced, however, that his own revolution's conspicuous contribution to a fundamentally altered world alignment of forces was that it had turned the colonial rear of imperialism into a restless, explosive anti-imperialist front. He did not want to let the Soviet Union use this front as a tame, compliant rear of a world order policed jointly by Moscow and Washington.

## MAO'S POSTWAR WORLD VIEW

Indeed Mao's perspective of the principal confrontation of forces after the Second World War differed qualitatively from Stalin's. Both in the Soviet Union and in the United States, the postwar world looked largely bipolar; the old Europe-centered balance of power now yielded place to a new, emerg-

ing bipolar balance. Winston Churchill's Fulton speech found a resounding echo in the 1948 speech of Zhdanov. In a bipolar world, there could be only two alternatives—bipolar conflict or coexistence. Mao's perspective of the postwar situation was different. In his famous interview with Anna Louise Strong in 1946, Mao explained why, in spite of the verbal bellicosity of the imperialists, war between the Soviet Union and the United States was *not* imminent. "The United States and the Soviet Union are separated by a vast zone which includes many capitalist, colonial and semicolonial countries in Europe, Asia and Africa. Before the U.S. reactionaries have subjugated these countries, an attack on the Soviet Union was out of the question."[3] Mao believed that the anti-Soviet "trumpeting" of the United States was some kind of a smoke screen. The principal contradiction in the postwar world was between imperialism headed by the United States and all the countries, peoples, and territories that had passed under American control. "Under the cover of anti-Soviet slogans," the Americans were "frantically turning . . . all the countries which are the targets of U.S. external expansion into U.S. dependencies." This was the "real aim" of the United States, and if a third world war were to be averted, "the American people and the peoples of all countries menaced by U.S. aggression should unite and struggle against the U.S. reactionaries and their running dogs in these countries." Thus, even in 1946, the principal contradiction in the world was, according to Mao, the contradiction between imperialism and the national liberation movement, not between socialism and capitalism.

Since 1959–60 this Maoist strategic concept began to be put forward in China with increasing clarity, reflecting a resolve to frustrate, as a revolutionary duty, a *détente* between the Soviet Union and the United States. In the world that emerged from the second world war, wrote "Yu Chao-li" in *Red Flag* in April, 1960, the "real and direct contradictions are not between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet Union and the United States can and are actually co-existing

peacefully." The real and direct contradictions were between the "reactionary cliques of an imperialist country and its own people," between the imperialist countries and their colonies and semicolonies, and "amongst the imperialist countries" themselves.[4] Only a few weeks earlier "Yu Chao-li" had remarked that US aggression was directed "primarily against the colonial and semi-colonial countries which have won national independence." It was the duty of "people everywhere" —which meant all Communists—to support the national liberation movement and the "righteous wars for national liberation and against imperialist aggression."[5] Implicit in these formulations was the strategy, elaborated at length in Lin Piao's September, 1965, article, of exhausting the military and financial might of the United States in a series of "just" people's wars in countries brought within the sphere of American influence. A major plank of the Lin Piao thesis, that the struggle against imperialism must be spearheaded as a struggle against the United States and that it need not be directed, except in a secondary manner, against the lesser "imperialist" powers like West Germany, Britain, and Japan, also germinated in 1960. *People's Daily* said in an editorial that the "decisive factor" in the global confrontation was the "war policy" of the U.S.; all peace-loving peoples must concentrate their attack on America. "Departing from this point is departing from the heart and essence of the matter."[6]

The Chinese might have had a different stance on the Twentieth Congress line if the United States could have been persuaded to normalize its relations with China simultaneously with improving its relations with the Soviet Union. In fact, despite Mao's grave doubts about certain vital aspects of the Twentieth Congress thesis, particularly the strategy of peaceful transition, the Chinese Government did cooperate for some two years with the peaceful coexistence line. As a result of the Chinese initiative, diplomatic talks began in Warsaw between Peking and Washington, in which the Chinese position on Taiwan was spelled out with some realism: all that Peking wanted was

American recognition *in principle* that Taiwan belonged to China and a phased withdrawal of American military presence from the Taiwan area. It is possible that Peking took this cooperative line because, as Robert R. Bowie and John K. Fairbank have found, the CCP leadership was considerably under the influence of "rightists" till 1957; it was only in 1958 that the party was rid of "rightist" elements.[7] An immediate result of Mao's return to the command of the revolution in 1958 was the attempt to liberate the off-shore islands and, then, Taiwan. It was during this contest with American power that the Chinese discovered the hollowness of their ideological and military alliance with the Soviet Union. The year 1958 was, thus, the great watershed in Sino-Soviet relations. From then on, Khrushchev persevered with the Twentieth Congress line of *détente* with the United States, regardless of Chinese objections, evidently encouraged by the fact that the CCP had to lie rather low because of the costly failures of the great leap forward and the communes in 1959-61. If Khrushchev sometimes looked during this period like an old man in a hurry, it was probably because he was anxious to have the CPSU strategy accepted by the international Communist movement *before* the CCP could inflict much damage.

In 1959-61 the CCP was incapable of doing much mischief. Chou En-lai, who led the Chinese delegation to the CPSU Twenty-first Congress, did raise his voice in dissent and speak of the "road of struggle and revolution" as the only way to defeat imperialism.[8] But it was not a voice of challenge. Khrushchev's treatment of the CCP was at times cavalier. He was evidently encouraged by the favorable response to his strategy from the Communist parties of Europe and from neutral countries, particularly India. He was certainly encouraged also by the conflict that was raging in the CCP between Maoists and their opponents.[9] Khrushchev did not consult with Mao *before* going to the United States for his meeting with Eisenhower, even though the US President had considered it necessary to consult with several heads of government of his West European

allies. When Khrushchev halted in Peking, on his way back to Moscow, he was really empty-handed as far as the Chinese were concerned. He had failed to obtain from the US any satisfaction on the questions of the Chinese seat at the UN and Taiwan; his advice to the Chinese leaders was that they should put the latter issue in the cold storage at least for some time. In his public speeches Khrushchev attacked the Maoist line on peaceful coexistence, defended the concept of peaceful transition, and admonished the Chinese for what they had done along the Indian border. Also in 1959, Khrushchev reportedly got from the Chinese Defense Minister, Marshall Peng Teh-huai, a secret memorandum calling for Soviet intervention in the inner-party conflict in the CCP.[10] Within a few days of this event, the Soviet Government declared its neutrality on the Sino-Indian border dispute, ignoring Chinese requests not to take a public position injurious to Peking.

## BID TO ISOLATE CHINA

At the Hungarian Communist Party Congress in Budapest in December, 1959, Khrushchev, in effect, asked all Communist parties to synchronize their watches to the time set by the CPSU and uttered a veiled warning to the Chinese: "If the leadership of one country or another starts giving itself airs, this may play into the hands of the enemy."[11] In February, 1960, the Soviet press ignored the speech made by the Chinese observer, Kang Sheng, at the Warsaw Pact conference in Moscow. On the ninetieth anniversary of Lenin's birthday in April, Otto Kuusinen, in delivering the keynote speech at the celebrations in Moscow's Red Square, was conspicuously reticent in acknowledging China's role in the postwar expansion of the Socialist camp. On the other hand, he described the Twentieth Congress thesis as a "new contribution to Marxism," and the policy of peaceful coexistence as pursued by the Soviet Union "as the only correct and viable policy." In June came Khrushchev's surprise attack on the CCP at the Bucharest Congress of the Rumanian Communist party. He ridiculed

those who tried to apply Lenin's propositions literally to the changed conditions of the present-day world, and he seemed to confirm the fears of the Chinese that the real purpose of the *détente* was a division of world hegemony between the United States and the Soviet Union. Edward Crankshaw says that Khrushchev's angry speech was provoked by the distribution by the Chinese delegation of a secret letter the CPSU had written to the CCP; the letter, says Crankshaw, was like "the explosion of an angry father with a rebellious son."[12] At the Moscow conference of eighty-one Communist parties in November-December, 1960, Khrushchev was able to isolate the CCP from most of the international Communist movement. In the final statement that emanated from the conference, there was no mention of the Great Leap and the people's communes, no full-throated acknowledgment of the uniqueness of the Chinese revolution. China was merely listed as one of the people's democracies in which "remarkable progress in socialist construction" had been made "within a historically short period." The draft of the new party program for the Twenty-second CPSU Congress, published in July, 1961, had only eleven words for China: "The victory of the revolution in China was of special significance." Crowning all this cavalier treatment of China was an article by a Soviet theoretician S. Titarenko, published in *Sovietskaya Latvia* in August, 1960. The article reminded the CCP that the People's Republic owed not only its progress in building socialism but also its very existence to the Soviet Union. "Could one imagine the successful construction of socialism going on in present day conditions even in so great a country as, let us say, China, if that country were in a state of isolation and could not rely on the collaboration and aid of all other socialist countries? While being subjected to an economic blockade by the capitalist countries, such a country would be subjected simultaneously to military blows from outside. It would experience the greatest difficulties even if it succeeded in withstanding the furious attacks of the enemy."[13] Donald Zagoria thinks that Titarenko was holding

out the possibility of an open schism between Moscow and Peking in which China would be expelled from the Socialist camp much as Yugoslavia had been in 1948. In that event, Titarenko was suggesting that "Russia would withdraw its deterrent shield and economic support, and the West would be free to intensify its economic and military pressure on an isolated China."[14] Even if this interpretation is regarded as somewhat exaggerated, it is noteworthy that the Titarenko article was published only three days after an AFP report from Peking had been flashed across the front pages of world newspapers saying that Soviet technicians had begun to leave China in large numbers since the end of July. Within the CCP there were still powerful voices that opposed a break between Peking and Moscow. One such was T'ao Chu, then first secretary of the provincial party of Kwangtung, who, in a speech on March 30, 1960, had stressed the "enormous amount of material and spiritual assistance" China had received from the USSR and suggested that such "mutual assistance" must be strengthened before the country could carry out the building of socialism at a "faster rate."[15] Although it is debatable whether T'ao Chu was voicing some of the Soviet doubts about the "more, better, faster" line of Mao Tse-tung or merely asking the Soviet Union to do more for China in order to preserve the alliance, there is little doubt that the Soviets were expecting the Maoist stance to mellow either as a result of the setbacks in the Great Leap and the communes, or as a result of opposition from the gradualists.

Not only this did not happen; some of the radical changes in the Chinese perspective of the world strategic situation occurred during the years 1958–62, a period of acute administrative, ideological, and economic crisis in the Chinese People's Republic. Mao had returned from Moscow in late 1957 probably with some dark apprehensions about Soviet intentions and policies. At the Moscow Communist meeting he not only had opposed the concept of peaceful transition but had proclaimed his own strategic idea of the over-all military supremacy of the Socialist bloc over the capitalist bloc following

the Soviet mastery of the ICBM and the launching of Sputnik. "I believe that the East wind is [now] prevailing over the West wind," Mao had declared, adding, by way of explanation, "that is to say, the forces of socialism are overwhelmingly superior to the forces of imperialism."[16] In his discussions with the Soviet leaders, however, Mao found them unwilling to transfer nuclear rockets and warheads to China under Chinese control. This was not merely because the Chinese might provoke war with the United States by trying to liberate Taiwan. As Alice Langley Hsieh has put it, "An outright transfer of nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union to China would have enabled the latter to claim membership in the nuclear club, thus reinforcing China's bid for great power status and for leadership in Asia and permitting her, within limits, to practise nuclear blackmail against her neighbours. To some extent it would have freed China to initiate military operations in Asia independently of the Soviet Union."[17] The Soviet refusal led to a serious reappraisal of the Chinese military policy and contributed to the decision, taken probably in early 1958, to build an independent, indigenous nuclear deterrent, regardless of cost.[18] In 1958 the Chinese provoked the crisis over the offshore islands probably with the main purpose of testing the depth and the range of actual Soviet military commitment to China in the event of a Sino-American war. They discovered that not only did this commitment fall far short of protecting China with nuclear weapons against *any* American attack, the decision about when, to what extent, and with which weapons, to intervene on behalf of China rested unmistakenly with the Soviet Government.

## PEKING'S "TURNING POINT"

The Soviet pursuit of the strategy of peaceful transition and its refusal to share nuclear power with China led to a profound reassessment of the Russian role in world affairs in the higher Maoist echelons in Peking. A remarkable reflection of

this reassessment can be found in an article published in *Chieh-fang-chun Pao* on May 28, 1958. Written by the Commander of the PLA Air Force, General Liu Ya-lou, it envisaged the need for "another turning point" in the world balance of forces, with the construction of an independent Chinese nuclear deterrent, without foreign assistance.

> China's working class and scientists will certainly be able to make the most up-to-date aircraft and atomic bombs in the not-distant future. By that time, in addition to the political factor in which we already occupy an absolutely predominant position, we can use atomic weapons and rockets used by the workers, engineers, and scientists of our country, in coping with the enemies who dare to invade our country and undermine world peace. By that time another *new turning point* will probably be reached in the international situation. The revolutionary movement in the world in general and in Asia in particular will advance with more vigorous steps[19] [italics added].

This was cautious writing by a military leader, but, nevertheless, most remarkable. The need for "another new turning point" is to be seen in the light of Mao's speech in Moscow only six months earlier in which he had proclaimed, "It is my opinion that the international situation has now reached a new turning point." Within two weeks of Mao's speech, *People's Daily*, in an editorial, made the meaning of his words clear:

> The October Revolution was a fundamental turning point in world history, which shook the world domination of capitalism to its foundation and opened up the new era of proletariat revolution. Thereafter, the victory in the world war against fascism and the victory of the Chinese revolution was another important turning point which greatly expanded the forces of socialism and weakened the forces of imperialism. Now the world situation is moving into a new turning point—the forces of the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union have definitely surpassed those of the imperialist camp headed by the United States both in popular support, in population, and in a number of most important scientific and technological fields.[20]

Now, six months later, the commander of the Chinese Air Force was visualizing *yet another new turning point* when China would acquire its own nuclear weapons relying on its own resources. This would not only enable China to neutralize any nuclear opponent; it would also vitalize the revolution in all of Asia. The Chinese leaders had evidently come to the conclusion that for neither purpose could they any longer rely on the Soviet Union.

At the Warsaw Pact meeting in Moscow in February, 1960, the Chinese observer made the startling declaration that "any international agreements which are arrived at without the formal participation of the Chinese People's Republic and the signature of its delegate, cannot, of course, have any binding force on China." In April, the Chinese chose the Lenin birthday anniversary to assert their ideological opposition to the Soviet line. Peaceful coexistence of nations and "people's revolution in various countries" were "two different things, not one and the same thing; two different concepts, not one; two different kinds of questions, not one and the same kind of question."[21] This was the first Chinese recorded assertion that what they and the Soviets were propagating were *two different lines* altogether and that Khrushchev could not sell peaceful coexistence and national liberation at the same time. Between June (when Chou En-lai spoke at the WFTU meeting in Peking) and November (when Liu Shao-chi represented China at the Moscow meeting of eighty-one Communist parties), the Chinese position became clearer and sharper. The key point of difference between China and the USSR at the Moscow meeting, according to the organ of the Belgian Communist party, in which the first authentic report of the conflict was published, was the Chinese objection to making the Twentieth Congress line the line of the entire international Communist movement. The CCP rejected the right of the CPSU to be the sole interpreter of Marxism-Leninism, the prime giver of law in the Socialist camp. It also rejected the rule of the majority. It affirmed that peaceful coexistence could only be a tactical move, not the general strategy of world communism.[22]

Despite this increasing assertiveness of its own position, the CCP was apparently expecting, in 1960–61, the CPSU to make some concessions to achieve unity in the Socialist camp. Khrushchev, however, made none. Indeed he could not, for the Chinese had rightly described their own line and the Soviet line to be two entirely different lines; the two could not go together. Khrushchev could accommodate Mao only if he were prepared to abandon or postpone the pursuit of a *détente* with the United States. Through all the major international Communist gatherings in 1960–61, Khrushchev's strategy was to establish the supremacy of the Soviet line without having the USSR saddled *formally* with the responsibility of leading the world Communist movement. With the successes he was able to achieve at several Communist meetings, culminating in the Soviet victory at the 1960 Moscow Conference, the Russian leader was able to proclaim at the Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU in October, 1961, "The policy elaborated by the 20th Congress of our Party is a Leninist policy, and we cannot make a concession on this fundamental policy either to the Albanians *or to anyone else.* . . . No one can divert us from the Leninist road" [italics added].

Mao's patience with the Soviet position was largely an unavoidable result of the domestic situation in China. The low performance of the Great Leap experiments in 1958–59 and the sharp struggle within the CCP inhibited strong action. For some time during this period Mao was probably facing a serious challenge to his leadership of the CCP. Readjusting the Great Leap strategy to more sober and realistic objectives and resolving the differences within the party were tasks more compelling than measuring lances with the CPSU. The Chinese goal had therefore to be somewhat altered till the autumn of 1962. Earlier, in March, the National People's Congress had to admit a grave economic crisis and reschedule the economic priorities of the years ahead, giving agriculture the first place, consumer goods industry the second, and heavy industry the third. The communique issued at the end of the

NPC session did not preach the inevitability of local wars nor revolution in the newly liberated countries. *People's Daily,* in an editorial on the Congress session, virtually denounced the strategy of Great Leaps and returned to the subdued rhetoric of "step-by-step," of "patience" and "objective laws," of continuous toils of "generation after generation" of Chinese in constructing a Socialist economy.[23] *Pravda* printed the editorial, breaking the rule it had adopted after 1960 not to publish Chinese articles on China's domestic performance. It was also during the first six to eight months of 1962 that the exchange of Sino-Soviet polemics was muted and economic relations were to a large extent revived.

By the autumn of 1962, the economic difficulties were largely overcome and differences within the Central Committee of the CCP were resolved, Mao returning to the command of affairs. The Tenth Central Committee Plenum in a communique issued on September 28 declared that "the general line of our country's foreign policy is entirely correct"; it re-endorsed the Lushan Plenum's decisions against "right opportunism, that is, revisionism"; and announced that the "scheming activities, be it intrusion, provocation or aggression, or subversion within our state or party" by imperialists and "their running-dogs in China and abroad" had been and would continue to be "resolutely smashed."[24]

## SINO-INDIAN BORDER

The words *intrusion* and *aggression* in the September 22 communique evidently referred to what was going on at the Sino-Indian border. As Klaus Mehnert says, "We must assume that the CC session also approved the plan for attacking India in the Himalayas, for on October 20, 1962, less than a month after its conclusion, war broke out on the Sino-Indian border."[25] The decision to intervene with strong force against Indian "intrusions" and "provocations" must have been taken at the

highest level in Peking. For within a week of the Chinese military action, *People's Daily* came out with a massive article, composed, once again, by its editorial department, offering ideological justification for the military action.[26]

In many respects this was a remarkable piece of writing, for, in attacking Nehru and his government, it betrayed a pathological aspect of the Chinese Communist mind. The Chinese now found Nehru to be an archimperialist, fired by aspirations of establishing a "great empire unprecedented in Indian history." The Indian Government was under control of the big monopoly bourgeoisie, but, worse, the Indian big bourgeoisie was expansionist in character and was an ally of imperialism. The Chinese article painted the picture of an India where the progressive forces were being ruthlessly suppressed by the reactionary, expansionist ruling classes and where "bureaucratic monopoly capitalism," a Maoist term for the Indian state sector, had joined with the big bourgeoisie to extract "bloody money" from the common people to feed their own lust for power and territory. One has to read this article with the one printed in *People's Daily* in May, 1959, to grasp the radical transformation of the Chinese stance on India in three years. Nehru was no longer a friend of China; no longer did he belong to the progressive vanguard of the third world. At the second nonaligned nations' conference in Belgrade in 1961 he had parted company with the anti-imperialist front in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. India's nonalignment, too, was losing its content. He had employed a manufactured "anti-China hysteria" in India to secure aid from both the United States and the USSR. His "socialism" was nothing but a camouflage for the domination of the Indian economy by the big bourgeoisie and big landlords linked with imperialist monopoly capitalism. The new thesis of *People's Daily* was a somewhat emotional attack on the Soviet line on India. It evidently betrayed the fear and misgiving that were to harden in the Chinese mind in the sixties that India was being deliberately built up by the Soviets (and the Americans) as China's militant rival in Asia.

## THE BORDER WAR

Before we attempt to examine the motivations of China's border war with India and its immediate and long-term consequences, it is necessary to trace the developments on the Sino-Indian frontier between 1959 and 1962. The following chronological account should enable us to sift the important events from the vast amount of Indian and Chinese printed material available for study.

(We have already noted how the border was born during the Tibetan revolt in March, 1959. The Chinese wanted to close the frontier to prevent the refugees from fleeing to India and arms or other aid from reaching them from across the border. This led to close contacts between the Chinese and Indian armies for the first time. In Ladakh, the Chinese advanced roughly to the line they claimed as the frontier of Tibet. They had built a strategic road through Aksai Chin in 1956–57; they built a second road in 1959–60. Having built this road, they advanced their claim line, presumably to give it adequate protection. The Indians began to set up border posts along the MacMahon Line in the east; control of these posts was taken over by the Indian army in late 1959.)

August 9, 1959: A small clash occurs at Khinzemane, in the western part of the border between Tibet and the North-Eastern Frontier Agency. Location of Khinzemane disputed by India and China, each claiming it to be on its side of the MacMahon Line.[27]

August 10, 1959: Clash at Longju, another disputed location along the MacMahon Line. The Chinese evacuate Longju in autumn of 1960.[28]

September 26, 1959: Nehru, in a letter to Chou En-lai, admits that India had evacuated a post at Tamaden when it was found to be located north of the MacMahon Line. India asks China to evacuate Longju similarly.[29]

October 20–21, 1959: A serious clash is reported near Kongka Pass, adjacent to the trijunction between Tibet, Sinkiang,

and Ladakh, through which the second Chinese-built highway passes. The Chinese fire on an Indian patrol which was apparently trying to find the new road, whose existence the Chinese never officially admitted. Nine Indian soldiers are killed, ten taken prisoner and released after a month.[30]

December 17, 1959: Chou En-lai, in a letter to Nehru says the Chinese have stopped sending out patrols along the entire frontier.[31]

March, 1961–September, 1962: India improves its strategic position in Ladakh by setting up forty-five posts in locations claimed by China. These posts were generally in a line about one hundred miles from the Aksai Chin highway; three of them were somewhat near the Kongka Pass and thus close to the second road the Chinese had built.[32]

November 28, 1961: Nehru tells the Indian Parliament that the border situation "progressively has been changing from the military point of view and from other points of view in our favour and ultimately we may be in a position to take action to recover territory in their possession."[33]

April 30, 1962: China, alleging that many Indian intrusions into Chinese territory in the western sector have occurred during the month, orders its frontier guards to resume border patrol in the sector from the Karakoram Pass to the Kongka Pass—the sector that contains the two highways—and warns India that if it "continues to invade and occupy Chinese territory and expands the area of its intrusion and harassment on China's border, the Chinese Government will be compelled to consider further steps of resuming border patrols along the entire Sino-Indian boundary."[34]

May 14, 1962: India asks for mutual withdrawal behind the line claimed by the other side in the western sector and, for the first time, offers the Chinese nonmilitary use of the Aksai Chin road "pending negotiations and settlement of the boundary question."[35]

July 10, 1962: Chinese troops in the western sector try without success to surround an Indian outpost.[36]

July 21, 1962: Chinese troops fire on an Indian patrol in the first use of violence since 1959.[37]

August 14, 1962: Nehru tells the Indian Parliament that India has thrice as many outposts in the western sector as China, asks and is given a free hand to deal with the border situation.[38]

September 8, 1962: A serious clash occurs near the western end of the MacMahon Line.[39]

September 20, 1962: Following several other clashes in the same area, the Chinese resume patrolling along the entire border.[40]

October 5, 1962: The Indian Government sets up a new border command under Lieutenant-General B. M. Kaul in NEFA with order to advance.[41]

October 12, 1962: Nehru announces to pressmen at New Delhi's Palam airport, while taking off for a journey to Ceylon, that he had ordered the army to launch an offensive to drive the Chinese out. *People's Daily* announces that a "massive" Indian "invasion" is "imminent" and alerts the Chinese troops.[42]

October 20, 1962: Continuous and steadily increasing local fighting in the eastern sector since the beginning of October escalates into a large-scale border war with a major Chinese offensive at several points on both the eastern and western sectors of the border.[43]

This chronology of actual developments along the Sino-Indian border has to be seen in the light of the diplomatic efforts between China and India to avoid a border war and to have a peaceful settlement. Major diplomatic positions and moves of the two countries can be listed chronologically as follows:

September 8, 1959: Chou En-lai, in letter to Nehru, makes four major points: (1) The entire frontier is not delimited, it is a legacy of imperialism; (2) China does not recognize the MacMahon Line but is prepared to consider the new

realities of Burmese and Indian independence and friendship; (3) Chinese frontier troop movements are designed to prevent Tibetan rebels from crossing the frontier; and (4) an implicit emphasis of the importance of the western sector for China corresponding to the importance of the eastern sector for India.

September 9, 1959: *Tass* statement is issued declaring Soviet neutrality on the Sino-Indian border issue and deploring the use of force by China in a relatively minor clash on the eastern sector.

September 15, 1959: Nehru meets the Soviet ambassador in Kabul while on a visit to Afghanistan.

September 26, 1959: Nehru, in reply to Chou's letter, reiterates the Indian position that the border is generally defined by treaties, conventions, etc., and says, "No discussions can be fruitful unless posts on the Indian side of the traditional frontier now held by the Chinese forces are first evacuated by them and further threats and intimidations immediately cease."[44]

October 2, 1959: Khrushchev discussed border issue with Chinese leaders in Peking and, according to *People's Daily*, "did not wish to know the true situation." Publicly, he asked the Chinese leaders not to "test by force the stability of the capitalist system."[45]

November 7, 1959: Chou, in letter to Nehru, proposes both sides maintain *status quo* and then agree to withdraw their troops, though not civilian personnel, twenty kilometers from the "so-called MacMahon Line in the east, and from the line to which each side exercises actual control in the west." According to Professor Harold C. Hinton, this proposal in effect would eject the Indian army from its outposts along the MacMahon Line but leave the Chinese in control of the two highways in Aksai Chin. "On the other hand, the strategic effect would have been to set in motion a strong and perhaps decisive trend toward a compromise settlement of the dispute along at least *de facto*

lines much like the informal partition of Kashmir between India and Pakistan: India would keep the North East Frontier Agency and the CPR most of Aksai Chin and the other territory claimed in Ladakh."[46]

November 16, 1959: Nehru's counterproposals: (1) in the eastern sector each side stop sending out forward patrols, thus stabilizing the border; (2) in the western sector, each side withdraw behind the line claimed by the other. The effect of Nehru's proposals would have confirmed and stabilized Indian control of the MacMahon Line and deprived the Chinese of control of the two highways in Ladakh.[47]

December 17, 1959: Chou rejects Nehru's proposals as one-sided and asks whether India would apply to the eastern sector also the principle of each side withdrawing behind the line claimed by the other. This would have deprived India of the entire Northeast Frontier Agency. This was the first hint from China of a uniform formula being applied to the entire frontier.[48]

December 15, 1959: Chou proposes talks between two premiers on December 26 either in China or in Rangoon.[49]

December 21, 1959: Nehru declines to meet Chou. "How can we, Mr. Prime Minister, reach an agreement on principles when there is such complete disagreement about facts?," he asks.[50]

December 26, 1959, and February 12, 1960: China and India furnish one another with statements of the historical basis of their respective territorial claims.

February 5, 1960: Nehru writes to Chou proposing talks in New Delhi during the latter half of March. Chou agrees to their meeting in New Delhi from April 19 to 25.

April, 1960: The Nehru-Chou meeting ends in failure. The only agreement reached is to refer the dispute to officials for further study on the basis of documents, maps, etc. The officials meet in New Delhi and Rangoon in the latter half of 1960 and fail to agree.

May 4, 1961: China asks for compromise on the border but takes steps to build friendly relations with Nepal. A Chinese note to India says Peking will "absolutely [not] retreat an inch from its stand" as long as India refuses to negotiate and tries to "impose its views on others."[51]

December, 1961: Indian position hardens. It refuses to renew or extend the India-Tibet trade agreement (China makes three proposals for renewal) unless China vacates all territory taken since 1959.[52]

November 30, 1961: China, in a note to India, gives the implicit warning that if India persists in its forward movements along the eastern sector, China might decide to retaliate strongly in the Northeast Frontier Agency.[53]

March 22, 1962: Chinese note to India reiterates determination to defend positions in Ladakh and expresses China's desire to avoid war.[54]

May 14, 1962: India repeats proposal for mutual withdrawal in the western sector to behind the lines claimed by each other, and offers to recognize, pending a settlement of the border by negotiation, Chinese use of the Aksai Chin road for nonmilitary purposes.[55]

June 2, 1962: China rejects Indian proposal and says it is satisfied with the *status quo,* pending a settlement of the border dispute through negotiation.[56]

August 4, 1961: After a series of mutual accusations of intrusions and advances since May and following the violent incident along the MacMahon Line on July 21, a Chinese note repeats the demand for negotiations and says there will be a "relaxation of the border situation at once" if the Indian side "stops advancing into Chinese territory."[57]

August 22, 1962: India replies that there can be no relaxation of tension or any negotiations without Chinese withdrawal from all territory claimed by India.[58]

September 13, 1962: China proposes talks on October 15 without preconditions.[59]

October 6, 1962: India rejects proposal and insists on Chinese withdrawal from Indian territory.[60]

## A NEW KIND OF WAR

Looking from this remove of time at these chronological accounts, it seems that the border conflict could have been avoided if both sides have been less rigid and more ready to accommodate each other's interests and points of view. The Indian position was evidently more rigid than the Chinese; Nehru was apparently expecting the Indian army to obtain a series of tactical advantages along the border. What was locked in combat in the Himalayas was not merely the frontiers of China and India but also their power ethos, the rivalries inherent in the revival of Asia's two largest empire-nation states. Mutual misperceptions aggravated the crisis. To India, China looked like an aggressive power determined to humiliate its neighbor. To China, India was a deserter from the anti-imperialist camp,[61] a friend of the imperialists; its forward moves in the Himalayas were nothing but an encroachment on the integrity of Tibet. In India there was no understanding of the Chinese concern with Tibet's frontiers, no appreciation of the flexibility Peking had offered on the border issue were India to agree to enter into negotiations. In China, there was equally no understanding of the wounded pride of Nehru; there was, on the contrary, a tendency to take the utterances of Indian politicians literally. Scholars who have carefully studied the Indian and Chinese stances on the border issue have been persuaded, despite their sympathy for India, to blame the fighting on Indian obstinacy and shortsightedness. Harold Hinton, with all his sympathy for the Indian position, came to the conclusion that "India precipitated war with a stronger enemy, on whose disposition it had no adequate intelligence, and who had evidently made considerable efforts from the autumn of 1959 to the spring of 1962 to avoid hostilities, but who had watched the steady advance of Indian troops in the western sector with growing concern. Presumably India hoped either that the CPR would give way or that its other preoccupations, and perhaps Soviet pressures, would enable India to win a local victory."[62] Professor John K. Gal-

braith who as the US ambassador to India was witness to the Sino-Indian war, takes a similar view of the Chinese military action. "During the preceding summer, there had been evidence of increasing pressure and support from various sources in India for military action to move the Chinese out of the area which they claimed. In light of this, one can imagine the Chinese coming up with the notion of a major military demonstration to show the Indians that this kind of military policy had no future."[63]

K. P. S. Menon, former Indian ambassador to the USSR, confirms Galbraith's account of public pressure on the Indian Government, which, he regrets, did not allow the Indian Government to exhaust alternative means of a settlement. "Undoubtedly, the blame for the present deplorable situation rests on China. Yet, it is up to us to search our hearts and see whether we, too, have not, by any acts of omission or commission, aggravated the situation; whether, for instance, public opinion, as expressed in Parliament, did not, in its righteous frenzy of indignation against China, tie the hands of the Government overmuch and leave the Government with little room for maneuvering on critical occasions."[64] India, moreover, had no experience of war, except in Kashmir in 1948 with Pakistan, which was a very different matter. A biographer of Krishna Menon points out a major psychological difficulty India had to face during the border war with China. "Even after the Chinese attack was mounted," he writes, "Krishna Menon [who was India's Defense Minister] had a precise strategic plan with which he was confident of containing the threat. This was a plan of 'defence in depth.' He wanted to let the Chinese come through the Himalayan ranges in order to avoid pushing up Indian defenses to the geographically unfavourable Thagla-Dhola heights. Indian forces were to make a planned withdrawal to the Se La Pass line, trap the Chinese there and mount an all-out counter-offensive. But opposition M.P.'s and newspapers made it impossible for the Government to pursue this strategy. They magnified the early 'reverses' out of all propor-

tion and let out howls of protests every time an inch of Indian territory was lost. Popular morale was so grievously threatened that the Nehru Government had to find a scapegoat. But in finding one, it destroyed all hopes of the Indian Army's eventually scoring a convincing victory in its own way."[65] This proposition, of course, betrays a lack of understanding of the kind of war the Chinese had decided to fight, but it was not wide off the mark in blaming the Indian defeat partly on the Indian people's lack of war experience.

The Chinese waged a new kind of war on the border. It was based on meticulous intelligence of the terrain and of the local people, and the strategy was to administer a quick devastating blow to the Indian state, not to defeat it in a major war. It was a war not of arms alone but of politics also. The first major Chinese offensive was halted after four days, with a cease-fire offer to India, when the Chinese forces were still not on regularly administrated Indian territory, except that they had taken Tawang, the main town near the MacMahon Line. The cease-fire proposal also offered a mutual twenty-kilometer withdrawal from the line of actual control, and a meeting of the prime ministers of China and India. Along with it, an appeal went out from Peking to the Afro-Asian governments "for an effort about the materialization of these three proposals." Between October 23, 1962, when this cease-fire proposal was made, and November 16, when the Chinese launched the second offensive, fighting went on on a very limited scale, and the main emphasis was on diplomacy—between Peking and Moscow, Moscow and Delhi, Delhi and Peking. After the Soviets had finally decided to stand by India, and New Delhi was in no mood to accept the Chinese terms for a cease-fire and negotiations, the Chinese forces, starting the second phase of the fighting, took Walong and, shortly afterwards, launched a major offensive in both sectors of the frontier. On November 18, they took Bomdila, halfway between the MacMahon Line and the border of Assam state, and the next day, by a clever outflanking movement, they

descended on the foothills across the Brahmaputra River, overlooking Assam with its rich tea plantations and oilfields, which earn a little less than a third of India's foreign exchange. Nehru went on the air in New Delhi with a message to the people of Assam which was widely interpreted as preparing them for a temporary occupation of their state by the Chinese. But instead of crossing the river to Assam, the Chinese declared a unilateral cease-fire and announced their decision to pull back to the MacMahon Line within a month provided India did not send its troops back to the vacated area. The Chinese claimed not to have crossed into undisputed Indian territory, for in their enlarged territorial claims, they had included the whole of the Northeast Frontier Agency. In the western sector, the only place which the Chinese had shelled and which was not in territory they claimed to be theirs was the airfield at Chushul. Later they denied the fact of shelling.

In assessing the reasons for the Chinese attack on India, one must not dismiss the territorial factor, which was important. Perhaps the Chinese did seriously apprehend, following the establishment of forty-five Indian posts in what they claimed to be their territory in Ladakh, that India would eventually be able to threaten the second road they had built in the Aksai Chin salient. And since the Indian army was well entrenched in Ladakh, they struck at the MacMahon Line, where the Indian defense was weak. Probably the fresh outbreak of another rebellion in Tibet made it necessary for them to secure the mountain passes once and for all. But the Chinese were all along fully aware that a war with India would involve them in a serious ideological and geopolitical conflict with the Soviet Union because India was a major base for the operation of the Twentieth Congress strategy of the Soviet Government. They also knew that if they wanted to strike a serious blow at that strategy, *they could strike only at its Indian base.*[66]

## WHY CHINA STRUCK

There were probably a number of reasons why the Chinese

leaders selected the conflict with India to demonstrate their will and ability to act against the Soviet line—the international Communist line—soon after the differences within the CCP Central Committee were resolved in the fall of 1962 with the defeat of the gradualists and moderates. If the Soviets accused China of betraying Communist solidarity by its military action against India, the Chinese hurled the same charge at the Russians for their unambiguous support for India; this claim of each to the loyalty of the other was, in effect, a thinly veiled struggle for leadership of the international Communist movement. The Chinese, however, consistently stuck to their main argument that they had to go to war with India only to thwart Indian aggression and to secure their national frontiers. The Soviets, on the other hand, accused the Chinese of subverting Moscow's policy of a "definite relaxation of the cold war." In a long statement in September 1963, the Soviet Government concluded that the Sino-Indian war had had the "most negative consequences for the cause of peace, inflicted great harm on the unity of the anti-imperialist front in Asia and placed the progressive forces in India in an extremely difficult position."[67] Moreover, "China herself did not benefit in any way. And her prestige in the eyes of the peoples of the world, especially of the Afro-Asian peoples, has certainly not grown." These peoples, said the Soviet statement, saw "with a feeling of bewilderment and bitterness," a Socialist country, which had "served as a model to them," make use of its military superiority to wrest from a "young neutralist state" a "favourable solution of the problem of a certain part of territory." The Soviets, in effect, were warning the Afro-Asian countries that China would not hesitate to use its military might to settle territorial questions with other young neutral states, and as such it could hardly serve as a model to Afro-Asian peoples.

To comprehend the full meaning of the Indian issue in the Sino-Soviet conflict, we have to go back to 1959 when the Soviets declared their neutrality in the Sino-Indian border

dispute and condemned the Chinese for using force. At Bucharest, Peng Chen had raised the issue which drew from Khrushchev a wrathful attack on the Chinese handling of the Indian question.

> He had a great deal to say about the frontier dispute with India [reports Crankshaw], rejecting violently the Chinese charge that the Russians had let them down by refusing to support them. In fact, *it had been the Chinese who let the cause of socialism down.* By quarreling with the Government of India, they had not merely failed to work with the Russians for the socialization of India; *they had worked against it* [italics added]. . . . Of course, Nehru was a capitalist. But the Chinese dispute with him had nothing to do with capitalism and socialism; it was a purely nationalist dispute and it had done the socialist cause untold harm, quite apart from such details as losing Kerala to communism. . . . And what would happen to this frontier dispute when the day came, as it would, when India was a socialist country? The Chinese comrades, he said, should take to account what Lenin had said about great nation chauvinism. They should also remember that it had been Lenin who was prepared to surrender territory for tactical reasons—as under the Treaty of Brest Litvosk —and Trotsky who had opposed any abandonment of territory. Meanwhile, Nehru became the national hero, and this was just what the imperialists desired. The Soviet Union too had its frontier problems. But she approached these in a responsible way. If she had taken the Chinese line, war would have been declared on Iran more than once. There had been plenty of border incidents on the Russo-Iranian frontier, and men had been killed in them. But the Soviet Union would not allow incidents of this kind to precipitate war since this would contradict the true spirit of revolution.[68]

In December, 1963, the Chinese Government came out with a detailed account of how differences with the Soviet Union on the Sino-Indian border question had developed "over the last few years."[69] In yet another article written by its editorial department *People's Daily* replied to a *Pravda* article of September 19 and the Soviet Government statement of September 23. That statement had also claimed that the Soviet stand on the Sino-

Indian border question had been "consistently correct since 1959," while *Pravda* had said that China wanted to settle the border question by force of arms and that it did not sincerely want a peaceful settlement.

*People's Daily* disclosed a series of Sino-Soviet consultations on Sino-Indian border issues, which have not so far been contradicted in Moscow. The first diplomatic exchange took place on September 6, 1959, when "a Chinese leader" told the Russian chargé d'affaires in Peking the "facts" of the August 25 armed clash and the "Chinese policy of striving to avoid hostilities." The Chinese leader—presumably either Chou En-lai or Ch'en Yi—also gave the Soviet diplomat an ideological interpretation of India's alleged behavior on the border question. India's purpose in "provoking the border conflict" was to "oppose communism and China." The Indian bourgeoisie, *"as was to be expected,"* had become "increasingly reactionary with the sharpening of the international class struggle" (italics added). It was necessary for the Soviet Union "not to be taken in by Nehru," who was trying to "put pressure on China by utilizing the Soviet Union."

The Chinese explanation had little effect on Moscow. On the morning of September 9, the Soviet chargé d'affaires notified the Chinese Government of Moscow's decision to issue the *Tass* statement on September 10. A copy of the statement was given to the Chinese Government. Peking "immediately" told Moscow that it would be better "in principle" for the Soviet Government "to refrain from making a public statement on this question." The same afternoon Peking gave the Soviet envoy a copy of Chou En-lai's September 8 letter to Nehru; in the evening, the envoy was told that this letter had "already been published," and asked Moscow to take the Chinese position into consideration and "not to issue the *Tass* statement." Not only was the Chinese advice ignored in Moscow; the *Tass* statement was issued on September 9 "ahead of time."

During Khrushchev's visit to Peking in September–October, 1959, the "Chinese leaders personally" gave him an explana-

tion of the "true situation" and background of the Sino-Indian border dispute and told him that China would not yield to the Indian reactionaries "all the time." But Khrushchev "did not wish to know the true situation and the identity of the party committing the provocation but insisted that anyway it was wrong to shoot people dead." On October 26, the Chinese Government informed the Soviet chargé d'affaires in Peking of the "facts" of the border incident of four days earlier. On October 31, Khrushchev, speaking to the Supreme Soviet, again expressed regret and distress over the border situation and "brushed aside India's responsibility for the provocation."

Between December 10, 1959, and January 30, 1960, "the Chinese leaders had six talks with the Soviet ambassador." They pointed out that the Soviet leaders "were wrong to maintain strict neutrality" and that "far from being neutral, their statements actually censured China and were in favour of India." In a verbal notification to the CCP Central Committee on February 6, 1960, the CPSU Central Committee stated that "one cannot possibly seriously think that a state such as India, which is militarily and economically immeasurably weaker than China, would really launch a military attack on China and commit aggression against it," and that China's handling of the question was "an expression of narrow nationalist attitude." The CPSU also accused China of trying to sabotage Khrushchev's mission to Washington. "When shooting was heard on the Sino-Indian border on the eve of N. S. Khrushchev's trip to the United States, the whole world considered this to be an event that could hamper the peace-loving activity of the Soviet Union."

On October 8, 1962, "a Chinese leader" told the Russian ambassador that China had information that India was "about to launch a massive attack" and that "should India attack we would resolutely defend ourselves." He also told the ambassador that the use of Soviet-made helicopters and transport planes by India to airdrop and transport military supplies in the border areas was making a "bad impression" on the Chi-

nese frontier guards. On October 13 and 14, "Khrushchev told the Chinese ambassador the following: *Their information on Indian preparations to attack China was similar to China's. If they were in China's position, they would have taken the same measures. A neutral attitude on the Sino-Indian boundary question was impossible. If anyone attacked China and they said they were neutral, it would be an act of betrayal*" [italics added].

The *People's Daily* article then summarized the Soviet actions and expressions *after* the outbreak of the border hostilities, pointing out the contrast between a *Pravda* statement of October 25 supporting China, and Khrushchev's December 12 statement at the Supreme Soviet "reverting to his original tune." *People's Daily* accused Khrushchev of using the Sino-Indian border conflict to "create the so-called Camp David spirit"; by bringing out the Sino-Soviet differences into the open, he made "a ceremonial gift" to the Americans. It was only during the Caribbean crisis that the Soviet leaders "spoke a few seemingly fair words out of considerations of expediency"; when the crisis was over, "they went back on their words."

Soviet action during the Sino-Indian border war did not impress the world as being particularly consistent. For India the very inconsistency and vacillation of the Soviet Government was a main source of comfort and strength. The hope that Nehru evidently cherished in 1962 was that the Soviets would be able to prevent the Chinese from making war on India. On his own part, he had doubtless been persuaded by the military that the Indian army was in a position to make a series of limited forward moves along the border without risking a general war with China. Lieutenant-General B. M. Kaul has given a distressing account of the general Indian unpreparedness for the major military engagement with the Chinese; Indian intelligence of Chinese troops buildup and their logistical strength was also tragically poor.[70] A section of Indian public opinion was clamoring for a show of strength with the Chinese; its voice received noisy support in the press. Nehru too appeared to be looking for a situation of strength from which he could

approach Peking for a settlement of the border issue by and large on the basis of the basic Indian position. Neither Nehru nor the Indian army seemed to have much knowledge of the Chinese strategy of conflict, nor was there in India any appreciation of what psychological factors might have been operating in Peking. It was assumed without serious reflection that the Chinese Government was out for Indian territory, for power and influence in South Asia, and for a duel of realpolitik with the Soviet Union. These factors must have weighed in Chinese calculations, but there was also the other strong psychological mechanism that makes the leaders in Peking paranoid on questions of national security.

As soon as the Chinese attacked on October 20, Nehru and his colleagues realized that the crucial factor for India, next to the war itself, was the attitude of the Soviet Government. Within hours of the Chinese offensive, Nehru was closeted with the Soviet ambassador, Benediktov, who was supposed to be somewhat critical of the Indian position on the border dispute.[71] Nehru's first diplomatic action was to send a personal message through the ambassador assuring Khrushchev that his Government did not wish to ask for more Western arms to fight the Chinese than was absolutely necessary. Benediktov, on his part, counseled restraint—an immediate cease-fire, if possible, and nonseverance of diplomatic relations with Peking.[72] For the first few days of the war, India refrained from publicly asking for Western arms. Nehru talked about "no pact with the Western powers," Krishna Menon of "buying all the arms we need."[73] The military, on the other hand, was pressing for Western arms and had some political support within the Government.[74]

On October 21, Khrushchev sent a letter to Nehru presumably confirming the counsel of restraint verbally conveyed by his ambassador. The Soviet press reported the border war on October 24, along with the Chinese proposals for a cease-fire. (The Chinese strategy of combining fighting with cease-fire proposals baffled the Indians.) The next day *Pravda* came out

with an editorial that sent a chill down the Indian spine. *Pravda* rejected the sanctity of the MacMahon Line ("the notorious MacMahon Line which was never recognized by China" but was "foisted on the Chinese and the Indian people" by the British imperialists). It regarded the October 24 Chinese proposals as "constructive," offering an "acceptable basis for the beginning of talks and a peaceful settlement." It even made a partial concession to the Chinese ideological position—"certain reactionary circles in India which have tightly bound their destiny with foreign capital and with imperialist forces." And it called upon the Indian Communists to make "more active efforts" for a peaceful settlement and not to yield to "nationalistic influences and move over to chauvinistic positions" which are "useless in questions of struggle for peace." The Indian reaction to the *Pravda* editorial was one of shock and dismay.[75]

The *Pravda* editorial was, however, not a wholehearted endorsement of the Chinese stand. It offered limited support to Peking's war, presumably to bargain for reciprocal Chinese support for Moscow's nonwar in the Caribbean. Pravda still equated "fraternal China" with "brotherly India." It warned China that by waging war on India it was helping no one but the imperialists. There was little evidence of Soviet diplomatic pressure on India to accept China's October 24 cease-fire proposals. More importantly, the *Pravda* editorial was a sermon on peace, peaceful coexistence and peaceful solution of international disputes. It certainly did not reflect the mind of government about to enter nuclear or any war with the United States. "The Soviet Union and the other countries of socialism consider the main aim of their foreign political activity the ensuring of peaceful conditions for the preservation of a new society, strengthening of friendship between all peoples, and redeeming mankind from the threat of a new world war. The Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist commonwealth consistently adhere to this position." Probably in the diplomatic exchanges that went on between Moscow and Peking during the crucial last week of October, 1962, the Soviets

sought an agreement or understanding that would cover both the Indian and the Caribbean situations. Khrushchev's transient acceptance of the Chinese appraisal of the Indian military buildup and actions on the border was probably designed to obtain a reciprocal Chinese acceptance of the Soviet appraisal of the Caribbean situation. These exchanges broke down probably because no satisfactory concessions to the Soviet position on the Cuban crisis were forthcoming from Peking. On October 27, Khrushchev sent his message to John F. Kennedy offering peace in the Caribbean. In Peking, the publication of *People's Daily* was delayed by several hours to carry the twenty-thousand-word article attacking India, Nehru, and the general line of the CPSU on the national liberation movement. The marathon article was immediately broadcast over Peking Radio's entire overseas network.

The die was cast and events now moved rather swiftly. On November 5, *Pravda* printed a second editorial on the Sino-Indian border war, reversing the October 25 line and withdrawing almost all the concessions made therein to the Chinese position. Dropped were its rejection of the MacMahon Line, support of China's October 24 cease-fire proposals, and the directive to the Indian "progressives" not to yield to nationalistic sentiments. The Chinese were still "brothers" and the Indians "friends," but to the counsel for an immediate cease-fire was added a qualification: "without advancing any pre-conditions." There were warnings to China that its action was pushing India and the newly independent nations into the arms of the imperialists, and to India that the continuation of the conflict would exhaust its limited economic resources and sidetrack "the Indian people from solving the tasks of social and economic regeneration . . . the task of carrying to the end the anti-feudal, anti-imperialist revolution." The recognition of the existence of such a revolution in India was a rejection by the Soviet Union of China's ideological interpretation of the Indian state. The Soviet and Chinese positions now began to harden along contrary lines, drawing India closer into the

Soviet orbit. The second *Pravda* editorial was followed up by Deputy Premier Alexie Kosygin on November 6 with a virtual rejection of the Chinese cease-fire proposals. "We consider that a correct solution [of the Sino-Indian border war] would be a cease-fire between India and China on a reasonable basis," said Kosygin in the course of a speech at a Kremlin function.[76] Two days later Chou En-lai made another peace offer to India containing even more preconditions than the proposals of October 24. On November 19, the Chinese forces, as already noted, came down almost on the banks of the Brahmaputra and were a mere thirty-two miles from Tejpur, the first major town in the plains of Assam. Nehru declared in the Lok Sabha that India was asking for "all the aid we require" and that "there is no inhibition about it."[77] The US Government decided to send Averill Harriman to India on a special mission. Khrushchev made an important political gesture by keeping up the earlier promise to send some MIGs to India in December. On November 27 it was officially announced in New Delhi that India had asked for an emergency supply of arms from the Soviet Union and that Moscow had not said no to the request.[78]

## SOVIET ASSESSMENT OF WAR

The Soviets took a long time to react publicly to the declaration of a unilateral cease-fire by China on November 21 and to its decision to withdraw the Chinese forces back to the pre-invasion line of actual control. The conclusion to be drawn from this is that Moscow had failed to influence the Chinese action to any appreciable degree. Frol Kozlov, in addressing the Italian Communist Party Congress on December 3, still expressed concern for the Sino-Indian conflict, "which is seriously harming the interests of both the brotherly Chinese people and the friendly Indian people."[79] He taunted the Chinese quite explicitly: "Those who are certain of their historic future have no need to play with thermo-nuclear fire and endanger all the achievements of civilization." This mixing

together of the Caribbean and Sino-Indian conflicts became all the more pronounced in Khrushchev's long foreign policy speech at the Supreme Soviet on December 12.[80] He chided the Chinese leaders for accusing Moscow of capitulation to the United States, though he did not name them directly. Khrushchev derided Peking's continued toleration of colonial control of Macao and Hong Kong and even suggested that India, with its military action against the Portuguese in Goa, had proved to be more anti-imperialist than the leaders in Peking. And then he came directly to the Sino-Indian border war, defended Soviet policy as being consistent since 1959, and regretted "to this day" that both sides did not "avail themselves in time of the possibilities of nipping the incipient conflict in the bud." It had been "especially painful" to the Soviet Union that blood had been shed between "the fraternal Chinese People's Republic and our friend, the Republic of India," between a Socialist country and "a country which had started on the road of independent development and follows a policy of non-alignment." Khrushchev regarded the unilateral Chinese cease-fire and withdrawal as "reasonable" and added, "We are most happy about this and welcome such actions by our Chinese comrades." But this welcome was tempered with strong criticism of the Chinese action. "Would it not have been better if both sides refrained from resorting to arms in general? Of course, it would have been better. . . . Would it not have been better not to advance from the positions where these [the Chinese] troops were at the time?" Khrushchev went on to suggest that the Chinese cease-fire and withdrawal had been brought about by fear of American armed intervention on India's behalf; this was his own way of returning to the leaders of China the compliment of capitulation before American arms. "There are some people who are already alleging that China desisted from hostilities apparently because India had begun receiving support from the American and British imperialists who are supplying her with arms. Therefore, such people say, the Chinese People's Republic realized that, if the armed

conflict continued to develop, it might turn into a large scale war, which would result in even greater numbers of victims. Yes, our Chinese friends took the situation into account. . . ." And then came Khrushchev's final blast against Peking. The war on the Sino-Indian border would reveal to all countries of the world the real character of the leaders of the Chinese regime. "It is indisputable that the actions of the government of the Chinese People's Republic will be assessed at their true value by the peace-loving peoples. Indeed, why wage war?" He "rejected" the "slander" that China had "ever set itself the aim of invading India," but hastened to add, "we also absolutely disavow the thought that India wanted to start a war with China." In this careful exercise of parity between China and India, Khrushchev unmistakably pointed the accusing finger to the leaders of Communist China.

The Soviet assessment of the Sino-Indian war was sharper, more candid, and more bitter in a secret letter the CPSU sent toward the end of January to the Communist parties of the countries of the Socialist camp.[81] China, it was now alleged, "invaded" India "without even informing the USSR beforehand"—a claim that the Chinese disputed in the *People's Daily* article referred to above. The Soviet Union had "many times willingly offered to mediate"; India was "willing to negotiate"; the Chinese, in contrast, used negotiations "only to gain time for aggressive actions." The "unprovoked" Chinese aggression against India "put the USSR in a very difficult position." The MacMahon Line was no doubt "artificial," but the Chinese knew that "the policies of India and the USSR have much in common." India was trying "genuinely" to find the path to "neutral absolute independence," and there were "many socialist elements" in India which "it was worth encouraging." Soviet-Indian relations had become very close since 1956; this was the result of "many years of difficult negotiations and patience." China attacked India with full knowledge of the close Indo-Soviet friendship. "China was aware of the USSR's relationship with India, the contents of our treaty, and, *inter alia*,

that it was the USSR which was supplying India with the means of self-defence which represented a tremendous victory over the United States and England." When the Chinese started the invasion, "we begged—yes, we begged—the Chinese to stop their military operation immediately and we offered immediate mediation, for which India was ready. We wanted to prevent India from being forced to run for military aid to the United States and Great Britain, who had been waiting for such an opportunity from the Chinese, who call themselves Communists." The net result of the Chinese invasion was a serious blow to all that the Soviets had gained in India. "Thus, years of hard striving for Indian friendship and Indian neutrality went for nothing. Not only that—and let us be straight—today the capitalists are supplying arms to India because Chinese aggression forced them to do so. The Chinese aggression also had the consequence that we lost one of our most faithful friends among the Indian leaders, and that because he relied on our help." The reference obviously was to Krishna Menon, who had to resign as Defense Minister in the wake of the border war. The war had brought about a radical change in the Indian situation. "Before this treacherous attack India was, thanks to our untiring efforts, genuinely neutral." Another attack by China would "flood" India with American and British arms. The Soviet Union therefore had no option but to fulfill its commitments to supply defense equipment to "friendly India." The CPSU letter gave a different reason from Khrushchev's at the Supreme Soviet for the Chinese cease-fire and withdrawal. The PRC stopped the aggression "too late," only when "it was obvious that she lost the sympathy even of the Asian peoples." It ended with an attack on China's newly emerging friendship with Pakistan: "Her [India's] neighbour is a member of the aggressive SEATO pact. But with this appendage of the capitalists the CPR is now negotiating a pact of friendship."[82]

## THE INDIA-PAKISTAN WAR, 1965

With the Sino-Indian frontier war, there collapsed not only

the traditional Himalayan walls protecting India from external invasions across its land frontiers but also the delicate balance of power that had kept the peace in the subcontinent for about a decade. One of the immediate results of the war was mounting tension between India and Pakistan, in which China was now able to play a major instigative role. The first bitter pill India had to swallow, too soon after the debacle in NEFA, was the recognition forced out of her by Britain and the United States that the Kashmir dispute was very much alive and that it remained to be settled between New Delhi and Rawalpindi.[83] The Anglo-American initiative was, however, too late, much as the Indian claim at the Security Council in 1961 that Kashmir was no longer a live dispute had been made too soon. Even way before the outbreak of the border war, the Chinese opened talks with Pakistan on a border agreement, adding a new dimension to the Kashmir dispute. The announcement of the Sino-Pakistan border agreement was cleverly timed to scatter the results of the efforts put in by Duncan Sandys and Averill Harriman in later November, 1962, to bring about an Indo-Pakistan *rapprochement.* It was signed in Peking on December 27 when the Indian minister, Swaran Singh, was discussing Indo-Pakistan problems, including Kashmir, with a Pakistani delegation in Rawalpindi led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The Sino-Pakistan border pact killed all chances that the two countries would come together for the purpose of defense.[84] It gave Pakistan what it had lacked since 1948—recognition by a great power of its *de facto* ownership of one third of Kashmir—and it inspired the hope that by taking advantage of the split between China and the USSR, Pakistan would eventually be able to weaken Soviet support for the Indian position on Kashmir. Pakistan's inability to exploit the Sino-Soviet rift had so far been a major failure of its foreign policy. The weaknesses of its total dependence on the United States had begun to be felt as soon as the Americans and the Russians had started to seek a *détente.* Pakistan's faith in US protection was rudely shaken when the US and Britain offered military aid to augment India's defense against a second Chinese attack. Pakistan

was now under some compulsion to try to take advantage of both the Soviet-American *détente* and the conflict between the Soviet Union and China. The neutralist accent that now entered Pakistan's foreign policy formulations reflected a desire to ease out of the military alliances that were progressively losing their cold war meaning. More important, however, was Pakistan's open effort to incline cautiously toward Peking, for this was the only way Pakistan could convince the Soviets of the importance of its friendship, as India had done in the fifties.

## PAKISTAN SIGNS A PACT

India reacted predictably, though wrongly, to the Sino-Pakistan border agreement. It protested to China as well as Pakistan, blaming China more strongly and in greater anger, for building up a "collusion" against India.[85] Nehru said in the Indian Parliament that China "is directly interfering in Indo-Pakistan relations, and, by doing this, seeking to exploit the differences between India and Pakistan on the Kashmir question to further its own expansionist policies."[86] India also lodged a complaint with the Security Council. The Indian assessment of the territories gained or lost by Pakistan as a result of the pact differed sharply from Pakistan's.[87] As a *status quo* power in Kashmir, having already suggested to Pakistan formalization of the cease-fire line, with minor adjustments, as the international frontier, India might have, with better results, recognized Pakistan's right to normalize its border in northern Kashmir with Chinese Sinkiang, and at the same time warned Pakistan of the ambiguity of Peking's intentions in Kashmir, which were reflected in the phrasing of the agreement itself. Largely at Peking's insistence, the agreement carefully avoided the mention of Kashmir and related merely to the border of Chinese Sinkiang and of the "contiguous areas the defence of which is the responsibility of Pakistan."[88] *People's Daily* explained in an editorial that China was aware of the

Sino-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir; the agreement was provisional; "after the question as to whom Kashmir belonged was solved, the sovereign power would conduct fresh negotiations with the Chinese Government on the question of Kashmir's boundary in order to sign a formal boundary treaty."[89] Here was the embryo of what was soon to develop as a new Chinese stance on Kashmir. India with its instant rejection of Pakistan's right to sign a border pact with China lost an opportunity to exploit the contradictions in the Chinese and Pakistani perspective of Kashmir. The Chinese stance was an extension of Peking's intentions in Sikkim and Bhutan. India, in fact, made it easier for China to sell to Pakistan a Kashmir policy that was not necessarily favorable to Pakistan's interests in all circumstances. Chou En-lai was able to endear himself to the people of Pakistan by supporting, during his state visit in February, 1964, the Pakistani demand for a plebiscite in Kashmir.[90] The joint communique issued on Chou's talks with Ayub Khan urged a solution of the Kashmir question by a reference to the will of the people "as pledged to them by India and Pakistan"; it would be "of no avail," it added, "to deny the existence of these disputes and to adopt a big nation chauvinistic attitude of imposing one's will on others."[91] In appearance what the Chinese were now saying was not basically different from the traditional stand of the United States and Britain on Kashmir. There was, however, one significant difference. The US and Britain had relied mostly on the Security Council for a settlement of the Kashmir problem. If in words they had sometimes advocated a settlement through bilateral negotiations, their actions had drawn the two partners of the subcontinent farther apart. Neither was physically involved in Kashmir or anxious to hurt Indian sentiments beyond a certain limit. China, on the other hand, was physically involved in Kashmir; the border war with India had left it in military control of a strategic portion of Ladakh. Its relations with India were hostile. It was in some position to counterweight the Soviet support for the Indian stand on Kashmir. And, above all, China offered to

Pakistan the allurement of joint action against India once the chips were down. The British Labour party leader, John Strachey, found highly placed people in Pakistan in 1963 candidly talking about what they should do in the event of a second Sino-Indian war. Strachey was quoted in *The Observer* as saying, ". . . during the week in which my parliamentary colleagues and I were in Pakistan, a Pakistani Cabinet Minister declared publicly that the Kashmir question must be settled by peaceful means or 'otherwise. . . .' Another Pakistani public man in a key position assured us that if China attacked again, he and his friends would not miss their opportunity this time but would immediately attack India."[92]

Pakistan's motivation in drawing closer to China was, of course, different from China's motivation in wooing Pakistan, although the two were bound by their hostility to India. For Pakistan the ground was shifting from under its alliance with the United States. Since the foreign policy of Pakistan largely begins and ends at her borders, more particularly at the Indian border,[93] arrival of American arms in India, the sudden big leap in the Indian defense budget, and substantial Soviet assistance in building an indigenous Indian heavy-arms industry shook the foundations of its foreign relations. Bhutto echoed the fear of most Pakistanis when he said, "Who knows, in not too distant future, India might again reverse its stand, for it remains uncommitted, a so-called 'neutral country'? Whereas India is under no obligation whatever to adhere to any set policy, other countries that are bound by alliances have such an obligation. . . . India might well settle its problem with China. It is not an insoluble problem . . . all the strength and might of India will then be turned against Pakistan, for in India's eyes, Pakistan alone is a heresy."[94] Pakistan's alignment, was thus meaningful only as long as India was truly nonaligned; as soon as Indian nonalignment changed qualitatively, Pakistan's alliance-bound security was shaken. Pakistanis correctly surmised that the hitherto unflinching US-British support for a plebiscite in Kashmir would now progressively

slacken, for India was resisting Chinese expansionism and aggression with Anglo-American arms.

In these changed circumstances, it was natural for Pakistan to try to loosen the ties of its alliances. The reason why Pakistan moved closer to China and not the Soviet Union was firstly, that this was the surest and quickest way of making its dissatisfaction with the American ally felt in the United States; it was also the surest way of impressing India with a newly found strength that more than counterbalanced the Indian acquisition of American arms, and of drawing Moscow's attention to Pakistan's importance in the shifting scheme of South Asian affairs. The strategy that Pakistan followed deserves reflection. It was a clever mixture of caution and adventure. In the first place, Pakistan persistently minimized the seriousness of the Sino-Indian conflict and laid the blame for it on India rather than China. It refused to recognize any expansionist or aggressive element in Chinese foreign policy. Pakistan became an ardent protagonist of a peaceful settlement of the Sino-Indian border dispute.[95] Secondly, Bhutto—and, somewhat waveringly, Ayub Khan too—made it clear that the Communist threat to South Asia could come, not from China, but only from the Soviet Union, and that Pakistan remained wedded to its opposition to international communism as represented by the USSR. *The New York Times* reported Ayub Khan to have said on November 23, 1962, that threats to Pakistan's security came from "international communism and Hindu imperialism"; the "Indian threat" remained more pressing. On January 6, 1963, the Pakistani President "dismissed as not making 'military sense' the possibility that China might want to use Tibet as a base for a major offensive against South Asia."[96] Bhutto told the Washington *Post* correspondent on December 9, 1962, ". . . if China were to embark on aggression, surely she would think of other regions, possibly of Southeast Asia, regions which are more vulnerable and in which there are Chinese populations." And he added a little later, ". . . given geography and the power realities of the nuclear age, the military threat

to us, if there is one, would come more from the Soviet Union than from China."[97] The Washington *Post* correspondent had a correct insight into a major aspect of Pakistan's flirtations with China. "The geopolitical logic of Pakistan's new neutralism," he wrote, "is that a widening Communist bloc rift has reinforced Indian ties with the Soviet Union and has made it possible for Pakistan to be on good terms at one and the same time with Moscow's disparate antagonists in Washington and Peking." Bhutto himself left little doubt that Pakistan was seeking parity with India in taking advantage of the Sino-Soviet rift. "The answer for both India and Pakistan lies," he told the National Assembly, "in finding some sort of equation between ourselves without jeopardizing our friendship with China."

A third aspect of Pakistan's strategy was its efforts to convince Washington that its friendship with China was not detrimental to American interests in Asia; in other words, Pakistan wanted to retain its alliances with the US while "normalizing" its relations with China. In this the Chinese gave all the help they could, if only to demonstrate their friendly understanding of Pakistan's needs and requirements. They "understood" Pakistan's membership in SEATO and CENTO. During his 1964 visit to Pakistan, Chou En-lai encouraged Ayub Khan to project Pakistan as a bridge between Peking and Washington.[98] Pakistan, however, could not help using a certain amount of blackmail in projecting its new foreign policy. Bhutto deliberately tried to create an impression in 1963 that Pakistan had entered into a mutual defense pact or understanding with China.[99] He quickly ate his own words, but this exercise in blackmail had its impact, for the Indians took him seriously, and his own people derived from it a sense of excitement. It transpired in 1965 that, pact or no pact, Pakistan and China were capable of coordinating actions and policies in the event of a war in the subcontinent.

Washington reacted predictably to the "normalization" of Sino-Pakistan relations. There was no official objection to, or

disapproval of, the border agreement; the American press, however, speculated on opportunities it might provide the Chinese to threaten the security of India's border areas. The trade agreement signed between Pakistan and China in January, 1963, drew no adverse comment in the United States.[100] The American mood changed when Pakistan decided to sign an air transport agreement with Peking, thus opening up China to a host of countries in the Middle East, Africa, and Europe. The agreement was signed on August 29, 1963, and within a week Undersecretary of State George Ball arrived in Rawalpindi to talk to Ayub Khan and his ministers. He told the Pakistani President, according to *The New York Times*, that any close relationship between Pakistan and China would "nullify the sense of alliance between Pakistan and the US."[101] The first pressure put on Pakistan by the US Government was the cancellation of credit to improve the airport near Dacca. The main purpose of the Ball mission to Rawalpindi was, however, to prevent a defense agreement or arrangement between Pakistan and China; and in this the US Government was on very sure ground. On August 12, soon after Ball's return to Washington, President John F. Kennedy told a news conference that he doubted that Pakistan would make a military alliance with China because that would "disrupt the treaty ties with the West."[102] The warning worked, for, as *The New York Times* reported on October 6, "Bhutto was no longer hinting privately or publicly that Pakistan is seeking a military alliance with Communist China."

## CHINA PICKS UP AN ALLY

The motivation of China's cultivation of Pakistani friendship is to be found in the growing estrangement between Peking and Moscow, and the place that the Chinese believed India occupied in a Soviet-sponsored anti-China front in Asia and Africa. It was no mean feat for Peking to loosen Pakistan's alliance ties with the United States, something that the Soviets had not been able to do; Pakistan was also the most depend-

able ally the Chinese could get if their intention was to weaken and devitalize India and thus defeat a major plank of the Twentieth Congress CPSU line. These were the immediate Chinese objectives in Pakistan, but the ramifications of China's Pakistan policy, which was an integral part of its India policy, were far greater. During the border war with India and thereafter, the Chinese found in Pakistan a friend who would tirelessly work on their behalf to dispel the impression in Afro-Asian minds that China had aggressively invaded India and that it cherished any expansionist ambitions in South Asia. The vigorous diplomacy that the Chinese employed in the early months of 1963 to win Afro-Asian support for their stand on the Sino-Indian border issue was not unrewarded; at the six-nation Afro-Asian conference in Colombo, only the UAR was ready to take a stand that was overtly favorable to India. The aftermath of the border war thus gave the Chinese the first opportunity to divide the neutralist ranks and to pose a challenge to Soviet influence in Asia and Africa. At the meeting of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization at Moshi, in February, 1963, the Chinese were able to register considerable success, and in May they set up a pro-Chinese Afro-Asian Journalists' Organization in Jakarta, from which the Soviet Union was excluded. China made Pakistan an important member of the Afro-Asian front, even though it remained outside the forum of neutral nations because of its military pacts with the US. The Chinese built up the theory that Pakistan, with its new pursuit of an independent foreign and national policy, was more valuable to international communism than India, whose neutrality was now but a smoke screen, maintained merely by Soviet indulgence. They found a new factor to test whether a newly liberated country stood on the side of progress. It must be opposed to US "imperialism." "The non-aligned policy of peace and neutrality pursued by the Asian and African countries *is, in fact, pointed at U.S. imperialism,*" said Chou En-lai in April, 1965, in an interview by the editor-in-chief of the Middle East News Agency.[103] In

June, 1965, Peng Chen, speaking at the Aliarchan Academy of Social Sciences in Jakarta, went so far as to claim that anti-US patriotic "royal families and nobility" were more revolutionary than modern revisionists: ". . . they [modern revisionists] cannot be compared with the anti-imperialist and revolutionary representatives of the national bourgeoisie in Asia, Africa and Latin America, nor even with the Anti-imperialist and patriotic representatives of royal families and the nobility. As Stalin said in *The Foundations of Leninism,* some so-called socialists were reactionary while certain kings and some merchants who fought for national independence were objectively revolutionary. This is the fact and the truth."[104] In fact, the Chinese had been convinced much earlier that they had little to hope for from the Communist movements of the advanced industrialist countries, who had come profoundly under revisionist influence, and that their hope lay in the revolutionary national bourgeoisie of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. This was made abundantly clear in the CCP letter to the CPSU on June 14, 1963, in which Asia, Africa, and Latin America were declared to be the "epicentre of the world revolutionary process."[105] The theme was elaborated by Chou Yank in October at a meeting he held under the auspices of the Chinese Academy of Sciences.

> What revolutionary changes have taken place in the world revolutionary forces and revolutionary situation as compared to the time of Marx and Lenin! . . . For a long time in the past, the working class movement and the struggle centering round it were mostly confined to the advanced capitalist countries of Europe and North America. Now, however, the people's struggle against imperialism headed by the U.S. and the struggle of the revolutionary Marxist-Leninists against modern revisionism are being waged on a much broader—indeed on a worldwide—scale. In a number of countries the vanguard of the proletariat formerly standing at the forefront of the struggle is now eroded by modern revisionism, while the proletariat and revolutionary people of many countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, who have long been looked down upon, now stand at the frontline of the battle.[106]

Since June, 1963, the Sino-Soviet rift went through a process of progressive escalation, with occasional downward bends such as immediately after the resignation of Khrushchev. The polemics revealed the complex, multiple causes of the conflict, most of which have been documented in scholarly studies of Sino-Soviet relations. What has not been adequately stressed, however, is that each major landmark in this conflict was related to a clash of Sino-Soviet interests over India or the "Indian question." The tensions building up during the fifties burst into the open Sino-Soviet rift in 1959 in Soviet support for India in the Sino-Indian border dispute. The rift turned into a veritable conflict during and after the Sino-Indian border war in 1962. The CCP June, 1963, letter to the CPSU was the first open Chinese challenge to Soviet organizational predominance over the international Communist movement, particularly in the third world area, and the first Chinese attack on Soviet domestic policies. The Soviet effort from now on was to isolate China from the international Communist movement, if not to excommunicate it; the Chinese response was to build up Peking's own leadership of the national liberation movement and of radical minority groups in international communism.[107] At several stages of the conflict the Chinese accused the Soviets of using India to forge an anti-China alliance.[108] India proved to be an unusually abrasive factor in Sino-Soviet relations. The Soviets refused to support China in its border dispute with India; the Chinese, in return, questioned the validity of their central Asian frontiers with the USSR and raised the issue of the unequal treaties imposed on China by the czars. Border incidents occurred in Sinkiang and elsewhere in 1963, and the Soviet Government late in that year proposed "friendly consultations" to "define accurately the boundary in different sections."[109] During and after the Sino-Indian border war, the Soviets accused the Chinese leaders of acting under the impulse of nationalism and big power chauvinism. A devastating reply came from Mao Tse-tung himself when in July, 1964, he gave an interview to a group of Japanese So-

cialists. Mao questioned the territorial integrity of the USSR with all the areas it has acquired during and after the Second World War and also by the treaties of the czarist period, for which "we have not yet presented the bill." Mao, in effect, pictured the Soviet Union as an imperialist country. "There are too many places occupied by the Soviet Union," he said. "In keeping with the Yalta agreement, the Soviet Union, under the pretext of insuring Mongolia's independence, actually placed this country under its domination. Mongolia takes up an area which is considerably greater than the Kuriles. In 1954 when Khrushchev and Bulganin were in China *we took up this question but they refused to talk to us.* They appropriated a part of Romania. Having separated a portion of East Germany, they chased away the local inhabitants to West Germany. They divided a part of Poland and annexed it to the Soviet Union and gave a part of East Germany to Poland as compensation. The same thing took place in Finland. They took everything they could. *Some people have declared that the Sinkiang area and the territories north of the Amur must be included in the Soviet Union.* The USSR is concentrating troops along its borders" [italics added].[110] Shortly after the India-Pakistan war in 1965 in which the Chinese and the Soviets, as we shall presently see, took up mutually hostile positions, the CCP rejected all possibilities of united action with the CPSU, declaring that the leadership of the Soviet Union had entered into "collusion with American imperialism for the sake of joint domination of the world." "That which divides exists and that which unites is absent; that which sets at odds exists and that which would be in common is absent." Unity in action was impossible since the two parties were "diametrically opposed" to each other.[111]

## PEKING TRIES A SMILE

Against this backdrop of Sino-Soviet relations, China's friendship with Pakistan has to be related more specifically to its relationship with India during 1963–65. The Chinese kept their

propaganda against India almost steadily at a high pitch, but, until after the India-Pakistan war, they did not adopt toward India a posture of total hostility. India symbolized the national liberation movement betrayed by a "reactionary" bourgeoisie which, only because it enjoyed the unrelenting favor of the revisionist leadership of the Soviet Union, could not be exposed. India was doubly aligned with the United States and the USSR, providing a ripening ground for an anti-China alliance forged by the superpowers. In the Afro-Asian camp, India played a disruptionist, antirevolutionary role, with its reluctance to fight imperialism and its increasing dependence on US aid. With a highly accelerated defense budget and with Western as well as Soviet assistance to bolster its armed forces, India posed an expansionist threat to all its neighbors, including China. India's mounting economic troubles and the increasing "repression" of the Indian people by the "reactionary" ruling class were the result of the massive diversion of resources to defense, of its anti-China policy, and of the growing stranglehold of the feudal-capitalist class on its economy, aided and controlled by foreign monopoly capital. The Soviet Union's alliance with the Indian "reactionaries" was directed against China and all true Marxist-Leninist parties. The Soviet Union had already overtaken the United States in May, 1964, "in the race to build India up militarily"; in a year and a half since the Sino-Indian border war it had "committed itself to slightly more military aid to India than has the United States." Soviet military aid to India no longer inspired resentment in the US; "Russia and the U.S.A. are now following a parallel course in relation to India." India "tops the list of newly independent countries to which the Soviet Union gives economic aid. This aid is obviously intended to encourage the Nehru Government in its policies directed against communism, against the people, and against the socialist countries. . . ."[112] When in September, 1964, *Tass* released an Indian official statement on an alleged Chinese intrusion into Sikkim, *Hsinhua* came out promptly with a rejoinder pointing to fresh evidence

of Indo-Soviet "collusion" against China. "The revisionist Khrushchev clique has stopped at nothing to oppose China. It has been some time since the two [Russia and India] have closely colluded, but now the revisionist Khrushchev clique propaganda machine has not refrained from scrounging around in the garbage heap of Indian rumours to pick up rubbish for its anti-China campaign."[113] India and Yugoslavia were the only "small adverse current" at the second nonaligned summit conference in Cairo in October, 1964, doing "everything they could to distort the essence of the policies of peaceful coexistence and non-alignment."[114] Behind this attack on India, Yugoslavia, and like-minded neutralist countries was, once again, the extreme Chinese sensitiveness about losing, even in part, the cherished identity of the People's Republic as leader of the world anti-imperialist front.

## AFTER NEHRU'S DEATH

The Chinese, however, seemed to regard the death of Nehru in June, 1964, and the ouster of Khrushchev in October with a measured hope of improved relations with India. Between June, when Lal Bahadur Shastri became India's prime minister, and early the next year, Peking Radio somewhat played down its anti-Indian propaganda. In a gesture of some significance, the Chinese chose the occasion of the Cairo nonaligned conference to make India their last offer to date to settle the border question by negotiation, with the 1963 Colombo proposals as the basis.[115] The offer was all the more meaningful because of Shastri's unsuccessful effort to persuade the Cairo conference to adopt a resolution Peking might have been construed to be anti-Chinese. Even a lack of positive response from India to the offer did not provoke Peking's anger. Chou En-lai, in his report to the first session of the Third National People's Congress in Peking in December, 1964, reiterated China's desire to settle the border dispute peacefully, and added, "but if India is determined not to have negotiations, no matter; we can wait."[116] What the Chinese leaders were waiting for was not so much a

change of outlook in New Delhi as a major change of policy in Moscow. Soon after the fall of Khrushchev, they summed up under twelve heads the "bad things" that the Soviet leader had done. "He [Khrushchev] backed the reactionaries of India in their armed attack on socialist China and, together with the United States, incited and helped them to perpetrate armed provocations against China by giving them military aid."[117] Linked with this was Khrushchev's strategy of peaceful transition and peaceful co-existence, which was also attacked. The Chinese were thus expecting a change in the Twentieth Congress general line after the fall of its chief architect.

The Chinese reverted to attacks on India when its hopes for a change of policy in Moscow were frustrated, and it was convinced that Khrushchev's successors were in no mood to give in on many major plank of the Twentieth Congress general line. They had scored a success in India when the Indian Communist party split in 1964 and the "pro-China" elements formed their own organization, the Communist Party of India (Marxist). In January, 1965, following the arrest of many of the CPI(M) leaders, Peking came out with a sharp denunciation of Shastri's Government: "Since his assumption of power, Shastri has followed Nehru's long-discredited reactionary home and foreign policies, thereby precipitating an even more acute state of crisis in India's domestic and foreign policies."[118] *For the first time the Indian Government was given a reactionary class character; it was described as a "dictatorship of the big bourgeoisie and big landlords."* India's peace moves in Vietnam in the spring of 1965 drew Chinese wrath; these, in Chinese estimate, betrayed the interest of the Asian and African peoples and helped US "aggression" in Vietnam.[119] It was, however, Shastri's visit to Moscow in May that convinced the Chinese that the new Indian Premier would follow the Nehru line as much as the successors of Khrushchev would follow the Khrushchev line. In *People's Daily,* Shastri now came to be described as a "rare anti-China cavalier as well as Washington's pet"; the Russians were taken to task for "applauding" Shastri's anti-China "slan-

ders"; and the conclusion became "clear" that "the Soviet leaders and the Indian reactionaries are bedfellows in opposing China." The Chinese anger at the new leadership in Moscow was greater than their anger at Shastri. "From the moment the new Soviet leaders came to power, they vowed to the Indian reactionaries that Soviet policy towards India would remain unchanged. Now they have made a heavy capital investment in Shastri. This demonstrates their determination to unite with India in opposition to China."[120] From then on, the Chinese kept India under unrelenting propaganda attack. In May, 1965, they supported Pakistan in the Indo-Pakistan "little war" in the Rann of Kutch on the west coast; *this was the first Chinese intervention in a conflict between the two partners of the subcontinent.*[121] In August, when large-scale armed infiltration from Pakistan created a major crisis in Kashmir, *Peking Review* published a long article by Shih Yen on India's "double-alignment." It said significantly that India was receiving the same kind of military aid from the Soviet Union and the US and suggested that the Russians made no condition that their arms could not be used against China. "Both American and Soviet 'aid' serve India's purpose of opposing China and [of] foreign expansion and arms expansion and war preparations, all of which endanger the security of India's neighbour and peace."[122]

## PAKISTAN GETS AN IDENTITY

Since China needed Pakistan's friendship mainly to put pressure on India, the tactics employed to win it were designed to transfer from India to Pakistan the charisma that goes in the Asian-African world with the pursuit of policies of "national independence" and "opposition to imperialism." The Chinese could not openly proclaim Pakistan as a nonaligned country, but they made it clear, as already noted, that Pakistan's "independent foreign and domestic policy" made it more progressive than India which had become subservient to America. China did succeed in giving Pakistan a sense of belonging to the Asian-

African community; this was what the Pakistanis wanted but could not get in the fifties. In what Bhutto called in 1963 an agonizing reappraisal of Pakistan's foreign policy,[123] there was a conscious attempt to capture an Asian-African ethos, and this is where the Chinese helped. Chou En-lai, addressing a special session of the West Pakistan Provincial Assembly in Lahore on February 4, 1964, praised Pakistan's "unremitting struggles" to win "victories in defending national independence . . . and in opposing foreign pressure and threats." Pakistan had made "positive contributions to the strengthening of Afro-Asian solidarity"; its international status was "rising with each passing day."[124] Toward this happy achievement, the Chinese made their own contribution. The Chinese had made a big event of Bhutto's visit to Peking in March, 1963, to sign the border agreement with Ch'en Yi; the faithful ten thousand had turned up to cheer and applaud the Pakistan foreign minister's speech. "Peking rolled out the red carpet on March 2 [1965] to welcome President Field Marshal Ayub Khan on his first state visit to China." He was given a "tumultuous public welcome," and a Chinese reporter announced with a flourish of revolutionary fantasy that "a new chapter in the 2,000-year history of Sino-Pakistani relations, one which will cement the ties of friendship between two close neighbours, is being written during President Ayub's visit." Liu Shao-chi, in welcoming the visiting President, declared that "on China's part, friendship with Pakistan is a long-term policy. It is not a matter of expediency," a sentiment which was reciprocated in almost identical words by Ayub Khan at a reception held on March 5 in the Hall of People.[125] Earlier, on March 4, Mao and Ayub Khan had a "friendly and cordial talk." The communique on the visit described Ayub's conversations with Liu Shao-chi and Chou En-lai as "frank, sincere and friendly," and "both parties were highly satisfied with the results." Apart from a decision to sign a cultural agreement "as soon as possible," the visit did not produce any immediate measure to develop state re-

lations; if problems of mutual security were discussed, nothing was mentioned about them, although the Chinese support for Pakistan during the Rann of Kutch conflict indicated retrospectively that the Chinese leaders did give Ayub Khan some assurance of political and moral support in the case of "aggression" by India. Pakistan affirmed support for the Chinese claim to Taiwan and received from China reciprocal support for its general line on Kashmir. Concrete evidence of closer political cooperation between the two countries could be found in their identical approach to the proposed second summit conference of Asian-African countries.[126] On March 25, Ch'en Yi arrived in Rawalpindi to sign the Sino-Pakistani boundary protocol with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and said at an official banquet that between the two countries there now existed "a boundary of peace on the ground and a traffic line of friendship in the air."[127] Chou En-lai made a brief halt at Rawalpindi on June 2 on his way to Africa and was treated to an enthusiastic mass welcome; no official statement was issued on his talks with President Ayub.[128] But Pakistan soon reached a landmark in its new quest of an Afro-Asian identity when, on June 28, Ayub Khan joined Nasser, Sukarno, and Chou En-lai in Cairo to discuss the postponement of the Asian-African conference in Algiers following the sudden overthrow of Ben Bella and the capture of power in Algeria by a military junta.[129]

The Chinese lost no occasion to highlight the slowing down of American arms and economic aid to Pakistan or to publicize Pakistani sentiments for an independent foreign and economic policy. When in July the US Government asked the Aid Pakistan Consortium to postpone its meeting to consider Pakistan's foreign aid requirements for the third five-year plan, it came as welcome grist to the Chinese propaganda machine. *People's Daily,* in an editorial, praised Pakistan's refusal to "succumb to foreign pressure" and reaffirmed China's support "in its just struggle against US imperialist intervention in its internal affairs."[130]

## SHADOW WAR IN KASHMIR

On August 5, Pakistan Radio announced that "freedom fighters" in Kashmir had risen against the Indian "occupation regime" and set up a "Revolutionary Council" and a clandestine radio station of their own. The Government of India promptly accused Pakistan of having sent several thousand infiltrators, armed with Pakistani army weapons and led by officers of the Pakistani army, to subvert the legally constituted government of Kashmir. Thus began a second Pakistani attempt in eighteen years to conquer Kashmir by camouflaged war. There is no reliable evidence that Pakistan had coordinated its action in Kashmir with China or that the Chinese had either trained Pakistani troops in guerrilla warfare or supplied them with arms, although reports to this effect appeared in the Indian press. However, Pakistan had certainly found strength in China's endorsement of its position that Kashmir remained an unsettled territorial dispute and that a settlement could be arrived at only on the basis of the will of the Kashmiri people. The Chinese, as already noted, had succeeded in unsettling what the Indians had regarded as the settled issue of Kashmir's accession. Between 1963 and 1965, Indian Kashmir was rent by political and communal tensions. The Government headed by Bakshi Ghulam Muhammed was forced to resign, and Nehru released Sheikh Abdullah from prison in the hope that he would be able to stabilize the situation in Kashmir. The Sheikh—like the volatile politician that he has always been—soon made it clear that his personal preference was for an independent Kashmir,[131] protected by, and treaty-bound to, both India and Pakistan. His meeting with Chou En-lai in Algiers led to his recall by the Indian Government from a foreign tour and subsequently to his rearrest, but it added a new dimension to the Kashmir question.[132] The Pakistan Government probably calculated that there would be a mass upheaval in Kashmir on August 7, the anniversary of the ousting by the Indian Government in 1953 of Sheikh Abdullah as Kahmir's prime minister. They had prob-

ably sent a large number of armed infiltrators into Kashmir to transform the expected upheaval into an armed uprising. For more than fifteen years Pakistan had expected the Security Council to find a solution to the Kashmir problem and had relied on the Western powers to bring this about. It was perturbed to see the Government of India progressively integrating Kashmir with the Indian Union and reducing it to the level of a constituent state. As long as Pakistan could count on Western support in the Security Council, it could have presented its people at least with a measure of political gain over India. Pakistan's new relationship with China cooled off Anglo-American support for its position on Kashmir, while the flow of Western Arms aid to India convinced Pakistan that the old strategy on Kashmir was spent. The pace of integration of Kashmir with the Indian Union frightened the Pakistan Government; the feeling in Rawalpindi was that India was taking advantage of its improved relations with the United States and the American coolness toward Pakistan to complete the integration of Kashmir. Seen in this light, it is not difficult to understand why Pakistan sent the infiltrators to the Valley. India regarded the infiltrators as irregulars of the Pakistan army and was persuaded from captured documents that the entire operation was being directed from across the border. On August 12, U Thant appealed to India to refrain from retaliatory action against Pakistan, while Shastri, in a broadcast, described the infiltration as a "thinly disguised armed attack on our country," which "has to be met as such." Pakistan projected the incidents in Kashmir as a popular uprising against Indian rule; in India, patriotic passion rose to a high pitch and demanded strong military action. It was reflective of the changed mood in both countries that the fighting in Kashmir soon spilled over the cease-fire line. The Indian army was given orders to advance to the points from which the infiltrators were coming into Kashmir. By the end of August, Indian troops captured the strategic Uri-Poonch bulge in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, which contained the main routes of infiltration; the Indians now could, if they wanted to, advance

toward the capital of Pakistani Kashmir. The fighting was clearly going against the infiltrators. It became apparent that Pakistan could not save the situation without direct military intervention.

This intervention occurred on September 1 when the Pakistani army crossed into the Chhamb sector of Jammu, violating the international line, but keeping the fighting still within the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The Pakistani attack, which was mounted with Patton tanks and armored vehicles, was cleverly designed to cut off the Valley of Kashmir from Jammu. It apparently, though somewhat surprisingly, took the Indian army unawares; India was able to blunt the Pakistani thrust only with the prompt use of air power in support of the ground forces, thus risking an escalation of the conflict. Shastri accused Pakistan of having launched a "regular attack" on India, and declared, " . . . we will certainly meet it."[133] The Pakistan air force now joined in the fighting. For four more days the clash remained confined to the disputed state of Jammu and Kashmir. But the direct involvement of the armed forces of India and Pakistan in the clash was enough to alert the United Nations as well as the major world powers. The Security Council met in an emergency session and called for an immediate cease-fire. An unofficial version of the report of the Chief UN military observer to U Thant on the infiltration confirmed that the "invaders" had come into the Valley from across the cease-fire line.

## FULL-SCALE WAR

Indian troops crossed the Punjab frontier on September 6 and attacked simultaneously in the Lahore and Sialkot sectors. Thus what for eighteen years had remained an Indo-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir was transformed into a war between the two partners of the subcontinent. It was the first full-scale war between two sovereign states of Asia since the Second World War; the India-China border war, like the India-Pakistan Kashmir conflict, had been fought over disputed frontier areas. Each

country accused the other of "naked and fullscale aggression." The Indian defense minister, Chavan, claimed that India had attacked in Punjab "in order to forestall the opening of a second front by Pakistan."[134] President Ayub Khan grimly told his countrymen, "We are at war"; while Foreign Minister Bhutto, in a communication to the chairman of the Security Council, described the Indian attack as the "greatest possible violation of the UN charter."[135] He affirmed Pakistan's right under the Charter to individual and collective self-defense. For Pakistan this was the testing time for its allies and friends; "the future course of diplomacy," Bhutto added at a press conference, "will be determined by the definitive and demonstrative attitude of the various countries at this moment."[136] The warning implied was primarily for the United States. However, it was already too late, for President Johnson's first diplomatic action on the India-Pakistan war was to suspend military supplies to both Pakistan and India. A shipment of spare parts to the Pakistani armed forces was canceled about the time the war broke out.[137] This was a crippling blow to Pakistan's ability to wage mechanized warfare for more than six or eight weeks. Pakistan officially asked a number of countries for military and economic assistance, but its hopes were mainly riveted on Turkey and Iran, allies in CENTO. The prime minister of Iran and the foreign minister of Turkey arrived in Rawalpindi on September 14, after it had been known that the US had prevented both from sending major war equipment to Pakistan.[138] The great disappointment of the Pakistan Government was reflected in an official spokesman's announcement on September 11 that "Pakistan will shortly ask for material help from all countries, whether or not they are members of the United Nations."

The war was rapidly escalated on the ground and in the air and was fought practically all along the border of West Pakistan and the Indian States of Punjab, Rajasthan, and Jammu and Kashmir. While air battles were confined to the actual area of land fighting and to major bases and civilian areas adjacent

to the border, air raid sirens were heard and a blackout was observed in Delhi, Karachi, Bombay, Dacca, and Calcutta. The entire Pakistani navy patrolled the Arabian Sea off India's western coast, and there was some shelling of a few Indian coastal positions. India carefully kept East Pakistan out of the war, partly because it did not wish to fight on three fronts at the same time (a major portion of the Indian army stood guard along the entire Sino-Indian frontier), and partly because this was considered to be politically expedient.[139] Committed to the war, however, were almost the entire military resources of West Pakistan and a major portion of the Indian military strength.[140]

## CONSEQUENCES OF THE WAR

It was, nevertheless, a peculiar war in some respects. Both Pakistan and India were fighting for limited political objectives —Pakistan in order to get Kashmir or, in the least, to breathe the Kashmir problem back to life as the major war-or-peace issue in the subcontinent; India to defeat this very Pakistani objective by breaking the backbone of the Pakistani war machine. Both Pakistan and India could be said to have had a grand strategic design against each other and in relation to China, but, as the war went on, it became evident that neither had a clear war strategy and commanders in the field were uncertain about their mission.[141] They did not know what kind of war they were expected to fight, an all-out general war, a limited war for clearly defined limited objectives, a prestige campaign, or a campaign of attrition. In Kashmir until August 30, Pakistan actually fought a political war with military subversion; if the strategy was protracted guerrilla war, it failed because of lack of adequate cooperation from the Kashmiri people. Technically, therefore, the Kashmir operations were neither a war nor a campaign; they were fought in relatively minor tactical engagements. The only major battle between the armored formations of both armies on the soil of Jammu and Kashmir took place after the Pakistani offensive in the Chhamb

area on September 1. After September 6, both armies fought what was essentially a defensive war of attrition, with the mutual objective of blunting each other's striking power. Six hundred tanks took part in what Ayub Khan described as "history's greatest tank battle" in a single day in the Sialkot sector.[142] India had no real war objective in Pakistan; the capture of big cities like Lahore and Sialkot was from the beginning outside the terms of the Indian thrust. In Pakistan, on the other hand, there was genuine fear that the Indians would take major cities and overrun large population areas; this writer heard from several Pakistanis in New York of the near-panic conditions that had seized the threatened inhabitants of Lahore. A young Pakistani lady studying at Columbia University told the writer that the women of Lahore were getting ready to "offer resistance" and, if necessary, to burn themselves to death rather than fall into the hands of the Indian troops. Although Indian and Pakistani figures of the casualties in the war varied greatly, there is no doubt that both countries suffered substantial losses, of equipment, including tanks and aircraft, as well as human life.

The political and economic losses were even more crippling. Diplomatic relations were not broken off, but the war destroyed the results of many years of Indo-Pakistan labor to stabilize relations, and pushed back the two countries to their prenatal hostility. Rail, road, waterways, and air traffic were broken off; telephone and telegraph lines were snapped. Members of the sharply reduced diplomatic missions were harassed and, in Pakistan, treated almost like prisoners.[143] Pakistan tried to incite the Sikhs against the Hindus, and the Muslim minority in India with inflammatory religious propaganda; India tried to take advantage of the differences between the eastern and western wings of Pakistan, of the simmering hostility between the Pakhtoons of the northwest frontier and the Pakistan Government.[144] Neither country, however, was able to count success in internal subversion in enemy territory. The war aroused the most fervent patriotic feelings in both populations and in-

fused in each a sense of victory.[145] Muslims in India and Hindus in Pakistan vied with the majority communities to demonstrate their loyalty to the state, which demonstrated, more pitiably than ever before in Indo-Pakistan history, the insecurity that attended the life of vast ethnic and religious minorities in the subcontinent. Cultural relations between the two countries ceased to exist. This hurt East Pakistan more than the West. Dacca Radio was ordered to stop playing Tagore music. East Pakistani booksellers and publishers were forbidden to import books from West Bengal.

The war introduced traumatic changes in power relationships in Asia. From the Asian point of view, the most significant developments were the virtual dissolution of the Pakistan-US military alliance, Soviet-American cooperation at the Security Council to achieve a cease-fire, and the emergence of the Peking-Jakarta-Rawalpindi axis, as a brief anti-status quo phenomenon. India lost some of its traditional friends in the Arab world and in Africa; Syria, Iraq, Kuwait, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco were among the countries that expressed varying degrees of sympathy for the Kashmiri people's "struggle for self-determination." A majority of the Afro-Asian governments were anxious to see the war come to an end and adopted a posture of neutrality.[146] A notable Indian gain was the Malayasian opposition to Pakistani infiltration in Kashmir; this led to severance by Pakistan of diplomatic relations with Kuala Lumpur. The biggest Indian gain, however, was the support it was able to obtain at the Security Council for its basic stand on the war—that it began, not with the Indian crossing of the border of Pakistan Punjab, but with the Pakistani infiltration in Kashmir on August 5. From the Indian, and the larger Asian, even world, point of view, the two important developments at the UN during the India-Pakistan war were the Soviet-US agreement on major aspects of the crisis, and, secondly, the refusal by the United States and Britain to link a cease-fire with the root cause of the conflict—Kashmir. The most remarkable single outcome of the war was the emergence of the USSR as mediator

between India and Pakistan. The diplomatic correspondent of the BBC described this as "perhaps the most important international event in the East-West dialogue since the signing of the test ban treaty in 1963."[147]

## THE SOVIETS AND THE WAR

The India-Pakistan war provided the Soviet Union with a tremendous opportunity to expand its influence in South Asia. Moscow could anticipate relatively easily that Pakistan's subversion of Kashmir would meet with strong American disapproval. Having regarded the North Vietnamese infiltration in South Vietnam as an "aggression" that had to be broken with a massive deployment of American arms, the US Government could hardly indulge Pakistan in its armed infiltration in Kashmir or reject the Indian contention that it amounted to aggression. The Vietnam war made the US Government extremely sensitive to any country's friendly relations with China; friendship offered to Peking by Pakistan was almost the betrayal of an alliance. In any case, with the seriously escalated Vietnam war in hand, the United States was hardly in a position to play a major role in the South Asia crisis. The Vietnam war had enhanced India's political and strategic importance to the United States; the various Indian peace proposals in the spring of 1965 had not been greatly injurious to the American political stand on the Vietnam question; some of these had even been promptly welcomed in Washington. Pakistan's new stance on China foreclosed American support to Rawalpindi.[148] The Soviet leaders therefore saw considerable opportunity to maneuver. The emergence of China on the South Asian scene as a friend of Pakistan lent an impetus to Soviet diplomacy.

The Russians would appear to have played their cards with admirable skill and dexterity. The first Soviet comment on the war came in *Pravda* on August 24 when the fighting was still confined to Kashmir, but the cease-fire line had collapsed, and it could spill over beyond Kashmir any day. *Pravda* reported

that "disturbing news" had been received from the "Indian" state of Jammu and Kashmir: an "armed conflict" had broken out between the two neighboring countries. *Pravda* was reluctant to blame Pakistan for the fighting: "Indian and Pakistan papers have given different versions of its causes. *We shall not discuss which of the two versions more accurately reflects the course of events.*" "The Soviet Union," *Pravda* went on, "highly appreciates the general orientation of India's foreign policy and its devotion to the principle of peaceful co-existence between countries with different social systems. It follows the policy of non-alignment and the Soviet Union has deep respect for the prestige of India which, as a great power, is playing a remarkable role in international affairs." As important as this high praise for India was the neutral stance *Pravda* for the first time took on the actual conflict in Kashmir. Throughout the period of the war, Soviet media used the utmost caution in reporting, or commenting on the developments. There was no mention of Pakistani infiltration in Kashmir till September 6 and thereafter only when Soviet media was quoting Indian sources; each Indian source was carefully balanced off by quoting a Pakistani source. In its South Asian broadcasts Moscow Radio scrupulously avoided the word *war*, and described the events as "conflict" or "military conflict," though in home broadcasts expressions like *invasion* and *war* were freely used.[149]

In a bold and unprecedented diplomatic initiative on September 4, Kosygin offered Soviet good offices to Pakistan and India for bringing about "negotiations for a peaceful settlement of the differences that have arisen between them." In almost identical letters to Shastri and Ayub Khan, Kosygin proposed an immediate cease-fire and mutual withdrawal to the 1949 cease-fire line, followed by peaceful negotiations.[150] Both sides "can count" on the good offices of the Soviet Union "in this matter." "We are ready for this," said Kosygin, "if both sides consider this desirable." This Soviet intervention, *before* the Security Council had become active in the conflict but after Pakistan had attacked in Jammu, was prompted, Kosygin added, by the

close physical proximity of the area of the conflict to the Soviet Union, and by the distinct possibility that the "tension in Kashmir" would develop into a "military conflict on a larger scale," which would benefit only "foreign forces" which were trying to "disunite and bring into opposition those states which have freed themselves from the colonial yoke." Kosygin told both Shastri and Ayub Khan that this was not the time "to put to the fore the question of causes behind the conflict or to seek who is right and who is wrong." The main task was "to stop the tanks and silence the guns." Meaningfully, the Soviet Premier's letter to Ayub Khan contained *the first recorded Soviet compliment to Pakistan's foreign policy:* "That the Government of Pakistan has sought, especially of late, to direct its efforts to the maintenance of world peace warrants us to hope . . ."

In addition to its own unilateral initiative, the Soviet Union joined in the Security Council's effort to obtain a quick cease-fire in Kashmir. When the crisis came up before the Security Council on September 4, the Soviet delegate, P. D. Morozov, blamed the "imperialists" for "always" seeking to "exploit the Kashmir issue to fan strife between the peoples of India and Pakistan." The Soviet people, in contrast, were "sincere friends" of the peoples of the two neighboring countries. They wished to see the bloodshed stop and they believed that the two countries "should settle their *dispute* peacefully with consideration for mutual interests."[151] Here was another subtle concession to the Pakistani point of view—the open Soviet acknowledgment at the Security Council that Kashmir was a "dispute" between India and Pakistan. The Russians voted for the first time for a Security Council resolution on Kashmir calling for a cease-fire and troop withdrawal to the 1949 cease-fire line.

## CHINA INTERVENES

The Chinese Government now intervened directly in the Kashmir war.

It is tempting to speculate whether, or to what extent, Chinese intervention on Pakistan's behalf was prompted by the Soviet

peace initiative and the explicit Soviet attempt to move closer to Pakistan. The Chinese foreign minister made an unannounced stopover in Rawalpindi on September 4 on his way to Syria and Africa. After six hours of secret conversations with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, he announced at a press conference Peking's unreserved support for Pakistan.[152] Ch'en Yi "sternly denounced India's provocations," its "provocative acts of violating the cease-fire line and kindling and aggravating the conflict." He "firmly" supported "Pakistan's just action in striking back." Ch'en Yi also announced China's "complete sympathy and support" for the Kashmiri people's "just struggle to resist India's tyrannical rule" and declared that the Kashmir question should be settled according to the pledge made by India and Pakistan to the Kashmir people and in accordance with their aspirations." Breaking a month's silence on the events in Kashmir, Peking media came out on September 5 with a report that was clearly designed to strengthen the Pakistani position. It was India that had "whipped up tension in Kashmir" and, crossing the cease-fire line, "invaded" an area under Pakistani control. Pakistan hit back "later" by crossing the cease-fire line to attack in Jammu. To "justify the Indian attack on Kashmir," the Indian Government had "branded the just revolt of the people in the Indian sector as Pakistani infiltration." Lal Bahadur Shastri (the report continued) had told opposition leaders on August 15 that the attack in Kashmir was being directed by Chinese officers, a "lie" that had been "demolished" by the Kashmir Revolutionary Council and the Pakistan Government. Only after giving this "factual" report on Kashmir did Peking Radio announce Ch'en Yi's strong support for Pakistan.[153]

The Soviet Union and China were thus locked in a grim unconcealed competition to bend an Asian war to serve the purpose of their respective ideology and power interests. From then on every Soviet and Chinese move was to a large extent motivated to counter one another's diplomatic, ideological, and geopolitical thrust during the war.

On September 6, Arthur Goldberg of the United States, who

was chairman of the Security Council, summoned an emergency meeting of the Council to consider the grave escalation of the war. The Soviets gave their full support to the Council resolution asking for a cease-fire followed by mutual withdrawal of all military personnel to positions occupied before August 5. The resolution asked the Secretary-General to arrange for supervision of the cease-fire and military withdrawal and to report back to the Council.

Pakistan was against a simple cease-fire; its strategy was to secure the Security Council's intervention to organize a plebiscite in Kashmir. Not only did the Council's resolution not mention Kashmir, the call for withdrawal to pre-August 5 positions amounted to vindication of the Indian stand that the war was started by Pakistan with its military infiltration in Kashmir. The Security Council resolution of September 6 was acted upon neither by Pakistan nor by India. On September 7 the Soviet Government made, through Tass, another appeal to India and Pakistan to stop the war, effect military withdrawals to the cease-fire line, and return to the conference table, under Russian good offices, "if they deemed it useful."[154] This statement was significant for two reasons. It contained an oblique denunciation of the role the Chinese People's Republic was playing in the India-Pakistan conflict: "Present developments in that region only play into the hands of those outside forces that seek to disunite and set at loggerheads the states that have cast off the colonial yoke." Secondly, it reflected a hardening of the Soviet mind with regard to Pakistan probably in view of suspected Chinese influence on its government. The Tass statement began thus: "The Soviet Government has urged India, whose policy of nonalignment has earned broad international recognition, and Pakistan, to stop military operations immediately . . . "; there was no longer any compliment to Pakistan's contribution to world peace. However, the statement made no mention of the Pakistani infiltration in Kashmir or of the Pakistani attack in Jammu or of the Indian counterattack. Soviet concern over the "armed conflict" was increasing, it said, be-

cause it was taking place in "an area neighboring on the frontiers of the Soviet Union." The Soviet Government appreciated that the problems between India and Pakistan had great "complexity" but was convinced that a peaceful solution could still be found.

The Chinese Government also issued a statement on September 7 on the Indo-Pakistan war, after a meeting between Chou En-lai and the Pakistani ambassador, A. M. Raja.[155] It began with a terse premise: "On September 6, 1965, India suddenly launched an armed attack on Pakistan." The statement accused India of "naked aggression," of waging war on the people of Kashmir whose resistance was "entirely proper." The UN was accused of being partial to India. "Eighteen years have passed during which the United Nations looked on without lifting a finger while India acted lawlessly in Kashmir. The UN did not breathe a single word when India violated the cease-fire line. But as soon as Pakistan fought back in self-defence, the UN came out to meditate. . . . On the Kashmir question, the UN has once again proved itself to be a tool of US imperialism and *its* partners in their attempt to control the whole world." Apart from this indirect gibe, the statement had nothing to say about the Soviet role in the India-Pakistan war. Its aim evidently was to fortify Pakistan's rejection of the Security Council resolution of September 6.

On September 8 the Pakistan envoy had a meeting with Liu Shao-chi. The next day the Chinese Government sent a note to India protesting against "repeated intrusions" by Indian troops into Chinese territory in both the western and eastern sectors in July and August.[156] Ominously it linked these "intrusions" with the Indo-Pakistan conflict. "Indian provocations in August in the western sector cannot be regarded as isolated cases. They are by no means accidental, occurring as they did when the Indian Government was carrying out armed aggression against Pakistan." The note made three specific demands: India must dismantle all "aggressive military structures built on or beyond the China-Sikkim border; withdraw its ag-

gressive forces"; and stop all its "aggressive" provocations. Otherwise it must "bear responsibility for all the consequences."

As the Chinese note reached New Delhi, Peking Radio was beaming to India and Pakistan the first warning of "action" on the Sino-Indian border, given by a Chinese vice-premier, Hsieh Fu-chih. Addressing a ceremonial function in Lhasa on the occasion of the inauguration of Tibet as an autonomous region within the Chinese republic, Hsieh, who was leading the Central Government delegation, spoke of "300 ground and air violations" of Tibetan territory by India since 1962. In an attempt to rouse Tibetan nationalist sentiments against India, he said:

> The Indian reactionaries have always had the ambition of expansion and aggression against China's Tibet and Sinkiang. . . . In August alone, Indian troops intruded into China's territory in the western sector on five consecutive occasions. . . . If they do not stay content, but start enlarging their intrusions, *we will have to take action.* . . . The Tibetan people and people throughout the country should maintain sharp vigilance against this act of India.[157] [Italics added]

Hsieh's speech was front-paged in all Peking newspapers and was the lead item in several Peking Radio news bulletins directed to India and Pakistan. The Chinese Government now went on rapidly escalating its political war on behalf of Pakistan. Speaking to an airport audience in Algiers, Ch'en Yi likened the Indian "aggression" toward Pakistan with the American "aggression" in Vietnam. Chou En-lai at an official reception in Peking on September 9 accused India of extending armed aggression against Pakistan;[158] next day Chinese media came out with a strong attack on the Tass statement of September 7 for making no discrimination between "aggression and its victims."[159] Chinese propaganda began to picture a Soviet-American collusion at the UN against Pakistan.[160] About September 10–11 a distinct change was noticeable in Chinese reporting on the India-Pakistan war. Hitherto the Pakistani forces were shown to be

fighting mainly a defensive war; now Peking media started reporting Pakistani successes and Indian reverses.

## SINO-SOVIET TUG OF WAR

Chinese support appeared to strengthen Pakistan's political conditions for a cease-fire. These were spelled out officially on September 9—complete withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani troops from the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir; induction of an Afro-Asian UN force to maintain peace and security; and a plebiscite within three months of a cease-fire. India rejected the package. There was no support for it in the United States either. *Dawn's* Washington correspondent cabled on September 9 that the US Government had "rejected the Pakistani view that there must be an agreement to let the Kashmiris decide their future before an effective cease-fire can take place and one which will be durable. . . . It is noteworthy that throughout the present crisis in and over Kashmir, the US has gone out of its way to avoid any reference to the genesis of the dispute." The Soviet strategy was to obtain a cease-fire through the UN and to bring India and Pakistan to the conference table under Soviet auspices. Pakistan was, however, holding strongly to its political demands, and when U Thant arrived in Rawalpindi on September 9, he found the Pakistani leaders unrelenting. The Soviet attitude toward Pakistan appeared to be hardening as the latter stuck to its rejection of a simple cease-fire and withdrawal of troops to positions held before August 5. Brezhnev, at a Soviet-Rumanian friendship rally in the Kremlin palace on September 10, stressed the strength of Soviet-Indian friendship: "With India, we are bound by a friendship which has already become traditional. We have become accustomed to valuing and respecting the peace-loving foreign policy of India. . . ." He had no word of praise for Pakistan, but he stressed the Soviet Union's wish to develop "good neighborly relations with Pakistan" and noted a certain "understanding" of Soviet "striving" in that country. Brezhnev's chief concern seemed to

be to rescue the India-Pakistan situation from "those forces . . . which already exist, which will be gladdened and will try to make capital out of the aggravation of India-Pakistan relations and *sometimes add oil to the fire.*"[161]

Unable to persuade Pakistan to agree to an unconditional cease-fire, U Thant arrived in New Delhi on September 12. His two days of talks with Shastri led to Indian readiness for a simple mutual cease-fire on the morning of September 16 with certain conditions. Shastri, however, made it clear that India reserved the right to wipe out the Pakistani infiltrators from Kashmir; it would not withdraw from the key positions its troops had captured beyond the 1948 cease-fire line in order to seal off the main infiltration routes; and it would not make any deal on Kashmir as a price for the war's end.[162] U Thant wrote to the two governments on September 14 that since both sides had raised conditions, he was obliged to refer the matter back to the Security Council.

The failure of the U Thant mission to the subcontinent brought forth yet another direct appeal from Moscow to India and Pakistan for an immediate end to the hostilities. Tass, in a second statement on September 13, using somewhat more forceful language, and expressing Moscow's growing concern over the expansion of the war, asked the two governments to be "reasonable" and to realize what was at stake.[163] There were forces (other than the imperialists) which sought to "profit by worsened Indian-Pakistani relations"; by their "incendiary statements," they were pushing the two belligerents "towards further aggravation of the military conflict." If these elements were allowed to succeed, *"many states may find themselves drawn to the conflict one by one."* This was a "dangerous prospect which would have the gravest consequences not only for the peoples of the region where the conflict began, but also far beyond it." Tass repeated the offer of Soviet good offices to bring about a summit meeting between India and Pakistan and ended with an explicit warning to China: "The whole world, all states should warn those who facilitate the fanning of the conflict by

be to rescue the India-Pakistan situation from "those forces . . . which already exist, which will be gladdened and will try to make capital out of the aggravation of India-Pakistan relations and *sometimes add oil to the fire.*"[161]

Unable to persuade Pakistan to agree to an unconditional cease-fire, U Thant arrived in New Delhi on September 12. His two days of talks with Shastri led to Indian readiness for a simple mutual cease-fire on the morning of September 16 with certain conditions. Shastri, however, made it clear that India reserved the right to wipe out the Pakistani infiltrators from Kashmir; it would not withdraw from the key positions its troops had captured beyond the 1948 cease-fire line in order to seal off the main infiltration routes; and it would not make any deal on Kashmir as a price for the war's end.[162] U Thant wrote to the two governments on September 14 that since both sides had raised conditions, he was obliged to refer the matter back to the Security Council.

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their incendiary statements and by their policy that they thereby assume grave responsibility for such action. No government has any right to add fuel to the flames."

The Tass statement was significant because it showed Moscow's growing concern not only over incendiary Chinese statements but also over Peking's "policy." The Soviets were afraid that Chinese involvement in the India-Pakistan war might lead to a much greater and wider conflagration from which they themselves might not stay out.[164] The Tass statement, however, seemed to have had different impacts on India and Pakistan. On September 13 the Government of India rejected the Chinese note of four days earlier but offered to send an "independent and neutral" observer to inspect and report on the existence of Indian military structures in Chinese territory beyond the border of Sikkim.[165] The Indian note, moderately worded, denied that such structures existed and rejected any link between Kashmir and Sino-Indian relations. "The Kashmir question and India's unfortunate relationship with Pakistan . . . have nothing to do with the Sino-Indian border question." In Pakistan, Bhutto told newsmen on September 14 that the war would not end until the Security Council had accepted Pakistan's three-point proposal for a plebiscite in Kashmir;[166] two days later, he declared that Pakistan would "reconsider" its attitude to the UN if it did not "honour its commitment for a plebiscite in Kashmir." At a press conference on September 16, Ayub Khan urged the United States to play a "positive role" in the conflict and said that Pakistan would welcome even a Commonwealth peace mission if its essential demand was met.[167]

## THE CHINESE ULTIMATUM

An entirely new situation developed on September 17. At one o'clock in the morning, a deputy director in the Chinese Foreign Office summoned the Indian chargé d'affaires in Peking to hand him a note demanding that India dismantle within three days "all its military works for aggression on the Chinese

side of the China-Sikkim boundary or on the boundary itself."[168] Otherwise, the Indian Government would be responsible for "all the grave consequences" of its inaction.*

The note, trenchantly worded, gave the number of military works as fifty-six, "built in the past few years all over the important passes" along the boundary. The Chinese Government rejected the Indian proposal for impartial and neutral observation; the note said that Peking had made thirteen representations in the past, including a proposal for joint inspection, all of which had been rejected by India. The note once again linked the Sino-Indian border issue with Kashmir and the India-Pakistan conflict and claimed that the same logic of "aggression" that had goaded India to "attack" China in 1962 had now led to the Indian "aggression" against the Kashmiri people and to its war with Pakistan. China was truly non-involved in Kashmir, it claimed, for all that it demanded was that the Kashmir question should be settled on the basis of self-determination, as pledged by both India and Pakistan. Non-involvement did not mean "failure to distinguish between right and wrong," nor did it mean that China could approve of the denial of self-determination to the Kashmiri people or "Indian aggression on Pakistan on the pretext of the Kashmir issue." Then came the first open gibe at Moscow during the Indo-Pakistan war: "And yet some countries have acknowledged Kashmir as belonging to India. In that case, how can one speak of their non-involvement in the dispute?" The Chinese stand on Kashmir and the Indo-Pakistan war was firm. It would "never change," however much India might be helped by the United States, the modern revisionists and the "U.S.-controlled United Nations."

For the six more days that the war continued, the question asked in most world capitals was whether China would attack India to help Pakistan exact from the Security Council and from

*The surprised Indian diplomat asked the Chinese official, "Is this an ultimatum?" The reply was a curt "Yes."

India a plebiscite in Kashmir. The nature and extent of the Sino-Pakistani "collusion" in that crucial week of September, 1965, is still to be determined; the lack of documentable facts leaves room only for reasonable speculation. The leverage that China clearly possessed all along the Sino-Indian border put it eminently in a position to exert military pressure on India. Such pressure would have forced India to fight on widely dispersed fronts against two formidable enemies and might have weakened India's will to resist a plebiscite in Kashmir. Chinese media had already reported that India had deployed part of its US-equipped mountain division to fight the infiltrators in Kashmir; Chinese military action in Ladakh, NEFA, and Sikkim, even if of a limited nature, might have compelled India to divert some of its troops and equipment from Kashmir to Punjab. The Chinese Government was probably not thinking in terms of a major war with India, which would have been logistically more difficult to sustain in 1965 than it had been in 1962, and which might also have been dangerous in view of predictable American reaction. What evidently was in Chinese calculation in the third week of September, with Pakistan's possible concurrence, were limited tactical forays along widely dispersed points of the Sino-Indian border; even a few initial Indian setbacks, not unexpected in the given terrain, might have demoralized Indian public opinion and shaken New Delhi's resolve to stand by its position on Kashmir. This, in the present writer's judgment, was Peking's political motivation, for which the tactical moves of mid September were carefully designed. If Peking could have helped the people of Kashmir attain "self-determination," either as an independent state or in some formal manner tied to Pakistan, it would have won a major victory over India and the Soviet Union; the impact of such an event on Sikkim, Bhutan, and Nagaland would have been incalculable. The Chinese Government might have seen the first concrete step toward the formation of a Himalayan federation friendly to China.

Chinese troops along the Sikkim border were battle-ready,

as part of the brinkmanship posture of Peking. The BBC special correspondent who visited the border, said in a report:

> The Chinese certainly seem to be preparing for an attack. I saw seven Chinese soldiers within 60 yards of me as I reached India's most forward post. Two companies, about 400, were making their way to the summit of a peak to see activities on the road behind the Indian lines. The movements were clearly visible to the naked eye. I watched more activity through binoculars, perhaps 400 yards away. . . . All this activity was taking place in complete disregard of the fact that Indian observers were watching every move.[169]

The Indian Government and especially Prime Minister Shastri tried their best to maintain their *sangfroid,* but an air of anxious uncertainty hung over the Indian capital. A crowded Lok Sabha heard in hushed silence Shastri's report on the Chinese ultimatum. "I am sure Parliament will be concerned about the intentions of the Chinese Government," said Shastri in an understatement; and he echoed the hope of his countrymen when he added, "We do hope that China will not take advantage of our present situation and attack India." In order to avert a Chinese attack, Shastri made three concessions to Peking in his prompt reply to the Chinese note:[170] he virtually admitted the possibility that certain military structures were still left intact on Chinese territory; he accepted the earlier Chinese proposal for joint Sino-Indian inspection; and he agreed to the dismantling of such structures as might be found to be in existence. Shastri, however, knew that the Chinese would not be lacking in excuses if they really wanted to attack. "The might of China will not deter us from defending our territorial integrity," he declared to the applause of every member of Parliament, including the Communists belonging to the supposedly pro-Peking CPI(M).

Peace or a wider, graver war depended now on the decision of the Pakistan Government, or perhaps of one man in Pakistan, Ayub Khan. Strong pressure was brought upon him to

agree to a cease-fire.[171] Arthur Goldberg summoned the Security Council to another emergency session on September 17, and U Thant, in his report, stressed the "dangerous nature of the present situation which is fraught with a serious threat to peace."[172] He asked the Security Council to "demand specifically," under Article 40 of the Charter, immediate cessation of hostilities on pain of sanctions. Goldberg pressed for quick action:

> The Security Council must act . . . firmly, decisively and promptly. . . . Time is the essence of the grave situation. . . . While we are meeting, in direct contradiction to our effort, the Chinese Communists are pursuing a course of action clearly designed to aggravate further the already grave situation and complicate the peace-making effort of the United Nations.[173]

The Soviet representative, Fedorenko, repeated the Russian position on a cease-fire and withdrawal of troops but carefully avoided referring either to the Chinese threat or to his government's mediation offer to India and Pakistan.[174] The meeting was adjourned to provide for secret diplomacy. Council members confabulated for sixteen hours, waiting for the crucial word from Ayub Khan.

The Pakistan President was still hoping and insisting that the Security Council resolution provide for a settlement of the Kashmir dispute. U Thant, in his report referred to earlier, suggested that the Council call for a summit meeting between India and Pakistan "in some country acceptable to both sides to discuss measures which could be taken as the first step in settling the conflict."[175] This was the only open move to relate the UN with Indo-Pakistan talks even if these were to be held in the Soviet Union, and U Thant proposed the creation of a committee to "facilitate the negotiations." There were, however, difficulties in formally linking the Security Council with bilateral Indo-Pakistan talks. India might have suspected that any such formal link would lead to the revival of the plebiscite

proposal under UN auspices and bring a major victory to Pakistan. In the face of such predictable Indian objection, the Soviet Union might have been constrained to veto any resolution containing such a proposal. The draft resolution that appeared before the Security Council for consideration therefore contained no reference to Kashmir or to an Indo-Pakistan summit.[176] It "demanded" a cease-fire at 0700 hours GMT on September 20 and withdrawal of all armed personnel to pre-August 5 positions; it asked the Secretary General to provide assistance to supervise the cease-fire; and it called upon all states to "refrain from any action that could complicate the situation." In the fourth and last clause of the resolution it was stated that after both sides had implemented it, the Council would meet to consider what steps could be taken to resolve the political causes underlying the conflict.

While Ayub Khan kept the Security Council waiting for his decision for five days, taking counsel with his cabinet, the military command and political leaders,[177] the Chinese Government did almost everything within its ability to impress Pakistan with the genuineness of its supportive moves. On September 18, *People's Daily* came out with a wrathful attack on the Soviet Union for "backing the Indian reactionaries" in their "aggression" on the people of Kashmir and on Pakistan, as they had backed them in India's "aggression" on China in 1962.[178] "How could the Indian reactionaries, beset by difficulties both at home and abroad and with limited potential at their disposal, have been so bold as to dare launch aggressive war on such a large scale despite the condemnation of world opinion?" asked the newspaper in an editorial, and hastened to provide the answer. "They have become so bellicose and arrogant because there are people who are backing them. Who are their backers? One is U.S. imperialism, the other is the revisionist leadership of the Soviet Union." The editorial left no doubt that Kashmir was the heart of the crisis. The Soviet Union was "to a great extent responsible" for the India-Pakistan conflict because of its support of Indian "annexation" of Kash-

mir. Soviet policy during the war was to "force Pakistan to accept India's annexation of Kashmir as legitimate." It was "not difficult" to settle the Indo-Pakistan war, affirmed *People's Daily;* all that was required was for India "to give up" its "policy of annexing Kashmir" and recognize the Kashmiri people's right of self-determination. Chinese media went on highlighting the impact the Peking "ultimatum" had produced all over the world, perhaps in order to make a serious impression on the Pakistani mind. Presumably to dissuade Pakistan from agreeing to a cease-fire, Peking media described U Thant's report to the Security Council as an attempt to "compel Pakistan with highhanded measures to accept the 'cease-fire' formula in favour of India";[179] the UN was described as a "sanctuary for the Indian reactionaries."[180] On September 19, the Chinese Government rejected the Indian proposal for joint inspection of the China-Sikkim border and extended the ultimatum by three more days.[181] The tone of the new Chinese note was harsher and more uncompromising than that of the first one; it gave India no condition to fulfill in order to avoid a conflict. On the same day, Peking accused India of a fresh intrusion near Demchok in the western sector of the border, and this complaint was quickly followed up with "the strongest protest." On September 19-20 the Chinese reported a violation of the border by five Indian troops; they were said to have opened fire, and "the fire was returned." The Indians denied that there was any firing at all from their side.

## PAKISTAN ACCEPTS CEASE-FIRE

Ayub Khan apparently realized by September 20 that he could not risk rejecting the Security Council's "demand" for a cease-fire and face sanctions under Chapter 7 of the Charter. What advice he received from his military colleagues, cabinet ministers, and political leaders is not precisely known. It is, however, reasonable to imagine that many of them must have been extremely wary of a joint war with China against India. Ayub himself might also have regarded such a course of events

highly distasteful and dangerous to Pakistan's future. In any case Pakistan's economy and defense were so dependent on Western, especially American, assistance that Ayub could hardly risk economic sanctions by the UN. If he and his close military colleagues knew by September 20 that with the heavy losses suffered by the Pakistani army and air force in two weeks of fighting that Pakistan could not continue the war for more than another ten days (This is what the Pakistan correspondent for the *Times* of London reported in a dispatch about a month after the ceasefire),[182] it was entirely possible that the hard reality of the gains and losses in the battlefield had something to do in shaping the Pakistan President's final decision. His representative to the Security Council's emergency meeting, Law Minister S. M. Zafar, tried to do all that he could to oppose the draft resolution. He wanted the Security Council to condemn Indian "aggression" before calling for a cease-fire; he described U Thant's proposals as "neither precise nor adequate."[183] Shortly before the draft resolution was adopted by the Council on September 20, Zafar declared: "We feel bound to warn and put on record that unless the basic cause of the present conflict is removed, another and wider conflagration is bound to ensue."[184] The resolution did not call for sanctions in the event of noncompliance with the Council's "demand" for a cease-fire but provided for further appropriate action by it in case either party or both failed to respond. For forty-eight hours a positive response from Pakistan did not come forth. U Thant cabled Shastri on September 21 asking for a unilateral Indian cease-fire; Shastri, who received the message on the morning of the twenty-second, announced in Parliament that this was "entirely impossible."[185] India had, however, already notified the Council of its readiness to accept the September 20 resolution.[186] Ayub Khan, in a last attempt to sway the Council from its stern "demand," dispatched Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to New York as he himself continued high-level consultations in Rawalpindi. The Chinese Government probably was informed by this time that Pakistan had no alternative but

to order a cease-fire. Ch'en Yi broke his homeward return journey at Kabul on September 20 and held talks with the Afghan Premier. However, he neither hopped over to Rawalpindi nor commented publicly on the Indo-Pakistan war.[187]

Bhutto arrived in New York in the night of September 21 and immediately went into discussions with some of the leading delegates. The Security Council met the next morning at his request, just three hours before the expiry of China's extended ultimatum, and at this meeting, he dramatically concluded a highly emotional speech by reading a cable he had just received from Ayub Khan announcing Pakistan's acceptance of the Council's resolution.[188] In his speech Bhutto asked for clarification of what to Pakistan was the key paragraph of the UN resolution: ". . . after the implementation of the cease-fire the Council will consider what steps should be taken towards the settlement of the political problems underlying the present conflict." He did not get much satisfaction. His anger and disappointment with the UN was evident in his speech. "Pakistan is giving the Security Council the last chance to address themselves to the solution of this problem," he declared. If the Council failed to find a fair and honorable solution within a time limit [which he did not set], "Pakistan will withdraw from the United Nations."

## THE SOVIETS GET A MEETING

The Chinese ultimatum had created a delicate and difficult situation for the Soviet leadership, pointing to the serious constraints on Moscow's adoption of an openly anti-China line, even if this should be the dictate of the USSR's power interests in an area where Russian and Chinese claims to influence and prestige are in conflict. That the Soviet Government looked upon the Chinese ultimatum with extreme disfavor was not concealed by Soviet media; and, yet, in dealing with it, the Russians exhibited an extreme measure of public caution. The Soviet press reported the Chinese note twenty-four hours after it had been delivered, and then in a peculiar style of journalistic

reporting. The report that appeared in all the major Soviet papers was worded as follows: "The Washington *Post* reports that secret talks were held yesterday in the White House, the State Department, and the Pentagon, at which, in the paper's words, the participants discussed 'the Chinese note to India demanding that within three days India dismantle all military installations along the border between Sikkim and China.'" This was a vicarious way of informing the Soviet public that not only had the Chinese Government intervened during India's war with Pakistan with an ultimatum to Delhi, its action had roused serious concern in the American capital, and should, by implication, cause concern in Moscow too. At the Security Council, the Soviet delegate made no mention of the Chinese note. On the other hand, within hours of the delivery of the Peking note, Kosygin sent fresh messages to Shastri and Ayub Khan proposing Tashkent or "any other city of the Soviet Union" for their meeting after the cease-fire.[189] The letter to Shastri had a paragraph quietly but firmly assuring India of Soviet support in the event of a Chinese attack. "You are familiar with the Tass statement containing a warning to those who would not be adverse to extracting advantages for themselves from the India-Pakistan relations." This could be construed in New Delhi only as an indication of Soviet support against the Chinese, although it left the form, content, and extent of such support highly conjectural. The Soviet priority was obviously for wresting the political initiative in getting a summit-level meeting between India and Pakistan. For this, the urgent overriding need was to stop the fighting. Kosygin pleaded with Shastri that "every new day of the armed conflict gives birth to new and complicated problems the solution of which become a heavy burden on the shoulders of the peoples of India and Pakistan." As soon as the Security Council adopted the "demand" resolution, Soviet media began to press for an early India-Pakistan conference. "The two countries should meet as soon as possible," counseled Moscow Radio in a broadcast on September 21. They could meet only under Soviet

initiative, it added, because the Western powers had failed to bring peace to the subcontinent in twenty years and had "always tried to cause bad blood between the peoples of Asian and African states."[190]

Pakistan's disappointment with the Security Council resolutions of September 4, 6, and 22 almost guaranteed success for the Russian initiative. We have already noted U Thant's effort toward an India-Pakistan summit meeting under UN auspices. Neither Pakistan nor India responded to it positively. The Soviet diplomacy was conducted parallel to that of the UN, which had the implicit backing of the US and Britain. As noted, the Soviets appeared to be adequately aware of the limitations of a UN role in Kashmir and in Indo-Pakistan affairs beyond the enforcement of a cease-fire and withdrawal of troops; in other words, the UN could stop the war, but it could hardly build the peace. Soviet diplomacy exacted reluctant support from the United States and Britain, primarily because of the general ineffectiveness of a Western role in settling the conflict, but also because Western and Soviet interests during the South Asian crisis were parallel, though not convergent. Neither in Washington nor in Moscow was there any evident desire to stress the differences between Western and Soviet policies and objectives.[191] The Russians themselves had made concessions: they had voted with the majority on all the resolutions the Security Council passed on the India-Pakistan conflict. However, they had also exacted a price for their vote—confinement of the resolutions to the hostilities, and avoidance of terms or phrases which in their wording might have rendered India's rejection of them a strong probability. After the Chinese ultimatum to India, the Soviets even linked their diplomatic initiative to the UN peace-making effort. On September 17, Kosygin's letters to Shastri and Ayub Khan of the same date were circulated, at the request of the Soviet delegate, to the members of the Security Council as an official UN document. This probably was welcome to both the Indian and Pakistani governments. The Russians appeared to be conducting their

diplomacy during the war with considerable self-confidence, as if they *knew* that neither India nor Pakistan could reject their mediation offer in the given circumstances. This was largely true. Neither government nor the press in either country reacted adversely to the Soviet offer. But the Government of India was initially hesitant to accept it, fearing that any settlement under Soviet mediation would loosen the Soviet commitment to India's stand on Kashmir. However, both governments conveyed to Moscow on September 23 their acceptance of Soviet mediation, Pakistan doing so "gratefully," and India in a simple letter from Shastri to Kosygin.[192]

After Pakistan's agreement to a cease-fire, the extended Chinese ultimatum lost all sense and meaning, and the Chinese found their own way out of it rather clumsily by claiming that Indian troops had entered Chinese territory in the darkness of night on September 22 and demolished the military works.[193] The anticlimax was, however, more amusing than reassuring. As long as the cease-fire between India and Pakistan remained fragile and the climate was charged with the possibility of a fresh outbreak of fighting, the Chinese Government kept the Sino-Indian border abnormally hot. Ayub's cease-fire order to the Pakistani troops asked them to stay where they were "for the time being,"[194] at several places they were inside Indian territory, particularly in Jammu and Rajasthan. India likewise was in no mood to vacate the strategic posts its army had taken in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. Numerous violations by both sides, the freeze on state relations, and a relentless mutual radio warfare kept the cease-fire tenuous for many weeks. During this period Peking served several notes to India protesting border violations. Meanwhile, Chinese troops off the Sikkim border took control of the strategic mountain passes between Tibet and Sikkim, arming themselves with a tactical advantage in the event of military conflict. Chinese media continued to denounce the Soviet role during the India-Pakistan conflict.

On the whole the Chinese behavior during the twenty-two-

day war reflected not so much the strength of the Chinese position in South Asia *vis-à-vis* the USSR, as its weakness. Although there is no reliable evidence that China encouraged or approved of the Pakistani infiltration tactics in Kashmir, it is not impossible that the idea of guerrilla type of people's resistance in that state would appeal to the leaders in Peking.[195] As long as the fighting remained confined to Kashmir, Chinese media took almost no notice of it. However, as soon as the Kashmir fighting threatened to escalate to a war between Pakistan and India, Peking came out with strong *political* support for Pakistan; it was hardly in a mood to give Pakistan material support. The ultimatum to India was also basically a political move—at the most an exercise in brinkmanship. Its purpose evidently was to strengthen these elements in Pakistan which were opposing the acceptance of the UN cease-fire resolution. It is doubtful if the Chinese would have risked more than limited military thrusts across the border in Sikkim if Pakistan had decided to continue the fighting. Even if the ultimatum to India was designed to lend support to Pakistan's resistance to the Security Council resolutions, its actual impact on the Council was to hasten the adoption of the "demand" resolution which Rawalpindi was hardly in a position to reject. Thus the ultimatum served a double political purpose for the Chinese leaders. On the one hand, it convinced many people in Pakistan of Chinese readiness to come to their help in the event of a war with India; on the other hand, *it actually made an immediate cease-fire inevitable.* The Chinese Government might well have desired the fighting to end *before* the numerically superior Indian army could inflict any major defeat on the Pakistan forces in the battlefield; the grave limitation of Pakistan's ability to wage mechanized war might not have been unknown to Peking. When the fighting ended, the Chinese could wage only a propaganda war on Pakistan's behalf, knowing very well that they did not have the influence to prevent Pakistan from attending the Tashkent meeting. China's main concern in the autumn of 1965 was how to keep out of the escalated Vietnam

war and at the same time give Hanoi and the Viet Cong all the support it possibly could. This was clearly not the time for Peking to get involved in a major conflict with India. Yet something had to be done for Pakistan, which was a valuable friend. The India-Pakistan war showed how little the Chinese regime *can* do in a realpolitikal situation in which the interests and power of mightier nations are involved (in this case, that of the Soviet Union). All it can do and is resolved to do is to protect the hard core of its national interests, which is exactly what it was finally able to do when the war between India and Pakistan ended. The occupation of the mountain passes between Sikkim and Tibet—which happen to be in Chinese territory but were to be left militarily unoccupied according to the understanding reached between Nehru and Chou En-lai in 1960—made the borders of Tibet more secure.

## TASHKENT MEETING

Chinese propaganda against the Tashkent meeting had no impact on either India, Pakistan, or the USSR. Yet neither for India nor for Pakistan was the journey to Tashkent easy. The war had left both populations feverishly excited with a feeling of victory. In India, for the first time, a strong lobby emerged in favor of an indigenous nuclear deterrent, while in Pakistan, search for new sources of arms delivery went on with a state of euphoria over what some of its politicians regarded as a final break with the American alliance system, and, therefore, the emergence of Pakistan as an independent nation. Both in India and Pakistan there were varying degrees of apprehension about the projected peaceful confrontation in Tashkent. The Indian leaders repeatedly emphasized that Indian sovereignty over Kashmir was not negotiable; in Pakistan, there were many angry assertions that the Tashkent meeting would not take place unless the Government of India was prepared to settle the central problem of Kashmir. Yet the Tashkent meeting did finally take place, three months and ten days after the cease-fire.

Circumstances made it almost inevitable. There was no seri-

ous attempt to convene a meeting of the Security Council under Clause 4 of the September 22 resolution. The United States Government kept economic and military aid under suspension. Soviet diplomacy was unusually active behind the scene. The war had ended in nonpeace, and neither country was prepared to invite the other to a bilateral conference to resolve the frozen conditions of war, if only because such an initiative was bound to fail. Thus, the most famous, the longest, and the most eventful Indo-Pakistan summit meeting began on January 4, 1966, outside the frontiers of the subcontinent, but still on Asian territory, for Tashkent, capital of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Uzbekistan, is not merely part of geographic Asia but has numerous exotic links with ancient Hindustan. Having successfully brought about the meeting, the Soviet Government spared no effort to prevent it from being a failure. For Moscow, Tashkent was a novel experiment and a new experience. For the first time was the Soviet Government mediating publicly between two non-Communist countries; it was mediating one of the toughest and most complex problems in Asia, which the United Nations could not resolve despite eighteen years of effort and which had only recently led to Asia's costliest war since 1945. Tashkent was also the first major diplomatic venture on the part of Khrushchev's successors, who knew that success would earn them the wrath of Peking and the envy of the Western powers. The Tashkent meeting coincided with three other major events, each of considerable import for Sino-Soviet relations. President Johnson had announced a bombing pause in North Vietnam and launched a big "peace offensive." Two days after the Tashkent meeting opened, Shelepin led a delegation to Hanoi, giving rise to speculation in the Western countries that Moscow, unlike Peking, was in favor of a negotiated settlement of the Vietnamese conflict. Coincident with the Tashkent meeting was the journey by Brezhnev to Ulan Bator to negotiate and sign a new Soviet-Mongolian friendship treaty. And in session in distant Havana was the first tricontinental

solidarity conference, a grand, if amorphous, assembly of "anti-imperialist" organizations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Each of these four events was marked with Sino-Soviet rivalry and conflict.

Soviet diplomacy made the Tashkent meeting an unprecedented experience for India and Pakistan also. Both countries had long known outside intervention or "mediation" in the Kashmir affair. The Soviet intervention, however, was entirely different. In the first place, Kosygin took the most scrupulous care not to *appear* to be intervening, not to be too anxious to mediate, but to make it clear every time he had a private meeting with Shastri or Ayub Khan that it was at the request of the Prime Minister or the President. The weight of the Soviet delegation, which included Foreign Minister Gromyko, Defense Minister Malinovsky, and Marshal Sokolovsky, could not but impress Shastri and Ayub Khan with the seriousness of Soviet purpose; the contrast with Western efforts of the past to bring India and Pakistan to an understanding on Kashmir could not be more compelling. Soviet publicists and diplomats strenuously built up within the first forty-eight hours of the meeting what an Indian spokesman later described, quite aptly, as the Tashkent Spirit:[196] the entire emphasis in publicity, in press briefings, in after-meeting small talk was on the positive rather than the negative aspects of the confrontation. Soviet media did not ignore the vast complexity of the problems being discussed at Tashkent, nor was there any overt attempt to generate optimism where there was no cause; there was, however, an organized Soviet endeavor to create a climate of friendliness. It worked. Both Indian and Pakistani press officers joined Soviet spokesmen in blaming British and American correspondents for trying to wreck the conference by asking questions and raising issues that were sort of unofficially forbidden by the Spirit of Tashkent.[197] There were more handshakes and smiles exchanged between Indian and Pakistani newspapermen at Tashkent than at any

other India-Pakistan summit conference. This was truly remarkable because each side still had memories of the war fresh in its mind.

The meeting began predictably with Shastri and Ayub Khan outlining the central positions of their respective governments on the mosaic of Indo-Pakistani relations. They might have somewhat mellowed the final draft of their inaugural speeches as a result of Kosygin's separate private meetings with them before the opening session; Kosygin's first major success was a brief Shastri-Ayub meeting before the plenary session opened on January 4. Ayub Khan, for example, did not mention Kashmir in his opening speech, and Shastri did stress the importance of improving the "totality" of Indo-Pakistani relationships. Kosygin, who presided over the Tashkent conference at the request of the two delegations, was himself quite modest in his inaugural address. He was aware of the difficulties involved in "normalizing" Indo-Pakistani relations—the Soviet euphemism for settling the Kashmir question—but he still hoped the meeting would mark a "turning point" in subcontinental relations, creating a "climate of trust and mutual understanding" for the ultimate achievement of "normalization."[198] Shastri, and after him Ayub Khan, then put forward, in mild but firm language, the two hitherto irreconcilable first priorities of India and Pakistan. "The question which we both have to face," said Shastri, "is whether we should think of force as a method of solving [our differences] or whether we should decide and declare that force will never be used. . . . It would be a notable achievement if at this meeting . . . an agreement could emerge for renouncing the use of force in settling our differences."[199] Reciprocating the Indian Premier's wish for peace, Ayub Khan lost no time to point out that a "semblance of peace is no substitute for real peace. . . . A no-war agreement between nations can work only if it was adopted after taking concrete steps for resolving the disputes that divide them, and disputes can be resolved only in a spirit of conciliation." His question to Shastri was: "Why should we be unable to face up to the

*basic* problem which continues to cause tension and conflict between us?"[200]

India and Pakistan thus began their peace conference in Tashkent with the postures that had become familiar during Indo-Pakistani dialogues of the past eighteen years. India had always wanted a no-war pact first, to be followed up, step by step, by the solution of differences and disputes. Pakistan, on the other hand, had consistently maintained that a no-war pact without a settlement of the Kashmir issue would amount to its losing Kashmir forever. Kosygin's task at Tashkent was to reconcile these two viewpoints, and it was admittedly not an easy task. That Kosygin had four private meetings with Shastri would indicate that he was trying to persuade the Prime Minister not only to discuss Kashmir with the Pakistani President (in which effort he was successful) but also to concede that Kashmir was linked with the vital issue of war and peace within the subcontinent (in which his success was limited). On January 5 and 6, Shastri and Ayub Khan had two fairly long private meetings at which, according to Tass, "the entire range of problems involved in making the Tashkent meeting a success" was discussed.[201] Tass quoted an Indian spokesman as denying "rumours being spread by certain parties that the Tashkent meeting was deadlocked and that *someone was under pressure.*" [italics added][202] Yet a deadlock had evidently been reached which the closed-door Shastri-Ayub meeting of January 7, with Kosygin present, was apparently unable to resolve. Tass reported on January 8 that both delegates were "approaching the stage of difficult negotiations,"[203] while a Pakistani spokesman was more candid: "Kashmir is the main obstacle to establishing peaceful and good-neighborly relations; . . . no useful talks on a no-war pact could be held as long as the Kashmir dispute remained unsettled."[204] While Kosygin spent several hours talking with Shastri privately on the first five days of the conference, Gromyko met the Pakistani Foreign Minister a number of times. It was probably on January 8 that Ayub Khan, unable to get any concession from India, threat-

ened to walk out of the conference; he announced through a spokesman that the Pakistan delegation would return to Rawalpindi on the eleventh.[205] Kosygin had perhaps the most crucial meeting with the two leaders on January 9; he was with Shastri more than two hours, which delayed a scheduled meeting between the Indian and Pakistani foreign ministers. Later he had a shorter meeting with Ayub Khan. These meetings apparently saved the Tashkent talks from breaking down. Tass reported on January 9 that the participants "are reportedly discussing new ways of bringing [their] viewpoints closer on a number of important questions." The Pakistani press officer, as reported by Tass, was somewhat optimistic on January 9, while All-India Radio reported that the "climate of despondency" seemed to be "disappearing to a large extent" and "predictions about failure may have to be revised."[206] On January 10, Shastri and Ayub Khan met to "give final touches" to the communique to be issued the same evening. The last-minute breakthrough apparently took even the Soviet journalists by surprise, for *Pravda* printed on January 10 a dispatch from its own correspondent which was far from cheerful. It spoke of the need for "complex and delicate" work at the conference, of "difficult, painstaking negotiations," and added, "it seems wrong to be in a hurry to guess at and surmise the possible outcome of the Tashkent meeting."

What chemistry of compromise Kosygin was able to provide to turn failure into success remains still unknown; it is not unlikely that he gave Ayub Khan certain assurances based on his own long conversations with Shastri. The Tashkent Declaration, signed on January 10, was, however, a tenuous compromise between the main positions of India and Pakistan. The two countries "reaffirmed their pledge, in conformity with the [UN] Charter, not to resort to force but to resolve their disputes peacefully." This was far short of a bilateral no-war pact, as Bhutto was soon to point out. The Kashmir question was discussed, the declaration said, in the context of tension and peace in the subcontinent; "each of the sides set forth its

respective position." There was some gain in this for Pakistan —the Indian admission of a "dispute" over Kashmir and its being relevant to the crucial question of tension and peace. The gain, however, was slender, for India did not yield on the basic question of its sovereignty over Kashmir, or on a plebiscite, nor did Tashkent provide for a "mechanism" for the solution of the Kashmir issue, which was one of the major demands of the Pakistani delegation. It is probable that Shastri and Ayub Khan came to a personal understanding of each other's difficulties at home and agreed to a phased attack on the problem of Kashmir. This impression was given by Ayub Khan himself in a radio talk to the Pakistani people soon after the Tashkent meeting.[207] Unfortunately, Shastri's sudden death at Tashkent in the night of January 10 removed whatever foundation of mutual trust and understanding might have been laid there between him and Ayub Khan.

Leaving aside Kashmir, the Tashkent Declaration was a major achievement. It provided for liquidation of the state of war. The two countries agreed to complete the withdrawal of all armed personnel to pre-August 5 positions "no later than February 25, 1966"; to build mutual relations on the basis of noninterference in each other's internal affairs; to discourage hostile propaganda and promote facilities for the development of friendly relations; to resume normal diplomatic ties; to restore normal trade and cultural relations; to repatriate war prisoners; to continue discussions to prevent illegal immigration; and, lastly, to have regular periodical meetings "both at the highest level and other levels" to examine "questions of direct concern" to both countries. The two leaders also found it necessary to create "joint Indian-Pakistani agencies" to keep up a continuing dialogue. Kosygin was quite objective in his final assessment of the Tashkent accord: "It marks a new stage in the development of relations between India and Pakistan, puts an end to the military conflict, points out ways of overcoming the difficulties that stand in the way of the normalization of relations between the two major Asian powers

and, in our opinion, lays [a] real foundation for the creation of conditions of peace in this highly important area in Asia." With a dramatic flourish, *Pravda* correspondents spoke of the "firm triple handclasp" that concluded the meeting at Tashkent.[208]

## TASHKENT AND PAKISTAN

Reaction outside the USSR, however, was more ambiguous. We have already noted the doubts and misgivings in India as well as Pakistan about the Tashkent meeting between the cease-fire and January 4. During the talks both Shastri and Ayub Khan were concerned with how the political parties and the general public would react to their performance in the Uzbek capital. Shastri kept in touch with New Delhi on the telephone to receive reports of public reaction, and Ayub Khan might have done the same. Shastri had taken with him the defense minister, Chavan, who used to be considered to be politically the most important man in the cabinet after the prime minister. With Ayub Khan at Tashkent was Bhutto, representing the faction in Pakistan politics that was opposed to a compromise with India. The cease-fire had left both countries with an exalted sense of victory; in Pakistan the euphoria had been even greater than in India, because in addition to having dealt a "crushing blow" to the Indian forces (this was what the Pakistani people had been told and they had apparently come to believe it), Pakistan had also arrived politically as a member of the Afro-Asian community. Public opinion in India was elated for more concrete reasons: Pakistan had not been able to wrest Kashmir, and India was holding strategically important territory in the state beyond the cease-fire line. Shastri's death within hours of the signing of the Tashkent Declaration emotionally committed the Indian people to his last act as prime minister. Moreover, the Indians were quick to realize that whatever might have been the pressures from the Soviet side, Shastri had made no concession of any value at

Tashkent. India could very well live with the Tashkent agreement.

The reaction in Pakistan was very different. There, the people had been fed on stories of victory in the battlefield, and they expected this victory to be reflected on the document signed at Tashkent. When they found that it brought them no gain in Kashmir but only a restoration of the *status quo,* they were shocked and dismayed. Riots broke out in the major cities of West Pakistan. The perspicacious correspondent of *The Times* of London reported:

> The Tashkent Declaration came as a shock to political and public opinion in West Pakistan and the resulting turbulence shook President Ayub's position badly. For the first time the Opposition in West Pakistan could attack the President and the regime with the wind of public anger solidly in their sails; in West Pakistan, and especially in the Punjab and the Frontier, the feeling would be that President Ayub was betraying Pakistan as well as Kashmir if he suggested the need for reappraising the Kashmir policy.
>
> In East Pakistan, on the other hand, there was general welcome of the Tashkent Declaration; the whole political and public opinion was with Ayub. Naturally Kashmir has always been a less immediate issue for the East Pakistanis and if the road from Tashkent led towards peace and normalcy, it was of no less moment for them that it also led away from Kashmir. So there was no opposition in East Pakistan on this issue."[209]

An American student of Pakistani affairs wrote on similar lines:

> The first public announcement of the Declaration on January 11 stunned Pakistanis because they believed that their troops had decisively defeated the Indians in the field, and that therefore the Indians at Tashkent should have negotiated on Kashmir. Many Pakistanis looked on the Tashkent Declaration as a betrayal of their ideals. One frequently hears, "We lost at Tashkent what we gained on the battlefield."

> Opposition in Pakistan to the Tashkent Declaration exploded in certain areas. An anti-Tashkent Declaration student demonstration in Lahore erupted on January 14. Two persons (one a student) died in the melee, and the Government of West Pakistan immediately closed down all universities and schools. On January 20, students at the University of Punjab signed a petition opposing the Declaration and urging the Government to continue the war. In January Miss Fatima Jinnah issued a statement attacking the Ayub Khan Government for its "betrayal" of Kashmir.[210]

In fact, the impact of Tashkent on the military regime of Ayub Khan and on the image of the Pakistani President himself was more shattering than it at first appeared to be. The regime was soon able to ride the high wind of public discontent, but, as the soldiers returned from the battlefield, it began to be clear to many people that what had been sold to them as victory was at best a military stalemate for which they had paid a very high price.[211] A military regime that loses a war also tends to lose its *raison d'être* to govern. Ayub Khan tried to make up the loss of his prestige with the people with anti-Americanism, but here too he had to labor under obvious handicaps. The sudden storm of public unrest that forced Ayub Khan to resign in the spring of 1969 had been sown in January, 1966, at Tashkent. The war with India and China's "moral support" cost the regime American military aid; Pakistan's economy was suddenly faced with a crisis. Whatever else the Ayub regime might have gained from the friendship with China and, later, with the Soviet Union, the old symmetry between Pakistan's political structure and its foreign policy was broken, and a strange situation emerged: although neither the Chinese nor the Soviets showed the least sign of public interest in the Pakistani people's struggle for representative government or the East Pakistani's demand for a large measure of local autonomy, these movements grew, feeding on Chinese and Soviet influence in Pakistan, and with the complete moral and emotional support of the Indian Communists of all ideological persuasions.

## CHINA REACTS TO TASHKENT

The Soviet leaders could not have been unaware of the burden the Tashkent accord had imposed on Ayub Khan. Having persuaded him to accept the terms of the agreement, they were under some obligation to strengthen his position *vis-à-vis* India. This they could do in two ways: first, by bringing pressure on India to come to a settlement of the Kashmir issue with Pakistan, and, secondly, by gradually balancing their military assistance to India with Soviet military aid for Pakistan. It is in this twin direction that the Soviets' Pakistan policy now began to move, as we shall see in the next chapter. That the initiation of such a new policy would immediately strain Soviet-Indian friendship was only one of the two major constraints under which Moscow had to act; the other constraint was Pakistan's relationship with China. The second Kashmir war left a widespread sentiment in Pakistan that of all the great powers China alone was its true friend and ally, if only because the Chinese looked upon India as a major link in the anti-China "ring of encirclement" being built by the USSR in collusion with the United States. The Chinese leaders reacted to the Tashkent accord and to post-Tashkent developments in the subcontinent with the knowledge of this sentiment in Pakistan, and also out of fear, real or imaginary, that the Russians would now act more vigorously in pursuit of their "encirclement" strategy. Predictably, Peking bent its effort to loosen the "triple handclasp" of Tashkent. Peking media ignored the Tashkent meeting till January 11. On that day the Tashkent accord was reported by the New China News Agency along with the news of Shastri's death. After a brief objective summary of the main points of the agreement, NCNA hastened to emphasize the divergent Indian and Pakistani approaches to the Kashmir problem and quoted a Pakistani spokesman as saying that it was merely a "declaration of intent" which did not "go far enough." An Indian spokesman was quoted to show that the declaration "solved no problems," but only provided "an avenue" for their

solution. The Indian spokesman was supposed to have added that the main purpose of the declaration was "not to open negotiation on any particular question," which could only mean Kashmir.[212]

For the Chinese Government, Tashkent was an integral part of the larger Soviet revisionist scheme of collaboration with US imperialism for joint hegemony over the world. NCNA released, on January 4, Ch'en Yi's interview by the Peking correspondent of the Japanese Communist party paper, *Akahata*, held five days earlier. The most important point in the interview was the charge that the Soviet Government was not doing all it could to help Hanoi resist American aggression. Shelepin's mission to Hanoi was looked upon by the Chinese leaders with grave suspicion; they were afraid that the Soviets were responding to the American peace drive by trying to persuade Hanoi to enter into negotiations with Washington. The talks between Vice-President Hubert Humphrey and Kosygin in New Delhi, on the occasion of Shastri's funeral, only strengthened Peking's fear and suspicion, and it seemed to regard the US Government's guarded praise for the Tashkent accord as a gesture of reciprocity for Moscow's apparent disapproval of the Chinese stance on the Vietnam war as put forth in the Lin Piao thesis published, by sheer coincidence, of course, almost simultaneously with the outbreak of the India-Pakistan war. Peking's fear and suspicion were not allayed by the talks Shelepin had with the Chinese leaders in Peking on his way back to Moscow from Hanoi. The Chinese leaders were unhappy also with the conclusion of the new Soviet-Mongolian treaty of friendship and mutual assistance as well as with the Soviet performance at the tricontinental meeting at Havana.

The brute fact of the situation was that the Chinese leaders could *do* but little to counter the Soviet actions. They had little leverage with the Mongolian regime which they could use to prevent the conclusion of the new Soviet-Mongolian treaty. They could not hold up or obstruct the transit of Soviet aid for North Vietnam through China without hurting Hanoi, which they

would scarcely wish to do. There was, however, some little opening for them still in the subcontinent, which they were prompt to utilize. They kept the border with India heated during the entire period of the uneasy India-Pakistan cease-fire, as we have already noted. It came to be known in February, 1966, that the Chinese troops had advanced, during the Indo-Pakistan war, into the twenty-kilometer demilitarized zone both in the eastern and the western sectors of the border and had sent troops into Longju, Che Dong and other areas that had remained unoccupied since the Chinese withdrawal of troops in late 1962. India made a protest describing the Chinese forward movements as violations of the Colombo powers' proposals. In a strongly worded rejoinder on May 4, Peking admitted the forward movements and refused to pull back.[213] China had created the demilitarized zone, on its own initiative, said the reply from Peking; however, it did not relinquish its sovereignty over the territory, nor its right to take the necessary measures of self-defense. Because of the "many Indian intrusions" since 1962, "it was only natural for the Chinese Government to adopt the necessary precautionary and self-defense measures; that is exactly what it has done." India had "altogether cast the Colombo proposals to the winds" by its failure to respond positively to them. This probably amounted to saying that China no longer regarded the Colombo proposals to be of any real value. A noteworthy point in the Chinese formulation was that it denounced for the first time India's "special relationship" with Sikkim.

Peking kept a close watch on the progress made by India and Pakistan toward implementing the Tashkent accord, reporting on its powerful radio transmitters almost every action or reaction in Pakistan and India adverse to the agreement. Of these there were many. In India, as soon as the new government took over with Indira Gandhi as premier, Tashkent began to be criticized for its "implied" surrender of the posts the Indian troops had occupied in Pakistan-held Kashmir. In their effort to justify the accord, government leaders in both countries

emphasized only what they had "gained" as a result of the agreement. What was underlined in Pakistan was the Indian admission that Kashmir was central to the disputes between India and its neighbor; Shastri's alleged desire to take up the Kashmir question once relations between India and Pakistan were normalized; and the Indian obligation under the agreement to vacate the outposts beyond the cease-fire line in that state. Indian leaders, in their turn, stressed that Pakistan had agreed at Tashkent not to wage war to settle territorial disputes. The only part of the Tashkent agreement that was smoothly implemented, despite the dark forebodings of foreign correspondents stationed in India and Pakistan, was the one relating to the withdrawal of all armed personnel to pre-August 5 lines, before the stipulated dateline of February 25. Pakistan, of course, did not formally ask the infiltrators to withdraw from Kashmir. The infiltration had stopped even during the last stages of the war; most of those who remained in Kashmir had been "flushed out" by the Indian forces. Indian papers reported toward the end of February that several hundred infiltrators had "quietly" slipped back into Azad Kashmir. Progress in other directions was, however, agonizingly slow. The high commissioners returned to their respective posts in January, but trade and commerce, transport and communications, and cultural exchanges remained frozen; the radio warfare continued unabated; and Pakistan rejected several Indian proposals for ministerial-level meetings to discuss normalization of relations as long as India was not prepared to negotiate a Kashmir settlement. Ayub Khan thus lost the initiative to take political action to add flesh and blood to the Tashkent accord; he received no support from India. On the other hand, extremist sentiments appeared to be growing in both countries. In India, the revivalist Jan Sangh party was cashing in on the anti-Pakistan sentiment of the masses in the Hindi-speaking states; in Pakistan, Bhutto was apparently leading a faction within the ruling elite that was opposed to any further concessions to India or the USSR.

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Liu Shao-chi and Ch'en Yi to pay an official visit to Pakistan, returning the 1965 visit of President Ayub Khan. They arrived in Rawalpindi on March 26 to be treated to an unprecedented welcome. "Almost the entire population of Rawalpindi—400,000 strong—turned out to greet the Chinese guests," reported *People's Daily*, not untruthfully.[214] The welcome was a "spontaneous and heartfelt demonstration of the popular sentiment here for a great and friendly neighbor," echoed the *Pakistan Times*. The *Morning News* ran its main headline in Chinese characters when Liu and Ch'en Yi arrived in Karachi on March 30. The mass welcome there was no less enthusiastic than in Rawalpindi. The people of Pakistan needed the comfort and strength of a strong ally, and Liu sensed it. Thus he spelled out the foundation on which rested the edifice of Sino-Pakistani friendship, while addressing a highly responsive audience in Karachi:

> We have smoothly settled the boundary question left over by history and steadily strengthened our co-operation in all fields. We have given each other sympathy and support in the struggle against imperialism and expansionism and in defense of national independence and world peace. Last year when Pakistan was subjected to India's armed attack . . . the Chinese Government and people firmly supported Pakistan. . . . Recently, when the imperialists and their collaborators were villifying China without scruple and attempting to form a ring of encirclement against China, the Pakistan Government sternly refuted the nonsense about China's threat to the subcontinent, thus expressing the firm wish of the Pakistan people to maintain friendship with the Chinese people.[215]

At Dacca, Ch'en Yi answered the Soviet critics of China's wartime support for Pakistan: "Some people said that by supporting Pakistan's struggle against Indian aggression and the Kashmiri people's struggle for the right of self-determination, China was 'adding fuel to the fire' and 'fishing in troubled water.' These assertions are complete reversal of right and wrong. Should China have refrained from supporting the victim of aggression but supplied large amounts of weapons to the aggressor, as *they* did in order not to be labelled as 'adding fuel

to the fire?' " Ch'en Yi then proceeded to announce China's support for Pakistan if it was again attacked by India; *he extended this support to both wings of Pakistan.* "In the future, should East Pakistan or West Pakistan again face the armed attack by any aggressor, the Chinese Government and people will continue to support the Pakistani people in their struggle to safeguard national independence. So long as the Kashmiri people still suffer from brutal oppression and are deprived of their freedom, the Chinese Government will continue to support them in their struggle for the right to self-determination." Liu Shao-chi met four leaders from Azad Kashmir and had "friendly conversations with them."[216] Thus in two years' time the Chinese leaders had met with popular leaders from both parts of Kashmir and got themselves fairly well acquainted with the feelings and sentiments of the Kashmiri people.

The year 1966 marked a new chapter in Pakistan's exposure to the outside world. It was now to be subjected to the turgid impact of an open Sino-Soviet rivalry for its friendship. The Russians were now sharpening their diplomatic and other tools to woo Pakistan away from the Chinese embrace. In this ensuing competition, the Chinese leaders appeared to believe that the superior economic and military resources of the Soviet Union did not place them altogether at a lasting disadvantage. They had built up a most favorable image of China in the minds of the people of Pakistan, and their hostile relations with India made Pakistan China's natural ally. Moreover, they had built up a Chinese presence in *both* West and East Pakistan, although in all appearances they cast themselves in the role of strong defenders of Pakistan's unity and territorial integrity. At least three front-rank Chinese leaders—Chou En-lai, Liu Shao-chi and Ch'en Yi—had visited East Pakistan, where the Chinese were aiding several development projects; in contrast, no prominent Soviet leader had set foot in the eastern wing. With this and other advantages on its side, Peking was now apparently prepared to wait and watch—with the famous Chinese patience—to see how the Soviet leaders played their new diplomacy in the subcontinent.

# 5

# 1960s: CONSEQUENCES OF CONFRONTATION

THE YEAR 1963 marked the beginning of the third period in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent's general cross-pattern of relationships with the outside world. During the first, initial period, between 1947 and 1951, both India and Pakistan had remained generally tied to the Western power universe. Each had been in quest of a pattern of foreign policy and relations that would best serve its national interests. The second period could be said to have begun in 1952, when India moved somewhat closer to the Chinese People's Republic, and Pakistan to the United States. With the Chinese and Soviet endorsement of India as a progressive new nation, Nehru's nonalignment became something more than mere neutrality in the Cold War. For a major part of the fifties India remained nonalignedly allied with the USSR and China, enjoying at the same time the benefit of Western economic assistance and playing some useful role within the bipolar world power system. Guided by the supreme compulsion of Pakistan's internal and external environment, its leaders sought and obtained the protection of American arms. Contrary to what its protagonists claimed, nonalignment brought the subcontinent within the orbit of the Cold War almost as much as did Pakistan's military alliance with the US. The Soviet-American Cold War, however, did not overly affect South Asia,

primarily because the commitments of each superpower in the region were limited. Both India and Pakistan, each in its own way, were more or less able to seek a social identity that would peacefully cement together the dissident elements of their societies.

Soviet and Chinese Communist perspectives of the subcontinent, as we have seen in these pages, never quite completely converged. There were ideological differences—subtle, subdued, but not completely muted except for brief whiles—and there were differences arising from the mutual exclusiveness of the power interests of the two Communist states. Nevertheless, between 1953 and 1958 the USSR and China were able to control the conflicts brewing under the surface of unity, and Sino-Soviet strategies for South Asia showed a broad symmetry. This symmetry visibly cracked, as we have noted, when the Soviets extended their moral (and a little later, material) support to India in its border dispute with China. Moscow's quest for a *détente* with the United States irrespective of the ideological persuasions of the Chinese Communists and the vital national interests of the PRC brought about the rift between Russia and China. India was the first country to absorb the shock of this rift because it had been elevated by Khrushchev to one of the main areas where the CPSU Twentieth Congress strategy with regard to the newly liberated states was to be implemented. In selecting India for the experiment, the Soviets must have been guided, at least partially, by the hope, confined not to the USSR alone, that, next to Japan, (where Moscow could not expect to gain much support) India was the only Asian country that could be built to counter Chinese power and influence in the Asian continent.

The period in the subcontinent's external relations that had begun with 1952 collapsed in 1962 in the glacial Himalayas. Neither India nor Pakistan could remain what it was after the border war between India and China. For, with the Sino-American Cold War receding to the background, a new Cold War was emerging between the USSR and China, and the subcontinent

got engulfed in it before it could even ponder the sea change that was overtaking the global power realignments. The arrival of American military aid in India, however limited in quantity, symbolically heralded the end of the era in which every such action would have drawn angry reactions in Moscow. Now, Soviet arms and American weapons began to refurbish Indian military strength *vis-à-vis* the Chinese People's Republic. Its immediate inescapable impact on Pakistan was predictably one of increased fear of India and a sense of bitter frustration with the friendship of the United States. The primary motivation of Pakistan's military alliance with the United States had been as well known in Washington as in Peking, Moscow, and New Delhi. The spectacle of an India being jointly helped by both superpowers to build its military and economic strength could only generate the darkest forebodings in Pakistan, where a twisted knot of psychological reflexes, seldom adequately understood in India, made the fear of India the central motivation of most foreign policy thinking and activity. It was not surprising therefore that Pakistan would in the new circumstances ease out of its alliance with the US (which steadily lost its meaning) and seek security and strength in the readily offered friendship of China.

## SOVIETS REAPPRAISE INDIA POLICY

In the first months of 1963 the Soviet leaders apparently reappraised their policy for India in the context of the Sino-Indian border war and India's newly developing friendly relations with the United States. Developments within India demanded this reappraisal as much as India's broken relations with China. One result of the India-China conflict was that, in Nehru's own words, it made the rightist elements "more clamorous," and the left "to some extent weak."[1] Krishna Menon had been forced out of the cabinet before the end of 1962, and in early 1963, K. D. Malviya, Nehru's favorite left-leaning minister for petroleum, was also obliged to quit on ground of political ethics;

the exit of these two dwarfed the left wing in Nehru's cabinet. The by-election victory in May, 1963, of three prominent opposition parliamentary candidates, each a strong critic of Nehru's domestic and foreign policies, reflected the political mood of northern India.[2] In June, T. T. Krishnamachari, minister for defense production, made a successful trip to Washington, obtaining the US Government's agreement in principle to supply India with communications, radar, and road-building equipment and help in constructing an ordnance plant. The background to this rather important decision on the part of the United States had been provided by the decision jointly made by President Kennedy and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan of Britain to provide further military assistance to India.

The Soviets could not look with unconcern at the rightward swing in Indian politics and at the waning of Nehru's charismatic hold on the Indian elite. During the first three months of 1963 there was an unusual lull in Indo-Soviet collaborative activity as well as in Soviet press assessment of Indian events. Signs of important decisions having been however taken began to appear in the spring, when a protocol was signed to continue Indo-Soviet cultural collaboration.[3] This was followed up with an agreement to implement two accords already reached, one providing for the construction of a second Soviet-aided precision instrument factory, and the other—politically significant in view of the political demise of Malviya, who had visited the Soviet leaders—for Soviet assistance for oil exploration.[4] In June, Commerce Minister Manubhai Shah journeyed to Moscow to sign the third Indo-Soviet five-year trade agreement providing for doubling the trade volume.[5] It was now quite evident that the Soviet leaders had decided on a renewal of Indo-Russian friendship. As if to dramatize this decision, Khrushchev himself inaugurated an Indian exhibition in Moscow in July. Also in July, an Indian air force mission toured the USSR and discussed with the Soviet Government the supply of air-to-air and ground-to-air missiles to India.[6] About this time the Soviet Government made known to India that it

was willing to build the proposed steel plant at Bokaro, Bihar, if the US Government backed out.

The most notable feature of the renewal of Soviet commitment to India's development (and the contribution to its defense) was that it was accompanied with a lowering of ideological sights on the Indian situation. India, the Soviets knew, had not gone "pro-American"; there were developments in India that still pleased Moscow, and Nehru still had a certain command of political initiative. For instance, in July, 1963, the Indian Government canceled, under pressure of public opinion, an agreement reached earlier (as a result of the felt need to vitalize its radio transmitters beaming broadcasts to southeast Asia) for American assistance in setting up a high-powered broadcasting station in Calcutta on condition that it would relay several hours of Voice of America transmissions every day. Soviet media had been critical of the VOA deal, and its cancellation must have been pleasing to Moscow. Much more pleasing was the wholesale reshuffle of the Nehru cabinet in the summer of 1963 on the basis of the so-called Kamaraj plan. Under this plan (ostensibly devised to obtain for the Congress party the services of leaders locked for years in the central and state governments) Nehru secured the resignation of all his cabinet colleagues and accepted only those of Morarji Desai, S. K. Patil, Lal Bahadur Shastri, and B. Gopala Reddy. The exit of these four was welcomed in the Soviet press. Desai and Patil were identified in *Pravda* as the "two most passionate defenders of the monopolies in the Congress party," while *New Times* noted that Shastri, as interior minister, had sent many Communists to prison.[7] Gopala Reddy, as minister for information, had been at least formally responsible for the VOA deal. *Pravda* speculated that the easing out of the four, especially of Desai and Patil, would strengthen India's nonalignment and enhance the influence of the progressive forces in the ruling party.[8] A third gratifying event for Moscow was the cancellation in September of the accord under which the United States was to put up the steel plant at Bokaro.

Evidently the decision of the Soviet leaders in mid 1963 to enlarge their commitment to India was prompted by two major

objectives—to keep the country outside the pale of American economic and political domination, and to build it up as an Asian ally against China. It became known only after Khrushchev's resignation in October, 1964, that the new strategy was, at least in the vital aspect of giving India military aid, largely his own. Subsequent events proved, however, that where the anti-Khrushchev faction had differed with Khrushchev was not so much on extending military assistance to India as on his failure to evolve a balanced strategy for India *and* Pakistan. The Chinese leaders too made the mistake in late 1964 and early 1965 of identifying the enlarged Soviet participation in India's economic and military development with Khrushchev himself; they were soon to find out that Khrushchev's successors were as much committed to the general strategy as had been the former premier himself. In other words, the pursuance of the Twentieth Congress policy and the deepening schism between Moscow and Peking dictated a continuity of Khrushchev's India policy; after 1965 it was modified and applied to the entire subcontinent.

It may be useful at this point to reflect briefly on the new phase in India's relations with the United States. We have already noted the great impact Eisenhower's visit had made on India, and we have suggested that however much Moscow might have disliked American collaboration with India, it could not react strongly without going back on the general line of the Twentieth Congress thesis as long as the collaboration remained largely economic and did not take a *political* character. To Nehru in the late fifties, Eisenhower's image was that of a co-architect of the new policy of a Soviet-American *détente,* of the man who had invited Khrushchev to the United States and had built the Camp David spirit. To the less visionary in the Congress leadership and to others, the United States meant support for economic policies cutting across the Government's declared objective of building a Socialist structure in India. The election of John F. Kennedy as President of the United States in November, 1960, somewhat opened up the Indian mind to the America

of the New Frontier. The Indian reaction was comparable to its reaction in 1945 to the landslide victory of the British Labor party in the first election held after the Second World War. Lyndon B. Johnson noticed a mental affinity between the Indian elite and the new American administration when he visited India in early 1961. In his report to Kennedy, the Vice-President observed: "This Administration is highly regarded as well as received in India. Only part of this follows out of hope or expectation of aid. Mainly, there is an intellectual affinity, or an affinity of spirit."[9]

John F. Kennedy's strong sentiments about India were well known. As Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., puts it, "Kennedy was most interested in India, which he had long regarded as 'the key area' in Asia." Schlesinger recalls Kennedy's remark in 1959: "We want India to win the race with China. . . . If China succeeds and India fails, the economic-development balance of power will shift against us."[10] It was with this perspective that Kennedy tried, during his Presidency, to expand the field of Indo-American economic collaboration. His efforts to persuade Congress to take a more enlightened view of India's economic needs was frustrated when the latter scuttled the Administration's proposal to build the Bokaro steel plant in the Indian public sector; however, the very fact that the offer was made by an American Government created a deep impression on the Indian mind. There was therefore a favorable climate for a certain measure of Indo-American *political* cooperation in the early sixties. The Kennedy victory enabled Nehru during the period of 1960–62 to act in certain international issues against the declared policies of the USSR. On the Congo issue, for example, India consistently supported the UN peace-keeping operations while criticizing certain aspects of UN policy. India contributed eight hundred troops to the UN force, the chief of which was also an Indian, while another Indian served as the UN Secretary-General's representative at Leopoldville. India did not support Khrushchev's *troika* plan for the UN Secretariat. In January, 1961, Nehru was able to work with both the United States and the

Soviet Union for a settlement of the Laotian crisis; the first American recognition of a neutralist regime in Asia as worthy of American economic support was to him a particularly welcome phenomenon. In 1961, Nehru showed probably the maximum degree of independence of Moscow in several years. His comment on the Bay of Pigs affair was unusually mild. During the Berlin crisis in August, Nehru was quite ambivalent; on August 23 he told the upper house of Parliament that the allies had no legal right to secure access to Berlin, and only five days later, speaking in the same forum, he supported continued Western access to Berlin and criticized the Berlin Wall.[11] At the nonaligned summit in Belgrade in September, Nehru was explicitly critical of the resumed Soviet nuclear testing. His remark that imperialism was no longer a live issue cost him dearly in terms of the support of several Afro-Asian leaders; in China, as we have already noted, this was sure proof of Nehru's walking into the imperialist camp. Perhaps Nehru was too rash in his assessment of the new trends in American policy, but he seemed to genuinely believe that under Kennedy's leadership, the United States would play a positive role in Asia and Africa.

Yet when Nehru visited Washington in November, 1961, his talks with John F. Kennedy, to which the latter had looked forward, were singularly unproductive of intellectual and ideological results. There was a renewal of American commitment to India's economic development, but Kennedy was able to get very little from Nehru in terms of new ideas and fresh thinking. Schlesinger reports that the formal discussions were "heavy going" and the private meetings were "no better." Of the entire conversation, Kennedy was reported to have remarked later that it was "like trying to grab something in your hand, only to have it turn out to be just fog." Schlesinger's own impression of Nehru was that "of an old man, his energies depleted, who heard things at a great distance and answered most questions with indifference." Schlesinger goes on to add:

The following spring, reminiscing about the meeting, Kennedy described it to me as "a disaster . . . the worst head-of-state visit I have had." It was certainly a disappointment, and Kennedy's vision of India had been larger before the visit than it would ever be again. Nehru was obviously in decline; his country, the President now decided, would be increasingly preoccupied with its own problems, and turn more and more into itself. Though Kennedy retained his belief in the necessity of helping India achieve its economic goals, he rather gave up hope, after seeing Nehru, that India would be in the next years a great affirmative force in the world or even in South Asia.[12]

## DOUBTS OF THE IDEOLOGUES

We have no recorded evidence of how the Soviet leaders assessed Nehru at the turn of the sixties. However, a duality began to appear in the Soviet stance on India. The Soviet ideologue or scholar on India no longer seemed to be in full step with the makers of Soviet policy. The number of Soviet indologists had increased considerably since 1956, and by 1960 several younger men and women joined the once-exclusive club of the veterans like Zhukov, D'iakov, Balabushevich, Sofia Melman, Kotovsky, and Pavlov. Increasing experience in dealing with the developing nations breathed a certain sophistication in intellectual and academic appraisal of socioeconomic and political conditions in traditional societies. The national liberation movement continued to be one of the most discussed and debated issues in Soviet academic circles, partly in response to the fundamental challenge from the Chinese Communist party and also because of the success and failure of Soviet policies in Asia and Africa. India figured prominently in the discussions because it had been given the highest Soviet economic and political commitment. Soviet indologists, among whom were the major newspapers' and journals' expert correspondents on oriental affairs, began to show an increasing amount of dissidence with the official viewpoint on the Indian question. Critical assessments

of the Indian internal situation began to appear in the Soviet press without any apparent change in Indo-Soviet state relations. Indeed, state relations went on expanding and strengthening in spite of a steady lowering of the Soviet ideological sight into the Indian internal situation.

In the second half of the fifties, the Soviet leaders, especially Khrushchev, had put across the theory that with increasing Socialist bloc assistance, India would be able to develop along the noncapitalist road and reach broadly Socialist goals. By 1960 this theory came to be hotly debated in the Soviet Union, and only a minority appeared to be still clinging to the old ideological euphoria about India. The first organized body of critical writings on India appeared in 1960 in *Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism*, a manual prepared by a committee appointed by the central committee of the CPSU with Otto Kuusinen as director, and in a collection of articles and reports on India by the correspondents who had traveled with Khrushchev during his 1960 Asian tour.[13] The main factor that caused misgivings in the writers' minds about India was its improving relations with the United States. The Americans were said to be trying to build a climate in India that would be favorable to private US investments; American economic aid was, in effect, directed at weakening the Indian public sector, which, in any case, was growing only slowly. The draft third five-year plan had failed to provide for faster growth of the public sector and for radical land reforms which remained unfinished, with only the feudal system of intermediaries—the zamindars and jagirdars—liquidated, but with very little land actually distributed to the landless peasants and keeping enough loopholes for systematic violations of even the limited reforms. The Soviet writers found the ruling Congress to be a "motley" party, inconsistent in its ideology, motivated by "class-narrow" interests. They were doubtful if the party would adhere for long to its own objective of a Socialist structure of society.

Out of the ideological debates at the 1960 Moscow Communist conference emerged a new concept called the national demo-

cratic state. Devised by the CPSU, the national democratic state was defined as one that had won complete economic independence from the imperialist world and assumed close economic ties with the Socialist bloc; had built a predominant state sector in its economy; had followed a consistently anti-imperialist foreign policy; and had achieved a list of democratic reforms including land reforms and freedom of political activity by the Communists. In 1961, Soviet scholars began to examine the Indian situation in the light of the 1960 manifesto, and their stance was increasingly critical. A minority was still ideologically hopeful about India.[14] In early 1962 the majority view at a conference held by the Institute of Economics and International Relations of the Soviet Academy of Sciences seemed to be that the industrial bourgeoisie in India had developed "monopolistic tendencies"; the Indian leadership was not consistently anti-imperialist because it vacillated between "struggle and cooperation"; and India lacked the radical intellectual leadership that was noticeable in some of the less industrially developed African countries.[15] By early 1963, Soviet experts on the national liberation movement generally agreed that India had gone a long way toward capitalism and no longer qualified for noncapitalist growth. This selective qualification was now bestowed on only a few less industrially developed Moscow-oriented African countries.[16] Vladimir Pavlov, in a book published in 1963, was quite alarmist about American influence on the Indian economy.[17] Relations with the US and other Western countries, he wrote, were increasingly endangering India's economic independence; the Indian Government was making a series of concessions to private foreign and domestic capital, and under foreign pressure it was no longer able to place external capital under "national democratic" restrictions. Pavlov found the Indian Government on the defensive even on foreign policy. Concurring with this was Lev Stepanov's article in *New Times* a little later, alleging that the US objective was to destroy India's nonalignment and concluding that India was already vulnerable to American pressure.

By 1964, Soviet academic thinking on the national liberation movement crystallized further, and differences between various schools seemed to have been overcome. At a conference of Soviet orientalists early that year, agreement was reached on the countries that specifically qualified for noncapitalist growth. Summing up the conference deliberations, Tyagunenko announced that only five Afro-Asian states—Algeria, Burma, Guinea, Ghana, and the United Arab Republic—were completing their national democratic revolution and moving toward socialism.[18] By the end of the next year K. Ivanov gave a "very rough approximation" of the social and economic conditions then existing in the nonsocialist countries of Asia, Africa, and America, Japan alone was "imperialist." India was among the seventeen countries with "intermediate capitalist development and widespread feudal ties."[19]

A noteworthy feature of the Soviet analysis of Indian conditions in 1964 was the printing of many critical articles in mass circulation journals, some of which are read in India itself. Probably the first such article on the Congress party in a mass circulation journal was a joint report by Kotovsky, Pavlov, and Redko in *New Times*[20] on the All-India Congress Committee session in November, 1963, and the annual Congress party session in January, 1964. They found the leadership of the party sharply divided over major domestic issues, rendering the organization incapable of resolute action. The existing balance of forces was clearly against the progressive elements and in favor of the monopolistic and feudal interests. The most disquieting fact was the growth of the political power of the monopolists, against which the Congress left was largely ineffectual. The Congress conception of socialism was still very hazy, and the resolutions adopted at the annual session were indicative of the ideological compromises between various elements in the leadership.

Ulyanovski's assessment of Nehru's leadership soon after his death was the most candid to come from any Soviet scholar:

The method Nehru and the National Congress had chosen in

an attempt to abolish inequality without revolution, that is, without a fundamental change in the system of ownership, and eliminate the contradictions between labour and capital, were bound to fail. Socialism cannot be built and universal equality assured through a "socialist pattern of society," as an "intelligent combination of socialism and capitalism," as the embodiment of "cordial relations" between capital and labour in the interest of national progress and through applying socialism in the form of the so-called "moderate nationalization" while deliberately allowing certain aspects of the capitalist economy, without which, allegedly, there are no safeguards for individual freedom.[21]

## IDEOLOGY AND STATE POLICY

Interestingly, however, Soviet ideologists appeared to exercise little influence on the policy makers in the central committee of the CPSU and in the Soviet Government. At the Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU in October, 1961, there was no criticism of India's domestic policies, although there was much discussion on the dual approach of the national bourgeoisie to the anti-imperialist and antifeudal revolutionary task.[22] Khrushchev, on the other hand, paid an indirect compliment to the Indian leadership when he declared, "We rejoice in their [India's and Indonesia's] success and realize their difficulties, and we readily expand business co-operation which helps them promote their economy and culture." The Indian military action in Goa in December, 1961, won immediate Soviet applause: the Soviet veto saved India from a censure by the Security Council. In May, 1962, the Soviets once again stood firmly by India during a Security Council debate on Kashmir. Then came the strong Soviet backing of India during the Sino-Indian border war and, by mid 1963, the major Soviet decision to help India substantially with development and defense.

The Indo-Soviet agreement for the construction of the Bokaro steel plant was signed in May, 1964. The same month the Indian defense minister, Chavan, went to Washington and was able to secure a tentative agreement with the US Govern-

ment for $110 million in credit and grants to equip India's newly created mountain divisions and to develop communications along the Sino-Indian border. However, Chavan failed to get any intercepter aircraft from the United States.[23] In June, Mikoyan, on a visit to New Delhi, was encouragingly receptive to soundings on aircraft supply.[24] He suggested that Chavan should go to Moscow for formal talks. Nehru died in June, and his funeral brought Deputy Premier Kosygin to New Delhi, where he met with Shastri and other Congress leaders. The decision to give India substantial defense aid was probably taken in Moscow in the weeks immediately following Nehru's death.[25] Thus it was a Soviet gesture to strengthen the Indian leadership after the passing of the man who had been for over a decade a major source of Indian strength. Chavan made the important trip to Moscow in August and was so confident of success that even before his departure from Delhi he listed the defense items he would like most to obtain from the Soviet Union.[26] He reported to Parliament in September, after his return from Moscow, that his mission had been a "complete success."[27] Under the arms agreement signed in Moscow on September 11, the Soviet Government pledged to supply India immediately with forty-four Mig-21 aircraft, and later with sixty more, which were to be assembled in India. Moscow was also to supply twenty more MI-4 helicopters and seventy light tanks. The timetable for setting up a Mig plant in India was to be speeded up, to be completed now in three years.[28] The promptness with which the Soviets finalized the arms agreement betrayed their anxiety to keep Nehru's successor on the track of Soviet-Indian friendship. The Soviets were apparently afraid that the leadership weakness created by Nehru's death might have induced the new Indian Prime Minister to turn to the United States for arms or to conciliate Peking on the border dispute and strive for a settlement.

A scrutiny of Soviet-Indian relations since the death of Nehru brings out three notable features that clearly distinguish these from the pattern and style of Indo-Soviet relationship during the Nehru period: first, an uninterrupted public appraisal of the

Indian situation in the Soviet media including the mass circulation journals and newspapers and the radio, often critical of the Indian leadership and its performance, and candidly articulating Soviet preferences and apprehensions; secondly, a steadily unfavorable ideological assessment of Indian conditions by Soviet ideologists and experts on third world affairs; and, thirdly, with each critical turn in Indian political life, a renewed Soviet commitment in India's development.

The Soviet Government was no longer averse to bringing open as well as secret pressure on the Indian Government on major economic and political matters. Criticism of particular Indian political leaders in *New Times* was, rightly or wrongly, interpreted in India as Moscow's disapproval of the persons concerned. Criticism of specific economic policies and decisions was probably meant to warn the Indian Government of the consequences of its actions and their possible repercussions on Soviet-Indian relations. During the prolonged final negotiations on the Bokaro steel plant, the Soviet Government insisted on a turnkey project and India finally had to give in. On Indo-Pakistan issues the Soviet stance began to change subtly in 1964. At the Security Council debate on Kashmir in May, Soviet support for India was subdued, and, for the first time at the United Nations, the Soviet delegate asked the two countries to settle their *dispute* peacefully.[29] Moscow was scrupulously neutral during the Indo-Pakistan armed clash over the Rann of Kutch.

During the short tenure of the prime ministership of Lal Bahadur Shastri, the Soviets appeared to be keeping a close watch on the Indian situation.[30] Their primary concern was to prevent the right wing from dominating the Congress party and the Indian Government. Thus when at the beginning of January, 1965, there was speculation in the Indian press about the return of Morarji Desai to the central cabinet, *New Times* came out with an article on the assassination of Gandhi in 1948, the sole purpose of which appeared to be to advise Shastri to keep Desai out. Desai was described in the article as the

finance minister in Nehru's cabinet "who had done everything he could to defeat Nehru's socialistic policies."[31] In reviewing the Jaipur session of the Congress in August, 1965, *New Times* noted the ruling party's inability to come to grips with major problems and remarked: "How long the Congress will be able to maintain its influence unless tangible steps are taken to realize the promises of earlier years is a question that now squarely faces its leaders."[32]

Shastri's sudden death at Tashkent brought Kosygin to New Delhi for the funeral and Indian newspapers reported that his talks were partly intended to explore who would be the next prime minister and what would be his or her broad domestic and foreign policies. That Moscow was interested primarily in keeping the rightist forces in the Congress out of a commanding position in the Indian Government became clear when, in February, 1966, *New Times* hailed Mrs. Gandhi's election as leader of the Congress party in Parliament and Desai's defeat, which was ascribed to his "unpopularity as spokesman for the Indian big bourgeoisie and foreign capital."[33] Indira Gandhi, in contrast, represented "that group in the Congress which has consistently striven towards social and economic renewal." This hopeful stance was, however, short-lived, for soon after, *New Times* noted India's increasing dependence on US aid, and "the growing strength of the capitalist monopolies with their close foreign ties," and offered a piece of advice (or was it a warning?): " . . . it is not enough to adopt good resolutions; they have to be backed by purposeful action by the Congress and Government."[34] Moscow's sights into India continued to be lowered as unrest grew and spread over vast segments of the Indian people throughout 1966. In October the Soviets found the draft of the fourth five-year plan inadequate to avoid "increased dependence on the imperialist west" and to provide for "the needs of the masses of the people."[35] As the year approached its end, India had entered an "exceptionally complex political situation," with the right "making more and more determined efforts to influence its policies."[36]

A sharper and more candid ideological formulation on India came after the general elections in February, 1967. There was now no praise for Indira Gandhi; her cabinet was "a coalition of the ruling party's centrist and rightist elements."[37] A major development in India was the ousting of the Congress from power in nine states, and Moscow categorized these non-Congress coalitions into four classes—the leftist-dominated governments in Kerala and Bengal; the rightist-leftist coalitions in Punjab, Bihar, and Uttar Pradesh; the rightist coalitions in Hariana, Orissa, and Madhya Pradesh; and Madras, "a class by itself," with a government formed by the "local democratic party, DMK."[38]

## SHARPER IDEOLOGICAL LINE

An in-depth ideological analysis of the socioeconomic alignments in India brought about by the elections came in the April, 1967, issue of *International Affairs*.[39] In this article, M. Savelyev found a radical shift within the system of Indian big business and in the Indian monopolies; these had seriously extended their control over vital sectors of the Indian economy. Large-scale alignments had occurred between the Indian national bourgeoisie and Western monopoly capital; jointly, they were putting pressure on the Government to abandon its progressive domestic and foreign policies. Monopoly interests had wrested major concessions from the Government and had massively entered fields hitherto reserved for state capitalism including vital defense industries, and Indian monopoly had accepted the domination of imperialist monopoly capital. These combined forces of reaction had to a large extent already undermined state capitalism; in certain fields state capitalism had even strengthened the importance of the private monopolies. Indian monopoly bourgeoisie, with the support of the West, had launched an open campaign for power. Big business actually chose the election candidates for the Congress party, and it was trying to reorganize it radically.

"Given the present balance of forces in the Indian National Congress, is not the election victory a triumph for big monopoly capital?"

If Savelyev's question was posed to Soviet policy-makers, he also made it clear that the adverse trend in India had been known to Soviet "scientists" for a long time.[40] Moscow, however, gave no evidence of having formulated a clear answer to the question, apparently because of the necessity to maintain friendly relations with the Indian Government. References to India were therefore muted in the published report of a prolonged academic appraisal of developments in the third world at a high-level seminar held in Moscow at the beginning of 1967. In the twenty-page report in the May, 1967, issue of *International Affairs,* there is, however, a categorical admission that "in India the national bourgeoisie and the landowners are in power" and that "capitalist relations are developing apace."[41]

The pace of events in India compelled Moscow to adopt a sharper ideological line before 1967 was out. The dismissal of the Bengal United Front Government opened the way for a further realignment of political forces in India, and Moscow read in the situation the possibility that the Congress would go still farther right. In a broadcast to India on November 29, Moscow Radio said that the country's "progressive gains, its independence and its foreign policy are threatened"; there was a call to the Indian people for resistance. What was at stake was much more than a Communist-dominated government in Bengal: "If the reactionaries are allowed to use the fruits of their intrigues in West Bengal, tomorrow they will encroach upon the coalition governments of Kerala, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. There is no guarantee that they will not try to take over at the Centre and dangerous symptoms are already present. . . . The hand of reaction raised above India's future must be stopped." Moscow Radio broadcasts not only supported the mass struggles in Calcutta against the dismissal of the coalition government but actually urged the Indian people to fight in defense of their Constitution.[42]

## STRONGER STATE RELATIONS

Moscow was aware that the Indian Communist party was taking a leading role in the West Bengal agitation and that the target of the agitation was the Central Government in New Delhi, on whose order the governor had dismissed the United Front Government. In all Soviet comment on the Indian situation, however, criticism of the Indian Government was carefully omitted; for the dismissal of the UF Government, only the big business and landlords of West Bengal were held responsible.[43] Interestingly, even while Moscow Radio was criticizing the action of the West Bengal Governor and warning the Indian people that their democratic Constitution was in danger, a Soviet delegation was negotiating a new trade agreement in New Delhi, and soon thereafter it was announced that Kosygin would be paying an official visit to India. This visit ironically coincided with the fall of the United Front Government in Bihar, following the defection of a small faction, which was allowed to form a new government with the support of the Congress party.

Moscow gave enough hint that it attached great importance to the Kosygin visit. In January, criticism of adverse political events in India was muted. First Deputy Chairman Kirill Mazurov praised India's foreign policy at an embassy reception in Moscow and promised continued economic aid. In an editorial, *New Times* said that Soviet-Indian friendship had passed the "acid test of time"; the Soviets were "vitally interested in that India firmly stands on its feet economically, and makes progress in solving its social problems."[44] A Moscow radio broadcast was somewhat more communicative about the purpose of the visit: India, it said, had passed through a difficult year and was facing numerous problems. "The forces of reaction sought to use the difficulties to sway the country from the traditional path of non-alignment and planned progress. The struggle is assuming varied forms, and, in this context, the vast masses of Indian people and forces of democratic progress

value even more every step that strengthens Soviet-Indian friendship."[45]

Kosygin reportedly decided on the visit quite suddenly at a time when the Indian embassy in Moscow had almost despaired of getting the Soviet Prime Minister to make the trip in response to an invitation that had been made a year ago.[46] His talks with Indira Gandhi covered the whole gamut of subjects from economic affairs to foreign relations. The communique issued at the end of the talks indicated that the Soviet Union was still ready to go a long way to help India restore its economic health and remain steadfast in its foreign policy.[47] Much of the discussion related to China, Pakistan, and the role of the Indian Communist movement. Kosygin reportedly reassured Mrs. Gandhi that he expected no Chinese invasion of India; he was doubtful "whether the present Chinese regime would even last long."[48] On Pakistan, as the communique itself said, Kosygin expected India and its neighbor to "exert all their efforts in order to bring about a further normalization of their relations and for the creation of an atmosphere conducive to the solution of the outstanding problems through bilateral contacts." In conversations with Indian leaders he asked them to take into account that it was only with Pakistan that the Chinese had not spoiled their relations; for this, he said, the two countries' common interests against India were primarily responsible. The visit resulted in agreement to hold consultations between Moscow and New Delhi at different levels and at regular intervals on economic as well as political matters.

Moscow apparently chose a crucial moment in India's political life to intervene strongly with the Congress Government to keep Soviet-Indian friendship and collaboration a running business. The backdrop to this Soviet effort, which one leading Indian commentator compared in significance to the Khrushchev-Bulganin tour of India in 1955,[49] was provided by a deepening political crisis in India to which Soviet media had already drawn pointed attention, a serious intensification of the war in Vietnam, and the proposed British military withdrawal from Asia by 1970. Kosygin's primary concern appeared to be to ensure

the continuity of Nehru's domestic and foreign policy, and a durable peace in the subcontinent. *The Times of India* reported that Kosygin discussed with the Indian leaders whether India could fill the power vacuum to be caused in South Asia following the British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf area. While Soviet diplomacy was said to be trying to preempt the emergence of a US-backed regional alliance in South Asia and the Near East, Kosygin was credited with the view that there could be no stability in South Asia without a "modus vivendi in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent."[50]

To sum up, whatever doubts and misgivings the Soviets may entertain about India's adherence to domestic and foreign policies which would keep it clearly outside the American sphere of influence, they have shown no sign of flinching from their intensive commitment to its development and defense. Soviet economic aid to India's development in 1965 was three times that of the United States; the Soviet Government plays a greater role than any other in equipping India with modern weapons of warfare. Shastri made it clear during an interview with James Reston, of *The New York Times,* in December, 1965, that India was frankly not in a position to do anything in the realm of foreign affairs that might alienate it from the USSR.[52] The Soviets know this. Their intervention in India with greater and larger assistance for development and defense at each critical point of its recent history—in 1963, when India was licking the wounds of the debacle in the northeast frontier, in 1965, and in the beginning of 1968—was evidently motivated by the belief that only with massive assistance could they keep India from going over to the "other side." The Soviets are certainly interested in securing India from Chinese influence and in India's friendly help in their own political, diplomatic, and ideological conflict with China, but they are also at least as much interested in a stable, independent India, by which they mean an India that is not unduly dependent on the United States. They are also equally interested in a stable Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. Although they are flexible in their attitude toward the political complexion of leaders

of the Indian bourgeoisie, they would certainly expect any Indian government with which they might do business to pursue broadly such domestic and foreign policies as would be consistent with Soviet involvement in Indian development and defense. The Soviets would expect India to understand and appreciate their policy on Pakistan and not to make their task more difficult than it is by reacting emotionally and short-sightedly to their effort to assemble a Soviet-backed balance of power in South Asia.

## THE SOVIETS AND PAKISTAN

Forces working in the tangle of South Asian relationships since the late fifties for a positive turn in Soviet-Pakistan relations yielded fruits in April, 1965, with President Ayub Khan's first visit to the USSR. The Soviet invitation to Ayub Khan had been announced in Karachi on September 14, 1964, just about a fortnight before the fall of Khrushchev. It had been specifically renewed by the new Soviet premier, Alexei Kosygin.

Steady improvement in Soviet-Pakistan relations had begun in 1960. The U-2 incident and the Soviet threat of nuclear attack on the US base in Peshawar had shocked the people and Government of Pakistan to a realization of the dangers to which the military alliance with America exposed their country; that Ayub had no prior knowledge of the Powers flight probably added insult to fear. According to *Pakistan Horizon,** "from 1960 onwards" the attitudes of the Soviet Union and Pakistan toward each other began to change, and the Pakistani Government made a "serious effort to review and revise its relations with the Communist bloc." The Oil Pact concluded in 1961, providing Pakistan with Soviet assistance in oil prospecting and exploration and a $30 million credit, was the first measure taken by Ayub Khan to diversify his country's eco-

*Quarterly journal of the Pakistan Institute of International Relations, Karachi.

nomic and political relations. Between 1962 and 1964, Pakistan signed a number of barter agreements with the USSR and other members of the Socialist bloc. In 1963 came an air transportation agreement between Pakistan and the Soviet Union, while some of the East European countries offered to help in Pakistan's industrialization. Exchanges at the cultural level also increased.

*Pakistan Horizon*'s appraisal of the changing pattern of Soviet-Pakistan relationships leading to the invitation to Ayub Khan is interesting. The diverse developments which effected Soviet-Pakistan relations between 1961 and 1964 were the Kennedy Administration's "pro-India oriented" South Asia policy, further improvement in Pakistan's "always cordial" ties with China, the Sino-Indian border conflict and the ideological rift between Peking and Moscow, parallel Soviet-US "support for India against Peking," the strain on Pakistan-US friendship as a result of the supply of American arms aid to India and Washington's rejection of Pakistani protests. All these factors led to a thaw in Soviet-Pakistan relations and brought them to an "equivocal" stage.

> Pakistan's position in South Asia *vis-a-vis* the Soviet Union is equivocal [wrote *Pakistan Horizon* towards the end of 1964]. It would appear that by drawing close to China and by opposing India's military buildup, Pakistan should earn the hostility of the Soviet Union. But this has not been the case, for Soviet-Pakistan relations have continued to improve. On account of its earlier ties with India, the Soviet Union has moved with caution. Thus in 1962 it vetoed the mild Irish resolution in the Security Council which simply reminded the two countries in the Kashmir dispute of their obligations under the UN resolutions. However, in the 1964 Kashmir debate in the Security Council there was some softening of the Soviet attitude. The Soviet representative did not accuse Pakistan of aggression in Kashmir, as had been previously done by his government. Instead he called for a peaceful settlement between the two parties.
>
> The removal of Mr. Khrushchev from power in Moscow

has introduced a new element in Soviet-Pakistan relations. Although it has been claimed by Indian leaders that the new Soviet Government's policy toward India, the Kashmir dispute and arms aid remains unchanged, it is unlikely that Mr. Kosygin will strictly adhere to Mr. Khrushchev's policy. It has been reported that the Soviet Communist Party theoretician, Mr. Mikhail Suslov, in his report, which led to Mr. Khrushchev's resignation, stated that the former Soviet Premier had continued to give technical and military aid to India during the Sino-Indian border dispute without obtaining directives from his Party or Government. Another shift in Soviet policy is that serious efforts are being made to repair ties with Peking. This might lead to some adjustments in international relations in South Asia. Moscow's invitation to President Ayub was specifically renewed after the new Government of Mr. Kosygin had taken over power in the Kremlin. In November 1964 Mr. Sergei Lapin, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, visited Pakistan and held discussions with the leaders of this country. This reflects a change in Soviet attitude for it indicates a willingness to discuss and understand Pakistan's concern over India's arms buildup.[53]

Between late 1964 and early 1965 a steady improvement in Soviet-Pakistani relations went on side by side with an expansion of Sino-Pakistani friendship. For example, in December, 1964, Pakistan and China decided to start a regular shipping service the following March. Three days after this was announced, a Soviet delegation arrived in Rawalpindi to discuss the scope of expansion in Russo-Pakistani trade. At the invitation of the Soviet foreign minister, the foreign minister of Pakistan arrived in Moscow on January 11, 1965, to arrange for Ayub's visit. On January 13, Bhutto said that the Soviet Union and Pakistan held identical views on "many major world problems," and the Soviet Government formally announced that the Ayub visit would be made in April.[54] The Pakistani commerce minister announced on January 25 that his government would soon sign a long-term trade agreement with the USSR and also expand its trade with China.[55] In February,

China gave Pakistan an interest-free loan of $60 million to finance development projects.

## A NEUTRAL STANCE

At the beginning of March, Ayub Khan paid an official visit to China and, as already noted, obtained the Peking Government's full support for the Kashmiri people's right to national self-determination. The timing of the Chinese support was significant. Kashmir had been going through serious internal turmoil for well over a year; Chou En-lai had met Sheikh Abdullah in Algiers, and a general India-Pakistan crisis was building up, which was to explode soon in the "little war" in the Rann of Kutch. Neither Ayub Khan's "triumphant" visit to China, nor Chou En-lai's one-day stopover in Rawalpindi on April 2, had any chilling effect on the Pakistan President's visit to the Soviet Union. Kosygin described it as a "momentous event in the history of Soviet-Pakistan relations."[56] At this first-ever visit by the head of any Pakistan Government to the USSR, a Soviet understanding of Pakistan's objection to the Soviet-American arms aid to India was established. This helped the new Soviet leaders to bring about, albeit slowly and cautiously, a change in Moscow's South Asia policy.

The change had evidently been contemplated immediately after the fall of Khrushchev; it constituted a major break with Khrushchev's India-Pakistan policy. The communique issued on Ayub Khan's Moscow talks did not mention Kashmir, and yet it was "worded in a manner that was entirely satisfactory to Paskistan."[57] What gladdened Pakistan was this sentence in the communique: "They [the Pakistani President and the Soviet Premier] declare resolute support for the peoples who are waging a struggle for their national liberation and independence and for the peoples who are fighting for the right to determine their future in accordance with their own will."[58] The Soviet leaders could not have been un-

aware how this sentence would be interpreted in Pakistan and India. They had apparently decided to shift their South Asia policy from a wholesale commitment to India's territorial and geopolitical interest *vis-à-vis* Pakistan to one of neutrality on Indo-Pakistan disputes. This new stance came out in bolder relief when Shastri visited the USSR in the following May. Kosygin was reported to have told Shastri on May 13 that the Soviet Government desired to see a peaceful settlement of the Rann of Kutch dispute between India and Pakistan. More significant was the absence in the communique issued on the Kosygin-Shastri talks of Soviet support for India on issues that concerned Pakistan. The communique did not mention Kashmir (a parity with the April communique) or the Rann of Kutch. The new element in Soviet policy did not go unnoticed in the world. The Russians made it plain, said *The Economist,* that "they had no intention of getting involved in India's problems with its neighbours. Though their public exchanges were extremely cordial, Russian reservations were plain enough between the lines. Mr. Kosygin was clearly thinking of Pakistan when he said that peace-loving countries and peoples need not take any development in Russian-Indian ties as directed against them; . . . the impression left was that the Russians would aim to keep both Pakistan and India looking, equally, to Moscow as a friend."[59]

This Soviet aim met with unprecedented success during the India-Pakistan war, as we have already noted. According to a perceptive Pakistani expert on the country's relationship with the USSR, Khalida Qureshi, Soviet intervention in the war was motivated by a multiplicity of factors—"the USSR's proximity to the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent, its own successful policy of peaceful co-existence with the West; its fear that the East-West *détente* would end if a world war broke out, in which case it would have been obliged, for political reasons, to side with China; the Sino-Soviet dispute; and the Soviet anxiety to deny China any great influence in the subcontinent."[60] Qureshi found a "strange parallelism" in the US and Soviet policies. A

staff study in *Pakistan Horizon* noted a change in the hitherto "diametrically opposed" stand of the USSR and the US to the Kashmir issue that led to the war. "The Soviet Union had previously supported India on the Kashmir issue, declaring the State to be an integral part of the Indian Union; now it has assumed a neutral stance."[61] The Soviet stance was articulated with greater clarity in November, 1965, when both Pakistan and India were publicly adopting mutually irreconcilable positions on the question of Kashmir's being discussed at the Tashkent meeting. A press commentary issued by the Soviet embassy in Karachi on November 12 stated: "Attempts are made at times to claim that the Soviet Union is allegedly not objective and is inclined to support one side at the expense of the other. Such opinions are far from the reality; . . . the Soviet people are convinced that only under these conditions, not on the battlefield but at the roundtable of peaceful negotiations, can and should a final stable agreement be reached between Pakistan and India on the Kashmir problem."[62]

## SOVIET ARMS FOR PAKISTAN

The Tashkent meeting ended the state of war between India and Pakistan, but the next step—the creation of an Indo-Pakistani dialogue on Kashmir—remained unachieved. The immediate problem of the two countries was how to replenish the heavy losses of modern arms during the war. Kosygin was mindful of an imminent arms race between Pakistan and India; at Tashkent one of his main arguments for a solution of Indo-Pakistan problems was that otherwise an arms race would consume much of the resources of the two countries.[63] The stalemate in India-Pakistan relations gave a fillip to the arms race. Both Ayub Khan and Indira Gandhi, during their visits to Washington in 1966, found the US Administration unwilling or unable to replenish their respective countries' losses. India therefore turned to the Soviet Union and met with a positive response. The Soviet Government undertook a phased

program to replenish India's war losses, not unaware that this would have an adverse effect on its relations with Pakistan. For a time the Russians probably believed that Pakistan would be able to secure enough supplies, if not directly from America, then indirectly from Iran and Turkey. It therefore did not respond immediately when a request was received from Pakistan for modern weapons. However, the Soviet Government sold some trucks and jeeps to Pakistan, and a little later, about half-a-dozen sample helicopters.[64]

Even at an early stage of the 1965 war, the Pakistan Government had been trying to obtain fresh supplies of aircraft. When the Pentagon's new director of military assistance, Vice-Admiral L. C. Heinz, arrived in Rawalpindi in August, 1965, Pakistan gave notice that "it will seek military aircraft from the Soviet Union if Washington does not make up its mind 'within the next six or seven months' on the replacement of 100 obsolete F-86 jet fighter planes."[65] Within a week of the cease-fire, a three-man Pakistani team, led by Air Marshal Asghar Khan, former commander-in-chief of the air force, left for China on a ten-day mission.[66] In December, *The Times* reported that Pakistan was expanding its army by three divisions and "it is believed that some of the weapons for these have been sent from China by a shuttle of air transports flying from Sinkiang."[67] Toward the end of December, an Indian official spokesman in New Delhi gave "evidence" of the arms aid Pakistan had been receiving from China. One of the three new divisions being raised by the Pakistani army, he said, had already reached combat readiness with weapons supplied by China. Pakistan, he added, had received a Chinese loan of $67.5 million for the purchase of arms, and a large number of Pakistani pilots were being trained in China.[68] Confirmation of a Chinese arms flow to Pakistan came in March, 1966, from Bhutto himself. Bhutto, who was speaking to pressmen during the visit of Liu Shao-chi and Ch'en Yi to Lahore, denied that there was an arms agreement between Pakistan and China but added that his country might get more Chinese weapons "if India continued its own arms buildup." *The New York Times*

correspondent reporting Bhutto's statement, recalled that only a few days earlier four Chinese Mig-19 fighters and five medium-sized Chinese tanks had been displayed in Karachi's Pakistan Day parade.[69] The Indian defense minister, Chavan, told Parliament in August that China had supplied two hundred tanks to Pakistan and "some bombers as well as Mig fighter-bombers." On September 4 *The New York Times* reported that both the United States and the Soviet Union were facing the problem of "how to woo Pakistan away from undue dependence on Chinese military supplies without antagonizing India or stirring new tensions in the subcontinent." Both governments, the report said, were considering limited sales of arms to Pakistan; both were reluctant to do anything that would harm Indira Gandhi's prospects in the coming Indian elections, and each would prefer the other to "take the lead in arms sale to Pakistan."

The Soviet Government had already taken the lead. In June a Pakistan military mission headed by Air Marshal Noor Khan had arrived in Moscow, met with the Soviet defense minister and officials concerned with the sale of arms, and visited a number of military installations and inspected new supersonic jet aircraft. *The Christian Science Monitor* reported that the mission returned to Rawalpindi with the impression that Moscow would be willing to consider "any reasonable request Pakistan might make for the purchase of Soviet arms."[70] The negotiations were evidently not smooth and went on for about a year before yielding positive results. In July, Selig Harrison reported in the Washington *Post* that the prospects of a Pakistan-Soviet arms deal were regarded as "linked to Pakistan's willingness to permit continuation of U.S. electronic intelligence facilities there, and this, in turn, is linked in part to future U.S. military aid policy."[71] The US-Pakistan defense treaty under which Washington maintains its electronic intelligence stations in Pashawar expires in 1970 unless renewed. Moscow was probably pressing Pakistan for an assurance that the treaty would not be renewed.

By April, 1967, Ayub Khan lost all hope of a renewal of

American military aid to Pakistan of the pre-1965 scale. Asked by *The Times* correspondent Neville Maxwell if this would make Pakistan more dependent on China, Ayub Khan quoted a Persian proverb saying, "He who searches, finds." The USSR, he said, had "armed India to the teeth" since the war, and it would be unfair to Pakistan if Moscow were now to close off supplies to the subcontinent. Maxwell had the impression that Ayub Khan was still hoping to get Soviet arms.[72] Pakistan apparently reached an understanding with Moscow in the summer of 1967. It was reported in August that the Soviets had decided to send troop-carrying helicopters to Pakistan. The Washington *Post* said that the Soviet shipment would be no more than twelve helicopters and that only half a dozen Pakistani airmen had been sent to Russia for training.[73] Soviet sources were most reluctant to confirm reports of an arms deal between Moscow and Rawalpindi and thereby place Soviet-Indian relations under strain. Early in August the Indian foreign minister, M. C. Chagla, declared in Parliament, "We have the solemn assurance from the USSR, from the highest dignatary of the Soviet Union, that Russia has not supplied and will not supply any weapons to Pakistan. We are completely satisfied on the evidence before us that Russia has not supplied any lethal weapons to Pakistan." Technically, troop-carrying helicopters are regarded in military circles as support items and not as lethal end-products.

Consideration of Indian reaction probably withheld the supply of lethal Soviet weapons to Pakistan for some more time. Meanwhile, Moscow accelerated the supply of aircraft to India. At the Indian Republic Day parade in New Delhi on January 26, 1968, India for the first time put on public view its Soviet-built surface-to-air missiles; in the fly-past of 136 aircraft, 32 Mig-21s were the "stars of the show and drew the greatest response from the audience."[74] In February it was reported that the Soviets were shipping 100 SU-7 fighter-bombers to India.[75] This created the first note of discord between Moscow and Pakistan since 1960. Pakistan's foreign minister, Shaifuddin

Pirzada, said the shipment would seriously upset the arms balance in the subcontinent. "We are taking the matter up with the Russians. We think the shipment has effectively nullified the terms of the Tashkent agreement and we want to make sure that the Russians realize the implications of what they are doing."[76] The Pakistani press in a chorus of protest said that the Soviet action had made the Tashkent agreement a "dead letter."[77]

In April, 1968, Kosygin paid his (and any Soviet premier's) first visit to Pakistan, returning Ayub Khan's two visits in three years, the second having been made in October, 1967. Kosygin's visit was a momentous event for both countries. For the USSR it marked a significant step forward in its continuing effort to gain influence in the nations lying near its southern frontier. For Pakistan it had the "symbolic value of showing how far they had travelled since the days when they ranked high on John Foster Dulles' list of stalwart American allies in Asia. . . ." On the eve of the visit, newspapers in Pakistan printed articles reminding the Russians that the lease would soon be up on the US intelligence base near Peshwar. Ayub Khan-Kosygin talks were cordial but did not resolve all differences. The Soviet Premier repeatedly stressed in his public speeches that he and his host did not see eye to eye on all questions. Evidently Kosygin was referring to Pakistan's perspective of China, although some American correspondents thought his repeated reference to continuing areas of disagreement between the Soviet Union and Pakistan was meant to reassure India over the questions of arms supply and Kashmir.[78] Kosygin offered Pakistan Soviet assistance on a broad range of development projects—a steel plant on the Indus River, probably at Kalabagh, if experts found the project suitable; a nuclear reactor power plant at Rooppur in East Pakistan, a project the United States had backed out of for "technical" reasons in 1967; a radio link between the two countries; and assistance in building a Pakistani fishing fleet. The agreement on the nuclear plant in East Pakistan was an extremely shrewd

move. Rawalpindi's decision to postpone the project, following the withdrawal of American backing, had led to vociferous protests in East Pakistan. Kosygin was able to strengthen the Soviet image in an area where the appeal of China was believed to be strong; he was also able to take some pressure off Ayub Khan in a very sensitive part of his country.

Pakistan still did not get what it wanted above everything else—major supplies of modern arms from the Soviet Union. Kosygin made a brief "friendship" visit to New Delhi from Rawalpindi for talks with Indira Gandhi. India was still left with the impression that the Soviets would not sell arms to Pakistan. Comments in responsible Indian newspapers suggested that Kosygin brought to New Delhi certain ideas for an Indo-Pakistan settlement which would have saved the subcontinent from the arms race. It seems that he did not get a very encouraging response.[79]

The Soviet-Pakistan arms deal came in July following a visit to Moscow by the commander-in-chief of the Pakistan Army, General Yahya Khan. Its exact scope remains unknown. Ayub Khan told newsmen in Teheran on July 21, "In fact, what we may get from the USSR will fill up gaps here and there."[80] *Dawn* reported on July 12 that there were indications in Rawalpindi that "Russian arms supplies to Pakistan would be defensive in nature, that they would be far less than what India has been receiving," and that, finally, they were to be given on the express condition that they would not be used against India. The Delhi correspondent of the *Financial Times*, London, said that Indira Gandhi believed that the "type and quantity of weapons supplied by the Soviet Union to Pakistan would be strictly controlled so as not to alter the balance of power in the subcontinent."[81] The India correspondent of the Washington *Post* found a "striking parallel" between the Soviet and American positions on arms supply to Pakistan. "Both are distressed that Rawalpindi relies on China for arms and both would like to wean Pakistan away from this dependence. At the same time, both regard India as their principal client on

the subcontinent and dislike creating an unfriendly climate here."[82]

It is not clear whether and to what extent the Soviet Government had kept India informed of the arms talks with Pakistan. After the first Karachi press reports of the agreement, Kosygin sent a message to Indira Gandhi on July 6 vaguely indicating the probability of an arms deal with Pakistan of a kind that would not affect the general political and military balance in the subcontinent. This crossed with a message from the Prime Minister expressing concern over the effect of the reported deal upon Indo-Soviet and Indo-Pakistan relations. She received a reply from Kosygin on July 12 containing a "firm assurance" that "nothing would be done to undermine" Indo-Soviet friendship.[83] Nevertheless, Indian reaction was predictably one of anger and disappointment. The Government tried to take a balanced view of the novel development, and some of the more responsible Indian newspapers urged an understanding of the changed political realities in South Asia and the world. But the volatile traditionalist elements both within the ruling Congress party and in the opposition parties, almost the entire Indian languages press and the anti-Soviet lobby, joined together to create a climate of distrust of the USSR. The tabloid weekly of the Jan Sangh party ran a banner headline: "The Soviet Union Stabs India In The Back";[84] the anti-Communist Bombay weekly *Current* cried out, "Once again a Communist country has betrayed our friendship. It was China in 1962. It is Russia in 1968."[85]

On July 9, Indira Gandhi expressed her "concern" over the Soviet-Pakistan arms deal while addressing a press conference in Calcutta but added that Indian policy toward the Soviet Union would not change. On July 22, perhaps anticipating what would happen in the ensuing session of the Lok Sabha, she issued a statement criticizing the Soviet action, whose "unavoidable consequence would be to accentuate tension in the subcontinent and to add to our responsibilities in regard to defence and security of our country. It will make Pakistan even more

intransigent than it has been." The next day the Congress Parliamentary party, in an on-the-eve-of-the-session meeting, asked the Prime Minister to condemn the Soviet action. Three days of discussion in Parliament, during which the biggest ever anti-Soviet demonstration in New Delhi, organized by the Jan Sangh, had to be dispersed with tear gas and *lathi* charges, ended on July 24. Government spokesmen, while leaving no doubt of Indian anxiety, were unwilling to question Soviet motives. The Prime Minister said she had received assurances that the agreement with Pakistan would not be allowed to affect either Indo-Soviet friendship or India's own interests and that the arms would not be used against India. The home minister, Chavan, used a caution against taking up strong anti-Soviet positions, which were unjustified, but he added that Soviet policy toward Pakistan was "the approach of a changing world."[86]

The Chinese Government and media had maintained a studied silence on the Pakistan-Soviet arms negotiations. Pakistan probably kept it informed of their tortuous course. In June, 1966, Chou En-lai made an unscheduled stopover in Rawalpindi just on the eve of Bhutto's journey to the Soviet Union. President Ayub Khan himself took care not to offend Peking. During his own visit to the USSR in October, 1967, he sent the senior-most member of his cabinet, Khwaja Shahabuddin and his own son, Altaf Gauhar, to Peking for the People's Republic's anniversary celebrations. Chinese media, however, kept up their attack on the "Soviet-U.S. alliance to dominate the world" and went on warning the third world countries of the fetters hidden in Soviet economic aid. Chinese agencies in Pakistan maintained discreet caution in reacting to the Pakistan-Soviet negotiations. There was one lapse, however, when on May 6 a news bulletin issued by the Chinese embassy at Rawalpindi warned Pakistan against the friendship efforts of Kosygin. "The Soviet modern revisionist clique," it said, "has recently conducted conspiratorial activities in connection with Indo-Pakistan relations. Superficially, the clique pretended to

promote the normalization of relations between the two countries, but in reality it colluded with U.S. imperialism in continuing its policy of fostering Indian reactionaries and bullying Pakistan."[87]

## A MAOIST LINE FOR INDIA

Peking appeared to be making a fresh ideological appraisal of the Indian internal situation at the beginning of 1966. This appraisal was conditioned largely by China's geopolitical interest in the subcontinent and also by its assessment of the place occupied by India in an anti-China grouping supposedly sponsored by Moscow and Washington. Economic and political weakening of India by inciting discontent and protest movements against the Indian Government seemed, in the early months of 1966, to be the major objective of Peking propaganda. A propaganda offensive on these lines had to be justified by a revolutionary interpretation of Indian realities. Thus in February, Peking radio began to speak of a "determined revolt" of the Indian masses against the policies of the Congress leadership. In March the radio reported "frequent peasant struggles in the countryside" against the landlords and the Government, and of demonstrations throughout the country in which "two million people" had taken part.

It was only after the official launching of the great proletarian cultural revolution in August, 1966, that Peking developed a clear and completely independent ideological line for India. The general guideline was provided by the communique formulated at the eleventh plenary session of the Eighth Central Committee of the CCP and issued on August 12: the world was now in a "new era of revolution"; all political forces were undergoing a "process of great upheaval, great division and great reorganization."[88]

## INDIAN UPSURGE NOTED

Peking's propagandists and ideologues began to formulate the theme of a mighty national revolutionary upsurge in India

comprising broad sections of the Indian people—students, government employees, traders and businessmen, workers and peasants, the intelligentsia, national minorities, and the rank and file of almost all political parties ranging from the extreme right to the extreme left. Till August, 1966, it was still the "struggle of the Indian people against persecution and for subsistence." After the launching of the cultural revolution in China, however, it became a different kind of struggle, because of its nationwide dimensions and because people had begun to use "violence to deal with the armed suppression by Government authorities."[89] When in the autumn unrest spread among students, Peking spied the first sparks of a revolutionary fire and radio broadcasts reported: "In India, a students' movement of unprecedented scale against the reactionary Congress Government has swept through major cities in the North like a tempest and is rapidly spreading southward to other cities."[90] "Excellent is the situation of the Indian people's struggle since the beginning of this year. The struggle is spreading to the whole country on an unprecedented scale, in which more than ten million people have taken part. It is evident that the struggle is extending its scope from the field of economics to that of politics. The surging waves of the Indian people's struggle shows that the various political forces of India were undergoing a great political upheaval, a great division and a great reorganization."

The Maoist strategy of the broadest possible united front against the "reactionary Indian authorities," big landlords and big capitalists, now began to unfold rapidly through daily Peking radio broadcasts to India. In October the Indian people had "resorted to revolutionary violence" and had begun to see through the smokescreen of the doctrine of nonviolence with which "narcotic" the ruling classes sought to "split and dissolve [their] revolutionary struggle." In November, "Indian peasants in various districts . . . have begun to stand up and fight for their survival," and the students' movement was growing into a "united struggle of all strata of the Indian people."[91]

In December, "Government employees throughout the country are rising in rebellion." And the Nagas and the Mizos were conducting their armed struggle for "national self-determination" and "national salvation."

At the beginning of 1967, Peking found the Indian situation even riper for a Maoist-type revolution. The "storm" of the Indian mass struggle was now "making a violent assault on the rule of the Indian reactionaries"; workers had emerged as its "main force"; and it was "spreading to the villages," which was "highly significant." The biggest gain was that the "broad masses" had realized that the "root cause of their impoverishment" was the "reactionary rule of the Congress Government which represents the interests of the big bourgeoisie and the big landlords." However, the Indian struggle would be a long and protracted one, with many "difficulties and twists and turns" to be overcome.[92]

The February election, in Chinese eyes, only further sharpened Indian class contradictions and made the classes increasingly antagonistic to one another. It brought at the center a government "more reactionary than ever" and "still more subservient to US imperialism and Soviet revisionism"; but its great significance was that in several states it broke the "monopoly of local power" of the Congress party and made it "ineffective in the face of people's resistance."[93] However, it was entirely mistaken to think, as did not merely the Dange "clique" of the revisionist CPI but also some of the leaders of the CPI(M), that the non-Congress governments were in any way progressive and that anything substantial in the interest of the people could be achieved peacefully, through the parliamentary method. The formation of non-Congress governments in several states merely indicated the "decay and decline of the Congress party"; those who had assumed power in the non-Congress states were "from top to bottom" the "local feudal-comprador forces" and, therefore, "no different" from the Congress governments"; the reactionary role of the political regime has not changed in the least." Only in two states, Kerala and Bengal,

were the Communists partners of coalitions; but even these two governments were "component parts of the state apparatus of India's big landlords and big bourgeoisie"; under the direct control of the Central Government "they are completely unable to either introduce any reforms in substance or shake the foundation of the capitalist and feudal relations of production." The elections had left India "littered with dry faggots," but there were dangerous possibilities of the rising revolution being betrayed, and the greatest danger came from the revisionists in the Indian Communist movement, certainly not confined to the Dange "clique."[94]

Peking ideologues therefore intervened in June, 1967, to lay the myth of "peaceful transition" to socialism and of the parliamentary way, revisionist ideas, and to offer a warning to the CPI(M). It must pay no heed to the revisionist conspiracy to unite the two CPIs; it must abandon the idea that the Indian revolution could be advanced by fighting elections and entering governments under the direct control of the Centre. The two left-coalition governments in Kerala and Bengal were merely being used by the Central Government to put down the people's movement and to contain the coming revolution. The Indian people had only one task to perform: to wage "relentless armed struggle" in order to "overthrow" the Government and "forcibly seize power."

By the time this call came from Peking in the form of an article in *People's Daily* written by a "Red Guard" (the contents of the article were repeatedly broadcast to India in various transmissions),[95] peasants at Naxalbari and two other adjoining villages in the Darjeeling district of north Bengal had risen in revolt, providing Peking the signal it had long waited for. Peking projected Naxalbari as a "Red district" encircled by a "White regime"; it had "raised the Red flag" and was the "prelude to a violent revolution by hundreds of millions of people throughout India." Naxalbari was the result of the militant action of the "revolutionaries" of the Indian Communist party who had "deserted the united front government"

in West Bengal because "it served as a tool of the Indian reactionaries."

## CALL FOR REVOLUTION

*People's Daily* now laid down the Maoist line for India in clear, unmistakable terms. The Indian revolution "must take the road of relying on the peasants, establishing base areas in the countryside, persisting in protracted armed struggle, and using the countryside to encircle and finally capture the cities."[96] The city-orientation of Indian Communist strategy must be given up and the peasants made "the invincible force of the Indian revolution"; the proletariat must therefore integrate with the peasants. Since the reactionary forces were "temporarily stronger than the revolutionary forces," Communists must use the "whole set of the flexible strategy and tactics of people's war" and "persevere in protracted armed struggle." This armed struggle must begin in the countryside, where "the revolutionaries can manoeuvre freely." It mattered little if the beginning was small and if the peasants had to fight at first with bows and arrows; as long as the Communists relied on the peasants, "it is entirely possible for them to advance from one revolutionary rural base to another in the huge backward rural areas and build a people's army of a new type." There will, of course, be "twists and turns" and "difficulties," but eventually the Communists will be able to develop "from isolated areas into a vast expanse."[97] And as if to drive the point home, the Chinese began to see "dozens of Naxalbaris" appearing "in all parts of the Indian countryside."[98]

To help them enhance their strength, the Chinese began to tell the Naxalbari revolutionaries how to conduct their struggle. They must "adhere to mobile and flexible guerrilla tactics" in order to avoid the mopping up operations of the police and to break out of "encirclements." "So long as these revolutionary forces are good at employing the tactics of 'the enemy

advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass, the enemy tires, we attack, the enemy retreats, we pursue . . .' they will be able to gather strength and exhaust the enemy's effectiveness. . . . To gain a firm footing and to stick to long-term armed struggle, the revolutionary peasant forces must set up and expand their base areas in the countryside."[99] Reports published in the Chinese press, when broadcast over the radio, took on aspects of programmatic instructions:

> They [the peasants of Naxalbari] have started to set up their own regime and organize peasant societies. The rebel peasants occupied by force the land of the landlords, the plantation holders and the reactionary government. They ploughed the land, drove away the plantation holders, seized grain, guns and ammunition from the homes of the big landlords, collected money and grain from the landlords and eliminated hoarding and speculation. They established people's courts to put on trial and punish the stubborn local police and their accomplices. They move about in armed bands, and women are also seen marching ahead of these bands. The rebel peasants guarding their hamlets with bows and arrows have made many successful ambushes against the reactionary troops and police.[100]

Expectedly, the Chinese invoked the Telengana uprising of the late forties as the correct road for the Indian peasant revolution; what was of real significance was that they linked Naxalbari with Telengana and implied that Naxalbari could have something very vital for a protracted armed struggle which Telengana had lacked. Naxalbari was the "rekindling" of the "torch of armed revolution once lit by the peasants of Telengana"; "that red torch lights the road to victory for the Indian revolution."[101] Naxalbari had the strategic advantage that Telengana did not: it is "only four miles from Nepal, 30 miles from Sikkim, 14 miles from East Pakistan and 60 miles from China's Tibet."[102] The implication clearly was that an expanded armed revolutionary base could in certain circumstances be fed from a rear base and a sanctuary; the Chinese

probably had in mind an argument advanced by some of the leaders of the CPI in 1951 justifying the withdrawal of the armed struggle in Telengana because it could not have such a rear base.[103]

In Chinese calculations the threat to Naxalbari came not so much from the Indian "reactionaries" as from the revisionists in the Communist movement who had betrayed the Telengana uprising and who were about to betray Naxalbari too. They had to be mercilessly exposed. Peking therefore mounted a vehement attack on the "revisionist" leadership of the CPI(M), first picking out by name the chief minister of Kerala, E. M. S. Namboodiripad, with whom it had many old scores to settle, and, after the dismissal of the West Bengal UF Government, men like Jyoti Basu, who was deputy chief minister in that government, and Harekrishna Konar, its minister from land revenue. Namboodiripad and his colleagues were "faithfully adhering to the reactionary and traitorous policies of the Congress-ruled Central Government"; they had "babbled much about the 'parliamentary road' and 'peaceful transition,'" but actually they "stand firm against the peasant armed struggle"; worse, "they hanker after high office . . . and seek to have themselves elected." There were "many facts to show that the Kerala state Government which enforces the fascist rule of the central government is part of the state machine operating in the interests of the landlords and the bureaucratic-comprador bourgeoisie": Namboodiripad acts as "an apologist and protector of the international agents of U.S. imperialism."[104]

When, at the beginning of 1968, Peking ideologues summed up Indian developments during the preceding year, they came broadly to four conclusions. The first was that an Indian revolution had become an important factor for the triumph of Maoism in Asia, for "India occupies an extremely important strategic position in the world proletariat revolution." The second conclusion was that 1967 had been a "turning point" for India not merely because of the outbreak of a Maoist-type "revolution" in Naxalbari, or because "the Naxalbari-type of

peasants' land struggles have developed in 50 places in eight states and areas under the direct control of the Central Government," but also because "the struggle between the two lines and the two roads" which had existed in the Indian Communist party for a long time, was "intensified" and carried a step further. Ignoring the protests of the CPI(M), the Chinese sharpened their attack on Indian "revisionists"; 1967, they said, had shown that the parliamentary road followed by "Namboodiripad, Jyoti Basu and other Indian revisionists" was "further exposed and went up in smoke." Peking denounced the entire political strategy of the CPI(M) and put forward its own: "to spread among the people Mao Tse-tung's thought, the acme of Marxism-Leninism in the present era; to carry further the struggle against the old and new types of revisionism; to make a specific analysis of India's objective conditions in accordance with the brilliant thought of Mao Tse-tung; and to formulate the programme and tactics of the Indian rerevolution on this basis; and to give impetus to the peasant revolutionary struggle and develop Naxalbari-type movements."[105]

The Chinese viewed the Kosygin visit to India in January, 1968, as a clearly anti-China move in South Asia. "Commentator," writing in *People's Daily* on February 5, described the visit as a "new step by the Soviet revisionist renegade clique to step up the aid it gives India against China, and, acting in co-operation with U.S. imperialism, to expand the U.S. war of aggression in Vietnam and actively peddle the peace talk fraud." Noting that the visit was made when India's "political-economic crisis" was "steadily deepening" and "the people's struggle against starvation and tyranny" was developing "day by day," the article added that the Soviet Premier's purpose was "to boost the morale of the reactionary Congress Government in the hope of keeping this tossing ship afloat in the raging revolutionary torrent so that the Indian reactionaries can continue to serve as a tool in the joint U.S.-Soviet opposition to China."[106]

## THE NINTH CONGRESS OF CCP

It remains to be noted that the projection by China of its own revolutionary ideology and strategy to India occurred during the great proletarian cultural revolution which some people have regarded as a period of madness. It is a moot question whether the Chinese stance will continue to be the same once the turmoil of the cultural revolution has been brought finally under control and the leadership chosen at the Ninth Congress of the CCP has settled down to its appointed tasks. It is pertinent to ask whether Mao's policies and strategies will not be substantially modified by his successors and what such modifications are likely to be. No answer to these questions can be more than speculation. Chinese foreign policy went through a near-paralysis during the cultural revolution. Peking withdrew its ambassadors from world capitals with the sole exception of Cairo. There was evidently a lack of central direction to foreign policy—once again, with one remarkable exception: China's noninvolvement in a war with the United States. While the documents of the Ninth Congress will require serious study before reliable conjectures are made on the future course of China's foreign policy, it seems very probable that for some years to come, the Chinese Communist stance will be mainly internal. Large leadership gaps remain to be filled before the ruling structure in China is fully restored, and this may not be achieved without further turmoil.[107] Although Mao took over the commanding heights of the cultural revolution, the new leadership that is emerging in China, even before the Chairman's exit, is a coalition or collective of radicals, moderates, and pragmatists. Contrary to widely publicized reports, the Central Committee chosen at the Ninth Congress does not seem to be dominated by the military in comparison with the Eighth CC. Of the 99 full and 95 alternate members of the Eighth Central Committee, 30.9 per cent were members of the People's Liberation Army. Of the 170 full and

109 alternate members of the Ninth CC, 40.5 per cent are known to be members of the PLA.[108] Thus the old balance between the military and political wings of the CCP appears to have been by and large maintained. Of some considerable significance is the elevation to the highest decision-making body of at least two dozen persons described as model peasants or workers or PLA heroes; in other words, grass root people. The 70 members of the Ninth CC, of whom nothing was known outside China in April, 1969, indicate the massive new political recruitment undertaken during the cultural revolution; the inclusion of 22 women as full and alternate members is another significant aspect of the new CC.

The emotional backdrop to the Congress was provided by the Sino-Soviet military clashes over the island in the Ussuri River on March 2 and 14–15. The conflict aroused nationalist fevers in both the USSR and China; each country's leadership tried to use the incidents for the purposes of its ideological and state interests. Border positions on both sides were quickly reinforced, and, *The New York Times* reported on May 7, each side had mounted a "nuclear presence not far from each other's frontier." Steps were taken at the same time to prevent an escalation of the conflict. Although local frontier clashes may still occur along portions of the Sino-Soviet border, serious flare-ups do not seem to be likely, and while the border dispute centering on the Chinese concept of "unequal treaties" will take a long time to settle, arrangements to maintain the *status quo* may well be made after the international Communist conference scheduled to assemble in Moscow in June, 1969.

If the Lin Piao political thesis adopted at the Ninth CCP Congress means anything it is that the Sino-Soviet cold war will rage with varying ferocity, clouding the Sino-American and the Soviet-American cold wars during the seventies. Unless there is a major rightward swing in the CCP after Mao's death, the mere demise of the Chairman is not likely to bring about radical changes in China's relationship with the Soviet Union.

In several respects, the Sino-Soviet cold war may be more dangerous to world peace and stability than the Soviet-American Cold War because it is not merely a clash of ideologies and power interests but also of cultures and the irrational forces of whipped-up nationalisms. In this cold war, the Chinese will have to operate within the hard fact of their economic and military inferiority, as well as the bitter truth that the international Communist movement is predominantly pro-Soviet. It will be a main Chinese endeavor to weaken the Soviet influence within the Socialist bloc and in the Communist parties in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The Lin Piao Report to the Ninth Congress and other Congress documents enable us to visualize tentatively the future projection of Chinese domestic and foreign policies. China can wage the cold war with the USSR and the US only from a secure bastion. This bastion is China itself, a continent rather than a nation, largely self-sufficient, almost completely self-reliant, foreign trade playing a negligible role in its economy compared to that of countries like Britain and Japan. The cultural revolution, as Edgar Snow has pointed out, has created an "increasingly sinocentric atmosphere akin to the day of Ch'ien Lung, of the eighteenth century."[109] The Chinese Communists will now address themselves primarily to building a Fortress China, a Maoist version of Stalin's socialism-in-one country. The great emphasis laid on the Soviet-American encirclement of China is perhaps the most effective way to project what is basically a revolutionary-isolationist stance. Lin Piao said in his Report:

> US imperialism and Soviet revisionism are always trying to 'isolate' China; this is China's honour. Their rabid opposition to China cannot do us the slightest harm. On the contrary, it serves to further arouse our people's determination to maintain independence and keep the initiative in our own hands, rely on our own efforts and work hard to make our own country prosperous and powerful; it serves to prove to

the whole world that China has drawn a clear line between herself on the one hand and U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism on the other.[110]

This "clear line" marks out China as the world's third great power, bent on earning equality with the two other great powers, and also on creating its own power constellation. US imperialism and Soviet revisionism, Lin warned the Congress, might launch a large-scale, even nuclear, war on China. China must be prepared. It will, however, avoid adventurism and pursue a policy of caution as it has done so far. "We will not attack unless we are attacked." While China seems no longer interested in the United Nations as it now exists and functions,[111] revolutionary isolationism does not mean that it will shut itself out of the outside world. The Lin Piao Report appears to have classified the world community into four categories of nations, with each of which China is likely to have a different pattern of relationship. Although the USSR and the US are clubbed together in their hostility toward China, and it remains a main imperative of Chinese policy to break up their joint hegemony of the world, there is a subtle difference in Lin Piao's Report between Russia and America. US imperialism is already a *proven* paper tiger; although "the most ferocious enemy of the people of the whole world," it is "going downhill more and more." The "social-imperialist Soviet revisionist renegade clique" is a paper tiger too, but *this remains to be proven.* Thus, although "a new historical period of opposing U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism has begun," the Chinese may be flexible in their approach to America provided there are real opportunities of resolving Sino-American disputes.[112]

In the second category belong the Socialist countries and countries of the intermediate zone with whom the Chinese would like to maintain friendly relations. In the closing phase of the cultural revolution China signed an important trade agreement with, of all Socialist countries, Yugoslavia! It placated

Rumania and stoutly denounced the Warsaw Pact military action in Czechoslovakia. Its strong condemnation of the so-called Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty of each member of the Socialist commonwealth (which, in effect, can only mean limited sovereignty of all members except the USSR) must have struck responsive chords in many East European hearts. In the Socialist countries the Chinese would want to deflate Soviet influence. With the countries of the intermediate zone it would like to develop fruitful economic and cultural relations, making up for the loss of trade with the USSR and creating jealousies between capitalist economies.

Across the Asian-African-Latin American world, the Lin Piao Report appears to have thrown a broad flexible dividing line: between countries that are overly tied up with the United States and the USSR and those that are not. Opposition to American imperialism *and* Soviet revisionism would endear a country to China; but since such countries are rare in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the Chinese would regard as friendly those nations that are positively opposed to American imperialism. In this category are placed such countries in Asia and Africa as Pakistan, Egypt and the other Arab states, Tanzania, Afghanistan, Nepal, Cambodia, even Ceylon. There is, however, another cluster of countries located in the vicinity of China and too closely allied to, or dependent on, America and Russia. Lin Piao listed these as South Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, India, Palestine, "and others." In these countries "armed struggles" of peoples for national liberation and independence and against imperialism have been going on, and these struggles would continue to receive Chinese support. This is the area where the Chinese People's Republic would want to build up its great power sphere of influence. The revolutionary-isolationist stance implicit in the Lin Piao thesis would not exclude pressures on some of or all these countries, depending on China's capability and the behavior of each of these countries. In other words, flexibilities are not ruled out. The decision to send the Chinese ambassador to Burma

back to his post at Rangoon may be a sign of flexibility. In the case of India, a relaxation of the Indian stand on the border issue may generate a favorable climate for improved relations with China. Lin Piao clubbed together the Indian and Soviet positions on the border issue; both have leaned on the "unequal treaties" which are not acceptable to China. If India were to revise its position and agree to have a *political* settlement of the border with China, the Chinese leadership may even respond generously, since this would weaken the Soviet insistence on the validity of "unequal treaties."

With regard to some areas, there is a deceptive similarity between Soviet and Chinese strategies, which ill conceal an acute rivalry for positions of influence. In Indonesia, for example, the Soviets as well as the Chinese support armed struggle by the Communists to overthrow the military regime, and yet Moscow and Peking have been trying since October, 1965, to rebuild the PKI in either's own image.[113] Neither in the USSR nor in China was there any open support for the popular democratic movement that forced Ayub Khan to resign from the presidentship of Pakistan in March, 1969; from each capital came a renewal of friendship for Ayub's successor, General Aga Mahammed Yahya Khan. The Pakistan correspondent of *The Statesman* reported in April that, outweighing Indian sentiments, the Soviet perception of China would shape Moscow's Pakistan policy in the years to come, and he was not predicting anything but the most probable.[114]

6

# HOW THE NEW NATIONS VIEW ONE ANOTHER

## THE SHAPING OF PERCEPTIONS

Does the foregoing study of relations among China, India, Pakistan and the Soviet Union yield an insight of psychological dimensions of politics among the new nations? We suggested in the first chapter that each of the four nations is what is rather vaguely termed as a developing nation, the USSR being the most developed of the developing societies. Apart from the developing character of these societies, the four can be said to share a number of psychological as well as physical elements which influence each one's foreign policy. Ideology, for example, plays a major role in each nation's Weltanschauung. Ideology influences each one's perception of itself as well as of the external world. Since ideology implies a gap between vision and reality, an ideologically oriented elite imposes its own perceptional "grid" on the world outside as also on the domestic universe. How this leads to devil images with operational consequences for foreign policy is well known to students of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, the US and China, and China and the USSR. Within our Asian Triangle, elite images have tended to change from one extreme to another. The Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic began their mutual relations as brothers in close

embrace, only to turn at each other's throat within a relatively short span of ten or twelve years. The exalted image of Hindi-Chini-Bhai-Bhai [1] of the mid-fifties collapsed before the decade was over, and in the sixties, as we have seen, the Indian elite saw China as a menace to the whole of Asia. Ideology would seem to have played a major part in bringing about these extreme fluctuations.

Disputed international frontiers, a physical element shared by the four nations of the Asian Triangle, have probably proved to be a stronger factor than ideology in shaping mutual perceptions. A peculiar characteristic of relations among the four nations is that frontier disputes have tended to involve all of the four, even when the actual quarrel has been bilateral. The USSR and China have both involved themselves in the Indo-Pakistan conflict over Kashmir; the Soviets got entangled in the Sino-Indian boundary dispute as well as in the frontier war of 1962; China and the USSR played major roles in the India-Pakistan war of 1965; and India has lent its moral support to the Soviets in their frontier disputes and conflicts with Peking. What has made the frontier disputes more complicated than they might have been is that in most cases the nations have striven to invest them with an ideological content. This has not only inflamed the minds of the masses but also make a settlement of frontier disputes more implacable.

If the frontier disputes have proved one thing, it is that neither China, nor India, nor Pakistan is in complete control of its international boundaries. Indeed, non-recognition by the international community of each of the three neighbors' territorial integrity (as perceived by it) in another experience they have shared since their birth as sovereign nations. Interestingly, this shared experience has generated little empathy. For instance, the newly-born Indian state found itself at war with Pakistan to defend its territorial frontiers in Kashmir, and with the Naga rebels who demanded an independent state on the northeastern border adjacent to Burma. And yet the Indian government accused Peking of invasion in Tibet in 1950, and nine years later denounced the Chinese suppression of the Khampa uprising. The territorial imperative of the ruling elites of China, India and Pakistan has been stronger than their anti-imperialist ethos; each has employed ideology to foster and strengthen its territorial claim. India holds on to Kashmir because Kashmir is the kingpin of its secular democracy; Pakistan strives to get Kashmir because without it the Islamic republic remains truncated and incomplete. In fighting the frontier war with India, the Chinese claimed to have fought the "Indian reactionaries" and their "imperialist backers". Khruxhchev remonstrated with the Chinese for not giving away some bits of land to the Indians; but the Soviet rulers have refused even to join with the Chinese communists in a formal denunciation of unequal,

imperialist treaties of the past centuries. Such is the enormity of the gap between precept and practice in international politics, and the new nations would not seem to have been different from the old ones in justifying the pursuit of national interests with moral suasion.

Territorial self-images of the four nations have overlapped and have been in conflict, as we have seen in the foregoing chapters. It is somewhat surprising, as Ralph K. White has pointed out [2], that so little attention has been paid by psychologists and students of international politics to scientific analysis of the territorial self-images of human groups. The new nations are highly sensitive to the imperialist powers' territorial ambitions. But they tend to ignore the fact that the territorial self-image of their own elites has not been exactly self-denying. Indians, Pakistanis and Chinese have made manhood and virility as much a part of their territorial self-image as have Americans and Russians. For the elites of the new nations also, territories assume symbolic importance as part of the national body-image. [3]

Territorial aspirations of the new nations normally take two forms. First, it is considered absolutely necessary to expand into all territories subject to dispute and ambiguity. This is what India and Pakistan have done in Kashmir, and India and China in the Himalayan region south of Tibet. Secondly, it is regarded as beneath a nation's dignity to

accept a diminished image of its own territorial claims on the map, and there is a tendency to commit cartographical "aggression" on neighbours' territory.

In the Asian landmass, the Soviet Union alone is capable of defending its frontiers and also of imposing, if it so determines, its territorial claim on neighboring nations. Among the other three nations, none is powerful enough in absolute terms. However, India is stronger than Pakistan but weaker than China and the USSR; China is stronger than Pakistan and India but must yield to Russia in a major war; Pakistan has an advantage over India if it can have China on its side. Highly unequal power equations within the Asian Triangle probably contribute toward unstable relationships: the crucial factor here is Pakistan's chronic fear of India which propels it to seek the support of at least one power that is distinctly superior to India. There is, however, another consequence of the unequal power questions and their bearing on frontier or territorial disputes. Inability of a nation to control its frontier tends to loosen its grip of the internal political environment. This hypothesis has been tested time and again in the history of nations, and it has been tested several times in recent years in the experience of the new states. The Pakistan government's failure to wrest Kashmir out of the Indian

grip has probably been the strongest single factor in the country's internal politics of discontinuity. Similarly, the increasing strains on the Indian political system can be traced to the border conflict with China [4].

The ruling elites of the four nations have, then, in spite of shared experiences, and physical elements common to their policies, pursued different foreign policy courses which have engaged them in relations of rivalry and conflict. The self-image of these elites as well as their images of the outside world have at times converged and at other times clashed; the images, as noted, have fluctuated greatly from one extreme to another. The fluctuations can be better understood if we remember that these nations have been living in a period of epochal change in which no cultural milieu can remain stable for a long time. Men, especially those in power, however, tend to resist change, and this would seem to be true as much of the "old" nations as of the new. "Men become acutely conscious of historic change only when it occurs within the short span of one or two generations," observed C. Wright Mills [5]. In our time of historic change, the ruling elites of the new nations have perhaps been subjected to pressures not experienced by some of the stabler societies. These pressures emanate not so much from changes in the external environment as in the internal; the new societies are like icebergs of which only a small portion can be seen floating above the water. The ruling elites are (or say they are) committed to rapid social change, and yet, paradoxically, the changes they

are able to bring about in their societies are nearly always not enough to meet the ever increasing demands or inputs, the rising expectations. In the unpredictable dynamics of development and change, the ruling elites tend to lose control of the internal environment. This would seem to have already happened in Pakistan and threaten to happen in India. In China, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution has been perceived by a psychologist as "the hero's quest for doing more than the possible [6]." The quest led to colossal internal turmoil. The ruling elite could regain control of the environment with great difficulty and at enormous cost in terms of human life, social cohesion and economic production.

Pressures come from changes in the external world also. Human history can be defined as the continuous spread of ideas and images from mind to mind and group to group. Ideas and images are often products of the interplay of internal and external milieus; in our electronic age it is impossible to seal off any collectivity from impinging outside currents. There is a continuing mental invasion that penetrates all curtains, iron, bamboo or dilken. Each nation, however, has a dominant idea-milieu which acts powerfully to shape elite perceptions of the external world as well as elite self-images. Michael Becher has shown how stubborn this dominant idea-milieu is or can be in the elite images of the new nations [7]. After an in-depth analysis of the "world view" of V.K. Krishna Menon, he has come to the conclusion that images are formed

early in life and are deep-rooted in the psychology of decision-makers, as with all men. "The image of all decision-makers in foreign policy reveals a time lag in the adjustment to changing reality." The time lag may, however, prove to be more costly for a new nation than for the grown-up ones. Quite a few of the leaders of the new nations have toppled down from power because of their inability to comprehend the changing realities at home and abroad and adjust to the changes. Like all societies, continuing conflict between continuity and change mark the politics of the new nations. Elite images generally act in behalf of continuity rather than major change. However, transition from the old to the new can be more abrupt and more radical in the new nations than in the stable ones.

Pressures exerted on elite images by changing internal and external environment tend to be acute when the time is out of joint, and a serious disequilibrium in the balance of power creates a psychological state of desonance. Desonance seems to be a marked feature today of the minds of the ruling elites in many of the new nations. It is the result partly of the growing disequilibrium in the political societies and partly of the apparent disintegration of the balance of power that emerged, not painlessly, after the second world war. Strains on the internal political system tend to intrude on foreign policy. If foreign policy is seen as a system of action with its key variables of environment, actors, structures and processes [8], a growing gap between the two pairs of variables appears to exist in some, if not most, of the new

nations. Sharp changes have occurred in environment as well as actor. But the structures and processes of foreign policy making have not fully adjusted to these changes. Decision-makers act in accordance with their perception of reality, not in response to reality itself; image and reality may coincide or diverge [9]. To the extent they diverge, policy will tend to be "irrational". What is pertinent, however, is the degree of objectivity in the elite perception of reality and the measure of flexibility in adapting the image to changes in the environment. Failure to comprehend the meaning of change reduces flexibility, especially when the change itself is ambiguous. This is the milieu that splits elite perceptions and makes major changes of foreign policy decisions extremely difficult.

## Ideology, Values and Perceptions

Ideology, as we have seen in the foregoing chapters, plays a major part in the foreign policies of each of the four nations of the Asian landmass. Ideology profoundly influences the world-view of the ruling and decision-influencing elite. It is probably the principal component of the idea-milieu of each of the four nations. Ideology goes a long way in solving the identity problem of a nation, as also of individual men and women. The new nations need ideology simply because they are in search of an identity. Ideology, however, is provided by the elite leaders, who, in the case of the new nations, are sometimes bestowed with charismatic qualities.

The sociology of ideology cannot be fully explained by the class position of the elites. Other factors, such as the nation, generation, and racial and ethnic ties combine with a variety of structural forces -- such as the degree of social mobility and competition -- to provide the social basis for ideological constellations [10]. Nevertheless, the Marxist-Leninist doctrine enables the ruling elite of the socialist countries to reconstruct an ideological constellation that is less buffeted by the changing scale of elite mobility and competition than in non-socialist societies. This is not to suggest that ideological shifts do not occur within the given framework of the Communist ideology; too often in the last few decades have the ruling elites in the USSR and China changed their ideological position vis-a-vis the external world as well as in competition with rival elite groups. The terms of reference, however, remain more or less the same; deviants from the doctrine of the dominant elite groups are condemned for alleged violation of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. In non-Communist societies, however, the dominant ideology has to compete openly with rival ideologies. The dominant ideology has its ups and downs. In India, for example, the ideology of non-alignment abroad and middle-of-the-road 'socialism' at home competes with the rival ideologies varying from Communism to Hindu Raj. The dominant ideology has in recent years lost a good deal of its earlier shine. In Pakistan, the Islamic ideology of the elites of the Western wing is challenged by the more secularly oriented elite of the Eastern wing. In both countries of the subcontinent therefore there exists what

may be called an ideological crisis. It is, in reality, part of an identity crisis that pervades a great portion of the Third World.

The identity crisis of the new nation probably has something to do with the negative aspects of the dominant idea-milieus. The new nations know what they do not want rather than what they do want. It is instructive that the two pre-eminent concepts that have gone to the making of ideology of the Indian nation are both negative: non-violence and non-alignment. The new nations are bound together by anti-imperialism. It has been suggested that only some strong anti-wave can arouse the Indonesian people, and that is why Sukarno tried constantly to discover causes to fight against rather than causes to fight for [11]. One reason why the new nations have been more energetic in foreign policy than in the field of nation-building is probably that in the former they can fight against imperialism and foreign intervention, whereas in the latter they are required to strive for positive goals. This psychology of rehection inhibits the new nations' efforts for collective action for regional development.

The roots of rejection, however, go deeper into the colonial past. The imperial powers thaught the intelligentsia of their colonies to reject their own national heritage. A whole generation of freedom-fighters grew in each of these societies with only fragile emotional and intellectual foundations on their own civilization and culture. The alienation of the colonial elite from their own society creates

pecular problems when the same elite is called upon to shoulder the unexperienced responsibilities of nation-building. The elite is now required to take pride in the nation, in its historical past, in its heritage, culture and folklore. It is not without meaning that Nehru "discovered" India during his last prison term in 1942: the result was, in a way, the self-solution of the identity of a man who had once described himself as " a queer mixture of the East and the West, out of place everywhere, at home nowhere ... a stranger and an alien in the West ... But in my own country also, sometime, I have an alien's feelings [12]".

Ideology is employed to reinterpret and reconstruct history, to create pride in the past and confidence in the future. The charismatic leader with his reconstructed personality, immortal longings, and desire to make history, imposes his own dreams and visions on the elite and the masses. However, as the new nations meander along, the elite multiplies and circulates and tends to become competitive. What now emerges is a conflict of elite political cultures, between the culture of the national elite that takes over power at the end of the colonial regime, and the culture of the emerging new elite groups. The form and dimension of the conflict vary from society to society. However, the national elite tends to become defensive, and critical of the political culture of the new elites. [13] The new political culture tends to be more traditional, though not, for this reason alone, necessarily less conducive to modernization [14]. Conflicts between elite political cultures now characterise the political universe of the third world. There is hardly any nation

in Asia and Africa where the national elite that took over from the colonial rulers is not on the defensive, where the ideologies, values and perceptions of this elite are not challenged by the emerging elite political culture.

Ideology and values are not synonymous. On the contrary, the two can often be seen in conflict. Each society has a central value system, although sholars differ both on its components and on its importance as a terms of reference for analysing structure and process in the social system itself [15]. The ideology adopted by the ruling elite has to be "nationalized" through the central value system. Thus, Lenin had to russify Marxism, and Mao sinify Marxism-Leninism; and Nehru had to seek sanctity for non alignment in the cultural heritage of India. The central value system, however, is not constant, but subject to change. A complex society, as Lipset has observed, is "under constant pressure to adjust its institutions to its central value system, in order to alleviate strains created by changes in social relations [16]." The central value system is reinterpreted and reconstructed in the light of institutions sought to be created by the ruling elite. In India, for example, the parliamentary institutions have been justified as being rooted to an ancient tradition of representative government in certain parts of the country [17]. The new nations are still in the process of discovering the components of their central value systems, a process that is highly disturbed by the "value crisis" faced by most of them. Modernization hits many of the traditional values; as tradition absorbs

and assimilates the modern values of science and technology, it tends to melt as well as consolidate.

In sum, the new nations, being adolescents of the international society, share the problems faced by adolescents in human societies. These problems, for nations as well as individuals, are directly related to the experience they meet in the various groups in which they find themselves as members. Their power of reacting to these situations and the type of response they make is, however, a consequence of their inherited potentialities as well as of their environmental treatment.

In their perceptions of one another and in their self-perceptions, the new nations tend to behave like adolescents. They are possessed of strong strains of self-love; their emotional responses tend to fluctuate from one extreme to another; they are given to the storm and stress of transition from the dependence and irresponsibility of childhood to the independence and responsibility of adult status. The resultant emotional instability and intellectual ferment is conditioned by the internal and external environment. They are constantly exposed to the need for adaptations in appearance, strength, structure and functioning. They have to discover how to adjust their own expectations and wishes to their own capacity relative to the peers in the international community. To the degree to which they develop

social maturity, they must also learn to accept the variability of the international society, and of the nature of international politics -- the unexpectedness of human behaviour, the range of differences in attitude and points of view in the world at large, and the relativity of friendship and enmity and of the means by which nations make themselves acceptable to one another. They require to develop both flexibility and steadfastness in relation to all of these. And at the same time, they have to learn the traditions of their own societies with regard to internal and external relationships. All this brings with it a certain amount of insecurity and uncertainty which varies with the nature of each nation's nature and the character of the experiences it has met with in the course of its history. Uncertainty and insecurity in the face of the unknown may lead to tension and to fluctuations between aggressiveness and timidity. These, however, stem not so much from the "biological accompaniments" of the new nations as from social consequences of their experience [18].

## India and China: First Perceptions

Nehru lamented in 1959 that while India had tried to understand the Chinese revolution, there had been no reciprocal understanding of the Indian revolution by the Chinese Communists: "I am not sure that there was even an attempt on the other side". [19] Readers of this wolume have seen that this was not quite true; the Chinese Communists did have

their own appreciation of the Indian Independence and they did articulate it during the India-China crisis over Tibet in 1950-51. It will, however, be true to state that the two great Asian neighbors met in the late forties as strangers in the corridors of fast-moving history. The China that Nehru and a few other Indians knew was the China of Chiang Kai-shek. This is not to suggest that the Chinese Communist movement was entirely unknown to the Indians: in the early forties, the Indian National Congress sent a medical mission to China which worked in areas controlled by the Communist guerrillas, and this act of friendliness elicited a personal letter of thanks to Nehru from Mao Tse-tung [20]. This, however, was probably the only communication that took place between Mao and Nehru before the Chinese and Indian revolutions. The Indian perception of the Chinese Communist movement was influenced profoundly by reports appearing in the American and British press and by books like The Red Star Over China. At mid-century when the two neighbours confronted each other over the future of Tibet, each was handicapped by its inadequate knowledge and understanding of the other's environment. Panikkar found the Chinese Communist leaders, with a few exceptions, woefully ignorant of conditions in India. "When I took up my political work, the first thing I noticed was that apart from Chou En-lai and some of his close associates, especially Chen Chia-king, no one in China knew anything about India.

They had only vague ideas about India's political position or historical development. Most people had a remantic interest in India — the inheritance of the Buddhist tradition — but no one knew anything about modern India. This was due not only to the notorious ego-centrism of the Chinese but because their education in the past had been controlled by the Americans and to a lesser extent by Western missionary societies. Their knowledge, as ours in India, was more of the Western countries than of their eastern neighbours". [21] Indians, Panikkar discovered a little later, were no less ignorant of real conditions in China. Nehru and some others had their own perspective of the Chinese revolution, but among the Indian elite, as Panikkar himself noted, there was considerable ignorance of "the historical background of Asian countries" [22].

It is highly instructive that the Indian intellectuals of the twenties and thirties who had reacted positively to the Bolshevik Revolution and generally welcomed the liberation of the working class from the shackles of capitalist exploitation, were left more or less unmoved in the late forties by the Chinese Revolution and the liberation of the mass of Chinese peasantry from the shackles of feudalism and capitalism [23]. Even the Indian Communist Party refused to perceive in the Chinese revolution what the Soviet Party was not prepared to see. Only a small group of Communists in Andhra Pradesh was apparently influenced by the Chinese Revolution in the early fifties, and that too for the wrong reasons: they were impre-

ssed by Mao's conciliation of the rich peasants rather than by his tactical line of peasant guerrilla warfare [24].

Both the Indian and the Chinese elites were under the charismatic spell of their own revolutions. It was their self-images that shaped their perceptions of the outside world. The Indian elite saw their own and the Chinese revolutions as largely similar, two great acts in the exciting and absorbing drama of Asia's liberation from Western dominance. Panikkar inescapably compared Mao with Gandhi when he had his first interview with the maker of the Chinese Revolution. "How did he, this rough-hewn warrior bred on mountain-tops and in caves, compare with Mahatma Gandhi and Nehru, the liberators of 350 million Indians?" He did find similarities between Mao and Nehru. "Both are men of action, but with dreamy idealistic temperaments. While both may be considered humanists in the broadest sense of the term, Nehru has his roots in Western liberalism which affects his socialist thinking. Mao Tse-tung, being mostly self-educated, with his economics and history learnt from Marx and Lenin, has perhaps no use for the liberal creed of individual liberty. However, as one bred in the classical literature of China, with an early Buddhist training, it is perhaps fair to add that Mao has something more than the dry theories of Marxism in his mental makeup". [25]

The first Indian perception of China was a split as the first Chinese perception of India. As India's Prime Minister, Nehru's first confrontation was with what he perceived in China not an essential feature of Communism, but an expansionist drive of resurgent nationalism. We have noted how the Indian strategic

perspective of the Himalayas clashed in 1950-51 with the Chinese Communist liberation of Tibet. Nowhere in Nehru's speeches and writings in the fifties can one find cogent, organized reflections on the Chinese Communist Revolution; there was, on the other hand, a deliberate attempt to play down the Communist content of the Chinese resurgence and play up the nationalist content. In 1950-51, Nehru accused the People's Republic of mounting an "invasion" of Tibet. His defense of the recognition of the new regime in Peking was that it was recognition of a fact of international life, whether or not one liked it. In a broadcast over the BBC in January 1951, Nehru expressed his perception of China in these words:

> China has taken a new shape and a new form. But whether we like that shape or form or not, we have to recognize that a great nation has been reborn and is conscious of her new strength. China, in her new-found strength, has acted sometimes in a manner which I deeply regret. But we have to remember the background of China -- as of other Asian countries -- the long period of struggle and frustation, the insolent treatment that they received from imperialist powers and the latter's refusal to deal with them on terms of equality. It is neither right nor practical to ignore the feelings of millions of people. It is no longer safe to do so. We in India have had two thousand years of friendship with China. We have differences of opinion and even small conflicts, but when we hark back to the long past something of the wisdom of the past also helps us to understand each other [26].

Here was framed Nehru's basic perception of the Chinese Revolution. It was part of the nationalist awakening in Asia, and India and China could understand each other if they harked

back to their past history. Within less than a year of this broadcast, Nehru had his diplomatic breakthrough in Peking, and thus began a period of collaboration between China and India; the Tibet issue was resolved, as we have noted, on the basis of an unwritten quid pro quo. Nehru's slogan of two thousand years of Sino-Indian friendship entered the charismatic vocabulary of Asian resurgence. It mattered little if this claim had a slender basis in the facts of history. It was a myth born of immaculate conception, and it mingled easily with the emotional temper of the time [27].

During the bhai-bhai phase of Sino-Indian relations, the Communism of the People's Republic was downgraded in the Indian perception of China, Peking was now regarded as more or less a radical-nationalist regime. Panikkar had declared in late 1951 that "the Peking Government today is not a Communist Government. It has never claimed to be a Communist Government. In fact, it objects to being called 'Communist' [28]". This perception of China by so eminent a scholar as Panikkar had an impact on the Indian intellectual elite.

> To them the Indian and Chinese systems were different in form, but not in substance. Indeed many stressed that Peking was neither Communist nor undemocratic. The debate on Peking's alleged non-Communism is remarkable not only because it occurred at all, but because it endured so long as it did, and was prompted by the affirmations of such distinguished and knowlegeable spokesmen as V.K.R.V. Rao and K.M. Panikkar as well as countless lesser notables. That China had a "coalition" government and not a Communist one was affirmed by many throughout this entire period. The Government of India tended to support this view of a "non-Communist" China because it

> reinforced non-alignment in the Cold War while permitting the advocacy of Peking's cause, and, perhaps more significantly, tended to neutralize the Indian Communists, who used widespread enthusiasm for the Chinese regime to advance their own prospects [29].

If this perception appeared to be wishful, it was nonetheless entirely valid. As Lippmann has put it, "For the most part, we do not see first, and then define, we define first and then see." We also define what we wish to see. In the mid-fifties, the ruling Indian elite and their supporters wanted to see their indentification with a drama more spectacular than the Indian experiment. They felt a powerful drag to the north. A leading Indian commentator wrote, "It is owing to the similarity of the historical process by which they achieved their independece that India and China, in spite of their different ideology, have ... a common approach to Asian problems ... While India chose the liberal democratic way, China preferred the Communist system; but this difference in ideology does not change the basic fact that both represent the spirit of Asian resurgence [30]". The National Herald, founded by Nehru before independence, admonished two dissenters of a highly impressed Indian agricultural delegation to China in 1957 that "those who do not understand the Chinese Revolution do not understand the Indian Revolution ..." [31]

## The Other Image of China

This perception of China was, of course, not universally shared by the Indian elite, nor did it gain ground before the

settlement of the Tibet question, nor without official sponsorship. Here was a classic case of the official perception being imposed on the minds of responsive sections of the elite. Other sections of the elite, however, held very different perceptions. We have noted in Chapter 3 that there was considerable opposition within the first Indian cabinet as well as in the foreign office and Parliament to Nehru's China policy. Born in the midst of the Cold war, independent India was not immune to the ideological controversies that marked international politics in the late forties and early fifties. In fact, as we have suggested before, the debates in the Indian Parliament on the Tibet issue in 1950-51 betrayed a greater polarization of outlooks than one could find in Chinese formulations on the same issue. China's split perceptions of India fitted into the overall framework of the CCP's guidelines. India being an open society, the perception of those who did not share the official viewpoint was aired openly and with considerable force of conviction. Thus, among the opposition leaders in Parliament, N.G. Ranga had the vision of millions of Chinese pouring into India as they had poured into Korea. S.P. Mukherjee warned Nehru that the Chinese would keep all the border territory they regarded as their own. In the perception of M.R. Masani, Asia had been "cut into two" by the Chinese Revolution: there was now a non-Communist Asia and a Communist Asia. "Those of us who are not prepared to go all the way with them must fall on the other side of the fence." A leading Congress member, M.A. Ayyangar, who was

later to be elected Speaker of the Lok Sabha, declared that China would not have venture on Tibet if the 350 million Indians "had armed ourselves and were ready for an offensive." Only a lone Congress member, Brajeshwar Prasad, called for a "peace alliance" between the USSR, China and India, an idea that even the Communist MPs had not dared to put forward [32]. When, following the 1954 India-China agreement on Tibet incorporating the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, the two-thousand-year-old friendship between Asia's two largest nations became an officially sponsored folklore, criticism of China was muted and confined to a relatively small section of confirmed rightists. However, it broke out with resounding fury in Parliament, in the press and in public forums as soon as the friendship foundered on the barren rocks of Himalaya. Nehru's critics now took the Premier to task for all the faults and blunders of his China policy dating back to 1950. Masani cried jubilantly: "The story goes back to 1950. Ever since the Chinese Communist Revolution, a policy of sentimental misreading of history has been inflicted on this country ... Communist history is always expansionist; it is always imperialist [33]." Ashoka Mehta hoped that the Prime Minister now realized that "the instinctive expansion of China has been further aggravated by the fact that China is today ruled by Communists, because it is the Communist power in that country that has made it possible for them to achieve the total mobilization of the energies of the people ..."[34] These leaders were speaking no longer for only themselves, but for large sections of the elite, whose perception

of China was completely reversed after the 1962 border war. Almost all the intellectuals who had lauded various Chinese achievements and experiments in the fifties now rallied to the defense of aroused Indian nationalism, and China was seen as an expansionist, ungrateful, untrustworthy, and aggressive power. The India-China Friendship Society was dissolved. Newspaper editors, creative writers and artists -- including most of those who had joined delegations to China -- now vied with one another to denounce the Chinese aggression. A noted Bengali novelist withdrew and made a bonfire of his won book on travel in Communist China, while other writers joined together in a chorus of protests against the Chinese perfidy in the columns of the Bengali (and Indian) press. Those very few who kept out of this parade of patriotic fervor -- like the film director Satyajit Ray -- were charged in the press with suspicious political sympathies. The Communists too decried the Chinese action, the right Communists (CPI) vociferously, the leftists (CPI-M) with somewhat subdued enthusiasm.

In a large measure, the Indian elite's self-image seemed to determine their perception of China. For Nehru, the Chinese and Indian experiements were competing in Asia for the hearts and minds of its teeming millions. Nehru who had acknowledged his emotional and intellectual affinity with the Soviet Revolution and its liberating impact on the toiling humanity, saw little that was particularly remarkable in the Chinese Revolution and its liberation of the peasantry. In his parliamentary speeches, he sometimes conceded that China was doing some-

what better in particular fields of modernization (and he concede this but rarely), but he always hastened to add that these successes were due to the totalitarian methods employed by the Peking regime and abhored by India. The interaction of Nehru's images of India and China can be seen in his report to Parliament after his first visit to the People's Republic:

> I went to China and spent about nine or ten days. There being so many similarities in our problems, I was constantly comparing how we were dealing with a particular problem, and how they had dealt with or were dealing with it. I am not going into details, but in some matters I took it that we had the advantage and had done better. In some matters I felt that they had done much better. Of course, the conditions of functioning are different... in China there is what they call "democratic centralism", which is a highly centralized form of government over a vast territory. They have a method -- a very widespread and effective method -- of administration, by local organs, conferences, etc. but power remains at the centre. We ... have a federal state with autonomous provinces and a parliamentary democracy, which has many virtues but which also functions slowly ... I am still convinced that for my country this system of parliamentary democracy is the best ... I feel that our system of parliamentary democracy will yield results and is yielding results [35].

Thus for Nehru the difference was mainly between <u>two systems of administration</u>, not two different social systems. India too was building socialism, or at least a socialist structure of society, and it was doing this with human freedom and without coercion. If the Chinese administrative system showed better results in certain areas, it was because of the coercion employed. The Indian system was fundamentally better; it was nourished on greater values.

An interesting aspect of the Indian self-perception and perception of China is that while Indians are very mindful of what they have done on China's behalf, they are almost completely indifferent to what the Chinese Communists might have done for their country. India had been a strong champion of Peking's rightful place at the United Nations. It befriended China during the Korean war, and Nehru ushered Chou En-lai in at the Bandung conference of Afro-Asian nations. After 1959 and particularly after the border war, Indians have looked upon China as an ungrateful power that paid for friendship with treachery and aggression. What the Indians do not generally wish to see is that the Chinese regime too gave them something that their country was looking for in 1950-51. As we have seen in this study, it gave India recognition of the Socialist bloc as a progressive force. It was only after Peking had smiled on Nehru that Stalin smiled too, and India could develop non-alignment as an international policy only after it had been found useful by Peking and Moscow. The Chinese were the first to improve Nehru's image with the Indian Communists. In 1950-51, as we have seen, the Chinese gave India an unwritten understanding about the south Himalayas: so long as India would not interfere with Chinese sovereignty in Tibet, the Chinese would recognize India's interests in Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim. After 1962, when this understanding lost all meaning, India stopped advocating Peking's case at the UN, and the Chinese began their efforts to undermine Indian

interests in the Himalayas. Reciprocal friendship was now replaced by reciprocal enmity. Either country adopted a posture of self-righteousness. The Indian perception of China was now so distorted that even eminent statesmen did not hesitate to reconstruct recent history. Opening Tibet House in Delhi in October 1965, soon after Chinese intervention on Pakistan's behalf in the India-Pakistan war, Minister M.C. Chagla (who was then India's chief political spokesman on Kashmir) declared: "When we recognized China's sovereignty over Tibet, it was on the explicit condition that Tibetan autonomy would be preserved. We now realize how misguided we were, how wrong to have put faith in the word, in the pledge that was given to us by China. That condition was violated ... Therefore, it is a matter of consideration whether we are bound by our agreement with China that we recognize China's sovereignty over Tibet [36]." Chagla could not have been unaware of the fact that the Chinese had made no such pledge, for Nehru himself had declared in Parliament in 1959 that "it would be wrong to say that this stress on autonomy (for Tibet) was included there (in the Sino-Tibetan agreement of 1951) because of our pressure and our desire ... So, it is not correct to say that they had given us an assurance which they broke later [37]." In Indian perception of China in 1965, however, Peking had become worse than the worst colonial oppressors. Rafique Zakaria, a member of the Indian delegation to the UN General Assembly in 1965, supporting a resolution asking the Chinese to "restore" human rights in Tibet, accused the Peking

regime of committing the worst kind of genocide, which "surpasses anything the colonialists have done in the past to the people whom they ruled and enslaved [38]."

## Chinese Perception of India

Like the Indians, the Chinese too had split perceptions of India during 1950-51. Panikkar identified the "two minds" of the Chinese Communist leaders with regard to India. On the one hand, they were Communists who regarded India as a capitalist country. On the other, they "instinctively recognized" that India was "friendly to them", and wanted to know about their neighbor. [39] The Chinese perception of India at mid-century was probably to a large extent determined by the dialectics of Mao's concept of new-Democracy, and its political system, the People's Democratic Dictatorship. In Mao's theory and practice of government one could see a marriage of ideology and pragmatism. Mao and the new Communist regime in China wanted to do business. "Business has to be done," Mao wrote on June 1, 1949. "We only oppose domestic and foreign reactionaries who hamper us from doing business, and we do not oppose any other people." If only the Chinese Communists could "unite all forces at home and abroad" to smash the domestic and foreign reactionaries, "then there will be business, and the possibility of establishing diplomatic relations with all foreign countries ..." The People's Democratic Dictatorship provided a criterion for

distinguishing the friends and foes of the new regime. Friends were to be found among "the People", who, within China, comprised the proletariat, the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie, and, outside, all those who were opposed to imperialism [40]. The reader of this volume has noted how even in 1949 the Chinese Communists placed India in a special category among the colonial and semi-colonial nations, and how they opposed, at the WFTU conference in Peking, the prevailing Moscow line of armed insurrection in India [41]. Mao in 1949-50 was apparently looking for a broad coalition of progressive forces within and outside China, and this quest made it relatively easier for him to discover in India "two opposing trends", one friendly toward China, the other hostile; those representing the friendly trend, with Nehru their leader, however, controlled the government [42]. The dominant idea-milieu of the People's Democratic Dictatorship then enabled the Chinese leaders to find in Indian non-alignment a friendly force. They sought to make use of this friendly force in their bloodly confrontation with the United States in Korea.

Like the national bourgeoisie at home, the friendly "international bourgeoisie" was, however, always suspect, and had to constantly prove its friendliness. It is significant that not even at the height of the bhai-bhai period, did the Chinese leaders exhibit overmuch emotional warmth for any of the leaders of the Indian national bourgeoisie, including Nehru. Nehru, as we have seen, was held in

high esteem, but the Chinese Communists were not unaware of his "weaknesses" and "failures", which they pointed out, in a rather "friendly" way, in the spring of 1959. Almost as soon as the CCP began to smell revisionism in the leadership of the CPSU, it also started to suspect that the Indian national bourgeoisie, led by Nehru, would align with the Soviet against the People's Republic. The CCP perceived a shift in Indian foreign policy in the latter half of 1956, as we have already noted. By the end of the fifties, this perception became clearer and stronger, and by 1963, the Chinese shook off all doubts about the Indian ruling elite's intention to peacefully co-exist with China. We have noted how the Chinese now perceived India as almost a satellite of the two superpowers, and a partner of their global design to effect a military encirclement of China.

During the latter half of the sixties China and India had largely identical images of one another. The mirror images found articulation in the mass media of both countries. Indians viewed China as an expansionist, aggressive force, " the greatest menace to Asia," as Prime Minister Shastri declared after the India-Pakistan war [43]. The Chinese saw India as expansionist and aggressive, assisted substantially by the USSR and the U.S., and threatening the independence and sovereignty of the smaller nations of South and South-east Asia. Even with regard to domestic developments, the two countries held mirror images of one another. The Chinese, we have noted, perceived India as plunged into a deepening

internal social and economic crisis, a country littered with faggots [44]. Indians too saw China being torn asunder by the proletarian cultural revolution. The Chinese regarded the Indian Revolution to be a completely spent force. Indians saw the Chinese Revolution to be smothered by Mao, and the country practically handed over to the army following a widespread collapse of civilian rule. Both countries sought to intervene in one another's internal affairs in accordance to their respective capability and resources. Indians took up the cause of the Tibetan people's human rights at the UN and other international forums. A resolution moved from the opposition benches in the Lok Sabha urging India to champion the cause of Tibetan independence evoked the sympathy of considerable sections of even the ruling Congress party, although it was lost because the Government would not give it formal support [45]. The Chinese, as we have noted, gave moral and material support to the Naga rebels on India's eastern frontier, to the Mizo tribesmen fighting for their "national rights", to the Kashmiri people's "right to national self-determination," and to a small number of Indian revolutionaries who, breaking away from the Communist Party of India (Marxist) in 1967, declared a peasant guerrilla war on the Indian regime. The only significant difference in this mirror image was that the Chinese saw India as a plaything in the hands of the Soviet revisionists and American imperialists, while Indians viewed China to be an isolated aberration in Asia, stewing in its own juice.

In the next three years, however, Indian perception of China underwent some significant change, and Chinese perception of India too appeared to have changed a little. As China emerged from the proletarian cultural revolution, what drew the Indian mind was not the ruins of the pre-1966 CCP, but China's growing nuclear might, its determined stance of self-reliance, and its apparent readiness once again to "do business" with the rest of the world. The most important single factor that brought about a change in Indian perception was the flow of Soviet arms to Pakistan. As long as the USSR remained India's exclusive friend in the subcontinent, India could live with a hostile China. But as soon as the Soviets bestowed their friendship on Pakistan, and softened their political commitment to India over Kashmir, Indians were obligated to take a second look at their northeastern neighbor. The substantial improvement in Indian defense brought about a confidence that India was now approaching a stage of equal-level co-existence with China; in any case, Indians did not expect a repetition of 1962 in the event of another border conflict with the Chinese. Trends toward normalization of Sino-American relations, the U.S. policy of gradual disengagement in Asia, and the anxiety noticeable in other Asian capitals to find an acceptable basis of co-existence with Peking are some of the other factors that seemed to have influenced Indian perception of China during the last two or three years. A leading Indian political commentator reported early

1969 that New Delhi was willing to talk with Peking on a more flexible basis than China's prior acceptance of the Colombo proposals to settle the border dispute [46]. Prime Minister Gandhi, visiting Indonesia in July 1969, made the somewhat startling declaration: "I do not see any real danger from China [47]." Evidently, a change of mood occurred in Peking also. The Indian ambassador to Burma paid a "courtesy call" on the Chinese charge d'Affaires soon after Mrs Gandhi's statement; they talked for 35 minutes [48]. President Giri, during an official visit to Kathmandu, had the rare pleasure of the presence of Kuo Mo-jo at a reception held in his honor by the King of Nepal. The crowning incident came on May 1, 1970, when, at a huge Peking function, Mao sought out the Indian charge d'Affaires, greeted him with a smile, and declared that there was no reason why China and India should not live as good friends [49]. About this time, Peking media suspended direct attacks on the "reactionaries" of the Indian Government. In the next fall, the media also suspended reporting the "revolutionary gains" of the "Naxalites" as well as reproduction in Peking Review of articles published in the official organ of the CPI (M-L) [50]. On January 26, 1971, senior officials of the Chinese foreign office attended a reception at the Indian embassy in Peking in celebration of the Indian republic day. This was the first participation by the Chinese in an Indian official state function since 1962. As a reciprocal gesture, no Indian official was present at the Dalai Lama's annual reception in Delhi in March on Tibetan "independence day".

## Indian Perception of Pakistan

Indian perception of China seems to have been less rigid than its perception of Pakistan which is still regarded by Indians as their enemy number one. The China-Pakistan relationship is not an autonomous one, but derives to a large extent from the strains between New Delhi and Peking. "This makes for an indulgence towards Pakistan in Washington as well as in Moscow, which infuriates some in New Delhi to the point of wanting to turn the tables by seeking, paradoxically, an improvement in India's relations with China [51]." Similarly, from 1950 onward, China-India relationship has also ceased to be an autonomous one, both for the Chinese and for the Indians. The Chinese leaders look upon India as a country too deeply enmeshed in the Soviet Union's anti-China strategies in Asia; the Indian leaders too find it difficult to improve relations with China at the cost of offending the Soviets. India-Pakistan relationship is, however, an autonomous one. The central focus of India's world view is Pakistan, not China. The dispute with China is over the border; it can be politically settled, given the will on both sides. The Chinese are not perceived by Indians -- except by a polarized minority -- as posing a challenge to the central value system of the Indian state. Pakistan is. Most Indian still perceive Pakistan to be wedded to a policy of "changing the status quo in this part of Asia through power and force [52]." Sisir Gupta, a noted Indian scholar on Pakistan, believes that the Islamic republic is more concerned with undermining the Indian Union than in just

getting Kashmir; this perception of Pakistan is still widely shared by the Indian elite. Nothing disturbs the Indians more than the supply of arms to Pakistan by any of the major powers; an armed and war-ready Pakistan is for them far more alarming than a China equipped with the nuclear bomb and the ICBM. It was the "victory" in the Indo-Pakistan war, and not the "defeat" in the Sino-Indian border conflict that strengthened the Indian demand for the nuclear bomb [53]. And the principal argument of the bomb lobby is not that the bomb will enable India to counter China in Asia, but rather that it is, in the short run, the most inexpensive way of heralding India's promotion to the exclusive club of world powers. [54]

It is because Pakistan is the focal point of India's world view, it has been the single most important factor in shaping Indian perception of external powers. The United States became highly unpopular with the Indians because of its military alliance with Pakistan. It was collusion with Pakistan that made China, in Indian perception, the menace to the freedom and integrity of the Asian nations. Britain's influence in India slumped sharply with Harold Wilson's statement of September 6, 1965, accusing India of crossing the international border in Punjab to launch an invasion of Pakistan. Indians have been shocked, puzzled, angered and offended by the Soviet bid to win Pakistan's friendship. Within the Asian orbit, Sukarno's friendship with Pakistan during the mid-sixties brought India-Indonesian

relations to an all-time low, while Malaysia became a friend worthy of cultivation after the Malaysian delegate to the Security Council voted against Pakistan during the 1965 conflict. India's foreign policy in the Arab world is carefully and dilligently designed to counter Pakistani diplomacy with regard to the Islamic countries. Neither the Indian nor the Pakistani elites have recovered from the trauma of the partition of the subcontinent; it still dominates the psychology of the two nations and profoundly influences their world view.

The two elites entertain devil images of one another. Mass media in the two countries highlight not each other's achievements, but failures and problems; it is the seamy side of Pakistan's affairs that are normally reported in the Indian press and vice versa. The Government-controlled broadcasting systems in the two countries wage a daily psychological warfare against one another. In these circumstances, it is only natural that the Indians have reacted positively to the current political crisis between the two wings of Pakistan, and have not hesitated to lend their moral and emotional support to East Pakistan's struggle for autonomy. The Bengali nationalism of East Pakistan finds a spontaneous response in the Indian state of West Bengal. The grave political crisis in Pakistan has, however, had a diluting effect on Indian perception of the Islamic neighbor. In the 1971 mid-term parliamentary election in India, one reason for the surprisingly poor performance of the Hindu revivalist Jana Sangh party

appears to be the sudden weakning of the Pakistan Government's hold on East Pakistan and the consequent decline of its will or ability to do harm to India. The urban electorate of Delhi, Punjab, Uttar Prades, Rajasthan and Bihar shifted their traditional loyalty from the Jana Sangh probably because in their perception West Pakistan was no longer a danger to India. If Pakistan is finally split into two independent or semi-independent nations, with Bangla Desh (as the East Pakistanis have named their wing) engaged in friendly commercial and cultural intercourse with India (which is one of the major demands of the nationalist elite of the Eastern wing), the central focus of India's world-view may undergo a change, and it may have profound implications for Indian foreign and strategic policies.

## Indian Perception of the Soviet Union

Since the mid-fifties, the Indian elite, with only relatively small exceptions, has been accustomed to perceive the Soviet Union as a friendly power. This Indian image of the USSR has been hewn out of major acts of friendship on the part of Moscow: support for the Indian stand on Kashmir, extensive economic and technological assistance toward the construction of a publicly-owned industrial sector in the economy, support for India in its border conflict with China, and substantial aid for a modern Indian defense system. The increasing scale and extent of Soviet involvement in Indian development and defense has been dealt with in this volume, and the reader has also noted the growing dichotomy between the friendly state relations between Moscow and Delhi and the doubts and misgivings with which many Soviet scholars have

been watching the Indian political scene since the early sixties. Aid creates influence. In the absence of empirical studies, it is difficult to measure precisely the degree and extent of Soviet influence on Indian domestic and foreign policy decision making. It should, however, be permissible to suggest that no country exerts greater influence on Indian foreign policy today than the USSR. In recent years, India has gone deliberately against Soviet wishes on only one major international issue : it has refused to sign the nuclear proliferation treaty. However, a leading Indian editor, visiting the Soviet Union in the summer of 1968, had returned with the reassuring information that India's non-signature to the treaty would not affect the flow of Russian assistance. "At every accessible level of decision and policy-making machinery in Moscow," he reported, "the assurance is readily available these days that Soviet economic aid will not be affected adversely by her (India's) deicision not to signe the nuclear proliferation treaty [55]."

Indian perception of the USSR was jolted only when Moscow began to supply military assistance to Pakistan, as we have already noted. The Soviets, however, have adopted **measures** to mollify Indian resentment and fear. They have not only repeatedly assured India of the continuity of the "traditional" friendship between the two countries, they have estended military assistance which India could have hardly obtained from elsewhere — for example, in naval expansion and manufacture of tanks and military aircraft [56].

The Indian elite, on its own part, has shown a remarkable capacity to rationalize Moscow's new Pakistan policy. As a result, there still exists the dominant Indian perception of a high mutuality of Indian and Soviet national security interests in South Asia [57]. "Moscow needs Asia more that Asia needs a Soviet presence," writes Dev Murarka, the only Indian press correspondent now located in the Soviet capital. "Moscow is in search not of client states but of reliable partners which would help to smash the West-enforced encirclement of the Asian frontier. This ploy goes hand in hand with Soviet efforts to contain the influence of China. In this triangular contest for influence, South Asia occupies a pivotal position in the Soviet scheme ... most important, South Asia is so placed that with a little help it can block the path of Chinese ascendance and assist the Soviet Union in contending with Peking's superpower aspirations in Southeast Asia [58]."

Sisir Gupta has rationalized Indo-Soviet friendship with some ingenuity: Russia, he wrote in 1965, is the least occidental of the Western countries, and India the least oriental of the Eastern nations as far as the values of its elite are concerned; this, he suggested, partly explains Indo-Soviet friendship [59]. D.R. Rangnekar, editor of The Economic Times, perceives an extensive market for Indian manufactures and semi-manufactures in the "rapidly growing" Soviet economy [60]. P.C. Joshi, a former secretary of the CPI, and

now a non-party intellectual, believes that the Sino-Soviet ideological conflict has saved the ideological content of Indian nationalism [61]. The Soviets are perceived by most Indians as a status quo power, strongly opposed to violent revision of long-existing international frontiers [62]. Indians see the Sino-Soviet conflict as investing Moscow with a greater interest than the United States in persisting in its current effort to support India. Most Indians have thus given the Soviet moves in Pakistan the benefit of the doubt, perceiving the Russians to be more capable than the Americans of exercising their leverage to restrain Pakistan from disturbing the status quo in the subcontinent [63].

This image of the USSR is reinforced by the Indian perception of a certain congruence of Soviet and American security-related interests in South Asia. This image of the United States survived the escalation of the Vietnam war in February 1965 and was fostered by the large measure of Soviet-American co-operation to bring the India-Pakistan was to an end. What heartened the Indians was that, unlike in the past the U.S. was no longer insisting on a settlement of the Kashmir dispute as an essential precondition for normalization of relations in the subcontinent. US approval of the Tashkent accord further strengthened the image of congruent interests. K.P.S.Menon, former Foreign Secretary and former ambassador to the USSR, wrote in October 1965:

> It is no exaggeration to say that China today is the principal menace to peace and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. The containment of China is therefore likely to be the principal preoccupation of world statesmen. The two states which, more than any other, have the means and the will to contain China are the USA and the USSR. The most effective way in which India can ward off the danger to herself, to Asia and to civilisation is to draw nearer to these states which, too, despite differences in their ideologies and the persistence of the legacies which they have inherited from their past, have been drawing nearer each other in their common desire to save peace [64].

Traditional critics of the U.S. and the USSR, coming from opposite sides of the elite spectrum, showed a sophisticated appreciation of Russian and American policies. Wrote the chief editor of the Hindustan Times in a signed column:

> We are not even trying to understant the changing pattern of Russian interest in the South Asian region. Russian interest in stability is now almost as obsessive as that of the US. With a Pakistan in search of independence from the Washington orbit and exposed to the counter-pull of Peking, Moscow's role is to move closer and closer to an equidistance between New Delhi and Rawalpindi. This should be welcome to us because Moscow's influence in Rawalpindi will be on the whole constructive and help toward a normalized relationship between India and Pakistan [65].

Behind this more or less steady perception of the Soviet Union as a substantial friend, there is also a simmering Indian fear of an undue amount of Russian influence amounting to domination. This fear almost instinctively surfaced when Brezhnev presented in July 1969 his idea of collective Asian security. The extreme vagueness of the Sovier idea made the Indians all the more uncomfortable. If Moscow was envisaging a military

alliance with a collectivity of Asian nations, India, with its principled opposition to all military pacts, could not be part of it. The Government of India therefore responded to the Russian move with caution [66]. Sounded through diplomatic channel, the Soviet Government told Delhi that it was not seeking a military pact but collective Asian collaboration to defend common interests [67]. Part of the Soviet initiative was, however, welcome to India, particularly the proposal for a regional economic conference between India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Some Indians perceived the Soviet idea of collective Asian security to be basically designed to contain China. Others saw in it an attempt to fill the vacuum to be created by American disengagement in Southeast Asia. According to Dev Murarka,

> Stability and peace -- these are the qualities most sought by the Soviet Union in Asia, and not entirely for altruistic reasons. In hard political terms, the Moscow line means it does not want any violent change in the status quo. It explains why the Russian commitments have become less selective and no more confined to ideologically congenial regimes, broadening to all countries and regimes willing to have dealings with Moscow ...
>
> A highly significant aspect of the Soviet objective is that Moscow is seeking something less than a military pact but more than an alliance -- most certainly not an arms pact. There is in its calculations an implicit assumption that progress toward realization of its concept will hasten the withering of existing military pacts in Asia while preventing formation of rival agreements. The fact that such pacts already are much discredited -- and that some members adhere to them only nominally -- also helps [68].

By 1970 the central Indian perception of the Soviets consolidated as one of conflict-controller and tension-manager in South and Southeast Asia. The Soviet concept of collective Asian security was now officially described as a constructive proposal; it was apparently seen in the external affairs ministry as part of a larger and ambitious Russian wish to stabilize inter-Asian relations in the wake of an American pull-out from Vietnam [69].

A related perception of the USSR is that of a welcome counter-balance to American and Chinese influence in Asia. This perception enables Indians to tolerate a Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean, even to welcome it, without saying so in public. Between 1965 and 1969 Indians were disturbed at the joint British-American moves to build naval bases in the Indian Ocean on the chain of islands now known as the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT). The Government of India went as far as lodging strong protests with Britain and the United States, and numerous official pronouncements were made reiterating India's opposition ot the construction of military bases anywhere in the world, and particularly in Asia. India joined with other Asian-African countries at the UN to decry the establishment of a new British colony in the Indian Ocear [70]. The Soviet naval presence in the Ocean saved India's non-alignment. Non-alignment thrives on a bipolarity of power balance; this was now seen to be emerging in the Indian Ocean. The Soviet presence energi-

cized Indian diplomacy, and somewhat sharpened the ideology of anti-imperialism [71]. It was vital for India's interests that the Ocean was not dominated by any single power or combination of powers. The Anglo-US defense infrastructure therefore called for a Soviet presence, each neutralizing the other.

Balancing the West, however, was not the only usefulness Indians perceived in the Soviet naval build-up in the Indian Ocean. The Soviet presence was also seen and justified as designed to contain China, a role that had been assigned in the recent past to the United States. Foreign Minister Swaran Singh disclosed in the Lok Sabha in March 1969 that China was one of the major subjects discussed with the visiting Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Grechkov [72]. Reports in the Indian press that the Chinese were building naval bases in the Maldives and at Zanzibar fortified the perception of the Soviet Union as the power to contain China [73]. The Government which denied these reports, apparently found them not entirely useless in planting its own perception of Moscow on the mind of the elite. Ministers now drew a distinction between the Anglo-US bases in the Indian Ocean and the Soviet presence which was only on the high seas. "According to our information, the Soviet Union has no military bases in the Indian Ocean area," reported Defense Minister Jagjivan Ram to Parliament. India could not protest to the USSR because the Soviet ships were on the high seas which "are under nobody's control [74]." The only aspect of the Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean that

Indians really feared was possible Russian acquisition of bases in Pakistan. The press carried numerous reports of Soviet success in this direction. The Government, however, was apparently satisfied that the Russian had acquired no bases in Pakistan, nor in South Yemen or Mauritius [75].

## Chinese Perception of the Soviet Union

The bitter controversy between the CPSU and the CCP over the entire strategy and tactics of the Communist thrust for global victory reminds one of how Agamemnon and Achilles argued bitterly over their beauteous war prizes, Chryseis and Briseis. The collapse of collaboration between the two Communist titans has been likened to the violent split among the ranks of the Tartar princes of the thriteenth century when, massed on the banks of the Danube with their invincible forces for an invasion of Western Europe, they got the news of the death of their leader and started immediately to fight over a successor [76]. The Sino-Soviet split has disproved the Marxist view that national differences would disappear after proletarian revolutions have abolished social classes. The history of the socialist commonwealth of the last two and a half decades shows that nationalist interests and rivalries are stronger than the internationalist philosophy of Marxism, and that the socialist countries have as many problems as the non-socialist ones in establishing stable and fruitful norms of international relations.

Between 1949 when the People's Republic was set up in China following the victory of the Communist forces in the civil war, and the early sixties, when Sino-Soviet differences turned into a veritable conflict, Chinese perception of the Soviet Union has swang from one extreme to another. This total change of perception can hardly be attributed to mere ideological differences, or even to a clash of national interests. Beneath the clash of ideologies and interests lies the history of Sino-Russian relations dating back to the 19th century when the Czars extended the Russian empire in the east. No other people in the world have a greater sense of history than the Chinese, nor has any other nation a longer historical continuity. The Chinese empire had reached the Amur and Prinoye region and Far Turkistan and beyond one to two thousand or more years ago; the frontiers of the empire since advanced or retreated in periods of rise and decline. The frontiers of Russia are relatively recent. The Russian empire advanced across the then largely nomadic lands of Asia to reach the Pacific during the 19th century, largely by a process of attrition, without any head-on collision with China. Following the exit of European colonialism from eastern Asia, and China's rise as a formidable continental power, Chinese attention began to turn north and far west. "The main migratory movements inside modern China have been toward the north; now the state was also sponsoring mass settlements in the far west. China had reached

Sinkiang by rail and begun modernizing the area with great vigor. She had linked it up with Tibet by roads that flank Soviet Turkestan, which the Romanovs formally incorporated into the Russian empire scarely a century ago. The Kremlin has not forgotten that when the Mongols were overlords of Russia -- for two centuries -- Tashkent and Samarkand, as well as Moscow, paid tribute to Peking. Nor does Peking forget that Moscow 'detached' Outer Mongolia from the suzerainty formely exercised there by China [77]." The rise of China as a strong continental power has checked Russian pressure on the East. The question that recent events have raised is whether the process will be reversed. "The underlying geopolitical facts are possibly of greater long-range significance than the ideological gulf between Peking and Moscow. More accurately, the former are inseparable from the latter [78]."

Chinese perception of the Soviet Union is therefore profoundly influenced by the geographical, historical, economic and psychological or cultural, and perhaps above all the demographical ecology which determined the behaviour of two large, multinational states. The differences in all these factors found articulation in quarrels over strategy and tactics toward the non-Communist world and over complex problems of intramural management and cooperation. The ideological conflict is, then, mainly a particular means of confrontation between two continental powers both in the process of moderni-

zation and development. Memories of the past seem to have weighed heavily in shaping Chinese perception of the USSR, while Russian perception of China seems to be deeply influenced by apprehension of the future.

An important feature of the Chinese Communist movement, brought to light by recent research, was its virtual independence of Moscow and the Comintern since the late thirties when Mao Tse-tung captured leadership of the CCP. Around 1937-38 Mao came to the conclusion that the methodology of the Bolshevik Revolution would not apply to China, and that he had to try his own creative application of Marxism-Leninism to the social, economic and political conditions prevailing in China. In november 1938 he expounded his major reasons for rejecting the political strategy of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party (RSDLP) before the October Revolution as the model for the political programme of the CCP before it seized political power. After offering his own analysis of the socio-political conditions in the capitalist countries in which the Communist parties had to strive for revolutionary uprisings, Mao wrote:

> In China it is different. China is not an independent democratic state, but a semi-colonial and semifeudal country; internally there is no democratic regime; but her people suffer the oppression of a feudal regime; externally there is no national independence, but her people suffer the oppression of imperialism. Because of these facts, there is no legislative assembly to make use of, no legal right to organize the workers to strike. Here the fundamental task of the Communist Party is not to go through a long

> period of legal struggle before launching an insurrection or civil war. Its task is not to seize first the big cities and then the countryside, but to take the road in the opposite direction [79].

The Chinese Communists fought and won the civil war very largely on their own. In fact, the Communist victory in China deprived both the United States and the Soviet Union of the enormous privileges each enjoyed in Kuomintang China. The 1945 treaty of alliance signed between Moscow and Chungking virtually abandoned China's claim to Outer Mongolia, agreed to restore Russia's former rights in Manchurian railways and enterprises, and even restored Russian control over the old Tsarist Port Arthur naval base on the Pacific. According to Snow, "In sponsoring this treaty the United States recognized a Soviet sphere of influence in Manchuria and tacitly drew a line at the Great Wall beyond which American nationalism might not intervene [80]." The Soviet Union came forward with an aid program for Communist China only after Mao's visit to Moscow, and it was just a modest loan of $ 300 million. We have already noted the hard bargaining that took place between Stalin and Mao over Russian interests in Manchuria and Sinkiang; even the concessions Mao had to make provoked strong criticism in China [81]. It was only after Stalin's death that his successors, anxious to obtain the CCP's support for their leadership of CPSU, made sweeping concessions to China and left it in full control of Manchuria

and Sinkiang. However, even Stalin's successors could not, or would not, pay too big a price for Communist China's friendship. Relations began to worsen, as we have noted, as soon as Krushchev embarked on his detente policy with the United States without due regard to China's national interests, and Mao abandoned the Soviet model of social reconstruction and launched his own model of the Great Leap and Communes.

Mao and his comrades, then, allowed historical memories and their own revolutionary experience to shape their perceptions of the Soviet Union in a greater measure than the common heritage of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. In fact, as we have seen in this wolume, the ideology fortified the historical Chinese perception of the USSR. Of the two images of Russia prevalent in China [82], the devil image thus got the upperhand of the image of the friendly big brother. It is now known that even in the first years of the People's Republic, when the outside world viewed Russia and China as one monolith of Communist power, the friendliness of the two revolutionary regimes was strongly diluted with mutual suspicions. It was suspicion born not merely of past history and the CCP's experience of the Chinese revolution, but also of the mutual ignorance of the Russian and Chinese Communists of each other's background and sensibilities. Klaus Mehnert narrates his conversation with a Chinese professor

in 1957 who had been a signatory to a Sino-Soviet agreement for the joint survey and development of the mineral wealth and natural resources of the Amur basin. Mehnert asked if in that joint undertaking each section consisted of Soviet and Chinese scientists. "No, not at all," replied the professor. "The Russians work on their side of the border and we on ours." Mehnert then wanted to know if the two sides had come up with any solution to the main problem of the Amur -- its outlet into the Sea of Okhotosk, way up in the north. "There are two opinions on that," replied the Chinese scholar. "The Russians have proposed the building of a waterway from the Heilungkiang via the Ussuri River and Lake Khanka as far as the Bay of Vladivostok. We Chinese would benefit more from a waterway being built via Sungari and Liao Rivers straight across the Northeastern Provinces to the South, ending in the Gulf of Liaotung [83]." Eleven years later the Chinese and the Russians fought a bloody encounter over the possession of some islands on the Ussuri. It is now known that many Chinese Communists resented the presence of the large number of Soviet technical advisers in China during the years of friendship. The Chinese resented that in all of the reciprocal basis agreements, no Chinese was invited to the USSR to give technical assistance or help solve a scientific problem in the Soviet Union [84]. The Russians apparently knew little of the famous Chinese self-esteem and self-pride. It is this pride that make the Chinese call Manchuria the "Three Northeastern Provinces [85]." It is the same pride that make them resent the very name of Vladivostok -- "Rule the East [86]."

## Conclusion

"In the last analysis," Lenin wrote on his deathbed, "the outcome of the struggle will be determined by the fact that Russia, India, China etc account for the overhelming majority of the population of the globe. And it is precisely that majority that, during the past few years, has been drawn into the struggle for emancipation with extraordinary rapidity ... In this sense, the complete victory of Socialism is fully seen and absolutely assured [87]." In some two and a half decades after Lenin's death, socialism triumphed in China, and India was liberated from colonial domination, split, though, in two countries, the other being Pakistan. The victory of socialism in Russia and China may or may not have weakned international capitalism. What has clearly happened is the mutual rejection of each ot er's socialism. The Asian landmass, instead of becoming a vast expanse of friendly intercourse, is the scene of multiple conflicts and tensions. History is indeed full of ironies for those who make it.

This study of relations among China, India, Pakistan and the USSR has shown that there are certain problems peculiar to the uneven pattern of relationships between and among the developing nations. The foremost of these is uncertain or disputed frontiers which feed the territorial imperative of the ruling elites. The geographical frontiers of the stabler, more developed nations are settled, except when, as in the case of Eastern Europe and Germany, wars have unsettled them. The new nations have not only inherited unstable, ill-defined, dis-

puted frontiers; they tend to make the national frontiers as perceived by each one of them a matter of prestige and patriotic fervor. This renders settlement of disputed frontiers extremely difficult, especially when a settlement can only be political, as between India and China, India and Pakistan, and China and the USSR. The geographical frontiers of the new nations are generally "soft" -- they are still to be brought firmly under administrative control, and they are, at least in the Asian landmass, extramural areas of the nation-states, often inhabited by the same ethnic groups on both sides of the border. These "soft" frontiers enable the nations to interfere in one another's internal affairs. Ethnic minorities are sometimes treated as hostages. More often are they used or sought to be used as a kind of fifth column in enemy territory.

While historical memories profoundly influence the mutual perceptions of the new nations and their perception of the stabler members of the international community, nothing seems to shape these perceptions more strongly than national interests as seen by elite groups. The new-found nationalism of the new nations is generally infused with a high degree of emotional exhuberance; a mixed psychology of pride and fear intrudes on international relations making compromise which is the essence of international politics, difficult of attainment. Pride as well as fear are often irrational yet powerful forces, and their intrusion on foreign policy tends to blunt the tools of diplomacy. Hence the tendency in the new nations

for heads of governments to prefer personal diplomacy to the traditional style of diplomatic intercourse. Since many of the leaders of the governments of the new nations happen to be charismatic persons to their own people, and as such rather poor negotiators, their foreign policies tend to have a "populist" content that is not generally conducive to the settlement of international disputes.

The ruling elites build their world-views not from personal knowledge but from national experience, the dominant idea-milieu of each nation. The new nations tend to see a great future behind them, so to speak; it is the past rather than the future that weighs on their mind. The elites are in a continuous process of discovering the greatness of their nations. The new nations are often "born with a mission" but without the strength to carry it out. They have the adolescent's psychology of self-righteousness, and their pride is easily injured. Lack of experience in the conduct of diplomacy and mutual ignorance of each other's internal environment lend a certain volatile quality to their approach to interstate disputes. All this was amply demonstrated by the "confrontation" between Sukarno's Indonesia and Malaysia.

The unstable internal environment is another factor that contributes to the foreign policies of the new nations and their perception of one another as well as of the developed, stabler nations. As the elite class expands and circulates, it also tends to be fragmented; in many of the new nations, mobilization tends to match parochialization of the elite groups. The dominant idea-milieu is then exposed to attacks by the dissidents. Thus ensues a conflict between continuity

and change. The ruling elite clings to its images of the internal environment and the outside world, even when the images have been "sicklied over" by the turn of events. Thus the ruling elites of India and Egypt continue to perceive the world through the lenses of non-alignment even when in private conversations they admit that non-alignment has become to a large extent irrelevant to the emerging pattern of the global balance of power.

The extreme fluctuations in mutual perceptions that we have noticed among the four nations of the Asian landmass add to the problems of normal conduct of diplomacy and foreign relations. The new nations, being adolescents, are somewhat fundamentalist in behavior; they know, or wish to know, either total friendship or total enmity. And yet they are not unaware of the fact that international politics is always dynamic, never static, and that today's enemy can turn out to be tomorrow's friend. They live and learn, losing their innocence, painfully inching toward adulthood.

Finally, the new nations, or most of them, smart under the brutal fact of their political, economic and military weakness, the backwardness of their social institutions, and the fact that in the race for development they are continuously losing to those who have already gone much ahead. They have to look up to the affluent, mighty nations of the world for security and for the wherewithals of development. They resent this dependence [88]. Much of their self-righteousness, their truculence and even their arrogance can be traced to their

weakness and fear. They are supplicants for the great powers' favor, and yet they are always suspicious of the great powers' motives. Their inferiority breeds some kind of contempt for one another. Their common humiliation at the hands of the colonial powers of the West has bred a feeling of brotherhood as well as a feeling of intense rivalvy among themselves. They have yet to learn to understand each other's problems and predicaments, to recognize each other's legitimate interests.

The new nations function within an international system which is largely the making of the strong and stable powers. They strive for equality within this system, knowing all the time that equality is not within their grasp. The Chinese resent what they perceive to be the Soviet Union's bid to control the global balance of power in collusion with the United States. James Reston wrote in January 1970: "An odd thing is now happening in world politics. The small and middle nations, which used to be afraid that the United States and the Soviet Union would blow up the world, now seem to be afraid that Washington and Moscow will get together in their own national interests and against the interests of many other nations [89]."

The world's centers of conflict and tension have shifted from stable Europe to unstable Asia. Guns roar and aircraft spit fire every day in Asia. Millions live in fear of today and tomorrow. In the midst of grime and gunfire, a most mystifying drama is being played on the world stage. It is the

drama of modernization of the traditional societies of Asia, Africa and Latin America. In South Asia, this drama involves vast masses of human beings. How the tides of modernization will toss the human societies in China, India, and Pakistan, nobody quite knows for certain. In the USSR and China, modernization has been going ahead under the rigorous discipline of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung Thought. In Moscow and Peking, the leaders believe that their own ideology and social engineering techniques hold the key to rapid modernization of backward societies and to human progress and happiness. Both leaderships believe in the ultimate triumph of their own brand of Communism and in the eventual collapse of the capitalist system. In India, Pakistan and other developing nations, the transition from tradition to modernity has entered perhaps the most complex and painful phase. The national leaderships that had ushered in independence are no more; the process of political socialization has been bringing to the forefront of political life men and women who are simultaneously rooted to tradition and alienated from it. Ruper Emerson, in his study of the emerging nations, has forecast a conceivable pattern of transition to modernization in at least some of these societies: "... a present Western-style leadership might be replaced by a resurgent traditionalism, and ... the latter would in its turn be forced to yield to a new and tougher modernizing drive under Communist auspicis [90]." This is the pattern that was observed in China with Chiang Kai-shek's

turn toward Confucianism and the subsequent victory of Communism. The Chinese experience may or may not be repeated in other Asian countries; some of the major conditions of the Chinese revolution are absent in India as well as Pakistan. What is certain is that most of the new nations in their passage through the agony of modernization will meet with convulsive changes in social, economic and even political relations. Their journeys will be uneven. "It is more likely," says C.E. Black, "that there will be ten to fifteen revolutions a year for the foreseeable future in the less developed societies, in addition to the many forms of domestic strife in the societies that are more developed. If this is not optimistic, it is at least 'normal' by the standards established by the evidence available [91]."

Foreign policies and relations of the new nations caught in the cruel process of modernization are likely to be as unstable as are their internal societies. This is particularly so during a period of uncertain change in the global power system, with one great power obliged to retreat from its overextended forward zones of influence, and two others threatening to fill up the vacuum. Such statesmanship as may be available to the new nations in a period of troubled transition should find it useful to keep relations with neighbors free from undue strain. This will not always be possible, especially in South Asia, where neighbors are overly involved in each other's affairs. Nonetheless, derelict societies will ill bear the strain of external pressures, and it will

only be wise for India and Pakistan to try to gain control of their environments -- at least partially -- by settling international frontiers with each other and with China.

Correct self-perception and correct perception of other nations and of alignment of nations -- in terms of interest, motivations, and options -- are the foundation of foreign policy and external relations. And this is where operators of foreing policy and international politics generally founder. Relations among nations must necessarily rest on compromise and accommodation; the alternative is international anarchy. Nations are almost always locked in co-operation and conflict; the test of statesmanship lies in the management and control of conflicts. The history of international relations is strewn with human failings and mistakes. We, however, live in a small world where mistakes made by one nation may cost too much, and not merely for its own people. The cumulative chain of mistakes lends a tragic aura to world politics. Blunders of one generation visit the next, and, as George Kennan has said it so eloquently,

> In the fabric of human events, one thing leads to another. Every mistake is in a sense the product of all the mistakes that have gone before it, from which fact it derives a sort of cosmic forgiveness; and at the same time, every mistake is in a sense the determinant of all the mistakes of the future, from which it derives a sort of cosmic unforgivableness. Our action in the field of foreign policy is cumu lative; it emerges with a swelling stream of other human happenings; and we cannot trace its effects with any axactness once it has entered the fluid substance of history.

# NOTES

## CHAPTER 1

1. "Monopolies Today," *International Affairs*, Moscow, Nos. 5 and 6, 1968.

2. T. A. Hsiah, "Demons in Paradise: The Chinese Image of Russia," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Mar. 1965, pp. 28–29.

3. This is not to suggest that the Chinese did not wish to see India independent. Chiang Kai-shek pleaded during the Second World War with the British to grant India independence as he also pleaded with Indian leaders not to do anything that might hamper the allied war effort against Japan. At its seventh Congress, the Chinese Communist party demanded Indian independence. However, neither the Indian freedom movement nor the Indian renaissance had much of an impact on the Chinese mind. The Chinese have always rejected the non-violence of Gandhi. Similarly, many Chinese scholars rejected the liberal humanism of Rabindranath Tagore. See Ssu-yu Teng and John K. Fairbank, *China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey*, Atheneum, New York, 1967, Doc. No. 59, pp. 240–45, and Harold C. Hinton, *The Myth of Traditional Sino-Indian Friendship*, Jan. 1963, mimeographed.

4. In China, scholarly and journalistic writings in the Communist press seem to reflect the official government and party line much more faithfully than in the Soviet Union.

5. The clash occurred on Mar. 2, 1969, on an island in the Ussuri River, which the Chinese call Chenpao and the Russians Damansky. The Russians were the first to broadcast the news of the clash. *Pravda* charged that Peking had provoked the border battle in pursuit of a "radical reorientation of the policy of China and China's final transformation into a force hostile to the Socialist countries." Quoted in *The New York Times*, Mar. 10, 1969. The Chinese Government, in a statement on Mar. 11, accused the Soviet leaders of having "taken over the mantle of Czarist Russian imperialism and [of] pursuing [a] social-imperialist policy of aggression." For the text of the Chinese statement, which

also disclosed more information than hitherto available on border negotiations between Moscow and Peking, see *The New York Times*, Mar. 12, 1969.

6. The conflict of perspectives of American scholars on China became bewilderingly evident at the two-day conference sponsored by the National Committee on United States-China Relations in New York in Mar. 1969. The writer, who had the privilege of attending the sessions, counted at least twelve different interpretations of the cultural revolution and its political, social, and ideological consequences.

7. The significance of the Communist victory in West Bengal in Feb. 1969 lies in the following factors: (1) it came after more than a year of governor's rule following the dismissal of the first United Front Government by New Delhi in Nov. 1967; (2) it was fought by the two CPIs on the basis of a single united front of the leftist parties while the two had forged two separate united fronts to fight the Feb. 1967 general election; (3) it gave the CPI(M), the more leftist of the two parties, a dominant position in the UF Government. But for a brief ten-month period in 1967, when West Bengal was ruled by the United Front, Communists held power only in the small Indian state of Kerala. Now, with their success in Bengal, which is the hub of industrial India, they can be said to have established themselves as one of the major elements in Indian politics.

8. For differences between the two CPIs and Moscow and Peking, see the writer's "Moscow and Peking and the Indian Political Scene After Nehru," in *Orbis*, summer, 1968.

9. For Ayub Khan's statement announcing his resignation, see *The New York Times*, Mar. 26, 1969.

10. *Ibid.* also Mar. 28, 1969.

11. For a more detailed examination of the "soft" areas in the Himalayas, see Ch. 5.

12. Both the Soviet Union and China have been trying through radio propaganda to rouse the nationalistic passions of ethnic minorities living on the other side of the Sino-Soviet frontier, especially in the Central Asian region. However, there is no evidence to suggest that either regime is seriously trying to disintegrate the other's hold on the minority nationalities.

13. The quotation is from Lord Curzon, who also said, "The Indian Empire is the strategic centre of the third most important portion of the globe. . . . The fate of distant Korea revolves on the Indian axis." Quoted in S. P. Patel, *Foreign Policy of India: An Inquiry and Criticism*, Bombay, 1960. Curzon's perspective of India would seem to have influenced the strategic thinking of Indian leaders more than they were wont to admit.

14. George N. Patterson, *Peking Versus Delhi*, Faber & Faber, London, 1963, p. 94.

15. *Afghanistan*, Country Survey Series, Human Relations Area File, New Haven, 1956, p. 156.

16. It is interesting to trace the evolution of Mao's territorial perspective between 1930 and 1940. In 1931, Mao, as chairman of the Soviet Chinese Republic, announced a national minorities policy that virtually amounted to a denunciation of the territorial acquisitions of the Chinese emperors. "The Soviet Government of China recognizes the right of self-determination of the national minorities of China, their right to complete separation from China and to the formation of an independent state for each national minority." In his interview with Edgar Snow in 1936, Mao envisaged a Chinese Federation of which Outer Mongolia, Tibet, and Sinkiang would be "automatically" integral, if autonomous, parts. "It

is the immediate task of China to regain all lost territories, not merely to defend our sovereignty below the Great Wall." Formosa was added four years later to Mao's vision of China. He wrote in 1940: "After having inflicted defeats on China, the imperialist countries forcibly took from her a large number of states tributary to China as well as a part of her own territory. Japan appropriated Korea, Taiwan, the Ryukus Islands, the Pescadores, and Port Arthur; England took Burma, Bhutan, Nepal and Hong Kong; France seized Annam; even a miserable little country like Portugal took Macao from us." See *Fundamental Laws of the Chinese Soviet Republic, New York, 1934;* Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China,* Grove Press ed., New York, 1961, p. 96. It is interesting to note that even in 1936 Mao committed himself to giving independence to Formosa if it wished to break away from China. See also Mao's *The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party,* Peking, 1954. For revisions made in the original text in current editions of the article, see Stuart R. Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung,* Praeger, New York, 1963, p. 257n.

17. India regards itself as the successor state, inheriting the rights and obligations conferred on British India by its treaties and compacts with neighboring states. India has of course revised the inherited treaties with Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, but it regards all these three as an integral part of the Indian defense perimeter. As Nehru stated in Dec. 1950, "India had . . . a stake in assuring that nothing went wrong in Nepal and that the Himalayan barrier was not crossed or weakened, because that would be a risk to India's as well as Nepal's security." Girilal Jain, *India Meets China in Nepal,* Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1959, pp. 23–24.

It was in its reply to the cable from Lhasa (see 14 above) that the Government of India probably used for the first time its intention to preserve "inherited treaty relations" with foreign countries. Two important factors that weighed against any determined Indian effort to maintain inherited treaty interests in Tibet were the military reality of the situation—India did not have more than two hundred troops in Tibet—and geography. Nehru told George Patterson in 1960 that while Sikkim and Bhutan were "closely attached to India," Tibet was not. See *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches,* Vol. III, Publications Division, New Delhi, and *Peking Versus Delhi,* pp. 174, 285–87.

18. For an insight into Pakistan's British-oriented perspective of the northwest frontier, and of its relations with Afghanistan, see Hafeez R. Rahman, "Afghanistan and Pakistan," *Pakistan Horizon,* Vol. XIII, No. 1, pp. 49–64.

19. At its Bombay session in 1904, the Indian National Congress deplored the action of the British Government in dispatching the Younghusband Mission to Lhasa, which eventually led to the 1914 Simla agreement (not signed by China). The Congress objected to the payment of expedition costs from the Indian exchequer because such expeditions served only the causes of the imperial power. The National Congress opposed and condemned the expeditions against the Nagas in the northeastern frontier area. It also condemned British India's wars with Burma and Afghanistan. In 1921 the All-India Congress Committee, the policy-making body of the National Congress, averred in a resolution that the people of India regarded "most treaties entered into with the Imperial Government by neighboring states as mainly designed by the latter to perpetuate the exploitation of India by the Im-

perial Power. . . ." See N. V. Rajkumar, *Background of India's Foreign Policy*, New Delhi, 1952, p. 44; and Bimla Prasad, *Origins of Indian Foreign Policy*, Calcutta, 1962, pp. 42–50; also, *Report of the 20th Indian National Congress*, Crown Printing Works, Bombay, 1905, pp. 40–48; and Annie Besant, *How India Wrought for Freedom: The Story of the National Congress Told from Official Records*, Madras, 1915.

20. C. S. Venkatachar, "Geographical Realities of India," *Far Eastern Economist*, Pamphlet No. 34, p. 40.

21. K. M. Panikkar, "The Himalayas and Indian Defence," *India Quarterly*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1947), p. 135.

22. Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Oxford University Press, New York, Vol. 8, pp. 690–91.

23. Sir Olaf Caroe, *Wells of Power*, Macmillan, London, 1951, p. 258.

24. J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, Van Nostrand, Princeton, Vol. 2, pp. 229–30.

See also, W. K. Fraser-Tyler, *Afghanistan*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1953, p. 300. "For whatever happens in north-western India, there is one great factor in the political development of Central Asia which is likely to increase as time passes. Great areas in Russian territories across the Oxsus are being developed and to some extent industrialized. This process will in time lead to a demand for an access to the sea, for a port through which Russian merchandise can be exported to the markets of the world, and through which imports can enter Central Asia. There is one port to which access can easily be obtained from the Russian frontier in Central Asia, and only one, the port of Karachi."

"The fear Pakistanis sometimes express in private conversations that the Soviet Union has designs on West Pakistan, had its origin in colonial times. . . ." Gunnar Myrdal, *Asian Drama*, Pantheon, New York, Vol. 2, p. 191n.

25. "India cannot and never has been able to hold her frontier without assistance. To deny this fact would be futile, to ignore it must necessarily end in disaster." Lt.-Col. C. E. Bruce, *Waziristan* 1937–38, Eale and Polden, Aldenshot, 1938, p. 61. The sobering reality is that neither India nor Pakistan, in the postindependence period, has been able to hold its frontier without external aid.

26. For cultural and ethnic affinities between populations inhabiting both sides of the Sino-Indian border, see Mark C. Feer, "India's Himalayan Border," *Far Eastern Survey*, Oct. 1953.

27. B. Shiva Rao, "Nehru and the U.N. During the Korean Crisis," *The Statesman*, New Delhi, Dec. 7, 1965.

28. As reported in *The Statesman*, New Delhi, Dec. 8, 1950.

29. For a contrary view of India's gain and loss as a result of the settlement of the Tibet question with China, see P. C. Chakravarty, *India's China Policy*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1962, pp. 52–57.

30. Herbert S. Dinerstein, *Fifty Years of Soviet Foreign Policy*, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1968, p. 37.

31. In discussing the CPSU 20th Congress, Zbigniew Brzezinski concentrates almost entirely on Moscow's differences with Yugoslavia and gives little or no consideration to the oncoming shape of the Sino-Soviet relations having any significant bearing on the 20th Congress grand strategic design. However, he stresses the point that relations among Communist states was the pivotal issue leading to the 20th Congress formulations. See

Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1967, pp. 180–84. Adam B. Ulam, in his stimulating study of Soviet foreign policy, suggests that the Chinese objection to the 20th Congress line was an afterthought: " . . . the evidence points out that *in* 1956 they [the Chinese Communists] were not unhappy at having Soviet Communism baring its scars." Adam B. Ulam, *Expansionism and Co-Existence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy*, Praeger, New York, 1968, pp. 574–75. Donald S. Zagoria, on the other hand, maintains that "the 20th Party Congress represents the major turning point in Sino-Soviet relations in the post-Stalin era. That Congress set the stage for several of the major elements of conflict that have since appeared: differences over global strategy, over intra-bloc relations, over the pace and scope of de-Stalinization, over the permissible diversity of methods used in building socialism and Communism, and over the fundamental question of socialist-camp leadership." Donald S. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956–61*, Atheneum, New York, 1964, p. 40.

32. Prof. M. Kapitsa, "National Liberation and the Mao Group's Splitting Activity," *International Affairs*, No. 7 (1968), pp. 15–16.

## CHAPTER 2

1. *Pravda*, June 8, 1945. The United States was found to be uninterested in the stability of the "existing colonial world." It favored, instead, an open door to the colonies of the other powers.

2. See Cordell Hull, *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, McMills, Vol. II, pp. 470–72; Robert F. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History*, 1948, pp. 572–74; and "The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran," *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers*, US Department of State, Washington, 1943, p. 485.

On each of the three major issues relating to the colonies in the post-war world—international trusteeship, a general declaration of principles, and proposals for specific countries, especially the Pacific colonies of Japan, Indo-China and Malaya—the Soviets appeared to be responsive to Roosevelt's wartime ideas. The American draft fell through because the British raised strong objection to the key word "independence."

3. *Ibid.*

4. At San Francisco the Soviets fought for the insertion of "independence" rather than "self-determination" as the goal of UN trusteeship. The proposal to seat all five permanent members of the Security Council on the Trusteeship Council came from the Soviet Union. Despite the rejection of several Soviet amendments, the Russians appeared to be generally pleased with the trusteeship arrangement worked out at San Francisco. In two articles in *Pravda*, A. Leont'ev drew a contrast between the progressive policy of the Soviet Government and the American retreat from the draft declaration in the face of British opposition; however, he was not more than mildly critical of the United States. See *Pravda*, June 8 and 9, 1945. For a Soviet perspective of UN trusteeship, see E. Zhukov, "The Trusteeship Question," *New Times*, Dec. 15, 1945, pp. 3–6.

5. Jawaharlal Nehru, *Before and After Independence: A Collection of Speeches*, 1922–1950, New Delhi, p. 376.

6. R. J. Sontag and J. S. Beddie (eds.), *Nazi-Soviet Documents 1939–41*, Department of State, Washington, 1948, pp. 251–57.

7. See S. Mel'man, "Polozhenie v Indii," in *Mirovoe khoziaistvo i mirovaia politika*, No. 11-12 (Nov.-Dec. 1942), pp. 46-47.

8. For a fairly detailed summary of this article, see Charles B. McLane, *Soviet Strategy in Southeast Asia*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1966, pp. 251-53.

9. *Voina i rabochii klass*, No. 7 (Apr. 1, 1945), p. 13.

10. *Bol'shevik*, No. 23-24, Dec. 1945. Also "The Trusteeship Question," pp. 3-6.

11. *Soviet Strategy*, p. 254.

12. *Bol'shevik*, No. 20 (Oct. 1946), pp. 38-47. In this article Zhukov identified the United States as a major obstacle to the independence of the colonies.

13. *Bol'shevik*, No. 4 (1946), pp. 44-45.

14. *New Times*, No. 10 (1946), pp. 27-28.

15. *Pravda*, Oct. 21, 1946.

16. *The Hindu*, Madras, Dec. 8, 1946. It is interesting to note how the United States reacted to the Molotov speech. John Foster Dulles remarked that "in India, Soviet Communism exercises a strong influence through the interim Hindu Government." *The New York Times*, Jan. 21, 1946.

17. Eugene Varga, *Izmeneniia v ekonomika kapitaliana*, Moscow, 1946, pp. 212-26.

18. For a partial English translation of this article, see E. Zhukov, "The Colonial Question After the Second World War," in Alvin Z. Rubinstein (ed.), *The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union*, Random House, New York, 1966, (paperback ed.), pp. 398-402. For a more detailed interpretation of the article, see *Soviet Strategy in Southeast Asia*, pp. 256-57.

19. Perhaps the best study is to be found in Gene D. Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller, *Communism in India*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1959, Ch. 11-13, and John H. Kautsky, *Moscow and the Communist Party of India*, M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, 1956, Chs. 2 and 3.

20. *People's Age* (weekly of the Indian Communist party), Aug. 11, 1946; *World News and Views*, Vol. 27, No. 5 (Feb. 1, 1947), p. 60; and "Review of the Second Congress of the Communist Party of India," *People's Age*, Mar. 21, 1948, supplement.

21. *People's Age*, June 29, 1947. The CPI resolution on the Mountbatten Plan was ambiguous. The Plan was condemned as a British attempt to retain actual control over the subcontinent; its sole purpose was "to disrupt the people, strengthen reaction, get into an alliance with it, and thus make Indian independence formal." At the same time, it described the Congress and Muslim League governments of India and Pakistan as "popular," and the Congress "the main democratic organization" in India. It offered Communist cooperation in the task of nationbuilding. The ambiguity was probably a reflection of the ambiguity of the Soviet perspective of the national liberation movement in the late forties.

22. Typical of this phase of the CPI strategy—which Kautsky calls "the Right strategy"—was the exhortation made by its General Secretary, P. C. Joshi, at a meeting in Calcutta on Oct. 8, 1947. "All support to the Government," cried Joshi. "Reaction is threatening our two Governments and it is the duty of us all to rally wholeheartedly and enthusiastically behind them and pledge them all our support." Quoted in *Moscow and the Communist Party of India*, p. 23.

23. Students of Indian communism differ in their estimation of the influence of the British Communist party, and of R. Palme Dutt particularly, on the formulation and execution of the CPI's "right" strategy.

Dutt spent four months in India in the spring and summer of 1946. It seems that the CPI was somewhat to the right of the CPGB line on India, particularly in regard to the Muslim League. The CPI delegate to the 1945 CPGB Congress, S. S. Mirajkar, said in the course of his speech, "While you rightly admire the National Congress as the premier organisation of the freedom movement, you should not dismiss the differences with the Muslim League as merely the promptings of imperialist wire-pullers. The driving force and base of the Muslim League are the Muslim masses of various nationalities who have come to consciousness of their nationhood." *World News and Views*, Vol. 25, No. 49 (Dec. 15, 1945), p. 406.

24. For the role played by the CPI during the communal riots of 1947, see B. T. Ranadive's articles in *People's Age*, Mar. 30, 1947; Nov. 9, 1947; and Jan. 11, 1948.

25. "The Asian Conference," *International Affairs*, Moscow, July 1947, p. 303-4.

26. *Pravda*, May 12 and 16, 1947. Also Gene D. Overstreet, "The Soviet View of India: 1945-1948," unpublished M.A. thesis, Columbia University, Feb. 1953.

27. Zhukov's speech was published in *Mirovoe khoziaistvo i mirovaia politika*, No. 7, July 1947; the other three speeches were published two years later. For a penetrating critique of the conference, see *Moscow and the Communist Party of India*, pp. 24-26.

28. *Izvestia*, May 31, 1947.

29. What distinguished all of the four Soviet scholars from the Maoist strategy was their emphasis on the proletarian rather than peasant form of revolutionary struggle in the colonies and semicolonies. All the four downgraded peasant movements.

30. For an account of the debate see Leo Gruliow (trans.), *Soviet Views on the Post-war Economy*, Public Affairs Press, Washington, 1949.

31. *Bol'shevik*, No. 17 (Sept. 1947), pp. 57-64.

32. P. J. Vatikiotis, J. Harris Proctor (ed.), "Islam and the Foreign Policy of Egypt," *Islam and International Relations*, London, 1965, p. 150.

33. Demetrio Boersner, *The Bolsheviks and the National and Colonial Question, 1917-1928*, Geneva, 1957, pp. 124-25.

34. See *Communism in India*, p. 188. D'iakov and V. Bushevich in an article in 1940 accused the Muslim League of "disrupting the front of struggle of the Indian people for independence." However, when in later years the Muslim League became strong and powerful, the Soviet press refrained from open criticism. Evidently, the British Communist party's perspective of the Muslim League had a strong impact on Moscow.

35. *Ibid.*, p. 277.

36. *Cf.*: " . . . for two years after the close of World War II Moscow favored the 'right' strategy of co-operation 'from above' with the bourgeois-nationalist movements of colonial areas. However, Moscow probably had little knowledge of or even interest in India—or the rest of Asia—during this period of Soviet preoccupation with Europe. Moscow was, therefore, rather uncertain about the role of the Congress and could give little guidance to the Indian Communists on their paramount problem, their relations with the Congress. Thus, left with a good deal of independence, probably much to its regret, the CPI by and large followed the 'right' strategy, seeking a united front from above with the Congress, or at least its 'progressive' wing, and with the Muslim League. It was, however, apparently so unsure of the proper course to take that at one point in 1946 it suddenly switched to the 'left' strategy of the

united front from below against these movements, only quickly to revert to the 'right' one. Throughout, so far as we know, it was never repudiated or, for that matter, clearly encouraged in its course by Moscow." *Moscow and the Communist Party of India*, pp. 23–24.

37. *Communism in India*, p. 256.

38. A. Zhdanov, "The International Situation," *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, Nov. 10, 1947.

39. *Bol'shevik*, No. 23 (Dec. 15, 1947), pp. 51–64.

40. This was the time when Mao Tse-tung rejected the possibility of "a third road."

41. For a most illuminating detailed analysis of the Calcutta conference, see Ruth McVey, *The Calcutta Conference and the Southeast Asian Uprisings*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1958.

42. This is probably the most detailed and thorough piece among Mao's writings analyzing China's history and society. Students of Chinese communism have naturally subjected it to close scrutiny. It has been revised several times, evidently to reflect Mao's changing perception of Chinese history and society. The current edition of Mao's *Selected Works* says that the piece was *not* written by him; however, its inclusion in the *Selected Works* means that it is an authentic account of his views. For an interesting discussion on whether, in revising the various versions of this thesis, Mao wanted to please Stalin during his lifetime or the revisions reflected his own educational progress, see K. A. Wittfogel, "The Marxist View of China (Pt. 2)" *China Quarterly*, No. 12 (1962), pp. 154–69, and Stuart R. Schram, *The Political Thought of Mao Tse-tung*, Praeger, New York, 1966 (paperback ed.), pp. 59–60n.

43. The speech was reported in *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, Dec. 30, 1949, and the main theme was elaborated in an editorial in *People's China*, Vol. 1, No. 4, Feb. 16, 1950. It was also printed in *Pravda*, Jan. 4, 1950.

44. A word of caution for the more discriminating student of Sino-Soviet differences on the national liberation movement is perhaps necessary. In 1948–49 there was evidently some willingness in the Soviet Union to accommodate the Chinese strategy of revolution in the colonies and semicolonies. For instance, *Pravda* printed in its issues of June 7, 8, and 9, 1949, Liu Shao-chi's article "Internationalism and Nationalism." The most significant portion of this thesis related to the strategy of revolution in the colonies and semicolonies. Liu urged the Communists of several Asian countries by name, including India, to adopt the strategy of the broadest united front from below. They "must for the sake of their national interests . . . adopt a firm and irreconcilable policy against national betrayal by the reactionary section of the bourgeoisie, especially the big bourgeoisie, which has surrendered to imperialism. . . . On the other hand, Communists . . . should enter into an anti-imperialist alliance with that section of the national bourgeoisie which is still opposing imperialism and which does not oppose the anti-imperialist struggle of the masses of the people." Apparently the Maoist strategy had an impact on several Soviet experts on the colonial question, and it did for a while influence the official Soviet perspective too. But the printing in *Pravda* of Liu's article did not amount to an official Soviet endorsement of the Chinese strategy *per se* (as Kautsky seems to believe: see *Moscow and the Communist Party of India*, p. 87). A more realistic conclusion seems to be that Moscow,

faced with the apparent failure of its own strategy for revolution in the colonies and semicolonies, and the spectacular success of the Maoist strategy, was, in the late forties, tentatively willing to adopt some of the ingredients of the latter, provided it was possible to assemble a new strategy under Soviet leadership. What Moscow was not prepared to concede is the Chinese claim to the exclusive discovery of the strategy of revolution in the colonies and semicolonies.

45. See Chen Po-ta, "Mao Tse-tung's Theory of the Chinese Revolution Is the Integration of Marxism-Leninism with the Chinese Revolution," *People's Daily*, June 28, 1951; *Current Background*, No. 126 Oct. 15, 1951.

46. *Mirovoe khoziaistvo i mirovaia politika*, No. 1 (1947), pp. 16–27, and No. 12 (1947), pp. 14–28.

Maslennikov was apparently trying to build a fusion of Soviet and Chinese revolutionary theory and methods in which Moscow held an undisputably superior position.

In the latter half of 1949, Soviet scholars appeared to have moved somewhat closer to the Maoist strategy. At the June 1949, meeting of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Zhukov's thesis supported a broad-based anti-imperialist united front in the colonies and semicolonies; only the big bourgeoisie, he said, had "finally gone over into the camp of the imperialist reaction." In a general report, Maslennikov had much to say in favor of the four-class strategy of the Chinese Communists, although he maintained that the revolutionary experience of the Soviet Union "was and still is of tremendous significance for the national liberation movement. . . ." At a special session of the Academy's scholars on India, Balabushevich read a paper entitled "A New Stage in the National Liberation Struggle of the Peoples of India," in which the most significant point was his newly discovered emphasis on the peasantry, agrarian reforms, and armed struggle in the countryside. Summing up the discussions of the Academy, Zhukov said that the "controversy as to at what stage the colonial bourgeoisie begins to play a reactionary role can be solved only when an answer is given to this main question" of "its attitude towards the Soviet Union." See *Moscow and the Communist Party of India*, pp. 88–91.

47. Philip Jaffe, "The Strange Case of Anna Louise Strong," *Survey*, No. 53 (Oct. 1964), pp. 132–33.

48. A. Kheifets, "The National Liberation Movement in the Colonial and Dependent Countries," *Molodoi bol'shevik*, No. 7 (1948), pp. 43–52.

"The new-democracy, the struggle for which goes on now in colonial and dependent countries [wrote Kheifets] is not identical with people's democracy, which is victorious in the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe. The states of Central and Southeastern Europe—these in the past were capitalist countries —had in a greater or lesser measure significant feudal survivals. People's democracy in these countries is a suitable form of transition from capitalism to socialism. In the East, the situation stands otherwise. Imperialist subjugation caused survival of feudalism as a rule to predominate in the economy of the colonial and dependent countries and the imperialist subjugation interlaced with the feudal. Even in such countries as India and China, more developed in industrial relations, the central question is the liquidation of feudal landholding in the countryside. New-democracy in the East rises from the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle. . . ."

49. *Voprosy economiki*, No. 9, 1949,

Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. 1. (Jan. 3, 1950), pp. 5-6.

Zhukov took the following position: "People's democracy as a special form of regime which corresponds to the period of transition from capitalism to socialism and has become possible owing to the victory of socialism in the USSR, and the strengthening of the democratic forces throughout the world, not only accords in full measure to the interests of the broadest toiling masses of the colonies and semi-colonies but also is easily comprehensible to them and practically realizable. . . . The general patterns of social development are identical for both Eastern and Western countries. One can speak of differences in the tempo and concrete forms of this development. In this sense the people's democracy in the East is no different in its basic features from the people's democracy in the West."

50. See *Moscow and the Communist Party of India*, pp. 39-40 and 52-54.

51. The suggestion that the Yugoslav delegation influenced the thinking of the CPI is made in *Communism in India*, pp. 259-74.

52. Ruth McVey, *The Soviet View of the Indonesian Revolution:* A Study in the Russian Attitude Toward Asian Nationalism, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1957, pp. 59-66; "The Indonesian Communist Movement: Its Development and Relations to the Soviet Union," unpublished certificate essay, Russian Institute, Columbia University, New York, pp. 85-88.

53. Lu Ting-yi, "World Significance of Chinese Revolution," *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, June 29, 1951; also, *People's China*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (July 1, 1951).

54. E. Zhukov, "On the Character and Attributes of People's Democracy in Countries of the Orient," *CDSP*, Vol. IV (June 28, 1952), p. 3.

55. Zhukov's downgrading of the Chinese revolution was followed up by A. Sobolev's restoration of the supremacy of the October revolution. In a major thesis in *Bol'shevik* in 1951, Sobolev described the people's democratic revolution as a special type of two-stage revolution, a bourgeois-democratic revolution being succeeded by a socialist revolution. The East European revolutions had passed through both stages. The Chinese revolution, on the other hand, was a manifestation of the Soviet doctrine of people's democracy; however, it lagged behind the East European revolution because it had not proceeded beyond the first stage. A. Sobolev, "People's Democracy as a Form of Political Organization of Society," *Bol'shevik*, Vol. 19 (1951), pp. 25-38.

It was at this period that the Asian Communists were directed to call off insurrectionary struggles, which, in any case, had shown little promise of success in Burma, Indonesia, and India. Interestingly, the Indian Communist party resolved in 1951 to discover an "Indian path to Communism," a path which is "neither only the Russian path nor the Chinese path, but a path of Leninism, applied to Indian conditions." Such a path, however, still remains largely undiscovered.

56. Donald S. Zagoria, "Strains in the Sino-Soviet Alliance," *Problems of Communism*, May-June, 1960.

57. "Kaznacheev [the former Soviet diplomat in Rangoon] reports that the Chinese embassy assumed responsibility for Burmese Communist strategies from the outset and, even after the establishment of the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon the following year [1950], continued to guide the BCP without consultation with the Russians." *Soviet Strategy*, p. 384n.

58. Stalin almost completely ig-

nored the newly independent countries in his report except when he spoke of the imminent capability of the Socialist countries to become exporters of industrial goods to the rest of the world. Of considerable significance, however, was Stalin's advice to the foreign Communists attending the Congress to identify themselves with the nationalist movements in their countries "if you wish to gather the majority of the people around you," and to work for national independence "if you wish to be patriots of your country, if you wish to be the leading force of the nation."

Malenkov stated, "It is to be presumed that in countries condemned to the role of obedient powers of the American dictators there will be found genuinely peace-loving democratic forces which will pursue an independent peace policy and will find a way out of the impasse into which the American dictators have driven them. Taking this new path, European and other countries will meet complete understanding on the part of the peace-loving countries." See Leo Gruliow (ed.), *Current Soviet Policies:* The Documentary Record of the 19th Communist Party Congress and the Reorganization After Stalin's Death, Praeger, New York, 1953, pp. 1-20 and 104.

59. V. P. Dutt, "India, China and the Soviet Union," in Kurt London (ed.), *Unity in Contradiction: Major Aspects of Sino-Soviet Relations,* Praeger, New York, 1962, p. 252.

60. *Pravda,* Oct. 23, 1949.

Apparently Nehru's visit to Washington in the fall of 1949 led to a hardening of the Soviet stance on India. *Pravda,* on Oct. 23, surmised that Nehru showed the "greatest readiness to make concessions to the American capitalists and to open up the Indian market to both American goods and capital investment." In Nov., in an article in *Pravda,* D'iakov described the Nehru government as "very similar" to the "reactionary regime" that existed in Kuomintang China. *Pravda,* Nov. 25, 1949.

61. In retrospect, several scholars on the Soviet Union have found a significant change in Soviet policy during this period. Karunakar Gupta, an Indian foreign policy commentator, believes that the Soviet attitude to India softened in 1949. Karunakar Gupta, "A Study of Indo-Soviet Relations," *Calcutta Review,* Apr. 1956. Kyril Tidmarish seems to concur with this view; he found the Soviet media softening their attack on Nehru toward the end of 1949. See *St. Anthony's Paper* No. 8, Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale, 1960, pp. 105-6. K. P. Karunakaran, a Marxist interpreter of India's foreign policy, states that the Korean war made obvious to Asian eyes the equality of military power of the Western and the Communist states and "this aspect of the international situation makes it possible for India and other Asian and African states who are uncommitted to either of the two camps to make their influence felt on world affairs." K. P. Karunakaran, *India in World Affairs: A Review of India's Foreign Relations,* Oxford University Press, Bombay, 1958, p. 1. Marshall Shulman has noticed flexibility and moderation in Soviet foreign policy during this period. Marshall Shulman, *Stalin's Foreign Policy Reconsidered,* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1963.

The change in the pattern of external relations, however, began with Nehru's effort to take advantage of the Korean war to establish some rapport with Peking which had been less hostile to his regime than Moscow. It was Nehru's diplomatic breakthrough in Peking and a perceptible readiness of the Chinese Government to utilize India as a

link between Peking and Washington that made Stalin nod toward India.

Perhaps the most significant aspect of Soviet foreign policy formulations during this period was that *for the first time*, a gap began to be noticed between the ideologues' interpretation of India and the Kremlin's handling of new elements emerging in the world situation. Molotov moved while Zhukov and D'iakov stood still. Ideological rigidity and government-level flexibility marked the Soviets' India policy for the rest of the Stalin era.

62. The first barter trade deal between India and the USSR was signed in 1949. See B. Vasilyev and K. Lvov, *Soviet Trade with Southeast Asia*, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1949, pp. 90–95.

63. A. Alexeyev, "The Political Situation in India," *New Times*, Oct. 31, 1951.

The capitalism that the Soviets found in India in 1951 disappeared after 1956 when Soviet scholars considered India capable of noncapitalist development, to be rediscovered in the closing years of Khrushchev's leadership, and more clearly, after his exit from power. See Chs. 3 and 6.

64. *Pravda*, July 24, 1940; *CDSP*, Sept. 9, 1950.

*Izvestia*, Sept. 23, 1950, *CDSP*, Nov. 4, 1950.

65. *Pravda*, July 16, 1951.

66. *Indiia vovnemia i posle vtoroi mirovoi voiny*, Moscow, 1952.

67. See, for example, *New Times*, Nov. 14, 1951; O. Orestov, "The Parliamentary Elections in India," *Bol'shevik*, Mar. 1952; *Soviet Press Translations (SPT)*, Apr. 15, 1952.

68. Stalin had received only three ambassadors in the preceding five years. K. P. S. Menon, *Flying Troika*, Oxford University Press, London, 1963, p. 27.

69. The change in the Soviet stance on India was not an isolated phenomenon. In Feb. 1952, the Indonesian Communist party abandoned people's democracy as an immediate objective and called for a united front national government from which only the Masjumi party was to be excluded. Two months later, the PKI gave its support to the Wilopo Government even though the Communists were not in the cabinet.

70. *Pravda*, Aug. 9, 1953; *CDSP*, Sept. 5, 1953.

71. India did not get from the Soviet Union what it wanted most in those days. "India had most to hope whether in terms of mediation or even the veto, from Soviet Russia and its satellites." Alan Campbell-Johnson, *Mission with Mountbatten*, London, 1951, p. 287.

72. *Dawn*, Karachi, Jan. 31, 1952.

73. India and the USSR established diplomatic relations on June 28, 1947, several weeks *before* the formal inauguration of the Indian Union. On Nov. 21, 1949, it was announced in Karachi that Ivan Nikolaevich, former ambassador to Afghanistan, would be appointed to Pakistan. For some unexplained reason, however, he "could not take up his post." A former counselor at the Soviet embassy in London arrived in Karachi on Mar. 15, 1950, as the first Soviet ambassador to Pakistan. See "Pakistan's Relations with the USSR," a staff study, in *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (first quarter, 1961), p. 33.

74. F. M. Innes, "The Political Outlook in Pakistan," *Pacific Affairs*, Dec. 1953, p. 311. Innes, a former member of the Indian Civil Service, was adviser to the Central Commerce Committee of Pakistan.

75. "Pakistan's Relations," p. 39.

76. "Russia Is With Us" was a typical headline in Urdu newspapers. *Ibid.*, p. 34. No date was fixed for the visit, but Liaquat Ali Khan

said, "I hope to avail myself of the invitation as soon as possible."

77. For the Soviet note to Pakistan urging nonacceptance of military aid from the United States, see *Pravda*, Dec. 2, 1953.

There were rumors that the Soviet Union would give India matching military assistance. These reports were described as "malicious" in *New Times*, Jan. 9, 1954.

78. "Mr. Mikoyan in Delhi and Karachi," *Eastern Economist*, New Delhi, Mar. 30, 1956; *Pakistan Times*, Lahore, Mar. 25, 1956.

79. *Dawn*, Feb. 27, 1956. This was followed up with the offer of a steel plant. *Pakistan Times*, Mar. 25, 1956. On June 27, 1956, the Soviet Union and Pakistan signed a trade agreement providing for payment in Pakistani rupees. *Dawn*, June 28, 1956.

80. *Pravda*, Feb. 15, 1956.

81. *Dawn*, Nov. 16, 1956. Also see K. Sarwar Hasan, "Kashmir Before the Security Council," *Pakistan Horizon*, Mar. 1957, p. 31.

82. For a critical reflection on Pakistan, see also *New Times*, No. 30, 1957.

83. *Pravda*, July 19, 1958; *New Times*, No. 26, 1958. In Feb. 1958, Mikoyan had made his second trip to Karachi. His talks with Pakistani leaders apparently covered Pakistan's military relations with the US Mikoyan had told newsmen that the Soviet Union need not have any concern about Pakistan being made a base for American aggression against Russia. *Pravda*, Feb. 5, 1958. Also of interest is the visit of a Soviet parliamentary delegation to Pakistan in Feb. 1958. I. A. Benedictov, leader of the delegation, renewed the offer of Soviet assistance for the development of Pakistan's agriculture. "Pakistan's Relations," pp. 50–51.

84. *New Times*, No. 51, 1958.

85. *Pravda*, Jan. 31, 1959; *CDSP*, Mar. 25, 1959.

86. "An Economic History of Pakistan," in *JPRS*, No. 4807.

87. *Pravda*, Mar. 17, 1959.

88. *Izvestia*, Dec. 1, 1959. It should be noted that the military regime was the first in Pakistan to accept Soviet assistance for mineral exploration in Aug. 1959.

89. *New Times*, No. 44, 1959.

90. *The New York Times*, May 9, 1960; *Dawn*, May 31, 1960.

91. *Pravda*, May 11 and June 24, 1960.

92. Bhutto had stated in July, 1949, that in an attempt to diversify Pakistan's foreign trade "special attention has been given to promoting trade with the USSR, the East European countries including Yugoslavia, and the Chinese mainland." *Pakistan Times*, July 12, 1959.

A Pakistani film, *Jago Hua Savera (The Day Is Dawning)*, was awarded a gold medal at the Moscow Film Festival.

93. *Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union*, p. 388.

94. *Izvestia*, Dec. 4, 1953.

95. *International Affairs*, July 1955.

96. R. S. Iskandarov, "Kvoprosu o pomoshohi slabo razvitym stranam," in *JPRS*, No. 16141.

97. For Soviet perspective of the Bandung conference, see "After the Meeting in Bogor," *International Affairs*, Jan. 1955, and E. Zhokov, "The Bandung Conference of African and Asian Countries and Its Historic Significance," *International Affairs*, May 1955.

98. This was done in 1959 after the rebellion in Tibet. See next chapter.

99. Shortly before Nehru's visit, a Russian translation of his *Discovery of India* was published, and Nehru was praised by no less a scholar than D'iakov as an ardent and lifelong enemy of imperialism. *Kommunist*, No. 9, 1955. The Indian ambassador in Moscow, K. P. S. Menon, has highlighted three major aspects of

the visit: in the ceremony of welcome and in popular enthusiasm, it had no parallel in Soviet history; the Soviet leaders listened with respect to Nehru's interpretation of the Western attitude to major world problems; in agreeing to give India substantial development assistance, they were willing to tolerate an American economic presence. *Flying Troika*, pp. 114–20.

100. For the text of the joint statement, see *Foreign Policy of India, Texts of Documents*, New Delhi, 1959, pp. 185–87.

101. At the 20th Congress, Kuusinnen attacked the total denial of a positive role in history to Gandhi "solely on the basis of criticism of Gandhi's philosophical views." He also called for revaluation of other publications, specifically mentioning the Thesis on the Colonial Question adopted at the 6th Congress of the Comintern. It had lost, he suggested, its relevance to the realities of the post-Stalin world. *Pravda*, Feb. 20, 1956; *CDSP*, Vol. 8 (Apr. 18, 1956), pp. 23–24.

102. The Indian Government had drawn the attention of the Soviet Government to the deprecatory interpretation of Gandhi's role in the 1954 edition of the *Large Soviet Encyclopedia*. "The Soviet Reassessment of Mahatma Gandhi," *op. cit.*, p. 109. For a partial English translation of an article by D'iakov on Gandhi, reflecting the ideological rigidity of the Stalin period, see *Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union*, pp. 402–3.

103. Donald S. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956–1962*, Atheneum, New York, 1964.

104. For the elevation of India in Soviet writings of this period, see *New Times*, Jan. 26, 1956, and *International Affairs*, Feb. 1956, pp. 20–28.

105. *New Times*, July 5 and Aug. 2, 1956.

106. *New Age* (monthly), Oct. 1956, which also reprinted Rubinstein's articles. Ghosh's criticism was aimed at the Soviet commentator's flat statement that socialism was being built in India by Nehru and the Congress party, and his total rejection of the contributions made by the Communist and other leftist movements.

107. *Pravda*, Sept. 18, 1956. Mikoyan's statement apparently sought to make three major points. First, it implicitly reiterated the Soviet claim that the Maoist new-democracy was not the only way to achieve socialism in the new countries. Secondly, again implicitly, it reiterated that the 20th Congress road was a creative contribution to Marxism-Leninism. Thirdly, that there wasn't any substantial difference between state capitalism in China and state capitalism in India.

Liu Shao-chi, in his main report to the 8th Congress, refuted Mikoyan's statement. State capitalism, he said, was productive of socialism only when it was "under the leadership of a state where the proletariat holds power," for it could then be kept under restrictions. *People's Daily*, Sept. 16, 1956.

108. For a summary of the discussions, see *Sovetskoe vostokovodenie*, No. 1, (1957), pp. 172–85.

109. *Ibid.*, No. 4, 1957.

110. *Mirovaiia ekonomika*, No. 6, 1957.

111. *Ibid.*, No. 4, 1958.

112. D'iakov and Balabushevich (eds.), *A New History of India*, Moscow, 1959.

113. *Flying Troika*, p. 171. See also *The Statesman*, New Delhi, Nov. 9, 1956, for a note to Nehru.

114. The Soviet delegate asserted that the Kashmiri people had settled the Kashmir question "as a result of the vote taken by the [state] constituent assembly," and that they regarded themselves as "an inalienable part of the Republic of India." *The Statesman*, Jan. 25, 1957. The Russians stood solidly by India during the

Security Council debate on Kashmir on Nov. 5, 1957; this time they blamed Pakistan for the difficult situation created by the Kashmir issue.

115. For Nehru's reference to Yugoslavia, see *The Statesman*, May 13, 1958, and for Moscow's reaction, *Flying Troika*, p. 209.

116. *Eastern Economist*, Mar. 2, 1962.

117. This became a necessity after the principal contract for the Bhilai steel plant was signed in Apr. 1956.

118. *New Times*, Dec. 12, 1957.

119. *New Times*, No. 39, 1959.

120. See the article on India by Kolikhalova and Redko in *Politika s. Sh. A i strany Yugo-vostochnoi Azii: Indiya, Birma, Indoneziya*, B. G. Gafurov, Moscow, 1961, p. 130.

121. The Tibetan question is discussed at some length in the next chapter.

122. For the text of the Tass statement, see Chanakya Sen, *Tibet Disappears*, Asia Publishing House, London, 1960, pp. 468–69.

123. See Harry Gelman, "Communist Policy and India: Sino-Soviet Battleground," in A. Doak Barnett (ed.), *Communist Strategies in Asia*, Praeger, New York, p. 109.

124. Pavel Yudin, "Can We Accept Pandit Nehru's Approach?" *World Marxist Review*, No. 4, Dec. 1958.

125. *Pravda*, Feb. 6, 1959; *CDSP*, Vol. 11, Mar. 25, 1959; and *Pravda*, Jan. 31, 1959.

126. *Sovremennyi vostok*, No. 9, Sept. 1959, and *Mirovaiia ekonomika*, No. 11, Nov. 1959.

127. *Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism*, Moscow, 1960. This important publication was the work of a committee set up by the CPSU under the chairmanship of Otto Kuusinen.

## CHAPTER 3

1. For a documented study of how the American people have been misinformed about China, see Felix Greene, *A Curtain of Ignorance*, Doubleday, New York, 1964.

2. Statement at the annual session of the Association of Asian Studies, *The New York Times*, Apr. 30, 1969.

3. O. Edmund Clubb, "Chinese Communist Strategy in Foreign Relations," in Arthur Stein (ed.), "Report on China," *The Annals*, American Academy of Political and Social Science, Sept. 1951, p. 166.

4. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Knopf, New York, 1967, Ch. 2.

5. The Chinese leaders, particularly Chou En-lai, have repeatedly stressed in their statements the enormity of the economic reconstruction task facing the Communist leadership. For an illuminating analysis of the not overly successful struggle waged by the CCP to master the internal environment during the first decade of Communist rule, see the introductory chapter in Robert R. Bowie and John K. Fairbank, *Communist China 1955–1959: Policy Documents with Analysis*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1962.

6. Howard L. Boorman and Scott A. Boorman, "Strategy and National Psychology in China," *Annals*, Mar. 1967, pp. 143–55. For a penetrating insight into the Chinese national character, see Arthur H. Smith, *Chinese Characteristics* (2d rev. ed.) Revell, New York, 1894; also, Klaus Mehnert, *Peking and Moscow*, Putman's, New York, 1963.

7. "Strategy and National Psychology, pp. 151–55.

8. The first writings on India in the Chinese Communist press echoed the prevailing Soviet perspective of the Indian situation. In Apr. 1950, Huang Ts'ao-liang, in *New Aspects of the Post-war World*, Shanghai, placed India in the imperialist camp, found its independence only formal, and

said that India was merely playing at neutralism. A change in the Chinese perspective was noticeable in the summer of 1950, after the outbreak of the Korean War. On July 9, 1950, *People's Daily* discussed India without criticizing Nehru but still with some cynicism about neutrality. On July 13, however, the newspaper was more charitable to the Indian regime. India was now found to be an important member of the peace camp. Peking's a titude toward India became clearly positive at the beginning of 1951. *People's China*, on Jan. 1, recognized the Indian national liberation as part of the great tide of liberation sweeping over Asia. On Sept. 1, it wrote appreciatively of India's refusal to sign the American draft of the peace treaty with Japan. The contrast with Soviet press comment on this and similar Indian action is instructive.

9. K. M. Panikkar, *In Two Chinas*, Allen & Unwin, London, 1955. Panikkar wrote, "Nehru has his roots in Western liberalism which affects even his socialist thinking" (p. 82).

10. See the text of Nehru's speech in Parliament on Dec. 6, 1950, in *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches: 1949–1953*, Publications Division, Delhi, pp. 174–79. It gives interesting clues to the inherited Indian strategic perspective of the Himalayas. Nehru said, "Our interest in the internal conditions in Nepal has become still more acute and personal because of the developments across our borders, to be frank, specially those in China and Tibet. Besides our sympathetic interest in Nepal, we were also interested in the security of our own country . . . as much as we appreciate the independence of Nepal, we cannot allow anything to go wrong in Nepal or permit that [Himalayan] barrier to be crossed or weakened, because that would be a risk to our own security."

11. *Cf:* "Right from the first few months of independence, I repeatedly stated in Parliament that the MacMahon Line, by which I simply mean the defined frontier, was our frontier. When I say something in Parliament, it is meant for the outside world and it was meant, if I may say so, for the Government of China. . . . Seven or eight years ago I saw no reason to discuss the question of the frontier with the Chinese Government because, foolishly if you like, I thought that there was nothing to discuss." Nehru in Parliament, Sept. 10, 1959, in *Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches: 1957–59*, Publications Division, Delhi, p. 206.

12. In *Two Chinas*, p. 67.

13. When the Tibet question was debated for the first time in the Indian Parliament in Dec. 1950, N. G. Ranga, Congress party front-bencher, referred to the "millions of [Chinese] people pouring into Korea" and asked, "Is it possible for those people, under more or less similar circumstances, to pour into India too . . . ?" M. A. Ayyangar, who later became speaker of the Lok Sabha, declared, "As against the 450 million Chinese, if we with our 350 million had armed ourselves and were ready for an offensive, China would not have ventured on Tibet." M. R. Masani, an Opposition leader, remarked that the "Chinese had cut Asia into two—Communist and non-Communist Asia. . . ." For text of the debate, see: Chanakya Sen, *Tibet Disappears: A Documentary History of Tibet's International Status, the Great Rebellion, and Its Aftermath*, Asia Publishing House, New York, 1960, pp. 109–19.

14. *Peking Versus Delhi*, p. 286.

15. *Ibid.*, Ch. 8.

16. *Ibid.*

17. *The New York Times*, Oct. 15, 1950.

18. "Third, it was Lhasa's hope that once a clash with Peking became a fact, some form of foreign

assistance would be forthcoming. But since the British have pulled out of India, their interest in Tibet has become mainly academic. Lhasa's hope naturally turned to India." Tsung Lien-shen and Shen Chi-liu, *Tibet and the Tibetans,* quoted in *Tibet Disappears,* p. 17.

19. Quoted in *Tibet Disappears,* p. 18.

20. *Peking Review,* May 19, 1959, p. 15.

21. Quoted in *Tibet Disappears,* p. 19.

22. *The Hindu,* Oct. 29, 1950.

23. Quoted in *Tibet Disappears,* p. 21.

The Soviet press took a harder line on India than the Chinese press during the 1950 Tibetan crisis. There was not merely unqualified support for the Chinese stand on Tibet and strong backing to the liberating mission of the PLA; there were also explicit insinuations that the Western powers were plotting a deal with India about Tibet. *Trud,* on Oct. 28, 1950, described Tibet as an "inalienable part of Chinese territory"; *Pravda* had only two days earlier announced that the PLA was carrying "freedom, peace and democracy" to the people of Tibet. *(CDSP,* Vol. 11, Nov. 18, 1950). *Oktyabr,* on July 1950, accused India of working with Britain and the US not only in Tibet but also in the other Himalayan territories *(SPT,* May 13, 1950; *SPT,* Oct. 15, 1950). *Pravda,* in another report, alleged that Nehru had personally taken part in arranging the dispatch of American arms to the Tibetan rebels through Indian territory *(Pravda,* May 13, 1950; *SPT,* July 1, 1950). The Soviet press printed only the Chinese versions of the Tibetan issue.

24. *People's Daily,* Sept. 13, 1950.

25. For text of these notes, see *Tibet Disappears,* pp. 69–77.

26. *People's China,* Dec. 1, 1950.

27. Jagdish Chandra Kundra; *Indian Foreign Policy,* Groningem, Netherlands, 1960, Ch. 2.

28. *In Two Chinas,* pp. 78–81.

29. P. K. Banerji, "China in India and Pakistan," speech before the US House of Representatives on June 13, 1966. The writer is grateful to Dr. Banerji for sending him a reprint of the speech.

30. *Dawn,* Oct. 3, 1949.

31. See the Pakistani delegate Mohammed Zafrullah Khan's statement in the UN General Assembly, Sept. 25, 1950, as reported in *Dawn,* Sept. 26, 1950.

32. Ko Po-nien; "China's Peace Policy," in *People's China,* Oct. 1, 1953.

33. Nehru rationalized his Tibet perspective in the following words in 1959: "It is perfectly true that British policy was one of expansion into Tibet and that they carried this out by force of arms early this century. That was, in our opinion, an unjustified and cruel adventure which brought much harm to the Tibetans. As a result of that, the then British Government in India established certain extra-territorial rights in Tibet. When India became independent, we inherited some of these rights. Being entirely opposed to any such extra-territorial rights in another country, we did not wish to retain them. But in the early days after independence and partition, our hands were full . . . and we had to face a very difficult situation in our own country. We ignored, if I may say so, Tibet. Not being able to find a suitable person to act as our representative in Lhasa, we allowed the existing British representative to continue at Lhasa. Later an Indian took his place. Soon after the Chinese armies entered Tibet, the question of these extra-territorial rights was raised and we readily agreed to give them up.

We would have given them up anyhow, whatever developments might have taken place in Tibet." Statement in Parliament, Apr. 27, 1959, in *Nehru's Speeches: 1957–59*, p. 188.

34. T. J. S. George, *Krishna Menon: A Biography*, Taplinger, New York, 1964, p. 179.

35. Quoted in an editorial in *People's Daily*, July 2, 1954.

36. Note to map 36 in *Provincial Atlas of the Chinese People's Republic*, Shanghai, 1953.

37. *The New York Times*, Feb. 21, 1955.

38. *The Times*, May 30, 1955.

39. Lok Sabha *Debates*, New Delhi, series 2, vol. 34, col. 6, 541, Sept. 4, 1959. Compare this with the statement by M. C. Chagla, Indian Education Minister and spokesman on Kashmir at the UN Security Council, in Delhi while opening Tibet House on Oct. 26, 1965: "When we recognized China's sovereignty over Tibet, it was on the *express condition* that Tibetan autonomy would be preserved. We now realize how misguided we were, how wrong to have put faith in the word, in the *pledge that was given to us by China.* That condition has been violated . . . Therefore, it is a matter of consideration whether we are bound by our agreement with China that we recognize China's sovereignty over Tibet." *The Statesman*, Oct. 27, 1965. In reply to the Lok Sabha debate on a Jan Sangh party resolution in 1967, Chagla, who was then Minister for External Affairs, said that the Government was keeping its Tibet policy under "constant review." The resolution demanding a complete reversal of the 1950–54 policy, was defeated. *News-Tibet*, Vol. 3, No. 3, Aug. 1967. [Italics Added.]

40. In a major speech in Parliament on Sept. 4, 1959, Nehru listed "two or three points" governing India's approach to Tibet and the related frontier problem—"our sympathy for the Tibetan people and our desire to maintain friendly relations with China." He hastened to add: "Now there may appear to be something contradictory and it does in the present context slightly contradict each other. That is the difficulty of the situation." Nehru was unable to resolve this difficulty.

41. The Chinese also were resentful that statements by the Dalai Lama were issued through the information bureau of the Indian Government and that his cabinet was allowed to function in India; at the same time, they seemed to accept at face value Nehru's assurance that the Dalai Lama was not to function in India politically. They ascribed to reactionary political pressure on Nehru the contradiction between his assurance and the actual functioning of the Dalai Lama.

42. *Peking Review*, Feb. 3, 1959. Ch'en Yi was speaking at the Indian Republic Day function in the Indian embassy in Peking on Jan. 26.

43. Quoted in *The Times of India*, Apr. 24, 1959.

44. *Ibid.*

45. *Ibid.*, May 4, 1959.

46. For text of the statement, see *Tibet Disappears*, pp. 432–37. The ambassador's exhortations betrayed Peking's fear of getting involved in wars on two fronts; he was also evidently warning India of the danger of getting involved in conflicts on two fronts.

47. For text of the thesis, see *ibid.*, pp. 330–56.

48. The ethnic composition of the border areas make it relatively easy for the Chinese to interfere in Indian internal affairs. See Dick Wilson, "Where the World's Roof Ends," in *Far Eastern Economic Weekly*, Mar. 12, 1965; also, his "Himalayan Honour," *ibid.*, Mar. 25, 1965.

49. Chou En-lai made this more

explicit in his letter of Jan. 23, 1959, to Nehru. For text, see *Documents on the Sino-Indian Boundary Question*, Peking, 1960.

50. In his letter, Chou linked the Sino-Indian border with the Sino-Burmese border and implicitly indicated a similar political solution for both.

51. For text of Nehru's letter, see *Tibet Disappears*, pp. 449–52.

52. Reply to debate in Parliament on Sept. 10, 1959, in *Nehru's Speeches: 1957–63*, Publication Division, Delhi, pp. 206–7.

53. *The Statesman*, New Delhi, Sept. 4, 1959.

Interestingly, a Soviet writer implicated Pakistan in the Tibetan uprising, although no such allegation emanated from Peking. See, K. Krutov, "Tibet: Imperialist Adventure," in *International Affairs*, May 1959. Chinese maps were printed in Soviet journals without comment. *Pravda* printed three Chinese and two Indian statements on the border issue in the second and third week of Sept. 1959.

54. At the same time, Chou stated that China "has always respected the proper relations between them [Bhutan and Sikkim] and India." For the text of Chou's letter, see *Documents on the Sino-Indian Boundary Question.*

55. Margaret Fisher, Leo Rose, and Robert A. Huttenbeck, *Himalayan Battleground: Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh*, Pall Mall, London, 1963.

56. Alastair Lamb: *The India-China Border*, Royal Institute of International Relations, London, 1964.

Elsewhere, Lamb has put forward the interesting hypothesis, which, he cautions, does not apply to the Indian case, that China would, other factors being equal, prefer to create a buffer than to assert ancient territorial claims. He draws this conclusion from a study of China's border agreements with Burma, Nepal, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. See his "China's Land Borders," in *Australia's Neighbours*, Melbourne, Sept.–Oct. 1964.

57. This is evident in the letters and notes exchanged between New Delhi and Peking on the border question. While most of the Indian effort was to argue effectively the validity of the agreements relating to the border, the Chinese notes often addressed political appeals. *Cf:* "China and India are both countries which were long subjected to imperialist aggression. This common experience should have naturally caused China and India to hold an identical view of the . . . historical background and to adopt an attitude of mutual sympathy, mutual understanding and fairness and reasonableness in dealing with the boundary question. The Chinese Government originally thought that the Indian Government would take such an attitude." (From Chou En-lai's letter of Sept. 8, 1959 to Nehru.) "The Chinese Government has pointed out many times that the boundary between China and India is very long and has never been delimited by the two Governments, that there are discrepancies between maps of the two countries, and that therefore it is natural that the two countries should hold different opinions regarding the boundary. A reasonable settlement of this outstanding historical issue should not be difficult at all to achieve provided it is sought through friendly consultations." (Chou's letter of Dec. 17, 1959, to Nehru.)

58. "Where the World's Roof Ends."

59. *Krishna Menon*, pp. 254–55.

60. At a 2½-hours-long press conference after his talks with Nehru, Chou En-lai put forward six basic points on which he apparently had tried, but failed, to obtain Indian concurrence. One of these was that

"a settlement of the boundary question between the two countries should take into account the national feelings of the two peoples for the Himalayas and the Karakoram mountains." Commenting on the six points (five of which he rejected, accepting the sixth: "There exists a dispute on the boundary between the two parties"), Nehru said in Parliament: "I take it as a response to the fact that the Himalayas are an intimate part of India and Indian culture. If the Chinese feel strongly about the Karakoram, they are welcome to do so; I have no objection to it." *Nehru's Speeches: 1957-63*, pp. 216-17.

61. *Dawn*, Oct. 1, 1959.

62. *Ibid.*, Oct. 3, 1959.

63. *Ibid.*, Oct. 22, 1959.

64. *Ibid.*, Nov. 24, 1959.

65. Mohammed Zafrullah Khan: "South Asia: A Perspective," in *Pakistan Horizon*, second quarter, 1965, p. 118.

66. See Ch. 4.

67. Pakistanis believed that Chou En-lai had been influenced by his talks with Nehru, see *Dawn*, Dec. 20, 1956. During his visit to Colombo shortly afterwards, Chou opposed the stationing of UN troops in Kashmir. *Dawn*'s comment was that "it is the Communist world and its leaders . . . who stand to gain by the prolongation of the conflict over Kashmir between Pakistan and India." *Dawn*, Feb. 7, 1957.

68. *Long Live Leninism*, Peking, 1960, p. 67.

69. For the first body of organized Chinese attack on the Indian economy and on Soviet aid policy for India, see *Studies in International Affairs*, No. 1, Jan. 1960, in *JPRS*, July 7, 1960.

70. *Ibid.*

71. *Nehru's Speeches: 1957-63*, p. 278.

72. *Nehru's Speeches*, Vol. III, p. 264.

73. Quoted in Joseph Needham, *Science and Civilization in China*, Vol. 1, Oxford University Press, New York, (1954), p. 214.

74. The psychological mechanisms that operate the minds of newly liberated nations include identification, alienation, replacement, and denial. See Otto Klineberg, *The Human Dimension in International Relations*, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, New York, 1965, pp. 83-89.

75. Dennis Bloodworth, *Chinese Looking Glass*, Dell, New York, 1966, p. 394.

## CHAPTER 4

1. In 1965 the CCP denounced the entire platform of the 20th Congress, describing it as the "root of all evils of Khrushchev revisionists" and declaring that "the 20th Congress of the CPSU is the origin of the split in the international communist movement." *Peking Review*, No. 18, Apr. 30, 1965. However, the Chinese formulation said nothing specific about the attitude to be adopted toward individual Asian-African and Latin American countries or the "third world" as a whole.

2. In the war of polemics the Russians and the Chinese have grossly distorted each other's stand on several major issues. Perhaps nothing has been more distorted in Russia as well as in the Western press than the Chinese stance on nuclear war. For a cogent and forceful presentation of this stance, see Lin Piao; "Long Live the Victory of People's War," *Peking Review*, No. 36 (Sept. 3, 1965), pp. 27-28. For an elaborate and perceptive comparative study of the Soviet and Chinese positions on nuclear war, see Walter C. Clemens, Jr., *The Arms Race and Sino-Soviet Relations*, Stanford University, Stanford, Cali., 1968, especially Pts. 3 and 4.

3. *Collected Works of Mao Tse-tung*, Vol. V, International Publishers, New York, pp. 97-101.

4. *Peking Review*, No. 15, (Apr. 21, 1960), pp. 17-24. "Yu Chao Li" is a pseudonym used by top leaders of the CCP.

5. "Excellent Situation for the Struggle for Peace," *Peking Review*, Jan. 5, 1960, pp. 15-19.

6. *Peking Review*, No. 17 (Apr. 26, 1960), pp. 29-30.

7. Robert R. Bowie and John K. Fairbank, *Communist China: 1955-1959; Policy Documents with Analysis*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1962, pp. 13-19.

8. The 21st Congress was convened "in large measure because Khrushchev believed that he had to reply to the Chinese challenge in the highest forum available to him." *Sino-Soviet Conflict*, pp. 109-12.

9. Much of the difference in the CCP was apparently related to the Maoist Great Leap Forward strategy of which the communes were an integral part. See *Ten Glorious Years, 1949-1959*, Peking, 1960, pp. 287-88, for a *People's Daily* editorial shedding light on some of these differences.

10. Franklin W. Houn, *A Short History of Chinese Communism*, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1967, pp. 90-91. It is, of course, not suggested that the dismissal had anything to do with the Sino-Indian border issue or with Sino-Soviet differences on it. What is suggested, however, is that Soviet intervention in the border dispute on India's behalf might have acted as an additional point in shaping the decisions of the CCP leadership in the fall of 1959 to dismiss Peng Teh-huai, Chen Yun, and Chang Wen-tien from the Political Bureau for their alleged pro-Soviet leanings. Mrs. Hsieh makes the point, perhaps rightly, that Peng was not particularly qualified by his background to oversee China's transition to a nuclear power. Alice Langley Hsieh, *Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era*, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1962, p. 176.

11. David Floyd, *Mao Against Khrushchev: A Short History of the Sino-Soviet Conflict*, Praeger, New York, 1963, p. 264.

12. Edward Crankshaw, *The New Cold War: Moscow Vs. Peking*, Penguin, New York, 1965, pp. 97-110.

13. The article was first published in a daily newspaper in Baku and then reprinted in several provincial papers and in a couple of metropolitan journals. In the last instance, the strong warnings to China were deleted. *Mao Against Khrushchev*, pp. 285-86.

14. *Sino-Soviet Conflict*, pp. 335-36.

15. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 334.

16. For the text of Mao's speech, see *Peking Review*, No. 37, Nov. 11, 1958.

17. *Communist China's Strategy*, p. 97.

18. On May 10, 1958, Ch'en Yi told the West German newspaper *Die Welt*, "At the moment China does not own atomic weapons, but we shall have them in the future."

19. Quoted in *Communist China's Strategy*, p. 112.

20. *People's Daily*, Nov. 25, 1957.

21. *Long Live Leninism*, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1960. For partial text, see *Mao Against Khrushchev*, pp. 266-71. Compare this with Kuusinen's Lenin anniversary speech of Apr. 22, delivered only three days after the publication of the Chinese article in *Red Flag*. The Chinese drew the line between "peaceful co-existence" and "revolution" as dividing true Marxist-Leninists and revisionists. "Peaceful co-existence refers to relations between nations, revolution means the overthrow of the oppressors as a class by the oppressed people within each country, while in the case of the colonial and semi-colonial countries, it is first and foremost

a question of overthrowing alien oppressors, namely, the imperialists."

22. For text of Liu's speech, see *Peking Review*, No. 24, June 14, 1960. Liu classified wars of the present epoch into four—the unjust wars were the imperialist wars against the colonial peoples and the imperialist wars on the oppressed people of the imperialist countries themselves. The just wars were the national liberation wars and the people's revolutionary wars. He said nothing of a global nuclear war.

23. *People's Daily*, Mar. 29, 1962; *Pravda*, Apr. 3, 1962. Students of the Communist science of communication will find the *People's Daily* editorial interesting. Most of it was on the surface about regulating the Urumchi River in Sinkiang; the whole writing was highly symbolic. Its publication in *Pravda* revealed its real importance in the context of the nearly four-year-old controversy between Moscow and Peking about the Great Leap strategy of Mao Tse-tung.

24. For the communique, see *Peking Review*, No. 39, Sept. 29, 1962.

25. Klaus Mehnert, *Peking and Moscow*, Putnam, New York, 1963, p. 429.

26. "More on Nehru's Philosophy in the Light of the Sino-Indian Boundary Question," *Peking Review*, Nov. 2, 1962. The article was immediately broadcast over the entire Peking radio network and repeated in extracts and summaries for several days.

27. *Indian White Paper*, No. 2, pp. 1–2.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 3–10.

29. *Ibid.*, pp. 27–31.

30. *Ibid.*, No. 3, pp. 52–57.

31. *Documents on the Sino-Indian Boundary Question*, pp. 18–28.

32. None of these was on the Chinese side of the ridge that marks the edge of the Aksai Chin plateau. See Harold Hinton, *Communist China in World Politics*, Boston, 1966, p. 294; also, *The New York Times*, July 25, 1962.

33. *The Statesman*, Delhi, Nov. 29, 1961. A week later Nehru told Parliament that he saw no peace on the frontier "so long as all recognized aggression is not vacated." Nehru, who had just returned from a visit to Washington, appeared still to rely mostly on diplomatic means to bring about a Chinese withdrawal. However, he did not rule out war and was evidently seeking to build up a situation of strength. The border situation, he said, was "progressively changing" from "the military point of view and from other points of view" in India's favor, "and we shall continue to take steps to build up these things so that ultimately we may be in a position to take action to recover such territory as [happens to be] in their possession." *The Statesman*, Dec. 7, 1961.

34. *Indian White Paper*, No. 4, p. 39.

35. *Ibid.*, pp. 41–43.

36. *Ibid.*, No. 6, p. 81.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 92. The Chinese said that the Indians had fired first. Indian troops continued their forward movement despite Chinese protests. *The New York Times*, July 25, 1962.

38. *The Statesman*, Aug. 15, 1962. In a note on Aug. 22, the Indian Government told Peking that there could be no negotiations and no relaxation of tension without a Chinese withdrawal. *Indian White Paper*, No. 7, pp. 36–37.

39. *The Statesman*, Sept. 10, 1962. For the Chinese version of the incident, see the Chinese notes to India of Sept. 13 and Sept. 20, in *Indian White Paper*, No. 7, pp. 71–73, 80–81.

40. Chinese note of Sept. 20, in *Indian White Paper*, No. 7.

41. *The Statesman*, Oct. 6, 1962.

42. *Ibid.*, Oct. 13, 1962; *People's Daily*, Oct. 14, 1962. On the same

day Krishna Menon announced, "We will fight to the last man, to the last gun." *The Statesman*, Oct. 15, 1962.

43. The Chinese and Indian notes are in *Indian White Paper*, No. 7.

44. *Indian White Paper*, No. 2, pp. 34–52.

45. *People's Daily*, Nov. 2, 1963, in *JPRS* 22, 262, Dec. 13, 1963.

46. *Communist China in World Politics*, p. 291.

47. *Indian White Paper*, No. 3, pp. 47–51; *Communist China in World Politics*, p. 291.

48. *Documents on the Sino-Indian Boundary Question*, pp. 18–28.

49. *Ibid.*

50. *Ibid.*, pp. 139–41.

51. *Indian White Paper*, No. 5, p. 26. The failure of the officials' talks evidently hardened the Indian position. On Nov. 23, Nehru spoke of war between India and China lasting for a generation. *The Statesman*, Nov. 24, 1960.

52. Between Dec. 1961 and May 1962 China proposed three times to India a new trade agreement to replace the 1954 India-China agreement on trade between Tibet and India, which was due to expire in June 1962. In a note on August 22, 1962, India rejected the Chinese proposal. See Chou En-lai's letter to the Afro-Asian heads of government, in *Documents on the Sino-Indian Border Question*.

53. *Indian White Paper*, No. 4, p. 4.

54. *Ibid.*, pp. 32–36.

55. *Ibid.*, pp. 41–43.

56. *Ibid.*, pp. 56–58.

57. *Ibid.*, No. 6, pp. 14–18.

58. *Ibid.*, No. 7, pp. 36–37.

59. *Ibid.*, pp. 71–73.

60. *Ibid.*, pp. 110–11.

61. To the Chinese Communist leaders India appeared to have moved closer to the imperialists during 1961–62, with Nehru's essentially pro-Western stand on Laos, Congo, and Berlin, and his downgrading of imperialism at the Belgrade non-aligned conference.

62. *Communist China in World Politics*, p. 299.

63. *Bulletin* of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Jan. 1965, pp. 2–3.

64. K. P. S. Menon, "The Nehru Technique in Diplomacy," *Link*, New Delhi, May 30 1965.

65. *Krishna Menon*, pp. 278–79.

66. The Russians seemed to have been aware of the vulnerability of the Indian flank of the 20th Congress strategy. See the CPSU confidential letter to all the Parties in the Socialist camp in late Jan. 1963, quoted, in extracts, in *Mao Against Khrushchev*, pp. 361–67, and referred to later in this chapter.

67. *Ibid.*

68. *The New Cold War*, pp. 107–8.

69. "How the Leaders of the CPSU Have Allied Themselves with India Against China," *People's Daily*, Nov. 2, 1963.

70. Lt.-Gen. B. M. Kaul, *The Untold Story*, New Delhi, 1966, Chs. 2 and 3.

71. "China and the Asian Triangle," by C.S., *India Quarterly*, New Delhi, Summer 1967, p. 91.

72. *Ibid.*

73. *Ibid.*

74. *Ibid.*

75. See *The Hindu*, Oct. 29, 1962. Its New Delhi correspondent reported: "It was thought that at best the Russians would continue to adopt a neutralist attitude. All these hopes were dashed to the ground when . . . *Pravda* came out with an editorial wholeheartedly endorsing the Chinese stand. Enquiries made here show that the Soviet Premier, Mr. Khrushchev's letter to Mr. Nehru runs on exactly the same lines as the *Pravda* editorial. The reaction in the capital, not only in official circles but also among a section

of the Indian Communists, is one of dismay, and the Soviet attitude is regarded as not only unkind but even offensive."

76. *Pravda,* Nov. 7, 1962; *The Hindu,* Nov. 7, 1962.

77. *The Hindu,* Nov. 20, 1962.

78. *Ibid.,* Nov. 28, 1962.

79. *Mao Against Khrushchev,* p. 326.

80. *Ibid.,* pp. 327–33.

81. *Ibid.,* pp. 366–67.

82. It should be interesting to end this appraisal of the Sino-Indian border war with the following reflections by Galbraith on its consequence for India's relations with the outside world: "As a result of this episode, there has . . . been a radical change in Indian foreign policy. . . . The formal commitment to nonalignment has, of course, continued, and the United States has been very careful in the last two years not to force the Indians into any position where they would have to disavow their past policies. But, as Nehru once said, it is not entirely easy to be nonaligned against an invader. India as a result of the Chinese attack has had to be much more considerate toward its friends. It recognizes that safety against a Chinese attack depends greatly on American and British support; thus the prospect of alienating the Americans is not nearly so inviting now as it was when the risk of an attack was not considered imminent. . . .

"This greater caution has inevitably resulted in a considerable loss of influence. The Indians in the future will be a good deal more popular but a good deal less powerful. It would be interesting to speculate whether the Chinese had anticipated that a possible consequence of their attack would be the weakening of India's influence in world affairs." *Bulletin,* pp. 3–4.

83. Pakistan's then foreign minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, claimed this as a major gain for his country in the India-Pakistan talks brought about by Anglo-American efforts in Dec. 1962. See Bhutto's speeches in the Pakistan National Assembly in: Z. A. Bhutto, *Foreign Policy of Pakistan,* Pakistan Institute of International Relations, Karachi, 1964.

84. To the last of his days Nehru could not reconcile himself to the idea of joint India-Pakistan defense lest this might lead to the loss of the Kashmir Valley to Pakistan. We have noted this rejection of Ayub Khan's offer of joint defense provided a suitable machinery could be devised for an actual settlement of all outstanding disputes, notably Kashmir. *The Times* (Oct. 31, 1961) wrote editorially, obviously with the 1959 development in mind, "At the time of the suppression of the revolt in Tibet in 1959, senior Indian and Pakistani officers took the view that the differences between their countries over Kashmir should be dropped, as China was the real danger. On both sides there were those who favoured the signing of a defense pact. The Indian Government, however, considered that the differences with China would be settled by negotiations."

According to Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan, one of Ayub Khan's first actions after the rebuff from Nehru was to ask his aides to prepare a brief on the border issue between northern Kashmir and Sinkiang. "In due course the brief was put up to the President, and he gave instructions that they should open the conversations with Peking." "South Asia: A Perspective," p. 119.

After the war with China, Nehru expected the Western powers to help India defend Kashmir from the Chinese. One of his typical statements was: "Remember that at

present Srinagar offers the only way to reach Ladakh, and all our campaigns against China depend on the Kashmir Valley." *Overseas Hindustan Times*, Dec. 27, 1962. He also dismissed as "outrageous and unthinkable" the idea that the defense of Ladakh should be handed over to Pakistan. *Hindustan Times*, June 20, 1963.

85. The major diplomatic events leading to the Sino-Pakistan boundary agreement are as follows:

(From *Report of the Indian and Chinese Officials*, 1961) "Regarding the extent of the boundary to be considered at the Meeting of the Officials of the two countries, the Indian side also suggested that the boundaries between China and Sikkim, between China and Bhutan, and between China's Sinkiang and Kashmir west of the Karakoram pass, must be included. The Chinese side expressed its disagreement to this assertion. . . . As for the boundary west of the Karakoram pass . . . in view of the present actual situation in Kashmir, it was . . . inappropriate for . . . China and India to discuss the boundary west of the Karakoram pass between China's Sinkiang and Kashmir."

Indian note to Pakistan, May 10, 1962: "The Government of Pakistan are obviously not entitled to negotiate with China or any other country about territory that is not their own. . . . The Government of India will never agree to any arrangements, provisional or otherwise, between the Governments of China and Pakistan regarding territory which constitutes an inalienable part of the Indian Union."

Pakistan's reply, Aug. 9, 1962: "Such an agreement can in no way prejudice a peaceful and just settlement of the dispute between Pakistan and India over Kashmir—a dispute which remains unsettled since 1947 due solely to the refusal of the Government of India to honour their solemn pledge to the people of Kashmir, to Pakistan, and to the world."

Indian protest note to Pakistan, Mar. 13, 1965: "This collusive attempt to demarcate and annex part of the Indian Union territory in Jammu and Kashmir will never be accepted by the Government of India."

Pakistan rejected the Indian protest "completely" in a note on Apr. 20, 1965.

Indian note to China, May 10, 1962: "It is clear that . . . China [is] in this matter acting in furthering [its] aggressive designs and [is] seeking to exploit the troubled situation in Kashmir and India's differences with Pakistan for [its] advantage."

Chinese note to India, Feb. 2, 1963: ". . . the Chinese Government has never involved itself in the India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir; the Sino-Pakistan boundary negotiations and the related Agreement have not at all touched upon the question of the ownership of Kashmir. . . ."

Indian note to China, Mar. 2, 1963: ". . . no further proof is needed to show that the Chinese objective is to come to terms with Pakistan on the question of the ownership of Kashmir and to involve itself in its neighbours' dispute in the interests of its expansionist and chauvinistic policies."

Indian note to the Security Council, Mar. 16, 1963: "In view of the conflicting claims by Pakistan, it is not clear how much Indian territory Pakistan has unlawfully ceded to China, although it is known to be not less than 2,000 square miles."

Pakistan letter to the Security Council, Apr. 10, 1963: "It is a sombre irony that a move of this kind towards the insurance and consolidation

of peace in a large and sensitive region should be protested by the Government of India, a Government which has been so anxious to build for itself a reputation as a champion of peace."

For texts of these and other related documents, see *China, India, Pakistan*, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi, 1966, pp. 385–422.

86. *The Statesman*, Mar. 6, 1963.

87. Nehru said in his Parliament speech on Mar. 5, 1963, that "Pakistan has obviously surrendered over 13,000 square miles of territory."

Ayub Khan announced in a speech on Mar. 29 that "the Chinese Government had given away 750 sq. miles of their territory, which was still under the occupation of the Chinese Army." *China, India, Pakistan*, pp. 419 and 421.

Alastair Lamb has offered an explanation of this huge discrepancy between the Indian and Pakistani perspectives of the area involved in the agreement. "There can hardly be said to have been anything like a Sino-Pakistani border dispute. It is, perhaps, unfortunate, however, that the 1927 line never found its way on to British maps so that the boundary now agreed to looks on paper as if it has involved the surrender by Pakistan to China of a great deal of territory. All that has in fact been surrendered has been the theoretical advance boundary of the kind which Sir John Ardagh proposed in 1897." *The India-China Border*, Oxford University Press, for the Royal Institute of International Relations, 1964, p. 175.

It is interesting to note that the watershed theory to demarcate the Sino-Indian border applies best to northern Kashmir and Sinkiang and the worst to the MacMahon Line.

88. For text of the agreement, see *China, India, Pakistan*, pp. 377–83.

89. *Peking Review*, Mar. 15, 1963.

90. *Ibid.*, Mar. 6, 1964.

91. *Ibid.*

92. *The Observer*, June 16, 1963.

*Cf.*: "We were not even tempted to resort to a show of force during India's hour of humiliation and defeat in the autumn of 1962. That is sufficient evidence of Pakistan's peaceful intentions. I think very few countries would have restrained themselves, as Pakistan did, when India lay completely beaten by the armies of the People's Republic of China." *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, p. 4.

93. *Cf.*: "Pakistan's history was played out in the shadow of India's hostility, and together with the struggle for survival, Pakistan's external policy was directed at asserting its international personality and escaping diplomatic isolation by India." Wayne Wilcox, *India, Pakistan, and the Rise of China*, New York, 1964, p. 40.

94. *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, pp. 8–9.

95. Since 1963, Pakistan has taken the line at the UN and elsewhere that India exploits its dispute with China to get military aid from the West, which it can use only against Pakistan. Pakistani spokesmen have therefore decried the Chinese military threat to India and blamed India for the border impasse.

*Cf.*: "To our utter astonishment, instead of accepting this [Chinese offer to settle the border dispute peacefully] as the only sane course open to men of goodwill, India is persisting in its folly of whipping up frenzy against its neighbour, a colossus that cannot be destroyed, a neighbour that only asks for the rectification and adjustment of its border as a sovereign equal and not as a colonial vassal. China's call for the demarcation of the Sino-Indian boundary is not a capricious act. In that sense, it is unlike the ways followed

by imperialism since the map of Europe was redrawn at the great Congress of Vienna in 1815 to satisfy the personal ambitions of rulers and the territorial ambitions of powerful nations." *Ibid.*, pp. 16–17.

"But there is no reason why the People's Republic should embark upon a military action again. So far as the border question is concerned, they are in a favourable position. They are occupying the line which they thought would be a fair boundary. . . . If the Chinese desired anything beyond a negotiated border settlement, their opportunity was there, but they decided not to go forward. . . ." *South Asia: A Perspective.*

"For the Chinese, to use Tibet as a base for a major operation for the conquest of India is again military nonsense because of the enormous height of Tibet, which is 18,000 ft. There are two routes leading from mainland China to Tibet. . . . Eighteen thousand feet is almost an intolerable height for human beings to live at. I do not think that roads at that height could be usable for more than two months in a year. Therefore a war between India and China is an utter military impossibility." Ayub Khan, in an address at the Pakistan Institute of International Relations; *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (1965) pp. 17–18.

96. *The New York Times*, Nov. 24, 1962. Ayub Khan described the Sino-Indian war as a "border dispute and not a war."

97. Washington *Post*, Dec. 10, 1963. Bhutto also said that as far as India was concerned, "it is a question of two giants of Asia feeling their pride hurt." In a speech at the National Assembly, Bhutto suggested, ". . . the answer for both India and Pakistan lies in finding some sort of equation between ourselves without jeopardizing our friendship with China."

98. See Chou En-lai's press conference at Dacca in *Peking Review*, Mar. 6, 1964.

99. In Pakistan, there was considerable talk in 1962 of a nonaggression pact with China. It seems that an offer of such a pact did come from Peking. *Dawn* reported that the nonaggression pact proposed by China included an offer of aid "against aggression from any quarter" while not requiring that Pakistan cut its ties with the West. *The New York Times*, Nov. 25, 1962. The *Times* correspondent said that "militarily, a Chinese-Pakistani understanding might smooth the way for a Chinese strike at India from a new sector, the Chumbi Valley." This is where the Chinese threatened to strike during the India-Pakistan war.

Bhutto told the National Assembly on Nov. 26 that Pakistan would not join India in any action against China even if the Kashmir dispute were settled amicably. "There is no condition to our friendship with China. Our friendship with the Chinese People's Republic is fundamental." *The New York Times*, Nov. 27, 1962.

In a speech in the National Assembly, on July 17, 1963, Bhutto warned that an attack on Pakistan by India would involve "the largest state in Asia," obviously China. *The New York Times*, July 18, 1963. The *Times* correspondent added that this was the first Pakistani statement that China would assist her in case of aggression. Parliamentary circles believed that Bhutto's remarks "implied an understanding between Rawalpindi and Peking on mutual defense."

In India, Foreign Office spokesman commented that the "openly announced collaboration" between China and Pakistan, coupled with reports of massive Chinese military buildup along the northern border, were "causing concern" to the Indian Government. Bhutto's statement "con-

firmed" the existence of a "secret military pact" between China and Pakistan. *The New York Times*, July 26, 1963. Also see *Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 9, 1963.

The *Christian Science Monitor* reported in June that "despite improved Pakistani relations with Communist China, some fear of international Communism remains in Pakistan, and the feeling here is that better relations with Afghanistan and Pakistan will thwart the drive of the Communists toward the subcontinent." Whoever might have briefed the correspondent obviously had the USSR in mind.

100. Also in Jan. 1963, China offered Pakistan long-term credit in hard currency. In the following weeks sporting and youth teams were exchanged. In June, Bhutto presented the Chinese ambassador five hundred copies of the Koran and sixty-three works of the poet Mohammed Iqbal. In August a number of Chinese trade delegations arrived in Pakistan, coinciding with the visit of George Ball, and on Sep. 1, Pakistan and China signed a trade agreement exchanging jute for cement. In Mar. 1964, Chou En-lai, accompanied by Ch'en Yi, paid a visit to both wings of Pakistan.

101. *The New York Times*, Sept. 4, 1963.

102. *Ibid.*, Aug. 13, 1963.

103. *Peking Review*, No. 15, Apr. 9, 1965.

104. *Ibid.*, No. 24, June 11, 1965.

105. For text of the CCP letter, see William E. Griffith, *The Sino-Soviet Rift*, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1964, pp. 259–88; also, *Peking Review*, No. 25, June 21, 1963.

106. "The Fighting Task Confronting Workers in Philosophy and Social Sciences," in *Peking Review*, No. 1, Jan. 3, 1963.

107. The Sino-Soviet rivalries began to be reflected with increasing attrition on such platforms as the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization.

108. *Cf.*: "Though a late starter in the race to build India up militarily, the Soviet Union has already overtaken its main rival . . . in the period since India provoked a major conflict on the Sino-Indian borders in 1962, [the USSR] has committed itself to slightly more military aid to India than has the United States. . . ." *Peking Review*, Mar. 29, 1964.

"It is clear that the Soviet leaders and the Indian reactionaries are bedfellows in opposing China," *Peking Review*, No. 28, June 4, 1965.

"On the pretext of meeting a 'nuclear menace from China,' New Delhi is forming an open military alliance with U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism directed against China and other neighbours." *Peking Review*, No. 17, Apr. 21, 1967.

"Asia, not Europe, is now the focal point for U.S. aggression. . . . Confrontation with China, instead of the Soviet Union, is the military strategy Washington now subscribes to. . . . As part of this strategy, a U.S.-dominated anti-China front is being pushed up." *Peking Review*, Feb. 11, 1966.

"The policy of the leaders of the CPSU is to unite with U.S. imperialists and the reactionaries of various countries in forging a counter-revolutionary ring of encirclement against China." *Peking Review*, Feb. 18, 1966.

109. Letter from the CPSU to the CCP of Nov. 29, 1963, in *Peking Review*, May 8, 1964.

110. For Mao's statement to the Japanese delegation, see *Sekai Shuho*, Tokyo, Aug. 11, 1964, trans. in Dennis J. Doolin, *Territorial Claims in the Sino-Soviet Conflict*," Hoover Institute Studies, No. 7 (1965), pp. 42–44.

Of particular significance is Mao's reference to Sinkiang. He was obviously suggesting that there had been

Soviet attempts to foment trouble in Sinkiang, if not to detach it from China. Allen S. Whiting has reported a Russian attempt, on the eve of the Communist take-over in Peking, to persuade the Kuomintang General T'ao Shih-T'ao to declare Sinkiang independent, on the precedent of Outer Mongolia; "following victory by the Reds, Sinkiang could be incorporated into a federal republic." According to Whiting, the Russians told General T'ao, "If you will do this, we will order the Chinese Communists not to continue their advance into Sinkiang." Whiting adds, "The only condition allegedly attached was removal of a regimental commander hostile to Soviet influence." Allen S. Whiting, *Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot?*, Michigan State University Press, East Lansing, 1958, p. 117.

111. "Refutation of the New Leaders of the CPSU on 'United Action,'" by the editorial departments of *People's Daily* and *Red Flag*, in *Peking Review*, Nov. 12, 1965.

112. *Peking Review*, Mar. 29, 1964.

113. *Ibid.*, Sept. 16, 1964.

114. *Ibid.*, Oct. 16, 1964.

115. For the text of the Chinese Government statement, see *ibid.*

116. *Ibid.*, Jan. 1, 1965. Chou repeated the Chinese claim to 90,000 square miles of territory south of the MacMahon Line.

117. "Why Khrushchev Fell," *Red Flag* editorial, Nov. 21, 1964, in *Peking Review*, Nov. 27, 1964.

118. "New Delhi Reaction Strips Off Mask," Commentator, in *People's Daily*, *Peking Review*, Jan. 22, 1965.

119. "Expose the Essence of India's 'New Proposal,'" Observer, in *People's Daily*, May 8, 1965, in *Peking Review*, May 14, 1965.

120. Much of the attack, by Observer in *People's Daily*, May 27, 1965, was directed against the new leaders of the CPSU. Soviet and American aid was linked as a "reward" for India's "anti-China" policy.

It should be noted that 1965 was the year of a split in the Chinese Communist elite on foreign policy; there was evidently a section that did not favor a complete split with Moscow. See the interesting editorial in *People's Daily* on Feb. 14, 1965, on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of the signing of the Sino-Soviet treaty of alliance. "Today U.S. imperialism is still afraid of the treaty and is trying by hook or by crook to undermine it. What the enemy fears is precisely what we treasure. We will continue to make the treaty play its part in the struggle against U.S. imperialism and its stooges." *Peking Review*, Feb. 19, 1965. At a Soviet embassy function Ch'en Yi remarked, "Only by concrete action against U.S. imperialism and its followers can the Sino-Soviet alliance be tested and tempered." *Peking Review, ibid.* These two formulations probably reflect the two main schools of thought.

121. In a dispatch, *Hsinhua* blamed India for provoking the armed clashes. This was the first Chinese intervention in an India-Pakistan territorial dispute, and the first support Peking gave to Pakistan. *Peking Review*, May 14, 1965.

122. *Ibid.*, Aug. 13, 1965.

123. *Foreign Policy of Pakistan*, p. 28.

124. For text of the speech, see *Peking Review*, Feb. 28, 1964. *People's Daily*, in an editorial on Mar. 3, argued that Pakistan, Burma, and Ceylon were more truly neutral than countries like India. The main theme in the joint communique on Chou-Ayub Khan talks (text in *Peking Review*, Feb. 28, 1964) was Pakistan's emergence as a major Afro-Asian nation.

It is interesting to note how the Western press reacted to Chou En-lai's first really "friendship" visit to Pakistan: the situation in the subcontinent had changed vastly since his first visit in 1956. *The Times* in a previsit dispatch from Rawalpindi said

the Pakistan Government was approaching the visit "with more wariness than enthusiasm." Its "restrained approach" did not reflect "a loss of confidence in the value" of China's friendship but "rather expresses a reservation of that policy." For Pakistan "the road to Peking must detour around Washington." *The Times*, Feb. 18, 1964. In a second report on Feb. 21, *The Times* correspondent said Ayub Khan would not like to do anything to undermine the "support" it had only recently received from Britain and the US during the Security Council debate on Kashmir. On the twenty-fourth, the paper reported that the Pakistanis were satisfied with Chou En-lai's observations on the Kashmir issue and regarded the new Chinese stand to be an improvement on its previous position. Ch'en-Yi was reported to have told Pakistani journalists: "Pakistan and China will remain friends even after you take Kashmir and we get Formosa." *The New York Times* reported on Feb. 25 that while Pakistan had gained something "concrete from China—public support for Pakistan's position on Kashmir—it gave China nothing it had not given before."

125. *Peking Review*, Mar. 5, 1965.

126. *Ibid.*

127. *Ibid.*, Apr. 2, 1965. The two foreign ministers signed a cultural collaboration agreement too, covering education, art, culture, journalism, and other fields. Ch'en Yi also paid a visit to Afghanistan; welcoming him, the Afghan deputy premier described an already offered Chinese loan to his country as an indication of China's "sincere concern" for the development of Asian and African countries. *Ibid.*

128. *Peking Review*, June 11, 1965. The arrival was "the scene of a tremendous welcome from tens of thousands of Pakistani people." Evidently, Chinese support for Pakistan during its Rann of Kutch conflict with India had built the image of China as a valuable friend.

129. *Ibid.*, July 29, 1965. It is not clear whether Chou had been able to persuade Pakistan to support the Chinese campaign to keep the USSR out of the Algiers conference. The postponement of the conference following the Algerian *coup d'etat* and the overthrow of Ben Bella prevented a decision from being taken on this crucial issue before the meeting.

130. *Ibid.*, July 23, 1965.

131. In 1948, India did not appear to have ruled out the alternative of an independent Kashmir. *Cf.*: "The question of the future status of Kashmir vis-a-vis her neighbours and the world at large, and a further question, namely, whether she should withdraw from her accession to India and either accede to Pakistan or *remain independent with a right to claim admission as a member of the United Nations*—all this we have recognized to be a matter for unfettered decision by the people of Kashmir after normal life is restored to them." Gopalaswamy Ayyanger, speech at the Security Council on Jan. 15, 1948, quoted in "Special Report on Kashmir, Pt. II," by N. C., *Mainstream*, Oct. 21, 1967. [Italics added.]

132. It is difficult to measure Sheikh Abdullah's impact on the 1965 Kashmir crisis or even his role as a charismatic leader of the Kashmiri people. In a way he seems to symbolize the Indian dilemma in Kashmir. At one time Sheikh Abdullah was the symbol of the secular qualities of Kashmiri politics. His socioeconomic views were regarded to be even radical. Then in 1953 he was arrested and imprisoned on the charge of unspecified conspiracy to "sell out" Kashmir. He was not put on trial, and the conspiracy charge was dropped in 1964. He stayed with Nehru when he came to New Delhi, and their talks were sufficient for Nehru to depute him to Pakistan for similar

talks with Ayub Khan. Thus Sheikh Abdullah was cast in the exciting role of a mediator and a reconciliator between India and Pakistan. During his prison years he had become a hero in Pakistan and in Kashmir, and a nonhero in India; now he had behind him an articulate section of the Indian public that wanted a settlement of the Kashmir issue. Abdullah's own views on Kashmir, at least those he gave out publicly, were far from precise; however, he insisted that a settlement must rest on an agreement between India and Pakistan. He got a rousing welcome on his first ever visit to Pakistan on May 25, 1964. The next day he met Ayub Khan, and he announced after the meeting that Ayub and Nehru "may meet" in Delhi in the third week of June to discuss Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah was still in Pakistan when Nehru died on May 27. Returning to Delhi, Abdullah expressed the hope that Nehru's successor would pursue the course of action Nehru had opened before his death. On June 3, Abdullah reported to Lal Bahadur Shastri on his talks with Ayub Khan, and in July he conversed with the Indian minister for external affairs in Srinagar. Increasing unrest in Kashmir apparently put the Shastri regime on the defensive, and in the coming months a tone of frustrated anger could be noticed in Sheikh Abdullah's speeches. His meeting with Chou En-lai in Algiers came as a surprise to Indians. *The Times* reported on Mar. 19, 1965: "Sheikh Abdullah did not find Pakistan's relation with China a complication; no increase in friendship, he thought, could complicate anything. As for Pakistan's border settlement with China, President Ayub had told him that he had himself shown Mr. Nehru the line of demarcation he had proposed to negotiate, and Mr. Nehru had said this would be 'a wonderful solution,' if he could get Chinese agreement. In any case the agreement was provisional, pending a Kashmir settlement, so Indian protests . . . were pointless." It is entirely possible that Sheikh Abdullah met Chou En-lai in pursuit of his image as a reconciliator of differences between Asian neighbors. His position in India was made worse by the chorus of approval of the meeting in Pakistan, and by Bhutto's offer of a Pakistani passport if he wished to travel to China. He told an Indian journalist later that his first action on return to India would have been to report to Shastri on his talks with Chou. However, he was arrested at the airport and imprisoned for two more years. He was released in 1967. For Sheikh Abdullah's views on Kashmir, see his article in *Foreign Affairs*, Apr. 1965. For an assessment of his role in the current phase of the Kashmir issue, see "Special Report on Kashmir," Sept. 30 and Oct. 21, 1967.

133. *The Statesman*, Aug. 16, 1965.

134. *Ibid.*, Sept. 7, 1965.

135. *Dawn*, Sept. 7, 1965.

136. *Ibid.*, Sept. 8, 1965.

137. *The New York Times*, Sept. 7, 1965. The cancellation of the shipment to Pakistan was announced by the US ambassador to India, Chester Bowles. *The Statesman*, Sept. 7, 1965.

138. *Dawn*, Sept. 15, 1965.

139. Chavan announced in the Lok Sabha: "We have no quarrel with East Pakistan and while our troops have taken up positions within our territory, at the present moment I do not visualise our taking any action to escalate the war in that field unless, of course, the rulers of Pakistan compel us to do so. . . ." He was, in effect, treating East Pakistan as a separate entity. *The Statesman*, Sept. 9, 1965.

140. Pakistan alleged that India had moved a brigade from the Aksai Chin area and a division from NEFA "armed and equipped by the United States

and some Commonwealth countries" for use against China, to reinforce its six divisions thrown into the India-Pakistan war. Thus was revealed the crude irony of American military assistance to both Pakistan and India. Arms given for the explicit purpose of resisting Chinese aggression were used by both sides to fight each other. For the Pakistani version of the Indian use of American arms, see *Dawn*, Sept. 9, 1965.

141. See Leo Heiman, "Lessons from the War in Kashmir," in *Military Review*, Kansas, Feb. 1966.

142. *Dawn*, Sept. 23, 1965.

143. *Christian Science Monitor*, Oct. 29, 1965.

144. Pakistan Radio broadcast an appeal to the Sikh community in India, which said in part: "The Sikhs and the people of Pakistan have both been victims of the vile and aggressive designs of the Indian rulers. No people can be more conscious of the aspirations of the Sikhs than we . . . we are determined that our affinity with the Sikhs based on the common aspiration of undoing Indian hegemony is not disturbed." Karachi domestic service in English, 0810 hrs. GMT, Sept. 7, 1965. The appeal was repeated many times during the war.

145. The war had, however, a political impact on both Punjab and East Pakistan. The Indian authorities had to bend to the Sikh demand for a Punjabi-speaking state in which the Sikhs would form a majority. In 1966, Punjab, already partitioned between India and Pakistan in 1947, was divided up once again into Punjab and Hariana. In East Pakistan, the demand for autonomy gathered strength and led to widespread mob violence in 1969, forcing Ayub Khan to relinquish office.

146. BBB Overseas Service in English, 0545 hrs. Indian Standard Time, Sept. 23, 1965. The correspondent pointed out that "historically, of course, it is unprecedented for the Russians to act as mediators on the Indian subcontinent or indeed anywhere outside the Communist bloc."

147. Interestingly, while the Afghan Government adopted a neutralist stance on the India-Pakistan war, Kabul Radio put out several reports of fighting between Pakistani troops and Pakhtoon tribesmen on the northwest frontier of the subcontinent. *Hindustan Times*, Sept. 8, 1965; Kabul Radio domestic service in Pushto, 1530 hrs. GMT, Sept. 7, and External Service in English, 1400 hrs. GMT, Sept. 9.

Next to China, Pakistan's main support came from Indonesia. On Sept. 9, mobs attacked the Indian embassy in Jakarta. On Sept. 16, the Soviet Union reportedly expressed its displeasure at Jakarta's readiness to supply arms and other material to Pakistan. *The Statesman*, Sept. 17, 1965.

148. On Sept. 8, the US Government expressed "considerable surprise and annoyance" at Ayub Khan's attempt to use American military aid as a "psychological lever to force a settlement on Kashmir with India." *Information Service of India*, Sept. 12, 1965.

149. In its domestic services Moscow Radio freely used the word *war*. It also told the Russian people that the root cause of the war was Kashmir. "Commentators' Roundtable," 1300 hrs. GMT, Sept. 12, 1965.

150. The letter was released on Sept. 11 (for text, see *The Statesman*, Sept. 12, 1965). It was evidently prompted by the Pakistani attack in Jammu, which also activated the Security Council.

151. Tass International Service in English, 0615 hrs. GMT, Sept. 5, 1965.

152. *Peking Review*, Sept. 10, 1965 and *Dawn*, Sept. 5, 1965. Note Ch'en Yi's remark: "Indian papers have

joined the Western press in linking any struggle for freedom and independence in the world with China, alleging that it is instigated by China which supplies arms and trains cadres. By doing so, they give China the honor of supporting all struggles of freedom, independence and liberation. But China has neither the ability nor the qualifications yet to accept such honor."

153. For text, see *ibid.* The Chinese statement linked the Indian "aggression" against Pakistan with continued Indian "aggressive occupation" of Chinese territory on the Sino-Sikkim border as well as "intrusions and harassment of Chinese territory in the western sector." This was an ominous indication of possible Chinese action on the Sikkim-Indian-Chinese border. The Government statement was broadcast in all Peking services for twenty-four hours.

In other Peking Radio broadcasts on Sept. 7, it was alleged that the Pakistan public had "condemned" the Security Council Resolution of Sept. 4, and that in the debate the Soviet delegate "chimed in with India," and that "India had used its U.S.-equipped mountain divisions in Kashmir against Pakistan." The US "let down" of Pakistan was stressed. "For the past 18 years the UN has never bothered itself with India's expansion and provocations in Kashmir. . . . On Aug. 14, the UN continued to keep silent about India's crossing of the cease-fire line in Kashmir. But when Pakistan made a counter-attack, the UN Security Council became suddenly active. The U.S.-dominated United Nations' obviously partial stand of siding with India . . . is as clear as daylight." New China News Agency International Service in English 1921 hrs. GMT, Sept. 7, and 2025 GMT Sept. 8, 1965.

154. Tass International Service, in English, 2022 hrs. GMT, Sept. 7, 1965.

155. For text see *Peking Review*, Sept. 10, 1965.

156. New China News Agency International Service, Sept. 9, 1965. The note to India was given "pride of place" in all Peking newspapers.

157. *Peking Review*, Sept. 17, 1965. The speech went unreported in the Indian press. A check by the writer showed that it was not covered by any of the international news agencies.

158. *Peking Review*, Sept. 17, 1967. The Indian chargé d'affaires walked out of the reception. *The Statesman*, Sept. 11, 1965.

159. NCNA International Service, Sept. 10, 1965.

160. *Cf.*: ". . . during the recent Security Council discussion on the India-Pakistan armed conflict, the Soviet delegate voted for the resolution drawn up in accordance with U Thant's biased report. Reporting the matter, AFP said that this was 'a rare show of American-Soviet unity. The Soviet Union has shown its good faith by abstaining for the first time from putting its veto to a Security Council resolution on Kashmir.'" NCNA International Service, Sept. 10, 1965.

161. Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, 1100 hrs. GMT, Sept. 10, 1965.

162. For the text of Shastri's statement, see *The Statesman*, Sept. 16, 1965, and for that of Thant's letter, *ibid.*, Sept. 17.

163. Tass International Service in English, 1311 hrs. GMT, Sept. 13, 1965.

164. New Delhi Radio interpreted that the Tass warning was meant for China. A spokesman of the Indian foreign office declared that the supply by any country of arms to Pakistan would be regarded by India as a hostile action. *The Statesman*, Sept. 16, 1965.

165. *Ibid.*, Sept. 14, 1965.

166. *Dawn*, Sept. 15 and 17, 1965.

167. *Ibid.*, Sept. 17, 1965.

168. For the text of the Chinese note, see *Peking Review*, Sept. 24, 1965.

The Chinese note was delivered after the Indian Government had come close to accepting Thant's cease-fire proposals. For the Thant-Shastri correspondence, see *The Statesman*, Sept. 17. Moscow Radio reported Thant's mission to India and Pakistan and recognized that the UN was trying to play a positive role in the conflict. Tass International Service in English, 1840 hrs. GMT, Sept. 14 through 17, 1965.

Belgrade Radio had this to report on the Soviet reaction to the Chinese ultimatum: "The Chinese attitude to the India-Pakistan conflict has been received with dissatisfaction in Moscow. After a long period, today's Soviet papers inform their readers of China's unfavorable attitude towards efforts to reach an agreement and restore peace on the India-Pakistan border. *Izvestia* in particular stresses that Chinese papers publish NCNA statements which distort the Soviet position on the India-Pakistan conflict." Tanyug International Service in English, 1315 hrs. GMT, Sept. 16, 1965.

In Moscow, the Indian ambassador had a meeting, at his own request, with Kosygin on Sept. 17.

169. BBC Radio Newsreel, 1915 hrs. Indian Standard Time, Sept. 20, 1965.

170. The Indian note was broadcast over Peking Radio, NCNA International Service, 0908 hrs. GMT, Sept. 19, 1965. No Chinese note was, however, broadcast in full over the network of All-India Radio.

171. The American ambassador, the British high commissioner, and the Soviet charge d'affaires called on Ayub Khan separately on Sept. 20. *Dawn*, Sept. 21, 1965.

172. *The New York Times*, Sept. 18, 1965.

173. *Ibid.*

174. Tass International Service in English, 0713 hrs. GMT, Sept. 19, 1965.

175. Thant had already proposed a summit meeting between India and Pakistan during his visit to the subcontinent. *The Statesman*, Sept. 17, 1965. There was no reply from India. Ayub's reply was in the negative. *Dawn*, Sept. 18, 1965.

176. For the text of the resolution, see *The New York Times*, Sept. 20, 1965. There were ten votes in favor. Only the Dutch delegate abstained.

177. There was evidently some strong opposition to Ayub's acceptance of the cease-fire resolution. See *The Times*, Oct. 18, 1965.

178. "Who Backs the Indian Aggressors?," in *Peking Review*, Sept. 24, 1965.

179. NCNA International Service, 2021 hrs. GMT, Sept. 18, 1965.

180. "U.N.—Sanctuary for the Indian Aggressor," *Peking Review*, Sept. 17, 1965.

181. For text of the note, see *ibid.*, Sept. 24, 1965.

182. *The Times*, Oct. 17, 1965. The correspondent wrote: "But the essential factor in Pakistan's military posture is that her stamina in war is limited not by her own capacities but by the Pentagon. Not only the numbers of her front line tanks and aircraft are set in Washington but also the level of the supplies for them than can be accumulated. That level is secret but is believed to be in the region of 30 days in war conditions. By September 22, Pakistan's reserves might not have been running low [although the Pakistan army had been extravagant in the use of artillery and in the last week, orders were issued forbidding counter-battery fire] but after another ten days they would have been."

Also see Selig Harrison's report in the Washington *Post*, Oct. 16, 1965:

"It is not generally realized even in the armed forces that the United States has limited Pakistan to a thirty-day ration in ammunition and even a shorter supply line in rockets, missiles and other air force items. American military advisers suspect that practice ammunition may have been hoarded over the years and that Pakistan may have had more than a 30-day supply of some items when the war broke out. Rifle and small arms ammunition are made at home. Turkey manufactures military shells which Pakistan has been getting. But in critical categories such as armor-piercing warheads for the 90mm guns on its Pattons, the Pakistan army is totally beholden to the U.S. The arms aid suspension literally made it impossible for Pakistan to carry on a protracted mechanized war."

183. *Dawn*, Sept. 20, 1965.

184. *Ibid.*, Sept. 21, 1965.

185. *The Statesman*, Sept. 23, 1965. *The Times of India* reported on Sept. 19 that the Indian Government had discussed the "possibility of military assistance from the U.S., the Soviet Union and Britain" in the event of war with China.

186. *The New York Times*, Sept. 22, 1965.

This is how Radio Pakistan reacted to the Indian acceptance: "Political observers at the United Nations headquarters in New York have contrasted India's anxious pleadings for an immediate cease-fire with the bravado with which it launched its ill-fated invasion of Pakistan a fortnight back. At that time the Indian Parliament had received with applause the news given by the Indian War Minister of the attack on Pakistan. Today, because of the terrible mauling which the Indian army has received from the Pakistan forces, the Indian warlords are having second thoughts." Karachi Domestic Service in English, 1500 hrs. GMT, Sept. 20, 1965.

187. Kabul Radio External Service in English, 1410 hrs. GMT, Sept. 20, 1965.

Between Sept. 8 and 21, Peking Radio played up the impact of the Chinese ultimatum to India on various world capitals. It had "thrown the U.S. officials into intense activities in an atmosphere of tension," caused "deep concern" to President Johnson, "brought the U.S., the Soviet Union, Britain and India in constant touch" on the "extent of help in arms" that India could be given. NCNA International Service in English, Sept. 18 and 19.

The Chinese themselves did not describe their note of Sept. 17 as an ultimatum in any of the official communications. On Sept. 21, Peking Radio said, "*Izvestia* alleged that "the Chinese note was an ultimatum." English, 1930 hrs. Indian Standard Time, Sept. 21.

Peking propaganda also tried to play up Pakistani resentment at Soviet policy. NCNA, Sept. 20, 1965.

188. For the text of Bhutto's speech, see *Dawn*, Sept. 23, 1965.

Bhutto made a highly emotional speech and was more than once almost in tears. The BBC correspondent at the UN said: "Mr. Bhutto's speech obviously left a very deep impression. Many regarded it as the best ever made in UN history." BBB Overseas Service, 1630 hrs. Indian Standard Time, Sept. 22, 1965.

Serious anti-American riots broke out in Karachi on Sept. 21. British and UN establishments were also attacked. The BBC correspondent in Karachi who had "watched the mob in action" reported that "there were clear signs of excellent organization behind the demonstration." The demonstrators carried portraits of Chou En-lai and Sukarno. " 'We want war, we want victory,' was the com-

mon cry." BBC Newsreel, 1945 hrs. Indian Standard Time, Sept. 21, 1965.

189. The Soviet proposal offering Tashkent as the venue for an India-Pakistan summit was broadcast over Moscow Radio on Sept. 19. For text, see *The Statesman*, Sept. 20, 1965. Also, *The New York Times* of the same date.

190. Nikelay Ilyashenko's commentary to South Asia, 1600 hrs. GMT, Sept. 21, 1965.

While reporting the Security Council meeting of Sept. 22, Moscow Radio completely ignored Bhutto's speech except to note that he announced his government's acceptance of the cease-fire.

191. *The New York Times*, Sept. 14, 1965.

192. Pakistan's reply also wanted Kosygin to be associated with the projected negotiations from the beginning. *Dawn*, Sept. 24, 1965. Shastri announced in Parliament: "I should like to inform the House that on Sept. 18, 1965, I received a message from Mr. Kosygin, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, offering his good offices for bringing about improved relations. Mr. Kosygin is impelled by a noble intention. No one can ever contest the view that ultimately India and Pakistan will have to live together as peaceful neighbours. We cannot therefore say no to any effort which may help bring about such a situation, made by those who are sincere and genuine in their feelings of goodwill and friendship. I have therefore informed Mr. Kosygin today [Sept. 23] that we would welcome his efforts and good offices." *The Statesman*, Sept. 24, 1965.

Peking Radio reported Kosygin's letters to Shastri and Ayub Khan proposing the Tashkent meeting, with this comment: "It is known to all that the Soviet leaders take a highly partial stand on the Kashmir question. They have always sided with India and opposed Pakistan and denied the people of Kashmir the right of self-determination. . . . Kosygin's message shows that the Soviet leaders are anxious to lay their interfering hands on the India-Pakistan conflict." NCNA International Service in English, 2104 GMT, Sept. 19, 1965.

On Sept. 23, *Pravda*, in a report on the Sino-Indian border, traced developments from Sept. 9 to 21. Among the events it listed prominently were Chou En-lai's speech to the State Council on Sept. 9, in which he had accused India of having "set afoot a large scale armed offensive against Pakistan," and the Chinese note to India of Sept. 17. *Pravda's* comment on the note was: "According to foreign news agencies, the delivery of the CPR representative of the above-mentioned note was accompanied by movements and concentrations of Chinese armed forces on the Indian border."

NCNA reported the text of the *Pravda* article and Peking Radio broadcast it with this comment: "One can see clearly from the *Pravda* report that the Soviet leadership stands completely on the side of the Indian reactionaries, support their aggression against China, and vilify China." Peking Radio NCNA International Service, 2109 hrs. GMT, Sept. 23, 1965.

It is interesting to note how Moscow media projected the India-Pakistan war and the Soviet role in it to radio listeners in Africa and Asia. E. Evanov, in a French broadcast to Africa on Sept. 8, stressed Soviet efforts to settle border problems peacefully, and added: "Any frontier dispute between the young states of Asia and Africa can only play in the hands of the colonisers. . . . In the India-Pakistan dispute also the Soviet Union takes a stand in favor of peaceful solution as far as possible taking into account the interest of

both sides." This was evidently an effort to counter the effect of Chinese and Pakistani propaganda that the Soviets were working against the Kashmiri's right of self-determination. Moscow, 1800 hrs. GMT, Sept. 8, 1965.

In a commentary for South Asia in English on Sept. 9, V. Ilyashenko referred to "certain other forces" which were also "seeking to profit from the sufferings and misery of the Indian and Pakistani peoples." The reference obviously was to China. The Soviet Union was against the formation of "another tension spot" in Asia. Moscow, 1600 hrs. GMT, Sept. 9, 1965.

193. *Peking Review*, Sept. 24, 1965. See the photos and charts as well as the Chinese story of how "intruding" Indian troops had "hurriedly and surreptitiously" demolished the military works. It is somewhat remarkable that *Peking Review* of Sept. 24 should be able to carry the report of what was alleged to have happened in the distant Sikkim border only in the night of Sept. 20.

Later the Chinese claimed that some of the barracks had not been dismantled "at all." *Ibid.*, Oct. 1, 1965.

194. For text of Ayub's broadcast to the nation, see *Dawn*, Sept. 23, 1965. In a reference to China, he said, "The moral support which the Chinese Government has extended to us, so willingly and so generously, will forever remain enshrined in our heart."

195. At the same time, Chinese Communist military strategy seems to have made an impact on strategic thinking in Pakistan. A Pakistani strategical analyst writes: "While we are not directly concerned with the subtleties and controversies of the various military doctrines currently being debated in the West, the application of Mao's theories of protracted conflict and guerrilla warfare to our defence problems has an obvious significance." Inamul Haque, "Current Strategic Thinking in Pakistan," *Pakistan Horizon*, No. 2 (1964), pp. 137–38.

Pakistan's fear of an India strengthened by American and Soviet aid is also reflected in that country's opposition to the stationing of units of the US Seventh Fleet in the Indian Ocean. See Rashid Ahmed Khan, "Strategy in the Indian Ocean," *Pakistan Horizon*, No. 3, 1965.

196. Tass International Service in English, 1435 hrs. GMT, Jan. 5, 1966.

197. *Ibid.*

198. *Pravda*, Jan. 5, 1966.

199. *Ibid.*

200. *Ibid.*

201. Tass International Service in English, 1522 hrs. GMT, Jan. 6, 1966.

202. *Ibid.*

203. Tass International Service in English, 1511 hrs. GMT, Jan. 8, 1966.

204. *Ibid.*

205. *Dawn*, Jan. 9, 1966.

206. Tass International Service in English, 0857 and 1637 hrs. GMT, Jan. 9, 1966. All-India Radio domestic service in English, 2100 hrs. Indian Standard Time, Jan. 10, 1966.

207. *Cf.*: "Kashmir continues to be the basic problem between India and Pakistan, and as long as this is not settled, peace cannot be maintained in the subcontinent. Lal Bahadur Shastri had accepted our viewpoint but said that first of all relations between the two countries should be normalized and after that we could settle our disputes." *Dawn*, Jan. 15, 1966.

208. *Pravda*, Jan. 11, 1966.

209. *The Times* of London, Mar. 7, 1966.

210. Lonis Dupree, "Further Reflections on the Second Kashmir War," *American Universities Field Staff Reports Service*, South Asia Series, Vol. X, No. 3, p. 15.

211. See *The Times*'s correspondent's

dispatch in the paper of Oct. 18, 1965.

212. NCNA International Service, Jan. 11, 1966.

213. For the text of the Chinese note, see *Peking Review*, May 20, 1966.

214. *Peking Review*, Apr. 1, 1966.

215. *Ibid.*

216. *Ibid.*

## CHAPTER 5

1. Jawaharlal Nehru, "Changing India," *Foreign Affairs*, Apr. 1963, p. 463.

2. The three opposition leaders elected were M. R. Masani, of the Swatantra (Freedom) party, J. B. Kripalani, a former Congress president, and Ram Manohar Lohia, of the Sunyukta (United) Socialist party. *The New York Times*, June 15 and 16, 1963.

3. *Pravda*, May 8, 1963.

4. *Izvestia*, June 5, 1963.

5. *The New York Times*, Aug. 2, 1963.

6. *Pravda*, Aug. 10, 1963.

7. *Ibid.*, Dec. 7, 1963. *New Times*, No. 37, 1963. This was the first and the last time that Shastri was criticized in the Soviet press.

8. *Pravda*, Dec. 7, 1963.

9. William White, *The Professional: Lyndon B. Johnson*, New York, 1964, p. 155.

10. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.: *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House*, Boston, 1965, p. 523.

11. *The Statesman*, Aug. 24 and 29, 1961.

12. *A Thousand Days*, pp. 522–32.

13. *The Awakened East*, Vols. I and II, Moscow, 1961; *Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism*, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960, pp. 506–12.

14. *Mirovaiia ekonomika*, No. 5, May 1962, in *JPRS* No. 14552.

15. Thomas Thornton, *The Third World in Communist Perspective*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1965, pp. 278–79.

16. *Kommunist*, No. 13, 1962, in *CDSP*, Nov. 7, 1962.

17. Vladimir Pavlov, *India: Economic Freedom Versus Imperialism*, People's Publishing House, New Delhi, 1963, p. 64.

18. *Mirovaiia ekonomika*, No. 6 (1964), pp. 62–68.

19. K. Ivanov, "The National Liberation Movement and the Noncapitalist Path of Development," *International Affairs*, Dec. 1964, p. 12.

In 1964, Soviet scholars, while acknowledging that India was developing along the capitalist path, were still emphasizing the progressive character of its economy in comparison with Pakistan's. *Cf.*: "India is a very typical example of a former colonial country which has taken the path of industrial development within the world capitalist system. She meets enormous difficulties in this path due to her colonial past and the resistance put up by imperialism and internal reaction, which are hindering the development of an independent economy. However, basing herself on her sovereignty and independent national policy, India has scored important successes in laying the foundations of her economic independence. . . . A comparison of the results of industrial development in India and Pakistan shows that additional difficulties lie in the way of those young states who in their economic programmes fully orientate themselves toward the 'aid' and 'support' of their former colonisers and other imperialist powers. The examples of India and Pakistan can serve to illustrate two different approaches to the problem of industrialization and the state sector in the industry of the newly liberated countries. During the years of their independence India, while opting for the state sector, has to a certain extent, succeeded in

strengthening her economic independence, whereas Pakistan, having entangled herself in imperialist blocs, has failed to achieve any comparable results." V. Rymalov, "Industrial Development in South and Southeast Asia," *International Affairs*, Oct. 1964, p. 46.

20. Kotovsky, V. Pavlov, and Redko, "Some Indian Economic and Political Problems," *New Times*, No. 1, 1964.

21. Ulyanovski, "Nehru: Architect of New India," *New Times*, No. 23, 1964.

22. For text of Khrushchev's speech, see *The Road to Communism: Documents of the 22nd Congress of the CPSU*, Moscow, 1962.

23. *The Hindu*, Sept. 22, 1964.

24. *The New York Times*, June 22, 1964; *The Times of India*, Bombay, Aug. 29, 1964.

25. This speculation is based upon the fact that Kosygin had evidently satisfactory conversations in New Delhi with Shastri, Kamaraj, and others during the funeral of Nehru. The signal for Chavan's arms-seeking visit to Moscow came several weeks after Kosygin's return to Moscow. Kosygin told a Moscow audience on June 8 that he was satisfied that Shastri would carry out Nehru's policies and resist the pressure of pro-imperialist circles. *Pravda*, June 9, 1964. In a commentary on the post-Nehru political situation in India, *Pravda* on June 11 welcomed the inclusion of Indira Gandhi and Sanjivayya in the Shastri cabinet as well as the exclusion of Morarji Desai from it. *Pravda*, however, was not without doubt if the cabinet would be able to stand up to the increasing political and economic power of the right represented by S. K. Patil and T. T. Krishnamachari, whom it described as "agents of the imperialists." Also noteworthy is Khrushchev's ritualistic message of May 28, 1964 to the acting Indian prime minister, Gulzarilal Nanda, expressing Soviet "readiness" further to develop and strengthen the friendship between the USSR and India. *The Times of India*, May 29, 1964.

26. *The Times of India*, Aug. 29, 1964.

27. *Ibid.*, Sept. 12, 1964.

28. The arms deliveries were valued at $142 million, to be repaid in rupees over a ten-year period at 2 per cent interest. *The New York Times*, Sept. 22, 1964.

The resignation of Khrushchev in October, 1964, raised doubts in New Delhi about the continuation of Indo-Soviet friendly relations. This was particularly because the ousted Soviet leader had been criticized in the CPSU Central Committee meeting for the 1962 Mig-supply agreement with India. *The New York Times*, Oct. 30, 1964. However, on Oct. 17, the Soviet chargé d'affaires in India, L. A. Karobin, assured Shastri that there would be no change in Soviet policy. *The New York Times*, Oct. 18, 1964. Armed with this assurance, the Indian Government issued a statement expressing its confidence that Indo-Soviet friendship would continue to grow under the new Russian leadership. *The Times of India*, Oct. 18, 1964. Indira Gandhi, returning from a trip to Moscow, told a news conference that she had been personally assured by Kosygin and Suslov that the change of leadership in the USSR would not affect Russian economic and military assistance to India. *The Times of India*, Nov. 3, 1964.

29. For the statement of the Soviet delegate, N. Foderenko, see *The New York Times*, May 14, 1964. At the Security Council meeting on Kashmir in the preceding February, the Soviet delegate had deplored efforts to employ any "outside impetus" to solve the Kashmir problem. The word *dispute* was used in the May meeting for the first time since 1956.

Pakistan had asked for a fresh discussion on Kashmir because of certain measures introduced by India to pace up the state's integration with the Indian Union.

Several significant changes took place about this time in Pakistan's relations with Moscow as well as Peking. CENTO was being transformed from a US-backed anti-Soviet military alliance into a regional organization for economic and cultural collaboration among Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan. This coincided with an improvement in relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Soviet ambassador to Pakistan disclosed that *high-level consultations* were in progress between the *two countries* to find a reasonable and workable solution of the Kashmir problem. *Dawn*, Mar. 11, 1964.

The significance of the subtle shift toward neutrality in the Soviet stand on Kashmir at the Security Council made little immediate impact on Pakistan. Of much greater meaning for Pakistan was the change in the US attitude. *Pakistan Horizon* commented: "In spite of the fact that almost all the members of the Council agreed on the urgency of the matter, not even a consensus was recorded by the Council. Why the Security Council failed in this is no secret. The constant fear of Soviet veto and the pernicious influence of the United States collusion with the Soviet Union prevented any positive attitude being taken by the Council." *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1964), p. 108.

Less than a month before the Security Council meeting, the Pakistan foreign minister had told the SEATO ministerial council meeting at Manila that "in view of preoccupation with a vital threat to her own security, [Pakistan] might be unable to make a contribution to some of the decisions reached during the recent Council meeting." *Ibid.*, p. 110.

It was more than a year later that Pakistan publicly acknowledged the "slight but significant shift in the Soviet stance" at the May 1964, meeting of the Security Council. See *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (1965), p. 5.

30. See the writer's "Moscow, Peking, and the Indian Political Scene After Nehru," in *Orbis*, Philadelphia, Vol. 12 (1968), pp. 534–62.

31. *New Times*, Jan. 19, 1965. The article also said that Morarji Desai became, in a government "pledged" to socialism, "the hope of the vested interests and the inspiration for Right-wing reaction."

32. V. Yakunin, "Problems of India's Congress Party," *New Times*, No. 9, Mar. 2, 1966.

33. G. Drambyants, "India's New Prime Minister," *New Times*, No. 5, Feb. 2, 1966.

34. P. Nichoksky, "Nehru's Party Without Nehru," *New Times*, Aug. 11, 1965.

35. A. Vladin, "The Indian Economy," *New Times*, Oct. 9, 1966.

36. Y. Gotlober and Y. Shtykanov, "Towards Election Time in India," *New Times*, No. 38, Sept. 21, 1966.

37. A. Usanov, "The New Indian Cabinet," *New Times*, No. 13, Mar. 29, 1967.

38. Y. Gotlober and Y. Shtykanov, "Indian Political Scene," *New Times*, No. 48, Nov. 29, 1967.

The timing of this article is interesting. It was published *after* the West Bengal leftist coalition ministry was dissolved by the Center on Nov. 21, 1967. The news of the dismissal was carried in a "box" along with the article.

Also of interest is the Soviet assessment of the role of the various non-Congress coalitions. While the Chinese dismissed the West Bengal and Kerala governments as part of the landlord-capitalist Indian state apparatus, the Soviet comment was: "It is still too early to pass any final

judgment on the activities of the state governments in which the Communists are represented. These governments, in particular those in Kerala and West Bengal, are encountering great difficulties. Nevertheless, despite their limited possibilities, they have outlined progressive measures and already carried out some."

39. M. Savelyev, "Monopoly Drive in India," *International Affairs*, Apr. 1967, pp. 35–40.

40. *Cf.*: "It cannot be said that scientists have been unaware of these economic, social and political processes in India. More is now being said about them in view of the increased political activity of the Indian monopoly bourgeoisie and, consequently, of imminent clashes in Indian society and potential departures from the established neutral course in foreign policy."

41. "Immediate Problems of the National Liberation Movement," *International Affairs*, May 1967, pp. 51–78. For this reference to India, see V. L. Tyagnenko, "Capitalist and Non-Capitalist Development," *ibid.*, pp. 56–57.

An editorial note at the end of the summary suggested a serious, continuing debate in the Soviet Union on the question of the national liberation movement. "It goes without saying that some of our conceptions which took shape in the stormy period of the national liberation movement are now undergoing certain changes. . . . There may be some differences of standpoint on the problems facing the developing countries, and these at the present stage have been given more attention. This is because the liberation revolutions, having entered a new stage, confront scientists and Marxist science as a whole with entirely new problems whose solutions demand a great deal of time and effort."

42. Moscow Radio, Peace and Progress in English in Asia, 1130 hrs. GMT, Nov. 29, 1967.

43. ". . . feudal elements and monopolists who had opposed progressive changes being brought about by the leftist united front had a big hand in the dismissal of the Mukherji government." Moscow in Hindi to India, 1130 hrs. GMT, Dec. 4, 1967.

44. Moscow Radio, Tass International Service in English, 1810 hrs. GMT, Jan. 26, 1968.

45. Moscow in English to South Asia, 1600 hrs. GMT, Jan. 23, 1968.

46. Dilip Mukherji, "New Turn in Indo-Soviet Relationship," *The Statesman*, Feb. 2, 1968.

47. *The Statesman*, Jan. 30, 1968.

48. *"New Turn in Indo-Soviet Relationship."*

49. *Ibid.*

50. *The Times of India*, Bombay, Feb. 4, 1968.

51. *The New York Times*, Dec. 16, 1965. See James Reston's interview with Shastri.

52. *Ibid.*

53. *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (fourth quarter, 1964), p. 324.

D. S. Polyansky, reporting to a ceremonial meeting in the Kremlin Palaces of Congresses on Nov. 6, 1965, referred to a "deep crisis" in CENTO and SEATO, and remarked: "A number of countries belonging to these blocs are now attempting to follow an independent foreign policy and do not want to be involved in the military adventures of the American imperialists. . . . In the past year we took new steps that promoted the consolidation of friendship with Afghanistan and India . . . the improvement of relations with Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey. . . ." *Pravda*, Nov. 7, 1965; *CDSP*, Nov. 24, 1965, pp. 3–8.

As far as the writer has been able to find out, the first Soviet appreciation of Pakistan's independent foreign policy came, in very guarded language, in *Pravda*, Nov. 24, 1965, p. 4

and Nov. 26, 1965, pp. 1, 3, in reporting Bhutto's visit to Moscow.

54. *Dawn*, Jan. 14, 1965.

55. The Minister had announced on Sept. 6, 1964, that the terms offered by the Soviet Government for a trade agreement were not acceptable to Pakistan. *Dawn*, Sept. 7, 1964. Negotiations, however, continued, and the announcement of the readiness to sign a long-term trade pact was made on Jan. 25, 1965. *Dawn*, Jan. 26, 1965.

56. *Ibid.*, Apr. 4, 1965.

57. *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1965), p. 106.

58. For text of the joint Soviet-Pakistan communique, see *ibid.*, pp. 185-89.

59. *The Economist*, London, May 22, 1965.

60. Khalida Qureshi, "Diplomacy of the India-Pakistan War," *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 13, No. 4 (1965), p. 372.

61. *Pakistan Horizon*, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1965), p. 326.

62. *Dawn*, Nov. 14, 1965.

63. Washington *Post*, Apr. 23, 1967. In a dispatch to the *Post* of Aug. 6, 1967, Warren Unna said that Moscow had been known, even before the Tashkent meeting, to be seeking some way of "countering Pakistan's increasing intimacy with China."

64. *Ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1965.

65. New York *Herald Tribune*, Sept. 30, 1965. Pakistan officials insisted that the visit was "strictly civil aviation business."

66. *The Times*, Dec. 18, 1965. The report said Pakistan had been offered Migs by Indonesia and China and that "there are persistent reports that Pakistan air force pilots are in China taking conversion courses in Migs. These reports cannot be confirmed but there is no reason to doubt them."

67. Washington *Post*, Mar. 30, 1966. Bhutto added: "We were the victims of aggression and we had to get arms wherever we could." The *Post* dispatch interestingly quoted Khuda Bakish Bucha, head of the West Pakistan Muslim League, as saying that the Chinese had "softened up" the Indian attack on Lahore during the India-Pakistan war, by "forcing India to keep some of its divisions in the Himalayas."

68. *The Times*, Aug. 9, 1966.

69. This interesting dispatch from Anthony Lucas in *The New York Times*, Mar. 30, 1966, made the following additional points: (a) the US and the Soviets were both anxious to wean Pakistan away from undue dependence on China; (b) if either Moscow or Washington began arms supplies to Karachi, the other might conclude that Chinese influence in Pakistan had already been somewhat reduced and might "decide not to move."

*The Times* had reported on May 11 that according to outside observers in Rawalpindi, "Pakistan had not received enough Chinese equipment to make any real difference to her fighting capability (a view which is shared by some nonofficial political circles in Delhi.)"

70. *Christian Science Monitor*, June 25, 1966.

71. Washington *Post*, July 12, 1966.

For an excellent description of this electronic intelligence complex, see Selig Harrison, "America, India and Pakistan: A Chance for a Fresh Start," *Harper's Magazine*, July 1966.

The Pakistani foreign minister, Ashrad Hussain, announced in the National Assembly on May 20, 1968, that Pakistan had given notice to the United States to close down its communications unit near Peshawar when the ten-year agreement signed on July 18, 1959, expired. *The New York Times*, May 21, 1968.

The Pakistani decision to terminate the agreement apparently pleased both Moscow and Peking, perhaps the latter more than the former. "The base

. . . had aroused considerable hostility among the Russians and the Chinese Communists. Lately, the Chinese had maintained that the installation was really being used against them, in view of the growing *détente* between the United States and the Soviet Union." *Ibid.*

72. *The Times*, Apr. 18, 1967.

73. Washington *Post*, Aug. 6, 1967.

74. *The New York Times*, Jan. 27, 1968.

75. *Ibid.*, Feb. 26, 1968.

76. *Ibid.* "The Pakistanis view the Chinese as the allies who can be counted on to come to their aid in any future difficulties with India. A senior government official said, 'The Chinese were the only ones ready to commit themselves in 1965 and we expect they'll be with us in the future.' "

77. *Pakistan Times*, Sept. 29, 1967. "One conclusive element emerging from the current visit so far is the Russian acknowledgement of the fact that the Tashkent Declaration has become virtual dead letter. The top Soviet leaders now seem to realise that whatever the Declaration was capable of achieving it has already yielded. Nothing more could be expected of it."

78. "The Week in Review," *The New York Times*, Apr. 21, 1968.

79. *The Statesman*, Apr. 22, 1968.

80. *Dawn*, July 22, 1968.

81. *The Financial Times*, July 12, 1968.

82. Quoted in *Dawn*, July 11, 1968.

83. *The Times of India*, July 12, 1968.

84. *Asian Analyst*, Aug. 1968, p. 8.

85. *Ibid.*

86. *Ibid.*

87. *Asian Recorder*, New Delhi, Vol. 14, No. 29, pp. 8, 428.

88. For the text of the communique, see *Peking Review*, Aug. 19, 1966.

89. Peking Radio, evening transmission to India, Oct. 10, 1966.

90. *Ibid.*, late evening transmission to India, Nov. 14–15, 1966.

91. *Ibid.*, evening transmission to India, Dec. 10, 1966.

92. "India: Anti-Tyranny Struggle Rocks Reactionary Rule," *Peking Review*, Feb. 24, 1967.

93. "After the Indian Election: A Still More Reactionary Government," *Peking Review*, Mar. 24, 1967.

94. "Dange's Plot to Sabotage Indian People's Revolution Will Surely Fail," *Peking Review*, June 9, 1967.

95. Peking evening transmission to India, June 10, 1967, repeated in several subsequent transmissions.

96. "The Darjeeling Peasant Armed Struggle," *Peking Review*, July 14, 1967.

97. "Let the Red Flag of Naxalbari Fly Still Higher," Commentator, *People's Daily*, Aug. 3, *Peking Review*, Aug. 11, 1967.

98. "Dozens of Naxalbaris," *Peking Review*, July 28, 1967.

99. "Historical Lessons of Telengana Uprising," Commentator, *People's Daily*, Aug. 3, 1967, *Peking Review*, Aug. 11, 1967.

100. Peking Radio transmission to India, July 10, 1967; compare this with relevant paragraph in "The Darjeeling Peasant Armed Struggle," p. 24.

101. "Historical Lessons of Telengana Uprising."

102. "The Darjeeling District," *Peking Review*, July 14, 1967.

103. *Moscow and the Indian Communist Party*, Ch. 3.

104. "Indian Revisionists in Kerala: Serving the Reactionaries," *Peking Review*, Sept. 8, 1967; also, "Indian Revisionists Are Quacks," *Peking Review*, Sept. 22, 1967.

105. "Historic Turning Point in the Indian Revolution," *Peking Review*, Jan. 12, 1968.

106. "What Kosygin Was Up To in India," *Peking Review*, Feb. 5, 1968.

107. The Party Congress set up only the three top decision-making bodies—the Central Committee, the Politburo, and the Standing Committee of the Politburo. Below these organizations, a massive amount of restoration remains to be done before the ruling

structure, badly fractured, has been repaired. See Tillman Durdin's report in *The New York Times*, May 3, 1969.

108. In making this assessment, membership of the National Defense Council and the Military Affairs Committee has not been taken into consideration.

109. Edgar Snow, "Mao and the New Mandate," *The New Republic*, May 10, 1969.

110. For the Lin Piao Report, see *Peking Review*, Apr. 30, 1969, which also contains the final new Constitution of the CCP as well as other 9th Congress documents.

111. *Ibid.*

112. There seems to be some expectation in Washington that the 9th Congress strategy will lead to an opening in the Sino-American impasse. See Peter Grose's report in *The New York Times*, Apr. 7, 1969.

113. *Cf.*: Moscow Radio broadcast to central America on Apr. 5, 1969: "Today, the Indonesian Communists, irrespective of their views on other matters, agree that the reactionary and terroristic regime in Indonesia can be overthrown only by armed struggle, and the Indonesian Leninists, unlike the proponents of Maoism, who display revolutionary impatience, are preparing for a serious and possibly prolonged struggle. . . ."

The Chinese position can be seen in a NCNA article dated Dec. 29, 1969: "Our great leader, Chairman Mao, has pointed out: 'Experience in the class struggle in the era of imperialism teaches us that it is only by the power of the gun that the working class and the labouring masses can defeat the armed bourgeoisie and landlords; in this sense we may say that only with guns that the whole world can be transformed.' Through the protracted and tortuous path they traversed and especially through their bitter experience the Communists and revolutionary people of Indonesia have come to realize this great revolutionary truth pointed out by Chairman Mao."

114. *The Statesman*, Apr. 16, 1969.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

1. The slogan, born in 1954 of the Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet, means India and China are brothers.

2. There have been studies of factors that determine national identification, for example, Karl Deutsch: Nationalism and Social Communication, New York, Wiley, 1953. But we still know very little of why a human group identifies itself with a piece of land and calls it "our" land, and why human masses react so strongly to impingement of the territorial self-image by outsiders. See Ralph K. White: Nobody Wanted War, New York, Doubleday Anchor, 1970, pp 188-198.

3. White, p.189.

4. Similarly, the fall of Sukarno can be traced to a large extent to the failure of his "confrontation" with Malaysia. The Chinese rulers would seem to have been anxious not to allow the frontier dispute with the USSR to go out of their hands. While they have made use of the border clashes to rouse a patriotic fervor within China, they have been careful to keep the "dispute" under control by initiating a process of protracted negotiations, and, pending a settlement, maintaining the status quo on the Manchurian border. They have apparently refused to allow the dispute to loosen their grip of the internal environment. In other words, in view of their relative military weakness in relation to the USSR, the Chinese leaders would seem to have deliberately played the border problem rather low.

5. Quoted in Irving L. Horowitz (ed.) The New Sociology, New York, Oxford University Press, 1965, p. 45.

6. Robert Jay Lifton: Revolutionary Immortality: Mao Tse-tung and and the Chinese Cultural Revolution, New York, 1968, p.82.

7. Michael Becher: "Elite Images and Foreign Policy", Pacific Affairs, Vol. XI, No. 1 and 2, 1967.

8. Becher, op cit.

9. Ibid.

10. William E. Connolly: Political Science and Ideology, New York, Atherton Press, 1967, p. 58.

11. Report of the first meeting of the Southeast Asia Study Group of the Unesco project "Cultural Relations for the Future", cyclostyled.

12. Jawaharlal Nehru: Toward Freedom, New York, Doubleday, 1941, pp 352-53.

This is how an Arab Scholar poses the problem for the newly-liberated Arab nations: "When we find a man who disowns, and takes no pride in the fact that he is an Arab, even though he is Arabic-speaking and belongs to an Arab nation, we must discover the reasons for his attitude ... He is an Arab whether he likes it or not, whether he accepts it or not ... at the present time. He may be ignorant, stupid, ungrateful, or treacherous ... but he is an Arab all the same ... an Arab who has lost his sensibility, his emotions, and maybe ever his conscience." Sati' al-Husri: "The Historical Factor in the Formation of Nationalism." in Kemal H. Karpat (ed.): Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East, New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1968, p. 55.

Franz Fanon has offered clinical studies of the psychopathology of the colonized man. According to Fanon, colonial rule erodes the subject's self-respect, and his respect for his own culture and civilization. Confronted by the totality of the colonial oppression, "You are forced to come up against yourself." As Fanon puts it, "For a colonized man, in the context of oppression like that of Algeria, living does not mean embodying moral values or taking his place in the coherent and fruitful development of the world. To live means to keep on existing." Franz Fanon: The Wretched of the Earth, New York, Grove Press, 1963, pp 308-9.

13. For a perceptive analysis of this conflict in the Indian political system, see Myron Weiner: "India: Two Political Cultures," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (ed.) Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1965, chapter 6. Weiner sees the conflict as one between an elite political culture and an emerging mass political culture. It is perhaps more accurate to describe the latter phenomenon as the new elite political culture. The masses of India are still relatively removed from the center of the political process, although they have been showing remarkable self-assertion in the elections since 1967.

14. How tradition works as a force for modernity is shown in Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow (ed.): Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1968.

15. For a discussion of several theories and concepts of the central value system, see Seymour M. Lipset: The First New Nation, New York, Doubleday, 1967, Introduction.

16. Lipset, p. 8. See also, Karl Deutsch: Nationalism and Social Communication, New York, John Wiley, 1953, pp 150-165.

17. Hiren Mukherji: India and Parliament, New Delhi, People's Publishing House, 1962, chapter V.

18. C.M. Fleming: Adolescence: Its Social Psychology, New York, Grove Press, 1962, chapter XVII. Also, Eric Erikson: Youth, Identity and Crisis, Boston, 1968; and Karl Mannheim: Diagnosis of Our Time, London, Kegan Paul, 1943.

19. The Times of India, September 11, 1959.

20. The letter is included in Jawaharlal Nehru: A Bunch of Letters, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1960.

21. In Two Chinas, pp 100-101.

22. Ibid. p. 70.

23. For Nehru's reaction to the Bolshevik Revolution, see The Discovery of India, New York, Doubleday, paperback edition, p. 15. See also, Rabindranath Tagore: Letters from Russia, Calcutta, 1935.

24. Moscow and the Indian Communist Party, Chapter 2; also, the author's Communism in India: Problems and Promises, New York, Columbia University Press, forthcoming.

25. In Two Chinas, p. 82.

26. Nehru's Speeches 1949-53, p. 135.

27. For a convincing array of historical facts that disprove the theory of two thousand years of Sino-Indian friendship, see Harold Hinton: The Myth of Traditional Sino-Indian Friendship, Washington, 1963, mimeographed.

28. The Statesman, October 29, 1951. For typical examples of similar Indian perceptions of China, see Sundarlal: China Today, New Delhi, 1956.

29. G. Eric Hansen: "The Impact of the Border War on Indian Perception of China," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 11, Nos. 3 and 4 (1968), p. 238.

30. Quoted in Peking Vs. Delhi, pp 117-18.

31. Quoted in Impact of the Border War, p. 238.

32. Tibet Disappears, pp 109-19.

33. Parliamentary Debates (Lok Sabha), New Delhi, November 25, 1959, col. 1,735.

34. Ibid., col. 1,928

35. Nehru's Speeches 1953-57, p. 278.

36. The Statesman, October 27, 1965.

37. Lok Sabha Debates, series 2, vol. 34, col. 6541, September 4, 1959.

38. News-Tibet, New York, N.Y. Vol. 2. No. 1, February 1966, p. 1. See also the writer's "Tibet and the Sino-Indian Impasse" in International Studies, Special Tibet Number, New Delhi, April 1969.

39. In Two Chinas, p. 101.

40. Brandt, Schwartz and Fairbank: A Documentary History of Chinese Communism, New York, Athenuem, 1967 pp 444-461. Also, Mao Tse-tung: On the People's Democratic Dictatorship, Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1949.

41. Chapter 3.

42. Ibid.

43. Shastri's perception of China was widely shared by the Indian elite. K.P.S. Menon, diplomat and scholar wrote: "It is no exaggeration to say that China today is the principal menace to peace and is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future." The Statesman, October 19, 1965.

44. P. 275 passim. See also the writer's "A Maoist Line for India," China Quarterly, Jan.-March 1968.

45. "Tibet and the Sino-Indian Impasse", p. 523. The Indian Government opposed the resolution, but Chagla announced that it was keeping its Tibet policy under "constant review." See also, News-Tibet, vol. 3, no. 3, August, 1967.

46. The Statesman, January 10, 1969. Dilip Mukherji, the paper's political correspondent, said that the Soviet arms deal with Pakistan did not by itself lead to a change of Indian posture toward China; "the change was already on the way, but it became a good deal easier to give voice to it in public."

47. The Times of India, July 4, 1969.

48. Ibid. July 27, 1969.

49. The Statesman, October 3, 1970. It was reported in the Indian press that soon after the May 1 incident, the Indian mission in Peking started getting telephone calls from the Chinese foreign office inquiring if the Indian Government had any concrete plans to improve Sino-Indian relations. The Indian charge d'Affaires was called to Delhi for extensive consultations but it was apparently decided at the highest level that the time to initiate negotiations was not yet ripe.

50. The Statesman, October 15, 1970. The "Naxalites" are a group of revolutionaries who instigated a small peasant uprising at the Naxalbari area in Darjeeling district of West Bengal, adjacent to Nepal and East Pakistan, and not far from Tibet. The peasant rebellion was immediately hailed by Chinese media as the "front paw" of a Maoist-type revolution in India. Leaders of the peasant movement, who were expelled from the Communist Party of India (Marxist), announced the formation of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) on May 1, 1969.

51. Inder Malhotra: "Lessons from Indo-Pakistan Fighting," The Statesman, October 22, 1965.

52. Sisir K. Gupta: "India-Pakistan Conflict: The Real Cause," Hindustan Times, October 5, 1965.

53. Inder Malhotra: "Pakistan Conflict Revives Debate on Bomb," The Statesman, October 15, 1965. See also, Seminar, New Delhi, January, 1965.

54. Ibid.

55. Pran Chopra: "Soviet Aid to India Not to be Affected," The Statesman, June 14, 1968.

56. The Soviet have helped India build its first submarine fleet and to add three Petya class destroyers to its navy. Baltimore Sun, July 7, 1968, and April 2, 1968.

57. See, for example, the AICC Economic Review, August 1, 1968; the first editorial in The Statesman, April 12, 1969; The Hindu, July 21, 1968; The Times of India, December 23, 1968.

58. Dev Murarka: "The Kremlin At Large," Far Eastern Economic Review, August 21, 1969.

59. Seminar, January, 1965.

60. Ibid.

61. The Political and Economic Weekly, Bombay, April 27, 1968, and July 20, 1968.

62. The Hindu reported on May 19, 1969 that Prime Minister Gandhi had received a "firm" assurance from Kosygin that Pakistan would not go to war once again over the Kashmir dispute.

63. T.B. Miller: "South and East of Suez," Foreign Affairs, October-December, 1970. Mr. Miller dwells on the Soviet Union's conflict-management role in South Asia, and says that Indians seem to have more confidence in the potency of this role than they had in similar roles adopted by Britain and the U.S. in the past.

64. K.P.S. Menon: "Working for Welfare with a 'Chastened' Pakistan," The Statesman, October 10, 1965.

65. The Hindustan Times, September 29, 1965. Some Indians were apprehensive of joint U.S.-Soviet domination. The late Ram Manohar Lohia, socialist leader, wrote for example, "America has taken India's body (mineral wealth etc.) and Russia our mind ... Russia and America came to a tacit agreement (by 1950) to keep India dormant and weak." Mankind, Delhi, July, 1967. Romesh Thapar, left-wing columnist, believes that the two superpowers are acting in union in Asia with several shared objectives, one of which is to deny the bigger states of Asia the possibility of an independent military role. Economic and Political Weekly, August 14, 1967.

66. As Dilip Mukherji reported, "But, as far as Indian reaction as a whole goes, Brezhnev used the wrong phrase. 'A collective security for Asia' raked up all the antipathies which had become part of Indian thinking during the long years of John Foster Dulles. Characteristically, though, New Delhi has rejected the Soviet initiative without saying so. This, like the knack of accepting -- without saying so -- American stipulations against trading with Cuba, North Vietnam and North Korea, is part of India's search for a policy which will do for it what non-alignment did in another era." Far Eastern Economic Review, July 24, 1969.

67. Foreign Minister Dinesh Singh told Parliament: "In conversation with us they (the Soviet Union) have said they have no desire to dominate in this part of the world." The Statesman, June 4, 1969.

68. Far Eastern Economic Review, July 24, 1969.

69. See Annual Report of the External Affairs Ministry, New Delhi, 1970.

70. The Statesman, June 7, 1967. The Hindustan Times East Africa correspondent pointed out that India was the first country to oppose the Anglo-American move to build naval bases in the Indian Ocean.

71. Of some interest in this connection is the widespread circulation in the Indian press of an article printed originally in Review of International Affairs, Belgrade, suggesting that the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean was having the effect of balancing American influence. Written by Aristide Ratsimbazapy, the article said that the emerging balance of power created a new scope for "positive neutralism" on the part of the littoral states. See Searchlight, Patna, June 10, 1969.

72. The Times of India, March 21, 1969.

73. National Herald, New Delhi, June 2, 1969; The Statesman, September 5, 1969.

74. National Herald, December 15, 1970.

75. The Times of India, November 20, 1970.

76. Edgar Snow: The Other Side of the River: Red China Today, London, Pelican paperback edition, 1970, p. 610.

77. Snow, chapter 77.

78. Ibid.

79. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, II, p. 267. See also, John E. Rue: Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, Stanford University Press, 1966, pp 277-291.

80. Snow, pp 616-17.

81. Allen S. Whiting and Sheng Shih-ts'ai: Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot?, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1958, Notes to Part I.

82. See page 290.

83. Klaus Mehnert: Peking and Moscow, New York, G.P. Putman's Sons, 1963, pp 254-255.

84. Chin Szu-k'ai: Communist China's Relations with the Soviet Union, 1949-1957, Hong Kong, multigraphed.

85. The Chinese do not wish to remember the Manchu dynasty.

86. Some of the Russian experts apparently had a better knowledge of the Chinese pride when they left China en mass for the USSR. See Snow, pp 626-27.

87. Quoted in Snow, p. 610.

88. See Girilal Jain: "China, India and Pakistan," Times of India, March 24, 1970. Mr. Jain's remarks that with the overwhelming majority secured in the Lok Sabha in the March 10 mid-term parliamentary roll, Mrs. Gandhi should be able to meet the USSR as an equal. "Before elections, it could legitimately be argued that it (the Indian Government) needed China as a counter-weight against the growing influence of Russia, specially in view of the retrenchment of American commitment in the (South Asian) region. The Indian electorate has disposed of this problem by giving the New Congress an overwhelming majority in the Lok Sabha because Mrs. Gandhi's Government can now deal with Moscow on the basis of equality."

89. The New York Times, January 14, 1970.

90. Rupert Emerson: From Empire to Nation, Boston, Beacon Press, 1967, p. 371.

91. C.E. Black: The Dynamic of Modernization, New York, Harper & Row, 1966, pp 165-167.