DEMONSTRATIVES IN MOTION:
THE GRAMMATICALIZATION OF DEMONSTRATIVES AS A WINDOW INTO SYNCHRONIC PHENOMENA

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ABSTRACT

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Advisor: Professor Christina Tortora

There is significant variation in the literature on how demonstratives are characterized semantically, leading to divergent syntactic analyses of demonstratives. A major source of this disagreement regards how distance specifications relate to the demonstrative: whether [+/-speaker] is an integral property of the demonstrative or not. I argue that distance-marking divides the class of demonstratives into strong and weak, along the lines of what Cardinaletti and Starke (1999) propose for pronouns. Strong demonstratives possess a [+/-speaker] feature, while weak demonstratives have a neutral [speaker] feature, corresponding to a distance-neutral interpretation, and the pragmatic notion of immediate accessibility of the referent (Lyons 1999).

The diachronic component of this work serves as a lens through which to view the demonstrative's synchronic behavior. I argue that the process of grammaticalization (Meillet 1912) allows us to 'see' certain aspects of a demonstrative's meaning (and, I argue, corresponding internal syntactic structure) getting peeled away as the demonstrative evolves. Latin *ille* and spoken Finnish *se* provide evidence that demonstratives pass through a distance-neutral phase before being analyzed as definite articles, suggesting that strong and weak demonstratives should receive distinct analyses in the synchronic domain. I argue that strong and weak demonstratives can be viewed as synchronic imprints of a diachronic process.

In addition to teasing apart different semantic types of demonstratives, this dissertation seeks to identify differences between demonstratives and definite articles. I propose that the

demonstrative is specified for (i) [(+/-) speaker], (ii) [+contrastive] (encoding contrast), and (iii) [+identifiability], and that these features are encoded on functional heads in the extended projection of the demonstrative. The complex demonstrative is merged in a dedicated functional projection ([Spec, TrackerAdjP) within the DP. The definite article, in contrast, expresses only [+identifiability], and is merged directly in the DP projection. I argue that the common core of [+identifiability] helps explain the synchronic and diachronic dependency between the demonstrative and the DP projection, and sheds light on our discussion on the phenomenon of apparent 'double definiteness.'

Dedicated to my three greatest teachers,

Aeneas, Lorenzo and Delphine

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The graduate student who first had an inkling of this topic and the author of this dissertation are separated by a decade of life experience, a thousand miles, three children, and the wisdom that came from navigating the path that led from there to here. The bridge between that graduate student and the present author is, in fact, the path. In the process of writing this dissertation and in all aspects of my life, I have focused on the path as a guide. At times, the path has felt like an obstacle to the destination, and at other times, the destination has felt like an obstacle to the path. But ultimately, I knew I had to do it my way, the only way I'd know for sure that my work was true. In this, I think I have succeeded. Walt Whitman wrote: "Whatever satisfies the soul is truth." For me, this dissertation is truth.

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People always asked me how I could manage to write a dissertation with three small children. My answer was simple. I could not imagine writing this dissertation without them. I never could have done this without the counterbalance to knowledge that is sheer joy and spontaneous connection with something larger; without the self-knowledge that comes from perceiving yourself outside of yourself, without feeling the crushing weight of existence that

comes from watching time trace its pattern on once-newborn skin, or without the confidence that comes from knowing there is one thing in this world that you are doing absolutely right.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Demonstratives have long been the victim of imprecise analyses in the literature. The lack of consensus in the literature as how to interpret these elements syntactically and semantically is highlighted by the inconsistent use of terminology to describe the demonstrative. While the demonstrative is frequently considered to be the prototypical 'deictic' element (contrasting with the 'non-deictic' definite article), the definition of 'deictic' is almost always taken for granted in the literature despite its many different senses. As applied to demonstratives, 'deictic' is sometimes used in the sense of accommodating ostension (pointing), while in other cases, it means that the interpretation of an element "makes crucial reference to some aspect of the speech situation" (Diessel, 1999: 35). In some researchers' conception of deixis (Giusti 2005, Grohmann & Panagiotidis 2004), this contextual aspect is further restricted to the physical situation. But by far the most pervasive meaning of 'deictic' as applied to demonstratives is that of *spatial* deixis, the property of locating a referent with respect to the deictic center, the speaker.

Simply assuming the demonstrative to be 'deictic,' therefore, is not as innocuous as it seems, since the term carries different implications depending on which definition of 'deixis' we choose. Different definitions of 'deixis' lead to differences in how determiner elements are categorized across languages. French *ce* ('this'/ 'that') is a case in point: while *ce* is generally considered a demonstrative, there are some (like Harris 1978, 1980) who characterize *ce* as a definite article. The different classifications of *ce* reflect a fundamental difference in opinion as to what constitutes a demonstrative: for Harris, demonstratives are spatially deictic. Since *ce* does not express distance specifications ('close to speaker'/ 'distant from speaker'), it is therefore not a demonstrative but a definite article according to him. Other researchers (Kirsner

1979, 2011; Himmelmann 1996, Diessel 1999, C. Lyons 1999, Silva-Villar & Gutiérrez-Rexach 2001 among others) adopt a non-spatial version of deixis, or explicitly argue against equating distance specifications with demonstrativity, and hence classify *ce* as a demonstrative. I argue that the inconsistent use of terminology to describe the demonstrative in the literature is symptomatic of a deeper problem, which is the absence of a clear understanding of the semantic and pragmatic nature of this element.

The lack of a precise characterization of the properties of the demonstrative is further compounded by (or perhaps even fueled by) the apparently fickle nature of demonstratives themselves. In some languages, a given demonstrative can express a 'close to speaker'/ 'distant from speaker' contrast in some cases, and no distance contrast in other cases. We will see this behavior with the German demonstrative *dieser*, which Lyons (1999) describes as sometimes marking 'close to speaker' and other times being distance neutral. Spanish *ese* also exhibits a 'split personality,' characterized in traditional grammars as a demonstrative marked for 'close to hearer' but in actual contemporary speech analyzed as distance-neutral (Gutiérrez-Rexach 2002, 2005). To the extent that this 'split personality' of demonstratives is noted in the literature, it is rarely explained or analyzed. I see the apparent 'split personality' of some demonstratives as one of the main explananda in this dissertation. In other words, I propose not only to define the differences between a demonstrative and definite article, but also to identify potential distinctions within the class of demonstratives.

These gaps and inconsistencies in the literature on the demonstrative suggest three main questions, which will be addressed in this dissertation:

(1) What is the precise semantic nature of the demonstrative?
(2) Do demonstratives constitute a homogeneous class?
(3) How is a demonstrative's semantics correlated with its syntax?

I will approach the research questions above by examining the cross-linguistic data on demonstratives in the literature, drawing from corpora-based studies in many cases and supporting my findings with native speaker judgments whenever possible. The majority of my data comes from European languages (with emphasis on Romance and Germanic), but data from other language families make important contributions to my analysis. I propose that my analysis of demonstratives can be generalized across languages.

Answering (1) and (2) above is a prerequisite to answering (3). In other words, the key to understanding demonstratives lies at the syntax/semantics interface. I argue that only by understanding the demonstrative's semantics can we gain insight into its syntactic behavior, i.e. its phrasal status, where and why it raises, and its dependency with the DP, both synchronically and diachronically. Investigating the interpretive contribution of the demonstrative and proposing a precise and well-motivated semantic characterization of the demonstrative, therefore, will be at the heart of this work. Our decompositional approach to the demonstrative's semantics will then serve as a roadmap to its internal syntax.

My approach to the research questions above is novel in that I propose we look at the synchronic nature of the demonstrative through the lens of its historical evolution. I argue that looking at the diachronic picture allows us to make better sense of the synchronic landscape. Specifically, I argue that the process of grammaticalization allows us to 'see' certain aspects of the demonstrative's meaning (and corresponding structure) becoming bleached as the demonstrative evolves. It is largely widely accepted that the first step in the process of grammaticalization of the demonstrative is for distance distinctions to be neutralized (Lehmann 1995, Deissel 1999, among others), and I will illustrate this progression for Latin *ille* and

spoken Finnish *se*. The fact that demonstratives pass through a phase where they are distance-neutral before they become definite articles argues for a different *synchronic* analysis of the demonstratives that express a distance contrast and the ones that do not. In other words, the two different 'readings' of German *dieser* and Spanish *ese* mentioned above can be seen as representing two distinct lexical entries corresponding to different stages of grammaticalization, which happen to exist side-by-side in those languages. Roberts & Roussou (2003) refer to this phenomenon as 'lexical splits.'

This dissertation will be organized as follows. In Chapter 2 I discuss the diachronic development of the demonstrative, in terms of its grammaticalization path. Grammaticalization, a term originally attributed to Meillet (1912), is a process whereby "lexical items develop into grammatical items and items that are already grammaticalized assume new grammatical functions" (Diessel 1999: 116). It is a well-accepted fact that that, cross-linguistically, demonstratives give rise to definite articles. Greenberg (1978) fleshes out the end-point of this process, decomposing the 'definite article' into stages of grammaticalization, with the process ending in agreement markers. I focus on the front-end of this process in Late Latin and spoken Finnish, and conclude that grammaticalization proceeds through an intermediate phase where the demonstrative is distance-neutral. Recognizing that demonstratives become distance-neutral before being reanalyzed as a definite article suggests a different synchronic analysis of demonstratives that express a [+/-speaker] distinction and those that do not. I am therefore led to conclude that English and Italian have two different (yet homophonous) demonstratives, (i) distance-marked *that/those, quello/quelli* and (ii) distance-neutral *that/those, quello/quelli*, as well as a 'definite article' form (*those, quelli*).

In Chapter 3, I address the semantics of the demonstrative. In my analysis, the property of distance-marking acts as a semantic dividing line between demonstratives, separating distance-marked demonstratives from distance-neutral ones. Along the lines of what Cardinaletti and Starke (1999) propose for strong and weak pronouns, I will classify demonstratives as either strong or weak, where strong demonstratives are distance-marked and weak demonstratives are distance-neutral. I propose the feature matrix for strong demonstratives in (a), weak demonstratives in (b), and definite articles in (c):

(4) a. strong demonstratives: [+/-speaker], [+contrastive], [+identifiability]
b. weak demonstratives: [speaker], [+contrastive], [+identifiability]
c. definite articles: [+identifiability]

The [+/-speaker] feature encodes the close to/distant from speaker contrast. Once the [+/-] value for this feature is lost in the process of grammaticalization, we are left with a neutral [speaker] feature, which I argue contributes the pragmatics of immediate accessibility of the referent (Lyons 1999), meaning that the referent can be identified by searching the immediate situation or discourse. I make the claim that demonstratives (strong and weak) are contrastive, in the sense of presupposing the existence of a contrast set. This property is encoded on a [+contrastive] feature. The definite article lacks both the [(+/-) speaker] feature and the [+contrastive] feature, encoding only the [+identifiability] feature, the feature that underlies 'definiteness' (Lyons 1999). I also address the more complex three-term demonstrative systems, which I argue involve the presence of a [(+/-) hearer] feature in addition to [(+/-) speaker]. I argue that the combination of [speaker] and [hearer] features allow us to explain why, cross-linguistically, the 'distal' and 'middle-term' demonstratives pattern together in being vulnerable to grammaticalization:

regardless of the presence or absence of a [hearer] feature, they are both specified for [-speaker]. I use Spanish *ese* as a case study to illustrate this tendency.

In chapter 4 I turn to the syntax of the demonstrative. I propose that we can best address the questions of the demonstrative's 'external' syntax (in terms of its base position, where and why it raises, and its distribution with respect to the definite article) by appealing to its 'internal syntax.' While recent analyses of the syntax of demonstratives have made important contributions in terms of the complex internal structure of the demonstrative (Leu 2007, 2008, Roehrs and Putnam 2009, Kayne 2009), I argue that these analyses cannot account for the distance-marked/distance-neutral distinction in a structural way.

I propose that the demonstrative has a rich extended projection, the functional heads of which correspond to the semantic features I identify in Chapter 2. In addition, I propose that we include InflP in the demonstrative's extended projection, in order to capture certain facts of Swiss German and Norwegian demonstratives discussed by Leu (2007, 2008). The structure I propose is the following, where the lexical element 'Tracker' has a rich extended projection:

(5) [InflP [SpeakerP [ContrastP [IdentP [TrackerP]]]]]

Following Roehrs (2010), I argue that this articulated structure of the demonstrative can account for high reinforcers in Germanic, and for the fact that they are allowed to co-occur pre-nominally. While the entire structure in (5) is merged in a low dedicated functional projection within the DP (Brugè 1996), which I label 'TrackerAdjP' there appears to be a movement dependency between the demonstrative in [Spec, TrackerAdjP] and the position in which the demonstrative surfaces in many languages, DP. I argue that this movement dependency is due to the demonstrative's [+identifiability] feature, which serves as an appropriate 'goal' for the D

probe which has an uninterpretable [+identifiability] [EPP] feature. The diachronic relationship between the demonstrative and the DP projection can be explained by appealing to the same mechanism, where reanalysis from [Spec, TrackerAdjP] to [Spec, DP] can be seen as isomorphic to synchronic movement. The idea that the demonstrative and the definite article share a piece of functional structure (IdentP) raises questions about apparent 'double definiteness,' specifically of the Greek type in ***afto to*** *vivlio*, 'this the book,' where both the demonstrative and the definite article appear in the left periphery of the DP. I will argue that 'double definiteness' in such cases is a misnomer, and that the 'definite article' in these languages does not actually express [+identifiability].

Finally, decomposing the demonstrative into its various components allows us to address the syntactic mechanisms of grammaticalization. Following Roberts and Roussou's (2003) syntactic theory of grammaticalization, I assume that learners prefer a one-to-one mapping of semantic features to syntactic structure. As such, my analysis explains why it is weak demonstratives (as opposed to strong ones) that serve as the source for definite articles. As long as there is morphological evidence for a more complex structure (containing a SpeakerP), the language learner will continue to posit the rich, extended projection of the demonstrative (which is itself merged in a dedicated functional projection that encodes the demonstrative's constellation of features). In the transition from a strong to weak demonstrative, however, the morpheme encoding [+/-speaker] becomes dissociated with that meaning (it becomes semantically bleached). As a result, language learners lack a cue for positing a value for [speaker], and a weak demonstrative results. In the absence of a semantic contrast between [+speaker] and [-speaker], a weak demonstrative becomes ripe for further syntactic reanalysis, a process whereby the SpeakerP layer is stripped away (along with ContrastP). When the language

learner reanalyzes the demonstrative as a simple IdentP, we get a definite article, merged directly in [Spec, DP].

In Chapter 5 I conclude the dissertation by summarizing and evaluating my findings, discussing some limitations that point the way to future research, and suggesting possible extensions of my analysis.

CHAPTER 2: GRAMMATICALIZATION OF THE DEMONSTRATIVE

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter I propose that we use the historical evolution of the demonstrative as a lens through which to view its synchronic behavior. Just as familiarizing ourselves with world history helps us to get a clearer perspective on current events, I argue that looking at the history of demonstratives helps bring into focus the synchronic phenomena surrounding these elements. If we look at how demonstratives evolve, we can see which aspects of meaning get lost over time. Assuming that semantic features are encoded in functional structure (Cinque 1999) and that grammaticalization involves structural simplification (Roberts and Roussou 2003), we can glean important information about the syntax of demonstratives by looking specifically at how the meaning of these elements changes over time. By showing us which aspects of meaning are systemically lost, the process of grammaticalization reveals which aspects of a demonstrative's meaning are semantically and structurally represented in a synchronic analysis. In other words, the diachronic picture allows us to 'reconstruct' the demonstrative synchronically. The findings that result from our investigation of the diachronic data here will motivate the semantic analysis of demonstratives presented in Chapter 3, as well as the syntactic analysis outlined in chapter 4.

This chapter is organized as follows: In section 2.2, I give a brief overview of the characteristics of grammaticalization. In section 2.3, I will zero in on the grammaticalization path of the demonstrative in particular, discussing Greenberg's (1978) classification of the stages of the definite article. In 2.3.2, I introduce the idea of 'lexical splits' (Roberts and Roussou, 2003), in which homophonous lexical elements are analyzed as constituting two different stages of grammaticalization, existing side-by-side in a language. I suggest that we apply the concept of lexical splits to demonstratives, which allows us to see the grammaticalization path of

demonstrative as broken up into smaller steps. Section 2.4 presents evidence from Late Latin for an intermediate stage, in the form of the recognitional demonstrative, a first-mention, distance-neutral use, which serves as the bridge between the distance-marked demonstrative and the definite article, the 'determinative.' Section 2.5 examines the grammaticalization of spoken Finnish *se* which, according to Laury (1997) has recently become a definite article. I argue that we can discern the same pattern in spoken Finnish that we saw in Late Latin, specifically, the development of a definite article from the distance-neutral recognitional demonstrative. In 2.6, I give evidence that the same progression we identified in Late Latin (distance marked → distance-neutral, recognitional demonstrative → determinative definite article) has occurred in English and Italian. In section 2.7, I address the issue of 'specialized' versus 'diffuse' grammaticalized forms, and in Section 2.8 I conclude the chapter.

2.2 General Characteristics of Grammaticalization

'Grammaticalization' is a term coined by Meillet (1912) which refers to the process whereby "lexical items develop into grammatical items and items that are already grammaticalized assume new grammatical functions" (Diessel 1999: 116). Lexical items are content words, constituting an open class. They include the major word classes: nouns, verbs, and adjectives. Grammatical items can be viewed as the 'glue' that holds content words together, and constitute a closed class, comprising elements such as prepositions, conjunctions, and auxiliaries. However, Hopper & Traugott (1993) suggest that the division between lexical and function words is not so clear-cut; rather, lexical and grammatical elements exist on a spectrum of grammaticality that ranges from free content words on one end to bound grammatical morphemes on the other. Simply put, grammaticalization can be seen as "the process by which an item moves towards the grammatical end of this cline" (Diessel 1999: 116).

Grammaticalization may affect all aspects of a linguistic sign: its phonology, its morphosyntax, and its semantics (Diessel, 1999: 117). Phonologically, items tend to shorten and coalesce with other elements in the process of grammaticalization: consider the progression of personal pronouns to clitic pronouns, for example, where clitic pronouns are usually phonologically reduced compared to the strong forms from which they derive (Lehmann 1995: 41): French *lui* (strong- 3sg) versus *le* (weak 3sg). Morphosyntactically, a grammaticalized element often becomes restricted in its use. In addition to being phonologically reduced, for example, clitics often appear affixed to other elements (like prepositions and infinitivals) and are confined to certain positions. As noted by Lehmann (1995: 41), in many languages (such as the Romance languages and Modern Greek), clitic pronouns cannot appear as the complement to prepositions; this position can only be filled by a full NP or a (strong) personal pronoun (cf. Italian *ho letto il libro* [$_{PP}$ *a *lo/lui/Gianni*]). Another frequent morphosyntactic change is that lexical items often lose their ability to inflect upon grammaticalization, as with the English modals (*She will(*s) arrive tomorrow*). Semantically, items become "semantically less concrete" and "pragmatically less significant" (Diessel 1999: 117), a process referred to as 'semantic bleaching,' a term which Diessel (1999) attributes to (Sweetser 1988).

I claim that one example of semantic bleaching is the neutralization of distance specifications in demonstratives. Hand-in-hand with semantic bleaching comes the acquisition of new grammatical functions: functions that either were once filled by a different linguistic element (a process called 'renovation' by Lehmann 1995), or functions that were previously unavailable in the language altogether (referred to as 'innovation' by Benveniste 1968, and Lehmann 1995). The development of the definite article in Romance from Late Latin *ille* would be considered a case of 'innovation' (Benveniste 1971), while reinforcement of *ille* by *eccu* to

create new demonstratives in Romance (for example, *eccu* + *ille* = Italian *quello*), represents a case of 'renovation'

To briefly illustrate the process of grammaticalization, I will reproduce the frequently cited example of the formation of the future tense in Romance, which demonstrates semantic bleaching, morphosyntactic change and phonological weakening. To express the future, Vulgar (Late) Latin had the periphrastic construction 'infinitive of main verb' + form of *habere* (to have). In this particular construction, *habere* did not have a possessive meaning[1]. *Habere* became phonologically reduced in Romance (from *habere* to –(*e)r* in French and Italian) and became agglutinative, giving rise to the synthetic future in Romance. This process is most transparent in French, as illustrated below. Note the similarities between the future endings (attached to the infinitive) and the present tense of *avoir* (to have):

(1) *Fut*: chanter-*ai*, chanter-*as*, chanter-*a*, chanter-*ons*, chanter-*ez*, chanter *ont*
avoir: ai, as, a, avons, avez, ont
(Roberts and Roussou (2003)

[1] On a decompositional approach to 'have', where 'have' is not seen as a lexical verb but rather a copula corresponding to 'be + to' (Benveniste 1960, Belvin and Den Dikken 1997 among others) we would have a different analysis of this construction. We might analyze the *amare habeo* construction on par with how Belvin and den Dikken (1997) analyze experiencer *have* constructions, as in *I had a strange man walk into my office*. These types of constructions share the basic properties of regular possessive constructions like *John has the car*, where we have a SC, the predicate of which is a PP (P_{DAT} *John*) and the subject an NP (*the car*). The predicate inverts with its subject, causing the spell-out of *have*. In experiencer *have* constructions, the subject of the small clause is a verbal proposition rather than an NP. In the case of *amare habeo*, the infinitive *amare* could be analyzed as the SC subject, although details would need to be worked out (for example, we would need to account for the surface word order *amare habeo*). In this analysis of *have*, the reanalysis of Latin *habere* into the future/conditional endings in Romance would be an example of grammticalization in which we have material that is already functional becoming even more grammaticalized (Diessel 1999).

Because grammaticalization is a gradual process, it is not unusual for new and old constructions to exist side by side in a language for some time. For example, Roberts and Roussou (2003) note that possessive (lexical) *habere* coexisted with *habere qua* future ending in Late Latin, and even persisted into French and Italian. According to Roberts and Roussou (2003), this kind of coexistence of the same phonological form expressing two different meanings can be attributed to a process of 'lexical splits.' The authors claim that "much of the allegedly continuous or cline-like nature of grammaticalization is due to multiple 'lexical splits,' where "the different readings attributed to a single lexical item correspond to different positions in which it may be merged" (36).[2] I argue that we should extend a lexical splits approach to distance-marked/distance-neutral homophonous demonstratives.

Grammaticalization has been argued to be a unidirectional process, meaning that lexical items may become grammatical, but not the other way around.[3] Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of grammaticalization is its universality: the evolution of functional elements follow certain paths termed 'grammaticalization channels' (Claudi et al. 1991: 221), meaning that a particular source consistently leads to the same target, across languages and throughout time. Lehmann (1995) claims that once we know the meaning and the syntactic function of a given category undergoing grammaticalization, its fate is largely predetermined. For example, adnominal demonstratives gravitate toward the definite article. However, Lehmann (1995) notes that elements may enter and exit the grammaticalization process at any stage. In fact, he notes

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[2] While Roberts and Roussou (2003) understand diachronic structural change as positional (the position in which element is merged) I will propose that structural change affects first and foremost a lexical element's extended projection, which I will refer to as its 'internal syntax' (cf. ch. 4). The internal syntax may then, of course, affect where the demonstrative is merged within the DP, but the instigating factor is 'internal' structural change.

[3] There are a few counterexamples to this claim in the literature, but they are controversial and generally considered poorly substantiated (Lehmann 1985).

that it is somewhat rare to find an element that has run through the whole process of grammaticalization from beginning to end. So, while the grammaticalization path of the demonstrative leads to the definite article, the diachronic evidence examined in this chapter suggests that there is an intermediate phase that the demonstratives passes through. Demonstratives may either remain in this intermediate stage or continue along to definite articlehood. Whether or not the demonstrative continues to evolve into a definite article in a given language may be affected by external factors, namely whether or not that language already has a definite article, and if it does, what stage of grammaticalization it is in (Harris 1977, Carlier et al. 2012, de Mulder and Carlier 2011). If the niche of the definite article is already filled, it is unlikely that the distance-neutral demonstrative will become reanalyzed as a definite article in that language.

2.3 Grammaticalization path of the adnominal demonstrative

Diessel (1999) distinguishes eighteen different grammaticalization channels that commonly originate from the demonstrative. He divides these channels into four groups, depending on their lexical source:

(i) Grammatical elements deriving from pronominal demonstratives (e.g. third person pronouns)
(ii) Grammatical elements originating from adnominal demonstratives (e.g. the definite article and noun class markers)
(iii) Grammatical elements that come from adverbial demonstratives (e.g. temporal adverbs)
(iv) Grammatical elements that originate from identificational demonstratives (e.g. nonverbal copulas).

My discussion of demonstratives here focuses on the grammaticalization channel that leads from the adnominal demonstrative to the definite article (and beyond).

It is a well-known fact that demonstratives historically give rise to definite articles. Take Latin *ille,* for example, which gives rise to the Romance definite articles: French *le/las/les*, Italian *il*/*i, la/le, lo/gli*, Spanish, *el/los, la/las*; Romanian *–ul, a, etc.* While there has been much attention given in the literature to the diachronic development of the definite article from the demonstrative, existing diachronic accounts focus on the definite article end of the spectrum, leaving the nuances of the demonstrative largely unexplored. Greenberg (1978) offers the most extensive account of the stages of grammaticalization of the definite article, and I briefly summarize his analysis below. I will then suggest that we expand Greenberg's thorough approach to the diachronic stages of the definite article to include sub-stages of the demonstrative as well.

2.3.1 Greenberg's (1978) stages of definite articles

Greenberg (1978) considers the demonstrative to be Stage 0 for the development of the definite article[4]. He contends that the point at which a Stage 0 gives way to a Stage I article is when the element becomes obligatory[5] in the context of a referent that is 'identified in general,' whether known from context, from general knowledge, or because it is a member of its class" (Greenberg 1978: 61-2). This is in contrast with the demonstrative, whose referent is identifiable only from the context. If further semantic weakening occurs beyond stage I, the article may extend its use from that of marking definiteness to that of expressing specific indefinite

[4] Although demonstratives do not always become definite articles, nor are they confined to this grammaticalization path (cf. the discussion of Diessel 1999 above).
[5] However, see my discussion of spoken Finnish (2.5) with regards to abandoning Greenberg's (1978) 'obligatoriness' clause.

information[6]. This is the stage II article. Roughly speaking, Stage II articles cover the area of definite and indefinite articles combined, where the article is extended to all kinds of nouns, not just 'identifiable' ones, except for a handful of unrelated cases[7]. On the morphosyntactic front, while Stage I articles can be free standing, Stage II articles are affixal. As languages progress towards Stage III, the choice between the articulated and non-articulated form of the noun is often taken over by rules of the grammar and the articulated/non-articulated distinction ceases to exist (Greenberg 1978: 63). At this point, there are two options open to a language: it is possible for the non-articulated form to generalize (as in Eastern Bantu languages without pre-prefixes), but most commonly it is the articulated form of the noun that becomes the norm, resulting in a Stage III noun marker. Greenberg (1990: 477) explains that in Stage III, the term 'article' is to be taken diachronically, in that these elements are derived from the article (and

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[6] 'Specific,' opposed here to 'generic,' is the use of such an article in contexts in which a "specific but unidentified item is referred to" (Greenberg 1978: 62). Hellan (1981) and Ioup (1977) characterize an NP as specific when "the speaker has an individual in mind as its referent" (from Enç 1991: 1).

[7] As Greenberg (1990) explains: "these non-articulated uses derive from the two ends of the determination spectrum" (477): they may lack the article because the NP is already specified for definiteness (as with vocatives, proper nouns, possessed nouns, or nouns appearing with a demonstrative); or the non-articulated uses may have to do with generic uses, which include: (i) negation, (ii) predication and (iii) adverbials:

(i)	negation:	je n'ai pas d'eau I not-have-PAS of-water "I don't have any water"	French
(ii)	predication:	Il est tailleur He is tailor "He's a tailor' (contrasts with the identificational use: "He is **the** tailor")	French
(iii)	adverbials:	Vado a piedi Go-1sg. at foot-PL "I'm going on/by foot"	Italian

Notice that the examples given are Stage I articles: French and Italian. The characteristic 'omissions' of the definite article outlined above are consistent from Stage I to Stage II, but do not persist into Stage III.

more distantly, the demonstrative), but have nothing functionally in common with the article. Stage III is described as the final stage where "the former article is a pure marker which no longer has any synchronic connection with definiteness or specificity" (Greenberg, 1978: 69).

Greenberg's (1978) classification is summed up in Table 2-1 below:

Table 2-1: Summary of Greenberg's (1978) classification of definite articles

	Stage 0	**Stage I**	**Stage II**	**Stage III**
Properties	The demonstrative (Greenberg does not discuss the specific attributes).	Article is compulsory, when referent is 'identifiable.'	Article has the combined function of definite and indefinite article.	Productive contrast between articulated and non-articulated forms has largely disappeared. If articulated form dominates, we get either a gender marker or a general noun marker.
Languages that exhibit this type of determiner	English *this/ that,* Italian *questo/quello*	Many European languages; Italian *il* and variants, French *le/la/les*, English *the,* German def. art. *der*	Common in African languages. Maasai *ol* [masc.], *en-* [fem]	Niger-Congo languages, Nilo-Saharan, *k-*

One aspect of Greenberg's classification that has been contended is the 'obligatoriness' clause on Stage I articles (see Epstein (1990) and Laury (1997) for two different perspectives). Laury (1997) argues, for example, that spoken Finnish *se* meets Greenberg's semantic criteria for Stage I articles, even though it is not (yet) obligatory in all cases where the referent is identifiable (cf. 2.5 for more discussion). We will see below that Late Latin (determinative) *ille* fits the same

description as Finnish *se*. Since the semantic definition of the Stage I definite article and its distributional criteria do not always align, we need to take a stand on which one to use as our yardstick. I will use the semantic criteria to identify a Stage I definite article: that is, if an element can be used to refer to something that is 'identified in general,' then it is a Stage I article. For example, one can identify the referent of 'the sun' by accessing general knowledge about our world (the fact that it only has one sun). A referent that is 'identified in general' differs from one that is identified due to previous mention or due to its presence in the immediate situation (as with referents of demonstratives).

2.3.2 Expanding Greenberg's classification: Stage 0_2

Greenberg admits that his categorization of the stages of the definite article is to some degree an idealization of the facts, since there is a good deal of overlapping and blurred edges between the stages of the definite article. Greenberg interprets this 'overlapping' phenomena as meaning that a particular definite article is on the border between two stages. I will take a different approach, however, taking my cue from Roberts & Roussou (2003). Working within a minimalist framework (Chomsky 1995, 2000) Roberts & Roussou argue that each stage of diachronic change is accompanied by structural change (see 4.5.1 for a detailed discussion). While diachronic change can appear gradual and sometimes fuzzy in nature, Roberts and Roussou argue that it is actually comprised of small increments of concrete and discreet structural change. This particular syntactic analysis of diachronic change is not compatible with an analysis where a single lexical entry can exist in a gray area, sometimes exhibiting signs of grammaticalization and other times not. Roberts and Roussou (2003) propose that if we have a situation in which a single phonological element appears to occupy two stages of

grammaticalization, we actually have two distinct lexical entries with different syntactic representations[8], occupying distinct places along the grammaticalization path.[9] In other words, languages could simultaneously have two distinct definite articles, for example, a Stage I and a Stage II article.

Applying the same logic to the class of demonstratives, I will argue that the spectrum of grammaticalization can be divided into discreet steps even at the beginning of the process. In other words, we can divide Greenberg's Stage 0 into sub-stages. In the next sections I will show that diachronic data from Late Latin and spoken Finnish point to one such division. In order to account for these diachronic facts, I suggest we take Greenberg's (1978) classification and expand it to include an intermediate stage of demonstratives, which I will tentatively call Stage 0_2. The proposal laid out in (2) represents the grammaticalization path that begins with a demonstrative and ends with a gender/noun marker:[10]

(2) Stage 0_1 → **Stage 0_2** → Stage I → Stage II → Stage III

Furthermore, our investigation of Late Latin and spoken Finnish reveals that Stage 0_2 is characterized by the lack of distance marking.

[8] While Roberts and Roussou (2003) focus on the difference in the 'external syntax' of these lexical splits (where they are merged), I will focus first and foremost on the differences in their internal syntax (their functional architecture).

[9] Although, see section 4.3.3.1.2 for an alternative to homophony.

[10] There are likely finer distinctions within Stage I, II, and III as well, but coaxing those out is not within the scope of the present work. See Löbner (1985) for a possible distinction within Stage I articles, that of pragmatic vs. semantic definiteness, and Ebert (1971) for the implementation of this distinction in the North-Frisian dialect of Ferhring; also Heinrichs (1954) for the Rhineland dialect of German and Hartmann (1982) for the Mönchen Gladbach dialect.

2.4 Diachronic evidence for Stage 0_2: Latin

Before looking at the data from Late (Vulgar) Latin, I will first give a brief outline of the demonstrative paradigm in Classical Latin. Classical Latin, in addition to being a null-subject language, also permitted object *pro*-drop; this means that the default pronoun was a zero anaphor (*pro*) and was used to track continuing topics, for example. To track discontinuous topics, the pronoun *is* (unmarked for distance) was employed. In order to focus the NP, either contrastively or emphatically, one of three demonstratives below was able to fulfill this function in Classical Latin, as well as the so-called identity marker, *ipse*.

(3) Classical Latin Demonstrative paradigm[11]:

(i) *hic* (close to speaker)

(ii) *iste* (close to hearer)

(iii) *ille* (distant from speaker and hearer)

Identity marker:

(iv)*ipse* (used to mark emphasis or contrast)

(adapted from Vincent 1997: 151)

The demonstrative paradigm underwent a shift in the transition from Classical Latin to Late Latin. One account of these changes is given by Harris (1978). While I will give a brief outline of his frequently-cited account below, I will ultimately take issue with his conclusions and adopt instead the analysis presented by Carlier & de Mulder (2010), outlined in 2.4.2.

[11] In Chapter 3 (3.3.7) I suggest that a combination of the [+/-speaker] and [+/-hearer] features can capture the distinctions expressed by three-term demonstrative systems like Latin. In order to keep matters simple for now, however, I will simply describe the distance specifications in terms of 'close to speaker,' 'close to hearer,' and 'distant from speaker and hearer.' When referring to demonstratives that are not marked for distance, I will use the term 'distance-neutral.' In Chapter 3 I will introduce specific terminology for distance marked/distance-neutral demonstratives, calling them *strong* and *weak*, respectively.

2.4.1 Late Latin: Harris (1978, 1980)

Harris (1978, 1980) argues that the following shifts occurred in the demonstrative paradigm from Classical to Late Latin: To begin with, he claims that *hic* (marking 'close to speaker') was lost, due most likely to sound changes that deleted both initial /h/ and many final consonants in Latin (Vincent and Harris 1988), leaving *iste* to take its place. Harris (1978) argues that the shift of *iste* into the 'close to 'speaker' slot caused *ipse*, which was previously used as an identity marker (signaling that the referent is identical to the aforementioned NP) to take *iste's* place as the demonstrative marking 'close to hearer.' In addition, the reported loss of anaphoric *is* (presumably due to phonological weakness), left *ille* to serve double-duty as a demonstrative marking 'distant from speaker and hearer,' and a general, distance-neutral anaphoric demonstrative: Harris' (1978) interpretation of the Late Latin demonstrative paradigm is represented in Table 2-2 below, alongside the Classical Latin paradigm:

Table 2-2: Classical and Late Latin demonstratives according to Harris (1978)

Properties expressed	**Classical Latin**	**Late Latin (Harris 1978)**
close to speaker	*hic*	*iste*
close to hearer	*iste*	*ipse*
distant from speaker and hearer	*ille*	*ille*
general anaphora (distance-neutral)	*is*	*ille*
emphasis or contrast	*ipse*	

Before proceeding, some clarification of terminology is in order. I take the term 'anaphoric' to refer to an element that is "dependent for its interpretation on being associated

with something else in the context" (Asher and Simpson 1994: 116). Anaphoric demonstratives contrast with what I will call the 'situational' use of demonstratives (Himmelmann 1996, Lyons 1999), which have a referent in the immediate surroundings (*e.g*. Can you please hand me **that towel?**).[12]

Note that one of the changes that Harris posits between Classical Latin and Late Latin is that *ille* takes over the role of *is* as a generalized (non distance-marked) anaphoric marker:

> . . . *ille*, while retaining at first at least its demonstrative functions, was also used both as a 'personal' and 'anaphoric' pronoun (these both also being [+definite, -proximity])[13], and additionally came to be used more and more pre-nominally (in Romanian, post-nominally) as the appropriate determiner to mark a particular nominal **unspecified in respect to proximity** [emphasis mine]. It is from this starting point that the systems of the modern Romance languages all derive." (Harris, 1980: 146-7).

While Harris clearly acknowledges the importance of *ille's* lack of distance specifications in the process of grammaticalization (stating in fact, that it is from the distance-neutral adnominal use that "the systems of the modern Romance languages all derive," see citation above), he nevertheless emphasizes *ille's* role as an anaphoric device (pronominal and adnominal) as a key development.[14] I will argue that this view is problematic in two respects[15]: the first, as we will

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[12] In this definition, 'anaphora' is a cover term for both backward anaphora and forward anaphora (the latter also called 'cataphora'), discussed in Chapter 3 (3.3.1.2), hence includes demonstratives specified for both 'close to speaker' and 'distant from speaker.'

[13] By [–proximity] Harris means unmarked for distance.

[14] See Diessel (1999) for a similar argument.

[15] In fact, the directionality of this progression (situational → anaphoric) is in itself controversial. Kempson (1975) and Heim (1982) claim that the anaphoric use is the basic one and the situational use is derived from that. As Lyons (1999: 160) notes, Kempson (1975) and Heim's (1980) view "is based on the assumption that definiteness is about familiarity (and by extension identifiability), and anaphora represents the paradigm case of familiarity." In other words, the

see below, is that it is not supported by the data in actual Late Latin documents (as pointed out by Carlier & de Mulder 2010).[16] The second problem is that the claim itself is based on data that is skewed in favor of anaphoric demonstratives. Lyons (1999: 334) points this out, that "given that the evidence for these early Romance developments is necessarily from texts rather than speech, we cannot expect to find much, if any, information about immediate situation reference, and this may distort conclusions." Since we have no recorded dialogue at our disposal from the critical time period, we are limited to using narrative/literary texts and historical documents, both of which contain very little (if any) direct dialogue, hence few occurrences of the demonstrative in its situational use. The conclusion that the definite article derives from anaphoric use may, therefore, simply be an artifact of the methods of investigation, and may not be a true reflection of actual language use during that time period. I conclude that definite articles do not necessarily derive from anaphoric demonstratives; in fact, as we will see, the evidence points to the opposite conclusion in the case of Late Latin and spoken Finnish, where definite articles derive from first-mention uses of demonstratives[17], in which the demonstrative is used non-situationally, without an antecedent in the discourse.

2.4.2 Late Latin: Carlier & de Mulder (2010)

Carlier & de Mulder (2010) reject the characterization of Late Latin put forth by Harris (1978) because, they argue, it is based on a comparison between Classical Latin and the picture

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anaphoric demonstrative has a referent that is identifiable and familiar due to the fact that it has been explicitly mentioned in the preceding discourse. Himmelmann (1996) suggests that anaphoric and situational uses developed in tandem (see 3.1 for more discussion).

[16] Nor is it supported by the Finnish data presented by Laury (1997).

[17] An example of a first-mention use with a definite article would be as in (a):

(a) *The president will give a speech tomorrow at noon*.

that emerges in Romance, rather than on actual Late Latin texts. For example, they claim that Harris' reason for positing the disappearance of *hic* and *is* in Late Latin has to do with the fact that these demonstrative forms did not survive into Romance. Bauer (2007: 117) shows that, in fact, *hic* is far from absent in Late Latin texts. She claims that *hic* occurs with high frequency in Late Latin texts, even after the phonological weakening cited by Harris had occurred (*iste*, on the other hand, is relatively infrequent). As for *ipse*, Carlier & de Mulder (2010) claim that Harris' characterization of *ipse* as a demonstrative marked for 'close to hearer' is likewise not instantiated in Late Latin texts. Rather, Carlier & de Mulder find that *ipse* continues in its function as an anaphoric demonstrative. According to Carlier & de Mulder, Harris' analysis of Late Latin *ipse* stems from the fact that Spanish, Portuguese and Catalan have three-term systems in which the middle terms (specified for 'close to hearer') are morphologically derived from *ipse*: Spanish *ese*,[18] Catalan *ese*, Portuguese *aqueix* (from *accu* + *ipse*). Furthermore, Carlier & de Mulder (2010) point out that Harris' conclusion seems to be at odds with the fact that not all Romance languages have a descendant of *ipse* in their demonstrative paradigms. For example, we have the following two-term systems in Romance, where the [+speaker] member of each pair derives from *ecce* 'behold' + *istu(m)* and the [-speaker] member from *ecce* + *illu(m)*:

(4)

Old French	close to speaker	= *cist*
	distant from speaker	= *cil*
Italian	close to speaker	= *questo*
	distant from speaker	= *quello*
Romanian	close to speaker	= *acest*
	distant from speaker	= *cel*

[18] In 3.3.8.1, however, I argue that Spanish *ese* is distance-neutral.

Even for languages that do have a three-term demonstrative system (like Spanish), however, some have argued that the three-term system is a product of innovation and not inherited directly from Latin. Silva-Villar & Gutiérrez-Rexach (2001) make this argument for Spanish, claiming that the three-part system could not have come directly from Latin, since the Latin system had already become a binary one.

The main difference between Harris' (1978) and Carlier & de Mulder's (2010) accounts of Late Latin, however, has to do with how these authors analyze the evolution of *ille.* While Harris argues that the definite article in Romance originates from the anaphoric demonstrative uses of *ille* in Late Latin, Carlier and de Mulder present evidence to the contrary, suggesting instead that it is non-anaphoric, first-mention use of *ille* which gave rise to the definite article. Carlier & de Mulder's discussion of how *ille* came to have this first- mention use is couched in a comparison between *ipse* and *ille* in Late Latin.

2.4.2.1 Competition between *ipse* and *ille:* Why *ille* won out

Carlier & de Mulder's (2010) empirical study of Late Latin is based on the Late Latin text *The Chronicle of the Merovingian Times*[19], written in Gaul by a certain Fredegarius in the 7th century and continued during the 8th century. In this text, Carlier & de Mulder find a high rate of occurrence of *ipse*, especially in relation to the relatively infrequent *ille*. They note that *ipse* "extends its frequency as marker of anaphora and competes in this role with *ille*" (Carlier & de Mulder, 2010: 4). This finding is surprising, in light of the fact that *ille* becomes the source for most definite articles in Romance. While the various empirical studies of Late Latin

[19] *Fredegarii Chronicurum liber quartus cum continuationibus*: The Fourth Book of the Chronicles of Fredegar, translated from the Latin with Introduction and Notes by J.M Wallace-Hadrill, London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1960.

demonstratives lead to remarkably diverse conclusions, as noted by Bauer (2007), one of the common findings among them is in fact the high frequency of *ipse* and the relatively low frequency of *ille*:

> What emerges, however—despite the diverse results—is the long-lasting strong persistence of the *hic* paradigm . . . the clear decrease with time in the use of *is* . . . the relatively infrequent occurrence of *iste* . . . **the high occurrence of *ipse* in some documents . . . and the fact that when it comes to frequency nothing seems to predict the strong survival of *ille* as definite article in Romance** [emphasis mine] **(**Bauer 2007: 120)

In fact, Aebischer (1948: 200-201) points out that *ipse* was robustly attested in a wide variety of genres and geographical areas, even in those areas where *ille* ultimately prevailed as source of the definite article.[20] In an analysis like Harris' (1978) where anaphoric demonstratives are taken to be the key link in the grammaticalization of demonstratives to definite articles, the fact that *ipse* did not win out as the source of the definite article is surprising. After all, *ipse* was a much more frequent anaphoric device than *ille*, as well as a more straightforward one, as we will see presently[21]. This means we need to look elsewhere to explain *ille's* ultimate dominance as

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[20] Aebischer (1948: 193) claims that the old texts reveal a period in which *ipse* "reigned unchallenged" from Gascony through Languedoc, Quercy, Rouergue and Catalonia to the South, and to the East as far as the Alps of Provence, as well as parts of Italy, Sicily, and Sardinia. *Ipse,* however*,* survived in only Balearic Catalan and Sardinian, generalizing at the expense of *ille* for strong third person pronouns and articles, while clitic object pronouns continue the *ille* forms (see below examples from Sardinian).

Sardinian

a. third person non-clitic pronouns: *issu, ussa, issos, issas*
b. articles: *su, sa, sos, sas*
c. clitic object pronouns: *lu, la, los, las*

[21] Furthermore, Carlier & de Mulder (2010) point out that, if anaphoricity were the integral property that positioned a demonstrative to become a definite article, we would need to explain why the exclusively anaphoric element *is* in Latin did not develop into a definite article in any of

the source for the Romance definite article. According to the authors, while both *ille* and *ipse* served as anaphoric devices in Late Latin, there was a key difference between them, and it was this difference that determined *ille's* 'advantage' in becoming the definite article in Romance. Below I illustrate the different roles of *ipse* and *ille* in their anaphoric use.

Carlier & de Mulder (2010: 14) characterize *ipse* in Late Latin as "reinforcing the continuity of the referential chain when this chain is endangered," endangered either due to ambiguity (in cases where there is another potential referent) or because the referent is unexpected. For instance, in the example below, *ipse* is used to refer back to *Leudesius* in order to ensure co-reference, since the referential chain is somewhat unexpected:

(5) Inde egressus Crisceco uilla ueniens in Pontio, Leudesio sub dolo fidem promitti se simulans fefellit, facto placito ut coniuracione facta cum pacae discederint. Sed Ebroinus fallaciter agens ut solebat, conpatri suo insidias praeparans **ipsum Leudesium** interficit; [...] (Fredegarius, *Continuationes,* § 2)

'Then Ebroin left Baizieux and reached the domain of Crécy in Ponthieu. He there deceived Leudesius by making a false promise that they should arrange a meeting and, after having exchanged loyalty oaths to each other, should part friends. But, as usual, Ebroin acted treacherously. He laid an ambush for his godfather and slew **this same Leudesius**.'

De Mulder & Carlier (2011) point out that, in the above example it is unexpected that the main character, after giving his word to his godfather *Leudesius*, would kill *that very same man*. Hence *ipse* is used to ensure proper identification of the referent. The authors note that *ipse's*

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the Romance languages, as noted by Himmelmann (1997: 98), but instead, faded into oblivion, as the passage from Bauer (2007) above points out.

function as an identity maker make it a more straightforward anaphoric device than *ille*, which explains why it was more common in Late Latin:

> In comparison with the demonstrative *ille*, mobilizing the context of utterance for a new identification of the referent, the identity marker *ipse* conveys a simpler and more precise referential instruction as an anaphoric device. As long as *ipse* and *ille* coexisted, this precision of its referential instruction turned out to the advantage of *ipse* and explains why it was more frequent.
> (Carlier & de Mulder 2010: 18)

But of course, it was *ille* that eventually triumphed. Carlier & de Mulder argue the ultimate dominance of *ille* can be traced back the fact that it was used to introduce a new identification of an aforementioned referent, as in the example below:

(6) Quando Deo conplacuit, Aubedo ligatarius dirictus a Chlodoueo regi causam legationes usque ad Chrotharium regem Langobardorum, Papia coinomento Ticino ciuitatem Aetaliae peruenisset, cernens regina, quam sepius in legationem ueniens uiderat et ab ipsa benigne semper susceptus fuerat fuisse retrusam, quasi iniunctum habens exinde inter citera Chrothario regi suggessit quod **illam parentem Francorum** quam reginam habuerat, per quem etiam regnum adsumserat, non dibuisset umiliare; [...] (Fredegarius § 71)

'In God's good time, Aubedo, sent by King Clovis on an embassy to the Lombard King Rothari, reached the Italian city of Pavia, or Ticinum. Realizing that the Queen, whom he had often seen during his missions and who had always received him well, was incarcerated, he put it in the course of the conversation to King Rothari, as if on instructions, that it would have been better not to humiliate **that relative of the Franks** who had been given to him as Queen and who had been instrumental in obtaining the throne for him.'

In (6), *ille* signals a new identification of a previously mentioned referent: in this case, *the Queen* is newly identified as *that relative of the Franks*. So, while *ipse* communicates the idea that the NP is *in fact the same* as a previously mentioned NP (despite the fact that the referential chain is unexpected), *ille* attributes a new property to a previously-established NP, inviting the hearer to view the referent in a new light. Carlier & de Mulder (2010) suggest that it is the property of establishing a new identification of a referent that subsequently made *ille* possible in first-mention contexts. Specifically, they suggest that the progression from demonstrative *ille* to definite article *ille* occurs via a particular first-mention use, the so-called 'recognitional' demonstrative (Himmelmann 1996).

2.4.2.2 The recognitional demonstrative

The recognitional use was productive in Late Latin and unique to *ille*. The following is an example of a recognitional use demonstrative in Late Latin, written on the back of a royal charter of the Saint Dennis' Abbey:

(7) Hic sunt carctas de illi thellenio de **illo mercatho** (Les diplômes originaux des Mérovingiens, ed. Ph. Lauer and Ch. Samarin, quoted by Selig 1992: 166).
'Here are the documents of the toll of **the (litt. that) market'** (= of our market, of the well-known market organized on the day of the Patron Saint).
(from Carlier & de Mulder 2010: 20).

In the example above, the referent of *illo mercatho* is not previously mentioned, nor is it present in the immediate situation of utterance. In Lyons' (1999) terms, the referent is not 'immediately accessible.' Instead, the referent is identifiable thanks to specific knowledge shared by the interlocutors, due to common experience in the past (Himmelmann 1996). This is illustrated in

the gloss above: ***our*** *market*, *the* ***well-known market*** *organized on the day of the Patron Saint*. Due to the fact that recognitional demonstratives do not have a referent that is physically present in the immediate context or previous discourse, De Mulder (2006) claims that they represent a sort of 'porthole' into definite article-hood. In 3.3.5.1, I argue that the recognitional demonstrative actually *coerces* the immediate accessibility reading of the referent: it is used to create a 'special effect,' cuing the reader to interpret the referent as being in the immediate situation or context. In this way, the recognitional demonstrative is distinguished from the definite article, which does not have the pragmatic presupposition of immediate accessibility.

More importantly, I argue that the recognitional demonstrative is distinguished from distance-marked demonstratives.[22] While a distance-marked demonstrative helps the hearer identify the referent by specifying the location of the referent (whether it is close to or distant from the speaker), a recognitional demonstrative merely signals to the hearer to interpret the referent as if it were in the immediate situation. In other words, the intermediate stage of grammaticalization that Late Latin *ille* exhibits can be characterized as *distance-neutral*.[23]

2.4.2.3 From recognitional demonstrative to determinative: Stage 0_2 to Stage I

De Mulder & Carlier (2011) note that the recognitional demonstrative is reanalyzed as a definite article when "the anchorage in the speech situation is lost and the use of the article no longer requires specific knowledge shared by the speaker and hearer to be activated to identify the referent of the noun phrase" (6). We see this transition with so-called 'determinatives' (Quirk 1979: 217, Himmelmann 1997: 77-80, Diessel 1999) in Late Latin. Determinatives serve

[22] Consider the fact that French *ce*, a distance-neutral demonstrative, appears robustly in the recognitional use. See 3.3.5.2 for more discussion.
[23] Note that distance-neutral demonstratives are not limited to recognitional uses. In 3.3.4, I give examples of other pragmatic uses of distance-neutral demonstratives.

as relative markers, indicating the nominal head of a relative clause. As Himmelmann points out, determinatives have none of the semantic properties of the demonstrative.[24] Like recognitional demonstrative, determinatives are unique to *ille* and very productive in Late Latin.[25] An example of a determinative from Carlier & de Mulder (2010:16) is given below:

(8) **Homines illos** quos Waiofarius ad defendendam ipsam ciuitatem dimiserat clementiam sue pietatis absoluit dimissisque reuersi sunt ad propria. (*Continuationes*, § 43).
'Of his goodness he showed mercy to ***the*** *(litt.* ***that)*** ***men*** that Waiofar left there to defend the city, and dismissed them to go off home.'

In the above example, the referent of *homines illos* is not present in the immediate situation or the previous discourse, and unlike the recognitional demonstrative, it is not identifiable to the hearer due to specific, shared knowledge between speaker and hearer. The referent is identified only by the presence of the relative clause. Diessel (1999: 108-9) notes that determinatives have "lost the discourse pragmatic properties of a (recognitional) demonstrative and serve a purely grammatical function." I will consider determinatives a Stage I definite article.

In addition to the semantic profile of determinatives which, in my framework, qualify it as a Stage I definite article, Swedish offers formal evidence that determinatives are grammaticalized elements. As noted by Diessel (1999), Swedish determinatives have a special form: While Swedish adnominal demonstratives always co-occur with a definite article that is

[24] I argue that English and Italian both have determinative uses as well, which will be discussed in 2.6.
[25] Carlier & de Mulder (2010: 7) note that *ille* was so frequently associated with a relative clause in Late Latin that in some cases *ille* morphed with the relative pronouns *qui/cui*, resulting in the following forms: nominative singular *illi*; dative *illui*, *lui*, *ilaei*, *lei*.

suffixed to the noun, as shown in (9), determinatives occur with a bare noun—the definite article affix is crucially missing, as in (10), from Diessel (1999: 136):

(9) **De** turist-er- **na** fick mycket sol. demonstrative
DEM tourist-PL-**DEF** got lot.of sun
'Those tourists got a lot of sun.'

(10) **De** turist-er som åkte till Island fick mycket sol determinative
DEM tourist-PL REL went to Island got lot.of sun
medan **de** turist-er som åkte till Italien fick
while **DTM** turist-PL REL went to Italy got
regn varje dag
rain every day
'Those tourists who went to Iceland got a lot of sun, while those tourists who went to Italy had rain every day.

In (9) the noun has the suffixed article *–na*, while this suffix is missing on the noun in the case of the determinative, in (10).[26] The fact that the determinative is formally distinguished from the demonstrative in Swedish in terms of syntactic behavior provides further evidence for analyzing it as something distinct from the demonstrative. While I consider this 'something' a definite article, I will refer to it as the 'determinative definite article,' in order to indicate that this element occurs in a specific context (i.e. with a relative clause). The determinative has not yet become what I will call a 'diffuse' definite article, being obligatory in all cases where the referent is identifiable. Whether or not the 'determinative definite article' becomes 'diffuse' or not has to do with external factors, as I will discuss in 2.7, namely on whether or not there is a

[26] Diessel (1999: 136) notes that the nominal head of the relative clause usually appears with a definite article suffixed to the noun; it is only in the case of the determinative that it does not.

niche to fill—in other words, whether or not the language has an existing definite article (and what 'stage' the article is in).

Because Classical Latin lacks a definite article, it leaves an open niche to be filled by *ille*. The prediction is that *ille* would eventually develop into a diffuse (or obligatory) Stage I article, which is of course is borne out in Romance. Carlier & de Mulder (2010) provide evidence that *ille* had already begun to expand its uses beyond the determinative in the 6th century. For instance, in the following example (cited in Carlier and de Mulder, 2010: 9), the content of the nominal expression itself is sufficient to identify the referent (the bishop):

(11) Ductus itaque sanctus Eugenius ad regem, cum **illo Arrianorum episcopo** pro fide catholica decertavit. (Gregory of Tours, cited from Trager 1932: 173)
And so the holy Eugenius was led before the king, and disputed with **the bishop [lit. that bishop] of the Arians** in defense of the catholic faith.

We see that in (11) above, *ille* cannot be characterized as having an immediately accessible referent, nor is it a recognitional demonstrative. In this example, *ille* appears to have extended its use beyond cases where the referent is identifiable by the relative clause. Carlier and de Mulder suggest, however, that Late Latin *ille* was not yet a full-blown definite article, not yet obligatory in all cases where the referent was identifiable.[27] We can characterize the progression of *ille* from Classical Latin to Late Latin and into Romance, in the following way: While in Classical Latin *ille* was a demonstrative specified for 'distant from speaker and hearer,' contrasting with 'close to speaker' *hic*, it underwent a lexical split in Late Latin and developed a

[27] According to Putzu & Ramat (2001), the full-fledged definite article begins to appear in the first vernacular texts, from the 9th century on.

new, first-mention (distance-neutral) use, showcased by the recognitional demonstrative.[28] A further lexical split yielded the definite article, represented robustly in Late Latin texts by the determinative use. In Romance, this specialized definite article became diffuse, being used in all cases where the referent is identifiable. This progression is illustrated below:

(12)	*ille*:	distant from speaker and hearer	CLASSICAL LATIN
	↓	↓	↓
a.	*ille*$_1$:	distant from speaker and hearer	LATE LATIN
	↓	↓	
b.	*ille*$_2$:	distance-neutral (recognitional)	
	↓	↓	
c.	*ille*$_3$:	specialized definite article (determinative)	
	↓	↓	↓
Italian *il,* French *le,* etc.		diffuse definite article	ROMANCE

[28] It does not necessarily follow that the *distance-marked* → *distance-neutral* progression we have noted for Late Latin is restricted to the domain of recognitional demonstratives. While the nature of the Late Latin corpus does not lend itself to situational uses, French provides a good example of a language that has a distance-neutral demonstrative that is used situationally. In the following example (repeated from above), *ce livre* could mean *this book* or *that book*:

(a) [pointing]
Je veux lire **ce** livre.
I want to-read **DEM** book
'I want to read this/that book.'

2.4.3 Summary of Latin

In the previous discussion of Late Latin, based on Carlier & de Mulder (2010), we have seen that anaphoricity is not the bridge to definite articlehood, as evidenced by the fact that (i) other more straightforward anaphoric devices—such as *ipse* and *is*—did not triumph as the definite article in Romance, and (ii) the most frequent use of Late Late *ille* was not an anaphoric but a first-mention use, unique to *ille*. In addition, we have seen that it was a certain first-mention use, the recognitional use (which had the special effect of brining the referent into the immediate situation) that ushered in the definite article. The recognitional demonstrative provides evidence for an intermediate stage of grammaticalization in Late Latin, Stage 0_2, which I characterize as the distance-neutral demonstrative. It is from the recognitional use that the demonstrative becomes further grammaticalized, being used obligatorily with a relative clause.[29] In these cases, there is no appeal to specific, shared knowledge and no 'special effect' of bringing the referent into the immediate situation. These are the determinative uses of *ille*, the early occurrences of the definite article.

In the preceding sections of this chapter, we have seen that diachronic analyses carry an inherent challenge that they limit the investigator to certain types of texts, namely historical documents, which present a biased sample of language use. We noted this effect in connection with the perceived importance of anaphoricity in the grammaticalization of demonstratives in Late Latin (Harris 1978 and Diessel 1999), since historical documents contain very few situational uses. Optimally, we would like to examine a language that is undergoing

[29] On the other hand, the RC is not obligatory with recognitional demonstratives. While recognitional demonstratives are frequently used with relative clauses or other modifers, as in (a), they can also appear without modification, as in (b):

(a) *Remember that song we always used to sing?*
(b) *Remember that song?*

grammaticalization of the demonstrative in real-time; in other words, a language that is in the process of acquiring a definite article, to see if the data line up with our observations from Late Latin. In the next section, I will discuss the emergence of the definite article in spoken Finnish, based on Laury's (1997) comprehensive corpus analysis of *se*.

2.5 Diachronic evidence for Stage 0_2: Spoken Finnish

Finnish has traditionally been characterized as having no definite article, but Laury (1997) challenges this assumption, arguing that in spoken Finnish, the demonstrative *se* has been reanalyzed as a definite article. To provide a brief background, Finnish is traditionally described as having three demonstratives: *tämä, tuo,* and *se* (plural form*, ne*). Laury notes that while there is general agreement among Finnish grammarians that *tuo* and *se* are 'more distal' than *tämä*, there is disagreement as to where *tuo* and *se* fit on the distance scale: by some accounts, *tuo* is more 'distal' and *se* a middle-distance demonstrative, by other accounts the situation is reversed. Still other researchers claim the *se* is distance-neutral (Laury directs the reader to Larjavaara 1985: 28 for discussion). Working within a functionalist framework, Laury abandons the distance-based analysis of demonstratives altogether and adopts instead a dynamic approach, which makes reference to interlocutors' 'cognitive spheres' rather than actual physical distance. I will discuss the implications of this approach further below.

Laury (1997) gives an extensive corpus-based study on spoken Finnish demonstratives, using both a conversational corpus and a narrative corpus, each featuring exclusively recorded speech. The conversation corpus contains eight conversations, recorded between the late 1950s through the 1990s. The narrative corpus contains 22 recorded narratives dating from the 1800s through the 1990s. While I cannot do justice to Laury's extensive corpus study here due to

considerations of space, I wish to highlight two key points that are especially pertinent to our analysis.

The first point is that, contra to what Harris (1978) and Diessel (1999) argue, and in line with what Carlier & de Mulder (2010) find for Latin, definite articles do not directly derive from the anaphoric use of demonstratives in spoken Finnish. In fact, as the frequency of the emergent definite article *se* increases in spoken Finnish, the anaphoric uses of *se* decline. The second significant and related point I wish to take away from Laury's study is that there is an explosion of first-mention uses in the later corpora, among which is the recognitional use.[30] On analogy to Late Latin, I argue that these recognitional demonstratives in spoken Finnish represent Stage 0_2 of grammaticalization, the distance-neutral demonstrative.

2.5.1 Decrease in anaphoric use precedes the definite article use of *se*

Laury's study of narratives from the 1800s to the 1990s show that, as the frequency of *se*-marked NPs increases, anaphoric uses of *se* actually decrease. Laury outlines the following progression, from the late 1800s corpus, to the 1930s and '40s corpus, to the modern corpus (1960s through the early 90s). In the 1800s corpus *se* is used to express focus, in reference to a prominent entity, prominent usually because it was present in the previous discourse. The referent of *se* is important in the discourse and mentioned frequently. In the 1930s/40s corpus, *se* is still used for previous mention of prominent referents as in the 1800s corpus, but crucially, a new type of demonstrative use emerges. This is a first-mention use, where noun phrases are identifiable either (i) from specific, shared knowledge, or else (ii) from already evoked frames of

[30] Note that Laury (1997) does not use this term to refer to these uses.

knowledge.[31] I will characterize the former use as the recognitional demonstrative, and the latter, as the Stage I definite article. In the later corpora, discourse prominence ceases to be a factor, and first-mention use takes center stage. In the modern corpus, the referent only has to be 'identifiable' in general to be *se*-marked.

While I will give examples of *se*-marked demonstratives from Laury's corpus in section 2.5.2, the goal of the present section is to highlight the trend of the emergent definite article *se* away from anaphoric use and towards first-mention use. As the table below illustrates, as the total number of instances of *se*-marked NPs increases (for lexically-identifiable referents), the number of *se*-marked NPs used anaphorically decreases. While Laury does not provide data for the most recent corpus in terms of number of anaphoric uses, we can at least see the trend that develops from the earlier two corpora.

Table 2-3: Inversely proportional change in total number of *se*-marked NPs and the number of *se*-marked NPs used anaphorically through time

Date of Corpus	Percentage of total lexically-identified NPs that are *se*-marked	Percentage of total *se*-marked NPs that track a previously-mentioned NP
1800s	29%	96%
1930s & 1940s	35%	54%
1970s, 1980s, 1990s	47%	unspecified

On the flipside, Laury notes that new but identifiable referents marked with *se* are nonexistent in the 1800s corpus, but are very robust in the 1930s and '40s corpus, accounting for around half of

[31] This means that the speaker can infer the referent thanks to an association with a previously mentioned referent (this is also referred to as the 'associative anaphoric use'), as in (a):

(a) *I turned on the stove but the burner wouldn't light.*

Here, the burner is identifiable thanks to the previous mention of the stove (and the hearer's knowledge that stoves have burners). The 'associative anaphor use' is typical of the definite article, but not the demonstrative.

the occurrences of *se*. I claim that the trend we see in Finnish, the decrease in anaphoric use and the increase in its use for new but identifiable referents, mirrors the situation we see in Latin. Specifically, while the anaphoric use of *se* is dominant in the early corpus, the further down the grammaticalization path it gets (and hence the closer to the definite article), the less frequent anaphoric uses become and the more the first-mention, recognitional use takes center stage. We can take this as evidence that the recognitional use of *se* 'foreshadows' the appearance of the definite article use of *se*.

2.5.2 The grammaticalization of *se*

We have mentioned that Laury eschews a distance-based analysis of demonstratives and adopts instead a dynamic approach, which makes reference to interlocutors' 'cognitive spheres' rather than actual physical distance. Laury claims for example, that *tämä* indicates that the speaker knows the referent is included within his or her sphere. The use of *tuo* "places the referent outside the speaker's current sphere," while the speaker uses *se* to "place the referent in the addressee's sphere" (Laury 1997: 59). Under this dynamic approach to deixis, distinctions between demonstratives are more broadly defined than in distance-based systems, which allows the dynamic approach to account for uses that would appear exceptional in a distance-based system. For example, while Laury's characterization of *se* captures situational uses in which the referent is physically close to the hearer (as with distance-based systems), it also encompasses uses where the hearer is able to identify the referent due shared knowledge or background (as with recognitional demonstratives), or even through world knowledge (as with the definite article). In other words, in Laury's framework, *se's* association with hearer becomes so broad that it includes cases where the referent is 'identified in general,' applying to the definite article

uses. I argue that the dynamic-based system casts its net too wide, and that the finer distinctions definable only within by a distance-based system are distinctions worth preserving. One of these distinctions is the distance-marked/distance-neutral distinction.

Recall that Laury (1997) characterizes the evolution of *se*-marking in the three narrative corpora in the following way: In the 1800s corpora, referents are *se*-marked when they are identifiable through previous mention. In the 1930s/40s corpora, the main use of *se* is to mark new referents; either (i) referents that are identifiable due to shared background between speaker and hearer or (ii) ones that are identifiable through evoked frames of knowledge. In the modern data, "if the referent is identifiable, the noun phrase is *se*-marked whether the referent is new, given or accessible" (Laury 1997: 226). While we can see the cline of grammaticalization of *se* expressed above through the different corpora, Laury's framework does not provide us with the tools to formally distinguish between the different uses of *se* in terms of semantic features, since his characterization is so broadly defined. Within a distance-based approach to demonstratives, however, we can interpret the progression of *se* in terms of grammaticalization, from a distance-marked demonstrative to a distance-neutral one, and finally, to a definite article. Beginning in the 1903s and '40s corpus we find all these uses of *se*, suggesting that *se* has undergone a lexical split.

We can see the distance-marked instance of *se* most clearly in the situational use, an example of which is given below from the 1930s/40s corpus. The speaker, the host, is directing her son to pour some schnapps for two of the guests.

(13) Simo [ku sa olet siel] **se snapsin** vartija,
Simo as 2SG be-2SG SE-LOC-ADE **SE schnapps-GEN** guard
'Simo, since you are the schnapps guard over there,'

The schnapps is being referred to with *se* because it is near the hearer and distant from the speaker, as evidenced by the mother's use of the locative *siel* (over there). In this case, I claim that s*e* is clearly marked for [+hearer].

There is another use of *se*, in the 1930s/40s (and modern) corpus, however, that was absent from the early corpus. This is a first-mention use, which I characterize as the recognitional demonstrative. Laury (1997) notes that in Finnish, "a typical example of a referent whose pathway of identifiability is a shared background is a referent for which a proper name is used" (20). In the example below, the narrator is quoting his neighbors, who are appealing to the fact that the narrator knows people from the surrounding areas in order to entreat him to round up some additional grain:[32]

(14) Sanovat, sinä kun tunnet enemmän tuolta **niitä** **Riäkkylän**,
Say-3PL 2SG as know-2SG more TUO-ABL **SE.PL-PRT** **R.-GEN**
niitä **hovilaissii** ja
SE-PL-PRT **manor- ADJ-PL-PRT** and,
'They said, since you know more of **the Riäkkylän [people]** from over there, the [people] from **the manor house** and,'
(Laury 1997: 21-22).

Laury points out that *se* is used here because the speaker assumes that the hearer shares his knowledge of the Riäkkylän people.

Another example of a recognitional demonstrative from the 1930s/40s corpus is found in an excerpt from an interview. The purpose of the interview was to get informants to talk about

[32] To remain true to Laury's data, I will follow his convention of glossing *se* as SE, and translating into English as *the*, even when *se* fits the profile of the demonstrative in my framework, as in its recognitional use (for example, ***those*** *Riäkkylän people*, ***that*** *bridge*, ***that*** *house*).

their personal experiences. Here, the interviewer is asking the informant if he remembers a time before there was a bridge in a nearby narrows, and the residents had to cross by ferry:

(15) Muistatteko te hyvin, sen ajan vielä,
Remember-2PL-Q 2PL well SE-ACC time-ACC still
kun siellä . . . Laitilan salmessa,
as SE.LOC-ADE Laitila-GEN narrows-INE
ei ollut **sitä** . . . **siltaa**
NEG be-PST.PPL **SE-PRT** **bridge-PRT**
'Do you remember well, still the time when in the Laitila narrows, **the bridge** wasn't [there]'. (206)

The use of the word *muistatteko* 'remember' indicates that the referent of the *se*-marked NP is to be found in the memory of the hearer, and recalls Himmelmann's (1996) description of recognitional demonstratives, whereby "recognitional demonstratives often appear with phrases like *you know* or *remember*" (Himmelmann 1996: 237).

Recognitional uses also occur in the modern corpus (1970s-1990s). Consider the following example, involving a conversation where one of the interlocutors had previously been talking about a time when her family had to live in a small space. The other interlocutor then picks up the thread of the conversation and utters the following:

(16) Te 'rakenitte **sitä** **taloo** sitte vai
2PL build-PST-2PL **SE-PRT** **house-PRT** then PTC:
'you were building **the house** then, right?'
(Laury, 1997: 118)

Laury (1997: 120) notes that, "by using the determiner *se* in the noun phrase *sitä taloo*, the speaker places the referent in the addressee's sphere; she indicates that she expects the addressee, whose childhood home the noun phrase refers to, to be able to identify the referent.

All the uses of *se* above have the earmarks of a recognitional demonstrative and mirror the recognitional uses we saw in Late Latin in section 2.4.2.2, repeated below:

(17) Hic sunt carctas de illi thellenio de **illo mercatho** (Les diplômes originaux des Mérovingiens, ed. Ph. Lauer and Ch. Samarin, quoted by Selig 1992: 166).
'Here are the documents of the toll of **the** (litt. **that) market'** (= of our market, of the well-known market organized on the day of the Patron Saint).
Carlier & de Mulder (2010: 20)

In Finnish, then, we witness the same progression identified in Late Latin: the development of a distance-neutral first-mention use as a turning point in the evolution of the demonstrative towards a definite article.[33] Recognitional *se* has lost its specifications for [+hearer], but places the referent in the immediate context by signaling that the referent can be located in the shared memory/experience of the speaker and hearer. Once this pragmatic presupposition of immediate accessibility is gone, we are left with the definite article.

[33] I focus on recognitional demonstratives here because they figure prominently in Laury's corpus, but I assume that *se* can be used distance-neutrally in all of its functions, including situational use. The difficulty of finding diachronic data on situational demonstratives has already been underscored with respect to ancient languages like Latin (as historical documents contain a paucity of direct speech, where the situational use of demonstrative is normally showcased). However, even in Laury's conversational corpus, which has a higher likelihood of showing situational demonstratives than historical documents, very few examples of situational demonstratives are offered, as many examples that Laury cites are excerpts from stories told within a conversation, and therefore have the properties of narratives rather than dialogue.

Another new-mention use that arises in the 1930s/40s corpus is when the referent of the demonstrative is identifiable though evoked frames of knowledge:[34]

(18) ... sitte **se ... lautturin** ... **emäntä**ï sitten ni, se
then **SE** **ferry.**$_{\text{AGT.G}}$ **wife.**$_{\text{N}}$ then so SE
autto meitii sitt sinne
help.$_{\text{PAST 1PL.P}}$ then se.$_{\text{LOC-CAT}}$
'then the ferrytender's wife then, she helped us then'

In this example, there has been no previous mention of either the ferry tender or his wife, nor is the speaker 'reminding' the hearer of a common experience or memory. To identify the referent the speaker can appeal to general knowledge, namely the knowledge that ferries have ferrytenders (and ferrytenders possibly have wives). In these types of examples, which are new to the 1930s/40s corpus and continue into the modern corpus, *se* is no longer associated with accessibility of the referent, but only identifaibility (Laury 1997: 188). This is the benchmark for Greenberg's Stage I definite article. Another example of definite article *se* comes from the modern corpus. In the example below the speaker is telling about her participation in a confirmation ceremony:

(19) Ja **se** **pappi** . . . tuli justiisa **niite**, **sen**,
and **SE** **minister** come.PST just **SE-PL-GEN**, **SE-GEN**,
sen . . . **ehtoollisen** kanssa ja, **sen** **leivän** kansa
SE-GEN eucharist-GEN, with and **SE-GEN** bread-GEN with
'And **the minister** came just then with the, the, with **the eucharist** and, with **the bread.'**
(Laury 1997: 228).

[34] I limit my discussion here to *demonstrative* uses of *se*, as exemplified in the first (bolded) instance of *se* below. In the second occurrence of *se* in the example below, *SE autto* (*she helped*) we are dealing with a 3rd person pronoun, whereas the third instance of *se* (*sinne*) is a locative-adverbial form.

None of the *se*-marked NPs in the example above (the minister, the eucharist, the bread) have been previously mentioned in the narrative. All three NPs in the example above are new mentions, identified according not to any kind of specific, shared knowledge, but through general knowledge that is part of a particular speech community (for example, the knowledge that confirmation ceremonies involve ministers and communion). The fact that *se* appears robustly without a relative clause in its 'identifiability' uses in Laury's data indicates that *se* is more 'diffuse' than the Late Latin determinative *ille*. Still, however, *se* is not obligatory in all uses where the referent is identifiable. Laury notes that, in the modern corpus, *se* is used with common nouns whose referent is identifiable, **except** for body-part mentions, terms of kinship, and uniques, as well as nouns preceeded by other demonstratives or genitive determiners (Laury 1997: 261). However, she notes that, even though it is not (yet) obligatory, *se* has gone well beyond Greenberg's Stage 0, and meets the semantic 'benchmark' of Stage I, meaning it is used with referents that are 'identified in general.' The progression of Finnish *se* can be characterized in the following way:[35]

(20)

Distance-marked *se* →	**distance-neutral *se*** →	**definite article *se***
situational uses	recognitional uses	first-mention uses, referent known through general knowledge

[35] Note that the graphic above merely represents a snapshot of the data we were able to observe in spoken Finnish and is not meant to be a comprehensive analysis of the grammaticalization of *se*. For example, while Laury's corpus does not provide any evidence of distance-neutral situational demonstratives due to the nature of the corpus, the prediction is that they should exist alongside recognitional uses.

Looking at spoken Finnish provides us with the unique opportunity to observe a language whose demonstrative is currently in the midst of grammaticalization. What we find in the case of spoken Finnish is that there is a progression from *se* being used primarily as an anaphoric device for prominent referents, to being used robustly in first-mention use with non-prominent referents. One of these first-mention uses is the recognitional demonstrative. Our findings mirror the progression we noted in Late Latin, bolstering my claim that demonstratives pass through an intermediate stage where they are distance-neutral before becoming definite articles. Like Late Latin, Finnish *se* has continued along the grammaticalizaiton path, splitting off into a ('diffuse') definite article.

2.6 Evidence of grammaticalization in English and Italian demonstratives

The progression in Late Latin from recognitional demonstrative to determinative definite article, which I argue instantiates the progression from Stage 0_2 (distance-neutral) demonstrative to Stage I definite article, is argued by Himmelmann (1996, 1997) and Diessel (1999) to be a cross-linguistic phenomenon.[36] I will show that English and Italian both instantiate this progression, as they both have recognitional demonstratives and determinatives.[37] Because this diachronic evidence is obscured by synchronic phenomena (in the sense that grammaticalized forms exist alongside homophonous ungrammaticalized forms), it has received little notice in the literature. The following examples show English and Italian recognitional demonstratives:

[36] In Himmelmann (1996), the author merely makes this assumption, but he follows up it up with evidence in a subsequent work (1997).

[37] An initial query of two native speakers suggests that Romanian, too has both recognitional demonstratives and determinatives. Pending verification from more native speakers, we suggest that Romanian as well has a gramaticalized demonstrative, *acela* (and its more colloquial counterpart *ăla*).

(21) a. ENGLISH: I couldn't sleep last night. **That dog** (next door) kept me up.
(Diessel, 106, due to Gundel et al. 1993: 278).

b. ITALIAN: Non ho potuto dormire la notte scorsa**. Quel cane** (dei vicini) mi ha tenuta sveglia.

(22) a. ENGLISH: I wonder what happened to **that crazy tour guide**. Remember him?

b. ITALIAN: Mi chiedo che cosa sia successo a **quella guida turistica matta**. Te lo ricordi?

In section 3.3.5.2 I provide evidence from French that recognitional demonstratives are not distance-marked. Therefore, examples like the ones above suggest that English and Italian have a distance-neutral demonstrative (the recognitional demonstrative), in addition to their distance-marked counterparts:

(23) English: a. *that, those*$_1$ = [-speaker]
b. *that, those*$_2$ = distance-neutral (recognitional)

(24) Italian a. *quello/a, quelli/quegli/quei/quelle*$_1$ = [-speaker]
b. *quello/a, quelli/quegli/quei/quelle*$_2$ = distance-neutral (recognitional)

It appears that *those/quelli*[38] have undergone further grammaticalization in English and Italian, as witnessed by existence of determinatives in these languages:

[38] I will use *quello*/*quelli* as cover terms for the singular and plural forms of this demonstrative, respectively.

(25) English determinative:
. . . provision was made for payment for unemployment relief by nation-wide taxation rather than by a levy only on **those states** afflicted with manpower surplus.
(Himmelmann 1997: 78)

(26) Italian determinative
[. . .] **quei partiti** che sono in Germania federale contrari al nucleare [. . .
those parties that are in Germany federal opposed to-the nuclear . . .
'the parties that are opposed to nuclear power in Germany . . . '
(la Repubblica, 4 July 1986, p. 6, cited in Berruto 1989: 78)

From the data above, we can conclude that the recognitional demonstrative has split off into a determinative definite article in English and Italian, on par with what we saw for *ille* in Late Latin. The determinative can be conceived as a specialized definite article (I will discuss the issue of *specialized* versus *diffuse* grammaticalized forms below). The historical progression of *that/those* and *quello/quelli*, then, is shown below:

(27) [-speaker] demonstrative → dist-neutral recognitional dem → determinative
that/those → *that/those* → *those*
quello/quelli → *quello/quelli* → *quelli*

2.7 Avenues of grammaticalization: specialized or diffuse

As we have seen above, the distance-neutral demonstrative may be limited to a particular pragmatic environment in a given language, as with recognitional *that* in English and

recognitional *quello* in Italian. Once a distance-neutral demonstrative is specialized in a particular function, it seems reasonable to assume that two avenues are available to it: (i) from a specific pragmatic niche, the distance-neutral demonstrative may extend its uses to include all pragmatic uses of the demonstrative, becoming a 'diffuse' distance-neutral demonstrative. In Chapter 3 I will discuss some 'diffuse' distance-neutral demonstratives: French *ce*, German *dieser*, and Spanish *ese*.[39] Alternatively, the distance-neutral demonstrative may remain specialized, as we have seen with the current state of English recognitional *that* and Italian recognitional *quello*. If the distance-neutral demonstrative remains specialized, it may undergo further grammaticalization in that context, as we witnessed in 2.4.2.3 with recognitional *ille* giving way to *determinative ille* in Late Latin (which later became diffuse), and English and Italian determinatives. Alternatively, it may become a diffuse definite article early on, as appears to be the case with Finnish *se*. The grammaticalization algorithm described above is graphically represented below:

(28)



[39] Although I will not take a stand on whether these 'diffuse' distance-neutral demonstratives are 'born' diffuse, or whether they have become diffuse via a specialized use.

Thus far my analysis has focused on the lower path, which is bolded, in which the demonstrative passes through a specialized distance-neutral use (the recognitional use) on its way to becoming a (specialized) definite article, the determinative. There is nothing in my theory, however, that rules out definite articles being derived from other pragmatic uses of distance-neutral demonstratives (like situational use demonstratives), as illustrated by the dotted lines in the figure above. While the default assumption is that definite articles derive from all pragmatic uses of distance-neutral demonstratives, the nature of historical documents makes this difficult to verify.[40]

2.8 Chapter summary

I have suggested that we can look through the diachronic lens of grammaticalization in order to get a clearer picture of the synchronic status of the demonstrative. Specifically, I argue that, by identifying systematic changes in meaning over time, we can reconstruct the semantic make-up of the source item (as well as its corresponding 'internal' structure). I argue that distance-marking is one of the semantic properties that gets bleached in the process of grammaticalization: specifically, it is the [+/-] value for the feature [speaker] that gets lost.

In the first part of the chapter I discussed the general tenets of grammaticalization and outlined Greenberg's (1978) arguments for the diachronic stages of the definite article. I suggested that the blurred edges occurring around the boundaries of these stages should be interpreted along the lines of 'lexical splits,' where two homophonous lexical items have

[40] As pointed out earlier with respect to Latin, the nature of historical documents does not provide many cases of situational use demonstratives. Even in Laury's study in spoken Finnish, however, where he analyzed a conversational corpus and a narrative corpus, there was a paucity of situational uses cited. I hypothesized that this is due to the fact that the conversational corpus contained many examples involving stories told within conversations, rather than actual dialogue.

differing syntactic representations and represent different stages of grammaticalization. With that perspective in mind, I analyzed the progression from *ille* in Classical Latin to Late Latin, and adopted Carlier & de Mulder's (2010) argument that a crucial turning point in the grammaticalization of *ille* was its appearance in first-mention uses, specifically, the recognitional use demonstrative. I argued that the recognitional demonstrative represents an intermediate stage of grammaticalization, and that it is distance-neutral, a point I argue for extensively in 3.3.5.2. We then looked at a modern-day language, spoken Finnish, in order to perceive the process of grammaticalization happening in real-time. We saw that the state of affairs in spoken Finnish is strikingly similar to that of Late Latin, where anaphoric usage decreased through time and first-mention, recognitional uses become increasingly more prominent.

Taking the insights we gained from Late Latin and Finnish, we were able to identify tell-tale signs of grammaticalization of the demonstrative in English and Italian. I argue that these languages have recognitional demonstratives as well as determinatives, suggesting that the [-speaker] demonstratives in those languages have split off into (i) a distance-neutral demonstrative, which has lost its [-] value for [speaker], and (ii) a determinative definite article, with no [speaker] feature at all.

By showing that there is a cross-linguistic tendency for demonstratives to lose their distance-specifications before being used to express referents that are 'identified in general,' I have provided evidence for two distinct phases of grammaticalization: distance-marked and distance-neutral. In turn, I have set the stage for analyzing distance-marked and distance-neutral demonstratives as synchronically distinct lexical items. While this chapter has served as the diachronic lens, Chapters 3 and 4 will sketch out the synchronic picture that has come into focus in the course of our discussion here.

CHAPTER 3: SEMANTICS OF THE DEMONSTRATIVE

3.1 Introduction

Part of the reason why demonstratives have escaped a precise semantic characterization in the literature has to do with fact that they have many different pragmatic uses. Himmelmann (1996) identifies four different pragmatic types of demonstratives, as shown in (1)-(4).

(1) Situational use: refers to an entity in the situation of utterance

Ex: Can you help me with **this box**? I'm about to drop it.

(2) Tracking use: also called 'anaphoric use' by many researchers, the tracking use "makes reference to (usually major) participants which helps the hearer keep track of what is happening to whom" (Himmelmann 1996: 226).

Ex: A. Did you go the Cubs game last weekend?

B. No, I can't believe I missed **that game** - it may be the only one they'll win this year.

(3) Discourse deictic demonstratives: refer to propositions in the surrounding discourse instead of prior NPs.

Ex: A: Management has reconsidered its position. They've promoted Fred to second vice president.

B: **That's** false.

(Diessel 1999: 101)

(4) Recognitional demonstratives: "involves reference to entities assumed by the speaker to be established in the universe of discourse and serves to signal the hearer that the speaker is referring to specific, but presumably shared, knowledge" (Himmelmann 1996: 240).

Ex: I wonder what ever happened to **that crazy tour guide**. Remember him?

In the discussion that follows, I will refer to Himmelmann's 'tracking use' as 'anaphoric.'[41] In chapter 2 I defined anaphors as elements that are dependent for their interpretation on being associated with something else in the discourse. I contend that this 'something else' can be an NP or a proposition. In other words, I consider 'discourse deixis' to constitute a sub-case of anaphora, in which reference is to a proposition rather than to an NP.[42] We are then left with (i) the situational use (ii) the anaphoric use and (iii) the recognitional use.[43] The question I wish to address here is whether or not these demonstrative uses are semantically and syntactically distinguished one from the other, or if are we simply dealing with different pragmatic uses of the same entity, as Himmelmann suggests.

In what follows, I will argue that there are only two kinds of demonstratives, distance-marked and distance-neutral, and that this semantic distinction cuts across the pragmatic uses of the demonstratives identified above.[44] For example, while in Chapter 2 I gave diachronic evidence for distance-neutral demonstratives in the form of recognitional demonstratives, in this chapter I will provide examples of distance-neutral demonstratives that can be used situationally and anaphorically. In addition to identifying the two demonstrative types proposed above, distance-marked and distance-neutral, I also provide criteria for distinguishing demonstratives from definite articles (giving us reason, for example, to analyze the 'determinative' as a definite article). Hence, this chapter accomplishes two main objectives: (i) it identifies what constitutes a demonstrative, semantically, in terms of semantic features, as opposed to other elements like

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[41] In Chapter 4 I will use the term 'Tracker,' but in a different sense than Himmelmann (1996) uses the term 'tracking.'

[42] C. Roberts (2002) shares this view.

[43] In addition to these pragmatic uses of the demonstrative, we have another use, the determinative, discussed in Chapter 2, which I argued is semantically and syntactically distinct from the other uses in that it is a definite article.

[44] The recognitional use, however, is specifically distance-neutral.

(definite) articles (ii) it identifies the semantic properties of the two types of demonstratives I argued for in Chapter 2, distance-marked and distance-neutral demonstratives.

The chapter is generally organized around the three major features I identify for the demonstrative: the [(+/-) speaker] feature, the [+contrastive] feature, and the [+identifiability] feature. In 3.2, I begin my discussion by arguing for a parallel between Cardinaletti and Starke's (1999) strong and weak pronouns and what I will call strong and weak demonstratives, corresponding to distance-marked and distance-neutral demonstratives respectively. In 3.3, I introduce the idea of the [(+/-) speaker] feature and discuss its import in strong demonstratives (section 3.3.1) and in weak demonstratives (section 3.3.2). In section 3.3.4, I will discuss an instance of the 'diffuse' weak demonstrative, French *ce*, while in section 3.3.5 I discuss a 'specialized' weak demonstrative, the recognitional demonstrative (in Australian languages and German in particular). In 3.3.7, I introduce three-term demonstrative systems, and show how the middle term in these systems is vulnerable to grammaticalization, using Spanish *ese* as a case study. In 3.4, I discuss the property of contrastiveness, which is encoded by a [+contrastive] feature on demonstratives, arguing that demonstratives are contrastive in such a way that their contrast set can remain implicit. Finally, in 3.5 I argue that the demonstrative has a [+identifiability] feature that ties it, both synchronically and diachronically, to the DP projection. Section 3.6 concludes the chapter and gives a summary of our findings.

3.2 Strong and weak demonstratives

One of the major challenges of teasing apart demonstrative uses has to do with terminology—specifically, how to capture the insight that we are dealing with sub-divisions within a previously established class. To this end, I propose to retain the familiar term

'demonstrative' but to make finer distinctions within that class. I will appeal to Cardinaletti and Starke's (1999) seminal work on pronouns, and call distance-marked demonstratives 'strong demonstratives' and distance-neutral demonstratives 'weak demonstratives.' I retain the term 'demonstrative' for two reasons: (i) I believe that both strong and weak demonstratives have something that definite articles do not, and (ii) we might as well call this property 'demonstrativity' since it is familiar, as long as we can qualify it in a way that distinguishes between the two types ('strong' and 'weak').

Cardinaletti and Starke (1999), henceforth C&S, identify three classes of personal pronouns: strong, deficient, and weak (weak pronouns are considered a subset of deficient pronouns).[45] Strong and weak pronouns vary in syntactic, semantic, morphological and prosodic ways.[46] Syntactically, strong forms can be coordinated and modified, while weak forms generally cannot be. In addition, the examples below show that weak forms are generally not stressable:

(5) Strong form (Italian *lei*):
Luigi saluta LEI/ lei e suo padre /solo lei.
'Luigi greets HER/her and her father/just her'

(6) Weak form (Italian clitic *la*)
Luigi [*LA/*la e sua madre/*solo la] saluta.
Intended interpretation: 'Luigi greets [HER/her and her mother/just her]'

It is important to note, however, that the use of stressability as a diagnostic for strength is an idealization of the facts in the literature that has followed C&S's (1999) seminal work. C&S

[45] For the sake of clarity and symmetry, I will simply refer to *non*-strong forms as 'weak.'
[46] Note that strong and weak demonstratives do not show all of these distinctions.

actually claim that weakness and stress are not mutually exclusive: rather, the generalization is that weak elements cannot bear stress *unless* "they refer to an entity which is 'already prominent in the discourse'"(154). Strong pronouns, on the other hand, do not have this requirement: they may be stressed when the discourse referent is not prominent. The conditions under which strong pronouns may be stressed are complex, but the important point to take away is that stress is not a failsafe diagnostic for strength in pronouns, as is sometimes assumed. Cardinaletti and Starke state that "both deficient and strong pronouns are identically stressable and usable in ostension" (154), and whether or not a pronoun takes stress is determined by external factors. I make a similar argument for demonstratives. Both strong and weak demonstratives are stressable,[47] while definite articles are not.[48]

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[47] Recognitional demonstratives are an exception, in that they cannot be stressed: **Do you remember THAT crazy tour guide?* I will suggest that stress is not compatible with the pragmatics of the recognitional demonstrative, perhaps because the contrast set of the recognitional demonstrative is not made available until after the hearer has brought the referent into the immediate context from his memory.

[48] I will briefly note an exception to this generalization, illustrated in the example below, due to Abbott (1999):

(a) THE person who could have convinced me to join that club just quit himself.

Abbot argues that stress highlights the uniqueness supposition of the definite article: what (a) conveys is the idea that there is only one person in the speaker's mind who could have convinced her to join the club. She notes that "the contrast is one of uniqueness vs. plurality, not familiarity vs. novelty" (Abbott 1999: 1). That this is the case becomes more evident when we contrast the stressed definite article with the stressed indefinite article, as in (b).

(b) That wasn't A reason I left Pittsburgh, it was THE reason.

In this example, the point is being made that there was one single reason for leaving Pittsburgh. However, Abbot points out that there are cases where the definite article can be stressed even where the referent in question is not unique. In such cases, the definite article is arguably being used to create a special effect, to create the *impression* of a unique referent. As seen in my example below, it is obvious that Main Street Bistro is not literally the *only* place (restaurant, bar, etc) in town, even though we may replace *THE place* with *the only place* to achieve a similar effect:

(c) Main Street Bistro is THE place to be on a Friday night in this town.

(d) Main Street Bistro is the only place to be on a Friday night in this town.

What the speaker is trying to convey is that Main Street Bistro is *the only place that is worth being* on a Friday night. As Abbott puts it: the use of a stressed definite article is

The difference in syntactic behavior between strong and weak pronouns illustrated above corresponds to a semantic distinction. Strong pronouns are limited to referring to human referents, while weak pronouns can refer to both human and non-human referents. C&S illustrate this with Italian. The third person feminine nominative pronouns, *esse* and *loro*, behave differently with regard to coordination and reference, and also with respect to what kind of entity they may refer to. *Loro*, a strong pronoun, may be coordinated but is limited to human referents, while weak *esse* cannot be coordinated but may refer to both human and non-human entities.

			<+hum>	<-hum>
(7)	a. ***Esse***	(*e quelle accanto) sono troppo alte.	yes	yes
	b. ***Loro***	(e quelle accanto) sono troppo alte.	yes	no
	3PL, FEM, NOM	(and those besides) are too tall/high		

In light of these distribution facts, Cardinaletti and Starke propose that strong and weak pronouns differ with regards to their feature composition: strong pronouns are specified for [+human], while weak pronouns lack this feature.

The difference in speaker composition just discussed leads to another proposed distinction between strong and weak pronouns, which is that weak pronouns are syntactically deficient.[49] C&S attribute the lack of a [+human] feature in weak demonstratives to missing syntactic structure: strong pronouns project a CP layer, which brings in the [+human] feature, while weak pronouns are lacking this piece of structure (C&S 1999: 33). I argue that a similar

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"invoking standard Gricean mechanisms to arrive at the hyperbolic understanding" (3). In other words, the stressed definite article is a sort of 'special effects' definite article designed to create the impression of uniqueness, in the same way that the 'special effects' recognitional demonstrative is designed to create the sense of immediate accessibility (see 3.3.3).

[49] Weak pronouns also tend to be morphologically smaller than their strong counterparts: consider the strong pronoun *lui* (he) vs. the weak pronoun *il* (he) in French.

structural impoverishment occurs in the grammaticalization of the demonstrative, which I discuss in depth in 4.5.2. My claim regarding demonstratives differs slightly from Cardinaletti and Starke's (1999) analysis, however, in that I do not claim that the [+/-speaker] feature of strong demonstratives goes missing altogether in weak demonstratives, but rather, it is not specified for a value (analogous to Tortora's 1997 analysis of weak *there*, cf. section 3.3.2).

Cardinaletti and Starke (1999) argue that strong and weak pronouns are not necessarily instantiated by distinct morphological forms. In fact, they claim that the majority of the strong/weak pronominal pairs in the world's languages are homophonous. They show that the same properties that were shown for Italian *loro* and *esse* in (7a,b) hold for French *elles* (*they* $_{\text{FEM-PL}}$), which is the form for both the strong and the weak pronoun. C&S show that the French translation of the Italian examples exhibits the same effects, even though there is no phonological variation between the weak and strong forms. In (8) below, we see that coordination will not support the non-human reading (C&S 1999: 145):

			<+hum>	<-hum>
(8)	a. Elles	sont trop grandes.	yes	yes
	b. Elles et celles d'à coté	sont trop grandes.	yes	no

The authors conclude that, despite phonological identity, we are dealing with two different classes of pronouns, *elles*$_1$ which patterns with *loro* in being strong, and *elles*$_2$ which patterns with *esse* in being weak. The idea that phonological identity does not always indicate syntactic identity brings us back to grammaticalization and the idea of 'lexical splits' (Roberts and Roussou 2003), as discussed in chapter 2. Under our account, *elles*$_2$ would be analyzed as a grammaticalized version of *elles*$_1$. Similarly, I argue that strong and weak demonstratives

correspond to two stages of grammaticalization, which may exist side-by-side in some languages. The upcoming sections are dedicated to investigating the semantic properties of weak and strong demonstratives.

3.3 Decomposing the demonstrative: the [(+/-)speaker] feature

3.3.1 Strong demonstratives are specified for [+/-speaker]

What property characterizes demonstratives? If we look to the literature, we see that demonstratives are considered to be the quintessential deictic elements. 'Deixis' comes from a Greek word meaning 'pointing' or 'indicating' (Lyons, 1977) and is in fact still involved in the notion of ostension (Lyons 1977), where an object is identified by pointing. In its broader sense, 'deixis' has come to refer to how some aspect of the speech situation is exploited in order to pick out a referent. As Diessel (1999) puts it: "Deictic expressions are linguistic elements whose interpretation makes crucial reference to some aspect of the speech situation" (35). This is not generally the sense of *deixis* that is used in conjunction with demonstratives in the literature, however. By far the most common use of the term 'deixis' in the demonstrative literature is a more specific use, in which proximity to/distance from the deictic center (the speaker) takes center stage.[50] In other words, *spatial* deixis is normally implied when deixis is used to describe demonstratives.[51]

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[50] Kirsner (1979, 2011), proposes another view of deixis with respect to demonstratives, defining deixis as constituting "an instruction to the hearer to seek out and attend to some referent" (2011: 97). On Kirsner's view, deixis is a semantic concept that is distinct from distance-marking, which he calls 'location' (but see 4.3.2.1 for a discussion of why we should not conflate distance-marking with the concept of *location*).

[51] It is important to note that there are many sub-types of deixis, of which spatial or place deixis is only one: we also have person deixis, time deixis, social deixis and discourse deixis (cf. Levinson 1983 for the latter two).

The following definition by Lyons (1977: 636) sums up this point of view:

> By deixis is meant the location and identification of persons, objects, events, processes and activities being talked about, or referred to, in relation to the spatiotemporal context created and sustained by the act of utterance and the participation in it, typically, of a single speaker and at least one addressee.

I assume demonstratives to be deictic in the more general sense described by Diessel (1999) above, which has to do with contextual anchoring rather than locating a referent with respect to the deictic center.[52] However, due to the inconsistent manner in which 'deixis' is used in the literature, I have chosen to avoid this term altogether. When it is necessary to refer to the property of a demonstrative to locate an object in space or time, I will continue to refer to the demonstrative as distance-marked (or *strong*). Formally, I propose that this distance-marking is encoded by a [+/-speaker] feature, with [+speaker] indicating 'close to speaker' and [-speaker] indicating 'distant from speaker.' The key difference between my proposal and the majority of other semantic accounts of demonstratives in the literature is that I do not see the distance specifications as a property of *all* demonstratives, but only of strong ones.[53]

The feature [speaker] plays a role in various accounts of so-called 'deictic' elements which have the speaker as their reference point, like locative adverbs (*here* and *there*) and personal pronouns (see Poletto 2000, Tortora 1997, Cinque 1972, Fillmore 1975, Vanelli 1995). For example, Tortora (1997) employs the [speaker] in her discussion of (what she refers to as) weak and strong *there*: strong *there* is specified for [-speaker] whereas weak *there* is unspecified

[52] In this respect, I agree with the following statement by Hanks (1992: 52) cited in Himmelmann (1996: fn 21): "The standard assumption that space is always foundational to deixis is an inconvenient fiction not borne out comparatively."
[53] In traditional terms, one could say that I view all demonstratives to be deictic in the broad sense, but only strong demonstratives to be spatially deictic.

for [speaker] (see 3.3.2 for more discussion). The [speaker] feature also plays a role in Poletto's (2000) study of subject clitics in Northern Italian dialects (NIDs). Poletto (2000) argues that subject clitics in NIDs are merged in different positions according to what person feature they encode. For example, the [+ speaker] distinction corresponds to 'first person' and is encoded in the clausal structure, in the form of a dedicated functional head, SpeakerP. By positing the existence of a [speaker] feature for demonstratives, therefore, I follow established approaches to speaker-oriented expressions.

3.3.1.1 The [+/-speaker] feature in situational demonstratives

The [+/-speaker] distinction is relatively transparent in demonstratives that refer to an entity in the immediate situation. As discussed in Chapter 2, these types of demonstratives are called 'situation use' or 'situational' demonstratives (Himmelmann 1996, 1997: Lyons 1999).[54] The following example of a situational demonstrative shows the [+/-speaker] feature at work:

(9) [speaking to a salesperson in a clothing store]
I don't like the way **this**$_{\textbf{[+speaker]}}$ **parka** fits—it's too tight in the arms. I think I'll try **that**$_{\textbf{[-speaker]}}$ **parka** [pointing across the room] instead.

In this example, a [+speaker] demonstrative (*this*) is used to indicate a referent that is near the speaker; in this case, the parka that the speaker is currently wearing. The [-speaker] demonstrative (*that*), on the other hand, points to a referent that is distant from the speaker. Situational demonstratives contrast with 'anaphoric' demonstratives, which I defined in Chapter 2 as elements whose interpretation is dependent on being associated with another referential

[54] Diessel (1999) prefers the term 'exophoric,' adopted from Halliday and Hasan (1976).

element in the linguistic context. However, in the next section I will show that anaphoric demonstratives are like situational demonstratives in that they can express a contrast between [+speaker] and [-speaker].

3.3.1.2 The [+/-speaker] feature in anaphoric demonstratives

In the semantic literature, anaphoric demonstratives have traditionally taken second seat to situational demonstratives. Kaplan's (1978) seminal work on demonstratives, for one, has nothing to say about anaphoric demonstratives. By definition, a demonstrative in Kaplan's sense is an expression that is accompanied by a 'demonstration,' a physical pointing in space. On this conceptualization of 'demonstration,' anaphoric demonstratives get left out of the picture.[55] The tendency to treat situational demonstratives as having primacy over anaphoric ones may be rooted in the widely held belief that, historically, it is situational demonstratives that give rise to anaphoric demonstratives, not the other way around. For example, Diessel (1999: 118) describes the grammaticalization of demonstratives as an ongoing process which starts with exophoric (situational) demonstratives and leads to endophoric (anaphoric) demonstratives (and ultimately ends with the definite article), a claim that I disputed in chapter 2.[56] Kempson (1975) and Heim (1982), however, make the opposite claim—that the anaphoric use is basic, while Himmelmann (1996) argues that situational uses and anaphoric uses developed in tandem. While I will not take a stand on this issue at present, I wish to make the point that there is no reason to treat anaphoric demonstratives as somehow less 'demonstrative-like' than situational ones. In the next section I

[55] C. Roberts (2002), however, extends the notion of 'demonstration' to include anaphoric reference.

[56] In Chapter 2 I showed that in Late Latin and Finnish the definite article does not come directly from an anaphoric demonstrative, but rather from a first-mention use.

will show that anaphoric demonstratives can express a [+/-speaker] contrast just like their situational counterparts.

Often implicit in the viewpoint that anaphoric demonstratives are derived from situational ones is the idea that anaphoric demonstratives have been stripped of their distance specifications. As I will illustrate with the examples below, this assumption is inaccurate. While distance-neutral demonstratives are sometimes specialized in an anaphoric function (Latin *ipse* for example) there are many more distance-neutral demonstratives that are *not* limited to anaphoric use. Egyptian Arabic, for example, has a single demonstrative, *da*, which is unmarked for distance and can be used either anaphorically or situationally (Lyons 1999: 112)[57]. The Siouan language of Lakhota is another example: Lyons (1999: 113) reports that, in addition to its three-term distance-based demonstrative system, Lakhota has an additional 'general purpose' (i.e. weak) demonstrative, *'e*. French *ce/cette/ces*, German *dieser* and Spanish *ese/esos/esa/esas*, all of which I will discuss further on in this chapter, are additional cases of weak demonstratives that can be used either situationally or anaphorically. Importantly, I argue that anaphoricity is not synonymous with weakness in demonstratives, nor the other way around: these two aspects of demonstrativity are independent of one another.

Lyons (1999) claims that the 'close to speaker/distant from speaker' contrast at work in anaphoric demonstratives is not a spatial one, but rather a temporal one. He suggests that the [+/-speaker] distinction (terminology mine) in anaphoric demonstratives can be understood as essentially a temporal contrast, analogous to the spatial one expressed by situational demonstratives. The contrast between [+speaker] and [-speaker] in anaphoric demonstratives can be most clearly seen in instances where backward anaphoric demonstratives are contrasted with

[57] Lyons notes that *da* is not a definite article, since Egyptian Arabic has a separate form for that *ʔil*.

forward anaphoric demonstratives (also called 'cataphoric' demonstratives, where the referent of the demonstrative is located in the discourse that follows the demonstrative). In the examples below, backward anaphoric *that* contrasts with forward anaphoric *this*.[58] In the temporal dimension of the discourse, a forward anaphor is 'right in front of' (or close to) the speaker, and the backward anaphor is 'distant from' the speaker:

(10) a. I wanted to tell you **this/*that** before you hear it from someone else: I'm taking a job in London and will be leaving next month.

b. I'm taking a job in London and will be leaving next month. There. I've been dreading having to tell you **that/?this**.

(11) a. You're going to smile when you hear **this/*that** little piece of news: The New Yorker just called--the caption you submitted for the cartoon was accepted and will run next week's issue.

b. The New Yorker just called--the caption you submitted for the cartoon was accepted and will run in next week's issue. I knew **that/?this** little piece of news would bring a smile to your face.

As we can see, when the referent of the demonstrative NP follows the demonstrative (an instance of 'forward anaphora') only the [+speaker] demonstrative is felicitous. When the referent precedes the demonstrative NP ('backward anaphora'), a [-speaker] demonstrative is strongly

[58] This example contains what researchers have referred to as 'discourse deixis' demonstrative use, which means that the referent of the demonstrative is a proposition rather than a prior NP. I argued in the introduction to this chapter that discourse deixis is a specific case of regular anaphoric reference.

preferred.[59] The forward/backward anaphoric distinction, therefore, is one way in which the [+/-speaker] distinction is manifested in anaphoric demonstratives. However, the [+/] value of the [speaker] feature can also set up a contrast between two backward anaphoric references. We will discuss these cases below.

C. Lyons (1999) also notes that in many languages, the [+/-speaker] distinction serves to disambiguate between two referents mentioned in the previous discourse, in terms of a recent vs. remote contrast: a [-speaker] demonstrative is used to identify a referent further back in the discourse, while a [+speaker] one is used for the more recent mention (161), mimicking the use of 'former' vs. 'latter.'[60] Italian uses pronominal demonstratives in this manner, as the following example from Vanelli (1995) illustrates, where *queste* refers back to the eggs, and *quello* to the butter:

(12) Ho comprato burro$_1$ e uova$_2$: queste$_2$ erano fresche, ma quello$_1$ era rancido.
have-$_{1SG}$. buy-$_{PPT}$ butter and egg-$_{PL}$: these BE-$_{3PL.IMP}$ fresh, but that BE$_{3\text{-}SG.IMP}$ rancid
'I bought butter and eggs: the former were fresh, but the latter was rancid.'

Vanelli (1995) comments on an additional role of the [+/-speaker] feature of *questo* and *quello*, distinct from that of communicating 'former' vs. 'latter'. Consider Vanelli's example below, in which the statement in (13) is accompanied by three possible follow-up sentences, indicated by (a), (b) and (c):

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[59] It appears that the restriction on backward anaphora being expressed by a [-speaker] demonstrative is not as rigid as the restriction on a forward anaphor being expressed by a [+speaker] demonstrative. I suggest that this difference is due to the fact that we can also get a [+/-speaker] distinction within backward anaphoric reference. I will discuss these cases below.

[60] Furthermore, Lyons (1999) points out that, even in languages that have a specialized distance-neutral anaphoric demonstrative, the distance-marked demonstratives can be used anaphorically when it is necessary to create a "recent-remote contrast" between referents (114).

(13) Ho ricevuto una lettera da Carlo.
have-$_{1SG}$. received-$_{PPT}$ a letter DA Carlo
'I received a letter from Carlo.'

a. ***Nella* (in *tale*) lettera** mi diceva che era stato molto malato.
In-the (in such) letter me-$_{DAT}$ tell-$_{3SG.IMP}$ that BE-$_{3SG.IMP}$ BE-$_{PPT}$. very sick
'In the (in such) letter he told me that he had been very sick.'

b. In ***quella* lettera** mi diceva che era stato molto malato.
In that letter me-$_{DAT}$ tell-$_{3SG.IMP}$ that BE-$_{3SG.IMP}$ BE-$_{PPT}$. very sick
'In that letter he told me that he had been very sick.'

c. In ***questa* lettera** mi diceva che era stato molto malato.
In this letter me-$_{DAT}$ tell-$_{3SG.IMP}$ that BE-$_{3SG.IMP}$ BE-$_{PPT}$. very sick
'In this letter he told me that he had been very sick.'

Vanelli characterizes the difference between (a), (b) and (c) in the following way:

(a) the speaker communicates to the hearer that the referent is located in the verbal context (anaphora).
(b) the speaker communicates to the hearer that the referent is located in the verbal context (anaphora), and in addition, that the *referent is positioned* at a point in time distant from the speaker (308).
(c) the speaker communicates to the hearer that the referent is located in the verbal context (anaphora), and in addition, that the *referent is mentioned* at a point in the discourse that is near to the moment of utterance. (308).

We are most interested in the differences between the demonstrative uses, between (b) and (c). In these examples, [+speaker] anaphoric *questa* communicates information about the location of the antecedent with respect to the moment of utterance, while [-speaker] anaphoric *quella* gives

information about the actual letter itself, the denotatum;[61] namely, that it is located at a point in time distant from the speaker. I will refer to the [+/-speaker] distinction that Vanelli points out for anaphoric *questo* and *quello* above as the 'antecedent location versus denotatum location' distinction (AL/DL distinction for short).

I propose that the distinction made in AL/DL contexts indicates that [+speaker] *questo* is the 'default' anaphoric demonstrative in Italian, in the sense that its role is to communicate information about the location of the antecedent in the discourse (as opposed to the denatatum).[62] The idea of a 'default' anaphoric demonstrative is championed by Himmelmann (1996: 226), who claims that, in the languages he surveyed, there is usually one demonstrative that is dominant in anaphoric use,[63] and that it is usually the [+speaker] demonstrative. His data shows that English follows this pattern as well: in the Pear Stories[64], there are only 3 instances of [-speaker] adnominal demonstratives used anaphorically, in contrast to 40 instances of [+speaker] adnominal demonstratives used anaphorically. However, Himmelmann notes that there is significant cross-linguistic variation with regards to the 'default' anaphoric demonstrative. One can imagine, for example, a language in which the [-speaker] demonstrative is the 'default' anaphoric demonstrative, simply cuing the hearer to 'look back' for the antecedent, while the [+speaker] demonstrative communicates further information about the location of the denotatum, in terms of being positioned at a point in time near to the speaker. In other words, languages may vary as to how they choose to exploit the [+/-speaker] contrast in backward anaphora.

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[61] I use the terms 'denotatutm' and 'antecedent' for maximal explicitness here, since up until this point I have been using the term 'referent' as a cover for both of these concepts.
[62] Crucially, I do not use the term 'default' to mean distance-neutral. Vanelli (1995) characterizes *questo* in her examples as indicating that the antecedent is *close in time to the speaker* (in the immediately preceding discourse); in our terms, it is [+speaker].
[63] Himmelmann (1996) uses the term 'tracking' for anaphoric demonstratives, and 'proximal' and 'distal' for our [+speaker] and [-speaker] demonstratives, respectively.
[64] The Pear Stories are published in the appendix to Chafe (1980).

Lyons (1999) notes that there is another way in which the [+/-speaker] distinction is manifested in backward anaphoric demonstratives, which is that demonstratives can convey information about the interlocutor. Specifically, [+speaker] demonstratives are used to refer to something previously mentioned by the speaker, while [-speaker] demonstratives (more precisely, 'non-proximal' forms) are used to refer to an entity introduced by the hearer. In a conversation where both interlocutors are sometimes the speaker and sometimes the hearer, I will rephrase this to mean that a speaker makes use of a [+speaker] demonstrative to refer to a referent that he himself has previously mentioned, and a [-speaker] demonstrative to refer an entity mentioned by the other interlocutor. While Lyons (1999) does not offer any examples of this type of usage, I suggest that English *this/these* and *that/those* have this function. Consider the following example:

(14) Speaker 1: Did you hear that three students from our department were seriously injured in a car accident coming home from the party last weekend?

Speaker 2: I know. I can't believe it. I almost got a ride home with **those/??these** students.

In the example above, where Speaker 2 is following up on Speaker 1's mention of *three students from our department*, the [-speaker] demonstrative is much better than the [+speaker] demonstrative. On the flipside, When Speaker 1 refers back to his own mention of *three students from our department*, a [+speaker] demonstrative is the most natural follow-up:

(15) I heard that three students from our department were seriously injured in a car accident coming home from a party last weekend. The department is creating a fund for **these/??those** students to help with their medical bills.

However, when the speaker wants to indicate temporal distance between himself and the referent (in the sense described by Vanelli above)[65], the [-speaker] demonstrative is preferred:

(16) I heard that three students from our department were seriously injured in a car accident coming home from a party last weekend. Even though I hadn't seen **those/*these students** in years, I still cried when I heard the news.

In sum, we have seen that both situational and anaphoric demonstratives can be strong, instantiating the [+/-speaker] feature. Anaphoric demonstratives encode the [+/-speaker] distinction in a variety of ways across languages, and it seems, even within languages. We have seen that the [+/-speaker] distinction is manifested in anaphoric demonstratives in terms of distinguishing between backward vs. forward anaphora. Within backward anaphora, the [+/-speaker] distinction can express: (i) the recent/remote contrast—parallel to the 'former' vs. 'latter' distinction, (ii) the AL/DL distinction or (iii) speaker-reference versus hearer-reference. The important point to take away from this discussion is that anaphoricity is not synonymous with lack of distance-specifications, but that anaphoric demonstratives can be strong or weak, just like situational demonstratives.

[65] I claim that this type of 'temporal' distance is distinct from the 'emotional' distance discussed by Levinson (1979), which he refers to as 'social deixis'. In 'social deixis,' a particular demonstrative is chosen to convey the attitude of the speaker towards the referent. For example, English uses the [-speaker] demonstrative to convey disdain for the referent on the part of the speaker. Recall Bill Clinton's infamous statement about Monica Lewinski: "I did not have sexual relations with **that woman**." What the actual contribution of the [-speaker] feature is in these cases, whether semantic or not, is a subject of debate. I have argued that we should consider the temporal expression of [+/-speaker] as semantically relevant in anaphoric demonstratives, just as we do the spatial realization of this feature in the realm of situational demonstratives. I leave open the question of where to draw the semantic line from here (for example, whether before or after 'social deixis').

3.3.2 Weak demonstratives have a neutral [speaker] feature

We have argued that strong demonstratives are specified for [+/-speaker], and that both situational and anaphoric demonstratives can express this distinction. Definite articles, on the other hand, do not express the [+/-speaker] distinction. For example, note that English has no such thing as *the* $_{[+speaker]}$ vs. the $_{[-speaker]}$:[66]

(17) #I don't like the way **the**$_{[+speaker]}$ **parka** fits—it's too tight in the arms. Can you please bring me **the**$_{[-speaker]}$ **parka** [pointing across the room]?

Contrary to my thinking, however, it is frequently argued that the loss of distance specifications is synonymous with loss of demonstrative status (Anderson and Keenan 1985, Lyons 1975, 1977, Sommerstein 1972). For example, Anderson and Keenan (1985) argue that a demonstrative unmarked for distance "would be little different from a definite article or third person pronoun" (280). I suggest that such a view is overly simplistic, and furthermore, that it is rooted in the faulty assumption that demonstratives are semantically and syntactically homogeneous. I argue along with Kirsner (1979, 2011), Himmelmann (1996), C. Lyons (1999), Silva-Villar & Gutiérrez-Rexach, (2001), Hiietam and Börjars (2002) among others, that the absence of distance marking in a demonstrative does not qualify it as a definite article. Rather, I propose that the loss of distance specifications in a demonstrative signals that this element is

[66] Lyons (1999) however, claims that some languages (Wolof, Macedonian and Classical Armemian) preserve the [+/-speaker] distinction in definite articles. It is not clear to me from his data, however, that there is a real semantic distinction between these so-called spatially marked 'articles' and actual demonstratives.

weak.[67] Specifically, on analogy to Tortora's (1997) two *theres*, I argue that strong demonstratives have a [+/-speaker] feature, while weak demonstratives have a [speaker] feature that is unspecified for a value. In order to avoid confusion with the minimalist notion of an 'unvalued' feature, I will use the term *neutral* to describe the impoverished [speaker] feature of weak demonstratives.

Tortora (1997) argues that there are two types of *there*, strong and weak. While both strong and weak *there* refer to location (and hence are *locative*), only strong *there* is specified for distance (in that it encodes the concept *far from speaker*).

(18) **There** arrived four women. Weak there

(19) Four women have arrived **there**. Strong there

She argues that strong and weak *there* differ in their feature makeup:

(20) Strong there: [+locative], [-speaker]
Weak there: [+locative], [speaker]

On analogy to Tortora's weak *there*, I argue for a *loss of a value* for the [speaker] feature in weak demonstratives, rather than arguing for the disappearance of this feature altogether. My motivation for this claim is that while a weak demonstrative may be used to refer to an entity that is either near the speaker or distant from the speaker, the deictic center nonetheless remains the same: the speaker. The referent of a weak demonstrative, like that of a strong demonstrative,

[67] It is important to note that I do not rule out the possibility that weak demonstratives may be 'born' weak. I suggest that this may be the case for Classical Latin *ipse*, which is an identity marker used as a demonstrative (2.4.2.1).

must be in the 'speaker's sphere." Specifically, it must be in the immediate situation or previous discourse. In other words, I argue that the neutral [speaker] feature itself makes a pragmatic contribution to the interpretation of the demonstrative which does not disappear when the [+/-] value of the [speaker] feature is lost. I will discuss the pragmatic contribution of the neutral [speaker] feature in more depth below.

3.3.3 The neutral [speaker] feature and immediate accessibility

Different researchers have considered the question of what distinguishes a distance-neutral (weak) demonstrative from a definite article. As C. Lyons (1999) notes: "writers who agree that demonstratives have some distinctive property apart from deixis [where 'deixis' can be understood as [+/-speaker], comment mine] are divided on what it is" (20). For Himmelmann (1996), 'demonstrativity' boils down to the ability to be accompanied by a pointing gesture. It is this property that, in his mind qualifies certain weak demonstratives (like German *dieser*) to retain their 'demonstrative' status. I argue, however, that pointing is not unique to demonstratives—it can accompany other types of definite descriptions as well, like definite noun phrases and proper nouns. Witness the following exchange, for example, where pointing accompanies the definite article (example (21) due to C. Tortora, p.c.).

(21) **Speaker A**: "Do you have anything to cover the bed with?"
Speaker B: "Yes, the bedspread" (pointing to the bedspread).

Similarly, one can use ostension with proper nouns. Consider the following example, where Bill and Sue are at a party, and John is also there:

(22) Bill: "Yesterday you were telling me about a friend who restores old furniture. Who was that again?"
Sue: "Oh, John" (pointing).

So ostension, while certainly a common feature of strong situational demonstratives, is not unique to demonstratives, weak or strong.

Hiietam and Börjars (2002:11) also address the question of how demonstratives are distinguished from definite articles. According to Hiietam and Börjars, the semantic property that unites all definite descriptions is 'familiarity.'[68] The authors divide the term 'familiarity' into different sub-types, as seen in the table below, claiming that demonstratives express only a sub-set of the different types of familiarity, namely direct familiarity. While both definite articles and demonstratives can express direct familiarity, it is only demonstratives that are *limited* to this type of familiarity.[69]

Table 3-1: Properties of definite articles and demonstratives (Hiietam and Börjars 2002)

PROPERTY	PURE DEFINITENESS	DEMONSTRATIVES
situational familiarity	√	√
familiarity through world knowledge	√	χ
discourse familiarity: direct	√	√
indirect	√	χ
anticipatory	√	χ
uniqueness / inclusiveness	√	χ
contrastiveness	χ	√
generics	√	χ

[68] Hiietam and Börjars' 'familiarity' (term due to Christophersen's (1939)) is our 'identifiability.'
[69] In addition, Hiietam and Börjars claim that 'contrastiveness' is a property unique to demonstratives—this will be addressed in 3.4.

In line with Hiietam and Börjars (2002), I will argue that what sets demonstratives apart from definite articles is direct familiarity, although I prefer to use C. Lyons' (1999) term for this same concept, 'immediate accessibility' (of the referent).[70]

In defining the notion of immediate accessibility, Lyons (1999) takes his cue from Hawkins (1978). Hawkins proposes a 'matching constraint' on demonstratives, which basically cues the reader to 'match' the referent with some object that is present in the situation, or known from the previous discourse (Lyons 1999: 20). Lyons (1999) translates Hawkins' matching constraint as a condition of immediate accessibility of the referent, defined in terms of what can be identified in the immediate situation or text:

> Suppose we set up an extended notion of ostension (call it "textual-situational ostension") which includes anaphoric reference as well as reference to an entity perceptible in the physical situation. What these have in common is that the referent is immediately accessible. It is either directly perceived in the physical surroundings or straightforwardly recalled from the preceding discourse.
> Lyons (1999: 161).

In other words, whereas the definite article can be used in situations where the referent is inferable by general knowledge, demonstratives cannot. Consider the following examples ((24) is due to Lyons 1999):

(23) **The moon** is 238,900 miles from Earth.

(24) I had to get a taxi from the station. On the way **the driver** told me there was a bus strike. (Lyons 1999: 3).

[70] In other words, 'familiarity' = 'identifiability,' and 'direct familiarity' = 'immediate accessibility'.

In both cases above, the referent is identifiable due to the general knowledge about the world. In (23) the general knowledge is that the Earth has a unique moon, while in (24), the knowledge is that taxis have drivers.[71] Examples (25) and (26) show that the demonstrative cannot be used in these cases:

(25) ***That/*this moon** is 238, 900 miles from Earth[72].

(26) I had to get a taxi from the station. On the way ***that/*this driver** told me there was a bus strike.

What Hawkins (1978), Lyons (1999) and Hiietam and Börjars (2002) all conclude is that (one of) the common denominators of demonstratives, regardless of whether or not they are specified for distance, is that their referent must be present in the surroundings or in the previous discourse.[73] I represent this intrinsic tie to immediate accessibility in my framework as a

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[71] As noted in Chapter 2, examples like (24) are frequently referred to as the 'associative anaphoric use,' because the referents are identifiable "due to already evoked frames with which they were associated" (Laury 1997: 19). Lyons (1999) points out that associative anaphoric uses can be thought of as a "combination of anaphoric and general knowledge types," where, for example in (24) above "the driver has not been mentioned before, but it is part of our general knowledge that taxis have drivers. "The idea is that the mention of a taxi conjures up for the hearer all the things that are associated with taxis (a driver, wheels, seat, the fair, and so on) and any of these things can then be referred to by means of a definite noun phrase. So the referent of the driver is familiar through association with the antecedent, *a taxi"* (Lyons 1999: 4).

[72] *That moon* is possible when *that* is recognitional, however, as in the sentence below:
(a) ***That moon*** *was so bright last night—remember we didn't even need a flashlight?*
In this case, *that moon* refers to a particular appearance of the moon on a particular night, which both interlocutors had the experience of seeing (most likely, together). I will discuss the recognitional use in section 3.3.5.

[73] In light of the recognitional demonstrative discussed below in 3.3.5, I will modify the definition of immediate accessibility slightly: immediate accessibility means that the referent of a demonstrative is *interpreted* as being in the context of utterance, and the context of utterance

[speaker] feature. In strong demonstratives, the [speaker] feature is accompanied by [+/-] value, contributing information regarding the referent's location, namely whether the referent is near to the speaker ([+speaker]) or distant from the speaker ([-speaker]). Weak demonstratives, on the other hand, have an impoverished feature specification, and the only information communicated by the neutral [speaker] feature is that the referent can be located in the immediate situation/context. I will argue that, while the [+/-] value of the [speaker] feature has a linguistic value, being encoded in the lexicon in the form of distinct morphological forms (like *this* and *that* in English),[74] the contribution of the neutral [speaker] feature is pragmatic in nature, reflecting the underlying concept of immediate accessibility of the referent. In other words, the use of a demonstrative (and the presence of a [speaker] feature) presupposes that the referent is in the immediate situation (or, at least, it cues the hearer to interpret it as such). The definite article, in turn, crucially lacks the [speaker] feature altogether, and hence lacks the accompanying presupposition of immediate accessibility. In the next section we will look at how the neutral [speaker] feature contributes to the meaning of weak demonstratives, by looking specifically at the weak French demonstrative *ce*.

3.3.4 Diffuse weak demonstratives

In Chapter 2 we discussed different routes that the demonstrative can take within the path of *strong demonstrative* → *weak demonstrative* → *definite article*. One route we identified (and illustrated for Late Latin, Italian and English), was for the strong demonstrative to become weak in a specialized environment first (for example, the recognitional use), and continue along the

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par force includes the speaker. In other words, the referent is interpreted as being in the speaker's 'sphere.'

[74] See 4.3.2.2 on the notion that English demonstratives are bi-morphemic.

grammaticalization path from there. Another route was for the strong demonstrative to become weak in all pragmatic uses, becoming what I call 'diffuse.' Below, I discuss French *ce* and German *dieser* as examples of diffuse weak demonstratives, while in 2.6 I will argue that English recognitional *that* and Italian recognitional *quello* are instances of specialized weak demonstrative.

3.3.4.1 French *ce*

The French demonstrative *ce/cette/ces* (henceforth *ce*) is an example of a 'diffuse' weak demonstrative. French represents the paradigmatic case of grammaticalization in Romance, as it has a single demonstrative, *ce*, unspecified for distance. Only when *ce* is combined with the post-posed locatives *ci* (here) or *là* (there) can the entire expression express a [+/-speaker] contrast, as shown in the examples below. Note that the locative adverb (*ci* 'here') does not 'value' the [speaker] feature of the demonstrative itself. Rather, it is the entire constituent [demonstrative + reinforcer] that takes on the value of the locative adverb.[75] I attempt to illustrate this distinction with the aid of brackets in the examples below.[76]

[75] In 4.3.3.2, I adopt Brugè's (1996) analysis that the demonstrative and the locative adverb form a constituent: specifically (as Brugè argues) the two elements are in a predication relation, hence their features for distance to/from the speaker must agree. Furthermore, I argue that in this predication relation, the [**weak** demonstrative + locative adverb] constituent takes on the value of the locative adverb.

[76] Note that the bracketing is not technically correct, since (as I argue in Chapter 4) the noun (*livre*) does not form a constituent with the demonstrative and locative adverb. I merely intend to illustrate that it is not the weak demonstrative *itself* that takes on a value for speaker in these cases, but rather the *demonstrative + locative adverb* expression as a whole.

(27) a. Je veux lire **ce** [speaker] livre.
I want to-read DEM book
'I want to read this/that book.'

b. Je veux lire [**ce** [speaker] livre-**ci** [+speaker]] [+speaker]
I want to-read DEM book-here
'I want to read this book'

c. Je veux lire [**ce** [speaker] livre-**là** [-speaker]] [-speaker]
I want to-read DEM book-there
'I want to read that book.'

Hence we have a situation where *ce livre-ci* (this book) and *ce livre-là* (that book) are opposed to *ce livre*, which has an neutral [speaker] feature:

(28) [ce livre-ci] = [+speaker]
[ce livre-là] = [-speaker]
ce livre = [speaker]

It is worth noting here that *strong* demonstratives may also be accompanied by a locative adverb as well (cf. Italian *questo libro qui* 'this book here / *quel libro lì*, 'that book there'). In such cases, however, the [+/-speaker] interpretation of the demonstrative is not *dependent* on the locative adverb. The adverb merely reinforces the existing [+/-] value of the demonstrative's [speaker] feature. A weak demonstrative, on the other hand, does not itself contribute a value for [+/-speaker], but is parasitic on the locative adverb for that value. This is evidenced by the fact that a weak demonstrative can appear equally well with either a proximal or a distal locative adverb, as with French *ce*. In fact, I argue that the ability of a demonstrative to appear with

either a proximal or a distal locative adverb is one of the cues available to the language learner that the demonstrative is weak (cf. 4.5.1.1).

Italian and French show an interesting contrast with respect to the accompanying locative: Berruto (1989) claims that there is an increasing tendency for demonstratives in Italian to appear with locative reinforcers, inducing him to conclude that the Italian demonstrative is beginning to grammaticalize. For example, while pointing to a house, a speaker might utter (29a), even though the information conveyed by the [-speaker] demonstrative (without the accompanying locative) as in (29b) is itself is sufficient for the hearer to identify the referent.

(29) a. Mi piace tanto **quella casa lì** Italian
to-me pleases much **that house there**
'I really like that house.'

b. Mi piace tanto **quella casa.**
to-me pleases much **that house**
'I really like that house.'

However, the fact that Italian demonstratives must still match the proximal/distal value of their reinforcing locative, as shown in the examples below,[77] means that they still have a *valued* [speaker] feature—in other words, they are still strong:[78]

[77] There is one interesting counterexample to this, in which the demonstrative and locative have mismatching features for [speaker], which comes from an Italian pop song, *C'è da spostare una macchina* (lit. *There's a car to be moved*) by Francesco Salvi. In this song, a frantic valet comes into a disco pleading for help with parking cars:

(a) **Quella** macchina **qua** devi metterla là
'**That** car **here** must-2SG. put-$_{\text{INF-IT-FEMSG}}$. there
'**that** car **here** you have to put there.'
Quella macchina **là** devi metterla qua
'**That** car **there** must-2SG. put-$_{\text{INF-IT-FEMSG}}$. here
'**that** car **there** you must put here'

(30) a. Mi piace tanto **quella casa lì/*qui.** Italian
To-me pleases much **that house there/here**
'I really like that house.'

b. **Mi piace tanto questa casa qui/*lì**
To-me pleases much **this house here/there**
'I really like this house.'

On the other hand, we have seen that weak French *ce* combines equally with both *ci* and *là.*

(31) Je veux lire **ce livre ci/là**. French
I want-1_{SG}. to read this/that book here/there
'I want this/that book.'

Researchers who equate distance specifications with demonstrativity are forced to conclude that a demonstrative without distance distinctions, like *ce*, is identical to the definite article. Harris (1977, 1980) takes this stance, arguing that the loss of distance specifications in *ce* make this element equivalent to a definite article. Harris' analysis of the demonstrative in

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In the first sentence we see a mismatch between [-speaker] *quella* (*that*) and [+speaker] *qua (here*). The native speaker I consulted about this maintains that the use of *quella N qua* is unique to this particular song and is otherwise unattested in Italian.

[78] Note, however, that the demonstratives in Northern Italian dialects have grammaticalized more than their counterparts in standard Italian. Vanellli and Renzi (1997) note that in Lombard, Emilian, and Friulian, the distal demonstrative [kel] 'that' may combine with either 'here' or 'there,' especially in its adnominal use. In other words, the demonstratives themselves are not valued for [+/-speaker]:

(a) ['kel 'libri 'ka] Friulian
that book **here**
'this book'

(b) ['kel 'libri 'la]
that book **there**
'that book'
(Vanelli and Renzi, 1997: 113).

French, however, is largely informed by what he sees to be the changing role of the definite article in that language. Contra Greenberg (1978), Harris claims that the definite article in French is transitioning from a Stage I to a Stage II article. Because of this shift, he claims, the demonstrative has come in to fill the niche of a Stage I definite article:

> In no other Romance language is the presence of a pre-nominal determiner so nearly obligatory as in French; and in no other Western Romance language do we find forms exactly equivalent to *ce/cette/ces*, which serve neatly to fill the gap caused by the gradual weakening of the original semantic value of *le/la/les* as markers of a specific nominal. We may say that, in effect, the very presence of the *ce/cette/ces* set available to serve as definite articles ensured that there was no obstacle to the progressive 'grammaticalisation' of *le/la/les'*
> (Harris 1977: 255-6).

While a detailed discussion of the status of the French definite article is beyond the scope of the current discussion, I will not adopt Harris' viewpoint on how the evolution of the definite article has affected the demonstrative; specifically, I do not consider *ce* to be a definite article, but rather a weak demonstrative. I argue that, while loss of distance specifications (loss of a [+/-] value for [speaker] in my framework) does indeed reflect a key step along the grammaticalization path for demonstratives, the change in question is not reanalysis as a definite article but rather the shift from a strong to a weak demonstrative.

Distance-neutral *ce* is not a definite article in my analysis because it displays typical properties of demonstrativity, one being immediate accessibility (its referent must be present either in the situation of utterance or in the previous discourse).[79] Hawkins (1978: 103) notes that, for example, that while either the definite article *le/la/les* or the demonstrative *ce/cette/ces*

[79] It also expresses contrastiveness, but I will reserve discussion of this property for 3.4.

may be used to refer to a referent in the immediate situation, only the definite article is good when the referent in that case is not visible. We can see this in the following example (from Hawkins): in this scenario, the interlocutors are standing in front of a closed door, behind which lies a vicious dog. There has been no discussion of a dog, nor is the hearer aware that there is a dog behind the closed door. The hearer goes to open the door, and the speaker says:

(32) Ne va pas là-bas, mon vieux. **Le/*ce chien** va te mordre.
NEG go-3SG. NEG there-down my old (one). The/DEM dog go-3SG. you bite-INF.
'Don't go in there, chum. **The/*that/*this dog** will bite you.'

As in English, only the definite article will do in French when the referent is not visible in the immediate surroundings. The examples in (33)- (34) show a similar effect. In example (33), the interlocutors are standing in the hallway of the speaker's home. There is only one bathroom in the house and it is not visible to the interlocutors from where they are standing. The speaker hands the hearer a stack of towels and utters the following:

(33) Please put these clean towels in **the bathroom** (from Lyons, 1999: 3).

The English sentence can only be translated into French with the definite article, not *ce*:[80]

(34) Mets ces serviettes propres dans **la/*cette salle de bain** s'il te plaît.

Again, *ce* is not felicitous in this scenario because the referent is not immediately accessible (it is not visible).

[80] Thanks to Joanna Birnbaum for the French judgments on these examples.

Similarly, *ce* is not possible in cases where the referent is identifiable due to general knowledge, the trademark usage of a Stage I definite article. To illustrate this fact, I repeat examples (23) and (24) as (35) and (36) below, giving the French translations in (35b) and (36b). We see that, just as in the English examples, the demonstrative in French is barred from these contexts:

(35) a. **The/*this/*that moon** is 238,000 miles from the Earth.

b. **La/*cette lune** est à 238 000 "miles" de la terre.

(36) a. I had to get a taxi from the station. On the way **the/*this/*that driver** told me there was a bus strike.

b. J'ai du prendre un taxi à la gare. Sur le chemin, **le/*ce chauffeur** m'a appris que les (chauffeurs de) bus faisaient grève.

Even if we were to adopt Harris' (1977, 1980) argument that *il* has transitioned from a Stage I to a Stage II definite article, it does not automatically follow that *ce* has filled the niche of the Stage I definite article. The fact that *ce* is not allowed in cases where the referent is identifiable due to general knowledge (as shown in the examples above) indicates that *ce* is not a definite article. Rather, I argue that *ce* is a weak demonstrative. Specifically, it is a 'diffuse' weak demonstrative, employed in various pragmatic contexts: situational use, anaphoric use and recognitional use. Weak German *dieser* is another example of a diffuse weak demonstrative.[81] I briefly address

[81] Afrikaans *dié*, as described by Kirsner (2011), is another example of a distance-neutral demonstrative. Kirsner (2011) argues that distance-neutral *dié* contrasts with the other demonstratives *hierdie* and *daardie* in that *dié* is marked only for DEIXIS, which constitutes "an instruction to the hearer to seek out and attend to some referent" (2001: 97), and not for *location*. *Hierdie* and *daardie*, on the other hand, are marked for DEIXIS as well as for *location*, where *hierdie* = 'CENTRAL' (to the speaker) and *daardie* = 'PERIPHERAL' (to the speaker).

dieser below, and then turn my attention to languages that have a 'specialized' weak demonstrative, the so-called 'recognitional' demonstrative introduced in Chapter 2.

3.3.4.2 German *dieser*

In Middle and Old High German, the demonstrative *dieser*, built from Indo European stems **t-, *k- and *s-* (corresponding to Germanic **th, *s-, *þ* respectively) plus an additional reinforcing particle *–si*, 'behold') had a [+speaker] interpretation, and contrasted with [-speaker] *jener*, which signaled remote distance from the speaker (cognate to English (*yond(er)*)).[82] Below I give the declensions of *dieser*, which can be used both anaphorically and situationally:

Table 3-2: Declensions of *dieser* in Modern Spoken German

	Masculine	**Feminine**	**Neuter**	**Plural**
Nominative	dieser	diese	dieses	diese
Accusative	diesen	diese	dieses	diese
Genitive	dieses	dieser	dieses	dieser
Dative	diesem	dieser	diesem	diesen

While the role of *dieser* as a [+speaker] demonstrative and *jener* as a [-speaker] demonstrative was constant from Old High to Middle High German, the demonstrative paradigm has shifted in Modern Spoken German. According to Lyons (1999), in Modern Spoken German [-speaker] *jener* has fallen into disuse, and (perhaps due to the collapse of the [+speaker]/[-speaker]

[82] Thanks to Rob Howell (p.c.) for the OHG and MHG data in this section.

contrast), *dieser* has taken on a distance-neutral role.[83] There seems to be some variation with respect to the status of *dieser*, however: Lyons (1999) claims that *dieser* maintains its function as a [+speaker] demonstrative in addition to serving as what I would call a weak demonstrative, which suggests that *dieser* is lexically spit in the following way (I will refer to Lyons' 1999 grammar as Modern Spoken German$_1$).

(37) Modern Spoken German$_1$: Lyons (1999)

$dieser_{strong}$ = [+speaker]

$dieser_{weak}$ = [speaker]

Diessel (1999), on the other hand, argues that *dieser* is only distance-neutral (in our terms, 'weak'). He argues that when used on its own, *dieser* does not express distance specifications, but only when it combines with a locative adverb. *Dieser* can combine with either the [+speaker] locative adverb *hier* (here) or [-speaker] *da*/*dort* (there), to give a [+speaker] or [-speaker] interpretation to the demonstrative + locative adverb complex. Consider the examples below (adapted from Gshossmann-Hendershot and Feuerle, 1997, p. 88):

(38) Willst du **diesen Pullover hier**?
Want you this sweater here
'Do you want this sweater?'

[83] Old High German also had a [+speaker] demonstrative *der*, which presumably became weak in Middle High German. Adnomial *der* eventually became reanalyzed as a definite article. While the exact timing of this reanalysis is a subject of debate, Catasso (2011: 28) suggests that the re-purposing of adnominal *der* as a definite article was complete by the 9th century. In Modern Spoken German, *der* is interpreted as a definite article when used adnominally, and a distance-neutral (weak) demonstrative when used pronominally (Rob Howell (p.c.)).

(39) Ich fahre mit **diesem Bus dort**.
I take with that bus there
'I am taking that bus.'

The way to make sense of this is as follows: let us say that Diessel's grammar (call it Modern Spoken German$_2$), contains only weak *dieser*. Modern Spoken German$_2$, however, exists alongside another grammar, Modern Spoken German$_1$ (identified by Lyons 1999), in which two lexical entries for *dieser* exist, both strong and weak. I suggest that these grammars are diachronically related, with MSG$_2$ being a progression of MSG$_1$.

(40) Progression of Modern Spoken German$_1$ to Modern Spoken German$_2$

Modern Spoken German$_1$

dieser$_{strong}$ = [+speaker]

dieser$_{weak}$ = [speaker]

⬇

Modern Spoken German$_2$

dieser$_{weak}$ = [speaker]

The above scenario represents a frequent cross-linguistic progression: In the transition from strong to weak demonstrative, a transitional grammar frequently arises in which a lexical split has occurred. Two stages of grammaticalization for distinct (but homophonous) lexical elements may exist side-by-side for some time before language learners simplify and converge on a new grammar which features only one of those lexical items.

In the next section we will discuss a specialized weak demonstrative, the recognitional demonstrative.

3.3.5 A specialized weak demonstrative: the recognitional demonstrative

In Chapter 2 (2.4.2.2) I introduced 'recognitional demonstratives' (terminology due to Himmelmann 1996,1997) in connection with Late Latin, spoken Finnish, English and Italian. I argued that in these languages recognitional demonstratives marked an intermediate stage of grammaticalization, Stage 0_2, where the demonstrative is weak. Recognitional demonstratives are of interest to us few key reasons: first of all, they are distinct from other demonstrative uses (both weak and strong) in that they *coerce* the immediate accessibility reading of the referent rather than being bound by it. Second of all, I argue that they provide another example of a weak demonstrative, which is especially interesting for languages that do not otherwise have them. Thirdly, as shown in Chapter 2, I argue that recognitional demonstratives provide the key to grammaticalization of the demonstrative to the definite article in numerous languages (Late Latin, spoken Finnish, English and Italian, and likely others).

3.3.5.1 Recognitional demonstratives coerce immediate accessibility

In Chapter 2, we saw that recognitional demonstratives are first mention uses—they do not have a referent in the previous discourse, nor in the immediate situation. This property of recognitional demonstratives is illustrated in the examples below. The dog in question is not present in the immediate situation, nor has it been previously mentioned:

(41) I couldn't sleep all night. **That dog** (next door) kept me awake.
(Diessel 1999: 106, due to Gundel et al 1993: 278).

In this respect, recognitional demonstratives appear to flout the immediate accessibility condition on demonstratives. However, I will argue that recognitional demonstratives actually facilitate

the observance of this condition: they are used to achieve a special effect, that of bringing the referent into the speaker and hearer's sphere. Under the Gricean maxim of quantity (be as informative as possible, but no more informative than necessary), the hearer assumes that the speaker is using the demonstrative (to the exclusion of the definite article) for a reason; he wishes to signal to the hearer that the referent should be interpreted as being immediately accessible. In the case of the recognitional demonstrative, where the referent is not actually physically present in the situation or in the discourse, the hearer mobilizes personalized, specific knowledge that he shares with the speaker in order to locate the referent.[84] The definite article does not entail immediate accessibility, hence does not activate this kind of specific, shared knowledge. We can see this in the contrast between (42) and (43) below.

(42) You'll never believe where Carl proposed to Anna—at **that cathedral** in Orvieto!

(43) You'll never believe where Carl proposed to Anna—at **the cathedral** in Orvieto!

In (43), the use of the definite article showcases the uniqueness presupposition of definite descriptions, leading the hearer to believe that there is only one cathedral in Orvieto. But it does not carry any implication of familiarity due to shared experience. In (42) the recognitional demonstrative signals to the hearer that he possesses the necessary information to identify which cathedral is being referred to, and prompts the hearer to activate knowledge that he shares with the speaker in order to identify the referent. In essence, a recognitional demonstrative brings the

[84] It is important to distinguish the kind of shared information that a recognitional demonstrative accesses from that of a definite article. While a definite article draws on knowledge shared by all members of a particular speech community, the knowledge that a recognitional demonstrative accesses must be 'personalized' and specific (Himmelmann 1996: 233).

referent into the speaker and hearer's sphere, making an otherwise inaccessible referent accessible.

The pragmatic *tromp l'oeil* we get with recognitional demonstrative is reminiscent of what we see with clitic left dislocation in Italian. Clitic left dislocation, abbreviated as CLLD by Cinque (1990), has been argued to be exclusively available to topics, used when the DP expresses old information. In other words, it has been argued that clitic dislocation is not allowed in 'out-of-the-blue' contexts. For example, in response to the question *Che cos'è successo* (*what happened?*), the response in (44a) is perfect, but the response in (44b) with clitic left dislocation (where the dislocated constituent is bolded) is claimed to be infelicitous.

(44) *Che cos'è successo?*

a. La polizia stradale ha fermato l'autobus per Roma. Italian
' The road police stopped the bus for Rome.'

b. **??L'autobus per Roma**, la polizia stradale la ha fermato.
The bus for Rome, the road police stopped it.
(Belletti 2004: 238)

It has been pointed out to me by C. Tortora (p.c.) however, that in reality, speakers make use of clitic dislocation in out-of-the-blue contexts, as a sort of metalinguistic request to the hearer that he interpret the dislocated material as old information. The same type of metalinguistic request is implicit with recognitional demonstrative: the speaker signals to the hearer that the referent should be interpreted as directly familiar (i.e. immediately accessible).

To sum up, I have argued that the strong demonstrative is valued for the feature [+/-speaker], where the [+] value is 'near the speaker' and the [-] value is 'far from the speaker.' I

further proposed that this distance distinction is neutralized in the process of grammaticalization, such that the value for the feature [speaker] is lost. What remains in the case of a weak demonstrative, then, is the presupposition of immediate accessibility. I have shown this presupposition of immediate accessibility at work in weak demonstratives—I first illustrated this with a 'diffuse' weak demonstrative, French *ce*, and then with a specialized weak demonstrative, the recognitional demonstrative. With the recognitional demonstrative, the presupposition of immediate accessibility mobilizes specific, shared knowledge between the speaker and hearer. Evidence that it is the *neutral* [speaker] feature that does the work in the case of recognitional demonstrative (and not a [-] value on the [speaker] feature, for example) comes from languages that have an established weak demonstrative used recognitionally.

3.3.5.2 The recognitional demonstrative is weak

Himmelmann (1996) notes that in several Australian languages (Pama-Nyungan as well as Non-Pama-Nyungan ones) the recognitional demonstrative has a special from. He gives an example from Nunggubuyu, where the morpheme *–uba* reresents the recognitional demonstrative.[85] Himmelmann notes that this demonstrative occurs in first mentions, as shown in the following example which is taken from the very first line of Heath's (1980) collection of Nunggubuyu texts:

(45) bagu winingambangambi:ni **nu: birni** **nawulmurwa:**
ba-gu wini -RED=ngambi-ni na **-uba** -rni na- wulmurwa:
ANAPH-LOC.ADV 3.M.DUa-RED=bathe-PAST2 M.DU– **ANAPH** –M.DU M.DU-circumcised-DU
'Two unmarried (boys) were bathing (in a billabong). (Himmelmann 1996: 232-3)

[85] Himmelmann argues that the gloss of these recognitional demonstratives as 'ANAPH' is a misnomer, due to the fact that these demonstratives appear in first mention contexts.

Himmelmann points out that in the example above the audience is familiar with the protagonists of the myth, of which the example is an excerpt. Hence, the mention of *nu: birni nawulmurwa* ('those two unmarried ones') "serves just as a reminder, meaning something like 'you know the ones, those two unmarried ones'" (Himmelmann 1996: 233). Another Australian language, Yangkunytjatjara has the recognitional demonstrative *panya,* which is described by Goddard (1983: 54, cited in Himmelmann 1996, 232) in the following way:

> *Panya* ANAPH (roughly 'you know the one') calls the listener's attention to the fact that he or she is already familiar with a referent [. . .] Actually, *panya* ANAPH does not presuppose an explicit mention in previous discourse, but simply that the addressee be able to call to mind the intended referent, . . ."

Another recognitional demonstrative, *nhenge*, in the Austrialian language of Mparntwe Arrernte has been identified by Wilkins (1989: 21). Wilkins glosses *nhenge* as 'remember' and defines it as "something from before which I (the speaker) think that you (the addressee) should be able to remember" (cited in Himmelmann 1996: 232). Goddard's and Wilkins' descriptions of *panya* and *nhenge* correspond to our characterization of the recognitional demonstrative. According to Himmelmann, the recognitional demonstratives in Australian languages clearly lack a spatial basis; in other words, they are distance-neutral. In fact, Himmelmann uses examples of recognitional demonstratives in Australian languages to argue against the claim that demonstratives are intrinsically distance-marked. Additional evidence for this argument comes from French and German.

In German *dieser* can be used in the recognitional use, as shown by the following examples from Auer (1981, 1984), cited in Himmelmann (1996: 231):

(46) GERMAN conversation

A: Ta: was hast n(dann) gelesn
what PERF-you PART-Q then read
'what did you read then'

B : (ja) diesen Aufsatz von dem Olson
well **that paper** by the PN
'well **that paper** by Olson.'

(47) GERMAN conversation

was isn eigentlich mit diesem
what happened-Q-PART I-am wondering to **that**
Haustelephon was mir immer khabt ham;
internal phone which we always had PERF
'I'm wondering what happened to **that internal phone** we used to have;'

I have argued in section 3.3.4.2 that *dieser* has undergone a lexical split in Modern Spoken German, resulting in two lexical entries for *dieser*: one that is marked for [+speaker] and one that has a neutral [speaker] feature. We can take the appearance of *dieser* in the recognitional use to instantiate the weak demonstrative.

We also discussed above (3.3.4.1) that French has a diffuse weak demonstrative, *ce*. In the following example, *ce livre* could mean *this book* or *that book*:

(48) Je veux lire **ce** livre.
I want to-read **DEM** book
'I want to read this/that book.'

We see that weak *ce* can also be used in the recognitional use, as shown in the following example (de Mulder 2006, and Carlier & de Mulder 2010, 2011):

(49) **Cette personne**, tu sais, Mlle E... dont je t'ai parlé, avec qui je devais prendre le thé dans la quinzaine chez Mme Chesneau qui la connaît, eh bien, j'ai appris hier qu'elle a un amant, un grand banquier de Paris, qui ne veut pas l'épouser. (Villiers de L'Isle-Adam, *Correspondance générale*)

That person, you know, Ms E... I talked you about her, with whom I had to have tea within two weeks in the house of Mrs Chesneau who knows her, well, I heard yesterday that she has a lover, an important banker of Paris, who doesn't want to marry her.

As witnessed by the examples above, whatever is doing the pragmatic 'work' of mobilizing specific, shared knowledge between the speaker and hearer in recognitional demonstratives cannot be distance-marking.[86] I argue that it is the neutral [speaker] feature, which has the presupposition of immediate accessibility.

[86] If recognitional demonstratives are weak, one might expect that they could combine with either a proximal or distal locative adverb like weak French *ce*, contra what we find. In fact, recognitional demonstratives are not felicitous with any locative adverbs in English (or, to my knowledge, in any language):

(a) Remember **that** guy ***there/*here** from the bookbinding workshop?

I argue that the inability of recognitional demonstratives to appear with locative adverbs is due to the pragmatic contribution of the recognitional demonstrative, which is not compatible with a locative interpretation. However, the recognitional demonstrative provides other cues to the language learner that it is weak. As Himmelmann (1996) notes, in languages that have a recognitional demonstrative, it is always a particular demonstrative (usually the [-speaker] one) that is employed in this pragmatic use. What this means is that, in its recongitional use, the demonstrative does not contrast with another demonstrative: there is no [+speaker]/[-speaker] contrast. For example, the English recognitional demonstrative is only expressed by *that/those*. Because we don't get a contrast between *that/those* and *this/these* in the recognitional use, the cue for a [-] value for [speaker] is obscured, and the language learner will ultimately posit a neutral [speaker] feature for recognitional *that/those.*

3.3.6 Interim Conclusions on the [speaker] feature

I have argued that the [(+/-)speaker] feature is central to demonstrativity. De-valuing of this feature is what triggers grammaticalization from a strong to a weak demonstrative, while further semantic weakening corresponds to loss of the [speaker] feature altogether, giving us the definite article:

(50) strong demonstrative = [+/-speaker]
weak demonstrative = [speaker]
definite article = no [speaker] feature

This perspective on grammaticalization reflects the empirical fact that, cross-linguistically, demonstrative systems with speaker as the reference point are basic, existing in almost all languages (C. Lyons, 1999: 108; Frawley 1991: 276). We can see this transparently in the two-term demonstrative systems we have discussed thus far, where there is a contrast between demonstratives specified for [+speaker] and [-speaker]. However, our analysis must also be able to account for grammaticalization within more complex demonstrative systems. In next section I will extend my analysis to three-term demonstrative systems, showing that the tendency for middle terms to grammaticalize in three-term systems can be attributed to the same factor that contributes to weakening of demonstratives in two-term systems.

3.3.7 Beyond [speaker]: The [hearer] feature in three-term demonstrative systems

In Chapter 2 we discussed Classical Latin, a three-term demonstrative system, described in terms of distance or proximity to the speaker and/or hearer:

(51) Classical Latin demonstrative system:
hic (close to speaker)
iste (close to hearer)
ille (distant from speaker and hearer)

Identity marker:
ipse (used to mark emphasis or contrast)
[adapted from Vincent 1997: 151]

Portuguese and Modern Armenian also have three-term person-oriented demonstrative systems, illustrated below:

(52) Portuguese demonstrative system:
esta (close to speaker)
essa (close to hearer)
aquela (distant from speaker and hearer)

(53) Modern Armenian demonstrative system (Lyons, 1999, citing Feydit 1948):
ays (close to speaker)
ayt (close to hearer)
ayn (distant form speaker and hearer)
Lyons (1999: 55)

As seen above in the above examples, demonstratives in three-term systems encode a feature in addition to the basic [speaker] one.[87] Specifically, I propose that demonstratives belonging to a

[87] I use 'three-term' as a coverall for any system with more than two terms. In reality, there exist languages that have as many as four terms. Diessel (1999: 40) cites the Bantu language of Ewondo as an example of a four-term language:
(a) *vá* 'near speaker'
válā 'near hearer'

three-term system have a [hearer] feature in addition to a [speaker] feature.[88] I will argue that only by appealing to a combination of [speaker] and [hearer] features can we formally express the more fine-grained distinctions expressed by demonstratives in three-term systems.

Three-term demonstrative systems can be further broken down into what Anderson and Keenan (1985: 282-286) have dubbed 'person-oriented systems' or 'distance-oriented systems.' As Lyons (1999) puts it, in both person and distance-oriented systems "the speaker forms the deictic centre; [+/-speaker] is understood in terms of proximity to the speaker, and the person analysis represents the contrast as association with first person or not" (107). In the spirit of Lyons, I argue that whether we are dealing with a so-called 'distance-oriented' or a 'person-oriented' system, [speaker] is the core feature of the demonstrative system. The [hearer] feature is merely superimposed upon this primary feature. The following sections will focus on the role of the 'middle term' in ternary systems. The middle term is referred to as the 'second person' demonstrative in person-based systems, and the 'medium-distance' in distance-based systems. I will refer to both of these demonstratives by their cover term, 'middle-term demonstrative,' unless it is necessary to make precise whether we are dealing with a person-based or distance-based systems, in which case I will use the terms 'second person' and 'medium-distance,' respectively.

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válí 'away from speaker and hearer'
álí '*far* away from speaker and hearer'
C.Tortora (p.c.) points out that in Appalachian, *yonder* (or adnominal *yon/yan*) is of the same type of as *álí* in Ewondo, denoting '*far* away form speaker and hearer.'
Diessel (1999) argues that the specifications expressed in four-terms systems are always expressed *with respect to* the deictic center, the speaker or hearer (41). In other words, all variation within the demonstrative system boils down to [speaker] and [hearer] features, with [speaker] being the basic one.

[88] The weak demonstrative does not count as a third term in a two-term language, according to Diessel (2005) because "the neutral demonstrative does not add another distance contrast to the system" (170).

3.3.7.1 Person-oriented systems

In person-oriented systems, the middle term is referred to by Anderson and Keenan (1985) as 'second person,' because the referent is specified according to its proximity to the hearer. But, as Anderson and Keenan have noted, the speaker is still the deictic center with middle terms, and the [hearer] feature is simply superimposed upon this core feature. To capture this dependency, I will propose that the [hearer] feature is dependent on the existence of a [speaker] feature.[89] The person-oriented system of Modern Armenian, then, would be reformulated in our framework as in (54):

(54) Modern Armenian demonstrative system
ays [+speaker], [-hearer]
ayt [-speaker], [+hearer]
ayn [-speaker], [-hearer]

Introduction of a [hearer] feature not only allows us to formalize the information conveyed by 'second person' demonstratives, but it also allows us to further refine the semantics of distal demonstratives. In two-term demonstrative systems, so-called 'distal' demonstratives refer only to distance from the speaker, denoting a referent that is either far from the speaker but close to the hearer, or far from both speaker and hearer. In other words, the hearer does not factor into the semantics of the expression in two-term systems. In ternary systems, on the other hand, a distal demonstrative denotes an object that is distant from *both* speaker and hearer. In terms of feature composition, a 'distal' demonstrative in a three-term system denotes both [-speaker] and

[89] While the presence of a [+hearer] feature normally entails [-speaker], we shall see in Table 3-3 that some languages have 'first person inclusive' demonstratives, which express proximity to both speaker and hearer (in contrast to another demonstrative in the paradigm that expresses 'close to speaker only').

[-hearer]; in other words, it is 'third person.' Henceforth, I will refer to demonstratives specified for [-speaker], [-hearer] as 'third person' demonstratives (even in distance-based systems) and demonstratives specified only for [-speaker] as 'distal' demonstratives. Third person and distal demonstratives are both specified for [-speaker]; the distinction between them can only be expressed formally by positing a [hearer] feature:

(55) a. third person demonstratives: [-speaker], [-hearer] three-term systems
b. distal demonstratives: [-speaker] two-term systems

3.3.7.2 Distance-oriented systems

The so-called 'distance-oriented' systems are arguably more complex than person-oriented systems (as well as more rare), because the demonstrative appears to denote points along a distance scale rather than a binary relation. The 'middle term' in distance-oriented systems is called a 'medial' demonstrative by Anderson and Keenan (1985), but I will adopt the more explicit term 'medium-distance' as employed by Irsara (2009). The medium-distance demonstrative denotes a referent that is a 'medium distance' from the speaker—not close to the speaker, but not terribly far either, and not necessarily close to hearer. Lyons (1999: 108) cites that the Siouan language of Lakhota as a language with a three-term distance-based system, and characterizes it in the following way:[90]

[90] Lyons (1999) suggests that Lithuanian and Serbo-Croat can also be characterized in the same way.

(56) Lakhota demonstrative system
le (proximal)
he (medium distance)
ka (distal)

From a formal perspective, the crucial information conveyed by a medial demonstrative is that the referent is *not* interpreted as being near the speaker, as witnessed by the fact that medium-distance terms are translated as *that* in English. However, medium-distance demonstratives have proven difficult to characterize in terms of features, since merely classifying them as [-speaker] would make them formally indistinguishable from distal demonstratives in two-term systems. As a solution, I propose introducing a neutral [hearer] feature into the feature matrix of medium-distance demonstratives. The neutral [hearer] feature represents the fact that the referent, while in the hearer's sphere, is not localized with regards to him in the case of middle-distance demonstratives (or, as Lyons 1999: 108 puts it, the referent of a middle-distance demonstrative is "*not necessarily close* to hearer,' [emphasis mine]). In our framework, then, the paradigm for Lakhota would be formally rendered in the following manner:

(57) Lakhota demonstrative system
le [+speaker], [-hearer]
he [-speaker], [hearer]
ka [-speaker], [-hearer]

What differentiates 'medium-distance' demonstratives from 'third-person' demonstratives in distance-based systems, then, is the value of the [hearer] feature:[91] in medium-

[91] The presence of the [hearer] feature additionally distinguishes between the middle term in a person-based system ('second person' demonstratives), and the middle term in a distance-based

distance demonstratives, the [hearer] feature is neutral, meaning that the referent is not defined with respect to the hearer. In third-person demonstratives, however, the third-person demonstrative is negatively specified for both [speaker] and [hearer]. This makes sense if the state of being 'very far away' from the speaker essentially entails that the referent is far from the hearer as well (under the assumption that speaker and hearer are close enough to one-another to be able to communicate).

I will propose that all ternary demonstrative systems, whether person-based or distance-based, can be characterized by appealing to a combination of [speaker] and [hearer] features. Among the logical possibilities that results from combining these features is a 'first person inclusive' demonstrative, where a referent that is close to both speaker and hearer is contrasted with one that is only close to the speaker (or one that is close to the hearer). In most languages, first person plural is subsumed by the category of first person in demonstratives, meaning that the value [+speaker] can indicate a referent that is close to speaker and hearer as well as one that is close to speaker but distant from hearer. Lyons (1999) cites a language that does, however, make the first person inclusive/exclusive distinction. The Native American language of Hualapai has a demonstrative specified for 'close to speaker only' (*va*) as well as one for 'close to both speaker and hearer' (*ya*). Another possible feature combination we have not discussed is one in which the [speaker] and [hearer] features are both neutral. I propose that this feature combination is the result of the weakening of a middle-term demonstrative. I have argued that the [hearer] feature is dependent on the existence of the [speaker] feature, but I suggest further that the [hearer] feature can only have a value if the [speaker] feature does. When the [speaker]

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system ('medium-distance' demonstratives): second person demonstratives are [+hearer], while medium-distance demonstratives have a neutral [hearer] feature.

feature loses its value, therefore, the [hearer] feature does too. I will argue in section 3.3.8.1 that Spanish *ese* is an example of this kind of demonstrative.

There is one logical combination, however, that does not correspond to any of the demonstratives I have examined in this section, and that is [+speaker], [hearer]. Such a demonstrative would, in theory, contrast with demonstratives whose [hearer] feature has a [+/-] value: demonstratives specified for [+speaker], [+hearer] on the one hand, and demonstratives marked for [+speaker], [-hearer] on the other. Whereas the latter two demonstrative types specify the referent with respect to the speaker *and the hearer* (close to hearer in the first, and distant from hearer in the second), a [+speaker], [hearer] demonstrative would simply mean that the referent is close to the speaker but unspecified with respect to the hearer. While my framework allows for the existence of a [+speaker], [hearer] demonstrative, I am not aware of any demonstratives of this type within a three-term system (although this description approximates the semantics of [+speaker] demonstrative in two-term systems, like English *this*).[92] The following table illustrates the different combinations made possible by proposing both a [speaker] and a [hearer] feature in three-term demonstrative systems.

Table 3-3: Combinations of [speaker] and [hearer] feature in three-term systems

Type of Demonstrative	**Proximal**	**Second Person**	**Medium-distance**	**Third Person**	**First person inclusive**	**Weak demonstrative**
Feature composition	[+speaker] [-hearer]	[-speaker] [+hearer]	[-speaker] [hearer]	[-speaker] [-hearer]	[+speaker] [+hearer]	[speaker] [hearer]
Examples	Portuguese *esta*	Armenian *ayt*	Lakhota *he*	Class.Latin *ille*	Hualapai *ya*	Spanish *ese*

[92] The non-existence of such demonstratives is most likely accidental.

One of the major benefits of introducing a [hearer] feature into our analysis of demonstratives is that all attested permutations within three-term languages are accounted for simply by appealing to the features [speaker] and [hearer]. We do not need to propose one system based on person features, another based on gradient distance specifications, and yet another hybrid system (as has been proposed for Spanish, by Lyons 1999: 109).

I have argued that demonstratives belonging to two-term systems have only a [(+/-)speaker] feature,[93] while demonstratives in a three-terms system have [(+/-) speaker] and a [(+/-) hearer] feature. In both systems, a demonstrative is strong *if and only if* it has a value for the feature [speaker]. When a demonstrative loses its value for [speaker], no matter in a two-term or three-term system, it becomes weak.

Now that we have a feature system in place for three-term systems, we can examine the process of grammaticalization in languages with these systems. What we will find is that there is a common denominator between two-term and three-term systems in terms of grammaticalization; specifically, it is almost always demonstratives specified for [-speaker] that become weak[94].

3.3.8 Reduction of a three-term to a two-term system

Cross-linguistically, it is common for a three-term system to become reduced to a two-term system (Lyons 1999, Lehmann 2002). Davidse, Cornillie, and Leuschner (2012) claim that this means of "downsizing and tightening of grammatical paradigms" is prevalent in grammaticalization because "the difference between different degrees from the speaker is less clear than a twofold opposition between near to and far from speaker" (218). I will argue that the

[93] In addition to a [+contrastive] feature, discussed in section 3.4.3.
[94] German *dieser* is a counterexample to this tendency; see section 3.3.4.2.

reduction from a ternary to a binary demonstrative system is part of a larger process, in which demonstratives that are *not* specified for [+speaker] are vulnerable to grammaticalization (or in some cases, to deletion).

My discussion of the [speaker] and [hearer] features in three-term systems aims to formally capture the empirical fact that, cross-linguistically, three-term demonstrative systems are diachronically unstable. Specifically, I propose that 'middle terms' are vulnerable to grammaticalization due to their [-speaker] specification. To see why this would be so, consider the fact that the speaker is at the core of the deictic system (c.f. Diessel 1999). It makes intuitive sense that an element specified for close to the deictic center, [+speaker], would maintain the positive value for this feature. An element specified for far from the deictic center [-speaker], on the other hand, might more readily be re-interpreted as having an absence of the value for the [speaker] feature. We see this occurrence in other contexts, as with expletive *there*: it is the [-speaker] locative adverb (*there*) that is co-opted for use as an expletive, not the [+speaker] one, (*here*): *there/*here is a fly in my soup!*

This line of reasoning predicts that, cross-linguistically, in ternary systems middle-term and 'third person' demonstratives should be more vulnerable to grammaticalization than [+speaker] demonstratives. Harris (1980: 145) claims that this prediction is borne out: "it seems clear, in fact, by virtue of considerable morphological and syntactic evidence, that a "non-proximate" demonstrative may very often serve in addition as the unmarked member of that particular paradigm, i.e. with a [+definite, -proximity] value," (where [+definite, -proximity] means distance-neutral).[95] In Chapter 2 we saw instances of [-speaker] demonstratives becoming

[95] Moreover, as Lehmann (1995) notes, the definite article can usually be traced back to a non-proximal demonstrative (third person and middle-term demonstratives). My analysis captures this fact, by proposing a two-stage diachronic process: [-speaker] demonstratives tend to become

grammaticalized; Latin *ille*, Italian recognitional *quello* and determinative *quelli* and English recognitional *that* and determinative *those*. In the next section, we will take a look at Spanish as a case study into the weakening of the middle term, *ese*.

3.3.8.1 Spanish *ese*

Spanish has three demonstratives: *este*, *ese* and *aquel*. Gutiérrez-Rexach (2002, 2005) notes that traditional grammars like Bello's (1847) characterize the demonstrative paradigm along the following lines: *este* denotes 'close to speaker,' *ese* indicates 'close to hearer,' and *aquel* refers to an object that is 'distant from both speaker and hearer.' Bello's (1847) paradigm is translated into my feature system below:

(58) Spanish demonstrative system (Bello, 1847)

este, estos, esta, estas	=	[+speaker], [-hearer]
ese, esos, esa, esas	=	[-speaker], [+hearer]
aquel, aquellos, aquella, aquellas	=	[-speaker], [-hearer]

Gutiérrez-Rexach (2002, 2005), however, argues that the traditional classification of the Spanish demonstrative system is an oversimplification, and that in actual usage, *ese* is more multi-faceted than the traditional paradigm would suggest. Consider the following example, given by Gutiérrez-Rexach (2002: 223):

---

weak more readily than [+speaker] demonstratives because they are not positively associated with the deictic center, and it is these weak (yet phonologically 'distal' demonstratives, having undergone a lexical split) that serve as the source for definite articles.

(59) No quiero que me traigas **este** o **ese** libro, tráme **aquel**.
Not want-I that me bring-you **this** or **that** book, bring-me **that**
'I don't want you to bring me this book or that one, bring me that other one.'

Gutiérrez-Rexach (henceforth G-R) notes that the traditional Bello paradigm would predict the following: if the sentence above were uttered in a conversation between interlocutors A and B, A (the speaker) must be making three demonstrations: the first (denoted by *este*) close to the speaker, the second (denoted by *ese*) close to the hearer, and the third (*aquel*) distant from both, as indicated by the English translation of the example. This tri-partition is depicted in the table below, using the [speaker] and [hearer] features I identified in 3.3.7:

Table 3-4: Scenario 1: Bello's characterization of Spanish demonstratives

features	[+speaker], [-hearer]	[-speaker], [+hearer]	[-speaker], [-hearer]
demonstrative	*este*	*ese*	*aquel*

G-R (2002: 223) notes that, while (59) above may be felicitous and true in the situation described above, the generalization is not completely accurate. For instance, the sentence may also be true if the first two books (denoted by *este* and *ese*) are close to the speaker and the third one (denoted by *aquel*) is closer to the hearer, as explicitly stated below.

(60) No quiero que me traigas **este** o **ese** libro que están por aquí, tráme **aquel**
Not want-I that me bring-you **this** or **that** book that are by there, bring-me **that- one**
que está cerca de tì.
that is close of you

As G-R (2002: 223) notes, in this scenario, *ese* is used to indicate 'close to the speaker,' rather than close to hearer, while *aquel* has the role of indicating proximity to the addressee. The division of labor of the demonstratives in this example is illustrated in Table 3-5 below:

Table 3-5: Scenario 2: Division of labor of Spanish demonstratives (G-R)

features	[+speaker], [-hearer]	[-speaker], [+hearer]
demonstrative	*este, ese*	*aquel*

Finally, G-R points out that we could have a third scenario where both *ese* and *aquel* denote proximity to the hearer, in contrast to *este*, denoting proximity to the speaker:

(61) No me traigas **este** libro de aquí, tráme **ese** o **aquel** que están cerca de tì
not me bring **this** book of here, bring-me **that** or **that** that are close of you.
'Don't bring me this book from over here, bring me that one or that one closer to you.
(G-R 2002: 223)

In this case, G-R notes that the use of *ese* versus *aquel* does not indicate that one object is closer to the hearer than the other; both referents can be equidistant from the hearer. The two demonstratives simply denote a contrast between one referent and another, irrespective of physical location (224). The division of labor depicted in (61) is illustrated in table Table 3-6.

Table 3-6: Scenario 3: Division of labor of Spanish demonstratives (G-R)

[+speaker], [-hearer]	[-speaker], [+hearer]
este	*ese, aquel*

Putting these options together gives us the following possible characterizations of the Spanish demonstratives:

Table 3-7: Possible feature specification of Spanish demonstratives

Demonstrative	*este*	*ese*	*aquel*
Option 1	[+speaker], [-hearer]	[-speaker] [+hearer]	[-speaker] [-hearer]
Option 2	[+speaker], [-hearer]	[+speaker], [-hearer]	[-speaker], [+hearer]
Option 3	[+speaker], [-hearer]	[-speaker], [+hearer]	[-speaker], [+hearer]

Looking at the table above, it appears that both *ese* and *aquel* have some flexibility with respect to their specification for [hearer]: the value for [hearer] can vary depending on how the three demonstratives are juxtaposed. However, *este* and *aquel* have fixed values for the [speaker] feature: *este* always denotes [+speaker] and *aquel* always expresses [-speaker]. *Ese*, on the other can express the values [+speaker] or [-speaker], depending on which demonstrative it is contrasted with.[96]

G-R (2002, 2005) interprets *ese's* flexibility as indicating a lack of distance marking. G-R (2002) remarks that, in reality, "*ese* works as a neutral term with respect to spatial positioning and can be used in situations where the demonstrative object is close to, or distant from, one of the agents of the utterance context" (224). When *ese* is used in isolation, on the other hand, it is

[96] In other words, the value for [hearer] can vary, even in strong demonstratives, while the value for [speaker] remains constant. This state of affairs highlights the idea that [speaker] is the basic feature in three-term demonstrative systems, with [hearer] only superimposed upon this basic one.

usually because "the speaker does not know the position of the object, that position is the common ground, or he does not want to make that spatial presupposition salient" (224). In my terms, the fact that *ese* can vary with respect to the value of its [speaker] feature indicates that it is fundamentally weak.

Further evidence that *ese* is weak comes from the fact that, when paired with a locative adverb, *ese* can combine with both *aquí* (here) and *allí* (there) as well as with neutral *ahí*.[97] This is in contrast with its strong counterparts: *este* (this) can only occur with *aquí* (here), and *aquel* (that) with *allí* (there), as illustrated in the following examples due to G-R (2002: 225):

(62) **este** libro **de aquí /*allí**
this book of here/there

(63) **aquel** libro **de *aquí / ahí**
that book of here/there

(64) Dame **eso** que està **aquí / allí / ahí.**
Give- me that that is here/there/there.

G-R also shows how this deictic agreement carries over to temporal and aspectual domain as well. The following examples show how the [-speaker] demonstrative (*aquel*) must be paired with the simple perfect (*plantée*), while the [+speaker] demonstrative (*este*) must be paired with the present tense (*planteo*). As example (67) shows, however, *ese* is okay with both tenses:

[97] As noted in my discussion of French *ce* in section 3.3.4.1, the ability of a demonstrative to combine with either a [+speaker] or [-speaker] locative adverb is a sign of its weakness (but see fn 86 for a discussion of recognitional demonstratives).

(65) ¿Qué resolviste de **aquel** problema que te *planteo/plantée?
What resolved-you of that problem that to-you pose-I/posed-I?

(66) ¿Qué resolviste de **este** problema que te planteo/*plantée?
What resolved-you of this problem that to-you pose-I/posed-I?

(67) ¿Qué resolviste de **ese** problema que te planteo/plantée?
What resolved-you of DEM problem that to-you pose-I/posed-I?
(G-R, 2002: 225)

Empircal evidence for *ese* as a weak demonstrative can be found in a corpus study by Gutiérrez-Rexach (2005), based on thirty hours of recorded speech from spontaneous conversation.[98] G-R (2005) notes that in his corpora speakers tend to use *ese* in cases where distance distinctions are not relevant. In the following example (an excerpt from one of the recorded sessions in G-R 2005), one of the subjects elicits the following, pointing at a car passing by:[99]

(68) No me gusta **ese** coche
Not to-me like 3sg.pres that car
'I don't like that car.'

In this example, the car in question is not close to the hearer, nor is it closer to the hearer than the speaker; G-R (2005) notes that distance specifications are simply not relevant. Hence the [+hearer] characterization of *ese* by Bello seems to be inaccurate. In another example, the

[98] The subjects were students in a Madrid university, both male and female, ages 18 to 25 years old.
[99] G-R (2005) warns the reader to take his gloss of *ese* as 'that' with a grain of salt, as he does not intend to equate *ese* with a 'distal' demonstrative.

speaker utters the following, pointing to a beer that is closer to him than the other discourse participants (G-R 2005: 156):

(69) **Esa** cerveza es la más cara.
That beer be-3sg. pres. the more expensive
'That beer is the most expensive one.'

Gutiérrez-Rexach (2005: 156) notes that there are many examples of this nature in his corpus. In fact, in only 30% of the cases can *ese* be clearly and unambiguously associated with a referent that is close to the hearer. In general, *ese* occurs more frequently than either *este* or *aquello* in the corpus: *ese* occurs 45% of the time, as compared to *este's* 35% and *aquel's* 20% of the time. Gutiérrez-Rexach and Zulaica (2006) interpret G-R's (2005) data as evidence that *ese* is relatively free in its distribution, being "appropriate in situations instantiating a wider range of spatial relations than the more constrained demonstratives *este* and *aquel"* (80). In other words, they consider *ese* to be a weak demonstrative. In my framework, G-R's characterization of the Spanish demonstrative paradigm would be as follows:

(70) Spanish demonstrative system (G-R 2002, 2005): [100]
este = [+speaker], [-hearer]
ese = [speaker], [hearer]
aquel = [-speaker], [hearer]

[100] I have interpreted G-R's (2002) examples (in (59) –(61)) to mean that that *ese and aquel* can vary in their specification for [hearer]. In other words, these demonstratives have an inherently neutral [hearer] feature, like medium-distance demonstratives (Lakhota). Note that another way of capturing these facts would be to assume that the [hearer] feature is missing altogether in this system.

It is important to note that G-R's (2002, 2005) studies are synchronic in nature and do not explicitly address the question of grammaticalization; i.e. if the Spanish paradigm they propose derives from an older one (like the one characterized by Bello, for instance). However, Gutiérrez-Rexach and Zulaica (2006) claim that their analysis of *ese* as distance-neutral represents an instance of a more general cross-linguistic phenomenon of "an underlying convergence of demonstrative systems, where ternary oppositions are recategorized as binary oppositions" (80). I will take the above statement to suggest that we are indeed dealing with a case of grammaticalization with *ese*, in which we see a shift from an older demonstrative paradigm in (71) to a newer one in (72):

(71) Old Spanish demonstrative paradigm (Bello 1847):

este = [+speaker], [-hearer]
ese = [-speaker], [+hearer]
aquel = [-speaker], [-hearer]

(72) New Spanish demonstrative paradigm (G-R 2002, 2005):

este = [+speaker], [-hearer]
ese = [speaker], [hearer]
aquel = [-speaker], [hearer]

3.3.8.2 Piedmontese *ës*

I have used Spanish as a case study to illustrate a common cross-linguistic process whereby middle-term demonstratives become weak. I will briefly mention another Romance language that exemplifies this tendency, the Northern Italian dialect of Piedmontese. Like Spanish, Piedmontese is traditionally characterized as having a three-way demonstrative system,

its demonstratives deriving from Latin *(eccu) istu(m), ips(um),* and *eccu illu(m)*. Parry (1997) notes, however, that the use of these terms does not conform to the usual tripartite system, but instead to a binary system, with the addition of a distance-neutral demonstrative. In our terms, the distance-neutral demonstrative *ës* would have a neutral [speaker] feature, as in (73):

(73) *cost, sto, st'*$_{masc\text{-}sing.}$ = [+speaker]
costa/sta/st'-$_{fem\text{-}sing}$
costi/sti-$_{m\text{-}pl}$
coste/ste$_{f\text{-}pl}$

col $_{masc\text{-}sing}$ = [-speaker]
cola/col $_{fem\text{-}sing}$
coj $_{mpl}$
cole/coj'-$_{pl}$

ës, së, s'$_{masc\text{-}sing.}$ = [speaker]
sa/s' $_{fem\text{-}sing}$
si $_{mpl}$
sé$_{fpl}$

When used on its own, *ës*, as in *ës liber* ('this/that book') no longer communicates the information [-speaker], [+hearer]. Parry points out that, like French *ce*, the demonstrative *ës, së, s'* must be used with the locative adverbs *sì* 'here', and *lì* 'there or *là* 'over there,' in order to communicate a distance specification. The fact that it can appear with either one of these locative adverbs provides solid evidence for the status of *ës* as a weak demonstrative.

3.3.9 Summary and Conclusions of the [speaker] and [hearer] features

The discussion of Spanish and Piedmontese above illustrates the common cross-linguistic phenomenon of the reduction of three-term systems to a two-term one, via the weakening of a middle-term demonstrative (Finnish *se*, Spanish *ese*, Piedmontese *ës*).[101] I have argued that the vulnerability of middle terms is tied to the idea that they are specified for [-speaker]. Since the speaker is the deictic center in all demonstrative systems, a term that is specified for close to the deictic center is less likely to lose that value than one that is not.[102] We witnessed this tendency in Chapter 2 for [-speaker] demonstratives in two-terms system (Latin *ille*, English *that, those*, Italian *quello, quelli*), and in this chapter with middle term demonstratives in three-term systems, which I argue are also specified for [-speaker]. The following table summarizes our conclusions thus far:

[101] Another way in which the vulnerable middle-term can be affected by diachronic change is for it to disappear from use altogether, resulting in a reduction of the demonstrative paradigm. Modern Italian is an example of this. Italian has a two-term demonstrative system, with *questo* specified for [+speaker], and *quello* for [-speaker]. However, an earlier system (still intact in the Tuscan dialect) had a third term, *codesto*, specified for [-speaker], [+ hearer], which disappeared in the 19th century. The disappearance of this second-person term has made a binary demonstrative paradigm out of once was a ternary one.

[102] We will examine this tendency further in 4.5.2.

Table 3-8: Properties and features of weak and strong demonstratives and Stage I articles

Stage	Properties	Features	Examples
Stage 0_1: the strong demonstrative	1. referent specified for distance to/from speaker (and hearer in three-term systems)	[+/-speaker], ([+/-hearer])	(a) Spanish *este/aquel* (b) English *this/that*$_{strong}$ (c) Italian *questo/quello*$_{strong}$
Stage 0_2: the weak demonstrative	1. referent is interpreted as being immediately accessible	[speaker], ([hearer])	(a) French *ce* (b) Spanish *ese* (c) *German dieser*$_{weak}$ (d) Piedmontese *ës* (e) English recognitional *that/those*$_{weak}$ (f) Italian recognitional *quello/quelli*$_{weak}$ (g) Late Latin recognitional *ille*$_{weak}$
Stage I: definite article	1. referent is identifiable to speaker and hearer	no [speaker] feature (no [hearer] feature)	(a) English *the* (b) Italian *il/lo/la/i/gli/le* (c) Finnish *se* (d) English determinative *those* (e) Italian determinative *quelli*

Thus far in this chapter, the discussion of the demonstrative's semantics has been pointing to the notion that there is such a thing as a weak demonstrative: it has predictable past (generally as a [-speaker] demonstrative), and a generally predictable future (as a definite article), and a definable set of properties, one being immediate accessibility of the referent. We will now turn our attention to its other property, contrastiveness.

3.4 Decomposing the demonstrative: contrastiveness

In section 3.3.3 we discussed how the condition of immediate accessibility of the referent distinguishes demonstratives (both weak and strong) from definite articles, and that that this concept is derived from the presence of the [speaker] feature. Hiietam and Börjars (2002:11) conclude that both 'direct familiarity' (what we are calling immediate accessibility) and

'contrastiveness' are properties that set the demonstrative apart from the definite article, and I will adopt this argument here. Hiietam and Börjars' (2002) data is synthesized in table Table 3-9:

Table 3-9: Properties of demonstratives and definite articles (Hiietam and Börjars 2002)

Property	**Demonstratives**	**Definite articles**
contrastiveness	yes	no
limited to direct familiarity (immediate accessibility)	yes	no
uniques/inclusiveness	no	yes
generics	no	yes

The table above expresses the conclusion we came to in 3.3.3, which is that while both demonstratives and definite articles can express direct familiarity (immediate accessibility), only demonstratives are limited to this kind of familiarity. The interpretation of immediate accessibility was expressed in my framework as a [speaker] feature. 'Contrastiveness,' on the other hand, is the only semantic property that demonstratives possess to the exclusion of the definite article, according to Hiietam and Börjars (2002). The idea that demonstratives are inherently contrastive has been proposed by many researchers, including Hawkins (1978), Mendoza (2005), Diessel (1999), Lyons (1999), and C. Roberts (2002). Researchers who consider contrast/contrastiveness to be a fundamental characteristic of the demonstrative agree that there are different manifestations of this property. More precisely, a demonstrative signals (i) that the referent in question contrasts with similar members of the contrast set in a key way and/or, and (ii) that the referent contrasts with some other more salient referent. Let us explore these different types of contrast expressed by the demonstrative.

3.4.1 The referent differs from similar members of contrast set in a key way

C. Roberts (2002) suggests that, aside from the [+/-speaker] contrast, demonstratives express a general contrast between the intended referent and other members of the contrast set. She argues that this contrastive property is "based on the proximity distinctions which are central to demonstratives in their canonical use" (125), where canonical here means situational use. For example, with strong demonstratives, referents can be contrasted with respect to their position to the deictic center, the speaker: *this house* differs from *that house* in that the former is specified for [+speaker] and the latter is specified for [-speaker]. In that way, the [+/-speaker] distinction is a special kind of contrast, one that applies only to strong demonstratives. However, once the binary contrast between [+speaker] and [-speaker] is lost, a general contrast remains between the intended referent and other similar candidates (Roberts 2002).

Working with Polish but generalizing to other languages, Mendoza (2005) claims that "in using a contrasting demonstrative pronoun, the speaker ascribes a quality to the referent that does not relate to the other members of the same class" (14), meaning that the intended referent differs in one key way from other candidates. She argues that this contrast may be implicit (when unstressed) or explicit (when stressed).[103] As mentioned above, the quality that differentiates the referent of the demonstrative from its contrast set may be one of distance, as with strong demonstratives, or it may be another property unrelated to distance. Consider the following examples (adapted from Hiietam and Börjars 2002), featuring a situational use definite article and demonstrative:[104]

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[103] I will pick up on the idea of implicit vs. explicit contrast in 3.4.3.

[104] Hiietam and Börjars' (2002) example is in English, but I will use French to highlight the fact that weak demonstratives are also contrastive.

(74) a. Mettez **l'oeuf** dans **le bol.**
put-2sg. the-egg in the bowl
'Put **the egg** in the bowl.'

b. Mettez **cet** **oeuf** dans **ce** **bol**.
put-2sg. this/that egg in this/that bowl
'Put **this/that egg** in **this/that** bowl.'

Even without a distance contrast, the demonstratives *cet* (*oeuf*) and *ce* (*bol*) signal a contrast between the egg and bowl in question and other members of the set; something which the definite article cannot do. In fact, as Hiietam and Börjars (2002: 9) point out, in a situation where there is more than one egg and one bowl, and where it makes a difference which egg and which bowl is used, there is no other choice but to use the demonstrative. The contrastive property of demonstratives represents the flipside of the uniqueness presupposition of definite articles: a referent that is unique cannot be contrasted (either implicitly or explicitly) with any other referent (Hiietam and Börjars, 2002: 9). The following example illustrate this:

(75) **The/*this/*that sun** rose at 6:18 AM today.

As the authors point out, the demonstrative would only be allowed in the above example if there were more than one sun in the sample set.

3.4.2 The referent is somehow unexpected

Another way that contrastiveness is manifested with demonstratives is that the intended referent contrasts with a more obvious choice. Anaphoric demonstrative specifically exhibit this

kind of contrast.[105] Diessel (1999) argues that, in contrast to other tracking devices, "what all anaphoric demonstratives have in common is that they do not just continue the focus of attention; rather, they indicate that the antecedent is not the referent the hearer would expect in this context (i.e. the most topical NP)" (99). According to Diessel (1999), there are two main reasons why the intended referent may be unexpected, or less salient than other referents: (i) the referent constitutes a new topic or (ii) the referent is mentioned further back than other referents. In the first case, the demonstrative serves to shift the topic; in the second case, the demonstrative serves to reactivate a previous topic.

Demonstratives are commonly used to establish a new topic. Diessel (1999) cites several studies that look at the specific properties of anaphoric demonstratives compared with other tracking devices (Linde 1979, Ehlich 1982, Sidner 1983, Lichtenberk 1988, Ariel 1990, Himmelmann 1996, Comrie 2000). Diessel (1999) notes that what these studies reveal is that "anaphoric demonstratives are often used to indicate a referent that is somewhat unexpected and not currently in the focus of attention" (96). Comrie for one, shows that in German, Dutch and Russian, demonstratives cannot be co-referential with the topic of the preceding discourse. The following example from German shows that the tracking of continuing topics is limited to third person pronouns or definite noun phrases in that language, while demonstratives are used to indicate topic shift (Diessel 1999: 96):

[105] Mendoza (2005) separates the anaphoric use of demonstratives in Polish from their contrastive, situational use, claiming that the purpose of anaphoric demonstratives is "guarantee of coreferential interpretation" (16). I see this function of anaphoric demonstratives as isomorphic to the 'contrastive' function of situational demonstratives: an anaphoric demonstrative highlights one particular referent in contrast to all other possibilities, thus guaranteeing co-referential interpretation.

(76) *Der Anwalt$_i$ sprach mit einem Klienten$_j$ Da* ***er$_i$/der$_j$*** German
The lawyer talked with a client since he/**this.one**
nicht viel Zeit hatte, vereinbarten sie ein wieteres
not much time had agreed.on they a further
Gespräch nächste Woche
conversation next week
'The lawyer talked to a client. Since he didn't have much time, they agreed to have another meeting next week.'

Diessel points out that the third person pronoun *er* refers to the subject NP of the preceding sentence, *der Anwalt* 'the lawyer,' signaling a continuing topic. The demonstrative *der* on the other hand, can only refer to the non-topical NP *einen Klienten* 'a client' at the end of the preceding sentence.

Cross-linguistically, it is common for anaphoric demonstratives to be used after the first mention of a new topic as a means of shifting the focus of attention. Lichtenberk (1996) illustrates this phenomenon for To'aba'ita, the language of Malaita, Solomon Islands; while Cyr (1993a, b, 1996) shows a similar distribution for Montagnais (Algonquian). Himmelmann (1996) gives the following example from Tagalog (Austronesian):

(77) *May kasaysayan sa isang manlalakabay;* Tagalog
EXIST statement LOC one traveler
ang manlalakbay na ***ita*** *ay si Pepito*
SPEC traveler LK **DEM** PRED PROPER.NAME Pepito
'(One incident) is told about a traveler; this traveler (his name) was Pepito.
(example due to Himmelmann 1996: 229)

The use of the demonstrative *ita* after the noun *manlakbay* 'traveler' in the example above signals that "the focus of attention has been shifted to a new participant that was mentioned for the first time in the preceding discourse" (Diessel 1999: 98). Diessel observes that once a new discourse referent has been established by a demonstrative, other tacking devices such as third person pronouns, zero anaphors, definite articles and pronominal affixes on the verb tend to take over tracking of the referent for subsequent mentions.[106] In its function as a topic-shifter, then, the demonstrative signals a contrast between the intended referent and another more salient referent; in this case, the more salient referent being the topic of the preceding discourse.

Demonstratives are also commonly used to refer to a referent that is further back in the discourse and therefore not as salient as other potential referents. Citing Lichtenberk (1988), Diessel (1999: 98) reports that in To'aba'ita, in addition to establishing new discourse referents, demonstratives are frequently used to 'reactivate' a referent that is further back in the discourse. To track a referent in the immediately preceding clause, on the other hand, third personal pronouns or pronominal affixes of the verb are preferred.

3.4.3 Contrastiveness encoded by [+contrastive] feature

In the above discussion, the term 'contrast' and 'contrastiveness' has been used rather generally, to mean that the demonstrative presupposes a set of alternatives that the referent of the demonstrative is contrasted with. Repp (2010) considers more carefully the nature of contrast and how it relates to the idea of focus. The notions of focus and contrast are tightly interwoven, conceptually, and in the literature, often leading to a conflation of the terms. Repp (2010)

[106] Diessel (1999: 98) points out, citing Himmelmann (1996) and Christophersen (1939), that while use of a demonstrative after the first mention of a new topic is especially common in languages that lack a definite article, demonstratives are often are preferred in this context even in languages that do have a definite article.

attempts to tease these two concepts apart. She argues that, while both focus and contrast evoke a contrast set, the contrast set associated with 'plain' focus does not need to be explicitly named nor its members identified. Moreover, the contrast set can be open. To illustrate this, Repp gives the following example:

(78) Only [BILL $_{FOC}$] turned up at the main station.

Repp argues that in a 'non-contrastively focused' interpretation of *Bill* in the example above, the members of the set of alternatives do not need to be identifiable. For example, the sentence can be uttered "in a context where all the kids of a primary school were supposed to meet up at the station but then only one, viz. Bill, turned up. We need not know who the other kids are or even how many kids there are in the school for [it] to be a felicitous utterance" (Repp, 2010: 6). Contrastive focus, on the other hand, is accompanied by an alternative set with 'clearly identifiable elements' (Repp 2010: 5, citing É. Kiss 1998: 268). In the sentence above, for example, contrastive focus is set up in the case that "there is at least one other identifiable salient individual in the context that did not turn up at the station" (Repp 2010: 6). For example, a contrastive focus interpretation of the sentence would imply something like *Only BILL turned up at the main station—John and Steve never made it,* where John and Steve had been specifically mentioned in the preceding discourse.

The distinction that Repp points to turns out to be quite relevant to demonstratives. Researchers who identify demonstratives with 'contrast' or 'contrastiveness' do so on the basis that the demonstrative evokes a set of alternatives (which are often more salient for one reason or another than the intended referent). However, as Repp (2010) has pointed out, both plain focus and contrastive focus involve the notion of a contrast set. With plain focus, the set of

alternatives can be implicit, while with contrastive focus, it must be 'clearly identifiable' in the discourse or context, and is closed.[107] In order to preserve the insight that demonstratives presuppose a contrast set, I will continue to use the term 'contrastive' and 'contrastiveness' to describe this property of demonstratives, yet with a caveat: my use of 'contrast' is closer to Repp's notion of 'focus,' in that the contrast set of demonstratives need not be clearly identifiable. Crucially, my [+contrastive] feature does not necessarily denote *contrastive* focus.[108] In other words, what is often accomplished phonologically with stress in a definite noun phrase is accomplished with the (unstressed) demonstrative due to an inherent [+contrastive] feature.

Demonstratives can of course also express *contrastive* focus when the demonstrative is stressed, as the following shows:

(79) *context: at a wine tasting*
THIS wine [the one contained in the glass the speaker is holding] is way too sweet, but I liked the finish of **THAT wine** [pointing to a wine at the end of the table].

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[107] López (2009) proposes a different analysis of contrastive focus from that of É. Kiss (1998) and Repp (2010), arguing that the 'domain of identification' need not be known to the hearer. He gives an example of focus fronting (FF) in Catalan to illustrate this. In example (a) below, the NP *THE KNIVES* is contrastively focused, even though the knives in question need not be known to the hearer:

Context: you gave him the spoons
(a) ELS GANIVETS li vaig donar
The knives CL. dat PAST.1 gave.inf
'THE KNIVES, I gave him.'

López argues that the defining characteristics of contrastive focus are that: (i) it creates a variable (for all x, you gave him x) and (ii) it provides a value of the variable (x = knives).

[108] This is opposed to the [+c(ontrastive)] feature proposed by López' (2009), which not only indicates contrastive focus, but which is also associated with movement to the left periphery (of the clause).

We see that it is the addition of stress that makes a demonstrative NP contrastively focused, in the sense of Repp (2010), where the contrast set is clearly identifiable. Even when the contrast set is not explicitly named (i.e. even if we left out the conjunct *but I like the finish of THAT wine*), the contrast set here is 'clearly identifiably' due to the linguistic contrast between the [+speaker] and [-speaker] demonstrative forms. Moreover, the contrast set in such cases is closed, containing only the referent (or set of referents) that correspond to the opposite value for [speaker]. Consider a situation where there are two used wine glasses on the table, one near the speaker/guest and one further away. The host re-fills the glass closest to the speaker and hands it to her. In uttering (80a), the guest is committed to (80b):

(80) a. I wasn't drinking out of **THIS glass**!
b. I was drinking out of **THAT glass**.

In other words, (80a) entails (80b). Repp notes that contrastive focus behaves differently from non-contrastive focus in that, if we substitute a contrasted element with a member of the contrast set, the result is a false proposition. This seems to be the case with stressed demonstratives:

(81) #I wasn't drinking out of **THIS glass**, and I wasn't drinking out of **THAT glass.**[109]

This is not the case with unstressed demonstratives:

(82) I wasn't drinking out of **this glass**, and I wasn't drinking out of **that glass**.

[109] This sentence would be felicitous in a case where there were more than two glasses to chose from: I wasn't drinking from THIS glass and I wasn't drinking from THAT glass, I was drinking from that over glass OVER THERE. My intuition tells me that this has to do with two-way vs. three-way distance distinctions—there is a way that [+speaker] and [-speaker] demonstratives can be contrasted with one another and yet still be paired together to contrast with yet a third term (third person), even in languages where this three-way contrast is not expressed lexically.

In the example above, it is possible that the speaker wasn't drinking out of either of the glasses, or wasn't drinking at all. Repp (2010) notes that, as opposed to contrastive focus, plain focus "elicits alternatives but otherwise imposes no restrictions on how the alternatives are evaluated – whether replacing the focus with an alternative results in a true proposition or not" (8). In sum, unstressed demonstratives behave like non-contrastively focused elements, while stressed demonstratives are used to express contrastive focus. Both stressed and unstressed demonstratives, however, evoke a contrast set and can thus be characterized as [+contrastive].

To sum up, I have argued that one of the defining properties of the demonstrative is that it evokes a contrast set, but the evocation of the contrast set does not entail contrastive focus. When the demonstrative is not stressed, the members of this contrast set are implicit. I have proposed that this inherent property of evoking a contrast set is encoded by a [+contrastive] feature on the demonstrative; contrastive focus on the other hand, comes about only with the addition of stress. The feature compositions of strong and weak demonstratives, in comparison with definite articles is as follows:

(83)

strong demonstrative:	[+/-speaker] (and in three term systems: [(+/-)hearer]) [+contrastive]
weak demonstrative:	[speaker] (and in three term systems: [hearer]) [+contrastive]
definite article:	----

One question that arises when we look at the paradigm above is what the semantic contribution of the definite article is (if anything). We will address this question in the next section, in connection with the semantic content of the demonstrative. Specifically, we argue

that demonstratives and definite articles share a common core, and that once the [(+/-) speaker] and [+contrastive] features have been 'peeled away' from the demonstrative in the process of grammaticalization, we are left with this common core (to be identified below), resulting in a definite article.

3.5 Decomposing the demonstrative: identifiability

Demonstratives are often assumed to share with the definite article the property of being definite. The nature of definiteness, however, is a complex matter. As a starting point to our investigation, let us consider definiteness with respect to the definite article. The question of what, if anything, a definite article contributes to the interpretation of the noun has been the subject of much debate. Alexiadou, Haegeman, and Stavrou (2007), henceforth AHS, outline various views in the literature on the role of the category 'definite article' and its contribution to the interpretation of DP. In the DP-literature, DP/the definite article is taken to have various roles, among which are the following:

(i) A grammatical category which 'grammaticalizes' the semantico-pragmatic notion of identifiability as definiteness in certain languages (Lyons 1999)
(ii) A subordinator which turns its NP complement into an argument (Abney 1987, Stowell 1989, 1991, Szabolsci 1994)
(iii) The 'natural' bearer of referentiality (Longobardi 1994, 1996)
(iv) A semantically empty grammatical morpheme whose main function is a case-assigner (Giusti 1993, 1997, 2002).

As we can see, the first three roles are ascribed to the category D, while the last refers specifically to the morpheme which instantiates the category, the definite article itself. The

views above can be divided along other lines as well, according to whether D/the definite article is viewed primarily (i) as contributing semantics to the expression or (ii) bringing about argumenthood. Alexiadou, Haegeman, Stavrou (2007) suggest that, with a few minor assumptions, we can group the last three together, as they all ascribe to D/the definite article the property of making NP an argument. Specifically, if we assume that argumenthood and referentiality are closely related (AHS: 56), then Longobardi's view of D as being the bearer of referentiality is consistent with the view of D as an argument-maker. Similarly, the authors point out that if we assume that case entails argumenthood, then Giusti's perspective outlined in (iv) can be subsumed in this group as well (56). Lyons' (1999) proposal as described in (i) on the other hand, in which D encodes the concept of 'identifiability' in the grammar, focuses on the interpretational properties associated with this category rather than its relation to the noun's argument status.

Like Lyons (1999), I will be primarily concerned with the semantic contribution of the position of D/the definite article: only through understanding the semantic contribution of the definite article and the associated properties of D can we begin to understand what happens semantically when a demonstrative undergoes grammaticalization as a definite article. On the syntactic front (to be discussed in Chapter 4), focusing on the interpretive contribution of the definite article allows us to understand why the demonstrative tends to raise to D in the syntax,[110] and it helps us make sense of cases where a definite article co-occurs with a demonstrative, giving rise to apparent 'double definiteness.' With these goals in mind, let us take a moment to review Lyons' (1999) work.

[110] In many languages (English, French, Italian, among others), the demonstrative must appear in [Spec, DP] in the syntax, even though (I claim) it is merged lower down.

3.5.1 Definiteness as identifiability: Lyons (1999)

As our point of departure, let us review one of the major ideas developed in Lyons' (1999) work, which is that definiteness is not a semantic notion but rather a grammatical category:

> The proposal is that definiteness *strictu sensu* is not a semantic or pragmatic notion as assumed by almost all writers on the subject, but rather a grammatical category on a par with tense, mood, number, gender etc. But, like these, it is the grammaticalization (that is, the representation in the grammar) of some category of meaning (274-5).

For Lyons, the 'category of meaning' which underlies definiteness is 'identifiability.' Identifiability is a refinement of the concept of 'familiarity,' a term that goes back to Christophersen (1939) and developed further in work by Hawkins (1978). Familiarity speaks to the fact that with definites, the referent is familiar to *both* the speaker and hearer, whereas with indefinites, only the speaker is aware of what entity is being referred to (Lyons 1999: 2-3). In other words, familiarity means shared familiarity. There are different types of familiarity, which Lyons illustrates with his examples below:

(84) Just give **the shelf** a quick wipe, will you, before I put this vase on it.

(85) Put these clean towels in **the bathroom** please.

(86) An elegant, dark-haired woman, a well-dressed man with dark glasses, and two children entered the compartment. I immediately recognized the woman. **The children** also looked vaguely familiar.

(87) **The moon** was very bright last night.

(88) I had to get a taxi from the station. On the way **the driver** told me there was a bus strike.

The first two examples (84-85) are instances of situational familiarity, with the difference that in (84) the entity is visible, while in (85) it is likely not. Example (86) illustrates familiarity through previous reference (i.e. anaphoric use). Examples (87) and (88) illustrate familiarity that stems from general knowledge, as discussed in section 3.3.4.1: in the case of (87) this general knowledge concerns the fact that there exists is a unique moon in our world,[111] while in (88) the general knowledge is that taxis have drivers.

However, as Lyons (1999) notes, there are certain cases of definiteness that cannot be easily characterized by familiarity, as we see in the examples below (due to Lyons 1999):

(89) They've just got in from New York. **The plane** was five hours late.

(90) **The president of Ghana** is visiting tomorrow.

In (89) one might deduce that air travel is likely, especially if the point of arrival is a great distance from New York, but the association does not fall out automatically through accessing previously evoked frames knowledge or through general knowledge. While (90) appeals to the general knowledge that Ghana has a president, the particular individual referred to is likely not familiar to the hearer. Due to the fact that the notion of familiarity has a difficult time accounting for examples like those above, many linguists have preferred to adopt the term

[111] The uniqueness presupposition of the definite article interacts with general knowledge in this example.

'identifiability' rather than familiarity when it comes to characterizing definiteness. Identifiability basically means that the hearer is in a position to identify the referent. As Lyons (1999: 6) puts it: "while on the familiarity account *the* tells the hearer that he knows which, on the identifiability account it tells him **that he knows or can work out which** [emphasis mine]." In other words, familiarity represents a special case of identifiability.

Lyons does not equate identifiability with definiteness, but instead considers definiteness to be the formal representation in the grammar of the semantico-pragmatic property of identifiability. Lyons points out, however, that the relationship between a grammatical category and the meaning it is based on is never one-to-one: "When a concept comes to be represented grammatically it takes on a new life, with the result that the grammatical category created is not limited to expressing that concept" (276). Here Lyons refers to the fact (which he discusses in detail) that the definite article is not restricted to expressing the concept of identifiability. In the literature on definiteness, there are various semantic-pragmatic properties that have been associated with the category of definiteness (referentiality, specificity, uniqueness, inclusiveness, familiarity, identifiability), but, as Lyons observes, there are two main aspects of definiteness that do not seem to derive one from the other: identifiability and inclusiveness. I will briefly discuss inclusiveness and then give Lyons' motivation for zeroing in on identifiability.

'Inclusiveness,' a term coined by Hawkins (1978), is a reframing of Russell's (1905) concept of uniqueness, which signals that there is only one entity capable of satisfying the description given by the NP. This aspect of definiteness is distinct from identifiability and is illustrated in the following example (due to Lyons 1999). I use English here, but the uniqueness aspect of definite articles is attested cross-linguistically:

(91) I've just come back from a wedding. **The bride** was wearing red.

In the example above, the bride is not familiar or even identifiable to the hearer (as witnessed by the use of the indefinite NP *a wedding* in the first sentence), so it cannot be familiarity or identifiability at play. Instead, the definite article appeals to the knowledge that there is (generally) only one bride at a wedding, hence there is a unique referent that satisfies the description in the NP. Inclusiveness is related to the concept of uniqueness, but casts its net broader in that extends the concept of uniqueness to apply to mass nouns and plurals. Rather than a unique object satisfying the description of the NP, with inclusiveness "the reference is to the totality of objects or mass in the context which satisfy the description" (Lyons 1999: 11). Some examples of the definite article expressing inclusiveness would be like those below (from Lyons):

(92) John was looking for **the cats** (that lived in his garden).

(93) **The wine you brought** needs to be chilled.

Even though there is not a single entity that is referred to in these examples, there is still the sense that only that a particular group/mass can satisfy the description of the NP. Lyons (1999) argues, therefore, that uniqueness is just a special case of inclusiveness, where uniqueness applies to individuals and inclusiveness to whole sets.

Even after assimilating uniqueness to inclusiveness, and familiarity to identifiability however, it is still not possible to reduce definiteness to a single property. As Lyons notes, identifiability and inclusiveness seem to represent different, autonomous aspects of definiteness: "Identifiability is particularly attractive for referential uses, especially where the referent is a physical entity locatable in a physical context, and inclusiveness is particularly attractive for non-

referential uses" (253). Lyons' approach is not to choose one property to the exclusion of the other, but rather to identify one property as basic and fundamental and suggest that other property is a result of the 'grammaticalization' of that concept: once the concept gets formalized in the grammar, it essentially becomes semantically bleached and the morpheme expressing that concept takes on new uses. Lyons argues that that prototypical property is identifiability.

There are a few reasons why Lyons chooses identifiability as the fundamental property supporting definiteness. For one, despite the variation in how definiteness is expressed cross-linguistically,[112] Lyons notes that "there is always a large central core of uses relatable directly to identifiability" (278). In addition, the concept of identifiability seems to have syntactic reflexes even in languages that lack definiteness marking. For one, in languages that lack definite articles, there are still ways to convey a 'definite' interpretation, and this 'definite' interpretation is tied to identifiability. In Mandarin, for example, an NP in subject position must be a topic and is therefore taken to be 'definite,' while an NP in the existential construction is interpreted as 'indefinite' (Lyons 1999: 278). According to Lyons, the interpretation of definiteness in languages like Mandarin has to do with "whether or not a referent is familiar or already established in the discourse" (278). This property, as Lyons points out, is linked to the concept of identifiability, not inclusiveness. Secondly, the syntactic behavior of demonstratives in

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[112] For example, some languages require generics (which meet the semantic/pragmatic criteria for both inclusiveness and identifiability; Lyons 1999: 98) to be definite while others do not (Lyons 1999: 278). Still in other languages, definiteness marking is optional with identifiability (as in Hausa, where a sentence like 'the boy has come' can be translated either with the definite article as in (a) or without (b):

(a): Yaro-n ya zo
boy-DEF AUX come
'The boy has come.'

(b) Yaro ya zo.
Boy AUX come
'The/A boy has come.'

(examples due to Lyons 1999: 52)

languages without definiteness marking points to identifiability as the underlying property of definiteness. Specifically, Lyons (1999: 278) points out that demonstratives are invariably treated as definite in definiteness effect contexts. In Mandarin, for example, demonstratives are not allowed as the complement of existential constructions (Lyons 1999, citing Huang 1987). This syntactic behavior of demonstratives suggests there is some property shared by demonstratives and definite articles which triggers the definiteness effect. We know that this property cannot be inclusiveness, since I have argued that demonstratives presuppose a contrast set, whether or not they are stressed (cf. 3.4.3), and the property of having a contrast set is incompatible with inclusiveness (since having a contrast set by definition implies reference to only a *subset* of all potential referents). Hiietam and Borjars (2002) point out that the contrastive nature of demonstratives is essentially the opposite of the uniqueness (i.e. inclusiveness) property of definite articles. To use Hawkins' (1978) term, demonstratives are 'exclusive,' not inclusive. Lyons concludes that it is the property of identifiability that links demonstratives to the DP:[113]

> Suppose they [demonstratives] are marked [+Dem] and that this feature is interpreted as meaning that the speaker is pointing out or otherwise providing sufficient information for the hearer to pick out the referent. It follows that the referent is identifiable, so demonstratives bring the pragmatic concept underlying definiteness into play.
> (Lyons 1999: 279)

[113] Although I do not dismiss the idea that D can also be involved in forming arguments. I do not believe that these properties are mutually exclusive. One can imagine a scenario where the category D is responsible for turning NP into an argument, while it is the definite article that contributes the semantics of 'definiteness.'

3.5.2 The [+identifiability] feature

My analysis takes Lyons' basic insight and formalizes it: I propose that demonstratives have a [+identifiability] feature, in addition to the [(+/-) speaker] and [+contrastive] features. Hence, the reason why the demonstrative can appear in DP in lieu of the definite article is clear: like the definite article, the demonstrative has a [+identifiability] feature which can be checked against D's uninterpretable [+identifiability] feature. This movement dependency will be discussed in chapter 4.

3.5.2.1 The significance of the [+identifiability] feature for grammaticalization

Under my analysis, the fact that the demonstrative and the definite article can both satisfy something in the DP projection is not just a happy coincidence. On the contrary, the [+identifiability] feature is the result of the historical link between the two elements. If the definite article is derived from the demonstrative, we can conclude that whatever semantics are encoded in the DP (i.e. identifiability) come from the erstwhile demonstrative which has become reanalyzed as a definite article in [Spec, DP].[114] Translating this formally, when a demonstrative grammaticalizes, its [(+/-) speaker] feature and [+contrastive] feature are stripped away, and the only semantic feature it leaves behind is the [+identifiability] feature. The newly reanalyzed definite article in [Spec, DP], therefore, hangs on to a subset of the semantics of its ancestor.[115]

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[114] While cross-linguistically, most definite articles are derived from demonstratives, Lyons (1999) points out that sometimes definite articles have other sources, like verbs and classifiers. For example, the Sissala article *ná* which has its source in the lexical verb 'see'(and still exists alongside its grammaticalized form), and the Bengali definite article (*ti*), affixed to the noun, is derived from a numeral classifier (Lyons, citing Masica 1986).

[115] Note that I depart with Lyons' (1999) view that the semantics of definiteness (identifiability) are not associated with the lexical item itself (the article), but rather with D as a category. According to Lyons, the definite article itself has no semantic content. Unlike Longobardi (1994), however, who argues for a distinction between 'substantive' definite articles (which

As the definite article undergoes further grammaticalization, transitioning from a Stage I to Stage II article, for example, it in turn loses its [+identifiability] feature (abbreviated as [+ident] below).

(94)

strong demonstrative:	[+/-speaker], ([+/-hearer]), [+contrastive], [+ident]
weak demonstrative:	[speaker], ([hearer]), [+contrastive], [+ident]
stage I definite article:	[+ident]
stage II article:	--
stage III article:	--

Recall that Greenberg's (1978) Stage II article is used for referents that are both identifiable and unidentifiable (its use is like that of a definite and indefinite article combined) and hence cannot be said to encode [+identifiability]). In Stage III either the articulated or non-articulated form has spread to the extent that there is no longer any real distinction between article and no-article in the language.

The account of definiteness (and how it relates to the demonstrative) proposed in this section accomplishes the following objectives: (i) it refines our view of the demonstrative's

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encode definiteness) and 'expletive' uses (where the definite article merely fulfills a grammatical function), Lyons takes all definite articles to be 'expletive.' One important reason for not adopting Lyons' (1999) viewpoint that all definite articles are expletive comes from diachronic evidence. We know from Greenberg's (1978) work on the stages of articles that the morpheme sitting in D can cease to express definiteness. Lyons says that, at this point, "unless a new article emerges with a reduced function to renew the category, the definite-indefinite distinction collapses." (340). The difficulty I see with this line of reasoning has to do with *how* the new article can renew the DP (or, rather, the semantics it encodes) if the lexical items itself is semantically void. In other words, the property of identifiability has to come from somewhere. If we attribute the semantics of identifiability solely to the DP, then we have no way to "get those semantics back" once they have been lost in the process of grammaticalization. The only way to escape this circular reasoning is to ascribe semantic content to the actual lexical item itself. In my analysis, where diachronic syntax is taken into account, the semantic content of the definite article (identifiability) is a remnant of the erstwhile demonstrative.

semantic contribution to a definite expression and (ii) it lends continuity to the *demonstrative* → *definite article* progression by elucidating the semantic and historical link between these elements, which I've argued is identifiability.

3.5.2.2 A possible exception to identifiability: *new-this*

A possible exception to the claim the demonstratives have a [+identifiability] feature comes from '*new-this'* in English (terminology due to Wald 1983). *New-this* is a common narrative device in colloquial English which "marks important new topics that usually persist in the subsequent discourse (unlike *that*)" (Diessel 1999: 109, following Wald 1983). For example, in the sentences below, the expectation on the part of the reader is that we are going to hear more details about *this hippie* and *this man*:

(95) A few years ago, there was **this hippie**, long-haired, slovenly. He confronted me . . . . (Prince 1981: 233).

(96) I enter, and there is **this man** looking at me with a knife in his hand. (Zamparelli 2000: 45)

The NPs introduced by *new-this* are first-mention and thus have no referent in the preceding discourse or in the immediate surroundings. The referent, while identifiable to the speaker, is not identifiable to the hearer, a common trait of specific indefinites. Some researchers have in fact been prompted to analyze *new-this* as a specific indefinite article (Prince 1981a, Diessel 1999 among others). The indefinite nature of *new-this* has been attributed to the fact that (i) it is replaceable by the indefinite article and that (ii) it can be used in *there*-sentences, illustrated in (97) and (98) respectively:

(97) A few years ago, there was **a hippie**, long-haired, slovenly . . .

(98) There's **this book** you simply must read!

The hypothesis that *new-this* is a specific indefinite marker raises some interesting questions about the grammaticalization path of the demonstrative, however; specifically with regards to the proposed [+identifiability] feature. Specifically, how do we explain the absence, or apparent loss, of the [+identifiability] feature on *new-this*? One explanation might be that *new-this* is akin to a Greenberg Stage II definite article, which covers the area of both the definite and indefinite articles. This theory has a few problems, however: to begin with, *new-this* does not actually cover the combined area of both the definite and indefinite article, but only a sub-portion of the indefinite article's domain (the *specific indefinite* portion). Second, *new-this* does not have the morphological profile of Stage II articles, which are always affixal. Finally, since I am aware of no evidence that English *this* has ever functioned as a Stage I definite article (determinative, or diffuse), analyzing *new-this* as a Stage II article would entail proposing that this element has effectively 'skipped' Stage I. An alternative explanation is that *new-this* follows a separate grammaticalization path from other demonstratives, namely the path normally taken by numerals (which leads to indefinite articles). Under this analysis, *new-this* would represent another example of a quantifier-like demonstrative in English, alongside 'quantifier *those,'* identified in the appendix to this chapter. I will leave the interesting question of how to characterize the diachronic path of *new-this* question open to future research.

3.6 Chapter Summary

In this chapter, I have given a thorough account of the semantics of the demonstrative. Not

only have I proposed a distinction between demonstratives and definite articles, I have characterized the intermediate stage of grammaticalization identified in Chapter 2: the weak demonstrative. My proposal is that strong demonstratives are specified for [+/-speaker], while weak demonstratives have a neutral [speaker] feature. I have shown that the strong/weak distinction cuts across the pragmatic uses identified in the introduction to this chapter: specifically, both situational and anaphoric demonstratives can be strong or weak. An important contribution of this dissertation to the understanding of demonstratives is the proposal that weak and strong demonstratives can exist side-by-side synchronically. In this vein, I discuss Spanish *ese* and German *dieser*, arguing that these strong/weak homophonous pairs are the result of a process of lexical splits. Furthermore, I analyzed Spanish *ese* as a case study into the phenomenon whereby non-proximal demonstratives, i.e. those specified for [-speaker], are most vulnerable to weakening.

While it is the presence of distance marking that separates strong and weak demonstratives, it is the semantic property of contrastiveness and the pragmatic property of immediate accessibility that distinguishes the demonstrative from the definite article. I argued that immediate accessibility is brought in by the [speaker] feature, whether valued or not: the [speaker] feature triggers the presupposition that the referent of a demonstrative must be interpreted as being either in the immediate surroundings or previously mentioned in the discourse. The definite article does not carry the presupposition of immediate accessibility, as the definite article can signal that the referent is identifiable through general knowledge. I also argued that all demonstratives, to the exclusion of the definite article, are contrastive, either overtly or implicitly. A demonstrative signals that the intended referent differs in a key way from other members of the contrast set; this contrast can be rooted in distance specifications

(strong demonstratives) or it can also be a non-spatial, general contrast (weak demonstratives). With anaphora, the presence of a demonstrative signals that the referent contrasts with some more salient member of the contrast set, either because it is not the current topic or because it is further back in the discourse than other referents. Finally, the property of identifiability is what serves as the common denominator between demonstratives and Stage I definite articles, and provides the key diachronic link between them. As the demonstrative progresses along the grammaticalization path, it becomes more and more semantically bleached, being stripped of its features, and the definite article undergoes the same process.

In table 3-10 (a fleshed-out version of Table 3-8), I sum up the semantic properties of the demonstratives and definite articles as laid out in this chapter (and their relation to the diachronic stages introduced in Chapter 2), giving examples from languages discussed in both chapters. The subject of the next chapter will be how the semantic features identified in this chapter interface with the syntax of demonstratives.

Table 3-10: Properties and features of weak and strong demonstratives and definite articles

Stage	Properties	Features	Examples
Stage 0_1: the strong demonstrative	1. referent specified for distance to/from speaker (and possibly hearer) 2. referent is interpreted as being immediately accessible 3. presupposes a contrast set 4. referent is identifiable to speaker and hearer	[+/-speaker], ([+/-hearer]) [+contrastive] [+identifiable]	(a) Spanish *este/aquel* (b) English *this/that*$_{strong}$ (c) Italian *questo/quello*$_{strong}$
Stage 0_2: the weak demonstrative	1. referent is interpreted as being immediately accessible 2. presupposes a contrast set 3. referent is identifiable to speaker and hearer	[speaker], ([hearer]) [+contrastive] [+identifiable]	(a) French *ce* (b) Spanish *ese* (c) *German dieser*$_{weak}$ (d) Piedmontese *ës* (e) English recognitional *that/those*$_{weak}$ (f) Italian recognitional *quello/quelli*$_{weak}$ (g) Late Latin recognitional *ille*$_{weak}$
Stage I definite article	1. referent is identifiable to speaker and hearer	[+identifiable]	(a) English *the* (b) Italian *il/lo/la/i/gli/le* (c) Finnish *se* (d) English determinative *those* (e) Italian determinative *quelli*
Stage II	article has the combined function of definite and indefinite article.	--	Common in African languages: Maasai *ol* [masc.], *en-* [fem]
Stage III	Productive contrast between articulated and non-articulated forms has largely disappeared. If articulated form dominates, we get either a gender marker or a general noun marker.	--	Niger-Congo languages, Nilo-Saharan: *k-*

Appendix to Chapter 3: Simple and Complex Demonstratives

A.1 Introduction

One aspect of the demonstrative's semantics that I do not directly investigate in this dissertation but which is related to the analysis proposed here is the referential status of the demonstrative; namely, whether it is referential or quantificational. In this appendix I will consider both sides of the argument, and I conclude that demonstratives are referential. A related issue is whether there are substantive differences between so-called simple demonstratives (of the form *that*) and 'complex' demonstratives (*that* N). Within the direct reference view, I will suggest some possibilities for a unified analysis of simple and complex demonstratives. In the spirit of Harris (1980), I argue that simple and complex demonstratives should be viewed as different morphological ways of instantiating the same semantic features.

A.2 Direct reference view

It is traditionally accepted that simple demonstratives of the form *that* are directly referring expressions, meaning that the content of a simple demonstrative is simply the individual to which it refers, in the context it occurs. This is the view championed by Kaplan (1978, 1989 a,b). Kaplan believes that the direct reference theory should extend to complex demonstratives; that complex demonstratives should be considered 'singular terms' and that their semantic content (in contexts) are individuals.

A major problem with Kaplan's particular theory is that it can only handle situational demonstratives, specifically, the ones that involve pointing (Kaplan's *demonstration*). The limitations of Kaplan's theory of direct reference has pushed researchers to formulate alternative

analyses of complex demonstratives. Roberts (2002), for one, modifies Kaplan's theory of direct reference, so that it can apply to other types of demonstratives, like anaphors, where identification of the referent depends on another referential element in the text.[116] Other researchers have challenged the view that complex demonstratives are directly referring expressions altogether, and taken an approach where complex demonstratives are considered quantifier phrases. We will discuss the quantificational view in section A.4.

A.3 The role of the noun phrase in complex demonstratives

It has been noted that complex demonstratives resemble definite descriptions in that the NP seems to play a role in identifying the referent. There is friction, therefore, between the syntactic configuration that complex demonstratives appear in and the semantics they embody. Borg (2000: 3) aptly describes this friction in the following way:

> . . . we have an expression which (due to the demonstrative term at its head) seems to be directly referential, but one which also serves to describe the object in question (thanks to the concatenated predicate(s)) and thus would seem more akin to quantifier phrases [in that the NP aids in identifying the referent; comment mine].

Borg (2000) notes that at the heart of this friction is the question of what role, if any, the noun plays in complex demonstratives. One position involves treating the complex demonstratives as

[116] What is directly referential in Roberts' (2002) account is not the demonstrative itself, but its accompanying demonstration, which is more broadly defined than in Kaplan (where the demonstration is synonymous with a physical gesture). Roberts couches her analysis in a framework of dynamic semantics (cf. Heim's 1982 notion of 'File-Change Semantics'), so that the notion of context is understood in terms the interlocutors' *common ground*, which consists of a set of propositions shared by the interlocutors, in addition to discourse referents, which are conceived of as mental representations.

semantically unstructured, with the noun being semantically irrelevant. This allows the entire expression to be treated as a directly referring expression. This is Kaplan's (1978) view. Direct reference theorists like Kaplan believe the expression 'that F' to be semantically unstructured and to have as its content an individual, so that conceivably, F could be replaceable by any property without changing the truth conditions of the sentence (Lepore and Ludwig 2000: 212). However, the noun does have a pragmatic contribution, in that if the object denoted fails to have the property expressed by the noun, the demonstration fails. For example, if I point to a horse and say "that unicorn is white," I have not succeeded in demonstrating anything (example from Lepore and Ludwig 2001: 211). Another view involves treating the noun and the demonstrative as semantically autonomous, with the noun making a semantic contribution to the whole. On this view, two scenarios present themselves: the quantification view and the predicational view. We will first discuss the quantificational view, which I reject, and then, the predicational view, which seems more promising.

A.4 Quantificational view of demonstratives

The quantificational view of demonstratives is motivated by the observation that, syntactically, complex demonstratives more closely resemble quantifier phrases like 'some man' or 'every woman' than they do proper names, for instance. Since definite descriptions have been considered by many to be quantifier phrases (following Russell, 1905), some have claimed that demonstratives should be analyzed as quantifiers as well. On the quantificational view, the demonstrative is interpreted as a quantifier, along the lines of 'some men' or 'all women,' with the noun operating as its restriction. While an in-depth discussion of the quantificational theory

of demonstratives goes beyond the scope of the current discussion, I will briefly outline some core arguments for the quantificational view given by King (2001).

The first argument King cites in favor of analyzing the complex demonstrative as a quantifier is its behavior in Weak Cross-over effects. In Weak Crossover constructions, quantifiers in the object position cannot bind the pronoun that is part of the subject, while proper names can. For example, in (1a) *his* cannot be interpreted as anaphoric on *every man*, whereas in (1b) the pronoun *his* can be interpreted as anaphoric on the NP *John*. This has been explained by appealing to the fact that quantifiers undergo raising at LF.

(1) a. His mother loves every man.
b. His mother loves John.
(King 2001: 18-19)

King (2001) claims that demonstratives pattern with quantifiers as in (1a) in that they exhibit weak crossover effects. In (2), for example, *his* cannot be bound by *that man with the goatee*:

(2) His mother loves that man with the goatee (King 2001: 19).

King's second piece of grammatical evidence concerns 'Antecedent-Contained Deletion,' where a verb phrase (VP) has been elided and replaced with a dummy verb 'do'. It is a condition on VP deletion that neither the missing verb nor its antecedent c-commands the other, which explains the ungrammaticality of (3). However, ACD seems to be allowed with quantifiers, as shown in (4):

(3) *Janet flunked Holmes, who Robert did

(4) Janet flunked every student that Robert did.
(examples due to King 2001: 18)

Examples involving quantifiers, therefore, appear to violate the condition of VP deletion, since *flunked* c-commands *did* at S-S. If quantifiers raise at LF (following May 1985), however, *flunked* will not c-command *did* at LF, and hence such sentences would not actually constitute counterexamples to the constraint on VP deletion. As the example below shows, demonstratives pattern with quantifiers rather than R-expressions with respect to ACD:

(5) Janet flunked **that student** that Robert did.

Another syntactic piece of evidence for demonstratives as quantifiers concerns so-called 'Bach-Peters' sentences, which contain two quantifiers, each one simultaneously restricting the scope of the other:

(6) [Every friend of yours]$_1$ who studied for it$_2$ passed some math exam$_2$ she$_1$ was dreading.
(example due to King 2001: 13)

In the example above, *it* is bound by 'some math exam she was dreading', and 'she' by 'every friend of yours who studied for it'. Johnson and Lepore (2002) note that Bach-Peters sentences are distinctive primarily because of the mutual interaction between the quantifiers. Complex demonstratives exhibit the same distributional effects as quantifiers.

(7) That friend of yours$_1$ who studied for it$_2$ passed that exam$_2$ she$_1$ was dreading
(from King 2001: 12-13).

The arguments above all center around the syntactic behavior of demonstratives. Johnson and Lepore (2002) hold that the evidence put forth by King (2001) shows only that complex demonstratives share certain syntactic properties with quantifiers; a fact which in their estimation does not make them *semantically* akin to quantifiers. Furthermore, demonstratives are often thought of as the quintessential referring expressions, and that intuition is difficult to give up. As Borg (2000) puts it, "our intuition is that if anything is a distinct referring term, ordinary appearances of 'this' or 'that,' used to pick out objects in the immediate environment, must be" (9). While I will not adopt the argument that demonstratives are quantifiers in general, *contra* King (2001), I will mention here one possible case of a quantificational demonstrative, as seen with English non-referential *those*.

In English, *those* can be used in cases in which the speaker does not have a specific referent in mind. Consider the following examples:

(8) **Those students** who do not wish to take part in the dissection may leave the room now.

(9) Under the new administration, **those governmental** agencies that are judged to be ineffective will be eliminated.

In these sentences, not only is the referent of the NP is not present in the physical surroundings, previous discourse, or shared experience of the interlocutors, but it may actually be non-existent. For example, in (8), the sentence can be true even if the set of students who wish to leave the room is empty. It has been pointed out to me by C. Tortora (p.c.) that these demonstratives behave like the quantifier *any*:

(10) **Any students** who do not wish to take part in the dissection may leave the room now.

(11) Under the new administration, **any governmental agencies** that are judged to be ineffective will be eliminated.

While I do not hold with the view that complex demonstratives are quantifiers in general, I leave open the possibility that this particular use of *those* may represent a special case of quantificational use of demonstratives, and will therefore refer to it as 'quantification *those*.' But whereas the quantificational view holds that demonstratives are quantifiers with *existential* import (like *some, few,* and *the*), the interpretation of *those* above is that of a *universal* quantifier (*any, all, every*, etc.).

Below I will suggest an alternative to the quantificational analysis of complex demonstratives, which involves analyzing the noun in the complex demonstrative as a predicate.

A.5 Predicational view

The quantificational view, whose global application I rejected above, represented one approach to analyzing the noun as autonomous in complex demonstratives. Another approach that also views the noun as autonomous is the predicational view. Lepore and Ludwig (2000) offer a predicational account of complex demonstratives in which the demonstrative in '*that* F' is analyzed on par with bare *that* in being directly referential. This singular referring term, then, is conjoined to a separate predication introduced by the noun. The net result is that the property expressed by the noun is applied to whatever referent the simple demonstrative has picked out. For example, the phrase *that cat is black* would be represented as [the x: x= that and x is a cat](x is black), where *that* is a singular referring term (Lepore and Ludwig 2000: 215). In this

framework, the complex demonstrative is treated as a restricted existential quantifier, with the demonstrative *itself* ('that') as (part of) the predicate restriction.[117] This represents a sort of hybrid model between the quantificational and direct reference theories. Under Lepore and Ludwig's analysis, the noun contributes to the meaning of the demonstrative expression, but crucially does not semantically constrain what the demonstrative refers to (Lepore and Ludwig, 2000: 201). For example, if someone utters "that unicorn is white" while pointing to a horse, it makes sense to respond: "That is white, but not a unicorn." While the utterance "that unicorn is white" is truth-conditionally false, the speaker has nonetheless succeeded in demonstrating *something* (Ludwig and Lepore 2000: 211). This view is in contrast to that of 'strict' direct reference theorists (like Kaplan) who would say that nothing is demonstrated in the above scenario. While I will not commit to this hybrid analysis of complex demonstratives at present, it represents a promising option.

A.6 A unified analysis?

A tempting approach to simple and complex demonstratives would be to adopt a dualistic approach, embracing a direct-reference view of simple demonstratives but a quantifier view of complex demonstratives. However, Borg notes that not only does such an approach ignore the

[117] An alternative predicational view suggested to me by Marcel den Dikken (p.c.), is one in which the demonstrative itself is underlyingly a predicate. The complex demonstrative *that cat* for example, could would have *cat* as the subject (presumably of a small clause) and *that* as its predicate: $[_{SC}$ cat X that]. The semantics of this construction would be roughly *the cat is that*. While this interesting proposal deserves a more in-depth investigation, it seems at first blush to make the interpretation of the demonstrative dependent on the noun. I agree with the viewpoint adopted by Lepore and Ludwig (2000) that the noun does not semantically constrain what the demonstrative refers to, and that something can be demonstrated by the complex demonstrative even if the referent does not have the property of the noun (recall the unicorn example). It is not clear to me, therefore, how this partiuclar predicational configuration can allow for an object to be picked out in the event that the nominal fails to apply to it, since the demonstrative (as a predicate) would be dependent on noun (its subject), for its interpretation.

similarities in form and function between simple and complex demonstratives, it is theoretically anomalous:

> So the suggestion is that the act of concatenating a paradigm referential term with a predicate expression changes its semantic status to that of a quantifier; yet this class of demonstrative descriptions would seem [. . .] to be the only case of such a remarkable change of allegiance. (Borg 2000: 8)

I agree with Borg that adopting two different analyses for simple and complex demonstratives is not advantageous,[118] hence our goal should be to identify a unified account. On the semantic front, we have Lepore and Ludwig's (2000) analysis discussed above as a promising option, in which the demonstrative is a single, referring expression in both simple and complex demonstratives (with the difference that the complex demonstrative features a separate predicate). On the syntax front, we have Johnson and Lepore's (2002) 'hybrid' analysis, which I will discuss below.

The cornerstone of Johnson and Lepore's (2002) argument is that the syntactic similarities between demonstratives and quantifiers that King (2001) cites does not make demonstratives quantifiers. It simply means that they are *determiners*. Furthermore, the authors assimilate simple demonstratives to complex ones, along the lines of what Postal (1966) claims

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[118] The solution Borg (2000) proposes capitalizes on the distinction made by Kaplan (1978, 1989a,b) between the content and character of a demonstrative expression, where *content* is conventional meaning, whereas *character* is "what determines content in varying contexts (Kaplan 1978: 505). Borg adopts a solution in which the noun contributes to the *character* of the expression but not its content. Specifically, the contribution of the noun in the complex demonstrative is that it lays a constraint on the selection of the referent in the initial context of utterance.

for pronouns in English.[119] The unified analysis that Johnson and Lepore (2002) suggest, therefore, takes simple demonstratives to be syntactically like complex demonstratives. That 'pronominal' elements occur in determiner position has been argued for independently for pronouns in general, as Johnson and Lepore point out, in languages such as Italian, Italian, English, Rumanian, Serbo-Croatian, and Welsh (Progovac 1998, Cornilescu 1992, Koopman 1999, Postal 1966, Longobardi 1994). Johnson and Lepore conclude that the mere fact of being in the determiner position does not mean that a word is a quantifier.

If we put the syntactic analysis of Johnson and Lepore (2002) together with the semantic analysis of Lepore and Ludwig (2000), the following scenario results: Syntactically speaking, simple demonstratives are like complex demonstratives in that they are determiners (*that* = *that* $N_{\emptyset}$). Semantically, complex demonstratives (of the type '*that* N') are like simple demonstratives in that the demonstrative component (*that*) is directly referential.[120] To form a 'complex

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[119] Johnson and Lepore's (2002) evidence is based on possessive constructions, where the possessive (English "s") does not appear at the end of a noun phrase in which the noun has been elided (examples due to Johnson and Lepore 2002: 11).

(i) a. Many students raised their hands; all were convinced that the right answer was 27.
b. *Many students raised their hands; all's answer was 27.
c. Your mother's house is bigger than Mary's mother's.
d. *Your mother's house is bigger than Mary's (i.e., bigger than Mary's mother's house).

They point out that the same distribution is seen with simple and complex demonstratives:

(ii) a. This dog's collar is blue.
b. That dog's collar is blue.
c. These dog's collars are blue.
d. Those dog's collars are blue.

(iii) a. *This's collar is blue.
b. *That's collar is blue.
c. *These's collars are blue.
d. *Those's collars are blue.

[120] In order to be able to accommodate anaphoric demonstratives, we would need to broaden our notion of demonstration along the lines of Roberts (2002).

demonstrative,' a separate predication is then conjoined with simple *that* applying the property of the noun to whatever referent *that* has picked out. In other words, a combination of these two analyses would give us a semantically and syntactically unified account of simple and complex demonstratives. A unified approach to simple and complex demonstratives is attractive for a few reasons: (i) it maintains that idea that the demonstrative is directly referring and (ii) it recognizes the intuition that the NP has a semantic contribution in a complex demonstrative (in other words, if we point to a horse and say *that unicorn is white*, the utterance is false, but the demonstrative does not fail to refer).

A.7 Conclusion

In this appendix I address the issue of simple and complex demonstratives. While simple demonstratives can be captured straightforwardly with a direct reference theory like Kaplan's, complex demonstratives pose more of a challenge in that they syntactically resemble definite descriptions, which have been argued to be quantifier phrases (Russell 1905). I will reject the claim that demonstratives are quantifiers across the board, while at the same time, recognizing that this may be the correct analysis for certain demonstrative uses (English 'quantificational *those'* in non-referential cases and 'new *this'* discussed in section 3.5.2.2.). I propose that the predicational view of the noun within complex demonstratives is attractive, especially when combined with a view in which the simple and complex demonstratives are semantically assimilated, as this allows for a unified picture of simple and complex demonstratives. What remains unclear, however, is how a predicational analysis would interface with a Cinque-esqe approach to demonstratives, in which demonstratives are merged in a semantically-contentful functional projection. While I keep open the option of merging the demonstrative as an

underlying SC subject of a nominal predicate, I will not develop this approach in my syntactic analysis of the demonstrative. Instead, I will put forth a Cinque-style analysis, where the demonstrative is merged in the specifier of a dedicated functional projection, TrackerAdjP.

CHAPTER 4: THE SYNTAX OF THE DEMONSTRATIVE

4.1 Introduction

In Chapter 3 I addressed the pragmatic/semantic distinctions between strong and weak demonstratives on one hand, and between weak demonstratives and the definite article on the other. In this chapter, I will implement a structural analysis of these distinctions. My argument for a rich internal structure of the demonstrative provides a contrast to existing syntactic accounts in the literature, in which a demonstrative's semantics are disconnected from its syntax. Pre-minimalist accounts of the syntax of the demonstrative have focused on issues like the phrasal status of the demonstrative, its base position, and where and why it raises, giving very little attention to the syntax-semantics interface. While it is generally accepted in the syntactic literature that the demonstrative and the definite article are different semantic beasts, for example, this intuition is not exploited in the structural treatment of demonstratives.

This chapter is organized around three main concepts: (i) the 'internal' syntax of the demonstrative, (ii) the 'external' syntax of the demonstrative and (iii) the syntax of grammaticalization of the demonstrative. In section 4.2 I begin by laying out some of the leading pre-minimalist syntactic analyses, developed by Giusti (1993, 1994, 1997), Brugè (1996) and Bernstein (1997). I point out two major shortcomings of these analyses: (i) they do not attempt to link the semantics of the demonstrative with its syntax and (ii) they do not make explicit the relationship of the demonstrative to the DP projection. I propose that these two issues can be best addressed by analyzing the demonstrative as a morphosyntactically complex element and decomposing it into its respective parts, which is what I undertake in section 4.3.3, after discussing some alternative and contributing proposals in 4.3.2. In section 4.3.3.1 I address the question of what the terminal nodes of the demonstrative's internal structure correspond to:

whether they are actual morphemes or abstract features. In connection with this question, I discuss how grammaticalization affects the internal structure of the demonstrative. In section 4.3.3.2 I pin-point the position of the demonstrative reinforcer (like *qui* 'here' in *questo libro qui*, 'this book here' in Italian). I argue that there are two positions for the reinforcer: a demonstrative-internal position (identified by Roehrs 2010), which results in a high surface position of the reinforcer in Germanic, or a low position (as in Romance), where the reinforcer is merged as the predicate of a small clause with the demonstrative as its subject, as in Romance (in the spirit of Brugè 1996).

In the second part of this chapter I discuss the external syntax of the demonstrative: where it is merged, where it raises to, and why. I also investigate whether the 'internal' syntactic difference between strong and weak demonstratives has a reflex in the external syntax. In this connection, in section 4.4.1 I investigate the possibility that the pre/post-nominal distinction correlates with a semantic property of demonstratives, but ultimately reject this possibility. In section 4.4.2 I discuss the demonstrative's relationship to the DP projection, arguing that it raises to [Spec, DP] in the absence of the definite article because its [+identifiability] feature serves as a legitimate goal for the D probe. In 4.4.2.1 I address the issue of 'double definiteness' and argue that true double definiteness is not allowed in the DP projection. I investigate some languages that exhibit co-occurrence of the demonstrative and the definite article in the left periphery and conclude that, in these cases, the definite article is a Stage II article.

In the third part of this chapter I give a syntactic analysis of the grammaticalization of the demonstrative, as identified for Late Latin and spoken Finnish in Chapter 2. In 4.5, I lay the foundation for my arguments with a discussion of Roberts & Roussou (2003) who work within a Minimalist framework. In section 4.5.2 I discuss the semantic bleaching of an individual

morpheme (in this case, the morpheme associated with the [+/-speaker] feature of the demonstrative), which results from the loss of meaning-to-form connection. I argue that this semantic bleaching at the morphological level (the mechanism at work in the transition from distance-marked to distance-neutral demonstrative), triggers simplification of a demonstrative's functional structure. I give the examples of German *dieser* and Latin *ille* to illustrate this process. In 4.5.3 I argue that this 'internal' simplification of the demonstrative's structure leads to 'external' simplification, in the sense of the Merge operation replacing Move + Merge. I suggest that this diachronic process is isomorphic to its synchronic derivation: while the synchronic derivation entails *raising* of the demonstrative to [Spec, DP], the diachronic derivation involves *reanalysis* of this element as an article in [Spec, DP]. Only when the article loses its [+identifiability] semantics and corresponding internal structure does it become a head. I argue that this is equivalent to Greenberg's (1978) stage II article. Section 4.6 summarizes the findings of this chapter.

4.2 Overview of syntactic proposals

In the section that follows I will discuss three of the leading pre-minimalist syntactic accounts of demonstratives presented by Giusti (1993, 1994, 1997), Brugè (1996), and Bernstein (1997). An important contribution made by these accounts is the idea that the demonstrative is syntactically distinct from the definite article. I take these accounts a step further, to the goal identified here, which is to formulate a syntactic analysis of the demonstrative that takes into account the syntax/semantics interface. My analysis accomplishes this goal by proposing (i) that the demonstrative is merged in a dedicated functional projection that encodes its semantics, and (ii) that the demonstrative has a rich internal structure (what I will refer to as its 'internal

syntax') which helps us make sense of the demonstrative's link with the DP projection, synchronically and diachronically. I will first address how the demonstrative/definite article distinction is addressed within these accounts, and then I will turn towards the issue of raising.

4.2.1 The Demonstrative and definite article are semantically and structurally distinct

Giusti (1993, 1994) devotes much of her discussion to the question of whether or not the demonstrative should be lumped together with numerals, quantifiers, possessives and articles under the label 'determiner.' She concludes that the demonstrative, while sharing important qualities with the definite article, is categorically distinct from it and other determiner-type elements. She provides both semantic and syntactic evidence for this distinction: semantically, definite articles do not contribute to the interpretation of the noun phrase, while demonstratives do. She claims that the function of the article is purely syntactic (Giusti 1993: 49), specifically, "the definite article is not the realization of a semantic feature (definiteness, or referentiality), but one possible morphological realization of (abstract) Case" (Giusti 2005: 37). She argue that demonstratives, on the other hand, have a [+REF] feature, and in later works (Giusti 1997), she specifies an additional 'deictic' property that distinguishes demonstratives from definite articles, although the precise meaning of this term is not made clear. As a reflection of this lexical/functional divide, Giusti argues that the definite article is in D while possessives, demonstratives, and quantifiers occupy specifiers of AgrPs. According to Giusti, the demonstrative is base-generated in the specifier position of the AgrP directly dominated by DP.

Syntactic evidence that the demonstrative is distinct from the definite article comes from observed blocking effects of the demonstrative in Romanian: while the demonstrative does not block movement of N to D (as seen in (1a) below), it does block AP movement to Spec, DP (as

in (1b)) which is otherwise possible in Romanian (ex. (1c)).[121] These data would not be expected if the demonstrative were in a head position.

(1) a. omul acesta
man-the this
'this man'

b. *batrtinul acesta om
old-the this man
'this old man'

c. batrinul om
old-the man
'the old man'

Giusti's (1993) main hypothesis is that demonstratives and definite articles are distinct, both in terms of their contribution to the interpretation of the noun phrase and their structural position (definite articles are in D while demonstratives are merged in [Spec, AgrP]). With the advent of the cartographic enterprise in syntax, spearheaded by Cinque (1994, 1999)[122] and further developed by Belletti (2004) and Rizzi (2004), functional categories take on a different role. Rather than representing the locus of agreement, they become associated with specific semantic/pragmatic content. Shlonsky (2010) notes that as a result, the Pollockian (1989) Agr

[121] However, if we posit NP movement rather than N movement, we would need to explain why the demonstrative as an XP does not block noun raising.
[122] Cinque (1999) proposes a structure for the clause with some thirty functional categories, the specifiers of which host different classes of adverbs and proposes a similar analysis for adjectives within the DP (2004). Poletto (2000) has argued along similar lines for subject clitics in Northern Italian dialects, as has Zanuttini (1997), for the different interpretation of negative markers in the clause.

gave way to other semantically contentful functional heads, which Cinque's (1994, 1999) research on adjectives and adverbs strives to identify. The content of functional heads in cartographic syntax is represented by interpretable features.[123] I build on Giusti's work and argue, in the spirit of Cinque (1994, 1999, 2002), that demonstratives are merged in a functional projection that encodes their semantics (akin to adjectives) and that these semantics are represented by the demonstrative's rich internal structure.

Brugè's (1996) work focuses on word order facts of the Spanish demonstratives *este/estes* (this/these), *ese/esos* (this/that/these/those),[124] and *aquel/aquellos* (that/those) and argues that the base position of the Spanish demonstrative is universal. Specifically, the demonstrative originates in a position distinct from that of the definite article. Based on the position of the post-nominal demonstrative with respect to the various classes of adjectives identified by Cinque (1994), Brugè argues that the demonstrative is generated in a low position within the DP; below all the functional positions hosting adjectives and directly above the NP (or the base position of the possessive adjective if there is one):

(2)

$[_{DP}$ D $[_{XP}$ poss.AP X $[_{YP}$ card.AP Y $[_{WP}$ ord.AP W $[_{ZP}$ speaker-orientedAP Z $[_{HP}$ subj-orientedAP H $[_{FP}$ Manner/ThematicAP F $[_{FP}$ **DEM** $[_{NP}$ N]]]]]]]]]

Extending her analysis beyond Spanish, Brugè (1996) uses the position of the locative reinforcer as a diagnostic for the base position of the demonstrative even in languages where the demonstrative raises to pre-nominal position in the syntax.

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[123] Shlonsky (2010) explains that, "like Minimalism, it [Cartography] attributes a cardinal role to features in syntax but whereas Minimalism focuses on the driving force of uninterpretable features, Cartography is concerned with the inventory of interpretable ones" (417).

[124] Brugè glosses *ese* as *that*, but I have argued in Chapter 3 that *ese* is weak.

In many languages, a demonstrative may simultaneously appear with a locative adverb, as we see in the examples below:

(3) **este** de **aquì** — Spanish
this of here
'this one here'

(4) **questo qui** — Italian
this here
'this one here'

(5) **celui ci** — French
this one here
'this one here'

In this construction, the locative adverb has the distinct function of reinforcing the [+speaker] or [-speaker] value of the demonstrative, hence Brugè calls it a 'reinforcing locative.' Brugè takes the position of the reinforcing locative to be a marker of the base position of the demonstrative. She proposes an idea (subsequently taken up by Bernstein 1997),[125] that the demonstrative (*este*) and its reinforcer (*aquì*) are base generated together as a constituent. Specifically, Brugè argues that sequence *este de aqui* ('this (of) here') has a complex internal structure in which the

[125] Although Bernstein (1997, 2001) offers a different account of the demonstrative-reinforcer construction. She proposes that in demonstrative-reinforcer constructions, like French *ce livre-ci* (this book here) for example, the demonstrative and its reinforcer are both generated in a functional projection below DP: the demonstrative in specifier position and the reinforcer in the head position. The surface word order is derived via XP movement (of the NP plus its modifiers) to the left of the reinforcer, followed by demonstrative movement to D. The result is that the reinforcer is stranded in DP-final position, where it can receive main stress (Bernstein 1997, 2001).

preposition *de* (of) mediates a predication relation between *este* and *aquì*. I will discuss this construction in more detail in section 4.3.3.2.

Just as floating quantifiers are taken to be stranded in their base position by the NP they quantifier over (cf. Sportiche 1988), Brugè (1996) submits that locative reinforcers mark the base position of the demonstrative they modify. In (6a) and (6b) the reinforcing locative (*aquì*) is taken to be in its base position, which is lower than the adjectives but higher than the post-nominal possessive and PP complements of the noun (examples from Brugè 1996):

(6) a. El libro **este de aquì** està mal hecho
the book this of here is badly made
'this book here is badly made.'

b. **Este** libro **de aquì** està mal hecho
this book of here is badly made.
'this book here is badly made.'

While I will adopt Brugè's (1996) argument for base-generating the demonstrative in a low position, my analysis differs from her in how I envision the nature of the FP the demonstrative is merged in. For Brugè, this FP is an AgrP, the locus of adjectival agreement: the semantics of the demonstrative do not come into play. In my analysis, on the other hand, the merge-site of the demonstrative is a semantically contentful functional projection, TrackerAdjP, specialized to the demonstrative.

Bernstein follows Giusti (1993, 1994) and Brugè (1996) in considering the demonstrative structurally distinct from the definite article. She cites three main reasons for making this distinction: (i) in many languages the two elements can co-occur (as I will illustrate below),

(ii) the demonstrative, but not the definite article, may appear without a noun (for example, *I like this* vs. **I like the*), and (iii) the demonstrative exhibits adjectival qualities in many languages, showing a full range of adjectival inflection and often sitting in a structural position typical of adjectives (Bernstein points the reader to Dryer 1992: 120-122).

Co-occurrence of the demonstrative and the definite article can be seen in Spanish and Romanian (Bernstein 1997: 92-3):

(7) **el** hombre **este** (cf. este hombre) Spanish
the man this
'this man'

(8) omu**l acesta** (cf. acest om) Romanian
man-the this
'this man'

Bernstein (1997: 93) notes that in some languages, like Hungarian, demonstratives can even co-occur in pre-nominal position. We also see this in Modern Greek :

(9) **ez a** fiu' Hungarian
this the boy
'this boy'

(10) **afto to** vivlio Modern Greek
this the book
'this book'

Bernstein cites these co-occurrence facts as evidence that the demonstrative and the definite article are not in the same position. At the same time, however, Bernstein acknowledges that in

most languages, the demonstrative and the definite article *cannot* co-occur, especially in the left periphery, thus prompting her to posit an analysis of the demonstrative whereby "the X^0 corresponding to the demonstrative head in Spec, AgrP raises and substitutes into the D_0 position" (94). I will discuss this proposal in further detail below.

Thus far we have seen that the demonstrative and definite article in these accounts are considered structurally distinct. The exact semantic contribution of the demonstrative, and how this factors into its syntax, however, is only hinted at in these accounts. Giusti (1993, 1994) argues that the demonstrative is lexical, entering into the LF computation, while the definite article is functional and does not enter the LF computation (Giusti 1993, 1994). And while both Giusti (1997) and Brugè attribute a 'deictic' property to the demonstrative, it is not clear what role, if any, this property plays in the syntax. I argue that the semantic contribution of the demonstrative is relevant to its syntax, and that viewing the demonstrative from the syntax/semantics interface helps us explain, rather than just describe, the syntactic behavior of the demonstrative.

4.2.2 The Relationship of the demonstrative to the DP projection: raising

All of the accounts considered here propose that the demonstrative is base-generated in a position lower than DP and raises to the DP projection, either in the syntax or at LF. Below I will discuss the different ways that demonstrative raising has been accounted for, and suggest that we need to refine these proposals in order to account for the distributional patterns of the demonstrative with respect to the definite article. In fact, one of the main challenges a syntactic account of the demonstrative faces is explaining the general tendency for complementary distribution between the demonstrative and definite article, while still being able to capture the

cases where the two elements can co-occur. Because the definite article and demonstrative are argued to occupy distinct structural positions, we are left with the conclusion that, as expressed by Giusti (1994), "whenever these two categories appear in the same structure they could—in principle—cooccur. What should be considered as surprising, then, is the number of languages in which they never cooccur" (89). Giusti's (1993, 1994) discussion of the movement of the demonstrative is centered around languages in which the demonstrative can surface either pre- or post-nominally, like Romanian. In the examples below, we see that in Romanian we can have a pre-nominal demonstrative as in (11a) or a post-nominal demonstrative, as in (11b). In the cases of the post-nominal demonstrative, a suffixed definite article must appear on the noun (which Giusti argues has raised to D):

(11) a. **acest** om
this man
'this man'

b. omul **acesta**
man-the this
'this man'

Giusti's derivations for these two options are shown below:

(12) a. $[_{DP}$ **acest**$_j$ $[_D]$ $[_{AgrP}$ t_j $[_{Agr}]$ etc. $[_{NP}$ om]]]

b. $[_{DP}$ [F' om$_i$-ul] $[_{AgrP}$ **acesta** [agr $t_{i'}$] $[_{NP}$ t_i]]]

Giusti (1997) argues that in general, a functional projection exists in order to realize some feature, and that this feature (which she suggests is the [+REF] for DP), has to be 'visible' in

order to be interpreted at LF; in other words, it must have an overt element. Either the demonstrative or the definite article can raise to the DP projection to license the functional specifier, but the raising of both would be prevented by a 'Doubly–Filled DP Filter' (1993, 1994). In (11b) the definite article (suffixed to the noun) is in D,[126] hence raising of the demonstrative to the DP projection in the syntax is not allowed. Conversely, the demonstrative raising to Spec, DP in (11a) obviates the need for overt N (+ affixal article) raising, and, by economy, makes it impossible.

Giusti (2002, 2005) attempts to account for languages that *do* allow the demonstrative and the definite article to co-occur in the left periphery (like Hungarian and Modern Greek). She proposes two intersecting principles: an Economy Principle, which limits functional heads, and a visibility requirement (Dimitrova-Vulchanova and Giusti 1998 and Giusti 2002), which states that a "functional projection must be visible at all levels of representation" (Giusti 2005: 38). Languages may fulfill this requirement by making the specifier **and/or** the head visible, where the 'and/or' choice is a matter of parametric variation. The crucial modification here is the inclusion of the conjunct, which allows Giusti to account for languages like Hungarian and Greek, in addition to Romance and Germanic. However, these principles seem stipulatory and do not offer insight as to *why* languages show different distributional patterns with regards to co-occurrence of the demonstrative and the definite article in the DP.

Brugè (1996) also offers an explanation of the distributional patterns of the demonstrative, attributing movement to a strong [+REF] feature. As discussed above, Brugè (1996) proposes that the demonstrative is always generated in the same base position, namely,

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[126] As illustrated in the examples above, demonstrative movement and N-raising appear to be interrelated. Giusti suggests that the noun enters the derivation already inflected for the affixal article in the base. The affix is then checked by N-to-D movement of the [N+art] complex before spell-out (Giusti 1994: 249), as shown in (12b).

the relatively low position identified for Spanish. Extending her analysis to other languages, Brugè identifies three different groups of languages, classified according to the level of representation at which raising applies: (i) languages where the demonstrative can move either to DP in the syntax *or* at LF: Spanish, Catalan, Bosnian-Serbian-Croatian, Russian, Romanian, Modern Greek (ii) languages where the demonstrative must move to [Spec, DP] overtly: Italian, French, English, German, Albanian, and (iii) languages where movement of the demonstrative must procrastinate (i.e., it remains in its base position at PF): Hebrew, Irish (Celtic). The varying positions of the demonstrative cross-linguistically and the apparent 'optionality' of demonstrative movement within some languages (like Spanish and Romanian) is addressed by Brugè in terms of a strong/weak feature dichotomy. Languages where the demonstrative must surface pre-nominally have a demonstrative with a strong [+REF] feature.[127] In languages where the demonstrative must stay in its base position, the demonstrative has a weak [+REF] feature. In languages where both possibilities are available (like Spanish) the demonstrative's [+REF] feature has both weak and strong properties.

Brugè's account predicts that raised demonstratives should have a different interpretation than demonstratives left in-situ: namely, raised demonstratives (which have a STRONG [+REF] feature) should result in an NP which is 'strongly referential,' while low demonstratives (which have a WEAK [+REF] feature) should give rise to a 'weakly referential' NP. To my knowledge, this prediction is not borne out empircally.[128] If we recast Brugè's account of movement in a Minimalist framework, however, in which movement is envisioned in terms of the properties of

[127] Brugè also posits a [+deictic] feature on the demonstrative, but this feature does not have any bearing on her syntactic analysis of the demonstrative.
[128] In 4.4.1, I will discuss different interpretations associated with the pre and post-nominal positions, but none of them can be characterized as a 'strongly referential' vs. 'weakly referential' distinction.

the 'attractor' (later called the 'probe'),[129] the burden of movement is shifted away from the demonstrative itself.

While Bernstein (1997) argues that the demonstrative and definite article should be analyzed as semantically and structurally distinct, she also acknowledges certain similarities between them that point the way to the analysis proposed here. For example, Bernstein (1997: 94) points out that in several dialects of French Picard, the simple demonstrative appears to have an article-like function (examples from Haigneré 1903/1969: 264):

(13) che monde — Boulogne Picard
this world
'the world'

In (13), *che* used in a situation where the referent is unique (there being only one world). In Chapter 2 we saw that the demonstrative is not compatible with uniqueness, which suggests that that *che* in the examples above is something other than the demonstrative. Bernstein (1997) argues that the 'article like' quality of the demonstrative in the example above would be difficult to account for if the demonstrative remained in [Spec, AgrP] or raised to [Spec DP], since neither structural position according to her is tied to the definite article interpretation.[130] Bernstein proposes that, while the demonstrative originates in the specifier of an agreement phrase (as

[129] The 'attractor/probe' is strong features in early minimalism (Chomsky 1995), uninterpretable features in later versions (Chomsky 2000), and finally, an EPP feature (on an uninterpretable feature) (Chomsky 2001).

[130] I will take issue with the idea that only the D head can host the definite article. Specifically, I adopt a (modified) version of Lyons' (1999) proposal that the DP projection is associated with the semantics of identifiability, and that both [Spec, DP] and D can host articles—the former housing free-form definite articles and the latter, affixal articles. This analysis reflects the intuition that, while the demonstrative possesses semantics above and beyond the definite article, the two elements share the common core property of identifiability.

proposed by Giusti 1993), the head of the XP raises and substitutes into the D position; not only in French Picard, but cross-linguistically. I propose a different interpretation of the French Picard facts, which essentially turns Bernstein's synchronic analysis into a diachronic one: I propose that in these dialects, the demonstrative has been reanalyzed as a definite article. A diachronic analysis allows us to recognize the state of affairs that Bernstein points out for French Picard, without having to argue that the demonstrative is both an XP and a X^0 within a single language. While Bernstein's synchronic XP→ X accounts for why we cannot get co-occurrence of the demonstrative and definite article in DP in Romance and Germanic, without having to resort to a filter (cf. Giusti's 1999 'Doubly-Filled DP Filter'), it conversely gives up an account for why the two elements *are* in fact allowed to co-occur in the left periphery of the DP in other languages. My analysis seeks to explain this apparent conundrum.[131]

4.2.3 Problems with syntactic analyses and possible solutions

In the preceding section we identified two main shortcomings with the pre-minimalist syntactic literature on demonstrative syntax: (i) the fact that the semantics of the demonstrative are not reflected in its syntax and (ii) the fact that the relationship between the demonstrative and the DP projection is not made explicit, leaving the question of 'double definiteness' and its converse, complementary distribution, largely unanswered. As for the first issue, while it is widely agreed upon in the literature that the demonstrative has semantic properties in addition to being 'definite,' these additional properties are not argued to have any bearing on its syntax. As suggested by Silva-Villar & Gutiérrez-Rexach (2001), however, these theoretical shortcomings

[131] Bernstein (1997) admits that, for languages that can have both the definite article and the demonstrative in pre-nominal position at PF, it is possible that the demonstrative raises to [Spec, DP] instead of substituting into D, which basically amounts to Giusti's (1993, 1994) position.

may be due to the limitations of a pre-minimalist framework, where the role of features is not clearly defined. In a Minimalist framework (Chomsky 1995, 2000) on the other hand, the number and nature of features associated with the demonstrative becomes central. As Silva-Villar & Gutiérrez-Rexach (2001) suggest, if the interpretable features of demonstratives are different from the features of article, "then it follows from minimalist assumptions that their behavior in the computational system will be different" (331). Within a Minimalist framework, the semantic differences between the definite article and the demonstrative entail that demonstratives possess features *in addition to* the one that they arguably check on D. In Chapter 3 we identified those additional features as [(+/-) speaker], [+contrastive].

As for the second issue cited above, I argue that the [+identifiability] feature is what links the demonstrative to the DP projection. I will argue that the co-occurrence of the demonstrative and definite article is generally prevented by structural as well as semantic considerations: structurally, the raised demonstrative and the Stage I definite article vie for the same position ([Spec, DP]), and semantically, both check the same semantic feature in the DP, [+identifiability]. My account explains cases of apparent double definiteness, then, by appealing to the idea that the definite article in these cases is a Stage II definite article: it does not check [+identifiability] in the DP and does not occur in [Spec, DP].

In the next section of this chapter I turn to the internal syntax of the demonstrative. I suggest that the semantic features of the demonstrative are encoded on functional heads that are part of the demonstrative's extended projection: SpeakerP, ContrastP and IdentP respectively. I argue that demonstratives and Stage I definite articles are both underlyingly lexical items, called 'Trackers,' and that they share a piece of functional structure in common with the definite article, IdentP. It is this common core structure that explains the demonstrative's affinity for the DP

projection, in addition to providing the historical link between the demonstrative and the definite article.

4.3 The internal structure of the demonstrative

In Chapter 3 I not only addressed the semantic distinctions between the demonstrative and the definite article, but also made a finer distinction between strong and weak demonstratives. I have argued that demonstratives are semantically decomposed into the following features: [(+/-) speaker], [+contrastive], [+identifiability], with strong and weak demonstratives differing in the presence versus absence of a [+/-] value for the [speaker] feature. Definite articles, on the other hand, lack the [(+/-) speaker] and [+ contrastive] features altogether:

(14) strong demonstrative: [+/speaker], ([+/-hearer]), [+contrastive], [+identifiability]
weak demonstrative: [speaker], ([hearer]), [+contrastive], [+identifiability]
stage I definite article: [+identifiability]

In the sections that follow I will make precise how the features above are represented in the syntax of the demonstrative, with the main idea being that each of these features heads their own functional projection.

4.3.1 Background

My proposal that a demonstrative has internal functional structure builds on Grimshaw's (1991) seminal work, in which she argues that a functional category is a relational entity, sharing the same categorical features of the lexical head it is associated with (Grimshaw 1991: 1-3).

Functional projections 'extend' the projection of the lexical item they are associated with, giving rise to the term 'extended projection' to refer to the totality of a lexical item's functional structure. Research aimed at broadening the inventory of functional heads beyond the domain of the verb first began in the domain of nominals: working with the Hungarian noun phrase, Szabolsci (1983) argues that the possessor inside a noun phrase is similar to the subject of a clause. Abney (1987) makes the case for a parallelism between the functional structure of clauses (the extended projection of V) and nominals, introducing the idea of a DP projection which is analogous to CP. Much subsequent research has sought to develop this parallelism (Cardinaletti & Starke 1999, Bernstein 2001 and Rijkhoff 2008, among others), and to further refine the semantic/syntactic correlations in the noun phrase. Cinque (1994), for instance, argues for dedicated functional projections in the DP that encode the semantics of adjectives merged in their specifiers.

It is not only NPs, however, that have been argued to project functional structure. The same argument has been made for prepositions: Koopman (2000) and den Dikken (2003, 2010) for place PPs in Dutch, and Tortora (2008) for place PPs in Italian and Spanish. I will extend this line of research to the realm of demonstratives, arguing that demonstratives are lexical items, 'Trackers,'[132] having their own extended projection.[133] The similarity of demonstratives to

[132] I use the term 'Tracker' in a broader sense than Himmelmann (1996), for whom the term 'tracking' describes only anaphoric demonstratives. My use of the term 'Tracker' appeals to the fact that both demonstratives and definite articles are *trackers of referents*—whether in the physical surroundings, in the previous discourse, or in the speaker's mental representation of the world. While I will continue to use the term 'demonstrative' in a more general sense, I employ the term 'Tracker' specifically to refer to the lexical item underneath all the functional structure.

[133] Positing functional structure for the demonstrative entails that the demonstrative is a lexical rather than functional entity. This point of view has been argued by many, with Giusti (1993) specifically arguing for a lexical/functional distinction between the demonstrative and definite article. Still, one may argue that the demonstrative should be analyzed as functional rather than lexical, due to the fact that demonstratives are part of a closed class. A possible explanation for

adjectives makes it natural to extend the idea of internal functional structure to demonstratives. This research program has been taken up by Leu (2007, 2008), Roehrs and Putnam (2009), Roehrs (2010), and Kayne and Pollock (2009), and is further developed in this work.

4.3.2 Other proposals for demonstrative-internal syntax

4.3.2.1 Leu (2007, 2008)

In this section I will give a brief overview of Leu's (2007, 2008) analysis of demonstratives in Germanic. While Leu's account is important for our purposes in that it attempts to map the semantics of the demonstrative to its internal structural make-up, I argue that it cannot capture the weak/strong distinction without making significant assumptions.

Working with Germanic, Leu (2007, 2008) argues that demonstratives are morphosyntactically complex, having an internal structure corresponding to a (hidden) adjectival component akin to *here/there*, plus an agreement morpheme and a definiteness marker,[134] as graphically illustrated below (example due to Leu 2008: 11).

(15)



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its behavior as a closed-class item is based on conceptual limitations, along the lines of what den Dikken (2010) proposes for his lexical prepositions in Dutch. There are simply a limited amount of spatial relationships to be expressed (proximity/distance to/from the speaker and hearer, and in a few cases visibility--as with Navaho and Hualapai--or height, as in Dyirbal and Lezgian, c.f. Lyons, 1999: 112). Because the spatial relations themselves are limited, the lexical inventory that can instantiate a demonstrative is also limited.

[134] Taking their cue from Leu (2007, 2008), Kayne and Pollock (2009) argue that English *this* and *that* are made of up the definite article (*th-*) and bound 'deictic' morphemes *–at*/*-is*, which correspond to reduced relative clauses in pronominal demonstratives.

Leu (2007, 2008) argues for this internal locative analysis based on the syntactic behavior of demonstratives in Mainland Scandinavian and Swiss German. In Mainland Scandinavian, the definite marker is suffixal on the noun, as seen by example (16a) below. In the presence of an adjectival modifier, however, an additional pre-nominal definiteness marker shows up, as seen in (16b). This inflected pre-nominal definiteness marker can occur without an adjective present as in (16c), but in this case it is obligatorily interpreted as a demonstrative.

Norwegian: *Ø/det*-alternation (Leu 2007: 3):

(16) a. hus-et Swedish
house-DEF
'the house'

b. de-**t** svarte hus-et
the-**INFL** black house-DEF
'that/the black house'

c. de-**t** hus-et
the-**INFL** house-DEF
'that house

A related phenomenon occurs in Swiss German—the definite marker on unmodified nouns lacks inflection (17a), but in the presence of an adjectival marker (17b) *or with demonstratives* (17c), the definite marker carries inflection:

Swiss German *d/di* alternation (Leu 2007: 3)

(17) a. d rosä — Swiss German
the rose

b. d-**i** rot rosä[135]
the-**INFL** red rose

c. d-**i** rosä
the-**INFL** rose
'this rose'

Leu notes that "the appearance, in adjectival contexts, of this inflection on the definite marker in Swiss German is to be related to the appearance, in adjectival contexts, of a pre-nominal marker (with strong adjectival inflection) in Norwegian" (2007: 4). He concludes that the Germanic demonstratives contain a hidden adjectival modifier, the equivalent to locative *here/there*. In some languages this locative is overt (Swedish and Colloquial Norwegian), while in others it is silent (English). Leu (2007: 5) gives the following examples, where *HERE* (in caps) indicates the silent version of '*here*' in English:

(18) a . *det här* — Swedish
the here
'this one'

b . *det där*
the there
'that one'

[135] This example is ambiguous between 'the red rose' and 'this/that red rose' (Tom Leu, p.c.)

(19) a. *den her-re klokka* Colloquial Norwegian
the here-$_{INFL}$ watch-$_{DE}$

b. *det der-re huset*
the there-$_{INFL}$ house-$_{DE}$

(20) these books English
the-s(e) HERE books.

Leu's proposal of a demonstrative-internal locative captures the notion that demonstratives are associated with 'locativity,' or in our terms, distance marking, namely [+speaker] or [-speaker]. However, as I argued at length in Chapters 2 and 3, distance marking is a characteristic of strong demonstratives only, and Leu's proposal of the internal locative cannot straightforwardly account for this fact without making additional assumptions. Specifically, Leu claims (along the lines of Kayne 2004, 2005) that demonstrative-internal locatives can have a *optional* silent PLACE, where PLACE is taken to contribute distance-specifications. The 'optionality' of a silent PLACE in demonstrative-internal locatives contrasts to the obligatory PLACE in overt reinforcing locatives (like *here* in the English example below):

(21) This **here** jacket is expensive.

However, Leu's proposal conflates two distinct semantic notions, location and spatial deixis. C. Tortora (p.c) points out that locatives can indicate 'location' without indicating a proximal/distal distinction: for example, the PP *in the room* expresses a location (PLACE), but does not locate an object with respect to the deictic center. Similarly, adverbial *ci/vi* in Italian indicate location

but not [+/-speaker]. It is unclear, therefore, what the exact semantic contribution of Leu's PLACE would be.

I will argue that the Norwegian and Swiss German data presented by Leu (2007, 2008) can be more elegantly captured by positing a SpeakerP internal to the demonstrative, which would fulfill the same semantic workload as Leu's internal locative, yet at the same time allow the distinctions between strong and weak demonstratives to fall out naturally. Specifically, the head of SpeakerP in a strong demonstrative has a [+/-speaker] feature, while the head of SpeakerP in weak demonstratives has a neutral [speaker] feature. If, in addition, we allow for the possibility of an Inflectional phrase within the demonstrative, as suggested by Roehrs and Putnam (2009) and Roehrs (2010) and discussed in 4.3.2.2 below, we can capture the morphological facts of Norwegian and Swiss German along with the semantic ones.

4.3.2.2 Roehrs (2010)

Following Leu (2007, 2008), Roehrs (2010) proposes that the demonstrative has a complex internal structure. Developing a proposal first presented in Roehrs & Putnam (2009), Roehrs (2010) proposes a structure of the demonstrative that features a definiteness marker merged as the head of a referential phrase, a 'deictic' element (to be specified below) which heads a DeicticP, and an inflectional suffix which heads an Inflectional phrase (Roehrs 2010: 3):

(22) [Infl [Deic [Ref]]]

In (23) we can see what morphemes correspond to the various functional projections of the demonstrative proposed by Roehrs, for German and Spanish.

(23)	InflP	DeicP	RefP
German *diese*:	*-e*	*-ies*	$d_{[+REF]}$
Spanish *esta*:	*-a*	*-st*	$e_{[+REF]}$

One interesting contribution of Roehrs' (2010) analysis is the inclusion of an InflP in the extended projection of the demonstrative. While I have not been considering inflection to be syntactically represented on the demonstrative up to this point, there seems to be some evidence in favor of including it as part of the internal structure of the demonstrative, at least for Germanic. Leu's (2007) data presented in (16) ad (17), for example, indicate that Swiss German inflection is present with the demonstrative but not with the (unmodified) definite article, and in Norwegian the presence of a pre-nominal definiteness marker (which carries inflection) is obligatorily interpreted as demonstrative. Taking these facts into consideration, I will include an InflP as part of the extended projection of the demonstrative.[136]

Roehrs' DeixisP can be understood as the locus of spatial deixis. While Roehrs does not explicitly define his use of 'deixis' here, the fact that he maps the *–ies* morpheme of German *diese* and the *–st* morpheme of Spanish *esta* to the Deic head suggests that he intends a spatial interpretation of deixis. If I am correct in this assumption, it is difficult to account for distance-neutral (weak) demonstratives like German *dieser* and Spanish *ese* in Roehrs' structure. The difference between weak and strong demonstratives can be accounted for in my account, however, by positing that the Speaker head can have either a [+/-] or a neutral [speaker] feature.

[136] Roehrs (2010) acknowledges that this InflP may be divided up into smaller components of case, number, and gender. He suggests that, in this way, inflection is different from the more semantically-contentful functional projections such as (what he calls) deixis and referentiality (14). For the sake of the integrity of his analysis, Roehrs collapses the sub-components of inflection into one phrase, and I will follow suit.

4.3.3 My analysis of the extended projection of the demonstrative

Leu (2007, 2008) and Roehrs (2010) make important contributions to the syntax of the demonstrative in terms of mapping the semantic features of the demonstrative to its internal structure. My analysis of the internal syntax of the demonstratives builds on these accounts in that (ii) it paints a more fine-grained semantic picture of the demonstrative, with *contrastiveness* and *immediate accessibility* represented in the functional hierarchy of the demonstrative and (ii) it allows us to make a structural distinction between strong and weak demonstratives. In the structure I propose, contrastiveness, represented by a [+contrastive] feature, is encoded on a ContrastP. The strong/weak distinction, on the other hand, is structurally represented by SpeakerP whose head has a [+/-speaker] feature in the case of strong demonstratives and a neutral [speaker] feature in the case of weak ones. Finally, IdentP is the locus of 'identifiablity.' The complex demonstrative is headed by 'Tracker.' Below I illustrate the extended projections of the weak and strong demonstratives, in (24) and (25) respectively.

(24) **The extended projection of the strong demonstrative**



(25) **The extended projection of the weak demonstrative**



I will argue that the entire InflP represented above (for both strong and weak demonstratives) is itself merged in the specifier of an FP within the DP.[137] Specifically, I argue that demonstratives are merged in the low position identified by Brugè (1996), below all the classes of adjectives identified by Cinque (1994) and directly above possessives (if present). In the spirit of Cinque, I will label this dedicated functional projection 'TrackerAdjP.' Below is an illustration of the demonstrative DP, with the base position of the demonstrative. While it is outside the scope of this work to provide a comprehensive inventory of the projections within DP, I will adopt the by-now pervasive NumP (Ritter 1991). I will use the label AdjP as shorthand for the various classes of adjectives identified by Cinque (1994): In the structure below, the bolded **InflP** = DEM corresponds to the complex demonstrative outlined above:[138]

[137] While I offer tentative evidence for a distinct merge position for the weak demonstrative in Spanish (section 4.4.1.3), the analysis I have put forth here is compatible with the idea that strong and weak demonstratives are merged in one and the same position.

[138] On the Cinque-esque approach to merging the demonstrative, we would need to explain how the noun and the demonstrative come to agree in *phi*-features, since the demonstrative's *phi*-features are ostensibly embedded in the internal structure of the demonstrative. However, if we the take the demonstrative's *phi*-features to reside in the InflP layer of the demonstrative (its topmost projection), it may not be unreasonable to assume that 'AGREE' can access these *phi*-features. Alternatively, the *phi*-feature agreement facts could be captured by positing the predicational view of complex demonstratives as discussed in Appendix to Chapter 3. I will leave the question of *phi*-feature agreement open at present.

(26) The Merge position of the complex demonstrative



4.3.3.1 What are the terminal nodes?

Looking back at the structures in (24)-(25), the question arises as to what the terminal nodes represent: are they abstract features, or morphemes? In other words, is there a one-to-one correspondence between the morphology of the demonstrative and its structural representation? One avenue involves associating the functional heads outlined above with morphemes. Another approach would view syntactic terminals as abstract features, along the lines of nanosyntax (Starke 2009), where a single morpheme may span several terminal nodes. I will briefly discuss both options, ultimately adopting the first.

4.3.3.1.1 Terminals are morphemes

Let us explore the possibility that the terminals of SpeakerP, ContrastP, and IdentP correspond to morphological material. Roehrs (2010) adopts the commonly-held assumption that *-d* and its variants in Germanic are markers of definiteness, i.e. identifiability in my terms. Dechaine and Wiltschko (2002), Leu (2007, 2008) and Kayne and Pollock (2009) make the same argument for English *th-*. The definite morpheme is constant across definite determiners and demonstratives in Germanic, as in English *the* and *that*:

(27) a. *the*: *th* = [+identifiability]
b. *that*: *th* = [+identifiability] + *-at* = [-speaker]

A similar situation holds for other Germanic language, as the following example from Roehrs (2010: 10) illustrates:

(28) Germanic

Definite article	Demonstrative	Language
a. *the*	*-this*, *that*	English
b. *de* [*het*]	*-deze, die*	Dutch
c. *der*	*-dieser, der,[jener]*	German
d. *(h)-inn*	[*þessi*], [*sá*]/*hinn*	Icelandic
e. *(d) –en*	*-denne, den*	Norwegian
f. *der*	*-der, [seller]*	Pennsylvania Dutch

Romance, on the other hand, is more complicated. Roehrs (2010) points out that, while articles and demonstratives in Germanic share a definiteness marker (*-d* and its relatives), this is not the case for Romance languages. This is illustrated in the examples below, (due to Roehrs 2010:10):

(29) Romance

Definite article	Demonstrative	Language
a. *el, la*	*-este*, *ese*/*aquel*	Spanish
b. *o*, *a*	- *este*, *esse*/*aquele*	Portuguese
c. *–ul, -a*	- *acest*, *acel*	Romanian
d. *le, la*	- *ce* (*...-ci*/*-là*)	French
e. *il/lo, la*	- *questo*, *quel*	Italian
f. *su, sa*	- *kustu*, *kussu*/*kuddu*	Sardinian

It may *seem* like the [-speaker] demonstrative and the definite article share a definiteness morpheme in Romance languages, judging by the appearance of *(-l)* in the definite article/demonstrative pairs below: ***el***/*aque****l*** in Spanish, *u****l***/*ace****l*** in Romanian, *i****l***, ***l****o*/*que****l*** in Italian. However, the *–l* morpheme actually instantiates a different feature for each member of the pair: (i) in the case of the definite article (which has no [(+/-)speaker] feature), *–l* = [+identifiability], and (ii) in the case of the demonstrative, *–l* = [-speaker], where [-speaker] *–l* contrasts with [+speaker] *–st*, as in Italian *questo*/*quello*. In other words, Romance does not have a counterpart of Germanic *d*: its [+identifiability] morpheme is not overtly realized.

Since it was the grammaticalized, definite article form of Late Latin *ille* that carried over into Romance, the [-speaker] morpheme *–l* of *quello* in Italian cannot be a direct transfer from Latin. I argue that the [-speaker] feature of *quello*, then, is a result of the fact that the Romance demonstrative has been 'rebuilt,' where the [+identifiability] morpheme of Late Latin *ille*, *-l*, has been reemployed as a [-speaker] morpheme in Romance, as illustrated below. In addition, the morpheme *qu-* (from Latin *eccum* 'behold') has been inserted into the structure as a reinforcer:

(30) Italian *quello*



Note, however, that *eccum* is not a locative reinforcer. Specifically, it does not bring in the semantics of [+/-speaker]. The common assumption that *eccum* takes the Late Latin definite article *ille* and makes it into a new, distance-marked demonstrative, then, is not technically correct. On the terminals-as-morphemes approach, one would say that it is the reanalysis of the *–l* morpheme from the Ident head to the (newly-constructed) Speaker head that brings in, or rather brings 'back,' the [+speaker]/[-speaker] distinction. I propose that the reinforcer *eccum* (and its descendents in Romance) instantiates the Contrast head of this 'renovated' demonstrative.

Putting the Romance and Germanic data together, therefore, we have morphological evidence for each feature I have posited in Chapter 3:

(31) (i) [+identifiability] = Germanic *th, d, etc.*
(ii) [+contrastive] = Romance *c/k/qu*
(iii) [+/-speaker] = Romance *st/l*, English *is/at*

Note that none of the languages considered here instantiates all of the demonstrative's sub-components on its own. If terminal nodes in the demonstrative's extended projection are taken to be actual morphemes, then, we must allow for null allomorphs. In fact, under the terminals-as-morphemes approach, the lexical head itself, Tracker, would be analyzed as a silent morpheme.[139] With this allowance, we can have demonstratives 'composed' according to Baker's (1985) mirror principle, whereby the lowest head (Tracker) raises up incrementally to the highest head (Infl), picking up other heads along the way. On this analysis, the order of functional heads proposed here falls out from the morpheme order facts.

If the demonstrative's functional heads correspond to morphemes rather than abstract features, we would expect morphological material to disappear along with semantic information in the process of reanalysis from the demonstrative to the definite article.[140] This appears to be the case in the progression from Latin *ille* to the Romance definite articles (Italian *il*, French *le*, etc). In the following structure, the bolded portion denotes the functional architecture that remains after the rest of the structure gets pruned away in the process of grammaticalization:[141]

---

[139] This analysis is reminiscent of Kayne's (2008) analysis of locative *there*, where *there* is associated with a silent morpheme PLACE: [*there* PLACE].

[140] One may wonder why definite articles can still surface with inflection if InflP gets pruned along with SpeakerP and ContrastP. In fact, Diessel (1999: 118) notes that a common effect of grammaticalization is loss of ability to inflect. One possibility is that the inflection that surfaces with definite articles (as in Romance and some Germanic languages) is not residual structure from the demonstrative but is rather 'rebuilt' into the determiner's structure. In order not to unnecessarily complicate the diachronic picture here, I will abstract away from inflection in my syntactic representation of the article issue.

[141] Note that the transition from weak demonstrative to Stage I definite article involves loss of the SpeakerP as well as ContrastP. I will argue that there is a dependency between SpeakerP and

(32) Latin weak (recognitional) *ille*



(33) Italian definite article (*il* and its variants)



ContrastP, namely that SpeakerP selects ContrastP, along the lines of what Zanuttini (1997) suggests for NegP and TP. Zanuttini argues that NegP selects a TP, or looking at it from the bottom-up, "given a TP, the NegP will be generated to its left as to satisfy the selectional requirements of its head" (181). I extend a similar argument to SpeakerP and ContrastP. From the perspective of grammaticalization, then, when the SpeakerP disappears, so does its obligatory complement, ContrastP, and we are left with an IdentP: the Stage I definite article, which I argue is merged in [Spec, DP].

The gist of the diachronic change exemplified above is that the morpheme *–l* starts out as instantiating Speaker in (32) and gets reanalyzed as the Identifiability head in (33), a process a will refer to a 'morphological reanalysis.' According to Roberts and Roussou (2003), whose account we will discuss in section 4.5.1, reanalysis involves structural simplification. Within a 'terminals as morphemes' approach, internal structural simplification can mean one of two things: (i) morphology and the corresponding functional structure is lost altogether or (ii) morphology is reanalyzed on a different functional head ('morphological reanalysis').[142] In section 4.5.3, I will show that the structure in (33) above is merged higher in the DP than (32); i.e. the definite article is merged higher than the demonstrative. Under the terminals-as-morphemes approach, when a morpheme disappears, so does its corresponding functional structure. This means that the two different use of *ille* discussed in chapter 2 (demonstrative and definite article) correspond to different internal structures: *ille* (dem) is an InflP while *ille* (Stage I definite article) is merely an IdentP.

4.3.3.1.2 Terminals are features

An alternative approach to the terminals-as-morphemes route, which would obviate the need for homophony in the lexicon, is to assume that the syntactic terminals in (24) and (25) are smaller than morphemes; they are features. This is the approach championed by Starke (2009) in the field of nanosyntax. The idea behind nanosyntax is that there is no lexicon prior to the syntax. Syntax projects features, which combine to form morphemes, and then words. Within a nanosyntax approach, we could interpret the partially suppletive nature of Romance

[142] In section 4.5.2 I will discuss the notion that before morphological loss or morphological reanalysis occurs, there is a process of semantic bleaching of the [+/-speaker] morpheme, which characterizes the grammaticalization of a strong demonstrative to a weak one.

demonstratives pointed out in (29) as an indication of the abstract status of the morphemes. In other words, we could interpret the terminal nodes in (24) and (25) as abstract features, which may or may not correspond to morphemes. Under this approach, "spellout becomes an operation matching the tree constructed by syntax to the (sub-) trees stored inside lexical entries" (Starke 2009: 2).

If we adopt a nanosyntax perspective, there is no need to posit two distinct structures for the two uses of *ille*, and hence, no need to appeal to lexical homophony: we could have the *–l* of demonstrative *ille* spanning two terminals, both the Speaker head and the Ident head. While the *–l* of demonstrative *ille* (both strong and weak) would be linked to two features, [(+/-)speaker] and [+ident], the *-l* of definite article *ille* would be linked only to the [+ident] feature. This approach is attractive in that we only need to posit one *ille*: the difference between demonstrative and definite article *ille* has to do only with in how many features the *–l* is associated with. In other words, the functional architecture is the same for both demonstrative and the definite article. However, what we gain in simplicity of representation by this approach (i.e. both demonstrative and definite article *ille* are the same size), we lose in explanatory power with respect to the syntax of grammaticalization (see section 4.5 for discussion). I argue that positing different structures for the demonstrative and definite article actually makes sense semantically and syntactically, and allows us to draw a connection between a lexical item's 'internal' syntax and its 'external' syntactic behavior. Specifically, I argue in section 4.5.3 that the language learner gets his cue to merge the 'Tracker' higher up in the functional hierarchy of the DP (in [Spec, DP]), from the fact that this element has lost the functional structure which once served as a cue to the language learner to merge this element in a specialized FP, TrackerAdjP. If both the demonstrative and the definite article have the same amount of structure, we cannot easily

formulate this connection between internal and external 'reanalysis.' I will therefore adopt the terminals-as-morphemes approach.[143]

4.3.3.2 The demonstrative-reinforcer construction

One remaining question regarding the internal syntax of the demonstrative is where the demonstrative 'reinforcer' is merged. Roehrs' (2010) notes that reinforcers have different properties in Romance and Germanic. Germanic reinforcers can occur in various positions in the DP and can reiterate, whereas Romance reinforcers are confined to a low position and cannot co-occur, as the following examples taken from Roehrs (2010: 1) illustrate:

Germanic:

(34) **this here** big house — English
(due to Bernstein 1997)

(35) **ot** **der** gutter man — Yiddish
REINF this good man
'this good man'
(due to Jacobs 2005: 186)

(36) **Das** shöne Bild **da** — German
That nice picture there
'that nice picture'

[143] Another way to envision the internal structure of demonstratives which also avoids homophony is to posit a PRO operator in [Spec, SpeakerP] which binds an overt lexical item in IdentP (the *–l* in *ille* for example). Thanks to Marcel den Dikken (p.c.) for suggesting this possibility to me. In this scenario, demonstratives would have a PRO in SpeakerP while definite articles would not. However, the structures for the demonstrative and Stage I article would still be equally as large on this approach, preventing us from capturing the connection between the internal and external syntax of 'trackers.'

(37) **den herre her** populœre boka mi Eastern Norwegian
this here here popular book-the my
'this my popular book'

Romance:

(38) **ce** livre rouge-**ci** French
this book red-here
'this red book'
(due to Brugè 1996)

(39) **el** libro viejo **este de aquì** Spanish
the book old this of here
'this old book'
(due to Brugè 1996)

Roehrs suggests two different analyses for high and low reinforcers. Specifically, he argues that high reinforcers are merged internal to the demonstrative, in a specifier position made available by the FPs in its extended projection, while low reinforcers are merged outside the InflP. I adopt the core of Roehrs' (2010) proposal—that there are two different merge positions for reinforcers, depending on whether they surface high or low, and in particular, his argument that Germanic high reinforcers are merged internal to the demonstrative. However, I will suggest an alternative to low reinforcers (of the Romance variety), offering an analysis along the lines of Brugè (1996), in which the demonstrative and its reinforcer are base generated low in the DP in a predicational relationship.

Brugè (1996) argues that in the following example, demonstrative (*este*) and its reinforcer (*de aquì*) are in a predicational relationship in the base:

(40) este libro de aquí
this book de here
'this book there'

Specifically, the sequence *este de aquí* ('this (of) here') has a complex internal structure in which the preposition *de* (of) mediates a predication relation between *este* and *aquí*:

(41)

$[_{DP}$ spec D . . . $[_{XP}$ spec X $[_{FP}$ $[_{XP}$ spec X *de* $[_{ZP}$ ***este*** Z $[_{PP}$ ***aquí***]]] F $[_{AGRP}$ (Poss.)/ NP *libro*]]]]

Brugè extends Kayne's (1994) analysis of *de*-constructions in French to the demonstrative-reinforcer construction. Accordingly, she assumes that *de* occupies the head position of a maximal projection that shares qualities with the CP projection. *De* dominates *este* (this) and *aquí* (here) and establishes a predicational relationship between them, along the lines of a small clause with an abstract copula (Brugè 2006: 23). Drawing from Kayne's work, in which *de* (in X) requires an overt element in its specifier, Brugè argues that *este* must move up to [Spec, XP]. Combined with N-raising and merging of the definite article in D, this gives rise to the word order *el libro este de aquí*, as shown in (42) below (I extract away from intermediate head movement for ease of exposition):

(42) *el libro este de aquí*

$[_{DP}$ spec *el* . . . $[_{XP}$ spec *libro* $[_{FP}$ $[_{XP}$ *este* X *de* $[_{ZP}$ ~~*este*~~ Z $[_{PP}$ *aquí*]]] F $[_{AGRP}$ (Poss.)/ NP ~~*libro*~~]]]]



Alternatively, from [Spec, XP] the demonstrative may move to [Spec, DP], shown as option (43) below. Combined with N-raising, this gives us the surface word order *este libro de aquí*.

(43) *este libro de aquí*

[$_{DP}$ *este* . . . [$_{XP}$ spec *libro* [$_{FP}$ [$_{XP}$ ~~este~~ X *de* [$_{ZP}$ ~~*este*~~ Z [$_{PP}$ *aquí*]]] F [$_{AGRP}$ (Poss.)/ NP ~~libro~~]]]]

For low reinforcers, I will adopt Brugè's (1996) argument that the demonstrative and reinforcer enter into a predication relationship. In fact, I will extend her analysis beyond Spanish and argue that the predicational relastionship holds for *all* low reinforcers (which includes all Romance reinforcers and some Germanic reinforcers) and their demonstratives. However, I depart with Brugè in the implementation of the predication relationship. Specifically I will adopt den Dikken's (2006) approach to predication, wherein the relationship between a subject and its predicate is mediated by a RELATOR (labeled "R" below), viewed not as a specific functional or lexical category, but rather as a "general purpose connective between predicates and subjects" (den Dikken 2006: 29).

(44)



Den Dikken (2006) argues that predication a non-directional, meaning that either the subject or the predicate may sit in the specifier position in the above configuration. Like Brugè (1996), I

will assume that the demonstrative is in the specifier position of the small clause above, while the reinforcer is in predicate (complement) position.

(45)



In Spanish, the RELATOR head would be realized by the preposition *de*:

(46)



In the structure above, *este* of course has the rich internal structure of a strong demonstrative as outlined in (24). I will simply call it InflP. The small clause (RP) which has the complex demonstrative *este* as its specifier and the reinforcer *aquí* as its predicate is itself sitting in the specifier position of an FP (TrackerAdjP). The surface word order in Romance (*ce livre-ci* in French and *este libro de aquí* in Spanish) is derived by raising of the demonstrative to [Spec, DP] and concomitant noun (or NP) movement. I represent only the relevant parts of the DP structure, circling the small clause that houses the demonstrative and its reinforcer:

(47)



We have seen above that Germanic reinforcers can occur in various positions and can reiterate (Roehrs 2010), contrary to reinforcers in Romance. Brugè (1996) accounts for the possibility of high reinforcers in Germanic by suggesting that the demonstrative pied-pipes its reinforcer to [Spec, DP] in these languages. Brugè's predicational account, however, has trouble dealing with the fact that reinforcers can iterate in Germanic. In Roehrs' (2010) analysis, there are multiple specifier positions made available to the reinforcer within the extended projection of the demonstrative, hence the reiteration facts receive a natural account. I will therefore follow Roehrs (2010) in arguing that high reinforcers in Germanic originate internal to the demonstrative.

Basing himself on Leu (2008) but distinguishing himself in key ways,[144] Roehrs (2010) suggests that the high Germanic reinforcers are merged internally to the demonstrative, in one of

[144] Leu's (2007, 2008) argument is slightly different. As noted in 4.3.2.1, Leu makes the case for a distinction between 'demonstrative-internal' reinforcers (which he calls the 'internal locative') and demonstrative-external reinforcers. Leu (2007, 2008) claims that it is just the first instance of the Germanic high reinforcer that is an internal locative. He assumes the optional second high reinforcer in Eastern Norwegian is merged low, external to the demonstrative.

the specifier positions made available by the demonstrative's functional projections, as illustrated below for Easter Norwegian.

(48) ***den herre her*** populære boka mi — Eastern Norwegian
[$_{InflP}$ **den** [$_{DeicP}$ **herre** [$_{RefP}$ **her**]] . . .]

I will adopt the core of Roehrs' general proposal for high reinforcers in Germanic, but will emphasize the connection between the semantics of the reinforcing locative and the position in which it is merged inside the demonstrative. Specifically, I argue that high reinforcers are merged in the specifier of demonstrative-internal SpeakerP, where it enters into a spec-head relationship with the (the trace of) the [+/-speaker] morpheme. I illustrate this below with English *this here:*

(49)



We may account for the pre-demonstrative reinforcer *ot* as in (35) in Yiddish if we assume that the reinforcer originates in [Spec, SpeakerP] and then raises to [Spec, InflP]. The co-occurrence of reinforcers we see in Eastern Norwegian, on the other hand, can be explained if the first reinforcer *herre* is merged in [Spec, SpeakerP] and the second reinforcer *her* is merged in [Spec, ContrastP].[145] Below, I repeat Roehrs' (2010) examples of the high demonstratives in Germanic, and then show where I propose they are merged within the DP:[146]

Germanic:

(50) **this here** big house — English
(due to Bernstein 1997)

(51) **ot** **der** gutter man — Yiddish
REINF this good man
'this good man'
(due to Jacobs 2005: 186)

(52) **Das** shöne Bild **da**[147] — German
That nice picture there
'that nice picture'

(53) **den herre her** populœre boka mi — Eastern Norwegian
this here here popular book-the my
'this my popular book'

[145] Leu (2007: 11, citing Vangsnes 2004) reports that a third reinforcer is possible, in low position:
(a) Eastern Norwegian:
den **herre her** populœre boka mi (**her**)
this **here** **here** popular book-the my **here**
'this my popular book'
I argue that this low occurrence can be analyzed parallel to the Romance reinforcers and German *da*, as predicates of a small clause containing the demonstrative and the reinforcer.

[146] Although the reason for this apparent variation in the merge position of the Germanic reinforcers remains to be explained.

[147] German *da* is an instance of a low reinforcer.

(54) Merge positions of high reinforcers in Germanic



In conclusion, to account for the different positions of Germanic and Romance reinforcers, I have followed Roehrs (2010) in assuming two different merge positions for high and low reinforcers, differing from him however in my analysis of the low Romance reinforcer. I follow Brugè's (1996) account for low reinforcers in Romance in which the demonstrative and reinforcer entertain a predicational relationship in the base. Since Brugè's predicational account cannot easily account for the fact that (high) Germanic reinforcers can iterate, I adopt Roehrs' (2010) internal-merge account of high Germanic reinforcers. I will now discuss a different aspect of reinforcers, which is the fact that they agree with the demonstrative in terms specifications for [+/-speaker]. I argue that agreement between the demonstrative and its reinforcer can be explained by appealing to the structural configuration they find themselves in.

Recall that a core characteristic of the demonstrative-reinforcer construction is that the strong demonstrative and its reinforcer must agree in their specifications for [+/-speaker]. For

example, in Spanish it is impossible to combine *este* 'this' with *de allí* '[of] there,' or *aquel* 'that' with *de aquí* '[of] here' (Brugè 1996: 23). Brugè (1996) cites this fact as evidence that the demonstrative and its reinforcer are in a predicational relationship. However, it must be noted that high reinforcers in Germanic also agree with the demonstrative, as shown in the English example below:

(55) **this *there/here** car
that *here/there car

I argue that the internal-merge hypothesis of high reinforcers can account for the fact that high reinforcers must also match the demonstrative for [+/-speaker] specifications. I have suggested that reinforcers are merged in the specifier of SpeakerP, while the [+/-speaker] morpheme demonstrative sits in the Speaker head. If we posit spec-head agreement, then the agreement facts follow from the configurational relationship between the [+/-speaker] morpheme and the demonstrative reinforcer: the value for [speaker] must be the same for the element in the specifier and the element in the head of SpeakerP.[148]

However, there are cases of *apparent* disagreement between the demonstrative and its reinforcer. I noted in chapter 3 that in certain Northern Italian dialects (Lombard, Emilian, Friulian) the demonstrative and reinforcing locative appear to exhibit different values for [+/-speaker], where *kel* (glossed as 'that') can combine with either *ka* 'here' or *la* 'there.' An example is shown below for Friulian:

[148] We would still need to explain, however, why the second iteration of the reinforcer *her* in Eastern Norwegian *den herre **her** populære boka mi* 'this my popular book' must also agree with the demonstrative in terms of [+/-speaker], since I have suggested it is merged lower than SpeakerP, in [Spec, ContrastP].

(56) [‘kel ‘libri ‘ka] Friulian
‘**that** book **here’**
‘this book’

(57) [‘kel ‘libri ‘la]
‘**that** book **there**,”
‘that book’
(examples due to Vanelli and Renzi 1997: 113)

I argue that these apparent cases of ‘disagreement’ between the demonstrative and its reinforcer are actually instances of *non*-agreement: In Friulian, the erstwhile [-speaker] demonstrative *kel* has become weak, crucially lacking a value for its [speaker] feature:

(58) kel_{strong} [-speaker] → kel_{weak} [speaker]

Since grammaticalized *kel* lacks a value for [+/-speaker], it can combine with either the [+speaker] locative (*ka*) or a [-speaker] locative (*la*). In fact, the only way for *kel* to express distance specifications in Friulian is by combining with a reinforcer, which means that *ka* and *la* are not technically reinforcers: they do not ‘reinforce’ the [+/-] value of the [speaker] feature of the demonstrative, but rather contribute a value to the [weak demonstrative + locative] complex as a whole. I suggest that the [weak demonstrative + locative] constituent takes on the value of the accompanying locative due to the structural relationship between the demonstrative and the locative. In low (Romance-type) reinforcers this is structural relationship is a predicational one, while in Germanic (high) reinforcers, it is spec-head relationship.

4.3.4 Conclusion of Internal Syntax

In this section I argued that the issues left unaccounted for in the syntactic literature are better addressed from the syntax/semantics interface. Specifically, I argue that the demonstrative has a rich extended projection where its semantics are encoded. My analysis builds on existing accounts of the internal syntax of the demonstrative by attempting to account for the strong/weak demonstrative distinction in a structural way. By mapping the demonstrative's semantics onto functional structure in its extended projection, we can both represent and explain the similarities and differences between it and the definite article. I proposed that the demonstrative is merged in a different position that the definite article, but that it frequently raises to the domain of the definite article (DP) because it has a piece of structure in common with the definite article, IdentP. I made the argument for analyzing the terminals (of the heads) in the demonstrative's rich extended projection as morphemes rather than abstract features, as this perspective is more amenable to the syntactic theory of grammaticalization we will put forth in section 4.5. The internal structural analysis presented here also allows us to account for the co-occurrence of high reinforcers in Germanic. In the next section I will turn my attention to the demonstrative's 'external syntax,' namely, how the internal changes discussed here affect the demonstrative's external distribution (within the DP).

4.4 The external syntax of the demonstrative

I have made the claim for distinguishing strong demonstratives from weak demonstratives, pragmatically and semantically, and now I will discuss the syntactic reflexes of these differences. I have argued extensively in chapter 3 that the transition from a strong to a weak demonstrative involves the loss of a value for the [speaker] feature. Examples (24) and (25), repeated below as (59) and (60), illustrate this change:

(59) **The extended projection of the strong demonstrative**



(60) **The extended projection of the weak demonstrative**



The question I ask in this section is whether the semantic difference between strong and weak demonstratives corresponds to an external syntactic difference. We saw that Cardinaletti and Starke's (1999) strong and weak pronouns, for example, display distributional differences that can be seen as syntactic reflexes of their internal structural differences. Specifically, strong forms can be stressed, coordinated and modified, while weak forms cannot:

(61) Strong form (Italian *lei*):
Luigi saluta LEI/ lei e suo padre /solo lei.
'Luigi greets HER/her and her father/just her'

(62) Weak form (Italian clitic *la*)
Luigi [*LA/*la e sua madre/*solo la] saluta.
Intended interpretation: 'Luigi greets [HER/her and her mother/just her]'

One place we might begin to look for evidence of such syntactic reflexes between strong and weak demonstratives is in the surface positions of demonstratives within the DP. We know that demonstratives occur pre-nominally in some languages and post-nominally in others, and that they can even in both positions in other languages. It is reasonable to ask, then, if this pre/post-nominal distinction is correlated with something deeper, possibly even with the occurrence of strong and weak demonstratives. I devote the next section to investigating the pre/post-nominal distinction. While there are reported interpretational differences correlated with this positional distinction, I will show that these correlations vary across languages and hence do not correspond to universal properties of the demonstrative.

4.4.1 The pre/post-nominal distinction

I have discussed the fact that in the pre-minimalist literature on the syntax of the demonstrative, a demonstrative's meaning is not correlated with its syntax. In more recent years, however, there have been more attempts to capture a demonstrative's semantics in the syntax (Giusti 2005, Panagiotidis 2000, Grohman and Panagiotidis 2004, Silva-Villar and Gutiérrez-Rexach 2001, Taboada 2007 to name a few). The aforementioned accounts, some of which will be discussed below, all focus on the interpretational differences between pre- and post-nominal demonstratives. While it is tempting to fixate on the pre/post-nominal distinction in demonstratives because it is a difference we can see, I will offer two reasons why we should not base a syntactic account of the demonstrative on these distinctions: (i) the pre/post-nominal position of the demonstrative is a relative position: Specifically, the surface position of the demonstrative vis-à-vis the noun does not reflect the underlying structure of the DP, as possible noun (or NP) raising and/or demonstrative movement may obscure the underlying position of the demonstrative, (ii) the meaning-to-position correlations suggested in the literature cannot be generalized across languages. When it comes to the pre/post-nominal distinction, I suggest that we can only evaluate interpretational differences on an individual basis, for each language. In other words, we cannot claim that the post-nominal position is intrinsically associated with one semantic type of demonstrative and the pre-nominal position with another. This fact becomes clear when we juxtapose two languages that exhibit the opposite correlation between a demonstrative's surface position and its interpretation, Greek and Romanian.

The observed interpretational differences between pre-and post-nominal demonstratives have been attributed in the literature considered here to the presence versus absence of a DP-

internal Focus phrase.[149] It is important to note here that the FocusP proposed in these accounts (Giusti 2005 and Grohmann and Panagiotidis 2004) is distinct from the demonstrative-internal ContrastP I have posited, both in terms of position and the semantics it encodes. The ContrastP I have proposed is part of the extended projection of the demonstrative, while the Focus Phrase posited by Giusti (2005) and Grohmann and Panagiotidis (2004) is demonstrative-external, located within the DP. Semantically, my ContrastP encodes the property of contrastiveness in demonstratives, discussed in 3.4. For both Giusti (2005) and Grohmann and Panagiotidis (2004), on the other hand, FocusP encodes what they term the 'deictic' use of the demonstrative, which corresponds to what I have been calling the 'situational' use.[150] Recall that a demonstrative is used situationally when its referent is located in the immediate surroundings, as opposed to the anaphoric use, where the referent is to be found in the linguistic context.

While both Giusti (2005) and Grohmann and Panagiotidis (2004) tie FocusP to 'situational' use, they differ on its location within the DP. Grohmann Panagiotidis (2004) argue that FocusP is in the far left periphery of the DP (above the position of the article) in Greek, but for Romanian, Giusti (2005) argues that FocusP is sandwiched in-between the article and the agreement domain of the noun phrase. This difference in position of the FocusP correlates to different surface positions of the situational demonstrative with respect to the noun in these

[149] While I only discuss here the accounts of pre/post-nominal demonstratives that link these positions to a situational vs. anaphoric interpretation, the pre/post-nominal distinction has also been linked to a neutral vs. emphatic interpretation (see Silva-Villar & Gutiérrez-Rexach 2001 and Bernstein 1997). In these accounts, post-nominal demonstratives are claimed to be emphatic and pre-nominal demonstratives, neutral.

[150] I have mentioned that the term 'deictic' is used with different meanings in the literature, among which are the following: (i) distance-marked (ii) used with ostension, (iii) having a referent in the immediate situation or previous discourse, and (iv) situational. The latter is the sense in which Giusti (2005) and G & P (2004) use the term 'deictic.'

languages: in Greek, situational demonstratives are argued to be pre-nominal, while in Romanian, they are argued to be post-nominal.

4.4.1.1 Romanian: Giusti (2005)

Giusti (2005) proposes that post-nominal demonstratives in Romanian are in a focus position. Her work is inspired by Tasmowski (1990), who argues that the post-nominal demonstratives are pragmatically marked in Romanian. Specifically, Tasmowski claims that the post-nominal position of the demonstrative corresponds to a rhematic interpretation, while the pre-nominal position corresponds to a thematic interpretation. What Tasmowski means by this is that the post-nominal position of the demonstrative can be characterized as "presupposing a contrast with a set of other similar individuals or presupposing direct reference to an individual present in the external world (deixis)" (quoted in Giusti 2005: 31). Giusti notes that this is opposite to the anaphoric interpretation of the demonstrative, which "refers to an individual already present in the discourse (2005: 31). Translating Giusti's (2005) and Tasmowksi's (1990) claims into my terms, the post-nominal demonstrative in Romanian is interpreted as 'situational,' while the pre-nominal demonstrative corresponds to an anaphoric interpretation. For the sake of clarity, I will use the terms 'situational' and 'anaphoric' throughout the following discussion.

Giusti (2005: 31) cites the following examples from Tasmowski (1990). The first example showcases a situational demonstrative, where the demonstrative refers to a train that is visible in the immediate situation (at the train station). When the phrase *this train is always late* is translated into Romanian, we see in (63a) that the post-nominal demonstrative is felicitous in this context but the pre-nominal one is not, as in (63b):

(63) *context: at the station*

this train is always late

a. trenul ăsta întîrzie întotdeauna
train-the this stop staying always

b. # acest tren ăsta întîrzie întotdeauna
this train this stop staying always

On the flipside, when we the context calls for an anaphoric demonstrative, only the pre-nominal demonstrative is felicitous. In Giusti's example below, the first paragraph in (64) sets the scene and introduces the referent (*felurite povestiri şi întîmplări* 'stories and anecdotes'), which is then resumed in sentence that follows: *They, these stories, these transitory confessions, start all by themselves.* The translation of this follow-up sentence into Romanian illustrate the two possible word orders: In (65a) the pre-nominal demonstrative is felicitous as an anaphoric demonstrative, while in (65b) the post-nominal one is not:

(64) buna deprindere de a circula încolo şi încoace îti oferă (. . .) prilejul de a cunoaoşte tot felul de indivizi (. . .) de la care poţi auzi felurite povestiri şi întîmplări (. . .)
"The good habit to travel here and there offers you the possibility of meeting all sorts of people (. . .) from whom you can here [sic] stories and anecdotes.

(65) "They, these stories, these transitory confessions, start all by themselves."

a. Ele, ***aceste povestiri***, *acele pasagere confesiuni,* izvorăsc aproape de la sine.
They, **these stories**, those transitory confessions, stem almost of the self

b. *? Ele, ***povestirile acestea****, confesiunile acestea pasagere*, (. . .).
They, **stories these**, confessions these transitory (. . .)

To account for these facts, and building on the hypothesis that the nominal functional domain parallels the functional structure of the clause, Giusti posits a split DP (in the spirit of Rizzi's 1997 split-CP hypothesis), which features a Focus projection in the 'complementation area' of the noun phrase.[151] This FocusP, which is immediately dominated by D, hosts situational demonstratives, which surface post-nominally in Romanian.[152] Accordingly, Giusti posits that situational demonstratives raise from the low base position described by Brugè (2006) to the specifier of FocusP, where they receive a rhematic (situational) interpretation. Since the noun raises higher than FocusP in Romanian (incorporating into the article), situational demonstratives will surface in post-nominal position, as with *trenul ăsta*, 'this train.' Anaphoric demonstratives, on the other hand, raise all the way up past the noun in D to Spec, DP, appearing pre-nominally at spell-out, as with *aceste povestiri*, *'these stories.'* Below is a sketch of Giusti's proposed structure, focusing only on the aspects of DP that are relevant for our purposes:

(66) [DP ***anaphoric dem*** [D *noun+def art* [FocusP ***situational use dem*** Focus [AGRP [AGRP [AGRP ~~***anaphoric/situational dem***~~ AGR [**N** ~~*noun*~~]]]]]]].

While in Giusti's account of Romanian the situational use corresponds to the post-nominal position and anaphoric use to the pre-nominal position, the reverse has been argued for Greek (by Panagiotidis (2000) and Grohmann & Panagiotidis (2004)), as we will see below.

[151] She also posits a TopicP which hosts topicalized adjectives, but we will not discuss this here.
[152] FocusP can also host *marked* postnominal adjectives in Giusti's account: "The postnominal position of the demonstrative, and of *marked* postnominal adjectives, is triggered by leftward movement of these nominal modifiers to a Focus position, which is further crossed by N-movement to the highest functional head" (Giusti 2005: 25).

4.4.1.2 Greek: Panagiotidis (2000) and Grohmann and Panagiotidis (2004)

Modern Greek is another language that allows the demonstrative to occur in different positions within the noun phrase. As shown in the following examples, the Greek demonstrative *aftos* (this) can occur pre- or post-nominally:[153]

(67) a. o andras **aftos**
the man this

b. **aftos** o (neos) andras
this the (young) man
'this (young) man'
(Panagiotidis, 2000: 718)

Pre-nominal demonstratives occur in a position identified by Grohmann & Panagiotidis (2004), henceforth G&P, as DEM_{HI} while the post-nominal demosntratives are in DEM_{LO}.[154] Taking their cue from Panagiotidis (2000) and Manolessou & Panagiotidis (1999), G&P claim that the DEM_{HI} position in (67b) is a derived position (the DEM_{LO} position in (67a) being basic), resulting from raising of the demonstrative to the left periphery of the noun phrase, above the definite article. G&P adopt Panagiotidis' (2000) explanation for this movement, which

[153] Greek pronouns are inflected for number and case: the accusative forms are *afton, aftin,* while the nominative forms are *aftos, afti*. In addition to the [+speaker] form, *aftos* (*this*), Greek also has a [-speaker] demonstrative, *ekinos* (*that*).

[154] Additionally, there is an intermediate position for the demonstrative in Greek, where the demonstrative appears between the adjective and the noun:

c. o neos **aftos** andras
the young this man
'this (young) man'

The intermediate demonstratives behave on par with post-nominal demonstratives in having an anaphoric interpretation, prompting Grohmann and Panagiotidis (2004: 4) to refer to intermediate and post-nominal demonstratives collectively as DEM_{LO}, while the high, pre-nominal demonstratives are referred to as DEM_{HI}.

capitalizes on the interpretation of DEM_{HI} and DEM_{LO}. Specifically, if the demonstrative raises to the DEM_{HI} position, we get a so-called 'deictic' interpretation, which the authors use to mean a situational use, compatible with ostension.[155] If, instead, the demonstrative remains low, we get an anaphoric interpretation. For maximal clarity and consistency, I will use the terms 'situational' and 'anaphoric' to characterize the DEM_{HI} and DEM_{LO} respectively. The examples below illustrate this distinction:

(68) **afta** ta nea fenomena — DEM HI = situational reading
these ART new phenomena
'these new phenomena'

(69) ta nea **afta** fenomena — DEM LO = anaphoric reading
ART new these phenomena
'these new phenomena'
(G&P, 2004: 110)

An additional example illustrates that it is in fact *only* the pre-nominal demonstrative that can be used situationally:

At the butcher's, pointing to a pork joint:

(70) a. #Thelo to butaki **afto**
I-want the joint **this**

b. Thelo **afto** to (apaho) butaki
I-want **this** the (lean) joint
'I want this (lean) joint' (Panagiotidis 2000: 723)

[155] It is not clear to me whether the restriction on post-nominal demonstratives has to do with disallowing situational use *per se*, or more specifically, with not being compatible with ostension.

In (70a) the post-N demonstrative cannot be used situationally (with ostension), while the pre-N demonstrative is perfectly felicitous.

Panagiotidis (2000) and G&P (2004) account for the situational/anaphoric distinction between pre and post-nominal demonstratives by invoking a distinction between demonstrative determiners and demonstrative operators. The situational reading can only be realized when a demonstrative determiner raises to the nominal left periphery to a position above the definite article, FocusP. When the demonstrative does not raise, "a locally generated covert operator *OP* takes its place (. . .), resulting in an anaphoric reading for the DP" (G&P 2004: 3). While the details of the movement operations will be discussed in section 4.4.2 in connection with the phenomenon of 'double definiteness,' I have included a sketch of how the different positions of the demonstrative are argued to arise in Greek:

(71) a [$_{FocP}$ . . . afta . . . [~~afta~~ ➡ ta [nea [~~afta~~ [fenomena]]]]]
DEM art new phenomenon
= situational use interpretation

b. [$_{FocP}$. . . . OP . . . [~~OP~~ ➡ ta [nea [afta [fenomena]]]]]]
art new DEM phenomenon
= anaphoric interpretation

In the above discussion, we have seen that the meaning-to-position correlations noted for pre- and post-nominal demonstratives are different (in fact, opposite) for Romanian and Greek, and hence cannot be generalized across languages. We have seen that Giusti (2005) argues that in Romanian the pre-nominal position corresponds to an anaphoric interpretation and the post-nominal position to a situational one, while this correlation is claimed to be the reverse for Greek

by Grohmann and Panagiotidis (2004). Note that we are not concerned with the surface position of the demonstrative vis-à-vis the noun *per se*, as it can be affected by noun raising. However, if we adopt Cinque's (1994, 1999) hypothesis that the ordering of functional heads is universal, the different positions of FocusP (encoding situational use) proposed by Giusti and G&P is problematic. The fact that the respective FocusPs are not in the same place in the DP in Romanian and Greek points to the language-specific nature of the distinction it encodes, as well the language-specific nature of the pre/post-nominal distinction it has been tied to.[156] The main point of this section has been to show that the pre/post-nominal positional distinction of the demonstratives does not correlate to universal semantic properties of the demonstrative, situational use[157]or otherwise, as far as I can tell.

4.4.1.3 Evidence for a weak intermediate position in Spanish

While I have not yet found the kind of robust syntactic reflexes for strong and weak demonstratives that Cardinaletti and Starke (1999) cite for strong and weak pronouns, there does seem to be some possible evidence for an intermediate position in the DP for the weak

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[156] The question arises, then, as to how to explain these interpretational differences, if we cannot tie them to a semantically-contentful functional projection that is uniform across languages, in the spirit of Cinque (1994, 1999). One pragmatic explanation comes to mind, which capitalizes on the similarities between post-nominal demonstratives and adjectives in Romance. It may be possible that speakers assimilate post-nominal demonstratives to adjectives in Romance, since post-N position is the canonical position for adjectives. In Romanian, we see adjectival infection on the post-nominal demonstrative but not on pre-nominal demonstratives: cf. *acest om* versus *omul acesta*, 'this man'. It would not be unreasonable to assume that the assimilation of post-nominal demonstratives to adjectives in Romance would contribute to a situational interpretation of the demonstrative: visible entities are more commonly modified by an adjective than entities referred to in the previous discourse. Greek would be harder to tackle with this approach, however, due to the multiple positions available to adjectives in that language. I leave this matter open to future research.

[157] In fact, I have been assuming that situational use is a pragmatic and not a semantic property of demonstratives. The findings in this section support this idea.

demonstrative in Spanish. According to Bernstein (2001), in addition to the pre-and post-nominal positions, there is an intermediate (post-nominal) position available to the demonstrative in Spanish that is marginally acceptable, as seen in (72c):

(72) (a) **este** libro viejo
this book old

(b) el libro viejo **este**
the libro old this

(c) ?el libro **ese** viejo
the libro this old

Brugè (1996) does not share Bernstein's judgment regarding the (marginal) acceptability of these intermediate demonstratives, but argues that the intermediate position is possible only when an intonational break occurs between the demonstrative and the adjective, as shown below:

(73) El cuadro este/ese, redondo, es muy antiguo.
'the painting this/that round is very antique.'

At the same time, however, Brugè (1996) cites a different judgment on this data, in the form of a personal communication with Luis Sáez (c.f. Brugè 1996: fn 15), according to whom the example above is acceptable even without an intonational break.

(74) El cuadro este/ese redondo es muy antiguo.
'the painting this/that round is very antique.

Further data from Sáez (cf. Brugè 1996: fn 15) suggests that this intermediate position is associated with a distance-neutral interpretation. Brugè notes Sáez' characterization of the demonstrative in this construction: "In cases which we contrast the spatial position of an object with the spatial position of another one, the postnominal demonstrative can never appear preceding the adjective" (Brugè 1996: 12, fn15). The example below shows that the [+/-speaker] distinction expressed by *este* and *aquel* ('**this** round painting and **that** ashtray') is not supported when the demonstrative is in intermediate position, as in (75b). In other words, the intermediate position is associated with a distance-neutral interpretation:

(75) a. El cuadro redondo **este** y el cenicero aquel me encantan
The painting round this and the ashtray that to me [CL.] like very much
'I like very much this round painting and that ashtray.'

b. *El cuadro **este** redondo y el cenicero aquel me encantan
The painting this round and the ashtray that to me [CL.] like very much
'I like very much this round painting and that ashtray.'

According to Sáez, the (weak) demonstrative in intermediate position is good before adjectives of shape (as seen above with *redondo* in (75)), as well as before adjectives of color and nationality as shown below in (76) and (77), but crucially not before adjectives of size (cf. (78):

(76) El cenicero **este/ese** azul me lo regaló Maria [color adjective]
the ashtray this/that blue to-me gave Maria
Maria gave me this/that blue ashtray.

(77) El grabado **este**/**ese** ingles está mal hecho [nationality adjective]
the engraving this/that English is badly made
This/That English engraving is badly made.

(78) *El chico **este**/**ese** alto vive cerca de casa [size adjective]
the boy this/that tall lives near my home
This/that tall boy lives near my home.

These judgments suggest that the intermediate position of the weak demonstrative in Spanish is lower than the merge position of 'size' adjectives in the DP, but above adjectives of shape, color and nationality. In (79) I give Cinque's (1994) structure for object-denoting nominals, which I have modified to include the intermediate position of the weak demonstrative in Spanish, in [Spec, TrackerAdjP]:

(79)
$[_{DP}$ D $[_{XP}$ poss.AP X $[_{YP}$ car.d AP Y $[_{WP}$ ord. AP W $[_{ZP}$ qualityAP Z $[_{HP}$ sizeAP H $[_{TrackerAdjP}$
DEM TrackerAdj $[_{LP}$ shapeAP L $[_{MP}$ colourAP M $[_{OP}$ nationalityAP O $[_{NP}$ N]]]]]]]]].

While the questionability of the intermediate position in general (at least for some speakers) makes the data above less robust than we would like, the judgments presented here at least suggest a possible avenue to pursue in terms of identifying syntactic reflexes of weak and strong demonstratives.

In Chapters 2 and 3 we gave independent reasons for considering strong and weak demonstratives distinct syntactic entities. Aside from the semantic distinctions we identified in Chapter 3, we cited diachronic phenomena as evidence of a weak demonstrative. Lehmann (1995) argues the first step in the grammaticalization of the demonstrative is for distance

specifications to be neutralized, and in Chapter 2 I showed that this claim is borne out for Late Latin and spoken Finnish, where I argue demonstratives pass through a phrase where they are distance-neutral before they are reanalyzed as definite articles. The fact that the grammaticalization path of the demonstrative involves a point that corresponds to the weak demonstrative suggests that the weak demonstrative is a synchronically real entity.

4.4.2 The demonstrative's syntactic relationship with the DP projection

In section 4.3 we have argued that the demonstrative is merged in [Spec, TrackerAdjP] low in the DP. In this section I will address demonstrative raising. I have proposed to bring the existing theories of demonstrative raising in line with Minimalist thinking, in which the impetus for movement is attributed to the c-commanding element. More specifically, movement is triggered by the presence of an EPP feature on (the feature of) a probe, which in this case is D. I propose that D has an uninterpretable [+identifiability] feature adorned with an EPP feature, requiring something overt to appear in the DP projection.[158] In the absence of a definite article, therefore, the demonstrative moves to [Spec, DP] because it is attracted by D, not because of its own checking needs. While the demonstrative's [+identifiability] feature is interpretable and can be checked in-situ via 'Agree' (i.e. it does not need to be checked via movement), its [+identifiability] feature is nonetheless *available* for checking. More precisely, the demonstrative's [+identifiability] feature is an appropriate target for the D probe (or rather, for

[158] I fully acknowledge that postulating an EPP feature as the trigger for movement is stipulatory. The fact remains that *something* forces movement of a [+identifiable] element up to DP; I remain open as to what that trigger might be.

the EPP feature on D's uninterpretable [+identifiability] feature). In the absence of a definite article, therefore, the demonstrative will move to [Spec, DP].[159]

(80) Synchronic derivation of the demonstrative



The next question to address is how we to account for cross-linguistic (and even language-internal) variation with regards to obligatoriness/optionality of demonstrative movement up to DP. As mentioned throughout, we will not appeal to strength or weakness of

[159] There does appear to be some parametric variation with respect to D's EPP feature. Roehrs (2010), citing Vangsnes 1999), notes that in Modern Icelandic there are two positions available to the demonstrative—pre- or post-nominal. The post-nominal option in (ib) shows the demonstrative remaining low, without the presence of an article higher up:

(i) a. **þessi** maður (Modern Icelandic) this man
b. maður **þessi**
(Vangsnes 1999: 148 fn. 34)

We might say that in Modern Icelandic, D's uninterpretable [+identifiability] feature does not have an EPP feature.

features on the demonstrative to account for this variation, as other researchers have done (c.f. Brugè 1996). If movement is triggered by properties of the probe (namely, an EPP feature on an uninterpretable feature of the probe), then the question of why the demonstrative can stay low in some languages does not arise in the first place: demonstratives themselves do not *need* to move to check (or 'value') their interpretable features, as this can happen via 'Agree.' Languages like Spanish and Romanian (which force demonstrative raising in the absence of a definite article but prohibit raising in the presence of a definite article) receive a natural explanation under such an account: rather than having to appeal to strong features vs. weak features, we simply point to the argument made above, which is that D requires something overt in its specifier or head in the syntax. If the definite article is not in DP to fulfill this local checking relation, the demonstrative must raise there, in order to check the EPP feature on D. But what about the Romanian and Spanish cases, where a definite article is merged when the demonstrative remains in its base position (Spanish *el libro este,* lit.'the book this')? Perhaps the more important question to ask is why this configuration is only allowed in some languages. While the details remained to be fleshed out, one possibility presents itself, which is that some languages allow the property of 'identifiability' to be expressed more than one time within the extended projection of the noun phrase (but crucially not within the 'complementation' layer of the DP—its left periphery), while other languages only allow definiteness to be expressed once within the entire extended projection of the noun.[160] I will leave this question open for future research.

I will now address the question of 'double 'definiteness' in the left periphery of the DP, which we see in Greek and Hungarian.

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[160] Interestingly, it seems to matter what kind of 'second' element is allowed: in Spanish and Romanian, only a demonstrative can occur with a definite article; crucially not two definite articles (while article doubling is allowed in many languages, it is doubtful that both of these elements are expressing 'definiteness' in a semantic way).

4.4.2.1 'Double Definiteness'

The phenomenon whereby both the demonstrative and the definite article occur pre-nominally (or the 'left periphery' of the DP) has been referred to 'double definiteness.' Note that I put 'double definiteness' in single quotes, since I will be arguing against the idea that definiteness is actually expressed twice in these cases. To distinguish the co-occurrence of the demonstrative and the definite article in pre-nominal position from other cases like Spanish and Romanian, I will call this 'left periphery double definiteness,' (or LPDD) where the left-periphery means the topmost part of the DP, also called the 'complementation layer' (Giusti, 1994). LPDD has proved a stumbling block for many accounts of demonstrative syntax, since it seems to flout the "Doubly-Filled DP Filter," according to which a demonstrative in [Spec, DP] and a determiner in D are in complementary distribution. In my terms, LPDD is ruled out on semantic grounds, since both demonstratives and definite articles have a [+identifiability] feature. If the definite article is in DP, then there should be no reason for the demonstrative to raise there. In fact, on my analysis, left periphery co-occurrence should be structurally impossible as well, since Stage I definite articles are argued to be in [Spec, DP], the same position that the demonstrative raises to. My explanation of 'left periphery double definiteness,' then, is that it is not actually double definiteness. In most cases, the article that participates in LPDD has grammaticalized beyond the point where it can express [+identifiability].[161] I argue that the article we see in LPDD constructions is a Stage II definite article, merged directly in D, and does not compete with the demonstratives structurally or semantically. This hypothesis further predicts that the order of the demonstrative and definite article in LPDD should be demonstrative-definite-article, which is indeed what we find.

[161] And when this is not the case (as in Hungarian), I argue there are other factors at work.

The proposal outlined above is supported by empirical evidence. Svenonius reports a study conducted by Jan Rijkhoff (2002) which confirms that the co-occurrence of the demonstrative and 'definite' article is the exception rather than the rule. Out of the eighty-five languages surveyed by Rijkhoff (2002), only six allow the demonstrative to co-occur with an article. Of these six, only three of the languages in the sample (Abkhaz, Guaraní, and Hungarian) allow the demonstrative and definite article to occur together in the left periphery. Below are the surface orders of the languages allowing co-occurrence (Rijkhoff's 2002 data, as reported by Svenonius 2007) :

(81) a. Dem-Art-N: Abkhaz, Guaraní, Hungarian
b. Art-N-Dem: Berbice Dutch Creole, Galela, Samoan

Crucially, we do not see the order 'Art-Dem-N,' lending support to my hypothesis that the definite article in LPDD is a Stage II article, merged in D rather than in [Spec, DP], where the raised demonstrative sits:

(82)



We zero in on the order in (81a) above, where the demonstrative and definite article co-occur in the left periphery. According to Rijkhoff (2002), both Abkhaz and Guaraní have a

Stage II article, in the sense of Greenberg (1978). This means that the article does not encode [+identifiability], and in my analysis, is merged in D rather than [Spec, DP]. We may therefore assume that in Abkhaz (and Guaraní), LPDD is not actually a case of DP true double definiteness.

A similar explanation can be given for Modern Greek, which shows pre-nominal co-occurrence of the demonstrative and definite article:

(83) autos o aner
this the man
(example from Giusti 1994)

Grohmann and Panagiotidis (2004) offer an explanation of the Greek demonstrative-definite article construction, according to which the 'definite article' is interpreted as a copy spell-out. Their analysis is based on a theory of distance developed by Grohmann (2000, 2003) called Anti-Locality. In a nutshell, the idea is that, just as a moved element is restricted in the maximal distance it can traverse, it is likewise restricted in the minimum distance: in other words, movement must not be too local. Specifically, movement must not occur within the same Prolific Domain (Grohmann 2000, 2003), which is explained as a domain spanning information-relevant related projections. The example below shows the prolific domains proposed for the DP by G&P (2004: 118), where the Ω domain roughly corresponds to the complementation layer of DP, the Φ domain corresponds to agreement domain, and θ, the theta domain (the NP projection):

(84) a. $[_{\Omega\Delta}$ . . . afta . . . [~~afta~~ ta $[_{\Phi\Delta}$ nea [~~afta~~ $[_{\theta\Delta}$ fenomena]]]]]
DEM art new phenomenon

If movement is too local, occurring within a prolific domain, the offending copy must be spelled out to rescue the operation. The definite article appearing in demonstrative constructions in Greek (*ta*) is considered to be the spell-out of an offending copy of the demonstrative. In the example below, is repeated from above, the spell out of the copy is indicated by the arrow:

(85) a. [$_{\Omega\Delta}$ . . . afta . . . [~~afta~~ ➡ ta [$_{\Phi\Delta}$ nea [~~afta~~ [$_{\theta\Delta}$ fenomena]]]]]
DEM art new phenomenon

In the example above, G&P (2004) argue that the demonstrative, originating in the Φ domain, first lands in the 'article' position before raising to its surface position (Spec, FocP). The authors argue that the second step is too local, occurring within the same prolific domain, causing the offending copy of the demonstrative to be spelled out in the form of the article, "fully agreeing with the demonstrative in number, gender and Case" (G&P 2004: 12). In (86) on the other hand, it is a covert operator, OP, that performs this too-local step, leaving behind a spelled-out copy in the form of the article.

(86) [$_{\Omega\Delta}$ . . . OP . . . [~~OP~~ ➡ ta [$_{\Phi\Delta}$ nea [afta [$_{\theta\Delta}$ fenomena]]]]]
art new DEM phenomenon

Recall from section 4.4.1.2 that when the demonstrative itself raises to [Spec, FocP], it triggers a situational reading of the demonstrative, while the raising of a covert operator results in an anaphoric reading of the demonstrative.

According to Grohmann and Panagiotidis (2004), the 'definite article' in the examples above in Greek is not really a definite article at all, then, but "a grammatical formative: the result of Copy Spell Out of the demonstrative, specified exactly for the relevant phi-features"

(122). The authors further state that "regarding demonstrative structures across languages, this analysis makes an interesting (because testable) prediction: the "doubling" article should never be a "real" article (real in the sense of an independently merged linguistic expression which is part of the numeration, as laid out above)" (123). While I will not necessarily adopt the copy spell-out approach to the definite article in apparent 'doubling' languages outside of Greek, I agree with Grohmann and Panagiotidis (2004) that the 'doubling' article should never be a 'real' article, in that it does not express [+identifiability].

That the doubling article is not semantically 'definite' has also been argued for the LPDD in Mainland Scandinavian by Giusti (1994). As seen in the example below, the demonstrative in Mainland Scandinavian appears to be in the highest specifier position. In some dialects an enclitic article also occurs on the head noun when the demonstrative appears.[162]

(87) **denna** man% (**nen**) Mainland Scandinavian
this man-**the**
'this man'

Giusti assimilates the co-occurrence of the demonstrative and definite article in cases like (87) above to the so-called 'double article' construction in Scandinavian, shown below in (88). Giusti shows that an unmodified definite noun phrase appears only with a suffixal article, as shown in (88a). In the presence of an adjective, however, as in (88b), a free-standing article (*den*) appears at the beginning of the string. In some dialects, the enclitic 'article' may also appear, as the % symbol indicates below:

[162] Giusti (1994, fn 2) notes that Swedish allows this construction freely, Norwegian only in some spoken variants, while Danish does not display it at all.

(88) (a) mann**en**
man-**the**
'the man'

(b) **den** gamle man%(**nen**)
the old man-(**the**)
'the old man'

While I will not go into the details of her argument here, Giusti (1994) argues that the suffixal *(-en*) is not actually the definite article, but rather an agreement morpheme between N^0 and D^0. The dialectical variation in Scandanvaian could then be reduced to morphological variation: Norwegian and Swedish have this morphological agreement of N^0 with D^0, while Danish does not. On analogy, Giusti claims that the *(-en*) suffixed on the end of the noun in the presence of a demonstrative in some dialects of Scandinavian as in (87) is likewise an agreement morpheme, instantiating agreement between the demonstrative in [Spec, DP] and the head noun. "The cooccurrence of Dem with the apparent enclitic article in Scandinavian, is therefore reduced to the property of Dem, in certain variants, to trigger morphological agreement with the head noun" (91). Thus, the 'definite article' appearing with the demonstrative in Scandinavian is not associated with definiteness: in our terms, it does not have the [+identifiable] feature and hence cannot check the same feature in D.[163]

[163] Recall from section 4.3.2.1 that Leu (2007), also discusses so-called 'double definiteness' in Scandinvian. He expands on the similarities Giusti (1994) points out between the 'double article' construction and the demonstrative + definite article construction, although his ultimate conclusion is quite different. Specifically, Leu zeroes in on the role of the adjective in the 'double article' construction, considering the definite marker in these cases an adjectival determiner. The co-occurrence of the 'definite article' with the demonstrative in Norwegian, then, is attributed to the presence of a silent adjectival modifier, HERE/THERE: the definite article is taken to be an adjectival determiner on this silent modifier.

So far we have provided arguments against treating the apparent 'definite article' in demonstrative-definite article constructions as actually 'definite'—in other words, it does not express [+identifiability] and is not in [Spec, DP]. Hungarian, however, remains an outlier, since, according to Svenonius (2007) it has a Stage I article. I propose that Hungarian stands as a case unto itself, due to the way in which the demonstrative came about. Rijkhoff (2002) discusses the Hungarian case of the LPDD. Following Moravcsik (1997), Rijkhoff (2002) claims that origin of the demonstrative in (90) below was the appositive construction in (89):

(89) **ez**, **a** barna kalap
dem art brown hat
'this, the brown hat'

(90) **Ez** **a** barna kalap
dem art brown hat
'this brown hat'

(Moravcsik 1997: 319, cited in Rijkhoff 2002)

Moravcsik claims that the Hungarian demonstrative + definite article sequence is the result of a previous apposition construction, in which the noun phrase was appositionally adjoined to pronominal demonstrative. Rijkhoff considers the case of the Hungarian demonstrative as an instance of 'syntactic entrapment,' where the DP-external demonstrative becomes reanalyzed as a DP-internal element, trapping the definite article in D in-between the demonstrative and the rest of the noun phrase. Grohmann and Panagiotidis (2004) make similar remarks regarding Hungarian, claiming that "the Hungarian case can be argued to arise from lexical word formation

or any other non-syntactic means" (126). While more work needs to be done on the Hungarian demonstrative-definite article construction to fully understand the factors at work, it seems reasonable to assume that there is no double definiteness being expressed here: either the demonstrative still sits in a projection external to the DP (has not become fully reanalyzed as a DP-internal element), or else the 'definite article' has become fossilized in this construction, and does not actually express [+identifiability].

4.4.2.2 Summary of the Demonstrative's relationship to DP

In this section I hope to have elucidated the relationship between the demonstrative and the DP projection. The demonstrative is merged low like adjectives, in a position that encodes its semantics, TrackerAdjP. Because of its [+identifiability] feature, the demonstrative serves as a viable goal for the D probe. If there is nothing merged directly in the DP projection that has the semantics of identifiability (i.e. a Stage I definite article), the demonstrative must raise to check D's uninterpretable [+identifiable] feature. In some languages, a definite article may surface in [Spec, DP] while allowing the demonstrative to stay low (Romanian, Spanish), while in other languages the only option is to raise the demonstrative (English, German, Italian, etc.). I have suggested that in the first kind of language, the property of identifiability may be expressed by multiple elements in the extended DP, whereas it can only be expressed by one element in the latter set of languages. What should be universally ruled out under my analysis, however, is a scenario in which the definite article and a demonstrative to surface together in the in the left periphery of the DP. This is ruled out by economy: the EPP feature on D forces the presence of an overt element which contributes 'identifiability' in the DP projection. If the definite article is already in the DP projection, checking D's EPP feature, there should be no trigger for the

demonstrative to raise, and hence, by economy, it must not raise. In addition, in my analysis the Stage I definite article is in [Spec, DP], and so should not be able to co-occur with the definite article for structural reasons. I have argued that in languages where the demonstrative and 'definite' article surface together pre-nominally, the article does not have the semantics of identifiability (or else, in the case Hungarian, the demonstrative may not actually be in the DP projection).

4.5 The Diachronic picture: a syntactic analysis of grammaticalization

We have discussed the synchronic derivation of the demonstrative—where it is merged where it (potentially) raises. We will now us now consider the diachronic correlate of the movement operation illustrated in (80) above, reanalysis. Our discussion on the syntax of grammaticalization of the demonstrative is based on the principles outlined in Roberts and Roussou (2003), who develop a formal theory of grammaticalization couched in Chomsky's (1995, 2000) Minimalist framework. I will first give an overview of Roberts and Roussou's (2003) theory, and then discuss the main principles of their work in relation to the grammaticalization of the demonstrative.

4.5.1 Roberts and Roussou (2003)

Roberts and Roussou (2003) set out to provide a theoretical framework to support the rich empirical findings of grammaticalization research, striving to bring explanatory adequacy to the already descriptively adequate body of grammaticalization research. The authors provide an account of the phenomenon of grammaticalization in terms of a formal theory of syntax, working within a Chomsky's Minimalist framework (1995, 2000). Roberts and Roussou identify a

number of important issues, including the question of why grammaticalization happens in the first place, and why it appears to follow certain pathways, which we have identified as 'grammaticalization channels.' Imbedded in the answers to these questions are important theoretical predictions, namely that (i) grammaticalization involves categorial reanalysis, creating new functional material[164] (ii) categorial reanalysis is always local and upward and (iii) reanalysis always involves structural simplification. Structural simplification can be as straightforward as the reduction of structure (like the change from a bi-clausal structure to a mono-clausal one), or, it can refer to a simplification in the derivation, like the shift from Move to Merge.[165] I will hypothesize that structural simplification also involves reduction of a lexical item's extended projection (which I will term 'internal structure'). Moreover, I will argue that the simplification of an item's internal structure triggers simplification of the structure in which it is merged (an item's 'external structure.'). I will address the process of internal simplification of the demonstrative in section 4.5.1.1, while in section 4.5.3 I will explain how this internal simplification triggers external reanalysis of the demonstrative.

4.5.1.1 Reanalysis involves structural simplification

Roberts and Roussou (2003) highlight the tension between descriptive and explanatory adequacy in the field of grammaticalization. To be descriptively adequate, a theory of grammaticalization must recognize the overwhelming cross-linguistic tendency for diachronic

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[164] Specifically, "functional structure is present both before and after grammaticalization takes place; what changes is the way the features associated with the functional heads are realized . . . the change involves the overt realization of these heads" (Roberts and Roussou, 2003: 35).
[165] Here Roberts and Roussou take their cue from the learnability literature (Clark and Roberts 1993), in which it has been shown that "loss of movement in general is a mechanism of change due to properties of language acquirers, who aim at least-marked settings" (Roberts and Roussou 2003: 72).

change to follow specific pathways. At the same time, however, R & R (2003: 235) note that the notion of 'grammaticalization channels' runs against the 'Principles and Parameters' (Chomsky 1981) view of language change, which is characterized as a "random walk through a space defined by the range of parametric variation." As a solution to this friction, the authors suggest that language change is a result of a change in the parameter settings of a language, and that certain parameters are 'marked' in terms of language acquisition, creating 'basins of attraction' within the parameter space (R&R 2003: 4). These basins of attraction take on the shape of the familiar grammaticalization channels, which R & R argue reflect the hierarchical ordering of functional projections. They suggest that once we take upward reanalysis to be the "basic mechanism of syntactic change" (209), the formation of grammaticalization channels can be seen as a result of diachronic 'movement' through the functional projections (for example, those identified by Cinque 1999 for the clause), which is always upwards and local. Lexical verbs, for example, became modals in English via the process of upward reanalysis. Whereas the lexical verb *will* in Old English was merged in V and raised to T, in Modern English auxiliary *will* is merged directly in T, as illustrated below:

(91) English modals: $[_{TP}\ V + T\ [_{VP}\ t_v\ \ TP]]\ >\ [_{T}\ VP]$

R&R claim the same process is at work in the reanalysis of the Greek lexical verb *thelo* 'want,' which gives rise to the modal particle *tha* (except that we have further reanalysis of *tha* as a modal particle in C).[166] In both cases, there is upward reanalysis of the grammaticalized element and the transition from a bi-clausal to a mono-clausal one.

[166] Similarly, Roberts and Roussou (2003) argue that the grammaticalization of Latin *habere* + infinitive into the future/conditional endings in Romance languages involves reanalysis of

I will claim that, not only does grammaticalization involve simplification of the structure in which it is merged, but it also involves **internal** structural simplification, where 'internal' refers to the extended projection of a lexical item.[167] In the case of English modals, for example, not only does grammaticalization involve the simplification of the external structure (from a bi-clausal structure to a mono-clausal one), it also involves the simplification of the internal structure of the pre-modal verb. Under the assumption that inflection is structurally represented (as argued by Roehrs 2010; see section 4.3.2.2), loss of inflection on English pre-modal verbs would involve internal structural simplification. In addition, English pre-modals lose their argument structure, which would presumably entail the loss of the *v*P layer. Similarly, with Greek *thelo*, which involves the reanalysis of the volitional lexical verb which projects a *v*P, to an auxiliary which does not (and finally, to the modal particle *tha*). These changes are illustrated in the progression from the pre-modal verb in (92) to the modal in (93):

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habere from V to T, with additional reanalysis as an affix (as noted in Chapter 2). As noted in fn. 1 of Chapter 2, however, this analysis would need to be re-envisioned if we take a decompositional approach to 'have.' Whichever approach we take to the paraphrastic construction of the future in Latin (with *habere* as a lexical verb or as a the realization of a functional head as the result of predicate inversion), the transition from this construction to the future/conditional endings in Romance involves structural simplification, in that we move from an autonomous word to an affix (Latin *amare habeo*→ Italian *amerò* 'I will love'). In addition, the semantic bleaching of *habere* in the Romance future/conditional endings (loss of possessive meaning) may involve simplification of the sentential (*pro*) subject—from the NP complement of a dative PP to a simple NP.

[167] At least, when we are dealing with the reanalysis of a lexical item to a functional one. Recall that grammaticalization can also involve functional material becoming even more grammaticalized (Diessel, 1999), and we have suggested that the reanalysis of Latin *habere*+ infinitive into the future/conditional endings in Romance languages may be a case in point. Since functional elements lack extended functional projections to begin with, the further grammaticalization of these elements does not involve internal structural simplification.

(92) 

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(93) 

Roberts and Roussou (2003), following Lightfoot (1979) note that language change occurs when "a population of learners converges on a grammar which is distinct from the grammar that creates the input to learning [. . .]. In other words, the final state of acquisition may not result in full convergence with the adult grammar" (33). They suggest that this happens when the 'cue' for a particular analysis (parameter) is obscure or ambiguous. In this case, the conservative learner prefers simpler representations (Roberts and Roussou 2003: 33). Applied to the grammaticalization of demonstratives, the 'cue' for a strong demonstrative is the contrast between [+speaker] and [-speaker] forms. When this contrast is lost, we get ambiguity.

Let us briefly discuss the idea of contrast and the notion that loss of contrast leads to ambiguity. The contrast between [+speaker] and [-speaker] in demonstratives is evident, for instance, when a demonstrative is reinforced by an accompanying locative adverb with a matching value for [speaker], as in ***this*** *book* ***here/ that*** *book* ***there***. This [+speaker]/[-speaker] contrast is absent, however, in cases where a demonstrative can be paired with *either* a proximal or distal locative adverb, as in the French examples below:

(94) ce livre-ci
DEM book-here

(95) ce livre-là
DEM book-here

In this case, the speaker does not know how to value the [speaker] feature of bare *ce*; the cue for positing a value for this feature is absent; hence he will posit a neutral [speaker] feature for *ce*.[168] Contrast can also be expressed pragmatically, in the form of 'pointings': a [+speaker] demonstrative points out referents that are near to the speaker, and a [-speaker] demonstrative points out referents that are distant from the speaker. When a given demonstrative can be construed with a referent that is *close to the speaker* as well as with one that is *distant from the speaker*, the contrast between [+speaker] and [-speaker] is lost. When a language learner is repeatedly exposed to input where a given demonstrative can be interpreted as expressing either [+speaker] or [-speaker], he will ultimately hypothesize that the demonstrative is underlyingly unspecified for this feature; it has a neutral [speaker] feature.

4.5.2 Semantic bleaching of speaker morpheme as trigger for internal reanalysis

Roberts and Roussou argue that the 'cue' for a more complex representation is in most cases morphology, and that, when the morphological cue is lost, the learner will opt for a simpler representation (R&R 2003: 204). R&R define simplicity as a one-to-one mapping between features and morphology. From this perspective, Merge is deemed simpler than Move, because it merges an element directly in the functional head X to realize the feature X*, rather than raising a lexical element that expresses [X* and Y*] up to X from a lower position (Y). This is schematized below, where (97) is deemed simpler than (96) from a learnability perspective:

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[168] In other cases, as with the recognitional demonstrative, the demonstrative develops a specialized pragmatic use in which it does not contrast with any other demonstrative, as discussed in fn 86. For example, in Latin the recognitional demonstrative is expressed only by *ille*. Because we don't get a contrast between *iste and ille* in the recognitional use, the cue for a [-] value for [speaker] is obscured, and the language learner will ultimately posit a neutral [speaker] feature for recognitional *ille.*

(96) Move



(97) Merge



(YP does not have to be the complement of X)

However, as long as there is morphological evidence for the feature Y*, the more complex derivation (Move) is justified. Roberts and Roussou (2003) argue that when the morphology associated with feature Y* is lost, the language learner is faced with ambiguous input. As a result, he will eventually opt for a one-to-one match between features and form (merging the element directly in a higher position).

By 'loss of morphology,' Roberts and Roussou intend the disappearance of morphological material, an example of which can be seen with the reanalysis of the Classical Greek complementizer *hína* to a subjunctive modal particle *na* in Modern Greek (Roberts and Roussou 2003: 74). I will suggest, however, that there is another kind of loss of morphology, which also gives rise to ambiguous input for the language learner. This kind of morphological loss does not involve morphophonological reduction, but rather involves the loss of the sound-meaning correlation, and hence, loss of the morphological 'cue' for positing a more complex structure associated with a particular meaning. In other words, a lexical item can hold onto phonological material that is no longer 'morphological' in the sense of being a unit of meaning. In such cases, the morpheme itself has undergone semantic bleaching, and becomes opaque. Below, I will discuss the German demonstrative *dieser* and Latin *ille* to exemplify this process.

In section 3.3.4.2, I discuss the German demonstrative *dieser* as belonging to a homophonous distance-marked/distance-neutral demonstrative pair. In Middle and Old High German (and also, in Modern Formal German) *dieser* had a [+speaker] interpretation. In Modern Spoken German, however, *dieser* has a distance-neutral interpretation as well (and Diessel 1999, for one, argues that this has become its only function). In the case of Middle and Old High German, therefore, the language learner had a morphological cue for interpreting *dieser* as a [+speaker] demonstrative, thanks to the *–ies* which has the same source as English *these*, encoding *near the speaker*. In my analysis, this means in turn that the learner of MHG and OHG had concrete evidence for a SpeakerP in the extended projection of the demonstrative. Below I illustrate this process graphically, giving the extended projection of the demonstrative, where the [+identifiability] feature is instantiated by *–d* and the [+speaker] feature is encoded by *–ies*:

(98) Old/Middle High German: strong [+speaker] *dieser*



However, a lexical split has occurred in Modern Spoken German$_1$ (Lyons 1999), creating a distance-neutral *dieser* that exists alongside its [+speaker] counterpart. I argue that this lexical split has occurred due to the fact that the language learner was exposed to ambiguity in the input. For one, *dieser* can be combined with either *hier* (here) and *da/dort* (there), and two, *dieser* can be used to refer to entities that are both close to and distant from the speaker.[169] Because the language learner lacks evidence that the [speaker] feature of *dieser* is specified for a (positive) value, he hypothesizes a grammar in which *dieser* has a neutral [speaker] feature.[170]

This reanalysis, I argue, happens at the morphological level. Let us see how. We know that it is the phonological string *–ies* that encodes the [+speaker] feature on *dieser* (cf. Roehrs 2010: 3) in OHG and MHG. While this phonological material (*–ies*) is still intact in the distance-neutral demonstrative in Modern Spoken German, the [+speaker] meaning associated that phonological string has been lost. In other words, the *–ies* has ceased to be a morphological cue for the [+speaker] feature. In this way, we can see the semantic bleaching of *–ies* as an instance of morphological loss.

[169] However, not all informants shared these judgments.

[170] In section 3.3.8 I argue that [-speaker] demonstratives are more vulnerable to grammaticalization than [+speaker] demonstratives. Framed in the current discussion, we might say that [-speaker] demonstratives cover a space that, conceptually, lends themselves more readily to ambiguity than [+speaker] demonstratives. German *dieser* would then constitute a counterexample of this tendency.

(99) Modern Spoken German: weak *dieser*



Roberts and Roussou (2003) argue that a language learner will maintain a more complex structure *as long as* there is morphological evidence for it, but once the morphological cue is gone, he may opt for a simpler structure. We have already shown how the *–ies* morpheme in strong *dieser* provides a cue for the [+] value of the [speaker] feature, and that once the morphological evidence for the [+] value is gone, the language learner hypothesizes a neutral [speaker] feature, hence a weak *dieser*. But how does the weak demonstrative with a neutral [speaker] feature lead to a simpler structure (i.e. that of the definite article)? And why is it specifically the weak demonstrative (as opposed to the strong demonstrative) that gives rise to the definite article? I will suggest that a strong demonstrative provides a more robust cue for the SpeakerP projection than a weak demonstrative, due to the fact that its [speaker] feature has a [+/-] value. In the absence of the semantic distinction between [+speaker]/[-speaker], the

language learner is left with the pragmatic contribution of the neutral [speaker] feature, immediate accessibility, which, being pragmatic rather than semantic, may not provide the language learner with the same kind of robust evidence for a SpeakerP that a valued [speaker] feature does. This means that the weak demonstrative is inherently unstable and susceptible to further grammaticalization, i.e. to reanalysis as a definite article.

German *dieser* has only undergone the first step of grammaticalization, the semantic bleaching exemplified in (99) which shows the transition from strong to weak demonstrative. It has not made the transition from weak demonstrative to definite article. However, we can witness the process of reanalysis run all the way through with Latin *ille*:

(100) Classical Latin strong [-speaker] *ille*: *-il* encodes [-speaker]



(101) Late Latin weak (recognitional) *ille*:



(102) Late Latin definite article *ille:*



In Late Latin, the *–il* morpheme is reanalyzed from a [-speaker] morpheme in (100) to a [+identifiability] morpheme in (102). This reanalysis occurs via the intermediate structure in (101), the weak demonstrative (recognitional in Late Latin), in which the *–il* encodes a neutral [speaker] feature. In its recognitional use, Late Latin *ille* does not contrast with *iste*. This means

that the morphological contrast between *–st/-l* is neutralized in this pragmatic use, and the language learner will not longer interpret the *–il* in recognitional (weak) *ille* as lexicalizing the [-speaker] feature. As discussed above, the neutral [speaker] feature does not provide as robust a cue for SpeakerP as the [-speaker] feature of strong *ille*, hence the language learner may ultimately posit a structure for *ille* which lacks the SpeakerP projection altogether (and, consequently, also lacks the ContrastP, see fn 141). The IdentP we are left with is, then, is analogous to the Stage I definite article.

4.5.3 Internal reanalysis triggers external reanalysis

I propose that the internal reanalysis of the demonstrative triggers external reanalysis of the demonstrative as a definite article. In order to illustrate this point, let us recap my analysis of synchronic demonstrative syntax. I have argued that the demonstrative is merged in a dedicated position within the DP (which I call [Spec, TrackerAdjP]), where it realizes the features [(+/-) speaker] and [+contrastive]. There is a dependency between the demonstrative and the DP projection, which causes the demonstrative to raise to the DP projection in the absence of a definite article to check some feature on D. I argued that this dependency boils down to a [+identifiability] feature: the demonstrative has an interpretable [+identifaiblity] feature, while D has an *uninterpretable* [+identifiability] feature, adorned with an EPP feature, triggering movement in the absence of a definite article.

Turning to the diachronic picture, recall that Roberts and Roussou (2003) make the argument that language learners prefer simplicity, in the sense of preferring a one-to-one mapping of features and morphology, rather than having many features realized by the same lexical item in one position. Applied to definiteness, the simplest scenario would be one in

which the [+identifiability] feature is realized directly in the DP projection by an element expressing only that feature (a definite article), rather than as part of another element carrying other baggage, like [(+/-)speaker] and [+contrastiveness]). If a language learner loses evidence for the rich extended projection of the demonstrative (i.e. evidence for SpeakerP and ContrastP), as detailed above, the motivation is lost for merging that element in a dedicated projection, TrackerAdjP; in other words, the language learner has lost the cue for positing the more complex derivation of 'Merge plus Move' and will reanalyze the IdentP directly merged directly in the DP projection. See the example below, where the dotted line represents diachronic movement:

(103) **Diachronic reanalysis of the demonstrative**



Once 'DEM' has lost its SpeakerP and ConstrastP, it is reanalyzed as an element in [Spec, DP][171] and we have Greenberg's Stage I article, which expresses identifiability. As the definite article continues to grammaticalize, however, the [+identifiability] feature (and corresponding functional structure) is lost. This means that the referent of the definite article is no longer par force identifiable to the hearer, and we have Greenberg's (1978) Stage II 'indefinite specific' article. While Greenberg uses different terminology, his description of the Stage II article is in line with my analysis: he describes the Stage II 'indefinite specific' article as being a cross between the definite and indefinite article, meaning that it can be used to refer to an entity that is not identifiable to the hearer. With the loss of internal structure comes the loss of XP status; a Stage II definite article is reanalyzed as an X^0.[172] Once it is reanalyzed as a head, the article is ripe for becoming affixal; consequently we find that the majority of Stage II and Stage II articles are affixal (Dryer, 1992: 150).[173]

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[171] If the definite article retains internal structure (at least in its early stages), therefore, it cannot be analyzed as a X^0. Lyons (1999) shares this view: he argues that free-form definite articles are in [Spec, DP] while affixal articles are in D.

[172] This process is reminiscent of Giusti's (2001) proposal for Latin *ille*, which she claims is reanalyzed from its original position in [Spec, DP] to the D head. While Giusti's proposal deals with the progression from demonstrative to definite article, however, my analysis describes the progression of Stage I to Stage II articles.

[173] Lyons (1999) points out that the loss of [+identifiability] feature (i.e. the transition to a Stage II article) is not always accompanied by the creation of a new article, which is not what we would expect considering D's need to check an [+identifiability] feature. Lyons attributes this phenomenon to the fact that definiteness is "highly flexible in the semantic/pragmatic ground it covers" (339). Roehrs (2010), on the other hand, suggests that articles can appear in D for reasons other than checking a [+REF] feature (which corresponds to my identifiability); articles can make other features "visible," although he does not however expound upon what features those might be. This is a very interesting idea that requires further thought, but one might consider it in conjunction with the affixal nature of Stage II articles. Specifically, one might claim that, if the Stage II article is no longer able to check anything in D (i.e. *identifiaibility*), it must be attached to a lexical item that can check something in D: the categorial [N] feature of the noun would be a good candidate. I will leave this matter open to future research.

(104)



Putting it all together, the structure below shows the merge positions of strong/weak demonstratives, Greenberg's Stage I definite article and his Stage II article:

(105)



[174] Roberts and Roussou's (2003) claim that reanalysis is always upwards applies *between* phrases, not within a phrase (in other words, reanalysis from spec to head of the same phrase would not be considered downward movement).

4.6. Chapter Conclusion

In this chapter I have argued for a syntactic analysis of the demonstrative that takes into account this element's rich extended projection. First I discussed some leading syntactic analyses from the syntactic literature, and identified two main shortcomings: (i) the fact that the demonstrative's semantics are disjoint from its syntax and (ii) the fact that the relationship between the demonstrative and the DP projection is not made explicit. I proposed that these two shortcomings can be overcome by analyzing the demonstrative as a morphosyntactically complex element. The features I identified in chapter 3, [(+/-speaker], [+contrastive] and [+identifiability]), correspond to internal syntactic structure, SpeakerP, ContrastP and IdentP respectively—the demonstrative's extended projection. I presented two possibilities as to how the terminals of these projections can be envisioned, (i) as morphological material or (ii) as abstract features, and suggested that considering terminals as morphemes lends itself more easily to the account of grammaticalization put forth by Roberts and Roussou (2003), and developed in this chapter. I argued (following Roehrs 2010), that positing internal structure for the demonstrative allows us to account for the position of high demonstrative reinforcers in Germanic and their co-occurrence, while low reinforcers in Romance can be dealt with by positing a predicational analysis similar to that of Brugè's (1996).

Positing internal structure for the demonstrative also sheds light on the demonstrative's relationship with the DP projection: because the demonstrative has a [+identifiability] feature, it serves as a possible target for the D probe, when the definite article is not merged. Furthermore, the fact that the demonstrative encodes [+identifiability] provides an explanation for why we do not normally get a demonstrative and a definite article appearing together in the left periphery of the DP, and that when we do, there is an alternative explanation and crucially no expression of

'double definiteness.' At the same time, the demonstrative has more going on semantically and syntactically than just creating a link with the DP projection. Specifically, the position in which the demonstrative is merged is specialized to the demonstrative (TrackerAdjP) which encodes its unique constellation of semantic features.

My analysis predicts that it is distance-neutral (weak) demonstratives that will be reanalyzed as definite articles, and not distance-marked (strong) ones. In the transition from distance-marked to distance-neutral demonstratives, the morpheme encoding [+/-speaker] becomes dissociated with that meaning (it becomes semantically bleached). As a result, language learners lack a robust semantic cue for positing the more complex extended projection of the demonstrative, specifically the SpeakerP projection, and are likely to posit a simplified structure; that of the Stage I definite article. The definite article becomes a head when it loses its [+identifiability] feature, being reanalyzed as a Stage II article, in the sense of Greenberg (1978).

By decomposing the demonstrative into its various semantic and syntactic components I hope to have contributed not only to a better understanding of the demonstrative itself, but also, in some small way, to a clearer picture of the concept of definiteness and how it is expressed in the noun phrase. And while I am aware of introducing perhaps more questions than I have answered, I hope to have at least revealed the rich terrain that underlies the syntax of the demonstrative.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

This dissertation addresses three main questions that have not been adequately addressed in the literature:

(1) What is the precise semantic nature of the demonstrative?

(2) Do demonstratives constitute a semantically homogeneous class?

(3) How is a demonstrative's semantics correlated with its syntax?

In what follows, I will revisit and evaluate the answers I have given to these questions. Along the way I will address certain limitations of my analysis, which will point out avenues for future research. Finally, I suggest some potential extensions to my analysis outside the realm of demonstratives.

5.1 What is the precise semantic nature of the demonstrative?

The first two questions above are intertwined, in that we must first know what constitutes a demonstrative before we can begin to identify distinctions between them. By contrasting the semantic and pragmatic contribution of the demonstrative and that of the definite article, I identified two properties that are specific to the demonstrative, contrastiveness and immediate accessibility. I showed that the demonstrative is contrastive in that it involves the existence of a contrast set, and that when the demonstrative is unstressed, this contrast set is implicit. Definite articles, on the other hand, are unable to express contrast and in most cases (except with generics) presuppose the opposite: uniqueness. In addition, demonstratives trigger the presupposition that the referent is located in the immediate context—whether in the physical

surroundings or the discourse. Even though definite articles can have referents that are immediately accessible, they are not limited to immediately accessible referents (the referent of the definite article may also be identifiable through general knowledge). I argued that we can see the presupposition of immediate accessibility at work in recognitional demonstratives. Even though the recognitional demonstrative does not have a referent that is physically present in the immediate situation or discourse, it coerces an immediate accessibility reading of the referent. In other words, the use of a recognitional demonstrative signals to the hearer to interpret the referent as if it were in the immediate context, which includes himself and the speaker. The hearer, then, mobilizes specific, personal knowledge/experience he shares with the speaker to 'bring forth' the referent. I proposed that the interpretation of immediate accessibility is triggered by the presence of a [speaker] feature.

The [speaker] feature plays a central role in my discussion of the demonstrative's semantics, as it not only serves to distinguish demonstratives from definite articles, but also strong demonstratives from weak demonstratives. The presence of a neutral [speaker] feature is one of the properties that distinguishes weak demonstratives from definite article, while the presence of a [+/-] value on the [speaker] feature distinguishes strong demonstratives from weak ones: strong demonstratives are specified for [+speaker] or [-speaker], while weak demonstratives are not. This analysis captures the intuition that the concept of *immediate accessibility of the referent* is a semantically bleached version of distance-marking on the demonstrative. Specifically, once the information encoding the location of the referent with respect to the speaker (the [+/-] value) is gone, we are left with the information that the referent is merely locatable in the speaker's sphere, i.e. the immediate context (the situation or discourse), encoded by the [speaker] feature. This distinction is illustrated below in Table 5-1:

Table 5-1: The interpretive contribution of the [+/-] and neutral [speaker] feature

Strong	Weak
[+/-speaker]	[speaker]
Referent is located close to/distant from speaker	Referent is located in speaker's sphere (immediately accessible)

While the presence of a [+/-] value on the [speaker] feature serves to differentiate strong demonstratives from weak ones and the presence of [(+/-) speaker] and [+contrastive] distinguishes demonstratives from definite articles, the [+identifiability] feature unifies all three. The following is an outline of the semantic spectrum of the demonstrative/definite article continuum, as I have envisioned it:

Table 5-2: The semantic spectrum of the demonstrative/definite article continuum

Strong demonstrative	Weak demonstrative	Stage I article
[+/-speaker]	[speaker]	----
[+contrastive]	[+contrastive]	----
[+identifiability]	[+identifiability]	[+identifiability]

5.2 Are demonstratives a semantically homogeneous class?

In answer to the second question, whether demonstratives constitute a homogeneous class, I argue that there are exactly two kinds of demonstratives, strong and weak. What we found in our discussion of Latin and spoken Finnish is that the bridge between demonstratives and definite articles is not anaphoricity, as has sometimes been assumed (Diessel 1999, Harris 1978), but rather, distance-neutrality. An examination of the diachronic data suggest that the

recognitional demonstrative plays a key role in the transition from demonstrative to definite article in Latin and in spoken Finnish. As mentioned above, the recognitional demonstrative has special status as a demonstrative in that the demonstrative appears to maneuver the referent into the foreground, coercing the immediate accessibility reading. Another important aspect of the recognitional demonstrative, however, is that it does not provide information as to the location of the referent with respect to the speaker. In other words, it is weak. I take the recognitional demonstrative in Late Latin and in spoken Finnish, therefore, as evidence of an intermediate stage of grammaticalization of the demonstrative, where the demonstrative is unmarked for distance.

While the diachronic discussion of weak demonstratives centered around recognitional demonstratives, I hypothesized that we should also find weak demonstratives used situationally in Late Latin and spoken Finnish. We know that weak situational demonstratives exist synchronically (cf. French *ce*), so we would expect to find them diachronically as well. Confirming this prediction, however, proved difficult due to the nature of the corpora available. Situational demonstratives, which refer to an entity in the immediate physical situation, are most prevalent in spontaneous speech or dialogue, which historical documents generally lack. My quest to find evidence of weak demonstratives used situationally provided the impetus for investigating spoken Finnish. Because the grammaticalization of *se* in spoken Finnish (as presented by Laury 1997) is a rather recent phenomenon, we have access to more diverse corpora, including recorded speech and dialogue. However, contrary to expectations, as with the Late Latin corpus we did not find instances of weak situational demonstratives in Laury's study on spoken Finnish. I argue that we can attribute this gap in data once again to the nature of the corpora. First of all, the older corpus that Laury analyzes (from the late 1800s) consists of

recorded narratives, not spontaneous speech, and the examples Laury takes from this corpus do not contain many situational uses at all, let alone weak situational demonstratives. While Laury's conversational corpus has a higher likelihood of showing situational use demonstratives, the author's examples from this corpus feature mostly excerpts from stories told within a conversation. In other words, they are also from narratives, and as such, contain few instances of *se* in its situational use.

What Laury's corpus did show, however, was an abundance of recognitional use demonstratives, which appeared only in the newer corpora. These recognitional use demonstratives in spoken Finnish mirrored our findings in Late Latin, and provided further evidence of the weak demonstrative as an intermediate stage of grammaticalization. From our findings in Finnish, one might be tempted to conclude that it is a specialized use of the weak demonstrative, the recognitional use, that constitutes the intermediate stage of grammaticalization. This conclusion would not be at odds with my analysis, and we could accommodate the existence of weak situational demonstratives synchronically by appealing to a notion of the 'spreading' of the weak demonstrative, from a specialized use to a diffuse one. I have in fact suggested a parallel account for the 'definite article' uses in English and Italian, where the 'determinatives' *those*/*quelli* signal the incipience of a Stage I definite article that has not become 'diffuse.' However, I argue that such a conclusion for weak demonstratives would be premature at this point. In order to confirm or deny the presence of weak situational use demonstratives in spoken Finnish during the critical time period of grammaticalization of *se*, we would need to analyze a different type of corpus of spoken Finnish from the last century or so. In addition, we would need to do the same for other languages that have a recently

grammaticalized demonstrative (Piedmontese comes to mind). While this undertaking exceeds the scope of the present work, it represents an interesting avenue for future research.

Postulating an intermediate stage of grammaticalization of the demonstrative, the weak demonstrative, allows us to make sense of the chaotic picture of demonstratives presented in synchronic accounts of the demonstrative. We have seen that synchronically, demonstratives sometimes exhibit a 'split personality' in a given language, sometimes behaving like a strong demonstrative and other times like a weak demonstrative. I cited Spanish *ese* and German *dieser* as examples of demonstratives that are 'lexically split' (in the sense of Roberts and Roussou 2003), where one form corresponds to two lexical entries, dem_{strong} and dem_{weak}, with the former representing a grammaticalized version of the latter. In other words, when we see a strong and weak demonstrative in a given language, we are not looking at different 'readings' of the same demonstrative, but rather two different lexical items that correspond to two stages of grammaticalization.

Another way to look at the German and Spanish data, however, would be to adopt a dynamic approach to deixis along pragmatic lines, as we saw with Laury's (1997) proposal for spoken Finnish demonstratives. In this framework, the speaker's choice of demonstrative in essence 'creates' a relationship between referent and speaker/hearer rather than reflecting that relationship. For instance, Laury argues that, in spoken Finnish, the speaker uses *tuo* to situate the referent outside the speaker's current cognitive sphere, while he would use *se* to place the referent within the hearer's cognitive sphere. On this view, we could account for the apparently distance-neutral tokens of a demonstrative (like Spanish *ese* and German *dieser*) in the following way: In cases where the traditional distance-marking of certain demonstrative does not match the context (or else is irrelevant to it), we would say that the [+/-speaker] contrast is still

operative, albeit in a subjective sense that can only be identified by understanding the speaker's intentions.

While this view of spatial deixis may be sufficiently broad and flexible enough to capture the intractable tokens of a particular demonstrative, I argue that this flexibility comes at a cost, which is the loss of potentially valuable distinctions (specifically, between what I call 'strong and 'weak'). Specifically, the fact that certain languages exhibit strict spatial deixis (like English) while other languages allow 'dynamically' distance-marked demonstratives in the sense of Laury would force us to conclude that spatial deixis is expressed differently in different languages. We would have to say, for example, that it is not demonstratives themselves that differ between languages in terms of strength and weakness, but that the entire concept of spatial deixis is subject to parametric variation. While this hypothesis may not, in itself, be entirely unattractive, it does not seem to be empirically correct. Consider, for instance, the fact that it is only certain demonstratives within a language that are (in my terms) weak: for example, Spanish *este*, but not *aquel*. Within an analysis that sees the concept of spatial deixis to be subject to parametric variation, this strong/weak variation within languages would remain unexplained.

5.3 How is a demonstrative's meaning correlated with its syntax?

In my review of the syntactic literature, I showed that the commonly-held belief that a demonstrative contributes something more to the interpretation of the DP than a definite article is not adequately reflected in the syntax of the demonstrative. I suggested that we adopt a Cinque-esque view of the noun phrase, according to which demonstratives (like Cinque's adjectives), are merged in a dedicated functional projection, which I call TrackerAdjP. More importantly, however, I argued that the 'external' syntax of the demonstrative—its phrasal status, its merge

site, where and why it raises, and its synchronic and diachronic relationship with DP, can best be understood by appealing to its 'internal' syntax. In other words, the demonstrative is a morphosyntactically complex element, with a rich extended projection whose FPs correspond to its semantic features. The presence of an extended projection explains the phrasal behavior of the demonstrative (the fact that it shows 'blocking' effects with APs in Romanian but not with the head noun, for example); while the fact that it must raise to the DP projection in many languages is accounted for by the presence of an [+identifiability] feature that serves as a goal to the D probe.

While we might expect the semantic and pragmatic distinctions between the strong and weak demonstrative to have an overt syntactic reflex in terms of a positional difference, this is not ultimately what I found in the languages under consideration here. The pre-and post-nominal distinctions, for example, did not correspond to the strong/weak distinction, nor to any semantic distinction that could be expressed cross-linguistically. I provided some tentative evidence for an intermediate position in Spanish for weak demonstratives, but firmly establishing this position requires further research.

While identifying a clear syntactic difference between strong and weak demonstratives would bolster my arguments for the strong/weak distinction, my analysis is not dependent on the existence of such evidence. The hypothesis that strong and weak demonstratives are merged in the same base position is consistent with the idea that grammaticalization of the demonstrative first involves loss of a *value* for [speaker], not the loss of a feature altogether. The loss of a [+/-] value for [speaker] results in the semantic bleaching of the [+/-speaker] morpheme, making the erstwhile [+/-speaker] morpheme opaque. This opacity, while not itself resulting in a loss of structure, obscures the language learner's cue for positing a SpeakerP (and hence, ContrastP).

The semantics of the weak demonstrative, therefore, serves as a trigger for reanalysis of the demonstrative's internal structure (it becomes simply an IdentP), which I argue goes hand-in-hand with its reanalysis in the 'external' syntax, where the IdentP is merged in [Spec, DP]. Further loss of the [+identifiability] feature and of the IdentP it is encoded on results in a Stage II definite article, merged directly in D.

5.4 Limitations

While the research and analysis in this dissertation has been carefully prepared, I am aware of limitations and shortcomings. To begin with, the relatively wide scope of this project constrained its depth in some areas. Specifically, both the diachronic and synchronic aspects of this project could be further strengthened by the inclusion of additional empirical data, from Romance and Germanic as well as from language families not considered here. Diachronically, a corpus study on Germanic, for example, would complement the existing data offered here from Latin and spoken Finnish. Synchronically, an aim of future research would be to perform text analysis to gather additional data on weak demonstratives in Spanish and German.

5.5 Implications for future research

While my dissertation has expanded on existing analyses of the demonstrative as an internally complex element, drawing specifically from Leu (2007, 2008), Roehrs & Putnam (2004) and Roehrs (2010), it has approached the internal syntax of the demonstrative from a novel angle, that of diachrony. The diachronic picture has acted like a lens through which to view synchronic phenomena, leading me to the novel conclusion that there are two distinct semantic/syntactic types of demonstratives, strong and weak. I suggest that the strong/weak

distinction can be extended into other domains. I have argued elsewhere (Ferrazzano 2003), for example, that we can analyze the Italian pronominal/adverbial clitics *ci* and *vi* along the same lines, where pronominal *ci/vi* are strong in the sense of being distance-marked (expressing [+speaker] and [-speaker] respectively), and adverbial *ci/vi* are weak. Applying the ideas developed here to the data on *ci/vi*, we could say that weak adverbial *ci/vi* have undergone semantic bleaching, where the *–c/-v* phonemes no longer correspond to a [+/-speaker] distinction. The development of *ci* into an affixal expletive, *c'* as in *c'è un uomo in giardino* ('there's a man in the garden'), then, would represent a further step along the grammaticalization path, where semantic bleaching has led to structural loss. One can envision a similar diachronically-informed approach to the indefinite article. In fact, Heine & Kuteva (2006) and have mapped out the grammaticalization scale for indefinite articles in parallel fashion to Greenberg's (1978) scale for definite articles: Stage I is the numeral, Stage II is the presentative marker (*in a village there lived an old woman . . .*), Stage III is the specific indefinite maker (*I have an exam tomorrow at noon*), Stage IV is the nonspecific indefinite marker (*I feel like reading a book*), and Stage IV is the generalized article stage (Spanish *uno* in *unos hombres* 'some men.') These diachronic findings present us with a roadmap with which to formulate the 'internal' syntax of the indefinite article, in which each FP of its extended projection would encode the semantics of a particular 'stage.' Just as analyzing the demonstrative as a morphosyntactically complex element allows us to account for certain aspects of its behavior in the 'external' syntax, I predict a decompositional approach to the indefinite article, and determiners in general, has the potential to contribute greatly to our understanding of the behavior of these elements within and across languages.

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