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CRIME IN A CITY:

URBAN DISORDER AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

IN NEW YORK, 1890-1990

by

ROBERT D. McCRIE

VOLUME I

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate Faculty in History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of New York.

1995

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in History in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

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To my parents

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PREFACE

Is the city safe? Or to put to the contrary, is the city so unsafe "that the crime that has emerged in New York City threatens the existence of the city in its present form"?[1] The issue is not alarmist. Research has established that losses of investment and population can be attributed to the experience of or fear from urban crime.[2]

In the final years of this study, covering eleven census periods, 1890 to 1990, evidence mounted that the city's future was uncertain, if not imperiled in the view of some. New York City was down. The Bronx had burned. Corporations had relocated. Thousands of white and black residents had fled. And in 1990 reported serious crime had reached a historic peak on a population adjusted basis. Was urban disorder leading to declension of a world capital?

Order is defined as "the natural desire of ordinary people for a reliable, orderly, moral, and safe society in which they can go about their everyday business and live their personal lives."[3] This is a study of crime--a type of disorder--and the consequences it has on urban existence over a sweep of time. To pursue this topic I have relied primarily upon the following materials: city, state, and federal police reports; public health records; archives of organizations concerned with crime either directly or indirectly; private and government studies; and newspapers and periodicals. A

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literature far beyond history and criminology has been consulted.

When I started my graduate endeavors, I had no intention of writing on this topic. What I had in mind was undertaking a history of the security--that is, protection of assets from loss--industry with which I had considerable familiarity and to which task I now may turn my attention. Yet I needed grounding in historical contexts beyond my own narrow field. Thus it was that, at an advanced aged relative to most graduate students, I found my perspective and vision tested by my first class at the Graduate School of the City University in something called urban history. I was hooked.

Over the next several semesters, I began to research the dynamics of the city in America and Europe, particularly regarding crime and its countermeasures. Drawing from my own background as a security consultant, editor of security publications, and teacher at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, I identified another large issues I wished to analyze from my own outlook. New York City would provide the data base for analysis. Two issues that I initially sought to consider were whether crime and violence had changed much over a century's time and what was the role of police in controlling it.

As my work progressed, another theme became of interest: the emergence of crime--particularly the incidence of violence in the city--from the 1960s through 1990 as a critical topic.

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This was a subject so timely that it crowded the media for attention and served as a topic for researchers and experts from many disparate fields on which to write. My evaluation begins in chapter 6 and concludes in chapter 9.

What began with my intention of taking a few graduate courses has ended with the completion of a dissertation to be published. Much has to be excluded, even in as lengthy a treatise as this one is, and the major unaddressed topics include political corruption (crime against democracy) and so-called white collar crime (property offenses against the public and private sectors). I do not suggest that these topics are inconsequential; however, I conclude their relationships are sufficiently tangential to the central theme of my inquiry on urban violence not to have brought them more than I have into the core of this discussion.

As a stylistic matter, I have endeavored to retain consistency throughout and, therefore, have made some minor spelling and punctuation changes in contemporary citations. For documents and earlier quotations, no changes were made.

Notes.

1. Roger Starr, The Rise and Fall of New York City, New York: Basic Books, 1985, p. 116.

2. For example: Martin T. Katzman, "The Contribution of Crime to Urban Decline," Urban Studies, 17 (October 1980): 277-86.

3. Michael Barone, Our Country: The Shaping of America from Roosevelt to Reagan, New York: Free Press, 1990, p. 437.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In reaching a conclusion of this opus, the first appreciation must be extended to the initial instructor I encountered at the CUNY Graduate School who later became my supervisor for this topic, and pursued my efforts with his patient, insightful, and genial presence: Richard C. Wade. Dick Wade first developed my interest in the city and crime as a general topic, and later interested me in such specialty areas as public health, housing, and transportation.

Mary Gibson has been a conscientious and insightful first reader, bearing with me over many months' efforts. Thomas Kessner and Herbert A. Parmet, both gifted teachers of mine, served on the dissertation defense committee. Robert Bonn read and made helpful suggestions to chapter 3. I thank these persons for their criticism and support.

Next I wish to thank the many librarians who cheerfully helped me find material for this study. Of greatest value was the staff of the Lloyd George Sealy Library at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, the City University of New York. Many additional libraries provided materials critical in the following pages. Here are the most important ones listed in the order in which I found them to be most valuable: other libraries of the City University of New York beyond John Jay's, particularly at the Graduate School and University

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Center, Hunter College, and City College; the Municipal Reference and Research Center, and the magnificent New York City Research Library. Lesser but valuable material and assistance came from the following: the Library of Congress, the American Antiquarian Society, the libraries of the Brooklyn Historical Society and the Bronx County Historical Society, and the libraries of Columbia, Fordham, and New York Universities.

I wish to express my appreciation to the police officers of the New York City and Englewood, New Jersey police departments for the assistance they provided me. Luis A. Javier was patient in checking facts and preparing tables.

Finally, I wish to thank Fulvia, not only a beloved wife, but also an invaluable colleague, for bearing with me through this with uncommon forbearance.

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CHAPTER 1

1890!

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(T)he fact [is] that nearly all the poor, the improvident, the disgraced, the criminals, all the adventurers of both sexes, are consumed with the passion for city life.*

If one has anything to conceal, the place to conceal it is among a million other people. The anonymity of the big city, its impersonality is a positive encouragement to a-social or anti-social actions. Hence a professional form of surveillance, by an organized police, must take the place of neighborly scrutiny and pressure: A city of strangers lacks any other form of stabilizing check. The transformation of the town guard into the professional police...marks one of the critical changes from a town economy to a metropolitan economy.†

*E.L. Godkin, "Criminal Politics," North American Review, 150 (1890): 706.

†Lewis Mumford, The Culture of Cities, New York: Harcourt Brace and Company, 1938, p. 266.

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1890!

It was a year for which historical sobriquets abounded. The Gilded Age--that Mark Twain-named period of exaggeration, exuberance, and gritty accomplishment--was passing.[1] The Populist Movement--largely rural, unabashedly provincial and western, highly self-conscious and stentorian--offered its ideology to the skeptical city.[2] Progressivism--with roots in the American dream of making an imperfect nation if not perfect at least better--emerged on the urban agenda to revise, but not revolutionize, existing institutions.[3] To a social critic the period was termed "the brown decades," not so much for the profusion of brownstone material used to face urban residences, but more for the depressive spirit extending from a poignantly divisive Civil War through a period that would lead to yet another engulfing military conflict.[4] Scientific and technological revolution transfigured urban life with full force beckoning the professed fruits from research advances in numerous ways on the cusp of altering human existence in 1890: aluminum from electrolysis, coated photographic paper, the electric motor, the pneumatic tire, hydroelectric power from Niagara Falls, medicines like aminopyrine and phenacetin, and the indoor flash toilet were changing the ways life was to be lived.

Later writers also would conclude that the nation had undergone substantial change just at this time, that Americans politically, economically, and socially were parting from an old order that was fundamentally different from the present.

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Kansas editor William Allen White and Walter Lippmann much later used such terminology as "the revolt against formalism," "the watershed of the nineties," "the search for order," and "the end of American innocence" to explain the gulf that separated the nineteenth from twentieth-century America.[5]

New York, in 1890, referred to the island of Manhattan and its sparsely populated territory to the north, later formally named The Bronx and a contiguous section beyond which would become part of southern Westchester County. New York City in 1890, therefore, was understood to refer to the populous island of Manhattan primarily, and would do so until the communities of Brooklyn, Queens, and Staten Island were incorporated into a consolidated city on January 1, 1898. In 1890, New York seemed to be straining from the growth of peopling due to daily arrivals on transatlantic passenger ships. The population was almost 1,500,000 for the island itself, which represented a doubling of the total since 1865. The oft-called "greatest harbor" made New York the port of first disembarkation for millions of immigrants as well as travellers and commercial agents. Many immigrants passed quickly through the city to homestead, mine, or farm in the beckoning west; nonetheless, the arrival, departure and permanent residence of so many foreigners made New York one of the most cosmopolitan cities of its time, if not the most internationalized city, a quality that had existed since Civil War hostilities had ceased. Census data indicated that the foreign-born represented 43 percent of the enumerated

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population in 1865, and by 1890, with intervening fluctuation, they accounted for 42 percent.[6]

The Irish in 1865, represented over half of all foreign-born living in New York, with Germans accounting for about 30 percent; by 1890, Germans had exceeded Irish natives in the city by 20,000; other immigrant groups speaking neither English nor German now were increasing rapidly. The third largest foreign-born component in 1890 was from Eastern Europe, mostly Russia, a figure that had increased by over ten-times since the census of 1880. The fourth largest foreign-born category came from England which represented under nine percent of the foreign-born in 1865, and drifted to under eight percent by 1890, reflecting a continuing diminishing Britannic immigration of over a century's duration. The Italians had steadily increased as a percentage of the foreign-born since the Civil War, and had grown from 0.3 percent in 1865 to over, six percent by 1890.

The babble of foreign tongues heard at Castle Harbor, the city's principal port of entry, had never produced such cacophony judged by linguistic diversity. It was a young population, though it had aged from the previous census: in 1880 13.8 percent of the population was under five years old and only 3.4 percent was 65 or older; by 1890, the percentages had changed to 12.2 percent and 3.9 percent respectively.

The multitudes--native and foreign-born--were astounded at a city that was remaking itself demographically and physically without cease. For one trend, New York was looking

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up. A combination of three technical factors had enabled architects, engineers, and financiers to refashion an escarpment for the city that dramatically had transformed linear construction that had dominated earlier building: the elevator, new steel-making and welding processes, and electricity.

The first elevator had appeared as an office building appurtenance over two decades earlier, grew quickly in acceptance and by 1890 scores of ten-story buildings rose from pavements of the metropolis, a few reached even fifteen or sixteen stories. Next, the introduction of the steel skeleton in building construction had permitted the reduction of huge weight-bearing walls at the base, allowing buildings to be built skywards. The city still depended largely on gas for its artificial illumination, as it had since gas replaced oil lamps in the 1820s. But electricity already was being successfully used for street lighting and was winning acceptance for internal illumination in a few trend-setting offices and residences: the technical problems ahead for wide-spread usage looked formidable, but the opportunities looked even greater. Electricity had enormous promise of reducing the cost of public transportation and of providing cheap, reliable interior illumination, and if demonstrably safe from creating unacceptable fire risks (not then established), could make the city run more efficiently then ever without the environmental hazards from ubiquitous animal wastes; moreover, electricity produced more reliable illumination than gas.[7]

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An Age of Opulence

New York had become well established as venue for domestic and international tourists, travellers, and flâneurs. Visitors in 1890 were not only astonished by enormous skyward-reaching office building, sumptuous residences, and expansive public works construction, but also by the vast number of commemorative landmarks at street level. Within the previous quarter century, the city had been festooned with scores of heroic statues displayed in European fashion within parks and along streets: generals and soldiers, of course, but also poets, artists, writers, inventors, politicians, and patriots. The Memorial Arch had opened on Washington Square a year earlier, while Bartholdi's "Liberty Enlightening the World," after a long and difficult period of gestation, had been unveiled in October, 1886, and would quickly become one of the City's most enduring symbols and tourist attraction. Public park areas had been scarce in the expanding metropolis.

Yet hardly a dozen years earlier a former squatters' area and cow pasture had been transformed into an expansive urban oasis, Central Park. Elegant Beaux-Arts bow bridges crossed circuitous bridal paths; lakes, woods, trails, and playing fields drew as many as 150,000 visitors for recreation on warm weekend days.

On the Sabbaths, New York provided religious practicants with a broad selection among elegant and commodious places of worship, fit for every ethnic predisposition and social rank. According to Moses King, a popular guide book author of the

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time, in 1845, the city contained 245 houses of worship; by 1890, the number had more than doubled matching its population growth. King comments: "The religious history of New York is remarkably free from the bitter persecution that characterized the early history of other colonies."[8] Nearly all religious creeds were represented in structures reflecting diverse styles of architecture. The combined membership of all religious organizations, Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish, at the time, was almost 700,000, representing almost half of the population, while thousands more attended such places of worship without committing to membership.

Geographically within the City, religious societies were relocating northward following the movement of congregants to newer developed residential areas. Recently completed religious structures of significance emphasized the trend to relocate to the north: Calvary Methodist, a vast brick edifice at Seventh Avenue and 129th Street was completed in 1887, and served the biggest congregation of that denomination in the city; St. Patrick's Cathedral, Fifth Avenue between 49th and 50th Streets, dedicated in 1879, served as an important religious and social marker for Irish city residents; Temple Emanu-El, Fifth Avenue and East 43rd Street, was distinguished by its Moorish-style twin towers and boasted an auditorium seating 2,000 people. Plans to construct the most commodious religious structure in the nation were afoot: the Cathedral of St. John the Divine had been planned by the Episcopal Church diocese since 1885, though groundbreaking for the Morningside

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Heights structure would not take place until 1892. The implications of co-religionists' expression at these and hundreds of other religious institutions impacted the City: civic activism among practicants was high and most economic activity ceased due to Sabbath adherence. Pronouncements from the leading clergy during their sermons regularly were reported in the press the next day as compelling news.

In many ways New York had become an American capital. Though the state and federal governments long earlier had removed their seats elsewhere, New York City had indisputably secured preeminence in a wide range of endeavors: from finance to fashion; from retailing to research. In public, private, and political matters of importance, the city had become both leader and laboratory for the rest of the nation, the crucible for innovation and change. European cities in earlier years had provided New York with much social and artistic inspiration; a subtle shift of power had begun with the American Revolution and Europe increasingly regarded the young republic's greatest city in its first full century as a political and economic entity as an exemplary spectacle of undiminished urban development, provoking both admiration and emulation contrasted with perceived danger and social disintegration.

The national significance of New York as a financial capital was readily apparent: over a score of the largest trust companies in the nation made the city their base of operations as did the largest savings bank in the world and a

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host of smaller financial institutions which, in turn, supported a myriad of professional and business services such as lawyers, auditors, insurers, engineers, and printers. For workers with modest change to spare, over a score of savings banks served the thrifty welcoming deposits as low as ten cents. The fiduciary institutions were geographically demarcated by a zone beginning at mid-island from Chambers Street on the north and stretching to the south of Manhattan to the Battery. Over half of the nation's entire bank clearings passed through New York in 1890. The Stock Exchange, founded in 1792, was easily the most important exchange in the nation; yet other financial, commodities, and produce exchanges and various trade and commercial associations also made the city their headquarters. However, the city was becoming a leader in other less apparent and measurable ways.

Long a book and periodical publishing center, New York was developing an intellectual attraction of a sort, increasingly providing a more commercially dynamic alternative for writers, editors, lecturers, and teachers to a more intellectually toned coastal city to the north. William Dean Howells arrived for an extended visit from Boston in 1888, and two years later changed lodgings and remained as a writer and critic for over a decade.[9] For millions of younger readers, Horatio Alger's intrepid characters served role models for Americans, and perhaps half of his youth-oriented novelettes occurred with a New York City setting. Written by a popular

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writer who formerly served briefly as Unitarian minister, Horatio Alger's scenarios were not rags-to-riches adventures, as many commentators later assumed, but they did serve as inspirational page-turners for impressionable young men and indubitably many young women readers as well. In a typical scenario, a young man improves himself under challenging circumstances, often aided by fortuitous events, moving himself up a notch or two economically.[10]

The New York location for such adventures riveted the imaginations of countless young people to the dynamic risks and quick and tangible rewards of urban existence. Howells, Alger, and scores of other actual or would-be intellectuals and writers were drawn to the city, often favoring residences in the area near Washington Square--the closer, the better--itself made celebrated by Henry James's Washington Square of 1881. The book was written in England where the novelist and critic had settled in 1875, but the Jamesian themes that contrasted manner and moral differences between complex, sophisticated Europeans with refreshing, ingenuous Americans was still a leitmotif of a rarified social milieu in 1890, centered in New York City with Eastern seaboard and European connections.

"Higher culture" in America as expressed in European and ancient classical artistic and historical artifacts had reached an apotheosis in New York for the time. A year earlier the south wing of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, housing European art objects, had been joined to a central

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section completed in 1880; a north wing meanwhile was under construction, definitively establishing the Metropolitan as the most significant art institution in the hemisphere to concentrate on classical and European art. The next year, after considerable misgivings by some museum trustees and many Protestant clergy, the museum opened regularly on Sundays without charge for the first time. Scores of other organizations fed the city's frenetic cultural vitality enlivening its edifying and artistic richness: scores of museums and art galleries, but also artists' and writers' associations, debating societies, art schools and the requisite specialty suppliers to serve this community.

For serious music lovers the Philharmonic Society began in 1842, and the Symphony Society organized in 1880, provided spirited, advantageous competition; the Metropolitan Opera House, occupying an entire block bounded by Broadway, Seventh Avenue and 39th and 40th Streets, opened in 1883, itself was created when a group of wealthy music lovers were unable to secure boxes at the Academy of Music. The Music Hall Company, nine-tenths of which was owned by Andrew J. Carnegie, was completing construction of a music palace in modern Renaissance architecture to be formally opened in May, 1891. Theaters for dramatic presentations mostly were located off Broadway, between Fourteenth and Thirtieth Streets and grew steadily reflecting a long urban tradition of dramatic and music hall entertainment.

The inner person could be fed by establishments like the

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celebrated Delmonico's--from $3 upward for a good dinner--to cheap downtown eating-houses available by the thousands. Almost 8,000 drinking places licensed by the Board of Excise Commissioners could be found to quaff the city's thirst with many more bars and saloons believed to be operating without a license.

The New World's Economic Capital

While serving as a financial and transportation fulcrum, the city's economic base was in manufacturing with 12,000 factories employing 500,000. The leading industry was garment manufacturing, followed by various types of publishing; the third and fourth largest industries were cigar and tobacco manufacturing and musical instruments respectively. A trend had begun in which plants were moved to the suburbs particularly Long Island and New Jersey, while headquarters remained in the city, yet a wide range of manufactories remained on the island. While a movement for an eight-hour day began two decades earlier in the city, the average industrial employee worked six days a week for ten hours per day; though in the poorer-paying garment shops dominated by piece-good compensation, in construction, cleaning, seasonal work and domestic service, the weekly time worked could exceed sixty hours.

Fed by differences created by commerce, industry and culture, what had become increasingly clear to observers was how the city had evolved into an exemplar of profound class

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and economic separation. The urban environment created and supported a social and commercial plutocracy:

> The wealth concentrated in a hands of residents of New York is almost inconceivable. Many vast fortunes have been made here and many enormously wealthy Americans have come here to live and enjoy the fortune accumulated elsewhere. A recent table of the wealth of New-York's millionaires estimates that at least two New-Yorkers are worth more than $100,000,000 each; six more have above $50,000,000 each; more than thirty are classed as worth between $20,000,000 and $40,000,000; and 325 other citizens are rated at from $2,000,000 to $12,000,000 each.[11]

Due largely to its concentration of wealth supported by flourishing economic enterprises, New York was preeminently the social capital of the nation. Many fine mansions graced Fifth Avenue and the streets perpendicular to it from the 20s up to Central Park and from there along the eastern side of Fifth Avenue northward along the Park. These chateaux-on-the-avenue were often designed by architects trained in the Beaux-Arts tradition of Paris, such as H.M. Congdon, Richard M. Hunt, C.F. McKim, and Henry Van Brunt. Such domestic structures for well-to-do inheritors, industrial titans, merchants, bankers, and those in the learned professions were not limited to the Fifth Avenue area alone. The western edge of the Central Park and along Riverside Drive on the eastern edge of Riverside Park also contained monumental residential construction. The impression was often aesthetically jarring with the juxtaposition of dissimilar architectural style side-by-side: Flemish or Dutch with Elizabethan or Gothic; Florentine Renaissance with Nuremberg style, in addition to the trendy and always socially acceptable French design

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influences. The preponderant and dull New York brownstone residential building facing was relieved in a few of the costlier residential buildings with Vermont, Ohio, and Tennessee sandstone and marble, sometimes trimmed with Italian marbles from Carrara and Siena. By 1890, some of newly constructed demesnes for the rich had pioneered the use of interior elevators and electricity for illumination. An elaborate world of balls and levées, calling and dining, meeting and greeting for a tiny cadre of wealthy and socially active families flourished.

Ward McAlister, a self-anointed social arbiter and consultant, published Society as I Have Found It in which he describes the social milieu of the extravagant times.[12] McAlister figured--incorrectly, it turned out--that exactly 400 people could fit into the ballroom of Mrs. Vincent Astor's house on Fifth Avenue at 34th Street. He later said that, "If you go outside that number, you strike people who are either not at ease in a ballroom or else make other people not at ease." On one morning of Mrs. Astor's annual ball, the list of "the 400" was published, and later re-published as a widely-distributed pamphlet.[13] In addition to their ostentatious style of living within the city and their goings and comings to other residences in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere, many among the élite of society frequently led lives also partially committed to benefit the arts, education, libraries, research and scientific endeavors, hospitals, welfare facilities, and programs for the poor.

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The era marked the further awakening of American consciousness to the dramatic disparity between wealth and poverty coexisting within a proximate geographic milieu. The pinnacle of economic success and nadir of failure were apparent with stunning contrasts within a few blocks of each other. To be sure a middle class existed between these extremes, but as one account of the time stated:

> The great cost of living in New York makes it impossible for the city to number a strong middle class among its people. The very rich can afford the expense, since it brings them pleasures and compensations they can obtain nowhere else in America for their outlay. The very poor and the laboring class huddle in the tenement houses, and put up with discomfort at a cost which would enable them to do far better in the other cities of the country. What a workingman pays for his two or three rooms in a New York tenement house would give him a separate house and a comfortable home in almost any other American city.
>
> Persons of moderate means doing business in New York who desire the comforts of a home for their families are, as a rule, obliged to reside out of the city. They come into New York in the morning, and leave in the evening....This leaves New York with but a comparatively small representation of the class which is the mainstay of modern communities.[14]

The two economic extremes rarely met person-to-person, and when they did, the occasion might provide awkward moments for both.[15] Indeed, social and economic extremes lived on the same island but had little meaningful contact with each other: the poor were effectively invisible and unconnected to the rich; the rich had no logical basis for direct contact with poor denizens other than, perhaps, through symbolic, sporadic charitable occasions. A poor individual might ogle the mansions of the plutocrats and ring service entrance bell inquiring about possible employment, but prolonged human

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contact outside of one's economic category was rare and was presumed to be undesirable as well as uncomfortable and possibly distasteful while just over half the city's residents were living at or below a subsistence level. The main exceptions were men and women of comfortable means who volunteered in charitable and religious services concerned with the poor and their moral and social betterment.

Among the contemporary organizations they supported were the New York Association for Improving the Conditions of the Poor, incorporated in 1848, and providing about 37,000 beneficiaries, including 16,000 visits to the poor; the New York Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, organized in 1875, the Children's Aid Society, founded in 1853, which cared for 34,000 children of whom 3,000 were provided homes, and Stanton Coit's Neighborhood Guild, founded in 1886, established "to promote the moral and physical improvement" of "the laboring classes" in its environs. Additionally, numerous charities and churches with active programs for working girls, fallen women, indigent females, old men and aged couples, not to mention English, Scottish, Irish, French, Belgian and German charitable groups and those sponsored by churches and synagogues.

The strategy of such benevolence was to create moral order for the urban masses, to suggest the theme of Paul Boyer, and volunteers earnestly committed themselves to eradicate the presumed causes of poverty and crime and to show compassion for "the unfortunate."[16]

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An Era of Marginalization

Under one percent of the population lived in the precious and ostentatious regions of Fifth Avenue, Central Park on the West and South, and the rapidly developing Riverside Drive. Middle income housing, as noted, was in short supply, but could be available to the persistent or to the fortunate. Yet it was in the ungilded, unprepossessing neighborhoods where the vast bulk of the city's teeming dwellers could be found: accommodations of a different nature were found there. Appleton's Dictionary of New York City described what one might encounter among the more modest housing available within the City:

> Boarding-Houses are the homes of a large number of the permanent as well transient population of New York, and are of as many grades as there are ranks in society. People living in tenement houses not infrequently "take boarders" in the cramped and dirty apartments, and from this base boarding-houses rise in size, style, and price to the superb houses in fashionable avenues where every convenience of luxury and a first-class hotel may be obtained. The boarding-houses are occupied by the vast army of clerks and salesmen and saleswomen employed on small salaries all over the city. The rates of board in these houses range from $5 to $10 a week, according to the location of the house and the room occupied. Two meals a day, breakfast and dinner at night, are furnished, and the table is the same for all, variations in price being based solely upon the apartments occupied....References as to character and responsibility are usually given and required in the better class of boarding-houses; but strangers who are unable to furnish these, if of respectable appearance, are admitted upon payment of their board in advance.[17]

Apart from edifices for the wealthy, more modest brownstone dwellings, and the growing taste for apartment and boarding house living, huge numbers of New Yorkers, particularly immigrants, called a tenement house their home

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and still others lived in cheap flop houses or on the streets, the economically marginalized. Jacob A. Riis, a Danish-born journalist and photographer who worked in the City, had reported on conditions of the poor and sick for the Tribune for over a decade beginning in 1878: his persistent criticism had helped bring about creation of the Tenement House Commission in 1884.[18] He left the Tribune for the Evening Sun where he wrote a volume that described with spare language and vivid, stark photographs his findings on life in the nether regions of the burgeoning metropolis. How the Other Half Lives provided a shocking documentation on living conditions of the poor, immigrants, and homeless youth from the time it was first published in 1890.

The flashlight photography Riis used enabled not just comfortably situated New York, but also the vastly larger category of readers living elsewhere to look into the alleys, workshops, tenements, police stations, and other domains of the City's native-born and immigrant poor. Rag-pickers, rogues (burglars and muggers), beggars, "street Arabs," working girls, peddlers, and tradesmen and working women become visible and unforgettable from Riis's photographic survey of the seamy side of life. Riis's efforts concentrated on three wards in the southeastern part of Manhattan: the tenth, eleventh, and thirteenth. These political districts provided dwellings for many of the poorest residents and transients of the city. The housing of such persons occurred at an extraordinary density, one unmatched by any other

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identified urban area of the time: while Manhattan Island had an average population of just over 73,000 persons per square mile in 1890, Riis stated that the tenth, eleventh, and thirteenth wards had per square mile densities of 334,000, 246,000, and 274,000 respectively. As will be discussed later, these areas also had significantly exacerbated public health and crime problems.

The fame of the dangerous areas of the city extended far beyond the borders: the poorest, sickest, and most dangerous areas of the city created their own magnetism for some visiting travelers and thrill-seekers. Guides to the city at the time did not merely identify the dangerous areas, but teased the intrepid visitors to go a-calling with an appropriately armed guide--a private detective from firms like Pinkerton's, Drummond's, and Fuller's--who could be retained easily for the occasion. "Slumming" was a diversion practiced by travelers who sought to experience excitement in the netherworld of the City. A guide of the time advised that:

> It is certainly possible to hire a guide at some one of the main private detective agencies, and to pay him to show you the darker parts of the town at midnight. But the chances are, unless you are hunting for an opportunity to join in with some deviltry which must hide away from the light and the law, that he will reveal to you little, if anything, more than you can see for yourself, any night. As for danger--pooh! leave at home your silk hat, diamond studs and kid gloves, and your watch too, if it is a valuable one; don't exhibit a roll of bills when you pay for your occasional glass of beer or cigar....a sober man of ordinary appearance and tact, can go anywhere on the streets of New York...at any hour of the night, without worrying himself a particle as to his safety.[19]

The same guide provides specific information on the

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places where the nocturnal rambler can come in touch with venues of past crimes and present notoriety. Some decrepit areas had not changed much in over half a century despite enormous growth in the northerly sections. The epicenter of presumed danger over most of the earlier century was The Five Points, where five corners formed the famous intersection of criminality and gang turfing.[20] Yet by the 1890s the guide writer concludes: "There is no danger, whatever, at present to visit the Five Points by daylight; and little at night, or even to the crowded quarters beyond it, if a person keeps his eyes open and does not allow himself to be enticed off the street."[21]

The other dangerous neighborhoods to thrill the traveler of the 1890s include Baxter Street, The Mulberry Bend, Chinatown, dark corners behind the Bowery, the Russian quarter, and "Judea."[22] The guidebook writer suggests that the professional slummer might wish to visit one of the "dives" along Cherry and Water Streets "frequented by harlots, river-pirates and cut-throats, and patronized chiefly by sailors and canal-boatmen, and the roughs of the Fourth Ward."[23]

For further excitement the urban visitor might take a Bowery car to 25 East Fourth Street to visit one of the most daring locales of all, a socialists' and anarchists' meeting place. Portraits of Karl Marx, Guttenberg, Frederic Engels, and other socialists decorated the walls, the guide informs. A five cent cup of coffee may be ordered and the visitor-interloper may vicariously experience the politically-charged

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environment. The furtive debates carried on at such places considered which revolutionary political system would be most appropriate to replace capitalism with its disparate socioeconomic inequalities, so apparent in 1890. "All smoke cigarettes and those who are not playing are discussing, not loudly, yet with vehemence, European politics, always with indignation of kingly tyranny and proud comparison of American independence with foreign subservience."[24] The intrepid visitor might end his soirée searching for wine, women, and song among the many establishments off Sixth Avenue, only one of which is described by the guide writer as "wicked." Probably travel writers of the time restrained themselves from advocating that their readers probe too deeply under the surface of the city at night, for surely further searching could have enabled the visitor to come in contact with crime, poverty, sickness, depravity, and numerous houses of prostitution that prompted the Riis's exposé at the time. According to this report, with an armed escort a well-heeled male visitor could visit the most dangerous sectors with impunity from felonious physical injury, though risk from robbery or pick-pocketing ("jostling") to the unwary was not ruled out.

Policing and Its Appearance

The need to control crime and disorder and also to manage a variety of other municipal activities, fell predominantly within the responsibilities of the police department. These

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included: issuing licenses and permits, enforcing excise laws, investigating steam-boiler accidents, providing a Tenement-House Squad to support the Health Department, responding to complaints and violations reported by the Sanitary Police, and caring for runaways and foundlings.

By 1890, police officials understood that their department had emerged from a turbulent half century of evolution and was just then feeling the transformation into a modern urban bureaucracy, guided steadily by technological and scientific findings. The department had been quick to adapt to technology since its modern organization of 1844-45. The Police Telegraph System had been founded in 1857, and by 1890, it handled almost 347,000 messages, serving both public safety and other municipal departments. The year saw the expansion of a police call box system which was now installed in six out of thirty-five precincts. The contribution these systems made to the investigation and solution of crimes or for response to fires, accidents and other emergencies was not analyzed by the department. Of the total number of messages transmitted, the superintendent sent 827 general alarms concerning lost and stolen property; 1,244 about missing persons and lost children, and 2,026 related to fire. Meanwhile, dead animal carcasses on the streets was an everyday sight and the office received a total of 31,009 complaints about dead animals.

The neighborhood signal box system allowed calls for ambulances, police, or fire assistance and which also allowed patrolling police officers to confirm their presence three

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times a day and receive messages at other times.

Yet by 1890, policing in the city while relentlessly modernizing, lived under the specter of a swaggering police bureaucracy an rigid patrol officers some of whose members were believed to be corrupt in their official duties. The police brass faced periodic criticism from state officials, reform groups, and predictably from the forty-three daily newspapers. The commercial and financial elite of the city seemed content with police services in 1890--at least their needs were being addressed generally.

Superintendent William Murray, contemplating retirement a year away, continued his campaign to increase police staffing. With an urban population of 1,700,000, according to police estimates--almost 200,000 higher than the official census--and an officer count of 3,525, the police/public ratio calculated as one police officer for every 482 inhabitants. However, excluding vacations and personal leave, sick time, and specialized and supervisory staff functions, the number of police actually on patrol was closer to one per every 560 residents. Murray claimed, without citing his sources, that this put New York City at a great disadvantage in attempting to serve the public and to make the point compared the city to European capitals: Berlin had one police officer for every 322 in population; London one for 312, and Paris one for 283.[25] (The Superintendent's claims were to resurface in the years ahead in subsequent annual police reports under different leaders also without the source of police personnel numbers

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and population data listed.)

Murray's appeal for additional policing was based on population changes within the rapidly growing metropolis. "The city north of the Harlem river has grown so rapidly that an increase of force there is imperatively necessary...," he argued; further, the palpably rapid pace of growth strained police management that could only be relieved by more personnel. The city retained its eminence as a national port of entry and as a major transportation terminus. With the completion of the Brooklyn Bridge seven years earlier, traffic between the city and Brooklyn had been greater than city officials had expected. Indeed, tolls from vehicles and pedestrians had provided such revenues that vehicular traffic would pay for the cost of constructing the bridge a few years earlier than initially predicted.

City authorities felt so encouraged about bridge usage and finances that the one cent pedestrian charge was eliminated; the urgency for additional bridges over the East River had become apparent. Talk of amalgamation with Brooklyn and other territories had been raised for years and had become an active issue for city and state legislators. In the context of expanding urbanism, a unified police presence with expanded resources would be required. (The origins of early policing and its development through the nineteenth century will be discussed in Chapter 2.)

The police and the poor always have had an informal, protean contractual relationship. While keeping a way eye and

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an exploitative arm on the poor during daytime, New York police offered an ultimate safety net at nighttime, beyond the services offered by churches, charities, and the city government. Police precincts offered free nocturnal lodging in station houses to those destitute of any other accommodations.[26] The police were burdened with their role as lodger-of-last-resort since police officers on evening duty within precinct houses frequently had to visit the basement dormitories to maintain quiet and order while also maintaining responsibility simultaneously for prisoners from criminal proceedings, usually housed on an upper floor. For years, superintendents had railed against this duty, but had continued to accept it, nonetheless. Officers on night duty also had to be available for any general emergencies that might come to their attention during their tours. Some prisoners held in the jail cells might not be there following arrest in connection with a crime. Some were held as material witnesses to testify in a forthcoming trial. Superintendent Murray expressed sympathy for lack of fairness present in the situation:

> The 346 unfortunate witnesses of crimes should be confined within the walls of a prison for no other offense than that of seeing a crime committed, and too poor and friendless to furnish security for their presence at a legal proceedings following such crimes is, by inference, an equal number of offenses against justice and right.[27]

The Police Department in 1890 was directed by a Board of Police composed of a president (Charles F. MacLean), a treasurer, and the chairman of the committee on repairs and

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supplies and the committee on pensions. The officers of the department and its force were a Chief Clerk (William H. Kipp), a First Deputy Clerk, the Chief of the Bureau of Elections, the Superintendent of Telegraph, the Property Clerk, the Superintendent of Police (William Murray), a Chief Inspector (Thomas Byrnes), and three additional inspectors. In addition to these the department counted eighteen surgeons, thirty-six captains, 161 sergeants, forty detective sergeants, 158 roundsmen (roving supervisors), 3,032 patrolmen, and forty doormen. Of these patrolmen and officers, forty-five were assigned pursuant to law to the Health Department, where they existed as the Tenement-House Squad to make arrests subject to the order of the superintendent, and sixty to the Department of Street Cleaning. Traditional police service was provided through thirty-five precincts each of which had one captain and three-to-five sergeants, two-to-six roundsmen, one or two doormen, and twenty-seven to 126 patrolmen. A few officers were permanently assigned to the six courts, fifty-one served in the central office, 330 Mulberry Street, and sixty-four served within the Detective Bureau.[28]

The character of New York policing of the era is expressed in the career of Inspector Thomas Byrnes, the most celebrated member of the police force of the time whose reputation and public visibility frequently exceeded that of the superintendents under whom he served until finally being elevated to that office himself. Byrnes became chief of

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detectives in 1880; two years later through his and others' efforts, the Detective Bureau was created by the state legislature. Byrnes's reputation derived from three achievements: his ability to create an apparent crime-free zone in the financial district, the capacity of his squad to make a steady well-publicized number of criminal arrests, and his ability to communicate eloquently with the public cementing support for his position and programs. An article in Harper's of the time described the apparent success of this celebrated bureau:

> The Detective Bureau soon attained to national importance. Special attention was paid to Wall Street. Skilled thieves, the "best men" of their nefarious occupation, prized it as the richest of their hunting grounds....[Thieves] may view from afar, but may not enter. Any thief found below a line drawn across the city through Fulton Street is seized at once and compelled to account for himself. If the explanation be not satisfactory, the grip of the law tightens around the culprit, and the familiar jail again becomes his home. Ten or twelve detectives are always on duty at a room in the Stock-Exchange. On call, one or more can be sent to any place in the lower section of the city within two or three minutes. "From the 12th of March, 1880, until to-day, they have not lost a ten-cent stamp in Wall Street by a professional thief--not a penny, not a cent," is not an empty boast. It is sober truth.[29]

Byrnes's zone sanitaire might reflect a writer's exuberance and not reflect critically examined reality, because on one occasion while the president of the New York Stock Exchange presented a gold watch to Byrnes "in recognition of his single usefulness," the exchange president's fur-trimmed overcoat disappeared and was not reported recovered.[30]

Four years after the detective bureau was created, Byrnes

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wrote a remarkable volume 1886 Professional Criminals of America, which included the photographs, aliases, specialties, descriptions, and police records of 204 "professional criminals."[31] The inspector additionally wrote knowingly about different criminal types, including sagacious observations based on his investigative experience: a bank burglar is "A man of education, refined habits, and possibly a minimum of courage..."; forgers are sometimes chemists and "by the aid of a secret mixture of acid, they are able to erase figures in ink from the faces of notes without destroying or damaging the paper"; and store and safe burglars often operate between Saturday night and Monday morning, often as a group. These felons, Byrnes opined, "are men of fair education, but those who spend their lifetime operating in the lower degrees in that line are coarse and dull, still in planning and executing a theft they display considerable shrewdness."[32]

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. noted in an essay accompanying a reprint edition of the volume that Byrnes "wrote about criminals in language which might have been taken from the didactic tracts of the day praising contemporary millionaires and telling how they made their money."[33] Byrnes used photography to aid in identification and stated that his Rogues' Gallery served the public in spotting people despite the attempt to use disguise. Byrnes's book provides a cornucopia of information on mysterious murders, consequences of the opium habit, prison commutation laws and rules in several states, prison, penitentiary, and reformatory

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locations, and other material, establishing the inspector as a man clearly with a firm grasp of his vocation. By 1894, Byrnes boasted that as head of the Bureau he had "obtained more years of convictions against crimes than the detective forces of Scotland Yard, Paris and New Jersey put together, nearly 10,000 years."[34] The same year, then promoted to superintendent, Byrnes exulted on the success of crime reduction during his tenure:

> Not many years ago, New York city was infested with criminals of all kinds. It was impossible to walk along the streets without rubbing up against them; indeed, they were so numerous that they actually elbowed respectable people off the sidewalk....So radical measures were taken; in a comparatively short space of time everyone of these men was summoned to Police Headquarters and ordered to leave town and to keep away. They all left and most of them have kept away; those who returned have had occasion to regret it.[35]

Byrnes then warned that Europe was giving America "the most dangerous kind of criminal that exists at the present time--the anarchist." His article also harangued the media for being "a frequent obstacle" to the detection of crime, while at the same time recognizing that publicity enabled identification of malefactors "in a great many cases." The much lauded officer was more than he seemed: defender of the "respectable people"; maintainer of the crime-free zone for the financial community, and foe to the forger, burglar, and thief; he was also during the same tenure a conduit of money and patronage for Tammany Hall and the apparent unindicted head of a major pervasive police extortion ring.[36]

Byrnes through the 1880s, had been considered a formidable crime-fighter and force for good by Lincoln

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Steffans, Jacob Riis, and numerous bankers, financiers, journalists, and civic leaders. His ability to inoculate the area south of Fulton Street from petty crime was considered an extraordinary feat which received the admiration of police and non-police government officials in other American and European cities. Yet when Byrnes was forced to retire in 1894, precipitated by evidence of an impending scandal, he settled in an estate in Cos Cob, Connecticut, with an estimated fortune in excess of $350 thousand and that from an annual salary that reached $4,800 in his year of retirement.[37] The hypocrisy of top officers like Byrnes, professing honesty and efficiency publicly while systematically profiting from a corrupt system he headed, was not likely to be lost on younger officers, and Byrnes's presence--his very existence, it would later be learned--reflected a profound malaise in police management that would face intense scrutiny in the proximate future.

The Limitations of 1890 Police Data

In 1890, total arrests data for the city included seizures by regular officers, the Detective Bureau, and the Sanitary Squad. Data for the year reflected police reaction to persistent demands for greater enforcement of ignored violations. Gambling arrests had risen to 409 for the year, up from 292 in 1889, and resulted in 103 convictions, 195 discharges, and 111 cases pending. In addition, the Tenement-House Squad conducted over 190,000 inspections during the

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year, including almost 24,000 night inspections, ordered by the Health Department's Division of Contagious Diseases, a process which resulted in 126 arrests.

Other tasks included routine patrols of business establishments supposed to be locked at night. Almost 2,800 buildings were found open by patrolling officers and were secured. The issuing of permits was another police task. The city granted permits for 1,142 parades, 231 funerals, and 277 masked balls, in addition to 622 pistol permits.[38] The sanctity of the voting booth was an additional responsibility of police during elections and represented an abiding interest of reformers. Data for the year show that 483 ballot clerks resigned and another 2,460 were under investigation.

From a perusal of the departmental report for 1890, a reader might conclude that policing was being relentlessly modernized, though the department was understaffed compared with European police departments. The reason for being of the police department was the control of urban disorder, encompassing a variety of threats to urban stability: violent crime occurred, but was subordinate in local preoccupation to the control of potential violent strikes, political activism, and neighborhood riots. Moses King concludes that the department "in general efficacy, discipline and morality, is conceded to be 'one of the finest' in the world." Further, monographs and articles published within the previous decade by William Browne, Anthony Comstock, Augustine E. Costello, Ernest Howard Crosby, S.A. Mackeever, and George W. Walling

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tell colorful, even lurid tales of the colorful, corrupt, and sometimes dangerous nightlife of the city, while not substantially criticizing the police or methodically subjecting their performance to analysis. The often rough behavior of New York police's on-the-spot justice was documented by some critics while police advocates believed that justice at the end of a stick was one reason why New York City seemed to have a low crime rate: criminals were known to the precinct police and feared them.[39] Some observers were pleased about how safe the city had become from crime and wanton physical violence, though two murders or homicides per week on average did not make the city seem altogether safe to some critical viewers. In 1890, police activity was measured by arrests, which reflect success at responding to or clearing a crime complaint: not available are complaints themselves that signify the quantity of incidents brought to the attention of police. (Table 1.1)

Nonetheless, arrests do provide documentation of police activity that can be contrasted with other years of the era. But arrest data present information of successes only: information on the total number of crime incidents were not part of officials reports for 1890.

Women, Immigrants, the Poor and Crime

Women represented about one-quarter of the individuals arrested for crimes within the city in 1890: of 84,556 total arrests, 18,595 were women. Of the female arrest aggregate,

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Table 1.1

All Arrests by New York City Police--1890

Offenses	Males	Females	Total
Assault & Battery	4,859	549	5,408
" with Intent to Steal	12	2	14
" felonious	642	53	695
Arson	15	6	21
Abandonment	492	16	508
Abduction	38	6	44
Abortion	2	3	5
Assault, indecent	56	--	56
Attempt at suicide	143	71	214
" Burglary	32	--	32
" Robbery	10	--	10
" Rape	10	--	10
" Blackmail	1	--	1
" Grand Larceny	1	--	1
" Arson	--	1	1
Assaulting an Officer	36	1	37
Aiding/abetting prize fight	5	1	6
Alcoholism	5	--	5
Advertising counterfeit money	1	--	1
Burglary	689	12	701
Bastardy	198	--	198
Bigamy	14	4	18
Blackmail	10	--	10
Begging	10	7	17
Bribery	11	--	11
Breaking Jail	1	--	1
Bringing Stolen Property into the State	2	1	3
Broaching Cargo	5	--	5
Contempt of Court	95	11	106
Cruelty to animals	92	--	92
" to Children	55	34	89
Crime Against Nature	16	--	16
Conspiracy	21	--	21
Carrying Burglars' Tools	10	--	10
Counterfeiting	2	--	2
Compounding felony	1	--	1
Disorderly conduct	9,921	4,735	14,656
Deserter	24	--	24
Disorderly persons	1,078	926	2,004
Delirium Tremens	1	--	1
Disposing of mortgaged property	--	1	1
Dereliction of Duty	3	--	3
Escaped Prisoners	12	--	12
Embezzlement	3	--	3
Exposure of Person	61	2	63
Extortion	9	1	10

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Table 1.1, continued

Fugitive	2	--	2
Forgery	96	3	99
Fighting in the Street	7	--	7
Failing to Provide for Family	1	--	1
False Pretense	6	--	6
Forcible Entry	3	--	3
Gambling	170	1	171
Homicide	96	4	100
" Accessory to	1	--	1
Intoxication	16,134	7,036	23,170
" and Disorder. Conduct	6,246	2,068	8,314
Insane	451	239	690
Interfering with an Officer	56	1	57
Injuring Property	1	--	1
Infanticide	--	1	--
Incorrigible	10	--	10
Juvenile Delinquents	34	15	49
Keeping Unlicensed Sailor's Boarding House	2	--	2
Keeping Disorderly House	61	145	206
" Gambling House	26	4	30
Kidnapping	--	1	1
Keeping opium joint	4	4	8
Libel	28	1	29
Larceny, Grand	1,456	258	1,714
" Petit	2,984	462	3,446
" Person	110	14	124
Malicious Mischief	314	33	347
Mayhem	13	3	16
Murder	7	--	7
Misdemeanor	40	8	48
Obstructing Railroad Track	31	--	31
" Mail Wagon	1	--	1
Picking Pockets	4	--	4
Perjury	8	6	14
Personating Officer	7	--	7
Passing Counterfeit Money	54	2	56
" Worthless Checks	5	1	6
Public Nuisance	1	--	1
Prize Fighting	1	--	1
Robbery	249	8	257
Reckless Driving	732	2	734
Receiving Stolen Goods	67	9	76
Rape	40	--	40
Reckless Blasting	34	--	34
Rescuing Prisoners	3	--	3
Selling Adulterated Vinegar	2	--	2
" Obscene Literature	12	1	13
Surrender Bail	63	4	67
Suspicious Persons	3,284	386	3,670
Swindling	3	--	3
Seduction	10	--	10

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Table 1.1, continued

Stringing Wires	17	--	17
Selling Liquors to Minors	6	2	8
Selling Impure Milk	4	--	4
Smoking Cigarettes	2	--	2
Soliciting	--	1	1
Truancy	149	44	193
Trespass	11	--	11
Till Tapping	2	--	2
Unlawful Entry	2	--	2
Vagrancy	1,331	773	2,104
Violation of Corp. Ordinance	5,179	138	5,317
" Health Law	2,174	357	2,531
" Excise Law	4,646	97	4,743
" Lottery Law	107	5	112
" Penal Code	21	2	23
" Sabbath Law	225	3	228
" Electrical Law	8	--	8
" State Law	2	--	2
" Medical Law	20	1	21
" Hotel Law	22	--	22
" Auction Law	6	--	6
" Pool Law	90	--	90
" Oleomargarine Law	4	1	5
" Dental Law	10	--	10
" Building Law	--	1	1
" Obscene Print Law	12	2	14
" Theatrical Law	14	--	14
" Factory Law	18	--	18
" Dairy Law	2	--	2
" Gambling Law	5	--	5
" Steam Boiler Law	1	--	1
" Election Law	59	--	59
" Usury Law	1	--	1
" Trade-mark Law	3	--	3
" Parole Law	1	--	1
" Consolidation Act	1	--	1
" Chapter 817, Laws of 1872	14	--	14
" Chapter 430, Law of 1887	3	--	3
" Chapter 377, Law of 1887	2	--	2
" Chapter 499, Law of 1885	2	--	2
" Bottle Act	102	1	103
Warrant	1	--	1
Witnesses	8	5	13
Total	65,961	18,595	84,556

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disorderly conduct, intoxication, and vagrancy represent 15,538 (83.6 percent) of the total. The majority of females were arrested in reality for actual or suspected prostitution though this charge was not a specific offense used at the time and women arrested for prostitution could be cited for any one of numerous offenses. New York police concentrated much attention on parlor houses and certain tenement houses, hotels, furnished rooms, and massage parlors likely to be frequented by prostitutes. Timothy J. Gilfoyle has reviewed the commercialization of sex within the city from 1790 to 1920, and identified the extent and migratory pattern of houses of prostitution in the city over a century's time: the "disorderly houses" changed locations based on complex forces, including police protection.[40] From the beginning of his study to the end, the connection between prostitution and police corruption was sustained. In 1806, watchmen (precursors to modern police) were charged with "going to a common dance house and there joining and dancing with the common girls and their associates." Gilfoyle quotes one citizen as early as 1805, who concluded that city marshals were little were little more than "brokers among the prostitutes."[41]

The decentralized nature of police in the early century allowed residents or business operators to influence policing in their areas. Some guidebooks of the time provided explicit addresses and details of houses of prostitution; these publications were sometimes sold with a warning that such locations were identified as a precaution that they might be

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avoided. Prostitutes were poor and often desperate, though a few might become proprietors of their own "houses" and be able to save, invest, and retire from the business with an estate of their own. Long prior to such dreamed retirement, however, cooperating with the police was a requirement for doing business and in time the extent to which prostitutes and police shared common economic objectives would be revealed by a state investigative committee.

Middle class women were disproportionately arrested for another type of crime: the preceding years had heralded the emergence of the modern department store with its tantalizing skills of making a large number of objects desirable--even irresistible--under one roof: this encouraged shoplifting, or larceny of merchandise displayed for sale. The invention of the Victorian era department store, coupled with the fact that many middle-class women had the time, desire, and necessity to shop while their spouses worked long hours, led to the emergence of shoplifting as a crime that eventually attracted academic interest.[42] However, women were disproportionately underrepresented in arrests for felonies, that is, serious offenses defined here as violent crime (murder, robbery, and felonious assault) and property crime (larceny-theft and arson) which could result in imprisonment for over one year. Of the 1,116 arrests for violent crime, only 6.1 percent were females, and of the 7,128 arrests for property crime, 12.5 percent were females. In total, women were arrested for 11.5 percent of all serious offenses in 1890. (Table 1.2)

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Table 1.2

Arrests for Serious Crimes, New York City Police Department, 1890

Offenses	Males	Females	Total
Violent Crime			
Murder & Non-Negligent Homicide[1]	103	5	108
Rape	40	0	40
Robbery	249	8	257
Aggravated Assault[2]	655	56	711
Subtotal	1,048	68	1,116
Percent	93.9	6.1	100.0
Property Crime			
Burglary	689	12	701
Larceny-Theft[3]	4,556	734	5,290
Arson	15	6	21
Subtotal	5,260	752	6,012
Percent	87.5	12.5	100.0
Total	6,308	820	7,128
Percent	88.5	11.5	100.0

Notes: 1. Includes one accessory to homicide. 2. Includes mayhem. 3. Includes grand, petit, and personal larceny, and till tapping.

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Immigration was surging: police records show that 93,740 passengers landed at Castle Garden wharf travelling cabin class with an additional 379,150 travelling steerage. As a port of debarkation, tens of thousands of voyagers arrived and soon moved on to other parts of the nation; however, thousands remained in the city with or without immediate job opportunities, connections with families or friends, housing, and knowledge of customs and language. Established city residents had long feared that immigrants were disproportionately linked to violent and property crime in the City. Those fears are partially confirmed by an analysis of police and population records. (Table 1.3)

Native born white citizens had an arrest rate about one-fifth less than the total arrest average; native born American blacks, few in population within the city in 1890, had an arrest record about half higher than their numerical representation.

However, police and community fears seemed to focus on foreign born males who, having fewer economic and social ties to the community, appeared to have a higher arrest rate. For some immigrant groups that was the case: arrestees born in Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, and otherwise undefined "other" nations had a considerably higher than average arrest rate; those from Austria, Germany, Hungary, and Russia showed disproportionately lower crime than their percentage of the population would suggest, and those born in France and the Scandinavian countries were arrested at about the average

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Table 1.3

Nativity of People Arrested Compared with Total Population

Where Born	Arrests by Birthplace Male	Female	Total	%	Population by Birthplace Total	%
U.S. (White)	30,225	7,435	37,660	44.6	852,641	56.3
U.S. (Black)	1,186	765	1,951	2.3	22,717	1.5
Germany	8,179	967	9,146	10.8	210,723	13.9
Ireland	13,863	7,391	21,254	25.2	190,418	12.6
Russia	2,091	112	2,203	2.6	48,790	3.2
Great Britain	2,440	948	3,388	4.0	48,306	3.2
Italy	4,350	407	4,757	5.6	39,951	2.6
Austria	562	45	607	0.7	27,193	1.8
Hungary	199	32	231	0.3	12,222	0.8
France	394	155	549	0.6	10,535	0.7
Scandinavia	547	60	607	0.7	10,139	0.7
Other	1,925	228	2,153	2.6	41,666	2.7
Total	65,961	18,545	84,506	100.0	1,515,301	100.0

Sources: New York City Police Department. Report for the year ending, December 31, 1890, and Ira Rosenwaike. Population History of New York City.

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arrest rate. Some arrest patterns by sex are striking by their deviations from the average: for example, women from Great Britain, Ireland, and native born blacks were much more likely to be apprehended than the median arrest level for comparable groups.

Arrest, that is, the deprivation of one's liberty by legal authority, is a precursor to formal charges and is only one indication of crime and police performance. Arrests can be understated as a crime indicator and manipulated at various police reporting levels to suit the agenda at hand; for example, a precinct captain eager to either increase or decrease arrests could make this point either directly during daily precinct assemblies or through officers who supervised officers on patrol, yet the amount of actual crime would be little different from the time prior to the time of the change in arrest emphasis. Furthermore, arrest data tell nothing about the magnitudes and patterns of crime for which individuals of different nativities might be arrested. Nonetheless, the data indicate an aggregated basis for otherwise unexamined nativist white prejudices against certain other national or ethnic groups of either sex. These assumptions stigmatized national and ethnic groups, making assimilation more difficult.[43]

At the beginning of the year, Mayor Hugh J. Grant made clear his approval of the police: "(O)ur condition will compare favorably with that of any city in the world. Nowhere is the public peace more effectively maintained, and nowhere

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are violations of the laws providing for personal safety and for the security of property more vigorously enforced." The next year, looking back on 1891, Grant reported:

> The value of the service rendered by the police is universally recognized. There have been, during the past year, no serious riots or serious disturbances of the public peace, and crime has diminished. The force now numbers 3,546 men, and its efficiency makes unnecessary the employment in this city of any private police. No better force exists anywhere in the world than the municipal police force, and nowhere is crime more completely held in check, and by methods of which no complaint can be made."[44]

The spirit of urban progressivism spurred many special interest groups to deal directly with crime and vice problems within the city. The list of such organizations is long: in the early 1840s, the "ragged battalions" of immigrants posed a threat to the city's moral equilibrium. Robert Milham Hartley founded in 1843, the New York Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor, based on the premise that direct personal intervention in the lives of poor families could help them modify their behavior. The organization was in some ways a modification of earlier relief societies that existed from the eighteenth century. Hartley's New York model soon spread to other Eastern cities, though by the 1870s that organization was in decline, as social groups increasingly forced government, not individual volunteers, to establish support programs for the poor. While asylums had been established to serve the needs of paupers, prostitutes, convicts, and the insane, children received age-conditioned support with the creation in 1853 of the Children's Aid Society founded by Charles Loring Brace. In addition "the masses" were served by

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diverse religious groups who provided organized Sunday Schools, tract societies, and "Y's." However earnest the intentions of these endeavors, the perceived growth in crime convinced civic and social leaders that more focused organizations needed to be established to deal with urban crime and disorder. The New York Society for the Suppression of Vice, founded in 1872, was begun as an offshoot of the New York City Young Men's Christian Association. Anthony Comstock, a former dry-goods clerk who had served with the wartime Christian Commission in Florida, was put in charge. Under Comstock's increasingly forceful leadership, the Society became a committed and effective pressure group to counter the laissez-faire attitude of police toward the prevalence of street vice, the failure to enforce Sunday closing laws, the openness of prostitution, and other complaints of urban evils which found their way onto the Society's agenda. Society members were convinced that vice could be reduced bringing myriad social benefits if the police enforced laws found on the books but which routinely were disregarded flagrantly.

Society records provide considerable detail on the nature of specific violators who came within the scope of the group's concerns: abortionists, birth-control advocates, gamblers, lottery operators, and purveyors of obscene materials who, in Boyer's words, "were gnawing away at the moral order."[45] The Society's detailed data collection included: age, nationality, religion, education, offense, evidence seized, and legal actions taken against the moral offenders.[46] The disposition

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of the case and bail charged, if any, were part of the records, along with names of arresting officers, witnesses, inventory of "stash" seized, and remarks. Approximately 140 cases were profiled in 1890 fitting the Society's particular definition of correctable deviance, namely larceny-theft, fraud, embezzlement, and gambling offenses. The first and last cases of the year give two examples of the Society's usual targeted offenders:

> Isaac Lieberman, 42 Avenue B, German-Jew, unmarried, common education, aged 25. Charged with selling tickets to a lottery bringing two indictments to the General Sessions court. A $500 bail was set. The stash included lottery tickets, circulars, letters, and memo books. The Society observed: "A young man, but was very sharp and shrewd and had escaped arrest for a long time." Sentence: six months.

The final case of the year was recorded on December 30, 1890:

> Louis L. Levine, 33 Pleasant Avenue, German-Jew, age not given. Charged with grand larceny. Bail of $500 set. Arrested at Essex Market. Comment: "See former arrest. Took gold watch, chain & studs from Isaac Lieberman while he was in jail serving sentence in place of Levine."

Comstock provided another source of crime data. For a quarter of a century, 1872-1898, he served as a special agent or inspector for the Post Office Department. In this position he separately provided tabular information on fraudulent lottery schemes, "green goods" swindlers, and mailed circular violations.[47] Over the years, Comstock's reports became more data-oriented seeking to find correlations among a multivariate set of factors such known age, nationality, previous arrest record, and punishment of the perpetrator. The success of reformers' anti-vice activities produced

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tangible results. Comstock's office reported that by 1897, book and sheet stock of obscene matter totaled over 1,500 pounds; obscene pictures and photos seized reached almost 5,700, and 3,400 boxes of pills and powders used by abortionists were found and seized. To reformers of the Comstock ilk, the connection between obscene material, gambling, and breaking the Sabbath laws, with intemperance and the consequences of crime, poverty, and unproductivity was patently clear. Moral offenses could be the precursor of societal decline including violent criminal behavior.

Of all the vices concerning reformers, control of distilled spirits had the greatest urgency to many. The Society for the Prevention of Crime, founded by New York City merchants in 1878, developed a censorious moral position against municipal corruption. At the heart of this Society's deep-rooted belief was the certainty that "rum," meaning any kind of distilled spirits, was at the foundation of urban evil particularly for factory workers, immigrants, and youth. The Society invited the charismatic reformer and minister, Dr. Charles H. Parkhurst of New York's Madison Square Presbyterian Church, to become its head, which he did in 1892. The invitation came following a much noted sermon delivered February 14, 1882, that became a clarion call for reformation of New York City's policing:

> Ye are the salt of the earth!...In its municipal life our city is thoroughly rotten. Here is an immense city reaching out arms of evangelization to every quarter of the globe, and yet every step that we take looking to the moral betterment of this city has to be taken directly in the teeth of the damnable pack of

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> administrative bloodhounds that are fattening themselves on the ethical flesh and blood of our citizenship.[48]

Parkhurst proposed a City Vigilance League that would concentrate on advancing "the purity and honesty" of city government. It was clear to the Parkhurst-led group that systematic corruption was beyond self-correction by the municipal ballot box and that a force majeure was required to correct the city's moralistic misdirection: the Society would accomplish this aim not through legislation but litigation in that the police would be enjoined by the courts from Parkhurst-led initiations to enforce laws against violations of the Sabbath, selling of alcohol by saloons to minors, tolerating houses of prostitution with the active knowledge of the precinct, and other violations of the municipal code.

The connection with violent and petty property crime and age of the perpetrators had been an established observation for centuries: youth, for all its promise, is directly related to higher violent and property crime rates and civil disorder. (See further discussion in chapter 9.) In the context of expanding urban life, the young, it was believed, could be saved from crime, immorality, and profligacy if reached physically and spiritually. Tract societies and Sunday School programs of great regimentation provided the hope that the young might be rescued from themselves and their environments: gangs and groups of youth needed to be contacted with particular urgency and well-intentioned persistence. Mission societies worked among the poorest and most dangerous wards with unquestioned sincerity and zeal. Their Sunday schools

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sought to provide for youth what the family unit and community could not or would not, though the coercive nature of these schools did not appeal over the passage of time to the many unsheltered and unstructured young for whom such facilities were intended. Gang life had been a feature of New York since Colonial days. Herbert Asbury estimated that perhaps 50 gangs could be identified prior to the Revolution, some of which existed for years under a succession of names and leadership. Principal among them were the Five Pointers, successor to the Dead Rabbits, the Pug Uglies, and the Whyo's. The Five Pointers had their social center on Great Jones Street from which their 1,500 members controlled an area bounded by 14th Street on the north, the Hudson River on the west, City Hall Park to the south, and the Bowery to the east. Two other territorial gangs of some significance were the Gas House Gang, 200 thugs who controlled the area around Third Avenue and 35th Street, and the Gophers on the opposite side of town, the Lords of Hell's Kitchen.[49]

Gang life had social structure: a club house, scheduled social events, distinctive clothing, often particular hair cuts, and specific roles within the gang members were expected to fulfill. Petty criminal activity was a minor feature of gang life in 1890, mainly involving opportunity thefts of neighborhood businesses such as the snatching of food from streetwalk vendors. But these same gangs also provided protection to businesses within their territories from theft or coercion by other gangs or from non-gang members outside

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the community. Violence among gang members and between gangs was common in this brawling age and sometimes resulted in frightening and dangerous usually nocturnal occurrences. Deliberate attacks on strangers appear to be uncommon based on a reading of police reports and newspapers of the time though robbers may intimidate their victims with vehemence and fury in order to assure and hasten compliance: when physical injuries did occur, they were usually accidental, adventitious, and likely to be directed against an inebriated stranger with serious injury or death an unlikely occurrence, but the fear of gangs threatened the sense of safety of citizens, especially those who lived in or visited gang territory.

Charles Loring Brace had offered the nomenclature for those individuals presumed responsible for the violence, crime, and venality of the expanding metropolis in his book The Dangerous Classes of New York.[50] Those who were dangerous tended to be mostly males, poor, recent immigrants, non-churched, unskilled, poorly educated, unmarried, and imbibers of alcohol. These committed crimes, brawled at libitum, and were likely to be riotous were the circumstances appropriate, and threatened the peace of the respectable citizenry.

This inquiry concentrates on violent crime within the city; however, another type of penal law violation transfixed newspaper readers of the day: it was perpetrated by middle class and wealthy citizens against each other--New Yorkers were on the make. A review of newspaper articles indicated

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the extent to which 1890 was a year of fraud, forgery, and embezzlement as frequent causes for front page news: eighty-nine major cases were reported during the year primarily involving bankers, executives for insurance companies, and trustees for estates, and other wealthy individuals. Charitable and religious organizations were not immune: for example, Patrick Hynes was charged with embezzling from the Ancient Order of Hibernians of which he was the treasurer; B.H. Vernet disappeared with the sixty-ninth Regiment's funds; S. Baruch stole from the Austria-Hungary emigrants' funds, and J.C. File, treasurer of the Lutheran Orphans' Home, was reported for irregularities.[51]

The Police and the Public Health Nexus

Reform of policing was part of the progressive agenda; how-ever, as noted earlier, it failed to rank as a highest priority, and when addressed, at least in the years preceding 1890, attempts to manage changes in "the system" of urban crime control had led to firm resistance and largely successful opposition by police groups. Why were reformers not more effect in changing police behavior prior to the 1890s? One explanation suggests that progressives tended to choose their targets singly, and policing was not highest among objectives; therefore, such issues as: the improvement of urban public health conditions; reform of municipal government, including the introduction of the Australian ballot; and the attempt to bust powerful economic industrial

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oligarchs (the "trusts") attracted the most interest from progressive groups. Yet progressive interest was broad, encompassing not just general governmental management concerns, but also included specific issues like improved transportation, housing, public education and fire protection.

The successful interconnection of policing and public health departments--one on the cusp of a wave of reform and the other evolving steadily in permanent institutional change--was believed to be critical to a functioning, modern community. In his annual message dated January 6, 1890, Mayor Hugh J. Grant stated: "The first requisite of any civilized community is security of life and property...The public health may be considered as next in importance to personal security.[52] In 1890 and for many years previously, police and public health services were coordinated administratively and organizationally in some aspects: for one, the president of the Board of Police was one of six members of the Board of Health, the others were Commissioner of Health, Health Officer of the Port, a secretary, a lawyer, and the president. Both policing and public health were related by the concept that they were fundamental linked requirements of urban management, as reflected in the origin of the word police from L. politia, meaning state, and city, and Gk. polites, citizens.

The greatest challenges for health services providers were related to the teeming tenement and lodging house areas where disease control was an urgent priority. Services included a vast array of activities related to both

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departments mandates to enforce the Sanitary Code: this included inspections and, if necessary, fines, and seizures. The use of animals for transportation and as pets throughout the city contributed to a pervasive environmental hazard as health officials had become convinced of the relationship between omnipresent and plentiful animal wastes and communicable disease issues. The Sanitary Bureau devoted considerable effort to remove wastes from horses and also from other domestic animals found in great numbers within the city, but removal of the cadavers of such animals was an added issue. Almost eight thousand dead horses were removed from the streets in 1890, in addition to almost 2,750 cows and calves, 543 sheep, and 125 goats, though dead cats and dogs removed from the streets or pound were the most frequently cited animal, totaling almost 31,000.[53]

This quantity of domestic animals produced enormous wastage which, combined with human wastes among a rapidly growing population, contributed to management problem requiring the support of law enforcement. In addition to issuing citations for health violations, the police supported health department objectives in other ways such as by licensing "night soil" scavengers: those licensed removed wastage to three locations where the material was loaded on specially constructed barges to be transported to Barren Island for final disposition. The department realized the desirability of eliminating privy vaults and, by orders of the Board, these had been reduced from about ten thousand in 1885

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to less than 900 at the end of 1890.[54]

Vigorous public health measures had brought demonstrable progress: a widely used measurement of epidemiological change is the death rate, determined by dividing the number of recorded deaths by the population and reporting the results on a per thousand population basis. The death rate for 1880 was 26.41; it jumped to 30.99 the next year, and then decreased to 1890 when it was recorded at 24.58. The Health Department's annual report for 1890 noted that "La Grippe" struck the community beginning in December, 1889: on December 30, 123 died; the next day 196. The epidemic reached its height about two weeks later, then slowly abated, lasting about six weeks in all. In the eight days from January 4 to January 11, "the almost unprecedented total of 1,424 (died), the largest number ever recorded in this city in a single week since 1865, with the exception of the week ending July 6, 1872," when 1,591 died, including 212 from sun stroke. Yet had it not been for the influenza epidemic in January, 1890, the death rate for the year would have been 23.68 per thousand, proof of the steady efforts of health, police, and other resources cooperating to fight health risks. The Health Department report explains:

> The death-rate of the city is not excessive, considering the comparative density of the population in many localities, the fact that it is the chief point for receiving and distributing immigrants, and other unavoidable circumstances peculiar to its commercial and metropolitan character; and New York City can justly claim to be preeminent as a healthy place for both residential and business purposes.

The official connection between police and public health

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departments, though separate operationally, regularly resulted in needed police support for public health enforcement efforts. The Sanitary Bureau's four divisions made tens of thousands of annual visits to tenement houses and other residences, retail, commercial, and industrial facilities. In the process occasional police presence was provided for health officials to accomplish their objectives, although the department had the ability to issue its own subpoenas and fines. An example of the cooperation needed by public health officials in performing their prophylactic urban duties requiring police response, is reflected in a report from a neighboring city:

> The forcible vaccination of recalcitrant citizens was a trying experience. Persons who have been warned of the approach of the district physician fled their homes or locked themselves in their rooms. When taken by surprise, they hid in barrels and closets and physically resisted their would-be "tormentors." During an outbreak of smallpox in an Italian tenement district in 1887 the vaccinating party was attacked with chains and rolling pins, forcing a hasty retreat from one of the buildings they had entered. One physician asked for police protection and said that without such help it would be impossible to vaccinate these "ignorant, hot-blooded and impulsive people." Prejudice and lack of tact probably accounted for some of the rough treatment shown the vaccinators and on other occasions undoubtedly may their task that much more difficult.[55]

While crime, corruption, and disorder were of obvious concern to community leaders, risk to physical well being was considerably greater from disease than from criminal injury as reflected from statistics produced by police and public health officials at the time. Compared to the numbers of people who died by natural causes or suicide, how do the number of deaths from crime (murder and homicide) compare and how do they

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reflect life in 1890?

One hundred-eight arrests for murder were reported by New York police in 1890 (Table 1.2), though no indication is given as to the total number of actual incidents. The police also reported 172 initially unknown dead, eighty-one of whom were later identified and buried by friends: no criminal inference, however, can be drawn from this statistic as all cities have unknown dead who appear in the morgue for undetermined reasons. The New York Times for 1890 published 115 articles relating to separate individual murders and homicides within the city, excluding those incidents about which more than one article was written. (Table 1.4) An analysis of these 115 incidents reveals that forty-three were news articles of murders-homicides that occurred outside of New York City, excluding the area of Westchester then considered part of the city. After deleting two incidents that occurred in 1889 but were reported in 1890 and adding one incident that took place in 1890, but was not a news story until 1891, the refined gross figure of murder-homicide articles in the newspaper for the city in 1890 was seventy-two. Of these, thirty-nine homicide incidents (54.1 percent) involved acquaintances during arguments or fights; nineteen (26.4 percent) involved killings of spouses, children, or both; eight (11.1 percent) involved victims from unknown cause; two (2.7 percent) occurred among acquaintances at the workplace; additionally four (5.6 percent) occurred during or following a robbery.

The Board of Health report for the year by contrast

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TABLE 1.4

Summary of Murder-Homicide News Articles in "The New York Times" for 1890

The index for the New York Times in 1890 lists 494 separate stories under the heading "Murder-Homicide." Eliminating those incidents for which several articles were written, the number of separate incidents for the year becomes 115. A review of these establishes that 43 of them concern incidents outside of Manhattan-Westchester, therefore, these incidents were eliminated for consideration. Two murder-homicide incidents occurred in 1889, but did not become a news article until 1890, and these were eliminated; and one event occurred in 1890 but was not reported until the next year. To determine these a search of news stories of 1891 was undertaken and all incidents referring to 1890 were included in the table.

New York "Times" Murder Articles Analysis

Total murder-homicide articles for 1890	494
Individual incidents in 1890*	115
Incidents that occurred only in New York City	72

Murder-Homicide Analysis of 72 Incidents

During or following a robbery	4
Of spouse, children, or both	19
By acquaintances during arguments or fights	39
At the workplace	2
Victims found, cause unknown	8

*Excludes multiple articles for the same incident.

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identifies only sixty-one homicide deaths of whom forty-four are male. Causes for death are: blows, nineteen; cuts and stabs, twelve; gunshot, fifteen; one poison, and fourteen by other methods. Suicides totalled 239. Reflecting the dangerous, coarse, and possibly non-reported criminal activity of the day was the department's data indicating deaths from accidents and negligence totalled 1,449. Among negligence-accident mortality were 731 who died by fractures and contusions, sixty-two by poison, and thirty-two by wounds, and four by cuts and stabs. Within this category deaths caused by murder and non-negligent homicide could be easily categorized, especially by a police department where data collection had flexible standards. Thus, it is likely that the number of deaths by murder-homicide exceeds the sixty-one suggested in the police report and the seventy-two mentioned in the New York Times. In short, while the number of murders cannot be known with precision, the true number is likely to be higher but comparable than that reported by police of the time.

On balance in 1890, it appeared to some contemporary observers that the police department though certainly with a venal past and a suspect present was responsive to most of the established interests of the community and generally satisfied business leaders; reformers, some small business operators, and systematic law-breakers, and others felt differently. The high sense of urban disorder from earlier years in the century had declined and the memories of divisive mass rioting grew dim. That perception would have ignored another factor:

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persevering but well hidden venality and criminality within the department itself. Beneath the surface intransigent corruptive problems--approaching those of the mid-1850s in magnitude--were emerging to the surface: reformers had called with increasing insistence for an investigation of New York City police by the New York State Senate which was finally convened on January 30, 1894, under the leadership of upstate Republican Senator Clarence Lexow, to investigate perceived widespread organized graft, "the system." Over seven months later the Lexow Committee had produced five volumes with over 1000 pages each, devoted to testimony on corruption of the Police Department of the City of New York. Tammany Hall, though never openly espousing corrupt activities, surreptitiously supported a graft-operating political system which had been flourishing from 1886 under the leadership then of Richard Croker.[56] Without any evidence of police wrongdoing appearing anywhere in departmental reports and without any significant independent internal police controls, the Lexow Commission would later document that criminal and civil violations abounded: opponents to police shakedowns and graft "were abused, clubbed and imprisoned, and even convicted of crime on false testimony by policemen and their accomplices."[57]

Some legitimate businesses, particularly those concerned with transportation, were forced to pay graft. But the biggest targets for police graft were small businesses and operations which frequently violated municipal, excise, or Sabbath laws in the process of their normal operations.

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Saloons might pay $2 to $20 per month; poolrooms $200; betting shops $20. New brothels paid $500 to open. The flow of funds from police shakedowns was estimated at $7 million annually, nor did it stop there. So attractive was a career in policing because of the illegal stream of money that some applicants, according to testimony, would pay $300 in graft to be hired. Promotions to higher ranks cost more and a captaincy might fetch $15,000, or over five times the annual salary for captain at that time ($2,750).

The administration and collection of monthly payoffs from the extorted graft-payers involved managerial skills similar to those being used in modernized corporate activities of the time: collection, supervision, record-keeping, and disbursements were all routinized and institutionalized. Indeed, for many of the graft payers who testified before the Lexow Commission, the system was so much taken for granted as a way of life for policing that few involved questioned its illegality. The relationship between the police and graft-payers was one of well understood reciprocity: the police permitted illegal businesses to operate or legal businesses to operate without following the law strictly for a negotiated fee or a set percentage of the business's gross revenues. Similarly, petty crime-related problems that individuals or organizations might face in the process of operating would receive the diligent efforts of police, no doubt partially, so that their graft income stream would be protected.

Surely not all police positions entailed the payment of

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graft, though testimony at the Lexow hearings indicated that police officers with a predisposition toward corrupt behavior angled and bought their way into positions which would assign them generally to the socially and economically marginal precincts of the city where certain criminal propensities were greatest and where the police were most organized to exploit graft for themselves.[58]

The Republican-dominated committee was devastating in its litany of charges about performance of the highly Democratic Party-influenced police force. The charges sought to cause maximum damage to the party for its blind eye to police brutality, blackmail, disorderly houses, gambling, green goods (confidence games), failure to collect excise taxes, connections among detectives with brokers and thieves, "oppression of the lowly and unfortunate," and blackmail and extortion of legitimate businesses were among the detailed charges, all backed up with testimony and, according to the committee report, more evidence than could be heard or presented in over seven months of hearings.

Concerning brutality the committee charged: "This condition has grown to such an extent that even in the eyes of our foreign-born residents our institutions have been degraded, and those who have fled from oppression abroad have come here to be doubly oppressed in a professedly free and liberal country."[59] The hearings included a "spectacle" appearance of about 100 uniformed patrolmen who had been "convicted by the police commissioners of unprovoked and

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unwarranted assaults on citizens, amounting to crimes of assault in the second and third degree" over the previous three years. The police force had become demoralized, in the opinion of the committee, because of the burden of the corrupt practices enumerated during the investigation and revealed in often sensational press coverage. The committee noted the endemic social perniciousness from police officers who purchased their appointments:

> The policeman who pays for his appointment commences his career with the commission of a crime, and it is not strange that the demoralization thus engendered should follow him in his further career. The captain who pays a fortune for his appointment finds himself compelled to recoup in order to return the moneys loaned to him by his friends by resorting to the practices which have been disclosed in the record before us. It seems incredible that men who are otherwise law-abiding and efficient, should stoop to the perpetuation of the monstrous and debasing practices revealed by this record, unless influenced by a system existing as a result of the conditions hereinbefore alluded to.[60]

Yet in many other ways New York City was coping with its growth in population and industrialization with an élan that won the admiration of other municipal governments. For the previous two years the tax rate had dropped. Mayor Grant boasted:

> We can justly congratulate ourselves that during the year which has just closed the city has accomplished the most remarkable financial achievement that has ever been recorded in history. For the first time in the history of any political body, whether federal, state or municipal, republican or monarchical, the obligations of this municipality, bearing two and one-half percent interest, have been sold at a premium in the open market.[61]

That money was to be used for major street improvements, to remove street wires which were heavily strung like uncooked

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spaghetti from pole to pole in the entire business district; it was to be spent on the creation of new school houses and the employment of additional teachers: the city founded huge capital projects, provided increasing public services, and helped finance state government. The city celebrated on July 15, 1890 the opening of the New Aqueduct at a cost of almost $25 million, and had approved $2.5 million more for the completion of the New Croton Aqueduct "giving to the city a more beautiful and more healthful supply of water than that enjoyed by any other city in the world."[62] In addition to other increased expenditure for bridges, baths, poor relief, hospitals, asylums, and other charitable institutions, the city looked with pride on its achievements on so many fronts. It would be a later day, however, when progressive reform that was succeeding so effectively against public health scourges would turn to a more protean urban service to effect reorganization: the municipal police. And for the citizenry at large, respective of the venalities of police, it would be a year regarded for many decades as a low base from which the most serious category and reliable measurement of violent crime--murder and nonnegligent homicide--would begin to ascend in coming decades, or appear to do so.

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ENDNOTES

1. Mark Twain and Charles Dudley Warner, The Gilded Age: A Tale of Today, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1972. First published in 1873. The amusing but rather convoluted novel follows the career of the Hawkins family from Kansas with action taking place in Washington, Philadelphia, New York, and elsewhere. Laura Hawkins finds herself imprisoned in the New York Tombs (city jail) for the homicide of her lover who jilted her. Parodying New York criminal justice of the time, the authors posit that justice as exemplified by Laura's attorney, Mr. Braham, and Judge O'Shaunnessy, if not literally for sale, can be vastly influenced by money and position.

Was Twain's "gilded" appellation an insightful social comment or an example of his wry wit? The answer is open to discussion. Other societies have been known for their widely identified Golden Ages--for example, the Dutch Northern Netherlands, 1580-1620, and Denmark, 1800-1840--but Twain has left America with a time designation that implies a false veneer over a baser reality.

2. Populism was a movement which centered on issues not of central concern to New York, or to cities in general; while not overtly anti-city, its message was aimed mostly at rural populations distant from New York. A comprehensive survey of the movement is found in John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt, Lincoln, NE: Nebraska Press, 1961, and Norman Pollack, The Populist Response to Industrial America, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962, which posited a linkage between the sometimes radicalism of populism with later Marxism, though Robert F. Durden, The Climax of Populism, Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1965, emphasizes the rationality of leadership. A negative view on populism was presented in Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R., New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955, which seemingly asserted that "the Populist had been motivated, not by radical ideas and real grievances, but rather by irrational anxieties about their declining status in a modernizing society," see Robert M. Collins "The Originality Trap: Richard Hofstadter on Populism," The Journal of American History. 76:150, 1989. An interesting psychological interpretation of the period is provided by James M. Youngdale, Populism: A Psychohistorical Perspective, Port Washington, NY: Kennikat, 1975.

3. Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order: 1877-1920, New York: Hill & Wang, 1967, provides a historical outline and rationale behind the progressive agenda, though readers may find it hard to accept the author's premises that progressive legislation was directed by and primarily benefitted oligarchs. An earlier work on the period is Harold U. Faulkner, The Quest for Social Justice, 1898-1914, New York: Macmillan Co., 1931.

Numerous facets of the Progressive agenda are reflected

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in a series of then scholarly essays in Michael H. Ebner and Eugene M. Tobin, eds., The Age of Urban Reform: New Perspectives on the Progressive Era, Fort Washington, NY: Kennikat, 1977. Only one contribution deals with New York, Augustus Cerillo, Jr.'s, "Early Twentieth Century Government in New York City," and none of them concerns crime, policing, and the courts as a central issue for reform. Progressivism in policing is discussed in chap. 2.

4. Lewis Mumford, The Brown Decades: A Study of the Arts in America, 1865-1895, New York: Dover Publications, 1971.

Mumford's describes his book as "a ground-breaking work in American architectural history" which, consequently, has an urban orientation. During these same years New York City was being clad in a characteristic material which Edith Wharton refer to as "the universal chocolate-colored coating of the most hideous stone ever quarried."

5. David W. Levy, Herbert Croly of "The New Republic": The Life and Thought of an American Progressive, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985, p. 96. Still another identification for the time was the term "American Renaissance," which incorporated architecture, painting, sculpture, and related activities. The term came into usage about 1880, when artistic, political, and financial activity seemed reminiscent to some with the Italian Renaissance (1420-1580). See: Robert Guy Wilson, The American Renaissance: 1876-1917, Brooklyn: Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences Museum, 1979, p. 11.

The period additionally and pivotally reflected corporativism emerging in its modern form. See: Oliver Zunz, Making America Corporate, 1870-1920, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1990.

6. See Ira Rosenwaike, Population History of New York City, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1972, pp. 64-73. Racial data were not available until the Census of 1900.

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Population and Nativity in New York City and Brooklyn

City and Year	Population Total	Native	% Native	Foreign	% Foreign
New York City (includes Westchester, "The Bronx)					
1860	813,669	429,952	52.8	383,717	47.2
1865	726,386	412,909	56.8	313,477	43.2
1870	942,292	523,198	55.5	419,094	44.5
1880	1,206,299	727,629	60.3	478,670	39.7
1890	1,515,301	875,358	57.8	639,943	42.2
New York City & Brooklyn					
1860	1,080,330	592,024	54.8	488,306	45.2
1870	1,338,391	774,579	57.8	563,812	42.2
1880	1,772,962	1,116,598	62.9	656,364	37.1
1890	2,321,644	1,420,001	61.1	901,643	38.9

Source: Ira Rosenwaike. Population history of New York City. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1972, p. 63. Even years from decennial US Census data; 1865 from Census of the State of New York.

7. Moses King, King's Handbook of New York City, Boston: Moses King, 1892, pp. 185, 860 (Hereafter cited as King's Handbook). This also is a main source for urban detail for the rest of this section. See also: M.G. Van Renssalaer, "Picturesque New York" (1892) and Richard Wheatly, "The New York Produce Exchange," (1886) in Gaslight New York Revisited, Frank Oppel ed., Secaucus, NJ: Castle, 1989, and James D. McCabe, New York by Sunlight and Gaslight, New York: International Publishing Co., 1883, passim (Hereafter cited as Sunlight).

A non-technical discussion of modern construction phenomena discussing the use of steel, elevators, and transportation in urban city growth is found in: James Trefil, A Scientist in the City, New York: Doubleday, 1994.

8. King's Handbook, p. 303.

9. Howells made New York the location for A Hazard of New Fortunes, published in 1890, which pitted Dryfoos, a self-made millionaire, against Lindau, a fervent revolutionary who worked as a translator for a Dryfoos-owned magazine. The book serves both as a kind of documentary of the disparity in wealth between classes and a caricature of the intense politically charged environment of the time.

Howells reflected the ambivalence some well-off intellectuals felt for the time. He wrote Henry James that "at

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the bottom of our wicked hearts we all like New York" which he further characterized as "vast, gay, shapeless" adding:

> I'm not in a very good humor with "America" myself. It seems to be the most grotesquely illogical thing under the sun...I now abhor it, and feel that it is coming out all wrong at the end, unless it bases itself anew on a real equality. Meanwhile, I wear a fur-lined overcoat, and live in all the luxury my money can buy.

Clara Marburg Kirk, W.D. Howells and Art in His Time, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1965, pp. 118-119.

10. Ralph D. Gardner, Horatio Alger, or, the American Hero, Mendota, IL: The Westside Press, 1964. Among the New York-based books were: Adrift in New York; or Tom & Florence Braving the World, Cleveland, OH: The World Syndicate Publishing, copyright in 1889; Ragged Dick, or Street Life in New York, Boston, MA: Loring, 1868, and Ned Newton; or The Fortunes of a New York Bootblack, published in 1890. Because of the frequency with which titles were changed in the series and reissued later often by different publishers, sorting out the exact number concerning New York City is not easy to do.

11. King's Handbook, p. 56.

12. Ward McAlister, Society as I Have Found It, New York: Cassell, 1890. Not all wealthy New Yorkers lived in such single family dwellings. The apartment house was created to served the exigencies of urban life and, over time, would become the preference of most urban dwellers, including the rich. See: Elizabeth Hawes, New York, New York: How the Apartment House Transformed the Life of the City, 1869-1930, New York: Knopf, 1993.

13. New York Times, February 1, 1892, p. 1. "The 400" list actually totalled 319 names of whom 169 families were represented. The list begins with Frederick Hobbs Allen, son of the chief justice of the Kingdom of Hawaii and partner in Adams & Allen, and ends with Mr. & Mrs. John J. Wisong, a lawyer and resident of Newport and Tuxedo Park. No "new money" families like the Carnegies, Flagers, Fricks, Goulds, Harrimans, or Rockefellers made the list.

14. Sunlight, pp. 62-63.

15. An example might be seen in Steven Crane, Maggie: A Girl of the Streets, Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1983. A story of New York in 1893. When Maggie, ditched by her boyfriend, shunned by her family, needs a handout she considers approaching a wealthy stranger spotted walking on the street:

> A stout gentleman, with pompous and philanthropic

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whiskers, went stolidly by, the broad of his back sneering at the girl.

A belated man in business clothes, and in haste to catch a car, bounced against her shoulder. 'Hi, there, Mary, I beg your pardon! Braze up, old girl.' He grasped her arm to steady her, and then was away running down the middle of the street.

Maggie continued to approach wealthy-looking people but was shunned as a presumed prostitute. She lost control of her life, saw no options, and ends her life.

16. Paul Boyer, Urban Masses and Moral Order in America, 1820-1920, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1978, pp. 132-174. (Hereafter cited as Urban Masses). Those charitable and benevolent institutions referred to included, as examples of such numerous institutions were: The Working Girls Vacation Society, founded 1883 and providing two weeks' vacation "for spectable unmarried working girls who have satisfactory recommendations and a physician's statement that a vacation is necessary"; the Florence Night Mission for Fallen Women, established 1883; the Venerable Association for the Relief of Respectable Aged Indigent Females for "women who, having in their youth known better things, had in their old age fallen upon evil days"; the House for Old Men and Aged Couples, incorporated in 1872. Ethnic charitable institutions were equally numerous including: The St. George's Society (English), the St. Andrew's Society (Scottish), the Irish Emigration Society, La Société Français de Bienfaisance, the Belgian Society of Benevolence, and for Germans the Leo House for German Catholic Immigrants and the Lutheran Emigrant House. Orphanages, hospitals, and asylums based on race, religion, national, origins, and vocation (actors, sailors, firemen) served the poor and unfortunate of the City. The New-York Charities Directory, published by the Charity Organization Society, listed: public charities 28; for temporary relief 83; for special relief 51; for foreigners' relief, 26; for permanent relief 67; for medical relief 101; for defectives 161; reformatories 16, and 116 miscellaneous. King, p. 383.

17. Appleton's Dictionary of New York and Its Vicinity, New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1887, p. 33. Also: William T. Elsing, "Life in New York Tenement-Houses," Gaslight, pp. 191-215.

18. Jacob A. Riis, How the Other Half Lives, New York: Dover Publications, [1890] 1971. Preface to the Dover edition by Charles A. Madison. Riis's photography has in recent years been criticized as being staged and contrived, while still an accurate representation of the time.

Madison states that by 1880, more than 37,000 tenements housed a population of almost 1,100,000. More than 100,000 persons lived in rear apartments unfit for human habitation.

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He states: "Riis observed this human hall with increasing indignation. He saw about 40,000 of these social wrecks sent to asylums and workhouses annually." p. vi.

19. Ernest Ingersoll, A Week in New York, New York: Rand, McNally & Company, 1891, pp. 201-202.

20. Ibid., p. 204. The Five Points for over a century was the epicenter of criminality and disorder in New York; thus, it also was the target of considerable missionary effort. See: Helen Campbell, Darkness and Daylight, or Lights and Shadows of New York Life, Hartford, CT: A.D. Worthington & Co., 1900, pp. 68-88.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid., pp. 204-217.

23. Ibid., p. 212

24. Ibid., p. 215.

25. Annual Report, Police Department of the City of New York for 1890. Published 1891.

26. In 1890, police reported 80,559 male and 69,294 female guests--many of them repeat lodgers--who sought shelter in precinct basements outfitted for overnight accommodation.

27. Ibid., p. 46.

28. Ibid., pp. 3-7.

29. Richard Wheatley, "The New York City Police Department," Harper's New Monthly Magazine, March, 1987, in Gaslight, p. 23.

30. Ibid., p. 24

31. Thomas Byrnes, 1886 Professional Criminals of America, New York: Chelsea House Publishers, opening essay "The Business of Crime," by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. [1886], 1969. Byrnes's survey of 204 offenders includes 17 women but no blacks. Yet he identifies 8 of the 33 men executed from 1851 to 1886 at the Tombs as "negro" or "colored." This observation appears in Frank Richard Prassel, The Great American Outlaw: A Legacy of Fact and Fiction, Norman & London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993, 211

32. Ibid., pp. 1, 12, 26.

33. Ibid., p. xiii.

34. Quoted by Schlesinger, ibid., p. xvi.

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35. Thomas Byrnes, "How to Protect a City from Crime," North American Review, 159 (1894): 100.

36. Gustavus Myers, The History of Tammany Hall. 2nd ed. New York: Dover Publications, 1971.

37. James F. Richardson, The New York Police: Colonial Times to 1901, New York: Oxford University Press, 1970.

38. Fees for the masked balls ($6,710) and for the pistol permits ($1,555) by law were paid into the police pension fund. In total the police Ordinance Squad conducted 32,301 investigations for all type of licenses.

39. Not all would agree with this assessment. See varying views in: William Browne, Stop That Clubbing!, New York: [E. Kimpton], 1887; Anthony Comstock, Gambling Outrages, New York: American News Company, 1883; Augustine E. Costello, Our Police Protectors. Montclair, NJ: Patterson Smith, 1972, originally pub. 1885; Ernest Howard Crosby. "Crime and Punishment in New York," North American Review, 133: 167-175, 1881; S.A. Mckeever, Glimpses of Gotham and City Characters, New York: National Police Gazette, 1880, and George W. Walling, Recollections of a New York Chief of Police, New York: Caxton Book Co., 1887. Browne's criticism of policing at the time was most trenchant, focusing on the frequent and largely undocumented violence of police against the citizenry. Walling's book understandably is the most sympathetic to police performance. The Byrnes reference is found in "How to Protect a City from Crime," North American Review, 159 (1984): 100-107, 1894.

40. Timothy J. Gilfoyle, City of Eros: New York City, Prostitution, and the Commercialization of Sex, 1790-1920, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992.

41. Ibid., p. 87. Prostitution did not respond to reform efforts. Two decades later a prostitution house operator complained that from receipts of $1,500 per week, thirteen detectives received $10 per month, and one $25, two patrolmen received $2 per day; the lieutenant and sergeant each received $5 per month, while regular protectors cost $100 per month paid to a go-between, formerly a wardman. The operator added: "And then I've got to buy tickets and contribute to funds for strong arm guys in trouble." George J. Kneeland, Commercialized Prostitution in New York City, New York: The Century Co., 1913, pp. 146-147.

42. Elaine S. Abelson, When Ladies Go A-Thieving: Middle-Class Shoplifters in the Victorian Store, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. By the 1888s the defense of kleptomania, considered a form of insanity, was in full force and arrested shoplifters might be defended by doctors and lawyers. Defendants who used this argument frequently were

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excused further prosecution, according to the author.

43. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. wrote: "The idea that crime was an immigrant monopoly has been expressed since almost the beginning of the republic....It is not clear at all that crime in America can be thus exclusively traced to foreigners. Very few immigrants, for example, got off the boat and headed directly to Wasatch, Utah. The desperados of the West mostly had splendid old American names," introduction to Professional Criminals of America: 1886, New York: Chelsea House Publisher, 1969, p. xxiv.

44. Message of Hugh J. Grant, Mayor, to the Board of Aldermen. New York: Martin B. Brown, January 6, 1890, p. 8, and January 5, 1891, p. 22 (Hereafter cited as Grant).

45. Urban Masses, p. 56.

46. Papers of the New York Society for the Suppression of Vice, 1872-1898. Library of Congress.

47. The Society concentrated on petty vice that preyed upon low income and immigrant families. No conclusion should be drawn, however, that Comstock's tireless leadership was received uncritically by the public. A particularly vitriolic attack is D.R.M. Bennett, Anthony Comstock: His Career of Cruelty and Crime, New York: Da Capo Press, [1878], 1971. Bennett states: "This man has evinced the disposition of hatred and cruelty that a few centuries ago would have made a first-class Torquemada, Calvin, Alva, Charles IX, or Matthew Hopkins," p. 1009. Bennett recognizes some good in his zealous target: "While he has suppressed much that is vile, he has, to a much larger extent, infringed upon the dearest rights of the individual, thus bringing obloquy and disgrace upon those who had a good object in view. And upon those who, in a limited degree, were in fault, he has been severe and relentless to a criminal extent," p. 1010.

48. Parkhurst's efforts helped create in 1894 a nonpartisan but avowedly political Committee of Seventy, including J.P. Morgan, William E. Dodge, Jr., and Cornelius Vanderbilt, Jr., devoted to political reform in the city. Their Republican fusion candidate for the for mayor in the upcoming election was William L. Strong who won the election, introduced vigorous reform and attacked the Tammany political machinery, including the installation of Theodore Roosevelt as police superintendent. But Strong later was not reelected, Roosevelt moved on in his political career, and the Tammany forces resumed their hegemony on policing and certain other municipal activities.

Parkhurst's mandate "as a preacher of righteousness" concerning crime and corruption is summarized in his sermon "Municipal Misrule," Homiletic Review (May 1892): 416-423. Parkhurst's bugbear is reflected in the remarks: "You cannot

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get anything from Tammany unless you are solid with Tammany. A man, though he be working night and day for the ennoblement and purification of the city he loves, has no rights which Tammany is bound to respect," p. 418, and "The obligations of our Police Department to enforce law are distinct, and their failure to do it is just as distinct," p. 423.

Parkhurst's charges against city officials, particularly those of the Police Department, fiercely attacked as "a damnable set of administrative bloodhounds," was received by the police with the demand for "proof." This Parkhurst and his associates provided in abundance. According to Andrews, the success of the resultant Lexow hearings "was largely due to the skill and boldness of their counsel, John W. Goff," and Irish Catholic. In the end, sixty-seven men were accused of crime, on evidence sufficient in most cases to warrant indictments. E. Benjamin Andrews, The History of the Last Quarter-Century in the United States, 1870-1895, vol. 2, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1896, pp. 319-321.

Parkhurst's anti-saloon, anti-corruption convictions did not originate from his famous sermon of February, 1892, but began years earlier and were enunciated from his pulpit with regularity. In a sermon delivered on December 9, 1888, he indicated the personal philosophy that would later sustain both reform and prohibition initiatives in the entire city:

> In the entire city there are estimated to be ten thousand saloons and five hundred and fifty-five Protestant churches, about twenty saloons to a church; with this difference, that a great many of the saloons are doing business one hundred and sixty-eight hours in the week, and a good many of the churches only from about five down to two hours a week. See: Charles H. Parkhurst, "Opportunities and Resources for Christian Work," New York: William C. Martin, 1888, p. 5.

For further insight on Parkhurst and criminal connection to the police, see: Leopold Hoenig, "Police Corruption in New York City in the 1890's," Master's thesis, Queens College, 1959.

49. Herbert Asbury, The Gangs of New York: An Informal History of the Underworld, Garden City, NY: Garden City Publishing Co., 1927, pp. 225-271. Also see: C. Ronald Huff, Gangs in America, Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1990, pp. 71-100.

50. Charles Loring Brace, The Dangerous Classes of New York, and Twenty Years' Work among Them, New York: Wynkoop & Hallenbeck, 1888.

51. See New York Times for defalcation articles in 1890: P. Hynes, Treasurer of Ancient Order of Hibernians, May 20, p. 1; S. Baruch arrested for stealing Austria-Hungarian funds, January 4, p. 8; J.C. File, Treasurer of Lutheran Orphans

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Home, June 1, p. 2.

52. Grant, January 6, 1890, p. 8.

53. Report of the Board of Health of the Department of Health for 1890, dated March 5, 1891.

54. Privy vaults were communal waste receptacles. In later years the Board of Health would take on another target: the Elimination of "school sinks" from the city's tenements. Originally designed for use in schoolyards, these structures had become ubiquitous outdoor facilities usually behind the tenement buildings. Wastes were held within the drain and would be flushed with a stream of water, ideally, at least once a day. In the 1880s property owners were required to install the sinks, but after April 11, 1901, they were unlawful and heralded the urban improvement of mandated indoor toilets. A fascinating legal issue emerged when tenement owners claimed the city was reducing the value of property without compensation. This issue is thoughtfully discussed by Judith A. Gilbert, "Tenements and Takings: Tenement House Department of New York v. Moeschen as a Counterpoint to Lochner v. New York," Fordham Urban Law Journal, XVII, no. 3, 1991.

55. Stuart Galishoff, Newark: The Nation's Unhealthiest City, 1832-1895, New Brunswick & London: Rutgers University Press, 1988, p. 155.

56. Lothrop Stoddard, Master of Manhattan: The Life of Richard Croker, New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1931.

57. See n. 48.

58. Report and Proceedings of the Senate Committee appointed to investigate the Police Department of the City of New York, Albany: James B. Lyon, State Printer, 1895 (The Lexow Committee), pp. 15-30. Crime was disproportionate in the poorest, most densely populated precincts. The worst was the Sixth Precinct in which almost one-third of the city's arrests for gambling offenses occurred: yet of those arrests, over 70 percent were discharged.

The Lexow Committee made it clear that most police officers were not involved in corruption: "(L)ittle corruption has been traced into the pockets of the ordinary patrolmen...your committee believes that a very large proportion of the patrolmen of the city, and a considerable number of their superiors are good officers and true, reliable and incorruptible men, whose conduct in guarding their honor...marks them as men to be especially commanded." p. 29.

59. Ibid., p. 30.

60. Ibid., p. 49.

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61. Grant, 1890, p. 7.

62. Grant, 1891, p. 10.

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CHAPTER 2

FROM COLONIAL DAYS THROUGH

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

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The province of New Netherlands, destitute of wealth, possessed a sweet tranquillity that wealth could never purchase. There were neither public commotions, nor private quarrels, neither parties, nor sects, nor schisms; neither persecutions, nor trials, nor punishments; nor were there counsellors, attorneys, catchpolls, or hangmen. Every man attended to what little business he was lucky enough to have, or neglected it if he pleased, without asking the opinion of his neighbor.

Washington Irving*

*Washington Irving, Knickerbocker's History of New York, Anne Carroll Moore, ed., Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Doran & Co. 1928, p. 92-93.

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The commercial ventures which later supported colonization on an island wilderness, later to be called New Amsterdam, were shaped from complex forces. Survival for the colonists involved their capacity to manage in a territory rich in natural resources and strategic geographic position, while groping for means to organize daily life within a fragile community that must harness such resources to thrive. Survival required that order be imposed on the rough frontier existence. This chapter first surveys the nexus between two principal early manifestations of disorder--alcohol consumptive patterns and physical violence--then discusses formal measures of internal controls that became institutionalized to maintain order: the schout, the rattle watch, the origins of urban crime controls in modern New York, and the emergent, though imperfect, modern professional police department that had been formed by the end of the nineteenth century.

A Boozy Society

In the middle days of September, 1609, Henry Hudson's Dutch-financed sloop, De Halve Maen (the Half Moon), sailed into a splendid, commodious harbor. Fed by "as fine a river as can be found, wide and deep, with good anchoring ground on both sides," the intrepid band of voyagers were seeking a northeastern passage to the Spice Islands, and as part of the process they needed rapport with the natives whom they encountered en route.[1] According to one account, natives

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fishing in the bay caught sight of the strange sailing vessel with its bizarrely clad passengers and rushed to welcome these visitors from afar, meanwhile retaining considerable skepticism of these voyagers and their ways. A feast by the shore quickly was arranged by the natives to be shared by sailors and natives alike. No sooner had the groups convened than, according to a later historical report, the Dutch sought to render their newly-encountered native hosts intoxicated.

According to a nineteenth century historian, John G.E. Heckewelder, the Indians were initially dubious about whether or not to drink a container of alcohol, proffered by the crew as perhaps "a gift, a companionable toast," but sensing that to refuse to do so might be considered an affront, first one reluctantly and then other Natives with increasing willingness sipped the exotic libation until all had become intoxicated. Heckewelder continues his narration of this chronicle supplying one version of origin's of the island's name:

> I have no doubt that this tradition is substantially founded on fact. Indeed, it is strongly corroborated by the name which, in consequence of this adventure, this people gave at the time, to that island, and which it has retained to this day. They called it Manahachta-niek, which in the Delaware language means "The island where we all became intoxicated." We have corrupted this name into Manhattan.[2]

In future years alcohol would become a significant relational factor between white men and American natives; further, such consciousness-altering beverages additionally would be linked as the most significant component to explain urban disorder in New Netherlands--including crime and violence causation--among the white, black and native

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residents. Alcohol taken in excess similarly was believed to be a causative factor for lassitude, which could lead to poverty. For native Americans the experience with alcohol was particularly significant, even epochal to an understanding of their later history. James Axtell concluded that Indians drank for three reasons all of which had roots in their culture. The first was to inflate self-esteem, making them braver in mind, if not deed. Next is that drunkenness gave Indians a freedom from responsibility: enemies could be killed with impunity even within one's own tribe which would have been taboo for sober combatants. Finally, and the major reason for Indian intoxication, was "to achieve a dream like state of religious possession," putting the inebriated Indian in communication with his (Indian females drank too, but were largely excluded from prolonged Dutch-Indian drinking bouts) personal guardian spirit. Warnings and threats by white men to intemperate Indian imbibers, therefore, had little effect: "Madness, murder, and mayhem seemed to reign when the traders rundlets arrived from the English ports. Drunken 'frolics' lasting several days often produced several victims of shootings, stabbings, brawls, burning, biting, and bawdry."[3]

Alcohol became a part of the American idiom when it became a beverage for all classes and ages of settlers as it did soon after the beginning of colonization. The earliest habitants preferred milk as a beverage, first obtained from goats and later from cows; tea, coffee, and chocolate were not available in the Netherlands until the mid-seventeenth

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century, and did not reach the Dutch colony until later. However, beer and wine were imported with the settlers and soon native drink would be produced in quantities copious enough to export. Captain George Thorpe, an early Virginia leader, is credited with first establishing the production of a satisfactory beverage from Indian corn.[4] Orchards were planted seemingly with every settlement farm not only to provide fruit for direct consumption, but also because the produce was a vital ingredient for creating spirituous beverages. Within a generation of settlements in the Chesapeake, New Netherlands, and New England, settlers began producing malt and hops creating a taste for home-produced beer.

Commercial exploitation soon commenced: Virginia had two breweries by 1629, Massachusetts, New Amsterdam, and Philadelphia each supported one distillery to supply the needs of their town folk, visiting sailors, and settlers who stowed quantities of spirituous beverages for their trek into the frontier. In addition to the ubiquitous consumption of beer, a taste for rum, which was made from imported molasses, soon came to satisfy the thirst of those locals who desired a stronger spirituous drink. In New Amsterdam the Dutch called it "kill-devil" and in the ensuing years the potent spirits had created such a market that the number of distilleries and taverns was to grow steadily without abatement even after the English hegemony imposed over the Dutch in 1664.

The tavern was soon established as an important social

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institution in New Amsterdam. Unlike the church, taverns reached all classes of people and were frequently filled as a social locale even for post-church service refreshment and socialization. On weekdays the tavern served as a democratic convivial meeting place to relax with friends, to entertain visitors, or for personal respite; it also quickly became a venue for business discussions between merchants and mariners, a place for the court to eat when not in session, and a locus for political discussion and sometimes governmental action.

The Dutch West India Company, in one of its earliest commercial activities in the fledgling colony, opened a "store" within the Fort and soon sold beverages from a brewery it established for its products along with imported wines and brandies.[5] Governor Kieft enthusiastically supported the first inn, opened under the management of Philip Gerritsen, and additionally encouraged householders to sell spirits for which the Company would derive fees for business licenses and from production and sale. By 1637, Kieft estimated that one-quarter of the dwellings in the village were "grog-shops or houses where nothing is to be got but tobacco and beer."[6] Much alcohol also was sold through boarding houses because operators, using the pretense of maintaining boarders, could sell liquor without payment of the usual license fee demanded from a tavern. Bridenbaugh provides a vivid picture of the centrality of tavern life in the early city:

> Social life at New Amsterdam centered even more about the taverns than at Boston. The Director and his Council, the Burgomasters, and the Court of Orphan-Masters always dined at a tavern, and frequently held

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> their meetings there. Many commercial transactions took place in exchange rooms, and there Dutchmen heard the latest news of the Fatherland or of English encroachments on the Connecticut. In the evenings jolly burghers liked nothing better than to join their "drinking clubs" at their favorite taverns, and there to spend the night in dancing and song. On the Sabbath after sermon-time, it was the custom of many families "to eat their usual Sunday meal" at an inn.[7]

During the years in which the Dutch governed New Amsterdam, at least seventeen such establishments served the public, and by 1680 when the colony was under firm English control, the now re-named expanding community, New-York, boasted almost twice as many. David Freeman Hawke concluded his picture of seventeenth-century early life with the comment: "Even by modern standards early America appeared to be what can only be called a boozy society."[8]

The alcoholic tradition affected many settlers and natives alike engendering the imposition of societal controls. Directors general of the West India Company promulgated a wide variety of ordinances concerning sales of alcohol, which were sometimes emphasized by republishing the measures. But while some Dutch colonists suffered from the consequences of immoderate alcohol consumption, native Indians in the opinion of the Dutch establishment suffered more from inability to control their alcoholic usage, necessitating the passage of discriminatory anti-sale measures. Regardless of the proscription, an early illegal commerce in selling alcohol had become established. In 1668, after earlier measures had failed, an absolute prohibition within the entire Dutch colony against selling alcoholic beverages to natives was issued: it

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fared no better than earlier controlling attempts. In 1675, a special order of the court stated: "Strong liquors not to be sold to the Indians less than two gallons, under penalty of five shillings sterling."[9] The issue occurred in other colonies: Pennsylvania similarly attempted to prevent the sale of spirits to Indians. Despite the warnings of the court, traders indiscriminately became the conduit of spirits to their Indian trading partners, invariably to the latters' disadvantage when coming to terms over what the settlers and traders in New Netherland wanted most: land and furs.[10]

The ways in which Dutch settlers used alcohol to manipulate native behavior raise an incidental question: Was the island of Manhattan purchased from the Indians while they were drunk? The oft-repeated assertion that Governor Peter Minuit purchased the island from the Indians for twenty-four dollars is wrong from a historical aspect, but is likely to be right on the point that the property was bought and not seized without compensation. The Dutch by tradition were unlikely to settle an area involving the planting of crops without achieving ownership of the land. The much repeated legend of Minuit's purchase was created in 1902 in John J. Anderson and A.C. Flick's A Short History of the State of New York, in which the 60 guilders price was transmogrified by an exchange rate equal to "24 gold dollars."

Documents discovered and translated since then provide further information on the historic process: Minuit was the

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fourth Dutch leader of the settlement, preceded by Adriaen Jorisz Tienpont in 1623, Cornelis Jacobsen May from March to October, 1624, who was succeeded by Willem Verhulst, serving soon after January, 1625 to the fall of the next year.[11] It is likely that Verhulst made the purchase for the 60 guilders, as Minuit's responsibilities on the Island at that time were to explore the Hudson and Delaware valleys for any mineral resources; hence, Minuit was not likely present in New Amsterdam at the time the island would have been purchased. Verhulst was recalled by the Dutch West India Company after August, and replaced by Minuit; but by then crops had been sown and were about to be harvested on "the island Manhattes." While it is possible--even probable--that alcohol would be offered during Verhulst's negotiations with the natives for their island, experience suggests that the value of the "60 guilders" was equivalent to the worth of various items purchased or obtained in exchange. Minuit did acquire Staten Island after Verhulst's departure for which he paid the Indians: "Duffels, Kittles, Axes, Wampum, Drilling Awls, Jews Harps, and diverse other small wares."[12]

Despite the socializing and much-vaunted health-promoting effects of alcohol, the dangers from indiscriminated consumption were understood by the English and Dutch even before their arrival in the New World. The English colonists used the license system as part of their laws with probably the earliest legislation on the subject passed by the Plymouth

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Colony on July 1, 1633: "That the person in whose house anywhere found or suffered to drink drunk be left to the arbitrary fine and punishment of the Governor and council, according to the nature and circumstances of the same." On Long Island, the people of East Hampton were alarmed at the evils of intemperance and passed an order in a town meeting in 1651:

> That no man shall sell any liquor but such as are deputed to by the town; and such man shall not let youths, and such as under other men's management, remain drinking at unreasonable hours; and such persons shall not have above half-a-pint at any time among four men.[13]

Yet New Amsterdam had established ordinances even earlier relating to the consumption and abuse of alcohol. For one thing, drinking upset the peace of church-goers on the Sabbath and at other weekly prayer times. Peter Stuyvesant, who succeeded Kieft as director general of New Netherland and who injected a Dutch sense of Calvinist morality, sobriety, and rigidity into the community, wrote in May 30, 1647: "Whereas we have experienced the insolence of some of our inhabitants, when drunk, their quarrelling, fighting and hitting each other even on the Lords day of rest, of which we have ourselves witnessed the painful example last Sunday in contravention of law, to the contempt and disgrace of our person and office, to the annoyance of our neighbors and to the disregard, nay contempt of Gods holy laws and ordinances" that "all brewers, tapsters and innkeepers" may not "draw any wine, beer or strong waters of any kind and under any pretext before 2 of the clock, in case there is no preaching or else before 4."[14]

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The ordinances of New Amsterdam during Stuyvesant's tenure frequently reflected alcohol-related regulation: in 1648, 1649, and 1657, measures were addressed to local brewers and grog sellers to discourage suspected defrauders of the Company from expected alcohol tax revenues by not reporting small amounts of alcohol illegally sold. Beyond the crass commercial implications of earning revenues from alcohol sales to white settlers, the desire to control distribution to Indian natives, nonetheless, became a persistent parallel goal. By 1656, Stuyvesant prohibited the sale of "directly or indirectly any beer, wine, brandy of other strong waters to any Indian under penalty of 500 fl. and besides arbitrary bodily punishment as well as banishment from the country."[15] This was a Draconian potential sanction and was promulgated because of internal disorder caused by inebriated natives while within the town limit, though not just Indians were affected by strong drink.

The connection between alcohol and public violence was evident in an ordinance of December 25, 1657, which referred to "quarrelling, fighting, and beating each other" often "for the sake of a single insulting word." Stuyvesant's council resolved to strengthen the penalties against the effects from lack of restraint "because such things can only cause provocation and trouble, even murder" and penalties were doubled for some offenses or quadrupled for others from their earlier levels.[16]

By the eighteenth-century, New York experienced dramatic

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population expansion almost growing by two-thirds from 1703 to 1723, and then rising by three-quarters again by 1749, reaching 13,300 including slaves. Along with population increases came the steady presence of alcohol as a popularly accepted lubricant for civic life and further as a cheap, desirable caloric source. Yet careful and continuous enforcement of the liquor laws resulted in an absence of serious tavern problems in New York compared with other growing port cities. As early as 1691, to prevent exploitation of mariners, New York passed an ordinance prohibiting tavern operators from detaining sailors or giving them credit beyond six shillings. Licenses to sell liquor and keep taverns were issued by the Mayor's Court and required applicants to provide information that they were "of good life & Conversation and fit to keep such a house."[17]

The tavern was assuming "an evermore vital role in the life of townsmen of all classes" and the New York experience resulted in a great number and quality of such facilities, though disreputable establishments like the "Sign of the Dog's Head in the Porridge Pot," operated by Ebenezer Grant in 1736, where the "scum of society" met, received widespread local disapprobation.[18] The only additional tavern regulation in the first half of the century involved a measure passed, but never enforced, to prohibit shuffleboard, billiards, truck table, and other forms of gambling in public houses. Though smaller than Boston in population in the mid-eighteenth century, New York could boast more public houses. In 1744 the municipal

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corporation licensed 166; eight years later the number rose to 334 but then fell to 232 by 1760.[19] As they increased in numbers, taverns developed particular clienteles: while certain tippling houses attracted the sailor or woodsman, others ensconced travelers from specific regions, still others received support from merchants, though most public houses were geared at attracting the mechanic, skilled, and crafts customers of all economic classes. Some provided entertainment which could include singing, dancing, and theatrical productions; others offered domestic and foreign newspapers for patrons, while yet other served as political and economic community fulcrums. In the mid-eighteenth century, a majority of licenses were issued to women, implying that the sale of alcohol was subordinate to the husband's primary vocation, though some provided needed income to widows; such licenses netted the corporation between £418 and £593 annually. By 1773, 396 licenses had been issued to New Yorkers, an American record, and additional sellers of alcohol may have operated without licenses.[20]

Distillation of rum required more capital and managerial effort than did the production of beer. Rum retailers, therefore, were likely to depend upon specialist suppliers, rather than attempting to produce their own product. By 1770 New York was served by twelve distilleries, while four more were located on nearby Manhattan (now Long) Island. But New York's total number of rum distilleries was minuscule compared with other Atlantic coast cities: Philadelphia had fourteen,

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Newport twenty-two, and the distillery capital, Boston, had thirty-six.[21] Supplying distillers were sugar refineries which were vital to the distillation of rum: four were each in New York and Newport, and seven both in Philadelphia and Boston.[22] Rum not only was produced to satisfy native tastes, but prior to the Revolution, it also had become an important local commodity for export revenue.[23]

From earliest years of colonization, the consumption of alcohol was highly regarded in New Netherland and the English-founded colonies not only for its social and nutrient value, but also for its presumed medicinal value against infection. Alcoholic drinks additionally served as an antidote to respiratory infection, fever, snakebite, as an aid to surgery, and as a general relaxer. W.J. Rorabaugh concluded: "Such favorable views led to a wide-spread use of strong drink. Before 1750, nearly all Americans of all social classes drank alcoholic beverages in quantity, sometimes to the point of intoxication."[24] Acceptance of drinking was so broad that the initial efforts of the established and property owning classes to control public consumption for the sake of public order did not succeed.

Over the colonial period attitudes toward alcohol by the clergy had undergone a marked evolution that reflected growing awareness of the dangers from indiscriminate usage: Increase Mather (1639-1723), the great Puritan clergyman of New England, considered that drink was "a good creature of God" to be partaken without wasting or abusing it. His son, Cotton

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Mather (1663-1728), preached a similar message, though explicitly condemning drunkenness. By 1740, George Whitefield, the itinerant English evangelist largely responsible for mid-century religious fervor termed the Great Awakening, condemned inebriation as ungodly in his peripatetic sermons delivered to thronged masses in New York and elsewhere the colonies.[25] In the subsequent years some vociferous mainstream clergy raised increasingly strident voices to condemn the dangers of alcohol by directly or indirectly supporting social movements that would espouse temperance, that is, moderate imbibing of alcohol, or eventually abstinence, or total avoidance of alcohol consumption.

From mid-seventeenth century society, the directors-general of the Dutch West India Company had comprehended the risky balance of profit and risk in their management of the alcohol trade. The profit connection derived from money generated from taxing alcohol distillers and sellers through quarterly licensees and production fees. The Stadt Herbergh (city tavern) was erected in 1641 as a public house modeled after a hostelry in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, of the same name. Later re-built, it was substantially constructed of stone and brick, measuring about fifty feet square and rising three stories high, comprising one of the largest and most imposing buildings in New Amsterdam. The tavern was owned by the West India Company and apparently remained profitable until the city was chartered in 1653, and the building ceased

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to function as a tavern and became the Stadt Huys or City Hall.[26] The risk part of the equation reflects the need to assuage the public thirst for alcoholic beverages with societal costs in disorder caused by the boozy society. The Dutch administrators for the Company had no illusions about the dangers alcohol created for the community, while depending upon the revenue potential from taxation of alcohol manufacturing and consumption. These societal costs included: personal debt incurred by colonists from excessive and addictive alcohol imbibing which might not be repaid, thus causing social disruption; difficulty in controlling Indian alcoholic consumption patterns and the colonists who illegally sold alcohol to them, and the a priori connection between alcohol ingestion with crime and violence within the community.

Disorder and the Founding of a Colony

Violence was an inherent trait in the Dutch settlement from the earliest days of contact. The role of adventurer-discoverer played by Henry Hudson was only possible by the tenuous support of an unrestrained crew without which the voyage would not have been possible, a crew whose skepticism of their skipper's competence and fairness flared periodically, making an uneventful voyage problematic. Hudson's pivotal third voyage of exploration--the one financed by investors in the Dutch East India Company--resulted in mapping of his future eponymous river and the geographic

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charting around the future New Amsterdam. In the process several encounters--peaceful and otherwise--occurred with the natives. Robert Juet of Lime-house, a member of Hudson's party, provides documentation of these experiences. The Anglo-Dutch and native Indian encounter began on a positive note. On September 4, 1609, while sailing near the entrance of what would be called the Hudson River, Juet wrote:

> This day the people of the Countrey came aboord of us, seeming very glad of our comming, and brought greene tobacco, and gave us of it for Knives and Beets....They desire Cloathes, and are very civill. They have great store of Maiz, or Indian Wheate, whereof they make good Bread.[27]

The Half Moon sailed on, and the next day natives again boarded the craft: "At night they went on Land againe, so wee rode very quiet, but durst not trust them."[28] The next day, September 6, the sense of distrust seemed to anticipate the first violent contact with natives: a sailor from the vessel was killed in an encounter with them:

> Our Master sent John Colman, with foure other men in our Boate, over to the North-side to sound out the other River [probably the Narrows near Sandy Hook], being foure leagues from us....As they came backe, they were set upon by two Canoes, the one having twelve, the other fourteene men. The night came on, and it began to rayne, so that their Match went out; and they had one man slaine in the fight, which was an English-man, named John Colman, with an Arrow shot into his throat, and two more hurt.[29]

The next morning Colman's body was buried and the vessel continued sailing along the shoreline, being henceforth increasingly alert to any possible unfriendly Indian attack. From that point on when apparently friendly Indians were encountered, they were discouraged from boarding the vessel or were not allowed aboard in any great number. Juet related

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that two hostages were taken and held as a presumed means of coercing future native cooperation: the first documented kidnap victims in the European exploration of the "New World." But soon one escaped: "hee which wee had taken, got up and leapt overboard,"[30] and a few days later the other also departed. The voyage continued and on September 12, Juet noted: "There came eight and twelve Canoes full of men, women and children to betray us: but we saw their intent, and suffered none of them to come abooard of us."[31]

Continuing their voyage of discovery up the great river, the ship encountered still more Indians with whom they traded "trifles" for food and tobacco, and plied them with wine and aqua vitae to the point of stupefaction. As the voyage continued, contacts with the natives were almost daily experiences with varying results, sometimes celebrated with communal meals on shore providing Juet with the opportunity to observe the "modesty" of the Indian women and the natives' "reverence" for their elders. During such encounters, the Dutch and English sailors of the Half Moon traded with the natives to obtain animal skins and cutting stones in addition to food and tobacco. The relationships with the Indians seemed to be improving as the vessel continued to sail up river. On October 1, the Half Moon voyagers had just completed trades for still additional skins with a group of natives. Juet then noted:

> This after-noon, one Canoe kept hanging under our sterne with one man in it, which we could not keepe from thence, who got up by our Rudder to the Cabin window, and stole out my Pillow, and two Shirts, and two Bandeleeres.

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> Our Masters Mate shot at him, and strooke him on the breast and killed him. Whereupon all the rest fled away, some in their Canoes, and so leapt out of them into the water.[32]

Following the killing of one of their own for a property theft, the next day the natives returned for retributive vengeance. Two canoes carrying warriors armed with bows and arrows drew near and began to shoot arrows toward the Half Moon. Well-armed sailors discharged six muskets killing two or three. The Indian attack persisted and before it was over, the sailors additionally killed seven to eleven natives more, by Juet's reckoning, and Hudson and his crew then determined that it was a propitious moment to conclude their period of exploration. They quickly sailed down-river arriving at Dartmouth, England, on November 7. Thus, in a span of twenty-eight days exploring the harbor near the future site of New Amsterdam and the river as far north perhaps to the site of the present Albany, Hudson's band experienced one dead sailor; by contrast to fourteen natives, by Juet's estimation, died while additionally the crew temporarily kidnapped two natives.[33]

Hudson's voyage initially disappointed his Dutch patrons; yet eventually sponsors for subsequently chartered ventures were enlisted when they realized that profits could be derived, if not in trading for spices and other products of the unattainable East, then from another potential activity and a vastly lucrative one: trading trinkets for furs. In 1621, The States General charted the West India Company, a successor company to Hudson's patrons, with an initial short-

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term monopolistic trading opportunity, later extended to twenty-four years. Eventually colonization was determined to be a necessity to protect the trading posts and to enhance the value of the perilous Dutch investment wedged, as it was, between English settlements to the north and south, and further potentially compromisable by a distant French presence to the northwest; therefore, a decision, circa 1610, was made to establish a fort at the settlement.

Following Verhulst's presumed purchase of the island and Minuit's consolidation in 1626, New Amsterdam grew slowly and unevenly for the next two decades. Minuit was ordered by the company to organize a provincial government, retaining the supreme authority for executive and judicial matters with the director and his appointed council. The two principal subordinate executives were the koopman, the Company's secretary and bookkeeper of the warehouse, and the schout-fiscal, who combined two separate duties: schout tasks--civil and criminal judicial presentments and peace-keeping responsibilities--and fiscal work which was primarily management of the Company's customs house. By the early 1650s the position was divided into two posts. According to his instructions, the schout was to be the director-general's and council's "guardian of the law...[to] preserve, protect and maintain, to the best of his knowledge and ability, the preëminences and immunities of the privileged West India Company." The duties involved sensitivity to the civil rights of the accused: "And in order that he may well and regularly

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institute his complaint, the Schout, before entering his action or arresting any person, shall pertinently inform himself of the crime of which he shall accuse him, without his being empowered to arrest any one...unless the offense be committed in his presence." Concerning the real presence of sporadic local violence, the schout was instructed:

> (O)n learning or being informed that any persons have injured each other or quarreled, shall have power to command the said individuals, either personally or by court messenger, or his deputy to observe the peace, and to forbid them committing any assault, on pain of arbitrary correction at the discretion of the Burgomaster and Schepens.[34]

An event occurred during Minuet's tenure that was to have destabilizing ramifications over two decades later during Willem Kieft's governorship. A Weckquaesgeek Indian approaching New Amsterdam with his young nephew in tow hoped to sell furs to settlers. Near Fresh Water Pond three of Minuit's farm servants attacked, then robbed and murdered, the Indian; apparently news of this incident never reached Minuit or others in the village. The young nephew escaped, meanwhile, but swore a revenge that would require years to attain.

In 1629, the States General ratified a proposal granting a large tract of land and the title "patroon" to any member of the West India Company who would found a colony of fifty adult persons within a four year period. The patroon's authority would include holding jurisdiction not only over misdemeanors and minor felonies, but also implied the right to try

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defendants for capital offenses within this fiefdom, though defendants found guilty of such offenses would be returned to Holland for case-review and presumably eventual punishment. While the patroon held territorial judicial and economic powers, the Company expected to receive a five percent duty on all trade, excepting for furs initially, for which it retained exclusivity.[35]

Minuit was replaced by Wouter Van Twiller who supported tight societal control measures for New Amsterdam including: the confiscation of all furs taken in illegal trades with the natives; the imposition of a capital offense (never enforced) against anyone selling arms to Indians; the requirement of sailors to remain on their ships after nightfall; the reorganization of judicial activities providing civil and criminal court to meet on Thursdays, and strict rules against vice and profanity.[36] Still, immigration was slow and inducements to prospective patroons and in turn incentives provided to other colonists had to be made more attractive to entice adequate settlers.

Van Twiller's successor, Willem Kieft, possessed a keen commercial sense and established the aforementioned tavern, sought to increase commerce by starting two annual fairs, and enforced more vigorously the company's regulations already issued during Van Twiller's term. However, relations with Indians in the Province of New Netherland deteriorated early in Kieft's governorship. The director general had forbidden the selling of arms to all Indians, but some tribes,

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particularly those in the northern region of the colony, were able to obtain them despite the ban, leaving the weaponless tribes agitated, feeling vulnerable, and angry with the Kieft. Further, he had tried unsuccessfully to levy a tribute of corn, furs, and wampum upon the Indians which they resented. After the theft of some hogs, blamed on the Raritans on July 16, 1640, Kieft sent Koopman Van Tienhoven to extract summary justice from the suspects. The Indians professed innocence, but Van Tienhoven's revengeful militia attacked, killing ten while losing one of their own. Hours later, the Raritans retaliated by killing four planters and burning some farm storage buildings. Kieft next responded by placing a high bounty on the heads of all dead Raritans which was a threat with certain repercussions as the bounty certainly would be pursued by the Raritans' enemies: this forced them to sue for peace.

Shortly thereafter, however, the Indian who agonized when Minuit's men killed his uncle years earlier before his eyes, took revenge by bludgeoning to death an innocent wheelwright. Without knowing the attacker's motivation, Kieft called twelve burghers as a council, August 28, 1641, to consider retaliatory action, noted as the first deliberative assembly ever convened in New Amsterdam.[37] Eventually, the council sanctioned what Kieft wanted: a plan for extermination of certain local tribes, including the Tankitekts, a thousand of whom had recently been forced to flee their ancestral foes, the Mohawks, and, therefore, were unarmed, vulnerable, and

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encamped nearby at Pavonia and Corlear's Hook. No decision was taken immediately on how to deal with this issue, but after consuming much alcohol at a Shrovetide feast, Kieft was easily induced by revengeful settlers to sign, February 25, 1643, an order authorizing the attack on Indians at both locations. Perhaps eighty were killed in the ensuing surprise nighttime assaults. Retaliation would follow. Eleven tribes united to attack settlers in the entire colony, excluding Rensselaerswyck. Mary L. Booth, a nineteenth century historian noted: "The settlements on New Jersey fell prey to the Indians, and little remained to the Dutch save the little colony at Manhattan."[38]

Relying on the superiority of European weaponry and the use of surprise tactics to attack Indians, Kieft now dispatched troops who, in 1664, virtually killed two quasi-belligerent Indian colonies: the Canarsees on Long Island and the Connecticut Indians encamped near Greenwich, thus ending the two year war. The bloodshed on both sides had made the director-general a pariah on his own island. Frequently denounced during divine services by the resident Dutch religious leader, the Domine Everardus Bogardus, Kieft responded by absenting himself from church services and ordering cannon to be fired and drums beaten during sermon time. Bogardus continued railing against the director general who then unsuccessfully sought to charge the minister with sedition.[39]

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Controlling Early New Amsterdam

The Company replaced Kieft two years later with Peter Stuyvesant, who arrived May 11, 1647. Stuyvesant's leadership sought to rebuild the physical security of the town, making it safer for settlers; additionally, he formalized judicial procedures demanded by the community whose population was cut perhaps by one-third over the rancorous previous three years. Physical security for the vulnerable settlement was enhanced: the rickety fence that had demarcated the northern limit of the town was rebuilt according to exacting standards and completed in only three months' time.[40] The fence served as an organizing function for the colony, primarily keeping rummaging animals from straying into the populated streets: native Indians were hardly deterred by the encumbrance and, when it was removed during the British hegemony, the only reminder was its name, Wall Street. A measure to decrease the risks of fire by having chimneys inspected was promulgated.[41] And despite Stuyvesant's remonstrations in opposition, the Company approved incorporation on 1653, which entailed appointments of two burgomasters by the Company and five schepens magistrates to be elected by the people. Having obtained a measure of self-governance, the burgomasters and schepens then requested an independent schout.[42]

Again, settler-Indian hostilities flared: on September 5, 1655, when all seemed calm in New Amsterdam, Stuyvesant sailed with seven vessels and 160 men to attack the Swedish colony at Fort Christina, meanwhile leaving New Amsterdam with

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attenuated defenses.[43] A short time before Stuyvesant's departure, the ex-fiscal, Hendrick Van Dyck, had shot dead a squaw whom he had detected stealing peaches from his orchard. On September 15, two thousand armed warriors entered New Amsterdam, were dissuaded from remaining overnight, but remained long enough to kill Van Dyck and another colonist. The havoc then moved to Hoboken, Pavonia, and Staten Island where one hundred settlers were killed over three days. Stuyvesant quickly returned to the endangered community, but achieved a quick peace with a combination of a mighty show of force and the offering of peace gifts to the Indians. This appeared as a stark contrast with the uncompromising behavior of his predecessor and may have served to initiate a period of normality of diminished conflicts between colonists and native Indians.

Criminal incidence was not a major concern in the colony during the seventeenth and into the early eighteenth century. Ellis Lawrence Raesly in Portrait of New Netherland observes:

> (T)he majority of offenses were of such a trifling nature that their commission today would be winked at by the authorities. The explanation of this absorption of New Netherland justice in matters of minor consequence may be attributed to the smallness of the communities, to the nervous tension that always prevailed in frontier outposts, to the dependence of much of European jurisprudence upon religious taboos rather than upon a scientific study of human behavior, and finally to the impossibility of adopting some Old World laws to New World conditions.[44]

Daytime control in times of disorder was provided by the burgher companies, following measures that had evolved in old

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(European) Amsterdam by the late sixteenth century and were replicated by the colonists. Burghers there from eighteen to sixty years of age were subject to this unpaid, generally honorific citizenly duty which also entailed ceremonial processions on occasions.[45] In New Amsterdam regular nocturnal street patrol during peacetime of the first half century of colonization was provided by paid watchmen about whom only scanty references remain: the only watchman specifically mentioned in New Amsterdam was Andries Tummelyn, 1645. When Indians, or later the English, threatened the security of the community, the burgher guards would be assembled to protect both day and night. In the process of their service, the guard provided a protective function for the inhabitants; when the emergency subsided, they were discharged. Otherwise, during daytime, the community received protection from others: the Company's soldiers on guard at the fort or, more likely, the schout and his deputies.[46]

But disorder at night was a separate issue that stemmed from unsupervised youth, mischievous drunk citizens, sailors on leave, and slaves at liberty; these risks were augmented by the fear of fire and the oftpresent threats of Indian attacks. Following the model of old Amsterdam, the Netherlands, and perhaps influenced by the English colony in Boston, Stuyvesant recommended that a night watch be established.[47] Soldiers had provided a kind of urban patrol, but the concept evolved that a permanent civil, non-military patrol was needed that would be separate from protection by soldiers of Fort Amsterdam.

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The first official reference to a civil militia appears in an ordinance of May 9, 1640, requiring every man to keep a gun and to report to his corporal to defend the town in case of attack.[48] A decade later the burghers concluded that a nighttime specialized rattle watch, following the example of Holland's commercial city, was now practical.

The first proposal was read from the steps of the Stadt Huys in 1654, but produced no volunteers for the available positions.[49] The concept was raised again four years later. The burgomaster resolved that each housekeeper should pay fifteen stivers each month for the support of the watch, "except those whose husbands are from home, widows, preachers, also such as are in somebody's service."[50] By the next month a required number of men had presented themselves to the court to serve as watchmen and were administered the oath:

> We promise and swear in the presence of the Most High that we will fully observe the articles read to us, and demean ourselves as faithful watchmen are bound to do. So Truly Help us God Almighty.

The articles ordained by the burgomasters included seventeen items involving deportment of the guards and spelled out fines which might be meted to those who fail to obey the measures. If a watchman "comes drunk on the watch or commits any opposition, insolence or impurity within the Square of the City Hall or in going the rounds, he shall forfeit each time one guilder." The nightly pay was 24 stivers and at the time one guilder equalled 20 stivers, additionally, watchmen received two pieces of firewood per night and candles.[51] The service function of the watch was emphasized in the

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requirement: "If anyone lies still when people call Val Val, or be otherwise disobedient, he shall forfeit twenty stivers." The eight men who were selected for the watch alternated in groups of four each night. Sometimes referred to as "ramblers," the men were instructed to patrol on foot in pairs and to call out the hour on the hour.[52] In their rounds they carried a staff (half-pike), an hourglass, a broadsword, and a wooden clacker or rattle, from which they received their popular name, that was to be used to rouse citizens for action in time of emergencies. The men wore a uniform "of blue dopple turned up with orange facings."[53]

According to John E. O'Connor: "Although the Schout and his deputies made many arrests, the only recorded arrest by a Rattle Watchman occurred in October, 1661."[54] Following its organization in 1658, the watch became inactive soon afterwards at an unknown date, for records indicate the burgomasters' intention to re-establish the watch at their meeting of January 7, 1661, which was accomplished.[55] When the English threatened to invade the Dutch colony in 1663, the burgomasters combined the watch with the burgher guards who were summoned to deal with the potential invasion.[56]

Throughout the Dutch phase of operating the rattle watch, monetary support came from a special tax collected by the master of the watch. Records show that collecting the tax was problematic and the burgomasters and schepens regularly made accommodations for those residents who had difficulty paying their fees for the rattle watch, usually by stretching out the

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time required by which payments were supposed to be made.[57]

The English Hegemony and Then Independence

With the imposition of English control on New Amsterdam and New Netherland in 1664, and again permanently following a brief return of Dutch rule, 1673-1674, Dutch customs were merged with English civil and judicial traditions. In New York, named for James, Duke of York, brother of Charles II, the schout became akin to the English sheriff and his deputies were called constables. The schout also possessed investigative responsibilities and was capable of charging defendants with violating public statutes; one historian has argued that the position has continued to exist in the office of district attorney.[58]

Governor Andros established the Duke's Laws throughout the colony, reflecting New England codes and English common law, within the New York courts, although some Dutch influences were retained, such as the way the sheriff ordinarily complained and prosecuted substantially as the schout had done before him. While a determined effort to appease and retain the Dutch community was exerted, Andros ordered administrative changes, including that court transactions be conducted in English. The offices of sheriff, alderman, and mayor were established. Conflicts between the Dutch and Anglo cultures occasionally affected different strata of society. "Even the man of the constable's watch fell prey to hostile ethnic thoughts, with detrimental effects

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to the peace which they were supposed to preserve."[59] Implying the existence of an immigrant role by recruits for the watch, in 1676 and 1682, authorities threatened punishment to those who quarrelled with a member of the watch due to his being of a different nationality, though no record of actual punishment is found for such an offense.

While absorbing Dutch influences, the newest British colony derived much of its criminal justice structure from English traditions over the previous millennium, and even earlier concepts of order derived from Roman, Greek, and various other influences. Derived from the Greek noun polis (city), via Middle French policier (to govern), the word connotes urban order, control, and regulation. Hence in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, usage of the word police had connotation with public order that involved a matrix of diverse activities related to citizenly and civic governmental affairs: public health, arraignment of criminals, the service of public papers, and general civic regulation. However, by the early nineteenth century, the concept of policing was filled by the office of constable, a position which could be traced to Norman times in England and initially was a compulsory public duty for citizens.

In England, each parish provided its own civic security and services through the constable, in a position filled by a parishioner for a year's time. By the fourteenth century the constable had received statutory recognition. Following the bloodless Revolution of 1688, bringing a more conciliatory

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regime of William III and Mary to the throne, the power of constables became immense, and included supervising the jail, daily activities of deputy constables, and the night watch. The night watch had existed in England since the reign of Charles I, and by the seventeenth century the force in London had reached about 1,000 persons per night who were paid a shilling or less according to the amount set by the parish vestry where they patrolled. This watch patrol, called "Charlies" after the monarch, served as fire and vandal watch, drunk patrol, and hourly nocturnal time-callers.[60] The meager compensation of the watch was supplemented with tips, for example, from a drunk reveler whom the watch might take home safely; the dependence on fees from fines and services paid by jailed prisoners also provided remuneration to the judiciary in addition to constables and the watch.

Venality of the criminal justice system extended from the jail to the courthouse. While few cases of overtly corrupt judges have been described in the literature, the situation was different from justices of the peace, or magistrates. Some magistrates routinely pocketed bail money, and the dignity of the court might be compromised when the Westminster Quarter Sessions were held in a pub called Hell, frequented by Pepys for his morning draft. Serving as a magistrate was considered to be "a very lucrative office" and Leon Radzinowicz observed that in the second half of the eighteenth century and later: "The prevailing system of payment of fees for every act which a justice performed meant that it was

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greatly in the interest of both the magistrates and their clerks to keep up the continuous flow of business."[61] Many such individuals, particularly in London and Middlesex and Sussex Counties received the pejorative designation of "trading justices."

Nonetheless, justice was neither loose nor devoid of civil rights for the accused: constables had limited authority, sometimes sharply limited to one side of the street and they had no authority outside of their parishes. A constable who arrested someone who was later acquitted could be sued for false arrest; further, the constable had no right to search an individual or that person's premises unless he actually saw a crime being committed by an individual or within a particular location. This risk could be avoided if the constable received a warrant signed by a magistrate in advance of the arrest. Yet the constable was liable to a fine or dismissal if he failed to make an arrest he was supposed to have made: the particular charge would be nonfeasance of duties.

Constables and their deputies found that arresting someone was not always easy. Criminals frequently were armed and might vigorously resisted losing their liberty. By the eighteenth century the ancient "hue and cry" raised by constables or the night watch for public assistance in making an arrest or establishing order might be met instead by support from the criminal's friends who might actively obstruct justice.[62] The fragmented policing system helped

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encourage thieves to join gangs as a means of resisting arrest and escaping punishment. Another practical reason for gang-associations, was the ameliorated rapid sale and dispersal of stolen items. By the early nineteenth century established law enforcement in London had little success of controlling the forceful strengths of criminal gangs and individual operators; yet the public was loathe to support measures for a reorganization of urban protection due to the increased costs involved, though the concept had been raised in Parliament since the previous century.[63] The public opposed revisions in police administration because of a variety of philosophical and practical explanations: philosophically many citizens feared that an efficient, well organized police service aimed at controlling urban disorder could metamorphose easily into a force to threaten civil liberties by becoming the equivalent of a standing army; additionally, practically policing was regarded as a costly urban measure that would not necessarily bring benefits equivalent to the additional taxes required to fund the service.

While Parliament debated and newspapers editorialized, the private sector created a detective service to fit the needs of victims of theft: the thief-takers. These individuals had no official status but were paid by aggrieved parties to bring defendants to trial to face civil charges; similarly, government might offer them a fee to bring wanted criminals to the bench. These private body snatchers were established by an Act of Parliament of 1693, which initially

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approved the scheme combined with a reward for the apprehension of any highwayman.[64] The system was extended in the reign of Queen Anne (1702-14) and George I (1714-27) to cover additional offenses such as burglary, sheepstealing, and army desertion. Thief-takers emerged in greater numbers when Parliament offered special bonuses to those capable of making criminal arrests during times of apparent increased crime. Thief-takers were willing, if necessary, to share their fees with informants, government officials, and others aiding them to accomplish their objectives. Often these private agents would themselves be active criminals, and a suspect provisionally charged with a lesser crime might sometimes identify the perpetrator of a more serious crime or series of criminal incidents; in the process the informant might be pardoned for his lesser crime and also receive a reward for identifying the more wanted criminal.[65]

The concept of policing as a deterrent to crime was unknown and the driving motif was for law enforcement to respond after-the-fact to a criminal incident. As a consequence, authorities saw no alternative to the use of terror to discourage future criminality. The use of Draconian measures was a feature of English urban control which influenced the early traditions of New York policing and it was one characteristic that the new nation was determined to expunge as part of its criminal justice system. The number of crimes for which capital punishment was the offense was reduced in New York to three following the conclusion of the

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Revolution. Yet England remained an enduring model which New Yorkers studied for clues on how best to manage an increasingly urban setting. The Industrial Revolution of England, roughly 1750 to 1850, preceded the wave of industrialization in New York and other American cities; therefore, London remained a laboratory to study possible effects of changing urban governance. And much was occurring in England. After years of effort for reform, Home Secretary Robert Peel led passage of the Metropolitan Police Act of 1829, bringing a long-awaited transformation in policing: the night watch was eliminated and absorbed into a 24-hour policing system; the officers were uniformed and deliberately not armed; emphasis on statistical collection and crime analysis began.[66] This was a quasi-military model of administration which New York City soon was to adopt to its own needs.

The wilderness in the New York urban area had been tamed by the first third of the eighteenth century. Always the most cosmopolitan of the colonial cities, New York had instituted municipal controls on alcoholic sale early in its history in an attempt to mitigate problems with red, white, and black residents. In 1731, the city received an important charter issued by Governor John Montgomerie, a document that was to guide the city for over a century. Although the city had received patents prior to 1731, they were defective in that a reigning sovereign had not bestowed them. Neither was the

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Montgomerie charter to be approved by the monarch, but it was issued by the meretricious Montgomerie and served to establish such issues as: fixed extended boundaries; established ferries, docks, and the fees that could be collected from their use. The Montgomerie charter also enlarged the city into seven wards, instead of six, as provided by an earlier charter; permitted the mayor to select a deputy, and extended ordinances of the common council, the city's legislative body, to remain in force for a year instead of three months as previously.[67] Judicial matters also were established by providing that the mayor, recorder, and aldermen be constituted as justices of the peace empowered to hear all claims of forty shillings and less and the same officers possessed the power of holding quarter sessions of the peace.

Robert Crannell, a marshal, was appointed supervisor of the watch by the common council in 1731 at an annual salary of £20 and reported to the high constable. A watch house was erected on Broad Street the same year for £60, containing two rooms: one for the watch and the other for the confinement of prisoners arrested during the night.[68] The city corporation constructed a second watch house in 1746 for specific use to guard the city powder magazine when an attack from the French was anticipated. The watch was to vary in personnel numbers, payment, and duties widely over the next century. In 1731, the force was divided into two squads each with five watchmen and a constable serving on alternate nights. Each watchman received pay of £5 10s. for five months' service, 20s. being

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allowed extra for "Encouragement to the Constables to be diligent and Circumspect in performance of the Dutys of their Office."[69] By 1735 the watch had expanded to ten for most of the year, but was reduced to six for two summer months; in 1738 the force increased to twelve, but the following year was reduced to three to patrol a city of over 10,000 citizens, mostly concentrated south of the present Duane Street. The "Negro Conspiracy" of 1741, with its trumped-up fears of slave insurrections temporarily led to a military watch, soon to be replaced with a new night watch of thirty-six men divided into three shifts of eleven and one overseer for each.[70] This paid patrol was continued until 1742, when it was again replaced with a citizen watch.[71] From 1762 on, the watch was once more a paid civil position.

As a garrison city, New York was the frequent locale of British regulars who increasingly disrupted local order by their presence from the 1760s until their post-Revolution departure. British-led press-gangs, numbering as many as 3,000 in strength, made periodic sweeps through the streets seizing men for military and naval service.[72] The existence of policing during the day and the watch at night protected the public from possible excesses of military patrol and further internal crime.[73] Violence and property theft in this port city occurred, but seemed to be manageable. As Carl Bridenbaugh concluded prior to the revolution: "The people of New York probably enjoyed better police protection than the residents of any contemporary town, colonial or English."[74]

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This arrangement served the pre-revolutionary city. For three-quarters of the eighteenth century, New York grew steadily as a port and commercial center outpacing Boston, but still ranked third in population behind the exploding metropolis of Philadelphia which had become the second largest city after Boston by 1775. With the threat of revolution, city government would have to adjust to the requirements of a city at war.

To maintain internal order the commander-in-chief appointed on May 4, 1778 a department of police, headed by Andrew Elliot, assisted by David Mathews and by Peter Dubois. The specific duties of the police were: "suppression of vice and licentiousness," support of the poor, direction of the night watch, regulation of markets, ferries, and all other matters in which the "economy, peace, and good order of the day" were of issue.[75] During the post-Revolutionary year, the police depended solely on the military commandant for their orders. Social welfare was not among their duties: the previous year the commandant had appointed the city vestry to take charge of renting houses, helping the poor, and overseeing lamp lighting, pump fixing, and street cleaning.[76] Revolution exacerbated conflicts between Loyalists and Revolutionarists and engendered disorder within the city, straining the capacity of military and civil forces to maintain order:

> Civilian robbers did not have to fear the harsh punishments which threatened military offenders. In their case, indeed, the police and military authorities were so lax, it was said, that it was dangerous "to walk

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> the streets at night or be in a crowd in the day," and scarcely a night passed without some crime being committed. In short, citizens had serious causes for complaint in this respect; all contemporary evidence proves the inability of the authorities to police the city properly.[77]

New York Policing Takes a Modern Form

The young Republic retained English traditions in some ways while eager to express independence and reform of some conditions found abhorrent of their former rulers. An immediate goal was to decrease the number of capital crimes. England provided the model for criminal procedures up until the revolution, and it was repressive. Throughout the eighteenth century in England, a great increase in the number of capital offenses occurred: so many and so confusing with their numerous categories and subcategories that the precise number of capital offenses is moot. At the beginning of the century the New York criminal justice inheritance from England produced a list of approximately 100 offenses for which capital punishment was the possible sentence. For the next century scores of additional capital crimes were added to the statute books. Further a condemned prisoner conceivably might lose not only his or her life, but also could forfeit all property, leaving family members destitute.[78]

Brutal as these measures appear to be, the fact is that many persons sentenced to death were reprieved in both England and the colonies. One of the less repressive punishments in England was transportation, commonly employed as a substitute for capital punishment. Bernard Bailyn calculated: "In the

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course of the eighteenth century Britain would send over to North America, mainly to Maryland and Virginia, an estimated fifty thousand convicted felons."[79] Transportation involved the physical removal of a felon for a term usually of seven years, though possibly as long as fourteen years could be possible if the felon was sentenced as a repeat offender or following conviction on a homicide charge. Prisoners would be transported on private ships where the captains had power of life or death over their charges. Upon reaching a port city, captains would then sell the term of confinement to a settler. Prisoners usually were transported to southern port cities, especially Savannah, Charleston, and Richmond, where prisoners' services were needed on plantations; those with trade skills or education would more likely remain in the port cities. New York received a few of such prisoners, though it was clear that the vast majority were transported further to the south. The impact of transported prisoners in New York does not seem substantial, while some transported convicts escaped to northern cities where they sought freedom through the anonymity of urban living.[80]

The first four decades of the nineteenth century in New York confirmed the steady decline of policing in a city that was expanding constantly in complexity. How did travellers to the city perceive security in the era? A privately printed treatise on the police of 1812, describes the characteristics of policing at the time, admittedly influenced by the fears of

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a possible British invasion of New York City.[81] The citizen, Charles Christian, railed against the conditions of anomie in the growing urban confine: "(I)t appears to be highly necessary that there should be established, as soon as possible, as complete a system of preventive Police for this city, as our laws will admit of."[82] The citizen's critique covered twelve subjects "of such great public importance" requiring urban policing: thieves and sharpers; city night watch; state prison convicts; pardons; city prison--Bridewell; women of the town--penitentiary; brothel keepers; gamblers--gaming houses; taverns--ardent liquors; pawn brokers--dealers in old clothes--dealers in junk and ship iron; intelligence offices--servants, and general observations--public baths. Christian's list excluded murderers, rapists, arsonists, and those accused of aggravated assault for reasons that were not stated but could have been because such offenses were perceived to be too few in number, were believed to be beyond the capacity of police to make meaningful change on their occurrence or might be considered to be generally the responsibility of citizens to deal with wrongdoing on their own or to accept the incident without further recourse.

In the citizen's thirty-two page report, he calls thieves and sharpers, "this dangerous class of men," of particular concern to police. Christian proposes more vigorous punishment since "to the utmost is but sixty days confinement at picking oakum (which) is very inadequate either to deter or reform its subjects."[83] Christian's recommendations for the

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watch included that they be deprived of their watch boxes and provided with "substantial watch-coats" so they will patrol with greater frequency in the cold weather so that every resident "would be certain that a watchman would pass his door about every third minute."[84] The author further opines: "This system is, in all probability, the most perfect that can be practiced, and it may not be too much to say, that it would effectively prevent shop lifting--house-breaking--street-robbery, and nightly depredations on shipping at the wharfs."[85]

Captain Frederick Marryat was one of the most widely read English novelists in the 1830s in the United States and England. Marryat arrived in New York City on May 4, 1837, when the city was in the throes of the most severe depression since the country had become a nation. His presence in New York, where he remained until July, and other cities served to dampen his personal popularity which he had previously enjoyed, due largely to his "manner more of the sailor than the author."[86] In retrospect, Marryat's editor concludes: "(W)hen concerned with recording the sites and sounds of America, he drew in brilliant detail invaluable vignettes of American life."[87] Marryat made no comment in his Diary about crime and disorder in the city despite the tremulous conditions relating to financial chaos. He refers to the stores "fitted up with large plate-fronts, similar to those in London, and but for the depression which has taken place, many more would have followed the example."[88] He noted the enterprise of the tradesmen using hand-bills, placards, and

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advertisements to bring in business. Significantly, he describes fire as the greatest urban risk:

> Every traveller who has visited the city has spoken of the numerous fires which take place in it, and the constant running, scampering, hallooing, and trumpeting of the firemen with their engines; but I do not observe that any one has attempted to investigate the causes which produce, generally speaking, three or four fires in the twenty-four hours. New York has certainly great capabilities, and every chance of improvement as a city; for, about one house in twenty is burnt down every year, and is always rebuilt in a superior manner.[89]

Other visitors to New York in the early decades of the nineteenth century paint vivid portraits of city life, often including vignettes of the sordid underlife. Alexis de Tocqueville and his companion Gustave de Beaumont traversed North America over a seventeen month period spanning 1831-32. Tocqueville, of course, is remembered for his seminal critique of American political spirit in Democracy in America. However, the initial purpose of the two young French travelers' visit was to study prison conditions and innovations in America that were attracting considerable interest on the Continent.[90] While Tocqueville had much to say about democracy and the state of American prisons, his comments on urban order and disorder in New York City are not extensive or particularly illuminating. Mrs. Trollope's Domestic Manners of the Americans and Harriet Martineau's Society in America provide credible detailed documentation of social mores of the time. None of these works, concentrating as they do on a sliver of urban life, deal with the fears and risks to daily existence: these issues simply are not mentioned, whether out of delicacy or ignorance.

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However, a rougher part to New York existence indeed existed and was reflected in Charles Dickens's American Notes, based on his visit beginning in January, 1842. Dickens found New York to be "the beautiful metropolis of America," though not as clean as Boston. His writing of the city concentrates on: the hubbub of traffic, the strivings of Irishmen, and the excellence of hospitals, schools, and other institutions. But much of his discourse centers on the crudeness of urban existence: The Five Points; The Tombs, the ominous city jail where he looked in on a man arrested for killing his wife; the pigs which rooted freely around the city streets, and the slums and bar-rooms catering to seamen, transients, immigrants, and the poor. It was in the prison yard of The Tombs where the "terrible performances" of execution occurred: "Into this narrow, grave-like place men are brought out to die. The wretched creature stands beneath the jibbet on the ground; the rope about his neck; and when the sign is given, a weight at its other end comes running down, and swings him up into the air--a corpse."

Nowhere in this book does Dickens attempt to explain how people perceived their safety; however, he provides ample information on institutions serving the growing city: a jail holding cell where "five and twenty young women (were) locked up in this very cell at one time" until they could face a magistrate the next morning; a lunatic asylum headed by changeable political appointees, and an alms house lodging "nearly a thousand poor." Like Captain Marryat seven years

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before him, Dickens marveled at the "admirable fire department (as, indeed, it should be, having constant practice)":

> What is this intolerable tolling of great bells, and crashing of wheels, and shouting in the distance? A fire. And what that deep red light in the opposite direction? Another fire. And what these charred and blackened walls we stand before? A dwelling where a fire has been. It was more than hinted, in an official report, not long ago, that some of these conflagrations were not wholly accidental, and that speculation and enterprise found a field of exertion, even in flames; but, be this as it may, there was a fire last night, there are two to-night, and you may lay an even wager that there will be at least one tomorrow. So, carrying that with us for our comfort, let us say, Good-night, and climb upstairs to bed.[91]

Isabella Lucy Bird, daughter of a devout Church of England clergyman, became one of the most widely read travel writers of the nineteenth century. Yet her first book, based on letters and notes for the amusement of her friends at home, related to a trip on which she celebrated her twenty-third birthday in October, 1854, published two years later as The English Woman in America. Isabella concluded: "New York, from its position, population, influence, and commerce, is worthy to be considered the metropolis of the New World." She was entranced with the "very handsome city" while noting that "a great part of the city is indescribably dirty, though it is stated that the expense of cleaning it exceeds 250,000 dollars per annum." Her vivid narration covers commerce, industry, institutions, and aspects of daily life. The danger of "Young Americans" driving dangerously in and out among the crowd caught her attention: "Occasionally, the whole traffic of the street comes to a dead-lock, in consequence of some obstruction or crowd, there being no policeman at hand with

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his incessant command, '<u>Move on</u>!'" The writer made unequivocally clear her opinion of the city's main law enforcement institution:

> Strangers frequently doubt whether New York possesses a police; the doubt is very justifiable, for these guardians of the public police are seldom forthcoming when they are wanted. They are accessible to bribes, and will investigate into crime when liberally rewarded; but probably in no city in the civilised world is life so fearfully insecure. The practice of carrying concealed arms, in the shape of stilettoes for attack, and swordstick for defence, if illegal, is perfectly common; desperate reprobates, called "Rowdies," infest the lower part of the town; and terrible outrages and murderous assaults are matters of such nightly occurrence as to be thought hardly worthy of notice, even in these prints which minister to man's depraved taste for the horrible.[92]

In the edition published two years later, an asterisked note to this quotation added: "The state of New York has improved. Mr. Fernando Wood, who is elected Mayor in November, 1854, has issued stringent regulations for the maintenance of order." But Wood was not reelected and the author opined: "(I)t is much to be feared that the mob, which exercises an undue influence upon the municipal elections, has not chosen a successor who will interfere with its privileges." Isabella's conservative biases so vividly expressed continued:

> No language can be too strongly expressive of censure upon the disgraceful condition of New York. The evil may be distinctly traced to the wretched system of politics which prevails at the election of municipal officers, who are often literally chosen from the lowest of the people, and are venal and corrupt to the highest degree. During my visit to New York a candidate for one of these offices stabbed a policeman, who died of the wound. If I might judge from the tone of public prints, and for conversations on the subject, public feeling was not much outraged by the act itself, but it was a convenient stalking-horse for the other side, and the policeman's funeral procession, which went down Broadway, was nearly a mile in length.[93]

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Rapid growth of the city, increasing industrialism and corporatism, and a perceived heightened sense of disorder led to creation of the modern police department matching similar developments abroad. The organizational model, established the previous decade in London, guided the structure. To police the English capital, Robert Peel settled on a military model of organization: uniforms, military ranks and hierarchical relationships, marching drills, and life for the police officer centrally connected to the station house.[94]

New York followed the same model, but implementing a new police force was an awkward scenario involving the settling of numerous competitive political issues. By 1844, the time the reorganized urban policing had arrived, but differing measures were proposed within the Common Council and a separate police bill was introduced in the state legislature on April 1.[95]

A critical dispute centered on differences between the reformist native American Republican Party, which won election on April 11, and the Democrats, pictured by their opponents as the champions of the status quo.[96] The native American party's measure passed the council on May 7, and was signed into law by the governor the same day. The office of police chief was created to supervise the new regimen, and eight hundred police officers would be appointed by the mayor upon nomination of aldermen and tax assessors from each ward. While the native American concept embodied many of the English principles, the issuance of a uniform was not provided: officers received a star-shaped badge for identification, and wore a blue coat

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with the letters "M.P.," for municipal police, on the collar which could be turned down to conceal identity.[97] Many officers and general citizens objected to the English style uniform for the same reasons Londoners did years earlier: the fear of an internal standing army which could threaten hard-won liberties. In the city election of 1845, opposition to the anti-Catholic native American party grew, aided by higher taxes, Mayor James Harper's vigorous enforcement of blue laws, and the reluctance of the native American party to implement the police law passed by them a year earlier.

The Democrats campaigned on a platform that supported the state law; they were elected and on May 23, 1845, Mayor William F. Havemeyer's-led council passed the measure, definitively providing the city with policing reorganization including twenty-four hour police service.

The population of New York increased substantially in the next decade but was augmented primarily by a surge of immigration. The changing diversity of national origins would affect the organization, composition and management of policing. While the native-born population grew 30 percent reaching 307,444, the foreign born population grew almost two-and-one times to 322,460: in 1845, 36 percent of the population was foreign born, but by 1855, over half the city's population was born beyond national borders. By 1855, Irish-born natives had grown by almost seventy-five thousand to 175,736, or almost 30 percent of the population, and during the same time German-born residents increased almost four-fold

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reaching 97,572. Meanwhile, the number of police grew only by half while the population nearly doubled. Intensities for political expression grew as immigrants jockied for political representation and social mobility in their new city. One avenue for social mobility was the Police Department which began to count more German and Irish members in the ranks.

The 1844 law provided one-year terms for policemen, but Mayor Havemeyer preferred tenure based on good behavior. A trend toward electing police officers in other cities did not interest New Yorkers but the legislature did increase the appointment term in New York in 1849 to four years, and in 1853 to terms of good behavior, thus reducing the chances of partisan removal of police officers who might not hold their jobs long enough to learn them.

Since its earliest days as an English colony, important decisions taken by the city council generally would require approval or could be countermanded first by the English-appointed governor and later by the democratically elected state assembly. The two legislative groups--council and assembly--increasingly were divided by economic interests, ethnicity, and culture. The political check which the state assembly held over the city's actions became pivotal in the creation of the first regular police force. Deriding the corruption and inefficiencies of the police he inherited upon assuming office, the nativist mayor Harper appointed the first uniformed force. The state legislature enacted the Municipal Police Act of 1844, but insisted that it should not take

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effect until the city passed ordinances for it. The city council refused to enact the requiring legislation and opted for their own ordinance codifying the existence of forces: the traditional night watch of about 1,000 men, popularly called "leatherheads" due to their firemen's hat; the day constabulary police force which had grown in the years, and the new uniformed municipal police, popularly called "MPs" or "Harper's Police" comprising approximately 200.

Later in 1844, the Democratic candidate, William Frederick Havemeyer, handily won the mayoral election (as he did three times later) partially due to the failure of the native American party to implement police reform as the electorate had come to expect. A few months later the Democratic council bill was signed into law on May 23, 1845, establishing the new unified policing system. Among the requirements of the measure was that New York police had to be residents of the ward in which they worked; this act was unlike the English system in which police officers were often posted far from their neighborhoods or who were moved into London from distant counties. Police historian James F. Richardson remarked: "The police arrangements of New York cannot be considered apart from the social and political structure of the city, and if tension and antagonism marked this structure, it is not surprising that the inefficiency and instability characterized the police force of the 1840's and early 1850's."[98]

That tension--reflecting ward politics enhanced by strong

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ethnic immigrant influences--resulted in the absorption and streamlining of the watch, but not in the immediate elimination of the city police. But beginning from the innovations of 1840-45, policing became more law and order task orientated, as duties related to lamp lighting were transferred to other city workers and police salaries increased. Police were on duty thirty-six out of every forty-eight hours, and could be called out for extra duty for fires, riots, and official processions. Police officers obtained their positions from ward politicians and had to have them renewed each year until 1853, when an act by the legislature permitted policemen to retain their appointments indefinitely during good conduct. Before that some men would lose their positions with a change following local elections. George W. Walling, later police commissioner, relates in Recollection of a New York City Chief of Police the ease with which he entered a career in policing, and the similar ease with which he was dismissed after the election of 1848:

> One day, late in 1847, I was hunting quailes in New Jersey, when a friend accosted me and asked whether I would like to take his position on the New York Police force. He was about to resign, and the alderman and assistant-alderman of his ward had given him the privilege of naming his successor....My début was made as one of the force of the Third Ward. I received no special instructions as to what were to be my duties...It is amusing to me to recall the ease with which my appointment was secured.[99]

After serving the two year term, Walling was not reappointed by his alderman "owing to political differences" and moved to the eighteenth ward where eventually he was nominated by the alderman there.[100]

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Police duties of the time included maintenance of the peace, enforcement of official regulations, assisting other govern-mental departments, and responding to and solving crime. The quantity of crime--"arrests and offenses"--during the first eight-and-a-half years of the newly organized force is indicated in Table 2.1. The records for this compilation--since destroyed by the department--suggest a city with moderate crime incidents: 160 murders and homicide "arrests and offenses" over 8.45 years, or an average of 19 events per year; rape and attempted rape averaged 39 events, and robbery averaged 49 incidents.

With a population in 1850 of 515,547, this would suggest that on a per hundred thousand population basis the murder-homicide rate was about 3.7, actual and attempted rape of approximately 7.6; robbery of 9.5; and aggravated assault of 54.7 per year. However, these data give only an impression of criminality at the time from reports which focus on arrests and do not provide separate indications of complaints, the reported number of incidents, that might have been known to police. What is revealed, however, reflects a turbulent level of non-lethal violence of the time. With police reporting only arrests--not complaints and clearance rates (solutions or other dispositions)--law enforcement controlled perception of its own performance and, further, had few incentives to pursue actual incidents to arrests that would be hard to solve: the neighborhood and political machine connections of the average police officer were likely to have an inhibiting effect of

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Table 2.1

"Arrests and Offenses" for New York City

July 15, 1845 - December 31, 1853

Incidents	Number
Violent Crime	
Murder & homicide	160
Rape & attempted	330
Robbery	415
Aggravated assaults	2,382
Property Crime	
Burglary & attempted	1,679
Larceny Theft*	5,189
Arson	195
Serious Crime	10,350
Other Incidents	247,388
Total	257,738

*Includes: embezzlement, forgery, felony, fraud, grand and constructive larceny

Source: A. E. Costello, Our Police Protectors: History of the New York Police from the Earliest Period to the Present Time, New York: The author, 1885, p. 116.

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arresting male factors if such actions could conceivably affect the officer's reappointment. Police had a sworn duty to arrest those breaking the laws and presenting them usually to a police court for sentencing; yet considerable discretion existed for lesser offenses like vagrancy or disorderly conduct relative to robbery or burglary. Nonetheless, the level of street violence resulting in arrests reached a stunning level in frequency: over 168,000 incidents--almost two-thirds of the total--in the "other" category are composed of disorderly conduct, intoxication, and vagrancy. Assault and battery-related arrests per se accounted for over 11 percent of the total, but many incidents either failed to become a police statistic, or are counted among disorderly conduct. People solved their own disputes, or police dispensed summary judgment at the end of a night stick. Walling described the level of casual street violence which existed in mid-century which was not likely to appear in official statistics:

> On Twenty-second Street, between Second and Third avenues, there were two rows of tenements, known as the "English" and "Irish." They were on either side of the street, and the occupants were rarely at loss for an excuse to come to blows. I have known them to indulge in as many as a dozen fights in one evening. After dusk the life of a policeman who patrolled this beat alone was not worth much.[101]

The remaining "other" incidents included: sexually related events--indecent exposure, 550; insulting females, 270, and bigamy, 112--as well as such matters to attract police attention as runaway apprentices, 344; violation of corporation ordinances, 2,700, and abandonment, 899.

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Turbulence Leads to Early Reform

The number of police arrests made each year increased for a decade beginning 1847: still the newly reorganized police force was not performing to expectations. By 1856, the perpetuating conflicts between New York City and upstate legislators included the city government's partisan regime.

A dénouement was in the making: due to the legislature's dissatisfaction with the political overtones of police appointments--conveniently ignoring their own brand of partisanship--and the persistence of a high acceptable level of official corruption, the state exercised its superior power to create a new police system for the city.

Elected city officials were not prepared to surrender their prerogatives. The city's first Irish-American mayor, Fernando Wood, held office as the first candidate sponsored by the Democratic Tammany Club and quickly sought to bring the police under the mayor's direct charge. When Wood faced reelection in 1856, he privately turned to police captains and other officers and solicited direct contributions for his campaign, perhaps raising as much as $10,000 within one week.[102] That issue aside, reformers split with Wood's administration on its failure to enforce Sabbath and alcoholic control measures severely. Wood implied that he did not oppose enforcement of prohibition measures, but felt that desirable control could be achieved without coercion. Moreover, the sense of security within the city had been poor, and a wave of "garroting" against citizens had provoked

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citizens' fear.[103] Richardson described the venality of the election that would soon provoke an astonishing battle between competing police forces:

> Election day saw the grogshop owners and their customers shouting, bruising, and repeating for Wood. Many of the policemen on furlough actively electioneered for him, and those who were on duty did not interfere with the repeaters who roamed the city casting numerous ballots for him. Policemen Petty and Hanley of the First Ward stood by the poll clubbing anyone with a mayoral ticket other than Wood's.[104]

Wood was reelected, but his triumph soon prepared the epochal confrontation: the state's Metropolitan Police Act of April 15, 1857, was rejected by the mayor who had been a vigorous law-and-order advocate during his election campaign. This new state measure created an enlarged police district from the counties of New York, Kings, Richmond, and Westchester which included the present Bronx. The governor was to appoint five commissioners to run the state districts three of whom would be from New York, with the mayors of New York and Brooklyn serving as ex officio members. The state then sought to disband the city's force offering policemen an opportunity to keep their jobs if they would change their allegiances. Three hundred of the 1,100 members resigned to join the new force; the remainder stayed loyal to Wood. Thus, the city had two police departments: one was a new Metropolitan force led by a governor-appointed superintendent and five commissioners, three from New York, one from Kings, and one from Richmond or Westchester together with the mayor's of New York and Brooklyn as ex officio. The other was the historic police department headed by a mayor-appointed

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superintendent. Each force with its partisans regarded the other as being unconstitutional and sought to vindicate its position within the courts.

Meanwhile, a confrontation surfaced concerning a new commissioner who refused to pay Wood a bribe: a street commissioner had died and his deputy sought to replace him in the position but could not or would not pay the mayor his demanded tribute. Wood rejected him. With the post open the Republican governor appointed one of his party cohorts, Daniel D. Conover; meanwhile, Wood appointed his own man, Charles Devlin, after receiving a $50,000 bribe.[105] Conover sought to assume his office in City Hall; Wood's police physically blocked his entry; Conover then appeared before a Republican judge and swore out two warrants against the mayor--for assault and inciting a riot. George W. Walling, then a captain of the Metropolitans, was ordered to serve one warrant upon Wood but initially was prevented from doing so by his own accounting, as hundreds of Municipal police were posted around City Hall with more inside. Eventually, Walling passed through the police lines and entered the mayor's office where he attempted to serve the warrant, even seizing the mayor by his arm who repulsed him. Walling was ejected into City Hall Park, narrowly escaping injury; nonetheless, he endeavored to return and again was expelled. A contingent of "Mets" arrived to support him in service of the second warrant when they too were repulsed by the more numerous, highly agitated, and apparently better armed Municipals. An astonishing

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confrontation then erupted between the two forces: an inter police forces riot. Fortuitously for the Mets, the national guard's Seventh Regiment was marching down Broadway toward a ship taking the troops to Boston for celebration. Met officers hailed the commanding officer, Major General Charles W. Sanford, and requested that his soldiers provide aid which was immediately given. With most of his troops positioned nearby, Sanford entered City Hall and confronted the mayor, saying that he represented the state's military power and properly was taking the mayor into custody; later Wood was released on bail and never stood trial. When the struggle was over, twelve Mets had been injured, one crippled for life.

Meanwhile, the power vacuum signaled by the police debacle permitted gang battles to erupt unimpeded in the streets. In legal pleadings the mayor protested the constitutionality of the state's action, but in the fall the State Supreme Court upheld the measure creating the Metropolitan force and Wood disbanded the attenuated Municipal police force.[106]

The remaining decades of the nineteenth century were years of struggle for reform and counterreformation in city police. After the Civil War, one historian sharply-worded an attack on policing:

> New York is growing more and more like Paris in respect to the police. It is literally governed by them. They have almost everything in their own hands, and are prone to make the law a terror to all but evil doers. That they have entirely too much power is beyond question; and that they abuse it is a matter of hourly

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observation.[107]

The author cautioned: "We have no right to look to saintliness in blue uniforms and pewter badges, particularly their wearers receive but $25 to $30 a week, and are necessarily demoralized by the very air they breath."[108] The attack continued stating that the majority of police officers "are generally foreigners, ignorant, brutal fellows, whom any elevation renders tyrants and bullies" who have obtained their employment "by partisan favor" prior to reform measures then in place. The atmosphere in the thirty-two police stations was "repulsive at best." The detectives were described as "a peculiar and distinct part of the police force" constituting "the shrewdest and most dishonest of the entire body."[109] Despite the unsparing denouncement of policing, later the author concluded: "New-York...bears no comparison for wickedness with what it was fifteen years ago. Rowdyism has no such immunity, lawlessness no such power. Even the municipal government has improved, and will improve."[110]

A police history noted the fin de siècle tensions: "As the 1870s dawned, two persistent ailments plagued the city. The first of these was deep-seated ethnic hostilities and the second was the involvement of almost the entire police force in the systematic looting of the city and its residents."[111] The ethnic rivalry was reflected in the strife between a police department that had become dominated by Irish Catholic members and a local militant Northern Ireland Protestant contingent which emphasized its religious separatism at Orange

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parades and picnics. In 1871, following a conflict between Celts and Orangemen at the latter's parade, the melee resulted in 11 dead, 67 wounded civilians, and two dead police.[112] The same year the rapacious reign of William Marcy "Boss" Tweed came to an end when the political leader was sentenced to prison for official corruption. The collapse of the Tweed Ring did not serve as an opportunity for needed police reform, however, as reformers' agenda was concentrated on enhancing the probity and responsibilities of aldermen, councilmen, and civic officials.[113] Corruption within government was pervasive with "Tweed's Courthouse" as the most famous example of the deposed political manipulator's success at skimming graft from public contracts: the civic building was paid for by the city for almost three times its actual construction cost: the courthouse became a lasting icon of rampant official corruption. Ironically, Tweed also was the contractor of the Ludlow Street Jail, north of Grand Street, in which he died and which reflected the mores of the time:

> (T)here are two distinct casts in Ludlow Street jail, of which the public generally hears of but one--and that the higher one. These two casts may be called the "paying" borders, and the "non-paying borders." The former class are the aristocrats of the jail. They pay the warden fifteen dollars a week for the privilege of sitting at his table and eating the luxuries of the market. This sum includes also a respectable room, not cell, and fair attendance. Except for the restraint of confinement the paying border's life in Ludlow Street jail is not an unhappy one as most persons think. [Some]....get a nicely furnished room with all the luxuries, have their meals served in their rooms and live in royal style. For this privilege, however, they have to pay from $50 to $100 a week.[114]

The quality of policing in the nineteenth century has

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been characterized as "an era of incivility, ignorance, brutality and graft."[115] Inevitably, the evolving impetus for reform of policing received greater urgency as the century reached its end, emphasized by continuing urbanization with a substantial increase in non-English-speaking immigration. In the minds of many observers this portended an era of dire events, at least in the mind of one commentator in 1885, who saw linguistic, religious, and cultural immigrant influences as being causal factors threatening urban stability:

> The city is the nerve center of our civilization. It is also the storm center....While a little less than one-third of the population of the United States is foreign by birth or parentage, eighty percent. of New York [is]. Because our cities are so largely formed, Romanism finds in them its chief strength. For the same reason the saloon, together with the intemperance and the liquor power which it represents, is multiplied in the city.[116]

Any retrospective conclusions of the relative low crime and presumed urban peace of 1890 must be challenged in the light of subsequent investigations of pervasive police dishonesty. While only a minority of police were shown to be corrupted, the event must cast doubt on police statistics of the time.

The pivotal New York police corruption investigation in 1894-95, the Lexow Committee, provided documentation into organized corruption in police, though the tone of the condemnation had an overtly political note to it by condemning abuses of the Democratic Tammany machine from the Republican pulpit. The forces calling for reform gained momentum: the appointment of the high-profile New York native and civil

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service reformer, Theodore Roosevelt, as president of the board of police commissioners reflected a pinnacle of regeneration in New York policing, albeit a brief one. Richardson noted: "Roosevelt often spoke and acted as if he were the police commissioner just as his later writings stressed his role in reforming the police. However, he was only one member of four and policy was made by the board as a whole."[117] Coming as it did with findings of the politically-motivated and ideologically inspired Lexow Committee, Roosevelt's brief tenure, nonetheless, was a propitious time for reorganization of the police department by receiving a higher place in the urban reform agenda.

One unsuccessful objective by the Roosevelt-led board was to create a special Police Board appointed by the governor, which could remove police officers without recourse to court review or appeal whose competence and honesty were in doubt. The measure provoked much discussion but the police department itself vigorously opposed the measure and it died within the state legislature. Failure of the proposal to pass widened the cleavage between police and reformers, but could be regarded as yet another milestone in reform pressures which were increasing.

The greatest success of Roosevelt's term, May 1895, to April 1897, was unrelated to eliminating dishonest policemen and their superiors: "Perhaps Roosevelt's most significant contribution as police commissioner was the construction of a rational, systematic testing procedure that became the model

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for police personnel selection methodology in the United States."[118] Despite the sense that changes in policing were occurring, the extent of corrective issues seemed to rise to the surface of reform concern. By the end of the century during the post-Lexow years, complaints persisted: the metropolis was New York in Bondage, according to one group of citizens who published their complaints in a cranky harangue mostly of police corruption but also adding disapproving words about other city departments.[119]

Over three-and-a-half centuries a wilderness settlement had been transformed into a world leader in commerce, finance, transportation, industry, education, and culture. Institutions of urban modernity had been created from earlier antecedents and by 1890 were facing challenging times as a city, its state, and the nation clearly were headed for a greater place in a global affairs. New York City, née New Amsterdam, had faced cataclysmic and unremitting change in its goals of security, order, growth, and prosperity. It had arisen from a fragile trading outpost, organized for profit and indirectly controlled by the Dutch government, and evolved into the world's most cosmopolitan city, which by the end of the nineteenth century was poised to assume unprecedented economic, commercial, and, to some extent, social leadership. What generalization emerge about urban disorder from this extended time? Disorder may be broadly identified to include serious threats to the citizenry of problems that at one

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historical time or another seemed daunting, even overwhelming: these include hostile conflicts with the native Indians; disastrous fires; public health epidemics; criminal violence; violence of racial, ethnic, and religious prejudice; labor violence; and urban riots.[120]

These elements of risk and disorder varied over three centuries. Threats from the native Indians had been eliminated during the second half of the nineteen century through a strategy of massive extermination, expropriation, relocation, and appeasement. The risks of massive urban fire remained at the end of the century. Strengthened building codes emphasizing safer construction and the use of fire-resistive materials, stringent insurance regulations, and the availability of improved fire fighting equipment assured that future conflagrations, while certain to occur, would not level the city so substantially as other cities had experienced in the previous third-of-a-century and yet others would in the years to come.[121]

In the nineteenth century public health had emerged as perhaps the central urban domestic cause of untimely death and fear. The scourges of tuberculosis, cholera, and periodic epidemics remained with the city as killers capable of extraordinary losses; yet even in issues of public health, great progress had been achieved. The latter years of the century constituted a time when mandated sanitary housing and schooling, inoculations against certain epidemics, and the concept of pure food and drink found acceptance of legislative

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and social procedures to increase the collective safety.[122] The history of fire protection and public health in New York City reveal an interrelationship to controlling urban problems in the reduction of loss of life and property and maintenance of public order. It would be in a similar context by which law enforcement correspondingly could be judged as to its success in serving the public.

What were the themes and countermeasures of violent urban crime as a dominant manifestation of disorder? Internal disorder as reflected by violent crime, had been an omnipresent concern for city authorities since early days; however, that level of concern rose and fell and rose again over different historic periods based on police records and court reports, newspaper accounts, official reports, and the witnesses of native and visiting observers of the time. All add to a measure of understanding this historic panorama. Yet no comparative measure exists that can offer precise time-by-time differential: reliable comparative data over any period of time do not exist and attempts to judge from incomplete, biased, and politically sensitive police and court records may illustrate police activity and be interesting and useful to historians without being of comparative value.

Newspaper reports of the time can be selective and fail to detect or comprehend trends not within their editorial focus of the time. Visitors from afar and local commentators have strong impressions, yet frequently their views are highly personal and not based on great experience or serious

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analysis.[123] One observer sees the city during her visit as "so fearfully insecure," while others extol the city's wonders and opportunities and are not burdened by insecurity.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries at times the public in both London and New York opposed public policing for economic, practical, and philosophical reasons. The exigencies of a modern industrialized city overcame these reservations sufficiently to establish and fund modern policing. By the beginning of the twentieth century, violent crime and riots were believed to be activities of "rougher sorts," often immigrants, frequently in manual trades or without firm employment, generally young, often tending towards political radicalism and fuelled by the immoderate intake of alcohol. Order was maintained by an often brutalizing police force. Originating from a quasi-military structural model, modern police had succeeded for most of the nineteenth century at successfully maintaining a Janus-faced appearance, often placating commercial and political powers in their midst meanwhile not above exploiting the population they were designed to control. The next century soon would see a strong effort at eradicating the perceived major cause of crime and pauperism while the reform of policing would advance, concentrating on creating competent, non-political, trained agents of urban control.

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ENDNOTES

1. J. Franklin Jameson, ed., Narratives of New Netherland, 1609-1664, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909, p. 283.

2. John G.E. Heckewelder, History, Manners, and Customs of the Indian Nations Who Once Inhabited Pennsylvania and the Neighboring States, New York: Arno Press, [1876], 1971, p. 262.

Phelps-Stokes disputes this etymology: "No one, for instance, in our day, would be so bold as to assert a Spanish origin for the name Manhattan, deriving it from moñas--drunkenness, or monados--drunken people." He adds and further speculates: "The first mention of the name Manhattan is in Juet's Log, where it is written Manna-hata, and its first appearance on a map is on the Velasco Map of 1610, where it appears in two forms....neither, however, being applied directly to the island...In both of these documents, the name was probably bestowed by Hudson himself, and, no doubt, represents an attempt to perpetuate the name of an Indian tribe, or the name by which the locality was called by the Indians themselves. Perhaps the mostly likely derivation is that suggested by Tooker..."The island of the hills.'" I.N. Phelps-Stokes, The Iconography of Manhattan Island, vol. 2, New York: Robert H. Dodd, 1916, p. 121 (Hereafter cited as Iconography).

3. James Axtell, The European and the Indian: Essays in the Ethnohistory of Colonial North America, New York: Oxford University Press, 1981, pp. 257-258. Thefts by Indians might also be supported by their culture. Nicholaes Van Wassenaer in "Historische Verhael," 1626, notes: "The natives are always seeking some advantage by thieving. The crime is seldom punished among them. If any one commit that offense too often, he is stript bare of his goods, and must seek fresh means," in Jameson, p. 85.

4. David Freeman Hawke, Everyday Life in Early America, New York: Harper & Row, 1988, p. 78 (Hereafter cited as Everyday Life).

5. Carl Bridenbaugh, Cities in the Wilderness: The First century of Urban Life in America, 1625-1742, New York: Oxford University Press, 1938, p. 110 (Hereafter cited as Wilderness).

6. Ibid., p. 111.

7. Ibid., p. 112.

8. Everyday Life, p. 80.

9. Richard Eddy, Alcohol in History, New York: National Temperance Society and Publication House, 1887, p. 179

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(Hereafter cited as Alcohol).

10. Ibid.

11. C.A. Weslager, "Did Minuit Buy Manhattan Island from the Indians?," De Halve Maen, xliii (October 1968): 5-6. The purchase of the island is established by only one document: a letter from Peter Schagen, a delegate of the States General signed in Amsterdam, November 5, 1626. See: Susan Elizabeth Lyman, The Story of New York: An Informal History of the City from Its First Settlement to the Present Day, New York: Crown Publishing, 1964.

12. Ibid., p. 6.

13. Wilderness, p. 273.

14. Berthold Fernow, ed., The Records of New Amsterdam from 1653 to 1674, Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Co., 1976, vol. I, p. 1. (Hereafter cited as RNA)

15. RNA, vol. 1, p. 25.

16. Ibid., pp. 35-36.

17. Alcohol, p. 361.

18. Wilderness, p. 428.

19. Carl Bridenbaugh, Cities in Revolt: Urban Life in America, 1743-1776, New York: Oxford University Press, 1955, p. 157 (Hereafter cited as Cities in Revolt).

20. Ibid, p. 358.

21. John J. McCusker, "The Rum Trade and the Balance of Payments of the Thirteen Continental Colonies, 1650-1775," PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh, 1970, pp. 431-447.

22. Ibid. Sugar was also important for more than the making of molasses; it was used to sweeten imported chocolate, tea, and coffee, and had become important over the past century to satisfy sweetness in the American diet.

23. The importance of rum for export income for New York in the eighteenth-century apparently has not been reported in the literature. However, New England commodity exports, 1768-1772, ranked rum as the seventh largest source of income. See James J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard, The Economy of British America, 1607-1789, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991, p. 108.

24. W.J. Rorabaugh, The Alcoholic Republic: An American Tradition, New York: Oxford University Press, 1979, p. 25.

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25. Ibid, p. 23; for Great Awakening context, see: Patricia U. Bonomi, Under the Cope of Heaven: Religion, Society, and Politics in Colonial America, New York: Oxford University Press, 1981, pp. 131-160.

26. Earle H. Houghtaling, Jr., "Administration of Justice in New Amsterdam: I," De Halve Maen, xlviii (October 1968): 9-10, 15-16.

27. J. Franklin Jameson, ed., Original Narratives of Early American History: Narratives of New Netherland 1609-1664, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909, p. 18.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid. pp. 18-19. Nellis M. Crouse in "The White Man's Discoveries and Explorations," History of the State of New York, ed. Alexander C. Flick, vol. 1, New York: Columbia University Press, 1933, p. 161, notes:

> The natives in these encounters do not seem to have acted in a savage or even in a hostile manner; they appear to have been guilty only of a lack of appreciation for the sanctity of property, as understood by their visitors. Furthermore, the men who made up the crew of the Half Moon were, in all probability, drawn from the rougher elements, and looked upon the natives as a breed far beneath them to be accorded consideration. The simplest manner to protect private property was to shoot the thief and sail away."

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid, p. 20.

32. Ibid, p. 26.

33. This was the penultimate voyage for Hudson. The next year he sailed again, this time sponsored by three English merchant-princes, again hoping to find a faster route to the Spice Islands. He was mutinied with eight others in what would be called Hudson's Bay. See: Julian Wolfenstein, "Mutiny on the Discovery," De Halve Maen, xl (July 1965): 9-10.

34. E.B. O'Callaghan, comp. and ed., Documentary History of the State of New-York, vol. 1, Albany: Weed, Parsons & Co., 1849, pp. 600-602. The director general, or "governor" has the English called him, of New Netherland wielded near absolute power in civil matters, tempered by appeal to the Amsterdam Chamber, then to the Council of Nineteen, and finally to the States General. See: William R. Shepherd, The Story of New Amsterdam, Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, [1926], 1970, pp. 6-7. The early schouts, far from being judicially independent, vigorously sought to protect the company's

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interests as contained in the Charter of Freedoms and Exemptions and subsequent documents; additionally, schouts "took advantage of their positions for personal aggrandizement." Stefan Bielinski, "The Schout in Rensselaerswijck: A Conflict of Interests," A Beautiful and Fruitful Place: Selected Rensselaerswijck Seminar Papers, ed. & indexed by Nancy Anne McClure Zeller, [Albany, NY]: New Netherland Publishing, 1991, pp. 3-12 (Hereafter cited as Beautiful and Fruitful).

35. Oliver A. Rink, Holland on the Hudson: An Economical and Social History of Dutch New York, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986, pp. 95, 104-107. According to Rink (p. 105): "This grant of power of life or death over tenants had the effect of making the patroons the most powerful law enforcement officials in New Netherland." However, the only documented execution during the Dutch hegemony occurred not in New Amsterdam, but in Rensselaerswyck. See: Philip English Mackey, "Capital Punishment in New Netherland," De Halve Maen, xlvii (July 1972): 7-8, 14. Despite Link's statement that patroons held the right of judging capital offenses, Van Laer insists that by two decades later, at one patroonship, at least, the obligation "was evidently intended to be a court of limited civil and criminal jurisdiction," see: A.J.F. Van Laer, trans. and ed., Minutes of the Court of Rensselaerswyck, 1648-1652, Albany: University of the State of New York, 1922, p. 9. This is the only court record extant in New Netherland. It was here that, nonetheless, a felon had been executed in 1646 for crime not mentioned in the accounts.

A perusal of the cases heard suggests that most involved civil actions, especially, debt, failure to fulfill contracts, Indian-laws violations, and slander; however, a few cases of assault and battery were also noted. The record had no indications of homicide, rape, robbery, burglary, or arson

36. For the description of Kieft's campaigns against the Indians, 1641-1646, see Jameson, pp 269-284. Mary L. Booth, History of the City of New York from Its Earliest Settlement to the Present Time, New York: W.R.C. Clark & Meeker, 1859, pp. 63-77.

37. Booth, p. 107.

38. Booth, p. 119.

39. Booth, p. 127. See also Shepherd, pp. 49-62.

40. RNA, pp. 65-73. The conditions for the wall were specific: "The palisades must be 12 feet long, 18 inches in circumference, sharpen at the upper end to be set in line. At each rod a post 21 inches in circumference is to be set, to which rails, split for this use shall be nailed one foot below the top. The breastwork against it shall be 4 feet high, 4 feet at the bottom and 3 feet at top, covered with sods, with

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a ditch 3 feet wide and 2 feet deep, 2 1/2 feet within the breastwork. The length of the ground to be lined with palisades is 108 rods, the end of the rods being the lest of the money. Payments will be made weekly in good wampum," p. 72.

41. RNA, vol. 1, p. 304. Three fire inspectors and fire regulations were announced at the Burgomaster's meeting of April 13, 1655. In 1657, a colonist was fined for having a fire on his premises. The next year local shoemakers received contracts to make leather buckets which placed about the town to be used as needed. See: John A. Bogart, "Volunteers Fought Fires in New Amsterdam," De Halve Maen, xxxii (January 1958): 7.

42. Booth, p. 136. RNA, vol. 1, pp. 144-145.

43. Booth, p. 143. This produced the so-called Peach Tree War.

44. Ellis Lawrence Raesly, Portrait of New Netherland, Port Washington, NY: Ira J. Friedman, 1965 (orig. pub. 1945), p. 137. Other writers share this same opinion. For example Alice Norse Earle, Colonial Days in Old New York, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909, includes a chapter (pp. 227-260) on "Crimes and Punishments," and cites inflammatory insults of the Dutch period ("black pudding," "hay thief," "Thou swine," and "spitter-baard,") More serious "crimes" also were noted: Claerbout van ter Goes was branded, whipped on a half-gallows, and banished, for words considered treasonable (p. 240).

45. John E. O'Connor, "The Rattle Watch of New Amsterdam: I," De Halve Maen, xlii (April 1968): 11-12, 14 (Hereafter cited as Rattle Watch).

The tradition of a night watch was codified in Amsterdam and served as a template for creating a similar, though much reduced, force in New Amsterdam. Incidentally, Rembrandt van Rijin's monumental work The Nightwatch, the Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam, does not picture a night watch. Formally known as The Company of Captain Frans Bonning Cocq, the painting is a stylized "Joyous Entry" preparation of Cocq's militia company, itself a potential part of the city's internal controls and external defenses--into Amsterdam for a ceremonial and festive occasion. Margaret Deutsch Carroll, "Rembrandt's Nightwatch, and the Iconological Traditions of Militia Company Portraiture in Amsterdam," Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1976.

46. Rattle Watch, vol. 2, (July 1968): 12.

47. RNA, vol. 1, p. 265. The watch in Boston had been established in 1631, when it was ordered by court that "watches be set at sunset, and if any person fire off a piece after the watch is set, he shall be fined forty shillings, or be whipped." Edward H. Savage, Police Records and

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Recollections, or Boston by Daylight and Gaslight for Two Hundred and Forty Years, Montclair, NJ: Patterson Smith, [1873], 1971, p. 11. The early watch had the character of a military guard which also served the public. In February 1636, the town meeting assumed the prerogatives of its appointment and control.

48. Rattle Watch, vol. 1, p. 11.

49. RNA, vol. 1, p. 265. The watch sought to establish four to six man to guard the city at night.

50. RNA, vol. 2, pp. 198, 202-203.

51. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 196-202, also O'Connor, vol. 2, p. 10. Another aspect of the criminal justice system also was codified the same year when instructions for the keeper of the jail and the public prison were issued. RNA, vol. 2, pp. 294-296. The jailor was required to sleep in "his ordinary chamber" at all times unless otherwise being given permission to be away (item 1). The jailor was required to keep prisoners in fetters as provided by the schout, burgomasters, and schepen (item 7). He was to provide prisoners with "meat and drink according to order" (item 10) and was compensated for it. The instructions also note: "No person shall pass the night with a prisoner for any offence, even though man and wife" (item 14) and "The Jailor shall separate the prisoners, as much as possible from each other, and arrange them according to their offenses and persons; especially the men from the women" (item 15).

52. Rattle Watch, vol. 3, (October 1968), p. 13.

53. Ibid., vol. 3, p. 14.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid., p. 13.

56. Ibid., p. 14. During the Dutch hegemony, crime was uncommon, but the population was small--about 2,000 in 1643--and the population could distinguish residents from strangers easily. When a criminal was judged: "The Dutch believed in public punishments, quickly imposed. The time between detection, judgment, and punishment seldom took more than a few days. Dutch criminal punishment, like their tenure, was to be short and sweet." Scott Christianson, "Criminal Punishment in New Netherland," Beautiful and Fruitful Place, p. 88.

A study of women in criminal cases in the early colonial town 1653-1674, identified 43 cases over 22 years. Composed of" thievery, 14 cases; illegal tapping of alcohol, 10; assault, 9; illegal weight or weighing, 3; runaway shalve and whorish behavior, 2 each, and indecent exposure, littering, and baptism one each. Linda Biemer, "Criminal Law and Women in

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New Amsterdam and Early New York," Beautiful and Fruitful Place, p. 77

57. Rattle Watch, vol. 2, pp. 11-12. Also RNA, vol. 1, p. 214.

58. W. Scott Van Alstyne, Jr., "The Schout: Precursor of Our District Attorney," De Halve Maen, xlii (April 1967): 5-6, 15 and (July 1967): 7-8. For a lucid description of the time including transformation of the political and court systems, see: Thomas J. Archdeacon, "Anglo-Dutch New York, 1676," in New York: The Centennial Years, 1676-1976, Milton M. Klein, ed., Fort Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1976, pp. 11-37.

59. Thomas J. Archdeacon, New York City, 1664-1710: Conquest and Change, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1976, p. 102. For comment on Dutch law and its effects on the English system, see: Julius Goebel, Jr. and T. Raymond Naughton, Law Enforcement in Colonial New York: A Study in Criminal Procedure, Montclair, NJ: Patterson Smith, [1944], 1970, pp. 256-69, 329-30, 565, 688.

60. For an early history of urban controls in England, see: John Stark, "The Police of the City of London," Police Journal, IV, 1931, pp. 5-16; also: John Wade, A Treatise on the Police and Crimes of the Metropolis, Montclair, NJ: Patterson Smith, [1929], 1972.

61. Leon Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law and Its Administration from 1750, London: Stevens & Sons, vol. 3, 1956, pp. 32-33. For a further discussion of trading justices, see: Norman Landau, The Justices of the Peace, 1679-1760, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984, pp. 184-90, 200-4; for a general history of the time, note: J.M. Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England 1660-1800, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986, pp. 59-67, passim.

62. The concept of "hue and cry" existed in England since pre-Norman times, and was one of several principles that aided in the management of urban communities. Hue and cry meant that the constable, watch, or citizen might raise a noise (hue) and call for citizenly assistance to maintain the peace. Along with several other measures, hue and cry was codified in 1285 by Edward III's Statute of Winchester. Other measures codified by Edward similarly shared peacekeeping duties between the public and those specifically charged and compensated to preserve it. These principles include formalizing the watch within church wards and requiring citizens to have a weapon available with which to assist the constable or watch as required (assize of arms).

63. Numerous parliamentary debates were heard in the eighteenth century calling for revision of the means of urban

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protection. Reform was fought by opponents who variously claimed that such measures would be too costly, would usurp local traditions controlling employment, and could act as an infringement on hard-won civil liberties.

64. Patrick Pringle, Hue and Cry: The Story of Henry and John Fielding and Their Bow Street Runners, New York: William Morrow, 1955, p. 35.

65. Ibid., pp. 35-36.

66. In addition to Wade's A Treatise, see: Clive Emsley, The English Police: A Political and Social History, London: Harvester Whitesheaf, 1991.

67. George William Edwards, "New York as an Eighteenth Century Municipality," Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1917, pp. 17-18.

68. Ibid, p. 121.

69. Ibid.

70. Ibid, p. 122. The Negro Revolt of 1712-41 inaugurated the intermittent American tradition of rioting, defined as unlawful assembly of three or more persons, whose act or acts constitute a clear and present danger of violence and property loss.

The revolt of 1712 occurred when an organized and armed band of blacks burned a house in the middle of the night as a signal and assembled near it. Governor Springing ordered that the Battery cannons be shot, and the militia was quickly roused. In the ensuing skirmish, "eight or ten whites" were killed and a "great" number of blacks were subsequently executed. For the next generation this incident was a fragile constant reminder of the precarious balance between the races. In February, 1741, following a burglary and a series of fines, rumors circulated that blacks and poor whites were plotting to seize power. While little hard evidence of a conspiracy was produced, numerous blacks and a few whites were hanged and burned at the stake, others were punished by transportation. Joel Tyler Headley, The Great Riots of New York 1712-1873, New York: Dover Publications, [1873] 1971, pp. 24-45.

71. Citizens might have to serve once every four or five weeks and frequently complained about the burden of service to them and their families. Men could be excused from service on the watch by volunteering as firefighters or performing other unpaid civic duties.

72. Ibid, pp. 109-112.

73. Supporting day constables and the night watch were jailers who were private contractors, substantially supported

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by fees from prisoners themselves or, in the early nineteenth century, by creditors who had to pay the incarcerative costs of their debtors. Initially, debtors would face the unhappy conundrum of being thrown into jail for failing to meet debt payments in a timely fashion, then being faced with the cost of being incarcerated, and thus falling further into debt to the augmented costs.

During this time one historian posits: "Crimes of personal violence not resulting in death were the most common criminal offense...cases of assault and the like tended to be more rapidly disposed of in New York City (then elsewhere in the State), but a smaller proportion of them were satisfactorily resolved. Douglas Greenberg, Crime and Law Enforcement in the Colony of New York, 1691-1776, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1974, p. 199.

74. Wilderness, p. 65. By the second third of the eighteenth century, New York was to enter a period of greater urban disorder. Bridenbaugh, Cities in Revolt, p. 113, notes: "Not until about 1749 did Manhattan consider crime as a major problem. Then one newspaper sadly commented: 'It seems to be now become dangerous for the good People of this City, to be out late at Nights, without being sufficiently strong or well armed, as several Attacks and Disturbances have been lately made in our Streets.'" For other references to growing crime and urban disorder in New York mid-century to the Revolution, see: Gary B. Nash, The Urban Crucible: The Northern Seaports and the Origin of the American Revolution, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986, pp. 3, 117, 210, 218; Douglas S. Greenberg, "Persons of Evil Name and Fame: Crime and Law Enforcement in the Colony of New York, 1691-1776," Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1974; Augustine E. Costello, Our Police Protectors: A History of New York Police, Montclair, NY: Patterson Smith, [1885], 1972, pp. 19-48, and James F. Richardson, The New York Police: Colonial Times to 1901, New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1970, pp. 10-12 (Hereafter cited as New York Police).

75. Oscar Theodore Barck, Jr., New York City During the War for Independence, New York: Columbia University Press, 1931, pp. 57-58. Barck emphasized the adjustments for New York in the war time city. Municipal government was tenuous. Military government made no provision for trial by jury. He notes: "The town was crowded with people who sought the protection of the crown, many of whom did not know the meaning of law and order, or when removed from their home communities, were quite irresponsible."

76. Ibid.

77. Ibid.

78. Leon Radzinowicz, A History of English Criminal Law and Its Administration from 1750, New York: Macmillan Company,

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1948, p. 3-5. Exactly how many capital crimes existed in England and in New York prior to the American Revolution is uncertain due to differences in interpretations. Radzinowicz states: "Even as late as 1688...no more than about fifty offenses carried the death penalty. In the eighteenth century, however, their number began spectacularly to increase. Thirty-three capital offenses were created in George II's reign--about one for every year--and a further sixty-three were added during the first fifty years of the reign of George III (1760-1810)," p. 4.

The proliferation of capital offenses in England reached its apogee following passage of the Waltham Black Act of 1723, meant to punish poachers and private hunting property trespassers. More than 50 distinct offenses called for capital punishment, but considering the legalistic multiplication of aspects to the Act gives a total of between 200 and 250 separate capital offenses. Albeit capital punishment was not frequently used for Black violations, the principle of such a bloody code was repugnant to colonists' sensibilities and represented judicial reform that would be addressed over a half century later. See: E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act, New York: Pantheon Books, 1975.

79. Bernard Bailyn, The Peopling of British North America: An Introduction, New York: Vintage Books, 1988, p. 121.

80. Bernard Bailyn, Voyagers to the West: A Passage in the Peopling of British North America on the Eve of the Revolution, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1987, pp. 292-295. Bailyn's book studies approximately 8,072 men, women, and children who made a passage to America stretching from Nova Scotia through the Gulf Coast. The study was commenced by an analysis of Public Record Office data on emigrants from the United Kingdom from December 1773, to March 1776. Of these 1,954 migrated to the provinces of New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts. However, no information is available as to how many of these were sent to New York.

81. Charles Christian, A Brief Treatise on the Police of the City of New York, New York: Southwick & Pelsue, 1812, repr. New York: Arnold Press, 1970.

82. Ibid., p. 4.

83. Ibid., p. 5.

84. Ibid., p. 7.

85. Ibid., p. 8. The author's treatise is filled with observations on how the system of urban control might be improved. His suggestions for prisoners at the city prison, Bridewell, be that they are employed "under proper economy and discipline" at: making cut nails, sawing stone, polishing marble, picking oakum, chopping rugs, and sticking cards.

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(p. 15) The citizen deplores "the obvious inequalities of fortune; the insatiable appetite for animal gratification, at any sacrifice, in weak and depraved minds" (p. 28) but does not offer any further illumination on the condition of urban violence then or prior.

86. Diary comment of Philip Hone, one-time mayor of New York and dinner host to Marryat, in Jules Zanger, ed. and forward, Captain Frederick Marryat: Diary in America, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1960, p. 12.

87. Ibid., p. 30.

88. Ibid., p. 65.

89. Ibid., p. 66. Marryat found four reasons for the high level of conflagration: "By the notorious carelessness of black servants, and the custom of smoking cigars all day long"; from insurance fraud caused by "the knavery of men without capital, who insure to double and treble the value of their stock"; from "hasty and unsubstantial" construction, and from "conflagration of houses not insured, effected by agents employed by the Fire Insurance Companies, as a punishment to some, and a warning to others, who have neglected to take out policies." p. 66.

90. See: Gustave de Beaumont & Alexis de Tocqueville, On the Penitentiary System in the United States and its Applications in France, Carbondale & Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, [1833], 1964. Tocqueville, 26, and Beaumont, 29, came at their own expense to study American prisons with a commission from the French minister of the interior. During their stay, the observers visited in New York the House of Refuge for juvenile offenders, the penitentiary on Blackwell's Island, and the Bridewell of New York City, in addition to visits to Sing Sing and Auburn penitentiaries. Additionally, they saw penal facilities at Baltimore, Boston, Philadelphia.

91. Charles Dickens, American Notes, Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1968, pp. 99-117, esp. p. 113.

92. Isabella Lucy Bird, The English Woman in America, forward and notes by Andrew Hill Clark, Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966, pp. 334-388, esp. pp. 337-39.

93. Ibid., pp. 339-40.

94. In London after 1829 and in New York after 1844, for some years police officers lived in police barracks and were on duty for most of the typical week. Police officers could not be married until the captain interviewed the fiancee and approved the union.

95. New York Police, pp. 43-44.

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96. Democrats and Whigs had joined over the previous two years to elect candidates favoring the continuation of Bible reading in the schools. By 1843, this "American" school program became the basis of the jointly organized American Republican Party. James Harper, a devote Methodist, ardent temperance supporter, and successful publisher, seemed like a better candidate than most through his successful business experience and freedom from political commitments. But he "was to be the first in a long line of reform-minded mayors who vanished from government almost as quickly as they came. In this case, his exit to the revolving door of city politics was quicker than most, because his term was for only one year," Edward K. Spann, The New Metropolis: New York City, 1840-1857, New York: Columbia University Press, 1981, pp. 36-8 (Hereafter cited as New Metropolis).

97. Ibid., p. 46. The law stated: "The watch department, as presently organized, is hereby abolished, together with the offices of marshals, street inspectors, health wardens, fire wardens, dock masters, lamp lighters, bell ringers, day police officers, Sunday officers, inspectors of pawnbrokers and junk shops, and of the officers to attend the polls at the several election districts of the city and county of New York, and superintendent of roads of the twelfth ward of the said city, except the office of mayor's or first marshal." The watch and other offices were to be replaced by "a day and night police" with a maximum of 800 men including officers. The chief was to be appointed by the mayor with the approval of the common council for term of one year unless removed for cause. Other officers and policemen were also appointed for one year and could be suspended by captains for cause. Laws of NY (1844), chap. 315; Commercial Advocate, May 25, 1844.

98. Ibid., p. 50.

99. George W. Walling, Recollections of a New York Chief of Police, Montclair, NJ: Patterson Smith, [1885], 1972, p. 33 (Hereafter cited as Recollections).

100. Ibid, pp. 47-48.

101. Ibid, p. 48.

102. New York Police, p. 94.

103. The same phenomenon was noted in London at about the same time. See: Geoffrey Pearson, Hooligan: A History of Respectable Fears, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1983.

104. New York Police, p. 95. Wood was eventually arraigned. A press report in the New York Daily Tribune, November 23, 1861, stated: "When he came into office the taxes of the city were six millions per annum. They are now over twelve millions. Where are his vetoes which would have stayed this tide of

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profligate expenditure?" Wood made the police force "a mere machine for his private and political purposes. Under his sway gamblers, ticket swindlers, emigrant robbers, baggage smashers, and all the worst classes of the city, rose into prominence," quoted in Iconography, vol. II, p. 1900.

105. Ibid. See also: New Metropolis, pp. 390-394; Edward Robb Ellis, The Epic of New York City, New York: Coward-McCann, 1966, pp. 276-284.

106. New York Police, p. 95. See also Headley, pp. 129-134. With the police battle reducing the law enforcement capabilities of the city, two gangs took the opportunity to battle each other beginning July 4, 1857: the Dead Rabbits and Roach Guards. The police sought to intervene as the two groups of youth attacked each other. As they charged them, the police became the common enemy of the gang members and their supporters. The Metropolitans failed initially and regrouped, then with the assistance of the Seventy-first Regiment, eventually prevailed. Eight fatalities were reported.

The incident serves to illustrate another feature of urban control of the time: if police were inadequate for the time, the national guard could be called in to assist police in restoring order. This was not a situation limited to New York City. Mahon writes: "Of the 481 calls of detachments from the National Guard to keep the peace between the Civil War and 1906, 156, or almost one-third stemmed from labor trouble. Although industrial strife had much with stimulating the Guard, leaders of the Guard did not accept internal police work as the only or the two mission of the National Guard." John K. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1983, p. 118.

107. Junius Henri Browne, The Great Metropolis; A Mirror of New York, Hartford: American Publishing Company, 1989, p. 50.

108. Ibid.

109. Ibid., pp. 53-54.

110. Ibid., pp. 697-698.

111. Gerald Astor, The New York Cops: An Informal History, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971, p. 39.

A journalist specializing in crime and police articles for The Galaxy of the time provides insight to crimes of this period. In an article "Will Murder Out?" Edward Crapsey, The Nether Side of New York; or, The Vice, Crime and Poverty of the Great Metropolis, Montclair, NJ: Patterson Smith, [1872], 1969, pp. 164-175, provides murder-homicide data for the period 1856-1871 which he obtained from "the examination of fifty-two huge volumes."

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Homicides 1856-1871

Year	By Persons Known	By Persons Unknown	Total
1856	24	11	35
1857	42	13	55
1858	47	12	59
1859	36	15	51
1860	32	5	47
1861	37	15	52
1862	31	15	46
1863	38	11	49
1864	42	8	50
1865	49	12	61
1866	26	9	35
1867	24	10	34
1868	39	9	48
1869	36	5	41
1870	37	4	41
1871	34	8	42
Total	574	172	746

112. Ibid, p. 41.

113. Alexander B. Callow, Jr., Boss Tweed, New York: Oxford University Press, 1965. William Marcy Tweed's career effectively came to an end in 1868; he died in prison a decade later. His successor was "Boss" John Kelly who battled political reform from 1876 to 1886. Richard Croker next assumed the Tammany mantle, 1886-1902. The influence of Tammany Hall was to continue well into the next century. Shortly after beginning as a reporter for McClure's Magazine, Lincoln Steffens wrote: Tammany is bad government; not inefficient, but dishonest; not a party, not a delusion and a snare, hardly known by its party name--Democracy; having little standing in the national councils of the party and caring little for influence outside of the city. Tammany is Tammany, the embodiment of corruption," The Shame of the City, New York: Hill and Wang, [1904], 1957, p. 203.

114. Recollections, p. 390.

115. August Vollmer quoted in Samuel Walker, Popular Justice: A History of American Criminal Justice, New York: Oxford University Press, 1980, p. 61.

116. Josiah Strong, "Perils.--The City," in Popular Culture and Industrialism, 1865-1890, Documents in American Civilization Series, Henry Nash Smith, ed. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1967, pp. 172-173.

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117. New York Police, p. 249.

118. Jay Stuart Berman, Police Administration and Progressive Reform: Theodore Roosevelt as Police Commissioner of New York, Contributions in Criminology and Penology, No. 19, New York: Greenwood Press, 1987, p. 71. Berman calls the entrance examination procedure "absolutely revolutionary in 1895," p. 71. Roosevelt recruited from the entire state for the first examination which resulted in 18,000 requests for applications to fill 300 vacant positions existing following the Lexow investigation trials. Only one year earlier appointment to the New York City Police required a payment of $300 to Tammany Hall, according to Berman.

Other Roosevelt contributions to the force included: the creation of an undercover detective unit, annual physical examinations for all officers, bicycle patrols, use of technology to conduct investigations and increase efficiency, and opening the department to women and ethnic minorities. H. Paul Jeffers, Commissioner Roosevelt: The Story of Theodore Roosevelt and the New York City Police, 1895-1897, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1994. A novel which catches the spirit of the time is Caleb Carr, The Alienist, New York: Random House, 1994.

119. John D. Townsend, New York in Bondage, New York: Issued for Subscribers, 1901.

120. The topic of riots is excluded from this discussion, though certainly this manifestation of collective violence is a recurrent feature in American history. Over different times mobs have had distinctive functions: reaction against an unacceptable government, political discontent, social and economic frustration, racism, and criminal looting. For early nineteenth century violence, see: Paul O. Weinbaum, Mobs and Demagogues: The New York Response to Collective Violence in the Early Nineteenth Century, Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Research Press, 1979; Paul A. Gilje, The Road to Mobocracy: Popular Disorder in New York City, 1763-1834, Chapel Hill & London: University of North Carolina Press, 1987. For the Civil War era draft riots, see: Adrian Cook, The Armies of the Street, Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1974; James McCague, The Second Rebellion, New York: Dial Press, 1968; Iver Bernstein, The New York City Draft Riots, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990, and a broader view: Jules Archer, Riot: A History of Mob Action in the United States, New York: Hawthorn Books, 1974.

121. In earlier times fires were major cause of death, injury, and loss of property and were, therefore, one of the earliest form of municipal regulation. An ordinance in 1648 prohibited chimneys to be built of wood "or plaister" if the dwelling was located within the limits of the town. Fire wardens were to inspect chimneys and could levy a fine of three guilders for every flue found to be dirty. Minutes of the Common Council,

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1675-1776, vol. 1, pp. 46-47.

Risk of fire was an omnipresent threat to urban order and tranquillity and serious fires were recurrent features in the city's history. Dutch trading ship captain Adriaeh Block escaped death in 1613 when his ship Tigere caught fire while at anchor off the Battery. He and his crew built four huts on the island which remained until 1628 when one of them burned. Three fire wardens were appointed--all prominent men--in 1647. When the rattle watch discovered flames, they called out: "Hear thee...claim your buckets!" And citizens were expected to respond.

Due to on-going threats to the young city's safety, a paid fire department was established in 1737, over a century prior to the creation of a modern police department. Hilton Obenzinger, Seattle: Real Comet Press, 1989, pp. 9-10.

At the end of the eighteenth century, New Yorkers felt "anxiety" about risks from big fires with ten in 1797, and six each in 1978 and 1979. The first great fire of the nineteenth century came on December 18, 1804, in which 40 buildings were destroyed, coming at the end of a year in which sixteen fires--the highest number since the Revolution--occurred.

Due to the disorder and risk of theft at fires, the attendance of all peace officers was required. In 1817, a penalty for any marshal or constable failing to appear for duty at a fire was put at $10 where they were responsible for "the removal of all idle and suspected persons, or others not actually and usefully employed in aiding the extinguishment of such fires." Steven F. Ginsberg, The History of Fire Protection in New York City, 1800-1842, Ph.D. diss., New York University, pp. 224-225.

The fear of incendiarism was great at times in the early nineteenth century provoking the suggestions of rewards to the watch of the time, the creation of a special watch, and rewards for the apprehension of arsonists. One New Yorker wrote in August, 1829: "We live, I believe infested with incendiaries," also adding that it was "no time to leave a house alone to servants." Ibid., pp. 222-223, also 188. For a summary on how the municipality sought to reduce fire risks, see pp. 373-376. See also: Augustine E. Costello, Our Firemen: A History of the New York Fire Departments, New York: Knickerbocker Book Publishing Co., 1888; Kenneth H. Dunshee, Engine! - Engine! A Story of Fire Protection, New York: Harold V. Smith, 1939; H.E. Gillingham, "The First Fire Engines Used in America," New-York Historical Society Quarterly Bulletin, xx (July, 1936), and Alexander J. Wall, "The Great Fire of 1835," New York Historical Society Quarterly Bulletin, xx (January, 1936).

122. According to Duffy, in its earliest years as a colony, New Amsterdam had no serious sanitary problems. As population grew, the great epidemic diseases that periodically swept the colonies did not spare New York and regulations relating to street cleaning, removal of human and animal wastes, requirements for wells, and food market regulations were

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gradually introduced. Competent medical practitioners from abroad were attracted to the growing community.

In addition to endemic diseases like colds, malaria, and enteric disorders, periodic waves of devastating and fear-provoking epidemics wrecked the community. For example, infection in 1668; smallpox in 1679-1680 and 1689-1690; yellow fever in 1702 during which time between 10 and 12 percent of the population died; measles in 1713; smallpox in 1731 wiping out 5 to 8 percent of the population; measles in 1743; smallpox each year 1756-1766, and yellow fever 1791-1822. In the summer of 1832, probably over 3,000 deaths occurred from cholera. The advent of Asiatic cholera in the nineteenth century forced street cleaning measures which abated after the body count dropped. By mid-nineteenth century, dogs and hogs, burial grounds, the rise of the hospital as an institution, and the beginning of sanitary engineering became issues of the time.

The passage of the sweeping Metropolitan Health Act of 1866 "certainly brought an immediate improvement in the city's health and sanitary conditions," though the measure was criticized by opponents for its anti-democratic authority and probably was opposed by some since it prevented opportunity for graft. John Duffy, A History of Public Health in New York City 1625-1866, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968, passim, p. 570. A dramatic recounting of the fight for improved health conditions is provided by an official whose life "symbolized the sanitary movement," Steven Smith, The City That Was, pref. John Duffy, Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Reprint Corp., 1973.

123. The variability of crime tempered by the imprecision of measuring it is reflected in other early studies. Lane's research of crime in Boston in a sixty year period of the nineteenth century found:

> In the city of Boston, at least, the result was a progressive decrease in the number of annual arrests made by each patrolman. This in turn suggests a second reason for the rise in the total; as the serious or real crime rate eased, the public and authorities were able to raise the officially condoned standards of conduct, to concern themselves with those third-class offenses previously overlooked. Roger Lane, Policing the City--Boston 1822-1885, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967. Also "Crime and Criminal Statistics in Nineteenth Century Massachusetts," Journal of Social History, December 1968. Warner asks a pertinent rhetorical question:
>
> What is the conclusion to the amount of crime in Boston today as compared with that in other years and cities? The safest conclusion is none at all. There are no reliable figures on crime committed; there are only statistics on prosecutions. Sam Bass Warner, Crime and Criminal Statistics in Boston, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934.

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CHAPTER 3

THEORIES AND LAWS: THE CAUSES OF CRIME

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Ancient philosophers had two main views about the formation of human society, first that it occurred through a love of association in man, secondly that it was the result of men's weakness and fear of harm.*

Naturally, safeguarding society against criminality is the foremost duty of the state.†

*Andrew Lintott, Violence, Civil Strife and Revolution in the Classical City, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982, p. 13.

†Boris (Leo) Brasol, The Elements of Crime (Psycho-Social Interpretation), New York: Oxford University Press, 1927, p. vi.

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Cain killed Abel.[1] Clytemnestra fatally stabbed Agamemnon.[2] Odysseus and his men savaged the peaceful city of the Cicones simply because it had no defenses.[3] Romulus killed his brother Remus.[4] Emperor Commodus boasted he killed thousands, using only his left hand.[5] In the Middle Ages, organized English gangs descended on unprotected hamlets and burned down houses if their owners would not pay a tribute.[6] Cesare Borgia lost his temper with a cardinal, drew a sword and slashed him, splattering blood on a nearby pope.[7]

Definitions and Directions

Crime exists as an omnipresent feature in all societies and at all historic times, reflected in religious writings, mythology, folk tales, and recorded history. No unitary, generally accepted theory as to what causes crime has broad agreement: cogent explanation of crime must encompass complex features relating to definition, philosophy, biological, economic, social, and cultural research and viewpoints. Philosophers, moralists, biologists, the criminal justice establishment, social workers, certainly sociologists and criminologists, but also a considerably larger and seemingly constantly expanding group of academics and amateurs, politicians and prelates, and those of various ethnic and socioeconomic backgrounds have expressed themselves on this topic with varying flashes of illumination and depths of research supporting their contentions. Nonetheless, a number of formal independent theories have been posited to explain

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the genesis and cause of crime.

Crime is not always or even generally a clearly definable activity: its definition is created by government and is subject to change in written law over time and also due to extenuating circumstances. For the sake of discussion, to be pursued in later chapters, the term crime is usually limited to "major crimes" against people and property as reflected in reports from the New York City Police Department and other law enforcement organizations including, since the 1930s, the Uniform Crime Reports of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.[8]

Such crime data are not inclusive of all such activity: "lesser" crimes, like misdemeanors and quality of life offenses, are real events but are generally outside of the scope of this discussion because such events are less significant self-evidently, in the sense, for example, that the loss of a one-dollar item from an unlocked car is less serious than an assault and battery on its driver. Also mentioned but deemphasized here are "middle class crime" which incorporate a wide variety of civil and criminal violations as well as ethical breaches: these events encompass all kinds of scams, illegal gambling, fraud and embezzlement, and political dishonesty and are particularly mentioned within their historical context. These types of crime are consequential: indeed, their significance as social and economic issues remains beyond debate and in the view of a few commentators the virulence of economic crime is connected to the prevalence

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of violent and property offenses. Rather, this analysis concentrates on the urban disorder that strikes directly at the long-range integrity of city life and which generates personal fear for individual safety and communal integrity. Therefore, particular focus in this analysis will be on violent crimes, particularly murder-homicide. "Violence" is derived from the Latin violentia and is akin to violare or to violate with the implication of force.

The ultimate result from unrestrained violence leads to loss of life. "Murder" is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought, either expressed or implied. Killing another human is not necessarily a crime since it may be committed in self-defense, in execution of a judicial sentence, or in other circumstances justifying or excusing it; homicide is the unjustifiable, inexcusable, and intentional killing of another without deliberation and malice. In the eyes of the State, killing may be justified in limited, defined circumstances; however, throughout this discussion non-negligent homicide refers to criminal homicide committed with deliberation and not as an accidental consequence.

In addition to violent crime, the other major division into which criminal behavior is categorized relates to the illegal misappropriation of physical objects. Most crime as measured by quantity of incidents is theft. The psychiatrist Karl Menninger noted: "Crime is mostly a great mass of stealings, small and great, secret and overt, bloody and 'clean,' sneaking and spectacular, nice and nasty."[9] However,

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from an analytical perspective, data on theft have less comparative precision for researchers because this type of activity often is not reported to police and, when reported to police, is harder to categorize consistently over time.

The strategy for organizing theories of crime borrows initially the linguistic descriptive used in psychiatry for the explanation of mental disorders: the biopsychosocial model which posits that mental illness generally has interrelated features for causation and treatment from: biological, including genetic and physiological considerations; psychological, encompassing conscious processes; and social, involving the network of relationships between a person and all other human units, from the mother-child dyad or family to peer groups and entire cultures in explaining causation.[10] However, this definition fails to include political, economic, and non-academic theories and notions. Concepts of crime causation are modern topics for human study, though earlier explanations are available in religious writings and interpretations, mythology, and folk wisdom. The introduction of scientific methodology in the eighteenth century not only endeavored to produce science-based explanations for deviance, but also encouraged further thinking in phenomenological, existential, and the broad connections between crime and non-criminal human activity.

Early Views of Crime

Standards of personal conduct have existed since time

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immemorial within groups and have been enforced by groups through diverse rewards and sanctions.[11] As primitive groups settled together for reproductive, social, economic, and self-protective purposes, norms developed that could result in sanctions to individuals whose canon-deviating behavior threatened the status quo.[12] In time mores were codified into rules and laws that might be understood by the society and eventually became available in written form. Such measures protected kinship groups from the debilitating costs of revenge that could ignite protracted inter- or intragroup strife: compensation or other penalties could compensate for the losses of a victim or the victim's family or group that might begin from a minor incident. Disputations between groups could arise from harm or injury to one individual which could cause the entire victim's kinship to call for retribution that might be acceded to voluntarily by the perpetrator's clan or which might be rejected and signal the commencement of blood feuding that could last an indefinite period of time until one party prevailed, both parties became fatigued from the dispute, the issues had become changed substantially or by subsequent events such as imposition of peace by a force majeur.[13]

Until the Age of Enlightenment in the eighteenth century, Christian and Jewish societies had no difficulty in understanding causality for criminal action: criminals were sinful and all sin could be traced to Original Sin--the inherent, inevitability of the ungodly who were headed

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unswervingly to certain damnation. Sinners were presumed to be like a different human species whose fixed course of iniquity led surely to damnation unless interrupted by saving grace.[14] Religious tenets were not the sole phenomenological basis for explaining deviant behavior: mythologists and classical writers vividly informed Western civilization of the effects from unrestrained passion by humans, demigods, and gods.

Laws, the State and the Church

No evidence exists that earliest societies were analytical as to why certain members of their communities violated codes or laws; yet the need for enunciated precepts of social conduct can be discerned from evidence provided by the earliest literate communities. References reflect that societal coherence and organization was a goal necessitating the control of behavior.

The earliest collection of laws recovered to date is that of Bilalama (c. 2268-2259 B.C.), king of Ešnunna, the capital city of the district between Accad and Elam about seventy miles northeast of Babylon.[15] Two centuries later the code of Hammu-rabi (c. 1728-1686) was promulgated: the Babylonian king was a law-giver and great political and military figure in ancient eastern history, whose code was uncovered after millennia of oblivion on steles uncovered by a French expedition at Susa in the winter of 1901-02.[16] Concerning Hammu-rabi's code, G.R. Driver and John C. Miles state that

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"the Laws are a law of Persons," in that distinctive provisions are human situationally-oriented for crown-tenants, farmers, merchants, commercial agents, innkeepers, professional men, and craftsmen; for the unmarried, the engaged to be married, the married, and the divorced; concerning children, adults, the elderly; involving the patricians, plebeians, and slaves.[17] Hammu-rabi's reign of forty-three years included the proclamation of legal measures that improved commerce, for example, by enabling foreign merchants to visit and leave the kingdom in peace, an achievement realized both by establishing commercial regulations and by the extirpation of brigandage.[18] Yet the code was Hammu-rabi's greatest attainment, a crowning effectuation suggested by the vainglorious personal references in the prologue and epilogue. While much of the code--expressed in terse language throughout its 282 paragraphs--concerns commercial, marriage, inheritance, land and house, and other matters, criminal violations were identified and discussed in numerous categories such as thefts, the receiving of stolen property, kidnapping, and robbery and looting, and contains such legalistic guidance as: "If a seignior has stolen the young son of a(nother) seignior, he shall be put to death."[19]

The principle of the talion (L. talio, retaliation) implies punishment in the same kind such as the punishment of an injury by an act of the same kind, as an eye for an eye or a tooth for a tooth and is "the essence of Old Testament

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law."[20] The Ten Commandments, or Decalogue, provides the summary of divine law given to Moses on Mount Sinai and became the paramount ethical and judicial bases for Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.[21]

Classical Athens was the center of a Greek civilization with a tradition of legalistic structure: governance depended upon the rigid aristocratic archons until the reforms of Solon (594 B.C.) and Cleisthenes (506 B.C.), who expanded the extant body of laws and established a democracy for its freemen. Following the Persian Wars (500-449 B.C.) Athens emerged as the strongest Greek city-state and reached a cultural and political zenith under Pericles (443-429 B.C.). During this time Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides contributed seminal literary works which reflected ethical, legalistic, and judicial notions in addition to their humanistic content.[22]

Following its defeat by arch-rival Sparta in the Peloponnesian War (431-404 B.C.), Athens began a long decline but still numbered among her conspicuous figures Aristotle, Aristophanes, and Plato. Of these Plato's (427? - 347 B.C.) epistles and dialogues provide an enduring insight to the understanding of moral order: the philosopher argued for a harmony of the human soul with the universe of ideas, which would assure order, intelligence, and a world pattern in constant flux. In Plato's last and longest work, the Laws, details for an ideal state called Magnesia are incorporated, a polity to be founded in the South of Crete, which would operate under guidance from the Academy. Magnesia was not

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meant to be "ideal" in the sense of perfection described in the Republic, rather it was intended to be a realistic state--utopian, but one expected to have crime and criminals and, therefore, required appropriate measures of control.[23]

Indeed, Plato saw the need for penology and a penal code to be of central importance for the survival of the community. Toward this end the code combines "rule of law" with "rule of philosophy." Treatment of the criminal should never look backward to his crimes, but always forward to the "cure" of his mental and moral "disease." Plato provided a cogent explanation as to the cause of criminal behavior. It has three stages:

> 1. Three causes of crime are: anger, an irrationally violent factor innate in the soul, causing much havoc; pleasure (personified, it seems), to the actor who achieves his will by "persuasion with violent deceit"; and ignorance which is divided into the simple kind (the cause of trivial faults) and the double, (ignorance reinforced by conceit of wisdom).
>
> 2. Intellectual and emotional causes which prompt a person in a direction contrary to the one he or she wishes.
>
> 3. Injury and injustice, in which injustice is the tyranny in the soul of "anger, fear, pleasure, pain, envy, and desire," whether or not it does any damage.[24]

Plato identifies a large number of states of mind, or similar personal conditions, as contributory to or consequent upon the committing of criminal offenses or "injustice," adikia. These include such considerations as: ambition (philotimia), anger (thumos, orge), avarice (philochrematia), fear (phobos), folly (anoia), illness (nosoi), jealousy, envy (phthonoi), and youth (paidia, neotes) among others.[25] At

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least for some crimes, Platonic law provides penalties according to the social and political status of the criminal who could be a member of any among four categories: citizens--farmers and their families; resident aliens--admitted for twenty years as farm workers, craftsmen, medical practitioners, and teachers; temporary visitors--such as traders, pilgrims, ambassadors; and slaves. Plato devotes more space to homicide (phonos) than to any other crime, not because it is expected to occur frequently, but rather since it involves "important questions of policy within a carefully contrived social and political structure."[26]

Four categories of homicide are identified with differing degrees of seriousness: involuntary, such as in the killing of a compatriot in contests, war or military training, and requiring only purification, also included death while under care of doctors; homicide in anger, in which the killer acts immediately on sudden impulse without premeditation and followed by instant remorse; voluntary homicide, the result of the domination of pleasure, desire, jealousy, and ambition over the soul for which reform is ruled out and for which offenders are to be punished by extreme penalty to satisfy the resentment of the dead man and his family, and justifiable homicide which recognizes error or mishap, however disastrous, that should not attract punishment or pollution.[27] Plato's criminal justice plan for Magnesia redefines the aims of punishment to serve specific purposes: appropriate compensation for the injured party; "satisfaction" for the

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injured party, the pleasure of triumphing over an opponent or criminal perpetrator; the betterment of the offender by deterrence, and the betterment of society through improvement in offender behavior or with the elimination of the offender by exile or death. Trevor J. Saunders criticized the philosopher's schema:

> The major drawback of any penology such as Plato's is that to permit "any" method of punishment which will prevent the criminal from offending again is an unconscionable infringement of his status as a responsible person, and is likely in practice to lead to treating him as a sort of animal suitable only for conditioning. Such an extreme reformative position has to be tempered by some notion of desert, which permits suffering to be imposed only in some reasonable relationship to the gravity of the offense.[28]

Plato argued the inevitability for forms of law even in the ideal city. The philosopher also advanced an economic argument related to conflict inevitability: in Republic II, Plato observed that the city which is "luxurious," that is, living above subsistence level, will be required to fight with neighbors over territory; therefore, it will require military guards and a political organization to control foreseeable predators.[29]

Archaic cities depended upon ad hoc collective self-defense: after their raid on Ismarus Odysseus's men let their guard down and spent the time feasting and drinking; the Kikones implored their neighbors to help them take vengeance on Odysseus's men. Boe is equivalent of the medieval English "hue and cry" or the German Gerücht, a mutual defense response found among other closely knit societies who do not possess professional defense forces or organized police.[30] A citizen

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discovering a crime or emergency in public would raise a cry which other citizens would amplify and physically respond to provide assistance: this principle implied a shared mutual obligation to protect the city.

Law and the Scholastics

From the twelfth century on, the European university fully constituted, consisted of four faculties including, law and became the leading, though not sole, source of jurisprudential training whose influence permeated government, commercial life, and the courts. Yet the arts and theological faculties also influenced legal thinking. The early medieval university faculties depended on a small number of texts, mostly from Greek, Latin and Arabic authors; however, at least by the thirteenth century, some university faculties were supplementing these texts with their own commentaries. Several orders of friars had emerged by the beginning of the thirteenth century: one of these was the Dominicans of whom Thomas Aquinas (1224?-1279) became the preeminent theologian. In the period 1269-72 Thomas was in Paris where most of his Summa Theologica was written.[31] The Summa is a systematic exposition of theology on philosophical principles and is constructed in three parts: posing questions, providing answers, and concluding with related objections and solutions to philosophical and practical problems. Philosophical questions to be addressed are divided into three categories then further broken down in which the three-part analysis

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occurs. The second part, Pars Secunda, deals with the nature of behavior, concentrating on personal actions and inactions, a series of which deals with injustice.[32] Indeed, as Thomist biographer Anthony Kenny states, the Secunda Secundi, "deals with the majority of topics that would nowadays be covered by a textbook of criminal law: homicide, theft, unjust enrichment, injuries against the person, fraud, slander, usury, misconduct by judges and advocates."[33] For example, in a question on theft and robbery with violence, Thomas poses nine points of inquiry:

1. Is the possession of external goods natural to men?
2. Is it legitimate for individual man to possess such goods as their own?
3. Is theft the surreptitious taking of another person's goods?
4. Is robbery with violence a sin specifically different from theft?
5. Is all theft a sin?
6. Is all theft a mortal sin?
7. Is theft justifiable in case of necessity?
8. Is it possible for robbery not to be a sin?
9. Is all robbery with violence a greater sin than theft?

Thomas provides his commentary using principally as sources: the Bible; writings of the Saints, especially St. Augustine, St. Jerome and St. Gregory the Great; and from the classical literature Aristotle, especially his Ethics.[34] The state, Thomas argues, is critical to allow people the opportunity to reach their individual perfection, that is, government offers an orderly guarantee of life's necessities by harmonious regulation of civil conduct. The state also assures the rightful ownership of private property; Thomas concludes that it is contrary to justice (contrariatur

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justiciae) to usurp someone else's property though theft is not always a sin. For example, a starving person might steal the minimum food necessary to feed himself or herself. Penalties imposed by the state which exists for the common good and the ius gentium supporting punishment in this life is meant to be corrective rather than retributive, which is God's judgment (retributio inam reservatur divino judicio). The Thomist influence extended from the Dominical halls and convents to Oxford lecture rooms and from there to the extended university and non-academic communities. Thomas's writing was to have an influence on religious and secular thinking and practice until the Renaissance and has exerted religious and secular influence cyclically since then. Though the degree of its influence is impossible to quantify, Thomas's writings importantly reflect a body of religious legal precepts that influenced secular and religious judicial thinking and practices over several centuries.

The Classical School of Criminology

Profound scientific and intellectual advances occurred in the seventeenth century, among which the empiricism of Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, and John Locke provided important views on the nature of freedom. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) presented a bleak view of human behavior in the Leviathan (1651) in which life was viewed as "nasty, brutish, and short." The fear of violent death was the motive for which individuals surrendered their natural rights to a sovereign's power and

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with it the hopes for a regally enforced peace.[35] Hobbes challenged the concept of the divine right of kings while arguing at the same time that the sovereign's power is not subject to review either by the people or the church. Hobbes's inconsistent views of the legitimacy of regal powers, nonetheless, may be regarded as a significant explication of the social contract that personal freedom is surrendered in order to obtain benefits of the sovereign's protection and organizational services. John Locke's (1632-1704) statement in Two Treatises on Civil Government (1690) established him as a leading philosopher of freedom in emphasizing the importance of private property and control of the product of one's own labor and stating that no one has the right to harm another in his "life, health, liberty, or possessions." State legitimacy is fused by a social contract when men abandon the "state of nature" and agree to live under organization seeking to provide order and safety.

The rationalist, liberal, humanitarian, deistic, anti-biblical, and scientific initiatives of eighteenth century Western thought, collectively known as the Enlightenment or the Age of Reason, equally sparked changes in the world view of criminals and criminality. The Enlightenment writings of Voltaire, Rousseau, Montesquieu, and Diderot merged to form the classical school of criminal law and criminology, so-called because they were early modern theories and based on the "classical" tradition that humans were self-determining, acting on reason, intelligent, and responsible for their own

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behavior. At the same time, industrialization had begun and cities mushroomed, attracting a migration of people from farms and villages which created appalling urban living conditions. Crime increased and with it the incarceration of criminals--begun initially as a temporary measure until a court proceeding either summarily punished or freed the defendant--became a legitimate form of punishment itself. This unplanned institution grew as a humanitarian progression beyond the blood code.

It was in this context that the vanguard of the classical criminological school appeared and it arrived with an Italianate panache. Cesare Beccaria (1738-1794) was raised among a Milanese élite of intellectuals and received his doctor's degree in law at the University of Pavia at the age of twenty. Beccaria and his friend, Pietro Verri, as young men created a literary club called the Academia dei Pugni, or Academy of Fists, suggesting that heated discussions--not necessarily physical confrontations--were anticipated in the group.[36] One of the expectations of the academy was that members would write scholarly papers which then would be read by a presenter and then discussed by assembled members.

In March, 1763, Beccaria began working on a critical study of the existing criminal law; it was proposed by Verri and was read and criticized by him during its drafting. In April, 1764, Dei Delitti e Delle Pene (An Essay on Crimes and Punishments) was completed, and the treatise of slightly more than one hundred pages was published in Milan three months

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later. It quickly received second and third printings, none of which bore the author's name. Marcello Maestro, Beccaria's biographer, states: "The success of the book was tremendous, and the Patriotic Society of Berne, even before knowing who the author was, decided to award a gold medal to a 'citizen who dared to raise his voice in favor of humanity against the most deeply ingrained prejudices.'"[37]

Beccaria's contributions were centered on reform of medieval criminal law and its consequences, then still in effect in Europe. His writings caught the attention of statesmen, jurists, and intellectuals and created debates and reform on extant punishment practices and also the causes of criminality. His work, therefore, served as an intermediary into productive speculation on criminality, including sparking interest among later reformers, called positivists. Praising "the immortal President de Montesquieu" as a "great man," Beccaria claims he was following in the French philosopher's footsteps to uphold "the interests of humanity!" with his essay.[38] Among Beccaria's findings and arguments was the proposition that: Laws provide independence and freedom in a united society in which individuals "sacrifice a portion of this liberty in order to enjoy the remainder in security and tranquillity." To dissuade the despotic characteristic of plunging society into chaos, "tangible motives" (sensibili motivi) are required by society "to counterbalance the strong impression of individual passions opposed to the general good."[39]

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Beccaria's success as a pioneer criminal law reformer lies in his ability to counteract the previous "cold and impersonal" judicial writings and to react against the brutality of the prison system in much of Europe. One commentator noted: "It is not an exaggeration to regard [that] Beccaria's work has been of primary importance in paving the way for penal reform for approximately the last two centuries. The reader will find proposed in his essay practically all of the important reforms in the administration of criminal justice and in penology which have been achieved in the civilized world since 1764."[40] His biographer further states:

> Beccaria put the problem of punishments on a new plane, stating that the purpose of penalties is not retribution, but prevention: justice requires a right proportion between crimes and punishments, but the purpose of penalties is to prevent a criminal from doing more harm and to deter others from doing similar damage. Beccaria was convinced that man remains barbaric if he inflicts cruel punishments, that he degrades himself by becoming a spy, that he becomes accustomed to bloodshed if he is exposed to it.[41]

Beccaria's work was first translated into English in 1767 and in England, as on the Continent, the message inspired penal reformers. One of these was Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) a trained lawyer who terminated his practice to devote his life to scholar-ship. Bentham's comprehensive code of ethics became the ethical principle of utilitarianism: an act is not supposed to be judged by an irrational system of absolutes, but by a supposedly verifiable principle. That principle sought "the greatest happiness for the greatest number."[42] To measure "goodness" or "badness," Bentham created the "felicity" or "hedonistic calculus," in which he constructed

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an elaborate table of human contingencies with intrinsically quantitative weights to reflect different human behaviors. Criminal acts detract from happiness and, therefore, should be deterred. The human calculus, Bentham believed, permitted the criminal justice system to serve as the fulcrum for the movement an individual's behavior from unacceptable activity to the normal parameters of social standards. Bentham believed that a risk-reward ratio exists in which the individual is governed by pain and pleasure and weights one against the other in considering a course of action. Bentham argued that the state could deter behavior that deviated from socially accepted norms with punishment, but to achieve its goal the sanction had to be effective in producing the greatest good for society. Gilbert Geis states:

> Sophistical as they are, the tables of motives are stage setters for the future elaboration of Bentham's theories. For basically, he avows, all human action is reducible to one simple formula of motivation: The pursuit of pleasure and the concomitant avoidance of pain.[43]

Bentham concluded that effective punishment needed to have the qualities of: certainty--a high degree of likelihood of the offender's being punished; proximity--direct, swift response to have a maximum deterrent effect; mildness--"in no case to be more than what is necessary to bring it into conformity" with the law; and sensibility--the recognizing of age, sex, health, and wealth as mitigating factors; and celerity in that the punishment should be imposed as soon after the commission of an offense as possible. A historian of the law proclaimed: "I do not know of a single law reform

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effected since Bentham's time which cannot be traced to his influence."[44] Yet Bentham's evaluation of criminal behavior control fails to consider all the complexities of human interactions that could contribute to criminality and its deterrence.

Biological Explanations for Criminal Action

Just as the Enlightenment had ushered in classical and neoclassical views of deviant behavior, evolving humanistic writings and scientific discoveries brought further developments in explaining crime: scientific positivism introduced empirical studies into the understanding of criminal behavior. Earlier scientific advances, reflected in the objective documentation of Charles Darwin's Origin of Species (1859) and The Descent of Man (1871), reflected an emphasis on rational deductions based on premises tested by research that also might possess implications for social sciences, including what would later be called criminology. Indeed, for much of the third quarter of the century, the notion was advanced that criminals were physically different and that such differences could be demonstrated by standardized measurements. Much as Darwin observed with minute exactness fauna he encountered while cruising on the Beagle, others might observe anthropomorphic features differentiating criminal from noncriminals.

No figure has been more pivotal in the history of criminology than Cesare Lombroso (1835-1909) of whom "More has

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been written by and about [him] than any other criminologist."[45] Born in Verona, Lombroso wrote well regarded historical essays as a fifteen-year-old, but then studied medicine at several universities, receiving a degree in surgery from the University of Genoa. Lombroso divided his career between medical service with the Italian army and postings over several extended periods at mental hospitals. During this time his research generally supported the conclusions of positivism, a philosophical system that emphasized description over explanation and observable reality over metaphysical suppositions. One of Lombroso's scientific specialties became phrenology, popularly called "skull-feeling," a study first introduced about 1800 by German physiologist Franz Joseph Gall whose work had inspired further studies in Italy. As an army physician, Lombroso was able to conduct research and specialized in cretinism on which his doctoral thesis was published. In the 1860's, he had systematically analyzed and physically measured the skulls of 3,000 soldiers seeking to establish a connection among physical differences and behavior of soldiers respective of their various Italian regions. Lombroso discovered an agnation between tattooing--especially those with lewd graphics--and frequency of criminal behavior. From this early work eventually his most important book was inspired. In 1876, Lombroso published L'Uomo Delinquente (The Criminal Man), which quickly went through five printings in Italy, though it was never translated into English. Lombroso

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concluded that criminal behavior is a throwback in the evolutionary development of an individual, hence is atavistic. In The Criminal Man he explains how physical features can be linked to criminal identity:

> They have in common, for example, thinning hair, lack of strength and weight, low cranial capacity, receding foreheads, highly developed frontal sinuses, a high frequency of medio-frontal sutures...enormous development of the jaws and zygomata obliquity of the orbits, darker skin, thicker curly hair, large or handle-shaped ears, a greater analogy between the two sexes, less pronounced genetic activity, a lower degree of sensitivity to pain...[46]

Lombroso believed that the skulls of criminals tended to be larger or smaller than the average skull of noncriminals in the region in which the criminals lived. With this observation, he concluded that physical generalizations about the somatotypes of criminals likely to commit certain types of offenses could be proposed. His daughter and protégé, Gina, further developed classification and interpretation: rapists and murderers are likely to have fleshy, swollen, and protruding lips; swindlers are up to possess thin, straight lips.[47] Lombroso did not claim absolutism about his findings or methodology: he argued that careful observations and comparisons suggested only relationships that could be valuable as a forensic tool. In a study of skull abnormalities contrasting criminals guilty of murder-homicide and non-criminal Italian soldiers, Lombroso found that 52 percent of the non-criminal soldiers possessed no skull abnormalities, whereas 37 percent had one or two, and 11 percent had three or four. By contrast, convicted civil

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murderers showed only 12 per cent with no abnormalities; 47 percent with one or two; 34 per cent with three or four, and seven percent with five or more. The impact of Lombroso's conclusions interested detectives of the time though the influence on police practices does not appear to be great. Inspector Thomas Byrnes's 1886 Professional Criminals of America attests to the power of photography as a resource for police work, but Byrnes doubted the validity of Lombroso's technique, arguing that physiognomy as a guide to spotting criminal types was "a very poor one," and thought that non-verbal observation by detectives was more significant as an investigative tool than anatomical observations. Nonetheless, Byrnes held that appearance possessed utility as an investigative tool and, for example, that "river thieves and low burglars are as hard-looking brutes as can be found" and "There are numbers of confidence men, too, who in spite of their gentlemanly dress and conversational powers, look the very incarnation of sharpers,"[48]

Lombroso's positivism later was attacked by a revisionist English criminologist, Charles Goring (1870-1919). Initially, Goring criticized Lombroso for depending on direct observation without using instruments as phrenologists had done; therefore, he concluded that Lombroso was not truly using a replicatable scientific approach.[49] Working with Karl Pearson, a statistician, Goring studied 3,000 English convicts and compared his findings with a control sample group of non-criminals. The criminal subjects selected for the study were

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recidivists and, therefore, were presumed to represent a congenital criminal typography; the control sample was composed of army recruits, engineers, teachers and professors, and students presumed not to represent a crime typography. Both groups were instrumentally measured on physical characteristics and were evaluated also by mental tests. In The English Convict, Goring offers his conclusion:

> The preliminary conclusion reached by our inquiry is this anthropological monster has no existence in fact. The physical and mental constitution of both criminal and law-abiding persons, of the same age, structure, class, and intelligence, are identical. There is not such thing as an anthropological criminal type.[50]

Physical differences of a different nature, nonetheless, continued to interest researchers since the work of Lombroso, Goring, and others. An American anthropologist, Earnest A. Hooton (1887-1954) and associates conducted extensive observations and measurements of 17,000 persons, of whom 14,000 were prisoners. Hooton found differences between the two groups. Contrasting criminals with noncriminals, Hooton concluded that among the differences were that criminals: were more likely to have tatoos; had more red-brown hair and less grey and white hair; were more likely to be blue-grey or have mixed colored eyes; possessed low and sloping foreheads; spoke through thin lips and compressed jaw angles, and had long, thin necks attached to sloping shoulders.[51]

Hooton's ambitious studies have serious methodological flaws, such as not comparing offenders with a carefully selected and random sample of nonoffenders, and further lacked any logical hypothesis that criminal physical differences

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should have reasons for being different from noncriminal appearances, considering the varieties of criminal and noncriminal behavior. Criminologists also criticized Hooton's studies for the "haphazard" sample used and the fact that differences in physical characteristics among prisoners were greater than the differences between the prisoner and non-prisoner sample.[52]

The classic studies attempting to link genetics and behavior are Richard Dugdale's The Jukes: A Study in Crime, Pauperism, and Heredity, published in 1877, and Henry Goddard's study of the Kallikaks.[53] Dugdale located more than 1,000 descendants of Ada Jukes of whom 140 were criminals (including sixty thieves, fifty prostitutes, seven murderers), 280 were paupers; forty family members possessed venereal disease, and still others manifested assorted deviant conditions. Goddard followed the two lineages of Martin Kallikak who served in the militia during the Revolutionary War. Kallikak had a son with "a feeble-minded girl" whom he met in a tavern. The ensuing birth of a son, who took his father's name along with his mother's genetic contribution, provided one of the family lines the researcher traced. Of 480 descendants investigated in this family line: thirty-six were illegitimate; thirty-three prostitutes, of whom three operated houses of prostitution; twenty-four confirmed alcoholics; three were epileptics, and three were counted as criminals in addition to other deviant types. However, Martin Kallikak also had a respectable marriage from whose 496

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descendants of this union all were judged to be within normal behavioral parameters except for two alcoholics and one apparent prostitute. The conclusions of the work by Dugdale and Goddard seemed to point convincingly to a connection between genetics and behavior; however, sociologists in recent years find many unanswered questions and unexplored issues in establishing biological determinism. For example, psychological and social factors could explain subsequent behavioral patterns and sufficient information was not collected on the non-criminal or "normal" descendants.

Since these earlier studies, genetically-oriented research has concentrated on familial characteristics: notable among them are twin studies in which identical or monozygotic and fraternal/sororal dizygotic twin lives can be compared. The pioneering work in studying criminal behavior was Johannes Lange's Verbrechen als Schicksal (Crime as Destiny) (1929) in which the author concludes that heredity is inextricably linked to criminal behavior.[54] In Denmark, Karl O. Christiansen, a geneticist, studied twin crime correlates by evaluating all twins born in Denmark between 1881 and 1910. He traced them as long as possible: of 3,586 twin pairs, a total of 926 twins belonging to 799 pairs appeared in police or penal records. The crime concordance for the twins were: 35 percent for monozygotic males, 13 percent for dizygotic males, 21 percent for monozygotic females, and eight percent for dizygotic females. Despite this apparent concordance, the researcher acknowledges that the possibility of an

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environmental effect exists: parents and others are likely to treat monozygotic and dizygotic twins differently which could explain behavior.[55]

Recent studies involving biological theories in crime causation have included sex chromosome abnormality studies which suffer from limited research, and electroencephalographic and neurophysiological research, which indicate that recidivist violent offenders tended to manifest severe neurological problems at one year of age. The slowing of brain waves in antisocial people has also been described.[56] Biogenetic studies provide interesting perspectives on familial normal, episodic dysfunctional, and deviant behavior; however, upon analysis the judgments of the underlying hypotheses are not sufficiently convincing to provide a resolute explanation for criminal behavior.

Most persuasive of all among the biological factors useful in helping to understand the origins of antisocial behavior are the observations in the previous two chapters--and those to follow--that men commit more violent and property crime than women and maintain such a behavioral pattern throughout their lives.[57] The explanation for this indisputable difference can lead in several directions. Higher levels of testosterone, the male sex hormone, has been posited as an explanation as to why males may possess more aggressive criminal behavior. A study has shown that prisoners incarcerated for violent crimes have higher levels of testosterone than do prisoners without such history.[58]

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Another line of inquiry has emerged from feminist studies holds that sex-role learning by women may relate to less aggressiveness and consequent antisocial behavior and is discussed below.

Psychological Explanations for Criminal Behavior

Explanations relating to the origin of crime from a psychological and psychiatric perspective pose many problems because of the nature of crime and the particular ways in which historically these disciplines defined, studied, and sought to provide behavioral analysis of a criminal population. This discussion considers the topic from selected leading theoretical, behavioral, and research-oriented human behavior concepts that have influenced understanding of crime causation and mitigation.

Psychological theories on crime causation have never been a central interest to leading innovators of the field, though the contributions of psychology and psychologists to the understanding of and response to criminal behavior are enormous and continuous.

Premises to explain crime causation conceptually should provide a basis for practical action. Herbert C. Quay suggests:

> The "ideal" theory of crime causation and control should describe (1) the process by which criminal behavior is acquired; (2) the social context in which this learning is most likely to take place; (3) the motivations of criminal behavior; (4) the means by which patterns of criminal behavior may be changed; and (5) the ways in which the development of criminal behavior can be prevented.[59]

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Consensus does not exist that any single psychological theory manages to fulfill all of these descriptive qualifications. Psychology sets for itself the task of studying behavior through direct observation and instruments. Arnold Binder, in a review of literature on juvenile delinquency research, found that characteristics more common among the delinquent group then among nondelinquents include sadism and a lack of compassion, emotional immaturity, hyperactivity, and insensitivity to others.[60] Among adults, William McCord and Joan McCord defined qualities of a psychopathic personality: an aggressive, asocial, and highly impulsive individual feeling little or no guilt who cannot form lasting relationships with others. Such individuals are narcissistic, motivated by self-gratification, and are often described as loners who are incapable of showing love or affection. Psychopathic symptomatology may include social features (early rejection by parental figures) and biological findings (brain dysfunction).[61] A psychoanalyst observes:

> Hell hath no fury like a narcissist scorned. Yet for a narcissist, being scorned is inevitable. In fact, the more narcissistic one is, the greater the potential for being scorned because of the greater demands for gratification. The greater the demands for gratification, the greater the chance of frustration. To a narcissist, frustration is being scorned by the society he expects to feed him and take care of all his needs.[62]

Persistent narcissism (self-love, usually to an inordinate degree) leads to inability to resist frustration which can induce aggression and sometimes violence. "Violence is a special form of behavior in which the aggressive feelings are directly expressed toward other human beings who are

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either real or symbolic representations of the source of his frustrations. One resorts to violence only when all other means of dealing with frustration fail."[63] Narcissism exists in all individuals, this view holds, and is directly related to potential for violence which can only be moderated "by recreating our sense of responsibility for our fellow man."

Psychoanalysis has provided fascinating speculation on the nature of the aggressive personality: according to Freud, an inborn drive, originating in the death instinct and impossible to eliminate but capable of being moderated, exists as a psychological urge, but this trait does not provide a cogent explanation for criminal behavior. Freudian theory identifies an id composed of biological and psychological drive unconsciously underlying all behavior including self-gratification. The ego operates as a conscious mediating force between the id and the superego, which reflects the moral and ethical standards of society, the conscience. August Aichhorn suggests that criminals have underdeveloped superegos; thus, the unchecked id permits the individual to commit crimes without the restraint capable of being exercised by the superego.[64] To date, based on limited clinical experience, psychoanalysis has not proven useful in the mitigation of antisocial pathology, and as a practical matter criminals have lacked the long-term commitment to be successful analysands.[65]

Behavior therapy, a form of psychotherapy employing conditioned response techniques, emerged from behaviorism, a

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psychological theory in which scientific investigation is limited to objective, observable phenomena draws from natural science methodology. Pioneering work by John Broadus Watson in the 1920s, later followed by B.F. Skinner, eschewed "unscientific" or "supernatural" psychological techniques and sought to make psychology objectively based by using measurable research techniques derived from Pavlov's animal conditioning studies. The principles of behaviorism hold the following conditioning techniques help form and shape behavior:

Stimulus-response. All forms of behavior--simple and complex, are composed of simple stimulus-response events which can be seen, measured, predicted, and controlled.

Conditioning. Most learning flows from simple conditioning in which an old response reacts to a new stimulus (classical or respondent conditioning), or a new response is acquired from satisfying a need (instrumental of operant conditioning). This theory recognizes that emotional expressions--anger, love, hate, et al.--are biologically based.

Behaviorism argues that behavior is controlled by its consequences; thus, the manipulation of the contingent consequent event can result in the reenforcement of a particular behavior. Grossly reduced as a practice, an event can be programmed by a positive reinforcer, a reward; it can also be powered by a negative reinforcer, a punishment. In

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moving from learning theory to criminal behavior application, behavior therapy conceivably could serve to reprogram undesired social activity.[66] Behavior research has been criticized for concentrating on rearranging contingencies of an environment to teach an maintain noncriminal activity as a practically unaccomplishable social goal. Still, behaviorism has helped to turn attention away from unmeasurable phenomena to controlled circumstances that can be measured precisely. Behavior therapy has employed a variety of techniques to mitigate criminal behavior based on the underlying assumptions of simple, operant, and aversive conditioning, a process that has informed thinking about criminal behavior but has yet to provide results that sustain the ability of the theory to stand on its own as cogent explanation of normative or, for that matter, criminal behavior.

Social Structure Explanations for Criminal Action

Since the early twentieth century, sociologists have come to dominated the debate on crime causation, arguing that various types of deviant behavior result from the impact of social forces rather than from individual differences or biological predispositions. Michael Gottfredson and Travis Hirschi note the "relative lack of influence of psychology in the study of crime, despite an impressive literature on obviously relevant topics."[67] Claiming that psychology "lacks the tools to resolve disciplinary disputes," the authors state: "Early in its history, sociology claimed to possess a

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concept of crime and to own criminology. This left psychology as an interloper, a discipline without any real disciplinarian interest in the subject."[68] Nonetheless most sociologists interested in the field seems willing to consider multi-disciplinary approaches to understanding crime causation and do not intend their biases to exclude psychology or other learned endeavors from playing roles in criminal behavior comprehension.

The originator of social structure theory was Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) who received in 1892 the first doctoral degree in sociology bestowed by the University of Paris. His thesis, The Division of Labor in Society, published the next year, concentrated on social process linked to industrialization, a theme which would segue into his subsequent interest in crime and criminality.[69] Durkheim believed that members of early societies were bonded together through extended families who tended to their own needs with the result that enhanced group cohesion occurred: he termed this process mechanical solidarity. By contrast industrialized societies are characterized by division of labor into specialized tasks which necessarily produces mutual dependency, a process Durkheim labeled organic solidarity. Crime and its control may be understood by the way society defines roles in each of these two types of societal relationships. Durkheim raised three arguments that crime served society in pre-modern society. First, norm deviation which proved threatening to the social group would be met by

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repressiveness including expulsion and, therefore, the process forced society to suppress individual interests for the benefit of the entire group. Next, as a consequence, the punishment of norm violators unified the society. Finally, crime constantly tested social sanctions forcing a dynamic review of group norms leading to the possibility of social change.[70] In organic solidarity--modern society--the mutual interdependence of tasks among people should produce a productive, well-functioning society; laws and codes seek to regulate the numerous diverse members toward common objectives. But sometimes law fails to achieve its objectives, resulting in anomie (Gk. lawlessness, normlessness, disconnectedness and, hence, disordered society).[71] Durkheim saw crime as being a normal process in both pre- and post-industrial types of societies, but that anomie results when the failure of laws lead to the weakening of organic solidarity. Anomie theory was advanced in a paper by Robert K. Merton which was to serve as the basis of theoretical discussion of deviance for the next several decades.[72] Durkheim had argued that all human beings are inclined to possess unlimited desires that are controlled by social constraints; Merton believed that such desires originated from social forces. Merton saw that "the almighty dollar" was a tangible goal for which Americans were taught, inspired, cajoled, and rewarded to strive. The American dream itself institutionalized the goals of wealth attainment and the power that it brought. Society equips members with the

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regulative norms to achieve materialistic goals, but these are not adequate to enable all parts of the society to fully achieve such goals equally; thus, a disfunction exists creating a "strain." Merton noted that not all responses to stress are deviant. Five individual adaptive patterns exist--conformity, innovation, ritualism, retreatism, and rebellion--which aid the individual to respond to anomic conditions and which can equally be used to explain maladaptive behavior. To Merton, criminals are individuals who seek relief from strain resulting from socially structured problems of adjustment. Merton saw that a culture might agree on the goal of material success, but concordantly provide unequal means by which individuals could achieve such success: this "strain" was chronically present among those with the fewest economic resources and, hence, the class most likely to cause violent and property crime.[73]

The French criminologist Gabriel Tarde (1843-1904) proposed a concept of "laws of imitation," a theory embodying the understanding that the skills and techniques for criminal endeavors are learned, varying with the complexity of the crime. He also saw the importance of economic factors in the creation of crime: he described complex factors of urbanization that made crime easier and more rewarding to commit under densely populated circumstances. Tarde concluded that large cities had become centers of criminal learning and the genesis for recidivism. The greatest prizes of economic and social attainment were offered in the city and

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coincidentally the risks were lessened by a more merciful "reformed" penal system.[74] Tarde's contribution was to influence the greatest American sociologist of his era and the first to propose a specifically sociological explanation for crime cause, Edwin Hardin Sutherland (1883-1950). A product of the University of Chicago's sociology department where he received his doctorate, Sutherland developed a concept of differential association emphasizing differences among individuals and groups of individuals identified with nine principles including the assertion that criminal behavior is learned in interaction with other persons in a process of communication within intimate social groups.[75] When criminal behavior is learned, the learning includes: techniques of committing the crime and the specific direction of motives, drives, rationalization, and attitudes in the crime.

These postulates emphasized that crime is culturally patterned behavior, learned the same way as any other element of the culture; thus, Sutherland attacked the extant theories of personality characteristics, poverty, stress, or biological and psychological abnormality. What his theory did not address was why certain individuals in identical environments have criminal associations and others do not: he argued that this was not the objective of his theory. Sutherland also pioneered research in so-called white collar crime, criminal dishonesty by wealthy individuals and corporations that was to become an on-going subject of academic interest.[76] Sutherland observed that economic crimes by the wealthy and powerful were

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rarely punished as criminal offenses, did not figure in official crime data, and, if they had, other theories that place lower-class members as being the disproportionate cause of crime would be challenged.

A generation following Merton's introduction of the strain theory, Richard Cloward, a student of Merton's, and Lloyd Ohlin, a student of Sutherland's, fused the two traditions and concluded that three types of delinquent subculture exist.[77] Cloward and Ohlin agreed with their respective mentors in several ways but proposed their own macrotheory to explain how illegitimate opportunity structures relate to the development of deviant adaptations to dissociative situations. They point out that institutionalized means for pursuing legitimate opportunities do not exist equally in society; similarly, the opportunity to pursue illegitimate opportunities are not found in commensurate degrees.

The presence of deviant behavior and the form it takes depends on the illegitimate opportunity structure available: the chances to learn, practice, improve, and finally practice deviant behavior. The three delinquency subcultures they describe are the criminal, the violent, and the retreatist, each reflecting in different ways community-oriented characteristics determining opportunity structure and the form of delinquency. Adult criminals pursue the illegitimate opportunities for crime using, often, the gang to achieve money and status through illegal activities. Such gangs are

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likely to be reinforced in their behavior by the presence of other adult criminals in the neighborhood who are available to act as learning resources to perfect illegal opportunity. Destructive and violent behavior occurs when an illegitimate opportunity structure does not exist and alternative values emphasizing physical strength and cunning are resorted to. Conflict gangs--which can operate for members' benefit or expand into generalized riotous behavior, encountered as a recurrent feature in American life--reflect the second kind of deviancy. Finally, the retreatist is the social dropout composed of vagrants, drunkards, addicts, and those with other individualistic behaviors. Such individuals who find they are blocked from legitimate and illegitimate social channels, and cannot exhibit destructive and malicious violent behavior in their immediate environments, are likely candidates for social withdrawal or addiction to alcohol or drugs.

While Cloward and Ohlin's theory makes no reference to socioeconomic class, researchers at the University of Chicago studied delinquency in the inner city and saw delinquency patterns that had economic correlation. Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay analyzed rates of male delinquency in Chicago for the years 1900 to 1933, using census data and correlating it with population movements to determine that high delinquency rates were associated with: a decreasing population; a high percentage of "foreign born" and black heads of households; a high percentage of families receiving welfare; a low rate of home ownership, and low median rental values.[78]

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Like other Chicago school of American sociological perspectives, Shaw and McKay's posited ecological phenomena as being pivotal in understanding delinquency rates. They determined that delinquency was highest in the zone surrounding the central business district and declined as one progressed through the suburbs into undeveloped residential areas. Urban growth produced a deleterious ecology: as the city expanded, commercial and industrial development stretched into proximate residential areas, making them less desirable, and pushing the residents capable of moving or relocating into more affluent and distant areas. With their departure, poorer residents settled into this "zone in transition" creating an environment conductive to crime. Such a neighborhood--marked by declining resources, high mobility, and social, cultural, and ethnic diversity--made a sense of community difficult to achieve, contributing to the prevalence of social disorganization. This made the raising of children and the maintenance of family integrity difficult since the forces to inhibit delinquent behavior were themselves circumscribed in such neighborhoods.

Social reaction theory has documented that the way in which agents of social control, such as the police, courts, and social workers, deal with an initially allegedly illegal act. How this process unfolds, they argue, can have a powerful effect on subsequent behavior: this is referred to as labeling theory. The earliest exponent of this causation theory was Frank Tannenbaum who termed the process of social

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reaction to illegal behavior as "dramatization of evil."[79] He observed and documented that the way an individual is perceived and managed in an initial or early criminal apprehension, can give a perspective to that individual reinforced by that person's milieu which over time can lead to self-fulfilling prophecies of antisocial behavior.[80] When the criminal justice system arrests, convicts, and punishes someone, the person becomes a certified criminal, selectively ensnaring some and freeing others often based on pre-existing social and political factors. Individuals labeled "delinquent" or "criminal" may be denied access to legitimate opportunity and may be forced turn to illegitimate opportunities to achieve their goals. They may be shunned by earlier conventional noncriminally labelled associates and may then have social contact limited only or largely to associates who similarly are ostracized by their labels, resulting in "amplification of deviance."[81] The frequent impact of this theory for the criminal justice system has been to divert initial offenders system into noncoercive treatment contexts usually within the community.

Violent crime, though inevitably throughout history less frequent than property offenses, leads to the search for explanations as to why some individuals act violently and others in the same circumstances exercise self-restraint. Probing for the reasons why some assaults and homicides occur spontaneously "in the heat of passion" or "in the heat of the moment," Marvin Wolfgang and Franco Ferracuti proposed a

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subculture of violence theory, concluding that violent behavior is particularly prevalent among late adolescent to middle-age males in lower-class environments.[82] The subculture theory observes that a violent societal quality cannot be substantively different from what exists in the parent culture. The subculture flourishes when in certain situations "a violent and physically aggressive response is either expected or required."[83] Such a culture maintains that violent action may be undertaken as a matter of "honor" or attacks on one's self-esteem.[84] This behavior is facilitated by positive reinforcement within the culture as, indeed, the failure to resort to violence at the "appropriate" time could result in scorn and loss of self-respect. A cultural anthropologist with a group of social workers under his direction spent three years studying lower-class male gang membership near Boston.[85] Walter B. Miller found a syndrome of factors that orchestrated lower-class gang activity: trouble--the ambivalence about the potential complications from norm deviation perceived by the gang members; toughness--perhaps a reaction to the female-dominated household in which many reside; smartness--in the sense of verbal and psychological skills in informal gang relation-ships; excitement--in the thrill of gang action that transcends the daily life's routine; fate--the belief that they have little control in shaping their future; and autonomy--the sense of resentment against the ideas expressed in social controls and "unjust or coercive behavior."[86]

An amplification of the excitement theory was developed

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by Jack Katz who describes an emotional dynamic in criminal activity, so that "cold-blooded, senseless murders" or a spurious robbery, rather becomes "a thrilling experience" to the perpetrator with an attraction so powerful that it is self-reinforcing.[87] He notes the moral fascination in which young vandals and shoplifters skirt the edge of humiliation for the inherent excitement of risk taking:

> The closer one looks at crime, at least the varieties examined here, the more vividly relevant become the moral emotions. Follow vandals and amateur shoplifters as they duck into alleys and dressing rooms and you will be moved by their delight in deviance; observe them under arrest and you may be stunned by their shame. Watch their strutting street display and you will be struck by the awesome fascination that symbols of evil hold for the young men who are linked in the groups we often call gangs.[88]

In contrast to killing and other violent acts, larceny and theft are the most prevalent of all crimes and the perpetrators frequently rationalize their act as not being a crime but rather is undertaken through "neutralization," that is, the process to justify behavior which would otherwise be unacceptable. The process to protect oneself using psychological defenses from the guilty conscience and the condemnation from the mores of society are outlined by Greshem Sykes and David Matza in the following techniques:

> 1. Denial of responsibility. "I couldn't help it; that's just the way things are done around here."
>
> 2. Denial of injury. "It doesn't make any difference: they have insurance." "So what? No one got hurt."
>
> 3. Denial of the victim. "He had it coming." "He should not have been there in the first place."

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4. Condemnation of the condemners. "Who are they to say it's wrong to smoke grass? They get high on liquor."

5. Appeal to higher loyalties. "I didn't do it for myself."[89]

The neutralization concept (or ex post facto rationalization) behavior appears to describe criminal actions but is difficult to validate empirically as a causal factor. Regardless, the defense mechanism in the giving of questionable reasons to justify antisocial behavior retains a place in any comprehensive explanation of deviant action.

Political and Economic Features in Understanding Crime

While radical concepts about crime causation existed among nineteenth century European utopian socialists, anarchists, and Marxists, these notions had little impact on the development of American criminology until the second half of the twentieth century. Karl Marx (1818-1883) wrote little about crime in his discourses, but by the 1960's political and economic theories and research "began to reject the belief in a benevolent state and a capitalistic economy that had informed a liberal, positivist criminology."[90] New Left thinking enabled Marxist thought to be examined to determine if it offers any beneficial insight into criminal action and the organization of the state. Marxist philosophy emphasized "class struggle" in which the bourgeoisie (capitalist class) would eventually be supplanted by the proletariat (working class) following a probably violent struggle; the theory envisions that the weaknesses of the capitalist system creates

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economic cycles which inevitably will result in a severe economic crisis with deep impoverishment of the working class. Following the deep decline, the proletariat will rise to attack and disassemble the bourgeois system which will be replaced--or aborted into--a classless society operating with rational economic cooperation. From this orientation Marxist criminology is based on the necessity of human transformation in the achievement of peace and justice.[91]

The emphasis from the Marxist approach is on mediation, reconciliation, abolition of punishment and the death penalty, and implementation of various types of humanistic actions.[92] New Left commentators see state dysfunction that leads to racism, poverty, depression, and unequal opportunity due to the capitalist political system. Curiously, the decline of socialist states based on Marxist philosophy creates the opportunity for capitalist society to acknowledge its own successes and failures at political efforts of crime control, transcending its historic insularity in examining criticism from a competitive system. A glaring failure to be examined by the capitalist system is why extensive anti-crime measures, encompassing rehabilitative programs and the dramatic expansion of penal facilities, have not resulted in a comparable decline in the incidence of crime. This issue will be discussed in the final chapter.

In the last half of the twentieth century, a sociological movement in the study of law has emerged attacking an

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enunciated existence of legal exclusivism. The sociology of law includes conventional in addition to radical and Marxist ideas; thus far the movement has dealt with the interrelationship between juris-prudential and sociological concepts, tracing their origins to Durkheim, Roscoe Pound, Max Weber, Karl Llewellyn, and others.[93] Studies of cognitive development and social learning theories--some informed by longitudinal, multimethodological research--demonstrate that cognitive development, that is, intellective knowledge acquisition, influences legal socialization more than social learning, though to date neither has been useful as a predictor of behavior and does not appear to be testable empirically.[94]

Criminal law including law enforcement is the primary target for sociological analysis of law, which historically has been interpreted as a primary means of accomplishing the process of social control. F. James Davis observes: "The state's power is limited, but it does have a near monopoly of power, and this force stands behind the operations of the courts of law."[95] In the words of Roscoe Pound, law may serve as an attempt "to satisfy, to reconcile, to harmonize, to adjust these overlapping and often conflicting claims and demands." Richard Quinney believes that society is characterized "by diversity, conflict, coercion, and change, rather than by consensus and stability," that law is the result of particular interests though law may control such interests, and that law represents not a compromise of diverse

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interests in society, but supports some at the expense of others.[96] Criminal law perspectives involve evaluation of political and economic forces and are not primarily concerned with causation except as the sources of such forces hypothetically create the criminogenic conditions and in this context reference to sociology of law is included.

Economists also have proposed theoretical crime control concepts of; these are econometric models which seek to explain criminal behavior by arguing that individuals who commit criminal acts respond to incentives much as noncriminals do. Criminal behavior, therefore, is posited as being a resource allocation of the criminal's time, money, and energy that will maximize his or her well-being and financial gains to the highest relative to competing opportunities for the use of such resources. The factor entered into the model which expresses the potential criminal's mental process is called a utility function. Economists assume that individuals will maximize expected utility in the use of their limited resources and may endeavor to envision adjustments that may be necessary to respond to changing risks.[97] Gary S. Becker produced a pioneer model in which he analyzed what the probability of conviction and resulting sanctions would be on criminal conduct and concluded that an increase in either results in a reduction of offenses. He assumed that different levels of risk appetite among people exist in that some individuals will undertake risky endeavors--such as criminal acts--more readily than others. The "deterrence hypothesis"

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supposes that increased criminal justice sanctions, if instituted, should decrease crime.[98] Subsequent economists working with Becker's model have sought to consider the mathematical permutations created from individual preference assumptions regarding legal gain, illegal gain, penalty functions, value of time, economic standing.[99] Limitations of econometric approaches to date rest in the difficulty in reconciling theoretical constructs with empirical data. One economist concludes:

> There is strong evidence...that an increase in the threat of punishment can reduce the amount of crimes in some circumstances, but very little evidence about the long-term effects, the typical magnitudes involved, the relevance of process, the responsiveness of juveniles to threats, or the extent to which some important crime categories (such as murder) are responsive to changes in the threat level.[100]

Such a thesis, in any case, is more applicable to property than to violent crime causation. Despite the lack of quality data to test the hypotheses, econometric models provide a fresh means for considering criminal behavior and evaluating how or to what extent the deterrent hypothesis might have practical application through the manipulation of incentives.

Feminist Perspectives

The genetic similarities and differences between male and female human species derive from the fact that each has twenty-three pairs of chromosomes, twenty-two homologous pairs of autosomes and one pair of sex chromosomes. The sexual chromosomal difference accounts for the biological and

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physical differences and in turn has presented compelling issues for study of social and psychological variance and distinctiveness in the scientific age. The scope of research verges into criminological differences and holds the possibility of providing insight to crime causation. The extent of writings on gender differences in criminal behavior explore numerous perspectives such as traditional (or conservative) explanations that concentrate on biological sex differences; liberal feminist views which argue that women's full exposure to intellectual and physical pursuits of the male have shaped behavior; Marxist feminist where class and gender relationships in hierarchical relationships to property are significant; and radical feminist in which patriarchy associated with "ownership" of women affected male-defined power relationships.

A non-academic writer claims that boys are rewarded for "boisterous behavior" in school which suggests that males learn aggressive traits.[101] By contrast feminist criminologists observe the uninterruptedness between conformity of women and girls to the criminal justice system and controls by other institutions and structures in society.[102] One writes:

> Men, as males, have not been the objects of the criminological gaze. Yet the most consistent and dramatic finding from Lombroso to post-modern criminology is not that most criminals are working class--a fact which has received continuous theoretical attention--but that most criminals are, and always have been, men.[103]

Some feminist writers point out that men and women have been seen as fundamentally and qualitatively distinct

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creatures. "Women were seen as pure, passive, dependent, submissive, selfless, caring and gentle, but also as childlike, narcissistic, emotional, jealous, malicious, deceptive, sexual and unstable. These images of women were reflected in images of criminal women."[104] But a British social work lecturer observes: "The irony of this should be obvious: it is men who rape and the sexual abuse of children is almost entirely perpetrated by men. Yet perhaps highest on the professional agenda is the assumption (and concomitant practices) that girls in trouble fundamentally have a problem with <u>their</u> sexuality."[105]

Participants at an international conference on female criminality in Florence concluded: "Growing up good, for a girl, means developing approved sexual practices" and failure to respect such codes results in greater chance of punishment for girls than boys. For example, in Belgium, males were about four-times as likely to be referred to the prosecutor's office for violent and property crimes in 1974, and again in 1981; by contrast males were likely to be referred to the same office by a substantially similar amount as females for status offenses which include: misconduct, in danger, running away, truancy, and moral protection. A report concludes: "(T)here is evidence that girls are still punished more severely than boys for activities which put them at risk of an unauthorized sexual encounter, for sexual offences, although boys engage in these activities at least as often as girls."[106]

An illuminating question in feminist criminology is what

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effect, if any, the women's liberation movement will have on female crime. A century earlier L.O. Pike in History of Crime in England (1876) wondered if as women grew more independent they would also manifest greater criminal behavior. Perhaps a few feminist writers believe that no liberation has occurred; excluding such views and accepting the position that women have achieved measurable progress within the past generation and beginning far earlier than that in all spheres of contemporary endeavor, the question remains whether changes in female criminality over time can be documented. Frances Heidensohn concluded:

> The central hypothesis has been extensively explored and tested, to no finally conclusive results--although it has been refuted to some degree. Its power as a concept is more than just scientific: it has a symbolic value to its proponents, its critics and the public. In a very real sense, then, and in the least helpful way to women offenders or women workers, one branch of feminist criminology has at last made female crime visible.[107]

Other Views on Crime Causation

Perspectives on crime causation from non-academic, non-research-oriented sources have provided numerous thoughtful contributions to causation over the years: a few of them are now discussed. In 1872, a temperance leader and suffragette stated her conviction on crime causation: "Let me first try to analyze the Cause of this increase in the present day...Permit me to say that I think the present '*Cause*' of these flagrant evils is, the false state of *society*, the total *lack* of reality, the *excess* of *frivolity*, the great desire for *outside*

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equality, and the dearth of the right kind of entertainment for the RISING YOUTH!"[108] In 1888, a clergyman asserted the importance of alcohol and disorder: "Nothing is more fully proven than that Intemperance is one of the most prolific sources of crime."[109]

Clarence Darrow (1857-1938), the greatest criminal lawyer of his generation, saw crime as a deviation from "folk-ways" and largely caused by economic and social inequality: "Any improved social arrangement that would make it easier for the common man to live will necessarily save a larger number from crime. Perhaps if the social improvement should be great enough it would prevent the vast majority of criminal acts."[110] Another book written in the 1920's identified a single cause for crime: hunger.[111] A New York lawyer in the 1920's saw journalism--including its "rude, vulgar, and often malicious pictures put forth in the guise of wit and caricature"--as being a potent force to encourage crime, if not actually cause it:

> Suggestion is known by all who have any acquaintance with the principles of psychology to be one of the most potent causes of the commission of crime. There are numbers of people in the community who feel the temptation and approach the brink of crime who only need the slight incentive to convert the impulse into action.[112]

Early in the century, a penologist believed that mental disorders, particularly epilepsy, were a cause of criminality, a notion held by many for much of the century: "As the result of our own intensive studies, we have come to agree with those who maintain that a large percentage of recidivists are

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mentally defective....Of the repeated offenders whom we have studied at length, now some seven hundred and fifty cases, about 25 percent are below normal mentally."[113]

In a book reflecting the mood of the 1960's, an author declares that an ever-increasing "wave" of criminal behavior might be occurring, and, if so, it is because America is a criminal society because it is an unequal society: this is deduced by virtue of the nation's involvement in mass violence abroad, such as the Vietnam war; because "of certain emphases in our cultural values that help generate crime" such as personal success largely being viewed in materialistic terms; "because it has 'created' much unnecessary crime," and "because it has adopted an unseeing and unworkable orientation to the crime problem" such as a failure to press antipoverty programs and improve race relations.[114]

In the latter quarter of the century, however, neo-conservative views have found expression arguing that liberals in the Progressive Era, 1890-1920, and in the Civil Rights Era of the 1960's urged social reform to avoid violent confrontations and in the process contributed to a failure of reform and a rhetoric of violence.[115] Others have claimed that the welfare state has created dependency, sustained poverty, diminished family structure, reduced personal enterprise, and created a permanent criminal subculture that is served by a permanent bureaucracy tied to maintenance of the status quo.[116]

A surfeit of scholarly and popular theoretical propositions has illuminated the discussion on causes of urban

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crime. But no single theory currently serves to underpin contemporary crime reduction concepts and strategy. The following chapters provide a narrative on how one city experienced crime in the twentieth century. The final chapter proposes an analysis of conditions that precipitated an increase in violent and property crime in the last years of the period of study.

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ENDNOTES

1. Genesis 4:1-16. "Cain went away from the presence of the Lord, and dwelled in the land of Nod, east of Eden," 4:16. A similar story appears in the Quran. A psychiatrist writes: "According to the legend, which, whatever else it may constitute, embodies some element of anthropological truth, the earliest family--Adam, Eve, and their children--was beset by three major troubles: first, what has been described as a 'turmoil of thought,' especially about good and evil (the tree of the knowledge of good and evil); secondly, sex (the serpent of lust); thirdly, violence (Cain's murder of Abel)." Frederic Wertham, A Sign for Cain: An Exploration of Human Violence, New York: Macmillan, 1966, p. 2.

2. Aeschylus, Agamemnon.

3. Homer, The Odyssey, translated by E.V. Rieu, Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1958, p. 140. The Greek king killed more than just these. Odysseus (L. Ulysses) returned to his kingdom, Ithaca, to find suitors for his wife Penelope in attendance. He registered his displeasure by silently killing them, using the great bow that he alone could bend. Alice Mariani, "The Renaming of Odysseus," in Critical Essays on Homer, Kenneth Atchity ed., Boston: G.K. Hall & Co., 1987, p. 211. Homer initially depicted Odysseus as wise and canny; in a later version Homer found Ulysses to be wily, lying, and evil. In contemporary colloquial Italian, the noun Ulysses means astuto and simulatore (astute and duplicitous). See also: George E. Dimock, Jr., "The Epic of Suffering and Fulfillment," in Homer's Odyssey: A Critical Handbook, Conny Nelson, ed., Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1969, p. 163.

4. The foundation of Rome is described by two legends for different time periods: when Lavinium was founded by the Trojan Aeneas and the foundation of Rome herself by Romulus. When Romulus and Remus were born, their greatuncle Amulius sought to drown them in the Tiber. The current washed them away and a she-wolf fed them until they were discovered by a shepherd and shepherdess. At adolescence, Romulus and Remus killed Amulius, restored the throne of Alba to their grandfather, and left to found a new city which was miraculously were they have been cast into the Tiber. According to Livy's version, Romulus and Remus argued over the site and the meaning of the omens. They came to blows and Remus was killed. According to a more popular tradition, Remus jumped Romulus's newly built wall and was killed. Romulus's warning was: "So shall perish all who attempt to pass over our walls." Raymond Bloch, The Origins of Rome, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960, pp. 47-48.

5. Colin Wilson, A Criminal History of Mankind, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1984, p. 225.

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6. Luke Owen Pike, A History of Crime in England, vol. 1, London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1873; vol. 2, 1876.

7. Criminal History, Wilson, p. 356. Cesare desired the sexual company of his sister who was married to Alfonso. In July, 1500, Alfonso was returning from supper with the Pope when he was attacked by assassins, but survived. He was taken to the Vatican and placed in a room near the Pope's for security and kept under watch of his relatives. When they left him alone for an hour, they returned to find him strangled and Cesare was accused of murder. He admitted the charge but claimed it was self-defense since Alfonso had fired a crossbow at him as he walked in the garden, p. 252.

8. The incidents to be of greatest concern in this chapter are often called "index crimes," because they are included in the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) semi-annual Uniform Crime Reports. Since 1930 when the FBI first began collecting crime from various reporting police departments, these index crimes have undergone some change. In 1990 they included four in each of two categories: violent crimes--murder-homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated (felonious) assault, and non-violent or property crimes--burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. These eight major types of "incidents" constitute perhaps only 30% to 35% of all crimes. This has been determined by diaries kept by a statistically projectable population sample and reported annually by the Bureau of Justice Statistics in their National Crime Survey.

9. Karl Menninger, "Crime (What Causes it?)" in The Ann Landers Encyclopedia, Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1978, p. 304. Theft is often not reported because there is little or no financial loss or physical injury, victims' sense of personal security is not risked, and the results do not seem serious to the victims.

10. This term was most prevalent in the late 1970's through the mid-1980's. See Charles Patterson Kimball, The Biopsychosocial Approach to the Patient, Baltimore: Williams & Wilkens, Co., 1981. For an overview of crime explanations, see: Daniel Glaser et al. "Crime Causation." In Sanford H. Kadish, ed., Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice. New York: The Free Press, 1983, pp. 307-353.

11. Violations of group norms result in sanctions including punishment, L. punire akin to penalty as from pain, suffering, shame, strict restraint, or loss. No society has been identified to date which has not had punishment within its social structure for norm violations, though forms of sanctions have wide variability. See next note.

12. Cultural anthropology has provided some insight into the existence of laws and punishment in early societies. Lowie

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finds among the Hupa: "All homicide is criminal since it deprives the ruler of a subject and must be atoned by a compensation paid to the chief irrespective (sic) of criminal intent. But injury to another man's fields or other possessions is a tort, and if the harm is done without premeditation no indemnities are paid," p. 401. Among the Chukchi:

> For those cases of homicide which do not require a shedding of blood in return the rich slayer must provide elaborate feasts and supply a variety of articles to be distributed among the dead man's heirs, the total expense sometimes running up to 975 pesos. (p. 402)

In Australia, Lowie notes: "It is very popular in the Southeast and also in Queensland, where a thief will express contrition and offers his head for a blow, while a gossip will allow his mouth to be struck by the slandered person," p. 408. Among Esquimo: "The nearest relative of the slain person wreaks vengeance on the slayer or one of his kinsman, true the principle of collective responsibility the quarrel may be handed down to the following generation, and the number of innocent people will suffer death before a formal reconciliation is effected." p. 414. In Africa: "When an Ewe had committed murder, the victim's kin sometimes kidnapped members of the criminal household or destroyed their fields and houses, but that seems to be as far as the feud went and even in this diluted form it was rather exceptional," p. 418. Robert H. Lowie, Primitive Society, New York: Liveright Publishing Corp., 1947.

Among the Labrador Indians, in the Montagnais-Naskapi area, Speck finds: "The treatment of individuals who have done minor injury to others and become obnoxious seems to be that of annoyed patience or temporary indifference," p. 565. Further:

> The Naskapi is an exceedingly affectioned father. His children are never an annoyance to him about the camp, although it should be recalled that at such times he is enjoying a period of relaxation from the arduous exactions of the hunt. He will not tolerate the idea of punishing children for misdemeanors, for such are not thought of as being possible in child behavior....I can recall no instances of corporal punishment, in fact, few circumstances in the tent-life of the savages where need for it would arise. (pp. 573-574)

Speck makes no reference to homicide in the territory, and notes: "Personally, I can testify to never having had a single object lifted from my property or equipment, though many times I have exposed small things to test this circumstance," p. 578. Concerning use of alcohol: "Crimes of violence are almost unknown among them except when caused by drunkenness....abstinence is not considered in any way as

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associated with good behavior, except among those who have been taught its virtue and who fall as speedily as the ignorant," p. 583. Frank G. Speck, "Ethical Attributes of the Labrador Indians," American Anthropologist, n.s., 35 (1933): 559-594.

In the development of early law, Maine observes: "Anglo-Saxon and other Germanic codes, when they suffer a thief chased down and caught with his booty to be hanged or decapitated on the spot, while they exact the full penalties of homicide from anybody who kills him after the pursuit has been intermitted." Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of Society, and Its Relation to Modern Ideas, Tucson: University of Arizona Press, [1864], 1986, p. 367.

13. Retaliation was the earliest right for a wrong. "In early primitive societies, personal retaliation was accepted and even encouraged by members of the tribal group. This ancient concept of personal revenge could hardly be considered 'law.' Yet it has influenced the development of most legal systems, especially English criminal law, from which most American criminal law derives." Harry E. Allen and Clifford E. Simonsen, Corrections in America: An Introduction, 6th ed., New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1992, p. 4. Personal retribution could take the form of "blood feud," in which the victim's family or tribe sought revenge and such revenge "could easily escalate and result in an endless vendetta between the injured factions," p. 5.

14. Douglas Greenberg, Crime and Law Enforcement in the Colony of New York, 1691-1776, Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1974, pp. 99-101.

15. G.R. Driver & John C. Miles, ed., trans. and commentary, The Babylonian Laws, vol. 1, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952, p. 6 (Hereafter cited as Babylonian Laws). The clay tablets containing the Laws of Bilalama deal mostly with property matters, such as prices and rates of hire and repayment of loans, but issues relating to assault and injuries and personal liability from injury were also included.

16. Hans Jochen Boecker, Law and the Administration of Justice in the Old Testament and Ancient East, trans. Jeremy Moiser, Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1980, p. 74 (Hereafter cited as Law).

17. Babylonian Laws, p. 50.

18. William Seagle, Men of Law: From Hammu-rabi to Holmes, New York: Macmillan, 1947, pp. 19-20.

19. Law, p. 85.

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20. Ibid., p. 171. The author points out that "the so-called talion formula occurs in only three places, the third of which has undergone linguistic changes and is also for other reasons to be included only as a marginal occurrence," p. 172. These are: Exodus 21:23-5; Leviticus 24:18-20; and with limitations Deuteronomy 19:21, and concludes that "the talion principle is not generally determinative of OT law. It comes into effect only occasionally..." Exodus 21:23-5 begins in pure casuistic style in v. 22, but from v. 23 is transmuted into the talion formula:

> When, in the course of a brawl, a man knocks against a pregnant woman so that she has a miscarriage but suffers no further hurt, then the offender must pay whatever fine the woman's husband demands; and he must pay it in front of the arbiters. If, on the other hand (v. 23), hurt is done then you shall give life for life eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, bruise for bruise, wound for wound.

21. Exodus 20:2-17 and Deuteronomy 5:6-21.

22. Yet Athenian criminal law did not recognize a public action for theft, adultery, robbery, or burglary based upon accusation by means of a written indictment (graphe). This may be because "in many pre-modern legal systems apprehension at the time of the commission of the offense constituted the dominant means of prosecution (very often the only practicable one)," David Cohen, Law, Sexuality, and Society: The Enforcement of Morals in Classical Athens, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 129.

23. Trevor J. Saunders, Plato's Penal Code: Tradition, Controversy, and Reform in Greek Penology, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991, pp. 1, 10.

24. Ibid., pp. 145-150.

25. Ibid., pp. 187-192.

26. Ibid., p. 217.

27. Ibid., pp. 217-257. Saunders observes (pp. 243-244) that several groups of penalty-free homicides are recognized in Attic law: 1. Killings of innocent persons in competitions and battles; persons who die under a doctor's care; 2. Killings of persons illegally returned from exile; 3. Killings in self-defense; 4. Killings of criminal aggressors (such as footpads, rapists, and adulterers); and from the protection of third parties. And, 5., killings of persons attempting to set up a tyranny or subvert democracy.

28. Ibid., p. 356.

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29. Andrew Lintott, Violence, Civil Strife and Revolution in the Classical City, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982, p. 13.

30. Ibid., pp. 18-19.

31. James A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d'Aquino: His Life, Thought, and Work, Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1974, chap. 1, and G.K. Chesterton, St. Thomas Aquinas, London: Hodder & Stroughton, 1933, chaps. 1-2.

32. The entire Summa is a sixty volume series. Questions relating to justice and injustice are found in vol. 37 & 38. Marcus Lefébure, ed., St. Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologica, gen. ed., Thomas Gilby, London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1975, 38 vols.

33. Anthony Kenny, Aquinas, New York: Hill and Wang, 1980, p. 23.

34. Thomas draws heavily from Aristotle's Ethics for guidance on his criminal justice related pronouncements. See: Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, esp. pp. 106-136. A criminologist points out how institutions must serve human needs to survive: "On the interpretation which Aristotle probably and Thomas Aquinas certainly would have endorsed, the beneficial consequences are a necessary condition of law in a society," Nigel Walker, Behavior and Misbehavior: Explanations and Non-explanations, New York: Basic Books, 1977, p. 25.

35. George Mace, Locke, Hobbes, and the Federalist Papers: An Essay on the Genesis of the American Political Heritage, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1979. As his main thesis, the author argues that Hobbes not Locke was the most significant political inspiration to the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. Locke stressed emphasis on individual property rights; Hobbes emphasized the importance of a system that "employs the pursuit of private interest to attain the public good."

36. Marcello Maestro, Cesare Beccaria and the Origins of Penal Reform, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1973, p. 9. Industrialization had begun in Europe among the most industrialized nations beginning about 1750. This process resulted in enormous rapid growth of cities and drew workers from farms and towns to cities for employment opportunities. These conditions precipitated a rapid exacerbation of urban social problems and signalled the initiation of attempts to control them.

37. Ibid., p. 20.

38. Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments, trans. with

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notes and intro by David Young, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1986, p. 4.

39. Ibid., p. 7 et seq. and Cesare Beccaria, Dei Delitti e Delle Pene, Milano, Mursia, 1973, p. 27 et seq.

40. Elio Monachesi, "Cesare Beccaria," in Pioneers in Criminology, ed. and intro. by Hermann Mannheim, 2nd ed. Montclair, NJ: Paterson Smith, 1973, p. 49 (Hereafter cited as Pioneers).

41. Maestro, p. 158. Beccaria's thought contributed to reformation of barbaric penal practices; however, his theory of moral responsibility has been attacked by sociologists and psychiatrists and may have contributed to the advent of plea bargaining with the offender. See: Seagle, pp. 212-232, esp. 230.

42. Gilbert Geis, "Jeremy Bentham," in Pioneers, p. 54.

43. Ibid., pp. 56-57.

44. Henry Sumner Maine quoted Ibid., p. 67. Bentham also advanced an eccentric and highly controversial proposal for prison reform: He advocated a self-contained prison, the Panopticon, under which inmates would work solitarily but under constant supervision by a centrally placed guard tower which looked into the cells. It was never constructed in England, but had considerable influence in the construction of a prison in Joliet, Illinois.

Concerning age and crime, it is a settled matter that crime is related to youth, which explains historical interest in the importance of juvenile delinquency studies. Individuals can commit crimes at any time of life, but "The number of elderly offenders is small compared to the number of younger criminals," p. xx. See: Evelyn S. Newman, Donald J. Newman, Mindy L. Gewirtz, Elderly Criminals, Cambridge: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain Publishers, 1984.

45. Marvin E. Wolfgang, "Cesare Lombroso," in Pioneers, p. 232.

46. Sawyer Sylvester, The Heritage of Modern Criminology, Cambridge, MA: Schenkman, 1973, pp. 71-72.

47. Gina Lombroso-Ferrero, Criminal Man, Montclair, NJ: Patterson Smith, [1911], 1972. Cesare's efforts in modern criminology extend far beyond his phrenologic studies. His research includes blood pressure fluctuations and deviance became a precursor to further polygraphic studies. "Lombroso, the 19th century Italian criminologist, and his student, Mosso, adapted the plethysmograph, a device for measuring changes in the volume of the limb, to produce continuous records of pulse and blood pressure changes in their subjects'

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records very similar to those obtained on the 'cardio' channel of a modern interrogation polygraph," David Thoreson Lykken, A Tremor In the Blood Uses and Abuses of the Lie Detector, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1981, p. 26.

48. Thomas Byrnes, Professional Criminals of America: 1886, New York: Chelsea House Publishers, [1886], 1969.

49. Edwin D. Driver, "Charles Buckman Goring," in Pioneers, p.429-442.

50. George B. Goring, The English Convict: A Statistical Study, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1913. Goring did find that criminals and non-criminals did differ on some physical characteristics. For example, convicts were one to two inches shorter and weighed three to seven pounds less than non-criminal comparisons. Goring concluded that hereditary differences accounted for this physical variation. Havelock Ellis believed that professional criminals were caused by "cosmic" factors such as temperature, climate and diet, by social factors including "economic perturbations" but that biological factors, including "the criminal's anatomical, physiological, and psychological nature" are more important than cosmic and social as discussed in: Havelock Ellis, The Criminal, Montclair, NJ: Patterson Smith, [1890], 1973, pp. 24-25.

The linkage between intelligence and class structure has been argued in recent books as a likely genetic factor with broad sociatal implications, though arguments for criminality are not developed. See: Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in American Life, New York: Free Press, 1994, and Seymour W. Itzkoff, The Decline of Intelligence in America: A Strategy for National Renewal, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994. Piers Bierne has argued that Goring's conclusions were not much different from Lombroso's.

51. Earnest Albert Hooton, The American Criminal, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, [1939], 1969. Not discussed here is the work of William Shelton on somatotypes which sought to relate criminal behavior to body typography. Shelton's work--arguing, in part, that mesomorphs are more likely to produce violent crime--has not held up to subsequent criticism. Edwin H. Sutherland, "Critique of Shelton's Varieties of Delinquent Youth," American Sociological Review, 16 (1951): 10-13.

52. Stephen E. Brown, Finn-Aage Esbensen and Gilbert Geis, Criminology: Explaining Crime and Its Context, Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing Co., 1991, p. 261.

53. Robert L. Dugdale, The Jukes: A Study in Crime, Pauperism, Disease, and Heredity, New York: J.P. Putnam's Sons, [1877], 1910, and Henry H. Goddard, The Kallikak Family, New York: Macmillan, [1912], 1925. Both family names, used by the

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researchers--Jukes and Kallikak--are pseudonyms.

54. Johannes Lange, Verbrechen als Schisksal, Leipzig: Thieme, 1929. See also: Lee Ellis and Harry Hoffman, eds., Crime in Biological, Social, and Moral Contexts, New York: Praeger, 1990, and Lawrence Taylor, Born to Crime: The Genetic Causes of Crime, Contributions in Criminology and Penology, no. 2, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984. The author, a law professor, wonders if the "very basic premises" concerning criminality might be wrong and that recidivism, or habitual criminal behavior, might be due to genetic factors.

55. Karl O. Christiansen. "A Preliminary Study of Criminality Among Twins." In Sarnoff A. Mednick & Karl O. Christiansen, eds., Biosocial Basis of Criminal Behavior,. New York: Gardner Press, 1977, pp. 89-108.

56. Sarnoff A. Mednick; Vicki E. Pollack; Jan Volavla, and William F. Gabrielli, Jr., "Biology and Violence," in Criminal Violence, ed. Marvin E. Wolfgang and Neil A. Weiner, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982, pp. 21-81.

57. This observation seems to hold true for time immemorial. For an example of an early scientific study emphasizing the sex and crime differential, see research of Adolphe Quetelet in Piers Beirne, Inventing Criminology: Essays on the Rise of 'Homo Criminalis,' Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993, pp. 86-88 (hereafter cites as Inventing Criminology).

58. Robert T. Rubin; June M. Reinisch, and Roger F. Haskett, "Postnatal Gonadal Steroid Effects on Human Behavior," in Science 211 (1981): 1318-1324.

59. Herbert C. Quay, "Classification," in Psychopathological Disorders of Childhood, 2nd ed., ed. Herbert C. Quay and John C. Werry, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1979, pp. 1-42.

60. Arnold Binder, "Juvenile Delinquency," Annual Review of Psychology, 39 (1988):253-282.

61. William McCord and Joan McCord, The Psychopath: An Essay on the Criminal Mind, Princeton, NJ: D. Van Nostrand, 1964, and William McCord, "Psychopathy," in Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice, vol. 4, Sanford H. Kadish ed., New York: Free Press, pp. 1315-1318.

The McCords had earlier been involved in a longitudinal project, begun in the 1930's, "which attempted to prevent delinquency and develop character by means of friendly guidance." The program "probably the most extensive and costly experiment...failed primarily because it did not affect the basic psychological and familial causes of crime," p. vii. Nonetheless, some important findings resulted including certain social crime causations. A genesis of crime was or was not related to the following factors: intelligence "was not

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strongly related to the causation of crime" and that most property criminals were "of average intelligence"; physical condition did not significantly affect crime incidents; social factors were not strongly related to criminality such as the economic neighborhood level, though criminality chance was "significantly increased" if a delinquent gang was a child's "basic reference group"; home environment "had an important effect on whether he became a criminal" and quarrelsome homes led to delinquency; discipline is a complicated factor but "consistent discipline, whether of a punitive or love-oriented nature, tended to prevent criminality"; father's personality was important in that "warm fathers and passive fathers produced very few criminals" and "parental absence, cruelty, or neglect" produced criminality in a majority of boys; role model of the father was significantly important since "boys raised by criminal fathers were especially prone to property crimes and crimes against the person, to early and prolongued criminality"; mother's personality "appeared to be the most fundamental" in that "maternal cruelty and absence led to high criminality," and the son's position in the family had an affect on crime in that children viewed as "troublemakers" by parents and those in the middle range of the birth order were likely to become criminals. William McCord and Joan McCord, Origins of Crime: A New Evaluation of the Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study, New York: Columbia University Press, 1959, pp. 166-172.

62. Aaron Stern, ME: The Narcissistic American, New York: Ballantine Books, 1979, p. 147.

63. Ibid., p. 148. A psychologist proposes that "mothering styles...generate the neurosis of our time" which can lead to violence as "one example of the compulsive acting-out process." He adds: "The fact that 40 percent of ghetto homes are fatherless and that a matriarchal setting prevails most decisively in ghetto homes is a cultural fact that has its roots in many causes outside the family. Nevertheless, the home establishment cheats, frustrates, deprives the growing infant and child of his identity. It is this primal experience that repeats later in youth, adolescents, and young manhood. All the regressed emotional states are transferred to new objects and institutions." Matthew Besdine, "Cradle of Violence" The Neurosis of Our Time: Acting-Out, comp. and ed. Donald S. Milman and George D. Goldman, Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas, 1973, pp. 87-88.

64. August Aichhorn, Wayward Youth, New York: Viking, 1963.

65. Freudian thought has provided a way of interpreting criminal behavior: "(E)ven great criminals and humorists, as they are represented in literature, compel our interest by the narcissistic consistency with which they manage to keep away from their ego anything that would diminish it," and "People of the narcissistic type who are exposed to a frustration from

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the external world, though otherwise independent, are peculiarly disposed to psychosis; and they also represent essential pre-conditions for criminality," in Elisabeth Young-Bruehl, ed., Freud on Women: A Reader, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1990, pp. 193, 319. Two psychiatrists in the 1930's wrote: "(I)t is are conviction that any great reduction of crime will result...solely by a better understanding of the psychological processes which underlie human behavior in general and crime in particular." Franz Alexander and William Healy, Roots of Crime: Psychoanalytic Studies, Montclair, NJ: Patterson Smith, [1935], 1969, p.3.

66. Behavior therapy is rooted in principles that psychiatric disorders and antisocial behavior are partially linked to faulty learning requiring the maladaptive responses to be treated by removal of the inappropriate behavior (symptom) and toward learning new, more effective patterns of behavior. This therapy places emphasis on the social environment as a source of stimuli supporting symptoms but also capable of behavior modification. Shirley H. Mink and Walter D. Mink, "Behavioral Concepts," in Handbook of Behavior Modification and Behavior Therapy, ed. H. Leinterberg, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1976. The principle form of behavior modification for deviancy reached its zenith in the 1960's and 1970's.

67. Michael R. Gottfredson and Travis Hirschi, A General Theory of Crime, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990, p. 69 (Hereafter cited as General Theory).

68. Ibid.

69. Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, New York: Free Press, [1893], 1965.

70. _____, The Rules of Sociological Method, New York: Free Press, [1895], 1965.

71. _____, Suicide: A Study in Sociology, New York: Free Press, [1897], 1951. The concept of anomie is raised in this book. Durkheim's classic on suicide, following his brother's self-demise, reinforces his earlier concepts on deviancy but served also to turn attention to the topic of suicide with such success that it blocked consideration of biological depression as a cause for considerable time.

72. Robert K. Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie," American Sociological Review 3 (1938):672-682. Also note: Robert Dubin, "Deviant Behavior and Social Structure: Continuities in Social Theory," American Sociological Review, 24 (1959): 147-164.

73. General Theory, pp. 78-84.

74. Inventing Criminology, pp. 143-164.

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75. Edwin H. Sutherland and Donald Cressey, Criminology, 9th ed., Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1974, pp. 75-76. The remarkable success of the University of Chicago's research in the 1920's and 1930's is summarized in Martin Bulmer, The Chicago School of Sociology: Institutionalization, Diversity, and the Rise of Sociological Research, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984. Bulmer traces the department's intellectual influence to philosopher George Herbert Mead and concludes that diversity, eclecticism, and methodological tolerance helped the "Chicago heritage" make its stamp upon the field.

76. Edwin H. Sutherland, White Collar Crime, New York: Dryden, 1949.

77. Richard A. Cloward and Lloyd E. Ohlin, Delinquency and Opportunity, New York: Free Press, 1960, and Richard A. Cloward, "Illegitimate Means, Anomie, and Deviant Behavior," American Sociological Review, 24 (1959): 164-76.

78. Clifford R. Shaw and Henry D. McKay, Juvenile Delinquency in Urban Areas, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942. See also: Anthony E. Bottoms, "Environmental Criminology," in Oxford Handbook of Criminology, ed. Mike Maguire, Rod Morgan and Robert Reiner, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, pp. 585-656. A discussion of the University of Chicago's Sociology Department and its "intellectual assault on the study of the city" is in David Downes and Paul Rock, Understanding Deviance: A Guide to the Sociology of Crime and Rule-Breaking, 2nd ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988, pp. 57-87.

79. Frank Tannenbaum, Crime and the Community, Boston: Ginn, 1938.

80. The point of people acting in the role that society expects of them is best made by Edwin M. Lemert, "Diversion in Juvenile Justice: What Hath Been Wrought," Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 18 (1981): 35-46.

81. Leslie Wilkins, Social Deviance: Social Policy, Action, and Research, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1965. For a further discussion of criminal labeling, see: Arthur Niederhoffer, "Criminal Justice by Dossier: Law Enforcement, Labeling and Liberty," in Current Perspectives on Criminal Behavior: Original Essays on Criminology, ed. Abraham S. Blumberg, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974, pp. 47-67.

82. Marvin E. Wolfgang and Franco Ferracuti, The Subculture of Violence, London: Social Science Paperbacks, 1967.

83. Ibid., p. 159.

84. A youth may feel fully vindicated in reacting violently even fatally against someone, in the language of the inner

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city, who is "dissing" him, that is, disrespecting him by gestures, word, or deed.

85. Walter B. Miller, "Lower Class Culture as a Generating Milieu of Gang Delinquency," Journal of Social Issues, 14 (1958): 5-19.

86. Ibid., p. 12.

87. Jack Katz, Seduction of Crime: Moral and Sensual Attractions in Doing Evil, New York: Basic Books, 1988.

88. Ibid., p. 312.

89. Gresham M. Sykes and David Matza, "Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency," American Sociological Review, 22 (1957): 664-670. Wilson and Herrnstein, respectively professors of government and psychology, redirected thinking of crime causation from social factors to individual behavior: "(B)ehavior is determined by its consequences. A person will do that thing the consequences of which are perceived by him or her to be preferable to the consequences of doing something else. What can save such a statement from being a tautology is how plausibly we describe the gains and losses associated with alternative courses of action and the standards by which a person evaluates those gains and losses." James Q. Wilson and Richard J. Herrnstein, Crime & Human Nature, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985, p. 43.

90. Richard Quinney, "Criminology," in Encyclopedia of the American Left, ed. Mari Jo Buhle, Paul Buhle, and Dan Georgakas, New York & London: Garland Publishing, 1990, p. 167. "The American Left" is "defined as that segment of society which has sought fundamental changes in the economic, political and cultural systems, the subject does not include reformers who believe that change can be accommodated to existing capitalist structures, or who believe that an egalitarian society can be attained ultimately within national borders," p. xi.

91. David F. Greenberg, ed., Crime and Capitalism: Readings in Marxist Criminology, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993. (The author believes that New Left thinking aids in the comprehension of contemporary criminal justice issues, though he believes that democracy is best. See: "Democracy Works Best" and "Democracy and Growth: Why Voting is Good for You," Economist, August 27, 1994, pp. 9-10, 15-17.)

92. Probably the first leaflet emphasizing this philosophy was John Keracher, Crime: Its Causes and Consequences, 1937. A more recent article that explores "the organizing process of capitalism" as a factor in the expansion and contraction of property crime is explored theoretically by Drew Humphries and

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Don Wallace, "Capitalist Accumulation and Urban crime, 1950-1971," Social Problems 28 (December 1980): 179-93.

93. Alan Hunt, The Sociological Movement in Law, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978.

94. Ellen S. Cohn and Susan O. White, Legal Socialization: A Study of Norms and Rules, New York: Springer-Verlag, 1990.

95. F. James Davis, "Law as a Type of Social Control," in Law and Control in Society, ed. Ronald L. Akers and Richard Hawkins, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1975, p. 32.

96. Richard Quinney, "The Social Reality of Law: A Sociology of Criminal Law," in Law and Control in Society, p. 75. Quinney proposes a composite formulation of the social reality of crime based on: definitions created by authorized agents in a politically organized society"; promulgate by those who "have the power to shape public policy" and its "enforcement and administration" aimed against those "in segmentally organized society" with persons who "have relative probabilities of being defined as criminal," which propositions are "constructed and defused in the segments of society by means of communications." Richard Quinney, "The Social Reality of Crime" in Jack D. Douglas, Crime and Justice in American Society, Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1971, pp. 134-145.

97. I. Ehrlich, "The Economic Approach to Criminal Behavior: A Preliminary Assessment," Criminology Review Yearbook, vol. 1, ed. Sheldon L. Messinger and Egon Bittner, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979, pp. 25-60.

98. Gary S. Becker, "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy 76 (1968): 169-217.

99. Ann D. Witte, "Estimating the Economic Model of Crime With Individual Data," Quarterly Journal of Economics 94 (1980): 57-84.

100. Philip J. Cook, "Punishment and Crime: A critique of Current Findings Concerning the Preventative Effects of Punishment," Law and Contemporary Problems 41 (1977): 164-204.

101. Judy Mann, The Difference: Growing Up Female in America, New York: Warner Books, 1994. This discussion narrowly limits definition of feminist criminology to theories that help to explain criminal causation for both sexes. The agenda of feminist criminology is vast and growing: treatment of women in prison; as targets for violent acts; in evaluation of myths of collusion in their own rapes; the unconscious racism of white feminism, and the connection between crime and American imperialism. See for example: Susan Griffin, Rape: The Power of Consciousness, New York: Harper & Row, 1979; Germaine

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Greer, Sex and Destiny: The Politics of Human Fertility, London: Secker & Warburg, 1984, and Kathleen Daly and Meda Chesney-Lind, "Feminism and Criminology," Justice Quarterly, 5 (December 1988): 497-538.

102. Maureen Kane, "Feminists Transgress Criminology," in Growing Up Good: Policing the Behaviour of Girls in Europe, ed. Maureen King, Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1989, p. 1. The editor of this book claims: "I am arguing that, in a sense, feminist criminology is impossible; that feminist criminology disrupts the categories of criminology itself," p. 3. The concern among such writing is "with the complex ways in which these discursive practices and the sites of their constitution and expression interlock or are independent."

103. Ibid., p. 4. See also: Francis Heidensohn, "Gender and Crime," in Oxford Handbook of Criminology, ed. Mike Maguire, Rod Morgan and Robert Reiner, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, pp. 997-1039. Women do kill, of course, just not in the same proportion as men. See: Ann Jones, Women Who Kill, New York: Fawcett Columbine, 1981.

104. Allison Morris, Women, Crime and Criminal Justice, Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987, p. 12.

105. Annie Hudson, "'Troublesome Girls,'" in Growing Up Good, p. 196.

106. "Girls in the European Criminal Courts: A Comparative View," Growing Up Good, pp. 220-232. The issue of nurture versus nature in the relationship of women to crime poses irresolvable issues for analysts. A criminologist states: "Contemporary feminist accounts that focus upon the sociology of sex and gender have done much to erode the authority and credibility of biological and psychological determinism in explanations of female crime. Yet there is a danger that theories of sex and gender are deemed necessary and relevant only when the subject is female. And, conversely, that these theories alone are ordained sufficient explanations of female crime....[Female] criminality is rooted within the social structure of the area and shaped by the dialectical interrelation of sex and gender, race and social class," Elaine Player, "Women and Crime in the City," Crime and the City, ed. David Downes, London: The Macmillan Press, 1989, pp. 111-127.

107. Frances Heidensohn, Women and Crime, New York: New York University Press, 1985, p. 160. The author's "framework" concerning women and crime is: "These are that women have apparently no less capacity then men for committing criminal acts, nor do they face formally different rules and laws, but their official criminality tends to be lower, less frequent and less serious," p. ix.

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108. Anna B. Boone, The Increase of Crime, and Its Cause, Boston: The author, 1872, pp. 90-91.

109. Richard Eddy, Alcohol in History, New York: National Temperance Society and Publications House, 1887, p. 216. Nor was this issue confined to the United States. Inebriety was considered as a cause of crime at an international congress of the time. Lt. Col. A.B. McHardy, chairman of the Prison Commission for Scotland reported that a majority of all crimes committed there were under the influence of alcohol and concluded: "I do not know of anything which could be put in the place of strong drink which would approach it as a crime producer," A.B. McHardy, "Alcoholism and Crime," Proceedings of the Twelfth International Congress on Alcoholism, London: Paternoster House, 1909, p. 247. This topic is explored further in chap. 5.

110. Clarence Darrow, Crime: Its Cause and Treatment, Montclair, NJ: Patterson Smith [1922], 1972, pp. 277-278. A deputy chief inspector of police in the same era believed that the origin of crime was "due to laziness, and a hatred for remaining any regular vocation that requires punctual attendance and regular set habits. [Criminals] feel that they are exempt from all forms of discipline; they want to frequent dance halls, pool parlors, and similar places, stay out late at night, and sleep in late in the morning. Many others desire to live and dress above their means, and steal to maintain social prestige or to gratify sexual desire." Cornelius Francis Cahalane, The Policeman, New York: Arno Press, [1923], 1970, p. 140.

111. Louis Harris, The Story of Crime, Boston: The Stratford Company, 1929.

112. Theodore Spector, "The Influence of Journalism on Crime," Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology 15 (1924): 155-158, quote on 156. More recently, a psychiatrist has argued that among the "fostering factors" in the creation of violence are "commercial disrespect for human life" such as cigarette and alcohol advertising and "arms advertising for the nursery." See: Fredric Wertham, A Sign for Cain: An Exploration of Human Violence, New York: Macmillan, 1966, pp. 43-70.

113. William Healy, "The Problem of Causation of Criminality," Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology 2 (1912): 849-850.

114. Edwin M. Schur, Our Criminal Society: The Social and Legal Sources of Crime in America, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1969, pp. 16-21.

115. Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, Violence and Reform in American History, New York: New Viewpoints, 1978.

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116. Terence Morris, "Crime and the Welfare State," in Approaches to Welfare, ed. Philip Bean and Stewart MacPherson, London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983, pp. 166-181. One of the purposes of the welfare state was to reduce crime by attacking poverty "that had become the inevitable consequence of the later stages of industrial capitalism," p. 166. The author finds no relationship between "welfare" and "predatory" acts: "Neither theft nor burglary, nor shoplifting nor the taking of cars, nor violent assaults at football matches nor the vandalistic treatment of buses has been shown to respond to a penny more of child benefit or any other benefit for that matter. It is impossible to legislate for virtue and the best the law can achieve is to limit the extent and consequences of vice," p. 179. Stuart Butler and Anna Kondratas, Out of the Poverty Trap: A Conservative Strategy for Welfare Reform, New York: Free Press, 1987. This book argues that the "war on poverty is being lost" because it "exacerbated the problem of the underclass" and caused other effects; but it does not make the point that crime is caused as a result.

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CHAPTER 4

BROOKLYN AND THE GREAT WORLD WAR

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With a few exceptions, New York City is to-day rid of gunmen and gangsters who terrorized the town two years ago, and those not caught in the police dragnet, if they are living here at all, are behaving themselves sufficiently well to keep out of the hands of the authorities.*

The gravest problem, perhaps, that confronts the Police Department is the effective regulation of traffic.†

*Commissioner Arthur Woods, Annual Report of the Police Department for 1915, 1916, p. vii.

†Commissioner Richard E. Enright, Annual Report of the Police Department for 1920, 1921, p. 22.

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By the mid-second decade of the twentieth century, Brooklyn, the oft-called city of homes, churches, and cemeteries, was experiencing a sustained period of growth while retaining a proud sense-of-self which differentiated it from the neighboring borough across an estuary called the East River. Brooklyn and Manhattan, indeed, were intrinsically bonded by ties that reinforced earlier historical, political, and social commonalities. War in Europe had begun in July, 1914 and by September was a raging conflict: feelings in New York initially were mixed as to where sympathies lay; yet increasingly, as the conflict expanded, Brooklyn like a myriad of individual communities elsewhere grew to support the Allied Powers, excepting for areas of German immigration. How would war in Europe effect a neighborly borough's stability including its crime pattern and, further, how would the immediate destabilizing post-war years alter the domestic order of such a dynamic urban area?

"Breuckelen" was established tenuously by a charter in 1646, but had been preceded by a settlement at New Amersfoort, or Flatlands, a decade earlier. The hearty band of Dutch pioneers had survived the Indian Uprising of 1643, cold winters, and meager early returns from the friable soil. The departure of the rancorous director general of the Dutch West India Company, Willem Kieft, signalled a turn toward stability for the region, but one that could not be fully realized for some years. Kieft's successor in 1647, Peter Stuyvesant,

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continued the practice of his predecessor in purchasing parcels of land from the natives; by 1660 land for six villages on the southwestern tip of Long Island had been secured. These tiny communities were called Flatlands, t'Vlache Bos (Flatbush or the wooded plain); Boswijk (Bushwick or town of woods); Gravesend (for 's Gravensande, Dutch for count's beach); Nieu Utrecht; and Breuckelen (both towns in Holland). Despite purchases of land from the natives, relations with them remained unsettled and to protect settlements from attacks by hostile natives, Stuyvesant proclaimed in 1660 that all farmers who "lived outside the villages" should "abandon their separate dwellings and destroy them, or at least to unroof them, and to transport themselves and their goods into the adjoining villages."[1] The order was reluctantly received and soon repudiated.

With the establishment of Dutch governance, the concept of order and law was borrowed from continental practices. A schout-fiscal (bailiff and financial agent) and constables were anticipated in the initial charter. That commitment was significant: only with the likelihood to near certainty that internal order would be enjoyed could growth be feasible in the early community. By the time the Dutch ceded control to the British in 1664, the same functional positions of schout and constable were retained, though the title of schout was no longer used. In 1669, the first court was convened in the area; the year before the first public house there was licensed.[2] Later when English governance replaced Dutch

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administration, the six original towns, widely scattered and separated by woods and small farms, were consolidated into Kings County in 1683 as an administrative entity within New York Colony.

The transition from scattered farming settlements to small rural towns under the English flag occurred slowly aided by political and social stability. The farming communities were rich in land and poor in population which, therefore, necessitated the presence of compulsory workers: slaves and apprentices.[3] Though communities in the county were involved in the tumultuous conquest by England in 1664 and the War of Independence of 1776-1783, fundamental social and economic changes did not occur in this Anglo-Dutch county. By 1785, in the town whose name had been anglicized to Brooklyn, only two constables were needed to guard the town--Hix and D.B. Voise--who were paid $18 per year. A night watch had begun a century earlier, largely as a non-paid civic responsibility to provide security and fire watch service and to complement the constable's daytime service. The watch evolved from a voluntary into a paid system continuing to aid the constables when requested and providing order during the hours the constables were off duty. By 1809, a fourth constable was budgeted for the community, and in 1825, a fifth night watchman was added. One historian has speculated that crime may have increased in the first years of the nineteenth century prompting increased personnel and construction of a new watchhouse.[4]

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With population growing in newly opened residential and commercial areas of Kings County, crime also increased in the 1840s. A gang of burglars roamed the streets in 1842 and a private police force to protect the neighborhood along Clinton Avenue was considered.[5] In September, a $100 reward for apprehension and arrest of anyone breaking and entering to burglarize was offered by the city; in November a house was entered and a resident was severely beaten with the result that the reward was raised to $250. The city's newspapers speculated on the cause of and countermeasures to such crime; Jacob Judd wrote: "According to the Eagle, the major causes of the crime wave of 1942 could be traced to the fact that Brooklyn was in close proximity to New York City. The latter was the 'great mart to which villany (sic), foreign and domestic, resorts' where 'dens of vice' could be found."[6] The Brooklyn Daily News tended to be more critical of the Common Council while a competitor, the Eagle, felt the issue was exaggerated; but by the next year, both newspapers agreed that the night watch was not working satisfactorily and that the police force should be increased, perhaps substantially. A council measure was introduced to increase the number of watchmen from thirteen to fifty-two. Mayor Sprague, however, felt that the increase was too great, suggesting that forty-two would be a more acceptable number while muddying his proposal by also adding that a watch force of at least 240 was required to adequately protect the municipality. Thirty-nine additional watchmen eventually were approved, though the Eagle

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argued that the watch should be abolished and replaced with a night police, a restructuring other communities had already implemented.

In 1850 the Legislature approved a reorganization merging the Police and Watch departments into a single police unit comprising 144 men and fifteen officers, providing twenty-four hour service to the community for the first time.

As the city continued to grow and the police force along with it, complaints of inadequate policing, nonetheless, continued to rise: for the first six months of 1851, almost 1700 arrests were made, mostly for assault and battery, intoxication, vagrancy, and petty larceny.[7] Calls were raised by the Star to increase further the size of the department, but Mayor Conklin Brush argued that already one-fourth of local taxes were allocated for policing and that further expenditures could not be justified. The next year a "gang of ruffians" controlled the city's streets, according to the Star, and when a policeman was at one end of his beat, a crime would be committed at the other, giving the perpetrators a chance to escape before the policeman could arrive on the scene.

Candidates for police positions were appointed by aldermen based on political expediency issues rather than competency which provoked general suspicion and distrust of the appointment system. The desultory politics of Brooklyn police appointment patronage matched that in other area communities and served as a harbinger of the forced

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consolidation of the local force into the regional metropolitan police administration, orchestrated by politicians in Albany.

Brooklynites were skeptical of this new system: while the mayor had one vote out of five in the new police commission, New York representatives could outvote Brooklyn's and residents felt that the richer and more populous New York City would angle preferential treatment for itself in the new organization; nonetheless, the community was limited in its options and the new policing structure was established.[8] The City of Brooklyn would maintain a local police commander: John S. Folk, the first Brooklyn police commissioner, was heralded for his efficiency and is remembered as leading a quiet period in the city's growth, according to the author of an early Brooklyn police history.[9]

With the creation of the Metropolitan Police District of 1857, leadership was provided by the mayors of New York and Brooklyn, together with five commissioners: the new police district was a region which embraced the counties of New York, Kings, Westchester, and Richmond, with police headquarters for the region located at the corner of Broome and Elm Streets in New York. The entire city had a population of 820,000 with a police force of 1,430 men. For the year ending October 31, 1858, 61,455 arrests in New York City, and 13,918 arrests in the City of Brooklyn were recorded. Most apprehensions were for non-violent offenses, though that fact did not reassure the citizenry since most violent acts, particularly those near

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the bars and brothels along the waterfront, were taken for granted as being non-criminal events and did not result in any recorded police action. The attitude toward violence of the time often masked its extent: assault and battery among members of the same sex generally would not result in arrests.

Financial crime also befell the city's institutions: a Brooklyn bank embezzlement occurred in 1877, apparently the first such crime in the city's history; regardless of such incident, by the next year police historian W.E.S. Fales gloated on "Brooklyn's superb moral condition," reflecting moral superiority felt by the growing Brooklyn communities relative to their august economic rival across the East River.[10] Fales's boast had good reason: evidence indicated that crimes of all type were lower in Brooklyn than in New York City on a comparable population basis.

Many Brooklynites wanted to keep it that way and "progress" was not always welcomed; by the advent of the ninth decade of the century, the prospect of a bridge linking the two cities was not reassuring to all Brooklynites. The desirability of linking the two were vibrant communities was indisputable as the daily commuter stream to Manhattan from Brooklyn had supported thirteen ferry lines until the year the great bridge was opened. The Brooklyn Bridge would provide a clean artery between the two cities and would assure that commerce and real estate values would flourish from the expedited physical connection. The great conduit opened on May 24, 1883, to a tumultuous popular reception. It is

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uncertain whether the Roeblings' glorious handiwork did shift some criminal activity from New York to Brooklyn, but such a transfer is feasible since criminal perpetrators would be aided by fast, cheap transportation over the bridge: greater crime would be a price of progress and most certainly an acceptable one for most residents of Brooklyn to pay justified by the greater economic advantages received from the great bridge opened.[11]

Growing population and mutual commercial interests forced cooperation not only between Brooklyn and New York City (the island of Manhattan), but also among other regional communities: uniting of the disparate communities broadly served mutual interests. Regional annexation, on Jan. 1, 1898, was derisively termed "the Great Mistake" by some Brooklynites who approved the merger by the narrowest margin of all areas voting; the two cities plus three other lesser developed areas became boroughs of the City of New York. The region had cooperated, albeit reluctantly, in the operation of a metropolitan police service for a brief term beginning in 1857: yet the merger served to underscore the stereotypes in which the more law abiding Kings County coexisted administratively with the more raucous, riotous, corrupt, and criminal reality of New York. Police historian James Richardson wrote:

> During the time that the commissioners were unable to appoint an adequate number of policemen, New York had a continuously high level of crime and public disorder; and this fact was used to discredit the police....The Board of Supervisors of Kings County also petitioned for repeal (of the metropolitan scheme)

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> and Senator Francis B. Spinola of Brooklyn conducted a senate investigation of the metropolitans in the hope of breaking up "this damnable organization.[12]

The Brooklyn supervisors were particularly concerned that the metropolitan police "looks to New York as the heart--the principal point to be protected--and makes Brooklyn and the adjacent districts to some extent subsidiary of that city."[13]

The road to reform in New York policing was a long one and corruption of New York police in much of the latter nineteenth century was regularly assaulted by anti-corruption initiatives. The service of Theodore Roosevelt, then 36, as president of the board of police commissioners for 23 months beginning May, 1895 represented a brief vigorous phase of police renewal.[14] Roosevelt's tenure as a commissioner represented a visible, imperfect phase in the attempts of Progressives to raise police probity as an intense civic issue for reform.

Yet Brooklyn played a role in deterring police reform in Manhattan: a major source of police graft was the extortion of tavern owners to permit them to avoid the Sabbath Laws and excise taxes. Roosevelt noted that over 8,000 arrests had occurred prior to his taking office and that these were likely to be the tavern operators who could not or would not pay bribes to the police. The new police board commissioner ordered that the laws be uniformly enforced, and when they were, Sunday drinkers took their patronage to Brooklyn, especially at taverns near the foot of the bridge, where no

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such order to enforce Sabbath and excise laws had been given there by police officials.[15]

Some reform initiatives were short-lived and the post-Roosevelt era was marked by the return to policing under resurgent control of machine politics. Since the 1860s, Tammany Hall leaders regarded police patronage to be a normal machine prerogative: a right to influence police hiring, promoting, disciplining, and firing was taken for granted, by the political machine at least. Meanwhile, such power was being chipped away by reform movements; the task to demolish the power of the clubhouse would not be completed until the mid-twentieth century when urban political machines were extinguished.[16] In this regard Brooklyn differed from Manhattan: the suburban borough was more conservative, tending toward Republican control, and less politically machine-oriented. In mid- and late-nineteenth century the borough also was less rich and populated by a larger native-born population percentage than Manhattan.

Still, Brooklyn's sprawling neighborhoods extended to provided homes for the influx of immigrants and the borough provide cheap land for factory relocations from Manhattan which no longer could expand or afford the higher cost of doing business there. Manhattan had grown vertically while its sister borough expanded horizontally feeding new residential and commercial areas which were contiguous with the completion of elevated railways, which beginning in 1898, extended from various parts of Brooklyn to terminate at

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Manhattan's Park Row. Two more bridges--the Williamsburg (1903) and the Manhattan (1909)--were constructed and elevated steam railways were replaced by electrified roads beginning 1900. The first subway, the Interborough Rapid Transit Company extended its service from Manhattan into Brooklyn by 1908, and by 1915 a second line, the Brooklyn Rapid Transit Company also linked the two boroughs.[17]

Consolidation of the cities of Brooklyn, New York, and surrounding areas reflected a general movement toward annexation and political unification which had been anticipated for much of the century in urban areas and which had occurred from the earliest years as growing communities came in contact with each other. Within the New York region real estate interests, including investors in the New York Bridge Company and members of the New York Chamber of Commerce, were among the leading advocates for metropolitan consolidation. Brooklynites were less enthusiastic about consolidation than the other communities involved and a League of Loyal Citizens unsuccessfully fought the issue; however, the borough required fresh capital investment to finance public works and was reaching its debt limit as set by the state constitution. The ability of Brooklyn to use New York City's credit capacity to expand internal improvements was a logical business argument for supporting metropolitan union. Consolidation also would mean that costly, specialized resources could serve all parts of the city and centralization would increase the efficiency of using these public services:

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policing would be one of the municipal services affected in the process. Following consolidation, the police department in Brooklyn assumed a configuration of 32 precincts, each further subdivided into patrol posts or beats, and headed by a first deputy commissioner for the borough. Policing of Brooklyn for the immediate years ahead would be marked by general cooperation and cohesiveness with the central office.

The period from the turn of the century to the American entry into the Great World War was marked by vigorous urban industrial and commercial growth and solidification of the port of New York encompassing generous marine shoreline in Brooklyn, as a pivotal national transportation center. A patina of cultural sophistication covered Brooklyn in substantial measure rivalling, though not surpassing, Manhattan's enlightening institutions.

Brooklyn was established as a fecund bedroom community for industrial and office workers of Manhattan, but also provided demesnes for the wealthy in parts of Brooklyn Heights, Park Slope and Clinton Hill. The borough further provided jobs from its own expanding economic base and that of the contiguous Borough of Queens and Nassau County.

Politics retarded changes in police practice; for example, the community remained consistently ambivalent about the importance of undercover detectives, because, while these officers were vital for pursuing investigations, their undercover clothing permitted them, too often, to act as collection agents for unscrupulous precinct captains demanding

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tribute from neighborhood businesses that paid police to avoid official regulations. Nonetheless, support for the police of Brooklyn remained generally positive because residents believed they were safer and its department less corrupt than the Manhattan equivalent. Yet with the turn of the century, the fabric of life in Brooklyn began to strain from rapid changes. Immigration mostly from Eastern Europe and black domestic migration from Southern states tested the "melting pot." Still, violent crime as measured by official reports was not steadily increasing and fluctuated substantially from the turn of the century into the second decade with an undeterminant pattern.

The clouds of war began to drift westward following the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand, crown prince of Austria, in Serajevo, June 28, 1914. The Austrian-Hungarian government sent an ultimatum to Serbia and declared war five days later. Due to treaties to protect Serbia if threatened, Russia began to mobilize. Germany then declared war on Russia on August 1, and on France two days later. The next day Great Britain, bound by a treaty with Belgium, declared war on Germany as the Kaiser's army entered Belgium in an attempt to outflank France. The United States government watched these developments anxiously. Isolationist feelings remained strong. Still, the sinking of the Lusitania with 114 American on board on May 7, 1915, turned vacillation into resolve to speed the day when troops would be sent to the military

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theater, augmenting the credits and matériel that had already been committed. A concatenation of events led Congress to declare war against Germany on April 6, 1917; but by then the nation had reached a fever-pitch of anti-German sentiment.[18]

The war was to have a deeply unsettling effect on life in Brooklyn, as indeed was the case elsewhere in American communities. All social, political, and economic institutions were to be tested in a way never previously experienced from a war abroad: the United States, initially reluctant, later more willingly, had accepted a role of substantive leadership by entering a conflict just as its allies' resolve was wavering and their resources were being depleted beyond ready repair. Life went on at home in the shady borough, but many aspects of daily existence would undergo profound change, not only during the war but for the years afterwards.

The Great War and a City of Homes

The years preceding the nation's declaration of war were times in which New York policing underwent considerable structural evolution initially unrelated to European events. In 1914, Commissioner Arthur Woods sought to introduce a managerial style to operations: a weekly meeting with inspectors to discuss administrative procedures was inaugurated; the chief inspector's authority over the uniformed force (in contrast to the detective bureau members who were not uniformed) was extended, and changes in criminal complaints tracking were introduced. The most important

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modification to existing procedures from Woods's management related to the maintenance and reporting of criminal statistics by the department. Arrests for serious crimes had declined, but could the data be trusted? The two previous years had reflected a low number of arrests compared to earlier times; however, in his annual report to Mayor John P. Mitchel, Woods stated: "After a very careful inquiry into the methods of compiling these statistics in the past, the conclusion was reached that except in isolated cases the figures were so incomplete as to be misleading."[19] Later he explained:

> One of the fundamental defects of the method of compilation of these statistics in the past has been that police action taken on crimes reported in previous periods has been entered as police action taken on crimes reported in the current period. In the serious offenses for which the records are complete, a decrease of 105 in crimes is indicated, and an increase in arrests and convictions of 25% and 20% respectively.[20]

This suggests that the apparently low level of reported arrests of 1912-1913 for serious crimes would have been even lower in actuality relative to earlier years. Nonetheless, Woods's changes reflected future commissioners' penchants to change annual police report contents without any explanation or justifications for such modifications, making reliable comparative longitudinal studies impossible. Most striking about the report of 1914 was the sharp increase in arrests for the sale and possession of narcotics: from 511 arrests and 256 convictions in 1913, the quantity of offense grew to 1,950 arrests and 947 convictions the next year. (Pending convictions at year's end would result in a still higher final

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arrest rate.) The war in Europe was already in its fifth month when Woods signed his report for 1914, but no mention was made in his accounting of how policing might respond to any anticipated urban needs stemming from the conflict. A year later police planning had begun to respond to the European conflict for the contingent of 10,772 men and 70 matrons who composed the largest police force in North America and probably in the hemisphere, though personnel strength had declined from 1913. By 1915, the police department anticipated major urban dislocations due to the intensity of the war abroad. Woods and his inspectors were geared for action:

> This plan for instance enables the Force to give full and complete cooperation to other Departments in fighting a great conflagration; to mobilize quietly and quickly in case of trouble; to establish relief stations by districts; to feed and house refugees; to aid the sick and needy...to protect the City's water supply; to commandeer food and clothing supplies, and vehicles for transportation; to render effective cooperations to the Army and Navy; and to offer protection, up to its maximum strength and efficiency, to the public against armed invasion.[21]

Police officials had met extensively with military officials, institutional leaders, and business executives over the previous year concerning possible effects the war might have on the New York region and what the indicated police service requirements might be. Other problems continued to concern the police commissioner such as the growing usage and sale of illicit drugs. Woods proposed a number of measures to control narcotics sales announcing a "drug crusade" which involved several recommendations including controls on

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manufacturers, distributors, brokers, and retailers of pharmaceuticals. Another proposal was: "That the possession of the hypodermic needle be limited to those authorized by law" to have possession of such a device. Still another new police priority dealt with gangsters and gangsterism whose organized activities mimicked features of the modern corporation. The primary profit from organized crime stemmed from illegal gambling operations. Occasionally, the majesty of the law would swoop down for a series of rapid arrests in pool halls, candy stores, night-clubs, and after-hours clubs where gambling flourished.[22] Newspaper headlines chronicled the raids, and life resumed as it was before the raids.

The technique of using a "dragnet" to achieve a large number of arrests rapidly for a similar type of crime had begun years earlier. A police dragnet in 1913 to arrest gangsters and gunmen had received much public support as the drama of this type of paramilitary assault produced fast results. Woods claimed that he had "a list of approximately 5,000 names of gunmen to work upon" and that "cleaning the town" of this "terrorism" was a major priority.[23] Police Commissioner Woods detailed in his report for 1916 how the police force had organized in the previous year in response to war abroad:

> The first manifestation of force appeared shortly after the war began in the fires in steamships and on piers of those companies engaged in carrying goods to the Allied governments. In cooperation with Federal authorities, members of the Neutrality Squad were immediately assigned to the work of discovering the perpetrators of these crimes and to secure evidence for the prosecution of such cases in the courts of

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> this country. The first arrests were made in October, 1915, when six men were charged with conspiring to destroy ships in New York Harbor. The men were taken before the crimes were consummated, the explosives and bombs which they intended to use, seized, and by the testimony of experts given in the trial, the fact established beyond question that this quick police action had prevented great loss at sea of human life as well as much property.[24]

While the war in Europe did not draw America directly into the conflict initially, the mood in the city turned dark as urban sabotage unsettled a sense of order. Neutrality Laws, enforced locally by a special squad of police, served as a counter-terrorist force to investigate threats and actual disruptions of domestic life from Axis influences. The department cooperated with the U.S. Secret Service and other federal authorities in the management of the case load. Neutrality Laws had been tested numerous times over the year stemming from threats against the British-owned Cunard Line which often berthed ships in New York harbor and for which extortionist demands had been raised; an attempted assassination of J.P. Morgan was followed by mail demands that later led to arrests; and numerous conspiracies to bomb public places which also led to highly publicized seizures of suspects. In this latter category two Italians--Carbone and Aborono--were arrested in an attempt to explode a bomb in St. Patrick's Cathedral on March 2, 1915.

Woods reported in 1916 "an enormous increase of work and a variety of new cases to handle" since the outbreak of the European war.[25] He added: "The Detective Bureau was literally almost swamped with reports and communications from all

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angles....Various groups who, from time to time, had attempted to create industrial disturbances, and who were suspected of being financed by German agents, had been kept under surveillance by members of this Squad."[26] A German espionage network operated locally and incorrectly was blamed for causing any local accident or disruptions that befell the area. Fears from anarchists' threats and the un-American prospect of political anarchy quickly spread jolting New Yorkers' habitual self-confidence and intensified their uncertainties for the immediate future.

Police cooperated with many governmental and community segments to defend against espionage and sabotage. These measures took many forms including assistance in training the Home Defense League, a group of defense-minded New Yorkers. One unit was composed of executives and managers whose members are pictured in an annual police report dressed in stylish coats and fedoras drilling incongruously in their business attire on a skyscraper rooftop. The League was not a military body but was created as a type of auxiliary police force: established in 1915, in the Brownsville district of Brooklyn, the League soon expanded to the rest of the city. It quickly reached a membership of almost 22,000 "fine physical specimens," according to Woods.

League members were issued a "forestry green" uniforms, bronze police buttons, canvas leggings and black shoes, campaign hats, nightsticks, and police whistles.[27] In practice, the League had no role in crimefighting activity;

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however, it rendered service to police at holding firelines, directing traffic, and assisting the city's sanitary patrol. The League soon came to be regarded as amateurish and ineffective, though the lofty intentions were not disputed, and the group resurged as an auxiliary force in early 1917.

Serious labor disputes also marked the time. Brooklyn--indeed much of the country--had experienced three decades of strikes of varying significance but in 1916 "hundreds" of strikes are mentioned as demanding police response. The streetcar strikes of July 1916, were the most dramatic interruption of daily life. Labor disputes were frequent, noisy, and sometimes violent. With Europe at war and the US economy benefiting from it, major public strikes tended to be little wars of their own.

Since consolidation of Brooklyn and the other boroughs with New York, police commissioners had usually grouped arrest and conviction data for the entire city. In 1916, however, arrests by precincts were available for the first time. New York City reported a population of 5,047,221 with a population in Brooklyn of 1,798,513, or 35.6 percent of the total. The annual report for 1916 indicates 200,901 arrests for the city as a whole and 47,667 arrests in Brooklyn, or 23.7 percent of the total, underscoring the perceived relative safety of Brooklyn as a community relative to the rest of the city based on a quantitative comparison.[28]

In the early months of 1917, Brooklyn, like the rest of the city, sustained profoundly unsettling stresses and

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conflicts. Immigration fell as the European conflict escalated. Employment was full, but relationships were frequently unsettled and rancorous.

Further, a period of intense wintery weather in early 1917 had reduced transportation of food to the city. Food prices rose steady for meat and dairy products; even potatoes seemed to gain in price by the day. On February 17, a crowd of women stormed City Hall Plaza to protest the high cost of food staples. The act was more than symbolic: workers and housewives alike were in a militant mood, and the next day the demonstration spread to Brooklyn.[29] Restrained protest would not suffice any longer. Citizens acted out frustrations about wages, city services, the cost of food, and their collective conflicts about the war in Europe, now almost three years old.

As noted previously, in 1914, many New Yorkers initially were divided about the smoldering political issues on the continent and, consequently, the debate over neutrality was a lively issue.[30] From the time war was commenced in 1914 in Europe, the factions which supported American neutrality or which were sympathetic toward Axis interests, began to wane; conversely, the public resolution to support Great Britain, France, and their Allies grew steadily. By the presidential election of 1916, it had been a profitable war for America, as American employment swelled to fill military orders from Britain and the continent. The region hosted patriotic meetings and the nation prepared for war. The newly

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re-elected president, Woodrow Wilson, returned to Washington on the theme "he kept us our of war," would in just a few weeks later guide the nation to full mobilization. When Germany announced unrestricted submarine warfare after January, 1917 against neutrals, armed or unarmed, that sailed into a German war zone. Thus, the United States became irrevocably drawn into direct conflict.[31] Less than one month after being inaugurated president, Woodrow Wilson asked Congress to declare war on Germany April 2, 1917. By the time war against Germany was declared four days later, feelings against Germans and German interests had become intense and intemperate. A wave of great patriotic display suffused Brooklyn, highlighted by a pro-war demonstration at the Academy of Music: the previous week 327 Brooklynites applied to join the Navy, while the Army received an average of fifteen volunteers a day.[32]

Congress passed the Selective Service Act on May 18, authorizing the registration and draft of all men between twenty-one and thirty. The first American soldiers landed in France on June 24, under John Jay Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary Force. These were the first of hundreds of thousands who would be dispersed among European contingents where they were most needed, though the first American shot did not occur until October 27. Throughout the nation Selective Service Boards were created to draft males of the designated age category, though both President Wilson and Secretary of War Baker initially had affirmed their faith in

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the volunteer system and specifically had refused to endorse proposals for universal training. The need to obtain a huge soldierly pool quickly became apparent and determined youth were swept up in the excitement of the cause. At Princeton University a mass meeting in March had to be convoked to restrain undergraduates from deserting their desks and labs in droves and some academics, at least, suspended habits of emphasizing nuance and tempered judgment to shape the war "as a clear-cut contest between the forces of light and the forces of darkness."[33] But young men elsewhere were seeking to avoid compulsory service. The draft law contained loopholes and exempted some called for service: some boards granted deferments to almost all married men launching a "nuptial boomlet in some communities," though other boards denied exemptions and nationally the induction of married men varied throughout the states from six to thirty-eight percent.[34]

By June, War Draft Boards had been established in each borough and registration for men between the ages of 21 and 31 was set, but not without dissent. On June 16, a riot composed mostly of women opposing the draft provisions charged police lines in New York. But majority opinion supporting the war effort held solidly: military service had been regarded substantially as a reasonable obligation to expect from young, healthy, perhaps unmarried males. That last provision served as a catalyst to stimulate human commitment: in an effort to escape the draft, scores of "slackers" took the plunge and married on the last day possible, July 31. The draft

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resisters, according to the Eagle, were largely non-natives "a great majority of whom were born in Russia or had Russian parents, and a sprinkling of Austrians."[35] The marriage boom detonated during a debilitating heat wave: eighteen died on July 31, and 194 were overcome by the highest heat wave on record--four consecutive days of temperatures above 94 degrees.[36]

War preparations moved swiftly. On August 14, the 23rd Infantry, formerly the 23rd National Guard for the State of New York from Brooklyn, pitched their tents in Van Cortland Park, prior to their departure for camp in South Carolina. The Brooklyn avant-garde was soon to be followed by new inductees, some of whom were not eager for prospects of service abroad. About two hundred men deserted camp at Mineola. However, for every objector, slacker, absolutist, or deserter, many others stepped forward with patriotic zeal.[37]

Life in the city changed; increased fears of invasion, espionage, and sabotage gripped the city in disconcerting ways. Though few informed New Yorkers actually expected an invasion by German troops in 1917, the technical prowess of the Teutonic enemy, coupled with their daring military strategy, seemed threatening to New Yorkers. Officials believed that ships in New York harbor were at risk of sabotage. The fear of conspiracy seemed to lurk around every harbor front. Waterfront bars were closed for the duration of the war to prevent Axis submarines from establishing reference points at nighttime. When the war ended, commissioner of

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police Richard E. Enright observed:

> The enemy alien element was constantly scheming to deliver a staggering blow here which could be exaggerated and distorted in the press, at home, into a proof of the complete demoralization of this country. Plots were constantly being hatched which for fiendishness and cunning have never been surpassed in the world's history.[38]

Axis agents were believed to have targeted ships in harbor planting incendiary bombs with delay fuses which would ignite well after the cargo or passenger ship was at sea. Another fear was the potential for submarine spying along the coast and the use of submarines to place agents ashore without detection. Workers in buildings near the harbor were asked to watch for suspicious activities within their vantage points and to cease business and extinguish lights early in the evening. Police tended secret machine gun posts established near the great bridges and at other locations.[39] Many people, whose only fault it was to be born in Germany or by German parents, were stigmatized with the tag "enemy aliens" and lived under constant mistrust from natives and non-Germanic immigrants alike. Incidents of Axis-sponsored sabotage were documented in New York City during the war years; yet such restrictions on Germans from occupying locations in tall buildings near the harbor, for example, were an excessive reaction under the unsettled wartime conditions.

Policing during Wartime

The draft and voluntary enlistment removed a total of about one thousand police officers from their duties in New

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York, with a maximum number of just over eight hundred being in military service at any one time. This occurred at the time when newly appointed Commissioner Richard E. Enright argued that policing should be increased by 20 percent over the previous staffing level of about 10,500 to absorb additional burdens being placed on police during wartime. These issues included policing for military personnel en route to Europe most of whom embarked from the New York port; protection of the waterfront with the threat of disorder caused by German agents; and additional police tasks created by federal requests for service that had to be met by police, further diverting experienced officers from the already reduced force. To compensate for the reduction of normal police level, the use of compensated, briefly-trained special policemen grew. By the end of the year, 1,549 special policemen were on the rolls. About half of them (713) assisted police; another large number (331) aided private employers where they would perform nighttime guard duty. The remainder were spread about the city in various other protective roles; for example, the Brooklyn Department of Parks had 52, while agencies like the British Consul or the Board of Inebriety each were assigned.[40]

These special officers, originally provided during the leadership of Enright's predecessor, Arthur Woods, were later repudiated by Enright because they were poorly selected and trained and often had been "detailed" to tasks that had little to do with traditional police functions: he eliminated most

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special police officers and redeployed the remaining at police posts that did not have high priority during wartime. The regular police force was augmented by staff managers and support personnel: by the end of 1917, the rolls of these workers increased seven positions to 326, over the previous year. The total included the commissioner, four deputy commissioners with their secretaries, and numerous and diverse specialized positions, including two horseshoers, one harness maker, and two roofers. Indeed, despite losses of police personnel to the draft and officers volunteering for military service, the number of sworn police personnel positions grew slightly in 1917 to 10,884, resulting in a population per policeman ratio of one to 527, a slightly improvement from 1916, but a decreasing trend, generally, from the one to 479 ratio of 1913. Based on population estimated by the Department of Health on July 1, of each year, New York grew from 5,199,000 in 1913, to 5,737,000 in 1917, an increase of 10.1 percent in four years.[41] Meanwhile, the number of authorized police positions almost flat during the same time.

As the nation set itself to war, serious reported criminal incidents declined sharply throughout New York City. Arrests for felonies in 1918 reached the lowest level in five years of 17,638 and represented a steady decline from 20,041 in 1915, the highest year in the 1913-1917 period. The reduction in misdemeanors was even greater: 81,105, a decline of 25.1 percent from the high of 1915 which had 108,367

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arrests. Meanwhile, the ratio of sworn police officers to population was decreasing, though the extent to which increased police auxiliaries might be a factor is impossible to determine. The only exception was the decreasing crime pattern in juvenile, delinquency which rose from the previous year as judged by the number of arrests.[42] This was believed due to a decreased parental presence in the home caused by full employment opportunities or the absence of fathers to wartime duties.

New York was at war throughout 1918, until the Armistice of November 11, when church bells began to sound at 5 a.m. all over the city celebrating peace. The city prepared to receive soldiers back home again. The war had made New York a major debarkation region for troops who were returning from the conflict or as well as a transit point for some who were en route via New York to a new base assignment. Military personnel at temporary liberty in the city could easily become victims to crime or, on the contrary, face arrest for their own illegal actions. In 1918, 2,661 arrests of soldiers, sailors, and marines related to prostitution and the illicit use or sale of liquor were recorded.[43] By contrast, only slightly more than 300 such arrests occurred the previous year in the city. Yet overall crime declined in the year. Total arrests and summonses dropped from 187,913 in 1917, to 170,159 the next year, a decline of 9.4 percent.[44]

With the arrival of peace, a reduced police department continue to face "unprecedented demands," according to

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Enright, to handle the parades, demonstrations, and crowd conditions which occurred following the armistice and the influx of returning high-spirited military personnel.

Extreme weather conditions continued to affect the city: the shattering cold of the 1917-18 winter resulted in a coal shortage that left approximately 450,000 people cold and angry. The police collected coal and distributed it gratis to almost 90,000 families.[45] Police were active in fighting new fraud fads and handling huge wartime traffic growth at transportation facilities. Enright boasted about the men during times of increased duties: "Not one ever complained or murmured about the additional duties, loss of time off, or increased demands for personal service, and often money, that met them at every turn. No army, under the most rigid discipline, ever had a better record."[46] Indeed, technically local policing was subordinate and responsive to federal direction. The conflict also gave an opportunity for women to play a greater role in policing. A fifth deputy police commissioner was appointed, and ten police women were added to the force in addition to matrons who had long been part of the force to process female prisoners.[47]

Among the duties New York police had assumed by federal order was surveillance of "enemy aliens." As part of this process, a complete census of all German males was ordered, requiring seventy-eight days to complete which enumerated 40,151 Germans. Later in the year, a supplemental census of female Germans was undertaken and identified 35,000 additional

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persons.[48]

The Sullivan Law was passed by the state legislature which attempted to prevent criminal possession of concealed firearms without a permit. Enright complained that the "criminal element" was "securing firearms from the large towns and cities across the river in New Jersey, which has no legislation in force similar to the Sullivan Law."[49] Nonetheless, the year saw a decrease in reported vice and a general lessening of violent crimes as measured by arrests.

By the end of 1918, a small number of soldiers, many of them wounded and convalescing, had returned from the front and passed through New York City. The new year would bring the exciting homecoming of thousands of soldiers from the front, but with it enormous social changes would strain the fabric of the city.

New York, like much of the nation, began 1919 suffering from the effects of an influenza epidemic, an affliction that would reach its apogee later in the year. The war had ended but police officers who served abroad returned slowly to regular duty. Of 661 officers on war service at year's end, 187 were still absent by July 1, and 20 at the close of the year. The combination of war duty and influenza, which kept an average of 330 men on the sick list, produced a chronic underrepresentation of police personnel, averaging a normal level of 88 percent.[50]

The nation had been at war for one year, seven months, and nine days. By the end of the conflict, November 11, 1918,

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almost two million American soldiers had landed in Europe, and over half of whom saw action. The war cost America almost $42 billion and resulted in 130,174 deaths and 203,460 wounded.[51]

From the perspective of Brooklyn governance, a short-term depopulation of young men occurred in part of the age cohort--the twenties, but including younger volunteers as well--which is disproportionately associated with high arrests for criminal activity. Among them were young men who routinely were given the choice of the army or jail by the court thus, lessening from the community the presence of convicted young male felons and lesser criminals whose continued presence might be expected to result in further criminal acts.[52] Meanwhile, the principal control mechanism for the community, the police, was depleted by the draft and volunteering, though local volunteers maintained a patrol presence in the community during the conflict.

What crime pattern changes should be expected in a community during wartime, or after? The answers are not consistent. What wars have in common is that for a limited time the state sanctions and even rewards homicide. The military training and brutalizing experience of combat soldiers might be expected to produce a citizenry blunted in affect and more likely to be participants in violent confrontations and criminal acts. The experience of Brooklyn and New York immediately following the war would raise searching questions on the outcome of such possibilities.

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Postwar Economic Collapse and "Crime Wave"

Enormous enthusiasm and transitory euphoria greeted servicemen who returned in great numbers during March and April 1919. For a period of time general public ebullience masked the development of substantial economic dislocation that was taking hold on the area and in the nation.

With the cessation of conflict, war industries were shut down rapidly, in some cases overnight as numerous military-related contracts were canceled precipitously by the Department of War and related government offices. Many employees who had been earning substantial salaries prior to and during the war were suddenly unemployed with the dubious prospects for immediate re-employment. While more than seventy percent of the American Expeditionary Forces left for Europe through the Port of New York, a substantial number returned though many stayed in the New York region, the police believed, where employment opportunities suddenly had become scarce. Their presence became a concern to police as "many of them became affiliated with the lawless element of the city," asserted Enright.[53]

The press began to refer to the widening perceptions of urban disruption, dislocation, and criminality with increasing stridency. The media took up the issue en masse and accepted the dour pronouncements of unrestrained criminality as fact. But even a year before the return of servicemen and women, the press had begun to emphasize articles dealing with lurid

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aspects of urban crime. The expression "wave of crime" appeared in a Brooklyn Eagle front page news story on February 25, 1918. The report referred to a single Manhattan ruffian, Fred Syrop, who was sentenced by Judge Dike to thirty-six years in Sing Sing at hard labor. The jurist used the occasion to blame most recent Brooklyn crimes "to East Side thugs who come to Brooklyn...to prey upon Brooklyn residents in the streets." Three other Manhattan residents also received stiff sentences during the same Brooklyn court session. Addressing Syrop who had beaten unconscious and robbed a Brooklyn man of two rings and cash, the court opined: "Let us hope that the wave of highway robbery that has afflicted Brooklyn of late will recede after the imposition of sentence in your case."[54]

The next year generalized preoccupation with crime became a frequent press topic. The influential Literary Digest examined the issue in a four-page editorial. "Crimes, 'Crime Waves,' Criminals, and the Police," provided a ranging search for the so-called crime growth phenomenon that supposedly was not just local but also "of varying intensity in Paris, Stockholm, London, Rome, and Berlin."[55] The story received its impetus from a series of articles written by ex-police commissioner Arthur Woods in the New York Tribune. Woods, who had been ousted by the new Tammany administration, claimed that "crime waves" existed throughout the nation's cities and abroad. He postulated that dynamic social conditions were behind the phenomenon and that preventative measures recently

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taken soon could have beneficial effects. In fact, Woods stated, New York police had shown that they could be as socially conscious as any welfare organization: since poverty and temporary desperate personal emergencies could be factors in the "crime wave," police had been encouraged to spot individuals and families in distress and direct them to municipal relief organizations. New York police officers as individuals often contributed money to those down on their luck, and hundreds of off-duty New York police officers volunteered in Police Athletic League programs, formally organized in 1914 and other volunteer sporting and community events and activities designed to lure crime-prone males off the streets and into the gyms. Make-work projects were among the activities created by urban society to provide employment to the capable needy. Yet, the Digest article implied that poverty by itself failed to explain the reasons for the supposedly high crime rates.[56]

What the Brooklyn Eagle initially called "wave of crime" had become "crime wave" in later reportings. An unusually prominent three-columns headline announced: "Arrest Bandit in $10,000 Brooklyn Jewelry Robbery; Crime Wave Still Grows."[57] Two stories were covered in the news section: A Brooklyn man had robbed a jewelry factory of $10,000 in "swag" which was promptly recovered. A second story was based on the general fear of crime in the area: the Eagle reported that in the space of a few hours, a messenger was robbed of an $800 payroll for a factory in Long Island City; burglars stole

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$6,000 in silks from a factory on Myrtle Avenue; the house of a man in Elmhurst was burglarized of clothing and jewelry; a school principal's safe in Jamaica was cracked with unknown loss; a Bronx salesman was shot and wounded while in Manhattan, and the wife of a physician was robbed in a taxicab of $15 in cash and jewelry. However, only one of these crimes occurred in Brooklyn, the remainder being in Manhattan, and arrests and recovery were made the same day in most cases.

Incidents like these which collectively crowded front pages placed extensive pressure on the thin-skinned police commissioner. Enright was forced to abandon a pet project to raise $5 million for the construction of a police hospital to focus on combatting fears of the crime pattern throughout the city. A consensus that the antidote to the diffuse, increased criminality was to augment the strength of police patrol officers. The Sunday Eagle again had a three column headline: "Enright Finds Crime Wave; Adopts Woods Plan; Puts Six hundred More Men on Patrol."[58] Yet Enright's initial strategy had not been to hire additional police officers--that was not his prerogative--but to change the way police officers were given time off. The number of hours police officers were to be on duty was to be changed from thirty-six hours off duty every six days (the ten squad system) to thirty-six hours off duty every nine days (the nine squad system), reverting to the scheduling used previously during the tenure of Commissioner Woods and, thus, extending tours of service. Additionally, Enright created "a flying squad of 35 motorcars" which would

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respond "to aid in hunting down the desperate criminals who are attempting to operate in the city." The plainclothes detective unit further was strengthened by the addition of personnel, and police reserves were called to duty.

Regular police officers emphatically expressed disappointment with the commissioner's requirements for additional hours of imposed work. They remembered that, when he had become commissioner, Enright had referred to he six squad system as an attempt to make the policemen's position "a white man's job." The new schedule gave them little rest.[59]

In a letter to the mayor acceding to the schedule change, Enright complained that police efforts would be nullified if other aspects of the system were not equally responsive to the crime pressures:

> If the District Attorneys and Judges will cooperate with this department by providing for speedy trials, and more severe sentences, it will greatly aid in ridding the city of this criminal element.[60]

Since assuming office, Enright had been consistently bitter about the way the press had reported on crime incidents. In his letter, the commissioner made his views clear:

> There seems to be a concerted action on the part of certain newspapers to embarrass the department and to destroy its morale in the face of the dangerous conditions which have confronted us for the past three years. This department has energetically engaged in the suppression of vice, gambling, and like crime, and we are carrying on an effective campaign against these vicious elements.[61]

This was the first time Enright had gone so public with his complaints about journalism, but the commissioner's anti-

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press bias was there since he assumed the commissionership. Earlier in his annual report for 1918, issued on October 1, 1919, Enright blasted the press with anguished syntax that was not reported by the newspapers of record but which reflected the depths of the commissioner's anti-press convictions:

> The press of this city has always employed the Police Department as a weapon with which to destroy the city administration. When desirable, certain newspapers have treated the Police Department...with the most unblushing disregard for truth and...they have joined hands with the before mentioned self-constituted censors of public morals and besmirched the fair name of the Police Department ruthlessly. Shooting into the crowd was a favorite method.[62]

By the 1919 annual report, issued November 10, 1920, Enright's obsession to criticism of the police by the press had become unrestrained. At the same time he sought to mollify the sense that crime was unrestrained.

> During the year the local press of this city took occasion to publish, almost daily, scare-headlines and exaggerated stories of crime and lawlessness in this city, which served only to advertise the business of the criminal and to attract criminals from far and near, who, because of the newspaper stories, believe they could operate here with impunity. Many young men, without previous criminal records, stated under oath upon examination at Police Headquarters that they were induced to commit crime because the newspapers had led them to believe that they could do so in this city with little or no fear of arrest and the consequences.[63]

Enright's stirring but undocumented assertion was a valiant attempt to promulgate his and others' views that the police were not receiving adequate support under difficult times. Responding further to critics, the commissioner's report later for the first time specifically doubted the seriousness of charges in the press:

> The Police Force is subject to frequent attacks from

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> two opposing points of view. In the event of a fortuitous conjunction of two or more crimes of an unusual, atrocious character, the alarm of a "crime wave" is immediately created to account for the fact....The police are blamed for permitting the "crime wave" to exist and for not stopping it instanter; while from the other side the police are assailed as merciless persecutors of innocent citizens. The more vigorously the police respond to the demand for effective protection, the more likely they are to encounter abuse from the opposing factions.[64]

The press continued attacks on the New York commissioner: though the criticism tended to be diffuse and constant, it often but not invariably attacked the commissioner personally. (Letters to the editor could do that.) The Eagle in a leading two column editorial exemplified the type of coverage the commissioner and, presumably his entire force, deplored: "How They Do It in Chicago."[65] The message was that police in the Windy City were primarily an "agency for the prevention of crime rather than an agency for the detection of crime after crime has been committed."[66] Proof that style management of the Chicago police was more effectively than New York's was not supported with any data of police effectiveness. However, the editorialist observed that the: "Chicago police have been instructed to give short shrift to bandits caught at work. They are not supposed to wait for the criminals to shoot. The police are expected to shoot first."[67] The editorial gloated that since Chicago Mayor Thompson's new administration took office, an average of two bandits a week were killed. The editorial failed to note if reduction in crime was demonstrated to result from this frontier era policy.

Brooklyn Eagle cartoonist Nelson Harding frequently found policing and crime to be irresistible topics and occasionally

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made Enright the target for his pen. Three cartoons were devoted to police issues within a ten day period in December, 1920: "Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea," shows a law abiding citizen threatened by a gun-toting criminal on one side and the crash of a wave representing proposed blue laws. (Figure 4.1) One criticism of police at the time was that police leadership did not show sufficient zeal at suppressing vice. Another cartoon entitled, "Broken," shows the heavy heel of a political boot cracking the vulnerable beam of police efficiency. Presumably the Commissioner would have approved this rendering since the cartoonist recognized that efficiency was possible without political intervention. Finally, "Another Statute Coming to Life," shows a police officer dismounting his pedestal of "indifference" to scatter the intimidated lesser figures representing crime. Surely, Enright and his supporters could have been incensed by the implication that police had been indifferent to crime in the past, since a continual process of reform had occurred, and yet this cartoon established the efforts being made at the time to fight crime through the rapid emplacement of additional officers.

The same month the Board of Estimate approved 769 new policemen in addition to the 500 extra men already provided for in the 1921 budget, making an increase of 1,269 authorized positions.[68] But that was not all. The dramatic "dragnets" which police had employed to arrest a large number of criminals from the same raid was considered to be dropped as

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Figure 4.1

BETWEEN THE DEVIL AND THE DEEP BLUE SEA!



Source: Brooklyn Daily Eagle, December 20, 1920, p. 6.

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an enforcement measure, but the issue was reconsidered and the exercise would be continued. On December 23, a dragnet resulted in the arrests of three burglars, four gunmen, and 100 others, making headline news. The year ended with arch gangster "Monk" Eastman being shot dead in Brooklyn.[69]

Fighting the forces of crime became a central editorial issue by the press in 1921, with numerous publications loftily appraising the "crime wave" phenomenon from afar. In a lead article of four pages, the Literary Digest again expressed dismay at society's plight: "Criminals have developed a system of attack that is more efficient than the defensive armament of society."[68] The article mentions an unidentified statistical expert of an insurance journal who stated "human life was never as insecure in the United States as it is today." Other publications similarly reported the dire conclusion. An inestimable source, The Sing Sing Bulletin, published by convicts at the Ossining, NY, institution, stated: "It wouldn't be a bad idea to build a wall around New York City and keep all their crooks there, instead of sending them up the river to contaminate the inmates of Sing Sing."[69] Judging by press reports, citizens had become afraid of going out alone at night. Merchants were warned to arm the messengers carrying cash or valuable items to deter robberies, and hotel guests were reminded to keep their rooms locked.

Editorial writers searched for explanations and solutions to the crime direction. The proffered explanations included: a non-native, heterogeneous population; an inadequate number

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of police relative to the total population; psychological aftermath from the recent war; greater crime following passage of the Eighteenth Amendment, and the emergence of unrestrained career criminals. The solutions were: greater citizens' vigilance; less political involvement in directing police departments; improvements in the courts; more respect for law and order at home, and other solutions.[72] The issue seemed not only to be a local one, but a surge of crime and violence that was sweeping, seemingly, other urban centers.

In an editorial in The Nation, writer Joseph Gollomb opined that basic differences between American and European cultures accounted for crime fighting differences, which, he concluded, were less effective in American then in Europe.[73] Gollomb espoused the introduction of specialized crime squads like those found in England, conceivably including separate police teams for church thefts, thefts from waiting rooms, and usury and postal frauds. Raymond B. Fosdick in the New Republic assessed that "The Crime Wave in America" was the "natural consequence of war."[74] But other factors explained the American situation: economic failures and political machines have created a spoils system for "base and selfish purposes, he argued." As a result: "We have sown the seed in apathy and corruption and now when the crime epidemic comes we reap the whirlwind. This is why the post-war disease of crime has not ravaged the countries of Europe as it has the United States."[75]

Enright's annual report for 1920, issued November 1,

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1921, reflected the debate concerning effectiveness of police as urban control agents. The commissioner's past complaints of unfairness to police from the press also were continued in an eight paragraph statement. Enright sought to counter the criticism his department had steadily received with a vigorous rebuttal in the pages of his annual report which also countered the prevailing view in the press:

> The hostile press of this City, always in the forefront when an attack is made on the Police Commissioner, or Police Department, was reduced to dire straits because of a lack of material to give color to its assaults. Ultimately, finding that no such material existed, resort was had to the simple but sinister expedient of manufacturing it....
>
> The records of the Police Department, during your administration of the affairs of this City, failed to show at any time an extraordinary increase in the commission of crime, which, I take it, is what is meant by the vague metaphor, "crime wave." Statistics prove the contrary the case...There were marked decreases in many classes of felony, and in no instance was there anything approaching a crime "wave," nor even a modest undertow.[76]

The "Crime Wave" Considered

Warfare is an event of staggering magnitude to the countries involved: it fundamentally affects all political, social, and economic activities within the conflicted nations. Criminal lawyer and social critic Clarence Darrow observed four years after the termination of the Great War: "War is a sudden, violent and spectacular destroyer of all established habits. In its conduct and preparation it has rules of its own which have no analogy in civil life."[77] What are the expectations for urban disorder during modern wartime?

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Writing in 1918, Edith Abbott, an American academic, commented on crime in England prior to and during the war: "For a decade preceding the war, there was in England a marked and almost continuous decrease in the number of persons convicted of crime, but this decline has been much more marked during the three war years for which information is available."[78] Convictions per 100,000 population there had fallen from 586 in 1904-05, to 369 in 1913-14; since the war began the decline was abrupt falling to 281 in 1914-15, to 159 in 1915-16, and to 118 in 1916-17. The Commissioner of Prisons for England and Wales provided three reasons for this decrease: enlistment of many habitual offenders; restrictive orders on alcohol consumption, and the demand for labor which made "employment easy and well paid."[79]

Another factor was that wartime full employment in England and Ireland provided defendants sentenced to fines the opportunity to pay them rather than opting for jail time in lieu of paying the sanction in cash. Nor was the trend limited to studies involving England and Wales: Ireland reported that its daily average prison population for 1915 "was the lowest on record"; Scotland decreased prison commitments from 43,535 in 1914 to 19,946 just two years later. Abbott quotes M. Roux of the University of Dijon on the fact that war emptied the prisons of France and "liquidated the criminality of the past," but also observing that following the War of 1870 a great increase in crime occurred.[80]

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While adult crimes declined during wartime in France, juvenile delinquency increased. Professor Roux noted that the lack of a father's supervision and employment of the young in adult occupations likely were factors. The prison commissioners for Scotland reported on May 3, 1917 that a large number of first-time offenders were being sentenced: "This, it is to be feared, indicates a considerable tendency to lawlessness on the part of the younger members of the population who have either been exempted from or not yet called up for military service."[81]

Darrow noted with reference to the Great World War: "For more than four years most of the western world did nothing but kill," and suggested as a result of this: "religious ties and religious commands were ignored"; "everyone was taught to hate"; hangings and imposition of the death penalty increased; prize fighting grew from "one or two states" to "state after state."[82] He adds:

> It is not alone murder that can be traced directly to the war psychology. Robbery and burglary have rapidly increased, and much of this is due to the emotions of boys. The robbing of country banks has grown to be almost a pastime, and often one or more participants in these raids is a return soldier....Common honesty, common sense and common humanity alike plainly show that a large part of the crimes of violence are due to the war.[83]

Sociologist Edwin Sutherland explained why war and its relation to crime may not be so direct:

> Any explanatory generalization regarding crime in wartime is suspect because neither war nor crime is a homogeneous entity. Wars vary in many respects, and the constituent elements have not been standardized,

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> nor have their comparative weights in the total complex of war been determined. Consequently, we do not know...how much more "war" is involved in one war than in another. Also, many social changes which occur in wars occur also in times of peace. For these reasons the effect of wars on crimes is not a good theoretical problem.[84]

In the Great World War the economic and social structure behind the roughly two million men and women involved--one million directly--necessarily has great impact on the life of those at home and not involved in conflict-related activities in addition to those at the front. For example, if wartime necessitates rationing of food supplies, it is logical to assume that a new kind of crime--black market activity and coupon fraud--will emerge, because no such opportunity for this type of crime previously existed and because the profits from such endeavor is likely to be attractive relative to the risks of detection and punishment. Further, economic crimes such as profiteering are likely to occur because normal marketplace checks and balances have been affected by wartime conditions making the temptations for brief, extortionist profits irresistible for some unless adequate countermeasures are in place. Similarly, if young men in the crime-prone age category that is, roughly ages 14 to 24, are removed from the population, fewer property and violent crimes predictably could be committed by such an age group. Further younger males and, to a lesser extent, females with less adult supervision at home or in their immediate milieu due to the effects of war would be prone to commit more juvenile offenses than at other times.[85]

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Beyond these and related special circumstances, the leading general theories of criminal behavior must be regarded, Sutherland argues, as "invalid, inadequate, or unproved for one or more reasons." Sutherland concluded that crime patterns during wartime cannot be predictive.[86]

D. Archer and R. Gartner, who have systematically compared homicide rates cross-culturally after wartime, find that: "Despite its frequent omission from scholarly treatments of violence and crime, the violence committed by warring nations may be particularly deserving of scientific attention."[87] Conditions following a war are different and may be regarded as rather more amenable to evaluation. Archer and Gartner endeavored to assess homicide rate changes in combattant and control nations after World War I, World War II, the Viet Nam War, and eleven other wars.[88] The conclusions were mixed, though quantitative differences were established. Among combattant nations, ten reported decreased crime from 15 percent to 83 percent following the conflict. In 13 other national circumstances, not much change resulted, or a decrease of nine percent to an increase of seven percent. Finally, a larger number of nations showed an increase from eleven percent to 313 percent in the homicide rate.

The conclusion was that among combattant nations, a tendency for crime to increase after the conflict exists, but numerous exceptions to this tendency also may be noted.

Among non-combattant or neutral (control) nations, the results are different: 16 nations declined in homicide

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following the conflict from 13 percent to 67 percent. Five nations showed little change, and nine nations increased crime from 11 percent to 124 percent. The conclusion was that among control nations, a tendency for crime to decrease after the cessation of conflict elsewhere resulted, but also numerous exceptions occurred to this pattern.

Archer and Gartner do not make clear why they selected homicide as the reference crime for their research, but it may have been as the crime that has the greatest certainty of being reported to police on a continuing basis. However, it may be argued that homicide is an unsatisfactory crime to be studied because it possesses a different relationship between perpetrator and victim than other violent and property crimes. In homicide about one-quarter of victims are related or have or have had an intimate relationship with the perpetrator and approximately only one-third of the perpetrators and victims do not know each other. Thus, in about two-thirds of the cases victims and perpetrators have some familial, intimate, or social relationship with each other that has turned deadly. Though the issue has not been examined analytically, the measurement of urban disorder or crime by considering primarily murder-homicide as the reference incident may be flawed, for this type of crime might not be comparable to other sorts where the perpetrator is more likely to be a stranger. Nevertheless, the murder-homicide rate reflects itself and does not speak necessarily to trends for other types of criminal activity.

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What was the pattern of murder-homicide prior to and following the Great War in the city? Homicides in New York from 1906 through 1921 reached a high of 869 in 1906 and a low of 351 in 1913. (Table 4.1) Adjusting the data based on population per 100,000, the number of homicides in 1910 was 560 or 11.7 per 100,000. A decade later with the next census following a World War with a "crime wave" sweeping across the city, 743 homicides resulted, or 13.2 per 100,000 population, reflecting population of New York in 1910 of 4,766,883 and in 1920 of 5,620,048.

Robberies in this period are not comparable over 16 year period due to reporting differences in 1916. (Table 4.2) However, for the years 1916-1921, decreased robbery occurred during the war year of 1918, jumped the following year, and returned in 1921 to within 20 percent of its level in 1916.

Burglaries in New York City showed considerable variations over a 16-year period. The increase in burglaries from 1906 to 1921 was 14.7 percent, while the population grew substantially. (Table 4.3) Like robbery, burglary offenses showed a substantial drop in 1918 and a great rebound in 1919, only to decline the next two years. Larcenies showed little variation over a 16 year period despite a growth in population. (Table 4.4) Marked changes in robberies and burglaries noted in 1918-1919 simply did not occur in this category of offense. Felony assaults which reflect non-homicidal battery and related offenses, dropped almost 60 per cent in 1918, explained by a reduction in the age category of

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Table 4.1

Homicides in New York City, 1906-21

Year	Homicides	% Change
1906	869	--
1907	843	(2.9)
1908	758	(10.0)
1909	755	(0.3)
1910	567	(24.9)
1911	366	(35.5)
1912	417	13.9
1913	351	(15.8)
1914	443	26.2
1915	452	2.0
1916	491	8.6
1917	579	17.9
1918	618	6.3
1919	649	5.0
1920	743	14.5
1921	712	(4.1)

Source: Arrests in Annual Reports, Police Department, City of New York, 1906-21.

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Table 4.2

Robberies in New York City, 1906-21

Year	Robberies	% Change
1906	523	--
1907	578	10.5
1908	750	29.7
1909	832	10.9
1910	825	(0.8)
1911	515	(37.6)
1912	502	(2.5)
1913	556	10.7
1914	669	20.3
1915	637	(4.8)
1916	1,106	73.6
1917	1,275	15.3
1918	1,143	(10.3)
1919	1,744	52.5
1920	1,586	(9.0)
1921	1,428	(9.9)

Source: Arrests in Annual Reports, Police Department, City of New York, 1906-21.

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Table 4.3

Burglaries in New York City, 1906-21

Year	Burglaries	% Change
1906	2,319	--
1907	3,117	34.4
1908	2,670	(14.3)
1909	2,680	0.4
1910	1,898	(29.2)
1911	2,196	15.7
1912	2,135	(2.8)
1913	2,364	10.7
1914	3,151	33.3
1915	3,217	2.1
1916	2,476	(23.0)
1917	2,973	20.1
1918	2,244	(24.5)
1919	3,100	38.1
1920	3,040	(1.9)
1921	2,660	(12.5)

Source: Arrests in Annual Reports, Police Department, City of New York, 1906-21.

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Table 4.4

Larcenies in New York City, 1906-21

Year	Larcenies	% Change
1906	5,481	--
1907	6,134	11.9
1908	3,739	(39.0)
1909	5,001	33.7
1910	4,839	(3.2)
1911	5,150	6.4
1912	4,520	(12.2)
1913	4,022	(11.0)
1914	4,556	13.2
1915	4,651	2.0
1916	4,546	(2.2)
1917	4,933	8.5
1918	4,869	(1.3)
1919	5,198	6.7
1920	4,923	(5.3)
1921	5,350	8.6

Source: Arrests in Annual Reports, Police Department, City of New York, 1906-21.

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the population most likely to be involved in such offenses. (Table 4.5) Following the end of the Great World War, felony assault arrests did increase, but for the period 1919-1921 the offenses were below any years of the period 1909-1917.

Could the wartime restriction on alcoholic availability reflect a diminution of crime? The Prohibition Amendment had been an ultimate goal for some visionaries since early in the eighteenth century. (See next chapter.) On January 29, 1919, the 18th Amendment to the Constitution was ratified and would become effective on January 16, 1920. Federal enforcement began under the Volstead Act passed October 28, 1920. The effects were immediate and measurable: in New York City, arrests for intoxication and drunk disorderly dropped precipitously in 1918 and again in 1919. Increases in 1920 and 1921 still left the arrest rate for this offense far below levels that had existed in earlier years. (Table 4.6)

Total arrests for the city for both sexes from 1906 to 1921, show an upward trend over the 16 year period, but not necessarily an alarming one or a "crime wave." (Table 4.7)

Total arrests decreased for the period 1916-18. Arrests for robberies, burglaries, larcenies, and felony offenses--but not homicides--increased in 1919, and continued the trend into the next year. Even in 1919 when "crime wave" scares were disturbing the region, the total number of arrests was less on an absolute number than in 1908, and less on a relative basis than the period 1907-1909. Crime had increased as judged by

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Table 4.5

Felony Assaults in New York City, 1906-21

Year	Assaults	% Change
1906	3,375	--
1907	3,823	13.3
1908	3,726	(2.5)
1909	4,312	15.7
1910	4,481	3.9
1911	4,309	(3.8)
1912	4,099	(4.9)
1913	4,444	8.4
1914	4,605	3.6
1915	4,912	6.7
1916	5,210	6.1
1917	5,567	6.8
1918	3,485	(59.7)
1919	3,771	8.2
1920	3,796	0.7
1921	3,899	2.1

Source: Arrests in Annual Reports, Police Department, City of New York, 1906-21.

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Table 4.6

Intoxication & Drunk Disorderly in New York City, 1906-21

Year	Intoxication	%Change	Drunk Disorderly	% Change
1906	39,249	--	8,500	--
1907	36,469	(7.0)	8,318	(2.1)
1908	36,034	(1.2)	2,550	(69.3)
1909	30,233	(16.0)	7,029	175.6
1910	28,733	(4.5)	7,046	0.2
1911	21,994	(23.4)	4,773	(32.2)
1912	20,640	(6.1)	4,965	4.0
1913	21,727	5.1	4,480	(9.7)
1914	20,269	(6.7)	2,772	(38.1)
1915	20,194	(0.3)	2,183	(21.2)
1916	17,099	(15.3)	2,208	1.1
1917	13,844	(19.0)	2,292	3.8
1918	7,090	(48.7)	1,553	(32.2)
1919	5,562	(21.5)	1,293	(16.7)
1920	5,936	6.7	1,534	18.6
1921	6,237	5.0	1,656	7.9

Source: Arrests in Annual Reports, Police Department, City of New York, for the years 1906-21.

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Table 4.7

New York City Arrests, 1906-21

Year	Male	%	Female	%	Total	%
1906	157,284	83.1	31,918	16.9	189,202	--
1907	172,252	84.4	31,867	15.6	204,119	7.9
1908	190,448	84.5	35,032	15.5	225,480	10.5
1909	185,962	85.3	31,989	14.7	217,951	(3.3)
1910	141,928	84.3	26,373	15.7	168,301	(22.8)
1911	130,917	86.0	21,264	14.0	152,181	(9.6)
1912	148,258	87.1	21,907	12.0	170,165	11.8
1913	146,766	85.3	25,254	14.7	172,020	1.1
1914	166,175	87.6	23,456	13.4	189,631	10.2
1915	186,196	87.9	25,633	12.1	211,829	11.7
1916	174,684	87.0	26,217	13.0	200,901	(5.1)
1917	163,992	87.3	23,921	12.7	187,913	(6.5)
1918	152,296	89.5	17,863	10.5	170,159	(9.4)
1919	199,099	90.4	21,050	9.6	220,149	29.4
1920	247,905	92.9	18,844	7.1	266,749	21.1
1921	255,650	93.5	17,701	6.5	273,351	2.5

Source: Annual Reports, Police Department, City of New York, 1906-21.

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arrest data but the incidence was not extraordinary, relative to variations in earlier years. Other reasons must be discovered to explain why the nation's press fanned the "crime wave" flame.

One feature of crime in the period 1919-21 not rated by any commentator was that the faces in the jail's holding pens become more male as a percentage of arrestees than at any time. For the period 1916-18 the percentage of women arrested was 12.1; for the next three years, the average arrest rate percentage for female was 7.7, a drop of over one-third. Exploration for why this short term differential occurred would be difficult to argue convincingly; however, the point might be made that a qualitative difference had occurred among arrestees in a short period of time.

Why did the press think there was a "crime wave"? In over a score of articles in which the expression was used, no single article referred to specific crime data to support the underlying assumption. Certainly, former Police Commissioner Woods, an avowed authority on crime, helped start wave-fear with his much discussed and referenced articles in the New York Herald. However, no basis for impugning his motives should be inferred: the public felt that crime was on the increase and no officials--except Police Commissioner Enright with lengthy, poorly communicated, and largely ignored reports--sought to counter the trend.

The rhetoric of "crime wave" in the New York press was supported by sharp increases in reported incidents of violent

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and property crime occurring within a few months following the cessation of the Great World War. Yet even at their highest, crime incidents adjusted for population, reflected serious criminal activity at under levels experienced prior to commencement of the war; hence, the explanation of the phenomenon must be related to political, social and economic factors that released forces of urban disorder in a city that had just helped achieve a military peace.[89]

Nativism in the City and Economic Crisis

A significant urban dislocation resulted from economic deterioration following the Armistice: the war had brought high employment at attractive salaries; with rapid demilitarization a hard landing of the economy threw thousands out of their jobs often with little advanced notice. By the fall of 1920, unemployment had reached an urgent level with 60,000 unemployed in Brooklyn alone. Thousands more were underemployed or not counted at all in the methods then used to measure the labor pool.[90]

Another problem that made the public unsettled was the high level of labor disruption affecting the community. In 1920, 707 miscellaneous strikes involving 30,868 persons were recorded. Additionally, 352 strikes in the "needle trade" occurred affecting 13,255 persons. Many of these strikes were unruly, prolonged, and disruptive to the community. The most notable strike of the year was the Brooklyn Rapid Transit System strike that affected elevated, surface, and subway

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transportation.[91] The strike angered residents of Brooklyn and elsewhere because those with jobs were prevented from reaching their employment and those seeking work could not easily travel to distant parts of the city to seek work. The BRT strike occurred just as the greatest number of police officers were about to go on summer vacation and, therefore, these plans were canceled to assure that adequate police personnel were available for the duration of the labor dispute.

Gun control became a political issue at the time. Section 1897 of the State Penal Law had made it difficult for New York City residents to obtain pistol permits legally. Nonetheless, as Enright reported: "Hundreds of such permits were readily obtained from judicial sources outside the city, with the result that armed desperadoes, licensed by judicial authorities to carry firearms, are at large on the city streets."[92] The commissioner noted that realistic blank cartridge pistols were advertised available for $1 postpaid for criminal use and to make his point the advertisement was reproduced in the police report for the year.

The city had become more censorious of a particular ethnic minority believed responsible for a new pattern of crime: on July 8, 1919, the police organized a Gangster Squad to maintain order: by a year later it consisted of ten men all of whom spoke Italian. The squad was detailed to patrol the Italian section of the city and they made 263 arrests, securing 99 convictions in 1920. Of these arrests, 174 were for felonies, 77 for misdemeanors, and 12 as juvenile

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delinquents. The police and many other officials believed that foreign birth was linked disproportionately to property and violent crime. In 1920, 35.4 percent of the population of the city was foreign-born, and many immigrants turned to crime when no work option appeared to be available to them.[93]

The number of authorized personnel for the city had not changed substantially from 1917 through 1921.[94] The Board of Estimate finally acceded to the commissioner's request for a staff increase which was achieved in 1922. The increase in patrolmen resulted from steady political pressure from law enforcement officials, though the conclusion that more police would reduce crime was not established. New York City police commissioners sought to show that the ratio of police to the population was disproportionately weak in the United States compared with European cities, but the data they supplied for foreign police services was never thoroughly explained or took into account significant military factors such as the fact that some European police forces shared closer links with standing armies to respond to potential disorder than did American police forces. Indeed, in a comparison of policing for New York City in this period with three other United States cities, New York ranked about the same in number of police officers on a population adjusted basis. (Table 4.8)

Crime and Coming of Age

The period 1914 to 1920 represented a great coming of age for Brooklyn, New York, and America. The war abroad initially

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Table 4.8

Comparison of Population, Police, and Arrests Among Four Large Cities, 1917-21

City	Population	Police	Arrests	Popul. per off.
1917				
Boston	745,439	1,661	86,341	449
Chicago	2,497,722	5,277	104,535	473
New York	5,365,125	10,874	200,901	464
Philadel.	1,657,810	4,079	95,873	406
1918				
Boston	--	--	108,556	--
Chicago	--	4,986	129,270	--
New York	5,450,587	10,701	187,913	--
Philadel.	--	--	n.a.	--
1919				
Boston	--	1,763	90,293	--
Chicago	--	4,723	105,632	--
New York	5,536,049	11,379	170,159	--
Philadel.	--	--	n.a.	--
1920				
Boston	748,060	1,468	67,947	510
Chicago	2,701,705	5,120	91,457	528
New York	5,620,048	11,382	199,099	494
Philadel.	1,823,158	4,475	75,618	407
1921				
Boston	--	1,846	58,817	--
Chicago	--	5,152	87,197	--
New York	5,705,000	11,395	266,749	--
Philadel.	--	--	n.a.	--

Source: Annual Reports, Police Department, City of New York, 1917-21.

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brought great prosperity at home.[95] When the full thrust of American troops and full industrial productive resources were committed to the conflict, the costs were high, though nowhere matching those paid by a dozen European nations. During this year when America was actively at war, three types of serious reported crimes declined: robberies by 10.3 percent; burglaries by 24.5 percent, and felony assault by 59.7 per cent. A fourth type of serious crime showed little change: larcenies decreased 1.3 percent; and homicides--the most reliable crime in terms of being reported to police--increased 6.3 percent. No theoretical basis is advanced to explain such a diverse pattern of criminal experience related to war, though it is apparent that in aggregate terms serious crime dropped the year the nation was busy fighting a war.

For the year following the end of the Great World War, only two major crime indices increased substantially: robberies jumped 52.5 percent and burglaries rose 38.1 per cent. The press and a former police commissioner declared that a "crime wave" had crashed upon the shores of New York and added that many American and European cities were going through the same process. But were they? The use of data analysis by "crime wave" exponents was rarely resorted to. Indeed, analysis of other serious crimes failed to show any "wave" patterns: Homicides increased by 5.0 percent, far less than the increase of earlier years in the century: 26.2 per cent in 1914, or 17.9 percent in 1917. Similarly, felony assaults increased by 8.2 percent, but this number was still

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at lower level by absolute figures than any year since 1908. Similarly, larcenies increased 6.7 percent, a level that had been exceeded four times in the previous dozen years.

Prohibition could have been a factor. As New York started to go dry--or drier--the number of arrests for intoxication and drunk disorderly was substantially less in 1918 and 1919 than any previous years in the century.

The "crime wave" may have derived its impetus not from the "serious" crimes cited above, but from the "less serious" incidents such as petty thefts and misdemeanors that are more likely to engage average citizens by their sheer quantity. Total arrests for all incidents including mostly these crimes grew 29.4 percent in 1919 and again 21.1 percent the next year. The trend in total arrests was up from the early part of the decade, but it was--in a longitudinal context--a modest undulation, not a wave.

The police were unrealistically expected to respond to perceived this wave and their method was to request greater personnel numbers. Finally, in 1919 and 1920 additional police officers were authorized by the Board of Estimate; however, the increased strength may have helped the community to feel safer, but it could not be correlated by any demonstrable crime reduction factor: if anything, the reverse occurred.

Commissioner Enright proved his competence as an executive in his guidance of the department during much of the wartime and post-wartime period. However, domestic economic

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and labor uncertainties abounded following peace. The "Red scare" affected the Brooklyn and New York region with its political and social divisiveness and modern witch-hunting.[96] This phenomenon was mixed with pressures from nativism, which had the effect of making native-born citizens suspect immigrants for criminality, influenced by anecdotal justification. Criticism by the press and politically-motivated groups convinced many citizens that the police were not doing all they should to protect the peace. The rapid increase of arrests for minor crimes following war's end seemed a confirmation of the critics' charges. But analysis of what actually happened showed that only two types of "serious crimes" increased substantially, and then by levels that had been exceeded in earlier years; other major crime incidents did not increase significantly. The wave must be explained by the winds of emotion that blew from postwar economic dislocation. Meanwhile, the City of Brooklyn continued to cast a wary unblinking eye on its all-too-close Manhattan neighbors: crime was consistently lower in "the city of homes" than across the East River as it had been since prior to annexation. Strikes were fewer; tensions were lower. A kinder, gentler Brooklyn remained apart as New York celebrated its loss of innocence in hectic post-war confusion.

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ENDNOTES

1. E.B. O'Callaghan, ed., The Documentary History of the State of New York, vol. 1, Albany: Weed, Parsons & Co., 1849, pp. 648-49.

2. W.E.S. Fales, Brooklyn's Guardians: A Record of the Fateful and Heroic Men Who Preserve the Peace in the City of Homes, Brooklyn: Fales, 1887 (Hereafter cited as Guardians). Fales's history of Brooklyn police is particularly instructive as the 1870-1880 period is discussed. The book apparently was sponsored by mostly Brooklyn businesses which might have had some dealings with the police. At the end of the text portion, 64 pages of advertisements are included, including Peter Cooper's Glue Factory and Burlington Woolen Co., manufacturer of Standard Police Cloths.

3. David Ment, The Shaping of a City: A Brief History of Brooklyn, Brooklyn: Brooklyn Educational & Cultural Alliance, 1979, p. 22.

4. A nineteenth century historian of Brooklyn writes: "Crime and vice seem to have made fresh and increasing inroads upon the primitive simplicity of this old Dutch town; for, in 1802, the town took measures to determine the location and ascertain the expense of erecting a 'cage or watch-house.' Whether this was a rebuilding of the old one, or an additional one, is somewhat uncertain. At the same meeting, the foremen of the fire-engines were authorized to establish and regulate a 'Guard, or Night-watch within the Fire District, by and with the consent of the majority of the inhabitants.'" Henry R. Stiles, History of the City of Brooklyn, Brooklyn: by subscription, two volumes, 1, 1867, p. 387.

5. Jacob Judd, "Policing the City of Brooklyn in the 1842's and 1850's," Journal of Long Island History, 6 (Spring 1966): 13-22.

6. Ibid., p. 14.

7. Ibid., p. 18.

8. Guardians. With the creation of a Metropolitan Police District area, some 400 precincts were created and these were divided into patrol beats according to a district manual dated April 10, 1860. This policing system existed for thirteen years when: "its opponents felt it was too cumbersome and that it failed to recognize the principle of local autonomy. Accordingly, the State Legislature abolished the metropolitan police district and, on April 5, 1870, it passed a bill making the Police Department of Brooklyn an independent organization," Alter F. Landesman, A History of New Lots, Brooklyn, Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1977, pp. 116-117. Those towns of Kings County outside of Brooklyn as

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then established were left unprotected but the police law allowed communities to apply to Brooklyn for the appointment of police to their areas.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., p. 135.

11. A brief study as to how the two cities were similar and dissimilar is found in Margaret Latimer, Two Cities: New York and Brooklyn the Year the Great Bridge Opened, Brooklyn: Brooklyn Educational & Cultural Alliance, 1983. In 1867, the New York Bridge Company was organized and hired German engineer John Roebling to design and supervise construction of the bridge. Roebling's great contributions included the monumental towers which supported wire weaved like rope, a process he originated. The Corporation sold stock to the cities of Brooklyn and New York and to the general public. Counterfeit stock certificates began to circulate which probably was the origin of the notion that sharpers would sell fools pieces of the Brooklyn Bridge. See: David W. McCullough, Brooklyn and How It Got That Way, New York: Dial Press, 1983, p. 48.

12. James F. Richardson, The New York Police: Colonial Times to 1901, New York: Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 113, 115.

13. Ibid., p. 116.

14. J.S. Berman, Theodore Roosevelt as Police Commissioner of New York: A Study of Progressive Police Reform, Ph.D. diss., Newark: Rutgers University, 1985, and H. Paul Jeffers, Commissioner Roosevelt: The Story of Theodore Roosevelt and the New York City Police, 1895-1897, New York: John Wiley & Son, 1994. See also references in the preceding chapter to TR.

15. Commissioner Roosevelt, pp. 134-135.

16. G. Astor, The New York Cops: An Informal History, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971. A.E. Costello, Our Police Protectors: A History of the New York Police, Montclair, NJ: Patterson Smith, [1885], 1972.

17. Stan Fischler, Uptown, Downtown: A Trip Through Time on New York Subways, New York: Hawthorn/Dutton, 1976, pp. 3-40; 33-52; Brian J. Cudahy, Under the Sidewalks of New York, New York: Stephen Greene Press, revised edition, 1988, pp. 1-70; Brian J. Cudahy, Cash, Tokens, and Transfers: A History of Urban Mass Transit in North America, New York: Fordham University Press, 1990, pp. 7-21; Clifton Hood, 722 Miles: The Building of Subways and How They Transformed New York, New York: Simon & Schuster.

18. S.L.A. Marshall, World War I, Boston: Houghton Mifflin

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Company, 1964, pp. 6-53, 165-166, 274, 267.

19. New York City Police Department, Annual Report for 1914, 1915, p. 8.

20. Ibid.

21. New York City Police Department, Annual Report for 1915, 1916, p. v. Commissioner of Police Arthur Woods commented on the way the department's "drug crusade" had changed the nature of criminal of the time: "Instead of the big, burly criminal of former years, society to-day has to deal with the drug-poisoned weekly, whose use of a drug strips him of all moral instinct, and, at times, incites him to commit the most vicious crimes," p. vi.

22. Ibid., p. xii.

23. Ibid., p. vii.

24. New York City Police Department, Annual Report for 1916, 1917. Woods adds: "The activities of the members of [the Neutrality] Squad since the outbreak of the European war have made such an impression upon the remaining German agents under cover in this land, that most of them apparently have discontinued their criminal conspiracies and fled, some of them returning in roundabout ways to Germany and others going to Mexico, South, and Central America," p. iii.

25. Ibid., p. ii.

26. Ibid., p. iii.

27. Ibid., pp. 24-27. A distinctive task of the time performed by police was the inspection of all steam boilers once a year and to examine and qualify engineers and firemen to operate them. The staff of twelve patrolmen and two civilian boiler inspectors tested over 14,000 steam boilers for the year. Ibid., p. 82.

28. Data for Brooklyn were generally consolidated with the entire city for this period. However, crime statistics for the borough were available for the years 1917-1919 and sustained the observation of Brooklyn as being less likely to have violent or property crime than the rest of the city in toto.

29. Eagle, February 20, 1917, p. 1. The next day a disturbance occurred in Brooklyn for the same reason. The Brownsville women charged that "chickens had gone up in price from 27 cents to 37 cents a pound, onions from 18 to 20 cents a pound and potatoes from 10 to 12 cents a pound. Several police uniforms were "in tatters" as a result of the "bread riot." Eagle, February 21, 1917, p. 1. The paper reported the next day that 11 women were arrested and held on bail. See

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also: David M. Kennedy, Over Here: The First World War and American Society, New York: Oxford University Press, 1980, pp. 93-143.

30. Franklin K. Lane, "Why We Fight Germany" and Douglas W. Johnson, "Efficiency Versus Freedom," in America at War: A Handbook of Patriotic Education References, ed. Albert Bushnell Hart, New York: George H. Doran Company, 1918, pp. 170-173.

31. Eagle, February 1, 1917, p. 1; February 17, 1917, p. 1.

32. Eagle, April 6, 1917, p. 4. Of the 327 who applied, 199 men were rejected on the first examination primarily "for flat feet, defective teeth and vision and bronchial troubles."

33. Kennedy, p. 147.

34. Ibid.

35. Eagle, July 31, 1917, p. 1. On July 30, 1917, Borough Hall issued 119 marriage licenses compared with 54 the previous year.

36. Eagle, August 1, 1917, p. 1.

37. According to the Eagle, August 2, 1917, p. 1, Brooklyn had 202,000 men registered to supply the borough's first quota of 13,848; however, among the early men examined, only one out of every seven were found physically fit to go to war. That would mean that 97,000 men would have to be called to meet the first quota. According to the newspaper non-native born were most eager to avoid military service, sometimes through ruses. Assistant United States District Attorney John L. Knox said he had taken steps to investigate the report that some young men in the effort to avoid military service under the selective draft law "were deliberately having their sight impaired through the wearing of strong and blinding glasses. Also the Board of Inebriation reported that there had been "an unusual jump in the requests to be sent to some institutions from persons alleging that they are addicted to drug habits."

38. New York City Police Department, Annual Report for 1918, 1919, p. 20.

39. The fact that actual sabotage occurred and for which arrests were not made contributed to a feeling of community unrest, fanned by government-sponsored propaganda. As a sign of the reaction against Germanic people in the guise of war efforts, the police department, already short of staff due to enlistments and the draft, was forced to "take a complete census of all male Germans in the metropolitan district," as mandated by the federal government. The effort required the services of 536 police officers over a 78-day period. Later

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the government required the enumeration of German women as well which took longer. In total the census found 75,151 "alien enemies of both sexes." Ibid., p. 16.

40. New York City Police Department, Annual Report for 1917, 1918, p. 9.

41. Ibid., p. 17.

42. Ibid.

43. New York City Police Department, Annual Report for 1918, 1919, p. 4.

44. Ibid., p. 5.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid., p. 20.

47. Ibid., p. 23. According to Schulz, the first matron to serve in a New York City jail was hired in 1845. "New York City...lagged behind smaller cities, keeping its ranks closed to women as fully sworn police officers until 1918, when ten were appointed 'as an experiment,'" p. 92 in Dorthy Moses Schulz, "From Policewoman to Police Officer: An Unfinished Revolution," Police Studies 6 (Fall 1993): 90-98. The term "an experiment" had appeared in Enright's annual report who observed that employment of women for regular police duty "presents too many angles for consideration, to make possible a final decision on their worth as yet."

In Britain, World War I represented the opportunity by which a separate female force of police women could come into existence for routine patrol and factory policing. A scholar notes: "The war was indubitably decisive in the making of the British policewoman. In Germany and the United States, where women were appointed to police positions earlier, their functions were shaped before the distortions of war further complicated gender relations and identities." Philippa Levine, "'Walking the Streets in a Way No Decent Woman Should': Women Police in World War I," Journal of Modern History 66 (March 1994): 34-78.

48. Ibid., p. 16.

49. Ibid., p. 25. The decrease in crime by most measurements while the police force also had been reduced partially might be explained by the addition of Police Reserves on the streets. The report for the year notes: "They patrolled the streets, guarded the city's water supply, detected and arrested the criminal and the enemy alien bent on misdeed, transported the sick and wounded soldiers from ship to base hospital, assisted in receiving the returning soldiers after the war....they received not a dollar of compensation for

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their time, effort or the actual outlay of money, involving considerable sums, which many members freely disbursed in behalf of cases which they came across in the course of performance of their many duties." Ibid., p. 22.

50. New York City Police Department, Annual Report for 1919, 1920, pp. 3-4.

51. Almanac of American History, gen. ed. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1983, p. 436. Another estimate finds that in World War I, the United States sustained 126,000 battle deaths, or approximately 6,667 dead per nation month in the conflict. J.D. Singer & M. Small, The Wages of War--1816-1965, A Statistical Handbook, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1972.

52. A contributing factor to the amelioration of crime appears to be that men in their twenties convicted of crimes who might normally be placed on probation were offered the alternative of military service, thus depopulating the borough of men with a crime record who might be expected to persist in such behavior if at liberty in the community at a time when its police force was at weakened strength. It is impossible to determine how many young men might have been given this option by the courts.

Apart from a cadre of young men who "volunteered" for military service at a judge's suggestion, many more willingly volunteered or were drafted.

A relevant question is: what percentage of the young men in Brooklyn and other boroughs were removed from the community for wartime service and what percentage of them might have been ordered by a judge to military service in lieu of prison or jail time? This question cannot be answered due to the loss of World War I military records in a fire in 1974 and the failure by researchers to compile and analyze the data prior to that time. According to the Brooklyn Daily Eagle Almanac [1918], by June 6, 9,659,382 men were registered nationally for the draft. Brooklyn counted 202,808 registrations and a total of 590,670 registrations in New York City as a whole of whom 270,783 claimed exemption, p. 363. Those with exemptions would have sought them for marital, dependency, and health reasons, making this category less likely to be criminogenic in the general population.

The census for 1920 identified a Brooklyn population of 2,018,356. Of these 172,554 (8.5%) were 15-19 years; 194,513 (9.6%) were 20-24 years; 196,643 (9.7%) were 25-29 years, and 172,866 (8.6%) were 30-34 years. The population for the entire city was 5,620,048. Of these 453,758 (8.1%) were 15-19 years; 545,660 (9.7%) were 20-24 years; 575,915 (10.2%) were 25-29 years, and 513,204 (9.1%) were 30-34 years. Walter Laidlaw, compiler and editor, Population of the City of New York, 1890-1930, New York: Cities Census Committee, 1932, p. 300. About half this population would be male.

At the beginning of the war the draft called for

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registration of men from the ages of 21-31, and this represented the majority of those drafted. By mid-1918, the draft age span was increased requiring registration from ages 18 to 45. In the final report of the Selective Service System, 159,254 New Yorkers were inducted, of these 11,452 were rejected and an additional 3,882 had cancellation of their draft, leaving a total of 143,866 from the city accepted. Final Report of the Provost Marshal General to the Secretary of War on the Operations of the Selective Service System to July 15, 1919, Washington, DC: USGPO, 1920, pp. 92-94. Thus, it appears that in 1918 in the range of 20% to 30% of young men ages 19-31 had been drafted for military service, and others had volunteered and were not counted in the Selective Service total. Consequently, the temporary loss of such a portion of the young unmarried male population should have had an affect on decreasing crime in the city, and apparently did so.

53. New York City Police Department, Annual Report for 1919, 1920, p. 5.

54. Eagle, February 25, 1918, p. 1.

55. "Crimes, "Crime Waves," criminals and the Police." Literary Digest 60 (8 March 1919): 62-65.

56. Ibid.

57. Eagle, December 18, 1920, p. 1.

58. Eagle, December 19, 1920, p. 1.

59. Ibid.

60. Eagle, December 19, 1920, pp. 1, 5.

61. Ibid.

62. New York City Police Department, Annual Report for 1918, 1919, p. 18.

63. New York City Police Department, Annual Report for 1919, 1920, p. 8.

64. Ibid., p. 14.

65. Eagle, December 22, 1920, p. 6. Enright was the first New York commissioner who rose through the ranks to achieve the highest position, a fact he reminded readers in his annual reports.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid.

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68. Eagle, December 21, 1920, p. 1.

69. Eagle, December 27, 1920, p. 1. The police response on such occasions would be massive, sometimes nationally coordinated, arrests of suspects. In December, 62 arrests in a crime roundup occurred of which 20 were in Brooklyn. Eagle, December 21, 1921. p. 1.

70. "How to fight the forces of crime," Literary Digest 68 (1 January 1921):7-10.

71. Quoted in Ibid.

72. The surge of crime with return of the troops had been predicted by former Sing Sing Warden Thomas Mott Osborne, then a warden at the United States Naval Prison at Portsmouth. On a visit to Albany he said: "There has been an unprecedented decrease in crime all over, not only in this country but England, France and most of the civilized world since the war began. It is because those seeking the excitement that usually leads to crime found that excitement in war. Now that it is over they will seek it again in a way that will result in crime and our prisons will be filled again." Eagle, January 5, 1919, p. 2.

73. Joseph Gollomb, "Meeting The Crime Wave: A Comparison of Methods," The Nation 112 (19 January 1921): 80-83.

74. R.B. Fosdick, "The Crime Wave in America," The New Republic, 26 (6 April 1921): 150-152. While widely called "the city of churches," Brooklyn was also a Jewish community from the seventeenth century on. The earliest co-religionist arrived in September, 1654 as refugees fleeing Pernambuco, Brazil after Brazilian hegemony was supplanted by Portuguese control. Other Jews arrived in 1655, including Asser Levy who purchased property in Brooklyn. The first kosher slaughter-house opened in Williamsburg in 1851. Congregations became organized in the 1850s, and met in the homes of members until the first synagogue was dedicated in 1862. By the third decade of the twentieth century, Brooklyn had become "the world's biggest Jewish community." See: Ralph Foster Weld, Brooklyn Is America, New York: AMS Press, 1967, pp. 100-103, 116.

75. Ibid.

76. New York City Police Department, Annual Report for 1920, 1921, pp. 25-26.

77. Clarence Darrow, Crime: Its Cause and Treatment, Montclair, NJ: Patterson Smith, [1922], 1972, p. 213.

78. Edith Abbott, "Crime and the War," Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology 9 (1918): 32-45.

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79. Ibid., p. 32.

80. Ibid., p. 39.

81. Ibid., p. 41. The rise of juvenile delinquency was noted during the Civil War. Abbott notes: "(I)n the wartime reports of the old Eastern Penitentiary is that as early as 1863 the increase in juvenile offenders is noted and in 1864, commenting upon the general decrease in the number of prisoners during the war, attention is again called to the distressing fact that there had been an increase in young first offenders," p. 44.

82. Crime: Its Causes, pp. 215-217.

83. Ibid., pp. 217-218.

84. Edwin H. Sutherland, "Wartime Crime," The Sutherland Papers, ed. A. Cohen and K. Schuessler, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1956, p. 120. Sutherland draws upon the theory of Franz Exner, Krieg und Kriminalität in Österreich, Wien: Holder-Pichler-Tempsky, 1927, in which "the scarcity of commodities explains both the increase in theft and the decrease in sex offenses and assaults" during World War I in Austria, p. 122. Theft increased because of the pressure of unsatisfied needs (need of food and clothing) and the restrictions on legitimate methods of securing commodities (shortage of availability); sex offenses and assaults decreased because undernourished people had little surplus energy for such behavior and the scarcity of appropriate perpetrators and victims.

85. Ibid.

86. Ibid.

87. D. Archer & R. Gartner, "War and Violent Crime," in Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice, ed. S.H. Kadish, New York: Free Press, 1983, pp. 1639-1645.

88. _____, "Homicide in 110 Nations: The Development of the Comparative Crime Data File," International Annals of Criminology 16 (1977): 101-139. (For discussion of this topic following World War II, see: Edward Smithies, Crime in Wartime: A Social History of Crime in World War II, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982, and Hannu Takala and Henrik Than, eds, Crime and Control in Scandinavia during the Second World War, Scandinavian Studies in Criminology, vol. 10, Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1989.

89. The "crime wave" issue was to persist for the next years of Enright's tenure. In the Annual Report for 1922, 1923, the publicity sensitive commissioner noted: "One of the most familiar shapes taken by [enemies of the police department],

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is the circulation of reports that 'crime waves' are engulfing the City. For those who do not understand just what is meant by the term 'crime wave,'it may be said that it is another way of claiming that the criminal and lawless elements have completely over-reached and gotten the best of the police.

"No such condition has ever obtained in this City during recent years--certainly not during the incumbency of the present police administration," p. 24.

90. Robert K. Murray, Red Scare: A Study of National Histeria, 1919-20, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955.

91. New York City Police Department, Annual Report for 1920, 1921, pp. 40-41.

92. Ibid., p. 95.

93. Ibid., p. 3.

94. **Police Personnel in New York City, 1917-1922**

Position	1917	1918	1919	1920	1921	1922
Chief Insptrs	26	26	26	24	24	35
Borough "						
Marine "					1	
Surgeons	13	18	18	18	18	20
Captains	90	90	103	103	103	86
Military Capt.					1	1
Lieutenants	524	524	524	524	524	523
Sergeants	790	769	769	769	769	769
Patrolmen	9,376	9,217	9,887	9,887	9,877	10,420
Matrons	53	55	56	56	56	56
Patrol Women					20	20
Telegraph	2	2	2	2	2	2
Total:	10,874	10,701	11,385	11,383	11,395	11,932

Source: Police Department City of New York, Annual Reports, 1917-1922.

95. Kennedy describes the powerful effects on the American economy by the nation's initial delay and later full participation in the war. He writes: "The war worked its greatest economic transformation on the international

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financial role of the United States. Net debtors in the amount of $3.7 billion at war's out-break, Americans were net internationally creditors by an almost identical amount in 1919, excluding government loans.' p. 338.

96. The themes of nativism and the red scare of the time, both of which acutely unsettled the urban corpus, are brilliantly explored in: John Higham, Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism 1860-1925, 2nd. ed., New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1988, and Robert K. Murray, Red Scare: A Study of National Hysteria, 1919-1920, New York: McGraw-Hill [1955], 1964.

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CHAPTER 5

THE ERA OF PROHIBITION

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The colonists disliked and distrusted water and drank it only when they had no choice.*

Just as yellow fever was successfully attacked by draining the swamps and morasses where it bred, so the attack on crime is, in part at least, a matter of eliminating its breeding places....The police must attack not only the social swamps and morasses, the existence of which are more or less patent, but must seek out and combat sources of criminal infection and contagion wherever they exist in city life.†

*David Freeman Hawke, Everyday Life in Early America, New York: Harper & Row, 1988, p. 78.

†Police Commissioner Grover A. Whalen, Annual Report for 1929, 1930, p. 9.

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The concatenation of events that linked New York life from a stage of copious alcoholic consumption, to restrictiveness, to legal prohibition of sale, and then to rejection of prohibition has its antecedents in colonial times and indeed from earliest human experience in controlling immoderate potation.

Alcohol has been part of society since time immemorial. The act of drinking alcohol, sometimes to the point of intoxication has lubricated religious ceremonies, official functions, sporting events, wartime preparations, medical treatments, and social gatherings. Late Stone Age beer jugs establish the fact that fermented beverages existed in the Neolithic period. The earliest known book, the Ebers Papyrus, refers to beer and wine and advises use of a medicine composed of castor berries washed down with beer.[1] But also from early historical writings, the notion is established in various ways that society has sought to control manufacture, distribution, sale, and consumption of alcohol to fit the reasonings of the time. Spartan soldiers received limited wine rations. Plato suggested that wine be prohibited to several categories of individuals: children under eighteen, male and female slaves, magistrates in office, pilots and judges, and councilors on duty. Further, Plato advised that drinking parties be regulated with a drinking captain or supervisor appointed for each affair.[2]

The Bible contributed almost two hundred references to vineyards and wine and added to the lore of drinking and

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intoxication: Noah who feel asleep from his ignorance of the intoxicating properties of wine was the first such reference.[3] Others include: the feast of Belshazzar with the handwriting on the wall; the parable of the rich fool with his more and bigger barns; the parable of the drunken steward; and the law permitting capital punishment for gluttonous and drunken sons who persist in their rebelliousness. Yet Arthur P. McKinlay observes that many biblical figures were noted for their abstinence: Samson, Hannah, Samuel, Daniel, John the Baptist, the Nazarites, and the Rechabites.[4]

The word "alcohol" is derived from the Arabic al kohl, designating a fine powder of antimony used for staining the eyes.[5] The word became generic for all products of combustion and the term alembic (an Arabic deformation of a Greek word) referred to a fermented drink and the alcohol vapors condensed from the cooling process following distillation.

In addition to the production of alcohol from vineyards, beverages have been made from the distillation of various grains, the honey of wild bees, and sap and gum plants. Distilled spirits emerged with the discovery of the distillation process in the tenth century by the Arabian physician Rhazes, and earliest uses for such distillate were as medicines, a tendency that existed until the modern scientific understanding of the pharmacological action of alcohol.[6]

With the understanding of the effects from alcoholic uses, movements to mitigate the effects from excessive

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consumption occurred. Plutarch and Diodorus noted how Roman discipline gave way to moral laxity that may have been related to the drinking of wine.[7] However, generally through the centuries, the proscriptions against alcoholic use in excess were not widespread, probably because the direct connection between consumption and anti-social behavior and medical pathology was not established compellingly until more recent times. Various strong liquors were drunk throughout the world using stills constructed and operated to the designs of particular countries. The products of such distillation generally was the privilege of wealthy males who consumed such beverages, often to excess.

A turning point in the democratization of imbibing occurred with the invention of the gin still. The Dutch appear to be the first to distill alcohol other than wine, a fifteenth century development, and made the first gins from juniper. The production of gin grew and became a source of significant income for the Netherlands state.

By the end of the sixteenth century, gin had conquered England. Thomas Nashe in 1592 described the horrors of public inebriation in Pierce Penniless, His Supplication to the Devill.[8] William Hogarth wittily engraved the damage from drink and depravation (and stupidity) in his morality series The Harlot's Progress (1732) and The Rake's Progress (1735) and in such prints as Gin Lane. Gradually, the British government sought to profit from the tax benefits of gin production and sales and further desired to encourage

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indigenous gin production at the expense of the Dutch State, and consumption rose from 527,000 gallons in 1685, to eleven million gallons by 1750.[9] Intemperance embraced all classes including monks and religious orders of sisters:

> The sixteenth century seems to have been characterized by as general dissipation as its predecessor had been. Strong beer was a penny a gallon; table beer less than a half-penny; Spanish and Portuguese wines four shillings; French and German wines, eightpence.[10]

Thus the English laborer, whose wages were from threepence to six pence a day according to his skill, could afford to drink; similarly, his employer might provide alcoholic drinks as part of the expected compensation. At the same time Dutch society held to its own inveterate alcoholic consumptive patterns.[11] It was from the influences of this Anglo-Dutch culture that permitted, often encouraged, sometimes controlled, and invariably taxed alcohol at differing stages that New Amsterdam and later New York life emerged, and which was discussed in Chapter 2.

Drink and Urban Commerce

By the beginning of the nineteenth-century the New York public at large become more sanguine about ramifications from consumption of spirituous products. The connection between drinking and working habits was well recognized by the artisans of New York. The General Society of Mechanics and Tradesmen of the City of New York, founded in 1785, and quick to become the leading local artisanal society for the next

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century, required sobriety for membership, though alcoholic drinks were provisioned conscientiously as part of their regularly scheduled social occasions. By early in the 1830s the Society's apprentices, for whom an extensive library, lecture series, and after-work educational program were created, were similarly urged to espouse temperance, and the society made its rooms readily available for Youth Temperance Society meetings.[12] Regardless of the General Society's predilections, the consumption of liquor had become a routine part of workforce life. New apprentices as part of their craft induction often would be expected to provide a footing, that is, a day's supply of liquor to the existing apprentices and journeymen.[13] Masters would frequently pay apprentices in part with alcoholic drink, and not infrequently master, journeymen, and apprentices might end a week of work by drinking together, sometimes to the point of inebriation.

Upon the launching of a recently completed ship, the yard owner would treat journeymen and apprentices alike to a Saturnalia that included biscuits, cheese, and rum punch, and might continue for an extended period of time. The commercial sector was as likely to use alcohol as a social lubricant as industry did. A shoe dealer from Newark remembered: "I could scarcely visit New York on the most important business without getting Drunk."[14]

For workers the result of regular and intensive drinking was the keeping of "Blue Mondays" that deleteriously affected productivity. In early 1829, when silk manufacturer Lewis

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Tappan and others founded the city's first temperance society, twenty masters joined and nine leading craftsmen were named to the body's board of managers.[15] The term juvenile delinquent was heard for the first time in these years and generally referred to youth who ran and drank with gangs. Employers noted that worker dissatisfaction and alcohol consumption were connected and deduced that temperance represented one means of restraining the formation of workers into mutual benefit associations that not only provided charity to less fortunate members, but also might serve as a collective force for obtaining higher wages.[16]

By 1810, Americans were spending an estimated two percent of their incomes on distilled spirits.[17] In the years ahead with the city expanding from industrialization, a further surge in total alcohol consumption occurred. The fashion for high alcoholic rum drinks declined in popularity as American-made whiskey found new customers. The advent of the Erie Canal system opened the inner grain markets, allowing farmers to export grain or transport it to distant large distillers at cheaper costs, decreasing beverage market prices for consumers. Economies of scale also meant the demise of many local distillers, W.J. Rorabaugh argues, resulting in a decline in the "wiskey glut" that, along with temperance initiatives decreased consumption; meanwhile, the growing societal effects of alcohol use became more widely understood. It was in this context of increasing urbanization that threatened to overwhelm available social services that the

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organized Temperance Movement became grounded.

Temperance in the Nineteenth Century

The first American temperance society was created far from the urban scene: it was founded in 1808, when twenty-three concerned citizens of Saratoga County, New York, met under the leadership of Dr. Billy F. Clark.[18] Within a dozen years numerous other communities had established temperance societies, and in 1826, sixteen temperance leaders met in Boston to form the American Society for the Promotion of Temperance, later renamed the American Temperance Society. This militant organization used evangelistic and revivalistic methods to persuade the unconvinced: their message equated drinking with ungodliness and additionally observed that physical health was risked by immoderate alcohol consumption. The origin of this movement and its early support was strikingly regional with nearly half of the American Temperance Society affiliates located in New York State and about one-third additionally situated in New England.

Most Protestant denominations became committed to the concept of abstinence rendering the word "temperance" as the common euphemism for the Rechabite reality. Among various religious sects, the Methodist Church in particular played an exceptional leadership role during this earliest organizational phase and continued that vision for years later in marshalling members' and supporters' calls for legislative restraint on alcohol consumption. The Methodist General

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Conference of 1832 advocated "entire abstinence," a theme that was endorsed by the New York State Temperance Society three years later.[19]

The first national temperance convention convened in Philadelphia in 1833, and called for abstinence from hard liquor. The second conference three years later additionally endorsed abstinence from beer and wine. Temperance advocates had many reasons to point with alarm to the expanding evils from alcohol consumption and to sustain their increasingly rigid advocacy: individual maladies from the hard drinking population were seen as factors within a general public health issue. Dangers to the integrity of the family and societal costs from habitual excessive consumption of alcohol were among the compelling reasons for seeking to control public alcohol consumption. But what influences existed between alcohol usage and crime in society?

In the nineteenth century temperance advocates saw an incontrovertible causal relationship between drink and crime which seemed so established that it barely demanded serious documentation: more specifically the relationship between alcohol consumption with violent and property crime was clear enough to every soapbox reformer, each caregiver to the destitute, and many station house sergeants. To the religious community the connection was apparent enough. James H. Timberlake observed:

> By destroying man's love of God, intemperance, the churches believed, also destroyed Christianity's

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> most powerful incentive to self-discipline and social morality. The result was wretched homes, pauperism, crime, disease and vice, and a lowering of the moral tone of society in general.[20]

Over time the accumulation of data seemed to substantiate the role of alcohol as a direct cause of criminal behavior. This perceived reality came at great financial cost to the public. A report determined that two-thirds of general governmental expenditures at the time were appropriated for criminal justice and poor relief use.[21]

Strong economic arguments similarly were raised about the effects of alcohol usage among workers: circulars addressed to employers argued that whenever the temperance principle was applied to business conditions, workplace sobriety resulted in greater productivity through less absence and greater safety. Higher profits were the rewards to employers who emphasized abstinence or moderation among workers. The need for forthright action to stem abuses from alcohol consumption seemed unequivocal since relative consumption of alcohol was on the increase with a concomitant augmentation of societal problems: in 1810, the per capita consumption of alcohol by white men and women over fifteen years of age was about seven gallons of absolute alcohol. By 1830, this figure had increased to ten gallons per capita, most of which was distilled spirits since consumption of beer did not increase significantly until after 1850.[22]

The first state prohibition against manufacturing, transporting, and selling alcohol was passed in Maine in 1846,

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but the measure initially lacked any real force. Five years later Maine strengthened the law, providing imprisonment for third offenders and permitting search-and-seizure of suspects who sold or transported alcohol on complaint from three persons. This was the first major legislative victory by temperance forces, and its success spurred further efforts in other states.

Over the next four years, dry laws with variously different restrictions were enacted in twelve states: Connecticut, Delaware, Indiana, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont, and New York. Following the Maine model, repressive measures allowed to public authorities under this legislation would be the basis for testing their constitutionality. The New York Supreme Court was the first to find its bill unconstitutional in 1856.[23] Nationally, this first organized temperance movement stopped growing in the mid-1850s when sectional concerns over slavery and its abolition diverted the interests of many reformers who had previously been occupied by alcohol, its evils, and how to contain them legislatively as the primary issue on the agendas.

The reasons for the temperance movement's success were numerous and arose from various religious and moral, social, economic, and political explanations. Among the justifications for the control of alcohol sales and consumption were the growing relationship understood by temperance advocates that a causal relationship existed

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between excessive alcoholic drinking and crime and poverty. A voluminous report published by the New York State Temperance Society in 1834 summarized the effects of immoderate alcoholic consumption among those who had become incarcerated. On behalf of the Society, Samuel Chipman visited county poorhouses, jails, prisons, and similar institutions throughout the state:

> An analysis of these returns indicated that in every county at least sixty percent of the men and women held on criminal charges were habitually intemperate, while in some sections the percentage was even higher. With few exceptions at least a fifty percent of the inmates of each county poor-house testified that the use of spirituous liquors was the cause of their poverty. Furthermore, a general average of governmental expenditures throughout the state showed that more than two-third of the county taxes were appropriated annually to defray the cost of criminal justice and poor relief.[24]

The first temperance movement existed from the early national period to about 1850. The New York State Temperance Society (NYSTS), founded in 1829, spurred the creation of local chapters throughout the state, though support for the organization was greatest primarily upstate.[25] While the initial philosophic goals of the NYSTS was to promote moderation in the consumption of alcoholic beverages, two years after its founding the society like organizations elsewhere "advocated total abstinence from ardent spirits as a condition of employment for teachers."[26]

The perfectionist impulse emerging from the Second Great Awakening (1800-35), the belief that humans could speed the coming of the millennium by improving themselves and society

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on earth, forged a logical and supportive connection to the temperance movement. The shift of temperance advocates from moderation to abstinence, or teetotalism, was energized by the spiritual fervor of the time that militated against going only half way with principles, be they spiritual or social. Yet an opposition to temperance movements was always present and expanded during these years and, while much of society could acknowledge the social problems from abuse of alcohol, opponents to the movement reacted dramatically to developments. Rather than opt to debate the issue dispassionately, they maintained a strident tone: "Where argument ended harassment began, as shaving of horse tails, girdling of trees, and defacing of house fronts became standard responses to temperance campaigns and campaigners."[27]

In contrast to their upstate confreres, the New York City Temperance Society agreed that the teetotal pledge was an ideal to be pursued with patience and, therefore, should not be forced on the public suddenly, but that consensus should be achieved over time. The New York society believed that members of the city's black, Irish, and German communities should be weaned gradually from alcohol and circulated both the moderation and teetotal pledges challenging the state association's advocacy of teetotalism.[28]

Regardless of this intrastate contretemps, the first temperance movement enjoyed considerable success. Supported by statements from the respected Philadelphia physician Benjamin Rush that distilled spirits were addictive for some

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people, the religious, social, and scientific arguments coalesced in the face of often hostile and inchoate opposition. Per capita consumption of absolute alcohol "suffered its most precipitous decline in American history," falling from almost four gallons in 1830, to about half that only a decade later.[29]

The first movement depended on suasion to achieve its objectives of abstinence or, when that was not achievable, temperance; future years would see advocates increasingly opt for legislative support to their goals, often in the face of a fragmented and poorly communicative opposition.[30] The next phase of the temperance movement reflected social change with the decrease consumption of distilled spirits reflecting the new mores. In 1842, New York governor William H. Seward provided only lemonade and cold water for New Year's callers in contrast with the imbibing habits of years earlier; some socialites picked up the cue. This gesture was a counterpoint to urban political campaigns of the time which made copious uses of alcohol during election days to encourage and thank supportive voters. At the workplace, employers eliminated or substantially reduced workers' daily or weekly liquor portions in keeping with the new wave of restrictiveness.[31]

New Yorkers guarded their skepticism to the lure of teetotalism: dramatic measures would be needed to snare the uncommitted. The New York City Temperance Society spread the message by locally sponsoring five lecturers from Baltimore in

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March 1841, to expound on the evils of drink. At the first New York soiree, a young intoxicated man in the gallery--evidently planted by the meeting organizers--would interrupt the lecturer by asking if there would be any hope for an evidently wretched person like himself should he agree on the spot to drink no more. The lecturer reassured that hope was not lost. Amid great emotional feeling that gripped the audience, the young repentant shakily would descend from the balcony, sign the vow of abstinence as an exhilaration passed over the assemblage, and in the process would influence others subsequently to rise and "take the pledge."[32]

The Sons of Temperance, founded in September 1842, in New York City, provided a new type of organizational affiliation--a fraternal fellowship--to provide social activities for members linked by abstemiousness. The society thrived and within two years had expanded to six states and the District of Columbia; a smaller Daughters of Temperance was organized during the same time.[33] The ritualistic activities of such fraternal groups were designed to keep their members engaged in social activities and good works where consumption of alcohol was not part of the socialization. Gender roles remained inviolate at the time and were not mitigated by mutually shared valued. The Sons of Temperance refused to permit women to participate on an equal basis in their activities, and in 1852, a walkout from the convention, led by prominent women's rights activists, resulted in the formation of the Woman's New York State Temperance Society which

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advocated women's suffrage and political equality in addition to prohibition. This association soon dissolved, but the adherents' energies were transformed into social movements that directed women's energies into increasingly more visible and politically charged activities over subsequent years.[34]

The next phase of the movement toward legal control of the manufacture, selling, and consumption of alcohol also had its genesis far from the frenetic bustle of urban America. Activities occurring on the farms, in the villages, and within smaller urban areas eventually came to change city life; leadership for such developments stemmed from women, exemplified in the career of Frances E. Willard.

Born in 1839, the daughter of a prominent Massachusetts family, Willard's parents moved to the Midwest where her father became a banker in Chicago, and the family settled in Evanston. Following the completion of a phase of her own formal education, Willard taught in Evanston, Pittsburgh, and Lima, New York. While teaching at the Female College in Pittsburgh and imbued with Protestant evangelical zeal, she wrote a memoir, Nineteen Beautiful Years, published in 1864 by Harpers, which reflected her inner vision that was manifest in good works. Willard's father died in 1868. As the guest of her friend, Kate Jackson, the two women journeyed extensively through Europe during which time they attended lectures at the Collège de France and the Sorbonne.

Back home in 1871, Willard was elected president of the

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Woman's College in Evanston: she soon resigned as a matter of principle when the union of that college with Northwestern University meant that her plan of "self-government" for students would not be carried out.[35] She joined the Woman's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) in 1874 as corresponding secretary, an organization which had been founded at Chautauqua, New York, a year earlier. Becoming president of the national temperance union in 1879, Willard became inculcated with the cause which became her crusade. She spoke and travelled through more than a dozen states and Indian territories lecturing about the evils of alcohol, organizing the efforts into a potent national movement, and serving as a pivotal role in raising abstinence as a moral imperative almost until her death in 1898.

In her book Woman and Temperance, Willard avoids making arguments that alcohol directly leads to detrimental social behavior, such as encouraging crime or dissolute social circumstances. Rather the book portrayed how the WCTU organized to succeed in its mission. Perhaps Willard considered the relationship self-evident and did not require further elaboration. In any case, the constitution of the WCTU states the clear goal:

> The object of this Union shall be to educate public sentiment up to the level of total abstinence, to train the young, reform and save the inebriate, and hasten the time when the dram-shops shall be banished from the streets by law.[36]

The movement established organizations throughout the nation, but New York City clearly would be a problematic

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terrain for the establishment of a WCTU chapter. A history of the movement cautiously narrated:

> "It is useless for the women to do anything here: New York is a walled city," said a liquor dealer to one of our visitors in the early days of the Crusade. And, indeed, we have proved it so; its walls are thick and high, and to all human force impregnable. First in the entrenchments are the drunkards, men and women, standing shoulder to shoulder, not very erect and firm, it is true, but, supported and filled in by the moderate drinkers next behind them, everyone is a brick well laid. Then come the domestic and social users and the offerers of beer and wine, next the traffickers, then the property-holders with their wealth and greed, and last, but not least, since they afford strength, finish, and adornment to the defenses, stands the Church in its cold indifference. What a strong wall this is![37]

When the WCTU crusade reached the isle of New York, their initial failure appears to be confirmed by the paucity of any concrete references to achievements. Success in Brooklyn was in sharp contrast. There the itinerant crusaders drew crowds of over thirteen hundred who "arose for prayers" at the meetings. At other times the women visited jails and held prayer meetings on shipboard, at the Inebriate Asylum, within the penitentiary, on the waterfront, and at other Brooklyn locations.[38]

A reform club was organized and the Brooklyn Temperance Union now found that churches began to open their doors and provide support. Captain Oliver Cotter, a converted saloon-keeper, abandoned his business and threw his energies into temperance activities, according to the movement's historian:

> When the Union was organized, March, 1874, there were 3,110 saloons in this city, and their doors were open on the Sabbath day, bidding defiance to the Sunday closing law as well as to the secret day. An official statement, published after three months of prayer and labor, showed that 180 of these

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> had been closed--twenty-one being closed through their direct involvement in three weeks. At the expiration of three years, one-half of the saloons were closed, and there was no open selling on the Sabbath day. The arrests for drunkenness in 1875 were 6,810 less than during the year of 1874.[39]

In only a few circumstances during this time, however, were the efforts of the WCTU women and some male supporters shifted from transient emotional convictions to established refrainment laws. By the end of the 1870s, only Maine remained legally dry, and though New Hampshire voted to reject constitutional prohibition, it continued a statutory measure for unenforced prohibition.[40] Further movements to create a strong political position came to a watershed in 1892. Populist and Prohibition leaders met at the Sherman House in Chicago where leaders of the two parties failed to agree on a coalition, despite Willard's efforts to have a prohibition plank accepted by the Populist Party. According to historian Jack S. Blocker, Jr.: "Although Willard was to live for another five years, this incident virtually brought to an end the American political career of the most visible woman in late-nineteenth-century politics."[41]

The polarization of the two ideologically charged but vulnerable political parties could not be resolved in the critical weeks preceding the presidential elections. Failing to obtain sufficient support from the populists, the Prohibition Party "failed because it could neither attract the middle-class voters who had supported prohibition legislation in 1880 and would do so again after 1900, nor link up with the

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insurgent farmers of the 1890."[42]

With the demise of the partisan movement, the forces agitating for temperance and prohibition sought new expression. The kernel of leadership was provided in 1893 by the Ohio Anti-Saloon League founded in Oberlin by Howard H. Russell, a minister. The organization itself could trace its roots to the Oberlin Temperance Alliance of 1874, which over the years expanded its efforts from local to state-wide activism.[43] The next year a national convention of temperance workers, a majority of whom were clergymen, convened in Washington, D.C. The meeting included Archbishop John Ireland, the first Roman Catholic prelate to participate actively with the largely Protestant reformers, and Ireland agreed to serve as a vice-president.[44] By the next decade the Anti-Saloon League was organized on a national basis and was recognized as the real agency through which the church was directing its fight against the liquor traffic.[45]

The churches' moral battles to save souls among the intemperate was formidable. Timberlake noted:

> Economically and socially, intemperance was stigmatized by the evangelical churches because it struck at the well-being of the individual and prevented him from achieving success. It caused him to squander his wages, plunged him into bankruptcy, and pauperized him and his family. The drink habit, moreover, lowered his efficiency and hampered production and this interfered with the material progress and prosperity of the nation as a whole. Furthermore, by increasing the amount of crime, poverty, disease, and death, it caused untold misery and suffering, and by adding to the cost of maintaining jails, poorhouses, and public charity, it imposed on all people an extra burden of taxation.[46]

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In New York City, the Committee of Fifteen, a citizens' investigative group, determined that alcohol stimulated social vice and that prostitutes frequented saloons to get men to drink.[47] A more discursive study under the aegis of an expanded civic band, the Committee of Fifty, investigated the "liquor problem" from their inception in 1893 to a final report a decade later. The group was headed by Seth Low, later a mayor and subsequently president of Columbia University, and included business and church officials and academics, and involved criminal justice practitioners from the northeastern states. A subcommittee under the direction of Yale professor Henry W. Farnam conducted an investigation headed by John Koren.

This inquiry received the assistance of thirty-three charity organization societies, eleven children's aid societies, sixty almshouses, and seventeen prisons and reformatories in exploring the problem.[48] In its findings on crime due to liquor, the committee distinguished between liquor consumption and "other leading causes, notably unfavorable environment and lack of industrial training, in bringing about crime."[49] Using data provided by chaplains in institutions, superintendents, and others concerned with 13,402 convicts in seventeen prisons and reformatories scattered over twelve states, the researchers concluded that liquor influenced the motives of men and existed as a primary, secondary, or tertiary cause of crime as seen in the lives of the majority of convicts examined by the correctional

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personnel.

The national temperance movement began to score repeated successes with local option clauses which were later enlarged to state-wide prohibition. A local option law permitted specific regions within the state to decide for themselves whether to choose a no-license policy. By 1911, five out of sixty-eight legislative bills favorable to liquor traffic were passed by the general assembly of New York State and a large gain in the number of dry townships was noted.[50]

The Sons of Temperance had envisioned a constitutional amendment prohibiting the sale and manufacture of alcohol as early as 1856, but the first amendment was not proposed in the House of Representatives by Congressman Henry William Blair of New Hampshire until December 27, 1876. As a senator nine years later, Blair and Senator Preston B. Plumb from Kansas presented a similar motion. It was reported favorably by a Senate committee and appeared on the legislative calendar the next year, but no further action was taken.[51] The Fifteenth National Convention of the Anti-Saloon League of America held in Columbus, Ohio, November 1913, unanimously went on record favoring an immediate general campaign throughout the nation for national constitutional prohibition.

Ernest H. Charrington, a long-time temperance movement official, noted: "From this time forward, all the leading temperance organizations of the nation centered their efforts on the movement for National Prohibition."[52] A Committee of One Thousand Men--actually more than twice that in size and

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including women as members--began to pressure Congress, observing incidentally within their argument, that in thirty-six states of the Union the aggregate number of saloons was not so large as the number operating in New York City alone.

Efforts to block the prohibition bandwagon were begun belatedly and never achieved the level of organization or determination to counter the Anti-Saloon League and supportive groups. However, the efforts to stave off the prohibition drive contained arguments questioning the social, commercial, political, and religious commitments behind the prohibitionists' motives as well as arguing for a citizen's right to self-determination on such an issue.

Percy Andreae was one of the most consistent and vociferous anti-prohibition exponents during the second decade of the century. His impassioned discourses were heard before state political conventions considering the prohibition initiative as well as before vexed and belligerent brewers' conventions. In one of his addresses Andreae observed:

> Prohibition is merely the title of the movement. Its real purpose is of a religious, sectarian character, and this applies not only to the movement in America, but to the same movement in England, a fact which, strangely enough, has rarely, if at all, been recognized by those who have dealt with the question in the public press.... I venture to say...the assertion that the fight for prohibition is synonymous with the fight of a certain religious sect, or group of religious sects, for the supremacy of its ideas.[53]

Yet the decade ending in 1920 was an extraordinary one for prohibitionists crowned by developments that led to the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment. The impetus for the wave

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of prohibition victories "came from states in the South and West. In political matters, however, the nation's center of gravity lay in the Northeast because of that region's wealth, population, and control over national media of communications."[54] While clearly support for prohibition came preponderantly from non-urban and non-North-eastern sectors, New York City supported the movement financially, organizationally, and politically during these years, though manifestly numerous residents expressed skepticism about the merits of the legislation and its enforceability. Respectful of this urban misgiving, the New York State legislature passed a city local option on the question, enfranchising urban residents on the issue.

Radical Reform through the U.S. Constitution

The Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution prohibited the manufacture, transportation, and sale of intoxicating beverages--though not the personal possession or consumption--within the United States as well as the import or export of such beverages. The swiftness of the Amendment's passage was astounding. In December 1917, senators who generally opposed the measure sought to weaken its chances for success by requiring ratification within seven years. At that time merely twenty-three states had enacted state prohibition and prohibitionists sensing that the time for decisive action was at hand pressed their drive ahead. Thirteen months later on January 16, 1919, legislatures in the required three-quarters

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of the states had approved the measure and the Constitutional measure took effect a year later.

The Amendment "was one of the most radical reforms the United States ever undertook."[55] In one act an established, even historic, industry was dismantled, saloons were closed overnight, and the retail space was converted for other use, tax revenues were disrupted, and, above all, personal behavior began to undertake a prolonged and fundamental change in the years ahead. Other subterfuges to produce alcohol were held in check: a Food Control bill prohibited the use of food materials in the manufacture of beer and wine.[56]

Ten months following the implementation of the Amendment, Congress passed the Volstead Act (also called the National Prohibition Act), named for Representative Andrew Volstead of Minnesota, which provided for federal prosecution and criminal sanctions, including imprisonment for up to six months and seizure of personal and corporate property for violators. The United States Treasury Department through its Bureau of Internal Revenue commissioned officers to execute the law; these law enforcement officers were expected to supplement the activities of local police in enforcing prohibition.

The improving of social conditions, including the lessening of crime, had become an important argument for the mighty transformation of the environment with the passage of the act. It seemed self-evident to many academics, clergy, and civic leaders alike that if the state would abolish the

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availability of alcohol, in turn the environment would improve and criminogenic circumstances would be ameliorated. The sociologist Edward A. Ross believed that prohibition would reduce crime and poverty, improve the position of women and children, benefit the home, purify politics, and elevate the status of the wage earner.[57] Ross further opined that by the year 2100 a race constitutionally resistant to alcohol would have emerged.

Similarly, the business community believed that prohibition would bring lower taxes and sobriety would mean less crime, poverty, accidents, and disease decreasing public welfare costs from such consequences.[58] The middle classes generally concluded that drinking among the lower classes brought unrest, primarily among the propertyless urban poor, and that lawlessness and violence could be diminished or conquered by prohibition.[59]

These advocates believed that working people would be the greatest beneficiaries of prohibition and the laws should in no way be regarded as a violation of personal liberty. "To this objection the drys gave their usual reply: prohibition would no more prohibit than the laws against murder, gambling, prostitution, and burglary prohibited, but there was no reason to appeal these laws."[60] Indeed, many proponents were convinced that the sentiments in favor of prohibition were so united that enforcement eventually would receive unquestioned support of the public, if not immediately.

The city had first experienced war-time prohibition

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beginning July 1, 1919, until the following January 16, when the Constitutional measure went into effect. Federal prohibition officially took effect in New York City beginning January 16, 1920, but enforcement by police in New York City over these months was tentative. One reason for the hesitancy was that the Volstead Act was challenged as being unconstitutional, but on June 6, the United States Supreme Court upheld the enforcement act and ruled against New York State's palliative act permitting 2.75 percent beer and wine. While the legislative battle had been a national one, the focus on New York City was symbolically and technically important. The Anti-Saloon League Year Book for 1920 observed:

> While New York's percentage of foreign population and the attitude of the New York papers, which have kept the people in ignorance, make the problem of enforcement the most desperate in the entire country, yet with even partial enforcement there has been a noticeable improvement in New York City....The feeling is typified by a State Senator, an advocate of beer, who, in response to the proposition that Prohibition should have a fair test for two years, said: "If Prohibition lasts for two years beer can never come back."[61]

The League reported that for the first three months of 1920 inebriants brought before city magistrates had been decreased by more than half, further adding: "During the last six months of 1919, which was the first dry period for New York City, there was a decrease of more than 15 percent in the number of inmates of prisons of that city compared with the same months of 1918."[62]

The research secretary for the Board of Temperance of the

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Methodist Episcopal Church cast a positive spin on the city's response to prohibition in its earliest days: "New York went dry very much after the fashion of a baby taking castor oil. She kicked and hollered, bit and clawed, but she took the medicine and to-day she feels better for it."[63] The church official referred to "the astonishing degree of success with which the law is being enforced a bare few months after its enactment" and the "sportsmanship and good faith with which the masses of the city's population have accepted the law."[64]

Within the first year of enforcement, Colonel Daniel C. Porter of the Bureau of Internal Revenue with a maximum of forty men, made eight hundred arrests and five hundred cases in New York City, as many as were made in the entire nation. Porter estimated that the quantity of alcohol consumed by citizens of New York had dropped to one-quarter of the pre-prohibition levels "despite the large quantities stored by private owners for personal use."[65] Almost all of the city's nine thousand saloons were closed or were transformed for legitimate purposes, according to an estimate. A New York City-based prohibition worker at the time wrote:

> One evening in February I started down Seventh Avenue from Twenty-eighth Streets and walked nearly one hundred blocks on Seventh Avenue and Broadway, entering every former saloon that was open. It was Saturday night. In practically every case I found the bartender leaning on the bar, idly flicking his towel or with his head in his hands. The strongest drinks to be head were sweet ciders and near-beer containing less than one half of one percent of alcohol. On the Bowery, from Mulberry Bend to McGurk's old Suicide Hall, one does not see a drunk, nor a bully, nor a street walker.[66]

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The official concluded in his report that the effects of prohibition in the city "constitute an eighth wonder" and that: "Prohibition has made only two changes in New York City: First, the city is more prosperous because of it, and second, the city is less lawless because of it."[67]

The early economic and social benefits of prohibition included an increased saving rate, more alert audiences in the theater, and less street boisterousness at holiday time. The New York World reported on December 27, 1919: "Never in the history of the city were there so few persons arraigned in the police courts as a result of over-imbibing on Christmas....A year ago yesterday in (Yorkville Court) twenty-six persons were arraigned on charges of drunkenness on Christmas day. This year there were only two cases." Even many of the city's foreign-born with a tradition of alcohol consumption as part of their habits seemed to acquiesce to the imposed restriction. The Brooklyn Daily Eagle of January 11, 1920, stated: "The dissatisfied ones are growing fewer daily."

Prohibition was the product of Main Street and its advocates scrutinized successes and failures in New York City, emphasizing the former. The grandiously named World League Against Alcoholism, operating from Westerville, Ohio and Washington, DC, maintained its research department in New York City in the 1920s and used the city to report on Gotham's successes and developments in implementing the prohibition movement. Several reports attest to the results of alcohol control.

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In 1923, the Bowery, "that notorious district," was profiled in a fourteen-page League report which was meant to document the success of prohibition on a quintessentially intransigent street relative to alcoholic consumption.[68] The report observed: "The Bowery was the last haven for derelicts; here Bacchaus and Gambrinus reigned supreme over helpless subjects." The report argued that, despite its reputation, the Bowery was undergoing a prolonged period of saloon diminishment: from 97 saloons in 1886, the number had dropped to forty-four in 1916. Then prohibition of a sort had begun in the spring of 1917 when prices increased sharply while quality decreased, followed by efforts from the Army and Navy to limit liquor for military personnel stationed in or passing through the city. By 1922, the number of streetside saloons on Broadway had been reduced to six. The report noted: "It should be added that five of them are about as unattractive, filthy and dilapidated as barrooms can be."[69] It further argued that real estate values had increased steadily since 1916 at saloon locations that had been transformed into other businesses. Similarly, tabular data in the report indicated a precipitous decline in activities of the Bowery Mission from 1910 through 1922. From 1910 through 1915, the one a.m. bread line averaged 141,000 people per year; in 1918, it was discontinued.[70] Total meals served at the Mission for the years 1910 to 1916 averaged 282,233 per year. For the years 1920-22, the average number of meals served dropped to 66,518; meanwhile, the number of employment positions found increased

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over ten-fold from the pre-war to the years 1921-22.[71]

The Bowery was cited as an avatar of debaucheries by tradition and reputation and the imposition of prohibition had improved its reputability by the early 1920s. But what of a street known more for its financial dealings, retailing, and amusements? The League also published a report on "Broadway--The Greatest Street in America Under Prohibition," which documented, from the League's perspective, post-prohibition observations that were similar to those of the Bowery in a much greater detailed report.[72] The changes required by adaptation to prohibition were notable in the amusement district, called at the time "the great white way" or the "roaring forties." Prohibition killed streetside saloons and liquor stores while it also reduced the number of hotels which thrived from liquor consumption. In the theater district saloons decreased from thirty-five in 1886, to twenty-nine in 1918, and none by 1923. The report stated: "The theatres report unanimously that the coming of Prohibition has increased their door receipts....This is particularly true in big motion picture palaces which accommodate several thousand patrons."[73] Prohibition closed such hotels as the Holland House on Fifth Avenue, the Knickerbocker in the theater district, and the Manhattan; but other closed hotels were transformed into office buildings, and a few Broadway hotels expanded during the post-prohibition years. The report concluded: "Prohibition has done more on this street to circumvent the evil of alcoholism than all the former laws and

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regulations ever did."[74]

In 1924, the League published a report entitled: "The Passing of the Saloons in New York City," prepared by Robert Everett Corradini, research secretary.[75] The largely pictorial report contains photographs of saloons prior to prohibition and pictures of saloon locations that were transformed into a wide variety of other businesses. The author noted:

> Prohibition meant a complete social readjustment for many men who had dealt in liquor all their lives and were mentally both unequipped and unprepared for the new order. Some very frankly did not know how to make a change. Others, having never known anything else felt that a monstrous injustice had been done to them when the American people enacted the Eighteenth Amendment, depriving them of what they thought was an honest way of making a living. A few simply would not incommoditate themselves and they refused to adjust their affairs to the new order of things.[76]

In 1924, the League issued a more detailed report, evaluating changes in saloons after the first three and five years of prohibition.[77] The report cited historical findings of alcohol consumption and its consequences: from 1910 to 1916 in Greater New York, the alcoholic death rate per 100,000 population remained unchanged at 13.[78] Similarly during this period, arrests for drunkenness "had not decreased to such an extent as one would expected to be the case, considering the efforts put forth by the legislature to encompass the evil of drunkenness."[79]

However, in the report summary for 1922, substantial decreases in the numbers of saloons and liquor stores were restated. Retailers who sold distilling devices and implements for home brew were identified--thirty-six malt and

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hop stores were counted throughout Manhattan and seven in the rest of the city. Yet the report concluded that the stock of such stores was not extensive: "As to distilling, for private home consumption in New York City, it is a negligible factor."[80] Notwithstanding this assurance, the survey of 1924 reflected less confidence than earlier reports on the success of prohibition: "New York has enforced Prohibition only so much as it had to. The Police Department has made, with good results, several spasmodic attempts to dry up the city, but the good intentions have always outrun the actual performance."[81]

An argument of the wets frequently raised was that prohibition would result in an unacceptable diminution of tax revenues. From the year 1908 to 1918, total receipts from the liquor traffic in New York State rose from eighteen million dollars to about twenty-two million. Expenses of the Excise Department for obtaining such revenues were under two percent of the gross income for 1918. But a surge in real estate tax revenues beginning in 1920 more than absorbed the total loss of receipts from liquor taxes, the League determined. William Douglas Kilpatrick, a real estate operator, placed an advertisement in a New York newspaper which argued that prohibition had been a "health-giving, accident preventing, home-protecting-and-owning, money-saving, business-increasing and employment-giving economic measure..."[82]

The early months after passage of the restrictive laws produced data that seemed to underscore prohibitionists' faith

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in their vision. Arrests for several types of alcohol-related crimes in New York City declined sharply comparing the previous six months: arrests for intoxication declined from 3,605 to 1,827; intoxication and disorderly conduct declined from 861 to 536, and arrests for operating a vehicle while intoxicated dropped from ninety-nine to eighty-three.

Disorderly conduct was a lose and indefinite charge at the time signifying any behavior that is contrary to law, more particularly behavior that disturbs the public peace or decorum, scandalizes the community, or shocks the public sense of morality or safety. Individuals arrested for disorderly conduct frequently are engaged in fighting or threatening behavior, make unreasonable noises or utterances by those who create offensive conditions which serve no legitimate purpose: such behavior frequently is associated with drinking.

Apart from those arrested on the intoxication charge, individuals taken in custody for disorderly conduct showed a dramatic increase in the first six dry months over the six wet months a year earlier rising from 7,044 to 13,053. Clearly, something was happening that the prohibition propagandists failed to observe or report. A possible explanation for this development is that actual alcohol consumption remained approximately at a level within the range that it had been prior to prohibition and that consumption had moved elsewhere from the saloon. Another theory is that policing practices changed to deemphasize intoxication as the charge for arrest, replacing it with a charge of disorderly conduct. Probably

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these data indicate that alcohol had found distribution channels into the city and that ad libitum consumption by some consumers had led to individual disorderliness prompting a surge of arrests.

Despite the efforts of an ostensibly committed Bureau of Prohibition, enforcement in reality weakened within New York State. In March 1921, the Legislature passed the Mullan-Gage state enforcement act that provided grants to police throughout the state aiding them to enforce the regulation. The next month the superintendent of state police told his 232 state troopers that they must be prepared to make raids throughout their districts and that the state should be "bone dry" in sixty days.[83]

But such raids by state troopers would not be conducted within New York City, where federal and city law enforcement officers were expected to fulfill that task. The same year on July 4, Shaemas O'Sheel led the first New York temperance protest parade. Nonetheless, prohibition had transformed public assemblies that often previously had a cast of licentiousness to them. The immensely popular heavy weight boxing championship fight, in which Dempsey defeated Carpentier by knocking him out in the fourth round, occurred in Jersey City and attracted a record crowd of ninety thousand including many New Yorkers. Bootleggers were "noticeably absent," at the fight and the spectators were noted to be "orderly and well handled," according to a newspaper report.[84]

Beneath the surface, however, organization to supply

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alcohol had been established. Throughout the metropolitan region a regimen of clandestine alcoholic purchasing and consumption culture, supported by an elaborate domestic and international supply network, had taken shape. Police action mitigating the organized supply links, begun hastily, increased their efforts. Later that year ninety prohibition agents descended upon four illicit establishments serving liquor in the Broadway region, but seized only thirteen prisoners.[85] Not all the supply need arrive from afar: the provision of alcohol could be derived locally. The next month eight moonshine stills exploded in Brooklyn, injuring five firemen.[86] Distilled spirits also could be imported by meticulously organized rum runners who supplied the New York market mostly from Canada, Europe, and the Caribbean. The same month an alleged bootlegger, a Brooklyn resident, was shot dead by a rum runner when the boat carrying the bootleggers left the tramp steamer anchored in international waters for Brooklyn apparently without paying for the liquor they had received.[87]

The Crime Argument and Repeal

Crime reduction and control had never featured as central reasons for supporting prohibition: the moral arguments were usually uppermost. Yet the study of its effects on crime were inevitable and evolved into a logical national concern. The unreliability of crime data nationally became an issue that had become apparent with the passage of time. A Special

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Committee on Law Enforcement of the American Bar Association in 1923, noted generally the "lack of reliable official information...that the United States is the only great civilized country which does not collect and preserve its criminal statistics."[88] Based on correspondence with police officials and clerks from forty-eight cities within the United States, the report concluded: "(W)e ascertain that the growth of crime in the country was steady and almost regular up to our entrance into the World War; that during the war crime decreased greatly, but upon the resumption of peace, criminals resumed their depredations with increased activity all over the country."[89] The committee determined that from 1910 to 1922, the general population had increased 14.9 percent while the criminal population increased 16.6 percent. Quoting from the committee's report to the Bar Association at their annual meeting a year earlier, the contention was made:

> From all the data and opinions of experts which your Committee has been able to gather, we beg leave to report that particularly since 1890, there has been and continues a widening, deepening tide of lawlessness in this country, sometimes momentarily receding, but swelling again into great depths of intensity; at interval this tide billows into waves that rise and break, but only for a time attracting attention....The criminal situation in the United States so far as crimes of violence are concerned is worse than in any other civilized country....
>
> It is our united opinion that the means provided in the United States for coping with crime and criminals are today neither adequate nor efficient.[90]

But what role did prohibition have on the perceived increase in crime? The committee noted: "In the hundreds of

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replies to our communications from members of our profession in every State of the Union, we find constant reference and very decided difference of opinion as to the effect of the Eighteenth Amendment and the laws, federal and state, passed in conformity therewith."[91]

In effect, the committee could arrive at no conclusion concerning the implications of prohibition legislation observing that any conclusions "are largely expressions of opinion. Statistics have been very difficult to obtain." The committee appended a statement without comment from Palmer Canfield, Federal Prohibition Director, dated June 15, 1923, stating in part:

> There are many who state without recourse to figures, and without any analysis of facts, that law enforcement has broken down, due principally to prohibition. It is true that prohibition has added a heavy load to the enforcement of law and has led to flagrant violations of a certain character, yet it has more than offset this result by contributing largely to a reduction in the commission of other crimes....
>
> It is true that this large decrease is mostly in the county and municipal jail because prohibition has resulted in a large decrease in crimes such as assault, disorderly conduct, public intoxication, vagrancy, and similar crimes. Therefore, a comparison of the prison population of state prisons will show a smaller decrease.[92]

Citing a report from the director of the Department of Child Helping of the Russell Sage Foundation of New York, Canfield notes that total prison and jail population in five states--New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Illinois, and Missouri--declined 16.3 percent from 1917 to 1922, and concluded: "The decrease of 6,455, therefore, occurred

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entirely in the county and city prisons, and was due chiefly to the effect of prohibition. If it had not been for prohibition, those twenty-eight states, like the twenty prohibition states, would doubtless have shown a very large increase in consequence of the war."[93]

In the following years the debate on the success or failure of the measures remained active. Reviewing the relationship between prohibition in 1928 and crime, Charrington, declared that the year showed a recession in crime: "The rising tide of crime which, as the American Bar Association and other students of our criminal data feared, once threatened to engulf the nation, has become a receding tide under Prohibition."[94] Charrington asserted, further, that the movement against the use of beverage alcohol gained impetus in almost every industrialized country in the year, and attributed the trend to prosperity resulting from the measures instituted in the United States. But Charrington leveled a charge against major cities and the willingness of authorities had there not to enforce existing legislated measures severely: "When cities like New York, Philadelphia and Chicago purged their Police Department of criminals, the gang wars, the alliances with bootleggers and the protected crime in such communities will drop to the same level as that attained in other communities where a respect and not a disrespect for law is encouraged."[95]

While the literature of the prohibitionists barely

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recognized the fact, opposition to the law had steadily grown within the city and it had taken several forms. One way of circumventing prohibition was through the issuance of physicians' prescriptions. Medical practitioners faced restrictions on prescribing alcohol as a palliative; nonetheless, the legislation entitled them to one hundred such forms every ninety days. A past president of the American Medical Association told a Senate subcommittee that most doctors bootlegged prescriptions.[96]

Druggists were allowed one hundred gallons of spirits every three months and might purchase physicians' pre-signed prescription blanks to provide their own customers; further, some pharmacists diluted medicinal liquor with bootlegged alcohol to stretch their authorized allotment of spirits and increase their profits.

But the major source of illicit alcohol was the burgeoning commerce that spirits produced from supplies which were distilled abroad and which were smuggled into the United States and distributed through an elaborate and constantly protean network. While illicit alcohol could be produced in private domestic stills, most of the supply was imported from abroad where it would reach New York by land or sea.

One important source of supply to New York City consumers was from eastern Canada. Canadians had followed the American-led initiative by imposing their own federal form of prohibition on the consumption of alcohol. However, the provinces had no power to regulate its manufacture and Ottawa

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chose not to prohibit production of alcohol despite demands by the United States.[97] As a result, Canadians could manufacture distilled spirits and export them to the United States without violating Canadian law meanwhile being unable to purchase the product for their own consumption. Canadians soon became enterprising in the risky trafficking of moving spirits to a strip known as Rum Row, the Atlantic coastal region from Boston to New York City.

Crews on vessels would deliver the distilled product to international waters, three miles off shore, where it would be transferred to smugglers who would move it ashore for distribution. The process involved risks to both parties. The Coast Guard had the task of interdicting the trade but generally could not overtake the faster vessels when a chase developed. Along Rum Row an estimated one hundred thousand cases of distilled spirits were delivered each month of which the Coast Guard intercepted less than five percent of the contact boats.[98]

Smugglers themselves were subject to attack by audacious hijackers eager to capture such valuable cargo and transfer it away quickly in their own armed vessels.[99] A bottle of Canadian whiskey which cost three dollars in Canada, fetched over twice that in northern New York State, and four times the original amount in New York City.[100] Nonetheless, no way existed to seal off the Canadian border, almost four thousand miles long, or the vast American Atlantic coastline which could receive shipments from Canada, Nassau ("The Isle of

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Rum"), St. Pierre of the Miquelons ("The Isle of Champagne"), and other offshore sources of supply.[101]

The principal means of enforcing the restrictive laws was through the Bureau of Prohibition, and yet the "Dry Congress" had authorized a maximum of one thousand five hundred agents for the entire nation and paid them a mere forty dollars a week. The most celebrated of these was Izzy Einstein, self-proclaimed in a book he wrote as Prohibition Agent No. 1.[102] Einstein claimed to have arrested 4,932 persons during his years with his partner, Moe Smith. The intrepid agents reflected the disparate and often improbable individuals who were drawn to this work. Einstein was a former post office clerk measuring five feet in height and weighing about two hundred twenty-five pounds; Smith was a former cigar salesman and was even heavier than his partner though taller. Despite their physical incongruity as agents and their pronounced New York accents, the team was able to feign numerous disguises successfully in arresting prohibition violators. During their career they confiscated an estimated five million bottles of liquor and millions more bottles of beer. The publicity-loving team apparently irked their supervisors and they were terminated in 1925.

At the end of the distribution chain in New York City was the speakeasy. Customers would approach a discreet door, knock, be viewed through a peephole, would be recognized or would proffer the appropriate identification, and then would be admitted. Like the tavern of the early Dutch colony,

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speakeasies of the 1920s were available in all areas of the city and catered to a wide variety of economic and social classes. They could be found in fashionable penthouses, in mid-town brownstones, in Greenwich Village cellars, in rooming houses, behind legitimate front businesses, within tenement houses, and associated with numerous restaurants, tearooms, and clubs. One on New York's East Side had an entrance that made it look like a synagogue.[103] By 1929, Police Commissioner Grover Whalen's department estimated that the city supported thirty-two thousand such establishments, or more than one speakeasy for every two hundred residents regardless of gender or age.

During the decade of the 1920s, older, settled residents of Greenwich Village regretted the bohemian practices of many residents and "regretted the multitude of speakeasies and the emphasis on drink" in their neighborhood noted historian Caroline F. Ware.[104] Speakeasies meant vice and with it an increasing linkage between citizens and police in perpetuating the commerce of illegal alcohol distribution. Ware explained how an expectation of graft had infused some residents:

> By 1930, the Italians generally accepted the assumption that politics was a form of business. One storekeeper, who paid protection to gangsters, stated that he preferred to pay gangsters rather than to pay the police because the former were more efficient as protectors. Upon further inquiry it turned out that he assumed that the police had to be paid as a matter of course--not as a matter of graft.[105]

Others disputed Charrington's earlier estimate of the extent to which the city provided brewing materials available

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for sale, especially malt syrup. Author John Kobler stated: "In New York City alone more than 500 malt and hops shops flourished."[106] In addition to independent retail food shops, chains like A&P displayed great pyramids of malt syrup cans. The expanding trade of such staples resulted in the formation of two associations of wholesalers and retailers, the National Association of Malt Syrup Manufacturers and the Interstate Products Association.

The associations informed their members that maple syrup was a food to be sold with impunity unless it should be used to make alcohol; therefore, members were advised against placing any advertisements that suggested illegal applications. In a store on lower Fifth Avenue, facing Marble Collegiate Church, a congregation backing the Volstead Act, a salesgirl demonstrated a new product--a brick of grape concentrate, a gallon glass jug, and various accessories--informing her potential customers in a carefully crafted sales presentation:

> "You dissolve the brick in a gallon of water," she explained, "and it is ready to be used immediately. Do not place the liquid in this jug and then put it away in the cupboard for twenty-one days, because then it would turn into wine.
>
> "Do not stop the bottle with this cork containing this patented red rubber siphon hose, because that is only necessary when fermentation is going on....do not shake the bottle once a day, because that makes the liquor work."[107]

The result of such a procedure would be to create a mud-brown liquid smelling of sourly mash and "tasting like a laundry soap": the alcoholic content was approximately

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thirteen percent.

After over a year's experience with the Prohibition Amendment in effect, Representative Andrew Volstead gloated to a convention of the Anti-Saloon League: "There is as much chance of repealing the Eighteenth Amendment as there is for a hummingbird to fly to the planet Mars with the Washington Monument tied to its tail."[108]

In a history of the era, Frederick Lewis Allen stated: "When the Eighteenth Amendment was ratified, prohibition seemed...to have an almost united country behind it. Evasion of the law began immediately, however, and strenuous and sincere opposition to it--especially in the large cities of the North and East--quickly gathered force."[109] In fact, the movement to repeal the act started within months of its passage and the leadership for repeal came from New York City. Larry Engelmann, author of a history of the era, wrote: "A turning point of sorts in public opinion occurred in 1923. New York repealed its 'Baby Volstead Act' that year and an increasing amount of criticism welled up in the mass media."[110]

The argument for repeal came from many sources. One was an ideological argument raised by a Voluntary Committee of Lawyers who asserted:

> The Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act violate the basic principles of our law and government and encroach upon the powers properly reserved to the states and the people, [and] the attempt to enforce them has been productive of such evils and abuses as are necessarily incidents to a violation of these principles, including disrespect for law, obstruction

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> of the due administration of justice, corruption of public officials, abuse of legal process, resort by the government to improper and illegal acts in the procurement of evidence and infringements of such constitutional guarantees as immunity from double jeopardy and illegal search and seizure.[111]

Another factor was that the forces against prohibition belatedly became organized as a counteraction to and following the model of the Anti-Saloon League. New Yorkers initially sought not to reverse the Amendment, which seemed insuperable as an issue, but rather sought to render "the law less obnoxious in practice" by eliminating double jeopardy in federal and state prosecution and seeking to allow the use of mild beer as a beverage.[112]

The Moderation League of New York, formed in 1923, was directed toward these goals. Soon, however, a national effort was launched to coordinate modification or, conceivably, repeal. The principal group which was to protest against the measures was the Association Against the Prohibition Amendment (AAPA). In January, 1924, the AAPA formed a joint Legislative Committee, composed of the American Federation of Labor, the Moderation League of New York, and the Constitutional Liberty League of Massachusetts to seek mitigation of the prohibition strictures.[113]

A Women's Organization for National Prohibition Reform was organized in New York City and headed by Mrs. Charles H. Sabin. Among its activities was the sponsorship of literature arguing that prohibition was against state rights.[114] By 1931, Repeal, a monthly magazine devoted to prohibition reform, was

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launched and published in New York City under the leadership of Major Maurice Campbell.

The attitude in New York City and the nation as a whole steadily turned stronger against prohibition, and may have been intensified by the stock market crash of October, 1929 which helped plunge the nation into an economic morass. In 1924, New York State's Democratic Party governor, Al E. Smith, derided by the drys as "ALE" Smith, was the first presidential contender since prohibition to indicate a sympathy for loosening the legal strictures. Smith lost the presidential election of 1928 to Herbert Hoover; but by the 1932 election voters, once firmly opposed to modification of prohibition measures, had perceptibly weakened.

In contrast to Hoover's continued support of prohibition measures, the Democratic Party nominee, Franklin D. Roosevelt, was identified as a wet. The partisan conventions of the summer of 1928 indicated, however, how potent the topic remained. John Dewey observed: "Here we are in the midst of the greatest crisis since the Civil War and the only thing the two national parties seem to want to debate is booze."[115]

On election day, Roosevelt received 22,800,000 votes to Hoover's 15,750,000, and the patrician former New York governor captured the majority vote from all except six states. The landslide placed the wets in control of both Houses, though short of a two-thirds majority in the Senate.[116] That encumbrance did not serve as a deterrent to repeal and Congress quickly passed the Twenty-first Amendment, which was

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ratified when the Utah legislature cast its vote as the thirty-six state on December 5.[117] With ratification of repeal, Roosevelt urged "temperance," and in New York City most speakeasies closed and crowds "marked by absence of undue hilarity" rejoiced in Time Square. According to a newspaper article "many of the thousand restaurants, hotels and clubs fortunate enough to have received their licenses for the sale of alcoholic beverages were back in business again."[118]

One of the increasing factors that militated for the unprecedented repeal of the Constitutional measure related to perceptions of changes in crime in the city. With the nation in the throes of an economic quagmire, prohibition remained as a powerful moral issue which would not be relinquished willingly. Even during the weeks before final repeal was passed, wet propagandists continued to maintain a consistent viewpoint. In The Drama of Drink, published in 1932, Raymond Westervelt Cooper argued "why prohibition has been a success."[119] The temperance educator concluded that public opinion actually favored prohibition; consumption of beverage alcohol vastly had decreased; and prosperity was "unparalleled even in a depression [compared with a] liquor nation." He also observed that youth opposed alcoholic drink and that abstainers lived longer.

Another argument raised by Cooper was that "prohibition has actually reduced crime."[120] He argued that the "crime wave" was worldwide in scope as proven by statistics of all

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nations and resulted from the loss of morality which was "swept aside by the war" and which was abetted by "the auto in aiding escape from crime." Despite such observations, the author asserted: "Without prohibition being a huge deterrent to crime, we would be having a crime wave that would make the present one seem very insignificant."[121]

Nor was this view confined to the New York area. William N. Gemmell, a judge for seventeen years of the Municipal Court of Chicago, and an avowed prohibitionist, argued that the city prison census was 1,800 to 2,200 prisoners before prohibition and had ranged from 650 to 1,200 after:

> Fifteen years ago...it took all of the time of two judges sitting at Harrison Street, our central court, to dispose of the criminal business there. They often tried as high as four hundred cases in a single morning. Now only one judge sits there and he seldom has over 125 and often has less than fifty cases per day....Since the Eighteen Amendment, we have abolished two courts for want of business.[122]

Other results in Chicago following prohibition included a decrease in the severity of alcoholism. A patient ward at the city's bridewell for persons afflicted with delirium tremens, capable of holding fifty to one hundred patients, was closed. Arrests for juvenile delinquency declined nearly 50 percent and dependency dropped about 40 percent between 1917 and 1922. Gemmell commented: "These figures are very significant because most of our cases of juvenile delinquency come from broken homes."[123]

The number of inmates at the Oak Forest Infirmary, the Cook County poor house, dropped from almost 9,000 in 1916, to

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under 7,200 six years later. The judge noted: "The population had decreased to such an extent that [the superintendent] did not now have a sufficient number of able-bodied men and women to perform the necessary work about the place. At his request we began to commit slight offenders, and during the year 1922, we committed 375 such prisoners to this infirmary."[124]

In Chicago deaths from exposure and from uncertain circumstances also decreased. Before 1918, many dead bodies were found in which death had been caused presumably by exposure while intoxicated: these required an inquest by the county coroner's office. In 1917, 6,636 inquests were held; in 1922, the number had been reduced to 5,842, while the population of Chicago had increased by over a half million. During the same time, total deaths from all causes dropped in 1922 to the lowest death rate in the city's history.

Concerning crime and drunkenness, the judge concluded that incidents "have been reduced in a most remarkable degree," and added, "I have before me the record of sixty-three cities of the United States, touching crime brought down to January 1. In all of these cities, save five, there has been a remarkable reduction in the number of persons arrested for serious crimes. What is true with reference to crimes is true with reference to drunkenness."[125]

As the decade continued, rhetoric arguing that crime had decreased contrasted with dissenting information which demonstrated that crime had increased and had done so in ways

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never foreseen by the prohibition initiative. In its "National Survey of Conditions Under Prohibition" for 1926, the Moderation League of New York City found that arrests for drunkenness nationally in 1925 had reached levels of pre-wartime restrictions, and the pattern was worsening. According to Stanley Shirk, the League's research director: "Drunkenness increased almost twice as fast in 1925 as it did in 1924."[126] The report contended that conditions in the former "so-called 'dry' states are worse today, compared with 1914, than are conditions in the so-called 'wet' states."

By the 1930 report, the situation had exacerbated, though to a lesser degree. Shirk observed: "Previously there had always been each year a quite noticeable rise over the prior year; but in 1929 the rise was very slight, and this, in our judgment, was due to the panic with resulting hard times. It is well known that, other things being equal, drunkenness increases in good times and decreases in hard times."[127]

What was more remarkable during the decade was the extent to which violent and property crime, always present within American society, became more fully organized, mimicking features of corporatism. The AAPA by the late 1920s had emerged as the ideological think tank to repeal the Act and zeroed its attacks on the corruption and crime emerging in association with the repressive measure. In a booklet, "Scandals of Prohibition Enforcement," the AAPA stated: "New York is considered the most conspicuous example of a wet city. Its wetness is usually attributed to the fact that New York

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has no State enforcement act."[128]

The AAPA directed its scrutiny on how prohibition affected the courts and the correctional system. The growth of criminality had placed a strain on federal courts and prisons. A publication prepared by the AAPA's research department argued: The number of individuals sentenced on federal crimes increased by four times between 1916 and 1930, while the five federal prisons remained unaugmented in number and the list of federal judgeships had grown only by fourteen.[129] Criminal cases in federal courts had grown from 34,230 in 1920, reaching a peak in 1925 of 92,711, and declining to 85,328 by 1929. However, the percentage of prohibition-related cases grew sharply during this time from 5,095, or 14.9 percent of the cases in 1920, to 47,925 cases or 51.5 percent by 1925, and 56,455 cases or 66.2 percent by 1929. Thus, by this measurement, almost two-thirds of federal criminal cases involved offenses associated with prohibition.[130] Eliminating cases of espionage--of negligible importance after 1922--and selective draft cases, the "net" increase of total criminal cases prosecuted under the national prohibition act became a singular feature of the court calendar in the 1920s. Indeed, prosecution of such cases seemed vigorous: "The reports show a high rate of convictions. The ratio of convictions to total cases terminated has never been less than 76 percent and in some years it has reached 85 percent. On their face, these figures would seem to indicate effective enforcement."[131] Federal civil litigation also was

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effected during the time: an AAPA publication stressed: "Civil cases to which the United States is a party have greatly increased by padlock injunctions and libel suits brought in under prohibition. Such civil cases have increased 347 per cent since 1920, but if we exclude prohibition actions, the increase is only 117 percent."[132]

Federal statistics tell only part of the story: prisoners held in state and local jails also rose during this time. Further, many more crimes simply never made their way onto police station house blotters--a perennial situation--to provide a fuller assessment of criminal activity at the time, though no evidence exists that this predicament had changed during the prohibition era. An academic of the era argued that the extent of crime at the time was unmeasurable:

> Of the extent of crimes which are not reported to the police or which are not known to the public, we have no means of knowing; but it is undoubtedly very large. Of reported cases of felony in general hardly more than one-half, sometimes less than one-half, are apprehended or undergo arrest.[133]

From 1923 to 1927, the federal and state rate of prisoners as of January 1, increased 11.2 percent from 74.0 per 100,000 population to 85.0; moreover, the parole system and the use of suspended sentences had come into general use, not subjecting thousands to imprisonment who prior to prohibition would have not escaped the sanction of incarceration.[134]

Concerned with the growing incidence of crime, Congress

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authorized appointment of a National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement in 1929, composed of ten leading citizens and headed by New York lawyer George W. Wickersham, for whom the commission was popularly called. Over eighteen months the Wickersham Commission conducted hearings which eventually resulted in a five volume report, totalling almost three thousand pages. The hearings delved into numerous aspects of corruption in New York City and throughout the nation.

Major Chester P. Mills, regarded as an honest prohibition administrator, claimed in Collier's Weekly in 1927 that "three fourths of the 2,500 Dry agents are ward heelers and sycophants named by the politicians."[135] In New York State, a former prohibition administrator, a former enforcement chief, and several agents were indicted in a bribe scandal estimated at about fifty-thousand dollars. Yet concerning the Eighteenth Amendment, the eleven Wickersham Commission members arrived at no consensus on the matter: two endorsed repeal; seven proposed modifications in the Amendment, and two stood for its continuance without considerable change.

Despite the ambiguities from the positions taken by the commission members, the tide was rolling out swiftly for control measures on alcohol consumption. Still polemicists in 1932 continued to argue that prohibition was a success in the United States and indeed was on the verge of leading to the success of prohibition on a worldwide basis.[136] The stress and strain of the disconcerting combination of economic collapse,

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relentless urbanization, and prohibitionism had become a burdensome issue for the nation. The highly circumspect churchman and moderate, John D. Rockefeller, Jr., "slowly and reluctantly" concluded that the positive effects of prohibition were "far more than outweighed by the evils" resultant from it.[137] With the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the "experiment" came to an end.

The verdicts of prohibition's societal impact in the decades following repeal largely have been unfavorable. Seven years following repeal, Fletcher Dobyns regarded the experiment as having similarities to the actions of "totalitarian states" in the ways that both parties used propaganda. The activities of the AAPA and its "directing force," Pierre du Pont, were censured for assuring "the triumph of the liquor traffic...complete and final."[138] Henry Lee concluded: "Prohibition inspired lessened respect for the law which, like lady drunks and corrupt cops, has persisted as a heritage of those thirteen nationally misspent years. In the end, only the underworld had profited..."[139] And William E. Leuchtenburg noted: "The gangsters in many of the great cities either took over the government or were permitted to create their own private governments....in New York speakeasies paid 'protection' money to gangsters like Dutch Schultz, who were allied with Tammany Hall powers like Jimmy Hines."[140] While organized crime power basis existed in both Chicago and New York, the latter city became more powerful, and by 1929 a

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candy store in the Brownsville section of Brooklyn served as the organizing center for what came to be dubbed Murder Inc., a confederation of well-paid contract killers who were responsible for scores or hundreds of executions.

Similarly, the progression of Italians and Jews into the elaboration and solidification of American syndicate crime has been noted by others. Humbert S. Nelli observed that "Mafia" leaders initially confined illicit activities to their own ethnic colony prior to prohibition. But then the lure of economic riches drew those from southern Italy and Sicily into criminal organization that expanded on a nationwide basis to exploit opportunity.[141] And Jewish denizens of the Lower East Side at the end of World War I, had dour conclusions for their community. Alfred Fried called prohibition "a disaster for the Jews," because of the impact the measure had on keeping immigrant youth particularly in criminal enterprises. This was "the generation which, had normality prevailed...would have gone straight by the end of the decade at the latest and never been heard from again."[142] Jewish youth formed tougher gangs then the non-Jewish ones, Fried believed, because Jews found little market for liquor among their co-religionists and therefore: "To capture their main chance Jewish gangsters had to secure a foothold elsewhere, in gentile neighborhoods, often using brutal tactics."[143] As a consequence, prohibition became "the source of their wealth."[144]

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New York City: Prohibition and Policing

Arrests for intoxication experienced an extraordinary revision beginning in the early years of the second decade of the century: arrests had averaged 27,504 for the years 1910-14, and then declined steadily and sharply to the lowest level in 1919.[145] Arrests for this ubiquitous urban offense declined to almost one-quarter of the average level achieved only five years earlier.

With the imposition of gradual prohibitory enactments augmented by higher costs for legitimate purchases, not surprisingly arrests for alcohol-related offenses were affected. Indeed, arrests for intoxication per se and intoxication with disorderly conduct dropped from 1918 to 1919 from a total of 8,643 violations in 1918 to 6,855 the next year, reflecting a one year decline of over 20 percent. However, 457 arrests for selling liquor, a category of offense that did not appear in police tabulations previously, were recorded in 1919, and an increase in twenty-one arrests for dangerous vehicle operation while intoxicated, totalling 173, was noted over the previous year. For 1919, the number of alcohol-related offenses dropped almost fifteen percent from the previous year achieving the lowest arrest-rate over a quarter century and reflecting the implications of wartime shortages of alcoholic products and the absence of many young men to military service. From that year forward, however, the number of arrests for alcohol-related offenses began an ascent that would more than quadruple the number of arrests for these

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violations only five years later. (Table 5.1)

Prohibition from its passage was never fully implemented in the city and this fact was patent to local law enforcement. Police Commissioner Richard E. Enright reflected cynicism in his report for 1921 on the difficulties of prohibition enforcement and the ambiguities of managing the federal mandate:

> The Prohibition Law, from being at the outset a war measure, under guise of military necessity, was enacted into a constitutional amendment following the armistice....Too much emphasis cannot be laid upon the necessity for the Police Department to enforce the so-called prohibition laws; popular sentiment, no matter how widespread or unanimous, cannot be permitted to swerve, or modify, the strict enforcement of all, or any, laws by representatives of the Police Department...The record of the efficiency of the police force under almost general antagonism toward the Prohibition Law, testifies to the high efficiency and discipline of the Department under trying circumstances.[146]

Repeal of the state prohibition measure Law (Mullan-GageLaw) in April, 1923, created a dilemma for police in the city: the corporation counsel, the city's attorney, determined that the police department and other law enforcement organizations of the city had no special responsibility in the enforcement of the federal prohibition law. Therefore, "numerous saloons, dives and other resorts for the sale of liquor" reopened, nevertheless, New York City police "in the interest of public order and decency, enforced [the federal prohibition law] as vigorously as ever."[147]

Commissioner Enright complained that since the federal alcohol interdiction program was not succeeding in its

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Table 5.1

Arrests for Alcohol-Related Offenses: New York City, 1920-33

Year	Intoxication		Intoxications Disorderly Conduct		Illegal Selling Liquor		Traffic Oper. Vehicle While Intoxicated		Total
	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	
1920	5,146	790	1,423	111	1,786	35	332	2	9,535
1921	5,505	732	1,512	144	10,802	385	273	3	19,356
1922	7,555	1,023	2,118	189	11,301	509	514	3	23,212
1923	9,516	1,147	2,250	228	13,202	485	864	13	27,705
1924	9,736	1,188	1,948	164	19,216	636	934	10	33,832
1925	7,865	1,106	1,875	165	7,274	310	1,001	5	19,601
1926	7,713	1,034	2,155	220	13,273	681	1,197	11	26,284
1927	7,019	999	2,242	252	15,635	1,108	1,460	25	28,740
1928	8,104	1,115	2,345	278	14,585	870	1,489	22	28,808
1929	6,167	937	2,217	227	18,057	952	1,407	27	29,991
1930	4,832	731	2,193	253	12,107	653	1,375	24	22,168
1931	4,061	659	1,871	207	7,888	306	1,185	29	16,206
1932	2,563	509	1,466	200	6,450	213	858	16	12,275
1933	2,675	490	1,391	189	3,853	156	818	17	9,589

Source: Annual Reports of the Police Department, City of New York, 1920-33.

objectives, police in the city were suffering: "If the Federal authorities would stop contraband liquor in bulk being smuggled into this State over the borders from Canada or prevent it from being smuggled into this City through the Port of New York, this Department would be relieved from any responsibility, in respect to this unlawful traffic and they could give their entire attention to more serious violations of the law."[148] Enright insisted that his force had "no discretion" in the implementation of policy: "The laws must be enforced at all times of day and night, with all the effective machinery at the disposal of this Department."[149] He noted further: "The figures that tell the story of the reduction of criminal offenses in the City of New York during the last five years, are proof of the determination of this administration to continue the work of the enforcement of law, the preservation of order, and the suppression of crime."

Enright issued general orders no. 24 in August, 1923 requiring all commanding officers of inspection districts and precincts to make a census of every place where it is suspected that prohibition was being violated. Duplicate forms from such a numeration were to be completed, one for the precinct and the other for the office of the district inspector. Later in the year Enright required the chief inspector to analyze the reports on such locations and "to show cause why charges should not be preferred" against anyone within the jurisdiction for failure to carry out the provisions of his orders.[150]

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What were the effects of such measures? By the end of 1923, the failure to impose restrictions on the sale of alcohol within New York City was reflected in an increase in arrests for public intoxication. (Figure 5.1) But other crimes, generally considered more serious, had their own pattern during the same time which differed in their pattern.


According to data reported by police, serious crime which comprised murder, felonious assault, assault and robbery, and burglary declined from the period 1915 through 1923. (Figure 5.2) Moreover, violent crime that was being reported to police increasingly was related to liquor disputes by law enforcement officials. Two years earlier in his annual report, Commissioner Enright had prophetically stated: "In the craze for 'easy money,' many worthy and reputable persons have apparently lost themselves completely and vie with the dregs of the City in their efforts to make huge quick profits from the handling and sale of these poisons. Such conditions cannot help but breed crime, when demented and demoralized by their own goods, they quarrel amongst themselves, and end by murdering and robbing one another."[151]

For 1921, Enright had expressed frustration over separate investigations of the department which directly and indirectly could change perception and tenure. First one came from a Citizen's Union, which Enright characterized as "mischief makers and professional scandal mongers, masquerading as 'reformers'--although what they have ever reformed and when they reformed it, no one knows, not even themselves."[152] The

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
Figure 5.1



Source: Annual Report of the Police Department, City of New York for the Year 1923, 1924, p. 34.

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Figure 5.2



Source: Annual Report of the Police Department, City of New York for the Year 1923, 1924, p. 25.

Citizen's Union charged that the commissioner mishandled a r elief fund for widows and orphans. A second inquiry by the Meyer Investigative Committee complained about police officers who sold citizens tickets for police field say games to support distressed members of the force and their dependents.[153] The latter group implied that some officers used coercive pressure in their zeal to sell tickets and raise revenues. Enright and his allies suspected that the scrutiny was meant to hamper the department's effectiveness.

That effectiveness concentrated on enforcing an unpopular law. The department's Fourth Field Squad, also known as the Warrant Squad, had the responsibility for issuing all warrants for violations of the prohibition law. Evidence needed in order to obtain warrants was secured in two ways: either by purchasing alcohol on the premises, or by frequenting such premises until the officers could testify that they heard and observed someone order and receive alcohol. The warrant was then prepared and taken to an office of a United States commissioner where the police officer signed and swore to the warrant which was then sealed. The warrant was then returned to the squad where it was catalogued. Next it was passed to a federal agent in the sealed envelope and two patrolmen were assigned to assist the agent who then broke the seal to ascertain the location in which the warrant was to be executed.[154] Enright's annual report gives a graphic explanation of some of the evasions and subterfuges devised to circumvent police action:

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> A fruit store, soft drink parlor, restaurant, lunch room, etc., often disguises a flourishing "speak-easy." One of the most noxious developments of the Prohibition Law Legitimate enterprises of all kinds have annexed the surreptitious sale of illicit liquor as an auxiliary source of revenue...
>
> Some, notably those who continue to conduct former saloons and cider stubes under various lawful guises, keep the door of the premises locked, and permit only known customers to enter the place. They keep their stock of liquor elsewhere, in the vicinity, and only have on hand sufficient to meet their immediate demands. This is usually kept in a convenient place, in glass tumblers, pitchers, cans or other wide-mouthed vessels that may be readily emptied. By the time the door has been unlocked, their contents, if the proprietor has reason to suspect the visitor, have been dumped into a vat of running water, which is generally a part of the equipment of such places.[155]

Enright retired and the immediate years following data on administration of the prohibition law were not included in annual police reports. For 1927, Commissioner Joseph A. Warren submitted a report to the flamboyant Mayor James J. Walker, in which he stated: "The continued reduction in major crimes during 1927, even in comparison with the record for 1926, is an indication of the continued efficiency of the police."[156] Warren soon departed and the next year Commissioner Grover A. Whalen continued his predecessors' disinclination to provide discursive interpretation of crime patterns, though the usual extensive consolidated data were included.

A remarkable and indirectly related development of the time was how serious street accidents had become in New York City as reflected in police reports. In 1928, thirty-one categories of highway and automobile-related accidents were

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itemized in police reports: nine persons were killed and 278 injured from charges that drivers of vehicles were intoxicated.[157] However, this reflected only a small part of the carnage on the streets. A total of 1,072 persons were killed and an additional 45,466 were injured. Some of these were young people killed while stealing rides on a vehicle (twenty-one fatalities) or hit while playing games in a roadway (forty-three fatalities), but most were killed while not crossing at a corner or posted crossing location (323), from various causes at a crossing (262), and as a result of collisions of vehicles (117).[158]

The next year Whalen reported to the mayor on a departmental survey and a reorganization which, in the commissioner's view, led to "a maximum degree of efficiency and the absolute elimination of non-productive effort" maintained in an environment that "has improved the morale" of the department.[159] The organization created a Gunmen's Squad composed of plain clothed officers from each borough "organized for the purpose of driving loafers, criminals, gangsters and disorderly characters from the streets, subway trains, 'speakeasies,' pool parlors, dance halls, and breeding places of immorality and crime."[160] No data were provided on the performance of this squad, although the report found that the innovation had "been most gratifying in preventive police work."[161]

Commissioner Whalen's report repeated a concern earlier raised by a predecessor Enright, specifically the connection

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between youth and crime. Whalen asked: "Why is it that so many of our criminals are mere youth? Fifty percent of our delinquents are under twenty-one years of age."[162] Arrests for youth aged sixteen and seventeen were analyzed for the five boroughs: 5,679 males and 672 females were charged in the year. The commissioner noted philosophically: "Crime thrives on bad contacts and environment. Every city has its vitious spots--its centers of contagion--distributing contamination over widespread areas."[163]

Serious reported crime declined for the year from 7,878 incidents in 1928, to 7,009 the next year, representing a major drop in burglary, felonious assault, and assault and robbery, while murders increased from 339 to 357. The commissioner believed that the age of criminals arrested also was changing: "The past records of this Department testify that the majority of our criminals were of the adult classes of our population and the average minimum age was thirty years; but now the great majority of our criminals are recruited from the juvenile classes and in a great many instances are in the adolescent period of life."[164] The report observed that the existence of crime by youth without any previous criminal or police history makes "detection and apprehension of offenders most difficult."[165]

Nonetheless, the success of the police in reducing reported crimes of violence by 11 percent in the year was counterpoised to the fact that the most serious offense is the one least preventable by the police: "Sixty-seven percent of

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the murders in 1929 were committed indoors and could not possibly have been prevented by the police," the report insisted.[166] Compared with six major American cities, New York reported the second lowest murder or manslaughter rate, and the lowest rate for assault and robbery and for burglary.[167]

For the year 1931, yet another new commissioner, Edward P. Mulrooney, who had taken office in May, 1930, reported to Mayor Walker that the availability of the latest technology to criminals was making crime fighting more difficult than it had been in the past:

> New means of transportation and means of communication have unified the criminal world and are used by highly organized groups of criminals, often actively led by unseen leaders, with a sufficient knowledge of the technicalities of law to remain without the pale but still to direct criminal operations and with sufficient wealth at their disposal to facilitate the accomplishments of their ends. A machine gun, a sawed-off shot gun or a revolver may be used to commit a crime here and again in a city most remote. Criminals now use the mails, the facilities of transportation, and communicate by radio, telegraph, cable and telephone. Their ramifications extend from coast to coast and often embrace foreign countries.[168]

The fear of alien criminals as being disproportionately responsible for criminal acts had been a long, though largely unexamined, conviction of New York police and criminal justice officials. The previous year a unit within the Detective Division was created called the Bureau of Criminal Alien Investigation, the first such office in any American police department. Of 1,158 aliens investigated during 1931, 571 were either imprisoned or delivered to the Bureau of Immigration at Ellis Island for deportation.[169]

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With the repeal of prohibition, New York went wet on December 5, 1933, and about the same time New York City's dapper, good-time Mayor Walker left office in disgrace. His successor, Fiorello H. La Guardia, the quintessential multicultural New Yorker, the Protestant son of an Italian-American father and a Jewish mother, became the master of political coalition building. La Guardia set a high moral tone for policing in the post-prohibition era, reorienting police mores from Jimmy Walker's ethical nonchalance. The message was that "wets" could be as firm for law and-order as the "drys."

In an early 1925 campaign, La Guardia featured "an exhibit"--a cut of meat, a piece of coal, and a beer mug--symbols of his fight for fair meat prices, against the fuel monopolies, and for an end to prohibition.[170] In many ways La Guardia represented an archetypical opponent of prohibition: it was unreasonable, unenforceable, disrespected certain alcohol-using cultures, and was aimed primarily at the people of the city. Instead of concentrating on providing needed services, government was "on a doomed crusade that was corrupting citizens, officials, and the very basis of their society."[171] Yet La Guardia was a reformer and the "Little Flower" concentrated on breaking the grip of Tammany Hall's power while he forged connections with the emergent New Deal initiatives of the Roosevelt Administration. The beginning of La Guardia's mayoral tenure marked the end of the "experiment noble in purpose," but ultimately one that had spawned

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unintended initiatives for corruption, criminal activity, police and federal agent enforcement malfeasance, and other types of official corruption.

Diverse Effects on Crime Patterns

What were the effects of prohibition on violent crime within the city? Any analysis can not provide a simple judgment. During the span from early prohibitory measures of 1918 through 1933, numerous political, social, and economic factors undoubtedly played significant differing roles some of which could act to offset each other's effects. But with these reservations in mind, some generalizations may be made.

Prohibition decreased the amount of alcoholic intake by the average New Yorkers, despite the fact that the city was a focus for bootleggers to satisfy natives, tourists, and travellers who expected the city to have drink available for them regardless of its forbidden status. The average yearly amount of alcoholic consumption during prohibition remains a speculation for residents of New York City and elsewhere. But evidence suggests that the annual consumption of all alcoholic beverages declined from its level of the first decade of the century and plummeted with prohibition to the lowest point in the nation's history and remained there at least until a period after the imposition of prohibitory laws.[172]

Arrests for four types of serious crimes decreased during this period, according to police reports. Reported serious crime had declined from 13,141 incidents in 1917, to 6,109

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sixteen years later when prohibition ended. (Table 5.2) But murder and homicide, the most serious and most accurately reported criminal violation, increased by over half during the period. (Table 5.3) For the same years, however, aggravated assault felonies--reflecting serious personal violence--remained about constant on a population adjusted basis. (Table 5.4) With the general anguish from urban disorder covering the entire period 1920-30, a remarkable pattern emerged over the era, though one marked by inconsistencies.

Using Census Bureau city population for 1920 and 1930 and adjusting crime per 100,000, this "most serious" crime, murder-homicide, increased by over half. (Table 5.5) But by contrast, felonious assault, five- to ten-times more frequent an offense, was reduced by one-third. Taken in total, four "serious" crimes--murder-homicide; felonious assault; assault and robbery, and burglary--declined sharply during the decade of prohibition reducing to less than half the rate of the first year of federal prohibition. Meanwhile, "minor" crime, such as arrests for intoxication and disorderly conduct also declined from 132.9 incidents per 100,000 in 1920, to 115.6 a decade later, though far more persons were arrested for the illegal selling of liquor during these years than formerly, as would be expected. A period that was referred to as both "the gay twenties" and "the lawless decade," in retrospect may indeed have been gay, but was more lawful than some observers have imagined.[173]

Were the prohibitionists with their undeniable zeal,

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Table 5.2

Four Serious Crimes:

New York City, 1916-33

Year	Murder	Felonious Assault	Assault & Robbery	Burglary	Total
1916	186	3,466	886	9,893	14,431
1917	236	2,591	864	9,450	13,141
1918	223	2,354	849	7,412	10,838
1919	224	2,537	1,133	7,398	11,292
1920	215	2,786	1,145	7,451	11,597
1921	237	2,444	1,197	6,558	10,436
1922	266	2,405	1,086	5,390	9,147
1923	262	2,496	1,077	4,933	8,768
1924	310	2,300	1,555	4,205	8,370
1925	308	2,243	1,483	4,103	8,137
1926	289	2,276	1,173	3,371	7,109
1927	278	2,174	951	3,380	6,783
1928	339	2,599	1,232	3,708	7,878
1929	357	2,490	1,172	2,990	7,009
1930	421	2,310	1,166	2,830	6,727
1931	489	2,214	1,434	2,678	6,815
1932	478	2,310	1,429	2,417	6,634
1933	431	2,264	1,138	2,276	6,109

Source: New York City Police Department, Annual Report, 1916-33.

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Table 5.3

Arrests for Murders Adjusted for Population: New York City, 1916-33

Year	Murder	Gross Change per Year
1916	186	--
1917	236	26.9
1918	223	(5.5)
1919	224	0.4
1920	215	(4.0)
1921	237	10.2
1922	266	12.2
1923	262	(1.5)
1924	310	18.3
1925	308	(0.6)
1926	289	(6.2)
1927	278	(3.8)
1928	339	21.9
1929	357	5.3
1930	421	17.9
1931	489	16.1
1932	478	2.2
1933	431	(9.8)

Source: New York City Police Department, Annual Report, 1916-33.

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Table 5.4

Arrests for Felonious Assault Adjusted for Population: New York City, 1916-33

Year	Aggravated Assault Felonies	Gross Change per Year
1916	3,446	--
1917	2,591	(24.8)
1918	2,354	(9.1)
1919	2,537	(7.8)
1920	2,786	9.8
1921	2,444	(12.3)
1922	2,405	(1.6)
1923	2,496	3.8
1924	2,300	(7.8)
1925	2,243	(2.5)
1926	2,276	1.5
1927	2,174	(4.5)
1928	2,599	19.5
1929	2,490	(4.2)
1930	2,310	(7.2)
1931	2,214	(4.1)
1932	2,310	4.3
1933	2,264	(2.0)

Source: New York City Police Department, Annual Report, 1916-33.

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Table 5.5

Reported Serious Crime Adjusted for Population: New York City, 1920-30

Year	Murder Homicide	Felonious Assault	"Serious" Crimes[1]	Population[2]
1920	3.8	49.6	206.4	5,620,048
1930	6.1	33.3	97.1	6,930,446

Notes: 1. Composed of four "serious" crimes from Table 5.2.
2. Decennial Bureau of the Census data.

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unquestioned organizational abilities, and messianic drive pursuing means that were, while impractical and unenforceable, also irrelevant? Has a causal relationship between alcohol use and crime been established? William McCord and Joan McCord in an analysis of alcoholism and criminality found that stress-producing conditions tend to underlie social deviance in general. They do not differentiate between the backgrounds of alcoholics and those of criminals: "Criminals, as well as alcoholics, differed significantly from nondeviant subjects in that they more often came from families in which sexual deviance had occurred."[174] The researchers defined sexual deviance as occurring in a family unit in which either an illegitimate child was a member or in which one of the children was a victim of incest. Other findings included suggested that maternal deviance was significantly related to alcoholism among children. The authors noted:

> Both forms of deviance share certain characteristics: Both, to a large extent, appear to be by-products of American society, for the United States ranks highest in the world in criminal rates and ties with Sweden for the highest rate of alcoholism; both occur primarily among the male population; both are essentially distractive forms of behavior--although alcoholism may be considered primarily self-destructive and criminality is more directly aimed at the destruction of others or their property, each results in self-destruction and loss to others.[175]

The McCords found that both alcoholics and nonalcoholic criminals were emotionally frustrated in childhood, but differed in several respects. In comparing similarities and differences among three types of deviance--noncriminal

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alcoholics, criminal alcoholics, and non alcoholic criminals--all three were found to have had "backgrounds conductive to general anxiety."[176]

Robert Straus maintained: "Virtually all social policy directed towards controlling both drunkenness and drinking has been supported by assertions that alcohol 'releases' aggression and is a major cause of crime, violence and other antisocial behavior."[177] But this researcher noted that while inebriety was undoubtedly a contributory factor to crime, the question has not been finally answered as to its degree of significance.

A law professor, John Kaplan, argued: "Though the relationship between alcohol and crime is a complicated one, there is a good reason to believe that alcohol use is a major causal factor in a wide variety of criminal behavior; for instance, a number of studies have derived impressive figures relating alcohol use to homicide."[178] He further observed: "While causality...is notoriously difficult to disentangle, alcohol abuse is undeniably a predictive factor in violent crime, and there are good reasons to believe it is a causal factor as well."[179]

In a foreword to his edited a series of contributions on the linkage between alcohol consumption and crime, Marvin E. Wolfgang observed:

> Relative to crime, the presence of alcohol may be a <u>contributing</u> factor, may be <u>positively correlated</u>, may be a <u>determinant</u>, but our scholars are generally unwilling to assert <u>cause</u>. And rightly so, for the best available evidence is sometimes contradictory and never fully compelling and convincing. Alcohol

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> may arouse aggression or may augment aggressive behavior which may, in turn, result in criminal assault. But many other things also promote aggression, and even aggression aroused need not lead to criminal behavior.[180]

Interpretation of the issues and groups behind the prohibition initiative and the subsequent counterinsurgency which defeated it have centered on how propaganda and power have been wielded by opposing interest groups. Advocates saw the prohibition Amendment as a mandate for "revitalizing and [to] restore American democracy."[181] In achieving passage of the Eighteenth Amendment, proponents could boast that the measure was not an act of legerdemain, but rather had met the tests of time and full discussion and that a decisive majority decision had enabled ratification. That insightful observer during the prohibition era, Lord Bryce, stated:

> The right of an individual man to lead his own life in his own way is better recognized now than ninety years ago, when Tocqueville noted what he called the Tyranny of the Majority. Many regard the prohibition of intoxicating liquors as an infringement of these rights, but since the principle of protecting a man against his own propensity, when these are injurious to the community also, is deemed legitimate if sufficient grounds for legal interference have been shown, the question comes in each case to be what grounds are sufficient, and how to balance the admitted discomfort to some individuals who need no protection against the admitted benefit to others who do need it. The prohibition movement has not proceeded from any one class or section of the community....It grew partly because employers thought it made for efficiency, partly perhaps because Southern men desired to stamp out the risks of intoxication which made the negro dangerous, but mainly because it appealed to the moral and religious sentiments of the plain people.[182]

The post-prohibition debate came to center on whether American liberty was coopted by an anti-urban, conservative

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and well organized fanatical minority who achieved the Amendment through a propaganda blitz while the nation was preoccupied by World War, or whether prohibition was a measure which at its heart was both radical and conservative.

Like other who were persuaded for the need to risk a fundamental change in society, clergyman Lyman Beecher had changed his position from one favoring moral suasion to a position of legal coercion: "No one now would care to have such forms of personal liberty as freedom to duel, to keep slaves, to sell narcotics to all who call, exist again freely....They are out of date, and for the same reason that auto speeding is restricted in a crowded city."[183]

The notion that prohibition was smashed by a crystallization of popular libertarian ferment has been reassessed by Paul A. Carter who documented the narrow economic and social base of those who opposed the measure through the Association Against the Prohibition Amendment and the Woman's Organization for National Prohibition Reform. Carter contrasted these groups with those which earlier had advocated temperance. Carter then observed:

> In short, the victory for personal liberty contained in the Twenty-First Amendment was more ambiguous than it seemed; not all the right-wing elitism was on one side, not was all the left-wing democratic liberalism on the other. In other words, the fight over Repeal was a more <u>normal</u> kind of American political controversy than historians have usually assumed.[184]

The scuttling of prohibition left nothing in place except the earlier measures--jail and religion--to deal with

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alcoholism as a public health problem. The pattern of changes in criminal behavior in the city during the period 1919-33 must be assessed in a context of inadequate and often dubious public records. Still, in the early days of the imposition of federal controls, reported violent crimes fell to levels below pre-prohibition times. Further, taking four major crimes as a group, the crime level moved still lower through the decade on a population adjusted basis. But from the earliest days of prohibition, "wets" within the city fought the measures with a steady intensity that belied the apparent absence of saloons along the Bowery and Broadway and from The Bronx to Bensonhurst. Arrests for public intoxication and disorderly conduct reached a low during the period of wartime prohibition and remained at this low rate, relative to pre-prohibition experience, for a few years.

What had emerged during this period was another type of disorder: syndicate crime that grew from its domestic and foreign roots into a mature, well financed and urban distinctive presence which flourished due to the attractiveness of rewards from criminality relative to the social countermeasures in place. In the end, police and other social institutions were unable to attack the social swamps and morasses providing this type of criminal infection and contagion of city life, and indeed they sometimes profited illicitly from it.[185]

Despite the negativism connoted with the concept of state-induced restriction, the prohibition era in the

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metropolis was infused with excitement, disappointment, and change. Excitement was provided by the movies shown to all in their resplendent palaces, the affordable automobile which provided freedom to travel never previously available, and the multiplication of "indispensable" electrical appliances into the city's homes and places of work. Then, too, it was an age of dancing and jazz when the evening's high and low notes were modulated with an alcoholic haze induced by hooch for the well heeled and bathtub gin for do-it-yourselfers. The disappointments center in the limited failures of social reform--though progress in many areas was apparent--and the political turn to isolationism. Economically, great change marked the decade: seemingly endless prosperity in the city started to run out of steam in 1927, when urban and suburban housing starts declined, and prosperity received its coup-de-grace with the stock market collapse of October, 1929.

Why did violent and property crime associated with alcohol use decline during this period even while ample supplies of alcohol were available surreptitiously? The answer relates to the economics of alcohol supply of the time which favored smuggling and sale of costly hard alcohol drinks over cheaper beer or wine. This priced the available stock of alcohol generally out of the means of poor or lower income New Yorkers, who were subsequently less likely to commit violent crime and face arrest from the enhanced criminogenic circumstance lubricated by the presence of alcohol.

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ENDNOTES

1. Raymond G. McCarthy, ed., Drinking and Intoxication: Selected Readings in Social Attitudes and Controls, Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1959, p. 1. The papyrus was dated about 1500 B.C.

2. Ibid., p. 39.

3. Jean-Charles Sournia, A History of Alcoholism, Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990, p. 5 (Hereafter cited as History of Alcoholism). Genesis, 9:20-5

4. Arthur P. McKinlay, "Non-Classical Peoples," in Drinking and Intoxication, ed. Raymond G. McCarthy. New Haven: College and University Press, 1959, p. 58 (Hereafter cited by title).

5. Andrew Poznanski, "Our Drinking Heritage," in ibid., p. 42.

6. Ibid., p. 43.

7. Arthur P. McKinlay, "Roman Sobriety in the Later Republic," in Drinking and Intoxication, p. 55.

8. T.G. Coffey, "Beer Street, Gin Lane: Some Views of 18th Century Drinking," Quarterly Journal of the Studies of Alcohol, 27 (1966): 669-92.

9. History of Alcoholism. p. 20.

10. Richard Eddy, Alcohol in History, New York: National Temperance Society and Publication House, 1887, p. 157.

11. Simon Schama, The Embarrassment of Riches: An Interpretation of Dutch Culture in the Golden Age, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1987, pp. 189-93, 199-203.

12. Minutes of the General Society of Mechanics and Tradesmen of the City of New York, December 12, 1832.

13. W.J. Rorabaugh, The Craft Apprentice: From Franklin to the Machine Age in America, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 104 (Hereafter cited as Craft Apprentice). Rorabaugh quotes John Roach who was apprenticed at the Howell Iron Works. A teetotaler, Roach initially declined to provide the expected drinks paid for by any new apprentice and recalled: "I remember very well how they laid me face down over a barrel and rolled me back and forth while a big Englishman spanked me with a board until I agreed to give them whiskey enough to pay for my footing."

14. Quoted in Sean Wilentz, Chants Democratic: New York City and the Rise of the American Working Class, 1788-1850, New York: Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 146.

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15. Ibid, p. 147.

16. Ibid., pp. 282-3.

17. Craft Apprentice, p. 89.

18. Henry Lee, How Dry We Were: Prohibition Revisited, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1863, p. x

19. Randall C. Jimerson, "The Temperance and Prohibition Movement in America, 1830-1933," Guide to the Microfilm Edition of Temperance and Prohibition Papers, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 1977, pp. 1-2 (Hereafter cited as Guide to Papers).

20. James H. Timberlake, Prohibition and the Progressive Movement 1900-1920, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963, p. 6.

21. John Allen Krout, The Origins of Prohibition, New York: Russell & Russell, 1925, p. 235 (Hereafter cited as Origins of Prohibition).

22. Guide to Papers, pp. 1-2. The decline in alcohol consumption from 1830 on reflected strongly supported social changes: "By the 1830 Americans had created a new culture that appears to have enabled them to prosper amid the upheaval of the Industrial Revolution...central to the new culture were the subordinations of emotion to rationality, the postponement of gratification, and an orientation toward the future. These were the principal means by which Americans reconciled the contradictions between their two key and sometimes contradictory impulses, a drive for material gain and a desire for religious salvation," W.J. Rorabaugh, The Alcoholic Republic: An American Tradition, New York; Oxford University Press, 1979, p. 212 (Hereafter cited as Alcoholic Republic). Also note: Joseph F. Kett, "Review Essay/Temperance and Intemperance as Historical Problems," in Journal of American History, 62 (March 1981): 878-85.

23. This was the "first wave" of state prohibition. According to Lee, supra no. 18, all of these states would repeal their dry laws by 1903, though some would reintroduce the measure: Massachusetts, for example, repealed its law in 1868, reinstituted it the next year, and repealed it once more in 1875, remaining wet thereafter.

24. Origins of Prohibition, p. 235.

25. Jack S. Blocker, Jr., American Temperance Movements: Cycles of Reform, Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1989, p. 14 (Here after cited as American Temperance). The Schenectady County Temperance Society was the state's largest with 915 members.

26. Ibid., p. 21.

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27. Ibid., p. 22.

28. Ibid., p. 28.

29. Ibid., p. 29.

30. The relationship between government and public consumption of alcohol has always been complex. The nation's first attempt to tax whiskey in 1791 resulted in a refusal by western Pennsylvania farmers to pay excise tax on corn liquor. On the advice of Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton, President George Washington used the militia to crush the rebellion, confirming the authority of the federal authority. See, for example: C. Melvin Sonne, "The Whiskey Rebellion: Our Nation's First Constitutional Crisis," Pennsylvania, 16 (December 1993): 18-21.

31. American Temperance, p. 34.

32. Ibid., p. 41.

33. Ibid., pp. 48-49. Membership peaked in 1851 at almost 240,000; while membership for the sister organization peaked in 1848 at about 30,000.

Similar movements were occurring elsewhere in the nation. In Cincinnati: "Crime and alcohol were also directly linked to temperance thought. Some people were obviously more prone to violent behavior when drunk. Criminals reported that they drank before committing crimes to steel their nerves. In temperance, according to temperance activists, engendered sloth and dissolution, which in turn encouraged a life of crime. Overall, criminals as a class appeared to be unquestionably within the grip of alcohol's evil power. The Record claimed that 'two-thirds of all the crimes committed in the State' were the product of intemperance." Jed Dannenbaum, Drink and Disorder: Temperance Reform in Cincinnati from the Washingtonian Revival to the WCTU, Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1984, p. 79.

34. Founders of the society included Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and Emilia Bloomer. Stanton and Lucretia Mott organized the Seneca Falls (New York) Convention in 1848, the first women's rights conference in the nation.

35. Mary A. Lathbury, introduction, "Francis E. Willard of Illinois," in Frances E. Willard, Woman and Temperance: Or, the Work and Workers of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union, Hartford: Park Publishing Co., 1883, pp. 22-24.

36. Ibid., p. 638.

37. Annie Wittenmyer, History of the Woman's Temperance Crusade, Boston, MA: James H. Earle, 1882, p. 543.

38. Ibid., p. 548.

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39. Ibid., p. 550.

40. American Temperance, p. 91. The evils of drink had ramifications at the time for the presidency. Upon leaving the presidency in 1880, Rutherford B. Hayes heard that James Garfield planned to restore wine and liquor to the White House. Hayes prepared a memo for his successor on the topic in which he declared, "the American who drinks wine is in danger of becoming the victim of drunkenness, licentiousness and gambling" and any move by Garfield would "grievously disappoint thousands of the best people who supported" him and which would "revive the Temperance party, which has now dropped almost out of sight," see Ari Hoogenboom, The Presidency of Rutherford B. Hayes, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1988, p. 217.

41. Ibid., p. 93.

42. Jack S. Blocker, Jr., Retreat from Reform: The Prohibition Movement in the United States 1890-1913, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976, p. 121.

43. Herbert Asbury, Great Illusion: An Informal History of Prohibition, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, [1950], 1977, p. 94.

44. Ibid., p. 95.

45. Ernest H. Charrington, The Evolution of Prohibition in the United States, Montclair, NJ: Patterson Smith [1920], 1969, p. 259 (Hereafter cited as Evolution of Prohibition). During the prohibition era, Ernest H. Charrington, director of the Department of Education of the Anti-Saloon League of America, exemplified the leadership played by the Methodist Church and members of that denomination. "Methodism flourished most in the United States as a frontier faith, it had, in fact, begun as a sect for the urban poor, just as in England, where it had been strikingly successful in stemming intemperance among the industrial proletariat," see: James H. Timberlake, Prohibition and the Progressive Movement 1900-1920, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993, p. 30 (Hereafter cited as Prohibition and the Progressive). The initial history of the League is Peter H. Odegard, Pressure Politics: The Story of the Anti-Saloon League, New York: Octagon Books, 1966, which focuses on the League's use of ad hominium propaganda. A newer history is by K. Austin Kerr, Organized for Prohibition, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985, which casts the League as the national political arm of evangelical Protestantism.

46. Prohibition and the Progressive, p. 9.

47. Ibid., p. 58.

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48. Committee of Fifty, The Liquor Problem: A Summary of Investigations, 1893-1903, New York: Arno Press & The New York Times, [1905], 1970, p. 13.

49. Ibid., p. 121.

50. Ernest H. Charrington, Evolution of Prohibition in the United States of America, Montclair, NJ: Patterson Smith, [1920], 1969, p. 308.

51. Ibid., p. 317.

52. Ibid., p. 322.

53. Percy Andreae, The Prohibition Movement in Its Broader Bearings Upon Our Social, Commercial and Religious Liberties, Chicago: Felix Mendelsohn, 1915, p. 12. Andreae also made the argument that the distinction between temperance and prohibition advocacy alters the moral force of education and good example: "Prohibition, or that which it implies, is the direct negation of the term self-control. In order to save the small percentage of men who are too weak to resist their animal desires, it aims to put chains on everyman, the weak and stronger alike," p. 15.

54. American Temperance, p. 108.

55. David E. Kyvig, Prohibition: The 18th Amendment, the Volstead Act, and the 21st Amendment, Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration, 1986, p. 1.

56. Evolution of Prohibition, pp. 354-355.

57. Prohibition and the Progressive, p. 61. Others made the same point. The evangelist Billy Sunday declared: "The rain of tears is over. The slums will soon be a memory. We will turn our prisons into factories, our jails into storehouses and corn cribs," quoted in William K. Klingaman, 1919: The Year Our World Began, New York: Perennial Library, 1989, p. 41.

58. Ibid., p. 77.

59. Ibid., p. 115. Timberlake adds: "(T)he saloon had figured prominently in the assassinations of three presidents. John Wilkes Booth, given to alcoholic indulgence, had been drinking the night he shot Abraham Lincoln and had taken his last tumbler of wiskey at a saloon next to Ford's Theater. Charles J. Guiteau, who shot James A. Garfield, was drinking more heavily than usual the day he committed the crime, and Leon F. Czolgosz, son of a saloonkeeper, was living in the saloon when he set out to assassinate William McKinley. Even John N. Schrank, the man who shot but failed to kill Theodore Roosevelt in 1912, had been a saloonkeeper and bartender most of his life," Prohibition and the Progressive, p. 115.

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60. Ibid., p. 177.

61. Ernest Hurst Charrington, comp. and ed. The Anti-Saloon League Year Book, 1920, Westerville, OH: Anti-Saloon League of America, 1920, p. 46.

62. Ibid. The publication listed other tangible benefits from the early experience with prohibition: The New York City Board of Inebriety asked the Legislature to dissolve it because it had nothing to do; the Municipal Lodging House and the Alcoholic Wards in the hospitals had "practically closed," and real estate values "are going higher than at any other time in the history of New York city."

63. Deets Pickett, "How Prohibition Works in American Cities," Washington, DC: Board of Temperance, Prohibition and Public Morals of the Methodist Episcopal Church, 1920, p. 13.

64. Ibid.

65. Ibid.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid., p. 17.

68. Robert Everett Corradini, compiler, "The Bowery," Washington, DC: World League Against Alcoholism, [1924].

69. Ibid., p. 5. According to the compiler, the real estate value of the six saloons still in business showed a decrease in valuation from $242,000 in 1916 to $211,000 in 1922. Of 29 properties on the Bowery used as saloons in 1916 and transformed into other businesses by 1922, total value had increased from $1,269,500 to $1,501,500, see p. 14.

70. Ibid., p. 14.

71. Ibid.

72. Robert Everett Corradini, comp., "Broadway--The Greatest Street in America Under Prohibition," Washington, DC: World League Against Alcoholism, [1924].

73. Ibid., p. 11.

74. Ibid., p. 24.

75. Robert Everett Corradini, comp., "The Passing of the Saloons in New York City," Westerville, OH: World League Against Alcoholism, [1924].

76. Ibid., p. 7.

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77. Robert Everett Corradini, comp., "Saloon Survey New York City: Changes in Saloon Property After the First Three Years and After Five Years of Prohibition," Westerville, OH: World League Against Alcoholism, [1924].

78. Ibid., p. 4.

79. Ibid.

80. Ibid., p. 9. The use of alcohol for religious purposes was an acrimonious issue dividing drys and wets. The report states: "With over 1,500,000 Jewish inhabitants of the City of New York we found only two stores selling sacramental wine for religious purposes in place of the former saloons. That there has been abuse of this privilege, under the Volstead Act, of selling wine for religious purposes cannot be denied. However, it is to the infinite credit of the Jewish inhabitants and an indication of their loyalty to the government that they have evidently been able to devise ways and means to be as patriotic as they are religious," p. 19.

81. Ibid., p. 13.

82. Ibid., p. 22. See also William D. Kilpatrick, "Rentals Higher, Collections Easier, Under Prohibition," Record and Guide, November 18, 1922. On a national level, auto pioneer Henry Ford raised similar arguments that "prohibition has put more of the workman's money into savings banks and into his wife's pocket-book...they have time to see more, do more--and, incidentally, they buy more. This stimulates business and increases prosperity, and in the general economic circle the money passes through industry again and back into the workman's pocket," in Benefits of Prohibition, Westerville, OH: American Issue Publishing Company, 1928, p. 2.

83. "Bone Dry State in Sixty Days, Chandler's Order," New York Times, April 28, 1921, p. 1.

84. "Dempsey Knocks Out Carpenter in the Fourth Round; Challenger Breaks His Thumb Against Champion's Jaw; Record Crowd of 90,000 Orderly and Well Handled," New York Times, July 3, 1921, p. 1. This was the largest crowd ever assembled in the country. About 1,000 firemen aided police in maintaining the peace.

85. "90 Dry Agents Raid Broadway Resorts and a Village Hotel," New York Times, December 18, 1921, p. 1.

86. "Eight Moonshine Stills Explode in Two Fires; Five Firemen Seriously Burned; One May Die," New York Times, January 8, 1922, p. 1.

87. "Rum Runner Kills Bootlegger in Boat," New York Times, March 11, 1922, p. 1.

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88. American Bar Association "Report of the Special Committee on Law Enforcement," New York: Evening Post Job Printing Office, 1923.

89. Ibid., p. 2.

90. Ibid., p. 3.

91. Ibid., p. 4.

92. Ibid., pp. 4-5.

93. Ibid., p. 5. The number of prisoners nationwide between January 1, 1910 and the same date for 1923, shows a decrease of 2.2 percent, to 109,075. However, the number of commitments during the year dropped 25.5 percent, primarily from fewer commitments at county and municipal jails and workhouses. See Census Bureau data from "Prisoners: 1923" reprinted in the Anti-Saloon League Year Book, 1927, p. 43. Homicides increased from 2,876, or 0.6 percent in 1910 to 3,906 or 1.1 percent, in 1923.

94. "Dry Asserts Crime Receded in Year," New York Times, December 31, 1929, p. 1.

95. Ibid.

96. Henry Lee, How Dry We Were: Prohibition Revisited, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963, p. 203 (Hereafter cited as How Dry We Were).

97. C. W. Hunt, Booze, Boats and Billions: Smuggling Liquid Gold!, Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1988, pp. 22-23.

98. Ibid., p. 129.

99. Ibid., p. 23.

100. Ibid., p. 63. Another route from Canada to the New York market was across Lake Ontario, described in detail in Hunt's book. In an ironic switch, American smugglers developed a bootleg operation to purchase industrial alcohol, manufactured under federal license to be sold to perfume companies and other legitimate users. They then removed the denaturants, making it potable for human consumption, and smuggled it to Canadian distillers. Hunt notes: "It was a nice arrangements for the rum- runners, who were making profits on both legs of their trip across the lake," p. 164.

101. Paul Sann, The Lawless Decade: A Pictorial History of a Great American Transition: From the World War I Armistice and Prohibition to Repeal and the New Deal, New York: Bonanza Books, 1957, pp. 90-94 (Hereafter cited as Lawless Decade).

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102. Izzy Einstein, Prohibition Agent No. 1, New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1932.

103. Lawless Decade, p. 191.

104. Caroline F. Ware, Greenwich Village, 1920-1930, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963, p. 249.

105. Ibid., p. 279. Ware studied records of three family welfare agencies from 1920-30, measuring changes by group in health, economy, family characteristics, behavior, morality, quality of household management, death, and imprisonment. For the decade: tuberculosis declined; family economy improved; mental disorders dropped; bad housing rates fell though bad housekeeping increased; the death rate declined, and imprisonment dropped from 2.3 per cent in 1920-22 to 0.9 percent in 1923-26, and up to 1.4 per cent in 1927-30. See p. 474.

106. John Kobler, Ardent Spirits: The Rise and Fall of Prohibition, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1973, p. 238.

107. Ibid., pp. 239-240.

108. Larry Engelmann, Intemperance: The Lost War Against Liquor, New York: Free Press, 1979, p. 189 (Hereafter cited as Intemperance).

109. Frederick Lewis Allen, Only Yesterday: An Informal History of the Nineteenth-Twenties, New York: Blue Ribbon Books, 1931, p. 99. Another states: "Yet from the first, prohibition was unpopular with a sizeable minority of the country, particularly in the great cities," William W. Leuchtenburg, The Perils of Prosperity, 1914-32, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958, p. 214 (Hereafter cited as Perils of Prosperity).

110. Intemperance, p. 190.

111. Quoted in David E. Kyvig, Repealing National Prohibition, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1979, p. 128.

112. Ibid., p. 54.

113. Ibid., p. 59.

114. AAPA, reel 16.

115. Quoted in Perils of Prosperity, p. 266. In the campaign of 1928, Hoover undercut Smith's portrayal of him as a narrow moralist by suggesting that federal prohibition required rethinking and the law might be changed by "straightforward methods" if popular support was sufficient, see James D. Calder, Origins and Development of Federal Crime Control Policy: Herbert Hoover's Initiatives, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993, p. 31 (Hereafter cited as Origins and Development).

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116. "Wets in Control in Both Houses, But Short of Two-Thirds in Senate," New York Times, November 9, 1932, p. 1.

117. "Legal Liquor Due Tonight; City Ready to Celebrate; Stores to Open Tomorrow," New York Times, December 5, 1933, p. 1.

118. "Prohibition Repealed is Ratified at 5:32 P.M.; Roosevelt Asks Nation to Bar the Saloon; New York Celebrates with Quiet Restraint," New York Times, December 6, 1933, p. 1.

119. Raymond Westervelt Cooper, The Drama of Drink, Andover, MA: Drama of Drink Distributors, 1932, pp. 201-278 (Hereafter cited as Drama of Drink).

120. Ibid., pp. 247-258.

121. Ibid., p. 248.

122. William N. Gemmell, "Prohibition in Chicago," Westerville, OH: American Issue Publishing Company, [1923], p. 2.

123. Ibid., p. 3.

124. Ibid.

125. Ibid., p. 4.

126. "A National Survey of Conditions Under Prohibition," New York: Moderation League, 1926, p. 3.

127. "A National Survey," 1930, p. 3.

128. "Scandals of Prohibition Amendment," AAPA, reel 15. New York may have been "the most conspicuous example of a wet city," but that does not suggest it was the wettest. That distinction would be a matter of debate, though New Orleans was referred to as "the wettest dry city in America," by Lewis Andrew Vyhnanek, "The Seamier Side of Life: Criminal Activity in New Orleans during the 1920s," Ph.D. diss., Louisiana State University, 1974, chapter 3.

129. "Prohibition Enforcement: Its Effects on Courts and Prisons," Washington, DC: Association Against the Prohibition Amendment, 1930, AAPA papers, reel 6.

130. Ibid.

131. Ibid. However, each year 12 to 14 percent of all cases were dismissed or "nolle prossed," that is, nolle prosequi, indicating the declaration that the plaintiff will no further prosecute the case.

132. Ibid.

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133. Harry Best, Crime and the Criminal Law in the United States, New York: Macmillan, 1930, p. 116.

134. "Prohibition Enforcement," AAPA papers, reel 6. Mismanagement and corruption suffused federal prohibition efforts. On July 1, 1930 the Bureau of Prohibition was transferred from the Treasury Department to the Department of Justice. The Bureau was placed under the leadership of A.W.W. Woodcock who tabulated the vigor of his first full year's operations: 63,177 arrests; 8,499 automobiles and 76 boats seized; 21,541 stills, 14,904 fermenters, 5 million gallons of beer, 2 million gallons of spirits, 32 million gallons of mash as well as other distilling and brewing materials seized. Woodcock also established a Special Inspection Division to investigate charges against unethical conduct and violations of various laws. During the year 181 investigations for specific charges against employees were conducted. "Annual Report of the Attorney General of the United States for the Fiscal Year 1931," Washington, DC: USGPO, 1931, pp. 61, 66-67.

135. Quoted in Henry Lee, How Dry We Were: Prohibition Revisited, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963, p. 161. For further discussion on the Wickersham Commission, see Origins and Development, pp. 84-99.

136. For example, Drama of Drink.

137. How Dry We Were, pp. 11-12. Herbert Hoover in a speech at Stanford University of August 11, 1928, called prohibition a "social and economic experiment, noble in motive and far-reaching in purpose," but the proponents of prohibition never thought of it as an experiment, but rather a fundamental societal reorganization.

138. Fletcher Dobyns, The Amazing Story of Repeal: An Exposé of the Power of Propaganda, Chicago & New York: Willett, Clark & Company, 1940, p. 399, passim.

139. How Dry We Were, p. 13.

140. Perils of Prosperity, p. 216. Much has been written about how prohibition encouraged organized crime. Calder observes "an increasingly severe drug problem" which also marked the era, Origins and Development, p. 250, n. 61. Syndicate crime had its origins in Chicago in the 1830s, according to Albini, when criminals entered the city in large numbers since no police force was organized until 1835. Joseph L. Albini, The American Mafia: Genesis of a Legend, New York: Irvington Publishers, 1979, p. 178. But prohibition "unleashed competitive violence and served to reverse the power order between the criminal gangs and the politicians. It also led to a superior level of organization." Howard Abadinsky, Organized Crime, Chicago: Nelson-Hall, third edition, 1990, p. 95.

For information on Murder Inc. and Midnight Roses's,

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see references in: Carl Sifakis, The Mafia Encyclopedia, New York: Facts On File Publications, 1987.

141. Humbert S. Nelli, The Business of Crime: Italians and Syndicate Crime in the United States, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981, chapter 5. Daniel Bell has noted that organized crime served as a "queer ladder of social mobility" for some Italians. No inference should be drawn, however, that organized crime started with prohibition. Block states: "Since the Gilded Age (1890s, organized crime in the United States moved into tertiary industries and the control of significant unions and has infiltrated...aspects of modern capitalism," in Alan A. Block, ed. and introd., The Business of Crime: A Documentary Study of Organized Crime in the American Economy, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991, p. 16.

142. Alfred Fried, The Rise and Fall of the Jewish Gangster in America, New York: Columbia University Press, rev. ed., 1993, p. 93. See also: Jenna Weissman Joselit, "Dark Shadows: New York Jews and Crime, 1900-1940," Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1981.

143. Ibid., p. 103.

144. Ibid., p. 128. Other ethnic groups were involved in exploiting economic opportunities offered by prohibition. Haller finds that data on those who were leading bootleggers by the late 1920s in Philadelphia indicate that some 50 per cent were Jewish, some 25 percent of Italian background, the rest primarily Irish and Polish in background. Although their previous occupational experiences were frequently, but not universally, in some areas of crime, the future bootleggers were by no means prominent in crime prior to prohibition," Mark H. Haller, The Peoples of Philadelphia: A History of Ethnic Groups and Lower-Class Life, 1790-1940, edited by Allen F. Davis and Marc H. Heller, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1973. Note also: Robert A. Rockaway, But--He Was Good to His Mother: The Lives and Crimes of Jewish Gangsters, Jerusalem: Gefen Publishing House, 1993.

145. Annual Report of the Police Department, City of New York for the Year 1921, 1921, p. 88 (Hereafter cited as ARPDNYC).

146. Ibid. Enright objected "to the so-called State Prohibition Enforcement Law, commonly known as the Mullan-Gage Law," because it "put the enforcement of the prohibition laws almost solely in the hands of the various police forces, throughout the state" and these forces had "numeric insufficiency" to carry them out. The commissioner claimed that this "extremely unpopular" law had "nearly doubled" the work of the police department without commensurate increase in resources. Meanwhile, the "bootlegger," the surreptitious vendor of intoxicating liquor and his trade enjoyed "the sympathetic attitude of the people at large," pp. 8-10.

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147. Ibid.

148. ARPDNYC 1923, p. 30, also 5-6.

149. Ibid., p. 31.

150. Ibid., p. 33.

151. ARPDNYC 1921, p. 11

152. Ibid., p. 16.

153. Ibid., pp. 16-17. In short, pressure groups were alleging that corruption existed within the management of the welfare fund. In retrospect, the extensive complaints seem more to be an attempt by unrespectable pressure groups. In the end, the Meyer Committee failed to specify any particular member of the department, time, date, or place where misconduct of the rules and regulations of the police occurred.

154. Ibid., pp. 106-107.

155. Ibid. Speakeasies usually contained very little alcohol and that could be flushed away quickly suppressing the opportunity for police to make arrests. Therefore, the squad was pressed to collect evidence for night search warrants which positively had to state that alcohol is kept on the premises during the night for the purpose of selling liquor during the night. Applications for a night search warrant had to be made within twenty-four hours after the evidence was obtained.

156. ARPDNYC 1927, p. 3.

157. ARPDNYC 1928, p. 31.

158. Ibid.

159. Ibid.

160. Ibid.

161. ARPDNYC 1929, p. 3.

162. Ibid., p. 8.

163. Ibid. Whalen also noted the significance of recidivism: "Five hundred thousand people are sent to prison each year in this country. Sixty percent of that number have previously served a prison sentence." Enright had stated: "The setting of the current of crime, in the direction of extreme youth, is an appalling development, which the Police Department constantly encounters. Statistic show that in the past, the majority of criminality was to be found among adults of thirty years or

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more. Whatever caused may be chargeable with the change, there has been decided shift and now the majority of the criminal element is recruited from among an almost juvenile class," ARPDNYC for 1923, 1924, p. 7.

164. Ibid., p. 9.

165. Ibid., p. 11.

166. Ibid., p. 14.

167. Ibid.

168. Ibid., p. 15. On a population adjusted basis (percent per 100,000 population), for murder or manslaughter the rates were: New York 5.9; Chicago 9.2; Philadelphia 8.1; Detroit 13.8; Los Angeles 4.2; Cleveland 6.3, and St. Louis 12.0.

169. ARPDNYC for 1931, 1932, p. 3.

170. Ibid., p. 5.

171. Thomas Kessner, Fiorello H. La Guardia and the Making of Modern New York, New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, 1989, p. 105.

172. Ibid., p. 114.

173. For example, Lawless Decade, note 101.

174. Alcoholic Republic, pp. 8-9.

175. William McCord and Joan McCord, Origins of Alcoholism, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960, p. 100.

176. Ibid., p. 120.

177. Robert Straus, "The Social Costs of Alcohol in the Perspective of Change, 1945-1980," in Alcohol, Science and Society Revisited, eds. Edith Lisansky Gomberg, Helene Ruskin White and John A. Carpenter, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1982, p. 142. Studies have shown that the effects of strikes and other temporary perturbations in the alcohol supply produces lower incidents of violent crime. Room states: "In an exemplary series of studies of the strike in the Finnish alcohol monopoly stores in 1972, it was estimated that overall consumption was reduced by about 30 percent, with less impact on middle-class drinking habits and a particularly strong impact on homeless alcoholics. To an 'absolutely striking extent,' visible public drunkenness disappeared from the Helsinki streets. 'Cases of assault and battery were reduced by some 20 to 25 percent,'...The fall-off was particularly evident in the rate of aggravated assault,'" in Robin Room, "Alcohol and Crime: Behavioral Aspects,"

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Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice, vol. 1, ed. Sanford H. Kadish, New York: Free Press, 1983, p. 41.

178. John Kaplan, "Alcohol, Law Enforcement, and Criminal Justice," in Alcoholism and Related Problems: Issues for the American Public, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984, p. 79.

179. Ibid., p. 81.

180. Marvin E. Wolfgang, "Forward," in Drinking and Crime: Perspectives on the Relationships between Alcohol Consumption and Criminal Behavior, ed. James J. Collins, Jr., New York: Guilford Press, 1981, p. xi.

181. Prohibition and the Progressive, p. 184.

182. James Bryce, Modern Democracies, New York: Macmillan & Company, 1921, II, p. 159.

183. Quoted in Paul A. Carter, "Prohibition and Democracy: The Noble Experiment Reassessed," Wisconsin Magazine of History, 56 (Spring 1973): 192.

184. Ibid., p. 195. Carter quotes Dobyns (supra no. 138) that repeal was a struggle by AAPA supporters "to save themselves hundreds of millions of dollars by substituting for the income tax a liquor tax to be paid by the masses," p. 26. For 1929, Methodist Board of Temperance spokesman Deets Pickett estimated that of the total contributions received by the AAPA, 75 percent was given by only fifty-two men. The female leaders of the "wets" included Mrs. Pierre Du Pont, Mrs. August Belmont, Mrs. J. Roland Harrison, Mrs. Coffin Van Rensslaer, and Mrs. R. Stuyvesant Pierrpont. Carter observes that the group was "hardly the representatives of an American democrat in the Jackson-Bryan tradition would have chosen to typify 'the little people of the world,'" p. 196.

185. See, for example: Alan Block, East Side-West Side: Organizing Crime in New York, 1930-1950, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1983, chapter 6, and Humbert S. Nelli, "American Syndicate Crime: A Legacy of Prohibition," in Law, Alcohol and Order, David E. Kyvig, ed. Contributions in American History, no. 110, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985, chapter 8.

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CRIME IN A CITY:

URBAN DISORDER AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

IN NEW YORK, 1890-1990

by

ROBERT D. McCRIE

VOLUME II

1995

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CHAPTER 6

CRIME IN THE BRONX--1950 TO 1980

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No urban area in the country experienced more private residential development during that troubled decade [the 1930's] and the boast was often made that the Bronx was 'the city without a slum.'*

The Bronx is Burning.†

*Lloyd Ultan, Devastation/Resurrection: The South Bronx, Bronx: Bronx Museum of the Arts, 1980, p. 36.

†Title of a documentary produced by the British Broadcasting Company in 1973.

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The Bronx cocktail, circa 1935, was composed of one part orange juice and one part dry vermouth added to a jigger of gin. Shake with ice. Strain and serve usually during late afternoon hours. The soothing potion originated not from The Bronx but from a polished bar at Manhattan's Waldorf-Astoria.

The Bronx cocktail, circa 1975, was even more lethal. It was composed of a liberal amount of kerosene, sprinkled during the evening hours over wooden steps or along back halls of tenement buildings, to which a lighted cloth fuse was added. This potent combination similarly was not invented in The Bronx, but evolved as a powerful symbol of that borough's seemingly unremitting self-destruction during a prolonged and intense period of decline beginning in the 1960s. The purpose of this chapter is to review social and, in particular, criminogenic circumstances in The Bronx, particularly for a three decade period beginning in 1950.

Settlement and Growth

Settlement of the island of Manhattan by the Dutch moved steadily from south to north in the early seventeenth century as the government in the Hague and Amsterdam sought rapid development of the settlements. Jonas Bronk, whose name took many spellings, was a Dane or Swede who lived in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, where he there married a local woman, Antonia Slagboom. Like other ambitious newlyweds Bronk was enticed by the incentives his future adopted country beckoned for those willing to risk time and money in developing property a

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world away, New Netherland. Bronk's family's assets appeared to be ample as the household embarked for New Amsterdam in July, 1639, with animals, numerous personal and utilitarian servants, and hard currency. Because of his use of money in real estate transactions, Bronk must be classified among the earliest of the region's land speculators and developers: the year after arriving in New Amsterdam, he leased an undeveloped mainland area to the east of the northern neck of Manhattan and quickly subleased it to two others, to be cleared for tobacco and maize cultivation. The next year, 1641, Bronk purchased five hundred acres of land between the Harlem and Aquahung (Bronx) Rivers from two Indian sachems, Ranaque and Tackamuck.[1] Near the Harlem River he erected a farm house, called Emmaus, along with various dependencies. The Indian war precipitated by the bellicose Governor Kieft brought disastrous results to the colony with many bouweries destroyed by Indian attacks. Seeking an early peace to the strife, Bronk arranged a treaty with the Indians in 1642, but it was short-lived and hostilities resumed. Bronk died the next year, leaving an estate to his family and his name to a river which eventually would become the appellation for the mainland region.

Over the next two hundred years the area was settled mainly for farming purposes. The Bronx offered irresistible attractions: the area provided rich land for farming with access to numerous streams and rivers for transportation. The region possessed physical beauty: three spinal ridges, forming

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the foothills of the Berkshires, were traversed by the Bronx and Hutchinson Rivers and Pugley's and Westchester Creeks. In the ensuing generations of development, The Bronx would become the locus of exceptional parks linked to each other by ribbons of parkways. An eighty mile waterfront would permit considerable opportunity for recreational, residential, and, eventually, industrial use.

The state legislature on March 7, 1788, divided all counties into townships and what was to become The Bronx included ports of the towns of Yonkers, Eastchester, Pelham, Westchester, and, principally, Morrisania. Lewis Morris, a signer of the Declaration of Independence and the eighteenth century owner of the historic Bronk estate, sought in 1790 to have the permanent capital of the United States established in the county because it was "perfectly secure from any dangers wither from foreign invasion or internal insurrection." The proposal drew scant interest.

Annexation of part of Westchester County to New York had been considered as early as 1864.[2] The Bronx was included within the territory of Westchester until 1874 for the western part and until 1895 for the eastern part. On January 1, 1874, the townships of Kingsbridge, West Farms, and Morrisania became annexed to the City of New York, forming the twenty-third and twenty-fourth wards. The demand for services provided by the city fuelled this desire for annexation in the New York region and finally on January 1, 1898 the charter of Greater New York went into effect and the annexed section

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north of the Harlem River became known as The Bronx, receiving its name from the river named for its early settler.[3]

The struggle to bring order to chaos and to controls but not suppress individualism and privilege were developmental challenges to officials of The Bronx, like other regions being settled. Cooperation and mutual sacrifice served common interests and were part of the traditions of the developing territory. However, crime, criminality, and brutality also have been part of The Bronx during its entire history as features recounted from the wilderness years to modern urbanization.

Yet early records of crime in the area that was to become The Bronx are sparse. During colonial times from 1664 the capital crimes statutes of English law were in effect, though rarely used. The courts were headed by trusted local citizens who generally heard property disputes or complaints about contract issues, though occasionally a criminal matter was on the docket. During the service of Judge Lewis Morris II, an offender was convicted of "hogg stealing" and a jury member accused of "hanging" the jury in the case was fined by the court.[4]

In the third quarter of the eighteenth century, competing partisan issues disrupted order of the region. The peaceful woods and fields of The Bronx were crisscrossed by rival political factions which sometimes resorted to criminal behavior in the guise of partisan righteousness:

> It was a time of great distress and overwhelming tension. It was not unusual for roving bands of

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> Americans to sweep down from northern Westchester County and steal cattle from Tory refugees. Similarly, the refugees...would move northward and do the same thing to the Patriot settlers...There are recorded incidents of Americans coming across a hapless Tory, demanding payment from the man, and when not given, they would knock him to the ground and kick him, still demanding the money.[5]

By the twentieth century annexation brought continued growth and prosperity to The Bronx. By 1927, the borough had grown rapidly as a largely residential area serving as "a home borough for the workers of Manhattan as well as for the workers in the other parts of the city." A history of the time exalted: "It cannot boast of the great concentration of power and wealth which is the essence of Manhattan....It can glory in the fact that if it is not the heart and brain it is at least a powerful limb of the earth's greatest city."[6] For the first half of the twentieth century, The Bronx served not solely as a bedroom community for the well-off and poor, the native and immigrant alike, but also as an educational, cultural, and recreational center in its own right. To hundreds of thousands, the borough served as a desirable place to live and learn and work and, moreover, it was The Beautiful Bronx.[7]

Relative to the more populous areas to the south, The Bronx had a preferred location strategically as a transportation center which made the area a convenient nexus for living but also served powerful commercial and industrial needs for making, storing, and moving products, produce, and

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commodities. Housing, though never limitless, seemed sufficiently elastic to meet the needs of thousands of native and immigrant families searching for more living space and tranquility than they could obtain in Manhattan for the same amount of money. Inspired by the Champs Elysées in Paris, the Grand Concourse was aligned along a glorious north-south route where housing proliferated in spacious, well detailed apartment buildings from Siegel Park in the south to the Concourse's north terminus at Mosholu Parkway. Radiating from the Grand Concourse were attractive, though less grand apartment buildings which declined in value with the distance the building was separated from the Concourse. The Bronx housed the rich and well-off not only in apartments of the Grand Concourse, but more particularly in splendid houses often with Hudson River views in Riverdale in the northwest region. Moderate and inexpensive housing stock was found throughout the borough, particularly among the thousands of apartment buildings of the South Bronx, including the communities of Mott Haven, Longwood, Morrisania, and Croton Park.

By 1950, The Bronx, despite its established and thriving commercial and industrial base, was considered a particularly convenient urban suburb for thousands of residents who worked each day in Manhattan or elsewhere. But unlike such communities in Brooklyn, Queens, Staten Island, and suburban areas, housing in The Bronx was predominantly in rental apartment buildings, rather than in free-standing dwellings

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largely owned by occupants or in co-operative--tenant-owned--apartment buildings which had popularity among the costlier residential buildings of Manhattan.

The concentration of residential housing had worked to the borough's advantage. Not many years earlier, The Bronx often has been described as "the city without a slum,"[8] characterized, as it was, by solid housing stock that had withstood relentless population growth despite waves of immigrants.

Despite its reputation as an urban success story, the community was targeted for an amusing, but derisive, couplet from the pen of doggerel poet Ogden Nash:

> The Bronx?
>
> No, thonx.[9]

Nash's whimsical dismissal was published in 1931, when a measure of prosperity, despite the depression, characterized life in the borough. It was later to change. "By the late 1960s (The Bronx) had come to symbolize the kind of negative sentiment about the borough one heard everywhere. The Bronx was being written off; it had become a symbol of urban decay, crime and despair."[10] References to crime in The Bronx as a symbol of urban decline were commonplace. A Bronx-born reporter reflecting on the traumatic mutation of the borough's reputation from the 1960s on, wrote:

> Even Bronx boosters admit that in pointing out positive aspects of Bronx life, the image they must always dispel first is that of crime...Three years ago, when Jones (an assistant chief, head of uniform patrol) was assigned to the Bronx, he inherited a borough that was experiencing an almost decade-long

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> rise in serious felonies. In some precincts, increases of almost 15% were being noted in a year's time. While it is true that the entire city was going through the same experience, the increases were larger in the Bronx and it appeared that more neighborhoods were being affected."[11]

For the vast majority of its history The Bronx appeared to be a bucolic, well positioned and serviced, immigrant-friendly "suburb" to Manhattan's dynamism. Then it became the symbol of a feral state in serious disorder and in rapid decline. Dramatic changes had occurred in reported crime throughout urban America beginning in the late 1950s or in the early 1960s; however, the pattern has not been examined quantitatively for The Bronx.

How did crime patterns differ in The Bronx from 1950 to 1980? Or, in fact, did they? Is the Bronx an unfair scapegoat, reflecting, in reality, a pattern noted substantially in the other boroughs but not publicized with the same intensity? Was Bronx crime simply more concentrated, more proclaimed, and perhaps more dramatized than that of other metropolitan areas to the borough's detriment?

A Note on Measuring Crime in The Bronx

To determine crime patterns, data were collected from several sources, principally from annual reports issued by the New York City Police Department. The preparation of such reports began in the nineteenth century and were modified in the 1930 to suit requirements of the city's participation in the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) program managed by the Federal

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Bureau of Investigation (FBI).[12]

A crime must be reported to be counted: when incidents are not reported resulting in a permanent record, evidently they cannot be counted. Similarly, if law enforcement discourages the public from formally reporting a crime for whatever reason, no crime is counted. Moreover, if police officials face urgent pressures to increase or decrease reported incidents, they may not-so-subtly pass this requirement as an expectation to patrol officers who might achieve the politically or socially desired results.[13] Therefore, criminal incidents records have serious limitations that always are present to cast doubt on official pronouncements and any conclusions about them. Yet, the UCRs and local police reports remain an indispensable yardstick for measuring "serious" criminal activity.

Criminal data in New York City mainly are generated by law enforcement activity at each precinct; activity by other law enforcement entities occurs constantly and totals for arrests from these police actions are included in UCR totals, and usually, though not necessarily, in police precinct records. Criminal incidents are reported to the Department's Arrest and Crime Coding Unit where numeric codes are assigned and the precinct reports checked for accuracy. After this unit completes a review of the most serious crimes--murder and homicide--data are forwarded to the Management Information section, which in turn analyzes and formats the reports for the state and the FBI.

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Actual incidents or complaints reflect the level of crime reported to or known to law enforcement. Arrest data, including the deliverance of summonses, are divided by reported crime to produce the clearance rate, or another indication of the success of police effort.

The Uneven Prosperity

In 1950, the national economy was experiencing a period of mighty population and economic expansion concurrent with broad general prosperity. The population in 1945 was 139.9 million; by 1950, it was 226.5 million, an increase of 61.9 percent in five years. Gross National Product (GNP) stood at $212.4 billion in 1945 and then reached $286.5 billion in 1950 (which actually represented a decrease in constant dollars from the last year of World War I). By 1965, the GNP reached $691.1 billion, and by 1980 $2,626.1 billion, representing substantial real growth in inflation-adjusted terms from 1965 to 1980. Historian Robert H. Ferrell observed:

> As the 1980s dawned and the country began to approach the end of the century, pundits and preachers and students of American history looked to the past and future and some saw signs of social decay, notably in the increasing divorce rate and the increasing acceptability of couples living together, even having children together, without benefit of clergy.[14]

The number of divorces declined slightly from 2.6 per 1,000 population in 1950 to 2.5 in 1965, but then doubled to 5.2 by 1980. Ferrell mused: "Whether this meant anything other than a basically more honest arrangement for everyone concerned was hard to say."[15] Regardless, it was clear that

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from 1950 to 1980 extraordinary social change occurred, shaping and reshaping every aspect of American life.

The early 1950s were years of low crime in New York City as measured by incidents reported to police, including The Bronx. One of the prominent concerns of the police commissioner of 1950 was a critical coal shortage at the city's 213 coal yards occasioned by a bitter winter. Police administrators received the power "to ration and control available coal stocks and sought to expedite the deliveries." Another police task was to control panhandlers and arrests by the Mendicant Squad declined 15 percent from the previous year, including four arrests for the illegal wiping of automobile windshields. The third highest rate of arrests for "crimes against the person" were for "offenses against chastity." The 7,500 arrests were mostly for prostitution, soliciting, and loitering in a "comfort station" [public toilets]; however, 261 arrests also were recorded for sodomy, twenty for indecent exposure, and five for seduction of females over eighteen years of age were noted.[16]

What specific changes, meanwhile, occurred in The Bronx?

Population of the Bronx surged immediately following World War II. By 1950, it had reached slightly more than 1,450,000. For the next two decades the population remained at the same level, with constant population movement omnipresent as an urban feature. From 1970 to 1980, however, a steady population decline occurred in The Bronx, reducing

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the number of residents by 20.6 percent from the previous census period (Table 6.1) This change was not exceptional in that declines were occurring in other boroughs of New York City and in many other urban centers of the nation. However, The Bronx decline was almost two-and-one-half times as great as what was being experienced in the remainder of the city.

Accompanying the population drain was a period of rapid erosion of capital investment within the borough that was particularly graphic in the real estate industry. Many explanations were postulated as to why this population and economic decline was so fierce. Numerous factors can be cited either as causes, effects, or associated phenomena of such a process. Crime is one of them. In over three decades the character of Bronx crime differed markedly.

Crime was a public concern in The Bronx as elsewhere in 1950. But the nature and intensity of reported criminality was to change extraordinarily over the next three decades in ways that could not be foreseen. Examples of press coverage reflect these evolving concerns. In 1950 and the years immediately following, The Bronx citizenry was concerned with two "crime" issues relating to urban disorder above all others: youthful gangs and "the Mob."

In the New York Times Annual Index for 1950, only two Bronx-related crime stories appeared. Both of them concerned gang fights. A decade later in 1960, no crimes of any sort for The Bronx appeared in this annual index. By 1970, an explosion of incidents was noted including evidence of

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Table 6.1

Population in The Bronx

Compared with Other Boroughs, 1950-80

Year	Bronx	Change	New York*	Change
1950	1,451,277	--	6,440,680	--
1960	1,424,815	(1.8)	6,357,169	(1.3)
1970	1,471,701	3.3	6,423,862	1.0
1980	1,168,972	(20.6)	5,902,667	(8.1)
1950 - 1980		(19.4)		(8.3)

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census.

*Exclusive of the Bronx. These population figures are used in subsequent tables to determine crime on a population adjusted basis for The Bronx compared with the other boroughs.

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disruptions within the public schools. Some examples:

> An article on absenteeism in city schools, particularly The Bronx, cited parents' fears that children are unsafe on the streets due to gangs and older predators.[17]
>
> A few days later the newspaper reported on a petition to Mayor Lindsay from teachers and administrators of Public Schools 20 and 150 in the Hunt's Point Section asking that the neighborhood be declared a "disaster area." The article said that students, as they were on the way to or from school, were being assaulted by drug addicts.[18]
>
> Later in the year, District Attorney Roberts announced that fifteen arrests had been made that apparently had broken up youthful Bronx gangs that had terrorized merchants and residents in the Northeast Bronx.[19]

The organization and violence of youthful gangs that mushroomed in the Bronx in the late 1960s and early 1970s was described by a journalist who related the life passages of a young gang leader, portrayed in Reaper.[20] Georgie was raised in the Fordham section of the Bronx by his Spanish-speaking grandmother. Loosing interest in school work, he dropped out, eventually assimilated with a gang in Crotona Park, and commenced a career of petty thievery. Georgie got hooked on drugs and was arrested for drug related crime and was sentenced to a rehabilitation program. After release from a drug treatment program, ultimately, he assumed control of a gang, the Fourth Division Reapers, which terrorized residents in the University Heights area. Georgie's story reflects youth problems characteristic of the time in The Bronx and elsewhere: an unstable home led by a single parent which competed with and lost to the lure of the gang-family.

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By 1980, however, concerns with gangs declined as a public issue if not as a reality. Crime was surging; but it had taken a direction in which youthful gangs no longer played as visible a role. Prosecution, theoretically, had stiffened for juveniles: under a 1978 law, serious juvenile offenses could be subject to prosecution in adult criminal courts, though such adult courts sometimes refused to hear the cases sending them back to Family Court. The conviction rate was dramatically different between the two court systems: in adult court, conviction was 55 percent compared with family court where the rate was 16 percent. Additionally, if convicted in family court, juveniles faced lighter sentences. A public outcry eventually demanded tougher measures against juveniles, threatening the abolishment, advocated by some, of the family court itself if more severe sanctions were not meted out to recalcitrant youth: meanwhile, a contrary view held that juvenile criminals, regardless of circumstances, themselves were the victims of dysfunctional society.[21]

Gangs had had a long history in the borough and some members became associated with organized crime. Such figures as "Dutch" Schultz and "Mad Dog" Coll who operated during the Prohibition Era came from The Bronx. By the 1950s, organized crime activities continued to exist but received declining sporadic analysis from the press. In The Shame of New York (1953) a work largely concerned with political corruption and its connections to mobsters, the author claimed that Joseph Rao "controls and finances distribution of narcotics in Harlem

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and the Bronx, and also finances or collects tribute from the gambling, bookmaking, prostitution and numbers rackets in those neighborhoods."[22] Five "syndicate" members also were identified in The Bronx: Vincent Mauro, Pasquale Moccio, Tommy Milo "Marlo," Vincent Alo, and Sam Accardi, who additionally was identified as a mob power in New Jersey. Organized crime and its associations with corrupt government waxed and waned over the following years. However, by 1980, the over-whelming frequency of violent and property crime diverted attention from what might otherwise have been directed to the malaise evolving nature of organized crime.

In the 1950s arson--malicious burning of property--was not a crime of great consequence in The Bronx, or most other urban centers for that matter. But arson grew as an issue for urban concern. The offense did not become a Part I Index crime, that is, listed as a separate, serious property felony, until Congress ordered this in 1978, and two years later was incorporated into UCR releases. The difference between arson losses in the 1950s with the 1970s was striking, so to speak. Arson was discovered as a tool for economic survival of Bronx real estate investors though arson served the agendas of tenants and others as well. By the late 1960s and for years thereafter, arson lit up The Bronx at night: the targets included commercial, industrial, and government buildings, though multifamily residential structures were torched in the greatest number. The reasons for the ashen pall of homelessness and destruction were complex, but ultimately

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discoverable. Jill Jonnes who wrote an impassioned book of the borough's plight, We're Still Here, explained:

> In the late sixties in the Bronx the rental apartment building (a form of housing invented in ancient Rome and reliably lucrative in every era thereafter) suffered a dramatic demise as an economic entity, becoming in short order a worthless investment. Costs had soared, rents remained controlled, while rent delinquency and vandalism were rampant. Some landlords just abandoned their buildings, others "milked" them--paying no taxes, providing no services, but collecting what rents they could. The most venal turned to arson to recoup their losses. Concurrently, "finishers" (whose vocation was invented in this time and place) and junkies mined the dying apartment houses for every item of worth. They set fires to force out tenants so that they might more easily extricate pipes and other valuables. Welfare tenants, desperate to escape buildings without heat or hot water and often under siege, torched their apartments in order to get priority on city housing list....
>
> An epidemic wave of arson broke out in 1969, and for years the fire engines screamed endlessly through the lower borough, futilely extinguishing blaze after blaze.[23]

Arson was described as "the fastest growing crime in America and the most difficult to solve."[24] A newspaper report of 1975 described an evening's tour of duty for two fire inspectors, most of whose time was spent in the South Bronx. Quoting a Stanford Research Institute report for the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, the article stated that deliberate incendiary fires tripled since 1960, and the International Association of Arson Investigators thought that arson losses nationally increased ten to fifteen percent annually with the price tag of $1.5-billion a year. The article noted the specific regional character of this crime:

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> There were 12,300 fires in the South Bronx last year, with indications that a third of them, or more than 10 a night, were deliberately set. Forty residents of the area and three firemen were killed. A few weeks ago, the Right Rev. Paul Moore Jr., the Episcopal Bishop of New York, appealed from the pulpit for help against the arsonists "burning down our city in front of our very eyes."[25]

Fireman-turned-writer Dennis Smith related his experiences in Report from Engine Company 82, reflecting impressions from a firehouse to which he had been assigned. The fire fighting unit located at Interval Avenue and 169th Street in the South Bronx was described as "the busiest firehouse in the city, averaging 700 runs a month," and "may be the busiest in the world."[26]

Despite the property and life-saving mandates of firefighters and the conventional logic pertaining to the desirability of their services, the local denizens sometimes did not welcome fire-fighters arriving to battle conflagrations. Doubtlessly, some of those present desired evidence of incendiarism to burn with the fire and a rapid extinguishment might save criminal evidence that could result in a successful investigation, arrest, and conviction. To the dismay of new fire personnel, Smith related how jeering crowds called firefighters obscenities as they performed their emergency services and how on one occasion an ash-filled garbage can was flung from a roof and almost killed a comrade.[27]

What was causing the conflagrations that began in the late sixties and became an hourly matter of carnage by the

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mid-seventies? Why had The Bronx become an international symbol of cities in distress, exemplified by a British Broadcasting Company documentary in 1973, entitled: "The Bronx is Burning"?

The explanations are multifactorial; but underlying the emergency to the southern section of the borough were economic, political, and social factors related to jobs, housing, and incentives for arson. By the end of 1974, according to Fire Department data, buildings were being abandoned at a faster rate than the city could demolish them. By mid-1975 the city had an estimated 7,600 structures waiting to be knocked down and serving as inviting fire traps.[28]

The deterioration of sound and repairable housing stock into abandoned buildings and then to arson-inviting shells selectively served interests of landlords and tenants alike: "You have to understand the economics," Fire Marshall Tony Russo was quoted in a news story as saying. "There is a profit margin for everybody. The tenant maybe wants to move and figures to burn down the building to get Welfare to relocate him and give him a few hundred dollars for new furniture. The landlord wants the insurance. The neighborhood junkie wants to strip the place for its pipes and fixtures to sell for his next fix, and the home-repair contractor wants a job."[29]

To exacerbate the situation, an international issue was quickly to change the cost of operating a building. The city was dependent for low sulphur oil from certain Middle Eastern

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countries and their consortium, OPEC, introduced huge crude oil price increases, beginning in 1973, which within three years increased home fuel costs by almost four-times. This factor raised operating costs that could not be passed immediately on to tenants. Marginal South Bronx real estate investments became untenable and the rate of abandonment increased. Tenants of burned-out buildings had a right to demand immediate housing and relocation allowances from city agencies, a payment that could exceed $2,000. Meanwhile, some landlords possessed unprofitable properties for which property taxes were behind and maintenance of the structure was poor. They were assured, nonetheless, that their property could be insured from fire damage:

> (L)ast year the Fair Access to Insurance Requirements (FAIR) plan, which allows insurance protection for ghetto dwellers on an assigned-risk basis, paid $10-million on the policies in the South Bronx alone. On a citywide basis, the program claimed a $19.5-million operational deficit, and one from the New York State Insurance Department a 26.2 percent increase in premiums.[30]

Only in retrospect did it become apparent that FAIR had a below average return to society as a whole. Fortune provided its critical analysis of the declivity in "How Government Helped Ruin the South Bronx" by Herbert E. Meyer.[31] The article claimed that "a generation of misguided policies drained the neighborhood's economic life" resulting in destruction which "was inevitable." Calling the South Bronx "a social sinkhole," the article maintained: "So few criminals go the jail that crime clearly pays. Welfare handouts diminish

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the incentive to work and promote the breakup of families." Due to the sharp increase in alcohol within the area, The Bronx borough police commander called the neighborhood "the largest floating cocktail party in the world" and added that such inebriation might be a blessing in disguise: "If these people were not anesthetized by alcohol, the problems would be worse."[32]

According to the Fortune writer, the South Bronx was experiencing rapid change in social and ethnic residency patterns through the fleeing of whites from the area and the influx of poor welfare clients placed there by the city. Adding to this, the South Bronx was housing the poorest of the new domestic and foreign immigrants. "(I)t is hard to imagine how the South Bronx could ever be a more depressing or dangerous place to live than it is right now....Any resident who can afford to leave does." The article placed the time when destructive forces began to work as 1943 when the federal government passed the Emergency Price Control Act, freezing rents at their March, 1943 levels as a means to prevent unscrupulous landlords from benefiting from the severe wartime housing shortage. The federal law was repealed in 1947, but the enforcement remained only in one city:

> New York City is a tenants' town: the ratio of rental to ownership is about four to one, compared with the national average of three to two in favor of owners. Over the years, tenants came to regard low rents as a right, so New York politicians clung to local rent control, even after it became plain that the law was wrecking the entire city's stock of rental housing and undermining its tax base.[33]

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New York City folklore had long held that wealthy mid-town or suburban "slumlords" derived great riches from the rent pittances of the poor in areas like The Bronx. This was not the case: "Mostly they were (and are) small businessmen who lived and worked in the neighborhood, and who invested their lives' savings in a single piece of property."[34] With the rapid white flight and the compensating inflight of poorer residents, building maintenance by the landlords declined because they were not making a profit from their investment.

The lack of refinement by some newcomers was also a factor or decline: a symbol of this change was "airmail garbage" in which tenants threw refuse out of back windows or onto the sidewalks rather than using available receptacles. Such behavior from newcomers was precedented; but in the past older residents present in substantial numbers would interact with those abusing the unwritten code of neighborhood civility and the practices would stop.

The community's direct link between local job availability and the presence of a healthy business community, which would sustain tax and rent paying jobholders, was broken, the Fortune article maintained, by increased taxes and charges which made the climate unfavorable in which to conduct business: "By 1974, the South Bronx had lost 650 of the 2,000 manufacturers who were there in 1959 and 17,688 of the 54,037 jobs that they provided. Few new businesses moved in, and those that did...brought most of their employees with them from elsewhere in the city."[35] The press of these declensional

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forces conspired against the area's chances of surviving as a multicultural, multieconomic community:

> By the sixties, then, the forces that eventually would wreck the South Bronx were firmly in place. Housing was being ruined by rent control, jobs were becoming scarce, and low-paying jobs were being made unattractive by welfare. And the exodus of remaining middle-class families, who gave the neighborhood what little stability it still had, was accelerating. Black and Puerto Ricans immigrants continued to arrive and be packed in by the welfare department. It was inevitable that these destructive forces would reinforce one another, and when they reached a critical mass, would burst into flame.[36]

As the 1970s passed, more and more Bronx neighborhoods were felled by the epidemic of arson. Montrose, Mott Haven, Hunt's Point, Morrisania, West Farms, Tremont, Concourse, Highbridge, and Morris Heights had been burned substantially, and in some blocks to devastation. By 1980, the city of New York and the media "had redefined the boundaries of the infamous South Bronx to include everything south of Fordham Road, or twenty square miles."[37] Thus, sections of over half the entire borough--excluding park land--lay scarred from the prodigality of scorched earth.

Serious Crime Patterns in The Bronx

Three types of offenses are particularly significant in affecting public perception of criminality and danger. These are murder and nonnegligent homicide; robbery, and burglary.

Murder is classified as homicide aforethought and nonnegligent manslaughter is defined as the willful (nonnegligent) killing of one human being by another and is

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referred to here collectively as murder-homicide. Not included for this classification are deaths by negligence, suicide, or justifiable homicide. Attempts to murder--classified as aggravated assaults--are also not included.

Robbery is the taking or attempting to take anything of value from the care, custody, or control of a person or persons by force or threat of force or violence or by putting the victim in fear. Burglary is the unlawful entry of a structure to commit a felony or theft. The use of force to gain entry is not required to classify an offense as burglary.

In 1950, The Bronx reported arrests and summonses for twenty-seven murders-nonnegligent homicides. On a population adjusted basis, this resulted in 1.9 murder-homicide arrests per 100,000 persons. (Table 6.2) Murder complaints were 2.3 per unit of population. (Table 6.3)

From 1950 to 1960, murder-homicide arrests in The Bronx grew at an astonishing rate: by the end of 1960, murder arrest rate had increased 66.7 percent to forty-five incidents from a decade earlier, a total which was down seventeen arrests from the previous year. Substantial further upsurge was still to come. In the next decade an extraordinary leap occurred when incidents grew over four-times to 232 in 1970. Over the next decade as the population of the Bronx decreased, the murder-manslaughter rate remained at the same level reaching a high of 219 in 1973, and growing further to 490 in 1980, an increase of 19.9 percent over the previous year. From point-to-point, the murder arrest rate rose 10.7 times, a rate

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Table 6.2

Murder-Homicide Arrests in The Bronx

Compared with Other Boroughs, 1950-80

	Bronx			Non-Bronx New York		
Date	Number	Change	Rate per 100,000	Number	Change	Rate per 100,000
1950	27	--	1.9	244	--	3.8
1951	36	33.3				
1952	31	(13.9)				
1953	37	19.3				
1954	34	(8.1)				
1955	38	11.8				
1956	41	8.0				
1957	44	7.3				
1958	53	20.4				
1959	62	18.9				
1960	45	(27.4)	3.1	342	40.2	5.4
1961	82	82.2				
1962	71	(13.4)				
1963	77	8.4				
1964	94	22.1				
1965	141	50.0				
1966	117	(17.0)				
1967	140	19,6				
1968	213	52.1				
1969	214	0.5				
1970	232	8.4	15.8	729	113.1	11.3
1971	278	19.8				
1972	398	43.2				
1973	419	5.3				
1974	356	(15.0)				
1975	316	(11.2)				
1976	250	(20.9)				
1977	234	(6.4)				
1978	257	9.8				
1979	249	(3.1)				
1980	290	16.5	24.8	841	15.4	14.2

Source: New York City Police Department, Annual Report, 1950-80.

Population data based on US Bureau of the Census, decennial reports.

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Table 6.3

Murder Complaints in The Bronx

Compared with Other Boroughs, 1950-80

	Bronx			Non-Bronx New York		
Date	Number	Change	Rate per 100,000	Number	Change	Rate per 100,000
1950	33	--	2.3	261	--	4.1
1960	38	15.1	2.7	352	34.9	5.5
1970	229	502.6	15.6	888	152.2	13.8
1980	374	63.3	31.9	1,441	62.3	24.4

Source: New York City Police Department, 1950-80.

Population data based on US Bureau of the Census, decennial reports.

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further exaggerated by the 20.6 percent decline in population for this decade.

Similarly, murder complaints--in contrast to arrests--grew substantially on a population-adjusted basis from 2.3 per 100,000 in 1950, to 31.9 in 1980. (Table 6.3)

Robbery arrests also showed substantial increases from 253 arrests and summonses per 100,000 population in 1950, to 533 in 1960, an increase of 110.7 percent, the highest robbery rate of the decade. (Table 6.4) But the next decade saw yet a further exacerbation of this crime: from 1960 to 1970, the robbery arrest rate increased every year--generally at a double-digit level--except for 1965 when robbery--but neither murder nor burglary--decreased substantially for no discernable reason. By 1970 the robbery arrest rate had grown to 3,119, an increase of 485.2 percent in the decade and the highest level of those years. The 1970s showed a less dramatic rise. Arrests increased to a peak in 1975 of 4,617. By the end of the decade the robbery level had steadily declined to 3,673, which nonetheless represented a point-to-point increase of 17.8 percent. In total for the 30-year span, the robbery rate grew even more substantially than murder-homicide, a growth of 13.5 times.

Robbery complaints grew substantially in parallel with the arrest rate. (Table 6.5) From 1950 to 1960, complaints grew almost two-and-a-half times. Yet over the next decade the level was to increase by 12.7 times the 1960 rate. On a population adjusted basis, the reported incidents rose from

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Table 6.4

Robbery Arrests in The Bronx

Compared with Other Boroughs, 1950-80

	Bronx			Non-Bronx New York		
Date	Number	Change	Rate per 100,000	Number	Change	Rate per 100,000
1950	253	--	17.4	1,645	--	25.5
1951	263	3.9				
1952	352	33.8				
1953	308	(12.5)				
1954	326	5.8				
1955	291	(10.7)				
1956	293	0.7				
1957	429	46.4				
1958	488	13.7				
1959	494	1.2				
1960	533	7.9	37.1	2,779	68.9	43.7
1961	589	10.5				
1962	643	9.2				
1963	699	8.7				
1964	1,434	105.1				
1965	949	(33.8)				
1966	1,161	22.3				
1967	1,397	20.3				
1968	1,853	32.6				
1969	2,262	22.1				
1970	3,119	37.9	211.9	9,997	259.8	155.6
1971	3,989	27.9				
1972	4,475	12.2				
1973	3,934	(13.7)				
1974	4,413	12.2				
1975	4,617	4.6				
1976	4,235	(8.3)				
1977	3,657	(13.6)				
1978	3,705	1.3				
1979	3,419	(7.7)				
1980	3,673	7.4	314.2	16,063	60.6	272.0

Source: New York City Police Department, 1950-80.

Population data based on US Bureau of the Census, decennial reports.

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Table 6.5

Robbery Complaints in The Bronx

Compared with Other Boroughs, 1950-80

	Bronx			Non-Bronx New York		
Date	Number	Change	Rate per 100,000	Number	Change	Rate/ 100,000
1950	289	--	19.9	2,168	--	33.7
1960	988	241.9	69.3	5,591	157.9	87.9
1970	13,578	1,274.3	922.6	60,524	982.5	942.2
1980	16,181	19.2	1,384.2	84,369	39.4	1,429.3

Source: New York City Police Department, 1950-80.

Population data based on US Bureau of the Census, decennial reports.

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69.3 per 100,000 residents to 922.6. For the period 1970-80, the change was a more modest growth of 19.2 percent. However, the population of The Bronx had declined and the rate per 100,000 climbed from 922.6 to 1,384.2.

Murder-homicide is usually unplanned and unintended, committed in a brief period of unchecked individual spontaneity, though perpetrators normally possess motive, means, and opportunity to commit the crime. Robbery reflects the desire for urgent gratification and often is considered by the perpetrator as chosen employment. Burglary is a type of violation which may involve greater skill and planning, sometimes requiring tools and experience. Owners and operators of residential, commercial, and industrial property have the opportunities to make capital expenditures for the reduction of vulnerability through investment in security products, systems and services. Therefore, the growth of burglary might be expected to be less robust than the increase of anti-personal crimes. This is the case in The Bronx for the period evaluated.[38]

Burglary arrests and summonses were 543 per 100,000 population in 1950, and increased in seven of the next ten years to 972 incidents, an increase of 79.0 percent. From 1960 on, increases of burglary incidents rose eight of the next ten years, reaching 3,252, an increase of 234.6 percent for the decade. As with murder and robbery, burglary reached a peak in 1977 with 6,641 incidents. Rapid decline occurred and a point-to-point comparison showed an increase in

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incidents of 1,342 to 4,594, or up 41.3 percent for the period. During the three-decade span of 1950-1980, burglary crime arrests and summonses grew 7.5 times. (Table 6.6)

Burglary complaints grew more than two-and-a-half times from 1950 to 1960, similar to the increase in robbery. In the next decade burglary rose 5.8 times, a considerable growth but at a less rapid rate than robbery. By 1980, the gross number of incidents had not changed from a decade earlier. (Table 6.7) Nevertheless, on a population adjusted basis, the rates grew every decade substantially.

Other crime indices from The Bronx support the pattern of broad growth of property crime. Grand larceny increased almost six times in the 30-year period. Narcotics and drug arrests were reported by police from 1950 to 1975, with the exception of 1964, but the data jumped so erratically in the 1970s that their value for comparative purposes is unacceptable. For example, the number of arrests increased from 1,983 in 1968, to 6,088 in 1970, and then dropped to 1,350 in 1973. Such exaggerated movements suggest analytical unreliability for drug-related crime in The Bronx and no explanation is offered for the erratic pattern of the data.

Stolen property in The Bronx for 1950 until 1973, when such information was no longer reported in the Police Department's annual report, reflected a rampant level of criminality. From $2,966,000 of losses in 1950, property stolen increased 20 of the next 23 years, reaching $36,209,000 in 1973, a growth of 12.6 times in this period.

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Table 6.6

Burglary Arrests in The Bronx Compared with Other Boroughs, 1950-80

	Bronx			Non-Bronx New York		
Date	Number	Change	Rate per 100,000	Number	Change	Rate per 100,000
1950	543	--	37.4	2,923	--	45.4
1951	637	17.3				
1952	649	1.9				
1953	712	9.7				
1954	686	(3.6)				
1955	547	(20.3)				
1956	640	17.0				
1957	867	35.5				
1958	977	12.7				
1959	952	(2.5)				
1960	972	2.1	68.2	5,386	84.3	84.7
1961	1,162	19.5				
1962	1,232	6.0				
1963	1,603	30.1				
1964	7,720	369.1				
1965	1,804	(76.0)				
1966	1,819	0.8				
1967	2,040	12.1				
1968	2,153	5.5				
1969	2,704	25.6				
1970	3,252	30.3	211.0	10,029	86.2	156.1
1971	4,005	23.1				
1972	4,107	2.5				
1973	4,931	20.1				
1974	6,167	25.1				
1975	6,233	1.1				
1976	6,404	2.7				
1977	6,641	3.7				
1978	4,803	(27.7)				
1979	4,911	2.2				
1980	4,594	(6.4)	393.0	14,726	46.8	249.5

Source: New York City Police Department, 1950-80.

Population data based on US Bureau of the Census, decennial reports.

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Table 6.7

Burglary Complaints in The Bronx Compared with Other Boroughs, 1950-80

	Bronx			Non-Bronx New York		
Date	Number	Change	Rate per 100,000	Number	Change	Rate per 100,000
1950	1,269	--	87.4	5,813	--	90.2
1960	4,656	266.9	326.8	30,579	426.0	481.0
1970	31,812	583.2	2,161.6	149,882	390.1	2,333.2
1980	32,107	0.9	2,746.6	184,686	23.2	3,128.9

Source: New York City Police Department, 1950-80.

Population data based on US Bureau of the Census, decennial reports.

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Changes in Urban Policing

The dramatic changes in reported crime data in The Bronx took their toll on the daily lives of people who lived and worked in the borough. The media covered an urban problem which began as a serious concern, reached the disaster state, and went beyond seemingly to achieve catastrophic proportions. Such development was unforeseen including by police officials.

In 1960, an academic declared "A Crisis in Police Management," which was published in a highly regarded professional journal.[39] Symptomatic of its time, the article found that policing was "in crisis" for three reasons: police managers had failed to identify the core of education, training, and experience required by the entire group to master; next, police had failed "to adapt basic police organizational structure to modern needs" such as its failure to examine "the assumption that police organization must be quasi-military in nature"; and, finally, police failed "to create challenge necessary for effective utilization of available brain power," more specifically, the slow movement on the creation of academic programs in police science to meet the needs of the time. Nowhere did the "crisis" identify challenges in the problems facing policing from changing societal forces.

Another academic focused on problems of being a police officer including conflicts with loyalties, temptation, fear, and coping with human misery.[40] Yet as policing was undergoing change, pressed by advances in management trends and

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technological innovations, the observers did not identify fundamental quantitative changes in crime as being a critical feature of the day.

Policing in 1960 was concerned about better management. New York's Police Commissioner Stephen P. Kennedy stiffened personnel requirements in an effort "to halt the waste of tax dollars caused by training men who ultimately fail to meet...standards."[41] Kennedy's concern was that "greater changes in the medical and physical standards for patrolmen" would "disqualify candidates with a prior history of nervous conditions, similar to those with a history of alcoholism, peptic ulcers, and back conditions." Police educators and practitioners of the era circa 1960 seemed to have no sense of the imminent societal changes which would engulf the nation, particularly urban areas like the South Bronx, over the next three decades.

By the years 1965-67, a remarkable increase in crime, based on incidents reported to police was recorded in The Bronx. These changes were coming under the scrutiny of researchers. A two-year borough study conducted by researchers at Fordham University and financed by a grant from the Federal Office of Economic Opportunity identified that "a significant movement of middle- and lower-middle-income families out to the suburbs has occurred and in their place have come thousands of Negro and Puerto Rican families."[42] The study team composed of forty-five economists, researchers, and field interviewers who surveyed three thousand Bronx

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households covering eleven thousand people. The final report included analysis of changes in the borough's industry and commerce.

The period 1960 to 1966 saw a net loss in The Bronx of over 205,000 non-Puerto Rican whites, decreasing the non-Puerto Rican white population from 75.7 to 60.5 percent of the total population. A press report stated: "Those who moved out were in the more productive ages and the better-paying occupations."[43] Meanwhile, Puerto Ricans moved in by the tens of thousands in a six-year period, increasing their share of the population from 11.3 to 20.9 percent. Additionally, migrants from rural areas increased the number of blacks in the borough from 11.3 to 17.4 percent of the population. "Together, Puerto Ricans and Negroes grew from a quarter to more than a third of the population. They moved predominantly into the South Bronx and the East Bronx, but now they have settled also in sections east and west of the Grand Concourse."[44]

The new residents had lower average family income than the previous residents and brought with them few job-related skills to serve the borough's manufacturing base. During the six year period, 216 manufacturers of furniture and fixtures, machinery, stone, glass and clay, transportation equipment, food, textile, apparel, paper, printing and publishing, chemicals, leather, and miscellaneous manufacturers departed. Executives and managers of exiting companies applauded the borough's superior transportation network, but decried the

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growing tax burden, paucity of parking and loading facilities, growing vandalism, and declining quality of the labor force. The report included many general recommendations such as upgrading the fitness of the labor force and encouraging youngsters to complete their education.

By late 1967, Mayor John Lindsay described the city's crime problem as the "number one priority" of his administration and grappled with how to make the force of over 28,200 officers more effective.[45] An increase of 5,000 police officers was proposed by unidentified Police Department sources in a news report that stated: "[T]he people of New York are concerned about crime and fearful of walking their streets at night. This fear and its concomitant demand for more protection is a real need...that must be met with more policemen."[46] The same story stated that "anxious parents" in the Bronx called for more protection for their children "in the wake of a series of rapes of eight young girls, all under twelve, in the last two months," all of which occurred in the Morrisania-Hunts Point section. Also mentioned was the arrest of three youth in the beating and robbing of an 85-year-old man in the hallway of his home in The Bronx.

The police responded to complaints of increased crime by arresting more. The total number of arrests in the entire city increased every year from almost 42,000 in 1962 to just over 58,000 in 1966. However, the clearance rate of all reported felonies deteriorated for the same period from 35.5 percent in 1962 to 17.9 percent in 1966.[47] In that period the

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most frequently solved serious crime, murder and non-negligent manslaughter, declined from a clearance of 90.2 to 78.1 percent; robbery clearance dropped from 43.7 to 17.7 percent, and felonious assault from 66.7 to 45.5 percent. The police were arresting more but were solving fewer of the most serious incidents within the city. The reasons for this trend are important and puzzling but have not received analysis to date.

For 1967, murders in the city increased by 14 percent, a rate of 9.5 per 100,000 population. The police hastened to report that this rate, nonetheless, was still the lowest of the ten largest cities.[48] The news coverage argued that homicide data were reflective of underlying crime conditions:

> The report on murders is regarded as an accurate barometer, because there has be no change in the department's methods of classifying murders. The methods of recording other crimes reported to the police--such as rapes, burglaries and felonious assaults--were revised in March, 1966, to reflect the type of crime more accurately.[49]

Tensions in the South Bronx between black and Puerto Rican residents in July, 1968 led to four deaths in two shooting accidents in less than a week.[50] Roman Catholic priests and nuns walked the streets with representatives of Bronx Borough President Herman Badillo to cool the tempers. A black 26-year-old laborer was accused of shooting to death a 45-year-old Puerto Rican mother following a neighborhood argument and a 31-year-old black was accused of killing three Puerto Ricans and wounding a fourth outside the building where he worked as the superintendent. The car of the 26-year-old was overturned and set afire. "Firemen attempting to put out

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the car blaze were pelted with bottles and bricks hurled from roofs."[51] A patrol car moving along the area was hit by a brick and its windshield shattered. Later in the day, a procession of about 150 mourners, which included black grievers, ended their expression of bereavement without further incident.

According to Barry Gottehrer, chairman of the Mayor's Urban Action Task Force, friction between the two ethnic community groups arose from a struggle for control of antipoverty funds allotted to the area. Tensions had been aggravated further by the shooting incidents and the hot weather.

Implication should not be drawn that the majority of members of different ethnic groups did not continue to live harmoniously during the turbulent years. They did. The community as a whole was victim to its own criminal minority, and struggled to resist the daily toll such disorder extracted. Mayor John V. Lindsay's book, The City, which chronicled his "political miracle" of being re-elected after earlier great voter discontent, noted:

> One of the most unjustified myth at large in our cities is that the black ghetto areas of the city are staging areas for criminals and that most of the residents there are somehow sympathetic to lawlessness. In fact, there is nothing that unites every neighborhood in the city, black and white, affluent, middle class, and poor, more than a common demand for increased efforts against crime.[52]

By 1970, desolation had swept across Hunts Point and threatened Morrisania, but neighborhood stalwarts remained hopeful:

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> The odds against the almost fanatical optimists are formidable. There are addicts galore, fires daily, robberies, abandoned stores and purse-snatchings. Welfare checks are stolen from mailboxes, and piles of rubble and garbage stand where there were once houses....At times, those who were trying to halt decay in their neighborhood become resentful because they believe that the more they do for themselves the less likely they are to get help from government sources.[53]

With release of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's final Uniform Crime Reports for 1967, another significant increase in crime had been registered. Predictably, the FBI Director, J. Edgar Hoover, decried the situation with particular gloom: "Perhaps never in our history has there been such widespread concern over crime and the capability of our criminal justice agencies to contend with it."[54]

Many criminal justice academics and researchers had been skeptical about the year-after-year increase in crime reported nationally. Their complaints included the fact that the FBI's Crime Index measured only reported crime and that the growing number of incidents of property crime might only prove that people were becoming more affluent, and perhaps careless, and were aware that they had to report thefts to claim insurance policy losses or income tax deductions. Another complaint was that FBI data did not identify teenagers and young males as preponderant actors in violent and property crime.

The FBI sought to counter the relevancy of the reporting by adjusting crime rates on a population adjusted basis and to improve its screening of data reported to it from various law enforcement organizations. An article reported that the

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opinions of crime analysts had changed and that the sense that crime was climbing at a disturbing rate was developing a consensus: Marvin E. Wolfgang of the University of Pennsylvania "who had also previously been dubious of the FBI's conclusions, conceded that 'the violent crime increase is accurate.'"[55] By the late 1960, crime analysis come to agree with what the man and woman on the street had believed for a few years: violent and property crime had increased on an absolute and population adjusted basis.

In 1971, Tom Walker was appointed captain of the 41st precinct on Simpson Street in the South Bronx. Years later Walker described, in a short book, what he termed, "Statistically...the busiest, most crime-ridden police precinct in New York City."[56] His book, Fort Apache, described how the precinct had become "a dumping ground" for rookie officers who were not able to meet the standards of other precincts; shirkers, veterans who tried to avoid work, and corrupt cops. This crew, according to Walker, was the only force available to deal with some of the most challenging urban criminal problems in the nation. The book provided material for a popular film, safely made not in the grime of Simpson Street but in the more controlled environment of a Hollywood studio. Yet Fort Apache, The Bronx, became exemplary of a feral community: officers responding to calls sometimes met aggressive resistance from the public whom they were sworn to protect.

Crime growth in the Bronx occurred in other precincts

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besides the 41st. The entire Bronx had become a symbol of lawlessness reaching a pinnacle in the mid-1970s: one aspect to the perception was the rise in youth gang killing that a newspaper article claimed originated in The Bronx. A police officer in charge of youth gang intelligence for The Bronx, said in November, 1972: "To my knowledge the largest number of gang homicides in any one year was twelve for the whole city. Already this year we have had thirty in the Bronx alone."[57]

The intensifying crime pattern was a national issue and not one confined to the South Bronx. A Time article in 1975 entitled "Crime Boom," reported: "The call for law-and-order has literally become a battle cry in America."[58] Ten weeks later the full realization of national crime had grown as an issue and the newsweekly made "The Crime Wave" a cover story. The issue began with a quotation from President Gerald Ford:

> America has been far from successful in dealing with the sort of crime that obsesses Americans day and night--I mean street crime, crime that invades our neighborhoods and our homes--murders, robberies, rapes, muggings, holdups, break-ins--the kind of brutal violence that makes us fearful of strangers and afraid to go out at night.[59]

Technological failure was to provide an occasion with which The Bronx and other areas of the city demonstrated a sense that conventional order had been eroded within the city. On July 10, 1977, Charles F. Luce, chairman of the board of Consolidated Edison, told a television news interviewer that the utility was in its strongest position in years to cope with heavy summer electrical power demand and that he anticipated no blackouts or brownouts of major dimensions on

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the system for the summer.[60] Three days later lighting struck Con Edison equipment between Indian Point and Buchanan, communities in northwestern Westchester County. This cut a major power feed to New York City. To prevent a repetition of the blackout that paralyzed the northeast twelve years earlier, power inputs were cut from New Jersey and Long Island, leaving great portions of New York City suddenly in darkness unrelieved in some places for twenty-five hours.

The Great Blackout of 1977 provoked arson and looting in a day and night rampage.[61] Looters preyed on a blinded city. By the end of the second day, more than 3,400 persons had been arrested, 558 policemen had been injured, 2,225 alarms involving 851 fires were been received, including fifty classified as "serious." Property losses exceeded $100 million. The entire city was not affected equally. No substantial crime occurred in Staten Island and Brooklyn had moderate effects relative to its size and population. A news report emphasized:

> The Bronx appeared hardest hit, particularly along stretches of the Great Concourse. "They wiped out the guts of this neighborhood," said Patrolman Ed Grower of the 46th precinct....
>
> In the Bronx, thieves used the cover of darkness to steal 50 new Pontiacs from Ace Pontiac...When the cars were recovered later in parts of the city, they were found stripped clean of parts.[62]

The loss of electrical power to the region was a transforming moment: "(T)he blackout meant there were no alarms, no floodlight, and no law. New York found itself in a disaster movie."[63] The liberal New Republic bemoaned the

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situation, remarking "it is hard to see any desirable result coming out of this one....How do you rally 'round the mugger's cause?" and noting that, following the neighborhood-specific violence, federal funds for the devastated areas would be harder to obtain, adding: "Sympathy is running low." The oft-called war on poverty was in full campaign yet skepticism from observers of wide political and philosophical positions abounded:

> People have begun to think that New York's problems are not the kind that can be solved by spending money. If they were, the reasoning goes, then New York would be the most problem-free city in the world. No city has been more generous in terms of the amount of money or the variety of programs it has offered to help the poor.[64]

The city's fortunes had been dour in the 1970s: a bond sale had failed because the city's underlying finances were weak. This occurred following years of using capital funds to pay for operating costs and from devising financial tricks to make the city government appear more solvent than it really was. As the nation entered the recession of 1973-75, President Ford refused to aid the city during its fiscal crisis and many citizens in New York and disparate other communities understood why confidence had ebbed so. Of twelve areas where extensive looting was reported, two were in Brooklyn, three each in Manhattan and Queens, and five in the Bronx. It seemed as if a segment of the population awaited the signal to loot and then burned and stole as if by cue.

The author Midge Decter, who lived in a looted area, observed at the time that: "New York is currently engaged in a

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battle against fiscal, and with it possibly economic and social, ruin."[65] Many New Yorkers remembered an earlier power failure in 1965 which, the author remarked, produced "a moment of neighborliness and civic cooperation and that special kind of gaiety that these produced in times of crisis."[66]

But in 1977 the mood was substantially different: the liberal consensus of the past decade was that "the looting was an expression of the rage and desperation of minority youth at being the hopeless members of a hopeless community." While noting that high youth unemployment existed in the riot-scarred area, "said to be 40 to 50 percent in the worst of the slum ghettos," the author found the ambiguity of the special status accorded to poor blacks which tended to incapacitate them as a community: "The term brutality has sometimes been intended to mean that we degrade the poor by keeping them as objects of charity or welfare and sometimes that we degrade the poor by not making our charity more abundant."[67] Decter concluded that liberal racism was involved that failed to support the black community adequately to achieve higher standards and self-respect.

Two years later Robert Curvin and Bruce Porter contributed a retrospective special feature in Society on the looting, detailing the high costs to a city which was still shaken by its financial crisis.[68] The authors concluded that the blackout commenced by rioting and segued into looting. The early phase of looting "was overwhelmingly performed by criminal types who opened the stores and swept in quickly to

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take away the most valuable merchandise....Indeed, 81.5 percent of those arrested in the first hour of the blackout had previous arrest records."[69] As the looting continued, those arrested had a lower rate of previous arrests.

The melee created absurd situations. For example, a man was arrested for possession of stolen goods--ten pairs of women's slacks and seven blouses--that were not for his wife and for which the thief had no apparent use. The authors noted: "Indeed, looters in the 1977 blackout often seemed unconcerned about the picture they presented to outsiders of themselves as thieves."[70]

The authors rejected the view that looters were "riff-raff," though "criminals played an important initiating role at the onset of the disturbances." They concluded: "In our view, the main cause of the violence was the serious national economic decline that has created exceedingly high levels of unemployment and high prices for food and other necessary goods, and has substantially worsened the living standards of the poor."[71] Controlling this "corps of hardened, street-type urban dwellers who operate in a shadow economy of hustle and crime" is no easy matter due to their alienation: "These men are virtually unreachable by conventional social programs or general economic improvement."[72] The authors claimed that the social contract has "worn extremely thin among the poor in general" but has not also be honored by other segments "most notably by business and government elites whose penchant for cheating and criminality has been widely reported in the media

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for the last 10 years, makes it easy for ghetto dwellers to discount any call for restraint and forbearance on their part as exceedingly hypocritical."[73]

Another singular criminal event that transfixed public consciousness had been on-going: a serial killer. The next month, August 1977, brought to a conclusion what was described as "379 days of terror." "Son of Sam" killer David Berkowitz was arrested as a suspect in the killing of six and the wounding of seven. Though a resident of Yonkers, press reports emphasized Berkowitz's Bronx connections in his bizarre crime spree. The serial killer worked as a clerk in the Bronx General Post Office on the Grand Concourse; four of Berkowitz's thirteen victims were in the Bronx.[74]

With the end of 1980, the Police Department termed the previous twelve months "the worst year of crime in New York City history."[75] In every category--except rape and assault--increases were recorded, and the actual number of crimes could have been considerably higher because many victims do not report crime, especially property losses. Overall, the total number of reported crimes reached 710,153 incidents, up 14.3 percent over a year earlier. Queens increased the most with 17.4 percent. The Bronx was next with 16.5 percent; then Brooklyn, 15.5 percent; Manhattan at 11.4 percent, and Staten Island 2.7 percent.

These increases included substantial jumps in theft and burglary, the two largest categories in the gross number of incidents. Except for The Bronx, the corner had been turned

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on two serious violent crimes, murder and robbery. The late 1970s represented the watershed of most of the virulent crime growth. The movie "Fort Apache," stirred public impressions of a vast crime-infested urban jungle. A book by Heywood Gould entitled Fort Apache, The Bronx, was published to coincide with the movie and perpetuated the image.[76] However, a critical reviewer in 1981 noted that perception was not the same as reality.

The 41st precinct on Simpson Street had modulated: A review in a historical journal quipped: "In fact today the precinct has so changed that its station house is known as the little house on the prairie since the population has declined so greatly."[77] In part, crime in The Bronx lessened due to depopulation. On a population adjusted basis, decline in the most serious type of crime was noted from the peaks of earlier years.

Official corruption and white collar crime also flourished during these times in The Bronx. Organized crime had spread over a dozen industries according to press reports.[78] Ironies abounded. Morton Van Allen, a 380 pound Baptist minister, was sentenced to prison for three years because he stole $5,000 from a South Bronx crime prevention group of which he was a director. Venality which touches the reputation of law enforcement can be particularly harmful in a community with tenuous defenses and deserving of high-performance policing. A report on the Mayor's Bronx Model Cities Program asserted: "Graft in the streets is visible

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everyday to the youth. They witness police and authority figures violating laws which they are supposed to adhere. (sic) Such acts reinforce distrust and hostility felt by youth toward police and authorities."[79] While no wave of arrests and convictions was publicized during this period, the candor of the assertion of corruption in a mayoral report readily cannot be dismissed.

Responding to Crime in Difficult Times

From time immemorial individuals and societies sought to protect themselves from animals, foes, hostile neighbors, criminals, and vandals. Protective measures were not invented for The Bronx during this period of study. Nonetheless, The Bronx increased measures taken for self-protection during these years almost in lock-step with the growth of serious crime itself. Some of these responses involved citizens working together to decrease fear and vulnerability; other responses included looking to the commercial security industry for assistance.

From the mid-1960s on, community crime prevention groups were founded and grew in The Bronx and elsewhere. Local precincts appointed community relations and crime prevention officers to allay fear and to help the public "do something" constructive concerning the risks around them. For example, black and Puerto Rican residents of the Morrisania section of the Bronx conducted their own community fight against crime with programs including renovating tenements and creating a

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school to teach residents how to prevent vandalism.[80]

Violent and property crime and economic distress sometimes go hand-in-hand: community leadership of The Bronx sought appropriate responses. Some of the measures introduced appeared well intentioned but palliative. One of these was the Civilian Radio Motor Patrol in which locally based, licensed limousine taxi-cabs in the South Bronx sought to provide additional crime watch. The program, started in 1973, was a joint effort by First National Citibank and the South Bronx Development Corporation.[81]

Neighborhood groups also were formed to create appropriate response. A typical example of enlightened self-response occurred in April, 1975, when 600 neighborhood residents in the Pelham Parkway attended an anti-crime meeting at Columbus High School. Whistles were distributed to those attending. Community tenants patrols were established, some with radios for mobile units and a base radio station which were partially paid with city funds.[82]

Changes in policing during these three decades were notable. In 1950 the city had 18,563 uniformed officers. By December 31, a decade later, the figure grew 26.7 percent (23,515) reflecting an era that demanded more policing and was willing to pay for it. The crime growth in the 1960s stimulated the funding of large classes of police officers, up 34.7 percent (to 31,680) by 1970. In the next decade crime continued to increase at a moderate level; but severe budget

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cuts, mandated by city finances in deep deficit that teetered the urban government toward bankruptcy, reduced police personnel levels to that of a generation earlier with a decline of uniformed personnel to 21,891 at the end of 1980.


Crime prevention was regarded by South Bronx communities as being too important to relegate only to police. But police could advise the community on protective measures. Individual residents received commonsense advice from crime prevention officers such as: install burglary-resistant door and window hardware, upgrade lock cylinders to pick-resistant hardware, and install intrusion alarms. Similarly, advice was dispensed on the advisability of travelling in groups and otherwise, making oneself less attractive as "a target." Commerce and industry in The Bronx similarly upgraded the quality of their physical security measures, sometimes with the aid of government money, and increasingly they patronized specialized security vendors to provide requisite services and systems.

Neighborhoods and businesses in The Bronx turned to watchmen, guard, and patrol services to provide protection and peace of mind. The growth of this highly fragmented industry is reflected by yellow pages advertisements over the period 1950 to 1980. (Figure 6.1) In 1950, only four companies advertised their services in the borough, two of which had Bronx offices and two which were located in Manhattan but advertised to The Bronx market. From 1950 to 1960, the number of such services remained constant. By 1961, however, indication of growing crime and concomitantly the existence of

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Figure 6.1



Source: New York Telephone Company Yellow Pages, 1950-1980. (Note: No volume for 1955.)

a customer base willing to contract for security guard services was reflected in a great increase in Manhattan and, to a lesser degree, Westchester security companies which advertised in Bronx telephone yellow pages. Yet the figure indicates that The Bronx itself counted an increased number of domiciled security guard and patrol firms. The period 1973 to 1980 represented a high point in the increase both of domiciled Bronx security companies and in other borough competitors. These watchmen, guard and patrol services found a market because of the inability of public law enforcement to provide the level of security desired by paying customers.

As crime grew in The Bronx, private security services there expanded in tandem. By 1980, a decrease in public policing occurred which further enhanced the desirability of private security services.

A perusal of other types of security businesses advertising to Bronx potential customers in addition to guard services during this time similarly reflects parallel growth in other types of security services. Alarm company systems and monitoring services increased their advertising during this period. Armored courier services also appeared to grow forcefully in soliciting Bronx business during these years. However, these types of businesses could not be documented by yellow page advertisements in the same way that watchman, guard, and patrol services could be because the book's publisher categorized these businesses in an inconsistent manner and because these businesses were less dependent on

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obtaining customers through placing advertisements in such a medium.

The Bronx Compared with Its Island Neighbors

Residents of The Bronx in modern times savor a certain cachet: it is distinctive from other boroughs. The Bronx is the only part of New York City located on the mainland of the United States. This geographical quality has enabled some Bronx legislators in the past to refer to other city lawmakers good-naturedly as "representatives of off-shore islands." For many years the distinguishment of Bronx life related to the value, quality, and convenience of habitation for diverse economic and social segments. For most of the twentieth century, the borough had a less extreme differentiation between rich and poor than Manhattan. It was proudly the domicile for a large lower- to middle-income populace who lived and lived well in The Bronx. They might move on one day to a beckoning suburb, but when they did, it would be with lives that had been enriched by the lifestyle, the feisty grittiness, born of hundreds of thousands of strivers and survivors who were nourished by their Bronx years.

One factor which gave The Bronx livability related to its low crime and criminality. The Bronx was safe. Doubtlessly representing the pattern of earlier years, crime was low in 1950 relative to other city boroughs (excluding the thinly-populated Staten Island). The murder-homicide rate of The Bronx was substantially lower to non-Bronx New York City, 2.3

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incidents per 100,000 population versus 4.1 in the rest of the city. (Table 6.3) Murder-homicide arrests (Table 6.2) were one-half that of the rest of the city, 1.9 versus 3.8, suggesting a more successful level of policing than other boroughs.

The low crime pattern in The Bronx was comparable with two other major crimes studied in the survey. Robbery and burglary, evaluated both by incidents and arrests, were substantially lower than the other city parts for the years 1950-60. (Tables 6.2 through 6.7)

In the decade 1950 to 1960, crime increased in The Bronx and the other city parts. Yet in 1960, The Bronx remained, if not safe, safer by far than Manhattan on a borough-wide consideration. For the decade the murder rate increased 15.1 percent in The Bronx versus 35 percent in the rest of the city. Burglary rose 267 percent in The Bronx versus 481 per cent elsewhere. Only in robbery was Bronx crime growing faster relative to the rest of the city, 242 percent versus 158 percent. Still, through the decade 1950-60, The Bronx remained substantially safer than the comparative three other populous boroughs.

From 1960 to 1970, the nation's social fabric was tested in extraordinary ways: rapid growth of reported urban crime was one of the characteristics. For the first time the murder-homicide rate of The Bronx exceeded the rate of the rest of the city. Yet even with the much-heralded destruction of the South Bronx, the entire borough's robbery and burglary

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complaint rates were lower than the rest of the city. The public saw a vision of a burned and bloodied borough on the evening's news coverage, yet never noticed that extensive and densely populated areas of Riverdale, the suburban enclave Spuyten Duyvil, the northcentral region, and Co-op City quietly had remained apart from the fray and also enjoyed large and substantially safe residential and commercial districts.

Co-op City located in the far northeast corner of The Bronx opened in 1968 and provided fifteen thousand subsidized apartments in undistinguished massive towers. Jill Jonnes refers to an interview with a young man: "I remember when my mother and I went to see our congressman. We wanted to talk to him about what was going on and see if we couldn't get the neighborhood working to fight this change, to stem the tide. He said, 'Move to Co-op City.'"[83] When the vast project prepared to open its first thirty-three hundred apartments in 1968, seven thousand of the ten thousand applications on file, were from The Bronx. Of these, four thousand were reported to be from the central Bronx and the Grand Concourse region.[84] From the early 1960s on, the elegant and previously stable Grand Concourse experienced steady loss of earlier residents, an increased vacancy rate, decreasing quality of rental building maintenance, often due to landlord negligence, and decreased property valuation.

By 1980, on a population-adjusted basis, the murder-homicide rate of The Bronx led the rest of the city. However,

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robberies and burglaries actually decreased in The Bronx relative to the rest of the city. The Bronx was not demonstrably safe from property and violent crime. Still, it was safer than what most people believed, considerably more tranquil and stable that its sooty image, and some areas were safe consistently relative to other law crime urban areas.

Was the destruction in The Bronx substantially different than other urban cores? Apparently not. Reports from other cities--Baltimore, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Los Angeles, St. Louis, and others--document inner city disorder, depopulation, and arson at that time. Smaller cities were also subject to urban turmoil. In Providence, RI, for example, the Fourth of July weekend of 1970 was described as "a nightmare." A description continues: "During one seven-hour period firefighters were summoned to douse 43 building fires, 236 bonfires, and 14 auto fires. This hectic period also included 29 false alarms, 15 rescue runs, and several hydrant openings. The vast majority of such incidents were in South Providence, with Federal Hill a distant second."[85] The Bronx, specifically the South Bronx, was burned and bloodied, but not unique, and capable of rejuvenation.

The depopulation, desolation, increased crime, and lowering economic conditions in The Bronx from the 1960s through the 1970s was occurring in particular urban areas close to home as well. In the metropolitan area, Newark, Jersey City, and Elizabeth, New Jersey are examples of cities whose downtown residential areas experienced traumatic shock

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in this time. The problem was not regional, but national in scope with mature cities experiencing vast depopulation and decommercialization of residential areas near the historic retail, commercial, and governmental urban core.[86]

Beyond the confines of The Bronx and the boundaries of the city, momentous developments reflected the times. These included: the Vietnam war with radicalization of America's youth, the civil rights movement, antiwar demonstrations that provoked much bitterness separating young and old, assassinations of public figures, street demonstrations, and uprisings in some universities across the nation. As critic Morris Dickstein observed in 1989: "The sixties were not simply a time when the young grew long hair and took to the streets; it was also when many others dramatically reexamined their lives, with consequences that can still be felt."[87]

The seventies reflected a continuance of urban disorder in The Bronx and beyond. But an intractable problem of the decade was the arms race which seemed to cast a frightening doomsday pall on planning for youth and engendered civic and social skepticism. Other timely momentous issues included women's rights, a presidential resignation over improprieties and the specter of Watergate, and the diplomatic facedown of the Iranian government. And the problems of the inner cities. In 1977, recently elected President Carter stood in front of crumbling buildings and empty lots on Charlotte Street, The Bronx, and promised that the federal government would help transform the city's most desolate borough and an

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international symbol of urban decline into something better.[88]

In the decade of the eighties, The Bronx had reversed partially its decline economically, though crime remained higher than average rates for the other four boroughs and most other metropolitan areas for serious crimes. Job growth increased while a global recession forced residents to lead themselves out of the recent dim past. Even the South Bronx, "the middle of the enduring symbol of America's urban catastrophe," began building afresh and provided homes and opportunities for those who might have moved elsewhere.[89] The economic renewal began accompanied by hopeful social indications of moderation in the number and pattern of criminal incidents, including in the most distressed regions of the South Bronx.

Journalist and first-time novelist Tom Wolfe reimposed on the public perception a vision of raw life in the streets and courts of The Bronx in a best selling work of fiction and later a motion picture, The Bonfire of the Vanities. The portrayal did as much to censure the politically conscious criminal justice system as the book did to reinforce the negative imagery of a dangerous locality trying to mend itself.[90] At least The Bronx was not burning any more.

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ENDNOTES

1. Stephen Jenkins, Story of the Bronx, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1912, chap. 2.

2. James L. Wells; Louis F. Haffen, and Josiah A. Briggs, eds., The Bronx and Its People: A History 1609-1927, vol. 1, New York: Lewis Historical Publishing Co., 1927, p. 22.

3. Ibid., p. 23.

4. Story of the Bronx, p. 96.

5. Lloyd Ultan, "1776-1940, The Story of the South Bronx," in Devastation/Resurrection: The South Bronx, Bronx: Bronx Museum of the Arts, 1980, p. 36.

6. Bronx and Its People, p. 1.

7. Lloyd Ultan, The Beautiful Bronx, 1920-1950, New York: Harmony Books, 1979.

8. Devastation/Resurrection, p. 16.

9. Over time the two-liner became awkward baggage for the poet. On the 50th anniversary of the Bronx as a county, Abe Tauber, dean of the faculty, Bronx Community College, wrote Nash asking if he would care to take the occasion to write something additional. Nash replied as follows:

> Dear Dean Tauber--
>
> I can't seem to escape the sins of
> my smart-aleck youth.
> Here are my amends.
>
> I wrote those line, "The Bronx? No thonx!"
> I shudder to confess them.
> Now I'm an older, wiser man
> I cry, "The Bronx? God bless them!"
>
> Contritely yours,
> Ogden Nash

Nash's amends were well received, but an irony of timing remained. When Nash wrote the lines originally, the Bronx had a robust economy, particularly so since the depression was near its nadir. By the early 1960s, signs of decline were widely trumpeted. See: Abraham Tauber and Ogden Nash: "Ogden Nash and the Bronx," Bronx County Historical Journal I (July 1984): 68.

10. J. Schmetterer, "Crime: Dispelling the Myth...Fighting the Reality," New York News Magazine, March 20, 1983, p. 38.

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11. Ibid.

12. The FBI's Uniform Crime Reports (UCRs) have been collected from crimes reported to police since 1930. These offenses are "major" crimes divided into violent and property incidents. Crimes reported to police have never been assumed to be comprehensive: the more serious the offense or the more likely that loss of property can be recompensable by insurance, the more likely it is that such incidents will appear on police records.

By the 1920s, urban communities were collecting and disseminating criminal incidents data on a routine basis, generally using such information as a basis for evaluating departmental programs and their effectiveness. Law enforcement and other governmental officials foresaw the importance of maintaining a national database of police and criminal activity. In 1927, the Committee on Uniform Crime Records (UCR) was established by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) to "create a viable system of uniform police statistics." This task was not easy since the definition of many crimes can vary considerably. In 1929, the Committee finalized its recommendations which became the foundation of the UCR Program. Through the voluntary and cooperative efforts of many agencies, the UCR was implemented in 1930. The same year Congress authorized the attorney general to gather such data, and designated the FBI to serve as the national clearinghouse for the program.

From its monthly origins the Uniform Crime Survey was changed to a quarterly report in 1944, and to a semiannual format in the later 1970s. The annual compilation of adjusted data is published seven to twelve months following the end of the calendar year. The UCR collects "crimes reported or known to police" in two broad categories: violent and property crimes. Violent crimes include murder and homicide, non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, and robbery (theft with force from a victim). Property crime includes larceny-theft and motor vehicle theft. Arson was added as a UCR offense in 1979.

"Crimes reported or known to police" are not likely to be comprehensive. To be a crime in the FBI's tabulation, the incident has to be reported by someone to a police department which participates in the Survey. Overall only about 30%-40% of all crimes are reported to law enforcement authorities. This characteristic--long known to criminologists--was the impetus to the National Crime Survey which began in the mid-70s to provide a greater picture of criminal activity in the United States in addition to the one provided by the FBI's UCR.

13. As a new resident in New York City in 1965, the author did not understand conventional protective measures required

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by city residents. One day he returned to his apartment and found it had been burglarized through an open unguarded window opening onto a fire escape. He proceeded to the local precinct police station and gave many details of the stolen items. A concerned and sympathetic detective patiently took notes of all the items and offered general, well-intentioned advice.

A few days later, the author found an identification number that had been engraved on the back of a watch which had been among the stolen items. Feeling this bit of information was vital to policing efforts, the author returned to the police station to provide the additional clue. A different detective was on duty from the one to whom the original report had been made and he searched through records made on the day of the author's earlier police station visit and then announced that no record of the crime had been logged at the precinct.

He showed the author the master list of incidents reported to the precinct at approximately the time the author had been there just a few days earlier, and indeed, no record of the burglary had been made. It was a puzzlement.

Several years later, the author had become interested in crime and security and came to know police officials. One day he told the experience to a deputy inspector. He smiled knowingly: "Your case was assigned to 'Detective Can.' When you left the station house, your complaint went into the can." By this means a precinct which is receiving too much political pressure for crime in the area can reduce the number of incidents in official reports simply by not recording the crime incidents. This abuse was addressed during the term of Patrick Murphy, as police commissioner, who instituted a procedure to increase the likelihood that crimes reported to the police would indeed be recorded.

14. Robert H. Ferrell, "Emerging as a World Power: 1946-" in, Almanac of American History, ed. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1983, p. 512.

It should not be concluded that signs were not present in the 1950s that behavioral changes were occurring among youth. A New York City Welfare study asserted:

> The number of youth in conflict with the law has been increasing steadily in New York City, as in the United State as a whole, for the past five years. Whether this rise is measured by the number of police arrests, the number of court cases or the delinquency index of the New York City Youth Board (which combines data from the police and the courts) the picture is the same. The volume of delinquency is higher not only in actual number but in relation to the growing

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population of this age. Fact Book on Youth in New York City, New York: Welfare & Health Council, April, 1956, p. 43.

15. Ibid. The trends and differentials in marital dissolution in the period 1940-90 resulted in: "One of the most dramatic changes in American family experience," Bruce A Chadwick and Tim B. Heaton, eds., Statistical Handbook on the American Family, Phoenix: Oryx Press, 1992, p. 83. Chadwick and Heaton continue: "The risk of dissolution varies substantially across subgroups. Marriages that end in divorce last an average of about seven years, and the average age at divorce is in the early to mid-thirties. Blacks have much higher divorce rates than whites....Premarital birth and low educational attainment are also associated with higher risks of dissolution."

The reasons for divorce, listed in order of importance with the most important listed first, are: infidelity; no longer loved each other; emotional problems; financial problems; physical abuse; alcohol; sexual problems; problems with in-laws; neglect of children; communication problems; married too young, and job conflicts. Thus, problems of physical violence (abuse) and intemperance (alcohol) rank as fifth and sixth reasons in importance. Statistical Handbook, p. 97.

16. Annual Report of the Department of Police, City of New York for 1950, 1951.

17. Michael Stern, "Truancy Overwhelms the Truant Officer Here," New York Times, February 2, 1970, pp. 1, 28.

18. Martin Tolchin, "Lindsay Says Lack of Funds Hinders Fight on Narcotics," New York Times, February 11, 1970, p. 1.

19. Arnold H. Lubasch, "End of Youth Gang Seen in Arrest of 15 in Bronx," New York Times, August 7, 1970, p. 30.

20. G. Hoenig, Reaper: The Story of a Gang Leader, New York: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1975.

21. Michael Fabricant, Juveniles in the Family Courts, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1983, pp. 141-43, passim.

22. Ed Reid, The Shame of New York, New York: Random House, 1953.

23. Jill Jonnes, We're Still Here: The Rise, Fall, and Resurrection of the South Bronx, Boston & New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1986, p. 7 (Hereafter cited as We're Still Here).

24. Fred C. Shapiro, "Raking the Ashes of the Epidemic of Flame," New York Times Magazine, July 13, 1975, pp. 14-16+.

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25. Ibid., p. 15. The story noted that in the South Bronx there is "also the suffering of those driven from their homes and the fear of those who are left. "The arsonists have about finished driving everybody who can move out of this part of the Bronx," chief Kliduff said at the 18th Battalion firehouse. "Those who have to stay, mostly old people locked into their homes, are afraid to go out," p. 19.

26. Dennis Smith, Report From Engine Company 82, New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972, p. 11.

27. Ibid., pp. 144-45. Attacks on firemen responding to emergency calls were not new to the city. Years earlier a late model car belonging to a South Bronx suspect, was overturned and set on fire. "Firemen attempting to put out the car blaze were pelted with bottles and bricks hurled from roofs," See: Joseph Novitski, "Mott Haven Leaders Meet in Bronx with City Aides in Wake of 4 Slaying," New York Times, July 19, 1968, p. 10.

28. "Raking the Ashes," p. 19.

29. Ibid. For similar comment, see: "Cities: The Bronx is Burning," Newsweek, 85 (June 16 1975): 30: "(V)irtually everyone had a motive. Welfare recipients were eligible for extra money and better housing if they were burned out; junkies could steal plumbing and other saleable items more easily from vacant buildings. Owners of burned-out buildings could collect insurance and, in many cases, go on to collect Federal grants to rebuild. Contractors and construction workers also stood to gain, and the bitter, futureless kids had nothing to lose."

30. Ibid.

31. Herbert E. Meyer, "How Government Helped Ruin the South Bronx," Fortune, 92 (November 1975): 140-146, 150, 154.

32. Ibid., p. 140.

33. Ibid., p. 143.

34. Ibid. Two decades later the pattern of ownership of properties within the South Bronx was similar, though a recovery of sorts had occurred, see: Douglas Martin, "The Life of a Small Landlord," New York Times, January 15, 1995, sec. 9, pp. 1, 10. The article mentions that the Citizens Housing and Planning Council, a property owners' group, estimates that there are over 350,000 privately owned apartments in the twenty poorest community board districts. At the time of the article, 50,000 of these were in immediate danger of being seized for tax arrears or simply being abandoned. For their part tenants often regard landlords as enemies and the article quotes a handbook published by the

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city Human Rights Commission in 1992 that warned that a landlord is "likely to try to get his money through lying, promises, intimidation, harassment."

35. Ibid., p. 145.

36. Ibid., p. 146.

37. We're Still Here, p. 8. Concerning arson in the economically distressed inner city, novelist Claude Brown profiled a vacant, city-owned building in Upper Harlem which had become home to youngsters whose ages ranged from 14 to 17. Brown explained the mechanics of the rewards from arson:

> If someone is burned out of his or her apartment in New York City on a cold night, the Fire Department has the authority and responsibility to provide emergency shelter. So when the relocation arrives, every junkie in the neighborhood converges on him swearing that he or she has been burned out and demanding emergency relocation; it frequently works. The junkies get put up in welfare hotels, sometimes for as long as a couple of months. See: Claude Brown, "The Group," New York Times Magazine, December 16, 1973, p. 79.

38. Property crimes are more common than violent crimes against the person by a factor of five to 10 times. Violent crimes are not only fewer in number they are also easier for police to solve through arrest or other types of disposition, a process called clearance. The clearance rate for New York City during 1960 to 1980 showed a steady drop. Caution is urged in interpreting such data because crime reporting data underwent revision in late 1950, 1961, and 1967. In these latter years the definition of larceny-theft changed, which could result in an explanation as to why burglary clearances dropped so much in 1970 and 1980. Murder-homicide clearances for 1970 and 1980 are only for nonnegligent homicide. The smaller number of premeditated and deliberate murders had clearance rates in the 94% to 96% range. Nonetheless, it appears that law enforcement was less effective citywide in solving crimes in 1970 and 1980 than two decades earlier.

Crime Clearance	1950	1960	1970	1980
Murder	84.0%	88.2%	61.1%	62.1%
Robbery	43.7%	42.2%	24.2%	14.5%
Burglary	25.8%	28.3%	18.4%	6.7%

Source: Annual reports, New York City Police Department

39. Richard A. Myren, "A Crisis in Police Management," Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science 50 (January-February 1960): 600-04. This point is cited as an example of the time in which the literature failed to

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speculate on growing, fundamental societal changes altering urban order. The Police Yearbook, published by the International Association of Chiefs of Police during these years, contains the papers and proceedings of annual conferences and supports the point that police management saw no cause for societal alarm.

40. Richard H. Blum, "The Problems of Being a Police Officer," Police, 4 (November-December 1960): 10-13, and 5 (January-February 1961): 33-37.

41. Stephen P. Kennedy, "New York City Police Stiffen Requirements," Police, 5 (January-February 1961): 70.

42. Will Lissner, "Poverty Found Rising in Bronx; Many Businesses Go to Suburbs," New York Times, September 3, 1967, p. 1, 34.

43. Ibid., p. 34.

44. Ibid.

45. Sylvan Fox, "5,000 New Police Proposed in City," New York Times, November 30, 1967, p. 1, 51.

On a national level, 1967 was a year of great civil disorder with 51 to 217 disorders recorded by various agencies, depending on definition, as having occurred during the first nine months of 1967. No incidents within The Bronx are included in this total, though the one on Fifth Avenue and two in Brooklyn were cited.

President Lyndon B. Johnson established a bipartisan national commission to report on the summer racial disorders to American cities which brought "with them shock, fear, and bewilderment to the nation." See: "Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders," Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1968. This 428 pp. document called for greater law enforcement and community planning, more "vertical planning" with national guard, tougher laws against rioters, and better housing and job opportunities for the inner city. The Commission was headed by Otto Kerner, governor of Illinois, later a judge of the United States Court of Appeals who ironically four years later was indicted on bribe, perjury, and tax evasion charges. See: Seth S. King, "Federal Judge Kerner Indicted on Bribe, Perjury, Tax Charges," New York Times, December 16, 1971, pp. 1, 49.

46. Ibid.

47. Peter Kihss, "Police Here Making More Arrests, but in Only 20% of Felonies," New York Times, November 30, 1967, p. 51. This discussion focuses on "serious" crimes as defined by police and criminal justice officials, but to many members of the public incidents like mugging--a type of unarmed robbery

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in which the offender approaches the victim by surprise--is considered serious and symbolic of urban disorder.

A newspaper report of the time studied the court records of 136 persons arrested in 100 cases in Manhattan during the first two months of 1967 for charges of assault and robbery, the legal charge placed against most muggers. After examination of pertinent law enforcement records, the reporter found: the average mugger struck many times before being arrested; "even when arrested and convicted, he will prowl the streets again in a relatively short time," and time behind bars is unlikely to "furnish him with meaningful rehabilitation treatment." See: David Burnham, "Fear of Muggers Looms Large in Public Concern Over Crime," New York Times, May 20, 1968, p. 1, 52.

The effects of muggings were examined in a book on that topic which frequently used The Bronx for case material. The author claimed:

> Crimes of violence against the person...have grown steadily more common for the past several decades until they have changed much of the tenor and character of daily life in America. As a conservative estimate, such crimes are three times as likely today, per 100,000 population, as they were thirty years ago; in consequence, our feelings about our fellow man have sadly deteriorated and our freedom to do what we wish and to go where we like has radically diminished. See: Morton Hunt, The Mugging, New York: Atheneum, 1972, p. viii.

48. Martin Gansberg, "Murders Rose 14% in City Last Year," New York Times, April 18, 1968, pp. 1, 94.

49. Ibid., p. 94.

50. Joseph Novitski, "Mott Haven Leaders Meet in Bronx with City Aides in Wake of 4 Slayings," New York Times, July 19, 1968, p. 10.

51. Ibid.

52. John V. Lindsay, The City, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1970, p. 166. Despite his Republican lineage, Lindsay was described at the time by Conservative Party opponent William F. Buckley, Jr., as the worm that spoiled the Big Apple, whose "free-spending ways and caves-ins to municipal unions" left the city near bankruptcy shortly after Lindsay left office in 1974, see: John H. Fund, "John Lindsay's Revenge on New York," Wall Street Journal, October 26, 1993, p. A22.

53. Murray Schumach, "Neighborhoods: Morrisania Fights Odds to Realize Dream," New York Times, August 21, 1970, p. 35.

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54. Fred P. Graham, "Crime Figures Show Something New," New York Times, September 1, 1968, sec. 4, p. 5E.

55. Ibid.

56. Tom Walker, "The Siege of Fort Apache," New York, 9 (February 23 1976): 48. The article was adapted from: Tom Walker, Fort Apache, ed. Rodger W. Huehner, New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1976.

57. Robert A. Wright, "Rise in Youth Gang Killing Alarms Police in 3 Cities," New York Times, November 27, 1972, p. 1, 53. The article stated: "In New York, the police say, gangs have more than doubled in the last nine months. A proliferation that started in the Bronx has spread to Manhattan, Brooklyn and Queens, with a total of 285 distinct gangs identified by the police."

58. "Crime Boom," Time, 105 (April 14 1975): 61.

59. "The Crime Wave," Time, 105 (June 30 1975): 10-24.

60. Robert D. McFadden, "New York's Power Restored Slowly; Looting Widespread, 3,300 Arrested; Blackout Results in Heavy Losses," New York Times, July 15, 1977, p. A1-2.

61. "The Lights Go Back On," New York Daily News, July 15, 1977, p. 1.

62. O. Moritz, "Looters Prey on Blinded City," New York Daily News, July 15, 1977, p. 5. See also: Martin Gottlieb, "In Ashes of the Blackout, Fire Sleuths Work," New York Daily News, July 17, 1977, pp. 4, 71.

63. "The Mugging of New York," New Republic, 177 (July 30 1977): 5.

64. Ibid., p. 6.

65. Midge Decter, "Looting and Liberal Racism," Commentary, 64 (September 1977): 48.

66. Ibid., p. 49.

67. Ibid., p. 50. Decter's attack on the prevailing liberal ideology as applied to racial matters provoked nine pages of letters from readers in the November and December issues, the majority agreeing with her analysis. A black college educator wrote: "(S)o-called 'Black Education' taught in schools of education...imply with little subtlety that Blacks are different, that Blacks have different standards, thus delivering the unspoken statement that Blacks must be trained differently. It is racism reinforced by higher education in schools of education," November, p. 4. Others echoed Decter's

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observation that the majority of ghetto residents did not participate in the looting, perhaps because of fear or the existence of personal morality. In a response to critical letters, Decter discussed the problem of providing sufficient jobs for ghetto youth which have become "little more than a means of bribing kids to stay off the streets, with virtually nothing demanded of them in the way either performance or attendance." December, p. 35.

68. Robert Curvin and Bruce Porter, "Blackout Looting!" Society, 16 (May 1979): 68-76.

69. Ibid., p. 69.

70. Ibid., p. 73.

71. Ibid., p. 75.

72. Ibid., p. 76.

73. Ibid.

74. George Carpozi, "Who The 44th Killer Is...Such a Quite Man," New York Post, August 11, 1977, p. 3, 7.

75. L. Buder, "1980 Called Worst Year of Crime in City History," New York Times, February 25, 1981, p. B3. Meanwhile, the business community had discovered the importance of urban disorder as a national issue. The Emergency Issues Committee of the Public Relations Society of America reported according to their 1979 survey that the "most important" entitlement of Americans out of a list of 18 items was "preventional of serious crimes in the cities," cited by 43% of respondents. The report further stated that 94% of respondents said the public was "entitled" to prevention of serious urban crimes, but only 37% said that they "have it now." See: "Report of the 1979 Emerging Issues Committee," Public Relations Society of America, November, 1979, pp. 8, 11.

76. Heywood Gould, Fort Apache, The Bronx, New York: Warner Books, 1981.

77. G. Hermalyn, Book Review Comment, Bronx County Historical Journal, 18 (Spring): 21.

78. Howard Blum, "90 Hours of Tape Spur Bronx Crime Inquiry," New York Times, March 22, 1980, p. 25

79. Bronx Model Cities Comprehensive Demonstration Program, New York: Office of the Mayor, 1969, p. 85.

80. Murray Schumach, "Neighborhoods: Morrisania Fights Odds to Realize Dream," New York Times, August 21, 1970, p. 35.

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81. M. Greene, "Cabbies to Join War on Crime in Streets," New York Daily News, December 2, 1973, p. B1.

82. "Police, Citizens United to Fight Fear," Parkway News, June 12, 1975, p. 21.

83. We're Still Here, p. 6.

84. Ibid., p. 274. The role of Co-op City in contributing to the demise of the Grand Concourse and other regions of The Bronx has been raised. The largest co-op housing project in the nation was built under New York State's Limited Profit Housing Law of 1955, known as the Mitchell-Lama Law, making funds available for moderate-income housing. A recent article states that most of the original residents were Jewish, Italian, or Irish, see: "A City, Bigger Than Many, Within a City," New York Times, November 20, 1994, section 9, p. 5.

A real estate broker in The Bronx subsequently wrote that Co-op City "has a much darker side" because it contributed to the decline of real estate values elsewhere in the borough. "In the two-year period when the state pulled 15,000 working class families out of the last viable neighborhoods in the middle and South Bronx, the fate of private profit-making rental housing the borough was sealed. The state compounded the error when it promised the new shareholders a monthly maintenance of only $25 per month per room....Even the rent-controlled occupants in luxury Grand Concourse apartments could not pass up such a dreamy offer. Co-op City was a free ride for those who initially flocked there," see Sid Miller, "Letters," New York Times, December 18, 1994, section 9, p. 9.

Less than two years after Co-op City opened, a Fortune article (supra no. 31) stated: "It is both ironic and symbolic that the most telling blow of all to the stability of the South Bronx was struck by do-gooders" with the development of middle-income housing from "the union-dominated United Housing Foundation" which sponsored construction of Co-op City.

85. P.T. Conley and P.R. Campbell, Firefighters and Fires in Providence, Providence: Rhode Island Publications Society, 1985, p. 105.

86. The "urban crisis" of the 1960s and 70s--characterized by fiscal emergencies, welfare dependence, and surging crime--was an overblown concept, one urban historian believed. "In any kind of reasonable historical time span, the urban crisis that began in the mid-seventies is to a large extent an imaginary event. Its scope and existence have dependent on very limited historical knowledge, research, or analysis, especially in the case of urban fiscal history," see: Eric H. Monkkonen, "The Sense of Crisis: A Historian's Point of View," Cities in Stresses, edited by M.Gottdiener, volume 30, Urban Affairs Annual Reviews, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1986, p. 21.

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87. Morris Dickstein, Gates of Eden: American Culture in the Sixties, New York: Penguin Books, 1989, p. v.

88. If The Bronx was a symbol of uncontrolled urban decline, Charlotte Street became its epicenter. Politicians had walked over the territory in the previous two decades prior to the visit of President Carter promising resources but without effecting much change subsequently. See also: Leonard Buden, "30 of City's 73 Police Precincts Report Decreases in Felonies," New York Times, March 25, 1982, p. 1.

What caused the "complex tangle of economic, social, and psychological forces that had battered urban America for the last three decades"? asked a newspaper article. The social pathology included "poverty, high unemployment, crime, narcotics, housing decay and one of the biggest population migrations in the country's history." See: Joseph P. Fried, "The South Bronx, U.S.A.," New York Times, October 6, 1977, p. A22.

While President Carter was visiting the borough, he asked Patricia Roberts Harris, his Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, "Most of this occurred in the last five years after Nixon cut off the urban renewal funds?" Mrs. Harris said yes. But the reporter noted: "While the housing subsidy moratorium certainly exacerbated the situation, the analysts say, the kind of decay and abandonment that Mr. Carter called 'sobering'...had become apparent in the South Bronx--and in other slums in New York and across the country--by the late 1960's. That was a time when the urban-betterment programs enacted during President Lyndon B. Johnson's 'Great Society' Administration were still in full swing."

89. Matthew Purdy, "Left to Die, the South Bronx Rises From Decades of Decay," New York Times, November 13, 1994, p. 1, 47. See also: Michael Harrington, "The South Bronx Shall Rise Again," New York, 11 (April 3 1978): 34-38; Ira Rosen, "The Glory That Was Charlotte Street," New York Times Magazine, October 7, 1989, p. 42, and Yalman Onaran, "The Bronx," Christian Science Monitor, June 1, 1994, pp. 12-13.

90. Tom Wolfe, The Bonfire of the Vanities, New York: Bantam Books, 1988. A former prosecutor wrote that the book "is so accurate, so insightful a panorama of the contemporary criminal justice system that those of us who attempt to explain the system might just as well yield to Wolfe," see: Ronald L. Goldfarb, "Tom Wolf's Jurisprudence," Criminal Justice Ethics, 9 (Winter/Spring 1990): 2.

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CHAPTER 7

CRIME IN THE SUBURBS--1950 TO 1980

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As early as the 1950s, suburban real-estate advertisements were harping on the themes of race, crime, drugs, congestion, and filth. Thus, the well-to-do could avoid the local costs of urban old age by simply stepping over the border, leaving the poor to support the poor.*

Suburbia, idealized as a quite haven for the crime-wary, increasingly is becoming the target of smooth-working gangs of burglars.†

*Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States, New York: Oxford University Press, 1985, p. 285.

†"Crime in the Suburbs--Pros Take Over," U.S. News & World Report, 84 (April 17 1978): 66.

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The city has always had its depreciators before, during, and after industrialization. But their slings only hit the mark as urban growth reached a certain size: anti-city expression in America gained currency as nineteenth-century urban development thrived.

The bucolic vision of the country, close to nature and peopled by sophisticated polymaths, appealed to the vision of Thomas Jefferson who, furthermore, saw cities as providing conditions that crushed liberty: "I view large cities as pestilential to the morals, the health, and the liberty of man."[1] However, later in life he revised his earlier view and made it clear that he regarded the city as an indispensable part of American life, particularly for the role the city could play in sustaining political independence.

Industrialization required capital, diverse suppliers and services, ready distribution channels, and human density. Only the city could best provide these necessities. Following the Civil War "the city took supreme command," as Arthur Schlesinger wrote, changing the character of urban life and ushering in a new generation of philosophical and literary urban critics.[2] Literary figures within the city frequently expressed a dichotomous relationship to life in the city. Frank Norris initially found that "New York is <u>all</u> right," but later complained that unlike Paris, London, and Boston, New York "can claim ridiculously few of the men of [literary] calibre as her own" natives.[3] New York was a disappointment for Theodore Dreiser who felt diminished by the city's vast

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scale and denounced it in the close of Newspaper Days.[4] William James found the New York of 1880 to 1900 to be antipathetic due to its "clangor, disorder, and permanent earthquake conditions" but by 1907 was spending more time in the city and then "founded [it] simply magnificent."[5] Progressive advocate Frank C. Howe published The City: The Hope of Democracy in 1905, but Morton and Lucia White noted: "Howe called the city the hope of democracy, but at times he seemed more like a suburban booster than a city-lover."[6]

The architect Frank Lloyd Wright envisioned dismantling the city to create a new form of life, convinced, as he was, that the dynamic forces of history would sweep the decaying urban structure away creating something that could not then be envisioned.[7] Writing a column in the suburban newspaper he owned, the Dearborn Independent, Henry Ford observed that the city had pestiferous growth and "the ultimate solution will be the abandonment of the city, its abandonment as a blunder" and adding further "we shall solve the city problem by leaving the city."[8] No doubt, Ford's vision of the future would be communities reachable by an independently operating conveyance powered by an affordable internal combustion machine which companies like his would manufacture.

Suburbs are the natural extensions of urban limits. Often suburbs are contiguous with city limits, though suburbs may be discrete communities separated by considerable undeveloped land from an urban core yet remaining dependent on it. Suburb derives from the Greek sub- near (or under) + urb

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city. Yet the definition of suburb lacks sharp precision. Suburbia is "both a planning type and a state of mind based on imagery and symbolism." The functional relationship with the urban core defines a suburb for an economist; residential density and commuting patterns define the suburbs for demographers and planners; behavior and "way of life" attracts the concerns of sociologists or psychologists.[9] A "peculiar psychology and motivation" infests the suburbanite mindset characterized, in part, frequently by a "more homogeneous" citizenry, sometimes marked by "snobbishness," though, one author averred in 1970, "The suburbs, in spite of their limitations, are the most promising aspect of urban civilization."[10] That judgment has not held up well from critics in the subsequent years, though extension of suburbanization has continued unabated.

Suburbs seem to spring up once an urban boundary gives way. For much of history based on European archetypes, the city's protective wall defined the limits of growth. When the circumferential urban enclosure became obsolete due to changes in warfare that could devastate bricks and mortar, massive expansion in urban growth became inevitable. Typically, medieval walled continental cities established elaborate fortifications only to have them compromised by prototypical suburbanite squatters who endeavored to settle near the walls of the bustling locale. Frequently, these town wall squatters were harassed and forced to move away by the city's militia

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which required an open field beyond the walls for defensive purposes in the event an unfriendly enemy was to attack. When city walls were extended later to encompass the stubborn, nearly contiguous sprawl, the process of continued new growth from other settlers who began putting down roots outside this new wall resumed. In effect, the suburbs of walled cities beseeched the enclosed community for annexation. The point was that not only was the city the desired place to live commercially, it was also the safest place to live.

Modern suburbs of London in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries were distinct politically from the central city, maintaining, however, a symbiotic social and economic relationship with them.[11] The American suburb followed a similar pattern. By the early nineteenth century in the United States, suburbs were sprouting near Boston, New York, and Philadelphia. These early communities, generally, would be annexed quiescently and gratefully so they could benefit from the expanding city's service hegemony and enjoy increased property values. The waves of migration to port cities in the nineteenth-century were times when these locales served as transit points for farmers, ranchers, and miners who usually moved out if they possessed sufficient capital. Yet cities continued to grow from those who remained permanently within municipal boundaries or nearby. By 1890, the suburban growth rate surpassed that of the established city, a condition that remained unchanged through the twentieth century.[12] The suburbs had begun to flourish without the necessity of

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annexation, though simultaneously they maintained links with the commercial urban power.

The distinction between the city and suburb became more rigid in the twentieth century. The pivotal census of 1920 established that urban populations exceeded suburban and rural inhabitants for the first time. In the years ahead urban communities loomed large in national life to define values, economics, and living conditions that were demarcated from the plasticity of suburban bedroom community equivalents. John E. Bebout and David Popenoe observed in 1980 how the sharpness of such division changed:

> Until fairly recent times, the city was the area of prestige, the home and the chosen instrument of the rich, the powerful and the more highly cultured. Contrast this with the current stereotype of the old, decaying central city and the new, shiny suburb, the preferred abiding places of those who can afford the choice.[13]

A review of the literature identifies a steadily growing bibliography on suburban history and issues. Clearly, "the crab-grass frontier" gradually began to decide for itself how it would organize, plan, educate, recreate, collect refuse, and provide supportive services, respective of the historic city. Policing always has been considered a required part of urban and suburban basic municipal services. The earliest cities actively discouraged residence of unsavory individuals, encouraging criminals to move away or else live in the suburbs. In 1812, when New York's population was crowded in the southern extremity of the island, a citizen wrote:

> The suburbs of the city are annoyed, in a much greater degree than the center, by the brutal

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> effusions of vulgar and intemperate persons, common disturbers of the peace, and are, almost exclusively, the retreat of sharpers, passers of counterfeit money, pickpockets, and other villains that have their dens in those parts of town. It would be a great advantage to the public in general, and manifestly to the citizens residing in the upper parts of the city, if the police office was established in that quarter, say at the watch-house at the head of Chatham Street, for those who have no respect for society or the laws fear their agents [the police].[14]

However, no critical assessment has been published on the role crime and policing have played in suburban history and operations.[15] Brief, unexamined commentaries are the rule: in particular, few analytical books about the nature of suburban growth were written specifically about the period from 1920 to the post-World War II era, a period of extensive urban expansion in the United States. Some valuable and lengthy academic discourses in suburban life and development failed to mention crime as an issue or concern[16] or mentioned it in a cursory, non-analytical fashion.[17]

Few studies illuminate aspects of crime in suburbia, and when they do they present description or comment of developments beginning from the 1960s. Clifford E. Simonsen and Marshall S. Gordon contend that: "Suburbia may be described as a place in which individuality is lost or absorbed, and the modern nuclear family and its traditional functions are disintegrating" resulting in suburban crime "increasing at an alarming rate" due to residents who "are becoming alienated and frustrated."[18] David Loth's Crime in the Suburbs offered a promising title and a persuasive thesis

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that crime in suburbs was an important topic. Loth noted that four-out-of-five suburban crimes were caused by their own residents, not city thieves on the prowl in greener territory. The unreferenced, uncritical text alluded to the growth of crime among the young in suburbs, though issues were never fully detailed or analyzed. The author refers to sources including "more than 300 individuals" whom he interviewed between 1964 to early 1966; however, no tabulation of or detailed references to these interviews appears to provide the reader with much insight on any pattern or nuances to suburban crime.[19] Also missing is a historical perspective of the suburb, either general or topic-related. Loth's conclusions advance unsupported observations which, nonetheless, are provocative; namely that suburbs have less reported crime than cities partly because crimes committed by middle- and upper-income individuals are more likely to be concealed and not recorded by the police and reach the courts. The author also observed that suburbs treat crime by their young with imaginative social intervention which is made possible due to greater wealth.

These two works do reflect feelings of a suburban malaise. Still, suburbs (in the mid-1960s) were suffering from a "crisis of affluence," and according to FBI figures, crime was rising faster there than elsewhere. Many suburbanites had moved out of the city precisely to avoid the problems of crime..."[20] On the other hand, while suburban crime had risen faster vis-à-vis urban centers, suburban crime

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began its ascent from a lower base; nonetheless, one reason for suburban development is an anti-urban, crime-fearing bias on the part of city dwellers fleeing to, or hoping to relocate in, the suburbs.[21] Suburbanites themselves tacitly accept and expect that a lower crime rate is an indisputable feature of extraurban neighborhoods. As suburbs expanded toward their physical limits, some community leaders sought to control such growth, hoping to freeze-frame suburban life at an earlier apparition: "An anti-urban bias...becomes translated into policies indirectly aimed at preventing crime, garbage, crowds, noise, and pollution."[22]

The trend created a massive voting bloc insuring reinforcement of the suburban myth. The 1970 census recorded a plurality of suburban over urban residents--76 million suburbanites compared with 64 million city dwellers and 63 million in rural areas. Moreover, the suburban resident was, in some sense, a revolutionary, "a radical." John B. Orr and F. Patrick Nichelson found the suburbanite possessed an expansive personality, characterized by a sense of the self, eager to experience the highest good with volunteerism and community commitment, eclectic in religion, anti-intellectual, and possessing sensuality, nostalgia, and a sense of communal style.[23]

A Rand Report prepared under contract for the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development analyzed correlations among variables of large suburbs. The study assessed such factors as education of the residents and their

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children; changes in black population; percentage of housing that was "old," in this case built before 1950; percentage of poverty in the region; correlation of Hispanic population with community factors; and the relationship of residents' age to the suburb. Crime was also evaluated in this econometric approach and dispatched with a single, damning conclusion:

> Crime rates in 1975 are highest in places with many low-income residents; two-third of high-crime suburbs are at the high extreme of percentage of black or Hispanic population, reflecting the association nationwide between ethnic groups and income levels.... The high-crime suburbs appear to reflect different sources of crime. The preponderance of high crime rates in low-income suburbs...can probably be attributed to local residents, whereas high levels of crime in high-income areas...are presumably largely crimes committed by people from other cities.[24]

Like a medieval city or town where a broad greensward was maintained outside to protect the fortified structure from the enemy, the conceptual prototypical modern American suburb employs physical separation and economic exclusion to protect itself from unwanted city influences like crime. This measure succeeds to a certain extent by excluding from those suburbs a non-resident criminal population who cannot afford to live there or are deterred by the physical separation from travelling to a location to commit property or violent crime. However, problems within such communities, though less intense, could be expected to have much the same variety and virulence of the suburbanites' city cousins' experience. Clearly, the concept of a suburban community with undifferentiated economic status encompassing conforming social and political viewpoints among its residents fits image

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more than reality. Suburbs have endless variety and they are changing rapidly. In the dynamic process they become more like central cities over time with problems like increasing crime, fiscal distress, transportation blockage, deteriorating housing stock, commercial and industrial growth or the lack thereof, and social and economic diversity. To assess the role of crime in a suburban community, a neighboring municipality of New York City is now discussed from its early years through 1980.

Englewood, Its County, and the State

The area that was to be called Englewood, New Jersey, was settled by Dutch families who had immigrated in 1623 on the ship New Netherland. With desirable farming lands in or near New Amsterdam largely occupied by earlier settlers, some Dutch families migrated in a northwesterly direction of Scheyichbi, as the Indians called the region which what would later become New Jersey. Domestic order and justice were important concerns with the territory, sparsely populated as it was, based on the records of judicial deliberations which attested to the citizen's right to petition the courts for civil redress of a wrong. In 1651, Bergen was dignified by an establishment of a lower court of justice by ordnance from Governor Peter Stuyvesant.[25]

The Dutch hegemony was to end, however, and in 1664, an English fleet lay inside the Sandy Hook basin. Charles II sought war with Holland as a means of strengthening the

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commercial basis of his government by reducing competition from Dutch sailors and traders. To precipitate this conflict, the English pretended grievance against the Dutch for allegedly causing loss of revenues in the New England colonies because of smuggling countenanced or practiced by the Dutch.

Charles gave his brother, the Duke of York (later James II), title to a patent of land that included all the Dutch possessions in America. The sole problem for James was to obtain cooperation of the Dutch colonists: either they could voluntarily leave "his" lands or remain and accept James's authority. Gunboat diplomacy would help.[26]

The British fleet which arrived in Sandy Hook carried 60 guns of the heaviest caliber then known; the 22 guns at the Dutch fort carried a smaller caliber and were of an earlier design. The Dutch concluded that survival was the better part of valor and on September 7, 1664, the Dutch garrison marched out of the fort, boarded ship at Whitehall, and embarked for Holland. This was the beginning of sustained English rule with the exception of a brief interregnum a decade later when, for a few months, the Dutch reasserted control of the colony they had founded.

Settlers on the west side of the North (Hudson) River quickly pledged allegiance to Charles II since they did not appear eager to leave and the King's surrogates promised that the principal rights and privileges of the Dutch era would be respected and largely retained. James in turn later bestowed vast territory on the south and west of the North River to Sir

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George Carteret and Lord John Berkeley. That portion of New Netherland was renamed the Province of New Jersey, to recognize Carteret's defense of the Island of Jersey for the Stuarts during the English Civil War, or Great Rebellion (1642-1648).

In 1673, Berkeley sold his share of the province to a group of English Quakers, partitioning the territory into West Jersey (Berkeley's former part) for settlement by the Quakers. The remaining East Jersey became a socially heterogeneous region with the Dutch remaining populous in what was to become Bergen County. An act of 1675 divided East Jersey into four judicial divisions. In 1683, these districts became designated as counties: Bergen, Essex, Middlesex, and Monmouth.

Bergen was named for Bergan op Zoom, a village eighteen miles north of Antwerp. The county was laid out in 1660 and originally contained what is now Hudson County as well.[27] In 1692, an act of the legislature allowed inhabitants of the counties to set territorial limits for towns. A survey was conducted and beginning the next year boundaries for various towns began to be set. The creation of new communities often centered around practical issues such as where roads would be permitted and how they would be maintained.

Over the next several decades, immigration to New Jersey grew. One area in Bergen County came to be known as the "English Neighborhood," though settlers and immigrants from various nations were also living there in addition to English. In the mid- and later-eighteenth century, settlers from

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Holland, France, England, and Germanic territories established farms in this area. One settler, Garret Lydecker, had bought one thousand acres between the Hudson River and Overpeck Creek in 1705. Over the years the original property was sold in pieces to settlers who cleared land and farmed, and constructed roads to serve the evolving community.

With the repeal of the Stamp Act (March 18, 1766), the colonies celebrated. The Patriotic Sons of Liberty in New York erected a Liberty Pole--a rallying point--on the New York common. The symbolism was adopted elsewhere in the region. The owner of a wayside inn on Neighborhood Road in Bergen County, New Jersey placed a pole outside of his establishment which was then called the Liberty Pole Tavern. The tavern served as a refreshment outpost for customers with Patriot sympathies, though it was incongruously located near an English loyalist enclave. The little tavern served as a polling place for road district elections and gave its name to the community for almost a century.

With weeks of the outbreak of revolutionary activity, the patriot army constructed a field fort at Fort Lee in 1776. Commander George Washington advised General Greene to evacuate his men from the fort if Colonel McGraw at Fort Washington should lose his position; he did. Following McGraw's surrender, Greene moved his men by the Liberty Pole Tavern. "Tradition relates that Washington was a guest at the tavern a few days before the retreat (November 18, 1776) while on his return to Hackensack to complete arrangements for the march

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through the Jerseys."[28] Indeed, Washington's writings indicate that after the Battle of Monmouth on June 28, 1778, he went back to Englishtown, and left there on July 1 for New Brunswick.[29]

During the Revolutionary years, the future Englewood was nothing more than a tavern with a few farms nearby, though growth continued. In 1779, the First Baptist Church of the English neighborhood was founded. By 1850, the tavern became the starting point of a stage line between Liberty Pole and Hoboken, a route that was scheduled twice daily lasting three hours. One of its founders was Andrew Engle a local resident of Germanic ancestry. With the establishment of a school about 1858, the community sought a name to replace its Liberty Pole designation which no longer seemed fitting. A group of residents met one evening in a carpenter shop at the rear of the town store and selected the name Englewood. This choice most likely, reflected a version of the prevalent English Neighborhood designation though the name could also have respected the prominence of the Engle family and the nearby woods of the palisades. Another later opinion stated that the name meant "wood of angels." Whatever the derivation, following the neighborly gathering, Englewood replaced Liberty Pole as the community's permanent name.[30] J. Wyman Jones, a New York lawyer and land promoter, established a home in the area and encouraged others to purchase property there as well and is regarded as the most prominent developer of the area in the mid-nineteenth century.[31]

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The Northern Railroad, completed in 1864, ran through to Piermont, NY, thus linking Englewood to communities in the south and north. The train, composed of two cars, aided the Englewood land boom which began in 1868. The railroad established Englewood as the quintessential nineteenth century suburb: churches, schools, and businesses were constructed in the following years. A newspaper, the Englewood Times, was established in 1874, and continued to be published through this study period.

A Village Improvement Society was established in 1881, reflecting early interest in community betterment: activity such as tree planting and street lighting were early issues addressed by the society. Urban jobs were nearby and the commuting paths (addition to the railroad) included transportation by electric streetcar and nearby ferry service, leading into Manhattan. With a population of 5,443, trollies were introduced to Englewood in 1896, following the application and approval to lay tracks and operate cars filed the previous year. More than other growing suburban communities nearby, Englewood had a broader socioeconomic spectrum, from low income units west of Grand Avenue gradually extending to more affluent areas in an easterly direction, and culminating with the costliest properties nearest the western ridge of the palisades. Turn-of-the century residents represented cosmopolitan origins and included black inhabitants.

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Englewood's Community Controls

Residents of small, expanding communities have limited initial priorities: general governance, roads, schooling, and protection.

The State of New Jersey had established "public welfare and rural democracy" as its precepts in the eighteenth century. In the next century state institutions became organized to serve the larger community. These included an almshouse in Bergen County in 1826. The first penitentiary was erected in Hudson County in 1869; later one was built in Essex County, 1873, and then another in Mercer County (Trenton) in 1892.[32] The New Jersey State Police force was created on June 30, 1881, to provide support for existing police departments and to serve rural areas and smaller communities without police personnel. The Jersey troopers also existed as a means by which the governor might draw upon police personnel to deal with potential emergencies without calling out the militia.[33]

Protection, however, was largely a responsibility of those most intimately concerned: local residents themselves. Crime in Englewood required countermeasures early in the community's history. An early town historian explained why:

> The unprotected condition of Englewood and its accessibility to New York attracted professional thieves and house breakers, as they could so easily escape into the forest and down the steep gorges of the Palisades to the Hudson River.[34]

Many households had been burglarized--some repeatedly--before a society for mutual protection was formed. A group of

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residents met at the Palisade House, a nearby resort hotel, on January 30, 1869, for the purpose of "organizing the society for the maintenance of order and the protection of property." The Society was approved by an act of legislature the same year. Thirty-one members were enrolled at the first meeting of the Protection Society of Hackensack Township which included Englewood.

Due to fear from the omnipresent threat of nocturnal residential burglary, William King of Chestnut Street required a servant to sleep off the hallway with pistol at the ready to ward off a burglar; nonetheless, a successful theft occurred anyway when the startled servant was too frightened to shoot the intruder. The group asked the governor to allow the Society's officers to commission one or two marshals "with all the authority and powers of constables in criminal cases." Additionally, the Society patrolled roads on horseback at night and provided a lockup for prisoners that was sometimes used for various other community purposes as well. During the panic of 1873, the number of vagrants passing through the town increased, and the Society was asked by officials to feed and house them. A local historian noted tartly: "What was impossible to the township, in speeding the departure of these unpleasant guests, was effectively accomplished by the Society."[35] The Protection Society's lockup on the west side of Van Brunt Street later became the first police station and the seat of the recorder's court.[36]

The Society also had a role in crime investigation and in

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the arrests of fugitives from other areas. On numerous occasions in the latter nineteenth century, escapees from Sing Sing State Prison, Ossining, New York, crossed the Hudson River to the Englewood region and were captured by the Protection Society volunteers or their marshal. By the end of the century, the Society was still in existence but was playing a smaller role in crime prevention due to the importance of the marshal who, in turn, hired assistants in the formation of a nascent police department. A new territory had become organized and with it became the imperative to protect the community from fear and loss.

Policing the City, County, and Region of Englewood

Law enforcement for any community in modern times involves numerous organizations which have the potential for overlapping jurisdictions and issues, but which, in practice, usually interact cooperatively with each other. City, county, state, and federal departments and agencies potentially are involved in local crime control. Certainly this is the case in Englewood, New Jersey, where the local communities are expected to manage their own routine policing requirements. A separate review of the main formal control components--state, county, and city--provides a sense of how policing was administered in Englewood during 1967 to 1980.

New Jersey. The State of New Jersey frequently has been referred to as the "Crossroads of the East." Since the 1950s

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the New Jersey Turnpike links the "Garden State," another soubriquet, with three states: New York, Pennsylvania, and Delaware, providing channels for vehicular transportation from the north to the south and west. The state is divided into twenty-one counties. By the 1960s, the state encompassed fifty-three cities, twenty-one towns, 257 boroughs, 235 townships, and one village within a state territory comprising of 237 square miles. Including non-municipal law enforcement units, 592 law enforcement agencies governed the state. In 1967, population was 7,086,746, representing an increase of 16.8 percent over 1960 in the state, compared with a 10.3 percent growth for the nation as a whole for the same period. Jersey was growing. In 1967, New Jersey was ranked eighth in population and forty-sixth in size. It was--and still is--the most densely populated state in the country with 943.7 persons per square mile in 1967. By 1980, density had risen to 978.7 persons per square mile, though its national population ranking had dropped one notch to ninth.

Some boosters claim the state has wild, even unexplored areas, in the southcentral regions. However, in 1967, the state was estimated to be about ninety percent urban. New Jersey is classified as a suburban state, though possessing major population clusters for the New York and Philadelphia metropolitan regions. By 1980, the urbanization percentage had gained further, particularly around major urban centers and along commuting paths.

The New Jersey State Police is one of eight divisions of

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the Department of Law and Public Safety and was established in 1921. State police officers are sworn to enforce any law or ordinance within the state. The division is headed by a superintendent who leads an organization with the following four managerial categories: administration; records and identification; investigation; and operations.

The records and identification section handles fingerprints, photographs, and other data concerning criminal investigations. It operates a municipal police training center, a statewide communications system, the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) system, and other services. The investigation unit has the capacity to probe criminal violations within the state for which local law enforcement is unavailable or inadequate. The operations unit is divided into five police commands: Troop A (Southern New Jersey), Troop B (Northern New Jersey, including Bergen County), Troop C (Central New Jersey), Troop D (New Jersey Turnpike), and Troop E (the Garden State Parkway). The troops routinely patrol outside of the established boundaries of municipalities with their own organized police department. They are unlikely to respond to a criminal or civil complaint within such a municipality unless requested to do so by state authorities, a judge, or during an emergency. Nonetheless, their relationship with county and local police appears to be harmonious and co-operative. The state police have published annual reports since 1921.

Bergen County. Occupying the northeast corner of the

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state, Bergen County is bounded by the Hudson River on the east, north by New York State, west by Passaic and Essex Counties, and to the south by Hudson County. In 1967, the county had a population of 901,550 persons, representing an estimated 15.5 percent increase since 1960. With a density of 3,835.1 persons for the county's 235.1 square miles, the county ranked fourth in density within the state.

Bergen county is an important commuter center and also possesses a significant industrial base in its own right. The county is patrolled by a police department which reports to the chair of the Public Safety Committee and the Bergen County Board of Chosen Freeholders. In 1972, Chief Arthur Abrams reported that among the department's activities 19,483 motor vehicle summonses were issued and 168 criminal arrests were made.[37] That year the department also received "a total of 94 complimentary letters." Statistics reported 111 vehicle accidents along with 381 undefined summonses and arrests in addition to other services provided by the police. Headquarters for the Bergen County Police are at the county seat in Hackensack, a community to the west of Englewood. In 1972, the county had almost 1,900 sworn police officers with civilian employees bringing the total to over 2,000. The county police's main service activities relate to traffic control.

The state had been interested in analyzing how its police services compared with other states. In 1958, the New Jersey Law Enforcement Council, Trenton, completed a survey of the

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state's municipal police departments. The state funded council retained Donal E.J. MacNamara, an experienced police department analyst, who identified features in the state's policing operations: high police to population ratios; generally high police salaries; low personnel turn-over ratios relative to the industrial population; and support from "intelligent, public-spirited citizens interested in police-crime problems."[38]

The same report identified numerous general problems in New Jersey policing. The analyst's findings were based on personal interviews and resulted from a 58-item questionnaire completed by 473 police departments. The conclusions seemed all-too-often vague: the first unresolved problem noted in the report was "Politics in policing and police in politics."

Other policing problems identified related to the following issues: recruitment, planning, administration, discipline and supervision, poor relations with the public, obsolete equipment, "empire-building, over-specialization, internecine strife, intra-departmental jealousies," and other issues which the researcher felt were "not unique to the Garden State."[39]

Following MacNamara's state-wide survey, the Bergen County Board of Chosen Freeholders retained the same researcher for an extensive evaluation of the county's law enforcement functioning.[40] The ninety-page evaluation plus appendices primarily assessed the technological facilities for policing the county and recommended a variety of patrol,

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recording, investigative, and communications measures. The report noted at the time that Englewood was one of only five known municipalities in the country to operate radio communications on three separate channels, one each for police, fire, and local government.[41]

Englewood. Also referred to as Englewood City or City of Englewood, the community has an area of 4.90 square miles. The municipality is bounded on the east by Englewood Cliffs, on the north by Tenafly and Bergenfield, on the west by Teaneck, and on the south by Leonia and Fort Lee. (Figure 7.1) In 1960, Englewood had a population of 26,057 producing a density of 5,317.8 persons per square mile. By 1970, population had declined 4.1 percent to 24,985 reducing density to 5,099.0. A decade later, density had further declined by 5.1 percent to 4,836.9. In two decades population of Englewood declined almost 10 per cent, while population in the state grew (Table 7.1) For the same two decade period, population in the state grew 25.6 percent. Probably for the first time in three centuries, the 1980 census also reported a decline in population of the entire county.

Physically, the City of Englewood is a pleasant, tree-shaded community divisible into quarters by two major roads: Engle Street runs with a north-south orientation and connects to Route 4 from the George Washington Bridge to the south. The east-west orientation is provided by Palisade Avenue. The easterly quadrants are the more affluent areas, especially the northeast portion possessing a few electric gated compact

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Figure 7.1



Map Englewood about 1980.

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Table 7.1

Population Change in Englewood, 1960-80

Year	Number	Change	Percent Change
1960	26,057	--	--
1970	24,985	(1,072)	(4.1)
1980	23,701	(1,284)	(5.1)

Source: US Bureau of the Census.

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estates on heavily wooded and rolling land. The westerly half of the city has greater population density and historically has been the home for numerous service and production workers. The proximity of rich and poor in a small urban setting has long been one of the characteristics of this community. Englewood in 1980 was the third richest community in the county based on family income, while Bergen County was the richest county in the state based on family income.[42]

During this study period Englewood served New York City as a commuter bedroom community, much as it had for a century earlier. However, from a New Jersey perspective, the community is deemed "urban," meaning "densely populated with extensive development," with its own local economic activity plus connections nearby to job centers elsewhere in the New Jersey-New York area. Many Englewood residents and supporters reject any assertion that the city was a "suburb" of, or "dependant" on New York City: residents upon discussing the matter often stated how seldom they visit New York City and how unconnected they feel with it. During the years studied, a majority of residents were employed locally, not in New York City. Yet the importance of Manhattan as a regional economic, communications, social, and cultural anchor for the region is beyond dispute. Still, residents of Englewood like those in other suburbs aver to diminishing importance of the city and to the conviction of steadily gaining self-sufficiency. The community of Englewood has a full complement of governmental services dedicated to the public's interest and service.

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Among these is the Englewood Police Department. We now examine the pattern of crime in this community and relate it to trends of urban crime in American suburbs generally.

How crime is reported in Englewood. Anyone with knowledge of a crime may and should contact police to report the incident. A criminal complaint also may be originated by police officers who observe or have knowledge of a crime. The complaint might result in police action such as in an arrest. Ordinarily, an arrest will be for a single charge, but may in more serious circumstances include two or more charges. For example, robbery, burglary, and larceny theft could be counted three times for a single criminal action, but for record-keeping purposes the charges only represent a single offense, ranking under the most serious charge only. Arrests or other dispositions to complaints are termed "clearances" by police.

Following arrest, an offender may be arraigned before a judge, scheduled for trial, tried in court, and convicted or acquitted. This information is relevant to the crime monitoring and analysis process, but the conviction rate generally is not provided or counted by police, but rather such data are collected by court authorities and are reported separately to the state criminal justice unit for tabulation.

On a monthly basis, local police collect crime data and forward them to the New Jersey State Police, Records Bureau, Uniform Crime Reporting section. This UCR unit analyzes the data for accuracy and transmits compiled reports to the UCR unit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In the late

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1920s, Congress debated the importance of maintaining a national database on crime in the United States. Many communities had maintained such information which was required by some states, though standards were variable. Congress turned to the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) which created its UCR committee in 1927, under the leadership of Commissioner William R. Rutledge of Detroit.[43] Funding for the technical staff was provided by the Rockefeller Foundation. The IACP presented its recommendations to Congress, which became the working requirements for the program. The audit begun in January, 1930, with four hundred police departments participating. By that September, the number had reached eight hundred, and by 1933, 1,658 police departments were contributing data. Though urban areas participated in what at the time was a quarterly UCR Report, many smaller cities, suburban areas, and rural districts initially did not participate, or might do so only on an irregular basis.

New Jersey approved a statewide process for gathering and collating criminal data under the New Jersey Uniform Crime Report System, inaugurated on January 1, 1967. Though many communities had been recording complaint, arrest, and conviction data for decades, and many of them reported the data to the state police, extensive specific new reporting regulations went into effect for the 592 agencies which provided data into the system. Therefore, earlier crime data reports from New Jersey "should not be compared with any

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previous reporting period," wrote New Jersey Attorney General Arthur J. Sills at the time.[44] That's also why the study period for this chapter begins in 1967.

The New Jersey Act (NJSA 52:17B-5.1 et seq.) was passed to assure uniformity in the crime reporting process. The term "crime" includes "disorderly persons offenses" and incidents related to a quality of life, rather than an action resulting in specific harm or loss to a victim. To differentiate between these two categories, the New Jersey UCR process divides incidents into two categories: Part I offenses include murder-manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft. These are regarded generally as "more important" violations which come to the attention of police.

Part I offenses for this report have been further separated into two categories: violent crime against persons including murder-manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. Non-violent offenses against property include burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and, separately beginning in 1980, arson. Part II offenses are generally of a "less serious" nature and are not considered in this analysis to the same extent as Part I incidents, though the perception of what is a major and what is a minor crime is subjective and personal.

Because of the confusion with a single event being counted more than once, as mentioned above, the New Jersey UCR protocol adopted a hierarchy rule in which crimes or attempted

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crimes are counted in only one offense category. The sum total of seven major offenses used to measure the extent, fluctuation, and distribution of crime comprise the crime index, and those seven (or eight beginning in 1980) offenses are referred to as Crime Index offenses because the data are incorporated into the FBI's national Crime Index. The crime rate is the number of Index offenses reported usually per 1,000 or 100,000 residents. The number of "offenses known" or reported to police are used as the basis of these UCR reports. For the sake of this report, data are rounded off. A separate category for arrests of persons under 18 years of age is maintained: juvenile data are not analyzed separately in this report.

New Jersey and Englewood: 1967-80. The Search for Control

The New Jersey Uniform Crime Report System provided Englewood and other New Jersey reporting areas a chance for the first time to compare crime profile with other municipalities in their respective county, with other counties in the state, against the state as a whole, and with the rest of the nation. Crime, criminality, and policing have long been a vital concern for the public: internal stability is presumed to be intrinsic for the enduring success of communities. By May 16, 1966, when the legislature in Trenton approved the state's UCR law, the sense of the public was that serious crime and public disorder were growing unremittingly and were expanding in ways that needed to be understood

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through a more reliable reporting and analysis system.

In 1960, the national crime rate was 11.2 incidents per 1,000 population. But the subsequent years had been socially unstable within a period characterized by economic prosperity. A charismatic and undaunted John F. Kennedy assumed the presidency only to be cut down at what seemed the zenith of his career on November 22, 1963. Then a Cuban missile crisis had seemingly set the nation on the edge of war. Next, on August 7, 1964, an apparently low priority act by Congress provided President Lyndon Baines Johnson with the leverage to commit steadily increasing numbers of troops to the Vietnam conflict escalating the nation into a costly and ultimately failing conflict that roiled the country and provided a sufficient level of dissent to block Johnson's dream of standing for re-election.[45]

Other tumultuous political and social events transpired: civil rights workers and demonstrators fought valiantly for their constitutional guarantees, sometimes dying in the process of the struggle. A major race riot in Watts, a southwestern area of Los Angeles, resulted in the deaths of thirty-four, the arrests of thousands, and property loss values at $40 million in damages.[46] The ghetto riots signalled that internal dissent had exceeded controls on internal order.

Still, the Great Society programs poured billions of dollars into programs largely conceived to benefit urban areas and the disadvantaged. Reported crime and instability were on the rise in urban America--a time of guns and butter and urban

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disorder. Why was crime increasing and cities burning at a time when "the good life" was available, benefitting a large segment of the population through full employment? A Presidential task force had been convened to hold hearings and evaluate experts' opinions. Many measures to address crime throughout the nation were found in the Report of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice. New Jersey had already anticipated one of the measures the Commission was to initiate: its new UCR system was already in effect.[47]

President Johnson's Commission, established through Executive Order 11236, July 23, 1965, was issued because of "the urgency of the Nation's crime problem and the depth of ignorance about it."[48] The report began dramatically: "There is much crime in America, more than ever is reported, far more than ever is solved, far too much for the health of the Nation. Every American knows it. Every American is, in a sense, a victim of crime."[49] This phenomenon had puzzled academics and the public alike. Writing in 1975, James Q. Wilson reflected on the early years of the 1960s:

> Crime soared. It did not just increase a little; it rose at a faster rate and to higher levels than at any time since the 1930s and, in some categories, to higher levels than any experienced in this century... The prosperity of the decade was also accompanied by alarming rises in welfare rates, drug abuse, and youthful unemployment. During the 1960s, we were becoming two societies--one affluent and worried, the other pathological and predatory.[50]

A load of weighty studies ensued from Great Society

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monies. Research with sometimes original analysis examined crime and criminal justice. How could a rich society and a caring nation not fail to solve crushing domestic problems if enough resources and governmental intervention were expended to do so?

Programs started under a Democratic administration would continue with Republican successors in a bipartisan, though never consensual, conviction that funded, well crafted policies eventually would achieve their societal objectives. One of these innovations would be the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) which would be the principal conduit,
beginning in 1967, of supplementary funding to aid criminal justice. Created by the Nixon Administration, LEAA would provide a revenue stream to police departments, courts and correctional facilities, and criminal justice research and educational programs at all levels. The existence of these programs served as proof that government was spending to mitigate the reality of a mounting pattern of reported crime.

By 1967, New Jersey's level of reported violent and property crime had surpassed the national average: 138,630 Crime Index offenses were reported in 1967 in the state, resulting in a ratio of 19.7 incidents per 1,000 persons. (Table 7.2) Meanwhile, a national rate of 19.2 Index crime per 1,000 residents was reported. Firearms were used in 44 percent of the 274 murders reported, including 9 percent in which rifles and shotguns were used. (Table 7.3) Of the 6,588

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Table 7.2

Serious Crime in New Jersey, 1967-80

Year	UCR Offenses	Crime 100,000	Change from Previous Year
1967	139,000	1,968.3	--
1968	172,000	2,391.8	21.5
1969	175,554	2,410.3	0.7
1970	196,618	2,742.9	13.7
1971	224,709	3,076.9	12.1
1972	223,517	3,027.5	(1.6)
1973	300,176	4,058.5	34.0
1974	350,134	4,722.8	16.3
1975	376,139	5,059.8	7.1
1976	396,448	5,334.5	5.4
1977	373,450	5,088.8	(4.6)
1978	381,540	5,191.8	2.0
1979	425,890	5,795.1	11.6
1980	470,169	6,409.2	10.6

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports, Washington, DC: USGPO, 1961-81.

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Table 7.3

Murders and Homicides in New Jersey, 1967-80

Year	Homicides & Murders
1967	274
1968	355
1969	366
1970	405
1971	422
1972	483
1973	544
1974	481
1975	500
1976	476
1977	407
1978	400
1979	482
1980	509

Source: State of New Jersey, Uniform Crime Reports, West Trenton, NJ: Division of State Police, 1968-81.

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"atrocious assaults" (the term would be changed in 1979 to aggravated assault), firearms were used in 12 percent of the circumstances. Over 49 percent of all persons arrested for serious crimes were under the age of 18, and over half the persons arrested for Narcotic Drug Law violations were under the age of 21. Of 5,775 robberies reported during the year, over 55 percent occurred on the streets.

Outsiders--immigrants and the rootless--and blacks were believed responsible disproportionately for crime in Englewood as they were in many other communities. But did facts exist for such assumptions? The state attorney general used the 1967 inauguration of UCR reporting as a means to evaluate the backgrounds of known criminals within New Jersey. A Non-resident Arrest Survey determined that over 32 percent of all persons arrested for crimes were not residents of the community in which the crimes occurred; over 9 percent were nonresidents of the state. By contrast, the immigrant-birth population of the state was about 15 percent, suggesting that immigrants were more than twice as likely to be arrested for a crime than a native born resident.

UCR reporting also became the opportunity to measure numbers of and injuries to police officers. In 1967, almost eleven out of every 100 police officers in the state were victims of assaults, some mild, but reported nonetheless, though no fatalities were recorded.

In 1967, Englewood registered five murders-homicides; twenty-one robberies; four rapes, and twenty-one aggravated

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assaults, or a total of fifty-one Part I violent crime offenses. (Table 7.4) The same year Part I property offenses totaled 466: 194 breaking and entering; 129 larcenies, and 43 motor vehicle thefts. (Table 7.5) The refined data produced 463 Index crimes, or 17.8 per 1,000 (Table 7.6) Part I property offenses are generally five-to-ten times more prevalent than violent crimes.[51]

Recorded crime increased relentlessly in the period 1967 to 1980 in Englewood despite the best intentions to control it. By 1980, Crime Index offenses in the city increased from 463 to 2,569, an increase of 4.5-times. Simultaneously, with a decrease in population in the city, the crime rate per 1,000 population increased even more. Among Part I offenses, murder-homicide showed no particular pattern: five times in a fourteen-year period no homicide occurred. In one of the quietest year for the survey, 1967, five murders resulted. In a peak year, 1971, six occurred.

Similarly, robbery grew from nineteen to twenty-three incidents per year in the late 1960s, waxing for years to come and reaching a peak of 129 in 1980. Rape, like murder-homicide, failed to follow any particular trend: in three years only one or no rape was reported. At the high end eight rapes were reported in each of two years, 1972 and 1976, and thirteen in 1971. Aggravated assault, that is, assault with intent to kill or for the purpose of inflicting serious bodily injury whether or not a dangerous weapon is used, grew over the fourteen-year period ending almost three-times higher in

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Table 7.4

Violent Crime in Englewood, 1967-80

Year	Murder/ Homicide	Robbery	Rape	Aggravated Assault	Total
1967	5	21	4	21	51
1968	2	23	1	23	49
1969	1	19	3	19	42
1970	-	56	6	50	112
1971	6	80	13	80	179
1972	-	32	8	32	72
1973	3	41	1	31	76
1974	-	43	5	34	82
1975	2	42	3	28	75
1976	4	57	8	45	114
1977	-	92	2	38	132
1978	1	62	5	62	130
1979	-	103	-	49	152
1980	1	129	3	61	194

Source: State of New Jersey, Uniform Crime Reports, West Trenton, NJ: Division of State Police, 1968-81.

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Table 7.5

Englewood Property Crimes, 1967-80

Year	Breaking & Entering	Larceny	MV Theft	Total
1967	294	129	43	466
1968	447	237	71	755
1969	334	538	84	956
1970	493	560	155	1,208
1971	705	656	178	1,539
1972	535	597	124	1,256
1973	466	542	138	1,146
1974	552	788	90	1.430
1975	597	771	127	1,495
1976	753	843	133	1,729
1977	892	657	180	1,729
1978	957	637	153	1,767
1979	1,125	725	228	2,078
1980	1,190	954	231	2,391*

*Includes 16 arson crimes, first listed separately by the FBI in 1980.

Source: State of New Jersey, Uniform Crime Reports, West Trenton, NJ: Division of State Police, 1968-81.

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Table 7.6

Englewood Change in Violent and Non-Violent Crime per 1,000 Population, 1967-80

Year	Crime Index	Crime/ 1,000	Violent Crime/ 1,000	Non-violent Crime/ 1,000
1967	463	17.8	--	--
1968	709	--	--	--
1969	815	--	--	--
1970	1,076	--	--	--
1971	1,380	--	--	--
1972	1,070	--	--	--
1973	1,222	48.9	3.0	44.9
1974	1,517	61.4	3.5	57.9
1975	1,570	63.9	3.0	60.8
1976	1,843	76.0	4.7	71.3
1977	1,861	79.1	5.6	73.5
1978	1,877	80.2	5.5	74.6
1979	2,230	96.9	6.6	90.3
1980	2,569	108.5	8.2	100.3

Source: State of New Jersey, Uniform Crime Reports, West Trenton, NJ: Division of State Police, 1968-81.

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1980 than it was in 1967. However, the pattern was highly erratic from a low of nineteen reported crimes in 1969, to a high of eighty in 1971. In total, Part I violent offenses over doubled in one two-year comparison, 1969-70, and quadrupling in a two-year period, 1969-1971. (Table 7.4)

Part I property offenses similarly rose, but even more robustly than the "more serious" violent crime category. Breaking and entering offenses grew from 294 to 1,190, an increase of over three-times. Larceny, defined as "the unlawful taking, carrying, leading, or riding away of property from the possession or constructive possession of another," developed even faster from 129 reported crimes in 1967 to 954 in 1980, an increase of over six-times.[52] Motor vehicle theft similarly increased at an astonishing rate from forty-three incidents in 1967, to 231 in 1980, or an increase of over four-times. In total, Part I property offenses grew over four-times in absolute numbers.

A Singular Year for Englewood: 1971

Amidst the relentless upward trend of reported crime in Englewood for the 14-year period, one year stands out: 1971. That year the number of Part I reported violent offenses hit peaks, from which it receded, but which were not equalled for many years. The highest toll of murder-homicide was achieved, six incidents. The highest robbery rate by far was reached, eighty incidents compared with 56 the year before and only nineteen two year earlier. Similarly, rape reached a record

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in reported incidents--thirteen--not to be equalled in this period studied. Finally, aggravated assaults also reached a high in number of incidents reported--eighty--which was not matched in any other year during the fourteen-year period. The total number of Part I incidents reached a record 179, only surpassed in 1980, by a surge of robberies and aggravated assaults.

Similarly, Part I property offenses for all three criminal components reached record highs of reported incidents that year. Breaking and entering had 705 reported incidents up 43.0 percent; larcenies grew a more modest 4.1 percent, and motor vehicle theft grew 14.8 percent. The total Part I increase in property offenses for the year was 27.4 percent. What factors could help explain the dramatic change in reported crime noted in this suburban enclave in 1971?

Could world events somehow indirectly have triggered what was taking place in this apparently privileged locale? Nationally, the Vietnam conflict had declined from its terrible peak of human carnage from previous years, but public outcry against it had grown. Perhaps 200,000 antiwar demonstrators convened in Washington, April 24, to protest the policies of President Richard M. Nixon, inaugurated only ten weeks earlier. The top secret Pentagon Papers on Vietnam resumed publication following a June 30, decision by the Supreme Court, revealing deceitful military and civilian roles that misled the nation on military conduct in Southeast Asia.

The economy had become sluggish despite the previous

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chief executive's dreams of guns and butter; in fact, inflation threatened to expunge previously realized economic gains. Nixon announced on August 15, a ninety-day freeze on prices, wages, and rents. The dollar, long an anchor of international currency stability, was devaluated in December by 8.57 percent in a move designed to increase exports. Meanwhile, in New York State, Governor Nelson Rockefeller coldly recused himself from personal negotiations at a riot in Attica State Prison. When ill-trained mostly local law enforcement and government volunteers stormed the prison, the result was that thirty-one prisoners and nine hostages were shot dead. They were killed, it was later revealed through autopsies, by fire from their inept and poorly led rescuers.[53] It seemed as if leadership conspicuously had lost grip of international, domestic, and local matters: an unravelling of public confidence in hard-line elected officials was a consequence. But it is not likely that events like these, tumultuous as they were in all areas of the nation, could be traced to the burgeoning crime rate in pleasant suburban cities like Englewood. The explanation was apt to be closely associated with how people lived, pursued a living, and viewed the risk of causing crime relative to the potential rewards.

In Englewood, the population struggled without success to understand what was happening. Routine arrests for violent and property crimes had stopped being mentioned on the pages of the Bergen Record or the Englewood Times, perhaps due to their status of unexceptionability. Still, the "crime wave on

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Windsor Road" had a cachet that attracted newspaper attention, as it served as a metaphor of that troubled year.[54] Neighbors in the middle-class community previously had increased lighting on the street and upgraded door and window hardware to no avail. Some frightened and frustrated residents of the area obscurely discussed organizing a vigilante corps or moving out of town. The police were not particularly blamed during this period of time, though some citizens were puzzled how Englewood with a population of about 25,000 and eighty-nine sworn officers could have more crime than Bergenfield with 33,000 population and only forty-eight policemen.

The entire county faced the growth of crime that outpaced population increases.[55] State voters in an Opinion Research Corporation poll taken for the New Jersey Department of Education identified plenty of reasons for concern. Crime, taxes, and schools were the biggest issues on the minds of residents.[56] If the police were not at fault, who was? The Record crossly decided that the Board of Freeholders had made a serious error in appointing Haig Simsarian to be director of the county criminal justice planning agency. Politics had gotten into the way of the director's appointment, the newspaper claimed, and the result was that inadequate planning had been done including underfunding of criminal justice programs.[57] But had not the budget for criminal justice matters increased for the few years prior to the manager's appointment? A theoretical basis for understanding the increase in crime was unavailable to inform and guide public

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officials, the police, and the public in general.

Toward Understanding Changes in Englewood

After over a decade of almost steady prosperity, America found itself with an alarming growth in reported violent and personal crime in the early 1960s. A Presidential Commission was established to undertake "The most comprehensive study of crime and criminal justice in the Nation's history."[58] The report accessed research from surveys, polls, and research projects. Task Forces on particular areas were convened and later issued their findings in lengthy reports dealing with such issues as the police, organized crime, and private security.[59] Numerous goals, standards, and recommendations were issued for each category of inquiry and other topics which subsequent Task Forces would consider. Some of the recommendations were legislative for federal or state; others involved needs for standards of performance that had mutual consensus action; still others called for additional investment in personnel, programs, research, education, and technology. The Great Society provided much additional investment through the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) which, as an agency within the Department of Justice, dispensed about eight billion dollars in funds to fight crime from the late 1960s through early 1982.[60]

Nonetheless, crime as recorded by official statistics, rather than mitigating, increased at higher levels than were

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measured prior to the extensive public concern and anti-crime funded programs. The increase was felt in the inner cities, in the outer cities, in rural areas, and in suburbs like Englewood, New Jersey. Why? This question will be explored further in Chapter 9; however, evidence of what New Jersey authorities believed was responsible for the surge of criminality is next reviewed.

Any explanations for the trend are subject to skepticism upon analysis. The problem of rising crime in society was not being reduced by social and judicial programs instituted during the 1967-80 period. The way reported crime totals in Englewood bobbed about in the 1970s suggests that satisfactory answers are frustratingly difficult to provide. Nevertheless, certain explanations were offered at the time to explain this crime phenomenon. Conditions listed by the Uniform Crime Reports State of New Jersey for 1967 as being "some of the conditions which will, by type and volume, affect the crime that occurs from place to place" were the following:

> Density and size of the community population and the metropolitan area of which it is a part.
>
> Composition of the population with reference particularly to age, sex, and race.
>
> Economic status and mores of the population.
>
> Relative stability of population, including commuters, seasonal, and other transit types.
>
> Climate, including seasonal weather conditions.
>
> Educational, recreational, and religious characteristics.

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Effective strength of the police force.

Standards governing appointments to the police force.

Policies of the prosecuting officials and the courts.

Attitude of the public toward law enforcement problems.

The administrative and investigative efficiency of the local law enforcement agency, including the degree of adherence to crime reporting standards.[61]

To further confound criminal data, separate research of the Department of Justice, National Crime Survey, finds that, in general, only about 35 percent of actual crimes were being reported to police. This research was based not on crimes reported to police used for this work, but rather are on crimes reported by a rotating, statistically representative selected group chosen by the Bureau of the Census who reported periodically on crimes within their households or with their immediate knowledge. This research was not included in this study because the crimes not reported to the police are generally property thefts, and this paper has focused on "more serious" violent incidents more likely to be reported. However, the National Crime Survey data established that the total crime picture is larger and more diffuse than the results from police data indicate.

However, perhaps the crime picture trend for these years, while increasing, was not as serious as the data suggest. This possibility could be explained by the following partially unsupported contingencies: the public steadily has been educated to report all crime to the police more faithfully

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than in the past; similarly, police are more likely--for operational and legal reasons--to record all complaints received rather than in past years, when the standard operating procedure was to use discretion on what matters should be recorded and what should be ignored. Then, homeowners' insurance policies increasing demanded proof of crime or loss--indicated by a police complaint report--as a condition of considering a claim.

Englewood had sustained a marked increase in reported violent crime during the period 1967 to 1980; property crime increased substantially as well. Further by 1980, the rate of increase in Englewood exceeded the rate of increase in the county, the state, and the nation. (Table 7.7) Crime per 1,000 residents in Bergen County had increased from 23.1 incidents to 50.2 from 1970 to 1980; Englewood had increased from 43.1 to 108.4 for the same period. While the percentage increase in Bergen County was greater than Englewood's for this period of time, the absolute level of crime incidents in Englewood was significantly higher that these other measurements. Meanwhile, despite shrinking population, the community maintained the size of its police force. (Table 7.8)

The New York Times had published a cheery series of articles about the community during these difficult years. Two stories remembered Helicon Hall in 1906-1907 when Upton Sinclair and Sinclair Lewis lived there in this Socialist cooperative community which attracted the interest of John

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Table 7.7

Comparison in Crime Rates Among

Englewood, the State, and the Nation, 1960-80

(per 1,000 Population)

Year	National Crime	New Jersey	Bergen County	City of Englewood
1960	11.2	--	--	--
1970	27.4	27.4	23.5	43.1
1980	59.0	64.0	50.2	108.4

Sources: State of New Jersey, Uniform Crime Reports, West Trenton, NJ: Division of State Police, 1968-81, and Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports, Washington, DC: USGPO, 1961-81.

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Table 7.8

Englewood Police Personnel, 1967-80

Year	Civilians	Police Officers	Total Police Employees
1967	9	64	73
1968	11	64	75
1969	14	77	91
1970	15	78	93
1971	17	87	104
1972	17	86	103
1973	--	--	--
1974	10	81	91
1975	20	79	99
1976	24	81	105
1977	19	80	99
1978	--	--	--
1979	--	--	--
1980	--	--	--

Source: State of New Jersey, Uniform Crime Reports, West Trenton, NJ: Division of State Police, 1968-81.

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Dewey and William James.[62] Another article told how "Englewood's East Hill Is Changing, but Gracefully."[63] East Hill was described as a particularly desirable community residential area that had welcomed black families among its residents which seemed appropriate, the reporter noted, in that the mayor also was black. A story on Englewood's actors' home described the reposing comfort actors and actresses enjoyed in their "haven for old troupers."[64] And a five column story entitled: "Both Spirits and Rents Are High in Englewood."[65] A citizen was quoted: "We're a completely integrated city. Our schools and neighborhoods are integrated, and our community spirit is great." The article did not mention crime, but did comment on the extensive, costly housing stock and the new public library on Engle Street.

But all was not well in Englewood. A review of police records and newspaper stories reveal two much discussed and reported issues in bold relief. The first topic concerned organized crime and the way it affected Englewood and the county in the early part of the study, or at least how the issue was featured in press coverage. In 1970, press coverage of this issue hit a peak: 106 articles in the Bergen Record concerned the Mafia and its involvement of local affairs. This compared to only eighty-five articles for all other types of crime, and a total of eleven articles, for example, on religion. Could organized crime--flourishing and flaunting its apparent immunity from eradication--be a supportive factor

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behind the rise in the area's total crime rate? Long disputes between the police and the legislature on their desire to expand wiretapping was one expression of the concern to control the mob.

Another factor in the dynamic quality of the community's existence also related to crime: the changing nature of the city's race and ethnicity balance.

The typography of Englewood is distinctive. On the east is the magnificence of the palisades with its chichi East Hill. To the extreme west is a distressed largely black neighborhood that had become blacker over the years. Census figures show that the black population in the city grew from 4,200 in 1950 to 9,600 in 1980--from 18 percent to 41 percent of the total population. Although ethnic and racial data are not precise, elsewhere in the city Jewish population also increased, indicated by the establishment of three synagogues. However, during the period 1960 to 1980, the number of blacks living north of Palisade Avenue increased only slightly from 104 to 186, from four per cent to eight percent. Meanwhile, the residents of East Hill were "now about a third to a half Jewish, by most estimates."[66] Additionally, Asians moved into the more affluent area north of Palisade Avenue. The moving wagons were always in sight.

Englewood did not report racial data of individuals arrested during this period in tabular form. However in 1970, the New Jersey State Police analyzed race as a factor in arrests on a regional basis. The Northeast region, comprising

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eight counties including Bergen, reported 15,108 white arrests, 14,242 of blacks, and of sixty-four others for Part I offenses; that is, blacks accounted for over 48 percent of the arrests for the most serious crimes. Racial data for 1970 could not be found, but in 1980 the racial composition of Bergen County was as follows: white 784,834; black 33,043; American Indian 706; Asian 19,723; other 7,079. Assuming that extraordinary racial changes had not occurred in a ten year period, the preponderance of black crime relative to proportional resident representation is suggested. Representing less than five percent of the population, blacks represented almost half of the most serious crime during this period.

No explanation is available to illuminate why 1971 was such a high year for recorded crime in Englewood; perhaps it was a blip on the screen, a statistical artifact. The larger issue has a more concrete possibility. Could the growing number of blacks in this community and the inherently higher level of serious black crime be connected to Englewood's crime increase? Or was skin color incidental to other changes that related to crime causation? A large majority of black Englewood residents were law abiding and exemplary citizens who were vexed and angered. Some of this population were crime victims themselves from perpetrators of their own race and yearned for establishment of greater order within their community.

How can the rich and poor, the haves and the have nots

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coexist so closely in Englewood? A newspaper article reporting on Englewood gives a clue: "(W)ith the cluster of four good private schools within walking distance, including Dwight-Englewood School, parents do not have to worry about problems in the public schools."[67] Englewood is a small city with its population representing disparate economic groups. It is likely that a further exploration of changing socioeconomic factors will illuminate why Englewood City experienced a marked increase in serious crimes--violent and property--from 1967 through 1980. Meanwhile, circumstances in this compact and diversified Bergen County city were by no means exceptional: suburban communities nearby and in other regions were experiencing a similar dynamic of troubled times manifested by increased reported crime.

Other Suburbs. Similar Problems

Stephen Birmingham discussed "Troubled Darien" in The Golden Dream. Darien, the largely white and affluent Connecticut community, was "considered a livelier, more fun-loving, party-going town for younger, upwardly mobile families" than its well-manicured rival, New Canaan, experienced increased in crime.[68] Population doubled from 11,000 to 22,000 over the twenty years since the Darien Exit 13 opened on the Connecticut Turnpike. Commercialization increased and by the mid-1970s two new motels opened bringing in transients for the first time, apparently a factor in an increase in crime within the city according to the author:

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> In 1975, Darien has its first murder in more years than anyone can remember--a triple homicide in a barroom brawl. A year earlier, the town had its first bank robbery and, shortly afterward, its first street holdup. The incidence of shoplifting and bad-check passing has climbed alarmingly, along with break-ins and residential burglaries. Home owners who never used to lock their doors when they went out are now installing elaborate burglar alarm systems, and shops and banks now scan customers with mirrors, sheets of one-way glass, and closed-circuit television cameras.[69]

Other changes in the community were noted. Residents became disinclined to have their houses photographed and identified for appearance in magazines like House Beautiful or House & Garden. The once popular fund-raising technique of opening houses to benefit charities attracted fewer volunteers. Retailers in the community demanded over one thousand "bank escorts" from the armed police to deposit their receipts, a process that years earlier was considered unnecessary.

The attitude toward crime in Darien had also undergone a change: residents blamed "outsiders" for crime, but anecdotal evidence suggested that the mores of local residents also had changed from earlier years. The owner of a trendy Darien ready-to-wear shop described observing a local sixteen-year-old girl shoplift a piece of costume jewelry. The retailer knew the parents and called the mother and told her what had happened. The shoplifter's mother screamed at the retailer and denied that her daughter would steal from a shop, threatening to cancel her charge account. Later the girl's father called the store owner threatening to sue if charges

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were pressed. The retailer wrote the parents apologizing for the accusation and sent the girl's mother a bottle of perfume as a peace offering.[70]

Crime and the Suburb in Context

The spatial redistribution of residences, workplaces, and supporting institutions to the suburbs and beyond to nearby rural areas had early origins. The process gained momentum following World War II, fed by loans and credit permitting the automobile to traverse super highways and support development of communities far from established transportation links. "The 'pull' of cheaper land, newer housing, lower densities, and more homogeneous neighborhoods in the suburbs," fed the process, argued Thomas M. Guterbock.[71] This has been termed the pull hypothesis. The result of this process was a depopulation of urban centers centrifugally creating a pattern of urban sprawl.

But "some observers" believe deconcentration is better explained by a push hypothesis in which changing social conditions in the central cities were occurring "which white middle-class Americans perceive as threatening. Chief among these are the presence in large and increasing numbers of low-status minority group members and decreased personal safety."[72] Based on a small analysis of Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas changes, Guterbock concluded that the notion of "flight to the suburbs" and "panic selling" by racially motivated better-off whites is "without foundation" and that the rush to

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the suburbs must be explained from the general affluence of the time. Nevertheless, he concluded: "The suburbanization of whites coupled with the ghettoization of blacks exacerbates problems of inequality, discrimination, crime, and conflict, which we seem unable to solve."[73]

Not only housing for the affluent moved to the outer suburbs: many corporate offices followed. This generally enabled executives decisive in relocating companies' headquarters closer to golf and garden. The results produced a dramatic relocation of Fortune 500 industrial and service corporation headquarters from 1970 on. In 1970, Manhattan was the domicile of 117 of the Fortune 500 leading industrial companies. By 1979, the number had dropped to seventy-eight, and by 1988 the drop continued further leaving the metropolis with only fifty such headquarters.[74] New York suburbs benefitted from this exodus with the number of Fortune 500 industrial suburban headquarters increasing from thirty-four in 1970, to fifty-four nine years later, and then dropping to fifty in 1988.

Meanwhile, the business publication's list of largest service corporations showed improvement during the same time increasing from fifty-six in 1983 to sixty-six in 1988, while similar headquarters in the suburbs over the same years decreased from twenty-three to seventeen.[75] For New York City loss of industrial headquarters in less than two decades was devastating, marked by a 57 percent decline and only partially compensated by growth in the corporate services sector.[76]

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Paralleling the decline of the city as a corporate headquarters locale was the drop in administrative and auxiliary employment, particularly in manufacturing. Employment in manufacturing in New York City dropped from 122.6 thousand in 1970, steadily to 59.8 thousand by 1985.[77] For the period 1970-80, the annual decline was 4.3 percent; for the next five years the decline accelerated to 5.2 percent. The New York suburbs, meanwhile, saw robust growth of manufacturing employment from 1970-80, increasing 5.8 percent annually. However from 1980-85, the New York suburbs also experienced a decline of such workers averaging 4.2 percent per year. Meanwhile, the employment base for non-manufacturing administrative and auxiliary employment grew a modest 1.3 percent for the years 1970-80 and by a further diminished 1.1 percent for the next five years, while employment surged in the suburbs by 14.3 percent annually for the years 1970-80 and 3.8 percent for the next five years.

The redistribution of jobs and economic activity along with them was at the expense of New York City--and certain other large, older urban neighbors like Newark and Jersey City--generally for the benefit of white, upper-income, and lesser populated suburbs or green locations beyond the suburbs. The change contributed to a social polarization within New York and other cities that was evitable. Actions of the government at the local level through zoning and at a national level with long-term mortgage loans, concluded Kenneth T. Jackson, "helped to insure that metropolitan areas

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would be segregate by income and race. The result has been as detrimental to cities as it has been beneficial to most suburbs."[78]

One effect to the city from urban deconcentration was increased crime. Some, but not all, studies have supported a positive relationship between the degree of suburbanization of a metropolitan area and central-city crime rates.[79] However, as this chapter has demonstrated, urban crime growth was not a solitary development: crime also increased during this period in the suburbs as well. From 1960-80 the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Uniform Crime Reports established that a steady increase in both violent and property index crimes occurred in the suburban sector, and the increases did so in both absolute numbers and when adjusted on a population basis.[80] (Table 7.9) It was an era of unprecedented documented growth in reported serious crime. Nationally, reported suburban crime from 1965-80 increased five-fold when adjusted for population changes.

An Area Problem

The suburbs were conceived as A Better Place to Live yet as an author concerned with urban planning issues observed: "It is no coincidence that at the moment when the United States has become a predominantly suburban nation, the country has suffered a bitter harvest of individual trauma, family distress, and civic decay. There is a strong connection between the ills we exhibit as a people and the suburban

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Table 7.9

Suburban Cities Index Crime in the United States, 1965-80

Year	Violent Crime	Property Crime	Crime Index Total	Suburban Population	Crimes per 100K Population
1965	21,448	242,197	263,645	24,069,000	1,095.4
1966	24,504	274,761	299,265	24,069,000	1,243.4
1967	26,407	310,869	337,276	23,859,000	1,413.6
1968	31,320	387,840	419,142	24,658,000	1,699.8
1969	35,944	450,990	486,934	26,039,000	1,870.0
1970	44,377	540,248	584,625	26,616,000	2,196.5
1971	56,850	659,486	716,336	28,813,000	2,486.1
1972	55,469	616,532	672,001	26,624,000	2,524.0
1973	67,955	1,078,501	1,146,456	29,025,000	3,949.9
1974	85,096	1,396,923	1,482,019	33,134,000	4,472.8
1975	94,645	1,608,820	1,703,465	35,264,000	4,830.6
1976	95,422	1,661,915	1,757,337	37,527,000	4,682.8
1977	105,509	1,666,653	1,772,162	39,810,000	4,451.5
1978	114,448	1,735,532	1,849,980	41,206,000	4,489.5
1979	131,015	1,942,050	2,073,065	42,609,000	4,865.3
1980	144,441	2,081,736	2,226,177	41,648,617	5,345.1

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports 1965-80, Washington, DC: USGPO, 1966-81.

Note: Suburban crime data began as a separate report item in 1966, which included incidents for the previous year.

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'communities' (to use a much-abused word) that we inhabit."[81]

The suburb continues to evolve with the creation of highly planned shopping and commercial centers far beyond center-cities and peripheral to many established suburbs: these are the edge cities, and they are not only an American feature but a development in other nations.

In Edge City, Joel Garreau describes the importance of design: "Edge City design pays overwhelming homage to one principle: making women--especially women--feel safe. In fact, that concern has evolved beyond 'safe' and into the art and science of 'comfortable,' and how people can be made to feel that."[82] The mall at a profiled New Jersey suburb is a place with generally "not much violence" and little serious crime though shoplifting "is always an issue, and some of the mall rats without question deal drugs."[83] Edge cities are privatized domains "in the midst of what originally had been residential suburbia." As retail and commercial developments, they have their own vocabulary like "active water feature" meaning unpotable moving water like a fountain, and "animated space" in which bareness and sterility are presumably mitigated by flags or "programmed space" where a consultant hires a street musician to play.

"Highly visible security" occurs throughout the malls and within the office parks of such terrains. No public amenities like urban parks exist within these campuses intentionally: they are planned out. George Sternlieb of the Rutgers Center for Urban Policy observed: "They don't want the strangers. If

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it is a choice between parks and strangers, the people there would sooner do without the parks."[84] The anti-democratic criticism of malls and corporate campuses clearly disturbs some developers and operators who endeavor to maintain good public relations with "economic good sense" in protecting their real estate investment from reversal. The malls, office parks, and corporate estates evolved with resolute determination from the 1960s on with the goal to provide a safer working milieu; but the agenda did not necessarily include a more humane, creative, or dynamic environment.[85]

By the late 1980s the growth of crime in the suburbs had exceeded that in the inner cities, though the suburban increase began from a lower base and was not foreseeable to surpass the gross urban crime rate. Crime had come to the suburbs in force, and the controls required went beyond the capacities of many of these fragmented communities to offer the response some violent and complex property crimes required. The higher reported crime levels brought incidents that surpassed the skills of local, or even county, law enforcement personnel.

A suburbanite suggested flippantly: "To a New Yorker, suburban living is the equivalent of being buried alive," reflecting a long-going love-hate relationship and differing viewpoints between city and suburban residents.[86] Complex mutual problems and the need for connectivity in managing them reasonably suggest the urgency for cooperation over cavil. The future will demand area-wide pooling of resources to deal

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with crime so easily transportable from city to suburb, but which also is present indigenously within the suburb at unwanted high levels.[87]

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ENDNOTES

1. Morton and Lucia White, The Intellectual Versus the City, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1977, pp. 6, 12-19 (Hereafter cites as Intellectual). Yet Jefferson's agrarianism have influenced thinking about him, creating an impression of anti-urbanism which, even if true, was not his final attitude. An academic writes: "Jefferson's fondness for the farm and dislike of the city are legendary, and Crevecoeur located his ideal Americans on the farms of the "middle settlements," midway between sea and wilderness, where the simple cultivation of the earth would purify them. These men expressed beliefs which have demonstrated amazing staying power," Scott Donaldson, Suburban Myth, New York: Columbia University Press, 1969, p. 24.

Jefferson believed the farmer to be the bulwark of democracy and he personally delighted in civilized urban life. Still, Jefferson's love of Paris during his ambassadorship there was not strong enough to prevent an early antipathy to the deleterious effects of cities on American democracy. His Notes on Virginia was his only full-length book partly composed of answers to questions put to him by the Marquis de Barbé-Marbois, then secretary of the French Legation in Philadelphia, 1782-83. Jefferson had a period of leisure following his resignation as governor of Virginia and subsequent to his being thrown from a horse, presenting him with sufficient time to compose extended notes and descriptions during his recuperation.

Jefferson provides precise and detailed discussion of boundaries, mountains, flora and fauna, and much more of his beloved state within the discourse. His anti-urban biases appear, for example, in response to Query XIX, "The present state of manufactures, commerce, interior and exterior trade?"

> While we have land to work then, let us never wish to see our citizens occupied at a workbench, or twirling a distaff. Carpenters, masons, smiths, are wanting in husbandry; but, for the general operations of manufacture, let our workshops remain in Europe....The mobs of great cities add just so much to the support of pure government, as sores do to the strength of the human body. It is the manners and spirit of the people which preserve a republic in vigor. A degeneracy in these is a canker which soon eats to the heart of its laws and constitution. Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson, ed. Adrienne Koch and William Peden, New York: Modern Library, 1944, p. 280.

However, years later with the War of 1812 in mind, Jefferson moderated his views on the city, noting in a letter to Benjamin Austin in 1816: "We must now place the manufacturer by the side of the agriculturist....(E)xperience has taught me that manufactures are now as necessary to our

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independence as to our comfort," Intellectual, p. 18.
For further discussions on "man's dislike of cities," see: Jeffrey K. Hadden and Joseph J. Barton, "An Image that Will Not Die: Thoughts on the History of Anti-Urban Ideology," in Urbanization of the Suburbs, ed. Louis H. Masotti and Jeffrey K. Hadden, Urban Affairs Annual Reviews, vol. 7, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1973, pp. 79-116. (Hereafter cited by title).

2. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Paths to the Present, New York: Macmillan, 1949, p. 225.

3. Intellectual, pp. 121, 123.

4. Ibid., p. 131.

5. Ibid., p. 142.

6. Ibid., p. 177.

7. Ibid., pp. 189-99.

8. Ibid., p. 201. Clearly, the industrialist's views had a self-serving character to them. The original city was a community where residents generally walked to destinations. The advent of fixed transportation lines led to the development of growth extending from those lines. For example, see Sam Bass Warner, Jr., Streetcar Suburbs: The Process of Growth in Boston, 1870-1900, New York: Atheneum, 1973. With the development and mass production of the automobile, the elaboration of life into verdant suburban areas became inevitable.

9. Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States, New York: Oxford University Press, 1985, pp. 4-5 (Hereafter cited as Crabgrass Frontier). A definitive definition of suburb cannot be achieved; two writers provide four general characteristics of suburbanites: they do not live in rural dwellings; they do, therefore, live in cities or towns ("urban"); further, they do not live in large central cities; finally, they do live near large central cities of over 50,000. See: Ben J. Wattenberg with Richard M. Scammon, "The Suburban Boom," in North American Suburb: Politics, Diversity and Change, ed. John Kramer, Berkeley, CA: Glendessary Press, 1972, p. 72.

10. Harlan Paul Douglass, The Suburban Trend. New York: Arno Press, New York Times, 1970, p. 36.

11. Eric E. Lampard, "The Nature of Urbanization," in Pursuit of Urban History, ed. Derek Fraser and Anthony Sutcliffe, London: Edward Arnold, 1983, pp. 5-6, 40-2.

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12. Judith Fernandez & John Pincus with Jane Peterson, Troubled Suburbs: An Exploratory Study, Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1982, pp. 7-8 (Hereafter cited as Troubled Suburbs).

13. John E. Bebout & David Popenoe "America as an Urban Society," in Crime in the City, ed. Daniel Glaser. New York: Harper & Row, 1980, p. 6. A more recent book which deals with the morphology of suburban creation and growth argues that the outer suburb was propelled by reaction to urban growth with its moral and health disadvantages. John R. Stilgoe, Borderland: Origins of the American Suburb: 1820-1939, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988.

14. A Citizen [Charles Christian], A Brief Treatise on the Police of the City of New York, New York: Southwick and Pelsue, 1812, p. 29, quoted in Richard C. Wade, Cities in American Life, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1971, p. 69.

15. If urban crime has received little critical lengthy attention, save for a large number of subscribed police histories, suburban crime has received even less. An exception: David Loth, Crime in the Suburbs, New York: William Morrow & Company, 1967 (Hereafter cited by title).

16. For example, Streetcar Suburbs or Robert Fishman, Bourgeois Utopias: The Rise and Fall of Suburbia, New York: Basic Books, 1987.

17. Troubled Suburbs or Herbert J. Gans, The Levittowners, New York: Columbia University Press, 1982 (Hereafter cited by title).

18. Clifford E. Simonsen and Marshal S. Gordon III, Juvenile Justice in America, New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1982, p. 74.

19. Crime in the Suburbs, p. x.

20. Thomas E. Cronin, Tania Z. Cronin & Michael E. Milakovich, U.S. v. Crime in the Streets, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981, p. 36.

21. A 1973 Gallup Poll Index asked why city dwellers chose to live in the suburbs. Crime was the second most important reason. For further comment on opinion polls and urban crime, see chap. 9.

22 Mark Baldassare, Trouble in Paradise: The Suburban Transformation in America, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, p. 20.

23. John B. Orr and F. Patrick Nichelson, Radical Suburb: Soundings in Changing American Character, Philadelphia, Westminster Press, 1970, pp. 16-47.

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24. Troubled Suburbs, p. 129.

25. Adaline W. Sterling, The Book of Englewood,, Englewood, NJ: Mayor and Council of the City of Englewood, NJ, 1922, p. 6 (Hereafter cited as Book of Englewood). This community may not be a typical suburb as it has had over the studied period greater racial and economic diversity that most suburbs. However, it was selected for use in this section because of the fortuitous retention of crime and police records which most suburban communities discard after a few years.

26. The English had full certainty of Charles's right to assume control of New Netherland. His right was not questioned by the English, at least. See: Julius Goebel, Jr. & T. Raymond Naughton, Law Enforcement in Colonial New York, Montclair, NJ: Paterson Smith, [1944], 1970.

James, Duke of York, conveyed a tract of land to Berkeley and Carteret lying between the Hudson and Delaware Rivers "which said tract of land is hereafter to be called by the name or names of New Caesarea or New Jersey." The document dated March 12, 1674, was the first time the name New Jersey was applied to the territory and it was finally selected in honor of Carteret who was born on the Island of Jersey in 1599. See: Augustine E. Costello, History of the Police Department of Jersey City, Jersey City: Police Relief Association Publication Co., 1891. Another explanation on the origin of the colony's name is provided in the text.

27. F.W. Westervelt, History of Bergen County, 1630-1923, New York: Lewis Historical Publishing Company, 1923, I.

28. Book of Englewood, p. 19.

29. Claire K. Tholl, "A Guide to the Whereabouts of Washington During the War for Independence (Bergen and Surrounding Counties)." Bergen History, 1977, pp. 71-81.

30. Book of Englewood, p. 21. See also: Bergen Evening Record, June 9, 1950.

31. Bergen Evening Record, June 3, 1955.

32. H.E. Barnes, A History of the Penal, Reformatory and Correctional Institutions of the State of New Jersey, New York: Arno Press, [1918], 1974, and J. Leiby, Charity and Correction in New Jersey: A History of State Welfare Institutions, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1967.

33. L.J. Coakley, Jersey Troopers: A Fifty Year History of the New Jersey State Police, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1971.

34. J.A. Humphrey, Englewood: Its Annals and Reminiscences, New York: J.S. Ogilvie Publishing Company, 1899.

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35. Book of Englewood, pp. 104-05, 110.

36. Ibid., p. 116.

37. Annual Report for 1972, Bergen County Police, 1973, p. 51.

38. Donal E.J. MacNamara, A Study and Survey of Municipal Police Departments in the State of New Jersey, Trenton: New Jersey Law Enforcement Council, 1958, p. 10.

39. Ibid.

40. Donal E.J. MacNamara, Law Enforcement in Bergen County, New Jersey, New York: Donal E.J. MacNamara & Associates, 1967.

41. Ibid., p. 70.

42. E.R. Horner, ed. New Jersey Economic Almanac, Montclair: NJ Associates, 1987, pp. 7, 18.

43. "Blueprint for the Future of the Uniform Crime Reporting Program," Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 1985, pp. 21-2.

44. Letter of transmittal with 1967 UCR Report, 1968, signed by Arthur J. Sills.

45. Robert H. Ferrell, "Emerging as a world power, 1946-," in Almanac of American History, ed. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1983, pp. 508-09.

46. Ibid., p. 573.

47. Uniform Crime Reports State of New Jersey, 1967, West Trenton, NJ: Division of State Police, 1968, p. 7.

48. Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, Washington, DC: USGPO, 1967.

49. Ibid., p. 1.

50. James Q. Wilson, Thinking about Crime, New York: Basic Books, 1975, pp. 4-5.

51. At police stations desk sergeants over time have had considerable latitude in deciding which complaint should be the subject of a written report requiring action and which may not be noted at all by "talking down" the matter with the would-be complainant, and otherwise discouraging someone from filing written complaints. This is most frequently found in the suburbs for marital, juvenile, and adult intoxication incidents which might never appear on police blotters. Further, a judge might combine several persons arrested into a

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single case, diminishing the importance to individuals. These examples further reflect the imprecise nature of crime data.

52. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports, Washington, DC: USGPO, 1967-80.

53. See: James R. Gleason, Attica, the Official Report of the New York State Special Commission on Attica, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972. Personal reflections of the time are provided by Richard X. Clark, Brothers of Attica, ed. Leonard Levitt, New York: Links Books, 1973; Russell G. Oswald, Attica--My Story, ed. Rodney Campbell, Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1972, and Tom Wicker, Time to Die, New York: Quadrangle/New York Times Book, 1975.

54. David Corcoran, "Burglars Aren't Choosy," Bergen Record, September 14, 1971, p. C1.

55. John Mulqueen and John Santangelo, "N.J. Crime Outpacing Population," Bergen Record, November 27, 1972, p. A1.

56. Sharon Rosenhausen, "Crime, Taxes, Schools Head N.J.'s Worries," Bergen Record, February 11, 1972, p. A1.

57. Bergen Record, February 14, 1971, p. A1.

58. Robert W. Winslow, ed. Crime in a Free Society: Selections From the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, 3rd ed., Encino, CA: Dickenson Publishing Company, 1977, p. iii.

59. Examples of LEAA--sponsored research and recommendations include: National Advisory Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Police, Washington, DC: USGPO, 1976; Annelise Gaebner Anderson, Organized Crime: The Need for Research, Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, 1970, and National Advisory Committee, Private Security, Washington, DC: USGPO, 1976.

60. Over the years of its existence, LEAA dispensed eight billion dollars to a large list of police departments, institutions, and private contractors. Such a varied and committed initiative deserves detailed critical analysis which is until now unavailable. In one sense, LEAA spent billions for crime reduction at a time when local law enforcement agencies were also increasing their spending with the net effect that reported crime grew each year without remission.

Some LEAA financed programs were doomed to early failure when "soft money" for crime reduction efforts produced initiatives that stopped because LEAA provided no permanent funding stream for the programs. A celebrated success is LEAA-funded projects combining architectural and crime prevention concepts in buildings. See: Robert L. O'Block, Joseph F.

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Donnermeyer, and Stephen E. Doeren, Security and Crime Prevention, 2nd ed., Stoneham, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1991, pp. 5, 344. The agency was started by the Nixon Administration, reached its peak in 1968 when it had 667 employees, and was phased out by the Carter Administration beginning in 1978. LEAA ceased to exist as of April 15, 1982, when remaining programs were folded into other Justice Department offices. See: "The Execution Complete: LEAA is no More!" Community Crime Prevention Digest, 9 (April 1982): 1-2.

61. Uniform Crime Reports--New Jersey, 1967, p. 7. This report also provides a "Profile of New Jersey" and "Profiles of Incorporated Municipalities" which have provided statistical data for this section.

62. "Muckraking Reformer Had Role in the History of the Hill," New York Times, March 5, 1972, p. NJ 84.

63. Deirdre Carmody, "Englewood's East Hill Is Changing, but Gradually," New York Times, March 5, 1972, p. 84.

64. Donn Selhorn, "Englewood's Actors' Home: A Haven for Old Troopers," New York Times, May 7, 1972, p. 122.

65. Alan L. Gansberg, "Both Spirits and Rents Are High in Englewood," New York Times, September 8, 1974, p. NJ 16.

66. Meg Lundstrom, "Englewood's East Hill: Where Giants Lived," Bergen Record, January 25, 1984, p. A1, A12.

67. Ibid.

68. Stephen Birmingham, The Golden Dream: Suburbia in the Seventies, New York: Harper & Row, 1978, p. 99.

69. Ibid., p. 100.

70. Ibid., pp. 101-02. The author adds: "The possibility of crime--or at least the interruption of piece of mind--hangs in the air as persistently as the distant drone of traffic from the turnpike. It is something unwanted and unexpected that the turnpike has brought to little Darien."

Two sociologists believe that young people from working-class communities may be more involved in crime than their Harlem equivalents: "Kids in [working-class communities] may become involved in more self-destructive behaviors, more use of (heavier) drugs and alcohol, more irrational crime, than kids in Harlem housing projects. But black or white, all are outlaws to some degree, because they are in the limbo between childhood and adulthood, with limited rights, uncharted futures, little privacy, no legal places of their own, few possessions, and an attraction to adult behaviors that for them entail violating the law," Terry Williams and William Kornblum, The Uptown Kids: Struggle and Hope in the Projects, New York: Grosset/Putnam, 1994, p. 93.

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71. Thomas M. Guterbock, "The Push Hypothesis: Minority Presence, Crime, and Urban Deconcentration," in Changing Face of the Suburbs, ed. Barry Schwartz, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976, p. 137. A Canadian writer who wrote about the development of Toronto suburbs concluded that the reason why suburbs developed was simple: "People moved out to the suburbs in search of space. They wanted a house, and the only place they could find a house was in the suburb....There were far from enough houses in the city to go around," S.D. Clark, Suburban Society, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966, p. 223.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid., p. 155.

74. Thomas M. Stanback, Jr., The New Suburbanization: Challenges to the Central City, Eisenhower Center for the Conservation of Human Resources Studies in the New Economy, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991, p. 79.

75. Ibid.

76. Such corporate movements were related to numerous reasons including attractiveness of regional cities closer to primary markets, thus bringing growth to the Dallas-Fort Worth area, for example, and the high cost of doing business in New York City, apparently outweighing the benefits of closeness to clients, customers, and services which eroded during the 1980s with the advent of facsimile machines and teleconferencing making frequent face-to-face interaction less necessary as a means of conducting business.

77. Ibid., p. 80.

78. Kenneth T. Jackson, "The Effect of Suburbanization on the Cities," in Suburbia: The American Dream and Dilemma, ed. Philip C. Dolce. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1976, p. 93.

79. Wesley G. Skogan, "The Changing Distribution of Big-City Crime: A Multi-City Time Series Analysis," Urban Affairs Quarterly 13 (1977): 33-48, and Mark C. Stafford and Jack Gibbs, "Crime Rates in an Ecological Context: Extension of a Proposition," Social Science Quarterly 61 (1980): 653-65.

80. Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reports, Washington, DC: USGPO, 1971-91. FBI data are derived from Tables 7 or 11 depending on the year for the category of suburban cities composing cities from under 10,000 population up to those with a population of 49,999. The number of cities reporting each year varies; therefore, the total population for the cities used each year is the basis for calculating the number of index crimes for that year.

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81. Philip Langdon, A Better Place to Live, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1994, p. 1. The author continues: "The late twentieth-century suburbs are not the only thing making us sick. But the suburbs are implicated in the downward spiral. After spending much of the last several years exploring the workings of suburbs, I have come to the conclusion that suburban ways of living--in particular, the ways of living associated with the suburbs we have been building since World War II--have been bad for us as individuals and as a society," p. 2. Langdon argues that suburbs should be planned with well-defined public spaces to encourage people to explore their neighborhood with greater pedestrian-scale facilitation.

82. Joel Garreau, Edge City: Life on the New Frontier, New York: Doubleday, 1991, p. 49.

83. Ibid.

84. Quoted ibid., p. 52.

85. The corporate palaces erected by industrial potentates themselves were subject to the forces of economics that began to reshape the nature of organizational work in the 1980s. Downsizing, corporate restructuring, and pressures for consolidation to improve profits forced many suburban and exurban facilities to become costly redundancies, see: Thomas J. Lueck, "Vacated Corporate Headquarters Scatter the Suburban Landscapes," New York Times December 4, 1992, p. A1, B6.

86. Charles Strum, "Thoughts from an Urban Suburbanite," New York Times, December 1, 1994, p. C12.

87. Herbert J. Gans comments: "Probably the major disadvantage of urban sprawl is the proliferation of small local governments. Although it provides people with considerable control over their own destinies, it discourages public action on many metropolitan-wide problems. A logical case can be made for some form of metropolitan government, and the case has been made logically since the beginning of the twentieth century," The Levittowners, p. 422. For comment on urban crime, see for example: "Crime in the Suburbs--Pros Take Over," U.S. News & World Report 84 (April 17 1978): 66-7; Russell Roberts, "Fear Stalks Suburbia: God, It's Dark Out There," New Jersey Monthly, April 1993, pp. 66-8, 88-89, and William Celis 3d, "Suburban and Rural Schools Learning that Violence Isn't Confined to the Cities," New York Times, April 21, 1993, B11. For discussion on the need to establish regional solution to crime control, see: Elinor Ostrom and Roger B. Parks, "Suburban Police Departments: Too Many and Too Small?" in Urbanization of the Suburbs, pp. 367-402.

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CHAPTER 8

FROM THE EIGHTIES TO 1990

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The public, as evidenced by polls as well as by changing behavior, is frightened. People are afraid of straying from familiarly safe and short paths of travel, afraid of changing neighborhoods, afraid of being alone in an apartment or house, afraid of people who appear unfamiliar or in some way unusual. Above all, they fear that a city so frightening that people are unable to risk assembling represents a violation of the very principle that made cities important in the first place.*

The city has been unpopular, unpleasant, and unlivable for, oh, at least 100 years.†

*Roger Starr, "Crime: How It Destroys, What Can Be Done," New York Times Magazine, January 27, 1985, p. 19.

†Andrew Kupfer, "New York: Down But Hardly Out," Fortune, February 26, 1990, p. 92.

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1990. Yo![1]

The decade marked a period of excess, ebullience and exaggeration, peace and prosperity. Older industrial age values were trammeled by an already mature Information Age or post-Capital Society. New confidence and new uncertainties coexisted with scientific and technological imperatives emerging at unprecedented levels, unleashing sheer change at a pace seemingly straining the capacity of people in all walks of life to cope with it.

To one historian, dimming forces of civilization resulted from a "new barbarism" extending to the entire industrial world, a manifestation so great that civilization itself might see an end to the modern age.[2] Yet another writer demurred, finding the triumphant success in the 1980s of liberal democracy marking a kind of cease-fire in political ideological battles: the West had won and "the end" of history and of humankind was a natural consequence of the astonishing collapse of the communistic gladiator in a long-playing antagonistic political ideological competition.[3]

Still another commentator deduced that the ideological battle of the years was not between liberal democracy (reflected by the United States) and communism (embodied by a collapsed Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) but rather was best symbolized by a three-way conflict, the third party being radical nationalism (reflected by Hitler's Germany). The undoing of communist statism unpredictably resulted in a rapid re-emergence of supernationalism and chaos, not in the

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wealthy, information-rich nations, but rather among non-democratic nations such as those where Hitler's hegemony once ascended such as Czechoslovakia, Romania, and the Baltic states.[4]

On a personal level changes in fashions created their own statements: the decade of the 1980s began with the older generation denouncing those in their teens and twenties for clothing themselves too tightly and ended with the same older citizens chastising the younger for dressing too loosely. In a political sense the isms had changed dramatically. A fear of communism, socialism, and nationalism riveted the nation in the early eighties and was interrupted by the fragmentation of socialist governments in Europe. This unleashed in America a new preoccupation with potentially disuniting factors that stemmed from attacks on the assimilative traditions of American multiculturalism and allowed serious contemplation of fringe concepts like ableism--oppression of the differently abled by the temporarily able; heterosexism--oppression of sexual orientation other than heterosexual; and lookism--belief that appearance is an indicator of a person's value--to have a standing out of context to their value in a vibrant society.[5]

The United States entered the 1980s with a new political byword, "Reaganomics," which supposedly meant budget cuts and tax reductions along with increased defense spending and decreased social services funding. From the time Ronald Reagan took the oath of office on January 20, 1981, some

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critics claimed the policies he espoused were unfair and uncharitable. The president and his coterie responded that getting "government off the back of the people" would enable a newly challenged and self-responsive populous to solve its own problems rather than expect a bureaucracy to do it for them. In the 1984 election campaign, when Reagan asked the electorate if they were "better off...than four years ago," a resounding landslide re-election of the Gipper was their answer. The second term achieved massive tax reform and a pioneering arms-limitation agreement with the Soviets. But excess in the financial markets brought the inevitable correction. Black Monday, October 19, 1987, saw a precipitous stock sell-off which, measuring from the high point reached the previous August, reflected a loss in the value of stock market listed equities of almost one-third. Thus ended a stretch of time termed by a Wall Street Journal editor as "the seven fat years," in which pre-Reagan "stagflation" gave way to deregulation and tax cuts stimulating a buoyant economy.[6]

During these boom years of the 1980s, economic growth rose by almost a third; living standards grew 18 percent above 1982; jobs increases raised civilian employment by 19.5 percent, adding 18.4 million positions, and tax revenues in the decade almost doubled. Federal Reserve Board inflation-curbing monetary controls invigorated private enterprise and national productivity surged by about 30 percent with a 20 percent rise in per-capita income. With a record of peace, prosperity, and more expanded work opportunities, the

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president successfully turned over his incumbency to George Bush, the first vice president elected to the Oval Office since 1836.

Bush began his presidency as a quasi-Reagan legatee, though by 1990 it was clear that he was departing from his predecessor's political vision.[7] In one respect the Reagan-Bush outlook was unchanged. Direct benefits for cities were reduced, and the smaller pie would be sliced in state capitals with discretionary distribution. This gave the suburbs greater leverage to obtain a higher proportion of such emoluments while these same residential areas enjoyed higher personal average incomes than city residents.

New York City experience sometimes paralleled and other times was disjunctive with national trends from the 1980s to the 1990s. The phase produced an astonishing cycle of growth beginning with confidence that turned to self-skepticism: positivism changed to cynicism. How would city life survive opposite a persistently anti-urban bias from the burgeoning suburbs and exurbs? Cognizant of its reputation for over three centuries as humane, tolerant, talent-filled, alive, innovative, singular, and existentially exciting, the city in sober moods wondered what could be done to stem burgeoning government, a shrinking private sector, and citizens who increasingly voiced their fears of the streets and expressed their dismay with moving vans.

The decade had begun with the crescendo of a "crime boom"

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with nationally and locally serious crimes at a peak in absolute numbers and also when adjusted by comparative population.[8] The "mystifying" and "terrifying" development over the previous generation strained analysts for explanation:

> What could be the cause? The list of candidates included unemployment, divorce, poor schools, racial tensions, substandard housing, poverty, lax law enforcement, increased social mobility, permissive parents, television, and the general erosion in respect for tradition and authority.[9]

Landon Y. Jones argued that population changes explain much of the difference and cites the final report in 1972 of the Presidential Commission on Population Growth and the American Future which estimated that about 28 percent of the reported increase between 1960 and 1970 in arrests for serious crimes was due to the surge of population growth among those under twenty-five.[10]

The baby boomers as a category--roughly defined as the seventy-five million Americans born between 1946 and 1964--became victims by 1980 of a remarkable slowdown, and in some respects reversal, in the steady improvement in life expectancy from improved public health, industrial safety, and better safeguards in and around the home and at leisure. However, in the decade after the baby boomers arrived, death rates among the 15-to-29-year-old "reversed and rose an unprecedented 20 percent. This is the only sustained increase in mortality experienced by any age group in this country since 1900."[11] The author foresaw that with the aging of the

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baby boomers' generation, violent crime would decrease and that society would become more transfixed with economic illegalities likely then to emerge as this aging cohort moved from the streets to the suites.

Slightly more than a decade later urban anthropologist, Katherine S. Newman, described "the withering of the American dream" because this baby-boom generation would be unable to duplicate or surpass their own parents' standard of living.[12] The travails and triumphs of the yuppies--young, childless, urban professionals spreading urban gentrification--were the fawning focus of much journalistic comment over the decade; nonetheless, despite their striving and precociousness, the boomers' generation was heading downward economically and resented society for sending it there. In addition to young urban professionals a much larger no-name age cohort group existed. These also were young and urban but included those bereft of education, family supports, and career direction.

Changes within the Family

Contemporary social historians discount any idealization of the American family from colonial days on: evaluation of records indicates a sweep of history during which the family--a few families, at least--displayed pathological tendencies, even sustaining criminal behavior.[13] Yet as a generality, the family remained intact as a societal institution well into the second quarter of the twentieth century. The increasing trend in divorce has been termed by staticians "one of the most

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dramatic changes in American families experience during the past" half century.[14]

In earlier generations marital dissolution was common but usually was precipitated by widowhood rather than divorce or separation. By 1990, only about one in twenty marriages was terminated by death of a spouse; in contrast, the number of divorces per year more than doubled from 1970 to the early 1980s. A study of first marriages still intact from the 1982 and 1988 National Surveys of Family Growth confirmed "a decline in marital stability" for this period. The report found: "The risks of dissolution vary substantially across subgroups....Blacks have much higher divorce rate than whites."[15] The number divorced per 1,000 married persons increased unremittingly for white and black males and females alike from 1970 to 1988: for white males the number rose from thirty-two to 102; for white females from fifty-six to 146; for black males from sixty-two to 216, and for black females from 104 to 311.

For divorced individuals who do not remarry, the decline in family income for white and black was substantial, at least for the first three years following divorce. For women the economic loss in per capita change was particularly deleterious, averaging a decline of 21 percent regardless of family income status or number of years married.[16] Marital dissolution rates were lower for people who first marry in their later years and also declined in likelihood as spouses age. Persons whose parents were divorced while the children

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were young were themselves more likely to divorce. Similarly, such factors as premarital birth and low educational attainment were associated with high risks of marital disillusion.

While many women and men may justly rationalize behavior to "get out of a bad situation" through divorce, marital dissolution is associated with great economic and psychosocial cost to men, women, and the children they bore.[17] The burden of raising children in a divorced or separated home usually falls preponderantly upon the woman, though men sometimes do assume the major burden, and often both parents share responsibility equitably in caring for children. The decline of the extended family in proximate or co-residence was an indicator of the lessened intensity of kin interaction in the 1980s. These diminished kinship resources to care for children in their formative years was an added burden. Steven Ruggles noted: "In every sphere of family life, there has been a loosening of bonds of obligation among kin. There has been a revolution in attitudes toward divorce, cohabitation, premarital sex, and single parenthood."[18]

These momentous social changes occurred among all races and ethnic groups and within every socioeconomic status (SES). However, it was among inner city blacks, primarily, and Hispanics and certain minority immigrant representations, secondarily, that the effects of these developments would be felt most intensely.

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The Poor, Crime, and Public Money

Historically, urban governments had responded to the plight of the inner city poor with contributions from state and federal coffers in addition to their own major appropriations. Federal program had become important for cities to aid the poor and the young. The guiding federal policy during the Reagan years diminished spending that would have reached the poorest quintile (fifth) and adversely affected younger members of society. A relationship between youth and crime is an apparent conviction of social planners and the poorest population segments represented the most fecund population category. Another assumption relates to economic status: the poorest male quintile is most apt to be linked to violent and property crime.

The corollary to this assertion is that richest male quintile is less likely to be involved in violent and property crime but most likely to be associated with economic or white-collar crime. Economic crime constitutes a multibillion-dollar-a-year loss to the economy and far outstrips all the losses from property crime combined: these type of offenses are not to be minimized, indeed, for they create a profound burden shared by all of society, a patent issue, particularly in the second half of the decade of the 80s.

But economic crime does not possess the capacity to engender fear, dislocation, and threaten community stability the way violent crime does, the concern of this inquiry.[19] Still, it is generally the poorest segments of society who are

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associated most both as victims and perpetrators of violent crime. This statement is not an assertion that poverty per se causes violent or property crime; rather, poverty orients norm-rejecting individuals towards anti-social behavior most available and "profitable" to them. It must be noted also that many of the most heroic fighters for urban order and justice are those with few resources at their command and often live within a milieu of rampant disorder.

American society has sought from colonial days to establish and maintain moral order; with urbanization, social problems grew, encouraging scores of organizations from the Jackson era on to control the "dangerous classes."[20] Control was never achieved in any ultimate sense given the democratic and protean traditions, expectations, and legalities of American society. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the notion of the underclass, used to describe and explain urban poverty, was raised self-consciously.[21] A criminal justice textbook writer stated: "The relationship between crime and poverty has been studied at length for many generations, and the inescapable conclusion has been reached that the root cause of crime could not be found in any simplistic equation involving only the disadvantaged segments of society."[22] While this is not the "root cause" of most violent and property crime, it is perennially among the most disadvantaged where such crime exists and among whom criminal control measures must be most active.

The Reagan years marked a duration of national economic

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realignment that produced increased median (mid-point) income, higher average income, and a surge in personal wealth. In New York City the boutiques and salons along mid-town Fifth and upper Madison Avenues and across 57th Street welcomed their chic and gold carded customers. Trendy establishments opened in Soho, pricy new restaurants grew in Noho. Shops along Columbus and Amsterdam Avenues and elsewhere also felt the ascendent effects of free spending from a growing horde of affluent customers.

The cliché that New York was becoming a city for the rich and the poor and not for those in between continued to overlook the fact that thousands of residents remained in rent-controlled apartments at bargain rates, an anachronism from emergency rent controls during World War II that never were repealed, and thousands more lived in more costly but usually attractively-priced rent-stabilized housing. Somehow, determined middle-income families found affordable residences in New York, though the search was never easy and desirable amenities and prized location might be lacking. Meanwhile, at the high extreme of the real estate economic scale, the million-dollar apartment sale had passed from being an exception to being a daily occasion as the decade progressed. For residents of moderate and low incomes, the city provided over 30 major housing projects and scores of smaller housing facilities, all of them meeting standards for space, plumbing, maintenance, and safety.

The rising tide of economic betterment was lifting the


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family income of all economic units, some argued. In an article in the Wall Street Journal, a contributor to the editorial page posited that all quintiles of the community did not benefit equally: the poorest quintile actually did best, while the richest quintile also improved but by a more modest increment.[23] If this were true, the Reaganomics strategy of supply-side economics was scoring a home run, bringing a kind of 1920s prosperity to all segments of a consumerist nation. Even the stock market crash of October 19, 1987, failed to plummet the nation into a recession within the next few months as many pundits had assumed. At such a time when the economy was booming, jobs were plentiful, America stood tall in the world community, and even the poorest segment of the population was sharing in the vibrant economy, went the editorialist's argument. Thus it would be perplexing if the crime rate in the latter part of the decade should rise again to those persons who assumed that a dominant economic factor related to crime.

Yet further evaluation of economic data of the decade indicates a different perspective on what had happened economically. Paul R. Krugman, a professor of economics at MIT, demonstrated that all economic segments benefitted in the periods 1947-73 and 1973-79. However, for the period 1979-1989, income gains increased the most for the top five percent and declined progressively through the second lowest quintile. The lowest quintile was the only segment to show a decrease in income.[24] (Figure 8.1) These data were based on census

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Figure 8.1



Rate of income growth at selected income distribution points for 1947-73; 1973-79, and 1979-89. Source: Richard R. Krugman, The American Prospect, (Fall 1992), p. 20.

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responses, which are weak for high incomes, analyzing not higher than the top five percent or lower than the lowest five percent.


The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) for the period 1977-89 estimated income distribution using somewhat different data, showing percentage changes over the entire period rather than annual changes. Krugman notes: "In particular, the top 1 percent of families saw their incomes roughly doubled over a twelve-year period. That's a 6 percent rate of growth, which means that for the very well-off the 1980s really were a very good decade--not only compared with the slow growth lower down in the distribution, but even compared with the postwar boom years."[25] (Figure 8.2)

Krugman's "quite startling" findings are that 70 percent of the rise in average family income went to the top 1 percent. The findings suggest "the general picture of a dramatic and rapid increase in economic inequality in the U.S."[26] During this time, income mobility seemed to show some increase but not "high enough to make any difference to the overwhelming picture of growing inequality."

But does this period of the poor getting poorer translate into greater crime from this segment? To restate an earlier inference, the connection between poverty and crime is not direct but associative and contributive. As Michael Harrington wrote in 1984: "The decline in traditional family, so marked among the poor, and the increase in violent crime are the complex products of many of the same causes."[27] He

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Figure 8.2



Congressional Budget Office estimates for gains in income at different income distribution segments over the period 1977-1989. Source: Richard R. Krugman, The American Prospect, (Fall 1992), p. 21.

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further argued that a culture of poverty and crime have links in the social and political system.

The Reaganomics trickle-down theory, in which benefits to the uppermost economic tier would eventually reach those inferior strata, partially worked. But by the time economic benefits reached the second lowest quintile by Krugman's calculation, the trickle had been absorbed and economic inequalities grew. People within the poorest fifth of the nation were worse off in terms of federal funding, and following the onset of a recession in the city and the nation late in the decade, the economic effects seemed to support a crime-causing environment for this poorest sector, despite the availability of increased social services to mitigate these effects.

The changes in child welfare in the decade were extraordinary not only for New York City, but also for the entire nation. The Annie E. Casey Foundation conducted a national and state-by-state effort to track the status of child well-being in the United States: the KIDS COUNT project. Evaluating the educational, social, economic, and physical well-being of children, the Foundation reported on the environments of risk for children, concentrating particularly on children living in severely distressed neighborhoods. To be defined as a neighborhood in crisis, the area must have had high levels of (1) poverty; (2) female-headed families; (3) high school dropouts; (4) unemployment; and (5) reliance on welfare. "High levels" are defined as rates at least one

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standard deviation above the mean.[28] Data were not available for New York City specifically: only state-wide results were reported. Thus, the information can be considered in a regional context, and specific conclusions for the City are not indicated.

For New York State from the period 1985-90, the findings are mixed. The state was below average in child welfare by a number of measurements: for the percentage of low birth-weight babies the rate trended upward from 7.0 in 1985 to 7.6 in 1990 ranking the state thirty-seventh; for infant mortality rates per 1,000 live births, the rate declined from 10.8 to 9.6; for percent of teens not in school and not in the labor force, ages 16-19, the number increased from 5.4 to 6.1; for percent children in single-parent families and percent children in poverty the change was modest from 23.2 to 22.1, and 28.1 to 29.5 respectively from 1985-90.

In some categories the state ranked better than average: for child death rates per 100,000 children ages one to fourteen, a decline of 30.3 to 29.0 was marked from 1985-90. However, most state indices reflected a harsher reality, such as teen violent death rate ages fifteen to nineteen which increased per 100,000 teens from three to fourteen, 1985-90. The state was worst or almost worst in two measurements: juvenile violent crime arrest rate ages ten to seventeen per 100,000 youth which increased from 632 in 1985 to 909 in 1990, and percent graduating from high school on time which dropped from 64.2 in 1985 to 60.4 five years later. With a national

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composite rank for 1988 through 1990 using a consistent set of indicators, the Foundation determined that New York State ranked 39th, 40th, and 41st in the years 1988-90.[29]

Age specific population data for New York City in 1990 indicated that 23.7 percent of residents were under age eighteen. A minority population under eighteen of 37.6 percent was counted and children ages 5-17 who did not speak English at home numbered 23.3 percent. Women with their youngest child under age six who were in the labor force constituted 52.5 percent, while women with youngest child ages six-to-seventeen who were in the labor force measured 71.9 percent. Children under age six with both or only one parent working numbered 47.9 percent, and children under age eighteen who were not living with a parent constituted 4.7 percent.[30] The status of poor mothers and their children, living within a city of exemplary medical facilities and innovative social service programs, in toto was fragmented and, in some respects, deteriorating. How this change occurred is partially understood with the consideration of associated immigration changes within the city during the 1980s.

Immigration and Census Changes in the 80s

The decennial census reported that by 1990 New York City experienced a population increase of 4.1 percent from 1980. However, this development masks much change over a decade's time including significant additions and reductions of various population components. In the 1980s an analysis of Census

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Bureau data and birth and death records conducted by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey determined that the 35-to-44 age group lost 223,000 members, or nearly 27 percent, while migration increased the 25-to-34 contingent by 23.1 percent, or 279,000. For the same period the 45-to-54 age group was stable.[31]

For the 1980s the Census Bureau determined that non-Hispanic whites declined by 14.2 percent to 43.2 percent of the population while non-Hispanic blacks composed 25.2 percent of the population, Hispanic residents 24.4 percent, and non-Hispanic Asians 6.9 percent. A newspaper report in 1991 on complaints about the census observed the frequently mentioned limitations of the enumerative process, adding that: "City officials say that the census understates the trend and that its count missed hundreds of thousands of New Yorkers, mostly minority-group members."[32]

In 1992, the New York City Department of City Planning's Population Division issued a study on "The Newest New Yorkers" describing immigration characteristics of the approximately 685,000 who became permanent residents and declared their intended residency to be within New York City between 1982 and 1989.[33] New York City traditionally had been a magnet for immigrants. In the years 1946-89, almost 15.4 million immigrants arrived to the nation: New York City received about 17.2 percent of them, varying from a high of 21.0 percent in the years 1946-1949 to a low in the latest period, 1982-89, of 14.5 percent. Differential settlement patterns have been

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noted in the city when national and local country of birth distributions are compared: five Caribbean countries are in top twenty, three in the top five. Concerning regional population changes, the report noted:

> The attraction of New York City to Caribbean immigrants is best illustrated by the national settlement patterns of these major source countries. For example, 61 percent of all recent Dominican immigrants to the United States initially settled in New York City. Similarly, Jamaicans, Haitians, Barbadians and persons from Trinidad and Tobago all demonstrated relatively strong propensities for settling in New York City ranging from 61 percent of all Barbadians to 37 percent of all Haitians.[34]

The immigrant population of the 1980s proportionately tended to live in great numbers in particular neighborhoods relative to the immigrant group's origins. The Bronx "was not a magnet for immigration" during this time, though according to the 1990 census, the foreign born represented 23 percent of the population in The Bronx, up from 18 percent in 1980. These lived largely in the western and central regions of the borough. In Brooklyn, the foreign-born proportion increased from 17 percent during the 1970s to 29 percent of the borough's population by 1990 with the central zip code areas indicating the greatest influx of immigrants.

Manhattan "has traditionally attracted successful upwardly-mobile individuals from both across the world and across the country," the report stated. Immigrants from the same nation tended to settle together: an example was the dominance of immigrants in Washington Heights and Inwood where 80 percent of immigrants from the Dominican Republic settled.[35]

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In Lower Manhattan the area of greatest immigrant infusion was Chinatown and its environs. The borough of Queens represented a 31 percent increase in the number of foreign-born in the 1990 census over a decade earlier, constituting 36 percent of the population, settling largely in Astoria, Sunnyside, Woodside, Corona, and Flushing.[36] Staten Island had the lowest share of foreign-born of any borough in the city, constituting 10 percent of the borough's population in 1980. Of the almost 9,000 immigrants arriving 1983-89 to this borough, three immigrant sources reached or exceeded 10 percent: Korea, 10.0 percent; Philippines, 10.8 percent, and India, 12.7 percent.

Nationally, the wave of immigration brought more than 10 million legal and illegal entrants from 1980 to the census of 1990. Immigrants generally seek greater economic and social opportunities from their relocation which is a stimulus to city life. Meanwhile, domestic United States government immigration policies favored those with educational attainment and economic independence. However, the new wave had a widening gap in formal education deficiency compared with native-born American. A news report stated: "According to calculations from census data, about 85 percent of native-born American men of working age had completed high school in 1990, up from 77 percent in 1980. The portion of immigrants who had finished the equivalent of high school remained steady at 63 percent" and they arrived to encounter an economy which "offers proportionately fewer low-paid jobs for the poorly educated."[37] While the preponderance of the new arrivals

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brought vitality with them and the willingness to take risks, immigrants in the 80s placed a higher burden on New York City for education, welfare, and criminal justice costs.[38] The relationship between recently arrived legal and illegal immigrants and their contribution to crime in New York remains a matter of controversy. However, other areas of the country determined that the wave of immigrants arriving to their areas from 1985 on unduly added regionally to their crime and the costs of maintaining a criminal justice system.[39]

In addition to immigration from abroad, internal migration was changing the city's ethnic composition. Puerto Ricans have been citizens of the United States since 1917 and by 1988 about two-thirds of the 2.3 million Puerto Ricans in America lived in the metropolitan New York area with the number increasing substantially in New York suburban and other northeastern locations from 1980 to 1990. While income of Puerto Ricans living and working in New York City far exceeded the average of workers on the Island and grew substantially from 1975 to 1989, the median Puerto Rican income remained "substantially lower than the rest of New York City."[40] Similarly, the Great Migration of blacks and whites from the South to the North had begun by 1920.[41] By 1950, New York, like Philadelphia, Chicago, and Detroit, had grown rapidly from an influx of blacks during post-World War II years who were "drawn in the direction that offered them the most freedom and opportunities." Meanwhile, substantial numbers of established blacks--like whites--were leaving the city for the suburb.

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An interpretation of raw data from the Census Bureau's National Census of 1990 includes evidence of a society in transformation:

> As the final decade of the century began, welfare rolls in New York City broke the 1 million mark for the first time since the 1970s. At no time in the city's history was the proportion of people receiving public assistance higher....Poverty's chief victims have been children and their victims. Delinquency now seems too quaint a term to describe juvenile crime, which has more than doubled since 1960. Teenage suicide and homicide rates have more than tripled. The proportion of children born to an unmarried mother exploded from one in fifteen to one in four.[42]

The relationship between women, drugs, and dependency was evolving during these years. Women on welfare, often caring for children at home, had an increasing potential of becoming substance abusers. The Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University stated: "Substance abuse and addiction is Public Health Enemy Number One in America. The grim reality, shrouded for so long in our individual and national self-denial, is that any meaningful reform of our health care, criminal justice, or welfare systems must mount an all-fronts attack on all substance abuse--legal and illegal drugs, alcohol, and tobacco."[43]

The Center examined nationally the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) which provided financial support primarily to four million low-income women and their children of whom the population was 38 percent white, 38 percent black, with Latinos comprising most of the remaining 24 percent. The report concluded that women receiving AFDC "are nearly twice

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as likely to abuse or be addicted to alcohol and illicit drugs than women not receiving AFDC (27 percent compared to 14 percent)" and "37 percent of AFDC women 18 to 24 years of age abuse or are addicted to alcohol and drugs," and further "mothers receiving AFDC are three times more likely to abuse or be addicted to alcohol or drugs than mothers not receiving AFDC (27 percent compared to 9 percent)."[44]

The peculiar status of this group is that women with direct care for young, impressionable lives and supported by public funds and costing the nation 22.2 billion dollars by 1993, were exhibiting behavior likely to affect deleteriously their children's upbringing. Indeed, the report found, women once addicted would be more likely to be AFDC recipients for longer periods of time than those not addicted and were less amenable to job training. The report made no connection between mothers' behavior and potential or actual criminality by their children, but observed that "alcohol- and drug-exposed infants, many of whom are sentenced to a lifetime of dependence and poverty" may generate a cost of "$750,000 in medical care, special education, and social services" from birth to their eighteenth birthday.[45]

Crime Patterns in New York: 1980-90

"Serious" crime in New York from 1980 to 1990 generally showed a down-and-up-again pattern over the decade, but this statement requires clarification. Most crimes are not "serious." About four-out-of-five New York City complaints

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are for misdemeanors or lesser incidents for which a written summons may be served or a verbal warning given to the offender. Fewer than one-in-five incidents is for a "serious" crime, a category which is divided into two subsections with four specific offenses each: violent crime--murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, and a second category, property crime--burglary, larceny-theft, vehicular theft, and arson. These offenses comprise Crime Index offenses which all urban police departments report monthly to the Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and which have been discussed in earlier chapters.

All "serious" crimes are potentially felonies which carry with them possible imprisonment of one year or more in addition to a fine and other possible sanctions. A second major category is misdemeanor, for which the maximum punishment could be as much as one year in jail, a fine, and other sanctions. This category of crime is at least four times more frequent than felonies. Finally, police might serve offenders summonses or "appearance tickets" for offenses of lesser misdemeanors or civil code violations. If incidents that create police attention are placed on a spectrum with murder-homicide at one end and a summons for a minor traffic offense or creating unnecessary noise at the other end, the frequency and reliability with which these crimes will be reported by police decreases from the most serious to the least.

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For example, a "serious" crime like murder is highly likely to be reported to police; a "less serious" crime like the theft of property might or might not be reported to police and become a reportable statistic in the process, and a still less serious matter like an episodic threat by someone to commit harm against another is even less likely to attract police attention, assuming that the threat had no extenuating circumstances.[46] At the scene of an incident, a police officer responding to a request for service generally has discretion on how to handle a complaint on an individual basis. The majority of incidents are handled on the spot with police keeping notations of what they have observed and what actions they may have taken but for which no formal "crime" report is likely to be created.

Similarly, in earlier years in New York City, precinct captains or commanders, either directly or through their subordinates, exercised considerable latitude in influencing the crime rate; this was accomplished by informally indicating to police patrol officers during daily roll calls whether or which criminal incidents should be emphasized or de-emphasized. A police officer in a circumstance where his or her commander had great latitude in influencing the total number of incidents might be able to overlook a potentially criminal incident, instead giving the perpetrator a warning, or the officer might write a summons or optionally take the offender to a police station to be charged with a misdemeanor.

Further, it is conceivable in the same situation that a

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precinct police officer responding to a perceived order to "book" major crimes could "build a case" and have the same offender arrested and charged with a felony. Therefore, in determining the crime rate, considerable variability may exist, and the comparison over time of criminal incidents is imprecise and must be interpreted taking into consideration numerous factors in evaluating what crime trends really were taking place.[47]

Since first published in the 1930s, the FBI's UCRs have grown in comprehensiveness and reliability for serious crimes as reported to police. Separate from the FBI's UCRs, since 1972 within the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Justice Statistics has conducted a separate effort to collect crime data by concentrating on victimization--the National Crime Survey (NCS). This survey uses population polling techniques about crime experience developed by the Bureau of the Census which are collected and analyzed then projected for their national significance.

The NCS victimization-oriented survey measures crime by the injured party rather than by the incident. For crimes against persons, the number of victims is normally larger than the number of incidents. NCS does not measure murder-homicide because this type of violence is too rare relative to other major incidents and, while a few unreported incidents do occur, the number is so low as to be not projectable accurately for the entire nation. Thus, NCS and UCR are likely to deviate significantly, and they do. Depending on

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the category of crime, NCS may have two-to-four or more times the number of incidents reported by UCR.[48] NCS data are not available for individual communities, such as New York City. Further, the acceptance of UCR, regardless of the limitations noted, makes the measurement more appropriate for year-to-year comparison, certainly for major crime categories.

UCR maintains rigid definitions for different types of crime. In this study, murder and nonnegligent manslaughter received particular attention because of the high reportability of this offense and its significance in encouraging general fear and the sense of lawlessness in the community. Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter is defined as the willful (nonnegligent) killing of one human being by another. Deaths caused by negligence, attempts to kill, assaults to kill, suicides, accidental deaths, and justifiable homicides are excluded. If a victim dies of a heart attack as the result of a robbery or from witnessing a crime, the incident does not meet the criteria for inclusion in the criminal homicide classification. Justifiable homicide is limited to: (1) the killing of a felon by a law enforcement officer in the line of duty, and (2) the killing of a felon by a private citizen. Negligent manslaughter is also criminal homicide through the killing of another person through gross negligence. Traffic fatalities are excluded.[49]

Robbery is also included in this study, though the comparative significance of this crime is less valid since the nature of the offense is highly variable because police have

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latitude in classifying the theft; for example, theft of a purse may be classified as robbery or as larceny-theft. Nonetheless, robbery is highly fear provoking as it involves contact between an offender and a victim and is retained as a comparative incident. Robbery is defined as the taking or attempting to take anything of value from the care, custody, or control of a person or persons by force or threat of force or violence and by putting the victim in fear, or both.[50]

By 1980, the City of New York had reached a historical high in its total Crime Index rate and reached it in all eight component crime categories, modified to include arson, a new crime category that year. These combined Crime Index sets are also called Part I offenses. A decade earlier offenses known to police in the FBI's total Crime Index reached 517,716, compared with 718,804 in 1980, an increase of 38.8 percent, while the city's population declined almost 11 percent in the same decade. Criminal homicide increased from 1,201 in 1970, to 1,812 in 1980, an increase of 50.9 percent. Similarly, robberies rose during the same period: from 74,102 in 1970, to 100,550 a decade later, up 35.6 percent. When adjusted to compare the total crime rate per 100,000 population, the change was substantial. The total Crime Index rose from 6,557.6 to 10,217.1, up 55.8 percent. (Table 8.1) Murder and nonnegligent manslaughter increased from 15.2 incidents per 100,000 population to 25.8, up 69.7 percent, indicating the relatively greater increase in killing as reported to police.

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Table 8.1

Crime Index, Murder, and Robbery Rates Adjusted for Population:

New York City, 1980-90

Year	Population	Modified* Crime Index Total	Crime Index Per 100,000	Murder & Manslaught	Murder & Manslaughter Per 100,000	Robbery	Robbery Per 100,000
1980	7,035,348	718,804	10,217.1	1,812	25.8	100,550	1,429.2
1981	7,070,429	734,808	10,392.6	1,826	25.8	107,475	1,520.0
1982	7,096,559	696,812	9,819.0	1,668	23.5	95,944	1,351.9
1983	7,100,063	629,926	8,872.1	1,622	22.8	84,043	1,183.6
1984	7,167,121	607,305	8,473.4	1,450	20.2	79,541	1,109.8
1985	7,183,984	609,146	8,479.2	1,384	19.3	79,532	1,107.0
1986	7,179,609	641,966	8,941.4	1,582	22.0	80,827	1,125.7
1987	7,284,319	662,954	9,101.1	1,672	22.9	78,890	1,083.0
1988	7,346,352	725,087	9,870.0	1,896	25.8	86,578	1,178.5
1989	7,369,454	718,534	9,750.1	1,905	25.8	93,377	1,267.0
1990	7,322,564	716,403	9,783.5	2,245	30.6	100,280	1,369.4

*Modified means that arson is included with the other Index Crimes.

Source: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports, Washington, DC: USGPO, 1981-91.

Robbery for the same period increased from 938.6 in 1970 to 1,429.2, representing a 52.2 percent growth, which was more in keeping with the total crime index growth.

The New York City gross and population adjusted crime rates peaked in 1981 at 10,392 incidents per 100,000, or 25.8 murders and manslaughters and 15.2 robberies for the same population unit. The population adjusted number declined for the next two years, and in 1984, the rate was an almost identical 8,473 per 100,000 and just six incidents more the next year. Murder and manslaughter decreased to 19.3 incidents per 100,000, representing a decline of 23.6 percent in five years. Robbery also declined from its high of 1,520 incidents per 100,000 population to 1,107 in 1985, dropping still further to 1,083 in 1987, a decline of almost a quarter from only six years earlier.

Even with the substantial reduction in crime from its high of 1980-81, the city in the mid-1980s seemed like a dangerous place compared with other areas, relative to the numbers of crimes reported to police in New York. Yet change in age group components also occurred which were little noted by crime analysts at the time. While the population in the period 1980-90 increased 4.1 percent, demographic changes long foreseen shifted among age groups. As the "baby boomers" aged, the "crime-prone" demographic segment--generally years 15 through 24--shrank relative to the total population.

The connection between arrests for serious crimes and youth has been underscored by a wide variety of information

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and formal observations spread over time, from anecdotal experience through extensive statistical studies. In 1988, for example, a Bureau of Justice Statistics report found that the property crime arrest rate peaked at age 16 and dropped by half at age 22; the violent crime arrest rate peaked at age 18.[51] Clearly, age of population groups should have a potential predictive value in charting future crime trends and on an aggregate basis may be deemed the most significant integrant in explaining trend shifts. Bureau of the Census data reported that the population of the 15 to 24 cohort for the years 1985 to 1990 decreased 10.9 percent.[52] Because of the relationship this age category has on criminal activity, a logical conclusion would be that crime from 1985 to 1990 would decrease, assuming that all other factors were unchanged. But the reverse occurred.

The total Crime Index rate per 100,000 population increased from 8,479 to 9,783, a gain of 15.3 percent. Two serious violent reference crimes used in this survey also increased as noted above: robbery rose from 1,107 to 1,369 incidents per 100,000 residents, up 24.5 percent, and murder other than nonnegligent homicide rose from 19.3 to 30.6, a gain of 58.5 percent. Thus, while the crime-prone age decreased relative to the population as a whole and logically supported assumptions of a declining urban crime rate for this period, just the reverse occurred, a stunning fact largely unperceived and unreported by observers of the time. If violent crime increased in New York City from 1985 to 1990 and

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at a rate that was greater than expectations based on age, the phenomenon calls for a searching explanation which will be examined here and in the final chapter.

The short-term increase of 1985-90 might first be examined in a larger historical context: the previous century. Because of the unreliability of crime data for most of the past century, crime statistics in general are not comparable over a long period of time with any confidence. However, the crime of murder and nonnegligent homicide which also has weaknesses for comparative value, may be considered with a higher degree of confidence because of the likelihood of this offense being brought to the attention of police and being properly recorded by them. Even with the killing of a person, particular homicides may be subject to uncertainty as to definition--negligent (wilful) versus accidental, for example.

A retrospective study of murders and criminal homicides excluding vehicular deaths, indicates that considerable variation has occurred over the past century in the gross number of reported incidents and the rate when adjusted per 100,000 residents.[53] (Table 8.2) For example, from 1890 to 1900, the adjusted murder rate jumped over 80 percent, only to decline within the next decade. For 1920-30, reported incidents declined further on a population adjusted basis. The rate declined further for the census periods of 1940 and 1950. By 1970 the rate exceeded that of 1960 by over 80 percent. Finally in 1990, reported incidents reached the

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Table 8.2

Murder and Criminal Homicide in New York City, 1890-1990

Year	Population	Incidents*	Incidents per 100,000
1890	1,515,301†	108	7.1
1900	3,437,202	448	13.0
1910	4,766,883	443	9.3
1920	5,620,048	382	6.8
1930	6,930,446	421	6.1
1940	7,454,995	275	3.7
1950	7,891,957	294	3.7
1960	7,781,984	394	5.1
1970	7,894,862	1,117	14.1
1980	7,035,348	1,812	25.8
1990	7,322,564	2,245	30.6

*Murder and criminal homicide were reported by police for arrests only from 1890 to 1920. In the years 1930-90, incidents are reported. Infanticide is included as murder when listed as a separate crime. Excludes vehicular deaths such as when the perpetrator was under the influence of alcohol.

†Manhattan and Westchester only. On January 1, 1898, Brooklyn, Queens, and Richmond were incorporated into New York City, and the Northern part of Westchester County was detached leaving the Bronx and constituting New York City in its current five boroughs. Bureau of Census data for 1980 and 1990.

Sources: Annual Reports of the New York City Police Department, 1890-1990. Ira Rosenwaike, Population History of New York City, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1972. Bureau of Census data for 1980 and 1990.

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highest level of 2,245, or 30.6 crimes per 100,000 population, the highest on record and averaging over six crimes per day within the five boroughs.

The comprehensive Crime Index within the city including all reported crime activity declined over the decade. But from 1985 to 1990, the total Crime Index rate increased over 15 percent with fewer people in the crime-prone age category than five years or a decade earlier. What was going on? Why was crime in the city inexorably worsening in a decade remembered for its peace and prosperity?

Urban Controls and Crime

Theories of crime causation have been discussed earlier and will be examined further in the next chapter; however, another postulation may help elucidate the trend in urban disorder afflicting and threatening New York and other urban centers increasingly from the 1950s through the 1980s. The premise holds that over time the controls available to society primarily to manage those of lower socioeconomic status with a propensity to violent and property crime were weakened relative to reward attraction for this group to commit crime. The risk-reward ratio became tilted, emphasizing the ease of achieving rewards relative to risks--sanctions and chances of being apprehended, for example--for the potential offender that discouraged criminal behavior. This risk-rewards dialectic has long been familiar in American managerial thinking for evaluating, as an example, the risk of a capital

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investment relative to its potential pay-back.

Criminologist Ernest van den Haag argued a variant of the thesis in explaining at a policy research forum that criminal acts are based on "the expected comparative net benefit" of criminal activities, and as long as benefits outweigh penalties, criminals will proliferate to seize available rewards. He provided an analogy as illustration about the futility of crime "rehabilitation," or likelihood of success from the removal of a population group if the supplied benefits of that group's activities remained unmodulated by other demand-linked circumstances:

> If we rehabilitated every dentist who committed 50 dental acts [stopping them from the practice of dentistry], that would result in a [temporarily] reduced supply of dentists and encourage more people to enter dentistry. The rate would be as before. If you lock up every prostitute for life you can easily imagine the rate of prostitution would not change... [Rehabilitation] would do something for the individual, save his soul or whatever, but would not do anything for society.[54]

The rewards from criminal behavior are complex and not always readily apparent. The taking of money or property to satisfy the perpetrator's need seems unambiguous and reprehensible. But, as observed earlier in Chapter 3, criminologists believe that people commit crimes for a variety of reasons, generally attributable to multiple causations. Urgent unrequited physical need--to steal food to feed a starving child, for example--is a fanciful probability in a city where the welfare "safety net" is historically a major budget item and where free nourishment from churches,

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synagogues, and public and private neighborhood shelters was available at all mealtimes in all the boroughs in the decade through 1990. Other explanations must be explored to explain most crime incidents which exclude urgent need and these include psychological, social, and biological considerations.

In Seductions of Crime (1988), sociologist Jack Katz postulated that criminal assailants have "distinctive sensual dynamics" and that the "particular seductions and compulsions" criminals experience may be unique to crime, though the sense of being seduced and compelled is not.[55] Katz surveys the "street elites" in their "righteous slaughter" and "primordial evil" action, arguing persuasively that for some young men what takes place is not a calculating cost-benefit decision, but rather the allure of action, chaos, and control, thus defining "senseless" crime. Hence, these two theories argue that the criminal's act might be calculated on either an analytical risk-reward basis, or on an instantly gratifiable reach for action, control, power, and even joy from the criminal act.

Concerns about urban property and violent crime have been raised by journalists, politicians, and academics insistently in the later years of this study. New Yorker writer Richard Harris in 1970 titled a section in a book: "Something Has Gone Terribly Wrong in America." Among the problems he cited was crime: "(T)he widespread conviction that crime in this country is soaring uncontrollably has brought many people to the point where they live in terror."[56] In 1977, two British observers,

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Sir Leon Radzinowicz and Joan King, provided the disconcerting note: "It has been estimated that any citizen of New York has six chances in ten, during the course of his or her life, of being the victim of murder, rape, assault, or robbery."[57] Roger Starr, a former city housing commissioner and later an editorial page editor, observed in 1985: "Few people thought that, despite general prosperity and high employment levels, crime itself would, within twenty-five years, be regarded as New York's most serious problem. But as everyone now knows, the incidents of crime in the city took another turn and mounted upward."[58] The same year a criminologist noted:

> In New York, gangs of youth robbed and beat participants in a charity walkathon in Central Park.... a United States senator and his companion, on their way to dinner with the mayor of New York, were mugged by two men just down the street from the mayor's mansion....The public response to criminal violence has become correspondingly bitter and even desperate. Three-fifths of the American public expressed their support for a self-styled vigilante who shot down four young black men after they asked him for five dollars in a New York subway.[59]

In the evaluation of significant societal controls that are significant in the risk-reward equation, local politics with its managerial control of policing and its tangential influence on the local criminal justice system must be considered.

Ed Koch and Policing

In terms of local government, it was the decade, more or less, of Ed Koch.[60] A child of the Great Depression, Edward Koch was born December 12, 1924, in the Morrisania section of

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the Bronx. He attended City College but dropped out of school in 1943 when he was drafted, and served as a combat soldier. Returning to his native city with an honorable discharge, Koch graduated from City College and then New York University Law School, passing the bar examination in 1949. He settled into a general practice of law--contracts, wills, divorces, and minor negligence cases--and developed interests in Democratic politics.

Adlai Stevenson was then a liberal hero who appealed to idealists like Ed Koch. The young attorney became a member of the Tamawa Democratic Club in Greenwich Village. The district party leader was Carmine DeSapio, perhaps the most powerful Democrat in the state. DeSapio was not interested in supporting Stevenson though, so Koch with a group of like-minded party stalwarts challenged the status quo and established another club in 1957, the Village Independent Democrats (VID). Before the year was over, however, Koch returned to his original club. Then in 1959, he rejoined VID, and became its vice-president in 1960. Two years later Koch ran for the state assembly against incumbent William Passanante. Koch lost but was positioned to benefit from this defeat. His energetic leadership carried him to the club presidency in a narrow election later that year. For the next four years Koch was the model of a modern urban reformer and liberal. Koch was elected to the city council in 1966 and to Congress in 1968, representing the so-called "Silk Stocking" district on New York's Upper East Side, often described as a

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former bastion of the old guard Republican Party.

While maintaining his congressional seat, Koch sought his party's nomination for mayor in 1973. He announced his candidacy at a press conference held at the Biltmore Hotel, saying that the most vital issue facing the city was crime. Crime, he argued, was the reason why the middle class was fleeing to the suburbs, taking with it its tax base. "Crime is not a left-wing issue or a right-wing issue, but a problem that needs a realistic approach," he said. However, the candidate was squeezed ideologically--on the right by Abe Beame and Mario Biaggi and on the left by Arthur Blumenthal and Herman Badillo. Without a distinctive message, adequate financing, and sufficient organization, Koch dropped from the race.

Four years later Koch announced his second mayoral candidacy. This time his principal issue was "getting the hacks off the payroll," an appealing urban populist issue for a liberal, grassroots-oriented politician in a city where government was never fully trusted. A bachelor who had never married, the congressman often campaigned hand-in-hand with Bess Myerson, the first Jewish Miss America and the city's consumer affairs commissioner in the earlier mayoral administration of John Lindsay. Koch's campaign theme was "After eight years of charisma and four years of the clubhouse, why not try competence?" The neat rhetorical question, crafted by media adviser David Garth, slammed the previous two mayors: The photogenic, well-intentioned but

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ultimately overwhelmed John Lindsay and the minuscule numbers-cruncher Abraham Beame, earlier the city's controller.

The Koch primary candidacy was fresh and attention-getting, though certainty at the polls was problematic: ethnic and neighborhood biases conspired to produce a cliff-hanger of a primary election among the seven candidates. With the insistent support of the New York Post and by stressing his backing of capital punishment (which, however, was an irrelevant issue since the state government, not the mayor, decides this issue), Koch won the primary, surpassing the candidate who placed second, Mario Cuomo, by less than 10,000 votes. In the runoff election between Koch and Cuomo eleven days later, the key borough was Brooklyn, where the now defeated Beame had placed first followed by Cuomo and Koch respectively.

Meade Esposito headed the informal but rigidly organized political machine in Brooklyn; he held no elected political office but was the semi-active partner of an insurance brokerage business and had made partisan politics his avocation. Journalists Jack Newfield and Wayne Barrett had covered New York City politics for years and later wrote how Koch, instead of Cuomo, won Esposito's coveted support:

> Tipping the balance even more in Koch's favor was the fact that Cuomo refused even to ask for Esposito's support, for, as he recalls, "I knew there would be a price attached to Esposito's endorsement. I couldn't fool myself. I had known Meade for a long time. I knew that he wanted more than just a public display of deference. He wanted jobs, he wanted control, so I never asked him for help."[61] But Koch sought the political boss's endorsement at a

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Sunday morning breakfast in Esposito's mother's house in Brooklyn. With his advisors in tow, Koch was quickly told that Esposito would endorse him for mayor. The boss's only condition was: "I want to know you will return all my phone calls," and Koch assured Esposito that he would have all the direct access he desired.[62] Koch asked that Esposito's support remain a secret, and that he should tell reporters that he was neutral on the candidates, while his machine would aggressively roll out the vote.[63] The runoff election brought Koch a victory over Cuomo of 432,000 votes to 355,000, or 55 percent to 45 percent. Significantly, Koch's Brooklyn victorious vote tally was 131,000, to 113,000 for Cuomo. In the perpetual politics of New York City, the election was not over, only the runoff for the primary had ended. In the general election Koch's margin over Cuomo, who was still a candidate but without the Democratic Party's nomination, slipped. Koch garnered 50 percent of the votes compared with 42 percent for Cuomo. Two other candidates, Andrew Goodman and Barry Farber, split the remainder.

The Democratic congressman had become Mayor Koch. His ebullience and energy seemed like a stark contrast to his colorless though good-natured predecessor Beame. In the judgment of Newfield and Barrett: "Koch impressed almost everyone with the quality of the most visible commissioners he appointed during his first term as mayor," such as Robert Wagner, Jr., as planning commissioner.[64] The mayor's energy lifted the city's spirit. Koch seemed to be ubiquitous,

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appearing at schools, hospitals, parades, funerals, government offices, building openings, and sports events; he popped up everywhere: in restaurants, on television, in the parks. Koch was a singular booster in raising the city's already substantial visibility. The mayor emphasized a certain confident, dauntless New York tone that created many enthusiastic fans during the early mayoral years at home, if not elsewhere. Koch seemingly could enter a crowded assembly at will and ask: "How'm I doing?" and be sure to hear a roar of approval.[65]

Like no other mayor since Fiorello La Guardia, to whom he was frequently compared as his term in office lengthened, Koch was a master of the media. His pithy views won daily media attention with sound bites that generally seemed unequivocal and commonsensical, and which the electorate could understand and appreciate.[66] The mayor's national celebrity and visibility were unequalled among elected urban officials: he appeared on the cover of Time and made cameo appearances on national television programs like "The Tonight Show" and "Saturday Night Live," while taking to the local airwaves with finesse and frequency.[67] Higher political office seemed distinctly possible such as senator, governor, or, who knows?, President Koch.

Koch kept his pledge to Esposito, a promise that would have dire repercussions years later with the certainty of a Greek tragedy unfolding. An example came early in his first term.

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Upon taking office in 1977, the mayor established ten distinguished citizens' "search committees" to recruit and recommend commissioners and others for his administration. For the top transportation job, Koch's committee narrowed the search to two finalists: a city planner and professor, Sig Grava, and assistant commissioner for public transportation in New Jersey, Peter Stangl. While the mayor was presumed to be deciding between the two recommendations, the search committee was stunned to learn from the media that neither of the two finalists had been picked, but rather that a disappointing Transportation Department holdover from the Beame administration, Anthony Ameruso, had been named commissioner by Koch.

A New York Post editorial called the appointment "inexplicable and indefensible. As the present Highways Commissioner, Ameruso displayed little initiative and less imagination....Conceivably, Ameruso's ties to Brooklyn Democratic leader Meade Esposito counted more than the opinions of Koch's respected panel."[68] In the words of Newfield and Barrett, with the appointment of Ameruso, Koch "didn't deliver just a job to the (Esposito-controlled) clubhouse, he delivered an empire." Almost nine years later Ameruso would be indicted for secretly investing in a parking lot with a mob-tied investor and three associates of Meade Esposito. In the process Ameruso reportedly failed to report these financial dealings, which was required of commissioners and others through the city's ethical disclosure forms.

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Meanwhile, Koch was re-elected in 1981 and 1985 by substantial majorities. In the 1985 primary he won 64 percent of the vote, and, in the general election two months later, he achieved a record-breaking 76 percent of the vote.[69]

But by Koch's third term the evidence of municipal corruption began to surface, not just in the transportation department but in other less visible sectors. By the middle of that term, municipal government corruption had become a seemingly daily scandal, highlighted by a Parking Violation Bureau disgrace in which Datacom, a new, unfunded, untested company employing one person, received a $22 million contract over established vendors to develop a hand-held computer to automatically generate overdue parking summonses. At the same time, another new venture, Citisource, sought and won a highly lucrative contract to collect delinquent parking tickets. Both of these firms had connections to Meade Esposito. When these and other violations of city ethics policies were revealed, some officials simply resigned. By early 1986, nineteen high ranking officials were gone, others faced legal proceedings. By June 1987, the pressures on the mayor had grown, and Koch pleaded for understanding in an informal interview, offering defensively that "only five people have been indicted so far."[70] Koch doubtlessly hoped that his reputation as "the mayor who didn't want to know" would fade by the time the 1989 election arrived. But a poll conducted by New York Newsday early in 1988 revealed that 69 percent of New Yorkers thought that corruption was "worse now" than when

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Koch assumed his office; 46 percent blamed Koch "a lot" for the corruption.[71]

Throughout his term, the mayor placed major emphasis on crime and justice, issues he initially identified as significant during his first unsuccessful run for office in 1973. The mayor turned from liberal orthodoxy to a tough stand against crime which was reflected by an analysis of personnel changes between the fiscal year 1978 and 1989. (Table 8.3) While total city employees increased 18.1 percent during this time, policing and firefighting did not share the same degree of the increase: 11.2 percent and 11.8 percent respectively.

The mayor had talked tough about crime and earned his reputation as a law-and-order exponent by more than doubling correctional employment, which rose from 4,875 in 1978, to 6,469 in 1983, and then to 11,767 in 1989, marking a 189 percent change from 1978 to 1989. More than one-in-five of the new city government jobs were created in the corrections department. Koch vigorously expanded jail capacity to house the prisoners heading for cells and negotiated with out-of-state facilities to handle the undercapacity. Koch had promised to come down hard on crime and he kept that promise in his own way by expanding the punitive network. The public largely seemed to accept the incarcerative option supportively and uncritically.

Meanwhile, John Hull Mollenkopf concluded: "When all was said and done, social services suffered a loss relative to

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Table 8.3

The Koch Years:

Personnel by Department (Selected Fiscal Years)

Department	1978	1983	1989	Percent Change 1978-1989	Percent of Total Personnel Increase
Police	30,040	29,030	33,414	11.2%	9.2%
Uniformed	24,830	23,291	26,803		
Civilian	5,210	5,739	7,111		
Correction	4,075	6,469	11,767	188.8	21.1
Uniformed	3,297	5,546	9,851		
Civilian	778	1,013	1,916		
Fire	11,919	13,214	13,321	11.8	3.8
Social Services	23,012	21,844	29,227	27.0	17.1
All Other	132,139	124,039	150,654	14.0	
Total	201,885	194,623	238,383	18.1%	

Source: Adapted from Mollenkopf, Table 6.5, p. 153. Comprehensive Annual Financial Report of the Comptroller, FY 1983 and 1989, Part III, "Selective Service Delivery Statistics."

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other functions, while developmental activities gained during the Koch administration....The need for these services certainly did not decrease, since poverty and the rent burden on poor families rose substantially over this period."[72] By the end of Ed Koch's third and final term as mayor, the steady increase in crime, particularly the rise from 1985 on, matched the relentless burgeoning of incarcerative facilities. Something about the criminal justice policy in the city didn't make sense.

Reflecting on trends of crime before and during his tenure as mayor, Koch wrote:

> These days, we all take for granted that New York is not the safest place in the world and we make the necessary adjustments to our routines and life-styles, but back then (1973) was when things began to get worse....Our neighborhoods were beginning to deteriorate. Companies were abandoning the city; jobs were being lost. And, most troubling, middle-class families were fleeing the city because they feared the public schools were educationally inadequate and physically unsafe for their children."[73]

In retrospect, it was the same mayor who presided during a time when a "bad" crime rate deteriorated despite a proliferation of cells and social services.

By January 1989, Koch's public approval rating had dropped to a personal all-time low of 17 percent. He ran, nonetheless, and lost the Democratic primary in his bid for a fourth term as mayor. Campaigning against Koch and using the ethnically hopeful phraseology of "rainbow coalition" and "gorgeous mosaic," Manhattan Borough president David Dinkins assumed office and quickly terminated many of his

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predecessor's political hold-overs. Koch later wrote of his successor: "He was so concerned with cleaning house and bringing in his gorgeous mosaic of blacks and Hispanics and others that I think he sacrificed competence for color, on several occasions."[74]

However, Koch's autobiography mentioned with specific disapproval only one official, the head of the city's Health and Hospitals Corporation who "wasn't qualified to do the job" and "left the fifteen city hospitals under his jurisdiction in disarray when he resigned in October 1991." The former mayor adds: "Clearly, (Dr. Emilio) Carillo was hired because he was Hispanic; not because he was the best candidate."[75] Not mentioned by the former mayor was another Dinkins appointee, Lee P. Brown, who became police commissioner in 1990, leaving Houston where he had been chief of police for over eight years. This commissioner, who possessed a doctorate in criminology from the University of California at Berkeley, won the confidence of a substantial portion of the business community as well as of ordinary citizens. Brown sought to reorganize policing in the city. A task force was impanelled to evaluate the status quo in a city where violent crime had resumed the upswing. Brown proposed expanding the application of community policing which had begun as a policy strategy a decade earlier. This was an old-fashioned, but then considered as a fresh and appealing redeployment of patrol officers to bring more police officers out from behind their precinct house desks and patrol cars and into the neighborhood

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streets, stores, and parks than was previously the case. This protocol encouraged beat (or patrol) officers to interact with residents and business operators extensively and to use their skills in mitigating some of the fear- and crime-provoking conditions within the precinct.[76] Could this fundamental administrative realignment aid in better control of crime-plagued areas?

The Community-Oriented Policing Initiative

Brown and others had noted that New York policing had become preponderantly response-oriented; that is, police were so engaged in the process of traditional vehicular patrol or in responding to crime calls that the informal connection between local police and the community no longer existed as it once did. Community-oriented policing advocates were convinced that a police department that would connect better with the community by seeking to aid citizens in matters that did not involve a crime would bring results with greater trust and cooperation. Conceptually, the policing strategy engendered closer community attachments. Citizens were expected to feel more comfortable with police, and perceive that law enforcement was seeking to serve the public in more ways than reacting to crime. Tellingly, such a more informal and frequent liaison was likely to produce more assistance to the police by providing them with details on criminogenic circumstances within the neighborhood of which residents were likely to have more direct knowledge than the police.[77] The

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New York City public tended to feel short-changed by police for their services. Police officers often took on a hard edge in dealing with the public at large when asked for such requests as routine accident calls, building lockouts, calls to remove abandoned vehicles, complaints of graffiti vandalism, and assistance for older people. In reality, a considerable segment of the public was more concerned about order maintenance--for example, public disturbances, abandoned cars, and noise--than about violent crime. Community policing would allocate more effort to these non-criminal patrol activities.[78]

The concept of community policing designed to focus on urban disorder and community issues, could be at the expense of the crime control mission which was at the heart of urban police, some critics believed. Similarly, if police interacted with community groups on a frequent and intimate basis, the independence of police could be co-opted by the community. These and other criticisms aside, the community policing initiative was seen as a grass-roots approach at reducing disorder and the fear of crime in neighborhoods by adopting to nontraditional tactics and strategies that might reduce area crime problems as a desirable but not certain byproduct of the program.

Sworn police officer totals increased during the Koch years. Dinkins and his commissioner sought funds for more sworn officers to bring the total to a goal of 30,000. The

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total number of civilian and sworn employees increased reaching over 36,000 including civilian employees in 1990. (Table 8.4) But with the total departmental personnel increases, crime also went up, quite opposite the conventional expectation.[79]

From its peak levels of 1980, reported serious crime in New York City declined, and by 1985 the incidents in most categories had reduced steadily. This pattern was reflected nationally as well. A decline in the total number of teenagers in the 15-19 ages category began from the late 1970s and was foreseen from the perspective of the 1970s that crime would decrease by 20 percent by 1990. The demographic pattern augured well for the late 1980s through the mid-1990s since youth in this age span are arrested by the greatest percentage, followed closely by those ages 20-24. By the period 1983-86, the decline in the arrest pattern for serious crime could have been explained partially by the changing population in differential cohort age groups.[80]

The lower crime rate in mid-decade seemed auspicious. Still, the decline in serious crime did not seem to mollify a disturbed public. Roger Starr, a newspaper editorial writer at the time, spoke of the fear within the city and commented: "Many Americans, it seems, feel that governments are not doing the right things about random urban crime, even though that crime threatens the very existence of their cities."[81]

The pattern of fear certainly was not limited to the city

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Table 8.4

Police Employment in New York City, 1980-90

Year	Sworn Officers	Civilian Employees	Total
1980	22,590	4,349	26,939
1981	22,467	5,364	27,831
1982	22,855	5,876	28,731
1983	23,389	5,950	29,289
1984	25,044	7,970	33,014
1985	26,073	6,255	32,328
1986	27,425	6,428	33,853
1987	27,523	7,241	34,764
1988	26,723	9,304	36,027
1989	25,858	9,747	36,605
1990	26,844	9,563	36,407

Source: Uniform Crime Reports, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Washington, DC: USGPO 1981-91. Employment total is as of October 31, for each year.

See also: "New York City's Payroll: How Did It Get So Big?" New York Times, August 12, 1991, p. B6.

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on the Hudson. Most, if not, all older urban centers appeared, in varying degrees, to be experiencing a loss of confidence in cities as safe habitats, but most residents throughout this time continued to regard their neighborhood as safe.

From 1965 to 1990, the Gallup Poll asked on nine occasions an identical question relating to crime fears. The question was: "Is there any area right around here, that is, within a mile, where you would be afraid to walk alone at night?"[82] Over a quarter of a century, the question was identical, although data on respondents' race, sex, and community size were not asked in each survey phase. At no time over the survey period did more than half of the respondents reply that the fear of crime was greater over the past year. The peak year of fear was 1982, when 48 percent said that they had more fear in the past year relative to the question posed; the lowest year for expressing fear of neighborhood crime was in 1967, when 31 percent said they had more fear within the past year, 67 percent said fear was less, and 2 percent had no opinion. Thus, despite record national level of crime about the period 1980, for the five survey question collections 1970 through 1990, at no time did the majority of respondents claim that they had increased fear over the previous year within their neighborhood.

But when the same opinion polls are examined by sex, race, and size of community, a more alarmist pattern emerges. Females were two-to-three times more likely to express

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increased fears of their own neighborhood over the opinion sample periods. In 1979, 25 percent of males said they had greater fears within their neighborhood over the previous year, while 74 percent said they had less, and 1 percent had no opinion. By contrast, 57 percent of women expressed greater fear over the previous year of their neighborhood, 42 percent had less fear, and 1 percent no opinion. A decade later the percentages were about the same: male 25 percent and 75 percent expressing more fear compared with less, and females 59 percent and 41 percent expressing more and less fear respectively.

Concerning race, non-white respondents were invariably likely to express greater fear within their neighborhood than white respondents did. In 1979, 57 percent of non-whites expressed the feeling that they were more afraid in the past year and 43 percent were less; by contrast, only 40 percent of whites thought they had more fear at night while 59 percent said they had less with one percent holding no opinion. In 1989, responses had not changed by much: 55 percent of non-whites expressed more fear in the past year and 45 percent less, while 41 percent of whites expressed more fear with 59 percent less.

Ranked by size of community, the largest respondent section, cities with a population greater than one million, indicated a pattern of increasing neighborhood fear. In 1967 within largest cities, only 38 percent of the respondents thought that they had more fear over the past year, but the

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percentage responding affirmatively to greater fear increased erratically over the subsequent polling periods: 53 percent in 1972; 55 percent in 1975; 50 percent in 1977; 56 percent in 1979; 57 percent in 1982; and 56 percent in 1983, the last year in which data were provided by community size.

In 1980, an Ohio-based industrial conglomerate began sponsoring a series of surveys and reports that would be completed six volumes later in 1988.[83] The survey's initial report began:

> Crime is on the increase in the United States--but as distressing as the rapid rise is, this study discovers that the incidence of crime is far outstripped by the fear of crime...The study reveals that four out of ten Americans are highly fearful they will become victims of violent crimes, such as murder, rape, robbery, or assault.[84]

A sample of 1,047 respondents was weighted for geographic distribution, age, sex, and income and was interviewed by phone. The first phase of the research concluded that both "concrete" and "formless" fear affected the degree of fright. Concrete fear was caused by high rates of victimization and tended to be expressed by those living in large cities. Those expressing high concrete fears tended to be young, black, and female. Another concrete fear producer was information exposure to television and newspaper reports on crime and the personal knowledge of a crime victim.[85] Formless fear was generated two social conditions. First, was social disadvantage marked by low income, low occupational status, and low education. The second was social isolation associated with single marital status, unemployment, and older age in

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addition to having experienced high rates of victimization.

The research report contrasted the frequency of worrying about being a victim of a crime compared with the actual national incidence. Using data from the 1978 FBI Uniform Crime Reports, the comparison found, for example, that 0.009 percent of the population would have an incidence of murder while 17 percent frequently or sometimes expressed such a fear.[86] The most frequent serious crime, assault, had an incidence of 0.26 percent of the population while 24 percent frequently or sometimes expressed fear of such victimization. Even with the underreporting of crime, as noted above, the disparity between fear and the actual reported likelihood of victimization was enormous.

Among the many manifestations of fear of crime was a growth in the security industry. Nationally, employment of private security personnel experienced a robust growth in the 1980s. The security industry could trace its origins to the previous century, but had begun to expand with particular alacrity beginning at least from two decades earlier.[87] The industry employed approximately one million persons in 1980 and increased by half a decade later.[88] Meanwhile, law enforcement employment remained constant at about 650,000, growing during the decade at the rate of population growth. Thus, total protective service employment at all levels exceeded public law enforcement by 60 percent in 1980. By 1990 over twice as many private security practitioners were employed than those employed by governments at local, county,

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state, and federal levels combined. While specific information on the growth of security employment in New York City is unavailable, the New York City chapter of the largest professional and trade association, the American Society for Industrial Security, grew steadily during these years and numbered almost one thousand members by 1990, making the New York chapter by far the largest in the professional organization.[89]

The Puzzle of a Resurgence in Crime by 1990

As data in Table 8.1 indicate and as noted here earlier, serious reported crime in the city slid from its peaks of the years around 1980 to a trough by mid-decade. With national demographic projections of younger population expected to decline further from 1985 to 1990, the prospects for an increasingly less crime-significant period by the end of the decade was anticipated by some crime analysts for both New York City and the nation as a whole. Major crime had dropped in New York City for four years, but by 1985 a sharp rise had been noted. A newspaper report observed: "Law enforcement officials and criminologists who had predicted continuing increases say they are puzzled by the trend and are unsure how to cope with it."[90] The article noted how the city's Community Patrol Officer Program, which sought to place police officers back on neighborhood foot patrol, begun in 1984, was expanding but so far was only serving thirty-one of the city's seventy-five precincts. Officials noted further that "several

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thousand repeat offenders" were now jailed or imprisoned and that the number of people between 15 and 24 years of age has been on "steady decrease in the past five years." Martin E. Wolfgang, professor of law and criminology at the University of Pennsylvania, noted: "The latest increase is a little unexpected to those of us who had been forecasting up to the year 2000...We had expected the decline to continue until the end of the 1980s."[91]

However, a year later criminologists revised their projections for the years ahead. Wolfgang remarked in late 1987, on the then "sheer number of children entering their teenage years" which should begin turning crime numbers upward.[92] For 1986 and 1987, serious crimes in New York City began to rise again with murders up 5.7 percent and aggravated assaults climbing 12.1 percent according to Police Department reports.[93] By 1990, major recorded violent and property crime in New York City continued their upward trajectory. New York City reported a record 2,262 homicides, though with this stunning record, the city dropped nonetheless, from ninth to tenth in crime among the largest twenty-five cities on a population adjusted basis.[94]

Following the economic crash of October 1987, the major industry of the city, FIRE (for Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate) suffered major decline shrinking the pool for highly compensated service industry professionals. A Fortune article of 1990 expressed with resignation the feelings of many New Yorkers: "The bitter forbearance with which New Yorkers view

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their hometown is beginning to wear thin again."[95] Primary among the stated concerns were social and economic problems like "crime, illiteracy, and homelessness."

The next year a newspaper poll of 824 adult residents of the five boroughs in New York City and 1,726 adult residents of fourteen counties immediately surrounding the city in New York State, New Jersey, and Connecticut, indicated a decline of New York City resident confidence in their community compared with those outside of the city of their municipalities.[96] Concerning police protection, only 35 percent of city residents evaluated this service as excellent or good, compared with 73 percent outside of the city concerning their community police services.

In response to the question: "How much confidence do you have that you can walk in your neighborhood at night without been bothered," only 22 percent of New York City residents answered that they had "a lot of confidence" while 51 percent of residents within the region but outside of New York City responded positively to the question. The attraction that made the outer region dependent upon the city was weakening and the presumed superiority of basic city services, that had been a raison d'être for annexation in the nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries, were less likely to win encomiums from those not residing in the city. A suburbanite who had earlier been a Manhattan resident in the early 1980s commented: "I've seen a lot of changes in the city in the past ten years."[97] She added: "I see more crime, more homelessness.

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When I lived in the city, then I liked it. But I wouldn't want to move back there now." By the conclusion of 1990, economic troubles had cast a pall on the city long extolled in song and story. A newspaper article summarized: "Today, the most talked-about 'directions' in this teeming metropolis of 7.3 million people are more likely to be sociological and financial than geographical. What's up includes immigration, and in recent months, unemployment...Also up: Taxes. Crime. Homelessness. AIDS cases. Drug-related problems."[98]

Two years later a moment occurred when comparison of the city from July 1980, when the Democratic National Convention nominated Jimmy Carter for its candidate with July, 1992 when the same organization chose William J. Clinton as their nominee seemed pertinent. While the population had edged up to 7.3 million from 7.1 in 1980, unemployment, people on welfare, annual calls to 911, parking tickets issued, new tuberculosis cases diagnosed, and school enrollment had all increased.[99] Criminal justice data reflected a rise in uniformed police officers, a tripling of the average jail population, and an increase in homicides. Salutary developments included cleaner streets than in 1980 and about one-third fewer fires, but a reporter concluded that city life had changed "in fundamental ways" since 1980. Why such changes occurred--particularly with regard to violent crime--will be further discussed in the concluding chapter.

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Endnotes

1. An ebullient greeting meaning "hey" which came into use by some youth by 1990. An editorial page letter writer complained that the term originated in South Philadelphia from the Neapolitan dialect guaglione, emphasizing the middle syllable "yo" and meaning young man, see: Ernest Paolino, "Sorry, New York, 'Yo' Was Born in Philadelphia," New York Times, August 19, 1993, p. A22. Also: Michael T. Kaufman, "Greeting a New Yorker? Keep It Short and Sweet," New York Times, August 4, 1993, p. B3.

2. The transition from a capitalist state to an age of knowledge society is argued by Peter F. Drucker, Post-Capitalist Society, New York: Harper/Business/Harper/Collins, 1993.

3. The pace of change is emphasized by Paul Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-First Century, New York: Random House, 1993.

4. The corrupting forces of extreme materialism is raised by John Lukacs, The End of the Twentieth Century and the End of the Modern Age, London & New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1993. Communism's defeat is interpreted by Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, New York: Free Press, 1992. Resurgence in super nationalism and its consequence for liberal democracy is postulated by Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Pandemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

5. Quoted in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1992, e.g., p. 115.

6. Robert L. Bartley, The Seven Fat Years: And How to Do it Again, New York: Free Press, 1992.

7. For discussion on the Reagan years, see William H. Chafe, The Unfinished Journey: America Since World War II, 2nd ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, chap. 15; and Michael Barone, Our Country: The Shaping of America from Roosevelt to Reagan, New York: Free Press, 1990, part five.

8. Landon Y. Jones, Great Expectations: American and the Baby Boom Generation, New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegan, 1980, chap. 11.

9. Ibid., p. 142.

10. Ibid., p. 145.

11. Ibid., p. 147

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12. Katherine S. Newman, Declining Fortunes: The Withering of the American Dream, New York: Basic Books, 1993.

13. For example: Peter C. Hoffer and N.E.H. Hull, Murdering Mothers: Infanticide in England and New England 1558-1803, Linden Studies in Anglo-American Legal History, New York: New York University Press, 1981, and Steven Ruggles, "The Transformation of American Family Structure," American Historical Review, 99 (February 1994): 103-128 (Hereafter cited as Transformation).

14. Bruce A. Chadwick and Tim B. Heaton, eds., Statistical Handbook on the American Family, Phoenix: Oryx Press, 1992, p. 83.

15. Ibid. "Major reasons for divorce include basic personality differences, drug or alcohol problems, infidelity, loss of affection, and emotional problems....For people who decide to divorce, major factors important in their decision include their unhappiness, the desire to get out of a bad situation, alternatives for financial support, and becoming involved with someone else," p. 84.

16. Ibid., p. 102. However, divorced women whose family income is under $20,000 per year do better economically following divorce.

17. Similarly, children born out of wedlock have increased in America and other nations with one in four births of all white babies and 60% to 65% of all black babies born to a single mother. Births born outside of marriage increased five-fold between 1960 and 1988, see "Family Values: The Bargain Breaks," Economist, December 26, 1992, pp. 37-40.

The census identified a 60% increase in births out of wedlock from 1982 to 1992. The percentage of never-married women age 14 to 44 who have children increased for all races but by differing amounts: the white percentage increased from 6.7% to 23.7%; the Hispanic group increased 22.6% to 33.0%, and the black percentage grew 48.8% to 55.5%. Education was a significant discriminant in the likelihood of never-married women having children with almost a three-times greater likelihood that a high school graduate or more than a four-times likelihood that a woman who did not finish high school would have children compared with those having one year or more of college. See: Jason DeParle, "Big Rise in Births Outside Wedlock," New York Times, July 14, 1993, pp. A1, A14. See also: Stephanie Gutmann, "Debate Raging Over Govt. Role in Babies' Welfare," New York Post, April 20, 1994, p. 26.

18. The Transformation, p. 127.

19. The extent of the literature on economic crime committed by persons in positions of responsibility and trust is enormous and growing. One book by an attorney is

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representative of the times: Roger J. Magnuson. The White-Collar Crime Explosion, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1992. See also: Michael Binstein and Charles Bowden, Trust Me: Charles Keating and the Missing Billions, New York: Random House, 1993 and David Weisburf et al., Crimes of the Middle Classes: White-Collar Offenders in the Federal Courts, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1991.

20. The best sweeping view of progressive public efforts concerning the poor is found in Paul Boyer, Urban Masses and Moral Order in America: 1820-1920, New York: Oxford University Press, 1978. The term "dangerous class" was a nineteenth-century term referring to "a group of people responsible for but also suffering most from crime and disorder." See also: Eric H. Monkkonen: America Becomes Urban: The Development of U.S. Cities & Towns 1780-1980, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990, p. 227.

21. Joe William Trotter, Jr. "Blacks in the Urban North: The 'Underclass Question' in Historical Perspective," in The "Underclass" Debate: View from History, ed. Michael B. Katz, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, p. 56.

22. James A. Inciardi, Criminal Justice, 2nd. ed., Orlando: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1987, p. 23.

23. "Income Dynamics," Wall Street Journal, (16 June 1992), p. A12.

24. Paul R. Krugman, "The Right, the Rich, and the Facts: Deconstructing the Income Distribution Debate," American Prospect (Fall 1992): 19-31.

25. Ibid., p. 22.

26. Ibid., p. 25.

27. Michael Harrington, The New American Poverty, New York: Penguin Books, 1985, p. 181.

28. High levels: (1) high poverty rate above 27.5%; (2) high percent of female-headed families above 39.6 percent; (3) high percent of high school dropouts above 23.3%; (4) high percent of males unattached to the labor force above 46.5%, and (5) high percent of females receiving public assistance above 17.0%. See: "Kids Count Data Book: State Profiles of Child Well-Being," Greenwich, CT: Annie E. Casey Foundation, 1994, p. 16. While the limitations of relating this statewide data to New York City have been noted in the text, for comparative purposes, the population of New York City in 1990 comprised 40.7 percent of the state total of 17,990,455.

29. Ibid., p. 154.

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30. Ibid., p. 96.

31. Richard Levine, "Middle-Class Flight Feared by New York City Experts," New York Times, April 1, 1991, p. A1, B4.

32. Ibid., p. B4. The article emphasized the deteriorating economic trend of migrating populations within the city: "The migration rate is a function of two forces, people moving in and people moving out. Economic data from 1980's census...illustrate the impact the process can have on the city. From 1975 to 1980, about one million New Yorkers moved away and about 645,000 moved in, leaving a gap of 355,000. About 377,000 of those moving out had household incomes of $25,000 or more, but only 172,000 in that income group moved in. So out-migration was substantially higher among the affluent."

33. "The Newest New Yorkers: An Analysis of Immigration into New York City During the 1980s," New York: Department of City Planning, 1992.

34. Ibid., p. 28.

35. Ibid., p. 110.

36. Ibid., p. 116. See also: John Hull Mollenkopf, New York City in the 1980s: A Social, Economic, and Political Atlas, New York:
Simon & Schuster, 1993, and Sam Roberts, "New York Exports Its Talent As a Migration Tide Turns," New York Times, March 6, 1994,
pp. 1, 36.

37. Frederick Rose, "The Outlook: Latest Immigrants Face Tough Job Problems," Wall Street Journal, November 28, 1994, p. A1. Employers were required to ascertain the legal residency of all employees hired after November 6, 1986, by completing an immigration form (I-9) with civil and criminal penalties possible to employers who knowingly hired illegal aliens, see: Richard W. Stevens, "Hiring Aliens: The New Risks," New York Times, January 12, 1987, p. D1, D11.

38. Sam Walker, "New York's Welcome Mat Stays Out for Immigrants," Christian Science Monitor, July 1, 1994, p. 2.

39. "They Shall Not Pass," Economist, July 9, 1994, pp. 23-24, describes "Operation Hold the Line" to deter undocumented immigrants in Texas where the government claimed that 550,000 illegal aliens contributed only about $290 million a year to the state economy "but cost about $456 million in prison, health, education, and other services." With the blockade of illegal Mexican immigrants in El Paso in 1994, robbery, car theft, murder, and burglary also decreased over 20% from the

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previous year while arrests of deportable aliens dropped by almost three-quarters. In Florida, Gov. Lawton Chiles released a 28-page report, The Unfair Burden, Immigration's Impact on Florida, which claimed a 1993 cost of jailing immigrants in Florida prisons of $44 million--$28.7 million for documented immigrants and $15.3 million for undocumented immigrants--and $28.5 million for court costs and $6.6 million in law enforcement expenses. See: Mark Silva, "Chiles Plans Lawsuit against U.S. Government," Miami Herald, March 13, 1994, pp. 1A, 20A.

40. Sam Roberts, "New York's Puerto Ricans Split in Economic Success," New York Times, December 28, 1993, p. B3.

41. Karen De Witt, "Black Journeys: Many Travelers Along Many Roads," New York Times, February 27, 1994, sec. 4, p. 3. And Nicholas Lemann, The Promised Land: The Great Black Migration and How It Changed America, New York: A.A. Knopf, 1991. Blacks migrated north in great numbers during the years 1916-19 and again 1924-25 when job opportunities in the north were plentiful and when immigration was restricted. Further black migration to the cities began following the conclusion of World War I.

42. Sam Roberts, Who We Are: A Portrait of America, New York: Times Books, 1993, p. 190.

43. "Substance Abuse and Women on Welfare," New York: Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia University, June, 1994.

44. Ibid., pp. 2-3.

45. Ibid., p. 7.

46. Reasons why some people fail to report crime to police include: offense was not serious 34%; nothing could be done 27%; reported to someone else 11%, and police wouldn't do anything 10%. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Reporting Crimes to the Police, Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, 1985, pp. 8-9.

47. In 1970 New York City Police Commissioner Patrick Murphy revised the procedures whereby crimes were reported by police so that variability based on the precinct commander's agenda would be lessened. For example, under Murphy's reorganization, all complainants at a precinct stationhouse would receive a complaint number corresponding to the incident. This served as the basis of assuring that incidents would appear in police statistical compilations. Nonetheless, due to the variability of interpretation of an incident, discretion still remained with police on how to categorize an incident.

48. Report to the Nation on Crime and Justice, 2nd. edition, Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, 1988, p. 11.

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49. Uniform Crime Reports for 1990, Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, 1991, p. 327 (Hereafter cited as UCR 1991). For a concise history on the UCR, crime definitions, and police classifying and scoring procedures, see: Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook, Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1984.

50. UCR 1991.

51. US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics. Report to the Nation on Crime and Justice, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1988, p. 42. The report indicates that 48.0% of all property crime arrests occur to individuals under 21 years; 28.5% of all violent crime arrests to individuals under 21 years. For murder and non-negligent manslaughter, the figure is 24.9% and robbery 40.3% under 21 years.

52. "Changing Demographics Bring Lower Percentage Of Crime-Prone Age thru 2000, Other Changes," Security Letter, 18 (15 March 1988): 1. The 15-24 age category declined 10.5 percent between 1985 and 1990; the percentage this age comprised of the entire population dropped from 16.6 percent in 1985 to 14.2 percent in 1990. Further decline in their percentage will occur by 1995, with a slight increase by the year 2000.

53. Murder and nonnegligent homicide (manslaughter) has limitations as a type of crime to compare from 1890 to 1990. However, because of crime reporting changes for other categories, homicides represent the most consistently comparable crime type to follow as argued throughout this work. For example, in 1960, the entire city reported 2,842 robberies; because of definitional changes that were more significant than crime increase, the number grew in 1970 to 74,102. Still, murder and nonnegligent homicide may have been grossly underreported in the early decades of this study due to abuse and systemic neglect of children by parents and guardians which tended to go unreported by police. Similarly, cases of spouse abuse were recorded by police with reliability only in the recent decades of this study and, therefore, would not appear as felonious or other types of assault.

54. "One View of Rehabilitation," New York Times, December 1, 1982, p. B3.

55. Jack Katz, Seductions of Crime: Moral and Sensual Attractions in Doing Evil, New York: Basic Books, 1988.

56. Richard Harris, Justice: The Crisis of Law, Order, and Freedom in America, New York: F. Dutton & Co., 1969, p. 27.

57. Leon Radzinowicz and Joan King, Growth of Crime: The International Experience, New York: Basic Books, 1977, p. 12.

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58. Roger Starr, The Rise and Fall of New York City, New York: Basic Books, 1985, p. 113.

59. Elliott Currie, Confronting Crime: An American Challenge, New York: Pantheon Books, 1985, p. 4.

60. Most of the biographical information on Ed Koch is from Jack Newfield and Wayne Barrett, City for Sale: Ed Koch and the Betrayal of New York, New York: Harper & Row, 1988, quotation p. 133 (Hereafter cited as City for Sale). Additional biographical information comes from Arthur Brown, Dan Collins, and Michael Goodwin, I, Koch: A Decidedly Unauthorized Biography of the Mayor of New York City, Edward I. Koch, New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1985 (Hereafter cited as I, Koch). Koch's several books only contain fleeting biographical details.

61. City for Sale, p. 134.

62. Koch accepts this fact, see Edward I. Koch, Politics, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985 (Hereafter cited by title). In a caption to a picture of Meade Esposito, between pp. 64-65, the author writes: "He helped me win in 1977 by not endorsing me but having his organization work on my behalf. He's been a support and friend ever since." Esposito is quoted in I, Koch saying: "After he was elected, he called us to City Hall....He catered to us, in patronage, whatever," p. 177.

63. City for Sale, caption between pp. 276-277.

64. Ibid., p. 151.

65. This was also the title of an unauthorized book of the mayor's aphorisms, published in New York by Lion Books, 1981.

66. A casual retrospect of Koch's speeches, press conferences, and books suggests the highly polemical nature with which he communicated his ideas. Koch's books are larded with celebrity references mixed with political revisionism. Issues like policing, public health, and general government are shallow, devoid of any detailed discussion or analysis.

67. "America's Mayors--Politics of Survival," Time, June 15, 1981.

68. City for Sale, p. 145.

69. Politics, p. 65.

70. City for Sale, p. 433.

71. Ibid., pp. 441-442.

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72. John Hull Mollenkopf, A Phoenix in the Ashes: The Rise and Fall of the Koch Coalition in New York City Politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992, p. 132.

73. Edward I. Koch, Citizen Koch: An Autobiography. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, p. 123.

74. Ibid., p. 145.

75. Ibid.

76. Ralph Blumenthal, "Seeing Challenges Instead of Problems: Lee P. Brown, Relentlessly Optimistic Crusader for Community Policing," New York Times, May 17, 1992, p. 35. Another hoped-for feature from community policing was that closer relationships between police and public would make information on diverse topics, including corruption, more accessible to police. See: Seth Faison, "Police-Community Ties: Can Closer Links Deter Corruption?" New York Times, April 24, 1994, sec. 4, p. 4.

77. In 1987, police chiefs of six cities with populations over one million met under the aegis of the Police Foundation and agreed to cooperate in providing selective comparative information, something that had never been done before. The results of this collaboration were included in: Antony Pate and Edwin E. Hamilton, The Bix Six: Policing America's Largest Cities, Washington, DC: Police Foundation, 1991. The report focused upon the magnitude of cities as locations for serious crime:

> Although the Big Six hold 7.5 percent of the nation's population, they account for 12.8 percent of sworn police officers in the country. Furthermore, eleven percent of the property crimes recorded in the nation occur in these cities, and the Big Six account for almost 24 percent of the nation's reported violent crimes (p. 3).

The report did not indicate how an average patrol officer's time was allocated in New York City during the 1980s. It did reveal that in 1986, New York City received a total of 7.2 million police calls for service, or about one per citizen which was in line with four other municipalities in the city. The exception was Philadelphia which encouraged residents to call police and received over twice as many (pp. 110-11).

Exactly how New York City patrol officer time was allocated was not subject to published research during the 1980s; however, a much-cited study of patrol time allocation in Wilmington, Delaware, indicated that over one-quarter (26.4 percent) of police time was spent on crime-related activities including crime in progress, investigate crime not in

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progress, alarm response, officer in trouble, assist other police or backup requested, and service warrants or subpoenas. A larger percentage (29.4) was devoted to free patrol. Other components included: administration involving report writing, training, and meal breaks with 12.4 percent allocation; traffic procedures, 11.3 percent; order maintenance including noise or animal complaints, 8.7 percent; and miscellaneous time usage. See: Jack R. Greene and Carl B. Klockars, "What Police Do," in Thinking about Police, 2nd ed., ed. Carl B. Klockars and Stephen D. Mastrofski, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1971, p. 279. It is assumed that the time allocation to crime-related functions in New York City would be comparable. In effect, with community policing police were becoming more active in providing welfare and order rather than crime response tasks.

78. In a study of police time allocation, a Midwest city police department allocated service time percentages as follows: law enforcement 33, order maintenance 24, traffic 18, service 13, information gathering 8, and other 3 (totals less than 100 due to rounding). Richard J. Lundman, "Police Patrol Work: A Comparative Perspective," in Police Behavior: A Sociological Perspective, ed. Richard J. Lundman, New York: Oxford University Press, 1980, p. 56. For a comprehensive report on the initiative, see: Jerome E. McElroy, Colleen A. Cosgrove, and Susan Sadd, Community Policing: The CPOP in New York, Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1993. Community policing focuses more on controlling fear-provoking disorder than by concentrating on "the crime problem," see: George L. Kelling and Catherine M. Coles, "Disorder and the Court," The Public Interest 116 (Summer 1994): 57-74. The authors state: "For most citizens, the crime problem in cities is disorder."

79. Most crime historians and analysts accept the importance of police for urban order. However, the increased ratio of police in a community has not been demonstrated to result in "pay-back" through the reduction of crime levels. A sociologist writes: "As hard as it may be to believe, there is no direct relationship between the number of police officers and the rate of crime in a community," see: Richard Moran, "More Police, Less Crime, Right? Wrong," New York Times, February 27, 1995, p. A15. Also: Sam Roberts, "As Police Force Adds to Ranks, Some Promises Still Unfulfilled," New York Times, August 7, 1994, pp. 35-36.

80. Clifford Krauss, "Growing Up Wrong: No Crystal Ball Needed on Crime," New York Times, November 13, 1994, sec. 4, p. 4. The article quotes Richard H. Girgenti, the New York State Director of Criminal Justice: "Demographics have always been the best predictor of future crime," and noted that the number of males from 15 to 19 will grow in the state to 670,000 in 2007. He added: "I don't need a crystal ball."

81. Roger Starr, "Crime: How It Destroys, What Can Be Done," New York Times Magazine, January 27, 1985, p. 19.

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82. The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971, New York: Random House, 1972, p. 1935; Gallup Opinion Index, Princeton, NJ: Gallup International, September, 1967, p. 20; April, 1972, p. 13; June 27-30, 1975, p. 16; November 17-20, 1977, p. 27; November 2-5, 1979, p. 21; May, 1982, p. 21; March, 1983, p. 6; March/April 1989, p. 8, and September, 1990, p. 35.

A study of victims and nonvictims in selected cities, released in 1977, sampled individuals on the topic concerning crime and concluded: "Respondents were about twice as likely to believe that crime in the United States has increased in the past year or two then to say that crime in their own neighborhoods had increased during the same period....Regardless of age, race, sex, income, education, or experience with victimization, only a very small proportion of respondents felt that their neighborhood was more dangerous than others in the metropolitan area." See: Criminal Justice Research Center, Public Opinion About Crime: The Attitude of Victims and Nonvictims in Selected Cities, Analytic Report SD-VAD-1, Washington, DC: USGPO, 1977, pp. 31-2. Data for New York City are found on pp. 343-57.

83. The Figgie Report on Fear of Crime: America Afraid, vol. 1, sponsored by A-T-O Inc., conducted by Research & Forecasts, Inc., 1980.

84. Ibid., p. 18.

85. Ibid., p. 21.

86. Ibid., p. 29.

87. See: Milton Lipson, On Guard: The Business of Private Security, New York: Quadrangle/New York Times, 1975, and Robert D. McCrie, "The Development of the US Security Industry," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 498 (July 1988): 23-33. For the survey period from 1890 on, public law enforcement outnumbered private security personnel; however, according to researchers 1977 was the crossover point and by 1990 over twice as many private security as public personnel could be counted and by the year 2000 the differential is projected to be about three-times the number of private security people over the public sector. See: William C. Cunningham, John J. Strauchs, and Clifford W. Van Meter, "Private Security Patterns and Trends," Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, 1991, p. 3.

88. William C. Cunningham, John J. Strauchs, Clifford W. Van Meter, Private Security Trends, 1970 to 2000: The Hallcrest Report II, Stoneham, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1990, p. 229.

89. The author was a member during these years.

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90. Todd S. Purdum, "After a 4-Year Drop, Crime in City is Rising, Leaving Experts Puzzled," New York Times, May 25, 1986, pp, 1, 27. The decline of violent crime for 1981-85 was similar to a national pattern at about the same time, see: "U.S. Says Violent Crime Dropped From '80 to '84," New York Times, May 9, 1988, p. A15.

91. Purdum, ibid., p. 27.

92. "Violent Crime Drops in '86 but Decline is Slowing," New York Times, October 6, 1987, p. A24.

93. George James, "Serious Crime Rises Again in New York," New York Times, March 23, 1988, p. B1.

94. Robert D. McFadden, "New York Leads Big Cities in Robbery Rate, but Drops in Murders," New York Times, August 11, 1991, p. 27.

95. Andrew Kupfer, "New York: Down But Hardly Out," Fortune, February 26, 1990, p. 92-96.

96. William Glaberson, "Region Around New York Sees Links to the City Weakening," New York Times, December 1, 1991, pp. 1, 48.

97. Ibid., p. 48. A follow-up article indicated that about half of the regional residents were spending a day or evening in New York "less often" than five years earlier. William Glaberson, "For Many in the New York Region, The City is Ignored and Irrelevant," New York Times, January 2, 1992, pp. A1, B4.

98. Guy Halverson, "Economic Troubles Bite Big Apple," Christian Science Monitor, November 20, 1990, p. 9.

99. Martin Gottlieb, "New York City, a Decade Older, Has a Great Many New Wrinkles," New York Times, July 12, 1992, p. 22.

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CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSION: THE SAFE CITY

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(T)his is the fact that nearly all the poor, the improvident, the disgraced, the criminals, all the adventurers of both sexes, are consumed with the passion of city life.*

(I)t is no exaggeration to say that the crime that has emerged in New York City threatens the very existence of the city in its present form.†

*E.L. Godkin, North American Review 150 (1890): 706.

†Roger Starr, The Rise and Fall of New York City, New York: Basic Books, 1985, p. 116.

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This study has considered aspects of crime and disorder in a particular city over eleven census periods. Crime, it has been argued, is a type of disorder and the societal costs of violent crime, particularly murder and nonnegligent (willful) homicide, have received particular attention as an urban deforming and reforming agent. The years studied include cycles of expansion and contraction, times of confidence and doubt, and throughout this span a continuum of constant dynamic responses to the concatenations of factors sustaining urban life. Critical topics now may be examined concerning crime in New York City and the relevance such deductions may have to other cities generally. The questions posed concerned fluctuations in crime, quantitative changes from the past to the present, differences in conceptions of public order over a century's time, and the nature of American urban crime in recent decades.

Crime and Its Permutability

The first conclusion from this study affirms the observation that urban crime fluctuates. Included in the thesis of this study is the argument that crime exists naturally in society and does so as inextricable, though variable, behavior of a segment of the public. The issue is never one of eliminating crime in society by a "war" that might be winnable, but rather the postulate envisions the pursuit of social controls reducing criminal incidents to a level consonant with the indigenous concept of personal

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freedom found in a singular democratic society.[1]

This survey has identified sizeable changes in recorded crime occurring over a century: crime in the city was noted to decrease during a wartime.[2] World War I, concluded after brief, full American involvement, was associated generally with decline of property and violent crime, particularly apparent in the critical year of 1918, though murder increased over the previous year. (Table 9.1) Crime increased in the months following return of the troops who faced bleak opportunities in a contracting, rapidly demobilizing economy: certain types of crime then largely moderated during the age of prohibition.[3]

During those years in which putative state and federal legislation sought to eliminate the manufacture, transportation, and sale of alcohol, arrests related to alcohol-related incidents declined substantially suggesting that residents, even the most prohibition-resistive major city, consumed less alcohol on a per capita basis than they had a decade earlier. As a result, residents in New York City faced fewer sanctions from law enforcement for certain offenses like public drunkenness. But violent crimes related to the illicit commerce of alcohol. Vast criminal wealth was created through the exigencies of prohibition which solidified organized crime. The jousting of competing underworld gangs spilled over to wider society provoking an increase in serious crimes, particularly murder-homicide, in the latter years of prohibition; yet when adjusted for growth in population, "the

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Table 9.1

Complaints and Arrests for Major Crimes in New York City, 1890-1990

ARRESTS

Year	Murder	Rape	Robbery	Assault	Burglary	Larceny	Arson	Vehicle Theft	Total
1890[1]	108	40	257	6,117	701	1,838	21	--	9,082
1891	126	62	237	6,141	742	1,965	13	--	9,286
1892	119	58	240	5,927	742	1,937	25	--	9,048
1893	128	40	232	5,763	730	2,020	14	--	8,927
1894	138	56	291	6,665	814	1,954	19	--	9,937
1895	178	54	286	7,185	820	1,837	26	--	10,386
1896	170	54	298	7,631	830	2,511	17	--	11,511
1897	199	64	269	7,428	789	2,002	20	--	10,771
1898	346	96	401	9,924	1,378	3,017	19	--	15,181
1899	404	95	423	9,118	1,328	3,309	21	--	14,698
1900	449	112	512	9,254	1,706	3,582	17	--	15,632
1901	429	109	612	9,796	1,764	3,496	27	--	16,233
1902	511	148	555	10,939	1,566	3,926	24	--	17,669
1903	582	193	546	13,093	1,758	4,327	48	--	20,547
1904	631	200	550	13,656	1,904	4,704	34	--	21,679
1905	735	237	620	15,175	2,279	5,152	49	--	24,247
1906	885	326	526	14,483	2,321	5,607	24	--	24,172
1907	848	355	581	15,589	3,117	6,289	32	--	26,811
1908	758	--	750	4,234	2,670	3,739	--	--	12,151
1909[2]	648	226	335	3,871	1,655	4,219	48	--	11,002
1910	443	189	312	3,338	1,081	2,322	21	--	7,706
1911	366	396	516	5,076	2,196	5,150	50	--	13,750
1912	417	365	502	4,859	2,135	4,520	61	--	12,859
1913	351	392	556	5,195	2,364	4,022	66	--	12,946
1914	433	490	669	5,575	3,151	4,556	44	--	14,918
1915[3]	452	610	637	5,675	3,217	4,651	43	366	15,651
1916	491	804	1,220	5,210	2,476	3,354	50	--	13,603
1917	579	838	1,275	4,283	2,973	4,299	40	--	14,287
1918	618	669	1,143	3,485	2,244	3,685	32	--	11,876
1919	649	671	1,744	3,771	3,100	4,212	22	--	14,169
1920	743	668	1,586	3,769	3,040	3,843	18	--	13,667
1921	712	630	1,428	3,899	2,660	3,200	39	--	12,568
1922	780	530	1,445	4,057	1,970	2,566	39	--	11,387
1923	965	637	1,448	3,958	2,061	2,984	34	--	12,087
1924	936	659	1,946	3,783	2,346	3,673	38	--	13,381
1925	1,060	718	2,045	3,911	2,509	3,496	35	--	13,774
1926	1,089	847	1,766	3,901	2,135	3,322	36	--	13,096
1927	1,022	897	1,295	4,723	2,147	3,116	37	--	13,237

COMPLAINTS

1928[4]	1,046	969	1,611	2,599	2,500	3,782	45	13,545	26,782
1929	1,131	948	1,172	2,490	2,990	6,524	40	8,760	24,055
1930[5]	1,229	892	1,166	2,310	2,830	6,261	74	12,731	25,493
1931	1,584	686	1,434	2,214	2,678	5,924	58	12,153	26,651
1932	1,546	682	1,429	2,310	2,417	4,558	75	8,910	21,847
1933	1,500	643	1,138	2,264	2,276	3,557	63	6,991	18,432
1934	1,387	560	1,251	2,457	2,980	4,325	78	5,899	18,937
1935	1,007	582	1,184	2,525	2,614	3,252	77	4,945	16,186
1936	1,266	755	1,240	2,580	2,369	2,289	56	5,208	15,763
1937	1,242	796	1,276	2,921	3,128	2,747	59	7,504	19,673
1938	1,191	748	1,297	2,961	2,672	2,748	34	6,167	17,818
1939	1,191	872	1,427	2,945	3,181	3,962	49	8,393	21,970

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Table 9.1, continued

Year	Murder	Rape	Robbery	Assault	Burglary	Larceny	Arson	Vehicle Theft	Total
1940	1,190	862	1,393	2,551	3,062	3,884	47	11,463	24,452
1941	1,116	726	1,262	2,700	2,573	3,811	48	11,559	23,795
1942	1,105	748	1,183	2,409	2,245	3,405	35	9,054	20,184
1943	933	686	892	2,357	3,277	3,223	70	7,571	19,019
1944	834	711	887	2,402	2,316	2,844	44	10,159	20,197
1945	909	597	1,234	2,473	2,245	2,582	57	12,375	22,472
1946	940	643	1,600	2,794	2,615	3,802	47	13,013	25,454
1947	906	764	1,579	3,168	3,130	4,823	80	10,539	24,989
1948	802	849	1,516	2,847	2,733	5,121	73	10,206	24,147
1949	783	773	1,472	3,066	2,520	4,963	85	10,267	23,929
1950	733	704	2,457	3,695	7,082	7,626	93	10,146	32,536
1951	594	902	7,004	7,662	32,623	22,449	246	10,934	82,414
1952	754	1,013	9,092	8,403	42,914	27,456	398	12,349	102,379
1953	931	1,069	9,201	9,353	45,632	26,381	436	14,126	107,129
1954	729	1,148	10,316	9,519	47,291	24,117	481	12,237	105,838
1955	393	1,165	7,133	8,679	38,396	20,160	320	11,453	88,699
1956	370	1,267	5,258	9,517	35,476	21,183	358	12,327	85,756
1957	384	1,770	4,849	10,467	34,837	22,030	328	12,067	86,132
1958	418	1,115	6,046	10,636	33,806	24,467	361	13,718	90,567
1959	428	1,247	6,200	11,168	32,949	26,858	367	15,753	94,980
1960	435	1,296	6,579	11,021	35,236	30,276	323	16,731	101,897
1961	529	1,211	5,955	11,976	37,712	30,847	322	17,094	105,646
1962	551	1,310	6,634	12,418	40,568	34,120	359	17,654	113,614
1963	597	1,277	6,823	13,025	41,911	39,289	423	21,413	124,758
1964	696	1,504	7,988	14,831	44,792	42,757	438	26,284	139,290
1965	684	1,574	8,904	16,325	50,106	47,257	732	28,045	153,627
1966	734	1,761	23,539	23,204	119,783	76,492	1,597	40,943	288,053
1967	810	1,905	35,934	24,827	149,765	82,778	2,088	52,946	351,053
1968	1,058	1,840	54,405	18,061	173,559	74,749	2,268	67,333	392,273
1969	1,043	2,120	59,152	17,552	171,393	73,851	--	74,874	399,985
1970	1,117	2,141	74,102	20,919	181,694	78,276	2,488	84,323	445,060
1971	1,466	2,415	88,994	22,664	171,331	79,369	2,191	85,735	454,165
1972	1,691	3,271	78,202	25,685	148,046	53,337	2,397	67,243	379,872
1973	1,680	3,735	72,750	24,469	149,311	50,197	--	73,663	375,805
1974	1,554	4,054	77,940	26,084	158,321	64,915	--	66,198	399,066
1975	1,645	3,866	83,190	27,712	177,032	80,738	--	77,178	451,361
1976	1,622	3,400	86,183	27,456	195,243	105,803	--	90,548	510,255
1977	1,557	3,899	74,404	27,217	178,888	105,751	--	89,562	481,278
1978	1,518	3,882	74,029	27,234	164,471	104,787	--	79,361	455,282
1979	1,752	3,875	82,572	27,376	178,780	120,790	8,056	85,882	509,083
1980	1,821	3,711	100,550	27,358	212,748	147,073	8,658	96,471	598,390
1981	1,832	3,862	107,495	26,775	207,931	158,615	8,962	100,951	616,423
1982	1,675	3,547	95,944	27,082	174,367	166,708	8,245	104,056	581,624
1983	1,628	3,662	84,043	26,808	144,744	164,872	7,085	91,075	523,917
1984	1,459	3,829	79,541	30,804	129,924	167,351	7,089	88,347	508,344
1985	1,392	3,880	79,532	32,922	126,028	173,798	7,679	79,249	504,480
1986	1,598	3,536	80,827	37,276	125,410	175,075	6,767	85,662	516,151
1987	1,691	3,502	78,890	40,805	124,667	110,754	6,449	95,254	462,012
1988	1,915	3,412	86,578	45,824	128,626	110,717	6,604	119,659	503,335
1989	1,927	3,254	93,377	45,855	122,515	111,939	6,115	133,663	518,645
1990	2,262	3,126	100,280	44,122	122,055	108,487	6,181	146,925	533,438

Source: Reports of the Police Department of the City of New York, 1890 to 1990.
Notes: [1]Murder arrests include homicide, manslaughter, and infanticide, but exclude accessory to murder; assault arrests include: with battery, with intent to steal, andfelonious; larceny includes grand and personal, but excludes petit. [2]Exclusive of Detective Bureau arrests. [3]The first year vehicle thefts were reported; subsequently, 1916-27, incidents mostly were included with grand larceny. [4]Beginning this year crime complaints were reported in addition to arrests and summonses and were used exclusively from 1923-90. [5]Crime data began to be reported to the FBI often varying slightly with city totals; however, for consistency New York police report data are displayed through 1990.

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lawless decade" of the 1920 experienced less reported crime than in the years before prohibition.

In The Bronx, crime was modest for most of its history through the 1950s and into the early years of the next decade. During these years the prevalence of serious crime was substantially less on a population adjusted basis than in Manhattan.[4] But as the sixties progressed, crime and disorder in The Bronx soared in large, delimited geographic areas of that borough. The Bronx established itself as an archetype of urban decline; nevertheless, despite a horrific reputation, the borough as a whole became only somewhat more dangerous than the rest of the city. By the end of the study period, many of the worst areas experienced considerable reduction from their highest recorded levels of violent crime.

The suburbs thrived throughout the century at the expense of the older city. This was in part because suburban and exurban residents sought golf, garden, grass, lower taxes, more growing space and, partially, an environment of less crime by moving away from the historic city. However, by the later decades of the twentieth century, crime increased in the suburbs and at a rate faster than that experienced within the city, though beginning such growth from a much lower aggregate base.[5]

From the 1950s through 1990 in the entire city, crime increased substantially almost year by year, then decreased in the mid-80s, only to increase again sharply on a population adjusted basis in the last years of the decade.[6]

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A consideration of the gross number of major crimes reported for 1890-1990 (Table 9.1) indicates a generally increasing pattern of reported incidents consistent with growing population based upon waves of immigration and domestic migration and from internal growth. Further evaluation of a particular crime, murder and criminal homicide, indicates the fluctuation occurring in reported arrest of occurrence (complaint) rates for decennial periods beginning with 1890 and adjusted per 100,000 population using census data for that year. (Table 8.2) The homicide arrest rate generally rose from 1890 to 1900 and then dropped by 1940-50 to a level under one-third of that in 1900; next reported incidents began to rise reaching a historic peak in 1990. Within some decades lesser oscillations occurred. Fluctuation in crime data--even considering implications of flawed reporting systems--emerges as an established characteristic.

Perils of Comparative Urban Crime Judgments

We proceed to another issue: Has crime--particularly violent incidents within the city--changed measurably comparing the present with the past? Specifically, how has urban crime for the period about 1890 differed quantitatively and qualitatively from that of a century later?

The comparison of crime quantity differences from former to more recent times frequently draws popular, impassioned speculation. However, academic interest reflected by

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published studies on the topic is sparse and those studies which do exist are either discordant with each other concerning their conclusions or non-comparable due to different methodologies used. Research-oriented academics and others have sought to compare urban crime over disparate times without reaching unanimity in their conclusions, though no two such studies have sought to parallelize the same locations, methodologies, and time spans.

One early study concluded that the city intrinsically contributes to increased crime and that crime rises in cities as a feature of modernity. Charles A. Ellwood, a sociologist at the University of Missouri in 1910, compared crime in the United States from 1880 to 1904.[7] His paper was written at a time when residual fears of a "crime wave" swept the country, corresponding to the financial depression of 1907. Using arrests and prison population data to buttress his conclusion, Ellwood stated: "We must conclude, therefore, that serious crime increased out of proportion to the population in the United States from 1888 to 1904; but that apparently this increase took place mainly between the years 1880 and 1895."[8]

However, A.H. Hobbs of the University of Pennsylvania compared crime data from Philadelphia of 1790-1810 with that of 1937, and determined from a study of court sentencing data that crime rates were historically high in 1937 but actually may have been lower than what they were in 1790-1810:

> This comparison of actual cases which appeared before the courts in 1791-1810 and in 1937 lends no support to hypotheses that the total amount of criminality has increased with the complexity of

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> modern living; that cultural conflicts of the modern large city produce crime, or that the high contemporary crime rates in the United States are a product of our economically competitive society.[9]

In recent years, epidemiologists studying data of criminal homicide victims in Atlanta for two periods separated by a decade, 1961-62 and 1971-72, found large increases for the homicide rate from the earlier to the later period for whites and blacks.[10] The measurement also established an increase in the frequency with which homicides were committed with firearms occurring over a decade's time.

In The Growth of Crime, an analytical book but one which did not include new comparative studies, Leon Radzinowicz and Joan King posited in 1976 that crime was on the rise not only in the United States, but also throughout the entire globe: "The incidence seems to be going up in all parts of the world, whatever the stage of development and among all segments of society, the previously law-abiding as well as previously criminal. New forms of crime are emerging and old forms are assuming new dimensions."[11] The authors found that no nation was immune from crime increases, except perhaps Japan for a period between 1956 and 1967 when homicides dropped, frauds declined by half, and robberies waned by the thousands, a situation believed due to the economic leap beginning in the 1950s. Otherwise, all known economies--urban or rural; post-industrial or agrarian--participated in the increased crime trend in the authors' opinion.[12]

While the city has had many critics for its presumed

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criminogenic environment, other researchers have determined that the city is a civilizing place and that urbanization has tended to decrease criminal incidence. Such reports must be considered in the context of the years they assess. Drawing mostly from European studies, Eric H. Monkkonen observed: "Even if the casual mechanisms remain unclear, the evidence assembled by some historians suggests that until approximately World War II, crime and violence in the Western world had been on the decline, not on the rise."[13]

Theodore N. Ferdinand compared criminal patterns in Boston between 1849 and 1951 for seven major crimes: murder, manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, assault, burglary, and larceny, using as his data source "defendants before Philadelphia courts."[14] He concluded that the crimes collectively "show a distinct downward tendency," while murder, larceny, and robbery "have shown a downward tendency, although specific events have resulted in periodic upswings, bringing these crimes to new high levels in recent years." Ferdinand's dramatic graphs display rates of major crimes in Boston, 1849-1951, and show a steep decline from the 1870s to the late 1920s from which an increase from then has been noted in his data. He argued that "Boston has shown an almost uninterrupted decline from 1875-78, to the present era....Since that time, the crime rate has declined steadily to a level about <u>one-third</u> that in 1875-78."[15]

The earlier level followed a "dramatic upturn" after the Civil War, which was a trend also experienced by other

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American cities, Ferdinand noted. He distinguished between murder and manslaughter and found that while the murder rate fluctuated substantially over the years, the pattern has "steady decline" which reflects fundamental "long-term shifts in the structure and organization of the city as it grew into a great metropolitan center."

By contrast, manslaughter, undefined by the author but presumed to mean killing without aforethought, increased beginning 1907-9 at a sharp rate reaching "roughly six times the level throughout the nineteenth century," which held to 1934-36 and declined through the post-World War II. Ferdinand stated that much of the high rate of manslaughter during these years was related to criminal charges against dangerous automobile drivers which was considered a criminal offense and could result in a minimum prison sentence of two-and-one-half-years following the death of a victim. Reported forcible rapes moved upward over most of the period of the twentieth century with declines occurring during major wars and severe depressions. Robberies show a highly variable pattern over a century's time in Boston when the "highest burglary rate for the entire time span was realized near the end of the Great Depression in 1937-39." An earlier study on Boston, 1822-1885, by Roger Lane concluded that crime declined during most of the nineteenth century. This diminution represented a gradual adaptation of immigrants to urban living, Lane explained.[16]

Quantitative studies of long term crime differences in

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New York City have not been found; however, variances of predominant types of crime commission should be expected following changes in the laws defining crime, the process of recording incidents, evolving mores, demographic rate changes, and technological and market innovations.

Comparing 1890 with 1990, qualitative differences emerge. The period 1870 to 1890 appears to be a time when reported violent crime was not a high level of concern by a law-abiding citizenry. However, actual and potential public disorder, particularly labor unrest characterized by sudden, violent demonstrations and police and municipal corruption were prominent issues. By 1890, the combination of sustained urban growth, increased immigration in substantial numbers from non-English-speaking countries, and the arrival of the culture and technology of modernism created the basis for which substantial perceived change in the city as a safe haven from random criminal violence and an avatar of civility occurred.[17] Yet in 1890 residents feared for their safety when they ventured out at night or traversed high-crime neighborhoods. The carrying of weapons at the time was common. The city was unsafe.

Qualitatively, crime and disorder in 1890 tended to be influenced by violence that stopped short of recorded homicide, yet even in 1890, the homicide rate in the city was considered to be high, and America was largely regarded as a violent nation, indeed, the most violent nation among industrialized countries. Fatalities recorded by the Board of

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Health for "violence" were over ten-times the police arrest rates for murder, suggesting that the "true" rate for murder and homicide was considerably greater than what the police reported only as murder arrests.[18] (Table 9.2) Tables 8.2 and 9.2 show considerable reporting discrepancy between the way in which two city agencies report homicide. The police might arrest more than one person in a killing in the early periods of this study which would indicate that its rate for 1890, 108 arrests, represents a few less cadavers, closer to the Board of Health's total of sixty-one. Though since most murders are charged to a single individual, this change would not likely be large. The police department reported arrests for crimes--not complaints of actual incidents--until 1928; consequently, data before and after this date are not comparable.

The Board of Health lists a large number of deaths due to violence, some of which might be classified as homicides as definition of this crime changed over time. The high level of violent deaths in Health Department reports, 1890-1930, suggests a magnitude of loss of life far greater than conventional crime for these years and casts doubt on the likelihood of ever finding any "true" level of crime comparable over an extended historical period, even for murder-manslaughter, the incident category most reliably and consistently reported. In 1890, the department of Health reported 1,449 deaths by "accident and negligence," of which 731 were by fractures and contusions, 221 by drowning, 96 by suffocation, and 62 by poisoning, in addition to burns and

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Table 9.2

Homicides, Deaths by Accident and Violence, and Suicides as Reported by the Board of Health, 1890-1990

Year	Homicide	Accident & Violence	Suicide
1890	61	1,449	239
1900	140	3,012	761
1910	286	3,813	825
1920	325	3,944	670
1930	494	5,362	1,403
1940	290	2,980	1,263
1950	326	2,688	937
1960	425	2,658	856
1970	1,176	3,190	471
1980	1,908	2,181	716
1990[1]	2,272	2,066	646

Source: New York City Board of Health, Annual Reports, 1890-1990.

Notes: [1]For 1990, of 2,272 homicides, 1,595 (70.2%) occurred by firearms and explosives; 312 (13.7%) by cutting and piercing; 106 (4.7%) by fire and flames, and the rest by other means. Accident and violence deaths totalled 1,908 in the home, public places, concerning motor vehicles, at work, from firearms, and from accidental drug poisoning. An additional 158 deaths were "undetermined whether accidentally or purposefully inflicted."

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scalds, surgical operation, sunstroke and other forms of death. While many of those deaths were likely to be "normal" and occur at the workplace or at home, it is probable that at least some of the above enumerated deaths would have been classified as murder-homicide, given the changes in investigative and reporting charges, by a century later.

Using Department of Health and Bureau of Census data for 1890, the death rate from homicide and accident and violence was 99.7 per 100,000 population. By 1990, the figure had dropped to 59.2 for the same population unit.

The suicide level for this period is included not because it was considered a crime for these years, but rather because it can be used to reflect social strain, particularly 1930-40, where incidence increased sharply over 1920. Suicide rates could increase with the ready availability of firearms, but since 1960, suicides have decreased substantially probably because of the advent of antidepressant medication.

Property crime, not considered extensively within this study, nonetheless, occurred broadly in commercial businesses, industries, institutions, and residences in much the same pattern throughout the years evaluated. The categories of major crimes present in 1890, existed a century later though some new inclusions increased the total. What does not appear on ledgers, police blotters, and reports in 1890 is crime that occurred within the household, within the workplace, and near places of recreation which a century later is expected to be subject for an official report. Once private matters that

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generally were not deemed to be of criminal character--for example, spousal violence or parental abuse of children--in the latter decades for this study became legal proscriptions.[19] Police activity in 1890 included heavy representations of less serious arrests for disorderly conduct, public inebriation, gambling, prostitution, and other offenses related to the moral order. By contrast, 1990 reflected high incidents of reported serious violent crime, particularly, murder, rape, and robbery and the emergence of major property crime incidents and automobile theft.[20]

Quantitatively, a comparison between 1890 and 1990 is indefensible in an absolute sense due to vast changes in policing, politics, social mores, and enforcement of laws. Such an empiricist question is intriguing and significant, though ultimately unanswerable with an unqualified meaning. The growth of cities in the nineteenth century raised great fears, especially among nativists, about the capacity of urban government to effectively administer itself and reflected a deep crisis of confidence within urban society. The specter of unreformable governmental institutions with rampant corruption loomed large an issue. That has mitigated, not absolutely but relatively, from 1890 to the present.

One striking difference between 1890 and 1990, though an aspect that is beyond the scope of this study but is, nonetheless, worthwhile to observe here, is the patently greater probity and reliability of contemporary policing especially, and other municipal services, generally, which

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steadily occurred from 1890 to 1990. The police achieved greater reliability and honesty through standardized screening, uniform training, improved supervision, and from the decline of the police-influencing political organizations which controlled early police appointments and promotions. E.L. Godkin, editor of the New York Evening Post in 1890, found the city deeply corrupt, arguing that "pull" with the police or magistrate and "friendship of the district leader" was needed as a way of doing business in New York and wrote: "Great cities, when badly administered, cannot be sold and abolished; they simply become dirty, unhealthy, unsafe, disgraceful, and expensive."[21] Police corruption has been cyclical over a century's time, though apparently less in contemporary decades than in the department's early history.

I conclude that it is not possible to generalize sweepingly about the differences in magnitude of violent reported crime within the city in years separated by a century. The primary reason for this is because of the changing nature by which police report data; the decline of churches, synagogues, and neighborhood institutions as mediating forces in addressing recalcitrant co-religionists or neighborhood residents who might have committed a crime; public reporting and expectations which elevate the understanding of criminal activity and lead to greater crime reporting; the availability of modern technology to facilitate the reporting of crime; increased education of the public over time to report all crime; and differences in conceptions of

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public order that have steadily marred the ability to make defensible comparisons between the two eras regarding crime, particularly incidents of criminal violence.

Yet it can be stated categorically that the average city resident has experienced total greater safety measured in longevity, which has steadily improved over a century's time. Developments in public health, workplace and residential safety, child welfare, and total deaths from other untoward circumstances have declined steadily from the early years of this study.[22] (Table 9.3) These offset mortality from crime which did increase during 1960-90 on a population adjusted basis. The death rate from all causes, a widely used though imperfect public health index, from 1930-90 was about half that of an earlier period, 1890-1900. More tellingly, despite the record number of homicides and manslaughters reported for 1990, the death rate (9.9 per 1,000 residents) reached the lowest year for the survey period. If the city was not as safe as the public hoped or wanted, it certainly was relatively safer than earlier years.

Nonetheless, another conclusion is also offered as a basis for the discussion that follows: violent and property crime in New York grew substantially beginning from the mid-1950s, with some categorical fluctuations in the interim, through 1990. Why did this trend in the city evolve and how does it inform us about city life and, more broadly, American society?

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Table 9.3

Death Rates from all Causes in New York City, 1890-1990

Year	Population	Total Death	Rate/1,000 pop.
1890	1,515,301	40,102	26.5
1900	3,437,202	70,872	20.6
1910	4,766,883	76,742	16.1
1920	5,620,048	73,249	13.0
1930	6,930,446	74,888	10.8
1940	7,454,995	76,008	10.2
1950	7,891,957	79,082	10.0
1960	7,781,984	86,252	11.1
1970	7,894,862	88,161	11.2
1980	7,035,348	76,625	10.9
1990	7,322,564	72,477	9.9

Source: Annual Reports, New York City Board of Health, 1890-1990.

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The Nature of Recent Urban Crime

In a perusal of crime data within the city covering the period of this study and encompassing a literature review, several aspects of crime in the city might be termed settled matters. A beginning point is the relativity of the term "crime" itself, which is a concept that certain acts or the deliberate not taking of particular acts is of marked significance to a community that such transgressions merit strong communal disapprobation and may invoke sanctions proportional to the committed offense.

Once codified, the sense of the crime--a social construct--becomes a legal one, having led to the creation of enactments within the legislative and judicial systems that embody the will of the community.[23] Such laws can be enforced by citizens themselves or, more commonly, through their official surrogates, the police and the criminal justice system. Acts or inactions resulting in direct harm to an individual or a group may be universal like "major" crimes such as those listed in table 9.1. Even "universal" crimes, that is, events regarded as socially deplorable cross-culturally--violent incidents like murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, and property crimes--have undergone change in classification over a century's time. For example, within two centuries, abortion has been legal then illegal; next legal and illegal again. The history of taking a drink of alcohol is legal, then illegal, and finally legal once more.

Related to this issue is the observation that a single

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criminal incident is an action or nonaction that two or more people factually may disagree about. Surely, juries and judges have no hesitancy at achieving verdicts in most criminal cases; yet in other situations the relativity of criminal phenomenology will identify acts or failures to act as noncriminal by some persons and criminal by others: this is because crime, like other types of deviance, is a human behavior interpretable by members of society differently in terms of the norms of society.[24] Thus, some actions or inactions that are technically crimes might not be reported by otherwise law-abiding and socially sensitive persons. While it is significant to observe this relativity, the nature of the serious crimes selected for analysis in this study has not changed much and is of a universal nature.

Age. Throughout this study, age--specifically youthfulness--has been a characteristic as a predictor of greater than average involvement in violent and property crime activity. But this historically relevant observation requires clarification as the type of crime peaks at different ages for varying offenses. For 1990 using Uniform Crime Reports data, about 46.1 percent of those arrested for violent crime were between the ages of 13 and 24 while this population segment represented 44.1 percent of the total population.[25] It should be noted that the next measured age group categorized, 25 to 29, also represents high association with violent crime, accounting for 18.5 percent of all serious violent crimes

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arrests and representing about 17.9 percent of the population in that year.

The age of crime disparity appears greatest for ages 17 to 20, when 18.6 percent if the population accounted for 25.7 percent of the murders and nonnegligent homicides and 26.2 percent of all robberies. Thus this total age group, male or female, was almost half again as likely to commit these two crimes as their representation on a population adjusted basis. Property crime arrests are even more associated with youthful offenders than are violent incidents. Of serious property crime arrests, 64 percent are aged 13 to 24; their cohorts aged 25 to 29 account for 14 percent additionally of such arrests.

One might speculate that youth, because of artless inexperience and other age-related factors, are disproportionately represented in these criminal categories since they normally are easier for police to trace and arrest following the commission of a crime. Thus they tend to be over-represented relative to their actual crime involvement. This is a strong possibility but has not been subjected to extensive research to date. It is also possible that criminal and delinquent activity might be considered a "normal" phase of development, particularly as related to less serious crimes, and many youth will grow out of such behavioral pattern as responsibilities of work, marriage, and society divert the youthful proclivities of many from their previously deviant activity.[26]

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Nonetheless, the crime and youth connection has been recognized as being associated for much of history: the pattern of repeated serious crime by youth cannot be excused as a matter of a normal aging process. From the early nineteenth century separate correctional facilities were established for delinquents, though it was only in the early years of the twentieth century that the criminal justice system broadly treated youth separately from adult offenders.[27]

Many subtle questions remain unanswered, such as does a peak age reflect a peak in prevalence, incidence, or both. But the linkage between youth and higher than average criminal activity is established, and carries with it implications of demographic changes, in understanding frequency patterns.

Sex. Males disproportionately have been represented relative to females as the gender more likely to be arrested for violent and property crime.

In 1890 women represented about 22.0 percent of the total arrests made by the New York City Police Department. However, the majority of those arrests were for prostitution and alcohol-related charges such as disorderly conduct: if those categories were removed from the total, women would have represented only 8.9 percent of those arrested in that year. A century later, women arrested in New York City, continued to represent a small total of the percentage arrested for serious crimes. Though the New York City Police Department did not provide arrests by sex for 1990 in its Crime Analysis Unit

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report, the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports for the same year identified 11.5 percent of females arrested for violent and 26.2 percent for property crime. Nationally, of over 10 million arrests for 1990, 81.6 percent were males: this total is for all crimes reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.[28]

Considering only the most serious Crime Index data, the proportion of violent crimes committed by men rose to 88.8 percent, and the percentage of Index property crimes committed by men was 74.7 percent. Considering non-Index incidents, women accounted for 14.5 percent out of a total of 1.4 million arrests for both sexes. The largest national non-Index crime involving women was for drug abuse violations, representing 16.8 percent of the total of 785,536 arrests, and the only categories in which women outnumbered men in arrests were for prostitution and commercialized vice, of which 53,385 women were arrested from a total of 80,888 or 66.0 percent, and arrests for runaways for which 71,919 women were arrested, reflecting 56.5 percent out of 127,363 total persons arrested.

The prevalence of males as the gender more represented in violent and nonviolent, serious and less serious crime traditionally has suggested a biological explanation because of genetic differences, a psychological cause, and a social dimension, or all three to explain greater crime causation by males. In the 1930s social scientists at the University of Chicago began to challenge the male crime hegemony hypothesis,

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and in recent decades feminists and other writers have contended that the following three factors need to be examined to critique theories of female crime: differential rates of gender offenses; explanations of causes of female criminality, and the operation of the criminal justice system toward women.[29]

Socioeconomic standing. People of every economic class commit violent and property crimes. However, I conclude along with many others that the relationship between socioeconomic standing and these crimes is established with a likelihood of someone being arrested occurring inversely to the increase of his or her socioeconomic standing.

This ratio may be partially explained because the wealthier portion of the population is more capable of obtaining skilled legal defense and thus their criminal acts could be underreported as a crime category than what otherwise would be the case. That concept is a possibility but not a probability based on numerous research reports on this topic, though some researchers believe that this long held assumption is a myth. Charles Tittle and Associates in 1978 reviewed thirty-five studies concluding that the relationship between criminality and economic status cannot be sustained.[30]

However, John Braithwaite reconsidered the issue expanding a secondary analysis of 224 studies and found that 81 percent of them supported the inverse relationship between rising socioeconomic class and criminal activity.[31] While

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obvious distinctions among populations for constituents of socioeconomic classification exist--income, educational attainment, job status--the point holds that violent and property crime are disproportionately associated with lower socioeconomic status.

In a period (1980-90) sometimes pejoratively termed "the greed decade," when the many variations of white-collar crimes transfixed the nation, it must be observed, in passing, that perpetrators arrested for high-loss economic crimes represented not the lowest but the highest socioeconomic class.[32]

Time. In two senses, time is a discriminator in crime patterns. First, as demonstrated earlier, crime decreases at such times as during war and for adults during economic expansion.[33] A second aspect of time concerns temporal variability when time-of-day and seasons affect certain types of crime. For example, burglaries occur at places of work and residences when people are not working or are not at home; robbery occurs more frequently during the summer months when people are more vulnerable to the approach of a robber. In 1990 within New York City, during the hours of midnight and 8 a.m., when a large majority of the residents would be in bed, within the household, or preparing to rise for the day, 36.7 percent of the arrests for murder and nonnegligent homicide occurred; 44.3 percent for forcible rape; 26.3 percent for robbery, and 29.9 percent for felonious assault.

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Location and geography. Location is destiny concerning the magnitude of crime, though crime status at any particular location may vary over time. For example, in New York City for 1990, the differentiation among police precincts in terms of various crime types was substantial. For murder or nonnegligent homicide, several precincts were as safe as or safer than urban areas in Europe with the least incidence of this crime, that is, registering under two or three incidents per 100,000 persons per year. Over a dozen other precincts recorded rates under the national average, but others reported over seventy incidents of this crime for the year, more than twice the city's average.[34]

Nationally, substantial regional variation has always been the norm. In 1990 according to UCR data, the northeastern states accounted for 20.4 percent of the nation's population but represented only 18.2 percent of the Crime Index total on a population adjusted basis; however, the region was above average in violent crime at 21.1 percent, while the more numerous Index property crime accounted for 17.8 percent of the nation's total.[35]

These above characteristics are those that I have termed "settled," in the sense that wide, though not unanimous, consensus exists on their factorial relationship to crime frequency. The following issue has been raised in the literature as a persuasive topic, but is open to further discussion:

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Intelligence. The publication of Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray's The Bell Curve in 1994 raised a new basis for an acerbic and protracted continuing debate involving race, intelligence, and related topics such as welfare dependence.[36] Apart from the issue of intelligence and "race," the authors examined data from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth which originally followed almost 12,700 persons from ages 14 to 22 beginning 1979 onward.

Evaluating the data from this study, the authors reported that incarcerated criminals on average have an intelligence quotient (IQ) of about 92, eight points below the mean. More serious or chronic offenders generally had lower scores than more casual offenders.[37] Comparing data for individuals who have not been apprehended with imprisoned populations, wrongdoers who have not been apprehended have about the same IQ as those arrested, tried, and convicted. Further, high intelligence provides some protection against lapsing into criminality for those who are otherwise at risk, such as youth whose parents themselves were convicted criminals. Those with a higher level of intelligence than their criminal parents were less likely to become criminals themselves.

While men interviewed in jail represent a wide diversity of intelligence including a few in the highest intelligent IQ decile (tenth), close to 50 percent of those interviewed and tested in jail were placed in the lowest decile, and over 90 percent of those incarcerated men studied were classified among the four lowest IQ deciles. This violent and property

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crime rate inverse relationship to higher intelligence excludes offenses that are related to persons of high intelligence and occupational opportunity: white collar crime.

Intelligence and employment also have a connection. The authors noted:

> The correlation between IQ and employment patterns is also strong, with white males in the bottom 5 percent of IQ having three times the chance of being out of the labor force as men in the top 5 percent--after taking socioeconomic and educational background into account....Of the men who described themselves as being too disabled to work, more than nine out of 10 were in the bottom quarter of the IQ distribution.[38]

Murray and Herrnstein posit a race-IQ connection fixed by heritable factors. Others, including Marxist criminologists cited in Chapter 3, argue that changeable economic and cultural factors could modify such differences over time. Such a contention might have merit; however, the experience of lower IQ for norm violators correlates anecdotally with police experience in investigating and arresting violent and property crime perpetrators.

The following characteristics are questioned as to their pertinence in helping to define understanding of urban crime patterns:

Population density. The city has traditionally been etched in public consciousness as a focus for crime and criminality. Urban critic Lewis Mumford provided one explanation as to why the city was a natural habitat for

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criminal predators:

> If one has anything to conceal, the place to conceal it is among a million other people. The anonymity of the big city, its impersonality, is a positive encouragement to a-social or anti-social actions. Hence a professional form of surveillance, by an organized police, must take the place of neighborly scrutiny and pressure: a city of strangers lacks any other form of stabilizing check.[39]

Since the Industrial Revolution, the city has been characterized widely as a dangerous locale, certainly this is believed to be so relative to less densely populated communities. The city has been described as a place where temptations for criminal activity are high and also where the tempted can avoid easy apprehension. Yet if the city has more crime on a population adjusted basis than lesser populated areas, the explanation is likely to be related to factors apart from density per se.

Some kinds of crime frequency committed by repeat offenders are likely to be effected by the greater opportunity a city provides with its profusion of attractive and ready opportunities. However at the same time, the control measures available in a city are likely to be more advanced and better managed than those located in less populated locations and this probability would partially mitigate the city as a crime center on the basis of population alone.

Still, the city is tagged as being more criminally active than lesser densely populated areas in aggregate crime accounts. The Uniform Crime Reports divide the nation into three population categories and provide a rate per 100,000

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inhabitants for each. In 1990, Standard Metropolitan Areas (SMAs) account for 192.5 million population with a Crime Index total of about 6,500 per 100,000 population; non-metropolitan cities representing 22.4 million reported a Crime Index total of 5,300; and rural counties with a population of 33.8 million have a crime total of about 2,000 per 100,000 population or less than one-third of the total for the SMAs.[40]

This suggests a relation between population density and incidence of reported crime. The message that the city is a dangerous place has been emphasized by writers, the media, politicians, law enforcement personnel, citizens' groups, and other commentators over the years. Since the data from UCR studies beginning in the 1930s emphasized that crime is greatest in large cities, lesser in smaller cities, still reduced further in suburban communities, and least of all among rural populations, the issue has rarely been challenged. But it would not be accurate to conclude that population density per se directly is related to the quantity of crime registered for a particular urban location.

It has been clear since 1890, and probably much earlier, that the issue is not density, but rather location within a city as the defining feature of relative risk from crime. The quantity of crime can differ enormously from one region in a city to another, as can the types of such offenses. This point is best illustrated in identifying the level of homicides in different areas and adjusting them for population. In 1990 in the United States, 9.4 murders and

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non-negligent homicides were reported per 100,000 population. For New York City, 30.6 incidents were reported. A record 2,245 deaths occurred that year; however, in seventeen out of seventy-five police precincts, the murder and nonnegligent homicide rate was about or under 5.0 per 100,000 population making these neighborhoods "safe" relative to the city as a whole and comparable to the safest nations as measured by this most serious crime.[41]

Another thirty precincts were below city average for this crime, some considerably under. By contrast, ten precincts reported a crime rate of epidemic proportions, posing great personal and general public health risks to inhabitants, especially the young, with a murder and nonnegligent homicide rate about or higher than 50 per 100,000 population.[42]

Deviant behavior for certain types of crime is concentrated in identifiable neighborhoods. Marshall B. Clinard observed: "A high incidence of deviant behavior--crime, juvenile delinquency, prostitution, drunkenness, drug usage, mental disorder, suicide, illegitimacy, and family maladjustments--have long been associated with slum living. In the Western world, particularly the United States, the slum is closely associated with delinquency and crime."[43]

Significantly, the issue is not population density, but rather the socioeconomic status of locations. Incidence of crime preponderantly is greater in poor areas relative to rich ones. While criminals living in high crime neighborhoods may commit their depredations elsewhere, crime is highly spatially

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oriented; that is, criminals and their victims tend to live (or sometimes work) in close proximity with each other. Even in high crime dense urban areas, a particular street or housing project may have a low crime pattern and retain this disparity for an extended time relative to the pattern in other parts of the neighborhood located only a few blocks or minutes' travel time away.

Race. At no time in the history of New York City, or the nation as a whole, has the association between race--particularly regarding blacks--and high rates of violent and property crime and urban disorder seemed greater than that occurring in 1990. Yet this association is rejected unequivocally by me because such an assumption does not consider race, crime, and disorder in a historical context. To argue otherwise is ahistorical.[44]

From the eighteenth through the early nineteenth centuries in New York and other American cities, it was clear that a particular ethnic group was disproportionately responsible, relative to its population representation, for considerable disorder, public agitation, and crime. These new Celtic arrivals were considered uncivil, unstable, and dangerous by the Dutch-English establishment who rejected them as social equals. The earliest Western settlers in the city forced these newer denizens to face initial religious prosecution and still later lesser obstacles in the practices

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of their ancestral church. Socially, barriers existed among these newcomers in obtaining employment or commencing their own businesses.

Members of this group appeared frequently on police lists and court arraignments often to the despair of the more law abiding natives. These urban unworthies were, of course, the Scots.[45] In time the Scots assimilated, became less confrontational and disorderly, built businesses, established institutions and charities, and played diverse roles in the life of the young republic, reducing their earlier association with crime and disorder in the process.

In subsequent generations another Celtic tribe emigrated to New York, particularly driven in great numbers by potato famines, 1845-48, that prompted the emigration of hundreds of thousands of Irish to America. Many of them arrived at New York City and were too poor to leave. From the 1840s on, the Irish of New York were unequally represented among those arrested as violent and property criminals. Perhaps the nadir of trouble from the "Irish rabble" as a societal scourge occurred during the July, 1863 Civil War Draft Riots when stores, offices, government buildings and institutions were burned, a black orphanage was raised, and perhaps 2,000 rioters lost their lives in five days of rioting. Police historian James F. Richardson wrote: "All observers...agree that the rioters were Irish, and that many women were as ferociously active as the men."[46]

But Irish upward social mobility in the city had begun,

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exemplified by their leadership in erection of one of the grandest ecclesiastical buildings in the country, St. Patrick's Cathedral, for which the cornerstone was laid in 1858, and the edifice finally opened in 1879. From fragile early waves of immigrants, the Irish came to assume the highest positions in New York City political and civic life, and particularly contributed significantly to police staffing for most of the history of the city's department. Gradually but steadily, the Irish criminal heritage, always reflecting a small minority of the ethnic group, was supplanted by successful amalgamation into a cosmopolitan society.[47]

Jews had been part of the community since the time of Dutch colonization, and in the second half of the nineteenth century played important roles in city life. By 1890, however, Jews from Eastern Europe, mostly Russia, began arriving in the city in large numbers. By 1900 almost 180,000 were counted in the city's census and a decade later the number had grown to almost 485,000.[48] Crime attributable to some of these emigrées became an urgent concern for the city and specific institutions were established to assist them: in 1891 the Jewish Prisoners Association was formed followed by the Jewish Bureau of Social Morals in 1912. By 1915 Jews accounted for one-quarter of all persons arrested on felony charges in New York County and Jewish women accounted for 19 percent of all New York City arrestees as prostitutes.[49] As noted in Chapter 5, Jewish crime might have begun to ebb by 1920, except that the opportunity for profits from organized

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illegal sales of alcohol attracted extant Jewish gangsters extending a hegemony of criminal activity which otherwise likely would have subsided sooner.[50]

Italians had arrived as skilled craftsmen in New York City in the early nineteenth century as skilled contractors to build huge public works projects such as the New York City waterworks. However, in contrast to Jewish immigrants, initially many Italian engineers and masons had no intention of settling permanently in America and returned to Italy. Near the end of the century, however, poor Italians from Southern Italy and Sicily emigrated to New York to seek work. As Thomas Kessner explains in Beyond the Golden Door, many Italians continued to have the intention to return to Italy with savings from their labor. But increasingly long-term settlement in America represented a compelling option: that meant the city would be a residence for many.

Regional and kinship associations provided job entry for many arriving Sicilians and Southern Italians and for a few that involved connections with hierarchical family groups linked to organized crime. The Mafia from Sicily and the Cosa Nostra from Naples became powerful crime conglomerates dividing criminal territories within the city and other parts of the nation beginning in the early second quarter of the twentieth century.[51]

By 1990 however, Italian criminality patently was less of a defined ethnic issue as Italians fully had assumed leadership throughout American life and the vast majority of

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Italian-Americans distanced themselves from their few corrupt or criminal fellow compatriots.[52] It was clear that new waves of immigration were bringing with them threats of crime against the city with their own original ethnic or national cast, each appearing to present as ominous a risk to local police not yet ready to deal with them as did earlier threatening immigrant arrivals.[53]

For decades preceding 1990, however, blacks had been disproportionately represented in crime data reported by police as both initiators and victims from violent and property crime. The observation was a national urban phenomenon, noted Norval Morris and Michael H. Tonry:

> Blacks are genetically neither more or less inclined to crime than whites. Yet blacks, disproportionately to whites, are both the perpetrators and the victims of those types of crimes which in our society attract imprisonment as a punishment.[54]

By 1990, homicide became the leading cause of death among black men and women aged 25 to 34: among men aged 25 to 44, the risk of homicide for blacks was eleven-times the risk for whites. More than half the people executed in the United States since 1930 were black, and the rate of imprisonment for blacks in 1979 was 8.5 times the rate of imprisonment of whites. By 1992, among persons age 16 to 24 the rate of violent crime among black males was more than 1.5-times the rate for white males; meanwhile, black males between the ages of 16 and 24 comprised 1 percent of the population age 12 or over in 1992, but experienced 5 percent of all violent

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victimizations.[55]

To consider just one crime, homicide and nonnegligent homicide, the involvement of young black males with this offense is astounding. Nationally, in 1992, 8.5 homicides per 100,000 population were recorded for all ages and both men and women and black and white. For black males age 25 or older, the homicide rate was 67.5 compared with 7.8 for whites; however, for males 12 to 24, the homicide rate for whites was 11.7 and for blacks 114.9.[56] In the later years of this study black violence began to exhibit a more random character. David Ray Papke observed:

> Homicide rates in urban areas have also been higher, and since the 1950s these rates have skyrocketed, with African American killing of other African Americans accounting almost completely for the trend. An increased percentage of this homicide involves strangers. Correctly dismissing suggestions about innate African American criminality as racist, scholars nevertheless have been left in a quandary about the lamentable prevalence of violent crime in ghettos. The most plausible theory is that African American population grew in northern cities just as industrial labor opportunities shrank.[57]

Other explanations of the black male condition also have been raised: significant is the argument that blacks had faced protracted systematic discrimination based on skin color alone and, in effect, they were not acting any differently than other economically and socially deprived groups had before them. Yet by the 1990s, the black male was increasingly blamed not only for crime against his own people, but also because disproportionately his actions represented a substantial part of the entire increase in violent urban crime

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of the time. This placed a stigmatic burden on the majority of law abiding and crime abhorring-blacks.[58]

By the 1990s urban blacks seemed to have marked a change of greater self-awareness of "the black crime problem" requiring a distinctive black response. The head of the Urban League in Miami said: "At the root of the problems in black Miami is the black male's inability to recognize that there is something wrong with him, not with others."[59] The critique by some that the criminal justice system perpetuated racial bias against black males, portraying police as colonial occupation forces and prisons a center of racist oppression, was answered by Randall Kennedy, a Harvard Law School professor:

> In fact, the principal problem facing African Americans in the context of criminal justice today is not over-enforcement but under-enforcement of the laws. The most lethal danger facing African-Americans in their daily lives is not white, racist officials of the state, but private, violent criminals, typically black, who attack those most vulnerable to them without regard to racial identity.[60]

As profound and troublesome the issue of black male crime was through 1990, black crime, male and female, young and old, is bound to decline in time as black crime takes its rightful place for diminution in historical progression. The issues involved in any ethnic or social group's crime pattern are complex and interlink with interests of the community as a whole. White culpability to conditions that have helped create patterns of black crime is appalling and a grave social issue. However, the task of reducing black crime is primarily an issue for the black community to address, as it was largely

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by other earlier groups who transfixed the city with their seemingly uncontrollable violence, crime, and disorder.[61]

Explaining Crime Rates in New York and the Nation

With the United States assuming an international hegemony in the twentieth century, New York City became the "Capital of the American Century."[62] Yet as the century ended, the image was tarnished by crime in the city which reached a peak in 1990. This occurred at a time when the population of the crime-active age (14-24) declined for the period 1985-90 approximately from 18.4 percent to 16.1 percent, a drop of 12.5 percent in five years.

New York City and its region was never ranked highest in criminal incidents on a population adjusted basis for serious crime or murder-homicide specifically during the period 1970-90. For murder-homicide in 1970, the New York SMA was thirteenth in regions with more than one million population. In 1975 with SMA's redefined New York ranked fourth. Among the seven largest cities, New York ranked fifth, sixth, and fifth for the years 1980, 1985, and 1990 respectively for murder-homicide on a population adjusted basis.

As the nation's largest city numerically and as its news and communications capital, New York was sure to provide daily material to feed the media's voracious appetite for fresh revelations of crime, violence, and disorder, leading to the journalistic maxim, "If it bleeds, it leads." It is little wonder that public perception drove crime fears higher than

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aggregate numbers of criminal incidents could support.[63] Still, as it always has, the public felt that crime in the city was too high.

Regardless of where New York or any city might rank, the reality was that all of America's oldest cities had experienced relentless and unexplained increases in crime, augmented from the mid-1960s on when metropolitan police departments revised reporting practices to require that all public complaints to police personnel be catalogues as crimes, increasing the number of incidents reported.[64]

Historically, the explanations for the incidence and increase of crime in the city took on the fashion of the time. In the period of the 1890s the general causal factors, enunciated with much vigor, conviction, writings, and rhetoric, included: alcohol abuse,[65] gambling and fraud,[66] lack of religion and morality,[67] political and civic corruption,[68] and prostitution.[69]

Through the ensuing century academic and research-oriented explanations were propounded and were discussed in Chapter 3, during which time, however, no unitary theory received consensual support, though research and analysis on aspects of biological, economic, psychological, and social changes received attention. In addition to academic studies, by the latter decades of this study, other voices were raised suggesting as crime causal and growth factors: criminal leniency in the justice system and its ineffectuality,[70] economic disparities,[71] deinstitutionalization of the mentally

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ill,[72] legal and illegal immigration,[73] and motion picture and television violence.[74] In 1960 on the threshold of three decades of increased crime reportage, the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation opined that the "morals of America are besieged" by "salacious magazines" and "other pornographic products" available to young people to peruse in such places as drugstores and "sweetshops."[75]

These observations and findings--past and present--add to the understanding of urban, indeed pansocietal, violence and should be considered as contributory issues related to crime causation.[76] Yet for many reasons over the period 1960 to 1990, reported crime growth overstates the case. During these years the public was increasingly educated to report criminal incidents to the police, and law enforcement more faithfully recorded these complaints, often without verification or investigation. This change had the effect of producing increased crime totals while actual events did not change as much as the increased totals suggested. Further, the much cited Uniform Crime Reports were devised in ways that tended to exaggerate the increase in crime over the 1960s and 70s: in that process, the reports succeeded flawlessly. Almost every year new record crime levels were set when this was an exaggeration of developments, though factually correct.[77] A separate national comparative crime study, the National Crime Survey constructed to account for types of crime not reported to police, indicated that crime incidents varied only marginally from 1975 to 1990.[78]

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Crime in general and more serious incidents in particular were reported with greater faithfulness and accuracy in the later years of this study, obviating reasonable comparison with earlier years and suggesting that crime might be over emphasized as a societal concern. Nonetheless, the reality of a large increase in reported murders and nonnegligent homicides over later years of this study support the conclusion that this type of crime indeed did rise and other major violent incidents similarly increased.[79] The pattern of rapid, serious crime increases merits an analysis and explanation. In the search for short-term factors linked with crime increase in the later years of this study, I identify four interlocking acute factors in explaining increases in crime in the city over the years.

The thesis for the explanation of law breaking is that crime exists naturally in society and is moderated by social controls which, when mitigated, lead to greater criminality.[80] I argue that four major observed social controls weakened roughly from 1960 to 1990, leading to the increased violent crime, though total crime in the community did not increase as much.

Decline of familial controls. The declension of the family as a formal, contractual entity has an association with urban crime and disorder. This observation is not new. Plato argued that the most important education is provided in the

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nursery.[81] From Greek through modern writers, the stress on nurturing during early years has been discussed and evaluated in extenso, observing different attributes to maternal, paternal, sibling, grandparental, and related kinship contributions in raising children. In the later decades of this study period, methodological approaches have provided a data orientation to previously theoretical components involving the family unit and deviant behavior.[82]

A Freudian basis for explaining the connection between an absence of a father and the delinquency of boys was that the male overidentified with the mother and acted-out socially as a symptom of compensatory masculinity. Regardless of theoretical orientation, a home with children devoid of a father or a father surrogate is associated with a higher level of youthful delinquency. At the same time, it must be stressed that most female-headed households raise children who do not engage in recorded criminal behavior on a protracted basis. However, the lack of a permanent male holding a spousal contract with his partner leads to increased likelihood of serious crime in my opinion.

By 1990, a fatherless society in America had become a prevalent condition, particularly in urban America, and deserved urgent scrutiny for its consequences. The indications of familial crisis begins with a consideration of marriage data. From the period 1960 through 1988, the number of first marriages per 1,000 never-married women indicated that people were becoming married less often and later.[83]

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Within this time, first-marriage rates for 20- to-24-year-old women dropped by 63 percent. The first marriage rates for younger people similarly declined, while marriages for those 25 and older remained stable. For men the average age for first-time grooms rose from 24 in 1975 to 27 in 1992.

While men and women were marrying less often, those who did marry divorced in increasing numbers during the later decades of this study. The divorce rate was stable nationally from 1950 to 1960; however, the increase in total divorces tripled from 1960 to 1980.[84] Notable was the change in the number of children under 18 involved in divorce: in 1950, the number and percentage began a steep increase that did not stop increasing until the early 1970s, and declined in 1980, though from a level almost four-times higher than it was three decades earlier. Thus, fewer couples were marrying and when they did, the relationships were tenuous judging by the frequency of the divorce rate.

Births to unmarried women by age and race showed considerable disparity from 1950 to 1990. According to a government report:

> Between 1960 and 1975, birth rates for unmarried minority women 20 to 24 years old dropped significantly. During that time, rates for white women at that age remained relatively stable. Trends changed after 1975, when birth rates to unmarried white women of all ages began to rise. For unmarried minority women of all ages, birth rates fluctuated between 1975 and 1985, but have not risen since 1985.[85]

To emphasize the disparity in unmarried birth rates, consider the number of live births to unmarried white women

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ages 20 to 24, the age category for unmarried women at which births occur in greatest numbers. For white women in this age span for the years 1950 to 1955, an average of 12.5 births per 1,000 unmarried women occurred; for blacks and other races the number was 119.2 live births. For the period 1985 through 1990, the number of live births to white women in the same age category was 38.4; for blacks and other races, the number was 117.3 births.[86]

For all families the number living in poverty showed a dramatic change between those with two parents compared with female-headed families (with no husband present). In 1991, about 21 percent of all children lived in poverty compared with 56 percent of children in female-headed families, the rate being higher for minority children. "About 46 percent of all black children and 40 percent of Hispanic children lived in poverty in 1991. The proportion of poor children coming from female-headed households rose substantially from 24 percent in 1950 to 59 percent in 1991 for all children and from 29 percent to 83 percent for black children."[87]

From 1950 on, fewer couples were marrying, those who did were divorcing in increasing numbers with a higher likelihood of children being affected, and the changes were most striking among black unmarried women. Surely, no one argues that all or most fatherless households produce children who develop criminal patterns. Despite furious obstacles, some children and their parents or guardians overcome profound socioeconomic liabilities, perhaps are strengthened because of their life

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situations, and live lives with no or little criminal activity. Also any contention that "fatherless" households do not have a male present much or most of the time is erroneous since the "absence" of the father provides the mother opportunities to receive welfare benefits which would otherwise be diminished or eliminated. The conclusion is, however, that the presence of an intact marriage contract generally means that a father is at home sharing in child rearing with greater likelihood than in unmarried female-headed households where the father is less frequently present.

The connection between the social trends beginning in the 1950s and continuing through the study period must be associated with the early commencement and persistence of criminal patterns among youth, particularly males, who directly have been affected by these changes. Statistics on the change in the number of arrests for the period 1950 to 1990 confirm a significant increase during this time. In 1950 for youth aged 14 to 17, 4.1 arrests were recorded in 1950 and for those 18 to 24 years, 12.9 arrests occurred the same year per 1,000 persons. By 1970 the number had grown to 104.3 for youth aged 14 to 17 and 74.4 for those 18 to 24. By 1980 the arrest rate had risen to 125.5 and 113.8 respectively; by 1990, further growth in arrests of youth occurred to 131.8 and 126.2 respectively.[88] While these data are national, no reason exists not to relate the pattern to developments found in New York City from 1950 to 1990.

Fatherless households have additional deleterious

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connections for youth including: less likely high educational level attainment; greater possibility of illiteracy; greater chances of males and females being victims of violent crime, and higher death rates from all causes. The well-being of children faces a dour future, according to an author who states: "The fatherless family in the late twentieth century is a social invention of the most daring and untested design. It represents a radical departure from virtually all of human history and experience."[89]

The fatherless household is frequently headed by an unwed, young mother, often struggling to raise a family and improve her own position with resources which are often meager. With the absence of fathers on a regular basis, the absent father role may be filled by other males, and the mother frequently receives critical child-rearing support this individual, her kin, and from neighborhood and city institutions. Yet for many of these women, an independent value system perpetuating a lifestyle of single parenthood, under- or unemployment, welfare dependency, and low esteem are the expectations within the traditional "lower-class culture" and "culture of poverty" arguments.[90] While the decline of the inner-city family has produced fatherless households, the trend also includes fatherless-and-motherless ones as well, as an increasing number of children live in households not headed by either parent. This relationship rose from 6.7 percent in 1970, to 8.3 percent a decade later, and then reached 9.7 percent in 1990.[91]

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The relative change of homicide for young persons from the period 1950 to 1990 shows a marked increase in number, percentage of total deaths, and rank by type of death over the period. (Table 9.4) For New York City residents aged 15 to 24, homicides in 1950 ranked 6.2 percent of total deaths, placing this form of death as sixth. By 1980, the number of homicides had increased almost nine-fold and ranked first as a cause of death for this age cohort. Similarly, those aged 25 to 44 also represented an age category in which homicides played an increasing part in urban mortality, rising from 2.3 percent of deaths for 1950 to 20.1 percent by 1990, increasing from ninth to second as a cause of death for this age group.

The reasons why the family unit deteriorated so demonstratively from 1950 to 1990 are unclear. Certainly, the government in New York City remained sympathetic to the family unit over these decades. The proportion of the city budget allocated for social services, including federal monies for children, was 16.3 percent of the budget in 1950 and had decreased to 11.7 a decade later. (Table 9.5) Then the spending for social services almost doubled by 1970 to 22.2 percent and increased at a less robust rate to 23.9 and 25.0 for the years 1980 and 1990 respectively. For 1980 the city allocated more money for social services than any other service, including education or police. In recent years observers have raised the question that possibly burgeoning welfare payments and their inherent bureaucratic policies have been associated with family deterioration in the very

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Table 9.4

Homicide as a Cause of Death for Certain Age Groups by Number (No), Percentage (%), and Rank (R), 1950-90

Year	1 to 14				15 to 24				25 to 44				45 to 64			
	Total	No	%	R	Total	No	%	R	Total	No	%	R	Total	No	%	R
1950	--	--	-	-	1,009	63	6.2	6	6,754	154	2.3	9	--	--	-	-
1960	--	--	-	-	839	73	8.7	3	5,748	199	3.5	7	--	--	-	-
1970	1,021	27	2.6	6	1,870	314	16.8	2	6,308	541	8.6	4	--	--	-	-
1980	564	46	8.1	4	1,474	542	36.8	1	5,399	542	10.0	4	16,927	316	1.9	7
1990	499	54	10.8	4	1,485	754	50.8	1	3,924	790	20.1	2	14,361	227	1.6	10

Note: The Table shows total deaths from whatever reason for four age groups. The number of death by homicide is reported from which a percentage of deaths by homicide is calculated. Homicide then is ranked among the seven leading (10 in 1990) causes of mortality cited by the Board of Health.

Source: New York City Board of Health, Summary of Vital Statistics, 1950-90.

Table 9.5

New York City Budget, 1890-1990:

Expenditures for Police and Social Services with

Percentages of Total Budget and Numerical Rank (R)

Year	Total Budget	Police Budget	%	R	Social Services	%	R
1890	32,451,043	4,647,791	14.3	2	1,949,100	6.0	7
1900	90,778,972	11,327,503	12.5	1	1,476,739	1.6	4
1910	153,775,145	15,110,797	9.8	1	1,097,000	0.7	9
1920	129,326,777	27,326,149	21.1	2	4,632,886	3.6	8
1930	274,382,430	57,770,612	21.0	2	11,885,343	4.3	6
1940	428,118,366	102,479,483	23.9	2	63,125,626	14.7	3
1950	1,186,867,531	101,964,808	8.6	4	193,385,921	16.3	2
1960	2,174,946,957	208,258,278	9.6	2	253,636,290	11.7	4
1970	6,879,886,214	616,358,752	9.0	3	1,562,911,121	22.2	2
1980	11,429,201,000	674,884,610	5.9	6	2,727,288,550	23.9	1
1990	22,169,900,000	1,626,724,814	7.3	5	5,544,994,140	25.0	2

Source: Various city budget reporting agencies, 1890-1990.

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neighborhoods such funds and policies were meant to help. The argument held that the city's welfare system rewarded unmarried mothers with benefits when no father was present in the household and that such payments grew as the number of dependent children increased.[92]

This report does not argue for the elimination of welfare payments. Aid to those unable to provide for themselves was a feature of the early Dutch community on the island and the maintenance of a "safety net" for those experiencing financial exigencies has been a feature of civilized communities. However, such emoluments need not be provided inordinately by government intervention when public charity worked well by many considerations in earlier generations. Nonetheless, the system as it evolved in the last three decades of this study, goes beyond being anti-family. It encourages family disunity which decreases the ability of supervising caringly the growth of children, thus leading to greater potential criminality from their subsequent behavior.

Decline in societal controls. The family unit has been posited as a core resource for child raising and with it the diminution of delinquency and deviance. However, other institutions in addition to the family were weakened in the period 1950 to 1990 which also are associated particularly with symptoms of societal malaise and are suggested as being partly connected to increased violent crime. Societal measures at forming or supporting human behavior encompass

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numerous resource and institutions. This section considers three types of controls and how they have changed in the period 1950 to 1990: police and correctional services; the nature of work; and schooling.

•The police and correctional services. In the early 1970s with crime in New York City and other urban areas on the increase, a concomitant increase in jails, prisons, and parole programs was budgeted to accept the mounting numbers of felons and those committed for misdemeanors.

The number of persons sentenced per 100,000 residents had fluctuated over the years. From 1925 to 1940, the number incarcerated grew by half. With the advent of World War II, the number of prisoners dropped sharply to 1945 when there were about 100 prisoners per 100,000 residents.[93] However, by the early 1970s, a sharp increase in incarceration began which in 1990 had raised the number of persons incarcerated to a historically high level: 282 prisoners per 100,000 population.

This was a national phenomenon. By midyear 1991, the nation's state and federal prison population surpassed 800,000 with per capita rates of imprisonment at 588 per 100,000 males and 33 per 100,000 females.[94] But this total excluded individuals in jails, half-way houses, and in parole programs. The entire correctional population of the nation by 1990 was 403,000 in jails, 745,000 in prisons, and 531,000 on parole, and an additional 2,671,000 on probation.[95] In total, 2.35 percent of the United States adult population was under

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correctional supervision. In New York State, 1.89 percent of the population was under correctional supervision.

The nation was not complacent with the crime problem. The government was willing to allocate sixteen billion dollars per year by 1990 to provide sufficient incarcerated facilities and post-release services. The United States came to rank first in the world in its incarceration rate, exceeding South Africa and the post-cold-war Soviet Union.[96] Prison construction became a growth industry and the private sector entered--or perhaps more correctly, re-entered--correction facilities management to meet the demand for lower cost services. Nevertheless, overcrowding was mentioned by the nation's jail managers as their most serious problem.[97]

The hypothesis that social controls were reduced and that this fact was associated with increased crime is argued here. Therefore, why did crime increase so resolutely when society made it clear that it was willing to build so many cells and fill them? Why did an almost tripling of the incarceration rate within two decades not restrain or reduce the level of crime in the nation? The answers are suggested throughout this chapter. But the point of "correctional services" is obvious: they do punish; they remove criminals from the streets for a period; they serve the public cry for retribution and justice, but they do not deter or rehabilitate to any significant degree.[98] Another factor to be discussed suggests why public intervention has not achieved the results of producing a safer urban environment.

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For most of the city's history covering roughly the century-and-a-half following the organization of the modern force, policing has ranked as one of the largest budget categories. While waves of police criticisms, reorganization, and revitalization have occurred, the principle remains that the police are society's front line of deterrence and protection from crime. How spending is allocated reflects both civic funding priority and the quintessence of police service delivered to a community.

For the first half of this study period, policing was usually second to education based on total expenditures. For the budget years 1950 and 1960, policing ranked fourth and second as largest budget items respectively in the City of New York for which 8.6 percent and 9.6 percent were allocated. (Table 9.4) By the 1980 budget year the proportion of the budget spent for police had decreased to 5.9 percent and this service was sixth in overall municipal expenditures the lowest ranking for any period. By 1990, the budget had increased to 7.3 percent, ranking fifth in municipal priorities. Meanwhile, spending for jails and corrections had surged over the span 1970 to 1990.

Pertinent to this development was the observation that urban areas needing police services the most--those related to major violent and property crime rates--were not receiving their needed allocation of police services, or such services were being employed in these locations suboptimally.

The police department generally deployed officers

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relative to the population of the precinct; though precincts with high crime received more officers than their population would dictate, the ratio was not much different from the precinct with the least crime from the one with the most. The increase in crime for the period 1950-90 obscured the fact that some neighborhoods remained consistently low environments for violent crime. And by 1994, a research report stated: "Where most Americans live, all crimes except auto thefts have decreased since 1980. For urban minority Americans, however, all crimes including homicides are up....urban crime is concentrated in inner-city neighborhoods."[99]

If the perpetrators were mostly minority inner-city residents, their victims were living and working there as well. The declining family promoted an increasing gang culture as a familial surrogate, producing an environment that turned against itself in neighborhoods where youth are most vulnerable and also most likely to be in need of guidance and control.[100] Individuals most likely to be victims of violent crime are also skeptical of the older generation's commitment or capacity to protect them. Younger citizens who most require police services frequently reject the police as a source to provide them with personal safety.[101]

However, increasing the number of police is no more a means of reducing violent crime than increasing the number of hospital beds is a sure way of improving public health. Note that in 1950, the year in which expenditures for policing were lowest relative to other municipal allocations, the crime rate

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was also low. (Tables 9.1 and 9.5) How police are delegated does matter as a crime central factor. The redeployment of police as a managerial strategy from cruising patrol cars and desk jobs in precinct offices to more intimate contacts in the streets and community centers promises the endangered crime-intense poor neighborhoods a better chance to survive the travails of their environment and advance beyond them.[102] Criticisms of the judiciary system as having been broken, counter-performing and perpetually failing became common. Just as jails and prisons were not serving the inner-city, the criminal justice system accepted criticized of itself but was waiting for another day to change its ingrained orientation and procedures.[103] Meanwhile, improved policing strategies could deter crime and increase apprehension rates.

•The changing nature of work. The transformation of the city from having a manufacturing-based economy to being service-oriented occurred at a heightened pace in the period 1970-90 and had positive and negative implications for young people. New York City was proclaimed the capital of the information society by the early 90s.[104] Knowledge was exploding and technology had changed priorities for work and wealth creation. A newspaper article proclaimed: "In 1991 companies for the first time spent more on computing and communication gear--the capital goods of the new era--than on industrial, mining, farm, and construction machines. Info tech is now as vital, and often as intangible, as the air we

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breath, which is filled with radio waves."[105]

In some ways information technology made the historic city less necessary as a fulcrum for work-related activities: the corporate job could be done at a suburban home or rural retreat, rather than in a mid-town office; teleconferencing further permitted reducing the need for face-to-face meetings. Still, the city offered the greatest concentration anywhere of what Peter Drucker called Knowledge Workers and provided a logical and efficient locus when personal conferences, seminars, colloquies, workshops, research panels, and other types of meetings were necessary for organizations to meet the challenges of global change.

These developments change had been foreseen. Daniel Bell wrote in 1973 of the transition from industrial to post-industrial society where workers were consumed not with producing manufactured goods, but rather with producing valuable, but intangible, services. A fundamental shift in the nature of work was, so to speak, afoot.[106] This was clean work, intelligent work, work where the ubiquitous and cheap computer chip would aid in production, management, storage and retrieval of data, and even leading to strategic decision-making, leaving the knowledge workers available for responding to the need to manage creative change.

But automation, while not intentionally producing a new urban underclass, was solidifying the position of the marginal workforce entrant by making it difficult for unskilled males particularly to find permanent employment. Due to such

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factors as color-based prejudice and poorer educational skills, blacks faced stiff competition for the available diminishing non-skilled jobs. The rate of high income black household creation was growing about twice as fast as high-income growth for all households. But the poorest inner-city economic group black youth faced higher burdens to seek permanent, well paying employment.

Writer Jeremy Rifkin posited that fundamental work changes have and will eliminate tens of millions of jobs in the manufacturing, agriculture, and service sectors. Despite impressive and steady growth in minority income, these changes will produce net effects that prevent unskilled black workers from improving their economic and social status, as other groups had done over the course of the nation's history: "Technological unemployment has fundamentally altered the sociology of America's black community. Permanent joblessness has led to an escalating crime wave in the streets of America's cities and the wholesale disintegration of black family life."[107]

The result of this fundamental change was that the new jobs being created produced growing inequality in their wage rates. Unskilled youth had fewer opportunities for the plentiful entry-level manual and service jobs characteristic of the city's earlier history. Manual skilled and semi-skilled jobs that remained were relentlessly automated, if possible, to cut costs and improve quality. These changes occurred while unions, that historically strived for a high

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pay level, experienced a systematically weakened unskilled and semi-skilled union member base. Those unskilled jobs remaining were fought for in an increasingly competitive market, driving down pay rates and making it difficult for a single family worker to earn sufficient money to support the traditional family without the spouse and possibly children also working.

Economists John Bound and George Johnson noted: "For workers who are not college-educated, the ratio of older to younger workers' wages increased substantially during the 1980s. This trend continued into the early 1990s for women and a slower rate for men."[108] The authors identified a twenty year period when "the average level of real wages has been either constant or falling slightly." The gainers were college graduates, women, persons in their forties and fifties, and those in the highest percentiles of their relevant wage distributions. These gains came at the expense of other groups.

Richard B. Freeman, a British economist who studied American inner-city poverty neighborhoods, determined that for black school dropouts, "crime became a major determinant of their economic life rather than deviant behavior on the margin." He concluded:

> (1) That among blacks one-fifth of 16-34 year old men and upwards of three-fourths of 25-34 year old high school dropouts had criminal records in the 1980s, creating a sizeable relatively permanent population of offenders and ex-offenders outside the main stream of society--an "underclass," by most meanings of the word. A substantial though smaller proportion of other male dropouts also came under

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> supervision of the criminal justice system. Even in low unemployment cities such as Boston at the peak of the "Massachusetts Miracle" economic opportunities were insufficient to deter large numbers of disadvantaged youth from crime.
>
> (2) That incarceration and probation have long term adverse effects on the employment of young men, with those incarcerated at the outset of the 1980s had markedly less likely to work throughout the decade than other young men. The relationship between incarceration and employment is, moreover, "casual" rather than the result of fixed unobserved personal characteristics that are correlated with crime and employment: Proportionately fewer youths who had been incarcerated worked years afterwards then did non-carcerated youths with similar initial employment experiences.[109]

Unemployed young men and women from inner-cities had a formidable task to gain meaningful, full-time employment: instead they faced options of no work or part-time and temporary assignments as contingent workers. Such a work relationship is less attractive than the historic past where mutual obligations were recognized: "In many cases contingent workers earn less than core workers. And they usually have fewer benefits."[110] Another option, particularly for males, was to define crime as work: the hours were good, the entry requirements were few, the rewards were attractive and immediate, and in balance the risks were worth taking.

The issue whether poor work opportunities lead to fatherless homes or the father deserting the home had less incentive to work remains a controversial topic for discussion, and is probably beyond satisfactory resolution.

The essence of the shift of work resulted in poorly prepared and motivated inner-city young men would not find

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adequate employment channels for their energies. Moreover, their option might be a logical one: turning to crime. A policy analyst, Morgan O. Reynolds, argued:

> (M)ost crimes are not irrational acts. Instead, crimes are freely committed by people who compare the expected benefits of crime with the expected costs. The reason why we have so much crime is that, for many people, the benefits outweigh the costs. For some people, a criminal career is more attractive than their other career options. Put another way, the reason we have so much crime is because crime pays.[111]

Reynolds determined the expected punishment for potential criminals committing different types of serious crimes. Based on the probabilities of arrest, prosecution, conviction, and imprisonment, Reynolds ascertained that a murderer would spend an expected 2.3 years in prison for the crime. This was established by calculating the probability of arrest (70 percent) with the probability of prosecution given arrest (91 percent) and the probability of conviction given prosecution (75 percent) then the probability of prison given conviction (73 percent) which produces an overall probability of prison of 34.9 percent.

The median sentence is seventy-eight months producing an expected sentence of 819 days served. This was the longest expected sentence by far of any among the eight Index crimes. Using the same methodology, an expected jail sentence for larceny-theft, the crime with the least probability of apprehension and jail time, was 1.8 days.

•Decline in controls from schooling. The relationship

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between schooling, or the lack thereof, and delinquency and crime is one of the most strongly established factors relating to adult criminal careers.[112] The cycle of inadequate educational preparedness leads the unequipped to a more limited economic and social future: for such persons criminality ultimately exists as a limited option choice. If the day arrives when inner-city youth or adults seek to correct their educational deficiencies to make rewarding employment conceivable, they are likely to find that their weaker cognitive skills, possibly including illiteracy, and lower base of knowledge, could hamper any movement for these persons from the inner-city ghetto into a more affluent socioeconomic life.[113]

Critics and researchers have observed that high academic performance reduces likelihood of delinquency or subsequent criminality, but the extent to which such a conclusion is class-oriented remains in dispute. The consequences of poverty, with its frequent, though not inevitable, lack of nurturing and resources for the young, leads to circumstances in which the school system fails to compensate for the deficiencies of students from poor households relative to those from higher socioeconomic groups.

The educational system is severely taxed when it is expected not only to teach the poorly prepared, but also to mother, father, and police such students. Because of the particular syndrome of "at risk" students, urban schools like those in New York City have sought to provide youth programs,

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separate schools, and counselling and special services for this population. Regardless of good intentions, these measures have not succeeded in a broad sense.

The New York City Board of Education is the nation's largest public school system with 58 percent more students than the second largest system in Los Angeles. By the 1990s, its diverse student body was composed of black students comprising 38 percent of enrollment; Hispanics, 34 percent; whites, 19 percent; and Asians, 7 percent. More than one-third of the system's students come from families receiving some form of public assistance.[114] Critics claim that the school system is not about excellence in education so much as it is an ongoing confrontation between competing interest groups, preventing needed reform to flourish at the local school level. Two educational critics, Raymond J. Domanico and Colman Genn, noted in 1992: "The repeated failures don't come from lack of trying--or lack of money. Over the last ten years, the system's per-pupil spending has gone up by some 30 percent, after adjusting for inflation, with the biggest share of the increase coming from more state spending on education."[115]

That year New York City schools expended $7,100 per student, not lavish compared with some suburbs, but "far more to work with then most American schools." The decade had experimented with decentralization of schools, but the creation of semi-autonomous local school boards failed with the emergence of cliques of independent self-serving corrupt

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elected officials. The system needed a rigorously standards-based inspectorate that would not be weakened by politicians or bureaucrats. The marginal student needed new opportunity in the non-traditional career directions.

Nor is the situation more hopeful in institutional educational facilities where students are a captive audience. Reform schools and youth correctional programs harbor young inmates with substantial educational inadequacies. Inmates' sentences within institutional settings offer potential occasions to redress years of educational misdirection. But does it, or can it remedy academic deficits? The evidence is not encouraging. Young people in detention facilities frequently are high school dropouts or infrequent school attenders and may be semi-literate. A newspaper article describing students at a juvenile medium security facility in New Jersey explained that a teacher was attempting to start a discussion but "none" of her eight teenagers seemed interested. The teacher was quoted: "Some of the kids don't really get anything out of this. They just want to do their time and get out. That's true of most of the kids I deal with."[116]

Most urban school systems, reflecting the deficiencies of many of their students' backgrounds, cannot realistically expect to graduate from high school and send to college as high a percentage of their students as those school systems where residents hold higher socioeconomic status. Some students regardless of where they go to school lack the innate

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ability for or interest in higher education. But students in economically depressed environments particularly deserve other options. Critics of the system complain:

> (R)ather than design apprenticeship programs to provide job training for the 30 percent of the students who will never graduate from high school, the system resists tracking students into vocational education because tracks are supposed to be inequitable. It seems unlikely, however, that those who finish their high school years with neither a diploma nor a marketable skill regard their education as a triumph for equity.[117]

Decontrolling of society from the drug explosion. Factions of American society have battled the users and makers of nontherapeutic drugs and stimulants for almost all of the nation's history. For alcohol, which acts as both a stimulant and depressant, the goal to control public use stretches back to colonial days. In addition to the most popular mind-altering substances--caffeine, nicotine, alcohol, and marijuana--drugs that could be abused or used to support illegal commerce have been commercial realities since the nineteenth century. Early drug addiction to opium and heroin was limited to residents of large urban areas capable of paying their high cost.

In the 1930s amphetamines, prescribed for depression and obesity, began to be abused in first urban and later suburban society, and by the 1950s the nonprescription use of minor tranquilizers (especially the benzodiazepines) and barbiturates began serving a drug-hungry public.[118] In the

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1960s, heroin appeared as the greatest urban scourge. In 1971, President Nixon declared a "War on Drugs," discouraged foreign poppy cultivation, and promoted the substitution of methadone for heroin. In July 1973, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) was created within the Department of Justice by merging four separate drug law enforcement agencies to concentrate on drug interdiction and criminal prosecution of distributors. The war began. By 1992, the nation, through government, had spent nearly $70 billion to fight drugs.[119]

As the 1980s progressed, however, a particular drug, newly concentrated, became conspicuous for its societal impact and its associated effects on crime occurrence. Cocaine can be traced to its emergence in the nineteenth century pharmacopeia. The substance was first heralded as a medicine, and later almost as a panacea, then rejected for most medicinal uses, and finally categorized primarily as a substance of abuse. Expensive for most of its existence, a purified form of cocaine was developed in the early 1980s, crack.

A Crime Dictionary published in 1982 defines crack as "to break open a door, safe, vault or window; to falter emotionally and become mentally unbalanced; a whore."[120] Within a short period of time, the term had assumed a new and familiar character: "Crack, a derivative of cocaine, is a common commodity even in the best neighborhoods and is affordable to pre-high-schoolers. The combined factors of drug effects, availability, and affordability may help explain

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why the use of crack has grown so rapidly and is so difficult to deal with."[121] By 1985, cocaine use had reached a peak, while overall illicit drug use continued a twelve-year decline, according to data published in the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse. Yet crack's hold on the drug culture was unshakable. By 1990, no doubt existed in any informed New Yorker's mind as to what the word crack was likely related and what its implications for dependence were. The literature on the pernicious effects of the drug--taken on its own or in addition to other stimulant substances--had become a well-documented phenomenon.[122]

Crack's burden for inner-city youth was linked to economics: the cheap price drew many young people into distribution channels, encouraging them to sell the powder to their peer. This drew from the potential workforce makes who might otherwise have opted for what employment opportunities were available to them. The risk-reward ratio helps explain the lure of drug-related careers for youth--with limited job options, some youth selected the most profitable choice offering acceptable risks.

Sam Staley, an economist, argued in his book, Drug Policy and the Decline of American Cities, that the so-called War on Drugs increased urban violence by forcing drug traffickers to push harder to serve their customers. He explained that a nationwide decline in cocaine use in the late 1980s was due not to a decrease in drug availability or the success of educational programs but to the deaths of athletes Len Bias

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and Don Rogers. Staley further wrote: "While 84 percent of American high school seniors could get marijuana easily in 1990, a slight decline from 89 percent in 1980, cocaine availability increased to 54.5 percent from 47.9 percent and heroin availability almost doubled, to 31.9 percent from 16.4 percent. These trends occurred despite federal fundings for the War on Drugs that ballooned during the 1980s."[123]

A linear connection has presumed to exist between the excessive usage of mind-altering substances and anti-social behavior including violent and property crime. This assumption is risky. Simply because a person drank alcohol intemperately or "did drugs" occasionally or with some regularity did not make that individual a disorderly person or a criminal. Indeed, the "recreational" use of generally milder stimulants--caffeine, alcohol, and nicotine--remains a controversially accepted part of modern American life despite a solid body of established research findings that all such stimulants possess lurking risks for users.[124] However, studies have established the extent of known and unknown crime within adult populations both with observations by police at the time of arrest and from extensive self-reporting data collected separately. While the high relationship between illegal substance usage and overt criminal activity is well accepted, the connection between drug use and unreported or unsolved criminality proves the point.

James A. Inciardi investigated 573 male and female narcotics users, interviewing them at length concerning their

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crimes and arrests during the previous twelve months. The findings from the interviews was the "strikingly high" incidence of crime among this group while the arrest rate remained "almost insignificant." The 573 narcotics users in the study admitted to a total of 215,105 offenses during the previous 12 months, with an arrest rate less than 1 percent. More than half the offenses were "victimless," including drug sales, gambling, and prostitution. However, over 600 assaults, 1,000 frauds, 2,000 pickpocketings, 4,000 prostitute-theft incidents, 5,000 robberies, 6,000 burglaries, and 7,500 forgeries and counterfeiting offenses were acknowledged by the sample, most of whom were actively using drugs and committing crimes at the time of the interviews.[125]

The 1980s represented a time when government used increased incarceration, arrests, and community programs in an attempt to manage drug abuse problems, which were recognized as serious social problems long before the advent of crack. Two criminal justice professors sum up the experience of the 1980s drug control efforts:

> The well-publicized War on Drugs seems to be lost in a flood of marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and an all new family of "designer drugs"--those that are made for specific high or low reactions. The drug industry is estimated to be a $60 billion industry, and we are hard-pressed to find the resources to fight the chemical plague.[126]

Along with the emergence of crack, an increased flow of heroin added to New York City's drug-related crime problems. The purity level of heroin seized within the city grew steadily from 3.8 percent in 1982 to 37.0 percent in 1990.

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New York City Police Department seizures of heroin from 1982-90 vary considerably from year to year; however, the number of pounds seized for 1983-86 compared with the four years for 1987-90 indicate a difference of 469 pounds of seized heroin for the earlier four years, compared with 1,575 pounds for the later period, indicating to a presumed greater street availability of this drug.[127]

The National Survey on Drug Abuse is the most authoritative government-sponsored report on the country's illicit drug consumption. In the survey released in 1982, almost two-thirds of the sample, aged eighteen to twenty-five, had used marijuana and more than one-quarter had tried cocaine; however, much of this drug usage could be termed experimental with less than half the marijuana users having used the drug recently and about one-quarter of the cocaine users having tried the drug in the past month. As measured by death rates, both the experimental and chronic use of cocaine and heroin are not ranked high among the most lethal substances: the legalized stimulants are.

According to the Surgeon General, over 100,000 people die a year from alcohol effects including those caused by drunk driving; 300,000 are said to die from the effects of tobacco. In 1987 by contrast, 3,403 died nationally from cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and other socially proscribed substances combined.[128] Society fails to accept that "consumer culture" is responsible for major losses of life and does so without much reflection. Abhorrent to society as this terrible loss

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of life is, deaths from tobacco and alcohol abuse have tenuous linkage to urban disorder and the fear engender their commerce and use. That relationship is tied to immoderate consumption of illicit drugs which does correspond to the commission of Index crimes discussed in this work. Still at present an estimated one-tenth to one-quarter of those incarcerated on drug-related charges were not involved in violent or property crime and these "crime-free" internees may merit education and treatment in lieu of imprisonment with violent offenders. Yet availability of heroin and cocaine is linked to over half the murders in New York City and half of these involve dealers and their customers apparently in unresolvable disputes.

Donald J. Olsen in his Town Planning in London: The Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, identified distilled spirits as a social calming agent: "Cheap gin helped to keep the population of London stable from 1700 to 1750," when population remained stable during the half century.[129] The American policy against illicit drugs has been prohibitory, well intentioned, morally sound, and in some ways logical. But like the unsuccessful experience of alcohol prohibition earlier in the century, the current national policy supports flourishing drug-related crime by making the rewards greater than the risks for the persons attracted to drug-related crime commerce. Daniel Patrick Moynihan states: "It is essential we understand that by choosing prohibition we are choosing to have an intense crime problem concentrated among

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minorities."[130]

With the advent in the 1980s of a purified form of cocaine--crack--a measurable association with increased criminal activity occurred and the question may be asked: does previous historical experience in controlling addicted substances offer insight on how such a societal problem may be understood?

For roughly three-and-a-half centuries prior to 1990, alcohol control measures were attempted. The region sought first to prohibit availability of alcohol for native Indians, a measure which failed from its earliest endeavors. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, local laws were imposed and moral suasion was exercised until the Civil War averted the leadership for interdiction. Then in the late nineteenth century, reformers again turned their efforts to national prohibition. This was an audacious exercise, but one which was enthusiastically supported by a majority of the electorate in an effort to control broad urban problems from municipal corruption to ailments of the poor. These problems were centered particularly in the cities. National prohibition made cheap alcoholic beverages, notably beer and wine, scarce for poorer residents, while those with financial means who wanted alcohol supported illegal, flourishing streams of supply.

Due to this division of access to alcohol, arrests for related disorderly conduct and public inebriation charges dropped for poor to moderate income urban groups. Those with

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the means to buy illicit spirits, meanwhile, inadvertently but inevitably, supported profitable organizations which grew rapidly and became corporatized. In this context, it may be concluded, the prospect for success in restricting from a demanding segment of the public a highly desirable substance--alcohol or crack and other illicit substances of abuse--are dim based on the use of legal controls alone, no matter how well financed, dedicated, or skilled the enforcement action may be.

Drug control is an oxymoron: the costly, ineffectual social programs to combat the drug-crime connection await a new day for reformation, such as managed decriminalization and distribution.[131]

Losing control from proliferation of handguns. Between 1980 and 1990, the number of juveniles committing murder with guns increased 79 percent. The manifold availability of handguns made this possible, as a news report stated: "In 1990, nearly three out of every four youthful murderers used a firearm."[132] The report continued: "The rate was up not only among poor youth in urban areas...but 'in all races, social classes and life styles.'" This trend can be explained by such factors as youth-oriented weapon fashion, gun availability, and the desire of youth to have a gun to protect themselves from others who are armed. When youth enter the drug business, a weapon becomes a usual and expected business necessity. However, the increase in handgun availability is

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not related to juveniles alone: all age categories nationally participate in the effects from the availability and often fatal use of handguns.

New York City, like other metropolitan areas, faced exacerbating gun proliferation and violence, despite long established restricting local gun policies that were designed to control a public risk, but failed to do so. With the Sullivan Law passed early in the century, New York City had "the toughest gun law in the nation."[133] Police officials had been ambiguous for generations about local gun control legislation, but by 1970 police officers sensed the new risks inherent in criminal encounters where guns were available and police executives and officers' unions supported the passage of tougher gun control legislation. One measure called for automatic imprisonment for anyone using or possessing a handgun in the commission of a crime. It was hoped that this law would discourage strongly the importation to the city of illegal handguns and to deter their possession and usage: it failed to do so.

Guns have been a feature of American life since earliest colonial days, ennobled since the Federal period by the Second Amendment to the Constitution. The pivotal clause states: "A well-regulated Militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." From a historical retrospective, the measure is understandable, indeed compelling for the early post-colonial epoch. In 1790, the young nation continued to

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fear a menacing English power and would face a land and sea war with her former ruler beginning in 1812. Meanwhile, threats from other nations made the republican experiment risky, including an undeclared naval war with France, 1798-1800. A frontier mentality prevailed at the time the first ten amendments to the U.S. Constitution were debated 1789-1799. Protection was the state's first duty to her citizenry. What would happen if a usurping power or a rogue elite sought to suppress the incipient republic, the fledgling democracy? The right to keep and bear arms in the urban or frontier wilderness was akin to the right of liberty; therefore, a provision that no governmental power could prevent individuals from possessing arms as required by the militia seemed like a natural right to early Americans and a measure to be defended at all costs.

Over the next two centuries the rights of citizens to redress complaints or wrongs by government was sustained repeatedly by federal courts. In particular, the First Amendment became a bulwark of protection for individual liberties; conversely, the establishment of a powerful national army, which has been without exception subordinate to civilian authorities, mitigated the need for Second Amendment protection from a standing army. Further in time, the possession of guns in American urban life became incompatible with public safety. Yet for complex reasons many citizens gradually became divided into gun-loving and gun-hating opposites. Surely, guns were not used in all murders and

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nonnegligent homicides in the city, but for the period 1970-90 well over half all such felonious deaths were caused by handguns and in most years over 70 percent of deaths were committed by guns.

In 1975, the American Bar Association stated that the Second Amendment and provisions in state constitutions "have never prevented regulations of firearms," as the New York City example typified.[134] If the city had "the toughest" anti-gun law in the nation, supported by an increasingly vocal anti-gun police and civilian supporters, why could the law not be more successful? The answer involves two primary explanations.

First, guns are easy to transport from a state with few or no gun-possessing and owning regulations to a city like New York, which had explicitly firm measures passed into law. Higher jurisprudence than that passed by legislators in Albany--the law of supply and demand--would result in a steady supply of deadly hardware across an interstate border that had no controls. Reports of New Yorkers returning from Florida, Virginia, and other states with all the weapons they wanted facing little encumbrance in purchasing them was a feature of the 1980s.[135]

Another less perceived reason for gun proliferation relates to a magical loophole existing in federal firearms regulations. In New York City most individuals desiring to own or purchase a firearm were prohibited from doing so because of local regulations, such as denying applicants who had no demonstrable need for such a weapon. Further, if a

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pistol permit applicant had a felony conviction or other crime-related past, the City of New York would not grant a pistol permit. Throughout the 1980s individuals with a self-proclaimed need for a pistol permit--for example, an owner of a jewelry store who transported merchandise--would face a mandatory investigation and a delay of many months as the application was processed, and eventually the applicant might be rejected.

The magical loophole was that even an ex-felon could be able to obtain a federal license as a "gun dealer or collector." A convicted felon in New York City, despite the onerous regulations for local citizens, could obtain a permit as a gun dealer in the 1980s and order all the guns he or she wanted. An example of this regulatory largesse was a certain David T., a 35-year-old Bronx dry cleaning worker with a long criminal record: indicted for murder at age 16, but dismissed; arrested for assault age 17, but dismissed; arrested for criminal possession of a deadly weapon, age 18, and sentenced to jail for one year; arrested on weapons charges, age 20, disposition unknown; arrested for assault, age 28, pleaded guilty to a lesser charge; arrested for disorderly conduct, age 31, disposition unknown.

In February 1986, David T. applied for a license to become a dealer in firearms through the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF). In the application David T. was asked: "Have you ever been charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year?" He

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answered yes, but that did not prevent him from obtaining the license, overwhelming New York City's enunciated desire to control the gun trade within its border. David T. went into business. Months later, when detectives posing as deliverymen arrived with a shipment of guns and to collect thousands of dollars in cash due for the freight, they arrested David T. and found a cache of 112 pistols and revolvers, one of which was in a vise at the time of the arrest and had part of the serial number already filed off. Bronx County District Attorney Paul Gentile said David T. "(B)rought at least 1,000 handguns into the Bronx in the past year with the help of the United States Government and without knowledge of the New York City Police Department."[136] Over 800 such permits had been issued to city residents by late 1987.

This federal policy thwarted gun control laws like New York City's all over the nation. Between 1975 and 1990 only about one percent of people who applied to become gun dealers were denied a license in any given year. Moreover, only about six percent of gun dealers were investigated by BATF. From about 150,000 such licenses in the latter 1970s, the number began moving up sharply in 1980. By early 1993, 285,000 federally licensed firearms dealers existed in the United States.[137] A Washington Post article noted: "In 1990, handguns killed 22 people in Great Britain, 13 in Sweden, 91 in Switzerland, 87 in Japan, 10 in Australia, 68 in Canada, and 10,567 in the United States. God Bless America."[138]

According to data from the New York City Board of Health,

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1,595 homicides in the city were caused by firearms or explosives. Explosives account for a minor part of this loss of lives; therefore, about 15 percent of the nation's firearm-related crime fatalities occurred in a city representing approximately 3 percent of the nation's population.

Despite the best intentions of city policy, guns had become available to the fearful and criminals equally and served to exacerbate murder and other violent crime in the city.

According to Board of Health data for 1890, of sixty-one homicides, fifteen (25 percent) were committed by firearms or explosives; the largest number died from cutting, piercing, or clubbing. (Table 9.6) By 1940, firearms and explosives involvement in homicides increased to 31.4 percent. In the last two decades of this study, however, firearms and explosives accounted for 58.6 percent of all deaths in 1980 and 70.2 percent in 1990.

Theoretically, if all guns were removed from society, New York City's murder-homicide rate would still be high relative to economically developed countries. Moreover, perpetrators could use knives, clubs, and other weapons to do their killing, and New Yorkers desiring a weapon soon would have pistols replaced due to non-existent state border controls. Fanciful speculation aside, the connection between the rampant gun culture and inner city carnage and fear is beyond doubt, and it might be regarded in 1990 as the city's highest public health concern, as cholera and diphtheria were in 1890.

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Table 9.6

Causes of Death by Homicide, 1890-1990

Year	Cutting Piercing Clubbing	Firearms/ Explosives	Hanging/ Strang.	Submersion	Child Battering	Arson	Other	Total
1890	31	15	--	--	--	--	15	61
1900	70	61	--	--	--	--	9	140
1910	45	162	--	--	--	--	79	286
1920	39	177	--	--	--	--	109	325
1930	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	494
1940	100	91	--	--	--	--	79	290
1950	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	326
1960	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	425
1970	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	1,176
1980	447	1,118	75	4	16	--	246	1,908
1990	398	1,595	51	2	21	106	101	2,272

Note: Totals of homicides reported by the New York City Board of Health and the Police Department differ by a few incidents every year.

Source: New York City Board of Health, Summary of Vital Statistics, 1890-1990.

Regardless of this firm connection, further debate on a citizen's right to bear arms against a government that could crush liberty is apt to maintain the facility whereby an ample weapon supply is available to arm the would-be superpatriots as well as the inner-city criminal.[139]

Conclusion

Is the city unsafe? That is, is it "no exaggeration to say that the crime that has emerged in New York City threatens the very existence of the city in its present form"? Crime has never ceased to vex urban residents regardless of overall safety of the city. The costs of urban crime can be far reaching. Consequences from such a pattern of actual and perceived crime and the fear it engenders can rive citizens, businesses, and institutions from their urban base, leading to measurable economic and social decline.[140]

I conclude that crime risk has an important relationship to one's exposure to risk determined by age, sex, time, socioeconomic status, location, and other factors. The violent and property criminal is driven by opportunity, and sometimes lack of self-control, when the risk-reward ratio is propitious.

Property and violent crime as reported by police may not be used as a measure of accurate comparison over extended periods because of constantly changing definitions and police management issues. Murder-homicide is the most reliable measure of violent crime because of its high level of reliable

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reportage, though even here rates compared over time must be viewed cautiously.

Still the city has become safer over a century's time as measured by the death rate which considers mortality from all factors including public health issues and crime. By this measurement 1990 was "the safest" year based on death rates in a comparison covering eleven census periods of a century's passage. This occurred despite 1990 being the highest year historically in the murder-homicide rate for crime and due to a sharp increase in AIDS-related deaths since 1980.

But an issue remains: why was violent crime so much higher in the later decades of this study? Recorded serious crime by various measurements increased from a base beginning in the mid-1950s to hover at record levels from 1980 through 1990; this increase is particularly observed in the pattern of change in murder and nonnegligent homicide that increased from the mid-80s to 1990, while the crime-prone age decreased for the same years indicating that the killing was more active than most observers at the time believed.[141] Analysis of crime patterns indicates that the problem never involved the entire city, but rather infested areas of lowest socioeconomic status which were blighted by dysfunctional familial and societal controls. For many other residents in numerous areas of the city, the environment was historically safe.[142]

Crime exists naturally in society and is moderated by social controls which, when mitigated, lead to greater criminality. The complex and urgent problems concerning crime

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in the city remain heightened within the inner-city's poorest areas in which often fragmented family units subsist in a socially decontrolled environment. In addition to the decline of familial controls abetted by a pernicious welfare system, other measures explain high levels of violent crime and the spike of increased violent crime, 1985-90. Societal controls also declined, particularly police services that were underfunded and not managed to be community oriented in locations where crime was greatest. The changing nature of work reduced opportunities for youth to find dignified entry-level employment to divert themselves from potentially anti-social options. And the decline in public schooling to meet the needs of difficult inner-city youth made crime a limited option choice. Finally the facile availability of drugs and guns conspired to make life in the ghetto as dangerous as it is hard to escape.

By the close of 1990, New Yorkers, like residents of urban, suburban, and rural areas elsewhere, believed there was too much crime. They were informed of this from the media, official reports, and by their own direct experiences. Yet for many, if not all, the city remained a safe place: not if one lived, worked or travelled in distressed areas, and not if one pursued certain vocations, or dealt drugs, or was young and male and black, or frequented the wrong places at night. Yet amidst the pall of violent crime in these circumstances, hope was alive that the powerful, innate American determination to fix a problem could be directed afresh to

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reduce violence in the city and make the streets more secure and welcoming for people of all ages, groups, and economic conditions.

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ENDNOTES

1. The assumption that a "war against crime" could succeed in victory appears periodically. In 1931 the National Educational Association predicted that "crime will be abolished" by 1950 through the universal availability of education. See: Gwynne Nettler, Criminology Lessons, Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing, 1989, p. 207, n. 13.

2. See chap. 4. As noted, crime and urban disorder increased sharply in New York City for a brief time following the conclusion of World War I. Note patterns in table 9.1. Hardly more than two decades later a second major war occurred and again crime in the city was low during these years, though the period was not subject to discussion in this work. However, following World War II a major increase in major violent and property crime did not immediately occur like following the previous global conflict.

3. See chap. 5.

4. See chap. 6.

5. See chap. 7.

6. See chap. 8. According to a Presidential Commission (1973), crime "changes constantly, day and night, month to month, place to place. It is essential that society be able to tell when changes occur, what they are, that it be able to distinguish normal ups and downs from long-term trends." Robert W. Winslow, ed., Crime in a Free Society, 3rd ed., Encino and Belmont, CA: Dickenson Publishing Company, 1977, p. 45.

7. Charles A. Ellwood, "Has Crime Increased in the United States Since 1880?" Journal of the American Institute of Criminal Law and Criminology, vol. 1 (1910): 378-85. The term depression was not used at the time, the Panic of 1907-08 is largely thought to be related to rigidity of the currency system, then secured with bonds.

8. Ibid., p. 385. Ellwood stated that the data were not available for 1907 and that conclusions about a hypothetical "crime wave" were not justified at the time of his paper.

9. A.H. Hobbs, "Criminality in Philadelphia: 1790-1810 Compared with 1937," American Sociological Review, 8 (1943): 198-202. This same point was made by Melvyn Dubovsky in a review of Eric H. Monkkonen, The Dangerous Classes: Crime and Poverty in Columbus, Ohio, 1860-1885, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975. Dubovsky's point was that urbanization and industrialization don't cause poverty and crime, notes the reviewer, "They've been around since Biblical times." See: "A Case History in the Perils of 'Nonsocial History,'" Labor History, 13 (Spring 1977): 275-78.

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10. Robert S. Munford, Ross S. Kazer, Roger A. Feldman, and Robert R. Stivers, "Homicide Trends in Atlanta," Criminology 14 (August 1976): 213-31.

11. Leon Radzinowicz and Joan King, The Growth of Crime: The International Experience, New York: Basic Books, 1977, p. 3.

12. Ibid., pp. 5-9.

13. Eric H. Monkhonen, America Becomes Urban: The Development of US Cities & Towns, 1780-1980, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988, p. 97.

14. Theodore N. Ferdinand, "The Criminal Patterns of Boston since 1849," American Journal of Sociology, 73 (1967): 84-99.

15. Ibid., p. 87.

16. Roger Lane, "Crime and Criminal Statistics in Nineteenth-century Massachusetts," Journal of Social History 2 (1968): 156-63; also Policing the City: Boston 1822-1885. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967. Lane notes: "The issue of felonious criminality is more complex. Those mad or desperate offenses which accounted for most serious crime were not proportionately on the increase during the nineteenth century," pp. 221-2.

17. Ted Robert Gurr, "On the History of Violent Crime in Europe and America," in Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, ed. Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979, p. 359. A perusal of newspapers over the period 1885-95 indicates that few articles related to murder in the commission of robbery, yet the fear of such crime was a persistent feature of the time.

18. The police reported arrests of 106 persons for 1890 (Table 9.1) while the Board of Health tabulated 61 homicides and 1,449 violent deaths for the same year. (Table 9.2)

19. A principal example is domestic violence against which victims had little recourse within the precinct stations of an urban police department until the women's rights issue beginning in the 1960s forced a change in police response and reporting.

20. The automobile made an urban presence in the city during the first decade of the century and the Times attacked automobiles in 1905 as "devil wagons," and demanded an eight mile per hour speed limit. Anti-vice crusader Dr. Charles Parkhurst and Princeton University president Woodrow Wilson both attacked through sermon and speeches the depredations of the automobile in the decade. See: Clay McShane, Down the Asphalt Path: The Automobile and the American City, New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, pp. 178-9. McShane's lively

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narrative includes environmental, safety, and legal issues but ignores automobile crime. The New York City Police Department first noted automobile as a separately reported crime in 1915, but the incident failed to be accorded regular reporting until 1928.

21. E.L. Godkin, North American Review 150 (1890): 706-723. Police honesty is a fragile, precious quality in a democratic city that is never absolute, never enduring, always subject to changing temptations and management controls. The phenomenon of recurring cycles of police malfeasance is outlined in Robert D. McCrie, "Every Generation, Corruption Hits the Fan,"

New York Newsday, October 6, 1993, pp. 87, 90.

22. The changes have more than compensated for the increase in murders-homicides in the later years of this study. Similarly, a historian considering another city's crime changes over time wrote: "What is the conclusion as to the amount of crime in Boston today as compared with that in other years and cities? The safest conclusion is none at all." Sam Bass Warner, Crime and Criminal Statistics in Boston, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934.

23. Glanville Williams, "The Definition of Crime," Current Legal Problems, 8 (1955): 107-30.

24. Leslie T. Wilkins, "The Relative Nature of Deviance," in Crime and Justice, vol. 1, ed. Leon Radzinowicz and Marvin E. Wolfgang, New York: Basic Books, 1971, pp. 43-7.

25. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States: Uniform Crime Reports, 1990, Washington, DC: USGPO, 1991, pp. 184-5 (Hereafter cited as UCR). For a discursive comment on the age-crime curve, see David P. Farrington, "Age and Crime," in Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of Research, vol. 7, ed. Michael Tonry and Norval Morris, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1986, pp. 189-250.

26. Annette Jolin and Don C. Gibbons, "Age Patterns in Criminal Involvement," International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 31 (1987): 237-60. It should be noted that some commentators place more emphasis on youth as a critical predictive factor on crime prediction than the study does. For example: Irwin M. Selzer, "Beware the Coming Crime Wave," New York Post, May 18, 1995, p. 21.

27. Anthony M. Platt, The Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquency, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969 (Hereafter cited as Child Savers). Also: Harold Finestone, Victims of Change: Juvenile Delinquents in American Society, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976.

28. UCR, 1990, pp. 182-3.

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29. Elaine Player, "Women and Crime in the City," in Crime and the City, ed. David Downes, London: Macmillan, 1989, pp. 111-27. This is the issue of "feminist criminology" which sometimes, taken to extremes, argues that women are discriminated against by either preferential upbringing or gender-linked sensitivity by the courts. An intriguing concept is that women are under greater supervision in Western societies leading to a more surveillant youth, reducing chances of criminal behavior. For a perspective of how European criminal justice systems control girls' lives, see: Maureen Cain, ed., Growing Up Good: Policing the Behaviour of Girls in Europe, London: Sage Publications, 1989, esp. pp. 1-18.

30. Charles Tittle, Wayne Villemez, and Douglas Smith, "The Myth of Social Class and Criminality: An Empirical Assessment of the Empirical Evidence," American Sociological Review, 43 (1978): 643-56.

31. John Braithwaite, "The Myth of Social Class and Criminality Reconsidered," American Sociological Review, 46 (1981): 36-57.

32. Clearly, a factor exists that associates crime with opportunity. A poor person generally does not have the chance to embezzle from a company, illegally deceive government regulators, or demand kickbacks from buyers. Similarly, a member of the top socioeconomic quintile is not likely to be arrested as a robber or burglar because the reward would not be worth the risks since the apprehension for such a crime, though unlikely, could lead to court-imposed sanctions and costly defense far greater than potential expected rewards.

33. The reasons why crime decreases during war are likely to be: representation of the crime-prone age in military service either as volunteers, draftees, or as required by the courts as an alternative to incarceration; the generally tighter security controls on property during wartime; a tendency to treat law breakers more harshly during such times, and perhaps a sense of purpose or perceived unity that would deter marginal law breakers. While adults are less likely to be arrested for crimes during times of economic expansion, the reverse may be true for juveniles who have less adult supervision.

34. Crime Analysis Unit, "Statistical Report: Complaints and Arrests," New York City Police Department, 1991. Also: Matthew Purdy, "1993 Homicides Fewer but More Clustered in New York City," New York Times, January 10, 1994, pp. B1, B4. See also no. 41.

35. UCR, 1990, p. 51.

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36. Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Bell Curve, New York: The Free Press, 1994. The debate on this book and the issues it raises had centered on IQ measurement and its implications for schools, testing, government programs, and other topics. See for example The New Republic, October 31, November 7, 1994, passim; Jason DeParle, "Daring Research or 'Social Science Pornography'?" New York Times Magazine, October 9, 1994, pp. 48-53, 70-80.

Surely, the authors' conclusions should not allow assumptions about inner city education to foster lesser expectations from students in such institutions: the lesson of genetics is that smart and dumb persons are produced about equally in all socioeconomic groups. The crime connection issue is largely ignored in this debate, but deserves further recognition.

37. Ibid. Police investigators who account for numerous criminal arrests frequently express themselves in amazement that the people they arrest don't seem too bright. See for example: Alison Mitchell, "A Detective's Secret Weapon, So Many Criminals Trip Themselves Up," New York Times, August 22, 1993, sec. 4, pp. 1, 5.

38. Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray, "Race, Pathology and IQ," Wall Street Journal, October 10, 1994, p. A12.

39. Lewis Mumford, The Culture of Cities, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1938, p. 266.

40. UCR 1990, p. 51.

41. Crime Analysis Unit, "Statistical Report: Complaints and Arrests," Police Department City of New York, 1991. Population estimates only are available for the precincts and were provided informally by crime analysis officers. Based on this information, the "safest" seventeen precincts judged by murder-homicide were: 1, 6, 10, 17, 19, 20, 62, 66, 78, 94, 100, 102, 111, 112, 122, 123, and Manhattan South. Not considered is the Central Park Precinct which has a low crime rate but no residents.

While the comparison of international murder rates is a chancy activity, the national rates for European countries in the period 1983-84 ranged from a low of 0.92 per 100,000 population for Norway to a high of 5.74 for Sweden. These countries have higher crime rates in urban areas for both violent and property offenses. The same year Canada had a rate of 6.3 and the United States 8.3. See: George Thomas Kurian, World Encyclopedia of Police Forces and Penal Systems, New York: Facts on File, 1989, and Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports 1983, Washington, DC: USGPO, 1994. (Appendix)

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42. The ten precincts evaluated to have the highest murder-homicide rate on a population adjusted basis were: 32, 34, 40, 44, 46, 48, 75, 77, 79, and 83. These are the author's determinations, not those of the police department's.

43. Marshall B. Clinard, "The Nature of the Slum," in Crime in the City, ed. Daniel Glaser, New York: Harper & Row, 1970, p. 20. Clinard cites research by David R. Hunter who estimated that slums account for about 20 percent of the population of an American city and account for approximately 50 percent of all the arrests, 45 percent of the reported major crimes, and 55 percent of the reported juvenile delinquency cases. See also: David R. Hunter, The Slums: Challenge and Response, New York: Free Press, 1994, pp. 32, 71, 77.

A similar observation is made in British urban communities: "There is growing evidence that residents in areas of unpopular public-sector Council housing suffer from disproportionate levels of crime and other forms of social abuse." See: Anne Power, "Housing, Community and Crime," in Crime and the City, ed. David Downes, London: Macmillan, 1989, p. 206. Power also adds that during an increase in crime in the 1980s when "crime rates climbed everywhere, they climbed furthest on the poorest Council estates. Rates of burglary are nearly four times greater on the poorest estates than in better-off areas," p. 215. The reason for this may be related to numerous ramifications, such as the ability of wealthier neighborhoods to purchase superior security hardware or hire private neighborhood protection which would displace crime from their area.

44. The term "racist" is a vexatious, frequently pejorative term with the capacity to shut off meaningful discussion. Indeed the word "race" like "IQ" are clear to some people, but are considered myths to others. Ashley Montague wrote: "When, on occasion, the suggestion is made that these terms correspond to no reality whatever, but constitute an amalgam of erroneous and stultifying ideas of the most damaging kind, the suggestion is received either with blank incredulity or open derision. Nevertheless, the truth is the these terms not only are unsound but in fact correspond to no verifiable reality, and have, indeed, been made the basis for social and political action of the most heinous kinds," Ashley Montague, "Introduction," Race and IQ, ed. Ashley Montague, New York: Oxford University Press, 1975, p. 1.

45. About a century after the Romans left the British Isles beginning 400 A.D., a group of Scotti led by Erc and his three sons crossed from northern Ireland and landed near what became Argyll, calling their new land Dalraida. Erc's three sons created rival dynasties and became ancestors of the clans which later dominated the Highlands of Western Scotland.

Among many qualities, the Scots have been fighters against the Picts, their Celtic cousins, but particularly against their enemies the Britons and Angles to the south with

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whom clashes continued over the centuries and continued after the union with England in 1603 when James VI of Scotland became James I of the Commonwealth. Hostilities between the two contiguous nations only ceased in 1746 when the Jacobites were defeated at Culloden mostly by mercenaries led by the Duke of Cumberland.

While a number of Scots were residents when New Netherlands was surrendered to Col. Richard Nicolls in 1664, the Scots largely were prohibited from immigrating to America until after the Union of Parliaments in 1707. In New York the Scots' first minister was arrested by the English for failing to possess a license to preach. Over the years Scots continued to fight the English hegemony and played a role in supporting a separation from England. See: David Dobson, Scottish Emigration to Colonial America, 1607-1785, Athens and London: University of Georgia Press, 1994; Ian Charles Cargill Graham, Colonists from Scotland: Emigration to North America, 1707-1783, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956; Melvin H. Buxbaum, Benjamin Franklin and the Zealous Presbyterians, University Park and London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975; Charles A. Hanna, The Scotch-Irish, or The Scot in North Britain, North Ireland, and North America, vol. 1. New York: G.P. Putnam Sons, 1902, pp. 1-69. Not all of the Scots supported American separation from England; several thousands in New York were loyalists.

46. James F. Richardson, The New York Police, Colonial Times to 1901, New York: Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 141.

An indication of Irish poverty is that between the years 1848 and 1891, inmates of the Alms House who were born in Ireland averaged 64 percent with a low of 45 percent in 1866 and a high of 73 percent in 1871. "The percentage of Irish-born in the prisons and charity hospitals for the same period show a disproportionately high figure," Florence E. Gibson, The Attitudes of the New York Irish Toward State and National Affairs, 1848-1892, New York: Columbia University Press, 1951, pp. 16-17.

A detailed study of immigrant Irish life following the years of the "Great Hunger" in New York's Sixth Ward, which included the notorious Five Points, is found in Carol Groneman Pernicone, The "Bloody Ould Sixth," A Social Analysis of a New York City Working-Class Community in the Mid-Century, Ph.D. diss., University of Rochester, 1973. The author does not discuss crime in the ward but does provide a picture of strong kin-based relationships that aided in obtaining work for immigrants, making social mobility possible.

Crime from another important immigrant group, the Germans, who constituted about 15 percent of the population of New York City between 1860-80, occurred but at moderate levels. A historian writes: "The German immigrant community thus stood in marked contrast to its Irish contemporaries and later Jewish and Italian immigrant communities in failing to produce a significant violent underclass. On the whole, German New York's artisans and skill workers were able to create a

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stable enough environment for their families to protect their community from the widespread juvenile delinquency and criminality that desperate poverty generated in other immigrant communities." Stanley Nadel, Little Germany: Ethnicity, Religion, and Class in New York City, 1845-80, Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1990, p. 87.

47. T.J. English, The Westies: Inside the Hell's Kitchen Irish Mob, New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1990, describes venerable gangs mostly of Irish immigrants and their descendants who operated from 34th Street on the south to 59th Street on the north and bounded by Eighth Avenue on the east and the Hudson River to the west. By the 1960s, the author writes: "No longer an immigrant class, middle-income Irish Catholics assimilated--with a vengeance," p. 51 and "Local neighborhood mobs like the Hell's Kitchen Irish were allowed to operate, but only as long as the Italians got their cut," p. 53.

48. Thomas Kessner, The Golden Door: Italian and Jewish Immigrant Mobility in New York City 1880-1915, Urban Life in America Series, New York: Oxford University Press, 1977, p. 155.

49. Jenna Weissman Joselit, Dark Shadows: New York Jews and Crime, 1900-1940, Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1981, pp. 119, 329. The author quotes Rabbi Maurice Harris who argued that "we Jews have no more need to apologize for our convicts than the Episcopalians or the Lutherans for theirs [because] to err is not Jewish, not Christian, but human." Yet while the fear of immigrant crime was high, on a population adjusted basis native born persons convicted of a felony in New York County 1909-15 constituted a majority. Foreign born accounted for 36.7 percent in 1909; 39.4 percent in 1912, and 44.4 percent in 1915, and from 1900 to 1914 the number of foreign born persons held in the county for committing a minor crime grew from 49 percent to close to 60 percent. This group included foreign born from many nations and the author finds: "Controlling for age and sex, we find that for the whole of the prewar period the foreign born element was under-represented among those charged with committing a major crime; conversely, the native born were considerably over-represented among those arraigned on felony charges," p. 111.

Yet of Jews arrested for felony charges, 1900-1915, 28.7 percent were native born, the remainder were born in Russia 46.0 percent; Austria 11.5 percent, and Germany and Hungary 4.0 percent each, p. 118. Based on population Joselit concludes "Jewish criminals were a small proportion of the larger Jewish community and their behavior most unrepresentative," though Jewish crime grew as a social problem during the time, pp. 121, 329.

50. See chap. 5.

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51. Donald R. Cressey, Theft of the Nation: The Structure and Operations of Organized Crime in America, New York: Harper & Row, 1969, and Ralph Salerno and John S. Tompkins, The Crime Confederation: Cosa Nostra and Allied Operations in Organized Crime, Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969. For the origins of Sicilian crime and kinship patterns: Anton Blok, The Mafia of a Sicilian Village 1860-1960: A Study of Violent Peasant Entrepreneurs, New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1974.

52. Many prominent organized crime fighters in the city were also of Italian and Sicilian heritage.

53. Fenton Bresler, The Chinese Mafia, New York: Stein & Day, 1981; Gerald L. Posner, Warlords of Crime: Chinese Secret Societies: The New Mafia, New York: Penguin Books, 1988. Seth Mydans, "For Vietnamese, a Wave of Gang Terror," New York Times, April 8, 1991, p. A11. Francis A. J. Ianni, Black Mafia: Ethnic Succession in Organized Crime, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1974.

54. Norval Morris and Michael H. Tonry, "Black Crime, Black Victims," in The Pursuit of Criminal Justice, Studies in Crime and Justice, ed. Gordon Hawkins and Franklin E. Zimring, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984, p. 279.

55. National Crime Victimization Survey, "Young Black Male Victims," Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, December, 1994.

56. Ibid.

57. David Ray Papke, "Crime and Punishment," in Encyclopedia of American Social History, vol. 3, ed. Mary Kupiec Cayton, Elliott J. Gorn, Peter W. Williams. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993, p. 2080.

Higher arrests for blacks, an author believes, may be because deviance "is more likely to come to the attention of the police and lead to arrests" and that color can lead to "unwarranted stopping and questioning, searching, and arresting when there is no evidence that a crime has been committed." James E. Blackwell, The Black Community: Diversity and Unity, New York: Harper & Row, 1975, p. 246.

58. Leonce Gaiter, "American Mantra: Blame the Black Man," New York Times, November 12, 1994, p. 21.

59. Clemence Fiagome, "Blacks Look Inward on Crime," Christian Science Monitor, June 21, 1994, p. 2.

60. Randall Kennedy, "Blacks and Crime," Wall Street Journal, April 8, 1994, p. A14. The same year a newspaper story profiled a 15-year-old who believed his basketball sneakers "was messed up" and lacking money for a new pair, he robbed and killed a Dominican-American man who was delivering candy

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bars to a bodega. The reporter commented: "Hundreds of such senseless killings occur every year, but the black community's reaction is tepid compared to what occurs when a less than totally innocent black youth gets brutalized by the police," Hugh Pearson, "Black America's Silent Majority," New York Times, May 26, 1994, p. A23.

61. Bob Herbert, mod., "Who Will Help the Black Man?" New York Times Magazine, December 4, 1994, pp. 72-77, 90-110. John J. DiIulio, Jr. has written repeatedly for the right of black neighborhoods to be safe and secure, and the frequency with which inner city blacks bemoan the insufficiency of police protection in their neighborhoods, "The Question of Black Crime," The Public Interest, no. 117 (Fall 1994): 3-32, and "White Lies About Black Crime," The Public Interest, no. 118, (Winter 1995): 30-44.

62. Martin Shefter, ed., Capital of the American Century: The National and International Influence of New York City, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1993. Shefter writes: "If, as Walter Benjamin said, the capital of the nineteenth century was Paris, then the capital of the American century was New York," p. 1.

63. According to one author fear of crime led to the passage of a "bad law" resulting in "a great leap toward a police state." It was passage of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 which the author viewed as an irrational reaction to crimes mainly of young urban males. Richard Harris, The Fear of Crime, New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969.

64. In New York City police commissioner Patrick Murphy ordered all police precincts to provide complaint numbers without reservation to citizens reporting crimes. These complaints would be in addition to complaints by police officers on behalf of the people created during the conduct of normal police duties. This resulted in a substantial increase in the number of major and minor crimes reported but it was also a more accurate indication of crime activity.

65. Richard Eddy, Alcohol in History, Mauston, WI: National Temperance Society and Publication House, 1887. The author states: "Nothing is more fully proven than that Intemperance is one of the most prolific sources of crime," p. 216.

66. Anthony Comstock, Frauds Exposed; or, How the People Are Deceived and Robbed, and Youth Corrupted, Montclair, NJ: Patterson Smith, [1880], 1969. Such schemes "are corrupters of youth; they beggar wives and children; they breath the spirit of gambling, and ruin and destruction follow in their wake. They are rightfully regarded as public foes," p. 6.

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67. The response to this was religious humanitarianism and outreach to the unchurched and poor areas of the city. For example: Child Savers, p. 18.

68. John D. Townsend, New York in Bondage, New York: For subscribers, 1901. The book is a jeremiad against the anti-reform politicians who had regained control of the city. "For more than forty years the people of New York have been in the slough of absolute hopelessness concerning the government of their city." Among the causes for anguish was a corrupt police department which the state legislature allowed to be exposed in 1875 due to the "enormity of crime," police demoralization, and inefficiency, pp. 169-83.

69. George J. Kneeland, Commercial Prostitution in New York City, New York: The Century Company, 1913. This volume identified commercial prostitution with considerable detail in the city for 1912, but does not make any value judgments. Also for a reference that includes discussion and value judgment, see: E. Norine Law, The Shame of a Great Nation: The Story of the "White Slave Trade," Harrisburg: United Evangelical Publishing House, 1909.

70. A publication from a citizens' crime group claimed that police bias and racial discrimination were not explanatory for crime problems in the city, it was "the utter collapse of the system of juvenile justice and the increasing inacceptability of entry-level employment to dropout youth. At present, in the lives of these young people, there is simply no clear pattern of rewards for good behavior and penalties for bad. There is no effective economic carrot and judicial stick to communicate to coming generations the values which the society upholds and expects its young to observe." Whitney North Seymour, Jr. et al. eds., Blow the Whistle on Crime, New York: Citizens Action on Crime, 1979, p. 8.

71. A complaint of FBI crime reports is that it concentrates on crime caused by those with low socioeconomic status, see: Jeffrey H. Reiman, The Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Prison: Ideology, Class, and Criminal Justice, 2nd ed., New York: Wiley, 1984.

The FBI has also been criticized for giving "warped impression" of crime through the use of its "crime clocks" which show shrinking average intervals between the commission of various offenses. One critic notes: "This baffling presentation...seems to have no purpose other than sheer terror." The author notes that "the FBI's crime-reporting system [has a] tendency to tempt exaggeration, oversimplification, and even manipulation of the crime increase," though the critic also states: "Crime--violent crime--is increasing rapidly, and few criminologists will now deny it." Fred P. Graham, "A Contemporary History of American Crime, in Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, vol. 2. A Report to the National Commission on

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the Causes and Prevention of Violence. ed. Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr. Washington, DC: National Commission, June 1969, chap. 13. Also: James Bennet, "New York Crime Statistics vs. Reality," New York Times, August 16, 1992, p. 39.

72. Lisa W. Foderaro, "The Mentally Ill Overwhelm New York's Prisons," New York Times, October 6, 1994, pp. A1, B8.

73. Over much of this study immigration has been perceived by natives to be related to increased crime caused by immigrants. In a pioneer study, Thorsten Sellin showed that the immigrant crime rate was not quantitively different from that of natives, Culture Conflict and Crime, New York: Social Science Research Council, 1938. Fear of "Marielitos" who served time in Cuban prisons before arriving in Southern Florida, created some justified fears of disproportionate criminality; however, a study of homicides in Dade County, Florida, determined that Cuban immigrant and native black homicide rates were similar. William Wilbanks, Murder in Miami, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984, p. 26.

74. Many studies have suggested possible connections between violence on television and aggression in children, adolescents, and young adults. An epidemiologist-psychiatrist at the University of Washington, Seattle, wondered how dangerous television is for the nation's health. The researcher compared white-on-white homicides in the United States, Canada, and South Africa for the years 1945 and 1975. He found the greatest increase began in the early 1960s with the widespread introduction of television in the US and Canada, rising from 1.3 to 2.5 homicides in Canada and 3.0 to 5.8 in the US per 100,000 population.

In South Africa, where television was banned until 1974, the white homicide rate dropped seven percent between 1945 and 1974 from 2.7 to 2.5 homicides per 100,000 population. He predicted an increased homicide rate after the introduction of television to South Africa: the white homicide rate increased about 130 percent in that country between 1975 and 1987. See: Brandon S. Centerwall, "Exposure to Television as a Risk Factor for Violence," American Journal of Epidemiology, 129 (April 1989): 643-52.

The Center for Media and Public Affairs determined in a study in 1992 that 1,846 violent scenes occurred during "a day in the life of television" on ten channels which were monitored. Two years later, a 41 percent increase for the same channels, measuring programming between 6 a.m. and midnight, was noted. Michele Greppi, "Violence Rising, Not Falling, Study Says," New York Post, August 5, 1994, p. 103.

In 1972, the Surgeon General linked television to aggressive behavior; the industry protested. The next major federal statement inculpating the medium was not until a speech in 1993 to the television industry. See: Michael Wines, "Reno Chastises TV Networks on Violence in Programming,"

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New York Times, October 21, 1993, pp. A1, B16. The day following Reno's speech, the industry again objected. A television producer of one of the shows cited as most violent said: "Audiences love violence. They eat it up. They can't seem to get enough of it." See: Bill Hoffmann, "TV Execs. Say Reno's Wrong," New York Post, October 22, 1993, p. 11.

Television has also been criticized for the subtle way programming emphasizes antisocial behavior, particularly among children: Marilyn Gardner, "TV Values: Bart's Bad Influence," Christian Science Monitor, February 28, 1995, p. 4. Also: Elizabeth Kolbert, "Television Gets Closer Look as a Factor in Real Violence," New York Times, December 14, 1994, pp. A1, D20.

Since 1990, other forms to violence have been thought to corrupt youth--music lyrics and video games. Jon Pareles, "Pop View: Dissing the Rappers Is Fodder for the Sound Bite," New York Times, June 28, 1992, sec. 2, p. 20, and Lindsey Gruson, "Video Violence: It's Hot! It's Mortal! It's Kombat!" New York Times, September 16, 1993, pp. B1, 8.

75. John Edgar Hoover, Law Enforcement Bulletin, 29 (January 1960): 1. The director opined that the morals of America were besieged by the profit principle: "I am speaking of the unquestionably base individuals who spread obscene literature across our land to the means of films, decks of playing cards, photographs, 'comic' books, salacious magazines, paperbacked books and other pornographic products. These forms of obscenity indeed threaten the morality of our Nation and its richest treasure--our young people....Despite the splendid service rendered daily by the overwhelming majority of advertising and entertainment executives, a small group of opportunists in these industries are degrading America and its youth." Hoover connects pornography with the growth in forcible rapes between 1957 and 1958, a crime "occurring every 36 minutes!"

76. No unitary cause of "crime" can exist; therefore, no unitary control measure will suffice.

77. Increasing (or decreasing) crime rates may be due to factors unrelated to actual increase in crime such as more comprehensive reporting and recording of incidents.

78. Indeed, generally since its inception and certainly since 1981, the National Crime Survey (NCS) has shown a steady decrease in crime incidence. This survey uses national structured samples of citizens who report on crimes both reported and not reported to police for: rape, personal robbery, aggravated and simple assault, household burglary, personal and household larceny, and motor vehicle theft. This criminal victimization survey sample is then extrapolated to the nation and is conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. Data are not reported for specific locales like New York City, though the survey is believed to be more

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accurate at identifying previously unreported crime.

NCS victimization trends for 1973-90 identify a pattern in which violent crimes remain unchanged over the time span. By contrast personal theft and household crimes peaked in 1981 at 41.4 million and had declined to 34.4 million in 1990. The report confirmed that during this time the public increased the percentage of criminal victimization reported to the police from 32 percent to 38 percent for all crimes. "Criminal Victimization 1990," BJS Bulletin, October 1991, NCJ-130234.

A statistician at the Bureau of Justice Statistics determined that "Accompanying rising incarceration rates have brought gradual reduction in US crime rates after 1973," though he also notes: "Whether rising incarceration rates have reduced crime in the United States cannot be said with certainty," though the author believes that they have. Patrick A. Langan, "America's Soaring Prison Population," Science 251 (29 March 1991): 1568, 1573.

79. Murder and nonnegligent homicide have limitations as types of crime to be used for comparative purposes in that the dynamics of the perpetrator may not necessarily be equated with the type of crime being committed by others committing different offenses. Murder tends to be an event linked to episodic dysfunction among family members, friends, or acquaintances. Only about one-third of such incidents are committed against strangers as in crimes.

Reported data for New York City indicate the surge of homicides adjusted for population from 1950-90, but this was not an isolated phenomenon. Nationally, homicides measured from 1800 on cycled up and down over the decades, but began a relentless increase in the 1950s that reached a point far greater than the previous levels. See: Fox Butterfield, "Historical Study of Homicide and Cities Surprises the Experts," New York Times, October 23, 1994, p. 16.

The phenomenon of long term increased crime recorded by police was not limited to the United States. In England and Wales, crime offenses for the period 1876-1992 were essentially flat until about 1930 when an increase was noted that continued until about 1948, where it fluctuated within a stable range, and then increased sharply, generally, through 1992. See: Mike Maguire, "Crime Statistics, Patterns, and Trends: Changing Perceptions and Their Implications," in The Oxford Handbook of Criminology, ed. Mike Maguire, Rod Morgan, and Robert Reiner, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, pp. 256-59.

80. Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method, trans. S.A. Solovay and J.M. Mueller, ed. G.E.G. Carlin, Glencoe, IL: Free Press, [1938], 1958, p. 67.

81. Plato, The Laws of Plato, trans. Thomas L. Pangle, Basic Books, 1980, p. 32, passim. Earliest records also attest to the difficulty of rearing children, particularly males. Sumerian tablets, circa 1750 B.C., testify to the problems a father experienced with a rebellious son. John H. Wigmore,

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Source of Ancient and Primitive Law, Select Readings on the Origin and Development of Legal Institutions, vol. 1, Boston: Little, Brown, 1951.

82. An example is Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck, Family Environment and Delinquency, Littleton, CO: Fred B. Rothman & Co., 1982. See also chap. 3.

83. Thomas D. Snyder and Carol Sue Fromboluti, Youth Indicators 1993: Trends in the Well-Being of American Youth, Washington, DC: USGPO, 1993, pp. 16-17.

84. Ibid., pp. 18-19.

85. Ibid., pp. 24-25.

86. For the period 1960 to 1988, international comparisons of births to unmarried women showed an increase in several western countries. In the United States during this period, births to unmarried women rose 349 percent; it was exceeded by Ireland at 555 percent and the Netherlands at 488 percent. In the same range as the United States were Denmark at 342 percent; France 308; Luxembourg 250, and the United Kingdom 313. Nations with little increase include: Germany 11 percent; Greece 14, and Italy 50. Ibid., p. 26.

87. Ibid., pp. 48-49.

88. Ibid., pp. 130-31.

89. David Blankenhorn, Fatherless America: Confronting Our Most Urgent Social Problem, New York: Basic Books, 1995, p. 49. The author further states, p. 32: "We are generating male violence much faster than we can incarcerate it. Prisons cannot replace fathers."

90. Ruth Horowitz, Teen Mothers: Citizens or Dependents?, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995, p. 240.

91. Jane Gross, "Collapse of Inner-City Families Creates America's New Orphans," New York Times, March 29, 1992, pp. 1, 20. The article gives an example of how school discipline is tricky by citing the following "typical exchange": TEACHER: "All right, Charles, I'm going to call your mother." STUDENT: "Go on ahead. I don't have no mother no way."

92. Heather MacDonald, "Welfare Next Vietnam," City Journal, 5 (Winter 1995) 23-38, and James Q. Wilson, "Welfare Reform and Character Development," City Journal, 5 (Winter 1995) 56-64. Wilson states: "Our overriding goal ought to be to save the children. Other goals should be secondary to improving the life prospects of the next generation." A recent concept is the use of orphanages in response to the plight of poor,

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single parents requiring boarding schools for their children. See: Nurith Zmora, Orphanages Reconsidered: Child Care Institutions in Progressive Era Baltimore, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994. Also: James Q. Wilson, "Bring Back the Orphanage," Wall Street Journal, August 22, 1994, p. A10, and Susan Chira, "Struggling to Find Stability When Divorce is a Pattern," New York Times, March 19, 1995, pp. 1, 42.

93. Lawrence A. Greenfield, Prisons and Prisoners in the United States, Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1992.

94. Ibid., p. x.

95. Louis W. Jakowski, Correctional Populations in the United States, 1990, Washington, DC: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1992.

96. David C. Anderson, "A World Leader in Prisons," New York Times, March 2, 1991, p. 22, and Steven A. Holms, "Ranks of Inmates Reach One Million in a 2-Decade Rise," New York Times, October 28, 1994, pp. A1, 25.

97. National Institute of Justice, Research in Action, Washington, DC: National Institute of Justice, August, 1988 Also: Francis X. Clines, "Prisons Run Out of Cells, Money and Choices," New York Times, May 28, 1993, p. B7. For references to private prisons during the time, see: Timothy L. O'Brien, "Private Prison Market Attracts More and More Firms," Wall Street Journal, June 10, 1993, p. B2, and Robert D. McCrie, "Private Correction: The Delicate Balance," in Privatizing Correctional Institutions, ed. Gary W. Bowman, Simon Hakim and Paul Seidenstat, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1993, pp. 19-32.

98. David Holmstrom, "More Prisons Not a Cure to Crime, Experts Say," Christian Science Monitor, February 23, 1994, p. 7. The years had produced a jail population increasingly more violent and recidivist: Paul J. McNulty, "Who's in Jail, and Why They Belong There," Wall Street Journal, November 9, 1994, p. A23.

99. John J. DiIulio, Jr., "America's Ticking Crime Bomb and How to Defuse It," Wisconsin Interest, 3 (Spring/Summer 1994): 1-8.

100. Celia W. Dugger, "A Boy in Search of Respect Discovers How to Kill," New York Times, May 15, 1994, pp. 1, 36; Joe Sexton, "Young Criminals' Prey: Usually Young," New York Times, December 1, 1994, pp. A1, B14; Joseph B. Treaster, "Beyond Probation: Trying to Break Cycle of Arrest and Rearrest," New York Times, December 29, 1994, p. B7.

The Dugger article was criticized by a rival newspaper

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for failing to portray the boy as "a remorseless criminal" who had previously accomplished "multiple acts of violence" in the search for "respect." The journalist criticized a tendency of much of the media if not to glorify to present credible explanations to antisocial behavior. Hilton Kramer, "The Oprah-Fication of the New York Times," New York Post, May 17, 1994, p. 19.

101. Susan Chira, "Teen-Agers, In a Poll, Report Worry and Distrust of Adults," New York Times, July 10, 1994, pp. 1, 16. This article included a Times/CBS News poll in which teenagers were asked "How much of the time do you worry about being the victim of a crime?" Among black teenagers, 54 percent answered "a lot or some of the time," compared with 36 percent of white teenagers. To the question: "Do you know someone who has been shot in the past five years?" 70 percent of black teenagers answered yes, compared with 31 percent of white.
Also: John J. DiIulio, Jr., "The Black Crime Gap," Wall Street Journal, July 11, 1994, p. A12.

102. David R. Francis, "Want Less Crime? Hire More Cops," Christian Science Monitor, March 3, 1995, p. 9. The article quotes John Eck, executive director of the Crime Control Institute in Washington, who says: "Police matter, but not so much in numbers but in what they are doing."

103. Judy Farah, "Crime and Creative Punishment," Wall Street Journal, March 15, 1995, p. A15. Criticisms of the judicial system are found in: Richard Harris, Justice: The Crisis of Law, Order, and Freedom in America, New York: E.P. Dutton & Company, 1970, and David C. Anderson, Crimes of Justice: Improving the Police, the Courts, the Prisons, New York: Times Books, 1988. An important recent history has argued that the criminal justice system cannot have much impact on the crime rate: Lawrence M. Freedman. Crime and Punishment in American History. New York: Basic Books, 1993.

104. The Commission on the Year 2000 met for two years to identify planning perspectives for New York City. The report noted the city's strength in services and added: "New York City must take and hold its place as the world's center of information and communications--two industries that will continued to outperform the world economy as a whole," The Report of the Commission on the Year 2000, New York: The Commission, June 1987, p. 35.

105. Thomas A. Steart, "The Information Age in Charts," Fortune, April 4, 1994, pp. 75-9.

106. Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting, New York: Basic Books, 1973.

107. Jeremy Rifkin, The End of Work: The Decline of the Global Labor Force and the Dawn of the Post-Market Era, New York:

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G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1995, p. 77. The improvement rate in black family income was dramatic for the two decades ending in 1994, growing almost five-times whereas all household incomes slightly more than doubled in the same period. "How We Have Changed in 20 Years," Wall Street Journal, March 29, 1995, p. B1. Also: Dorothy J. Gaiter, "Many Voices: Diversity of Leaders Reflects the Changes in Black Community," Wall Street Journal, May 6, 1992, pp. A1, A6, and Robert Frank and Eleena De Lisser, "Research on Affirmative Action Finds Modest Gains for Blacks Over 30 Years," Wall Street Journal, February 21, 1995, p. A2.

108. John Bound and George Johnson, "What Are the Causes of Rising Wage Inequality in the United States?" Federal Reserve Bank of New York Economic Policy Review, 1 (January 1995): 9-17.

109. Richard B. Freeman, "Crime and the Employment of Disadvantaged Youths," Working Paper no. 3875, Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1991, p. 1.

110. Guy Halverson, "Behind the Impressive Data on Jobs, Some Hidden Problems," Christian Science Monitor, March 22, 1988, p. 12. John Dillin, "As 'Good' Jobs Become 'Bad' Jobs, Congress Takes a Closer Look," Christian Science Monitor, June 18, 1993, pp. 1, 4. Also: Tamar Lewin, "Low Pay and Closed Doors Confront Young Job Seekers," New York Times, March 10, 1994, pp. A1, B12. Louis Uchitelle, "The Rise of the Losing Class," New York Times, November 20, 1994, sec. 4, pp. 1, 5. Unionism, long a shield against employment reduction, faced give-backs, declining job bases, and a weakened structure: Louis Uchitelle, "Job Security A Mirage for Union Despite Wage Concessions of 80s," New York Times, January 9, 1989, pp. A1, D4. Young people who wanted to work but couldn't find it criticized elders who thought they should simply work harder: Brian Steinberg, "Me and My Work Ethic," USA Weekend, March 11-13, 1994, pp. 8-9.

The implications of urban work policy include broader aspects of mental health. "While unemployment is a major source of poverty, it is much more than that. Harvey Brenner of Johns Hopkins University has estimated that the 1.4 percent annual increase in the unemployment rate from 1970 to 1975 was responsible for 1,544 suicides, 5,520 admissions to state mental hospitals, 7,660 admission to state prisons, 1,740 homicides, and 26,440 deaths from heart and kidney diseases," see: Elliott Liebow, "The Urban Unemployed," in Working: Changes and Choices, New York: Human Sciences Press, 1981, p. 40.

111. Morgan O. Reynolds, "Crime Pays, But So Does Imprisonment," Policy Report No. 149, Dallas: National Center for Policy Analysis, March 1990, p. 1. In a perverse way the perpetrator becomes a victim. A mugger arrested and convicted later received a $4.3 million award for injuries sustained

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while struggling with a Transit Police officer. See: Eric Breindel, "Who Says Crime Doesn't Pay?" Wall Street Journal, December 15, 1993, p. A17. Another aspect of the "crime pays" argument is that many minor criminals given summonses never appear in court as charged and the system fails to pursue them. Ron Scherer, "New York Gives 'Disappearance Tickets,'" Christian Science Monitor, November 15, 1993, pp. 1, 24.

112. Delbert S. Elliott and Harwin L. Voss, Delinquency and Dropout, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1974, and Kenneth Polk and Walter E. Schafer, Schools and Delinquency, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1972.

113. Steven Greenhouse, "The Coming Crisis of the American Work Force," New York Times, June 7, 1992, p. 14. The article states: "The Labor Secretary's Commission on Achieving Necessary Skills found that 60 percent of Americans between the ages of 21 and 25 lack the basic reading and writing skills needed in the modern workplace. And a recent Urban League report notes that while 68 percent of white adults read at the 11th grade level, only 31 percent of African-Americans do."

114. Raymond J. Domanico and Colman Genn, "Putting School First: Changing the Board of Ed's Priorities," City Journal, 2 (Spring 1992): 47-57.

115. Ibid., p. 56. Criticism of the educational bureaucracy has continued: Lydia Segal, "Who Really Runs the Schools," City Journal, 5 (Winter 1995): 46-55.

116. Joseph B. Treaster, "Hard Time for Hard Youths: A Battle Producing Few Winners," New York Times, December 28, 1994, p. A12

117. "Putting Schools First," p. 52.

118. Robert O'Brien and Sidney Cohen, The Encyclopedia of Drug Abuse, New York: Facts on File, 1984, pp. xv-xxi.

119. Joseph B. Treaster, "20 Years of War on Drugs, and No Victory Yet," New York Times, June 14, 1992, p. 7.

120. Ralph De Sola, Crime Dictionary, New York: Facts on File, 1982, p. 33.

121. John Fay, Drug Testing, Stoneham, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann, 1991, p. 30.

122. See: Judith Droitcour Miller, National Survey on Drug Abuse: Main Findings 1982, and National Household Survey on Drug Abuse: Main Findings 1985, and National Household Survey on Drug Abuse: Main Findings 1990, Rockville, MD: National Institute on Drug Abuse; Dorothy E. Dusek and Daniel A.

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Girdano, Drugs: A Factual Account, 5th ed., New York: McGraw-Hill, 1993, pp. 26-27. James Q. Wilson writes: "Consider crime: There is no doubt a strong association between the use of drugs and aggressive behavior, but...it is far from clear that this correlation amounts to a cause. People who become aggressive after drinking alcohol or using cocaine usually turn out to be people who were aggressive before consuming these substances....There is also strong association between drug use and street crime, and here the research shows that, for at least certain drugs, their use--or more accurately, their purchase--does cause higher rates of income-generating crime," in Drugs and Crime, ed. Michael Tonry and James Q. Wilson, Crime and Justice series, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, vol. 13, 1990, pp. 521-522.
Also: "Drugs on Wall Street--Things Go Worse With Coke," Economist, May 9, 1987, p. 76.

123. Sam Staley, Drug Policy and the Decline of American Cities, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1992; quotation from Staley in "The War on Drugs Escalates Urban Violence," The Wall Street Journal, August 13, 1992, p. A15.

124. "Facts on Alcoholism and Alcohol-Related Problems," Rockville, MD: National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, 1985, NIDA references No. 42.

125. James A. Inciardi, The War on Drugs: Heroin, Cocaine, Crime, and Public Policy, Palo Alto, CA: Mayfield, 1986, p. 127.

126. Harry E. Allen and Clifford E. Simonsen, Corrections in America: An Introduction, 6th ed., New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1992, p. 644.

127. "War on Drugs: Heroin Price, Purity, and Quantities Seized Over the Past 10 Years," Washington, DC: United States General Accounting Office, GAO/GGD-92-95FS, May, 1992. In 1989, a single seizure of 832 pounds skewed the total for the later four year period; however, if this seizure had never occurred, the total for the period 1987-1990 would have been 733 pounds, still representing an increase of 56 percent between the two periods.

128. Barbara Ehrenreich, "Drug Frenzy: Why the War on Drugs Misses the Real Target," Ms., 17 (November 1988): 23-24.

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130. Ibid., p. 361. See also: Craig Reinarman, "Review Essay--Temperance Ideology and Sociological Denial: Prohibitionism in Drug Policy Discourse," Criminal Justice Ethics 12 (Summer/Fall 1993): 29-36, and William J. Bennett, "Losing the

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Drug War Without a Fight," Wall Street Journal, April 6, 1994, p. A14.

131. For example, Howard LaFranchi, "Europe Looks Again at Dutch Drug Policy," Christian Science Monitor, May 27, 1994, p. 5.

132. "Violent Crime by Young Is Up 25% in 10 Years," New York Times, August 30, 1992, p. 27.

133. William R. Tonso, "Social Problems and Sagecraft: Gun Control as a Case in Point," Firearms and Violence, ed. Don B. Kates, Jr., Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1984, pp. 71-95.

134. Jarvis Anderson, Guns in American Life, New York: Random House, 1984, p. 108.

135. For example: George B. Merry, "Handgun Control: Both Sides Post Losses, Wins in Ongoing Battle," Christian Science Monitor May 26, 1983, p. 10; Don B. Kates, Jr., ed., Firearms And Violence: Issues of Public Policy, Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1984, passim; "Gun Control, Too Much of It, They Say," Economist, July 13, 1985, p. 25; Robert M. Press, "US Agents Crack Down on Illegal Use of Hand-Held Machine Gun," July 10, 1985, p. 3.

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136. Gerald W. Lynch and Robert D. McCrie, "About Crime: A Gunrunner's Right to Arms," Newsday January 29, 1988, p. 4. This loophole for "dealers and collectors" has been tightened, but not closed: by the mid-1990s applicants were screened more thoroughly and those with felony convictions might be more likely to be denied approval than in the 1980s.

137. "Guns: A License to Kill," Economist, January 16, 1993, p. 29. For examples of reports indicating BATF policies for regulating firearms, see: "Firearms License Applications: Processing Improvements Made but Applicant Qualification Checks Limited," Washington, DC: United States General Accounting Office, November, 1992 and "ATF Firearms Inspections: Use of Results To Improve Inspection Targeting Has Been Limited," December, 1992.

138. Lloyd Cutler, "License and Restricting Handguns," Washington Post, December 21, 1993, p. A23. The writer cited data produced by an anti-gun organization, Handgun Control, Inc. While interests in the United States seek to decontrol

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firearms regulations relentlessly, other nations with low homicide-related firearms regulations tighten them further, for example: Clyde H. Farnsworth, "Registration of All Guns Proposed in Canada," New York Times, February 19, 1995, p. A16.

139. The connection between guns and violence is discussed by Gary Kleck in "The Relationship Between Gun Ownership Levels and Rates of Violence in the United States," Firearms and Violence, pp. 99-135.

140. A two-year study of the city's economic prospects concluded: "Ours is a time of New York ascendant. The city's economy is stronger than it has been in decades, and is driven both by its own resilience and by the national economy; New York is more than ever the international capital of finance, and the gateway to the American economy; it is the country's center of creativity in just about every field--music, theater, publishing, advertising, communications, painting, dance; neighborhoods that were slums ten years ago are now crowded with small, newly born, dynamic enterprises." Four months after the report was issued, the stock market crashed and three years later the economy settled into a steep recession. Still, the sense of optimism to control, if not cure, social problems remained alive. "The Report of the Commission on the Year 2000," New York: Commission on the Year 2000, 1987, p. 4.

141. Alfred Blumstein, "Youth Violence, Guns, and the Illicit-Drug Industry," Working Paper No. 94-29, Pittsburgh: H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy and Management, July 1994. Blumstein demonstrated that murder rates increased sharply for males during 1985-90, particularly for ages 15-22. No increase was noted for those 13-14 or age 24 or older. The increase in the homicide and victimization rates of blacks more than doubled during these years while the white rates, much lower to begin with, remained unchanged.

142. Tim W. Ferguson, "Calm Down: Risk Is Not All Around," Wall Street Journal, December 14, 1993, p. A17. The author notes that other than for the poor and innocent victims, "in the workplace, on the road and at home, danger is less today than at any point since records were kept. We have bought that security with safeguards and sense."

While public opinion polls rank crime as a high concern, quality of life measurements place it lower. See: "What Makes Us Angry? How Queens Defines the 'Quality of Life,'" New York Times, September 4, 1994, sec. 13, p. 7.

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Appendix

Murder Around the World

Country	Year	Number	%Solved	Crime per 100,000
Angola	1984	717	89.1	10.3
Australia	1984	534	84.8	3.4
Austria	1984	184	97.3	2.4
Bahamas	1984	58	56.9	25.7
Barbados	1984	15	86.7	6.1
Belgium	1984	322	86.0	3.3
Canada	1984	1,590	83.7	6.3
Chile	1984	744	85.8	6.3
Colombia	1984	776	--	2.5
Denmark	1984	295	90.5	5.7
Ecuador	1984	400	90.0	4.5
Egypt	1984	703	92.0	1.5
Finland	1984	275	93.8	5.6
France	1984	2,540	83.5	4.6
Germany	1984	2,760	94.1	4.5
Greece	1984	181	87.2	1.8
Hong Kong	1984	88	67.0	1.6
Hungary	1984	397	94.6	3.7
Ireland	1984	37	83.8	1.1
Israel	1984	77	68.8	1.8
Italy	1983	2,982	65.1	5.2
Japan	1984	1,762	97.2	1.5
Korea	1984	551	94.2	1.4
Luxembourg	1984	21	90.5	5.2
Morocco	1983	156	96.2	0.8
New Zealand	1984	83	89.2	2.5
Nigeria	1984	1,687	53.1	1.7
Norway	1983	38	81.6	0.9
Philippines	1984	22,604	--	42.5
Portugal	1984	461	--	4.6
Senegal	1984	100	--	1.7
Singapore	1984	69	78.3	2.7
Spain	1984	813	85.2	2.2
Sweden	1984	479	68.0	5.7
Switzerland	1984	144	--	2.2
Tanzania	1984	1,734	13.2	8.7
Turkey	1984	677	--	1.4
United Kingdom	1983	678	93.0	1.4
North. Ireland	1983	310	47.0	19.8
Scotland	1984	71	95.8	1.4
United States	1984	19,308	70.2	8.3
Venezuela	1984	1,673	100.0	9.9
Zimbabwe	1984	1,690	51.1	21.2

Source: George Thomas Kurian, World Encyclopedia of Police Forces and Penal Systems. New York: Facts On File, 1989, and Uniform Crime Reports. Washington, DC: FBI, 1984.

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