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**Associated statehood in the leeward and windward islands: A
phase in the transition to independence, 1967-1983**

Thomas, Arnold Norman, Ph.D.

City University of New York, 1987

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ASSOCIATED STATEHOOD IN THE LEEWARD AND WINDWARD ISLANDS:
A PHASE IN THE TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE 1967 - 1983

BY

ARNOLD THOMAS

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate
Faculty in Political Science in partial
fulfillment of the requirement for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy, The City University of
New York.

1987

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This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in satisfaction of the dissertation requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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Dedicated to Val, Eric, Iona and Cecily -
the ones who cared most.

ASSOCIATED STATEHOOD IN THE LEEWARD AND WINDWARD ISLANDS:
A PHASE IN THE TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE 1967 - 1983

by

Arnold N. Thomas

Adviser: Professor Dankwart A. Rustow

This is a case study of the application of the principle of self-determination to the Caribbean mini-states of Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent. Following independence of the larger West Indian territories the smaller islands were not considered to be economically viable for independence. The mini-state dilemma was solved through the constitutional device of Associated Statehood which provided the islands with full control over internal affairs while the United Kingdom retained responsibility for defence and external affairs. As a phase in the transition to independence, Associated Statehood was also regarded as a strategy for creating the conditions prerequisite to independence.

The main themes of the study are: the role of the international system in determining the status of territories; plans to devise schemes for the decolonisation of the West Indies; the status of Associated Statehood in the international system; the debate over economic viability; Associated Statehood as a transitional phenomenon and the place of small states within international systems.

The study is divided into four parts with Part I giving a background to the choice of Associated Statehood, Part II an analysis of the experience of Statehood 1967 - 1983, Part III the debate on economic viability in the transition to independence, and Part IV the place of small states within the international system.

From the analysis of the Statehood phenomenon, some of the conclusions made are:

1. Associated Statehood was designed more to slow down the pace of decolonisation at a time when the United Kingdom was hard-pressed in the United Nations and less over the presumed economic non-viability of the Associated States.
2. Associated Statehood failed to create economic viability but provided the islands with experience in international affairs through participation as members of the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM).

3. The transition to independence was not based on presumed economic viability but on the more pragmatic premise that independent status offered more opportunities and greater access to international aid.
4. Small size and economic viability are no longer impediments to independence, the criteria for viability having been eroded within a short space of time.
5. The Associated States were regarded as colonies by the international system but as small independent states they have the same status as large states within the United Nations.

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During my employment at the CARICOM Secretariat, I have met several political leaders who were involved in the Statehood negotiations either as Government or opposition and who must remain nameless. They have been helpful in filling gaps in the records of the negotiations and in sharing their views on Associated Statehood.

The staff at the library of the United Nations in New York, the library of the CARICOM Secretariat, the Research Institute for the Study of Man, New York, and the University of the West Indies, Cave Hill Campus have been of valuable assistance in locating source materials.

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The responsibility for any errors is solely mine.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS USED

AMP	-	Agricultural Marketing Protocol
BDD	-	British Development Division
CAIC	-	Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce
CARDATS	-	Caribbean Agricultural and Rural Development Advisory and Training Service
CARDI	-	Caribbean Agricultural Research and Development Institute
CARICOM	-	Caribbean Community and Common Market
CARIFTA	-	Caribbean Free Trade Association
CCTAP	-	Commonwealth Caribbean Technical Assistance Programme
CDB	-	Caribbean Development Bank
CFTC	-	Commonwealth Fund for Technical Co-operation
CIC	-	Caribbean Investment Corporation
CIDA	-	Canadian International Development Agency
ECCA	-	East Caribbean Currency Authority
ECCM	-	East Caribbean Common Market
ECLA	-	United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America
EDF	-	European Development Fund
EEC	-	European Economic Community
GATT	-	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GMS	-	Guaranteed Market Scheme
ISER	-	Institute of Social and Economic Research
LDC	-	Less Developed Countries
MDC	-	More Developed Countries
NSGT	-	Non-self Governing Territory
OECS	-	Organization of East Caribbean States

ORGA	-	Official Records of the General Assembly
RCM	-	Regional Council of Ministers
QRS	-	Quantitative Restrictions
UNDP	-	United Nations Development Programme
UWI	-	University of the West Indies
WINBAN	-	Winward Islands Banana Growers' Association
WISA	-	West Indies Associated States
WISCO	-	West Indies Shipping Corporation

ASSOCIATED STATEHOOD IN THE LEEWARD AND WINDWARD ISLANDS:
A PHASE IN THE TRANSITION TO INDEPENDENCE 1967 - 1983

Chapter i

Introduction

A. Purpose, Scope and Methodology of the Disseration

The Leeward and Windward Islands of the Caribbean were among the first to be colonised by the British and the last to be decolonised. During the long period of colonial history, spanning three hundred years in some cases, the island collectively or individually experienced various forms of governmental systems ranging from pure crown colony to a federal system. The islands also have the distinction of experiencing the three forms of self-government as prescribed in United Nations Resolution 1541 (XV), namely, "integration with an independent state" (through the defunct Federation of the West Indies), "free association" (through Associated Statehood) and finally, independence.

The first attempt at decolonisation of the British West Indies was through a federation which lasted from 1958 to 1962. Thereafter, independence was achieved by the larger territories which were considered to be economically viable, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago achieving independence in 1962 and Barbados in 1966 following futile attempts at another federation involving Barbados, the Windward Islands of Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and Leeward Islands of Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla and Montserrat.

The Windwards and Leewards by virtue of their small territorial size, population and resource endowment were not considered to be economically viable to sustain the trappings of political independence. As Table 1.1 shows, they were all less than 300 square miles with populations of less than 100,000 (St. Lucia reached this figure according to the 1970 population census). Having been advised against independence, the islands were offered (and accepted) the status of Associated Statehood.

TABLE 1.1

AREA POPULATION OF THE LEEWARD AND WINDWARD ISLANDS

	AREA Square mile	POPULATION 1970
Antigua/Barbuda	170.0	65,525
Dominica	289.5	70,513
Grenada	120.0	93,858
Montserrat	37.5	11,698
St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla	104.0	45,608
St. Lucia	238.0	100,893
St. Vincent	150.0	87,305

Source: 1970 Population Census of the Commonwealth Caribbean

Given the options to self-government, this study is an attempt to explore the logic of the choice of Associated Statehood as a phase in the transition to independence during the period 1967 to 1983. Associated Statehood was conceptualized as a non-colonial (self-government) status which promised the benefits and advantages of independence without having to sustain the demands and obligations of sovereignty. Associated Statehood was not only a constitutional status tailor-made to meet political needs of a group of mini-states, it was also regarded as a strategy for creating economic viability¹ which was considered necessary prior to independence.

The main themes of the study are:-

- self-determination for mini-states, and the role of the international system in determining the status of territories.;
- the attempts to devise plans for decolonization of the West Indies;
- the place of Associated Statehood within the international system as a transitional phenomenon;

1 For a discussion of various concepts of economic viability, see K. Dwight Venner "Finance and Resource Mobilization in Small States", in Vaughan A. Lewis, ed., Size, Self-Determination and International Relations: The Caribbean (Institute of Social and Economic Research UWI, Mona 1974), pp. 164-165.

- the debate over economic viability; and
- the place of small states within the international system.

Stated differently, the key questions posed for the study are:-

1. What was the rational basis for the choice of Associated Statehood?
2. What were the implications of Associated Statehood for national development, the regional integration movement and the international system?
3. How valid was the economic viability argument in the transition to independence?

Section B of the introduction reviews the evolution of the concept of self-determination within the United Nations and various ways that colonial countries could exercise their right of self-determination, while Section C analyses the viability debate. Of particular concern to the United Nations were the very small states which were considered either too small or too poor to undertake the responsibilities of sovereign independence. Free association was devised as a non-colonial status which offered the option of independence to the associated states if they so desired.

The disseration is divided into four parts. Chapters ii to iv which comprise the first part give the background to Associated Statehood.

The study of political change in the Windwards and Leewards must necessarily begin with the constitutional and political history of the islands. An understanding of the constitutional framework from which Associated Statehood evolved is essential for any critical assessment of the new arrangement. Thus chapters two, three and four are mainly historical in character, tracing various aspects of constitutional and political change from the 1920s to the evolution of Associated Statehood in the mid-1960s.

Chapter two places the decolonisation of the British West Indies in historical perspective by a review of constitutional developments for the period roughly between 1920 and 1960. It traces the attempt by the United Kingdom to prepare the colonies for eventual self-government or independence. More specifically, the review encompasses the economic, social and political background to constitutional change, British colonial development and planning policy after the First World War, and the development of representative and responsible government. What was significant about this period was that little or no thought was given to establishing a genuinely politically viable system. It was not until after the Second World War that real attempts were made to create representative and responsible governments.

In Chapter three, an analysis is given of the internal and external factors which induced political change in the West Indies, the attempts to devise plans for decolonisation through federation and the conditions which eventually led to the collapse of the Federation.

While at least two territories (Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago) resolved their colonial status, Barbados and the Leewards and Windwards continued their attempts to fashion a new federation of the "Little Eight". Chapter four examines the personalities and issues involved in this latest attempt together with new and emerging trends on the regional scene. For the first time alternatives to federation and independence are sought for the Leewards and Windwards. Chapter four also traces the evolution of the concept of Associated Statehood by piecing together information on what was taking place in other parts of the world where a similar situation existed. An analysis is also presented of the reasons for the choice of this third scheme which both the Caribbean politicians and the British Government regarded as the best solution under the circumstances.

Part II which comprises chapters five to nine is an analysis of the experience of Associated Statehood in its various aspects. The constitutional and political arrangements of Associated Statehood are described and analysed in Chapter five, highlighting the differences between the existing constitutions and the constitutions of the independent Caribbean countries. What the new constitution seemed to offer was a form of "internal independence" but which left the

territories with no international personality. The international implications of the new status are treated in Chapter six, beginning with the debates in the United Nations. The United Nations General Assembly had little difficulty accepting the association between the Cook Islands and New Zealand in 1965 but the Special Committee of Twenty-Four expressed dissatisfaction over the procedure adopted by the United Kingdom Government for determining the true wishes of the peoples of the West Indian territories. The United Kingdom Government refused to permit a United Nations visiting mission to the territories and, in the end, the latter body did not recognise Associated Statehood as an act of decolonisation, reiterating the principle that only the United Nations could decide whether or not a territory had achieved a full measure of self-government or had exercised the right of self-determination. The chapter then analyses the new status in the international system, in particular the implications for membership in international organizations, access to economic aid and technical assistance, authority to sign the Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community, and association with the European Community.

While the previous chapters examine the legal, constitutional and political relationships of Associated Statehood, the next two chapters analyse the debate over economic viability. Chapter seven presents an in-depth analysis of the social and economic bases of Associated Statehood and the development constraints that result from small size. Apart from the structure of the economy, aspects of the social conditions, that is, population growth, employment and the poverty problem, are addressed. Against this background consideration is given

in Chapter eight to the institutional arrangements and various strategies for promoting economic development in the Associated States which may lead to economic viability. The chapter examines the economic surveys and economic plans of the 1960s including the radical alternatives to the then accepted laissez faire approach to economic development. Broadly speaking, the development strategy advocated for the Associated States can be divided into two types: one involving the development of tourism and linkages between this sector and other sectors of the economy, and the other, the "radical" approach, which was inward looking and emphasised the ownership and control of the factors of production and natural resources through some central planning model, with a view to reducing the openness of the economy and increasing inter-sectoral dependence within it. The analysis of the attempts at creating economic development is treated in the context of the institutional framework for development planning at the national, sub-regional and regional levels, that is, through the East Caribbean Common Market (ECCM) and the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) which later became the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM).

The sub-regional and regional integration movements became very important for the Associated States which were designated as Least Developed Countries (LDCs) within the integration framework. Chapter nine gives an account of the Associated States within the regional integration movement in particular, analyses the special measures for the LDCs within the framework of CARICOM, assesses the impact of Associated Statehood on the integration movement and similarly the impact of CARICOM on the Associated States.

In Part III (chapter ten) the key question becomes: Is the condition of non-independence, that is, Associated Statehood, conducive to economic development, if not, should the Associated States move to the formal status of independence? The chapter analyses the attempts to find alternatives to Associated Statehood, the debates on the demerits of Associated Statehood and finally, the decision to opt for independence.

Part IV, the final chapter, gives a review and assessment of the findings and conclusions of the study and the place of small states in the international community. Since 1974, each of the Associated States has advanced to political independence. The extent to which independence was determined by the presence of the necessary economic conditions, presumably created during the Associated Statehood regime, is considered. A final comment is offered on the concept of the viability and some other reasons for the choice of Associated Statehood in the first place.

While this study does not aspire to the formulation of a theory of political change, it does attempt to locate the problem of decolonisation of small states within the international system and to specify the implications of independence or continuing colonial status both for the states themselves and the international system (the United Nations). The debate over economic viability has occupied the attention of both technocrats and politicians in the Caribbean integration movement and it is therefore important to show how attempts were made to make the Associated States economically viable, or more simply what strategies were designed to promote economic development. Within the Associated States themselves the status of Associated Statehood was increasingly

challenged as a stumbling block to faster economic progress since it severely restricted the States from entering into international agreements.

B. Self-Determination and the Evolution of Association

This section of the introduction presents a brief history of the concept of self-determination and the evolution of association as a means of achieving decolonisation in mini-states. There are three aspects or phases of self-determination with which this section is concerned:-

- (a) the origin of the concept;
- (b) its evolution through the United Nations system; and
- (c) its application to mini-states.

For purposes of analysis, a distinction is made between self-determination, decolonisation and independence, integration and association. Self-determination is a right by virtue of which all peoples "freely determine their economic, social and cultural development".²

² See International Covenants on Human Rights, Part I, Article 1 (i); General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960.

Decolonisation at minimum is a process by which a colony changes its status to a non-colonial one or the process by which a non-self-governing territory changes its status to a self-governing one. Independence, integration and association are three forms of a non-colonial status. By definition, all non-self-governing territories³ are colonies and the linkage between a colonial status and a non-colonial status is self-determination.

The term decolonisation should not be confined to the minimal process of change of political status - what we will call the "outer limits" of decolonisation. Rather, it is viewed as a continuing process after the formal change in status during which inherited structures are either thrown out, modified or accepted and new ones introduced. Decolonisation involves profound cultural, economic and social changes. These may be referred to as the "inner limits" of decolonisation and may vary in time depending on the nature of the post-colonial regime. This distinction is made in order to show that:-

- (1) the change in status by the stroke of a pen was almost entirely meaningless for a people who have had several decades, and sometimes centuries, of colonial rule without ever developing the capability of "making it on their own";
and

3 Hereafter referred to as NSGTs.

- (2) there are situations where adequate arrangements have been made to ensure viability after the departure of the administering power. In this case, it is theoretically possible that the decolonisation process is complete at the time of the formal change in status.

Having clarified the difference between a right, a process and a status, we can now turn to self-determination and the evolution of association as a form of decolonisation. It is not the intention here to give a full account of the origin and implementation of the principle of self-determination⁴ nor a detailed account of the evolution of association as an alternative means of achieving decolonisation.⁵ Rather, it is to highlight the changing content of the principle during the era of decolonisation, and the role of the international system in determining the status of territories.

The idea of self-determination can be traced to the emergence of the doctrine of popular sovereignty during the French Revolution and the American Declaration of Independence and had the character of a threat to the legitimacy of the established order; it was also related to the

4 See for example: Alfred Cobban, National Self-Determination, (London: Oxford University Press, 1945); V.I. Lenin, The Right of Nations to Self-Determination (1962 ed.); John Plamenatz, On Alien Rule and Self-Government (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1960).

5 For an indepth study of the evolution of association, see Juan Fernandez "Free Association as a Means for Achieving Decolonization", (Ph.d diss., City University of New York, 1978), chs. 2 and 3.

principle of peaceful change, that is, that people should agree to territorial transfers. The modern concept of self-determination falls broadly into four periods:-

- (1) 1918-1941 or the inter-war years;
- (2) 1941-1952: the effects of World War II which led to the setting up of the United Nations Organization and international attention to the colonial problem;
- (3) 1952-1960: during which the General Assembly established its competence in determination of non-self-governing territories and self-determination was firmly established as a right; and
- (4) 1960 - present or the period of application of the formula for rapid decolonisation.

The Inter-War Years

This period is characterised as an idealistic one for colonial territories. A number of anti-colonial declarations and principles were promulgated. However, these were limited in their application, for instance, Woodrow Wilson's announcement before Congress in January 1918 of the right of self-determination.⁶ For Wilson, peace would not last

⁶ See U.S. Congressional Record, vol. 53, part 9, p. 8854 and *ibid.*, vol. 54, part 2, p. 1742.

which did not recognise and accept the principle that governments derived their just powers from the consent of the governed.⁷ At about the same time, Lenin was defining self-determination as the "political separation of nations from alien national bodies and the formation of an independent national state".⁸ Wilson's enunciation of the right of self-determination was meant to be the new basic principle of world order following the collapse of monarchic-feudal legitimacy in Central and Eastern Europe during the First World War.⁹ In its first application, self-determination became the new basis of state-formation and territorial settlements - mainly in Europe; national minorities resulting from the post-war frontiers of all Eastern European countries were meant to be governed by special laws on minorities; in the Middle East and the colonial world, the distribution of conquered lands was settled by the bargains between the colonial powers; the institution of the mandate,¹⁰ later trusteeship was created by way of concession to

7 For an analysis of Wilson's Fourteen Point Programme for peace which included the principle of self-determination, see Herbert Hoover, The Ordeal of Woodrow Wilson (New York: McGraw - Hill Book Company), 1958.

8 Lenin, *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7.

9 For an analysis of the principles governing the international community before the First World War and the aftermath of the War, see Istan Bibo, The Paralysis of International Institutions and the Remedies. A Study of Self-Determination, Concord Among the Major Powers, and Political Arbitration (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1976), chaps. 3-4.

10 See, for details of the Mandate System H, Duncan Hall, "The Trusteeship System", The British Year Book of International Law, XXIV. (1947) pp. 33-71; Ernst Haas, "The Reconciliation of Conflicting Colonial Policy Aims: Acceptance of the League of Nations Mandate System", International Organization, vol. 6. No. 4 (November 1952), pp. 521-536.

the Wilsonian principle, but the principle was never enshrined in the Covenant of the League of Nations.

It was interpreted at the Paris Peace Conference to mean international provision for the supervision of territories formerly under German and Turkish rule. Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations entrusted a few advanced nations with the task of civilisation for the newly detached territories but left the colonial problem very much to the metropolitan powers.¹¹ "Natives" in the British Colonies were not considered to possess the necessary prerequisites for self-rule: colonial policy during the inter-war period was partially aimed at preparing them.¹²

It has been pointed out that until fairly recent times, self-determination had no legal standing¹³ and that pressure for

11 See Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

12 This is treated in greater detail in the next section of the chapter. For a comparison of British and French Colonial policy, see Rudolf von Albertini, Decolonisation: The Administration and Future of the Colonies, 1919-1960 (New York: Doubleday), 1971.

13 An analysis of emergence of self-determination from a principle to a legal right is given in A. Rigo Sureda, The Evolution of the Right of Self-Determination. A Study of United Nations Practice (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff), 1973.

decolonisation aided in its clarification as a right.¹⁴ The Second World War marked a turning point in world history: whereas the First World War gave rise to several European nations as the Central and Eastern Empires collapsed, the Second World War was to have a more profound impact on the existing international system as the colonial powers either suffered defeat or were too weakened to hold on to their Afro-Asian-Caribbean Empires. For the next 20 years the international system experienced a revolution as colonial territories one after the other asserted their right to self-determination which Emerson has dubbed the "new higher law of Anti-colonialism."¹⁵

During 1941, there were two important developments in this respect: the first was President Franklin Roosevelt's proclamation of Four Freedoms for peoples of the world in a speech to Congress on 6 January.¹⁶ The next was the issuing of the Atlantic Charter as a declaration by Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill on 14 August.¹⁷

14 For more views on decolonisation and self-determination, see Benjamin Rivlin "Self-Determination and Dependent Peoples", International Conciliation, No. 501 (January 1955), pp. 105-217; Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), Part IV, and his more recent Self-Determination Revisited in the Era of Decolonisation (Harvard University Centre for International Affairs, Occasional Papers in International Affairs), No. 9, December 1964.

15 Self-Determination Revisited, p. 1.

16 These were: freedom of speech and expression, freedom of worship, freedom from want and freedom from fear. See L. Ethan Ellis, A Short History of American Diplomacy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951), pp. 473-474.

17 *ibid.*

The Charter was a declaration of principles¹⁸ which the United States interpreted as being of universal application both to nations that were victims of Axis aggression, and dependent areas. On the other hand, the British interpretation was that the Charter principles did not apply to colonies.¹⁹

(b) Evolution of Factors in Determining
Dependence, 1941-1952

The second period, roughly 1941-1952, witnessed the move from the declaration of broad principles to the setting up of institutions for the

18 These include:-

- (i) renunciation of territorial or other aggrandizement for either the U.S. or Britain;
- (ii) opposition to territorial changes contrary to the wishes of those immediately concerned;
- (iii) support of the right of peoples to choose their own form of government;
- (iv) upholding the easing of existing restrictions on trade and access to raw materials;
- (v) support of co-operative efforts to improve the economic position and the social security of the world's workers;
- (vi) anticipation of a postwar world from which want and fear would be banished;
- (vii) freedom of the seas to be enjoyed by all; and
- (viii) attainment of peace under which nations given to aggression would be disarmed, pending the establishment of a permanent peace-keeping machinery.

19 See speech made by Winston Churchill to House of Commons on 9 September 1941 quoted in George Thullen, Problems of the Trusteeship System: A Study of Political Behaviour in the United Nations (Geneva: 1964), p. 28. That the Charter principles did not apply to colonies was based on the assumption that they were far from being ready for it.

implementation of those principles. It became very difficult not to extend the principles of the Atlantic Charter to colonial peoples once it had been announced, and by 1943²⁰ the colonial question came to be regarded as an issue related to international peace and security and therefore of concern to all members of the future United Nations.

Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations which contains the Declaration regarding NSGTs (Article 73) was the first international instrument in which administering Powers agreed to be bound by a set of principles concerning those territories. The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples was now firmly entrenched and all that was left was for the General Assembly to develop the competence to determine the status of colonies. During this phase the administering Powers maintained that it was their responsibility to decide whether or not a territory was fit for self-government.

Table 1.2 is a summary of the main developments within the United Nations organization in the evolution of free association as a means of decolonisation. The summary also includes the evolution of the General Assembly's competence in determining NSGTs.

20 The principle was further expressed in the Four-Nation Declaration signed in Moscow in October 1943 and in the Cairo Declaration of November of that year.

TABLE 1.2

SUMMARY OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS AND OTHER
EVENTS IN THE EVOLUTION OF FREE ASSOCIATION
1946-1970

DATE	GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION/EVENT	REMARKS
9 February 1946	Resolution 9 (I) ²¹	United Nations begins attempts to establish the factors determining NSGTs. Secretary-General requested to include in his annual report on the Work of the Organization a statement summarising information transmitted under Article 73 (e).
21 June 1946	Secretary-General's letter addressed to United Nations members ²²	Attention drawn to difficulties of determining which NSGTs come within Chapter XI; invited their opinion on factors indicative of NSG Status.
14 December 1946	Resolution 66 (I) on Transmission of Information under Article 73 (e) ²³	74 Territories enumerated by administering Powers as covered by Chapter XI; no definition of NSGT; <u>Ad Hoc Committee on Information</u> created to examine the Secretary-General's summary and analysis of information transmitted under Article 73 (e).

21 Official Records of General Assembly (hereafter abbreviated as ORGA), First Part of First Session, Resolutions.

22 UN Doc., A/74.

23 ORGA, Second Part of First Session, Resolutions.

DATE	GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION/EVENT	REMARKS
3 November 1947	Resolution 146 (II) Special Committee on Information established ²⁴	System of international accountability begins to evolve; administering Powers can no longer hide behind Article 2 (7) - the domestic jurisdiction clause.
3 November 1947	Resolution 29 (III) - Special Committee on Information established ²⁵	Basically a technical body, dealt with functional and procedural matters.
1947-1948	Cessation of trans- mission of information on 16 territories listed in 66 (1) ²⁶	Administering Powers see this as affirmation of voluntary nature of accepting Chapter XI; anti-colonial groups express great concern and demand (a) explanation, (b) definition of NSGT, (c) formulation of factors determining dependency.
1948		Clarified meaning of right of self-determination.
3 November 1948	Resolution 222 (III) ²⁷	Administering Powers are requested to notify details of change in constitutional status to United Nations before cessation of transmission; no definition of NSGT or what constituted full measure of self-government.

24 ORGA, Second Session, Resolutions.

25 ORGA, First Part, Third Session, Resolutions, p. 82.

26 UN doc., A/915/Add.1 for French response.

27 ORGA, First Part, Third Session, Resolutions, pp. 84-85.

DATE	GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION/EVENT	REMARKS
2 November 1949	Resolution 332 (IV) "Territories to which Chapter XI of the Charter applied ²⁸	General Assembly states that it is within its responsibility to express its opinion on the principles guiding enumeration of NSGTs; procedure is established for consideration of cessation cases as Special Committee on Information is invited to examine factors in the determination of territories.
1950	Resolution 448 (V) - Special Committee requested to examine all information on cessation ²⁹	Further strengthens procedure for examination communications with respect to cessation of information.
1951-1952	Formulation of first list of factors by Special Committee	Much controversy and conflict characterises this period; sub-committee appointed to prepare report for consideration; administering Powers view integration and loose association as alternatives; non- administering Powers see independence as only alternative. Chapter XI now linked with right and principle of self-determination; United Nations competence asserted regarding (a) definition of self-government, (b) authority to apply definition, (c) review of decisions.

28 ORGA, Fourth Session, Resolutions, pp. 43-44.

29 ORGA, Fifth Session, Resolutions, Supp. No. 20.

DATE	GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION/EVENT	REMARKS
4 December 1950	Resolution 421 (V) ³⁰	General Assembly calls on Economic and Social Council to request Commission on Human Rights to study ways of ensuring right of peoples and nations to self-determination.
18 January 1952	Resolution 567 (VI) - "Future Procedure for the continuation of study of factors..." ³¹	Ad Hoc Committee on factors established; met 6 times during September 1952; list of two sets of factors - one for political independence; the other for association on "equal status"; still confusion.
5 February 1952	Resolution 545 (VI) ³²	General Assembly decides to include in the International Covenant(s) on Human Rights an article on the right of all peoples and nations to self-determination and calls on administering Powers to promote realisation of that right.
1951-1953	Application of factors and principles to cases of cessation: Resolution 568 ³³	Kept the question of information on the Netherlands Antilles and Surinam under review.
	Resolution 742 (VII)	Netherlands Antilles and Surinam examined carefully.
	Resolution 742 (VIII)	Third list of factors to be used by General Assembly as guide in determination adopted.

30 *ibid.*, p. 43

31 *ORGA*, Sixth Session, Resolutions, Supp. No. 20.

32 *ibid.*, pp. 36-37. ,

33 Yassin El A-Youty, *The United Nations and Decolonisation: The Role of Afro-Asia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), pp. 188-192.

DATE	GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION/EVENT	REMARKS
11 December 1952	Resolution 648 (VII) ³⁴	Has (a) factors indicative of independence, (b) factors indicative of separate systems of self-government.
16 December 1952	Resolution 637A (VII) ³⁵	Principle of self-determination becomes a right, now considered for direct implementation by the United Nations.
27 November 1953	Resolution 742 (VIII) ³⁶	Defines "self-government" by giving primacy to "independence;" General Assembly's competence specifically referred to in applying test of factors.
19 January 1953	Letter from United States to Secretary-General informing on change of Puerto Rico's status ³⁷	New constitution had been in force since 25 July 1952; United States made decision to cease transmitting information on Puerto Rico.

34 ibid.

35 ibid., p. 26

36 ORGA, Eight Session, Resolutions, Supp. No. 17, pp. 21-26.

37 UN Doc., A/AC.35/L.121.

DATE	GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION/EVENT	REMARKS
30 March 1953	Letter from United States to United Nations on cessation of information on Puerto Rico ³⁸	Puerto Rico becomes first case of cessation following formulation of final list of factors; debate in Fourth Committee on Puerto Rico case involved three basic issues (1) right of Fourth Committee to grant oral hearings to petitioners from NSGTs, (2) the association of NSGTs with an independent state as a means of attaining full measure of self-government, (3) competence of General Assembly to determine NSG status.
27 November 1953	Resolution 748 (VIII) ³⁹	General Assembly decided that it was appropriate that transmission of information on Puerto Rico should cease - explicit recognition of association.
	Resolution 850 (IX) - Proposed United Nations mission should visit NSGT in agreement with administering Power before change in status took place ⁴⁰	No such mission undertaken until 1965 Cook Islands mission.

38 ibid., pp. 2-3.

39 ORGA, Eight Session, Resolutions, Supp. No. 17, pp. 25-26.

40 ORGA, Ninth Session, Resolutions.

DATE	GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION/EVENT	REMARKS
12 December 1959	Resolution 1467 (XV) establishes special committees to study principles which should guide members in determining whether or not obligation existed to transmit information under Article 73 (e) ⁴¹	Administering Powers position unchanged since 1946; non- colonial members formulate 12 principles mostly reaffirming concepts embodied in earlier resolutions.
15 December 1960	Resolution 1541 (XV) Adoption of list of 12 principles which should guide members in determination of obligation to transmit information ⁴²	International responsibility for advancement of colonial peoples towards independence asserted; <u>prima facie</u> existence of obligation to transmit information is reaffirmed; full measure of self-government attainable through one of three methods: independence, integration, association but independence given primacy. Free association method should be the result of a free and voluntary choice by the peoples of the territory concerned expressed by informed and democratic process.
15 December 1960	Resolution 1514 (XV) Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples ⁴³	A new formula for swift decolonisation, it represents the highest point in broad interpretation of Chapter XI; complete independence seen as ultimate goal.

41 ORGA, Fourteenth Session, Resolutions, Supp. No. 16, p. 36.

42 ORGA, Fifteenth Session, Resolutions, Supp. No. 16, p. 29-30.

43 ibid., Supp. No. 19, pp. 66-67.

DATE	GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION/EVENT	REMARKS
27 November 1961	Resolution 1654 (XVI) Special Committee of Seventeen established as implementation agency of the Declaration ⁴⁴	Members appointed by President of the General Assembly
17 December 1962	Resolution 1810 (XVII) - becomes Special Committee of Twenty- Four ⁴⁵	Endowed with broad terms of reference to examine application of Declaration. Has become the main instrumentality of decolonisation.
1965	Resolution 2105 (XX) ⁴⁶	Committee of Twenty-Four requested to pay particular attention to the small territories and to recommend the most appropriate ways as well as the steps taken to enable the populations of the territories to exercise fully their right to self-determination and independence.
1965	Cook Islands become State in Association with New Zealand	By resolution 2064 (XX) United Nations accepted status as self-governing ⁴⁷ .
1967-1969	Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts- Nevis, Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent became Associated States - United Kingdom ceased transmission of information.	Associated Statehood not recognised as United Nations not involved in the change of status.

44 ORGA, Sixteenth Session, Resolutions, Supp. No. 17.

45 ORGA, Seventeenth Session, Resolutions.

46 ORGA, Twentieth Session, Resolutions.

47 ibid.

There are a number of conclusions to be drawn from the foregoing analysis. What was enunciated at the end of the First World War as a principle of self-determination applicable only to countries in Eastern and Central Europe was declared as a right of self-determination applicable to all countries and peoples by the end of the Second World War. In the context of the political decolonisation which followed, self-determination meant that all dependent peoples were entitled to freedom and the people so entitled were defined in terms of the existing colonial territories, each of which was recognised as an incipient nation. Once such a people had come to independence no residual right of self-determination remained with any group within the nation or straddling its frontiers.⁴⁸ However, this principle has been challenged with increasing frequency in recent times as various ethnic, religious or linguistic groups within recognised nation-states have sought to assert their right to self-determination. Examples are the Basques in Spain, the Tamils in Sri Lanka, the Catholics of Northern Ireland and the secessionist movements in Katanga (Congo) and Biafra (Nigeria) during the 1960s.

The administering Powers had maintained throughout the period of decolonisation that the responsibility was theirs to determine the status of NSGT⁴⁹ while the anti-colonial-non-administering Powers sought to

48 Emerson, Self-determination Revisited, op. cit; p. 28.

49 For example, the United Kingdom delegate often repeated the principle that "the determination of the territories lay exclusively with each Metropolitan Power in the light of its constitutional relationship with the territories for whose international relations it was responsible". See UN Doc., A/AC.17/SR.11, p. 7.

make the issue an international responsibility. There were three aspects to the growth of the General Assembly's competence in the determination of dependency:

- (i) the study of factors which should be taken into account in deciding whether or not a given territory was one whose people had not yet attained a "full measure of self-government";
- (ii) the cessation of transmission of information under Article 73 (e) when a territory attained a full measure of self-government and the commencement of the transmission of this information when it was determined that an obligation existed under Chapter XI; and
- (iii) the formulation of "principles" which should guide members in the determination of whether or not an obligation existed under Chapter XI.⁵⁰

Through a number of resolutions over a period of years and in the light of other Charter provisions, a broad interpretation was given to Article 73 that eventually gave the United Nations the competence to include the supervision of the evolution of the NSGTs toward self-government.

50 This is outlined in El-Ayouty, op. cit, chaps. 2-5.

With respect to Resolution 1541 (XV), twelve principles are listed which should guide members in determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for under Article 73 (e) of the Charter. The ideological-political background to this resolution has not been dealt with in the scope of this study. However, it is important to note that by 1960 decolonisation, a mere trickle in 1945, had become of flood proportions⁵¹ and the wave of new members to the United Nations undoubtedly was responsible for the General Assembly adopting the historic "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples" on 14 December 1960, by a vote of 89 to 0 with 9 abstentions. This Declaration, later dubbed the "Anti-Colonialist Charter", established a new system for achieving orderly decolonisation under the Charter and was in effect a de facto amendment of the United Nations Charter.⁵²

Twelve preambular recitals refer to the provisions of the Charter relating to fundamental rights and to the equal rights of nations large and small; the need for creating conditions of stability conducive to the fulfillment of those objectives; the passionate yearning for freedom in all dependent peoples and the decisive role of those peoples in the attainment of their independence; the serious threat to world peace

51 Before 1960, Afro-Asian UN Membership did not exceed 31 states, including China. In 1960 alone 17 new nations became members, all of them, with the exception of Cyprus, being African states. Between 1961 and 1965, a further 14 members were added. See David Kay, The New Nations in the United Nations (New York: Colombia University Press), 1970, p. 3.

52 This view is expressed by Stanley A. De Smith, op. cit., p. 38; Emerson, Self-Determination Revisited, op. cit., p. 29.

constituted by the denial of freedom to those peoples; the important role of the United Nations in assisting the movement for independence; the fact that the peoples of the world ardently desire the end of colonialism in all its manifestations and the conviction that its continued existence militated against the purposes of the United Nations; that the process of liberation was irreversible; that all peoples had an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory. Accordingly, the Resolution solemnly proclaimed the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end, colonialism in all its forms and manifestations.

There are seven substantive paragraphs which declare, inter alia, that:-

- (i) the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation;
- (ii) all peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right, they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development; and

- (iii) inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.⁵³

We should note that although the Declaration, which was sponsored by forty-three Afro-Asian Powers, affirmed that the only form of freedom for dependent peoples is independence. Resolution 1541 (XV) had stated permissible alternatives to it and already there were cases of free association no longer requiring transmission of information by the administering powers. With the adoption of the Declaration on Independence, a Special Committee⁵⁴ was established under Resolution 1654 (XVI) of 27 November 1961 as an implementation agency with a membership of 17 (later raised to 24 by Resolution 1810 (XVII) of 17 December 1962) - self-determination by then had become an almost undisputed legal right with the United Nations having the competence and machinery to determine the status of territories.

With regard to the remaining territories which are still NSGTs, the Special Committee has since 1965 reaffirmed the right of small territories to self-determination and independence and further stated that the decision on their future status should be made by the people in the territories, who must be aware of the options open to them.⁵⁵

53 See Appendix I for full text of Resolution 1514 (XV) and Resolution 1541 (XV).

54 The full title of this body is "The Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples".

55 See UN Doc., A/6300/Rev.1, pp. 769-770; A/AC.109/L.486; A/AC.109/L.485; A/AC.109/L.487.

C. Independence and Small Size:
The Viability Debate

Self-determination is now an acknowledged right to independence; however, it is more often than not regarded as an insufficient condition for independence of very small states. On the commencement of a new state, J.H. Brierly declares that:-

A new state comes into existence when a community acquires, with a reasonable probability of permanence, the essential characteristics of a state, namely, an organised government, a defined territory, and such a degree of independence of control by any other state as to be capable of conducting its own international relations.⁵⁶

It is usually with respect to their presumed incapability of conducting their own international relations or fulfilling certain international obligations that small states are regarded as non-viable. In practice, this means: states which cannot put together elaborate foreign affairs and defence establishments do not qualify for a role in world politics.⁵⁷ As we shall see later, it was the assertion of economic non-viability, hence non-viability at the international level, that initially ruled out independence for the Leewards and Windwards Islands.

56 J.L. Brierly, The Law of Nations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, Fifth Edition), 1955, p. 137.

57 For an analysis of viability in relation to independence, see Patrick Emmanuel, "Independence and Viability: Elements of Analysis", in Vaughan Lewis, op. cit., pp. 1-15.

Perhaps the most important work on the problems of small states in the Caribbean is a collection of papers presented at a Conference on the Independence of Very Small States with Special Reference to the Caribbean, organised by the Institute of Social and Economic Research (Eastern Caribbean) at Cave Hill, University of the West Indies in 1974.⁵⁸ The volume contains articles which critically examine the so-called prerequisites for independence, and lays bare the arguments often advanced against independence for small states. Patrick Emmanuel's article on "Independence and Viability: Elements of Analysis"⁵⁹ notes that the central concern of a theory of viability must be the elements of territory, population, government and independence, and that the level of viability could be conceived in terms of the survivability of these factors.⁶⁰

David Vital⁶¹ attempts to define the notion of viability of states by focusing on "material size" and the "capacity" to make internal economic and political decisions in the face of big power disapproval. A critique of the orthodox requirements for recognition of state sovereignty is offered by Vaughan A. Lewis who noted that if the possession of a territory, population, a government that can maintain

58 Vaughan Lewis, op. cit.

59 op. cit. pp. 1-16.

60 op. cit., p.4.

61 David Vital, The Inequality of States (Oxford University Press, 1967).

order within the territory and inhibit penetration of its boundaries, and possession of a reasonable capacity to enter into international relations and to fulfill the obligations created by membership of the international society, were the essential requirements then there was not much to inhibit independence for the Leewards and Windwards.⁶²

The Leeward and Windward Islands by virtue of their small size face severe constraints to economic development. These include:-

- very limited range of natural resources;
- very small size of markets for industrial production;
- diseconomies of small scale and lack of "critical mass" in public administration and in economic and social overhead capital leading to high per capita cost of both public administration and economic and social infrastructure;
- grossly inadequate national savings, in some cases reflecting itself in consumption levels that are higher than total production as measured by the Gross Domestic Product (GDP);

62 Vaughan A. Lewis, "Small States in the International Society: With Special Reference to the Associated States", Caribbean Quarterly, 18, No. 2 (June 1972), pp. 36-47.

- extreme external economic and financial dependence -
including in some cases the receipt of grant-in-aid to
balance their recurrent fiscal budget; and
- susceptibility to natural disasters, mainly hurricanes,
floods and volcanic eruptions which devastate entire
countries because of their small size.

In terms of the economic problems facing small countries, William Demas has argued that under-development and self-sustained growth cannot be considered in isolation from the size of a particular country.⁶³ Focusing on the Caribbean, Demas identifies some of the difficulties of achieving growth and posits alternative strategies of development open to these economies. Demas' contribution includes an analysis of the "transformation of the structure of production",⁶⁴ a term used to identify the capacity to transform as determined by political and social processes and attitudes; the unification of the national market for goods and services; the shift of production and of labour as between primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors of the economy; the development of an increasing degree of inter-dependence among domestic industries and activities; changes in the importance and composition of foreign trade; the reduction of dualism in the economy; and the development of appropriate institutions.

63 William G. Demas, The Economics of Development in Small Countries with Special Reference to the Caribbean, Montreal: McGill University Press, 1965.

64 op. cit., pp. 8-38.

Economic viability, as we shall see, has always been a powerful argument in the independence debate. If economic viability is defined as the ability of a state to meet its recurrent expenditures out of its collections of revenue, or the ability of a country to balance its overseas payments without resort to grants or loans, there are not that many countries that can claim to be economically viable, notwithstanding the fact that many of these countries are very large in area and population. What is of significance in the debate is that while the United Nations proclaimed that low level of economic development should not be a pretext to delay independence in many mini-states it was the political leaders themselves who did not choose to exercise the option of independence, very often assuming that they would be economically better off having access to development assistance and aid grants from the administering power.

Chapter ii

The Development of Representative and Responsible Government in the West Indies 1920 - 1945

A. Introduction

The preceding chapter attempted to outline the evolution of the right of self-determination mainly through the United Nations Organization. Translated into political terms self-determination means that all non-self-governing territories (NSGTs), no matter how small, are entitled to political independence, although free association and integration are recognised under Resolution 1541 (XV) as alternative forms of self-government. Even where association has been accepted - and there are not that many cases - the Special Committee still regards independence as the ultimate goal and continues to reiterate the right of self-determination/independence. It will be recalled that throughout the period of decolonisation the administering powers had steadfastly maintained that it was their responsibility and not that of the United Nations to determine the status of a territory.

In the absence of universally accepted principles for determination of NSGTs the colonial powers clearly had the advantage in the issue; the anti-colonials in the UN had to have recourse to other provisions of the UN Charter. Even after lists of factors and principles were adopted to determine self-government (or dependency) colonial powers like the United Kingdom still asserted their responsibility, and the

transmission of information on the change in political status was regarded as little more than a courtesy for information purposes.¹

The other aspect of the issue of self-determination addressed in this section relates to the preparation of colonial territories for eventual self-government/independence. More specifically an attempt will be made to analyse the development of representative and responsible government in the progress towards self-government in the West Indies. This without dispute was the sole responsibility of the British Government. The emphasis will be more on highlighting the rates and sequences of constitutional change and their implications rather than giving a detailed blow by blow account of constitutional development. Two limitations seem to be necessary for this presentation: a time frame and a limited geographic scope. With regard to the former 1920 is taken as the point of departure, going backwards where appropriate to make the necessary linkages. Regarding geographic scope the study will focus on the Leeward and Windward Islands although it will be necessary from time to time to make reference to other West Indian territories.

B. The Economic, Social and Political Situation
at the End of the First World War in the
Leeward and Windward Islands

The end of the First World War marked the beginning of a new era

1 For comments of administering powers, see statement by (a) US following change of status in Puerto Rico contained in UN Doc., A/AC.35/L.121, pp. 2-7; (b) Netherlands on US decision, A/AC.35/-SR.83,3, France, A/AC.35/SR. 84, p. 14.

in the West Indies insofar as British colonial policy and internal developments were concerned. The next fifty years were characterised by social, economic and political change sometimes slow, sometimes rapid; sometimes peaceful at other times violent. To appreciate fully the character of this change it is essential to keep in perspective the colonial heritage in the islands. Ironically the Leeward and Windward Islands were among the first territories to be colonised by the British and among the last to be decolonised.²

The history of the Leewards and Windwards up to the First World War is characterised by slavery (later indenture), plantation agriculture and the Crown Colony system of direct administrative control.³ Originally established as colonies of settlement, as in America, Australia, Canada, New Foundland and New Zealand, they were never settled by many whites as in these territories. Plantation agriculture was introduced early and depended on African slave labour up to 1833 and

2 British settlement began in St. Kitts (St. Christopher) 1624, Nevis, 1628; Antigua and Montserrat 1632, Grenada, St. Vincent and Dominica in 1783 after changing hands several times between Britain and France; and St. Lucia, 1814. For a comprehensive history of all the West Indian Islands see Eric Williams, From Columbus to Castro (New York: Harper and Row, 1970.)

3 The literature on both slavery and post-slavery period is voluminous. Interested readers should consult W.L. Burn, Emancipation and Apprenticeship in the British West Indies (London: Jonathan Cape, 1937); Elsa Goveia, Slave Society in the British Leeward Islands at the End of the Eighteenth Century (New Haven: 1965); Lowell J. Ragatz, The Fall of the Planter Class in the British Caribbean 1763-1833: Study in Social and Economic History (New York: Century Company, 1928).

thereafter on semi-slaves brought over from Asia (mainly India) under the indenture system.⁴ A permanent result of the slavery - indenture system is that the populations in the West Indies are predominantly Afro-Asian⁵ - that is, either black or brown.

The ideology of colonial rule included the principle, often explicitly stated during the colonial era, that the minority of whites must never be governed by the black majority. Under slavery this principle found expression in a form of government known as the Old Representative System which consisted of a Governor, a Council and an Assembly. The Governor appointed men of wealth as Councillors to serve as his advisory body or Executive Council and held office at the Sovereign's pleasure. The House of Assembly or Legislative Council was elected on the basis of property qualifications and confined to white landowners or freeholders. This tripartite ruling elite was an extremely small group representing at best only planters, merchants and the legal classes.⁶ Following the abolition of slavery in 1833 all the West Indian territories, with the exception of Barbados and the Bahamas,

4 The indenture system lasted until 1917.

5 In Guyana (formerly British Guiana) and Trinidad (according to some estimates) East Indians form the single largest group; elsewhere populations are predominantly of African origin.

6 Gordon K. Lewis, The Growth of the Modern West Indies (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968), p. 95.

surrendered their limited representative institutions⁷ and became Crown Colonies.

The surrender of the representative institutions and the introduction of pure Crown Colony Government should be viewed in the context of the consequences of emancipation on politics and society: blacks now constituted the majority of free men. The local legislatures had argued that the British Parliament was incompetent to pass the Emancipation Act since complete local autonomy had been irrevocably granted to the legislatures and that emancipation was likely to cause an uprising among the slaves; further, when the slaves became "citizens" this social revolution would make any form of representative government next to impossible. It was this racist ideology which contributed to the fact that while territories with relatively large white populations⁸ were moving towards greater self-government, the West Indies had moved backwards or stood still in this respect.

It is very difficult to escape the conclusion that the introduction of pure Crown Colony rule was an attempt to maintain white

7 One of the best analysis of the causes and consequences of slavery in the Caribbean is Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944); see also D.G. Hall, "Slaves and Slavery in the British West Indies" in A. Singham and L.E. Brathwaite, eds., Social and Economic Studies, Special Number on the Conference on Political Sociology in the British Caribbean, 11, No. 4 (December 1962), pp. 305-318.

8 The white population had actually started leaving the West Indies since the late eighteenth century, following the decline of the sugar industry which was due, among other things, to the introduction of free trade and later the end of preferential treatment for West Indian sugar in the nineteenth century.

domination, for as others have pointed out⁹ while the white areas of the British Empire moved ahead the black areas stagnated or declined socially, economically as well as politically. The basic features of the pure Crown Colony system were: the Crown represented by the Governor; an Executive Council composed of government officials and a Legislative Council consisting of officials and nominated members. With the exception of Jamaica and the British Guiana, Crown Colony government persisted until after the First World War.¹⁰

It is a mistake to assume that slaves became citizens upon their emancipation having the same rights enjoyed by citizens of the mother country; at least they were free men, but subjects. The idea that black men did not have the capacity to rule persisted for more than a century after abolition and even became part of the myth of white supremacy and superiority accepted by the West Indian population - at least some sections of it.¹¹ Under slavery there was no problem of 'keeping one's distance' - the society was already bifurcated into slaves and free men.

9 See Hugh Egerton, 'Colonies and the Mercantile System', in George H. Nadel and Perry Curtis (eds), Imperialism and Colonialism (New York: 1964).

10 The Old Representative System had survived in Barbados and the Bahamas; Jamaica and Montserrat lost their old constitutions in 1866; the British Virgin Islands in 1867; British Honduras became a Crown Colony in 1870; St. Vincent lost its old constitution in 1876; Grenada in 1877; St. Christopher-Nevis in 1878 and Antigua and Dominica in 1898.

11 For an analysis of the social and political legacy of British colonialism see Gordon K. Lewis, op. cit., chaps. 3 and 4.

In the post-slavery situation this problem was solved by the new political structure which isolated the Governor and his advisers from the people.

In terms of the economy plantation agriculture mainly for the production of sugar for export was the pattern throughout the West Indies.¹² From the very beginning the larger-scale production of sugar made the territories modern economies; it was factory production that was highly capitalised, and linked to a complex commercial organization.¹³ Unlike other forms of capitalist enterprise labour was slave (and later semi-slave) labour which was often treated as capital investment. Rather than reinvesting profits in improved techniques of production funds were used either for purchasing more slaves or on ostentatious living either in the West Indies or in England. All these factors, combined with absenteeism and bad management and other external factors mentioned earlier led to the failure of the slave-based economies.

The colonial plantation system did not allow for the development of market links within and between the territories. In the post-emancipation era the planters pursued a policy that involved the deliberate use of coercion, the law, and the introduction of indentured labour with the aim of retarding the development of an independent free

12 For more on plantation society see Ramiro Guerra y. Sanchez, Sugar and Society in the Caribbean (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964).

13 Elsa Goveia, op. cit., p. 105.

peasantry and guaranteeing a cheap supply of dependent labour. The overall effect was to prevent the development of an internal market for domestically produced goods. The pattern was: largely mono-crop plantation agriculture for export, with much of what was consumed locally being imported and with a very large landless proletariat. Two sets of factors thus worked constantly against the economic development of the Windwards and Leewards: the vulnerability of the economies to external influences, such as falling world market prices, and the relative absence of an internal dynamic for growth.

On the eve of the First World War economic collapse in the Caribbean was avoided partially through two developments: the implementation of some of the recommendations made by a Royal Commission in 1897, and a preferential trade agreement between Canada and the West Indies in 1912. The Royal Commission documented the decline of the West Indies and made a number of recommendations, some of which were later implemented. These included the setting up of an Imperial Department of Agriculture in the West Indies to study plant diseases and develop new and more productive varieties of sugar cane; the re-introduction of cotton production; provision of subsidy to a line of steamers to carry West Indian products to British markets; loans to some islands like Barbados to build factories and to Jamaica to build a railway which encouraged the growth of bananas in areas unsuitable for sugar.¹⁴

¹⁴ See R.V. Sires, "Government in the British West Indies: An Historical Outline", Social and Economic Studies, 6, No. 2 (Institute of Social and Economic Research, University College of the West Indies, Jamaica, June 1957), pp. 108-132.

The other development concerned the preferential treatment given to West Indian sugars by Canada: since 1897 Canada had given a 25 percent (later 33 1/3 percent) preference on West Indian sugars; in 1909-10 a Royal Commission comprising representatives from Canada, the West Indies and the UK recommended closer intra-empire trade relations, and in 1912 a preferential trade agreement was made between Canada and most of the West Indies.¹⁵

The First World War produced a sugar boom in most of the West Indian islands following the destruction of beet sugar factories in Europe. However, this boom was short-lived as beet-sugar production quickly recovered and Cuba and Hawaii after the War increased their production of cane-sugar which literally priced West Indian sugar off the world markets. By 1920 the world depression had struck the islands which left the sugar producers and other producers of primary products in an almost hopeless condition.

C. Formation of Representative Government
Associations and British Response to
Demands for Political and Economic Change

There is no doubt that the world reaction against imperialism and colonialism at the end of the War, coupled with deteriorating conditions in the West Indies, on the one hand encouraged West Indian demands for self-government and for improved social and economic conditions, and on

¹⁵ *ibid.*

the other hand prompted the British Government to pay closer attention to economic and political development in the territories. Certain gains were registered in the 1920s but it took the world depression and riots which erupted in almost every West Indian territory during the 1930s to awaken the colonial administration to the urgency of the situation.

Two sets of factors contributed to the development of representative and responsible government in the West Indies in the post-World War I era:-

- (a) internally, the worsening socio-economic conditions of the mass of the people coupled with the frustrations of the middle class which was left out of politics; and
- (b) externally, the impact of the First World War itself which exposed many West Indians to experience in Europe and elsewhere and also gave rise to the first public affirmation of the idea of the right of self-determination.

Other events were also taking place outside the region which contributed to the rise of West Indian nationalism such as the Russian Revolution of 1917, the formal recognition of the Dominions as independent States within the Commonwealth under the Statute of Westminster 1931, and anti-colonial and nationalist struggles in Ireland, India, the Middle East and elsewhere. Men like Andrew Arthur Cipriani of Trinidad had served abroad in the British West Indies Regiment and returned home radicalised after the War to start the struggle against colonialism.

The ideas and movements of nationalism, socialism and anti-imperialism were translated locally into movements for social and political reforms. Beginning in 1917, Representative Government Associations were formed in the Caribbean mainly to petition the imperial government for the end of the Crown Colony system of government. The first was formed in Grenada under the leadership of T.A. Marryshow. In their "Petition to His Majesty George V for Representative Government for Grenada, 1920", the petitioners called Crown Colony rule "invidious and unjust". The people, they pleaded, owned the bulk of the land, conducted most of the commerce, supplied almost the whole revenue for the upkeep of the colony, controlled the legal and medical professions, were law abiding and of unquestionable loyalty to "Your Majesty's Throne and Person"; had fought in the War for the Mother Country and had assisted the Imperial Government in its War efforts; were law-abiding subjects whose present political condition was unwarrantable, who should be restored those rights and principles of citizenship of which they have for nearly half a century been deprived, namely, "the election of representatives to control and regulate the importation and allocation of taxes paid by them, and the making of laws by which they are bound." They therefore "prayed" that Crown Colony Government be abolished and government based on popular representation be established.¹⁶

16 Patrick Emmanuel, Crown Colony Politics in Grenada 1917-1951 (Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, Cave Hill, Barbados, 1978), Appendix I, pp. 186-190.

We should note in passing that in 1884, Jamaica was granted an elective element in its government - 9 elected members of the Legislative Council as opposed to 4 ex officio and 5 nominated - this modified system of Crown Colony Government was not granted to any other West Indian territory until 1925 when Trinidad was granted a partly elected Chamber.

Between the First and Second World Wars the UK Government sent three Commissions to the West Indies to investigate conditions and make recommendations. These were: the Wood Commission, 1921,¹⁷ the Ferguson/Orr Commission, 1933;¹⁸ and the Moyne Commission, 1938.¹⁹ It was in response to a common demand for a measure of representative government that E.F.L. Wood (later Lord Halifax) visited the West Indies and British Guiana from December 1921 to February 1922.

Briefly, the constitutional position of the Leeward Islands at the time of the visit can be summarised as follows: Antigua, Dominica, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Montserrat and the Virgin Islands constituted the Leeward Islands Federation which had one Executive and one Legislative Council, under one Governor; the Legislative Council consisted of eight official and eight elective members, three of whom were chosen by the unofficial members of the Legislative Council of Antigua, two by those of

17 Cmnd. 1679/1922: Report of the Hon. E.F.L. Wood, M.P. on his Visit to the West Indies and British Guiana, 1922.

18 See Report of the Closer Union Commission, 1933.

19 Cmnd. 6607/1945: Report of the West Indian Royal Commission 1938-39. The recommendations of the Moyne Commission will be reviewed in chapter iii.

the Legislative Council of Dominica and three by those of the Legislative Council of St. Kitts and Nevis. The official members were the governor, the Colonial Secretary, the Attorney-General, the Auditor-General, the Administrators of St. Kitts-Nevis and Dominica, and the Commissioners of Montserrat and the Virgin Islands.²⁰ Antigua had a 16-member Legislative Council, eight official and eight non-official, all nominated by the Governor;²¹ St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla had an Executive Council consisting of the Governor, the Administrator and ex officio members and a Legislative Council consisting of six official and six nominated unofficial members, besides the Governor and the Administrator;²² Dominica had an Administrator and Executive Council of five members and a Legislative Council of official and five non-official nominated members;²³ Montserrat possessed a Legislative Council of six nominated members²⁴ and the Virgin Islands, which were then part of the Leewards Group, possessed an Executive Council with members being nominated at the Sovereign's pleasure.²⁵

20 For a full description of the Leeward Islands Federation see Regulations for His Majesty's Colonial Service, Colonial Office List, H.M.S.O., 1922, p. 251.

21 *ibid.*, pp. 253-254.

22 *ibid.*, pp. 256-257.

23 *ibid.*, p. 261.

24 *ibid.*, p. 263.

25 *ibid.*, p. 265.

The Windward Islands then consisted of Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent under a single Governor. Unlike the Leewards there was no common legislature and each island retained its own institutions with Grenada having a Legislative Council of thirteen nominated members;²⁶ St. Lucia having an Administrator aided by a nominated Executive Council,²⁷ with similar situation in St. Vincent.²⁸ All these territories were therefore administered under a system of pure Crown colony Government by a legislature composed of an official majority, controlled by the Governor who was responsible to the Secretary of State and an unofficial element nominated by the governor.

As Wood saw it, the demand for representative government²⁹ would, in the long run, prove irresistible, bearing in mind the effect of the War, increasing education and traditions of representative institutions going back to the early days of colonisation. However, while asking for a measure of representative government, he stated that in none of the territories was there a demand for responsible government, neither could such a demand be considered "within measurable distance of

26 *ibid.*, p. 443.

27 *ibid.*, p. 446.

28 *ibid.*, p. 450.

29 In this context the concept of representative government refers to a government elected by universal adult suffrage; responsibility refers to the conduct of government.

time."³⁰ This was so because of the presence of the various colour, religion and race of the population which was backward and politically undeveloped; the absence of a class of leisured citizens who could take an active part in political life; smallness and isolation made it questionable whether responsible government would be practicable in the absence of economic development, a further risk was that a financial oligarchy could be entrenched which would dominate the Colony and use their position for the sole benefit of their class; some uniformity of administration under the controlling influence of the Secretary of State was essential for a future West Indian federation; and, only a small proportion of the electorate (where such existed) exercised the franchise. On this score, Wood noted that the majority of voters in Jamaica were coloured or negro, small peasant proprietors who showed little concern for politics.

In general, Wood visualised two stages in the future development of the West Indies: (1) substituting election for nomination in the choice of a number of the members of the Legislative Council, with the official majority being maintained; and (2) the transfer of the majority held by ex officio members to the hands of the nominated unofficial and the elected members conjointly.³¹ With regard to St.

30 Cmnd. 1679, op. cit., Part I et seq. The relationship between Responsible and Representative Government is discussed in this part of his Report.

31 For fuller details see Cmnd. 1679, Part I.

Kitts-Nevis, the Representative Government Association (RGA) had claimed to speak on behalf of the entire community, with the exception of the planters, in pleading for some form of representative government with a limited franchise and for control of finance. After listening to the Agricultural and Commercial Society of St. Kitts which was opposed to any form of election of members of Council, Wood told the RGA that he could not recommend the concession since it was not supported by the "general weight of responsible opinion in the island." In Antigua only certain elements - not the most substantial - demanded representative government, hence it was recommended that the request be denied. Similar views were expressed for Montserrat. However, in Dominica, Wood found that conditions were different: both peasant owner class and the substantial elements were largely in favour of representative government. For this reason, and moving cautiously, Wood favoured some concession while ensuring that an official majority was maintained in the Council.

Conditions were hardly different in the Windward Islands but Wood did recommend that two or three unofficial members of the Legislative Council should be elected in St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada. Where concessions had been granted, these were far less than had been demanded by the RGAs - Wood had concluded that as a condition of progress and mobility it was important to maintain a European element in the territories, which presence depended on the prosperity of the sugar industry.³²

32 Speech made in the House of Commons by the Hon. E.F.L. Wood, Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1922, Parliamentary Debates (Commons) 156, 1922, Col. 234-235.

The following year a Parliamentary Committee was appointed in the House of Commons in the words of the new Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, Ormsby-Gore, "to take an interest in our oldest and most historic colonies."³³

By 1925 there were modest changes in the constitutions of Dominica,³⁴ St. Lucia, Grenada and St. Vincent. In these islands the privilege was granted to elect a minority of the Councils on a restricted franchise. In Antigua and St. Kitts, the strong opposition of the 'substantial elements' - the planters and merchants - delayed the introduction of the election principle until 1936. The irony was that in these two islands and Montserrat, representative institutions flourished before any such existed in the British Empire. The rationale for delaying the granting of representative government was clearly spelled out in the Wood Report. There was no disguising the class bias of the colonial officials which Wood exemplified: concession could only be granted when supported by 'responsible opinion' or 'substantial elements' and even when 'responsible opinion' supported it the demand was refused, as in the case of Dominica, on the ground that it would encourage agitation among the adjacent islands.

The Ferguson/Orr Commission was appointed in 1933 to consider

33 Parliamentary Debates (Commons) 167, 1923, col. 491-492.

34 Dominica Constitution Ordinance, No. 21 of 1924. Ordinances of Dominica.

whether there should be a union of the Leeward and Windward Islands under one Governor.³⁵ Among its recommendations, the Report recommended that each territory should be given the greatest possible measure of local autonomy. Further constitutional 'gains' were experienced during the 1930s.³⁶ Also of note during this period was the separation of Dominica from the Leeward Islands group in 1938.³⁷

D. Attempts at Planning Economic Development:
The Colonial Development and Welfare Acts
1929 - 1950

In studying colonial economic development policy, it is important to bear in mind that the debate had always centred on whom the beneficiaries from economic development ought to be: the people of the Mother Country or the people of the colonies. The idea of promoting the welfare of colonial people did not emerge until very late in colonial history.³⁸ The English mercantilists had argued that economic

35 Cmnd. 4383/1933, Report of the Closer Union Commission.

36 See for example: Despatch from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor of the Windward Islands 2 June 1935; Dominica Order in Council, (S.I. 1896/1939).

37 Dominica Act, 1938.

38 For a full treatment of mercantilist policy and other policies of colonialism and imperialism see: George H. Nadel and Perry Curtis (eds.), Imperialism and Colonialism (New York: 1964); The Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Colonial Problem: a report by a study group of members of the Royal Institute of International Affairs (London: 1937); Michael Barratt-Brown, After Imperialism, (London: 1963).

development of colonies, i.e., development of natural resources, would be for the exclusive benefit of the people of the metropolitan country; consequently bounties, guaranteed markets, investment in a few basic raw materials including agricultural crops for exports were some of the mechanisms used for achieving the objectives of this policy. With the collapse of the old colonial system following the American War of Independence mercantilism was replaced by the doctrine of laissez-faire.³⁹ The new colonial policy meant that until late into the nineteenth century successive British Governments deliberately abstained from formulating programmes for colonial economic development involving funds from the British Exchequer; colonial governments were expected to finance their own economic development from revenues obtained from export earnings.

By 1895 the laissez faire policy with respect to colonial economic development was denounced as obsolete.⁴⁰ From then on the principle was accepted more and more that it was the responsibility of the British Government to assist in the economic development of colonies. In 1899 the Colonial Loans Act made £3 million available for colonial development

39 Adam Smith in his Wealth of Nations had argued that British consumers were not the recipient of any gain from colonies for two reasons: higher prices of colonial products due to monopolistic organization of colonial trade and the burden of taxation for defence of the colonies in addition to payments of bounties to producers.

40 Speech made by Joseph Chamberlain in the House of Commons on 22 August 1895, House of Commons Debates, 4th Series, 36, cols. 641-2.

purposes.⁴¹ Aid to the colonies before the War was confined mainly to the guarantee of loans by the British Government and provision to enable colonies to borrow in the London capital market at preferential rates of interest. Beyond that colonial administrations were expected to develop their own resources and their own revenues from which social services would be financed.

The Colonial Development Bill introduced in 1929 by the Labour Government was primarily intended to relieve the unemployment problem in Britain rather than promote colonial economic development. This was emphatically stated in both the House of Commons⁴² and the House of Lords.⁴³ Schemes approved under the Act were expected to provide immediate and substantial orders for British goods and materials. It need hardly be emphasised that finding jobs for a few Englishmen was more important than encouraging colonial economic development. This was the first major attempt at planning economic development in the West Indies.

41 See E.R. Wicker, "Colonial Development and Welfare: 1929-1957", Social and Economic Studies, 7, No. 4 (December 1958), p. 173. The following paragraphs draw heavily on this article.

42 The Lord Privy Seal in introducing the Bill here, stated that the measure was introduced "not because we do not believe in colonial development or because it is urgent, but because ... of ... unemployment." House of Commons. Debates, 5th Series, 229, Col. 1300.

43 House of Lords Debates, 5th Series, 75, col. 173.

Under this first development Act a maximum of £9 million annual expenditure was set and while more than £6.4 million was actually spent⁴⁴ it should be pointed out that these figures were for all colonial territories. A Colonial Development Advisory Committee set up under the Act insisted that schemes approved for funding should provide immediate and substantial order for British goods and materials,⁴⁵ although expenditures on public health were not precluded.⁴⁶ The limitation of schemes to capital projects and material development precluded consideration of other projects for which there had been pressing need. Two types of projects were identified for purposes of approving applications for assistance - works of development which included expenditures on 'material development' and public health and work of an ordinary administrative character which could normally be financed from the revenues of a colony. The achievements of the 1929 Act were modest but at least they did lay the foundation for a more positive policy in the future.⁴⁷ As we saw above although £1 million was earmarked as the amount that the colonies could absorb annually the actual expenditures never approached that figure. This was due to lack of a planning machinery, adequate supervisory staff and no comprehensive picture of the colonies' needs.

44 Wicker, op. cit., p. 175.

45 Final Report of the Colonial Development Advisory Committee (1941), Cmnd. 6298, p. 7.

46 First Report of Colonial Development Advisory Committee (1939), Cmnd. 3540, p. 17.

47 For details of expenditures during 1929-1940 under the first Act see Wicker, op. cit., pp. 176-179..

The Colonial Development and Welfare Act, 1940, an improvement on the previous one, was a direct outcome of riots and protests of the 1930s in the West Indies. Following outbreaks of violence a Royal Commission was appointed in August 1938 to investigate the situation and make recommendations. The Commission gave such a gloomy picture that publication of the full report had to be postponed until after the war; a temporary report was issued in February 1940 along with a Statement of Policy on Colonial Development and Welfare.

Among other things the Royal Commission pointed out that there was a "pressing need for large expenditure on social services and development which not even the least poor of the West Indian colonies can hope to undertake from their own resources";⁴⁸ they called for the establishment of a West Indian Welfare Fund, independent of local governments, to be financed by an annual grant of £1 million for a period of twenty years; the object of the annual grant would be to finance schemes for (1) general improvement of education, (2) social welfare, (3) housing and slum clearance, (4) health service, (5) creation of labour departments and (6) land settlement. Also included in actual allocation was a specific sum for promoting colonial research. In all more than £11 million were spent.

Before the Second World War ended, the 1940 Act was amended on 31 January 1945 to provide for an extension of the period of operation of

⁴⁸ op. cit., pp. 180-183. A fuller treatment of the Moyne Commission is given in chapter iii.

the Act to 1956 and to increase the amount of the allocation.⁴⁹ The 1940 Act was further amended in 1949 and again in 1950 each time increasing the amount to be expended for research and development purposes.⁵⁰ After a comprehensive review of the operation and administration of the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts it was agreed that a ten-year period was too long for realistic planning and in 1955 Parliament approved expenditures for economic development over the period 1955-1960. Thereafter, five-year development plans became the norm in the Caribbean.

Conclusions

The ideology of colonial rule persisted long after the abolition of slavery, and the introduction of the Crown Colony system of government had the effect of maintaining white domination rather than paving the way for a more representative system of government. The vulnerability of the economies to changes in the world market coupled with the relative absence of an internal dynamic for growth retarded economic development in the colonies. It was not until the First World War that there was a major shift in colonial policy during which the laissez faire attitude towards colonial development was abandoned. This shift was partly due to the imperatives of a war situation and partly to an enlightened awareness

49 *ibid.*, pp. 183-187.

50 *ibid.*

that the imperial government must do more to promote development and welfare. Moreover, some West Indians had fought for King and Country and had returned home determined to struggle for political emancipation.

The shift in policy was demonstrated through the introduction of Colonial Development and Welfare Acts in 1929 and 1940. These acts represented the first attempts at planning economic development but were also designed to alleviate the unemployment problem in Britain and promote the sale of British goods and materials rather than to promote the welfare of the colonies since the latter did not have the technical and administrative capability to implement the development plans.

Increasing population coupled with serious unemployment and under-employment produced pressures that constantly wiped out whatever gains might have been achieved through educational and social legislation, and even though improvements in education standards provided arguments for greater participation of the unenfranchised, the mobility of the non-white population was held back through various policies such as recruitment for public and private sector jobs in the metropolitan country and closing the doors of the representative assemblies. The Crown Colony system which was supposed to protect the interests of the non-white population ensured that enough power was retained in hands of the local plantocracy to control the rest of the country.

The denial of representative Government was based on the assumption of the lack of a strong middle-class which would provide the

basis for political parties and politics along the Westminster model. However, British colonial policy did not encourage the creation of such a class, and even where a middle-class began to emerge they were denied the opportunity to get practical training and experience. In the Windwards and Leewards, Representative Government Associations were formed to agitate for the end of the Crown Colony System. However, during this period, no thought was really given to establishing a genuinely politically viable system.

Chapter iii

British Attempts to Devise Plans for Decolonisation 1945 - 1960: Emergence of the Federal Idea

A. Introduction

In the previous chapter, consideration was given to the political and economic conditions prevailing in the West Indies in the period after World War I and the response of the Colonial Office to demands for constitutional change. Chapter iii continues the analysis of identifying the linkages between economic development planning and the planning of decolonisation through a scheme for a West Indian Federation.

It is an assumption of this study that the decolonisation of the Leewards and Windwards is inextricably linked to the decolonisation of the entire English-speaking Caribbean, consequently the study of development in the smaller territories must be located within the broader framework of the Caribbean. While the analysis is mainly historical in content our primary concern is with the application of the principle of self-determination to the West Indian territories and political and constitutional development towards this end.

B. Post-War Colonial Development Policy

The Colonial Office had always sought to link constitutional change with economic development and in recognition of the need to

co-ordinate planning activities of colonial governments with the Colonial Office, an Adviser on Development was appointed at the Colonial Office in April 1945. The first task of the Adviser was to decide on the allocation of the 120 million among the colonial dependencies. The following year a Colonial Economic and Development Council was appointed to advise, as well as examine, the ten-year development plans submitted by the colonial governments; it functioned until 1951. At the local (regional) level a Colonial Development and Welfare Organization (DWO) was established in 1940 fully staffed by imported Englishmen, to implement schemes approved in London.¹

Apart from sums voted by Parliament, colonies were expected to supplement the financing of development plans from loans either at home or abroad and revenues from local resources. Partnership in planning became the theme after the War and while the Colonial Secretary could disavow any attempt on the part of the British Government to impose "a new heaven prefabricated in Whitehall"² it is highly doubtful whether the colonial territories could have mustered the type of planning capability envisaged, particularly in the case of the Leewards and Windwards. To extend the opportunity for peoples of the territories to be associated with planning their future is to assume a level of

1 Wicker, op. cit., p. 184.

2 Statement made by the Colonial Secretary in the House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, 407, Col. 2105 as quoted in Wicker, op. cit., p. 184.

technical and administrative capability among the people. Statements like those coming from Whitehall overlords in 1945 were almost meaningless in the Leewards and Windwards. In other territories where local legislatures were representative of the people, as in Barbados, consultation, participation and co-operation did have some meaning; in the Leewards and Windwards 'consulting the people' was restricted to the few nominated members of the legislature.

As we saw earlier, pure Crown Colony government had the effect of denying the rising non-white middle-class participation in government at all levels. Even if they were suddenly brought into the inner councils of policy-making in 1945 their participation in planning would have been barely less than a farce, given their inexperience, and they would have been judged by their social superiors as 'unfit to govern'. A point often overlooked in policy formulation and implementation in the Leewards and Windwards is that throughout the period of colonial rule, decisions were made in London without reference to the people in the territories and handed to them for implementation under colonial supervision. The condition of under-development and sheer political and economic backwardness can be no mystery if we keep in mind some of the legacies outlined here.

When the C.D. and W. Acts were reviewed in 1955, it was hardly surprising that ten years were found to be too long for realistic planning. Not only was planning inadequate and faulty, it also lacked the proper administrative apparatus including locally trained and

experienced personnel. If colonial governments were required to supplement development funds from their own revenues or by borrowing, this posed another problem for the smaller territories for they hardly had the economic base either to raise the required revenues by fiscal measures or to offer sufficient security in order to procure loans from abroad.

Before concluding this section of colonial development policy, mention should be made of other efforts to encourage development through regional co-operation in the years after World War I. As early as 1896, a Royal Commission had recommended that an Imperial Department of Agriculture should be set up for the Leewards and Windwards and having advisory functions for the other West Indian islands.³ A Department was established in 1898 financed from imperial funds with the purpose of raising, by means of research and teaching, the standards of agricultural practice in the area and therefore the standard of living. The development of a separate Department of Agriculture in Barbados and later the establishment of the Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture in Trinidad eventually led to its supercession. Another important development was the establishment of the University College of the West Indies in 1948.

Probably the most important institution created during this period for co-operation in the economic field was the Regional Economic

3 Cmnd. 8655/1898: Report of the West Indian Royal Commission.

Committee (REC) which arose out of the federal negotiations of 1948. The Committee's function was to study and report on matters of common economic significance and to advise on the merits of plans for economic development.⁴

The REC was responsible for an intra-regional shipping service, trade commissioner services in Canada and the United Kingdom, information services and trade and commodity surveys.⁵ Other regional institutions established over this period were the Eastern Caribbean Currency Board (1946);⁶ the British Caribbean Air Transport Advisory Council; and a West Indian Court of Appeal. With the formation of the REC there soon arose conflict with the older DWO which was regarded as, and indeed was, imperially-oriented. It should be noted that unlike the DWO the REC's first Executive Secretary was a West Indian. The growth of 'functional federalism' was actually encouraged by the UK Government as the institutional basis for a political federation; later it became apparent that even this policy of regional collaboration was insufficient to sustain a political federation.

4 For details see Lloyd Braithwaite, "Progress Toward Federation, 1938-1956", Social and Economic Studies, 6, No. 2, June 1957, pp. 166-177.

5 *ibid.*

6 *ibid.*, pp. 177-178.

C. Recommendations of the Moyne Commission⁷

The Moyne Commission was appointed to investigate the riots and protests of the 1930s. The causes of the unrest were several but the Commission, in examining the relationship between the Legislative and Executive Councils under the Crown Colony System made this startling discovery:

Not only are the people, when they become politically conscious, compelled through that system to resort to permanent opposition to government and their elected representatives forced into the position of vehement and continual critics of government, but these representatives are left with no responsibility for practical alternative measures and their criticism, when it becomes perpetual and irresponsible, often leads to a static position and prevents constructive action by the executive.⁸

With respect to colour prejudice and colour discrimination, the Report showed that it had an important bearing on the relationship between Government and the people; the causes of the serious increase in racial prejudice were economic, social and political.⁹

As we noted earlier, the gloomy picture prevented the publication of the Report until after the Second World War. However, one immediate outcome was the 1940 Colonial Development and Welfare Act which sought to

7 Cmnd. 6607/1945. The Report of the West Indian Royal Commission 1938-39.

8 *ibid.*, Chapter V, Section 2, ¶para. 8.

9 *ibid.*, para. 13.

improve economic conditions in the islands. Despite its tone, the Report did not support extreme proposals for the granting of immediate and complete self-government based on universal adult franchise; instead it proposed the following changes in the composition of Executive and Legislative Councils:

- (a) attempts should be made to have all important sections of the population represented in Executive Councils;¹⁰
- (b) an Advisory Committee should be instituted so that elected representatives could get an insight into the working of the government; the Committee should comprise elected members of the Legislatures and heads of Government departments to be put into operation in the 1950s and would be the starting point of the Ministerial System;¹¹
- (c) the only officials to continue to sit on the Legislative Councils should be the Colonial Secretary, the Treasurer and the Attorney-General; the resulting vacancies should be filled by nominations;¹²

¹⁰ *ibid.*, Chapter XXII, para. 8.

¹¹ *ibid.*, paras. 4-6.

¹² *ibid.*, para. 7.

(d) governments should move slowly in the direction of adult suffrage;¹³ and

(e) the Governor's reserve powers should remain in order to control the behaviour of officials.¹⁴

Adult suffrage was introduced into Jamaica in 1944, Trinidad and Tobago 1946, Barbados 1950 and the Leeward and Windward Islands in 1951. Between the Wood and Moyne Commissions politics was largely in the hands of elite groups: planters, merchants, lawyers and other professionals and large shop-keepers. The period was characterised by increasing social prejudice and the rise of a black/brown middle-class operating through RGAs and Reform Leagues to challenge the hegemony of the old plantocracy.

The introduction of adult suffrage in the Leeward and Windward Islands in 1951 witnessed the demise of the Crown Colony System of government¹⁵ and the emergence of working class political leaders who had their roots in trade union organizations which began to emerge during the 1930s.¹⁶ As Gordon Lewis remarked "Crown Colony economies breeds

13 *ibid.*, paras. 12-17.

14 *ibid.*, Chapter XXII.

15 Adult suffrage was not introduced into British Guiana until 1953.

16 St. Kitts was the first to form a progressive organization, the Workers League, in 1932, followed by Antigua in 1939 with the formation of a similar organization.

Crown Colony politics".¹⁷ What Governors often referred to as "irresponsible politicians" were, after all, only local expressions of an irresponsible system.¹⁸ Given the elitist nature of the system, its lack of concern and responsiveness to the real problems of the masses, small wonder that the first elected members were highly suspicious of and even anti-government, as Moyne found out; small wonder, too, that in the aftermath of adult suffrage and the popular election of leaders, people still regarded government with a certain amount of suspicion.

D. The Impact of the 1951 Constitutions: The Institution of Representative Government

The new constitutions given in 1951 to St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent provided for popular election of the majority membership of the Legislative Council, but this did not entail the transfer of responsibility from London to the island capitals. The Governor still had power to override the Legislature and only the Crown through the Secretary of State could disallow a law to which the Governor had given his assent.¹⁹ It was not until 1956 and later that gradual transfer of formal political power to the local people began to be initiated with the designation of the Executive Council as

17 Lewis, op. cit., p. 155.

18 For an in-depth analysis of politics under the system see Patrick Emmanuel, op. cit.

19 See for example, The Antigua Constitution and Elections Ordinance, 1951, Ordinance No. 10, Section 34 (1). The constitutions of the other territories of the Leeward and Windward Islands were similar.

the principal instrument of policy.²⁰ However, the Governor remained as the effective head of the administration who could, with the prior approval of the Secretary of State, act contrary to the advice of the Council.²¹

Half the seats in the Executive Councils were used by elected members of the legislature; these were held on the basis of their election by the Legislative Councils in which elected and nominated members took part. What is interesting is that the elected members of the Executive Councils were styled Ministers and even assigned departments. However, 'Ministers' did not have final authority over departments under them.²² The point to bear in mind is that the Executive Councils, during the period up to 1960, were not responsible to the Legislative Councils and hence the electorate, but to the Governors.²³

Under the quasi-Ministerial System,²⁴ committees of the Legislative Councils were established to consider subject areas of

20 Nominated Executive Councils existed in the Windward Islands until 1951 and the Leeward Islands until 1954.

21 The Leeward Islands Letters Patent, 1956, discharged the Governor of any obligation to consult the Executive Council in cases where such consultations were regarded as prejudicial to the good government.

22 See for example, the Leeward Islands Royal Institutions 1956, Col. 21 (1).

23 Royal Instructions to the Governor of the Windward Islands, dated 10 August 1951.

24 First introduced in Jamaica in 1944.

government policy.²⁵ While their function was mainly deliberative rather than legislative or executive, the idea was to introduce Colonial politicians under non-responsible constitutions to government administration - a tacit recognition of the failure of previous colonial policy in educating the "natives" for self-rule. The Committee-system was regarded as the first step towards the introduction of a full ministerial system of Government.²⁶ As in other cases of constitutional change, the Committee system was introduced in the Leewards and Windwards at various times over a four-year period.²⁷

It was not until 1960 that the Executive Council, as the principal instrument of policy, was made collectively responsible to the Legislative Council.²⁸ Under this new system a 'Chief Minister' was appointed on the basis of his ability to command the support of the majority in the Legislative Council; other Ministers were appointed on his advice. With the principle that the government could be dismissed on a no-confidence vote by the Legislative Council or that Council could be

25 The Committee-system experiment was recommended by the Moyne Commission, op. cit., Chapter XXII, paras. 4-6.

26 Address by the Governor to the General Legislative Council, 6 January 1953, Leeward Islands Gazette, 22 January 1953; and announcement made by the Acting Administrator of Grenada to the Legislative Council, 20 December 1954, Grenada Legislative Council Minutes, 1954, pp. 19-21.

27 Some of the main Committees were: Trade and Production Committee, Communications and Works Committee, and Education and Social Services Committee. For details of their structure and functions see announcement of the Acting Administrator to the Grenada Legislative Council, *ibid.*

28 Antigua Letters Patent, 1959 Act, 12 (2).

dissolved on the advice of the Chief Minister, the Westminster model of parliamentary government was firmly implanted in the islands.

The changes introducing collective responsibility and the office of the Chief Minister were implemented in Barbados in 1946, Jamaica and British Guiana in 1953 and Trinidad and Tobago in 1956. In these cases official membership was retained and discretionary powers were still vested in the Governor. This was the system of government that obtained in the Leewards and Windwards until full internal self-government was granted through Associated Statehood in 1967.

The move toward self-government and decolonisation was within the context of a federation and federal attempts for more than twenty years after the War. In many respects, the politics of the West Indies Associates States was fashioned out of the politics of the abortive federation, and as we shall see later the federal idea - at least in its economic and functional aspects - remained very strong among the islands.

E. The Failure of Decolonisation through
a West Indian Federation

The Federation which came into existence in 1958 had its roots going as far back as the 19th century.²⁹ There were both official and

29 The Leeward Islands Federation was formed in 1871; a Royal Commission of 1882 favoured closer union among all the British territories and envisaged an ultimate federation; similar official views were expressed in 1894, however, in 1896 another Royal Commission saw no virtue in federation. For an account of federal attempts in the West Indies see: Lloyd Braithwaite, "Progress Toward Federation 1938-1956", Social and Economic Studies, 6, No. 2, pp. 133-184.

unofficial proposals for closer union. As we saw earlier, Wood had investigated the conditions in the West Indies and concluded that public opinion was not in favour of federation.³⁰ However, he proposed a union of the Windward Islands with Trinidad. A Closer Union Commission which reported in 1933 rejected the idea of a larger federation but recommended a union of the Leewards and Windwards. This idea was rejected and until the Second World War there was little official consideration of federation. Unofficially there had always been groups advocating closer union, for example, during the 1920s the Associated Chambers of Commerce of the West Indies under its President, Sir Edward Dawson, proposed a standing conference in West Indian affairs directly to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The result was a West Indian Conference in London in 1926³¹ followed by a similar Conference in Barbados in 1929. This group was mainly interested in functional co-operation rather than political union.³²

At the time there had been an upsurge of nationalistic feelings in the Caribbean with demands being made for representative (if not responsible) government. There was also the call for a West Indian federation. In 1923 a conference was held in Dominica at which a federal constitution was formulated and proposals submitted to the Secretary of

30 Wood Report, op. cit., Cmnd. 4383/1933.

31 Cmnd. 2672/1926.

32 *ibid.*, para. 7.

State for the Colonies.³³ Both the proposals submitted by the Dominica Conference and the Closer Union Commission were rejected on the grounds of divergence of opinion and the additional expense involved.³⁴ It was not until the Moyne Commission of 1938-39 that the federal idea was again pursued. It was the view of the Commission that although there was advance in the direction of political unity, the time was not ripe for any large scheme of federation. Moyne had found that West Indian opinion was not ready to accept federation in principle, however, he felt that a federation of the Leewards and Windwards would be a practical test of the advantages of federation.³⁵

Before anything could be implemented the War had intervened and it was not until the War ended that the Colonial Office turned its attention to the problems of West Indian political organization and federation. In the meantime a "Windward Islands Conference on Constitutional Reform" was held in January 1945 at which the question of constitutional reform in terms of local self-government took precedence over federation. The proposals of the Conference called for a modified form of adult suffrage, the retention of the principle of nomination in the Legislative and

33 See Report of the Dominica Conference held at Roseau, 1932. Appendix B to the Report of the West Indies Closer Union Commission 1933, op. cit.

34 Statement by the Secretary of State for the Colonies on Closer Union proposals for the West Indies, 31 October 1934, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 293, Col. 192-93.

35 Moyne Report, op. cit., Chapter XVII, paras. 9-12.

Executive Councils and of ex officio membership by senior government officials in those bodies and the lowering of property qualifications - hardly what one would consider as radical proposals given the mood of the times. It was also the view of the Conference that internal constitutional reform should take place before the establishment of the proposed Windwards-Leewards federation. In response to these proposals, the Secretary of State for the Colonies replied emphatically that "I am not in favour of immediate constitutional reform before the question of federation is discussed".³⁶ Further in the despatch, the Colonial Secretary outlined the basis of a federation with a strong central government.³⁷

There was much debate in the islands concerning the proposals of Colonial Office. However, in the end, with talk of a larger federation much in vogue, not only did a Leewards-Windwards federation fail to materialise but the Leewards were defederated by an Act of Parliament. The Leewards-Windwards federal attempt failed because the latter group felt that the association was so loose and the autonomy of the individual units so real that no formal act was necessary.³⁸ With the failure of the Leewards-Windwards attempt, attention became focused on the wider

36 Despatch from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governors of the Leeward and Windward Islands, dated 14 March 1946, Supplement to Leeward Islands Gazette, 4 April 1946.

37 *ibid.*, paras. 6-7.

38 Braithwaite, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

federation. The idea, muted during the Second World War, was revived in 1944 at two meetings held in Barbados: the meeting of the Associated Chambers of Commerce and the West Indian Conference. The following year, the Caribbean Congress of Labour - a newly formed organization - echoed the call for a federation. Against this background, the Secretary of State invited the Legislatures of all the English-speaking colonies in the Caribbean and the Bahamas, including British Honduras and British Guiana, to debate the issue and, if they favoured the idea, a conference would be convened.³⁹

This paved the way for the Conference on the Closer Association of the British West Indian Colonies held in Montego Bay, Jamaica, from 11-19 September 1947 (hereafter referred to as the Montego Bay Conference) under the Chairmanship of Arthur Creech-Jones, Secretary of State for the Colonies. This was the first time in West Indian history that delegates from all the Caribbean territories⁴⁰ had met around a common conference table to discuss federation. At the end of the Conference, fifteen resolutions were passed for submission to various member governments.⁴¹ Also of significance was the presence of Jamaica for

39 Despatch from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governors of the West Indian Colonies dated 14 March 1945, Appendix I of Cmnd. 7120/1947.

40 Bahamas had declined the invitation.

41 Cmnd. 7291/1948. Report of the Conference on the Closer Association of the British West Indian Colonies, Montego Bay, Jamaica, 11-19 September 1948.

the first time in federal talks. Among the resolutions was one establishing a Standing Closer Association Committee (SCAC) to consider and make recommendations on a number of vital areas. It was almost a foregone conclusion that federation had become a reality at the end of the Conference. However, it would take several more years and several more conferences before a federation finally came into existence.⁴²

The Report of the SCAC in 1949 presented a model of federation which was accepted by all the territories with the exception of British Guiana, British Honduras and the British Virgin Islands. With the SCAC Report as its base, a Conference was held in London in 1953, with the elected West Indian leaders for the first time taking part in the plan. Agreement was reached on the constitutional framework for the Federation but not before several modifications were made to the SCAC proposals. The problems of working out the details of the federal machinery were essentially technical in nature and the bureaucratic apparatus in the Caribbean proved to be incapable of doing this, with the result that the initiative lay largely with the Colonial Office. At the local level, according to Gordon Lewis, federation marked a stage in which the intelligentsia took over leadership of the nationalist movements from the

42 Those dates give an indication of the long process involved in working out the mechanisms for federation: 1940 Report of the SCAC (Rance Report); 1949 Report of the Holmes Commission on Freedom of Movement, Reports of the three pre-Federal Commissioners, the Judicial, Fiscal and Civil Service; 1957 Mudie Commission Report on the Federal Site; 1958 Report of the Trade and Tariffs Commission (Colonial No. 225/1950).

popular mass force that had controlled it in the period after 1938.⁴³ The full effect of the London Plan of 1953 was that unit governments would retain substantial power while the central government was deprived of effectiveness.⁴⁴

Three years after the first London Conference, the draft federal constitution which emerged was regarded as unsatisfactory and this led to the final meeting of West Indian plenipotentiaries in 1956⁴⁵ before the Federation came into effect. Even after this Conference the West Indian leaders were dissatisfied with some of the major provisions.

Between the two London Conferences the government had changed in Jamaica. Norman Manley, the new Premier, proposed that:-

- (i) the federal executive should be truly representative of modern political development and should match the ability and capability of unit governments; and
- (ii) it was necessary to provide at the outset for easy and flexible amendments to the constitution and thus to avoid difficulties that other federations had made for themselves

43 Lewis, op. cit., p. 354.

44 See Braithwaite, op. cit., pp. 152-155.

45 ibid., pp. 157-159.

by drawing up ironclad constitutions amendable only with great difficulty.⁴⁶

Grantley Adams of Barbados agreed with Manley and pointed out that since an increasing measure of self-government was being granted to individual territories it would not be appropriate to grant less to the Federation; in point of fact, Barbados had the most advanced constitution in the West Indies and it would therefore be a sacrificial act on her part to join the Federation. Eric Williams of Trinidad objected to the 1953 draft scheme on the following points:-

- (i) the objective economic conditions of the British Caribbean demanded that these territories, previously isolated, should be federated;
- (ii) the 1953 draft scheme would perpetuate the worst evils of colonialism which had ruined the Caribbean;
- (iii) the Jamaica Legislature was unanimously of the opinion that the draft should be revised; and
- (iv) the temper of the modern world was hostile to the continuation of any form of colonialism.⁴⁷

46 British Caribbean Federation: Report of the 1956 Conference, (Government Printing Office, Port of Spain, Trinidad), Cmnd. 9733, pp. 1-2.

47 ibid.

Because the 1956 London Conference could not settle all the details before the Federation could be established, it was agreed that the heads of the delegations should continue as a Standing Federation Committee (SFC) to carry out certain administrative and constitutional functions. It met four times between February 1956 and January 1958. The Federation, named "The West Indies Federation", with its capital in Port of Spain, was formally inaugurated in April 1958. Four years later it was dismantled.

The story of the break up of the Federation has been told so often that it is hardly worth repeating here.⁴⁸ What is important to bear in mind is that Federation as conceived by Britain was an attempt to shed responsibility for the colonies at one stroke. In constitutional terms, the Federation was little more than a Crown Colony since the UK Parliament was empowered by the British Caribbean Act of 1956 to legislate for the Federation. Further, the Governor-General could act without ministerial advice on several matters - which no unit constitution allowed! In fact, as Sir Fred Phillips remarks, there were so many colonial features of the constitution that "it is accordingly

48 See the following for a history of the West Indies Federation: Sir John Mordecai, The West Indies: The Federal Negotiations (Evanston, North Western University Press, 1968); Morley Ayearst, The British West Indies: The Search for Self Government (New York, N.Y. University Press, 1960); Charles Archibald, "The Failure of the West Indies Federation", World Today, No. 18. 1962, pp. 232-242; for an inquiry into the requisites for successful federation see Thomas M. Franck, ed., Why Federations Fail (N.Y., New York University Press, 1968).

difficult to avoid the conclusion that at all material times the Governor-General was intended to rule by decree".⁴⁹

The Prime Minister of the Federation was a mere 'figurehead' and the constitution was, in 1958, more colonial than the constitutions of Jamaica, Barbados, and Trinidad and Tobago, and by 1959 even the Leewards and Windwards, which in that year were granted instruments in several respects more advanced than the Federal Constitution. In that year a Leeward and Windward Islands Constitutional Conference was held in London and for the first time in their history all seven territories (Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent) had been able to come together on a single issue. As we have already observed, there were far-reaching constitutional changes which paved the way for responsible government in these islands. The significance of the 1959 Conference was that:-

- (i) the majority leader in the Legislature became Chief Minister, a new title in the Windwards-Leewards. At the same time the Chief Minister of Trinidad and Tobago became 'Premier'; and
- (ii) the Executive Council, in fact, was an embryo Cabinet (already provided for in Trinidad and Jamaica).

⁴⁹ Phillips. op. cit., p. 40.

The next logical step in the smaller territories was the evolution of Cabinets and Premiers.

The Federation was self-governing, but did not have Dominion Status; both Jamaica and Trinidad had divergent views on the structure and distribution of powers and in the end, in 1962, Jamaicans voted in a referendum to secede from the Federation, becoming independent in that year, followed by Trinidad and Tobago.

Conclusions

Colonial policy planning in the West Indies took on a new dimension after the Second World War. It was more purposeful planning aimed at preparing the territories for self-government and eventual independence. Colonial Development and Welfare Acts became the main instruments of the new economic development policy which also sought to include the local people in the planning process without much success. The Moyne Commission sent to investigate the unrest of the 1930s could not support local demands for self-government but instead recommended a gradual introduction of adult suffrage which was finally introduced in all the territories by 1951, thus paving the way for the formal transfer of political power to the local people. Representative Government became a reality with the introduction of the quasi-Ministerial system of government in 1956. These developments took place alongside plans for a West Indies Federation designed to decolonise the territories at one stroke. However, the Federation which came into existence in 1958,

although self-governing, was little more than a Crown Colony. Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados had more advanced constitutions. In the end, the Federation was repudiated first by Jamaica through a popular referendum and later by Trinidad and Tobago which became independent the same year the Federation collapsed.

Why Federations fail has been an ongoing subject of inquiry among scholars and politicians alike. In a comparative study of four failures (the West Indies, East Africa, Malaysia and Rhodesia-Nyasaland) the authors⁵⁰ considered the role played by constitutions in allocation power between central governments and units, the importance of cultural, linguistic and religious factors and the distribution of resources, and the style of political leadership. In each of the federations it was found that political, economic and social factors played a different role both in the formation and the eventual failure. The only common factor among them was the desire to unite around common objectives. The study concluded that factors such as common colonial heritage, common language, prospect of complementary economic advantages may be necessary for federation but not sufficient to ensure success; in all four cases the absence of a positive political or ideological commitment to the primary goal of federation as an end itself among leaders and people, make success improbable if not impossible; if political commitment is only commitment to short-term goals, once these goals are achieved, and new

50 Thomas M. Franck, op. cit.

goals are not substituted disintegration is likely; the creation of federal institutions without paramount ideological commitment to the federal ideal will not solve conflicts when these arise. In the West Indies many of the necessary conditions were present, including a certain level of ideological commitment which was carried over into regional integration phase of the late 1960s. With the three larger territories well on the way towards self-government/independence it was really too much to ask of these territories in joining a federation which offered a lower political status. This was a clear example of having to sacrifice constitutional gains in return for benefits which were well into the future.

Chapter iv

The Search for Alternatives to Federation and the Decision to Choose Associated Statehood 1965 - 1967

A. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to give an account of the attempts made between 1962 and 1966 to fashion a new federation as a means of decolonising the Leeward and Windward Islands and Barbados, the problems which eventually led to the demise of the federal idea, and the genesis of the concept of Associated Statehood.

During February and March 1962 following the dissolution of the West Indies Federation the representative of the "Little Eight" - Barbados, Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis, Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent - met in London to present their own proposals to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, still hoping to salvage a federation. On 16 April, the Secretary of State informed the House of Commons that Her Majesty's Government was of the view that a new federation offered the best constitutional solution to the problem of the area, on condition that the federal constitution provided adequate powers to the central government and offered a reasonable prospect of economic and financial viability. Between 9 and 24 May all eight governments met again in London for what was to be the last time to discuss the future of the proposed federation.

Among other things the Conference¹ agreed that the name of new political union should be The West Indies Federation; and the federal capital should be located in Barbados. It set out detailed proposals for the structure of the federal and unit governments, the division of powers between them, the public services, the judiciary and overseas representation. A general programme of the preparatory work for the establishment of the federation was drawn up and it was envisaged that following approval of the recommendations of the Conference by unit governments a further conference would be held in London in June 1963 to which opposition parties would be invited.

The Conference also recommended that the Premier of Barbados and Chief Ministers of the other territories or their nominees should constitute a Regional Council of Ministers under the chairmanship of the governor of Barbados to consider problems of common interest to the eight territories concerned in connection with the setting up of the federation.

It was recognised that the new federation would require external assistance on both budgetary and capital account after its establishment and the UK Government undertook a survey of the economic needs and potential development of the territories which was published in 1963.²

1 Report of the East Caribbean Federation Conference, 1962 (London: HMSO), Cmnd. 1746.

2 Carleen O'Loughlin, A Survey of Economic Potential and Capital Needs of the Leeward Islands, Windward Islands and Barbados (London: HMSO, 1963).

The proposals of the survey, which will be treated in greater detail below, were meant for the islands to achieve economic viability by 1973.

The first signs of problems appeared late in 1962, just shortly after the Conference when following a change of government Grenada announced that it wished to seek association with Trinidad and Tobago in a unitary state. Grenada thus never took part in the meetings of the Regional Council (until the last meeting was held in 1966). The remaining seven territorial legislatures meanwhile approved the report for an East Caribbean Federation and further discussions were held among themselves in May 1963.

Between the London Conference of May 1962 and August 1966 the Regional Council of Ministers held 11 meetings. Among other things it set up a Fiscal Commission,³ studied the report of a Civil Service Commission⁴ and a report on Customs Union,⁵ and other surveys.

Further strains developed during 1963 when new proposals were put forward which would have had the effect of weakening the powers of the proposed federal government; these were unacceptable to some Governments including the UK Government and the Conference scheduled for June 1963

3 Cmnd. 1991.

4 Cmnd. 1992.

5 McW. Todman, A Report on a Customs Union of Barbados, the Leeward and Windward Islands, April 1963.

was postponed to allow time for further consideration. This situation did not improve following talks in Antigua in Septemebr among the "Little Seven" as differences remained with regard to the form of the federation and the level of financial support to be provided by the UK Government. Also during this year Secretary of State, Duncan Sandys, and later the Under Secretary of State had visited the territories to try to sell the idea of a strong federation as the only hope. In the discussions, Barbados and Antigua had proposed that the projected federation should be independent at the inception, however, this request was rejected.

During October 1964, the Regional Council met to consider a Draft Federal Scheme submitted by the Government of Barbnados and a measure of agreement was reached on the kind of federation they all wanted. These included:-

- establishment of an independent federation;
- the source of Federal revenue at the beginning of the Federation should be import duties which should be distributed in agreed proportions between the Federal Government and the Unit Government;
- the establishment of a Federal Supreme Court;
- the transfer of the following services from the Unit Government to the Federal Government:-

- (1) audit;
 - (2) customs and excise;
 - (3) income tax;
 - (4) police training school and a nucleus police force;
 - (5) prisons;
 - (6) telecommunications, including united broadcasting television and telephone services;
 - (7) civil aviation;
 - (8) meteorology;
- the grant of internal self-government to Unit Governments before the inauguration of the independent federation;
 - the establishment of a Loans Council and of a Federal Industrial Development Board;
 - procedures for constitutional amendments and for accession of members;
 - a provision that no Unit should be permitted to secede from the Federation except all the other Unit Governments agreed;
 - the establishment of a unified service for administrative, professional and officers.⁶

6 Draft Federal Scheme published by The Government Printing Office (Barbados) and promulgated by the Regional Council of Ministers, 12 November 1964.

Early in 1965 Anthony Greenwood, the Secretary of State for the Colonies invited four teams of British Members of Parliament each consisting of a Labour and Conservative supporter to visit the smaller territories and report back to him as his personal representative of the Colonial Secretary. Greenwood himself and his Parliamentary Secretary, Mrs. Eirene White, visited the "Little Eight" and British Guiana between 31 January and 17 February 1965 to make acquaintance with Ministers and leading political and other personalities in each territory in order to impress upon them the imperative of a strong federation as the only hope for the territories.

The Regional Council of Ministers met at the time of Greenwood's visit and had prepared a Draft Federal Scheme which they had decided to release. Greenwood also agreed at the same time to the publication of certain correspondence between the former Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Chairman of the Regional Council of Ministers along with related correspondence between the Chairman and the governments concerned.⁷ In his statement Greenwood noted that there substantial differences of view but thought they were not irreconcilable.

On 30 March 1965, the Colonial Office issued a press notice on the views of Her Majesty's Government concerning the proposed East Caribbean

7 See Anthony Greenwood's written statement to the House of Commons following his visit to the Caribbean on 25 February 1965, quoted in West Indies Chronicle (April 1965), p. 221.

Federation Scheme which the Regional Council of Ministers had approved with certain reservations in October 1964 and released for publication on 10 February 1965, the views were contained in a despatch of 22 March to the seven governments,⁸ and published on 21 March together with the Draft Federal Schemes.⁹ In commenting on the draft scheme it was made abundantly clear that before the British Government would be prepared to sponsor any legislation necessary to implement a new scheme of federation it would require to be satisfied that the plan was suited to the needs of the area and likely to endure in view of the fact that the dissolution of the Federation was a serious blow to outside confidence and in the West Indies. Her Majesty's Government shared the view of its predecessors that federation offered the best prospect for solutions of the constitutional problems of the area.

The despatch clearly indicated the lines along which the Colonial Office wished to see the Regional Council of Ministers fashion their draft at the tenth meeting due in the last week in April 1965. These were:-

- (i) Legislative and Executive Powers. The Federal government should have the power to deal with all matters of major concern to the Region as a whole. The proposals in the draft as regards the legislative powers of the federation

8 Colonial Office Circular Despatch 121/65 of 22 March 1965.

9 Colonial No. 360, HMSO.

seemed to afford the basis for a satisfactory agreement but it was pointed out that there was a need to ensure that the executive powers of the federation were also adequate, and it was suggested that they should in general extend to those matters in respect of which the Federal Legislature had, for the time being, power to legislate. Antigua had already expressed reservation in respect of the executive powers of the Federation.

- (ii) The Federation should have its own sources of revenue adequate to the performance of its functions. While recognising that it was a matter for negotiation, it was suggested that whereas under the draft Federal Scheme the main sources of revenue would be 35 per cent of the proceeds of duties on imports, consideration should be given to the possibility that from the outset the Federation might derive a part of its revenue from income tax.
- (iii) Further consideration should be given to enabling the Federal government to influence effectively in the event of maladministration or financial mismanagement in a Unit, which could otherwise undermine good government and the financial stability of the Federation as a whole.

What the Colonial Office was saying was that the proposals in the Draft Federal Scheme did not go far enough. It should be remembered that

this Draft Scheme was almost solely the product of the Regional Council of Ministers, with Antigua the only participant expressing reservations on portions of it.

A few days prior to the start of the tenth meeting which was to discuss the views expressed by the Colonial Office, V.C. Bird, the Chief Minister of Antigua, declared that in view of the comments of the Colonial Office, the Antigua Government came to the conclusion that it would not be in the interest of Antigua to enter into Federation on those terms and that in the circumstances the Government regretted that it was not prepared to participate in any further arrangements to establish a federation either on the basis of the Scheme which it had helped to formulate or on the basis set out in the Colonial Office Circular Despatch.

This new development did not deter the Colonial Office from still pursuing the idea of a federation. Shortly after the Antigua bombshell, the Secretary of State for the Colonies communicated to the remaining six territories, indicating the willingness of Her Majesty's Government to consider a federation without Antigua if desired - apparently the lower limits had not yet been reached.

The Tenth Meeting of the Regional Council took place, without the participation of Antigua, in April 1965. The Draft Federal Scheme as amended by the Ninth Meeting had been published - before the Scheme was considered by the UK Government - in order to bring together in a single

document the decisions and compromises of the past three years.¹⁰ However, the Draft Scheme was never discussed and the Conference ended prematurely and inconclusively. It had been earlier agreed that the April meeting would be followed by a conference in London in July to finalise the federal constitution; this conference never took place.

By then it had become quite clear to all concerned that the idea of a federation - either of a "Little Eight", "Little Seven" or "Little Six" - was dead. For the territories concerned the lower limits had been reached as in August 1965 the Government of Barbados proposed to the Legislative Council in a White Paper,¹¹ that Barbados should proceed to separate independence before considering federation further. At a press conference on 14 August, Premier Errol Barrow stated that his Government had had three years of discussion with the Windwards and Leewards on the formation of an East Caribbean Federation and there was still no basic idea as to the formation of a federation. However, he was quick to point out that the White Paper did not close the door to federation. On the subject of federation, of interest was a story which appeared in a newspaper in 1965, long after the Federation had broken up. It was reported¹² that following a resolution of Eric Williams' party (The

10 Draft promulgated by the Secretariat of the Regional Council of Ministers on 12 November 1964, published by Government Printing Office, Barbados, April 1965.

11 "The Federal Negotiations 1962-1965 and Constitutional Proposals for Barbados" (Government Printing Office, Barbados, 1965).

12 The Nation, 12 March 1965.

People's National Movement) on 15 January 1962,¹³ a British Minister had requested Williams to put forward some specific proposals. Williams then suggested the following:-

1. A West Indian confederation based on the association of Trinidad and Tobago and the Windward Islands with centralised services in foreign affairs, external representation, economic planning, fundamental legislation such as income tax and import duties, etc., but with Windward Islands retaining full internal self-government in a single Parliament bearing the same relation that the Parliament of Northern Ireland bears to Westminster.
2. A similar arrangement involving the association of Barbados and the Leeward Islands.
3. A West Indian Confederation based on Jamaica, British Guiana, Barbados (as extended above), Trinidad and Tobago (as extended above) with a common foreign and defence policy, with single external representation and with other central services and

13 The resolution proposed that "Trinidad and Tobago should reject unequivocally any participation in a Federation of the Eastern Caribbean and proceed forthwith to national independence without prejudice to the future incorporation in a unitary state of Trinidad and Tobago of any territory of the Eastern Caribbean whose people may desire it, and on terms to be mutually agreed on to the future establishment of a Common Economic Community embracing the entire Caribbean area". *ibid.*

unified policy in fields to be agreed upon - but all this would be a prelude to the larger Caribbean integration.¹⁴

B. Genesis of the Concept of Associated Statehood

Without wasting much time the Colonial Office, now convinced that attempts at a further federation would be futile, began to search for an alternative solution for decolonisation.

Earlier in 1964 in an article published in St. Lucia, Sir Garnet Gordon had suggested as an alternative to federation some form of integration with Britain with guarantee of social security, education, markets and opportunities for training and services in all fields of national life. The author cited several cases in support of his suggestion which included the Netherlands and the Netherlands West Indies, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the United States, and the French Antilles and French Guiana in the new relationship with France as Overseas Departments.¹⁵ It is quite probable that this suggestion played a role in the British offer of statehood in 1966.

14 It should be recalled that in 1962 Grenada began discussions for becoming a unitary state with Trinidad and Tobago. As it proved in later years while the federal idea became muted the concept of regional economic integration was very much alive.

15 Voice of St. Lucia (3 June 1964), article by Sir Garnet Gordon entitled "Sir Garnet Looks at the Future of the Seven".

16 Yearbook of the United Nations, 1965, p. 547.

At the time plans for an East Caribbean Federation were falling through, across the Pacific in April 1965 the New Zealand Government was inviting the United Nations to send representatives to observe the proceedings concerning a draft Constitution in the Legislative Assembly of the Cook Islands, as well as the conduct of elections which would create a new constitutional arrangement between New Zealand and the Cook Islands whereby the latter would enjoy full internal self-government while New Zealand would retain responsibility for defence and external affairs.¹⁶ With this model in mind, Greenwood called a conference to discuss the future of the smaller territories. The Conference on the future of the smaller territories was convened at Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford, from 8-12 July 1965, just at the time when the representatives of the "Little Seven" should have been in London to discuss the constitution for an independent federation.

Participants to the Oxford conference were invited on a personal basis. These included Governors of the Bahamas, Bermuda, British Honduras, Mauritius, and Seychelles; the High Commissioner, Western Pacific; the Administrators of St. Lucia and the Cayman Islands, the former Administrator of the Turks and Caicos Islands; and representatives from universities, the business world, journalism and government.¹⁷

Noticeably absent from this conference were representatives of the people concerned. With the object of stimulating free discussion, stated

17 Chronicle of the West India Committee (August 1965), p. 453.

one report, the conference was held in private and it was agreed that no report would be published. The discussions were conducted in general terms and not in relation to the affairs of individual territories or group of territories. The main topics discussed were the organization of government in the small territories; safeguards for democracy; finance; development and provision of staff, and future relations with Britain and international aspects.¹⁸

Another development worth mentioning at this point was the establishment in 1965 of a Constitutional Planning Department within the Colonial Office whose purpose was to consider general questions as to public policy, the co-ordination of constitutional development and assistance to geographical departments in the introduction of new constitutional patterns including United Nations implications. There is no doubt that this Department worked closely with the governments of the territories during 1966 to fashion the constitution of the Associated States.¹⁹

By the time the Regional Governments had put up the shutter on federation, the UK Government had already thought out a solution to the constitutional problems of the smaller territories. From the statement made by the Minister of State for the Colonies, Judith Hart in the House

18 *ibid.*

19 Phillips, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

of Commons on 31 January 1967 we can conclude that the visit of Anthony Greenwood, then Secretary of State, to the islands did not give much of a hope for a federation and the Colonial Office was certainly aware of what had been taking place elsewhere with respect to changing the colonial status of small territories.

According to Judith Hart, the result of the Oxford conference was "a ferment of ideas ... partly worked out on the basis of first principles and partly by studying experience elsewhere".²⁰ All that remained was for the Colonial Office to sell the idea to the Windwards and Leewards, independence having been previously ruled out on the grounds of economic and financial viability. November 1965 witnessed Sir Stephen Luke on the Caribbean circuit discussing, or more properly hawking, the idea of statehood in association with Britain to the Island Governments. He must have been a good salesman or may be by then Ministers of the territories had been so tired of Federation that they were prepared to discuss any other alternative.

C. The Associated Statehood Negotiations

The end of 1965 saw the beginning of a new era in the West Indies. It marked the end of the trek to London to discuss federation, certainly the longest drawn out affair in West Indian history, and the

²⁰ The Parliamentary Debates Official Report (Commons), 740, 1966-1967, 30 January - 10 February, Col. 335-338.

beginning of an era of co-operation among all the islands - independent and non-independent. The theme of regional co-operation will be taken up later. All of the territories which became independent following the dissolution of the Federation had constitutions autochthonously produced, including Barbados which became independent in 1966. For the Windwards and Leewards, the question was whether or not they too could, in time, produce their own autochthonous constitutions. This was not to happen as following the Oxford Conference in July 1965, new constitutional proposals were formulated by the Colonial Office and sent to all the Administrators of the Territories under cover of despatches from the Secretary of State for the Colonies.²¹ It is very important to bear in mind the political climate in which the proposals for the new constitutional status for the "six" were made and equally important the conditions prevailing in the territories during their negotiations for Associated Statehood. In the despatch to the Administrators, the British Government had indicated that they intended to discuss separately constitutional changes for Montserrat (the smallest territory) with that Government at a later date.

The specific internal conditions will be dealt with in depth in the chapter on the social and economic bases of Associated Statehood. For the time being we should bear in mind the assumption long held by the

21 Constitutional Proposals for Antigua, St. Christopher/Nevis/Anguilla, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Grenada, 1965, Cmnd. 2865/1965

22 This account draws heavily on the White Paper, op. cit.

British and accepted by the Territories leaders that the Territories did not possess the factors necessary and sufficient for gaining political independence. In later chapters, we shall also develop an argument as to why political independence was regarded as not feasible and may have been viewed as inimical to British interest. To return to the climate of the early nineteen sixties the Barbados White Paper dealing with the Federal Negotiations 1962-65 outlined the difficulties encountered during the negotiations and more than that showed on the one hand that the political will was not strong enough among the leaders of the "Little Eight" and on the other revealed a certain degree of insensitivity on the part of British politicians to the real needs of the Territories. The discussion on the new federation had begun in January 1962 when the leaders of the "Little Eight" unanimously rejected the proposal contained in a resolution passed by the ruling Party in Trinidad and Tobago that the eight territories were welcome to have unitary statehood with Trinidad and Tobago. It is probable that the "sardines versus the shark(s)" analogy, very much in vogue at the time, was coined just about the time of the rejection of Eric Williams' offer. At any rate the leaders of the "Little Eight" seized the opportunity of the visit of Reginald Maudling, Secretary of State for the Colonies, to Trinidad to present their joint proposals.²³

Among other things, the territorial Governments emphasised strongly that considerable economic and financial assistance was required

²³ The actual meeting took place on January 1962 between Maudling and Grantley Adams, Premier of Barbados, who spoke on behalf of the eight governments.

for regional development over a period, and that the new federation should be an independent state within the Commonwealth, simultaneously with the dissolution of the then Federation. The response was negative on both proposals: on the question of Independence careful examination was required since the question of viability was important; it did not matter that the Premier and Chief Ministers had produced evidence showing that several countries with less national income than the proposed federation were already sovereign states. At a Leeward and Windward Islands Constitutional Conference held in 1961, it was already agreed that internal self-government would be granted to the territories in the then Federation;²⁴ a year earlier the Secretary of State not only queried the necessity for a full ministerial system in the unit territories but rejected the idea²⁵ that decisions arrived at the 1961 Conference would be appropriate in the new Federation.

With regard to the question of financial assistance the Barbados White Paper quotes the following statement from Maudling:-

I would make it plain at once that the British Government in view of their many heavy commitments in other areas of the world where needs are in many cases even greater, are unlikely to be able to assist the West Indies on a greater scale than had so far been envisaged. It will therefore be necessary to attract to it aid from elsewhere.²⁶

24 Cmnd. 1417, 1961, Report of the West Indies Constitutional Conference, 1961.

25 Circular Despatch from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the officers responsible for the Administration of the East Caribbean Colonies dated 30 April 1962.

26 White Paper, para. 12.

The ensuing years, prior to the Statehood negotiations, did not witness any positive change in attitude towards the issue of financial assistance. In fact in 1963 when the Secretary of State was reminded of the proposal he retorted by saying that the British Government was not buying a Federation.²⁷

If British insensitivity proved a stumbling block to political unification, the internal problems proved insuperable as the kind of political leadership required at that critical juncture seemed to be lacking. It was not only the British Government that had problems with the Draft Federal Scheme; almost everyone had reservations: Antigua on Income Tax, Agriculture, Police and Postal Services; St. Kitts on Customs Union; St. Vincent on Police; and Dominica and St. Lucia on utilisation of Federal Revenues. With all these reservations no wonder that the Regional Council of Ministers had decided at their Ninth Meeting not to publish the Scheme until outstanding matters had been resolved. As indicated earlier, first, the Antigua Government declared that it would not be in the best interests of their people to enter into a Federation on the terms laid down by the Secretary of State and the Draft Federal Scheme; next, the St. Lucia Legislature debated and then rejected it and by the time of the Tenth Meeting in April 1965 only Dominica, St. Vincent, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla expressed any willingness to proceed with the proposals for a federation of six territories,

27 *ibid.*, para. 28.

Montserrat having decided that with the withdrawal of Antigua it would not be worth their while to enter into a federation. When a St. Lucia delegate to the Tenth Meeting challenged in what was regarded as offensive terms, the bona fides of the Barbados Cabinet decision to seek independence, the Barbados Premier withdrew from the meeting and it was all over.²⁸

This aspect of the federal negotiations has been dealt with at some length in order to highlight the conditions under which the negotiations for Associated Statehood was conducted. Much has already been written on the failure of the West Indies Federation and the failure to create a new one. In both these cases what has often been overlooked or not emphasised enough is the role that British assumptions about viability and sovereignty placed in retarding constitutional and political change in the West Indies. As we shall see internal self-government was offered to the Windwards and Leewards within a few months of the final breakdown of the federal negotiations, an issue over which the Colonial Office had stalled for several years.

The proposals embodied in Cmnd. 2865 had features which the political leaders of the Windwards and Leewards found attractive. It was only a matter of time before they would ask for early constitutional changes to give them greater control over their own affairs. Suddenly,

28 *ibid.*, para. 41.

and it was sudden, British policy towards the smaller territories shifted dramatically: "the British Government have great sympathy with the object of these requests (for internal self-government), but they feel that the time has come to replace the existing colonial relationship by a new form of association".²⁹ The islands had asked only for greater control over their own affairs; they were offered a new form of relationship.³⁰

In response to the Secretary of State's invitation in his despatch of 17 December, the Governments of Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada each prepared detailed proposals for the new internal constitutional arrangements within the frame of the scheme set out in the White Paper (Cmnd. 2865). Even at that time the British Government was still expressing the belief that closer association between the Territories offered the best future prospect for the area and hoped that once the constitutional future was settled the Governments would have discussions among themselves about future regional co-operation.³¹

29 Cmnd. 2865, para. 2.

30 The proposals were spelled out in a memorandum to all the Administrators of the territories under cover of despatches from the Secretary of State for the Colonies dated 17 December 1965.

31 *ibid.*, para. 8.

As outlined in Cmnd. 2865, under the constitutional arrangements, each Territory would become a state in association with the UK, with control of its internal affairs and with the right to amend its own constitution including the power to end this association and to declare itself independent. Such constitutional amendments would require two-thirds majority in the legislature and a two-thirds majority of the votes cast in a referendum. On its part, the UK Government would accept responsibility for the external affairs and defence of the Territories as long as they remained States in association, and the UK Parliament and the Queen-in-Council would have legislative power for the discharge of their responsibility. Apart from these powers and responsibilities, and the powers concerned with the application in the Territories of the British Nationality Acts, the UK Government would have no power to legislate for the Territories without their consent and no responsibility for the conduct of their affairs. The Executive Government would be headed by the Queen's representative appointed for a term of five years by the Queen on the advice of the Secretary of State for the Colonies who would be guided by the Chief Minister (or Premier) concerned. A UK representative in the area would be responsible for the conduct of relations between the UK and the Territories.

Entrenched in the constitutions of the Territories would be safeguards for the preservation of democratic forms of government and for the protection of fundamental rights. A Superior Court would be established for all the Territories to ensure, inter alia, the observances and interpretations of the constitutions. The President of

the Court would be appointed by the Lord Chancellor. Citizenship would continue to be governed by the British Nationality Acts unless a Territory established a separate citizenship.

The Territories would continue to be eligible to receive British aid, including budgetary assistance. These arrangements, if accepted were to provide the basis from which fresh forms of regional co-operation either among themselves or with neighbouring islands could be considered.

The Antigua Government was the first to discuss in detail arrangements for the new relationship of association with Britain between 28 February and 25 March 1966.³² the Windward Islands Constitutional Conference was held between 18 April and 6 May 1966, followed by the St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla Conference.³³ At the Windward Islands Conference all delegations strongly emphasised that in view of the fundamental nature of the constitutional proposals, they should have included arrangements for aid and trade.³⁴ For the delegates this was an

32 Report of the Antigua Constitutional Conference, 1966. Cmd. 2963, 1966.

33 Report of the St. Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla Constitutional Conference, 1966, Cmd. 1966.

34 Report of the Windward Islands Constitutional Conference, 1966, Cmd. 3021, 1966. The Conference itself was conducted in two parts, the first consisted of plenary sessions which discussed matters of regional concern to all four territories or relating to the nature of the association with Britain. The second part dealt with the territories individually, in which the nature of the internal constitution and other territorial matters were discussed.

opportunity to bring the territories into a more favourable and closer relationship with Britain with respect to matters of trade, aid and immigration than they had been enjoying. From their point of view, such arrangements were absolutely essential to giving stability to the association and providing a satisfactory framework for development.

The British and West Indian delegations were poles apart in their thinking, the former stating quite categorically that the constitutional changes proposed were IRRELEVANT (emphasis mine) in the context of development aid, trade and immigration, and further, in view of their many commitments the British Government could not contemplate any increase in the level of aid above the allocations already made.³⁵ The British delegation, however, generously offered to undertake various measures to ensure that their aid was spent more effectively. After stating how much Britain was spending on aid to the islands - £2.5 million or roughly £6 for every man, woman and child, assurances were given that the proposed constitutional changes would not of themselves alter the favourable trading arrangements with the UK. On the issue of immigration the delegation was equally emphatic: the British government would not feel able to offer the inhabitants of these countries specially favourable treatment as compared with other Commonwealth immigrants into the UK.³⁶

35 A similar reply had been given when financial assistance for the Federation was sought.

36 The London Times of 25 April 1966 reported that "unexpected difficulties" had arisen in the conference over the issue of aid and immigration.

Not to be accused of doing nothing and to show how much they appreciated the economic difficulties of these territories and the special nature of their economic problems, the British Government had even recently established a British Development Division (hereafter referred to as BDD) in Barbados so that "the UK department responsible for aid could be more closely and directly associated with the territorial governments in their efforts to deal with their economic problems".³⁷

From all appearances it seemed to be business as usual under the new arrangement. What then was the rationale for offering Statehood? The British were brutally frank about this one. During the Windward Islands Conference when asked to say whether he would be prepared to consider full internal self-government on the normal colonial pattern as an alternative to the Statehood proposals, the Secretary of State simply pointed out that when full internal self-government was granted to a territory which remained a colony, the UK retained the ultimate power to legislate for all aspects of that territory's affairs including its constitution, and the British government was answerable to Parliament accordingly. It was further pointed out that this situation which was found acceptable in the case of territories on the road to independence within a reasonably short period of time and within a foreseeable future, was likely to create difficulties for both sides if unduly prolonged.

37 Cmnd. 3021, para. 8.

Then the Secretary of State posed what was a dilemma for the UK Government; they were held internationally responsible for matters over which they had no effective means of controlling while at the same time they were being urged to interfere in matters which the local Government regarded as their sole responsibility. For these reasons the British government would not enter this type of arrangement with the territories, which, because of their size and because of the vulnerability of their economies and other factors, were not contemplating early independence. It was very clear that the UK Government did not wish to encourage independence at the time, which was quite understandable given what was taking place in Africa and at the UN. As if to drive the last nail in the colonial coffin, the Secretary of State declared that the scheme was designed to show "where Britain's responsibility begins and ends".³⁸

The conclusions of the Statehood negotiations were far from satisfactory to almost all the political leaders. Only V.C. Bird, Chief Minister of Antigua, seemed to have been fully satisfied with the outcome. At the conclusion of the Antigua Conference, he stated:-

We have worked out what I feel will be a satisfactory constitution ... (which) will give to our people the right to declare their independence whenever they so desire. I think with that right of abrogation we can say truthfully to anybody in the world and to our own people at home, that we are satisfied with the solution that has been found ...³⁹

38 Cmnd. 3021, para. 9.

39 Quoted in Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-First Session, Annexes, Add. to Agenda item 23, Chap. XXII, p. 733.

However, this was not the view of the other delegations. Herbert Blaize, Chief Minister of Grenada, stated that he expected to discuss economics and trade as well as constitutional matters, adding that the Associated States would not thrive and grow on a constitutional exercise alone and even urged the establishment in the UK of a council to promote investment in the islands; Sir Garnet Gordon (St. Lucia), Keith Alleyne (Dominica) and E.T. Joshua (St. Vincent)* all emphasised the need for the creation of light industries; similarly, all delegations expressed disappointment at failure to secure any substantial financial assistance from the UK.⁴⁰

Paul Southwell, Chief Minister of St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, stated at the outset of his Constitutional Conference that provision should be made to have the status of association reviewed every four years; in addition he proposed the establishment of an economic sub-committee to work side by side with the Constitutional Conference. Needless to say that the British turned a deaf ear to all these proposals and in the end the terms of the association agreed to, and the form of the internal constitutions were very much along the lines laid down in Cmnd. 2865, 1965. According to Southwell, the agreement was the best under the circumstances.⁴¹

* In conversation with author Joshua stated that he was particularly disappointed over the immigration issue.

40 *ibid.*

41 *ibid.*

By getting the Governments of the territories to agree to the proposals there is no doubt that the British had gained a great victory. In fact, at least two victories; they could wash their hands of responsibility for internal development (no more answering to Parliament) and could no longer be accountable internationally, that is, Britain would no longer have to supply information on the territories as required under Article 73 (e) of the United Nations Charter.

It is not very difficult to understand why the delegations of the territories accepted the proposals as put forward by the British Government. At every stage of 'negotiation' the British had the upper hand - before, during and after. Before the negotiations, it was British Government which took the initiative in proposing an alternative to federation and independence. The island leaders in their own way had rejected both for different reasons. They were faced with an option over which they had little or no input at all. Recall that they were never invited to submit proposals following the breakdown of the federal talks.

During the Statehood negotiations they failed to get special arrangements for trade, aid and immigration - they were dismissed as "irrelevant" to the new proposals. It was quite clear that these were not normal negotiations in which each side had its demands over which it was prepared to bargain. It was a case of one side stating quite categorically "You must accept our proposals on our terms, no specially favourable treatment". To reject the proposals would have left the leaders exposed to the charge of being colonial-minded. The territories

would have remained colonies (or dependencies as the remnants are now called) with the possibility of having this status for a long time. Almost identical agreements were reached at the three separate conferences regarding the responsibilities and powers of the UK.⁴²

At the end of the negotiations, the British had scored a political victory. It was then left to the United Nations to decide whether or not the arrangement was an acceptable form of decolonisation. This aspect will be treated in Chapter viii. All Leeward and Windward Islands with the exception of St. Vincent became Associated States in 1967.

D. Problems Experienced by St. Vincent Prior to Attainment of Associated Statehood, 1969

St. Vincent had participated in the Windward Islands Constitutional Conference held in London in April and May 1966 at which it was agreed that subject to the approval of the legislature, the island would become an associated state along the lines set out in the Report of the Conference (Cmnd. 3021). Both the Government and Opposition parties agreed to an outline of a new constitution for St. Vincent. However, they disagreed on two essential features of the Constitution: the establishment of a second chamber and the voting age.

42 See Appendix II for Heads of Agreement on Defence and External Affairs and Draft Despatch (Annex E) setting out the means of entrusting authority in the field of external relations to the Government of the Associated States - identical in other conference reports.

At the time of the first Constitutional Conference (May 1966) the St. Vincent Legislature was about to expire and a general election was expected to be held before the island became an Associated State at the same time as the other three territories, i.e., by February 1967. It was suggested by the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, Fred Lee, that in the event the general election resulted in a change of Government the two questitons on which there had been disagreement between the Government and Opposition parties could be reviewed. It was also agreed then that the Statehood Constitution should provide for a House of Representatives containing 13 elected members and, until the legislature otherwise provided, three nominated members of the existing Legislative Council to become members of the House of Representatives and since the Legislative Council contained only nine elected members, the Legislature was authorised to provide for the four additional members elected on the basis of the existing constituencies during life of the first legislature.⁴³

The general election was held in August 1966 at which the government People's Political Party led by Ebenezer Theodore Joshua won five of the nine seats and the St. Vincent Labour Party led by Milton Cate won four. These results further complicated matters as the Government majority was reduced to one and the two political parties each filed two election petitions, one of which related to a PPP candidate who

43 Cmd. 3021.

had been returned with a majority of only four votes. There was now the possibility that the outcome of the petitions would result in a change of Government and in this state of flux and uncertainty the position regarding the establishment of the second chamber and the voting age could not be determined. Given these developments, the Secretary of State decided that it was inappropriate to invoke the transitional provisions which enabled the new legislature to provide for additional elected members to be elected in existing constituencies since the election petitions could not be determined by February 1967 in time for Associated Statehood.

In an effort to resolve the difficulties, both Joshua and Cato were invited to London for discussions which took place from January to February 1967. At these talks it was agreed, inter alia, that:-

- a) St. Vincent would become an Associated State not later than June 1967;
- b) a general election on the basis of 13 constituencies would be held not later than 31 December 1968 these constituencies to be delimited by an impartial commission appointed by the Secretary of State from outside St. Vincent;
- c) both St. Vincent political parties would bind themselves to and accept without reservations the findings of the Boundaries Commission;

- d) until this general election there would be no increase in the size of the legislature;
- e) the new constitution would contain dormant provisions to permit the establishment of a Senate and the lowering of the voting age to 18 years by a simple majority of the votes of the elected members of the legislature.⁴⁴

The next development saw a member of the Government join the Opposition on 16 March before the agreement could be implemented and shortly afterwards the legislature was dissolved. In the ensuing elections held on 19 May 1967, the St. Vincent Labour Party won six of the nine seats and a new Government reaffirmed the commitment to make St. Vincet an Associated State but took the view that the number of elected members should remain at nine under the new Constitution.

Prior to the May 1967 general election, Joshua, then Chief Minister, addressed a petition to the United Nations in which he charged that the Administrator was aiding the Opposition in the election campaign and requested the United Nations to send two observers to observe the elections.⁴⁵ In two more petitions, Joshua charged that the elections had "bristled with irregularities, corruption, personation, bribery and

44 Cmnd. 3219, St. Vincent Report of Discussions on Constitutional Progress, London: HMSO March 1967.

45 UN Document A/AC.109/Pet. 584/Add. 1.

vote trading" and requested an investigation.⁴⁶ The new Government was also charged of victimizing the PPP. In another petition, he complained that the lawful and duly elected chairman of the Bequia* District Council had been illegally, unlawfully and unconstitutionally ousted on 26 July 1967.⁴⁷

Keeping up the stream of communication, Joshua next forwarded a copy of a resolution adopted by his party in June 1967 which called for the recall of the Administrator and an investigation into the affairs of St. Vincent from May 1966 to the date of the petition by an independent agency such as the United Nations.⁴⁸ Another resolution adopted by the PPP called for an immediate announcement of the date for Associated Statehood and for fresh elections under the new constitution by December 1968.⁴⁹

Joshua seemed to be fighting his political battles on all fronts for, in a statement made on 15 October 1967, he again charged that the delay in implementing a date for Associated Statehood with the UK was due to the desire of certain elements to carry St. Vincent back to a type of colonial rule in which the Administrator would be supreme head of

* One of the dependencies of St. Vincent.

46 A/AC.109/Pet. 584/Add. 2 and 3.

47 A/AC.109/Pet. 584/Add. 4.

48 A/AC.109/Pet. 173.

49 ibid.

State.⁵⁰ Joshua alleged that Chief Minister Cato had indicated to the people of St. Vincent that the island was too bankrupt to sustain Statehood,⁵¹ which was not at all surprising. Regarding observance of the elections by a visiting United Nations Mission, we have already seen that the UK was opposed to the idea - although Statehood was the main issue.

In explaining the delay in implementing a date for Statehood, Cato stated that immediately after the last elections Government had started to work on preliminary arrangements for Associated Statehood but had met with delays which were "natural" whenever there was a marked constitutional change. In probably what was a calculated statement, Cato added that the people of St. Vincent had expressed complete satisfaction with his Government. The implication in this statement was quite clear: there was no need for his Government to rush to become an Associated State. Later that year (August), the Government of St. Vincent declared to the UK Government that there was no longer reason for a general election to be held before 31 December 1968. On the other hand, it was the view of the Opposition that the terms of the agreement of the January discussions (Cmnd. 3219) should be implemented.⁵²

50 Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, Annexes Addendum to Agenda Item 23, p. 330.

51 ibid.

52 Statement by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs on the political situation in St. Vincent, 12 April 1967 in Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 744, 1967, Col. 207-208.

Further discussions were held in London in April 1968 with Cato, Joshua and representatives of their respective parties in the course of which neither party wanted to modify its position. Lord Shepherd, Minister of State for Commonwealth Affairs, expressed "sincere disappointment that no solution or compromise satisfactory to both parties, has been possible",⁵³ and outlined the procedure which should be followed if the Government of St. Vincent contemplated a departure from the basic constitutional scheme agreed to in 1966.⁵⁴

Basically, the procedure which was identical to the procedure for constitutional advance in dependent territories, required the St. Vincent Government to first of all draw up their proposals in detail stating the reasons why they considered changes to be necessary; these proposals would be discussed with the Opposition and others in St. Vincent; after which a White Paper was to be published in St. Vincent. Following publication, the White Paper should be debated in the Legislative Council as well as widely discussed in the island. It was only then that the Government proposals could be submitted to the UK Government for consideration.

The position at the end of 1968 was as follows: the procedure as outlined by Lord Shepherd had been followed; the proposals of the Government of St. Vincent were included in a White Paper and published in November; thereafter they were widely discussed throughout the island

53 For the record of the April 1968 meeting see Cmnd. 4116, Appendix A.

54 *ibid.*, p. 8.

and approved with amendments by the St. Vincent Legislative Council in December 1968.

During May 1969, Lord Shepherd visited the island and after extensive discussions with the Government, Opposition, representative organizations and individuals, expressed satisfaction that the overwhelming majority of Vincentians wanted Associated Statehood at the earliest possible opportunity, that is, before the end of 1969. The last Constitutional Conference prior to Statehood was held in June 1969,⁵⁵ and while both Cato and Joshua were reaffirming their desire for Statehood the latter wanted it on condition that Statehood was preceded by a general election on a 13-constituency basis. In the end, it was left to Lord Shepherd to finally state the basis for Statehood,⁵⁶ and St. Vincent became an Associated State on 27 October 1969.

55 For full details see Cmnd. 4116: Report on the St. Vincent Constitutional Conference, 23-27 June 1969 (London: HMSO July 1969).

56 The basis of the settlement was that:-

- a) the House of Assembly (the new name for the Legislative Chamber) should contain 13 elected members;
- b) since the present government of St. Vincent was returned to power with a significant majority as recently as May 1967, there would be no requirement for a general election prior to Statehood. the first general election after Statehood would be held within the normal period applicable to the present legislature;
- c) until the first general election after Statehood the number of elected members would remain at nine;
- d) the first general election after Statehood would be held on the basis of 13 constituencies delimited by a further impartial Boundary Commission which would be appointed by the Secretary of State after consultation with the Chief Minister; and
- e) meanwhile revision of the electoral roll on a nine-constituency basis, necessary in case of by-elections, would be put in hand, and the revision completed before Statehood.

At the Conference, Joshua had again raised the question of the arrangements for the level of budgetary aid and development grants and loans from the UK to St. Vincent after Statehood. The response was no different from previous ones: the achievement of Statehood implied no discontinuation of British aid but the level of aid would be a matter for periodic discussion between the two governments.⁵⁷

We should also note that since St. Vincent did not become an Associated State until 27 October 1969, the UK Government continued to treat it as a NSGT, that is, information was supplied to the United Nations under Article 73 (e).

Conclusions

The motive of the British Government has often been questioned for viewing federation as the 'best constitutional solution to the area'. Looked at against the background of decolonisation, it is not difficult to find or impute a motive in the choice of federation: at one stroke of the pen Britain would no longer have to supply information on her Caribbean territories as required by Article 73 (e) of the United Nations Charter. But there was more to it than giving the islands their freedom: a federation in effect meant fobbing off responsibility for economic development to the more developed territories of the region. Alexander Bustamante felt this way about Jamaica's role and would have

⁵⁷ *ibid.*, p. 5

none of it. Later, the UK Government tried to get at least one of the more developed territories as the core unit of an Eastern Caribbean Federation but things did not quite turn out that way.

In the final analysis, it was the argument of non-viability which determined the choice of Associated Statehood. The commission appointed by the British Government in 1963 to carry out a survey of the economic potential and capital needs of the Leewards, Windwards and Barbados reported that the islands would need EC\$215 million over five years (1964-1968)⁵⁸ or a total of EC\$311 million over ten years (1964-1974). This was the minimum recommended for the territories if they were to achieve economic viability by 1974, yet in an earlier decision the British Treasury had refused to guarantee EC\$75 million for the first five years.

Consequently, the leaders of the "Little Seven" decided among themselves that they should not even settle for EC\$75 million when a British Government appointed mission recommended three times that amount as a minimum. The Regional Council of Ministers at their Seventh Meeting held in Antigua in September 1963 unanimously endorsed "a request that financial assistance on the scale envisaged in Dr. O'Loughlin's survey be made available and that no conference to settle the details of a

58 See Carleen O'Loughlin, A Survey of Economic Potential and Capital Needs of the Leewards Islands, Windward Islands and Barbados (London: HMSO 1963), p. 136. The Report of this Commission will be dealt with in depth in a later chapter.

constitution for an Independent Federation be held until satisfactory assurances about the quantum and duration of assistance by Her Majesty's Government have been obtained".⁵⁹

Of course, those assurances were never forthcoming for the next three years and we can reasonably conclude that in the absence of such assurance the Windwards and Leewards could at least hope to 'save face' by agreeing to accept the new version of a non-colonial status. The idea of equating Associated Statehood status with internal independence must have been appealing to the political leaders who at that time had no alternative proposal to put to the UK Government, in other words at that stage of political development no one really paid attention to the benefits of independence for mini-states. That the UK Government did not enlighten the politicians in this regard (we have not been told if they did so) was to the advantage of the UK as the entry of at least six mini-states into the United Nations might have created further political problems at a time when Her Majesty's Government was under pressure over the independence of Rhodesia.

59 Report of the Seventh Meeting of the Regional Council of Ministers (unpublished).

Chapter v

Constitutional and Political Arrangements of Associated Statehood

A. Introduction

The purpose of this Chapter is to analyse the constitutional and political arrangements of Associated Statehood. The proposals for a new constitutional status for the Windwards and Leewards were set out in White Paper Cmnd. 2865. These proposals were later enshrined as the West Indies Act, 1967. It is important to emphasise that the political leaders of the various territories were never invited to negotiate terms and conditions of Associated Statehood as could be seen from the Report of the Windward Islands Constitutional Conference.¹ All delegations from the Windwards wanted arrangements for aid, trade and immigration included in the constitution. The British reply was that the proposed constitutional changes would be irrelevant in the context of development aid, trade and immigration.

When asked whether the UK Government would be prepared to consider full internal self-governing according the normal colonial pattern as an alternative to the Statehood proposals, the Secretary of State pointed out that that arrangement was for colonies on the road to independence within a foreseeable future, a clear indication that independence was

1 Cmnd. 3121/1966.

not on. Moreover, the UK Government would still be fully responsible to Parliament for all aspects of that territory's affairs; internationally, the UK Government would also be held responsible for matters over which they (UK Government) felt they had no effective means of controlling. The intention of the proposals was made abundantly clear: the UK Government would no longer be accountable to Parliament and the United Nations.² It is also interesting to note that while discussions were taking place between the UK Government and the territories, a party of Cook Islanders visited Antigua in early 1967 to persuade the Chief Minister to pursue the idea of association.³

B. The Constitutional Arrangements

The constitutional status of the four Windwards (Grenada, St. Vincent, St. Lucia and Dominica) and two Leewards (Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla) was set out in the West Indies Act, 1967, which made each of the Associated States fully self-governing in its internal affairs while reserving to the UK responsibility for external affairs and defence with legislative and executive powers to discharge this responsibility. The Act described the association as free and voluntary, terminable by either party at any time, with the UK Government

2 See Cmnd. 3021, para. 9.

3 Reported in House of Commons Parliamentary Debate, No. 711, Jan 27 to Feb 02, 1967, Col. 337.

undertaking to give six months' notice of intention to terminate the Association.

At the commencement of the association, the UK Government would have no responsibility for the Government of any Associated State except in matters relating to defence, either of an Associated State or of the UK or any of its territories, or to external affairs, nationality or citizenship, or relating to the succession to the Throne or the Royal Style and Titles. Specific provisions of the Act are summarised below.

External Affairs

The Heads of Agreement on Defence and External Affairs reached at the constitutional conferences spelled out where the UK might enter into obligations for the Associated States and the extent to which the Associated States might participate in external affairs.⁴ It was agreed that the UK Government would consult the Government of a territory before entering into international obligations involving that territory. A draft despatch annexed to the report of the constitutional conferences set out the extent to which the UK Government was prepared to entrust to the Associated States the power to deal with external affairs. These entrustments included the authority to apply for full or associate membership in Specialised Agencies of the United Nations or similar

4 See Appendix II, Heads of Agreement on Defence and External Affairs.

organizations of which the UK is a member; to arrange or permit visits of representatives of international organizations of which the Associated States might become a full or associate member; to negotiate and conclude trade agreements with other countries either of a bilateral or multilateral nature relating only to the treatment of goods; to arrange or permit visits of up to thirty days for trade or commercial purposes by representatives or residents of the respective islands to any other country and by representatives or residents of any other country to any of the Associated States; to negotiate and sign agreements of a purely local concern with any member of the British Commonwealth or any British Colony in the Caribbean area; to negotiate and sign agreements for financial and technical assistance with any member of the British Commonwealth, the United States of America or any international organization of which the UK is a member; to negotiate and sign agreement with other countries whether multilateral or bilateral relating to immigration from any Associated State to the abovementioned countries and emigrant labour schemes.

The entrustment of external affairs in these terms was made only on condition that the UK Government was informed by each Associated State in advance of any proposal for the exercise of executive authority in external affairs.

The letters of entrustment further stated that where there was difficulty in reconciling the divergent views of the Government of an Associated State with those of the UK Government in the area of external

affairs, the view of the UK Government should prevail. This stipulation to inform the UK Government in advance of the exercise of the delegated executive authority in external affairs by the Associated State meant that the State was not in a really different position as that existing before Statehood.

In keeping with the policy to encourage co-operation among the Caribbean countries, restrictions were not placed on officials from the Associated States in their negotiations with Caribbean partners; thus they were free to join or establish regional agencies such as the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA).

One area of particular concern which touched on both internal and external affairs was the question of air-traffic between and into the Associated States. The UK Government had claimed exclusive competence to grant or withhold traffic rights, which was interpreted by the islands as an attempt by the UK to protect its own national airlines. Furthermore, the UK Government had indicated that air services were exclusively within the ambit of external affairs which would not be entrusted to the Associated States.

Provisions were also made in the Heads of Agreement to safeguard good relations between the Associated States and the UK Government and to secure fulfillment of Commonwealth or international obligations. In this regard the Associated States undertook to introduce or support legislation which might affect the UK's discharge of its international

responsibilities. It was further stipulated that where in the opinion of the UK Government the enactment of legislation for the Associated State was required in the interest of the responsibility of the UK for the defence or external affairs by that State, the UK or any other Associated State, then the Government of the Associated State would be invited to signify its consent to the passing of the necessary legislation by the UK Parliament or by passing appropriate legislation in its own territory.

Defence

Both the Heads of Agreement and the West Indies Act provide for defence arrangements. The Government of an Associated State undertook not to grant access to any part of its territory or territorial waters, or allow the use of its airfields, communications or harbour facilities by forces or agents of any other Government. Even where UK forces were introduced into the State for defence purposes such forces could not be used in aid of the local authority except by prior agreement between the UK Government and the Government of the Associated State.⁵

Termination of Association

At no time did any of the political leaders regard Associated Statehood as anything but a step toward complete independence. The UK

5 West Indies Act 1967, para. 6.

Government for their part stressed on several occasions that the States could proceed to independence any time they chose to do so. This represented a remarkable shift in attitude since 1965 when independence for the territories was neither encouraged nor offered.

The procedure for termination of association was spelled out in Schedule 2 of the West Indies Act.⁶ It required an interval of ninety days between the introduction of the Bill of Termination and the second reading of the Bill. No less than two-thirds of all elected members of the legislature were required to support the Bill after its third reading and then, if approved, it had to go to the electorate in a referendum to be supported by two-thirds of the votes cast. Only then could it obtain the Governor's consent. Provision was also made for an Associated State to enter a federation, union or other form of association with an independent Commonwealth country without recourse to a referendum.

Nationality

The West Indies Act (S.2)(i)(b) stated that the UK Government had exclusive competence in matters relating to nationality or citizenship. Henceforth a citizen of the Associated States was known as a citizen of the UK, Associated States and Colonies - passports were issued locally, making holders subject to the terms of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act, i.e. they now had to apply for visitors' visas for entry to the UK. It is interesting to compare the status of citizens of the West Indies

6 See Appendix III.

Associated States with citizens of the Cook Islands where the latter are New Zealand citizens and British subjects.

The Executive

Under the Colonial regime the Queen's representative was the Administrator. The office was transformed to that of Governor under Associated Statehood, the Governor being of local origin having a knowledge of important issues and usually above party politics. In the selection of the Governor, it was understood that the Secretary of State would be guided by the Chief Minister (whose title was changed to Premier) of the territory and that there would be consultation between the British Government and the Chief Minister before the Chief Minister made any recommendation to the Secretary of State.⁷

The provision which stated that the Queen's representative would be appointed by Her Majesty and would hold office "during Her Majesty's pleasure" suggested that the UK Government wished to be involved more directly in the appointment of the Governor of an Associated State than in the case of an independent state.

The Legislative

Four of the six Associated States retained the unicameral legislature which existed before Statehood, Antigua and Grenada opting

7 See Constitutional Proposals, op. cit., p. 5.

for a second chamber. In each of these there was a nominated element, appointed by the Governor on the advice of the Premier. The system of nomination was to ensure the representation of special interests or the inclusion of special competence, both of which were not likely to be thrown up by the electoral process. More often than not the practice had been to nominate members who had been party faithfuls, and to ensure that the ruling party had a comfortable working margin. It could also be used to introduce a member who had aspirations of contesting an election in the future. The St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla Constitution, however, disqualified a person who was unsuccessful in the last election.⁸

The Judiciary

Under the West Indies Act, 1967, a common system of courts for the Associated States was established. The Act also, by an Order in Council, permitted the inclusion of provisions for the establishment of a common Judiciary and Legal Services Commission for the territories. A regional Supreme Court was established by the West Indies Supreme Court Order, 1967, consisting of a Court of Appeal and High Court. The Chief Justice was appointed by the Queen by letters patent while the Justices of Appeal and the Puisne Judges were appointed by the Judicial and Legal Services Commission.

8 St. Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla Constitution Order, S. 26 (4).

The provisions of the West Indies Associated States Supreme Court Order were part of the constitutional instruments of each of the Associated States; thus any amendment of the Supreme Court Order had to follow procedural steps identical to those for amending the various constitutions.

C. Internal Implications of Associated Statehood

The argument put forward by the UK Government (and accepted by the political leaders of the day) was that Associated Statehood offered the best constitutional solution to the problem of decolonising the Windwards and Leewards. Sir Fred Phillips, an eminent Caribbean jurist, argues that the Associated States had been transformed overnight from colonial status to "full internal independence". He laments that:-

It is regrettable that this fact does not seem to have impressed itself upon scholars and lawyers in the Caribbean or upon the United Nations Committee of Twenty-Four, despite valiant efforts in that behalf on the part of the United Kingdom delegation at the United Nations.⁹

Continuing, he observed in the territories themselves:-

... the transformation has been so sudden that the populace have not yet weaned themselves from the concept of colonial rule. And one cannot blame them, for in the past before a country could have reached this stage of independence there was always (rightly or wrongly) the intermediate stage of self-government.¹⁰

9 Sir Fred Phillips, op. cit., p. 84.

10 *ibid.*

Sir Fred Phillips further notes that in some cases the period of internal self-government was brief, but never had it been skipped altogether;¹¹ whereas during the period of internal self-government the Governor was both the Queen's Representative and the Representative of Her Majesty's Government, in the case of the Associated States the break with colonialism was on an "appointed day", sudden and complete. The Governor became the Queen's Representative with no link whatever with Whitehall and with little or no executive powers, his functions becoming those of the normal constitutional monarch insofar as internal matters were concerned.¹² What is also interesting is the fact that in the post-war period up to 1955 "internal self-government" was never considered an option for the Caribbean in all of the Conferences held. It was then more fashionable to speak of "steps towards independence".

If internal self-government fell short of independence in that the country did not have full international personality, Associated Statehood seemed to have gone one step further. Again Phillips feels that a new rubric of "internal independence" should be coined to meet this new status, which raises a fundamental issue as to whether independence is divisible and can be achieved in stages. The difference between internal self-government and "internal independence" is seen in the way the then government of an Associated State operated: in the Associated State the

11 *ibid.*, p. 85.

12 *ibid.*

government proceeded in exactly the same way as it did in the UK by the Prime Minister and his Cabinet except for defence and external affairs; under internal self-government the Queen's Representative was always the representative of the UK Government, and usually retained responsibility for the civil service, police, internal security, external affairs and defence. Also in some cases the Governor could refuse assent to bills affecting his special responsibilities.

The internal constitutions of the Associated States were along the lines of the Constitutional Proposals set out in Cmnd. 2865/1965. they were remarkably similar to the independence constitutions of Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and Barbados with the following differences among the Associated States:-

(a) Legislatures:

Dominica, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla had unicameral legislatures, consisting of both elected and nominated members in the House of Assembly. In addition the Constitution Order of St. Lucia provided for the establishment of a bicameral legislature by simple resolution of the House of Assembly. On the establishment of the Senate (wholly nominated on the advice of the Premier and the Leader of the Opposition) the House became fully elected. St. Vincent's House of Assembly had sixteen members, thirteen of

whom were elected and three nominated, two of the latter being appointed by the Governore on the advice of the Premier and one on the advice of the Leader of the Opposition.¹³

(b) Supervisor of Elections:

Practices varied among the constitutions of the Associated States in the supervision of elections, for example, Antigua's Constitution had no provision for appointment of a public office while Dominica's placed the responsibility on the Governore for administration and conduct of elections. St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent had an independent Supervisor of Elections appointed on the advice of the Public Service Commission and not subject to direction or supervision in the performance of his duties. In Grenada, a similar Supervisor was appointed by the Governor.

(c) Delimitation of Boundaries:

All the Constitutions varied with respect to the provisions for constituency boundary delimitation. In Antigua a Commission was appointed on the advice of the Premier; in St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla a Boundaries Commission consisted of

13 St. Vincent Constitution Order, 1969, S. 28.

the Speaker of the House as Chairman and four members of the House of Assembly: two appointed on the advice of the Premier and two on the advice of the Leader of the Opposition; In St. Lucia a Standing Committee of the House acted as a Commission under the rules of procedure; Grenada and Dominica provided for independent commissions consisting of the Speaker of the House as Chairman and four members appointed on the advice of the Premier and the Leader of the Opposition; finally in St. Vincent the Governor appointed the Commission consisting of a Chairman and up to four members, acting in accordance with the advice of the Premier.

Apart from these, there were minor variations in the various constitutions regarding the appointment of the Attorney General, Public Service Commission and Public Appeals Board.¹⁴

D. The Debates in the British Parliament

The West Indies Associated States met very little opposition in the British Parliament. In fact, the author recalls sitting in the gallery of a partially empty House of Commons late on evening when the Bill was being discussed. It appeared that only those members who had studied the Bill had any real interest in it and these echoed the pros

14 Details of the differences among the constitutions of the Associated States are given in: Ann Spackman (ed.), Constitutional Development of the West Indies, 1922-1968, Caribbean University Press, pp 410-413.

and cons of Associated Statehood. Some felt that it was a device for getting rid of the colonial remnants and so ending ministerial responsibility in the House; that the recommendations of the Tripartite Mission should have been implemented before this step was taken, thus giving the islands a greater opportunity for their economic survival.¹⁵

Over in the House of Lords, the same level of disinterestedness was demonstrated with the Government spokesman claiming that Britain was not shirking its responsibilities but was prepared to assist in achieving internal self-government without the trappings of sovereignty.¹⁶

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that all sections of the British political directorate were most eager to be rid of these colonial millstones.

Conclusions

With all due respect to Sir Fred Phillips, the notion of equating Associated Statehood with "internal independence" stretches the concept a bit too far. To say that the constitutions of the Associated States were remarkably similar to the constitutions of the independent state,

15 See House of Commons Parliamentary Debates, Weekly Hansard, No. 711, 27 January to 2 February 1967, Col. 337-376.

16 House of Lords Parliamentary Debates, Weekly Hansard, 3-9 February 1967, No. 645, Col. 1487.

however, did not make them independent. The so-called internal independence was indeed very late in coming as the constitutional history revealed and some British colonies had already achieved this status before the onset of the twentieth century. What on paper appeared to be major constitutional advances, in reality were minor changes which gave local populations and their elected governments a bigger say in conducting their internal affairs but still left the territories without an international legal personality. Associated Statehood, however, did remove the stigma of colonial status and judging by the relative ease with which the provisions were accepted it can be concluded that at the time and under those circumstances, the leaders found nothing obnoxious in them, having not been advised of the limitations imposed or the advantages of proceeding directly to independence.

Over a very brief period of two years, the UK Government had shifted its attitude on independence for mini-states. By 1967 much of the heat over Rhodesia was off at the United Nations, the Afro-Asians were already a majority and all that remained of the colonial empire were the small states, hardly to be regarded as status symbols and more as millstones.

Chapter vi

The International Implications of Associated Statehood

A. The Debates in the United Nations

During 1964 the Special Committee referred the Windwards, Leewards and Barbados to its Sub-Committee III for consideration.¹ In a statement to the Sub-Committee, the UK Representative asserted that the main problem was to find new resources to develop and diversify the economy in order to provide sufficient employment for the growing population. It was the view of the UK Government that individually most of the islands had little chance of becoming viable in the foreseeable future. Quoting the report of the economic survey undertaken earlier, the Representative pointed to the inadequate state of the infrastructure of the islands and the recommendation that urgent attention should be given to those deficiencies before the islands were launched on an independent career.

The UK Representative pointed to the major economic problems and gave an indication of financial assistance to the territories between 1945 and 1964. This had amounted to about US\$84 million and grants in aid of \$2.8 million per annum were given to all territories except Barbados and Antigua, and in addition an average of between \$5.5 million and \$8.5 million a year

1 G.A.O.R. Session 19, 1964/65; 19:3, Annexes Part I, Annex 8, Chapter XXV, pp. 471-483.

were given to all territories for developmental purposes. The Canadian Government also helped and favourable trading arrangements were also provided to these territories for their basic products.

A review of constitutional development was also presented, highlighting of course the attempts to form a federation since 1945 without success. What is interesting about the UK analysis of the failure of Federation since 1945 was that it blamed it on a "basic difference of opinion among the West Indian Leaders" - about the extent and nature of the powers of the Federal Government. This was said of the 1962 Federation and it was repeated following the failure of the attempts of the "Little Eight" to form one.²

It was left to the representative of Trinidad and Tobago to partially rebut some of the statements the UK had been making to the Special Committee. Speaking before Sub-Committee III in May 1964, the representative stated what the Windwards and Leewards had been saying all along: that they were fit and qualified to govern themselves. It is worth repeating some of the arguments put forward on behalf of these territories by the Trinidad and Tobago representative.³ If freedom implied the right to an infrastructure which gave a reasonable

2 See Annex No. 8 (Part One) of Nineteenth Session of the General Assembly, New York, United Nations 1966, pp. 466-49.

3 For a full summary of the Statement of the Trinidad and Tobago representative see *ibid.*, pp. 499-500.

possibility of standing on one's own feet and seeking to solve one's problems with self-respect, of finding food, shelter and employment for one's citizens, of taking one's independent place in the family of nations, then freedom was denied to his neighbours and relatives.

He went on to state that Britain was not entitled to extract for centuries all that could be got out of a colony and when that had been done to relieve itself of its obligations by the conferment of a formal but meaningless political independence, and, going one step further he declared that justice required that reparation be made to the country that had suffered the ravages of colonisation before that country was expected to face up to the problems and difficulties that would inevitably follow independence. To emphasise the point, the Trinidad and Tobago representative stated quite categorically that without substantial economic aid none of the suggested forms of self-determination could lead to real independence.

The \$84 million in economic aid over the 18-year period - this amounted to less than EC\$8 million a year - was grossly inadequate since according to the planners in Trinidad and Tobago \$180 million in grants only was required over a 10-year period in order that any real economic development could take place.

Three years later, the Jamaica representative went a step further:-

"There are those small states, economically not viable which would choose independence if they could. It should not be beyond the capacity of the United Nations to devise means of linking them to

This organization in order to ensure that the exercise of their right does not lead them to continuing or eventual poverty. Specifically, it would not be amiss for the General Assembly to recommend that a section of the Secretariat should devote itself exclusively to the interests of the small territories which might elect to exercise that right. This special section could provide technical and administrative assistance where needed.⁴

Time and time again the statement was being made that if the requisite economic aid were forthcoming there could be no doubt that the people could decide for themselves exactly what was the most appropriate political structure that would ensure their political independence. It was on the UK Representative's insistence that the real obstacles to the formation of a federation were political that the Sub-Committee felt that information on the territories was incomplete and set up a Working Group to make a thorough study of the political, social and economic situation in the territories.⁵

The Working Group, comprising representatives of the Ivory Coast, Madagascar and Venezuela, never visited the Caribbean although it held discussions with V.C. Bird, Chief Minister of Antigua, who had been visiting New York during this period. This fact prompted at least one delegation to suggest that the best solution would be to visit the territories.⁶

There was really nothing new in the report of the Working Group

4 G.A. Report A/PV 1584, p. 17, 10 October 1967.

5 *ibid.*, pp. 502-510.

6 *ibid.*, p. 503.

except that V.C. Bird and other officials made it quite clear that the differences between political leaders came from a lack of confidence for adequate financing after federation.⁷ Similar views were being voiced by the Premier and Deputy Premier of Barbados and members of the public.⁸

B. Consideration by the Special Committee

At the end of 1964 in its recommendations and conclusions, the Special Committee emphasised that the provisions of Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 applied to all dependent Territories, irrespective of their size, population and other factors. While agreeing that these small Territories presented peculiar problems because of size, population, economies and other deficiencies, it categorically emphasised that it was for the peoples of the Territories alone to express themselves freely with regard to the form they wished to adopt in order to achieve the objectives of Resolution 1514 (XV). The Special Committee even suggested that "in a world characterised by the integrationist movement, it might be desirable for the peoples of these Territories to bear in mind the forms mentioned in Resolution 1514 (XV) in their achievement of the objectives of Resolution 1514 (XV)."⁹

7 ibid., p. 507.

8 Barbados House of Assembly Delegates (Official Report), Session 1962, pp. 18-22.

9 For general conclusions of the Special Committee on the Windwards and Leewards, see General Assembly Official Records, Session 19:3, 1964/65, Annexes Part I, Annex No. 8, pp. 493-494.

The Issue of Visiting Missions

The Special Committee had further asserted that the United Nations must be satisfied that the exercise of self-determination was undertaken in complete freedom and in order to ensure that this was done the United Nations should seek the ways and means authorised to this end. Pointing to the need for a more thorough investigation of facts and opinions, especially the opinions of leaders and the whole question of the amount of assistance after independence, the Special Committee concluded that the best way to obtain direct information concerning the views and wishes of the people was to send a visiting Mission to the Territories.

On the procedure of sending visiting missions, the UK Representative stated that apart from the reservation on a point of principle involved, it seemed doubtful whether a visiting mission would achieve a great deal. The Territories had fully representative and responsible Governments and a flourishing system of political parties. It was through the activities and organizations of political parties and elected members and ultimately through the ballot box that the wishes of the population would be ascertained. The dispatch of a visiting mission would be no substitute for that domestic process.¹⁰

¹⁰ *ibid.*, p. 503.

The Precedent of the Cook Islands

The Cook Islands had accepted their new constitution by elections held during April 1965 and supervised by the United Nations on the invitation of the New Zealand Government. The report of the UN representative was considered in the Special Committee of Twenty-Four and later by the General Assembly which by Resolution 2064 declared that the administering power had carried out obligations under General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV). Resolution 2064 (XX) also noted that on the date the new constitution came into force (August 1965) the Cook Islanders had control over their internal affairs of their future.

The General Assembly also considered the Windward and Leeward Islands in its Fourth Committee. In the general debate several members emphasised that the Declaration on the Granting of Independence was equally applicable to all territories and that the cardinal principle in any approach to the problem of future status should be the undisputed recognition of the right of all peoples to self-determination and independence regardless of size, population or stage of development. Some countries like Cuba, Ghana, and the USSR even opposed the merger of Territories with a colonial power.

A draft resolution approved by the Fourth Committee was considered, amended and adopted by the General Assembly as Resolution 2069 (XX), which among things called upon the administering powers to implement all General Assembly resolutions, requested administering

powers to allow UN Visiting Missions to visit the territories; reaffirmed the right of the people of these territories to decide their consitutional status in accordance with the UN Charter and the provisions of the Declaration on Granting Independence and decided that the UN should render all help to the people ... in their efforts freely to decide their future status.¹¹

Sub-Committee III of the Special Committee was formed to consider, inter alia, questions relating to the non-independent English-speaking territories in the Caribbean. This Sub-Committee noted that in 1964 and afterwards the only information available on the Caribbean territories had come from the UK Government. It was the view in 1966 that the Special Committee and the Sub-Committee could not carry out their task successfully unless they could send visiting missions to the islands. In other words, the fully expressed will of the population could not be determined solely on the basis of reports of constitutional conferences or information supplied by the Administering Power. To emphasise this point, a few times opposition parties had left constitutional conferences convened by the UK, which had then concluded arrangements with a minority Government; in other cases both opposition and Government were made to accept conditions imposed by the Administering Power.

An examination of the meeting of Sub-Commtee III during the 21st Session (1966) shows that at no time did the UK Representative explain

11 Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Annexes, Addendum to Agenda Item 23, Chapter XXII.

what happened before the idea of Associated Statehood was "sold" to the islands. The Statehood idea was conceived in the UK without participation of the political leaders of the islands. It was only after the UK Government had firmly decided on the new constitutional arrangement, including the specific conditions, was Statehood offered. It was packaged, gift-wrapped and presented with the compliments of the Colonial Office - and you do not look gift horses in the mouth!

During the course of the discussions in 1966 in the Sub-Committee several members had referred to the need for consultation of the people on questions affecting their constitutional status. The UK Representative pointed out that under the British system of representative government there was not usually any provision for direct consultation of the people on specific questions by such means as a referendum. Under that system consultation was a continuous process, operating through the election of parliamentary candidates representing political parties, parliamentary parties, the information media and in the case of the Territories in question, contact through the Governor or Administrator with the UK Government in London.¹² Two observations need to be made here. In the first place it is rather curious that while the British system of representative Government did not provide for direct consultation by means of a referendum a specific provisions was written into the Statehood Constitution for a referendum prior to termination of association, so it would appear that direct consultation

12 General Assembly Official Records, Section 21, Annexes VII 1, p. 782.

was not necessary before but after Statehood. The second observation concerns the notion of consultation. It seems clear that in the case of the Territories the Administrator was the link between them and the UK Government. We should note however, that the only representative from the Windwards and Leewards at the Oxford Conference on the future of Smaller Territories was the Administrator of St. Lucia. Only by a stretch of imagination can we conclude that the people or their representatives were involved in hatching the scheme.

Petitions before the Special Committee

E.M. Gairy, leader of the Opposition in Grenada, felt so strongly about the imposition of Associated Statehood that he took the matter to the United Nations in September 1966. Appearing before the Special Committee, Gairy stated that when in December 1965 a despatch had been sent to Grenada and the other Windward and Leeward Islands recommending a new constitution, 21,000 Grenadians attached their signatures to a document protesting the right of the Government to negotiate a new constitution over the heads of the people.¹³ Gairy's contention was that far-reaching changes had been made in the Grenada constitution and to implement them was not only an insult to democracy and to the people of Grenada but also a violation by the Administering Power under Articles 73 and 74 of the UN Charter.¹⁴ On January 1967, Gairy and three other

13 See A/AC.109/Pet. 446; G.A.O.R., Session 21, 1966 Annexes Vol. 1, pp. 753-757.

14 *ibid.*, p. 754.

members of his part in the Legislative Council resigned their seats, presumably in protest over the introduction of the new constitution before general elections were held.

Between 21 February and 23 March 1967, the Special Committee after giving consideration to the Associated States referred them to Sub-Committee III for further consideration.¹⁵ The Special Committee also had written petitions from Eric Gairy, Leader of the Opposition in Grenada;¹⁶ from M.A. Caesar, also from Grenada;¹⁷ two petitions from Ronald Webster¹⁸ and Atlin Harrigan,¹⁹ both from St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla; two petitions from E.T. Joshua, Chief Minister of St. Vincent²⁰ in addition to hearing a statement from M.A. Caesar (Grenada) on behalf of Eric Gairy.

With regard to Grenada, Eric Gairy contended that he had signed the report of the May 1966 Conference with certain reservations concerning parts of the proposed constitution and that newspaper reports which had quoted the UK Minister of State for Commonwealth Affairs as

15 G.A.O.R., 22nd Session, Annexes, Add. to agenda 23 (Part III), pp. 173-1931.

16 A/AC.109/Pet. 573 and Add. 1 and 2.

17 A/AC.109/Pet. 580 and Add. 1-3.

18 A/AC.109/Pet. 574.

19 A/AC.109/Pet. 575.

20 A/AC.109/Pet. 584.

stating that he had fully agreed to the constitution during the Conference were "palpably false".²¹ Areas of disagreement included clauses dealing with the Senate, the House of Representatives, traditional provision and the need for a referendum on certain issues. For Gairy, the real issue was that the people of Grenada were not given an opportunity to accept or reject the new constitution through a general election. Any attempt to implement the constitution he regarded as "a most unfortunate miscarriage of justice on the part of the United Kingdom, which would be held responsible for whatever might transpire in Grenada".²²

The dilemma was clearly stated before the Special Committee: the UK and others had placed great emphasis on the fact that no proposals for individual independence had been put forward at the London Constitutional Conference; yet it had been generally agreed that individual independence was impracticable, a fact recognised by all as early as 1945.

The UK Representative pointed out in his reply that Gairy's reservations at the Constitutional Conference related to the internal constitution of Grenada and did not affect the proposal for association to which Gairy and his party had fully agreed. Not only had he signed the London report but he had himself voted for it in the Grenada legislature

21 *ibid.*, p. 173.

22 *ibid.*, p. 174.

where it was approved without a dissenting vote. Lastly, in conversations in the United Kingdom, Gairy was told explicitly that by signing the London report he had agreed to Grenada becoming an Associated State. So it would appear that the UK was not prepared to allow Gairy to renege on his agreement.²³

What of the more general question of consultation before the new arrangements were accepted: For the UK, these had been worked out in full consultation with the people, and had been freely and willingly accepted by them. When it became clear that the formation of a federation was impossible in the autumn of 1965 the UK had sent new and comprehensive proposals for the Government concerned; in November a representative of the Colonial Secretary had discussed them with the Governments followed by London conferences of February to May 1966. Subsequently, the agreed arrangements were debated in all territories and approved by the Legislatures in which there was no opposition. There were thus two major forms of consultation: the London conferences which included all parties elected to the Legislative Council of the Territories and through debates in the local Legislature.

A third form of indirect consultation was through general elections which were held in each Territory except two, after the publication of the new proposals and in every case the ruling parties had been in favour of association. What is significant about this last point is that

23 *ibid.*, p. 176.

whereas it was not considered necessary by the UK to get two-thirds of the people declaring their preference for Statehood a two-thirds majority vote in the Legislature and in the Territory had to be obtained before the Territory ended its association with the UK, a fact which was not lost on the Special Committee. On the question of sending visiting groups to the Territories, the UK had refused to allow visiting missions²⁴ on what it considered was a question of principle.²⁵

The Withdrawal of the US and UK from the Special Committee

The UN debates during the following year were a rehash of the issues and arguments heard before, the UK Representative informing the Special Committee in February that the Windwards and Leewards with the exception of St. Vincent would assume the new status during February and would enjoy a full measure of self-government. The UK had therefore discharged its obligations under Chapter XI of the UN Charter and information on those Territories would not be transmitted in the future. However, led by the Soviet Union, the Special Committee adopted a resolution²⁶ by which it affirmed that the General Assembly's resolution of 14 December 1960 (1514) continued to apply to the

24 See Letter of Sir Roger Jackling to Chairman of Special Committee A/AC.109/171 dated 12 May 1966.

25 G.A.O.R., 22nd Session, Annexes, Add. to agenda Item 23, (Part I), p. 40; Part III - Chap. XXIII - deals with Associated States, i.e. pp. 125-246.

26 Adopted as G.A. Resolution 2357 (XXII) on 19 December 1967.

Territories. The Special Committee also requested its Sub-Committee III to examine, in the light of the recent constitutional developments, the situation in these Territories in all its aspects including the possibility of sending a visiting mission. It is interesting to note that whereas this resolution was passed by 86 to 0, there were 27 abstentions which included the Caribbean independent states of Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.²⁷

In the General Assembly, the UK Representative asserted that his government had fully discharged its Charter obligations and information concerning those territories would not be transmitted in the future. The General Assembly's response was to adopt Resolution 2357 (XXII) affirming that Resolution 1514 and other relevant resolutions continued to apply to the territories. similar resolutions were adopted by the General Assembly in 1968,²⁸ 1969,²⁹ 1970.³⁰

In 1971 both the US and the UK delegations withdrew from membership of the Special Committee, a move which was regarded by some Committee members as impeding the full and speedy implementation of the Declaration. During the proceedings of the Committee there was hardly

27 Yearbook of the UN 1967, p. 688.

28 Yearbook of the UN 1968, p. 702.

29 Resolution 2592 (XXIV).

30 Yearbook of the UN 1970, pp. 729-730; Resolution 2709 (XXV), Resolution 2710 (XXV).

any mention of the Associated States. By 1974 the issue no longer evoked the indignation of the Committee of Twenty-Four, although it still called for sending visiting missions to the Territories while the UK insisted that missions were not necessary since they had already supplied sufficient information.³¹

C. The Associated States in the International Community

The status of the Associated States in the United Nations system remained that of colonies as we saw earlier. However, there were two aspects which elevated them beyond colonial status, one of which was the attitude of international organizations towards Statehood and the other deriving from the executive authority delegated to the Government of the Associated State with respect to the conduct of external relations with other countries. Executive authority was delegated to each of the Associated States in several major areas as we saw in Chapter VI.³² Apart from these areas the British Government undertook to give sympathetic consideration to requests from the Associated States for authority to take action on individual questions of external relations not covered in the despatch.³³

31 Yearbook of the UN 1972, p. 543; Yearbook of the UN 1974, p. 764.

32 See Appendix II Heads of Agreement and Annex D.

33 Report of the Windward Islands Constitutional Conference, May 1966, Annex E, Draft Despatch, pp. 21-22.

It was very clear that the Associated States had no international personality and merely exercised powers delegated to them "on behalf of the United Kingdom". Unlike New Zealand in the Cook Islands, the United Kingdom had positive powers to implement its responsibilities in the Associated States. As we saw earlier an Order in Council relating to defence and external affairs of an Associated State could be made with or without the consent of the government of the Associated State and may contain such provision as appeared to Her Majesty's Government to be appropriate for changing the laws of the State.³⁴

In general, international organizations took the view adumbrated by the General Assembly, that Associated States were indistinguishable from colonies. However, some, like the International Labour Organization felt that Associated Statehood was a non-colonial status and that a place should be found for them within the system of international relations. Apart from this consideration the Associated States themselves were inhibited by the relatively large contribution they would have had to make in order to join some of these organizations.

Under the provisions for entrustment, an Associated State could be given executive authority to apply for full membership in an international organization of which the UK was a member. However, the inherent danger in this proposition was that there could be a conflict of

34 A fuller discussion of the legal aspects of Associated Statehood is given in S.A. De Smith, Constitutional and Administrative Law (Penguin Books Ltd., 1971), pp. 638-641.

interest between the UK and the Associated States. A case in point was the representation of the British Overseas Territories and Associated States (BOTAS) on the Commonwealth Telecommunications Council. In 1972 a Council meeting was held in Canada on which the BOTAS were represented apart from the United Kingdom. The East African delegation questioned the separate representation to which the British Government representative replied that separate representation was necessary because of the substantial BOTAS stake in the partnership and because BOTAS and UK interests did not always coincide. In August 1976, the UK Government-Representative for the Associated States circulated the latter on the subject and stated that the UK Government intended, unless it received objections, to maintain this representation until the matter could be considered at the next conference which was scheduled for mid-1977.³⁵

What was important here was that the interests of the Associated States were represented by the British Government. There was no indication of the divergent interests among the Associated States themselves and how the BOTAS representative decided what position to take where such conflicts arose.

35 Unpublished memorandum on "Representation of the British Overseas Territories and Associated States on the Commonwealth Telecommunications Council", by Lawrence Jones, ITU Adviser to the Government of Barbados, dated September 1976.

Economic Aid and Technical Assistance

The constitutional position of the Associated States also prevented them from borrowing from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This was stated by the UK delegate to the UNCTAD IV meeting in Nairobi in 1976. In an effort to demonstrate that the Associated States were not at a disadvantage the UK delegate pointed out that bilateral budgetary support was given to the neediest islands; the UK had supported the establishment of a Caribbean Development Bank Fund for emergency programme assistance which consisted of budgetary support where necessary, technical assistance and help for existing and new common services for the LDCs (Associated States) and toward this end had made available some one million pounds in 1976 on condition that the more developed Caribbean countries (Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Jamaica and Barbados) would make a combined equal contribution. Again to show that the UK had a special interest in the needs of the Associated States, the delegate compared the level of assistance given to the Associated States and other LDCs for 1974: whereas the average LDC received \$8 per capita aid from DAC sources the comparable per capita figures for the Associated States were: St. Lucia \$65; Antigua \$39; and St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla \$78. Additionally, the UK had supported attempts by the Caribbean Development Bank to achieve greater donor co-ordination and for other contributions to the Emergency Fund, especially from Canada, Venezuela, the European Development Fund and the US.

The UK Representative also pointed out that the IBRD had made loans totalling some US\$20 million to the Caribbean Development Bank for

onlending; of this amount \$17 million were to be lent on conventional World Bank terms and \$3 million on "third window" terms for the LDCs. Further, in order to meet the legislative requirements the UK agreed to guarantee repayments to the IBRD of such parts of loans to the Caribbean Development Bank as may be re-lent to the Associated States.³⁶

On the other side, there were several examples where the Associated States did not benefit from international assistance as a result of this status, for example, the Organization of American States (OAS) did not provide any assistance to the Associated States as they were not members (Grenada became a member after its independence in 1974); since 1965 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) under the auspices of USAID was providing technical advice and training in tax administration to the independent CARICOM States.

More or less as a compensation for their ineligibility to access international aid funds from bodies such as the World Bank, the British Development Division was established in Barbados in 1966 with responsibility for decisions concerning economic and technical assistance.

D. Entrustment of Authority to Sign the Treaty
 Establishing the Caribbean Community and to
 Represent the Associated States in the
 Conference and other Organs and Committees of
 the Community

The legal status of the Associated States as set out in the West Indies Act 1967 also provided for delegation of authority to negotiate

36 Statement by John Mason, UK Delegation to UNCTAD IV, Nairobi, Kenya, 18 May 1976.

and conclude trade agreements with other countries, authority to apply for full or associate membership of UN specialised agencies or similar international organizations of which the UK was a member, and authority to negotiate and conclude agreements of "purely local concern with any independent Commonwealth Caribbean country or other Associated States".

Where an Associated State contemplated the exercise of delegated authority the Government of the UK was to be kept informed in advance; if there were conflict with the international commitments of the UK or with its foreign policy the action by the Associated State would become null and void. In the case of the latter a certificate would be issued on behalf of the Secretary of State certifying that a matter specified in the certificate was one which in the opinion of the UK Government related to defence or external affairs.

During 1974 identical entrustment powers were given to each of the Associated States, Montserrat and Belize to sign the CARICOM Treaty. The authority was subject to the following conditions:-

- that the Community did not enter into any treaty or other international agreement affecting the Associated States unless the UK Government had been apprised of the terms of the treaty or engagement and had signified to the Premiers that they had no objection to it; and
- that no recommendation or decision of the Community to pursue any particular foreign policy was made in relation to the

Associated States unless the UK Government had been apprised of the terms of the recommendation and had signified to the Premier that they had no objection to it.

All the Associated States (including Montserrat and Belize) accepted the authorisation on these terms and conditions. In spite of the delegated powers according to one writer, "In the eyes of Whitehall and of the international organizations the Associated States are totally dependent territories".³⁷

E. Association with the European Common Market

According to the rules of European association policy the Associated States as non-independent UK territories could be associated under Part IV (Article 136) of the EEC Treaty.

This meant that the association of these States would be governed by the principles of Part IV of the EEC Treaty and decisions of the Council on the association of the overseas countries and territories. This implied that a part of the CARIFTA countries would be associated with the European Community under the Lomé Convention and the other CARIFTA countries would be associated under the Council Decision on

37 Margaret Broderick, "Associated Statehood - A New Form of Decolonisation", International Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 17 (1968), pp. 368-404, particularly p. 396.

Overseas Countries and Territories. More importantly, if the Europeans gave a purely legalistic interpretation, i.e. if the principles in Part IV and the Council Decisions on the Overseas Countries and Territories were taken as the basis, the Associated States would have no direct access to the Commission and the institutions of the association.³⁸

In the negotiations between the European Community and the CARIFTA countries, there were three political considerations with respect to the Associated States, firstly, the Caribbean integration process, secondly, the non-independent status of the Associated States, and thirdly, their dependence on development assistance. At the Tenth Meeting of the CARIFTA Council of Ministers in July 1972, it was decided that the CARIFTA countries should seek a joint relationship with the EEC. By the time CARICOM was established in 1973 it was agreed also that arrangements to be sought would be completely compatible and would not interfere with the integrity of the integration movement. By the time the Lomé Convention was signed in February 1975 concern was being expressed in four areas:-

38 For an analysis of these arrangements see Klaus Billerbeck, The Negotiations on Association Between the Commonwealth Caribbean and the European Community: Problems and Approaches for Solution (German Development Institute, Berlin, 1973) pp. 17-30 for the problem of the non-independent WI Associated States.

- Aid provisions for CARICOM Part IV countries (i.e., the Associated States and Montserrat);
- Provisions for participation in regional projects;
- Terms and conditions of aid to Part IV countries; and
- Institutional arrangements.

In a paper prepared by the Secretariat of the East Caribbean Common Market (the Associated States and Montserrat) for consideration by the CARICOM Council of Ministers in October 1975 dissatisfaction was expressed over:-

- (a) the level of aid to be provided to the CARICOM Part IV countries - some only 11.5 million units of account ((UAs) over a five-year period out of a grand total of 150 million UAs for all Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs);
- (b) the absence of provisions under the Part IV Regulations for participation in regional projects;
- (c) the indication that the terms and conditions of aid to the Associated States would be less favourable than those available to the independent Member States; and

- (d) the proposal by the British Government to assume a role in the relationship between the CARICOM Part IV Countries and the EEC.³⁹

In a letter from the UK Government to the ECCM Governments (quoted in the ECCM paper) it was stated that it was the responsibility of the British Government to represent "your interests and to submit to the Commission on your behalf all applications for development aid from the Fund". The letter further stated that it would be to the British Government that the Commission in Brussels would allocate the sum of 35 million units of account from the EDF for all the UK OCTs. On the Caribbean side, this stance by the British Government was regarded as inconsistent with the attitudes expressed earlier and was damaging to the integrity of CARICOM.⁴⁰

It was the view of the Associated States that the negotiations with the Europeans would not succeed in safeguarding the integrity of the regional movement if:-

- (a) that integrity did not involve uniformity of the arrangements which individual Member States had with the European Community;

39 "Arrangement between CARICOM Part IV Countries and the EEC", Paper prepared by the ECCM Secretariat, 7 October 1975.

40 op. cit., p. 5.

- (b) inviolability of the principle of joint policies, approaches and actions in the general relations of Member States with the European Community; and
- (c) ensuring that the relations with the European Community did not affect the internal equilibrium of the Caribbean Community, in particular the special position enjoyed by the CARICOM LDCs. The Associated States felt that the "miserable treatment" being accorded to the CARICOM Part IV countries was partly due to the absence of effective representation of the vital interests of those countries in Brussels, an indictment of the role that the British Government so lucidly spelt out in the letter to the ECCM Governments.

The final provisions regarding association between the EEC and the Overseas Countries and Territories were set out in a Council Decision of January 1976.⁴¹ Basically, and since the CARICOM Part IV countries were expected to advance to independence in the foreseeable future and would be eligible for accession to the Lomé Convention, the Decision provided that the OCTs should not be treated less favourable than the ACP States. Recognising the political difficulties arising from OCTs belonging to regional groupings such as CARICOM, Article 133 (3) of the EEC Treaty provided for admission on the possibility of derogation

41 See R/72/76 (PTOM) (FIN 25) Council Decision on the Association of Overseas Countries and Territories with the European Economic Community (Brussels, 14 January 1976).

resulting from membership of the OCTs of a customs union with other developing countries,⁴² in other words the decision was made in favour of the Associated States being represented through the Caribbean Community.

Conclusions

The major conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is that since 1960 the principle has emerged that only the UN can decide whether or not a territory has achieved a full measure of self-government or has exercised the right of self-determination. That the UK had not adhered to the procedures laid down by the United Nations by not allowing a visiting mission was reason enough in the eyes of the Committee of Twenty-Four for not recognising Associated Statehood as de jure an act of decolonisation.

During the debates on the Associated States several issues were raised on matters of principle, procedure and prospects under the new arrangements. Resolution 1514 (XV) still envisaged independence as the ultimate goal, however while association was acceptable as a form of self-determination/decolonisation under Resolution 1541 (XV) in the early debates in the UN Committee of Twenty-Four - the Special Committee on Decolonisation, by the mid-sixties the principle emerged that if a territory was fit for association it was also fit for independence.

42 Communication from the Commission of the European Communities, COM (75) 133 Final (Brussels, 3 April 1975).

Another hotly debated issue was the procedure outlined for the attainment of eventual independence by the Associated States. It was felt that a simple majority vote in a referendum was preferable to the system whereby a two-thirds majority in a referendum were required before the termination of association.⁴³

As one writer put it, "the terms of association between the United Kingdom and these Eastern Caribbean territories imply a tacit admission by the United Kingdom Government, of continuing reservations about the standard of political behaviour in the territories",⁴⁴ the inference being that a high probability of authoritarian behaviour existed. The UK Government also must have had in mind the event that led to the suspension of the Grenada constitution in 1962.⁴⁵

43 See UN Doc. A/AC.109/SR. 490, p. 10; UN Monthly Chronicle, March to April 1967 for report on meeting of the Special Committee.

44 Urias Forbes, Social and Economic Studies, 19, No. 1 (March 1980), p. 86.

45 During 1982 a Commission of Enquiry into the Control of Public Expenditure in Grenada during 1961 was appointed by the UK Government. The Report of the Commission published as a White Paper Cmnd. 1735/1962 found that the Minister of Finance (Mr. Eric Matthew Gairy, also Chief Minister) had disregarded and contravened the laws and regulations governing the control of expenditure; had failed to seek or to accept the advice of civil servants; had deliberately destroyed the morale of civil service by deliberate interference with administrative duties and through threats against the security of office; and had induced the Civil Service to condone improprieties or irregularities in the expenditure of public funds. For records of this incident see: Cmnd. 1735/1962; Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 661, 1962, Col. 947-49; Grenada (Constitution) Order in Council, 1962 (S.I. 1244/1962; despatch from the Secretary of State for the Colonies (Maudling) regarding the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Expenditure in Grenada, to the Administrator of Grenada, dated 13 July 1962.

Within the system of international relations the Associated States were still regarded as dependent and only exercised some measure of executive authority on behalf of the UK which in theory was revocable at any time. Be that as it may some international organizations appeared to be sympathetic in their attitude toward membership for the Associated States. Two of the most important decisions were the entrustments to the Associated States to sign the CARIFTA Agreement and later the CARICOM Treaty and the decision by the UK to continue to represent the Associated States within the framework of the EEC-ACP Convention which was later resolved in favour of the Associated States.

The provisions attached to the signing of the Caribbean agreements ensured the persistence of the metropolitan presence within the regional integration movement while British representation in Brussels could hardly be regarded as fulfilling the aspirations of the Caribbean Community as a whole, particularly where the interests of CARICOM appeared to be in conflict with the interests of the UK. It was then left to the EEC to decide that the "Part IV Countries" of which the Associated States were members would be treated no less favourably than the other ACP States.

Chapter vii

The Social and Economic Bases of Non-Viability

A. General Features of the Economies

What are the human and material resources of the Associated States? How are they distributed? How are resources sectorally allocated? How do these resources perform and what are the major constraints in the performance of resources? These are the questions with which this chapter is concerned. Bearing in mind that Associated Statehood was chosen against the background of economic non-viability, this chapter seeks to spell out in concrete terms the elements associated with the notion of economic viability.

The growth and structure of the island economies have been conditioned by three sets of interrelated factors as we saw earlier in the analysis: the heritage of economic dependency, low resource endowment and small size. We can observe from Table 7.1 that the islands are very small both in size, ranging from 304 square miles to 136 square miles, and in population. The natural resource endowment of the islands is consequently extremely limited. All the islands with the exception of Antigua, have volcanic soils suitable for a number of crops. However, water problems in the Leewards and hilly topography in the Windwards tend to restrict the areas of usable land, and limit extensive agricultural

TABLE 7-1

AREA AND POPULATION OF CARICOM REGION 1970-1974

(Showing percentage growth rate)

CARICOM Region	Area Sq. ml	Population		Growth Rate	Average Annual Growth Rate
		1970	1974	% 1970-1974	% 1970-1974
Antigua/Barbuda	170.0	65,525	69,650 ^b	6.45	1.61
Dominica	289.5	70,513	76,188 ^b	8.05	2.01
Grenada	120.0	93,858	104,177 ^b	10.99	2.75
Montserrat	37.5	11,698	12,981 ^b	10.97	2.74
St. Kitts-Nevis- Anguilla	104.0	45,608	47,400 ^b	3.93	0.93
St. Lucia	238.0	100,893	109,000 ^b	8.04	2.01
St. Vincent	150.0	87,305	97,500 ^b	11.68	2.92
<u>ECCM</u>	<u>1,109.0</u>	<u>475,398</u>	<u>517,896</u>	<u>8.94</u>	<u>2.24</u>
Belize	8,975.0	120,936	132,456	9.53	2.38
<u>LDCs</u>	<u>9,975.0</u>	<u>596,334</u>	<u>650,352</u>	<u>9.06</u>	<u>2.27</u>
Barbados	166.0	237,701	264,000 ^c	11.06	2.77
Guyana	83,000.0	701,885	883,000 ^c	18.68	4.67
Jamaica	4,411.0	1,848,512	2,162,000 ^c	16.96	4.24
Trinidad/Tobago	1,980.0	940,719	1,143,000 ^c	21.50	5.38
<u>MDCs</u>	<u>89,557.0</u>	<u>3,728,817</u>	<u>4,402,000^c</u>	<u>18.05</u>	<u>4.51</u>
<u>CARICOM</u>	<u>99,532.0</u>	<u>4,325,151</u>	<u>5,052,352</u>	<u>16.81</u>	<u>4.20</u>

Notes: a/ 1970 Census
b/ Mid-year Estimates
c/ Rounded to the nearest thousand

Source: 1. 1970 Population census of the Commonwealth Caribbean
2. Digests of ECCM Statistical Offices
3. East Caribbean Common Market Secretariat - Annual Digest of Statistics 1974 (LDC Countries)
4. Latin American Development and the International Economic Situation - Second Regional Appraisal of the International Development Strategy - Part three - Indications of Economic and Social Development in Latin America (MDC Countries)

production; the land tenure system in some of the islands also acts as a constraint on further land use. Mineral resources are virtually non-existence with Dominica being the only island having pumice resources that can be exploited commercially on a small scale. Geothermal resources have been identified in St. Lucia, Dominica and Montserrat. Although large forested areas exist in the Windwards most of the species have limited commercial use. Fish is plentiful both in the Atlantic and in the Caribbean Sea yet deep-sea fishing has not been a tradition among the local populations; the in-shore facilities have been somewhat depleted by overfishing. Populations are very large in relation to land area and the present level of resource utilization. The pleasant climate and beautiful beaches to be found in all the islands are perhaps the best asset of the whole area, making the islands suitable for all-year round tourism.

Small size and its consequences limit the range of options available to meet problems such as backwardness and poverty, and small populations limit the scope for securing economies of scale. Even where a few local supply industries have been developed, their scale has been very modest. Consequently, most local industries have had to depend heavily on the export market.¹ Another consequence of small size is that the possibilities of developing export industries of sizeable scale

1 For a general description of economic problems associated with small size see A.D. Knox, "Economic Problems", in Burton Benedict, ed., Problems of Smaller Territories (London: London University Press, 1967), pp. 35-44.

are limited by a lack of basic inputs such as labour and auxiliary support industries. Small population and domestic market have resulted in (i) heavy dependence on foreign trade; (ii) high susceptibility to monopolistic practices both in production and distribution; (iii) difficulty in developing import substitutes, except for a few items; and (iv) diseconomies of scale.

Since modern technology in production and administration focuses on unit sizes which are largely inappropriate to these islands, very often the choice is either doing without or incurring costly excess capacity. Even in providing minimum public services diseconomies of scale are evident in the inordinately heavy costs. The per capita costs of government administration are usually higher in smaller countries with fully developed administrative systems than larger ones that can spread services over a greater population. Diseconomies of scale apply to infrastructure expenditures, agriculture, industry, transportation and nationhood itself,² for example, when preparing for independence small countries usually face costs associated with defence, diplomatic representation and all the trappings and symbols of national independence. At the social and cultural level not many activities are usually offered with the result that emigration to larger countries is often regarded as the only option for social and cultural advancement. The "brain drain" in the smaller territories is therefore proportionately higher than for larger countries.

2 See D.P.J. Wood, "The Smaller Territories: Some Political Considerations", in Benedict, *ibid*.

Traditionally, and as part of British imperial resource deployment policy, the Leeward and Windward Islands have specialised in trading roles which they have retained to this day. Size has contributed to specialisation, sometimes in the extreme, where minimum production scale could be achieved only by putting the entire island under one crop; when market conditions change for different commodities very often the island producers have had to shift from one product to another.

Sugar has been the main crop of all the islands at one time or another and has been the monocrop economies of Antigua and St. Kitts for nearly 300 years. At present sugar for exports is produced only in

TABLE 7-2

BANANA PRODUCTION (TONS)

	1961	1966	1969
Grenada	11,581	20,917	22,578
St. Vincent	26,985	n.a.	32,758
Dominica	28,759	43,448	57,677
St. Lucia ³	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.

3 Although no output figures were available the value of exports from St. Lucia as supplied by the BDD were as follows:

EC\$'000	<u>1964</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1970</u>
	9,959.1	11,972.8	10,598.6	12,474.0

St. Kitts and here production has declined from 49,717 tons in 1960 to 27,000 tons in 1980. The sugar industry was revived in St. Vincent in 1979 after almost twenty years. Agriculture has been the main area of economic production, with banana production supplanting sugar in the Windward Islands during the 1960s. Table 7.2 shows figure for production in three of the islands.

It should be noted here that banana production has tapered off as the sixties drew to a close, mainly due to unfavourable prices in the UK market. Crops of significance in other islands have had severe difficulties either due to problems on the supply side, such as lack of capital and labour or on the demand side to unfavourable pricing arrangements.

In domestic agriculture all the islands have faced very strong competition from imported foodstuffs, even when cheap and plentiful supplies of local produce were available. On the other hand, there have been problems associated with both production and marketing as will be shown below. Manufacturing has played a minor role in the total GDP accounting in 1968 for less than 9% of the contribution to GDP in the most industrialised islands. Tourism on the other hand has been growing fastest during the decade of the sixties. However, the contribution to local capital formation is open to question in view of the type of hotel plant and its ownership. One very significant aspect of external dependence, i.e. external trade, is that import duties form a high percentage of total government revenue and consequently the Government

sector plays an important role in employment. What could be regarded as a further constraint was the fact that the monetary system of the Leewards and Windwards has been integrated with that of the UK. External dependence is thus further strengthened through integration of capital and money markets, and the links between the commercial banks in the islands and their headquarters in London.⁴

In writing about the economic structure of the Leewards and Windwards, Carleen O'Loughlin states that the central problem of economic underdevelopment is the narrowness of the capital base, when capital is defined to include investment in people in the form of education and acquisition of skills.⁵ Narrowness of capital base has been the result of the low income levels from which expenditure was directed for immediate consumption rather than the acquisition of capital. According to Rostow, as income increases, savings become greater and at some stage sufficient capital would be internally generated necessary to finance a country's development.⁶ The problem with this model is that it cannot

4 The East Caribbean Currency Authority (ECCA) was established in 1965 under the provisions of an Agreement made in January 1965 by the Governments of the Leewards, Windwards and Barbados. The East Caribbean dollar (EC\$) became the new unit of currency with its rate of exchange being the same as the West Indian dollar it replaced, namely, 4s. 2d (Sterling) or US\$0.5833.

5 Carleen O'Loughlin, Economic and Political Change in the Leeward and Windward Islands (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), p. 85.

6 W.W. Rostow, Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962); especially chapter on "take off into self-sustained growth".

be applied to the Windwards and Leewards: they have not been able to mobilize sufficient capital from home resources for investment.

The structural characteristics of the Leeward and Windward Islands are similar to those of small developing economies. Their economic structure is very often open, again partly the consequence of small size. The openness of their economies has implications for their monetary and financial institutions as well as for trade policy options, for example, export instability has serious consequences for them. It goes without saying that international terms of trade movements are crucial, and in the last few years their terms of trade have deteriorated in the context of stagnant prices for their primary exports and rising import prices mainly for food and fuel.

Coupled with high import propensity is the tendency in almost all of the islands to spend on consumption and investment more than they actually produce with the result that they have had to rely almost exclusively on foreign savings to support domestic investment and sometimes consumption. In 1964, it was estimated that local savings of persons and corporations in the Leewards and Windwards averaged 5% of GDP or \$8 million out of \$160 million, out of which some \$2 million was invested overseas.⁷

We should note here that the UK had financed almost all the public investment in the islands through capital grants, while foreign private

7 O'Loughlin, op. cit., p. 86.

capital inflows have financed most of the private investment. Since 1966 savings performance has deteriorated mainly due to increasing government current expenditures and a falling-off of remittances from abroad, mainly from the UK which was closed to Commonwealth immigration in the early 1960s. However, investment has been increasing rapidly since the mid-1960s mainly due to heavy infrastructure expenditures and hotel construction.

Extreme external dependence has left a legacy of administrative inexperience - particularly at the policy formulation and management level. Under the colonial period great fortunes were amassed by a few people (particularly during slavery) but most of it was invested outside the West Indies. As a result the opportunity for 'take-off into sustained growth', in Rostow's phrase, was lost. The lack of skills has always been a serious problem, compounded by the 'brain drain' to metropolitan countries which peaked in the years preceding Statehood. Planning has been virtually absent until the middle 1960s when the Tripartite Economic Survey strongly recommended the establishment of island planning units as of greatest priority.⁸ Not only was there a dearth of qualified civil servants, the Civil Service structures inherited were almost totally inadequate for dealing with developmental problems.

8 See Report of the Tripartite Economic Survey of the Eastern Caribbean, January-April 1966 (London: HMSO, 1967), p. XI.

TABLE 7-3

GROWTH OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 1960-64 (in EC\$ million)

	<u>Antigua</u>	<u>Dominica</u>	<u>Grenada</u>	<u>Montserrat</u>	St. Kitts- Nevis- <u>Anguilla</u>	<u>St. Lucia</u>	<u>St. Vincent</u>
1960	20.3	20.8	28.0	3.2	19.1	24.3	23.0
1961	21.0	20.9	28.7	3.3	21.0	26.4	22.8
1962	22.7	21.4	28.9	3.6	21.4	27.7	23.4
1963	24.8	21.8	29.5	3.9	20.2	28.9	24.3
1974	25.1	24.1	30.0	4.5	21.0	31.4	24.5

Source: ISER, Abstract of Statistics of the Leeward Islands, Windward Islands and Barbados No. 2, Barbados 1966.

C. The Social Conditions: Population Growth,
Employment and Unemployment

Between 1946 and 1970 the population of the Leewards and Windwards increased at an annual rate of 1.5%, from 349,000 to 432,000. The rate of growth decreased during the sixties to about one percent and by 1970 total population stood at 475,000. The working population, or those who reported as having worked for pay, actually fell from 134,000 in 1960 to 128,000 in 1970, the proportion of workers in the population dropping from 31% at the beginning of the sixties to 27% at the end. The slow rate of population growth during the period 1946-1970 has been attributed to three factors: falling birth rates, declines in death rate and emigration. Net emigration peaked during the first half of the sixties and has been falling since. It is estimated that while fertility rates increased from 35 per thousand in 1946 to 45 in 1960, falling back to 39 in 1965, and the mortality rate declined from 14 per thousand during

1946-69 to 10 per thousand during the sixties, migration was sufficiently high to offset the actual rate of growth almost half of the natural increase. With the bulk of migrants being relatively young (15-39 years of age), migration contributed to lessening the birth rate, increasing the dependents ratio and acted as a brake on the growth rate of the working age population.

The large number of migrants abroad was a factor that continued to generate fresh migration. However, with greater restrictions being imposed by the receiving countries migration was much reduced during the sixties.

As a result of migration, the structure of the population showed a very high ratio of dependents (under 15 years and over 65 years) to the productive members of the society. In addition during the sixties the employment structure changed somewhat with a massive exodus from agricultural employment. While in 1960 there were 50,000 persons employed in the primary sector in six out of the seven islands, by 1970 this number had fallen by more than a third to 38,000 in the manufacturing sector, including sugar refining, employment also declined from 13,600 in 1960 to 8,900 in 1970.

Only in the tertiary sector, mainly services, were employment gains registered. The exodus from the agricultural sector has been due to several factors: deterioration in earnings in that sector relative to other sectors; declining labour productivity; growth of tourism; increase in public sector jobs; better economic opportunities abroad

(the UK during the early sixties and Canada and the US thereafter); increasing educational attainment which led to growing aspirations incompatible with the employment conditions, life style and social status of primary sector jobs.⁹ Given these factors the most pressing manpower problem has been the large and rapidly growing number of persons in the 14-24 age group who are neither employed nor engaged in production activities, although it must be emphasised that the rates of growth of these individuals have been fairly low.

The Leeward and Windward Islands are among the poorest countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, and among the Caribbean islands only Haiti seems to be in a worse position. The estimated per capita incomes for 1969 are shown in Table 7-4.

TABLE 7-4

ESTIMATED PER CAPITA INCOMES OF ASSOCIATED STATES, 1969
(EC\$)

Antigua	537
Dominica	377
Grenada	437
Montserrat	537
St. Kitts	516
St. Lucia	423
St. Vincent	400

Source: BDD

9 Demographic data abstracted from reports of the British Development Division 1967-1975; World Bank, Caribbean Regional Study, Vol. II, June 1975, Statistical Appendix.

These figures do not reveal the distribution of income among the population. However, there was a high degree of income inequality due to the pattern of land ownership/tenure, and the big disparity in wage rates between skilled and unskilled workers and manual workers and professionals. The problem was exacerbated by the high literacy rate and the close contact with North American standards through migration and tourism. The highest level of poverty was concentrated among the rural population in the LDCs, although because of the size factor there was very little distinction between urban and rural population. As late as 1969 a report could state that conditions in some of the islands were not far removed from those existing under slavery.¹⁰

TABLE 7-5

EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF ASSOCIATED STATES
(EC\$'000)

	1963		1966		1968	
	<u>Exports/Imports</u>		<u>Exports/Imports</u>		<u>Exports/Imports</u>	
Antigua	7,131	23,005	2,370	43,914	-	-
Dominica	7,833	11,911	10,087	17,057	12,414	20,212
Grenada	7,885	15,024	10,003	21,724	9,962	26,389
Montserrat	350	2,744	-	-	-	-
St. Kitts-						
Nevis-Anguilla	8,288	12,278	8,615	15,818	-	-
St. Lucia	7,995	16,660	12,109	28,392	12,553	29,452
St. Vincent	6,321	12,796	6,711	16,054	-	-

Source: ISER Digest of Trade Statistics of the Leeward and Windward Islands

¹⁰ University of the West Indies Development Mission, The Development Problem in St. Vincent, Mimeo 1969.

The open nature of the economies and heavy dependence on foreign markets for exports and the high expenditure on foreign imports meant that the economies virtually operated at international prices. With the development of tourism the level of wage rates in this sector has increased with the overall effect of pulling the overall wage levels upwards, making most branches of agriculture and potential industries unprofitable in competition vis-a-vis the rest of the world. In addition tourism induced patterns of consumption which called for more imported consumer foods through a demonstration effect from high income foreign tourists. The wage rates of Antigua increased tremendously during the sixties as a result of hotel construction while the contribution of agriculture to GDP fell sharply to only about 3% in 1967 as sugar and other agricultural activities were abandoned. Antigua's wage level was about twice that of St. Vincent's where agriculture was still dominant.

Conclusions

The foregoing analysis has attempted to present the structure of the social and economic problem of the Leewards and Windwards. It showed that the seven territories with a combined area of 1,170 square miles had a population of just under half million by 1970 which was increasing during the sixties at a yearly rate of 1%. Migration to metropolitan countries had slowed down the rate of population growth but had increased the dependency ratio (under 15 years and over 65 years) of dependents to productive workers. Sugar has been the mainstay of virtually all the

economies up to the beginning of the sixties, thereafter it was supplemented by bananas in the Windward Islands and tourism in some of the others, chiefly Antigua. The openness of their economies and heavy external dependence exposes them to the fluctuations and changes in the international economy over which they have little control, and with imports accounting for over 70% of the GNP (1971) the terms of trade had deteriorated during the decade of the sixties. The basic structural weakness is shown by two indicators where (i) consumption exceeds GDP and (ii) the resource gap is as high as 40% of GDP. In 1965 the total GDP of the seven islands was about EC\$320 million with consumption expenditure at EC\$214 million; by 1971 GDP reached EC\$377 million and consumption EC\$404 million. This situation resulted in the reliance on external flows such as migrant remittances, UK budgetary aid, and foreign direct investment and capital aid to finance domestic investment. During the sixties the islands experienced modest output growth of 3% or 2% in per capita terms which was due partly to a rapidly increasing tourism sector which offset the decline in agriculture in most of the islands. However, wage rates were among the lowest in the Western Hemisphere.

Given the narrow resource base it was very difficult to accumulate capital for reinvestment, although in former times vast amounts of profits were realised from sugar production but never reinvested in the islands. Surplus labour, lack of skills, high growth rates of population were serious constraints to development. Economic change since the sixties has been anti-developmental, that is, the changes in the pattern of demand and production made the economies less capable of sustaining their own public sector. The weak structure in administration, in

particular public finance, has been reflected in recurrent budgetary deficits, and the gap between consumer expenditure and GDP has led to a heavy reliance of transfers from the grants-in-aid, capital aid and direct foreign investment.

Overall then the situation in the islands during the 1960s was that while steps were being taken towards self-government there were no real advances towards economic viability, long held by the Colonial Office to be the ability of the states, which were mostly grant-aided, to meet their recurrent expenditure out of the collection of revenues.

Chapter viii

The Institutional Arrangements and Strategies for Promoting Economic Development in the Associated States 1963 - 1968

A. Creating Economic Viability: Economic Strategies and Development Planning 1963 - 1968

In the previous chapter we have dealt with the economic structure and potential of the Leewards and Windwards, including the constraints to development. Never regarded as an end in itself, neither by Britain nor the States concerned, Associated Statehood can be regarded as a strategy for creating the necessary and sufficient conditions leading to economic viability and political independence.

This chapter deals with the various development strategies that have been advanced for the Associated States and the specific policies that have been pursued by the States themselves and through the regional integration movement. The final part of this chapter comments on the performance of the various productive, social and infrastructural sectors in so far as creating viability is concerned.

(i) The 1963 Survey of Economic Potential and Capital Needs¹

Economic planning is a fairly recent phenomenon in the Leeward and

1 Carleen O'Loughlin, A Survey of the Economic Potential and Capital Needs of the Leeward and Windward Islands and Barbados, London: HMSO, 1963; O'Loughlin, Economic and Political Change in the Leeward and Windward Islands, 1968.

Windward Islands. Formerly, it consisted of Colonial Development and Welfare projects for 3 to 5-year periods as we saw in chapter ii. The first attempt to measure the capital requirements of the smaller Eastern Caribbean territories was undertaken in 1963 when, following the break up of the West Indies Federation and subsequent attempts to form an East Caribbean Federation, a detailed study was commissioned by the Colonial Office on the size of the development programme required to secure a level of economic growth such that would make grants-in-aid unnecessary for the islands, i.e. make the territories viable. This economic survey was first to give emphasis to economic potential and capital needs for the islands as separate territories and then to bring together the findings for the new proposed federation as a whole.

More specifically, the questions posed for the survey were:-

- (a) Can this territory achieve the level of economic activity necessary to secure a rising standard of living for its population and independence from recurrent external aid?
- (b) What measures, in the form of increasing public utilities, developing industry and agriculture, attracting foreign investment and obtaining trained manpower and other basic needs, would be necessary to bring this about?
- (c) How can these measures best be implemented?
- (d) How long before these objectives can be achieved?

With these objectives in mind targets were set for financial viability thought to be within the fiscal and economic competence of the territory over the ten-year period; a capital assistance need of EC\$25 million was estimated annually for ten years; at the time UK capital aid averaged only EC\$6 million annually. The expansion in public investment would have been consistent with a level of economic growth of about 4.5% annually.

In terms of capital assets the survey identified the poor infrastructure conditions such as inadequate and poorly constructed roads, inadequate port facilities, poor water supplies, primitive drainage systems, deplorable telephone and electricity systems; inadequate public buildings such as schools and hospitals. The survey next identified several capital needs, nineteen of which were earmarked for St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla alone.² The report was connected with the proposed federation of the "Little Eight" (including Barbados) and since the federal negotiations had failed, the capital development programme

2 No fewer than 19 were identified for St. Kitts-Nevis, Anguilla: Deepwater harbour, Basseterre, St. Kitts; small pier at Newcastle, Nevis; airport, St. Kitts; airport, Nevis; airport, Anguilla; roads - feeder and main; telephones, Anguilla; boat for service between Nevis and St. Kitts; agriculture; crop and pasture investigations; agricultural credit for small farmers; rehabilitation and settlement; abattoir and cold storage facilities for meat; milk processing plant; market research study of export potential for vegetable to the US islands; improvement and extension to markets, livestock development; forestry; fisheries; water supplies; tourism; electricity extension; schools; teacher training; hospitals; housing. It is remarkable that almost identical capital needs were identified for all the other LDCs.

envisaged was never implemented. It is fairly safe to say that Britain's reluctance to implement the programme suggested by Dr. O'Loughlin and others contributed to failure of the federal negotiations.

(ii) The Tripartite Economic Survey, 1966³

With the idea of federation firmly out of the way late in 1965, the UK, Canada and the US agreed to participate in a tripartite economic survey of the Leewards, Windwards and Barbados, again for the purpose of "formulating plans for the achievement of economic viability and to suggest priorities for the next five years".⁴ Even at this stage the Commission was of the view that the islands already had far too many reports written on them and that another was entirely superfluous - what they needed was not more paper but hard cash.⁵ Already by 1965 there were a number of Development Plans prepared by the Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), UWI. However, these were not regarded as blueprints by the Tripartite Commission since they had not been sufficiently researched.⁶ In fact, the Commission did not examine the UWI Development Plans for the simple reason that the details of the costs of most of the projects in them were not given and little or no

3 Report of the Tripartite Economic Survey of the Eastern Caribbean, January-April 1966 (London, HMSO, 1967).

4 *ibid.*, p. 1.

5 *ibid.*, p. VII.

6 *ibid.*, p. viii.

information was available on the economic implications or benefits of the projects.⁷ The Commission defined viability not only in budgetary terms but also in terms of independence from foreign grants.

In defining the growth problem,⁸ the report recited the familiar problem of the islands: high population densities, shortages of land, capital and skills, and the dominance of export agriculture with poor market prospects and went on to argue that growth industries must need little land to be able to attract capital and skills from abroad and be major foreign exchange earners.⁹ It was their view that the possibilities of developing manufacturing industries were limited. However, there were remarkable growth prospects for the tourist industry,¹⁰ provided that the import content of tourist expenditure was kept down. The conclusions of the Tripartite Commission were not very optimistic over the prospects of spontaneous growth which could only be fostered by active development measures in the forms of a well-integrated, long-term regional programme, which in the beginning would have to rely on outside sources for much of the initiative, finance and execution; this external participation could be phased out as local resources were built up. It identified the following development

7 ibid.

8 A synopsis of the findings and recommendations is given in UN doc. A/6700/Rev. 1, Chap. XXIII, Annexes, paragraphs 154 -159.

9 Report, pp. X-XXI.

10 ibid., p. 2.

services to be planned and administered on a regional basis: industrial development and promotion; tourist development and promotion; market research; fisheries development; forestry and industrial minerals; agricultural development; and research and supporting technical services.¹¹ It also recommended the establishment of a regional development agency under the joint sponsorship of the US, the UK and Canada, and which should be divided into a technical and commercial services division and a development bank division. The bank would operate on strictly commercial lines, once interest-free or low-cost capital had been subscribed to it; as a regional agency it could deal with certain international development agencies whose rules precluded consideration of individual islands because of their small size.¹²

After outlining a strategy for growth and viability the Tripartite Commission underlined the need for development assistance in the transition to viability in the order of EC\$445 million annually, much larger than that recommended by the 1963 report. The report of the Tripartite Commission was discussed at a meeting of representative of the US, UK, Canada, Barbados and the Leewards and Windwards in Antigua in November 1966. Thereafter there was an increase in the level of British aid and the inauguration of Canadian assistance, with capital aid jumping from EC\$7 million in the early sixties to EC\$25 million by the end of the

11 *ibid.*, pp. X-XXI.

12 *ibid.*

decade, EC\$14 million coming from the UK and some EC\$12 million from Canada.

(iii) UWI Missions to Grenada and St. Vincent: 1968-9¹³

Since 1965 Development Plans were prepared by all the governments of the Leewards and Windwards with the assistance of ISER in Barbados; however, the Tripartite Commission did not think very much of these; the UWI later undertook two studies in Grenada and St. Vincent. Unlike the two previous surveys, the UWI studies redefined economic viability as a dynamic process which involved greater intersectoral dependence within the domestic economy and a reduction in the openness of the economy. They further argued that the views put forward by O'Loughlin and the Tripartite Commission were more a reflection of the UK's economic difficulties and policies towards its overseas territories than a real and imaginative examination of the islands' potential, involving the development of local skills and resources, for example it was felt that too much lip service was paid of structural reforms involving land use and consumption patterns. A further argument against the two commissioned reports was that they were unwilling "to concede to the public sector the ability to operate within a wider economic framework, i.e. the productive sector, and also its ability to use its coercive

13 University of the West Indies, The Economic and Social Development of Grenada (1968); The Economic and Social Development of St. Vincent (1969).

powers of taxation in order to provide investment inputs which could in turn widen its revenue base.¹⁴

If the University of the West Indies approach "relocated the response to development within a rational framework of rationally determined objectives,"¹⁵ this viewpoint has been countered with the argument that given the limitations of size and resources on the one hand and the advantages of specialisation on the other a reduction in the openness of the economies cannot be made the central focus of an appropriate development strategy; self-sufficiency, it was argued, can lead to major distortions. Herein lay the dilemma: income generation depended on exports (usually of one crop), government expenditures and remittances; exports and Government expenditure were the main determinants of both income and employment. Any reduction in imports without an increase in the value of exports would lead to a decrease in government revenues and its attendant social consequences. Exports were highly susceptible to market conditions; Government expenditures depended on government revenues and foreign aid, and migrant remittances could be expected to level off if not decrease, as emigration outlets were blocked off. These were the harsh realities with which development strategists have had to deal. Given these constraints at the state level it would appear then that a union of the various states would widen the

¹⁴ Venner, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

¹⁵ *ibid.*, p. 165.

resource base, improve the scope for economic planning and project execution and create a greater bargaining base within the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) and the rest of the world.

(iv) The Radical Approach

Departing radically from the development strategy advocated by the commissioned foreign experts, others have suggested that the most viable options open to the Associated States were Central Planning, Fiscal Policy and the Financial technique involving the ownership and control of the factors of production and natural resources, the imposition of taxes on individuals and firms and revamping of the central monetary authority which entailed nationalisation of banking and insurance sectors.¹⁶ The radical critique of the laissez-faire approach to economic development was that none of these techniques had been seriously used as a public policy instrument for mobilizing economic surpluses, a reflection of the prevailing ideologies of both national/state governments and aid donors. There were several obstacles to the central planning approach in the Associated States. In the first place central planning required a political system where one political party had monopoly of state power; this was incompatible with the tradition of party politics, based on the

16 For a fuller discussion of Central Planning, Fiscal Policy and the Financial Technique, see Venner, op. cit., pp. 166-179; see also C.Y. Thomas, The Structure, Performance and Prospects of Central Banking in the Caribbean (Jamaica: ISER, 1972), and Monetary and Financial Arrangements in a Dependent Monetary Economy (Jamaica: ISER, 1975).

Westminster model, in the Associated States. Secondly, one of the legacies of colonial rule had been the development of a colonial mentality which persisted among certain powerful sectors of the population such as the private enterprise sector. These sectors, or parts thereof, saw no alternative to external dependence and were afraid that the introduction of central planning or some socialist model would entail a loss in aid, export markets and foreign investment. Since political parties depended largely on private enterprise (e.g. Chambers of Commerce) for finance, the public sector had been hardly, if at all involved in productive activities. Thirdly, and also a feature of the colonial legacy, had been the dearth of planning skills and administrative capability. The lack of managerial skills was probably the greatest obstacle to development in the LDCs, and together with the lack of political commitment on the part of the leading parties, central planning became problematic.

Central planning, fiscal policy and financial technique do have their limitations as separate development strategies. Apart from the prevailing ideologies - a mixture of liberal/democratic politics and capitalist economics, at the technical level there was an acute shortage of skilled personnel; most of the governments of the LDCs (with the exception of Grenada since 1979) had not accepted psychologically as their responsibility the management of their economies; any new strategy

required an appropriate institutional framework which involved a complete restructuring of the administration to allow for co-ordinated policy-making, planning and implementation.¹⁷

8. Development Planning and Development Institutions¹⁸

Following the recommendations of the Tripartite Commission and other expert groups, steps were taken to provide the necessary institutional framework to implement various aspects of the development strategies that had been identified especially with regard to planning and technical assistance. The institutional framework for development in the Associated States can be separated into three levels: national, sub-regional and regional. As we noted earlier the establishment of island planning units was regarded as one of greatest priority. Since the 1966 Survey planning units were established in all the islands and attempts were made to improve the qualifications of senior public servants such as permanent secretaries; a review of the Civil Service structures was also undertaken in the various islands. Technical assistance was provided in the fiscal field to individual governments. In spite of these attempts the planning units at the national level left much to be desired: they remained understaffed and poorly trained.

¹⁷ *ibid.*,

¹⁸ The information in this section has been derived from published reports of the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 1966-1979.

Planning was also inhibited by inadequate statistical information and attempts were made with the assistance of UNDP and CARICOM Secretariat to organise individual statistical offices. Another feature of the post-Statehood era was the establishment of National or Industrial Development Corporations (IDCs) in the islands to advise on specific areas of development.

At the sub-regional and regional level the Associated States and Montserrat had formed themselves into an East Caribbean Common Market (ECCM) in 1968, and the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) incorporating all the English-speaking countries was also established that year. The British Development Division was established in Barbados in 1966 largely to assist the LDCs in spending development funds allocated by the UK Government. The most important institution insofar as development was concerned was the establishment of the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB).

One of the recommendations of the Tripartite Commission was the establishment of a Regional Development Agency with a Technical and Commercial Services Division and a Development Bank Division. After further studies by a United Nations Development Programme Mission the Caribbean Development Bank was established in late 1969 in order to "contribute to the harmonious economic development of the Caribbean countries and to promote economic co-operation and integration among them, paying special and urgent attention to the region's less developed members" (which include Belize, the British Virgin Islands, Cayman

Islands, Turks and Caicos Islands as well as the Associated States and Montserrat). We should note that the concept of a development bank envisaged by the Tripartite Commission was converted into a regional development bank. The CDB's operations were classified into two main groups, the ordinary (interest rate: 7.25% to 9% for 10-15 years) and the special (interest rate: 4% for 15-20 years). Loans to the MDCs and the LDC private sector were the first category while loans to the LDC governments were in the second. Lending operations began in 1970 and by 1974 loans totalling US\$46.4 million had been approved of which some US\$33.2 million was for the LDCs.

Ordinary capital resources comprised paid-up capital (US\$40 million by 1975) and expected future borrowing; the special resources comprised a Special Development Fund (SDF) made up of UK, Canada and United States contributions totalling US\$42 million (1975), a Canadian Agricultural Fund of US\$2.5 million and a Housing Fund financed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) of US\$10 million. Contributions were also made by Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago to the SDF. Among the major projects in the LDCs funded by CDB loans were ports, feeder roads, loans to agricultural estates and to agricultural development banks and development corporations. To assist member governments in the preparation of projects - a major impediment to CDB lending - CDB also functioned as a technical assistance agency by supplying project officers who were funded for the most part by a UNDP grant. Project officers were active mainly in agriculture and infrastructure.

As envisaged by the Tripartite Commission a Regional Development Agency (RDA) was the essential focal point for development planning activities among the individual territories, to mobilize the efforts of the islands in an effective desire for economic growth and viability and to plan and administer on a regional basis. The RDA was established in 1968 and had as its functions:-

- (i) the promotion of activities in critical sectors of the participating countries such as tourism, agriculture, industry;
- (ii) the promotion of the development of regional and external communications both by air and sea;
- (iii) the institution of specialised training programmes to provide the technical services in social fields such as education and health; and
- (iv) the preparation of feasibility surveys and development plans.

After two years of existence, the RDA became almost totally ineffective due to lack of funds, staff and political direction and participating Member Governments agreed to combine its services with those of the ECCM Secretariat into one organization. However, this was not the end of the regional planning idea as we shall see. In the

meantime some of the planning and technical assistance functions were taken over by the newly established BDD.

In 1971, the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) carried out an industrial survey with the purpose of identifying potential CDB projects. Many of the policy recommendations made by the EIU concerned institutional approaches. Among the recommendations were:-

- (a) an East Caribbean industrial promotion body to identify opportunities for investment, seek out investors and act as middleman to government - investor negotiations;
- (b) strengthening of the National Development Corporations (or their equivalent) so that they could provide complementary services to the above body in the form of information on industrial infrastructural requirements, and streamlining government processing of incentive applications; and
- (c) connected institutional improvements such as improved labour training facilities, active government support (reduction in delays concerning processing of applications, work permits); investment guarantees (legislation on compensation for rationalization, etc.); improvement of local savings through legislation designed to oblige more local investment from banks and insurance companies; improved national statistical services; development of industrial infrastructure.

With regard to the first recommendation a Caribbean Investment Corporation (CIC) was created in 1973 as one of the Special Mechanisms of the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) at inter-governmental level for ensuring the promotion of the industrial development including the development of agro-based industries, tourism and of integrated agricultural and industrial complexes of the Less Developed Countries (LDCs) of CARICOM. CIC was thus created as a regional financial institution designed to encourage the flow of financial resources from the MDCs to the LDCs and as a joint venture between the public and private sectors of CARICOM with the Governments holding 60% of the equity and the private sector 40%. With an authorised share capital of EC\$15 million the Corporation was given power to borrow funds to augment its financial resources; moreover, CIC's facilities were intended to provide a source of risk capital to the LDCs and also to complement the loan capital facilities of CDB, local Development Finance Institutions of the LDCs and local commercial banks.¹⁹

The primary objective of the CIC was to assist in the establishment or expansion of technically feasible and financially viable enterprises particularly industrial and agro-industrial enterprises to be located in the LDCs and in pursuance of this objective Article 11 of the Agreement Establishing the Corporation stipulated due regard be paid to two important criteria:-



19 Caribbean Investment Corporation: Objectives and Investment Policies
(Roseau, Dominica: Tropical Printers, 1977).

- (1) the ability of the projects in which it invests to promote further industrial and economic development in the economy of the LDC concerned; and
- (2) the creation of employment opportunities in the LDC concerned.

More specifically, the main types of projects identified for CIC investment included:-

- (i) Industrial enterprises, i.e., enterprises carrying on the following businesses: manufacturing, processing, assembling, reconditioning, repairing, altering, engineering, maintenance and fitting, brewing and bottling;
- (ii) agro-based industrial enterprises including processing, canning, drying, altering and reconstituting agricultural products and by-products, the processing of fish and shrimps and other products of the sea as well as commercial fishing and shrimping operations;
- (iii) services, including dry-cleaning, printing and bakeries;
- (iv) tourism - mainly small hotels with 40 rooms or less, apartments, guest houses and ancilliary services.

With regard to financial assistance CIC could participate in any of the above-mentioned enterprises in the form of equity investment

(investment in ordinary shares), loan, guarantee or a combination of these, with a minimum set at EC\$20,000 and a maximum commitment at EC\$400,000. There were also further stipulations as to security for its lending operations, the specific uses of funds, repayment and technical assistance, where necessary to bring to fruition projects to be financed. Between CDB and CIC it would appear that at least an adequate institutional framework was established for promoting industrial growth in the LDCs. How they have performed in this respect is treated in a later chapter.

East Caribbean Common Market and the
Caribbean Community Secretariat

Mention has already been made of the ECCM Secretariat and the CARICOM Secretariat. These two organizations have also been part of the institutional framework created for development at the wider regional level. Added to these was the British Development Division established in 1967. In light of the development constraints, development objectives could only be modest whereas the capital requirements were massive. Some of the specific goals considered to be realistic at the end of the sixties were:-

- (i) a higher growth in real output originating in an expansion in tourism, farm output for export and import substitution, and to a minor extent manufacturing;
- (ii) an increase in the volume of national savings, especially in the share generated by the public sector; and

(iii) a reduction in the islands' dependence on concessionary aid.

To achieve these goals consideration had to be given to the level of absorptive capacity and foreign exchange availability and this required sound economic policies on the part of island governments such as income policy, price incentives, and promotion. With regard to the balance of payments the prospect for rapid export growth was based on rational exploitation of the tourist potential and recovery of traditional export crop production (sugar, bananas) and improvement in their export prices. The current account deficit was expected to rise dramatically over a ten-year period (1968-78) and the financing for such was regarded as feasible if private direct investment increased up to 12% per year in real terms, and concessionary aid disbursements increased in a similar proportion including massive foreign assistance, in effect defeating the objective of reduction in dependence on concessionary aid.

Conclusions

The imperatives of creating economic viability as a prelude to independence required a conceptual approach to development which found expression in various development strategies promulgated by commissioned experts or by indigenous scholars and in the establishment of "development" institutions at the national, sub-regional and regional levels. The development strategies had to take into consideration constraints such as the inherited poverty problem, the narrow resource base and small size including the size of the population and the limited scope of the domestic markets; the expected population growth given

demographic trends and the reduction in migration opportunities; the structural characteristics of the island economies showing a high dependence on foreign trade where consumption exceeded GDP; the acute shortage of technical personnel; administrative structures which did not allow for co-ordinated planning and implementation of policy and finally the prevailing attitudes and ideologies. Broadly speaking, the development strategy advocated for the Associated States can be divided into two types: one involving the development of tourism and linkages between it and the sectors of the economy, and the other, an inward-looking development strategy aimed at increasing intersectoral dependence within the economy and a reduction in the openness of the economy.

The post-Statehood development plans for the LDCs called for (a) an ambitious investment plan with appropriate development policies to increase both private and public investment; (b) greater resource mobilization to finance the larger development programme through incomes and tax policies; (c) greater external aid flows; and (d) at least 5% growth in order to improve the employment problem. Any lower target of growth would result in rising unemployment, social and political strains and increasing claims on resources.

Institutionally, several mechanisms were established at the national, sub-regional and regional levels. These included national development corporations, the Caribbean Development Bank, the Regional Development Agency and the Caribbean Investment Corporation. Together

with the ECCM and CARICOM Secretariats the British Development Division, these formed a network of development planning institutions to facilitate the Associated States in their take-off into sustained growth, however, in spite of these mechanisms, economic viability remained an ideal and proved to be far more elusive than the national and regional planners had anticipated.

Chapter ix

The Associated States Within the Regional Integration Movement: 1967-1981

A. Introduction: Prelude to Formation of the East Caribbean Common Market (ECCM) and the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA)

In commenting on the failure of the federal attempts (1958-1965) it is fashionable in some quarters to be highly critical of the political leaders of that era for lacking the political good will and capability necessary for a successful federation. Yet these were the same political leaders who wanted regional integration as much after 1965. What happened to bring about this apparent change of attitude? An explanation lies partly in developments within the Caribbean after 1962 and developments at the international level which had the effect of propelling the islands towards regional integration. It is truism that until 1962 when Jamaica became independent all of the English speaking islands had closer ties with Britain than with each other, except perhaps in certain cultural aspects; the political-economic ties simply made each island an extension of the mother country. Coupled with the natural condition of insularity and having almost always to compete with one another at the world market level it was not surprising that Caribbean leaders hardly knew one another; few trading links existed between the islands and consequently there was a dearth of institutions for mutual development. Within a space of five years (1962-1967) the links which existed for over three hundred years between Britain and the Caribbean Islands either disintegrated as islands moved towards independence or considerably eroded as others achieved Associated Statehood. In the words of one writer "extreme small size with its consequent perceptions

of non-viability propels the Caribbean mini states towards the alternative of regional integration where they perceive their formal dependent linkages with the metropolis to be in the process of disintegration".¹

With the assumption of greater constitutional powers the political leaders who had repudiated Federation under conditions largely dictated by Britain were now faced with the responsibility for the social and economic well-being of their peoples. As long as Britain was ultimately responsible for their well-being there was little urgency to search for regional solutions. Faced with the inherited problems and constraints - small size, small markets, low resource endowment, high rates of population growth, high levels of unemployment, underdeveloped and economic dependency - it was the general view of the Governments that the best possibilities for solution to these problems lay in regional cooperation which offered opportunities for more intra-regional trade and a faster rate of development through coordination of economic programmes and policies. Evidence of the growing interest in functional integration can be seen from the formation of regional organisations after the failure of the West Indies Federation - for example, the Regional Council of Ministers (RCM) which was established in 1962 to pave the way for the proposed Eastern Caribbean Federation of the Leewards and Windwards and Barbados. This organisation, meeting regularly until April 1965, convened for the last time in Barbados in August 1966 at which time the

1 See Rosina Wiltshire, "Mini-States. Dependency and Regional Integration in the Caribbean" in Vaughan A. Lewis, (ed.), Size, Self-Determination and International Relations: The Caribbean, op. cit., p. 106

Council decided to wind up its activities on November 30, 1966, the day Barbados became independent.

The decision to terminate the activities of the RCM was accompanied by another decision of the seven territories of the Leeward and Windward Islands, to establish a new regional organisation. In this connection, two separate conferences were held in St. Lucia in September 1966, one concerned with the establishment of a successor organisation to the RCM, attended by Chief Ministers only, and the other with a regional supreme court, later established as the West Indies Associated States Supreme Court. Agreement was reached on the new organisation to succeed the RCM to be headquartered in St. Lucia. It was also agreed that the Chairman of the new West Indies Associated State Council of Ministers, or WISA as it became known would be the Chief Minister of one of the States and the office would be held in rotation. The WISA Council acted as a clearing house between participating governments and as the Authority for all matters requiring Government concerted action under the Agreement. Another development of this pre-integration era was the establishment of the East Caribbean Currency Authority (ECCA) in 1965 under provisions of the East Caribbean Currency Authority Agreement of January 18, 1965.

At the time the RCM was winding up its activities (mainly federal in nature) the governments of Guyana (then British Guiana), Barbados and Antigua in December 1965, signed an agreement to create a free trade area to be known as the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA).²

2 Often referred to as the Dickenson Bay Agreement.

Postponed twice during 1966, it later became, as the Principal Agreement of CARIFTA, the basis for wide-ranging negotiations aimed at enlarging the membership and the scope of the Association. Meanwhile, the WISA Council had met at regular intervals to discuss matters of common concern which included regional free trade, assignment of industries among members, a regional defence force, a regional development agency, external representation for the Associated States, a tourist agency to represent the Associated States in London and elsewhere, and regional transport arrangements.³

The fourth Conference of the Commonwealth Caribbean Heads of Government held in Barbados in October 1967 was undoubtedly the most important meeting in the period between the breakup of the Federation and the establishment of CARIFTA if for no other reason than it was the first Heads of Government Conference at which all the Heads were present.⁴ It was at this meeting that the LDCs first articulated their position for participating in a regional integration scheme; for them, regional integration could only be meaningful if their peculiar problems were taken into consideration; for example, they warned that unless means were found to ensure the development of the LDCs through the allocation of specific industries, they might well be forced to establish their own common market.

3 ORGA, Twenty-third Session, Annexes, Supp. 23, Chap. XXIII, paras. 7-8

4 It should be pointed out here that because reports of the meetings are still classified documents and cannot be quoted the author relied heavily on personal knowledge and interviews with participants/observers of the CARIFTA/ECCM negotiations.

The question of allocation of industries became very important for the LDCs since many of their representatives believed that free trade was a farce when they had nothing to trade; in this situation the LDCs regarded themselves as pawns. The MDCs, or at least one Premier had argued that the pooling and allocation of industries was akin to "national socialism" and would have none of it; neither did they believe that investors should be told in which countries they should locate their industries. Consequently, when the decision was finally made to grant special measures to the LDCs the concessions were given grudgingly to say the least. In its original conception, the Agricultural Marketing Protocol (AMP), discussed below, was intended as a special measure for the LDCs to counter balance the industrial start of the MDCs; in other words it was a measure designed to bring immediate short-term benefits from the integration movement.

The final agreement was at best a compromise which restricted the application of the Protocol to those commodities (attached as an Appendix to the Protocol) in which Member Countries declared an intra-regional export interest. In this regard, the AMP had provisions for: (a) the control of extra-regional imports; (b) the arrangements by which prices were set; and (c) the arrangements by means of which surpluses and deficits of Member Countries were identified and satisfied. What was very clear was that the MDCs did not want an agreement that would promote agricultural development in the LDCs at the expense of their own agricultural sector.

The proposals and recommendations formulated over years of negotiation and study for CARIFTA formally came into operation on May 1, 1968 with only four members; Antigua, Barbados, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago. That the remaining States hesitated in joining CARIFTA was a reflection of less than full satisfaction with the measures provided for the LDCs; Jamaica probably had memories of the defunct Federation and was unaware of its competitive position in regional trade; it remained lukewarm to integration until its government changed in 1972. At any rate both groups needed more time to study the provisions of CARIFTA.

B. MDCs versus LDCs: The Debate over Polarisation

Central to the formation/membership of the regional economic integration movement was the issue of equitable distribution of the costs and benefits. A distinction had to be made between equity and equality given that the partners in the integration scheme were at various levels of development and to this extent were not equal. Consequently it could not be expected that for benefits to be equitably distributed every participant should benefit equally. On the issue of distribution of benefits former CARICOM Secretary General Allister McIntyre had this to say:

The main aim of a Caribbean Common Market, to accelerate development, must be clearly understood. To achieve this end all integration should be required to do is to provide greater opportunities for each territory to increase its economic growth. It should not necessarily be expected that integration would allow all territories to enjoy the same rates of growth or that it would equalize per capita incomes over the area as a whole. For the crucial test for each territory

should be whether the rate of growth within an integration market would be higher than outside of it, not whether it would enjoy the same rate of growth or the same level of factor incomes as other participating countries.⁵

Specifically, benefits could take the form of increased trade (visible or invisible); increased financial flows and investments; technical assistance; and increased opportunities for agricultural and industrial developments. Apart from the benefits of economic integration the Caribbean integration movement also provided benefits in areas of functional cooperation such as shipping, meteorology, education and health, as well as political advantages derived from participation in international meetings.

Having said this it should be noted that the problem of "polarisation" exists in all economic integration movements where there are more developed and less developed partners.⁶ The problem of polarisation arises where to begin with member states are at different levels of development and market forces are permitted to operate unfettered in the absence of deliberate supplementary measures. In this

5 Allister McIntyre, "Some Issues of Trade Policy in the West Indies, New World Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1966).

6 For comments on the concept of polarisation, see: Havelock Brewster, "The Theory of Integration and the Caribbean Community Process", Paper presented at Conference on Contemporary Trends and Issues in Caribbean International Affairs, sponsored by UWI, (May 23-27, 1977); V.A. Lewis, "The Architecture of Political Regionalism in the Caribbean", op. cit., Byron W. Blake and Kenneth O. Hall, "Polarisation Problems in CARICOM", Paper presented to Conference in Contemporary Trends and Issues, *ibid.*, George Goodwin and Yolande Lake, "The LDCs in Integration Schemes - the CARICOM Experience", *ibid.*

case it is likely that most of the increases in industrial activity will tend to be attracted to the relatively more developed partners which already have factors that create "external economies" such as availability of public utilities; social and other infrastructure services and critical mass such as the existence of a group of industrial entrepreneurs and managers; the presence of a skilled or semi-skilled labour force; and the existence of complementary and ancillary industries, such as banking and distribution.

C. The Provisions of CARIFTA: the Special Measures for the LDCs

Against the background of constraints and advantages the Leewards and Windwards examined the provisions of CARIFTA prior to joining the Association with regard to:

- (i) Abolition of Tariffs
- (ii) Quantitative Restrictions on Imports
- (iii) Incentives and Aids to Production
- (iv) Agriculture
- (v) Special Measures for the LDCs.

In recognition of the disparities in the levels of development between the MDCs (Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Barbados) and the LDCs (the Leewards and Windwards and later Belize) as a serious obstacle to regional integration, the architects of CARIFTA inserted special provisions in the CARIFTA Agreement for providing the LDCs with additional opportunities to benefit from the Agreement. These were:

The Reserve List⁷

The main provision was that the LDCs were allotted a period of ten years to phase out their tariffs in two equal steps on a specified list of commodities, while the MDCs were given only five years to do so in equal annual steps. There were also some items on the list which applied only to the LDCs.

The Protection of Industries in the LDCs

Under Article 39 of the Agreement the LDCs were permitted, on establishing an industry already in existence in one of the MDCs to deny area tariff treatment to the exports of the relevant commodity from the More Developed Country.

Export Duties

Export duties on commodities which were exported to CARIFTA by the LDCs were to be retained for a period of ten years.

Consumption Duties

It was recognised that in all integration movements one of the more serious problems arose from the loss of revenue to LDCs in dismantling tariffs on intra-regional trade. This problem was avoided by allowing all Member States to impose consumption duties.

7 Annex B of the CARIFTA Agreement.

8 Article 39 of the Agreement.

The Agricultural Marketing Protocol (AMP)⁹, and
The Guaranteed Market Scheme (GMS)

Under the CARIFTA Agreement, specific arrangements were provided for twenty-two items annexed to an Agricultural Marketing Protocol (Article 13) in recognition of the fact that free trade treatment alone was insufficient to promote intraregional trade in agricultural products. Under the AMP, member countries could take up available supplies in the areas before importing from extra-regional sources, and to supplement this the Protocol also provided for the setting up of area prices and the allocation of markets. In its operation, priority was given to agricultural exports from the LDCs with a policy being adopted that all supplies from the LDCs should be allocated before allocations were made for the MDCs. Under the Guaranteed Market Scheme (GMS) one member country agreed to take a specified quantity of produce from another. It should be pointed out here that taking agriculture as a whole the four so-called MDCs account on average for about 88% of total agriculture GDP of CARICOM and that since 1967 the contribution of agriculture to total CARICOM GDP has been just over 10%.¹⁰ While the bulk of the area's production has been exported outside the region, the LDCs have been

9 See Article 13 of the Agreement. It should be pointed out that the AMP was negotiated after the CARIFTA Agreement had been signed. According to one observer of the negotiations during this period there was considerable pressure for the conclusion of an agreement on agricultural trade in view of the fact that the immediate gains from CARIFTA would accrue to those Member Countries with the more sophisticated industrial sectors. The AMP was then regarded as a quid pro quo.

10 Economic Commission for Latin America, Office for the Caribbean, The Caribbean Integration Programme (1968-1972), POS/INT/72/8, December 1972, p. 23.

traditionally engaged in producing root crops, vegetables and livestock for intra-regional trade, mainly to the MDCs. In the first two years of the AMP operation trade in AMP products increased by 38% from EC\$557,000 to EC\$770,000,¹¹ but exports from the LDCs did not perform as had been expected.

Oils and Fats Protocol (OFP)

The marketing of oils and fats products in the region predated the CARIFTA Agreement by some ten years, was enshrined in the CARIFTA Agreement and is now part of the Annexe to the CARICOM Treaty. In essence, the OFP is very similar to the AMP in its main principles and reserves the regional market for commodities produced in the area, specifically copra and coconut oil from the LDCs. Only a very small percentage of the region's requirements of oils and fats products can be supplied from regional sources, however, while markets existed for these products, production problems prevented the Associated States from taking full advantage of the OFP.

D. Formation of the East Caribbean Common Market: Creating Viability Among the Associated States.

After careful study of the concessions available to them as a whole, the Associated States and Montserrat agreed to advance the process of integration more rapidly among themselves by creating the East Caribbean

¹¹ *ibid.*, p. 16.

Common Market (ECCM) and along with Jamaica acceded to the CARIFTA Agreement on August 1, 1968.¹² The formation of the ECCM was a recognition of the need for a higher level of integration among the LDCs and the belief that more advantage could be taken of the CARIFTA concessions through joint action. The ECCM Agreement itself came into operation in July 1968 prior to accession of the Associated States and Montserrat to CARIFTA.

The major principles incorporated in Article 3 of the ECCM Agreement were:

- (i) the elimination of customs duties and quantitative restrictions on the importation and exportation of goods, as well as of all other measures with equivalent effect;
- (ii) the establishment of common customs tariff and commercial policies;
- (iii) the abolition of obstacles to the free movement of services and capital, and the phased removal of obstacles to freedom of movement of persons within the Common Market;
- (iv) the progressive harmonization of investment and development policies, including industrial development, treatment of non-resident business establishments and development planning;

¹² British Honduras, later renamed Belize, became a member of CARIFTA as an LDC in May 1971.

- (v) the coordination of monetary and fiscal policies;
- (vi) the progressive harmonization of taxation policies and incentive legislation;
- (vii) a cooperative approach to infrastructural development especially in the fields of transport and communications; and
- (viii) a common policy on agricultural development.

From the foregoing it can be seen that the ECCM Agreement was more 'advanced' than the CARIFTA Agreement insofar as the scope of operation was concerned, in other words, ECCM was at a deeper level of integration.

At this stage it is useful to remember that economic groupings are conventionally classified into the following categories or stages of integration:

- (1) the preferential trading area in which member countries of the grouping agree to extend to each other's products preferential treatment as compared to that granted to non-member countries' products;
- (2) the Free Trade Area in which tariffs and quantitative restrictions are removed between participating countries, but tariffs against non-member countries are not unified;

- (3) the Customs Union, which embraces the Free Trade Area with the addition of a common external tariff against imports from non-member countries;
- (4) the Common Market which is a Customs Union, with the full removal of intra-regional restrictions on the movement of labour, capital and entrepreneurial resources; and
- (5) the Economic Union in which the Common Market harmonises its intra- regional fiscal, social and financial policies as well as its policies towards third countries.¹³

According to this classification the ECCM scheme was ahead of the CARIFTA arrangements so that by the time the Associated States joined CARIFTA there already existed the institutional framework for 'deepening and strengthening' the wider regional integration movement. The ECCM Agreement itself, as was the CARIFTA Agreement, was devised with the

13 The literature on integration is voluminous. Among the theorists are: Karl Deutsch, Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Definition and Management (NY Doubleday 1954); Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950-57 (London: Stevens, 1958); Leon N. Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963); Ernst B. Haas, Beyond the Nation State: Functionalism and International Organisation, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969); Ernst B. Haas and Philippe C. Schmitter, "Economic and Differential Pattern of Political Integration: Projections about unity in Latin America", International Organisation, 18, No. 4, (Autumn 1974); Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration, (Homewood, Illinois, Richard D. Irwin, 1961); Joseph S. Nye, "Patterns and Catalysts in Regional Integration", International Organisation, 19, No. 4, (Autumn 1965); J.K. De Vree, Political Integration: The Formation of Theory and its Problems, (The Hague: Mouton, 1972).

assistance of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) Office for the Caribbean. According to one observer several attempts were made to get the LDCs to sign the CARIFTA Agreement before the ECOM arrangements were completed. This would have had the effect of "tying" hands of the ECOM States.¹⁴ In spite of the advanced nature of the ECOM Agreement negotiations over common policies were protracted and limited so that by the time CARIFTA was about to become CARICOM, only few of the provisions of the ECOM Agreement were activated.¹⁵

In order to put the CARIFTA Agreement into operation a Regional Secretariat was established in Guyana in 1968; similarly, an ECOM Secretariat was established in Antigua in the same year, both as the principal administrative organisations of the respective integration movements.

E. The Associated States during the CARIFTA Years: 1968-1973

Any assessment of the impact of CARIFTA on the development of the Associated States must take into consideration the limited view of integration which prevailed during those years. The integration exercise in 1968 was seen mainly as the freeing of intra-regional trade and coordination of administration of areas of common interest to Member

14 A view expressed at the time was that attempts were made to slow down ECOM integration by making the ECOM Agreement subject to the CARIFTA Agreement (as told to the author).

15 The Common External Tariff (CET) against non-CARIFTA Countries was not established until October 1972.

Governments; it was to be extremely limited with Governments surrendering only a minimum of their power, enough to allow the movement to function. While all Member Governments agreed on the necessity for integration, discussions focused on two distinct approaches to integration: a more or less laissez faire approach advocated mainly by the business community through the Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce (CAIC),¹⁶ and a dirigisme or policy-oriented approach advocated mainly by professional economists for integration of production.¹⁷ Brewster and Thomas adopted an 'organic' definition of economic integration involving total fusion of the parts into a single organic whole.¹⁸ At a time when the Caribbean countries had just emerged as independent or semi-independent states such a prescription could hardly be expected to find ready acceptance, given the fact that: (a) the new rulers regarded political sovereignty as something to be jealously guarded, and (b) ideologically the dominant groups were more attuned to the laissez faire approach. In the end the latter school won and for the next four years attention was focused primarily on increasing intra-regional trade rather than economic development through "structural transformation".

16 Also known at various times as the Incorporated Commonwealth Chambers of Industry and Commerce of the Caribbean; the Incorporated Chambers of Industry and Commerce of the British Caribbean; and the Incorporated Commonwealth Chambers of Commerce and Industry of the Caribbean.

17 See for example Havelock Brewster and Clive Y. Thomas, The Dynamics of West Indian Economic Integration Mona (Jamaica: ISER, 1967); Steve de Castro, The Caribbean Air Transport Industry (Mona, Jamaica: ISER, 1967); Norman Girvan, The Caribbean Bauxite Industry (Mona, Jamaica: ISER, 1967).

18 *ibid.*

Two of the prime objectives of CARIFTA were that intra-regional trade should be on the basis of fair competition and that the CARIFTA arrangements should promote the expansion and diversification of trade. The evidence for the CARIFTA years (1968-1973) indicates that the LDCs did not receive as much benefit as was hoped; at the same time it cannot be said that they lost through participation in CARIFTA. While intra-CARIFTA trade expanded rapidly, a marked feature of the trade was the dominance of the MDCs (as shown in Tables 9.1 and 9.2). Intra-regional trade was also limited to a few commodities: petroleum and its products, rice, copra, coconut oil, fruits and vegetables.

TABLE 9.1

	<u>INTRA-CARIFTA TRADE - IMPORTS (EC\$'000)</u>				
	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>
MDCs	68,870	71,097	88,777	110,653	127,717
ECCM Group	27,145	31,905	36,500	45,000	50,000

TABLE 9.2

	<u>INTRA-CARIFTA TRADE-DOMESTIC EXPORTS (EC\$'000)</u>				
	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>
MDCs	81,841	100,014	127,292	146,170	172,595
ECCM Group	4,844	4,924	5,500	-	-

Source: ECLA Office for the Caribbean, the Caribbean Integration Programme (1968-1972), POS/INT 72/8, Port-of-Spain, December 6, 1972, p. 18.

The figures for the share of CARIFTA trade for 1967 and 1970 are very revealing. The MDCs accounted for 68.8% of imports in 1967 and 71.2% in 1970, while exports rose from 92.3-94.8%. The ECCM States contributed 28.2% to imports in 1967 and 25.5% in 1970, with exports declining from 6.9-4.6% for those years.¹⁹

While exports of the ECCM States to the region increased by 20% during 1967-1971, their imports from the region increased by 90% and the intra- CARIFTA trade deficit of these state more than doubled from EC\$23 million in 1967 to EC\$47 million in 1971.²⁰ The implication of this trend was quite clear; the ECCM group constituted a significant and growing market for the MDCs, and accounted for more than 70% of total intra-area imports over the period 1968-1972. In intra-area exports they accounted for approximately 95% of the total.²¹

TABLE 9.3

PATTERN OF LDCs IMPORTS: 1970-1974

<u>IMPORTS FROM</u>	<u>EC\$000)</u>		<u>GROWTH RATE %</u>
	<u>1970</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1970-74</u>
Other LDCs	1,970	8,153	313.9
Other MDCs	46,619	73,484	57.6

Source: ECCM Digest of External Trade Statistics 1976.

The increase can be attributed to trade diversion as well as higher relative import prices.

¹⁹ Caribbean Integration Programme 1968-1972, op. cit., p. 20

²⁰ ECCM Digest of External Trade Statistics, 1976.

²¹ The Caribbean Integration Programme (1968-1972), op. cit., pp. 17-19

TABLE 9.4

ESTIMATED CONTRIBUTION OF MANUFACTURING TO GDP (EC\$'000)

	% INCREASE				
	1968	% OF TOTAL	1974	% OF TOTAL	1968-74
LDCs	9.3	4.2	19.8	4.3	112.9
MDCs	445.5	15.4	1,438.7	14.7	223.0

Source: ECLA Report on Economic Activity in CARICOM countries 1975, (ECLA POS 76/6)

TABLE 9.5

ESTIMATED CONTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURE TO GDP (EC\$'000)

	% INCREASE				
	1968	% OF TOTAL	1974	% OF TOTAL	1968-74
LDCs	59.5	26.9	92.5	20.1	55.5
MDCs	325.5	11.2	842.2	8.6	158.7

Source: Ibid.

Taking into consideration the different levels of development between the Associated States and the MDCs it was to be expected that the latter would benefit more from trade liberalisation; the special trading concessions to the LDCs did not bring about an equitable distribution of benefits of the increased trade because, in the words of many spokesmen for the LDCs, they had very little to trade. However, the LDCs were beneficiaries of other measures to promote their development. The Agricultural Marketing Protocol (AMP), while being far from satisfactory due to marketing, production, transportation and communication problems, did offer benefits to at least one Associated State - St. Vincent. Critics of the operation of the AMP have often asserted that producers in the LDCs have not responded to the opportunities provided by the AMP.

While it is true that the slow response was due to difficulties such as traditional practices and lack of institutional support (effective marketing systems, agricultural, credit, extension services) the apparent failure of the AMP to boost agricultural output has to be seen in the way the Protocol itself operated.

The provisions for control of extra-regional imports, fixing prices and allocations from declarations of surpluses and deficits had at one time or another been ignored if not violated by Member States, and the Regional Secretariat which was charged with collecting and disseminating information often found itself having to accept information from Member Governments without being able to challenge it. This was very apparent when surpluses and deficits were declared or when information relating to cost of production was given. When a Member State did not want to import a particular commodity it simply declared a surplus of that commodity; it was deemed impolitic to challenge such declarations; other countries could simply "doctored" the cost of production data to show a lower cost structure so as to avoid importing the commodity, or to keep the price of the commodity down. In the period 1968 to 1970 trade in AMP products grew by 38% from EC\$557,000 to EC\$700,000 - not a significant level of growth considering the small share of agriculture in regional trade.

Two other points need to be made: under CARIFTA there was no provision for regulating agricultural production; while the AMP was created to promote trade the restrictions inherent in the arrangements described above had the effect of inhibiting growth in intra-regional

trade while extra-regional imports continued to increase.²² The other development which had repercussions on the AMP was the decision in almost all the MDCs to promote their own agricultural production as part of their national development programme,²³ and the declaration of surplus has been most effective mechanism for this purpose.

In addition to the special trading concessions other steps were taken to stimulate development in the LDCs as seen earlier. Mention has already been made of the establishment of the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) in 1970 to promote economic cooperation and integration among Member States "having special and urgent regard to the needs of the less developed members of the region". The performance of the CDB can hardly be regarded as successful during the CARIFTA years as it fell short of the expectations envisaged by the LDCs. The lengthy procedures hampered the early implementation of projects; more important, the observation has often been made that the procedures for approving and disbursing funds, and the terms and conditions were not tailored to suit its borrowers, but were reflections of the terms and conditions under which the Bank raised the capital for financing projects that had been submitted to it. In addition, as the CDB would finance only part of the funds, applicants had to find other sources of finance which were not only difficult but, if found, had to be credit-rated by CDB.

22 On the whole prices of extra-regional imports tended to be lower than regional imports.

23 This was done through various "Feed, House and Clothe Programmes", "Green Papers" and "Food Plans".

Apart from CDB, intra-regional financial assistance to the Associated States took place bilaterally, that is, Governments and Central Banks of the MDCs took up loans issued by the Governments of the LDCs. In addition, the MDCs had long provided the LDCs with technical assistance, bilaterally and through a Commonwealth Caribbean Technical Assistance Programme (CCTAP); extra-regional financial and technical assistance was obtained from Canada through an Agricultural Development Fund which provided Can.\$5 million, out of which Can.\$2.5 million went to CDB for use as agricultural credit, and the remaining Can.\$2.5 million went bilaterally to the LDCs.²⁴ In all, some 70% of the Canadian Funds went directly or indirectly to the LDCs. Another source of extraregional assistance was the United Nations Development Advisory Team (UNDAT) which concentrated exclusively on the LDCs.

After four years of CARIFTA, and joint efforts by the Heads of Governments, the CARIFTA Council and the Regional Secretariat, it became very obvious that the special measures had not been effective in distributing the benefits of integration, let alone speeding up the rate of development in all the LDCs. At the Tenth CARIFTA Council held in Dominica in July 1972 a comprehensive review of the position of the LDCs within CARIFTA was undertaken and it was recognised that the institution of the free trade area imposed severe limits on the extent to which the MDCs could apply special measures to ensure a more equitable distribution of benefits; it was further recognised that the "deepening" of the integration movement beyond the initial stage of free trade should be accompanied by continual application of special measures in favour of the

24 Caribbean Development Bank Annual Report, 1973.

LDCs. While it was not possible to quantify actual and potential benefits, a distinction had to be drawn between the creation of opportunities for the LDCs, and their ability to take advantage of those opportunities; consequently the real problem of the LDCs in relation to CARIFTA was one of being able to increase productive capacity in Agriculture and Industry. It was now time to give serious consideration to tackling the root causes of under-development of the LDCs, the absence of industries. If the root cause of under-development in the LDCs was the lack of industrialisation, one of the causes of conflict between LDCs and MDCs lay in the fact that the MDCs were planning to expand production in many agricultural products of interest to the LDCs. While there was scope for agricultural development in all the CARIFTA countries it was essential that in planning for agricultural expansion, they should leave room for expansion of agriculture in the LDCs. This meant not only acceptance of a principle but active support on the part of the MDCs, in restricting extra-regional imports and allowing the LDCs free access to MDCs markets.²⁵

The LDCs had entered CARIFTA as an act of faith; substantial benefits did not materialise and new measures had to be taken. For example, while industrialisation was essential to the economic development of the LDCs steps had to be taken to ensure that any industries established would produce real and not minimal benefits in terms of employment, foreign exchange earned or saved, participation in ownership and top management, and the use of local and regional raw materials.

25 One, MDC, Guyana, consistently declared surpluses in most AMP products with the result that in recent years it did not import agricultural products.

It was at this Tenth Meeting of CARIFTA Council, that two important resolutions were taken, one relating to Trade, Finance, Technical Assistance and Agricultural Development in the LDCs and the other to the specific location of industries in the LDCs. With respect to the first resolution it was agreed that immediate action had to be taken which included re-examination of the provisions of the Reserve List and Article 39 of the CARIFTA Agreement; the investment of certain institutional funds of MDCs in appropriate securities in LDCs; raising loans in MDCs at rates of interest lower than those applicable in the capital markets of the LDCs; and the guarantee by the MDCs of markets for specific agricultural products of the LDCs.²⁶

Regarding industrial location in the LDCs the Council expressed concern that in spite of the number of devices and special instruments no significant industrial development had taken place in the LDCs. While the CARIFTA Agreement had accepted the principle of the establishment of regional integrated industries in the Region,²⁷ the plain truth was that the promotion of industrial development in the LDCs was not accepted as a regional responsibility. In fact the Council negotiations followed a well-established and traditional pattern. Those who already had industries wanted to protect them; even when others announced plans for particular industries more often than not one or another delegation would reveal that their country was already proceeding with plans for similar industries. It would take several years before this problem would be tackled.

26 Report of the Tenth Meeting of the CARIFTA Council of Ministers, Commonwealth Caribbean Regional Secretariat, 1972.

27 See Annex A of the CARIFTA Agreement.

However, and for what it was worth, lip service was duly paid to industrial allocation in the LDCs; it was resolved that all industries established in the region should make maximum use of regional raw materials; industries in the MDCs should be encouraged to develop "linked" industries in the LDCs; MDC-located industries should be 'encouraged' to locate expanded capacity in the LDCs; duplication should be avoided except where it would be demonstrated that the growing market could accommodate such production; in the strategy for regional industrial development MDCs should make available to the LDCs the facilities they already had for research; joint MDC-LDC ventures should be encouraged; the CDB should be requested to review its financing policies and practices in relation to industrial development in the LDCs and so on.

Given the ideological climate of the late sixties and early seventies it was difficult to see how the captains of industry could be 'encouraged' to locate their outfits in the LDCs. While political leaders were speaking of a "regional strategy for industrial development" (and a 'Location of Industry Task Force' was subsequently commissioned toward this end) there is no evidence to show that the Governments of the MDCs had taken any steps to 'encourage' their nationals and companies to invest in industries in the LDCs. This could hardly be expected when the so-called MDCs themselves were in need of industrialisation. The 'encouragement' had to be through other devices such as the Scheme for the Harmonization of Fiscal Incentives to Industry, which permitted the LDCs to grant Export Allowances to enterprises exporting to the MDCs and

extra-regional markets, and the relaxation of the Rules of Origin of the CARIFTA Agreement in relation to exports from LDCs to MDCs.²⁸ Other measures were the establishment of an Industrial Promotion Unit in the ECOM Secretariat, a meeting of the private and public sector coordinated by CDB to apprise them of the industrial potential of the LDCs and to lay the foundations for future discussions on the financial aspects of the programme.

In the area of agricultural trade and development it was noted earlier that a Guaranteed Market Scheme (GMS) was established whereby the MDCs undertook to buy specific quantities of selected commodities from the LDCs. Throughout 1972 several important meetings were held to follow-up earlier decisions and recommendations relating to the LDCs, including a Special Meeting of Ministers of Finance of CARIFTA Countries. That Meeting which was held in The Bahamas in August 1972, discussed, inter alia the 'encouragement' of a greater flow of portfolio capital from the MDCs to the LDCs, by continuation of the practice of Central Banks and Governments of MDCs subscribing to loans issued by the Governments of the LDCs, investment of financial institutions and Pensions and National Insurance Funds of MDCs in suitable securities issued by the LDCs as local investments, and the possibility of the MDCs contributing to a Special Fund to finance development projects in the LDCs.

28 That is, from 50% to 35% inputs.

A significant gesture was made in August 1972 when the Trinidad and Tobago Government made available TT\$50,000 towards the establishment of a Technical Assistance Fund (TAF) to be used for training at the craft and technical level, scholarships to The University of the West Indies (UWI), as well as for paying salaries and allowances for CARIFTA personnel assigned by Governments for duty in any of the LDCs. The proposed TAF was never established, although a contribution of f10,000 was made to it by the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation (CFTC).

F. The Associated States Within the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
1973-1981

Against the background of rising frustration from the LDCs, by the end of 1972 most of the regional leaders seemed to have accepted the idea of "deepening" the integration movement, each group for its own reasons. The MDCs on their part wanted establishment of a Common External Tariff (CET) which had eluded them since 1967, while the LDCs resisted implementation of the CET since other concessionary measures in their favour had either not worked very well or were not implemented at all. The Tenth Council therefore accepted the general principle that the continuing deepening and consolidation of the economic integration movement should go hand in hand with a continuous implementation of measures aimed at securing a more equitable distribution of benefits. It was also recognised that in the deepening process itself, special concessions had to be made to the LDCs in respect of each mechanism to be employed: for the Harmonisation of Fiscal Incentives to Industry, LDCs would be permitted to grant longer maximum periods of tax holidays than the MDCs; in the CET and Common Protective Policy, LDCs would be allowed, inter alia, a longer transitional period than the MDCs before they

adopted the full CET; on the Policy on Regional Industrial Development, special policies, instruments and devices were to be used to promote the location of industries, and similar special measures were to be applied in Fiscal, Financial and Monetary Cooperation; of course in the Rationalisation of Agriculture special attention would be given to guarantee of markets for LDC produce. A summary of the Special Measures which were proposed or applied on the eve of CARICOM is at Table 9.6.

TABLE 9.6

SPECIAL MEASURES AND INSTRUMENTS BEING APPLIED
OR PROPOSED IN FAVOUR OF THE LDCs, 1972

INSTRUMENT OF MEASURE	STATUS		
	ALREADY BEING APPLIED	ACCEPTED	BEING STUDIED
I. TRADE			
1. Reserve List	X		
2. Retention of Export Duties for ten years	X		
3. Consumption Duties to recoup Revenue Losses	X		
4. Easing of Origin Rules for LDCs		X	
5. Examination of Alleged Restrictive Business Practices			X
II. FINANCE			
1. Caribbean Development Bank Soft Loans Exclusively for LDCs	X		
2. Disproportionate Share of Canadian Agriculture Fund going to LDCs	X		
3. MDCs should press for Access by LDCs to funds of IADB	X		

INSTRUMENT OF MEASURE	STATUS		
	ALREADY BEING APPLIED	ACCEPTED	BEING STUDIED
II. FINANCE (contd)			
4. MDCs studying creation of Special Fund to Finance Development projects in the LDCs			X
5. Loans to Governments of LDCs by Governments and Central Banks of MDCs	X		
6. Proposal that Percentage of Assets of Financial Institutions in MDCs be Invested in LDCs		X	
7. Direct Investment by MDC Firms in Joint-Ventures in LDCs to be Encouraged through tax-sharing Arrangements	X		
8. Preferential Tax Treatment for MDC firms investing in LDCs			X
III. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE			
1. Bilateral Technical Assistance from MDCs	X		
2. Commonwealth Caribbean Technical Assistance Programme	X		
3. Proposed Regional Technical Assistance Fund		X	
4. UNDAT Team concentrating on LDCs	X		
5. UNDP Project for Agricultural Development in LDCs		X	
6. Proposal for UNIDO to establish Industrial Promotion Unit for LDCs	X		
7. Access by LDCs to industrial research facilities in MDCs	X		

INSTRUMENT OF MEASURE	STATUS		
	ALREADY BEING APPLIED	ACCEPTED	BEING STUDIED
IV. AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT			
1. Agricultural Marketing Protocol	X		
2. MDCs guaranteeing markets for selected crops produced in LDCs		X	
3. Exercise in Agricultural Rationalisation		X	
4. Improvement to Oils and Fats Agreement and adherence of Jamaica and the Leeward Islands	X		
5. Study of Allocation of Refined Oil		X	
6. Marketing of Fruits and Vegetables in North America by air		X	
V. INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT			
1. Article 39	X		
2. Amendment of Article 39		X	
3. Several Special Mechanisms for influencing Location of Industries in LDCs	X		
4. Project Identification in LDCs	X		
5. MDCs establishing Joint Ventures in the LDCs	X		
6. Amendment to Reserve List			X
VI. TOURISM			
1. Measures by MDCs to encourage more MDC tourists to visit LDCs			X
VII. SPECIAL CONCESSIONS FOR LDC IN DEEPENING PROCESS			
1. Harmonisation of Fiscal Incentives		X	

INSTRUMENT OF MEASURE	STATUS		
	ALREADY BEING APPLIED	ACCEPTED	BEING STUDIED
VII. SPECIAL CONCESSIONS FOR LDC IN DEEPENING PROCESS (contd)			
2. Common External Tariff		X	
3. Rationalisation of Agriculture		X	
4. Regional Industry Policy		X	
5. Fiscal, Monetary and Financial Cooperation	X		
6. Common Approach to EEC (Article 238 acceptable only if EDF Funds become available to LDCs)		X	

The decision to deepen and strengthen CARIFTA was taken at the Seventh Conference of Heads of Government of the Commonwealth Caribbean in October 1972. The decision was to convert CARIFTA to the Caribbean Common Market and at the same time to create a Caribbean Community which would include the Common Market. On July 4, 1973 the Treaty established the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) was signed at Chaguaramas in Trinidad by all four MDCs and came into force on August 1, 1973. The LDCs did not accede to the CARICOM Treaty until a year later. One notable development was that Grenada which became an Associated State in 1967 acceded to the Treaty as an independent State having obtained independence in February 1974.

The decision on the part of the LDCs to join CARICOM followed a pattern almost identical to that for CARIFTA, with the MDCs agreeing first among themselves to proceed and the LDCs acceding only after some

concessionary measures were provided to arrest and/or reverse trends toward polarisation.²⁹

The Georgetown Accord of April 12, 1973 was at least a compromise solution to the problem of the LDCs within CARICOM. It provided, inter alia for the creation of a customs union and for the initiation on June 1, 1973 of three agreements which had special significance to the LDCs: The Agreement on Harmonisation of Fiscal Incentives to Industry, the Agreement on the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Agreement on the Establishment of the Caribbean Investment Corporation (CIC).³⁰ This institution was to provide equity investment in projects located in LDCs with Member Governments subscribing 60% of the funds and 40% coming from the private sector. Whether or not this was the key element in the compromise decision to proceed to CARICOM, according to eyewitnesses of this crucial meeting, one element that perhaps contributed to the signing of the Accord by the LDCs was sheer tiredness after long stormy sessions lasting well into the night. As part of the compromise package the Accord provided for the MDCs to proceed to CARICOM in August 1973 and the LDCs in May 1974.

29 Montserrat, the smallest of the LDCs, presented a paper to the Thirteenth CARIFTA Council immediately preceding the Eighth Heads of Government Conference in April 1973, which was in essence representative of the LDC position. It was only after long deliberations both in Council and at the Heads Conference that the LDCs joined in signing the Georgetown Accord on April 12, 1973.

30 For full details see Commonwealth Caribbean Regional Secretariat, The Caribbean Community: A Guide, Georgetown, Guyana: 1973, pp. 93-96.

The CARICOM Treaty provided for expansion of activities of the new Community in three areas:

- (i) Trade and Economic Integration, through the Caribbean Common Market;³¹
- (ii) Common Services and Functional Cooperation;³² and
- (iii) Coordination of Foreign Policies of Member States.³³

The Principal Organs of the Community are the Conference of Heads of Government (HGC), and the Common Market Council (Council). The HGC is the supreme decision-making body of the Community; it also determines its policy. It normally meets once a year or as often as is deemed necessary with each Member State being represented by its Head of Government or a designated alternate. Decisions are taken by unanimous vote and are binding on all Member States. Special Institutions of the Community established under Article 10 are responsible for Health, Education, Labour, Foreign Affairs, Finance, Agriculture, Mines. These are usually attended by Ministers of Government or their alternates. In addition Article 14 of the Treaty provides for Associate Institutions which include: CDB, CIC; WISA Council of Ministers; ECCM Council of Ministers; Caribbean Examinations Council (CXC); Council of Legal Education; the

30 See Annex to the Treaty

31 See Article 18 and Schedule to the Treaty

32 See Article 17 of the Treaty.

University of Guyana (UG); the University of the West Indies (UWI); the Caribbean Meteorological Council; the Regional Shipping Council (now West Indies Shipping Corporation or WISCO) and the Caribbean Food Corporation.

The Common Market Council is the principal organ of the Common Market consisting of a Minister from each Member State or a designated alternate; decisions by unanimous vote are binding on all members whereas recommendations (to HGC) have no binding force. Council normally meets every three months or when considered necessary. Once a year prior to a Council meeting there is usually a meeting between Council and the Joint Consultative Group (JCG) which consists primarily of the CAIC, the Caribbean Congress of Labour (CCL) and the Caribbean Council of Consumers (CCC).

The principal administrative organ of the Community is the CARICOM Secretariat,³⁴ formerly the Commonwealth Caribbean Regional Secretariat (CCRS) headed by a Secretary General, appointed by the HGC on the recommendation of Council. The Secretary General and his staff operate under accepted rules of international organisations, that is, they do not accept instructions from national governments and are responsible only to the Community. The Secretariat's functions³⁵ include servicing meetings of the Community and any of its institutions and committees, implementing decisions of such meetings, initiating and carrying out studies on questions of economic and functional cooperation, providing

34 Article 15.

35 Article 16.

services to Member States at their request in order to achieve objectives of the Community and undertaking other duties assigned by the HGC or other CARICOM institutions.

The functions of the Secretariat have to be seen in relation to the specific role it plays in each of the institutions. The importance of this organisation is either diminished or increased by the duties the Community institutions assign to it. It does not have the power to compel compliance with any decision taken at the Community level.

Throughout its life CARIFTA was regarded as a losing concern by both people and political leaders of the Associated States and Montserrat.³⁶ As noted above LDC participation in CARICOM was contingent on more effective measures for their economic development. This meant some amendments to the CARIFTA Agreement and addition of new provisions. It is important to draw a distinction between matters that were purely of an economic nature - the objectives of the Common Market and the non-economic areas such as functional cooperation and the coordination of foreign policy.³⁷ Comments about the failure of CARICOM usually refer to the failure of the objectives of the Common Market and not necessarily the other two areas. The analysis which follows takes into consideration

36 For adverse comments see Statement by Official of St. Lucia Marketing Board in Barbados Advocate, May 12, 1969; St. Vincent Minister of Agriculture, James Mitchell, Advocate News, June 27 and October 4, 1970; President of Dominica Chamber of Commerce in Trinidad Express, June 6, 1970.

37 As Associated States, responsibility for external affairs remained with the UK although special arrangements were made for their participation in certain international organisations.

the different objectives of the Community as spelled out in Article 14 of the Treaty. The objectives are:

the economic integration of the Member States by the establishment of a common market regime . . . with the following aims:

- (a) the strengthening, coordinating and regulation of the economic and trade relations among Member States in order to promote their accelerated harmonious and balanced development;
- (b) the sustained expansion and continuing integration of economic activities, the benefits of which shall be equitably shared taking into account the need to provide special opportunities for the Less Developed Countries;
- (c) the achievement of a greater measure of economic independence and effectiveness of its Member States in dealing with States, groups of States and entities of whatever description.³⁸

These objectives were repeated at Article 3 of the Annex to the Treaty as the objectives of the Common Market.

A 'Special Regime for the Less Developed Countries' was again established under Article 51 of the Annex to the Treaty, with Article 62 providing for annual review of the mechanisms by Council.³⁹ The

38 Article 4(a).

39 Following the establishment of CARICOM, meetings of Council and Heads of Government were renumbered beginning with the first HGC in 1973.

Special Regime for the LDCs is embodied in Chapter VII of the Treaty. The special provisions can be divided into three sets of measures:

- (a) measures to facilitate LDC exports to the Common Market;
- (b) measures to confer greater benefits on the LDCs in certain policy coordination instruments; and
- (c) measures to promote a greater flow of resources into the LDCs.

It should be borne in mind that some of these instruments have been in effect since the formation of CARIFTA in 1968 while a number of specific measures were already accepted as shown in the summary above.

Under the first set of measures the LDCs could obtain free entry to MDC markets for their manufactured products where the local value-added was 40% compared with 50% local value-added for MDC-produced goods. Article 56 of the Annex to the Treaty on Promotion of Industrial Development in the LDCs considerably strengthened Article 39 of the CARIFTA Agreement which allowed the LDCs to introduce tariffs on any goods imported from the MDCs in order to encourage the development of an industry in any one of them; it also made it possible for LDCs to impose quantitative restrictions (QRs) on like imports from other Member States without retaliation (except from Barbados) as was done under Article 39 of the CARIFTA Agreement.

In addition the LDCs were allowed to grant export allowances on goods exported to three of the MDCs (Barbados being the exception) while the MDCs could not grant such allowances on exports to the LDCs. While these measures applied to manufactured goods, marketing arrangements for agricultural products continued under the Agricultural Marketing Protocol (AMP), the Oils and Fats Agreement and the Guaranteed Market Scheme (GMS) for certain crops in the MDCs.⁴⁰ While Schedule VIII did not specifically refer to provisions for the LDCs in practice, as explained earlier, preference was given to the LDCs. On the other hand, the GMS specifically provided for MDCs to import six AMP-covered products from the LDCs.

It was recognised at the outset that in the integration arrangements certain policy coordination instruments were likely to have costly implications for the lesser developed Member Countries. Provisions were therefore built into many of these instruments which were expected to reduce the burden of accession to some of these policy coordination instruments. These included the Reserve List; the CET and Common Protective Policy; and the Harmonisation of Fiscal Incentives to Industry. The CET was modelled after the CET of the ECOM by having identical rates of 55-60% of all tariff items. For the other items Article 55 allowed the LDCs a much longer phasing in period towards the CET than the MDCs (i.e., about five years starting from 1977). Under the Scheme for the Harmonisation of Fiscal Incentives to Industry the LDCs had a right to grant a greater maximum level of tax incentives than the

40 Schedule VIII of the Treaty for AMP arrangements and Schedule IX for 'Marketing of Oils and Fats Products.

MDCs; in particular LDCs were permitted to offer new or additional fiscal incentives to enterprises producing any of a list of 35 products. In addition the LDCs could give export allowances to exporters to the MDCs (Barbados excepted). MDCs were only permitted to grant allowances for extra-regional exports. Another measure was the Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation between MDCs and LDCs which gave favourable treatment to the LDCs to encourage a greater flow of MDCs capital to the LDCs.

There were two major regional institutions for mobilizing and transferring financial resources to the LDCs, the CDB and the CIC. (Both were mentioned earlier in relation to the CARICOM institutional framework). In addition, there was a Special Emergency Fund for Programme Assistance to the Windward and Leeward Islands, designed to transfer financial resources for budgetary support for common services.

We saw earlier that under CARIFTA (1968-1973) the benefits of integration to the LDCs were far short of expectations and in an effort to narrow the LDC- MDC gap several new measures were instituted under the CARICOM Treaty. With regard to measures to promote a greater flow of resources to the LDCs through CDB, CIC and the Special Emergency Fund (SEF) it is fair to say that a larger amount of finance had been provided for development projects. Table 9.7 shows the total flow of financial resources to the LDCs from CDB, CIC and the SEF for 1975-1976. What is interesting to note is that of the total of US\$68.5 million approved over the period 1970-1976 only about half or US\$33.7 million was actually disbursed. However, over a shorter period between January and August 1976 the three institutions committed US\$12.12 million and disbursed US\$10.85 million.

As was pointed out before the bulk of the finance went toward building up productive and infrastructural facilities in the LDCs with a small portion being used to finance recurrent public expenditure. Since its inception the resources of CDB had been increasing, thus making more resources available to LDCs for development, especially through the SEF.

TABLE 9.7

FLOW OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO LDCs FROM CDB, CIC AND
EMERGENCY FUND AS AT DECEMBER 31, 1975 and 1976
(EC \$ MILLION)

COUNTRY	75.12.31	76.12.31(a)	% Increase	75.12.31	76.12.31(b)	% Increase
Antigua	2.534	3.163	24.8	0.5	1.435	191.4
Belize	15.032	19.107	27.1	4.3	5.901	37.2
Dominica	8.925	10.350	16.0	5.307	8.348	57.3
Grenada	4.426	5.216	17.8	1.126	2.216	96.8
Montserrat	0.915	1.065	16.4	0.3	0.45	50.0
St. Kitts/ Nevis/ Anguilla	2.950	3.750	27.1	0.35	0.55	57.1
St. Lucia	12.284	12.478	1.6	3.7	5.942	60.0
St. Vincent	3.528	6.285	78.1	1.444	3.014	108.7
Total Regional Projects	5.8	7.1	22.4	5.8	5.8	-
TOTAL LDCs	56.394	68.514	21.5	22.827	33.678	47.5

Sources: CDB Annual Report, 1976.
CIC Annual Report, 1976.
CARICOM Secretariat Estimates, 1977

- (a) The following exchange rates were used: for CIC figures (1975), US\$1.00 = EC\$2.17 (average of monthly rates for the year), and for 1976 US\$1.00 = EC\$2.61 (average of monthly rates for the year). The Emergency Fund, US\$1.00 = EC\$2.70 (fixed).
- (b) Figures in these columns include CIC's approvals/disbursements between September and November 1976.

The Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) made available funds for regional projects designed specifically to benefit the LDCs. Between September 1975 and September 1976 the CDB approved US\$6.9 million for regional projects out of which US\$5.64 million was disbursed. Although by August 1976 CDB had only disbursed 41.6% of total funds approved, this was considered by the experts to be a good performance by comparison with similar institutions in other parts of the world.

The Caribbean Investment Corporation (CIC) did not live up to its expectations. For one thing the private sector lagged in its subscription to share capital. Of the total capital of EC\$3.65 million paid up by the end of 1976 only EC\$755,000 was contributed by the private sector. This latter figure represented only 38% of the EC\$2 million to which the private sector was committed over a five-year period ending August 1978 as against a contribution of 97% of the EC\$3 million by the public sector. To augment its resources, loan funds were obtained from CDB which amounted to US\$1.26 million in 1976. What is notable here is that unlike CDB the disbursement of investment funds had taken place so rapidly that by the end of 1976 about 88% of the total approved loans had been disbursed mainly towards manufacturing activities. The distribution of investments at the end of 1976 is shown below in Table 9.8. This rapid disbursement without proper financial and managerial control eventually led to the collapse of the CIC within a few years of its existence.

TABLE 9.8

CIC INVESTMENT BY COUNTRY AND PROJECTS PER COUNTRY, 1976

(EC\$)

COUNTRY	NO. OF PROJECTS	TOTAL INVESTMENT
Antigua	3	235,000
Belize	2	273,540
Dominica	3	125,000
Grenada	1	56,000
Montserrat	1	32,000
St. Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla	2	325,000
St. Lucia	3	410,000
St. Vincent	4	513,000
TOTAL	19	1,969,540

Source: CARICOM Secretariat, 1977.

An EC\$10 million Special Fund for Emergency Programme Assistance was set up in 1976 to which the UK Government matched the EC\$5 million contributed by the MDCs and was channelled through CDB. Based on projected deficit on the 1976 recurrent budget allocations were made as follows:

TABLE 9.9
DISTRIBUTION OF SPECIAL EMERGENCY FUND - 1976
EC\$10.0 million

<u>BENEFICIARY TERRITORY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Antigua	1.0
Dominica	2.7
Grenada	1.6
St. Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla	-
St. Lucia	1.6
St. Vincent	2.9
Montserrat	<u>0.14</u>
	9.94
Administration	<u>0.06</u>
	<u>10.0</u>

Source: CARICOM Secretariat, 1977.

The Fund was used for supporting existing common services and certain national programmes, especially agriculture and education and also for contributions to various regional institutions. It was envisaged that the Fund would operate in two phases, the first phase being disbursements of EC\$10 million and the second phase involving assistance to a Five-Year Development Plan for each LDC. To determine the level of assistance needed by the LDCs in the second phase, planning teams visited all the Leewards and Windwards during 1976. In the management of the Fund CDB was assisted by an Advisory Committee consisting of representatives from the Leewards, the MDCs and the UK Government.

A Task Force was appointed by the WISA Council in October 1975 to submit proposals for the establishment of common services for the Leewards and Windwards. With the assistance of UNDP, a Common Services Fund was eventually established at the ECOM Secretariat and largely funded by European Development Fund (EDF) in 1978. Several donor agencies indicated their willingness to support the Common Services through the Emergency Fund.

Technical Assistance to the LDCs was provided mainly under the Commonwealth Caribbean Technical Assistance Programme (CCTAP). Additional technical assistance was provided through CDB and CIC and other regional institutions such as the Caribbean Agricultural Research and Development Institute (CARDI), CARICOM Secretariat, Caribbean Agricultural and Rural Development Advisory and Training Service (CARDATS) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

The CCTAP preceded the CARICOM Treaty and was not part of the Special Regime for the LDCs although provision was made for intraregional technical assistance under Article 18 and the Schedule to the Treaty (Areas of Financial Cooperation). The CCTAP Agreement became effective on November 25, 1970 with Member States undertaking to provide technical assistance to one another where possible. Most of the requests came from LDCs, with the majority of experts being supplied by the MDCs.

After three years of operation a review was made of the CCTAP and recommendations made for improving its functioning. However, in the absence of a Technical Assistance Fund (agreed to by the HGC in 1974),

the CCTAP had fallen short of expectations. Another factor which inhibited the functioning of the Programme was the prolonged economic crisis among CARICOM Members since the mid-seventies.

Initiated in 1974 the CARDATS Project was designed to assist the LDCs in promoting agricultural and rural development within the context of regional integration and rationalisation of agriculture. Specifically the objectives were to increase food production, promote continuing agricultural developments and increase rural incomes through changes in the traditional structure and organisation of the agricultural sector. Both the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and UNDP/Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) have contributed to the Project. The CARDATS team was involved in national planning, regional programming, project identification and preparation, agricultural extension, training and production. The biggest problem encountered was the inadequacy of resources for the implementation of programmes.

Apart from agriculture, UNDP was involved in a number of ECCM regional projects through the provision of experts and advisors. Areas included industrial promotion, tourism development, telecommunications, health, civil service training and statistical services.

Perhaps the area of greatest conflict between MDCs and LDCs has to do with industrial development in the LDCs. Article 56 of the Treaty made it possible for the LDCs to suspend Common Market tariff treatment and Article 28 allowed QRs on eligible imports on grounds of production

in the LDCs. In order to fully take advantage of this provision the ECOM States had devised a scheme for the allocation of industries among themselves.

The decision to set up the ECOM Industrial Allocation Scheme was taken by the ECOM Council in June 1974, the main objectives of which were:

- (a) the establishment and distribution of industries equitably among Member States;
- (b) the progressive harmonisation of development, investment and industrial policies in Member States, involving a common policy towards industrial development; and
- (c) the creation of an immediate action programme for the establishment of industries in Member States.

According to this Scheme five regional industries were to be established in each of the seven Member States for supplying the ECOM market. The industries selected had the following basic characteristics:

- (i) they were small-scale industries;
- (ii) they would manufacture import substitution products;
- (iii) they required easily learned 'know-how' or easily acquired technology;

(iv) the required investment in machinery was relatively low;
and

(v) they would be labour intensive wherever possible.⁴¹

What is important for us in the context of CARICOM is the fact that the ECCM as a group had applied, or indicated their intention to apply for Article 56 treatment for protection of their markets. However, problems still remained with the operation of the Scheme: there was no automatic guarantee of access for LDC production to the MDCs neither was funding identified, not to mention other aspects such as a comprehensive industrial promotion strategy. In other words the ECCM States had identified what was to be done without articulating how it should be accomplished and, as it has been emphasised throughout this study, the lag between identification and implementation was due mainly to the shortage of qualified personnel and financial resources.

Regional industrial planning and the allocation of industries to the LDCs have been subjects of intense study by various institutions of the integration movement.⁴² In spite of the special provisions for industrial development the LDCs have long felt that they could not be in a position to compete successfully in the CARICOM market unless they were

41 It is interesting to compare these characteristics with those proposed by the EIU Survey of 1971.

42 The First Meeting of the Working Party of Regional Experts on a Strategy and Programme of Industrial Allocation for the LDCs was held in November 1977.

assured of: (a) access to raw materials produced in the region without conditions and at prices which did not discriminate between manufacturers in the LDCs and those in the countries where the raw materials were located (sugar is an obvious example); (b) free and unlimited access to MDC markets at all times; (c) reserved areas of industrial activities within the CARICOM market, for example, they requested certain agro-industries to be established during the implementation of the proposed Regional Food Plan, even when the agricultural raw material inputs originated in the MDCs; (d) an export credit insurance scheme financed by all CARICOM countries for the benefit of the LDCs; and (e) financing for industrial development especially risk capital. Needless to say that these have been highly contentious issues at regional meetings ever since the integration movement began. While some of these provisions have been reluctantly accepted in principle, by the LDCs, most MDCs have been, by and large reluctant to agree on principles which would affect their own industrial development.

We have already discussed the problems and constraints associated with the operation of the AMP and GME. What should be emphasised here is that imports into the MDCs from the LDCs increased in value terms. As the table below shows, total MDC imports rose from EC\$940,556 in 1973 to EC\$2,668,184 in 1976, representing an absolute increase of 283.7% or an annual increase of 41.6%.

With regard to the Common External Tariff (CET) and Common Protective Policy, the Scheme for the Harmonisation of Fiscal Incentives and the Regime of Double Taxation, although much progress was made in the

first four years of CARICOM there was still much to be done. In the case of the CET agreement was reached several times on a timetable to converge the CARICOM CET with the ECOM CET. The LDCs however, felt that there was no particular rush to implement the CARICOM CET in the absence of industries. The scheme for the Harmonisation of Fiscal Incentives to Industry became effective in April 1974 and over the first two and a half years of operation 28 enterprises received "approved" status, 21 of these being in three MDCs (Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago) and the remaining seven in St. Kitts and Dominica. What was obvious was that the Scheme which was intended to encourage location of industries in the LDCs had not done so.

TABLE 9.10

IMPORTS OF AMP/GMS COMMODITIES

FROM THE LDCs, 1973-1976

(EC\$)

	1973	1974	1975	1976 ¹
Barbados	325,742	290,551	329,662	526,442
Guyana	79,646	90,437	189,730	310,712
Jamaica	51	-	2,319	16,150
Trinidad and Tobago	535,117	621,775	1,482,863	1,668,184
TOTAL	940,556	1,002,763	2,004,574	2,668,184

1/ Based on allocations in respect of AMP and GMS of the year.

Source: CARICOM Secretariat, 1977.

An Assessment of Performance 1973-1983⁴³

(i) Trade Performance

Tables 9.11 to 9.13 summarise the performances of the Associated States from 1973 until 1981 when they all had become independent although they still maintained the status of LDCs.

TABLE 9.11

PATTERNS OF LDC AND MDC TRADE 1973-1981 (EC\$000)

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
<u>MDCs</u>									
Global domestic exports	2,448,290	6,075,830	6,536,640	8,203,500	8,742,147	8,655,187	10,237,637	14,972,918	13,340,122
Domestic export to CARICOM	251,704	435,701	537,701	697,200	676,578	699,208	889,050	1,228,053	1,272,677
Global imports	3,533,960	6,631,219	6,896,135	9,191,286	8,823,670	9,414,891	10,368,123	14,255,880	15,228,162
Imports from CARICOM	228,882	418,230	532,101	625,817	609,570	670,272	878,432	1,041,705	1,317,259
<u>LDCs</u>									
Global domestic exports	169,700	238,763	300,982	269,246	313,812	401,462	395,793	441,001	478,818
Domestic exports to CARICOM	17,312	24,624	29,264	47,632	54,647	83,323	77,174	105,571	133,109
Global imports	416,007	549,514	656,118	682,443	802,538	984,761	1,151,267	1,439,217	1,573,449
Imports from CARICOM	67,550	89,816	117,150	139,734	139,458	157,198	184,247	276,462	274,992

Source: Economic Affairs Secretariat of the OECS

⁴³ A major review of the progress of the LDCs under the CARICOM arrangement was undertaken by Swinburne Lestrade on behalf of the CARICOM Secretariat. See Swinburne Lestrade, CARICOM's Lesser Developed Countries (UWI/ISER, Barbados, 1981). A further review and assessment was undertaken by Lestrade in 'The Less Developed Countries within CARICOM: The Past Decade and the next' in Ten Years of CARICOM. Papers presented at a Seminar on Economic Integration in the Caribbean, Bridgetown, Barbados, July 1983, pp 265-282. This section draws heavily on these two reports.

TABLE 9.12

MDC AND LDC SHARES IN INTRA-CARICOM EXPORTS AND IMPORTS

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
MDCs exports to CARICOM	94%	95%	95%	94%	93%	89%	92%	92%	91%
LDCs export to CARICOM	6%	5%	5%	6%	7%	11%	8%	8%	9%
MDCs imports from CARICOM	77%	82%	82%	82	81%	81%	83%	79%	83%
LDCs imports from CARICOM	23%	18%	18%	18%	19%	19%	17%	21%	17%

Source: Economic Affairs Secretariat of the OECS

TABLE 9.13

RATIOS OF CARICOM TRADE TO TOTAL TRADE BY CARICOM LDCs AND MDCs
1973-1981

	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
<u>LDC Domestic Exports to CARICOM</u>	10.2	10.3	9.7	17.7	17.4	20.8	19.5	23.9	27.8
<u>LDC Global Domestic Exports</u>									
<u>MDC Domestic exports to CARICOM</u>	10.3	7.2	8.2	8.5	7.7	8.1	8.7	8.2	9.5
<u>MDC Global Domestic Exports</u>									
<u>LDC imports from CARICOM</u>	16.2	16.3	17.9	20.5	17.4	16.0	16.0	19.2	17.5
<u>LDC Global Imports</u>									
<u>MDC Import from CARICOM</u>	6.5	6.3	7.7	6.8	6.9	7.1	8.5	7.3	8.7
<u>MDC Global Imports</u>									

Source: Economic Affairs Secretariat of the OECS

The following observations can be made from the trade statistics:

During the period 1973-1981 domestic exports of the LDCs to CARICOM increased by 669% while overall domestic exports from the LDCs increased by 182%. On the hand MDC domestic exports to CARICOM increased by 406% while their domestic exports increased overall by 445%. It shows that for the LDCs the CARICOM market had become more important for their products.

For the same period LDC imports from CARICOM increased by 314% compared with an increase in overall exports by 388%; for the MDCs the comparable figures were 476% and 331%.

That CARICOM products had played a significant role in the imports and exports of LDCs can be seen in the increase of LDC global exports from 10.2% in 1973 to 28.8% in 1981; this compares with 10.3% in 1973 in the MDCs falling to 9.5% by 1981. On the import side 16.2% of LDC supplies were purchased from CARICOM in 1973, rising to 17.5% in 1981; for the MDCs the figures were 6.5% in 1973 and 8.7% by 1981.

Two facts emerge - the growing importance of the CARICOM market for the LDCs and the growing importance of CARICOM as a source of supply for the LDCs. Lestrade further pointed out that the LDCs were not marginal to total CARICOM trade since 1973.⁴⁴

44 Lestrade, Ten Years of CARICOM, op. cit., p.275 ff.

Other conclusions drawn for the period were:

- the bulk of LDC exports to CARICOM comprised of non-traditional light manufactures which provided the opportunity for product diversification while exposing the LDCs to import restrictions from the MDCs;
- LDC progress can be attributed to the CARICOM arrangements and to the realisation on the part of the LDCs of the need to attract export industries;
- while total domestic LDC exports to CARICOM increased by 669% between 1973 and 1981 in absolute terms, the increases were from EC\$17 million to EC\$133 million, while for the MDCs the figures were EC\$267 million in 1973 and EC\$1,329 million in 1981;
- the LDCs have gained from participation in CARICOM but not to the extent hoped by everyone due to internal deficiencies and a lack of appreciation by the region as to the capability limits within the LDCs.

Conclusions

Looking at the position of the LDCs within CARICOM as a whole then, it may be misleading to conclude from a comparison of rates of growth of GDP between MDCs and LDCs that the latter were worse off for the effort. Any evaluation should take into consideration the entire array of

opportunities open to the LDCs, as balanced against the costs of membership which resulted mainly from trade diversion whereby the purchases of some imports shifted from traditional sources to partner countries. The true measure of cost was the additional cost that countries paid for intra-regional imports. With regard to the Special Measures, consideration also has to be given to the fundamental constraints and obstacles described in detail above when assessing their impact on development - even when massive doses of financial and technical resources were applied to the LDCs they still lagged behind the MDCs. William Demas is emphatic in stating that on balance the LDCs had gained: their exports increased, and 'the increased cost of the goods has not been all that great'.⁴⁵ At the international level the LDCs have also gained from the joint positions adopted by the whole of CARICOM in negotiating trade agreements, for example, the negotiations with the EEC which eventually resulted in the Lomé Convention. Further, by virtue of membership in CARICOM the non-independent members have had access to international forums, and in those areas reserved for the UK Government the Associated States were sometimes given the competence to deal with international bodies. The participation in both the sub-regional and regional integration movement was very important in the transition to independence, primarily because the Associated States while not being formally independent in several respects were treated as independent (they participated fully in all meetings of CARICOM as equal partners and through CARICOM took part in international meetings) and within a short space of time had gained the experience of most newly independent states.

45 William Demas, "CARICOM and the LDCs", Bulletin of Eastern Caribbean Affairs, Nos. 3 and 4, May/June 1977, pp. 6-11.

Functional Cooperation and the Coordination of Foreign Policy

While problems abound in the operation of the Common Market the LDCs have also benefitted tremendously in the area of functional cooperation of which there are some 15 areas: Shipping; Air Transport; Meteorological Services and Hurricane Insurance; Health; Intra-regional Technical Assistance; Intra-regional Public Service Arrangements; Education and Training; Broadcasting and Information; Culture; Harmonisation of the Law and Legal Systems of Member Countries; Position of Women in Caribbean Society; Travel Within the Region; Labour Administration and Industrial Relations; Technological and Scientific Research; and Social Security.

PART III - TRANSITION FROM ASSOCIATED STATEHOOD
TO INDEPENDENCE: 1974-1983

Chapter x

The Transition to Independence

A. Introduction: The Debate Over Viability versus
The Metropolitan Presence

This chapter gives an account of stocktaking during the Statehood regime and the decision to finally exercise the option of independence. A British Government publication on the Associated States and Dependencies states:

It is not the intention of the British Government to delay independence for those who want it, nor to impose independence on those who do not want it. The guiding principle which has been repeatedly stated, must be the wishes of the people's concerned; the choice is theirs.¹

If it was not the intention of the British Government to delay independence during the 1960s they certainly did little to encourage it. Nothing in the records of the constitutional meetings on Associated Statehood suggest that the British were in favour of early independence. The opposite however appears to be true.

S.S. Ramphal, a former Attorney General and Minister of State of Guyana (and now Secretary-General of the Commonwealth Secretariat) had this to say about Associated Statehood in 1971:

1 Britain's Associated States and Dependencies (London: Central Office of Information, March 1976) p.5.

I believe it is sometimes thought that the rationale of Associated Status is the inability of each state to exercise responsibility for its own defence and external affairs, and that is why these subjects are reserved as the responsibility of Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. If these responsibilities were the only impediments to the independence of each Associated State they would hardly justify the restraint of its Government and people. So far as external affairs are concerned, the problems, though serious, would not be insuperable. So far as defence is concerned, although we are still a long way off from achieving an ordered international society in which defence is an acknowledged responsibility of the world community, we have made sufficient progress for the international legal system and international political realities to exercise a substantial deterrent on external aggression. . . .²

Continuing Ramphal noted that there would be a few states in today's world of nuclear weapons and intercontinental missiles to deliver them that would qualify for independence if one of the criteria for it was a defence capability equal to the task of sustaining national sovereignty in the case of external aggression.³ The author shares the view that defence capability is not a valid criterion for independence in the contemporary world. It can be asserted that the need to leave responsibility for defence and external affairs with Britain was not the reason for the formula of Associated Status; the real truth is that the reservation was the result of a decision taken on more general terms against the viability of independence for the islands separately. The architects of Associated Statehood were fully aware of the implications of half of a dozen mini-states entering the UN at a time when Britain was already having a tough time at the UN over the

2 S.S. Ramphal West Indian Nationhood: Myth, Mirage or Mandate? Opening Address in a series on "Caribbean Perspectives" sponsored by the Institute of International Relations, University of the West Indies, Trinidad, May 26, 1971 and published by the Ministry of External Affairs, Georgetown, Guyana (June 1971) p. 12.

3 *ibid.*

unilateral declaration of independence of Rhodesia, and as the record shows did not at any time encourage independence; in fact the British consistently played on the viability theme.

Right up to the late 1950s it was almost inconceivable that Britain would promote independence for small territories such as Cyprus, Jamaica or Trinidad. Yet by the 1970s the British criteria for independence (particular levels of economic resources, populations and territorial sizes) was abandoned. While Britain might not have wanted to delay independence, Associated Statehood status was a mechanism which proved to be of vital military-political importance since defence and foreign affairs remained in the hands of the UK. It meant a continued 'institutionalisation' of the metropolitan presence in the Caribbean as the Anguillan episode demonstrated when, following the break away of Anguilla from the tri-island state of St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla the British Government intervened by despatching troops and armed policemen and so effectively recolonising the island. The opinion of the Anguillan people apart, the episode raised the issue as to whether the British Government was empowered under the West Indies Act to unilaterally disrupt the constitutional arrangements.⁴ Similarly a Commission of Inquiry in the Anguilla problem posed the issue very starkly: when, if ever does an internal affair cease to be an exclusively internal affair and become an external affair or partially so? What if a change of

4 This fact has been pointed out by Ramphal, op.cit., pp. 10-11; V.A. Lewis 'Small States in the International Society with Special Reference to the Associated States', Caribbean Quarterly, 18, 2 (June 1972) pp. 38-39.

government is promoted by subversion from abroad? What if the government is overthrown by force of arms imported by a small but resolute group? Are external affairs involved if action is taken which threatens or breaks up the integrity of an Associated State?⁵ These were some of the critical issues exposed by the Anguilla affair.

As the UK Government ceased to transmit information on the territories to the UN the international community somewhat lost interest in them and it was largely left to the Associated States individually and collectively to develop mechanisms and structures for promoting social and economic development, including the creation of an international status if not an international legal personality. Whereas during the sixties the case against independence was made on the grounds of economic viability, by the early seventies the economic viability argument was hardly in vogue. Rather it became fashionable to look at the essential requirements for the recognition of state sovereignty by the international community; these included possession of a territory, possession of a government that could maintain internal law and order and prevent or at least inhibit external aggression and finally possession of a capacity to enter into and fulfill international obligations. All of the Associated States had these capacities, with the exception of the last one, before Statehood. It was therefore necessary to demonstrate these capacities and in the case of international relations to work within the regional integration framework when negotiating trade and aid arrangements as they had been doing.

5 Cmnd. 4510, Report of the Commission of Inquiry to examine the Anguilla Problem (London, HMSO, 1970) p. 48.

In terms of internal politics Associated Statehood did offer a sense of 'independence' with the hoisting of new flags, and the singing of new anthems by new Premiers, Parliaments and people. While it was false to equate Associated Statehood with independence Statehood did create a certain level of national self-consciousness with all the new trappings and celebrations of statehood day. Apart from the new self-consciousness, more a psychological response to the new situation, the new constitutions did not offer very much more than the constitutions introduced during the 1950s, particularly the Ministerial System introduced in the Leewards in 1956 and in the Windwards in 1958. In brief, the constitutions of the fifties were accompanied by the emergence of political parties and new political leaders from the labouring classes, most of whom remained on the scene during the sixties.⁶

B. Search for Alternatives:
The Grenada Declaration, 1971

While Associated Statehood was Britain's third scheme for decolonisation, the Associated States themselves along with other CARIFTA member states continued to explore alternatives to Associated Statehood.

The key issues during this period were:

- whether Associated Statehood was conducive to economic viability and if not should the Associated States move to formal independence;

⁶ For a discussion of the implications of the new ministerial system, A.W. Singham, "Legislative - Executive Relations in Smaller Territories" in Benedict, op. cit., pp. 134-148.

- whether separate independence was conducive to viability and if not should the Associated States become independent within an integrated framework.

While all the political leaders may have accepted Associated Statehood as the best solution to the problem at the time none of them regarded Statehood as a permanent condition. Eric Gairy of Grenada was most anxious to divest his country of this status when in 1969 he declared that independence was the ultimate objective.⁷

Similarly this intention was declared by the St. Lucia Government during the Throne Speech by the Governor on the occasion of the First Session of the Second House of Assembly on May 5, 1969. Even Trinidad and Tobago in its review of the integration movement reportedly prodded St. Vincent and Montserrat into forming a political entity⁸ and according to one report Premier Eric Gairy even discussed with Williams the possibility of Trinidad and Tobago taking over Britain's role in Grenada and forming a unitary state⁹, an idea discussed by Williams during a visit to London in 1969. The idea of Trinidad and Tobago handling the external affairs of the Associated States was rejected by the islands¹⁰ and by early 1970 independence and integration issues had to take a back seat as Black Power became the burning issue in all the

7 Reported in Advocate News, February 5, 1969.

8 *ibid.*

9 Advocate News, July 8, 1969.

10 Express, July 25, 1969.

islands, however Associated Statehood was again questioned by Forbes Burnham of Guyana as a 'peculiar constitutional arrangement' during the opening of the Sixth Meeting of the Heads of Government of CARIFTA in Jamaica during April 1970.¹¹ The British action in Anguilla further incensed the Guyanese Government which spoke out against the 'metropolitan presence'. While these tirades were taking place the Associated States themselves continued to search for a formula which would remove both the stigma of 'residual colonialism' and the metropolitan presence from the Associated States.

On July 25, 1971 at a meeting held at Grand Anse, Grenada, Premiers of five Associated States, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent as well as the Prime Minister of Guyana, signed an agreement known as the Grenada Declaration outlining plans for establishing by April 1973 a new state to be formed by the political union of their territories.¹² Publication was withheld until November 1, 1971 so as to enable the other CARIFTA countries (Antigua, Barbados, Belize, Jamaica, Montserrat and Trinidad and Tobago) to consider their attitude towards it. After publication it became apparent that the others were not enthusiastic and two days later Grenada and St. Lucia issued statements indicating that they would reconsider their position.

What was perhaps a most peculiar development was the hosting of a Heads of Government Conference by Grenada on July 26, 1971, the day after the Declaration, to discuss the proposals for political unity in the

11 Reported in Trinidad Guardian, April 17, 1970.

12 Appendix IV the Grenada Declaration, 1971.

Eastern Caribbean. In a statement delivered by F.C. Prevatt on behalf of the Trinidad and Tobago Government he stated bluntly that the summoning of the meeting was a departure from the agreed procedure for Heads of Government Conferences resulting in insufficient time for prior consultation. He then recited the efforts of his government towards economic and political union since 1958 and updated the meeting on the work of a Caribbean Task Force appointed by the Trinidad and Tobago Government in June 1971 to re-examine the concept of a political union. A Constitution Commission was appointed at the same time to study and make recommendations for the revision of the Trinidad and Tobago Constitution. Noting that there was no representation from Barbados and Jamaica Prevatt exhorted the meeting not to compound the issue by proceeding with the discussion.¹³

In light of this development a further meeting of Heads of Government of States signatory to the Declaration was held in Georgetown, Guyana on November 8-10, 1971. St. Lucia sent no representative, while Grenada sent an observer. A Communique after the meeting¹⁴ reported that Dominica, Guyana, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla and St. Vincent agreed to go ahead with the plan outlined in the Declaration with an extension in the timetable to allow for consultations with other Commonwealth Caribbean Governments. To further compound the issue on November 12-14,

13 Statement delivered by Senator the Hon. F.C. Prevatt at the Heads of Government Conference on July 26, 1971, at Grenada, called to discuss proposals for Political Unity in the Eastern Caribbean (unpublished).

14 Commonwealth Caribbean Regional Secretariat, Press Release No. 49, 49/1971.

leaders of six opposition parties from five Associated States, whose governments had signed the Declaration, met at Roseau, Dominica, to discuss the implications of the Declaration. With Antigua absent the six parties issued a joint statement expressing disapproval at the absence of prior consultations with and the exclusion of opposition parties from the earlier discussions. This group favoured the creation of an independent and "viable" nation embracing the entire Caribbean, but only after the concept had been thoroughly explored by experts.¹⁵

Reactions to the Grenada Declaration

There was mixed reaction to the Declaration while the Advocate News of Barbados initially lauded the initiative; Prime Minister Barrow stated that, Barbados was not interested¹⁶ and the President of the Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce, Sir Garnet Gordon, condemned the manner in which it was secretly conceived and increased by the politicians¹⁷.

In a statement by the Windwards and Leewards Students Association of the University of the West Indies, Mona Campus, Jamaica, four points were emphasised in relation to the Grenada Declaration. The authors held the view that firstly, political integration of the Windward and Leeward

15 Reported in UN Document A/9023/ Add. 6, October 29, 1973, p. 127.

16 Advocate News, July 26, 1971).

17 Trinidad Express, December 5, 1971.

Islands was a prerequisite before union with other member states; secondly, the new constitution should ensure and enlarge democratic and human rights and privileges; thirdly, political institutions should be geared to the purpose of solving pressing economic problems, and fourthly, that the social and cultural aspirations of the people of the islands should be unfettered so that they could realise their fullest expression.¹⁸

The authors (all citizens of the Associated States) expressed dissatisfaction with the position of the Windwards and Leewards within CARIFTA and particularly with the emphasis on economic integration which they considered to be based on "old formulas" and "false options". In fact several years later one of the authors of this statement was to renew the call in his review of the Special Mechanisms for the LDCs,¹⁹ and almost ten years later V.A. Lewis could still write:

Within the CARICOM system itself, the LDCs cannot be induced to further cooperation along the lines desired by the MDCs unless the MDCs can themselves agree to deepen the integration system and strengthen the cooperation system in both its internal and external relations aspects.²⁰

18 D. Venner, V.A. Lewis, S. Lestrade, "Statement on Grenada Declaration", Caribbean Quarterly, 18, No. 2, June 1972, pp.51-54.

19 Lestrade, op. cit.,

20 V.A. Lewis, "LDC-MDC Relations: The CARICOM Windward and Leeward Islands in the Caribbean", Paper presented to the Conference on the LDCS' Halcyon Reef Hotel, Antigua, June 4-7, 1980, sponsored by the Institute of International Relations, UWI, St. Augustine, (mimeo).

Another event worthy of note with respect to political union involving the Associated States was a meeting of prominent West Indians in Tobago on June 10-11, 1972, to consider the formation of the Federation of the West Indies. The meeting included an array of academics, professionals, and labour leaders, notably Sir Arthur Lewis, President of the Caribbean Development Bank and Chancellor of the University of Guyana; Sir Fred Phillips, Barrister-at-Law, St. Vincent; Sir Hugh Wooding, Chancellor of the University of the West Indies and former Chief Justice of Trinidad and Tobago and Reverend Andrew Hatch of Barbados.²¹ The purpose of the meeting was to rally public opinion to support the new efforts at federation which was considered feasible because of a "common sense of nationhood" which they felt was undermined by the breaking up of the Federation; the need for a common external policy; the possibilities for economic integration; the creation of a federal public service; and safeguarding civil liberties.

The authors predicted that a federation among the Associated States would come to nothing, that they should give up association with Britain and join the federation as individual territories, not as a unitary state. They also identified four bones of contention after 25 years of negotiation: industrial and agricultural zoning; finance for social services, including health, primary and secondary education and social security; taxation and customs revenues to finance the federal government; and freedom of movement which was considered not feasible at

21 See Appendix V for full list.

that time.²² Needless to say that these remained pious hopes during much of the seventies as one crisis after another effectively prevented any move towards federation.

The Petit St. Vincent Agreement

In a general election held in St. Vincent in March 1972 the St. Vincent Labour Party (SVLP) under R.M. Cato won six seats, the Peoples Political Party (PPP), led by E.T. Joshua won six with James Mitchell winning a seat as an independent candidate. On April 13, Mitchell was invited to form a new government following agreement with the PPP. No new statement was issued on the Grenada Declaration but on June 17, Premier Mitchell concluded an agreement with Grenada and St. Lucia, otherwise called the Petit St. Vincent Agreement, concerning steps towards the unification of the three states. The Agreement which came into effect on August 1, 1972 established freedom of movement throughout the three territories for their nationals, permanent residents and visitors; nationals were permitted to work and own land without restriction in any of the territories. It is interesting to note that at a press conference on the eve of the implementation of the Agreement, Mitchell's view was that St. Vincent "as I know it" could not go into independence by herself.²³

22 "Towards an Eastern Federation", Statement issued by meeting of prominent West Indians, June 10-11, 1972 (mimeo).

23 Reported in UN Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, A/9023/Add. 6, October 29, 1973, Chapter XXVI, Annex.

Meanwhile other groups were having their say on the Agreement: four leading labour unions from the three Associated States while supporting the Agreement in principle urged that implementation be deferred until all parties had expressed their opinion, a move criticised by Premier John Compton of St. Lucia since no alternatives were suggested, while Mitchell received the support of his island's Employers Federation. Gairy reiterated his intention of joining the Petit St. Vincent Agreement. At a meeting in September at St. George's, Grenada to review progress, the Premiers of St. Vincent, St. Lucia and Grenada announced the decision to discontinue immediately the use of immigration cards for nationals and permanent residents of the three states. This agreement was a remarkable step towards political unification of the three territories, but unlike so many other initiatives of the sixties and seventies hopes for unification remained unfulfilled.

C. Transition to Independence: 1974-1983

Within five years of becoming an Associated State one island declared its intention to proceed to independence. In a general election in Grenada in 1972, Eric Gairy whose Grenada United Labour Party (GULP) was then in opposition made it clear that if GULP won the elections it would seek full independence for Grenada. The ruling Grenada National Party (GNP) led by Herbert Blaize took the position that political independence would be meaningless unless it was buttressed by economic independence. The precise events leading up to independence have been documented elsewhere.²⁴

²⁴ See Richard Jacobs, "The Movement Towards Grenadian Independence", in Independence for Grenada: Myth or Reality? Tapia House Printing Co. Ltd., Trinidad, 1974 pp.21-33, UN Doc. A/9023/Add. 6, pp.153-157.

Under the GNP (1962-1967) proposals were made for unitary statehood with Trinidad and Tobago. When Gairy won the elections of August 1967 he abandoned the idea of unitary statehood and advocated a strong federation of the Associated States. Five years later in the 1972 elections the GULP campaigned vigorously on the independence issue. According to the GULP manifesto size was not a deterrent to independence, and while the Party committed itself to integration of the Commonwealth Caribbean it felt that "meaningful integration is only possible when all the units involved are independent".²⁵ There was by this time absolutely no mention of having achieved the "necessary" conditions for independence, neither did Gairy say whether he would invoke the relevant section of the West Indies Act which required a referendum. Instead the massive victory was regarded as a sufficient mandate to proceed to independence while the opposition forces felt that the issue should be postponed until certain constitutional reforms were enacted. That did not prevent the flamboyant Gairy²⁶ from leading a delegation to London in October 1972 to discuss independence for Grenada.

On his return Gairy told the state that the UK Government was satisfied that the elections had given him a mandate to lead Grenada into independence. Events moved very quickly thereafter; the GULP organised a rally in support of independence at which Gairy told the crowds that Grenada would seek membership in international organisations and could

25 GULP Manifesto, 1972, O. 2.

26 An incisive analysis of Gairy and his style of politics is given by A.W. Singham, The Hero and the Crowd in a Colonial Polity (Yale University Press) 1968.

obtain financial and technical assistance for further development; by year end a seven-member committee was set up to publicise plans for Grenada's independence; Gairy next discussed plans for joint overseas representation with Trinidad and Tobago and everything was set for independence during 1974.²⁷

By and large the opposition groups in Grenada had their own interests, hence reason for opposition to Gairy; some opposed independence as being non-viable; others were against independence under Gairy at that time, while some supported union with Trinidad and Tobago. In spite of internal objections it was announced that Grenada would be granted independence on February 7, 1974, following a Grenada Constitutional Conference held in May 1973 and a subsequent visit to London by a delegation led by Gairy in late July.

An analysis of the conditions under which Gairy sought independence revealed that while the international political climate had changed since 1969 economic conditions had not changed significantly. One group, the Chamber of Commerce reported that the economy had actually declined in 1972.²⁸ It is reasonable to conclude that Gairy sought independence for two underlying reasons: in the first place he had never accepted the formula of Associated Statehood, (GULP was in the opposition in 1967) having expressed the view that new elections should be held before the

27 The Trinidad Guardian, November 8, 1973.

28 Reported in UN Doc. A/9023/Add. 6, pp. 158-159.

introduction of Statehood.²⁹ The second reason was Gairy's view that there were no prerequisites to independence and that independence would give Grenada access to international development assistance. According to one report it was a case of independence supporting Grenada rather than Grenada supporting independence. So Blaize not Gairy became the first Premier of Grenada in 1968; and in 1974 it was Gairy's turn to be the first Prime Minister.

Gairy had exploded two myths: the myth of political union among the non-independent Commonwealth Caribbean Territories and the myth that small size was an impediment to independence. However, the search continued at the level of the Council of Ministers of the West Indies Associated States for political union among the States. The Council appointed a Commission in January 1974 to investigate the possibility of such a union. The Commission was requested to make a detailed investigation of the possibility of eventually creating a political union of the Associated States and to review their constitutional status, including Montserrat. Other terms of reference included the examination of the problems of small states in the international community; worsening terms of trade between the developed and developing countries with special reference to the Associated States and Montserrat; the current deterioration of the latter's position in reaction to higher oil prices; and the cost of administration within the context of the political structure of the Associated States and Montserrat. The seven-man

29 Gairy appeared before the Committee of Twenty-Four in September 1966 urging elections before implementation of the new constitution. UN General Assembly, 22nd Session 1967-68, Annexes (Vol. 1), Chapter XX, para. 666.

Commission under Sir Hugh Wooding former Chief Justice of Trinidad and Tobago, was appointed by Premier James Mitchell of St. Vincent who was then Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Associated States. In Mitchell's announcement of the appointment of the Commission it was pointed out that St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent would participate fully in all aspects of its work; Grenada and Montserrat indicated that they were only interested in the economic study and the following week Oliver Leblanc, Premier of Dominica declared that the proposals were ill-timed and ill-advised, without support in Dominica and he therefore could not support the proposal for constitutional advance.³⁰ Antigua did not participate in the investigation. Mitchell still held the view that a single political entity was necessary to overcome the social and economic problems of the Associated States. This approach was continued by Milton Cato who became the new Premier of St. Vincent following general elections of December 1974. Cato further stated that his government would seek full independence preferably in a federation or alone if federation proved elusive. Like Gairy two years before, Cato felt that the people of St. Vincent had given a clear mandate in this regard. The other Associated States of Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, and St. Lucia joined later in indicating their willingness to seek independence while Premier Patrick John of Dominica as late as 1975 indicated that his government's interest was not in seeking independence alone but through a political union of the Leewards and Windwards.³¹

30 As reported in UN Doc. A/10023/Rev. 1 - Supp. No. 23, 1975, paras. 3-8.

31 UN Doc. A/31/23/Add. 9 Part 1, paras 15-30.

The issue of viability was thoroughly explored by a Committee appointed by the Council of the West Indies Associated States in 1974 to assess the limitations of Associated Statehood with particular reference to the problem of small states in the international community, bearing in mind the financial and economic viability of such states. In their report³² the authors provided an analysis of the fundamental questions of political economy which were involved in the issue of independence. They proposed that the islands should proceed to independence and enter a scheme of association among themselves for the purpose of dealing with international bodies as a single entity. This conclusion was arrived at following an analysis of the performance of the Associated States within the regional and international setting. To begin with small size in itself cannot be seen as an impediment to independence. What the authors called for was "an identification and then examination of the instruments of authority and power that are involved in the possession of constitutional sovereignty: the formal mechanisms and the formal rights in the international system, to which independent states become entitled".³³ They argued that if the "instruments of authority" held by each state cannot be used "autonomously" to realise benefits for the population then policy matters should identify other instruments outside the domestic political system to support the domestic instruments, hence the rationale for regional integration where resources could be combined for the solution of internal and external problems, or "maximising viability" in the international system.

32 See P. Emmanuel, V. Lewis and A. McIntyre, The Political Economy of Independence for the Leeward and Windward Islands, Mimeo, February 23, 1975.

33 op. cit., p. 6 ff.

The future of the Associated States was again discussed at the Second CARICOM Heads of Government Conference in St. Kitts in December 1975. One resolution passed at the meeting noted that the status was a temporary measure, that no other constitution of a Commonwealth Caribbean Community contained provision for a referendum as a prerequisite to independence and that association no longer served the development and constitutional requirements and aspirations of the peoples of the Associated States.³⁴

The Associated States were called upon to discuss the termination of Associated Status with the UK at the earliest possible date in accordance with Section 10 (2) of the West Indies Act, 1967. This resolution supported the desire of the Council of the West Indies Associated States expressed earlier. After being non-independent members of the integration movement it became very clear that their status had placed them at a severe disadvantage.

It had become common since the 1972 elections in Grenada to treat independence as an election issue; Cato (in opposition during the St. Vincent elections of 1974) pledged full independence during his term of office; so did the ruling United Workers' Party of St. Lucia which also won in 1974; Patrick John was re-elected in Dominica in March 1975; Robert Bradshaw was returned as Premier in December 1975 pledging independence for St. Kitts-Nevis; Antigua's elections of February 1976

34 Ibid.

were won by the opposition Antigua Labour Party (ALP) under Vere Bird - the ruling Progressive Labour Movement had campaigned on the issue of independence by mandate while the ALP focused on economic issues and no independence without referendum. By 1976 independence talks were held in the UK between the Governments of Dominica, St. Kitts-Nevis, and St. Lucia.

Internally the independence debate focussed primarily on three issues: the nature and meaning of independence, the mode of proceeding to it and the character of the independence institution. These issues were viewed differently by the various groups competing for political power: some felt independence was an opportunity to gain international recognition and more international aid, a view often expressed by Gairy; others felt that independence would somehow release national creative energies while others were still wed to the notion of economic viability and preferred independence within an integrated framework, that is insular independence was deemed incompatible with regionalism. We should also note that the period of the late Seventies was characterised by the upsurge of radicalism in the Associated States and in two Associated States, St. Lucia and Dominica, left leaning parties had won elections.

It had become a familiar pattern for opposition parties to call for a referendum prior to independence while the ruling parties asserted that a mandate was given in the last elections. In March 1977 in Dominica, Eugenia Charles, the opposition leader called for a referendum during a House of Assembly debate on independence; following discussions in London in March and May, 1977 it was agreed that Dominica would adopt a republican form of Government by January 1978; St. Lucia's independence was also fixed

for early 1978; Antigua felt economically strong enough to ask for independence by February 1980; in St. Kitts-Nevis, the Anguilla issue proved to be a stumbling block to independence; a constitutional conference was held in London during September 1978 paving the way for St. Vincent's independence on October 27, 1979. Apart from minor procedural matters all the Associated States were well on the way to independence by the early eighties.³⁵

TABLE 10.1:

DATES OF INDEPENDENCE OF THE LEEWARD AND WINDWARD ISLANDS

<u>Territories</u>	<u>Date of Independence</u>
Grenada	February 7, 1974
Dominica	November 5, 1978
St. Lucia	February 22, 1979
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	October 27, 1979
Antigua and Barbuda	November 1, 1981
St. Kitts-Nevis	September 19, 1983

Conclusions

What was perhaps a most significant aspect of the transition to independence was the fact that no referendum was ever carried out in any of the Associated States prior to independence. In almost every case the opposition had sought to invoke the relevant section of the West Indies Act, 1967. In every case, some of which went before the courts, the UK

35 For chronology of events leading up to independence see UN Doc. A/31/23/Add. 9 (Part 1) October 1976, paras 15-43; A/32/23/Add. 7, August 1979, paras 27-49; A/34/23/Add. 7, October 1979, paras. 11-51. See also Bulletin of Eastern Caribbean Affairs, 4, 2, May/June, 1978.

Government acceded to the request by the governments of the Associated States to proceed to independence. In St. Vincent two opposition parties filed a writ in the High Court claiming that a resolution passed by the House of Assembly authorizing the government to seek full independence for the territory was ultra vires, null and void as it was not in conformity with the West Indies Act, 1967. The judge dismissed the complaints as "frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of the process of the courts". He further declared that no resolution was needed to enable the UK Government to terminate its association with the Government of St. Vincent and that the West Indies Act of 1967 could serve no useful purpose.³⁶ The West Indies Act had itself become null and void, at least that section dealing with termination of association. Whatever "fears" the UK Government might have had over despots becoming Prime Ministers had vanished during the seventies, thanks also to the changed UN and international climate. The procedure for independence had by this time become very simple: a government could claim to represent the wishes of the people for independence (as indicated through the last general elections) and request the UK Government to convene a constitutional conference to consider proposals for constitutional changes; thereafter it was left to parliamentary procedure and programme. Of course, the environment at the UN had also changed making it more conducive for mini-states to become members.

By the time independence was being actively considered none of the Associated States could be said to be economically viable. Table 10.2

36 Reported in UN Doc. A/34/23/Add. 7, paras. 34-36.

shows that during the late seventies for the group as a whole there were large deficits of expenditure over revenue.

TABLE 10.2

CURRENT REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE OF THE OECS COUNTRIES

1977-1981 (EC\$ MILLION)

Category	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
OECS Current Revenue	205.4	248.7	307.5	371.1	439.7
OECS Current Expenditure	216.3	256.4	329.8	386.0	452.5
OECS Surplus/Deficit	-10.9	- 7.7	-22.3	-14.9	-12.8
OECS Capital Revenue	10.9	15.5	17.2	19.6	44.9
OECS Capital Expenditure	56.5	82.5	118.9	167.2	283.7
OECS Overall Surplus/ Deficit	-56.5	-74.7	-124.0	-162.5	-251.6

Source: World Bank Economic Data.

For the period 1970-1977 the average annual growth rate of per capital income had declined in the Associated States with the exception of St. Kitts-Nevis and St. Lucia.

TABLE 10.3

GROWTH RATE OF PER CAPITA INCOME 1970-1977

Antigua	-3.7
St. Kitts-Nevis	1.6
Dominica	-4.1
Grenada	-3.2
St. Lucia	0.7
St. Vincent	-2.2

Source: World Bank Economic Data.

While it cannot be said that the Associated States had become economically viable during the Statehood regime, politically the territories had benefited tremendously from their participation in both the sub-regional East Caribbean Common Market and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). After all CARICOM was an international forum in which sovereign states discussed issues which not only affected the region but which were of concern to the international community.³⁷

What is very evident is that thinking both internally and internationally on independence for small states had changed/shifted dramatically within a short space of time. There was little or no mention of economic viability throughout the seventies when it could be said that by then Britain, having resolved the Rhodesian issue, could then urge the mini-states to choose independence.

For the Associated States themselves, they could now be full partners within the regional integration movement without being sniped at by the independent members and through independence the last vestiges of the institutionalised metropolitan presence would have been removed.

D. Comparing Associated Statehood with Other Forms of Association

Puerto Rico, the Netherlands Antilles and the Cook Islands have had some form of "free association" with a larger entity, the US, Netherlands

37 These included South-South Cooperation, New International Economic Order, Middle East Situation, Southern Africa, Namibia, and Non-Alignment.

and New Zealand, respectively. In all three cases there was unrestricted emigration to the metropolitan countries. This did not happen in the Associated States whose citizens were subject to the Commonwealth Immigration Act of 1962. Puerto Rico also shared with the US common defence, common currency and a free market, none of which was extended to the Associated States except defence. That the citizens of the West Indies Associated States did not enjoy some of the privileges afforded to the citizens of other associations which certainly put the Associated States in a less advantageous position.

As Margaret Broderick pointed out the constitutional position of the Associated States was less significant than they themselves realised, for Dominions such as Canada, New Zealand and Australia had by the turn of the nineteenth century achieved immunity from UK legislation.³⁸

"Internal independence" was merely a cover for continuing the colonial relationship as it became clear after Statehood. It was left to Gairy in 1972 to expose another myth that Associated Statehood did not "buy time", rather valuable time was lost as the territories could not effectively take part or take advantage of what the international community had to offer. Independence for the territories in 1974 was no more realistic than in 1965. The critical difference was in the attitude of the administering power and in the local political leaders themselves, an attitude which betrayed the paucity of ideas among the local politicians, and an inability to fashion alternative measures and mechanisms.

38 op. cit., p. 400.

E. Transition to Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States

On May 15-16 1979, the Council of Ministers of the Associated States at a Meeting in Castries, St. Lucia decided to convert the Council into the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). The decision was taken because of the constitutional and other changes which had taken place in the Associated States and the region as a whole. The aim of the OECS was:

- (a) to promote cooperation among the member states and at the regional and international levels having due regard to the Treaty establishing the Caribbean Community and the Charter of the United Nations;
- (b) to promote unity and solidarity among the member states and to defend their sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence;
- (c) to assist the member states in the performance of their obligations under international law as the standard of conduct of states in their reciprocal relations;
- (d) to achieve the fullest possible coordination of the foreign policies within the respective competences of the member states; to seek to adopt as far as possible common positions on all international issues; and to establish and maintain joint overseas missions and representation in the pursuit of their international relations with other states and international organisations; and

- (e) to pursue the foregoing purposes through its respective institutions by discussion of questions of common concern and by agreement and common action.

Four institutions were established by the Treaty which came into effect in June 1979:

- (1) an authority of Heads of Governments, which is the supreme policy making institution of OECS and responsible for concluding agreements with international organisations or third world countries, it meets twice a year;
- (2) a foreign affairs committee, which is responsible for developing the foreign policy of OECS, acting in the international sphere through a commission-general with the rank of a cabinet minister;
- (3) an economic affairs committee, which took over the functions entrusted to the Council under the ECOM Treaty; and
- (4) a central secretariat having responsibility for general administration of OECS and headed by a secretary-general reporting to the commissioner-general and through him to the authority.³⁹

39 Facts about the OECS, OECS Secretariat, 1979.

Chapter xi

Summary and Conclusions

A. Introduction: Main Themes and Issues

In the analysis of Associated Statehood as a transitional phenomenon account was taken of the role of the United Nations in determining the status of territories, the background and rationale to Associated Statehood, the experience of the Associated States in dealing with issues at the national, regional and international levels and the debate over economic viability in the final transition to independence.

The main themes of the study were therefore:

1. Self-determination for mini-states and the role of the United Nations in determining the status of territories
2. Attempts to devise plans for decolonization of the West Indies
3. Associated Statehood within the regional intergration movement as a transitional phenomenon
4. Associated Statehood within the international system
5. The debate over economic viability
6. The place of small states within the international system

The study was organised around the core concepts of "viability" defined as the ability of a state to meet its recurrent expenditures or to balance its overseas payments without recourse to grants-in-aid or loans; decolonisation as a change process which includes both formal constitutional decolonisation which is labelled the "outer limits" and post-colonial activities aimed at socio-economic systemic changes (the "inner limits"); self-determination which is the right whereby people freely choose the paths to economic, social and cultural development; and independence which is a "status" endowing states with the right to conduct or control their internal and external affairs. These distinctions become particularly relevant in the analysis of the application of self-determination to the Leewards and Windwards. The study was divided into four parts, Part I outlining the background to Associated Statehood, Part II an analysis of the experience of Associated Statehood, Part III giving an account of the transition to independence and Part IV an appraisal of small states within the international system.

As a study in political and economic change it necessarily began with a review of the constitutional and political history of the West Indies which forms the backdrop for constitutional experimentation.

In the review of the constitutional history of the islands, it was found that the ideology of colonial rule had persisted long after slavery was abolished: the Crown Colony system of government consolidated white domination rather than opening up the system to representative government. Up to World War II attempts were made to

link constitutional change with economic development which Britain sought to promote through Colonial Development and Welfare Acts.

Conceptually in the application of self-determination various constitutional and political arrangements were devised and/or adopted for the West Indies such as federation, unitary statehood, closer association, integration, Associated Statehood and independence. After the Second World War colonial policy planning shifted to the preparation of the territories for self-government through a more vigorous application of Colonial Development and Welfare Acts as the major policy instruments. The Royal Commission which investigated the unrest of the 1930s did not find the colonies ready for self-government, primarily because they were all considered too small, neither did they have the experience of representative and responsible government.

B. The Three Phases of Decolonisation: the Erosion of the Economic Viability Argument

The attempts to devise plans for the decolonisation of the West Indies took place in three phases: the first phase was that of federation which lasted from 1958-1962, and resulted in the independence of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago; the second phase was between 1962-1965 during which further attempts were made to form a federation of the Leewards and Windwards and Barbados (otherwise called the "Little Eight") which again failed, this time resulting in the independence of Barbados (1966); the third phase was the introduction of Associated Statehood as an alternative to federation and independence which was

ruled out for the smaller territories because of their size and their presumed incapability to undertake the responsibilities of independence.

The West Indies Federation, like most of the federal schemes devised by the British during the era of decolonisation, failed because of various reasons, not the least of which was the character of the Federal constitution and the status of the Federation as a non-independent entity. In a critique of the Federal constitution in 1959 the Trinidad and Tobago government called for a strong central government which was completely free and independent¹, none of which was realised by 1962.

The failure of the West Indies Federation did not prevent the "Little Eight" from continuing efforts toward a smaller federation. Just when it was thought that the problems besetting the earlier federation were resolved, Grenada announced that it was exploring the possibility of unitary statehood with Trinidad and Tobago and thereafter severe strains developed among the remaining seven leaders. Crucial to this second failure was the fact that although a UK-Commissioned survey had recommended financial assistance in the order of EC\$311 million over a ten-year period to achieve take-off into sustained growth on the level

1 The Economics of Nationhood, (Government Printery, Trinidad, 1959). This document spelled out in great detail the structure and prerequisites of a strong federation. In addition to setting out the division of power between Federal and Unit Governments it called for a completely independent government which should command the confidence and respect of all nations and international organisations.

of economic viability required for eventual independence (by 1974, according to the Commission's projection), the British Government could not even guarantee EC\$75 million. In the absence of assurance over the quantum and duration of assistance, the political leaders decided that it would no longer be worthwhile to pursue federation. It was evident at that stage that none of the islands envisaged early independence. In fact to suggest independence would have evoked scornful remarks from the dominant groups who always felt that the small islands could not rule themselves.

The decision to choose Associated Statehood came at a time when internationally, that is, at the United Nations, the calls for the end to colonial rule had reached fever pitch. Most of the larger territories had achieved independence; it was then the era of the so-called mini-states to exercise their right to self-determination, and several with populations of less than 200,000 had already done so, namely, Western Samoa (population 130,000) in 1961, Nauru (population 6,000) in 1967, Tonga (population 75,000) in 1970. Although by the late sixties it was firmly established that small size and low level of economic development were no longer impediments to independence, the prospect of the entry of several mini-states into the United Nations did become a source of concern to that body and in particular to the United States and the Western Powers. The analysis of political development of the Eastern Caribbean revealed a kind of weariness on the part of the local leaders who really had no alternative proposal to federation and were still wedded to the idea of economic viability. It was then left to the UK Government to find the constitutional solution,

in effect a brilliant one, since the UK fully discharged its obligations to the United Nations while it no longer had to shoulder the onerous task of creating economic viability in the islands. At no time did any of the islands regard Associated Statehood as anything but a transitional phase to full independence. From all accounts Associated Statehood was accepted because it promised continuing budgetary support. In fact budgetary support from the United Kingdom declined while there was an increase in aid to capital projects.

The constitutional arrangements under Associated Statehood had far-reaching legal and political implications, regionally and internationally. At the national level, Statehood was regarded as "internal independence", sometimes mistakenly taken for "full" independence. In reality, the constitutional advances provided under the West Indies Act were minor since the States already had experience of "responsible" governments. This is not to say that local populations were not given a bigger voice in the conduct of their internal affairs and, through the regional integration movement in certain areas of international affairs.

Although deprived of international personality, provisions were made to entrust the Associated States with power and authority to conduct certain kinds of external affairs which, along with defence, were reserved to the UK Government. Of great significance was the entrustment of authority to participate fully in the regional integration movement, the Caribbean Free Trade Association.

As it turned out later, having control over internal affairs (or internal independence as it was dubbed) was not a sufficient condition for economic development. It would take several years for the leaders to discover for themselves the political truth that Eric Williams spoke about in 1959 when he said in reference to the Federation that the economics of nationhood demanded a government absolutely free and completely independent, which should have complete command of all its materials and resources (and that includes jurisdiction over landing rights), and should have the confidence and respect of all nations and international organisations; Williams further regarded any concession on independence as an acknowledgement of weakness;² the acceptance of Statehood was indeed an acknowledgement of weakness.

The constitutional and political issues having been resolved for the most part, Associated Statehood then became a strategy for promoting accelerated economic development - mainly through the sub-regional and regional integration movement. During the early years of the Statehood regime, the primary concerns were with economic development and taking maximum advantage of opportunities under the sub-regional and regional arrangements. Participation in these arrangements provided both physical and psychological compensation for small size; the imperatives of creating economic viability were firmly rooted in integration, therefore for the Associated States it was an absolute necessity that special measures be provided within these frameworks to promote economic

2 Ibid.

development. Toward this end, a number of strategies were devised to facilitate:-

- (a) a greater private and public investment;
- (b) greater resource mobilisation to finance larger development programmes through incomes and tax policies;
- (c) greater extended aid flows; and
- (d) an annual growth rate of at least five per cent.

The conceptual approach to economic viability was through the establishment of several institutional mechanisms at national, sub-regional and regional levels, and included national development corporations, the Caribbean Development Bank, a Regional Development Agency, and the Caribbean Investment Corporation. Of these, only the development corporations and the Caribbean Development Bank survived the Statehood regime, one having outlived its usefulness and was swallowed up by the Caribbean Development Bank while the Caribbean Investment Corporation folded up after becoming bankrupt.

Under Statehood, economic development based primarily on import substitution strategy was uneven in the various sectors with the industrial activity showing lowest performance due mainly to continuing lack of proper infrastructure, insufficient or ineffective promotion of programmes abroad, and shortage of finance. Agriculture still lagged in spite of the Agricultural Marketing Protocol, due to high costs of production, lack of efficiency, lack of proper marketing facilities and seasonality problems which led all the islands to produce the same crops

at the same time. At the fiscal level at the time of Statehood, St. Lucia was the only State not receiving budgetary assistance (grant-in-aid) from Britain; by 1974 only St. Kitts-Nevis and St. Vincent still received this kind of aid; between 1970 and 1977 the average annual growth rate of per capita income had declined in all the States (including Grenada) with the exception of St. Kitts-Nevis and St. Lucia. Overall, there was a marked increase in the level of development assistance from agencies such as USAID, CIDA and the UK Government.

It is reasonable to conclude from the analysis that the Associated States, while not reaping the full benefits of integration (since they had very little to trade in the first place), were much better off economically than not participating at all. Industrial development remained elusive as the international economic crisis of the 1970s affected all countries, both MDCs and LDCs. The LDCs, as they were collectively named within the integration movement, at least had their special problems recognised to the point where special provisions were enshrined in various agreements relating to trade, finance, technical assistance, agricultural developments, industrial development, tourism and in certain policy co-ordination instruments (Harmonisation of Fiscal Incentives, Common External Tariff, Avoidance of Double Taxation).

In the areas of functional cooperation, the Associated States benefitted from regional schemes in several areas such as shipping, air transport, meteorological services, and technological and scientific research. Although non-independent, the Associated States had access to international forums and took part fully in negotiating international trade agreements with the EEC.

If viability can be measured in terms of capacity to participate in international meetings, to the extent that the Associated States participated fully through the regional integration movement, it can be argued that the Associated States demonstrated political viability. What was missing was the legal personality to conduct external affairs on their own. It was by then recognised that the condition of non-independence was detrimental to the aspirations of the Associated States. When Grenada opted for independence in 1974, Senator Derek Knight explained the rationale not on the basis of some unspecified economic viability but that the status had become an unnecessary hindrance to conducting international agreements.³

Increasingly there were calls from the independent members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) to rectify this "peculiar constitutional arrangement" especially as the potential always existed for Britain to intervene in the internal affairs of the Associated States as was demonstrated in the Anguilla Affair. If the non-independent Associated States were an embarrassment to the others Grenada's independence in 1974 certainly added to their embarrassment since Grenada demonstrated that independence did not require the capability to defend the national integrity or to establish foreign missions in the conduct of external affairs. It took another four years before the second Associated State (Dominica) became independent and almost ten years before they all finally chose that route. This long delay can be explained by two

3 Interview with Trinidad Express 23 March 1974.

factors: the relative comfort and 'safety' that the Associated States found within the sub-regional and regional integration arrangements (East Caribbean Common Market and the Caribbean Community)⁴ and the continuing belief that defence and external affairs were expensive luxuries, coupled with the belief that the 'special relationship' with Britain offered more economic benefits which they could not obtain as independent units. In reality the special relationship offered little by way of real economic development if measured in terms of per capita income or gross national product. International development assistance was channelled mainly through the Caribbean Community and it was not until the end of the Statehood regime that certain donors such as the United States Agency for International Development and the Canadian International Development Agency began to shift from multilateral to bilateral aid. In other words as a group of non-independent states it was more convenient to deal with them through CARICOM; with independence the door was open to more direct influence by donor countries.

When it was realised that the advantages of Associated Statehood were more or less exhausted the next logical step was for the Associated States to exercise the option of requesting a termination of association

4 For a useful account of the role of the integration movement in development see Anthony Payne, The Politics of the Caribbean Community 1961-1979. Regional Integration among New States (N.Y., St. Martins press, 1980); Jean F. Freymond, Political Integration in the Commonwealth Caribbean: a Survey of Recent Attempts with Special Reference to the Associated States (1967-1974) (Geneva: Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, 1980).

in favour of independence. The transition to independence was smooth, except for local opposition party leaders who always seemed to find a reason to delay the next constitutional step with the hope of leading the island into the new status.

From the evidence presented, independence was not linked to economic viability, however defined. By the 1970s, independence had become divorced from economic under-pinnings, and had become mainly a function of recognition at the international level. Secondly, while some economic progress was achieved through participation in the regional integration movement, the Associated States had displayed a level of political maturity which made independence a necessity rather than a choice.⁵

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- 5 For comments on events leading up to independence in the Leeward and Windwards see: Independence for Grenada: Myth or Reality, op. cit.; this excellent collection of papers presented at a Symposium prior to the independence of Grenada gives a detailed background to the political history of the island and the personalities and issues involved. Students of the politics of small states will find a goldmine of information in articles by participants which included Bernard Coard who later became Deputy Prime Minister under the Peoples Revolutionary Government. The Bulletin of Eastern Caribbean Affairs, vol.4, nos. 2-4, (May-October 1978) give detailed accounts on development in Dominica (N.J.O. Liverpool), St. Vincent (Ralph E. Gonsalves) and constitutional aspects of transition to independence (A. R. Carnegie). See also George C. Abbott, 'The Associated States and Independence', Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 23,i, (February 1981) pp.69-94; Anthony E. Thorndike 'The Politics of Inadequacy: a Study of the Associated Statehood and Political Arrangements for the Eastern Caribbean', Social and Economic Studies, 28, 3 (September 1979), pp.597-617; Edward A. Laing, 'Independence and Islands: the Decolonisation of the British Caribbean', International Law and Politics, 12 (1979), pp.281-312; Earl Gooding, The West Indies at the Crossroads: the Search for a Viable Future (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1981)

C. The Place of Small States in the International System

James Mitchell, former Premier and since 1984 Prime Minister of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, once remarked that mini-states, like minatures, were collectors' items,⁶ hinting that mini-states may not be viable and independent entities. With decolonisation in full swing after World War II and the prospect of very small territories becoming independent, attention began to be focused on the impact of mini-states on the United Nations and likewise the impact of the United Nations upon the mini-states. During 1965 the Secretary-General drew the attention of the United Nations to the emrgence of small new states, otherwise labelled micro- or mini-states and the problem they posed as to the role they should play in international life.⁷ The Secretary-General joined by the United States representative to the UN called for a study of the problem.⁸ Because of the ramifications of creating a new category of membership, there was little enthusiasm for open debate on the subject.

In 1967, the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) produced a report on questions relating to small states.⁹ It was the spectre of over two hundred islands joining the United Nations which prompted that body to study the problems, in particular the

⁶ See James Mitchell, "The Caribbean Mini-States" (mimeo) n.d.

⁷ UN Document A/6001/Add.1.

⁸ UN Document S/PV/1243, 20 September 1965.

⁹ UNITAR, Small States and Territories: Status and Problems, UN Doc. A/6701/Add. 1, (ARNO Press 1967)

criteria for United Nations membership and other forms of association with the United Nations. There were four areas of concern with respect to mini-states: the impact of a considerable number of mini-states upon the United Nations; the impact of the United Nations upon mini-states; the responsibilities of the United Nations towards mini-states and proposals for action to improve the relationship between mini-states and the United Nations.¹⁰

With respect to the first concern, the major issues were: distortion of representation, financial support, impact on the United Nations decision-making process and lack of human and financial resources to maintain representatives to the United Nations.

Regarding the impact of mini-states, the central concerns were: unbearable financial burdens on mini-states to maintain a Mission at the United Nations and to pay annual UN assessment and contributions to

10 These issues are further discussed in: Roger Fisher, "The Participation of Micro States in International Affairs", American Journal of International Law, 61, No. 2 (April 1968); W.L. Harris, "Micro States in the United Nations: A Broader Purpose", Columbia Journal of International Law, 9, (1970); Michael N. Grunter, "Liechtenstein and the League of Nations: A Precedent for the United Nations Mini-State Problem", American Journal of International Law, 68, No. 3 (July 1974); Stephen M. Schwebel, "Mini-States and a More Effective United Nations", American Journal of International Law, 67, No. 1 (January 1973); The Stanley Foundation, "Decision-Making Processes of the United Nations", Report of the Ninth Conference on the United Nations of the Next Decade (9-16 June 1974); UNITAR, op. cit., Status and Problems; Patricia Wohlgemuth Blair, The Mini-State Dilemma, Occasional Paper No. 6 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (revised ed. 1968); M.H. Mendelson, "Diminutive States in the United Nations", International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 21 (October 1972), pp.609-630.

special funds and specialised agencies; lack of competent and experienced diplomats; and involvement in activities with little relevance to mini-states.

The United Nations responsibility to mini-states entailed the extension of independence to all colonial peoples and the right of self-determination. While promoting decolonisation, the United Nations was also concerned for security of small states, for protection against overt or covert intervention from other nations. Additionally, the United Nations had the responsibility to advise and assist mini-states in developing viable economies, and those not opting for independence to assure them of access to development assistance.

It is against these concerns that much of the literature on mini-states is focused. Firstly, regarding the definition of a mini-state, the criteria used sometimes included size, population, economic viability and gross national product. Neither the United Nations and its special committees, nor scholars have agreed on a common definition, some proposing a population of less than one million while others preferred 100,000. The UNITAR study uses a population of less than one million;¹¹ while others have used less than 300,000 and 150,000 as rough guides.¹² Even a formula based on per capita income proved difficult to accept. For the United Nations, size was not the over-riding factor but the level of human and economic resources.

11 op. cit., p.22

12 Cf. Blair, op. cit.

The views of the United Nations on micro-states are well documented, for example, when the Maldives Islands (population 90,000) were admitted to the United Nations in 1965 it was time for the United Nations Secretary General to call on the United Nations to consider the question of micro-states.¹³ It was not until August 1969 that the Security Council set up a Committee of Experts which met for two years without taking any decisions. During this time, although there was debate and disagreement over the definition of a mini-state, the United Nations generally reiterated the right of all colonial peoples to self-determination and independence.¹⁴ In 1969, the United Nations Security Council identified two conditions for development of very small states: firstly, that the people must determine their own future being aware of the available alternatives, and secondly, that the United Nations must participate when they decided their future.¹⁵

The alternative forms of self-government as spelled out in Resolution 1541 (XV) were emergence as an independent state, integration with an independent state and free association with an independent state. With respect to association, on two occasions the United Nations accepted the choice of a small territory to have internal self-government but to remain in association with its old colonial power; these were Puerto Rico in 1953 and the Cook Islands in 1965.

13 UN Doc., S/PV 1243, 20 September 1965.

14 UN Doc. A/6300/Rev.1, pp. 769-770; A/AC.109/L.486, 8 July 1968; A/AC.109/L.485; A/AC.109/L.487

15 UN Doc., A/PV/1822, 5 December 1969

Although the right of micro-states to United Nations membership has been recognised, countries such as the United States, including the UN Secretary-General, were concerned with the influx of these states on the work of the United Nations as we noted earlier. The Prime Minister of Lesotho, speaking in the General Debate in 1967, challenged the protagonists of incorporation into a larger political entity by stating that, firstly, his people had not struggled for over a hundred years to achieve anonymity and oblivion, secondly, that the view did not reflect the collective opinion of the General Assembly and would violate the spirit and intention of the Charter, and, thirdly, smaller states had a vital contribution to offer in the field of international relations.¹⁶ If one takes into consideration other developments of the 1960s, particularly the issue of the Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence, the concern of the Western Powers was not over the work of the UN but the voting strength of small new nations on issues some of which were inimical to Western interests.

By 1974, the General Assembly had established an ad hoc Committee on the United Nations Charter which it was hoped might explore the possibility of amending the Charter to provide for a form of "associate membership".¹⁷ So far, nothing has come out of these proposals since non-members of the United Nations have the opportunity to participate in

16 UN Doc. A/PV. 1565, 25 September 1969.

17 Resolution 3349 (XXIX).

almost every field in the subsidiary bodies with identical rights to member states.¹⁸

Associated membership came to be regarded as "second class membership" which many felt would not be welcomed by mini-states. Another option considered by experts was group membership, however because joint representation had proved problematic, this idea was never pursued. In October 1967, the Jamaica representative proposed that the General Assembly should establish a section to deal exclusively with the technical and administrative problems of small states, a suggestion widely supported by the experts but which found little support with the United States and other delegations.¹⁹

In summary, numerous suggestions were made for resolving the mini-state problem in the United Nations, such as: maintaining the current status quo by encouraging mini-states to assume the benefits and responsibilities of full membership in the United Nations; allowing full membership in the United Nations upon meeting the minimum qualifications but with arrangements to lessen the mini-states' financial and manpower burden; encouraging mini-states to establish a full mission in regional

18 Non-members hold office in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO).

19 UN Doc. A/PV. 1584, UNITAR Series No. 3.

economic associations and/or United Nations specialised agencies particularly concerned with economic and social development in lieu of full United Nations membership; encouraging mini-states to become parties to the statutes of the International Court of Justice even without full United Nations membership; encouraging mini-states to accept an observer status at the United Nations with limited participation; developing a type of joint United Nations membership whereby several mini-states having compatible interests and similar problems would be represented by a single mission; developing an Associate Membership in the United Nations with less demanding commitments on either a voluntary or a mandatory basis.²⁰

The general political, administrative and economic problems of micro-states have been treated exhaustively in a collection of papers presented at a symposium on small territories.²¹ Highly critical of the United Nations approach to the problems of the smaller territories is Stanley A. De Smith, particularly with regard to the United Nations insistence on the right to self-government for these mini-states.²² De Smith's view represents a fossilised colonialist view which could not

20 These options were discussed at a Conference on Micro-States and the United Nations in 1974. See the Stanley Foundation, Mini- States and the United Nations, Vantage Conference Report (September 1974).

21 See Burton Benedict, ed., Problems of Smaller Territories (London: University of London, Athlone Press, for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1967).

22 See Stanley A. De Smith, Micro States and Micronesia (N.Y.: New York University Press 1970).

envisage independence or an independent role for small states. Preoccupation with power, size and viability can indeed blind one to the needs and aspirations of groups of peoples when these needs are not being met within an existing framework. Associated Statehood promised much but delivered very little economically. As noted earlier while association was one of the accepted means of achieving self-government under Resolution 1541 (XV) the international system still continued to treat the Associated States as colonies. Being independent small states the colonial stigma was not only removed but the states now had the opportunity to be recognised in international law and be allowed the opportunity to play a role in the international system to the extent that their resources permit. The fear of mini-states aligning themselves with radical anti-Western policies is not founded; in fact experience has shown that the so-called Third World is seldom if ever united on international issues; even among the Caribbean States in the UN Grenada decided to vote with Cuba in supporting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 while the other independent states condemned it or abstained.

Military-Strategic Importance of the Caribbean Mini-States

The military-strategic importance of the Leeward and Windward Islands has often been cited by some observers as one of the reasons (if not the real reason for devising Associated Statehood). While the evidence for U.S. involvement in promoting Associated Statehood is difficult to assemble there are several indicators which suggest that the choice of Statehood over independence at the time suited U.S. military-strategic interests in the Western Hemisphere. The 1960s was a

period of instability during which the Soviets firmly established a foothold in Cuba; the 1965 U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic signalled to the Soviets that further attempts to create client-states in the region would be resisted. Under these circumstances independence for the mini-states could have proved problematic. During the Statehood era little attention was paid by the U.S. policy planners, and it was not until independence was being seriously considered that attention was once more focused on the islands. Of course the over-throw of Somoza in Nicaragua and Eric Gairy in Grenada, both by radical groups, forced the United States to rethink its policy towards the Caribbean which culminated in Reagan's Caribbean Basin Initiative. Meanwhile the research institutions began working frantically to develop a coherent policy. While not treated within the scope of this study the implications of Associated Statehood for U.S. strategic interests should not be forgotten, neither should independence which created a new set of nightmare scenarios as borne out by events in Grenada.²³

23 For recent studies of U.S. military strategic interests in the Caribbean see: Josph M. H. Stodder, Profiles of the Caribbean Basin in 1960/1980: Changing Geopolitical and Geostrategic Dimensions (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corp., 1983); Thomas D. Anderson, Geopolitics of the Caribbean: Mini-States in a Wider World (N.Y.: Praeger 1984); Thomas H. Moorer and Georges A. Fauriol, Caribbean Basin Security (Georgetown, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University Press, N. Y.: Praeger, 1984); S. Curtis Morris, Jr., The United States-Caribbean Basin Military Connection (Washington D.C., Center for hemispheric Studies, 1983); U.S. Department of State, Democracy and Security in the Caribbean Basin (Washington D.C. 1982); Current Policy No. 364; Hester D. Langley, The United States and the Caribbean (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1980); J. Edward Greene, "United States - Caribbean Relations: Challenges and Responses," (Paper presented at 8th Annual Conference of Caribbean Studies Association, Santo Domingo, May 25-28, 1983); Paget Henry and Carl Stone, eds., The Newer Caribbean: Decolonisation, Democracy and Development (Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues, 1983).

D. Lessons of the Regional Integration Movement: Theoretical Considerations

Integration has played a key role in the decolonisation and development of the West Indies. It will be useful to consider some of the lessons to be learned from the West Indian experience of federation the formation of the Caribbean Community.

At a theoretical level integration studies are usually focused geographically on national integration, regional integration and international integration. Theories of intergration are usually applied to these three levels. Broadly speaking, there are three theoretical approaches to the study of integration: federalism, communications theory and neo-functionalism.²⁴ The federal approach emphasises common purposes and common needs among the units, the commonality of interests which facilitates the transfer of institutions from the national to the regional level. The communications approach is based on the concepts and methods of cybernetic theory to provide explanations for the growth of political systems and to predict the consequences of changes that affect the structures of systems — the volume of trans-actions is the main indicator. The neo-functionalist approach rests on the notion that the growing complexity of governmental systems requires

24 A critique of these approaches is given by Ernst Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorising," International Organisation, 24, 4 (Autumn 1978) pp.607-646

changes in technical and non-political tasks of government which in turn creates the demand for highly trained specialists at the national level. If the problems which could not be solved at the national level were assigned to specialists and separated from the political sector this would lead to collaboration in technical fields at the regional/international level. Functional collaboration would eventually encroach on the political order thus building up the foundations for political agreement.²⁵

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- 25 For an elaboration of the ideas and concepts associated with the federalist school see: Carl J. Friedrich, Trends of Federalism in Theory and Practice, New York: Frederick A. Preager, 1968; Amitai Etzioni, Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965; Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (ed.), The Integration of Political Communities, Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1964; Thomas M. Franck, ed., Why Federations Fail: An Inquiry into the Requisites for Successful federalism, New York: New York Univ. Press, 1968. The communications approach can be found in Karl W. Deutsch, et. al., France, Germany, and the Western Alliance: A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967; Deutsch, "The Impact of Communications upon International Relations Theory," in Abdul Said, ed., Theory of International Relations: The Crisis of Relevance, Practice Hall: 1968. The neo-functional approach is elaborated in Haas, op. cit., also his, Beyond the Nation-State, Stratford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1964. There are several volumes dealing with various aspects of integration, unification or regionalism. These include: Richard A. Falk and Saul H. Mendlovitz, eds., Regional Politics and World Order, San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Co., 1973; Cyril E. Black and Richard A. Falk eds., The Future of the International Legal Order, Princeton Univ. Press, 1972; J. S. Nye, Peace in Parts: Integration, Boston: 1971; also Nye, ed., International Regionalism, Boston: 1968; Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel, The International Politics of Regions, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1970; L. N. Lindberg and S. Scheingold, eds., Regional Integration: Theory and Research, Harvard Univ. Press, 1970. The edited volumes contain essays by leading theoreticians of integration.

In terms of the three phases of decolonisation described earlier, if we were to superimpose these phases on the three approaches, the following would be the result.

1. Under the federal approach (1958-1962) common purposes and needs were identified, however, there was no commonality of interests to facilitate the transfer of institutions from the national units to the Federal Government. This was already set out in the Trinidad and Tobago document 'The Economics of Nationhood'. Successful federalism requires not just the identification of needs and purposes but the willingness to transfer some aspects of decision making to the central government.
2. According to the cybernetic approach the Federation was doomed to failure from the start since the volume of transactions (the main indicator) was very low at the outset of the Federation and remained that way although efforts were made to improve communication between the islands through the provision of regular passenger service by sea. Under CARIFTA, and later CARICOM, the volume of transactions improved significantly as the islands became the main market for their own industrial and agricultural outputs. Not only were there increases in the flow of goods and services but a network of regional institutions were created to facilitate the implementation of regional policy.

3. Federalism gave way to neo-functionalism with the main emphasis on the creation of a free trade/common market area and cooperation in functionally specific areas. The greatest success has been in areas of functional co-operation in which several regional institutions have been established. Undoubtedly most of the individual member countries could not support the services at the national level undertaken by the regional institutions such as the Caribbean Development Bank, Caribbean Food Corporation, Caribbean Agricultural Research and Development Institute and the University of the West Indies.
4. The Leewards and Windwards have experienced a deeper level of integration since the formation of the East Caribbean Common Market (since 1979 the Organisation of East Caribbean States). Although they have not yet attained the ideal of a common market and community which allows for the free movement of people, attempts were made in this direction and indications are that as the areas of functional co-operation increase, the potential for political unification also increases. One of the most significant developments among the Leewards and Windwards has been the establishment of joint diplomatic missions in some of the metropolitan capitals.
5. Lastly, one should observe that while all member countries pay lip service to ideological pluralism, in practice ideological pluralism has created enormous problems for the integration movement and has at times threatened its integrity.

E. Recap of the Main Conclusions.

1. The decolonisation of the Leewards and Windward Islands was one of the longest drawnout affairs in colonial history during which the islands experienced various forms of colonial rule and various forms of constitutional decolonisation as prescribed by UN Resolution 1541 (XV).
2. The right of self-determination for colonial peoples established by the United Nations since 1945 was denied to the British-sponsored West Indies Federation of 1958, one of the main causes of its failure, as some unit countries had more advanced constitutions.
3. While the larger West Indian territories were granted independence following the break up of the Federation, the Leewards, Windwards and Barbados because of their small size were not considered viable for independence and were therefore encouraged to create viability through the formation of an Eastern Caribbean federation comprising the 'Little Eight'. The failure of the second attempt accompanied the erosion of the criteria for independence when Barbados graduated to independent status.
4. The policy to dissuade the Leewards and Windwards from seeking independence during the 1960s because of small size should be interpreted in the context of development at the United Nations where Britain and other colonial powers were being repeatedly condemned for their policies in Africa and elsewhere by Third World Nations

which had already become a majority in the United Nations by 1965. Independence for the mini-states would therefore have given the Third World bloc more voting power within the UN. Additionally, the Caribbean area had shown signs of growing instability following the establishment of a Soviet foothold in Cuba, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, the Bay of Pigs invasion and unrest in the Dominican Republic in 1965 which precipitated U.S. military intervention. It was feared that independence for the smaller territories at that time would have encouraged further Soviet adventurism or the emergence of radical groups inimical to U.S. interests. Statehood was designed to maintain the metropolitan presence to counter this perceived threat.

5. Associated Statehood was accepted by the island leaders because they were convinced that independence would be too burdensome whereas Statehood offered the prospect of continuing British budgetary aid. At no time did they regard Associated Statehood as anything but a phase in the transition to independence.
6. Associated Statehood was never accepted as a de facto act of self-determination since the UN was not involved in neither the design nor the application of Statehood. While the U.K. Government ceased transmittal of information on the islands the international community still continued to regard the islands as colonies.
7. Internally the Associated States had full control over their internal affairs while externally they lacked international legal personality.

8. The regional integration movement (the East Caribbean Common Market and the Caribbean Free Trade Agreement, later the Caribbean Community) provided the framework through which the Associated States could behave as if they were independent although their status was a source of increasing embarrassment particularly at meetings of the Caribbean Heads of Government.
9. Developmentally integration provided the conceptual framework for creating economic viability in the islands through the establishment of institutional mechanisms at the sub-regional and regional levels to support national planning institutions. The Associated States were net gainers through the participation in the integration movement.
10. Economic viability was no longer an argument against independence by 1974 although several bodies still believed that there were economic if not political advantages to be gained from continuing the relationship with Britain. Internally the most powerful groups and interests were not in favour of early independence although externally the British Government, having resolved their African problem appeared to be quite willing to support independence by the early 1970s. The change in attitude was very swift as the argument against independence for smaller states had completely lost its validity by then, viability taken simply to mean acceptance or recognition by the international community as a sovereign independent entity irrespective of size.

11. Internally the debate on independence was centered on three issues in most of the Associated States, namely, the nature and meaning of independence, the mode of proceeding to it, and the nature of the constitution. At the level of the subregional integration movement the debate was (a) whether Associated Statehood was conducive to economic viability and if not should the islands proceed to formal independence and (b) whether separate independence was conducive to economic viability and if not should they become independent through an integrated framework.

12. During the 1960s concern was expressed by the United Nations over the status and role of small territories. Several formulas were devised regarding membership and voting power in the UN; none of these measures were adopted — instead small states are entitled to full U.N. membership and to participate in its work to the extent that their resources permit. All the Associated States are now independent and members of the United Nations.

Appendix i

Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples (General Assembly
Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960)

The General Assembly,

Mindful of the determination proclaimed by the peoples of the world in the Charter of the United Nations to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

Conscious of the need for the creation of condition of stability and well-being and peaceful and friendly relations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of all peoples, and of universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion,

Recognising the passionate yearning for freedom in all dependent peoples and the decisive role of such peoples in the attainment of their independence,

Aware of the increasing conflicts resulting from the denial of or impediments in the way of the freedom of such peoples, which constitutes a serious threat to world peace,

Considering the important role of the United Nations in assisting the movement for independence in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories,

Recognising that the peoples of the world ardently desire the end of colonialism in all its manifestations,

Convinced that the continued existence of colonialism prevents the development of international economic cooperation, impedes the social, cultural and economic development of dependent peoples and militates against the United Nations ideal of universal peace,

Affirming that peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic cooperation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law,

Believing that the process of liberation is irresistible and irreversible and that, in order to avoid serious crises, an end must be put to colonialism and all practices of segregation and discrimination associated therewith,

Welcoming the emergence in recent years of a large number of dependent territories into freedom and independence, and recognising the increasingly powerful trends towards freedom in such territories which have not yet attained independence,

Convinced that all peoples have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory,

Solemnly proclaim the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations;

And to this end

Declares that:

1. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and cooperation.
2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
3. Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.
4. All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence, and the integrity of their national territory shall be respected.
5. Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.
6. Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
7. All States shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the present Declaration on the basis of equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of all States, and respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples and their territorial integrity.

General Assembly Resolution 1541 (XV). Annex.
Principles which Should Guide Members in Determining
Whether or not an Obligation Exists to Transmit the
Information called for in Article 73(e) of the
Charter of the United Nations

Principle I

The authors of the Charter of the United Nations had in mind that Chapter XI should be applicable to territories which were then known to be of the colonial type. An obligation exists to transmit information under Article 73(e) of the Charter in respect of such territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government.

Principle II

Chapter XI of the Charter embodies the concept of Non-Self-Governing Territories in a dynamic state of evolution and progress towards a 'full measure of self-government'. As soon as a territory and its peoples attain a full measure of self-government, the obligation ceases. Until this comes about, the obligation to transmit information under Article 73(e) continues.

Principle III

The obligation to transmit information under Article 73(e) of the Charter constitutes an international obligation and should be carried out with due regard to the fulfillment of international law.

Principle IV

Prima facie there is an obligation to transmit information in respect of a territory which is geographically separate and is distinct ethnically and/or culturally from the country administering it.

Principle V

Once it has been established that such a prima facie case of geographical and ethnical or cultural distinctness of a territory exists, other elements may then be brought into consideration. These additional elements may be, inter alia, of an administrative, political, juridical, economic or historical nature. If they affect the relationship between the metropolitan State and the territory concerned in a manner which arbitrarily places the latter in a position or status of subordination, they support the presumption that there is an obligation to transmit information under Article 73(e) of the Charter.

Principle VI

A Non-Self-Governing Territory can be said to have reached a full measure of self-government by:

- (a) Emergence as a sovereign independent state;
- (b) Free association with an independent state; or
- (c) Integration with an independent state.

Principle VII

(a) Free association should be the result of free and voluntary choice by the peoples of the territory concerned expressed through informed and democratic processes. It should be one which respects the individuality and the cultural characteristics of the territory and its peoples, and retains for the peoples of the territory which is associated with an independent state the freedom to modify the status of that territory through the expression of their will by democratic means and through constitutional processes.

(b) The associated territory should have the right to determine its internal constitution without outside interference, in accordance with due constitutional processes and the freely expressed wishes of the people. This does not preclude consultations as appropriate or necessary under the terms of the free association agreed upon.

Principle VIII

Integration with an independent state should be on the basis of complete equality between the peoples of the erstwhile Non-Self-Governing Territory and those of the independent country with which it is integrated. The peoples of both territories should have equal status and rights of citizenship and equal guarantees of fundamental rights and freedoms without any distinction or discrimination; both should have equal rights and opportunities for representation and effective participation at all levels in the executive, legislative and judicial organs of government.

Principle IX

Integration should have come about in the following circumstances:

- (a) The integrating territory should have attained an advanced stage of self-government with free political institutions, so that its people would have the capacity to make a responsible choice through informed and democratic processes;
- (b) The integration should be the result of the freely expressed wishes of the territory's peoples acting with full knowledge of the change in their status, their wishes having been expressed through informed and democratic processes, impartially conducted and based on universal adult suffrage. The United Nations could, when it deems it necessary, supervise these processes.

Principle X

The transmission of information in respect of Non-Self-Governing Territories under Article 73(e) of the Charter is subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require. This means that the extent of the information may be limited in certain circumstances, but the limitation in Article 73(e) cannot relieve a Member State of the obligations of Chapter IX. The 'limitations' can relate only to the quantum of information of economic, social and educational nature to be transmitted.

Principle XI

The only constitutional considerations to which Article 73(e) of the Charter refers are those arising from constitutional relations of the territory with the Administering Member. They refer to a situation in which the constitution of the territory gives it self-government in economic, social and educational matters through freely elected institutions. Nevertheless, the responsibility for transmitting information under Article 73(e) continues, unless these constitutional relations preclude the Government or Parliament of the Administering Member from receiving statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social and educational conditions in the territory.

Principle XII

Security considerations have not been invoked in the past. Only in very exceptional circumstances can information on economic, social and educational conditions have any security aspects. In other circumstances, therefore, there should be no necessity to limit the transmission of information on security grounds.

Appendix ii

Annex D to Report of Windward Islands Constitutional
Conference, May 6, 1966
Heads of Agreement on Defence and External Affairs

General

1. There will be a preamble referring to the provisions of the Order in Council defining the responsibilities of the United Kingdom Government for defence and external affairs and the powers of the United Kingdom Parliament and Her Majesty in Council to legislate for the Territory.
2. This agreement will have effect as long as the association between the United Kingdom and the Territory lasts, but will be capable of modification by mutual agreement.

Defence

3. The Government of the Territory will take all steps (including, where necessary, steps to secure the passage of legislation) to provide such facilities as may be required in the Territory or of the United Kingdom and its associated states and territories or the safety of any other part of the Commonwealth or of any of the allies of the United Kingdom.
4. The Government of the Territory will not, without the consent of the United Kingdom, grant access to any part of their Territory or territorial waters to, or allow the use of any of their airfields, communications or harbour facilities by, the forces or agents of any other Government.
5. An agreement dealing with the exercise of jurisdiction over United Kingdom visiting forces and other matters normally dealt with in status of forces agreements will be entered into at the same time as this agreement.
6. Any United Kingdom forces introduced into the Territory for defence purposes under this agreement will not be used in aid of the civil power or for any purposes other than defence purposes except at the request of the Government of the Territory and with the agreement of the United Kingdom Government. Provided that the request of the Government shall not be necessary if at any time that Government is unable, through circumstances beyond its control, to make a request.

External Affairs

7. The United Kingdom Government will consult the Government of the Territory before entering into international obligations with respect to that Territory.
8. The United Kingdom Government will from time to time by despatch define the extent to which the Government of the Territory will have authority to act in the field of external relations.

9. The Government of the Territory will take all steps (including, where necessary, steps to secure the passage of legislation) that, after full consultation between the United Kingdom Government and the Government of the Territory, are required by the United Kingdom Government:

- (a) to secure the fulfillment of the Commonwealth or international obligations or responsibilities of the United Kingdom Government; or
- (b) in the interests of good relations between the Territory or the United Kingdom and another country.

10. The Government of the Territory will not introduce or support legislation which might affect the discharge of the United Kingdom Government's Commonwealth or international obligations or responsibilities or the maintenance of good relations between the Territory or the United Kingdom and another country without prior reference to and consultation with the United Kingdom Government. The Government of the Territory will not proceed with or support legislation if the United Kingdom Government inform them that its passage would be detrimental to its discharge of those obligations or responsibilities or the maintenance of such relations.

11. (1) Where in the opinion of the United Kingdom Government the enactment of legislation for the Territory is required in the interests of the responsibility of the United Kingdom Government for the external affairs or defence of the Territory or of the United Kingdom and its other associated states and territories the United Kingdom Government shall invite the Government of the Territory either:

- (a) to signify their consent to the enactment of the legislation by the Parliament of the United Kingdom or by Her Majesty in Council; or
- (b) to take steps to secure the enactment of the legislation by the Parliament of the Territory or other appropriate authority in the Territory.

(2) If the consent of the Government of the Territory to the enactment of legislation by the Parliament of the United Kingdom or by Her Majesty in Council is signified under paragraph (1)(a) of this clause, the United Kingdom Government may take steps to secure the enactment of the legislation accordingly.

(3) If the Government of the Territory see difficulty in acceding to a request made to them by the United Kingdom Government under paragraph (1) of this clause, then the fullest consultation that is practicable in the circumstances of the case shall take place between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the Territory with a view to resolving the difficulty.

(4) Where after consultation under paragraph (3) of this clause there is failure to reach agreement concerning the enactment of legislation, and the United Kingdom Government remain of the opinion that it is nevertheless necessary for legislation to be enacted in the interests of their responsibility for the external affairs and defence of the Territory or of the United Kingdom and its other associated states and territories, the United Kingdom Government shall give as much notice as possible to the Government of the Territory of their intention to take steps to secure the enactment of the legislation by the Parliament of the United Kingdom or by Her Majesty in Council; *(and before taking such steps shall so far as is practicable afford the Government of the Territory the opportunity of considering whether, in all the circumstances, it would wish to take steps to secure the termination of the association between the United Kingdom and the Territory).

12. In order to enable the United Kingdom Government to discharge their responsibilities for defence and external affairs, the Government of the Territory will keep the United Kingdom Government fully informed on matters relating to or affecting these responsibilities of the United Kingdom Government.

Draft Despatch - Annexe E

1. In carrying out their general responsibility for the external affairs of the Territory the British Government will seek the fullest consultation with the Government of the Territory and will at all times have special regard to the interests of the Government of the Territory and of the association between the two Governments.

2. Subject to the understandings set out in later paragraphs of this despatch Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom hereby delegate executive authority to the Government of the Territory with respect to their external relations with other countries as follows:

- (a) authority to apply for full or associate membership, as may be provided for in the Constitution of the organisation concerned, of those United Nations Specialised Agencies or similar international organisations of which the United Kingdom is itself a member and for membership of which the Territory is eligible;
- (b) authority to arrange or permit visits by representative of or persons in the employ of any organisation under sub-paragraph (a) above of which the Territory is a full or associate member;

* () would not be required by the Governments of Dominica and Grenada.

- (c) authority to negotiate and conclude trade agreements with other countries, whether bilateral or multilateral, relating solely to the treatment of goods. Agreements relating to establishment matters (i.e., those affecting the rights of persons and companies of the contracting parties) will continue to be dealt with in commercial treaties negotiated by the British Government. The British Government will, however, be prepared, in appropriate circumstances, to delegate to the Government of the Territory ad hoc authority to conclude individual trade agreements in which establishment matters are included. Agreements affecting the Territory relating to civil aviation and shipping will continue to be dealt with in accordance with present practice whereby the British Government engage in the fullest consultation with the Government of the Territory and invite their participation in such negotiations as are necessary;
- (d) authority to arrange or permit visits of up to thirty days for trade or commercial purposes by representative or residents of the Territory to any other country, and by representatives or residents of any other country to the Territory (though questions relating to the establishment of permanent or temporary representation of other countries in the Territory or of the Territory in other countries will continue to be determined by the British Government after consultation with the Government of the Territory);
- (e) authority to negotiate and sign agreements of purely local concern with any member of the British Commonwealth or any British Colony in the Caribbean area;
- (f) authority to negotiate and sign agreements for financial and technical assistance or of a cultural or scientific nature with any member of the British Commonwealth or with the United States of America or with any international organisation of which the United Kingdom is a member;
- (g) authority to negotiate and sign agreements with other countries, whether multilateral or bilateral relating to emigration from the Territory to those countries and to emigrant labour schemes.

3. In addition the British Government will give sympathetic consideration to any request by the Government of the Territory for authority to take action on individual questions of external relations not covered by this despatch.

4. In view of the general responsibility of the British Government for the external affairs of the Territory under the terms of the association mutually agreed between them the Government of the Territory have agreed to inform the British Government in advance of any proposal for the exercise of the authority to conduct negotiations delegated to the

Government of the Territory in paragraph 2(c), (e), (f) and (g) of this despatch and to keep the British Government informed of the progress of any such negotiations. The British Government will inform the Government of the Territory if it shall appear that there is any conflict between the actions or proposals of the Government of the Territory in this field and the international commitments, responsibilities or policies of the British Government. The Government of the Territory have agreed that after consultation they will accept the decision of Her Majesty's Government in such matters.

West Indies Act 1967, Schedule 2, Section 10
Procedure for Terminating Status of Association

1. (1) The provisions of this Schedule shall have effect in relation to any associated state (in this Schedule referred to as "the state") with respect to the making by the legislature of the state (in this Schedule referred to as "the legislature") of any such law as is mentioned in section 10(1) of this Act.

(2) In this Schedule "the Bill" means the Bill introduced in the legislature for the making of that law; any reference to the second reading of the Bill in the legislature, or in a House of the legislature, is a reference to the stage of the Bill in the legislature, or in that House, as the case may be, which, whether called second reading or by any other name, is (disregarding any minor differences) analogous to the second reading of a Bill in the House of Commons of the Parliament of the United Kingdom; and any reference to the third reading of the Bill shall be construed in a corresponding way.

(3) In this Schedule "referendum" means a referendum on which all persons who, at the time when the referendum is held, would be entitled to vote at an election of members of the legislature (or if the legislature consists of two Houses, would be entitled to vote at an election of members of the lower House), but no other persons, will be entitled to vote.

2. Subject to the following provisions of this Schedule:

- (a) there must be an interval of not less than ninety days between the introduction of the Bill and the beginning of the proceedings in the legislature on second reading of the Bill.
- (b) on the third reading of the Bill in the legislature, the Bill must be supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds of all the elected members of the legislature;
- (c) if approved on third reading in the legislature, the Bill must be submitted to a referendum and must not be submitted to the Governor of the state for his assent unless not less than two-thirds of the votes validly cast on that referendum are cast in support of the Bill.

3. (1) If the legislature consists of two Houses (by whatever name called) the following provisions of this paragraph shall have effect instead of the provisions of paragraph 2 of this Schedule.

(2) There must be an interval of not less than ninety days between the introduction of the Bill in the lower House and the beginning of the proceedings on second reading of the Bill in that House.

(3) On the third reading of the Bill in that House, the Bill must be supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds of all the elected members of that House.

(4) If the Bill is passed by the upper House with amendments, any agreement by the lower House to those amendments must be supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds of all the elected members of that House.

(5) If the Bill, having been passed by the lower House, is passed by the upper House in the same Session either without amendment or with amendments which are agreed to by the lower House in accordance with the last preceding sub-paragraph, the Bill must be submitted to a referendum, and must not be submitted to the Governor of the state for his assent unless not less than two-thirds of the votes validly cast on that referendum are cast in support of the Bill.

(6) If in one Session the Bill is passed by the lower House in accordance with sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) of this paragraph, and either it is not passed by the upper House or it is passed by the upper House with amendments which are not agreed to by the lower House in accordance with sub-paragraph (4) of this paragraph, and in the next Session the Bill is again passed by the lower House in accordance with sub-paragraphs (2) and (3) of this paragraph, there must be an interval of not less than six months between the passage of the Bill by the lower House in the first of those Sessions and its passage by the lower House in the second of them.

(7) If, in the circumstances specified in the last preceding sub-paragraph, the Bill in the second of the two Sessions is sent to the upper House without amendment, but with suggestions for amending it, those suggested amendments must be supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds of all the elected members of the lower House.

(8) Sub-paragraph (5) of this paragraph shall have effect in relation to the passage of the Bill in the second of those Sessions as it has effect in relation to the passage of the Bill in the Session in which it is first introduced.

(9) If in the second of those Sessions the Bill either is not passed by the upper House, or is passed by the upper House with amendments which are neither amendments suggested by the lower House in accordance with sub-paragraph (7) of this paragraph nor amendments which are agreed to by the lower House in accordance with sub-paragraph (4) of this paragraph, the Bill must be submitted to a referendum, and must not be submitted to the Governor of the state for his assent unless not less than two-thirds of the votes validly cast on that referendum are cast in support of the Bill.

(10) Except in the circumstances specified in the last preceding sub-paragraph, the Bill must not be submitted to a referendum or submitted to the Governor of the State for his assent unless it has been passed by both Houses of the legislature in accordance with the preceding provisions of this paragraph.

4. (1) The provisions of this paragraph shall have effect where, before the introduction of the Bill, arrangements have been made between the Government of the state and the Government of a territory to which this paragraph applied whereby, immediately after the termination of the status of association of the state with the United Kingdom:

- (a) the state will enter into a federation or union or some other form of association with that territory (with or without other territories); and
- (b) the Government resulting from that federation, union or other form of association, or the Government of that territory, will be responsible for the defence and external affairs of the state,

and the Bill refers to those arrangements and make provision for giving effect to them on the part of the state.

(2) This paragraph applies to any territory which:

- (a) lies between the equator and the 20th parallel of north latitude and between longitude 50 degrees west and longitude 90 degrees west; and
- (b) at the time when the arrangements in question are made in a territory within the Commonwealth for whose government Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have not responsibility.

(3) In the circumstances specified in sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph, the Bill may be submitted to the Governor for his assent without a referendum and accordingly paragraph 2(c) or (as the case may be) sub-paragraphs (5) and (9) of paragraph 3 of this Schedule shall not apply.

Appendix iv

The Grenada Declaration, 1971

ACKNOWLEDGING it to be the inescapable destiny of the peoples of the West Indies to be bound together in Nationhood;

MINDFUL of the lessons of past efforts in the cause of West Indian Unity.;

CONSCIOUS of the urgent need to end all forms of colonialism in the Caribbean and to secure the effective independence of its peoples;

BELIEVING that the aspirations of the peoples of the West Indies for political freedom and social and economic justice can best be fulfilled through the creation of a West Indian Nation;

DESIRING that in the creation of the Nation the peoples of the West Indies shall be fully involved;

ACCEPTING it to be the responsibility of those who hold these truths to be fundamental to act now in their fulfillment and in so doing to create a West Indian Nation of which all the peoples of the West Indies may one day be a part;

The representatives of the people of Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent assembled at Grenada this 25th day of July, 1971, hereby declare it to be their intention to seek to establish out of their Territories a new State in the Caribbean and to this end to proceed as follows:

- (a) A Preparatory Commission will be set up by November 30, 1971, to prepare for the establishment of a new State. The Preparatory Commission will, if possible, be established within the Commonwealth Caribbean Regional Secretariat under a budget to be separately provided by the Participating Territories.
- (b) The Preparatory Commission will be headed by a Chairman, to be selected by agreement between the Heads of Government of the Participating Territories, who will have responsibility for recruiting all necessary personnel within the ambit of the Commission's budget.
- (c) In addition to the Chairman, the Preparatory Commission will comprise members drawn from the Participating Territories nominated by the respective Governments after consultation with the Chairman.
- (d) As far as practicable, Members of the Preparatory Commission will function as technocrats exercising specific responsibilities during the life of the Commission.

- (e) Questions of policy affecting the work of the Preparatory Commission will be referred by the Commission for decision by a Council of Ministers of the Participating Territories that will meet periodically for this purpose. The Council will comprise one Minister from each of the Participating Territories designated for this purpose by the Government of that Territory.
- (f) A Constituent Assembly will be established by January 1, 1972, comprising not less than one and not more than three members from each Participating Territory nominated by the Government of that Territory. The Constituent Assembly will have a limited existence of not more than 16 months (ending April 30, 1973) and will be responsible for drafting the Constitution of the new State.
- (g) The Constituent Assembly will be serviced by the Preparatory Commission and will rotate its sessions throughout all the Participating Territories holding at least one public session in each Territory. In the organisation of its work the Constituent Assembly will ensure the fullest participation of the people of the Region in the formulation of the National Constitution.
- (h) It will be the aim of the Constituent Assembly to complete the draft Constitution by December 31, 1972. It will be the aim of Participating Territories to secure the necessary Parliamentary approval for the establishment of the new State and to take by March 31, 1973 the necessary constitutional steps (See (i) below) to provide for its establishment.
- (i) The new Constitution will be promulgated on April 22m 1973, and elections will be held throughout the State by June 30, 1973 - assuming this to be the arrangement for assembling the first Government of the State provided for in the Constitution.
- (j) During the life of the Constituent Assembly the Governments of the Participating Territories will endeavour to coordinate their policies and programmes over as wide a field as possible, but more especially in relation to their dealings with the outside world; and it will be a particular function of the Preparatory Commission to secure such coordination.
- (k) During the life of the Constituent Assembly, Participating Territories will determine the nature of such changes as they may wish to make in their territorial Constitutions - taking account of the work of the Constituent Assembly.
- (l) If, in the light of the Report of the Constituent Assembly Parliamentary approval is secured for the establishment of the new State, the Participating Associated States will, by legislation enacted pursuant to Section 10 and the Second Schedule to the West Indies Act, 1967, terminate their status of association with the United Kingdom as from April 22, 1973, and amend their Constitutions to give effect agreed upon by the Constituent Assembly for their

association with the other Participating Territories in the new State, and the Independent States, by constitutional amendment will likewise provide for their association with the other Participating Territories in the new State.

- (m) Both the legislation to be enacted by the Associated States and the Constitutional amendments to be made by the Independent States will empower the Constituent Assembly to promulgate the Constitution of the new State.
- (n) With a view to enabling other Member States of the Conference of Heads of Government of the Commonwealth Caribbean Countries to participate in this Declaration and in the action to be taken under it, this Declaration will be published simultaneously in the Capitals of all Participating Territories on, and not before, November 1, 1971. Prior to such publication and at the earliest opportunity the Secretary-General of the Commonwealth Caribbean Regional Secretariat will bring this Declaration to the notice of the Heads of Government of such other Member States and convey to them the sentiment of the West Indian fraternity that underlies the Declaration and the invitation which the Declaration extends for their participation in it.

MADE AT GRAND ANSE, GRENADA, THIS 25TH DAY OF JULY, 1971, ON BEHALF OF:

The Government of Dominica

.....
Hon. E.O. Le Blanc
Premier

The Government of Grenada

.....
Hon. E.M. Gairy
Premier

The Government of Guyana

.....
Hon. L.F.S. Burnham
Prime Minister

The Government of St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla

.....
Hon. P.L. Bradshaw
Premier

The Government of St. Lucia

.....
Hon. J.G.M. Compton
Premier

The Government of St. Vincent

.....
Hon. R.M. Cato
Premier

MADE ALSO AT THIS DAY OF , 1971,
ON BEHALF OF:

List of Persons Signing Statement
"Towards an Eastern Caribbean Federation",
June 10-11, 1972

GASTON BENJAMIN (Trinidad and Tobago), Secretary of the Caribbean Congress of Labour.

FREDERICK LLOYD COZIER (Barbados), former Secretary General of the Commonwealth Caribbean Secretariat.

SURENDRANATH NORMAN GIRWAR (Trinidad and Tobago), Solicitor, First Vice-President of the Caribbean Cane Farmers Association.

REV. GEORGE ANDREW HATCH (Barbados), Director of the Caribbean Community Appeal.

RICHARD ALEXANDER ISHMAEL (Guyana), Principal, Indian Education Trust College, and President of the Caribbean Congress of Labour.

SIR ARTHUR LEWIS (St. Lucia), President of the Caribbean Development Bank, and Chancellor of the University of Guyana.

CLAUDE LLOYD LUCKHOO, S.C., (Guyana), Barrister-at-Law.

Mrs. THERESE MILLS (Trinidad and Tobago), Journalist.

Mrs. ELSIE PAYNE (Barbados) Headmistress.

J. MAURICE QUESNEL (Trinidad and Tobago), Managing Director of Canning and Co., Ltd.

EUGENE WALWYN (St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla), Barrister-at-Law, former Attorney General.

Dr. FRANK WILLIAMS (Guyana), Physician.

Sir HUGH WOODING (Trinidad and Tobago), Chancellor of the University of the West Indies, and former Chief Justice of Trinidad and Tobago.

Sir FRED PHILLIPS (St. Vincent), Barrister-at-Law had intended to be in Tobago but was unavoidably prevented. He has since signified his concurrence.

Declaration of St. George's, 1979

Recognising with satisfaction that since popular Governments in Dominica, Grenada and St. Lucia have taken office, the friendly relations between the three Governments and the people of the three countries have developed greatly on a new basis.

Confirming that the following Declaration constitutes the basis of the relations of peace, friendship and cooperation between the three countries and that the principles enunciated in the Declaration should be strictly observed.

Reaffirming that the principles of the Treaty of Chaguaramas, the Charter of the Organisation of American States and the Charter of the United Nations should be fully respected.

Hoping to contribute to peace, development, friendship and regional solidarity,

The Governments of Grenada, Dominica and St. Lucia, meeting in St. George's, Grenada between the 13th and 16th July, 1979,

Have declared as follows:

- (1) The Governments of Dominica, Grenada and St. Lucia shall develop relations of perpetual peace and friendship among their three countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and regional solidarity.
- (2) The three Governments shall, in the good neighbourly and friendly spirit and in conformity with the principles of equality and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, endeavour to further develop economic, trade and cultural relations among their three countries and to promote exchanges between the people of the three countries.
- (3) The three Governments are aware that the people of their respective countries have placed them in office so that important Caribbean questions touching on the livelihood of the people may be looked at in a new perspective.
- (4) The three Governments also recognise that popular democracy, respect for the rights of workers and social and economic justice for the masses must be the main objectives of their Governments.
- (5) Any new Caribbean Organisation must provide for and ensure maximum participation by the masses in the region.

- (6) The need for closer cooperation is recognised and in this respect arrangements should be made for more frequent consultation at the highest level and exchange of information to the mutual benefit of our countries.
- (7) The Governments are not opposed in principle to the establishment of a regional military force provided its operations will be limited to the countering of external aggression, including the threat of invasion by mercenaries.
- (8) The proposed Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States shall be brought into existence only after the widest possible consultation of and participation by the people of the three countries.
- (9) the three Governments endorse an independent and non-aligned approach to foreign policy relations with all countries. The Governments also condemn any attempts at destabilising governments of the region by means of propaganda destabilisation, economic destabilisation or violent destabilisation. The Governments particularly emphasise that the people of the Caribbean have a sovereign right to develop their countries in their own way and free from outside interference.
- (10) The Governments oppose imperialism in all its forms, particularly the domination and oppression of developing countries by big multinational corporations and their Governments.
- (11) The Governments strongly oppose all traces of colonialism in the region and internationally, and unequivocally support the right of all peoples to self-determination and national independence. In this regard, the Governments particularly express their support for the granting of unconditional independence to Belize and reject the claim by Guatemala to ownership of part of the territory of Belize.
- (12) The Governments also express their fullest support of and solidarity with the National Liberation Movements in Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa and Nicaragua.
- (13) The Governments reconfirm their commitment to the principles of Caribbean integration, cooperation and unity. In this regard, the decision in principle to allow entry by Caribbean nationals into their respective territories without the need for passports was taken. The Governments also announce that they have already removed the bans imposed by the previous regimes on progressive persons in the region.
- (14) The Governments support the holding of, and urgently call for a CARICOM Heads of Government Conference to be held later this year.
- (15) The Governments affirm that the Caribbean area is an entity regardless of language differences, economic differences, separation by sea or other such considerations. The Governments therefore emphasise the need for developing the closest possible relations between the islands and countries in the Caribbean regardless of whether they are English, Dutch, Spanish or French speaking.

- (16) The Governments agree to organise the exchange of all information on oil exploration and the law of the sea and to develop energy policies, including appropriate legislation for the three states.
- (17) The Governments support the position of those countries calling for the creation of an international body to explore the resources of the deep sea for the mutual benefit of all countries as opposed to their exploitation by Multinational Corporations for the benefit of a small minority and support the call by the third world for a New International Economic Order.
- (18) The Governments identify themselves with the movement in support of disarmament and an end to the arms race and regret the wasteful expenditure of funds in this regard. It is felt that these funds could best be used to aid developing countries. The Governments further identify themselves with the struggle for world peace and the settling of disputes by peaceful means. In particular, the Governments condemn the use or the threat of force by some countries as a means of bullying other countries.
- (19) And to assist in the achievement of the above objectives, the three Governments hereby establish a Consultative Commission of Ministers to coordinate the implementation of the decisions of this Mini-Summit and to communicate such decisions to other governments of the Caribbean.
- (20) The Governments also establish a Technical Commission of experts to examine, evaluate and make recommendations on all technical matters related to the strengthening of trade, agricultural, agro-industrial and other economic and technical cooperation among our three countries, among the CARICOM LDCs and within CARICOM generally.

DECLARED THIS 16th day of July, 1979 at St. George's, Grenada.

.....
For the Government of Dominica

.....
For the Government of Grenada

.....
For the Government of St. Lucia

Appendix vii

List of Independent Mini-States

Name	Size Sq.ml	Population (1980)	Year of Independence	Year of UN Membership
Bahamas	5,380	233,000	1973	1973
Barbados	166	275,000	1966	1966
Cape Verde	1,557	332,000	1975	1975
Comoros	693	327,000	1975	1975
Dominica	290.5	78,000	1978	1978
Grenada	133	108,000	1974	1974
Kiribati	264	52,000	1979	-
Maldives Islands	115	152,000	1965	1965
Nauru	8.2	8,000	1968	-
St. Lucia	238	122,000	1979	1979
St. Vincent	150	114,000	1979	1980
Sao Tome & Principe	372	83,000	1975	1975
Seychelles	110	65,000	1976	1976
Solomon Islands	11,015	222,000	1978	1978
Tonga	189	72,000	1970	-
Tuvalu	10	6,000	1978	-
Vanuatu	5,700	105,000	1980	1981
Western Samoa	1,097	155,000	1962	1976

Source: Encyclopedia of the Third World, N.Y: 1982.

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B. The following publications were consulted extensively for the period 1965-1985, where appropriate.

(i) Official Reports

- Official Reports of the United Nations General Assembly, particularly reports of the Special Committee on Decolonisation and its Sub-Committee III on the Caribbean.
- Unpublished and published reports of the Caribbean Community Secretariat and the ECCM Secretariat.
- Unpublished and published reports of the World Bank on the Caribbean, particularly the Leeward and Windward Islands.
- ECLA reports on the Regional Integration Movement.
- Reports of the Institute for Latin American Integration.
- Annual Reports of the Caribbean Development Bank.
- Annual Reports of the Caribbean Investment Corporation.
- Reports of the British Development Division.
- Unpublished and published reports on Caribbean technical cooperation programmes of United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the European Economic Community (EEC).

(ii) Journals and Newspapers

- Caribbean Contact.
- Newspapers of various Caribbean countries.
- Latin American Economic Report.
- Social and Economic Studies (ISER, UWI).
- Bulletin on Eastern Caribbean Affairs (ISER, UWI).
- West Indies Chronicle.
- Caribbean Quarterly.
- Caribbean Studies.