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City University of New York PH.D. 1982

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THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST ELECTORAL BREAKTHROUGH:
OPPORTUNITIES AND LIMITS IN THE WEIMAR PARTY SYSTEM

A Regional Case Study of Franconia

by

MICHAELA WENNINGER-RICHTER

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial Fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, the City University of New York.

1982

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Abstract

THE NATIONAL SOCIALIST ELECTORAL BREAKTHROUGH:
OPPORTUNITIES AND LIMITS IN THE WEIMAR PARTY SYSTEM
A Regional Case Study of Franconia
by
Michaela Wenninger-Richter
Adviser: Professor Dankwart Rustow

The meteoric rise to power by the Nationalist Socialist German Workers' Party (NSDAP) is among the most significant electoral developments in twentieth century democracies. No other victory by election has produced more profound consequences directly attributable to the choice of a party by voters.

This study reappraises a number of empirical and theoretical treatments of National Socialism by social scientists. All five authors studied in this work combine general theories of political extremism with empirical investigations of the NSDAP's electoral support. Two of these analysts, Reinhard Bendix and S.M. Lipset, offer sociopsychological interpretations of Nazism. The remaining three, Walter Dean Burnham, W. Phillips Shively, and Theodore Meckstroth attempt to explain the NSDAP's growth by theories about the sources and conditions of electoral change and stability developed by American students of voting behavior.

Their respective contributions are here assessed through a detailed statistical analysis of the NSDAP's partisan support in one region, Franconia. This micro-approach takes into account those special local characteristics that facilitated or impeded the NSDAP's electoral expansion; it also utilizes regional sources showing how Weimar parties, including the NSDAP, functioned at the grass roots level and were perceived by voters.

This study makes extensive use of multiple ecological regressions. This technique provided estimates of continuity and defection rates for the supporters of a given party from one election to the next. Such regression estimates helped identify which voting groups supported the Nazis and which others resisted their appeal. Rather than concentrating on Nazi electoral surges after 1932, this study examines voting for all parties and blocs in Franconia during the Reichstag elections throughout the entire period between 1920 and 1933.

This study finds that party identification did not determine partisan behavior. Franconian voters showed no long-term attachments to individual parties. But they remained surprisingly stable in their commitments to larger party blocs. Even during the Depression, extensive voter movements rarely transcended the boundaries separating Catholic, socialist and Protestant bourgeois parties. Thus the NSDAP's growth was limited by long-existing class and confessional cleavages.

The NSDAP was largely unable to penetrate the Catholic and socialist electorates. Defections to the Nazis clearly came from within the Protestant bourgeois camp. Within this bloc, the supporters of the liberal parties showed the same disposition to vote Nazi as

those who backed parties of the right and special interest parties. Nor did formerly inactive voters contribute significantly to the NSDAP's electoral surges in 1930 and July 1932. Only in March 1933 election did previous nonvoters choose the Nazis in overwhelming proportions.

The NSDAP's electoral development demonstrates the importance of examining the over-all structure of conflict within which extremist movements emerge and have to compete when they become political parties. The NSDAP exploited the polarization of Weimar electoral politics. After 1928, recognizing its failure to attract Catholic and socialist voters, the NSDAP turned to mobilizing the supporters of Protestant bourgeois parties. The Nazis did so by creating an organization geared to winning elections. They worked out a program and style deliberately designed to appeal to this particular electorate. But the more the Nazis concentrated on Protestant bourgeois voters, the less they were able to build that broad electoral alliance needed to come into power with the support of a majority of German voters. Both the extent and limits of the NSDAP's growth, in other words, were determined by the Weimar party system.

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ABBREVIATIONS

BBMB	Bayrischer Bauern- und Mittelstandsbund	Bavarian Peasant and Middle Class League
BVP	Bayrische Volkspartei	Bavarian People's Party
CNBL	Christlich Nationale Bauern- und Landvolk Partei	Christian National Peasant and Rural People's Party
CSVD	Christlich Sozialer Volksdienst	Christian Social People's Service
DDP	Deutsche Demokratische Partei	German Democratic Party
DNVP	Deutsch Nationale Volkspartei	German National People's Party
DVFP	Deutsch-Voelkische Freiheits-Bewegung	German Patriotic Freedom Movement
KPD	Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands	German Communist Party
KVP	Konservative Volkspartei	Conservative People's Party
NSDAP	Nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei	National Socialist Workers' Party (Nazi Party)
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands	Social Democratic Party of Germany
USPD	Unabhaengige Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands	Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany
WP	Wirtschaftspartei	Business Party

INTRODUCTION

This study assesses the most prominent theories that seek to explain the sources of electoral support for National Socialism during the Weimar Republic. For the most part social scientists have dealt with voting on the national level. This study tests their conclusions against statistical evidence derived from one region, Franconia. By comparing and contrasting national to regional evidence, I hope to provide a more precise statement of those conditions successfully exploited by the National Socialists in expanding their vote to a point where they could take power. In this way, I may make some contribution to the comparative study of how extremist movements can become successful parties in modern democracies.

In this Introduction, I specify the substantive issues to which this study is addressed, and then outline the theories I shall evaluate. This is followed by an account of the strategies guiding my inquiry. Then I state what this study is meant to demonstrate both about those who voted for the National Socialists, and the conditions created by the Weimar party system that the NSDAP utilized on its way to achieving its relative success in partisan competition. The sections that follow provide my reasons for choosing Franconia as the subject of my regional analysis, as well as a brief survey of that region. The Introduction concludes with a discussion of the data and methods on which this study is based.

The meteoric rise to power by the National Socialist German Workers' Party (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, or NSDAP) is among the most significant electoral developments in twentieth century democracies. No other victory by election has produced more profound consequences directly attributable to the choice of a party by voters. Hence explanations, explicit or implicit, of the NSDAP's rise and triumph play a prominent part in general theories of voting behavior. This is particularly true of that literature dealing with electoral instability and its consequences in advanced democracies.

As a popular movement with an unparalleled capacity to convert rapidly substantial sectors of the German electorate to its cause, National Socialism continues to serve as the favorite example of theorists who wish to emphasize those potential dangers inherent in the electoral systems of modern mass democracies.[1] Others use the sudden and dramatic rise in popular support for this movement to warn about what may occur in the event of sudden and over-extensive electoral participation.[2] For still others the triumph of National Socialism buttresses claims about the adverse effects of rapid social and political change or about the pitfalls of imposing democratic institutions on social structures incapable of supporting them.[3] The success of the NSDAP during the world-wide Depression of the 1930s has also been invoked to support warnings about the political consequences of future economic crises in Western democracies.[4]

Unfortunately many such contentions about National Socialism rely upon theories for which the evidence is inconclusive, methodologically unsound, or out of date. This is particularly true about those explanations that make prominent use of data about voter behavior. Such a situation calls for continued and critical reanalyses of evidence and for consequent reformulations of the causes of National Socialism's rise and triumph in Weimar Germany. To contribute to such a reassessment is a major purpose of this study.

But there are additional justifications for a detailed inquiry into National Socialism's electoral growth and sources of support. In the first place, any comprehensive study of political instability and protest in modern democracies ought to give this movement a prominent place. Secondly, there is neither consensus about who or what brought the National Socialists to power, nor about the implications of their seizure of power for other democracies.

The National Socialists, after all, established one of history's more monstrous regimes in a highly advanced, democratic, and sophisticated nation. This raises the question of why so many of its citizens were attracted to an ideology so primitive, irrational, and antidemocratic as that of National Socialism. Furthermore, the NSDAP's dramatic and rapid electoral successes after 1928 amount to perhaps the most extraordinary instance of popular conversion to a political party in the electoral histories of Western democracies. Finally, because the size of the National Socialist vote contributed to the appointment of Adolf Hitler as Germany's Chancellor, National Socialism is among those few extremist movements to achieve power legally and

with broad popular support. Hence this movement's emergence and seisure of power is a crucial case for any analysis of the forces supporting or undermining a democracy.

Despite the extraordinary amount of materials now available on all facets of National Socialism, the principal issues raised by the NSDAP's electoral victories are still far from resolved. Thus historians as well as social and political scientists who have studied the National Socialist seizure of power continue to differ over such crucial questions as: Who were the NSDAP's principal supporters in the Weimar electorate? What was their social background or previous party affiliation? What attracted so many German voters to this movement? What were their motives for abandoning democratic parties in favor of this extremist party? Which conditions facilitated the NSDAP's rapid electoral advances after 1928? In the same period, which obstacles to its growth did it overcome?

That there are no uncontested answers to these questions is due in part to the data available. Since no public opinion polls exist for that period of German history, information about National Socialist voters and their motives must be inferred indirectly from election and census statistics. And these data present major problems when they are used to determine individuals' behavior or perceptions. Many earlier analyses of this movement provided conflicting and/or methodologically weak interpretations of the available election and census data. While this study cannot resolve these issues, it may contribute substantive knowledge about the National Socialists' electoral growth and sources of support.

In short, through a systematic reappraisal of existing interpretations of National Socialism's rise to power, this study hopes to make two important contributions: first, to help develop empirically sound, cross-national theories about the causes and sources of support for political extremism in advanced democracies; secondly to provide a better understanding of National Socialism or, more particularly, of its electoral base and of the conditions that after 1928 made its growth into a mass-supported party possible.

In trying to attain these objectives I have adopted three strategies. Each of these distinguish my own work from other investigations of this kind. First, I compare and contrast the evidence with the claims made by some of the most important empirical and theoretical accounts of National Socialism written by social scientists. Secondly, in assessing their respective contentions, this study relies less on secondary information about National Socialist voters than on evidence derived from an original analysis of voting data. Finally, I have attempted to reconstruct the "voting universe" that shaped voters' perceptions and decisions about the political alternatives open to them in the Weimar electoral system. This is done by exploring the NSDAP's growth in one region through the use of primary historical sources. In this way, it may be better understood how all the leading Weimar parties functioned at this local level. Let me briefly explain each of these strategies.

It has been almost fifty years since the National Socialists came to power. Since that time historians and social scientists alike have attempted to determine the sources of that popular support which

made the National Socialist seizure of power possible. On the whole, historians have made a far greater effort to find the answer to this question than have social scientists. The post-war generation of historians has been particularly imaginative and thorough in its investigations of the NSDAP's organization, tactics, growth and support at both the regional and national level. As yet, however, few such historical inquiries have attempted to make any use, in their analysis of Germany's electoral tendencies, of those theories about the causes of political instability and political extremism derived from the social sciences.

Such a union of social science theory and empirical investigation into National Socialism's electoral expansion is requisite for the development of comprehensive and comparative analyses of radical movements in advanced democracies. The authors on whose works this study focuses -- Reinhard Bendix, S.M. Lipset, Walter Dean Burnham, W. Phillips Shively, and Theodore Mackstroth[5] -- all seek to combine general explanations of political extremism with empirical investigation into National Socialism's electoral support. It was for this reason that I centered my own analysis on their work.

But other considerations also entered into this choice of authors. They provide some of the best known and most widely accepted treatments of National Socialism by social scientists. Indeed the analyses made by Bendix and Lipset have become virtually the standard explanations of the Nazi phenomenon.[6] Another reason for concentrating on these five analysts is that they not only utilize different approaches to study this movement, but also come to different con-

clusions about its supports and its implications.

Bendix and Lipset, for instance, present an essentially socio-psychological interpretation of National Socialism. Both authors, in other words, treat the massive voter shifts to the National Socialists as the outcome of strains experienced by persons located in those sectors of Weimar Germany's electorate that had hitherto played a peripheral role in the Weimar Republic's social and political life. The Depression, which hit Germany in 1929, exacerbated the frustrations and tensions experienced by these groups and hence provoked their members to support this extremist party. Bendix and Lipset both identify non-voters and middle class supporters of the liberal parties as the NSDAP's key sources of support. (They differ, however, as to which of these two groups made up the NSDAP's core constituency; they also disagree about which groups contributed most to the NSDAP's first electoral surge (in 1930) and which groups only "jumped on the bandwagon" during the second phase of its electoral expansion.)

The studies of Burnham, Shively and Meckstroth differ markedly from the socio-psychological modes of analyses just described. These three authors have tried to make sense of the complex and intricate voting patterns in the Weimar Republic before and during the NSDAP's growth by turning to theories about the sources and conditions of partisan change and stability developed by American students of voting behavior. Put briefly, these theories assert that voters who have developed strong emotional ties to a political party are more likely to be "immune" to the appeals of a party arising outside the existing party system than are voters who have not yet developed a sense of

psychological identification with one or the other competing party.[7] Weimar Germany's electoral instability and the NSDAP's sudden and dramatic electoral growth had previously been used in studies of voting behavior to prove the importance of party identification to democratic stability.

Although Burnham, Shively, and Meckstroth address themselves to the same body of theory, their examinations of Weimar voting reflect somewhat different concerns and interests. Burnham and Shively, for instance sought to demonstrate: 1) that the Weimar party system contained elements of stability as well as instability; 2) that electoral instability in Weimar Germany could not be accounted for by the lack of party identification among Weimar voters; 3) that support for the National Socialists had less to do with the length or regularity of people's voting experience than with whether or not they had previously supported one or the other Protestant bourgeois party.

Unlike Burnham and Shively, Meckstroth accepts both the notion of party identification and its relevance to voting behavior in non-American contexts. What interests him is to determine the conditions under which emotional attachments to a party can be destroyed, as well as the consequences for a given party system. He is particularly concerned with those fundamental reorientations in an electorate's partisan attitudes and choices which American voting theorists have called "realignment."

In his analysis of Weimar voting between 1928 and 1933, Meckstroth has sought to show two things: 1) that the post-1928 elections in Weimar Germany resulted in a realignment since the voting shifts

to the NSDAP in particular produced a long-term change in the competitive positions of Weimar parties; 2) that Weimar Germany's voting patterns after 1928 in general and voting shifts to the NSDAP in particular are more consistent with "crisis" explanations (or as he calls them "valence issue explanations") of realignment than they are with interpretations that see these developments as manifestations of class antagonisms and ideological polarization in Weimar electoral politics (which he refers to as "position issue explanations").

In their approach and conclusions, then, Burnham's, Shively's, and Meckstroth's analyses provide an important alternative to the treatments of National Socialism offered by Bendix and Lipset. Whereas these two authors explore the relationship between a person's position in Weimar Germany's social structure and the propensity to vote for the NSDAP, Burnham, Shively, and Meckstroth emphasize the importance of specifically political determinants in their interpretations of National Socialism. Above all, these three authors make it clear that no analysis of this movement can ignore the larger structure of party conflict within which it emerged and expanded. Consequently, they not only examine voting tendencies before the 1930-1933 elections but also compare and contrast the sources and patterns of support for all major Weimar parties. It must also be stressed that they bring to their analysis of Weimar voting behavior far more sophisticated and reliable statistical methods than do Lipset and Bendix.

So far, much of the empirical literature on the NSDAP has addressed itself to propositions drawn from Bendix's and Lipset's social-psychological interpretations. What has not been done and what

what this study seeks to do, is to compare and contrast the findings and conclusions of that body of theory with the insights offered by the newer, comparative theories of voting behavior such as those attempted by Burnham, Shively, and Meckstroth. Central to this study is the belief that testing propositions from both types of theories ultimately provides the best basis for assessing the conditions facilitating the NSDAP's emergence and growing electoral support.

To assess the contributions made by each of these authors to our understanding of National Socialism, I undertook a detailed analysis of the NSDAP's sources of partisan support. Furthermore, my inquiry into the voting history of National Socialist supporters before they shifted to this party covers all of the Reichstag elections in which this party competed rather than only those during which it experiences its greatest growth, i.e. the Reichstag elections of 1930-1933. In addition, I examined the patterns of support for all major parties that competed during the Weimar Republic's brief existence.

In choosing to make such an electoral analysis, I was guided by several considerations. In the first place, all the interpretations on which this study focuses derive their conclusions about National Socialism from an examination of voting data; Lipset, Bendix and Meckstroth concentrate essentially on the post-1928 elections, while Burnham's and Shively's analyses encompass the entire 1920-1933 electoral span. Consequently, their claims can best be assessed by turning to the same type of evidence they considered crucial to their case.

Secondly, in the absence of public opinion polls and survey data, election results remain the most valid guides to voter sentiments and preferences. Moreover, the NSDAP was more than a "movement." It was also a political party that after its unsuccessful attempt at revolution sought to achieve power through elections.

In this endeavor, the National Socialists met with varying degrees of success. They were able to displace some of their electoral rivals and to become Weimar Germany's largest party. But they never managed to overcome the resistance of Catholic and socialist voters and hence failed to emerge with a clear electoral majority. This suggests that the NSDAP was both aided and limited by the Weimar Republic's underlying structure of party conflict. For this reason it is important to broaden any inquiry into that party's electoral growth and sources of support to cover the electoral strength and weaknesses of all the Republic's major parties during the entire 1920-1933 electoral span.

Ideally, a study of this kind would consider data, not only from the eight Reichstag elections held between 1920 and 1933, but also from the Presidential elections, national referenda, the local and state elections conducted in this period. Unfortunately this could not be done. Inclusion of the Presidential elections and the national referenda would have entailed considerable reworking of the ICPSR (Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research) data file. In the case of local and state elections it would have meant creating a separate data file for computer analysis. It is for this reason that I have confined myself, like most other recent

empirical studies of National Socialism, to the Reichstag elections. For much the same reason, I have concentrated on patterns of voter support for the Weimar parties rather than on attempting as well, an analysis of the demographic characteristics of the NSDAP's constituency or that of the other parties. The ICPSR file contains census information but the categories it uses are far too broad to permit reliable statements about the social background of those supporting the various Weimar parties.

In analyzing the electoral performances of the Weimar parties in general and the NSDAP in particular, this study relies extensively on multiple ecological regressions. This technique, which Meckstroth has used with particular success, makes it possible to estimate continuity and defection rates for the supporters of a given party from one election to the next. This contributes to a far clearer picture of voter movements among the Weimar parties than can be achieved either through the conventional methods of analyzing voting data used by Bendix and Lipset, or by the type of regression analysis that both Shively and Burnham utilize. The advantages and problems of using ecological regressions for the purpose of estimating individual level behavior will be discussed in greater detail in Appendix A and in the concluding section of this Introduction.

This inquiry also employs more conventional modes of measuring electoral stability and instability. Chapter IV in particular introduces such measures in surveying aggregate support for the Weimar Republic's parties at the national and regional level. For the Reich figures I relied essentially on Burnham's and Shively's calculations.

To contrast national voting trends with those in Franconia, however, required separate calculations for measures of change and stability in that region. These figures or measures are my own, and are not available elsewhere.

The third strategy adopted for this study was to examine the various claims made by Bendix, Lipset, Burnham, Shively, and Meckstroth through an analysis of voting at the regional level. The region selected for this purpose was Franconia, located in the state of Bavaria. Such a micro-level approach is justifiable on several grounds.

Recently historians have found that regional case studies provide the best insights into those conditions that enabled the National Socialists to mobilize so many German voters and to impose their control so quickly and completely on that society once they were in power. For one thing, such an approach enables the observer to determine the influence that regional or even local characteristics may have exercised on the decisions of voters during the Republic's history. All too often macro-theories (and those examined in this study fall into this category) fail to take into account the extraordinary variety and differences that characterize the sub-units (regional or communal) of the society that is being analyzed. No doubt there were major national concerns and issues that produced roughly comparable effects in Weimar Germany's states, regions or local communities. But there were also some local configurations that either worked against national trends or else went in their direction only because of distinctive regional reasons. Regional analyses, in

short, make it possible to study global outcomes comparatively.

Another advantage of regional analyses is that important materials and data can be found at that level that are not always available or accessible for the nation as a whole. Information on grass-roots organization and activity for the major parties in Weimar Germany is especially scarce and uneven in quality. To the extent that this type of evidence exists at all, it is to be found at the local level. This too has encouraged historians to trace the growth of the NSDAP through regional or local analyses.

My investigation makes use of such primary historical materials. For many regions in Germany such information is not available. In Franconia, on the other hand, a surprising amount of relevant material has survived. In part, this is due to the extraordinary system of reporting and record-keeping mandated by the state of Bavaria, into which Franconia was incorporated in the 19th century. My study relies especially on bi-weekly reports that governors in charge of Upper, Central and Lower Franconia had to submit to the Munich government. I also make use of political reports of the Nuernberg-Fuerth police.

These sources reveal much about the state of public opinion during and between the Reichstag elections. They also offer more thorough accounts of local organizational and political efforts by major political parties and groups than can be found in other sources. Finally, these reports provide invaluable information about the NSDAP's tactics, activities and strategies at the grass roots level, and about public reactions to them. To use this type of data helps clarify the context in which Weimar voters reached their decisions.

These reports also come as close to identifying the major concerns of Weimar voters (at least in Franconia) as it is possible to do in the absence of public opinion reports. This type of evidence has generally been ignored by those who have formulated the theories to be tested in this study. Nor has it been used by analysts trying to verify the claims made by the authors whose work this study addresses.

Although regional studies have flourished in recent years, virtually no attempt has been made by historians and students of National Socialism from other fields to undertake systematic and rigorous analyses of voting behavior at the micro-level. Barring some rare exceptions, existing regional histories fail to introduce into their analyses of voting changes any of the more sophisticated statistical methods now available. Nor do they pay much attention to the activities, organization and patterns of support for parties other than the NSDAP. My own study, then, constitutes the first attempt to test in a regional setting those contending theories of voting behavior developed at the macro-level. It is also among the few studies of regional voting to apply the more advanced methods now available to students of electoral behavior to periods prior to survey and opinion data.

No one case study can be expected to resolve all controversies about National Socialism's electoral supporters and the conditions that promoted their sudden and massive conversion to this movement. On the whole, however, my work has convinced me that at least at the regional level, none of the social science theories outlined previously offer a satisfying account of who voted for the NSDAP and what

immediate or broader structural conditions facilitated voter movements to this party. On the basis of regional evidence, Bendix's and Lipset's interpretations are the least tenable. As I hope to demonstrate in later chapters, the NSDAP's electoral expansion cannot be explained as the outcome of a sudden and massive influx of previously uninvolved voters, as Bendix contends. Nor can National Socialism be understood as an "extremism of the center", i.e. as the radical alternative of middle class supporters of liberal parties, as Lipset claims.

Franconian voting data generally supported many of the specific contentions about the NSDAP's sources of support made by Burnham, Shively, and Meckstroth. These data, in other words, largely confirm that the NSDAP's growth after 1928 resulted primarily from massive defections to this party by voters who had previously supported one or the other bourgeois party; it made little difference whether that party had been liberal, conservative or a special interest group. As will be seen at a later stage, the Franconian evidence further shows that for the most part the National Socialists did not succeed in mobilizing Catholic and socialist voters. Like these three authors, I also found that, on the whole, nonvoters played a distinctly subsidiary role in that party's electoral expansion.

At the same time, I found their explanations of these findings both too general and imprecise to account for the differentiated electoral behavior of bourgeois, Catholic and socialist voters either before or during the 1930-1933 period. In other words, on the basis of my regional analysis I found that the issues of why the NSDAP's support

was largely confined to the bourgeois bloc and why it was only after 1928 that it succeeded in consolidating the bourgeois vote could not be settled by Burnham's distinction between confessional and nonconfessional parties, by Shively's notion of tendance voting, or by Meckstroth's "crisis" explanation.

There are, of course, no simple answers to the question of why the "Nazi contagion," to use Burnham's phrase, affected above all bourgeois voters. What this study will try to show, however, is that among the conditions crucial to an understanding of this development are the following: First, the National Socialists entered the political scene at a time when Germany's class and confessional cleavages had become firmly entrenched and when the political fronts reflecting these divisions had already been firmly drawn. Secondly, for a number of reasons bourgeois parties were inherently more vulnerable to the NSDAP's electoral assaults than were the Republic's Catholic and socialist parties. Third, once the NSDAP's leadership had recognized that the party's only chance of electoral success lay in mobilizing bourgeois followers, it created an organization and a political style that none of its competitors within the bourgeois camp could match.

The fact that the NSDAP had to compete in a context where most voters had already been mobilized meant that it could not count on the existence of a large reservoir of potential voters that were not as yet "bound" to any political party. In order to acquire a voting base strong enough for them to seize power legally, therefore, the National Socialists faced two difficulties. First, they had to "detach" voters

from their previous partisan affiliation. Second, they had to attract them to a party "with an ideological hope to integrate the whole nation, overcoming the cleavages created in modern society and expressed through modern parties....."[8] In Weimar Germany this proved to be a hopeless task.

For the National Socialists, efforts to undermine the partisan commitments of Catholic and socialist voters proved especially difficult. In response to earlier attempts to destroy or isolate them (through Bismarck's anti-Catholic and anti-socialist legislation), the parties representing these electorates had developed highly effective modes of integrating their followers. How well these worked can be gauged from the extraordinary stability of the Catholic and left vote throughout the Weimar Republic's turbulent history.

By 1928, the National Socialists had begun to see the futility of trying to appeal to all strata. Despite extensive organizational and propaganda drives among workers in the early and mid-1920s, it had obviously failed to weaken their commitment to the parties of the left. Nor had they been successful in breaking down the religious barrier. Consequently, in the wake of its poor electoral performance in the 1928 Reichstag election, the NSDAP's leadership decided to change the party's strategy. In that and earlier Reichstag elections the National Socialists had done comparatively well in attracting support from Protestant bourgeois voters. Although the NSDAP never altogether gave up its effort to appeal to all strata of German society, after 1928 it concentrated on the constituencies of the Republic's non-socialist, Protestant parties. Once this decision had been made,

it adapted its program, organization and electoral tactics to that end.

The NSDAP's new choice of target, then, was essentially dictated by the exigencies of Weimar Germany's party system. But the National Socialists had, of course, no guarantee that their new strategy would work any better than their previous one. That it succeeded so well, therefore, suggests that certain conditions within the bourgeois camp made it comparatively easy for the National Socialists to convert this sector of Weimar Germany's electorate.

Among the most important of these conditions, which will be treated at greater length in later chapters were: 1) the pronounced fragmentation within the bourgeois bloc; 2) the lack of ongoing grass roots organizations by bourgeois parties; 3) the decomposition of bourgeois parties after 1928; 4) the absence of strong psychological barriers between the bourgeois parties and the NSDAP; 5) the absence of a viable political center; 6) the NSDAP's adoption of a program and themes previously used by bourgeois parties.

These conditions were all necessary to the NSDAP's success in consolidating the Protestant bourgeois vote. But they cannot by themselves account for either that development or for the rapidity with which the National Socialists after 1928 displaced their rivals within the Protestant bourgeois camp. One explanation commonly given for the sudden attractiveness of the National Socialists to this electorate is the economic impact of the Depression of 1929. But while economic hardship may have prompted Protestant bourgeois voters to change parties, it did not make the NSDAP an inevitable choice. Any number of

parties within this camp represented political ideas and economic positions almost indistinguishable from those held by the National Socialists.

What, in my view, led so many Protestant bourgeois voters to this party from 1930 on was that the NSDAP managed to transform itself into a highly visible and effective political organization. Once it had decided to concentrate on this electorate, the NSDAP completely revamped its organization. These organizational changes were accompanied by the adoption of new tactics and campaign strategies, many of which the National Socialists copied from the Catholic and left parties. The effectiveness of the NSDAP's reorganization and methods at the local level will be treated more extensively in chapter VII.

It should be stressed, however, that the NSDAP's reorientation did not mean that it became converted to the cause of Protestantism or of Germany's bourgeoisie. Nor did its reorganization signify that it had reconciled itself to the democratic process. Rather the NSDAP's strategy was to manipulate non-Catholic, non-socialist voters into backing it by advocating programs of interest to this electorate. Similarly, the goal of developing a powerful party and electoral organization was to enable the Nazis to "win the election to end all elections." In short, the NSDAP adopted the trappings of a "normal" party while remaining committed to its antidemocratic, radical vision.

To a considerable extent, this study pursues points raised by Juan Linz in his summary of this literature in an important reader on fascism.[9] There he argues that to understand fascist movements,

it is important to note that they were political "latecomers" which "arrived at a time when, in most countries, the party system had already crystallized."[10] When fascist movements appeared, therefore, "different sectors of society had identified with particular political options and with the organizations of different parties, trade unions and associated interest groups that had penetrated the social structure."[11]

In Linz's view, this meant that fascist movements "irrespective of the intentions of their leadership, the ideological and programmatic appeals, and their ambition to represent particular social strata, their success was largely preempted."[12] Consequently, he argues, as "latecomers" their ability to acquire a mass base ultimately depended on the particular configuration of social and politics conflicts that had appeared in each country.[12] Linz's remarks were meant to stimulate comparative analyses of fascism that focused less on the common features these movements shared than on "unique historical constellation of forces in each country at the time of the founding of the party and in the course of its struggle for support and power."[13] My study is meant to demonstrate the utility of this approach.

To summarize, the analysis undertaken in this study is longitudinal, regional in scope and based on aggregate voting data (i.e. on voting results grouped by geographic units) as well as primary materials. This inquiry seeks to assess the two sets of theories described earlier. Its immediate purpose is to determine just how sound the evidence is for those interpretations of National Socialism on which this study focuses. This is, of course, a step requisite to

assessing the broader theoretical conclusions their authors have drawn from this case about the conditions favoring political extremism. But I also seek to identify issues and evidence not considered by the theorists on whom this study focuses. This I do within the framework of a regional case study. I have chosen Franconia because it provides a suitable setting for testing the theories described earlier. A brief survey of this region will help explain my decision.

II

The region of Franconia, located in Northern Bavaria, comprised one of Weimar Germany's 35 election districts (_Wahlkreise_). It was divided into three areas: Central, Upper, and Lower Franconia; these made up three of Bavaria's eight administrative subdivisions (_Regierungsbezirke_). Each was headed by a district governor (_Minister-president_) who was appointed by and responsible to the Bavarian government in Munich. For the purpose of this study the election district of Franconia will be treated as a unit. It should, however, be stressed that Central, Upper and Lower Franconia had their own distinctive characteristics. Yet it can be argued that they differed from one another less than they did from the regions that comprised Southern Bavaria.

Franconia became a part of Bavaria only after 1806; it was part of a number of territorial concessions Bavaria received through its alliance with Napoleon. (The other territories were Eastern Swabia and the Palatinate.) Franconia differed from the older parts of Bavaria (which consisted of the regions of Lower and Upper Bavaria and the Upper Palatinate) in a number of ways. First, the population

of Central and Upper Franconia was overwhelmingly Protestant, while "Old Bavaria" was predominantly Catholic. Only Lower Franconia had a largely Catholic population but even here most cities and rural counties had sizeable Protestant minorities. Franconia also was more industralized than were the Catholic regions of Old or Southern Bavaria.

Franconia differed from these regions also in its political make-up. In Franconia the Catholic Center Party (and in the Weimar Republic its Bavarian counterpart, the Bavarian People's Party) never played the dominant role it did in Southern Bavaria. Rather it had to share the electoral stage with several major rivals. The most powerful of these was the Social Democratic Party which within Bavaria always did best in Franconia. The Center Party or the Bavarian People's Party found their position in that region challenged also first by the liberal parties and then, after 1890, by conservative and other Protestant middle class parties. From 1928 on, not only the Bavarian People's Party but also the Social Democrats and the Protestant bourgeois parties came under increasing pressure from the National Socialists. During the 1930-1933 elections, the NSDAP became the dominant party in Franconia.[14]

During the Weimar Republic's brief existence, the Catholic, socialist, and Protestant bourgeois parties were far more evenly balanced in Franconia than in the rest of Bavaria. Indeed, both in its economic and social structure as well as in its electoral politics, Franconia generally resembled the Reich more than the state of Bavaria where it was situated. Franconians, especially in the Protestant regions,

often were antagonistic toward the Bavarian government. Broad sectors of Protestant Franconia felt that the Catholic-dominated government favored the Catholic regions in awarding public works contracts and civil service jobs. For historical reasons as well, Franconians resented the continuing particularist stance of the Bavarian government. Pressures for German unification had been particularly strong in Franconia. Later this region became a stronghold of nationalist groups both in Imperial Germany and in the Weimar Republic.[15]

The choice of Franconia as the region for my voting analysis was determined by a number of considerations. First and foremost was the fact that the NSDAP did particularly well in this area. From the beginning, Franconia was a National Socialist stronghold. Indeed from May 1924 on, the NSDAP's vote there consistently exceeded its Bavarian and Reich levels. In the Reichstag election of May 1928, Franconia gave this party its highest vote in the country. During the 1930-1933 elections, Franconia remained among the few election districts in Southern Germany where the National Socialist support still reached levels above the national average.

What makes this region of particular interest, however, is that despite the early and persisting strength shown by the NSDAP in Franconia, it never succeeded in acquiring an electoral majority. (Only Central Franconia gave the NSDAP a slight majority but not before the 1933 Reichstag election.) From the first Reichstag election in which they competed to the last, the National Socialists found their advance impeded by stability of the Catholic and left blocs. In this pattern Franconia strongly resembled the Reich as a whole.

In other aspects of its electoral development, Franconia also paralleled the Reich. The dramatic rise and decline of the liberal-left coalition between 1919 and 1921; the emergence of the conservative German National People's Party as the dominant force within the Protestant bourgeois camp in the mid-1920s; the rise of interest parties in that period and, finally, the displacement of the conservatives first by a radical agrarian party and then by the National Socialists--all these were trends analogous to those which emerged in Weimar Germany as a whole.

Because of the NSDAP's electoral strength in Franconia on the one hand and the obstacles to its growth resulting from stable Catholic and socialist electorates on the other, Franconia is an ideal area for examining more closely the conditions that facilitated and impeded that party's advance. Furthermore, in view of the fact that Franconia's voting trends ran parallel to those in the Reich it is possible to test theories developed at the macro- (or national) level in this region.[16]

In other words, for the purpose of testing macro-theories at the micro-level, it helps to work with an area whose structure of partisan conflict (and whose economic and social make-up) is not unlike that of the country as a whole. In this way, it is possible to limit distortions that might arise in the process of testing theories based on national data in areas quite unique in their economic, social and electoral characteristics.

No valid inferences can be drawn about how voters behaved nationally or in other geographic areas on the basis of a sample as small and selective as that made up by Franconia's rural and urban counties.[17] On the other hand, insofar as Franconia resembles other regions where the National Socialists did well, it is at least possible to hypothesize that what happened in Franconia is representative of electoral developments elsewhere. In fact, one reason for focusing on Franconia that it was in many ways so similar to such areas as Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony in Northern Germany.

Franconia resembled these states both in its confessional make-up and in its social and economic structure. In other words, like them it had a large Protestant population; a substantial proportion of its inhabitants were engaged in agriculture; it had a heavy concentration of artisans and craftsmen. Like Schleswig-Holstein and Lower Saxony, Franconia had almost no heavy industry; its industrial activity centered on manufacturing electrical equipment, consumer goods, food and chemical products. Agricultural and industrial enterprises tended to be small and family-owned.

Franconia was also comparable to these states in its electoral development. Until the 1880s all these areas had been liberal strongholds; thereafter they took on a distinctly conservative complexion, especially in Protestant rural communities and small towns. During the 1920s, both conservative and liberal parties were challenged by special interest parties and especially so by radical agrarian movements. Most importantly, in Franconia as well as in Lower Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein, the NSDAP's electoral growth came earlier and was

more impressive than elsewhere in Germany.[18] In view of these resemblances, it is quite probable that the voter movements from which the NSDAP benefited so heavily in Franconia took place as well in these two states. Whether Franconian voting patterns are indeed representative of those in other regions, however, can only be decided by undertaking an analysis of their voting data along the lines done for this study.

Data and Procedure

The units of analysis in this study were the rural and urban counties (*Land-* and *Stadtkreise*) of the three electoral districts into which Franconia was divided. For each county the following information was recorded for each of the eight Reichstag elections: total population based on the most recent population census; the number of eligible voters; the number and percent of the valid votes cast for each party. The data source was the Inter-University Consortium on Political and Social Research file on *German Weimar Republic Data*: 1920-1933.

The data in the Consortium file also does not take into account numerous changes in the boundaries of the rural and urban counties in the Weimar Republic. Throughout the 1920s and especially after 1929, there were many administrative reforms designed to simplify local government and to distribute financial benefits and burdens more equitably. These significantly changed the size and borders of many rural and urban counties, including those in Franconia. Lest changes in partisan support due to the redrawing of county boundaries be

mistaken for shifts in voting preferences, it was necessary to determine which counties changed and how these boundary lines were redrawn. Using information from a dissertation by Loren K. Waldman, the Statistik des Deutschen Reiches,[19] and the Zeitschrift des Bayrischen Statistischen Landesamts, it was possible to establish which counties were merged or which changed their boundaries due to the addition or loss of areas and population from adjoining counties. On the basis of this information, it was then possible to create special aggregated units and to record population and election data for these units. The process of aggregation somewhat reduced the number of counties (from 82 to 71) but it ensured that the units of analysis were the same for all Reichstag elections. Given the often considerable differences in the population size of the Franconian rural and urban counties, these units were weighted, using the formula in the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences Manual.

The Consortium's file has no separate entry for nonvoters. This category had to be created for each Reichstag election by a program whereby the computer subtracted for each ecological unit the sum of the votes received by all parties and the invalid ballots from the total eligible electorate. Strictly speaking, the category of non-voters thus computed includes both previously eligible voters who failed to exercise their vote and newly eligible voters. To separate the newly eligible from nonvoters, however, would have meant recording for each county the proportion of the total population who died between two Reichstag elections and the total proportion who came of age in the same time. To gather such information at the county-level, however

proved to be too time-consuming and laborious a task, especially since such information is not always available at that level. I have therefore followed the practice of existing empirical studies of Weimar voting and combined these two groups into a single category of nonparticipants.

This is actually consistent with the interpretations of political extremism by Bendix, Lipset and those party identification theorists analyzed in Chapter II. These schools concur in judging new voters and those who have never exercised their right to vote as equally prone to support extremist parties. Lacking experience with the democratic process, these groups are allegedly unable to develop that commitment to established parties which would make them immune to extremist appeals. At any rate, it should be stressed that later references to abstainers and nonvoters include both groups.

In analyzing voting changes and continuities in Franconia, only Reichstag elections were considered. The reason for this was outlined earlier in the introduction. Between 1920 and 1933 a total number of eight Reichstag elections were conducted.

All data were first punched and verified on standard (80 column) IBM cards and then transferred to magnetic tapes. Each entry was carefully checked against the election figures published in the Zeitschrift des Bayrischen Statistischen Landesamts and the Jahrbuch der Deutschen Statistik.[20] Through this process and several computer programs devised to find errors in the recording, coding and punching of data, several important errors in the Consortium data file were discovered and corrected. All analyses were performed on the

BURROUGHS 87800 computer at the Computer Center of the Bundeswehr Hochschule in Munich.

III

Those who analyze contemporary voting behavior enjoy one advantage denied to students of past elections, and that is their ability to approach voters directly. The development of survey techniques has made it possible to acquire information from the voters themselves about their partisan backgrounds, their current party preferences, those issues that concern them, their awareness and understanding of the salient problems of the day, and their perceptions of positions taken by competing parties. In most Western democracies, however, information coming directly from voters has become available only since the 1940s, when sample surveys were first introduced. Data of this type does not exist for elections held prior to the advent and widespread adoption of this revolutionary technique.

But many of the seminal electoral experiences and developments in Western democracies--such as the formation or transformation of partisan alignments--occurred before voter surveys had been invented. For the study of voting in the pre-survey past, therefore, investigators must rely primarily on officially accumulated and published data, such as election and census statistics. These data, however, are available only in aggregated form, i.e. they exist only for geographically defined population units--wards, counties, states, census tracts, villages, neighborhoods, etc. From this aggregated information investigators must then determine _indirectly_ both the decisions made by individual voters and groups of voters and the social, economic or

political characteristics or considerations that shaped people's voting preferences at various crucial points in a country's electoral history. In other words, those working on electoral trends and developments that took place before it was possible to interview voters directly must "disaggregate" information about individuals from materials collected and recorded for larger, geographically defined entities.

But this task, as W.S. Robinson has demonstrated,[21] involves special problems and pitfalls that students working with sample surveys do not have to confront. Indeed, until quite recently the difficulties of inferring individual behavior or motives from aggregated information were either unknown to or ignored by political and electoral historians. The problems entailed by "ecological inference" and a discussion of currently available remedies for them can be found in Appendix A.

Ecological regression is generally considered to be among the best methods available to analysts forced to "disaggregate" information about individuals from ecological units. This method was first explored by Leo Goodman in two articles published in 1953 and 1959 respectively.[22] Goodman's discovery soon stimulated additional discussions of and contributions to this method so that the literature on ecological regression is by now extensive.[23] So far, however, applications of this method to concrete data have lagged far behind methodological discussions. Ecological regression is by no means free of problems. Nevertheless, social scientists generally consider it "the most practical, powerful and flexible" means of arriving at

unbiased estimates of individual behavior on the basis of aggregated information.[24] As I have indicated previously, this study relies on ecological regressions in analyzing Franconian voting data.

The advantages of ecological regression are numerous. It helps to reduce or to control bias resulting from contextual influences. Regression analysis also generates numerical predictions of behavior that can be checked against actual outcomes. And this technique provides numerical estimates of individual-level behavior in the form of conditional probabilities--i.e. the probability that individuals falling into a particular category of an independent variable will also fall into a particular category of the dependent variable. In other words, ecological regression can provide specific numerical estimates of internal cell proportions on the basis of subunit marginals. Finally, ecological regression can easily be adapted to cases involving variables with more than two categories. When regression methods yield biased estimates, several devices can be used to reduce or correct such bias. Regression models also have the advantage of revealing the direction and approximate magnitude of any bias.

As the following example illustrates, the procedure for arriving at transitional (or conditional) probability estimates are relatively simple and straightforward. Their results can be interpreted more easily than correlation coefficients. For the sake of simplicity, the example makes use of only two dichotomous variables, "vote in election 1" and "vote in election 2" for two parties, Party A and Party B. For each subunit of the total aggregation that is analyzed (e.g. for each county of a state or region), the investigator has the following

information: the proportion of voters who supported Party A in election 1; the proportion of voters who supported Party B in election 1; the proportion of voters who supported Party A in election 2; the proportion of voters who supported Party B in election 2. The problem is to discover on the basis of this aggregated information which party election 1 voters supported in election 2.

This problem can best be illustrated in the form of a matrix:

Election 1	Election 2		
	Party A	Party B	
Party A	P	Q	X_1
Party B	R	S	X_2
	Y_1	Y_2	

In this matrix, the known data are the percent of the vote received by Party A and by Party B in every county in the first and second election. Thus, what is known are the marginal totals X_1, X_2, Y_1, Y_2 where

X_1 = percent of the vote received by Party A in election 1

X_2 = percent of the vote received by Party B in election 1

Y_1 = percent of the vote received by Party A in election 2

Y_2 = percent of the vote received by Party B in election 2

The unknown or missing information are the cell entries P,Q,R and S which are proportions of first-election supporters of Party A or B

who either stay in their category or switch categories in the second election. Thus

P = percent of election 1 Party A voters who vote for Party A in election 2.

Q = percent of election 1 Party A voters who vote for Party B in election 2.

R = percent of election 1 Party B voters who vote for Party A in election 2.

S = percent of election 1 Party B voters who vote for Party B in election 2.

These cell entries represent individual behavior in the form of conditional or transition probabilities. Thus, the estimate P represents the probability of an individual voting for Party A in election 2 conditional upon having voted for Party A in election 1, and so forth. Assuming that the relationship between the cell entries and marginal totals are the same in all units, it is possible to solve for the values of P,Q,R, and S by the following regression equation: $Y_1 = P \times X_1 + R \times X_2$ or $Y_1 = PX_1 + RX_2$.

Given that $Y_1 = PX_1 + RX_2$, it follows that

$Y_1 = PX_1 + R(1-X_1)$ since $X_1 + X_2 = 1.0$. This can be rewritten as

$Y_1 = PX_1 + R - RX_1$ or as

$Y_1 = R + (P-R)X_1$

The final equation is equivalent to that for the linear regression of Y_1 on X_1, namely $Y_1 = a_{yx} + b_{yx}$. By regressing all subunit scores for Y_1 (which is the dependent variable or the variable to be explained and represents the percent of Party A's vote in election 2)

it is possible to solve for a_{yx} and for b_{yx}. In a regression equation, a_{yx} stands for the intercept and the regression coefficient b_{yx} for the slope.

Once the intercept and the slope for the relationship between the percentage of Party A's vote in election 1 and in election 2 have been calculated, it is easy to determine the values for cell entries P, R, S, Q. The cell entry R is the same as the intercept a_{yx}. The estimate of P is derived by adding the slope to the intercept. Given the fact that the internal cell entries must sum to 1.0 across each row, one can derive S by the subtraction of 1.0 - R and Q by the subtraction of 1.0 - P.[23] (Please consult Appendix A for further details.)

One advantage of ecological regressions is that the simple dichotomous model can easily be extended to variables with any number of categories. When variables with more than two categories are used, each regression equation includes the intercept and a number of regression slopes equal to the categories in the variable, minus one. For example, in analyzing voting changes from one election to the next in the Weimar Republic, voters generally confronted at least seven or eight categories of partisan choice, plus nonvoting. For seven categories, e.g., the regression equation looks like this:

$$Y_1 = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3 + b_4X_4 + b_5X_5 + b_6X_6$$

The number of equations needed to obtain all internal cell entries is equal to the number of categories in the variable minus one. The remaining estimates can be obtained directly by substracting from one.

When this regression is performed, one cell proportion produced by it is the intercept. The other cell proportions are obtained by adding the value of the intercept to that of each regression coefficient, which in this case would be six coefficients or slopes.[24] (The procedures for multiple regression equations and for the calculation and interpretation of the internal cell proportions will be discussed shortly.)

Regression analysis of aggregate data, however, produces unbiased estimates only under the following conditions: 1) that the relationship between subunit marginals X and Y is in fact a linear one; 2) that the row proportions do not vary systematically with the row marginals; 3) most importantly, that the values of the row proportions P and R (from which the estimates S and Q are derived) are constant for all units. That constant row proportions may be a condition that is exceedingly difficult to meet has been recognized by many analysts.

Voting probabilities, for example, are most likely conditional upon other variables in addition to the previous vote cast by an individual. Hence, additional methods must be introduced to avoid biased probability estimates. In a widely cited article, W. Phillips Shively has developed such a method for producing reliable and valid probability estimates even when internal cell proportions are not constant or vary systematically with marginal totals.[25] Because Shively's method is by far the most successful attempt to reduce aggregation or grouping bias in regression analysis, I have employed it in this study of voting changes in Franconia during Weimar.

His procedure is based on his insight that investigators can group variables either in terms of their scores on Y, or else in terms of their scores on X. This means that one can perform two regressions, namely that of Y on X or the reverse, that of X on Y. In this way, two estimates are obtained: from the regression of Y on X one gets the estimate P (which is the proportion of X's that are Y's) where $P = a_{yx} + b_{yx}$; from the regression of X on Y, the estimate P' (i.e. the proportion of Y's that are X's) is obtained where $P' = a_{xy} + b_{xy}$. According to Shively, the estimate P' can be used to arrive at the estimate of interest, namely P by multiplying the value of P' with the total number of Y_1 individuals in the population (as e.g. 2nd election supporters of Party A)and dividing that figure by the total number of X_1 individuals (i.e. 1st election supporters of Party A) in the population:[26]

$$P = \frac{P' \times \text{total number of } Y_1 \text{ individuals in the population}}{\text{Total number of } X_1 \text{ individuals in the population}}$$

Having two estimates to choose from (P and P'), the problem then becomes to select that which is less biased. For reasons discussed in Appendix A, Shively suggests that if both b_{yx} and b_{xy} are positive, the more biased of these two coefficients will be a more positive version of the corresponding individual-level coefficient and hence yield a higher estimate of P. Consequently, "in order to pick the one which involves less bias, we choose the lower of the two." Using the same logic, "if b_{yx} and b_{xy} are negative .... we pick the higher estimate of P."[27] (Shively also suggests that if the difference between both estimates of P is small, it may be better to take the average of the two estimates rather than to select the

one which presumably is less biased.)[28] Finally, according to Shively, by picking the lower estimate if the slopes b_{yx} and b_{xy} are positive and the higher estimate if these two slopes are negative, it is possible to estimate the upper or lower limit for the true value of P. In other words, Shively claims, his strategy not only reduces bias, but also specifies the direction of whatever bias remains, since "we know that the true value of P assuredly does not lie above our estimate..."[29]

Prior to Shively's discovery, analysts only used Goodman's original regression model or an extended form of it. Quite frequently, it was applied successfully to studies of voting changes.[30] Nevertheless, Shively, and even more so, Meckstroth, demonstrated the importance and value of developing estimates from both forward and backward models. For this reason, this study has followed Meckstroth's footsteps in analyzing Weimar voting by using estimates derived from both regression models. (Meckstroth refers to the regression of X on Y as the row model since the internal cell entries it yields must sum to 1.0 across each row of the matrix. He calls the reverse or backward regression of Y on X the column model since all internal cell entries produced by it must sum to 1.0 down each column of a given matrix.)[31]

In the construction of the regression equations for both models, as well as in the computation and interpretation of regression coefficients (estimates), this study essentially adhered to procedures indicated by Meckstroth, Shively, and the SPSS manual. None of these sources, however, were precise in their directions; this made the task

of figuring out the various steps involved an extremely laborious one. Fortunately I had the privilege of joining forces with Professor Jürgen Falter and his assistants at the Bundeswehr Hochschule in Munich who are engaged in the most comprehensive study of Weimar voting yet undertaken. With their help and collaboration it was possible to prepare the data for analysis and to work out the technical details in the construction and interpretation of the regression models used to analyze the data. (Needless to say, they are in no way responsible for any errors I may have committed in the course of constructing the regression models or of interpreting the data.)

As indicated previously, this study makes use of both row and column regression models. Each row and column equation contained a separate coefficient for each partisan alternative open to the electorate from one election to the next minus one. The alternative omitted was that corresponding to the intercept. Nonvoting was treated as one of the alternatives to voters. The number of equations of both the row and column type for each election pair was equal to the number of partisan alternatives less one. In other words, if there were nine partisan alternatives, there would be eight regression equations; the estimates for the remaining cell entries were obtained by subtracting the sum of all previous entries from 1.0. For each equation, in turn, there would be eight categories. In each equation, the cateogry omitted was a party's preceding vote in the row model and its subsequent vote in the column model, each of which represented the intercept. Thus, if the dependent variable was the NSDAP's vote in 1930, then the category omitted was the NSDAP's 1928 vote. If

the dependent variable was the NSDAP's 1928 vote (column model), the category left out of the equation was the NSDAP's 1930 vote.

In the row equations, the dependent variable was a party's proportion of the vote in the second election of each election pair. The independent variables were that party's vote in the first election plus the proportion of the votes received by all other parties competing in these elections plus the proportion of abstainers. In the column model the position of the dependent and independent variables were reversed. Votes for the smaller parties were combined into a single category of "Other" parties.

Each row equation yielded one estimate directly, namely the intercept or constant. The intercept represented a voter's continuity estimate or, more accurately, the probability of voting for a given party conditional upon having supported it in the preceding election. Each row equation also yielded a number of regression coefficients. If there were nine partisan alternatives, there would be eight coefficients. By adding the intercept to each of these coefficients, it was possible to establish turnover rates or the proportion of supporters for a given party who switched to the party in the position of the dependent variable.

A second set of conditional row proportions was produced using Shively's and Meckstroth's column model. The procedure for constructing the regression equation is the same as for the row model but the position of the variables is reversed. The proportion of the vote received by a given party in the first election of an election pair constituted the dependent variable and the percentage support

for that party, all other parties, nonvoting in the second election constituted the independent variables. The column estimates Q (in Shively's notation P') were computed in a similar fashion as those obtained from the row model. In the column model, the cell entries were entered across each row but had to sum 1.0 down each column (which is the reverse from the row model). To convert column into row estimates, Shively's formulation was used:

$$P = \frac{Q \text{ times the total number of } Y_1 \text{ individuals in the population}}{\text{total number of } X_1 \text{ in the population}}$$

As Shively has shown, one may generate two estimates of P, one directly and one indirectly through the conversion of column estimates into row estimates. Similarly, one may generate two estimates of Q, one directly and one through the conversion of row estimates into column estimates. To convert row estimates into column estimates, Shively's formula for arriving at row estimates through column equations is reversed. Thus row proportions can be converted into column proportions by reversing Shively's formula for arriving at row estimates through column equations:

$$Q = \frac{P \text{ times the total number of } X_1 \text{ individuals in the population}}{\text{total number of } Y_1 \text{ individuals in the population}}$$

In choosing the estimate likely to be more valid, Shively's method for selecting row estimates was adopted.[32]

If one model (i.e. either the direct or indirect one) provided acceptable estimates while the other did not, the choice of estimates was easy. Occasionally, however, both models would yield unacceptable estimates (i.e. below zero or above 1.0). Following Meckstroth's

example, in cases where negative estimates were less than -5%, and not more than one such estimate appeared in a single equation (and where all indicators suggested high reliability) the negative coefficient was treated as 0 and revised estimates were obtained for the remaining coefficients in the equation. Such estimates are treated in the text as 0 and are identified as such. This study, following Meckstroth's suggestions, assumed that this procedure did not in any way distort the overall results since the values involved were extremely small. In reporting estimates, values beyond 2 places to the right of the decimals were ignored. (They were considered only when checking the estimates against actual voting results.)

In the process of rounding the coefficients produced by any given equation, the sum of row or column proportions occasionally exceeded slightly the limit of 1.0. In these cases, I have followed Meckstroth's suggestion and reduced all estimates by the same amount to ensure that row and column proportions did not go beyond 1.0. Continuity estimates were generally reported as they appeared.[33] (To check for the reliability of these estimates, it was necessary to examine the multiple R's associated with each equation, as well as standard error and variance tests. Fortunately, the SPSS program provided the relevant information with each regression equation, which made the process of checking for unreliable estimates less cumbersome.)

The results reported in the later sections should be viewed as probabilities rather than as absolute statements. Moreover, all row and column values may well be invalid even though they appear as both reliable and acceptable. As Meckstroth emphasizes in his disser-

tation and elsewhere, at this point in time, it is not possible to prove conclusively the validity of estimates obtained from regression estimates or even to determine precisely the magnitude and direction of bias. Certain conclusions, however, can be drawn from analyzing relationships among estimates for a given matrix. For one thing, even if the absolute value of any estimate cannot be established, the relative value of such estimates seem to be approximately correct. Furthermore, "even if the relative magnitude of the estimates differ from corresponding population parameters the direction of the differences among the estimates may still be the same as those among population parameters."[34] Finally, to the extent that the direction of magnitude of the differences is the same in both row and column estimates, confidence in their relative accuracy increases. Thus, if both row and column models show that a much larger proportion of nonvoters switched to the Nazis than BVP voters, then both estimates can be viewed as reasonable accurate reflections of actual voting behavior in the region.

Nonetheless, it is important to stress that problems of validation in ecological regressions have not been resolved. Hence the findings reported in this study and in others using this technique must be considered provisional and tentative. Despite such unresolved problems, however, ecological regression remains the most attractive and worthwhile technique for recovering information about individual voting behavior from aggregated election results. To use this method, with all its shortcomings, seems certainly preferable to such strategies as ignoring important areas of research for fear of committing the

dreaded ecological fallacy or of persisting in modes of analysis that rest demonstrably on dubious methods and assumptions.

Footnotes

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9. ibid.

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19. Loren K. Waldman, Models of Mass Movements: The Case of the Nazis (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1971).

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CHAPTER I

NAZISM: MASS MOVEMENT OR CLASS PARTY?

The extraordinary surge in votes for the NSDAP between 1928 and 1933 has been aptly described as "one of the purest examples of political contagion to be found anywhere in the data of modern electoral politics."[1] Thus, in the Reichstag election of 1928 (the last before the Depression), the NSDAP managed a meager 810,127 votes. Five years later, in the March 1933 Reichstag election, 17,277,180 Germans voted for this party. In that short period its proportion of the vote had climbed from 2.6% to 43.9%. From where did those additional 16 million Nazi voters come? What prompted these massive shifts to this extremist movement?

Among those who have sought to answer these questions are Reinhard Bendix and S. M. Lipset. This chapter focuses on their respective contributions. These have been by far the most familiar and most highly regarded attempts by social scientists both to identify the voting groups from which the National Socialists drew their support during this period and to discover the conditions explaining their success. Much of the empirical literature on National Socialism has been concerned with trying to confirm or disconfirm the findings and conclusions of Bendix and Lipset. The recent re-publication of Lipset's Political Man, in which his analysis of Nazism first appeared, attests to the high regard in which his theory is still held.

In their treatments of National Socialism, both Bendix and Lipset were concerned to draw out the broader theoretical implications of this movement's triumph for the study of politics in general, and of political extremism in particular. Both also sought to discover what other modern democracies had to learn from the transformation of the NSDAP into a mass-supported movement. My discussion of their work, therefore, places equal stress upon their analyses of the NSDAP's sources of electoral support, and upon the theoretical framework that shapes their interpretations of Nazism and its political significance. Section I examines the analysis of this movement done by Bendix; section II turns to Lipset's treatment. Section III begins by pointing out the major shortcomings of their respective evidence and assumptions; it then indicates which questions need to be addressed in the course of testing their hypothesis. In this section I also stress the similarities in Bendix's and Lipset's conclusions about the NSDAP's sources of electoral support and the implications of that party's growth for the study of political extremism. In this way I hope to bring into sharper focus the contrast between their contributions and those discussed in Chapter II.

I

In his article "Social Stratification and Political Power," Reinhard Bendix aims to demonstrate the "decided limitations of a study of political power which would base itself exclusively on an analysis of social stratification."[2] To show the weakness of such an approach to the study of politics, he turns to those theories of

totalitarian mass movements that emphasize the class background of their supporters. He uses the rise of fascism (more particularly, National Socialism) as his principal case because it came to power in fully industrialized societies. This, in his view, makes it possible to determine the role of social stratification in the fascist (or Nazi) conquest of power. By contrast, Bendix argues, communist movements to date (that is up to 1952) have seized power only in predominantly agrarian societies; all of these allegedly lacked a mature class structure, i.e. one with a strong middle class. Consequently he considers analyses of communist movements from a class perspective to be generally inappropriate.[3]

While examining the rise of National Socialism, Bendix seeks to disconfirm suggestions that "fascist movements are of middle-class origin." This, he believes, can be demonstrated by focusing not on the social composition of the NSDAP's leadership or membership, but on those who voted for it. Hence what he wishes to show is first, that the National Socialists did not have a preponderant middle class electorate. Second, that those who voted for this party came from a variety of social backgrounds. For his evidence, Bendix turns to the 1930-1933 Reichstag elections.

Bendix's interpretation of Nazism, it should be stressed, rests principally on the Reichstag elections of 1930 and July 1932, i.e. those two elections which transformed the Nazis from a splinter group into Germany's strongest party. He treats the November 1932 and March 1933 elections only peripherally and then mostly for the purpose of buttressing contentions developed on the basis of analyzing the 1930

and July 1932 results. Interestingly enough, Bendix views these two elections as two distinct stages in the NSDAP's electoral expansion. In each stage, moreover, the NSDAP's supporters came from different sources.

Bendix is not concerned to deny the "general plausibility" of the thesis, developed by such theorists as Theodor Geiger, David Saposs and Harold Lasswell,[4] that "fascism can be explained as a mass response to the frustrations suffered by members of the middle class during a period of acute economic distress."[5] But he seeks to show that on the whole the election results during the crucial years of the NSDAP's growth fail to confirm this interpretation. For him the very suddenness of the NSDAP's electoral growth between 1928 and 1930 raises doubts about the middle class thesis. For one thing, it is inconceivable to him that middle class voters who ordinarily are firm supporters of the status quo should from one election to the next be "willing to support an attack on law and order and private property..." by voting for the National Socialists.[6]

Consequently, he argues, the massive increase in the Nazi vote must have come from different groups in Germany's electorate. To him the most plausible source of support for the National Socialists in 1930 were the vast number of additional participants that between 1928 and 1930 entered the active voting population. His evidence is twofold.

First, he cites the fact that the jump in the NSDAP's vote by by 5,569,545 between these two elections "occurred at a time when 2,444,990 persons decided to vote who had not voted in the previous

election and when an additional 1,758,234 young people became eligible to vote for the first time."[7] Secondly, he points out that "the only other parties which together gained over one million votes in 1930 as compared with 1928 were the small middle class parties and the Catholic Center Party. All other parties lost votes, ranging from a loss of 270,000 by the Democratic party to a loss of almost two million by the German Nationalist Party."[8]

These results lead him to deduce that in 1930, "the increase in the Nazi vote resulted from the radicalization of members in the nationalist parties of the Right and from the sudden participation of about 4,200,000 nonvoters and young people."[9] Furthermore, the fact that "small middle class parties and the Catholic Center" gained votes indicates that middle class voters shifted to these parties rather than to the National Socialists. Allegedly these small parties of the political center benefited also from defections of conservative and even socialist voters who, like liberal voters, "feared the radicalism of the Nazis and Communists and .... who wanted to bolster the middle-of-the-road parties during this crisis."[10]

According to Bendix, it was only in the July 1932 Reichstag election that much of the middle class electorate went over to the National Socialists. That these shifts occurred, he deduces from the fact that the NSDAP's gain of 7,300,000 votes coincided with a drop of 3,740,000 votes in the support of "the small middle class parties."[11] Bendix insists, however, that even in the July 1932 Reichstag election, nonvoters and newly eligible voters remained a crucial source of support for the National Socialists (as did defectors from nationalist

parties). Thus he calculates that of the 7.3 million votes gained by the Nazis between 1930 and July 1932, some two million came from those who entered the electorate between these elections while another 1.5 million came from former supporters of nationalist parties.[12]

In Bendix's view, moreover, nonvoters continued to have a major impact on the NSDAP's electoral and political strength. When nonvoting rose, as it did in November 1932, the NSDAP's share of the vote immediately declined. And when, in March 1933, almost 3.5 million additional voters entered the electorate, the National Socialists experienced their greatest electoral victories yet. These parallel fluctuations in Nazi voting and voter participation, Bendix regards as causally related.[13]

On the basis of his analysis of the 1930-1933 election results, Bendix came to the following general conclusion:

> "The importance of the newly eligible voters and of the politically apathetic casts doubt on the conception of fascism as a middle-class movement. This is not to deny that the economic insecurity of middle-class groups was important for the conquest of power as a secondary response. It is to assert rather that the radicalization of the electorate originated among the previous nonparticipants in party politics, who probably came from various social groups, and that the significant support of the totalitarian movement by members of the middle class and of other social groups occurred subsequently in the hope of relief from economic distress and in the desire to gain from backing the victorious movement."[14]

What Bendix is suggesting here is that the NSDAP's growth (and by implication, of fascist movements in general) proceeded through two separate stages. In the first stage, support from previous non-

participants actually initiated the NSDAP's transformation into a mass party; in the second stage, the NSDAP's electoral base grew as middle class voters jumped on the band wagon.[15]

For Bendix, therefore, the large and sudden influx of previous nonparticipants constituted an essential condition for the triumph of National Socialism. Both by turning the NSDAP into a powerful electoral contender and by radicalizing the political climate, their entry into the active electorate set the precondition for the conversion of middle class voters to the Nazi cause. In Bendix's words, "Fascism arose in Germany ..... partly because of the sudden entry into political life of previous nonparticipants. These nonparticipants were stimulated by and helped to spread an all-or-nothing demand for the solution of the crisis."[16]

Bendix's conviction that previous nonparticipants formed the NSDAP's initial and principal constituency, however, is not based only on his reading of the 1930-1933 election results. It also follows logically from his belief that this segment of society is generally more disposed to support radical movements than are middle class voters. Nonvoters, he believes, tend to come from strata with less education and less political experience than is true of middle class voters.[17] For this reason, he surmises, it is "probably characteristic of many nonvoters to regard political participation as 'useless', to believe that politics will only benefit the crooks anyway, and to profess a lack of concern with public affairs. Such people are likely to vote only under extreme provocation, and they are likely to support a party which proposes to clean the Augean stable

and to establish an entirely new political order."[18]

According to Bendix, middle class voters, in part because they are more educated, participate far more regularly in politics. Because their experience makes them more familiar with democratic procedures and norms, they understand democracy better than do nonvoters. This allegedly makes it more difficult for a radical movement to acquire middle class support. Furthermore, Bendix contends, middle class voters tend to favor the existing order, and are unlikely to support calls for radical changes. Sudden economic adversity, therefore, does not prompt them to back new, untried, extremist parties as do nonvoters.

Bendix argues that only in extraordinary conditions will middle class voters abandon parties of the political center. First, a crisis must exist long enough to create a "unity of interest" among previously antagonistic groups within that electorate. In other words, a large middle class shift to fascist movements (or any radical party) requires a temporary blurring of conflicts that ordinarily divide such diverse segments of the middle class as small town residents and people residing in big cities, farmers and artisans, shopkeepers and big retailers, intellectuals and entrepreneurs. What Bendix implies, therefore, is that middle class voters had to lose their sense both of social identity and of the distinctive interests of their social group before they could link up with the more marginal segments of society (i.e. perennial nonvoters) to support the Nazis. Second, middle class voters could make that shift only in the event of a highly radicalized climate of opinion; third, there had to be

a movement "on the verge of victory." The first condition was created by the Great Depression, the others by the entry of previous non-participants.[19]

On the basis of his findings about middle class conversion to the National Socialists and the reasons for this, Bendix generalizes that the "study of cumulative political experience" is likely to provide a far better understanding of why individuals or societies succumb to extremist movements than does "the study of social stratification, whether or not it is adumbrated by psychological analysis..."[20] To help clarify his point, Bendix introduces the following analogy: "Men of various personality types are sorely tried under great adversities. They are likely to meet them with patience and endurance only when their personal experience provides them with a backlog of success in the use of certain established methods, for such a backlog enables them to absorb the shock of repeated failure under trying conditions. It seems to me that such a backlog of success in the use of democratic institutions has been lacking wherever totalitarian movements have been successful."[21]

His conclusion that people without such "cumulative political experience" were crucial to National Socialism's "conquest of power," leads Bendix to further speculations about the implications of this triumph for modern democracies generally. From his interpretation of Nazism, Bendix concludes that "under certain conditions the survival of democratic institutions does not depend on a more widespread participation in politics as is commonly assumed. It may depend rather on a persistent residue of political apathy which enables the non-

participants to acquiesce in the democratic process and to ignore its many imperfections."[22]

In its principal points, Bendix's interpretation closely resembles the "mass society" theory of National Socialism. Among the best-known authors who have analyzed National Socialism in mass society terms are Hannah Arendt, William Kornhauser, Sigmund Neumann and Karl Mannheim. Like these theorists, Bendix rejects depictions of the major totalitarian mass movements of the 20th century--fascism, Nazism or communism--as expressions of specific class interests or forms of class organization. Like them, he consequently denies that National Socialism was a middle class movement. Bendix shares the conviction of mass society theorists that no rational middle class voter could have supported programs so abstract, so sweeping in their consequences, so nihilistic or so remote from concrete concerns as those allegedly advanced by the National Socialists. As do these authors, he views support for National Socialism as the abnormal response of marginal elements in German society thrown into confusion and provoked into action by the Great Depression.

Bendix's specific contentions about the NSDAP's sources of support are also common to mass society treatments of Nazism. As do Arendt, Kornhauser, Neumann and Mannheim,[23] Bendix argues that the rapid growth of the NSDAP in 1930 and thereafter would not have been possible without the massive support of previous nonvoters and newly eligible voters.[24] And like them he points to the heterogeneity in the social background of Nazi voters as proof that National Socialism was a "mass movement" and not a "class party."[25] For these reasons,

Bendix's analysis is generally treated as an attempt to provide empirical confirmation for the "mass society" theory of National Socialism.

II

In his article "Fascism --Left, Right, and Center," S.M. Lipset sets out to refute both Bendix's claim that "the knowledge of social stratification contributes little to an understanding of the success of .... totalitarian movements," and his further contention that National Socialism was not a middle class movement. Lipset seeks to demonstrate that the NSDAP's principal constituency derived from former supporters of middle class parties. He also wants to show that class remains the key to understanding such modern totalitarian movements as National Socialism. Like Bendix, then, Lipset turns to this movement for the purpose of confirming a more general theory of political extremism and its sources. He too concentrates his analysis on the 1930 and July 1932 elections and, like Bendix, treats them as two distinctive stages in the NSDAP's growth.

Central to Lipset's interpretation of National Socialism are the following contentions: 1) that "each major social stratum has both democratic and extremist political expressions;" 2) that all modern antidemocratic movements and ideologies "can be classified and analyzed in the same terms as democratic groups, i.e. left, right, and center;" 3) that the three principal antidemocratic movements of the 20th century (communism, traditional authoritarianism, and fascism), resemble their democratic counterparts (socialism, conservatism, and liberalism) "in both the composition of their social bases

and contents of their appeal."[26]

Lipset begins his study by identifying the distinctive modes of politics (both democratic and extremist) practiced by each class. According to him, manual workers or the poorer rural strata generally support the "Socialist left." The "conservative right," on the other hand, is allegedly backed by "the rather well-to-do elements--owners of large industry and farms, the managerial and free professional strata--and those segments of the less privileged groups who have remained involved in traditionalist institutions, particularly the Church." The "democratic center," Lipset claims, "is backed by the middle classes, especially small businessmen, white collar workers, and the anticlerical sections of the professional classes."[27]

Lipset goes on to argue that the "extremist movements of the left, right, and center, (Communism, traditional authoritarianism, and fascism) are based primarily on the working, upper and middle class respectively."[28] These movements share with their democratic counterparts (i.e. socialism, conservatism, and liberalism) not only the same social base but also a strong ideological affinity. In other words, Lipset suggests that the difference between democratic and extremist parties lies less in their respective political conceptions than in the methods by which they seek to realize their objectives.[29]

Lipset's article concentrates largely on the political center. More specifically, it focuses on the alleged similarities and relationship between liberalism and Nazism. He calls National Socialism and other fascist ideologies "extremisms of the center."[30] According to Lipset, Nazism like liberalism, has depended for its electoral and

political support above all on the middle classes--both old and new.[31] He ascribes this similarity in their social bases of support to the fact that both liberalism and Nazism (or fascism in general) answered the same psychological and political needs.[32] Both liberalism and Nazism, in other words, are said to have represented "an outlet for the stratification strains of the middle class in a mature industrial order."[33]

Consequently, he sees in liberalism and Nazism important ideological affinities. Both allegedly share the same antipathy toward "big business, trade unions, and the socialist state"; both are said to advocate a central role for small business and the independent peasantry. Both, Lipset claims, have also shown a similar distaste for religion and other forms of traditionalism on the one hand and for modernization, rationalization and advanced capitalism on the other.[34] In Lipset's view, where liberalism and Nazism differed was in their respective solutions to the difficulties allegedly faced by the middle strata.

According to him, liberalism generally sought to cope with the strains that the modernization process had created for the middle classes by "legitimate social change and reforms (reforms which would, to be sure, reverse the modernization process)." Nazism, on the other hand, allegedly proposed to solve the problems of these strata "by taking over the state and running it in a way which will restore the old middle classes' economic security and high standing in society, and, at the same time, reduce the power and status of big capital and big labor."[35]

Lipset actually suggests what electoral evidence is needed to confirm his thesis: "If classic fascism appeals largely to the same elements as those which backed liberalism, then the previous supporters of liberalism should have provided the backing for the Nazis."[36] But he must also show that in the period of its greatest growth the National Socialists did not attract any significant support either from former conservative or from previous socialist voters. And he must demonstrate that to the extent that the NSDAP attracted former nonvoters, it did so only after its transformation into a powerful mass party.

Lipset believes that the 1928-1933 election statistics provide strong support for his contentions. His inspection of voting shifts during this period lead him to conclude that "the Nazis gained most heavily among the liberal middle-class parties, the former bulwarks of the Weimar Republic."[37] He maintains that "between 1928 and 1932 these parties lost almost 80 percent of their vote, and their proportion of the total vote dropped from a quarter to less than 3 percent." On the basis of these figures he believes it is reasonable to infer that "as the Nazis grew, the liberal bourgeois center parties, based on the less traditionalist elements--primarily small business and white collar workers--collapsed."[38] Lipset subsumes under the category of "liberal bourgeois center parties" not only the Weimar Republic's two major liberal parties, i.e. the German Democratic Party (DDP) and the German People's Party (DVP) but also the Business Party (WP) and what he calls regional autonomy parties. He holds that these shared with the liberal parties both the same voting base (i.e. middle

class voters) and similar economic and political preoccupations. Hence the NSDAP could mobilize their supporters as easily as those of the two principal liberal parties.

Lipset finds further evidence for his claim that the NSDAP's growth came at the expense of "liberal bourgeois center parties" in the electoral pattern of the Catholic and Marxist parties: "The only center party which maintained its proportionate support was the Catholic Center party whose support was reinforced by religious allegiance. The Marxist parties, the socialists and the Communists, lost about a tenth of their percentage support, although their total vote dropped only slightly."[39] He finds his case strengthened by the voting behavior of the conservative electorate.

Although the party representing this electorate, the German National People's Party or DNVP, lost about forty percent of its vote during the NSDAP's electoral expansion, Lipset emphasizes the fact that this loss was far below that suffered by the liberal parties. He does not deny that in part this decline in the DNVP's vote resulted from defections to the Nazis. He does not, however, believe that these shifts were crucial to the NSDAP's growth at this or any other stage. Nor does he think that DNVP defections to the Nazis weaken his theory of class-specific forms of extremisms. Thus he maintains that most of the DNVP's losses were concentrated in the Republic's Eastern border areas. Here, according to Lipset, the DNVP's electoral support was based less on class interests or the party's conservatism than on its extreme opposition to the Versailles Treaty. What prompted DNVP defections in these areas, therefore, had less to do with economic

or social issues than with nationalistic concerns.[40]

Lipset, of course, emphatically rejects Bendix's claim that in the 1928-1933 period the NSDAP's initial and principal source of support were previous nonparticipants rather than middle class voters. His own analysis of the election statistics during this period showed that to the extent that nonvoters supported the National Socialists, they did so only after July 1932. For the 1928-1930 elections, however, Lipset actually found a "small negative rank order between the percent increase in the Nazi vote and the percent increase in the proportion of the eligible electorate voting."[41] (Lipset's disagreement with Bendix over the importance of previous nonparticipants for the NSDAP covers only the 1928-July 1932 period; for the last two Reichstag elections, those of November 1932 and March 1933, their analyses converge.)[42]

In claiming that former nonvoters supported the Nazis only after they had made significant electoral gains, Lipset is guided not by electoral evidence alone. For he sees the belated support given to the NSDAP by the politically apathetic as the outcome of their special characteristics and dispositions. Actually Lipset's view of this voting group differs little from that held by Bendix. Lipset, however, draws very different conclusions than Bendix about the political behavior that follows from the social situation and psychological attitudes that allegedly characterize the politically uninvolved and inactive segments of modern electorates.

Bendix is convinced that the politically apathetic, by virtue of their limited education and political information, their alienation

from society and its politics, their socio-economic isolation, generally support extremist movements at their inception. In Lipset's opinion, however, "the most outcast and apathetic sections of the population can be won to political action by extremist and authoritarian parties only _after_ such parties have become major movements, not while they are in their period of early rise."[43] The reason is that support "for a new and small movement requires a relatively complex, long-term view of the political process which insecure, ignorant, and apathetic persons cannot sustain."[44] Given these characteristics, Lipset thinks it unlikely that the NSDAP's _initial_ electoral surge was due to nonvoters' support. In his view, it is far more plausible that they swelled the rank of Nazi voters only _after_ the NSDAP's electoral breakthrough in 1930. In other words, not until its electoral successes in that Reichstag election did the NSDAP become sufficiently well-known for it to activate and mobilize the politically apathetic.

Like Bendix, then, Lipset sees the NSDAP's electoral expansion as falling into two stages. Lipset also shares Bendix's conviction that NSDAP successes in the first stage were crucial for generating the extraordinary surge of electoral support in the second stage. But for Lipset, Bendix's band wagon effect accounts much more for the behavior of the "traditional nonvoter" than of middle class voters.

Lipset concedes that since nonvoters tend to come from marginal elements in all strata, their support somewhat changed the composition of the NSDAP's electorate. So too did the influx of previous supporters of the DNVP. But while Lipset agrees that substantial portions of the

NSDAP's constituency may not have come from the middle classes, for him the "typical" Nazi voter remains the "middle class, self-employed Protestant who lived on a farm or in a small community and who had voted in the past for a centrist party...."[45]

To Lipset the fact that the Nazi electorate may have been more heterogeneous than his depiction of it as a middle class movement,does not undermine the utility or validity of his analytical distinction between extremisms of the left, right, and center. He contends that while "all extremist movements have much in common" they also exhibit "particular characteristics associated with the nature of their social base."[46] In his view it is essential to stress not the common, but the distinctive aspects of modern extremist movements. For only in this way is it possible to understand the success enjoyed by such movements and to protect democracies against their threat.

What extremist movements have in common is that they "appeal to the disgruntled and the psychologically homeless, to the personal failures, the socially isolated, the economically insecure, the uneducated, unsophisticated and authoritarian persons at every level of society."[47] But, Lipset continues, if one is to understand how and why various extremist movements emerge and what accounts for their success, analysts must "distinguish them and identify their distinctive, social bases and ideologies much as we do democratic parties and movements."[48] Thus, "the various extremist movements wax and wane depending on whether they can win and retain the support of the strata whom they are trying to represent and to lead."[49] Hence, he concludes, "if we want to preserve and extend parliamentary democracy, we must

understand the source of threats to it and threats from conservatives are as different from those originating in the middle-class center as these are from Communism."[50]

Lipset attributes the Nazis' success to the existence of a middle class that saw its economic and social status threatened by advanced capitalism. As its relative position declined, that stratum came to resent deeply those social and economic trends it attributed to capitalist industrial societies. In the process, the same liberal doctrines that once "had supported the bourgeoisie in their fight against the remnants of the feudal and monarchical order" now guided its resistance to the fundamental characteristics of modern societies.[51] To Lipset it was this "unreasonable and irrational"[52] aversion toward the modern state and society that led middle class voters to the NSDAP. Central to the National Socialist ideology was its profound hostility to the modern social and political order.[53]

From the triumph of Nazism, Lipset concludes that middle class extremism is most likely to emerge in societies with large-scale capitalism and a powerful labor movement. It is in such societies that the process of modernization has created special tensions for the self-employed rural and urban middle strata. Their anxieties, in turn, are said to prompt them periodically to abandon the more moderate spokesmen of their interests (i.e. liberal parties) for more extremist ones (i.e. fascism or populism).[54] Most recently, Lipset found his thesis confirmed by the rise and (albeit temporary) successes of Poujadism in France and McCarthyism in the United States.[55]

III

Both Bendix and Lipset derive their hypotheses about the NSDAP's electoral sources of support from a global analysis of aggregate data at the national level. Both treat net changes in aggregate support for various parties as the equivalent individual voting shifts. Such direct inference from aggregate to individual voting patterns, however, cannot be made without severe distortion. In fact, as the discussion of ecological regression in Appendix A shows, aggregated voting figures may hide very complex and intricate individual voting changes. Lipset also seeks to buttress his case by citing studies that use ecological correlations to determine who voted for the Nazis. (I am referring here especially to Rudolf Heberle's case study of Schleswig Holstein, to Samuel Pratt's analysis of the NSDAP's urban base of support in the July 1932 election, and to the analysis by Charles Loomis and Allen Beegle of that party's rural vote during the 1930-1933 elections.)[56] But, as W.S. Robinson and others have amply demonstrated, ecological correlations cannot be used as substitutes for individual-level characteristics.

Since the publication of Bendix's and Lipset's treatments, attempts have been made to test their propositions by using more sophisticated and reliable methods of statistical analysis. Thus in an article published in 1969, Karl O'Lessker, relying on multiple correlation and regression analysis, found that in the 1928-1930 period, most of the NSDAP support came from new voters and previous nonvoters as well as DNVP defectors. He also discovered that supporters of the liberal middle class parties shifted to the NSDAP only as of July 1932.

In other words, his findings essentially corroborated Bendix's thesis. Allan Schnaiberg, on the other hand, used path analysis to demonstrate that the evidence was far stronger for Lipset's contention that middle class voters contributed to the NSDAP's 1930 growth while nonvoters played a major role only in that party's July 1932 electoral surge. (His article appeared in the same issue of the journal that published O'Lessker's findings.)[57]

Among the more recent investigations, that of David Cameron (who like my own study used regression coefficients as estimates of individual transition probabilities) concluded that the evidence does not support Lipset's middle class thesis but at least in part backs up Bendix's claims. The analyses by David Cameron, Thomas Childers, Loren K. Waldmann, Richard D. Wernette and Mark H. Levine,[58] however, found inadequate the accounts by both Lipset and Bendix of the NSDAP's electoral sources of support. Using a variety of statistical techniques and analyzing data at the county level (rather than at the level of the much larger national election districts), these authors discovered that voter movements between 1928 and 1933 were considerably more complex than Bendix and Lipset had recognized. The same critics also found little ground for arguing that the NSDAP's electorate came predominantly from any one sector of the Weimar electorate, whether Bendix's nonvoters, or Lipset's middle class voters. My own analysis of regional voting has led me to much the same conclusions. Thomas Childers in fact discovered evidence of change in the composition of the NSDAP's electorate. But in his view, the crucial dividing line was the 1928 Reichstag election and not that of July 1932, as Bendix and Lipset

argue. He concluded that the social background of Nazi voters before 1928 differed substantially from that after 1928. At the regional level, I found a similar change in the partisan background of Nazi voters. This suggests that what transformed the composition of the Nazi constituency was not the band wagon effect described by Bendix and Lipset but as I show later, the party's reorientation and reorganization.

Several critics have also challenged many of the assumptions made by Bendix and Lipset in their analyses of the post-1928 voting shifts. Both assume that the characteristics and dispositions they identify with middle class voters and with nonparticipants respectively were distributed uniformly among members of these two groups. In other words, they seem to believe that there existed a homogeneous middle class electorate, all of whose members shared the same experiences, concerns, interests and outlooks and political preferences. Both theorists also presuppose that all nonparticipants shared the same social characteristics and personality traits that allegedly characterize people who are politically uninvolved. Bendix and Lipset also group indiscriminately under the rubric "liberal bourgeoise center" all Weimar parties other than the two Marxist parties on the one side, and the Catholic Center Party and the DNVP on the other. Bendix and Lipset further assume that these parties followed a "moderate" course of politics, and that they derived their support from much the same social groups.

But as Juergen Falter, H.A. Winkler, David Cameron, James Hunt and Thomas Childers, among others, have pointed out, these assumptions

considerably distort the reality of Weimar Germany's electoral politics.[59] These analysts argue that the Protestant middle class electorate was deeply fragmented; it supported a variety of parties including those of the left and right. Furthermore, the constituencies of the main liberal parties were quite different from one another and from the many special interest parties that competed in Weimar Germany. Nor do these critics of Bendix and Lipset find that "centrist" political orientation allegedly pursued by the parties of the "liberal bourgeois center". As Falter and Winkler have argued, these parties adopted themes and programs which as early as the Second Empire, had been the stock in trade of right-wing parties. Indeed, as I hope to show, it was precisely because of this right-wing tenor of virtually all non-Catholic and non-Marxist party propaganda, that the NSDAP could so easily penetrate their electorates.

Given so much empirical and historical work by social scientists and historians,it is surprising to find how little Lipset's perspective on National Socialism has changed between the initial publication of his Political Man and the "expanded and updated" version of it published in 1981.[60] In fact, he believes that recent writings on the collapse of the Weimar Republic and on the Nazi movement's sources of support sustain his original interpreation of National Socialism as an extremist revolt by the middle classes against those changes in society and politics "identified with the French Revolution, rationalism, equality and the rise of capitalism."[61]

Yet the recent literature he cites does not support his contention. First of all he relies primarily on the work of Peter

Gay, Fritz Stern, George Mosse, Wolfgang Sauer and Henry Ashby Turner.[62] But these authors addressed themselves to National Socialist ideology and propaganda rather than to the NSDAP's electoral growth. The two empirical studies to which he refers--Juan Linz's survey of the current literature on European fascism and Peter Merkl's reanalysis of 581 autobiographical essays by Nazi members originally collected and analyzed by Theodore Abel--do not offer any original analysis of Weimar voting.[63] Nor were their respective treatments meant to offer empirically-based conclusions about who voted for the NSDAP and why.

In short, Lipset's claim that recent scholarship sustains his original assessment is not warranted. On the contrary, the empirical literature on National Socialism has raised considerable doubts about the validity of Bendix's and Lipset's findings and conclusions. Those hypotheses need to be retested on the regional level by the use of the best techniques available. It is this task that my study will attempt to perform for Franconia.

Most recent empirical investigations into the electoral sources of Nazism have treated Bendix's and Lipset's analysis as alternative explanations of this movement. My own reading of their work, however, suggests that their assessments of Nazism's electoral growth and its sources are in basic regards similar. So too is their larger theory about those conditions that favor the rise of extremist movements in all advanced democracies.

Bendix and Lipset turn out to agree on a surprising number of points. They conclude that the NSDAP's growth proceeded in two stages,

during each of which it was supported by different elements in German society. Both agree about which groups in Weimar Germany were most responsible for the NSDAP's electoral growth. In other words, Bendix and Lipset concur in identifying previous nonparticipants and former supporters of the "liberal bourgeois center" as the NSDAP's principal constituencies. Both maintain that although former followers of the DNVP were important to the NSDAP's growth, nonparticipants or middle class voters played a much greater role. Both argue that the drop in voting participation and the NSDAP's decline in November 1932 resulted above all from nonvoting by a large number of those who had cast their ballots for the Nazis in the previous election. Both assume that those who became nonvoters in November 1932 had been in that category before they supported the NSDAP. Bendix and Lipset also agree that in March 1933 the sharp rise in Nazi voting must be attributed to the support of the huge numbers of additional voters who voted in that election.

In later chapters this study examines the evidence for all these detailed and interrelated contentions and proposed alternative conclusions. It will do so by analyzing voting data from the region of Franconia for the entire electoral period during which the NSDAP competed. More specifically, it is meant to answer the following questions raised by Bendix and Lipset: 1) Did the NSDAP's support in 1930 and July 1932 come from different sources in Franconia's electorate? Were there two stages in the NSDAP's electoral growth as Bendix and Lipset claim? 2) Which proportions of the voting groups identified by Lipset and Bendix as the NSDAP's principal supporters (i.e. previous nonpartici-

pants, supporters of the two main liberal parties and other middle class parties, as well as of the DNVP) did in fact vote for that party in the 1930 and July 1932 Reichstag elections? 3) In which proportions did each of these groups contribute to the NSDAP's total? 4) Did they support any other party in that period and if so which? 5) Did the NSDAP's voting decline in November 1932 result from withdrawals by its supporters into nonvoting? 6) To what extent did the NSDAP's increases in March 1933 come from the support of those who had not voted in the preceding election? 7) Did the NSDAP, in the period of its greatest growth, receive the support of any other voting groups than those identified by Bendix and Lipset? If so, which groups were they, and how important was their vote for the NSDAP's expansion?

Since both Bendix and Lipset make general claims about the effects of the crisis upon the behavior of nonparticipants and middle class voters, it is essential to examine pre-1930 voter movements as well. Thus I seek to answer a number of questions crucial to testing their hypotheses: 1) Which voting groups supported the NSDAP during the first election in which it competed? 2) Were they the same category of voters Bendix and Lipset projected as among that party's initial supporters? 3) Was there at any time a change in the composition of the NSDAP's electorate and if so, when did this change occur?

As stated previously, my reading of their respective accounts of Nazism has also convinced me that Bendix and Lipset adopt a very similar approach in their explanations of that movement in particular and of political extremism in modern democracies generally. Both authors, in other words, emphasize social determinants in their accounts

of mass behavior. Bendix and Lipset, for instance, point out that nonparticipants generally come from sectors of the society which have a low social and economic status, are isolated from the rest of society, and are less well informed about public affairs. Lipset also contends that middle class voters in advanced societies exist at the social and political periphery so that they too are likely to lack any real or psychological links to the rest of society. Both authors feel that this marginal existence creates psychological dispositions that extremist movements can easily exploit. Both in fact agree that those who voted for the National Socialists did so to overcome personal anxieties, resentments, fears rather than to realize concrete interests or to seek redress for real grievances.

Bendix's and Lipset's interpretations, therefore, fall within that category Charles Tilly has called "breakdown theories."[64] These locate the sources of mass supported opposition movements in the personal disorientations and strains allegedly created by sudden alterations in a population's customary social bonds, norms, and expectations. Such strains are said to have first emerged in the wake of such major processes of change as modernization and democratization. But the tensions produced by these transformative processes allegedly still manifest themselves in all advanced democracies. Periods of crisis exacerbate these underlying tensions and strains by initiating sudden and drastic changes. Such upheavals, in turn, are said to provoke marginal or "displaced" social strata to support extremist movements.

Neither Bendix nor Lipset pay any attention to political variables in their explanations of Nazism and political extremism generally. Thus they largely ignore the larger structure of electoral conflict in Weimar Germany and its impact on both parties and voters. These two theorists also fail to consider the relative importance of party organization and effectiveness in prompting voters to defect from their own parties and to shift to the NSDAP. By contrast, the theories examined in the next chapter emphasize the importance of such political variables and conditions in their accounts and interpretations of Nazism. These theories also seek to bring to the analysis of Weimar voting,insights derived from recent empirical work on the conditions for electoral stability and instability done by leading students of American voting behavior.

FOOTNOTES

1. Burnham, "Immunization," p. 9.
2. Bendix, "Stratification," p. 367.
3. ibid.
4. Theodor Geiger, "Panik im Mittelstand," Die Arbeit 7 (1930); D. J. Saposs, "The Role of the Middle Class in Social Development" in Economic Essays in Honor of Wesley C. Mitchell (New York, 1935); Harold D. Lasswell, "The Psychology of Hitlerism as a Response of the Lower Middle Class to Continuing Insecurity" in The Analysis of Political Behavior (London, 1949).
5. Bendix, "Stratification," p. 368.
6. ibid.
7. ibid.
8. ibid., p. 369.
9. ibid.
10. ibid.
11. ibid.
12. ibid.
13. ibid.
14. ibid., p. 369-370.
15. ibid., p. 375.
16. ibid., p. 371.
17. ibid., p. 369.
18. ibid., p. 372.
19. ibid., p. 369 and p. 371.
20. ibid., p. 375.

21. ibid., p. 375.

21. ibid.

22. ibid., p. 372.

23. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York, 1951); William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe, Ill., 1959); Sigmund Neumann, The Permanent Revolution (New York, 1965); Karl Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (New York, 1940).

24. Lipset, Political Man, p. 127-192.

25. ibid., p. 129.

26. ibid., p. 127.

27. ibid., p. 129.

28. ibid., p. 132.

29. ibid., p. 129.

30. ibid., p. 132.

31. ibid., p. 133.

32. ibid., p. 137.

33. ibid.

34. ibid., p. 140.

35. ibid.

36. ibid., p. 138.

37. ibid., p. 132.

38. ibid., p. 138.

39. ibid., p. 138.

40. ibid., p. 140.

41. ibid., p. 150.

42. ibid., p. 151.

43. ibid., p. 150-151.

44. ibid.

45. ibid., p. 144.

46. ibid., p. 178.

47. ibid.

48. ibid., p. 179.

49. ibid.

50. ibid., p. 178

51. ibid., pp. 132-133.

52. ibid.

53. ibid.

54. ibid., pp. 134-135.

55. ibid., pp. 154-173.

56. Lipset cites Rudolf Heberle's American edition, From Democracy to Nazism (Baton Rouge, La., 1945). The complete German edition is considerably more comprehensive; it was published for the first time in German in 1963 as Landbevoelkerung und Nationalsozialismus (Stuttgart, 1963). The other works referred to are Guenther Franz, Die Politischen Wahlen in Niedersachsen, 1867-1949 (Bremen, 1959); Samuel Pratt, The Social Basis of Nazism and Communism in Urban Germany (M.A. thesis, Michigan State University, 1948); Charles P. Loomis and J. Allen Beegle, "The Spread of German Nazism in Rural Areas," American Sociological Review 11 (1946), pp. 724-734.

57. Karl O'Lessker, "Who Voted for Hitler?", American Journal of Sociology 74 (1968-1969), pp. 63-69. Allen Schnaiberg, "A Critique of Karl O'Lessker's, 'Who Voted for Hitler'" in the same issue, pp. 732-735.

58. David Cameron, "The Mobilization of Nazism: Middle Class Party or Catch-All Party?" Paper delivered to the Annual Meeting of the Social Science History Association, 1977. Richard Wernette Political Violence and German Elections 1930 and July 1932 (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1974); Loren K. Waldman, Models of Mass Movement: The Case of the Nazis (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Chicago, 1973); Thomas Childers, "The Social Bases of Nazism," Journal of Contemporary History

11 (1976) pp. 17-42; Mark H. Levine, Who Voted for Hitler Revisited? A Cluster Analysis of the Bases of Increased Nazi Support in the 1930 Reichstag Election (Ph.D. Dissertation. Bowling Green State University, 1976).

59. By far the best evaluation of these two positions has been made by a German political scientist, Professor Juergen W. Falter. His article "Radikalisierung des Mittelstandes oder Mobilisierung der Unpolitischen?" in Peter Steinbach, ed. Partizipation als Mittel der Politischen Modernisierung (Stuttgart, 1980) offers an extremely lucid and critical assessment of Lipset's and Bendix's contentions in the light of their own evidence and that of more recent empirical studies. See also, Heinrich August Winkler, Mittelstand, Demokratie and Nationalsozialismus (Cologne, 1972); James Hunt, "The Bourgeois Middle in German Politics," Central European History 11 (1978), pp. 83-106.

60. S.M. Lipset, Political Man, expanded and updated ed. (Baltimore, 1981).

61. ibid., p. 489.

62. Fritz Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study in the Rise of German Ideology (Berkely, Cal., 1961); Peter Gay, Weimar Culture: The Insider as Outsider (New York, 1968); Henry Ashby Turner, Jr., "Fascism and Modernization," World Politics 24 (1972); George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology: The Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich (New York, 1964); Wolfgang Sauer, "National Socialism, Totalitarianism, or Fascism?" American Historical Review 73 (1967).

63. Juan Linz, "Fascism," (for full reference, see note 8, Introduction); Peter Merkl, Political Violence under the Swastika: 581 Early Nazis (Princeton, 1975).

64. Charles Tilly, Louis Tilly, Richard Tilly, The Rebellious Century: 1830-1930 (Cambridge, Mass., 1975), p. 4.

CHAPTER II

THEORIES OF ELECTORAL INSTABILITY: THE WEIMAR PATTERN--A PARADIGM CASE?

This chapter turns to treatments of Nazism by three political scientists--Walter Dean Burnham, W. Phillips Shively and Theodore Meckstroth.[1] As yet, the articles by Burnham and Shively and Meckstroth's unpublished dissertation have received insufficient attention. Yet in the recent empirical literature on electoral support for the NSDAP, their analyses are by far the most interesting and innovative. Instead of turning to familiar interpretations of this movement, their work introduces to this subject some of the most important theories of electoral instability developed by American students of voting. Furthermore, by confronting evidence from a party system so different and complex as that of Weimar Germany, with theories and methods derived from the American electoral system, these three authors provide new insights into the NSDAP's electoral growth and sources of support. In this way, they contribute to the formulation of cross-national, comparative theories of partisan stability and upheaval in modern democracies.

Burnham, Shively and Meckstroth particularly address themselves to what Shively calls the "party identification theory of electoral stability and instability." This theory, developed by such American voting analysts as Campbell, Converse, Stokes and McPhee,[2] stresses

the importance of strong voter bonds to parties for the stability of the American party system. These and other party identification theorists have also specified the conditions that have produced those dramatic and long-term alterations in American voting systems known as "realignments." From the perspectives of Burnham, Shively, and Meckstroth, this theory of electoral stability has important implications for the comparative study of the voting process and its systemic implications for Western democracies. Yet this theory has never been tested in other party systems.

Burnham, Shively and Meckstroth all hold that theories of electoral stability and instability must be tested in situations where many parties compete and thus with electoral cleavages and alignments unlike those in the United States. For only in this way is it possible to arrive at a general understanding of the conditions under which the electoral process as such strengthens or weakens modern democratic systems. The case of Weimar Germany is particularly useful to them for testing hypotheses about the sources of electoral instability formulated initially on the basis of American evidence. These three authors find the post-1928 electoral upheavals in Weimar Germany to be the single most dramatic example of electoral instability and its consequences in modern Western democracies. This case has figured prominently in the American voting and public opinion literature. There it is most often used to buttress warnings about the inherent dangers of mass participation for modern democracies.[3] Consequently, all three authors turn to the Weimar party system to determine the explanatory value of this body of theory outside the American electoral

context. The remainder of this chapter examines in greater detail their respective findings and theoretical conclusions.

As stated previously, both Burnham and Shively found that the notion of party identification and its alleged systemic effects did not adequately account for Weimar voting in general and the NSDAP's electoral growth in particular. Section I focuses on their respective criticisms of party identification theory, and on their own explanations of Weimar electoral developments, especially those after 1928. Meckstroth generally accepts the thesis that party identification is a prerequisite of electoral stability. He contends that the concept of realignment and explanations developed for such electoral upheavals accounts for the dramatic voting changes in the 1928-1933 period. Section II concentrates on his efforts to apply both the concept of realignment and explanations of it to electoral upheavals after 1928. These three authors need to be placed within their proper context. Section I provides a brief summary of "party identification theory" as an approach to the study of electoral stability and change in Western democracies.

I

Among the major discoveries by such voting and public opinion analysts as Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren E. Miller, William McPhee, Donald Stokes and other members of the Michigan School was that American voters--despite their low levels of political involvement and interest, their low "cognitive" capacities, and their unsophisticated view of politics--had developed unusually strong, long-term commitments to one of the two major competing parties. For the American

voter, they argue, party identification had become a form of social identity. It is this bond, rather than issues, party positions, or an individual's social background that allegedly determines American voting behavior.[4]

Voting analysts have viewed the attitudes of American citizens toward their party as a "habitual, somewhat sentimental attachment," not unlike their religious preferences. Most citizens, it appeared, "inherited" their partisan orientation from their parents--much as they acquired their religious affiliation. Later social experiences and the actual act of voting for a given party apparently reinforced this attachment. Such continuous socialization and reinforcement meant that party identification might extend not only over one person's life cycle but also over several generations of a family.[5]

These deeply embedded partisan attitudes of American voters, they argued, bring important benefits both to the individual voter and the party system as a whole. For the individual, party identification makes it much easier to evaluate an ever greater amount of complex information and such identification eases the difficult task of deciding among competing candidates or issues. Even more important were the more general consequences claimed for those affective bonds underlying partisan support. This school of analysts has concluded that the deep and long-lived attachments felt by citizens for their parties have provided the American party system with a level of political stability otherwise unattainable.

Because party identification apparently prevented or minimized sudden, dramatic alterations in American party alignments, some analysts

have posited such attitudes as the prerequisite for electoral stability in all democratic party systems. In other words, they held that in other democracies as well, electoral and political stability depend on the extent to which citizens identify themselves with established parties. Because such "party identification" takes time to develop, these theorists postulate that only those party systems will be stable where: 1) the major parties have competed long enough for voters to form continuous commitments to them; and 2) where the bulk of the electorate has participated long enough to feel emotionally attached to the parties they support.

From this perspective, unstable party systems are most likely to be those where democratic competition has been short-lived, where many or most citizens have been only recently enfranchised, and where many citizens only sporadically exercise their right to vote. Systems with little party identification are inherently unstable because without emotional attachment to a given party, voters tend to be capricious in their electoral behavior. In times of crisis, such voters are apt to support nontraditional, antidemocratic or "flash" parties.[6]

Adherents to this theory explain both the Weimar Republic's electoral instability and the NSDAP's sudden electoral surges after the onset of the 1929 Depression by the hypothesis that substantial portions of the German electorate had not developed strong attachments to any of the Republic's principal parties. The constitution of the Weimar Republic introduced democratic electoral competition and universal suffrage only ten years before the crisis of 1929. Thus the party system was too new, its characteristics too unprecedented to foster

that attachment to parties found in American voters. As the Depression of 1929 deepened, the NSDAP gained voters' support at the expense of those parties that had previously dominated the Republic's elections. These developments are accounted for by party identification theory in two ways: first, by the general absence of party identification in German voters; second, by the influx of voters who had not previously participated in elections and hence had no ties whatsoever to the principal parties. This is to say that the NSDAP derived most of its support from previous nonvoters and from such newly enfranchised voters as women.

In trying to assess party identification theory, Burnham and Shively address themselves to somewhat different concerns than Meckstroth. Essentially, Burnham and Shively turn to the Weimar Republic in order to test contentions about the general significance of party identification in modern party systems. Meckstroth, on the other hand, is more interested in discovering what destroys those bonds connecting voters to parties. He also wishes to explore what happens to party competition in such complex multi-party systems as Weimar Germany in the absence of stable, long-term loyalties to party.

To American students of voting, Weimar Germany exemplifies the problems facing a party system whose voters lack strong emotional ties to competing parties. But this judgment seems curious. If viewed from the perspective of what Shively refers to as "party identification theory," Weimar Germany seems to have met all the prerequisites for electoral stability. To begin with, it inherited from the Second Empire a fully developed party system. For as Burnham has pointed out, elec-

toral politics in Germany did not begin in 1919 but in 1871. The pre-war election period alone lasted "over forty years or at least two full political generations." Such a time span is generally considered more than adequate for the formation of stable partisan orientations.[7]

Nor were the principal Weimar parties wholly new or totally unknown quantities for German voters. Military defeat and the November 1918 Revolution had changed Germany's form of government. But, as has often been pointed out, both the pre-war conflicts and the parties linked to them reemerged after 1919 virtually intact. Consequently, Weimar voters were confronted by much the same contending parties, around which electoral politics had centered in Imperial Germany.[8]

Again, as Burnham argues, substantial proportions of Germany's population had participated electorally before World War I. Notwithstanding important restrictions, the Second Empire's franchise had been based upon virtually universal male suffrage. By 1907 most of Germany's potential electorate had in fact been mobilized by the main parties. Basic partisan attitudes, therefore, should have been formed and transmitted to a very large number of voters prior to the outbreak of the First World War.[9] If, as party identification theorists claim, partisan commitments are "inherited" and reinforced by social experiences, then the lowering of the voting age and the enfranchisement of women could not have been sufficient conditions for major reorientations and realignments after 1919. Furthermore, Weimar voting should have followed that pattern attributed by party identification theorists to electorates where such attachments are firmly entrenched.

In short, given Germany's relatively long electoral history, the prevalence in the Weimar Republic of parties that had competed for more than forty years, and the extensive voting experience of Germany's population before World War I, electoral politics should have been comparatively tranquil. Weimar's party system should have been characterized by: 1) very stable levels of support for all the main parties; 2) a relatively unchanging configuration of partisan competition over time; 3) low support among German voters for "flash" and/or "non-traditional" parties.

Actual voting data, of course, show quite contrary trends. As both Burnham and Shively point out, after 1919, Weimar elections were marked by "volcanic instability."[10] Levels of over-all change in partisan support were unusually high before as well as after 1930. All parties throughout the 1920-1933 span experienced dramatic fluctuations in their aggregate electoral support. The Weimar electorate was also unusually fragmented. And it shifted its support to an increasing number of new parties, many of which never lasted beyond one election. Finally, the 1930-1933 elections produced massive voter shifts toward antidemocratic parties.[11]

But this impression of extreme volatility, Burnham and Shively argue, should not obscure two other and equally important features of Weimar Germany's party system. In the first place, Weimar voting showed far greater signs of electoral stability than could have been predicted by party identification theory. Second, although after 1930 there occurred surges of voter support for the NSDAP as well as for the Communists or KPD, this extremist "contagion" was in fact quite

limited in its scope.

Both analysts, in other words, discovered that despite very high levels of over-all change in aggregate support for the Republic's parties throughout the 1920-1933 period, some parties clearly had stable electorates. This was especially true for the Catholic Center (and its Bavarian offshoot, the Bavarian People's Party or BVP) and, somewhat less so, of the Social Democratic Party or SPD. While individual parties frequently experienced dramatic changes in their aggregate votes, the proportion of the total vote held by the major party blocs showed only minor fluctuations. According to Burnham and Shively, all Weimar parties fell into three larger blocs made up of the socialist, Catholic and Protestant bourgeois parties. These party groupings or, to use Shively's term, tendances,[12] clearly reflected class and confessional cleavages in Weimar society. Burnham and Shively found the most intriguing feature of Weimar electoral politics to be the persistent stability of these three socially-based party blocs despite rapidly changing levels of support for the parties composing them. Not even during the electoral upheavals of the 1928-1933 period did voter movements transcend the class and confessional lines dividing these blocs. In Shively's view, this pattern suggests that in Weimar Germany class and confessional cleavages had become so "frozen" or rigidified that no party--extremist or democratic--could hope to attract a broadly-based electorate.[13]

Burnham and Shively also discovered voter volatility to be far more pronounced in the Protestant bourgeois or, as Burnham calls it, the "nonconfessional" electorate than in either the leftist or Catholic.

Protestant bourgeois voters had more opportunities to change parties since they were offered a larger array of partisan alternatives than were leftists or Catholics. The appearance of so many parties within the Protestant bourgeois camp indicated how difficult it was to form long-term attachments to any one party. This tendency of bourgeois voters to avoid durable partisan commitments had little to do with the "age" of any given party. The Protestant bourgeoisie abandoned parties which pre-dated the Republic (such as the two liberal parties) as often as they did those many interest parties that surfaced for the first time in the 1920s.

Burnham and Shively, then, discovered in the Weimar Republic's party system an unusual combination of stable and unstable voting trends. These conditions, they believe, also explain the second unexpected dimension of Weimar voting--the selectivity of the "Nazi contagion."[14] As both authors demonstrate, the National Socialists attracted above all those voters who had previously backed one or the other of the non-Catholic, non-Marxist parties. Burnham estimates that by 1933 the NSDAP received 80 percent of the total votes cast for this entire group of parties. (Both Burnham and Shively, it should be noted, included within the Protestant bourgeois camp the Republic's two liberal parties, the conservative DNVP, the special interest parties and the NSDAP.)[15]

Unlike Bendix and Lipset, Burnham and Shively discovered few differences among the liberal, conservative and special interest parties or their supporters. All these parties were equally incapable of maintaining the loyalty of their followers. In terms of their susceptibility to the NSDAP's appeal, there was little to distinguish those who had

previously backed "centrist" parties from those who had once supported "rightwing" or "special interest" parties.

Burnham and Shively agree in setting the boundaries of the NSDAP's electoral growth within existing class and confessional cleavages. In their view, the NSDAP failed to make progress beyond traditional lines of division within the German electorate. For a time, it sought to become a broadly-based "people's party." But the left and Catholic parties retained the support of their voters throughout the period during which the National Socialists experienced their greatest electoral surges. Burnham and Shively emphasize equally the NSDAP's inability to penetrate the Catholic and socialist electorates on the one hand, and its amazing success in mobilizing the supporters of all Protestant bourgeois parties on the other. Thus they conclude that class and confessional divisions limited the "Nazi contagion" far more effectively than did the ideological barriers identified by Lipset. Hence, both Burnham and Shively reject the categorization of Weimar parties and voters into left, right, and center which underlies the analyses of Weimar voting changes after 1928 by Bendix, Lipset and Meckstroth. I argue, in a later chapter, that at the regional level, voter responses to Nazism were determined more by class and confessional, than by ideological cleavages.

Neither Burnham nor Shively found any evidence to the effect that Weimar voters who had more limited voting experiences showed any greater disposition to support antidemocratic parties than did those with longer or more active voting histories. According to party identification theory, much of the NSDAP's support should have come from nonvoters,

young voters, and newly enfranchised voters. But according to Burnham and Shively, analyses of Weimar election data reveals no link between turnout and Nazi voting. With the exception of the 1933 election, there is no evidence that new or previous nonvoters moved disproportionately to the Nazis, or that they contributed significantly to that party's growth.

Shively also examined more closely voting patterns of female voters, who were enfranchised only in 1919, and of rural voters, who generally had the lowest rates of participation. What he discovered was that prior to the Depression, both groups displayed unusual continuity in their partisan choices. He also found that both groups shifted to the Nazis relatively late, i.e. only after the July 1932 election.[16]

After analyzing their data, both Burnham and Shively concluded that party identification, in the strong sense of a learned, stable commitment, did not exist in the Weimar Republic. However this did not produce those voting patterns alleged to arise in party systems lacking deep voter commitment to competing parties. Both Burnham and Shively offer their own explanations of the Republic's unusual combination of stable and unstable voting behavior on the one hand, and of the NSDAP's selective contagion on the other. Although both reject party identification, each does for very different reasons.

In Burnham's view, the party identification theory has ignored a familiar feature in European party systems: "the mass-based, tightly articulated political party, and the broader phenomenon of which such a party is a subset, 'political confessionalism.'" The distinction

between these parties and earlier formations is fundamental."[17] Burnham, therefore, finds the key to Weimar electoral behavior in the fundamental distinction between "nonconfessional" and "confessional" parties. That distinction, it should be stressed, does not involve the religious orientations shown by different parties; rather it is meant to highlight differences in the capacity of various parties to "bind" their followers to them (i.e. to turn voters into "adherents").

Confessional parties, according to Burnham, seek to absorb the total life of their supporters by providing them with a comprehensive world view by which the individual "may gain knowledge through right belief about the world as to what his right conduct in it should be." Such parties seek to involve their followers completely in a special political subculture. Consequently, confessional parties have the capacity to develop in their supporters a "total, invariant, lifelong commitment" to their organizations and goals. This provides these parties with unusually stable electorates, even in times of crisis. In Weimar Germany, both Marxist parties, i.e. the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Communists (KPD) exemplifed this type of party. So too did the Catholic-based Center Party which, in fact, combined religious and "political" or "secular" confessionalism.[18]

In sharp contast to confessional parties are those resembling "voluntary, limited liability associations rather than political churches complete with comprehensive world views."[19] Burnham identifies this second type as "nonconfessional" parties. In his view, middle class and especially liberal parties tend to fall into this category. Nonconfessional parties, according to Burnham, share essentially a secular

orientation; their politics are "epiphenomenal" and low in "ideological intensity;" they show little interest in sustained, continuous mobilization of their electorates. Finally, nonconfessional parties lack the will or capacity to create an extensive, strong organizational substructure that constantly involves voters and members in party-related or party-organized activities.[20] For these reasons, the electorates of liberal or other purely functional parties are less cohesive, less continuous in their partisan commitments and behavior. Their supporters are less "immunized" against extremist appeals than are the followers of confessional parties.[21]

According to Burnham, the differentiated voting behavior of Catholic and left electorates on the one hand and the Protestant bourgeois on the other indicates the importance of "political confessionalism" as a voting determinant in the Weimar party system. He also believes that Weimar voting patterns amply confirm the explanatory value of distinguishing between confessional and nonconfessional parties and voters. In the first place the persistence of class and religious cleavages in the Weimar electorate demonstrates to him the success that Catholic and left parties had in "binding" their voters to them. Secondly, in his view, the presence of "confessional parties" accounts for the unusual elements of stability in Weimar Germany's generally volatile party system. Finally, Burnham sees in the comparatively stable levels of support for the Catholic-based Center Party and for the Marxist parties proof of how effectively "political confessionalism" immunized broad sectors of the Weimar electorate even against the appeals of a party so aggressive and well-organized as the

NSDAP.

Burnham ascribes the instability in Weimar voting primarily to nonconfessional voters. Thus he shows that this sector of the Weimar electorate displayed the greatest discontinuity in the parties it supported. Liberal voters were the least attached to their parties. Conservative voters and supporters of interest groups also failed to make stable commitments. More important, nonconfessional and above all liberal voters offered least resistance to the NSDAP's appeals. In other words, the nonconfessional parties failed to integrate their partisans and hence to "immunize" them to outside appeals. The Nazis had no difficulties in capturing their attention and support.[22]

For Shively the "freezing" of cleavages that he regarded as one of the most unusual features of the Weimar Republic's party system was the "result not so much of the political parties 'binding' of the voters' loyalty, as of some other process."[23] This he attributes to a number of distinctive conditions: In Weimar Germany, social and economic cleavages and conflicts coincided with a clear choice of parties relative to these conflicts; Weimar voters had a strong sense of the "social group to which they belonged (proletarian or Catholic or Protestant bourgeois) and ... were able to identify the "political party or parties appropriate to that group."[24] These conditions, in turn, meant that Weimar voters could "place" themselves within one of the Weimar Republic's three socially-based party blocs (comprised by the Marxist, Catholic and Protestant bourgeois parties, respectively).[25]

Such perceptions of social conflict Shively argues, meant that Weimar voters did not have to go through "the arduous and time-consuming

task of developing party identification."[26] His hypothesis, then, is that: "If the social or economic conflicts in which a voter is involved are sufficiently clear; and if the position of parties or groups of parties with regard to these conflicts is sufficiently clear; then there is no need for the voter to develop lasting ties to any party per se, and he will not do do."[27] This formulation derives from Anthony Downs and others who have applied economic theory to the study of political behavior. Following that school, Shively concludes that "voters learn to choose a particular party regularly as a way of avoiding the difficult, and in a certain sense 'expensive,' task of gathering information to make their voting choice on some other basis."[28]

Consequently, a voter who regarded himself as a regular supporter of a given party is thus provided with an "easy way to decide his vote at each election without seeking out other information."[29] In Shively's view, voters who see themselves as members of a distinct social or economic group and who have identified a party or group of parties as the appropriate spokesman of their group may not "need a further guide in voting." And since a voter's "economic and social position coupled with the linkage of some party(ies) to that position provides him with sufficient voting cues he does not need to identify directly with a party."[30]

Hence Shively defines the "Weimar system" of voting as one in "which voter choices were structured by social and economic cleavages" in such a way that voters never had to develop strong attachments to an individual party as such.[31] The absence of such affective voter bonds to parties, in Shively's view, accounts for much of the volatility

in Weimar electoral politics. But, as he stresses, the ability of Weimar voters to be guided in their partisan behavior by their membership in distinct social and economic groups also constituted an important source of electoral stability. For it meant that while the "vote for particular parties could be quite fluid," aggregate support for the three socially based party blocs (Marxist, Catholic and Protestant bourgeois) was quite stable." In other words, when Weimar voters moved from one party to another, such shifts occurred primarily within the various blocs. Although the leaders of parties within a given bloc perceived major differences among themselves, "voters at the mass level saw essentially only Marxist, Catholics and the parties of the Protestant bourgeoisie."[32]

This pattern of voting explains for Shively both the selectivity and the rapidity of the NSDAP's electoral "contagion." Weimar voters clearly had no trouble in identifying the NSDAP's appropriate partisan position. Marxist, Catholic as well as Protestant bourgeois voters did not hesitate to treat it as a party whose "natural" electorate was the Protestant bourgeoisie. Once it was so tagged, _tendance_ voting set precise limits to the NSDAP's electoral appeal. On the other hand, the fact that "nonconfessional" voters found the NSDAP's positions and programs compatible with the interests, claims, demands traditionally voiced by the Protestant bourgeoisie and its parties, considerably facilitated the NSDAP's mobilization of this electorate. Even prior to 1928, Protestant bourgeois voters had shown a pronounced predilection for exploring the various partisan alternatives open to them

within the Protestant bourgeois bloc. As Shively remarked, "In this light, the shift of votes from the other Protestant/non-Marxist parties to the Nazis, although the results were monstrous, does not appear to have been such an exceptional event."[33]

On the basis of their respective analyses of Weimar voting, both Burnham and Shively concluded that party identification as defined by American voting theorists does not account for the qualities peculiar to Weimar electoral politics. Both authors agree that what made Weimar voting so unusual were the extreme fluctuations in voter support for individual parties on the one hand and the extraordinary stability of the three main party blocs or tendances on the other.

In analyzing the Franconian voting evidence, therefore, I have tried to test the hypotheses of Burnham and Shively at the regional level. This entails seeking to answer these questions raised by them: 1) Were voter movements largely confined to parties? 2) Were continuity rates for the main party blocs higher than for the parties that composed them? 3) Did voters always opt for parties within the same bloc or did they at times move to parties in another bloc?

Burnham and Shively further agree that when compared to the other blocs, partisan support within the Protestant bourgeois camp was the most unstable, and that the "Nazi contagion" was confined to voters within this bloc. They also found no differences in their susceptibility to the Nazi appeal among supporters of the various types of parties composing this bloc (i.e. centrist, rightwing or special interest). In analyzing any regional voting data therefore, the following questions need to be answered: 1) Did Protestant bourgeois

voters consistently show more unstable patterns of support than Catholic and left voters? 2) Did the NSDAP's support come exclusively from within the Protestant bourgeois camp or did it also attract Catholic and left voters? 3) Was this true for the entire period in which it competed or did its sources of support change with time? 4) Did liberal voters show any greater tendency to support the NSDAP than conservative voters? Finally, since both Burnham and Shively minimize the role played by previous nonparticipants in the NSDAP's growth, it is important to consider whether their conclusion holds true for Franconia.

II

Meckstroth, like Burnham and Shively, addresses himself to the party identification theory of electoral change. Unlike them, however, Meckstroth does not call into question the importance of durable, nonrational attachments to a party as a voting determinant in the U.S. as well as in other party systems. Having accepted the significance of party identification, he focuses primarily on explanations of individual and aggregate voting changes proposed by the leading theorists of voting behavior.

Meckstroth's particular interest is in those long-term alterations of partisan orientations called "realignments." More specifically, he poses two questions: Is the notion of realignment applicable only to a peculiarly American phenomenon? Or is it equally indispensable to explaining electoral upheavals of the type experienced by Weimar Germany after 1928? In his analysis of Weimar voting during the 1928-1933 elections, Meckstroth sought to prove two theses, both of which,

if true, are highly significant: 1) that its post-1928 electoral upheavals should be considered as a long-term transformation of Weimar Germany's party system; 2) that between 1928 and 1933, Weimar electoral patterns can best be explained by those "crisis" theories of realignment found in the American voting literature.

Meckstroth's objectives and conceptual approach are novel, as is his use of regression analysis to estimate individual-level voter movements. His treatment of the NSDAP's electoral growth is thus potentially interesting and important. This prompted me to compare and contrast his major empirical and theoretical claims with those made in the better-known work of Bendix and Lipset, Burnham and Shively.

The properties and sources of partisan realignments were first identified by V.O. Key, Jr. Analyzing American elections between 1888 and 1952, Key found the general stability of the American party system to have been profoundly disturbed on two occasions: in the 1880s and 1890s, when the Republicans replaced the Democrats as the majority party; and in the 1920s and 1930s, when the Democrats became once more the dominant party. In his article, "A Theory of Critical Elections," Key isolated one type of election "in which more or less profound readjustments occur in the relations of power within the community and in which new and durable groupings are formed."[34] He coined the term "realignment" to distinguish such exceptionally <u>sharp</u> and <u>long-lasting</u> alterations in the division of the American electorate.[35]

From the perspective of party identification theorists, realignments are anomalies. For to them party identification is a learned attitude acquired early in life and continually reinforced. Thus

these theorists expect only minor or temporary changes in the "standing commitments" of American voters. In responding to Key's discovery of this anomalous set of counter-examples, party identification theorists found it necessary to distinguish among three types of elections: those in which voter movements leave the existing configuration of partisan support unchanged; those in which voting shifts temporarily upset long-established partisan divisions; and those in which voting shifts cause a fundamental and durable change in patterns of partisan support. Party identification theorists have defined these three categories respectively as "maintaining," "deviating," and "realigning" elections.[36]

The notion of realignment thus called attention to a most unusual and interesting feature of American electoral history. But other democracies have experienced no less dramatic and enduring electoral changes. Hence the interest of Meckstroth's effort to ask whether and to what extent the concept of realignment can be applied as well to major electoral transformations in other contemporary party systems.

At first glance, this concept does not seem a likely product for export. As Meckstroth is careful to emphasize, the American party system is exceptional. In most systems elsewhere, numerous parties compete against each other. Few modern party systems have an electoral history so long and uninterrupted as the United States. In most other party systems, party and voter alignments are far more complex and rigid than the American.

Given these striking differences, it might seem almost impossible to apply the concept of realignment to contemporary multi-party systems.

As Meckstroth has pointed out, essential to the notion of realignment are the following propositions: a) that realignments cause a reversal in the positions of two parties "arrayed on a majority-minority dimension;" b) that it is possible to discern over a period of time, a "normal" vote on the basis of which "deviating" and "realigning" partisan shifts can be identified; c) that there is a "typical" realignment sequence whereby a party system moves from stability to dealignment to restabilization; d) that the new configuration of voting which emerges from realignments is durable; e) that partisan attitudes in an electorate may change as voters confront potent issues not previously encountered.[37]

In the American setting where the same two parties have competed against each other over an exceptionally long and unbroken period of time, all these components of realignment can be easily identified. But those concerned to apply the concept of realignment to electoral change elsewhere, cannot always find equivalents for these characteristics. The very notion of realignment, defined as any lasting reversal in the positions of majority and minority parties, would seem on its face, to be inapplicable to systems where many parties compete. For such reversals are unlikely in multi-party systems. Permanently divided by traditional cleavages, extensive voter movements do not necessarily produce an electoral majority for any party. Nor are voting shifts in multi-party systems likely to alter permanently existing alignment patterns or the prevailing distribution of political power.

In such systems, it is far more difficult to establish what constitutes a "normal" vote, whether for individual parties or for the

system as a whole. Nor is it always possible to specify either those voter movements which break "sharply" with previous patterns of electoral behavior or which produce "durable" transformations in the existing structure of partisan conflict. Since few party systems have so long and continuous an electoral history as the United States, it is often impossible even to distinguish the main phases of the realignment process, much less to determine the long-term implications of certain voting changes. Such problems become particularly acute in the analysis of electoral change in a party system so short-lived and turbulent as that of Weimar Germany.[38]

Despite these difficulties, Meckstroth believes it possible to make such adjustments in the concept of realignment as are needed to accommodate the peculiarities of multi-party systems. To overcome the difficulties posed by conceiving of parties arrayed only along the majority-minority dimension, Meckstroth suggests that for all party systems, available partisan alternatives be divided into three classes: primary competing parties, secondary competing parties, and ineffective parties.

In Meckstroth's view, the category of "primary competing parties" is a term applicable to a single party whose electoral support is so preponderant as to make its displacement unlikely. Alternatively, the term may designate two or more parties which together receive the greatest share of the votes cast in a country, but whose margin of the vote is small enough to leave unpredictable their electoral position from one election to the next. Meckstroth defines as "secondary competing parties" those which consistently win a sizeable proportion of

the vote but whose support never reaches a level large enough to displace primary competing parties. By "ineffective parties" Meckstroth means those which generally receive about five percent or less of the vote.[39]

On the basis of this classification, Meckstroth proposes two different types of realignment. The first involves a change in the competitive rank of contending parties, such as a reversal between majority and minority parties.[40] The second type of realignment entails a change in the competitive class of one or more parties. In this type of realigning situations, Meckstroth suggests, parties shift "into or out of the class of primary competing parties, into or out of the class of secondary competing parties or ..... of ineffective parties."[41]

By reformulating the concept of realignment to mean a change in a party's competitive rank or class, Meckstroth believes he has made it possible to apply the concept to electoral change even in multi-party systems with an unusually large array of competing parties. In other words, by focusing on a party's competitive position or any change thereof, it is possible to specify whether voting shifts away or toward one or more parties are realigning in so far as they alter the previous configuration of party competition. Similarly, by concentrating on a party's competitive location, it becomes quite easy to determine whether voting shifts away or toward it brought about a durable or merely short-term change in its political fortunes.[42]

For Meckstroth, this reformulation seems to resolve as well the problem of identifying partisan reorientations in highly segmented

party systems. By limiting the notion of realignment to changes in the competitive status of one or more parties vis-à-vis other parties, the effects of social cleavages can largely be ignored. In terms of Meckstroth's reformulation, then, it simply does not matter whether realigning changes occur within or outside existing cleavage lines. Voter movements that alter a party's competitive position he considers to be realigning, even if they leave intact existing lines of social and electoral conflict.

Meckstroth is no less pragmatic about settling on a time period suitable for analyzing realigning changes in different party systems. Essentially he advocates that such periods be determined by each country's special "temporal and spatial circumstances." As for the typical realignment sequence identified by American voting analysts--stability, destabilization and restabilization--Meckstroth treats them as essentially analytical distinctions. In his view, it is not necessary either to propose a "rigid time relation among these states" or to conceive of a sequential and inevitable transition from one phase to the next.[44]

To determine what constitutes a "normal" vote in multi-party systems, especially in unstable ones, is more difficult for Meckstroth. In fact, he does not believe in fixed criteria for doing so. So far as he is concerned, which voting shifts ought to be "designated as 'realignments' for any given aggregation depends on long-range developments _in that aggregation_, and cannot necessarily be inferred from conditions elsewhere."[45] He does, however, suggest that by distinguishing, on the one hand, random variations around a constant mean of a party's

aggregate vote from systematic changes in a party's mean vote, on the other, it may be possible to establish what constitutes normal or realigning change for a given party.

Meckstroth holds that the post-1928 electoral upheavals in Weimar Germany amounted to a realignment as he defines it. Between 1928 and July 1932, he argues, individual voter shifts to other parties caused major changes in the competitive positions of several parties. Most important among these transformations were the following:

1) The NSDAP's shift from the category of ineffective to that of primary competing party;
2) the KPD's elevation from a secondary to a primary competing party;
3) a change from primary competing to ineffective status for parties of the "bourgeois center";
4) a decline in the position of the DNVP from a primary to a secondary competing party.

Meckstroth finds also that the 1928-1933 elections followed the typical realignment sequence from stability to destabilization to restabilization. The realigning elections of 1928-1933 were preceded by a period of relative electoral stability: in the Reichstag elections of December 1924 and May 1928 aggregate and individual voting changes were far smaller than in any other Reichstag election during the 1919-1933 electoral span. After the 1928 Reichstag election, Weimar Germany entered a period of extreme destabilization. Although fluctuations in voter support for parties were always considerable in the Weimar Republic, after 1928 voting changes, both individual and aggregate, reached unprecedented levels. Meckstroth argues that the principal

outcome of the 1930-1933 elections was a shift to the Nazis so massive that it was unlikely to be reversed for some time, even had there been free elections. Furthermore, he claims to have demonstrated that support for the NSDAP was far more stable than had been the case for any other of the Protestant parties. Both the magnitude of the Nazi vote and the stability of its support during the 1930-1933 period lead him to conclude that the changes brought about after 1928 would have been durable and that elections after 1933 would have "restabilized" Germany's electoral situation.[46]

Although American analysts of electoral behavior have defined realignments as exceptional, Meckstroth contends that there has been relatively little theoretical discussion about necessary and sufficient conditions--at the individual and aggregate level--for electorates to give up permanently their previously held political allegiances and adopt new ones.[47]

To improve methods for analyzing realignments comparatively, Meckstroth tried to isolate from the American voting literature the main explanations for both short-term and realigning voting changes. In Meckstroth's view, such explanations whether of short-term or of realigning electoral changes, fall into two categories. Using terms first used by Donald Stokes,[48] Meckstroth defines the first category as "position issue explanations" and the second category as "valence issue explanations."[49] The first explanation presupposes that in all party systems there generally exist lines of conflict that remain stable over time. These cleavages, in turn, contribute to the division of parties and electorates into distinctive, rival groupings,

each of which advocates its own particular set of preferred governmental policies. In the United States, political and electoral divisions are said to arise over such explosive issues as civil rights, government intervention in the economy or social welfare provisions. In other systems, the dividing line may be determined by ideology, class, or confession. Position issue explanations assume that electoral conflict generally involves "single, stable issue domains," each of which elicits highly differentiated responses by parties and voters. Consequently, voters move to whichever party they think best represents their "side" in any given conflict. It is also assumed that voting is ideologically or socially consistent, i.e. that a voter's response to issues and parties corresponds to his location on a given dimension. Hence, voter shifts across existing lines of division are not to be expected, even in periods of crisis.[50]

"Valence issue explanations" of voting reject the notion of fixed voter responses to each and every issue. Rather, such explanations presuppose issues which simply cause voters to link parties with some condition about which they feel positively or negatively. The choice of party, therefore, hinges on voter assessment of where credit or blame is due. Or it may depend on voter feelings about which party, given control over the government, is likely to cause the situation to improve or to deteriorate further. In party systems where cleavage lines remain stable over time, "valence issue" explanations presuppose that issues may arise, about which <u>all</u> voters feel much the same way and which, therefore, prompt voter movements transcending these long-established lines of electoral division. Stokes and Meckstroth

cite controversies involving economic well-being, i.e. depression- or prosperity-related arguments as the purest type of valence issue. But issues involving corruption, national prestige, or the personality and performance of the candidates in a given election also fall into this class.[51]

For the most part, American voting analysts have offered what Meckstroth would call "valence issue explanations" of realignment. Burnham, for example, contends that realigning or critical elections in the U.S. have generally been closely "associated with abnormal stress in the socioeconomic system." Campbell agrees that realignments have occurred only in periods of "extraordinary national crisis."[52] Both authors concur in the view that this type of election is marked by increasing conflicts over governmental policies. In the course of such polarization, voters come to associate the main parties with clearly contrasting programs for solving the national crisis.[53]

Meckstroth too subscribes to this explanation in his analysis of Weimar voting. But he believes that American analyses have failed to specify sufficiently just which conditions are required for crises or "valence issues" to initiate basic transformations in partisan attitudes and behavior. Nor have explanations of American realignments isolated precisely which voting pattern distinguishes this type of election. In Meckstroth's opinion, both these issues must be resolved before realignments can be studied comparatively. This he attempts to do.[54]

According to Meckstroth realignments or long-term changes in existing configurations of partisan conflict occur only under the pressure of some condition so adverse (or as he says, <u>punishing</u>) as a severe and

prolonged depression intensely felt by voters of all parties. Such crisis conditions must affect all voters equally. For in cases where economic upheavals harm some portions of the electorate but benefit others (he cites inflation), voter movements in response to this crisis may cancel each other out. Furthermore, for a crisis to produce realignments, voters must also be able to discriminate among the competing parties those they hold responsible for adversity, and those parties they believe capable of bringing relief. In other words, Meckstroth argues, voters must share the same criteria for distinguishing between governing and opposition or nongoverning parties.

How, then, is it possible to determine whether realigning changes in any electorate have been caused by "valence issues" or crises? In Meckstroth's view, the impact of a crisis on voters may manifest itself in several ways. First, "crisis elections" produce far greater aggregate and individual voting changes than do non-crisis or "normal" elections. Secondly, during crisis elections the overwhelming majority of those who switch parties move away from governing and toward opposition parties. Third, crisis elections lead to sharp increases in aggregate voting turn-out. Fourth, those who enter the electorate at this point support opposition parties and generally avoid governing parties or parties associated with a governing coalition.

Meckstroth's examination of Weimar voting convinces him that a crisis or "valence issue" explanation provides by far the best understanding of electoral upheavals after 1928.

Thus the depression generated uniformly punishing consequences across all sectors of German society.[56] While in Weimar Germany, it

was not always easy to distinguish governing from opposition parties, Meckstroth is convinced that voters generally had no difficulty in making such a distinction, "even if this only meant distinguishing the Nazis and the KPD from everyone else."[57]

Meckstroth also found the behavior of the German electorate to be generally consistent with a valence issue explanation. Thus his analysis of Weimar voting data revealed that both "aggregate changes and the estimates of electoral transition indicate that an extra-ordinarily large proportion of the electorate switched from one party to the other."[58] The evidence further indicates that the overwhelming majority of Weimar voters "moved away from parties associated with the Weimar "system" (such as the DDP, DVP, SPD) and toward parties opposed to the Republic, (the NSDAP and KPD).[59] The depression led to a sharp increase in voting. Most previous abstainers showed a pronounced tendency to avoid parties associated with the Republic's coalition government.[60] Finally, Meckstroth insists that voter movements after 1928 transcended the traditional divisions within the Weimar electorate. Meckstroth, in contrast to Burnham and Shively, uses Lipset's division of parties and voters into those of left, right,and center. On the basis of his evidence that the NSDAP attracted supporters from parties of the center and right, Meckstroth argues that the Great Depression of 1929 reduced the significance of these older barriers (or position issues, to use his term) for Weimar voters. He sees further confirmation in shifts to the NSDAP by former SPD voters.[61]

In Meckstroth's view, too many accounts of voting changes in European party systems confine themselves to "position issue" explana-

tions. Such analyses have stressed the effects of class, confessional, or ideological conflicts on partisan behavior and preferences. Historians, he argues, have on the whole, taken this line in efforts to explain National Socialism's electoral success as well as Weimar Germany's chronic electoral instability. Meckstroth would seem to group together Lipset, Burnham and Shively as theorists who despite their other differences depend upon "position issue" explanations. In his view, neither the conditions nor the voting patterns consistent with this type of explanation can be found in the Weimar party system between 1928-1933.

Had Weimar voters been guided by position issues, (i.e. had the left, right, center divisions of politics been relevant to them), Meckstroth argues, voter movements after 1928 would have been quite different. Thus, the evidence would have to demonstrate conclusively that: 1) in changing parties Weimar voters never crossed the ideological barriers separating parties of the left, right, center; 2) that those voters who left any of these blocs then moved into that one most adjacent to it; in other words, in defecting from a party of the left, a voter would have moved to a party of the center and not to one of the right; 3) that Weimar voters systematically avoided certain partisan alternatives, e.g. that voters of the right systematically avoided parties of the left and vice versa.[62] He found no such evidence.

Meckstroth concedes some evidence to indicate that Weimar voting was shaped by traditional divisions or conflicts in German society and politics. But he claims that Weimar voters failed to follow consistently a pattern of voting appropriate to an electorate for which "position

issues" remained highly salient.[63] Meckstroth also admits that some electoral developments in the 1928-1933 period could not be reconciled with a "valence issue" or crisis explanation. Thus he found defections from the DNVP between 1928 and 1930 too high to be explained only by the economic concerns of this party's supporters. The voting behavior of the Catholic-based Center Party, Meckstroth feels, also deviated from the expected crisis pattern. In view of the fact that the Center Party constituted one of the pillars of the Weimar governing coalition, it should have experienced heavy voting losses in both 1930 and July 1932. But its partisans showed unusually low defection rates in these elections. They moved away from their party only after it began to negotiate with the NSDAP.[64]

Meckstroth explains the Center Party's stability by emphasizing the importance of its voters' religious affiliation. In other words, he suggests that because Center Party voters were bound to their party by strong religious bonds, they did not use the same criteria for evaluating their party's performance that were applied by supporters of other parties. Hence Catholic partisan commitments were far less affected by the 1929 Depression than any other group in the Weimar electorate.[65]

To Meckstroth, the DNVP's voting pattern also requires a special explanation. In his view this party was the only one among those competing in the Weimar party system that itself encouraged defections of its voters to the NSDAP. Thus voters left the DNVP only because internal division and splits had turned the DNVP into an ineffective contender just when voters were searching for parties capable of resolving the country's crisis. That former DNVP supporters turned to the NSDAP re-

sulted from the fact that the DNVP leaders, had directly or implicitly "legitimized" the National Socialists by cooperating with the Nazis and by adopting its political course.[66] According to Meckstroth, the DNVP voting pattern demonstrated that parties themselves can initiate realigning changes. He therefore suggests an additional explanation for realignments which he calls "valence issue C model."[64]

In assessing Meckstroth's treatment of Weimar voting between 1928 and 1933 and his explanations of the NSDAP's electoral growth, two issues particularly need to be addressed. First, how useful is his own concept of realignment for understanding post-1928 voting changes? Secondly, how adequate is his explanations of the electoral upheavals that marked the Republic's final electoral phase?

Although a regional analysis of Franconia cannot determine whether or not Germany as a whole experienced a realignment, such a geographically limited investigation can establish potential deficiencies in the concept of realignment defined and used by Meckstroth. Thus one issue I examine is whether in a system of stable voting blocs any change in a party's competitive rank or class suffices to be classified as "realignment" or whether such a change must also bring about a transformation in previous alignment patterns and distribution of power.

Meckstroth's notion of realignment raises additional questions that need to be resolved: 1) Given the brevity and turbulence of Weimar electoral politics does it make sense to divide Weimar elections into normal and realigning ones? 2) How can realigning sequences be distinguished in a party system where parties experience realigning changes at different points in time? 3) Were post-1928 voting changes actually

more extreme than in pre-1928 elections? 4) How strong is the evidence that the NSDAP would have been able to maintain its new competitive position over time even with free elections?

A second set of questions raised by Meckstroth's study involves his explanation of the 1928-1932 voting changes. Although Meckstroth favors "valence issue explanations," it remains to be seen whether voting trends in Franconia followed a pattern consistent with this type of explanation. Another question that needs to be resolved is whether Meckstroth's conception of position issues adequately accounts for the lines of conflict within the Weimar electorate. As I try to demonstrate, Meckstroth, by focusing all attention on the left-right-center dimension ignored other types of position issues relevant to Weimar voters such as those of class and confession. In other words, if as Burnham and Shively contend, aggregate and individual level support for the three socially-based tendances they identified remained stable throughout the 1928-1933 period, can it not be argued that class and religion were position issues which remained highly salient to Weimar voters even in times of crisis? If voter movements across cleavage lines declined after 1928, does that not signify an increased saliency of traditional conflicts among Weimar voters?

Meckstroth also considers party efficacy and image as possible voting determinants. However, he does so only for the DNVP. But did not the NSDAP's improved organization and new image serve to encourage voter defections? Did not the declining organizational strength of liberal and special interest parties and their increased shift to the right stimulate defections to the NSDAP? In my regional analysis I show

that shifts to the NSDAP by Protestant bourgeois voters had less to do with the Depression than with the NSDAP's reorganization and reorientation on the one hand, and the decomposition of all Protestant bourgeois parties on the other.

Meckstroth's dissertation offers an extremely interesting and innovative approach--both substantively and methodologically--to the analysis of Weimar voting in general and the NSDAP's growth in particular. His attempt to extend concepts and explanations developed on the basis of American voting theories is not, in my view, altogether successful. But like Burnham and Shively, his work demonstrates how important it is to test general theories about political behavior both at carefully chosen points in time and in varied political settings. The next chapters examine just what is the evidence for the theories set out both in this chapter and the one that preceded it. I shall first survey the principal characteristics that distinguished the Weimar party system before I turn to the analysis of voting behavior in Franconia.

FOOTNOTES

1. Walter Dean Burnham, "Political Immunization and Political Confessionalism," Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 3 (1972), 1-30; W. Phillips Shively, "Party Identification, Party Choice and Voting Stability, The Weimar Case," American Political Science Review, 56 (1972), 1203-1225; Theodore W. Meckstroth, Conditions of Partisan Alignments: A Study of Electoral Change (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Minnesota, 1971).

2. Angus Campbell, Phillip E. Converse, Warren E. Millar and Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter. (New York: 1960), pp. 50-51. Phillip E. Converse, "The Stability of Belief Elements Over Time" in Richard Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg, eds., Controversies in American Voting Behavior, (San Francisco, 1976) pp. 85-93. Phillip E. Converse, "Of Time and Partisan Stability," Comparative Political Studies, 2 (1969), 141-142. William McPhee, et al., Public Opinion and Congressional Elections (Glencoe, Ill. 1962).

3. Among the theorists who have posited the collapse of Weimar Germany and the triumph of Nazism as a "negative" example in support of their own contentions are Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston, 1965); Harry Eckstein, Division and Cohesion in Norway (New York, 1965); Bernard E. Berelson, "Democratic Theory and Public Opinion," in Heinz Eulau et al., eds., Political Behavior (Glencoe, Ill., 1956); Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory (New York, 1964).

4. Robert Dahl, Who Governs (New Haven, 1961), pp. 276-281; Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, "Civic Culture", pp. 45-64, 113-121; Angus Campbell, et al., American Voter, pp. 50-55, Phillip E. Converse, "Partisan Stability," pp. 141-142.

5. For a summary of this literature and its arguments, see Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, John R. Petrocik, The Changing American Voter. (Cambridge, Mass., 1976), pp. 29-41.

6. ibid.

7. Burnham, "Immunization," pp. 4-5.

8. ibid., p. 6.

9. ibid., p. 4
10. ibid.
11. ibid., pp. 6-7, Shively, "Party Identification," p. 1221.
12. Shively, "Party Identification," p. 1224.
13. ibid., 1220-1221; Burnham, "Immunization," pp. 7-9.
14. Burnham, "Immunization," p. 9.
15. ibid. 3-7; Shively, "Party Identification," pp. 1220-1221.
16. Shively, "Party Identification," pp. 1212-1214.
17. Burnham, "Immunization," p. 2.
18. ibid.
19. ibid., p. 3.
20. ibid.
21. ibid., p. 9.
22. ibid.
23. Shively, "Party Identification," p. 1224.
24. ibid., p. 1222.
25. ibid., p. 1221.
26. ibid., p. 1222.
27. ibid.
28. ibid.
29. ibid.
30. ibid.
31. ibid.
32. ibid., p. 1221.
33. ibid., p. 1222.

34. V.O. Key, Jr., "A Theory of Critical Elections," Journal of Politics, vol. 17 (1955), pp. 3-18; Key's theory has been further developed and refined by Walter Dean Burnham, especially in his book Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics (New York, 1970).

35. Key, "Critical Elections," p. 4.

36. Angus Campbell, "A Classification of Presidential Elections," in Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, Donald Stokes, eds., Elections and the Political Order (New York, 1966), pp. 63-73.

37. Meckstroth, Partisan Realignment, p. 6. The problems arising from applying American concepts to non-American party systems have also been discussed by Juergen Falter in "Einige Empirische Ergebnisse eines Uebertragungsversuchs des Konzepts der Partei-identifikations auf Deutsche Verhaeltnisse," Forschungsbericht 80.01 fuer die Hochschule der Bundeswehr (Munich, 1981). (The report was kindly provided by the author.)

38. Meckstroth, Partisan Realignment, pp. 10-12.

39. ibid., pp. 11-12.

40. ibid.

41. ibid., p. 13.

42. ibid., p. 11.

43. ibid., p. 18.

44. ibid., p. 46.

45. ibid., p. 14.

46. ibid., pp. 19-24.

47. ibid., p. 27.

48. Stokes, "Models," pp. 170-172.

49. Meckstroth, Partisan Realignments, p. 28.

50. ibid., p. 30; Stokes, "Models," pp. 170-171.

51. ibid. Stokes admits, however, that it is not always easy to decide whether a given set of problems should be classified as position or valence issues. He believes that this decision must be made on empirical rather than logical grounds.

52. Burnham, "Critical Elections," p. 10; Angus Campbell, "Surge and Decline: A Study in Electoral Change," in Campbell, et al., Elections, p. 45.

53. Campbell, "Classification," p. 76; Burnham, Critical Elections, p. 10.

54. Meckstroth, Partisan Realignments, pp. 43-47.

55. ibid., p. 188.

56. ibid.

57. ibid., p. 189.

58. ibid.

59. ibid.

60. ibid.

61. ibid., p. 192.

62. ibid., pp. 32-38.

63. ibid., pp. 94-104.

64. ibid., pp. 106-111.

65. ibid., pp. 156-159.

66. ibid., pp. 165-176.

67. ibid., p. 28

CHAPTER III

INSTABILITY AND POLARIZATION: ELECTORAL DEVELOPMENTS IN WEIMAR GERMANY, 1919-1933

The purpose of this chapter is to emphasize a point raised in the Introduction. There I argued that the electoral development of National Socialism was decisively affected by its late arrival on the political scene. As a new party which hoped to create a broadly-based constituency, the NSDAP was nevertheless faced by a party system, the main features of which had already crystallized before 1914. The NSDAP's inability to break down the traditional class and confessional barriers separating German voters meant that it could develop a mass base only by mobilizing the Protestant bourgeois electorate. What I try to show in this chapter is that the NSDAP's success depended upon the extent to which German politics were polarized. This at once created an opportunity and set limits for the Nazis' growth.

This chapter examines both the elements of instability and stability of voting behavior during the Weimar Republic. I do not deny the importance of conditions that have been presented as explanations of Weimar voting patterns. These include the adverse internal and international circumstances confronting Germany after World War I, the Weimar electoral system, the high rates of popular participation in politics, the structural defects of the Weimar constitution, the

Republic's mediocre political leadership, and the great economic crisis of 1929. Yet none of them separately, nor even all of them together, in fact undermined these deeply embedded social and political divisions that the Republic inherited from the Second Empire.

In this chapter, by the use of aggregate evidence, I demonstrate that the extraordinary fluctuations in voter support for individual parties, a steady shift away from parties identified with the Republic and toward parties fundamentally opposed to it--all occurred within the boundaries of the three principal party blocs specified in Chapter II. These blocs comprising the Catholic, socialist and Protestant bourgeois parties respectively, first emerged prior to World War I. Despite fundamental changes in Germany's form of government and electoral system, the proportionate share of the electorate's vote throughout the 1919-1933 elections remained both close to pre-war levels and remarkably stable over time. I also offer aggregate evidence to support two of Burnham's and Shively's claims: first, that the NSDAP's electoral growth came primarily at the expense of Protestant bourgeois parties; second, that the massive shifts to the NSDAP were limited by the durable barriers among competing party blocs. In short, the NSDAP never was able to attract any significant part of the Catholic and socialist electorates.

My survey of voting trends in this chapter relies on aggregate evidence, while the next chapter examines the features of Weimar voting behavior by individual-level transition estimates. Aggregate analysis should clarify the significance of individual voting changes examined in the subsequent two chapters. Were I to focus exclusively on indi-

vidual voting changes, this might obscure their impact upon the larger configuration of partisan politics. In this chapter I compare national voting trends to those in Franconia. This is done to show how much Franconian voting patterns paralleled those of the Republic as a whole. Hence Franconia provides an excellent setting for testing theories developed to explain electoral developments at the national level. This chapter also identifies those differences in Franconia voting trends that may be ascribed to conditions peculiar to that region.

This chapter is divided into three sections. The first deals with Weimar Germany's electoral instability and some of the explanations that have been offered for it. Section II examines the elements of stability in Weimar voting, i.e. the persistence of pre-war party blocs; it also analyzes the NSDAP's growth and its success in consolidating behind it the Protestant bourgeois vote. Section III then turns to review the conditions that in the Weimar Republic and, before it, in Imperial Germany, helped produce a deeply divided and polarized society.

I

Germany's first attempt at democracy, it has frequently been pointed out, could hardly have been made under less favorable conditions. The Weimar Republic was founded after Germany's disastrous and unexpected defeat in World War I. At its inception, the Republic's new leaders, lacking any extensive executive or policy-making experience, were forced to deal with severe economic and social dislocations caused by the war, with communist uprisings in many areas of Germany, with extensive political violence, as well as with a humiliating and punitive

peace treaty. Even so the Republic might have survived its inauspicious beginning and been able to establish its legitimacy had it not been for succession of crises it had to confront almost continually throughout its existence.

In rapid succession, the new democratic regime faced an attempted military coup by rightwing forces within the army and bureaucracy (the Kapp Putsch of 1920); the formation of a Red Army in the Ruhr area by communists which necessitated using the army to destroy it (in 1920); the assassination of Matthias Erzberger (in 1921) and Walther Rathenau (in 1922); the French invasion of the Ruhr (1923); a devastating inflation which impoverished large sectors of Germany's middle class (1922/1923); Hitler's Beerhall Putsch in Bavaria (1923); attempted communist revolutions in Saxony and Thuringia again making it necessary to order their bloody suppression by the national army (1923).[1] These shocks were followed by an all too brief respite.

With the stabilization of Germany's currency, the adoption of a less stringent schedule of reparations payments by the Allies (the Dawes Plan), and long-term American loans, the Weimar Republic finally achieved economic recovery and even prosperity. This was the time when many of the Republic's most strident foes fell into disarray, withdrew altogether from politics, or else suffered humiliating electoral defeats. Conservative opponents of the Republic now found it possible to accommodate themselves to the new democratic order and even to enter into governmental coalitions. Those parties most committed to the democratic constitution suddenly received a far more favorable reception than between 1920 and 1924. But this interlude of economic prosperity and

political tranquility lasted barely four years (1924-1928). This was too brief to legitimize the Republic, much less to create support strong enough for it to survive the economic and social devastation caused by the 1929 Depression.[2]

In Weimar Germany, signs of economic trouble appeared as early as 1928, particularly in the agricultural sector. This had been in difficulties throughout the mid-1920s. Following the collapse of the American stock market, however, Germany entered a period of economic upheavals even more disastrous than those of the early post-war period. Between July 1929 and February 1930, the number of unemployed rose from 1.35 million workers to 3.36 million. When Hitler became Chancellor in January 1933, more than six million people (or more than 40 per cent of the total labor force) were out of work. The economic hardships caused by unemployment were all the graver because unemployment insurance programs, as well as governmental relief agencies at all levels, lacked resources sufficient to provide relief for those without work.

Unemployment, however, was only one among other indices of economic collapse. The severity of Germany's economic situation manifested itself also in dramatic downturns in gross national income, industrial production, gross domestic investment, private consumption, government purchases, and both incomes derived from wages or salaries as well as from property and proprietorship. The industrial depression, in turn, led to further deteriorations in agriculture. After 1929 this precipitous drop in consumer purchases, combined with the declining purchasing power of farmers, the unavailability of credit, and the increased costs of production,all contributed to a rapid increase in

foreclosures of farms.[3]

Such a virtually uninterrupted chain of crises had a profound impact on Weimar Germany's electoral and political development. Continuous turbulence was hardly conducive to sustaining the widespread popular support that initially greeted the parties responsible for the Republic's foundation: the Center Party (Zentrum, or Z); the Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, or SPD) and the German Democratic Party (Deutsche Demokratische Partei,or DDP). The decline in voter enthusiasm for these parties was dramatic indeed.

In the election to the National Assembly held in January of 1919, these three parties received 76.1% of all votes cast in that election. In the Republic's first Reichstag election, held only one year later (in December 1920), these parties failed to acquire a majority. With the onset of the 1929 Depression, the Republic's founding parties suffered a further decline in voter support. By March 1933, these parties attracted only a third of the voters who participated in this last Reichstag election. Although the Center Party was as closely identified with the Weimar Constitution and the acceptance of the hated Versailles Treaty as were the SPD and DDP, it never suffered the precipitous electoral decline experienced by these two parties. The Social Democrats lost about half of their initial support, while the DDP was almost completely wiped out. The SPD experienced its most dramatic electoral reversals between the elections of 1919 and 1920. Voting analysts have suggested that in 1919 the SPD received unusually high support from middle class voters who hoped that it might restore internal order and negotiate a favorable peace treaty.[4] A

TABLE 1

PROPORTIONS OF THE VOTES CAST FOR THE REPUBLIC'S FOUNDING PARTIES: 1919-1933

Parties	Elections								
	1919	1920	1924 I	1924 II	1928	1930	1932 I	1932 II	1933
Reich:									
SPD	37.9	21.7	20.5	26.0	29.8	24.5	21.6	20.4	18.3
Z	19.7	18.1	16.7	17.5	15.2	14.8	15.7	15.0	14.0
DDP	18.5	8.3	5.7	6.3	4.8	3.8	1.0	1.0	.9
Total	76.1	48.1	42.9	49.8	49.8	43.1	38.3	36.0	33.2
Franconia:									
SPD	36.4	16.1	23.3	25.9	28.7	25.3	21.2	20.2	19.4
Z	28.1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
DDP	20.0	13.9	4.1	5.6	6.0	3.4	1.1	1.3	.9
Total	84.5	30.0	27.4	31.5	34.7	28.7	22.3	21.5	20.3

SOURCE: Bernhard Vogel, et al. Wahlen in Deutschland (Berlin and New York, 1971): pp. 296-297; For Franconia, Zeitschrift des Bayrischen Statistischen Landesamts (Munich, 1933): vol. 65, p. 300.

few months after the election, however, the National Assembly was forced to accept the harsh terms of the Versailles Peace Treaty. Since the SPD was by far the strongest party in the National Assembly it had to accept much of the odium for this hated treaty.[5]

Then, in the period between the election to the National Assembly and the first Reichstag election in 1920, Germany experienced an unprecedent wave of political violence and attempted seizures of power by extremists on the right and left. Hence in the 1920 Reichstag election middle class voters who had backed the Social Democrats in 1919 now turned their back on this party. It is generally assumed that these voters shifted to the conservative German National People's Party (Deutschnationale Volkspartei, or DNVP) and other parties critical or opposed to the Republic.[6] The unusually high support for the DDP in 1919 and its precipitous decline thereafter has been similarly explained.

As table 1 shows, the national trends tended to appear as well in Franconia. In the 1919 election to the National Assembly, Franconian voters gave an even bigger margin of support to the Republic's founding parties than they received nationally. At the time of the National Assembly elections, the Bavarian branch of the Center Party had not yet seceded. It was to do so shortly thereafter; it reconstituted itself as the Bavarian People's Party (Bayrische Volkspartei, or BVP).

Especially in the period between 1919 and Hitler's unsuccessful Putsch (in 1923), the BVP was an avowed opponent of the Republic. From 1924 on, the BVP entered a more moderate phase but its commitment to the Republic throughout its brief history was half-hearted at best. Consequently, for the post-1919 elections I have given voting proportions

only for the SPD and DDP. As for these two parties, the figures in table 1 show that their decline in Franconia was as dramatic as it was nationally. Between 1919 and 1933, the SPD lost almost half of the aggregate vote it had initially received in Franconia, while the DDP's electoral support in the region all but disappeared.

The atmosphere of crisis surrounding most of the Weimar Reichstag elections worked not only against the parties most closely identified with the Weimar Republic, but against any party that participated in a coalition government. The German People's Party (Deutsche Volkspartei, or DVP) together with the SPD, DDP and Center Party (Z) constituted one of the "pillars" of Weimar coalition governments. But its regular participation in such coalitions entailed a heavy electoral price, as the figures in table 2 indicate. That governmental participation generally led to electoral losses emerges also from a survey of the votes and Reichstag seats received by some other members of Weimar coalition governments, such as the BVP, the DNVP, and the Business Party (Wirtschaftspartei, or WP). The only time Weimar coalition parties increased their votes and Reichstag seats was between the May and December 1924 Reichstag elections. After the 1930 Reichstag election, it was no longer possible to form coalition governments with enough parliamentary support to function. From then on, Weimar governments depended on the President's support and his use of the emergency powers granted under Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution.

TABLE 2

ELECTORAL CHANGES FOR GOVERNING PARTIES: 1920-1930

Election Year	Coalition Partners	% of vote, # of seats	% of vote, # of seats held before	% of vote # of seats
1920	Z	13.6 (69)	19.7 (91)	- 6.1 (-27)
	SPD	21.6 (102)	37.9 (163)	-16.1 (-61)
	DDP	8.4 (39)	18.6 (75)	-10.2 (-36)
	Total	43.6 (205)	76.2 (329)	-32.6 (-124)
1924I	Z	13.4 (65)	13.6 (69)	- .2 (- 4)
	DVP	9.2 (45)	13.9 (62)	- 4.7 (-17)
	DDP	5.7 (28)	8.3 (45)	- 2.6 (-17)
	BVP	3.2 (16)	4.4 (20)	- 1.2 (- 4)
	Total	31.5 (154)	40.2 (196)	- 8.7 (-43)
1924II	Z	13.6 (69)	13.4 (65)	+ .2 (+ 4)
	DVP	10.1 (51)	9.2 (45)	+ .9 (+ 6)
	DDP	6.3 (32)	5.7 (28)	+ .6 (+ 4)
	Total	30.0 (152)	28.3 (138)	+ 1.7 (+14)
1928	Z	12.1 (62)	13.6 (69)	- 1.5 (- 7)
	DNVP	14.2 (73)	20.5 (103)	- 6.3 (-30)
	DVP	8.7 (45)	10.1 (51)	- 1.4 (- 6)
	BVP	3.1 (16)	3.7 (19)	- .6 (- 3)
	Total	38.1 (196)	47.9 (242)	- 9.8 (-46)

TABLE 2--Continued

Election Year	Coalition Partners	% of vote, # of seats	% of vote, # of seats held before	% of vote # of seats
1930	Z	11.8 (68)	12.1 (62)	- .3 (+ 6)
	DDP	3.8 (20)	4.9 (25)	- 1.1 (- 5)
	DVP	4.5 (30)	8.7 (45)	- 4.2 (-15)
	BVP	3.0 (19)	3.1 (16)	- .1 (+ 3)
	WP	3.9 (23)	4.5 (23)	- .6 (+ 0)
	Total	27.0 (160)	33.3 (171)	- 6.3 (-11)

SOURCE: Heino Kaack, Geschichte und Strukturen des Deutschen Parteiensystems (Opladen, 1971): pp. 126-131.

This voter trend away from parties associated in any way with the Republic and its governments clearly benefited parties of what one author calls the "disloyal opposition":[8] the National Socialist Worker Party (Nationalsozialistische Arbeiter Partei, or NSDAP), the Communist Party (Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands, or KPD) and the German Nationalists (DNVP). The DNVP joined several coalition governments in the mid-1920s. Previously in the period before 1924, and again after 1928 it adopted a course of uncompromising hostility toward the Republic and its main party, the SPD.

TABLE 3

PROPORTIONS OF THE TOTAL VOTES CAST FOR PARTIES
OF THE DISLOYAL OPPOSITION: 1920-1933

Parties	Reichstag Elections							
	1920	1924 I	1924 II	1928	1930	1932 I	1932 II	1933
<u>Reich</u>:								
DNVP	15.1	19.4	20.5	14.3	7.0	5.9	8.3	7.9
NSDAP	-	6.5	3.0	2.6	18.3	37.3	33.1	43.9
KPD	2.1	12.6	9.0	10.6	13.1	14.5	16.9	12.3
Total	17.2	38.5	32.5	27.5	38.4	57.7	58.3	64.1
<u>Franconia</u>:								
DNVP	18.4	14.9	23.6	18.8	2.3	4.0	6.6	5.4
NSDAP	-	20.7	7.5	8.5	20.5	39.9	36.4	45.7
KPD	1.1	6.1	3.7	3.2	4.8	6.9	8.5	5.0
Total	19.5	41.7	34.8	30.5	27.6	50.8	51.5	56.1

SOURCE: Bernhard Vogel, et al., <u>Wahlen in Deutschland</u> (Berlin and New York, 1971): pp. 296-297. For Franconia: <u>Zeitschrift des Bayrischen Statistischen Landesamts</u> (Munich, 1933): vol. 65, p. 300.

As the figures in table 3 indicate, support for these radical foes of the Republic was quite high even before the crisis elections of 1930 and 1933. Indeed, these parties received less than a third of the total vote in only two out of eight Reichstag elections. By July 1932 the parties of the disloyal opposition were backed by a majority of

the Weimar Republic's electorate.

Again, as table 3 shows, the trend toward support for these parties in Franconia ran parallel to that in the Reich. The proportion of voters who backed this group of disloyal parties in Franconia was somewhat higher than Reich proportions in the early period largely because of the DNVP's electoral strength in that region before 1928. After that the proportionate support these parties received in Franconia were below the Reich averages; this was due to the disintegration of the DNVP after 1928 and to the KPD's inability to gain a strong foothold in this region. (The reasons for the KPD's weakness in Franconia will be examined in chapter VI.) These national and regional figures suggest that, contrary to Bendix, Lipset and Meckstroth, the 1930-1933 elections did not depart from earlier voting trends. Rather earlier trends were exaggerated during this last election sequence.

Taken together these tendencies were hardly conducive to governmental stability. The electoral losses that seemed to follow from participation in governmental coalitions increasingly discouraged a number of important parties from joining them. This reluctance became all the greater on their part because parties often gained votes while in opposition. The SPD, for example, lost votes as a governing party (between 1919 and 1924), but improved its electoral position between 1924 and 1928 when it was out of the government. Although until July 1932, the SPD remained Germany's strongest party and that one most committed to the Republic, the SPD participated in only eight out of twenty Reich cabinets and headed only four out of twenty coalition governments.[9]

One outcome of this trend away from governmental parties and toward opposition groups was growing governmental instability. Because of the price that might have to be paid for governmental participation, it became increasingly difficult to find coalition partners or to maintain a coalition once it was formed. Between 1920 and 1933, the Republic had twenty different governments, none of which ever served its full term. Secondly, the inability or unwillingness of coalition partners to settle their difference frequently made it necessary to dissolve the Reichstag prematurely and to call for new elections. The Reichstag election of December 1924, for instance, was due to the collapse of a coalition government. The elections of May 1924, September 1930 and November 1932 were all caused by the absence of a parliamentary majority for important legislation advocated by some members of the ruling coalition and opposed by others. In July 1932 and March 1933, elections were called in the hope of improving the electoral position of one or the other coalition partner.

These elections, with the possible exception of that held in December 1924, further destabilized the electoral and political situation. Since they generally weakened government parties and aided those of the opposition, these successive Reichstag elections rarely helped to resolve the deadlocks that had occasioned them. The result was governmental immobilism. Especially after 1930 all parties were increasingly willing to have the executive assume ever greater governmental responsibility. Thus the number of laws passed by the Reichstag declined sharply; the number of executive decrees proliferated. As of 1930 the Reichstag passed 98 laws. In 1931 the number fell to 34; in 1932 to 5.

Conversely, the number of emergency decrees used to enact crucial policies rose from 5 in 1930, to 44 in 1931 and to 66 in 1932.[10]

In order to resolve this parliamentary deadlock and immobilism, and to weaken the NSDAP by letting it take over governmental responsibilities, key leaders of the DNVP prevailed on President Hindenburg to appoint Hitler as Chancellor. Hindenburg took this step because of pressures from important industrial and agricultural interest groups close to the DNVP as well as from forces within the army and civil service. Hitler was to head a government dominated by prominent DNVP leaders. Hindenburg appointed Hitler as the leader of a government (and hence Reich Chancellor) in January 1933.[11] Two months later, in March 1933, the Republic's last Reichstag election was held. The NSDAP emerged from this election greatly strengthened but still without an electoral majority.

Some analysts of Weimar voting behavior have emphasized both in their explanations of electoral instability and of the NSDAP's growth, the destabilizing role played by the influx of previous nonvoters. Bendix and Lipset, as well as those party identification theorists discussed in chapter II, have advanced the thesis that a sudden entry of formerly inactive voters leads to electoral upheavals in general and to sharp increases in support for extremist parties in particular. The 1930-1933 elections were said by those analysts to confirm the crucial role played by former nonvoters. Conversely, they claim that a decline in participation produces greater electoral stability and lower rates of support for extremist parties. Both voter turnout and electoral support for the NSDAP dropped between July and November 1932. This correlation

has been said to support the general thesis as additional proof.

What does the aggregate evidence show? To assess the electoral impact of fluctuation in voter participation in Weimar Germany it is clearly necessary to consider the entire electoral period, rather than only the post-1928 elections. On both the national and regional level voter participation in Weimar Germany was generally high, as table 4 indicates. In both the Reich and Franconia, voter turnout dropped between 1919 and May 1924 and increased sharply for the December 1924 election. Rates of participation fell again in 1928 but rose once more both in 1930 and July 1932. In November 1932 turnout declined only to surge sharply in March 1933.

Did elections with increased participation inevitably produce greater electoral instability and support for extremist parties than elections with lower turnout rates? On the whole, the evidence is mixed.

TABLE 4

PROPORTION OF ELIGIBLE VOTERS WHO PARTICIPATED
IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS, 1919-1933

Unit	1919	1920	1924I	1924II	1928	1930	1932I	1932II	1933
Reich:	83.0	79.2	77.4	78.8	75.6	82.0	84.1	80.7	88.8
Franconia:	83.6	75.9	73.3	83.3	77.6	82.0	85.2	82.7	90.6

SOURCE: For the Reich, Bernhard Vogel, et al. Wahlen in Deutschland (Berlin and New York, 1971): pp. 296-297. For Franconia, Zeitschrift des Bayrischen Statistischen Landesamts (Munich, 1933): p. 300.

Elections with lower turnout did not invariably produce greater electoral stability. Nor did elections with high rates of participation inevitably produce adverse outcomes. The sharp drop invoting between 1920 and 1924 coincided with both a sharp increase in extremist voting and with dramatic changes in levels of support for the principal contenders. On the other hand, the largest decline in nonvoting for the 1920-1933 electoral period occurred between May and December 1924. At that time, however, support for the extremist parties (i.e. the NSDAP and KPD) collapsed while the newly active voters flocked to politically centrist or moderate parties.

In the 1930-1933 period, participation generally rose as did electoral support for both the NSDAP and KPD. But while in November 1932 a decline in participation coincided with a drop in the NSDAP's vote, the Republic's other extremist party, the KPD, enjoyed its greatest single electoral surge. Neither nationally nor regionally do the data point to any direct relationship between increased participation and higher voter support for extremism. My analysis of individual transition estimates in the next chapter shows that not until the March 1933 election did previous nonvoters in fact exhibit any disproportionate tendency to back extremist parties. Since that was no normal election, nonvoters' massive support for the NSDAP may have been due rather to unusual social and political pressures than to any inherent preference for extremism.

Weimar Germany's electoral and political instability and rise to power have also been attributed to its electoral system. Under the Weimar Constitution, Germany was divided into 35 multimember constituencies. In each constituency, voters (all adults aged twenty

and over) cast their ballot for a party list; voters could not indicate any preferences for the candidates on that list. Seats in the Reichstag were distributed according to a system of proportional representation, by which each party system received one seat per 60,000 votes.

For the purpose of allocating surplus votes, two or three constituencies were combined into a constituency association (Wahlkreisverband). The excess votes thus combined were again allocated on the basis of one seat for every 60,000 votes cast for a party list. Thus if a party list had been able to receive only 30,000 votes in one constituency, it could win a seat by combining these with votes received in another constituency(ies). Any remaining surplus votes were then put into a national pool (Reichsliste) where allocation followed the same principle, i.e. one seat per 60,000 votes. If votes still remained, those were then distributed on the basis of one seat per 30,000 votes. This method and the size of the constituencies meant that normally a vote of 100,000 (out of 30 million) would guarantee a party at least one or two seats in the Reichstag.[12]

The Weimar system of proportional representation has been justly criticized for ensuring the political equality of voters only at the price of governmental stability or of the effective exercise of political power.[13] One of the principal critics of proportional representation, F.A. Hermens, has pointed out that this system facilitates the multiplication of parties. Because of this, proportional representation leads to governmental instability, stalemate and inactivity. Hermens claims it radicalizes parties. Once guaranteed of representation, they

need not moderate their position to appeal to undecided or uninvolved voters. Finally proportional representation favors extremist parties.[14]

All of these adverse consequences occurred in Weimar Germany. But were they caused by proportional representation? After all, the multiplication of parties, parliamentary instability and deadlock, polarization and the emergence of extremist parties were all features of the Second Empire which had a very different electoral system. Under its provisions, Reichstag deputies were elected from single-member constituencies by an absolute majority. A second or run-off election was held in the event that no candidate obtained a majority. Only the two leading contenders from the first election could enter the run-off election.[15]

The two-ballot system, it has been argued, furthered the multiplication of parties for the "availability of the second ballot reduced the risks of multiparty competition in the first ballot."[16] It also helped polarize electoral politics in Imperial Germany. The second ballot always gave the bourgeois parties a chance to work together to defeat SPD candidates. Similarly, especially in its last two decades, it proved just as difficult to form stable coalitions or a working parliamentary majority in the Wilhelmine Reichstag as in the Weimar Republic. And as the emergence of anti-semitic and other extremist parties in the 1890s indicates, the Second Empire's electoral system was by no means a barrier to extremism.

As for the Weimar Republic, it has been argued that the effects of proportional representation on its politics have been exaggerated or misunderstood. Although the number of small splinter parties increased from 18 in 1920 to 37 in 1928 only a small number of them ever entered

the Reichstag. Even when they did, they were far too weak to affect the formation of cabinets. As for the parliamentary stalemate and immobilism that so plagued the Republic,these resulted, Lepsius has argued, less from the number of parties in the Reichstag than from the absence of any consensus on key issues among the most likely partners in a given coalition.[17]

The Weimar party system essentially offered two principal coalition alternatives. The first, which may be called the "democratic" coalition, primarily combined the parties that were either firmly committed to the Republic, or at least willing to tolerate it and to participate in its governments. The Center Party, the SPD, the German Democrats and the German People's Party constituted the main partners in this potential coalition. The second alternative united parties committed to social and economic policies specifically designed to aid or protect the interests of Germany's middle strata. This "bourgeois" coalition, included the DNVP, the DVP, the DDP, as well as the two Catholic parties.

The major weakness of the "democratic" coalition was that while its partners could agree on constitutional and foreign policy issues, they could compromise not at all, or only with great difficulty,on social and economic policies. The parties in the bourgeois coalition, on the other hand, could reach a consensus on social and economic matters but not on constitutional issues or foreign policy.[18] Thus what contributed to constant cabinet crises in the Republic was above all the inability of potential coalition partners to resolve their internal divisions.

Did proportional representation help bring the Nazis to power? One authority has shown that while a plurality system might have worked

against the NSDAP in 1930, it would have enabled them to achieve a clear parliamentary majority in July 1932. Proportional representation allegedly <u>prevented</u> the NSDAP from becoming a majority party in the period of its greatest expansion. The fact that the Nazis were unable to win a majority in the Reichstag in the March 1933 election, when Hitler was already Chancellor, ultimately forced the National Socialists to resort to extraparliamentary and extralegal means to seize complete control of the country.[19]

Finally, it should also be pointed out that the process of party fragmentation in the Weimar Republic was generally confined to the Protestant bourgeois bloc. (This was true in the Second Empire as well.) As the NSDAP's vote increased, i.e. from 1930 on, the number of such parties competing and (their share of the vote) declined sharply: from 37 in 1928 to 25 in 1930 to 6 in 1933. Furthermore, as the next section and subsequent chapters demonstrate, the NSDAP displaced not only these small parties but also all other major competitors within the Protestant bourgeois bloc. In effect, the 1930-1933 elections brought about a consolidation of the bourgeois vote by the NSDAP. This suggests that in Weimar Germany, the system of proportional representation most affected parties within the Protestant bourgeois bloc. While proportional representation may have contributed to the fragmentation of this bloc, it did not prevent the process of consolidation entailed by massive bourgeois shifts to the NSDAP.

There is no need to deny that proportional representation aided tendencies hostile to the Republic. But this mode of voting explains only in part the disastrous electoral and political chaos that marked

the Weimar Republic's brief history. Although the shortcomings associated with this electoral system were present in the Weimar Republic, they had also existed at a time in Germany's political history when a different electoral system was in use. Many of the adverse consequences attributed to proportional representation may have originated in conditions relatively unaffected by the type of electoral system adopted by Germany. This has been argued by such an eminent student of Weimar politics as Karl Dietrich Bracher.[20] The dramatic electoral changes discussed previously, in other words, occurred within a surprisingly stable configuration of partisan competition. It established boundaries that could not be eroded even by a system of voting designed to ensure representation to the broadest possible range of orientations and interests in German society. This inherited structure of party conflict and its implications are the subjects of the following section.

II

Under the Weimar Constitution, the electorate was significantly enlarged by the adoption of universal suffrage for all adults twenty years and older. The voting system adopted for the Republic made it much easier for parties of any kind to achieve parliamentary representation. Despite these far-reaching changes in Germany's political life the party system that emerged did not substantially differ from that of Imperial Germany.

Between 1871 and 1912, electoral and political conflicts generally involved three political camps formed respectively by Catholic, socialist and Protestant bourgeois parties. Parties within each of these blocs

appealed to distinctive social and economic groups. These lines of division in the German electorate, which in essence reflected the continued relevance to German voters of class and confessional cleavages, persisted throughout the 1919-1933 electoral period.[21]

Table 5 summarizes the proportions of the total votes cast for the Catholic, Marxist and Protestant bourgeois parties in the last three Reichstag elections before World War I, in the 1919 election to the National Assembly and in the Reichstag elections held between 1920 and 1933. I have included the voting figures for the 1903-1912 Reichstag elections to illustrate changes and continuities in Germany's aggregate voting pattern after World War I. The last three Reichstag elections held under the Second Empire reflect most accurately the distribution of the votes each bloc then could count on.

Two things are particularly noteworthy about the figures in table 5. First, they show that the distribution of aggregate support for the three blocs after World War I was comparable to that in the last pre-war elections. The two exceptions are the elections of 1919 and of 1933. In 1919 it was the Marxist bloc that showed unusual voting gains compared both to its pre-war strength and to its electoral record during the 1920-1933 Reichstag elections. In 1933, it was the bourgeois bloc. In both elections there were clearly special conditions at work that altered the prevailing configuration of support for each tendance. Secondly, the proportions in table 5 reveal a remarkable stability in the votes received by the Catholic, socialist and Protestant bourgeois parties despite a most turbulent period. Between 1920 and November 1932, the average rate of change in each bloc's aggregate support from one election

TABLE 5

THE PERSISTENCE OF PARTISAN BLOCS: PROPORTIONS OF THE VOTES CAST FOR CATHOLIC, MARXIST AND PROTESTANT BOURGEOIS PARTIES: 1903-1933

Blocs	1903	1907	1912	1919	1920	1924I	1924II	1928	1930	1932I	1932II	1933
Reich:												
Catholic[a]	19.7	19.4	16.4	19.7	18.1	16.7	17.5	15.2	14.8	15.7	15.0	14.0
Marxist[b]	31.7	28.9	34.8	45.5	41.7	33.9	35.3	40.5	37.6	36.1	37.3	30.6
Bourgeois[c]	48.6	51.7	48.8	34.8	40.2	49.4	47.2	44.3	47.6	48.2	47.7	55.4
Franconia:												
Catholic	34.7	34.5	28.2	28.1	32.7	27.9	26.9	25.7	25.3	24.7	24.4	22.4
Marxist	26.3	24.3	22.7	42.5	34.0	30.0	30.1	31.9	30.1	28.1	28.7	24.4
Bourgeois	39.1	41.2	39.1	29.4	33.3	42.1	43.0	42.4	44.6	47.2	46.9	53.2

SOURCE: For the Reich, Bernhard Vogel, et al., Wahlen in Deutschland (New York and Berlin, 1971): pp. 292-293; 296-297. For Franconia, Zeitschrift des Bayrischen Statistischen Landesamts (Munich), vol. 51 (1919): pp. 608 et seq.: vol. 65 (1933): pp. 300.

a) During the 1919-1933 period, the proportions for the Catholic Bloc at the Reich level combine those for the Center Party and the BVP; in Franconia they are for the BVP only;
b) During the 1919-1933 period, the proportions for the Marxist bloc combine those for the SPD, USPD, KPD;
c) The proportions for the Bourgeois bloc between 1903 and 1933 include those for liberal, conservative and splinter parties.

to the next was 1.1% for the Catholic, 3.3% for the Marxist and 3.1% for the bourgeois bloc. Both the continuities in the voting strength of the main party groupings and the relative stability of their respective electoral support were just as evident and striking in Franconia, as table 5 indicates.

There were, of course, some important changes within this larger configuration of electoral politics inherited by the Weimar Republic from the Second Empire. For one thing, the November 1918 Revolution brought about a reversal in the relationship to the state by the principal pre-war parties. During the Second Empire, the opposition to the imperial government came from the SPD, Center Party and, after 1903, the "left" liberals or Progressives. After 1918 they now became the principal supporters of the new Republic. The pre-war Conservatives had been the principal supporters of the Wilhelmine state. After 1918, united in the DNVP, they became among the Republic's most intransigent foes.

Military defeat, the November Revolution of 1918 and the establishment of the Republic, all altered the composition of the three pre-war party blocs. Although these blocs were not destroyed, important changes took place in the make-up and relative electoral positions of the parties that made up each bloc. To begin with, both the Catholic and Marxist blocs were badly splintered by the events of this time.

During the 1871-1912 period, the left and Catholic blocs had been represented by the SPD and Center Party respectively. In 1917, however, the socialist movement split. The more radical anti-war wing, led by Karl Liebknecht, formed a new party--the Independent Social Democrats

(Unabhaengige SPD, or USPD). Although most of its leaders eventually returned to the SPD, and the USPD itself disappeared from the electoral scene after 1924, the schism within the left bloc turned out to be permanent. After the German November Revolution of 1918, USPD radicals around Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht (the Spartacists) left the USPD to form the Communist Party (KPD). During the Weimar Republic, the SPD was thus challenged not only by bourgeois parties of the right but also by a more radical party on its left.[22] Between 1919 and 1920, the Center Party also split as several of its regional branches seceded. Those who seceded wished the Center Party to pursue a more conservative political course. They broke with the national leadership both because it wished to establish a parliamentary democracy and because during and after the war, it had worked with the SPD. The Bavarians particularly objected to the Center Party's close ties to the SPD, to its support for the new Constitution, and to its readiness to assume a central role in the Reichstag. Most of the regional branches eventually returned to the Center Party. However this was not the case in Bavaria, which had by far the largest membership and most cohesive organization.[23]

Bavaria's dissident wing set up its own organization, the Bavarian People's Party (BVP). Thereafter it maintained its own parliamentary fraction. Eventually the BVP joined the Center Party in several coalition governments. But the Bavarians never shared the Center Party's commitment to the Republic nor its willingness to join forces with the Social Democrats. Indeed, in the Presidental elections held in 1925, the BVP threw its support behind the Protestant, Prussian Hindenburg

because the Center Party's candidate, Marx, had received the backing of the SPD. Both the Center Party and the BVP were aware of the danger posed by Hitler's growing electoral strength and the need for unity. Yet in the final years of the Republic these two parties could not be brought together again.[24]

The secession of the Center Party's Bavarian branch had much less of an impact on the relative power of the three blocs than did the split within the socialist camp. This was due to the agreement reached by the Center Party and BVP in 1924 not to compete against each other. The Center Party never campaigned in Bavaria; the BVP never sought to build an electoral base outside Bavaria. This agreement enabled both parties to maintain unusually stable voter levels since neither party had to worry about mutual voter raids. (See figures in table 5.)

By contrast, the division within the left bloc produced serious electoral consequences. Prior to World War I, the left bloc had steadily been adding to its voter support. Between 1919 and 1928 the Marxist vote fluctuated considerably. Thereafter its support continued to decline. Statistics for their respective aggregate support demonstrate that nationally the KPD turned into a major challenger of the SPD's predominance within the left bloc. This was not the case in Franconia, where the KPD was considerably far less successful in eroding the SPD's hold over its voters. (See figures in table 6.)

TABLE 6

PROPORTIONS OF THE TOTAL VOTES CAST FOR PARTIES OF THE LEFT: 1919-1933

Parties	1919	1920	1924 I	1924 II	1928	1930	1932 I	1932 II	1933
Reich:									
SPD	37.9	21.7	20.5	26.0	29.8	24.5	21.6	20.4	18.3
USPD	7.6	17.9	.8	.3	.1	-	-	-	-
KPD	-	2.1	12.6	9.0	10.6	13.1	14.5	16.9	12.3
Franconia:									
SPD	36.4	16.1	23.3	25.9	28.7	25.3	21.2	20.2	19.4
USPD	6.1	16.8	.6	.5	-	-	-	-	-
KPD	-	1.1	6.1	3.7	3.2	4.8	6.9	8.5	5.0

SOURCE: For the Reich, Bernhard Vogel, et al., Wahlen in Deutschland (Berlin and New York, 1971): pp. 296-297. For Franconia, Zeitschrift des Bayrischen Statistischen Landesamts (Munich, 1933) vol. 65, p. 300.

This schism within the left bloc had other adverse effects. Because it had a rival on its left, the SPD lost much of its maneuverability. Whenever it considered joining a government or supporting its policies, the SPD had to weigh the potential effect of these steps on its electorate. Also the SPD became far more dependent on the trade unions. This led to frequent conflicts between the SPD's national leadership and its Reichstag delegation. And the emergence of the KPD as a major political force made it all but impossible for the SPD to acquire legitimacy as a governing party in the eyes of Protestant bourgeois voters. The presence of the KPD made it easy for right-wing opponents of the Republic to play on middle class fears of socialism and revolution. With the onset of the Depression and growing support for the Communists, the NSDAP found the tactic of linking the SPD and KPD particularly successful in mobilizing middle class voters for its cause.[25]

The Protestant bourgeois parties comprised the third major electoral bloc both in pre-war Germany and in the Weimar Republic. It should be noted that by "Protestant bourgeois" are meant those parties that appealed to and were supported by Germany's non-Catholic and non-socialist voters. Admittedly, this label is problematical. Protestant bourgeois parties were not formally linked to the Protestant Church. Nor did these parties view themselves solely as defenders of the bourgeoisie's class interests. Nonetheless, because their constituency

was generally Protestant and middle class, the term "Protestant bourgeois" is conventionally applied to this group of parties. Hence I have adopted this label for my own study.

Taken together, the Protestant bourgeois parties constituted the strongest of the three blocs, both in the Weimar and in the 1871-1912 electoral periods. But that strength was deceptive. In the Weimar Republic as in the Second Empire, bourgeois voters divided their support among three types of parties. These were the liberal and conservative-nationalist parties as well as parties organized around special regional or economic interests.

Despite such continuities, other major changes occurred. After 1919 there was a merger of Imperial Germany's main conservative parties along with a number of parties and organizations close to them. The overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of a parliamentary democracy convinced these nationalist and conservative groups that if they were to exercise any political power in the Republic, they would have to transcend their pre-war rivalries and conflicts. The result was the formation of the German National People's Party (DNVP) at the end of November 1918. This brought together former members and supporters of the Empire's principal conservative parties, the German Conservatives and the Free Conservatives; interest groups affiliated with these parties, such as the Agrarian League (BdL) and the German National Employees Association; a host of small middle class parties

that had generally voted with the conservatives; and such radical right-wing groups as the Pan-German League and various anti-semitic parties. Also participating in the DNVP was the right wing of the National Liberal Party.

The new found unity among these heterogeneous groups turned out to be precarious. In the spring of 1924 some of the DNVP's most extreme elements departed in order to enter an alliance with the NSDAP and other _voelkische_ groups.[26] The DNVP experienced a second and more serious division between 1928 and 1930. In 1928 hard-line opponents of the Republic under Alfred Hugenberg (the pre-war leader of the Pan-German League) took control of the DNVP. The new leadership uncompromisingly opposed the Republic and any form of collaboration with its governments. This position finally led to the secession of elements within the DNVP who desired continued participation. No fewer than three new parties were formed by the dissidents prior to the 1930 election. Thus as the Depression began, the political Right had become as fragmented as it had been in the pre-war period.[27]

Table 7 indicates how the unification of the pre-war conservative groups produced beneficial electoral effects. Between 1924 and 1930 the DNVP emerged as the strongest contender within the Protestant bourgeois bloc. Even after 1928 its electoral support did not disintegrate as completely as that for the two liberal parties. In Franconia, where the DNVP had become the dominant party in Protestant rural areas, its voting losses after 1928 were more noticeable. In 1930, these losses benefited primarily the newly formed DNVP splinter parties; hence the increase in voter support for this group of parties.[28] In the next

TABLE 7

PROPORTIONS OF THE VOTES CAST FOR PROTESTANT BOURGEOIS PARTIES: 1903-1933

Parties	Elections											
	1903	1907	1912	1919	1920	1924I	1924II	1928	1930	1932I	1932II	1933
						Reich						
NSDAP	-	-	-	-	-	6.4	3.0	2.6	18.3	37.3	33.1	43.9
Conservative[a]	13.5	14.3	15.2	10.3	15.1	19.4	20.5	14.3	7.0	5.9	8.3	7.9
Liberal[b]	23.1	25.4	26.3	22.9	22.2	14.9	16.4	13.5	8.3	2.2	2.9	2.0
DDP	-	-	-	18.5	8.3	5.7	6.3	4.8	3.8	1.0	1.0	.9
DVP	-	-	-	4.4	13.9	9.2	10.1	8.7	4.5	1.2	1.9	1.1
Splinter[c]	12.0	12.0	7.3	1.6	2.9	8.6	7.4	13.9	14.0	2.8	3.4	1.6
Bourgeois Bloc	48.6	51.7	48.8	34.8	40.2	49.4	47.2	44.3	47.6	48.2	47.7	55.4
						Franconia						
NSDAP	-	-	-	-	-	20.7	7.5	8.9	20.5	39.9	36.4	45.7
Conservative	23.2	17.0	19.6	9.4	18.4	14.9	23.6	18.8	2.3	4.0	6.6	5.4
Liberal	7.4	15.7	16.8	20.0	13.9	4.1	5.6	6.0	3.4	1.1	1.3	.9
DDP	-	-	-	20.0	11.1	3.6	4.3	4.1	2.1	.5	.5	.3
DVP	-	-	-	-	2.8	.5	1.3	1.9	1.3	.6	.8	.6
Splinter	8.5	8.5	2.7	0	1.0	2.4	6.3	8.7	18.4	2.2	2.6	1.2
Bourgeois Bloc	39.1	41.2	39.1	29.4	33.3	42.1	43.0	42.2	44.6	47.2	46.9	53.2

SOURCE: For the Reich, Bernhard Vogel et al., *Wahlen in Deutschland* (New York and Berlin, 1971): p. 292-293, 296-7. For Franconia, *Zeitschrift des Bayrischen Statistischen Landesamts* (Munich) vol. 51 (1919) p. 608 et seq.; vol. 65 (1933); p. 300 et seq.

a) For 1903-1912, Conservative refers to both the German Conservative Party and the Free Conservative Party; after 1919 to the DNVP.
b) For 1903-1913, Liberal refers to the National Liberal Party and the Progressives;
c) For 1903-1912 Splinter refers to national minorities, Anti-semites, Christian Socialist, particularist and "other" parties; for 1919-1933 to special interest and "other" parties.

chapter I show that in Franconia it was precisely through these splinter parties, that most of the DNVP's supporters moved to the NSDAP.

The Liberal parties, once a force to be reckoned with during the Second Empire, declined during the Weimar Republic. Unlike their conservative rivals within the bourgeois bloc, the liberal parties failed in their effort to form a common organization. In the Weimar Republic, as in the Empire, "left" and "right" liberals competed against each other in elections, despite frequent cooperation in the Reichstag. The German Democratic Party (DDP) continued to link a congeries of pre-war liberal groups generally referred to as the Progressives. The DDP also attracted the more moderate elements of the National Liberals. What was left of the National Liberals after defections to the DNVP and DDP reconstituted itself as the German People's Party (DVP).[29] It is interesting to note that both these reconstituted liberal and conservative parties actually omitted these terms from their new names. Clearly both were seeking to develop broader bases of support than they had enjoyed in the pre-war period. The DNVP was considerably more successful in this endeavor than the two liberal parties.[30]

In Germany's new democratic order, neither of these two liberal parties succeeded in establishing a strong electoral foothold. As can be seen from their respective votes in table 7, the DDP as well as the DVP went into decline long before the 1929 Depression. After 1930 their support collapsed completely. By July 1932 they had been reduced to insignificant splinter parties. Franconia followed much the national

pattern. But in this region the decline of the liberal parties occurred earlier and was even sharper than elsewhere in the Reich.

Small splinter parties had been a familiar feature of German politics before the First World War. As table 7 indicates, the level of support for these parties in the last three Reichstag elections before the war had remained fairly stable. The revolutionary changes in Germany after 1918 first worked against these small splinter parties. Not very many competed in the 1919 election to the National Assembly, and their support was miniscule. But 1920 saw an increase in both the number of these parties and their share of the vote. They did especially well in the "normal" elections of December 1924 and May 1928; in fact these were the only two elections when voter support for special interest parties reached the pre-war levels. In 1930 these parties attained a relatively high vote; this was due primarily to the success of DNVP splinter groups in attracting voters away from their parent party. Their end was in sight. Aggregate figures in table 7 demonstrate that for DNVP voters these parties served but as a stepping stone to the National Socialists. After 1930, electoral support for such parties all but disappeared. This national pattern of initial support for special interest parties followed by their disappearance also held for the region of Franconia.

By far the most dramatic change in any party was the NSDAP's transformation from an insignificant splinter party in 1928 to Germany's largest party by July 1932. The Nazis' overall electoral expansion was striking even in the highly volatile context of Weimar party politics.

In the first election in which it competed (May 1924) it managed to gain 6.5% of the national vote, an impressive performance for a new arrival on the Republic's political scene. Although its electoral support dwindled in the two "normal" elections of December 1924 and May 1928, its rise thereafter was meteoric.

In Franconia, the NSDAP's electoral history was even more unusual. This began with the first election in which it participated, May, 1924. As can be seen from table 7, the National Socialist vote almost equalled the combined support for all other Protestant bourgeois parties. Contributing to the NSDAP's unusually high support in Franconia in this election was Bavaria's recent turbulent history. In 1918, the Wittelsbach monarchy was overthrown and replaced by a Marxist regime under Kurt Eisner, the leader of Bavaria's USPD. Within the same year, Eisner was assassinated. Radical USPD members then established a Soviet Republic, which a few weeks later was bloodily suppressed by the national army and Bavarian paramilitary groups. Between 1919 and 1924, Bavarian politics were dominated by forces violently opposed to the Republic. These included numerous radical rightwing parties. Among them the most prominent was the NSDAP.[31]

After the Nazis' unsuccessful attempt to seize power (the Beerhall Putsch of November 1923), dissident DNVP leaders in Bavaria combined with members of the new legally proscribed NSDAP and other rightwing extremists to form the _Voelkischer Block_. Its aim was to serve as a front for the NSDAP and to coordinate the activities of all "nationalist" groups for upcoming state and Reichstag elections. The Bavarian government did little to hinder this party's organizational

and electoral activities. Hitler's trial, held at the height of the spring campaigns, gave the new party excellent publicity. All this helped the NSDAP emerge from the May 1924 election as Bavaria's and Franconia's third strongest party.[32] Within Bavaria, Franconia recorded the highest vote for the NSDAP. Indeed the Franconian vote for the Nazis in May, 1924 was exceeded only by one other electoral district in the Reich, that of Mecklenburg. The NSDAP's astounding electoral successes in Franconia were due in large part to the fact that this region was a DNVP stronghold. Support for the NSDAP by former DNVP leaders, therefore encouraged substantial shifts by DNVP voters to the National Socialists. The DNVP's strength in Franconia and its subsequent disintegration again helped the NSDAP after 1928. Thus this region gave the National Socialists a vote consistently above the national average.[33]

During the NSDAP's rapid and massive electoral surges after 1928, its gains came primarily at the expense of other parties within the Protestant bourgeois camp. The spectacular voting increases for the National Socialists in both 1930 and July 1932 went along with the complete collapse of the Republic's liberal, conservative and splinter parties. By eliminating them as contenders, the NSDAP achieved what had been a major objective of all Protestant parties in Imperial Germany and in the Weimar Republic--to weaken or destroy German Social Democracy by rallying all Protestant bourgeois voters behind a single party. Table 8 indicates just how complete the NSDAP's "consolidation" of the Protestant bourgeois vote was. (For a comparison of the NSDAP's proportions of support within this bloc and those for liberal, conservative and splinter

parties see also table 37, Appendix B. That the KPD was far less successful in its efforts to mobilize the left vote away from the SPD can be seen in table 38, Appendix B.)

TABLE 8

THE NSDAP'S SHARE OF THE PROTESTANT BOURGEOIS VOTE: 1924I-1933

Unit	1924I	1924II	1928	1930	1932I	1932II	1933
Reich	11.8%	6.3%	6.3%	38.6%	77.5%	69.6%	73.0%
Franconia	49.1%	17.4%	18.9%	46.0%	84.5%	77.5%	85.8%

As the figures in table 8 show, nationally the NSDAP's strength within the Protestant bourgeois bloc improved dramatically only after 1928. This was due in part to the Depression; but it also reflected the success of its reorientation and reorganization after its poor showing in the 1928 Reichstag election.[34] Hitler's unsuccessful attempt to seize power by violence convinced the National Socialist leadership that it had to achieve power through elections. The NSDAP's left wing believed that the party could develop a powerful electoral base only by attracting working class support. At a party meeting in 1925, Hitler and the NSDAP's South German leadership accepted the strategy of attracting worker support in order to build a genuine mass basis for the party. The NSDAP's left wing, dominated by the Strasser brothers, Goebbels, Karl Kaufmann and Alfred Krebs aggressively

pursued this strategy in Germany's principal industrial areas and urban centers.[35]

Despite considerable opposition to this new course from the middle class, voelkisch elements in the party, the NSDAP now emphasized themes designed to appeal to the industrial proletariat. Thus its propagandists stressed the NSDAP's anti-capitalism, its socialism, its profound dislike of the bourgeoisie, as well as its desire for closer ties with the USSR. At the same time, Hitler ordered the dissolution of all links developed in the early 1920's with bourgeois political and paramilitary organizations. In his own speeches, he chose to play down the anti-semitic and extreme nationalist themes he had emphasized earlier.[36]

The 1928 Reichstag election terminated this left wing NSDAP strategy of attracting broad working class support. In virtually all major industrial and urban centers, including those where the principal advocates of the "urban strategy" had been most active, the Nazi vote declined or remained considerably below the NSDAP's national average.[37] In contrast to its poor showing in Germany's large urban centers, the NSDAP fared considerably better in Protestant rural areas and small towns. They did particularly well in the Protestant rural counties of Southern and Northern Germany, where support for the main bourgeois parties, from the liberal DDP to the conservative DNVP, had visibly declined.[38]

For the NSDAP, then, the May 1928 election proved to be a critical turning point. While some segments of the party's left refused to admit the failure of their program, the party's main leadership, including Hitler, came away from the 1928 election convinced that the party must

drastically change its strategy. Clearly the NSDAP's political future lay in its ability to mobilize the Protestant rural and urban middle classes. Their economic situation was at best precarious; their confidence in bourgeois parties, obviously waning. At a party congress held in August 1928, the NSDAP's leadership decided to drop its urban, working class strategy in favor of one geared specifically to attracting supporters away from Protestant bourgeois parties. From that time on, the NSDAP eliminated all socialist traces from its propaganda. Instead it emphasized themes designed to attract farmers, the petty bourgeoisie, industrialists, and nationalists. This programmatic reorientation was accompanied by far-reaching organizational changes meant to penetrate and control Protestant bourgeois organizations and electorates.[39]

The success of this NSDAP strategy occurred within the boundaries set by Germany's class and confessional cleavages. This hypothesis may be further confirmed by examining net changes in voter support for the Republic's parties and party blocs. My method for arriving at this relatively simple measure of voting change is that used by Shively.[40] Table 9 summarizes net changes for individual parties generally, for all three blocs, for each bloc, and for the parties within each bloc. All national figures come from Shively. I have calculated those for Franconia especially for this study.

When the figures of the first two columns are compared, it becomes clear that between 1928 and 1933 net changes in support for individual parties generally far exceeded those for the three blocs. The figures in table 9 further indicate that during this period, the levels of net change for the bourgeois parties far exceeded that for the bourgeois

TABLE 9

LEVELS OF OVER-ALL NET CHANGE IN WEIMAR GERMANY 1919-1933

Election Pair	Net Change all parties	Net Change all blocs	Net Change Catholic bloc	Net Change Marxist bloc	Net Change Bourgeois bloc	Net Change Bourgeois parties	Net Change Marxist parties
Reich:							
1919-1920	28.1	5.6	1.7	4.2	5.4	12.9	14.3
1920-1924I	27.9	9.8	1.4	7.8	9.2	12.5	14.4
1924I-1924II	9.7	2.5	.8	1.4	2.2	4.7	4.8
1924II-1928	12.7	5.3	2.3	5.2	2.9	9.0	2.6
1928-1930	19.7	2.8	.4	2.9	3.3	15.7	4.0
1930-1932I	35.5	1.8	.9	1.5	.6	18.6	2.1
1932I-1932II	6.4	1.3	.7	1.2	.5	4.0	1.8
1932II-1933	10.6	7.7	1.0	6.7	7.7	6.9	3.4
Franconia:							
1919-1920	30.5	8.5	4.6	4.0	3.9	10.7	15.6
1920-1924I	35.2	8.8	4.8	4.0	8.8	18.8	14.2
1924I-1924II	16.8	1.3	1.0	.1	1.4	13.7	2.6
1924II-1928	7.1	2.2	1.2	1.8	1.3	5.1	2.1
1928-1930	25.2	2.3	.4	1.8	2.4	22.5	2.0
1930-1932I	21.0	2.6	.6	2.0	2.6	20.1	3.1
1932I-1932II	5.0	.6	.3	.6	.3	3.6	1.3
1932II-1933	9.7	6.8	2.0	4.3	7.3	6.4	2.2

blocs. In elections held from 1928 through 1933, the levels of net change for Catholic and socialist parties fell below that for Protestant bourgeois parties. Finally, measures of net changes for each bloc during the 1928-1933 period were all quite low. All these trends confirm that the NSDAP's support came primarily from within the Protestant bourgeois bloc. The Nazis' electoral base never went beyond this established segment of the German electorate. My next chapter, which examines individual voter transitions in Franconia, provides even stronger evidence for these contentions.

Table 9 generally substantiates Burnham's and Shively's claim that throughout the Weimar electoral period, voting changes for individual parties always far exceeded those for the main partisan blocs or *tendances*. But it is interesting to note, first, that in both the Reich and Franconia between 1919 and May 1924 net changes for all blocs and for each of the individual blocs were higher than for all subsequent elections, save for the November 1932-March 1933 period; secondly, that after the May 1928 election, there was a noticeable decline in net changes for the blocs. These findings suggest that in the early election the boundaries separating the blocs were more permeable or fluid than in the post-1928 period. Until May 1924, there were still voter movements to parties in another bloc. One reason was given earlier, i.e. that in 1919 the principal left party, the SPD, may have received unusually large support by middle class voters who subsequently returned to their respective camps in 1920 and May 1924. Again during the course of World War I and the post-war turmoil, party organizations especially at the local level may have either disintegrated or not yet been formed.

Hence voters could not have been "integrated" into party activities as they were a later stage.

The decline in levels of net change for the blocs, on the other hand, suggests that after 1928, Weimar voters more or less retreated into their respective partisan camps. Because the Depression deepened divisions and conflicts among German parties and voters, voters identified themselves even more closely with parties representing their social group. The NSDAP, it must be stressed, considerably contributed to this polarization. A major part of its post-1928 plan was to heighten bourgeois antagonism toward the SPD and the Weimar system, to provoke clashes with parties of the left, and especially with the SPD. Thus it could project itself as the only party willing and able to resist "bolshevism," and to restore to the middle class its proper, i.e. key role in German social and political life. How the Nazis achieved their desired image at the local level will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter VI.

III

This National Socialist campaign to intensify existing divisions and conflicts and to polarize German politics hinged upon conditions favoring their strategy. These were furnished by the almost unending series of major domestic and international crises confronting the Republic. Thus existing antagonisms among major political contenders were further intensified. The inability of any one party to win an electoral majority and the increasingly high stakes involved in governmental participation further intensified political conflict.

Since no party could get a majority of the electorate to back it, all parties were forced to enter coalitions. As the grounds for agreements became ever narrower, political stalemate ensued. As a result, electoral and political confrontations among the parties and their supporters became increasingly bitter, uncompromising and, ultimately, violent. In short, Weimar parties, especially those in the Protestant bourgeois camp, helped to create an atmosphere of civil war. On the local level, as chapter VI shows, such a climate turned political conflicts into armed clashes. In such a context, the most successful parties could only be those most extreme in their position and most ruthless in their tactics.

The political and electoral deadlock that emerged from the Depression precluded the formation of any government based on a parliamentary coalition. This in turn shifted real power to the executive.[41] The provision in the Constitution for emergency government by the President (Article 48) was bad enough in that it encouraged Weimar Germany's parties to abrogate their legislative responsibilities.[42] Worse was the fact that at a crucial point in the Republic's history this office was occupied by a man who had openly admitted that he was unsuited to head the Republic because its nature and principles were both alien and repugnant to him. As an imperial officer and Prussian aristocrat, Hindenburg ultimately turned to those forces that had supported the monarchy and which, like him, showed a distinct preference for authoritarian government unencumbered by the squabbles of "irresponsible" parties. To choose such politicians and policies was to accentuate an already deep political polarization.[43]

But the causes of Weimar Germany's instability and polarization went beyond either the crises that continously shook its society or the structural defects of its political framework and institutions. They have to be located in political developments during the Second Empire. The Weimar Republic, it has previously been shown, inherited from the pre-war political order a fully crystallized structure of electoral politics. Thus the party system taken over by the Republic from the Second Empire was itself deeply polarized. What had created this polarization? What were its effects upon Germany's politics before and after World I?

I cannot provide here a comprehensive analysis of all causes that combined to produce Impreial Germany's volatile, polarized party system. But there is some consensus among historians about the forces shaping German politics before and after World War I. These include: 1) Bismarck's attempt to destroy or neutralize the Catholic-based Center Party (through the Kulturkampf) and the SPD (through anti-socialist legislation); 2) the Great Depression of 1873 to 1896; 3) the "politics of stabilization" that became the cornerstone of conservative politics first under Bismarck and particularly in the Wilhelmine period after Bismarck's dismissal.

The Center party was formed in 1871 to protect the interests of Germany's Catholic minority in what its leaders regarded as a potentially hostile environment. Catholic fears were amply confirmed when in 1872 Bismarck launched his assault on the Catholic Church and the Center Party. Between 1872 and 1873, Bismarck pushed through the Reichstag a number of laws curtailing the Church's powers in the areas of

education and marriage. In Prussia, these measures were reinforced by a campaign of repression against priests and Center Party officials as well as by blatantly discriminatory policies aimed at the Catholic population in general.

Bismarck's Kulturkampf, as his anti-Catholic policy came to be known, stemmed in large part from his desire to consolidate the still precarious unity and integrity of the Second Empire. In terms of his domestic policies this entailed strengthening the national government by expanding its responsibilities, and restricting the application of the 1871 Constitution's federal provisions. The Center Party was a major obstacle to both these objectives. The Center Party was bound to defend federalism. Because its support was geographically concentrated (in Southern and Western Germany), the Center Party viewed federalism as the only way to safeguard Catholic interests and to assure the Catholic minority a voice in policies affecting it. The Center Party, therefore, fundamentally opposed any measures that unified the central government or expanded its activities and power.

Bismarck's anti-Catholic campaign, however, failed to achieve its purpose. On the contrary, its immediate result was to double the Center Party's vote and to increase its number of Reichstag seats from 61 to 91. The Kulturkampf also made the Center Party's position among Catholic voters virtually invincible. The discrimination, repression and isolation experienced by the Center Party and its supporters in the decade after the passage of Bismarck's legislation, strengthened the Center Party's claim to exclusive representation of Catholic interests. This shared experience created a strong emotional bond

between Catholic voters of all social backgrounds and their party. Thus the Center Party could maintain internal unity despite the tensions created by the heterogeneity of its membership and electorate. The *Kulturkampf* also stimulated the Center Party to maintain continuous access to Catholic voters by the vast network of secondary associations it created. Through them the Center Party could mobilize its followers far more effectively than any other non-socialist party.[43]

The dismal failure of the anti-Catholic campaign should have made Bismarck wary of using repression to destroy a political party. Yet, only a few years after initiating the unsuccessful *Kulturkampf*, he once again chose this method. This time the object of his attack was the Social Democratic Party (SPD). Bismarck had attacked the Center Party because he saw it as a potential source of internal division and as an impediment to a strong central government. He moved against the Social Democratics because he considered them as a fundamental threat to the social and political foundations of the Second Empire. His campaign against this party, of course, had the same outcome as that against the Center Party. It turned the SPD into the key spokesman of Germany's working classes; it transformed the SPD from a relatively minor electoral force into Imperial Germany's largest party; it stimulated SPD leaders to create a powerful party organization supplemented by an extraordinary network of interest groups and worker associations.[44]

More serious, however, were the long-term effects of Bismarck's *Kulturkampf* and anti-socialist legislation. Both strategies produced deep and lasting fissures in German society and politics. It was the

experiences of discrimination and repression that created the solidarity of Catholics and working class voters, respectively. The blocs thus created remained firmly in place throughout both the Second Empire and the Weimar Republic.

Secondly, Bismarck's attempt to destroy or neutralize the Center Party and the SPD made it almost impossible for a democratic center to emerge. By supporting this anti-Catholic and anti-socialist legislation, the Second Empire's liberal parties, the National Liberals and the Progressives, in effect vacated the "centrist" position in Germany's political system. The Center Party, its name notwithstanding, failed to take over this position. In fact it fought only for the heterogeneous interests of its Catholic constituency. Toward this end it was willing to work with any constellation of political forces in the Reichstag. This earned the Center Party a reputation for opportunism, and hence suspect and untrustworthy. The Center Party was to follow a similar strategy of survival in the Weimar Republic. There again its lack of principle was decried by socialist and Protestant parties alike.

The emergence of a strong democratic center was further inhibited by the Great Depression of 1873-1896 and by liberal acquiescence in the Conservatives' politics of stabilization. The first two years after unification in 1871, brought with them dramatic economic achievements. This brief period of prosperity, however, came to an end in 1873. As in other industrialized countries, the following twenty-three years were marked by an economic depression only briefly interspersed with spells of economic improvement (1879-1882, and 1886-1890).[45] As would be the case in 1929, this world-wide Depression profoundly

affected German politics.

The economic slump which began with the crash of 1873 produced widespread labor unrest. This led in 1875 to the merger of the two rival socialist parties formed in the 1860's: the General German Workers' Association, which followed Ferdinande Lasalle, and the Social Democratic Workers' Party, which was led by August Bebel. The newly formed SPD immediately became so active in organizing workers that in the Reichstag election of 1877, the socialist vote doubled, going from 3.0 in 1874 to 6.8 in 1877.[46]

The combination of increased labor unrest and expanded electoral support for the SPD led Bismarck in 1877 to push through the Reichstag (with the reluctant backing of both liberal parties) legislation proscribing the SPD, its political activities and press. At the same time, Bismarck sought to placate German workers and to destroy their allegiance to the SPD through unusually liberal social welfare schemes. But by 1890 it became clear that this policy had not only failed to stem labor support for the SPD but had in fact increased social and political tensions.[47]

An even more important effect of the Great Depression of 1873-1894 was that it fundamentally altered the previous relationship between the German economy and state. Initially Bismarck's response to the economic downturn had taken the form of short-term emergency measures. But by 1876 he recognized the need for a more vigorous state intervention. Between 1878 and 1885 a series of regulatory and protective measures were passed designed to shield German producers and tradesman from the vagaries of the "free market".[48] This legislation benefited

not only big industry and agriculture, but also artisans, small farmers, shopkeepers and other segments of the "old" middle class. From that time on, it "was the destiny of the state to function as the supreme agent of economic coordination and integration on a national scale".[50]

This radical departure from the state's previous role in the German economy meant that whole groups of German producers became dependent on governmental support and intervention. The German middle class had little interest in electoral and political reforms that might produce a genuinely parliamentary and democratic system. The middle classes were pushed in the opposite direction as ever larger numbers of workers began supporting the SPD. By successfully bribing Germany's middle class, Bismarck strengthened the power not only of the central government but also of Prussian Conservatism. In the wake of his protective and regulatory legislation, the Prussian-based German Conservative Party and the Free Conservative Party began to win adherents among rural and urban middle class voters throughout Germany.

In addition, this period of economic decline between 1873 and 1894 virtually destroyed liberalism as an independent viable force in German political life. Because liberals advocated a free market, they were held responsible for Germany's economic troubles. But liberal decline during the long depression also stemmed from conservative successes among traditional supporters of the liberal parties--the urban and rural middle class. The liberals responded to all these developments by moving closer to Conservatives, at least in their economic programs. But by blurring the lines that had originally distinguished them from the conservative parties, the liberal parties

alienated their voters and encouraged them to shift either to the Conservatives or to various Christian socialist, anti-semitic and radical agrarian parties.

These new parties too were a response to the economic upheavals of 1873-1894. Their main effect was to introduce into an already complex and tension-ridden party system yet another source of strain. They did so by creating widespread popular support for ideas at once anti-democratic, anti-party, anti-socialist, anti-capitalist and anti-semitic. Together, these parties received almost 12% of the votes in the 1887 Reichstag election.[51] Again, Germany's conservative parties were ready to harness this new political force to their own cause. The German Conservative Party in particular actively supported this group of parties electorally and in the Reichstag. Indeed, in 1892 this party incorporated into its program (known as the Tivoli Program) not only the anti-semitism espoused by these radical middle class parties but also their economic demands. The liberal parties (and especially the National Liberals) soon followed suit. Although they did not publicly subscribe to anti-semitism, they both adopted the protectionist and corporatist economic program of these new parties.[52]

The 1873-1896 Depression, in short, further polarized Germany's social and political life. It did so by heightening middle class fears of socialism, by making the middle class dependent on the state and the political order it represented. The Depression also blurred differences in the ideologies, programs and social bases of the parties within the non-Catholic, non-socialist camp. Even in the period of prosperity and accelerated industrialization that was to follow, existing

social and political tension did not measurably recede.

Traditional conservatism suffered from this new spurt of economic and industrial growth and the concomitant shift from a rural to an urban society. Its traditional base dwindled. Despite their continuing social and political preeminence, Conservatives became aware of the dangers to them posed by rapid social and economic changes that began in the mid-1890s on.[53] Although the Conservatives, thanks to key provisions in the 1871 Constitution (which ensured Prussia's predominance and, through Prussia's three-class electoral system, that of the Conservatives) were still in a strong defensive position, they could not conceive and execute an outright conservative policy. For in the Reichstag, the Center Party's cohesiveness, the SPD's growing electoral support, the liberal parties' electoral decline and the relatively stable Conservative vote all combined to create a parliamentary stalemate. As Wolfgang Mommsen has argued, by the late 1890s, "none of the major political groups, the Conservatives, the bourgeois liberal parties, or the Social Democrats were in a position to alter things substantially".[54]

Conservatives in Wilhelmine Germany responded to this situation by pursuing with ever greater enthusiasm Bismarck's politics of stabilization. The major strands of that policy were: 1) protectionism for German industry and agriculture; 2) imperialism; 3) limiting the power of the Reichstag; 4) keeping the socialists in check by a combination of bribery in the form of social welfare legislation, and repression; 5) creating a common front among all non-socialist, non-Catholic parties. The principal objective of all these strategies was to check

the SPD.

Protectionism was to create a bond of common interest between the principal supporters of conservatism and liberalism. Imperialism was to divert the attention of German workers from tensions at home and to "buy" their acquiescence in the existing order by improving their standard of living. To reduce the power of the Reichstag (by threatened coup d'etats and by refusing to submit bills to it) was meant to deprive the SPD of any influence on national policy. This was the objective also of "rallying" all bourgeois parties (Sammlungspolitik), which periodically brought liberal, conservative and the newer middle class parties together in the Reichstag, (as in the cartel of 1887, Miquel's coalition for the 1902 Tariff Laws, and the Buelow Bloc of 1907). In every case there was a dual purpose: to secure parliamentary majority for specific legislation and to create in the Reichstag a united front against the SPD.[55]

These strategies did anything but stabilize German politics. They turned the SPD into a permanent object of fear among Protestant bourgeois voters but never thwarted the SPD's electoral advance. They did much to weaken the regime's legitimacy in the eyes of both Catholics and workers. They contributed to foreign adventures. They created a complete parliamentary and political deadlock. They helped bring Germany to the brink of civil war.[56]

So tense had Imperial Germany's domestic politics become that all parties greeted the outbreak of World War I almost with a sense of relief. But Germany entered this war with all its key domestic conflicts unresolved--the role of the SPD, democratization, social reform. Within

two years, struggle over those issues revived in forms more bitter than ever.[57] As Germany's military situation worsened, a new alliance emerged in the Reichstag formed by the Center Party, the SPD and the "left" liberals. But their demands for basic social and political changes presupposed Germany's military defeat and the November Revolution of 1918.

The November Revolution did not resolve these pre-war tensions; it exacerbated them. Because of the government and the SPD's electoral power, bourgeois parties had to develop a mass basis. As both liberal and conservative parties began to compete for the same electorate, programmatic and ideological distinctions became confused. Both liberals and conservatives were concerned to contain the threat posed by the SPD. The Republic's economic weakness meant that the stakes were high for all contenders. The bourgeois parties and electorate feared the SPD's economic demands, the Social Democrats in turn worried constantly about bourgeois attempts to dismantle the gains achieved after the Revolution. This mutual distrust further split the non-socialist and socialist contenders. In this atmosphere it again was virtually impossible for a moderate political center to emerge. The Catholic Center itself could not play this role since it had major areas of agreement and disagreement with both blocs. The liberals were locked in a strugggle for the bourgeois electorate with the right-wing DNVP. As for the SPD, its authority or right to govern was not accepted by the bourgeois electorate on its right,by large portions of communist voters on its left.

In such a context, no party could break down the existing blocs. Once the NSDAP recognized this, it took full advantage of Germany's divisions and polarization. To "detach" Protestant bourgeois voters from their parties, it sought to create an atmosphere of such conflict and fear as to prompt this electorate to reject "politics as usual". To attract these voters, in turn, the NSDAP built up an organization and developed tactics unmatched by any other Protestant bourgeois party. The NSDAP's strategies for mobilizing Protestant bourgeois voters worked unusually well. As aggregate figures in this chapter suggested and as my own regression analyses show in the next chapter, the NSDAP actually succeeded where all other Protestant bourgeois parties had failed--it rallied this entire bloc behind a single party. How the NSDAP achieved this in Franconia will be discussed in chapter VI.

FOOTNOTES

1. Erich Eyck, A History of the Weimar Republic, vol.1 (Cambridge, Mass., 1962), pp. 47-180, 238-242.

2. ibid., vol. 2, pp. 10-202.

3. For greater details on the inflation of 1922-1924 and the 1929 Depression, see Werner Kaltefleiter, Wirtschaft und Politik in Deutschland (Opladen, 1968); Heinrich Bennecke, Wirtschaftliche Depression und Politischer Radikalismus (Munich, 1968).

4. Eyck, Weimar Republic , p. 61; Karl Dietrich Bracher, "Probleme der Wahlentwicklung in der Weimarer Republic," in Deutschland zwischen Demokratie und Diktatur (Munich, 1964), pp. 58-60.

5. Eyck, Weimar Republic, vol. 1, pp. 100-105.

6. Bracher, "Wahlentwicklung," pp. 60-61.

7. For a more detailed treatment of the BVP's relationship to the Nazis see especially, Hans Fenske, Konservative und Rechtsradikalismus in Bayern (Munich, 1969), pp. 64 et seq.; Geoffrey Pridham, Hitler's Rise to Power (London, 1973), pp. 64-73, 146-183.

8. Rainer Lepsius, "From Fragmented Party Democracy to Government by Emergency Decree and Nationalist Socialist Take-Over," in Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes (Baltimore, 1978), p. 46.

9. Bracher, "Wahlentwicklung," p. 64.

10. Lepsius, "Fragmented Party Democracy," pp. 42-45; see also Karl Dietrich Bracher, "Parteienstaat, Praesidialsystem, Notstand - Zum Problem der Weimarer Staatskrise," Politische Vierteljahresschrift 13 (1962/3), pp. 212-224.

11. Karl Dietrich Bracher, Die Aufloesung der Weimarer Republik (Villingen, 1960), pp. 686-737.

12. Derek Urwin, "Germany: Continuity and Change in Electoral Politics," in Richard Rose, ed. Electoral Behavior: A Comparative Handbook (New York, 1974), pp. 116-118.

13. Dankwart A. Rustow, "Some Observations on Proportional Representation," The Journal of Politics 12 (1950), p. 116.

14. F.A. Hermens, Democracy or Anarchy (Notre Dame, 1941).

15. Urwin, "Germany," pp. 115-116.

16. ibid.

17. Lepsius, "Fragmented Democracy," pp. 42-46.

18. ibid.

19. Sten Nilson, "Wahlsoziologische Probleme des Nationalsozialismus," Zeitschrift fuer die Gesamte Staatwissenschaft 110 (1954), pp. 283-285.

20. Bracher, "Wahlentwicklung," pp. 56-57.

21. The persistence of pre-war political cleavages and party blocs has been noted by such analysts of Weimar voting as Urwin, "Germany," Lepsius, "Fragmented Democracy," Bernhard Vogel, et al. Wahlen in Deutschland (Berlin, New York, 1971), Werner Conze, "Politische Willensbildung im Deutschen Kaiserreich" in Vom Staat des Ancien Regimes zum Modernen Parteienstaat, Festschrift fuer Theodor Schieder (Munich, 1978).

22. For the 1917 schism and its aftermath, see Richard Hunt, German Social Democracy, 1919-1933 (Chicago, 1964), pp. 16-24, 191-209.

23. Rudolf Morsey, "Die Deutsche Zentrumspartei," in Erich Matthias and Rudolf Morsey, eds. Das Ende der Parteien (Duesseldorf, 1960).

24. The most comprehensive history of the BVP between 1919 and 1933 is that by Klaus Schoenhoven, Die Bayrische Volkspartei (Duesseldorf, 1972).

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27. Attila Chanady, "The Disintegration of the German National People's Party," Journal of Modern History 39 (1967), pp. 65-91.

28. Rainer Hambrecht, Der Aufstieg des Nationalsozialismus in Mittel- und Oberfranken (Nuremberg, 1976) pp. 299-301.

29. Among the more valuable scholarly treatments of the liberal parties are Robert Pois , "The Bourgeois Democrats in the Weimar Republic," Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, 66 (1976); Lothar Albertin, Liberalismus und Demokratie am Anfang der Weimarer Republik (Duesseldorf, 1972); Werner Stephan, Aufstieg und Verfall des Linksliberalismus 1918-1933: Geschichte der Deutschen Demokratischen Partei (Goettingen, 1973); Wolfgang Hartenstein, Die Anfaenge der Deutschen Volkspartei, 1918-1920 (Duesseldorf, 1962); Lothar Doehn, Politik und Interesse: Die Interessenstruktur der Deutschen Volkspartei (Meisenheim, 1970); H.A. Turner, Stresemann and the Politics of the Weimar Republic (Princeton, 1963).

30. Bracher, "Wahlentwicklung," pp. 55-56.

31. Harold J. Gordon, Hitler and the Beerhall Putsch (Princeton, 1972) pp. 15-21, 25-48, 88 et seq.

32. Pridham, Hitler's Rise, pp. 28-31, 72-73.

33. Rainer Hambrecht, Aufstieg des Nationalsozialismus, pp. 12-85.

34. Werner Kaltefleiter, Wirtschaft und Politik, pp. 22-94.

35. Otto and Gregor Strasser, both of whom had been Nazi leaders before the Putsch, concentrated their organizational activities in North Germany; Karl Kaufmann was the NSDAP's Gauleiter in the Ruhr district; Alfred Krebs was Hamburg's Gauleiter between 1926-1928. Goebbels took over the position of Berlin's Gauleiter in 1926. The NSDAP's efforts to win working class support have received detailed treatments by, among others, W. Boehnke, Die NSDAP im Ruhrgebiet 1920-1933 (Bonn, 1974); D.W. Muehlberger, The Rise of National Socialism in Westphalia 1920-1933, Ph.D. Dissertation (London, 1975); W. Jochman, Nationalsozialismus und Revolution: Ursprung und Geschichte der NSDAP in Hamburg (Frankfurt a.M., 1960); E. Bramsted, Goebbels und die Nationalsozialistische Propaganda 1925-1945 (Frankfurt a.M., 1971); Dietrich Orlow, The History of the Nazi Party, vol. 1, 1919-1933 (Pittsburgh, 1969.)

36. For the ideas and programs of the NSDAP's left wing see especially Reinhard Kuehnl, Die Nationalsozialistische Linke (Meisenheim, 1966); Joseph Nyomarky, Charisma and Factionalism in the Nazi Party (Minneapolis, 1967).

37. Peter Stachura, "Der Kritische Wendepunkt? Die NSDAP und die Reichstagswahl von 1928," Vierteljahreshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte 26 (1978), pp. 67-99.

38. ibid., pp. 88-89.

39. Horst Gies, "NSDAP und landwirtschaftliche Organisation in der Weimarer Republik," Vierteljahreshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte 15 (1967), pp. 341-376; Dietrich Gessner, Agrardepression, Agrarideologie und Konservative Politik in der Weimarer Republik (Wiesbaden, 1976); J.E. Farquarson, The Plough and the Swastika (Beverly Hills, 1976); Max Kele, Nazis and Workers, National Socialist Appeals to German Workers 1919-1933 (Chapel Hill, 1972).

40. Shively, "Party Identification," p. 1220. In order to obtain, for example, a measure of the net changes for all of the parties in the election pair of 1919 and 1920, all of the differences in the votes received by the parties competing in both elections are summed (signs ignored) and divided by two. The same can be done for all of the blocs, for the parties composing one of the blocs, and so forth.

41. Bracher, Aufloesung, pp. 364-388, 415-458, 608-637.

42. ibid., pp. 51-64, 443-458, 714-724.

43. For the Kulturkampf and its ramifications, see especially, David Blackbourne, "The Problem of Democratisation: German Catholics and the Role of the Centre Party," in Richard J. Evans, ed. Society and Politics in Wilhelmine Germany (London, 1978), pp. 160-184.

44. Hunt, Social Democracy, pp. 1-25.

45. Hans Rosenberg, "Political and Social Consequences of the Great Depression 1873-1896 in Central Europe," in James Sheehan, ed. Imperial Germany (New York, 1976), p. 40.

46. ibid., 41-44; Hunt, Social Democracy, pp. 7-8.

47. Rosenberg, "Great Depression," pp. 41-47.

48. ibid., pp. 47-52.

49. ibid., p. 47.

50. ibid., pp. 43-44; Geoff Ely, *Reshaping the German Right* (New Haven 1980), pp. 19-40; Dirk Stegmann, *Die Erben Bismarcks* (Cologne, 1970), pp. 26-47.

51. Peter G. J. Pulzer, *The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria* (New York, 1964); pp. 75-117.

52. ibid., pp. 118-127; Ely, "German Right," 23-40; Stegmann, *Erben*, pp. 20-23, 113-130.

53. Wolfgang Mommsen, "Domestic Factors in German Foreign Policy until 1914," in James Sheehan, ed., *Imperial Germany* (New York, 1976), pp. 242-246.

54. ibid., p. 244.

55. ibid., pp. 246-257; also Hans-Ulrich Weher, "Bismarck's Imperialism 1862-1890," in Sheehan, ed., *Imperial Germany*, pp. 199-214; Stegmann, *Erben*, pp. 97-113.

56. Stegmann, *Erben*, pp. 257-328, 352-409, 431-449.

57. ibid., 449-519.

CHAPTER IV

CONTINUITIES AND CHANGES IN FRANCONIAN VOTING: 1920-1933

As the preceding chapter showed, most of the Weimar Republic's elections were held during or after major economic and political crises. This was reflected in the highly volatile voting pattern of the Weimar electorate. Between 1919 and 1933, Weimar voters were unusually willing to desert parties they had previously supported. The parties most adversely affected by this tendency--the Social Democrats, the Center Party and the two liberal parties--had been the pillars of Weimar Germany's democratic regime. Thus voters showed an increasing readiness to back parties fundamentally opposed to the Weimar constitution.

Yet both these tendencies, it was shown, occurred within the boundaries set by Germany's three socially-based party blocs or *tendances*. The aggregate voting evidence for the Reich and Franconia surveyed in the preceding chapter indicated that the readiness of Weimar voters to switch parties and to defect from democratic to extremist parties did not fundamentally alter the traditional alignments long established by class and confessional cleavages. Not even the NSDAP's electoral surges after 1928 undermined the stability of the Catholic, Marxist, and Protestant bourgeois party blocs. On the contrary, aggregate evidence at both the national and regional level

suggested that in the last Reichstag elections the boundaries separating these three voting groups became even more rigid than they had been earlier. As Burnham and Shively have correctly insisted, it was this combination of generally volatile voting behavior and an unchanging commitment to the main party groupings shown by the electorate that made the "Weimar system of voting" unique.

This chapter seeks to provide even stronger regional evidence for these unusual features of Weimar voting. Its principal objective is to demonstrate that, as Juan Linz has argued, the NSDAP's political and electoral success was in large part determined by the configuration within which this party emerged and to which it had to adapt itself.[1] In this chapter I use estimates of individual voting derived from a multiple ecological regression analysis of Franconian voting data for the 1920-1933 Reichstag elections to demonstrate the following: 1) Franconian voters during the entire electoral period showed unusually volatile partisan behavior; 2) contrary to Meckstroth, post-1928 voter movements did not signify a break from earlier voting patterns; 3) as Burnham and Shively have argued, supporters of the Catholic, Marxist and Protestant bourgeois parties showed highly differentiated patterns of partisan behavior; 4) as Burnham and Shively have claimed, (and contrary to those of Bendix and Lipset) Protestant bourgeois voters irrespective of whether they originally supported liberal, conservative, or splinter parties tended to be less stable in their partisan commitments than Catholic or socialist voters; 5) again, as Burnham and Shively have contended, voter movements generally occurred within a particular <u>tendance</u> and voter reluctance to cross into another party bloc persisted

throughout the 1930-1933 elections; 6) that, contrary to Meckstroth, the voting shifts after 1928 did not constitute a realignment but, rather, a solidification of existing electoral divisions. Section I surveys voting stability and continuity in Franconia generally; Section II then examines regression estimates for the main parties competing in this region. Section III analyzes rates of continuity and change for the larger blocs or tendances. The next chapter will go on to discuss in greater detail both the partisan background of NSDAP voters and that party's own pattern of support.

This chapter relies principally on evidence produced by ecological regression. This technique, it will be recalled, yields coefficients from which individual-level voter continuity and transition rates can be computed. It is important to remember, however, that these estimates do not represent absolute statements but "conditional probabilities." In other words, an estimate that 5% of the BVP's voters in Franconia shifted to the NSDAP between 1928 and 1930 refers to the probability that a given group of voters (in this case BVP supporters) voted for the Nazis in 1930 given their support for the BVP in 1928; this estimate does not mean that five per cent in fact made this switch, since even regression can only infer individual level behavior from aggregated data. Nevertheless, for the purpose of simplicity, I generally refer to continuity and defection rates as simple proportions rather than reporting them always as probability statements.

Second, in the ensuing discussion of partisan behavior in Franconia, two types of estimates appear. The first involves estimates for _transitions_ from one state to another, e.g. from non-voting in election

1 to support for the NSDAP in election 2; the second involves estimates for the sources of a given party's support in the second election, e.g. what was the proportion of people who had voted in 1928 in the total vote received by the NSDAP in 1930. Both estimates were derived from different regression models discussed in the methods section of the Introduction. It is important to remember that the proportion of voters from one party to another party may differ substantially from the proportion these voters constitute within the second party's total vote. For example, it may be that less than one-half of one per cent of the BVP's voters moved to the DVP between July and November 1932. This miniscule proportion of BVP shifts, however, may constitute a considerable share, e.g. 30%, of the DVP's total vote in November 1932. Such a discrepancy arises from the fact that the BVP's vote in July 1932 was considerably larger than was the DVP's vote in November 1932. Similarly, a small party may lose a substantial part of its voters to another party, but if the second party is a very large one, those who shifted to the second party make up only a tiny share of the second party's vote. Generally, I have reported transition estimates and estimated sources of support as zero if the proportions involved were less than one half of one per cent. In such cases I have tried to indicate, however, that such proportions were in fact slighly positive.

Two further reminders are in order. For reasons stated in the Introduction, the category of "nonvoters" includes both people who had been ineligible to vote prior to a given election and those who had failed to exercise their right to vote.[2] Actually, the category of

nonvoters also includes those who were sporadic voters, i.e. who moved both in and out of the active electorate. As will be shown later, throughout the period 1920-1933, there were constant movements into and out of the nonvoting category. It is not possible to determine whether those who at any given point moved out of the nonvoting category had never voted before or whether they had been sporadic participants. For the sake of simplicity I follow the customary procedure and refer to those moving out of the nonvoting category from one election to the next as "previous or former" nonvoters. However, whenever possible I try to indicate whether those who moved out of the category may earlier have been active supporters of one or the other party.

Second, because Weimar parties fell into three party groupings with boundaries fixed by class and confessional cleavages, these parties cannot be neatly ordered along a left-right continuum. Consequently, in all tables I have ordered the parties by blocs, and within each bloc, by the parties' importance. The order of the blocs or tendances is: Catholic, Left, Bourgeois. In Franconia, the Catholic bloc was synonymous with the BVP. Hence in tables where estimates for parties are given, the BVP will appear first, since it was Bavaria's principal and governing party. Within the Left bloc, the order will be SPD, KPD, USPD; within the Protestant bourgeois camp, it will be: NSDAP, DNVP, DVP, DDP, splinter (i.e. special interest and other parties). Nonvoters appear last in all tables.

I

The analysis of aggregate voting figures in Chapter IV demonstrated that Franconian voters generally displayed a voting pattern of the type Converse calls "high variance behavior."[3] After 1919 all parties in Franconia experienced dramatic changes in their levels of support. None of the parties competing in this region, with the possible exception of the BVP and SPD, could count on stable constituencies from one election to the next. The extreme variability in Franconian voting was demonstrated graphically by Shively's index of net change in party support for the 1920-1933 period.

For the most part, individual transition estimates of Franconian voters for the 1920-1933 period confirm the impression of "high variance behavior" conveyed by the region's aggregate voting trends during this time. If anything,this volatility in the partisan behavior shown by Franconian voters emerges even more sharply from their continuity and transition estimates. Table 10 indicates the proportion of all voters who from one election to the next continued to vote for the same party, switched parties, or went into the inactive electorate. Table 11 displays the estimated sources of the total votes case in each election.

TABLE 10

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN VOTING: 1920-1933

Proportion of all first-election voters who in the subsequent election voted for the same parties, switched parties, or did not vote:

Voting Status	Election Pair						
	1920-1924I	1924I-1924II	1924II-1928	1928-1930	1930-1932I	1932I-1932II	1932II-1933
Voted for same party	53	68	79	66	73	85	89
Voted for another party	40	26	12	32	21	9	9
Did not vote	7	6	9	1	6	6	2

TABLE 11

SOURCES OF VOTING CHANGE: 1924I-1933

Proportion of all second-election voters who in the preceding election had voted for the same party, had voted for another party or had not voted:

Voting Status	1924I	1924II	1928	1930	1932I	1932II	1933
Voted for same party	52	59	81	60	67	88	81
Voted for another party	39	23	12	30	20	9	9
Did not vote	9	18	7	10	13	3	11

Both tables demonstrate, first, that for the entire 1920-1933 electoral period Franconian voters generally had a pronounced propensity to change parties. Only in the last two Reichstag elections and in that of 1928 did a relatively low proportion of the active electorate switch parties. Shively's index of net change revealed much the same pattern at the aggregate level.[4] These estimates confirm Burnham's and Shively's claim that within the Weimar context, post-1928 voting shifts, both aggregate and individual, were _not_ exceptional. At least for Franconia the evidence suggests that the crisis elections of 1930-1933 did not diverge radically from earlier voting patterns.

My estimates in both tables contradict Meckstroth's contention that individual voting changes (as well as aggregate shifts) after 1928 far exceeded those in preceding elections. On the contrary, as Shively's index of net change suggested, and as the estimates in table 10 confirm, voter movements in the 1920-1924 period were no less or even more extreme than those during the realigning elections of 1930-33. Since Meckstroth posits large individual and aggregate changes in voting as a defining characteristic of realignment, it would seem that to the extent that such an electoral transformation occurred, it did so between 1920 and 1924 and not, as Meckstroth argues, after 1928. Evidence examined later in this chapter also suggests this. Thus I show that several of the leading Weimar parties actually experienced what Meckstroth would call realigning changes--a radical and durable alteration in the party's competitive rank or class--during these early elections, that is before, not after 1928. I also demonstrate that only in this earlier 1920-1924 period did Franconian voters ignore established alignments and shift

to parties in another bloc.

Transition estimates in table 10 reveal that however great the disaffection of citizens with the parties competing for their support, voters did not generally consider abstention as an alternative. Compared to the proportions of voters who changed parties from one election to the next, the rates of nonvoting remained quite small. Franconian voters clearly believed in actively expressing by their votes their discontent with their own social or economic situation, the performance of their parties or the Republic's institutions and leaders. The regression estimates in table 11 also show that on the whole, those who entered the active electorate from one election to the next did not contribute significantly to the total votes cast at any given point. The only exception was the December 1924 Reichstag election when previous nonvoters contributed almost a fifth of the total votes cast.

The aggregate evidence examined in the previous chapter supported the claims made by Burnham and Shively. Further corroboration is provided by my estimates for voter support of parties and blocs in Franconia. These estimates are given in the following section, which analyzes support and patterns of partisan behavior for Catholic, socialist, and nonconfessional parties. This is followed by an analysis of voter support for the blocs themselves.

II

In Franconia, the Catholic bloc was synonymous with the Bavarian People's Party (BVP). This party, which had seceded from the Center Party in 1919, was Bavaria's main governing party for the entire period between the Republic's inception and demise. As the previous chapter

demonstrated, among all the parties competing in this region, the BVP's aggregate support between 1920 and 1933 showed the least variation. In the entire period, its vote dropped from a high of 28.1% (in 1919) to a low of 22.4% in 1933. Even in those elections marked by serious social and economic dislocations, aggregate variations in the BVP's vote remained far below levels for all other major parties. The continuity and transition estimates of BVP voters in Franconia summarized in table 12 amply confirm remarkably strong partisan commitments to this party.

One index of the unusually stable electoral support enjoyed by the BVP is the continuity rate of BVP voters. Between 1920 and 1933 this dropped below 90% only twice: between 1920 and May 1924 and between July and November 1932. During both these periods the BVP's political positions clearly encouraged some of its voters to abandon this party. Until the May 1924 election, leading elements in the BVP had openly or tacitly supported the forces of the extreme Right, above all the NSDAP It is therefore scarcely surprising that some BVP voters were encouraged by their party's stance to support these rightwing parties. As table 12 indicates, these defections largely benefited the NSDAP. After the May 1924 election, the BVP recognized the importance of "immunizing" its voters against the appeals of any outside party. Chapter VI will describe the means by which the BVP deliberately set out to erect organizational and ideological barriers around its voters. Among its chief targets of attack were the National Socialists and the Social Democrats, the only parties capable of threatening the BVP's political and electoral preeminence in Bavaria.

TABLE 12

TRANSITION BEHAVIOR OF BVP VOTERS IN FRANCONIA: 1920-1933

Proportion of first election supporters of the BVP
who subsequently voted for:

Election Pair	BVP	SPD	KPD	USPD	NSDAP	DNVP	DVP	DDP	WP	Splinter CNBL	CSVD	Other	Did Not Vote
1920-24I[a)]	86	0	2	0	6	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	5
1924I-24II	94	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	4
1924II-28[b)]	91	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	6
1928-30[c)]	95	0	0	-	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
1930-32I	95	1	0	-	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
1932I-32II	89	0	.0	-	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	7
1932II-33	90	0	0	-	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3

a) transition estimates to USPD are slightly positive; b) transition estimates to DVP are slightly positive;
c) transition estimates to DVP are slightly positive.

Once it had denounced those parties, the BVP found it difficult to modify its position without causing voter losses. This became especially clear after the November 1932 election. Between July and November 1932, negotiations were in progress involving the potential participation of the NSDAP in a government that would also include the BVP and the Center Party. Although these negotiations failed, voters in Franconia were clearly confused by the apparent shift in the BVP's position.[5] It is interesting to note that more BVP voters withdrew from the active electorate in November 1932 than in the May 1924 election. It may be that many BVP voters responded to "crosspressures" by sitting this election out. Those who defected, moved into the bourgeois camp where most of them supported the NSDAP. (The transition estimates from the BVP to the NSDAP was two per cent; the other two per cent went to splinter parties.)[6]

After the November 1923 election, the BVP once again mounted an offensive against the National Socialists. By the March 1933 elections, the country's political situation had changed dramatically. With the NSDAP in power nationally, the BVP feared all the more consequent political repercussions within Bavaria. It fought a vigorous campaign and although its defection rate in March 1933 was the highest since the 1920-1924 election pair, the party's support in Franconia remained surprisingly stable--in fact its continuity rate went up by one per cent. The estimated seven per cent of BVP voters who switched parties between November 1932 and March 1933 all voted for the NSDAP. Although this was a significantly larger proportion than had previously defected to the NSDAP, by Weimar standards it was not an unusually large voter move-

TABLE 13

SOURCES OF SUPPORT FOR THE BVP IN FRANCONIA: 1924I-1933

Proportion of second election supporters of the BVP who in the preceding election voted for:

Election Pair	BVP	SPD	KPD	USPD	NSDAP	DNVP	DVP	DDP	WP	Splinter CNBL	CSVD	Other	Did Not Vote
1920-24I[a)]	92	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8
1924I-24II	81	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	17
1924II-28	97	0	0	-	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
1928-30	86	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	7
1930-32I[b)]	90	0	0	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
1932I-32II	92	0	0	-	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
1932II-33	92	0	2	-	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	3

a) estimates from DVP are slightly positive; b) estimates from DVP and DDP are slightly positive.

ment. Moreover, as will be shown later, BVP defectors made up a small share of the NSDAP's total vote in 1933.

The BVP policy of creating a strong "we versus them" mood among its voters enabled it to survive the "crisis" elections of 1928-1933 with its electoral base largely intact. Indeed it actually improved its position. Its continuity rates between 1928 and July 1932 were higher than between any other series of elections in the 1920-1933 span.

The BVP's success in containing large-scale defections after 1928 was all the more remarkable given the fact that it was Bavaria's governing party during a period of severe economic crisis. Hence it had to formulate and administer highly unpopular austerity, welfare and tax measures. The absence of any significant defections to the NSDAP during this critical period demonstrates how strong were the limits imposed on the NSDAP's growth by the continuing power of confessional divisions over Franconia's voters. But it also shows how important were the BVP's efforts to maintain its hold over its supporters by strongly differentiating its own aims, values and political position from other parties.

This policy, however, also made the BVP an unacceptable alternative for any other group of voters. Table 13 indicates that it was generally avoided by both Marxist and Protestant bourgeois voters. Whatever voting gains the BVP achieved between 1920 and 1933 came overwhelmingly from voters who had been inactive in the preceding election. This means that the BVP's voter reservoir, like that of the NSDAP and the Marxist parties as well, was circumscribed by class and confessional boundaries.

The second major party bloc in Franconia comprised the Marxist parties. Initially, this bloc consisted of three contenders: the Independent Socialists (or USPD) who had seceded from the SPD in 1917, the Social Democrats (also known as the Majority-SPD), and the Communists (KPD), first formed in 1918. All the theorists examined in Chapters I and II emphasized the stability of the left bloc despite these internal divisions. For Burnham, Marxist parties exemplify integrative or as he calls them "confessional" parties. Such parties are said to enjoy generally very stable electorates. But he and Shively have found that aggregate support for individual Marxist parties varied considerably more than for the Marxist bloc. Both authors, however, were convinced that, given the stability of the left bloc right through the 1928-1933 period, voter movements generally took place within this bloc. What do regression estimates reveal about the electoral behavior of Marxist voters in Franconia?

The first major change within the left bloc occurred between the 1920 and 1924 elections. During that period, the USPD dissolved itself and most of its leaders returned to the SPD. This dissolution occasioned a substantial redistribution of electoral support for the parties composing the left bloc. In 1920, the USPD in Franconia had received 175,000 votes or 16.8% of the total vote. This was only marginally below the SPD's vote. In May 1924, the USPD's vote was a little over 6000, a figure unchanged in December 1924. Thereafter, this party disappeared from the political scene.

TABLE 14

TRANSITION BEHAVIOR OF USPD VOTERS IN FRANCONIA: 1920-1928

Proportion of first election supporters of the USPD who subsequently of each election pair voted for:

Election Pair	BVP	SPD	KPD	USPD	NSDAP	DNVP	DVP	DDP	WP	Splinter CNBL	CSVD	Other	Did Not Vote
1920-24I	0	50	15	2	13	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	14
1924I-24II	0	0	44	20	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	14	22
1924II-28	0	40	23	37	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

TABLE 15

SOURCES OF SUPPORT FOR THE USPD IN FRANCONIA: 1924I-1928

Proportion of second election supporters of the USPD who in the preceding election voted for:

Election Pair	BVP	SPD	KPD	USPD	NSDAP	DNVP	DVP	DDP	WP	Splinter CNBL	CSVD	Other	Did Not Vote
1920-24I	5	0	15	63	0	0	9	2	0	0	0	0	6
1924I-24II	0	26	2	24	17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	31

It has been generally assumed that the preponderant proportion of USPD voters went to the SPD.[7] My transition estimates in table 14 confirm this. So too does the SPD's aggregate increase in its voting support. (Between 1920 and December 1924, the SPD's vote went from 124,000 to 328,000.) On the other hand, my estimates also show that a substantial proportion of USPD voters went to the KPD. More significant, however, was the extent of movements to the NSDAP. As table 14 indicates, 13% of USPD voters left the Marxist for the Protestant bourgeois camp where they supported the National Socialists. In no other election was there such a large shift of left voters into another bloc. Furthermore, although the NSDAP attracted some leftist support in the period of 1930-1933, the proportions involved were substantially smaller.

There has been some speculation among historians that the NSDAP may have received USPD support; but the estimates in table 14 are the first concrete evidence of such a shift. What prompted USPD voters to shift to the NSDAP is difficult to say. One reason may have been the fact that initially the Nazis were the extreme left within the nationalist-voelkisch movement. It may well be that their combination of socialism, anticapitalism, antipathy toward the bourgeoisie and extreme nationalism appealed to segments of Franconian workers, especially in the wake of the Ruhr invasion. (Many of the poorer areas in Upper Franconia were located at the border of Czechoslovakia.) Desperate economic conditions in the region may also have contributed to this shift. Franconia suffered severe unemployment during the inflation since many of the smaller industries and businesses lacked the credit and resources to purchase raw materials necessary to their pro-

duction at world market prices. Ministerial reports of the time frequently mention that lack of work and money to purchase food drove desperate workers into the countryside where they went begging for food or work. Often bands of workers organized night-time raids to steal potatoes, fruit, grains or firewood.[9] Under these circumstances the NSDAP may have encountered less resistance among workers than in the last phase of its development. It must also be remembered that the USPD returned to the SPD. This may have made it easier for the Nazis to mobilize former USPD voters attracted neither to the SPD nor KPD. (That USPD voters were not altogether happy with their party's dissolution can be inferred from their high abstention rates.)

These explanations, however, assume that the USPD was predominantly a working class party. Was this in fact the case? When the party was founded toward the end of World War I, police reports of the time mentioned that most USPD meetings were attended principally by skilled workers, white collar employees and other middle class occupational groups.[10] This may explain defections not only to the Nazis but also to the Business Party (WP), which in May 1924, attracted an estimated 6% of former USPD voters.

Between 1920 and May 1924, the USPD attracted support from both the liberal middle class parties, the DDP and DVP. In its final election in December 1924, 17% of the USPD's vote came from Nazi defectors. At any rate, this exchange of voters between the USPD and bourgeois parties constitutes an exception to general patterns of voting behavior within the left bloc (see table 15).

TABLE 16

TRANSITION BEHAVIOR OF SPD VOTERS IN FRANCONIA: 1920-1933

Proportion of first election supporters of the SPD
who subsequently voted for:

Election Pair	BVP	SPD	KPD	USPD	NSDAP	DNVP	DVP	DDP	WP	Splinter CNBL	CSVD	Other	Did Not Vote
1920-24I a)	0	84	15	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
1924I-24II b)	0	94	0	0	1	0	1	4	0	0	0	0	0
1924II-28 c)	0	93	1	0	1	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	2
1928-30	0	91	5	-	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
1930-32I d)	0	84	4	-	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	8
1932I-32II e)	0	91	7	-	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
1932II-33	0	94	0	-	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	4

a) Transition estimates to DNVP are slightly negative; b) transition estimates to USPD are slightly positive; c) transition estimates to DNVP are slightly negative; d) transition estimates to WP and Other are slightly positive; e) transition estimates to DDP are slightly negative.

After the dissolution of the USPD and the redistribution of its voting support, the SPD and KPD remained the principal contenders within the Marxist bloc. In Franconia, the SPD emerged as stronger and politically more powerful. In the December 1924 and May 1928 elections its vote even exceeded the BVP's. After 1930, however, its level of aggregate support dropped considerably below that of the BVP.

How did the SPD's continuity rates compare to those of the BVP? In all but two elections, more than 90% of those who had voted for the SPD in one election supported it in the next. Like the BVP as well, most of the SPD's vote from one election to the next was made of those who had previously voted for the Social Democrats or parties in the same bloc (see table 16).

The stability of the SPD's vote as measured by its high continuity rate had two sources. First, it was the object of attacks and discrimination by the BVP on the one hand and by Protestant bourgeois parties (excepting the DDP) on the other. Secondly, like the BVP, the SPD created not only a strong organizational substructure but also strong ideological barriers around its electorate. Again such party strategies (examined in chapter VI) limited defections _from_ the SPD but at the cost of restricting the flow of voters from other blocs _to_ the SPD.

The SPD's sources of support and the partisan behavior of its voters clearly confirm the strength of the boundaries which it in part found and in part helped emphasize among Catholic, left and Protestant bourgeois blocs. My data thus indicates that SPD voters avoided the BVP completely and that only a small proportion of SPD voters ever moved

into the bourgeois camp. The largest transition of SPD voters to parties in the Protestant camp occurred in the May-December 1924 elections; at that point an estimated 6% of SPD supporters shifted to parties in the bourgeois bloc. Thereafter, transition proportions to Protestant bourgeois parties never exceeded 4%, a figure nevertheless higher than for exchanges between SPD and the BVP.

My estimates for the SPD's support in table 17 indicate that in Franconia the Social Democrats always attracted some share of the Protestant bourgeois voters. Although the proportion never exceeded 6%, this was higher than any received by the BVP. Such defectors to the SPD were not restricted to former voters for the DDP, the party, which in Bavaria, worked most closely with the SPD. At various times supporters of virtually every major bourgeois party shifted to the SPD. Again the proportions involved were not large, never exceeding 7%. Yet this is the first time that evidence of such movements even on this scale has been discovered in the empirical literature on Nazism. Within the same limits, as SPD transition estimates in table 16 confirm, Social Democratic voters also opted for a variety of parties within the Protestant bourgeois camp. Thus the barriers between the Marxist and Protestant bourgeois bloc were not altogether impermeable, but nevertheless confined exchanges to a level below 10%.

SPD shifts to the NSDAP, which never exceeded 4%, were on the whole below the level of BVP voter movements. (This reached 7% in March 1933.) For the national elections after 1928, both Cameron and Meckstroth found slightly higher shifts by SPD voters to bourgeois parties in general and to the Nazis in particular.

TABLE 17

SOURCES OF SUPPORT FOR THE SPD IN FRANCONIA: 1924I-1933

Proportion of second election supporters of the SPD
who in the preceding election voted for:

Election Pair	BVP	SPD	KPD	USPD	NSDAP	DNVP	DVP	DDP	WP	Splinter CNBL	CSVD	Other	Did Not Vote
1920-24I[a]	0	60	0	34	-	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	4
1924I-24II	1	74	0	3	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	20
1924II-28[b]	0	86	3	1	0	5	0	1	0	0	0	0	4
1928-30[c]	0	94	1	-	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
1930-32I	2	93	1	-	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	3
1932I-32II[d]	0	97	0	-	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
1932II-33	0	90	8	-	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0

a) Column estimates from DNVP are slightly negative; b) column estimates from WP are slightly positive;
c) column estimates from DPP are slightly positive; d) column estimates from DDP are slightly positive.

One explanation offered by both authors is that the SPD did not recruit its supporters exclusively from the industrial proletariat. There is some evidence to support that possibility.[11] But SPD defections to the NSDAP after 1928 were not unprecedented. In the pre-crisis elections there had been consistent, if small, voter exchanges between the SPD and Protestant bourgeois parties (including the NSDAP). Hence SPD defectors to the Nazis may have earlier supported one or another Protestant bourgeois party. Because of the SPD's large share of the vote, transfers on even a small scale could significantly aid the NSDAP. Hence the importance of examining sources of support and partisan behavior for all parties throughout the Weimar electoral period. For in this way it is easier to understand voter movements during the critical elections of 1930-1933.

The other member of the Marxist bloc in Franconia was the KPD. The realignment within the Marxist bloc that took place between 1920 and May 1924 also benefited the Communists. In that period, the KPD experienced a six-fold increase in its aggregate vote. Many of these gains resulted from an influx of former USPD voters. In Franconia, however, before the 1930 election the Communists did not seriously threaten the SPD's predominance within the socialist bloc. Even then the KPD's advances against the SPD were far more limited than on the national level.

As can be seen from the KPD's transition estimates in table 18, its continuity rates generally fell below the SPD's. The major exceptions to this pattern are the estimates for the 1928-July 1932 election pairs. In these two elections, only the Nazis and BVP voters

TABLE 18

TRANSITION BEHAVIOR OF KPD VOTERS IN FRANCONIA: 1920-1933

Proportion of first election supporters of the KPD
who subsequently voted for:

Election Pair	BVP	SPD	KPD	USPD	NSDAP	DNVP	DVP	DDP	WP	Splinter CNBL	CSVD	Other	Did Not Vote
1920-1924I	0	0	65	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	26
1924I-24II[a)]	0	15	49	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	30
1924II-28	0	15	74	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	11
1928-30	0	2	98	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1930-32I[b)]	0	3	95	-	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
1932I-32II[c)]	0	0	88	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12
1932II-33[d)]	8	21	60	-	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2

a) Transition estimates to DDP and DVP are slightly negative; b) transition estimates to Other are slightly positive; c) transition estimates to DNVP, DDP and DVP are slightly negative, transition estimates to Other are slightly positive; d) transition estimates to DNVP are slightly negative.

equalled the KPD's level of continuity. But for much of the period in which the KPD competed, its partisans had generally high defection and abstention rates. My estimates for Communist turnover suggest that KPD voters were less likely than SPD partisans to cross boundary lines and vote for bourgeois parties. When they did defect to parties in the bourgeois bloc, the proportions involved were lower than SPD defection rates. Communist defections to the Nazis throughout were more limited in scope and less frequent than SPD shifts to that party. Sizeable defections to the NSDAP occurred only in the November 1932-March 1933 election pair.

For the KPD, this was anything but a normal election. After the Reichstag fire, the Nazis had been granted emergency powers. These they used to jail most KPD leaders and to confiscate much of its press.[12] Given the circumstances under which the March 1933 election was held, those KPD voters who shifted to the NSDAP may have been terrorized or demoralized by the repressive measures carried out against KPD leaders and members. Some of the small-scale KPD defections to the NSDAP, however, may have come from former supporters of the National Socialists who between July and November 1932 had switched to the KPD. In the next chapter, I show that between these two elections an estimated 2% of July 1932 Nazi voters shifted to the KPD. As can be seen from the KPD's sources of support in table 19 these former Nazi voters made up 5% of the total KPD vote in November 1932.

Although there has been speculation about Communist and Nazi voter exchanges, these findings are the first concrete evidence of such exchanges and their scale. Neither Meckstroth nor Cameron, who use the

TABLE 19

SOURCES OF SUPPORT FOR THE KPD IN FRANCONIA: 1924I-1933

Proportion of second election supporters of the KPD
who in the preceding election voted for:

Election Pair	BVP	SPD	KPD	USPD	NSDAP	DNVP	DVP	DDP	WP	Splinter CNBL	CSVD	Other	Did Not Vote
1920-24I	9	41	10	40	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1924I-24II	0	0	72	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16
1924II-28	0	6	90	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
1928-30	0	27	56	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	17
1930-32I	0	16	61	-	0	0	1	5	0	4	0	0	13
1932I-32II[a)]	0	20	75	-	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1932II-33	0	0	93	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	3

a) column estimates from DNVP are slightly negative.

same method employed in this study, found evidence to this effect at the Reich level. In Franconia, therefore, these shifts may have been produced by conditions special to this region.

As can be seen from the KPD's transition estimates, the March 1933 election also occasioned unusually large movements to the SPD and, surprisingly, to the BVP. The only reason for the BVP shifts is that KPD voters may have been eager to support in this election those parties still capable of resisting the National Socialists. In Bavaria, that meant both the SPD and BVP. KPD shifts to the Catholic bloc may have occurred only regionally. Since Meckstroth's study excluded the election districts in the Ruhr area, which had a heavy concentration both of Catholics and industrial workers, he did not detect such shifts at the Reich level. (Meckstroth simply excluded from his analysis all urban and rural counties that underwent boundary changes. Unlike my own study, he did not attempt to create aggregated units that remained stable for the entire electoral period.) But Cameron (who used the same method but ignored boundary changes) also found no evidence of Communist defections to the Catholic bloc.

Finally, as table 19 indicates, the KPD was even less successful in attracting support outside the Left bloc than was the SPD. Hence the KPD's voting base was at once more narrow and more volatile than that of the SPD. When the two most extreme parties are compared, the KDP turns out to have been more unstable in the sources and patterns of its partisan support than the NSDAP. This confirms Burnham's point about the differences between these two extremist parties.[13]

Burnham classifies as "confessional parties" both parties of the left as well as the Catholic-based Center Party (and, by implication, its Bavarian sister party, the BVP). Confessional parties, according to Burnham, have a far more committed and stable electorate than do nonconfessional parties. This was certainly true of the BVP and SPD. But it was not true of the KPD. My data shows Communist voters in Franconia to have been generally less attached to their party than were SPD voters. Among the reasons for the KPD's relative electoral weakness and instability in Franconia were: 1) the absence of the type of industrial proletariat among which the KPD found its adherents elsewhere in Germany; 2) a poorly developed organizational and functional substructure compared to that of the SPD; 3) the close supervision by the Bavarian government of this party's activity from 1919 on. All these reasons for the KPD's voting behavior will be explored further in Chapter VI.

The transition rates I discovered for supporters of the BVP, SPD, and KPD confirm the reluctance of Catholic and left voters to move to parties in another bloc. My data further indicate that Catholic and left parties did not receive much support from voters outside their respective blocs. The impermeability of both the Catholic and left blocs in effect precluded the NSDAP from acquiring any considerable backing by Catholic and left voters. In Franconia at least, low defection rates to the NSDAP by BVP, SPD, and KPD voters attest to the difficulties faced by the National Socialists in developing a broadly-based electoral base. Clearly Catholic and left voters were strongly committed to their party or at least to the _tendance_ these parties

represented. Both electorates were unimpressed by National Socialist claims to be a party opposed to traditional cleavage lines in German social and political life.

Given the stability of the Catholic and left partisan commitments, as I have argued earlier, the NSDAP had no choice but to concentrate its efforts on the Protestant bourgeois electorate. This voting group proved to be highly susceptible to the NSDAP's appeal and mobilization. Protestant bourgeois voters had weak partisan ties and frequently changed parties. They were thus more willing to support a new or nontraditional party. Furthermore, Protestant bourgeois parties did not provide those integrative values and organizational structures which enabled the Catholic and Marxist parties to hold on to their voters. Once it had decided to do so, the NSDAP faced relatively few obstacles in its attempt to mobilize this electorate.

On the whole, my transition estimates reported below confirm that the Protestant bourgeois electorate was the most volatile voting group in Franconia. Parties in the Protestant bourgeois bloc suffered from by far the most erratic patterns of support. As can be seen from their continuity rates (Appendix B) bourgeois parties in general failed to develop the long-term partisan commitments shown by both Catholic and socialist voters. Thus continuity estimates for the bourgeois parties show rates at once lower and changing more dramatically between elections than those for Catholic and socialist parties.

Transition estimates for Protestant bourgeois parties in Franconia point to yet another feature common to all of them--unusually high defection rates. In other words, voters within this bloc showed a far

TABLE 20

TRANSITION BEHAVIOR OF DDP VOTERS IN FRANCONIA: 1920-1933

Proportion of first election supporters of the DDP
who subsequently voted for:

Election Pair	BVP	SPD	KPD	USPD	NSDAP	DNVP	DVP	DDP	WP	Splinter CNBL	CSVD	Other	Did Not Vote
1920-24I[a]	0	4	0	0	55	0	1	20	5	0	0	2	13
1924I-24II[b)]	0	0	0	0	10	0	10	46	32	0	0	2	0
1924II-28	0	6	0	0	0	0	2	52	6	0	0	9	25
1928-30	0	2	0	-	57	1	3	26	6	0	5	0	0
1930-32I	3	7	14	-	6	21	4	15	1	0	7	0	22
1932I-32II[c)]	0	7	0	-	0	0	22	70	0	0	1	0	0
1932II-33[d)]	0	0	0	-	0	2	0	66	0	0	6	0	26

a) Transition estimates to BVP are slightly negative; b) estimates to DNVP are slightly negative; c) estimates to NSDAP are slightly negative; d) estimates to DVP are slightly negative.

greater tendency to switch parties than did their socialist or Catholic counterparts. Nor were bourgeois defections necessarily crisis related; voter turnovers for all Protestant bourgeois parties were high in all Reichstag elections, even those in the Republic's most stable phase. As Shively has suggested, voter movements within this bloc after 1930 may have a more devastating impact but they were not exceptional. These constant voting shifts in the pre-1930 elections also suggest that Protestant bourgeois defections to the NSDAP after 1930 were not a sudden reaction to the new calamity of the Depression. Rather Protestant voters moved to the National Socialists by stages, shifting to and from a number of parties before they finally settled for this extremist opposition party.

Historians have generally noticed this gradual movement towards voting for the Nazis by supporters of Protestant bourgeois parties. But because they have used aggregate figures only, historians tend to assume that from 1920 on there was a steady shift to parties of the Right.[14] On the basis of regression analysis of Franconian data, this turns out not to be altogether true. My comparison of voter transition rates for all Protestant bourgeois parties reveals a continuous series of voter exchanges among parties representing varied views and economic interests. In the absence of any consistent pattern in voter movements among Protestant bourgeois voters, I should like to suggest that they were guided by pragmatic considerations in their choice of parties. That is to say, Protestant bourgeois voters moved to whatever party they believed could best represent their interest and they abandoned it when they found their choice to be too weak or ineffective. Protestant

bourgeois voters also showed unusually high rates of nonvoting. Why, given the range of choices open to them, did they abstain so often from voting? One explanation of this tendency is that it constituted yet another sign of discontent among voters in this bloc.

Despite their readiness to switch parties or not to vote, Protestant bourgeois voters, like their Catholic and socialist counterparts, generally did not venture outside their bloc. As will be seen from estimates for each bloc given in section III, voter movements into another bloc never exceeded 7% and this figure was reached only once, in the Reichstag election of 1930. The reluctance of this electorate to transcend bloc lines (and the class or confessional cleavages on which the main party groupings were based), meant that despite its volatility it could be mobilized only by a party identified as a spokesman for Protestant bourgeois interests. The NSDAP recognized this. After the failure of its strategy to enlist working class support had become obvious in the 1928 Reichstag election, the NSDAP set out to present itself as the only Protestant bourgeois party willing and able to respond to the needs of this electorate.

By far the most important feature shared by the supporters of all Protestant bourgeois parties was their massive defection to the National Socialists during the 1928 to 1933 elections. Compared to the proportions of such shifts I found for Catholic and left voters, figures for Protestant bourgeois defections to this party are staggering: between 1928 and July 1932 in particular, defection rates the NSDAP often exceeded 50%. In Franconia, after 1928, all bourgeois parties lost most of their voters to the NSDAP.

TABLE 21

TRANSITION BEHAVIOR OF DVP VOTERS IN FRANCONIA: 1920-1933

Proportion of first election supporters of the DVP
who subsequently voted for:

Election Pair	BVP	SPD	KPD	USPD	NSDAP	DNVP	DVP	DDP	WP	Splinter CNBL	CSVD	Other	Did Not Vote
1920-24I[a]	0	0	0	2	22	14	9	12	0	0	0	0	41
1924I-24II[b]	0	0	0	0	0	0	58	9	0	0	0	14	19
1924II-28	29	0	0	0	24	0	9	6	4	0	0	6	22
1928-30[c]	0	0	0	0	61	8	23	8	0	0	0	0	0
1930-32I	1	0	7	0	5	0	41	0	4	0	0	6	36
1932I-32II[d]	0	0	0	0	0	0	77	0	0	0	1	0	22
1932II-33	26	0	0	0	0	38	24	8	0	0	3	0	1

a) Transition estimates to SPD are slightly negative, transition estimates to Other are slightly positive;
b) transition estimates to KPD are slightly negative; c) transition estimates to Other are slightly positive;
d) transition estimates to DNVP are slightly negative.

Within the Protestant bourgeois bloc, patterns of support for the two liberal parties as well as for the conservative and splinter parties were all but indistinguishable. My estimates for both liberal parties (i.e., the DDP and DVP) in tables 20 and 21, for instance, show much the same discontinuity in their partisan support. Between every Reichstag election during the 1920-1933 period, each of these parties lost no less (and usually more) than a third of its voters. Some of these losses were compensated for by movements into these parties (as can be seen from their sources of support in Appendix B). But in Franconia the net effect of their high defection rates after 1920 was to transform them into ineffective electoral contenders long before the 1929 Depression.

DDP and DVP voters also showed much the same propensity to back the NSDAP. In May 1924, the DDP lost 55% of its voters to the National Socialists, the DVP 22%. In 1930, the proportion of DDP voters that switched to the Nazis was 57%, for the DVP 61%. Despite the magnitude of these proportions, in Franconia liberal defectors contributed only marginally to the NSDAP's post-1928 growth. By that time the liberal parties had already shrunken. Liberal voters also moved to parties of the right other than the NSDAP. My transition estimates show that DVP voters generally moved to the DNVP, while DDP defectors shifted frequently to the Business Party (Wirtschaftspartei, or WP). Contrary to Lipset, the WP was not a "centrist" party. In its political orientation and economic program it was closest to those small rightwing parties that emerged in the Second Empire's last decade.[15] (Before World War I, these parties were mere appendages of the conservative parties; after 1919

they merged with the DNVP.)[16]

Liberal voters differed from other groups within the Protestant bourgeois camp only by showing a higher tendency to vote for parties in another bloc. Generally DVP voters shifted to the BVP; this may have been due to the fact that after 1919 some leaders and members of the National Liberal Party (the DVP's precursor) joined the BVP. DDP voters, on the other hand, switched mostly to the SPD. Prior to 1930, the Franconian branches of the DDP and SPD had particularly close working ties largely because of the efforts of such prominent DDP leaders as Nuremberg's mayor, Dr. Hermann Luppe. Again, given the relatively small size of the DDP and DVP, defections across bloc lines had little electoral impact.

The conservative DNVP was no more successful in creating strong partisan commitments among its voters than the liberal parties. DNVP continuity rates were no higher and fluctuated no less than those for the DDP and DVP. DNVP voters also displayed the same enthusiasm for the National Socialists as did supporters of the liberal parties: in May 1924, 50% of those who had supported the DNVP in the preceding election switched to the NSDAP; in 1930 and July 1932, between one fifth and one third of the DNVP's supporters did so. The proportion of former DNVP who became Nazi voters after 1928, however, was probably considerably higher. As can be seen from my estimates in table 22, between 1928 and 1930, 53% of former DNVP voters went to the Christian National Peasant and Rural People's Party (Christlich Nationale Bauern- und Landvolk Partei or CNBL); these DNVP defectors constituted 87% of the CNBL's total vote. The CNBL was one of three parties formed by dissident DNVP

TABLE 22

TRANSITION BEHAVIOR OF DNVP VOTERS IN FRANCONIA: 1920-1933

Proportion of first election supporters of the DNVP
who subsequently voted for:

Election Pair	BVP	SPD	KPD	USPD	NSDAP	DNVP	DVP	DDP	WP	Splinter CNBL	CSVD	Other	Did Not Vote
1920-24I[a]	0	0	0	0	50	47	0	0	1	0	0	0	2
1924I-24II[b]	0	0	0	0	0	98	0	2	0	0	0	0	0
1924II-28	1	6	0	-	2	74	4	0	2	1	0	1	10
1928-30[c]	0	2	0	-	19	11	0	1	0	53	10	3	1
1930-32I[d]	0	0	0	-	29	37	0	0	1	0	0	3	30
1932I-32II	0	0	0	-	20	55	4	0	0	0	3	2	16
1932II-33[e]	0	0	0	-	31	68	1	0	0	0	0	0	0

a) Transition estimates to DVP and Other are slightly positive; b) transition estimates to BVP are slightly negative; c) transition estimates to DVP are slightly positive; d) transition estimates to DVP are slightly negative; e) transition estimates to CSVD are slightly positive.

leaders after Hugenberg took control of the party in 1928. The others were the Conservative People's Party (Konservative Volkspartei, or KVP) and the Christian Social People's Service (Christlich Sozialer Volksdienst, or CSVD).[17] In Franconia, the CNBL was by far the most successful of these splinter parties, followed by the CSVD. (This last party attracted only 10% of the DNVP defectors but these constituted almost 60% of its total vote.) In the July 1932 Reichstag election, all these parties lost most of their supporters to the NSDAP. The proportion of CNBL voters who went over to the Nazis was 91%. These voter shifts are by far the most direct and dramatic evidence of a two-stage movement toward the Nazis by Protestant bourgeois voters. (Voter shifts to the NSDAP after 1928 will be examined in greater detail in the following chapter. See also tables for splinter parties in Appendix B.)

DNVP shifts to these parties did not reflect--as Bendix argues--a desire among conservative voters to back "middle-of-the-road" parties. Contrary to the impression he and Lipset have given, small interest parties generally and the DNVP splinters in particular, rejected a "centrist" course of politics. As I show in chapter VI, the programs and political orientations of the CSVD, KVP and CSVD were indistinguishable from that of the DNVP. In fact, the leaders of the parties had broken with Hugenberg not because of ideological differences, but over the issue of participating in the government. (Leaders of the DNVP-affiliated National Farmer's League particularly opposed Hugenberg's policy of keeping the DNVP out of any government. To do so was to deprive them of a voice in shaping agricultural policy at a critical time. By forming an independent party, the head of the National Farmers'

League or <u>Reichslandbund</u> was able to join the government of Chancellor Bruening in March 1930 as Minister of Agriculture.)[18]

When liberal and conservative estimates are compared to those for splinter or special interest parties, they reveal not only very similar patterns of partisan behavior but also frequent voter exchanges among these three groups of parties. (See Appendix B for tables summarizing estimates for the splinter parties and for the sources of support of the liberal and conservative parties.) What is the significance of this similarity in liberal and conservative voting patterns, their occasional exchange of voters, and, above all, the common tendency of liberal and conservative voters alike to defect *en masse* to the NSDAP in the last Reichstag elections? Taken together, this data discredits Lipset's distinction of Weimar parties and voters as left, right, center. In Franconia at least, the right-center (or liberal and conservative) cleavage had little relevance to voters. Instead, as the analysis of bloc estimates in section III confirms, the crucial dividing lines for voters were those of class and confession.

III

The impermeability of the boundaries between the Catholic, socialist and Protestant bourgeois blocs emerges most sharply upon examination of their respective continuity and transition rates. The figures in table 23, represent estimates of individual voter shifts from parties in one bloc to parties in another bloc. My estimates show, first, that with the possible exception of the 1920-May 1924 elections, voter support for all three blocs remained at much the same level. Shifts by voters out of a given bloc to parties in another bloc always

TABLE 23

PERSISTENCE OF PARTISAN BLOCS IN FRANCONIA: 1920-1933

Proportion of first election supporters of parties in a given bloc who subsequently voted for parties in the same bloc, switched to parties in another bloc or did not vote:

Election Pair	Type of Party Supported in the First Election	Type of Party Supported in the Second Election (In the same bloc)	(In another bloc)	Did Not Vote
1920-1924I	Bourgeois	89	2	9
	Left	83	9	8
	Catholic	86	9	5
1924I-1924II	Bourgeois	90	3	7
	Left	87	6	7
	Catholic	94	2	4
1924II-1928	Bourgeois	83	6	11
	Left	91	5	4
	Catholic	91	3	6
1928-1930	Bourgeois	92	7	1
	Left	96	3	1
	Catholic	95	4	1
1930-1932I	Bourgeois	90	3	7
	Left	90	3	7
	Catholic	95	3	2
1932I-1932II	Bourgeois	92	3	5
	Left	96	-	4
	Catholic	89	3	11
1932II-1933	Bourgeois	96	4	-
	Left	93	3	4
	Catholic	90	8	2

involved less than 10% of a given electorate. These estimates further indicate that after 1930, voter movements across bloc lines dropped, except for Catholic shifts in March 1933.

The economic upheavals of the 1930's actually strengthened voter identification with the main partisan blocs. Thus during the 1930-1933 elections, voting evidence revealed increased continuity in bloc support and a marked decline in defections to parties located in another bloc. In other words, from 1928 on (and especially after the NSDAP's electoral successes in 1930) political fronts appeared to be even more sharply delineated than in the 1920's. The Depression clearly intensified the antagonism among the bourgeois, Marxist and Catholic camps, thereby discouraging voter shifts across bloc boundaries.

The extent to which each bloc drew voters primarily from parties associated with it, can be gauged from my estimates given in table 24. These show that in all Reichstag elections between 80% and 90% of a given bloc's sources of support came from voters who had previously supported parties in the same bloc. Increases in the strength of a given bloc were more likely to come from an influx of previous nonvoters (or newly activated voters) than from shifts by supporters of parties in another bloc. But only once, in March, 1933, were the competitive positions of the Catholic, left and Protestant bourgeois blocs changed by the entry of large numbers of former nonvoters. In that election, increased participation and the overwhelming tendency of these who entered the active electorate to back the NSDAP gave that party a popular vote larger than the combined vote of the BVP and SPD.

TABLE 24

SOURCES OF SUPPORT FOR PARTISAN BLOCS IN FRANCONIA: 1924I-1933

Proportion of second election supporters of parties in a given bloc
who in the preceding election had voted for parties
in the same bloc, parties in another bloc
or did not vote:

Election Pair	Type of Party Supported in the Second Election	Type of Party Supported in the First Election (In the same bloc)	(In another bloc)	Did Not Vote
1920-1924I	Bourgeois	73	12	15
	Left	93	4	3
	Catholic	92	-	8
1924I-1924II	Bourgeois	79	4	17
	Left	76	4	20
	Catholic	81	2	17
1924II-1928	Bourgeois	90	5	5
	Left	89	6	5
	Catholic	97	3	-
1928-1930	Bourgeois	93	4	3
	Left	88	1	11
	Catholic	86	7	7
1930-1932I	Bourgeois	82	5	13
	Left	92	3	5
	Catholic	90	1	9
1932I-1932II	Bourgeois	95	1	4
	Left	96	3	4
	Catholic	92	2	6
1932II-1933	Bourgeois	80	4	16
	Left	98	2	-
	Catholic	92	5	3

On the basis of the Franconian evidence examined in this chapter, I must reject Meckstroth's designation of the post-1928 voting changes as an instance of realignment in that region. One major problem with his concept of realignment is that it fails to account for the complexity of Weimar electoral patterns. In Franconia, the evidence suggests that voting changes in the pre-1930 period were of a magnitude he associates only with the elections after 1928. Secondly, some parties, such as the liberal DDP and DVP, experienced realigning changes in the early crisis elections rather than those of 1930-1933. Third, the BVP and SPD, two key parties, did not experience any significant defections during the realigning elections. Fourth, there were signs that some of the post-1928 changes were not permanent. Thus, in November 1932 the DNVP in Franconia recaptured its pre-1932 rank as a secondary competing party.

Meckstroth's notion of realignment as involving primarily changes in the competitive positions of parties, however, presents more serious difficulties. Presumably it makes sense to talk of a realignment only when such alterations in the competitive positions of parties result from voting changes so generally distributed and of such magnitude as to eradicate old lines of division within an electorate and to replace them with new ones. This certainly emerges from his explanation of Weimar voting after 1928 generally and from his analysis of the NSDAP's sources of support, in particular.

In Franconia, however, those voting changes that transformed the NSDAP into a primary competing party, that reduced the BVP and SPD to secondary competing parties, and turned all other contenders into

ineffective parties, all took place within existing blocs. Rather than destroying traditional cleavages, post-1928 voter movements in fact reinforced them. Both aggregate and individual evidence demonstrate that the major voting blocs remained intact. If anything, they became more cohesive during the Depression.. After 1930 the proportion of voters crossing bloc boundaries in fact declined. During the period of the NSDAP's major electoral surges, Catholic, leftist and Protestant bourgeois voters withdrew increasingly into their respective camps. The most significant aspect of the post-1928 voting changes was not only that they transformed the NSDAP into a major competing party but that this transformation involved a consolidation of the Protestant bourgeois vote.

To the extent that the NSDAP's growth produced erosion of older cleavage lines, this occurred only within the Protestant bourgeois bloc. In other words, by eliminating all liberal and conservative parties as effective contenders, the NSDAP destroyed the liberal-conservative division of which Lipset has made so much. Indeed my estimates show that in Franconia, from the very beginning of the Weimar Republic, this alleged cleavage never divided most Protestant bourgeois voters.

Finally, in the 1930-1933 period, changes in the SPD's and BVP's competitive position within Franconia were not caused by voter defections. In fact, the BVP gained additional support in both 1930 and July 1932, largely from previous nonvoters. There were also some compensating movements to the SPD between 1928 and July 1932. What caused the declining competitive positions of these two parties in these crisis elections was above all the NSDAP's ability to attract much of

the bourgeois vote. The disintegration of the DNVP splinters and the massive shifts of their voters to the Nazis between 1930 and July 1932 were primarily responsible for pushing the BVP and SPD into the category of secondary competing parties. This left the NSDAP as the sole party in the primary competing class. (In 1930, the SPD and BVP still shared that status with the NSDAP.)

In short, the distinctive difference in the electoral situation after 1928 was the unidirectional quality of voting changes within the bourgeois bloc. Defectors, in other words, no longer distributed themselves among a number of alternatives but moved predominantly to one party, the NSDAP. It was this which gave the NSDAP its competitive edge vis-à-vis the previously major contenders in Franconia, the BVP and SPD. Such unidirectional voter movements, however, run counter both to Meckstroth's concept of realignment and to that original concept taken from American voting literature he sought to reformulate.[19]

Nonvoters constitute another important sector of the Weimar electorate not thus far examined. What effects did their activation produce? How did this affect the structure of partisan conflict in Franconia? Party identification theorists, it will be recalled, saw in Weimar Germany's electoral instability, ample confirmation of their thesis. This emphasized the adverse political consequences of an electorate made up of voters without strong emotional ties to traditional political parties. Like Bendix and Lipset, these party identification theorists also explained the NSDAP's electoral growth after 1928 by the support it received from previous nonvoters, i.e. from people without

that voting experience allegedly needed to develop strong partisan commitments. From the aggregate evidence examined in chapter III, I could find no consistent relationship between increased rates of participation and higher voter support for extremist parties. What do individual voting estimates for this category reveal? Table 25 summarizes continuity and transition rates for nonvoters. These reveal that a major influx of nonvoters into Franconia's active electorate occurred in three elections: those of December 1924, July 1932, and March 1933. In the first of these three elections, the main beneficiaries were the SPD and BVP as well as the DNVP. The SPD, of course, was not an extremist party; the DNVP and BVP, both of which had been strong opponents of the Republic, became far more moderate after their electoral declines in May 1924. (The DNVP abandoned its "moderate" course after 1928.) In the July 1932 election, the largest proportion of previous nonvoters (26%) supported extremist parties (mostly the NSDAP). Yet a comparable proportion (19%) avoided extremist parties. Finally, as Burnham and Shively have contended, by far the largest proportion of nonvoters to support the National Socialists (42%) did so in March 1933.

My transition estimates for nonvoters indicate that they avoided the NSDAP both in the May 1924 Reichstag election when this party scored its first electoral successes and in the September 1930 Reichstag election when it scored the first of its crucial post-1928 electoral spurts. These figures support Lipset's argument that nonvoters came to the NSDAP only <u>after</u> its transformation into a mass party. On the other hand, Lipset claims that nonvoters generally support extremist

TABLE 25

TRANSITION BEHAVIOR OF NON-VOTERS IN FRANCONIA: 1920-1933

Proportion of first election non-voters who in the second election of each election pair voted for:

Election Pair	BVP	SPD	KPD	USPD	NSDAP	DNVP	DVP	DDP	WP	Splinter CNBL	CSVD	Other	Did Not Vote
1920-24I a)	6	3	0	0	0	17	0	3	0	0	0	0	71
1924I-24II b)	14	16	1	0	0	17	0	3	2	0	0	0	47
1924II-28 c)	0	5	0	-	0	3	3	5	0	0	0	0	84
1928-30 d)	5	2	3	-	5	0	1	3	1	5	1	0	74
1930-32I	11	2	4	-	26	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	55
1932I-32II	8	1	0	-	2	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	84
1932II-33 e	3	0	0	-	42	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	53

a) Transition estimates to USPD are slightly positive; b) transition estimates to USPD are slightly positive; c) transition estimates to Other are slightly positive; d) transition estimates to DVP and DDP are slightly positive, those to KPD are slightly negative; e) transition estimates to KPD are slightly positive.

parties only after they have developed a strong electoral position. On this hypothesis, there should have been large shifts by nonvoters to the NSDAP in the December 1924 election. This did not occur; nor is there any evidence in my transition rates that except for March 1933 Franconian nonvoters as a group showed any exaggerated disposition to back radical parties.

My figures in table 25 further reveal that, contrary to the impression given by Bendix and Lipset, nonvoters did not make precisely identical choices after they became active participants. Instead, except for the last Reichstag election, they opted for a variety of parties. The diversity of their partisan preferences can be explained by the fact that the number of nonvoters in Franconia (and, as Meckstroth has demonstrated, in the Reich) itself changed from election to election. In other words, my estimates in table 26 show that between 1920 and 1933 in Franconia there was constant movement into and out of the nonvoting category. A substantial proportion of former participants became nonvoters, while those previously "apathetic" joined the active electorate.

What were the sources of nonvoting? My data show that those who moved in and out of the active electorate came from a variety of partisan backgrounds. It seems plausible that many nonvoters had in the past been active supporters of one or the other party and that at least some returned to the parties they had once backed. For others, nonvoting may also have been a transitional stage before they moved from one to another party.

Generally speaking, BVP voters were the most likely to withdraw from voting. This may have been due to the fact that within the Catholic bloc there was no "protest" alternative such as existed within the Marxist and Protestant bourgeois blocs. The high BVP nonvoting rates, in turn, may account for the sizeable support this party received from newly active (or reactivated) nonvoters. Between December 1924 and May 1928, however, supporters of bourgeois parties made up an unusually large proportion of those who became inactive. This supports Meckstroth's point that the pool of nonvoters from which the Nazis drew support in 1930 and July 1932 may have come from the same social backgrounds as did the active bourgeois voters who switched to the Nazis in these elections.

A final point worth stressing is that even during elections marked by a significant increase in electoral participation, the entry of previous nonvoters did not alter the larger configuration of electoral conflict in Franconia. The sudden activation of previous nonparticipants often helped individual parties but until the March 1933 election it did not fundamentally change the electoral positions of the three party blocs. A major reason for this was that throughout the 1920-1933 period, turnout in Franconia was unusually high. Even a sizeable expansion of the active electorate, therefore, had relatively little impact on the over-all distribution of electoral support for the Catholic, Marxist and Protestant bourgeois _tendances_. For the NSDAP the absence of a large reservoir remaining to be tapped set _further_ limits on its growth. In Franconia, at least, the influx of former nonvoters after 1928, while massive was never large enough to give the NSDAP an electoral

TABLE 26

SOURCES OF NON-VOTING IN FRANCONIA: 1924I-1933

Proportion of second election nonvoters who in the preceding election voted for:

Election Pair	BVP	SPD	KPD	USPD	NSDAP	DNVP	DVP	DDP	WP	Splinter CNBL	CSVD	Other	Did Not Vote
1920-24I	5	1	1	6	-	1	3	4	0	0	0	0	79
1924I-24II	4	0	8	1	11	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	74
1924II-28	8	2	1	-	2	8	1	4	1	0	0	0	73
1928-30	1	1	0	-	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	97
1930-32I	4	9	0	-	1	4	2	4	0	0	8	0	68
1932I-32II	9	2	5	-	6	3	1	0	0	0	1	1	72
1932II-33	7	7	1	-	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	83

majority.

My analysis of patterns of support for parties competing in Franconia tend to confirm Burnham's and Shively's conclusion about the general irrelevancy of party identification as a determinant of partisan behavior in Weimar politics. The estimates I have provided in this chapter support as well another of their contentions. Although Weimar voters may have had no emotional attachment to individual political parties, the same was not true about blocs. The party system as a whole was far from unstable.

My data demonstrate that in Franconia, extensive voter movements rarely transcended the boundaries of the three party blocs. My individual voting evidence also show that even the Depression was not enough to undermine the barriers separating Catholic, socialist and Protestant bourgeois parties. Finally, my data revealed that in Franconia, electoral instability was above all confined to parties within the Protestant bourgeois bloc. Contrary to Meckstroth, therefore, voting changes after 1928 in Franconia did not constitute "realignment" even as he reformulated this concept.

Most important, my regression estimates indicate that the NSDAP's growth was indeed limited by existing class and confessional cleavages. Defection rates for the supporters of the BVP and the two parties of the left show that the NSDAP was largely unable to penetrate the Catholic and socialist electorates. Defections to the NSDAP clearly came predominantly from within the Protestant bourgeois camp. In their disposition to back the NSDAP, little or nothing differentiated supporters of the liberal parties from the conservative and splinter parties.

Finally, my data show that only in the March 1933 election did previous nonvoters in Franconia choose the NSDAP in overwhelming proportions. Their movement to this extremist party at that time was unprecedented and exceptional.

My regional findings about voter shifts to the NSDAP are also consistent with those of Burnham and Shively for the Republic as a whole. Thus far my examination in this chapter of individual voting shifts fails to support most claims made by Bendix and Lipset about either the NSDAP's sources of support or the general structure of Weimar voting. The next chapter will contrast my findings for Franconia with their respective analyses and explanations of Nazi voting in the 1930-1933 elections.

FOOTNOTES

1. Juan Linz, "Fascism," pp. 4-8.

2. see pp. 28-29, Introduction.

3. Philip E. Converse, "Survey Research and the Decoding of Patterns in Ecological Data," in M. Dogan and S. Rokkan, Social Ecology (Cambridge, Mass., 1969) p. 466.

4. Shively, "Party Identification," p. 1220.

5. Zdenek Zofka, Die Ausbreitung des Nationalsozialismus auf dem Lande (Munich, 1979), p. 175.

6. Pridham, Hitler's Rise, pp. 64-66; Zofka, Ausbreitung, pp. 157-176; Gordon, "Beerhall Putsch ," pp. 29-35; Falk Wiesemann, Die Vorgeschichte der Nationalsozialistischen Machtuebernahme in Bayern (Berlin, 1975), pp. 111-119.

7. Dietrich Thraenhardt, Wahlen und Politische Strukturen in Bayern, 1848-1953 (Deusseldorf, 1973), p. 149.

8. Gordon, Beerhall Putsch, p. 34; Alfred Milatz, Waehler und Wahlen in der Weimarer Republik (Bonn, 1955), pp. 88-89.

9. Lageberichte der Polizeidirektion Nuernberg-Fuerth (hereafter referred to as N-F/LB) LB 145/II/29; LB 165/II/30; LB 195/II/31.

10. N-F/LB 202/II/32; Halbmonatsberichte der Regierung von Mittelfranken (hereafter cited as HMB/Mfr.) GSA MA 102 153, 6.4. 1929, 8.5. 1931.

11. Cameron, "Mobilization," pp. 16-24; Meckstroth, Partisan Realignment, pp. 146-156; Pridham, Hitler's Rise, pp. 187-192; Sigmund Neumann, Die Parteien der Weimarer Republic (Stuttgart, 1975), p. 33.

12. Pridham, Hitler's Rise, pp. 302-307.

13. Burnham, "Immunization," pp. 9-10.

14. Bracher, "Wahlentwicklung," pp. 67-78; H. A. Winkler, "Extremismus der Mitte? Sozialgeschichtliche Aspekte der Nationalsozialistischen Machtergreifung," Vierteljahreshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte 20 (1972), pp. 175-191.

15. For a comprehensive treatment of this party see Martin Schumacher, Mittelstandsfront und Republik. Die Wirtschaftspartei--Reichspartei des deutschen Mittelstandes 1919-1933 (Duesseldorf, 1972).

16. Stegmann, Erben, pp. 32-47, 105-131, 249-257.

17. Bracher, Aufloesung, pp. 309-341.

18. Eyck, History, vol. 2, pp. 256-269.

19. Campbell, "Classification," pp. 74-76; Meckstroth, Partisan Realignment, , pp. 17-22, 42-49.

CHAPTER V

THE STAGES OF THE NSDAP'S GROWTH: BENDIX AND LIPSET RECONSIDERED

This chapter turns to those patterns and explanations of NSDAP's electoral growth proposed by Reinhard Bendix and S.M. Lipset. These two authors, it will be recalled, offered divergent interpretations of which voter movements contributed most to the NSDAP's growth in the September 1930 and July 1932 election. One objective of the analysis undertaken in this chapter is to confront their respective accounts of these two elections with voting evidence derived from regression analysis of Franconian voting data. But a second and equally important issue to be explored in this chapter is whether, as both Bendix and Lipset contend, there was a particular sequence to the NSDAP's growth. Both authors surmised that Nazism's growth occurred in two distinct stages during each of which it attracted different voting groups. In their view the key to understanding Nazism was to identify *those* groups in German society which *initiated* the NSDAP's meteoric electoral surges.

In analyzing individual voting movements in the 1920-1933 period (section I) I show that there was no discernible pattern in the NSDAP's growth. Hence, in my view, there is no empirical basis for using this movement as a model by which to construct a "natural" sequence in the development of mass support for extremist movements. I further seek to show (in section II) that the NSDAP was not a "flash" party, as were

so many others in the Protestant bourgeois bloc. Rather it shared common features with such integrative parties as the BVP and SPD. These common elements emerged, however, only after the NSDAP's reorganization and reorientation in 1928. This reorganization, I suggest, simultaneously contributed to the NSDAP's growth and electoral stability, and reinforced those boundaries that had throughout limited its ability to penetrate the Catholic and socialist electorate.

I

By far the most interesting conclusion drawn by Bendix and Lipset from their analyses of post-1928 national voting trends was that the NSDAP's growth proceeded through two separate stages. Both authors, it may be recalled, maintained that voter movements during the first stage--the September 1930 election--turned the Nazis into a powerful electoral contender. This development, in turn, initiated a "band wagon" effect that directly contributed to a second surge of Nazi voting in the July 1932 election so great as to transform the NSDAP into Germany's largest party. The implication of their "sequential" theory of Nazism was that whoever helped the Nazis _initially_ to become a major electoral force set the _precondition_ for its final triumph.

For Bendix as well as Lipset, therefore, it was crucial to identify those groups that initially flocked to the Nazis in the first stage (i.e. in 1930) and to distinguish them from all others who jumped on the Nazi band wagon only during the second stage of its growth (i.e. in July 1932). By drawing this distinction between first and second stage supporters, both authors wished to specify which groups in the

German electorate were most responsible for transforming the NSDAP from a splinter to a powerful mass party. But by identifying the NSDAP's initial (and hence key) supporters, Lipset and Bendix also hoped to be able to draw general conclusions about those parts of the electorate which constitute potentially the greatest threat to modern democracies.

Who initiated the NSDAP's first electoral growth? On this issue, these two authors differ. Bendix, whose views were given in Chapter II, believed that it was the sudden and massive influx of new and previous nonvoters in 1930 that was essential to the triumph of Nazism. According to him, an overwhelming proportion of this group voted for the Nazis. By turning the NSDAP thereby into a strong party and thus radicalizing the climate of politics in Germany, new and previous nonvoters set the stage for the conversion of middle class voters. Up to and including the 1930 election, these had backed either the main liberal parties or smaller middle-of-the-road parties. With the emergence in 1930 of the NSDAP as a powerful new party, middle class voters prompted by both fear and opportunism defected from the parties they had traditionally supported and moved instead to the Nazis. All these assertions are at the very center of Bendix's analysis.

For Lipset, on the other hand, the actual sequence was the reverse of that postulated by Bendix. In Lipset's view, in 1930 it was the overwhelming support for the NSDAP by former partisans of Germany's larger and minor liberal parties that most contributed to the NSDAP's initial growth. And it was only after this influx of liberal voters had transformed the Nazis into a suddenly visible and well-known electoral contender that nonvoters or new voters became aware of the NSDAP's

existence and importance. Hence, Lipset argues, nonvoters flocked to the Nazis only in the second stage, i.e. in July 1932. Both authors agree that nonvoters were the key to the NSDAP's electoral position in the last two Reichstag elections.[1]

Do individual voting transitions in Franconia during the 1930 and July 1932 elections support claims of a sequential growth in Nazi voting? Did the voter movements postulated by Bendix and Lipset during each stage in fact occur?

Table 27 displays the estimates of all voter transitions in Franconia to the NSDAP between 1928 and 1930 and between 1930 and July 1932. In this table, I have arranged the various voting categories according to the importance assigned to them by Bendix and Lipset. Unlike my practice in the preceding chapter, I list the NSDAP first, followed by 1) previous nonvoters; 2) parties designated by Bendix and Lipset as "liberal" or "middle-of-the-road"; 3) the DNVP; 4) the BVP; 5) the SPD; 6) the KPD. The "liberal" category of parties, according to these two authors, included not only the DDP and DVP but also the Business Party (WP) and splinter parties. Hence the place and order in which they appear in table 27.

TABLE 27

THE PROPENSITY TO VOTE NAZI: 1928-1932I

Proportions of different voting groups who shifted to the Nazis between:

Group	1928-1930	1930-1932I
NSDAP	97	96
Nonvoters	5	26
Liberal		
DDP	57	6
DVP	61	0^{sn}
WP	34	69
CNBL	0	91
CSVD	0	38
Other	32	7
DNVP	19	29
BVP	3	1
SPD	3	4
KPD	0	1

0^{sn} = refers to slightly negative estimates.

At first glance, these estimates provide strong empirical evidence for Lipset's claims. As he surmised, the proportion of nonvoters who supported the Nazis in 1930 was marginal, in July 1932, quite substantial. Secondly the estimates for the liberal parties (as he defines them) show an overwhelming propensity to vote Nazi both in 1930 and in July 1932. Support for the National Socialists by former DNVP

voters, by contrast, is quite high but considerably below the proportions for "centrist" defectors. Third, in line with Lipset's analysis of Weimar voting, the NSDAP did not derive much backing from either Catholic or left voters. (At the same time, the fact that such shifts occurred at all suggests that Lipset's left-right-center distinction was not completely perceived as such by Franconian voters.) These estimates disprove Bendix's contention that nonvoters constituted the NSDAP's principal source of support during the first stage of its growth. On the other hand, the dramatic shifts to the NSDAP by supporters of the liberal and of what he calls small "middle class parties" conform to Bendix's analysis of voter movements during the NSDAP's second electoral surge.

Do these massive shifts to the Nazis by Lipset's category of "centrist voters" justify his explanation of Nazism as an "extremism of the center?" The answer to this question must be decidedly "no." One reason is that by 1928 aggregate support for the liberal parties in Franconia (as well as nationally) was so small that even such unusually large defection rates as those displayed in table 27 could not alone have accounted for the NSDAP's first major electoral surge. This emerges clearly from my analysis of the NSDAP's sources of support for this period. The estimates in table 28 show what proportions the various voting groups contributed to the NSDAP's total vote in 1930 and July 1932.

As can be seen from this table, nonvoters were more important to the NSDAP in July 1932 than in 1930. But, contrary to Lipset, at least in Franconia nonvoters cannot be held responsible for Nazism's second electoral surge. Their support clearly helped the Nazis but was not

TABLE 28

THE SOURCES OF THE NSDAP'S SUPPORT: 1930-1932I

Proportion of second election Nazi voters who in the preceding election had voted for:

Group	1928-1930	1930-1932I
NSDAP	35	46
Nonvoters	8	13
Liberal		
DDP	11	1
DVP	5	0^{sn}
WP	6	6
CNBL	0	23
CSVD	0	3
Other	10	1
DNVP	16	2

0^{sn} = refers to slightly negative estimates.

decisive.[2] More important is the fact that in 1930, the share contributed by liberals (DDP and DVP) to the NSDAP's vote was no larger than that furnished by DNVP defectors. Each of these two groups furnished 16% of the NSDAP's vote in that election. If the Business Party's and splinter parties' proportions were to be added to the "liberal" share, the over-all "liberal" contribution to the Nazi vote in 1930 would be 32% or double that of the DNVP. This would clearly make liberal voters the key to the 1930 Nazi growth.

To follow this strategy would also considerably enlarge the "liberal" share of the NSDAP's July 1932 vote. As can be seen from table 28, in July 1932 the DDP's and DVP's combined share of the Nazi vote was just about one per cent or half of the DNVP's contribution. By adding to their proportions those contributed by the Business Party (WP), the Christian National Peasant and Rural People's Party (CNBL), the Christian Social People's Service (CSVD) and "other" parties, the over-all "liberal" contribution to the Nazi vote in July 1932 would rise to 34%. Moreover, that proportion would exceed that of any other group within the July 1932 electorate.

But to do so within the Weimar context, would constitute a completely unjustifiable procedure. The Business Party (WP), as I have shown in previous chapters and will emphasize again in chapter VI, was not a liberal or "centrist" party, either in its economic program or in its political orientation. It was very much a party of the right. So too were the CNBL and the CSVD, and most of those insignificant splinter groups which together formed the category of "other" parties. The CNBL and CSVD in fact were formed prior to 1930 by dissident DNVP leaders, most of whom returned to the DNVP after 1931. Consequently, if for the 1930 election, the proportionate shares of the Nazi vote contributed by the WP and "other parties" were added to the DNVP's, the total proportion of the 1930 Nazi vote coming from the "right" would be 32% (as opposed to 16% using Lipset's classification of parties). In July 1932, such an addition would change the proportion of the Nazi vote given by supporters of the "right" from 2% to 35% (or to 29% if the WP is excluded).

TABLE 29

TRANSITION BEHAVIOR OF FRANCONIAN VOTERS: 1928-1930

Proportion of first election voters for each competing party who subsequently voted for the following:

First Election Choice	Second Election Choice											Did Not Vote
	BVP	SPD	KPD	NSDAP	DNVP	DVP	DDP	WP	CNBL	CSVD	Other	
BVP	95	0	0	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
SPD	0	91	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
KPD	0	2	98	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
NSDAP	0	0	0	97	0	0	0	0^{sn}	3	0	0	0
DNVP	0	0	0	19	11	0^{sp}	1	0	53	10	3	1
DVP	0	0	0	61	8	23	8	0	0	0	0^{sp}	0
DDP	0	2	0	57	1	3	26	6	0	5	0	0
WP	0	0^{sp}	0	34	3	7	0	56	0	0	0	0
CNBL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CSVD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	34	0	0	32	1	0	0	14	0	8	10	1
Did Not Vote	5	2	3	5	0	1	3	1	5	1	0	74

0^{sn} = refers to slightly negative estimates; 0^{sp} = refers to slightly positive estimates.

There are ample grounds for attributing CNBL and CSVD shifts to the Nazis between 1930 and July 1932 as part of a larger DNVP movement to the NSDAP. What tables 27 and 28 do not show, is that between 1928 and 1930 these two parties received a disproportionate share of their vote from DNVP defectors. Hence, the reported CNBL and CSVD transition rates to the Nazis (table 27) in fact came from former DNVP voters. This emerges most clearly in table 29, which summarizes estimated continuity rates and turnover proportions between 1928 and 1930 for all parties as well as for nonvoters.

These estimates show that between 1928 and 1930 the DNVP, like the two main liberal parties, lost almost its entire 1928 electorate. Only an estimated 11% of its 1928 partisans continued to support their party in 1930. A substantial proportion of defectors moved to the National Socialists, as both Bendix and Lipset expected. What is most unexpected, however, is the magnitude of DNVP voter transitions to the CNBL and CSVD. Thus the DNVP lost two-thirds of its 1928 voters to splinter parties in 1930, with more than half going to the CNBL alone.

DNVP defectors, as table 30 indicates, contributed 87% of the CNBL's 1930 vote and 59% of the CSVD's. The massive shifts from these parties between 1930 and July 1932 that both Bendix and Lipset saw as evidence of a "liberal" or "centrist" shift to the Nazis was nothing of the kind. It was, rather, the second phase of a right-wing shift to the NSDAP. It may well be asked why DNVP voters chose this circuitous route to the Nazis? There are, in my mind, two explanations for this belated shift.

TABLE 30

SOURCES OF SUPPORT FOR PARTIES IN FRANCONIA: 1930

Proportion of second election voters for each competing party who in the preceding election voted for the following:

Second Election Choice	First Election Choice											Did Not Vote
	BVP	SPD	KPD	NSDAP	DNVP	DVP	DDP	WP	CNBL	CSVD	Other	
BVP	86	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	7
SPD	0	94	1	0	2	0	0^{sp}	0^{sp}	0	0	0	3
KPD	0	27	56	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	17
NSDAP	4	5	0	35	16	5	11	6	0	0	10	8
DNVP	0	0	0	0	83	2	6	6	0	0	3	0
DVP	12	0	0	0	8	32	9	18	0	0	0	21
DDP	0	0	0	0	10	6	46	0	0	0	0	38
WP	0	0	0^{sn}	0^{sn}	0	0	8	55	0	0	27	9
CNBL	0	0^{sn}	0	3	87	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
CSVD	0	0	0	0	59	0	14	0	0	0	18	9
Other	15	0	0	0	34	0	1	0	0	0	41	9
Did Not Vote	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	97

0^{sn} = refers to slightly negative estimates; 0^{sp} = refers to slightly positive estimates

The major reason for the CNBL's and CSVD's success in attracting former DNVP voters was that both these parties had been formed by dissident DNVP leaders. The CNBL, moreover, was in a particularly advantageous position to mobilize DNVP voters. It had been founded by the National Farmers' League (Reichslandbund), one of the Weimar Republic's most powerful and well-organized interest groups. Prior to Hugenberg's take-over of the DNVP, the Reichslandbund had been crucial to making the DNVP the dominant party among Protestant rural voters. In 1930, the newly formed CNBL could still count on the Reichslandbund's extensive network of local branches to provide them with the necessary access to rural voters. This was no longer possible in July 1932.[3]

By that time, the NSDAP had systematically penetrated its national organization and local branches. This take-over of the Reichslandbund had been part of a general strategy adopted in 1928, namely to acquire access to middle class voters by getting control over the key middle class interest groups. The NSDAP's strategy worked unusually well because the Nazis were able to exploit both group egotism, and existing tensions between the national leaders of middle class associations and the local rank and file.[4] The NSDAP even aimed to take charge of purely social clubs in rural and urban communities. If they failed to take over such social middle class associations (e.g. glee clubs, sports clubs) they set up rival groups. At any rate, by July 1932 the Nazis were in an extraordinarily advantageous position from which to mobilize Protestant bourgeois voters.[5]

Secondly, in 1930 the NSDAP was not as yet in a position to "capture" DNVP voters who, in Franconia at least, were heavily concentrated

in predominantly Protestant rural areas and small towns. As of 1930, the NSDAP had not as yet become fully visible in these more isolated places. It was still in the process of realizing its reorganization plans. The revamping of the party's structure was not begun until late 1928. From then on, Nazi leaders at all levels made extraordinary efforts to expand the party's grass-roots organization, to coordinate propaganda and campaign activities and to establish specialized agencies needed for their appeal to various middle class interests. Yet the NSDAP had only a short time between introducing its extensive organizational changes and the 1930 Reichstag election. Hence the NSDAP could not at that point attain the overwhelming presence at the grass-roots level it did in the following years. The Nazi gains of 1930 greatly facilitated this party's organizational expansions. For as a result of its strong showing, contributions to the Nazis surged, audience fees rose sharply, as did income from membership fees and Nazi publications.[6] The NSDAP's reorganization and tactics in Franconia will be discussed further in the next chapter.

One major source of the NSDAP's vote in both 1930 and July 1932 was never considered either by Bendix and Lipset, or by Shively and Burnham. The group I am referring here to are previous Nazi voters. Their role and importance to the NSDAP's strength can be detected only through the method of estimating individual-level voting shifts adopted for this study. As can be seen from the transition estimates in table 27, the NSDAP's continuity rate between 1928 and 1930 was 97%, between 1930 and July 1932, 96%. For a Protestant bourgeois party, such strong voter commitment from one election to the next was virtually un-

precedented. In fact, only once in the entire 1920-1933 election sequence did a party in this bloc reach a similar level. (This was the DNVP, whose continuity estimate between May and December 1924 was 98%.) Nazi voting continuity at the national level, according to Meckstroth's analysis, was higher for the 1928-1930 period (his estimate is 100%), but lower for the 1930-July 1932 period (86%).

How important to its growth was the loyalty of Nazi voters, can be gauged from my estimates in table 28. These show that in 1930, 35% of the NSDAP's total vote came from those who had supported it in 1928. In July 1932, that proportion was higher still, 46%. The national proportions reported by Meckstroth for 1930 were lower than the Franconian figures (14% as opposed to 35%) but were analagous for July 1932 (i.e. 41% to Franconia's 46%). This expanded share of the NSDAP's total vote held by Nazi partisans in July 1932 suggests that in Franconia at least the flow of defections to the Nazis was slowing down and that the NSDAP had reached or was beginning to reach the limits of its attainable voter reservoir. Henceforth it could sustain or increase its voting strength only by successfully holding on to its voters or by tapping new sources of support, such as nonvoters or supporters of parties in other blocs. This is confirmed by my estimates for the July 1932-November 1932 and for the November 1932-March 1933 election sequences in table 31.

For the November 1932 election, the NSDAP depended almost exclusively on those who had backed it in this preceding election.

TABLE 31

SOURCES OF THE NSDAP's VOTE: 1932I-1933

Proportion of second election Nazi voters who in preceding election had voted for:

Group	1932I-1932II	1932II-1933
NSDAP	97	72
Nonvoters	0	18
Liberal		
DDP	0	0
DVP	0	0
WP	0	0^{sp}
CNBL	0	0
CSVD	0	0
Other	0	0
DNVP	2	4
BVP	1	4
SPD	0	0
KPD	0	2

0^{sp} = refers to slightly positive estimates.

Even in the last Reichstag election the NSDAP's sources of support indicate that it could no longer count on massive defections to improve its position. In 1933, nonvoters clearly played a crucial role in the NSDAP's final electoral surge. For the one and only time they added a more significant share to the NSDAP's vote than did defectors. Indeed, in the last two Reichstag elections one can say that defections to the Nazis became little more than a trickle. By far the most substantial

voter shifts to the NSDAP came from former DNVP voters, as my estimates in table 32 reveal. But by this time, the DNVP's aggregate vote had become so small that even a 20% or 31% defection rate added little to the NSDAP's over-all vote. The estimates in table 32 once again undermine Lipset's claim that the DNVP's partisans were better able to resist the Nazi appeal than "liberal" voters. Whereas liberal shifts to the Nazis all but disappeared after July 1932, DNVP defections continued at much the same rate (i.e. between 20 and 30 per cent) during the entire 1928-1933 span.[7]

In the last two Reichstag elections, the National Socialists were helped somewhat by BVP and KPD defections (see table 32). But these shifts involved only a relatively small proportion of each party's voters and, as is shown in table 31, their contribution to the total Nazi vote both in November 1932 and March 1933 was marginal. In these two elections, what counted for the NSDAP most was the continued commitment to this party shown by its voters.

How strong was the loyalty created by the Nazis among their followers emerges from this party's continuity rates in table 32. Between July and November 1932, continuity in its support had dropped slightly from the levels registered in 1930 and July 1932. Nonetheless, given the endless round of elections held in 1932, and the failure of the Nazis to take over the government, the NSDAP's ability to retain 86% of its support indicates how stable its electoral base had become. Moreover, its continuity estimates for the following election pair was an unprecedented 100%--a figure higher than any party had ever managed in Franconia during the 1920-1933 elections. (Meckstroth's national

TABLE 32

THE PROPENSITY TO VOTE NAZI: 1932I-1933

Proportions of different voting groups who shifted to the Nazis between:

GROUP	1932I-1932II	1932II-1933
NSDAP	86	100
Nonvoters	2	42
Liberal		
DDP	0^{sn}	0
DVP	0^{sn}	0
WP	0	35
CNBL	0	0
CSVD	0^{sp}	8
Other	0	0
DNVP	20	31
BVP	2	7
SPD	0	0
KPD	0	9

0^{sn} = refers to slightly negative estimates; 0^{sp} = refers to slightly positive estimates.

proportion for the July-November 1932 pair was 87%; he does not give estimates for November 1932-March 1933.)[8]

Both Lipset and Bendix have claimed that Nazi losses in November 1932 resulted above all from significant shifts by its July 1932 voters into the nonvoting category. (Both assumed that those who did not vote in November 1932, had been nonparticipants before they shifted to the Nazis in 1930 or 1932.) The results in table 33, which display continu-

ity, turnover and nonvoting estimates for November 1932, provide at best marginal support for this claim.

In fact, only an estimated 3% of July 1932 Nazi voters failed to vote in November 1932. What the estimates do show is that substantial proportions of Nazi voters returned to the parties from which they had originally defected. By far the largest proportion of Nazi defectors went to the DNVP which had provided the NSDAP throughout with much of its voting support. The estimates in table 33 also show small defection rates by Nazi voters to the Communists, the Social Democrats, and to the BVP. Contrary to Lipset's theory about the natural affinity between Nazism and liberalism, Nazi voters showed absolutely no inclination to return to any of the liberal or particularist parties still left to compete in November 1932. (The estimates showed only a slightly positive movement, i.e. one involving less than one per cent to the Business Party and to "other" parties.)[9]

Although these defections account for part of the NSDAP's decline in aggregate support, the estimates in table 31 suggest that the NSDAP's downturn may have resulted more from its inability to attract new voters than from any largescale defections by its previous supporters. In the preceding elections, whatever losses the Nazis suffered were due to shifts away from it by its partisans, which were usually below 5% as tables 27 and 28 show. But they were more than compensated by the flow of nonvoters and defectors moving into the Nazi electorate. In November 1932 some compensating movements occurred but these were far too small to make up for defections and abstentions by the NSDAP's partisans. The party's net loss, then, stemmed from its inability to

TABLE 33

TRANSITION BEHAVIOR OF FRANCONIAN VOTERS: 1932I-1932II

Proportion of first election voters for each competing party who in the subsequent election voted for the following:

First Election Choice	Second Election Choice											Did Not Vote
	BVP	SPD	KPD	NSDAP	DNVP	DVP	DDP	WP	CNBL	CSVD	Other	
BVP	89	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	7
SPD	0	91	7	0	0^{sn}	0	0^{sp}	0	0	0	0	1
KPD	0	0	88	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12
NSDAP	1	1	1	86	7	0	0	0^{sn}	0	1	0^{sn}	3
DNVP	0^{sn}	0	0^{sn}	20	55	4	0	0	0	3	2	16
DVP	0	0^{sn}	0^{sn}	0	0	77	0	0	0	1	0	1
DDP	0	7	0	0	0	22	70	0	0	1	0^{sp}	0
WP	0	0	0	0	7	0	10	78	5	0	0	0
CNBL	0	0	0	0	70	0	16	2	0	2	10	0
CSVD	0	0	0	4	0	0	1	1	0	91	0	3
Other	0	0	0	0	18	1	2	1	0	10	2	66
Did Not Vote	8	1	0^{sn}	2	5	0^{sp}	0^{sp}	0	0	0^{sp}	0	84

0^{sn} - refers to slightly negative estimates; 0^{sp} = refers to slightly positive estimates.

tap--as it had done in all previous elections since December 1924--new sources of support rather than from defections or abstentions per se.[10]

Bendix and Lipset are also wrong in their assessment that the increase in nonvoting between July and November 1932 resulted almost exclusively from massive abstentions by Nazi voters. Actually, as the estimates in table 34 indicate, this group constituted only 6% of November 1932 nonvoters. In fact, by far the largest group of voters to become inactive between July and November 1932 were BVP partisans. Unsuccessful negotiations after July between the NSDAP, the Center Party, and the BVP over a possible coalition government seemed to confuse BVP voters, whose party, up to that point, had depicted the Nazis as a totally unacceptable alternative for Catholics. Confronted with obviously conflicting signals BVP supporters in Franconia responded by abstaining from voting to a far greater extent than in any preceding election.

Additional increases in nonvoting also came from those who in July 1932 had supported splinter parties, the DNVP, the DVP, and the SPD. What these figures indicate is that supporters of virtually every party had become tired of the incessant round of elections. For Franconian voters this was the 6th election in almost as many months. Yet there was no resolution of the political and electoral stalemate that had emerged with the onset of the Depression. But if participation declined in November 1932, it was also largely due to the fact that for the first time since 1928, the continuity rate among nonvoters had risen sharply. Between July and November 1932, only 15% of previous nonvoters entered the active electorate; in July 1932, by contrast, 45%

TABLE 34

SOURCES OF SUPPORT FOR PARTIES IN FRANCONIA: 1932II

Proportion of second election voters for each competing party who in the preceding election voted for the following:

Second Election Choice	First Election Choice											Did Not Vote
	BVP	SPD	KPD	NSDAP	DNVP	DVP	DDP	WP	CNBL	CSVD	Other	
BVP	92	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6
SPD	0	97	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
KPD	0	20	75	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NSDAP	1	0	0	96	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
DNVP	0	4	0	41	35	0	0	1	1	0	3	15
DVP	0	0	0	0	21	58	15	0	0	0	0^{sp}	5
DDP	0	0	0	0	0	0	76	9	3	3	2	7
WP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	88	1	5	1	0
CNBL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CSVD	0	0	0^{sn}	0	10	0	1	2	0	75	5	7
Other	49	0	0	36	12	1	0	0	0	0	2	0
Did Not Vote	9	2	5	6	3	1	0	0	0	2	0	72

0^{sn} = refers to slightly negative estimates; 0^{sp} = refers to slightly positive estimates.

of previous nonvoters participated in that election. In short, the declining rate of participation in November 1932 noted by both Bendix and Lipset had several sources. Certainly abstentions by former Nazi voters was among them. Yet this was neither the exclusive, nor even the most important source of decline in voting.

Bendix's and Lipset's claim that the NSDAP's 1933 gains came from former nonvoters is confirmed by the estimates in table 31. But my data for 1928-1933 also shows that in 1933 those moving out of the inactive electorate to support the Nazis had to a large extent been previously active voters and, most probably, had at one point supported Protestant bourgeois parties. My preceding chapter demonstrated that between 1928 and 1930 as well as between 1930 and July 1932, there had been substantial rates of nonvoting by DDP, DVP, DNVP supporters. Undoubtedly, the Nazis also mobilized in March 1933 large numbers of those who had not previously participated in any election. But these constituted only one group within the larger category of abstainers who entered the electorate in 1933.

On the basis of my regressions estimates examined so far, there is no evidence to support Bendix's and Lipset's contention that the Nazis attracted fundamentally different voting groups in the Reichstag elections of 1930 or 1932. In both these elections, the Nazis drew upon substantially similar sources. In 1930 as well as in July 1932, the NSDAP for the most part attracted voters from within the Protestant bourgeois camp. Furthermore, the Nazis were no less successful in capturing conservative voters than in mobilizing supporters of both liberal

and special interest parties (whatever their political orientation). The Nazi electorate never came predominantly either from former non-voters, as Bendix insists, or from previous partisans of liberal and other "centrist" parties, as Lipset asserts. In Franconia nonvoters certainly did not initiate Nazism's triumph by "causing" the NSDAP's 1930 triumph. Although in Franconia the overwhelming proportion of liberal partisans became Nazi supporters, the fact remains that in 1928 both the DDP and the DVP were far too small to turn the Nazis from a splinter into a mass party. For that the Nazis required above all the support of DNVP voters. This it received both through direct defections between 1920 and 1933, and through an intermediate shift via the CNBL and CSVD. Nor did a distinctive sequence emerge in the NSDAP's pattern of growth between 1930 and July 1932. In both these elections, the voter movements to the Nazis followed much the same pattern and had much the same outcome.[11]

Does the fact that Nazi voters came both from the "right" and from the "center" support then the view taken by Meckstroth that the Depression initiated a longterm realignment across existing class and ideological lines? In my view, it does not. Meckstroth, it will be recalled, points to the heterogeneity of the Nazi electorate as proof that those who backed the Nazis were prompted less by traditional ideological or social conflicts than by economic concerns generated by the Depression. In other words, the fact that the Nazis attracted support from bourgeois center defectors, from former conservative voters, from previous abstainers and even from a smattering of Catholic and socialist

voters to him signified a voter movement that, in the aggregate, changed traditional alignment patterns in Weimar Germany.[12] But his notion of realignment (as do Bendix's and Lipset's conceptions of Weimar voting in the 1928-1933 period) hinges on the ideological distinction of parties and voters into left-right-and-center.

As I showed in the preceding chapter, however, in Weimar Germany such groupings have no explanatory power. The crucial lines of division within the Weimar party system were those separating Catholic, Socialist and Protestant bourgeois voters and parties. Consequently, the fact that the Nazis attracted both "centrist" and "rightist" voters does not at all signify the erosion of traditional cleavage lines. Indeed, given the rigidity of these barriers throughout the 1928-1933 period (as evidenced by minimal defections of Catholic and socialist voters to the NSDAP) it is clear that the Depression did not so much undermine as reinforce older lines of conflict.

II

Bendix and Lipset, I have argued, failed to consider in their analyses of the NSDAP's electoral expansion after 1928 the unusual stability of its voter support. This omission is quite consistent with their view of the NSDAP's growth as an immediate, short-term response to the Depression by socially and economically marginal segments of German society. The stable partisan commitment of Nazi voters, however, suggests that the NSDAP was not merely a "flash" party bound to fade away as soon as Germany's economic conditions began to improve. Rather, the NSDAP's continuity rates from 1928 on make it clear that this party

had succeeded in transforming potentially fickle protest voters into partisans, i.e. into continuous supporters. In this as in so many other features, the NSDAP was quite different from other Protestant bourgeois parties. These had often managed to attract discontented voters away from a given party. But, as I showed in the preceding chapter, bourgeois parties generally failed to hold on to their newly gained support from one election to the next.

The continuous support for its voters over a series of critical but inconclusive elections gave the NSDAP a decisive electoral edge both against its rivals in the Protestant bourgeois camp and against the far more powerful BVP and SPD. What accounts for the NSDAP's success in developing a stable voting base? In my view, it was its own transformation from a "movement" into an ongoing party, one with a program and organization capable not only of reaching voters during elections but also of maintaining ties to their supporters between elections. In other words, after 1928 the NSDAP became an "integrative" or what Burnham calls a "confessional" party. Thus like the BVP and SPD, it had succeeded in "binding" its followers. Indeed, as my next chapter shows the NSDAP relied on much the same methods for ensuring its electoral stability as did the BVP and SPD. Like them, it developed an extraordinarily extensive network of local branches and subsidiary organizations. Again, it relied heavily on "negative integration" to create deep and long-term emotional bonds to its voters.

In imitation of the BVP and SPD, the National Socialists sought to create strong ideological and psychological barriers around its

electorate and thereby make defections (especially to parties in another bloc) quite "costly" for its partisans. Yet the consequences of so integrating its supporters (real and potential) were the same for the Nazis as for the BVP and SPD. Like these two integrative parties, the NSDAP was unable to expand its electoral base beyond its bloc. To the extent it succeeded it did so by support within the Protestant bourgeois camp and, by the continued commitment of its voters.

Had the Nazis remained in opposition, however, it is unlikely that it could have maintained the support of its partisans at the post-1928 level. Defection rates between July and November 1932 revealed signs of impatience among Nazi voters after several rounds of elections had failed to bring the NSDAP into control of the government. There is no reason to believe that under normal conditions the Nazis could have acquired the additional support they needed to gain power. Even under the unusual circumstances of the March 1933 election they failed to do so. Consequently the country's leaders could have continued to deny the NSDAP any access to the government while forcing them into another round of elections. Had this been done, the chances are high that NSDAP voters would increasingly have returned to their initial partisan choices. The NSDAP clearly recognized this danger and therefore agreed to join a government that in form if not in substance was dominated by the DNVP and its conservative allies.

It was not until 1928, i.e. until after its reorganization and reorientation that the NSDAP became an integrative (or to use Burnham's term "confessional") party. One would, therefore expect that its sources of support and the subsequent voting behavior of its supporters

TABLE 35

SOURCES OF SUPPORT FOR THE NSDAP IN FRANCONIA: 1924I-1933

Proportion of second election supporters of the NSDAP
who in the preceding election voted for:

Election Pair	BVP	SPD	KPD	USPD	NSDAP	DNVP	DVP	DDP	WP	Splinter CNBL	CSVD	Other	Did Not Vote
1920-24I	9	0	0	10	-	47	3	31	0	0	0	0	0
1924I-24II[a)]	0	4	0	0	92	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0
1924II-28	0	5	0	-	76	7	4	0	3	0	0	4	1
1928-30	4	5	0	-	35	16	5	11	6	0	0	10	8
1930-32I[b)]	1	3	1	-	46	2	0	1	6	23	3	1	13
1932I-32II	1	0	0	-	97	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1932II-33	4	0	2	-	72	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	18

a) Column estimates from KPD are slightly negative; b) column estimates from DVP are slightly positive.

to follow a somewhat different pattern before and after 1928. That this did in fact occur is confirmed by my analysis of the NSDAP's sources of support and its transition estimates.

Table 35 summarizes the NSDAP's sources of support for the entire period in which it competed. These estimates shows that in May 1924, Catholic and left defectors contributed almost a fifth of its total vote. Although this proportion was considerably below that contributed by the DNVP and the DDP, in no other election did the Nazis ever receive such strong support from voters outside the Protestant bourgeois camp. These data for the 1924 election, it should be stressed, further weaken Bendix's and Lipset's interpretations of Nazism. In its first election, the party attracted no support from previous nonvoters; the major share of its May 1924 vote came from DNVP defectors, with DDP defections making up the second largest contribution. This pattern runs completely counter to what these two authors expect to happen in the first stage of a fascist movement's growth. These estimates confirm that Nazism cannot be understood either as an "extremism of the center" or as the direct result of increased participation by marginal, politically uninvolved elements.

Although there was a slight increase in left and Catholic support for the Nazis in 1930 (when the NSDAP's change in course and reorganization was still in the formative stage), these proportions dropped for the last three Reichstag elections. The NSDAP's estimated sources of support for December 1924 and May 1928 also show that in these two elections, defections to it still played a marginal role. Even more interesting are the NSDAP's transition estimates, in table 36. These

reveal lower continuity rates before than after 1930. They also show a higher disposition among pre-1930 Nazi voters to abstain from voting or to move among a variety of parties. Signs of a change in the NSDAP's composition and the behavior of its voters began to emerge in 1928, when the Nazis showed higher continuity rates and fewer defections than had been true of December 1924. Defections to this party also began to make their impact felt in 1928.

These estimates suggest that to tht extent that it makes any sense to distinguish different stages in the NSDAP's development, the crucial dividing point is clearly the 1928 Reichstag election. That the NSDAP's electorate before 1928 was far more heterogeneous than during the period of the greatest expansion was discovered initially by Thomas Childers who examined both national election and census data. As far as I know, my regional study is the first to confirm his findings.[13]

In this chapter, I have argued that a sequential theory of the NSDAP's growth does not contribute significantly to identifying this movement's new supporters or their reasons for doing so. Nor can the NSDAP electoral surges in 1930 and July 1932, taken in isolation, tell us which groups in modern democracies are most volunerable to extremist appeals. In this chapter as in those preceding it, I sought to show that as an electoral phenomenon Nazism can only be adequately understood by examining the over-all structure of partisan competition within which it emerged. On the whole, the findings in this chapter support those of the more recent empirical studies: those of Burnham and Shively in particular but also those of Waldmann, Wernette and

TABLE 36

TRANSITION BEHAVIOR OF NSDAP VOTERS IN FRANCONIA: 1924I-1933

Proportion of first election supporters of the NSDAP
who subsequently voted for:

Election Pair	BVP	SPD	KPD	USPD	NSDAP	DNVP	DVP	DDP	WP	Splinter CNBL	CSVD	Other	Did Not Vote
1920-24I	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1924I-24II[a)]	1	3	2	0	38	29	2	1	11	0	0	1	12
1924II-28	0	0	0	-	82	3	0	0	4	0	0	5	6
1928-30	0	0	0	-	97	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0
1930-32I	0	0	0	-	96	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
1932I-32II[b)]	1	1	1	-	86	7	0	0	0	0	0	1	3
1932II-33[c)]	0	0	0	-	100	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

a) Transition estimate to USPD was slightly positive; b) transition estimate to WP was slightly positive;
c) continuity estimates from both row and column models were above 100 (108 and 114 respectively).

Cameron.[14] All these have stressed that the Nazi phenomenon was considerably more complex than Bendix's and Lipset's interpretations have suggested.

FOOTNOTES

1. See chapter I, pp. 7-10, 14-19.

2. Meckstroth's estimates for nonvoter support of the NSDAP are slightly higher: 14% for 1928-1930; 18% for 1930-July 1932. (As proportions of the Nazi vote, his estimates are 23% in 1930 and 11% in July 1932.) Meckstroth, Partisan Realignment, pp. 177-179.

3. For the NSDAP's take-over of the National Farmers' League (Reichslandbund), see especially Horst Gies, "NSDAP und landwirtschaftliche Organisationen in der Endphase der Weimarer Republik," Vierteljahreshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte 15 (1967), pp. 341-376.

4. H.A. Winkler, "German Society, Hitler, and the Illusion of Restoration," Journal of Contemporary History 11 (1976), pp. 1-10; Thraenhardt, Politische Strukturen, pp. 140-142.

5. N-F/LB 173/II, 5.31. 1930.

6. On the NSDAP's financing, see especially James Pool and Suzanne Pool in their book Who Financed Hitler's Rise to Power 1919-1933 (New York, 1978); Arthur Schweitzer, Big Business in the Third Reich (Bloomington, 1964); H.A. Turner, Faschismus und Kapitalismus in Deutschland: Studien zum Verhaeltnis zwischen Nationalsozialismus und Wirtschaft (Goettingen, 1972); Horst Matzerath and H.A. Turner, "Die Selbstfinanzierung der NSDAP 1930-1932," Geschichte und Gesellschaft 3 (1977), pp. 59-92.

7. Meckstroth, Partisan Realignment, pp. 177-181.

8. ibid., p. 177.

9. ibid., pp. 185-186.

10. ibid., pp. 184-185.

11. ibid., pp. 179-180.

12. ibid., pp. 187-188.

13. Childers, "Social Bases," pp. 26 et. seq.

14. See notes 57 and 58, chapter I.

CHAPTER VI

THE NAZI ROAD TO VICTORY IN FRANCONIA

The Weimar Republic's party system, it was argued earlier, set precise limits to the NSDAP's growth but also presented it with its opportunity for winning power through the electoral process. The impermeability of the boundaries around the Catholic and socialist electorates minimized the NSDAP's chances of winning their support and left Protestant bourgeois voters as this party's obvious target. In Chapter III, I pointed to explanations for electoral and political polarization on the one hand, and for the NSDAP's extraordinary success in mobilizing Protestant bourgeois voters on the other. There I tried to show the relative importance of historical circumstances, the formative experiences of Germany's parties, the adverse domestic and international situation in which the Republic found itself, the defects of its Constitution, and, not least, the decisions and actions of its parties and leaders.

In this chapter my purpose is to examine the conditions that in Franconia, i.e. at the grass roots level, both helped the NSDAP to win the backing of Protestant bourgeois voters and limited its success to this segment of the electorate. In a sense, this chapter aims to reconstruct the proximate "voting universe" that shaped people's attitudes and their electoral decisions. It begins by examining Franconia's economic conditions at the time of the NSDAP's greatest growth. I then

analyze the BVP's and SPD's attempts to hold on to their respective voting base and hence to minimize their losses even during the Republic's last series of elections. Finally, I consider those aspects of the Franconian case that facilitated the NSDAP's consolidation of the Protestant bourgeois vote.

I

That the economic adversity caused first by the inflation of 1923/1924 and then by the Depression of 1929 presented the NSDAP with an ideal opportunity for spreading its message cannot be denied. Throughout the 1920's, the Franconian economy was in trouble. Much of its industry was export-oriented; most of its enterprises, small-scale. The inflation all but wiped out the capacity of key Franconian industries to compete in the world market. The fact that these industries lacked capital or access to credit meant that even after the inflationary period, they were unable to recapture their previous markets or to hold their own against foreign competitors. The Depression of 1929, therefore, had all the greater effect because it climaxed a prolonged period of previous economic difficulties. Thus in 1929 almost 500 businesses went bankrupt; in 1931, 740. In 1930 alone the number of employers in Franconia dropped by 12%. Whole industries, such as the manufacture of toys, wicker and ordinary furniture, basket weaving, machines, cloth weaving collapsed and left entire towns or counties without work.

Unemployment figures rose dramatically, particularly in Franconia's largest cities. Nuremburg, for example, was among those German cities

with the highest unemployment rate. Given the region's precarious economic situation before the Depression, the worsening of the situation meant that many of the unemployed had been without a job too long to remain eligible for unemployment insurance. They had no alternative to going on welfare. This put a great strain on municipalities. At just the time that their tax base declined, they had to spend an even greater proportion of their income on welfare. Hence they could no longer provide basic services, much less create special public works projects. Furthermore, as the number of people on welfare increased, the benefits of each individual recipient declined.[1] The number of suicides rose sharply between 1929 and 1932.[2]

The economic picture was no less grim in the agricultural sector. Even before the onset of the Depression Franconian farmers suffered from a severe crisis. This was due to poor investments during the inflation, lack of credit in the 1920's, growing indebtedness, changing consumer tastes and the competition from cheap imported food. The industrial crisis from 1929 onwards sharply reduced consumer demands for more expensive domestic farm products. Prices fell. Between 1929 and 1930, the price of potatoes paid to farmers went down by 40%; that of rye, by 20%; that of pork by 36%. The result was a sharp increase in farm foreclosures. (In Central Franconia, Franconia's prime agricultural area, there were 112 foreclosures of farms in 1930; 282, in 1932.)[3]

Not surprisingly, the number of people attracted by the NSDAP's agitation for radical change went up sharply. Beginning in 1929, weekly police reports to Franconian district administrators emphasized the

unusually large audiences that the NSDAP were attracting even in rural areas, where the NSDAP previously had met only with indifference. This sudden interest in the NSDAP translated itself into active support. In the communal elections of 1929, then in the state and Reichstag election of 1930 and July 1932 the NSDAP's vote reached unprecedented heights.[4] That support came above all from middle class voters. Their sudden enthusiasm for the NSDAP seemed to have been prompted as much by economic motives as by a sense of general insecurity and disintegration. Thus opinion reports of the period often stress complaints made about the unseemly sight of large numbers of idle unemployed in public areas, where their unruly behavior, and drunkenness particularly offended the respectable middle classes. The wave of thefts, arson, begging, and other forms of petty crime experienced by many communities as the Depression deepened was also said by the police to have caused considerable anxiety and fear in bourgeois circles.[5]

II

Although no less affected by the Depression than middle class voters, among Catholic and socialist voters the NSDAP's message generally fell on deaf ears. What enabled these parties to immunize their electoral supporters so successfully against the Nazi appeal? Burnham's explanation was that both the Catholic and left parties were more successful in "integrating" their supporters. By involving them in an extensive network of party-affiliated organizations and by providing them with a set of beliefs that specified their proper conduct, these "confessional" parties succeeded in creating among their followers a durable

partisan commitment. The BVP and SPD certainly bear out Burnham's emphasis on the importance of effective grass-roots organization and a well-defined image of politics for the stability of the Catholic and socialist vote in the Republic's volatile party system.

In Franconia--at least before the NSDAP's reorganization in 1928--the BVP and SPD both had far more extensive grass roots organizations than any Protestant bourgeois party. Both parties made sure that their followers were constantly involved in party-related associations and party-organized social activities. Hence the stability of their electoral support. But both parties also recognized the importance of reinforcing party loyalty through "negative" integration. In other words, by making their followers feel embattled or besieged, the BVP and SPD made it psychologically more difficult for their voters to defect and especially so to a party in another "camp".

The revolutionary upheavals of 1918/1919 and the establishment of a Republic profoundly at odds with Bavaria's conservative, monarchist, particularistic traditions made it incumbent for the newly formed BVP to impose its absolute control over the state's Catholic population. After 1919, this party set out to expand systematically its local organization, particularly in the less accessible rural areas. Toward this end the BVP organized an extensive network of branches covering all of Bavaria. Because of the importance of rural voters to the BVP, it established the Christian Peasant Association (Christliche Bauernverein) again with a broad network of local branches. This organization was meant both to given Bavaria's rural peasantry a voice in BVP policies and to undermine (in Southern or Catholic Bavaria) widespread peasant

support for the anti-clerical, populist Bavarian Peasant League (Bayrischer Bauernbund, or BBB).[6]

Even more important than the BVP's or Christian Farmers' Association local branches (many of which collapsed or lay dormant between elections) was an unusually extensive and diverse network of lay associations. In rural communities these associations performed vital economic as well as social functions. They brought together informally on a regular basis, priests, local notables, local BVP administrators or politicians, and village or town residents.

In addition to such informal contacts, there existed more formal links between the Church and the local politicians and administrators. In most rural communities, many of those who sat in the church's administrative councils (Kirchenverwaltungsrat) also held seats in town or village councils. Local priests took on very active political roles particularly with the growing electoral threat posed by the Nazis. The associational substructure in which most Catholics participated maintained and reinforced the cohesiveness of the Catholic electorate. Such groups provided the BVP with ongoing forums for the dissemination of its views and positions; they gave the party access to its voters during and between elections.

Finally, the fact that it characteristically had such a central place in the social and economic life of Catholic communities, greatly facilitated the BVP's ability to mobilize its voters. In this task it was aided in no small measure by the support of the Church through its local priests.[7] The extraordinary influence exerted by local clergy over Catholic voters may be seen from the case of an Upper Franconian village

priest. In the mid-1920's he supported the DNVP and hence turned his village into a DNVP-enclave in an area dominated by the BVP. When this priest shifted to the NSDAP, he also brought his village into the Nazi camp.[8] (In Franconia, this was the only known instance of a Catholic priest openly supporting the Nazis.)[9]

The BVP also sought to maintain its control over its supporters by its strenuous efforts to define clearly the ideological boundaries separating it from rivals in the socialist and bourgeois camps. In Franconia as elsewhere in Bavaria, the BVP showed an unusual aggressiveness in presenting its own positions and in attacking those of its opponents. It stressed its role as the guardian of Bavaria's independence or special position within the Reich. It accused all other parties in Bavaria of aiming to destroy the state's separate and unique identity through incorporating it into centralized and unitary governmental structure. It also sought to create and maintain Kulturkampf orientations by emphasizing the secular educational policies advocated by the SPD or by pointing to the anti-religious stance of the NSDAP.

Since the SPD and the NSDAP constituted the BVP's chief rivals, its most virulent rhetoric was directed against these two parties. No doubt the events of 1919-1920 contributed to the BVP's extreme antipathy toward the SPD, although its actual behavior at that time cannot explain the BVP's hostility. The fact is that the Bavarian SPD, traditionally more conservative than the national organization, tried to prevent the overthrow of the monarchy in Bavaria; half of its delegates in the Bavarian Diet refused to ratify the Versailles Treaty. In the Reichstag, Bavaria's SPD members consistently defended Bavaria's special position

within the country. The BVP even conceded that the SPD had been a moderating influence during and after the November Revolution; it also admitted that when parts of the USPD sought to establish a Soviet Republic, the SPD government fled to Bamberg and there approved the suppression of that regime. Leaders of the BVP also recognized that the SPD's rhetoric notwithstanding, it was always prepared to make concessions in parliament; indeed in 1925 the SPD gave its approval to the concordat with the Vatican that the BVP had negotiated.[10]

The SPD's political moderation in practice, however, mattered less to the BVP than did the fact that the Social Democrats constituted the principal pillar of the hated Weimar regime. The SPD's numerical strength, both in the Reich and in Bavaria precluded a return of the old order, thus the BVP had to accommodate itself to the Republic or face complete political isolation. Even within Bavaria the SPD's mass appeal and numerical strength threatened to destroy the preeminent position traditionally enjoyed by Catholic political forces. Before the First World War the Social Democrats had already significantly undermined the Center Party's electoral hold over Bavarian voters. After 1919, it became essential for the BVP to prevent a further erosion of its own electorate, to contain, in other words, the SPD's potential popular appeal among Catholic voters. In developing a highly negative image of the Social Democrats, the BVP was not above exploiting the same social resentments and fears tapped by the Nazis. This was especially true in rural areas. Thus the BVP claimed that the SPD desired to expropriate all land, that it subordinated the interests of the peasantry to those of the workers, that it actively championed atheism and anti-

clericalism. The BVP even encouraged anti-semitic sentiments among its voters when it depicted the SPD as the party of international Jewry. Finally, the BVP made sure that its voters regarded the SPD as an extremist, radical party indistinguishable from the KPD.[11] It even held the Social Democrats responsible for the NSDAP's successes. One of the BVP's leaders argued that "if there were no left-oriented, anti-national radicalism, there would be no right-oriented radical nationalism."[12]

The BVP also sought to protect its fronts against bourgeois parties. BVP politicians and leaders of the Christian Farmers' Association frequently spoke of an unbridgeable gap between Catholics and Protestants or between the BVP and Protestant bourgeois parties. The Christian Farmers' Association accused the Protestant bourgeois parties of favoring a unitary state, a position regarded by Bavaria's Catholic politicians as close to treason. The Christian Farmers' Association also kept reminding its rural audiences that the liberal parties had been responsible for the _Kulturkampf_. When they advocated "freedom," they really wanted freedom from godly commands and the teachings of the Church.[13] Franconia's Protestant parties reciprocated by accusing the BVP of operating a party dictatorship that deliberately discriminated against Protestant Franconia. Or else they accused the BVP of running a police state because it clamped down on Nazi, but not SPD political meetings.[14]

For the BVP, the only bourgeois party actually capable of posing a serious political and electoral threat was the NSDAP. In the early years of the Republic, BVP leaders were still complaisant about the Nazis and other right-wing groups. Hitler's unsuccessful _Putsch_ became the turning point for the BVP's attitudes and policies toward the Nazis.

The astounding electoral victories of this party in the state and Reichstag elections of 1924 further convinced BVP leaders to move more strongly against the Nazis--all the more so since BVP leaders surmised that their own party's losses in both elections had resulted from defections to this radical party. This was in part true. As Chapter IV showed, an estimated 6% of BVP voters switched to the Nazis in the May 1924 Reichstag election; 4% moved to other parties and 5% abstained altogether from voting. Because of the usual scale of the BVP's vote, these shifts added significantly to the Nazis. After the coup, the new government under Prime Minister Dr. Heinrich Held, adopted an extremely stringent policy prohibiting incendiary speeches or other forms of provocation by any political group. Much to the dismay of the Nazis, this government never hesitated to enforce its regulations. In the last years of the Republic the Held government turned out to be far stricter in its interpretation and application of various emergency measures passed by the national government designed to limit political violence during elections than were most other states. In June 1932 Held even risked a constitutional crisis by refusing to revoke the ban against the SA and SS in Bavaria that had been ordered by the Reich government.[16]

The spring 1924 elections, in turn, prompted Bavaria's Catholic politicians to prevent any furture inroads into the BVP electorate by the National Socialists. Toward this end, BVP leaders set out to create a highly negative image of the Nazis. In the early 1920's BVP politicians, Church leaders, and newspapers close to the BVP had assailed to the Nazis primarily for their tactics and methods. After 1924,

Catholic publicists began focusing their attacks more deliberately on the NSDAP's ideology, religious views, economic policies and political goals. The aim of this propagandistic assault on the NSDAP was to depict it as a party no less radical in its economic views, no less atheistic in its religious stance and no less unitary and autocratic in its political conception than the KPD. Indeed, the Nazis were often portrayed as "Communists in nationalist clothing".[17]

As the agricultural crisis deepened in the late 1920s and as the NSDAP developed into an increasingly important and aggressive electoral contender, BVP denunciations of the Nazis became progressively more strident. Indeed, after 1930 the BVP's efforts to immunize its voters (especially those in rural areas) against National Socialist ideas and programs often employed language and methods reminiscent of Nazi speakers and publicists.

In the rural areas, the battle was carried out above all by the Christian Farmers' Association. Through its widely-read newspaper, the Fraenkisches Bauernblatt, this BVP subsidiary sought to bring the party's anti-Nazi message to its rural supporters. One issue of this newspaper, for example, pointed out the criminal record of some Nazi leaders. Another issue accused the Nazis of adopting a fake anti-semitism in order to cover up their dependence on rich industrialists. Other articles pointed to the stark discrepancy between the NSDAP's words and deeds. Thus the paper charged the Nazis with adopting a pro-farmer stance in their speeches but of voting against protective tariffs in the Reichstag. It queried the NSDAP's sincerity on the issue of reparations payments by telling its readers that the Nazis attacked the Young Plan at home

but told foreigners it would meet all payments once in power. It ridiculed the NSDAP's claim that it was not a party by showing that its voting record in both the Bavarian Diet and the Reichstag showed a strictly partisan line.[18]

The Nazis, of course, returned such attacks in kind. Reports of increasing physical clashes between BVP and Nazi supporters, especially in rural areas, led the BVP to establish in 1930 its own protective paramilitary units (the Bayernwacht).[19] Local branches of this organization proliferated rapidly so that by 1933 the Bayernwacht reached a strength almost equal to the SPD's paramilitary arm.

The Church too took an active role in the BVP's anti-Nazi campaign. Priests in both Lower and Upper Franconia prevented Nazis from participating in services while wearing their uniforms. They frequently warned their congregation against becoming members of the NSDAP; they threatened to deny them the Sacraments if they did. In 1930 the bishops of Lower and Upper Franconia banned the wearing of Nazi uniforms in church. This ban was rescinded by Cardinal Faulhaber but shortly thereafter, he established new guidelines defining the relationship between the Chruch and the NSDAP. Among the points made was that Catholic congregations were to be warned of the dangers of Nazism, that individual Nazis could wear their uniforms in Church but that closed formations of Nazis were not allowed, nor were the display of Nazi flags. Sacraments were to be given to Mazis only if they were not actively engaged in propagating the NSDAP cause.[20]

Like the BVP, the SPD was quite successful in holding on to its followers and for much the same reasons. It also had an extremely wide-

spread network of local organizations. As of 1928, the party had about 44,000 members and some 431 Ortsgruppen or local branches in Franconia. Added to these were an extensive system of functional associations and, even more important, social clubs. The SPD's ability to reach its electorate was aided also by its newspapers--there were eight SPD-oriented papers in Franconia.[21] Crucial to the SPD was its paramilitary arm, the Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold. It was founded in 1924 largely to counter the right-wing paramilitary bands so pervasive in post-war Bavaria. Originally, it was supported also by the DDP but most Reichsbanner members were Social Democrats.[22]

The Reichsbanner was both a protective organization and an important element in the SPD's offensive against anti-Republicans, particularly the NSDAP. According to a report by the Nuremberg-Fuerth police,among the Reichsbanner's functions were: 1) guarding SPD meetings; 2) providing a symbol of strength for SPD followers through the organization of plenty of activities from marches, torch light parades, political festivities, picnics, concerts, dances, to military excercises; 3) reporting to the SPD about anti-Republican newspaper attacks, the activities of the anti-Republican political and paramilitary associations, the activities and organizational strength of other parties, as well as the behavior of local officials and civil servants; 4) training and educating workers in special schools for political work; 5) organizing propaganda for the SPD in areas where the party was not firmly established; 6) setting up a warning system that would inform SPD functionaries of any paramilitary or Nazi activity against the SPD.[23]

How effective the Reichsbanner was can be seen from the Nazis' imitation of its features and functions. To combat Nazi terrorism, the SPD formed another paramilitary unit, the Iron Front.[24] Nazi-socialist street clashes usually were carried out by the SA and Iron Front.

The SPD was also extremely effective in mobilizing its electoral supporters. It was the first to develop a tactic later used by the Nazis, namely saturation campaigns during which a given area was bombarded for a short period with political meetings.[25] It was the first party to train local speakers, again a technique borrowed by the Nazis. The SPD was the first to boycott stores for political reasons.[26] It aimed, as did the Nazis at a later stage, to keep its presence alive not only during, but also between elections. Finally, the SPD ensured that voters actually went to the polls by providing transportation for those who lived in remote areas, for the incapacitated and for all other supporters that would otherwise have been unable to vote.[27]

Like the BVP, the SPD sought to immunize its voters against the Nazi threat. This task was relatively easy. From the very beginning, the National Socialists had made the SPD their primary target both for verbal and physical attacks. Throughout the early 1920s, one observer correctly noted, the NSDAP and SPD were involved in a constant, bitter and lethal guerilla war.[28] Violent clashes between SPD and NSDAP followers became the norm from 1930 on. The Social Democrats had for much of the 1920s attacked not only the NSDAP but also those bourgeois circles and parties which sympathized with it. After 1930 it concentrated its attacks on the Nazis. It stressed the NSDAP's links with big business, its reactionary position on social legislation, its

willingness to make promises it failed to keep, and its desire to impose a dictatorship. As Pridham has argued, the SPD was the only one of the NSDAP's opponents to emphasize the importance of protecting the Republic against the Nazi drive for power.[28]

The SPD also sought to rally its supporters against the BVP. This was not difficult, given the BVP's animosity toward the Social Democrats. At any rate, Franconia's SPD leaders accused the BVP of having been responsible for the Putsch, of abetting the Nazis, of seeing a greater danger on the Left than on the Right, and of trying to destroy the Republic. In the early 1920s, the SPD defined the BVP as its principal foe.[29] In the mid-1920's there were rumors that the SPD favored the establishment of a separate, and more pro-Republican state of Franconia.[30] Throughout, the SPD accused the BVP of using the Church as a forum for attacking the Republic and the SPD.[31]

Relations between bourgeois parties (barring the DDP) and the SPD were no less strained. Conflicts at the local level were frequent, especially over the SPD's social and economic policies. The SPD's efforts to keep prices down, its support of department stores and consumer cooperatives were deeply resented by middle class elements.[32] Many "national-minded" people among bourgeoisie continued to fear the SPD's "radicalism" and felt that Nazi attacks on the SPD were justified. The animosity was such that in communal governments major conflicts could arise between SPD and bourgeois politicians over such peripheral issues of whether or not to fly the national flag on certain public occasions.[33]

As for the KPD, in Franconia, its party organization and functional substructure was considerably weaker than that of the SPD. Even in those areas where it did best, the KPD had relatively few local branches, and often had trouble finding enough candidates for local elections. Hence it was willing to support candidates who were not KPD members or not even especially committed to the Communist cause. Although the KPD sought to develop a wide variety of social clubs and functional associations, it had considerably less success in enrolling members than did the Social Democrats. The KPD also suffered from repeated rifts between its more moderate and radical elements. Such tensions often led to departure of local leaders or members to the SPD. The KPD's political and organizational impact, however, improved markedly with the onset of the Depression. Its efforts focused especially on the unemployed ignored by the SPD, which addressed itself above all to working union members. But Franconian authorities made every effort to prevent the Communists from acquiring a strong foothold in the regions.

After 1919, the KPD was forced to operate under considerably greater constraints than any other party in Franconia, including the NSDAP. During the May 1924 election, most of the KPD's leaders were in jail. This was the case also in the March 1933 election. Throughout the 1920s and especially after 1930, Franconian authorities were infinitely more sensitive to the Communist danger than to that posed by the Nazis. Hence, they were far more ready to prohibit KPD meetings, to ban KPD demonstrations, to prevent even demonstrations or public meetings by the unemployed for fear of Communist subversion, and to confiscate KPD materials. Franconian authorities frequently called for an

end to all KPD meetings and for a complete ban on all Communist publications. No such requests were made for similar action against the National Socialists. Every opportunity was seized for limiting Communist activities in the region. By 1932, there even existed special courts to hold speedy trials for Communist agitators and to impose fines and imprisonments for Communist members and leaders who had been found guilty. There is no evidence that these courts were used for Nazis.[34]

The KPD, however, developed surprising skills in overcoming these obstacles. Its members and organizers became quite ingenious in their efforts to spread Communist propaganda. At one point, police complained that Communists began dropping leaflets in the backyards of policemen, ex-policemen, and soldiers. The party was also able to organize major demonstrations with little planning. Just as the police arrived, demonstrators would disappear only to regroup somewhere else. Once prolonged unemployment set in, the KPD also found greater receptivity for its more unconventional methods, including sabotage and terrorism.[35] But even at the height of the Depression, the Franconian Communists failed to achieve as dramatic a breakthrough as it did in other parts of Germany. This may also have been due to the fact that Franconia did not have the type of industrial proletariat among which the KPD found its adherents elsewhere in Germany. The Communists did best in the industrial areas of Hof, Solb, and Lichtenfels. The textile industry centered around the city of Hof, porcelain manufacture was concentrated mostly in the city of Selb, while the manufacture of baskets had Lichtenfels as its center. These were the dominant Franconian industries.

Although large companies existed in the textile and porcelain industries, most companies were small or medium size. In both the textile and basket industries, moreover, a major share of the labor force worked at home or in tiny firms situated mostly in rural communities or small towns. Although workers in the home or cottage industries were miserably paid, the highly decentralized structure of these industries made it difficult for the KPD to organize them.

Although the Communists never posed a serious threat in Franconia, they were the favorite target for attacks by the National Socialists. Like the SPD, the Communists were both victims of Nazi attacks and provoked them. At the same time, in communal governments, these two extremist parties often cooperated against the SPD or bourgeois parties.[36] This may explain the occasional voter exchanges between the NSDAP and KPD noted in Chapters IV and V.

Images of politics and of electoral rivals defined exclusively in terms of the "friend-foe" distinction thus characterized Franconia's main parties. The use of such antagonistic polarities no doubt deepened existing social and political divisions. Each of the three political camps in Franconia developed its exclusive subculture, its own social network, its own economic associations, its own political universe. As a result, contacts among members of the different blocs were broken off even in Franconia's villages and small towns. The absence of any common associations, in turn, made cooperation against the growing Nazi threat an impossibility, both at the communal and state level. The only parties in Bavaria strong enough to resist the NSDAP, the BVP and SPD, shared a common loathing for this party. Yet they could not find it

possible to work together against it. Even after 1930, when the BVP could in fact govern only with the SPD's tolerance in the Bavarian Diet, it rejected all SPD initiatives to form a coalition government with the Social Democrats.[37]

In Franconia and elsewhere in Germany, the National Socialists took full advantage of this discordant, embattled, conflict-ridden political milieu. The NSDAP turned this polarization to its own advantage. Especially after 1928, it sought to convince bourgeois voters of the extreme danger posed to their interest by both the BVP and the political Left, especially the SPD. The NSDAP emphasize the incapacity of bourgeois parties to meet this threat. It boasted of the NSDAP's willingness and ability both to unite the bourgeoisie and to triumph over those political forces that opposed its interests.[38] Apparently the NSDAP's arguments to this effect were quite persuasive. Thus many Protestants came to believe that the BVP was favoring Catholic Bavaria, that the SPD was out to win power in order to use it against the middle class, and that bourgeois parties contributed to the weakness of the middle class.[39]

The NSDAP also sought deliberately to increase this polarization. It purpose was clearly to define the political situation in such a way that non-Catholic, non-socialist voters would come to regard the Nazis as their only logical choice. At one meeting, it was argued that given the brutality of the enemy (the SPD), the Nazis too must resort to brutal means. The SPD was represented as evil, satanic, anti-Christian, treacherous. It was said to aim to destroy the middle class and indeed, German society and culture. Hence the Nazis were carrying on a sacred

battle in trying to root out the SPD. Nazi speakers also tried to argue that in this struggle there could be no neutrality. Hence their insistence that whoever did not join them or support them must be Bolsheviks.[40] The NSDAP made quite sure not to differentiate between the SPD and the KPD in its attacks against Bolshevism and Marxism. It suited Nazi purposes to depict the Left as a unified and powerful foe that could be defeated only by a united bourgeoisie and a party willing to use very means--including violence.

Nor were the left parties the NSDAP's only target. Nazi assaults on the BVP became vehement. They began to attack the BVP and Center Party as political whores for their readiness to cooperate with the SPD at the Reich level. The SA even had a marching refrain used in demonstrations through Catholic or working class areas, that accused the BVP of helping the Social Democrats to betray Germany: "Who betrayed the fatherland? The Social Democrats! Who was there with them? The Bavarian People's Party!" ("_Wer hat das Vaterland verraten? Die Sozialdemokraten! Wer war auch dabei? Die Bayrische Volkspartei!_")[42] In the context of Bavarian politics, that refrain was particularly provocative.

As the political temperature began to rise after 1930, the Nazis used increasingly crass language in their anti-BVP tirades. They began increasingly to speak of a Red-Black murder front or of Red and Black thiefs. At times they referred to BVP politicians as black Jews or as scoundrels and criminals no different from the Bolsheviks. They even started to attack the clergy directly. Thus some speakers accused priests of being more interested in people's money than in their souls.[43]

Beginning in 1930, Nazi speakers also began to threaten openly their BVP and SPD opponents. They let it be known that when the Nazis came to power, their enemies would hang from the next lamp post or would find themselves a head shorter. NSDAP verbal attacks on the BVP and SPD became so vicious and threatening that the Bavarian Ministry of Interior as well as local and regional authorities began to publish lists of Nazi speakers prohibited from appearing at public meetings.[44]

Nor were the NSDAP's assaults verbal only. After 1930 violent clashes between the Nazis and Social Democrats, BVP followers, or Communists became daily occurrences even in Franconia's hitherto peaceful small towns and communities.[45] By 1931, the mood of the region was one of fear. There was a sense of imminent civil war as armed parties vied for control of the streets as well as of the polls. Rumors of coups became rife as each side prepared itself for a possible seizure of power by the other. This civil war psychosis prevailed throughout 1932 and indeed was fed by the Nazis' disappointment over their failure to win power "legally." When Hitler was finally appointed Chancellor, voters greeted this development almost with a sense of relief. Their hope that political violence would decline, however, was soon dashed,as the Nazis prepared their final campaign, street violence reached unprecedented levels.

III

The National Socialist conquest of the Protestant bourgeois electorate, it has been emphasized previously, was facilitated by conditions special to this camp. Among them was the fact that unlike

Catholics and socialists, non-socialist, Protestant voters had to choose among a large array of parties representing diverse interests and political orientations. This was due to the fact that in Weimar as in Imperial Germany the middle class consisted of a congeries of competing groups in pursuit of mutually exclusive interests.

In Franconia, regional public opinion reports for the 1920's convey the impression that the Protestant bourgeoisie was marked by disunity, mutual resentments, and the disposition to see all situations in terms of the "it's either you or me."[39] Between 1919 and 1922 the Bavarian government requisitioned a certain proportion of each farmer's crops and produce in order to alleviate mass hunger in its urban areas. Farmers grumbled about having to bear the brunt of economic recovery.[46] During the inflation, retailers and shopkeepers accused farmers of speculation with food prices, and of selling their crops and produce to higher bidders outside the region, as well as of deliberately withholding food to push up prices. Throughout this period, townspeople called for ever greater controls, while farmers demanded an end to all controls on food prices.[47] In the mid-1920's, agriculture slumped while urban retailers and producers experienced a recovery. Farmers then accused shopkeepers of paying them low prices for their produce while charging record prices to consumers. Artisans and craftsmen were said by farmers to have raised their prices artificially. In this way farmers were forced into assuming ever greater debt.[48]

Every economic measure designed to help the middle class was apt to benefit one group at the expense of another. Although protective food tariffs helped farmers, they meant higher food prices for artisans and small shopkeepers who also had to pay higher wages. Import restrictions aided industries dependent exclusively on domestic markets but they undermined many of Franconia's export-oriented industries. Department stores were decried by shopkeepers but were essential for middle class people on low and fixed incomes.

Given these conflicting interests within the middle class, bourgeois parties found it almost impossible to develop economic programs that would satisfy all sectors of this diverse electorate. This in turn, led to secessions by discontented elements within the main bourgeois parties and to the emergence of a host of narrowly defined interest parties. Bourgeois voters throughout the mid-1920's had to choose among a bewildering array of different parties. Even in communal elections, bourgeois voters often had to choose among nine different bourgeois lists. Each of these represented an alliance of different bourgeois parties.

For Franconia's Protestant bourgeois voters, such divisions heightened their sense of weakness and insecurity vis-à-vis the far more cohesive Catholic and socialist blocs. Increasingly they came to blame both the older and newer bourgeois parties for their inability to stop squabbling and to unite in a common struggle against those parties threatening middle class interests. Protestant bourgeois voters seemed oblivious to the inconsistency between their calls for a strong, united middle class party and their readiness to defect from parties they had

previously supported. Protestant parties too failed to reconcile their desire to unify the middle class camp with a willingness to make compromises necessary to attain this objective.

After 1928, the National Socialists exploited this extreme segmentation of the Protestant bourgeois bloc. They never had to confront a single, well-organized opponent as it did when they sought to attract Catholic or working class support. Such fragmentation made it easier for them to take over local branches of middle class associations. These they used as channels to middle class voters. Internal divisions within the middle class electorate also made it possible for the Nazis to promise different things to different groups without having to worry about being accused of inconsistencies.

In Franconia, for instance, the NSDAP had two types of public meetings. In the first, themes of general interest to middle class voters were discussed (taxes, Versailles, the evils of the SPD, the threat of Bolshevism, the decline of the middle class, the destructiveness of parliamentary democracy, anti-semitism). The other type of meeting carefully specified the groups to which they were addressed: civil servants, teachers, shopkeepers and farmers. In these meetings the Nazis could with impunity promise whatever its highly selective audience wanted to hear.[49]

In rural communities where salaries of civil servants were a thorny issue, the NSDAP promised that once in power it would reduce civil service salaries and pensions.[50] In such towns as Ansbach and Bayreuth, where civil servants constituted an important group in the population, the NSDAP promised the opposite, stressing its great respect

for civil servants and the legitimacy of their complaints about low salaries.[51] For farmers, the NSDAP promised an end to the beer and slaughter taxes, a general reduction in personal taxes and an end to all debts. To urban middle-class entrepeurs they advocated wage reductions for their employees, setting limits on consumer coops, putting an end to government-funded projects that took away jobs from artisans and the closing of department stores. All groups, of course, were promised lower taxes, greater availability of credit and financial help and protection against undue competition.[52]

That strategy worked so well in large part because the NSDAP at the local level met little counter-pressure from bourgeois parties. These, with the exception of the DNVP, lacked ongoing extensive grass-roots organizations. The DDP and DVP existed at this level on paper only. During election, prominent leaders of these parties would occasionally hold meetings; but only in the larger towns or in places where they had traditionally done well. Between elections, these parties dropped out of sight completely. Whatever local branches existed, ceased to be a presence the moment a given election was over. Of the special interest parties, the Business Party was, at least until 1930, quite active in the region. From 1931 on, however, its meetings became increasingly rare. Prior to July 1932, the Franconian branches of this party dissolved themselves and told their voters to support the NSDAP.[53] After 1928 all Protestant bourgeois parties began to disintegrate. The collapse of these parties at the time that the NSDAP began building up its own organization meant that during the critical years of 1930-1933, Franconia's Protestant bourgeois voters in effect only received a single

message, that of the National Socialists.

That middle class voters proved so receptive an audience for the Nazi message, was in large measure due to the fact that it was not altogether novel or unfamiliar. The NSDAP's program and election slogans contained points and themes long propagated by Protestant bourgeois parties. The NSDAP's 25-point program called for, among other things, a healthy middle class and its support by the state, "communalization" of big department stores by renting space in them to small tradesmen, government orders from small tradesman rather than big concerns, the prohibition of any land speculation, the abrogation of all income not derived from working and the establishment of a second chamber founded on corporatist lines.[54] All these were demands originally voiced by those radical middle class parties which first appeared in the 1880s. During the 1890s, both liberal and conservative parties themselves incorporated ideas along this line in their programs.[55]

In the Weimar Republic, every party within the Protestant bourgeois camp reaffirmed its commitment to policies favorable to some sector of the middle class. Thus like the NSDAP liberal as well as conservative and special interest parties demanded a variety of protectionist measures for farmers, tradesmen, artisans. This appeared in the party programs of the DNVP (points 12,13), the DVP (points 12 and 15), the DDP (points 6 and 7), the Business Party (WP) (points 8-13), the three DNVP splinter parties, i.e. the CNBL (points 4 and 5), the CSVD (point 3), the KVP (points 7 and 8). Calls for a second chamber based on occupational representations came from the Business Party, the DNVP, and the CNBL.

Nor was the NSDAP alone in its hate for the SPD. No less strident than the Nazis were the DNVP and its off-shoots, the CNBL and KVP; as well as the Business Party.[56] In their party programs they held the SPD responsible for Germany's defeat, for destroying the middle class, for being Jewish-dominated, for undermining Germany's power and for undermining ethics and morality. Sometimes their attacks were couched neutrally, as in their opposition to the class struggle. More often than not, however, their attacks on the SPD were direct and vicious.[57]

The NSDAP's anti-parliamentarian and anti-Republican sentiments were shared by most other parties within the bourgeois camp. The sole exception was the DDP until its shift to the right in 1930. The DNVP called for a restoration of the monarchy in point 3 of its program. In 1927, moreover, the DNVP's suggestions for political reforms (for whose formulation Carl Schmitt was largely responsible)[58] included a rejection of "mechanical egalitarianism" as represented by the Weimar Constitution, radical limitations on parliament, substantial increases in the power of the President, indirect elections, upward revision of the voting age. The CNBL rejected the Weimar system outright, calling for a form of government above parties and a strong President not influenced by partisan pressures.[59] The Business Party's program too favored a form of government in which parliament and parties would play a much reduced role. (Point 1 of the CNBL's and point 5 of the Business Party's program reflect these positions.) The DVP reluctantly accepted the Republic and professed its willingness to work with it but declared at the same time that its preference was for the monarchy (point 3).[60]

Anti-semitic proclamations, statements and remarks were not uncommon for many of the bourgeois parties. The DNVP was especially virulent in its anti-semitism. Point 8 of its program called for an end to all influences which destroy the German spirit "whether it comes from Jewish or other circles". The CNBL promised to destroy "state socialism" by which it meant those policies that allegedly benefited workers but ruined small entrepreneurs unable to support the wages and benefits advocated by "Jewish-dominated red parties." The CNBL also committed itself to fighting what it called alien influences in German society that had resulted from racial impurities. It believed that a regeneration of the German spirit and a restoration of Germany's power could be achieved only by a "pure Aryan blood community" and it promised to work toward such a community.[61]

Although the liberal parties (and especially the DDP) eschewed anti-semitism or violent attacks upon the Republic and the SPD, there was otherwise little that fundamentally distinguished the liberal parties from their rivals on the right. By 1930, that line became even more blurred. The DDP merged with a right-wing, paramilitary organization, the Jungdeutscher Orden (Order of Young Germans, or Judo). Moreover, DDP and DVP leaders were in the process of negotiating an electoral and parliamentary alliance with the CNBL, the KVP, and the Business Party. That alliance came to naught over fierce objections by the remains of the DDP's left wing. Nor could the DVP and CNBL settle crucial policy difference. Beginning in 1931, there were well publicized moves to the Nazis by former Business Party leaders, as well as by leaders of two DNVP splinter parties, the CNBL and the CSVD. There was also a Nazi,

DNVP, and Stahlhelm alliance. These shifts to the right by liberals and the DNVP-NSDAP alliance, made it easy for the Nazis to present themselves to Protestant bourgeois voters as a sound and logical alternative.[62]

At the local level, bourgeois parties and opinion leaders never created that "spatial and psychological distance"[63] between themselves and the Nazis which were achievements by both the BVP and SPD. In Franconia, the NSDAP's brand of politics was generally hailed in bourgeois circles as showing the proper "patriotic" (vaterlaendische) sentiments. Especially in the Protestant areas of the region, the NSDAP's ideology and statements seemed neither outlandish nor extreme. Resounding condemnations of Versailles, reparations, the Republic, the BVP and the SPD, the "messy politics" of the parties and so forth were standard themes in the political rhetoric of the day. Indeed, when the BVP moved against the NSDAP's verbal excesses by banning certain speakers or when it sought to reduce political tensions by temporarily prohibiting political activities, as it did e.g. in August, 1931, bourgeois public opinion often resented these steps. They saw them as one-sided, unnecessary or even designed to prevent the Nazis from promulgating the "truth."[64]

When in 1930 and 1932, the Bavarian government sought to ease tensions by prohibiting the Nazis from wearing their uniforms in public, regional reports often mentioned the laments in bourgeois circles that the Nazis were being treated more harshly than the Marxists by the BVP government. Regional political and police reports, generally give the impression that bourgeois leaders were incapable of seeing the Nazis as

a threat,of reacting to Nazi excesses with any but mild reproofs. Police descriptions of local meetings, local festivities, sports and musical events make it clear that it was not uncommon for bourgeois politicians and opinion leaders to join local Nazi notables in such community activities.[65]

After 1930, bourgeois opinion leaders and converted bourgeois politicians began to participate as speakers in Nazi meetings. In late 1931, the Nuernberg-Fuerth police reports noted that the NSDAP made increasing use of mayors and public prosecutors who had gone over to the Nazis. Between 1930 and 1931, of the 45 speakers used by Nazis in major meetings from Franconia, seven were senior civil servants, five were factory owners, four were university or gymnasium teachers, three were dentists, two were medical doctors, five were engineers and eight were public school teachers. Only five were farmers; three were workers; and two, artisans. The remainder were salesmen. The NSDAP's use of speakers from highly respected professions and local politicians apparently did much to "legitimize" the Nazis at the local level.[66]

The Nazis were also actively supported by Franconia's Protestant pastors. In the 1920s, these were generally fervent supporters of the DNVP, after 1929, they turned to the NSDAP. Unlike their Catholic counterparts, Protestant pastors did not impose any restrictions on the wearing of uniform in church or of appearing for church services in closed formations. They welcomed the presence of Nazis during special war memorial services; they often read service during special Nazi festivities or large public assemblies; they even helped form local Nazi branches. Pastors not infrequently contributed to Nazi newspapers

publicized the Nazi program in their sermons, and encouraged their congregation to become party members. The official church leadership avoided responsibility by stressing the Church's party neutrality; but it left Nazi-oriented priests free to propagandize for their party.[67]

The regional bourgeois press did little to warn its readers of the Nazi threat. During the mid-1920s it generally ignored this movement. By 1926, the DDP-oriented Nuernberger Zeitung accepted NSDAP advertisements and printed NSDAP announcements of its meetings. As the NSDAP grew, the bourgeois press gave it broad and generally favorable coverage. After 1930, some leading "neutral" or "conservative" papers openly supported the NSDAP during elections. (Among the most important were the Fraenkischer Kurier, the Bamberger Tagblatt, and the Ansbacher Zeitung.) In rural communities, most small newspapers shifted to the Nazis between 1930 and 1932, particularly after Nazi threats of arson or of closing them after the seizure of power.[68]

Because they were never confined by strong psychological and ideological barriers such as those created by the BVP and SPD, Protestant bourgeois voters found it relatively easy to abandon their previous parties for the NSDAP. But in the final analysis, the NSDAP succeeded in mobilizing the Protestant bourgeois bloc because it was the only party within this bloc capable of forging itself into an electoral machine that was more than a match for the BVP and SPD organizations. The fact that the Nazis constructed such an effective electoral organization at a time when all other bourgeois parties were falling apart amidst severe economic crisis undoubtedly contributed to the rapidity of middle class voter shifts to the NSDAP after 1928.

As the result of its 1928 party congress, the NSDAP underwent a major reorganization. To begin with, it made its administrative districts (Gaue) coterminous with the National election districts; it also subdivided existing and newly created Gaue to improve their efficiency. Stricter controls on local cadres were imposed. Ortsgruppen or cells were made more responsive to the central leadership. The NSDAP also revamped its propaganda section, which now took on major responsibilities for developing the strategies, tactics, programs, cadres, and organizations needed to mount effective campaigns.

To facilitate the mobilization of key sectors within the middle class--farmers, shopkeepers, civil servants, white collar workers--a host of specialized organizations were created. They were meant both to find out the principal complaints of those groups the NSDAP planned to attract, and to develop the kind of themes that would appeal to them. In addition, these new organizations were to serve as conduits between the party's central propaganda and functional sections and its local leadership. They also provided local organizations with information, with appropriate propaganda materials and with specialized speakers.[69]

By far the most important and successful of these new organizations were the Agrarpolitischer Apparat (the NSDAP's special propaganda arm for the mobilization of farmers) under the leadership of Walter Darré, the department for the middle class (by which was meant primarily artisans, shopkeepers and small property owners as well as farmers), department for civil servants, the National Socialist Teachers Organization and the Associations of National Socialist students. The NSDAP never altogether gave up the idea of winning workers to their cause. Towards

this end it set up National Socialist factory cells (NSBO), the purpose of which was to get the Nazi message to the workers rather than to act as a trade union.[70]

The NSDAP leadership also recognized that such functional specialization could bear fruit only if the party possessed a powerful grass roots organization. One of its principal tasks after 1928, therefore, was to establish such a substructure. It proceeded to do this with unusual speed. For the communal elections of 1929 alone, it founded 63 new local cells (Ortsgruppen) in Middle Franconia, another 63 in Upper Franconia and 18 in Lower Franconia.[71] By 1930 local authorities could no longer keep track of the number of cells formed by the Nazis, especially since the Nazis made every attempt to penetrate into even the smallest hamlet.[72]

The NSDAP, however, realized that it was not enough to found such cells. It made every attempt to sustain their activity. Local organizers were expected to hold weekly meetings, to submit reports of their activities, and to enroll subscribers for Nazi newspapers. The party also conducted frequent training courses for local organizers. Such courses were designed to improve their knowledge of the community and to give them skills that would be useful in acquiring the support of one or the other group in their community. One course, for instance, taught participants how to help disabled veterans by finding out what were the legal provisions affecting them, whether veterans in their community were receiving the benefits to which they were entitled and to help veterans with social and health agencies that distributed services for veterans.[73]

To mobilize the bourgeois electorate, the NSDAP adopted several strategies. The first was to remain constantly visible before bourgeois voters, especially between elections. This involved a never ending series of marches, torch light parades, outings, concerts, discussion evenings, theatrical performances, and political meetings. During elections these activities were intensified. The number of meetings held by the Nazis soared. In 1930, the Nuremberg-Fuerth police reported 2,000 meetings held by the NSDAP in Franconia within 3 months. In the same period, the CNBL held no more than 30 meetings; the DDP, only five. A second tactic was to saturate chosen districts for short periods. Thus special districts were selected and then submitted to a constant barrage of meetings, sometimes up to 30 a day. In the larger towns, the NSDAP could run 245 meetings within a period of several days.[74]

To mobilize rural electorates, the Nazis organized motor-cycle and truck trips on the week-ends which brought several hundred Nazis into remote rural areas. There they paid door-to-door visits to farmers, posted materials in villages, and held meetings with local residents. These very often resulted in the establishment of local branches.[75] To maintain these activities required an enormous arsenal of speakers and the Nazis established a special speaker school. Students could participate through correspondence courses and the better ones were then chosen to receive further training.[76]

Other tactics included making the NSDAP part of a community's daily life. Garden concerts, SA marches and concerts, Christmas celebrations, participation at all formal occasions such as national holi-

days were part of this strategy. Thus the Nazis were prominent at all times. Indeed, the NSDAP made it a point to keep up a steady barrage of demonstrations, public assemblies, and discussion evenings. It was usually the first party to become active after elections and the first to open campaigns.[77]

It also did not hesitate to use violence and threats--and not only against the SPD. This emphasis on violence and threats became especially pronounced in 1932. There were constantly rumors about black lists drawn up by the Nazis containing names of civil servants who had not joined, the names of policemen opposed to them, the names of shopkeepers selling merchandise to Jews. The Nazis did little to discourage such rumors since it saw intimidation as an effective weapon against bourgeois elements reluctant to join them.[78]

Through verbal and actual violence, the Nazis also aimed to undermine the commitment of public officials to maintain order. They hoped to wear down the police and local officials. The Nazis so overwhelmed the police with work through provocative meetings, street violence, violations of speaking bans or uniform bans that the regional ministries increasingly complained to Munich about lacking the manpower needed to keep the Nazis in check. Since police had to attend every Nazi meeting, the Nazi speakers used these occasions to taunt the attending officer, to convince him of the NSDAP's cause, or to threaten him with a future loss of job should the Nazis get into power. These tactics apparently did not lack success since there were growing requests by the Munich government for Franconian officials to carry out Munich directives against the Nazis more aggressively.[79]

The NSDAP was keenly aware that the Protestant bourgeoisie expected concrete proposals for economic issues of concern to them. After 1928, the Nazis increasingly made specific promises to groups within the bourgeois electorate. The relative indifference shown by Franconian voters to the Young Referendum convinced the Nazis that voters were far more concerned about concrete, economic issues that immediately affected them than about abstract causes.[80] The NSDAP's promises were, of course, carefully geared to the grievances of specific groups and did not amount to an internally coherent economic program. These promises were taken quite seriously, especially in rural areas where no other messages than those of the Nazis reached the farmers. In May 1932, for example, there were reports that farmers stopped all tax and mortgage payments because they were convinced that the Nazis were coming to power.[81] The NSDAP also sought to give the impression that it actively engaged itself on behalf of one or another group. It even prevented the auctioning of farms and organized boycotts against cooperatives and department stores. Such actions were regarded by bourgeois voters as proof that the Nazis acted on their promises.[82]

The fact that the Nazis shifted to more concrete economic proposals after 1928 did not mean that anti-semitism, attacks on the Weimar system, on the Versailles Treaty and so forth disappeared from their campaign speeches. On the contrary, these themes continued to play a central role in all Nazi pronouncements. But with the onset of the Depression the NSDAP speakers were careful to link them to concrete economic concerns. Thus the Nazis linked the enormous sums Germany had to pay for reparations to the high taxes that farmers or shopkeepers had to pay.

Simiarly, its anti-semitic attacks were always combined with attacks on department stores, on animal traders, on banks or on local economic scandals.[65]

To conclude, the NSDAP's successful endeavor to create a well-organized, effective electoral machine enabled it to fill the political vacuum created by the fragmentation and, ultimately disintegration of the Weimar Republic's Protestant bourgeois parties. The Nazi conquest of middle class voters was of course helped by the Depression. But, as I sought to show, economic hardships suffered by broad sectors of the population cannot explain the spectacular electoral successes enjoyed by the Nazis after 1930. Other conditions were necessary to effect the massive shift of Protestant bourgeois voters to this party.

Franconia's polarization created a climate of opinion within which the NSDAP's extremism could thrive. The Protestant bourgeois parties presented this party with the ample opportunities for getting a hold over their own supporters. Last but not least, the Nazis understood that ideas and ideology alone cannot mobilize voters. Unlike their rivals in the Protestant bourgeois camp, they knew that to win power through the electoral process requires a strong grass roots organization and they proceeded to build one. And, of course, they knew how to manipulate the fears of voters all too ready to believe the worst of the parties in the other camps. The Nazis also saw the advantages of total ruthlessness and violence. Their methods succeeded in "rallying" Protestant bourgeois partisans behind them. Yet they failed to dislodge their principal opponents, the Catholic and socialist parties. To the end, these were maintained by the depth of class and confessional

cleavages in German society.

FOOTNOTES

1. Hambrecht, Aufstieg, pp. 187-190.
2. Zeitschrift des Bayrischen Statistischen Landesamts 64 (1932) p. 151.
3. Hambrecht, Aufstieg, p. 189.
4. ibid., p. 187.
5. ibid., p. 190.
6. The Bavarian Peasant League (BBB) was founded in 1893 to protest the Center Party's policy of supporting the liberalization of tariff laws under Caprivi; it continued to compete mostly in Southern Bavaria as the Bavarian Peasant and Middle Class League (BBMB); in Franconia, it was represented by the Business Party. Pridham, Hitler's Rise, pp. 69-72.
7. Pridham, Hitler's Rise, pp. 64-66; Zofka, Ausbreitung, pp. 157-176; Elke Froehlich, "Politische und Soziale Macht auf dem Lande: Die Durchsetzung der NSDAP im Landkreis Memmingen," Vierteljahreshefte fuer Zeitgeschichte 25 (1977), pp. 546-572.
8. Halbmonatsberichte der Regierung von Oberfranken (hereafter cited as HMB/Ofr.) GSA MA 102155/3, 5.18.1931.
9. Hambrecht, Aufstieg, pp. 286-287.
10. Pridham, Hitler's Rise, pp. 163-164, 169.
11. Wiesemann, Vorgeschichte, pp. 111-119.
12. ibid., p. 117.
13. Gordon, Beerhall Putsch, pp. 29-35; Fraenkisches Bauernblatt, April 23, 1932.
14. HMB/Mfr. GSA MA 102153, 5.20.1925; 6.20. 1929.
15. Pridham, Hitler's Rise, pp. 19-22.
16. ibid., pp. 276-279.
17. Zofka, Ausbreitung, pp. 160-161.

18. Fraenkisches Bauernblatt, August 15, 1931; March 28, 1932; April 17, 1932; April 23, 1932; July 16, 1932; July 30, 1932.

19. Wiesemann, Vorgeschichte, p. 120.

20. Akten des Staatsministeriums des Innern (hereafter cited as MINN) 81578; Ludwig Volk, Der Bayrische Episkopat und der Nationalsozialismus (Mainz, 1965) pp. 25-29.

21. N-F/LB 130/II/28.

22. ibid. LB 162/II/29; Gordon, Beerhall Putsch, pp. 602-603.

23. N-F/LB 162/II/29.

24. Pridham, Hitler's Rise, p. 272.

25. HMB/Ofr. GSA MA 102 155/3, 7.5. 1926.

26. ibid., 11.18. 1926.

27. ibid., 7.5. 1926.

28. Pridham, Hitler's Rise, p. 192.

29. Gordon, Beerhall Putsch, pp. 34-36.

30. HMB/Mfr. GSA MA 102153, 9.19. 1925.

31. HMB/ofr. GSA MA 102155/3, 1.3. 1930.

32. ibid., 3.18. 1926.

33. ibid., 10.4. 1927.

34. Pridham, Hitler's Rise, pp. 253-263.

35. HMB/Mfr. GSA MA 102154, January 1932-March 1933, passim.

36. Hambrecht, Aufstieg, p. 297.

37. Pridham, Hitler's Rise, p. 276.

38. MINN 81579, 5.9. 1931; 5.28. 1931.

39. Pridham, Hitler's Rise, pp. 180-189; MINN 81582, 12.2. 1929; MINN 81584, 1.30. 1931; 11.28. 1930; MA 81583, 3.7. 1930.

40. MINN 81583, 5.21. 1930.

41. MINN 81585, 6.14. 1931.

42. Hambrecht, Aufstieg, p. 207

43. Landratsamt Schwabach (hereafter cited as LRA), Bayrisches Staatsarchiv Nuernberg (BSA), #8958.

44. ibid., 6.1. 1932

45. HMB/Mfr. GSA MA 102153, 2.19. 1931; N-F/LB 1932/XI/5; 1930/XII/31.

46. HMB/Mfr. GSA MA 102152, 10.20. 1922.

47. ibid., 3.5 1923; HMB/Ofr. GSA MA 102155, 8.20. 1923.

48. HMB/Mfr. GSA MA 102153, 6.20. 1924; 3.3. 1927.

49. Hambrecht, Aufstieg, pp. 234-261.

50. Geheimes Staatsarchiv (hereafter referred as GSA MA) 81585, 7.3. 1931.

51. ibid., GSA MA 81581, 7.5. 1932.

52. MINN 81585, 1932.

53. Hambrecht, Aufstieg, p. 299.

54. Annette Leppert-Foeggen, "Der Mittelstandssozialismus der NSDAP" in Frankfurter Hefte, 29 (1974) pp. 656-666; For further clarification on the NSDAP's program see Voelkischer Beobachter, 12/21/1926 (MINN 81577).

55. Winkler, "Extremismus," pp. 175-194.

56. ibid., pp. 184-185.

57. Dieter Frick, Die Buergerlichen Parteien in Duetschland (Berlin, 1970) pp. 24-243, 799-815, 541-553.

58. Heinrich Muth, "Carl Schmitt in der Deutschen Innenpolitik des Sommers, 1932" Historische Zeitschrift Beiheft 1: Beitraege zur Geschichte der Weimarer Republik (Munich, 1971).

59. This attitude was shared by the Bayrische Landbund in the resolution of its annual conference, Nov. 30, 1925, HSA Muenchen, MWI 5636 (Akten des Wirtschaftsministeriums, MWI, Hauptarchiv Muenchen).

60. Johannes Sass, Die 27 Parteien 1930 und Ihre Ziele (Hamburg, 1930) pp. 26-38, 19-21.

61. ibid., p. 34.

62. Eyck, Weimar Republic, pp. 274-276.

63. Philip E. Converse, "The Problem of Party Distance in Models of Voting Change," in K. Jennings and H. Zeigler, eds. The Electoral Process (Englewood Cliffs, 1966), pp. 175-207.

64. HMB/Mfr. GSA MA 102154 7.6.-7.27. 1931; 8.19. 1931, 9.5. 1931.

65. GSA MA 81581, 7.5. 1932.

66. MINN 8185, 1930.

67. Hambrecht, Aufstieg, pp. 287-292.

68. ibid., pp. 301-303.

69. For a detailed treatment of the NSDAP's reorganization see especially Thomas W. Arafe, Jr., The Development and Character of the Nazi Political Machine, 1928-1930, and the NSDAP Electoral Breakthrough, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation (Louisiana State University, 1976).

70. MINN 81578, 3.1. 1928; N-F/LB 1929/II/23.

71. N-F/LB 1929/XII/23.

72. HMB/Mfr. GSA MA 102154, 3.18. 1931.

73. MINN 81578 contains a pamphlet which suggests the NSDAP's attitudes toward their local expansion; its by R. Muchow who did much to develop the NSDAP's propaganda machine. The title is "Petty War: Experiences of and Advice for the day-to-day battle of organizing a local branch" ("Kleinkrieg: Erfahrung und Ratschlaege des Tageskampf).

74. N-F/LB 18/II/1930.

75. Arafa, Political Machine, Chapter IV; HMB/Ofr. 102155/3, 4.18. 1932; HMB/Mfr. GSA MA 102153 5.20. 1931.

76. Arafa, Political Machine, pp. 88-114.

77. For the NSDAP's tactics see also Jutta Ciolek-Kumper, Wahlkampf in Lippe (Munich, 1976).

78. HMB/Ofr. GSA MA 102155/4, 4.18. 1932; GSA MA 81583, 4.2. 1932.

79. GSA MA 81583, 6.2 6.22. 1930; HMB/Ofr. GSA MA 102154, 4.12. 1932; GSA MA 100 399, Letter from the Minister of the Interior to the regional governments and polic authorities, December 7, 1931.

80. Apparently the rural population was quite confused about the purpose, sense and rationale of the Young Referendum; N-F/LB 389/Rehau, 10.24. 1929.

81. HMB/Mfr. GSA MA 102153, 4.5. 1932.

82. MINN 81578, 2.2. 1930; GSA MA 81581, 11.16. 1928; HMB/Ofr. GSA MA 102 155/3 12.2. 1931.

83. Zofka, Ausbreitung, pp. 222-239; N-F/LB 151/II/1929; Pridham, Hitler's Rise, pp. 57-59; Hambrecht, Aufstieg, pp. 249-259.

CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

I

This dissertation has examined a number of different theories about the Weimar Republic's electoral instability in general and the NSDAP's electoral growth in particular. It began with socio-psychological interpretations of Nazism offered by Reinhard Bendix and S.M. Lipset. Despite subsequent work, the methods and conclusions of Bendix and Lipset have remained the most generally accepted explanations among social scientists of how the Nazis attracted enough votes for Hitler to become Chancellor.

My strategy has been to consider alternative theories about the sources of electoral stability and instability derived from American voting studies. One of my objectives was to see whether theories formulated on the basis of American evidence about voting behavior could also explain Weimar Germany's electoral upheavals. The other authors whose contributions were examined in this study are Walter Dean Burnham, W. Phillips Shively, and Theodore Meckstroth. I included Meckstroth in my analysis because he is among the few analysts of Weimar voting to use regression analysis for estimating individual voting changes. Although I disagree with his explanation of post-1928 voting, his findings for the Republic as a whole generally paralleled my own regional evidence which I derived by the same method used by him.

In examining the evidence for and against the five theories of voting behavior in Weimar, I analyzed first aggregate and then individual voting trends. My aggregate analysis in Chapter III, concentrated on the entire Weimar record, the 1919-1933 electoral period. I also examined voter support for the major parties and blocs during the last Reichstag elections before World War I. Throughout this examination of aggregate data, I compared and contrasted national trends with those in Franconia. Chapter IV concentrated on electoral developments in Franconia during the Reichstag elections of 1920-1933, Chapter V on the NSDAP's growth in this region in 1933. In both Chapters IV and V, I relied on evidence of individual-level voting derived from regression analysis. Aggregate data and measures as well as regression estimates were used to assess the contending theories about the sources of Weimar voting and Nazi support. In addition, my study used archival materials and historical studies to clarify the electoral and political context within Franconia. For this shaped voter upheavals that transformed the Nazis into Franconia's strongest party.

My aggregate analysis in chapter III confirmed commonly held views about extreme electoral instability in Weimar Germany. From 1919 on, voters were unusually ready to desert parties from one election to the next. Already in 1920, they reversed their original endorsement of the parties that helped found the Republic, i.e. the Center Party, the Social Democrats (SPD) and the German Democrats (DDP). As the Republic confronted one crisis after another, voters began to avoid governing parties altogether, and to switch instead to parties of the "disloyal opposition:" the Nazis (NSDAP), the Communists (KPD), and the German Nationalists

(DNVP). Such choices at the polls ultimately produced severe parliamentary instability, governmental deadlock, and, in the critical period of 1930-1933, a transfer of power to the executive, i.e. the President and senior civil service. Neither were particularly well-disposed to Germany's first experiment with democracy. Hence it was the erratic choices made by voters that created the situation which led to Hindenburg's designation of Hitler as Chancellor in 1933. The swing to the Nazis between 1930 and 1933 was as dizzying as the losses of the older Weimar parties. But all these dramatic electoral changes took place _within_ the confines of larger party blocs or _tendances_, the boundaries of which were defined by class and confession. All these blocs, which pre-dated the Republic, continued to maintain levels of voter support approximating those of the Second Empire. Throughout the Weimar Republic's turbulent electoral history, these blocs remained remarkably stable. While voters shifted frequently from party to party, they did so within and not across existing bloc or cleavage lines. My regional findings confirm what Shively and Burnham have argued: the bourgeois bloc was generally more fragmented than were the Catholic and socialist blocs.

Finally, I found that the NSDAP's meteoric electoral rise occurred within the Protestant bourgeois bloc and at the expense of _all_ other parties within it. The NSDAP's ability to attract supporters from all other parties within the bloc enabled it to consolidate the bourgeois vote. Beginning with 1930, the bourgeois bloc developed a cohesiveness hitherto achieved only by the Catholic and left camps. Throughout this analysis of aggregate voting, I found that national and Franconian trends

generally resembled each other. In Franconia, however, the NSDAP emerged as a major electoral force earlier than in the Reich. Nazi growth in Franconia after 1928 on the whole exceeded that in the Reich as a whole. But even in Franconia, the NSDAP never acquired an electoral majority, largely because of its inability to penetrate or undermine support for the Bavarian People's Party or the Social Democrats. Franconia also diverged somewhat from the national voting pattern in that the liberal parties virtually collapsed as early as May 1924. In Franconia their place was first taken by the DNVP. After 1928, both liberal and conservative bourgeois Protestant parties all but disappeared from the electoral scene. The same was true of splinter parties within the bloc.

My analysis of individual voting in chapter IV fully confirmed conclusions already derived from aggregate data. In Franconia, the proportion of voters who changed parties was exceptionally high even before the 1928-1933 period. This tendency was far more pronounced among supporters of Protestant bourgeois parties than among either Catholic or socialist voters. Franconian voters generally avoided crossing over to parties in another bloc. This was particularly true after 1928. Thus the effect of the Depression was to make Franconian voters withdraw further into their separate camps.

As elsewhere, the NSDAP's support in Franconia came overwhelmingly from within the Protestant bourgeois camp. The Nazis attracted significant proportions of Catholic and left support only in the first and last elections in which they competed. The NSDAP's limited ability to attract Catholic and socialist voters even in these elections was due

to the special circumstances under which they were held. The NSDAP never succeeded in building a broadly-based electorate that transcended cleavage lines long established in Franconia.

By using regression analysis, I could determine relatively precisely both the sources of support for the major parties competing in Franconia and the subsequent voting patterns of their respective supporters. I was able to show just how strong voter commitments were for the BVP and SPD, and how weak, by comparison, were the partisan ties connecting Protestant bourgeois voters to their parties. My regression analysis also revealed that Protestant bourgeois voters generally continued to avoid parties of the left or the Catholic camp, just as Catholic and socialist voters rarely moved to parties outside their camp. Most important, my regression analysis helped identify complex voter movements within the Protestant bourgeois bloc prior to massive shifts to the Nazis. I had identified some earlier voting exchanges among parties of different blocs. Their timing and scale helped explain comparable defections to the Nazis by Catholic and socialist voters in the post-1928 elections.

Regression evidence also helped to demonstrate that there were indeed limited voter exchanges between the Nazis and the USPD, the Nazis and KPD, the Nazis and DNVP both before and after 1928. By thus establishing the NSDAP's rates of continuity and defection, I could trace how the NSDAP, after its reorganization, was developing into a "confessional" party much along the lines of the SPD and BVP. This evidence confirms my hypothesis that the NSDAP, by turning itself into such a party, also limited its potential electoral base. Like the SPD and BVP

in Franconia, the Nazis succeeded in creating a stable electorate but also a circumscribed one.

How well did the evidence examined, especially in Chapters IV and V, support the various contentions made by the five theorists discussed in Chapters I and II? On the whole, Franconian voting data provided little empirical support for either of the two discrepant interpretations of voter support for the Nazis that have been given by Bendix and Lipset. My regression estimates for Franconia revealed that the voting groups posited by Bendix and Lipset as essential to the NSDAP's growth--previous nonvoters and liberal defectors--were important but not decisive sources of support for the Nazis. In 1924 as in the 1930-1933 period, rightwing defectors--coming either directly from the DNVP or via DNVP splinter parties--contributed far more to the NSDAP's electoral growth than either nonvoters or liberal voters. The latter added significantly to the NSDAP's vote only in the May 1924 election. My evidence shows that in the long run Nazi voters came from all bourgeois parties rather than from only one segment of this bloc. It was their ability to attract liberal, conservative as well as particularistic Protestant bourgeois voters that transformed the Nazis from a peripheral splinter party to a powerful electoral contender.

Nor did nonvoters behave as either Bendix or Lipset expected them to do. Contrary to Bendix's contentions, previous nonparticipants offered no support for the Nazis in May 1924, and only marginal support in September 1930. Although most nonvoters in July 1932 and March 1933 voted for the Nazis, contrary to Lipset's theory, their share of the vote was not high enough to confirm that they were crucial

to the NSDAP's growth in these elections. My analysis shows that the NSDAP's decline in November 1932 was due less to nonvoting by its supporters than to their defections to other parties. I further established that nonvoters showed a disproportionate inclination to support extremist parties only in July 1932 and March 1933. Generally, nonvoters' partisan preferences were diverse and encompassed both moderate and extremist alternatives.

Both my regression estimates and analysis of aggregate data failed to uncover any sequential pattern in the NSDAP's growth. My findings in Franconia disconfirm the two-stage theories of growth delineated by Bendix and Lipset. The partisan background of Nazi voters in 1930 did not differ fundamentally from those of July 1932. Moreover, voter movements to the Nazis in May 1924 did not follow the pattern suggested by either Bendix or Lipset for the first sequence in Nazi voting. On the basis of the Franconian evidence and that discovered by other analysts for the Reich, it does not seem possible to construct a natural history for the development of a fascist movement along the lines attempted by both Bendix and Lipset. To the degree that any shift can be detected in the composition of the Nazi electorate, the break occurred around 1928. Thus my Franconian estimates show that the NSDAP's electorate in elections prior to 1928 was more heterogeneous than in the period of 1930-1933. Whereas almost a fifth of the May 1924 Nazi electorate came from outside the bourgeois bloc (i.e. from Catholic and socialist defectors), that proportion dropped to 5% in 1930 and to 4% in July 1932.

These estimates suggest that to the extent to which the NSDAP was an amorphous protest party, it was so only in the earliest stages of its

development, rather than during the period of its greatest expansion. That the composition of the Nazi electorate began to change after 1928 indicates how important were the NSDAP's structural reorganization and strategic reorientation to its later successes among bourgeois voters.

The evidence I found for Franconia confirmed the judgments by Burnham and Shively rejecting the party identification theory of voting stability. According to that theory, those with relatively little exposure to partisan competition such as nonvoters should be more disposed to support radical parties than are active partisans. This was not the case in Franconia. The electoral behavior of previous nonparticipants did not differ from that of active voters. My evidence from Franconia thus confirms Burnham's and Shively's conclusions derived from national data. Prolonged exposure to partisan politics as such did not forge stable partisan commitment in Franconia. Among parties competing there in the same time span, some succeeded in developing durable ties while others did not. Measured in terms of their low defection and high continuity rates, the SPD, BVP and NSDAP succeeded in creating a sense of party identification; all other contenders failed to do so.

Nor did the absence of party identification as such account for electoral upheavals. Although voters often switched parties, they generally remained loyal to the political orientation of their original preference. It is true that Franconian voters support for political parties fluctuated widely but they remained surprisingly loyal to their original blocs. My data supports Shively's claim that Weimar voters perceived both themselves and the competing parties in a way that made

it possible for them to identify parties appropriate to their social or economic group. They then confined themselves only to alternative so perceived. That ability to distinguish among the contending parties, in turn, gave the Weimar party system as a whole far greater stability than party identification theories would lead one to expect.

The bounds set by blocs to voter instability also weakens the explanatory value of party identification theory. In fact only bourgeois voters behaved in a way consistent with party identification theory. This points to the existence in that electorate of special conditions making Protestant bourgeois but not Catholic and socialist, voters subject to voting shifts and susceptible to the Nazi appeal. In Burnham's view it was the failure of bourgeois parties to develop into confessional parties that promoted the Nazi contagion within the bourgeois bloc. My evidence for Franconia generally support this. My data also confirm his contention that confessional parties, especially the Catholic Center and the SPD, largely managed to hold their voters and to "immunize" them against the Nazi appeal.

I tried to show that the NSDAP itself became an integrative party. It not only created the type of organizational substructure and integrative belief system that enabled the BVP and SPD to hold on to their voters, but it also met with comparable success. By 1928 the NSDAP too was able to create enduring partisan ties. Would the NSDAP have been able to maintain such long-term commitments as a governing party competing freely against other parties? Could it have do so as a permanent opposition agains assuming free elections? Could it have kept its supporters once the economic picture in Germany improved? Given

the history of the voting groups it attracted, its ability to do so seems at best dubious. The Nazi decision never to allow free elections after its failure to get a majority in 1933 may constitute its own acknowledgement that in 1933 it had reached the limits of its electoral potential.

This study also addressed issues raised by Meckstroth's study of Weimar voting. The first of these was whether the electoral upheavals in the 1930-1933 period could be described as a realignment as American students of voting behavior define it. The second issue was which of the most familiar explanations of realignment help to account most for the 1930-1933 period. In view of the fact that the 1930-1933 voter upheavals did <u>not</u> fundamentally alter the previous partisan divisions I have concluded that no realignment occurred. The magnitude of the 1930-1933 shifts was no greater than it in the early elections. Various parties experienced realigning changes (i.e. an alteration in their competitive status) at different points in time. Throughout the Weimar electoral period, parties changed their competitive class and that this change often lasted for several elections before it was reversed. Hence there is no reason to believe that the 1930-1933 voting changes would have been permanent. In fact, the DNVP's competitive status changed once again after July 1932. The bourgeois electorate was notoriously volatile. Had the NSDAP not been invited to enter the government, it might or might not have been able to retain its electoral following in the long run. Voting changes in the 1930-1933 period therefore amounted less to a realignment than to a consolidation of the bourgeois vote.

It was the bourgeois electorate that experienced the greatest electoral upheavals. This fact calls into question Meckstroth's conclusion that depression-related valence issues offer the best explanation for the 1930-1933 electoral developments. Surely Catholic and Marxist voters were no less affected by the depression. Yet they did not shift to the Nazis as did Protestant bourgeois voters. Other conditions must have been present to account for the NSDAP's ability to consolidate the bourgeois vote on the one hand and for its failure to penetrate the Catholic and socialist electorates.

I shall not argue that every development in Franconia was literally reproduced elsewhere in the Republic. But Franconian voting patterns do not seem to have been markedly different from those at the national level. The aggregate evidence presented in Chapter III supports this conclusions, as do Burnham's and Shively's analyses and Meckstroth's national estimates. Numerous regional studies published in recent years have shown that elsewhere in Germany, the NSDAP was similarly successful in convincing Protestant bourgeois voters to support its cause. These studies have also shown how crucial it was for the Nazis to develop a strong organization, how important their tactics and methods were in displacing their electoral rivals at the grass-roots level, and how much Protestant bourgeois parties contributed to their own demise.

II

That the Nazis benefited from the continuing series of crises confronting the Republic, from the structural defects of the Weimar Constitution, from the Republic's mediocre leadership at a critical point

in cannot be denied. But while they help to account for the NSDAP's ability to build a mass base, these unique features of Weimar Germany fail to explain why the NSDAP's electorate came almost exclusively from within the Protestant bourgeois bloc.

I tried to show, especially in chapter III, that the Weimar party system was highly polarized, and that its sources had to be located in Germany's political development during the Second Empire and in the formative experiences of Germany's parties--all of which resurfaced in much the same form after World War I. What created those deep and lasting fissures in German social and political life? Among the more important causes discussed in chapter III were Bismarck's anti-Catholic and anti-socialist legislation, the Great Depression of 1873-1896 and the Conservative politics of stabilization, the main aim of which was to destroy the growing power and alleged threat posed by German social democracy to the Second Empire.

So deep were the class and confessional barriers created in the pre-war period that not even a war, defeat, a new political order or an unending series of crises could erode them. An even more serious result was the disappearance of a political center in pre-war Germany. By joining the Conservatives in their anti-Catholic and anti-socialist campaigns, by acquiescing in key elements of the Conservative stabilization program, by adopting a backward-looking economic program, and by losing their traditional constituency to the Conservatives or radical interest parties, pre-war liberalism had destroyed whatever chances had existed in Germany for the emergence of a strong and viable political center.

Thus none of the key problems of the Second Empire--stability, legitimacy, democratization, equitable social system, economic peace--were ever resolved. They were inherited by the newly created democratic system, together with other continuities in pre-war parties, leaders, institutions, norms and attitudes. World War I and the additional difficulties it brought necessarily deepened the polarization that had been such a dominant characteristic of electoral and political conflicts in Imperial Germany.

In Weimar Germany, those continuing cleavages were perpetuated in the party system in all too many ways: by the stability of pre-war party blocs and by the reluctance of Weimar voters to cross bloc lines; by the inability of any major coalition group to arrive at a consensus on the key issues facing the Republic; by the absence of a political center; and by the inability of any democratic party, institution, leader to acquire the trust and confidence of a majority of Germany's population. Not without reason, Weimar politics have been described as the culmination of late Wilhelmine political conflicts.[1] Perhaps a more appropriate way of looking at Weimar politics is to see it as the last battleground on which the forces of the old regime (both its opponents and its defenders) tried to assert their dominance once and for all. None of them succeeded, but together they helped to make it possible for a relative newcomer to take over and to destroy both, the Wilhelmine and the Republican order.

Throughout this study, I demonstrated that Weimar Germany's pattern of polarization provided the Nazis both with their opportunity and set limits to its growth. The NSDAP was one of many "new" parties

that appeared after World War I. Like so many of these groups, it hoped to be able to recreate the unity of the front and the comraderie of the trenches, out of the political turmoil of the immediate post-war years.[2] Unable to impose its vision by force in 1923, it then sought to realize it through election, hoping to find adherents among all social groups in Germany society, and among workers in particular. But the NSDAP's interpretation of the past, of World War I, of the country's defeat, of the new Republic, and of Germany's problems were not shared by the very groups it sought to win to its cause. The stability of the pre-war confessional and class boundaries were not easily shaken by visions of a "Volksgemeinschaft" free of class and religious conflicts, free of "alien", "unGerman" forces.

The turning point came when the Nazis recognized the futility of breaching the barriers around the Catholic and social electorates and concentrated instead on the Protestant bourgeois camp. Here it found more fertile ground for its ideology and program. It also found less resistance from the hopelessly divided Protestant parties, most of whom lacked the structures requisite to ongoing contact with their electorates that they would have needed to maintain strong party attachments. The Nazis took full advantage of the opportunities that presented themselves within the Protestant bourgeois camp. Unlike all other parties in this bloc, the Nazis developed a strong party organization and tactics for mobilizing voters unmatched by other party within that bloc. By its concentration on the Protestant bourgeois electorate, however, the NSDAP also set the limits to its own growth. That the NSDAP had exhausted its electoral potential became evident after the July 1932 election. It

was clear to analysts as Neisser, Geiger, Mierendorff.[3] The Nazis themselves perceived this. This situation was also the hope of right-wing, conservative elements in control of Germany. Some of them counted on demonstrating this point by wearing out the Nazis through an unending series of elections. By appointing Hitler in the face of the NSDAP's electoral stagnation, conservative elites must bear a major share of the responsibility for the Nazis' seizure of power. But, as I showed previously, all parties to varying extents contributed to the circumstances under which Hitler ultimately came to power.

For the comparative study of political extremism, the case of the NSDAP offers important insights into how a movement can become a successful party. What I have tried to show in this study is that Nazi voting was not necessarily the spontaneous reaction of anomic, frustrated and marginal voters shaken by the profound economic and social impact of the Depression. Rather, a large proportion of those who voted Nazi in the 1930-1933 period came to it after exploring a variety of partisan alternatives. For many bourgeois voters, then, their shift to the Nazis was the last stage in their search for a party that would and could defend their interests against competing claims. The decision of so many bourgeois voters to support this party may have been a desperate act but was not irrational. Among the parties competing for their votes, they turned only to those which represented, or claimed to, address their concerns and interests. Protestant bourgeois voters did not shift to the NSDAP in large numbers until it appealed specifically to their self-interest. In other words, Protestant bourgeois began to move toward the NSDAP only when they perceived it as

an effective contender that might help them once in power.

The Nazis recognized the importance of being viewed as a viable alternative to other parties. Having failed to seize power by violence, they were ready to acquire it legally, through elections. Initially, they aimed to represent and integrate all social strata. But in Germany's crystallized and polarized party system, the Nazis' ideological visions had little appeal among Catholic and socialist voters. By 1928 the Nazis realized that its only hope for electoral success lay in mobilizing Protestant bourgeois voters. The NSDAP's leaders further recognized that this task made it necessary for them to acquire the structural characteristics of a political party capable of winning voters.

Thus despite its open antipathy to parties, elections, parliamentary government, the Nazis proved singularly adept in building an efficient party organization, in developing a powerful electoral machine, and in formulating a program sufficiently pragmatic to attract voters generally guided by economic self-interest. This study meant to show that in modern democracies with firmly established party systems extremist movements often have no choice but to transform themselves into political parties. My analysis of the NSDAP at the grass roots level also sought to illuminate the process by which one extremist movement turned itself into a successful political party. Among the many million German voters who supported the Nazis there were no doubt large numbers of those alienated, pathological outsiders who allegedly furnish extremist movements with their leaders and members.

But to limit the analysis of extremist groups to the alleged pathologies of those who lead or join them does not help to explain why some movements can become parties successful at the polls, while others fail to do so.

The NSDAP's triumph also illustrates that in trying to understand such movements, one should look upon them less as deviations from "normal" politics based on some abstract standard, than as one outcome following from given characteristics of a party system such as that of Weimar Germany. It is thus important, to compare and contrast what extremist parties say and do with what other parties, appealing to the same electorate, say and do. Among the most important and frightening aspects of Nazism was precisely the fact that so much of what is said and advocated was in the mainstream of Protestant bourgeois politics. Most elements of the Nazi program had been made familiar by other bourgeois parties in Franconia. The Nazis addressed themselves to concerns and problems that these parties had sought to exploit earlier. The NSDAP used themes and a rhetoric that were the staple of most major and minor Protestant bourgeois parties.

This is not to argue that the NSDAP was but a replica of those parties it sought to displace. On the contrary, it made every attempt to distinguish itself from its competitors within the Protestant bourgeois camp. It never abandoned its milleniary antidemocratic, extremist visions but, rather, combined them with pragmatic programs. It developed a powerful organization and electoral machine. But it never relied only on its ability to reach voters, on the judgement of those to whom it sought to appeal, on the justice of its cause. Rather it

used extensively violence, terror, and intimidation to ensure its success at the polls. For the triumph of the Nazis, the SA was clearly as crucial as was its network or functional association or its new breed of party functionaries.

The NSDAP, in other words, found it necessary to adjust its propaganda and electoral strategy to the exigencies imposed by Weimar Germany's party system. But it never viewed itself as a conventional party ready to work within the existing constitutional framework. Unlike all other Weimar parties (save the Communists), the Nazis never made any attempt to hide either their deep hatred of the Weimar system or its intention to abrogate the Republic's democratic institutions and procedures. To understand the NSDAP's success, it is therefore, equally important to know what it had in common with the parties it sought to displace and what differentiated it from them.

In the course of this study, I have sought to show that Nazism as an electoral phenomenon has to be analyzed and understood within the configuration of party conflict in which it emerged. Both the extent and limits of the NSDAP's growth were determined by the Weimar party system. The NSDAP was helped by the polarization of Weimar electoral politics because it made it easier for it to convince Protestant bourgeois voters of the Socialist threat, the ill-will of the Catholics and the need for unity. It was also limited by the fact that the more the Nazis stressed their affinity with Protestant bourgeois problems and traditions, the less their chances became for creating that type of broad electoral alliance needed to seize power with a majority of the Weimar electorate's support. The NSDAP's electoral development,

in other words, demonstrates the need to examine the over-all structure of conflict within which extremist movements emerge and have to compete when they choose to become political parties.

Finally, in this study I have hoped to show how important it is to understand the formation of a given party system, which were the conflicts that shaped it, how or whether they were resolved. It is, in fact, impossible to make sense of unusual variations in voter alignments at a given point in time, without knowing how these alignments were formed originally.[4] Which forces created a particular constellation and maintained it over time? What were the possibilities or choices confronted by parties, leaders or voters in the development toward a competitive democratic party system? All these are issues that need to be understood when dealing with how voters behave and the parties they support at a given stage. Voters are "typically faced with choices among historically given 'packages' of programs, commitments, outlooks and sometimes Weltanschauungen, and their current behavior cannot be understood without some knowledge of the sequences of events and the combination of forces that produced these 'packages'".[5]

This is not to deny the contributions of the socio-psychological explanations of antidemocratic politics. Clearly the alignments and political conflicts within which extremist movements emerge cannot be divorced from tensions that arise outside the political sphere, that are part of the larger processes of change. Nevertheless, for the purpose of studying such movements comparatively, more is gained by concentration on just how <u>political institutions</u>, <u>political systems</u>,

or party systems confront and adjust to transformations in the existing scheme of things and to the tensions such transformations entail.

FOOTNOTES

1. Bracher, "Wahlentwicklung," p. 57.

2. Gordon, Beerhall Putsch, pp. 3 et seq.

3. Theodor Geiger, "Panik im Mittelstand," Die Arbeit 7 (1930), pp. 637-654; Carl Mierendorff, "Gesicht und Charakter der nationalsozialistischen Bewegung," Die Gesellschatt 7 (1930/1930), pp. 489-504; Hans Neisser, "Sozialstatistische Analyse der Wahlergebnisse," Die Arbeit 7 (1930), pp. 654-659.

5. S.M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross National Perspectives, (New York, 1967). Introduction, pp. 1-64.

6. ibid., pp. 2-3.

APPENDIX A

Ecological Regression and Electoral Analysis

Aggregated statistics represent, in a highly condensed form, information about a large number of individuals. Thus, the proportion of the vote that the Republican presidential candidate received in the 1980 election in New York State in effect combines or aggregates millions of individual voting decisions. Disaggregation, in turn, refers to the process of recovering the behavior or characteristics of the original units of analysis (such as individual voters) from figures given for larger aggregations of such units. Ecological inference constitutes the most common and familiar form of disaggregation.

Ecological inference becomes necessary "whenever a relationship among characteristics of certain behaving units must be determined from relationships among aggregations of these characteristics."[1] Thus, if an investigator seeks to determine the likelihood that individuals who voted Republican in 1976 also voted Republican in 1980, and if he or she cannot personally interview voters, the relationship between voting Republican in 1976 and in 1980 must be inferred indirectly from the proportion of the electorate who voted Republican in 1976 and that which supported the Republicans in 1980. In the past, analysts have often taken the available aggregate data as a proxy for the missing information on individual voting decisions.

Bendix's analysis of the 1930-1933 Weimar elections, for example, typifies this type of inference.

Between 1928 and 1930, Bendix, using national election statistics, observed a net decline in the proportion of the eligible electorate that abstained from voting and a net increase in the proportion of Weimar voters who supported the Nazis. From these changes in the aggregate proportions of these two categories Bendix concluded that those who did not vote in 1928 but voted in 1930 largely went to the NSDAP. In other words, lacking any direct information about the voting decisions of 1928 abstainers, Bendix assumed that the aggregate changes in the proportion of nonvoters and Nazi voters between 1928 and 1930 stood for equivalent individual-level changes.

Such a direct inference from aggregate to individual patterns, however, is generally not warranted. The problems of determining voting changes when only aggregate statistics are available can perhaps be best understood by considering a concrete case. To keep it simple, the example below taken from Meckstroth's 1975 article,[2] involves a single voting unit and only two partisan alternatives. In the 1964 parliamentary election the Labour Party received 33.4% of the total vote in the UK, all other parties combined took 66.6% of the total vote. In the 1966 parliamentary election, the Labour Party's vote went up to 36.3% while the combined vote of all other parties dropped to 63.7%. Assuming that the same people participated in both elections, what is the pattern of change that took place between 1964 and 1966?

Lacking any information other than the national voting figures, the most plausible interpretation is that 2.9% of those who supported parties other than the Labour Party in 1964 switched to the Labour Party in 1966. In other words, the assumption made is that the only change that occurred between 1964 and 1966 was a unidirectional flow of voters from "other parties" to the Labour Party, resulting in a net loss of 2.9% for "other parties" and a net gain of 2.9% for the Labour Party. All of the 1964 Labour voters are presumed to have continued their support of this party in 1966, i.e. while there were switches from "other parties" to Labour there were no defections from Labour to other parties. This interpretation, which implies that the only change between 1964 and 1966 was that visible as net aggregate change in the levels of support for the competing alternatives, is generally called the "assumption of minimum change."[3]

Put more formally, in the above example the main task is to infer the cell entries in the fourfold table below when the only information available are the marginal totals X_1 (total % of Labour vote in 1964), X_2 (total % of "Other Parties" vote in 1964), Y_1 (total % of Labour vote in 1966) and Y_2 (total % of "Other Parties" vote in 1966). The internal cell entries represent the missing information, namely the actual pattern of voting change by individual voters between 1964 and 1966.

1a
1966

1964	Labour	Other	
Labour	?	?	X_1= 33.4%
Other	?	?	X_2 = 66.6%
	Y_1= 36.3%	Y_2= 63.7%	

1b
1966

1964	Labour	Other	
Labour	33.4	0	X_1= 33.4%
Other	2.9	63.7	X_2= 66.6%
	Y_1= 36.3%	Y_2= 63.7%	

1c
1966

1964	Labour	Other	
Labour	0	33.4	X_1= 33.4%
Other	36.3	30.3	X_2= 66.6%
	Y_1= 36.3%	Y_2= 63.7%	

According to the assumption of minimum change, the marginal total X_1 which was the Labour vote in 1964 (33.4%) corresponds to the internal cell entry P_{11} or the proportion of 1964 Labour Voters who remained Labour Voters in 1966. With one cell entry thus determined, the other internal cell proportions can be attained simply by subtraction from the marginal totals so that the complete matrix resembles that of table 1b. In this particular matrix, the cell entries correspond to the smallest proportion of individuals who could have changed their partisan preferences between 1964 and 1966 given the known marginal

totals--hence the name "assumption of minimum change."

But as analysts have pointed out there is in fact no unique solution to this particular case. In other words, there could be any number of internal cell entries consistent with the marginal totals or the observed results of the 1964 and 1966 elections. Thus given the same marginals, one could construct a model of maximum change, as in table 1c. Here the cell entries suggest the largest possible proportion of voters who could have altered their partisan preferences between 1964 and 1966 within the given marginal totals. In other words, lacking any data other than the observed election results or marginal totals, patterns of voting change for Labour supporters could range anywhere from no alteration in the position of 1964 Labour voters to a complete turnover in the Labour Party's electorate from 1964 to 1966, from a 2.9% shift by supporters of "other parties" to a defection rate of 36.3%. The minimum change model of voting change, therefore, creates a very simple picture of partisan change whereby only "one stream of change must be accounted for, rather than multiple currents and countercurrents."[4]

Problems with that model, of course, multiply in situations where more than two partisan alternatives must be considered. With only two party choices, only one cell entry need to be guessed. With more alternatives, the number of cell entries that must be inferred from marginal totals increases. It is no longer possible to obtain cell proportions by the simple procedures delineated for matrix 1b. That marginal totals or national election results can be consisent with any number of change patterns by individual voters was a

a possibility seldom considered by some of the most familiar interpretations of Weimar Germany and the rise of the Nazis.

Aggregate data generally are available, not only for countries as a whole, but also for a variety of geographic subdivisions. Voting statistics, for example, may be recorded for wards, counties, states, regions, the nation or any other geographically defined area. Often the geographic or "ecological" subunits for which voting records exist are quite small. Many analysts, therefore, have made extensive use of such geographically based statistics. The assumption here is that in the absence of data on individuals, information based on the smallest geographic aggregation of people can be used to obtain far more accurate insights into individual-level characteristics, behavior or relationships than can be derived from nationally aggregated data.

Perhaps the most familar form of inference based on data for geographically based aggregations are "ecological correlations". The method of "ecological correlations" uses information that has been aggregated, preferably for the smallest possible geographic unit. On the basis of variations in the observed values of selected variables (such as the % who voted Republican or Democratic and the % who are Catholic) among a given set of ecological or geographic subunits (such as all rural and urban counties in the country, in a state or in a region), ecological correlations seek to establish the extent to which a change in one variable produces a change in another variable. In other words, the application of Pearson's product moment correlation to ecological (aggregated) data yields a measure of association at the aggregate level between two variables, for

example between the proportion of Democratic voters and Catholics in a given set of aggregations.

Ecological correlations have played an important part in analyses of voting changes in the US and in Weimar Germany. The literature on partisan realignments and critical elections has made extensive use of this method in tracing American electoral developments over the past two hundred years.[5] Ecological correlations have also been used to account for electoral changes in Weimar Germany in the 1930-1933 period and for the NSDAP's social base. Lipset, for example, uses correlations between Nazi gains and DNVP losses to argue that German Nationalist voters did not shift to the Nazis in great numbers. Studies by Heberle, Pratt, Loomis, and Beegle have used ecological correlation in their efforts to identify those social groups that supported the NSDAP.[6]

The problem with ecological correlations is that analysts have frequently taken this aggregate measure of association to account for individual-level relationships. This is especially true of the literature on Weimar voting and Nazism. W. S. Robinson's famous article of 1950, however, directly challenged this tendency to infer individual relationships from those discovered on the basis on aggregate data. Robinson demonstrated that ecological and individual correlations do not and indeed cannot produce the same values. In his view, therefore, attempts to substitute ecological measures of association for individual ones are meaningless. He coined the term "ecological fallacy" to describe unwarranted inferences from the macro- to the micro-level.[7]

The possible discrepancy between ecological and individual correlation coefficients is so great that even signs may be reversed. For while the formula to compute individual correlations is based on deviations of individual scores from the population mean, ecological correlations are based on deviations of subunit means from the population mean. Furthermore, ecological correlations depend only on relationships _among_ subunit marginals, whereas the value of individual correlation coefficients depends on the sums of the internal cell frequencies of the ecological subunits. The problem then is that even when subunits are used instead of whole populations, their marginal scores are consistent with a variety of internal cell entries. Any given ecological correlation, therefore, is likely to be consistent with a wide variety of individual-level correlations. From this Robinson concluded first, that there is no general, constant, and consistent relationship between correlations derived from geographic subdivisions and correlations based on information about individuals. According to him, the precise relationship between these two types of correlation depends upon the "within-area" individual correlations and the areal clustering of the variables examined. Both conditions may differ from case to case so that the exact difference between individual and ecological correlations may vary widely under different circumstances. Robinson's second conclusion was that the value of an ecological correlation normally exceeds that of a corresponding individual correlation. Indeed, the larger the ecological units used for ecological correlations, the larger is the discrepancy between ecological and individual coefficients likely to be.

Robinson ultimately left the impression that ecological data are inherently inappropriate for the study of individuals and that any analysis of individual-level behavior or relationships can only be undertaken if the appropriate micro-data is available. Robinson also suggested that since ecological correlations are generally used as substitutes for individual ones, they should be dispensed with altogether. His critique and findings, however, have not gone unchallenged. Several analysts have disputed his contention that ecological correlations are invariably used to make inferences about individuals. In their view, social scientists are frequently interested not in individuals but in communities, i.e. in ecological subunits and they use ecological correlations to discover relationships among aggregate rather than individual-level variables. Students of voting, for example, have argued that ecological correlations are warranted in the study of critical elections and realignments where the focus is often on the behavior of entire electorates rather than on individual voters.[8]

Other writers (notably Hanushek, et al, Lichtman and Langbein, Hammond) have shown that the discrepancy between aggregate and individual correlation values found by Robinson resulted not so much from the inherent limitations of ecological data as from an improperly specified statistical model and incorrectly applied statistical methods.[9] Robinson, it may be recalled, studied the effects on illiteracy of two variables--race and national origin. Using first aggregate and then individual data, Robinson computed simple, bivariate correlations linking first race and second, national

origin to illiteracy. In the process, he discovered that the ecological correlation between race and illiteracy (derived from aggregate data on the proportion of blacks, of whites and of illiterates in the population), was considerably higher than the corresponding individual correlation between being black and being illiterate. In computing the ecological and individual correlations between national origin and illiteracy, he even found the sign for the ecological correlation to be different from that for the individual one.

Robinson's bivariate model, however, excluded a wide range of other variables that also have been linked to an individual's level of educational achievement: a student's social and economic background, home attitudes toward studying, the proportion of a community's revenues spent on education, and so forth. As Hanushek et al, Hammond, Langbein and Lichtman have pointed out, however, the exclusion of relevant variables from estimation in a given statistical model generally creates "biased" coefficients (i.e. sample coefficients that differ from the true or population coefficients). Moreover, misspecified individual correlation models are just as prone to bias as are misspecified ecological ones. Third, the magnitude of the bias (i.e. between the expected value of the sample coefficient and its true value) depends on the explanatory importance of the excluded variable(s). It is also a function of whether the excluded variable is itself related either to the dependent variable (i.e. the variable to be explained, such as Robinson's illiteracy) or to one or more of the independent variables (i.e. the determinant or explanatory vari-

ables such as Robinson's race and national origin), or to both.

In the opinion of his critics, then, Robinson's correlation models, were improperly specified and hence produced biased coefficients. This applied to his aggregate model. Thus the discrepancies he found between ecological and individual coefficients had their source in biased aggregate estimates due to an incomplete model rather than the nature of the ecological data he used. Hanushek and his colleagues, for instance, found that by incorporating additional variables into Robinson's original, bivariate model, they arrived at ecological estimates of minority group illiteracy rates that approached the actual or individual values. They concluded from this that properly specified ecological models can justifiably be used to infer individual-level characteristics or behavior. In Hanushek's view, had Robinson "considered a more complete and accurately specified model, his empirical finding would have been much more limited and much less severe."[10]

Robinson's strong injunction against the use of aggregate data to study micro-behavior and relationships seemed to confront analysts who must rely on such data with a difficult choice. They could avoid the "ecological fallacy" either by ceasing to work on important social or political phenomena for which individual level information was unavailable. Or they could seek out alternative methods of analyzing ecological data that would circumvent or solve the problems discovered by Robinson. In fact, several alternative devices have been developed which set out to by-pass or minimize the dangers inherent in ecological or cross-level inference.

One such alternative technique is the Duncan-Davis method of bounds.[11] These two authors proposed that aggregate data could be used to determine the range of individual-level relationship. Their method involves the calculation of the maximum and minimum strength of any given relationship consistent with the aggregate marginals. By obtaining the maximum and minimum values of internal cell entries of a population matrix from the matrix's marginal totals it is possible, according to them, to establish the "bounds" within which the true value of a given relationship lies. The bounds would set much narrower limits on the location of the true population value than could have been established on the basis of the population marginals alone. Despite some obvious advantages, this method has been found too inefficient when applied to large bodies of data. It also has a tendency for creating bounds that are too large and indefinite to allow any statements about individual relationships or behavior. In the analysis of voting, only W. Phillips Shively has tried to apply it and then only in combination with ecological regressions.[12]

Historians of popular voting behavior and electoral change have sought to avoid the ecological fallacy by limiting their analysis to communities that are homogeneous in terms of the variables of interest to the researcher. Thus instead of basing their correlations on information drawn from census data generally, they look for geographic units where characteristics important to their theory are either especially pronounced or almost nonexistent. Researchers interested in the relationship between confession and partisan preferences, for example, look for units with a very large proportion of Catholics,

and note for these units the proportion of the vote received by either the Democratic or the Republican Party. They then do the same for units with high proportions of Protestants. The proportions of Catholic and Protestants are then correlated with the proportion of the vote for the Democrats or Republicans. The assumption is that by correlating voting preferences only for units with high proportions of Catholics and Protestants the resulting coefficient represents an accurate measure of the individual relationship between being Catholic or Protestant and voting Democratic or Republican. This method underlies much of the "ethno-cultural" literature on American voting changes and realignments.[13] The utility of this method and the findings based on it, however, have been sharply criticized, notably by Langbein and Lichtman and J.M. Kousser.[14]

Some of the problems are said to be technical, such as finding a sufficiently large number of units homogenous on the variable of interests to permit correlation analysis. Others are more serious, such as the assumption that confession (or race or whatever variable has been selected) is the only source of variations in the partisan composition of such units and that the units chosen would be homogenous also on other variables that could affect variations in voting support for the main parties. Finally, this method does not in fact overcome aggregation bias since the individuals residing in homogenous units do not constitute a random sample of all group members.

The method that has received by far the greatest attention from social scientists is the technique of "ecological regression;" it was first explored by Leo Goodman in two articles published in 1953

and 1959 respectively.[15]

The method for estimating transition proportions or internal cell proportions through ecological regression may become clearer by considering the following case. It was taken from Shively's article and hence all notations are his.[16] Assume that there are two dichotomous variables such as "vote in election 1" and "vote in election 2" and that an investigator wishes to determine how election 1 voters voted in election 2. For each subunit of the total aggregation that is analyzed (e.g. for all counties of a state, a region or the nation), the investigator has the following information: the proportion of voters who supported the Democrats in election 1, the proportion of voters who supported the Republicans in election 1, the proportion of voters who supported the Democrats in election 2 and the proportion of voters who supported the Republicans in election 2. With this information the following matrix can be constructed for each subunit:

Table 2

Election 1	Election 2		
	Democratic	Republican	
Democratic	P	Q	X_1
Republican	R	S	X_2
	Y_1	Y_2	

In this matrix, the known data are the percent of the vote received by the Republicans and Democrats in every county in the first and second election. Thus, what is known are the marginal totals X_1, X_2, Y_1, Y_2 where

X_1 = percent Democratic vote in election 1

X_2 = percent Republican vote in election 1

Y_1 = percent Democratic vote in election 2

Y_2 = percent Republican vote in election 2

The unknown or missing information are the cell entries P,Q,R and S which are proportions of first-election Democrats and Republicans who either stay in their category or switch categories in the second election. Thus

P = percent of election 1 Democratic voters who vote Democratic in election 2

Q = percent of election 1 Democratic voters who vote Republican in election 2

R = percent of election 1 Republican voters who vote Democratic in election 2

S = percent of election 1 Republican voters who vote Republican in election 2

These cell entries represent individual behavior in the form of conditional or transition probabilities. Thus, the estimate P represents the probability of an individual voting Democratic in election 2 conditional upon having voted Democratic in the first election, the estimate Q represents the probability of an individual voting Republican conditional upon having voted Democratic in election 1 and so forth. Internal cell entries may also be called row proportions in that they must sum to 100 across each row of the matrix,

hence $P + Q = 100$ and $R + S = 100$. (Marginal totals also must sum to 100 so that $X_1 + X_2 = 100$ and $Y_1 + Y_2 = 100$.)

Assuming that the relationship between internal cell entries and marginal totals is the same in all subunits, it is possible to solve the values of P,Q,R and S by a regression equation that is derived as follows. In terms of the above matrix, the percent of the Democratic vote in election 2 equals the percent of the Democratic vote in election 1, times the percent of election 1 Democratic voters who vote Democratic in election 2, plus the percent of the Republican vote in election 1, times the percent of election 1 Republican voters who switched to the Democrats in election 2. This can be written more formally as $Y_1 = P \times X_1 + R \times X_2$ or $Y_1 = PX_1 + RX_2$.

Given that $Y_1 = PX_1 + RX_2$, it follows that

$Y_1 = PX_1 + R(1-X_1)$ since $X_1 + X_2 = 1.0$. This can be rewritten as $Y_1 - PX_1 + R = RX_1$ or as

$$Y_1 = R + (P-R)X_1$$

The final equation is equivalent to that for the linear regression of Y_1 on X_1, namely $Y_1 = a_{yx} + b_{yx}$. By regressing all subunit scores for X_1 (which is the independent or explanatory variable and represents the percent of the Democratic vote in election 1) against the subunit scores for Y_1 (which is the dependent variable or the variable to be explained and represents the percent of the Democratic vote in election 2) it is possible to solve for a_{yx} and for b_{yx}. In a regression equation, a_{yx} stands for the intercept and the regression coefficient b_{yx} for the slope.

The intercept for the relationship between X_1 and Y_1 is the expected value of the dependent variable Y_1 (or the percent of the Democratic vote in election 2) when the value of the independent variable X_1 (or the percent of the Democratic vote in election 1) is set at zero. Thus, in a given county (or whatever the subunit may be) where the percent of the Democratic vote in the first election was zero ($X_1 = 0$), all the election 1 voters in that subunit will have been Republicans. Consequently, in that subunit, the percent of the Democratic vote in election 2 (i.e. Y_1) will be equal to the percent of first election Republican voters who switched to the Democrats in the second election. In other words, the intercept a_{yx} is equivalent to the internal cell entry R representing the proportion of election 1 Republicans who become election 2 Democrats conditional upon having voted Republican in election 1).

The regression coefficient b_{yx} represents the slope, which measures the amount of the increase in the dependent variable due to an increase of one unit in the independent variable. In other words, starting from the intercept, the slope measures the increase in the percentage of the Democratic vote in election 2 resulting from the addition of a given percentage of the election 1 Democratic vote to a particular subunit. For instance, in a district where the Democratic vote in election 1 was zero and then went to 10 percent in election 2, the change in the percentage of the Democratic vote in election 2 equals the 10% times the proportion of election 1 Democratic voters who vote Democratic in election 2 minus 10% times the proportion of election 1 Republicans who switched to the Democrats in

the second election. Hence, the slope b_{yx} is equal to P-R.

Once the intercept and the slope for the relationship between the percentage of the Democratic vote in election 1 and in election 2 have been calculated, it is easy to fill in the individual cell entries P, R, S, Q. The cell entry R is the same as the intercept a_{yx}. The estimate of P is derived by adding the slope to the intercept. Given the fact that the internal cell entries must sum to 1.0 across each row, one can derive S by the substraction of 1.0 - R and Q by the substraction of 1.0 - P.[17]

One advantage of ecological regressions is that the simple dichotomous model can easily be extended to variables with any number of categories. When variables with more than two categories are used, each regression equation includes the intercept and a number of regression slopes equal to the categories in the variable, minus one. For example, in analyzing voting changes from one election to the next in the Weimar Republic, voters generally confronted at least seven or eight categories of partisan choice, plus the possibility of not voting. For seven categories, e.g., the regression equation looks like this:

$$Y_1 = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3 + b_4X_4 + b_5X_5 + b_6X_6$$

Assuming, for example, the task was to find out what voting changes occurred in Franconia between the Reichstag elections of 1928 and 1930, given the choices in the matrix below. For each county in the region, the matrix would look as follows:

Table 3

1928	1930									
	NSDAP	DNVP	DDP	DVP	SPD	KPD	BVP	REST	Nonvoting	
NSDAP	P_{11}	P_{12}	P_{13}	P_{14}	P_{15}	P_{16}	P_{17}	P_{18}	P_{19}	X_1
DNVP	P_{21}	P_{22}	P_{23}	etc.						X_2
DDP	P_{31}	P_{32}	P_{33}	etc.						X_3
DVP	P_{41}	P_{42}	P_{44}	etc.						X_4
SPD	P_{51}	P_{52}	P_{53}	etc.						X_5
KPD	P_{61}	P_{62}	P_{63}	etc.						X_6
BVP	P_{71}	P_{72}	P_{73}	etc.						X_7
Rest	P_{81}	P_{82}	P_{83}	etc.						X_8
Non-voting	P_{91}	P_{92}	P_{93}	etc.						X_9
	Y_1	Y_2	Y_3	Y_4	Y_5	Y_6	Y_7	Y_8	Y_9	

For each row equation, the dependent variables are the percentages of the votes received by each party in 1930 as well as the 1930 nonvoting category or Y_1 through Y_9. The independent variables are the percentages votes for each party and for nonvoting in 1928 or X_1 through X_9. The scores on the dependent and independent variables are then regressed against one another. The first regression equation takes the NSDAP's proportion of the vote in 1930 as the dependent variable so that the equation looks like this:

NSDAP 1930 = (NSDAP 1928) + b_1DNVP1928 + b_2DDP1928 + b_3DVP1928 + b_4SPD1928 + b_5KPD1928 + b_6BVP1928 + b_7Rest1928 + b_8Nonvoting1928 or

$$Y_1 = a + b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3 + b_4X_4 + b_5X_5 + b_6X_6 + b_7X_7 + b_8X_8 \text{ or}$$

$$Y_1 = P_{91} + (P_{11} - P_{91})X_1 + (P_{21} - P_{91}) X_2 + (P_{31} - P_{91})X_3 + (P_{41} - P_{91})X_4 + (P_{51} - P_{91})X_5 + (P_{61} - P_{91})X_6 + (P_{71} - P_{91})X_7 + (P_{81} - P_{91})X_8$$

When this regression is performed, one cell proportion is produced directly, namely that of P_{11} which represents the continuity estimate or the proportion of 1928 NSDAP voters who are also 1930 NSDAP voters. The other estimates, which represent transition rates to the NSDAP are derived by adding the value of that first proportion (which is in fact the intercept) to each of the coefficients obtained from the regression. In this way it is possible to arrive at turnover estimates to the NSDAP for DNVP voters (P_{21}), DDP voters (P_{31}), DVP voters (P_{41}) through to nonvoters (P_{91}). In the next regression equation, the dependent variable is Y_2 or the DNVP's percentage vote in 1930. Again, the regression yields a value (intercept) equivalent to the proportion of 1928 DNVP voters who also supported this party in 1930 (P_{22}) and this value is added to each coefficient produced by the regression. If it is added to the slope or coefficient for the NSDAP, one gets the cell proportion P_{12} or the proportion of 1928 NSDAP voters who were DNVP voters in 1930, by adding the intercept to the coefficient for the DDP, one gets the cell proportion P32 or the proportion of 1928 DDP voters who voted DNVP in 1930, etc. (The slopes for each party are identified in the computer printout.)

The last equation would have Y_9 or the percentage nonvoters in 1930 as the dependent variable. This equation, however, need not be performed. Since the values of the cell entries across each row must add to 1.0, the value of the cell entries P_{19}, P_{29}, P_{39} to P_{99} can be obtained by subtracting the sum of all preceding row proportions (e.g. P_{11} to P_{18}) from 1.0. In writing out each equation, the category omitted is that representing a given party's 1928 percentage vote.

When the matrix is completed, each row provides continuity and turnover rates for the supporters of a given party. Thus, row one indicates the 1928 Nazi voters' continuity rate in cell P_{11}, their transition rate to the DNVP in cell P_{12}, to the DDP in cell P_{13}, to the DVP in cell P_{14} and so forth.

Regression analysis of aggregate data, however, produces unbiased estimates only under the following conditions: 1) that the relationship between subunit marginals X and Y is in fact a linear one; 2) that the row proportions do not vary systematically with the row marginals and, most importantly, that the values of the row proportions P and R (from which the estimates S and Q are derived) are constant for all units. That constant row proportions may be a condition that is exceedingly difficult to meet has been recognized by many analysts. Thus, in a well-known study of the 1964 and 1966 British elections, for example, Stokes discovered that continuity and turnover rates for both Conservative and Labour voters varied systematically with the proportion of Conservatives and Labour supporters in a given constituency. Using panel surveys, what Stokes

discovered was that as constituencies became more homogeneous in their partisan make-up, local communications networks intensified pro-Conservative or pro-Labour sentiments. Hence in Conservative or Labour bastions, continuity rates were exaggerated while turnover estimates were underestimated.[18]

Goodman was, of course, aware of the possibility that regression analysis could yield biased estimates given the fact that absolute constancy for row proportions is a condition only rarely met in the empirical world. He argued, however, that linear regression could still provide unbiased estimates if the average value of the subunit proportions P and R (and those of S and Q) is constant for all different values of X. In other words, if the expected value of R is the same for all values of X, then a_{yx} or the expected value of R when X = 0 is a satisfactory estimate of the population value of R. If, on the other hand, the expected value of R is different at different values of X, then a_{yx} would not be typical of the population value of R; it would in effect be a biased estimate of R.

Goodman proposed several ways of checking for the reliability of the estimates derived from regression analysis. His first check involves an examination of the distribution of actual data points around the regression line (which summarizes the relationship between the marginals X and Y or the percent Democratic vote in election 1 and the percent Democratic vote in election 2). If the scores for the individual subunits are widely scattered around the regression line, the regression estimates are not reliable. The most convenient way to measure this "scatter" are correlation coefficients. In this

instance, ecological correlations are used not as a measure of association but as a measure of reliability for the regression coefficients. The higher the correlation coefficients, (be they obtained from simple or multiple correlations) the more reliable are the regression coefficients.

A second check on the reliability of estimates proposed by Goodman is the extent to which estimated cell proportions accurately predict the marginal totals corresponding to the dependent variable in the regression equation. Thus if the estimated percent vote received by the Democrats obtained from the row proportions P and R were close to the actual vote received by the Democrats in a given aggregate, then the internal cell proportions could be assumed valid. Goodman's final and perhaps most important test are the regression estimates themselves. More specifically, it turns out that if the conditions underlying regression analysis are not met (namely that row proportions are constant for all values of X or that they vary randomly with the value of X) the regression estimates of continuity or turnover proportions are either badly biased or altogether unacceptable in that they fall below 0 or above 1.0.[19]

Among the more frustrating aspects of regression analysis is the fact that inadmissible estimates (i.e. estimates that are less than 0 or more than 100 percent) appear even if all other indicators suggest high reliability. It has been argued that if inadmissible values were close to minor measurement errors, corrective methods could be used to force them into the acceptable range of 0-1.0. Several analysts, e.g. Telser and Irwin and Meeter have devised ways

of bringing unacceptable estimates within the proper range without altering the over-all results. But, as Shively and Meckstroth have pointed out, such techniques are altogether unsuitable when invalid estimates result from violations of the underlying assumptions of regression analysis. Furthermore, as Meckstroth has shown, even if all estimates fall into the acceptable range and even if all indicators suggest high reliability, it is still possible that the estimates obtained from the regression may be biased, i.e. that they do not correspond to the true population value.[20]

There are, however, a number of ways open to investigators for obtaining reliable estimates or proportions. As is true of correlation, bias in regression coefficients can be controlled or eliminated altogether by a better specified regression model. Thus, one reason that Stokes' analysis of the 1964 and 1966 elections or Goodman's case produced biased estimates was that they were both derived from simple or bivariate regression models. And as Hanushek et al., Langbein and Lichtman, and Meckstroth have pointed out, the propensity of bivariate regression models to produce biased estimates is not altogether surprising in light of the fact that bivariate regressions themselves are linear transformations of simple correlation coefficients. (However it is true that the standardized correlation coefficient are more likely to be biased than the unstandardized regression coefficient.)[21]

Voting probabilities, for example, are generally conditional upon other variables in addition to the previous vote cast by an individual. Therefore, one way of avoiding biased probability estimates

is to include in the regression model variable which may affect individual voting choices such as social class (S) or levels of partisanship (P) found in subunits. If, to cite one example (Miller, 1972) the original equation was Conservative vote 1964 = a (Conservative vote 1959) + b_1(Labour vote 1959) + b_2(Liberal vote 1959) + b_3(Abstainers 1959)
the better specified equation might read as follows:

Conservative vote 1964 = a (S,P) Conservative vote 1959 + b_1(S,P) Labour vote 1959 + b_2(S,P) Liberal vote 1959 etc.

Those who propose this course argue that by including all variables that may affect the independent and dependent variables (i.e. voting Conservative, Labour, Liberal etc. in 1959 and in 1964) significantly reduces or even eliminates aggregation bias.

The disadvantage of obtaining voting probabilities from multivariate models as that above is that the computations involved are far more complex and burdensome than those produced by the direct linear regression model.[23] Secondly, it is often not possible to find the macro-level variable which causes bias in individual-level estimates. Often, such discoveries can be made only with the use of survey information, as in the case of Stokes' discovery of local "communication networks".[24] Finally, because it may not be possible to find macro-level variables that have individual-level equivalents (e.g. the extent of party organization), proper specification is not always possible.[25] Researchers have also developed non-linear regression models for cases where subunit marginals do not appear to be linked in a linear relationship. Thus Goodman, Boudon, and Stokes[26]

have suggested an alternative to Goodman's basic regression model. This alternative is said to take into account those community-level variables that cause row proportions to vary systematically with marginals. But, as has been pointed out,[27] there is no reason to believe that any of the available non-linear models have in fact succeeded in controlling the independent effects of macro-level variables.

Fortunately, Shively in a widely cited article, has developed yet another method for producing reliable and valid probability estimates even when internal cell proportions are not constant or vary systematically with marginal totals. Shively's method seems by far the most successful attempt to reduce aggregation or grouping bias in regression analysis. I have used it in this study of voting changes in Franconia during the Weimar electoral period.

According to Shively, Goodman's conditions are met only when individuals are grouped into aggregate units randomly or on the basis of their scores on the independent variable X and when the independent variable affects the behavior of individuals directly, i.e. through his or her own state, rather than contextually, i.e. through the make-up of the unit. When grouping is done on the basis of individual scores on the dependent variable Y, Goodman's assumptions are violated and the estimates produced by this regression model are biased.[28] The difficulty, of course, is that investigators cannot always tell when they are safe in making the assumption that the data are grouped in such a way that the dependent variable is unrelated to the make-up of subunits except indirectly, through the independent variable(s).

Shively demonstrates, however, that it is possible to take measures that will reduce bias to acceptable limits. The first of his strategies follows from his discovery that "when variables with which we are concerned are strongly related at the individual level, grouping by dependent variable does not cause as great a bias in the ecological estimate as when they are weakly related."[29] Thus, even when investigators are unsure about grouping, as long as they can be reasonably certain that the individual-level relationship is likely to be a strong one, they can use ecological regression with reasonable confidence.

This characteristic, Shively claims, might help reduce biased estimates in analyses of voting stability and change. According to him, there is every reason to believe that a voter's partisan choice in the first election is probably the same as that in the second election. In other words, in all likelihood an individual's choice of party in the first election is strongly related to the choice made in the second election. Given that an individual has voted Democratic in election 1, the probability is high that he or she will vote Democratic in election 2. For relationships of this type, then, regression analysis tends to yield reliable estimates. On the other hand, the likelihood of there being a strong relationship between an individual's original party choice and his or her voting for any of the other competing parties is much weaker. Unless a strong individual level relationship could be discovered between, e.g. having voted Democratic in election 1 and voting Republican in election 2, regression estimates of turnover from the Democratic to the Republican

category are less like to be unbiased than are continuity estimates (i.e. the chance that an individual will support the same party in election 2 that he or she voted for in election 1). On the basis of this finding, Shively suggests that bias in analyses of voting changes can be reduced by concentrating only on estimates of stability (or continuity rates) which contain no or relatively limited bias and to ignore specific cross-overs.[30]

Since most investigators, however, are interested as much in turnover as in continuity rates, Shively recognizes that this strategy alone has limited appeal. He therefore provides a second way for reducing biased regression estimates when the assumptions are not met that row proportions are constant for all subunits or vary randomly with marginal totals. This procedure is based on his insight that investigators can group variables either in terms of their scores on Y or in terms of their scores on X. This means that one can perform two regressions, namely that of Y on X or the reverse, that of X on Y. In this way, two estimates are obtained: from the regression of Y on X one gets the estimate P (which is the proportion of X's that are Y's) where $P = a_{yx} + b_{yx}$; from the regression of X on Y, the estimate P' (i.e. the proportion of Y's that are X's) is obtained where $P' = a_{xy} + b_{xy}$. According to Shively, the estimate P' can be used to arrive at the estimate of interest, namely P by multiplying the value of P' with the total number of Y_1 individuals in the population (as e.g. 2nd election Democrats) and dividing that figure by the total number of X_1 individuals (e.g. first election Democrats) in the population:[31]

$$P = \frac{P' \text{ x total number of } Y_1 \text{ individuals in the population}}{\text{Total number of } X_1 \text{ individuals in the population}}$$

Having two estimates of P to choose from, the problem then becomes to select the one which is less biased. In order to do that, Shively first demonstrates that the value of a biased aggregate-level estimate is in fact an inflated version of the absolute value of its equivalent individual-level coefficient. In other words, Shively shows that, within sampling error, aggregation bias in either the b_{yx} or the b_{xy} coefficients will have the same sign as corresponding individual-level coefficients. Consequently, if b_{yx} and b_{xy} are positive, "then to the extent that data are grouped by Y, the direct estimate of P has a positive bias. And to the extent that data are grouped by X, the indirect P has a positive bias if the estimate P' has a positive bias." Similarly, if b_{yx} and b_{xy} are negative, the aggregation bias in the direct and indirect estimates of P can also only be negative.[32]

From this Shively concludes that if both b_{yx} and b_{xy} are positive, the more biased of these two coefficients will be a more positive version of the corresponding individual-level coefficient and hence yield a higher estimate of P. Consequently, "in order to pick the one which involves less bias, we choose the lower of the two." Using the same logic, "if b_{yx} and b_{xy} are negative .... we pick the higher estimate of P."[33] (Shively also suggests that if the difference between both estimates of P is small, it may be better to take the average of the two estimates rather than to select the one which presumably is less biased.)[34] Finally, according to Shively, by picking

the lower estimate if the slopes b_{yx} and b_{xy} are positive, and the higher estimate if these two slopes are negative, it is possible to estimate the upper or lower limit for the true value of P. In other words, Shively claims, his strategy not only reduces bias but specifies the direction of whatever bias remains since "we know that the true value of P assuredly does not lie above our estimate..."[35]

Prior to Shively's discovery, analysts only used Goodman's original regression model or an extended form thereof. Quite frequently, it was applied successfully to studies of voting changes.[36] Subsequently, Shively, and even more so, Meckstroth, demonstrated the importance and value of developing estimates from both forward and backward models.

Despite some of the difficulties with ecological regression, a strong case can be made for a more extensive utilization of it in the study of National Socialism or of other dramatic instances of voting upheavals in the past. This technique has been used successfully by analysts of voting. Many have found regression estimates to correspond closely to individual level coefficients in cases where both aggregate and individual data were available for analysis.[37] For the region examined in this study, estimates of individual voting obtained from ecological regressions were generally consistent with aggregate voting patterns found in the 1920-1933 electoral period. The findings of this study also confirmed or corresponded to evidence discovered by other investigators using a variety of statistical techniques.[38]

Certainly in view of the broader implications and theoretical importance of Nazism as a political and electoral phenomenon, the best available methods for generating new information about the supporters of this movement should be utilized--even if such methods prove to be not altogether adequate in the long run, or if subsequently developed methods yield better results. This is not to argue that evidence obtained from ecological regression is necessarily superior to or supersedes that gained from the application of different methods or the use of different materials. But to the degree that the findings in this study add new information or insights into the electoral sources of Nazi support, the use of this technique is justified. Albeit neither it nor the data on which it relies can furnish any but tentative conclusions, it would be--as Meckstroth has argued--an unconscionable ordering of research priorities if work on important subjects stop because of the difficulties inherent in the available data and tools of analysis.[39]

FOOTNOTES

1. Meckstroth, "Ecological Inference,", p. 114.

2. ibid., p. 120-123.

3. ibid., p. 3.

4. ibid., p. 129.

5. See especially Duncan MacRae, "Critical Elections in Illinois 1888-1966." American Political Science Review 54 (1960): 669-684; V. O. Key, Jr., "A Theory of Critical Elections" in Nelson Polsby et al., Politics and Social Life (Boston, 1963); Gerald Pomper, "Classification of Presidential Elections", Journal of Politics 29 (1967): 535-566; Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainspring of American Politics (New York, 1970).

6. For citations see notes to chapter 1.

7. For a more extensive treatment of Robinson see Hanushek et al. "Model Specification," pp. 90-95; Meckstroth, "Ecological Inference," pp. 123-128.

8. Pomper, "Presidental Elections," pp. 55-56.

9. Hanushek, et al. "Model Specification," pp. 92-95; Lichtman and Langbein, "Ecological Regression," pp. 173-180; Hammond, "New Approaches," pp. 489-491; for a critique of these conclusions, Meckstroth "Ecological Inference," p. 143-144.

10. Hanushek, ibid., p. 90; Hammond, ibid., pp. 489-90; Lichtman and Langbein, ibid., p. 173.

11. Duncan, O. and Davis, B. "An Alternative to Ecological Correlation," American Sociological Review 18 (1953), pp. 655-656.

12. For detailed treatments and critiques of this method see Meckstroth, "Ecological Inference," pp. 128-131 and Shively, "Ecological Inference," pp. 1184-85.

13. Paul Klepner, The Cross of Culture: A Social Analysis of Mid-Western Politics 1850-1900 (New York, 1970); R. P. Formisano, The Birth of Mass Political Parties: Michigan 1827-1861 (Princeton, N. J., 1970).

14. See especially Lichtman and Langbein, "Ecological Regression," pp. 180-183; J. M. Kousser, "The New Political History: A Methodological Critique," Review in American History 4 (1976): 1-14.

15. For citations see notes to Introduction.

16. It should be noted that the absence of any uniform notations for marginal totals and internal cell entries makes the discussions of ecological regression cited so far unnecessarily confusing.

17. Shively, "Ecological Inference," pp. 1187-1188.

18. Donald Stokes, "Cross-level Inference As A Game Against Nature," in Bend, ed., Mathematical Applications in Political Science (Charlottesville, Va., 1969), pp. 77-78.

19. Goodman, "Alternatives," pp. 613-614

20. Irwin Galen and Duane A, Meeter, "Voter Transition Models," pp. 565-66; L. Telser, "Least-Square Estimation of Transition Probabilities," in C.F. Christ, et al., Measurement in Economics (Stanford, Cal., 1963); for Shively's critique, see "Ecological Inference," p. 1191; also Meckstroth, "Ecological Inference," pp. 158-161.

21. Hanushek, et al. "Model Specification," p. 91; Lichtman and Langbein, "Ecological Regression," pp. 183-189; Meckstroth, ibid., 131-137.

22. Miller, "Measures," pp. 124-130; Lichtman and Langbein, ibid., pp. 186-187.

23. For the computing method, see Lichtman and Langbein, ibid., p. 187.

24. Meckstroth, "Ecological Inference," p. 144.

25. Lichtman and Langbein, "Ecological Regression," p. 187.

26. Goodman, "An Alternative," p. 665-66; R. Boudon, "Propriétés Individuelles et Propriétés Collectives: Une Problem d'Analyse Statistique," Revue Française de Sociologie 4 (1963), pp. 275-299; Donald Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain (New York, 1969).

27. Meckstroth, "Ecological Inference," p. 146.

28. Shively, "Ecological Inference," pp. 1188-1194.

29. ibid., p. 1191.

30. ibid., p. 1191-1192.

31. ibid., p. 1192-1193.

32. ibid., p. 1193.

33. ibid.

34. ibid., note on p. 1192; Meckstroth, Partisan Realignment, p. 73.

35. Shively, ibid., 1193.

36. Miller, "Measures"; David Cameron, "Mobilization of Nazism"; Stokes, "Game Against Nature"; Meckstroth, Partisan Realignment.

37. Miller, "Measures," pp. 122-131; E.J. Jones, "Electoral Analysis," pp. 256-261.

38. Burnham uses ecological correlations; Shively and Meckstroth use ecological regression. For citations see notes to Introduction and chapter 1.

39. Meckstroth, Partisan Realignment, pp. 66-67.

APPENDIX B

ADDITIONAL TABLES

TABLE 37

THE LIBERAL, CONSERVATIVE, AND SPLINTER PARTIES' SHARE OF THE PROTESTANT BOURGEOIS VOTE, 1924-1933

Electoral Category	1924I	1924II	1928	1930	1932I	1932II	1933
% Liberal of Prot. Bourgeois							
Reich	32.8	31.9	32.5	17.5	4.6	5.9	4.6
Franconia	9.7	13.1	14.1	7.6	2.3	2.7	1.7
% Conservative of Prot. Bourgeois							
Reich	34.9	42.8	34.0	14.8	12.3	17.5	18.7
Franconia	35.4	54.7	43.9	5.2	8.5	14.0	10.2
% Other of Prot. Bourgeois							
Reich	20.5	19.0	27.5	29.1	5.6	7.0	3.7
Franconia	5.1	14.7	13.9	41.2	3.7	4.7	2.2

TABLE 38

KPD's SHARE OF THE SOCIALIST VOTE, 1924-1933

Unit	1924I	1924II	1928	1930	1932I	1932II	1933
Reich	37.2%	25.3%	26.3%	34.9%	40.0%	44.9%	40.3%
Franconia	20.4%	12.2%	9.8%	15.8%	24.7%	29.5%	20.5%

TABLE 39

SOURCES OF SUPPORT FOR THE DDP IN FRANCONIA: 1924I-1933

Proportion of second election supporters of the DDP who in the preceding election voted for,

Election Pair	BVP	SPD	KPD	USPD	NSDAP	DNVP	DVP	DDP	WP	Splinter CNBL	CSVD	Other	Did Not Vote
1920-24I	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	66	0	0	0	0	25
1924I-24II	0	21	0	0	4	6	1	38	4	0	0	2	24
1924II-28	0	12	0	-	0	0	2	56	4	0	0	0	26
1928-30	0	0	0	-	0	10	6	46	0	0	0	0	38
1930-32I	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	64	0	0	36	0	0
1932I-32II	0	0	0	-	0	0	0	75	9	4	3	2	7
1932II-33	0	0	0	-	0	0	9	50	36	0	0	5	0

TABLE 40

SOURCES OF SUPPORT FOR THE DVP IN FRANCONIA: 1924I-1933

Proportion of second election supporters of the DVP who in the preceding election voted for,

Election Pair	BVP	SPD	KPD	USPD	NSDAP	DNVP	DVP	DDP	WP	Splinter CNBL	CSVD	Other	Did Not Vote
1920-24I	15	0	0	0	0	7	53	25	0	0	0	0	0
1924I-24II	0	28	0	0	26	0	20	24	2	0	0	0	0
1924II-28	0	0	0	-	0	50	6	4	0	0	0	9	31
1928-30	12	0	0	-	0	8	32	9	18	0	0	0	21
1930-32I	0	0	0	-	0	0	86	14	0	0	0	0	0
1932I-32II	0	0	0	-	0	21	58	15	0	0	0	1	5
1932II-33	0	0	0	-	0	26	52	0	1	10	0	11	0

TABLE 41

SOURCES OF SUPPORT FOR THE DNVP IN FRANCONIA: 1924I-1933

Proportion of second election supporters of the DNVP who in the preceding election voted for,

Election Pair	BVP	SPD	KPD	USPD	NSDAP	DNVP	DVP	DDP	WP	Splinter CNBL	CSVD	Other	Did Not Vote
1920-24I	0	0	0	0	-	61	3	0	0	0	0	0	36
1924I-24II	0	0	0	0	22	55	0	0	0	0	0	0	23
1924II-28	0	0	0	0	1	94	0	0	1	0	0	0	4
1928-30	0	0	0	0	0	83	6	2	6	0	0	3	0
1930-32I	0	0	0	0	15	20	0	11	0	21	14	7	12
1932I-32II	0	4	0	0	41	35	0	0	1	1	0	3	15
1932II-33	0	0	0	0	0	75	5	0	0	0	10	10	0

TABLE 42

TRANSITION BEHAVIOR OF PROTESTANT BOURGEOIS VOTERS IN FRANCONIA, 1920-1933

Proportion of first-election supporters of each of the following parties who subsequently voted for:

Party	2nd Election Preference	Election Pairs 1920-1924I	1924I-1924II	1924II-1928	1928-1930	1930-1932I	1932I-1932II	1932II-1933
NSDAP	Same Party	-	38	82	97	96	86	100
	Different Party	-	50	12	3	3	11	-
	Bourgeois	-	44	12	3	3	8	-
	Left	-	5	-	-	-	2	-
	Catholic	-	1	-	-	-	1	-
	Did not vote	-	12	6	0	1	3	0
DNVP	Same Party	47	98	74	11	37	55	68
	Different Party	51	2	16	88	33	29	32
	Bourgeois	51	2	9	86	33	29	32
	Left	-	-	6	2	-	-	-
	Catholic	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
	Did not vote	2	-	10	1	30	16	-
DVP	Same Party	9	58	9	23	47	77	24
	Different Party	50	23	69	77	23	1	75
	Bourgeois	48	23	40	77	15	1	49
	Left	2	-	-	-	7	-	-
	Catholic	-	-	29	-	1	-	26
	Did not vote	41	19	22	0	36	22	1
DDP	Same Party	20	46	52	26	15	70	66
	Different Party	67	54	23	74	63	30	8
	Bourgeois	63	54	17	72	39	23	8
	Left	4	-	6	2	21	7	-
	Catholic	-	-	-	-	3	-	-
	Did not vote	13	-	25	-	22	-	26

TABLE 42--Continued

Party	2nd Election Preference	1920-1924I	1924I 1924II	1924II-1928	1928-1930	1930-1932I	1932I-1932II	1932II-1933
Splinter	Same Party	-	45	72	42	8	68	36
	Different Party	-	20	22	58	85	12	63
	Bourgeois	-	20	18	37	84	12	29
	Left	-	-	1	-	-	-	17
	Catholic	-	-	3	21	1	-	17
	Did not vote	-	35	6	-	7	20	1

TABLE 43

SOURCES OF SUPPORT FOR BOURGEOIS PARTIES IN FRANCONIA, 1920-1933

Proportion of second-election supporters of each of the following parties who in the preceding election voted for:

Party	2nd Election Preference	Second Election of Each Election Pair						
		1924I	1924II	1928	1930	1932	1932II	1933
NSDAP	Same Party	-	92	76	35	46	96	72
	Different Party	100	8	23	57	41	3	10
	Bourgeois	81	4	18	48	36	2	4
	Left	10	4	5	5	4	-	2
	Catholic	9	-	-	4	1	1	4
	Did not vote	-	-	1	8	13	1	18
DNVP	Same Party	61	55	94	83	20	35	75
	Different Party	3	22	2	17	68	50	25
	Bourgeois	3	22	2	17	68	46	25
	Left	-	-	-	-	-	4	-
	Catholic	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Did not vote	36	23	4	-	12	15	-
DVP	Same Party	53	20	6	32	86	58	52
	Different Party	47	80	63	47	14	37	48
	Bourgeois	32	52	63	35	14	37	48
	Left	-	28	-	-	-	-	-
	Catholic	15	-	-	12	-	-	-
	Did not vote	-	-	31	21	-	5	-
DDP	Same Party	66	38	56	46	54	76	50
	Different Party	9	38	18	16	36	17	50
	Bourgeois	9	17	6	16	36	17	50
	Left	-	21	12	-	-	-	-
	Catholic	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	Did not vote	25	24	26	38	-	7	-

TABLE 43--Continued

Party	2nd Election Preference	1924I	1924II	1928	1930	1932	1932II	1933
Splinter	Same Party	-	25	53	22	63	60	-
	Different Party	100	61	44	69	28	37	-
	Bourgeois	43	52	25	68	17	24	-
	Left	42	6	7	-	11	11	-
	Catholic	15	5	12	1	-	13	-
	Did not vote	-	14	3	9	9	3	-

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" 102152-102154	Halbmonatsberichte des Regierungspraesidenten von Mittelfranken; Bd. I, 1921-23; Bd. II, 1924-28; Bd. III, 1928-32
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